Cu 86c0zjv0u add climate mediator package to platform #331
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…mbi/platform into CU-86c0zjv0u_Add-Climate-Mediator-Package-to-Platform
WalkthroughThis pull request introduces several Docker Compose configuration files for the Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 27
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (15)
climate-mediator/docker-compose.yml (1)
24-37: Review public network exposure and security implications.The network configuration exposes several networks as public, which requires careful security consideration:
- All networks (except default) are marked as external and include '_public' in their names
- Public exposure increases the attack surface
Consider:
- Documenting the necessity of public network exposure for each service
- Implementing network policies to restrict traffic between services
- Adding proper network segmentation and firewall rules
climate-mediator/importer/docker-compose.config.yml (2)
4-18: Add health checks and resource limitsThe service definition should include:
- Health checks to ensure proper monitoring
- Resource limits to prevent resource exhaustion
climate-mediator-config-importer: image: ${CLIMATE_MEDIATOR_CONFIG_IMPORTER_IMAGE} + healthcheck: + test: ["CMD", "node", "-e", "require('http').request('http://localhost:3000/health', (r) => process.exit(r.statusCode === 200 ? 0 : 1)).end()"] + interval: 30s + timeout: 10s + retries: 3 + deploy: + resources: + limits: + cpus: '0.50' + memory: 256M + reservations: + cpus: '0.25' + memory: 128M
32-36: Consider explicit default network configurationWhile the default network is defined, its configuration is empty. Consider making the configuration explicit for better clarity and control.
default: + name: climate_mediator_default + driver: bridge + ipam: + driver: default + config: + - subnet: 172.28.0.0/16monitoring/package-metadata.json (1)
Line range hint
28-28: Potential incomplete MinIO configuration cleanupThe AI summary indicates that MinIO-related configurations were removed, but
MINIO_BROWSER_REDIRECT_URLstill exists. This might indicate an incomplete cleanup of MinIO-related configurations.Consider removing this environment variable if MinIO is no longer used in the monitoring package.
datalake/docker-compose.yml (1)
19-21: Consider implementing a backup strategy for MinIO volumes.While the volume configuration is correct, ensure you have a backup strategy for the persistent data stored in these volumes.
Consider:
- Regular volume backups using MinIO's built-in backup features
- Implementing disaster recovery procedures
- Monitoring volume usage and setting up alerts
climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhimConfig.js (2)
1-2: Remove redundant 'use strict' directiveThe 'use strict' directive is redundant in JavaScript modules as they are automatically in strict mode.
-'use strict' -🧰 Tools
🪛 Biome
[error] 1-1: Redundant use strict directive.
The entire contents of JavaScript modules are automatically in strict mode, with no statement needed to initiate it.
Safe fix: Remove the redundant use strict directive.(lint/suspicious/noRedundantUseStrict)
14-17: Simplify Buffer creationThe current Buffer creation can be simplified by using template literals directly.
-const authHeader = new Buffer.from( - `${OPENHIM_API_USERNAME}:${OPENHIM_API_PASSWORD}` -).toString('base64') +const authHeader = Buffer.from(`${OPENHIM_API_USERNAME}:${OPENHIM_API_PASSWORD}`).toString('base64')datalake/swarm.sh (2)
3-7: Consider making STACK configurableThe STACK variable is hardcoded as "datalake". Consider making it configurable through environment variables or command-line arguments for better reusability across different stacks.
-declare STACK="datalake" +declare STACK="${STACK:-datalake}" # Default to "datalake" if not set
61-79: Add trap handlers and usage informationConsider adding:
- Trap handlers for cleanup on script exit
- Help/usage information
- Version information
+VERSION="1.0.0" + +function show_usage() { + cat << EOF +Usage: $(basename "$0") <action> <mode> + +Actions: + init Initialize and deploy services + up Start services + down Scale down services + destroy Remove services and cleanup + +Modes: + dev Development mode + prod Production mode + +Environment variables: + CLUSTERED_MODE Set to "true" for clustered mode (default: false) + STACK Override stack name (default: datalake) + +Version: ${VERSION} +EOF +} + +# Cleanup function +function cleanup() { + log info "Cleaning up..." + # Add cleanup logic here +} + +# Set trap +trap cleanup EXIT + main() { init_vars "$@" import_sources + if [[ "$1" == "-h" ]] || [[ "$1" == "--help" ]]; then + show_usage + exit 0 + fi + if [[ "${ACTION}" == "init" ]] || [[ "${ACTION}" == "up" ]]; thenclimate-mediator/swarm.sh (1)
1-25: Consider adding input validation and usage information.While the variable initialization is well-structured, consider these improvements:
- Add parameter validation in
init_vars- Make
STACKconfigurable via environment variable- Add usage/help information for the script
#!/bin/bash +# Usage: ./swarm.sh <action> <mode> +# Actions: init, up, down, destroy +# Modes: dev, prod + declare ACTION="" declare MODE="" declare COMPOSE_FILE_PATH="" declare UTILS_PATH="" -declare STACK="climate" +declare STACK="${CLIMATE_STACK:-climate}" function init_vars() { ACTION=$1 MODE=$2 + + if [[ -z "$ACTION" || -z "$MODE" ]]; then + echo "Error: Both ACTION and MODE parameters are required" + echo "Usage: $0 <action> <mode>" + echo "Actions: init, up, down, destroy" + echo "Modes: dev, prod" + exit 1 + fidatalake/docker-compose.cluster.yml (2)
12-14: Consider using Docker health stage for directory initializationThe current approach of using shell commands to create directories during startup could be replaced with a more robust solution using Docker's multi-stage builds or init containers.
