fp76.txt

THE President is "to NOMINATE, and, by and with the advice and consent 
        of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, 
        judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States 
        whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. 
        But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers 
        as they think proper, in the President alone, or in the courts of law, 
        or in the heads of departments. The President shall have power to fill 
        up ALL VACANCIES which may happen DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE, by 
        granting commissions which shall EXPIRE at the end of their next session." It has been observed in a former paper, that "the true test of a good 
        government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration." 
        If the justness of this observation be admitted, the mode of appointing 
        the officers of the United States contained in the foregoing clauses, 
        must, when examined, be allowed to be entitled to particular commendation. 
        It is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote 
        a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union; and it 
        will not need proof, that on this point must essentially depend the character 
        of its administration. It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appointment, in ordinary 
        cases, ought to be modified in one of three ways. It ought either to be 
        vested in a single man, or in a SELECT assembly of a moderate number; 
        or in a single man, with the concurrence of such an assembly. The exercise 
        of it by the people at large will be readily admitted to be impracticable; 
        as waiving every other consideration, it would leave them little time 
        to do anything else. When, therefore, mention is made in the subsequent 
        reasonings of an assembly or body of men, what is said must be understood 
        to relate to a select body or assembly, of the description already given. 
        The people collectively, from their number and from their dispersed situation, 
        cannot be regulated in their movements by that systematic spirit of cabal 
        and intrigue, which will be urged as the chief objections to reposing 
        the power in question in a body of men. Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject, or who have attended 
        to the observations made in other parts of these papers, in relation to 
        the appointment of the President, will, I presume, agree to the position, 
        that there would always be great probability of having the place supplied 
        by a man of abilities, at least respectable. Premising this, I proceed 
        to lay it down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted 
        to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, 
        than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment. The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget 
        a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, 
        on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested 
        to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be 
        filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest 
        pretensions to them. He will have FEWER personal attachments to gratify, 
        than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and 
        will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship 
        and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, 
        cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, 
        and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a 
        collective body. There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind 
        as personal considerations whether they relate to ourselves or to others, 
        who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every 
        exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, 
        we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings 
        and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, 
        which are felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may 
        at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course 
        be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, 
        or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic 
        merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the 
        qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party, will 
        be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. In 
        the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: 
        "Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one 
        you wish for that." This will be the usual condition of the bargain. 
        And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will 
        be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations. The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been felt by 
        the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the provision 
        made, in this respect, by the convention. They contend that the President 
        ought solely to have been authorized to make the appointments under the 
        federal government. But it is easy to show, that every advantage to be 
        expected from such an arrangement would, in substance, be derived from 
        the power of NOMINATION, which is proposed to be conferred upon him; while 
        several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment 
        in the hands of that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, 
        his judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty 
        to point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should fill 
        an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make 
        the final appointment. There can, in this view, be no difference between 
        nominating and appointing. The same motives which would influence a proper 
        discharge of his duty in one case, would exist in the other. And as no 
        man could be appointed but on his previous nomination, every man who might 
        be appointed would be, in fact, his choice. But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this 
        could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person 
        ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps 
        not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination 
        would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference 
        they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could 
        not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought 
        forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even 
        be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any 
        degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a kind 
        of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance 
        of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate, it is not likely 
        that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special 
        and strong reasons for the refusal. To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer, 
        that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, 
        in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a 
        spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent 
        the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family 
        connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity. In 
        addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the 
        administration. It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole 
        disposition of offices, would be governed much more by his private inclinations 
        and interests, than when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice 
        to the discussion and determination of a different and independent body, 
        and that body an entire branch of the legislature. The possibility of 
        rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing. The danger to 
        his own reputation, and, in the case of an elective magistrate, to his 
        political existence, from betraying a spirit of favoritism, or an unbecoming 
        pursuit of popularity, to the observation of a body whose opinion would 
        have great weight in forming that of the public, could not fail to operate 
        as a barrier to the one and to the other. He would be both ashamed and 
        afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished or lucrative stations, 
        candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from the same State 
        to which he particularly belonged, or of being in some way or other personally 
        allied to him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy 
        to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure. To this reasoning it has been objected that the President, by the influence 
        of the power of nomination, may secure the complaisance of the Senate 
        to his views. This supposition of universal venality in human nature is 
        little less an error in political reasoning, than the supposition of universal 
        rectitude. The institution of delegated power implies, that there is a 
        portion of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation 
        of confidence; and experience justifies the theory. It has been found 
        to exist in the most corrupt periods of the most corrupt governments. 
        The venality of the British House of Commons has been long a topic of 
        accusation against that body, in the country to which they belong as well 
        as in this; and it cannot be doubted that the charge is, to a considerable 
        extent, well founded. But it is as little to be doubted, that there is 
        always a large proportion of the body, which consists of independent and 
        public-spirited men, who have an influential weight in the councils of 
        the nation. Hence it is (the present reign not excepted) that the sense 
        of that body is often seen to control the inclinations of the monarch, 
        both with regard to men and to measures. Though it might therefore be 
        allowable to suppose that the Executive might occasionally influence some 
        individuals in the Senate, yet the supposition, that he could in general 
        purchase the integrity of the whole body, would be forced and improbable. 
        A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering 
        its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence 
        in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied, not only that it will 
        be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of its 
        members, but that the necessity of its co-operation, in the business of 
        appointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon the conduct 
        of that magistrate. Nor is the integrity of the Senate the only reliance. 
        The Constitution has provided some important guards against the danger 
        of executive influence upon the legislative body: it declares that "No 
        senator or representative shall during the time FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, 
        be appointed to any civil office under the United States, which shall 
        have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, 
        during such time; and no person, holding any office under the United States, 
        shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office."