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+
+1 INTRODUÇÃO
+
+Há uma conhecida parábola indiana que se espalhou por todo o
+
+subcontinente, sendo possível encontrar versões da mesma em diversas obras
+
+filosóficas e religiosas. A versão mais antiga que se conhece está no texto budista
+
+Udāna e desenrola-se na antiga cidade de Sāvatthī. Ela pode ser resumida da
+
+seguinte maneira: na época em que Buda ainda caminhava pela terra havia, nos
+
+arredores do templo de Sāvatthī, alguns sábios, cegos de nascença. Não
+
+conseguiam discutir e tampouco compartilhar ideias, apenas reiteravam a certeza de
+
+seus pontos de vista sobre verdades transcendentais. A arrogância dos mesmos
+
+começava a desviá-los da busca por sabedoria. O monarca de Sāvatthī, na tentativa
+
+de acabar com as disputas entre esses sábios, convocou-os ao palácio. Fez com
+
+que um servo levasse todos à presença de um elefante. O servo encostou a mão do
+
+primeiro sábio na orelha do animal e lhe disse: “Isto é um elefante”. Encostou a mão
+
+do segundo sábio em suas presas e lhe disse: “Isto é um elefante”. O terceiro tocou
+
+sua lateral; o quarto, sua cauda; o quinto, sua tromba. O rei aproximou-se dos
+
+sábios, perguntando-lhes: “Como é um elefante?”. “Parece um flabelo”, respondeu o
+
+sábio que tocara sua orelha. “Não! Parece-se com um arado!”, respondeu o sábio
+
+que tocara suas presas. O sábio que tocou sua lateral respondeu: “Parece uma
+
+muralha!”. “Parece uma corda”, falou o quarto; “Parece uma serpente”, respondeu o
+
+quinto. O rei deleitou-se com a disputa entre aqueles que estavam certos e errados
+
+ao mesmo tempo, dizendo: “Vocês que veem mais que qualquer outro, não
+
+conseguem enxergar uma mesma coisa. Mas é a mesma coisa, compreendida de
+
+jeitos diferentes”.
+
+Nesse espírito, o presente trabalho analisa a disputa metodológica acerca do
+
+estudo científico do direito travada entre Eugen Ehrlich (1868-1922) e Hans Kelsen
+
+(1881-1973) no contexto austro-húngaro de princípios do século XX. Era uma época
+
+em que a ciência do direito então existente aparentava não conseguir mais dar
+
+respostas a diversos problemas que se levantavam. Frente a tal situação, ambos os
+
+intelectuais aqui estudados talvez tenham se comportado tal como os sábios cegos
+
+da parábola indiana: um tanto perplexos, tateavam o mesmo objeto, o direito, mas
+
+eram incapazes de enxergar uma mesma coisa.
+
+Gestado em nível de iniciação científica ao longo de dois anos, este estudo
+
+está vinculado ao projeto de pesquisa coletivo A Sociologia do Direito em Busca de
+12
+
+uma Identidade: Debates Clássicos e Contemporâneos. Desenvolvido no âmbito do
+
+Grupo de Pesquisa Direito e Sociedade (GPDS) da Universidade Federal do Rio
+
+Grande do Sul, sob a coordenação do professor Lucas P. Konzen, o referido projeto
+
+de pesquisa investiga o desenvolvimento histórico da sociologia do direito e sua
+
+busca por uma identidade enquanto ciência social, visando compreender como se dá
+
+sua interação com a dogmática jurídica, o paradigma dominante no estudo do
+
+fenômeno jurídico ao longo do século XX.
+
+O debate contemporâneo sobre a coexistência de tipos diversos de pesquisa
+
+acerca do fenômeno jurídico pode ser compreendido a partir da teoria dos
+
+paradigmas científicos de Thomas Kuhn. Este diz que “Um paradigma é aquilo que
+
+os membros de uma comunidade partilham e, inversamente, uma comunidade
+
+científica consiste em homens que partilham um paradigma” (KUHN, 2013, p. 221).
+
+Dois paradigmas dispõem acerca do fenômeno jurídico na atualidade e ora
+
+conflitam, ora se complementam: o paradigma dogmático e o paradigma
+
+sociojurídico. “O paradigma dogmático se configura assim, paulatinamente na
+
+Europa continental do Século XIX [...]” (ANDRADE, 1996, p. 24), vigorando
+
+posteriormente de modo hegemônico na cultura jurídica ocidental romanogermânica,
+principalmente no contexto europeu continental e latino-americano.
+
+Nesse paradigma converge uma série de matrizes e processos que edificam aquilo
+
+que viria a se tornar a denominada ciência do direito. Por isso, para Lucas Konzen
+
+(2010), o paradigma dogmático se desdobra em quatro traços fundamentais: o
+
+monismo jurídico, a racionalização técnico-formal da prática jurídico-científica, a
+
+busca da certeza e da segurança jurídica e a crença na unidade lógico-formal capaz
+
+de equilibrar antagonismos e harmonizar interesses.
+
+Ainda que se possa elencar uma série de precursores1
+que tenham desafiado
+
+esses cânones de cientificidade desde a gênese desse paradigma, é somente na
+
+segunda metade do século XX que se testemunha o surgimento de um conjunto de
+
+iniciativas articuladas, que vem a se institucionalizar como comunidade científica
+
+efetivamente capaz de produzir e reproduzir conhecimentos jurídicos a partir de um
+
+paradigma diverso do dogmático. É na década de sessenta que desponta o
+
+
+1
+Entre os precursores aos quais se faz referência enumeram-se aqueles intelectuais que desenvolvem uma
+abordagem contextualizada do direito pela ótica do conhecimento sociológico, afirma Konzen (2010). Incluem-se
+aí Marx, Durkheim, Weber e movimentos críticos de juristas que se deixaram influenciar pelo conhecimento
+sociológico, como, por exemplo, a jurisprudência sociológica e o realismo jurídico nos Estados Unidos, não
+esquecendo também a contribuição de antropólogos que estudaram as manifestações da juridicidade em
+culturas não ocidentais, refutando a premissa monista da dogmática jurídica.
+13
+
+movimento Direito e Sociedade que, promovendo a sociologia do direito enquanto
+
+disciplina, ergue-se em torno do paradigma sociojurídico como modelo de
+
+cientificidade e se manifesta na fundação de duas associações: o Research
+
+Committee on Sociology of Law, estabelecido na Europa, em 1962; e a Law &
+
+Society Association, constituída nos Estados Unidos, em 1964. Konzen (2010)
+
+elenca quatro traços fundamentais do paradigma sociojurídico: o pluralismo jurídico,
+
+a reconstrução da prática jurídico-científica, a busca por contribuir para a
+
+compreensão dos significados da justiça na sociedade e das condições necessárias
+
+para alcançá-la e a crença na importância de contextualizar socialmente o direito.
+
+Um dos primeiros capítulos da história da sociologia do direito passa por um
+
+debate travado entre dois grandes intelectuais que buscaram compreender o
+
+fenômeno jurídico sob um viés científico: Eugen Ehrlich e Hans Kelsen. O debate,
+
+publicado entre 1915 e 1917 no periódico Arquivo para a Ciência e Política Social
+
+(Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik), principia com uma crítica elaborada
+
+por Kelsen sobre a obra maior de Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamentos da Sociologia do
+
+Direito2
+(Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts), publicada em 1913. A crítica de
+
+Kelsen é seguida de uma resposta de Ehrlich, sucedida por uma réplica de Kelsen,
+
+uma tréplica de Ehrlich e um epílogo de Kelsen. Este debate foi compilado e
+
+publicado posteriormente na Alemanha sob o título Ciência do Direito e Sociologia
+
+do Direito: Uma Controvérsia (Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtssoziologie: eine
+
+Kontroverse). Dada a importância dessa controvérsia, que completa 100 anos em
+
+2017, consta em anexo uma tradução inédita da mesma para o português a partir do
+
+original em alemão.
+
+Dado o exposto, o presente trabalho ocupa-se da seguinte questão:
+
+considerando o debate entre 1915 e 1917, quais as principais diferenças entre as
+
+perspectivas de Eugen Ehrlich e Hans Kelsen acerca do que deveria ser a ciência do
+
+
+2
+Em 03 de abril de 2017, o tradutor da versão brasileira de Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts, o
+professor René Gertz, me recebeu gentilmente em sua casa para sanar algumas dúvidas acerca da
+terminologia empregada na tradução da obra em questão. Na ocasião, o professor me esclareceu que
+sua intenção original era traduzir a obra ao português pelo nome de Fundamentação da Sociologia do
+Direito, e não Fundamentos. Grund em alemão significa, em um sentido específico, base. Assim,
+Grundlegen pode ser traduzido por embasar ou fundamentar. Derivando, Grundlegung pode ser
+traduzido por fundamentação. O professor queria adotar o termo fundamentação para traduzir
+Grundlegung, assim como Leopoldo Holzbach ou Antônio Pinto de Carvalho o empregaram em suas
+traduções de Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes,
+de Immanuel Kant. Deixe-se, por isso, aqui esclarecido que o nome original do livro de Ehrlich em
+português deveria ser Fundamentação da Sociologia do Direito, sendo publicado como Fundamentos
+da Sociologia do Direito em busca de melhor retorno comercial.
+14
+
+direito? A escolha da pergunta se deu com o intuito de confrontar as ideias de um
+
+intelectual que é geralmente reconhecido como o precursor da sociologia do direito
+
+com a reação às mesmas por parte de outro intelectual, reconhecido como um dos
+
+maiores pensadores do positivismo jurídico. Assim, um estudo aprofundado dessa
+
+crítica pode contribuir para esclarecer como a sociologia do direito foi recebida como
+
+abordagem científica no momento de sua fundação por uma das vozes mais
+
+importantes da filosofia do direito no século XX.
+
+A fim de possibilitar uma maior compreensão do conteúdo da controvérsia, o
+
+trabalho se inicia com uma contextualização histórico-intelectual. Há de se
+
+esclarecer o conceito de dogmática jurídica aqui referido, bem como a situação em
+
+que se encontrava o Império Austro-Húngaro, onde viviam ambos os pensadores. A
+
+seguir, será contextualizada a obra de Ehrlich, com a apresentação dos conceitos
+
+essenciais. Finalmente, será feita uma análise do conteúdo do debate, colocando-se
+
+lado a lado as visões extremamente antagônicas de Ehrlich e Kelsen acerca da
+
+metodologia científica adequada para a compreensão do mesmo objeto: o direito.
+15
+
+2 CONTEXTUALIZAÇÃO HISTÓRICO-INTELECTUAL
+
+Uma vez que o presente trabalho lida com autores e ideias que vigoravam e
+
+se difundiam na virada do século XIX para o XX na Europa, alguns dos conceitos
+
+que são objeto de disputa entre Ehrlich e Kelsen podem ser apresentados não
+
+apenas pela produção acadêmica mais recente, mas também pela literatura de sua
+
+própria época, a fim de que possamos nos aproximar do horizonte semântico que os
+
+intelectuais tinham diante de si3
+. Além disso, é importante considerar o contexto
+
+espaço-temporal comum a ambos os debatedores, o Império Austro-Húngaro da
+
+Belle Époque.
+
+2.1 A DOGMÁTICA JURÍDICA EM CONTEXTO
+
+Inicialmente, cabe apontar aqui o que significava, à época, os conceitos de
+
+Ciência do Direito (Rechtswissenschaft) e Jurisprudência (Jurisprudenz). Theodor
+
+Sternberg, em sua obra Teoria Geral do Direito (Allgemeine Rechtslehre), refere que
+
+a Ciência do Direito é o conhecimento unificado sobre o direito. Este conhecimento,
+
+porém, se divide em um conhecimento prático e um conhecimento filosófico, isto é,
+
+saberes sobre o direito em um sentido estrito, concreto e em um sentido amplo,
+
+abstrato. A Jurisprudência é composta pelos saberes sobre o direito em sentido
+
+estrito e a Filosofia do Direito pelos saberes sobre o direito em sentido amplo
+
+(STERNBERG, 1904, p. 124-125). Assim, para alguns dos intelectuais do panorama
+
+germanófono, o termo Filosofia do Direito abrangia a dimensão abstrata do direito,
+
+seus fundamentos; e o termo Jurisprudência, seus elementos concretos. Era
+
+consequentemente possível, dado o panorama da época, que os juristas de então
+
+considerassem a Jurisprudência não como uma ciência de princípios universais, mas
+
+como algo limitado pelo tempo e pelo espaço. (GAREIS, 1911, p. 22). Parte da
+
+academia germanófona à época distinguiu, em termos similares, uma Jurisprudência
+
+Geral de uma Jurisprudência Particular, onde a Jurisprudência Geral representava a
+
+Filosofia do Direito, enquanto a Jurisprudência Particular lidava com a prática do
+
+direito em tempo e lugar específicos. De todo modo, “o uso alemão da Filosofia do
+
+Direito (...) subordina a filosofia à ciência” (KOCOUREK, 1911, p. 19).
+
+
+3
+Tal ideia me foi gentilmente sugerida pelo professor Alfredo de Jesus Flores.
+16
+
+Para se referir a essa Ciência do Direito (Rechtswissenschaft), muitos estudos
+
+contemporâneos da Sociologia do Direito falam em um paradigma dogmático. O
+
+conceito de paradigma empregado por Kuhn (2013) é utilizado com o fim de
+
+compreender a ideia de ciência sob uma perspectiva histórica. Segundo Kuhn, a
+
+ciência não é caracterizada apenas pelo método, mas também pela existência de
+
+uma comunidade que reconheça mutuamente as realizações científicas de seus
+
+cientistas, suas descobertas, suas formulações. Em A Estrutura das Revoluções
+
+Científicas, ao definir o conceito de “ciência normal”, o autor afirma que “Essas
+
+realizações são reconhecidas durante algum tempo por alguma comunidade
+
+científica específica como proporcionando os fundamentos para sua prática
+
+posterior” (KUHN, 2013, p. 52). Historicamente, os cientistas que não contestam
+
+paradigmas o fazem “esquecendo disputas sobre os mais fundamentais conceitos e
+
+teorias em suas disciplinas para que possam estendê-los e refiná-los. Estes
+
+conceitos e teorias funcionam juntos como componentes de um paradigma (...)”
+
+(ROUSE, 2002, p. 103, tradução nossa).
+
+Além disso, Kuhn chama de paradigma as realizações científicas que
+
+partilham duas características: a primeira é que as realizações científicas dos
+
+estudiosos tenham sido sem precedentes, a ponto de atrair um grupo duradouro de
+
+partidários, que assim se afastam de outras formas de atividades científicas
+
+dissimilares. A outra característica é a necessidade de as realizações científicas
+
+serem suficientemente abertas para que toda a espécie de problemas que venha a
+
+surgir possa ser resolvida pelo grupo de praticantes da ciência (cf. 2013, p. 52).
+
+Essas realizações bem-sucedidas, que integram a constelação de crenças
+
+dos membros da comunidade, também se aplicam às comunidades de estudiosos do
+
+fenômeno jurídico. Uma série de intelectuais contemporâneos discorre sobre uma
+
+forma específica e tradicional de se estudar o Direito, a chamada Dogmática Jurídica
+
+(cf. AARNIO, 1986, p. 17; COTTERRELL, 2009, p. 78).
+
+O pesquisador ou estudioso que se debruçar sobre o panorama intelectual e
+
+político da Europa Continental na virada do século XIX ao XX, principalmente na
+
+região circunscrita aos países germanófonos, irá se deparar com sistemas jurídicos
+
+extremamente sofisticados, frutos de um desenvolvimento conceitual cujas raízes
+
+brotaram na Iurisprudentia romana, passando pelas Universidades Medievais e seus
+
+glosadores, coroados com o advento do Racionalismo nos Século XVII e XVIII,
+
+segundo FERRAZ JÚNIOR (1980, p. 3). Tanto a Alemanha quanto o Império Austro-
+17
+
+Húngaro eram, às vésperas da primeira grande guerra, estados que ainda
+
+misturavam alguns resquícios aristocráticos com elementos liberais.
+
+Para compreender essas estruturas políticas, é preciso voltar 500 anos,
+
+quando Luther pregou as 95 teses na Catedral de Wittenberg. “Com a Reforma, há
+
+uma cisão na Cosmovisão Ocidental. No mesmo espaço geográfico, encontram-se
+
+agora indivíduos com visões de mundo e valores diversos. Não há mais valores
+
+‘objetivos’, que recebam a adesão generalizada” (BARZOTTO, 2007, p. 13).
+
+A modernidade inaugura uma sociedade pluralista, onde os valores tornam-se
+
+objeto não mais de uma visão de universo imposta pela Igreja Católica, mas sim pela
+
+preferência subjetiva. Ao mesmo tempo que livre, está-se diante de uma
+
+insegurança na identificação de qual norma deveria ser seguida ou não; o estado
+
+moderno - em sua versão absolutista - surge com a função de fornecer um padrão
+
+objetivo de resolução de conflitos. (BARZOTTO, 2007, p. 14). Para sanar a
+
+insegurança causada por essa pluralidade de valores era necessário um padrão
+
+objetivo de resolução de conflitos, que estivesse acima da vontade subjetiva de cada
+
+indivíduo. Este padrão objetivo era a oferta do Estado Moderno Absolutista para a
+
+cultura ocidental: a lei. Evidentemente, a lei era a vontade do soberano. Esta, ainda
+
+que arbitrária, era o valor limitador das escolhas e atos dos indivíduos. É com a
+
+passagem para o Estado Liberal que o poder estatal se curva também ao Direito,
+
+representando, por isso, uma vitória dos valores da burguesia, que passava a
+
+proteger-se do poder ilimitado do Estado Absolutista (BARZOTTO, 2007, p. 15).
+
+É nesse contexto que começa a ser gestado o paradigma dogmático. O
+
+paradigma dogmático é construído consoante a própria imagem compartilhada pelos
+
+juristas dogmáticos sobre o trabalho que realizam, o que evidencia, segundo Vera
+
+Andrade, a existência de um paradigma dogmático na Ciência do Direito
+
+(ANDRADE, 1996, p. 18). O paradigma dogmático apresenta as seguintes
+
+características: se identifica com a ideia de Ciência do Direito, tem por objeto o
+
+Direito Positivo vigente em um intervalo espaço-temporal específico, tem como
+
+tarefa imanente a “‘construção de um ‘sistema’ de conceitos elaborados a partir da
+
+‘interpretação’ do material normativo, segundo procedimentos intelectuais (lógicoformais)
+de coerência interna” (ANDRADE, 1996, p.18).
+
+Na execução de sua tarefa de elaborar o Direito vigente, a Dogmática Jurídica
+
+interpreta as normas jurídicas produzidas pelo legislador, explica a sua conexão
+
+interna, cria um sistema de teorias e conceitos, garantindo, em tese, a maior
+18
+
+uniformização e previsibilidade possível das decisões judiciais. Por isso, trata-se “de
+
+uma Ciência de ‘dever-ser’ (normativa), sistemática, descritiva, avalorativa
+
+(axiologicamente neutra) e prática” (ANDRADE, 1996, p.19). Esse paradigma
+
+dogmático reproduz a si próprio, se autorrepresentando como dotado de
+
+neutralidade normativa. É um approach específico ao estudo do Direito que
+
+circunscreve seu objeto a partir da adoção do método de análise a ser empregado.
+
+Essa escolha atende “a uma ideologia de base e direcionando-se para determinado
+
+fim ou função declarada” (ANDRADE, 1996, p. 20), uma ideologia que justifica o
+
+funcionamento do ofício jurídico. Se o “paradigma dogmático desenvolveu-se à
+
+sombra do Direito Privado, especialmente do Direito Civil e na esteira de uma
+
+tradição privatista” (ANDRADE 1996, p. 20), estendeu-se para o Direito Público;
+
+podendo-se, por isso, falar em Dogmáticas Jurídicas, enraizadas em um tronco
+
+comum.
+
+A partir da análise histórica do pensamento jurídico ocidental, uma série de
+
+autores, como Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Júnior e Enrique Zuleta Puceiro, por exemplo,
+
+identificou “três grandes tradições ou heranças jurídicas que constituíram a base
+
+sobre a qual se originou a Dogmática Jurídica, (...), no Século XIX: a herança
+
+jurisprudencial (romana), a herança exegética (medieval) e a herança sistemática
+
+(moderna)” (1996, p. 21).
+
+O pensamento jurisprudencial romano nos legou o primeiro elemento que
+
+constitui o tripé de sustentação da Dogmática Jurídica. a Iurisprudentia
+
+“desenvolveu-se numa ordem jurídica que, na prática, correspondia apenas a um
+
+quadro regulativo geral” (FERRAZ JÚNIOR, 2003, p. 56), isso porque a legislação da
+
+época de se restringia a temas muito específicos. Como consequência, uma grande
+
+parte da realidade concreta era regida pelo Direito Pretoriano.
+
+(...) o Direito Pretoriano não era algo completo, uma vez que (...) representava
+apenas uma forma supletiva da ordem jurídica vigente: era criado adjuvandi vel
+suplendi vel corrigendi juris civilis gratia (para ajudar ou suprir ou corrigir o Direito
+Civil) (FERRAZ JÚNIOR, 2003, p. 57)
+
+Os conflitos na Roma antiga eram resolvidos por decisões de autoridade,
+
+baseadas em fórmulas doutrinárias genéricas. “O Direito assumiu o perfil de um
+
+programa decisório onde eram formuladas as condições para uma decisão correta”
+
+(ANDRADE, 1996, p. 31). As decisões vinham embasadas em uma série de regras,
+
+métodos de interpretação, princípios. A aplicação desses preceitos faz com que o
+19
+
+Direito não seja visto como um litígio entre seres humanos, “mas como uma ordem
+
+reguladora que seja dotada de validade para todos” (1996, p. 32). Assim, a
+
+jurisprudência romana se manifesta como um sistema prático de soluções: ela não
+
+apenas descreve e analisa, mas ela prescreve e age.
+
+Segundo Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Júnior, a outra herança que constitui o
+
+embasamento epistemológico da Dogmática Jurídica é a herança exegética, cujo
+
+cerne é jaz no Medievo. A cultura jurídica então desenvolvida nas universidades
+
+europeias. É nesse contexto que surge a escola dos glosadores. Diz FERRAZ
+
+JÚNIOR
+
+A ciência (europeia) do direito propriamente dita nasce em Bolonha no século XI. (...)
+O pensamento dogmático, em sentido estrito, pode ser localizado, em suas origens,
+nesse período. Seu desenvolvimento foi possível graças a uma resenha crítica dos
+digestos justinianeus, a Littera Boloniensis, os quais foram transformados em textos
+escolares do ensino na universidade (2003, p. 62)
+
+Os glosadores tomavam os códices romanos como verdades das quais não
+
+se podia desviar. Havia, porém, muito espaço para ambiguidade na leitura dessas
+
+obras diante dos quase 600 anos que separam as codificações romanas da cultura
+
+universitária que viria a desenvolver a dogmática na península itálica. Por isso,
+
+baseados em um método de interpretação próprio (influenciado pelo “Trivium”
+
+romano), os Glosadores anotavam os códices romanos com a interpretação dos
+
+mesmos à sua realidade, com isso - através de uma interpretação signatária de um
+
+método específico - mantinham o texto original intocado. “Desde a Idade Média
+
+percebe-se que (...) o Direito adquire todavia uma dimensão sagrada transcendente
+
+com a sua cristianização, o que possibilita o aparecimento de um saber prudencial já
+
+com traços dogmáticos” (ANDRADE, 1996, p. 34).
+
+A terceira e última herança que fundamenta a Dogmática Jurídica é a herança
+
+sistemática, que vê o Direito como uma ordenação racional. Esse enquadramento do
+
+fenômeno jurídico é uma manifestação do Jusnaturalismo racionalista moderno. A
+
+era do Direito Racional conecta o pensamento jurídico ao pensamento sistemático.
+
+FERRAZ JÚNIOR nos ensina que, durante o Renascimento, o fenômeno jurídico
+
+começa a perder o caráter de sacralidade de que estava revestido desde o advento
+
+do Direito Canônico.”E a dessacralização do direito significará a correspondente
+
+tecnicização do saber jurídico e a equivalente perda de seu caráter ético, que a Era
+20
+
+Medieval cultuara e conservara” (2003, p. 66). Esse contexto de superação de uma
+
+visão de mundo ocorre entre 1600 e 1800.
+
+Os pensadores que interagiam com um contexto de sacralidade do texto de
+
+direito desenvolveram seus estudos e teorias no coração da Europa - principalmente
+
+na Itália e na França - em uma época e região em que o Catolicismo dava
+
+estabilidade para sua visão de mundo. Esta estabilidade foi rompida com a Reforma
+
+Protestante, Franz WIEACKER nos ensina que
+
+Uma ascensão mais rápida depois do fim do séc. XVII atesta, em contrapartida, que
+a cultura alemã estava mais segura de si e mais promissora depois da Guerra dos
+Trinta Anos do que nos meados do séc. XVI; então, no meio das catástrofes
+materiais, a rigidez paralisante dos confrontos desfez-se e preparou o advento de
+novas forças culturais e políticas (1980, p. 239).
+
+Aos pensadores do Direito que assumem a tarefa intelectual de fundamentálo
+e continuá-lo depois do choque de visões de mundo pós-reforma, Wieacker
+
+chama de Juristas do Usus Modernus. FERRAZ JÚNIOR, por sua vez, nos esclarece
+
+que esses juristas não mais indagam acerca das relações morais do bem na vida,
+
+mas focam suas condições efetivas e racionais de sobrevivência. As necessidades
+
+surgidas de uma sociedade mais complexa clamam por soluções técnicas que
+
+embasarão o desenvolvimento de doutrinas jurídicas (2003, p. 66).
+
+A sistematização do pensamento jurídico permitirá mais uma de suas
+
+metamorfoses. Assim,
+
+a teoria jurídica européia, até então conformada como uma teoria
+preponderantemente da exegese e da interpretação de textos singulares, passa a
+receber um caráter lógico-demonstrativo de um sistema fechado, cuja estrutura
+dominou e domina até hoje os códigos e o pensamento jurídico (1996, p. 35).
+
+Com as informações presentes no quadro de linhas de fundamentação da
+
+Dogmática Jurídica, pode-se partir para compreender de que maneira o Positivismo
+
+atuará como matriz epistemológica do paradigma dogmático de Ciência Jurídica.
+
+ANDRADE nos esclarece que a concepção positivista de mundo não se define por
+
+um conjunto de leis absolutas e predeterminadas. Na verdade, os fatos estão no
+
+mundo, determinados. A função da ciência nesse contexto é descobrir as leis de
+
+manifestação do determinismo que vige na realidade (ANDRADE, 1996, p. 39;
+
+BLACKBURN, 1997, p. 304). Por isso, “a ênfase do positivismo recai, desta forma,
+
+sobre os métodos e regras de constituição do conhecimento (...)” (ANDRADE, 1996,
+21
+
+p. 40), dessa forma, a apresentação de uma ciência se dá pelos seus métodos e
+
+suas proposições.
+
+É a Escola Histórica Alemã que primeiro recepciona a concepção positivista
+
+de Ciência, aplicando-a ao Direito. Orbitando ao redor das obras de seus
+
+representantes, mais notadamente nos capítulos sobre metodologia da obra
+
+“Sistema de Direito Romano atual” de Savigny e, conforme ANDRADE (1996, p. 42),
+
+no livro II do “Espírito do Direito Romano”, de Jhering. Para esses dois autores, o
+
+Direito não é reconhecível pelo seu conteúdo, mas sim pela forma que se manifesta
+
+na vida social.
+
+A Ciência do Direito, porém, vem empenhada em uma função prática, que se
+
+ocupa da forma técnica da aplicação do Direito, “sua finalidade essencial é
+
+consolidar o princípio da certeza como base para a segurança do tráfego jurídico”
+
+(ANDRADE, 1996, p. 51). Para os fins deste estudo, cabe apontar que, dentre os
+
+diversos méritos da Escola Histórica, o que a faz pesar ainda hoje para o
+
+pensamento jurídico é a introdução no método jurídico de uma preocupação pelo
+
+rigor lógico e pelas construções abstratas de Sistemas. Contextualizando a situação
+
+intelectual que sucede a Escola Histórica e antecede o debate entre Ehrlich e
+
+Kelsen, FERRAZ JÚNIOR escreve que
+
+O sistema jurídico é necessariamente manifestação de uma unidade imanente,
+perfeita e acabada, que a análise sistemática, realizada pela dogmática, faz mister
+explicitar. Essa concepção de sistema, que informa marcantemente a Jurisprudência
+dos Conceitos, escola doutrinária que, na Alemanha, se seguiu à Escola Histórica,
+acentua-se e desenvolve-se com Puchta e sua pirâmide de conceitos, o qual
+enfatiza o caráter lógico-dedutivo do sistema jurídico, enquanto desdobramento de
+conceitos e normas abstratas da generalidade para a singularidade, em termos de
+uma totalidade fechada e acabada (2003, p. 80).
+
+E conclui
+
+Notamos, assim, que o desenvolvimento da dogmática no século XIX, em termos de
+sua função social, passa a atribuir a seus conceitos um caráter abstrato que lhe
+permite uma emancipação das necessidade cotidianas dos interesses em jogo. (...)
+Assim, no século XIX, a ciência dogmática instaura-se como uma abstração dupla: a
+própria sociedade, à medida que o sistema jurídico diferencia-se como tal de outros
+sistemas - do sistema político, do sistema religioso, do sistema social - stricto sensu
+- constitui, ao lado das normas, conceitos e regras para sua manipulação autônoma.
+Ora, isto (normas, conceitos e regras) passa a ser o material da ciência dogmática,
+que se transforma numa elaboração de um material abstrato, num grau de abstração
+ainda maior, (...); pois tudo aquilo que é direito passa a ser determinado a partir de
+suas próprias construções. (2003, p. 80-81).
+22
+
+Fica assim exposto que o desenvolvimento da dogmática jurídica marcou o
+
+contexto intelectual que formou Ehrlich e Kelsen. É em torno dessa abordagem do
+
+fenômeno jurídico que o debate intelectual entre os dois intelectuais ocorrerá.
+
+2.2 O IMPÉRIO AUSTRO-HÚNGARO NA VIRADA DO SÉCULO XIX PARA O
+
+SÉCULO XX
+
+Ambos os debatedores nasceram e se formaram no Império Austro-Húngaro,
+
+nação extremamente vasta localizada no coração da Europa e que trazia dentro de
+
+si uma pluralidade de etnias e costumes. Nesse sentido,
+
+ao contrário de outros Estados europeus, constituídos em torno de uma só
+nação e uma só língua, a monarquia dos Habsburgos era integrada por
+onze nacionalidades diferentes, as quais se somavam distintas etnias não
+reconhecidas como grupo nacional. Nele se uniam uma variedade de
+línguas e religiões, de formas de vida que destoavam entre si, indo da
+prática da agricultura preindustrial e a existência de uma cosmopolita
+burguesia liberal nos modernos centros urbanos de Viena, Praga e
+Budapeste. (MORENO MÍNGUEZ, 2015, p. 16, tradução nossa)
+
+Em seu momento de maior extensão, às vésperas da Primeira Guerra
+
+Mundial, o Império Austro-Húngaro ia da fronteira com a Suíça, do Tirol austríaco no
+
+oeste, em Salzburg, até sua fronteira leste, com a cidade de Czernowitz, na
+
+Bukowina, berço de Ehrlich. Ao norte, a Bohemia, cuja capital, Praga, é a cidade
+
+natal de Kelsen, sendo limitada ao sul pela região então conhecida como Eslavônia,
+
+hoje Croácia. Sua população, no último senso antes da Primeira Guerra Mundial,
+
+aproximava-se dos cinquenta milhões de habitantes (MORENO MÍNGUEZ, 2015, p.
+
+17; HEIMANN, 2006, p. 119). A data de nascimento do Império Austro-Húngaro pode
+
+ser fixada em Junho de 1867, quando Francisco José I, então Imperador da Áustria,
+
+selou um acordo com as elites Húngaras que após sucessivas revoltas conseguiram
+
+expandir sua autonomia administrativa e tributária (MORENO MÍNGUEZ, 2015, p.
+
+16). Esse acordo, chamado Ausgleich, constituiu a passagem do Estado Absolutista
+
+Austríaco em Estado de Direito, “sustentado por leis fundamentais que limitavam a
+
+influência do Imperador e estabeleciam a existência do Parlamento como órgão
+
+legislador, ainda que grande parte do governo restasse na mão de ministros
+
+designados por Francisco José” (MORENO MÍNGUEZ, 2015, p. 17, tradução nossa).
+23
+
+O Ausgleich redefiniu o panorama político europeu, isso porque se tratava de
+
+um Estado que, contendo diversas etnias e populações locais, reconheceu duas
+
+elites administrativas soberanas: as minorias de língua alemã e húngara. Hobsbawn
+
+nos ensina que segunda metade do século XIX foi uma época de florescimento de
+
+ideologias nacionalistas. Por essa razão,
+
+a identificação em massa com a ‘nação’ certamente cresceu, e o problema
+político do nacionalismo tornou-se provavelmente mais difícil de controlar,
+tanto para os Estados quanto para os competidores não nacionalistas.
+Provavelmente, a maior parte dos observadores da cena europeia durante
+os primeiros anos da década de 1870 acreditou que, após o período da
+unificação da Itália e da Alemanha e do compromisso Austro-húngaro, o
+‘princípio da nacionalidade’ se tornaria talvez menos explosivo do que havia
+sido. Mesmo as autoridades austríacas, quando lhes foi solicitada a inclusão
+de uma pergunta sobre a língua, em seu recenseamento (medida
+recomendada pelo Congresso Internacional de Estatística de 1873), não se
+negaram a fazê-lo, embora demonstrassem pouco entusiasmo.
+(HOBSBAWM, 2015, p. 228-29)
+
+Um pouco antes da Primeira Grande Guerra e do desmembramento do
+
+Império Austro-Húngaro, popularizou-se pelo continente europeu a expressão
+
+“prisão de nações” (MÍNGUEZ, 2015, p. 16). Essa expressão refletia as constantes
+
+tensões com minorias étnicas dentro do Estado, privadas de seus direito culturais e
+
+políticos. Os conflitos com as elites marginalizadas das outras nacionalidades
+
+constituintes do Império desencadeou dois tipos de reação por parte de sua capital e
+
+centro, Viena: ou se conquistava pela força militar ou se conquistava pela força
+
+cultural. É nesse contexto, que em 4 de Outubro de 1875, durante uma onda
+
+liberalizante por parte do governo, foi fundada na cidade de Ehrlich, Czernowitz, a
+
+Franz-Josephs-Universität (hoje Universidade Nacional de Czernowitz), instituição da
+
+qual Ehrlich seria reitor (EPPINGER, 2009, p. 26).
+
+Esse processo de integração cultural do Império Austro-Húngaro é essencial
+
+para que se compreenda o contexto em que Ehrlich estava inserido e
+
+fundamentando suas idéias sobre a discrepância entre registro normativo e registro
+
+descritivo (EPPINGER, 2009, p. 23). O Império trazia consigo uma desigualdade
+
+interna de difícil compreensão, isso certamente se refletiu em pensadores como
+
+Ehrlich. Sobre o contexto das fronteiras do mundo Europeu de então, esclarece
+
+Hobsbawm o seguinte:
+
+Talvez os camponeses da Bukovina, no ponto mais remoto do nordeste do
+Império Habsburgo, ainda vivessem na Idade Média, mas sua capital,
+Czernowitz, abrigava uma universidade europeia ilustre e sua classe média
+24
+
+judaica, emancipada e assimilada, era tudo, menos medieval.”
+(HOBSBAWM, 2015, p. 35-36)
+
+Todas as elites locais, em busca de formação, enviavam seus filhos para os
+
+grandes centros urbanos da nação. Tanto Ehrlich quanto Kelsen se formaram em
+
+Direito na Universidade de Viena. À diferença do primeiro, é que Kelsen, nascido em
+
+Praga, então grande centro urbano, teve toda a sua formação em Viena, cidade para
+
+a qual se mudou com sua família com apenas três anos de idade.
+
+O cenário intelectual germanófono da época abrangia as diversas elites locais
+
+do Império. Utilizando o alemão como língua franca, havia uma forte integração do
+
+cenário acadêmico do Império Austro-Húngaro e com a Alemanha e Suíça.
+
+(LÜDERSSEN, 2003, p. 4). Nesse contexto, circulavam entre os estudiosos de
+
+língua alemã diversos periódicos científicos. O debate que aqui se apresenta foi
+
+publicado nos volumes 39 (de 1915), 41 (de 1916) e 42 (de 1917) do Archiv für
+
+Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (em tradução, Arquivo para Ciência Social e
+
+Política Social). Editado por Edgar Jaffé, Werner Sombart e Max Weber, o periódico
+
+distinguiu-se em sua época pela publicação de alguns ensaios e livros que possuem
+
+importância acadêmica e intelectual até hoje, como por exemplo a Ética Protestante
+
+e o Espírito do Capitalismo, do próprio Weber (publicada em parte no ano de 1904,
+
+no vigésimo volume do periódico), a Crítica da Violência, de Walter Benjamin
+
+(publicado em 1921, no volume 48), o Conceito de Político, de Carl Schmitt
+
+(publicado em 1927, no volume de número 58) entre outros.
+
+O desfecho histórico que culminou com a Primeira Guerra Mundial já foi
+
+explicado como consequência da incapacidade administrativa de Viena na lide com
+
+a pluralidade de nações que integravam seu Império. (EPPINGER, 2009, p. 45).
+
+Com o assassinato do Arquiduque Francisco Ferdinando em Sarajevo por Gavrilo
+
+Princip, integrante da organização nacionalista sérvia Mão Negra, tem-se o início da
+
+Primeira Guerra Mundial que seguirá com o posterior desmembramento do Império.
+
+Carl SCHORSKE (1981, p. 320) exemplifica alguns nomes que sintetizam a riqueza
+
+do cenário intelectual da época: Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Mariane Beth,
+
+Gustav Klimt, Joseph Schumpeter, Arthur Schnitzler e Hans Kelsen. É, porém, na
+
+periferia do Império que nasce e se cria o primeiro dos debatedores aqui
+
+apresentados.
+25
+26
+
+3 EUGEN EHRLICH: A SOCIOLOGIA DO DIREITO COMO CIÊNCIA
+
+Eugen Ehrlich nasceu em Czernowitz, capital de província da Bukowina,
+
+fronteira leste do Império Austro-Húngaro, no ano de 1862. Realizou diversas
+
+viagens pelo Império durante seus anos de formação, dominando até o final de sua
+
+vida cerca de 11 idiomas. Tendo estudado Direito em Sambor, na província da
+
+Galícia, e em Viena, doutorou-se no ano de 1894 e foi nomeado Privatdozent para
+
+Direito Romano na mesma universidade (MALISKA, 2015, p. 22). Sua livre-docência
+
+versa sobre a declaração tácita de vontade. No ano de 1896 foi nomeado professor
+
+extraordinário de Direito Romano na Universidade de sua cidade, passando ao cargo
+
+de ordinário em 1899, tornando-se reitor da mesma entre os anos de 1906 e 1907.
+
+Nos anos finais de sua vida dedicou-se ao estudo de lingüística e direito
+
+comparados, dominando também Economia, Sociologia e História (REHBINDER,
+
+1962, p. 614)
+
+Em um artigo comemorativo aos cem anos do nascimento do autor, Manfred
+
+Rehbinder considera central associar os traços característicos de seu trabalho com
+
+sua posição no Império Austro-Húngaro de então. Em sua cidade natal, onde passou
+
+seus anos de formação, conviviam cerca de nove nacionalidades: Armênios,
+
+Alemães, Romenos, Russos, Eslovacos, Ucranianos, Húngaros, Poloneses e
+
+Ciganos. Tendo como língua materna o Polonês, Ehrlich, filho de um advogado,
+
+desde jovem aproximou-se da elite administrativa da cidade. Por pressão paterna,
+
+dominou e empregou o Alemão como língua de trabalho. Como Rehbinder enfatiza,
+
+Ehrlich conduziu algumas pesquisas empíricas quanto à aplicação efetiva do código
+
+civil austríaco na Bukovina. Com os resultados desse trabalho, organizou no
+
+semestre de inverno de 1909/1910 um “Seminário para o Direito Vivo”. Com o
+
+posterior desmembramento do Império Austro-Húngaro e a anexação da Bukovina
+
+pela Romênia, Ehrlich - associado à antiga elite alemã da cidade - foi destituído de
+
+seu cargo de professor. (REHBINDER, 1962, p. 3).
+
+Apesar de ignorado por boa parte do cenário acadêmico germanófono, Ehrlich
+
+vislumbrou certa recepção de sua obra nos Estados Unidos, tendo influenciado
+
+notadamente o pensamento jurídico de Roscoe Pound, outrora reitor da
+
+Universidade de Harvard (NIMAGA, 2009, p. 158). O mesmo recebeu a obra de
+
+Ehrlich com entusiasmo nos Estados Unidos, então uma nação também periférica. O
+
+texto de Ehrlich “Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence” foi publicado
+27
+
+originalmente em Inglês em uma coletânea da Universidade de Harvard sobre
+
+filosofia do Direito, o que - segundo Pound - prova a proficiência do autor na língua
+
+inglesa (POUND, 1922, p. 2). Pound teve um papel importante na divulgação da
+
+obra de Ehrlich, uma vez que em 1936, 14 anos após a morte deste, encomendou a
+
+tradução da obra Fundamentos da Sociologia do Direito (Grundlegung der Soziologie
+
+des Rechts) para a língua inglesa, divulgando-o para aquele país. No ano de 2009, o
+
+instituto internacional para Sociologia do Direito em Oñati publicou o livro Living Law:
+
+Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich, publicação integrada por grandes estudiosos de
+
+Sociologia do Direito hoje em dia, responsável por colocar o nome desse autor
+
+novamente em primeiro plano nos estudos da área.
+
+Um dos principais pesquisadores sobre Eugen Ehrlich, Manfred Rehbinder,
+
+considerava essencial o posicionamento geográfico de Ehrlich para a compreensão
+
+de sua Sociologia do Direito (REHBINDER, 1962, p.2). Roger COTTERRELL oferece
+
+uma interpretação do pensamento de Ehrlich em consonância com Rehbinder,
+
+dizendo que
+
+a Sociologia do Direito de Ehrlich não deve ser vista como um produto da
+marginalidade, mas deve ser vista em termos de uma dialética ou interação
+entre marginalidade e centralidade, o que reflete tanto a situação pessoal e
+profissional de Ehrlich e a estratégia consistente de sua Sociologia do
+Direito (COTTERRELL, 2009, p. 76, tradução nossa)
+
+A Sociologia do Direito de Ehrlich, já em sua própria época, é essencial para o
+
+estudo da dinâmica do direito, suas metamorfoses e sua efetividade. Sua obra abre
+
+a discussão de distinção entre os pontos de vista interno (normativo) e externo
+
+(comportamental) do direito. Por isso mesmo “Ehrlich buscava salvar a cultura
+
+jurídica dela mesma - de sua estreiteza intelectual e delírios de auto-suficiência
+
+como uma ciência do Direito - explicando sociologicamente o lugar dessa cultura na
+
+sociedade” (COTTERRELL, 2009, p. 75, tradução nossa).
+
+O pensamento de Ehrlich desnuda a fragilidade do pensamento jurídico de
+
+sua época, particularmente suscetível à ideia de que há um centro fixo no direito,
+
+havendo por isso uma periferia claramente estabelecida pela experiência e teoria
+
+jurídicas dogmáticas. O trabalho ehrlichiano é importante pelo fato de denunciar e
+
+demonstrar a falsidade de qualquer reificação das dicotomias centro/periferia e
+
+interior/exterior no que é ensinado nas faculdades de direito. Direito Vivo, ou o direito
+
+experimentado pelos cidadãos, não seria direito pela perspectiva de um jurista, como
+28
+
+Cotterrell claramente mostra. Por estes, aquele seria no máximo considerado uma
+
+norma social não-jurídica. (COTTERRELL, 2009, p. 79-80).
+
+Olhando os fatos biográficos acima expostos, principalmente os que ilustram
+
+o final da vida de Ehrlich, no entardecer da Europa do entre-guerras, afirma
+
+Cotterrell ser possível constatar que este advogara em prol de uma cultura
+
+transnacional. Ehrlich, como judeu, tendo sofrido a mesma perseguição que todos os
+
+seus no Império Austro-Húngaro antes da primeira guerra, via uma clara saída à
+
+questão do anti-semitismo: a existência de uma identidade transnacional, para além
+
+de qualquer delimitação étnica ou religiosa (COTTERRELL, 2009, p. 82) Ainda que
+
+tal corrente de pensamento tenha representado uma vã crítica à cultura dominante
+
+de então, ela é essencial para a compreensão das idéias do autor, uma vez que sua
+
+proposta de ciência do direito transcendia um dos pilares que a dogmática firmou
+
+para a mesma: a nação. Uma ciência do direito com um escopo de aplicabilidade tão
+
+vasto quanto um império. O mero contexto biográfico do autor o protege de uma das
+
+maiores críticas a ele endereçadas; sua perspectiva intelectual não se coloca contra
+
+o direito estatal (como se a periferia estivesse desafiando jurídica e politicamente o
+
+centro), mas clama por uma maior autoconsciência do poder estatal, com o fim de
+
+garantir a sobrevivência deste. (COTTERRELL, 2009, p. 84).
+
+Hobsbawm ensina que “a ‘Questão Oriental’ era um ponto conhecido da pauta
+
+da diplomacia internacional, e embora tivesse gerado crises internacionais
+
+sucessivas durante um século (...) nunca escapara totalmente de controle”
+
+(HOBSBAWM, 2015, p. 461). Ehrlich juntou-se ao grupo de intelectuais austrohúngaros
+que defendia a existência de uma cultura imperial, em seu sentido
+
+transnacional. E esse comprometimento é uma das chaves para a compreensão de
+
+seu projeto intelectual. Retomando Cotterrell “uma ciência do direito ‘livre de limites
+
+nacionais’ (...) promete retornos abundantes” (2009, p. 82, tradução nossa). A
+
+preocupação primordial de Ehrlich não diz respeito ao contraste, por ele arquitetado,
+
+entre a letra da lei (ou, à moda de Pound, law in books) e o direito na prática, mas
+
+previne acerca da existência de uma variedade de direitos e a interação existente
+
+entre os mesmo, destacando - é claro - o fato de que os juristas se ocupam dos
+
+primeiros apenas. É nesse contexto que Ehrlich vai escrever e publicar a sua obra
+
+mais relevante, posteriormente criticada por Kelsen, o Fundamentos da Sociologia
+
+do Direito.
+29
+
+Franz NEUMANN, em uma das mais interessantes resenhas escritas sobre a
+
+tradução em inglês da referida obra, observa o contexto em que a Sociologia do
+
+Direito de Ehrlich foi criada: enquanto a Alemanha, até a Primeira Guerra Mundial,
+
+vinha em um ciclo histórico de progresso contínuo o Império Austro-Húngaro se via
+
+incapaz de controlar as diversas minorias étnicas que o constituíam. As faculdades
+
+de Direito da Alemanha como um todo e, em particular, a de Viena tinham como
+
+objetivo maior formar os funcionários que iriam administrar e tornar possível a
+
+continuidade do progresso do Estado; não havia espaço, por isso, para pensar
+
+contrariamente ao Direito, ele tinha a função de fazer o Estado funcionar. O que se
+
+vê nas cidades não-centrais do Império Austro-Húngaro é o choque entre o Direito
+
+do Estado e a realidade concreta. (NEUMANN, 1938, p. 2) É por essa razão que o
+
+Fundamentos da Sociologia do Direito, de Ehrlich, surge na periferia do Império
+
+Austro-Húngaro, de uma interação entre centro e periferia, conforme aponta
+
+Cotterrell. É inserido nesse contexto que Ehrlich vai publicar a obra em que expõe
+
+todas as contradições que acredita ver na Ciência do Direito de sua época.
+
+3.1 A OBRA FUNDAMENTOS DA SOCIOLOGIA DO DIREITO
+
+Em 1913, às vésperas da Primeira Guerra Mundial, era publicado em Leipzig
+
+pela editora Duncker & Humblot o livro Fundamentos da Sociologia do Direito
+
+(Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts). Obra que, segundo Roscoe Pound (1922,
+
+p. 130), juntamente com a Lógica dos Juristas, de 1918, constitui o cerne de seu
+
+pensamento. De fato, o livro discorre sobre uma gama de extensa de assuntos: vai
+
+do conceito prático de direito às noções de organização Social e sua ordem interna;
+
+fatos de direito e normas de decisão; a relação entre Estado e Direito e a formação e
+
+construção do preceito Jurídico; aborda a natureza das jurisprudências romana,
+
+inglesa e, analisando a teoria do direito consuetudinário, nos explicita finalmente os
+
+métodos da sociologia do direito. Todos esses corpos do universo de Ehrlich giram
+
+em torno do lema exposto no prefácio de seu livro, lema esse, como nota Cotterrell,
+
+que resume a sua Sociologia do Direito:
+
+Afirma-se com frequência, que deve ser possível resumir o sentido de um livro em
+uma única frase. Caso o presente devesse ser submetido a tal prova, a frase seria
+mais ou menos esta: também em nossa época, como em todos os tempos, o
+fundamental no desenvolvimento do direito não está no ato de legislar nem na
+jurisprudência ou na aplicação do direito, mas na própria sociedade. Talvez se
+30
+
+resuma nesta frase o sentido de todo o fundamento de uma sociologia do direito.
+(EHRLICH, 1986, p. 7)
+
+A crítica levantada acerca da assistematicidade de Fundamentos da
+
+Sociologia do Direito não é gratuita. De fato, o livro raramente apresenta de forma
+
+clara e unificada os conceitos que fundamentam a sociologia do direito do autor, as
+
+ideias são trazidas e deixadas para trás sem uma lógica interna consistente.
+
+Conceitos apresentados em um capítulo são reformulados nos seguintes. Como um
+
+todo, a obra aparenta ser mais um conjunto de ensaios que o embasamento de uma
+
+nova ciência, como Kelsen bem apontou (Apêndice, p. 8).
+
+Sua estrutura, porém, não a invalida. Ehrlich, tendo a pretensão de criar uma
+
+nova ciência do direito, vê-se obrigado a revisar boa parte da lógica do direito
+
+europeu que o antecede, por essa razão lança mão de uma metodologia própria,
+
+que centra boa parte da compreensão do fenômeno jurídico na observação da vida
+
+social e na análise da história (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 370-71). Assim, esse jurista
+
+formado na tradição dogmática, no alvorecer do século XX, encontra certos
+
+obstáculos para dominar as idéias apresentadas, principalmente a que diz que o
+
+direito é mais amplo e vasto que o direito estatal.
+
+No ano de 1938, vinte e quatro anos após a publicação de Fundamentos da
+
+Sociologia do Direito, Gerhart Husserl, então professor da Universidade de
+
+Washington, resume em resenha da tradução para o inglês do livro de Ehrlich que o
+
+mesmo defende o ponto de vista de que a técnica jurídica do direito continental -
+
+conforme manifestado nos códigos, nos estatutos e na literatura jurídica - não
+
+conseguia mais suprir as demandas da vida social de então. O ano de publicação do
+
+livro, 1913, encerra um ciclo de desenvolvimento técnico vertiginoso da Europa que
+
+teve início em 1789, tendo o século XIX como centro, afirma HUSSERL (1938, p.
+
+339-40). Ehrlich estava entre os intelectuais que perceberam a alteração da ordem
+
+econômica, social e política que se deu no final desse período, antecedendo a
+
+Primeira Guerra Mundial - assim como a falência do modelo de Estado então vigente
+
+- exigia uma igual reformulação do Direito, que se opunha à onipotência da
+
+legislação. O resenhista, por isso mesmo, interessou-se pela obra de Ehrlich,
+
+propondo até uma ordem de leitura alternativa do Fundamentos da Sociologia do
+
+Direito a fim de sanar o problema da falta de um sistema.
+
+O resenhista aponta a importância que o livro teria para a época em que sua
+
+tradução era publicada nos Estados Unidos, no ano de 1936:
+31
+
+Em numerosos escritos, sendo o mais importante este livro de que estamos
+tratando, Ehrlich tomou o ponto de vista de que a técnica jurídica do Direito
+Continental, conforme manifesto em seus códigos, estatutos e literatura jurídica, é
+incapaz de lidar com as necessidades da vida social contemporânea. O surgimento
+de novas forças sociais requer o estabelecimento de uma ordem social diferente,
+baseada sobre uma nova ideia de direito (HUSSERL, 1938, p. 340, tradução nossa).
+
+Gerhart Husserl, autor do comentário, era parente de Edmund Husserl, o
+
+criador da Fenomenologia: um homem que sentiu em sua carreira os efeitos de um
+
+Estado totalitário onde o Direito não encontra mais a realidade. É curioso notar que,
+
+de algumas das resenhas da edição norte-americana do livro de Ehrlich, as mais
+
+positivas são aquelas de judeus refugiados dos regimes europeus4
+de então,
+
+principalmente Franz Neumann e Gerhart Husserl. Escrevendo em uma época que
+
+antecede brevemente uma Guerra mundial, é difícil não perceber uma similaridade
+
+de crise entre a época e o local em que Ehrlich escreveu e a época e o local que seu
+
+livro estava sendo traduzido:
+
+Eu dificilmente preciso chamar a atenção do leitor para a acentuada similitude que
+existe entre algumas das teses fundamentais de Ehrlich e as tendências recentes no
+campo da Jurisprudência Americana, que são coletivamente conhecidas como
+realismo legal. Nós encontramos em ambos os casos uma forte reação contra a
+atitude intelectual e individualista do século XIX. (HUSSERL, 1938, p. 340, tradução
+nossa).
+
+Talvez por conta da similaridade de tempos de crise em que se encontravam,
+
+a tradução da obra de Ehrlich recebeu um número razoável de resenhas à sua
+
+versão americana. Como afirma COTTERRELL em nota de rodapé, a resenha de
+
+Husserl é dentre todas a mais original (2009, p. 85). Preocupado com a recepção da
+
+obra, HUSSERL (1938, p. 2) elencou entre os principais conceitos presente no livro
+
+de Ehrlich: associação (Verband), regras do agir social (Gesellschaftlichen Regeln
+
+des Handelns), fatos de direito (Tatsachen des Rechts), normas jurídicas
+
+(Rechtsnormen), preceitos jurídicos (Rechtsätze), normas de decisão
+
+(Entscheidungsnormen). Estes conceitos são exatamente os mesmo discutidos por
+
+Kelsen, por isso merecem uma maior atenção.
+
+
+4
+Muitos intelectuais judeus fugindo dos regimes totalitários europeus já estavam estabelecidos nos Estados Unidos quando a
+obra de Ehrlich foi traduzida para o inglês, em 1936. Essa é uma das razões que justificam a presença de um número
+considerável de resenhas sobre a obra em Journals norte-americanos entre 1936 e 1938. Curiosamente, com exceção de
+POUND, a maior parte dos resenhistas tinha o alemão como língua materna. Dentre as resenhas, as de maior destaque são as
+de Franz NEUMANN (1937), Sidney Post SIMPSON (1937) e Gerhart HUSSERL (1938). O polêmico artigo de Nicolas
+Sergeyevitch TIMASCHEFF, What is Sociology of Law (1938), também aborda a obra de Ehrlich.
+32
+
+3.2 OS CONCEITOS ESSENCIAIS DA OBRA DE EHRLICH
+
+Primeiramente, para EHRLICH (1986, p. 27) a sociedade é o um conjunto de
+
+organizações ou associações humanas inter-relacionadas. De uma associação de
+
+moradores em Casca/RS à comunidade supranacional regida pelo direito
+
+internacional, passando pelo Estado; de países unidos por laços econômicos,
+
+políticos e culturais a uma igreja pentecostal de bairro; de grandes partidos políticos
+
+à organização da Kartoffelfest em Santa Maria do Herval, todos esses círculos
+
+intercruzados, incluindo aí as famílias, formam uma sociedade à medida que se
+
+constata uma interação entre associações.
+
+A associação é “uma pluralidade de seres humanos que em seu
+
+relacionamento mútuo reconhecem algumas regras de conduta como determinantes
+
+para o seu agir e em geral, de fato, agem de acordo com elas” (EHRLICH, 1986, p.
+
+37). O conceito então proposto abarcaria todos os padrões de relações sociais
+
+relativamente estáveis: de relações contratuais, famílias, organizações políticas ou
+
+religiosas, corporações, classes sociais e profissões a até mesmo Estados e
+
+Nações. Alguns autores posteriores, como o próprio Husserl (1938, p. 10) ou Franz
+
+Neumann (1937, p. 2), o criticariam pela sua vagueza, uma vez que a noção
+
+desempenha um papel central na obra de Ehrlich (COTTERRELL, 2009, p. 89).
+
+Todas as associações, porém, têm algo em comum: organização. “É através da
+
+organização que o grupo humano se transforma em associação” (EHRLICH, 1986, p.
+
+70). A organização necessita, por sua vez, de regras para indicar aos seus membros
+
+qual a sua posição e papel dentro dela. Ehrlich as chama de regras do agir social.
+
+As Regras do Agir Social - ou regras de conduta - regem o comportamento
+
+dos que integram as associações, pois são por eles reconhecidas como
+
+determinantes da conduta interna. “Estas regras são de diversos tipos e recebem
+
+nomes diversificados: há regras do direito, da moral, da religião, do costume, da
+
+honra, do bom comportamento, da moda” (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 37). Fundamentando
+
+sua nova ciência do direito, Ehrlich parece tomar a regra como a unidade mínima de
+
+análise, isto é, a regra como uma entidade normativa indivisível. As regras são
+
+“realidades sociais, resultado das forças que agem numa sociedade e elas não
+
+podem ser abordadas fora do contexto da sociedade em que são vigentes. (...)
+
+Quanto à sua forma e seu conteúdo são normas, isto é, ordens e proibições
+33
+
+abstratas, referentes à convivência na associação e destinadas aos integrantes da
+
+associação.” (1986, p. 37).
+
+Assim, a regra parece ser uma categoria geral, que se divide entre duas
+
+subcategorias: as regras do agir social, que se voltam à convivência dos homens,
+
+possuindo normas como conteúdo e forma; mas também regras que não dizem
+
+respeito à convivência dos homens, e neste ponto, curiosamente, Ehrlich afirma que
+
+estas, por sua vez, não são normas sociais, e cita como exemplo as regras
+
+linguísticas e de higiene. A leitura do Fundamentos da Sociologia do Direito não
+
+deixa exatamente claro onde as normas sociais se diferencia das regras. O autor
+
+apresenta a norma jurídica como “apenas umas das regras do agir e neste sentido
+
+se assemelha a todas as outras regras sociais” (1986, p. 38). Por isso, nem todas as
+
+associações são determinadas por normas jurídicas; apenas aquelas cuja ordem
+
+repousa sobre normas jurídicas é que se relacionam com o direito - e estas
+
+associações devem ser estudadas pela sociologia do direito. As regras do direito, em
+
+um primeiro momento, não estão obrigatoriamente ligadas ao Estado, mas à ordem
+
+interna das associações - o que pode embasar um conceito de direito. Caberia
+
+perguntar, apenas, qual o grau necessário de formalização e institucionalização para
+
+que essas regras sociais do agir possam ser reconhecidas teoricamente como direito
+
+(COTTERRELL, 2009, p. 89). Todas associações possuem uma ordem interna, mas
+
+esta torna-se mais clara em uma associação com caráter jurídico. A ordem interna é
+
+uma regra do agir social que indica a cada um dos integrantes da associação a sua
+
+posição de superior e/ou subordinado e sua tarefa. A questão então que se coloca é
+
+a seguinte: como caracterizar o elemento jurídico nessas associações? Ehrlich não
+
+oferece uma resposta clara, apresenta entretanto uma abordagem sociológica e uma
+
+abordagem psicológica para tentar esclarecer o que aufere juridicidade às normas,
+
+associações e regras.
+
+O que confere juridicidade a uma norma é o sentimento (Gefühlstöne) que se
+
+tem diante de sua existência ou violação: “O que caracteriza a norma jurídica é o
+
+sentimento para o qual os juristas do direito comum [continental] acharam o
+
+significativo nome de opinio necessitatis. É por ele que se deve identificar a norma
+
+jurídica” (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 129). Ehrlich não nos esclarece o que deve ser
+
+compreendido por Opinio Necessitatis, um termo que - para VOGL (2009, p. 99) -
+
+significa o elemento psicológico do costume, o instinto de obediência das obrigações
+
+sociais. A questão da oposição da qualidade de jurídica ou extrajurídica de uma
+34
+
+associação, de uma regra, de um fato, de uma norma deveria ser explicada pela
+
+psicologia social. A estratégia psicológica é considerada um dos pontos fracos da
+
+fundamentação teórica do autor, que apenas se limita a reconhecer que “por mais
+
+difícil que seja traçar cientificamente os limites entre a norma jurídica e outros tipos
+
+de normas, na prática esta dificuldade raramente aparece” (1986, p. 129). A violação
+
+de uma norma jurídica geraria, porém, um maior sentimento de revolta que a
+
+violação de uma norma não-jurídica. Bart VAN KLINK, sintetiza que Ehrlich
+
+identificou três espécies de fontes de direito: o direito que deriva do Estado, presente
+
+nas leis e nos códigos; o direito dos juízes e dos juristas que o utilizam em um nível
+
+mais concreto, para decidir certas conflitos na sociedade; e, finalmente, os fatos de
+
+Direito (2009, p. 128). A estratégia sociológica diz respeito a estes fatos de direito,
+
+Fatos de Direito são, para Ehrlich, fatos fundadores que o espírito humano
+
+associa com as regras de organização das associações sociais, que são aquelas
+
+regras do agir social internas que dispõem sobre a organização das mesmas: a
+
+posição e a função de cada integrante na sociedade. Ou seja, são relações sociais
+
+que são também relações de direito, sendo por isso fonte de ordem social, como
+
+nota VAN KLINK. É a partir destes fatos que tem início a exposição sobre a
+
+formalização do direito. Ehrlich afirma que “na base das concepções sempre estão
+
+fatos observáveis”, e uma vez que “Direito e relações jurídicas são uma coisa mental
+
+que não existe (sic) na realidade palpável e perceptível dos sentidos, mas somente
+
+na cabeça das pessoas”, o estudo de suas fontes não diz respeito a como as regras
+
+jurídicas que o juiz ou o funcionário devem aplicar se tornam determinante para eles
+
+mas sim às instituições jurídicas. “Quem quer determinar quais são as fontes do
+
+direito deve saber explicar como surgiram Estado, Igreja, família, propriedade,
+
+contrato, herança e como eles se modificam e evoluem através do tempo” (1986, p.
+
+70). Talvez, uma definição mais condizente com o exposto na obra do autor seja a
+
+seguinte: os fatos de direito são as instituições reais que no decorrer do
+
+desenvolvimento histórico, conduzidas por processos sociais, se transformam em
+
+relações jurídicas. Ou seja, são os fenômenos que arquitetam a transição de uma
+
+norma social em norma jurídica. Justamente pela idéia de arquitetar essa transição,
+
+Kelsen dirá que o único fato de direito é o hábito. Ehrlich consegue reduzir tais fatos
+
+a apenas quatro: o hábito, a dominação, a posse e a declaração de vontade.
+
+Condizente com Kelsen, Cotterrell acentua que o hábito é, na exposição de
+
+Ehrlich, o mais importante desses fatos (2009, p. 90), pois fundamenta todo o direito
+35
+
+consuetudinário. Relações de dominação e a posse fundamentam juridicamente
+
+quaisquer fenômenos econômicos de importância geral para a sociedade. A
+
+declaração de vontade é um fato de direito relevante apenas em dois formatos: o
+
+contrato e o testamento. A visão de Ehrlich é de que todo o direito resulta da ordem
+
+interna das associações sociais, que refletem diretamente nesses fatos. Agora, o
+
+ponto de onde o direito emerge das normas sociais não pode ser especificado com
+
+precisão. (2009, p. 80)
+
+Para Ehrlich todo o direito é por assim dizer social, uma vez que só pode
+
+existir da interação humana. Utilizando esse divisor comum, pode-se entender por
+
+qual razão o seu ponto de partida para o direito é a ordem interna das associações.
+
+Como Maliska nos ensina
+
+O mundo da vida e também o direito não conhece o indivíduo desvinculado de seu
+contexto. Para o direito a pessoa individualmente considerada somente existe como
+membro de uma das várias associações em que se vê inserida ao longo de sua vida.
+(MALISKA, 2015 p. 85)
+
+As regras que são criadas nas ordens sociais, como vimos anteriormente, são
+
+normas, quanto a sua forma e conteúdo. A ordem interna de uma associação é
+
+determinada por normas jurídicas. Assim “a diferença básica entre um preceito
+
+jurídico e uma norma jurídica é que o primeiro é a redação de uma determinação
+
+jurídica em uma lei ou código, e a segunda é a determinação jurídica transformada
+
+em ação.” (MALISKA, 2015, p. 87). Assim, o preceito jurídico emana do Estado por
+
+intermédio dos mecanismos formais de criação jurídica estatal. A Norma Jurídica,
+
+por sua vez, é o direito concreto, empírico. Independe da determinação legal. “Na
+
+forma de um preceito jurídico e, sobretudo na forma de uma lei podem ser
+
+incorporados diferentes conteúdos. (...) existem preceitos jurídicos sem conteúdo
+
+normativo, com conteúdo legal não vinculante, leis em sentido normal” (2015, p. 88).
+
+Maliska ainda acrescenta que na obra de Ehrlich, o concreto precede o abstrato. O
+
+que é essencial para que se compreenda a norma de decisão.
+
+Para Cotterrell, o Estado cria o direito, geralmente em seu formato legislativo;
+
+porém, as associações sociais - onde as pessoas de fato vivem suas vidas -
+
+produzem o Direito de maneira direta através da “ordem interna” dessas
+
+associações. “Na visão de Ehrlich, todas as associações sociais - formais ou
+
+informais - são organizadas por normas sociais que refletem diretamente a natureza
+
+da associação e definem a relação e a posição dos membros entre si” (2009, p. 87).
+36
+
+Mais do que isso, essas associações para solucionar as eventuais disputas e
+
+controvérsias - algo mais abrangente que um mero litígio judicial- que ocorrem entre
+
+seus membros produzem normas. Quando um preceito jurídico, ou seja, aquela
+
+redação formal, o direito positivado, embasa a decisão de um juiz, se está diante de
+
+uma norma de decisão.
+
+As chamadas normas de decisão produzem direito, que flui não apenas de
+
+fontes estatais, mas também sociais. Tal prática adjudicativa, que precede
+
+naturalmente a existência de normas formais de decisão, primeiramente surge como
+
+uma maneira de solucionar as expectativas sociais perante a associação social que
+
+as toma; no andar do tempo, à medida que as cortes se desenvolvem
+
+historicamente, tais normas começam a ser retrabalhadas abstratamente pela
+
+reflexão jurídica, tornando-se prescrições jurídicas - criadas, aprovadas e protegidas
+
+pelo Estado, endereçadas aos membros da associação social ou a esta, como
+
+quando uma norma de decisão é endereçada às cortes, tribunais, membros da
+
+administração ao Estado como um todo, que é a associação social maior.
+
+Como se verá a seguir, esses conceitos de Fundamentos da Sociologia do
+
+Direito são alvo da crítica contundente de Kelsen. As divergências entre esses
+
+autores quanto à natureza do direito e o método ideal para compreendê-lo nos
+
+oferecem um panorama de como as ideias que anteciparam o paradigma
+
+sociojurídico foram recebidas à época de seu surgimento. Não apenas pelos do
+
+paradigma então vigente, mas também por uma das maiores mentes do direito e do
+
+positivismo jurídico no século XX, que também vislumbrou as limitações que os
+
+estudos jurídicos de sua época enfrentavam.
\ No newline at end of file
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+Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
+http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjlp20
+
+Download by: [University of Otago] Date: 14 October 2015, At: 10:08
+
+The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law
+
+ISSN: 0732-9113 (Print) 2305-9931 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjlp20
+
+Legal indicators, global law and legal pluralism: an
+introduction
+
+David Restrepo Amariles
+
+To cite this article: David Restrepo Amariles (2015) Legal indicators, global law and legal
+pluralism: an introduction, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 47:1, 9-21, DOI:
+10.1080/07329113.2015.1046739
+
+To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07329113.2015.1046739
+
+Published online: 28 May 2015.
+
+Submit your article to this journal
+
+Article views: 134
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+EDITORIAL
+
+Legal indicators, global law and legal pluralism: an introduction
+
+David Restrepo Amariles*
+
+Assistant Professor of Law, HEC Paris, Law and Tax Department, Paris, France and Associate
+Research Fellow, Perelman Centre for Legal Philosophy, Brussels, Belgium
+
+This article explores the development of legal metrics by focusing on the links
+between legal indicators, global law and legal pluralism. In particular, it addresses the
+question of the performative role that legal indicators convey in a situation of legal
+pluralism in global law. First, I argue that indicators are not only a set of socio-legal
+research methods conducted periodically and systematically with the aim of
+describing the evolution of a socio-legal reality over time. From a pluralistic
+perspective, indicators are also devices factually constraining the behaviour of
+individuals and institutions at different geographical scales. I show that as legal
+indicators become entrenched in managerial modes of governance, they adopt the role
+of performance measures. As such, they bridge the factual, normative and behavioural
+dimensions of social normativity. They rely on data gathering, benchmarking and
+auditing practices to attempt framing legally relevant behaviour. Second, I argue that
+legal indicators are triggering a mathematical turn in legal thinking, and so
+transforming the analytical dimension of legal analysis. The mathematical reasoning
+underpinning indicators increasingly attempts to supersede, in practice, linguistic and
+conceptual modes of legal reasoning in the mission of constructing legal concepts,
+relating them to one another and giving them sense in a specific context. In brief, this
+article attempts to show that legal indicators are introducing to the legal field a set of
+practices which are central to any contemporary approach to public and private
+management, transforming en passant, the way we experience, see and think about
+law in the context of globalisation.
+
+Keywords: mathematical turn; global law; indicators; management
+
+1. Introduction
+
+For the rational study of the law the black-letter man
+may be the man of the present, but the man of the future
+is the man of statistics and the master of economics. (Holmes 1897)
+
+The number of legal metrics in the form of indicators, rankings and indexes is increasing
+rapidly. According to a study of the French organisation Civil Law Initiative, until
+the year 2000, only six sets of transnational indicators contained relevant information
+about state legal systems, in comparison to more than 20 today (Restrepo-Amariles and
+McLachlan 2015). But legal indicators are not only increasing in numbers. Recent sets of
+indicators are also more refined, accessible and specialised. For instance, the Rule of Law
+Index of the World Justice Project assesses societies against nine dimensions of the rule
+of law, from which at least seven are distinctively legal (2014, 8)1
+. When compared to
+former generations of rule of law indicators, such as the World Bank’s Country Policy
+
+*Email: restrepo-amariles@hec.fr 1
+These are constraints government powers, open government, fundamental rights, regulatory enforcement, civil
+justice, criminal justice and informal justice.
+
+ 2015 Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law
+
+The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 2015
+Vol. 47, No. 1, 921, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07329113.2015.1046739
+
+Downloaded by [University of Otago] at 10:08 14 October 2015
+and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rule-based governance rating and the Rule of Law
+World Governance Indicator, the Rule of Law Index displays a more sophisticated understanding
+of law as a social phenomenon and a more suitable methodological design. It
+also confirms a trend to produce legal indicators as a category on its own. The trend
+towards the production of specialised legal metrics is likely to continue for long enough
+that their study seems both desirable and pressing for legal scholarship.
+This special issue of the Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law aims to
+explore the development of legal metrics by focusing on the links between legal indicators,
+global law and legal pluralism. In particular, it addresses the question of the performative
+role that legal indicators convey in a situation of legal pluralism in global law.
+This enquiry follows up on the contributions and discussions triggered by the panel on
+Instruments of Global Regulation: The Emergence of a Pluralist Global Law? hosted in
+2013 by the Commission of Legal Pluralism during the 17th World Congress of the International
+Union for Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in Manchester.
+To shed some light onto this question, contributors to this issue explore a variety of
+normative devices, which directly or indirectly, rely on or associate with indicators used
+and produced at national, regional and global scales, by both public and private organisations.
+This article builds upon the analytical and conceptual framework laid down by
+Frydman and Twining in the preface to propose a threefold analysis. First, it provides a
+brief overview of key research initiatives in the field of legal indicators, their main claims
+and central methodological premises. Second, it discusses Frydman’s pragmatic conception
+of global law and its added value for the study of the performative role of indicators.
+Finally, it introduces Twining’s idea of global perspective in jurisprudence to bring to
+light two key transformations indicators are triggering in the legal field, namely, (1) a
+mathematical turn and (2) the rise of managerial forms of legal reasoning.
+
+2. Legal indicators: a developing field of legal studies
+
+This special issue is intended to contribute to the emerging literature on indicators and
+global law in socio-legal studies. It seeks to follow partly on the footsteps of the project
+‘Studies in Law and Development’ (SLADE) conducted by Merryman and Friedman in
+the 1970s at Stanford University, which is to my knowledge, the first significant sociolegal
+research project in the field of legal indicators. SLADE sought to address the lack of
+empirical evidence in the field of law and development by collecting systematic and comparable
+information about law and social change in Latin America and Mediterranean
+Europe (Merryman 2000, 713). After three years of research, they obtained 26 measurements
+of different legal variables spanning a period of 25 years, from 1945 to 1970.
+Empirical work relied mainly on fieldwork in each of the countries and on available
+national and regional statistics.
+Unfortunately, SLADE ran out of funding and the data collected remained mostly
+unprocessed in a volume published in 1979 under the title Law and Social Change in
+Mediterranean Europe and Latin America: A Handbook of Legal and Social Indicators
+for Comparative Study (Merryman, Clark, and Friedman 1979). In spite of not accomplishing
+data processing and analysis, SLADE left socio-legal scholars with two valuable
+premises that, in my view, should underpin any serious research initiative in the field of
+legal indicators.
+First, researchers in SLADE argued that indicators were meant to complement, rather
+than replace, traditional qualitative comparative legal research (Merryman 2000, 716).
+Legal metrics may indeed contribute to a better understanding of certain legal questions,
+but taken alone, they are as imperfect explanation of socio-legal phenomena as
+
+10 D. Restrepo Amariles
+
+Downloaded by [University of Otago] at 10:08 14 October 2015
+are qualitative or conceptual research alone. Second, researchers in SLADE were aware of
+the need to provide a context for data gathering, analysis and interpretation of results.
+Hence, they included a qualitative variable to account for ‘legal culture’ in the hope it will
+shed light on the quantitative variables measuring both ‘law’ and ‘development’ (Merryman
+2000, 722724). Unfortunately, none of the current initiatives in the field of transnational
+legal indicators includes a qualitative variable of legal context or legal culture.
+Not surprisingly, studies with large-scale, socio-legal, quantitative and comparative
+research designs aimed at the production of indicators have been rare since SLADE. These
+studies are costly, imply a long-term focus, and require constant updates and highly specialised
+interdisciplinary research teams to be relevant. Probably as a consequence of this, as
+Twining pointed out at the beginning of the century, law remains strikingly absent as a significant
+category from most of the general statistical literature, with the major exception of
+crime statistics (Twining 2000, 154). However, Twining also highlighted that rankings and
+indicators were flourishing on the back of the greater standardisation of data, and that some
+were relevant from a legal perspective and producing considerable effects among its
+addressees. For instance, he noted that league tables of universities and law schools in the
+United States were having a disproportionate influence on alumni, university administrators,
+employers, fund-raisers, donors and even faculty (Twining 2000, 163).
+Moreover, Twining noted that international organisations, such as the World Bank,
+were relying on indicators and rankings, most often rudimentary, to profiling legal systems
+(Twining 2000, 157, 2009a, 289290). He argued that a ‘reflective approach to
+evaluating the health of national legal systems, other legal orders or parts thereof may be
+stimulated by even the cruder efforts at producing national rankings’ (Twining 2000,
+164). In his view, ‘statistical tables and rankings involve comparison’ (Twining 2000,
+165), and comparison in turn requires comparators, ‘that is standards or measures for
+comparison’, which existing indicators lack (Twining 2000, 164). The lack of conceptual
+sophistication of most existing legal indicators is hard to deny still today. But as Michaels
+and Twining himself point out, legal scholars should not neglect them, despite their obvious
+shortcomings and dubious assumptions.
+
+2.1. Legal indicators: from comparative knowledge to global law
+
+Legal scholars are increasingly interested in understanding the role legal metrics are playing
+or are likely to play in legal scholarship and practice. For instance, Michaels has
+argued that comparative law knowledge is falling behind other forms of comparative
+knowledge, in part because it has neglected developments in the field of legal metrics,
+including rankings and indicators (Michaels 2009, 767). In his view, the lack of a common
+language of communication with other policy tools  most of which now make use
+of performance indicators  may also make traditional comparative law knowledge
+become obsolete for policymaking, legal reform and major political projects (Michaels
+2009, 791795). Michaels is right in calling on comparative legal scholars to seize the
+opportunity to confront their knowledge and methods of knowledge production with indicators
+and rankings. This not only with the purpose of assessing the strengths and weaknesses
+of their disciplinary approach, and if needed to update it, but also to ensure that
+comparative law will continue to have a say in the production of comparative knowledge
+with practical policy effects.
+More recently, Davis (2007, 2005), Kingsbury, Kirsch, and Stewart (2005), and Merry
+(2014, 2011) from New York University have taken on social indicators from the perspective
+of global governance and global administrative law (Merry, Davis, and Kingsbury
+2015; Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012a, 2012b). They have mainly analysed social
+
+The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 11
+
+Downloaded by [University of Otago] at 10:08 14 October 2015
+indicators in light of a Foucauldian interpretation of the knowledge-power relationship
+to show ‘where, by whom and in relation to whom governance takes place’ (Davis,
+Kingsbury, and Merry 2012a, 12). Davis et al. conclude that indicators are a technology
+of global governance, i.e., a tool by means of which power is exercised within and beyond
+states. As such, they go on to claim that their production and use need to be framed at a
+global scale. Their proposal is to start by subjecting indicators to the procedural obligations
+of global administrative law, which include transparency, participation and accountability
+(Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012a, 2021; Kingsbury, Kirsch, and Stewart
+2005, 17).
+At the Perelman Centre in Brussels, Frydman, I and co-workers have also analysed
+indicators in the framework of global law and governance, but based on slightly different
+methodological and theoretical premises. Following the ideas of legal pragmatism, we
+attempt to bring to light the effects indicators are producing on the conduct of actors
+including states, and to understand how they interact  i.e. compete, complement or
+cooperate  with other devices of global regulation. When possible, we provide explanations
+about how indicators may be shaping the transformation of law in our increasingly
+globalised society (Frydman and Van Waeyenberge 2014).
+For instance, Lewkowicz has recently argued that sovereign credit ratings attempt to
+constrain the economic behaviour of states in a global, non-sovereign environment. He
+provides evidence showing that credit ratings are so entrenched in the operation of the
+market economy that states can hardly dismiss or limit their use through legislative action
+(Lewkowicz 2014, 151). In his view, ratings contribute to reshape the concept of normative
+authority at a global scale, i.e. global law, because, in short, they form an effective
+normative device through which private financial institutions set standards and audit the
+institutional behaviour of states in the global market economy (Lewkowicz 2014, 148, 157).
+
+3. The performative role of indicators: pragmatism and global law
+
+In the field of global law, the performative role of legal indicators means nothing other
+than that indicators are devices factually constraining the behaviour of subjects in a nonsovereign
+legal context. They bridge the factual, normative and behavioural dimensions
+of social normativity (i.e. facts, norms and reasons for action), and therefore enable the
+transformation of social facts of legal relevance (e.g. ordered empirical data about the
+rule of law) into standards of behaviour (i.e. rule of law benchmarks) that addressees of
+legal metrics generally strive to observe. Indeed, legal indicators are not only a set of
+socio-legal research methods conducted periodically and systematically with the aim of
+describing the evolution of a socio-legal reality over time; they also have a performative
+role as standard setting and accountability tools. They appeal to the ‘magic’ of statistics
+(Desrosieres 1993, 88) to create new socio-legal realities, and to the managerial toolbox
+to ensure reactivity, this is, a change of behaviour in the subjects being evaluated,
+observed or measured (Espeland and Sauder 2007, 3).
+Legal scholars often overlook the performative role of indicators, in part, because we
+are trained to adopt an exclusive standpoint in the study of legal phenomena, more often
+particular than global. Additionally, we tend to limit our scope of research to normative
+devices which have an a-priori legal nature (i.e. rules broadly speaking), instead of those
+which in practice effectively frame legally relevant behaviour of individuals and institutions.
+In other words, we tend to neglect normative (Twining 2000, 2010, 224233) and
+legal pluralism(s) (Vanderlinden 2013).
+To ensure a broader perspective, this special issue relies on the pragmatic approach of
+the Brussels School of Jurisprudence (Frydman and Lewkowicz 2015), first revisited by
+
+12 D. Restrepo Amariles
+
+Downloaded by [University of Otago] at 10:08 14 October 2015
+Perelman in the field of legal argumentation (with Tyteca 1958), and later renewed by
+Frydman in the field of global law (2014, 181200). Frydman’s re-statement of legal
+pragmatism, or europragmatism (Haack 2014), in global law studies underlines three cornerstone
+ideas in regards to the study of legal indicators.
+
+3.1. Brussels’ pragmatism and global law
+
+First, Frydman argues that the first stage in the study of the consequences of globalisation
+on law should be empirical research, mainly through case studies and field observations
+(2014, 184185). In his view, researchers should give priority to micro-legal studies of
+legal problems and the perspective of the actors involved (i.e. particular perspectives),
+before they move to state or analyse general theories about law and globalisation. This
+particular perspective is meaningful because it sets forth what individuals experience as
+constrains (e.g. obligations) or empowerments (e.g. rights) framing their legally relevant
+behaviour. This symposium embraces this particular perspective in the study of legal indicators
+and combines it with a global perspective on the evolution of law in the world. This
+explains why contributors rely on case studies of legal indicators and indicators-based
+programmes to explore how law, as a social institution, evolves in a multifaceted and
+multi-scalar context.
+Contributors consequently engage with non-state law (e.g. codes of conduct and certification
+programmes), explore phenomena like diffusion of law (e.g. arbitration), competition
+among regulatory practices (e.g. corporate social responsibility, labelling and
+auditing, and state law) and further discuss the relations between legal metrics, policymaking
+and development (e.g. ‘justice in numbers’, happiness indicators and the Open
+Method of Coordination). At the risk of simplification, some of them attempt to identify,
+from a general perspective, certain trajectories, patterns and differences in the transformation
+of legal practices at local, regional and global scales.
+Second, Frydman (2014, 183184) defines the field of study of legal scholarship by
+reference to the effects normative devices produce in reality (Summers 1981, 872). He
+does not define it by reference to the belonging of such devices to the formal sources of
+law, or to passing what Dworkin called the ‘pedigree test’ (Dworkin 1967, 17). In other
+words, his pragmatic approach to global law replaces the ‘pedigree test’ by an ‘effects test’.
+From this perspective, Frydman’s conception of global law partly overlaps with
+Twining’s ideas about the meaning of global law in the preface of this issue. Both of
+them think of global law first and foremost as a field concept. For Frydman, global law is
+an overarching concept defining the study of normative devices with global effects; for
+Twining, it is better understood, though with some reservations, as a field of study concerned
+with law in the world as a whole (Frydman and Twining 2015). Both of these
+views give relevance to the study of legal indicators as an object of legal scholarship and
+open new horizons to the use of indicators in our efforts to understand and theorise about
+law from a global perspective.
+Third, Frydman builds from pragmatism and his rejection of methodological nationalism
+an elementary, but substantive, conception of global law (2014, 187188). For Frydman,
+global law as an analytical concept, using Twining’s terms, results from the need to
+address the question of how to regulate practical situations arising from the emerging
+global society, in the midst of a multiplicity of legal systems and fragmented legal
+regimes. In the preface, he argues that his conception of global law is pluralistic because
+it addresses the above question without suggesting the need for unification or convergence,
+or in other words, without reproducing, as mindset or methodology, a state-like
+world legal system or monist conception of global law. Instead, he conceives global law
+
+The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 13
+
+Downloaded by [University of Otago] at 10:08 14 October 2015
+as a struggle among actors, strategies and normative devices to set standards of behaviour,
+audit compliance and impose sanctions to actors of the emerging global society.