Consider creating a separate initialization stage in your Dockerfile:
FROM ${MINIO_IMAGE} as init RUN mkdir -p /data1/loki /data2/loki CMD ["minio", "server", "--console-address", ":9001", "http://minio-0{1...4}/data{1...2}"]Also applies to: 34-35, 56-57
17-21: Optimize health check configurationThe current health check configuration could be improved:
- 30s interval might be too long for critical services
- Consider adding start period to allow for initial setup
- Add curl timeout to prevent hanging health checks
Apply this configuration to all MinIO services:
healthcheck: - test: [ "CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live" ] + test: [ "CMD", "curl", "-f", "--max-time", "10", "http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live" ] interval: 30s timeout: 20s retries: 3 + start_period: 30sAlso applies to: 39-43, 61-65
climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhim-import.json (1)
91-91: Consider adding contact groups for monitoring and alertingThe empty ContactGroups array suggests that no notification targets are configured. Consider adding contact groups for operational monitoring and incident response.
Example structure:
"ContactGroups": [{ "group": "Climate-Ops", "users": ["${OPS_EMAIL}"], "alerts": ["system-errors", "data-validation-failures"] }]monitoring/docker-compose.yml (2)
Line range hint
75-95: Security concerns in Prometheus configurationSeveral security and version concerns need to be addressed:
- Running as root user is a security risk - consider using a non-root user
- Mounting Docker socket gives container access to host Docker daemon - evaluate if this access is necessary
- Prometheus version v2.38.0 is outdated (current stable is v2.48.1) - consider updating for security fixes
Apply this diff to address these issues:
prometheus: - image: prom/prometheus:v2.38.0 + image: prom/prometheus:v2.48.1 - user: root + user: nobody volumes: - prometheus-data:/prometheus - - ${DOCKER_SOCK_FOLDER}:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
Update cAdvisor version and review mount points
- The version update from v0.45.0 to v0.47.2 is valid and necessary.
- Regarding mount points, all the configured mounts are necessary for cAdvisor to function properly:
/:/rootfs:ro- Required for container root filesystem metrics/var/run:/var/run- Required for Docker socket access/sys:/sys:ro- Required for system metrics/var/lib/docker:/var/lib/docker- Required for Docker container metrics/dev/disk/:/dev/disk:ro- Required for disk metricsApply this diff to update the version:
cadvisor: - image: gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.45.0 + image: gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.47.2🔗 Analysis chain
Line range hint
96-106: Update cAdvisor version and review mount points
- cAdvisor version v0.45.0 is outdated (current stable is v0.47.2)
- Multiple sensitive host system mounts are used - ensure each mount is necessary
Apply this diff to update the version:
cadvisor: - image: gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.45.0 + image: gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.47.2Run this script to verify the necessity of each mount point:
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check if all mount points are being used by cAdvisor metrics # Get cAdvisor metrics and check for usage of mounted paths curl -s http://localhost:8080/metrics | grep -E "rootfs|var_run|sys|var_lib_docker|dev_disk"Length of output: 307
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's verify the cAdvisor configuration and mount points in the codebase # Check if there are any custom configurations or documentation about cAdvisor setup fd README -t f -X cat {} # Look for any cAdvisor configuration files or documentation rg -i "cadvisor" -A 5 -B 5 # Check for any docker-compose files that might have cAdvisor configuration fd docker-compose -t f -X cat {}Length of output: 202550
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (17)
climate-mediator/docker-compose.dev.yml(1 hunks)climate-mediator/docker-compose.yml(1 hunks)climate-mediator/importer/docker-compose.config.yml(1 hunks)climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhim-import.json(1 hunks)climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhimConfig.js(1 hunks)climate-mediator/package-metadata.json(1 hunks)climate-mediator/swarm.sh(1 hunks)config.yaml(2 hunks)datalake/docker-compose.cluster.yml(1 hunks)datalake/docker-compose.dev.yml(1 hunks)datalake/docker-compose.yml(1 hunks)datalake/package-metadata.json(1 hunks)datalake/swarm.sh(1 hunks)monitoring/docker-compose.cluster.yml(0 hunks)monitoring/docker-compose.dev.yml(0 hunks)monitoring/docker-compose.yml(5 hunks)monitoring/package-metadata.json(1 hunks)
💤 Files with no reviewable changes (2)
- monitoring/docker-compose.cluster.yml
- monitoring/docker-compose.dev.yml
✅ Files skipped from review due to trivial changes (2)
- datalake/docker-compose.dev.yml
- datalake/package-metadata.json
🧰 Additional context used
🪛 yamllint
climate-mediator/docker-compose.dev.yml
[error] 8-8: trailing spaces
(trailing-spaces)
🪛 Gitleaks
climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhim-import.json
10-10: Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.
