This repository has been archived by the owner on Jul 27, 2022. It is now read-only.
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 66
Problem: no way for mls member to prove invalid ciphertext (fixes #1797) #2029
Merged
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
tomtau
requested review from
yihuang,
samngmco,
devashishdxt,
leejw51crypto,
lezzokafka,
linfeng-crypto,
jimmyyip-crypto and
brianatcrypto
July 27, 2020 07:21
@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ impl HPKEPrivateKey { | |||
) | |||
} | |||
|
|||
pub fn marshal_arr_unsafe(&self) -> [u8; 32] { |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
what's arr?
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
array
also, had to change some types / panicing-behavior in tree / commit processing, otherwise it won't be possible to test this. |
leejw51crypto
approved these changes
Jul 27, 2020
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
lgtm
Codecov Report
@@ Coverage Diff @@
## master #2029 +/- ##
==========================================
+ Coverage 65.01% 65.28% +0.27%
==========================================
Files 211 213 +2
Lines 26728 27040 +312
==========================================
+ Hits 17376 17653 +277
- Misses 9352 9387 +35
|
…pto-com#1797) Solution: sketched out core of "NACK" mechanism which involves revealing shared secrets from invalid message parts and including DLEQ proofs. -- currently, needs: 1) latest master of p256 which contains scalar arithmetic (not yet released) 2) for the high-level API, it needs to directly decrypt HPKE ciphertext from a shared secret -- this may not ever be released
bors r+ |
Build succeeded: |
Sign up for free
to subscribe to this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Solution: sketched out core of "NACK" mechanism
which involves revealing shared secrets from invalid
message parts and including DLEQ proofs.
-- currently, needs:
from a shared secret -- this may not ever be released
also needs "verify_node_private_key" from #2018