+This conception of global law opens the possibility of thinking about the effects of
+indicators beyond the sociological idea of reactivity. It suggests that indicators may also
+be studied as normative devices in a non-sovereign environment, i.e. from the perspective
+of a pluralistic understanding of global law. This does not mean, however, that indicators
+are deployed in a territorial vacuum. For Frydman, global law pervades different levels of
+legal and political authority, from the most local and territorialised political entities and
+communities (e.g. local or national statistics in the administration of justice) to the most
+transnational, network-organised forms of social and economic interaction (e.g. international
+arbitration or corporate social responsibility).
+The question this special issue addresses unfolds in this context. Overall, contributors
+to this issue seek to account for how indicators  as an analytical concept  and other
+associated normative devices and programmes (e.g. Open Method of Coordination or The
+Marine Stewardship Council Programme) affect the conduct of individuals, institutions
+and other subjects of law (e.g. judges, states, investors, fishers, transnational corporations,
+etc.) at various geographical scales. Whether this constitutes a subject of study of
+global law  as a field concept , or a normative device of global law  as an analytical
+concept , is in my view a matter of perspective, global or particular respectively. In
+both cases, the question of legal pluralisms (Vanderlinden 2013, 4252) is central since
+it highlights the performative role indicators play among the multiple normative constraints
+coexisting in a multi-scalar society.
+
+4. A global perspective on indicators and global law: the mathematical turn and
+the rise of managerial reasoning in law
+The case studies contained in this special issue bring to light the hidden life of some indicators,
+their epistemological and operational underpinnings, and the mechanisms through
+which they become entrenched in institutional practices and other global devices. Some
+of these studies also show the type of contestations and resistance indicators experience
+in the specific contexts in which they are created and implemented, and at times, how
+they are dismissed, abolished or changed. However, this particular, micro-legal approach
+does not provide us with a general explanation about how indicators are changing the
+way we see and think about law.
+One may need to adopt a long-term scale and global perspective of law in the world,
+as proposed by Twining (2009a, 520, 2009b, 18), if one wishes to spot and theorise
+about the trajectories, patterns and differences in the way indicators are transforming
+legal practices and legally relevant behaviour at local, regional and global scales.
+A global perspective, according to Twining, allows us to discern ‘some general tendencies
+and biases in Western academic legal culture that are in the process of coming
+under sustained challenge in the context of “globalisation”’ (Twining 2009a, 5). This
+global perspective reveals two key transformations indicators are triggering in the field of
+law, both of which I have already discussed elsewhere (Restrepo-Amariles 2014a,
+193234). These are (1) a mathematical turn and (2) the rise of managerial forms of legal
+reasoning. In the following pages, I lay down the main characteristics of each of them.
+
+4.1. Indicators and the mathematical turn in law
+
+The mathematical turn defines the increasing use of mathematical and statistical techniques
+to describe, explain, assess and prescribe human and institutional behaviour of legal
+
+14 D. Restrepo Amariles
+
+Downloaded by [University of Otago] at 10:08 14 October 2015
+relevance (Restrepo-Amariles 2014a, 194). It is a multifaceted notion relating as much to
+‘talk about law’ as to ‘law talk’ (Twining 2009a, 2425,44), and as such, it embraces a
+set of disparate practices existing in the legal domain. In pointing out their shared mathematical
+underpinnings, I seek to provide a common framework to discuss their common
+assumptions and implications. In practice, the mathematical turn means nothing other
+than that mathematical arguments are becoming acceptable explanations of legal phenomena,
+both as a developing method of legal analysis, and as an emerging technique of
+regulation.
+In legal scholarship, the mathematical turn is an analytical trend in construction. It
+relies on mathematical and statistical techniques to describe legal phenomena and theorise
+about law at new levels of abstraction. As such, it seeks to expand the range of
+research methods and techniques used in legal research and legal reasoning, with the aim
+of furnishing legal scholars, practitioners and operators with more scientific and more
+general insights about law. As a set of research practices, the mathematical turn attempts
+to level up legal research methods with the scientific developments of our time, in which
+we have not only more empirical data, but also more sophisticated use of it.
+The evidence produced in this way aims most often to complement, sometimes challenge,
+the linguistic, argumentative, historical and qualitative-sociological accounts of
+law which are often deemed subjective and belief based (Aft, Mitchell, and Rust 2012,
+16). What the mathematical turn underlines is probably the beginning of the realisation of
+Holmes’ prediction in The Path of the Law, when he said that the man of the future in the
+study of the law was not the black-letter man, but the man of statistics and the master of
+economics (1897, 469).
+In legal practice, the mathematical turn appears as a new way of producing legal and
+regulatory devices on the basis of mathematical modelling, as well as a tool to advance
+rights and fact-based claims in law-making, law administration and adjudication. Examples
+range from the use of statistical evidence in the courtroom (Kadane 2008; Dawid,
+Twining, and Vasilaki 2011) and probability in risk regulation (Franklin 2005; Gastwirth
+2013) to the development of regulation and compliance software (Grimmelmann 2005;
+Bamberger 2010) and the production of statistics in the context of new public management
+(Ministere de la Justice Francais ¸ 2012; Borges Fortes 2015).
+Franklin has shown for instance the predominance mathematical reasoning has gained
+in global financial regulation, prompted mainly by the Basel II accords (Franklin 2005,
+243245), and continued under Basel III. Basel II allowed banks to evaluate their credit
+risk (i.e. defaults of loans) and exchange rate risk (i.e. losses from changes in currency
+exchange rates) using their own internal models and statistical technology under the condition
+they disclose them to the national regulatory agency and that the latter approves
+them. This opened the path for the exchange of statistical arguments before financial regulatory
+agencies and the admission of statistical models as evidence of compliance. This
+situation is particularly salient in Europe, where Basel II accords were endorsed by EU
+legislation (Directive 2006/49/EC).
+Legal indicators combine and further develop both dimension of the mathematical
+turn. First, they are used to describe the quality and performance of state law (e.g. Rule of
+Law Index) and to theorise about the trajectories of legal systems from a global perspective
+(e.g. comparisons through numbers, Michaels 2009). Second, they are also used to
+design regulatory devices in a global law setting, including performance measures and
+ratings (e.g. credit rating agencies). This special issue also provides evidence showing
+that indicators are increasingly used in the design, implementation and assessment of
+legal and judicial reforms. They are becoming vital for decision-making processes in
+
+The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 15
+
+Downloaded by [University of Otago] at 10:08 14 October 2015
+public and private sectors, for the assessments of legal systems, and especially for the
+allocation of development aid funds (Arndt 2009). In brief, indicators are increasingly
+taken to be explanatory, sometimes even demonstrative, arguments of the way legal systems
+or parts thereof work.
+Perry-Kessaris is one of the few legal scholars to have rightly spotted the key analytical
+significance of this shift towards numbers and discussed its theoretical implications. She
+persuasively argues, following Twining’s dimensions of jurisprudence, that indicators transpose
+the approach of neoclassical economics at the empirical (quantification), normative
+(marketisation) and analytical (mathematisation) level to the field of law and development
+(Perry-Kessaris 2011, 406407). In this context, she claims that the mathematics underpinning
+indicators is supposed to ‘clarify and render transparent relationships whether
+hypothesized or proven  between concepts’ (Perry-Kessaris 2011, 410). Perry-Kessaris
+goes on to claim that the economic approach of indicators transforms the empirical and
+analytical dimensions of law because it introduces numbers as facts and establishes methods
+of correlation for their association.
+I am in general accord with Perry-Kessaris’ thoughtful observations, but since my perspective
+is broader, I shall provide further clarifications of my point of view. First, from
+my perspective, it seems unfair to put the increasing mathematisation of law’s analytical
+dimension exclusively to the influence economics is having on law and development. As
+I argued elsewhere (Restrepo-Amariles 2014b, 175194), the movement towards mathematisation
+and scientific treatment of reality is a persistent and wider phenomenon affecting
+the social sciences in general, including economics, which until the early twentieth
+century was anything but a mathematical discipline (Roos 1948, 127129).
+Second, I agree with Perry-Kessaris that market ideology and linear relationships are
+important economic factors behind the mathematisation of law’s analytical dimension.
+Yet, in my view, it is mathematical reasoning broadly speaking that underpins the way
+most legal indicators attempt to construct legal concepts, relate them to one another and
+give them sense in a specific context. From my perspective, mathematical reasoning is in
+contrast with the linguistic and conceptual modes of legal reasoning underlying the
+black-letter study of law. Today, an increasing number of legal indicators rely on noneconomic
+assumptions such as those based on expert opinions and direct quantification,
+yet they rely on mathematical analysis and modelling at the stage of data aggregation
+(Restrepo-Amariles and McLachlan 2015, 2338).
+Finally, I think this issue provides evidence to expand on the link Perry-Kessaris makes
+between Twining’s normative, analytical and empirical dimensions of jurisprudence and
+the mathematisation promoted by indicators. In my view, by using mathematical reasoning
+to define legal concepts and establish relationships between them, legal indicators promote
+a new proceduralisation of law and social values in the context of globalisation. This mathematical
+proceduralisation increasingly attempts to supersede the argumentative and consensual
+model underpinning law, and international law in particular, in the mission of
+defining the form and content of legal standards with global reach.
+Legal indicators may thus play a greater role in defining concepts such as labour
+rights, legal certainty or reasonable delay of judicial proceedings in a transnational perspective.
+Think for instance about the concepts of well-being or unemployment as social,
+as opposed to individual, phenomena. What are they if not what ‘well-being’ (GDP or
+Gross National Happiness) or unemployment indicators respectively measure? As legal
+indicators become entrenched into new managerial models of governance of legal systems,
+their mathematically constructed meanings and relationships may continue to
+spread in the everyday life of law.
+
+16 D. Restrepo Amariles
+
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+4.2. Indicators and managerial forms in legal reasoning
+
+Frydman has noted rightly that indicators and other unconventional transnational norms,
+like the standards set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the
+International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), are capable of reaching faster and
+wider consensus than international law rules due to their apparent technical and voluntary
+character (Frydman 2014, 192200). In the context of the ‘audit society’ (Power 1997,
+414), we live in and in which these norms unfold, mathematical reasoning has gained
+predominance because it is seen as a technical, often depoliticised, means to set standards
+of behaviour and assess their compliance, such as argued earlier in regard to global financial
+regulation. However, mathematical reasoning itself is only the analytical tool of the
+broader managerial mode of governance in which indicators are entrenched and that is
+increasingly pervading the legal field, and legal reasoning in particular.
+I use the expression ‘legal reasoning’ here with the explicit purpose of calling to attention
+the restricted use that has been given to this concept in Anglo-American jurisprudence
+to signify what ‘lawyers do when they argue court cases … and what judges do
+when they decide cases’ (May and Brown 2010, 7). In this article, the idea of ‘legal reasoning’
+refers broadly to what regulators, compliance agents, rule-followers, scholars,
+etc. do when they discuss normative claims of human and institutional behaviour. It is
+thus not restricted to the context of adjudication but to the lager spectrum of norm-issuance,
+following, administration and enforcement.
+Legal indicators are transforming legal reasoning and the mindset in which we tend to
+think about the life of rules (i.e. law-making, administration and adjudication) by setting
+legal concepts within the managerial mindset of performance measures. Two main consequences
+follow. First, law is not defined only as a set of rules, but also as a measurable
+process capable of improvement and made up of measurable practices. Second, law, as a
+process, embraces part of the managerial toolbox in its everyday life, opening new horizons
+to think about the creation, implementation and enforcement of norms, and not only
+of rules, in the managerial terms of data-gathering, benchmarking and auditing.
+
+4.2.1. Law as process and performance measures
+
+A performance measure is broadly defined as a ‘general term applied to a part of the conduct
+of the activities of an organisation over a period of time, often with reference to some
+standard or base, with emphasis on management responsibility and accountability, or the
+like’ (Edwards 1986, 12). In management practice, a performance measure is successful
+if it facilitates the management control process through which managers ensure that the collection,
+allocation and use of resources is done in an efficient and effective manner to
+accomplish the objectives of the organisation (Edwards 1986, 12). Legal indicators apply
+this approach to law and focus, just like any other performance measure does, on measuring
+the inputs, processing system, outputs, outcomes or goals of legal processes.
+Most legal indicators today focus predominantly on socio-legal outcomes (RestrepoAmariles
+and McLachlan 2015, 15). They measure the extent to which the end results of
+legal processes (e.g. adjudication) are satisfactory or not to users of legal systems (e.g.
+users of the court system or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms). Indicators assess
+legal processes in general, and outcomes in particular, through three methodologically
+distinct but practically interconnected stages, namely (1) collection of performance information,
+(2) benchmarking and (3) auditing, which generally go together with incentives
+for the best performers.
+
+The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 17
+
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+As mentioned earlier, indicators are not only a set of research methods aimed at collecting
+information about performance of socio-legal concepts and institutions. They are
+also a mechanism of standard-setting and identification of good practices (i.e. benchmarking),
+especially, when developed across countries and over time. In my view, benchmarking
+as a pragmatic, management-based way of developing standards of individual and
+institutional behaviour increasingly cooperates and competes  or is in ‘coopetition’ to
+use Djelic’s language (2011, 43)  with legal rules in certain fields of legally relevant
+behaviour. However, benchmarking significantly differs from the way rules set standards
+of behaviour and assesses compliance.
+On the one hand, since a benchmark is drawn from comparison, its content is relative
+to the entities compared, realistic because is grounded in actual practice and dynamic
+because it changes overtime depending on real performance. In contrast to an intrinsic
+concept of outcome quality, benchmarking defines the concept of quality in a pragmatic
+manner, for instance, by focusing on the satisfaction of users of legal systems. On the
+other hand, benchmarking also introduces an alternative way of assessing social facts
+against norms, not in the binary terms legal/illegal  as legal reasoning does with rules,
+but in terms of degree, i.e. it determines where a given conduct is located in a performance
+scale, and how close or far it is from the benchmark. One may think for instance
+of an indicator in the field of corporate social responsibility. It will not state whether a
+company is in breach or not of a given rule of environmental law, but rather the extent to
+which its environmental behaviour fits the industry conception and standards of corporate
+social responsibility (e.g. 6 out of 10).
+Legal indicators also introduce auditing as a management practice into law. Today,
+auditing has become a lifestyle. Individuals, as users or consumers of services and goods,
+whether public or private, request and trust audits because they are believed to ensure
+transparency, enhance accountability and guarantee safety (Power 1997, 45). In our,
+increasingly global ‘audit society’ (Power 1997), the international bureaucracy uses more
+and more legal indicators to conduct systematic and periodic audits of states’ legal systems.
+Merry clearly describes the audit role of indicators in the field of human rights:
+
+The turn to indicator creation marks a shift in the way the administration of human rights law
+takes place. Instead of pressuring countries to conform to human rights laws on the basis of
+ambiguous and contextualized accounts in country reports or case studies—reports in which
+each country is presented as shaped by its history, social structure, wealth, and political agendas—indicators
+provide comparable information in numerical terms. The burden of assessment
+rests on the indicator itself, with its agreed-on standards and means of measurement…
+The reliance on numbers, with their apparently simple and straightforward meanings, produces
+an unambiguous and easily replicated field for judgment. Compliance becomes far more
+open to inspection and assessment. (2011, 88)
+
+Moreover, it is telling, to paraphrase Dworkin, that today even the sovereigns of
+Law’s Empire, namely parliaments and the administration of justice, are subject to audit
+controls. In this special issue, Borges Fortes provides original empirical data and an illuminating
+analysis which contributes to a better understanding of the performative role of
+indicators (2015). In his analysis of the Brazilian state programme ‘Justice in numbers’,
+Borges Fortes shows the links between the rise of legal indicators and a change in the
+behaviour of the Brazilian judiciary. Borges Fortes argues that judges and clerks tend to
+come in line with the performance standards indicators embody, in part because they are
+linked to mechanisms of internal promotion and professional disciplinary control (i.e.
+incentives). He points out that indicators are thereby inducing a worrying shift in the
+
+18 D. Restrepo Amariles
+
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+values driving the Brazilian administration of justice. Adjudication is on the way to
+becoming less content oriented and quality driven, and more prone to act in fulfilment of
+efficiency criteria.
+
+5. Concluding remarks
+
+Nelken has recently pointed out rightly the capacity of indicators to transform facts into
+norms when they are used for governance (2015). Indeed, the fact description and performative
+roles (i.e. standard setting and auditing) of indicators may be distinguished analytically
+for the purpose of academic or methodological discussions. However, in practice,
+when indicators are associated to a managerial mode of governance, these two aspects are
+inevitably intertwined. In this regard, I have argued throughout this paper that legal indicators
+reproduce a performance-based managerial mode of governance in the field of
+global law. They seek to frame individual and institutional behaviour by means of three
+key managerial mechanisms, namely performance data collection, benchmarking and
+auditing. In brief, this article attempted to show how these practices  central to any contemporary
+approach to public and private management today, are expanding into the legal
+field, transforming en passant, the way we experience, see and think about law in the context
+of globalisation.
+In my view, legal indicators are called upon to play at least two decisive roles in the
+coming years within legal scholarship and practice. First, indicators may help to improve
+the cognitive and theoretical dimensions of our legal discipline. If we legal scholars
+engage with indicators in the view of both, providing sustained critique and attempting
+refinement, they may in turn help to improve our socio-legal research methods and quality
+of our empirical data. This shall enhance our capacity to understand and theorise sociolegal
+realities at new levels of abstraction. Second, as indicators are expected to continue
+gaining relevance among public and private decision-makers, so will happen with their
+performative role. Hence, legal scholars may want to keep an eye on how the expanding
+managerial model of governance overarching indicators will affect law from a global perspective,
+especially in regards to what seems an inevitable shift towards evidence-based
+decision-making in the legal domain.
+
+Disclosure statement
+No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
+
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+11ª edição
+Primeira edição, 1982
+Editora Brasiliense
+Rua da Consolação, 2697
+São Paulo SP
+Fone (011) 280-1222
+ÍNDICE
+
+Direito e lei ........................................................................................................................... 3
+
+Ideologias jurídicas ............................................................................................................... 7
+
+Principais modelos de ideologia jurídica .............................................................................. 14
+
+Sociologia e direito .............................................................................................................. 30
+
+A dialética social do direito.................................................................................................. 42
+
+Indicações para leitura.......................................................................................................... 59
+DIREITO E LEI
+
+A maior dificuldade, numa apresentação do Direito, não será mostrar o que ele é,
+
+mas dissolver as imagens falsas ou distorcidas que muita gente aceita como retrato fiel.
+
+Se procurarmos a palavra que mais freqüentemente é associada a Direito, veremos
+
+aparecer a lei, começando pelo inglês, em que law designa as duas coisas. Mas já deviam
+
+servir-nos de advertência, contra esta confusão, as outras línguas, em que Direito e lei são
+
+indicados por termos distintos: lus e lex (latim), Derecho e léy (espanhol), Diritto e legge
+
+(italiano), Droit e loí (francês), Recht e gesetz (alemão), Pravo e zakon (russo), Jog e tõrveny
+
+(húngaro) e assim por diante. Noutra passagem deste livrinho, teremos de enfrentar a sugestão
+
+do grego, em que nomos (lei) também não se identifica, sem mais, com o Direito e Dikaion
+
+propõe a questão do Direito justo. As relações entre Direito e Justiça constituem aspecto
+
+fundamental de nosso tema e, também ali, muitas nuvens ideológicas recobrem a nua
+
+realidade das coisas.
+
+Em todo caso, não se trata dum problema de vocabulário. A diversidade das
+
+palavras atinge diretamente a noção daquilo que estivermos dispostos a aceitar como Direito.
+
+Por isso mesmo, os autores ingleses e americanos tem de falar em Right, e não law, quando
+
+pretendem referir-se exclusivamente ao Direito, independente da lei ou até, se for o caso,
+
+contra ela (isto não significa, note o leitor, que o verdadeiro Right não possa ser um Direito
+
+legal, porém que ele continuaria a ser Direito, se a lei não o admitisse.
+
+A lei sempre emana do Estado e permanece, em última análise, ligada à classe
+
+dominante, pois o Estado, como sistema de órgãos que regem a sociedade politicamente
+
+organizada, fica sob o controle daqueles que comandam o processo econômico, na qualidade
+
+de proprietários dos meios de produção. Embora as leis apresentem contradições, que não nos
+
+permitem rejeitá-las sem exame, como pura expressão dos interesses daquela classe, também
+
+não se pode afirmar, ingênua ou manhosamente, que toda legislação seja Direito autêntico,
+
+legítimo e indiscutível. Nesta última alternativa, nós nos deixaríamos embrulhar nos “pacotes”
+
+legislativos, ditados pela simples conveniência do poder em exercício. A legislação abrange,
+
+sempre, em maior ou menor grau, Direito e Antidireito: isto é, Direito propriamente dito, reto
+
+e correto, e negação do Direito, entortado pelos interesses classísticos e caprichos continuístas
+
+do poder estabelecido.
+
+A identificação entre Direito e lei pertence, aliás, ao repertório ideológico do
+
+Estado, pois na sua posição privilegiada ele desejaria convencer-nos de que cessaram as
+contradições, que o poder atende ao povo em geral e tudo o que vem dali é imaculadamente
+
+jurídico, não havendo Direito a procurar além ou acima das leis. Entretanto, a legislação deve
+
+ser examinada criticamente, mesmo num país socialista, pois, como nota a brilhante colega
+
+Marilena Chauí, seria utópico/ilusão) imaginar que, socializada a propriedade, estivesse feita
+
+a transformação social completa.
+
+Isto é acentuado, também, com referência ao Direito, pelo jurista húngaro Zoltán
+
+Péteri, quando assinala que as leis dum país socialista podem não exprimir os resultados da
+
+evolução social visada pelos padrões atualizadores do socialismo. Ali também surgem leis que
+
+carecem de “autenticidade e adequação” e escapam ao que é “verdadeiro e correto”
+
+juridicamente. Em que critérios poderemos buscar o meio de avaliação deste elemento
+
+jurídico, para aplicá-lo à consideração das leis, é precisamente a questão para a qual se
+
+encaminha o nosso itinerário, neste livrinho, e que aparecerá nas suas conclusões.
+
+Repare o leitor na arrogância com que todo governo mais decididamente autoritário
+
+repele a “contestação” (como se as remodelações institucionais não fossem uma proposta
+
+admissível e até parcialmente reconhecida em leis – no caso das emendas constitucionais, por
+
+exemplo); na pretensão do poder que, cedendo à “abertura” inevitável, quer, depois, controlar o
+
+diâmetro, a seu gosto; na irritação com que fala em “radicalismo de toda oposição que ameace
+
+trocar, mesmo pelas urnas, o estado de coisas presente; nas “salvaguardas” com que pretende
+
+garantir o status quo (isto é, na estrutura implantada, os esquemas vigentes); na astúcia que
+
+procura separar os “confiáveis” (isto é, os grupos e pessoas que são vinho da mesma pipa) e os
+
+“não confiáveis”(isto é, os grupos e pessoas que propõem alguma forma de reestruturação
+
+social, mesmo quando o fazem com a recomendação de meios pacíficos).
+
+Nisto, porém, o Direito resulta aprisionado em conjunto de normas estatais, isto é,
+
+de padrões de conduta impostos pelo Estado, com a ameaça de sanções organizadas (meios
+
+repressivos expressamente indicados com órgão e procedimento especial de aplicação). No
+
+entanto, como notava o líder marxista italiano,Gramsci, a visão dialética precisa alargar o
+
+foco do Direito, abrangendo as pressões coletivas (e até, como veremos, as normas nãoestatais
+de classe e grupos espoliados e oprimidos) que emergem na sociedade civil (nas
+
+instituições não ligadas ao Estado) e adotam posições vanguardeiras, como determinados
+
+sindicatos, partidos, setores de igrejas, associações profissionais e culturais e outros veículos
+
+de engajamento progressista.
+
+O Direito autêntico e global não pode ser isolado em campos de concentração
+
+legislativa, pois indica os princípios e normas libertadores, considerando a lei um simples
+
+acidente no processo jurídico, e que pode, ou não, transportar as melhores conquistas.
+Isto depende, é claro, de que Estado, concretamente, surge a legislação - se ele é
+
+autoritário ou democrático; se reveste uma estrutura social espoliativa ou tendente à justiça
+
+social efetiva e não apenas demagógica e palavrosa; se a classe social que nele prevalece é a
+
+trabalhadora ou a capitalista; se as bases dominam o processo político ou a burocracia e a
+
+tecnocracia servem ao poder incontrolado; se os grupos minoritários têm garantido o seu
+
+“direito à diferença” ou um rolo compressor os esmaga; se, em geral, ficam resguardados os
+
+Direitos (não menos Direitos e até supra-estatais; isto é, com validade anterior e superior a
+
+qualquer lei), chamados Direitos Humanos. Estes, como veremos, conscientizam e declaram o
+
+que vai sendo adquirido nas lutas sociais e dentro da História, para transformar-se em opção
+
+jurídica indeclinável. E condenam, é evidente, qualquer Estado ou legislação que deseje
+
+paralisar o constante progresso, através das ditaduras burocrático-policiais, sejam elas cínicas
+
+e ostensivas ou hipócritas e disfarçadas.
+
+Uma exata concepção do Direito não poderá desprezar todos esses aspectos do
+
+processo histórico, em que o círculo da legalidade não coincide, sem mais, com o da
+
+legitimidade, como notava, entre outros, inclusive o grande jurista burguês Hermann Heller.
+
+Diríamos até que, se o Direito é reduzido à pura legalidade, já representa a dominação ilegítima,
+
+por força desta mesma suposta identidade; e este “Direito” passa, então, das normas estatais,
+
+castrado, morto e embalsamado, para o necrotério duma pseudociência, que os juristas
+
+conservadores, não à toa, chamam de “dogmática”. Uma ciência verdadeira, entretanto, não
+
+pode fundar-se em “dogmas”, que divinizam as normas do Estado, transformam essas práticas
+
+pseudocientíficas em tarefa de boys do imperialismo e da dominação e degradam a procura do
+
+saber numa ladainha de capangas inconscientes ou espertos.
+
+Em muitos países, inclusive no Brasil, há dispositivos legais que contrastam com
+
+a Declaração Universal dos Direitos do Homem. Isto já foi reconhecido, entre nós, pelo atual
+
+presidente do Supremo Tribunal, Ministro F. M. Xavier de Albuquerque, quando tentou, em
+
+voto famoso, na justiça eleitoral, encaminhar uma jurisprudência (decisão uniforme, dada
+
+pelos Tribunais, a questão de Direito) que situasse aquela Declaração, como é devido, acima
+
+de qualquer desvio legislativo. Acentuou, então, o destacado juiz liberal que a Declaração dos
+
+Direitos do Homem é “capítulo duma evidente Constituição de todos os povos” que ainda não
+
+“existe” (como lei formalizada), mas orienta superiormente a captação do Direito.
+
+Sob o ponto de vista do socialismo, não é outro o posicionamento de Ernst Bloch,
+
+o filósofo marxista alemão, quando afirma que “a dignidade é impossível, sem a libertação
+
+econômica”, mas a libertação econômica “é impossível também, se desaparece a causa dos
+
+Direitos do Homem. Estes dois resultados não nascem, automaticamente, do mesmo ato, mas
+reciprocamente se reportam um ao outro. Não há verdadeiro estabelecimento dos Direitos
+
+Humanos, sem o fim da exploração; não há fim verdadeiro da exploração, sem o
+
+estabelecimento dos Direitos Humanos”. Daí a importância da revisão crítica, inclusive numa
+
+legislação socialista.
+
+Nosso objetivo é perguntar, no sentido mais amplo, o que é Direito (com ou sem
+
+leis), mas é preciso esclarecer, igualmente, que nada é, num sentido perfeito e acabado; que
+
+tudo é, sendo. Queremos dizer, com isto, que as coisas não obedecem a essências ideais,
+
+criadas por certos filósofos, como espécie de modelo fixo, um cabide metafísico, em que
+
+penduram a realidade dos fenômenos naturais e sociais. As coisas, ao contrário, formam-se
+
+nestas próprias condições de existência que prevalecem na Natureza e na Sociedade, onde
+
+ademais se mantêm num movimento constante e contínua transformação. E deste modo que
+
+elas se entrosam na totalidade dos objetos observáveis e das forças naturais e sociais, que os
+
+modelam e orientam a sua evolução. Cada fenômeno (fenômeno é, etimologicamente, coisa
+
+que surge) pode, então, revelar o seu fundamento e sentido, que só emerge em função daquela
+
+totalidade móvel. Isoladamente, cada um perde a significação própria e a conexão vital, assim
+
+como o órgão sem o organismo em que funciona, ou o homem, sem a sociedade, fora da qual
+
+ele não existe humanamente e regride na escala zoológica.
+
+Nesta perspectiva, quando buscamos o que o Direito é, estamos antes perguntando
+
+o que ele vem a ser, nas transformações incessantes do seu conteúdo e forma de manifestação
+
+concreta dentro do mundo histórico e social. Isto não significa, porém, que é impossível
+
+determinar a “essência” do Direito - o que, apesar de tudo, ele é, enquanto vai sendo: o que
+
+surge de constante, na diversidade, e que se denomina, tecnicamente, ontologia. Apenas fica
+
+ressalvado que uma ontologia dialética, tal como indicava o filósofo húngaro, Lukács, tem
+
+base nos fenômenos e é a partir deles que procura deduzir o “ser” de alguma coisa, buscado,
+
+assim, no interior da própria cadeia de transformações.
+IDEOLOGIAS JURÍDICAS
+
+Começaremos recapitulando, abreviadamente, os tipos de ideologia jurídica
+
+encontrados no segmento da História que se estende da Antigüidade aos nossos dias no
+
+panorama geográfico denominado, segundo convenção muito comum, de “Ocidental”.
+
+A amostra é suficientemente ampla (abrangendo mais ou menos 25 séculos) para
+
+servir como prova de que, nas ideologias, a “essência” do Direito vai transparecendo, embora
+
+de forma incompleta ou distorcida.
+
+Entretanto, vamos abrir uma seção preliminar, a fim de esclarecer em que sentido
+
+estamos empregando o termo - ideologia -, que é utilizado por diferentes autores, numa
+
+variedade considerável de significados. Desta maneira, será possível mostrar que as abordagens
+
+diversas não se excluem reciprocamente, mas ao contrário, se integram, representando,
+
+simplesmente, modos distintos de colocar-se o observador perante o mesmo fenômeno.
+
+Ideologia significou, primeiramente, o estudo da origem e funcionamento das
+
+idéias em relação aos signos que as representam; mas, logo, passou a designar essas idéias
+
+mesmas, o conjunto de idéias duma pessoa ou grupo, a estrutura de suas opiniões, organizada
+
+em certo padrão. Todavia, o estudo das idéias e seus conjuntos padronizados começou a
+
+destacar as deformações do raciocínio, pelos seus conteúdos e métodos, distorcidos ao sabor
+
+de vários condicionamentos, fundamentalmente sociais. Por outras palavras, descobriu-se que
+
+a imagem mental não corresponde exatamente à realidade das coisas.
+
+Esta verificação era irresistível, na análise das ideologias, e por isto mesmo o
+
+escritor francês Stendhal ficou muito irritado ante a mera proposta de um estudo desse tipo. Não
+
+é muito agradável saber que andamos iludidos e Stendhal chegou a desabafar-se de forma
+
+pitoresca: “um tratado de ideologia é um desaforo! Então pensam que eu não raciocino
+
+corretamente?!” Aliás, é isto mesmo que ocorre: ninguém raciocina com absoluta perfeição e há
+
+sempre uma boa margem de deformações, a que não escapam as próprias ciências. Queremos
+
+dizer que também nestas se intromete certo grau de ideologia, afetando as premissas (princípios
+
+que servem de base a um raciocínio) e as conclusões a que chegam os cientistas.
+
+Assim, no desenvolvimento de suas pesquisas sobre o que chama “discurso
+
+competente”, Marilena Chauí mostrou, com acerto, de que maneira a ciência não só carrega
+
+elementos ideológicos no seu interior, mas até serve à dominação social dos “donos do
+
+poder”, quando impõem aqueles falsos conteúdos à práxis social. Basta pensar, por exemplo,
+
+no que fazem os “Chicago boys”, criados na incubadora do economista Friedman e, depois,
+usados como assessores “científicos” do autoritarismo chileno ou até na política sócioeconômica
+da Sra. Thatcher, a “dama de ferro” do conservantismo inglês.
+
+A partir duma quota fatal de interferências ideológicas (de “idéias” preconcebidas
+
+e modeladas conforme os posicionamentos classísticos), o estudo das ideologias e a crítica do
+
+seu teor e efeitos encaminharam-se no sentido de falar da ideologia, não mais como simples
+
+conjunto de idéias, formando um padrão, mas apenas no setor desses conjuntos ou em
+
+conjuntos inteiros que carregam e transmitem as deformações. Desta maneira, surgiu o
+
+emprego atual, mais comum, do termo ideologia, como uma série de opiniões que não
+
+correspondem à realidade.
+
+Neste ponto é que surgem aquelas diferentes abordagens que já mencionamos.
+
+Desprezando matizes e sutilezas, é talvez possível reuni-las em três modelos principais: a)
+
+ideologia como crença; b) ideologia como falsa consciência; c) ideologia como instituição.
+
+Nos dois primeiros, ela é considerada em função dos sujeitos que a absorvem e vinculam; no
+
+terceiro é procurada na sociedade e independentemente dos sujeitos. A ideologia como crença
+
+mostra em que ordem de fenômenos mentais ela aparece. A ideologia como falsa consciência
+
+revela o efeito característico de certas crenças como deformação da realidade. A ideologia
+
+como instituição destaca a origem social do produto e os processos, também sociais, de sua
+
+transmissão a grupos e pessoas.
+
+Quando se fala na ideologia como crença, não se faz referência especial às crenças
+
+religiosas, embora estas últimas possam estar - como efetivamente estão - infestadas de
+
+elementos ideológicos. A ideologia como crença opõe esta última às idéias, no sentido que a
+
+ambas as palavras dava o pensador espanhol Ortega y Gasset. Por mais direitista que fosse,
+
+nem por isto ele seria incapaz de, em muitos pontos, acertar o martelo nos pregos em vez de
+
+golpear os dedos. Fazemos esta observação porque notamos que certas pessoas têm o hábito
+
+de discordar, em princípio, do nome ou da posição social dos autores, dispensando-se de
+
+verificar se, com tudo isso, o que eles dizem a respeito de um tema é certo ou errado. Já lemos
+
+um texto em que toda a filosofia de Kant, a grande figura do idealismo alemão, era explicada,
+
+resumida e liqüidada em duas palavras: “pequeno-burguesa”. Embora sejamos adversário de
+
+Kant, este juízo sumário parece-nos inaceitável, porque não explica a diferença entre Kant e
+
+outro qualquer pequeno-burguês, não aprecia validamente todas as suas idéias, algumas das
+
+quais são exatas, nem liqüida a sua influência na história do pensamento, que vai da direita à
+
+esquerda, compreendendo, inclusive, não poucos marxistas.
+
+Ortega considerava as idéias como algo que adquirimos através dum esforço
+
+mental deliberado e com o maior grau possível de senso crítico. As crenças, ao contrário,
+representariam opiniões pré-fabricadas, que nos vêm pelo contágio do meio, da educação e do
+
+lugar que ocupamos na estrutura social. Diz ele que as idéias nós temos e nas crenças
+
+estamos; isto é, nem nos ocorre discuti-las, tão óbvias nos parecem. E exato que, para Ortega,
+
+as crenças podem ser positivas e negativas (ao exame exterior que delas se faça), não se
+
+discutindo que, se alguém “crê” (sem refletir sobre isto) que a parede à frente é intransponível
+
+pelo seu avantajado corpo, faz muito bem quando evita uma topada desastrosa.
+
+Mas, em todo caso, a natureza subliminar (inconsciente) das crenças é que lhes vai
+
+dar uma característica favorecedora da ideologia. Em síntese, diríamos que nem toda a crença
+
+é ideologia (pode ser um resíduo válido de certezas adquiridas), mas toda ideologia se
+
+manifesta como crença (na medida em que nesta ficamos, sem verificar se, assim fazendo, é
+
+adotada a boa ou má posição; simplesmente parece que outra qualquer posição é inconcebível
+
+e só pode surgir por burrice, ignorância ou safadeza dos que a mantêm).
+
+A ideologia, portanto, é uma crença falsa, uma “evidência” não refletida que
+
+traduz uma deformação inconsciente da realidade. Não vemos os subterrâneos de irreflexão
+
+em que a fomos buscar e, ao contrário, ela nos traz a ilusão duma certeza tal que nem
+
+achamos necessário demonstrá-la. Raciocinamos a partir dela, mas não sobre ela, de vez que
+
+considerá-la como objeto de reflexão e fazer incidir sobre aquilo o senso crítico já seria o
+
+primeiro passo da direção superadora, isto é, iniciaria o processo da desideologização. Por
+
+isso mesmo, aceitamos, de bom grado, a troca de idéias, mas suportamos com dificuldade um
+
+desafio às crenças. Quem remexe nelas arrisca-se a receber um xingamento ou um coice.
+
+A ideologia, como crença falsa, leva-nos, portanto, à abordagem da falsa
+
+consciência. E esta última se exprime com tanto mais vigor quanto mais frágeis listo é, falsos)
+
+são os seus presumidos fundamentos. Estes passam a guiar, então, as nossas atitudes e
+
+raciocínios como “evidências” desvairadas. O escritor francês Alain dizia que se trata dum
+
+“delírio declamatório” na medida em que repetimos tranqüilamente (e, se contestados,
+
+repetimos exaltadamente) os maiores e mais convictos despropósitos. Pense o leitor na
+
+energia com que o racista proclama a “superioridade” do branco sobre o negro; com que o
+
+machista denuncia a “inferioridade” da mulher diante do homem; com que o burguês atribui
+
+ao “radical” o rompimento da “paz social” (que é, na verdade, o sossego para gozar, sem
+
+“contestação”, os seus privilégios de classe dominante).
+
+A falsa consciência introduz-se nas análises da ideologia, sobretudo a partir das
+
+contribuições marxistas. Não se trata de má fé, assinalam Marx e Engels, de vez que a má fé
+
+pressupõe uma distorção consciente e voluntária; a ideologia é cegueira parcial da inteligência
+
+entorpecida pela propaganda dos que a forjaram. O “discurso competente”, em que a ciência
+se corrompe a fim de servir à dominação, mantém ligação inextrincável com o discurso
+
+conveniente, mediante o qual as classes privilegiadas substituem a realidade pela imagem que
+
+lhes é mais favorável, e tratam de impô-la aos demais, com todos os recursos de que dispõem
+
+(órgãos de comunicação de massas, ensino, instrumentos especiais de controle social de que
+
+participam e, é claro, com forma destacada, as próprias leis).
+
+Mas a esta altura, sem dúvida, já nos deslocamos da natureza e efeitos da
+
+ideologia, para as suas origens. Nesta ordem de investigações também é grande a influência
+
+do marxismo em todo o pensamento contemporâneo. Uma disciplina chamada Sociologia do
+
+Conhecimento, cuja finalidade científica é investigar as raízes sociais de qualquer tipo de
+
+saber, constitui, quer queiram quer não os seus autores, um diálogo com o marxismo, em que
+
+muito mais é recebido do que reelaborado. Basicamente, foi o marxismo que propôs uma
+
+explicação das origens da ideologia, apontando os interesses e conveniências dos que
+
+controlam a vida social - já que, nesta, se apropriaram dos meios de produção econômica e de
+
+tudo o que representa a força e o poder, inclusive os meios de comunicações de massas, a
+
+organização do ensino e a produção das leis.
+
+As formações ideológicas estariam, assim, relacionadas com a divisão de classes,
+
+favorecendo uma (privilegiada) e se impondo à outra (espoliada na própria base da sua
+
+existência material). Tal dominação, evidentemente, não será eterna, pois as contradições da
+
+estrutura acabam rompendo a pirâmide do poder e, conscientizados, nisto, os que carregam o
+
+peso da opressão, abre-se espaço à contestação da ideologia “oficial”.
+
+Mas decerto convém matizar este influxo, na proporção mesma do processo
+
+dialético, que está no cerne do marxismo, apesar de obscurecer-se bastante, quando certas
+
+derivadas dele se desviam para a visão dogmática e mecânica. Engels dizia, com bastante
+
+ênfase, que o materialismo histórico pretende ser um guia para o estudo, não uma receita fácil
+
+a fim de que se derive, sem mais, da estrutura social básica tudo o que vier a ocorrer.
+
+O fato é que não se pode reconduzir, em linha reta, qualquer fenômeno ideológico
+
+à organização sócio-econômica. Há produtos ideológicos relativamente solúveis, sem troca do
+
+modo de produção, como os há relativamente indissolúveis, mesmo quando a troca se
+
+consumou. Exemplo disto é o machismo, já citado, que se vai atenuando, em certas
+
+sociedades capitalistas, e resiste com mais vigor em determinados países de socialismo
+
+implantado, ao menos quanto à base material das relações de produção.
+
+Em todo caso, as ideologias, absorvidas e definidas por este ou aquele sujeito, não
+
+são por ele criadas, mas recebidas. É isto que suscita a abordagem da ideologia como
+
+instituição, como algo que se cria e se manifesta na sociedade e não na cabeça deste ou
+daquele indivíduo. A ideologia é fato social (exterior, anterior e superior aos indivíduos),
+
+antes de tornar-se um fato psicológico (enquanto invade a formação mental, entrando,
+
+sorrateira, nas profundezas da mente). Porém não se trata, propriamente, dum “aparelho”
+
+ideológico, já que esta metáfora (significação duma palavra estendida a outra coisa
+
+semelhante ao que ela designa) tem o risco de sugerir uma forma, também mecânica, de
+
+atuação. Neste caso, o homem seria boneco inerte, fatalmente preso às determinações
+
+externas. E quem escaparia para corrigir a deformação ou proclamá-la incorrigível?
+
+Aliás, existe uma espécie curiosa de maniqueísmo (doutrina que vê tudo como
+
+uma espécie de bangue-bangue, com os “mocinhos” dum lado e os “bandidos” do outro) na
+
+oposição entre ideologia e ciência, que tende a considerar ideologia o saber... dos outros e
+
+ciência imaculada o saber de tais maniqueus. Em verdade, as coisas são muito mais
+
+complicadas, porque ficamos sempre oscilando entre a crença (iludida) e a ciência
+
+(retificadora) que, de qualquer forma, nunca se põe, definitivamente, como perfeita e acabada.
+
+E, coletivamente, não participamos duma tragédia, em que todos se agitam em vão, arrastados
+
+para a catástrofe inevitável, como um bando de cegos incuráveis: participamos, ao contrário,
+
+de um drama, em que os personagens buscam o seu itinerário, lutando contra barreiras de todo
+
+gênero e com a chance duma vitória final contra o “destino” (na medida em que temos a
+
+possibilidade de transformar a cegueira em miopia e procurar os óculos mais aperfeiçoados
+
+para ver o caminho).
+
+Marx já lembrava que não somos nem totalmente livres nem totalmente
+
+determinados. Se podemos superar as determinações, elas são, portanto, antes
+
+condicionamentos (“determinações” vencíveis, e não fatais), e é assim que se entende melhor
+
+a posição de Marx ao dizer que a maneira de superar as “determinações” é conscientizá-las. A
+
+propósito, um autor francês, Cuvillier, já observou que, em textos fundamentais do marxismo,
+
+a flexão alemã bedingt (condiciona) tende a ser traduzida, inexatamente, como “determina”.
+
+De qualquer maneira, a superação das “determinações” já acentua a participação ativa do
+
+homem e não apenas o funcionamento de máquinas e aparelhos.
+
+Por outro lado, há condições sociais que favorecem a conscientização: elas
+
+emergem quando as contradições duma estrutura social se agravam e a crise mais funda torna
+
+claros os contrastes entre a realidade e as ideologias. Hoje, o operário não tira mais o boné
+
+fazendo uma reverência ao “sr. dr.” que passa fumando charuto e com a mais valia no bolso.
+
+Ele já percebeu que existe “algo errado” no sistema, em que o valor dos bens produzidos pelo
+
+seu trabalho não corresponde à parte que lhe cabe a título de salário: e é precisamente nesta
+
+diferença que consiste a mais-valia, cujo destino é demasiadamente óbvio para que o
+trabalhador se conforme com vê-la engordar a riqueza do capitalista enquanto a miséria do
+
+povo se torna cada, vez mais dolorosa. A crise econômica e, mais amplamente, a crise social
+
+determinam rachaduras nas paredes institucionais e rompem o verniz das ideologias.
+
+Dentro deste clima, não é mais possível o funcionamento, por exemplo, daquela
+
+crença de que “cada um tem o seu lugar”, como se este fosse imposto pela natureza das coisas
+
+– por Deus ou pela racional partilha - e não pelos interesses entronizados duma classe
+
+dominante. A propósito de “dar a cada um o que é seu”, como principio “jurídico”, mostrava
+
+o grande jurísta João Mangabeira que é expressão muito velha da separação social das classes
+
+entre os proprietários e os não-proprietários, entre os dominantes e os espoliados: “porque se a
+
+justiça consiste em dar a cada um o que é seu, dê-se ao pobre a pobreza, ao miserável a
+
+miséria, ao desgraçado a desgraça, que isso é o que é deles... Nem era senão por isso que ao
+
+escravo se dava a escravidão, que era o seu, no sistema de produção em que aquela fórmula se
+
+criou. Mas bem sabeis que esta justiça monstruosa tudo pode ser, menos justiça. A regra da
+
+Justiça deve ser a cada um segundo o seu trabalho, como resulta da sentença de São Paulo na
+
+carta aos Tessalonicenses, enquanto não se atinge o princípio de a cada um segundo a sua
+
+necessidade.”
+
+A medida que a crise social desenvolve as contradições do sistema, emergem as
+
+conscientizações que apontam os seus vícios estruturais e surge um pensamento de vanguarda,
+
+que vê mais precisamente onde estão os rombos, superando a ideologia e fazendo avançar a
+
+ciência. Um jurista atual não pode mais receber o seu rubi de bacharel, repetindo, com
+
+serenidade, “a cada um o que é seu”, como se fosse a serena verdade do Direito.
+
+A ciência, porém, não será nunca, repetimos, definitiva, acabada e perfeita. A
+
+verdade absoluta - recorda-nos o marxista polonês Adam Schaff - é apenas um limite ideal,
+
+como na série matemática, um limite que efetivamente vai recuando cada vez mais à medida
+
+que avançamos. Isto não quer dizer que as verdades relativas alcançadas pelo homem sejam
+
+menos objetivas e válidas: a opção a fazer, nota Schaff, é pela “verdade mais completa
+
+possível”, na etapa atual e, a fim de procurá-la, é preciso combater em sua origem - a
+
+sociedade injusta - e em nós mesmos - pela conscientização assentada numa práxis libertadora
+
+- os fantasmas ideológicos, a fim de que não nos transformemos naquele tipo de intelectual
+
+atarantado, que “contesta” sem saber bem o quê nem por que. Este já foi corretamente visto
+
+como “a face exótica do poder”.
+
+Em síntese, a formação ideológica (fato-instituição social), oriunda, em termos
+
+gerais, de contradições da estrutura sócio-econômica (mas não exclusivamente redutfvel a
+
+estas, pois, com relativa independência, aparece, subsiste ou se dissolve) cristaliza um
+repertório de crenças, que os sujeitos absorvem e que lhes deforma o raciocínio, devido à
+
+consciência falsa (isto é, a inconsciência de que eles são guiados por princípios recebidos
+
+como evidências e que, na verdade, constituem meras conveniências de classe ou grupo
+
+encarapitados em posição de privilégio).
+
+No esforço para nos libertarmos desses condicionamentos floresce, por outro lado,
+
+uma conscientização, favorecida, em seu impulso crítico, pelas crises que manifestam as
+
+contradições da estrutura social, onde primeiro surgiram as crenças, agora contestadas ou de
+
+contestação viável (se não nos acomodarmos na alienação, desligando a mente do que vai em
+
+torno). O grau desta conscientização, a sua própria coerência e persistência dependem sempre
+
+do nosso engajamento numa práxis, numa participação ativa conseqüente.
+
+Não adianta ver que “o mundo está errado” e encolher os ombros, fugindo para
+
+algum “paraíso artificial”, no porre, no embalo, no sexo obsessivo ou na transferência de
+
+qualquer atuação positiva para mais tarde, noutra vida, no “além”. E quando falamos em
+
+práxis é evidente que ela pode ser também de maior ou menor amplitude; mas a atitude
+
+modesta, limitada mesmo, já é uma forma válida de participar pelo discurso, pelo voto, pela
+
+arregimentação, pela ajuda material e moral a espoliados e oprimidos.
+
+Tudo isto se reflete nas ideologias jurídicas. Tal como as outras, elas aparecem
+
+dando expressão, em última análise, aos posicionamentos de classe, tanto é assim que as
+
+correntes de “idéias aceitas” podem mudar - e, de fato, mudam – conforme esteja a classe em
+
+ascensão, relativa estabilidade ou decadência. Veremos adiante, por exemplo, que a burguesia
+
+chegou ao poder desfraldando a bandeira ideológica do direito natural – com fundamento
+
+acima das leis - e, tendo conquistado o que pretendia, trocou de doutrina, passando a defender
+
+o positivismo jurídico (em substância, a ideologia da ordem assente). Pudera! A “guitarra”
+
+legislativa já estava em suas mãos. A primeira fase contestou o poder aristocrático-feudal, na
+
+força do capitalismo em subida, para dominar o Estado. A segunda fez a digestão da vitória,
+
+pois já não precisava mais desafiar um poder de que se apossara. É daí que surge a
+
+transformação do grito libertário (invocando direitos supralegais) em arroto social, de pança
+
+cheia (não admitindo a existência de Direito senão em suas leis).
+
+Apesar de tudo, as ideologias jurídicas encerram aspectos particularmente
+
+interessantes, além de traduzirem, conquanto deformados, elementos da realidade. Porque
+
+distorção é precisamente isto: a imagem alterada, não inventada. O Direito, alongado ou
+
+achatado, como reflexo numa superfície côncava ou convexa, ainda apresenta certas
+
+características reconhecíveis. Resta desentortar o espelho, torná-lo, tanto quanto possível,
+
+plano e abrangedor, dentro das condições atuais de reexame global.
+Isto se beneficia, por outro lado, como processo de conscientização, da “crise do
+
+Direito” – isto é, desse “direito” que ainda aparece nos compêndios, nos tratados, no ensino e
+
+na prática de muitos juristas; no discurso do poder e até - por lamentável contágio - no de
+
+certos grupos e pessoas de sincero engajamento progressista. Estes últimos desafiam o estreito
+
+legalismo como se ali residisse o Direito inteiro; e, assim, com o desaparecimento de leis que
+
+representam mera conveniência e interesse duma ilegítima dominação, pensam que sumirá o
+
+Direito mesmo.
+
+Procuraremos demonstrar, adiante, que isto não é exato e que, ao contrário,
+
+andava certo o eminente colega Dalmo Dallari quando, noutro volume desta coleção,
+
+escreveu: “na realidade, o direito usado para dominação e injustiça é um direito ilegítimo, um
+
+falso direito”. O que se faz, aqui, é ampliar, desenvolver este excelente ponto de partida,
+
+esboçando uma abordagem global do Direito, sob o ponto de vista dialético.
+PRINCIPAIS MODELOS DE IDEOLOGIA JURÍDICA
+
+Não é possível repassar, agora, todas as ideologias jurídicas, uma por uma. Vamos,
+
+portanto, simplificar o imenso repertório de doutrinas que aparecem, da Antigüidade aos nossos
+
+dias. Tomaremos apenas dois modelos básicos, em torno dos quais se polarizam os diferentes
+
+subgrupos ideológicos - a que só faremos um breve aceno, sem descer a pormenores da posição
+
+de autores e movimentos. Fundamentalmente, aquelas ideologias situam-se entre o direito natural
+
+e o direito positivo, correspondendo às concepções jurisnaturalista e positivista do Direito. A estas
+
+duas daremos, portanto, especial atenção, porque a maior parte dos juristas, ainda hoje, adota uma
+
+ou a outra, como se, fora de ambas, não houvesse maneira de ver o fenômeno jurídico.
+
+É certo que muitos autores tradicionais não se julgariam corretamente
+
+enquadrados numa dessas duas posições; mas, quando observamos os alicerces da construção
+
+que pretende ser diferente, aparece ali a mesma oposição, que se pretendia evitar, entre direito
+
+positivo e direito natural. Antes de fazer um exame especial destas duas resistentes
+
+concepções, que assinalam a grande cisão das ideologias jurídicas - de um lado, o Direito
+
+como ordem estabelecida (positivismo) e, de outro, como ordem justa (iurisnaturalismo),
+
+daremos uns exemplos daquelas doutrinas que supostamente fugiram ao dilema.
+
+Assim, Miguel Reale, entre outros, recusaria a classificação como positivista e, no
+
+entanto, para este filósofo do Direito, é na ordem que se encontra a raiz de toda a elaboração
+
+jurídica: “em toda a comunidade, é mister que uma ordem jurídica declare, em última
+
+instância, o que é lícito ou ilícito”. E, para mais enfatizar este posicionamento, o mesmo
+
+destacado pensador da direita repete e endossa uma frase de Hauriou, no sentido de que “a
+
+ordem social representa o minimum de existência e a justiça social é um luxo, até certo ponto
+
+dispensável...”. Não se poderia fixar mais claramente a opção positivista. Depois disto,
+
+qualquer acréscimo ou matizamento é secundário: permanece, no âmago, o compromisso com
+
+a ordem estabelecida e as barreiras que ela opõe ao Direito justo não seriam jamais
+
+transponíveis, porque, na verdade, para o positivista, a ordem é a “Justiça”.
+
+Por outro lado, o jurista alemão Hans Welzel afirma expressamente que não é
+
+iurisnaturalista e, no entanto, admite certos princípios fixos, inalteráveis, anteriores e
+
+superiores às leis e que nenhum legislador pode modificar validamente. Por isso mesmo é,
+
+comumente, classificado como um adepto do direito natural.
+
+Somente uma nova teoria realmente dialética do Direito evita a queda numa das
+
+pontas da antítese (teses radicalmente opostas) entre direito positivo e direito natural. Isto, é
+claro, como em toda superação dialética, importa em conservar os aspectos válidos de ambas
+
+as posições, rejeitando os demais e reenquadrando os primeiros numa visão superior. Assim,
+
+veremos que a positividade do Direito não conduz fatalmente ao positivismo e que o direito
+
+justo integra a dialética jurídica, sem voar para nuvens metafísicas, isto é,sem desligar-se das
+
+lutas sociais, no seu desenvolvimento histórico, entre espoliados e oprimidos, de um lado, e
+
+espoliadores e opressores, de outro.
+
+Esta síntese dialética será exposta nas conclusões deste livrinho. Por
+
+enquanto, vejamos o panorama tal como ele se apresenta nas ideologias jurídicas duma
+
+tradição que ainda empolga e divide em facções opostas os cultores rotineiros do
+
+Direito; pois, antes de esboçar um passo adiante, é preciso ter em mente o caminho
+
+percorrido pelos antecessores e que, decerto, não foi inútil, nem mesmo quando
+
+representou uma deformação ideológica. E a própria tábua, sobre a qual se balançaram
+
+(e balançam ainda) tantos juristas ilustres, que há de servir-nos como trampolim para o
+
+salto dialético. Embora o jurisnaturalismo (a ideologia do direito natural) seja a posição
+
+mais antiga (e de nenhum modo inteiramente liquidada) é o positivismo que hoje
+
+predomina entre os juristas do nosso tempo, seja ele o que assenta na ordem burguesa e
+
+capitalista, seja o que, como “legalismo socialista”, representou aquele mesmo tipo de
+
+congelamento característico, por exemplo, no stalinismo, e que ainda prevalece na
+
+URSS. Tal congelamento, aliás, tende a desaparecer nas mais avançadas construções de
+
+uma filosofia jurídica realmente dialética.
+
+Esta intenção superadora, ainda hesitante, é muito nítida nos mais avançados
+
+escritores atuais da teoria socialista do Direito, que combatem o estreito legalismo, tanto nos
+
+países de modelo socialista implantado, em termos sócio-econômicos, como é o caso de Imre
+
+Szabó ou Zoltán Péteri, na Hungria, quanto em autores socialistas que trabalham nos países de
+
+estrutura fundada no capitalismo, como era o caso de Ernst Bloch, na Alemanha, até a sua
+
+morte, e ainda é o de Michel Miaille, na França, em obras mais recentes. A estes dois últimos
+
+faremos referência especial, a propósito de uma tensa, limitada, mas fecunda recolocação da
+
+problemática do direito natural, sob o ponto de vista do marxismo.
+
+De qualquer forma, trataremos, em primeiro lugar, do positivismo, tal qual ele se
+
+apresenta nas ideologias burguesas, já que é, por assim dizer, o trivial variado da cozinha
+
+jurídica, no mundo capitalista que aí temos à nossa frente. Faremos, aqui, apenas a ressalva de
+
+que o “legalismo socialista” apresenta diferenças resultantes do fato de que é socialista,
+
+revestindo, portanto, uma estrutura diversa e socialmente mais avançada; enquanto esquema
+
+ou modelo, contudo, vem a dar na mesma, pois que apresenta uma redução à ordem posta e,
+portanto, ordem do Estado, aceita, sem mais, e subsiste a restrição que, como tese jurídica, já
+
+decai, por isso mesmo, no pensamento de vanguarda.
+
+Assim como este, do ponto de vista social mais amplo, tende a procurar outro
+
+sistema de reestruturação socialista, de baixo para cima, antes no caminho da autogestão (de
+
+que participa o povo mais diretamente) do que na pesada maquinaria autoritáriaburocráticaestatal,
+que estabelece um domínio de cima para baixo, a reflexão socialista mais
+
+moderna tende, igualmente, a buscar uma teoria jurídica mais flexível, e, afinal, propriamente
+
+dialética, em que se liberte daquela noção de Direito como, antes de tudo, direito estatal,
+
+ordem estatal, leis e “controle incontrolado”.
+
+É na medida em que o socialismo pende para o democrático que a teoria
+
+correspondente do Direito pende e avança para o combate ao seu confinamento em estatismo,
+
+com a subsistência de opressões várias (por exemplo, a grupos minoritários étnicos ou
+
+sexuais). Vimos que as duas palavras-chave, definidoras do positivismo e do iurisnaturalismo,
+
+são, para o primeiro, ordem, e, para o segundo, Justiça. Isto se esclarece bem nas duas
+
+proposições latinas que simbolizam o dilema (aparentemente insolúvel) entre ambas as
+
+posições: íustum quia iussum (justo, porque ordenado), que define o positivismo, enquanto
+
+este não vê maneira de inserir, na sua teoria do Direito, a crítica à injustiça das normas,
+
+limitando-se ou a proclamar que estas contêm toda justiça possível ou dizer que o problema
+
+da injustiça “não é jurídico”; e iussum quia iustum (ordenado porque justo), que representa o
+
+jurisnaturalismo, para o qual as normas devem obediência a algum padrão superior, sob pena
+
+de não serem corretamente jurídicas. Este padrão tende, por sua vez, a apresentar-se, já
+
+dissemos, como fixo, inalterável e superior a toda legislação, mesmo quando sé fala num
+
+“direito natural de conteúdo variável.”
+
+Este, que aparece com o jurista alemão Stammler, também não altera a postura,
+
+uma vez que o “conteúdo” é concebido apenas como variação material de normas, dentro de
+
+uma ordem de princípios universais de ordenação. Isto reduz o número de princípios de
+
+direito natural (que, entretanto, permanecem fixos) e abre caminho a toda espécie de
+
+“particularização”, que acaba entregando os pontos ao Estado; mas tal vicio não é, apenas, da
+
+construção do Stammler e, sim, como veremos, de praticamente todo o direito natural.
+
+O positivismo, de qualquer sorte, é uma redução do Direito à ordem estabelecida;
+
+o iurisnaturalismo é, ao contrário, um desdobramento em dois planos: o que se apresenta nas
+
+normas e o que nelas deve apresentar-se para que sejam consideradas boas, válidas e
+
+legítimas. Em que medida o jurisnaturalismo cria, não a superação do positivismo, porém
+
+antinomia (contradição insolúvel entre dois princípios), entre a ordem justa e a ordem
+estabelecida, e, por outro lado, se ele consegue, ou não, fundamentar, convincentemente, o
+
+plano jurídico superior, que serve de estalão para medir as normas jurídicas encontradas na
+
+vida social - eis aí duas questões que examinaremos quando vier à consideração o próprio
+
+direito natural.
+
+Por enquanto, verifiquemos as posições e barreiras do positivismo. Ele sempre
+
+capta o Direito, quando já vertido em normas; seu limite é ordem estabelecida, que se garante
+
+diretamente com normas sociais não-legisladas (o costume da classe dominante, por exemplo)
+
+ou se articula, no Estado, como órgão centralizador do poder, através do qual aquela ordem e
+
+classe dominante passam a exprimir-se (neste caso, ao Estado é deferido o monopólio de
+
+produzir ou controlar a produção de normas jurídicas, mediante leis, que só reconhecem os
+
+limites por elas mesmas estabelecidos).
+
+De todo modo, as normas - isto é, como vimos, os padrões de conduta, impostos
+
+pelo poder social, com ameaça de sanções organizadas (medidas repressivas, expressamente
+
+indicadas, com órgão e procedimento especiais de aplicação) - constituem, para o positivismo,
+
+o completo Direito. E note-se que, no caso, se trata das normas da classe dominante,
+
+revestindo a estrutura social estabelecida, porque a presença de outras normas - de classe ou
+
+grupos dominados - não é reconhecida, pelo positivismo, como elemento jurídico, exceto na
+
+medida em que não se revelam incompatíveis com o sistema - portanto, único a valer acima
+
+de tudo e todos - daquela ordem, classe e grupos prevalecentes.
+
+Quando o positivista fala em Direito, refere-se a este último - e único - sistema de
+
+normas, para ele, válidas, como se ao pensamento e prática jurídicas interessasse apenas o que
+
+certos órgãos do poder social (a classe e grupos dominantes ou, por elas, o Estado) impõem e
+
+rotulam como Direito. É claro que vai nisto uma confusão, pois tal posicionamento equivale a
+
+deduzir todo Direito de certas normas, que supostamente o exprimem, como quem dissesse
+
+que açúcar “é” aquilo que achamos numa lata com a etiqueta açúcar, ainda que um gaiato lá
+
+tenha colocado pó-de-arroz ou um perverso tenha enchido o recipiente com arsênico.
+
+Há, porém, várias espécies de positivismo. Destacaremos, no mínimo, três: o
+
+positivismo legalista; o positivismo historicista ou sociologista; o positivismo psicologista.
+
+Vamos explicar, brevemente, em que consistem eles.
+
+O positivismo legalista volta-se para a lei e, mesmo quando incorpora outro tipo
+
+de norma - como, por exemplo, o costume -, dá à lei total superioridade, tudo ficando
+
+subordinado ao que ela determina e jamais sendo permitido – de novo, a título de exemplo -
+
+invocar um costume contra a lei. Não é este, contudo, o único positivismo.
+Há, também, o positivismo historicista ou sociologista. A modalidade historicista
+
+recua um passo e prefere voltar-se para as formações jurídicas pré-legislativas, isto é,
+
+anteriores à lei. Mergulha, então, nas normas jurídicas não escritas, não organizadas em leis e
+
+códigos, mas admitidas como uma espécie de produto espontâneo do que se chama “espírito
+
+do povo”. Acontece que este fantasma, utilíssimo à ordem dominante, atribui ao “povo” os
+
+costumes principais (aqueles mores, indicados pelos antropólogos e que são os costumes
+
+considerados essenciais para a manutenção da ordem social). Ora, estes mores são sempre os
+
+da classe e grupos dominantes, mascarados pelo historicismo positivista sob o rótulo de
+
+produtos do “espírito do povo”.
+
+Desta maneira, não importa muito que se desloque o foco da legislação (imposto
+
+pelo Estado) para os mores, de vez que estes, sendo focalizados em termos de mores da classe
+
+e grupos dominantes, e o Estado sendo expressão da mesma classe, é também à mesma ordem
+
+a que ambos (historicismo e legalismo) se referem e consideram inatacável. De qualquer
+
+forma, quando aparece a legislação estatal, aquelas formulações pré-legislativas tendem a
+
+ceder precedência às leis e só se aplicam, supletivamente; isto é, nas áreas em que não há
+
+disciplina legislativa. E o caso, por exemplo, do common law anglo-americano, direito
+
+consuetudinário (dos costumes), que não prevalece contra lei expressa.
+
+A modalidade sociologista de positivismo tem ligação íntima com a historicista
+
+(por isto, foram citadas num só grupo), uma vez que é apenas uma generalização do
+
+historicismo. Queremos dizer que, em vez de focalizar um direito costumeiro (afinal engolido
+
+pelas leis estatais, quando aparecem estas) o sociologismo propõe o esquema da abordagem
+
+historicista, generalizando-o. Assim, ele se volta para o sistema de controle social, que reveste
+
+a ordem estabelecida e na qual o Estado seria apenas um representante daquela ordem, que lhe
+
+dá substância, validade e fundamento.
+
+De certo modo, ainda mais se destaca, aqui, a dominação classística, pois fica bem
+
+clara a natureza e posição dos grupos e pessoas que encarnam a ordem listo é, antes de tudo, a
+
+classe dominante, de que o Estado é visto como simples porta-voz). A presença de outros
+
+projetos, outras instituições, oriundas de outra classe e grupos (não dominantes), é desprezada.
+
+O Direito aparece tão-só como forma de controle social, ligado à organização do poder
+
+classístico, que tanto pode exprimir-se através das leis, como desprezá-las, rasgar constituições,
+
+derrubar titulares e órgãos do Estado legal, tomando diretamente as rédeas do poder.
+
+Estas contradições da classe dominante, no entanto, acabam reforçando a
+
+dominação, pois o que invoca o novo grupo do poder é a mesma ordem social, que entendia mal
+
+defendida pelos seus representantes. É assim como se o mandante cassasse os mandatos de seus
+procuradores, mais ou menos infiéis, com receio de que estes entreguem o ouro aos banidos (do
+
+poder), isto é, os dominados, que “devem” continuar dominados. Vê-se, então, que as
+
+contradições à superfície representam uma coerência mais profunda (a da dominação, é claro).
+
+No positivismo sociologista é a classe dominante (a que ele não alude, por
+
+motivos óbvios, como tal, preferindo falar na sociedade, como se esta, por presunção
+
+inatacável, estivesse bem defendida por aquela classe) que pretende exprimir “a” cultura e
+
+traçar “a” organização social a resguardar pelos mecanismos de controle e “segurança” desta
+
+ordem estabelecida. O comportamento divergente dos grupos e classe dominados, seus
+
+padrões de conduta (com normas opostas às normas do sistema) são vistos como
+
+“subculturas”, comportamentos “aberrantes”, “antijurídicos”, uma “patologia” que constitui
+
+“problema social” a ser tratado com medidas repressivo-educativas para conduzir os
+
+“transviados” ao “bom caminho”.
+
+Se cresce a contestação, a atitude anômica ( isto é, que contesta o nomos, as
+
+normas, da ordem estabelecida), as hipocrisias paternalistas logo tiram a máscara, abandonam o
+
+mito da “educação” dos dominados (segundo os padrões da classe e grupos dominantes e para
+
+melhor servi-los) e saem para a “ignorância”, no sentido popular da palavra, isto é, recorrem à
+
+porrada, que os donos do poder e seus dóceis servidores consideram perfeitamente “jurídica”.
+
+Noutras palavras, o positivismo legalista, historicista ou sociologista (os dois
+
+últimos reforçando o primeiro, a que se acabam rendendo) canoniza a ordem social
+
+estabelecida, que só poderia ser alterada dentro das regras do jogo que esta própria
+
+estabelece... para que não haja alteração fundamental. Aliás, se as regras do jogo, apesar de
+
+todas as cautelas e salvaguardas, trazem o risco de vitória, mesmo pelas urnas e dentro das
+
+canais da lei, de correntes reestruturadoras, o poder em exercício (pressionado pelas forças do
+
+sistema e pelo seu próprio gosto de ficar no topo da pirâmide) trata de mudar as ditas regras
+
+do jogo, empacotando outro conjunto de normas legais. É assim como se o árbitro criasse um
+
+novo caso de impedimento, no meio da partida. Isto quando o time que não lhe é simpático já
+
+via toda defesa adversária “furar” e cair, diante do jogador mais ágil, que está sozinho diante
+
+do goleiro e na iminência de fazer gol.
+
+Aliás, sé os representantes da ordem estabelecida, chegando ao poder estatal,
+
+hesitam ou se revelam mais receptivos à pressão popular pelas reestruturações sociais, a
+
+mesma classe dominadora não teme substituí-los por outros, mais enérgicos, ainda que, para
+
+isto, rompa todo um ciclo de legalidade e substitua a legalidade feita por outra, então
+
+considerada intocável. E, durante esta substituição, os juristas do positivismo ficam no terrível
+
+suspense, esperando para ver quem vai “dar as cartas” do jogo; isto é, as novas leis, que tais
+rábulas diplomados e endomingados interpretarão e aplicarão, com a maior cara de pau e
+
+todos os balangandãs da técnica “jurídica”.
+
+Se, porém, a situação interna se transmuda e a classe dominante é derrotada,
+
+mesmo nas urnas, chegando as forças progressistas ao poder, o sistema imperialista de
+
+controle internacional não tarda a intervir, fomentando a resistência (a isto sé chama
+
+“desestabilizar” governos), desprezando o princípio de autodeterminação dos povos e
+
+mandando dinheiro e armas para manter a “ordem” nos quintais de sua “zona de influência”.
+
+No meio deste jogo violento, o positivismo psicologista desempenha o papel de inocente útil.
+
+Nele, o “espírito do povo” não fica pairando na sociedade: baixa na cuca de um ou mais
+
+sujeitos privilegiados.
+
+São estes que pretendem: 1. haver descoberto o “direito livre” dentro de suas
+
+“belas almas”, revelando um “sentimento do direito”; ou 2. que deferem aos juízes, como no
+
+judge-made law (o direito criado pela magistratura), de certas ideologias norte-americanas, o
+
+poder judicial de construir normas, além e acima do que está nas leis: um direito mais rápido,
+
+“realista” e concreto do que o dos códigos; ou ainda 3. vão à busca duma “essência
+
+fenomenológica do direito”, que não tem o romantismo do “direito livre” ou o pragmatismo
+
+(neste, o critério da verdade é o sucesso) do “direito dos juízes”, mas também não rende mais
+
+do que umas fumaças pretensiosas. Dá tudo no mesmo e o que este buquê de ideologias tem
+
+de comum, de psicologista, é a transferência de foco, passando daquele panorama exterior (de
+
+leis, controle social, “espírito” - objetivo - do “povo”) para as cabeças dos ideólogos.
+
+Vejamos um pouco mais de perto o positivismo do terceiro grupo (os positivismos
+
+psicologistas). O “sentimento do direito”, procurado numa intuição livre, acaba descobrindo, e
+
+não por mera coincidência, na “alma” dos pesquisadores, a ideologia jurídica peculiar à sua
+
+classe e seu grupo, isto é, os princípios perfeitamente compatíveis com a ordem estabelecida.
+
+Começando nas “belas almas”, em que a ideologia brota como uma flor, e idealizando,
+
+romanticamente, a dominação, o “sentimento do direito” acaba amadurecendo nos mesmos
+
+frutos repressivos.
+
+Nem os senhores delicados, do “sentimento” - nem, por outro lado, os senhores
+
+práticos, do direito criado por juízes “realistas” – sequer intentam uma crítica real e profunda
+
+de pressupostos estabelecidos pela ordem social dominante. Ao contrário, eles procuram
+
+melhor servi-la, apenas achando que a legislação é um caminho muito estreito (bruto, para os
+
+sentimentais, ou atrasado, para os realistas), em relação às exigências de manter a estrutura
+
+em perfeito funcionamento, com um pouco de água com açúcar ou pondo óleo e peças novas
+
+na máquina.
+Restam os artifícios da fenomenologia, que é também um positivismo
+
+psicologista. Aqui, há pretensões menos românticas, mas o processo nem por isto deixa de
+
+parecer-nos uma espécie de mágica besta. Sua intenção declarada, aliás, seria ultrapassar o
+
+psicologismo, ir às “coisas mesmas”, aos fenômenos e, por assim dizer, descascá-los, até que
+
+revelem, no âmago, a própria “essência”. Mas, perguntemos: quais são os fenômenos assim
+
+descascados? São os fatos de dominação que os legalismos, historicismos e sociologismos
+
+apresentaram como “jurídicos”, isto é, de novo e sempre, a ordem estabelecida e seus
+
+instrumentos de controle social. Este não é jamais questionado e, sim, trabalhado mentalmente
+
+pelo fenomenólogo, até que só reste a “essência”... da dominação.
+
+E qual o processo utilizado para extrair a “essência”? Como é que o
+
+fenomenólogo pretende atingir as coisas mesmas? Com a sua “visão” individual, que acaba
+
+transferindo para o objeto os próprios elementos ideológicos do observador. Lukács observa
+
+que se trata duma “abertura para o mundo de um sujeito que na verdade não sai de si mesmo”.
+
+Dizendo que se libertou da psicologia e das representações mentais para ver as coisas no que
+
+essencialmente são, o fenomenólogo toma as coisas (no caso, os fenômenos jurídicos) tal
+
+como as apresentou um fato de dominação e busca a “essência” dele, numa laboriosa “visão”,
+
+que esquece de tirar os óculos, de lentes deformadoras, que a ideologia pôs no seu nariz.
+
+Finalmente, e muito entusiasmado, grita que “já morou na essência daquilo”...
+
+Nem foi à toa que as mais laboriosas pretensões fenomenológicas, na teoria do
+
+Direito, acabaram “casando” com a teoria “pura” de Hans Kelsen: isto é, a fenomenologia
+
+jurídica de Kaufmann ou de Schreier não passa de um caminho complicado para o
+
+positivismo legalista de Kelsen. Todas as formas do positivismo, assim, rodam num círculo,
+
+porque, a partir do legalismo, giram por diversos graus para chegarem ao mesmo ponto de
+
+partida, que é a lei e o Estado.
+
+Em todo esse jogo de positividades manhosas, entretanto, a argúcia de Radbruch
+
+apontou um limite: é que, mesmo no plano ideológico, o positivismo, que diviniza a “lei e a
+
+ordem” como se ali estivesse o Direito inteiro, há de oferecer um qualquer fundamento
+
+jurídico para tal ordem, tal Estado produtor de leis, tal privilégio e exclusividade de produzir
+
+leis, que seria do Estado. E Radbruch, o grande iurisfilósofo alemão, com certeira malícia nos
+
+mostra que o positivismo, neste empenho, “pressupõe um preceito jurídico de direito natural,
+
+na base de todas as suas construções”, isto é, um preceito jurídico anterior e superior ao
+
+direito positivo. O que se pretende afirmar assim é que, ou o positivismo se descobre como
+
+não-jurídico, fazendo derivar o Direito do simples fato de dominação, ou, para tentar a
+
+legitimação da ordem e do poder que nela se entroniza, recorre a um princípio que não é o
+direito positivo (este direito já feito e imposto, em substância, pelo Estado?, pois a função
+
+daquele princípio é precisamente dar fundamento jurídico ao direito positivo.
+
+Afinal de contas, por que se atribui ao Estado o monopólio de produzir Direito, com a
+
+legislação? Que razão jurídica legitimaria este privilégio? Nenhum positivista escapa a esta
+
+questão: no máximo, ele a transfere para outra sede, isto é, procura oferecer à sua ideologia
+
+jurídica o aval de sua ideologia política - o que não deixa de ser engraçado em quem se afirma
+
+“objetivo”, isento, até “neutro” politicamente. Um caso extremo é o de Kelsen, a que aludiremos
+
+brevemente, porque ele nos conduz aos limites do paradoxo, na sua teimosia positivista.
+
+Assim é que, para conservar aquele mito da “neutralidade”, afirma que o Direito é
+
+apenas uma técnica de organizar a força do poder; mas, desta maneira, deixa o poder sem
+
+justificação, como que nu e pronto a ferrar todo o mundo, mas de calças arriadas, com perigo
+
+para sua dignidade; portanto o mesmo Kelsen acrescenta que a força é empregada “enquanto
+
+monopólio da comunidade” e para realizar “a paz social”. Desta maneira, opta pela teoria
+
+polftica liberal, que equipara Estado e comunidade, como se aquele representasse todo o povo
+
+(ocultando, deste modo, a dominação classística e dos grupos associados a tais classes).
+
+Chama-se, então, de “paz social” a ordem estabelecida (em proveito dos dominadores e
+
+tentando disfarçar a luta de classes e grupos).
+
+Ora, este artifício, que põe no Estado sempre a paz e o interesse da comunidade, é
+
+mais do que poderia engolir um iurisnaturalista consciente. Onde ficam, perante isso, o
+
+Direito de resistência à tirania, ao poder usurpado? E a guerra justa contra os Estados
+
+imperialistas que atacam nações mais fracas como o lobo ao cordeiro?
+
+Junto à questão do Estado emerge a da segurança jurídica, outro mimo da
+
+ideologia positivista. Afirma-se que há segurança para os cidadãos, tendo-se em vista que as
+
+preceituações legais estabelecem como todos devem pautar a sua conduta, a fim de evitar as
+
+sanções estabelecidas, no caso dum descumprimento dos deveres que as leis impõem. Mas
+
+haverá maior insegurança do que uma determinação sem limites, através da legislação, do que
+
+é permitido ou proibido, além do mais realizada por um certo poder que se dispensa de provar
+
+a própria legitimidade? Este poder, ao contrário, se presume legítimo, a partir do fato de que
+
+está em exercício e chegou á posição desempenhada, seguindo os processos que ele próprio
+
+estabelece, altera e, de todas as formas, controla a seu bel-prazer.
+
+Um círculo de legalidade (aliás, provindo de uma ruptura, mais próxima ou mais
+
+remota, de outra legalidade) não é, em si, prova de coisa alguma, quanto à legitimidade do
+
+poder, já o repetia, entre outros, Heller, conforme lembramos. Qualquer tirania pagava com
+
+gosto (e paga mesmo) este pequeno tributo, que é cobrir de leis o corpo nu do poder,
+pensando que isto basta para torná-lo inatacavelmente jurídico. Radbruch, que teve de
+
+enfrentar a perseguição de Hitler, advertia, também, que uma legalidade não é suficiente, pois,
+
+em situações comuns, ela é, em todo caso, o revestimento duma estrutura de dominação, que é
+
+preciso avaliar criticamente e, em situações extremas, pode ser constituída pelos “editos de
+
+um paranóico”, isto é, pelas leis de um doente mental com mania de grandeza.
+
+Volta sempre a questão da fonte suprema de qualquer Direito, inclusive do direito de
+
+produzir normas legais. A idolatria da ordem nunca elimina (apenas tenta disfarçar) o problema da
+
+Justiça. Que será, entretanto, esta Justiça, que se põe no centro das preocupações iurisnaturalistas?
+
+De que maneira, mesmo a este nível ideológico, emerge a dialética da ordem e da Justiça?
+
+Ressalvemos que, neste ponto, estamos fazendo abstração do posicionamento concreto e
+
+realmente dialético do problema (que só pode ser focalizado a partir da dialética social, e não
+
+apenas ideológica, do Direito). O nosso objetivo, por enquanto, é mostrar que as ideologias
+
+jurídicas refletem, apesar de tudo, algo mais profundo, nelas também relativamente deformado.
+
+O direito natural apresenta-se, fundamentalmente, sob três formas, todas elas
+
+procurando estabelecer o padrão jurídico, destinado a validar as normas eventualmente
+
+produzidas, ou explicar por que elas não são válidas. As três formas são: a) o direito natural
+
+cosmológico; b) o direito natural teológico; c) o direito natural antropológico. A primeira liga-se
+
+ao cosmo, o universo físico; a segunda volta-se para Deus; a terceira gira em torno do homem.
+
+Dizem que o direito natural tem origem na própria “natureza das coisas”, na
+
+ordem cósmica, do universo; e daí vem a expressão direito natural, isto é, buscado na
+
+natureza. Entretanto, se nos aproximarmos das concepções do que é tomado como “natureza
+
+das coisas”, verificamos que esta é apenas invocada para justificar uma determinada ordem
+
+social estabelecida, ou revelar o choque de duas ordens também sociais. Notemos, por
+
+exemplo, no primeiro caso, a atribuição ao direito natural, isto é, à “natureza das coisas” da
+
+escravidão, naquelas sociedades em que o escravagismo é o modo de produção econômica e,
+
+portanto, a base da estrutura assente. No segundo caso, temos, por exemplo, o conflito entre
+
+os costumes tradicionais religiosos, invocados por Antígona na tragédia grega de Sófocles, e a
+
+lei da Cidade-Estado representada por Creonte.
+
+Desde este último ponto se esboça a especial tensão do iurisnaturalismo, que vive
+
+oscilando entre os dois pólos, já entrevistos por Mannheim, sociólogo alemão, e mais
+
+recentemente focalizados pelo marxista Miaille: o direito natural conservador e o direito
+
+natural de combate. Porque, nota este último autor, “todos os movimentos sociais fundaramse
+num „Direito‟ que exprimia a sua própria situação e reivindicações”. Assim é que Miaille
+vai recomendar um “novo direito natural” de combate e concentrado na luta de classes e na
+
+liberação de grupos oprimidos.
+
+Temos insistido, invariavelmente, nesta referência a classes e grupos, e é preciso
+
+explicar que ela distingue o aspecto básico da oposição entre uma classe dominante,
+
+espoliadora, e uma classe dominada, espoliada, paralelamente à oposição entre grupos
+
+opressores e oprimidos, esta última oposição não estando diretamente ligada à outra. Assim é
+
+que Miaille recorda os conflitos de grupos, em termos de “minorias exigindo o direito à
+
+diferença”, um contraste colateral (de alcance jurídico, mas não vinculado à questão sócioeconômica
+apenas): minorias regionalistas, minorias sexuais, minorias étnicas. Assim como
+
+deixamos registrado, quanto às ideologias, o contraste não representa, sem mais, um choque
+
+classístico, podendo dissolver-se ou subsistir, independentemente da troca do modo de
+
+produção. Citamos, por exemplo, o machismo, que mantém a opressão da mulher ou dos
+
+homossexuais, em sociedades cuja base econômica já alterou o sistema classístico e a
+
+espoliação maior da injusta distribuição da propriedade.
+
+As limitações que um “novo direito natural” apresentaria serão indicadas no final
+
+deste capítulo; mas, de qualquer forma, o direito natural de combate pretende fundar um
+
+quarto modelo, que se poderia chamar de direito natural histórico-social e que nada tem a ver
+
+com os tipos tradicionais, cosmológicos, teológico e antropológico.
+
+Vimos em que consiste a forma cosmológica; a teológica pretende deduzir o
+
+direito natural da lei divina. Esta iria descendo, como que por uma escada: Deus manda; o
+
+sacerdote abençoa o soberano; o soberano dita a “particularização” dos preceitos divinos, em
+
+suas leis humanas... e o povo? A este só cumpriria aceitar, crer e obedecer. É claro que
+
+sempre fica admitida, em tese, a possibilidade dum erro dedutivo, em que a lei humana, por
+
+malícia ou cegueira, em vez de “concretizar” os vagos preceitos da lei de Deus, disporia
+
+escandalosamente contra esses preceitos. Mas isto é minimizado, seja porque, como em São
+
+Tomás de Aquino, ao poder social é deferida uma larga discrição no estabelecer o “justo
+
+particularizado” (é a tradição, que vem de Aristóteles), seja porque, como em Santo
+
+Agostinho, se admite que, criado e mantido pela Providência Divina, o poder social extrai
+
+desta investidura uma espécie de apoio moral de Deus para todos os seus abusos. O que “Deus
+
+criou e mantém” se entende que exprime o que Deus quer e consagra. De outra forma, o
+
+Senhor destronaria o soberano, com um divino pontapé no traseiro.
