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fp11.txt
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fp11.txt
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THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points
about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion,
and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who have
any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our intercourse
with foreign countries as with each other. There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous
spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has already
excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe.
They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that carrying
trade, which is the support of their navigation and the foundation of
their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies in America look
forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude.
They foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from
the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions, and would
possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine.
Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering
divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an ACTIVE
COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answer the threefold purpose of
preventing our interference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits
of our trade, and of clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous
greatness. Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult
to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers. If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our
prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending,
at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries
to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This assertion
will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the importance
of the markets of three millions of people--increasing in rapid progression,
for the most part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from
local circumstances to remain so--to any manufacturing nation; and the
immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of such
a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and an indirect
conveyance of its products and returns, to and from America, in the ships
of another country. Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America,
capable of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty
of commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation
of this step upon her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with
the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most
valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these
questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received a
plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said that
prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain,
because she could prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the
Dutch, who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for those articles
which were wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation
be materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being
her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its profits
be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk?
Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction?
Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of
other nations, by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets,
and by transferring to other hands the management of this interesting
branch of the British commerce? A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will
justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a state
of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of the
nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities of the
West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system,
and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those
islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most substantial
benefits. Such a point gained from the British government, and which could
not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in
our markets, would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct
of other nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether
supplanted in our trade. A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward
us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal navy.
There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an efficient
government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to
create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime
powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale
of either of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the
case in relation to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the
line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often
be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which
interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in
this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this consideration we add
that of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution
of military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived
that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage
for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship,
but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope,
erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to
incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world
as our interest may dictate. But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that
the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and
would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed
within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would be a
prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other;
who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or remorse,
supply their wants by depredations on our property as often as it fell
in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they
are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness,
forfeits even the privilege of being neutral. Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources
of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations
of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situation would even
take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing an impracticability
of success. An active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing
marine would then be the offspring of moral and physical necessity. We
might defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary
the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature. But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might
operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations,
availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions
of our political existence; and as they have a common interest in being
our carriers, and still more in preventing our becoming theirs, they would
in all probability combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner
as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We
should then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of
our commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us
to enrich our enemies and p rsecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise,
which signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators,
and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would
be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country
which, with wisdom, might make herself the admiration and envy of the
world. There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights
of the Union--I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the Western
lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the Confederacy
would give room for delicate questions concerning the future existence
of these rights; which the interest of more powerful partners would hardly
fail to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain with regard
to the Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned
with us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their
navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent to that
decided mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed in this
valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those
nations in their own markets. What more natural than that they should
be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors? This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit.
All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously participate
in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital,
would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or
when time shall have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation
in the several States, will become, a universal resource. To the establishment
of a navy, it must be indispensable. To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various
ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quantity
and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and support.
A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all,
is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial
confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single part.
It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated America possess
each some peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. The more
southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores--tar,
pitch, and turpentine. Their wood for the construction of ships is also
of a more solid and lasting texture. The difference in the duration of
the ships of which the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed
of Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of
naval strength or of national economy. Some of the Southern and of the
Middle States yield a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen
must chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection
to external or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation,
no more than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity
of a navy. An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance
the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not
only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to
foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished,
and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of
the commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater
scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States. When
the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can
call to its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the
value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign
commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a large number
of materials of a given value than with a small number of materials of
the same value; arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctations
of markets. Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods,
and unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can
scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter predicament,
and on this account the operations of the merchant would be less liable
to any considerable obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader
will at once perceive the force of these observations, and will acknowledge
that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would
bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the thirteen States without
union or with partial unions. It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united
or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them
which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered,
interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the course
of these papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial, as well
as political, interests, can only result from a unity of government. There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed,
of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into
the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper
discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our situation invites and our
interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs.
The world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into
four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the
other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and
by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all.
Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination. The
superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as
the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created
for her benefit. Men admired as profound philosophers have, in direct
terms, attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority, and have
gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate
in America--that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile
in our atmosphere.[1] Facts have too long supported these
arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the
honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.
Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add another victim to
his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European
greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble
Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control
of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms
of the connection between the old and the new world!