(generic-api-key)
11-11: Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.
(generic-api-key)
climate-mediator/package-metadata.json
17-17: Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.
(generic-api-key)
18-18: Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.
(generic-api-key)
🪛 Biome
climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhimConfig.js
[error] 1-1: Redundant use strict directive.
The entire contents of JavaScript modules are automatically in strict mode, with no statement needed to initiate it.
Safe fix: Remove the redundant use strict directive.
(lint/suspicious/noRedundantUseStrict)
🔇 Additional comments (13)
climate-mediator/docker-compose.yml (2)
1-5: LGTM! Verify the image variable configuration.
The Docker Compose version and service definition look good. Using an environment variable for the image tag provides flexibility for different environments.
Let's verify the image variable is properly configured:
✅ Verification successful
✓ Image variable is properly configured
The CLIMATE_MEDIATOR_IMAGE variable is correctly defined in package-metadata.json with a default value of "jembi/climate-mediator:latest", which aligns with the Docker Compose configuration. The parameterization allows for flexibility while providing a sensible default.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check if CLIMATE_MEDIATOR_IMAGE is defined in environment files
# Search for CLIMATE_MEDIATOR_IMAGE definition
rg -l "CLIMATE_MEDIATOR_IMAGE=" --type env
Length of output: 70
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for CLIMATE_MEDIATOR_IMAGE in all files, including .env files
rg -l "CLIMATE_MEDIATOR_IMAGE"
# Also check for any .env files that might contain this variable
fd -t f "\.env"
Length of output: 161
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the content of .env files for CLIMATE_MEDIATOR_IMAGE
rg "CLIMATE_MEDIATOR_IMAGE" cdr-dw.env cdr.env mpi-qa.env mpi.env
# Check package-metadata.json for any relevant configuration
cat climate-mediator/package-metadata.json
Length of output: 979
6-11: Review network access requirements.
The service is connected to multiple networks, which could potentially expose it to unnecessary security risks. Consider applying the principle of least privilege by only connecting to essential networks.
Let's analyze the network dependencies:
✅ Verification successful
All network connections are justified and required
Based on the verification results, all network connections are necessary for the climate-mediator's functionality:
openhim: Required for integration with the interoperability layer (OpenHIM)clickhouse: Needed for analytics data storagedatalake: Required for MinIO data lake accesspublic: Standard network for external communicationdefault: Docker's default network for basic container networking
The service is part of the cdr-dw profile which integrates with all these components, and the network configurations follow the platform's architecture where these services are connected through their respective public networks.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for service dependencies that justify network connections
# Search for service interactions with climate-mediator
rg -l "climate.*mediator" --type yaml
# Search for network references
rg -l "openhim_public|clickhouse_public|minio_public|climate_public" --type yaml
Length of output: 1178
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's analyze the actual network dependencies in climate-mediator's configuration
# Check climate-mediator's docker-compose files for service dependencies
echo "=== Climate Mediator Service Dependencies ==="
rg -A 10 "services:" climate-mediator/docker-compose.yml
# Check for network definitions and their usage
echo -e "\n=== Network Definitions ==="
rg "networks:" -A 10 climate-mediator/docker-compose.yml
# Check configuration files for external service connections
echo -e "\n=== Service Connections in Config ==="
cat config.yaml
# Check development configuration for comparison
echo -e "\n=== Development Configuration ==="
cat climate-mediator/docker-compose.dev.yml
Length of output: 3725
climate-mediator/importer/docker-compose.config.yml (2)
33-34: Verify OpenHIM network naming convention
The external network name openhim_public should be consistent with the OpenHIM service's network configuration.
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check OpenHIM network naming consistency across the platform
# Search for OpenHIM network definitions
rg -A 5 'networks:.*openhim' --type yaml
# Search for network name references
rg 'openhim_public' --type yaml20-30: Verify digest variable configuration
The config names use digest variables that are required (:?err), but their source is not apparent in this file.
✅ Verification successful
Digest variables are handled by Docker Swarm's config management
The digest variables (climate_mediator_config_importer_openhimConfig_js_DIGEST and climate_mediator_config_importer_openhim_import_js_DIGEST) are automatically managed by Docker Swarm's configuration system. These variables are used to create unique config names based on content hashes, which is a standard Docker Swarm practice for configuration versioning and updates.
