From 765ba6aa88678f3d68c18a414dcc43702231c27f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tirumaleswar Reddy <30891538+tireddy2@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 18:20:45 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] Add files via upload

---
 draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers.md b/draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers.md
index dd90590..e735384 100644
--- a/draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers.md
+++ b/draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers.md
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ Finally, in their evaluation criteria for PQC, NIST is assessing the security le
 
 “Shor’s algorithm” on the other side, efficiently solves the integer factorization problem (and the related discrete logarithm problem), which offer the foundations of the vast majority of public-key cryptography that the world uses today. This implies that, if a CRQC is developed, today’s public-key cryptography algorithms (e.g., RSA, Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Cryptography, as well as less commonly-used variants such as ElGamal and Schnorr signatures) and protocols would need to be replaced by algorithms and protocols that can offer cryptanalytic resistance against CRQCs. Note that Shor’s algorithm cannot run solely on a classic computer, it needs a CRQC.
 
-For example, to provide some context, one would need 20 million noisy qubits to break RSA-2048 in 8 hours {{RSAShor}}{{RSA8HRS}} or 4099 stable (or logical) qubits to break it in a much shorter time {{RSA10SC}}.
+For example, to provide some context, one would need 20 million noisy qubits to break RSA-2048 in 8 hours {{RSAShor}}{{RSA8HRS}} or 4099 stable (or logical) qubits to break it {{RSA10SC}}.
 
 For structured data such as public keys and signatures, instead, CRQCs can fully solve the underlying hard problems used in classic cryptography (see Shor's Algorithm). Because an increase of the size of the key-pair would not provide a secure solution short of RSA keys that are many gigabytes in size {{PQRSA}}, a complete replacement of the algorithm is needed. Therefore, post-quantum public-key cryptography must rely on problems that are different from the ones used in classic public-key cryptography (i.e., the integer factorization problem, the finite-field discrete logarithm problem, and the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem).