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title: Bolenz & Pachur (2023) | ||
subtitle: 'Older adults select different but not simpler strategies than younger adults in risky choice' | ||
date: 2023/08/15 | ||
authors: | ||
- Bolenz, Florian | ||
- Pachur, Thorsten | ||
journal: 'OSF Preprints' | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/9vhy8 | ||
data_url: https://osf.io/4sqcj/ | ||
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Younger and older adults differ in their risky choices. Theoretical frameworks on human aging point to various cognitive and motivational factors that might underlie these differences. Using a novel computational model based on resource rationality, we find that the two age groups select qualitatively different strategies. Importantly, older adults did not use simpler strategies than younger adults, they did not select among fewer strategies, they did not make more errors, and they did not put more weight on cognitive costs. Instead, older adults selected strategies that had different risk propensities than those selected by younger adults. Our modeling approach suggests that rather than being a consequence of cognitive decline, age differences in risky choice seem to mainly reflect motivational differences between age groups. |
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title: Brooks & Sokol-Hessner (2023) | ||
subtitle: 'Cognitive strategy use selectively changes temporal context effects in risky monetary decision-making' | ||
date: 2023/07/22 | ||
authors: | ||
- Brooks, Hayley R | ||
- Sokol-Hessner, Peter | ||
journal: PsyArXiv | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/m7pg4 | ||
data_url: https://osf.io/2wb5z/ | ||
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Some of the most influential modern theories of risky monetary decision-making assume that choices result from stable, trait-like preferences, invariant to contextual influences such as recent events. Recent research has challenged this assumption, demonstrating that even when values and probabilities are explicit and known, decisions under risk are contextually sensitive, affected by recent events on multiple timescales, including immediate (previous monetary outcomes), neighborhood (recently encountered values), and global (cumulative earnings relative to dynamic expectations) events. Such temporal context-dependencies are perplexing, because relying on recent events at any timescale is inconsistent with the assumed goal of risky monetary decision-making: to maximize payoff. Identifying this suboptimal behavioral pattern raises the possibility it can be mitigated using behavioral change strategies. We tested whether the effects of temporal context in risk-taking can be attenuated with an intentional cognitive strategy. 124 participants completed two rounds of a contextually structured gambling task with trial-by-trial feedback, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, and working memory capacity tasks. Participants were randomly assigned to complete each gambling round with a strategy either emphasizing a natural, uncontrolled decision-making approach or directly instructing participants to ignore context. Instructions to ignore context influenced temporal context effects on the immediate timescale but did not change those on the neighborhood or global timescales. The strategy was not uniformly effective for all individuals. The cognitive strategy eliminated (and even reversed) contextual effects on the immediate timescale for individuals with moderate and high habitual use of reappraisal. However, the cognitive strategy paradoxically strengthened contextual effects on the immediate timescale for individuals with low habitual use of reappraisal. The selective effects of strategic control on contextual influence indicates both intriguing possibilities and limits on the ability to optimize human decision-making, and suggests that people do not simply maximize local utility, but rather that even simple risky decision-making may be fundamentally goal-dependent. |
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title: Burton et al. (2022) | ||
subtitle: 'Optimism where there is none: Asymmetric belief updating observed with valence-neutral life events' | ||
date: 2022/01/01 | ||
authors: | ||
- Burton, Jason W | ||
- Harris, Adam J L | ||
- Shah, Punit | ||
- Hahn, Ulrike | ||
journal: Cognition | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104939 | ||
data_url: https://osf.io/8q74m/?view_only=9ea1dcb105164bda9f35228b3bb3495c | ||
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How people update their beliefs when faced with new information is integral to everyday life. A sizeable body of literature suggests that people's belief updating is optimistically biased, such that their beliefs are updated more in response to good news than bad news. However, recent research demonstrates that findings previously interpreted as evidence of optimistic belief updating may be the result of flaws in experimental design, rather than motivated reasoning. In light of this controversy, we conduct three pre-registered variations of the standard belief updating paradigm (combined N = 300) in which we test for asymmetric belief updating with neutral, non-valenced stimuli using analytic approaches found in previous research. We find evidence of seemingly biased belief updating with neutral stimuli - results that cannot be attributed to a motivational, valence-based, optimism account - and further show that there is uninterpretable variability across samples and analytic techniques. Jointly, these results serve to highlight the methodological flaws in current optimistic belief updating research. |
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title: del-Rio et al. (2023) | ||
subtitle: 'Perceptual confirmation bias and decision bias underlie adaptation to sequential regularities' | ||
date: 2023/07/30 | ||
authors: | ||
- del Rio, Magdalena | ||
- de Lange, Floris | ||
- Fritsche, Matthias | ||
- Ward, Jamie | ||
journal: PsyArXiv | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ak4b7 | ||
data_url: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/9K2TP | ||
