Merge pull request #1170 from volatilityfoundation/hollow_process

Add new plugin to detect hollowed processes using a variety of techni…

volatility3/framework/plugins/windows/hollowprocesses.py

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+# This file is Copyright 2024 Volatility Foundation and licensed under the Volatility Software License 1.0
+# which is available at https://www.volatilityfoundation.org/license/vsl-v1.0
+#
+import logging
+from typing import NamedTuple, Dict, Generator
+
+from volatility3.framework import interfaces, exceptions, constants
+from volatility3.framework import renderers
+from volatility3.framework.configuration import requirements
+from volatility3.framework.objects import utility
+from volatility3.plugins.windows import pslist, vadinfo
+
+vollog = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+VadData = NamedTuple(
+    "VadData",
+    [
+        ("protection", str),
+        ("path", str),
+    ],
+)
+
+DLLData = NamedTuple(
+    "DLLData",
+    [
+        ("path", str),
+    ],
+)
+
+### Useful references on process hollowing
+# https://cysinfo.com/detecting-deceptive-hollowing-techniques/
+# https://github.com/m0n0ph1/Process-Hollowing
+
+
+class HollowProcesses(interfaces.plugins.PluginInterface):
+    """Lists hollowed processes"""
+
+    _required_framework_version = (2, 4, 0)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def get_requirements(cls):
+        # Since we're calling the plugin, make sure we have the plugin's requirements
+        return [
+            requirements.ModuleRequirement(
+                name="kernel",
+                description="Windows kernel",
+                architectures=["Intel32", "Intel64"],
+            ),
+            requirements.ListRequirement(
+                name="pid",
+                element_type=int,
+                description="Process IDs to include (all other processes are excluded)",
+                optional=True,
+            ),
+            requirements.VersionRequirement(
+                name="pslist", component=pslist.PsList, version=(2, 0, 0)
+            ),
+            requirements.VersionRequirement(
+                name="vadinfo", component=vadinfo.VadInfo, version=(2, 0, 0)
+            ),
+        ]
+
+    def _get_vads_data(
+        self, proc: interfaces.objects.ObjectInterface
+    ) -> Dict[int, VadData]:
+        """
+        Returns a dictionary of:
+            base address -> (protection string, file name)
+        For each mapped VAD in the process. This is used
+        for quick lookups of data and matching the DLL
+        at the same base address as the VAD
+        """
+        vads = {}
+
+        kernel = self.context.modules[self.config["kernel"]]
+
+        for vad in proc.get_vad_root().traverse():
+            protection_string = vad.get_protection(
+                vadinfo.VadInfo.protect_values(
+                    self.context, kernel.layer_name, kernel.symbol_table_name
+                ),
+                vadinfo.winnt_protections,
+            )
+
+            fn = vad.get_file_name()
+            if not fn or not isinstance(fn, str):
+                fn = "<Non-File Backed Region>"
+
+            vads[vad.get_start()] = VadData(protection_string, fn)
+
+        return vads
+
+    def _get_dlls_map(
+        self, proc: interfaces.objects.ObjectInterface
+    ) -> Dict[int, DLLData]:
+        """
+        Returns a dictionary of:
+            base address -> path
+        for each DLL loaded in the process
+
+        This is used to cross compare with
+        the corresponding VAD and to have a
+        backup path source in case of smear
+        in the VAD
+        """
+        dlls = {}
+
+        for entry in proc.load_order_modules():
+            try:
+                base = entry.DllBase
+            except exceptions.InvalidAddressException:
+                continue
+
+            try:
+                FullDllName = entry.FullDllName.get_string()
+            except exceptions.InvalidAddressException:
+                FullDllName = renderers.UnreadableValue()
+
+            dlls[base] = DLLData(FullDllName)
+
+        return dlls
+
+    def _get_image_base(self, proc: interfaces.objects.ObjectInterface) -> int:
+        """
+        Uses the PEB to get the image base of the process
+        """
+        kernel = self.context.modules[self.config["kernel"]]
+
+        try:
+            proc_layer_name = proc.add_process_layer()