- The swarm.sh script uses Docker's built-in config management through the
docker::deploy_config_importerfunction - The config files (openhimConfig.js and openhim-import.json) exist and contain valid configuration
- The digest variables don't need to be manually defined as they are computed by Docker Swarm at runtime
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check if digest variables are defined in other compose files or env files
# Search for digest variable definitions
rg -l "climate_mediator_config_importer_(openhimConfig_js|openhim_import_js)_DIGEST"
# Check for .env files that might contain these variables
fd -g ".env*"
Length of output: 1404
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check for digest variable definitions in docker-compose files and related configuration
# Search in all yaml/yml files for digest-related content
rg -i "digest" --type yaml -A 5
# Also check specifically in the climate-mediator directory
fd . climate-mediator -t f -e yml -e yaml -x cat {}
Length of output: 45676
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check for any build or setup scripts that might generate these digest values
# Search for scripts that might compute file digests
rg -l "DIGEST|sha|hash" --type bash --type javascript
# Also check for any Makefile or similar that might set these variables
fd Makefile
fd "*.env*"
Length of output: 398
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for files that might contain digest computation logic
rg -t sh -t js -l "DIGEST|sha|hash"
# Look for environment files and Makefiles with correct syntax
fd -g "Makefile"
fd -g ".env*"
# Check for any setup or initialization scripts
fd -e sh -e bash
Length of output: 1596
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's examine the climate-mediator's swarm.sh and related files
cat climate-mediator/swarm.sh
# Also check the content of the config files being referenced
ls -la climate-mediator/importer/volume/
cat climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhimConfig.js
cat climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhim-import.json
Length of output: 6050
datalake/docker-compose.yml (4)
1-5: LGTM! Verify MINIO_IMAGE environment variable.
The service configuration follows best practices with versioned compose file and parameterized image.
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify MINIO_IMAGE variable is defined in environment files
# Expected: Find environment variable definition
# Search for MINIO_IMAGE in common environment files
rg "MINIO_IMAGE=" -g "*.env*"22-30: Verify domain configuration and consider HA setup.
The single replica deployment might not be suitable for production use. Also, verify the domain configuration.
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check domain configuration in environment files
# Expected: Find domain configuration
# Search for domain configuration
rg "DOMAIN_NAME_HOST_TRAEFIK=" -g "*.env*"Consider:
- Implementing multi-node MinIO deployment for high availability
- Adding monitoring and alerting for the service
31-40: Verify external network dependency.
The service depends on an external network minio_public. Ensure this network exists before deployment.
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for network definition in other compose files
# Expected: Find network creation
# Search for minio_public network definition
rg "name: minio_public" -g "docker-compose*.yml"13-17: Verify curl availability in the MinIO image.
The health check depends on curl being available in the container.
climate-mediator/swarm.sh (1)
1-82: Verify consistency with other deployment scripts in the codebase.
Let's ensure this script follows the same patterns and security practices as other deployment scripts in the platform.
✅ Verification successful
The script follows consistent deployment patterns used across the platform
The verification shows that the climate-mediator/swarm.sh script follows the same secure patterns and practices used consistently across all deployment scripts in the platform:
- Uses the same standardized Docker utility functions (
docker::deploy_service,docker::stack_destroy) - Follows identical initialization and variable declaration patterns
- Implements consistent error handling and logging
- Uses the same approach for dev/prod mode handling
- Follows the same pattern for config imports and service deployment
The script's implementation aligns with the platform's established security and deployment practices.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for similar swarm.sh files to verify consistency
fd swarm.sh --type f --exec head -n 50 {} \;
# Look for similar Docker deployment patterns
rg -A 5 "docker::deploy_service|docker::stack_destroy"
Length of output: 52366
config.yaml (1)
30-31: Verify dependencies for new packages
The new packages datalake and climate-mediator have been added to the root packages list. Let's verify their required configurations and dependencies are present.
✅ Verification successful
Dependencies verified and properly configured
Both packages have the required configurations in place:
-
datalakepackage:- Has proper Docker Compose files with MinIO configuration
- Package metadata file exists
- Required volumes and networks are defined
-
climate-mediatorpackage:- Has Docker Compose files with proper network configurations
- Package metadata file exists
- Correctly configured dependencies on OpenHIM, ClickHouse, and MinIO (datalake)
- Includes configuration importer setup
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for existence of required configuration files for new packages
echo "Checking for datalake configuration files..."
fd -t f "docker-compose.*\.yml$" -p datalake/
echo "Checking for climate-mediator configuration files..."
fd -t f "docker-compose.*\.yml$" -p climate-mediator/
echo "Checking for package metadata..."
fd -t f "package-metadata\.json$" -p "datalake|climate-mediator"
Length of output: 796
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check for package metadata files with a corrected command
echo "Checking for package metadata..."
fd -t f "package-metadata\.json$"
# Let's also check for any dependencies defined in these compose files
echo -e "\nChecking datalake compose files for dependencies..."
cat datalake/docker-compose*.yml
echo -e "\nChecking climate-mediator compose files for dependencies..."