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Our perception does not depend exclusively on the immediate sensory input. It is also influenced by our internal predictions derived from prior observations and the temporal regularities of the environment, which can result in choice history biases. However, the mechanisms facilitating this flexible use of prior information to predict the future are unclear. Prior information may offset evidence accumulation independently of the current sensory input, or it may modulate the weight of current sensory input based on its consistency with the expectation. To address this question, we used a visual decision-making task and manipulated the transitional probabilities between successive noisy grating stimuli. Using a reverse correlation analysis, we evaluated the contribution of stimulus-independent bias and stimulus-dependent sensitivity modulations to choice history biases. We found that both mechanisms coexist, whereby there was increased bias to respond in line with the predicted orientation alongside modulations in perceptual sensitivity to favour perceptual information consistent with the prediction, akin to selective attention. Furthermore, at the individual differences level, we investigated the relationship between autistic-like traits and the adaptation of choice history biases to the sequential statistics of the environment. Over two studies, we found no convincing evidence of reduced adaptation to sequential regularities in individuals with high autistic-like traits. In sum, we present robust evidence for both perceptual confirmation bias and decision bias supporting adaptation to sequential regularities in the environment. |
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title: Garrett & Sharot (2023) | ||
subtitle: 'There is no belief update bias for neutral events: failure to replicate Burton et al. (2022)' | ||
date: 2023/08/14 | ||
authors: | ||
- Garrett, Neil | ||
- Sharot, Tali | ||
journal: J. Cogn. Psychol. (Hove) | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2023.2245112 | ||
data_url: https://osf.io/48v6z/?view_only=a045403ebb874287bdc66a95417bb597 | ||
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In a recent paper, Burton et al. claim that individuals update beliefs to a greater extent when learning an event is less likely compared to more likely than expected. Here, we investigate Burton’s et al.’s, findings. First, we show how Burton et al.’s data do not in fact support a belief update bias for neutral events. Next, in an attempt to replicate their findings, we collect a new data set employing the original belief update task design, but with neutral events. A belief update bias for neutral events is not observed. Finally, we highlight the statistical errors and confounds in Burton et al.’s design and analysis. This includes mis-specifying a reinforcement learning approach to model the data and failing to follow standard computational model fitting sanity checks such as parameter recovery, model comparison and out of sample prediction. Together, the results find little evidence for biased updating for neutral events.In a recent paper, Burton et al. claim that individuals update beliefs to a greater extent when learning an event is less likely compared to more likely than expected. Here, we investigate Burton’s et al.’s, findings. First, we show how Burton et al.’s data do not in fact support a belief update bias for neutral events. Next, in an attempt to replicate their findings, we collect a new data set employing the original belief update task design, but with neutral events. A belief update bias for neutral events is not observed. Finally, we highlight the statistical errors and confounds in Burton et al.’s design and analysis. This includes mis-specifying a reinforcement learning approach to model the data and failing to follow standard computational model fitting sanity checks such as parameter recovery, model comparison and out of sample prediction. Together, the results find little evidence for biased updating for neutral events. |
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title: Grill et al. (2023) | ||
subtitle: 'Development and validation of an open-access online Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT) for spider fear' | ||
date: 2023/07/26 | ||
authors: | ||
- Grill, Markus | ||
- Heller, Martin | ||
- Haberkamp, Anke | ||
journal: PsyArXiv | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/5k497 | ||
data_url: https://osf.io/y2akv/ | ||
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The Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT) for spider phobia is a widely-used diagnostic tool assessing fear by measuring avoidance behavior. However, BATs require considerable preparation and different BAT protocols across studies hamper result comparability. To address this, we have developed an open-access online BAT (vBATon). We validated its efficacy in measuring avoidance and eliciting anxiety/disgust by comparing it to a real-life BAT. Spider-fearful (N = 31) and non-fearful (N = 31) individuals completed both tests on separate dates. Both tests successfully distinguished between spider-fearful and non-fearful individuals. Crucially, equivalence tests confirmed that vBATon captures avoidance, anxiety, and disgust equal to the real-life BAT. We found moderate to high correlations between vBATon and (1) the real-life BAT and (2) self-report measurements of spider-fear. Our study suggests that vBATon is a valid, standardized, efficient and user-friendly alternative to real-life BATs for measuring spider fear in both research and clinical practice. (Access to vBATon: https://spider-phobia-research.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/vbaton_pub/) |
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title: Ivanov et al. (2023) | ||
subtitle: 'Reliability of individual differences in distractor suppression driven by statistical learning' | ||
date: 2023/07/25 | ||
authors: | ||
- Ivanov, Yavor | ||
- Theeuwes, Jan | ||
- Bogaerts, Louisa | ||
journal: Behav. Res. Methods | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-023-02157-7 | ||
data_url: https://osf.io/stvpf/?view_only=31c7881b3f534686ac3589504812f057 | ||