+
+Em nosso tempo, o filósofo católico Maritain demonstra bem a tendência a
+
+minimizar o conflito entre lei divina e lei humana, recomendando ao oprimido a “coragem de
+
+sofrer”, a “paciência”, diante da dominação interna ou externa (o Estado que oprime o povo
+ou imperialismo que submete este último - e até o Estado - à dominação estrangeira). Assim, à
+
+força física prepotente, nada mais se oporia do que a “força moral”, o que é muito
+
+conveniente para o dominador, que jamais deu bola para tal “superioridade”.
+
+Aliás, o direito natural teológico, prevalecendo na Idade Média, servia muito bem
+
+à estrutura aristocrático-feudal, geralmente fazendo de Deus uma espécie de político
+
+situacionista. Mesmo quando a Igreja e o soberano (não esqueçamos de que a Igreja era
+
+Estado também) andavam às turras, estas pugnas de gigantes poderosos nada tinham a ver
+
+com o povo, nem contestavam as bases espoliativas da ordem sócio-econômica. Era, de novo,
+
+uma cobertura ideológica para o modo de produção. Tanto assim que a burguesia, no
+
+alvorecer do capitalismo, já tendo adquirido o poder econômico, partiu para a conquista do
+
+poder político; adotando outro tipo de iurisnaturalismo, o mesmo que as nações emergentes,
+
+como a Holanda, invocavam pata quebrar a partilha do mundo entre as nações católicas,
+
+dentro da linha traçada pelo Vaticano.
+
+A contestação burguesa da ordem aristocrático-feudal, internamente, assim como
+
+do sistema internacional montado, recorreu, então, à forma de direito natural, que
+
+denominamos antropológico, isto é, do homem, que extraía os princípios supremos de sua
+
+própria razão, de sua inteligência. Estes princípios, e de novo não por mera coincidência,
+
+eram, evidentemente, os que favoreciam as posições e reivindicações da classe em ascensão -
+
+a burguesia - e das nações em que capitalismo e protestantismo davam as mãos para a
+
+conquista do seu “lugar ao sol”.
+
+Está visto que, chegando ao poder, a burguesia, como já acentuamos, descartou o
+
+seu iurisnaturalismo, passando a defender a tese positivista: já tinha conquistado a máquina de
+
+fazer leis e por que, então, apelar para um Direito Superior? Bastava a ordem estabelecida.
+
+Por outro lado, no plano internacional, as novas correlações de forças iam formar-se, para a
+
+ordem, em que o liberal, o burguês, o capitalista - ontem execrados - ganhassem trânsito,
+
+extravasassem nos imperialismos e acabassem até obtendo o reconhecimento do Vaticano,
+
+que, repitamos, é também um Estado e, como Estado, se tornou capitalista.
+
+Na verdade, o direito natural não é tanto imobilista (apesar de suas pretensões a
+
+critério eterno e fixo de avaliação jurídica) como bastante manhoso: ele sempre deixa lugar
+
+para as “concretizações”, em que os preceitos atribuídos à natureza, a Deus ou ao próprio
+
+esforço racional, tendem a conciliar o padrão absoluto e as leis vigentes. Todavia, o mero
+
+dualismo (oposição de direito natural e direito positivo) tem uma certa dinâmica, que ao
+
+menos conserva a idéia potencial duma confrontação. É por isto, aliás, que nas horas de
+
+intoleráveis tensões - em que o poder instituído vai aumentando a intensidade da prepotência
+e sua autoridade desgastada vai também fazendo aumentar a intensidade da contestação -
+
+costuma reaparecer, com especial atrativo, o velho direito natural. Já se falou, por isto, em
+
+“eterno retorno”, diante da longevidade iurisnaturalista.
+
+Na falta duma visão dialética, o jurista não sabe para que apelar, quando aparecem
+
+as situações monstruosas, que a ninguém mais permitem engolir os sapos inevitáveis (os
+
+sapos tornaram-se indeglutíveis). Assim é que, na Alemanha Ocidental, durante o nazismo,
+
+para a resistência, ou após ele, para a restauração liberal democrática, o iurisnaturalismo
+
+ressurgiu com extraordinário vigor. Depois de ficar subjacente a todo o julgamento dos
+
+criminosos levados ao Tribunal de Nuremberg (onde foram julgados, após a 2ª Guerra
+
+Mundial, os dirigentes nazistas), o direito natural serviu de fundamento a sentenças da Justiça
+
+alemã, anulando velhas decisões, baseadas em leis nazistas, e empolgou as cátedras
+
+universitárias daquele país.
+
+O Direito de resistência à tirania, o Direito à guerra de libertação nacional, o Direito
+
+à guerra justa em geral, uma certa preocupação com a legitimidade (não só a legalidade) do
+
+poder têm nítido sabor iurisnaturalísta, e esta ideologia se revigora, como dissemos, a todo
+
+instante de maior tensão. O mal é que, nela, as questões vêm tratadas no plano ideal, da
+
+abstração, no sentido de que não conseguem ligar a elaboração teórica aos grupos, classes,
+
+dominações e impulsos libertários sistemas de normas estatais e pluralidade de ordenamentos
+
+listo é; outros conjuntos de normas jurídicas, não-estatais, institucionalizadas e funcionando em
+
+círculos de atuação dos grupos oprimidos e classes espoliadas).
+
+Por outro lado, o direito natural fica preso à noção de princípios “imortais” (da
+
+natureza, de Deus ou da razão humana) e, quando eles descem à “particularização”, tendem a
+
+confundir-se com o direito positivo do Estado ou dos grupos e classes prevalecentes. Apesar
+
+de tudo, é possível distinguir, naquela dinâmica dos dois direitos – o que aparece na ordem
+
+estatal ou costumeira e o que surge como direito superior - um germe da contestação possível,
+
+que torna o direito natural afeiçoável às reivindicações supralegais (acima das leis a até contra
+
+elas) e, em conseqüência, muito propício à utilização, nas horas de crise do direito positivo,
+
+pela classe e grupos dominados.
+
+É por esse motivo, como vimos, que Mannheim fala num direito natural
+
+progressista (perante o conservador) e autores marxistas como Ernst Bloch ou Miaille não
+
+hesitam em adotá-lo sob o ângulo dum direito natural de combate. Ernst Bloch chegou mesmo
+
+a fazer uma longa investigação histórica sobre essa ideologia, procurando mostrar que o
+
+germe de contestação a que aludimos é muito mais forte do que comumente se pensa.
+
+Entretanto, permanece o dualismo – direito positivo e direito natural - como uma antinomia
+(uma contradição insolúvel), que parte o Direito num ângulo que só vê a ordem e noutro que
+
+invoca uma Justiça, cujo fundamento não é adequadamente assentado nas próprias lutas
+
+sociais e, sim, em princípios abstratos.
+
+Por esse motivo, era perfeitamente compreensível a irritação de Engels contra
+
+Lassalle, quando este cogitava dum “Direito absoluto”, uma “idéia de Direito”, pairando acima
+
+do processo histórico e suas lutas concretas. Engels afirmou, então, que tal “idéia do Direito”
+
+nada mais era do que o “processo histórico mesmo”, sua direção superadora e libertadora.
+
+Mas decerto aí podemos discernir não só a práxis dos grupos e classe em
+
+ascensão, porém, na medida em que estas formulam os objetivos de sua luta, uma série de
+
+reivindicações, jurídicas também. Isto, desde que por Direito não se tome, nem o que a ordem
+
+dominante estabelece, nem um conjunto de princípios que não revelam bem de que fonte
+
+extraem substância e validade e por que mudam, historicamente, ficando uns superados -
+
+como vimos, quanto ao “dar a cada um o que é seu” - e outros aparecendo no horizonte –
+
+como por exemplo, o direito de todos a um nível de vida adequado, que emerge na Declaração
+
+Universal dos Direitos Humanos de 1948, consagrando um princípio ganho nas lutas sociais
+
+mais modernas.
+
+Só um fôlego dialético poderia unificar, dentro da totalidade do processo histórico
+
+e na sua perpétua transformação, os aspectos polarizadores de positividade e Justiça, de
+
+elaboração de normas e padrão avaliador da legitimidade. Muitos autores têm reconhecido,
+
+como Dujardin e Michel, que ainda não existe uma teoria dialética de Direito perfeitamente
+
+elaborada, e que é insuficiente o “positivismo de esquerda” (a equiparação do Direito às
+
+normas estatais, às leis, com o acréscimo de uma “explicação”, em geral bastante mecanicista,
+
+deste direito pela chamada infra-estrutura sócio-conômica).
+
+Dentro desta perspectiva, o máximo que se pode fazer é o “uso alternativo” do
+
+direito positivo e estatal, como propõem Barcellona e seus seguidores, isto é, explorar as
+
+contradições do direito positivo e estatal em proveito não da classe e grupos dominantes mas
+
+dos espoliados e oprimidos. A tarefa é de não pequena importância, mas também não supre as
+
+lacunas da concepção positivista do Direito - que analisamos neste capítulo.
+
+E foi isto que viram os marxistas de outra orientação, isto é, os que voltaram para
+
+um novo tipo de direito natural. Entretanto, já apontamos o problema de um “novo direito
+
+natural” (o iurisnaturalismo “de combate”): ele quer evitar o tipo fixo, abstrato, de princípios
+
+eternos, mas não consegue nem dar uma noção global de Direito, em que positividade e
+
+Justiça se entrosem, nem mostrar de que modo o processo histórico mesmo ganha um perfil
+
+jurídico. O inconveniente, aliás, vem de que tratam de dois direitos - o positivo e o natural -
+sem reperguntar o que é Direito como noção que unifique esses tipos opostos, ou seja, não
+
+chegam à visão histórico-social do Direito, mas apenas à oposição histórico-social de dois
+
+direitos, que não sabem muito bem por que seriam jurídicos. Isto fica muito claro em Miaille
+
+quando ele fala em “direito” natural de combate, pondo assim entre aspas a palavra Direito,
+
+como se não fosse um Direito propriamente dito e traindo um vestígio do “positivismo de
+
+esquerda” que só vê Direito - sem aspas - no direito estatal.
+
+Em síntese, o próprio exame da problemática, a nível ideológico, mostrou-nos que
+
+o direito positivo é insustentável, sem um complemento, que o jurista vai buscar no direito
+
+natural – com todos os defeitos deste - porque não vê onde se busque outro apoio, nada
+
+obstante indispensável. Para realizar a nova construção seriam necessários outros materiais e,
+
+sobretudo, outra atitude, propriamente dialética, que, por sê-lo, não tolera aquela antinomia
+
+(contradição insolúveis de direito positivo e natural, tomados como unidades isoladas,
+
+estanques e desligadas da totalidade jurídica, na totalidade maior, histórico-social.
+
+Numa página célebre, a que já fizemos referência, João Mangabeira notava que o
+
+Direito existe antes do Estado, nas sociedades primitivas, e que, mesmo admitindo o
+
+desaparecimento do Estado, numa sociedade em que o governo das pessoas seja substituído
+
+pela administração das coisas e pela direção do processo de produção, o que desaparece é o
+
+Estado, não o Direito. Entretanto, se quisermos demonstrar o que este vem a ser, nessas
+
+transformações, da sociedade primitiva à sociedade futura, antes do Estado, perante o Estado
+
+e até depois do Estado, qual o fio da meada?
+
+As ideologias jurídicas deram-nos, com seus reflexos distorcidos, uma visão dos
+
+problemas que surgem, quando o homem pensa, abstratamente, sobre o Direito; esses
+
+problemas, entretanto, constituem a imagem da realidade, da práxis humana (da atividade
+
+histórica e social do homem) no seu ângulo jurídico. O caminho para corrigir as distorções
+
+das ideologias começa no exame não do que o homem pensa sobre o Direito, mas do que
+
+juridicamente ele faz. Poderemos chegar, nisto, à dialética do Direito não já como simples
+
+repercussão mental na cabeça dos ideólogos, porém como fato social, ação concreta e
+
+constante donde brota a repercussão mental.
+
+A Sociologia Jurídica é a única base sólida para iniciarmos a nova reflexão, a
+
+nova Filosofia Jurídica, a fim de que esta última não se transforme num jogo de fantasmas
+
+ideológicos, perdendo nas nuvens o que vem da terra. As ideologias jurídicas são filosofia
+
+corrompida, infestada de crenças falsas e falsificada consciência do que é jurídico, pela
+
+intromissão de produtos forjados pelos dominadores. Para uma concepção dialética do
+Direito, teremos de rever, antes de tudo, a concepção dialética da sociedade, onde o Estado e
+
+o direito estatal são, a bem dizer, um elemento não desprezível, mas secundário.
+
+É ali também que se há de precisar e desentortar a consideração do que, apesar de
+
+tudo, ficou bem claro, no exame das ideologias jurídicas e que consiste nas duas vertentes do
+
+Direito (não, como elas continuam a focalizar, os dois direitos opostos e separados): a
+
+positividade manifestada em conjuntos de , normas (vários conjuntos, que conflitam e vêm de
+
+classes e grupos em luta), e os padrões de legitimidade, que nos permitem assumir posição,
+
+ante aqueles conjuntos, sem nos perdermos nalguma idéia de Justiça que voa nas nuvens, ou
+
+nos voltarmos para uma Justiça Social, ainda vaga, uma resultante do processo histórico (da
+
+luta de classes e grupos), que não sabe distinguir a face jurídica desse processo.
+
+O primeiro passo rumo à concepção dialética do Direito será, deste modo, a
+
+Sociologia Jurídica. O filósofo alemão Erich Fechner falava na Filosofia Jurídica enquanto
+
+“Sociologia e... metafísica do Direito”. Para vencer a “metafísica” do Direito, que é ideologia
+
+também, vamos traçar o esboço duma Sociologia Jurídica, que nada fique devendo, por outro
+
+lado, à “metafísica” da Sociedade (uma apresentação desta que utiliza “idéias” abstratas e
+
+falsas crenças) mas, ao contrário, se funde numa ciência dos fatos sociais. Sociologia e
+
+Filosofia Jurídica se completam, pois, como assinala Marilena Chauí, inspirando-se em
+
+Merleau, não há razão para uma rivalidade entre filósofos e sociólogos, os primeiros
+
+considerando-se possuidores da verdade porque defensores da “idéia” e os segundos
+
+reivindicando para si a posse do verdadeiro, porque conhecedores do fato.
+
+Esta rivalidade priva o filósofo do contato com o mundo (e entrega-o às
+
+ideologias) e priva o sociólogo da interpretação do sentido de sua investigação - o que conduz
+
+a sociologia a outros desvios, ideológicos também. A concepção dialética há de repensá-lo em
+
+totalidade e transformações, numa Filosofia Jurídica, que é Sociologia (e não sociologismo
+
+positivista - uma ideologia que já criticamos aqui) e Ontologia do Direito, no sentido que
+
+evocamos inicialmente, com Lukács, e que nada tem de “metafísico”. Para a visão dialética do
+
+Direito é necessária uma Sociologia dialética. No capítulo seguinte, procuraremos explicar em
+
+que consiste esta Sociologia.
+
+SOCIOLOGIA E DIREITO
+Vimos que as ideologias refletem certas características do Direito, embora
+
+deformadas, porque tendem a polarizar-se em torno de duas visões unilaterais e redutoras. Os
+
+positivistas conservam a tendência a enxergar todo o Direito na ordem social estabelecida pela
+
+classe e grupos dominantes, diretamente (com suas normas costumeiras) ou através das leis do
+
+Estado. Os iurisnaturalistas insistem na necessidade dum critério de avaliação dessas mesmas
+
+normas, para medir-lhes a “Justiça” (isto é, a legitimidade da origem e conteúdo); entretanto,
+
+não conseguem determinar satisfatoriamente o padrão da medida.
+
+Vimos, em seguida, que só um fôlego dialético poderia superar a oposição assim
+
+criada, entre o direito positivo castrador e o direito natural, que muitas vezes se limita a legitimar a
+
+ordem posta e imposta, por falta dum real e autêntico estalão crítico. A antítese ideológica (direito
+
+positivo –direito natural) só se dissolverá, como acentuamos, quando for buscado, no processo
+
+histórico-social, aquele estalão. Mas isto, não importa em identificar, simplesmente, Direito e
+
+processo histórico e, sim, procurar neste o aspecto peculiar da práxis jurídica, como algo que
+
+surge na vida social e fora dela não tem qualquer fundamento ou sentido.
+
+Em síntese, colhemos na abordagem das ideologias certo material preliminar, que
+
+agora cumpre rever, sem distorções e entrosado na totalidade em movimento, onde se
+
+manifesta a procurada “essência” do fenômeno jurídico.
+
+Não se trata, é claro, de recapitular, na sua imensa variedade, o Direito de todos os
+
+povos, um por um, através dos tempos - inclusive porque este recorte nos daria uma série de
+
+retratos mais ou menos sugestivos, mas não o processo de formação, transformação e
+
+substituição de normas jurídicas, bem como dos critérios por que elas podem ser avaliadas,
+
+sem recurso a medidas ideais, prévias, fixas e eternas. A “essência” do Direito, para não se
+
+perder em especulações, metafísicas, nem se dissolver num monte de pormenores irrelevantes,
+
+exige a mediação duma perspectiva científica, em que os “retratos” históricos se ponham em
+
+movimento, seguindo o modelo geral da constituição de cada uma daquelas imagens. A
+
+História é um labirinto, onde nos perderemos, às voltas com fatos isolados, se não
+
+carregarmos uma bússola capaz de orientar-nos a respeito da posição de cada um deles na
+
+estrutura e no processo.
+
+Contudo, entre a variedade dos fatos e o esquema condutor, também não podemos
+
+trocar a bússola por um mapa pré-fabricado, que deseje ver, em cada episódio, a confirmação
+
+fatal dum roteiro teórico. É por isto que Engels, já o lembramos, combatia os que se
+
+limitavam a submeter os fatos sociais a esquemas prévios e mecânicos, tachando-os de
+
+ignorantes e preguiçosos, por chegarem à História com uma pseudociência feita e acabada.
+
+Mas, por outro lado, nem Marx nem Engels jamais sustentaram que bastasse colher, ao acaso,
+fatinhos soltos, para, com isto, chegar à ciência visada. Eles, ao contrário, procuravam a
+
+conexão necessária de fatos relevantes, seguindo uma hipótese de trabalho. Esta, formulada ao
+
+contacto dos processos sociais, num exame preliminar, era, depois, submetida a pacientes e
+
+constantes verificações metódicas.
+
+Desta forma, os modelos não passavam - nem deviam passar - de arranjos duma
+
+primeira abordagem, depois conferidos e aperfeiçoados perante os fenômenos mesmos. Basta
+
+lembrar, por exemplo, como ilustração dessa troca (fenômenos - hipótese de trabalho -
+
+verificação ante os fenômenos - reajuste da hipótese), os tipos de modo de produção -
+
+comunidade primitiva - escravagismo - feudalismo - capitalismo - socialismo - corrigido pelo
+
+encontro do modo de produção asiático. Este último emergia na investigação histórica e Marx
+
+o registrou, como tipo especial, embora até hoje alguns de seus discípulos o omitam,
+
+carregando os cinco outros como um fetiche dogmático, a que tem de ajustar se tudo o que for
+
+encontrado, assim como teriam de chegar a um comunismo final, que é simples previsão (isto
+
+é, outra hipótese, neste caso prefiguradora e também sujeita à prova histórica).
+
+Naquele procedimento circular, que entra no ofício histórico, trazendo hipóteses e
+
+modelos, resultantes de exame anterior, sobre o material acumulado, para submetê-los,
+
+depois, ao crivo de novas verificações, Marx e Engels faziam História Social, isto é, voltavam
+
+à História com a bússola duma Sociologia. Não nos referimos, aqui, á Sociologia burguesa, tal
+
+como a concebeu Comte, na “Física Social”, mas à Sociologia Histórica, de que precisamente
+
+são precursores Marx e Engels, embora não usassem esta etiqueta. Porque é Sociologia a
+
+disciplina mediadora, que constrói, sobre o monte de fatos históricos, os modelos, que os
+
+arrumam (com a ressalva de emendas, ao novo contacto com o processo).
+
+A História registra o concreto-singular, a Sociologia o aborda na multiplicidade –
+
+generalizada em modelos, segundo os traços comuns. Assim, a análise da Revolução
+
+Francesa, em suas causas e peripécias, apresenta-se ao historiador que a reconstitui
+
+cientificamente. Mas, por outro lado, registrando o fenômeno duma revolução em especial e
+
+para não se perder na massa informe de relevâncias e irrelevâncias, de dados importantes e
+
+insignificantes, o historiador há de empregar os modelos que a Sociologia ministra no exame
+
+coordenado das revoluções em geral.
+
+Isto lhe permitirá, inclusive, mostrar que alguns episódios, cujos protagonistas
+
+chamam de revolução, na verdade não o são, como, por exemplo, no caso duma “revolução”
+
+cujos propósitos e comportamento fossem manter e resguardar uma estrutura. Um golpe de
+
+Estado, de índole conservadora, não é uma revolução; é uma forma brusca de conservar. As
+
+abordagens histórica e sociológica são, portanto, complementares e se escoram
+reciprocamente. Por isso mesmo, toda História realmente científica (e não apenas crônica de
+
+fatos isolados ou biografias coordenadas de “homens ilustres”) é História Social; e toda
+
+Sociologia realmente científica (e não apenas manipulação ideológica de “formas” ideais) é
+
+Sociologia Histórica (empenhada, sempre, em determinar a origem, os antecedentes das
+
+“formas” sociais, que não são desovadas no mundo por algum espírito criador ou líder
+
+excepcional, nem deduzidas pela inteligência “pura” de algum teórico de gênio).
+
+Aplicando-se ao Direito uma abordagem sociológica será então possível
+
+esquematizar os pontos de integração do fenômeno jurídico na vida social, bem como
+
+perceber a sua peculiaridade distintiva, a sua “essência” verdadeira. Cabe; entretanto, uma
+
+ressalva aqui sobre duas maneiras de ver as relações entre Sociologia e Direito: a que origina
+
+uma Sociologia Jurídica e a que produz uma Sociologia do Direito. Estas duas expressões são
+
+comumente tomadas como sinônimas, porém a questão é mais séria do que um problema de
+
+rótulo. Elas constituem abordagens diferentes, apesar de interligadas, num intercâmbio
+
+constante. O fato é que resulta possível olhar o Direito, sociologicamente, sob mais de um
+
+ponto de vista; e está nesta possibilidade a diferença das abordagens citadas.
+
+Falamos em Sociologia do Direito, enquanto se estuda a base social de um direito
+
+específico. Por exemplo, é Sociologia do Direito a análise da maneira por que o nosso direito
+
+estatal reflete a sociedade brasileira em suas linhas gerais (de poucas contradições e mínima
+
+flexibilidade, dado o sistema, ainda visceralmente autoritário, de pequenas “aberturas”,
+
+controladas, como um queijo suíço, perpetuamente a enrijecer-se, no receio de que os ratinhos
+
+da oposição alarguem os buracos). Toda aquela velha estrutura então se desvenda como
+
+elemento condicionante, que pesa sobre o país, obstaculizando as remodelações, sob a pressão
+
+simultânea das classes e grupos nacionais dominantes e das correlações de forças
+
+internacionais, interessadas em que ao imperialismo não escape tão gordo quinhão.
+
+Sociologia Jurídica, por outro lado, seria o exame do Direito em geral, como
+
+elemento do processo sociológico, em qualquer estrutura dada. Pertence à Sociologia Jurídica,
+
+por exemplo, o estudo do Direito como instrumento, ora de controle, ora de mudança, sociais;
+
+da pluralidade de ordens normativas, decorrente da cisão básica em classes, com normas
+
+jurídicas diversas – no direito estatal e no direito dos espoliados, formando conjuntos
+
+competitivos de normas, no contraste entre o direito dessas classes (até de grupos oprimidos,
+
+como vimos) e o que a ordem dominante pretende manter.
+
+É claro, repetimos, que a Sociologia do Direito e a Sociologia Jurídica realizam
+
+uma espécie de intercâmbio permanente, mas é difícil admitir que sejam idênticas as duas
+
+tarefas científicas. À base do que acima ficou assentado, quanto à diferença entre Sociologia e
+História, diríamos, inclusive, que a Sociologia do Direito (como estudo particular de “casos
+
+sociológicos”) é, mais propriamente, capítulo da História Social (História Social do Direito,
+
+no que a nós interessa aqui) e a Sociologia Jurídica é capítulo da Sociologia Geral, versando
+
+sobre o aspecto jurídico da vida em sociedade.
+
+De qualquer forma, a Sociologia, Geral ou Jurídica, também não é uma disciplina
+
+unívoca (de um sentido ou direção apenas), já que, nesta ciência, há diferentes orientações,
+
+que correspondem ao posicionamento do cientista no processo histórico-social, em que ele é,
+
+simultaneamente, ator e observador. Esta divisão, notemos de passagem, é apenas mais clara
+
+nas ciências sociais, onde o homem também está mais diretamente empenhado; porém ela
+
+existe em todas as ciências, traduzindo interferências ideológicas a que nenhuma escapa.
+
+Nas matemáticas, por exemplo, racionalismo, empirismo e operacionalismo
+
+defrontam-se, como diferentes concepções, produzindo diversos resultados, como é o caso da
+
+admissão ou negação da estrutura axiomática (proposições que parecem racionais, evidentes e
+
+eternas) desafiada pela dialética, segundo a qual já se vê o declínio dos “absolutos lógicos”.
+
+Da mesma forma, há finalismos e vitalismos, que desafiam a concepção lógico-estatística dos
+
+fenômenos estudados pela Biologia, com a séria conseqüência interna de que defendem a
+
+existência de leis teleonômicas (agrupamento segundo um sentido ou finalidade), negadas,
+
+entretanto, pelos que discernem, nos fatos biológicos, apenas relações estatísticas, sem
+
+“finalidade” alguma.
+
+A análise dos vínculos (e suas mediações), desde a situação do cientista (e sua
+
+quota de ideologia) até o padrão das doutrinas e teorias por tal situação afetadas é objetivo da
+
+Sociologia do Conhecimento, que constitui, sob certo aspecto, Sociologia ao quadrado.
+
+Partindo do fato de que o conhecimento - qualquer que seja o sentido - é sempre obra social,
+
+com participações individuais, a Sociologia do Conhecimento, cujas raízes mergulham na
+
+contribuição marxista, procura a razão e o modo de influência do engajamento, expresso ou
+
+implícito, do homem no “saber”, inclusive sociológico, que ele produz.
+
+Faz, por isto, a Sociologia da Sociologia também, isto é, uma Sociologia, como
+
+dissemos, ao quadrado. Já nos referimos, no capítulo sobre ideologias, à verdade-processo,
+
+isto é, à verdade que se desenvolve, sem chegar nunca a um conhecimento absoluto e
+
+irretocável - o que não desmoraliza, nem invalida, as verdades relativas e possíveis a cada
+
+etapa, uma vez que, nelas, podemos optar, como observava Adam Schaff, pela que mais
+
+amplamente explica e compreende os fenômenos, e é, portanto, real e objetivamente, a que, à
+
+altura dada, se pode ver e proclamar com mais acerto.
+Ademais, o avanço, a superação do ponto de vista dialético, não envolve o
+
+aniquilamento, mas a ultrapassagem que conserva os aspectos positivos e as conquistas de
+
+etapas anteriores. Sob tal ângulo, é muito instrutivo notar a aplicação prática deste princípio,
+
+demonstrando a sua eficácia, tal como faz Marx, n'O Capital, quando vai buscar a nova e mais
+
+completa focalização da mais-valia num roteiro que incorpora e transcende as teorias
+
+anteriores, de mercantilistas, fisiocratas, intuições de Adam Smith, colocações de Ricardo e
+
+assim por diante. Um saber definitivo, global e irretocável é mistificação de ciência
+
+degenerada, que transfere o ardor religioso das revelações divinas, dos místicos, para a boca
+
+dos profetas duma outra religião: o cientificismo. Esta põe no lugar da Bíblia a Enciclopédia
+
+Britânica (hoje, aliás, americana), trocando de edição à medida que os novos “teólogos” vão
+
+trocando de teoria.
+
+É possível discernir, a esta altura, duas posições fundamentais, na Sociologia
+
+Geral - e, portanto, na Sociologia Jurídica -, ambas fortemente sobrecarregadas de elementos
+
+ideológicos. Um dos mais finamente matreiros, dentre os sociólogos burgueses, Ralf
+
+Dahrendorf, definiu aquelas posições como (a) Sociologia “da estabilidade, harmonia e
+
+consenso” e (b) Sociologia “da mudança, conflito e coação”. A primeira, diríamos nós, é a
+
+Sociologia do burguês mais franco; a segunda pertence à pequena burguesia que se dedica às
+
+tempestades num copo d'água (ou melhor: às “revoluções” num copo de uísque).
+
+A Sociologia (a) da “estabilidade, harmonia e consenso” poderia resumir-se na
+
+forma seguinte. Em determinado espaço social - isto é, numa certa base geográfica onde se
+
+travam as relações sociais - uma variedade de grupos estabelece determinados padrões estáveis
+
+de relacionamento. Este relacionamento é governado por normas escalonadas numa faixa de
+
+crescente intensidade. As normas - isto é, os padrões de conduta, exigível sob ameaça de
+
+sanções (os meios repressivos, que vão das sanções difusas - não organizadas - às sanções
+
+organizadas - com órgão próprio e ritual específico de aplicação) - distribuem-se em usos
+
+(práticas consagradas pela mera repetição), costumes (práticas consagradas pela força da
+
+tradição ativa e militante, como necessidade coletiva e, portanto, obrigação indeclinável de
+
+todos), folkways (costumes peculiares que definem o “modo de ser” dum povo) e mores (o setor
+
+mais vigoroso dos costumes, julgados indispensáveis para a ordem social estabelecida e que,
+
+por isso mesmo, se resguardam com normas e sanções mais severas e melhor organizadas).
+
+O uso pode ser, por exemplo, vestir certo traje adequado a locais e ocasiões. Um
+
+costume pode ser, por exemplo, a deferência aos mais velhos; nos folkways pode estar, por
+
+exemplo, a valorização dos mais velhos (ou dos mais moços) como orientadores sábios (ou
+condutores vigorosos); nos mores residem, por exemplo, as relações de propriedade ou as
+
+formas de acesso ao poder e governo.
+
+Está visto que no modelo (a), considerado aqui, todas essas normas pertencem a
+
+um só bloco, presumido consensual (isto é, que teria sido adotado pelo consentimento da
+
+coletividade). O arcabouço de normas fixa-se nas instituições sociais (armação estabilizada e
+
+sistemática das práticas normadas), formando um tipo de organização, cuja legitimidade é
+
+também presumida e que, por isso mesmo, se reserva os instrumentos de controle social, para
+
+evitar que a pirâmide se desconjunte e vá por terra. Estes meios materiais de controle
+
+revestem a ordem com sistemas de crenças (ideologias), consideradas válidas, úteis e
+
+eminentemente saudáveis e que são, por assim dizer, a “alma” das instituições estabelecidas,
+
+isto é, o “espírito” da ordem social, com a máscara de cultura do “povo”.
+
+Esta pretensão cultural da classe dominante identifica as suas conveniências e
+
+princípios com os da sociedade inteira, tal como, nas autocracias, eles se encarnam no Rei.
+
+Luiz XIV, é sabido, afirmava: “O Estado sou eu.” Mais pitorescamente, o czar Paulo, da
+
+Rússia, depois dum porre gigantesco, olhava a cara no espelho, ao despertar, e afirmava: “O
+
+Império amanheceu de ressaca...” assim como se os efeitos da bebedeira se comunicassem a
+
+todos os seus súditos.
+
+Neste contexto, qualquer tipo de mudança social é limitado e controlado; e os
+
+ataques de qualquer dissidência, considerados “aberrações” do comportamento, “patologias”
+
+de “subculturas”, que se apresentam como “problema”, a ser resolvido pela “reeducação” ou,
+
+sendo esta ineficaz, na porrada mesmo. Esta se “justifica” pela “cultura”; é “exigida” pela
+
+“defesa das instituições” e exercida pelo “direito”, que, neste caso, é visto apenas como a
+
+parte mais atuante e violenta dos mores repressivos (atribuídos ao “povo” e, na verdade,
+
+ligados à classe e grupos dominantes). Está aí a raiz social dos positivismos jurídicos. Eles
+
+divinizam a ordem e fazem do jurista o servidor cego e submisso de toda e qualquer lei. A
+
+OAB, recentemente, no seu projeto de reforma do ensino jurídico, definiu bem o positivismo
+
+como uma das “pragas universitárias nacionais”.
+
+Para destacar melhor toda a construção do modelo (a), desta sociologia “da
+
+estabilidade, harmonia e consenso”, vejamos como ela se apresenta num esquema e à luz das
+
+explicações dadas.
+Está visto que aqui se omitem (não à toa) a base sócio-econômica, as classes
+
+radicalmente contrapostas (espoliada e espoliadora), a existência de grupos oprimidos, a
+
+contestação válida, as normas de espoliados e oprimidos: seus Direitos; e o reduzido
+
+“direito” fica oscilando entre as posições I e II: normalmente, nas leis e costumes consagrados
+
+pelo Estado (enquanto este é o lugar social do controle exercido pela classe e grupos
+
+dominantes); mas, excepcionalmente, se a classe e grupos dominantes receiam que os seus
+
+representantes no poder estejam muito débeis ou sensíveis à “reforma de base”, o sistema
+
+“reassume”, diretamente, invocando um direito supralegal, isto é, as normas “supremas” da
+
+organização social estabelecida, até contra a lei maior, que é a Constituição. Obtido o
+
+“equilíbrio”, tornam à função vigilante, restabelecendo-se um novo esquema legislativo: o
+
+direito positivo “intocável”, depois do remanejamento que o enrijeceu.
+
+Por outro lado, também não aparece nesta Sociologia o influxo externo, a presença
+
+de forças estabilizadoras (da ordem conveniente) ou desestabilizadoras (de qualquer ordem mais
+
+aberta à mudança, mais flexível e porosa), de acordo com os interesses imperialistas da “área de
+
+influencia”. Recentemente, um órgão conservador imprimia a advertência de que “a
+
+autodeterminação dos povos tem limites”... e que o sistema continental (isto é, os Estados
+
+Unidos) “não poderia tolerar” qualquer irrupção socialista ali bem pertinho de seu dedão do pé
+
+geográfico. Tudo isto recobre mais fundos interesses econômicos: as semicolônias (colônias
+
+disfarçadas por soberanias de fachada) “não devem” escapar à metrópole.
+
+O segundo modelo, isto é, a Sociologia (b) “da mudança, conflito e coação”
+
+representa uma espécie de negativo fotográfico do modelo anterior (a). Enquanto este último é
+
+centrípeto, aquele outro é centrífugo - mas centrífugo com as mesmas lacunas e
+
+escamoteações (um sumiço disfarçado e engenhoso de elementos essenciais), de tal sorte que,
+em vez de dilatar a estrutura conservadora é por ela absorvido, como veremos, sem maior
+
+dano para a dominação.
+
+Segundo o modelo (b), o espaço social é ocupado por uma série de grupos em
+
+conflito, em relação cuja instabilidade decorre de séries múltiplas de costumes, folkways e
+
+mores divergentes e competitivos, tornando precário e de legitimidade muito discutível o bloco
+
+dominante de normas, sobretudo porque as “subculturas” engendram contra-instituições. Estas
+
+são animadas por verdadeiro ímpeto contracultural, inassimilável à cultura dominante.
+
+Conseqüentemente, a organização social estabelecida tem de haver-se com ataques constantes
+
+de anomia (contestação das normas impostas pela ordem prevalecente), que reivindica
+
+mudança, em padrões de comportamento abertamente desafiador e também instituído, em
+
+setores mais ou menos amplos da sociedade não “oficial”. Tal análise força a ordem
+
+estabelecida a desmascarar-se como nua coação, mas, já veremos, não conduz os “desafios” à
+
+raiz espoliativa do poder classístico, nem à ligação deste com a opressão de grupos.
+
+O modelo (a) é muito favorecido pelas condições de vitalidade e equilíbrio da
+
+estrutura: queremos dizer, assim, que ele medra, nas ideologias sociológicas, desde que
+
+peculiares condições de crise (contradições aguçadas, decadência do sistema) ainda não
+
+tenham precipitado a conscientização, à maneira de Hamlet, na tragédia de Shakespeare, de
+
+que “há algo de podre no reino da Dinamarca” (ou em qualquer outro reino). Não à toa, o
+
+modelo (a) surge como o mais antigo, na Sociologia burguesa. Esta nasceu, como se sabe, na
+
+crista do capitalismo recém-chegado ao poder. Foi uma espécie de digestão científica dos
+
+princípios sociais, que à burguesia convêm e que na sociedade ela firmara com pretensões à
+
+eterna duração.
+
+A época de Comte (reputado fundador da ciência sociológica) era o marxismo em
+
+elaboração, e não a “física social” comteana, que preparava o amadurecimento da Sociologia
+
+como ciência e fazia estudo sociológico, embora sem adotar o rótulo especial. Está visto que o
+
+marxismo - permanecendo como a grande influência sobre o pensamento sociológico mais
+
+avançado, embora não fechado, irretocável e dogmático, como desejava o sectarismo de
+
+alguns - não pertence ao modelo (a) nem ao (b).
+
+A contribuição autêntica do marxismo não-dogmático (nem os seus criadores o
+
+desejavam como tal) vai introduzir-se num terceiro modelo, que começa a despontar, na fase
+
+atual - quando, já o dissemos noutro escrito, o marxismo ultrapassa a “fase católica” (com
+
+papas infalíveis, dogmas, igreja e igrejinhas, Santo Ofício, index de livros e idéias proibidas e
+
+até Inquisição). Os próprios marxistas, hoje, tendem ao “protestantismo”, e não ao
+
+“catolicismo” (isto é, querem ler e interpretar “a Bíblia” sem tutores, distribuem-se em
+diferentes seitas, interpretam livremente as “escrituras”, emendam, avançam e, nisto, se
+
+mantêm mais fiéis ao “espírito” da construção marxiana - que é de livre exame - do que os
+
+“teólogos” presos aos textos, às vezes expurgados).
+
+O modelo (b) ainda é burguês: apenas, pequeno- burguês. Foi o agravamento dá
+
+crise social do capitalismo que mostrou as rachaduras no edifício (a) de “consenso” e
+
+“estabilidade” mitológicos. Mas, nesta outra visão (b), tanto quanto na (a), são igualmente
+
+escamoteados elementos essenciais, que a análise marxista já estabelecera, à margem da
+
+ciência sociológica das universidades tradicionais e seus pequenos grupos de contestação
+
+inconseqüente. O modelo (a) é, em síntese, a resposta triunfalista da burguesia assente, antes
+
+de se precipitar na crise de que não pode mais sair.
+
+O modelo (b) traduz apenas a inquietação de superfície da pequena burguesia e
+
+pode exprimir-se, num gráfico paralelo ao do outro modelo, mais ou menos desta forma:
+
+Neste panorama, o Direito perde a nitidez positivista do modelo (a), ganhando um
+
+difuso colorido iurisnaturalista, dada a insistente reivindicação de direitos opostos, de grupos
+
+contrários à law and order (a lei e a ordem) do establishment (o “sistema” dominante). Assim,
+
+haveria (b I) um direito estatal, assentando num direito da organização social (b II) e um outro
+
+direito, expresso nas contra-instituições (b III). Mas, tal como no iurisnaturalismo, os padrões
+
+de crítica e avaliação das normas dominantes continuam muito vagos e, assim como os tipos
+
+tradicionais falavam numa certa ordem “justa”, meio nebulosa, a contestação, do modelo (b),
+
+fala em certa liberdade anárquica dos grupos, de timbre individualista, cada um procurando “a
+
+sua”, que pode escandalizar o burguesão “quadrado”, mas é logo absorvida e manipulada
+
+pelos mais espertos.
+Com uma das mãos, a classe e grupo dominantes reprimem, um tanto
+
+contraditoriamente; mas, com a outra, chegam a tolerar e até (disfarçadamente) estimular a
+
+contestação desbundada. As grandes organizações econômicas inclusive faturam sobre tais
+
+curtições barulhentas, multicores, mas inofensivas (à dominação fundamental). Não estamos
+
+aqui patrulhando as curtições de ninguém; achamos até legítimo curtir; mas é preciso não
+
+confundir isto com um tipo conseqüente e eficaz de contestação.
+
+O que há de comum nos modelos (a) e (b) é a tentativa consciente ou inconsciente
+
+de afastar o aprofundamento dialético: o modelo (a) esconde a evidência da espoliação e
+
+opressão; o modelo (b) omite ou despreza a espoliação, fala muito em opressão, mas opõe a ela
+
+um circo, em lugar dum programa coerente de ação e objetivos nítidos de reorganização social
+
+(a começar pelo fato de que a reorganização pressupõe a idéia de ordenação, a que é rebelde o
+
+individualismo anarquista, estéril e, afinal, tendente a ressacas conformistas, depois dos porres
+
+de agitação sem objetivo. E um nilismo coreográfico e tecnicolor, que não incomoda mais o
+
+poder dominante do que o bicho-de-pé do matuto: dá até uma coceirinha voluptuosa).
+
+A inquietação pequeno-burguesa de superfície não conduz a nada. Mais: ela
+
+contribui para aquele domínio burguês, dissolvendo os mais agudos instrumentos conceituais
+
+que a dialética movimenta; assim, reforça a operação ideológica de desatar a noção de classe
+
+das contradições e oposições geradas pelo modo de produção capitalista. Por isto, é
+
+assimilável aos padrões tradicionais. O sociólogo alemão Weber disfarçava a idéia de luta de
+
+classes, lisonjeando a estrutura capitalista com uma suposta expansão crescente da “classe
+
+aquisitiva” (emburguesada). O seu astuto patrício atual, Dahrendorf, diante da crise que
+
+desmente esse “otimismo” weberiano, volta à idéia de que um neocapitalismo bonzinho
+
+houvesse desfeito o conflito radical, adornando isto com a aceitação “liberal” do modelo (b),
+
+que é precisamente o tipo da “contestação” sem dentes. Assim, leva a vantagem de “explicar”
+
+a crise pelo que menos importa, e sem conduzi-la ao condicionamento básico (vindo do modo
+
+de produção). Dá, portanto, um ar de “tolerância” ao mesmo esquema estabelecido: O modelo
+
+(b) não cancela o modelo (a) - e, por isso mesmo, Dahrendorf sugere que sejam empregados,
+
+pelo sociólogo, os dois.
+
+A incorporação do modelo (b) pelo modelo (a) tem ,todas as largas facilidades
+
+inerentes ao superficionalismo do tipo de “contestação” mais farrista do que autêntico. Assim, os
+
+sociólogos conservadores, na aparência de modernidade, não têm o receio de cravar mais este
+
+prego na ferradura do seu cavalo de batalha teórico: ele dá às cavalgadas de classes e grupos
+
+dominantes, junto com o rei, príncipes e duques, um alegre colorido de bobos da corte. Se, por
+
+momentos, o mau humor do poder os chicoteia, prende ou expulsa, noutras horas eles até são
+bem-vindos para quebrar o tédio da corte e a monotonia das bajulações dos cortesãos. Por outro
+
+lado, absorvendo, teoricamente, o modelo (b), os sociólogos burgueses mais lúcidos procuraram
+
+mostrar-se “na onda”, “por dentro”, “gente boa”, sem maiores riscos de vez que põem no traje
+
+negro da direita umas lantejoulas emprestadas pela esquerda que late mas não morde.
+
+Esses dois modelos (a) e (b) não poderiam servir, evidentemente, à visão social
+
+dialética, nem, por via de conseqüência, à análise da dialética social do Direito. Entretanto,
+
+aqui poderemos ver, de novo, como as ideologias mesmas (no caso as sociológicas)
+
+emprestam á abordagem mais exata elementos que souberam registrar, embora com
+
+deformações. Substancialmente, nos apelos centrípeto (modelo a) e centrífugo (modelo b), há
+
+uma parte da verdade. Nenhuma estrutura social jamais se formaria sem alguma força de
+
+coesão - e estamos vendo aí que elas se formam e atuam até com o mais sufocante vigor.
+
+Portanto, o modelo (a), compendiando a visão conservadora, demonstra um ponto real de
+
+aglutinação: existe uma ordem, na estrutura social; o que falta, na escamoteação burguesa, é
+
+mostrar donde vem tal ordem e para que ela se impõe.
+
+A legitimidade (presumida) é, evidentemente, um mito e o modelo (b) se
+
+encarrega de quebrar a solenidade da poder com algumas vaias. Por mais inconseqüentes que
+
+sejam tais “apelações”, elas resultam igualmente sintomáticas - isto é, apontam dois outros
+
+aspectos reais: o questionamento da legitimidade e a presença de várias ordens ou séries de
+
+normas, em contra-instituições e contra-cultura, que denunciam as situações opressivorepressivas.
+Não chegam porém a levá-las à raiz da espoliação básica, mergulhada nos
+
+fundamentos da sociedade, com ramificações que atingem o núcleo da cisão de classes
+
+privilegiadas e desprotegidas, a partir de um modo de produção em que elas se formaram.
+
+Por outro lado, vimos também que o problema social e seu aspecto jurídico não se
+
+limitam ao modo de produção, isto é, como assinalamos com Miaille, pode haver opressões
+
+não diretamente derivadas do modo de produção, nem corrigidas apenas com a sua troca.
+
+Sobre isto citamos, logo no início de nossa exposição, as observações muito lúcidas de
+
+Marilena Chauí sobre a utopia (ilusão) de se pensar que, mudando o modo de produção, toda
+
+a questão social (e também jurídica) está resolvida.
+
+A tarefa a realizar, numa visão da dialética social do Direito, exige, portanto, que
+
+se delineie, ainda que toscamente (para aperfeiçoamento constante), um modelo sociológico
+
+dialético. É o que vamos ensaiar, nesta investigação metódica, por etapas, da “essência” do
+
+Direito, quando chegarmos ao capítulo final do nosso itinerário. Vamos edificando, com
+
+andaimes, a nossa reconstrução; ao cabo, eles serão afastados, para exibir a construção, no
+
+termo da jornada (e, em tal empreendimento dificílimo, um pouco já é bastante). Está visto
+que “termo” significará o ponto final desta obra, e não a idéia presunçosa de que se oferece
+
+aqui a “essência” do Direito, para não haver mais o que tirar nem pôr em tal abordagem. Se,
+
+ao menos, avançamos um tanto, se dissipamos, em trânsito, certos equívocos - a que
+
+aludíamos no primeiro parágrafo deste livro - já não foi de todo inútil o esforço.
+
+O Direito, afinal buscado, não “é” as normas em que se pretende vazá-lo (não
+
+confundamos o biscoito e a embalagem, pois, em tal caso, como o positivismo, acabaríamos
+
+comendo a lata, como se fosse a bolacha, e tirando estranhas conclusões sobre o sabor,
+
+consistência e ingredientes de tal produto). Aliás, não existe uma diferença nítida entre as
+
+normas jurídicas e morais, porque todas as características distintivas apresentadas se revelam
+
+imprecisas (isto é, tanto aparecem nas normas jurídicas, quanto nas morais). Não há, porém,
+
+espaço aqui para desenvolver este ponto, que temos focalizado em outros escritos nossos. O
+
+importante é notar que Direito e Moral distinguem-se pelo que são, independentemente das
+
+normas em que se exprimem e cuja forma é bem semelhante: há códigos morais; há Direito
+
+fora das leis (por exemplo, os chamados “Códigos de Ética”, ou o Direito Internacional).
+
+A DIALÉTICA SOCIAL DO DIREITO
+
+Temos de começar numa órbita muito dilatada, porque nenhuma sociedade vive
+
+completa e eternamente no isolamento. Hoje em dia, aliás, dá-se o contrário: com a rapidez do
+
+sistema de transportes e de comunicação à distancia, o contacto é imediato e universal. Não
+
+são apenas os jogos de futebol que nos chegam, ao vivo ou enlatados, pela TV, mas toda uma
+
+série de imagens significativas, geradas no estrangeiro e trazendo, inclusive, os produtos
+
+ideológicos. As nações, politicamente organizadas e tendo à sua disposição a necessária
+
+tecnologia, projetam-se além das fronteiras, com a sua mensagem, que vem a desempenhar
+
+um papel importante no encadeamento dos fatos sociais. E tal mensagem tanto pode ser boa
+
+quanto má.
+
+Desta maneira é que os imperialistas revigoram a sua presença, moldando
+
+“cultura” (e faturando royalties, ao mesmo tempo), assim como os povos libertados ou em
+
+vias de libertação procuram dar alento ás forças progressistas, inspirá-las e nelas influir
+
+positivamente. Por isso mesmo, o imperialismo, externamente, procura “fechar os canais” e,
+
+internamente, se desencadeiam os mecanismos da censura. As dominações modernas, daquém
+e dalém fronteiras, é que nos visitam em casa, sem bater à porta, aparecendo no vídeo, que por
+
+isto mesmo controlam, com a vigilância dum Falcão.
+
+Esse background penetrante inscreve-se na dinâmica das estruturas nacionais,
+
+porém sua raiz está fora.
+
+Existe uma sociedade internacional e, também nela, uma dialética. Sua estrutura
+
+modela-se, ademais, conforme a própria infra-estrutura sócio-econômica, cindida nas
+
+dominações imperialistas e nas lutas de libertação nacional dos povos colonízados e
+
+semicolonizados. E a partir deste núcleo que se recortam as “áreas de influência”, com as suas
+
+vizinhanças intrometidas.
+
+A sociedade internacional desenvolve, igualmente, as superestruturas peculiares,
+
+onde repercute a correlação de forças e ecoa a divisão dos “mundos” (capitalista, socialista,
+
+“não-alinhado”, terceiro mundo). Desde logo se note, é claro, que tal superestrutura não está
+
+livre de contradições, assim como não estão os Estados, internamente, na dialética de poder e
+
+contestação, de acomodações e confrontações. A infra-estrutura internacional é, entretanto,
+
+diferente, pois ela se caracteriza pela coexistência, pacífica ou violenta, de modos de
+
+produção distintos, ainda mais complicada pelo desigual nível das unidades, desenvolvidas ou
+
+em vias de desenvolvimento.
+
+Por outro lado, as instituições de âmbito internacional, como as internas,
+
+distribuem-se em veículos oficiais e marginais (contra-instituições), que se articulam, entre
+
+povos oprimidos, a fim de pressionarem o mecanismo perro das outras, em função de
+
+reivindicações comuns dos que ficam por fora ou por baixo.
+
+Dentro deste panorama é que surgem as sociedades individualmente consideradas
+
+e sujeitas à penetrante interferência do sistema externo.
+
+As sociedades nacionais têm, é claro, o seu único e próprio modo de produção: a
+
+sua infra-estrutura é homogênea, e, em conseqüência dela, as classes se dividem (já que não
+
+estamos aqui considerando as comunidades primitivas). Assim é que aparecem o domínio
+
+classista e as divisões grupais. Mantemos a distinção, explicada noutro capítulo, para marcar a
+
+diferença do posicionamento de grupos - como os grupos étnicos, religiosos, sexuais - de
+
+bastante importância na dialética do Direito e não diretamente ligados à oposição sócioeconômica
+e jurídica das classes - que, por outro lado e como veremos, continuam a digladiarse,
+mesmo nas sociedades socialistas já implantadas.
+
+A luta de classes e grupos, que cinde o bloco demográfico (da população), as
+
+oposições de espoliados e espoliadores, de oprimidos e opressores, movimenta a dialética
+
+social e, nela, a vertente jurídica, incompreensível e inexplicável fora deste contexto. O
+socialismo, é claro, envolve, em princípio, a superação dos conflitos radicais, mas entre este
+
+compromisso e a realidade dos sistemas socialistas já implantados há, de fato, um grande
+
+fosso, mostrando que nem tudo se encaminha, sem tropeços, para aquele desiderato assim
+
+formulado por Bloch: o “avanço da construção socialista, dentro dum quadro de
+
+solidariedade” (aliás, na situação presente, a palavra “solidariedade” ganha um matiz irônico).
+
+Sobre a dupla base interpenetrante das infra-estruturas internacional e nacional é
+
+que se armam os aspectos derivados e superestruturais – de um lado, estabelecendo a coesão,
+
+e, de outro, a dispersão. Se uma sociedade não tivesse o mínimo de força centrípeta para
+
+garantir e própria coesão explodiria como bola de borracha, soprada pela anarquia; se, por
+
+outro lado, não revelasse um coeficiente de forças centrífugas seria (como, iludidos, sempre
+
+esperam os donos do poder) uma estrutura inalterável e eternamente impeditiva de qualquer
+
+mudança verdadeira. Daí as visões centrípeta e centrífuga, notadas nos esquemas A e B
+
+(capítulo 4), que, entretanto, sonegam a dupla base, já referida, sem a qual não se explica em
+
+função de que a estabilidade e a mudança constantemente se defrontam e conflitam, com
+
+maior ou menor intensidade (isto é, conforme se trate da estrutura jovem e ascendente ou de
+
+estrutura caduca, trocando esta em ranzinzice e prepotência o que lhe falta em energia
+
+progressista e criativa).
+
+Ponhamos, então, num ramo, as forças centrípetas. Travam-se as relações sociais,
+
+dentro do modelo infra-estrutural; estas relações adquirem certa uniformidade e a classe e
+
+grupos dominantes exprimem-nas em usos, costumes, folkways e mores (que já, aparecem no
+
+esquema A): eles constituem os veículos da dominação e se entrosam nas instituições sociais,
+
+invocando princípios ideológicos. Tais princípios integram o mesmo domínio, sob o rótulo de
+
+“cultura”, como se aquilo fosse a legítima e harmoniosa compilação do que sente e deseja
+
+todo o povo. Na verdade, este último pode ser iludido pela ideologia, mas, como já dizia
+
+Lincoln - engana-se uma parte do povo todo o tempo; todo o povo uma parte do tempo;
+
+nunca, porém, todo o povo todo o tempo.
+
+O conjunto das instituições e a ideologia que a pretende legitimar (a ideologia da
+
+classe e grupos dominantes) padronizam-se numa organização social, que se garante com
+
+instrumentos de controle social: o controle é a central de operações das normas dinamizadas,
+
+dentro do ramo centrípeto, a fim de combater a dispersão, que desconjuntaria a sociedade e
+
+comprometeria a “segurança” da dominação. Neste ramo, é evidente, só se pode falar em
+
+mudança social amarrada, pois o sistema de controle apenas “absorve” a qüota de mudança
+
+que não lhe altere a organização posta e imposta; e, por isto, dita, normativamente, até as
+
+'”regras de jogo” da mudança. Como vimos, ao menor risco de se acentuar um desvio, mesmo
+dentro das regras, o poder enrijece o controle alarmado ou o sistema subjacente “demite” o
+
+seu débil representante para colocar um outro, mais enérgico, na direção.
+
+Vejamos, agora, o ramo centrífugo. As cristalizações de normas das classes e
+
+grupos espoliados e oprimidos produzem as instituições próprias, cuja presença na estrutura é
+
+fator de maior ou menor desorganização social, envolvendo a atividade anômica (a
+
+contestação das normas do ramo dominante), seja espontânea (sem maior coesão e ordem de
+
+militança), seja organizadamente (ao revés, com grupos adestrados e coesos, estratégia e
+
+táticas bem articuladas).
+
+Essa atividade contestadora pode ser de dois tipos: reformista (isto é, visando
+
+reabsorver-se no ramo centrípeto, que se acomode para recebê-la, sem mudar a estrutura
+
+global) ou revolucionário (visando remodelar toda a estrutura, a partir das bases). A ação,
+
+reformista ou revolucionária, não é, necessariamente, pacífica ou violenta. Há meras reformas
+
+que desencadeiam luta sangrenta; há totais revoluções que preconizam, ao contrário, os meios
+
+incruentos (sem derramamento de sangue) e não-ditatoriais. Exemplo das primeiras é, entre
+
+nós, a Guerra dos Farrapos. Exemplo da segunda é a estratégia do socialismo democrático.
+
+O perigo desta última; evidentemente, é a acomodação que dissolve os próprios
+
+objetivos revolucionários. A expressão socialismo democrático é, aliás, muito ambígua. Nós
+
+não a empregamos senão com a advertência de que, nela, se procura designar uma superação,
+
+evitando quer os desvios aburguesados quer os congelamentos ditatoriais. Desta maneira é
+
+que ela se revigorou, no panorama atual, com a rejeição do “socialismo” bem comportado e
+
+“confiável” (que a burguesia absorve) e também dos “socialismos” burocrático-repressivos de
+
+cúpula (que prevalecem nas repúblicas onde o trabalhador não tenha, efetivamente, canais de
+
+participação no governo e defesa eficaz contra os burocratas). O socialismo democrático,
+
+portanto, vai, hoje, ganhando o sentido da procura duma “alternativa” perante o capitalismo
+
+espoliativo e o socialismo gorado.
+
+As explicações até agora oferecidas permitem-nos, assim, resumir a visão social
+
+dialética num esquema diferente das focalizações A e B, já criticadas:
+Notará o leitor que foram inseridos, além dos elementos já mencionados, os
+
+algarismos romanos I a IX, que assinalam os pontos onde surge o aspecto jurídico. Estes
+
+pontos vão servir-nos para deduzir a “essência” do Direito, sem partir de nuvens metafísicas
+
+ou da amputação de um que outro aspecto, por simples capricho ideológico. Por isso mesmo,
+
+estamos empregando a palavra Direito em sentido (aliás, pluralidade aparente de sentidos)
+
+apenas nominal e nas suas ligações com o processo sociológico (única fonte onde podemos ir
+
+buscar uma visão nem idealista nem mutilada do Direito mesmo). Queremos dizer, com isto,
+
+que aparecerão assim todos os ângulos do Direito, focalizados por sociólogos, antropólogos,
+
+historiadores, e não somente este ou aquele ângulo privilegiado pelo preconceito duma ou de
+
+outra corrente e especialidade. Vários autores tomam ora um ora outro daqueles pontos como
+
+base, e, assim, produzem obviamente, definições diversas e inconciliáveis. Falta-lhes a
+
+abordagem global.
+
+Encaminhando as nossas conclusões sobre a “essência” do Direito, enquanto parte
+
+de dialética social, demarquemos, especialmente, cada um dos nove pontos assinalados.
+
+I - O Direito não se limita a aspecto interno do processo histórico. Ele tem raiz
+
+internacional, pois é nesta perspectiva que se definem os padrões de atualização jurídica,
+
+segundo os critérios mais avançados. Veremos isto no ponto IX. Mas, desde logo, cumpre
+
+acentuar que a correta visão jurídica não pode fazer caso omisso das instituições
+
+internacionais sob a alegação de que o Direito Internacional “não é jurídico”, porque as
+
+“soberanias” dos diferentes países não toleram repercussões internas senão quando “aderem”
+
+aos pactos internacionais. O princípio de autodeterminação dos povos e as soberanias
+nacionais (que, aliás, o imperialismo a todo instante ofende escandalosamente) não impedem
+
+a atuação, até, das sanções internacionais, na hipótese das mais graves violações do Direito.
+
+II - A verdade, entretanto, é que o direito entre nações luta para não ficar preso ao
+
+sistema de forças dominantes, e em que pesem as felizes contradições a sua forma inter-estatal
+
+(entre Estados) reproduz, no ângulo externo, a obstrução que veremos no ponto VI, quanto ao
+
+direito estatal. Daí a expressão jurídica paralela em uma dialética estabelecida pelos povos
+
+oprimidos e espoliados. Exemplo disto é o conjunto de princípios jurídicos, consagrados na carta
+
+de Argel (1977), em que os povos oprimidos formularam a sua quota de direitos postergados.
+
+III - IV - Afora as comunidades primitivas, de que não estamos cuidando aqui
+
+(como já foi advertido), cada sociedade, em particular, no instante mesmo em que estabelece
+
+o seu modo de produção, inaugura, com cisão em classes, uma dialética, jurídica também, já
+
+que, por exemplo, o estabelecimento da propriedade privada dos meios de produção espolia o
+
+trabalhador, cujos direitos então contradizem o “direito” ali radicado da burguesia capitalista.
+
+A oposição começa na infra-estrutura.
+
+Mesmo numa sociedade socialista não são suprimidos os problemas do conflito de
+
+direitos. Ali subsistem classes (socialismo não é comunismo, para o qual certas repúblicas do
+
+socialismo autoritário dizem estar em trânsito, embora não apresentem, há muito, o menor
+
+passo nesta direção). Não fica eliminada a problemática de classe, nem os limites jurídicos em
+
+que um regime socialista há de conter os processos de construção, para não desnaturar o
+
+próprio socialismo.
+
+De qualquer maneira, em sistema capitalista ou socialista, a questão classista não
+
+esgota a problemática do Direito: permanecem aspectos de opressão dos grupos, cujos
+
+Direitos Humanos são postergados, por normas, inclusive legais. Já citamos a questão das
+
+raças, religião, sexos – que hoje preocupam os juristas do marxismo não-dogmático.
+
+Quando falamos em Direito e Antidireito, obviamente, não nos referimos a duas
+
+entidades abstratas e, sim, ao processo dialético do Direito, em que as suas negações,
+
+objetivadas em normas, constituem um elo do processo mesmo e abrem campo à síntese, à
+
+superação, no itinerário progressivo. O grande equívoco dos iurisnaturalistas é, precisamente,
+
+oscilar entre a rendição ao “direito positivo” (a título de “particularização” dos preceitos
+
+"naturais") e a oposição irresolúvel entre “direito natural” e “direito positivo”, como se
+
+fossem duas coisas separadas: o Direito (que eles não conseguem fundamentar, pois arrancam
+
+esse “ideal” para fora do processo) e a multiplicidade dos conjuntos de normas jurídicas (que
+
+não sabem ver como parte do processo de realização dialética do Direito).
+V - A organização social, que padroniza o conjunto de instituições dominantes,
+
+adquire também um perfil jurídico, na medida em que apresente um arranjo legítimo ou
+
+ilegítimo, espoliativo, opressor, esmagando direitos de classes e grupos dominados. É assim que
+
+se insere o problema jurídico do sistema, a questão da legitimidade ou da ilegitimidade global
+
+da estrutura. Não basta para resolvê-la o simples fato dum status quo (a existência nua e crua da
+
+dominação), como não basta igualmente o tipo de “consenso” presumido, que se baseia da
+
+passividade das massas (intoxicadas pela ideologia e sempre “consultadas” com restrições - isto
+
+é, dentro de leis “eleitoreiras”, que não permitem o despertar da “consciência possível”,
+
+libertadora: exclusão de pessoas e correntes de opinião do pleito, restrições à propaganda, nos
+
+veículos de comunicações de massas, e toda a casuística dos estrategistas da reação).
+
+A passividade das massas não legitima, por si só, uma organização social, assim
+
+como o estabelecimento duma legalidade não importa, por si só, na legitimidade do poder. Caso
+
+contrário, teríamos de afirmar que o nazi-fascismo e os “regimes semelhantes - como os de
+
+Franco, Salazar e quejandos - eram “legítimos”, enquanto viveram e se “agüentaram” no poder;
+
+ou, da mesma forma, que as ditaduras subsistentes são “legítimas”, somente porque ainda se
+
+“agüentam”, á ferro e a fogo. Por outro lado, para que as garantias formais da consulta ao povo
+
+sejam legitimadoras, é preciso não só que se façam sem as restrições capciosas de leis cheias de
+
+manhas, como também que permitam o trabalho de conscientização popular, pelos líderes
+
+progressistas, sem restrições de pessoas e correntes, no acesso livre aos meios de comunicação e
+
+organização de massas. Isto é uma questão jurídica também.
+
+De toda sorte, a garantia democrática é parte do problema da realização do
+
+Direito, e não basta substituir a disciplina legal da propriedade para chegar ao socialismo
+
+autêntico: resta saber que posição real têm as classes na determinação do sistema, em que
+
+medida os trabalhadores efetivamente comandam o processo e que canais políticos ficam
+
+abertos para evitar o enrijecimento do Estado e o domínio burocrático-policial da estrutura por
+
+um conjunto de agentes repressores. Isto já preocupava Lênin quando redigiu as “Instruções
+
+de 1922” a respeito da “organização multiforme das massas”, para “controle sobre os
+
+aparelhos do Estado e sobre os próprios comunistas”. A conseqüência de se desprezar essa
+
+problemática foi a criação do “Estado-aparelho não-capitalista como patrão absoluto da
+
+sociedade”, que é hoje combatido pelo movimento da “autogestão socialista (o controle sócioeconômico
+de baixo para cima).
+
+VI - O controle social global, isto é, como dissemos, a central de operações das
+
+normas dominantes, do e no setor centrípeto, dinamiza em aspectos, não isentos de
+
+contradições, a organização social militante. Aí é que surgem as leis de todo o tipo, inclusive
+as anômalas; que rompem (para a garantia da organização subjacente) o próprio sistema legal,
+
+quando classe e grupos dominantes se assustam com a possibilidade mais ou menos próxima
+
+de verem escapar o controle social da mão das “elites do poder”.
+
+O ponto VI, na sua teia de normas em ação, é o único focalizado pelo positivismo,
+
+como se ali estivesse todo o Direito, quando, nada obstante as eventuais contradições, a
+
+espoliação e a opressão neste ponto descobrem a sede privilegiada de atuação. É importante
+
+examinar, sem rejeição indiscriminada, todo o direito estatal, que pode, inclusive, servir para
+
+o “uso alternativo”, de que cogitam o jurista Barcellona e seu grupo (voltar as leis do Estado
+
+contra o próprio objetivo dominador), operação de grande alcance teórico e prático. Mas
+
+obviamente é preciso enfatizar, com muita energia, que o Direito não está aí: o Direito está no
+
+processo global e sua resultante. Localizar o Direito neste ponto VI, exclusivamente, equivale
+
+a transformar a sua positividade, a sua força de disciplinar a práxis jurídica, em positivismo (a
+
+concepção legalista do Direito), que é outra coisa.
+
+VII - É óbvio que, se persiste a cisão de grupos e classes em dominadores e
+
+dominados, a dialética vem a criar, paralelamente à organização social, um processo de
+
+desorganização, que interfere naquela, mostrando a ineficácia relativa e a ilegitimidade das
+
+normas dominantes e propondo outras, efetivamente vividas, em setores mais ou menos
+
+amplos da vida social. No plano político, assim se estabelece o que os cientistas políticos
+
+denominam o “poder dual” (isto é, mais de um poder social na dialética de conflito).
+
+No plano das contra-instituições jurídicas, vê-se emergir o que o sociólogo
+
+português Boaventura de Souza Santos estudou na sua admirável tese Direito dos Oprimidos
+
+(com material de pesquisa de campo, realizada nas favelas brasileiras). Escreve o notável
+
+colega português: “uma vez que a coesão ideológica de uma sociedade de classes superpõe-se
+
+a inconciliáveis conflitos classistas, criados pelas relações de produção, as classes dominadas,
+
+ou grupos específicos dentro delas, tendem a desenvolver subculturas legais, que, em certas
+
+circunstâncias, podem estar ligadas a uma práxis institucional mais ou menos autônoma, de
+
+variável meta e nível de organização. Reconhecer esta práxis como jurídica e este direito
+
+como direito paralelo (isto é, caracterizar a situação como pluralismo jurídico) e adotar uma
+
+perspectiva teórica julgando esse Direito não inferior ao direito estatal - envolve uma opção
+
+tanto científica, quanto política. Ela implica a negação do monopólio radical de produção e
+
+circulação do Direito pelo Estado moderno”.
+
+A opção científica, a que alude o eminente sociólogo, é obviamente a dialética; a
+
+opção política é, não menos obviamente, a socialista, e socialista democrática, em oposição ao
+“estatismo” e “legalismo”, não só capitalista, mas do “socialismo” autoritário-burocráticorepressivo.VIII
+- Parece, então, claro que a coexistência conflitual de séries de normas
+
+jurídicas, dentro da estrutura social (pluralismo dialético), leva à atividade anômica (de
+
+contestação), na medida em que grupos e classes dominados procuram o reconhecimento de
+
+suas formações contra-institucionais, em desafio às normas dominantes (anomia).
+
+Este projeto, entretanto, pode ser de dois tipos: ou se revela apenas reformista,
+
+enquanto visa a absorção de seus princípios e normas pela central do ramo centrípeto (ponto
+
+VI), sem atingir as bases da estrutura e os demais aspectos da normação dominadora; ou se
+
+mostra revolucionário, isto é, delineia o contraste fundamental, com uma série de princípios e
+
+normas que são proposta e prática reestruturadora, atingindo a infra-estrutura e tudo o que
+
+sobre ela assenta. Reforma ou revolução representam o enlace jurídico-político; isto é, só
+
+politicamente se instrumentalizam e tem chance de triunfar; mas só juridicamente podem
+
+fundamentar-se (a dinamização é política; a substância é jurídica). E a fundamentação jurídica
+
+é indispensável para validar, inclusive, o apelo revolucionário e introduz ao mais amplo
+
+círculo do Direito, que, por isto mesmo, no esquema dialético, pusemos numa chave
+
+envolvente, com a designação de IX.
+
+IX - Radica neste ponto o critério de avaliação dos produtos jurídicos
+
+contrastantes, na competição de ordenamentos (as diferentes séries de normas entrosadas).
+
+É a síntese jurídica: Seus critérios, porém, não são cristalizações ideológicas de
+
+qualquer “essência” metafísica, mas o vetor histórico-social, resultante do estado do processo,
+
+indicando o que se pode ver, a cada instante, como direção do progresso da humanidade na sua
+
+caminhada histórica. Esta resultante final (final, não no sentido de eterna, mas de síntese
+
+abrangedora do aspecto jurídico naquele processo histórico-social, em sua totalidade e
+
+transformações) se reinsere, imediatamente, no processo mesmo, uma vez que a história não pára.
+
+A síntese não está por cima ou por baixo, num esquema prévio ou posterior, mas
+
+DENTRO DO PROCESSO, AQUI E AGORA. A meta foi anteontem, a conquista liberal
+
+(quando a burguesia ascendente indicava o rumo do progresso e todos sonhavam com a
+
+Revolução Francesa); foi, ontem, a vitória do socialismo no plano econômico (quando
+
+principiou a série dos avanços proletários e todos sonhavam com a Revolução Russa); mas é
+
+hoje o socialismo democrático, quando as revoluções socialistas estão esclerosadas (doença
+
+de enrijecimento), em países que lhe deram somente uma feição autoritário-burocráticorepressiva;
+esta última desnatura o socialismo e oprime, externa e internamente, nos seus
+
+blocos dominados, as próprias massas que se propunha libertar.
+O ponto IX é, então, a chave de abóbada para a análise do Direito e a sede onde
+
+emergem os Direitos Humanos. Note-se que não nos referimos às declarações dos Direitos
+
+Humanos, que desejam exprimir o ponto IX, porém a este mesmo ponto, que nelas
+
+aproximadamente se reflete, a cada etapa. Já tivemos a declaração das revoluções americana e
+
+francesa, cuja focalização representa a burguesia ascendente. Na declaração mais recente,
+
+repercute a luta social avançada, em que a igualdade formal dos homens, perante o direito
+
+estatal, se corrige com a remodelação jurídica, inspirada pelo socialismo, de igualdade
+
+substancial, sem a espoliação do trabalhador pelo capitalista, ou a opressão dos grupos
+
+minoritários pelo poder instituído.
+
+Para termos uma idéia da diferença entre as declarações dos Direitos Humanos e estes
+
+mesmos Direitos, basta pensar que a declaração “oficial” mais recente já é inatual, na medida em
+
+que ainda não incorpora outros aspectos da libertação, surgidos em lutas sociais posteriores. Por
+
+exemplo, a marca do social, na Declaração dos Direitos Humanos, ainda é muito vaga e
+
+incompleta e não dá expressão plena às metas socialistas do Direito contemporâneo autêntico.
+
+Aliás, este envelhecimento das “declarações” foi percebido até pelo filósofo francês bem
+
+reacionário, que era Jacques Maritain, quando acentuou, à ocasião em que foi redigida a última
+
+declaração “oficial”, que ela devia ser revista, pelo menos, de 15 em 15 anos.
+
+Eis, em síntese, o que, tomado, como dissemos, o Direito nominalmente, dele nos
+
+surge, na dialética social e no processo histórico. A “essência” do jurídico há de abranger todo
+
+esse conjunto de dados, em movimento, sem amputar nenhum dos aspectos (como fazem as
+
+ideologias jurídicas), nem situar a dialética nas nuvens idealistas – ou na oposição insolúvel
+
+(não-dialética), tomando Direito e Antidireito como blocos estanques e omitindo a “negação
+
+da negação”. É com esta que as contradições de Direito e Antidireito fazem explodir (com
+
+mediação da práxis jurídica progressista) a ostra normativa para que se extraia a pérola da
+
+superação. A falta de um senso deste processo é que leva, em desespero de causa, certos
+
+autores marxistas a aderirem ao direito natural, diante dos legalismos prepotentes à la
+
+Vichinski, o teórico soviético do “legalismo” socialista.
+
+É fácil ler Marx e Engels como positivista ou iurisnaturalista. A leitura soviética é
+
+legalista – não à toa. Heller, que já citamos, insinua, por outro lado, um iurisnaturalismo de
+
+base, na medida em que o Direito de revolução é, por assim dizer, o carro chefe de todo o
+
+materialismo histórico.
+
+O fato é que, entre marxistas e marxólogos, cada um cita os clássicos no trecho
+
+que lhe interessa, assim como os teólogos citam a Bíblia, para cá e para lá: eles sempre
+
+descobrem umas frases conservadoras ou progressistas, puritanas ou permissivas, até mesmo
+machistas ou gay...Catar frases é um passatempo de quem só faz negócio com assinatura de
+
+avalista e vive procurando uma firma célebre e desprevenida para as suas promissórias. Um
+
+pensamento, uma filosofia é um organismo em movimento, uma resposta intelectual aos
+
+estímulos duma práxis e cada noção, conceito, proposição têm de ser, não pinçados mas
+
+inseridos no movimento da obra.
+
+Por isso mesmo é que, em vez de ler Marx ou Engels, vertendo-os em garrafinhas
+
+que não mostram a grandeza e marés do oceano, é preciso repensar Marx e Engels com a
+
+leitura dos textos, que são marcos dum itinerário inacabado, e não repositório da ciência feita,
+
+para criar o dogma e abonar qualquer “linha justa”, amanhã revista, com outras citações, na
+
+hora de bater nas peitos e fazer autocrítica. Marx e Engels foram os constantes “revisionistas”
+
+de si mesmos. Prestamos homenagem maior, e até mais fiel, ao gênio marxiano retomando o
+
+itinerário, não porque sejamos mais inteligentes do que Marx, e sim porque estamos um
+
+século adiante.
+
+Mas onde fica, então, diante daquele panorama, a “essência” do Direito, no
+
+sentido em que a vimos buscando - isto é, na postura dialética, explicada no capítulo 1 ? Que
+
+noção, que conceito, ao mesmo tempo abrangedor e preciso, consegue resumir todo o
+
+processo, contemplado na síntese móvel do ponto IX e desdobrado nas contradições dos
+
+pontos I - II, III - IV, V - VII e VI - VIII?
+
+Marx afirmou que “a liberdade é a essência do homem” e não há
+
+incompatibilidade entre esta frase e outra, que ele escreveu mais tarde, mostrando que “a
+
+essência do homem é o conjunto das relações sociais”, isto é, as relações entre as pessoas,
+
+dentro dos grupos e classes e na forma que estes modelam. Porque este “ser real” – este
+
+homem na sociedade - não é apenas um boneco sem vida que as forças sociais movimentam.
+
+Ele se conscientiza, reage e se liberta dos condicionamentos. As relações sociais - inclusive as
+
+relações de produção -constituem relações entre homens, e não entre peças duma só máquina.
+
+Aliás, se não fosse assim, se tudo fosse aparelho, precisaríamos de um “Deus dos aparelhos”
+
+para movimentar a História e fazer com que a “máquina” funcionasse.
+
+O que é “essencial” no homem é a sua capacidade de libertação, que se realiza
+
+quando ele, conscientizado, descobre quais são as forças da natureza e da sociedade que o
+
+“determinariam”, se ele se deixasse levar por elas. Lembramos, com Marx, que consciência é
+
+conscientização; e também que liberdade é libertação; isto é, consciência não é uma coisa que
+
+nós temos, porém que vamos construindo, vamos livrando do que os nossos dominadores
+
+botam lá (ideologia); e liberdade também não é uma coisa que nós possuímos; pelo contrário:
+
+ela vive amarrada e nós temos de cortar os nós.
+O processo social, a História, é um processo de libertação constante (se não fosse,
+
+estávamos, até hoje, parados, numa só estrutura, sem progredir); mas, é claro, há avanços e
+
+recuos, quebras do caminho, que não importam, pois o rio acaba voltando ao leito, seguindo
+
+em frente e rompendo as represas. Dentro do processo histórico, o aspecto jurídico representa
+
+a articulação dos princípios básicos da Justiça Social atualizada, segundo padrões de
+
+reorganização da liberdade que se desenvolvem nas lutas sociais do homem. Quando falamos
+
+em Justiça, entretanto, não nos estamos referindo àquela imagem ideológica da Justiça ideal,
+
+metafísica, abstrata, vaga, que a classe e grupos dominantes invocam para tentar justificar as
+
+normas, os costumes, as leis, os códigos da sua dominação.
+
+Não é o idealismo iurisnaturalista que, ou se rende ao direito positivo (às normas de
+
+dominação), porque a este concede o poder de definir, em especial, o que a “Justiça” é, nas
+
+situações particulares e concretas; nem aquele outro iurisnaturalismo progressista, de combate,
+
+que continua, entretanto, pondo de um lado o “direito ideal” e de outro o “direito real”. A
+
+contradição entre a injustiça real das normas que apenas se dizem justas e a injustiça que nelas
+
+se encontra pertence ao processo, à dialética da realização do Direito, que é uma luta constante
+
+entre progressistas e reacionários, entre grupos e classes espoliados e oprimidos e grupos e
+
+classes espoliadores e opressores. Esta luta faz parte do Direito, porque o Direito não é uma
+
+“coisa” fixa, parada, definitiva e eterna, mas um processo de libertação permanente.
+
+Como já dissemos, o Direito não “é”; ele “vem a ser”. Por isso mesmo é que o
+
+revolucionário de ontem é o conservador de hoje e o reacionário de amanhã. Reparem, por
+
+exemplo, no caso da burguesia: como classe ascendente, quando estava na vanguarda,
+
+enriqueceu o patrimônio jurídico da humanidade. Quando chegou ao poder deu a “coisa” por
+
+finda, isto é, quis deter o processo para gozar os benefícios e se recusou a extrair as
+
+conseqüências de sua revolta contra a aristocracia e o feudalismo. Ficou, portanto, uma
+
+contradição entre a libertação parcial, que favoreceu os burgueses, e o prosseguimento da
+
+libertação, que daria vez aos trabalhadores. A burguesia saiu com o povo à rua, contra os
+
+aristocratas; mas, depois de tomar o lugar destes achou gostoso e mandou prender o povo, a
+
+fim de curtir uma boa, que é o poder. Como o povo se recusava a parar e, cada vez que era
+
+enxotado, teimava em reaparecer, a burguesia baixou o pau. A luta continuou.
+
+Aquela altura, um burguês já triunfante disse que “é fácil colocar o povo na rua;
+
+difícil é fazê-lo voltar para casa”: este queria parar a História mas a História é teimosa. A
+
+locomotiva amarrada acaba rompendo as amarras e passando por cima de quem quiser se encostar
+
+à frente e pará-la com a bunda. E o destino dos ditadores aí está, que não nos deixa mentir.
+E a luta social constante, com suas expressões de vanguarda e suas resistências e
+
+sacanagens reacionárias, com suas forças contraditórias de progresso e conservantismo, com
+
+suas classes e grupos ascendentes e libertários e suas classes e grupos decadentes e opressores
+
+- é todo o processo que define o Direito, em cada etapa, na procura das direções de superação.
+
+E preciso notar, inclusive, que as contradições não se dão apenas entre blocos de
+
+normas, porém dentro desses blocos. Assim, por exemplo, o direito estatal, as leis que
+
+exprimem, em linhas gerais, o domínio de classe e grupos privilegiados têm elementos que
+
+podem ser utilizados pelas classes e grupos libertadores, porque, na hipocrisia de fazer o
+
+contrário do que dizem (isto é, dizer que vão construir a “Justiça” nas normas, enquanto
+
+fazem das normas uma proteção injusta de seus privilégios), a classe e grupos dominadores
+
+muitas vezes se contradizem, deixam “buracos” nas suas leis e costumes, por onde os mais
+
+hábeis juristas de vanguarda podem enfiar à alavanca do progresso, explorando a contradição.
+
+De toda a sorte, a força, a evidência de que o Direito compendia, a cada momento,
+
+a soma das conquistas libertárias (ponto IX do nosso esquema) fica provada por dois fatos.
+
+Em primeiro lugar, nenhum legislador, mesmo o pior dos ditadores, diz, em tese, que vai fazer
+
+a norma injusta. Isto contraria a essência do Direito como já notava Engels. “A expressão
+
+brutal, intransigente da supremacia de uma classe”, lembrou ele, vai “por si só contra conceito
+
+de Direito”. Mas é claro que o “conceito de Direito” não é aquela “idéia” metafísica, abstrata,
+
+e, sim, o Direito, como um aspecto do processo social mesmo.
+
+Em segundo lugar, os direitos já conquistados geralmente não são desafiados pelo
+
+dominador: a dominação é, já o dissemos, hipócrita. Então, o dominador vai absorvendo o
+
+discurso de liberdade, para negá-lo, de fato, nas normas espoliativas e repressoras. Hoje, por
+
+exemplo, já não se fala em manter o colonialismo (que continua existindo) ou em resolver a
+
+questão social com a polícia (que, aliás, entra a toda hora na luta, chamada pelo burguês que
+
+tem medo do povo). Ao menos, não se confessa abertamente essas violências, o que significa
+
+que nem o opressor pode negar o Direito: apenas entortá-lo, dizendo uma coisa e fazendo outra.
+
+Inclusive quando uma estrutura socialista degenera em opressão, ela continua
+
+falando em socialismo e invoca o Direito da classe proletária para fazer calar, prender e
+
+agredir o trabalhador. A dominação soviética, por exemplo, está sempre falando em “defesa
+
+do socialismo”, tal como a burguesia está sempre falando em “defesa da democracia” - isto
+
+mesmo quando a “defesa do socialismo” é acabar com a pretensão à liberdade do país
+
+vizinho. Da mesma forma e no outro lado, fala-se no princípio de autodeterminação dos
+
+povos, mas logo em nome da “defesa da democracia” os E.E.U.U. vão criando polícia
+continental, na América Latina, para manter a semicolonização econômica determinada
+
+peloimperialismo regional, que não é menos hipócrita.
+
+A grande inversão que se produz no pensamento jurídico tradicional é tomar as
+
+normas como Direito e, depois, definir o Direito pelas normas, limitando estas às normas do
+
+Estado e da classe e grupos que o dominam. Ora, a doutrina que “fecha” todo o fenômeno
+
+jurídico, enquanto simples norma da classe e grupos dominantes (ou mesmo de grupos
+
+dissidentes retrógrados do tipo de Tradição, Família e Propriedade, que é mais “realista do
+
+que o rei”), subtrai toda dialética.
+
+Por outro lado, cada perfil atualizado do Direito autêntico é um instante do
+
+processo de sua eterna reconstituição, do seu avanço, que vai desvendando áreas novas de
+
+libertação. A contribuição dos primeiros socialistas foi contestar as normas do direito burguês,
+
+opor-lhes princípios jurídicos mais avançados, lutando para que se remodelassem as normas.
+
+Alguns daqueles princípios acharam o seu escaninho nas repúblicas socialistas (de vários
+
+matizes). Porém, depois do avanço de 1917, o poder soviético e, mais tarde, dos seus satélites,
+
+foi engordando tanto que se deitou na cama (estatal) e dormiu sobre o colchão de instituições
+
+domesticadas, acordando assustado toda vez que algum socialista herege e contestador
+
+berrava que ali (ou na casa do vizinho) havia algo de errado.
