From fde773dc631de1c51a8215ea786fe389f5a4669e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rohan Mahy Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2024 07:36:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Ready to submit draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02 --- versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.txt | 256 ++++++++++++ versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.xml | 380 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 636 insertions(+) create mode 100644 versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.txt create mode 100644 versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.xml diff --git a/versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.txt b/versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b6991f --- /dev/null +++ b/versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ + + + + +LAMPS WG R. Mahy +Internet-Draft Rohan Mahy Consulting Services +Intended status: Standards Track 20 October 2024 +Expires: 23 April 2025 + + + X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Instant Messaging URIs + draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02 + +Abstract + + RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers + (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines + Instant Messaging (IM) identity KeyPurposeId for inclusion in the + Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key + certificates + +About This Document + + This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. + + The latest revision of this draft can be found at + https://rohanmahy.github.io/mahy-lamps-im-keyusage/draft-ietf-lamps- + im-keyusage.html. Status information for this document may be found + at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage/. + + Discussion of this document takes place on the LAMPS WG Working Group + mailing list (mailto:lamps@ietf.org), which is archived at + https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/lamps/. Subscribe at + https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lamps/. + + Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at + https://github.com/rohanmahy/mahy-lamps-im-keyusage. + +Status of This Memo + + This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the + provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- + Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2025. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ + license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. + Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights + and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components + extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as + described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are + provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction + 2. Conventions and Definitions + 3. The IM URI Extended Key Usage + 4. Security Considerations + 5. IANA Considerations + 6. References + 6.1. Normative References + 6.2. Informative References + Appendix A. ASN.1 Module + Appendix B. Change log + Acknowledgments + Author's Address + +1. Introduction + + Instant Messaging (IM) systems using the Messaging Layer Security + (MLS) [RFC9420] protocol can incorporate per-client identity + certificate credentials. The subjectAltName of these certificates + can be an IM URI or XMPP URI, for example. Since IM clients could be + very numerous, operators are reticent to issue certificates for these + users that might accidentally be used to validate a TLS connection + because it has the KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth or id-kp-clientAuth. + + An explanation of MLS credentials as they apply to Instant Messaging + is described in [I-D.barnes-mimi-identity-arch]. These credentials + are expected to be heavily used in the More Instant Messaging + Interoperability (MIMI) Working Group. + +2. Conventions and Definitions + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in + BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + +3. The IM URI Extended Key Usage + + This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-imUri, which MAY be + used for signing messages to prove the identity of an Instant + Messaging client. This Extended Key Usage is optionally critical. + + id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { + iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } + + id-kp-imUri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 } + +4. Security Considerations + + The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this + document. This extended key purpose does not introduce new security + risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing means + to identify if the certificate is generated to sign IM identity + credentials. + +5. IANA Considerations + + IANA is requested to register the following OIDs in the "SMI Security + for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). These + OIDs are defined in Section 4. + + +=========+=============+============+ + | Decimal | Description | References | + +=========+=============+============+ + | TBD1 | id-kp-imUri | This-RFC | + +---------+-------------+------------+ + + Table 1 + + IANA is also requested to register the following ASN.1 + [ITU.X690.2021] module OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module + Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). This OID is defined in + Appendix A. + + +=========+===============+============+ + | Decimal | Description | References | + +=========+===============+============+ + | TBD2 | id-mod-im-eku | This-RFC | + +---------+---------------+------------+ + + Table 2 + +6. References + +6.1. Normative References + + [ITU.X680.2021] + International Telecommunications Union, "Information + Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): + Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation + X.680, 2021. + + [ITU.X690.2021] + International Telecommunications Union, "Information + Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic + Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and + Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation + X.690, 2021. