fp12.txt

THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have 
        been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of 
        revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry. The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened 
        statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive source 
        of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their 
        political cares. By multipying the means of gratification, by promoting 
        the introduction and circulation of the precious metals, those darling 
        objects of human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigorate 
        the channels of industry, and to make them flow with greater activity 
        and copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the 
        active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer,--all orders of men, 
        look forward with eager expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing 
        reward of their toils. The often-agitated question between agriculture 
        and commerce has, from indubitable experience, received a decision which 
        has silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between them, and has proved, 
        to the satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are intimately 
        blended and interwoven. It has been found in various countries that, in 
        proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how 
        could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent 
        for the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the 
        cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in increasing 
        the quantity of money in a state--could that, in fine, which is the faithful 
        handmaid of labor and industry, in every shape, fail to augment that article, 
        which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon 
        which they are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should 
        ever have had an adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, 
        how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction 
        and refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason 
        and conviction. The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in 
        a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity 
        with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these objects, 
        must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the 
        requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the Emperor 
        of Germany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and populous 
        territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild and luxuriant 
        climates. In some parts of this territory are to be found the best gold 
        and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influence 
        of commerce, that monarch can boast but slender revenues. He has several 
        times been compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other 
        nations for the preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, 
        upon the strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued 
        war. But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be 
        seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of view, 
        in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It is 
        evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, 
        from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable 
        to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have 
        in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in 
        vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, 
        and the treasuries of the States have remained empty. The popular system 
        of administration inherent in the nature of popular government, coinciding 
        with the real scarcity of money incident to a languid and mutilated state 
        of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, 
        and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting 
        them. No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be surprised 
        at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of Britain, where 
        direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more tolerable, and, from 
        the vigor of the government, much more practicable, than in America, far 
        the greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the 
        indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises. Duties on imported articles 
        form a large branch of this latter description. In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means 
        of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must be 
        confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill brook 
        the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the 
        farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, 
        in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and personal 
        property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in 
        any other way than by the inperceptible agency of taxes on consumption. If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will 
        best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be best 
        adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious doubt, 
        that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general Union. As 
        far as this would be conducive to the interests of commerce, so far it 
        must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. 
        As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations for the collection 
        of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it must serve to answer 
        the purposes of making the same rate of duties more productive, and of 
        putting it into the power of the government to increase the rate without 
        prejudice to trade. The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which 
        they are intersected, and of bays that wash there shores; the facility 
        of communication in every direction; the affinity of language and manners; 
        the familiar habits of intercourse; --all these are circumstances that 
        would conspire to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little 
        difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations 
        of each other. The separate States or confederacies would be necessitated 
        by mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the 
        lowness of their duties. The temper of our governments, for a long time 
        to come, would not permit those rigorous precautions by which the European 
        nations guard the avenues into their respective countries, as well by 
        land as by water; and which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles 
        to the adventurous stratagems of avarice. In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly 
        employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the 
        dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these patrols 
        at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense difficulty in preventing 
        that species of traffic, where there is an inland communication, and places 
        in a strong light the disadvantages with which the collection of duties 
        in this country would be encumbered, if by disunion the States should 
        be placed in a situation, with respect to each other, resembling that 
        of France with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers 
        with which the patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in 
        a free country. If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the States, 
        there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but ONE SIDE 
        to guard--the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from foreign countries, 
        laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to hazard themselves 
        to the complicated and critical perils which would attend attempts to 
        unlade prior to their coming into port. They would have to dread both 
        the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well after as before their 
        arrival at the places of their final destination. An ordinary degree of 
        vigilance would be competent to the prevention of any material infractions 
        upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed 
        at the entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made useful 
        sentinels of the laws. And the government having the same interest to 
        provide against violations everywhere, the co-operation of its measures 
        in each State would have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. 
        Here also we should preserve by Union, an advantage which nature holds 
        out to us, and which would be relinquished by separation. The United States 
        lie at a great distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from 
        all other places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign 
        trade. The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single night, 
        as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neighboring 
        nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious security against 
        a direct contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband 
        to one State, through the medium of another, would be both easy and safe. 
        The difference between a direct importation from abroad, and an indirect 
        importation through the channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels, 
        according to time and opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland 
        communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment. It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able, 
        at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison, 
        further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any 
        partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted, 
        that these duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three 
        per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., 
        and in Britain they exceed this proportion. [1] There 
        seems to be nothing to hinder their being increased in this country to 
        at least treble their present amount. The single article of ardent spirits, 
        under federal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable revenue. 
        Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quantity imported 
        into the United States may be estimated at four millions of gallons; which, 
        at a shilling per gallon, would produce two hundred thousand pounds. That 
        article would well bear this rate of duty; and if it should tend to diminish 
        the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally favorable to the 
        agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the health of the society. 
        There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of national extravagance 
        as these spirits. What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail ourselves of 
        the resource in question in its full extent? A nation cannot long exist 
        without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign 
        its independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a province. 
        This is an extremity to which no government will of choice accede. Revenue, 
        therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the principal 
        part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon 
        land. It has been already intimated that excises, in their true signification, 
        are too little in unison with the feelings of the people, to admit of 
        great use being made of that mode of taxation; nor, indeed, in the States 
        where almost the sole employment is agriculture, are the objects proper 
        for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very ample collections in that 
        way. Personal estate (as has been before remarked), from the difficulty 
        in tracing it, cannot be subjected to large contributions, by any other 
        means than by taxes on consumption. In populous cities, it may be enough 
        the subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppression of individuals, 
        without much aggregate benefit to the State; but beyond these circles, 
        it must, in a great measure, escape the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. 
        As the necessities of the State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in some 
        mode or other, the defect of other resources must throw the principal 
        weight of public burdens on the possessors of land. And as, on the other 
        hand, the wants of the government can never obtain an adequate supply, 
        unless all the sources of revenue are open to its demands, the finances 
        of the community, under such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation 
        consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus we shall not 
        even have the consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression 
        of that valuable class of the citizens who are employed in the cultivation 
        of the soil. But public and private distress will keep pace with each 
        other in gloomy concert; and unite in deploring the infatuation of those 
        counsels which led to disunion.