+
+O legalismo é sempre a ressaca social de um impulso criativo jurídico. Os
+
+princípios se acomodam em normas e envelhecem; e as normas esquecem de que são meios
+
+de expressão do Direito móvel, em constante progresso, e não Direito em si. Com o vício de
+
+rodar a manivela, o Estado troca, na sua Casa da Moeda, os papéis com lastro de ouro pelos
+
+papéis desvalorizados, na inflação das leis; e acaba usando a “guitarra”, a máquina de fazer
+
+dinheiro falso, para enganar os tolos.
+
+Direito e Justiça caminham enlaçados; lei e Direito é que se divorciam com
+
+freqüência. Onde está a Justiça no mundo? -, pergunta-se. Que Justiça é esta, proclamada por
+
+um bando, de filósofos idealistas, que depois a entregam a um grupo de “juristas”, deixando
+
+que estes devorem o povo? A Justiça não é, evidentemente, esta coisa degradada. Isto é
+
+negação da Justiça, uma negação que lhe rende, apesar de tudo, a homenagem de usar seu
+
+nome, pois nenhum legislador prepotente, administrador ditatorial ou juiz formalista jamais
+
+pensou em dizer que o “direito” deles não está cuidando de ser justo. Porém, onde fica a
+
+Justiça verdadeira? Evidentemente, não é cá, nem lá, não é nas leis (embora às vezes nelas se
+
+misture, em maior ou menor grau); nem é nos princípios ideais, abstratos (embora às vezes
+
+também algo dela ali se transmita, de forma imprecisa): a Justiça real está no processo
+
+histórico, de que é resultante, no sentido de que é nele que se realiza progressivamente.
+Justiça é Justiça Social, antes de tudo: é atualização dos princípios condutores,
+
+emergindo nas lutas sociais, para levar à criação duma sociedade em que cessem a exploração
+
+e opressão do homem pelo homem; e o Direito não é mais, nem menos, do que a expressão
+
+daqueles princípios supremos, enquanto modelo avançado de legítima organização social da
+
+liberdade. Mas até a injustiça como também o Antidireito (isto é, a constituição de normas
+
+ilegítimas e sua imposição em sociedades mal organizadas) fazem parte do processo, pois
+
+nem a sociedade justa, nem a Justiça corretamente vista, nem o Direito mesmo, o legítimo,
+
+nascem dum berço metafísico ou são presente generoso dos deuses: eles brotam nas
+
+oposições, no conflito, no caminho penoso do progresso, com avanços e recuos, momentos
+
+solares e terríveis eclipses.
+
+Direito é processo, dentro do processo histórico: não é uma coisa feita, perfeita e
+
+acabada; é aquele vir-a-ser que se enriquece nos movimentos de libertação das classes e
+
+grupos ascendentes e que definha nas explorações e opressões que o contra-dizem, mas de
+
+cujas próprias contradições brotarão as novas conquistas. Quando a burguesia, em avanço e
+
+subida, desafiou as discriminações aristocrático-feudais ela colocou o problema da igualdade;
+
+e quando essa mesma burguesia se encarapitou no poder e negou a igualdade real em suas
+
+leis, desencadeando a crítica marxista, que mostrava a fonte das desigualdades, foi a
+
+contradição apontada que indicou o caminho para o socialismo; quando o socialismo degenera
+
+em opressão burocrático-autoritária, falando em nome duma classe proletária, a que
+
+mecanismos estatais negam a real participação no poder, é também esta contradição que gera
+
+o movimento para democratizar o “socialismo” implantado, que se deixou engordar em
+
+dominação-repressão.
+
+À injustiça, que um sistema institua e procure garantir, opõe-se o desmentido da
+
+Justiça Social conscientizada; às normas, em que aquele sistema verta os interesses de classes
+
+e grupos dominadores, opõem-se outras normas e instituições jurídicas, oriundos de classes e
+
+grupos dominados, e também vigem, e se propagam, e tentam substituir os padrões
+
+dominantes de convivência, impostos pelo controle social ilegítimo; isto é, tentam
+
+generalizar-se, rompendo os diques da opressão estrutural. As duas elaborações entrecruzamse,
+atritam-se, acomodam-se momentaneamente e afinal chegam a novos momentos de
+
+ruptura, integrando e movimentando a dialética do Direito. Uma ordenação se nega para que
+
+outra a substitua no itinerário libertador.
+
+O ponto de referência IX, que pusemos no esquema C, da visão social dialética, é
+
+aquele em que a Justiça se identifica, enquanto substância atualizada do Direito, isto é, na
+
+quota de libertação alcançada, em perspectiva progressista, ao nível histórico presente. Nunca
+se pode aferir a Justiça em abstrato, e, sim, concretamente, pois as quotas de libertação
+
+acham-se no processo histórico; são o que nele se revela à vanguarda (às classes e grupos
+
+ascendentes), o aspecto jurídico do processo é o que delineia a forma positivada, alcance
+
+próprio dos princípios da práxis social justa e do controle social legitimo, com a indicação das
+
+normas em que ele venha a se organizar, no modelo atualizado e vanguardeiro de organização
+
+social da liberdade. E isto se resume, repetimos com o filósofo marxista Ernst Bloch, em
+
+determinar “a instauração da faculdade de agir” (das classes e grupos), sem alienação, “nas
+
+normas de agir duma comunidade enfim não alienada”. Por isso mesmo, no socialismo, o
+
+aspecto jurídico, ao invés de sumir, ganha mais relevo, como dizia ainda Bloch, enquanto “os
+
+Direitos Humanos não serão menos militantes, como direito à crítica, inexoravelmente
+
+objetiva e prática, pelo avanço da construção socialista, dentro dum quadro de solidariedade”.
+
+A simples troca do modo de produção, o fim de certo tipo de exploração e
+
+opressão não é o fim da História; é uma etapa. No processa histórico de libertação, perante as
+
+dominações ilegítimas, o Direito modela o padrão organizador, que resulta do processo
+
+mesmo, Mas ele não é apenas a seara da liberdade: é igualmente a antítese da anarquia (que
+
+deseja trocar a repressão ilegítima pelo caos) e da ação bruta, não contida por princípios de
+
+legitimidade (e na qual o objetivo libertador poderá descaracterizar-se, dentro de um caminho
+
+que não respeite os direitos fundamentais: hoje, por exemplo, a tortura já é definida como
+
+crime de Direito Internacional e continuará sendo crime, quer seja instrumento do
+
+conservantismo violento, quer seja aplicada a pretexto de facilitar o trabalho de libertação).
+
+O Direito, em resumo, se apresenta como positivação da liberdade conscientizada
+
+e conquistada nas lutas sociais e formula os princípios supremos da Justiça Social que nelas se
+
+desvenda. Por isso, é importante não confundi-lo com as normas em que venha a ser vazado,
+
+com nenhuma das séries contraditórias de normas que aparecem na dialética social. Estas
+
+últimas pretendem concretizar o Direito, realizar a Justiça, mas nelas pode estar a oposição
+
+entre a Justiça mesma, a Justiça Social atualizada na História, e a “justiça” de classes e grupos
+
+dominadores, cuja ilegitimidade então desvirtua o “direito” que invocam.
+
+Também é um erro ver o Direito como pura restrição à liberdade, pois, ao
+
+contrário, ele constitui a afirmação da liberdade conscientizada e viável, na coexistência
+
+social; e as restrições que impõe à liberdade de cada um legitimam-se apenas na medida em
+
+que garantem a liberdade de todos. A absoluta liberdade de todos, obviamente, redundaria em
+
+liberdade para ninguém, pois tantas liberdades particulares atropelariam a liberdade geral.
+
+Esta a razão por que o Direito não se confunde com a Moral. A Moral é também
+
+processo, também está inserida na dialética social; também se transmite a séries múltiplas de
+normas, conforme as classes e grupos em que se divide a estrutura social; também gera
+
+obrigações exigíveis e estabelece órgãos e procedimentos para a sua aplicação coercitiva: ela
+
+é, portanto, bilateral, como o Direito; o que não é, entretanto, é recíproca. Recíproco é só o
+
+direito. Na Moral se armam deveres que cada um há de cumprir em relação aos demais e até a
+
+si mesmo. Todavia, os princípios sociais e históricos da vida honesta não dependem da
+
+reciprocidade. Queremos dizer, com isto, que os deveres morais de cada um não dependem
+
+dos deveres morais dos outros, para se tornarem obrigatórios, nem no sentido de que estes
+
+últimos cumpram ou deixem de cumprir os seus próprios deveres, nem no sentido de que os
+
+preceitos morais se destinem a garantir o equilíbrio recíproco do exercício da liberdade.
+
+A Moral visa o aperfeiçoamento de cada um, dentro da honestidade. O Direito
+
+visa ao desdobramento da liberdade, dentro dos limites da coexistência. Mesmo quando, no
+
+Direito Criminal, por exemplo, se rejeita a compensação de culpas, isto não desmente, antes
+
+confirma, a reciprocidade, pois o que é juridicamente cobrado a ambos os sujeitos
+
+juridicamente culpados é o recíproco dever de não lesarem um ao outro, nem, juntos, assim
+
+ofenderem a comunidade. Se falta a lesão, o dano ou sequer o perigo para as liberdades em
+
+coexistência, crime não há.
+
+Deste modo é que, atualmente, se demonstra que são ilegítimas as definições
+
+legais de “crime sem vítima”, como, por exemplo, a autodestruição física ou psíquica, pelo
+
+suicídio, pelo consumo de drogas, pela degradação moral da prostituição. Estes
+
+procedimentos não deixam de ser, todos eles, reprováveis moralmente; porém o Direito veio a
+
+reconhecer que nada têm a ver com os deveres de reciprocidade e, assim, vão desaparecendo
+
+aquelas incriminações injustificáveis.
+
+A Moral, entretanto, permanece como estabelecimento de restrições à nossa
+
+liberdade, em si mesmas tidas como necessárias, para tornar-nos pessoas socialmente
+
+melhores, enquanto que o Direito só nos restringe a liberdade para garantir o que, nela, afete
+
+aos demais. Mesmo quando a Moral se volta para a disciplina dos nossos prazeres (a chamada
+
+Moral hedonista), admitindo a “curtição” de cada um, segundo o seu gosto, continua a levar
+
+uma restrição intrínseca, de auto-aperfeiçoamento, na medida em que o próprio hedonismo
+
+ensina a não abusarmos desordenadamente dos prazeres, ensina a controlar os apetites e a
+
+maneira de gozar, em todos os sentidos da palavra.
+
+Direito é o reino da libertação, cujos limites são determinados pela própria
+
+liberdade. Moral é o reino da contensão, em que a liberdade é domada. Nenhum dos dois, é
+
+claro, tolera os dogmas, os princípios eternos, ou se extrai de fontes ideais, o que é abstratas
+
+ou sobre-humanas. Ambos são, ao revés, conquistas sociais, históricas e fortemente
+condicionadas pela estrutura social, onde emergem, na oposição, no contraste de modelos
+
+diversos conforme a divisão de classes e grupos dominadores e dominados, cujas normas
+
+estão sujeitas aos critérios de legitimidade, histórica também, isto é, definida pelo padrão mais
+
+avançado, ao nível do tempo presente.
+
+Marx dizia, com humor, que “ninguém luta contra a liberdade; no máximo, luta
+
+contra a liberdade dos outros...” E aí está o que faz toda sociedade espoliativa e opressora, em
+
+que classes e grupos dominadores cuidam de si, à custa dos demais. Porém o princípio
+
+jurídico fundamental (isto é, a matriz de todos os outros, que se vão desvendando no processo
+
+libertador e inspiram a avaliação de qualquer norma) já foi conscientizado e expresso, no
+
+tempo histórico, para guiar-nos, como bússola da luta pelo Direito e desmentido a qualquer
+
+ordem que, de jurídica, tenha somente o nome, falsamente invocado. Foi Marx igualmente
+
+quem o registrou, assinando juntamente com Engels um documento célebre, no qual se lê: “o
+
+livre desenvolvimento de cada um é condição para o livre desenvolvimento de todos”. Isto é
+
+que é Direito, na “essência”, modelo e finalidade. Tudo o mais, ou é conseqüência, a
+
+determinar no itinerário evolutivo, ou é deturpação, a combater como obstáculo ao progresso
+
+jurídico da humanidade.
+INDICAÇÕES PARA LEITURA
+
+Especialmente recomendáveis para o iniciante, pelas informações atualizadas,
+
+clareza da exposição e enfoque progressista são - A Ciência do Direito: Conceito, Objeto,
+
+Método, de Agostinho Ramalho Marques Neto (Rio, Editora Forense, 19821 e Para uma
+
+Crítica da Eficácia do Direito, de José Geraldo de Sousa Júnior (Brasília, edição particular,
+
+1981: pedidos para a Caixa Postal 13.1957, CEP 70.259, Brasília, D.F.).
+
+Uma das figuras mais importantes da teoria e pesquisa jurídicas modernas é o
+
+sociólogo português Boaventura de Souza Santos, cuja notável tese de doutoramento - The
+
+Law of the Oppressed (O Direito dos Oprimidos, Law & Society Review, vol. 12, n° 1, 1957,
+
+p. 5-1261 - infelizmente ainda não tem edição disponível em nosso idioma (foi escrita,
+
+originariamente, em inglês e defendida na Universidade de Yale)). Mas quem quiser conhecer
+
+algo desse eminente autor pode consultar, em português, O Discurso, e o Poder (Coimbra,
+
+Separata do Boletim da Faculdade de Direito de Coimbra, 1979).
+
+O monumental estudo de Ernst Bloch, Naturrecht und Menschliche Würde
+
+(Frankfurt am Main, Surkhamp, 1961; com tradução francesa, Droit Naturel et Dignité
+
+Humaine, Paris, Payot, 1976) também não foi vertido para o português. Entretanto, tê-se algo
+
+dele, em matéria jurídica, no breve ensaio incluído na coletânea organizada por Erich Fromm,
+
+Humanismo Socialista (Lisboa, Edições 70, 1976, p. 226-234).
+
+O único trabalho de Michel Miaille até hoje aparecido no Brasil não é
+
+representativo da evolução deste excelente autor, cujo melhor trabalho se acha na obra coletiva
+
+de M. Bourjol & outros, Pour une Critipue du Droit (Paris, Maspéro, 1978, p. 114-146).
+
+Sob o ponto de vista histórico, é estimulante a leitura do livro de Michael Tigar &
+
+Madeleine Levy, O Direito e a Ascensão do Capitalismo (Rio, Zahar, 1978); e, quanto às ligações
+
+com a Ciência Política, têm especial destaque duas obras de Ralph Miliband, O Estado na
+
+Sociedade Capitalista (Rio, Zahar, 1972) e Marxismo e Política (Rio, Zahar, 1979). Sob vários
+
+ângulos correlatos, é importante meditar sobre as colocações de Marilena Chauí, na sua magnífica
+
+série de ensaios reunidos em Cultura e Democracia (São Paulo, Editora Moderna, 1981).
+
+Não devem ser desprezadas as páginas clássicas dos grandes precursores
+
+nacionais, como João Mangabeira, a exemplo do vigoroso parecer que marca a sua primeira
+
+definição socialista, no terreno jurídico (R Verdadeira Igualdade e a Socialização do Direito),
+
+em 1930, e a belíssima Oração aos Bacharelados da Faculdade de Direito da Bahia, em 1944
+
+(ambos os textos constantes da obra organizada por Francisco de Assis Barbosa, As Idéias
+
+Políticas de João Mangabeira, Brasília-Rio, Senado Federal - Casa Rui Barbosa, MEC, 1980,
+
+3 vols.: vol. 1, p. 491-504; vot. 3, p. 15-18).
+Outros volumes, já publicados ou a publicar, nesta mesma coleção Primeiros
+
+Passos, cuidam de temas jurídicos, tal como o no 49, Direitos da Pessoa, da muito ilustre e
+
+corajoso prof. Dalma Dallari.
+
+www.esnips.com/user/direito-unisulma
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,690 @@
+Bogg, A. (Accepted/In press). Book Review - Escaping Labour Law's
+Matrix: Governance by Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of
+Allegiance, Alain Supiot, (Saskia Brown trans., Bloomsbury, 2017, 336 pp).
+Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 101-115.
+
+Peer reviewed version
+
+Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
+PDF-document
+
+This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) will be available
+online via the University of Illinois Press . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
+
+University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
+
+General rights
+
+This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
+version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
+http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
+
+View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE
+
+provided by Explore Bristol Research
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+101
+
+BOOK REVIEW
+
+ESCAPING LABOR LAW’S MATRIX
+
+Governance by Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance, Alain
+Supiot, (Saskia Brown trans., Bloomsbury, 2017, 336 pp).
+
+reviewed by Alan Bogg†
+
+1999 was an auspicious year. It was the year that I began in earnest as a
+student of labor law in the neoliberal twilight years of the twentieth century,
+with my discipline in its seeming death throes. It was also the year that the
+critically acclaimed science fiction film The Matrix was released. The actor
+Keanu Reeves had been required to read Jean Baudrillard’s famous work
+Simulacra and Simulation as a philosophical prelude to reading the film
+script.1 The Matrix is a meditation on the nature of real human experience.
+The film is set in a dystopian future where intelligent machines have
+subjugated human beings who are encased in pods to harvest their bioelectric
+energies. The matrix is a simulated reality within which the conscious minds
+of the enslaved people are imprisoned. It is rather like a scaled-up version of
+Robert Nozick’s “experience machine”
+2
+: a computer-generated mirage that
+masks their real situation of enslavement. The heroic quest of this small band
+of liberated human beings was to smash through the simulation and to live a
+real human life outside of the matrix. Emancipation meant that the human
+beings must reclaim the real territory of lived human experience.
+Twenty years on, a reading of Professor Alain Supiot’s Governance by
+Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance reveals a manifesto of
+profound importance.3
+It is a stirring call for the emancipation of the human
+being, and the repositioning of the human being at the very center of work
+and politics. It is underpinned by rigorous scholarship on a grand scale and it
+
+† Professor of Labour Law, University of Bristol.
+I am grateful to Serena Crawshay-Williams, Ruth Dukes, Mark Freedland and Tonia Novitz for very
+helpful discussion of an earlier draft.
+1. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Glaser trans., 1994).
+2. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (2001).
+3. ALAIN SUPIOT, GOVERNANCE BY NUMBERS: THE MAKING OF A LEGAL MODEL OF ALLEGIANCE
+(Saskia Brown trans., 2017).
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+102 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 40:XXX
+
+scintillates with brilliant insights. For Supiot, the fate of work and the fate
+of politics are intertwined. In the book, Supiot argues that freedom depends
+upon human beings reclaiming the territory and repudiating the map.4 What
+does this mean? The territory describes the situation where the human
+imagination can leave its imprint in the world through meaningful agency in
+labor and democratic politics. The map is the matrix-like simulacrum of
+numbers, metrics, targets and statistics which provide the structure and
+content of new forms of governance in the public and private spheres.
+Supiot’s fundamental claim is that human beings are becoming progressively
+more alienated from politics and work through the tyranny of numbers. This
+treatise stands in a long and distinguished line of works in French social
+theory on the interplay between domination and emancipation in modern
+society. The work of Michel Foucault is in point here who, like Supiot, was
+also a Professor of the prestigious Collège de France.
+Governance by Numbers thus provides a grand theory of labor law’s fate
+in the early decades of the twenty-first century. This sets it apart from more
+particularized engagements with specific sectors of work activity (for
+example, care work), the regulatory challenges of gig work, the phenomenon
+of precarious work, or the stability and prevalence of the standard
+employment relationship. Supiot’s distinctive contribution is to examine the
+multiple linkages among conceptualizations of the state, legal form, public
+and private governance, and the constitution of work. In this way, he is
+concerned to penetrate the deeper causes of work’s degradation in the modern
+era. This process is linked umbilically to the degradation of legal form and
+of democratic politics. This contamination across different spheres of public
+life is being driven by the normativity of numbers and metrics.
+The book is divided into two parts. The first part traces the decline of
+law as a cultural form that instantiates shared meanings between citizens of
+a political community. Its “overthrow” has been facilitated by the rise of a
+“cybernetic imaginary” where individuals are expected “to react in real time
+to the multiple signals they receive, in order to meet the targets they are
+assigned.”
+5 This is the world of algorithms, metrics, instant feedback,
+indicators, and benchmarking. The second part explores some of the
+consequences of “governance by numbers” for the structuring of employment
+relations. Supiot suggests that the withering away of legal form and state
+sovereignty has led to the emergence of feudal forms of allegiance between
+networks of stronger and weaker actors. While many labor lawyers will be
+familiar with “fissuring” discourse in the modern economy,6 Supiot’s
+
+4. Id. at 169.
+5. Id. at 10.
+6. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+2019] BOOK REVIEW 103
+
+intriguing thesis attaches political significance to this phenomenon. Fissuring
+is not merely an economic process: it represents a new form of political
+organization based upon vassalage. Having identified these complex
+dynamics over centuries of legal and political development, and across a
+panoramic comparative sweep, Governance by Numbers then explores the
+possibilities for a reconstitution of labor law and the politics of work. This is
+a remarkable and ambitious work. Before evaluating Supiot’s main claims, it
+is important first to clarify the structure of the argument.
+The first part of the book traces the deep historical roots of governing
+by law and its gradual eclipse by “governance by numbers.” For Supiot, rule
+by law represents a particular aesthetic imaginary. The contours of this
+imaginary are painted in bold historical strokes, across different cultures, and
+through an examination of Greek and Roman legal traditions. There are of
+course important cultural variations in this ideal of government by law, and
+Supiot is sensitive to these differences. However, this symbolic ideal of law
+might today be understood as the “Rule of Law.” It would reject the reductive
+thesis that law is simply an instrument, like a sharp knife, designed to achieve
+specified ends with ruthless efficiency. Instead, the Rule of Law represents
+an ideal of government where citizens are consecrated as citizens with dignity
+and autonomy and are governed by shared rules.7 The law addresses them as
+agents with dignity, and it does so in the normative terminology of
+obligations. The law is not simply coercive brute force like the threats of a
+gangster. Legal texts and political institutions provide a cultural structure of
+solidarity in the political community. Supiot’s account of legal and historical
+development traces the slow degradation of these ideal of “government,” and
+its progressive substitution by “governance”:
+Where “government” relies on subordinating individuals, “governance,”
+in line with its cybernetic vision, relies on programming them. . . . The
+subordinated worker obeys the rules he is given, whereas the programmed
+worker reacts to the information reaching him from his environment. The
+move from subordination to programme is absolutely central to our
+contemporary representation of human action.8
+Supiot’s careful tracing of this movement is legal scholarship in the
+genre of the longue duree, and this makes it a rather unusual work in the labor
+law canon. For example, chapter 4 exposes the latency of “social harmony
+by numbers” in ancient political and legal practices. It is an excursus that
+takes us through Pythagoras, Plato and the Renaissance Neo-Platonists.
+Numbers represented secret truths of an imminent rational order in the world.
+This inspired the hope that esoteric knowledge of mathematical harmonies
+
+7. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS LIBERATE (2012).
+8. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 29.
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+104 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 40:XXX
+
+might provide models for the ordering of citizens in political communities.
+Given these roots in esoteric mystical practices, we are then led through the
+emergence of a normativity of numbers in early forms of legal practice in
+chapter 5. This is reflected in the legal obligation of accounting (whereby the
+account becomes the authoritative accreditation of a truth through the
+medium of a numerical image); the use of statistics and quantification as a
+technique of government, identifying regularities and patterns of social
+behavior in order to manage populations; the rise of probabilistic reasoning
+in adjudication; and the use of quantification as a basis for designing
+legislative interventions. In this way, the law’s encounter with quantification
+is a longstanding one. While the harnessing of scientific rationality and
+mathematical expertise is both inevitable and productive, it is an encounter
+that has also been fraught with risk. The Supiot narrative implies that the
+imagined superior objectivity of quantification has always threated to
+undermine the authority of law as a symbolic medium.
+Chapters 6 and 8 provide the most interesting contemporary insights
+into Supiot’s thesis of the gradual entrenchment of “government by
+numbers.” Chapter 6 explores the “dethronement of law” in two seemingly
+different political situations, the Soviet-style “planned economy” and the
+Anglo-American neoliberal paradigm. The modern era represents a
+“hybridisation” of these models which have conspired to displace law in
+favor of quantification. In the planned economy, law is reduced to an
+instrument or tool to implement the detailed numerical planning determined
+by the central planning committee. According to Supiot, this was a form of
+“government by numbers.”
+9
+It was not yet a form of governance because the
+individual was still subjected to coercive control implemented through legal
+directives. In neoliberal thinking, the law is also a mere technical tool that
+provides a minimal framework within which contracting parties maximize
+their self-interest through bargaining.
+In both ideal-types, the conceptualization of law as a coercive
+instrument “most certainly represents a regression and shows a lack of
+understanding of the law as a nodal point in the domestication of power. Law
+is most certainly a technique of power, but it is a technique which binds and
+limits power.”
+10 This “dethronement of law” leads to its degradation as
+cultural form. Laws become a product to be bought and sold in the political
+marketplace to the highest bidder; they also become simply another resource
+to be allocated in a contract, perhaps through the designation of a private
+
+9. Id. at 115.
+10. Id. at 118.
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+2019] BOOK REVIEW 105
+
+arbitrator to “resolve disputes” or choice of law clauses in a global
+marketplace of legal systems. Ultimately, calculation becomes the norm,
+akin to a biological norm or a computer programme, it results from the
+interaction of individual calculations and it operates from within. The
+interiorisation, or eradication of heteronomy, is precisely what
+governance means: whereas government implies a commanding position
+above those governed . . . governance starts out from individual freedoms,
+not to limit but rather to programme them.11
+The fact that there has been a confluence between capitalism and
+communism appears to give this process an irresistible momentum. Chapter
+8 provides a powerful overview of the displacement of law by “governance
+by numbers” at multiple levels of normative activity. In each normative
+domain, there is a “system of self-adjusting interacting units automatically
+responding to signal inputs and feedback, as programmed by computer
+algorithms.”
+12 Parallel regulatory phenomena are identified at the levels of
+individual governance, corporate governance, public sector governance,
+European governance, and global governance. Quantification,
+benchmarking, and indicators pervade each of these levels of governance.
+This has corroded democratic principles across multiple regulatory levels.
+The second part examines the specific consequences of “governance by
+numbers” in the field of social law and the organization of work. This is more
+familiar intellectual territory for labor lawyers, though Supiot analyses that
+territory in new and interesting ways. In chapter 9, Supiot examines the
+phenomenon of “governance by numbers” and the friction that it generates at
+the interface with “government by laws.” In the employment context, the
+book offers important insights into the reconfiguration of Taylorism by
+modes of quantification. Under Taylorism, workers “were reduced to the
+status of cogs obeying mechanically the rules of the workshop and the
+rhythms of the machines.”
+13 Despite the promise of liberation through
+technological advancement, “governance by numbers” “ensnares managers
+and workers alike in feedback loops governed by numerical representations
+of the world increasingly disconnected from experience.”
+14 Or again,
+“Taylorism was based on the total subordination of workers to a rationalised
+system imposed from outside, whereas today the organization of work is
+predicated on programming.”
+15
+Supiot then traces the complex dynamics within protective labor law
+generated by this new figure of the “programmed worker.” For example,
+
+11. Id. at 116.
+12. Id. at 145.
+13. Id. at 169.
+14. Id.
+15. Id. at 177.
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+106 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 40:XXX
+
+there is an interesting discussion of sites of resistance from French health and
+safety law to the mental degradations wrought by dehumanized work.16
+These legal challenges to objectives-led management techniques provide
+opportunities for democratic empowerment, and Supiot accordingly rejects
+crude technological determinism. This chapter also gestures tantalizingly to
+another possibility, which is that labor law developments can also be a Trojan
+Horse for the deeper penetration of “governance by numbers” into working
+life. Nearly twenty years ago, in the heyday of “third way” labor law in the
+United Kingdom, proposals emerged for new contractual paradigms based
+upon high-discretion contractual performance.17 On the face of it, this shift
+might be interpreted as an emancipatory development marking a transition
+from coercive subordination to cooperation and autonomy. Supiot’s powerful
+arguments provide a stark reminder that legal developments must always be
+assessed within the broader social, economic, and technological context. Just
+as formal subordination is eclipsed, new and more insidious forms of
+structural domination emerge. Autonomy must be assessed in its totality.
+Good faith and ideals of contractual cooperation may facilitate a state of selfenslavement
+through the internalization of metrics. Self-enslavement is a
+pernicious form of domination precisely because its chains are not so
+tangible.
+Chapters 10 and 11 set out the core analytical theses of the second part
+of the book. Chapter 10 explores the contours of the “withering away of the
+state.” For Supiot, this is reflected most strongly in the erosion of the public
+sphere and of the sovereignty of state law. State law and the sovereignty of
+the state has been displaced by the narrowing of mandatory ius cogens norms
+in favor of ius dispositivum norms that can be modified or excluded through
+private ordering. It is also reflected in the expanding legal universe of
+proliferating norm-systems that can be opted into through employment
+contracts. Legal norms are becoming an object of consumer choice like shoes
+or sofas. Imagine being a platform driver in Barcelona, contracting with a
+platform provider in New York, with your employment disputes governed by
+employment laws in Amsterdam. In the most extreme versions of this
+phenomenon, employment contracts provide for compulsory and
+individualized private arbitration so that employment disputes are channeled
+out of the system of public courts entirely.18 In the United States, the public
+
+16. Id. at 186.
+17. Hugh Collins, Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness 30 INDUS. L.J. 17
+(2001).
+18. MATTHEW FINKIN, AMERICAN LABOR AND THE LAW: DORMANT, RESURGENT, AND EMERGENT
+PROBLEMS 54-62 (2019).
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+2019] BOOK REVIEW 107
+
+courts have themselves been complicit in this privatization of public justice.19
+According to Supiot, “such legal forum shopping is of course incompatible
+with a system based on the rule of law, but it has its place in one based on
+rule by laws.”
+20 This is no doubt facilitated by the emergence of leximetrics,
+using numerical values and coding techniques to rank legal systems by
+business-friendly indicators, under the guidance of the World Bank.21
+According to Supiot, the vacuum created by the “withering of the state”
+and the “dethronement of law” explains the emergence of a new feudalism
+based upon “ties of allegiance.” This represents a situation where “the key
+idea is not that all should be subject to the same abstract law, but that each
+person should behave according to his or her place in the network. Each must
+serve the interests of those on whom he depends, and be able to count on the
+loyalty of those who depend on him.”
+22 On an initial encounter, these ideas
+of serfdom, loyalty, and vassalage seemed rather odd and obscure within the
+context of the current predicaments of labor law.23 I now incline to the view
+that there is considerable analytical power in this way of framing things. In
+particular, we start to see familiar phenomena from different angles. In a
+brilliant analysis of the “de-constitutionalisation” of collective labor rights in
+Greece, Ioannis Katsaroumpas has critiqued the dismantling of Greek social
+law through the use of economic conditionality tools by the Troika.24 While
+this narrative has been rather shocking to labor lawyers, witnessing
+constitutional norms dissolve like mist in an encounter with commercial debt
+arrangements, Supiot’s thesis of a new feudalism enables us to see how this
+might be a predictable and normal occurrence at the current political juncture.
+It also provides a new perspective on the ubiquitous discourse of “the
+fissured workplace.”
+25 In fissuring, there is a proliferating network of
+contracts parceling out productive activities to different contracting parties.
+So far, this has been conceptualized as an economic process that creates
+regulatory challenges for enforcement, namely, how to affix liability for
+employment standards to the “lead companies” in supply chains. Supiot’s
+feudalism thesis exposes fissuring as a political process that is subverting the
+sovereignty of law. This is a valuable corrective to underestimating the
+
+19. Epic Sys. Corp. v Lewis 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
+the preclusion of group claims by mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts.
+20. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 197.
+21. For a recent exploration of the nature of leximetric research in labor, which exposes some
+difficulties with the World Bank methodology, see Simon Deakin, The Use of Quantitative Methods in
+Labour Law Research: An Assessment and Reformulation, 27 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 456 (2018).
+22. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 212.
+23. Though see ANDRE GORZ, RECLAIMING WORK: BEYOND THE WAGE-BASED SOCIETY (1999).
+24. Ioannis Katsaroumpas, De-Constitutionalising Collective Labour Rights: The Case of Greece,
+47 INDUS. L.J 465 (2018).
+25. WEIL, supra note 6.
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+108 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 40:XXX
+
+significance of fissuring, and its connections to a wider crisis of democratic
+governance. It also implies that the regulatory responses to fissuring must be
+more than technical fixes to existing enforcement paradigms, such as the
+introduction of “joint employer” or “joint and several liability” into the
+regulatory armory.
+The book concludes with “ways forward.” This depends upon a
+reconstitution of labor law that recognizes “the anthropological dimension of
+work, understood in its broadest and most concrete sense of human beings’
+need to inscribe into their everyday living environment the mental images
+which guide their action and collaboration.”26 Above all, this book is an elegy
+for the tragic loss of meaning in work and in law.27 In turn, the
+“anthropological dimension of work” depends upon the reconstitution of
+meaningful work. This invites a search for new forms of solidarity and the
+creation of new functions for the nation state in fostering solidarities: “the
+state’s role should be to guarantee the articulation between national solidarity
+and solidarity organizations within civil society and internationally, which
+are woven through these networks of allegiance.”
+28 This envisages a radical
+democratization of the political and economic spheres so that human agency
+can overcome the tyranny of numbers. This is the way out of the matrix.
+This is a book of significance and magnitude. Its intellectual power lies
+in its ability to jolt and disrupt the familiar ways of framing legal
+developments. Here are two examples, both of which originate in the domain
+of “protective” labor law. As labor lawyers, we have been accustomed to
+defending the citadel of social law from encroachment by the neoliberal
+barbarians at the gate. “Governance by numbers” demonstrates how the
+deepening of quantified domination is being secreted into ostensibly
+protective measures.
+The first example is in the context of working time regulation under the
+Working Time Directive. In Federación de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras
+(CCOO) v. Deutsche Bank SAE the question arose as to whether it was
+mandatory for an employer to maintain records of the actual duration of daily
+and weekly time worked by workers in order to facilitate the effective
+enforcement of working time rights.29 The case arose out of a legal claim
+brought by a Spanish trade union. Advocate General Pitruzzella’s Opinion
+was that monitoring and precise measurement of working time was a
+
+26. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 288.
+27. More than once, Supiot indicates the value of a psychoanalytic approach. The deeper themes in
+Supiot’s book reminded me very much of CARL JUNG, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL (W. S. Dell
+& Cary F. Baynes trans., Routledge 2001) (1933).
+28. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 289.
+29. Case C-55/18, Federación de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) v. Deutsche Bank SAE,
+2019 EU:C:2019:87. This reasoning has recently been endorsed by the European Court of Justice.
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+2019] BOOK REVIEW 109
+
+mandatory obligation, which flowed from the need to ensure effective
+enforcement of working time limits. My first reaction to this case was that it
+represented a solidification of worker protective principles in the scheme of
+working time principles. Supiot’s arguments might lead us towards a more
+cautious assessment. The intensification of monitoring, particularly though
+technologies and discrete forms of surveillance, may have dehumanizing
+effects on workers. Would protective labor laws legitimate the use of
+patented wristbands to track the physical movements of workers?30 Should
+this be calibrated to measure the intensity of activities so that working time
+limits might be fine-tuned even further? What about technology that
+pinpoints cognitive activities such as thinking time? It is often forgotten that
+the Working Time Directive is based upon a normative principle of the
+humanization of work.31 It is vital that this shadow-side of worker-protective
+labor laws is given fuller recognition, and Supiot’s thesis provides a novel
+conceptual grammar for doing this.
+The second example is drawn from some recent developments in U.K.
+labor law. In July 2017 “Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern
+Working Practices” was published.32 This report had been commissioned by
+the Government to examine working practices in the U.K. labor market,
+prompted by public concerns about exploitation, under-enforcement of
+labour standards, and the proliferation of classificatory problems of ‘false
+self-employment’ in the ‘gig economy’. It was a remarkable opportunity for
+a meaningful public conversation about the constitution of work. Alas, the
+Taylor Review did not have a Supiot.
+There have been critical engagements with some of the details of the
+review’s regulatory proposals.33 However, Supiot’s arguments point the way
+to a deeper critique of the review’s intellectual and political framework. First,
+there is a startling faith in technology to deliver “clarity” on the issue of
+employment status, with the review recommending the development of
+“online tools” to assist individuals in discovering the legal identity of the
+working arrangements.34 This presents the employment status
+characterization as a technical exercise. Where next from here? We might
+
+30. Olivia Solon, Amazon patents wristband that tracks warehouse workers’ movements, THE
+GUARDIAN, (Jan. 31, 2018, 7:30 PM), www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/31/amazonwarehouse-wristband-tracking.31.
+Alan Bogg, Of Holidays, Work, and Humanisation: A Missed Opportunity?, 34 EUR. L. REV.
+738 (2009).
+32. Matthew Taylor et al., Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices, GOV.UK
+(July 2017), www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/627671/good-worktaylor-review-modern-working-practices-rg.pdf.33.
+Katie Bales, Alan Bogg, & Tonia Novitz, ‘Voice’ and ‘Choice’ in Modern Working Practices:
+Problems with the Taylor Review 47 INDUS. L.J. 46 (2018).
+34. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 39.
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+110 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 40:XXX
+
+develop numerical values to attach to specific features of the work
+arrangements, and an overall score for the employment status threshold. This,
+of course, is precisely the lie of “governance by numbers.” Its effect is to
+depoliticize the question of the employment status enquiry, which must be
+understood as a creative political act in determining which of us has
+employment rights (and which of us does not). Dressing this up as a technical
+enquiry, to be assisted by new technology, obscures the politics of
+employment status.
+Secondly, the review proposes a new statutory definition for an
+intermediate category of employment status based upon “control.”
+35 Building
+upon Supiot’s important distinction between the “subordinated worker” and
+the “programmed worker,” to inscribe “control” into a new statutory
+definition would be to track a set of preoccupations with the “subordinated
+worker.” As the numbers of “programmed workers” expand in the economy,
+legal tests need to be supple enough to track those constitutive features of
+“programmed work.” The forms and techniques of domination are less overt
+for the “programmed worker” than for the “subordinated worker,” precisely
+because they are internalized forms of cognitive subjugation. A statutory test
+of control, focused on external indicia, risks deflecting the enquiry away from
+these elements in new forms of work arrangement.
+Thirdly, the review embodies a particular aesthetic style of discourse.
+For a review concerned with the future of work and its regulation, it is rather
+short in running to 115 pages. It contains lots of quantitative data in chapter
+4, setting out the current composition of the U.K. labor market in a variety of
+colorful graphs and charts. The text is interspersed with trendy line drawings
+of people in a variety of work poses. Yet these people are faceless. Supiot’s
+arguments have finally helped me to pin down what I have found so irritating
+about this report. The faceless figures signify a glossy and superficial piece
+of work that is devoid of cultural and intellectual substance at the symbolic
+level. The report ignores a rich corpus of case law stretching back over more
+than a century, where courts have grappled with and refined different
+approaches to employment status. Undoubtedly, this case law has formulated
+legal tests with manifold limitations at the technical level. It has displayed
+folly more than wisdom. Yet this body of jurisprudence is a rich repository
+of cultural meanings that provide the foundations of a common life and for a
+law that we have in common. Supiot’s thesis provides a powerful argument
+to the effect that the reconstitution of meaning in work is bound up with the
+reconstitution of meaning in our shared legal practices. This suggests that a
+reductive approach to legal reform, based upon a slim statutory definition that
+
+35. Id at 36.
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+2019] BOOK REVIEW 111
+
+takes its year of enactment as Year Zero, is unlikely to be the best way
+forward.36
+Finally, the Government’s main response to date to the Taylor Review
+has been the implementation of a “Good Work Plan.”
+37 One plank in this
+strategy is dedicated to the promotion of “quality of work.”
+38 On its face, this
+might seem to invoke Supiot’s “anthropological dimension of work.”
+However, the proposal is for the “Industrial Strategy Council” to develop and
+refine “effective evaluation metrics” to measure the progress of quality
+work.39 Supiot’s thesis identifies the ways in which “evaluation metrics” are
+utterly destructive of the “quality of work.” For this reason, the Good Work
+Plan’s formula for achieving “quality work” will in fact be its undoing. What
+is needed is an approach focused on solidaristic democratic empowerment of
+workers, through representative organizations, so that these metrics are
+contested, shaped, and implemented through democratic engagement.
+Unfortunately, the entire corpus of restrictive trade union laws was outside
+the Taylor Review’s terms of reference, so there were very few concrete legal
+proposals on collective worker voice.
+In sum, Supiot’s work has provided us with a highly original and
+analytically powerful framework for theorizing labor law in the twenty-first
+century. Inevitably, for a major work in the longue duree genre, there are
+some important points of disagreement. For this reader, two of them are
+fundamental. First, Supiot is forthright in criticizing the EU institutions, and
+particularly the Court of Justice, for its “neoliberal deconstruction of labour
+law.”
+40 As evidence of this turn, which has “proved irreversible,” he cites the
+Viking and Laval cases41 and the Association de médiation sociale case.42
+The facts in Viking and Laval hardly need repetition in a labor law journal.
+In Association de médiation sociale, the Court concluded that Article 27 of
+the EU Charter, conferring a right to information and consultation, did not
+have horizontal effect. These cases are described by Supiot as exemplars of
+
+36. A leading trade unionist described the Taylor Review as “wishy-washy” and “full of fluff”: Jason
+Moyer-Lee, Wishy-washy and full of fluff – the Taylor review offers little, THE GUARDIAN (July 18, 2017,
+7:27 AM), www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/18/taylor-review-gig-economy-workers.
+While this was addressed to the specific content of the proposals, I think that this language also reveals
+frustration with the cultural and intellectual gravity of the document.
+37. DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, GOOD WORK PLAN, 2018,
+Cm. 9755 (U.K.).
+38. Id. at 17.
+39. Id.
+40. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 237.
+41. Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v.
+Viking Line ABP EU:C:2007:772; Case C-341/05, Laval v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet
+EU:C:2007:809.
+42. C-176/12, Association de Médiation Sociale v. Union départementale CGT des Bouches-duRhône,
+Confédération générale du travail (CGT) EU:C:2014:2.
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+112 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 40:XXX
+
+“the Law and Economics doctrine, according to which every legal rule must
+be judged in terms of its economic effects.”
+43
+In contrast to Supiot, I think this economistic reading is too reductive.
+These decisions are—rightly—unsettling to many labor lawyers. In
+substance, Viking and Laval involved the sacrifice of fundamental social
+rights where they conflicted with the employer’s free movement rights under
+EU law. Yet it is possible to read Viking and Laval as also involving a
+difficult constitutional navigation of competing solidarities in an enlarging
+European Union. It is as much a conflict between the competing social and
+economic interests of workers from different member states as it is a conflict
+between the “social” and the “economic” or between capital and labor.44
+Furthermore, the Association de meditation sociale case was a disappointing
+failure in the use of the Charter by atypical workers seeking to maintain
+solidarity and enforce their collective rights. Yet there is now a litany of
+working time cases where Article 31 of the EU Charter has had powerful
+normative effects on the interpretation of the Working Time Directive.45
+There have also been important worker-protective developments under
+Article 47 of the EU Charter, and the effective enforcement of EU social
+law.
+46
+Admittedly, the Court’s encounter with collective forms of solidaristic
+empowerment has been more fraught. Still, the longue duree perspective
+obscures the complex strands that make up our contemporary legal and
+political practices. European labor and social law represent a contested
+normative site. Any attempt to impose a Procrustean uniformity on this field
+is highly problematic, and certainly so when it is filtered through selected
+landmark judgments like Viking and Laval. Like other forms of law, the
+cultural symbolism of European social law is rich and multi-layered. Perhaps
+U.K. labor lawyers are more sensitive to the worker-protective elements in
+that unfolding narrative, given our brutal experience of many decades of
+neoliberal deregulation. And there is a strong hermeneutic tradition in AngloAmerican
+jurisprudence that treats law as an argumentative practice, with
+
+43. SUPIOT, supra note 3, at 238.
+44. ACL Davies, Identifying ‘Exploitative Compromises’: The Role of Labour Law in Resolving
+Disputes Between Workers 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 269 (2012).
+45. Case C-173/99, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Broadcasting,
+Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) EU:C:2001:356; Case C-155/10, Williams
+and Others v British Airways plc EU:C:2011:588; C-569/16, Stadt Wuppertal v Maria Elisabeth Bauer
+EU:C:2018:871.
+46. Jeremias Prassl, Article 47 CFR and the Effective Enforcement of EU Labour Law: Teeth for
+Paper Tigers? Working Paper for Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
+(April 2019).
+Jeremias Prassl, Article 47 CFR and the Effective Enforcement of EU Labour Law: Teeth for Paper
+Tigers? (Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Working Paper No. XXX,
+2019).
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+2019] BOOK REVIEW 113
+
+legal interpretation as constructive interpretation, interpreting the material in
+its morally best light.47 At the current time, constructive interpretation of EU
+social law strikes me as a moral imperative. In an era of resurgent
+nationalism, it would be a profound mistake to give up on the very idea of
+European social law in totality.
+The second fundamental disagreement is on the “withering of the state”
+and the “dethronement of law.” Supiot presents these developments as very
+highly developed at the current time. His presentation of these processes is
+too categorical. Take the “withering of the state.” This fails to account for the
+resurgence of authoritarian populism and resurgent nationalism that has led
+to a dramatic reassertion of the coercive power of the nation-state. We can
+see these developments in Hungary, Poland, Italy, and the “Brexit” debacle
+in the United Kingdom. This re-forging of nationalistic community is often
+implemented through coercive primary legislation. In the United Kingdom,
+for example, the Immigration Act 2016 and the Trade Union Act 2016 both
+represent legal interventions constructed around the cultural symbolism of
+organic national unity.48 It could be read as the legislative assertion of a
+Schmittian politics of “friend” and “enemy,” with the “enemy” in the guise
+of the “illegal migrant” or the disruptive “cultural Marxist” trade unionist.49
+This development represents not the “withering” of the nationalistic state, but
+its recrudescence. The rise of nationalistic communitarianism, centered on
+the nation state, is the reaction against rampant marketization. An urgent task
+for our time is to salvage the social and inclusive nation-state, based upon
+decent migration regimes and respect for fundamental rights. At the very
+least, then, the “withering” thesis should be understood as a single strand in
+a rather complex set of vectors shaping the development of the modern state.
+I would regard the resurgence of the populist nation-state as one of the most
+important developments of our time, and it is difficult to locate it within
+Supiot’s intellectual mapping. It also means that it is particularly important
+to be precise in portraying the contours of Social Europe at a time when the
+EU might have a vital role to play in stabilizing decent work and decent
+politics across Europe.
+Now take the “dethronement of law.” This obscures the persistence and
+value of the general law to provide solutions to some of the problems being
+thrown up by the degradation of work. For example, a recent case in Ontario
+was concerned with the enforceability of a private arbitration clause that
+
+47. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1998).
+48. Alan Bogg & Mark Freedland, Labour Law in the Age of Populism, in, COLLECTIVE
+BARGAINING AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (Julia López López ed., 2019).
+49. Supiot discusses Schmitt’s political thought (204-211), but this is within the context of a set of
+claims based upon the “withering of the state” rather than its authoritarian resurgence.
+BOGG_REVIEW_REV_1_1_ 6/19/2019 3:52 PM
+
+114 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 40:XXX
+
+compelled the individual to arbitrate in the Netherlands under Dutch law.50
+The arbitration clause was treated as invalid by the appeal court, in part
+because of the doctrine of unconscionability. This is an important
+development in resisting the encroachment of “governance by numbers” and
+law as marketized product. In the United Kingdom, the UKSC recently used
+the common law fundamental right of access to a court to strike down the
+tribunal fees regime that had effectively priced out the most vulnerable
+workers from enforcing their basic employment rights in a public court.51
+This was based upon a constitutional principle of the Rule of Law, which was
+formulated as a public good in the political community. These decisions are
+only possible because the law has not been “dethroned,” even though it may
+be experiencing tectonic pressures in a globalized world. National legal
+systems continue to provide workers with a law in common, some of it of
+ancient lineage and carrying deep symbolic meaning, and we do the law (and
+the workers) a disservice if we exaggerate its demise.
+In sum, Supiot’s work on “governance by numbers” should be read as
+the beginning of a research project, rather than its culmination. It reminds me
+of the literature around the “standard employment relationship.” Scholarship
+had been rather quick to declare the death, extinction, disappearance, or
+otherwise mortal condition of the standard employment relationship. More
+recent work has taken a more measured view of its position in labor
+markets.52 In a similar vein, we now need to examine some of the core claims
+of “governance by numbers” in the real world of work and social law. It is
+likely that the “withering of the state,” or the “dethronement of law,” or the
+rise of algorithmic control, represent important strands in a wider, complex
+and dynamic picture.
+In 1907, Mahler apparently said to Sibelius that “the symphony is like
+the world, it must encompass everything.”
+53 Supiot’s work is labor law on a
+Mahlerian scale. There are few labor law treatises that lead one through
+(amongst many others) Gödel, Livy, Cicero, Schmitt, Simone de Beauvoir
+and St. Paul. This is a book that demands much of its reader, but the rewards
+are rich indeed.
+
+50. Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc., 2019 ONCA 1 (Can.).
+51. R (UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor, [2017] UKSC 51, [2017] 3 WLR 409; Michael Ford,
+Employment Tribunal Fees and the Rule of Law: R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor in the Supreme Court, 47
+INDUS. L.J. 1 (2018).
+52. Zoe Adams & Simon Deakin, Institutional Solutions to Precariousness and Inequality in Labour
+Markets, 52 BJIR 779 (2014).
+53. Quoted in NORMAN LEBRECHT, WHY MAHLER? 9 (2010).
\ No newline at end of file
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+++ b/BORGES--Henrique-Souza.-Legal-aspects-of-the-regulation-of-financial-markets--University-of-Brasilia-undergraduate-law-course-2015..md
@@ -0,0 +1,6705 @@
+LAW SCHOOL
+
+CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
+
+BRASILIA
+
+UNDERGRADUATE LAW COURSE
+
+2015
+
+HENRIQUE SOUZA BORGES
+
+LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS:
+
+UNIVERSITY OF BRASILIA
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+to obtain the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the
+
+HENRIQUE SOUZA BORGES
+
+Faculty of Law of the University of Brasilia –
+
+2015
+
+LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS:
+
+UnB.
+
+CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
+
+Advisor: Prof. Dr Marcus Faro de Castro
+
+Monograph presented as partial requirement
+
+I
+
+BRASILIA
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Advisor
+
+made up of the following professors:
+
+Member
+
+____________________________________________________
+
+Brasilia, December 2, 2015.
+
+Monograph presented as a partial requirement to obtain the Bachelor of Law degree from
+
+Member
+
+Faculty of Law of the University of Brasília (UnB) and approved by the examining board
+
+Professor Doctor Paulo Burnier da Silveira
+___________________________________________________
+
+____________________________________________________
+
+HENRIQUE SOUZA BORGES
+
+CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
+LEGAL ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION:
+
+Professor Ana de Oliveira Frazão
+
+Professor Doctor Marcus Faro de Castro
+
+II
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+To my father.
+
+.
+
+III
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+I am also grateful to my family, who always renew my soul with sincere looks,
+
+I thank Eduardo, my partner on long study afternoons. thanks for
+
+And I thank the reader, you brighten this work.
+
+academic advice, as well as for the words of support regarding the stubborn insecurities that I
+
+It greatly inspired me on the path of economic law and helped me in researching and writing this
+
+I thank my mother, my example of determination and passion for life, and my father,
+
+work.
+
+support and guide me.
+my safe haven and wise guide on the paths of this world. I owe them the education and love that
+
+tight hugs and shared laughter. My dear uncles and aunts, cousins and cousins, the
+
+THANKS
+
+Brasilia. In particular, I thank my advisor, Prof. Dr. Marcus Faro de Castro, who
+I extend my gratitude to the masters I had at the Faculty of Law of the University of
+
+Always welcoming is the sap that nourishes me.
+
+accompanied on this journey.
+
+IV
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+V
+
+We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds
+
+in the great vaults of opportunity….
+
+a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of justice."
+
+Martin Luther King, 1969.
+
+"We refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt.
+
+And so, we've come to cash this check,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+this domain. On the one hand, the outbreak of events such as the 2008 financial crisis undermines the
+
+functioning of financial markets. Pistor (2012) argues that the known literature
+
+Keywords: Regulation of financial markets; Law and Finance; New Law and
+
+how “law and finance” dominates discussions of the purpose of law in regulating the
+
+Development; Legal Analysis of Economic Policy; Legal Theory of Finance.
+
+their influences is still the subject of intense global academic debate. This monograph is
+
+led by jurists who, more than highlighting systemic asymmetries, seek to offer
+
+objective is to analyze the main theories that intend to explain the role of law in relation to
+
+international level, but also more cohesive with the imperatives of social and economic justice.
+regulatory responses not only more consistent with the current profile of the financial system
+
+confidence in the efficiency of markets, the current regulatory architecture and current models
+
+SUMMARY
+
+development and economic growth, the way in which this relationship is structured and exerts
+While there is little doubt about the influence of law on the promotion of
+
+of corporate governance of the financial system. On the other hand, multidisciplinary analyzes emerge
+
+global financial system and on a national scale. However, contemporary reality challenges
+
+SAW
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+events such as the 2008 financial crisis undermines confidence in market's efficiency, the
+
+markets. Pistor (2012) argues that the Law and Finance literature dominates the discussions
+
+Keywords: Financial markets regulation; Law and Finance; New Law and Development; Cool
+
+about the purpose of the law in regulating the global financial system and also on a national
+
+Analysis of Economic Policies; Legal Theory of Finance.
+
+economy is still a matter of intense global academic debate. This paper aims to analyze the
+
+than highlight systemic imbalances, seek to provide regulatory responses not only more
+
+main theories that try to explain the role of law in relation to the functioning of the financial
+
+with the imperatives of social and economic justice.
+consistent with the current profile of the international financial system, but also more cohesive
+
+current regulatory architecture and the prevailing models of corporate governance of the
+
+ABSTRACT
+
+economic growth, how this relationship is structured and how law exerts its influence over
+Although there is little doubt about the influence of law on the promotion of development and
+
+financial system. On the other, there are multidisciplinary analysis led by lawyers who, more
+
+scale. But the contemporary reality challenges that domain. On the one hand, the emergence of
+
+VII
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+LIST OF FIGURES
+
+Figure 3 - Graphical overview of the Positional Analysis
+
+Figure 4 – New contractual analysis
+
+Figure 1 - Associations between Legal Institutions and Economic Institutions according to
+
+Figure 5 – Transnational transmission of economic policy changes
+
+Law and Finance literature
+
+Figure 6 – Dynamics of expansion and contraction of the monetary system
+
+Figure 2 - Interpretation of the theory of origins as an explanatory theory
+
+VIII
+
+Figure 7 - Empirical evidence of the Legal Theory of Finance
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+3. ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACHES................................................ ..................60
+
+1.3. Methodology ..................................................................... .................................................................. ............16
+
+6. REFERENCES ..................................................... .................................................................. ..................94
+
+2. DOMINANT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LAW AND FINANCE..................................................18
+
+1.1. Theme .................................................................. .................................................................. .....................10
+
+3.3. Legal Theory of Finance (Law in Finance) .....................76
+
+1.2. Justification ..................................................................... .................................................................. .............11
+
+5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................... ................................................................91
+
+4. SOME EVALUATIONS.................................................. .................................................................. 84
+
+3.1. New Law and Development ..................................... 60
+
+SUMMARY
+
+1. INTRODUCTION................................................. .................................................................. .............10
+
+3.2. Legal Analysis of Economic Policy ................................................... ...........................69
+
+2.1. Theory of Origins ................................................................ .................................................................. ..24
+
+2.2.1. Quantification of the right: debates on measurement and reductionism...............24 2.2.2. Legal families:
+
+systematization and obsolescence of the debate.................................33 2.2.3. Expansion of the concept of
+
+origins: social control and ideological nature..............40 2.2.4. Impact of law: economic performance and
+
+varieties of capitalism.............44 2.2. Tripartite Interpretation of the Origins Theory ...............47 2.2.1. Theory
+
+of origins as an explanatory theory .........47 2.2.2. Origins theory as predictive theory .............52 2.2.3. Theory
+
+about origins as normative theory................................................. ...........54
+
+IX
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+1
+Epstein (2005) conceptualizes financialization as the growth in the relevance of financial motivations, financial markets, actors and financial institutions in the
+
+functioning and operation of domestic and international economies. two
+
+3
+
+theme the interactions between law, financial development and economic growth still
+
+global integration and economic and social development around the world, as well as
+
+This movement, spearheaded by international bodies and entities, such as Banco
+
+1. INTRODUCTION
+
+supported the reduction of the right to an instrument of economic forces, and Max's analysis
+
+,
+
+Although there is a vast economic literature that supports the superiority argument
+
+This debate exposes the promotion, in the last two decades, of legal reforms aimed at
+
+development arouse the interest of scholars on the subject. In the 19th century, it was
+
+importance in relation to traditional sectors of the economy, such as industry, thanks to the fall
+
+raises questions on the part of jurists of comparative law and other scholars of
+
+perpetuate through legal traditions and legal transplants (GLAESER and SHLEIFER, 2002;
+
+considered the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s
+
+of Anglo-American legal institutions to attract financial capital (LEVINE, 2005), the
+
+XVI to XVIII (in particular, the glorious and the French) continue to produce obstacles to the
+
+But the contemporary reality is more complex: the financialization1 of the world economy
+
+accompanied by the rise of market society2 compete with reverberations of
+
+1.1. Theme
+
+Weber, for whom the rationality of law was a fundamental ingredient for the birth of
+
+(KREVER, 2013), is based on the assumption that styles of social control whose
+
+improving the business environment in the world.
+
+from borders to capital mobility (EPSTEIN, 2005). There was also the monetization of
+
+The contrast between Karl Marx's economic determinism, which
+
+2008 financial crisis3
+
+10
+
+development (ROE, 2007; MICHAELS, 2009a; PISTOR, 2013a). As a background
+
+LA PORTA et al, 2008). It is not new that the intersections between law, economics and
+
+(AKERLOF and SHILLER, 2009). Over the past thirty years, financial services have gained
+
+origins refer to medieval historical events or to the liberal revolutions of the centuries
+
+capitalism (GINSBURG, 2000; MILHAULPT and PISTOR, 2008).
+
+Considered one of the key moments of the crisis, on September 15, 2008, one of the four largest investment
+banks in the United States, Lehmann Brothers, filed the largest bankruptcy petition in that country: more than
+US$639 billion in assets and US$619 billion in debt. The global financial crisis that took place that year was
+responsible for the erosion of approximately US$10 trillion in the stock market in October 2008 alone
+(WIGGINS, PIONTEK and METRICK, 2014).
+
+Sandel (2013) defines market society as the place where the market mechanism stops being just a means
+of organizing economic activity, and takes precedence in society's moral choices.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+4
+
+4
+
+This is the systemic risk known as “too big to fail”, according to which some financial institutions have
+become too critical for the economy to the point that the government has to help them with public resources
+in order to avoid possible requests of cascading bankruptcy, as well as the loss of confidence in the
+sustainability of the financial system (KHANDANI, LO and MERTON, 2013).
+
+(GADINIS, 2013) and called into question the structure it adopted, based on measurement and
+
+Brazil did not remain isolated from the effects of this international crisis. Despite
+
+for future studies.
+
+go bankrupt”
+
+values replacing ethics and morals, which stems from the predominance of the conception of
+
+made use of countercyclical policies – for example, tax exemptions (RABELO, 2010).
+
+2013).
+
+United States government, fall 2008: preventing the collapse of the financial system
+
+in the slowdown of the international economy and in the increase in international liquidity, which
+
+the most relevant criticisms of the analyzed approaches; observe the role reserved for
+
+risk management by financial institutions (ROMANO, 2014). This crisis
+
+vigorous growth in the two years that followed, in 2009 there was a retraction of 0.2% of
+
+contemporary analytical panorama of the main theories that seek to explain the interweaving
+
+'what is there' to be investigated. Popper (1963) maintains that it is absurd to think about observation
+
+The 2008 crisis represented a general failure of financial system regulation
+
+of that country (PISTOR, 2014b).
+
+present study is to analyze the main theories that intend to explain the role of law in
+
+Justification
+
+superiority of the market as a mechanism for organizing life in society (SANDEL,
+
+Given this scenario, accepted the assumption that the law matters for the
+
+,
+through the multibillion-dollar bailout of financial institutions deemed “too big to
+
+jurist for each of these theories; and identify any theoretical gaps to be filled
+
+negatively affected the exchange rate, in the sense of appreciation of the national currency,
+
+relation to the functioning of the financial market. The specific objectives are: to outline a
+
+11
+
+Theories matter: they are fundamental to guide any investigation, as they define
+
+demanded a still not completely defined solution to a paradoxical problem faced by the
+
+Bruno Domestic Product (GDP). The Government of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014), based on
+
+between legal institutions, financial development and economic performance; identify
+
+even if at the expense of taxpayers, jobs, savings and homes of citizens
+
+development, although not fully understood, the general objective of the
+
+1.2.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+problems. Popper therefore argues that theory, in the form of a hypothesis to be tested and
+
+conceptual to the observer6 .
+
+financial system for domestic and international politics, warns that, once
+
+pure, without any prior selection of a certain object, a specific task, a problem, a point of view5 .
+
+Specifically about the financial system and its regulation, the theory defines not only
+
+within the scope of financial markets have happened in the last thirty years: (i) deregulation,
+
+preview of the phenomenon to be observed implies the description of similarities, differences and
+
+forbids, the better it is (POPPER, 1963).
+
+through timeless elaborations, but also a perspective of the world, trapped in time
+
+the market economy to efficiently allocate resources, all of which
+
+possibly falsified, precedes observation. Every theory is also a prohibition to
+
+Robert Cox (1981) goes further: theory always benefits someone and some purpose, because,
+
+according to which markets are efficient and self-regulating: the traditional economy, based on
+
+classifications that are based on interests, points of view and choices of
+
+used to answer them, which compromises the entire research and can create a prison
+
+substantiated significant changes in the financial system. Strange (1998) also argues
+
+He says that “observation is always selective”. The conception
+
+how the market is thought, but also determines the purpose of state regulation (PISTOR,
+
+very restricted concepts of the research object – in her case, politics –, the questions
+
+started in 1975, with the fall of restrictions on the differentiation of commissions in the brokerage of
+
+Strange (1998), when criticizing the myopia of social theorists of not seeing the relevance of
+
+supposedly benefit. According to Levinson (2014), four types of institutional change
+
+space for past experiences and future expectations.
+
+that the changes in the financial industry are largely due to the spread of the vision
+
+12
+
+evidence that goes against the horizon of the observer's expectations - let alone a theory
+
+however sophisticated it may be, carries within it not only the attempt to transcend the present
+
+in liberal economic theory, argues that the fall of barriers to capital is a prerequisite for
+
+formulated in the investigation are also equally restricted, as is the methodology
+
+2012). Gilpin (2001) argues that the rise of neoliberal theory in the 1980s
+
+Popper (1963) questions the absence of meaning in the imperative “observe!”, without there being any prior
+understanding or mention of the direct object. This anecdote would illustrate the requirement for selectivity inherent
+in any observation.
+For Strange (1998), the literature of international relations and political science was incapable of understanding
+the functioning of politics due to the emphasis respectively on international conflicts and the promotion of liberal
+values. The adoption of excessively restricted concepts about what politics was, for Strange (1998), necessarily
+limited the scope of what could be found as an explanation.
+
+6
+5
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Shiller (2015) defines irrational exuberance as the psychological basis of speculative bubbles, which constitute a
+situation in which an increase in the price of shares fills the investor with enthusiasm, which psychologically infects
+other people and, in turn, reinforces the rise in shares and amplifies justifications for this rise, attracting more
+classes of investors through envy of other people's success, as well as excessive optimism.
+
+7
+bad: instead of reinforcing the potential benefits of open markets, policies that followed
+
+they argue, human irrational exuberance and financial crises are seen as
+
+the great growth of financial institutions, the deregulation of the financial market, the
+
+thus marginalized the notion that financial crises find their cause in a supposed
+
+stocks in the USA; (ii) liberalization, with a reduction in state barriers to foreign participation;
+
+the 2008 financial crisis; and (iv) globalization, with the transnational operation of important
+
+world economy, which manifested itself in four ways: (i) liquidity crises; (ii) preference
+
+Financial Institution.
+
+(MINSKY, 1986).
+
+adoption of such a prescription would have been beneficial only to the financial elites of the economies
+
+real world, taken by politicians, regulators and investors on a global scale (DAVIS and
+
+ignore non-economic motivations, as well as disoriented choices – defined by them
+
+influence the regulation of the financial sector in their favor (COFFEE, 2012; GADINIS, 2013).
+
+managerial discretion of executives of banking entities. that was intimately
+
+recommendations of liberal economic theory would have increased the fragility and risks of
+
+13
+
+adverse shocks, far from characteristics specific to the economic mechanism. Remains
+
+The 2008 financial crisis would be a good illustration of this. Chefffins (2015) maintains that
+
+by speculative investments; (iii) governments' inclination towards deflationary policies
+
+(iii) consolidation, with the merger of financial institutions, which happened mainly after
+
+natural and inevitable financial instability of the modern capitalist economy, arising from
+
+diversification of financial services, as well as the differentiation of the governance system
+
+specifically for banking institutions have contributed to too much
+
+shocks, displacement of investments and dizzying expansions of bank credit
+
+Akerloff and Shiller (2009) argue that this dominant economic theory fails to
+
+Despite occasional incompleteness, the dominant theory influences decisions about the
+
+(less growth and less inflation); and (iv) pressure for capital outflows. A
+
+developed and under development (STRANGE, 1998; KREVER, 2013), capable of
+
+linked with the assumption of excessive risks taken by financial institutions, which
+
+as “animal spirits”, an element of uncertainty and ambiguity in the economy. That's why,
+
+KRUSE, 2007). Including, for Strange (1998), bad theories can support policies
+
+7
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+$180 trillion that same year. Only the stock of transnational funding , which includes
+
+financial institutions in the physiology of domestic and international economies (EPSTEIN,
+
+Levinson (2014), the global total of financing carried out via the capital market amounted to
+
+later enabled the emergence of the generalized crisis. This exposure to risk, however,
+
+with greater returns, which, in turn, reinforced strategies
+
+gains and losses, virtues and misfortunes of the financial system, ignoring boundaries between
+
+sovereignties. This is the process that occurred over the last three decades in which there was expansion
+
+benefited not only the chief executives, with bigger bonuses, but also large institutional investors8
+
+US$6.5 trillion in 2011, excluding non-securitized and resold domestic credit. One
+
+between 2008 and 2012 (US$1.841 trillion) (LEVINSON, 2014).
+
+solutions found are not enough (SCHWARCZ, 2014), contemporary reality
+
+national companies for international competition (DORE, 2008).
+
+The globalization of finance, or the financialization of the global economy, enhances
+
+14
+
+presents a peculiar context: the greater importance of finance for the global economy. Second
+
+in 2013. Another important change concerns the drop in the international use of debt securities (debt
+
+funding9 ) of almost 70% (totaling US$705 billion), the increase in fundraising through equity funding10
+
+of just under 80% (a total of
+
+In addition to the uncertainties posed by the 2008 financial crisis regarding a new architecture,
+
+2014), the accelerated growth in the complexity of financial intermediation, the rise of
+2005), resulting from several factors, including: market deregulation (SAWYER,
+
+defense of property rights, as well as the rise of a model for promoting
+
+regulation capable of avoiding new losses (ROMANO, 2014), as well as the pessimism that
+
+US$ 630 billion), and the stagnation of syndicated loans, an increase of 10% in the period
+
+,
+
+estimate of the value of all financial assets traded in these markets reached
+
+of taking greater risks (CHEFFINS, 2015).
+
+loans from international banks and issuance of debt securities, reached US$52 trillion
+
+significant participation of financial motivations, financial markets, actors and
+
+Cheffins (2013) recalls that institutional investors, such as pension funds, would be the investors capable
+of overcoming the monitoring disincentives suffered by individual shareholders. Therefore, in the 1980s and
+1990s, they would have led an agenda for improving corporate governance and the rights of non-controlling
+shareholders, including lobbying for the relaxation of regulatory rules, in order to have access to investments
+with higher returns, which were based on greater risks, on the other hand.
+Refers to creditors' resources invested in the company, with the commitment to return fixed interest,
+accompanied by the right to execute the underlying guarantee in the event of non-payment of the debt.
+Refers to the capital invested by shareholders accompanied by the right to vote and receive dividends. 10
+9
+
+8
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+economic impact directly affect the possibilities of enjoyment of rights (CASTRO, 2009).
+
+In social life, groups and individuals may ascribe special considerations of value or
+
+4.9% in 1980. The assets of the six largest US commercial banks grew
+
+such as food and housing, are now made available on a daily basis only by
+
+economic situation, referred to as “fiscal adjustment”, with the aim of reducing expenses and
+
+available credit supply, including its costs, as the price of consumer goods
+
+between 2001 and 2008, financial institutions listed on the S&P500 index showed
+
+Financialization is also associated with the change in the main source of accumulation of
+
+United States, at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the growth of institutions
+
+social constructions of relationships and goods, include beliefs, feelings, affective symbols or
+
+financial institutions was higher than that of other companies (STRANGE, 1998; CHEFFINS, 2015).
+
+global economy through the financial system: financial crises highlight the link between
+
+value is only secondarily linked to economic price.
+
+Every economy, according to Castro (2005) (who relies on Karl Polanyi), rests on
+
+general economy: this is a relative gain in importance, in which entities in this sector
+
+the right to work and the right to health, is also increasingly conditioned to flows
+
+contracts to the final consumer (CASTRO, 2014). Consequently, policy decisions
+
+Even so, in Brazil, the government introduced changes in its policy in 2015
+
+protections – a certain circumstantial unavailability – on certain notions that apply
+
+15
+
+four times more in relation to that country's GDP between 1994 and 2009. Furthermore, in the period
+
+monetary intermediation, which links the enjoyment of constitutionally guaranteed rights to
+
+cultural. To these social relations, not always oriented in favor of the exchange of goods, the
+
+profits: from trade and production to an emphasis on the financial sector (KRIPPNER, 2005). Us
+
+superior performance to all others (CHEFFINS, 2015).
+
+elementals has built-in the cost of credit used by the producer to make these available.
+
+same goods and is passed on cumulatively in the production chain through aggregates
+
+However, the theory has profoundly influenced not only the transformation of
+
+According to Cheffins (2015), the rise of the financial sector not only follows the growth
+
+capital flows and enjoyment of rights.
+
+individuals of a given group can assign a meaning that cannot be specified at first – the
+
+Castro (2014) observes that the empirical enjoyment of subjective fundamental rights, such as
+
+financial institutions, which escape full control through the use of force. basic rights,
+
+began to represent around 8.3% of North American GDP in 2006, compared to
+
+a social substratum that is neither fixed nor immutable nor is it defined solely in economic terms.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+11 FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, 09/14/2015, Government announces cut of R$ 26 billion and wants to revive CPMF.
+Accessed at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/09/1681450-corte-de-gastos-do-governo-deve-ficar
+proximo-ar-26-bilhoes.shtml
+
+Schumpeter (1911), who argue that the role of the financial system is essential for
+
+scientific journals, as well as books, on corporate governance, finance
+
+Law (Law and Economics); (ii) analysis guided by the Theory's propositions about the
+
+from its three possible interpretations – explanatory, predictive and normative character.
+
+with an emphasis on publications presented in the last twenty years. This investigation is based on
+
+increase state revenues, without any prior discussion about the effects of these measures
+
+not about the effects
+
+that it is the intermediary institutions that identify and finance entrepreneurs with
+
+on the effective enjoyment of constitutionally guaranteed rights
+
+more appropriate to discuss changes in the financial system, as that environment brings together
+
+financial market presents a scenario in which there is a prominent place for a theoretical framework
+
+markets (STRANGE, 1998).
+
+1.3. Methodology
+
+Namely, the second section is dedicated to Law and Finance literature ,
+
+interweaving between law, financial development and economic performance. Are they:
+
+mobilization of financial flows towards economic development to the extent that
+
+16
+
+international institutions and the role of legal institutions in promoting economic development,
+
+Origins, the most sophisticated formula in Law and Finance literature; and (iii) examination of this theory to
+
+the best opportunities for innovation.
+
+thinking of Strange (1998), for whom understanding the financial system requires
+
+In the third section, it focuses on three alternative approaches, which stand out from the
+
+other criticisms directed at the dominant framework for the holistic nature of understanding the
+
+multidisciplinary approach. Likewise, it is assumed that the academy is the place
+
+distributive over different social groups.
+
+actors who are freer of interests, as opposed to politicians and the operators of
+
+This monograph follows the structure designed by Pistor (2012), for whom the regulation of
+
+largely supported by assumptions borrowed from mainstream economic theory.
+
+which is analyzed from three perspectives: (i) its differentiation in relation to the current Economic Analysis
+
+This study is the result of a bibliographic review of the main articles published in
+
+The research carried out is also based on the intuition of Bagehot (1873), Hicks (1969) and
+
+11
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+17
+
+in the bibliographic review on the most relevant points of all these theoretical discourses and their
+
+(i) the New Law and Development (NDD); (ii) the Legal Analysis of Economic Policy
+
+respective impacts on the regulation of the financial system. The fifth section ends with
+
+brief summary of this monograph.
+
+Finally, the fourth section consolidates some brief evaluations based on
+(AJPE); and (iii) the Legal Theory of Finance (TJF).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+12
+
+14
+
+13
+
+15
+
+for finance, in particular, gained space in the academic and legal debate to the point of becoming
+
+company managers, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) concluded that competition, company reputation14 , as
+
+well as excessive optimism15 on the part of investors are incapable factors
+
+legal framework followed by a country, in the sense that the legal and institutional framework would have
+
+2. DOMINANT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LAW AND FINANCE
+
+determinants of financial development. Part of the economic literature maintains that the
+
+of common law.
+
+The study by LLSV (1997, 1998) followed the path set by a previous one, by Shleifer and Vishny
+
+(1997), on corporate governance13 (KAPLAN and ZINGALES, 2014).
+
+The link between finance and economic growth raises the question about the elements
+
+causal effect on economic growth (LA PORTA et al. 1998; HARRIS, 2008;
+
+comparison, which codified and measured the level of legal protection offered to investors,
+
+empirical) by a current known as Law and Finance, which, in the last two
+
+creditors and shareholders, by commercial laws of 49 countries, which follow the traditions of civil law and
+
+18
+
+decades, has defended financial and economic development as a product of the tradition
+
+international scope (GAROUPA and PARGENDLER, 2014; PISTOR, 2012).
+
+resources to these business companies and, seen on a large scale, the financial development
+
+(JENSEN and MECKLING, 1976). This was the assumed assumption (and transformed into a hypothesis
+
+The first – and, perhaps, most influential – study of this literature, presented by La Porta et al.12
+
+in a pair of articles from 1997 and 1998, constitutes empirical legal research
+
+legal protection of investors external to the company limits the possibility of deviation, on the part of
+
+MALMENDIER, 2009). As a result, the relevance of law to economics, in general, and
+
+agents internal to the organization, of the resources invested in it, which would ensure the offer of more
+
+become the dominant theoretical paradigm in understanding the intersection of law and finance in
+
+By analyzing the ways in which investors guarantee a return on investments with
+
+The four authors of the study in question are generally cited using their initials, LLSV. According to Collison
+et al. (2011), the four authors are the most influential in the world in the area of economics related to banking
+activity: Shleifer, with 3,765 citations in Essential Science Indicators, followed by Lopez-de-Silanes, with 2,396,
+La Porta, with 2,394, and Vishny, with 1,531.
+
+According to this explanation, managers return the income from invested resources because they hope to
+raise more resources in the future from the capital market. Therefore, establishing a good payment reputation
+is essential to influence future investors (SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 1997).
+
+In the study A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997), Shleifer and Vishny conceptualize corporate
+governance as a way in which investors guarantee the return of resources invested in companies. Corporate
+governance mechanisms, in turn, are conceptualized as economic and legal institutions that can be changed
+through a political process.
+
+According to this approach, investors would offer their resources, expecting appreciation in the company's
+short-term securities, without reflecting on the means of recovering their investments. An extremist possibility
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+this would be the occurrence of a Ponzi Scheme, in which the company that raises funds uses resources in a
+fraudulent and sequential manner: it pays high returns to past investors with the resources of future investors
+(SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 1997).
+One of the conclusions reached by the study was that the three corporate governance systems analyzed,
+the United States, Germany and Japan, present significant combinations of legal protection for investors with
+concentration of ownership, whether through majority shareholders, corporate reorganizations or large bank
+creditors.
+According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 308), agency theory explains business behavior based on the
+difference in interests between company administrators, holders of managerial control, and investors, holders
+of company ownership. The agency relationship involves a contract by which the principal (individual or
+ownership group) delegates powers to another (the agent) so that he or she can carry out activities of interest
+to the principal. Starting from the premise that both are utility maximizers, the theory assumes that there are
+incentives for divergence between the agent's behavior and the principal's interest. Such divergence can be
+limited by the principal, but this implies costs (agency costs), which can be summarized as: (i) costs of
+monitoring the agent by the principal; (ii) costs (pecuniary or otherwise) of the agent himself to demonstrate
+compliance with his obligations to the principal; (iii) costs of drafting contracts aimed at reducing agency costs;
+and (iv) residual losses resulting from the reduction of wealth by the principal and resulting from unavoided
+divergences between the agent's decisions and the principal's interests.
+According to Demsetz (1967), property rights are understood as a bundle of rights over a thing, an instrument
+of society that allows an individual to form expectations of keeping that asset under their control in relationships
+with other participants in society. Despite this broad definition of property rights theory, Jensen and Meckling
+(1976, pp.307) restrict property rights to what is generally defined contractually regarding the determination of
+how gains and costs will be distributed among the participants of a business organization. .
+
+According to Fama and Miller (1972), finance theory deals with how individuals and companies allocate
+resources over time. She explains how the existence of capital markets, which allow means of exchanging
+resources available at different points in time, facilitate solutions to resource allocation problems by companies.
+
+is perceived as a unit through a legal fiction, it is in essence a
+
+investigation.
+
+to fully explain fundraising in the financial market. In your place, Shleifer
+
+shareholders and creditors, as essential approaches to a good governance system
+and Vishny (1997) suggest the concentration of ownership and legal protection of investors,
+
+The theory of the firm's ownership structure integrates elements of economic theories
+
+company, by Coase (1937), adopted in the theory of the structure of the ownership of the firm, by Jensen and
+
+19
+
+Meckling (1976), which was the theoretical perspective chosen by those authors to base their
+
+opposite to the traditional view that sees the firm as just a market agent, a “box
+
+organization of economic activity, in general, and corporate governance, in particular,
+
+it also precedes the study by Shleifer and Vishny (1997): it is present in the contractual view of
+
+black” (JENSEN and MECKLING, 1976). Although it was not the first study focusing on
+
+corporate16 .
+
+of agency17 , property rights18 and finances19 , and assumes that the company, although
+
+The notion, however, that legal rules play a fundamental role in
+
+complex of contractual ties between individuals with conflicting objectives. It's about theory
+
+18
+
+19
+
+16
+
+17
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that the principal-agent problem occurs in all organizations and in
+
+Shleifer and Vishny (1997) cite the expropriation of assets by managers through the use of transfer prices as
+direct costs. They also mention Grossman and Hart (1988), who describe other forms of manifestation of this
+problem: private benefits of control, such as indirect gains and superfluous travel, irrational expansion of the
+company, the manager remaining in a management position even when contrary to the interests of shareholders.
+
+The first analysis in this sense was carried out in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, by Berle and
+Means (1932), which dominated the research agenda of the North American commercial law academy in the 50
+years following its publication. According to this approach, modern companies are characterized by the separation
+between those who have legal ownership over them and those who actually control them. The first group would be
+represented by shareholders, while the second by the board of directors and business managers. This division
+results in management groups that seek private benefits from control to the detriment of the interests of shareholders,
+who, as they are diffuse, have little incentive to monitor the companies to which they have allocated their resources.
+As a result, without robust regulation, shareholders would be harmed by powerful executives (CHEFFINS, 2013).
+
+Cheffins (2013) states that the study by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is the most cited in research on corporate
+governance. The author, citing Ocasio and Joseph (2005), states that 1976 was also the year in which the term
+“corporate governance” was used for the first time in the official journal of the North American federal government.
+
+See note 17.
+
+all cooperative efforts, at all levels of administration.
+24
+
+20
+
+23
+22
+
+21
+
+more consistent with the interest of the principal, this type of relationship, even if there are ways
+
+to limit this eventual divergence, presents a cost23 . Therefore, the separation between ownership
+
+and control in companies24 places them within the context of the agency cost problem. In
+
+to the Law and Economics literature and was used as a scientific basis for the conclusion that the
+
+separation of ownership/control20 nor made express mention of “corporate governance”, the
+
+For the theory of the structure of the firm's ownership, a peculiarity of the company
+
+most financial market regulations would be unnecessary in terms of governance
+
+The theory of the company's ownership structure became a starting point for research in this
+
+area21 and is now considered a cornerstone of financial economics (SAITO and SILVEIRA, 2008).
+
+in which one or more people
+
+shareholders, suppliers, etc.).
+
+(principal) assigns decision-making powers to a third party service provider (agent).
+
+La Porta et al. (2000a) state that the approach of Jensen and Meckling (1976) belongs
+20
+
+Considering the possibility of divergence between the actions taken by the agent and those
+
+delegation of decision-making powers, the principal-agent problem and the consequent costs
+
+and Vishny (1997), it is about the separation between “finance” and “management”. Such a separation would bring
+
+the firm from a “principal-agent” relationship
+
+would emerge in all these contracts (between workers, creditors, administrators,
+
+contemporary is the separation between “ownership of assets”, in the hands of external investors,
+
+,
+
+and “company control”, submitted to internal managers – in terms used by Shleifer
+
+In other words, if companies are conceived as contractual complexes with some
+
+corporate. La Porta et al. (2000a) note that this theoretical discourse presupposes that
+
+22
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+25 Jensen and Meckling (1976) make a curious analogy between this conception of the company and the
+dominant conception of the market: in both, the final behavior would result from a complex balance process between
+
+Financial contracts involve sophisticated and rational parties who, on average, recognize
+
+disagreement with their expectations, these impositions through greater requirements of
+
+securities . Thus, managers would have the incentive to restrict their own
+
+To illustrate, when an investor allocates his resources in a certain company and
+
+investors happen works in the theory of the firm's ownership structure as a
+
+state jurisdiction and the form of conflict resolution between the contracting parties. The influence
+
+its contractual obligations to disclose information about its activities and its
+
+a blow to the company's reputation, which will be considered by other investors in Dali
+
+argue that this occurs because companies internalize agency costs (the costs
+
+of what can be contracted, in order to reduce agency costs: which contracts
+
+that company fails to fulfill obligations assumed by it, such as disclosure obligations
+
+ex ante incentive that disciplines the company manager's own behavior, in the sense of
+
+Jensen and Meckling (1976) further argue that the law has an impact on the activity
+
+good treatment of investors.
+
+the functioning of the financial market. The possibility that such a sanction imposed by the
+
+of agency and, consequently, by increasing investments in the company (JENSEN and
+
+the risk of expropriation of their investments, penalize companies that fail so much with
+
+control powers, through contracts with investors, in order to limit the chance
+
+returns or even increasing credit to the company, for example.
+
+of law arises from the fact that companies are not individuals, but rather legal fictions
+
+21
+
+of divergence between owners and controllers) when securities and securities are issued
+
+on. Thus, investors would be able to impose sanctions on companies that acted in
+
+MECKLING, 1976).
+
+can be agreed between individuals and organizations, the hypotheses for triggering the
+
+of accounting information, the theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) considers that this represents
+
+economic when it establishes the types of possible contracts, as well as regulating the scope
+
+prevent the company from failing to meet its contractual obligations. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
+
+Jensen and Meckling (1976) maintain, however, that this is only part of the explanation.
+
+of expropriation and diversion of invested resources. This would be responsible for reducing costs
+
+whose behavior can be understood as that resulting from the balance achieved by individuals with
+
+conflicting objectives within a structure of contractual relationships25 . Per
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+26
+
+conflicting interests. However, they notice a difference. For the company, the law confers a fiction of legal
+unity. As for the stock market, for example, the “error” is made of conceiving it as a person with its own
+motivations and intentions, even though there is no legal provision in this regard.