cat climate-mediator/docker-compose*.yml climate-mediator/importer/docker-compose.config.yml
Length of output: 7720
datalake/docker-compose.cluster.yml (1)
15-16: Review security considerations for environment variables
The root credentials are being passed through environment variables. While this is a common practice, consider:
- Using Docker secrets for sensitive data
- Implementing credential rotation mechanisms
- Adding access logging for root user actions
Let's check if Docker secrets are already in use elsewhere in the project:
Also applies to: 37-38, 59-60
climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhim-import.json (1)
49-90: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Improve mediator configuration management
Several improvements can be made to the mediator configuration:
- Use semantic versioning (e.g., "1.0.0" instead of "0.0.1")
- Remove duplicate configuration between channels and defaultChannelConfig
- Remove static heartbeat and uptime values as they should be dynamic
Also, verify the mediator version consistency:
#!/bin/bash
# Check for version references in package.json or similar files
fd -e json -x jq -r '.version' {} 2>/dev/nullmonitoring/docker-compose.yml (1)
244-246: Review MinIO network security configuration
The MinIO network is marked as public (minio_public). Consider if this level of network exposure is necessary and ensure proper network segmentation is in place.
Run this script to check network isolation:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check network configuration and connected services
# List all services connected to minio_public network
docker network inspect minio_public --format '{{range .Containers}}{{.Name}} {{end}}'
# Check if network is encrypted
docker network inspect minio_public --format '{{.Options.encrypted}}'| environment: | ||
| OPENHIM_USERNAME: ${OPENHIM_USERNAME} | ||
| OPENHIM_PASSWORD: ${OPENHIM_PASSWORD} | ||
| REGISTER_MEDIATOR: ${REGISTER_MEDIATOR} | ||
| OPENHIM_MEDIATOR_URL: ${OPENHIM_MEDIATOR_URL} | ||
| TRUST_SELF_SIGNED: ${TRUST_SELF_SIGNED} | ||
| MINIO_ENDPOINT: ${MINIO_ENDPOINT} | ||
| MINIO_PORT: ${MINIO_PORT} | ||
| MINIO_BUCKET: ${MINIO_BUCKET} | ||
| MINIO_ACCESS_KEY: ${MINIO_ACCESS_KEY} | ||
| MINIO_SECRET_KEY: ${MINIO_SECRET_KEY} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Review security configuration and credential handling.
Several security considerations need attention:
- Ensure sensitive credentials are properly managed and not exposed in logs or container inspection
- The
TRUST_SELF_SIGNEDvariable suggests SSL/TLS certificate validation might be bypassed - MinIO credentials should be handled securely
Consider these security improvements:
- Use Docker secrets or a secure vault service for credential management
- Review the necessity of trusting self-signed certificates in production
- Implement credential rotation policies
| environment: | ||
| OPENHIM_API_USERNAME: ${OPENHIM_USERNAME} | ||
| OPENHIM_API_PASSWORD: ${OPENHIM_PASSWORD} | ||
| NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: 0 |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Security Risk: TLS verification is disabled
Setting NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 disables SSL/TLS certificate validation, which is a security risk in production environments. This should only be used in development/testing environments.
Consider:
- Using valid SSL certificates in production
- Making this configurable via environment variable to ensure it's enabled in production:
- NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: 0
+ NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: ${NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED:-1}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: 0 | |
| NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: ${NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED:-1} |
| OPENHIM_API_USERNAME: ${OPENHIM_USERNAME} | ||
| OPENHIM_API_PASSWORD: ${OPENHIM_PASSWORD} | ||
| NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: 0 |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Use Docker secrets for sensitive credentials
Consider using Docker secrets instead of environment variables for OPENHIM_API_USERNAME and OPENHIM_API_PASSWORD to enhance security.
environment:
- OPENHIM_API_USERNAME: ${OPENHIM_USERNAME}
- OPENHIM_API_PASSWORD: ${OPENHIM_PASSWORD}
NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED: 0
+ secrets:
+ - openhim_username
+ - openhim_password
+ secrets:
+ openhim_username:
+ external: true
+ openhim_password:
+ external: trueCommittable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| @@ -4,19 +4,14 @@ | |||
| "description": "A package for monitoring the platform services", | |||
| "type": "infrastructure", | |||
| "version": "0.0.1", | |||
| "dependencies": [], | |||
| "dependencies": ["datalake"], | |||
There was a problem hiding this comment.
💡 Codebase verification
Remove unnecessary datalake dependency
The monitoring package does not use the datalake package anywhere in its codebase. The only reference found is in the package-metadata.json dependencies array. The package appears to be focused on monitoring and metrics collection through Grafana, Prometheus, Loki, and Promtail, with no actual integration with the datalake package.
