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fp35.txt
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fp35.txt
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BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power
of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is, that
if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of revenue,
should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion
an undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those objects.
Two evils would spring from this source: the oppression of particular
branches of industry; and an unequal distribution of the taxes, as well
among the several States as among the citizens of the same State. Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation were
to be confined to duties on imports, it is evident that the government,
for want of being able to command other resources, would frequently be
tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess. There are persons
who imagine that they can never be carried to too great a length; since
the higher they are, the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage
an extravagant consumption, to produce a favorable balance of trade, and
to promote domestic manufactures. But all extremes are pernicious in various
ways. Exorbitant duties on imported articles would beget a general spirit
of smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the fair trader, and eventually
to the revenue itself: they tend to render other classes of the community
tributary, in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to whom
they give a premature monopoly of the markets; they sometimes force industry
out of its more natural channels into others in which it flows with less
advantage; and in the last place, they oppress the merchant, who is often
obliged to pay them himself without any retribution from the consumer.
When the demand is equal to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer
generally pays the duty; but when the markets happen to be overstocked,
a great proportion falls upon the merchant, and sometimes not only exhausts
his profits, but breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think that a
division of the duty, between the seller and the buyer, more often happens
than is commonly imagined. It is not always possible to raise the price
of a commodity in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid
upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small commercial capital,
is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order to a more expeditious
sale. The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true than
the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more equitable that the
duties on imports should go into a common stock, than that they should
redound to the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But it is not
so generally true as to render it equitable, that those duties should
form the only national fund. When they are paid by the merchant they operate
as an additional tax upon the importing State, whose citizens pay their
proportion of them in the character of consumers. In this view they are
productive of inequality among the States; which inequality would be increased
with the increased extent of the duties. The confinement of the national
revenues to this species of imposts would be attended with inequality,
from a different cause, between the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing
States. The States which can go farthest towards the supply of their own
wants, by their own manufactures, will not, according to their numbers
or wealth, consume so great a proportion of imported articles as those
States which are not in the same favorable situation. They would not,
therefore, in this mode alone contribute to the public treasury in a ratio
to their abilities. To make them do this it is necessary that recourse
be had to excises, the proper objects of which are particular kinds of
manufactures. New York is more deeply interested in these considerations
than such of her citizens as contend for limiting the power of the Union
to external taxation may be aware of. New York is an importing State,
and is not likely speedily to be, to any great extent, a manufacturing
State. She would, of course, suffer in a double light from restraining
the jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts. So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the import
duties being extended to an injurious extreme it may be observed, conformably
to a remark made in another part of these papers, that the interest of
the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against such an extreme.
I readily admit that this would be the case, as long as other resources
were open; but if the avenues to them were closed, HOPE, stimulated by
necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigorous precautions
and additional penalties, which, for a time, would have the intended effect,
till there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude these new
precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire false opinions,
which it might require a long course of subsequent experience to correct.
Necessity, especially in politics, often occasions false hopes, false
reasonings, and a system of measures correspondingly erroneous. But even
if this supposed excess should not be a consequence of the limitation
of the federal power of taxation, the inequalities spoken of would still
ensue, though not in the same degree, from the other causes that have
been noticed. Let us now return to the examination of objections. One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition, seems
most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is not sufficiently
numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens, in
order to combine the interests and feelings of every part of the community,
and to produce a due sympathy between the representative body and its
constituents. This argument presents itself under a very specious and
seducing form; and is well calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of
those to whom it is addressed. But when we come to dissect it with attention,
it will appear to be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The object
it seems to aim at is, in the first place, impracticable, and in the sense
in which it is contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for another place
the discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the
representative body in respect to numbers, and shall content myself with
examining here the particular use which has been made of a contrary supposition,
in reference to the immediate subject of our inquiries. The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by
persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly
provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation should send
one or more members, the thing would never take place in practice. Mechanics
and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give
their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own professions
or trades. Those discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic
and manufacturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise
and industry. Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected with the
operations of commerce. They know that the merchant is their natural patron
and friend; and they are aware, that however great the confidence they
may justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can be more effectually
promoted by the merchant than by themselves. They are sensible that their
habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired endowments,
without which, in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural abilities
are for the most part useless; and that the influence and weight, and
superior acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a contest
with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public councils,
unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These considerations,
and many others that might be mentioned prove, and experience confirms
it, that artisans and manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow
their votes upon merchants and those whom they recommend. We must therefore
consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes
of the community. With regard to the learned professions, little need be observed; they
truly form no distinct interest in society, and according to their situation
and talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and
choice of each other, and of other parts of the community. Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a political view,
and particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be perfectly united,
from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be
laid on land which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres
as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every landholder will therefore
have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and
common interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy.
But if we even could suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent
landholder and the middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude,
that the first would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national
legislature than the last? If we take fact as our guide, and look into
our own senate and assembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors of
land prevail in both; nor is this less the case in the senate, which consists
of a smaller number, than in the assembly, which is composed of a greater
number. Where the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether
they have to choose a small or a large number, their votes will fall upon
those in whom they have most confidence; whether these happen to be men
of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at all. It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have
some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their
feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to. But
we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves
the votes of the people free. Where this is the case, the representative
body, with too few exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of the
government, will be composed of landholders, merchants, and men of the
learned professions. But where is the danger that the interests and feelings
of the different classes of citizens will not be understood or attended
to by these three descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and
feel whatever will promote or insure the interest of landed property?
And will he not, from his own interest in that species of property, be
sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber it?
Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far
as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts,
to which his commerce is so nearly allied? Will not the man of the learned
profession, who will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different
branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between
them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive
to the general interests of the society? If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions which
may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and to which
a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man whose situation
leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to be a competent
judge of their nature, extent, and foundation than one whose observation
does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances?
Is it not natural that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the people,
and who is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance
of his public honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions
and inclinations, and should be willing to allow them their proper degree
of influence upon his conduct? This dependence, and the necessity of being
bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent,
are the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the representative
and the constituent. There is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive
information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy,
so much as the business of taxation. The man who understands those principles
best will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients, or sacrifice
any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might
be demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always
be the least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious
exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person in
whose hands it should be acquainted with the general genius, habits, and
modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the resources of the
country. And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of
the interests and feelings of the people. In any other sense the proposition
has either no meaning, or an absurd one. And in that sense let every considerate
citizen judge for himself where the requisite qualification is most likely
to be found.