fp53.txt

I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that where 
        annual elections end, tyranny begins. " If it be true, as has often been 
        remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in 
        reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often 
        applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not 
        look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which 
        this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to 
        the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between 
        the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear 
        the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this 
        respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, 
        which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required 
        by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. The election 
        of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances 
        it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and 
        if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why 
        not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established 
        among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the 
        State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this 
        instance, than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut 
        and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South 
        Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial 
        as is proposed in the federal government. Here is a difference, as four 
        to one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be 
        not easy to show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, 
        or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or 
        that either the one or the other of these States is distinguished in these 
        respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are different 
        from both. In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover 
        but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction 
        so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the 
        people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the 
        government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little 
        understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme 
        power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full 
        power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where 
        the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, 
        and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained 
        that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, 
        as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative 
        provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, 
        by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government. 
        They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; 
        and, on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of 
        triennial elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in place 
        four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. 
        An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural 
        alarm in the votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections 
        is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, 
        against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount 
        to the government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional 
        security, similar to that established in the United States, was to be 
        attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what 
        better security would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing 
        to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring 
        the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for 
        uniting the patriotic exertions? The most simple and familiar portion 
        of time, applicable to the subject was that of a year; and hence the doctrine 
        has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against 
        the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the advance towards 
        tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed 
        point of annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying 
        this expedient to a government limited, as the federal government will 
        be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend 
        that the liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under 
        biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those 
        of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or even more 
        frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the government? 
        The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary 
        or useful. The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative 
        will appear from several very obvious considerations. No man can be a 
        competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound 
        judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is 
        to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information 
        which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public stations. 
        Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by 
        actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period 
        of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion 
        to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance 
        of the service. The period of legislative service established in most 
        of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. 
        The question then may be put into this simple form: does the period of 
        two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal 
        legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? 
        The very statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer 
        that ought to be given to it. In a single State, the requisite knowledge 
        relates to the existing laws which are uniform throughout the State, and 
        with which all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general 
        affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, 
        and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. 
        The great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. 
        The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; 
        whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive 
        region, and are extremely diversified by t e local affairs connected with 
        them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any other place than 
        in the central councils to which a knowledge of them will be brought by 
        the representatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of 
        the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed 
        by the members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly 
        regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce, 
        the ports, the usages, and the regulatious of the different States? How 
        can the trade between the different States be duly regulated, without 
        some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? 
        How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually collected, if they 
        be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating 
        to these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations 
        for the militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many 
        internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each 
        other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation, and suggest 
        most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought 
        to acquire. The other interior objects will require a proportional degree 
        of information with regard to them. It is true that all these difficulties 
        will, by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious task will 
        be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation 
        of a federal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every year 
        become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the government will 
        be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. The affairs 
        of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation 
        among the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those 
        of different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge 
        of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation 
        of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements, the business 
        of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty 
        and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify 
        the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it. 
        A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative, 
        and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. In regulating 
        our own commerce he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties 
        between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial 
        policy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant 
        of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal 
        legislation, is submitted to the federal government. And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate 
        in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary connection 
        between the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches 
        will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, 
        and will sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and co-operation. 
        Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; 
        but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information; 
        and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention 
        to the subject during the period of actual service in the legislature. There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which 
        are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the representatives 
        will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by 
        that circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men 
        to this service, if limited to a single year, than if extended to two 
        years. No argument can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the 
        delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; 
        but their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies almost 
        as a matter of course. The election of the representatives by the people 
        would not be governed by the same principle. A few of the members, as 
        happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by 
        frequent reelections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly 
        masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves 
        of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the 
        less the information of the bulk of the members the more apt will they 
        be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is no 
        less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of 
        Representatives and the Senate. It is an inconvenience mingled with the 
        advantages of our frequent elections even in single States, where they 
        are large, and hold but one legislative session in a year, that spurious 
        elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision 
        to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what 
        unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is 
        sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a 
        very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for 
        obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature 
        to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly 
        in the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, 
        the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; 
        and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying 
        and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of 
        a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be 
        dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be 
        little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat. All these 
        considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that biennial elections 
        will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen that they 
        will be safe to the liberty of the people.