fix markdown links

docs/docs/adrs/adr-005-cryptographic-equivocation-verification.md

@@ -138,8 +138,7 @@ either using its infraction height or its unsigned timestamp. Note that changes
 The underlying reason is that a malicious validator could take advantage of getting tombstoned 
 to avoid being slashed on the provider ([see comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/1232#issuecomment-1693127641)). 
 
-- Currently, the endpoint can only handle _equivocation_ light client attacks. This is because the _lunatic_ attacks require the endpoint to possess the ability to dissociate which header is conflicted or trusted upon receiving a misbehavior message. Without this information, it's not possible to extract the Byzantine validators from the conflicting headers (see [comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826#discussion_r1268668684)). In addition, "amnesia" attacks are ignored, similar to CometBFT (see [ADR-056](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/blob/main/docs/architecture/tendermint-core/adr-056-light-client-amnesia-attacks.md#decision)).
-
+- Currently, the endpoint can only handle _equivocation_ light client attacks. This is because the _lunatic_ attacks require the endpoint to possess the ability to dissociate which header is conflicted or trusted upon receiving a misbehavior message. Without this information, it's not possible to extract the Byzantine validators from the conflicting headers (see [comment](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/826#discussion_r1268668684)). In addition, "amnesia" attacks are ignored, similar to CometBFT (see [ADR-056](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/blob/main/docs/references/architecture/tendermint-core/adr-056-light-client-amnesia-attacks.md#decision)).
 
 ## Consequences
 

docs/docs/validators/overview.md

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ At present, the consumer chain can report evidence about downtime infractions to
 :::info
 Causing a downtime infraction on any consumer chain will not incur a slash penalty. Instead, the offending validator will be jailed on the provider chain and consequently on all consumer chains.
 
-To unjail, the validator must wait for the jailing period to elapse on the provider chain and [submit an unjail transaction](https://hub.cosmos.network/main/validators/validator-setup.html#unjail-validator) on the provider chain. After unjailing on the provider, the validator will be unjailed on all consumer chains.
+To unjail, the validator must wait for the jailing period to elapse on the provider chain and [submit an unjail transaction](https://hub.cosmos.network/validators/validator-setup#unjail-validator) on the provider chain. After unjailing on the provider, the validator will be unjailed on all consumer chains.
 
 More information is available in [Downtime Slashing documentation](../features/slashing.md#downtime-infractions)
 :::
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Validators can use different consensus keys on the provider and each of the cons
 For more information check out the [Key assignment overview and guide](../features/key-assignment.md)
 
 ## References:
-- [Cosmos Hub Validators FAQ](https://hub.cosmos.network/main/validators/validator-faq.html)
-- [Cosmos Hub Running a validator](https://hub.cosmos.network/main/validators/validator-setup.html)
+- [Cosmos Hub Validators FAQ](https://hub.cosmos.network/validators/validator-faq)
+- [Cosmos Hub Running a validator](https://hub.cosmos.network/validators/validator-setup)
 - [Startup Sequence](https://github.com/cosmos/testnets/blob/master/replicated-security/CONSUMER_LAUNCH_GUIDE.md#chain-launch)
-- [Submit Unjailing Transaction](https://hub.cosmos.network/main/validators/validator-setup.html#unjail-validator)
+- [Submit Unjailing Transaction](https://hub.cosmos.network/validators/validator-setup#edit-validator-description)