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BBR Rules Addition (elastic#3027)
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shashank-elastic authored Aug 25, 2023
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/23"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/08/23"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Identify activity related where adversaries can add the 'hidden' flag to files to hide
them from the user in an attempt to evade detection.
"""
from = "now-119m"
interval = "60m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Hidden Files and Directories via Hidden Flag"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "5124e65f-df97-4471-8dcb-8e3953b3ea97"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "OS: macOS","Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Rule Type: BBR"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
file where event.type : "creation" and process.name : "chflags"
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1564"
name = "Hide Artifacts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1564.001"
name = "Hidden Files and Directories"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/24"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/08/24"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Identify instances where adversaries include trailing space characters to mimic regular files, disguising their
activity to evade default file handling mechanisms.
"""
from = "now-119m"
interval = "60m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Processes with Trailing Spaces"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "0c093569-dff9-42b6-87b1-0242d9f7d9b4"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "OS: macOS","Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Rule Type: BBR"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "* "
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1036.006"
name = "Space after Filename"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
45 changes: 45 additions & 0 deletions rules_building_block/discovery_of_domain_groups.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/23"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/08/23"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Identifies the execution of Linux built-in commands related to account or group enumeration.
Adversaries may use account and group information to orient themselves before deciding how to act."""
from = "now-119m"
interval = "60m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Discovery of Domain Groups"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "b92d5eae-70bb-4b66-be27-f98ba9d0ccdc"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Discovery", "Rule Type: BBR"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.type : ("start", "process_started") and host.os.type == "linux" and
( process.name : ("ldapsearch", "dscacheutil") or
(process.name : "dscl" and process.args : "*-list*")
)
'''

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1069"
name = "Permission Groups Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"

49 changes: 49 additions & 0 deletions rules_building_block/persistence_creation_of_kernel_module.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/23"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/08/23"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Identifies activity related to loading kernel modules on Linux via creation of new ko files in the LKM directory.
"""
from = "now-119m"
interval = "60m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Creation of Kernel Module"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "947827c6-9ed6-4dec-903e-c856c86e72f3"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Rule Type: BBR"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
file where event.type in ("change", "creation") and host.os.type == "linux" and
file.path : "/lib/modules/*" and file.name : "*.ko"
'''

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1547"
name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1547.006"
name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

49 changes: 49 additions & 0 deletions rules_building_block/privilege_escalation_trap_execution.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/24"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/08/24"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Identify activity related where adversaries can include a trap command which then allows programs and shells to specify
commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals.
"""
from = "now-119m"
interval = "60m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Trap Signals Execution"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "cf6995ec-32a9-4b2d-9340-f8e61acf3f4e"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "OS: macOS","Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Rule Type: BBR"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.type : ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "trap" and process.args : "SIG*"
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1546"
name = "Event Triggered Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1546.005"
name = "Trap"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"

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