🔗 Analysis chain
Verify the necessity of datalake dependency
Please confirm if the monitoring package actually requires the datalake dependency. While the PR introduces the datalake package, it's not immediately clear why the monitoring package needs to depend on it.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check for actual usage/references of datalake in monitoring package
# Search for datalake references in monitoring package files
echo "Searching for datalake references in monitoring package..."
rg -i "datalake" --type yaml --type json --type conf monitoring/
Length of output: 220
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's do a more comprehensive search for datalake references in monitoring package
# 1. Search all files in monitoring directory
echo "Searching for datalake references in all monitoring files..."
rg -i "datalake" monitoring/
# 2. List all files in monitoring to understand the structure
echo -e "\nListing monitoring package files:"
fd . monitoring/
# 3. Check if there are any imports or references to datalake in source files
echo -e "\nChecking for potential code references to datalake..."
ast-grep --pattern 'import $_ from "datalake"'
ast-grep --pattern 'require("datalake")'
Length of output: 1819
| entrypoint: sh | ||
| command: -c 'mkdir -p /data1/loki /data2/loki && minio server --console-address ":9001" --address ":9090" http://minio-0{1...${NUM_MINIO_SERVERS}}/data{1...2}' |
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🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider using a startup script instead of inline command.
The current approach of using inline shell commands in the compose file makes it harder to maintain and test. Consider moving this logic to a dedicated startup script.
- Create a startup script:
+# startup.sh
+#!/bin/sh
+mkdir -p /data1/loki /data2/loki
+minio server \
+ --console-address ":${CONSOLE_PORT:-9001}" \
+ --address ":${API_PORT:-9090}" \
+ http://minio-0{1...${NUM_MINIO_SERVERS}}/data{1...2}- Update compose file:
- entrypoint: sh
- command: -c 'mkdir -p /data1/loki /data2/loki && minio server --console-address ":9001" --address ":9090" http://minio-0{1...${NUM_MINIO_SERVERS}}/data{1...2}'
+ volumes:
+ - ./startup.sh:/startup.sh
+ entrypoint: ["/startup.sh"]Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| minio-02: | ||
| image: ${MINIO_IMAGE} | ||
| entrypoint: sh | ||
| command: -c 'mkdir -p /data1/loki /data2/loki && minio server --console-address ":9001" http://minio-0{1...4}/data{1...2}' | ||
| environment: | ||
| MINIO_ROOT_USER: ${MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER} | ||
| MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD} | ||
| healthcheck: | ||
| test: [ "CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live" ] | ||
| interval: 30s | ||
| timeout: 20s | ||
| retries: 3 | ||
| hostname: minio-02 | ||
| volumes: | ||
| - minio-02-data1:/data1 | ||
| - minio-02-data2:/data2 | ||
| deploy: | ||
| placement: | ||
| constraints: | ||
| - "node.labels.name==${MINIO_02_PLACEMENT}" | ||
| replicas: 1 | ||
|
|
||
| minio-03: | ||
| image: ${MINIO_IMAGE} | ||
| entrypoint: sh | ||
| command: -c 'mkdir -p /data1/loki /data2/loki && minio server --console-address ":9001" http://minio-0{1...4}/data{1...2}' | ||
| environment: | ||
| MINIO_ROOT_USER: ${MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER} | ||
| MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD} | ||
| healthcheck: | ||
| test: [ "CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live" ] | ||
| interval: 30s | ||
| timeout: 20s | ||
| retries: 3 | ||
| hostname: minio-03 | ||
| volumes: | ||
| - minio-03-data1:/data1 | ||
| - minio-03-data2:/data2 | ||
| deploy: | ||
| placement: | ||
| constraints: | ||
| - "node.labels.name==${MINIO_03_PLACEMENT}" | ||
| replicas: 1 | ||
|
|
||
| minio-04: | ||
| image: ${MINIO_IMAGE} | ||
| entrypoint: sh | ||
| command: -c 'mkdir -p /data1/loki /data2/loki && minio server --console-address ":9001" http://minio-0{1...4}/data{1...2}' | ||
| environment: | ||
| MINIO_ROOT_USER: ${MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER} | ||
| MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD} | ||
| healthcheck: | ||
| test: [ "CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:9000/minio/health/live" ] | ||
| interval: 30s | ||
| timeout: 20s | ||
| retries: 3 | ||
| hostname: minio-04 | ||
| volumes: | ||
| - minio-04-data1:/data1 | ||
| - minio-04-data2:/data2 | ||
| deploy: | ||
| placement: | ||
| constraints: | ||
| - "node.labels.name==${MINIO_04_PLACEMENT}" | ||
| replicas: 1 |
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🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Add network configuration for MinIO services
The services are missing explicit network configuration, which is important for:
- Securing inter-service communication
- Controlling access to the MinIO API and console
- Isolating the storage layer
Add network configuration:
minio-02:
image: ${MINIO_IMAGE}
+ networks:
+ - minio_distributed
# ... existing configuration ...
networks:
minio_distributed:
driver: overlay
driver_opts:
encrypted: "true"Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| "Users": [ | ||
| { | ||
| "firstname": "Super", | ||
| "surname": "User", | ||
| "email": "[email protected]", | ||
| "provider": "token", | ||
| "groups": ["admin"], | ||
| "passwordAlgorithm": "sha512", | ||
| "passwordHash": "ea3824f17cf1379eb118a36bc7c8cf0f45712e2af7748567fca5313dec6fa66d61064e82a5e5cb88e998486ee3c7d0dac235bbeda8c341d6edc1c77406be2ab6", | ||
| "passwordSalt": "d4f622c0404f09bd959bfb263efa3452", | ||
| "expiry": null, | ||
| "locked": false, | ||
| "token": null, | ||
| "tokenType": null | ||
| } | ||
| ], |
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Security: Avoid committing credentials to version control
The configuration contains hardcoded credentials including password hash and salt. This poses a security risk as these values should be managed through environment variables or secure configuration management systems.