+Coase (1961) emphasizes transaction costs that refer to the process of economic exchange itself. In a
+cost-free scenario, private negotiation between two contracting parties could lead to an efficient decision
+from an economic point of view. However, given the existence of transaction costs, Coase (1961) maintains
+that courts, when deciding on individual cases, should take into account not only the benefits generated by
+this judicial decision, but also the possible transaction costs. generated, because of this same court decision,
+in activities outside the scope of the judicial process. That is, Coase (1961) defends the consideration of the
+total effect of the decision.
+
+assumption (LA PORTA et al, 2000a).
+
+Investors have a more developed capital market than their peers.
+
+Despite such considerations about the importance of law for the economy, the literature
+
+Therefore, the legal system would determine the productivity, profitability and viability of the various forms
+
+Assuming that investors are able to sanction defaulting companies and
+
+companies, as well as the allocation of resources in the financial system. Shleifer and Vishny
+
+(1997) even observe that when two countries have judicial bodies capable of
+
+of economic organization (JENSEN and MECKLING, 1976).
+
+Law and Economics, represented here by the theory of the structure of the firm's ownership, of
+
+judicial enforcement of contracts observed around the world play a central role in
+
+necessary regulatory intervention on financial markets, in an environment of
+
+highlights the role of law and regulation as a form of investor protection, which, in
+
+would not be
+
+corporate governance of each country and, consequently, on the ownership structure of
+
+22
+
+competition (STIGLER, 1971; LA PORTA et al. 2000a).
+
+premise. On the other hand, they maintain that differences between the legal rules protecting
+
+(1976) conclude that, as long as contracts agreed between investors and companies are
+
+market competition as a sufficient factor to solve the problems arising from
+The authors, two of the four precursors of Law and Finance, thus discarded the
+
+separation of ownership and control. Consequently, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) consider
+
+duly applied by the Judiciary, as presupposed by Coase (1961),
+
+investors found in different jurisdictions, as well as differences between the form of
+
+that managers consider this capacity as an incentive to self-restrict control powers
+
+Jensen and Meckling (1976), takes judicial enforcement of contracts as a given
+
+control through contracts and the consequent reduction of agency costs, Jensen and Meckling
+
+Shleifer and Vishny (1997) move away from Law and Economics when they abandon this
+
+ensure equivalent contract compliance, the country that offers greater legal protection to
+
+26
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+27
+
+28
+
+Faced with the perception of greater importance of corporate governance, scholars of financial economics
+would have started to place greater emphasis on the analysis of the political and regulatory environment, what
+Jensen (1993, pp. 872) calls “finance politics”. From that moment on, Jensen (1993) argues that economists
+inclined to normative theory would be more interested in making the internal control systems of companies
+seek efficiency and optimization of the value of companies, while economists focused on positive economics
+would have as their greatest challenge understand how these internal systems interact with market, legal,
+political and regulatory factors.
+In the 1990s, the best corporate governance system was discussed. On the one hand, there was the system
+of dispersed ownership, marked by a thriving capital market, with great transparency and strong governance
+mechanisms. On the other hand, there was a concentrated ownership system, characterized by weak capital
+markets and low transparency (COFFEE, 2000). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) found that successful systems of
+corporate governance, such as those practiced in the United States, Germany and Japan, combined
+characteristics of these two typical models: legal protection for minority investors and a relevant role for majority
+shareholders. Although these authors did not find evidence of superiority of one of these governance systems
+over the other two, these three systems together, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), were considered
+superior to the others, such as Italy and Russia, characterized as having low protection. minority investor or
+with companies controlled by families and internal managers.
+
+Jensen (1993), economist of the Law and Economics approach , suggests a change in perception on the
+part of economists about the lack of regulation in financial markets in the early 1990s. For Jensen (1993), data
+collected until then would have corroborated failures in systems of internal control headed by boards of directors
+in large corporations. This would have prevented managers from maximizing the efficiency and value of these
+entities, which was one of the propositions of the theory of firm ownership. Jensen (1993) stated that conflicts
+between managers and investors would have played a central role in understanding finance.
+
+judicial application of these same norms, which could have a great influence on the
+
+(KAPLAN and ZINGALES, 2014), Shleifer and Vishny launch at the end of the study questions about
+
+according to La Porta et al. (2000a), challenges the Law and Economics perspective , which advocates
+
+the unnecessary need for regulation27 (STIGLER, 1964; EASTERBROOK and FISCHEL, 1991).
+
+his finding that the protection of property rights would be fundamental to guaranteeing
+Based on the company's contractual vision, with its emphasis on agency costs and
+
+the nature of the legal protection of investors provided by the different legal systems
+
+(2008).
+
+investor, as well as the institutional character of corporate governance, opened the way for research on
+
+what would be the best corporate governance system28 . However, given the
+
+23
+
+the fact that there was no systematized data on corporate governance around the world
+
+subsequently answered by La Porta et al. (1998), for the studies that were inspired and
+
+financial resources receive the due return on their investments, according to the risk
+
+(CHEFFINS, 2013). In this way, the need for legal protection for the
+
+for the consolidation of all this literature, the theory about the origins, elaborated by La Porta et al.
+
+investments, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) identified corporate governance mechanisms
+
+around the world, as well as differences in trade laws and variations in
+
+as economic and legal institutions designed to ensure that suppliers of
+
+corporate governance and, therefore, on investments. These questions that were
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+29
+
+30
+La Porta et al. (2008) divide these studies into three categories: (i) those that analyze the effects of origins
+on investor protection and of this on financial development; (ii) those that examine indices of state regulation
+on economic activities, such as the labor market; (iii) those who investigate the effects of origins on state
+institutions, such as the Judiciary, and of these on property rights and the application of law.
+La Porta et al. (2008, pp.3) hypothesize that such control is also reflected in other aspects of life.
+
+private individuals and the abuse of rights by the State: the common law would strengthen the mechanisms
+
+2009a), inaugurating what is now called “numerical comparative law” (SIEMS, 2005) or
+
+quantitative". The second states that these “variations are due to the historical origins of the
+
+2.1. Theory about origins
+
+LLSV to the data found in the initial research, as well as the studies that followed29 - states that the origins,
+
+conceptualized as systems of social control of economic life30
+
+that it is possible to measure the right, with regression analysis, with scatter diagrams, being the
+
+main technique used for this purpose. On the one hand, the method employed by this approach
+
+The theory of origins - the name by which the interpretation given by
+
+national legal system”. The third assumes that “the two main legal traditions, civil law and
+
+2.1.1. Quantification of the right: debates on measurement and reductionism
+
+summarized the theoretical building in four propositions. The first maintains that the “rights
+
+quantitative analysis is the foundation stone”. On the other hand, the use of this method
+
+The first supporting column of the theory about the origins consolidates the understanding
+
+24
+
+countries differ in a standardized way, making it possible to measure these differences in a
+
+stipulates that “differences between legal rules would be relevant to the growth
+
+Despite welcoming some of the criticisms that have emerged in the ten years since Law
+
+on proposals to reform legal institutions around the world, to the point that Krever
+comparative law and finance (DEAKIN and SIEMS, 2010). This method has had so much influence
+
+(2013, pp.132) state that “if law is the new church of development scholars, the
+
+and Finance (1998), La Porta et al. (2008) maintained the essence (MICHAELS, 2009a) and
+
+economic and for the regulation of society” (LA PORTA et al., 2008, pp. 326).
+
+also raised criticism, mainly coming from jurists of traditional comparative law,
+
+extremely persistent throughout history, have an impact on the normative framework of
+
+common law, differ in the way they seek the balance between the disorder of agents
+
+society as well as for economic activity.
+
+market, while civil law would restrict them or replace them with state control”. The last
+
+was responsible for the most important development in comparative law (MICHAELS,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The CRI is an index that aggregates four variables: (i) existence of mandatory minimum requirements, such as
+creditor consensus, for requesting judicial recovery; (ii) possibility of liquidation of guarantees in case of approval of
+the request for judicial recovery; (iii) preference for secured creditors in the event of bankruptcy; and (iv) judicial
+appointment or by creditors of a new administrator in the event of judicial recovery. If the country analyzed had any
+of these provisions in its law, a value of 1 was noted. Otherwise, zero. The ADI therefore varies from zero to four
+(LA PORTA et al., 1997).
+
+The ADI is an index that aggregates six variables indicative of the existence of six rules favorable to shareholders
+within a jurisdiction: (i) possibility for the shareholder to vote by means other than in person; (ii) possibility of trading
+company shares prior to general meetings; (iii) existence of proportional representation on the board of directors;
+(iv) existence of judicial mechanisms for challenging majority decisions; (v) minimum percentage of shares required
+to be less than or equal to 10% to call an extraordinary meeting; and (vi) existence of preference in the purchase of
+new issues (“anti-dilution” rights). If the country analyzed had any of these provisions in its law, a value of 1 was
+noted. Otherwise, zero. The ADI therefore varies from zero to six (LA PORTA et al., 1997; SPAMANN, 2010).
+
+This is an average of the monthly “rule of law” measures, which vary from zero to ten, measured between 1982
+and 1995, according to the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), an index resulting from more than thirty metrics .
+
+See note 9. 32
+
+34
+
+35
+
+31 See note 10.
+
+33
+
+protects minority shareholders against majority shareholders in the corporate decision-making process
+
+public offerings). In a second category, the legal protections provided to investors
+
+accustomed to research with descriptive methods and studies with small scope (MICHAELS,
+
+In the first work in the Law and Finance literature, La Porta et al. (1997) verify the
+
+includes both the legal origin of each country’s legal system – the sample was divided into four
+
+categories, common law countries , the French branch of civil law, the Germanic branch of civil law
+
+2009a).
+
+by the commercial laws of those same 49 countries are quantified in two indices: one, referring to
+
+most relevant right is the right to vote, the CRI assumes that the right to determine
+
+domestic companies, using as indicators, for example, the number of firms listed on stock exchanges
+
+(XU, 2011). While the ADRI assumes that the
+
+the liquidation of guarantees in the event of non-compliance. A third category of variables
+
+25
+
+of securities and the number of new primary offerings of securities (IPOs - Initial
+
+the protection provided to them, especially during the recovery and bankruptcy process
+
+performed regressions with three categories of variables. The first corresponds to the value of these
+how much debt funding Therefore, .
+
+capital markets in 49 countries, as well as the ease of access to them by companies
+
+(CRI – Creditor Rights Index)
+
+and another, related to the rights of creditors, which measures
+
+there is a strong correlation between a country's legal system and the size and breadth of the
+
+law and the Scandinavian branch of civil law – regarding the quality of application of law, verified from
+
+indices on the normativity of law in the countries of the sample35 .
+
+rights of minority shareholders, which measures how much a country's business laws
+
+capital markets, including both equity funding
+
+(ADRI – Antidirector Rights Index);
+
+31 32
+
+33
+
+34
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+According to the website of the PRS Group (Political Risk Services), publisher of the ICRG, this index is the
+product of research led by professors William Coplin and Micheal O'Leary, from the University of Syracuse, in
+partnership with the CIA/USA Department of State, whose objective was to develop a rigorous method for
+analyzing a country's risk components. Also according to the portal, the research gained strength during the
+Iranian Revolution, in the 1970s, with the nationalization of foreign companies.http://www.prsgroup.com/
+about-us/our-two methodologies/icrg. Accessed August 25, 2015.
+
+The second version of the study presented by La Porta et al. (1998), although following the same
+
+respectively: common law countries achieved an average of 4.00 and 3.11; the civil law countries
+
+law in relation to those of civil law, especially those with jurisdictions influenced by the
+
+nationalization or confiscation, by the government and (iv) risk of questioning contracts by the
+
+comparative between 49 common law and civil law countries showed positive correlations
+
+prepared in La Porta et al. (1998), has been used in more than one hundred quantitative studies on
+
+number of indicators relating to the quality of law enforcement, in addition to normative strength
+
+female entrepreneurs from each country in the sample. As for the ADRI and CRI indices, the
+
+in the ten largest companies in each country with shares traded on stock exchanges (XU, 2011). There was,
+
+or one of the explanatory variables, with the purpose of linking investor protection and
+
+government. Other indicators on property dispersion in
+
+significant differences between ADRI (shareholder protection), used as an independent variable, with
+
+The indices that translate into numbers the rights of investors, whether they are shareholders
+
+of law: (i) efficiency of the judicial system, (ii) corruption, (iii) risk of expropriation,
+
+Based on the statistical analysis of the data and the correlations found, this research
+
+between legal tradition and economic performance only with regard to the association between civil
+
+structure of the previous year's work, presents distinct regressions, as well as a greater
+
+French branch. The correlations found associated better economic performance and greater
+
+from the Scandinavian branch, 3.00 and 2.00; the civil law countries of the Germanic branch, 2.33 and 2.33; and the
+
+economy, business, finance (SPAMANN, 2010), establishing connections between the rights of
+
+26
+
+however, discrepancies regarding the data found when contrasting common countries
+
+methodology of the previous study, from 1997, resulting in these two indices
+
+French law and the concentration of corporate ownership.
+
+influence of origins far beyond the field of finance. Only the ADRI, as
+
+publicly traded companies, with analysis of the corporate composition of the ten largest entities
+
+or creditors, have been used by other studies since then as a dependent variable
+
+dependent variables such as the size of capital markets and ownership dispersion
+
+French civil law countries , 2.33 and 1.58.
+
+financial development with common law countries . The authors inferred a causal relationship
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+36 Spamann (2010) points out that the indexes elaborated in La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2007) would
+have already incorporated the methodological improvements he defended in his revisitation of the original ADRI,
+constructed by La Porta et al. (1998).
+
+shareholders and, for example, stock returns and resource allocation (GIANNETTI and
+
+level of share control to block the majority shareholder (NENOVA,
+
+would not be effective in explaining debt levels between common law countries and those
+
+LOPEZ-DE-SILANES and SHLEIFER, 1999); the payment of higher dividends (LA PORTA
+
+laws index, Collective relations laws index (BOTERO et al., 2004), Public enforcement index (LA
+
+PORTA et al., 2006)36 and Anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) (DJANKOV et al., 2008). One
+
+full and accurate accounts about the corporate reality have more development
+
+(DAHYA, DIMITROV and McCONNELL, 2008). Other studies have also established
+
+LOVE, 2004); increase in the value of banking institutions (CAPRIO, LAEVER and LEVINE,
+
+(SPAMANN, 2010).
+
+accounting information, in the sense that jurisdictions that prioritize credit rights in
+
+et al., 2000b); the greater appreciation of the company's assets (LA PORTA et al., 2002); better
+
+Since these new indices measure different aspects of investor protection, they do not
+
+address creditor rights and the development of financial intermediaries,
+
+links between ADRI and: the dispersion of ownership in large companies (LA PORTA,
+
+same orientation of quantification of rights, as Employment laws index, Social security
+
+(1998), for example, found a link between the CRI, the origins and the determination of the
+
+KOSKINEN, 2010) and the presence of independent executives on the board of directors of companies
+
+of civil law. On the other hand, Xu (2011) cites later research that made use of this same index and
+
+2003).
+
+of these financial intermediaries (XU, 2011).
+
+27
+
+On the CRI, on the one hand, La Porta et al. (1997) come to the conclusion that the
+
+2007); lower level of private benefits of control (DYCK and ZINGALES, 2004); smaller
+
+banking development. In the same sense, Levine, Loyaza and Beck (2000), when
+
+bankruptcy, effectively respect contracts and promote the communication of information
+
+level of corporate governance, market value and operational performance (KLAPPER and
+
+identified the impact of origins on the application of contracts and the quality of
+
+make the original ADRI obsolete – this is a complementary relationship
+
+At the same time, other studies in the literature constructed similar indices following the
+
+identified its relevance to various aspects of financial development. Levine
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Spalmann (2010) illustrates this inconsistency with the following example: the difference between the
+values in Austria and Germany attributed to preemptive rights in issuing new shares to shareholders.
+Although the normative provisions in both countries were practically the same (right of preference as long
+as certain conditions were met, such as payment in currency), Germany was assigned a value of zero and
+Austria, one.
+The law of the State of Delaware, used as a parameter for the United States, allows companies to change
+all the rules used as variables in the ADRI in their respective articles of incorporation (SPALMANN, 2010).
+
+37
+
+38
+
+SPAMANN, 2010); the excessive variation of values verified between countries of the same
+
+cites: (i) the existence of dispositive norms, with the possibility of substitution, addition or
+
+(COFFEE, 2001; DAM, 2006), the selection of variables studied for inclusion in the ADRI
+
+While even critics of the application of quantitative methods to law admit
+
+in an unprecedented scope of research (VAGTS, 2000; GRAFF, 2008; SPAMANN, 2010),
+
+used in ADRI, in particular, were ambiguous enough to house binary values
+
+(0 or 1) different for similar situations or too restricted to the point of not admitting any exception37 .
+
+As the ADRI was intended to measure “commercial laws”, the unrealistic aspects
+
+these studies are admirable for having found consistent and robust evidence,
+
+(GRAFF, 2008); ignorance of administrative regulatory rules and case law
+
+(2010). Considering that there is hardly any legal rule without exception, the accuracy of the data
+
+following problems: ambiguities in the definitions of chosen variables (SPAMANN, 2010);
+
+divergence between the “law of laws and books” and the “law of practice” (SPALMANN, 2010;
+
+collected by LLSV has been questioned, in the sense that the original definitions of variables
+
+28
+
+the questionable relevance of the variables analyzed for measuring investor protection
+
+A version of the ADRI with more accurate data for 33 of the 46 countries that
+
+such as ADRI and CRI, focus both on the lack of functionality and effectiveness of these metrics
+
+contrary to the formal prescription in law, and (iii) the existence of infralegal norms of a nature
+exclusion of rules, by the companies' articles of incorporation38 , (ii) business practices
+
+regulatory framework with act as substitutes for legal prescriptions. In short, it would be the
+
+and in methodological flaws (KREVER, 2013). Briefly, such criticisms refer to the
+
+participated in the initial sample of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) was built by Spamann
+
+MICHAELS, 2009a).
+
+the legal system is inherently complex and difficult to measure in quantitative terms
+
+as functional substitutes for the existence of prescriptions in formal law (DAM, 2006;
+
+(DAVIS and KRUSE, 2007; MICHAELS, 2009b). Criticisms regarding the creation of indexes,
+
+legal family (DAM, 2006; GRAFF, 2008).
+
+formal laws seem to have escaped their measurement – among these hypotheses, Spalmann (2010)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+39 Spamann (2010) notes that while La Porta et al. (1998) made use of data compiled by jurists from the
+countries analyzed, the methodology he employed uses the completion of standard forms, which would provide
+greater conciseness in data collection.
+
+The version constructed by Spamann (2010), although it maintained all the definitions of the
+
+variables from the original index39 , no longer found significant correlations between the variables
+
+how comparative research aimed at promoting pro-development reforms continues
+
+reformable, such as legal tradition
+
+check the conclusions reached by studies that made use of the original ADRI, generalize
+
+for example, the security of private property does not depend only on legal protection, but
+
+or even the issues to be resolved in general assemblies (COFFEE, 2001). The same
+
+the conclusion of the superiority of the common law over the civil law, in particular that of
+
+data collected (SPAMANN, 2010).
+
+to offer sufficient subsidies for reforms on specific issues, such as guaranteeing
+
+third parties without paying a premium – value above the market price –, which could
+
+that data collected in other works would automatically suffer from the same
+
+also support, or not, for expropriation by the State; (ii) numerical indicators on the
+
+partial and surmountable protection, since the guarantees ensured by the assessed rights are not
+
+French tradition with regard to financial development. Even though this could
+
+some variables do not uniquely capture certain features of the legal system –
+
+some aspects of the legal system (KREVER, 2013). In this sense, Deakin and Siems (2010)
+
+“origin”, “capital market size” and “ownership dispersion”. It thus became
+
+When an index intends to measure a certain object, it is essential to know exactly
+
+almost the same orientation. According to Davis (2004), such quantitative efforts would not be
+
+Thus, the variables analyzed by La Porta et al. (1998) in ADRI assume that shareholders
+
+29
+
+property rights; (iii) conclusions may arise from legal aspects not
+
+The criticisms that refer to later studies of the Law and Finance literature, as well
+
+argue, for example, that the variables chosen in one of the indices, the ADRI, offer
+
+configure the main hypothesis of corporate reorganization to the detriment of the minority shareholder,
+
+inconsistencies of the original ADRI would be inappropriate, although a revisitation of the
+
+sufficient to protect minority shareholders against the takeover of corporate control by
+
+quality of the system stem from overly broad system features such as rule of law,
+
+able to capture all aspects of legal systems in a useful way for three reasons: (i)
+
+which information should be aggregated (GRAFF, 2008), under penalty of implicitly privileging
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+42
+
+40
+
+41 Graff (2008) also demonstrates that the way in which the variables were aggregated in the indices, the types of tests
+carried out and the methodology for measuring values, as well as the exclusion of two variables “one share-one vote”
+and “mandatory dividends” were decisive for the conclusions reached by La Porta et al. (1998).
+
+On the contrary, Siems (2005) states that other comparativists, such as Markesinis (2004), defend the
+
+Combined as the author believes fit, the supremacy of common law countries disappears.
+
+Cheffins (2013) states that even a defender of “shareholder democracy”, such as Schwartz (1983), admits the
+consensus on the part of the most careful observations in the sense that direct shareholder participation is impractical,
+due to their rational indifference towards of corporate affairs.
+
+lack of fixed methodology for comparative law research.
+
+The author does not, however, find the same inconsistencies in the CRI (creditors), an index that does not have as
+much explanatory power as the ADRI (LA PORTA et al., 1997; BECK and LEVINE, 2003).
+
+comparative law prefer qualitative methods (REITZ, 2009; GAROUPA e
+
+different, but that have the same purpose (norms with more than one function), or even
+
+Porta et al. (1998) conducted research focused on the functioning of legal rules, the
+
+minorities behave like residents of a village where decisions are made in
+
+the variables “possibility of non-in-person voting” or “exemption from blocking
+
+(DAVIS and KRUSE, 2007).
+
+For this reason, the discipline of Comparative Law has long consolidated42 the functional approach
+
+democratic procedures based on the majority criterion, in which any condition for participation necessarily
+
+represents a 'non-protection' for the shareholder 40 (GRAFF, 2008). For example,
+
+study is based on the codification of legal rules only by listing
+
+DEAKIN and SIEMS, 2010), as well as the perception of uncertainty and the interactions between different
+
+comparative law (SIEMS, 2005), although jurists in the area (MICHAELS, 2009a) and the
+
+components of the legal system that can influence social and economic outcomes
+
+30
+
+legal academic environment (DAVIS and KRUSE, 2007) still ignore the debate. Despite her
+
+terminology, cultural differences between legal systems, the risk of arbitrariness in the selection
+
+and not an exclusion of minority shareholders from the decision-making process (GRAFF, 200841).
+
+functional) (SIEMS, 2005; MICHAELS, 2009a). In this sense, some authors defend the
+extrajuridical phenomena that can exercise functions of legal rules (equivalent
+
+need to understand the law within a context (DEAKIN and SIEMS, 2010), or at the same time
+
+The translation of law into numerical values is also challenged by the perspective of
+
+of objects of study, the eventual lack of knowledge of extralegal norms (MICHAELS, 2009b;
+
+actions prior to meetings”. The existence of obstacles in these cases does not
+
+similarities and differences between laws (DEAKIN and SIEMS, 2010). However, scholars of
+
+necessarily a lack of protection - it can even prevent fraud, representing a protection
+
+PARGENDLER, 2014) and indicate that it is fundamental to consider linguistic problems and
+
+(MICHAELS, 2009a). According to this method, there may be legal solutions formally
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+44
+43 MICHAELS (2009), pp. 787.
+An example that corroborates this observation is that in mid-1995 there were doubts about the best corporate
+governance system. The Japanese and German systems caught the attention of specialists precisely because
+they present other structures, with greater long-term financing, in the case of Japan – as opposed to the greater
+occurrence of mergers and acquisitions in the USA –, and greater participation of bank creditors, in Germany ,
+compared to the dispersion of ownership among shareholders, as occurs in the USA (SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 1997).
+
+elaborate question (MICHAELS, 2009a). On the other hand, the best solution to be found tends to
+
+Bias also arises from the choice of categories analyzed:
+
+least through other approaches that complement the reductionism of codifications
+
+embedded in a legal framework. Michaels (2009a) maintains that this bias can, on the one hand, be
+
+of one legal system over another, but rather of one discipline over another – what he calls
+
+deeply understood when isolated from other factors such as history, politics,
+quantitative (MICHAELS, 2009a). The complexity of the law makes it impossible to be
+
+manifest through the tendency to encourage issues posed by the legal system itself
+
+economists – the questions raised are not legal in nature, but economic.
+
+“economic bias”. Considering that the economic theoretical basis used in the research is
+
+a given object, of neutral description, also ignores the asymmetry of its effects for the parties
+
+Not only do norms have to be read within a context: the observer himself
+
+Michaels (2009a) highlights that this worsens the problem of bias – not in the sense of superiority
+
+affected by it (MILHAUPT and PISTOR, 2008).
+
+31
+
+analyzed based only on the presence or absence of specific rules in formal norms
+
+should be questioned about a possible bias resulting from being himself
+
+to be precisely that already internalized by the observer, about which he has greater knowledge.
+
+indicators are not neutral, as they reflect previous conceptions of the role of law and
+
+(MICHAELS, 2009a).
+
+Because the authors of Law and Finance are not lawyers – the four are
+
+its relationship with the law, which may be a reflection of its own ideology, such as the
+
+economic neoliberalism (KREVER, 2013). Likewise, the perception of law as
+
+economics and the social sciences (SIEMS, 2005). Therefore, the functional approach clashes with
+
+domestic. In this way, the legal system in which the observer finds himself may appear to have
+
+American origin and was developed within a US legal context, “the bias towards the economy would
+
+easily become a bias in favor of American law”43 – an example of this would be the emphasis on
+
+the rights of minority shareholders44 .
+
+the methodology used in the first works of the Law and Finance literature: the law
+
+the best legal solution to a given problem simply because it responds precisely to the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+45 Reitz (2009) states that he himself reached conclusions similar to the origins literature regarding a more
+intrusive and regulatory conception of law in civil law compared to common law. (pp. 849) – results obtained
+in the study Political Economy and Abstract Review in Germany, France, and the United States (1999).
+
+it by itself, which requires a non-quantitative theoretical framework to explain the relationship between
+
+numbers offer, the use of numerical metrics as an analysis method is also
+
+about the origins would be beneficial not only by enriching the discussions that come to
+
+of law depends not only on knowledge of the physiology of the legal system, but also on the
+
+quantitative analysis (KREVER, 2013). Despite this, studies such as La Porta et al. (1998) and
+
+to perceive a certain institutional deterioration in that country.
+
+of traditional jurists, but also for the possibility of confirming qualitatively formulated theories45 .
+
+indicators formed from data on the perception of companies, business leaders and
+
+that followed La Porta et al. (1998) can be very useful to comparative law (SPAMANN,
+
+qualitative studies, such as the classification of legal families. By the way, this author, when citing Tufte
+
+The quantification of the right is also contested based on the possibility, or not, of the
+
+emerges as such perceptions of the legal-regulatory environment are influenced by
+
+any adjustments made by scholars capable of recognizing the uncertainty of the law and the
+
+organizes the data in such a way as to make any causality clear, however, it is unable to prove
+
+objective descriptions. Combined with the appeal of objectivity and credibility in the judgments that
+
+sense, Krever (2013) cites Ocampo and Vos (2008), who would have noted that the perception of the rule
+
+(MICHAELS, 2009a). Reitz (2009) states that the use of quantitative methodology by theory
+
+economic performance of the country – when an economy was in crisis, there would be a tendency
+
+deal with the available data, bringing the challenge of demanding alternative explanations of the method
+
+associated with rigor and universality – even critics do not disagree with these virtues of
+
+others that were inspired by it, such as the World Bank's Doing Business , make use of
+
+Despite the criticisms made, the use of large-scale quantitative research such as
+
+Reitz (2009) also recalls that the literature on origins itself is based on
+
+32
+
+2009a), although the benefits of these research models are conditioned to
+
+(1974), points out that the product of quantitative research – the statistical analysis of correlations –
+
+other subjects of civil society. For Krever (2013), the problem in managing these indicators
+
+complexity of the legal social phenomenon can be subjectively perceived and summarized as
+
+ephemeral characteristics or not belonging to the legal system of the society analyzed. In that
+
+existence of functionally equivalent institutions within the same jurisdiction
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Reitz (2009) cites the work of Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) who, using exclusively qualitative methods, study how six
+countries responded to the challenges of the 2008 global financial crisis. According to him, this highlights a certain
+bias on the part of legal academics comparative, in the sense that there is rejection of the quantitative method. In the
+same sense, Michaels (2009b) maintains that there is an opposition between the current tradition of Comparative Law
+in proceeding with detailed descriptions of jurisdictions against the possibility of statistical measurement of differences
+between countries.
+Siems (2005) assumes that law, as a complex system of dynamic and chaotic rules, is not capable of being divided
+and analyzed based on smaller categories. As a result, any analysis that does so is incapable of understanding
+irregularities and disorder, and is therefore superficial. On the other hand, the author highlights that this is also
+refutable, since statistics are also used in other areas of knowledge that study human behavior, such as psychology
+and political science.
+
+46
+
+47
+
+al. (2008), maintains that the normative variations between the different jurisdictions of the world are
+
+general. In short, comparativists claim that this is not an opposition between methods46
+
+household); and (vi) the limitation of conclusions arising from statistical analyses, which do not
+
+variables improved through qualitative analysis of their effects on the legal system,
+
+2009; MICHAELS, 2009b; SPAMANN, 2009a).
+
+six beacons that can avoid mistaken results resulting from the use of methods
+
+,
+
+according to which comparative research in law should observe certain limits in the use of the
+
+descriptive data; (ii) methodological care, which includes awareness of the limitations of
+
+. An example of this would be ADRI itself,
+
+causality. Siems (2005) agrees with the virtue of numbers to reduce the complexity of
+
+misinterpretations of results
+
+selected variables; (iv) comparability, with an emphasis on insufficiency and impossibility,
+
+The second proposition of the theory about origins, as explained by La Porta et
+
+comparative research, specifically, and the practical value of comparative law, so
+
+by Spamann (2010), a legal and comparative academic, had the accuracy of his
+
+bias of favoring the rules of greater knowledge on the part of the observer (rules
+
+as seen above. As a possible remedy to these potential errors, Siems (2005) highlights
+
+rarely just mean a starting point for further research.
+
+but of a complementary relationship to be better explored (SIEMS, 2005; REITZ,
+
+Although there is a relationship of mutual benefit, arguments can be found in the literature
+
+quantitative comparisons: (i) the strict necessity, in order to avoid an excessive volume of
+
+33
+
+numerical comparison; (iii) transparency, mainly in the description and justification of the
+
+2.1.2. Legal families: systematization and obsolescence of the debate
+
+quantitative method. Seims (2005) points out that this methodological reductionism can lead to
+
+data on empirical reality and therefore increase the usefulness of the results of a
+
+originally elaborated by La Porta et al. (1998), which, revisited in research undertaken
+
+often, comparison between norms; (v) the search for functional equivalents, to avoid
+
+47
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+48 CABRELLI and SIEMS, 2015, pp. 124.
+
+specific and consistent theory. As this theory asserts that the growth of law is
+
+qualitative aspects of comparative law regarding the classification of legal families (REITZ, 2009;
+
+the adoption of a certain legal norm and the success of this reception depend on
+
+The theoretical basis for this is found in La Porta et al. (1996), who refer this
+
+The articles by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) classify the 49 countries in the sample into four
+
+and classification of jurisdictions from secondary sources such as language compilations
+
+and SIEMS, 2015).
+
+law of Scandinavian tradition. Common law countries make up a sample of 18 countries,
+
+Watson's (1974) theory of legal transplants holds that the law is not
+
+not only to comparative law, but also to legal sociology. This occurs to the extent that
+
+systematic and are due to the historical origins of the national legal system, with a certain
+
+Brazil, Philippines and Belgium. There are six countries identified as belonging to the civil tradition
+
+other countries (LA PORTA et al. 1997, 1998, 2008). Cabrelli and Siems (2015) explain that, for
+
+view of law as a mere reflection of society or some of its aspects in a
+
+theory about origins has arisen from quantitative studies, the theory rests on methods
+
+Scandinavian law – Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland.
+
+jurisdiction in another, because “law is conceived there as an autonomous phenomenon and distinct from
+
+the social, cultural, economic and political environment in which it operates”48 . As a consequence, both
+
+mainly explained by factors internal to it, there is the extraordinary persistence of
+
+three-frame classification: the theory of legal transplants, the reception of legal families
+
+much more from internal factors of the legal tradition than from contextual factors (CABRELLI
+
+GAROUPA and PARGENDLER, 2014).
+
+categories: common law, civil law of French tradition, civil law of Germanic tradition and civil law
+
+English.
+
+Ewald (1995) advances these ideas: Watson (1974) allows a revolutionary notion
+
+34
+
+usually written out of the blue, but rather the result of voluntary transplants, or not, of the right to
+
+that the theory of legal transplants discards what Ewald (1995) calls “mirror theories”, the
+
+such as Canada, Malaysia and Israel. The civil law countries of the French branch include 21 countries, such as
+
+superior economic performance by common law countries . even though the
+
+German law , including Japan, South Korea and Switzerland. There are four countries with a civil tradition
+
+this approach, there are no social difficulties in copying norms from a given
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+49 Based on the advancement of Law and Finance literature, in order to identify that the influence on the origins
+of law is not restricted to finance, the works that followed La Porta et al. (1998) stopped highlighting voluntary
+adoption, instead emphasizing only the involuntary adoption of legal transplants, which would reinforce the
+exogenous nature of the origins.
+
+In this sense, specifically in relation to commercial law, Roger Cotterrell (2001)
+
+impossibility of reducing the right to another discipline, never claimed that the right is
+
+as well as (ii) that those who adopted voluntarily did so considering
+
+legal cultural.
+
+relationship would be complex – Watson (1974) insists, moreover, on the notion of law as part of culture
+
+as a solution to the problem of endogeny: good legal institutions and development
+
+specifically the legal protection given to investors49 (LA PORTA, et al, 1998, 2008).
+
+simple and direct, even if superficially. Any study of the interaction between society and
+
+(GAROUPA and PARGENDLER, 2013). This problem implies that any differences between
+
+as an exogenous variable with an impact on the economic environment. La Porta et al. (2008)
+
+laws, although there is variation in the social context in which they operate - therefore, the reduction
+
+legal systems and social changes, but also processes internal to each of these spheres
+
+explained by exogenous factors (LA PORTA et al., 1998), such as political economy, culture and
+
+as an explanatory variable, and not an instrumental one (of an exogenous nature).
+
+Still, Ewald (1995) observes that Watson, although he defended the
+
+of transplantation theory, by emphasizing positive legal rules at times, at times indeterminate ideas of
+
+would have involuntarily adopted, via conquest or colonization, the legal system of other nations,
+
+maintains that it is an instrumental right (as opposed to cultural branches, such as the right to
+
+Still, the use of transplant theory is made by La Porta et al (1997, 1998)
+
+broader concerns, such as linguistic proximity and political importance, than
+
+totally disconnected from economics, politics, philosophy or society. Instead, this
+
+(COTERRELL, 2006). Watson's ideas would imply the impossibility of causal relationships
+
+economic may suffer mutual influence, with possible causality in both directions
+
+As a result, the legal tradition to which a given jurisdiction belongs could be investigated
+
+35
+
+the characteristics of financial markets, in particular, and the economy, in general, are
+
+highlight that more recent studies in the Law and Finance literature use the legal tradition
+
+law, therefore, should take into account not only reciprocal influences between
+
+from law to sociology, economics or politics would be just an illusion (EWALD, 1995).
+
+(EWALD, 1995). For Cotterrell (2006), this position of Watson (1974) reveals the ambiguity
+
+religion. To remedy the issue, La Porta et al. (1998) argue (i) that most countries
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+51
+50
+
+52
+LA PORTA et al., 2008, pp. 286.
+LA PORTA et al., 2008, pp. 288.
+In fact, the concept of “origins” appears to have been imported from Merryman's (1985) concept of “legal
+tradition”, which proposes a conception of law as a partial expression of social culture, including a notion of
+both law and a set of historically rooted attitudes about the nature of law and about its purpose and form of
+operation. Merryman (1985), however, is quoted by La Porta et al. (1998, 2008) solely as a source for
+classifying legal traditions.
+
+but rather as “a style of social control of economic life (and perhaps other aspects of life)”50 . This new
+
+definition includes content beyond the positive law [or “basic legal infrastructure”51 human capital of the
+
+mother system52 .
+
+Porta et al. (2008) recognize that cultural, political, economic and other factors
+
+family and administrative law) relatively culturally neutral, as it is
+
+those only emphasize the possibility of rejection of transplants by the jurisdiction that
+
+Nor would beliefs and ideologies be embedded in these laws. Michaels (2009a) illustrates this fact
+
+would be a right with less chance of rejection of possible transplants by a
+intrinsically linked to economic interests and not to habits and emotions. Therefore,
+
+has adopted (CABRELLI and SIEMS, 2015).
+
+Michaels (2009a) observes that legal rules are compatible with different
+
+with Germany during the 20th century, which went through five political regimes with characteristics
+
+jurisdictions around the world from the legal traditions that provide the laws and codes
+
+Legrand, state that every legal transplant is refined and reshaped by context and
+
+ideologies, as the transplantation of laws from one system to another does not involve human capital,
+
+transplanted (LA PORTA et al., 2008).
+
+36
+
+This use of the theory has not been immune from criticism. Cabrelli and Siems (2015) divide the
+
+local jurisdictions, with little room for any real meaning in the expression “transplant”,
+
+according to La Porta et al. (2008)]: ideology, general styles of the legal system and
+
+local characteristics are responsible for adapting and individualizing legal systems between
+
+opposing scholars into contextualists and culturalists. While these, led by Pierre
+
+,
+
+yes. This process of individualization, however, is considered by them insufficient to
+
+eliminate the basic elements of every legal tradition. This would allow the classification of
+
+jurisdiction contextually distinct from that which gave rise to the transplanted law
+
+However, a new problem arises when La Porta et al. (2008) define “origin
+
+radically different, while the law remained practically the same. Despite this, La
+
+(CABRELLI and SIEMS, 2015).
+
+legal” no longer as legal transplants that refer to common law and civil law traditions,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+La Porta et al. (1996, 1997, 1998, 2008) made use of Merryman's (1969) characterization of civil law.
+According to Merryman (1985), French law, because of its revolutionary roots, and German law, due to the
+influence of German jurists, would not be representative of the civil law tradition (apud MALMENDIER, 2009,
+pp. 1100).
+54
+53
+
+Germanic, Anglo-American, Nordic, Far Eastern, Islamic and Hindu (PARGENDLER,
+
+basically around the dichotomy between common law and civil law. According to La Porta et al.
+
+French and Germanic traditions, as two of several possible subclasses of the civil law. Yet
+
+of the area – in three other branches: French branch, Germanic branch and Scandinavian branch. Furthermore,
+
+as founded on the use of codes and formal written laws as primary legal sources, with
+
+chose secular legal traditions. This was done under the justification that the inheritance
+
+thus, Merryman (1985) declared these traditions to be unrepresentative
+
+in turn, originating from English law, aggregates jurisdictions in which the judge is called upon to resolve
+
+Although La Porta et al. (1998) allude this quadripartite classification to Merryman
+
+In fact, La Porta's classification (1998, 2008) is closer to Zweigert and
+
+The second milestone was the acceptance of the categories of legal families, as
+
+scholars in civil law (LA PORTA et al., 1998).
+
+same authors. On the one hand, David and Brierley (1985) made use of a tripartite division of the
+
+thought, legal sources and ideology, divide jurisdictions in the world into Romanistic,
+
+et al., 1996, 2008). The classification of the 49 jurisdictions contained in the initial sample was performed
+
+categories, as they branch the civil law - claiming to be a typical classification of scholars
+
+Merryman (1985) carries out a tripartite division, in which he highlights the common law families and
+
+2012a).
+
+although the authors recognized the prevalence of religious legal traditions in some countries analyzed, such
+
+as India and Pakistan, La Porta et al. (1996, 1997, 1998, 2008)
+
+(1998), the civil law, or Roman-Germanic tradition, originating from Roman law, has been described
+
+relevant participation of jurists in the formulation of legal dogmatics53 . The common law, for
+
+colonial status of these countries was more determinant on commercial law.
+
+(MALMENDIER, 2009).
+
+37
+
+(1985) and David and Brierley (1985), this division was not exhaustively applied by these authors.
+
+Kotz (1998). These authors, when using as a criterion a combination of history, mode of
+
+specific disputes. In common law the body of precedent supersedes the relevance of
+
+proposed by David and Brierley (1985), Merryman (1985) and Zweigert and Kötz (1998) (LA PORTA
+
+However, La Porta et al. (1998, 2008) classify countries not into two, but into four
+
+western law, in Roman-Germanic families, common law and socialist families. For another,
+
+54
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Conversely, see Legrand (1996), apud Pargendler (2012a).
+
+Pargendler (2012a) states that Beviláqua would have adopted a classification in which the Latin American systems
+as a fourth group, in addition to the three grouped by Glasson (1880), according to the influence of Roman law – they
+would be the Neo-Latin, the Germanic (a category that would include the United States and the United Kingdom) and
+Scandinavians. In Glasson's classification, there is no division between civil law and common law. See also Garoupa
+and Pargendler (2014).
+
+55
+
+56
+
+legislation of each country (LA PORTA et al., 1996).
+
+Pargendler (2014), classification does not claim to be static and timeless.
+
+. Incidentally, the decline in relevance of this dichotomy in recent decades
+
+despite the fact that the perception of differences between English and French rights is old, the categorization
+
+al. (1998) not only made use of sources little used by jurists, but also did not
+
+study on the history of the taxonomy of jurisdictions in comparative law, raises a bias
+
+as a discipline in 1900. The dichotomous perception of legal traditions between common law and
+
+including Kötz (GAROUPA and PARGENDLER, 2014).
+
+scholars to confer independent group status on the legal system of their respective
+
+of the twentieth century, with the work of David (1963) and Zweigert and Kötz (1969) (PARGENDLER,
+
+et al. (1997, 1998, 2008) based on data collection obtained from sources in English on the laws and
+
+The support of the quadripartite classification used by La Porta et al. (1998, 2008) on
+
+Brazilian jurist Clóvis Beviláqua, who, in 1893, grouped the legal systems of America
+
+among comparativists about the few differences that still justify the dichotomy between
+
+as a source Reynolds and Flores (1989), who compiled the main
+
+carried out is not considered exhaustive nor is it universally accepted. for grouper and
+
+Putting this classification into a historical perspective, Pargendler (2012a) observes that,
+
+Regarding the use of secondary sources in English, Spamann (2010) highlights that La Porta et
+
+in distinct legal families has varied greatly since the establishment of comparative law
+
+recent studies reaches the point of being treated as obsolete by a relevant portion of comparativists,
+
+Specifically, regarding the subdivision of the civil law tradition, Pargendler (2012a), in his
+
+nationalist on the part of comparative jurists. For her, there is a tendency on the part of these
+
+civil law would be relatively recent, from the end of the 19th century, presenting its apogee in the middle
+
+The third milestone is the classification of the countries that participated in the La Porta sample
+
+38
+
+2012a). Regarding more recent times, Spalmann (2009b) mentions that there is a growing consensus
+
+commercial codes of jurisdictions around the world. Particularly, the authors used
+
+countries, such as what happened with the Germans Zweigert and Kötz, with the Frenchman René David and even the
+
+Comparative law literature has not been without criticism. For Malmendier (2009), the division
+
+Latin America in an autonomous category of continental European law55 .
+
+civil law and common law 56
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+“law in practice”.
+
+systematics between these two traditions. Malmendier (2009) stresses that legal systems
+
+involved them in data collection. It states that, in this way, they restricted information from the
+
+rights. Consequently, they argue that, for economies in transition, the impact of the “right
+
+especially in commercial law, transplants and legal revisions of this type have always occurred,
+
+they were restricted to the perception of the compilers of secondary sources; (ii) language barriers
+research in two harmful ways: (i) relevant data on corporate governance
+
+in practice” is much greater than that of “law on the books”. On this point, La Porta et al.
+
+law of French tradition, but which adopted common law rules in its commercial law of 197758 . In
+
+these cases, researchers have placed greater emphasis on the origin of commercial laws and not on
+
+which blurs any strict division between civil law and common law, on the other hand, La Porta et
+
+which in itself was and is dynamic (MALMENDIER, 2009).
+
+(1998) to transition economies, with an emphasis on Eastern European countries, concluded that
+
+to the most recent revisions. In this regard, on the one hand, Vagts (2000) criticizes the fact that,
+39
+
+regarding data from civil law countries.
+
+the collected data, what they called “law on the books”, offered investors a protection different from
+
+that perceived from indices on the effectiveness57 of these same
+
+La Porta et al. (1998) admit that some jurisdictions in the sample do not belong as
+
+are dynamic and change over time, as well as the very origin of civil law, the
+
+Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000), in turn, when extending the research by La Porta et al.
+
+clearly to a given legal tradition. An example would be Ecuador, included in the civil group
+
+Roman legal system, migrated from an adaptive case-based system to a nonadaptable
+during the Roman Empire. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to take as fixed a tradition
+
+of compilers may have made it difficult to understand and describe foreign systems,
+
+(2008) respond that, although some indicators reflect only the “law of the books”, others
+
+al. (2008) argue that mutual influence and possible convergence do not rule out differences
+
+which, for Spamann (2010), may explain the greater lack of accuracy he verified by
+
+were also built based on experience, which also tends to incorporate part of the
+
+Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) used data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
+(EBRD) and the Central European Economic Review, a journal specializing in political and business coverage of
+Eastern and Central Europe.
+La Porta et al. (1998), pp. 1119. 58
+
+57
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+better investor protection, more efficient credit recovery and low participation
+
+in pro-market and civilist actions in the implementation of public policies. This statement
+
+that deal with the capital market, shareholders and corporate governance and (ib) those that
+
+Law and Finance literature in these three groups: (i) studies that focus on the impact of
+
+subsequent research, which empirically confirmed perceptions of
+
+investigations into the impact of the level of state regulation on economic activities
+
+all the criticisms outlined above regarding the assumptions of data collection by the research of the
+
+that followed verified the influence on the origins – still in the initial sense given, of
+
+level of unemployment, barriers to business creation and dispersion of ownership of means of
+
+point to the association of civil law with: less protection for creditors and shareholders; any less
+
+2.1.3. Expansion of the concept of origins: social control and ideological nature
+
+institutional design of the Judiciary, as well as state regulation of the economy (LA PORTA et
+
+institutions of the Judiciary, as well as these on property rights and respect
+
+per capita income and greater productivity growth, in turn, would be related to
+
+found in the civil law and common law traditions is due to the focus of the Anglo-American tradition
+
+La Porta et al. (2008) aggregate the results achieved so far by research into
+
+Regarding the impact on investments, research is divided between (ia) those
+
+right to investor protection and financial development and growth; (ii)
+
+are dedicated to analyzing the impact on the banking system and the credit market. Despite
+
+does not only follow from the initial work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), but it is a product of
+
+Hayek (1960)59 on the most relevant characteristics of these two systems. The investigations
+
+specific issues, as well as on other economic issues, such as the job market,
+
+Law and Finance literature , the results of these studies, according to La Porta et al. (2008)
+
+40
+
+communication; and (iii) studies on the impact of legal tradition on the characteristics
+
+efficiency in credit recovery; greater state involvement in the banking system. Bigger
+
+transplantation of laws from legal traditions – would not be restricted to finance, but would reach the
+
+The third proposition of the theory on origins argues that systematic variation
+
+al., 2008).
+
+of private contracts.
+
+Hayek (1960) suggests that the differences in the conception of economic freedom found in the civil law
+and in the common law, with decisive consequences for the performance of their economic ones, result
+from their respectively rationalist world views, in which freedom is attainable only through the search for a
+social, and empiricist, objective, according to which freedom is seen as the result of state abstention and
+the flow of spontaneity.
+
+59
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+this, it was possible to establish a system of independent judges, without risk of
+
+carried out in different sectors: entry of new companies into the market, means of
+
+belong to a fourth category of studies, far from the observation of empirical data and more
+
+would tend to have less unemployment.
+
+combined with the concentration of power in the hands of local forces. This prevented the consolidation of a
+
+of civil law, a higher level of barriers to companies entering the market, greater regulation of the
+
+assume that judicial independence and judicial control of constitutionality are aspects
+
+law (MALMENDIER, 2009; XU, 2011). For Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), the differences
+
+centralized in the State – at the time, the royal figure (GLEASER and SHLEIFER, 2002).
+
+while higher per capita income was found to be linked to less regulation and less
+
+higher levels of economic freedom, even though differences in political freedom
+
+twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when there began to be a distinction between two forms of protection for decision-makers
+
+government in the banking system. Civil law countries would be more interventionist, with
+
+state regulation with higher levels of corruption and more informal economy. Regarding the
+
+procedural formalism is greater in civil law countries , which was also linked to greater
+
+environment of lower risk of coercion, less concentration of power in local authorities. Per
+
+Regarding the level of regulation, La Porta et al. (2008) highlights studies that were
+
+work and lower spending on social security than civil law. On the other hand, the common law
+
+In addition to these three currents of study, it can be said that Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)
+
+subversion by local interests. In France, on the other hand, there was the bellicosity of the region
+
+Regarding the institutional design of the Judiciary and its practices, La Porta et al. (2004), when
+
+related to the theoretical-historical investigation of the reasons for the superiority of the common
+
+communication, job market. In these sectors, the results identified an association
+
+Justice independent of the interests of these gentlemen, which fostered a more
+
+job market and greater state participation as owner of media outlets,
+
+important aspects of economic and political freedom, observe that common law countries have
+
+systematics found between the two traditions, common law and civil law, originate from the
+
+41
+
+have been insignificant. Study by Djankov et al. (2003) also identified that the
+
+against the coercion of the litigants, whether through violence or not. England offered
+
+State participation in the media. Furthermore, a correlation was also verified between more
+
+governments with lower overall performance, according to La Porta et al. (1999).
+
+labor market, it was identified that common law would be associated with less protection of
+
+expected length of proceedings, more corruption and less fairness in judicial decisions.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+civil law would increase state intervention, on the other hand, common law countries would strengthen
+
+design of the Judiciary, its formalism and the speed of adaptation to changes in reality
+
+PORTA et al., 2008).
+
+on the origins emphasized the political mechanism, to the point of becoming one of the four
+
+By adopting such a proposition, the theory about origins, for Graff (2008), highlights its
+
+prioritization, or not, of private property over state action (GRAFF, 2008). In theory
+
+It gains emphasis in La Porta et al. (2008) the point of view of Djankov et al. (2003), for
+
+civil law and common law are due to these two distinct styles, each employed by a
+
+like Hobbes' Leviathan, in the sense that the state entity always tries to take part in
+
+ceased to be analyzed in an equivalent way, as in Beck, Demirguç-Kunt and
+
+disorder and in which state control confers order, but also risks abuse of power, the
+
+state-owned. As a consequence, the theory about origins would not only have an explanatory character
+
+From these four types of studies, two species of
+
+historical explanation of differences found between civil and common law – adaptability
+
+relating to one or another risk in the search for solutions to society’s problems. While the
+
+forecasting how countries would behave in times of crisis: on the one hand, countries of
+
+adaptability mechanism (BECK and LEVINE, 2003). While this relates to the
+
+liberal revolutions of the 17th to 19th centuries, Glorious and French Revolutions. On the other hand, the theory
+
+law prefers solutions that avoid State abuse rather than the risk of disorder (LA
+
+market mechanisms (DJANKOV et al., 2003; LA PORTA et al., 2008).
+
+propositions that support this theoretical building.
+
+Thus, the theory about origins states that the systematic differences found between
+
+economic, the former refers to the distinct preferences of legal traditions about the
+
+rooted in contemporary orthodox economics. This vision of the economy conceives the State
+
+about the origins, however, as stated by La Porta et al. (2008), the mechanisms
+
+who, in a tradeoff context where market failures pose a risk of unwanted
+
+tradition, of dealing with social and economic problems, one pro-market and the other pro-regulation
+
+society's resources, negatively interfering in the economic activity of agents
+
+42
+
+differentiating criterion of the styles of control of each legal tradition is the biggest concern
+
+differences present between the data collected in comparative studies, but it would also imply
+
+Levine (2003). On the one hand, the adaptability mechanism was relegated to a role only of
+
+mechanisms through which the law influences the economy: the political mechanism and the
+
+became a competing historical explanation with the explanation focused on the role of
+
+civil law is more concerned with disorder relative to the risk of state abuse, the common
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+according to Glaser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003). As an example of the advantages of civil law in
+
+any causal inference of the relationship between legal institutions and financial development, as verified
+
+by La Porta et al. (1998)61 , to accept a milder view of this
+
+(GRAFF, 2008). As an example, Beck Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (2003) assume that the largest
+
+absolute superiority of the common law. State regulation arising from civil law can be more
+
+evidence that civil law countries establish climate change policies more
+
+financial development, as they presuppose that a powerful state would have the possibility of
+support for state activism by civil law has adverse implications for the
+
+efficient in its regulatory solutions instead of offering only the mere legal support of the
+
+that civil law countries have lower deforestation rates compared to
+
+stricter than common law countries.
+
+since English law would prefer to limit state action (GRAFF, 2008).
+
+those of common law. Also in this sense, Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2015) find
+
+43
+
+competitive. For Graff, (2008), such a conception of the State would imply the superiority of the common
+
+However, La Porta et al. (2008) point out that the theory of origins does not stipulate a
+
+regarding regulatory policies, Marchand (2012), when testing the hypothesis that differences in
+
+link: legal rules matter for economic-social performance, with
+
+law over civil law regarding financial development and good economic performance,
+
+deforestation can be attributed to the origins of each country's legal system, finds
+
+superiority of one system over another only in a relative way and conditioned on
+
+certain circumstances, such as the level of disorder in the market (LA PORTA et al., 2008).
+
+easily change the right in your favor and thus manipulate the distribution of resources according to
+
+market, except when state action can be subverted by private interests (LA
+
+For this reason, the enunciation of the fourth proposition of the theory on origins abandons60
+
+its own objectives, which would be at odds with the conception of a financial market
+
+PORTA et al. 2008) – which would be especially worrying in developing countries,
+
+For Michaels (2011), the reason for this departure from the causality of law lies in the level of criticism
+directed at the initial statement by La Porta et al. (1998) that common law legal institutions would be more
+conducive to economic growth. Even
+though they found robust correlations between legal traditions – common law and the three –, investor
+Porta et al. (1998) protection, enforcement of legal rules and ownership structure, variations of civil law
+observe a causal relationship only in the sense that French civil law causes concentration of company
+ownership (pp. 1151).
+
+60
+
+61
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+the new definition's emphasis on current systemic aspects weakens the theory because
+
+economic. As stated above, this involves refining the conclusion initially reached
+
+that common law is an absolutely superior system in terms of economic growth
+
+economic: the common law approach would be more appropriate in times of calm, of
+
+legal over the other, to embrace the relative advantages of each, depending on circumstances
+
+offered by civil law would work better in the face of threats of war, financial crises
+
+from being the result of legal transplants (LA PORTA et al, 1998) to becoming a kind of
+
+La Porta et al. (2008) maintain that the origins would only determine distinct designs
+
+the increased use of common law solutions by civil law countries , and vice versa, for example
+
+Michaels (2009) highlights that the new definition of legal origins would be much more
+
+2.1.4. Impact of law: economic performance and varieties of capitalism
+
+organization of production, and the civil law model , coordinated and guided by state guidelines.
+
+United States and with the pressure to reduce regulatory barriers in the labor market in countries
+
+(1999), than with the law itself. Reitz (2009) argues that the new definition of legal origins would
+
+have much more to do with political economy62 . Pistor (2009) notes that
+
+between legal rules adopted in different countries would be relevant to the performance
+
+Porta et al. (2008) state that one or another model would be linked to better performance
+
+However, the abandonment movement by La Porta et al. (2008) of the idea of
+
+intensification of globalization and integration of financial markets, while solutions
+
+was also accompanied by a softening of the definition of legal origin – which left
+
+by La Porta et al. (1998), with abandonment of any absolute superiority of a system
+
+historical.
+
+and other extraordinary shocks. A third way would be the convergence of the two systems, with
+
+“social control of economic life” (LA PORTA et al, 2008, pp. 286).
+
+44
+
+of what happens with the adoption of more regulatory legislation in post-crisis times by States
+
+identified with the political position of a government, as defined by La Porta et al.
+
+of capitalism: the common law model, aimed at a type focused on the market as a means of
+
+The last proposition of the theory about origins maintains that the differences found
+
+Thus, faced with a context of economic growth interspersed with times of crisis, La
+
+of civil law (LA PORTA et al, 2008).
+
+Reitz (2009) uses his own definition of political economy: “the standard spectrum that runs from the most state
+centered political economies of state socialism and the command economy on the left to the true laissez-faire
+state at the extreme right or market- centered side of the spectrum” (pp. 855).
+62
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+diagram that shows the channels of influence of the origins on legal institutions and of these
+
+of the problem of endogeneity between law and economics (there would be reverse causality, as the
+
+this aspect to an economic institution, such as economic growth, larger economies
+
+in turn, observes that the movement to expand the concept of legal origin results in a
+economic development would affect legal norms and practices). Pargendler (2012b), by
+
+informal and economic freedom. For example, the Law and Finance strand of the theory on
+
+that links origins to a specific economic, social or legal aspect, such as
+
+45
+
+absence of any direct link between economic origins and institutions. grouper and
+
+financial development, level of bureaucracy or judicial independence, and another that associates
+
+about economic institutions. This illustration is below with adaptations:
+
+Pargendler (2014) remember that the theory about origins was conceived in two stages, one
+
+practically unfalsifiable statement, moving away from the Popperian63 sense of theory.
+
+origins would associate origins with financial development which in turn is associated with
+
+The conclusion of the theory of origins deserves two remarks. The first refers to
+
+economic growth (HARRIS, 2008). In this sense, La Porta et al. (2008) present
+
+See Section 1.2. 63
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of a society, as well as on the set of solutions available to resolve
+
+originally outlined by La Porta et al. (1998): increases in legal investor protection
+
+at the micro level they are directly related to the development of financial markets
+
+of social problems, as also defended by Djankov et al. (2003).
+
+The second observation refers to the fact that the big idea of the theory is not
+
+(PISTOR, 2009). This conception is based on the assumption that the market would be the sum of
+
+However, especially in relation to financial development, despite
+
+superiority of one system, but rather the effect of systemic and persistent style differences
+
+individual contractual relationships, disregarding the complexity of both the current features of the
+
+changes suffered by the main thesis, La Porta et al. (2008) keep the link unexplained
+
+46
+
+of regulation between the two systems, civil law and common law, on the institutions and purposes
+
+Performed:
+
+Corporate Law
+
+Legal Institutions
+
+structure of
+
+Financial
+
+DJANKOV et al.,
+2002
+
+Independence
+
+Firm
+
+bankrupt
+
+LA PORTA et al.,
+2000
+
+Freedom
+
+right of
+
+private credit
+
+Figure 1 – Associations between Legal Institutions and Economic Institutions according to Law literature
+
+LA PORTA et al.,
+1997, 1998
+
+level of
+corruption
+
+Origins
+
+Source: own elaboration based on La Porta et al. (2008)
+
+Studies
+
+LA PORTA et al.,
+2002.
+
+Valuation of
+companies
+
+Development
+
+LA PORTA et al.,
+2004
+
+owned by
+
+Affected Institutions
+
+Right
+
+BOTERO et
+al., 2004
+
+Judicial
+
+Barriers to
+market entry
+
+State
+ownership of banks
+
+LA PORTA et al.,
+1999
+
+economical
+
+Work
+
+Economy interest
+rate
+
+and Finance
+
+DJANKOV et al.,
+2007.
+
+unemployment rate
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+also whether the richness and quality of laws are due to a third factor (SPAMANN, 2010;
+
+Kevin Davis, on a panel at the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
+
+of reverse causality as possible omission of other explanatory variables (hypothesis of
+
+The topics below explore the main reflections on each of these three
+
+possible interpretations of the results verified by the Law and Finance movement. A
+
+2.2.1. Theory of origins as an explanatory theory
+
+Reverse causality occurs when the laws of a country improve as a result of
+
+last decades. The second is related to its predictive capacity to associate certain
+
+country's past, for example between 1960 and 2000, based on the legal system adopted. Treat
+
+economic development (PISTOR, 2009). In other words, even if one takes
+
+market, permeated by multiple agency costs, and the law itself, incapable of being
+
+or another rule of one of the great systems, civil law or common law. The third highlights its
+
+(MILHAUPT and PISTOR, 2008). However, the method they used based on regressions
+
+these nations are rich because they have better laws or if they have better laws because they are rich, or
+
+2.2. Tripartite interpretation of the theory of origins
+
+economic development.
+
+variables, failure to provide reliable estimates of causality, because of both the problem
+
+MICHAELS, 2009a). However, through the use of least squares regressions
+
+interpretive prisms.
+
+multicollinearity) (XU, 2011).
+
+Law (ASIL), dedicated especially to the analysis of the theory of origins64 , maintains that there are three
+
+The first refers to its explanatory capacity regarding the development of countries in
+
+Davis points out that the explanatory version of the origins theory justifies the performance
+
+political pressures from certain interest groups, whose power increases because of the greater
+
+47
+
+whether from a relationship assumed by LLSV in the unidirectional sense, from law to economy
+
+It is true that the most developed countries have the best laws, it would be difficult to determine whether
+
+empirical results, such as financial development and level of corruption, to the adoption of a
+
+reduced to the enforcement of contracts and property rights (PISTOR, 2009).
+
+normative bias, when determining what countries should do to improve the
+
+with ordinary least squares, despite identifying the strength of the relationships between two
+
+Panel Legal origins, Doing Business, and rule of law indicators: the economic evaluation of legal systems,
+held on March 24, 2011, Washington DC, United States.
+64
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+for investments in the face of increased protection of investors' property rights,
+
+It is characterized by a complex endogeneity, with emphasis on legal responses constructed in
+
+contexts of crises and economic growth65 . According to all these authors, the
+
+ordinary two-stage studies, Law and Finance studies were incapable of
+
+Porta and the co-authors of Law and Finance assume that the market is equivalent to
+
+market members and informs ex ante the behavior of investors, thus
+
+influence of origins is the legal system (XU, 2011).
+identify the existence, or not, of this third factor, nor to affirm that the only channel of
+
+sum of the individual contractual relations of each company, as well as it with its
+
+In fact, Pistor (2009) goes further: specifically regarding investor protection, the
+
+law would determine the mode of market growth. Along the same lines, Berkowitz, Pistor
+
+As seen above, Pistor (2009) observes that, in origins theory, causality
+
+law, by offering more safeguards to investments, also presents incentives to
+
+48
+
+of law on financial development is asserted rather than explained. For the author, La
+
+financial markets, even more so when contemporary markets are characterized by
+
+real dynamics between legal institutions and economics denies the perspective of endowment of law
+
+greater complexity than the mere sum of its agents (PISTOR, 2009).
+
+Reverse causality challenges theory about origins, as illustrated below
+
+investors. Although the origins theory explains how there would be an increase in incentives
+
+and Richard (2003a) and Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) argue that the relationship between law and economics
+
+from Graff (2008) and Xu (2011):
+
+there is no demonstration of how this would necessarily imply the development of
+
+65
+
+Figure 2 - Interpretation of the theory of origins as an explanatory theory
+
+Hypothesis explaining the theory of origins
+
+Legal origin ÿ Legal rules ÿ Financial development ÿ Economic Growth Reverse
+causality hypothesis Legal
+origin ÿ Financial development ÿ Economic growth ÿ Legal rules Source: Own
+elaboration, based on Graff (2008) and Xu (2011) .
+
+Especially regarding the regulation of financial markets, Gerding (2013) maintains that this law/economics
+endogeneity would be marked by the existence of “regulatory cycles” (or “regulatory instability hypothesis”)
+that accompany economic cycles interspersed with crises and periods of growth. These regulatory fluctuations
+would be responsible for the deterioration of financial regulation during times of extraordinary growth
+(speculative bubbles), in five stages that involve: stimulus regulations; loosening of compliance with regulatory
+rules; regulatory arbitrations; pro-cyclical regulations and pro-'herd behavior' regulations (GERDING, 2013).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The problem of the correlation of multiple variables allows us to ask whether legal rules
+
+market participants with the emergence of new demands for legal solutions.
+
+(MILHAUPT and PISTOR, 2008). Corroborating this importance, Coffee (2001) proved that
+
+Economics and Law.
+
+truly independent, a factor that can go far beyond the law (COFFEE, 2001).
+
+jurists, however, still remains a complex not understood. Deakin and Siems
+
+regressions run by LLSV. In this sense, Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007) observe
+
+aid of strong legal protection of investors, which would have occurred thanks to institutions
+
+candidates, such as the initial conditions of the colonies (colonial origins) where they went
+
+legislative changes suffered by ten jurisdictions during the last decades, reached ambiguous
+
+conclusions. In some cases, such as Indica, there was a significant correlation between the
+
+economists. In this sense, Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) argue that LLSV is assumed to be the
+
+of economic agents. An example of this would be the practice in the United States and the United Kingdom
+
+of Law and Finance, in which the legal system is presented as a fixed datum, a
+
+as in the case of the United States in relation to the profound alterations promoted by the Law
+
+informal structures that shape economic activity, such as codes of conduct for better
+
+administrators, even though there is no legal rule in both countries.
+
+rolling relation between legal responses to economic problems and generation of incentives to
+
+and Siems (2010) point out that there is still little understanding of the endogeny between Politics,
+
+identification of these non-legal mechanisms and their fitting into formal mathematical models
+
+that protect investors, for example, would not be mere products of a variable
+
+Another problem refers to the possibility of omitting an explanatory variable in the
+
+United States and the United Kingdom managed to develop their financial markets without the
+
+The endogenous relationship between economic, political and legal factors, for others
+
+Studies parallel to the development of Law and Finance literature offer potential
+
+(2010), using comparative research methods and encoding the
+
+that informal social institutions can have a relevant and totally ignored role by
+
+informal, which, despite not being judicially applied, condition the behavior
+
+49
+
+law the only source of discipline in social life, devaluing the existence of norms
+
+United Kingdom, that the majority of a company's board of directors be independent of
+
+quality of law and financial development over time. In others, there was not,
+
+sterilized social infrastructure. Instead, the appropriate model approximates a
+
+Sarbanes-Oxley, US response to the Enron scandal in 2001. For this reason, Deakin
+
+governance practices. This complete disregard is attributed to the difficulty of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+66 Countries former members of the socialist bloc, mainly from Eastern Europe, such as Poland, Ukraine and Russia.
+
+characterized, however, as a mere tool of a political nature, which would be highlighted in the civil
+
+receive these same transplants. Such receptivity would be associated with contact with the system
+
+(STULZ and WILLIAMSON, 2003).
+
+different societies, with a profound impact on local development.
+
+judges would limit this political power (RAJAN and ZINGALES, 2003). Pagano and Volpin (2005)
+
+socialist (BERKOWITZ, PISTOR and RICHARD, 2003b).
+
+investors, through emphasis on religion and language. They found a robust correlation between the
+
+enough factors to neutralize the effects of origins. Harris (2008) names this current
+
+Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007), based on the analysis of the relationship between culture and three types of
+
+in relation to origins, even though they consider them variables that are difficult to distinguish. The importance of
+
+about financial development, in which the State is an arena in which groups, friendly
+
+transplanted common law and civil law systems , as well as their association with strategies
+
+rekindle the discussion about the importance of British colonization and the English language as a
+
+it would encourage legislative changes in the sense of reducing barriers. In this way, the authors
+
+groups would also be tempered by the level of transactions with other countries. the right is
+
+conjunction between the transplanted legal institutions and the receptivity of the legal system that
+
+cultural values would have a greater explanatory capacity about the dominant individual values in
+
+defense of interests of specific groups, such as entrepreneurs, in Calvinist doctrine
+
+law, where legislation is an instrument in the hands of politicians. In the common law system, the
+
+Stulz and Williamson (2003) examine culture and its impact on the right to
+
+Political institutions, in turn, are also conceived by some studies as
+
+mother during the formation of the country's legal system prior to the adoption of the
+
+–,
+
+Other studies highlight culture as the most relevant explanatory variable. licht,
+
+creditors' rights, Protestantism and Catholicism, greater than that verified by LLSV
+
+of Politics and Finance. Rajan and Zingales (2003) formulate a theory of interest groups
+
+50
+
+culture would be tempered, however, by the country's openness to international trade, which
+
+or not to the rise of financial markets, fight for control. The relative power of these
+
+governance norms – the rule of law, the level of corruption and democratic transparency
+
+of colonization, which is carried out by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002). Berkowitz, Pistor and
+
+Richard (2003b), in turn, when analyzing transition economies66 , emphasize the
+
+associated factors higher values in these three indicators. For these authors, the guidelines
+
+speculate that culture and religion would be just a rationalization of political discourse, in
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+formal law.
+
+legal requirements of investors, majority judgment could be detrimental to investors when
+
+legal. A politicized legislative process would have been responsible for voluntary choices and
+
+initially drawn in relation to the high level of employment. This in turn would mark the
+
+financial development. La Porta et al (2008), incidentally, admit that historical issues
+
+In a similar vein, Roe (2003, 2007) argues that political economy
+
+dominant political interests (ROE, 2000). More articulately, Roe (2006, 2007)
+
+laws with rules from different legal traditions, later adapted to the needs of
+
+recalls that Roman law, the basis of civil law, structured in the form of a flexible case law
+
+secondary. For him, policies pursued by different governments, for example, the
+
+financial markets, as well as the way in which these conflicts are resolved, are responsible for affecting
+
+French civil law. In this process, Pargendler (2012b) emphasizes the importance of
+
+demonstrate how the design of the democratic electoral system influences the rights
+
+corporate characteristics that are specific to it, such as the concentration of ownership, as these mechanisms
+
+Specifically in relation to Brazil, Pargendler (2012b) maintains that the construction of the
+
+colonization and the conservation of expropriatory legal institutions, despite changes in the
+
+homogeneous social rights on the part of political parties, is inclined to provide improvements in the protections
+
+in its profit-maximizing behavior, which could jeopardize the policy
+
+theory about the origins, even though it has carried out legal transplants from other systems
+
+Other historical studies also reinforce the political economy view of the
+
+development of financial markets in a particular sense, according to the
+
+aware of the effects of legislators on the right to be adopted, which resulted in
+
+these do not represent the interests of dominant social groups.
+
+are the most challenging to origins theory. In this sense, Malmendier (2009)
+
+generally surpasses institutions such as the legal tradition, which he considers an institution
+
+notes that politics, conflicts between social groups and even between competitors in
+
+local elites. This would distance Brazil from simplistic views of involuntary adoption of standards
+
+– which calls into question the dichotomy of systems in theory about origins –, was able to shelter
+
+51
+
+the shape and effectiveness of financial markets.
+
+political constitution of the country, with emphasis on the social inequalities originated from the strategy of
+
+full employment in European social democracies, would be associated with governance arrangements
+
+of investors. As proportional systems, by capturing the interests of groups
+
+peculiarities are able, for example, to reduce the discretion of corporate managers
+
+Commercial law since 1850 has observed a pattern completely different from the model envisaged by
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+states that the initial conclusions of the literature on origins implied a very
+
+(MALMENDIER, 2009).
+
+motivation of groups that perceive reform proposals as improvements in the protection of their
+
+of investors, as advocated by the Law and Finance literature. similar conclusion
+
+financial institutions with sufficient liquidity, as, without reforms in their legal systems, they would be
+
+by them in four, in each of these periods at least one civil law country grew more
+
+corporate governance, suggest that contingency factors, such as military conflicts,
+
+financial, then there is the emergence of lobbying from these organizations as a driving force for
+
+legal rules from one system to another would not be a solution for most cases, as some
+
+historical developments in the capital market in the United States, particularly among
+
+origins in financial development.
+
+2.2.2. Origins theory as predictive theory
+
+a primitive legal-commercial institution, the societas publicanorum, only as long as there was
+
+development, the competition of state laws in the United States led by the State of
+
+Coffee (2000) notes that historical evidence suggests that developments in
+
+of common law rules with more financial development, for example. Coffee (2001)
+
+loss of this political support, this primitive form of “entrepreneurial society” disappeared
+
+extralegal factors would have played a more important role than advances in legal protections
+
+legal reforms are carried out, within a democratic context, in accordance with the
+
+pessimistic regarding civil law countries that wanted to develop their markets
+
+was achieved by Musacchio and Turner (2013), who, when examining the history of
+
+interests. Therefore, groups benefiting from development emerge first
+
+Milhaupt and Pistor (2008), in turn, observe that, from 1870 to 2000, a period divided
+
+condemned to have a model of ownership concentration. Furthermore, transplantation of
+
+faster than common law countries. Cheffins, Bank and Wells (2012), when analyzing the
+
+political instability, inflation and disorder in the economy would have been more relevant than
+
+change in formal law (COFFEE, 2000).
+
+52
+
+Bringing together explanations from the history and political economy of law change,
+
+The second possible interpretation refers to the predictive capacity that associates the validity
+
+1930 to 1970, note that, although this period was characterized by robust
+
+political support during the Roman Republic. When Roman law became more sophisticated and there was
+
+Delaware has eroded legal protections afforded to investors. The authors conclude that
+
+Legal institutions tend to follow, not precede, financial development. To the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+in legislative responses, in addition to approaching another hallmark of civil law: growth of
+
+restrict their economic performance. The examples of France and Belgium – countries of civilian
+
+assistance. Fairfax (2009) highlights both the US government as the owner of 6% of
+
+financial compensation to executives, as well as financial aid plans
+
+debt structuring and mergers, such as the acquisition of Banco Bear Stearns by Banco JP
+
+would be surmountable, although the exact factors necessary for this were not known (LA
+
+billion in the banking system (US$125 billion just for the nine largest institutions
+
+government for Chrysler's bankruptcy filing, with the aim of forcing its
+
+mechanisms at their disposal and that laws enacted by common law countries tend to reflect
+
+In order to test the theory of origins against its proposition that
+
+in fact, he already owns 60% of Bank of America, as well as being the majority shareholder of Citigroup,
+
+Fairfax (2009) states that the United States went in the opposite direction to what the
+
+aspects of legal systems would be so linked to the essence of these systems that the transplant
+
+analyzed the reaction of the United States to the financial turmoil of 2008.
+
+their actions) (FAIRFAX, 2009). Davidoff & Zaring (2008) even state that these
+
+the answer they formulated better. For the author, the American response to the crisis focused on
+
+(2008) refuse to conclude that origins limit a country's capacity for change or that
+
+companies in the financial and automotive sector, by, for example, limiting the payment of
+
+Similar intervention also suffered the automotive sector, with another US$80 billion in
+
+administrative power, with the American Treasury playing a leading role in structuring
+
+government agencies to these same sectors. The US government injected more than US$200
+
+General Motors, the largest of the companies, at the end of the 2008 crisis under pressure
+
+law with well-developed economies – would indicate that the obstacles associated with the origins
+
+Morgan. Although La Porta et al (2008) argue that each country has a mix of
+
+PORTA ET AL., 1998).
+
+financial institutions) and became the owner of shares in hundreds of banks – the government of that country,
+
+acquisition by a foreign company, which actually occurred in 2010.
+
+pro-market ideology, Fairfax (2009) notes that the new laws adopted a typical market bias.
+
+53
+
+as well as the insurance company AIG (an institution that received another US$173 billion, more than 8% of
+
+theory about origins and suggests that other forces, social, political and economic explain
+
+origins would be associated with different crisis response mechanisms, Fairfax (2009)
+
+would entail high costs with dubious returns (PISTOR, 2009). On the other hand, La Porta et al.
+
+several laws were enacted that articulated not only government intervention in
+
+movements would represent the largest partial nationalization in the history of the United States.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+67 Gadinis (2013) highlights that this movement was compensated with the increase in the power of the United
+States Congress. However, it highlights that the democratic responsiveness of the Treasury's administrative
+decisions poses the danger of greater influence from interest groups. Particularly this post-crisis movement of 2008
+would therefore be opposite to that of the crisis that occurred in the early 2000s, with technology companies (“dot
+com” crisis), in which the scandals were followed by the strengthening of the model of regulatory agencies (GADINIS, 2013).
+
+financial bailout67 .
+
+For authors such as Fairfax (2009), common law countries increasingly depend
+
+2.2.3. Theory about origins as normative theory
+
+In this sense, they are evidence that the US trusts the market mechanism as
+
+serious economic crises that require rapid responses. For others, however, like Pistor (2009),
+
+explanatory and predictive theory about origins are valid, countries that aim
+
+law: (i) acquisition of corporate shares without voting rights or with a commitment to abstain
+
+mainly regarding commercial law, which is more uniform to account for more and more
+
+social, political and economic stability, adopt legal institutions typical of common law.
+
+civil law: increased the power of at least eight financial system regulators and
+
+of rescues; (iii) use of financial devices to avoid the appearance of state control over
+
+for financial development, which increases the relevance of transnational investments
+
+about the origins, was mainly through research sponsored by
+
+judicial decision-making by the US Treasury in the execution of its
+
+regulatory; (v) difficulty in issuing laws and acts of administrative intervention in the economy.
+
+common law and civil law (PISTOR, 2009).
+
+However, the theory about origins maintains a certain relevance, according to Fairfax (2009).
+
+The third interpretation emphasizes the normative bias: considering that the contents
+
+of legislation to compensate for internal inconsistencies, even more so when faced with
+
+organizing principle of economic activity, according to the model of commonwealth countries
+
+financial development must, according to La Porta et al. (1998, 2008), in times of
+
+the future points to a context in which talking about legal families will make less and less sense,
+
+54
+
+transnational transactions. Today globalization and internationalization are more important
+
+governmental; (ii) absence of state guidelines regarding how resources are spent
+
+Although the volume of academic citations largely reflects the relevance of this theory,
+
+marginalized the role of the Courts and judicial rulemaking, through restricting review
+
+and international corporate governance codes, which do not fit the distinction
+
+Financial Institution; (iv) use of pro-market rhetoric when issuing new laws
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+68 Besley (2015) lists some of these studies, such as: Djankov et al. (2002); Djankov et al. (2003); Djankov et al.
+(2007); Djankov et al. (2008a); Djankov et al. (2008b).
+
+GROUP, 2015). This dimension, accompanied by the credibility conferred by the Bank's seal
+
+Asian, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began promoting legal reforms
+
+(PISTOR, 2002).
+
+to reduce them, in 2002 it gave rise to the Doing Business Project. It is launched annually
+
+because the quality of domestic rights in countries in that region was identified as
+
+Finance Corporation), body to that subsidiary, sponsored comparative research in a way
+
+Worldwide, with more than ten million annual accesses through the organization's website (DAVIS
+
+contagion: countries with better quality formal laws and better enforcement would be more
+
+associated with economic growth, as established by other surveys as well
+
+The DB's influence is largely due to the grandeur of its scope: it brings together eleven
+
+that normative influence has gained global strength (COLLISON ET AL., 2011;
+
+investor protection (JOHNSON, BREACH and FRIEDMAN, 2000), which would be in line
+
+constructed by these studies, as well as the main conclusions derived from them were
+
+the performance of small and medium-sized companies in more than 189 economies (WORLD BANK
+
+As a context, after the financial crisis of the late 1990s, which occurred in the East
+
+was the harmonization of the different systems based on the development of legal standards
+
+by De Soto (1989), who measured obstacles to entrepreneurs in Peru and suggested reforms
+
+regarding corporate finance and corporate governance (PISTOR, 2002). this occurred
+
+main publication, the Doing Business Report (DB), today the Bank Group's greatest success
+
+Following a similar guideline, the World Bank, through the IFC (International
+
+protagonist in inducing such turmoil in the markets, mainly in relation to the process of
+
+and KRUSE, 2007; MICHAELS, 2009; BESLEY, 2015).
+
+to identify the main obstacles to financial development (PISTOR, 2009), an element
+
+55
+
+promoted by World Bank economists, as in Levine (1997). The indicators
+
+well prepared to deal with similar crises relative to countries offering weak
+
+quantitative data sets, with historical series, about the regulations incident on
+
+2011; CABRELLI and SIEMS, 2015).
+
+used to categorize countries' legal systems (PISTOR, 2009). The sum of indicators and data compiled
+
+by studies of the Law and Finance68 literature with the methodology
+
+with the study by La Porta et al. (1998), contemporary to the crisis. The model proposed by the IMF
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+69
+
+70
+
+71
+Michaels (2009) points out that one of the exponents of Law and Finance literature, Simeon Djankov, held
+the post of chief economist at the World Bank for years, leading the Doing Business Project. Djankov was
+also Chairman of the Board of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as well as
+Minister of Finance of Bulgaria (2009-2013). Incidentally, the presence of the main authors of this literature
+is noted in highly visible positions in the 1990s and 2000s. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes were advisors to
+the Financial System Commission in Mexico, while Lopez-de-Silanes held a similar in the IMF and the World
+Bank (COLLISON ET AL., 2011).
+As an example, Besley (2015) cites Narendra Modi, Indian Prime Minister, who expressly stipulated the
+goal of reaching 50th place in the DB, and Vladimir Putin, Russian President, who in 2012 promised to raise
+Russia to 12th place by 2018 .
+Fauvarque-Cosson and Kerhuel (2009) note that the initial conclusions of Doing Business were so
+contrary to countries with greater civil law influence that France, although it suggested abandoning the one
+size fitz it all concept, a claim later accepted by the Bank World, carried out legislative reforms, with the
+edition of the Loi de Sauvegarde des entreprises (loi nº 2005-845) and the Loi de modernization de
+l'économie (loi nº 2008-776). In addition, the French reaction also included its own program of analysis of
+the efficiency of French law, the Attractivité Economique du Droit, a movement in defense of French legal
+culture, led by the Association Henri Capitant, the launch of the Fondation pour le Droit Continental, in
+addition to of a series of publications and studies, from academia, the Judiciary and the French administrative
+courts, aiming to respond to what had been identified as global legal competition (FAUVARQUE-COSSON
+AND KERHUEL, 2009).
+
+lent its reputation to these studies, origins theory has sought to revisit
+
+However, the DB is based on the conclusions of the theory about the legal origins, serving
+
+Mundial69 made this project a reference for academics, politicians and investors. Over the
+
+published in renowned journals, which is mainly due to the prior lack of this
+
+.
+
+In this regard, Pistor (2009) maintains that the DB borrows a lot from La Porta et al. (2008)
+
+subject, there were more than 5 thousand working papers published online and more than 2 thousand articles
+
+of propaganda to this academic literature and creating a relationship of symbiosis: while the Bank
+
+once adopted by renowned international organizations and incorporated into the DB, the arguments and
+
+assimilation, which facilitates its political use and is reinforced by structuring all countries in
+
+prescriptions arising from certain conclusions obtained in research in the Law and Finance line start to be
+
+directed to investors and legislators70 in a normative manner, in favor of the adoption of institutions typical of
+
+the common law71
+
+56
+
+rankings, and, moreover, it is an English language publication.
+
+This relationship is worrying, because if, on the one hand, in academia, the theory about the origins
+
+international (AHLERING and DEAKING, 2007; FAUVARQUE-COSSON and KERHUEL,
+
+2009). For Davis and Kruse (2007), the DB was successful because the clarity of the numbers is easy to
+
+laws is interpreted in a descriptive and analytical way, subject to wide debate, on the other hand, a
+
+type of data compilation (BESLEY, 2015). In addition, the DB serves as a model for
+
+World Cup during the last decade financed the expensive surveys of researchers in the area and
+
+legislative reforms, investment decisions and methods of analysis of financial institutions
+
+scientificity the assumptions that underlie the DB (PISTOR, 2009; MICHAELS, 2009a).
