fp62.txt

HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and 
        answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, 
        I enter next on the examination of the Senate. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered 
        are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The appointment of them by 
        the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate; 
        IV. The number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; 
        V. The powers vested in the Senate. I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those 
        of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period 
        of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative 
        must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; 
        as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions 
        is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater 
        extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same 
        time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely 
        to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions 
        with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly 
        weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and 
        education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between 
        a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim 
        a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission 
        of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national 
        councils. II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators 
        by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been 
        devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has 
        been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the 
        public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring 
        a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency 
        in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority 
        of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems. III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, 
        being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions 
        of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. 
        If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into 
        one nation, every district ought to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government, 
        and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple 
        league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share 
        in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that 
        in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, 
        the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional 
        and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard 
        of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to 
        be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual 
        deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation 
        rendered indispensable." A common government, with powers equal to its 
        objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political 
        situation, of America. A government founded on principles more consonant 
        to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be obtained from 
        the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former, lies between 
        the proposed government and a government still more objectionable. Under 
        this alternative, the advice of prudence must be to embrace the lesser 
        evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible 
        mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences 
        which may qualify the sacrifice. In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each 
        State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty 
        remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that 
        residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable 
        to the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous 
        to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation 
        of the States into one simple republic. Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of 
        the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper 
        acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the 
        concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority 
        of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on 
        legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; 
        and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller 
        States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct 
        from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar 
        danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over 
        the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of 
        the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of law-making seem to 
        be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible 
        that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice 
        than it appears to many in contemplation. IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come 
        next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of 
        these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are 
        to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be 
        necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from 
        the want of such an institution. First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in 
        a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it 
        may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful 
        to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second 
        branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power 
        with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. 
        It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of 
        two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition 
        or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution 
        founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United 
        States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will 
        barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will 
        be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, 
        it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance 
        which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with 
        the genuine principles of republican government. Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity 
        of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden 
        and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate 
        and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without 
        number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from 
        the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, 
        need not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is 
        to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently 
        ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, 
        and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable 
        duration. Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of 
        due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is 
        not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits 
        of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led 
        by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to 
        a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their 
        country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important 
        errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, 
        on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments 
        of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that 
        these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of 
        the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and 
        amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many 
        monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each 
        succeeding against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the 
        people, of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted 
        senate? A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of 
        government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge 
        of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments 
        are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient 
        in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American governments too 
        little attention has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids 
        this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last 
        in a mode which increases the security for the first. Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid 
        succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, 
        in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the 
        government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half 
        of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change 
        of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But 
        a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule 
        of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private 
        life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national transactions. To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a 
        volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be 
        a source of innumerable others. In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, 
        and all the advantages connected with national character. An individual 
        who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on 
        his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent 
        people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more 
        friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to connect their 
        fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making 
        their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another what one individual 
        is to another; with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, 
        with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer 
        restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions of 
        each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of 
        wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained 
        from the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbors. But the best 
        instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example 
        of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her 
        friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey 
        to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating 
        councils and embarrassed affairs. The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It 
        poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to 
        the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the 
        laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that 
        they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they 
        are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows 
        what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined 
        to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, 
        and less fixed? Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it 
        gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the 
        industrious and uniformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning 
        commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different 
        species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, 
        and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but 
        by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This 
        is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws 
        are made for the FEW, not for the MANY. In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. 
        The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, 
        the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing 
        arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new 
        branch of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered 
        unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will 
        lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation 
        or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors 
        and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? 
        In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward 
        which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy. But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment 
        and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a political 
        system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many 
        of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, 
        will long be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, 
        without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.