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RPKI Time-of-Flight: Tracking Delays in the Management, Control, and Data Planes

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RPKI Time-of-Flight: Tracking Delays in the Management, Control, and Data Planes

See the complete report here: Fontugne et al. PAM'23

Summary

Route Origin Validation (ROV) has recently received more attention from network operators. Overall ROV is a fairly complex process that involves, RPKI data from the five RIRs, open source software for fetching and validating data, and the various router software that implement the actual route origin validation functionality. This is currently in deployment on the Internet but many questions are left unanswered about the interactions of the different pieces involved in the ROV process.

One wonders how long it takes for the effect of RPKI changes to appear in the data plane. Does an operator that adds, fixes, or removes a Route Origin Authoriza- tion (ROA) have time to brew coffee or rather enjoy a long meal before the Internet routing infrastructure integrates the new information and the operator can assess the changes and resume work? The chain of ROA publication, from creation at Certification Authorities all the way to the routers and the effect on the data plane involves a large number of players, is not instantaneous, and is often dominated by ad hoc ad- ministrative decisions.

This is the first comprehensive study to measure the entire ecosystem of ROA manipulation by all five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), propagation on the management plane to Relying Par- ties (RPs) and to routers; measure the effect on BGP as seen by global control plane monitors; and finally, measure the effects on data plane latency and reachability. We found that RIRs usually publish new RPKI information within five minutes, except APNIC which averages ten min- utes slower. At least one national CA is said to publish daily. We observe significant disparities in ISPs’ reaction time to new RPKI information, ranging from a few minutes to one hour. The delay for ROA deletion is significantly longer than for ROA creation as RPs and BGP strive to maintain reachability. Incidentally, we found and reported significant issues in the management plane of two RIRs and a Tier1 network.

Experiments

We deploy experimental prefixes on the Internet and measure the management plane latency from ROA creation and subsequent publication by the RIRs to receipt by the routers, and then the resulting effects on the BGP control plane using RIPE RIS data. We also measure some of the results on the data plane using RIPE Atlas traceroutes; showing topological effects of ROAs, BGP path hunting, and latency shifts.

First experiment

To better understand the challenges affecting ROA propagation and the impact on BGP, and to have a global understanding, we generate ROAs for multiple prefixes at the different RIRs. The following experimental resources have been obtained from the five RIRs:

RIR type IPv4 IPv6
AFRINIC control 102.218.96.0/24 2001:43f8:df0::/48
AFRINIC test 102.218.97.0/24 2001:43f8:df1::/48
APNIC control 103.171.218.0/24 2001:DF7:5380::/48
APNIC test 103.171.219.0/24 2001:DF7:5381::/48
ARIN control 165.140.104.0/24 2620:9E:6000::/48
ARIN test 165.140.105.0/24 2620:9E:6001::/48
LACNIC control 201.219.252.0/24 2801:1e:1800::/48
LACNIC test 201.219.253.0/24 2801:1e:1801::/48
RIPE control 151.216.4.0/24 2001:7fc:2::/48
RIPE test 151.216.5.0/24 2001:7fc:3::/48

The control prefixes are expected to be always reachable, with an always valid RPKI status. For the test prefixes, the BGP announcements do not change, but we periodically add and remove a ROA to alternatively validate and invalidate the origin AS of the test prefixes’ in BGP. These resources have be announced by an AS number used for research purposes (AS3970).

Second experiment

For the second experiment (§5.1), we used three /24 prefixes from 151.216.32.0/21 and announced them from three diverse networks, including an IXP and a national ISP with 149 peer ASes. The three prefixes are used as test prefixes, meaning that we daily alternate the ROA status for all of them.

Data

The above experiments have been monitored in the management (RPKI), control (BGP), and data (traceroute) planes.

RPKI

The time of our ROA creation/deletion requests to RIRs is available here: data/

The ROA and CRL files produced by RIRs are available at RPKIviews

BGP

The BGP data is available in RIPE RIS and Routeviews.

Traceroute

For the data plane, we performed traceroutes every 15 minutes from RIPE Atlas with probes in 6 different ASes. The data is available via Atlas's API:

Atlas measurement ID target RIR type
40388150 103.171.218.1 APNIC control
40388151 103.171.219.1 APNIC test
40388152 2001:DF7:5380::1 APNIC control
40388153 2001:DF7:5381::1 APNIC test
40388154 151.216.4.1 RIPE control
40388155 151.216.5.1 RIPE test
40388156 2001:7fc:2::1 RIPE control
40388157 2001:7fc:3::1 RIPE test
40388158 102.218.96.1 AFRINIC control
40388159 102.218.97.1 AFRINIC test
40388160 2001:43f8:df0::1 AFRINIC control
40388161 2001:43f8:df1::1 AFRINIC test
40388162 165.140.104.1 ARIN control
40388163 165.140.105.1 ARIN test
40388164 2620:9E:6000::1 ARIN control
40388165 2620:9E:6001::1 ARIN test
40388166 201.219.252.1 LACNIC control
40388167 201.219.253.1 LACNIC test
40388168 2801:1e:1800::1 LACNIC control
40388169 2801:1e:1801::1 LACNIC test

Source code

The source code used for these experiments is available in the code and historical-analysis directories.

Inquiries

For any inquiries please contact: [email protected], [email protected], & [email protected]

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