+
+who, while recognizing the limitations of possible transplants between systems of origins
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+legal transplants accompanied by the absence of traces of familiarity awakens resistance
+
+Djankov et al. (2002) do not identify the reasons that would justify the low costs of changes
+
+desire all economic outcomes titled by the Law and Finance literature as
+
+protectionism against foreign legal transplants. Furthermore, although it is easy to change
+
+interdependence and self-referencing of rules (in the sense that only some rules are
+
+notes that the foundation would be a mere presumption that all legal systems
+
+this may not be universally valid. Michaels (2009) maintains that the theory about origins
+
+It is no coincidence that the export of standards must always take into account the context
+
+implicit and explicit references to others), legal terms or concepts with meanings
+
+rent-seeking (gaining economic income derived from manipulating standards).
+
+and that they are diverse from each culture.
+
+economic (DEAKIN and SIEMS, 2010). Pistor (2002) highlights that it does not matter the quality of
+
+different, claim that it is possible to change some legal rules without incurring great costs and
+
+may reflect more diffuse values in society, such as the preference for avoiding harm
+
+recommendations for legislative reforms. It can be an element that requires adaptations
+
+citizens themselves – will always be the determining part of the meaning of the norm. the export of
+
+of new companies in the market (regulation of entry). However, La Porta et al. (2008) and
+
+highlights the normative bias of origins theory and its assumption that people
+
+also represent a factor of restriction to advances, of conservatism, or even of mere
+
+domestic, with the problems of different interpretation from each culture, the
+
+of these institutions nor the certainty of benefits that would accompany them. Pistor (2009)
+
+formal law, the values that inform legal norms are not.
+
+“good” ones, for example, a larger financial market or a faster judicial system. But
+
+understood completely without necessarily requiring deeper explanations about
+
+function in the same way given the supposed decrease in behavioral incentives
+
+particular to the place where they will be applied, such as historical, social, cultural and
+
+connects the right to economic progress, neglecting that there are intrinsic values to things
+
+57
+
+In fact, observes Michaels (2009), culture has a dubious character when it comes to
+
+This assumption, according to Pistor (2009), would neglect the fact that such barriers
+
+laws offered: the demand side – represented by legislators, legal operators and
+
+with certain returns in terms of economic efficiency, such as lowering barriers to entry
+
+regulations and, therefore, the effectiveness of changes in law is fundamental. However, you can
+
+subsequent barriers through ex ante barriers instead of resorting to ex post regulations. this illustration
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+neutrality, universality and rigor (KREVER, 2013). It is highlighted which numbers would give the false
+
+economic progress, given the possibility that gaps will be filled by substitutes
+
+only that different adaptive strategies can be outlined for countries and sectors in
+
+(PISTOR, 2002), which, for Krever (2013), occurs in DB, through the choice of indicators
+
+DB, by seeing law as mere technology, reifies neoliberal institutions and reduces the
+
+application costs than new formal legal norms applicable to the activity
+
+The normative bias of the theory on origins reflected in the DB's conclusions also
+
+development. This is because the incentives for legal changes reserve a secondary role
+
+of information and the transmission of political guidelines, best code guidelines
+
+that of the United States (DEAKIN and SIEMS, 2010). How commercial and financial transactions
+
+to business and private contracts (KREVER, 2013).
+
+different. Therefore, the new law needs to count on the interest and understanding of those who
+
+capacity to increase the credibility of its political commitments. It is noted,
+
+in a scenario in which there is no supranational authority with enforcement capacity,
+
+discourse in politics, as numbers would have the virtue of appearing more objective,
+
+More than that, the transplantation of formal legal institutions is not necessary to
+
+that such functional equivalents can replace it adequately and completely, but as
+
+Choosing a model that serves as a parameter has traces of legal dominance or imperialism
+
+technical impression, which would sterilize the political decision-making process. O
+
+functional. Milhautp and Pistor (2008) point out that some mechanisms sometimes offer less
+
+of the quality of law that disseminate an “embedded” neoliberal ideology about whatever is
+
+particular (COFFEE, 2001).
+
+diversity of potentially contesting discourses of the development model
+
+economic, such as: pacts between political leaders and political groups that facilitate the dissemination
+
+to law, as a facilitator of the functioning of the market mechanism and as a platform
+
+hides a benchmark: an economic development model close to that which is
+
+58
+
+transactions require a coordinated response from multiple jurisdictions, states Pistor (2002) who
+
+practices that disseminate signals of desired behavior in the market, political leaders with
+
+The quantitative character of the DB72 studies would have facilitated the entry of this type of
+
+they want to make use of it to bring about effective social and legal change (PISTOR, 2002).
+
+The construction of effective domestic institutions becomes essential. However, the process of
+
+However, these alternatives do not mean reducing the importance of positive or
+
+For a discussion of the use of quantitative methods, see Section 2.2.1. 72
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+economies that normally depend on the resources of this banking entity (DEAKIN and
+
+more considered conclusions regarding the validity of information for use in reforms
+
+constitute an indirect governance mechanism. Creating a quality ranking
+
+(KREVER, 2013). This would be convenient for the World Bank, since this organization
+
+“technical” aspect, it becomes easier to pass on the idea that reform is needed or
+
+scope of the World Bank to evaluate the study methodology, with special attention to the
+
+labor market regulation (BESLEY, 2015). And, in fact, the 2015 edition of the study presents a
+
+new methodological design73 , with changes in eight sets of indicators, to be
+
+provides supposedly legal-technical assistance and, when the law is reduced to a
+
+absolute rule of law in relation to a given function of norms puts pressure on countries to
+
+2009a; PISTOR, 2009).
+
+emphasize regulatory competition, through rankings and ready-made recommendations, which
+
+Because of criticism like these, an independent panel was formed in 2012 at the
+
+59
+
+cease to be mere listings and take on the role of formulators of public opinion and
+
+interconnected and multifunctional, in addition to relating to other aggregates of
+
+(FABIANI, 2011).
+
+be understood before being appropriately applied, under penalty of erosion of its effectiveness.
+legislative74 . This is in line with Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000), for whom the law needs
+
+Michaels (2009a) argues that DB also stifles potential political discussions by
+
+formal and informal regulations, through their relative costs, for example (MICHAELS,
+
+an assistance (TRUBEK AND GALANTER, 1974; MIHAUPT AND PISTOR, 2008). Indeed,
+
+carry out reforms aimed at improving these same functions, many of which are even
+
+political interference is prohibited, according to its own Constitutive Agreement
+
+SIEMS, 2010). However, this conception of law ignores that legal institutions are
+
+fully implemented only in 2016. Furthermore, the most recent versions of the study contain
+
+According to the publication, the amendment has two objectives: to expand the scope of both the efficiency measure
+of a transaction or services to include aspects of service quality and the regulatory quality measure to include good
+practices in the surveyed sectors (WORLD BANK GROUP, 2015, pp. 24).
+Even so, the DB insists on highlighting the more than 600 legislative reforms that it would have given rise to since
+2003 (WORLD BANK GROUP, 2015, pp.22, 33-45, 152-166).
+
+73
+
+74
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+ended, what they call “Moments”. The first of these would have occurred in the 1990s.
+
+fixed infrastructure and prior to finance, what Pistor (2009) calls “endowment model”. A
+
+approaches – namely, respectively, Trubek and Santos (2006), Castro (2009) and Pistor (2013b).
+
+causality between one and the other, but only imbued with the intention of understanding the interactions
+
+about the conceptualization of development and the paths that would lead to it.
+
+functional complexity of legal norms. For this reason, this third section focuses on
+
+The New Law and Development (NDD) is identified by Trubek and Santos (2006)
+
+support the non-existence of a circumscription of the exact content, describes the NDD as a
+
+development agencies of developed countries, such as the United States, and targeted
+
+strictly positivist law and open to a more holistic view of institutions
+
+these authors less as a complete and robust theory, and more as the intersection of ideas
+
+The conceptualization of this field also changes in historical perspective, according to
+
+3. ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACHES
+
+New Law and Development (NDD), the Legal Analysis of Economic Policy (AJPE),
+
+development agencies. Trubek and Santos (2006) observe that the NDD would end a
+
+Since World War II, the D&D doctrine has presented points of relative cohesion of ideas that
+
+financial development and economic growth, reduces its role to that of a
+
+chronological publication of the works identified as the main ones in each of these
+
+by development, regardless of its definition and without the intention of inferring
+
+1960, when what they call the “First Moment” emerged and there were not so many doubts
+
+emphasis on statistical methods seems to have overshadowed the role of the jurist in analyzing the
+
+between them. This diversity of ideas is also expanded by Prado (2010), who, despite
+
+3.1. New Law and Development
+
+At that time, legal assistance programs were promoted by foundations and
+
+alternative approaches that place the jurist in a more central role, escape the perception
+
+field of studies, with a variety of approaches, analyzes and topics.
+
+as the Third Moment of the Theory of Law and Development (D&D), characterized by
+
+60
+
+belonging to the spheres of economic theory, law and practical policies adopted by
+
+legal entities and their interaction with financial development. Among them were identified the
+
+the type of interaction between law and development. Trubek and Santos (2006) maintain that the
+
+The dominant theoretical framework, although it considers the relevance of law for the
+
+bundle of ideas that attempts to guide and explain changes in legal systems carried out in the search
+
+as well as the Legal Theory of Finance (TJF). The order of analysis follows the criteria
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+75
+
+77
+
+76
+
+75
+
+Brazil received one of these projects, which gave rise to the Center for Studies and Research in the Teaching
+of Law (CEPED), the result of a partnership between the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), the United States
+Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Ford Foundation . CEPED trained 228 lawyers in its five
+years of existence (1967-1972), with innovation in legal education through an interdisciplinary curriculum, with
+teachers such as Mário Henrique Simonsen, and emphasis on the consequences of law for the economy and
+business (TRUBEK , 2007).
+
+Trubek and Galanter (1974) define “paradigm of liberal legalism” as a set of premises about the interaction of
+law and society, among them: (i) centrality of the state in controlling and promoting social changes; (ii) legal
+norms as instruments of social transformation; (iii) presumption that there is equivalence between legal changes
+and changes in social behavior; (iv) presumption that legal professions always defend the public interest; (v)
+presumption of institutional convergence of the legal systems of less developed countries towards institutions
+from more developed countries.
+According to Davis and Trebilcock (2001), this is the view of development as the adoption of a pre-established
+model of society, which is later characterized as the theory of modernization. According to this approach,
+development implies institutional convergence of less developed countries with standards from Western
+developed countries, which can be summarized with the adoption of the rule of law through legal transplants.
+
+necessary and sustainable. Trubek (2001) also observes that elites from these less
+
+as a framework for the operation of government bureaucracy.
+
+1950s and 1960s, defended the prominence of the State's managerial role in the economy, in the
+
+to countries in Africa and Latin America. These programs were designed by the academy
+
+legal system of that country – what Trubek and Galanter (1974) identify as the “legalistic paradigm
+
+reason, the First Moment of the D&D doctrine can also be understood, according to Trubek and
+
+Santos (2006), for “Law and Developmental State”, marked by the treatment
+
+American legal system with the implicit theoretical assumption that the export of the model
+
+sense of promoting the transformation of traditional societies towards their “modernization”.
+
+in key sectors and control financial capital, and thus promote industrialization by
+
+United States (TRUBEK AND SANTOS, 2006)77 .
+
+through import substitution strategies (TRUBEK and SANTOS, 2006). For this
+
+61
+
+Furthermore, Trubek (2001, 2012) highlights the predominance of theories that, in the decades
+
+capacity and interest on the part of dominant private groups, the State should be able to
+
+– less developed societies would be sufficiently capable of promoting social progress76
+
+(TRUBEK AND GALANTER, 1974). Therefore, the initial emphasis of D&D was
+
+coming from the American academy itself regarding the legitimacy and scientificity of
+The outcome of the First Moment of the doctrine was due to questions
+
+on legal education, with professional training of operators from these countries in
+
+plan and reallocate surplus capital, combat resistance from dominant groups, invest
+
+There was a notion that the private sector would be insufficient to provide investments
+
+developed would also be refractory to social changes. To remedy the absence of
+
+liberal"
+
+political instrument of law as a way of channeling economic and
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of property rights, which is partly explained by the influence of institutional economics
+
+development began to be eroded by the failure of legal reforms promoted until
+
+legal institutions do not play an autonomous role in development, as they would have their
+
+of development, by assuming that the role of law would only be to provide the
+
+building formal and informal institutions that create incentives for rational actors to
+
+began to be questioned. In this way, critics and scholars in the field began to realize
+
+argues that such conclusions about the role of law have attracted little attention from
+
+thus from a protagonist state, with emphasis on administrative law, to the emphasis on
+
+protect property rights and reduce transaction costs to promote credibility in the
+
+law and economic development, but the movement also had a bias
+
+Indeed, from the 1970s onwards, mainstream thinking about
+
+form, what Trubek and Santos (2006) identify as the “Second Moment”
+
+assistance programs, as well as because of the scarcity of resources previously injected by
+
+criticism actually resulted in the death of the academic project, which converged with the loss
+
+World, began to focus on pro-market reforms, which were later covered by the label
+
+From the mid-1990s, the Segundo Momento began to place greater emphasis on defense
+
+Krever (2013) narrate that the notion of importance of legal institutions for the
+
+Davis and Trebilcock (2001) observe that this First Moment left the lesson that
+
+The rise of neoliberal thought reserved a secondary position for the State in promoting
+
+by Douglas North. For him, the development of a modern economy is linked to the
+
+then. Furthermore, the application of this exported model to American society itself
+
+legal foundations to promote the expansion and efficiency of markets. there was the migration
+
+effectiveness linked to a wide range of other institutions. Still, Krever (2013)
+
+engage in economic transactions. These institutions would aim, for example, to
+
+that not only had very simplistic assumptions been adopted about the relationship between
+
+private law and legal changes that would facilitate the integration of markets. Of that
+
+and development entities, such as the World Bank.
+
+enforcement of contracts. According to this theory, it is precisely the lack of these institutions in
+
+62
+
+economic development, supported by the Bank's financial and intellectual resources
+
+ethnocentric (TRUBEK, 2001). Despite the call for in-depth empirical studies, the
+
+of the D&D doctrine, by them also called “the Law and the Neoliberal Market”.
+
+development agencies and foundations. On the part of academia, Trubek and Galanter (1974) and
+
+“structural adjustment” (KREVER, 2013). In this context, according to Trubek and Santos (2006), the
+
+of interest to development agencies (TRUBEK AND GALANTER, 1974).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+78
+
+79
+
+See note 73
+79 According to Davis and Trebilcock (2001), the view of development as aggregate economic growth
+welcomes scholars from three main groups: (i) those highlight the role of the State in solving market failures
+(developmental); (ii) those who defend the reduction of the state's role and the consequent increase in the
+importance of the market mechanism as an organizer of economic life (neoliberals); and (iii) those who
+understand that the State and institutions related to it have a fundamental role in the construction of
+institutions critical to economic development (institutionalists).
+
+same, with reinforcement of property rights, legal security and the independence of the
+
+from the female gender to politics, the promotion of gender equality and social empowerment
+
+only from the perspective of modernization or economic growth
+
+At the same time, in the 1990s, a deeper debate about
+
+gender inequalities (DAVIS and TREBILCOCK, 2001). Humanism, which gained strength
+
+Even so, in the Second Moment, ethnocentrism persisted, the emphasis on the
+
+development. Davis and Trebilcock (2001) associate the origin of the expansion of the concept of
+
+(GDP), would not be able to capture certain inequalities, for example those related to
+
+means of developing markets and society (TRUBEK and SANTOS, 2006). A vision
+
+less developed countries that explains their level of development. (TRUBEK, 2012).
+
+rejected the notion that different countries should experiment with similar forms of
+
+sustainability, in turn, emphasizes the link between environmental quality and development,
+
+development would only consolidate after 2000.
+
+emphasized the role of law also as a constitutive element of development itself
+
+from D&D. On the other hand, feminism, one of the new conceptions, defends the need for greater access
+
+competition of concepts, the path to development is no longer seen as
+
+(DAVIS and
+
+Judiciary.
+
+TREBILCOCK, 2001).
+
+of women, so strictly economic concerns should be open to combat
+
+legal reforms with the emergence of other perspectives on the definition of
+
+technical support of legal reform programs, as well as the belief in legal transplants as a
+
+with the ideas of Sen (1999), maintains that economic measures, such as the Gross Domestic Product
+63
+
+minorities and gender (DAVIS and TREBILCOCK, 2001). The development perspective
+
+development to the emergence of dependency theorists, who in the 1960s and 1970s
+
+broader view of Law and Development Theory that welcomes these other perspectives of
+
+Therefore, the “Second Generation of Reforms”, as called by Davis and Trebilcock (2001),
+
+emphasizing the search for the well-being of both current and future generations. Due to this
+
+development. This is opposed to the theory of modernization78 , which inspired the First Moment
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+more qualified belief as to the need for adequate regulation. The role of law
+
+this perception, one of which refers precisely to the rise of holistic thinking
+
+in a broader way they do so in order to include law as development itself
+
+such diverse conceptions would represent a potential for conflicts within the field itself.
+
+social objectives, such as poverty reduction. In this sense, the current orientation points to the
+
+of the doctrine, NDD, conceives development as consisting of several dimensions, social,
+
+been influenced by Amartya Sen's conception of development as freedom.
+
+Trubek and Santos (2006) argue that a second brand of this new Moment should be
+
+of the Judiciary (TRUBEK and SANTOS, 2006).
+
+However, this holistic approach as one of the NDD consensuses is not exhaustive
+
+From the diversity of development conceptions, Trubek and Santos (2006)
+
+Economists today would be aware of the need to reduce transaction costs and
+
+After the financial crises of the late 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium,
+
+that assume development as economic growth as a premise, which makes it
+
+(2011) believes that this same diversity, combined with the variation in conceptions about the relationship
+
+point out, however, that this is not a question of total disbelief in the efficiency of markets, but rather
+
+doctrine of Law and Development, a Third Moment. Three points would justify
+
+of “right in development” (PRADO, 2011). Those who conceive development
+
+of the field of New Law and Development. In the same sense, the reception of
+
+also goes beyond the defense of property rights to include human and other rights
+
+of development, in order to include other areas besides the economic one. the new moment
+
+(PRADO, 2011).
+
+– what Prado (2011) identifies as “law as development”. This group would
+
+reduction of formalist legal thinking and increase of consequentialist thinking
+
+political, cultural, with interdependencies between them (SANTOS and TRUBEK, 2006).
+
+refers to the consensus on the need for state regulation of the economy, as most
+
+view of law as both a means and an end in itself (PRADO, 2011).
+
+64
+
+highlight the growth of diversity sheltered by the Law and Development seal. Meadow
+
+according to Prado (2011). For her, the Law and Development seal also covers studies
+
+correction of market failures, such as information asymmetries. Trubek and Santos (2006)
+
+Trubek and Santos (2006) defend the existence of a new consensus among scholars of
+
+between law and development would be responsible for making it difficult to conceptualize precisely and
+
+see law as a mere instrument in promoting development – what she calls
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Development is marked by the conception that such institutions are so interventionist
+
+need to reduce the state's role in the judicial enforcement of contracts and the protection of
+
+pre-existing institutional framework of each country. As a result of forming this perception, Trubek
+
+about human behavior, such as culture, would be more refractory to the law's ability to
+
+would play an important role in the distribution of economic resources and power in society
+
+advocate greater regulation and direct state participation in the economy, with the aim of
+
+as a certain self-criticism on the part of scholars.
+
+Trubek and Santos (2006) finally highlight a particularity of the New Law and
+
+A third consensual point of the NDD, according to Trubek and Santos (2006), is related to
+
+diversity of methodological assumptions. According to her, these variations translate, in turn,
+
+consolidated by developmental thinking itself. Among these questions,
+
+Prado (2011), however, when emphasizing that Law and Development also welcomes
+
+transfer of foreign legal institutions to developing countries. You
+
+For example, the adoption of individual rationality, typical of neoclassical economic studies,
+
+contracts and property and court decisions. For these authors, the New Law and
+
+includes both supporters and opponents of state regulation. While these support the
+
+shared view that the effectiveness of legal reforms depends on the
+
+however, by taking as assumptions more structural views about the forces acting
+
+in the economy as well as regulatory public law, as private legal institutions
+
+property rights, for the best functioning of the market mechanism, those
+
+of promoting social changes by itself (PRADO, 2011).
+
+and Santos (2006) maintain that there has been a complete abandonment of the one size fits all notion, as well as
+
+(TRUBEK and SANTOS, 2006).
+
+implement public policies (PRADO, 2011).
+
+Development: your critical sense, in the sense of being responsible for questioning assumptions
+
+However, Prado (2011) points out that the Law and Development seal also includes
+
+65
+
+time, in different conclusions about the power of law to condition social behavior.
+
+with the emphasis on local institutions allied to the perception about the limits of simple
+
+lies the fight against the supposed neutrality of private law, of legal rules on
+
+studies that deal with development as economic growth, maintains that this seal
+
+would lead to the conclusion that law is capable of changing social behavior. Others,
+
+failures of legal transplants performed in transitional economies gave rise to the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+all, the GPC also rules out the possibility of full adoption of pre-established regulatory models
+
+Castro (2014) identifies the production of this approach as Public Capital Management
+
+assuming that the law only serves as an instrument to protect the rights of
+
+public banks allows not only correction of market failures, but also regulation
+
+CASTRO, 2014). At this point, by advocating a nationally adequate path to
+
+economic growth, but also the definition of development in a more
+
+broader social conflicts, far from a politically neutral conception.
+
+organization of the markets themselves). Thus, public banks can play a leading role in
+
+regulatory frameworks for finance, as well as as a component of economic development
+
+center occupied by the social and economic consequences of financial flows, in the sense
+
+cost, reducing, in the sense of Fabiani (2011), the obstacles to the development of
+
+Having traced the broad theoretical gradient sheltered by the New Law and Development seal,
+
+Brazilian credit, from 1999 to 2006: the endowment model, according to which the right is a variable
+
+implicitly considers in its argument the role of restricted credit volume and spread
+
+In line with the D&D doctrine's rejection of the export of one size fits models
+
+monograph, financial development.
+
+suffer reciprocal market influence. By highlighting that the credit market has been reformed
+
+valued. Schapiro (2010) argues that, in the national context, state activism through
+
+conceived of the financial system from more developed countries (SCHAPIRO, 2010;
+
+(GPC). This perspective not only embraces the vision of development in a way linked
+
+financial system through the establishment of governance structures (creation and
+
+creditors, Fabiani (2011) implicitly highlights other functions of law, as a mediator of
+
+wide. In this way, law is seen both as an instrument, a means to achieve ends
+
+concession of subsidized lines of credit in sectors where there is high private credit offer
+
+The GPC is also characterized by two other aspects. The first refers to the role
+
+66
+
+whether or not to promote freedom and development. Castro (2014) suggests that Fabiani (2011)
+
+(CASTRO, 2014). Fabiani (2011), for example, highlights the prevalence of a specific view of law in
+
+official documents that suggested legislative changes80 in the market
+
+aspirations of groups and individuals.
+
+We move on to the analysis of theoretical discourses that specifically deal with the scope of this
+
+high banking: they are obstacles to individuals and groups in achieving their objectives
+
+exogenous to the economy, as a prior and fixed instrumental infrastructure, with no possibility of
+
+80
+
+February 2005.
+Fabiani (2011) points out that one of these suggestions resulted in the new Bankruptcy Law, Law No.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+corporate strategies focused on product and process innovations” – as well as
+
+institutional alternatives. Therefore, it is based on the point of view of Bebchuk and Roe (2004),
+
+based on knowledge (SCHAPIRO, 2009). This new reality, in turn, proposes new
+
+development, the NDD would represent a refusal to accept recommendations
+
+Finance presupposes a certain convergence of corporate financing models to the model
+
+economy, which shapes the functioning of their respective financial systems.
+
+Specifically, Schapiro (2009) examines the hypothesis of public banks, such as Banco
+
+based on liberal growth models. According to Schapiro (2009), the Law and
+
+challenges to be equated by law, to the extent that it not only requires a new
+
+However, Schapiro (2009) starts from the premise that the alternatives to be offered
+
+in a context different from that in which the development of the richest countries took place. While
+
+these developed during the validity of the Fordist81 paradigm of industrial organization, the
+
+privatization of several state public banks in the 1990s, the BNDES still
+
+by law are linked to the legal-institutional trajectory of each regime
+
+67
+
+current economic context presents itself as an overcoming of this model, an economy
+
+investments and absence of guarantees usually used in financial operations
+
+deficiencies and the alternatives, as mistakes” (SCHAPIRO, 2009, pp.306).
+
+public, the resistance of groups benefited by this same arrangement, such as
+for whom once a certain arrangement has been established, such as the financing model
+
+means of preserving the established regime. This would explain, for example, the fact that, despite the
+
+Instead, Schapiro (2010) argues that less developed countries are
+
+(SCHAPIRO, 2009, pp.160).
+
+maintain as a growing public financing agent (SCHAPIRO, 2009).
+
+Anglo-American, characterized by an emphasis on private economic transactions. The utilization
+
+corporate design – of “emerging companies, carriers of intangible assets and
+
+of this parameter implies “the identification of institutional differences between countries as
+
+involves new business characteristics – high risk, long maturity of
+
+National Development Bank (BNDES) constitute one of these
+
+81 Schapiro (2009, pp; 106) defines Fordism as the expression used to describe an industrial production
+organization model – a techno-productive paradigm – with the following characteristics: (i) a determined
+productive technique, constituted by the rationalization of production through segmentation the production
+process; (ii) a specific type of work relationship, based on the division of functions, without requiring multiple
+skills from the employee; (iii) an efficiency model, based on specific scale-up tasks; (iv) a characteristic
+manufacturing product, that is, standardized final products, in series; and (v) a spectrum of consumption,
+mass consumption.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of institutions (SCHAPIRO, 2009).
+
+While they are attached to a certain set of institutions, such as the stock market,
+
+For this reason, even though there is abundant literature that argues the virtues of
+
+American, Schapiro (2009) argues that such a solution belongs to a context
+
+Schapiro (2009) cites as a source Charles Sabel, an economic historian, who argues that
+
+high risk financed through the capital market, as in the model
+
+dispersed capitals, and associates them with higher levels of development, those make
+
+that lead to a minimum level of national development are conditions rather than
+
+In contrast, Schapiro (2009) cites Magabeira Unger (2004), for whom this
+
+result of adherence to international regulatory standards (SCHAPIRO, 2010). On the same line,
+68
+
+The unfeasibility of replicating institutional arrangements pits experimentalists against fetishists.
+
+institutional framework appropriate to local needs. This is the guide suggested by
+
+thriving capital market, with anonymous and dispersed investors, is not found in the
+
+Brazil. Therefore, the use of similar institutional solutions, such as investments in venture capital82 ,
+
+would be impossible to replicate83 (SCHAPIRO, 2009).
+
+economists, such as Dani Rodrik, for whom specific organizational adaptation strategies
+
+circumscribed, a legal-institutional arrangement, not always found in other locations.
+
+use of law as an “instrument of institutional imagination” and open up to new combinations
+
+Specifically, the author argues that the context of the United States, characterized by a
+
+Schapiro (2009, 2010) thus preaches the need to manufacture an arrangement
+
+82
+
+83 Research carried out on the websites of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate on November
+8, 2015, reveals that the only proposition to be processed in the National Congress on venture capital is the
+Complementary Law Project nº 446 of 2014, which, according to its summary, establishes incentives,
+including through the improvement of the business environment in the country, for investments made in
+business participation through venture capital. This is the result of a study carried out by the technicaladvisory
+body of the Chamber of Deputies, the Center for the Study of Strategic Debates (Cedes). The study
+deals with private equity and venture capital, or even venture capital or entrepreneurial capital, a form of
+investment whose objective is “to enable or accelerate the development of companies – often privately held
+and with high growth potential – through the effective involvement of a professional manager in the business”.
+On the occasion of its official presentation by Rep. Inocêncio Oliveira, then President of Cedes, a publication
+entitled “Capital Empreendedor” was launched, which in addition to conveying the text of the proposal of
+PLP 446/2014, exposes the results of the study. Among them, mention is made of “the identification of
+shortcomings in our legislation”, such as “insufficient legal protection for investors who direct their resources
+to temporary participation in privately held companies”. To illustrate, PLP 446/2014 proposes, as one of the
+solutions to the “deficiencies” identified, the improvement of the disregard of legal personality, in order to
+avoid that “investors are legally liable for amounts that significantly exceed the capital they invested”
+(CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 2014).
+
+Schapiro (2009, pp. 197) defines venture capital as an investment tool in emerging companies, according
+to which the capital contribution occurs through concentrated equity participation, in charge of specialized
+investors, who have mechanisms to actively monitor the management of the invested company. Through
+this mechanism, the aim is to reduce the risks resulting from the asymmetry of information between
+entrepreneurs and investors, as well as any lack of managerial knowledge in new companies.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+thus, have access to a court of justice. Likewise, abstraction puts a veil over the different
+
+to compensate for the gaps present in the structure of the domestic market compared to the
+
+analytical tool for examining the legal consequences of decisions taken within the scope
+
+include vectors equally pursued by law, such as “good” and “justice”. AJPE aims
+
+include differences between participants, rules, and influences from informal institutions such as
+
+alternative access to credit. This is a recommendation that is the opposite of what the Law literature preaches.
+
+apprehension of the legal system and the legal formatting of policies. Part of the perception that
+
+One of the cardinal assumptions of this approach is the denial of markets as mere
+
+per capita and less developed financial systems (LA PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES,
+
+they present flaws regarding the equitable enjoyment of fundamental rights (CASTRO, 2009).
+
+of utility. These market agents carry out transactions based on information
+
+essential to development is the ability to experiment with arrangements, a process capable of
+
+largest capital market (LA PORTA et al, 1998, 1999; KLAPPER and LOVE, 2004).
+
+which the current legal culture provides incapable resolution techniques, according to Castro
+
+neoclassical approach to develop analysis of institutions based on their moral consequences and,
+
+Thus, as an institutional alternative, Schapiro (2009) advocates greater state action
+
+The Legal Analysis of Economic Policy (AJPE) is born as an alternative to
+
+translated into terms of efficiency and, on the other hand, non-economic interests and values, which
+
+empirical designs of market economies, making it difficult to examine their compositions that
+
+from more developed countries, which could occur through public banks, as a way
+
+fill this analytical gap of the legal operator.
+
+of public policies in their economic aspect, as opposed to formalistic methods of
+
+religious customs, moral codes, bureaucracies, etc. (CASTRO, 2010).
+
+and Finance, which links state ownership in the banking system to lower income levels
+
+abstractions, which embody the ideal of perfect competition between maximizing rational actors
+
+market economies, while allowing innovation and general wealth to flourish,
+
+69
+
+This contradiction, when opposed to legal operators, puts them in a decision-making dilemma, to
+
+SHLEIFER, 2002), or even reinforcement of investor protection, as a way of achieving
+
+transmitted at freely agreed prices. Such an abstract conception prevents the economy from
+
+give rise to solutions suited to the particularities of each country.
+
+(2009), of reconciling, on the one hand, consequentialist concerns of an economic nature
+
+3.2. Legal Analysis of Economic Policy
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of their conceptions of what their rights are or should be (CASTRO, 2005, 2009, 2014).
+
+producers, traders or consumers of goods, services and other utilities of value
+
+services and which consist of consumption practices that can acquire meaning not
+
+legitimate to make the exchanges. On the other hand, AJPE allows the identification of changes
+
+monetary and exchange rate measures
+
+This approach also offers new legal categories for understanding the
+
+economic, social and cultural” (DESCs) (CASTRO, 2009, 2014).
+
+transmissions of these monetary values through intercontractual chains
+
+different regulations, which occur, in turn, through due process of law, as in
+
+identified from the fundamental rights that not only entitle, but mainly
+
+practical consequences. On the one hand, it allows the lawyer to focus his analysis on the processes of
+
+In this sense, economic policy is also understood in a peculiar way by AJPE:
+
+–,
+
+The AJPE, on the other hand, asserts the empirical existence of markets, which are
+
+trade are identified as production rights, always understood as a way
+
+rules originating from institutions outside the market, such as States, courts and associations
+
+differentiated the current and planned actions of individuals and groups, with reflections on the formation
+
+that articulate patterns of cooperation between individuals and between these and groups, be they
+
+refer to activities in which there is no intention of producing or commercially exchanging products and
+
+can determine what can be exchanged and also the procedures considered valid and
+
+According to Castro (2007), part of economic policy – understood, in economic discourse, as
+
+economic, both locally, regionally or even globally (CASTRO, 2009).
+
+of the original conditions of the contracts, through changes in relative prices, and possible
+
+economic (cultural, moral, religious, etc.), which can be classified as “rights
+
+is carried out through financial contracts submitted to
+
+economic dynamics. Market agents are understood as economic actors
+
+(CASTRO, 2007).
+
+This notion of the economy as a fabric of empirical relationships presents two
+
+issue of new laws that determine mandatory content clauses (legislative process) and
+
+70
+
+construction of these connections on an essentially contractual basis, as well as in the different types of
+
+they take place empirically. Thus, legal activities of economic production and related to the exchange
+
+it is a set of rules and principles issued by the State that affect in a
+
+structured as sets of social practices and intertwined empirical normative links,
+
+professionals, for example. Castro (2007) exemplifies that the rules that structure markets
+
+“commercial property” (CASTRO, 2014). They are opposed to consumer rights, which
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+2007, 2014).
+
+can be grouped by Castro (2005) into four categories of instruments. A
+
+of the State in open markets for purchase and sale of financial securities, as well as
+
+they can be discussed with relative breadth in the legislative and judicial spheres, for example. O
+
+ignored by the strictly economic discourse, the AJPE starts from two assumptions. The first
+
+administrative, in the production – or delegation of this production – of utilities for social consumption,
+
+All these instruments are capable of altering the conditions in which individuals and
+
+transaction with public debt securities. This unevenness can result in policy decisions
+
+such as Economics, Economic Anthropology and Political Science, AJPE can broaden the views
+
+(i) rules on individuals and groups authorized to carry out certain activities
+
+– thus influencing the perception of what subjective rights are (CASTRO, 2005).
+
+unavailability by law based on the symbolic, cultural and affective value they represent
+
+in court decisions declaring the nullity or the obligation of certain contents
+
+contents of obligatory observance in private contracts, such as salary requirements
+
+public institutions, with broad visibility and representation of the plural interests of the
+
+suitable for the enjoyment of their own rights of production and trade (CASTRO, 2005,
+
+The ways in which the State conforms this set of rules that constitutes politics
+
+appropriating private wealth through the collection of taxes. The last one refers to participation
+
+autonomy of individuals. Direct interventions, such as administrative concession contracts,
+
+However, in order to assess the non-priceable and potentially
+
+The first of these is the direct interaction of the State with private groups, through its
+
+The same does not occur in the definition of the basic interest rate of the economy determined through the
+
+in exchange markets, in the purchase and sale of foreign currencies (CASTRO, 2005).
+
+is the interdisciplinary openness. Through the dialogue of Law with other intellectual disciplines,
+
+as public services. The second includes direct regulation of the economy through editing
+
+economy that fail to provide legal protection not only for certain assets covered by
+
+groups form their preferences regarding the production and consumption of goods and other utilities
+
+on the dimensions of the impact of the economy on empirical social life. This allows a
+
+71
+
+These tools, however, are not subject to the same level of deliberation in spaces
+
+economic restrictions or even prohibitions on the exercise of these same activities, as well as (ii)
+
+for their holders and that are not priced by economic management, as well as protection
+
+contractual.
+
+society, a deliberation capable of legitimizing state decisions through consensus
+
+minimum in employment contracts. The third corresponds to the state's coercive power to
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+related issues, such as the right to work. In the third, these rights are broken down into standards of
+
+The second strategy is the rejection of metaphysical and formalist conceptions about the
+
+the set of public and private contractual ties that also constitute the economy, the
+
+institutional – conceived by the jurist as contractual aggregates
+
+as a basis for legal texts or even surveys with the holders of these same rights regarding that
+
+human being, which draws attention to the notion of the social construction of law. On the other hand, move away from
+
+this perspective allows for more than one alternative to the formal treatment of the legal system:
+
+institutional and social actions where the enjoyment of a right, be it production or consumption,
+
+as well as the formulation
+
+(CASTRO, 2014).
+
+society, individuals and groups, whose practices allow, or not, the enjoyment of the rights
+
+This Analysis is carried out through predetermined steps, which can be summarized in
+
+the performance elements of the enjoyment of analytically decomposed rights can be seen in numbers.
+
+more holistic understanding of non-economic aspects that so influence preferences
+
+empirically by its titular subject. However, this is not a theoretical approach.
+
+For this, AJPE makes use of complementary analytical strategies as a means of
+
+a credit policy. In the second, the analyzed object is linked to subjective rights
+
+economical.
+
+combined, define the enjoyment of the right itself. Seen in another way, this beam is precisely
+
+level of empirical fruition of a given right based on the analysis of social conduct standards and
+
+institutional conduct necessary for the enjoyment of the right analyzed, an exercise that can take
+
+own right. On the one hand, the jusnaturalist premise of rights inherent to the human being is denied.
+
+of a fair fruition parameter. In the words of Castro (2014), position is “the intersection of
+
+what Castro (2007, 2009, 2014) calls “programs or contractual aggregates”. The utilization
+
+which they consider essential for the empirical enjoyment of the law examined. In the fourth, translate
+
+formalism of legal positivism, which suppresses references to substantive legal content
+
+acquires existence”.
+
+envisions the law by considering the views of other members of the
+
+–,
+
+72
+
+subjective.
+
+AJPE, instead, understands the law from the lived social experience
+
+six. In the first, an economic policy or a component thereof is identified, such as
+
+In the fifth, the verified values are aggregated to result in a single index, the Index
+
+and the social experience of the right by its holders when they are influenced by policies
+
+access this information. The first one is the “Positional Analysis”, which tries to identify the
+
+centered on the subject of law, but rather on the bundle of social relations and institutional practices that,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+2nd stage Subjective Law Y
+
+Conduct
+
+Standard
+
+6th stage
+
+10
+
+Source: Own elaboration.
+
+20
+
+5th stage
+
+Conduct
+
+Public Policy X
+
+Fruition
+
+Institutional C
+
+Empirical
+
+Conduct
+
+Legal
+Validation
+Index of
+
+1st Stage
+
+Institution B
+
+Figure 3 - Graphical overview of the Positional Analysis
+
+4th Stage
+
+Institutional A
+
+10
+
+3rd Sta
+
+ge
+
+unidirectional, “top-down”, aiming at the financial development of societies
+
+of Empirical Fruition (IFE). On Friday, an index is defined based on values considered fair
+
+Castro (2014) highlights that the focus on the empirical enjoyment of a right researched in a context
+
+less developed.
+
+The contrast between IFE and PVJ can reveal to the jurist discrepancies in the enjoyment of a
+
+for each of the institutional conducts analyzed, giving rise to the Validation Standard
+
+Legal (PVJ). The graph below attempts to provide an approximate illustration of this procedure:
+
+social demands that such reforms be structured from the bottom up, “towards higher levels”
+
+law, as well as offering insights into possible recommendations for improving
+
+high' of normative references”. In this way, AJPE joins the NDD approach and
+
+criticism of the dominant theoretical framework regarding the impropriety of legal reforms
+
+73
+
+social experience, through proposals for public policy reforms. In that regard,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+private or public, these defined as the result of institutionalized negotiations, in the
+
+nationalities, according to AJPE, are also interconnected by these links, the
+
+which are distinguished by containing content described in terms of monetary assets also in
+
+The second analytical strategy is called “New Contractual Analysis” (CASTRO,
+
+unit of analysis with the purpose of observing the conditions of enjoyment of a given
+
+AJPE's second analytical strategy allows the translation into legal terms of the transmission
+
+2010), or “Portfolio Analysis” (CASTRO 2014), which makes use of contractual aggregates as
+
+utility clauses (CASTRO, 2010).
+
+private (CASTRO, 2014). The figure below illustrates this organization of contractual clauses of the
+
+these specify obligations translated into pecuniary values, those describe a
+
+Considering that all market economies have contractual aggregates
+
+AJPE.
+
+74
+
+utility of the economy. This situation changes only in cases of financial contracts,
+
+mandatory minimum requirements (as provided for by law, administrative act or construction
+
+All economically relevant contracts have two ideal types of clauses:
+
+made up of different combinations of these four types of clauses and that the economies
+
+actual content or utility clauses; and monetary content clauses. While
+
+jurisprudential), without any possibility of removal through contractual negotiation
+
+right taking into account how certain contents (especially monetary ones) and their
+
+Furthermore, both types of clauses can convey content of interest
+
+variation arising from intercontractual relationships may affect such enjoyment. According to AJPE,
+
+scope of legislative, judicial and administrative processes, which often determine
+
+Goods and services produced in
+the real economy (determination
+made through private negotiation).
+
+legislative process, for example).
+
+Figure 4 – New contractual analysis
+
+legislative process, for example).
+
+clauses
+
+M' U'
+Provision of goods and services
+produced in the real economy
+(determination carried out through
+institutionalized negotiations –
+
+M
+Monetary Clause
+
+Amount of money or financial
+asset transacted (determination
+made through private negotiation).
+Private Interest
+
+Source: Adapted from Castro (2010, 2014).
+
+Public interest
+Provision of financial resources
+(determination made through
+institutionalized negotiations –
+
+U Utility Clause
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+contractual aggregates to maintain investment levels, which could mean
+
+a powerful analytical tool to evaluate unilateral actions by foreign jurisdictions, in
+
+United States (Locality A), as the amendment of clause M' in the United States
+
+transnational impact of unilateral conduct by countries on interest clauses
+
+The figure below illustrates this dynamic with the following hypothetical situation: the Locality
+
+absence of instruments such as the AJPE leaves these connections between contractual aggregates to the
+
+that foreign states intervene in a qualitatively different way in economic policy,
+
+public.
+
+(Location A) may represent gains from regulatory arbitrage, which would force Group W,
+
+contract between Groups Y and W, even if agreed under the jurisdiction of Location B, the
+
+In this sense, Castro (2014) states that, with the AJPE, jurists now have
+
+75
+
+Brazil, for example, will also be affected by the unilateral change in M' promoted by the
+
+as the consumption of families in Location B.
+
+basic interest rate. The contractual aggregate that binds Groups X and Y – which can be
+
+margin of any juridical argumentative opposition, relegating subjects such as “wars
+
+financial institutions and investors, respectively – will be affected. However, the aggregate
+
+exchange rates”, for example, to deliberation solely within the scope of politics and economics
+
+A – a country like the United States, for example – changes through processes
+
+and, in this way, there is a transmission of impacts originating from different monetary policies. A
+
+Brazilian financial institutions, for example, having to realign the other clauses of their
+
+institutionalized, such as the administrative process, the mandatory content of Clause M', the
+
+credit enhancement. This, in turn, could affect the enjoyment of fundamental rights,
+
+Location B
+
+Group X
+
+U-Clause U' clause
+
+Group Y
+
+M-Clause M'- Clause
+
+Figure 5 – Transnational transmission of economic policy changes
+
+Group W
+
+Location A
+
+Source: Own preparation.
+
+Contractual Aggregates and their clauses:
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(credit, foreign exchange, derivatives, sovereign debt, etc.), whose conclusions identified gaps
+
+Armed with these two strategies and guided by the search for justice, the jurist could,
+
+Finance.
+
+The legal theory of finance founds the beginnings of a political economy of finance (PISTOR,
+
+Legal Theory of Finance ( PISTOR, 2013a). All eleven
+
+The Legal Theory of Finance (TJF) proposes greater importance of the legal structure
+
+the time, form and conditions under which non-economic values and interests should
+
+This theoretical discourse originates from the multidisciplinary effort of a research program
+
+efficiency and cost/benefit analysis (CASTRO, 2005, 2009). AJPE intends to serve this way
+
+funding through the market mechanism, strengthens dependence on economic relations
+
+leadership by Katharina Pistor (Columbia University). After two years, the group, which includes
+
+individual and the preservation of social values. By giving the jurist a form of access
+
+(CASTRO, 2014). Castro (2007) illustrates the coordination of economic policies already taking place in
+
+dependency would explain only part of the current complex intersection between finance and law.
+
+joint effort: ten case studies on different segments of the financial market
+
+wealth and consumption patterns.
+
+theoretical and alternative approaches. The set of these analyzes inductively gave rise to a
+
+distributive effects of legal rules, which puts it in an opposite position to the Law and
+
+(law in finance) – both influenced by a hierarchical systemic structure of power.
+
+in the face of decision-making dilemmas arising from economic policy, to access casuistry and analytically
+
+3.3. Legal Theory of Finance (Law in Finance)
+
+2013a, 2013b).
+
+articles were published in a special edition of the Journal of Comparative Economics.
+
+called Global Finance and Law Initiative, with academics from several universities, under the
+
+prevail, or not, over economic considerations based strictly on criteria of
+
+of financial markets: the reality of contemporary finance, marked by the rise of
+
+76
+
+of an instrument capable of guiding legal decisions aimed at both the promotion of freedom
+
+in relation to the commitments capable of being compulsorily applied by the State. That
+
+jurists, sociologists, political scientists and economists, presented in 2013 the result of the
+
+It is, in fact, a symbiotic relationship in which the latter is part of those – law in finance
+
+informal scope, although it may have, as seen, a wide impact on the creation and distribution
+
+to inequalities in the enjoyment of rights, the AJPE completely discards the neutrality of the effects
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of rules, whether legal or not. TJF does not take them, however, as a mere sum of
+
+markets and became influential from the 1970s onwards (SHAMOS, 2013; GILSON and
+
+precaution is necessary to deal with possible liquidity shortages. On the other hand, the lack of
+
+to the exacerbation of the also unstable nature of finance. The third asserts the existence of
+
+Shamos (2013) observes that Pistor (2013b) builds the theory in a bottom-up view,
+
+diversification of investments, which affects both banks and other intermediaries
+
+market, which depends on the premise that all relevant information is available
+
+finance hierarchy. The last draws an association between the position occupied within that
+
+Information increases market efficiency, which diverts the search for a superior solution.
+
+of financial contracts whenever necessary (PISTOR, 2013b).
+
+increasing the farther from the center.
+
+future (PISTOR, 2012).
+
+The legal theory of finance, in general, is confronted with the premise of
+
+stylized ones”, which, according to Pistor (2013b, pp. 317), should be understood as the ground for a
+
+financial markets as primary units of analysis, without existence outside a context
+
+– the scientific justification of a political ideology contrary to government regulation of
+
+financial intermediary entities and agents, such as Law and Finance (PISTOR, 2009).
+
+unique circumstances, not reducible to calculation of probabilities, prevent the adequate and
+
+of highly complex financial assets. The second maintains that the law contributes
+
+KRAAKMAN, 2014). Pistor (2012) maintains that even the hypothesis of the relative efficiency of
+
+Liquidity is a risk that cannot be fully covered through the liquidity strategy.
+
+a pre-established order of fulfillment of contractual obligations, which shows a
+
+hierarchy, polarized between center and periphery, with the binding force of legal norms
+
+to market participants, is counterproductive as it results in the false notion that more
+
+vulnerable to such lack of liquidity. This fact prevents the occurrence of renegotiation
+
+77
+
+In fact, the level of information about the present and the past does not reduce uncertainty about the
+
+This approach is also articulated around four initial perceptions, or “facts
+
+The inductive and empirical construction of this theory has the particularity of welcoming the
+
+new theoretical map for empirical observation of finance. The first emphasizes that nature
+
+neoclassical economics of market efficiency, cornerstone – albeit in a distorted way
+
+The TJF adopts, in contrast, two interconnected premises: the fundamental uncertainty of
+
+the market and the volatility of its liquidity84 . On the one hand, an uncertain future, which presents
+
+Liquidity is defined by Pistor (2013b) as the “ability to sell an asset for another or even for currency” (pp.
+316).
+84
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+from these same institutions to monetary resources. In this sense, sovereignties would be the
+
+legal between them.
+
+conceived as a hybrid product of public and private rules (GELPERN and GULATI, 2013).
+
+more renegotiations necessary to overcome a financial crisis, for example.
+
+on their respective currencies and the greater part of their debts in currency terms
+
+through contractual interconnections and self-references. It resonates by itself
+
+connections, as a complex of interdependent contractual obligations (IOUs –
+
+of this approach. Mehrling (2012) states that the various financial instruments, such as
+
+issued both by private agents, such as derivatives, and by public entities, such as
+
+depends on respect for the commitments set out therein, influenced by positive law and
+
+quantitatively, but also qualitatively. It also maintains that the hierarchical position
+
+domestic or foreign and also in terms of domestic or foreign currency (PISTOR, 2013b).
+
+bottom-up, while neoclassical economics – here developed through the Law
+
+equivalent to legal structures, composed of networks of links between contractual obligations
+
+emit them. The position in the hierarchical structure, according to Mehrling (2012), depends on access
+
+Law and Finance literature falls on the agents, while Law in Finance highlights the bonds
+
+institutions with greater resources, since they are, in the last instance, the ones that have as much control
+
+purely private contracts and those that include sovereign nations, markets are
+
+form (PISTOR, 2013b). Furthermore, these legal commitments could further complicate
+
+Pistor (2013b) notes that the legal nature of markets emerges as a network of
+
+This approach would be able, therefore, to explain the scope and reaction of the markets,
+
+A hierarchical and dynamic financial system is also part of the initial perceptions
+
+national currency, foreign currencies, gold, Treasury bonds, are not only different
+
+Interdependent web of contractual obligations), a category that includes financial instruments
+
+conceptualization of financial asset, conceived, by Pistor (2013b), as a contract whose value
+
+78
+
+sovereign debt securities, which can be issued in state jurisdiction
+
+interpretation of regulators and the judiciary. Once considered that the financial markets
+
+between them reflects the different hierarchy between the bodies, entities and financial institutions that
+
+self-referenced and predetermined, it would be possible to predict how chain reactions would take place.
+
+and Finance – view markets from top to bottom, top-down. In this way, the emphasis of
+
+Incidentally, because of this characteristic of inserting within the same analytical category
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+quality of assets, there is debt execution and credit contraction. This oscillation between
+
+lower risk of default, while the opposite side was composed of the private sector. In your
+
+domestic85 – which would be linked to the debt socialization capacity of their sovereignties
+
+hierarchically superior to securities issued by banking entities, which would be
+
+The notion of hierarchy in the financial system goes beyond national borders. Mehling
+
+(2012a) points out that, in times of financial crisis, when the qualitative hierarchy of assets
+
+(MEHRLING, 2013). Thus, government bonds traded by the Treasury would be
+
+expansion movement, there is a quantitative increase in credit and qualitative differences between
+
+nationwide, is occupied by the institution with the greatest capacity to refinance its own
+
+79
+
+debts – in this case, a sovereignty represented by its own central bank –, that is, with
+
+the Keynesian view at one pole and the monetarist view of the economy at the other (MEHRLING,
+
+it is also a cardinal point of the theory of legal finance. The financial system is thought of as
+
+a structure in constant movement, sometimes expanding, sometimes contracting, whose apex, in
+
+2012). The figure below illustrates the dynamics of the monetary system:
+
+higher than those issued by companies, for example (MEHRLING, 2012).
+
+assets are irrelevant. In the reduction movement, the different hierarchies are accentuated
+
+The dynamism of the financial system as conceived by Mehling (2012a, 2012b)
+
+one movement and another would find a counterpart in business cycles, between the prevalence
+
+85
+
+Figure 6 – Dynamics of expansion and contraction of the monetary system
+
+Source: Adapted from Mehrling (2012b).
+
+Pistor (2013b) and Mehrling (2013) point out that discrepancies are observed regarding the perception of each
+country's ability to refinance its own debt. In this sense, Mehrling (2012) observes that the foreign exchange market
+is an indicator that there is also a hierarchy in terms of the resources available to each sovereignty, with a large
+advantage for the United States, since the dollar has become an international currency.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Free translation of “probability that ex ante legal commitments will be relaxed or suspended in the future”
+(PISTOR, 2013b, pp. 320).
+86
+
+because of falling real estate prices. This process ended up spreading, in the case of
+
+which, in turn, depends on having (i) control over its currency and (ii) the issuance of a majority of
+
+and regulatory issues throughout this hierarchical system, particularly in times of crisis. That would be
+
+The application of the concept of elasticity of law added to the conception of a system
+
+found it more difficult to receive their payments (RONA-TAS and GUSEVA, 2013).
+
+differentiated from law through the concept of elasticity, defined as “the probability of
+
+between sovereignties is unequal (MEHLING, 2012a; PISTOR, 2013b). To illustrate, Mehling
+
+hierarchical classes. For example, Rona-Tas and Guseva (2013) show that loans
+
+there was questioning of its ability to pay, regarding the use of the dollar as currency
+
+of divergence between what was foreseen and what actually happened in the future, the greater the
+
+more costly as, with the emergence of the financial crisis of 2008, there was appreciation
+
+The existence of hierarchy among financial assets raises the question about their
+
+startles, investors change their investment portfolio, initially getting rid of
+
+finance, where entities and institutions considered essential for the
+
+prevented from refinancing debts and began to foreclose on such mortgages, with significant losses
+
+sovereignties with large resources and capacity to refinance their own debts, the
+
+Hungary, for other sectors of the real economy, such as telephony, in which companies
+
+of financial market participants reveals the differentiated application of contractual rules
+
+are fully applied, resulting in involuntary exits from the system (PISTOR, 2013b).
+
+your debts in that same currency. Based on these criteria, the distribution of financial power
+
+opposed to the uniform legal application of the rule of law. Pistor (2013b) conceives this application
+
+hierarchical monetary system allows the visualization of the existence of hierarchies within the
+
+Based on illustrations like this, Pistor (2013b) argues that the periphery of localities
+
+real estate purchases made by Eastern European consumers in foreign currency have become
+
+(2012a) cites both Ireland, which was unable to refinance itself using its own currency, as
+
+a legal commitment to be relaxed or suspended in the future”. , so the greater the chance
+
+80
+
+international market and increased demand in times of crisis.
+
+elasticity of law. While the right tends to be more elastic at the apex of the system
+
+of these currencies, such as the Swiss franc, and banks, faced with the credit crunch, found themselves
+
+structural survival, law tends to be inelastic at the periphery, where legal rules
+
+those lower quality assets. In this sense, the best assets will be issued by
+
+impacts on the effectiveness of legal rules. Pistor (2013b) maintains that behavior
+
+86
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(Pistor, 2013b). The contemporary financial market presents dynamics that seek to increase
+
+historical circumstances. Pistor (2013b) cites as an example the success in wars in the case of
+
+those who push aside legal rules are also constituted by binding rules, only
+
+the premise that non-state entities have limited resources by definition, therefore,
+
+current situation of financial interdependence, is not capable of reducing the fragility of those before crises
+
+2013). Furthermore, the TJF stipulates that the migration from a relationship-based finance model
+
+direct control of the rules applicable to global finance and indirect control through intermediaries
+
+guarantor of this asset will only remain as such until its own survival is
+
+2013b). In this way, the law lends credibility to the system, by conferring
+
+The Legal Theory of finance builds on these four premises a vision of how
+
+by the financial system in relation to the enforcement capacity of legal systems
+
+abandoned in times of crisis and consequent search for lower risk assets guaranteed by
+
+monetary policy (PISTOR, 2013b). Its design is based on four other propositions. A
+
+peripheral areas of the financial system carry, in the case of the real estate market, not only the risk
+
+The second highlights the necessarily hybrid nature, public and private, of
+
+The third consists of the suggestion of a paradoxical relationship between law and finance
+
+However, the position occupied in the hierarchy of the financial system results from
+
+of returns and dilution of risks through the diversification of investments which, due to the level
+
+necessarily legal. This rejects the idea of markets "outside" the rules, because even
+
+Sovereign State as guardian of the survival of the system. This essential hybridity
+
+United States, in addition to highlighting that the strengthening of this superior position from the
+
+built through the delegation of normative production to the private sector (HODGSON,
+
+even if there is currency or financial assets in circulation not backed by a sovereign, the
+
+systemic. This, in turn, harms compliance with legal stipulations (PISTOR, 2012,
+
+at stake (PISTOR, 2013b). Furthermore, this asset not backed by sovereignty tends to be
+
+domestic financial institutions with transnational operations.
+
+personal to another organized through the market mechanism entails greater dependence
+
+greater confidence for investors in the fulfillment of contracts. In times of crisis, however,
+
+81
+
+contemporary finance operates both in times of expansion and contraction
+
+(GILPERN and GULATI, 2013; PISTOR, 2013b).
+
+sovereignties capable of refinancing their own debts (MEHRLING, 2013).
+
+financial markets, as a consequence of dependence, ultimately, on the performance of the
+
+of the loan, but also the risk of the currency itself.
+
+The first emphasizes that financial markets are systems of binding rules, not
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(CARRUTHERS, 2013, PISTOR, 2013a, 2013b)
+
+(RONA-TAS and GUSEVA, 2013, PISTOR, 2013a, 2013b)
+
+Theoretical Formulations
+
+Financial markets are
+necessarily public and
+private.
+
+Empirical Evidence
+The emergence of new highly complex financial assets, such as
+derivatives, although regulated by private rules,
+
+Source: Own preparation.
+
+(PISTOR, 2013a, 2013b)
+
+Figure 7 - Empirical evidence of the Legal Theory of Finance
+
+The position occupied by an entity within the hierarchy of the
+financial system determines the strength with which the law
+will be applied in the future, with changing circumstances. Countries
+with more access to resources, control of their currency and their
+debts, have greater political discretion.
+
+(MEHRLING, 2013, PISTOR, 2013a, 2013b)
+
+Crises show the existence of preferences regarding financial
+assets, based on the institution that guarantees them. The central
+banks of countries affected by the crisis acted as guardians of the
+survival of the financial system, even though the crisis originated
+in the private sector.
+
+The complexity of financial assets requires legal protection. In times
+of crisis, however, the full application of the law represented
+a risk to the survival of the financial system.
+Law and Finance are
+paradoxically related.
+
+Where right is elastic,
+power becomes
+prominent.
+
+Financial markets are
+equivalent to systems of
+binding rules.
+it has limits, which was observed in the 2008 crisis. These limits
+put pressure on the legal acceptance of these new contractual
+forms in all jurisdictions.
+
+global, determined by the five largest central banks, the US FED, the ECB,
+
+by sovereignties with more access to resources, Pistor (2013b) argues that the
+
+full enforcement of the law would result in the destruction of the financial system, even though
+
+2013b).
+the suspension of previously stipulated standards mitigates the credibility of the system (PISTOR,
+
+sovereignties with control of their currency and their own debt. In this sense, Mehling (2012)
+
+TJF formulations.
+
+(2013b) uses this differential relationship with law as the very definition of power.
+
+82
+
+In this way, combined with the premise that the apex of the hierarchy in the financial system is occupied
+
+from Japan.
+
+individuals and groups in the financial system, attention is drawn to the discretion of decision-making
+
+state decision on who should be excluded from the general effectiveness of the right. By the way, Pistor
+
+The figure below organizes the empirical evidence that supported the four
+
+The fourth associates the elasticity of law with the political economy of finance. Before the
+
+mentions that economic stabilization measures, for example, would depend on the policy, within the
+
+existence of different legal treatments based on the hierarchical position occupied by
+
+of the European Union, the Bank of England, of the United Kingdom, the SNB, of Switzerland, and Nippon Ginko,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+from a model guided by autonomous administrative agencies to another with greater
+
+that will determine the future of the system (PISTOR, 2013b).
+
+survival of the system, whether globally or domestically (PISTOR, 2013b).
+
+The Legal Theory of Finance, as a predictive approach, still risks stipulating
+
+financial system to be mutually beneficial to central countries, through the increase of
+
+important to the survival of the system, and consequently the level of resources to be
+
+eventually mobilized for its stabilization in a post-crisis moment. Still, in
+
+future stages of the development of financial markets. First, despite the expansion of
+
+This hypothesis is worrying as recent regulatory changes
+
+Third, the TJF predicts that this proximity of financial market participants
+
+decisions made by those at the center, market participants
+
+in relation to the center of the financial system will increase the number of groups considered
+
+83
+
+financiers will seek to place themselves close to the group responsible for making crucial decisions to the
+
+other financial market participants, known as interest groups with
+
+periphery of the system (PISTOR, 2013b).
+
+Second, as in financial turmoil the survival of the system depends on
+
+great capacity for mobilizing resources (GADINIS, 2013; GERDING, 2013).
+
+returns, and to peripheral countries, with a reduction in the cost of credit, the consequences of crises
+
+promoted by the United States, with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, represented the migration
+
+financial resources are unequally distributed, with full application of the right only to the
+
+political participation, which can increase the lobbying influence of financial institutions and
+
+Ultimately, the TJF predicts that it will be the policy of the country occupying the apex of the global system
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+involved identification and microeconomic analyzes of unprecedented scope, with results,
+
+While limited to the academic environment, theories provide subsidies to the understanding of
+
+may lose jobs and savings and, worst of all, faith in society and hope for the future
+
+represent a turning point in empirical research in the study of finance, economics
+
+of econometric modeling (DAM, 2006; KAPLAN and ZINGALES, 2014). Furthermore,
+
+political position on top of a scientific tower, which not only disqualifies speeches
+
+political actors to serve political goals (GILSON and KRAAKMAM, 2014). However,
+
+from a geographical, thematic and methodological point of view, whether due to the impact on scientific production
+
+institutional and legal and economic history (GLAESER and SHLEIFER, 2002; GRAFF,
+
+studies, and the contradictions found are fundamental for progress in science (KUHN,
+
+the mere progressive adoption of formal rules (PISTOR, 2009; KREVER, 2013).
+
+This approach, for example, systematized previously non-existent data. To the
+
+and regulatory policy.
+
+4. SOME REVIEWS
+
+in the academic production of the theme object of this study, seems to some extent to represent
+
+to a small number of countries (KAPLAN and ZINGALES, 2014). Law and Finance literature
+
+in general, and financial development in particular, matter in the real world.
+
+most of the time, deciphered in accessible, robust and objective language, not depending
+
+legal reforms can be the cause of serious damage, because when the law fails, people
+
+academic debate, this theoretical perspective has proved influential, in large part, for
+
+world, but when they enter political reality, theory is inevitably modified by
+
+(MICHAELS, 2009a). The political appropriation of academic theories seems to isolate decision-making
+
+comparative law and comparative law (SPAMANN, 2008; MICHAELS, 2009a), whether from the points
+
+combined multidisciplinary thoughts, from corporate finance theory, economics
+
+arising from it.
+
+if in the academy the theoretical limitations find fertile ground for the deepening of
+
+contrary to it, but also reduces the right, in democratic societies, to build
+
+2008).
+
+84
+
+1996), this does not happen when theories are used as justification for political discourse
+
+Law and Finance, an approach dealt with in the second section and which occupies a dominant position
+
+comparative empirical research until then involved extensive and therefore restricted descriptions
+
+example of improper mutation of explanatory theory into normative theory. When it comes to the
+
+Theories that attempt to explain how legal institutions relate to the economy,
+
+Theoretical approaches involving law raise specific ethical questions:
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+87 Although the Law and Finance methodology influenced the Doing Business World Bank Report, the study
+most relevant to the design of this Project was developed by economist Hernando de Soto, who analyzed
+the process of formalizing business and its impediments in Peru (WORLD BANK, 2015 ). See Section 2.2.3.
+
+There was even an inference of causality in the sense that the civil law resulted in greater
+
+of publicly traded companies as a continuous conflict between investors and shareholders
+
+head of the institution) (MILHAUPT and PISTOR, 2008), reveals questionable symbiosis from the point of view
+
+two studies were identified that can be pointed as the poles of this perspective
+
+their scope, relied not only on the resources of the World Bank, but also on its
+
+PORTA et al., 2008), and also contributed to the consolidation of two new fields of
+
+most recent consolidation, by La Porta et al. (2008), more sophisticated version identified
+
+Used, however, as a basis for legal recommendations from organizations
+
+of this dominant framework already coincided with the positions then adopted by the World Bank
+
+superiority of the common law legal tradition over the continental law tradition
+
+Law and Finance approach abandoned the controversial and thought-provoking academic character to the
+
+This literature was responsible for the significant increase in research on the role
+
+Parallel to the political appropriation of academic theories, this study found that,
+
+grounded in the idea of legal transplants from English and French legal traditions.
+
+corporate, with an emphasis on investor protection (DAM, 2006). Inaugurated a conception
+
+concentration of ownership.
+
+and authors typically associated with this literature, such as Simeon Djankov (former economist
+
+does not present itself in a monolithic manner. According to the literature review carried out,
+
+controllers, whose balance is determined by legal variables (COFFEE, 2001; LA
+
+view of the sociology of science. Quantitative research in Law and Finance, great in terms of
+
+theory: on the one hand, the initial study by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and, on the other hand, the
+
+expressly as a theory about origins. The earliest conclusions pointed to a certain
+
+research, law and finance and the new comparative economy (MICHAELS, 2009).
+
+prestige on the international stage for its advertising. Furthermore, the first conclusions
+
+85
+
+international institutions, whose renown inspires general credibility, such as the World Bank, the literature of
+
+since the mid-1990s.
+
+European in relation to financial development and economic performance, thesis
+
+contrary to what is sometimes cited in works of the genre, the Law and Finance literature
+
+of legal institutions on economic development, as well as on governance
+
+in-depth research: it gained the status of a truth, a legal remedy for structural ills, through projects such as
+
+Doing Business87 . In fact, the relationship between this institution
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+which legal institutions are relevant to the process of economic development
+
+state abuse and more adaptive solutions to market changes, while civil law would have its
+
+static infrastructure that, once established, does not interact with social, economic,
+
+refer to the political-social context: the concentration and decentralization of power that occurred,
+
+Motivated by this literature, it fueled discussions about the strengths and weaknesses of the methods
+
+legal and financial development as an upward linear graph where more rules
+
+private.
+
+glorious and French, which occurred in the 17th and 18th centuries. Now, in both explanations, the
+
+quantitative, attempts to translate the complexity of law into more malleable, transparent terms
+
+that is, with the effectiveness of legal norms, the multifunctionality of rules is underestimated
+
+financial markets and improved economic performance.
+
+literature review carried out, the literature on the origins does not provide grounds for the
+
+that inform legal norms. It is the implicit defense of a model that refers to
+
+The most recent conclusions consolidated in La Porta et al. (2008) discard
+
+variations in legal protections for investors – the legal tradition adopted by countries –
+
+Despite these contradictions, Law and Finance was responsible for establishing the idea of
+
+from social and economic circumstances – common law offers the best defense against
+
+(MICHAELS, 2009a). It was found that the interdisciplinary dialogue between Law and Economics
+
+economic. Pistor (2009) identified in Law and Finance the interpretation of law as a
+
+Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) the two origins of variations between common law and French civil law
+
+virtues with regard to the implementation of public policies and disorder control in the sector
+
+and politicians. In this way, the literature on origins conceives the relationship between institutions
+
+respectively, in France and England, from the Middle Ages, as well as the liberal revolutions,
+
+quantitative and qualitative. On the one hand, the literature on origins, based on method
+
+political-social context emerged as a determinant of the legal norms adopted at the time. At
+
+Although origins theory embraces concerns that go beyond formal law,
+
+in accordance with a given previous prescription would be associated with greater robustness of
+
+and simple for the general public. Furthermore, the use of statistical quantification techniques in
+
+86
+
+and principles of law, as well as the role played by informal surrogates and values
+
+However, the explanation given by this theoretical approach about the determining factor of
+
+reasons why this same context would not produce more inflections on the legal system.
+
+contradicts the very conception of law that is immune to the social changes underlying it. Second
+
+any absolute superiority of these two traditions, preferring relative superiorities to
+
+Max Weber, who saw law as a rational normative system prior to activity
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+that politics may determine the timing of legislative changes, but it does not determine the
+
+information about the growing integration of the global economy. Still, the method
+
+et al, 2009; SPAMANN, 2008). In general, the globalization of law and its variations
+
+policy (PAGANO and VOLPIN, 2005; ROE, 2000). Stulz and Williamson (2003), for example,
+
+A second strand of competing theoretical approaches to Law was also identified.
+
+KERHUEL, 2009).
+
+different norms from different legal systems can perform the same functions, which
+
+that religion is a more important determinant of creditor protection. La Porta et al.
+
+main thesis asserted by it would not be sustained from some historical facts, such as the
+
+As a result, the complementarity of methods was perceived in the sense that both
+
+alternatives to the Law and Finance literature and its recipe for transnational legal transplants.
+
+explanatory factor armed with the perception that the origins overlap with it, as they bring
+
+began to pay greater attention to the functionality of legal rules (LA PORTA et al, 2008)
+
+study of legal institutions allowed for an expansion of the scope of research, which had not previously been
+
+were based on the codification of laws and a quantitative method similar to that used by
+
+changes in the right to political and economic arrangements, the reply is based on the argument that
+
+extensively descriptive method proved to be incapable of meeting the needs of systematization
+
+format of institutional solutions, these would be the result of welcoming the origins.
+
+concern with the empirical reality and the simplicity of exposing the results (ARMOUR
+
+other factors such as culture (LICHT, GOLDSCHMIDT and SCHARWTZ, 2007) and economics
+
+qualitative also proved to be essential for improving the precision of concepts and clarifying how
+
+borders require a new approach for new analyzes (FAUVARQUE-COSSON and
+
+compare religious traditions and their philosophical position on the charging of interest, to sustain
+
+and Finance, which see the theory of origins as a product of history, as the
+
+(2008), precursors of the dominant framework, refute studies focused on culture as a
+
+dispels misunderstandings of the quantitative method.
+
+This study outlined a descriptive overview of some of the main approaches
+
+pragmatic origin of Roman Law (MALMENDIER, 2009) or even the apex of the force
+
+87
+
+quantitative research, usually carried out by economists, in the field of law and finance
+
+Three lines of competing theoretical views were identified. The first refers to studies that
+
+the definition of legal tradition from the concept of ideology. As for studies dealing with
+
+LLSV. These studies, however, explore the hypothesis that the origins are mere proxies of
+
+carried out by conventional comparative law. On the other hand, a qualitative approach
+
+as qualitative research, generally carried out by jurists, began to have greater
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+However, the lack of a single or even dominant concept of
+
+of corporate governance and financial development are mediated by the characteristics
+
+for their concern with the distributive effects of legal rules and which highlight the
+
+of each country. In fact, this conclusion that legal transplants in themselves are not elements
+
+researchers involved with this doctrine. Prado (2010), for example, suggests as a challenge
+
+very different visions. The first of them, New Law and Development, clashes with
+
+informal arguments that rule out the need for changes in positive law. That is, the impact of
+
+version of Law and Development, around the beginning of the 1970s (TRUBEK and
+
+He cites the right to property, which can mean different institutions from the perspective
+
+of time. Coffee (2001), for example, shows that the British and Americans developed
+
+interdisciplinary research involving economic institutions, legal institutions and the search
+
+potential ethnocentrism and legal imperialism that involves the export of legal models
+
+legal.
+
+French economy at the beginning of the 20th century (RAJAN and ZINGALES, 2003). In that line,
+
+Specifically with regard to financial development and performance
+
+SANTOS, 2002) and even projects such as Doing Business.
+
+It was found that the consequences of any legal reform with an impact on the structure
+
+development in the reviewed literature of this theoretical approach hinders the union between
+
+alternatives to Law and Finance. It is argued that this group brings together views that are similar
+
+institutional design nationally appropriate to social, economic and political circumstances
+
+institutional aspects of the system in which they are inserted, with the possibility of influencing norms
+
+existence of systemic asymmetries in the effectiveness of legal norms, even though they are
+
+sufficient to change economic institutions would have already been achieved by the first
+
+the occurrence of different meanings for institutions that lead to development.
+
+GALTANTER, 1974). Furthermore, this movement would also have already clarified the
+
+reforms depends on the prior institutional arrangement and its parallel development over the course of
+
+too much about its cohesion and structure. In fact, it appears to be more of a field of
+
+adopted, like that of the rich or the poor. With the emergence of new concepts of
+
+88
+
+very different forms of corporate governance, despite belonging to the same tradition
+
+by development.
+
+between countries, which again gained strength with neoliberal legal globalization (SOUZA
+
+economic, studies such as that of Schapiro (2011) support the need to build a
+
+follow studies by Cheffins, Bank and Wells (2012), Roe (2006) and Coffee (2001) for example.
+
+The present study dedicated a separate section to a third line of theoretical approaches
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+However, the fact that AJPE focuses on empirical research as a way of accessing
+
+and Development. Trubek (2012) points to the need for scholars in the area to open
+
+inherently intertwined with other social and legal institutions. From this new perspective, the
+
+systemic process of unilateral decisions that alter the contents of the contractual aggregates that
+
+national and global macro design on financial development without first
+
+finance, is perceived as vulnerable to distortions, with reduced ability to access the real
+
+doctrine.
+
+contract to four categories of clauses, subdivided, in general, into public/private and
+
+insights into the legal paths for distributing benefits and costs resulting from
+
+propositions. Two points of the AJPE seem to operate a certain revolution in legal thought
+
+For financial development in a global perspective, it seems to matter more
+
+that transversally affect an entire contractual aggregate, such as exchange rate, interest rate
+
+right. This is conceived less as a metaphysical entity, autonomous from other
+
+development, such as that of Jackson (2011), which separates economic growth from
+
+transmissions of contractual amendments initiated by negotiated decisions take place
+
+compulsory.
+
+de Prado (2010) on the existing conflicting potential within the New Law doctrine itself
+
+distributive effects of legal norms reduces the ability of this approach to draw a
+
+to the conception of the subjective right as a gradient of fruition, centered on the holder of the right and
+
+theoretical view, the jurist now has an analytical tool capable of visualizing the impact
+
+eyes to those potential political conflicts that may arise from the normative vision inherent in the
+
+binary criterion for coding laws into indices, basic to the method employed by Law and
+
+constitute the economy. This approach allows this to happen by reducing the content
+
+academic production on the subject. Even so, this vision is capable of launching relevant
+
+in monetary/real. From this, it becomes possible to identify the relative weight of clauses
+
+The second, the Legal Analysis of Economic Policy, presents greater cohesion of its
+
+fruition of rights of creditors and shareholders, for example.
+
+state decisions on issues today dominated only by economic discourse.
+
+89
+
+dominant. The first of them refers to the abandonment of formal categories for the treatment of
+
+AJPE's second key point: its instrumental purpose for identifying how
+
+basic income, taxes and minimum mandatory content, such as payment of dividends
+
+institutionally (judicial, administrative-regulatory and legislative processes). Through this
+
+development, to the point of suggesting that the former can prevent the latter, seems to strengthen the fear
+
+social or legal institutions and obedient to a binary criterion of existence or not. What's wrong?
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+empirical evidence, its propositions in their final version have not yet been fully
+
+taken as an example the advances in expanding the scope of research in comparative law
+
+same social order imbued by the sense of justice (CASTRO, 2012) – passively assists the double
+
+compared (SPAMANN, 2008). However, this study found that there was still a slight reaction due to
+
+These new conceptions challenge the dominant theoretical framework by abandoning the emphasis on
+
+strictly on the criterion of economic optimization deteriorate advances already achieved in fruition
+
+Economy, at domestic and global levels, as a continuous process in which these spheres
+
+how the law works, but also regulations on how it should work. And what else
+
+changes in the law itself. In this sense, Fauvarque-Cosson and Kerhuel (2009) warn that
+
+Although there is still controversy about the relevance of the role of law in
+
+The disadvantage of being recent and, therefore, still having reduced production
+
+purely economic discourse and the degradation of objects protected by legal norms.
+
+studies and the influence of their research on public opinion.
+
+Legal Theory of Finance (TJF). Despite being a theory formulated inductively, based on
+
+legal and economic institutions. The interdisciplinary dialogue proved to be beneficial for both,
+
+as a maintainer of order and defense of already assured rights and as a transformer of that
+
+tested. Even so, the TJF offers insights into the uneven structure of the financial system.
+
+(DEAKIN and SIEMS, 2009) and the conceptual and functional correction of research in economics
+
+dominance of economic discourse. On the one hand, legal changes that are based
+
+of rights. On the other hand, the economic discourse seems to monopolize political discussions about
+
+individual attitudes of countries and draw the structural interaction between Politics, Law and
+
+part of jurists against strictly economic considerations, not just positive ones, on
+
+90
+
+influence each other.
+
+What is surprising is that the silence of legal scholars comes at the cost of maintaining control over the
+
+jurists should take economists as an example of how to improve the relevance of their
+
+Faced with this situation, the jurist, who has a dual role towards society - both
+
+academic can also be attributed to the third alternative approach discussed in Section 3.3, the
+
+financial development, the certainty of interaction between institutions
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+fixed or universal (MALMENDIER, 2009; PARGENDLER, 2012a). Search results
+
+economic development in general and financial development in particular. Secondarily,
+
+There was a connection both with the contractualist view of the company, which refers to Coase
+
+support theories about the origins (LA PORTA et al., 2008), a sophisticated way that brought together
+
+adopted legal tradition – argue that, faced with social problems, common law countries
+
+(1976), from which the Law and Finance literature borrows the concern with agency costs
+
+as possible gaps to be filled by research in the area. Based on the growing
+
+1998 to 2008. The statement that the right can be quantified expanded the scope of research
+
+state action (DJANKOV et al., 2003a). Finally, the theory of origins argues that there are
+
+carried out took as a starting point the study by Pistor (2012) on the dominant theoretical view
+
+theory, Law and Economics, Law and Finance departs from it by emphasizing that differences between
+
+right (see Section 2.1.1.). Through statistical correlations considered robust, the literature
+
+generically as Law and Finance.
+
+5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
+
+would have a central influence on corporate governance and financial development
+
+each country, such as common law and civil law, although such categorization is not definitive,
+
+main theoretical views that explain how legal institutions interact with
+
+under this theoretical framework also pointed to distinct state behaviors based on the
+
+The first one was devoted to the origins of this discourse, based on the premises adopted by it.
+
+Secondly, the four propositions that
+
+we sought to identify the role reserved for the jurist by each of these theoretical discourses, as well as
+
+(1937, 1960), as well as Jensen and Meckling's theory of the ownership structure of the firm
+
+the main conclusions reached over ten years of academic research in the area,
+
+reinforce pro-market legal institutions, while French civil law countries reinforce the
+
+comparative studies on legal institutions, but has been criticized for providing an incomplete picture of the
+
+importance of finance for development and for the enjoyment of rights, research
+
+(see Section 2). Although this dual inheritance is also associated with another approach
+
+91
+
+about the regulation of the financial system, constant in the literature that became known
+
+legal traditions and between the functioning of judicial bodies in different countries of the world
+
+on origins associates variations of legal institutions with legal traditions followed by
+
+(LA PORTA et al., 2000a).
+
+This monograph was written with the aim of tracing a contemporary panorama of
+
+This predominant theoretical framework (Law and Finance) was described in three moments.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+88
+
+between legal institutions and economic institutions, aiming at a policy model
+
+. As an explanatory theory, the
+
+to investors, in the period between 1930-1970 (see Section 2.2.1.); and (iii) theories that identify
+
+projects from international organizations are supported, such as Doing Business, from the World Bank,
+
+local circumstances in each country. The Legal Analysis of Economic Policy, approach
+
+of legal changes (see Section 2.2.1.). As a predictive theory, the literature on the origins
+
+about origins, as mentioned by Kevin Davis
+
+The third section of this monograph described three theoretical approaches
+
+aims to combine the institutional conditions for the enjoyment of rights with considerations on the
+
+influence of origins. They face, however, three types of competition: (i) from theories that
+
+welcomed by them, even though the 2008 financial crisis, for example, seems to have
+
+Finance. The New Law and Development is presented as a doctrine or a field
+
+(ACEMOGLU, JOHNSON and ROBINSON, 2001); (ii) of studies that highlight events
+
+impact of law on economic performance, even though each legal tradition has,
+
+adopted against the crisis, by authorities within different traditions (see Section
+
+development, brings together authors who seem to share awareness about the interactions
+
+In a third moment, the three possible interpretations of the theory were discussed.
+
+economic drivers of development and that remains nationally adequate to the
+
+growth in the American capital market even after the increase in legal protections
+
+Financial development must embrace legal institutions typical of common law. In it
+
+political economy and informal social institutions as primary factors for understanding
+
+which recommends legal reforms based on theses arising from the Law and Finance literature.
+
+also cohesive and structured, it is described as an analytical tool for jurists, who
+
+holistic approach, which contrast with the assumptions and prescriptions belonging to the Law and
+
+Law and Finance propositions aim to associate current financial development with
+
+anticipates what types of solutions will be designed by States based on legal tradition
+
+economic dynamics of economic policy (see Section 3.2.). Finally, the legal theory of
+
+92
+
+see origins as mere proxies for other factors, such as colonial past
+
+represented an inflection point towards more convergence between medicines
+
+of studies (see Section 3.1.), which, although harboring diversity of views on the
+
+2.2.2.). As a normative theory, origins theory holds that countries that aspire to
+
+in different circumstances, particular virtues (LA PORTA et al., 2008).
+
+historical backgrounds contrary to the foundations of literature on origins, such as the small
+
+88 See note 62.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Finance, based on the premise of instability inherent to the financial system, in the progressive
+
+Section 3.3.).
+
+dependence of finance on the law, as well as on the existence of a monetary system
+
+hierarchical with ramifications from the global to the national economy, it links all
+
+With the presentation of the discussions throughout the sections above, and their evaluation (see
+
+Section 4), the work sought to contribute to clarifying the terms of the contemporary debate
+
+financial institutions to the same structure in which power is asymmetrically distributed
+
+93
+
+on relevant legal aspects concerning the regulation of financial markets.
+
+according to the possibility of future suspension or relaxation of legal commitments (see
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+BECK, Thorsten and LEVINE, Ross. Legal institutions and financial development. Handbook of
+New Institutional Economics. C. Menard and MM Shirley (eds), Dordrecht, Netherlands,
+Springer, 2005.
+
+BAGEHOT, Walter. Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. Henry S. King, London,
+1873.
+
+6. REFERENCES
+
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+
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+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+
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+
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+
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+
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+Critical Appraisal. Cambridge Press, 2006.
+
+WIGGINS, Rosalind, PIONTEK, Thomas and METRICK, Andrew. The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy:
+Overview. In: Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2012-3A-VI, October, 2014.
+
+TRUBECK, David. Law and Development. In: SMELSER, Neil and BALTES, Paul (Eds.).
+
+in:
+
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
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+First edition, 1982
+
+Rua da Consolação, 2697
+
+11th edition
+
+Editora Brasiliense
+
+Sao Paulo-SP
+
+Phone (011) 280-1222
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Law and law ............................................... .................................................... .......................... 3
+
+Main models of legal ideology ............................................. ................................. 14
+
+INDEX
+
+Legal ideologies ............................................. .................................................... ............. 7
+
+Sociology and law ............................................... .................................................... ............. 30
+
+The social dialectic of law................................................. .................................................... ...42
+
+Reading instructions.................................................. .................................................... ......... 59
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+law appears, starting with English, where law designates both things. But they should have
+
+but to dissolve the false or distorted images that many people accept as a faithful portrait.
+
+of our theme and, also there, many ideological clouds cover the naked
+
+of established power.
+
+In any case, this is not a vocabulary problem. The diversity of
+
+For this very reason, English and American authors have to speak of Right, not law, when
+
+indicated by different terms: lus and lex (Latin), Derecho and léy (Spanish), Diritto and legge
+
+of owners of the means of production. Although the laws present contradictions, which do not
+
+it cannot be said, naively or slyly, that all legislation is authentic law,
+
+State, because in his privileged position he would like to convince us that the
+
+legislative, dictated by the simple convenience of the power in exercise. The legislation covers,
+
+(Hungarian) and so on. Elsewhere in this little book, we will have to face the suggestion
+
+against it (this does not mean, note the reader, that the true Right cannot be a Right
+
+and correct, and denial of Law, warped by classistic interests and continual whims
+
+proposes the question of fair Law. The relationship between Law and Justice is an aspect
+
+The biggest difficulty in presenting Law will not be showing what it is,
+
+If we look for the word that is most frequently associated with Law, we will see
+
+The law always emanates from the State and remains, in the last analysis, linked to the class.
+
+The identification between law and law belongs, moreover, to the ideological repertoire of
+
+reality of things.
+
+serve us as a warning against this confusion, the other languages, in which Law and law are
+
+words directly affects the notion of what we are willing to accept as Law.
+
+organized, is under the control of those who command the economic process, as
+
+allow to reject them without examination, as pure expression of the interests of that class, also
+
+legitimate and indisputable. In this last alternative, we would let ourselves be wrapped up in the “packages”
+
+(Italian), Droit e loí (French), Recht e gesetz (German), Pravo e zakon (Russian), Jog e tõrveny
+
+intend to refer exclusively to the Law, regardless of the law or even, if applicable,
+
+legal, however that it would continue to be Law, if the law did not admit it.