Consider:
- Moving sensitive data to environment variables
- Using a more robust password hashing algorithm like Argon2
- Using a production-specific email domain instead of openhim.org
Example structure using environment variables:
{
"Users": [{
"firstname": "Super",
"surname": "User",
"email": "${ADMIN_EMAIL}",
"passwordHash": "${ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH}",
"passwordSalt": "${ADMIN_PASSWORD_SALT}",
...
}]
}🧰 Tools
🪛 Gitleaks
10-10: Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.
(generic-api-key)
11-11: Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.
(generic-api-key)
| "Channels": [ | ||
| { | ||
| "name": "Climate Mediator", | ||
| "urlPattern": "^/climate.*$", | ||
| "routes": [ | ||
| { | ||
| "name": "Climate Mediator Endpoint", | ||
| "host": "climate-mediator", | ||
| "port": "3000", | ||
| "primary": true, | ||
| "type": "http", | ||
| "path": "/climate/upload" | ||
| } | ||
| ], | ||
| "allow": ["instant"], | ||
| "methods": ["POST", "GET"], | ||
| "type": "http", | ||
| "updatedBy": { | ||
| "id": "65d47e98223a0672c3c9808b", | ||
| "name": "Super User" | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| ], |
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🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Security: Enhance channel configuration with additional safeguards
The current channel configuration could benefit from additional security measures:
- Consider a more specific URL pattern to prevent unintended matches
- Add rate limiting configuration to prevent abuse
- Configure request size limits for the upload endpoint
- Remove hardcoded user ID from updatedBy
{
"name": "Climate Mediator",
- "urlPattern": "^/climate.*$",
+ "urlPattern": "^/climate/upload$",
"routes": [...],
+ "requestBody": {
+ "limit": "10mb"
+ },
+ "rateLimit": {
+ "requests": 100,
+ "window": "15minutes"
+ },
"updatedBy": {
- "id": "65d47e98223a0672c3c9808b",
+ "id": "${ADMIN_USER_ID}",
"name": "Super User"
}
}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| "Channels": [ | |
| { | |
| "name": "Climate Mediator", | |
| "urlPattern": "^/climate.*$", | |
| "routes": [ | |
| { | |
| "name": "Climate Mediator Endpoint", | |
| "host": "climate-mediator", | |
| "port": "3000", | |
| "primary": true, | |
| "type": "http", | |
| "path": "/climate/upload" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "allow": ["instant"], | |
| "methods": ["POST", "GET"], | |
| "type": "http", | |
| "updatedBy": { | |
| "id": "65d47e98223a0672c3c9808b", | |
| "name": "Super User" | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "Channels": [ | |
| { | |
| "name": "Climate Mediator", | |
| "urlPattern": "^/climate/upload$", | |
| "routes": [ | |
| { | |
| "name": "Climate Mediator Endpoint", | |
| "host": "climate-mediator", | |
| "port": "3000", | |
| "primary": true, | |
| "type": "http", | |
| "path": "/climate/upload" | |
| } | |
| ], | |
| "allow": ["instant"], | |
| "methods": ["POST", "GET"], | |
| "type": "http", | |
| "requestBody": { | |
| "limit": "10mb" | |
| }, | |
| "rateLimit": { | |
| "requests": 100, | |
| "window": "15minutes" | |
| }, | |
| "updatedBy": { | |
| "id": "${ADMIN_USER_ID}", | |
| "name": "Super User" | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ], |
| "Clients": [ | ||
| { | ||
| "clientID": "instant-client", | ||
| "name": "Instant Client", | ||
| "roles": ["instant"], | ||
| "customTokenID": "test" | ||
| } | ||
| ], |
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💡 Codebase verification
Security: Critical - Replace hardcoded test tokens across multiple services
The verification reveals a systemic security issue where multiple services are using hardcoded test tokens and overly broad "instant" role:
- climate-mediator:
customTokenID: "test" - mpi-mediator:
customTokenID: "test" - fhir-ig-importer:
customTokenID: "test" - interoperability-layer:
customTokenID: "test"
- Replace all hardcoded "test" tokens with environment variables across all services
- Review and implement proper role-based access control instead of using the generic "instant" role
- Consider implementing different tokens for each service to limit the blast radius of potential token compromises
- Update client IDs to be more specific than "test" or generic "instant-client"
🔗 Analysis chain
Security: Replace test token and review access control
The client configuration contains a hardcoded test token and uses a single broad role.
- Replace "test" token with environment variable
- Consider implementing more granular roles based on specific operations
Let's verify if this client configuration is used elsewhere:
The previous search might have failed due to case sensitivity or word boundaries. Let's try a broader search to find any related client configurations and token usage patterns in JSON files.
