fp05.txt

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, 
        makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between 
        England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public 
        with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be 
        the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, 
        and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies 
        and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, 
        riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in 
        affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will 
        be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend 
        to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the 
        union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way 
        to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs 
        of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR 
        UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION." It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at 
        home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more 
        to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within 
        ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted. The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general 
        the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit 
        by their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although 
        it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should 
        be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, 
        and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and 
        wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect 
        to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy 
        and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually 
        kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient 
        and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other. Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, 
        would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and 
        be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection" 
        and free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and jealousy 
        would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests 
        of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, 
        would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most 
        other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes 
        and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them. The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably 
        suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point 
        of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting 
        that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance 
        of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend 
        to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress in 
        another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good 
        management which would probably distinguish the government of one above 
        the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration 
        would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of 
        sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each 
        of these confederacies for a long succession of years. Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, 
        that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale 
        of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment 
        would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions 
        would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise 
        to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from measures 
        calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would 
        not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. 
        She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but 
        also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally 
        creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily 
        changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether 
        expressed or implied. The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances 
        render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies 
        would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable 
        than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident than the NORTHERN 
        HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts 
        of America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor 
        does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often 
        be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air 
        of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors. They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies 
        will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would 
        in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they 
        would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be 
        a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they 
        would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless 
        wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER. From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly 
        mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed 
        between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union 
        of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put and 
        keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies. When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were formerly 
        divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign 
        enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them 
        would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; 
        and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for 
        different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. Different 
        commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different 
        degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign 
        nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation 
        with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with 
        whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving 
        peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest 
        would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed 
        and fulfilled with perfect good faith. Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring 
        nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly 
        passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering 
        our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies 
        to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and therefore 
        that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others 
        by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers 
        by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more 
        easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies 
        into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How 
        many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, 
        and what innovations did they under the same character introduce into 
        the governments of those whom they pretended to protect. Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any 
        given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against 
        the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.