+
+from the Greek, in which nomos (law) is also not identified, without further ado, with Law and Dikaion
+
+always, to a greater or lesser extent, Law and Anti-Law: that is, Law itself, straight
+
+dominant, because the State, as a system of organs that govern society politically
+
+LAW AND LAW
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+complete social transformation.
+
+be critically examined, even in a socialist country, because, as noted by the brilliant colleague
+
+forwards our itinerary, in this little book, which will appear in its conclusions.
+
+unions, parties, sectors of churches, professional and cultural associations and other vehicles
+
+repels “contestation” (as if institutional remodeling were not a proposal
+
+example); in the pretense of power which, yielding to the inevitable “openness”, later wants to control the
+
+Péteri, when he points out that the laws of a socialist country may not express the results of
+
+In this, however, the Law is imprisoned in a set of state norms, that is,
+
+repressive measures expressly indicated with a special application body and procedure). At the
+
+Authentic and global Law cannot be isolated in concentration camps
+
+accident in the legal process, and which may or may not lead to the best achievements.
+
+focus of Law, encompassing collective pressures (and even, as we will see, norms not
+
+they lack “authenticity and adequacy” and escape what is “true and correct”
+
+to exchange, even through the ballot box, the present state of affairs; in the “safeguards” with which it intends
+
+institutions not linked to the State) and adopt avant-garde positions, such as certain
+
+juridical, to apply it to the consideration of laws, is precisely the question to which
+
+juridical, with no right to seek beyond or above the laws. However, legislation must
+
+Marilena Chauí, it would be utopian/illusion) to imagine that, once the property is socialized, it is done
+
+seeks to separate the “trustworthy” (that is, the groups and people who are wine from the same barrel) and the
+
+of progressive engagement.
+
+Please note the arrogance with which every most decidedly authoritarian government
+
+This is also accentuated with reference to Law by the Hungarian jurist Zoltán
+
+admissible and even partially recognized in laws – in the case of constitutional amendments, for
+
+social, even when they do so with the recommendation of peaceful means).
+
+of standards of conduct imposed by the State, with the threat of organized sanctions (means
+
+However, as the Italian Marxist leader Gramsci noted, the dialectical vision needs to broaden the
+
+social evolution envisaged by the actualizing standards of socialism. There are also laws that
+
+diameter, to your taste; in the irritation with which he speaks of “the radicalism of any opposition that threatens
+
+legislative, as it indicates the liberating principles and norms, considering the law a simple
+
+guarantee the status quo (that is, in the implemented structure, the current schemes); in the cunning that
+
+contradictions, that power serves the people in general and everything that comes from there is immaculately
+
+legally. In what criteria can we seek the means of evaluating this element
+
+state-owned class and dispossessed and oppressed groups) that emerge in civil society (in
+
+“untrustworthy” (that is, groups and people who propose some form of restructuring
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+castrated, dead and embalmed, to the morgue of a pseudoscience, which jurists
+
+by the Courts, the question of Law) that placed that Declaration, as is due, above
+famous vote, in electoral justice, forward a jurisprudence (uniform decision, given
+
+by virtue of this same supposed identity; and this “Right” then goes beyond state norms,
+
+any law), called Human Rights. These, as we will see, raise awareness and declare the
+
+the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This has already been recognized among us by the current
+
+economic liberation", but economic liberation "is also impossible, if the cause of
+
+“right to difference” or a steamroller crushes them; if, in general, the
+
+legitimacy, as noted, among others, including the great bourgeois jurist Hermann Heller.
+
+From the point of view of socialism, Ernst Bloch's position is no different,
+
+An exact conception of Law cannot ignore all these aspects of
+
+know in a litany of unconscious or clever henchmen.
+pseudoscientific societies in the task of boys of imperialism and domination and degrade the search for
+
+effective social and not just demagogic and wordy; if the social class that prevails in it is the
+
+and overt or hypocritical and disguised.
+
+“exists” (as formalized law), but it guides the capture of Law from above.
+
+This depends, of course, on which State, specifically, the legislation arises from - whether it is
+
+irrevocable legal. And they condemn, of course, any State or legislation that wishes to
+
+Conservatives, not for nothing, call it “dogmatic”. True science, however, does not
+
+of any legislative deviation. Then, the distinguished liberal judge emphasized that the Declaration of
+
+Rights of Man. These two results do not arise automatically from the same act, but
+
+We would even say that, if the Law is reduced to pure legality, it already represents illegitimate domination,
+
+Rights (not least Rights and even supra-state; that is, with validity prior to and superior to
+
+President of the Supreme Court, Minister FM Xavier de Albuquerque, when he tried, in
+
+historical process, in which the circle of legality does not simply coincide with that of
+
+In many countries, including Brazil, there are legal provisions that contrast with
+
+the German Marxist philosopher, when he states that “dignity is impossible, without the liberation
+
+technocracy serves unchecked power; whether minority groups have guaranteed their
+worker or capitalist; whether the grassroots dominate the political process or the bureaucracy and
+
+paralyze constant progress, through bureaucratic-police dictatorships, whether they are cynical
+
+authoritarian or democratic; a social structure that is spoliative or tends towards justice
+
+can be based on “dogmas”, which deify the norms of the State, transform these practices
+
+The Rights of Man is a “chapter of an evident Constitution of all peoples” that has not yet been
+
+that is being acquired in social struggles and within History, to become an option
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+he does not humanly exist and regresses on the zoological scale.
+
+hang the reality of natural and social phenomena. Things, on the contrary, form
+
+In this perspective, when we seek what Law is, we are first asking
+
+reciprocally report to each other. There is no real establishment of rights
+
+in these very conditions of existence that prevail in Nature and Society, where
+
+what it comes to be, in the incessant transformations of its content and form of manifestation
+
+Humans, without the end of exploitation; there is no true end to exploitation without the
+
+Furthermore, they remain in constant movement and continuous transformation. And in this way
+
+concrete within the historical and social world. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible
+
+establishment of Human Rights”. Hence the importance of critical review, including in a
+
+they intertwine with the totality of observable objects and the natural and social forces that
+
+determine the “essence” of Law - what, despite everything, it is, as it goes on being: what
+
+socialist legislation.
+
+shape and guide its evolution. Each phenomenon (phenomenon is, etymologically, something
+
+it arises constantly, in diversity, and which is technically called ontology. It just stays
+
+Our objective is to ask, in the broadest sense, what is Law (with or without
+
+that emerges) can then reveal its foundation and meaning, which only emerges as a function of that
+
+with the caveat that a dialectical ontology, as indicated by the Hungarian philosopher, Lukács, has
+
+laws), but it is also necessary to clarify that nothing is, in a perfect and finished sense; what
+
+mobile totality. In isolation, each one loses its own meaning and vital connection, thus
+
+based on phenomena and it is from them that he seeks to deduce the “being” of something, sought,
+
+everything is, being. We mean, with this, that things do not obey ideal essences,
+
+like the organ without the organism in which it functions, or the man, without the society, outside of which
+
+thus, within the chain of transformations itself.
+
+created by certain philosophers, as a kind of fixed model, a metaphysical hanger, in which
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+LEGAL IDEOLOGIES
+
+that serve as the basis for reasoning) and the conclusions that scientists reach.
+
+highlight the deformations of reasoning, by its contents and methods, distorted to the taste
+
+say that a certain degree of ideology also interferes in these, affecting the premises (principles
+
+correctly?!" Incidentally, this is exactly what happens: no one reasons with absolute perfection and there are
+
+However, let us open a preliminary section in order to clarify in what sense
+
+serve as proof that, in ideologies, the “essence” of Law is becoming apparent, although
+
+Ideology meant, firstly, the study of the origin and functioning of
+
+it is very pleasant to know that we have been deluded and Stendhal has even vented in a way
+
+themselves, a person's or group's set of ideas, the structure of their opinions, organized
+
+power”, when they impose those false contents on social praxis. Just think, for example,
+
+found in the segment of History that extends from Antiquity to our days in the
+
+simply, different ways of placing the observer before the same phenomenon.
+
+French writer Stendhal was very irritated at the mere proposal of such a study. No
+
+ideological elements within it, but it even serves the social domination of the “owners of the
+
+considerable variety of meanings. In this way, it will be possible to show that the approaches
+
+the mental image does not exactly correspond to the reality of things.
+
+Thus, in the development of his research on what he calls “discourse
+
+incomplete or distorted.
+
+in a certain pattern. However, the study of ideas and their standardized sets began to
+
+ideas in relation to the signs that represent them; but soon began to designate these ideas
+
+picturesque: “a treatise on ideology is a shame! So they think I don't reason
+
+always a good margin of deformation, which the sciences themselves do not escape. we want
+
+what the “Chicago boys”, created in economist Friedman's incubator and, later,
+
+The sample is large enough (covering about 25 centuries) to
+geographic panorama called, according to a very common convention, “Western”.
+
+We will begin by recapitulating, briefly, the types of legal ideology
+
+diverse do not exclude each other, but on the contrary, they are integrated, representing,
+
+This verification was irresistible, in the analysis of ideologies, and for this very reason the
+
+competent”, Marilena Chauí correctly showed how science not only carries
+
+we are using the term - ideology -, which is used by different authors, in a
+
+of various conditionings, fundamentally social. In other words, it turned out that
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+a text in which the entire philosophy of Kant, the great figure of German idealism, was explained,
+
+as an institution highlights the social origin of the product and the processes, also social, of its
+
+check whether, with all this, what they say about a topic is right or wrong. we already read
+
+hit your fingers. We make this observation because we notice that certain people have the habit
+
+current, more common use of the term ideology, as a series of opinions that do not
+
+Ortega considered ideas as something we acquire through an effort
+
+set of ideas, forming a pattern, but only in the sector of these sets or in
+
+In the first two, it is considered in terms of the subjects who absorb and link it; at the
+
+both words used by the Spanish thinker Ortega y Gasset. No matter how right it was,
+
+it shows in what order of mental phenomena it appears. Ideology as false consciousness
+
+which are exact, nor liquidate their influence on the history of thought, which runs from right to
+
+From a fatal quota of ideological interferences (from preconceived “ideas”
+
+ideology as belief; b) ideology as false consciousness; c) ideology as an institution.
+
+ideological elements. Ideology as belief opposes the latter to ideas, in the sense that
+
+any other petty-bourgeois, does not validly appreciate all its ideas, some of
+
+used as “scientific” advisors for Chilean authoritarianism or even in social politics
+
+At this point, those different approaches that we have already mentioned emerge.
+
+When talking about ideology as a belief, no special reference is made to beliefs
+
+summed up and liquidated in two words: “petty-bourgeois”. Although we are opponents of
+
+deliberate mental and with the greatest possible degree of critical thinking. Beliefs, on the contrary,
+
+entire sets that carry and transmit the deformations. In this way, the
+
+reveals the characteristic effect of certain beliefs as a distortion of reality. the ideology
+
+third is sought in society and independently of the subjects. Ideology as belief
+
+not for that reason would he be unable, at many points, to hit the hammer on the nails instead of
+
+to disagree, in principle, with the name or social position of the authors, dispensing with
+
+left, including not a few Marxists.
+
+its content and effects were directed towards talking about ideology, no longer as a simple
+and modeled according to class positions), the study of ideologies and criticism of
+
+economy of Mrs. Thatcher, the “iron lady” of English conservatism.
+
+Disregarding nuances and subtleties, it is perhaps possible to group them into three main models: a)
+
+religious, although the latter may be - as indeed they are - infested with
+
+Kant, this summary judgment seems unacceptable to us, because it does not explain the difference between Kant and
+
+correspond to reality.
+
+transmission to groups and individuals.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+we are; that is, it does not even occur to us to discuss them, so obvious they seem to us. It is true that, for Ortega,
+
+and it can only arise due to the stupidity, ignorance or naughtiness of those who maintain it).
+
+arguing that if one "believes" (without reflecting on it) that the wall ahead is impassable
+
+“contestation”, their ruling class privileges).
+
+translates an unconscious deformation of reality. We don't see the underground of thoughtlessness
+
+are its presumed foundations. These then guide our attitudes and
+
+But, in any case, it is the subliminal (unconscious) nature of beliefs that
+
+we think it necessary to demonstrate it. We reason from it, but not about it, since
+
+“declamatory delirium” insofar as we calmly repeat (and, if challenged,
+
+Marxist contributions. This is not bad faith, Marx and Engels point out, since bad faith
+
+numbed by the propaganda of those who forged it. The “competent discourse”, in which science
+
+first step in the overcoming direction, that is, it would begin the process of de-ideologization. Per
+
+is ideology (it may be a valid residue of acquired certainties), but every ideology is
+
+energy with which the racist proclaims the “superiority” of white people over black people; with what the
+
+to the “radical” the disruption of “social peace” (which is, in fact, the peace to enjoy, without
+
+adopted the good or bad position; it simply seems that any other position is inconceivable
+
+place we occupy in the social structure. He says that the ideas we have and the beliefs
+
+challenge to beliefs. Anyone who touches them risks being insulted or kicked.
+
+beliefs can be positive and negative (to the external examination that is made of them), it is not
+
+False consciousness introduces itself into the analyzes of ideology, especially from the
+
+Ideology, therefore, is a false belief, an unreflected “evidence” that
+
+conscience. And the latter is expressed with all the more vigor the more fragile the list is, false)
+
+due to its large body, it does very well when avoiding a disastrous collision.
+
+where we went to look for it and, on the contrary, it brings us the illusion of such certainty that neither
+
+reasoning as wild “evidence”. The French writer Alain said that it is a
+
+we repeat exaltedly) the biggest and most convinced nonsense. Think the reader of
+
+considering it as an object of reflection and making critical sense affect it would already be the
+
+give a favorable characteristic to the ideology. In short, we would say that not every belief
+
+presupposes a conscious and voluntary distortion; ideology is partial blindness of intelligence
+
+That's right, we gladly accept the exchange of ideas, but we endure with difficulty a
+
+would represent prefabricated opinions, which come to us through the contagion of the environment, education and
+
+manifests itself as belief (to the extent that we remain in this, without verifying whether, in doing so, it is
+
+sexist denounces the “inferiority” of women compared to men; with which the bourgeois attributes
+
+Ideology, as a false belief, therefore leads us to approach the false
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+is more favorable to them, and they try to impose it on others, with all the resources they have at their disposal.
+
+explanation of the origins of ideology, pointing out the interests and conveniences of those who
+
+participate and, of course, in a prominent way, the laws themselves).
+
+capitalist societies, and resists more vigorously in certain countries of socialism
+
+everything that represents strength and power, including the mass media, the
+
+derivatives of it deviate into the dogmatic and mechanical view. Engels said, quite
+
+ideology, to its origins. In this order of investigations, the influence of
+
+Ideological formations would thus be related to class division,
+
+so that everything that comes to pass derives, without further ado, from the basic social structure.
+
+In any case, the ideologies absorbed and defined by this or that subject are not created by him,
+
+but received. This is what raises the approach of ideology as
+
+material existence). Such domination, evidently, will not be eternal, since the contradictions of
+
+Knowledge, whose scientific purpose is to investigate the social roots of any type of
+
+to socio-economic organization. There are relatively soluble ideological products, without changing the
+
+consumed. An example of this is machismo, already mentioned, which is attenuated, in certain
+
+much more is received than reworked. Basically, it was Marxism that proposed a
+
+convenient, through which the privileged classes replace reality with the image they
+
+weight of oppression, space is opened for contesting the “official” ideology.
+
+(mass communication bodies, education, special instruments of social control that
+
+implanted, at least in terms of the material basis of production relations.
+
+control social life - since, in it, they have appropriated the means of economic production and
+
+dialectic, which is at the core of Marxism, although it becomes quite obscure when certain
+
+But by now we have undoubtedly moved on from the nature and effects of
+
+organization of teaching and the production of laws.
+
+emphasis, that historical materialism is intended as a guide to study, not an easy recipe
+
+The fact is that any ideological phenomenon cannot be traced back to
+
+favoring one (privileged) and imposing itself on the other (spoiled at the very base of its
+
+of Marxism in all contemporary thought. A discipline called Sociology of
+
+institution, as something that is created and manifested in society and not in the head of this or
+
+structure end up breaking the pyramid of power and, aware of this, those who carry the
+
+corrupts itself in order to serve domination, maintains an inextricable connection with the discourse
+
+know, constitutes, whether its authors want it or not, a dialogue with Marxism, in which
+
+mode of production, as there are relatively indissoluble ones, even when exchange is
+
+But it is certainly convenient to tone down this influx, in proportion to the process
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+sneakily, in the depths of the mind). However, it is not really a “device”.
+
+complicated, because we are always oscillating between (deluded) belief and science
+
+similar to what it designates) has the risk of suggesting a form, also mechanical, of
+
+the contrasts between reality and ideologies are clear. Today, the worker no longer takes off his cap
+
+And, collectively, we do not participate in a tragedy, in which everyone is agitated in vain, dragged
+
+Marx's position when he said that the way to overcome “determinations” is to become aware of them. A
+
+external. And who would escape to correct the deformation or proclaim it incorrigible?
+
+of a drama, in which the characters seek their itinerary, fighting against barriers of every
+
+the German inflection bedingt (conditions) tends to be translated, inaccurately, as “determines”.
+
+He has already realized that there is “something wrong” in the system, in which the value of the goods produced by the
+
+difference that constitutes the surplus value, whose destination is too obvious for the
+
+possibility of transforming blindness into myopia and looking for the most improved glasses
+
+a kind of bang-bang, with the “good guys” on one side and the “bad guys” on the other) in the
+
+man and not just the functioning of machines and devices.
+
+emerge when the contradictions of a social structure worsen and the deepest crisis makes
+
+immaculate science, the knowledge of such Manichaeans. In fact, things are much more
+
+before it becomes a psychological fact (as it invades the mental formation, entering,
+
+Marx already remembered that we are neither totally free nor totally
+
+ideological, since this metaphor (meaning of a word extended to something else
+
+bowing to “Mr. Dr. who passes by smoking cigars and with the surplus value in his pocket.
+
+(rectifier) which, in any case, is never definitively considered perfect and finished.
+
+conditioning (“determinations” that can be overcome, not fatal), and this is how it is best understood
+
+performance. In this case, man would be an inert doll, fatally trapped by the determinations
+
+towards the inevitable catastrophe, like a band of incurably blind people: we participate, on the contrary,
+
+By the way, a French author, Cuvillier, has already observed that, in fundamental texts of Marxism,
+
+In any case, overcoming the “determinations” already accentuates the active participation of the
+
+gender and with the chance of a final victory against “destiny” (to the extent that we have the
+
+In fact, there is a curious kind of Manichaeism (a doctrine that sees everything as
+
+his work does not correspond to his share of salary: and it is precisely in this
+
+to see the path).
+
+of that individual. Ideology is a social fact (exterior, prior and superior to individuals),
+
+opposition between ideology and science, which tends to consider ideology the knowledge... of others and
+
+On the other hand, there are social conditions that favor awareness: they
+
+determined. If we can overcome determinations, they are, therefore, before
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+they determine cracks in institutional walls and break the veneer of ideologies.
+
+slavery occurred, which was his, in the production system in which that formula was
+
+belief that “everyone has their place”, as if this were imposed by the nature of things
+
+confused, who “contests” without knowing exactly what or why. This has already been correctly seen
+
+Justice must be granted to each person according to their work, as is clear from Saint Paul's sentence in
+
+absolute truth - the Polish Marxist Adam Schaff reminds us - is just an ideal limit,
+
+dominant. Regarding “giving each one what is his”, as a “legal” principle, he showed
+
+need."
+
+that we move forward. This does not mean that the relative truths achieved by man are
+
+In summary, the ideological formation (social fact-institution), arising, in terms
+
+these, therefore, with relative independence, appears, subsists or dissolves) crystallizes a
+
+awareness that points out its structural defects and avant-garde thinking emerges,
+
+between the owners and the non-owners, between the dominant and the dispossessed: “because if the
+
+possible”, at the current stage and, in order to search for it, it is necessary to combat its origin - the
+
+- ideological ghosts, so that we do not become that type of intellectual
+
+misery, to the poor misfortune, that this is what is theirs... Nor was it other than for this reason that at
+
+people becomes more and more painful. The economic crisis and, more broadly, the social crisis
+
+science. A current jurist can no longer receive his bachelor's ruby, repeating, with
+
+Within this climate, it is no longer possible for the operation, for example, of that
+
+as “the exotic face of power”.
+
+created. But you know well that this monstrous justice can be anything but justice. The rule of
+
+Science, however, will never be, we repeat, definitive, finished and perfect. A
+
+– by God or by rational sharing - and not by the enthroned interests of a class
+
+letter to the Thessalonians, until the principle of each according to his
+
+as in the mathematical series, a limit that effectively retreats further and further as
+
+less objective and valid: the option to make, notes Schaff, is for “the most complete truth
+
+As the social crisis develops the contradictions of the system, the
+
+the great jurist João Mangabeira, who is a very old expression of the social separation of classes
+
+general contradictions of the socio-economic structure (but not exclusively reducible to
+
+that sees more precisely where the gaps are, overcoming ideology and advancing
+
+worker is content with seeing it increase the capitalist's wealth while the misery of the
+
+justice consists in giving to each one what is his, give poverty to the poor, to the miserable
+
+unfair society - and in ourselves - through awareness based on liberating praxis
+
+serenity, “to each his own”, as if it were the serene truth of the Law.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+as evidence and which, in fact, constitute mere class or group conveniences
+
+some “artificial paradise”, in the drunkenness, in the lull, in the obsessive sex or in the transference of
+
+In the effort to free ourselves from these conditionings, on the other hand,
+
+distortion is precisely that: the image altered, not invented. The Right, elongated or
+
+praxis is evident that it can also be of greater or lesser extent; but the attitude
+
+legal positivism (in substance, the ideology of settled order). I wish! The guitar"
+
+contradictions of the social structure, where beliefs first emerged, now contested or
+
+regimentation, for material and moral aid to the dispossessed and oppressed.
+
+rising force of capitalism to dominate the State. The second digested the victory, as it no longer needed
+
+to challenge a power that it had taken possession of. That's where the
+
+recognizable features. It remains to straighten the mirror, make it, as much as possible,
+
+ultimately giving expression to class positions, so much so that
+
+lathe). The degree of this awareness, its own coherence and persistence always depend
+
+full (not admitting the existence of Law except in its laws).
+
+interesting, in addition to translating, albeit deformed, elements of reality. Why
+
+There is no point in seeing that “the world is wrong” and shrugging your shoulders, running away
+
+false consciousness (i.e., the unconsciousness that they are guided by principles received
+
+rise, relative stability or decay. We will see later, for example, that the bourgeoisie
+
+perched in a position of privilege).
+
+flattened, as a reflection on a concave or convex surface, still presents certain
+
+any positive action for later, in another life, in the “beyond”. And when we talk about
+
+above the laws - and, having achieved what he wanted, he changed his doctrine, starting to defend
+
+an awareness, favored, in its critical impulse, by the crises that manifest the
+
+modest, even limited, is already a valid way of participating through speech, voting,
+
+legislation was already in his hands. The first phase contested aristocratic-feudal power, in
+
+transformation of the libertarian cry (invoking supralegal rights) into a social belch, of paunch
+
+All of this is reflected in legal ideologies. Like the others, they appear
+
+viable contestation (if we do not accommodate ourselves to alienation, disconnecting our minds from what is going on
+
+flat and comprehensive, under current global review conditions.
+
+currents of “accepted ideas” can change – and, in fact, do change – depending on the class in question.
+
+repertoire of beliefs, which subjects absorb and which distorts their reasoning, due to the
+
+of our engagement in a praxis, in a consequent active participation.
+
+Despite everything, legal ideologies contain particularly
+
+came to power unfurling the ideological banner of natural law – on the basis
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This benefits, on the other hand, as a process of awareness, of the “crisis of the
+
+Really right.
+represent mere convenience and interest of an illegitimate domination, they think that the
+
+wrote: “in reality, the right used for domination and injustice is an illegitimate right, a
+the eminent colleague Dalmo Dallari was right when, in another volume of this collection,
+
+legalism as if the entire Law resided there; and, thus, with the disappearance of laws that
+
+in the practice of many jurists; in the discourse of power and even - by regrettable contagion - in that of
+
+certain groups and people of sincere progressive engagement. The latter defy the strait
+
+We will try to demonstrate later that this is not accurate and that, on the contrary,
+
+false right”. What is being done here is to expand and develop this excellent starting point,
+
+Law” – that is, of that “law” that still appears in textbooks, treatises, teaching and
+
+outlining a global approach to Law, from a dialectical point of view.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+therefore, to simplify the immense repertoire of doctrines that appear, from Antiquity to our
+
+that intends to be different, the same opposition appears there, which was intended to be avoided, between right
+
+ideological subgroups - to which we will only briefly mention, without going into details of the position
+
+commonly classed as an adherent of natural law.
+
+conceptions, which mark the great split in legal ideologies - on the one hand, Law
+
+expendable...” The positivist option could not be established more clearly. After this,
+
+and positive law, corresponding to the jurisnaturalist and positivist conceptions of Law. to these
+
+We will give some examples of those doctrines that supposedly escaped the dilemma.
+
+the established order and the barriers it opposes to just law would never be
+
+ends of the antithesis (radically opposing theses) between positive law and natural law. That is
+
+However, for this philosopher of law, it is in the order that the root of all elaboration is found.
+
+or the other, as if, outside of both, there was no way of seeing the legal phenomenon.
+
+On the other hand, the German jurist Hans Welzel expressly states that it is not
+
+superior to laws and which no legislator can validly modify. That's why it is,
+
+framed in one of these two positions; but when we look at the foundations of the construction
+
+It is not possible to go over all legal ideologies now, one by one. Let's go,
+
+instance, what is lawful or unlawful”. And, to further emphasize this position, the same
+
+days. We will only consider two basic models, around which the different
+
+Only a new, truly dialectical theory of Law avoids falling into one of the
+
+positive and natural law. Before carrying out a special examination of these two resistant
+
+social order represents the minimum of existence and social justice is a luxury, to some extent
+
+of authors and movements. Fundamentally, those ideologies are situated between natural law
+
+as an established order (positivism) and, on the other, as a just order (iurisnaturalism),
+
+any addition or refinement is secondary: the commitment to
+
+transposable, because, in fact, for the positivist, the order is “Justice”.
+
+Thus, Miguel Reale, among others, would refuse to be classified as a positivist and, in the
+
+we will therefore give special attention to two of them, because most jurists, even today, adopt a
+
+juridical order: “in every community, it is necessary that a juridical order declare, in the last
+
+MAIN MODELS OF LEGAL IDEOLOGY
+
+It is certain that many traditional authors would not judge themselves correctly
+
+iurisnaturalista and, however, admits certain fixed, unalterable, previous and
+
+prominent right-wing thinker repeats and endorses a sentence by Hauriou, in the sense that “the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+we will see that the positivity of the Law does not inevitably lead to positivism and that the law
+
+represented an ideological deformation. And the board itself, on which they swung
+
+social struggles, in their historical development, between the dispossessed and the oppressed, on the one hand, and
+
+features in bourgeois ideologies, since it is, so to speak, the varied trivia of the kitchen
+
+dialectical leap. Although jurisnaturalism (the ideology of natural law) is the
+
+countries with an implemented socialist model, in socio-economic terms, as is the case of Imre
+
+This dialectical synthesis will be exposed in the conclusions of this booklet. Per
+
+predominates among the jurists of our time, whether it is based on the bourgeois order and
+
+structure founded on capitalism, as was the case of Ernst Bloch, in Germany, until his
+
+that “socialist legalism” has differences resulting from the fact that it is socialist,
+
+or model, however, amounts to the same thing, as it presents a reduction to the established order and,
+
+characteristic freeze, for example, in Stalinism, and which still prevails in
+
+tradition that still excites and divides the routine cultists of the
+
+we will make special reference, regarding a tense, limited, but fruitful replacement of the
+
+In any case, we will deal, firstly, with positivism, as it stands.
+
+followed by its predecessors and which, certainly, was not useless, not even when
+
+positions, rejecting the others and reframing the first in a superior vision. Like this,
+
+a truly dialectical juridical philosophy.
+
+justice integrates legal dialectics, without flying into metaphysical clouds, that is, without disconnecting from the
+
+legal system, in the capitalist world that we have in front of us. Here, we will only make the exception of
+
+(and still rock) so many illustrious jurists, who will serve us as a springboard to the
+
+current writers of socialist theory of Law, who combat narrow legalism, both in
+
+despoilers and oppressors, on the other.
+
+The oldest (and by no means entirely liquidated) is the positivism that today
+
+Szabó or Zoltán Péteri, in Hungary, and in socialist authors working in the countries of
+
+death, and it is still that of Michel Miaille, in France, in more recent works. To these last two
+
+capitalist, whatever, as “socialist legalism,” represented that same kind of
+
+Meanwhile, let's see the panorama as it presents itself in the legal ideologies of a
+
+covering, therefore, a diverse and socially more advanced structure; while scheme
+
+USSR. Such freezing, in fact, tends to disappear in the most advanced constructions of
+
+Of course, as in all dialectical overcoming, it is important to preserve the valid aspects of both
+
+Right; because, before outlining a step forward, it is necessary to keep in mind the path
+
+problematic of natural law, from the point of view of Marxism.
+
+This intention to overcome, still hesitant, is very clear in the most advanced
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Just as the latter, from the broader social point of view, tends to look for another
+
+with the subsistence of various oppressions (for example, against ethnic minority groups or
+
+in which the people participate more directly) than in the heavy authoritarian machinery
+
+Positivism, in any case, is a reduction of the Right to established order;
+
+they are, for the first, order, and, for the second, Justice. This is made clear in both
+
+“natural right to variable content.”
+
+modern law also tends to seek a more flexible legal theory, and, after all, properly
+
+positions: iustum quia iussum (fair, because ordered), which defines positivism, while
+
+since “content” is conceived only as a material variation of standards, within
+
+norms and what they must present in order for them to be considered good, valid and
+
+antinomy (insoluble contradiction between two principles), between the just order and the order
+
+limiting itself either to proclaiming that these contain all possible justice or to saying that the problem
+
+state order, laws and “uncontrolled control”.
+
+natural law (which, however, remain fixed) and opens the way to all kinds of
+
+construction of Stammler and, yes, as we will see, of practically all natural law.
+
+law correspondent leans and advances to combat its confinement in statism,
+
+declines, for that very reason, in avant-garde thinking.
+
+jurisnaturalism, for which norms must comply with some higher standard, under penalty of
+
+bottom-up socialist restructuring system, rather on the path of self-management (from
+
+jurisnaturalism is, on the contrary, an unfolding on two levels: what is presented in the
+
+sexual). We saw that the two keywords, defining positivism and naturalism,
+
+we said, as fixed, unalterable and superior to all legislation, even when it is spoken of in a
+
+bureaucratic state, which establishes a top-down domain, the most socialist reflection
+
+Latin propositions that symbolize the (apparently insoluble) dilemma between both
+
+This one, which appears with the German jurist Stammler, also does not change the stance,
+
+an order of universal ordering principles. This reduces the number of principles of
+
+he sees no way of including, in his theory of Law, criticism of the injustice of norms,
+
+dialectic, in which one frees oneself from that notion of Law as, first and foremost, state law,
+
+legitimate. To what extent does jurisnaturalism create, not the overcoming of positivism, but
+
+of injustice “it is not legal”; and iussum quia iustum (ordained because righteous), which represents the
+
+therefore, order of the State, accepts, without further ado, and subsists the restriction that, as a legal thesis, already
+
+It is to the extent that socialism leans towards democracy that theory
+
+“particularization”, which ends up handing over the points to the State; but such vice is not only of the
+
+of not being properly legal. This pattern tends, in turn, to present itself, as
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+social life - these are two questions that we will examine when it comes to considering the
+
+In any case, norms - that is, as we have seen, standards of conduct, imposed
+
+For now, let's check the positions and barriers of positivism. He always
+
+gives the law total superiority, everything remaining
+
+indicated, with a special body and procedure for application) - constitute, for positivism,
+
+deduce all Law from certain norms, which supposedly express it, as if saying
+
+directly with non-legislated social norms (the custom of the ruling class, for example)
+
+lining the established social structure, because the presence of other norms - class or
+
+rice powder has been added or a pervert has filled the container with arsenic.
+
+subordinate to what it determines and never being permitted – again, by way of example –
+-,
+
+to the extent that they do not prove to be incompatible with the system - therefore, the only one to be valid above
+
+dominant class begins to express itself (in this case, the State is granted the monopoly of
+
+legalistic positivism; historicist or sociologist positivism; psychologist positivism.
+
+Legalist positivism turns to the law and, even when it incorporates another type
+
+limits established by themselves).
+
+higher legal plane, which serves as a standard to measure the legal norms found in the
+
+When the positivist speaks of Law, he refers to this last - and only - system of
+
+natural right.
+
+standard - such as, for example, the custom
+
+by social power, with the threat of organized sanctions (repressive measures, expressly
+
+certain bodies of social power (the dominant class and groups or, through them, the State) impose and label it
+
+as Law. Of course, this is going to be confusing, as such a positioning is equivalent to
+
+captures the Law, when already expressed in norms; its limit is established order, which is guaranteed
+
+the complete law. And it should be noted that, in this case, these are the norms of the ruling class,
+
+what sugar “is” what we find in a can labeled sugar, even if it’s a little bit of junk there
+
+There are, however, several species of positivism. We will highlight at least three: the
+
+dominated groups - is not recognized, by positivism, as a legal element, except in the
+
+or is articulated, in the State, as a centralizing organ of power, through which that order and
+
+invoke a custom against the law. This is not, however, the only positivism.
+
+of everything and everyone - of that prevailing order, class and groups.
+
+established, and, on the other hand, whether or not he can convincingly substantiate the
+
+produce or control the production of legal norms, through laws, which only recognize those
+
+We will briefly explain what they consist of.
+
+norms, for him, valid, as if legal thought and practice were only interested in what
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+prior to the law. Immerse yourself, then, in unwritten legal norms, not organized into laws and
+
+and dominant groups, and the State being an expression of the same class, is also in the same order
+
+of the people". It turns out that this ghost, very useful to the dominant order, attributes to the “people” the
+
+classistic, which can either express itself through laws, or despise them, tear up constitutions,
+
+Thus, when state legislation appears, those pre-legislative formulations tend to
+
+the established order and in which the State would only be a representative of that order, which
+
+considered essential for the maintenance of social order). Now, these mores are always the
+
+legislative discipline. And the case, for example, of Anglo-American common law, law
+
+In a way, the classistic domination stands out even more here, as it is well
+
+These ruling class contradictions, however, end up reinforcing the
+
+The sociological modality of positivism has an intimate connection with the historicist
+
+products of the “spirit of the people”.
+
+dominant class, of which the State is seen as a mere mouthpiece). The presence of others
+
+Law appears only as a form of social control, linked to the organization of power
+
+by the State) for the mores, since these, being focused in terms of the mores of the class
+
+takes a step back and prefers to turn to pre-legislative legal formations, that is,
+
+historicism. We want to say that, instead of focusing on a customary right (after all swallowed
+
+codes, but admitted as a kind of spontaneous product of what is called “spirit
+
+overthrow holders and bodies of the legal State, directly taking the reins of power.
+
+which both (historicism and legalism) refer to and consider unassailable. Of any
+
+historicist, generalizing it. Thus, he turns to the system of social control, which covers
+
+main customs (those mores, indicated by anthropologists and which are the customs
+
+give precedence to laws and only apply supplementarily; that is, in areas where there is no
+
+gives substance, validity and foundation.
+
+clear the nature and position of the groups and persons who embody the listo order is, above all, the
+
+customary (customs), which does not prevail against express law.
+
+of the dominant class and groups, masked by positivist historicism under the label of
+
+domination, because what invokes the new group of power is the same social order, which it understood
+
+poorly defended by its representatives. It is as if the principal revoked the mandates of his
+
+(which is why they were cited in a single group), since it is just a generalization of the
+
+There is also historicist or sociologist positivism. The historicist modality
+
+In this way, it does not matter much if the focus of legislation (tax
+
+projects, other institutions, coming from another class and (non-dominant) groups, is despised.
+
+by state laws, when these appear) sociologism proposes the scheme of the approach
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+contradictions on the surface represent a deeper coherence (that of domination, of course).
+
+“strayed” to the “good path”.
+
+obvious reasons, as such, preferring to speak about society, as if it, out of presumption
+
+same ruling class is not afraid to replace them with others, more energetic, even if, for
+
+norms, of the established order), paternalistic hypocrisies soon take off their mask, abandon the
+
+channels of the law, of restructuring currents, the power in exercise (pressured by the forces of
+
+outline “the” social organization to be safeguarded by the mechanisms of control and “security” of this
+
+better serve them) and leave for “ignorance”, in the popular sense of the word, that is, they resort to
+
+new case of offside, in the middle of the match. This is when the team that is not friendly to you is already
+
+considered untouchable. And, during this substitution, the jurists of positivism are in the terrible
+
+In other words, legalist, historicist or sociological positivism (the two
+
+standards of conduct (with norms opposed to system norms) are seen as
+
+of the goalkeeper and on the verge of scoring a goal.
+
+hesitate or are more receptive to popular pressure for social restructuring,
+
+“social problem” to be treated with repressive-educational measures to lead
+
+power), that is, the dominated, who “must” remain dominated. It is then seen that the
+
+established, which could only be changed within the rules of the game that this
+
+In sociologist positivism it is the dominant class (to which he does not allude, for
+
+this, break a whole cycle of legality and replace the legality made by another one, then
+
+If contestation grows, the anomic attitude (that is, one that contests the nomos, the
+
+all precautions and safeguards, bring the risk of victory, even through the ballot box and within the
+
+unassailable, was well defended by that class) that intends to express “the” culture and
+
+myth of the “education” of the dominated (according to the standards of the dominant class and groups and to
+
+system and for its own taste of staying at the top of the pyramid) tries to change the so-called rules of the
+
+game, packaging another set of legal norms. It's as if the referee created a
+
+saw all the opposing defense “break” and fall, in front of the most agile player, who is alone in front of
+
+beating, which those in power and their docile servants consider perfectly “legal”.
+
+established order. The divergent behavior of dominated groups and classes, their
+
+suspense, waiting to see who will “deal the cards” in the game; that is, the new laws, which such
+
+latter reinforcing the former, to which they end up surrendering) canonizes the social order
+
+attorneys, more or less unfaithful, fearing that they will hand over the gold to the banished (from the
+
+“subcultures”, “aberrant”, “anti-legal” behaviors, a “pathology” that constitutes
+
+Moreover, if the representatives of the established order, reaching state power,
+
+establishes... so that there is no fundamental alteration. In fact, if the rules of the game, despite
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+If, however, the internal situation changes and the dominant class is defeated,
+
+“beautiful souls”, revealing a “sense of entitlement”; or 2. which they defer to judges, as in
+
+international control does not take long to intervene, fomenting resistance (this is called
+
+of assumptions established by the dominant social order. Rather, they seek
+
+judicial power to build norms, beyond and above what is in the laws: a faster law,
+
+not by mere coincidence, in the “soul” of the researchers, the legal ideology peculiar to their
+
+sending money and weapons to maintain "order" in the backyards of their "zone of influence".
+
+phenomenological law”, which does not have the romanticism of “free law” or the pragmatism
+
+Starting with the “beautiful souls”, where ideology sprouts like a flower, and idealizing,
+
+sentimental, or delayed, for realists), in relation to the demands of maintaining the structure
+
+in the machine.
+
+than some pretentious smokes. It's all the same and what does this bouquet of ideologies have
+
+In it, the “spirit of the people” does not hover in society: it settles in the minds of one or more
+
+repressive fruits.
+
+practices, of the law created by “realist” judges – do not even attempt a real and deep criticism
+
+These are the ones who claim: 1. to have discovered the “free right” within their
+
+all the gimmicks of the “legal” technique.
+
+laws, social control, "spirit" - objective - of the "people") to the heads of ideologues.
+
+even at the polls, when the progressive forces came to power, the imperialist system of
+
+better serve it, just thinking that legislation is a very narrow path (rough, for the
+
+judge-made law (the law created by the judiciary), of certain North American ideologies, the
+
+psychologists). The "sentiment of entitlement", sought in a free intuition, ends up discovering, and
+
+“destabilize” governments), disregarding the principle of self-determination of peoples and
+
+“realistic” and concrete than codes; or even 3. go in search of an “essence
+
+class and its group, that is, the principles perfectly compatible with the established order.
+
+romantically, domination, the “sense of entitlement” ends up maturing in the same
+
+(in this case, the criterion of truth is success) of the “right of judges”, but it also no longer yields
+
+In the middle of this violent game, psychological positivism plays the role of useful innocent.
+
+in perfect working order, with a little sugar water or adding oil and new parts
+
+of common, of psychologist, is the transference of focus, passing from that exterior panorama (of
+
+qualified and endomingado lawyers will interpret and apply, with the utmost diligence and
+
+privileged subjects.
+
+Neither the delicate gentlemen, of “feeling” – nor, on the other hand, the gentlemen
+
+Let's look a little closer at the positivism of the third group (the positivisms
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+seem to us a kind of silly magic. His declared intention, in fact, would be to surpass the
+
+transferring the observer's own ideological elements to the object. Lukács observes
+
+reveal, in the core, the very “essence”. But, let us ask: what are the phenomena like this
+
+shows that positivism, in this endeavor, “presupposes a legal precept of natural law,
+
+Saying that he freed himself from psychology and mental representations to see things in what
+
+because, from legalism, they rotate through different degrees to reach the same point of
+
+presented as “legal”, that is, again and again, the established order and its
+
+how he presented them with a fact of domination and seeks its “essence”, in a laborious “vision”,
+
+In all this game of sly positivities, however, Radbruch's cunning
+
+positive right. What is intended to be said is that either positivism discovers itself as
+
+legitimation of the order and the power enthroned within it, resorts to a principle that is not the
+
+Finally, and very excitedly, he shouts that “he has already lived in the essence of it”...
+
+by the phenomenologist, until only the “essence”… of domination remains.
+
+order” as if the entire Law were there, it must offer some basis
+
+laws, which would belong to the State. And Radbruch, the great German philosopher, with certain malice in his
+
+Does the phenomenologist intend to reach the same things? With your individual “vision”, which ends up
+
+psychologist. Here, there are less romantic pretensions, but the process does not stop
+
+Right, they ended up “marrying” Hans Kelsen’s “pure” theory: that is, phenomenology
+
+psychologism, going to the “things themselves”, the phenomena and, so to speak, peeling them away, until
+
+on the basis of all its constructions”, that is, a legal precept prior to and superior to the
+
+that it is an “opening to the world of a subject who in truth does not leave himself”.
+
+Kelsen's legalistic positivism. All forms of positivism thus run in a circle,
+
+peeled? These are the facts of domination that legalisms, historicisms and sociologisms
+
+essentially are, the phenomenologist takes things (in this case, legal phenomena) as
+
+departure, which is the law and the state.
+
+pointed out a limit: it is that, even on an ideological level, positivism, which deifies “law and
+
+who forgets to take off his glasses, with their deforming lenses, that ideology has placed on his nose.
+
+instruments of social control. This is never questioned but rather worked on mentally
+
+non-legal, deriving Law from the simple fact of domination, or, to try to
+
+It was not by chance that the most laborious phenomenological claims in the theory of
+
+What remains are the artifices of phenomenology, which is also a positivism
+
+And what is the process used to extract the “essence”? How does the
+
+legal order for such an order, such a law-producing State, such privilege and exclusivity to produce
+
+of Kaufmann or Schreier is nothing more than a complicated path to
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+After all, why is the State given the monopoly of producing Law, with the
+
+for your dignity; therefore the same Kelsen adds that force is employed "while
+
+question: at most, he transfers it to another location, that is, he seeks to offer his ideology
+
+establishes, alters, and in every way controls at will.
+
+liberal policy, which equates State and community, as if the former represented the entire people
+
+positivist ideology. It is affirmed that there is security for the citizens, bearing in mind that the
+
+“objective”, exempt, even “neutral” politically. An extreme case is that of Kelsen, to which we will allude
+
+The established order (for the benefit of the rulers and
+
+established sanctions, in the event of non-compliance with the duties imposed by law. But
+
+remote, of another legality) is not, in itself, proof of anything, as to the legitimacy of the
+
+I like (and even pay) this small tribute, which is to cover the naked body of power with laws,
+
+Now, this artifice, which always puts the peace and interest of the community in the State, is
+
+Thus, in order to preserve that myth of “neutrality”, he affirms that the Law is
+
+is permitted or prohibited, moreover, carried out by a certain power that dispenses with proving
+
+is in office and reached the position performed, following the processes that he himself
+
+justification, as if naked and ready to screw everyone, but with his pants down, with danger
+
+of that principle is precisely to give a legal basis to positive law.
+
+Right of resistance to tyranny, to usurped power? And just war against the states
+
+legislation? What legal reason would legitimize this privilege? No positivist escapes this
+
+A circle of legality (by the way, coming from a rupture, closer or closer
+
+community monopoly" and to realize "social peace". In this way, the theory
+
+Together with the question of the State, that of legal security emerges, another treat of the
+
+legal support of his political ideology - which is still funny in those who claim
+
+(thus hiding the domination of the class and the groups associated with such classes).
+
+legal precepts establish how everyone should guide their conduct, in order to avoid
+
+there will be greater insecurity than an unbounded determination, by legislation, of what
+
+trying to disguise the struggle of classes and groups).
+
+briefly, because he leads us to the limits of the paradox, in his positivist stubbornness.
+
+power, Heller, among others, repeated it, as we remember. Any tyranny paid with
+
+more than a conscientious naturalist could swallow. Where, in the face of this, are the
+
+positive law (this right already made and imposed, in substance, by the State?, since the function
+
+just a technique of organizing the force of power; but, in this way, it leaves power without
+
+legitimacy itself? This power, on the contrary, is presumed to be legitimate, based on the fact that
+
+imperialists preying on weaker nations like the wolf on the lamb?
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+in common situations, it is, in any case, the covering of a structure of domination, which is
+
+only ideological, of Law). Our objective, for now, is to show that ideologies
+
+a paranoid”, that is, by the laws of a mental patient with delusions of grandeur.
+
+oscillating between the two poles, already interviewed by Mannheim, a German sociologist, and more
+
+Natural law is fundamentally presented in three forms, all of them
+
+established social order, or reveal the clash of two equally social orders. Let us note, for
+
+produce legal norms. The idolatry of order never eliminates (it only tries to disguise) the problem of order.
+
+produced, or explain why they are not valid. The three forms are: a) natural law
+
+slavery, in those societies where slavery is the mode of economic production and,
+
+natural combat. Because, notes this last author, “all social movements founded
+
+to the cosmos, the physical universe; the second turns to God; the third revolves around man.
+
+How, even at this ideological level, does the dialectic of order and justice emerge?
+
+traditional religious customs, invoked by Antigone in Sophocles' Greek tragedy, and the
+
+From this last point, the special tension of irisnaturalism is outlined, which lives
+
+really dialectic of the problem (which can only be approached from the perspective of social dialectics, not
+
+face the persecution of Hitler, he also warned that legality is not enough, because,
+
+cosmic order, of the universe; and from there comes the expression natural right, that is, sought in
+
+need to be critically evaluated and, in extreme situations, can be constituted by the “edicts of
+
+recently focused by the Marxist Miaille: the conservative natural law and the
+
+laws reflect, despite everything, something deeper, in them also relatively deformed.
+
+of things”, we verify that this is only invoked to justify a certain order
+
+The question of the supreme source of any law always returns, including the right to
+
+seeking to establish the legal standard, destined to validate the norms eventually
+
+For example, in the first case, the attribution to natural law, that is, to the “nature of things” of
+
+therefore, the basis of the settled structure. In the second case, we have, for example, the conflict between
+
+cosmological; b) theological natural law; c) anthropological natural law. The first connects
+
+Justice. What will be, however, this Justice, which is placed at the center of iurisnaturalist concerns?
+
+became a 'law' that expressed its own situation and demands”. That's how Miaille
+
+They say that natural law originates in the very “nature of things”, in the
+
+thinking that this is enough to make it unassailably legal. Radbruch, who had to
+
+We emphasize that, at this point, we are abstracting from the concrete positioning and
+
+law of the City-State represented by Creon.
+
+nature. However, if we approach the conceptions of what is taken as “nature
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+We have invariably insisted on this reference to classes and groups, and it is necessary
+
+production. We cite, for example, machismo, which maintains the oppression of women or men.
+
+despoiler, and a dominated, plundered class, in parallel with the opposition between groups
+
+The Lord would dethrone the sovereign, with a divine kick in the ass.
+
+greater spoliation from the unfair distribution of property.
+
+malice or blindness, instead of “concreteizing” the vague precepts of God’s law, it would dispose
+
+that Miaille recalls group conflicts, in terms of “minorities demanding the right to
+
+of this chapter; but, in any case, the natural right to combat intends to establish a
+
+Thomas Aquinas, social power is granted a wide discretion in establishing the “just
+
+minimize the conflict between divine law and human law, recommending to the oppressed the “courage of
+
+with traditional, cosmological, theological and anthropological types.
+
+economic only): regionalist minorities, sexual minorities, ethnic minorities. Like this
+
+Augustine, it is admitted that, created and maintained by Divine Providence, social power extracts
+
+created and maintains” is understood to express what God wants and consecrates. Otherwise, the
+
+classistic, being able to dissolve or subsist, regardless of the change in the mode of
+
+liberation of oppressed groups.
+
+natural law of divine law. This would go down, as if on a ladder: God commands; O
+
+explain that she distinguishes the basic aspect of the opposition between a ruling class,
+
+In our time, the Catholic philosopher Maritain clearly demonstrates the tendency to
+
+homosexuals, in societies whose economic base has already altered the class system and
+
+The possibility of a deductive error is always admitted, in theory, in which human law, for
+
+oppressors and oppressed, the latter opposition not being directly linked to the other. So it is
+
+The limitations that a “new natural right” would present will be indicated at the end
+
+scandalously against these precepts. But this is minimized, either because, as in São
+
+particularized” (it is tradition, which comes from Aristotle), either because, as in Santo
+
+fourth model, which could be called historical-social natural law and which has nothing to do with
+
+difference”, a collateral contrast (of legal scope, but not linked to the social issue
+
+suffer”, “patience”, in the face of internal or external domination (the State that oppresses the people
+
+We have seen what the cosmological form consists of; the theology intends to deduce the
+
+will recommend a “new natural law” of combat and focused on the class struggle and the
+
+Let us record that, regarding ideologies, the contrast does not represent, without more, a shock
+
+of this investiture a kind of moral support from God for all his abuses. What does “God
+
+priest blesses the sovereign; the sovereign dictates the “particularization” of divine precepts, in his human
+
+laws... and the people? This one would only have to accept, believe and obey. Of course
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+convenient for the dominator, who never gave a damn about such “superiority”.
+
+like the Netherlands, called for breaking the division of the world between Catholic nations,
+
+to the aristocratic-feudal structure, generally making God a kind of politician
+
+for “concretizations”, in which the precepts attributed to nature, to God or to the man himself
+
+The bourgeois contestation of the aristocratic-feudal order, internally, as well as
+
+make laws and why, then, appeal to a Superior Law? The established order was enough.
+
+State too) were fighting, these fights between powerful giants had nothing to do with
+
+we call anthropological, that is, of man, who extracted the supreme principles from his
+
+order, in which the liberal, the bourgeois, the capitalist - execrated yesterday - gained transit,
+
+dualism (opposition of natural law and positive law) has a certain dynamic, which at least retains the
+
+potential idea of a confrontation. This is why, moreover, that in the hours of
+
+were, evidently, those who favored the positions and claims of the rising class -
+
+an ideological cover for the mode of production. So much so that the bourgeoisie, in
+
+which, let us repeat, is also a State and, as a State, has become capitalist.
+
+eternal and fixed criterion of legal evaluation) as quite cunning: it always leaves room
+
+political power; adopting another type of jurisnaturalism, the same as emerging nations,
+
+arrogant physical force, nothing would oppose it more than “moral force”, which is very
+
+conquest of its “place in the sun”.
+
+In fact, theological natural law, prevailing in the Middle Ages, served very well
+
+rational effort, tend to reconcile the absolute standard and prevailing laws. However, the mere
+
+within the line drawn by the Vatican.
+
+its iurisnaturalism, starting to defend the positivist thesis: it had already conquered the
+
+situationist. Even when the Church and the sovereign (let us not forget that the Church was
+
+of the assembled international system, then resorted to the form of natural law, which
+
+On the other hand, at the international level, the new correlations of forces were to be formed, for the
+
+spill over into imperialism and even end up obtaining recognition from the Vatican,
+
+reason itself, of his intelligence. These principles, and again not by mere coincidence,
+
+with the people, nor did they contest the plundering bases of the socio-economic order. It was, again,
+
+intolerable tensions - in which the established power increases the intensity of arrogance
+
+the bourgeoisie - and of the nations in which capitalism and Protestantism joined hands for
+
+or imperialism that subjects the latter - and even the State - to foreign domination). Thus, at
+
+dawn of capitalism, having already acquired economic power, set out to conquer
+
+In fact, natural law is not so much immobilist (despite its pretensions to
+
+It is clear that, upon coming to power, the bourgeoisie, as we have already highlighted, discarded the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+“eternal return”, in view of the iurisnaturalist longevity.
+
+university students in that country.
+
+the monstrous situations, which no one else allows to swallow the inevitable frogs (the
+
+progressive (compared to the conservative) and Marxist authors such as Ernst Bloch or Miaille do not
+
+just war in general, a certain concern for the legitimacy (not just the legality) of the
+
+be confused with the positive law of the State or of prevailing groups and classes. Despite
+
+for the resistance, or after it, for the liberal democratic restoration, the iurisnaturalismo
+
+moment of greatest tension. The problem is that, in it, issues are dealt with on an ideal level, from
+
+state or customary and what emerges as superior rights - a germ of possible contestation,
+
+to carry out a long historical investigation of this ideology, seeking to show that the
+
+However, dualism remains – positive law and natural law – as an antinomy
+
+dominations and libertarian impulses systems of state norms and plurality of orders
+
+criminals taken to the Nuremberg Tribunal (where they were tried, after World War II
+
+them) and, consequently, very conducive to the use, in times of crisis, of positive law,
+
+It is for this reason, as we have seen, that Mannheim speaks of a natural right
+
+German, annulling old decisions, based on Nazi laws, and excited the chairs
+
+the old natural law usually reappears with special attraction. For this reason, it has already been discussed
+
+circles of activity of oppressed groups and dispossessed classes).
+
+Lacking a dialectical vision, the jurist does not know what to appeal to when
+
+they hesitate to adopt it from the perspective of a natural right to combat. Ernst Bloch really arrived
+
+The Right to resist tyranny, the Right to war of national liberation, the Right
+
+nature, of God or of human reason) and, when they descend to “particularization”, they tend to
+
+frogs have become ingestible). So it is that, in West Germany, during Nazism,
+
+power have a clear iurisnaturalist flavor, and this ideology is reinvigorated, as we said, at every
+
+of all, it is possible to distinguish, in that dynamic of the two rights – what appears in the order
+
+which makes natural law susceptible to supralegal claims (above laws and even against
+
+abstraction, in the sense that they cannot link theoretical elaboration to groups, classes,
+
+resurfaced with extraordinary vigor. After being underlying the entire judgment of the
+
+The germ of contestation we alluded to is much stronger than is commonly thought.
+
+list is; other sets of legal norms, non-state, institutionalized and functioning in
+
+and his eroded authority also increases the intensity of the opposition -
+
+World Cup, the Nazi leaders), natural law served as the basis for judgments of the
+
+by class and dominated groups.
+
+On the other hand, natural law is trapped in the notion of “immortal” principles (from
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+social and, yes, in abstract principles.
+
+extract substance and validity and why they change, historically, becoming outdated -
+
+Lassalle, when he considered an “absolute Law”, an “idea of Law”, hovering above
+
+a new type of natural law. However, we have already pointed out the problem of a “new
+
+such as, for example, the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, which emerges in the Declaration
+
+this right through the so-called socio-economic infrastructure).
+
+it was nothing more than the “historical process itself”, its overcoming and liberating direction.
+
+more modern.
+
+positive and state law, as proposed by Barcellona and his followers, that is, to explore the
+
+eternal, but it cannot even give a global notion of Law, in which positivity and
+
+legal. The inconvenience, by the way, comes from the fact that they deal with two rights - the positive and the natural -
+
+and in its perpetual transformation, the polarizing aspects of positivity and Justice, of
+
+rise, however, as they formulate the objectives of their struggle, a series of
+
+of the dispossessed and oppressed. The task is of no small importance, but neither does it meet the
+
+And this is what Marxists of another orientation saw, that is, those who returned to
+
+dominant establishes, nor a set of principles that do not reveal well from what source
+
+invokes a Justice, the foundation of which is not adequately established in the struggles themselves
+
+like Dujardin and Michel, that there is not yet a dialectical theory of Law perfectly
+
+For this reason, Engels' irritation with
+
+natural” (the “combat” iurisnaturalism): he wants to avoid the fixed, abstract type of principles
+
+as we have seen, regarding “giving to each his own” - and others looming on the horizon -
+
+state norms, to laws, with the addition of an “explanation”, generally quite mechanistic,
+
+of the historical process and its concrete struggles. Engels then stated that such an “idea of Law”
+
+Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, enshrining a principle won in social struggles
+
+Within this perspective, the most that can be done is the “alternative use” of the
+
+contradictions of positive and state law for the benefit not of the dominant class and groups but
+
+Only a dialectical breath could unify, within the totality of the historical process
+
+But certainly there we can discern not only the praxis of groups and classes in
+
+Justice intertwine, nor show how the historical process itself gains a profile
+
+elaboration of norms and legitimacy evaluation standard. Many authors have recognized,
+
+(an insoluble contradiction), which divides Law from an angle that only sees order and from another that
+
+claims, legal too. This, provided that by law it is not taken, nor what the order
+
+gaps in the positivist conception of Law - which we analyze in this chapter.
+
+elaborated, and that “left-wing positivism” (the equation of Law with
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+rights, which they don't know very well why they would be legal. This is very clear in Miaille
+
+(insoluble contradictions of positive and natural law, taken as isolated units,
+
+as if it were not a Law itself and betraying a vestige of the “positivism of
+
+new Legal Philosophy, so that the latter does not become a game of ghosts
+
+In a famous page, to which we have already referred, João Mangabeira noted that the
+
+problems, however, constitute the image of reality, of human praxis (of the activity
+
+In summary, the very examination of the problem, at an ideological level, showed us that
+
+disappearance of the State, in a society in which the government of the people is replaced
+
+of ideologies begins with examining not what man thinks about law, but what
+
+corrupted, infested with false beliefs and false awareness of what is legal, by the
+
+State, not the law. However, if we want to demonstrate what this comes to be, in these
+
+natural – with all its defects – because he doesn't see where else to look for support, nothing
+
+mental repercussions in the minds of ideologues, but as a social fact, concrete action and
+
+Legal Sociology is the only solid basis for starting a new reflection, the
+
+above all, another attitude, properly dialectical, which, for being so, does not tolerate that antinomy
+
+arrive at the socio-historical view of law, but only at the social-historical opposition of two
+
+and even after the State, what is the thread?
+
+when he speaks of the natural “law” of combat, thus putting the word Law between quotation marks,
+
+ideological, losing in the clouds what comes from the earth. Legal ideologies are philosophy
+
+watertight and disconnected from the legal totality, in the larger historical-social totality.
+
+problems that arise when man thinks abstractly about law; those
+
+left” that only sees Right - without quotes - in state law.
+
+Law exists before the State, in primitive societies, and that, even admitting the
+
+historical and social history of man) in its legal angle. The way to correct the distortions
+
+legally it does. We will be able to arrive, in this, at the dialectic of Law no longer as simple
+
+by the administration of things and by the direction of the production process, what disappears is the
+
+positive law is unsustainable, without a complement, which the jurist will look for in law
+
+interference of products forged by the dominators. For a dialectical conception of
+
+transformations, from primitive society to future society, before the State, before the State
+
+without re-asking what is Law as a notion that unifies these opposite types, that is, not
+
+nevertheless essential. To carry out the new construction, other materials would be needed and,
+
+constant from which the mental repercussion springs.
+
+Legal ideologies have given us, with their distorted reflections, a vision of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+SOCIOLOGY AND LAW
+
+It is also there that the consideration of what, despite being
+
+,
+Right (not, as they continue to focus, the two opposite and separate rights): the
+
+which this sociology consists.
+
+Legal Sociology. The German philosopher Erich Fechner spoke of Legal Philosophy while
+
+This rivalry deprives the philosopher of contact with the world (and delivers him to
+
+positivity manifested in sets of
+
+also, we are going to outline the outline of a Legal Sociology, which owes nothing, on the other hand
+
+sociology to other deviations, ideological as well. The dialectical conception has to rethink it in
+
+false beliefs) but, on the contrary, merges into a science of social facts. Sociology and
+
+before those groups, without getting lost in some idea of Justice that flies in the clouds, or
+
+positivist - an ideology that we have already criticized here) and Ontology of Law, in the sense that
+
+Law a dialectical sociology is necessary. In the next chapter, we will try to explain
+
+class and group struggle), which does not know how to distinguish the legal face of this process.
+
+State law are, to put it mildly, a not insignificant but secondary element.
+
+Merleau, there is no reason for a rivalry between philosophers and sociologists, the first
+
+everything, it became very clear, in the examination of legal ideologies and that consists of the two strands of the
+
+The first step towards the dialectical conception of Law will be, therefore, the
+
+claiming for themselves the possession of the true, because they know the fact.
+
+norms (various sets, which conflict and come from
+
+“Sociology and... metaphysics of Law”. To overcome the “metaphysics” of Law, which is ideology
+
+ideologies) and deprives the sociologist of the interpretation of the meaning of his investigation - which leads
+
+totality and transformations, in a Legal Philosophy, which is Sociology (and not sociologism
+
+side, to the “metaphysics” of Society (a presentation of it that uses abstract and
+
+classes and groups in struggle), and the standards of legitimacy, which allow us to take a stand,
+
+Legal Philosophy complement each other, because, as Marilena Chauí points out, drawing inspiration from
+
+Law, we will have to review, first of all, the dialectical conception of society, where the State and
+
+turn to a Social Justice, still vague, one resulting from the historical process (of the
+
+evoked initially, with Lukács, and which has nothing “metaphysical”. For the dialectical view of
+
+considering themselves possessors of the truth because defenders of the “idea” and the second
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+positivists retain the tendency to see all of law in the social order established by
+
+socio-historical, that standard. But this does not matter in simply identifying Law and
+
+State. Iurinaturalists insist on the need for an evaluation criterion for these same
+
+swapping the compass for a pre-fabricated map, wanting to see, in each episode, the fatal confirmation of
+
+a theoretical script. This is why Engels, we have already remembered, fought those who
+
+it arises in social life and outside it has no foundation or meaning.
+
+lose yourself in speculations, metaphysics, nor dissolve in a heap of irrelevant details,
+
+cannot satisfactorily determine the measurement standard.
+
+now it is necessary to review, without distortions and integrated in the totality in motion, where
+
+movement, following the general model of the constitution of each of those images. A
+
+ignorant and lazy, for arriving at History with pseudoscience done and finished.
+
+It is not a question, of course, of recapitulating, in its immense variety, the Law of all
+
+created, between castrating positive law and natural law, which often limits itself to legitimizing
+
+carry a compass capable of guiding us regarding the position of each of them in the
+
+However, between the variety of facts and the guiding scheme, we cannot
+
+positive – natural right) will only dissolve, as we have emphasized, when sought, in the process
+
+deformed, because they tend to polarize around two unilateral and reductive visions. You
+
+more or less suggestive portraits, but not the process of formation, transformation and
+
+ruling class and groups, either directly (with their customary norms) or through the laws of
+
+limited themselves to subjecting social facts to previous and mechanical schemes, labeling them as
+
+historical process and, yes, to look for in this the peculiar aspect of the juridical praxis, as something that
+
+without recourse to ideal, prior, fixed and eternal measures. The “essence” of Law, in order not to
+
+norms, to measure their “Fairness” (that is, the legitimacy of origin and content); nonetheless,
+
+In summary, in the approach to ideologies, we gleaned certain preliminary material, which
+
+requires the mediation of a scientific perspective, in which historical “portraits” are put into
+
+History is a labyrinth, where we will get lost, grappling with isolated facts, if we do not
+
+manifests the sought after “essence” of the legal phenomenon.
+
+Then we saw that only a dialectical breath could overcome the opposition like this.
+
+But, on the other hand, neither Marx nor Engels ever argued that it was enough to collect, at random,
+
+peoples, one by one, through time - also because this cut would give us a series of
+
+We have seen that ideologies reflect certain characteristics of law, although
+
+order placed and imposed, for lack of a real and authentic critical standard. The ideological antithesis (right
+
+structure and process.
+
+replacement of legal norms, as well as the criteria by which they can be evaluated,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+contact of social processes, in a preliminary examination, was then submitted to patients and
+
+carrying the other five like a dogmatic fetish, to which you have to adjust if everything
+
+In this way, the models were nothing more than - nor should they be - arrangements of a
+
+This will even allow you to show that some episodes, whose protagonists
+
+is another hypothesis, in this case prefiguring and also subject to historical proof).
+
+History records the concrete-singular, Sociology approaches it in multiplicity –
+
+remember, for example, as an illustration of this exchange (phenomena - working hypothesis -
+
+models, resulting from previous examination, on the accumulated material, to submit them,
+
+Frenchwoman, in her causes and adventures, presents herself to the historian who reconstitutes her
+
+whose purposes and behavior were to maintain and safeguard a structure. A blow of
+
+historical and sociological approaches are, therefore, complementary and are based on
+
+to History with the compass of a Sociology. We are not referring here to bourgeois Sociology, as
+
+primitive community - slavery - feudalism - capitalism - socialism - corrected by
+
+so as not to get lost in the formless mass of relevance and irrelevance, of important data and
+
+coordination of revolutions in general.
+
+recorded it as a special type, although to this day some of his disciples omit it,
+
+necessary connection of relevant facts, following a working hypothesis. This, formulated to
+
+Marx and Engels are precursors, although they did not use this label. Why is sociology the
+
+constant methodical checks.
+
+call a revolution, in fact they are not, as, for example, in the case of a “revolution”
+
+found, just as they would have to reach a final communism, which is simple prediction (i.e.
+
+tidy up (with the exception of amendments, upon new contact with the process).
+
+first approach, then checked and perfected in the face of the phenomena themselves. Enough
+
+In that circular procedure, which enters the historical craft, bringing hypotheses and
+
+generalized in models, according to common features. Thus, the analysis of the Revolution
+
+scientifically. But, on the other hand, recording the phenomenon of a revolution in particular and
+
+then, through new verifications, Marx and Engels made Social History, that is, they returned
+
+verification before the phenomena - readjustment of the hypothesis), the types of production mode -
+
+State, of a conservative nature, is not a revolution; it is a brusque form of conservation. To the
+
+as Comte conceived it, in “Social Physics”, but to Historical Sociology, of which precisely
+
+loose suits, to, with this, arrive at the targeted science. They, on the contrary, sought
+
+encounter of the Asian mode of production. The latter emerged in historical investigation and Marx
+
+insignificant, the historian must employ the models that Sociology provides in the examination
+
+mediating discipline, which builds, on the pile of historical facts, the models, which
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Truly scientific sociology (and not just ideological manipulation of ideal “forms”) is
+
+commonly taken as synonymous, but the issue is more serious than a problem of
+
+social “forms”, which are not spawned into the world by some creative spirit or leader
+
+competitive norms, in the contrast between the rights of these classes (even oppressed groups,
+
+constant. The fact is that it is possible to look at Law, sociologically, from more than one point of view.
+
+of the dominant national classes and groups and of the correlations of forces
+
+Applying a sociological approach to Law will then be possible
+
+We speak of Sociology of Law, while studying the social basis of a right
+
+Legal Sociology, on the other hand, would be the examination of Law in general, as
+
+It is clear, we repeat, that the Sociology of Law and Legal Sociology carry out
+
+state reflects Brazilian society in its general lines (of few contradictions and minimal
+
+perceive its distinctive peculiarity, its true “essence”. Fits; however, a
+
+for example, the study of Law as an instrument, sometimes for control, sometimes for social change;
+
+different legal forms – in state law and in the rights of the dispossessed, forming sets
+
+a Legal Sociology and the one that produces a Sociology of Law. These two expressions are
+
+isolated facts or coordinated biographies of “illustrious men”) is Social History; and all
+
+controlled, like a Swiss cheese, perpetually hardening, in fear that the mice
+
+Historical Sociology (always committed to determining the origin and antecedents of
+
+as we have seen) and what the dominant order intends to maintain.
+
+label. They constitute different approaches, although interconnected, in an interchange
+
+conditioning element, which weighs on the country, hindering the remodeling, under the pressure
+
+exceptional, nor deduced by the "pure" intelligence of some genius theorist).
+
+point of view; and this possibility is the difference between the aforementioned approaches.
+
+international organizations, interested in imperialism not escaping such a fat share.
+
+element of the sociological process, in any given structure. It belongs to Legal Sociology,
+
+specific. For example, Sociology of Law is the analysis of the way in which our law
+
+outline the points of integration of the legal phenomenon in social life, as well as
+
+a kind of permanent exchange, but it is difficult to admit that the two scientific tasks are identical. Based
+
+on what was stated above, regarding the difference between Sociology and
+
+flexibility, given the system, still viscerally authoritarian, of small “openings”,
+
+reciprocally. For this very reason, all truly scientific history (and not just a chronicle of
+
+caveat here about two ways of seeing the relationship between Sociology and Law: the one that originates
+
+of the plurality of normative orders, resulting from the basic division into classes, with norms
+
+of the opposition widen the holes). All that old structure then unravels as
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+what interests us here) and Legal Sociology is a chapter of General Sociology, dealing with
+
+face each other, as different conceptions, producing different results, as is the case of
+
+In any case, Sociology, General or Legal, is not a discipline either.
+
+impeccable - that which does not demoralize, nor invalidate, the relative and possible truths of each
+
+eternal) challenged by the dialectic, according to which the decline of “logical absolutes” is already being seen.
+
+Starting from the fact that knowledge - whatever the meaning - is always a social work,
+
+that correspond to the position of the scientist in the social-historical process, in which he is,
+
+phenomena studied by Biology, with the serious internal consequence that they defend the
+
+Marxist contribution, seeks the reason and the mode of influence of engagement, expressed or
+
+amply explains and understands the phenomena, and is, therefore, really and objectively, the
+
+however, by those who discern, in biological facts, only statistical relationships, without
+
+in the social sciences, where man is also more directly involved; but she
+
+Therefore, it makes the Sociology of Sociology as well, that is, a Sociology, as
+
+that is, to the truth that develops, without ever reaching absolute and
+
+In mathematics, for example, rationalism, empiricism and operationalism
+
+sociologists”) is, more properly, a chapter of Social History (Social History of Law,
+
+The analysis of links (and their mediations), from the scientist's situation (and his
+
+on the legal aspect of life in society.
+
+stage, since, in them, we can choose, as Adam Schaff observed, the one that most
+
+admission or denial of the axiomatic structure (propositions that seem rational, evident and
+
+Sociology of Knowledge, which constitutes, in a certain aspect, Sociology squared.
+
+univocal (one way or direction only), since, in this science, there are different orientations,
+
+Likewise, there are finalisms and vitalisms, which challenge the logical-statistical conception of
+
+with individual participations, the Sociology of Knowledge, whose roots plunge into
+
+implicit, of man in the “knowledge”, including sociological knowledge, that he produces.
+
+existence of teleonomic laws (grouping according to a meaning or purpose), denied,
+
+simultaneously actor and observer. This division, let us note in passing, is only clearer
+
+given time, it can be seen and proclaimed more accurately.
+
+any “purpose”.
+
+History, we would even say that the Sociology of Law (as a particular study of “cases
+
+it exists in all sciences, translating ideological interference that none escapes.
+
+we said, squared. We have already referred, in the chapter on ideologies, to the truth-process,
+
+share of ideology) up to the standard of doctrines and theories affected by such a situation is the objective of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+previous steps. From such an angle, it is very instructive to note the practical application of this principle,
+
+It is possible to discern, at this point, two fundamental positions in Sociology
+
+complete focus on added value in a script that incorporates and transcends theories
+
+all), folkways (peculiar customs that define the “way of being” of a people) and mores (the sector
+
+General - and, therefore, in Legal Sociology
+
+hold social relationships together - a variety of groups establish certain stable patterns
+
+so on. Definitive, global and irreproachable knowledge is mystification of science
+
+Dahrendorf, defined those positions as (a) Sociology "of stability, harmony and
+
+increasing intensity. The norms - that is, the standards of conduct, enforceable under threat of
+
+for this very reason, they protect themselves with more severe and better organized norms and sanctions).
+
+custom may be, for example, deference to elders; in folkways it may be, for
+
+Sociology of the most outspoken bourgeois; the second belongs to the petty bourgeoisie that dedicates itself to
+
+of the prophets of another religion: scientism. This replaces the Bible with the Encyclopedia
+
+organized - with their own organ and specific application ritual) - are distributed in uses
+
+active and militant tradition, as a collective need and, therefore, an indeclinable obligation to
+
+changing theories.
+
+annihilation, but the overcoming that preserves the positive aspects and achievements of
+
+-,
+
+demonstrating its effectiveness, just as Marx does in Capital, when he seeks the new and more
+
+most vigorous of customs, deemed indispensable to the established social order and which,
+
+both heavily overloaded with elements
+
+following way. In a certain social space - that is, in a certain geographic base where
+
+earlier, by mercantilists, physiocrats, Adam Smith's intuitions, Ricardo's and
+
+ideological. One of the most finely cunning among bourgeois sociologists, Ralf
+
+of relationship. This relationship is governed by norms scaled over a range of
+
+sanctions (repressive means, ranging from diffuse sanctions - not organized - to sanctions
+
+consensus” and (b) Sociology “of change, conflict and constraint”. The first, we would say, is the
+
+degenerate, which transfers the religious ardor of divine revelations, of mystics, to the mouth
+
+Usage can be, for example, wearing certain clothing suitable for places and occasions. One
+
+example, valuing older people (or younger people) as wise guides (or
+
+storms in a glass of water (or rather: “revolutions” in a whiskey glass).
+
+Furthermore, advancement, overcoming the dialectical point of view, does not involve
+
+British (today, incidentally, American), changing editions as the new “theologians” go
+
+(practices consecrated by mere repetition), customs (practices consecrated by force of
+
+The Sociology (a) of “stability, harmony and consensus” could be summarized in the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It is seen that in model (a), considered here, all these norms belong to
+
+This cultural pretension of the dominant class identifies its conveniences and
+
+collective). The framework of norms is fixed in social institutions (stabilized framework and
+
+explanations given.
+
+Louis XIV, it is well known, said: “I am the State.” More picturesquely, Tsar Paul of
+
+most active and violent part of the repressive mores (attributed to the “people” and, in fact,
+
+also presumed and which, for this very reason, reserves the instruments of social control, to
+
+Império dawned with a hangover...” as if the effects of drunkenness were communicated to
+
+they deify order and make the jurist the blind and submissive servant of any and all laws. A
+
+In this context, any kind of social change is limited and controlled; and the
+
+clothe the order with belief systems (ideologies) deemed valid, useful, and
+
+as one of the “national university pests”.
+
+stability, harmony and consensus", let's see how it presents itself in a scheme and in the light of the
+
+that is, the "spirit" of the social order, with the mask of the "people's" culture.
+
+forms of access to power and government.
+
+of “subcultures”, which present themselves as a “problem”, to be solved by “re-education” or,
+
+a single block, presumably consensual (that is, which would have been adopted by the consent of the
+
+principles with those of society as a whole, just as, in autocracies, they are embodied in the King.
+
+“defence of institutions” and exercised by “law”, which, in this case, is seen only as the
+
+systematic practice of norms), forming a type of organization whose legitimacy is
+
+Russia, after a gigantic drunk, looked at her face in the mirror, when she woke up, and said: “The
+
+linked to the dominant class and groups). Therein lies the social root of legal positivism. They
+
+OAB, recently, in its legal education reform project, defined positivism well
+
+all his subjects.
+
+prevent the pyramid from falling apart and falling to the ground. These material means of control
+
+attacks of any dissent, considered “aberrations” of behavior, “pathologies”
+
+vigorous drivers); in the mores reside, for example, property relations or
+
+eminently healthy and which are, so to speak, the “soul” of established institutions,
+
+To better highlight the entire construction of model (a), of this sociology “of
+
+this being ineffective, really. This is “justified” by “culture”; is “required” by
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+United States) "could not tolerate" any socialist outburst right there at his big toe
+
+established social organization, even against the highest law, which is the Constitution. Obtained the
+
+geographical. All this covers deeper economic interests: the semi-colonies (colonies
+
+It is clear that here the socio-economic base is omitted (not by chance), the classes
+
+“balance”, they return to the watchdog function, restoring a new legislative scheme: the
+
+disguised by façade sovereignties) “should not” escape the metropolis.
+
+radically opposed (spoiled and despoiling), the existence of oppressed groups, the
+
+“untouchable” positive law, after the reorganization that stiffened it.
+
+The second model, that is, the Sociology (b) “of change, conflict and constraint”
+
+valid contestation, the norms of the dispossessed and oppressed: their Rights; and the reduced
+
+On the other hand, this Sociology also does not appear the external influx, the presence
+
+represents a kind of photographic negative of the previous model (a). While the latter is
+
+“law” keeps oscillating between positions I and II: normally, in the laws and established customs
+
+of stabilizing (of the convenient order) or destabilizing (of any order more
+
+centripetal, that other one is centrifugal - but centrifugal with the same gaps and
+
+by the State (while this is the social locus of control exercised by class and groups
+
+open to change, more flexible and porous), in accordance with the imperialist interests of the “area of
+
+concealments (a disguised and ingenious disappearance of essential elements), in such a way that,
+
+dominant); but, exceptionally, if the ruling class and groups fear that their
+
+influence". Recently, a conservative body printed the warning that “the
+
+representatives in power are too weak or sensitive to “basic reform”, the system
+
+self-determination of peoples has limits”... and that the continental system (i.e. States
+
+“reassumes”, directly, invoking a supralegal right, that is, the “supreme” norms of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Model (a) is greatly favored by the conditions of vitality and balance of the
+
+divergent and competitive mores, making the bloc precarious and its legitimacy very questionable.
+
+The time of Comte (reputed founder of sociological science) was Marxism in
+
+infallible popes, dogmas, church and little churches, Holy Office, index of books and forbidden ideas and
+
+“Catholicism” (that is, they want to read and interpret “the Bible” without tutors, they distribute themselves in
+
+peculiar conditions of crisis (sharpened contradictions, decay of the system) have not yet
+
+they are animated by a true countercultural impetus, inassimilable to the dominant culture.
+
+as science and did sociological study, although without adopting the special label. It is seen that the
+
+that “there is something rotten in the kingdom of Denmark” (or in any other kingdom). Not by chance, the
+
+of anomie (challenging the norms imposed by the prevailing order), which claims
+
+advanced, although not closed, impeccable and dogmatic, as the sectarianism of
+
+conflict, in relation to which the instability stems from multiple series of customs, folkways and
+
+The authentic contribution of non-dogmatic Marxism (not even its creators
+
+more or less broad sectors of non-“official” society. Such analysis forces the order
+
+damage to domination.
+
+crest of capitalism newly come to power. It was a kind of scientific digestion of
+
+dominant norms, especially because “subcultures” engender counter-institutions. These
+
+structure: we mean, therefore, that it thrives, in sociological ideologies, as long as
+
+- when, as we have said elsewhere, Marxism goes beyond the "Catholic phase" (with
+
+plundering root of class power, nor its connection with group oppression.
+
+Marxism - remaining the greatest influence on most sociological thought
+
+have precipitated the awareness, in the manner of Hamlet, in Shakespeare's tragedy, of
+
+eternal duration.
+
+Consequently, the established social organization has to contend with constant attacks
+
+elaboration, and not Comte’s “social physics”, which prepared the maturation of Sociology
+
+to Inquisition). Marxists themselves today tend towards “Protestantism”, not towards
+
+model (a) appears as the oldest, in bourgeois Sociology. This was born, as we know, in
+
+instead of dilating the conservative structure, it is absorbed by it, as we shall see, without further ado.
+
+change, in patterns of openly challenging behavior and also instituted, in
+
+some - does not belong to model (a) nor to (b).
+
+social principles, which suit the bourgeoisie and which in society it has established with aspirations to
+
+According to model (b), social space is occupied by a series of groups in
+
+established to unmask itself as naked coercion, but, as we will see, it does not lead the “challenges” to
+
+wanted as such) will be introduced in a third model, which begins to emerge, in the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+right, expressed in counter-institutions (b III). But, as in jurisnaturalism, the standards
+
+inconsequential. Model (a) is, in short, the triumphalist response of the bourgeoisie based, before
+
+of criticism and evaluation of dominant norms remain very vague and, just as the types
+
+different sects, freely interpret the “scriptures”, amend, advance and, in this,
+
+of rushing into a crisis from which you can no longer escape.
+
+Traditionalists spoke of a certain “fair” order, somewhat nebulous, the contestation of model (b),
+
+remain more faithful to the “spirit” of the Marxian construction - which is free to examine - than the
+
+Model (b) only reflects the superficial restlessness of the petty bourgeoisie and
+
+speaks of a certain anarchic freedom of groups, with an individualistic tone, each one seeking “the
+
+“theologians” bound to the texts, sometimes expurgated).
+
+can be expressed, in a graph parallel to that of the other model, more or less like this:
+
+his", which can scandalize the "square" bourgeois, but is soon absorbed and manipulated
+
+Model (b) is still bourgeois: just petty bourgeois. It was the aggravation
+
+In this panorama, Law loses the positivist clarity of model (a), gaining a
+
+by the smartest.
+
+social crisis of capitalism that showed the cracks in the edifice (a) of “consensus” and
+
+diffuse jurisnaturalist color, given the insistent claim of opposing rights, of groups
+
+mythological “stability”. But in this other view (b), as well as in (a), they are equally
+
+contrary to the law and order of the establishment (the dominant “system”). Like this,
+
+concealed essential elements, which the Marxist analysis had already established, outside the
+
+there would be (b I) a state right, based on a right of social organization (b II) and another
+
+sociological science of traditional universities and their small groups of contestation
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+dominant power than the matuto's bug: it even gives a voluptuous itch).
+
+here patrolling nobody's likes; we even find it legitimate to enjoy; but it is necessary not
+
+had undone the radical conflict, adorning it with the “liberal” acceptance of model (b),
+
+nail in the horseshoe of his theoretical warhorse: he gives the cavalcades of classes and groups
+
+At times, the bad mood of power whips, arrests or expels them, at other times they are even
+
+contributes to that bourgeois dominance, dissolving the sharpest conceptual instruments
+
+What models (a) and (b) have in common is the conscious or unconscious attempt to
+
+the crisis for what matters least, and without leading it to basic conditioning (coming in the
+
+of the contradictions and oppositions generated by the capitalist mode of production. For this reason, it is
+
+oppression; model (b) omits or despises dispossession, talks a lot about oppression, but opposes it
+
+(b) does not cancel model (a) - and, for this very reason, Dahrendorf suggests that they be used,
+
+noisy, multicolored, but harmless (to fundamental domination) enjoyments. We are not
+
+The incorporation of model (b) by model (a) has all the broad facilities
+
+(starting with the fact that reorganization presupposes the idea of ordering, to which the
+
+contradictorily; but, with the other, they come to tolerate and even (disguisedly) encourage
+
+classes, flattering the capitalist structure with a supposed increasing expansion of the “class
+
+confuse this with a consistent and effective type of challenge.
+
+Surface petty-bourgeois unrest leads to nothing. More she
+
+Conservative sociologists, in the guise of modernity, are not afraid to emphasize this further
+
+aimless agitation. And a choreographic and technicolor nihilism that no longer bothers the viewer.