+            peb = self.context.object(
+                kernel.symbol_table_name + constants.BANG + "_PEB",
+                layer_name=proc_layer_name,
+                offset=proc.Peb,
+            )
+            return peb.ImageBaseAddress
+        except exceptions.InvalidAddressException:
+            return None
+
+    def _check_load_address(self, proc, _, __) -> Generator[str, None, None]:
+        """
+        Detects when the image base in the PEB, which is writable by process malware,
+        does not match the section base address - whose value lives in kernel memory.
+        Many malware samples will manipulate their image base to fool AVs/EDRs and
+        as a necessary part of certain hollowing techniques
+        """
+        image_base = self._get_image_base(proc)
+        if image_base is not None and image_base != proc.SectionBaseAddress:
+            yield "The ImageBaseAddress reported from the PEB ({:#x}) does not match the process SectionBaseAddress ({:#x})".format(
+                image_base, proc.SectionBaseAddress
+            )
+
+    def _check_exe_protection(
+        self, proc, vads: Dict[int, VadData], __
+    ) -> Generator[str, None, None]:
+        """
+        Legitimately mapped application executables and DLLs
+        will have a VAD present and its initial protection will be
+        PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY.
+        Many process hollowing and code injection techniques will
+        unmap the real executable and/or map in executables with
+        incorrect permissions.
+        This check verifies the VAD for the application exe.
+        `_check_dlls_protection` checks for DLLs mapped in the process.
+        """
+        base = proc.SectionBaseAddress
+
+        if base not in vads:
+            yield "There is no VAD starting at the base address of the process executable ({:#x})".format(
+                base
+            )
+        elif vads[base].protection != "PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY":
+            yield "Unexpected protection ({}) for VAD hosting the process executable ({:#x}) with path {}".format(
+                vads[base].protection, base, vads[base].path
+            )
+
+    def _check_dlls_protection(
+        self, _, vads: Dict[int, VadData], dlls: Dict[int, DLLData]
+    ) -> Generator[str, None, None]:
+        for dll_base in dlls:
+            # could be malicious but triggers too many FPs from smear
+            if dll_base not in vads:
+                continue
+
+            # PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY is the only valid permission for mapped DLLs and .exe files
+            if vads[dll_base].protection != "PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY":
+                yield "Unexpected protection ({}) for DLL in the PEB's load order list ({:#x}) with path {}".format(
+                    vads[dll_base].protection, dll_base, dlls[dll_base].path
+                )
+
+    def _generator(self, procs):
+        checks = [
+            self._check_load_address,
+            self._check_exe_protection,
+            self._check_dlls_protection,
+        ]
+
+        for proc in procs:
+            # smear and/or terminated process
+            dlls = self._get_dlls_map(proc)
+            if len(dlls) < 3:
+                continue
+
+            vads = self._get_vads_data(proc)
+            if len(vads) < 5:
+                continue
+
+            proc_name = utility.array_to_string(proc.ImageFileName)
+            pid = proc.UniqueProcessId
+
+            for check in checks:
+                for note in check(proc, vads, dlls):
+                    yield 0, (
+                        pid,
+                        proc_name,
+                        note,
+                    )
+
+    def run(self):
+        filter_func = pslist.PsList.create_pid_filter(self.config.get("pid", None))
+        kernel = self.context.modules[self.config["kernel"]]
+
+        return renderers.TreeGrid(
+            [
+                ("PID", int),
+                ("Process", str),
+                ("Notes", str),
+            ],
+            self._generator(
+                pslist.PsList.list_processes(
+                    context=self.context,
+                    layer_name=kernel.layer_name,
+                    symbol_table=kernel.symbol_table_name,
+                    filter_func=filter_func,
+                )
+            ),
+        )