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A series of recent studies has demonstrated that attentional selection is modulated by statistical regularities, even when they concern task-irrelevant stimuli. Irrelevant distractors presented more frequently at one location interfere less with search than distractors presented elsewhere. To account for this finding, it has been proposed that through statistical learning, the frequent distractor location becomes suppressed relative to the other locations. Learned distractor suppression has mainly been studied at the group level, where individual differences are treated as unexplained error variance. Yet these individual differences may provide important mechanistic insights and could be predictive of cognitive and real-life outcomes. In the current study, we ask whether in an additional singleton task, the standard measures of attentional capture and learned suppression are reliable and stable at the level of the individual. In an online study, we assessed both the within- and between-session reliability of individual-level measures of attentional capture and learned suppression. We show that the measures of attentional capture, but not of distractor suppression, are moderately stable within the same session (i.e., split-half reliability). Test-retest reliability over a 2-month period was found to be moderate for attentional capture but weak or absent for suppression. RT-based measures proved to be superior to accuracy measures. While producing very robust findings at the group level, the predictive validity of these RT-based measures is still limited when it comes to individual-level performance. We discuss the implications for future research drawing on inter-individual variation in the attentional biases that result from statistical learning. |
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title: Jenkins et al. (2023) | ||
subtitle: 'Assessing processing-based measures of implicit statistical learning' | ||
date: 2023/08/03 | ||
authors: | ||
- Jenkins, Holly Elizabeth | ||
- Leung, Phyllis | ||
- Smith, Faye | ||
- Riches, Nicholas Greatorex | ||
- Wilson, Ben | ||
journal: PsyArXiv | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/baupz | ||
data_url: https://osf.io/detp3/ | ||
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Implicit statistical learning, whereby predictable relationships between stimuli are detected without conscious awareness, is important for language acquisition. However, while this process is putatively implicit, it is often assessed using measures that require explicit reflection and conscious decision making. Here, we conducted three experiments combining an artificial grammar learning paradigm with a serial reaction time (SRT-AGL) task, to measure statistical learning of adjacent and nonadjacent dependencies implicitly, without conscious decision making. Participants viewed an array of six visual stimuli and were presented with a sequence of three auditory (nonsense words, Expt. 1; names of familiar objects, Expt. 2) or visual (abstract shapes, Expt. 3) cues and were asked to click on the corresponding visual stimulus as quickly as possible. In each experiment, the final stimulus in the sequence was predictable based on items earlier in the sequence. Faster responses to this predictable final stimulus compared to unpredictable stimuli would provide evidence of implicit statistical learning, without requiring explicit decision making or conscious reflection. Despite previous positive results (Misyak et al., 2009), we saw little evidence of implicit statistical learning in any of the experiments, suggesting that in this case, these SRT-AGL tasks were not an effective measure implicit statistical learning. |
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title: Lin & von-Helversen (2023) | ||
subtitle: 'Never gonna Give you up even when it is suboptimal' | ||
date: 2023/07/01 | ||
authors: | ||
- Lin, Hsuan-Yu | ||
- von Helversen, Bettina | ||
journal: Cogn. Sci. | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13323 | ||
data_url: https://osf.io/zq2sv/?view_only=e955aa7761c94feb823113dc20e4df4f | ||
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Previous research showed that animals adopt different foraging strategies in different environment settings. However, research on whether humans adapt their foraging strategies to the foraging environment has shown little evidence of a change in strategies. This study aims to investigate whether humans will adapt their foraging strategies when performance differences between strategies are large and why participants may fixate on a single strategy. We conducted two foraging experiments and identified the strategies used by the participants. Most participants used the Give-Up Time (GUT) strategy regardless of the environment they encountered. GUT was used even in environments where other strategies such as the Fixed-Time strategy or the Fixed-Number strategy performed better. Using computer simulations, we further examined the conditions under which the GUT strategy will perform well compared to the other strategies. We found that even though the GUT strategy is not always the best strategy, it performs consistently on a satisfactory level and had an advantage when variance in the quality of patches was introduced. The consistently good performance of the GUT strategy could thus explain participants' lack of strategy switching. |
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title: Nussenbaum et al. (2023) | ||
subtitle: 'Novelty and uncertainty differentially drive exploration across development' | ||
date: 2023/08/16 | ||
authors: | ||
- Nussenbaum, Kate | ||
- Martin, Rebecca E | ||
- Maulhardt, Sean | ||
- Yang, Yi Jen | ||
- Bizzell-Hatcher, Greer | ||
- Bhatt, Naiti S | ||
- Koenig, Maximilian | ||
- Rosenbaum, Gail M | ||
- O'Doherty, John P | ||
- Cockburn, Jeffrey | ||
- Hartley, Catherine A | ||
journal: Elife | ||
paper_url: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.84260 | ||
data_url: https://osf.io/cwf2k/ | ||
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Across the lifespan, individuals frequently choose between exploiting known rewarding options or exploring unknown alternatives. A large body of work has suggested that children may explore more than adults. However, because novelty and reward uncertainty are often correlated, it is unclear how they differentially influence decision-making across development. Here, children, adolescents, and adults (ages 8-27 years, N = 122) completed an adapted version of a recently developed value-guided decision-making task that decouples novelty and uncertainty. In line with prior studies, we found that exploration decreased with increasing age. Critically, participants of all ages demonstrated a similar bias to select choice options with greater novelty, whereas aversion to reward uncertainty increased into adulthood. Computational modeling of participant choices revealed that whereas adolescents and adults demonstrated attenuated uncertainty aversion for more novel choice options, children's choices were not influenced by reward uncertainty. |
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