Let's examine the actual client configurations in these files to understand if this is a widespread pattern that needs to be addressed across multiple services.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for references to the client ID or token
rg -l "instant-client|test" --type json
Length of output: 426
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for references to the client ID or token with case-insensitive and word boundary matches
rg -il '\b(instant-client|instant|customTokenID)\b' --type json
# Also search for any client configurations in JSON files
fd -e json -x grep -l '"Clients"\|"clientID"\|"customTokenID"' {} \;
Length of output: 1139
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check the content of all openhim-import files to see if they share similar client configurations
echo "=== Checking climate-mediator configuration ==="
cat climate-mediator/importer/volume/openhim-import.json | jq '.Clients'
echo "=== Checking mpi-mediator configuration ==="
cat mpi-mediator/importer/volume/openhim-import.json | jq '.Clients'
echo "=== Checking fhir-ig-importer configuration ==="
cat fhir-ig-importer/importer/volume/openhim-import.json | jq '.Clients'
echo "=== Checking interoperability-layer configuration ==="
cat interoperability-layer-openhim/importer/volume/openhim-import.json | jq '.Clients'
Length of output: 1267
| networks: | ||
| minio: |
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🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Add service dependencies and health checks for MinIO integration
The Loki service is configured to use the MinIO network, but lacks proper service dependencies and health checks. This could lead to startup issues if MinIO is not ready when Loki starts.
Add the following configuration:
loki:
networks:
minio:
+ depends_on:
+ minio:
+ condition: service_healthy
+ healthcheck:
+ test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:3100/ready || exit 1"]
+ interval: 10s
+ timeout: 5s
+ retries: 5📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| networks: | |
| minio: | |
| networks: | |
| minio: | |
| depends_on: | |
| minio: | |
| condition: service_healthy | |
| healthcheck: | |
| test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget --no-verbose --tries=1 --spider http://localhost:3100/ready || exit 1"] | |
| interval: 10s | |
| timeout: 5s | |
| retries: 5 |
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Actionable comments posted: 1
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
datalake/docker-compose.yml(1 hunks)datalake/package-metadata.json(1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
- datalake/docker-compose.yml
🔇 Additional comments (2)
datalake/package-metadata.json (2)
1-7: Verify package dependencies and version
The package metadata looks well-structured, but please verify:
- Whether the empty dependencies array is intentional
- If the initial version "0.0.1" aligns with your versioning strategy
9-9: Configuration mismatch: MinIO servers count vs placements
There's an inconsistency in the configuration:
NUM_MINIO_SERVERSis set to 1- But there are 4 MinIO placement configurations (MINIO_01_PLACEMENT through MINIO_04_PLACEMENT)
Please clarify:
- The intended number of MinIO servers
- Whether all placement configurations are necessary
- If this is meant to support different deployment scenarios
Also applies to: 15-18
| "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER": "admin", | ||
| "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "dev_password_only", |
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Security: Avoid hardcoded credentials in metadata
The metadata file contains default credentials that could pose a security risk if committed to version control. Consider:
- Using environment-specific configuration for credentials
- Adding a note that these are development-only credentials
- Implementing secure credential management
Example approach:
- "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER": "admin",
- "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "dev_password_only",
+ "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER": "${DATALAKE_ADMIN_USER}",
+ "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "${DATALAKE_ADMIN_PASSWORD}"📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER": "admin", | |
| "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "dev_password_only", | |
| "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER": "${DATALAKE_ADMIN_USER}", | |
| "MO_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD": "${DATALAKE_ADMIN_PASSWORD}" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
climate-mediator/docker-compose.yml (1)
24-37: Enhance network configuration robustnessWhile the external network configuration is good for service separation, consider these improvements:
- Explicitly specify network drivers (e.g.,
bridge,overlay) for consistent behavior across environments- Document the purpose and access patterns for each network in comments
- Consider if all networks truly need to be public-facing
Example addition:
networks: openhim: name: openhim_public external: true + driver: bridge + # Used for OpenHIM API communication
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
climate-mediator/docker-compose.yml(1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (2)
climate-mediator/docker-compose.yml (2)
6-11: Review network exposure and implement network segmentation
The service is connected to 5 different networks, which might expose it to unnecessary security risks. Consider implementing proper network segmentation by:
- Evaluating if all network connections are necessary
- Documenting the purpose of each network connection
- Implementing network policies to restrict unnecessary communication
16-16: Verify OPENHIM_MEDIATOR_URL configuration
Ensure that the mediator URL is properly configured for your environment and follows the expected format (e.g., http://climate-mediator:3000). This is crucial for proper service registration with OpenHIM.
|
Closing this PR since the package has been moved to another project repo |
Summary by CodeRabbit
Release Notes
New Features
climate-mediatoranddatalakeservices, enhancing deployment flexibility.prometheus,cadvisor, andloki.Bug Fixes
Documentation
climate-mediatoranddatalake, providing essential information about dependencies and environment variables.