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Thomas King edited this page Nov 25, 2015 · 20 revisions

RPKI-Light: RPKI and BGPSec Validation at the Route Server

Use-Case

Nowadays, at an IXP there are usually a lot of peers running routers not capable of running RPKI/BGPSec validation. However, RPKI and BGPSec validation already provides some value as it allows to detect route leaks / hijacks. Typically, many peers rely on the route-server anyway for receiving BGP information from other peers connected to IXP. So the route-server is a good place where RPKI and BGPSec validation could happen if there is a way of signalling the RPKI and BGPSec validation results to the peers.

This document is about a means to signal RPKI and BGPSec validation done at the route-server to peers. The way of signalling should be equal at all IXPs offering this service so that customers can easily consume this service.

Objectives

  1. RPKI validation results (Invalid, Valid, Unknown) must be signalled from the route-server to peers.
  2. BGPSec validation results must be signalled from the route-server to peers.
  3. A spreading of the RPKI and BGPSec validation results from one AS connected to the IXP
  4. Existing BGP speakers must be easily changed to support this new feature (e.g., configuration).

Current Situations

  • AMS-IX Falcon (http://www.ams-ix.net): AMS-IX is already running a route-server in beta mode providing RPKI validation. For signalling the following BGP communities are used:
  • Prefix has ROA status: VALID (6777:65012)
  • Prefix has ROA status: INVALID (6777:65022)
  • Prefix has ROA status: UNKNOWN (6777:65023)
  • DE-CIX (http://www.de-cix.net): Is currently designing and testing a solution.
  • Lyonix (http://www.lyonix.net) / Rezopole: Is currently executing RPKI validation with sharing the result.
  • Nicix (http://www.nicix.net) / Rezopole: see Lyonix
  • JPNAP (http://www.jpnap.net/english/): RPKI validation is currently tested.

Related Work

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