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + . + + [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., + Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List + (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, + . + + [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC + 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, + May 2017, . + +6.2. Informative References + + [I-D.barnes-mimi-identity-arch] + Barnes, R. and R. Mahy, "Identity for E2E-Secure + Communications", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- + barnes-mimi-identity-arch-01, 23 October 2023, + . + + [RFC9420] Barnes, R., Beurdouche, B., Robert, R., Millican, J., + Omara, E., and K. Cohn-Gordon, "The Messaging Layer + Security (MLS) Protocol", RFC 9420, DOI 10.17487/RFC9420, + July 2023, . + +Appendix A. ASN.1 Module + + The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications [ITU.X680.2021] + and [ITU.X690.2021]. + + + + IM-EKU + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-im-eku (TBD2) } + + DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + BEGIN + + -- OID Arc + + id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } + + -- Extended Key Usage Values + + id-kp-imUri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 } + + END + + + + +Appendix B. Change log + + RFC Editor, please remove this section on publication. + + * made Proposed Standard + + * added a MAY statement in Section 3 + + * corrected typo in registration of the ASN.1 module (Thanks Sean!) + + * updated author affiliation + + * added ASN.1 module + + * specified that eku is optionally critical + +Acknowledgments + + Thanks to Sean Turner and Russ Housley for reviews, suggestions, + corrections, and encouragement. + +Author's Address + + Rohan Mahy + Rohan Mahy Consulting Services + Email: rohan.ietf@gmail.com diff --git a/versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.xml b/versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..798cb66 --- /dev/null +++ b/versioned/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-02.xml @@ -0,0 +1,380 @@ + + + + + +]> + + + + + + X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Instant Messaging URIs + + + Rohan Mahy Consulting Services +
+ rohan.ietf@gmail.com +
+ + + SEC + LAMPS WG + x.509 + certificate + extended key usage + eku + instant messaging + im URI + mimi URL + + + +RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers +(KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines +Instant Messaging (IM) identity KeyPurposeId for inclusion in +the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key +certificates + + + About This Document + + The latest revision of this draft can be found at . + Status information for this document may be found at . + + + Discussion of this document takes place on the + LAMPS WG Working Group mailing list (), + which is archived at . + Subscribe at . + + Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at + . + + + + + +
+ Introduction + Instant Messaging (IM) systems using the Messaging Layer Security (MLS) + protocol can incorporate per-client identity certificate +credentials. The subjectAltName of these certificates can be an IM URI or +XMPP URI, for example. Since IM clients could be very numerous, operators +are reticent to issue certificates for these users that might accidentally +be used to validate a TLS connection because it has the KeyPurposeId +id-kp-serverAuth or id-kp-clientAuth. + An explanation of MLS credentials as they apply to Instant Messaging is +described in . These credentials are +expected to be heavily used in the More Instant Messaging Interoperability +(MIMI) Working Group. +
+
+ Conventions and Definitions + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL +NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", +"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as +described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they +appear in all capitals, as shown here. + + +
+
+ The IM URI Extended Key Usage + This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-imUri, which MAY be used +for signing messages to prove the identity of an Instant Messaging client. +This Extended Key Usage is optionally critical. + +
+
+ Security Considerations + The Security Considerations of are applicable to this +document. This extended key purpose does not introduce new security +risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing means +to identify if the certificate is generated to sign IM identity credentials. +
+
+ IANA Considerations + IANA is requested to register the following OIDs in the "SMI Security +for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). These +OIDs are defined in Section 4. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
DecimalDescriptionReferences
TBD1id-kp-imUriThis-RFC
+ IANA is also requested to register the following ASN.1 +module OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). This OID is defined in . + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
DecimalDescriptionReferences
TBD2id-mod-im-ekuThis-RFC
+
+ + + + References + + Normative References + + + Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) + + International Telecommunications Union + + + + + + + + Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation + + International Telecommunications Union + + + + + + + + Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels + + + + In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. + + + + + + + + + Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words + + + + RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. + + + + + + + + + Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile + + + + + + + + + This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] + + + + + + + + Informative References + + + The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol + + + + + + + + + Messaging applications are increasingly making use of end-to-end security mechanisms to ensure that messages are only accessible to the communicating endpoints, and not to any servers involved in delivering messages. Establishing keys to provide such protections is challenging for group chat settings, in which more than two clients need to agree on a key but may not be online at the same time. In this document, we specify a key establishment protocol that provides efficient asynchronous group key establishment with forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS) for groups in size ranging from two to thousands. + + + + + + + + Identity for E2E-Secure Communications + + Cisco + + + Wire + + + + End-to-end (E2E) security is a critical property for modern user + communications systems. E2E security protects users' communications + from tampering or inspection by intermediaries that are involved in + delivering those communcations from one logical endpoint to another. + In addition to the much-discussed E2E encryption systems, true E2E + security requires an identity mechanism that prevents the + communications provider from impersonating participants in a session, + as a way to gain access to the session. This document describes a + high-level architecture for E2E identity, identifying the critical + mechanisms that need to be specified. + + + + + + + + + + +
+ ASN.1 Module + The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications and +. + + +IM-EKU + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-im-eku (TBD2) } + +DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= +BEGIN + +-- OID Arc + +id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } + +-- Extended Key Usage Values + +id-kp-imUri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 } + +END + + + +]]> +
+
+ Change log + RFC Editor, please remove this section on publication. +
    +
  • + made Proposed Standard +
    • +
  • + added a MAY statement in Section 3 +
    • +
  • + corrected typo in registration of the ASN.1 module (Thanks Sean!) +
    • +
  • + updated author affiliation +
    • +
  • + added ASN.1 module +
    • +
  • + specified that eku is optionally critical +
    • +
+
+
+ Acknowledgments + Thanks to Sean Turner and Russ Housley for reviews, suggestions, +corrections, and encouragement. +
+ + + +