fp08.txt

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, 
        in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be 
        formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to 
        those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each 
        other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united 
        under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the 
        consequences that would attend such a situation. War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, 
        would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is 
        in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. 
        The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, 
        though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, 
        been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests 
        impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark 
        the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification 
        has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled 
        with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns 
        are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance 
        into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust 
        the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading 
        army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as 
        soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively 
        small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid 
        of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises 
        of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of 
        the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, 
        but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats 
        more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition. In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy 
        of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The 
        want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, 
        would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, 
        overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be 
        made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and 
        predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. 
        The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events 
        which would characterize our military exploits. This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not 
        long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful 
        director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after 
        a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and 
        property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on 
        a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to 
        liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a 
        tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, 
        they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free. The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the correspondent 
        appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are 
        not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is therefore inferred 
        that they may exist under it. [1] Their existence, however, 
        from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and 
        uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result 
        from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, 
        which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce 
        them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse to 
        them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. 
        They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and resources 
        by a more regular and effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, 
        and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to 
        strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their constitutions 
        would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature 
        of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority. The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or 
        confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors. 
        Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous governments, 
        and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over 
        large states, or states of greater natural strength, which have been destitute 
        of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important 
        States or confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying 
        and adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar 
        to those by which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their 
        lost pre-eminence. Thus, we should, in a little time, see established 
        in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have 
        been the scourge of the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural 
        course of things; and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just, 
        in proportion as they are accommodated to this standard. These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative defects 
        in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands of 
        a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclusions, 
        drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs. It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not standing 
        armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the 
        ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, 
        may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of 
        the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the 
        improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition 
        of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of 
        those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied 
        by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and the 
        science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring 
        with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the 
        system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the 
        body of the citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility. There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in 
        a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in 
        one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The 
        rulers of the former can have a good pretext, if they are even so inclined, 
        to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained 
        in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, 
        called into activity for interior defense, the people are in no danger 
        of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed 
        to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil state remains 
        in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or 
        propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army renders the 
        natural strength of the community an over-match for it; and the citizens, 
        not habituated to look up to the military power for protection, or to 
        submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view 
        them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand 
        ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice 
        of their rights. The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the 
        magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; 
        but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts 
        of the great body of the people. In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this 
        happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be 
        always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant 
        defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance 
        of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. 
        The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of 
        territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent 
        infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those 
        rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery 
        not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from 
        this disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote 
        nor difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under 
        such impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations 
        supported by the military power. The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An insular 
        situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against 
        the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous 
        army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden 
        descent, till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all 
        that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, 
        nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon 
        its domestic establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little 
        room for the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated 
        as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar felicity of situation 
        has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that 
        country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. 
        If, on the contrary, Britain had been situated on the continent, and had 
        been compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make her 
        military establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great 
        powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all probability be, at this 
        day, a victim to the absolute power of a single man. 'T is possible, though 
        not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes; 
        but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which 
        has been usually kept up within the kingdom. If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an 
        advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great 
        distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue 
        too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous 
        annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, 
        be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral 
        parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should 
        be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a 
        short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of 
        Europe --our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves 
        against the ambition and jealousy of each other. This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It 
        deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and 
        honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn 
        pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting 
        idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and trace it to 
        all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections 
        to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in all probability put 
        a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered 
        imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to the 
        more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.