fp13.txt

As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider 
        that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied 
        to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets 
        of the people. If the States are united under one government, there will 
        be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into several 
        confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to 
        be provided for--and each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive 
        with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole. The 
        entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties 
        is a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many 
        advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the 
        empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies--one consisting 
        of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five 
        Southern States. There is little probability that there would be a greater 
        number. According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise 
        an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. 
        No well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy 
        can be properly regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs 
        or institutions than that which has been proposed by the convention. When 
        the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the 
        same energy of government and the same forms of administration which are 
        requisite in one of much greater extent. This idea admits not of precise 
        demonstration, because there is no rule by which we can measure the momentum 
        of civil power necessary to the government of any given number of individuals; 
        but when we consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with 
        each of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, 
        and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the 
        passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason 
        to doubt that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform 
        the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized 
        and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent; 
        and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire 
        by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions. The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be 
        likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive 
        than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more 
        probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the alternative 
        to a general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial 
        considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different 
        States, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they will 
        most naturally league themselves under two governments. The four Eastern 
        States, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy and 
        connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated 
        as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported 
        flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are other obvious reasons 
        that would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State 
        to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful 
        combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission 
        into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern 
        league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own navigation, 
        is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of 
        her citizens. The more Southern States, from various circumstances, may 
        not think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation. 
        They may prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations 
        to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania 
        may not choose to confound her interests in a connection so adverse to 
        her policy. As she must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most 
        consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned towards the 
        weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the stronger power of 
        the Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid 
        being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania, 
        if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood 
        of more than one confederacy to the south of that State. Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able 
        to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or 
        any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight 
        in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on 
        the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to 
        take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken 
        ground. If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we 
        take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed 
        to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies 
        against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of 
        the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into view the military 
        establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the 
        jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the States 
        would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation would be 
        not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, 
        revenue, and liberty of every part.