+
+of production). It therefore gives an air of “tolerance” to the same established scheme: The model
+
+that the dialectic moves; thus, it reinforces the ideological operation of untying the notion of class
+
+denies this Weberian “optimism”, returns to the idea that a good neocapitalism
+
+away from the dialectical deepening: the model (a) hides the evidence of spoliation and
+
+which is precisely the type of toothless “contestation”. Thus, it takes the advantage of “explaining”
+
+dominant, along with the king, princes and dukes, a merry colorful of court jesters. If, by
+
+assimilable to traditional standards. The German sociologist Weber disguised the idea of struggle as
+
+With one hand, the dominant class and group repress, somewhat
+
+a circus, instead of a coherent program of action and clear objectives of social reorganization
+
+by the sociologist, both.
+
+acquisitive” (embourgeois). Your cunning current patrician, Dahrendorf, faced with the crisis that
+
+blunt objection. Large economic organizations even invoice on such
+
+anarchist individualism, sterile and, after all, prone to conformist hangovers after drinking
+
+inherent to the superficialism of the type of “contestation” that is more farcical than authentic. So, the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+to show where such an order comes from and why it is imposed.
+
+These two models (a) and (b) could not, evidently, serve the social vision
+
+On the other hand, we have also seen that the social problem and its legal aspect are not
+
+scaffolding, our rebuilding; At the end, they will be removed, to display the construction, in the
+
+in charge of breaking the solemnity of power with some boos. As inconsequential as
+
+Here we can see, again, how ideologies themselves (in this case, sociological ones)
+
+not directly derived from the mode of production, nor corrected by its exchange alone.
+
+real aspects: the questioning of legitimacy and the presence of several orders or series of
+
+deformations. Substantially, in centripetal (model a) and centrifugal (model b) appeals, there are
+
+Marilena Chauí on the utopia (illusion) of thinking that, by changing the mode of production, all
+
+black man on the right some sequins borrowed from the left who barks but doesn't bite.
+
+The task to be carried out, in a view of the social dialectic of Law, requires, therefore, that
+
+cohesion - and we are seeing that they form and act with even the most suffocating vigor.
+
+On the other hand, theoretically absorbing model (b), the most lucid bourgeois sociologists sought
+
+repressive. They do not manage, however, to take them to the root of the basic spoliation, immersed in the
+
+dialectics, nor, as a consequence, to the analysis of the social dialectics of Law. Nonetheless,
+
+(Assumed) legitimacy is, of course, a myth and model (b) is
+
+Right, when we reach the final chapter of our itinerary. Let's build, with
+
+agglutination: there is an order in the social structure; what is missing, in the bourgeois concealment, is
+
+In this regard, we quote, right at the beginning of our exposition, the very lucid observations of
+
+be such "appeals", they are equally symptomatic - that is, they point to two other
+
+privileged and unprotected, from a mode of production in which they were formed.
+
+lend to the more exact approach elements that they were able to record, although with
+
+limited to the mode of production, that is, as we pointed out with Miaille, there may be oppressions
+
+end of the journey (and, in such a difficult undertaking, a little goes a long way). is seen
+
+norms, in counter-institutions and counter-culture, which denounce the oppressive situations
+
+welcome to break the boredom of the court and the monotony of the courtiers' flattery. For another
+
+a part of the truth. No social structure would ever form without some force of
+
+the social (and also legal) issue is resolved.
+
+foundations of society, with ramifications that reach the core of the class split
+
+show themselves “on the wave”, “in the know”, “good people”, without major risks as they put on their costume
+
+Therefore, model (a), comprising the conservative view, demonstrates a real point of
+
+outline, even if crudely (for constant improvement), a dialectical sociological model. This is what we are going
+
+to rehearse, in this methodical investigation, in stages, of the “essence” of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+distance transport and communication system, contact is immediate and universal. No
+
+legal and moral norms, because all the distinctive features presented are revealed
+
+It's just the football games that come to us, live or canned, on TV, but a whole
+
+paths of liberation seek to encourage progressive forces, inspire them and influence them
+
+positively. For this reason, imperialism, externally, seeks to “close the channels” and,
+
+that “term” will mean the final point of this work, and not the presumptuous idea that it is offered
+
+imprecise (that is, they appear in both legal and moral norms). There is not, however,
+
+series of significant images, generated abroad and including the products
+
+Here is the “essence” of Law, so there is nothing left to take away or put into such an approach. If,
+
+space here to develop this point, which we have focused on in other writings of ours. O
+
+ideological. Nations, politically organized and having at their disposal the necessary
+
+internally, censorship mechanisms are triggered. Modern dominations, hence
+
+at least, we have advanced somewhat, if we have dispelled, in transit, certain misconceptions - which
+
+It is important to note that Law and Morals are distinguished by what they are, regardless of the
+
+technology, project themselves beyond borders, with their message, which comes to play
+
+as we alluded to in the first paragraph of this book - the effort was no longer completely useless.
+
+norms in which they are expressed and whose form is very similar: there are moral codes; there is Law
+
+outside the laws (for example, the so-called “Codes of Ethics”, or International Law).
+
+an important role in the chain of social facts. And such a message can be so good
+
+The Law, after all, is not “the” norms in which it is intended to be leaked (it is not
+
+how bad.
+
+let us confuse the biscuit and the packaging, because, in such a case, like positivism, we would end up
+
+We have to start in a very expanded orbit, because no society lives
+
+This is how the imperialists reinvigorate their presence, shaping
+
+eating the can, as if it were the cookie, and drawing strange conclusions about the flavor,
+
+completely and eternally in isolation. Nowadays, in fact, the opposite is true: with the speed of
+
+“culture” (and earning royalties at the same time), as well as freed or embattled peoples
+
+consistency and ingredients of such a product). In fact, there is no clear difference between the
+
+THE SOCIAL DIALECTIC OF LAW
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+contestation, accommodations and confrontations. The international infrastructure is, however,
+
+and subject to penetrating external system interference.
+
+The struggle of classes and groups, which divides the demographic block (of the population), the
+
+There is an international society and, also within it, a dialectic. Its structure
+
+social and, within it, the legal aspect, incomprehensible and inexplicable outside this context. O
+
+imperialist dominations and in the national liberation struggles of colonized and
+
+distinct production, further complicated by the unequal level of units, developed or
+
+its infrastructure is homogeneous, and, as a consequence of it, classes are divided (since they do not
+
+On the other hand, international institutions, such as internal ones,
+
+class and group divisions. We maintain the distinction, explained in another chapter, to mark the
+
+nosy neighborhoods.
+
+but its root is outside.
+
+considerable importance in the dialectics of Law and not directly linked to the social opposition
+
+they control this, with the vigilance of a Falcon.
+
+where the correlation of forces resonates and the division of “worlds” (capitalist, socialist,
+
+oppressed peoples, in order to put pressure on the perro mechanism of others, in function of
+
+It is modeled, moreover, according to the socio-economic infrastructure itself, divided into
+
+different, as it is characterized by the coexistence, peaceful or violent, of ways of
+
+free from contradictions, just as States are not, internally, in the dialectic of power and
+
+Within this panorama, societies emerge individually considered
+
+in the process of development.
+
+we are considering primitive communities here). This is how the domain appears
+
+semi-colonized. It is from this core that the “areas of influence” are cut out, with their
+
+even in already established socialist societies.
+
+National societies have, of course, their own unique mode of production: the
+
+oppositions of dispossessed and despoilers, of oppressed and oppressors, moves the dialectic
+
+are distributed in official and marginal vehicles (counter-institutions), which are articulated, between
+
+difference in the positioning of groups - such as ethnic, religious, sexual groups - from
+
+and beyond borders, is that they visit us at home, without knocking on the door, appearing in the video, which
+
+International society also develops peculiar superstructures,
+
+This pervasive background is part of the dynamics of national structures,
+
+“non-aligned”, third world). It should be noted right away, of course, that such a superstructure is not
+
+common demands of those who are left out or below.
+
+economic and juridical classes - which, on the other hand and as we shall see, continue to fight
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+function that stability and change constantly confront and conflict, with
+
+“culture”, as if it were the legitimate and harmonious compilation of what you feel and desire
+
+tied social change, as the control system only “absorbs” the share of change
+
+solidarity” (by the way, in the present situation, the word “solidarity” takes on an ironic tinge).
+
+'"game rules" of change. As we have seen, at the slightest risk of accentuating a deviation, even
+
+which the derivative and superstructural aspects are armed – on the one hand, establishing cohesion,
+
+obsolete structure, replacing it with surliness and arrogance for what it lacks in energy
+
+Lincoln - part of the people are fooled all the time; all the people a part of the time;
+
+Let us then put the centripetal forces in one branch. Social relationships are broken,
+
+The set of institutions and the ideology that seeks to legitimize them (the ideology of
+
+securing and cohesion itself would explode like a rubber ball, blown by anarchy; if, for
+
+formulated by Bloch: the “advance of socialist construction, within a framework of
+
+instruments of social control: control is the center of operations of dynamized norms,
+
+commitment and the reality of the socialist systems already in place there is, in fact, a great
+
+those in power expect) an unalterable structure that is eternally impeding any
+
+dominant groups express them in uses, customs, folkways and mores (which already appear in the
+
+On the double interpenetrating basis of international and national infrastructures, it is
+
+greater or lesser intensity (that is, depending on whether it is a young and ascending structure or a
+
+(chapter 4), which, however, evade the double base, already mentioned, without which it cannot be explained in
+
+invoking ideological principles. Such principles are part of the same domain, under the label of
+
+progressive and creative).
+
+never, however, all the people all the time.
+
+and, on the other hand, dispersion. If a society did not have the minimum centripetal force to
+
+would compromise the “security” of domination. In this field, of course, one can only speak of
+
+all the people. In fact, the latter can be deceived by ideology, but, as I said
+
+that it does not change the organization set and imposed; and, therefore, dictates, normatively, up to the
+
+within the infrastructural model; These relations acquire a certain uniformity and class and
+
+class and dominant groups) are standardized in a social organization, which is guaranteed with
+
+Socialism, of course, involves in principle overcoming radical conflicts, but between this
+
+on the other hand, if it did not reveal a coefficient of centrifugal forces it would be (as, deluded, always
+
+ditch, showing that not everything goes smoothly towards that desideratum like this
+
+true change. Hence the centripetal and centrifugal visions, noted in schemes A and B
+
+scheme A): they constitute the vehicles of domination and are embedded in social institutions,
+
+within the centripetal branch, in order to combat dispersion, which would disrupt society and
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+revolutionary goals. The expression democratic socialism is, moreover, very ambiguous. Us
+
+This contesting activity can be of two types: reformist (that is, aimed at
+
+we only use it with the caveat that it seeks to designate an overcoming,
+
+The explanations offered so far allow us to summarize the social vision
+
+dialectics in a scheme different from the focuses A and B, already criticized:
+
+within the rules, power tightens alarmed control, or the underlying system "dismisses" the
+
+reabsorb itself in the centripetal branch, which accommodates itself to receive it, without changing the structure
+
+avoiding both bourgeois deviations and dictatorial freezes. In this way it is
+
+its feeble representative to put another, more energetic one at the helm.
+
+global) or revolutionary (aimed at remodeling the entire structure, starting from the bases). The action,
+
+that it was reinvigorated, in the current scenario, with the rejection of well-behaved “socialism” and
+
+Now let's look at the centrifugal branch. The crystallizations of class norms and
+
+reformist or revolutionary, it is not necessarily peaceful or violent. There are mere reforms
+
+“reliable” (which the bourgeoisie absorbs) and also from the bureaucratic-repressive “socialisms” of
+
+dispossessed and oppressed groups produce their own institutions, whose presence in the structure is
+
+that trigger bloody fighting; there are total revolutions that advocate, on the contrary, the means
+
+summit (which prevail in the republics where the worker does not have, effectively, channels of
+
+factor of greater or lesser social disorganization, involving anomic activity (the
+
+bloodless (without bloodshed) and non-dictatorial. An example of the first is, among
+
+participation in government and effective defense against bureaucrats). democratic socialism,
+
+contesting the norms of the dominant branch), whether spontaneous (without greater cohesion and order of
+
+us, the Ragamuffin War. An example of the second is the strategy of democratic socialism.
+
+therefore, it is, today, gaining the meaning of the search for an “alternative” to capitalism
+
+militancy), or organized (the other way around, with trained and cohesive groups, strategy and
+
+The danger of the latter; evidently, it is the accommodation that dissolves the
+
+spoliative and failed socialism.
+
+well-articulated tactics).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+according to the most advanced criteria. We will see this in point IX. But, from the outset, it fulfills
+
+historians, and not just this or that angle privileged by the prejudice of one or
+
+emphasize that the correct legal vision cannot ignore the institutions
+
+The reader will note that, in addition to the elements already mentioned, the
+
+another stream and specialty. Various authors sometimes take one or another of those points as
+
+international law under the allegation that International Law “is not legal”, because the
+
+Roman numerals I to IX, which mark the points where the legal aspect appears. These
+
+basis, and thus obviously produce diverse and irreconcilable definitions. They lack the
+
+“sovereignties” of different countries do not tolerate internal repercussions unless they “adhere”
+
+points will serve us to deduce the “essence” of Law, without starting from metaphysical clouds
+
+global approach.
+
+to international pacts. The principle of self-determination of peoples and sovereignties
+
+or the amputation of one aspect or another, on a simple ideological whim. For that very reason,
+
+Forwarding our conclusions about the “essence” of Law, as part of
+
+we are using the word Law in a sense (by the way, apparent plurality of senses)
+
+of social dialectic, let us demarcate, in particular, each of the nine points indicated.
+
+only nominal and in its connections with the sociological process (the only source where we can go
+
+I - Law is not limited to the internal aspect of the historical process. It has roots
+
+seek a neither idealistic nor mutilated vision of Law itself). By this we mean
+
+international level, since it is in this perspective that the standards of legal update are defined,
+
+that all angles of Law will thus appear, focused on by sociologists, anthropologists,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The opposition starts with the infrastructure.
+
+Human rights are postponed, by regulations, including legal ones. We have already mentioned the question of
+
+this “ideal” out of the process) and the multiplicity of sets of legal norms (which
+
+(between States) reproduces, in the external angle, the obstruction that we will see in point VI, regarding the
+
+oppressed and dispossessed. An example of this is the set of legal principles enshrined in the Charter
+
+rights. Classes subsist there (socialism is not communism, for which certain republics of the
+
+When we talk about Law and Anti-Law, obviously, we are not referring to two
+
+step in this direction). The class issue is not eliminated, nor are the legal limits in
+
+objectified in norms, constitute a link in the process itself and open the field for synthesis,
+
+III - IV - Apart from primitive communities, which we are not taking care of here
+
+system of dominant forces, and despite the happy contradictions to its inter-state form
+
+oscillate between surrender to “positive law” (by way of “particularization” of precepts
+
+the action, even, of international sanctions, in the hypothesis of the most serious violations of the Law.
+
+its mode of production, inaugurates, with division into classes, a dialectic, legal too, already
+
+socialism itself.
+
+state law. Hence the parallel legal expression in a dialectic established by the peoples
+
+Even in a socialist society, the problems of conflict of interests are not suppressed.
+
+worker, whose rights then contradict the “right” rooted therein of the capitalist bourgeoisie.
+
+exhausts the problem of Law: aspects of oppression of groups remain, whose
+
+authoritarian socialism say they are in transit, although they have not shown, for a long time, the slightest
+
+abstract entities and, yes, to the dialectical process of Law, in which its denials,
+
+of Algiers (1977), in which the oppressed peoples formulated their quota of postponed rights.
+
+were two separate things: the Law (which they cannot justify, because they rip
+
+races, religion, sexes – which today concern jurists of non-dogmatic Marxism.
+
+do not know how to see it as part of the process of dialectical realization of Law).
+
+that a socialist regime will have to contain the processes of construction, so as not to denature the
+
+overcoming, in the progressive itinerary. The big mistake made by jurisnaturalists is, precisely,
+
+(which, by the way, imperialism scandalously offends at all times) do not prevent
+
+(as has already been warned), each society, in particular, at the very moment it establishes
+
+II - The truth, however, is that the law between nations struggles not to be trapped in the
+
+that, for example, the establishment of private ownership of the means of production despoils the
+
+In any case, in a capitalist or socialist system, the class issue is not
+
+"natural rights") and the irresolvable opposition between "natural law" and "positive law", as if
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+or, similarly, that the surviving dictatorships are “legitimate”, only because they are still
+
+extent to which workers effectively command the process and which political channels remain
+
+dominant norms, of and in the centripetal sector, dynamizes in aspects, not exempt of
+
+domination), as the type of presumed “consensus”, which is based on the
+
+that is, within “electoral” laws, which do not allow the awakening of the “possible conscience”,
+
+are legitimizing, it is necessary not only that they be done without the captious restrictions of laws full of
+
+a set of repressive agents. This already worried Lenin when he wrote the “Instructions
+
+progressive, without restrictions of people and chains, in free access to the means of communication and
+
+state apparatuses and on the communists themselves”. The consequence of disregarding this
+
+mass communication vehicles, and the entire casuistry of reaction strategists).
+
+of the structure. It is not enough to solve it the simple fact of a status quo (the naked existence of the
+
+society”, which is today opposed by the movement of “socialist self-management (socialist control
+
+It also acquires a legal profile, to the extent that it presents a legitimate or illegitimate, plundering,
+
+oppressive arrangement, crushing the rights of dominated classes and groups. That's how
+
+as the establishment of legality does not matter, by itself, in the legitimacy of power. Case
+
+In any case, the democratic guarantee is part of the problem of realizing the
+
+passivity of the masses (intoxicated by ideology and always "consulted" with restrictions - this
+
+“they endure”, with iron and fire. On the other hand, so that the formal guarantees of consultation with the people
+
+Franco, Salazar and the like - they were “legitimate”, while they lived and “held out” in power;
+
+authentic: it remains to be seen what real position the classes have in determining the system, in which
+
+tricks, but also that allow the work of popular awareness, by the leaders
+
+of 1922" regarding the "multiform organization of the masses", for "control over the
+
+liberating: exclusion of people and currents of opinion from the election, restrictions on advertising, in
+
+VI - The global social control, that is, as we said, the central operations of the
+
+open to avoid the stiffening of the State and the bureaucratic-police domination of the structure by
+
+contradictions, militant social organization. This is where laws of all kinds arise, including
+
+mass organization. This is a legal issue as well.
+
+problematic was the creation of the “non-capitalist state-apparatus as absolute boss of
+
+V - The social organization, which standardizes the set of dominant institutions,
+
+The passivity of the masses does not in itself legitimize a social organization, as well as
+
+the legal problem of the system is inserted, the question of global legitimacy or illegitimacy
+
+On the contrary, we would have to state that Nazi-fascism and “similar regimes - such as those of
+
+Law, and it is not enough to replace the legal discipline of property to arrive at socialism
+
+bottom-up economy).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+dominated, dialectics creates, in parallel with social organization, a process of
+
+to irreconcilable class conflicts, created by the relations of production, the dominated classes,
+
+political option is, no less obviously, the socialist, and democratic socialist, as opposed to
+
+as if the entire Law were there, when, despite possible contradictions, plunder and oppression at this point
+
+discover the privileged seat of action. Is important
+
+the “alternative use”, which the jurist Barcellona and his group are considering (returning the laws of the State
+
+dominant norms and proposing others, effectively lived, in sectors more or less
+
+circumstances, may be linked to a more or less autonomous institutional praxis,
+
+call “dual power” (that is, more than one social power in the dialectic of conflict).
+
+as parallel law (i.e., characterizing the situation as legal pluralism) and adopting a
+
+obviously it is necessary to emphasize, with great energy, that the Law is not there: the Law is in the
+
+Point VI, in its web of norms in action, is the only one focused on by positivism,
+
+both scientific and political. It implies the denial of the radical monopoly of production and
+
+when class and dominant groups are frightened by the more or less close possibility
+
+to transform its positivity, its strength to discipline legal praxis, into positivism (the
+
+Portuguese Boaventura de Souza Santos studied in his admirable thesis Law of the Oppressed
+
+examine, without indiscriminate rejection, all state law, which can even serve to
+
+disorganization, which interferes with it, showing the relative ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of the
+
+VII - It is obvious that, if the division of groups and classes into dominators and
+
+Portuguese colleague: “since the ideological cohesion of a class society is superimposed
+
+broad aspects of social life. On the political level, this establishes what political scientists
+
+target variable and level of organization. Recognize this practice as legal and this right
+
+against the dominating objective itself), an operation of great theoretical and practical scope. But
+
+The scientific option, to which the eminent sociologist alludes, is obviously the dialectic; The
+
+or specific groups within them, tend to develop legal subcultures, which, in certain
+
+In terms of legal counter-institutions, we see emerging what the sociologist
+
+theoretical perspective judging that law not inferior to state law - involves an option
+
+the anomalous ones; that disrupt (for the assurance of the underlying organization) the legal system itself,
+
+global process and its resultant. Locating the Law in this point VI, exclusively, is equivalent
+
+of seeing social control slip away from the hands of “power elites”.
+
+legalist conception of Law), which is something else.
+
+(with material from field research carried out in Brazilian favelas). Write the remarkable
+
+circulation of law by the modern state”.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+ground itself (the dynamization is political; the substance is legal). And the legal basis
+
+historic walk. This final resultant (final, not in the sense of eternal, but of synthesis
+
+of stiffening), in countries that gave it only an authoritarian-bureaucratic feature
+
+contestation), as dominated groups and classes seek recognition of
+
+dominated blocks, the very masses it was intended to liberate.
+
+This project, however, can be of two types: either it turns out to be merely reformist,
+
+circle of Law, which, for this very reason, in the dialectical scheme, we have placed in a key
+
+transformations) is immediately reinserted into the process itself, since history does not stop.
+
+IX - It is at this point that the evaluation criterion for legal products resides
+
+INSIDE THE PROCESS, HERE AND NOW. The goal was the day before yesterday, the liberal conquest
+
+VI), without reaching the bases of the structure and other aspects of the dominant norm; or if
+
+within the social structure (dialectical pluralism) leads to anomic activity (from
+
+French Revolution); yesterday was the victory of socialism on the economic plane (when
+
+repressive.
+
+norms that are proposal and restructuring practice, reaching the infrastructure and everything that
+
+It is the juridical synthesis: Its criteria, however, are not ideological crystallizations of
+
+their counter-institutional formations, in defiance of dominant norms (anomie).
+
+is indispensable to validate even the revolutionary appeal and introduces to the widest
+
+politically they are instrumentalized and have a chance of triumphing; but only legally can
+
+indicating what can be seen, at every moment, as the direction of humanity's progress in its
+
+surrounding, with the designation of IX.
+
+The synthesis is not above or below, in a previous or later scheme, but
+
+while aiming at the absorption of its principles and norms by the center of the centripetal branch (point
+
+democratic socialism today, when socialist revolutions are sclerotic (disease
+
+covering the legal aspect in that historical-social process, in its totality and
+
+repressive; the latter denatures socialism and oppresses, externally and internally, in its
+
+contrasting, in the competition of orders (the different series of interlocking norms).
+
+(when the rising bourgeoisie indicated the direction of progress and everyone dreamed of
+
+“statism” and “legalism”, not only capitalist, but authoritarian-bureaucratic “socialism”
+
+shows revolutionary, that is, it outlines the fundamental contrast, with a series of principles and
+
+VIII - It seems, then, clear that the conflicting coexistence of series of norms
+
+on it sits. Reform or revolution represent the juridical-political link; that is, only
+
+any metaphysical “essence”, but the socio-historical vector, resulting from the state of the process,
+
+the series of proletarian advances began and everyone dreamed of the Russian Revolution); but is
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+incomplete and does not give full expression to the socialist goals of authentic contemporary law.
+
+mediation of progressive legal praxis) the normative oyster to extract the pearl of
+
+that interests you, just as theologians quote the Bible, here and there: they always
+
+French, whose focus represents the rising bourgeoisie. In the most recent statement,
+
+state, is corrected with the legal remodeling, inspired by socialism, of equality
+
+reactionary, which was Jacques Maritain, when he emphasized, when the last
+
+Marxist authors to adhere to natural law, in the face of arrogant legalisms à la
+
+This is, in summary, what, taken, as we said, the Law nominally, from it to us
+
+It is easy to read Marx and Engels as positivists or naturalists. The Soviet reading is
+
+minorities by the instituted power.
+
+approximately is reflected, at each step. We have already had the declaration of the American and
+
+basis, insofar as the Law of revolution is, so to speak, the flagship of the entire
+
+human rights emerge. Note that we are not referring to declarations of Rights
+
+the same Rights, just think that the most recent “official” declaration is already out of date, insofar as
+
+this set of data, in motion, without amputating any of the aspects (as the
+
+echoes the advanced social struggle, in which the formal equality of men, before the law
+
+In fact, this aging of “declarations” was noticed even by the well-known French philosopher
+
+For example, the social aspect in the Declaration of Human Rights is still very vague and
+
+(non-dialectic), taking Law and Anti-law as watertight blocks and omitting the “negation of negation”. It is with
+
+this that the contradictions of Law and Anti-Law explode (with
+
+“official” statement, that it should be reviewed at least every 15 years.
+
+Vichinski, the Soviet theorist of socialist “legalism”.
+
+substantial, without the dispossession of the worker by the capitalist, or the oppression of groups
+
+The fact is that, between Marxists and Marxologists, each one cites the classics in the passage
+
+resilience. The lack of a sense of this process is what leads, in despair, to certain
+
+discover some conservative or progressive phrases, puritan or permissive, even
+
+arises in social dialectics and in the historical process. The “essence” of the legal system must encompass the entire
+
+legalistic – no wonder. Heller, who we have already cited, insinuates, on the other hand, a jurisnaturalism of
+
+Point IX is, then, the vault key for the analysis of Law and the seat where
+
+To get an idea of the difference between declarations of human rights and these
+
+Humans, who wish to express point IX, but to this same point, which in them
+
+which still does not incorporate other aspects of liberation, which emerged in later social struggles. Per
+
+legal ideologies), nor situate the dialectic in the idealistic clouds – or in the insoluble opposition
+
+historical materialism.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+But where, then, in view of that panorama, is the “essence” of Law, in the
+
+man in society - he is not just a lifeless doll that social forces move.
+
+we have, but we are building, we are getting rid of what our rulers
+
+inserted in the movement of the work.
+
+she lives tied up and we have to cut the knots.
+
+that do not show the magnitude and tides of the ocean, it is necessary to rethink Marx and Engels with the
+
+notion, which concept, at the same time comprehensive and precise, can summarize the entire
+
+production relations - constitute relations between men, and not between parts of a single machine.
+
+points I - II, III - IV, V - VII and VI - VIII?
+
+to move History and make the “machine” work.
+
+to create dogma and endorse any “fair line”, revised tomorrow, with other citations, in
+
+stimuli of a praxis and each notion, concept, proposition must be, not pinched but
+
+when he, becoming aware, discovers what are the forces of nature and society that
+
+guarantor and lives looking for a famous and unprepared firm for its promissory notes. One
+
+of themselves. We pay greater, and even more faithful, homage to the Marxian genius by resuming the
+
+incompatibility between this sentence and another, which he wrote later, showing that “the
+
+That's why, instead of reading Marx or Engels, pouring them into little bottles
+
+sense in which we have been seeking it - that is, in the dialectical stance, explained in chapter 1? What
+
+century ahead.
+
+within groups and classes and in the way they shape. Because this “real being” – this
+
+process, contemplated in the mobile synthesis of point IX and unfolded in the contradictions of
+
+In fact, if that weren't the case, if everything were devices, we would need a “God of devices”
+
+reading the texts, which are milestones of an unfinished itinerary, and not a repository of accomplished science,
+
+awareness; and also that freedom is liberation; that is, consciousness is not something that
+
+He becomes aware, reacts and frees himself from conditioning. Social relationships - including
+
+they put it there (ideology); and freedom is not something we possess either; on the contrary:
+
+Marx stated that “freedom is the essence of man” and there is no
+
+What is “essential” in man is his capacity for liberation, which is realized
+
+sexist or gay... Collecting phrases is a pastime for those who only do business with a signature
+
+time to beat the tits and do some self-criticism. Marx and Engels were the constant “revisionists”
+
+thought, a philosophy is an organism in motion, an intellectual response to
+
+itinerary, not because we are more intelligent than Marx, but because we are one
+
+The essence of man is the set of social relations”, that is, the relations between people,
+
+“determine” if he let himself be carried away by them. We remember, with Marx, that conscience is
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+contradiction between the real injustice of norms that only claim to be fair and the injustice that
+
+ended, that is, it wanted to stop the process to enjoy the benefits and refused to extract the
+
+tied-up locomotive ends up breaking its ties and running over anyone who wants to lean on it
+
+the articulation of the basic principles of updated Social Justice, according to standards of
+
+in Justice, however, we are not referring to that ideological image of ideal Justice,
+
+between progressives and reactionaries, between dispossessed and oppressed groups and classes and groups and
+
+contradiction between partial liberation, which favored the bourgeoisie, and the continuation of
+
+fixed, stationary, definitive and eternal “thing”, but a process of permanent liberation.
+
+aristocrats; but, after taking their place, he found it pleasant and ordered the people to be arrested,
+
+norms, customs, laws, codes of their domination.
+
+forward and breaking the dams. Within the historical process, the legal aspect represents
+
+shooed away, he insisted on reappearing, the bourgeoisie dropped the ball. The fight continued.
+
+we were, until today, stuck, in a single structure, without progress); but, of course, there are advances and
+
+domination), because it grants it the power to define, in particular, what “Justice” is, in
+
+Yesterday's revolutionary is today's conservative and tomorrow's reactionary. Repair, for
+
+reorganization of freedom that develop in man's social struggles. When we talk
+
+finds itself belongs to the process, to the dialectics of realizing Law, which is a constant struggle
+
+which continues, however, to put “ideal law” on one side and “real law” on the other. A
+
+enriched the legal heritage of humanity. When he came to power he gave the “thing” for
+
+despoilers and oppressors. This struggle is part of Law, because Law is not a
+
+liberation, which would give way to the workers. The bourgeoisie went out with the people to the streets, against the
+
+metaphysics, abstract, vague, that the dominant class and groups invoke to try to justify the
+
+It’s difficult to make him come home”: he wanted to stop History but History is stubborn. A
+
+consequences of his revolt against aristocracy and feudalism. There was, therefore, a
+
+forward and stop it with your ass. And the fate of dictators is there, which does not allow us to lie.
+
+As we have already said, the Law does not “is”; he “comes into being”. That's why the
+
+order to enjoy a good one, which is power. How the people refused to stop and, each time they were
+
+The social process, History, is a process of constant liberation (if it weren't,
+
+Is it not jurisnaturalist idealism that either surrenders to positive law (to the norms of
+
+setbacks, breaks in the path, which don't matter, as the river ends up returning to its bed, following
+
+particular and concrete situations; nor that other progressive, combative jurisnaturalism,
+
+example, in the case of the bourgeoisie: as a rising class, when it was at the forefront,
+
+At that time, an already triumphant bourgeois said that “it is easy to put the people on the streets;
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+the sum of libertarian conquests (point IX of our scheme) is proved by two facts.
+
+For example, there is no longer talk of maintaining colonialism (which continues to exist) or of resolving the
+
+neighbor. In the same way and on the other side, there is talk of the principle of self-determination of
+
+It is also necessary to note that contradictions do not only occur between blocks of
+
+express, in general terms, class dominance and privileged groups have elements that
+
+the unfair norm. This goes against the essence of Law, as Engels already noted. "The expression
+
+is afraid of the people). At least, this violence is not openly confessed, which means
+
+right". But it is clear that the “concept of Law” is not that metaphysical, abstract,
+
+Even when a socialist structure degenerates into oppression, it continues
+
+contrary to what they say (that is, saying that they will build “Justice” in the norms, while
+
+- is the entire process that defines the Law, at each stage, in the search for overcoming directions.
+
+attack the worker. Soviet domination, for example, is always talking about “defense
+
+reactionary bullshit, with its contradictory forces of progress and conservatism, with
+
+often contradict each other, leaving “holes” in their laws and customs, through which the most
+
+Second, rights already won are usually not challenged by the
+
+norms, but within these blocks. Thus, for example, state law, the laws that
+
+In the first place, no legislator, even the worst of dictators, says, in theory, that he will
+
+In any case, the force, the evidence that the Law comprised, at every moment,
+
+discourse of freedom, to deny it, in fact, in spoliative and repressive norms. Today, for
+
+brutal, uncompromising assertion of class supremacy," he recalled, goes "by itself against the concept
+
+that not even the oppressor can deny the Law: just bend it, saying one thing and doing another.
+
+can be used by liberating classes and groups, because, in the hypocrisy of doing what
+
+even when the “defense of socialism” is to end the country’s claim to freedom
+
+social issue with the police (which, by the way, joins the fight all the time, called by the bourgeois who
+
+peoples, but soon in the name of “defending democracy” the USA is creating police
+
+and, yes, Law, as an aspect of the social process itself.
+
+talking about socialism and invokes the Law of the proletarian class to silence, arrest and
+
+And the constant social struggle, with its avant-garde expressions and its resistance and
+
+make norms an unfair protection of their privileges), the dominant class and groups
+
+its ascending and libertarian classes and groups and its decadent and oppressive classes and groups
+
+skilful vanguard jurists can put the lever of progress, exploiting the contradiction.
+
+dominator: domination is, as we said, hypocritical. So, the dominator absorbs the
+
+of socialism”, just as the bourgeoisie is always talking about “defending democracy” - this
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+hues). However, after the advance of 1917, Soviet power and, later, its satellites,
+
+counterfeit money, to deceive fools.
+
+mix, to a greater or lesser extent); nor is it in ideal, abstract principles (although sometimes
+
+State and the class and groups that dominate it. Now, the doctrine that “closes” the whole phenomenon
+
+historical, from which it is the result, in the sense that it is progressively realized in it.
+
+retrograde dissidents of the Tradition, Family and Property type, which is more “realistic than
+
+domesticated, waking up scared every time some heretic and protesting socialist
+
+frequency. Where is Justice in the world? -, ask if. What justice is this, proclaimed by
+
+Legalism is always the social hangover of a legal creative impulse. You
+
+that these devour the people? Justice is obviously not this degraded thing. That is
+
+On the other hand, each updated profile of authentic Law is a snapshot of the
+
+norms as Law and then define Law by norms, limiting these to the norms of the
+
+name, as no overbearing legislator, dictatorial administrator or formalistic judge has ever
+
+by regional imperialism, which is no less hypocritical.
+
+release. The contribution of the first socialists was to challenge the norms of bourgeois law,
+
+expression of movable Law, in constant progress, and not Law itself. With the addiction of
+
+legal, as a simple norm of the class and dominant groups (or even of groups
+
+He gained so much weight that he lay down on the (state) bed and slept on the institutional mattress
+
+Some of those principles found their way into socialist republics (of various
+
+devalued papers, in the inflation of the laws; and ends up using the “guitar”, the machine to make
+
+He screamed that something was wrong there (or at the neighbor's house).
+
+a bunch of idealist philosophers, who then hand it over to a group of “jurists”, leaving
+
+than the king"), subtracts all dialectics.
+
+True justice? Evidently, it's not here or there, it's not in the laws (although sometimes
+
+Law and Justice go hand in hand; law and law are divorced with
+
+also something of it is transmitted there, in an imprecise way): the real Justice is in the process
+
+principles settle into norms and grow old; and norms forget that they are means
+
+denial of justice, a denial that earns him, despite everything, the homage of using his
+
+continental, in Latin America, to maintain the determined economic semi-colonization
+
+process of its eternal reconstitution, of its advancement, which unveils new areas of
+
+The great inversion that occurs in traditional legal thinking is to take the
+
+oppose more advanced legal principles, fighting for the norms to be remodeled.
+
+turn the crank, the State exchanges, in its Mint, gold-backed papers for
+
+thought to say that their “right” is not taking care to be fair. However, where is the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+whose own contradictions will give rise to new achievements. When the bourgeoisie, advancing and
+
+Opposed to injustice, which a system institutes and seeks to guarantee, is the denial of
+
+Reference point IX, which we placed in scheme C, of the dialectical social vision, is
+
+freedom. But even injustice as well as Antilaw (that is, the constitution of norms
+
+quota of liberation achieved, from a progressive perspective, at the present historical level. Never
+
+neither the just society, nor Justice correctly seen, nor the Law itself, the legitimate,
+
+and when this same bourgeoisie climbed into power and denied real equality in its
+
+and dominating groups, oppose other norms and legal institutions, originating from classes and
+
+pointed contradiction that indicated the path to socialism; when socialism degenerates
+
+coexistence dominants, imposed by illegitimate social control; that is, try
+
+oppositions, in conflict, on the painful path of progress, with advances and setbacks, moments
+
+of those supreme principles, as an advanced model of the legitimate social organization of
+
+they rub together, settle momentarily and finally arrive at new moments of
+
+emerging in social struggles, to lead to the creation of a society in which the exploitation of
+
+Law is a process, within the historical process: it is not something done, perfect and
+
+state mechanisms deny real participation in power, it is also this contradiction that generates
+
+illegitimate and their imposition in poorly organized societies) are part of the process, as
+
+rise, challenged aristocratic-feudal discriminations and raised the problem of equality;
+
+ascending groups and which languishes in the exploitations and oppressions that contradict it, but in
+
+domination-repression.
+
+laws, triggering Marxist criticism, which showed the source of inequalities, was the
+
+dominated groups, and also prevail, and propagate, and try to replace the patterns
+
+are born from a metaphysical cradle or are a generous gift from the gods: they sprout in the
+
+another replaces it on the liberating itinerary.
+
+Conscious Social Justice; norms, in which that system reflects the interests of classes
+
+one in which Justice is identified, as an updated substance of Law, that is, in the
+
+in bureaucratic-authoritarian oppression, speaking in the name of a proletarian class, which
+
+become generalized, breaking the dams of structural oppression. The two elaborations intertwine
+
+Justice is Social Justice, above all: it is updating the guiding principles,
+
+solar and terrible eclipses.
+
+and oppression of man by man; and the Law is neither more nor less than the expression
+
+finished; is that becoming that is enriched in movements for the liberation of classes and
+
+the movement to democratize the implemented “socialism”, which allowed itself to gain weight in
+
+rupture, integrating and moving the dialectic of Law. An ordination is denied so that
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+illegitimate dominations, Law models the organizing pattern, which results from the process
+
+unveils. Therefore, it is important not to confuse it with the norms in which it will be leaked,
+
+freedom for anyone, because so many particular freedoms would trample general freedom.
+
+standards in which it will organize itself, in the updated and cutting-edge organizational model
+
+process, is also inserted in social dialectics; is also transmitted to multiple series of
+
+determine “the establishment of the faculty of action” (of classes and groups), without alienation, “in the
+
+wants to exchange illegitimate repression for chaos) and brute action, not restrained by principles of
+
+The latter intend to implement the Law, to carry out Justice, but in them there may be opposition
+
+that does not respect fundamental rights: today, for example, torture is already defined as
+
+dominators, whose illegitimacy then distorts the “right” they invoke.
+
+legal aspect, instead of disappearing, gains more importance, as Bloch said, while “the
+
+characteristic of the principles of fair social praxis and legitimate social control, with the indication of
+
+On the contrary, it constitutes the affirmation of conscious and viable freedom, in the coexistence
+
+they are in the historical process; are what is revealed in it to the vanguard (to the classes and groups
+
+objective and practical, for the advancement of socialist construction, within a framework of solidarity”.
+
+violent conservatism, whether applied under the pretext of facilitating the work of liberation).
+
+social freedom. And this sums up, we repeat with the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch, in
+
+himself, But he is not only the harvest of freedom: he is also the antithesis of anarchy (which
+
+oppression is not the end of History; It's a step. In the historical process of liberation, faced with the
+
+and conquered in social struggles and formulates the supreme principles of Social Justice that are
+
+legitimacy (and in which the liberating objective may be mischaracterized, within a path
+
+between Justice itself, Social Justice updated in History, and the “justice” of classes and groups
+
+norms of action of a finally non-alienated community”. For this reason, in socialism, the
+
+that guarantee the freedom of all. The absolute freedom of all, obviously, would result in
+
+with none of the contradictory series of norms that appear in social dialectics. These
+
+This is the reason why Law cannot be confused with Morals. Morality is also
+
+crime under international law and will continue to be a crime, whether it is an instrument of
+
+It is also a mistake to see Law as a pure restriction on freedom, since, at the same time,
+
+Justice can be assessed in the abstract, and, yes, concretely, as the liberation quotas
+
+Human Rights will not be less militant, as the right to criticism, inexorably
+
+ascending), the legal aspect of the process is what delineates the positive form, scope
+
+The simple change in the mode of production, the end of a certain type of exploitation and
+
+The Law, in short, presents itself as a positive expression of conscious freedom
+
+Social; and the restrictions it imposes on everyone's freedom are legitimated only to the extent that
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+legally guilty is the reciprocal duty not to harm each other, nor, together, so
+
+Morality, however, remains an establishment of restrictions on our
+
+freedom. Moral is the realm of contention, where freedom is tamed. Neither of them, it's
+
+yourself. However, the social and historical principles of honest living do not depend on
+
+or superhumans. Both are, on the contrary, social, historical and strongly
+
+of the moral duties of others, to become obligatory, nor in the sense that these
+
+coexistence, there is no crime.
+
+better, while the Law only restricts our freedom to guarantee what, in it, affects
+
+laws of “victimless crime”, such as, for example, physical or psychological self-destruction, by
+
+Hedonistic morality), admitting the “enjoyment” of each person, according to their taste, continues to lead
+
+Moral precepts are intended to guarantee the reciprocal balance of the exercise of freedom.
+
+right. Morality sets out duties that each person must fulfill in relation to others and even to
+
+teaches us not to overindulge in pleasures, teaches us to control our appetites and
+
+enforceable obligations and establishes bodies and procedures for their coercive application: it
+
+aims at the unfolding of freedom, within the limits of coexistence. Even when, in
+
+procedures are all morally reprehensible; however, the Law came to
+
+reciprocity. By this we mean that the moral duties of each person do not depend
+
+offend the community. If there is no injury, damage or even danger to the freedoms in
+
+confirms reciprocity, as what is legally charged to both subjects
+
+those unjustifiable incriminations.
+
+In this way, it is currently demonstrated that the definitions
+
+to the others. Even when Morality turns to the discipline of our pleasures (the so-called
+
+latter fulfill or fail to fulfill their own duties, nor in the sense that
+
+Law is the realm of liberation, whose limits are determined by nature itself.
+
+freedom, in themselves considered necessary, to become socially
+
+clear, tolerates dogmas, eternal principles, or draws from ideal sources, which is abstract
+
+suicide, drug use, the moral degradation of prostitution. These
+
+an intrinsic restriction, of self-improvement, insofar as hedonism itself
+
+norms, according to the classes and groups into which the social structure is divided; also generates
+
+Moral aims at the improvement of each person, within honesty. The right
+
+it is, therefore, bilateral, like the Law; what it is not, however, is reciprocal. Reciprocal is just the
+
+Criminal Law, for example, if it rejects the compensation of faults, this does not contradict, rather
+
+recognize that they have nothing to do with the duties of reciprocity and, thus, disappear
+
+way to enjoy, in every sense of the word.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+liberating and inspire the evaluation of any norm) has already been made aware and expressed, in the
+
+conditioned by the social structure, where they emerge, in the opposition, in the contrast of models
+
+historical time, to guide us, as a compass of the struggle for Law and denial of any
+
+diverse according to the division of dominating and dominated classes and groups, whose norms
+
+order that, in legal terms, only has the name, falsely invoked. It was also Marx
+
+are subject to criteria of legitimacy, also historical, that is, defined by the most
+
+who registered it, signing together with Engels a famous document, which reads: “the
+
+advanced, at the level of the present time.
+
+free development of each person is a condition for the free development of all.” That is
+
+Marx humorously said that “no one fights against freedom; at most, fight
+
+which is Law, in “essence”, model and purpose. Everything else, or is it a consequence,
+
+against the freedom of others...” And that is what every exploitative and oppressive society does, in
+
+determine in the evolutionary itinerary, or is it distortion, to be combatted as an obstacle to progress
+
+that dominant classes and groups take care of themselves, at the expense of others. But the principle
+
+legality of humanity.
+
+fundamental legal framework (that is, the matrix of all the others, which are revealed in the process
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Ernst Bloch's monumental study, Naturrecht und Menschliche Würde
+
+Madeleine Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism (Rio, Zahar, 1978); and, as for connections
+
+(both texts in the work organized by Francisco de Assis Barbosa, As Idéias
+
+Critique of the Efficacy of Law, by José Geraldo de Sousa Júnior (Brasília, private edition,
+
+3 vols.: vol. 1, p. 491-504; vote. 3, p. 15-18).
+
+One of the most important figures in modern legal theory and research is the
+
+Humaine, Paris, Payot, 1976) was also not translated into Portuguese. However, having something
+
+Capitalist Society (Rio, Zahar, 1972) and Marxism and Politics (Rio, Zahar, 1979). Under various
+
+Socialist Humanism (Lisbon, Edições 70, 1976, p. 226-234).
+
+series of essays collected in Culture and Democracy (São Paulo, Editora Moderna, 1981).
+
+Law of the Oppressed, Law & Society Review, vol. 12, no. 1, 1957,
+
+Method, by Agostinho Ramalho Marques Neto (Rio, Editora Forense, 19821 and For a
+
+nationals, such as João Mangabeira, as an example of the vigorous opinion that marks his first
+
+Especially recommended for beginners, due to the updated information,
+
+originally in English and defended at Yale University)). But whoever wants to know
+
+representative of the evolution of this excellent author, whose best work is found in the collective work
+
+1981: requests to PO Box 13.1957, CEP 70.259, Brasília, DF).
+
+(Frankfurt am Main, Surkhamp, 1961; with French translation, Droit Naturel et Dignité
+
+Reprint of the Bulletin of the Faculty of Law of Coimbra, 1979).
+
+From a historical point of view, it is stimulating to read the book by Michael Tigar &
+
+Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Souza Santos, whose remarkable doctoral thesis - The
+
+of him, in legal matters, in the brief essay included in the collection organized by Erich Fromm,
+
+related angles, it is important to meditate on Marilena Chauí’s statements, in her magnificent
+
+in 1930, and the beautiful Oration to the Bachelors of the Faculty of Law of Bahia, in 1944
+
+with Political Science, two works by Ralph Miliband, The State in
+
+Policies of João Mangabeira, Brasília-Rio, Federal Senate - Casa Rui Barbosa, MEC, 1980,
+
+Michel Miaille's only work to date appearing in Brazil is not
+
+The classic pages of the great precursors should not be overlooked
+
+INDICATIONS FOR READING
+
+P. 5-1261 - unfortunately there is still no edition available in our language (it was written,
+
+clarity of exposition and progressive approach are - The Science of Law: Concept, Object,
+
+by M. Bourjol & others, Pour une Critipue du Droit (Paris, Maspéro, 1978, p. 114-146).
+
+something from this eminent author can be consulted, in Portuguese, O Discurso, e o Poder (Coimbra,
+
+socialist definition, in the legal field (True Equality and the Socialization of Law),
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Passos, take care of legal issues, such as no. 49, Rights of the Person, by the very illustrious and
+Other volumes, already published or to be published, in this same collection Primeiros
+
+brave prof. Dalma Dallari.
+
+www.esnips.com/user/direito-unisulma
+
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
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+Emerging Markets Review
+2 2001 67 Ž . 85
+
+The economic factors behind international
+legal harmonization: a jurimetric analysis of
+the Latin American experience
+
+Edgardo Buscaglia
+
+Uniersity of Virginia School of Law and Hooer Institution, Stanford Uniersity, 580 Massie
+Road, Charlottsille, VA 22903, USA
+
+Received 1 September 2000; received in revised form 11 December 2000; accepted 11
+December 2000
+
+Abstract
+
+This paper shows that the international harmonization of commercial legal rules and
+commercial legal standards in Latin America have been the result of very specific legal and
+economic country-specific factors. The paper proposes that international legal harmonization
+within a regional bloc of countries is a function of the convergence of three broad
+conditions: 1 first, the a priori international country-to-country compatibility in the form Ž .
+and scope of their legal rules applied to domestic commercial transactions; 2 the emer- Ž .
+gence and growth of intra-sectoral international markets supported by foreign direct
+investment; and 3 the emergence and growth of domestic trade-related industries seeking Ž .
+compatible legal rules in their exporting markets abroad. A jurimetric model is introduced
+showing that the drive to seek international legal harmonization has been explained by these
+specific economic and legal domestic factors.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
+reserved.
+
+Keywords: International; Legal harmonization; Jurimetric model; Latin America
+
+ Tel.: 1-301-233-0926.E-mail
+address: edbuscaglia@usa.net E. Buscaglia . Ž .
+
+1566-014101$ - see front matter  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
+PII: S 1 5 6 6 - 0 1 4 1 0 0 Ž . 00020-0
+68 E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85
+
+1. Introduction
+
+Recent literature on legal and economic regional integration has stressed the
+key role of emerging trading blocs in shaping the world economy of the 20th-century
+Davey et al., 1995 . Economic trends Ž .
+such as rapid changes in applied
+research, technology, capital flows and trade patterns
+have all assumed an
+enhanced importance in fostering economic growth. According to Abramovitz
+Ž . 1989 , the extent to which a country that is technologically behind a leader is able
+to catch up will depend in part on its social capability to absorb advanced
+technologies Abramovitz, 1989 . Nelson and Wright 1992 and Porter 1985 state Ž . Ž. Ž.
+that the main factors fostering the social capability for technological improvement
+include a strong research and development R & D sector, higher educational Ž .
+institutions satisfying the demand for scientists and engineers emanating from
+emerging markets, and competitive environments acting as disciplinary factors for
+firms Schumpeter, 1950; Porter, 1985; Rosenberg, 1985; Nelson and Wright, 1992 . Ž .
+None of these publications, however, discuss in depth the required legal changes
+needed to foster competitive environments and enhance the capabilities to absorb
+technologies.
+Developing nations are currently facing a unique opportunity created by global
+free trade, the continuous decline in transportation and communication costs
+coupled with the unprecedented availability of generic applied knowledge, and the
+expanding flows of international financial investments. However, throughout their
+history, many of these countries have lacked the institutional capability to create or
+absorb the applied knowledge aforementioned Buscaglia, 1993 . Ž .
+The main purpose of the analysis advanced in this paper is to explain how the
+limited international harmonization of commercial legal rules and commercial
+legal standards in Latin America has been the result of specific domestic legal and
+economic factors. This paper shows that the international legal harmonization is a
+function of the convergence of three broad conditions: 1 the a priori international Ž .
+country-to-country compatibility in the form and scope of their legal rules applied
+to domestic commercial transactions; 2 the emergence and growth of intra Ž .
+sectoral international markets supported by foreign direct investment; and 3 the Ž .
+emergence and growth of domestic trade-related industries seeking compatible
+legal rules in their exporting markets abroad. Specifically, the compatibility in the
+evolutionary natures of two or more economic and legal systems will be introduced
+as a factor that will affect the desirability and feasibility of international legal
+integrations. Moreover, a jurimetric model is introduced in Section 3 proving that
+the drive to seek international legal harmonization in Latin America is explained
+by well-specified economic and legal factors
+In Section 2, this paper will describe the main drives toward legal integration
+within South America during the 19th and 20th centuries. A jurimetric analysis
+follows in Section 3 revealing the connections between legal integration and
+economic structures. Section 4 offers a conclusion of our analysis.
+E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85 69
+
+2. Theory and its application: an account of the international legal harmonization
+experience in Latin America
+
+Most of the civil law countries in Latin America achieved their independence in
+the nineteenth century and, one after the other, adopted codified law within the
+Roman and Germanic tradition. Much of the codification observed in Latin
+American legal history until the early 20th century was the product of transplanting
+civil, commercial and penal codes from Europe to the different countries in the
+region Watson, 1983 . During the period from 1825 to 1890, substantive and Ž .
+procedural civil, commercial and criminal codes were all transplanted from the
+French Codification, with few adaptations, to the South American scene Merry- Ž
+man, 1985a . For example, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, .
+Peru and Venezuela adopted the Napoleonic Code even though they had never
+been under French territorial control. The impact of the American Constitution on
+Latin American public law is another example of a transplant Merryman, 1985b . Ž .
+As a result, most Latin American legal systems started from the same evolutionary
+base.1
+The complexity of a legal system is the product of its evolution. This complexity
+is defined in terms of the breadth of socio-economic interactions that a legal
+system is capable of addressing. As an economic structure evolves from its agrarian
+origin to a more diversified economic structure, the legal system would tend to
+branch out from its evolutionary base in order to address the higher diversity of
+economic interactions. In this respect, if a legal system were not subject to
+substantive changes in its private law, a possible explanation is that its economic
+structure may not have experienced much change compared to its agrarian beginnings
+i.e., new economic sectors or changes in the relative importance of these Ž
+.Ž . 2 sectors Clagett, 1952 . In fact, this economic evolution provides an explanation
+of why those legal systems in which only mild changes in the sectoral structure of
+their GDP have occurred and where the agricultural sector still prevails such as Ž
+Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru address substantive and procedural problems of .
+commercial law in strikingly similar ways and without showing much evolution
+Ž . 3 relative to their initial legal structures Karst, 1966; de Robertis, 1988 . In fact,
+within countries such as Bolivia and Paraguay one can observe that present
+economic structures are not too different from the ones observed at the time when
+the early 19th century transplants occurred. In short, the complexity in the
+evolution of private law is also explained by the complexity in the development of
+
+1
+Specifically, the compatibility in the evolutionary natures of two or more legal systems will be
+introduced as a factor that will affect the need and feasibility of legal integrations. 2
+One can observe that, within the volatile political history of the region, agrarian economies’ public
+laws e.g. constitutional or labor law frameworks were subject to drastic changes regardless of the stage Ž .
+of development. One can also observe that private law, however, in the form of civil and commercial
+codes, have experienced only minor changes since their inception. 3
+Karst points at these similarities found among the legal systems of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru
+without addressing its possible causes.
+70 E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85
+
+its economic structure. In this context, one can claim that the economic structures
+Ž . i.e., composition and relative importance of productive sectors provide the
+direction followed by the legal evolution in domestic commercial rules i.e. amend- Ž
+ments to the commercial code addressing new specific commands regulating
+economics interactions and also provide the direction followed by the legal .
+evolution in domestic commercial standards i.e. amendments to the commercial Ž
+. 4 code addressing new general norms pertaining to economic interactions .
+Testing this general theory within the Latin American historical context, one can
+find out that a bottom-up approach to law-making in the commercial area provided
+the framework for international legal and economic convergence during the period
+within which the Gold Standard ruled international trade.5 This period was
+characterized by the emergence of manufacturing capital-intensive industries in
+Latin America that were aiming at reaching economies of scale by expanding sales
+to foreign markets Muniz, 1951b . In this context, Latin American new industries Ž .
+attempted to sponsor international economic integration schemes since the early
+stages of their history. As a result, governments reacted before these powerful
+industrial groups by seeking international legal and economic regional agreements.
+There is a rich historical background addressing legal interrelations within the
+region. Starting with the Congress of Panama in 1826 and the Congress of Lima in
+1864-65 where Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru took the first steps toward greater
+legal harmony by adopting a postal treaty and a trade and navigation treaty Muniz, Ž
+1951b . In these treaties, all the contracting parties expressed their resolve to .
+provide their reciprocal trade with all possible facilities and protection, ‘as one of
+the most effective means of promoting the development and growth of their
+industry and wealth and making a future Confederation of states more secure and
+prosperous’.6 Both in the Trade and Navigation 1864 Treaties, there is an express
+provision for natives or nationals of all contracting Latin American states to be
+considered as equals with regard to a wide range of objectives and areas. This
+principle went on to become the direct legal foundation of what would later be
+known as the Latin American principle of equality of nationals and foreigners
+regarding the international liability of states when foreign nationals are subject to
+torts andor property damage. Moreover, the First Treaty of Lima signed by
+Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru in 1848 contains a rule whereby the
+contracts signed and documents executed in one of the signatory republics would
+have the same force and validity in the others, and the authorities, judges, and
+courts would be required to enforce them.7 New initiatives presented by the
+
+4
+Forces related to the determination of comparative advantages in production and that the composition
+of a country’s trade reflects the relative abundance of factors in that country’s endowment, also
+determine the composition and relative strength of productive sectors. These economic forces, however,
+are always enhanced or hampered by the political weight of organized constituencies. For an understanding
+of the economic factors’ impact on the determination of the productive structure, see Wright
+Ž. Ž. 1990 and North 1982 . 5
+A partial account of international legal treaties during the 19th century is taken from Muniz 1951a . Ž . 6
+Segundo Congreso de Lima, Articles 23, in Acevedo 1987 . Ž .
+E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85 71
+
+governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile led to the Congress of Jurists held in
+Lima between 1877 and 1880 establishing uniform rules in the design of private
+international law.8
+Subsequently, during the Second Congress of Jurists, held in Montevideo in
+188889, eight treaties and an additional protocol were adopted. These treaties
+were sponsored and drafted by Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean jurists. The
+treaties covered procedural law, literary and artistic property, patents for inventions,
+trademarks and brand names, international criminal law, and international
+civil law.9 The protocol contained general rules for applying the laws of any of the
+contracting states in the territories of the others. Later, Argentina, Brazil, Chile
+and Peru proposed a major step in legal integration when their intention in
+codifying international law was recognized in the Convention for the Drafting of
+Codes on Public and Private International Law, signed in 1902, and during the
+International Law Convention, signed at the Inter American Conference of Rio de
+Janeiro in 1906.10 Both treaties established methods and procedures to further the
+process of legal codification and cooperation at the Inter-American level. In all
+these cases, the countries pushing for international legal integration were at the
+same time experiencing changes in their trade-related economic structures that
+were addressed through amendments to their domestic commercial andor civil
+codes. In other words, one can conclude that during the 19th century and early
+20th century we can already observe a pattern of legal harmonization driven by
+international trade and economic change.
+The process of codification of private international law in the Inter-American
+context has clearly been one of the ongoing legal activities of the American states
+since the closing decades of the last century. This work has taken on different
+institutional forms and is currently being carried out as a legal process through the
+Specialized Conferences on Private International Law CIDIP under the auspices Ž .
+of the United Nations. Since the start of the codification of private international
+law, two different approaches have been taken: one involved a global approach that
+envisaged a single body of rules covering all aspects of private law; the other
+approach envisaged a process that was more gradual and progressive, involving the
+drafting of specific international instruments. The approach of drafting a single
+code was the prevailing one during the aforementioned 1877 Congress of Lima and
+culminated in the adoption of a single code of international law, the Bustamante
+Code, at the Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana in
+1928.11
+
+7
+Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto Argentina , Documento de Negociacion No 1214 Ž . A,
+Biblioteca Historica de Relaciones Exteriores, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 8
+Id.
+9
+This constitutes the Latin American legal response to the Paris and Berne Conventions in Europe.
+Latin American and other international historians have not paid due attention to this first step in the
+process of legal convergence within the intellectual property area. 10 Id.
+72 E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85
+
+Beginning in the 1960s and as part of the Organization of American States
+Ž . OAS framework, the Inter American Juridical Committee made efforts to codify
+all the different areas of private international law. To that end and in light of the
+US Restatement of the Law of the Conflicts of Laws for private international law,
+the Committee proposed to review the Bustamante Code to determine whether it
+was possible to merge its provisions with those of the Montevideo Treaties of 1889
+and 193940. The First Specialized Conference in Private Law adopted conventions
+covering international trade and procedural law in 1975. These are the Inter
+American conventions on conflict of laws concerning bills of exchange, promissory
+notes, and invoices; on conflict of laws concerning checks; on international
+commercial arbitration; on letters; on the taking of evidence abroad; and on the
+legal regime of powers of attorney to be used abroad. The 1979 Second Specialized
+Inter-American Conference also approved conventions on international trade law
+and international procedural law focusing on rules concerning checks and conflicts
+of laws involving commercial companies. With respect to international procedural
+law, these Inter-American conventions covered standards of proof and discovery
+material, enforcement of injunctions, and extraterritorial validity of foreign rulings
+and arbitral awards. Lastly, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Specialized Conference
+approved the Inter American Convention on Law to be applied to international
+contracts where the first common ground for a hemispheric commercial code was
+established. As a result of this effort, the Inter American Juridical Committee
+prepared a draft code, but it was not supported by the member states of the OAS
+Ž . Muniz, 1951c . This situation led to the abandonment of the global approach of
+codification of Inter-American codification, and the beginning of a second stage in
+which sectoral codification prevailed Muniz, 1951d . Ž .
+In fact, during the mid 20th century one can already observe that, under the
+OAS umbrella, those countries that were not undergoing profound economic
+changes in their private sector structure did not show and, in fact, did not support a
+legal integration sponsored by the relatively more complex legal and economic
+national systems of the region. Moreover, the countries supporting legal integration
+were in all cases the ones subject to more dynamic economic changes
+Ž . Argentina, Brazil and Chile , while reservations and opposition emerged from the
+Ž . mostly traditional-agrarian economies i.e. Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay .12
+In this context and within the OAS framework, intergovernmental meetings were
+scheduled to deal with special technical and limited matters or to develop special
+aspects of inter-American cooperation Garcia-Lopez, 1973 . Ž .
+As result of all of the above agreements, the legal systems in countries such as
+Argentina, Brazil, and Chile started to address new types of economic interactions
+reflecting higher levels of specialization and division of labor within their domestic
+markets. As the relative growth of their agricultural sectors diminished and
+information intensive sectors of the economy grew, commercial codes became
+
+11 Id. 12Refer to OASDoc. 1356-WP at Joint IMF-Bank Staff Library, Washington, DC.
+E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85 73
+
+Table 1 a Legal changes vs. economic structure during 18901995
+
+Country No. of high-growth No. of amendments No. of international
+trade related in commercial commercial
+non-agricultural industries codes agreements
+
+Argentina 11 353 20
+Bolivia 1 9 2
+Brazil 12 402 24
+Chile 6 278 15
+Colombia 0 5 6
+Ecuador 1 7 6
+Peru 0 20 7
+Uruguay 0 7 5
+Venezuela 1 12 3
+a
+The information related to amendments is provided by Aragon 1978a,b ; the quantitative data Ž .
+related to the growth in sales in the non-agricultural manufacturing and service industries are taken
+from Vazquez 1991 ; the number of international legal agreements per country is included in Carcano Ž .
+Ž. Ž. 1941 and Urrutia 1992 .
+
+subject to major re-drafting. Table 1 covers the period 18901995 and shows the
+number of economic-related amendments introduced to the commercial codes in
+each country. The amendments included in this table were all aimed at addressing
+new types of economic interactions as the direct result of the growth of the
+non-agricultural manufacturing and service sectors. These non-agricultural manufacturing
+and service sectors were composed of firms producing agro-manufacturing,
+chemicals, pharmaceuticals, steel, financial services, transportation, communications
+and energy Vazquez Presedo, 1981 . Ž .
+Finally, we also measure the number of international legal agreements addressing
+harmonization of commercial laws. Table 1 compares the dynamic economies
+of Argentina, Brazil and Chile where the average real annual growth in sales of Ž
+the non-agricultural manufacturing and service industries during the period
+18901995 exceeded 2% annually to countries that experienced no significant .
+changes in the number and relative strength of their non-agricultural manufacturing
+and service sectors such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela.
+As shown in Table 1, there is a strong association among the three legal and
+economic variables. That is, the number of non-agricultural industries experiencing
+an average of more than 2% of real growth in their compounded annual sales i.e. Ž
+capturing the speed of economic changes in their national economic structure is .
+associated with a higher number of legal amendments to the commercialcivil
+codes addressing the new type of economic interactions taking place within the new
+industries. Moreover, these two patterns are also associated with a strong drive of a
+country to harmonize its commercial legal framework through international traderelated
+agreements. For example, we observe that Brazil and Argentina who
+possess the most dynamic economies during the period 18901995 with 12 and 11 Ž
+new non-agricultural trade-related industries, respectively are also the countries .
+74 E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85
+
+with the largest number of amendments to their commercialcivil codes 402 and Ž
+353, respectively and with the largest number of trade-related legal treaties signed .
+Ž . i.e. 20 for Argentina and 24 for Brazil . As was claimed above, more complex
+economic systems i.e. a larger number of high growth trade-related non-agricult- Ž
+ural industries reflect a higher complexity in their domestic legal systems mea- .
+sured through the introduction of amendments in their civilcommercial codes. At
+the same time, Table 1 also shows that the more dynamic economies are also more
+likely to harmonize their legal systems through international legal agreements. The
+international legal agreements measured here cover the harmonization of legal
+standards e.g. health standards applied to merchandise crossing international Ž
+borders , the harmonization of legal standards applied to commerce in general e.g. . Ž
+codifying the principles of territoriality and independence , the harmonization of .
+rules e.g. duration and scope of patents , and the harmonization of legal doctrines Ž .
+Že.g. the doctrine of equivalence in the treatment of real property or the fair use
+. 13 doctrine in the use of copyrights . For example, one can observe that starting in
+the mid 19th century, Latin American countries started to adhere to two fundamental
+legal standards addressing the enforcement of laws: first, the principle of
+territoriality, based on the premise that rights and obligations need to be honored
+according to each state’s domestic rules. This principle is also known as the Calo
+Doctrine. This doctrine maintains that ‘aliens are only entitled to those legal rights
+and privileges enjoyed by nationals, and hence may seek redress for grievances only
+before local authorities and to the extent permitted by local law’.14 The second
+principle of independence indicated that the definition of rights within one state
+does not force other states to grant the same rights. Clearly, these two principles
+are examples of international harmonization of laws.
+Table 2 breaks down the pattern of international agreements for each country
+and shows a clear picture where the region’s most dynamic economies are also the
+ones that are more likely to reach international legal commercial agreements
+involving harmonization of rules and standards.15
+One can also argue that as an increasing number of business exchanges occur in
+countries with overlapping growing trade-related sectors, their need for legal
+harmonization will tend to increase. This could explain why in Table 2 we observe
+that most attempts to harmonize legal frameworks have mainly involved countries
+such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile. These countries all experienced growth in
+
+13All of these international agreements deal with measures related to strengthening foreign investment
+protection, simplifying technical standards, regulating professional services, standards to be
+applied to the intepretation of territoriality and independence, and the harmonization in the enforcement
+of tangible and intangible property rights e.g. introducing the doctrine of equivalence, the Ž
+doctrine of fair use in copyrights, rules dealing with duration and scope of patents, and standards to be
+applied to the intepretation of pipeline protection .. 14The Calvo Doctrine, named after Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo 1824 Ž . 1906 was adopted by most
+Latin American states in the 19th century. For an analysis of this doctrine, see Abbott 1976 . Ž . 15Note that an international legal agreement addressing the harmonization of standards is a much
+weaker form of harmonization than the international agreements involving the international convergence
+in commercial rules.
+E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85 75
+
+Table 2
+Matrix of inter-country legal agreements covering commercial areas
+
+Argentina Brazil Bolivia Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru Uruguay Venezuela
+
+Argentina 0 12 1 3 1 1 1 1 0
+Brazil 12 0 1 4 3 2 0 2 0
+Bolivia 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
+Chile 3 4 0 0 2 1 3 1 1
+Colombia 1 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
+Ecuador 1 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0
+Peru 1 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 1
+Uruguay 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
+Venezuela 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
+
+Total 20 24 2 15 6 6 7 5 3
+
+their most dynamic and capital-intensive trade-related sectors i.e. agro-manufac- Ž
+turing, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, steel, financial services, transportation,
+communications, and energy Vazquez Presedo, 1981 . .Ž .
+Asymmetries in market size are usually blamed for failures to reach economic
+and legal integration. If one aims at understanding the social forces behind these
+and other drives for legal convergence, the most promising approach is provided,
+not just by addressing the differences in market size. In contrast, international legal
+convergence must also be understood within the frameworks proposed by North
+Ž. Ž. 1982 and Olson 1982 and here applied to the international case studied here. In
+our case, foreign pressures coupled with the political weight and rent-seeking of
+the lobby groups associated with the main productive domestic sectors affected by
+integration in our case, trade-related sectors influences the political actors’ Ž .
+perceptions of the costs and benefits of legal convergence. For example, Buscaglia
+Ž . 1994a shows that during the 19th century the domestic political processes
+throughout the region assigned greater political weight to landowners and merchants
+linked to the export sectors during a time when the Gold Standard ruled the
+world of international trade and financial flows Buscaglia, 1994a . In this context, Ž .
+legal change and integration had little to do with social welfare maximization and
+much more to do with international political influence and domestic redistributive
+arguments, what Schwartz and Sykes 1996 denominate ‘political welfare-maximi- Ž .
+zation’.16 It can be then said that redistributive forces may slow down or speed up
+the process of institutional reform, but there is no doubt that political welfare-maximization
+related factors have had a powerful influence in shaping legal institutions
+throughout Latin American history. For example, one can observe that in Argentina,
+Brazil, and Chile, ad hoc advising congressional committees composed
+exclusively of landowners and merchants connected to the exports sector, joined by
+
+16The links between the political arm of lobbies and the business institutions associated with them
+often yields rents and higher profits for the firms involved Olson, 1982; Schwartz and Sykes, 1996 . Ž .
+76 E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85
+
+foreign pressure business groups, were asked to provide assessments of the civil,
+commercial, and criminal codes during the amendment procedures Perez, 1963a . Ž .
+The advice provided by these committees was often quoted and followed during the
+debates in the Senate and Chambers of Deputies Perez, 1963b . Moreover, the Ž .
+opinions issued by these committees were the foundation of key changes to the
+newly enacted codes. No other domestic groups were included in this political
+process. All this occurred during the period when the Gold Standard determined
+the terms of trade and trade patterns worldwide and during which all countries in
+Latin America were dependent upon foreign capital for their development.17
+One should also pay attention to other catalysts of legal change. For example,
+starting in the mid 20th century, developed economies generating technologies, led
+by the United States, started to rely heavily on the application of unilateral
+pressure and sanctions in order to stop the infringement of their multinationals’
+property rights. Suspension of preferential tariffs and trade sanctions were the
+most common policy tools for punishing developing countries.18 Foreign pressures
+notwithstanding, this study also shows that the trade-related legal convergence
+observed throughout Latin America is mainly explained by favorable incentives
+within the political and economic systems of the region.
+Based on the historical experience explained above, one can also show that the
+most recent legal reforms introduced within the legal systems of Latin America’s
+largest exporters during the 1990s are also following this same historical pattern of
+harmonizations. Following the same historical pattern described above, legal reforms
+in Latin American countries are still the product of the joint effect of local
+political conditions and foreign economic pressures Buscaglia, 1994a . In this Ž .
+respect, recent constitutional reforms in Latin America have done nothing to
+either enhance or to hamper the already strong historical trend in international
+economic-related legal harmonization within the region Buscaglia, 1994b; Ž
+Buscaglia and Guerrero, 1995 . Furthermore, regardless of the latest constitutional .
+reforms in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, Buscaglia and Guerrero 1995 Ž .
+have shown that foreign economic pressures to reform commercial laws during the
+period 195094 arose particularly because an increasing proportion of imports to
+these countries consisted of information-intensive and capital-intensive goods and
+19 services. For example, Buscaglia and Guerrero 1995 show that in countries with Ž .
+a poor enforcement record and lack of international harmonization drive, intellectual
+property was subject to a constant pattern of infringements due to the lack of
+a domestic producer base with a stake in this modern sector.20 As a result,
+
+17For a description of how the Gold Standard affected international business transactions, see
+McKinnon 1982 . Ž . 18An example of unilateral measures aimed at inducing legal changes in Latin America is provided by
+the Omnibus Trade and Competitieness Act of 1988, 19. 1301-1303 amending Section 301 of the Trade Ž
+Act of 1974 to include a ‘Special 301’ to deal with intellectual property protection. . Section 301 .
+authorizes the US Government to reduce Generalized System of Preferences GSP benefits i.e. Ž. Ž
+preferential tariffs or their elimination, and the imposition of import restrictions .
+or even retaliatory
+measures. 19See Buscaglia and Guerrero 1995 , and BNA 1996 . Ž. Ž.
+E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85 77
+
+advanced-country firms generating these technologies were then demanding their
+governments’ use of trade sanctions or threats of loss of trade benefits as a way to
+punish less-developed countries’ unauthorized use of intellectual property.21
+From a domestic policy perspective, Buscaglia 1994a also shows that a move- Ž .
+ment toward legal integration also covered the period within which an import
+substitution approach to development was implemented. As a product of the Great
+Depression, from the early 1930s until the 1980s, Latin America and almost all
+other developing countries encouraged domestic import substitution manufactur- Ž .
+ing investment, suppressed agricultural prices, and expanded the size of their
+public sector enterprises while attempting to stimulate savings and investment
+through taxation and credit allocated by the public sector. The prevailing view was
+that a shortage of domestic physical capital was the key impediment to developmentIn
+this context, Latin America’s attempts at legal integration during the period
+19301980 were also conceived as an integral part of this import-substituting
+industrialization ISI , a strategy strongly advocated and supported by the Economic Ž .
+Commission for Latin America ECLA , a branch of the United Nations known Ž. Ž
+more widely in Latin America by its Spanish nomenclature: Comision Economica
+para America Latina or CEPAL . For ECLA . CEPAL, regional integration offered
+a way to provide markets large enough to satisfy economies of scale and scope
+which would, in turn, strengthen the import-substitution process. Non-reciprocity
+and preferential treatment were to be granted through international legal agreements
+in accordance with, or dependent upon, the level of economic development
+of individual countries. Tariff barriers against countries outside the region would
+serve to protect Latin American products and enable them to compete more
+effectively against foreign imports. In brief, the ECLA recipe for regional integration
+was an inward-looking strategy, conceived and understood as a ‘collective
+defense’ for sheltering Latin America from adverse fluctuations in the world
+economy Rosenthal, 1991 . Ž .
+Import substitution industries grew behind protective walls based on subsidies
+and tariffs in a milieu where many other determinants of the rate of economic
+
+20 Id. at 34. 21The international harmonization of intellectual property rules and standards can also be understood
+from a historical perspective. The Paris and Berne Conventions, administered by the World
+Intellectual Property Organization WIPO , governed the international protection of intellectual Ž .
+property during more than a century. The Paris Convention, Berne Convention, and others that are
+assigned to protect intellectual property, are administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization
+WIPO , founded in 1967 as a specialized agency of the United Nations. The three most important Ž .
+international agreements under WIPO are: 1 the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Ž .
+Property 103 nation members established in 1883; 2 the Madrid Agreement concerning the Ž . Ž.
+International Registration of Marks 29 states adopted in 1891; and 3 the Berne Convention for the Ž . Ž.
+Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 90 members adopted in 1886. WIPO administers a total of Ž .
+nineteen unions and conventions. One of these treaties is the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 1970 PCT Ž .
+Ž . 51 members . PCT provides for the filing of international patent applications, thereby facilitating the
+examination of patent applications in the patent office of other member countries.
+78 E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85
+
+growth, such as investment in human capital and the role of microeconomic
+incentives, were completely ignored by policymakers. Protection of import substitution
+industries allowed domestic prices and costs to far exceed international prices
+and created little incentive for efficiency. These protected industries produced
+substitutes for imports but usually depended on the import of raw materials and
+technology. Domestic demands for foreign exchange and the region’s international
+debt grew rapidly over time as these firms and their governments imported capital
+goods to accelerate investment Buscaglia and Ulen, 1996 . In this context, the Ž .
+import substitution approach to development came to an end during the international
+debt crisis of the 1980s when developing countries’ policymakers realized that
+internal markets and protection of infant industries were not enough to assure
+sustainable growth.22
+The failure of the ISI strategy combined with the second oil shock, debt crises,
+and recession in the developed world which reduced the demand for developing- Ž
+country exports led to the 1980s Latin American economic crisis. As a result, .
+international legal harmonizations acquired a new form. By the early 1980s most
+countries in the region started to adopt pro-business market-driven economic
+policies to address the problems posed by large foreign debts, high inflation, and
+huge fiscal deficits. The ultimate goal of this free-market economic prescription
+was to push through legislative bodies laws needed to deregulate and liberalize
+trade so that the market, rather than the state, would be the ultimate referee on
+how resources would be allocated.23
+
+3. A jurimetric analysis of the economic factors affecting international legal
+harmonization
+
+The regional drive towards legal harmonization in Latin America has never been
+uniform. More specifically, one can observe that countries with overlapping dynamic
+trade-related sectors i.e. experiencing a higher proportion of intra-sectoral Ž
+international trade as a proportion of total trade also have private sectors .
+demanding compatible legal frameworks in their foreign markets within the areas
+affecting their products or foreign direct investment within their sector of the
+economy. We have already described how this has been true under both, the
+import substitution industrialization and the export-driven periods. In this context,
+imagine two types of countries hoping to harmonize their commercial laws:
+countries where private commercial laws are not far from their evolutionary
+agrarian base and with weak non-agricultural sectors producing information-inten22
+For a complete description of this process, see Buscaglia 1993 . Ž . 23As part of this new strategy and in order to address the crises, some countries ammended their
+constitutions e.g. Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico , while others pursued this new approach to Ž .
+policy-making on a legal piece meal basis e.g. Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela . For more details on the Ž .
+nature of the region’s domestic legal reforms see Barragan 1994 . For details on the macroeconomic Ž .
+aspects of reforms refer to Edwards 1991 . Ž .
+E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85 79
+
+sive products exist e.g. Bolivia, Paraguay , and, in contrast, countries with rela- Ž .
+tively evolved commercial legal systems i.e. legal systems addressing a much wider Ž
+range and higher complexity of economic interactions and with a high proportion .
+of their trade concentrated on dynamic sectors such as Argentina, Brazil and Ž
+Chile . The quantitative evidence Tables 1 and 2 and the analysis advanced would . Ž.
+predict that legal harmonization involving agrarian countries, possessing legal
+systems that are not far from its evolutionary base, will have less motives to seek
+legal integration. For example, one can currently observe that private sector firms
+in Bolivia or Uruguay importing Brazilian computer software and hardware,
+compact disks, or movies, actually oppose the enactment of foreign investment
+protection or intellectual property laws compatible with the needs and interests of
+the Brazilian firms exporting these products to Bolivia.24Let’s now test the above
+hypotheses. We measure the following independent variables that are aimed at
+explaining a country’s drive to harmonize its laws:
+The number of economic-related amendments to a country’s civilcommercial
+codes Ž . no. of ammendments ;
+The annual number of non-agricultural trade-related industries experiencing an
+average annual real growth of 2% or more in their compounded annual sales.
+This variable is designed to capture the economic dynamics and changes in
+economic structure Ž . no. of non-agricultural trade-related industries ;
+The average intra-sectoral international trade as a proportion of total trade
+Ž . aerage intra-trade as a percentage of total trade ;
+The relative size of the national GDP as compared to the region’s GDP
+Ž . national GDP as a percentage of the region’s GDP ; and
+The annual growth in trade between pairs of countries Ž growth in international
+trade..
+
+By applying multiple least squares regression analysis, in Table 3 we can see that
+the first three explanatory variables are significant at the 5% level and all have the
+expected signs. That is, a country’s larger number of international legal agreements
+aimed at harmonizing its commercial laws with the rest of the world will be
+explained by first, the higher number of amendments to its domestic civil code
+indicating the presence of a higher domestic legal complexity addressing new types
+of economic interactions; second, by a higher percentage growth in its international
+intra-sectoral trade with the region i.e. showing the presence of domestic economic Ž
+actors with a stake in harmonizing international rules in order to expand their
+markets abroad on a ‘one lawone market’ basis , and, third, by a higher annual .
+percentage growth in sales within the non-agricultural trade-related sectors i.e. Ž
+showing the presence of demand driven trade-related sectors aiming at expanding
+its markets ..
+Please note that the annual number of international legal accords used to
+measure our dependant discrete variable include all agreements involving the
+
+24Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Argentina , Comunicado No 342-92; and supra note 45 at 67. Ž .
+80 E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85
+
+Table 3
+Multiple regression analysisa
+
+b Variable to be explained Number of International Legal Agreements
+Number of observations 90
+Multiple R 0.619
+Squared multiple R 0.514
+Standard error of estimate 1.92
+Variable Coefficient Error Tolerance T P
+
+Constant 1.46 0.12 12.16 0.00
+No. of amendments 0.10 0.01 0.95 7.49 0.0
+No. of non-agricultural 1.08 0.05 0.95 21.60 0.00
+trade-related industries
+Average intra-trade as 2.02 0.23 0.99 8.78 0.00
+a percentage of total trade
+National GDP as a percentage 0.05 0.15 0.86 0.33 0.34
+of the region’s GDP
+Growth in international trade 0.07 0.33 0.93 0.21 0.45
+a
+An exponential link among the variables was tested and rejected for lack of fitness. The Sims’ test
+was also applied in order to show the direction of causality. The data related to the number of
+international legal agreements per country as our dependent variable are contained in Carcano 1941 ; Ž . Ž.
+from Urrutia 1994 . In dealing with the independent or explanatory variables the data were drawn from Ž .
+the following sources: i the annual number of amendments to the domestic civil codes dealing with Ž .
+commercial aspects is provided by Aragon 1978a,b ; ii the quantitative data related to the annual Ž . Ž.
+growth in sales of the non-agricultural manufacturing and service industries i.e. no. of non-agricultural Ž
+trade-related industries are taken from Vazquez 1991 ; iii macroeconomic data related to national, . Ž .Ž .
+regional GDP i.e. national GDP as a percentage of the region’s GDP , growth in international trade Ž .
+Ž .Ž i.e. growth in international trade and intrasectoral trade i.e. average intra-trade as a percentage of
+total trade are taken from Montenegro 1980 . Ž . b
+The international legal agreements include data on the harmonization of legal standards e.g. Ž
+health standards applied to merchandise crossing international borders , the harmonization of legal .
+standards applied to commerce in general e.g. codifying the principles of territoriality and indepen- Ž
+dence , the harmonization of rules e.g. duration and scope of patents and the harmonization of legal .Ž .
+doctrines e.g. the doctrine of equivalence in the treatment of real property or the fair use doctrine in Ž
+the use of copyrights ..
+
+trade-related non agricultural industries defined. However, the relative size of a
+country within the region national GDP as a percentage of the region’s GDP and Ž .
+the annual percentage growth in international trade between two countries growth Ž
+in trade show no significance in the explanation of legal harmonizing agreements. .
+In other words, relative size and movements in annual international trade, in
+general, do not explain a country’s drive to harmonize international legal standards
+and legal rules. Finally, we see that 51.4% of the variability in our dependent
+variable is explained by the independent variables included here.
+Therefore, the jurimetrics results here are consistent with the fact that a large
+proportion of international trade based on intra-sectoral exchanges between two
+countries creates an incentive for the private sectors in these countries to demand
+harmony in the rules of their international trade i.e. a drive towards a ‘one Ž
+market-one law’ business condition Buscaglia and Long, 1997 . This simply means .Ž .
+E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85 81
+
+Table 4
+Growth in intra-sector a
+
+Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay Paraguay
+
+Argentina 9.5 2.1 0.3 0.2
+Brazil 3.9 0.8 0.6
+Chile 1.0 0.1
+Uruguay 0.0
+a
+Bilateral trade as a percentage of total bilateral trade: 196098. Data related to the average
+intra-trade as a percentage of total trade are taken from Montenegro 1980 . Ž .
+
+that a bottom-up legal framework would emerge if enough overlapping in economic
+structures exist. Table 4 addresses this point by showing the proportion of total
+intra-sectoral bilateral trade for a sample of agrarian and ‘dynamic’ economies. As
+stated, one would expect that the larger the proportion of intra-sectoral trade, the
+more pronounced the propensity to seek legal harmonization.
+Based on the evidence shown in Table 4, we expect that a larger proportion of
+export-driven dynamic economic sectors engaging in intra-sectoral trade, such as
+Argentina, Brazil and Chile, would be actively supporting economic integration and
+the harmonization of commercial rules applied within their industries sectors. Fig.
+1 shows the historical pattern relating high levels of intra-sectoral trade with a
+strong drive to seek legal integration. The number of trade-related international
+agreements is measured on the vertical axis while a country’s proportion of total
+international trade classified as intra-sectoral trade is measured on the horizontal
+axis. One can observe a pattern already established in the correlation and regression
+analyses presented above. If one considers the period 18901990, the agrarian
+economies of South America have shown a poor record in seeking international
+legal harmonization while those economies with private sectors engaged in crossborder
+trade and investments tend to seek a ‘one-marketone-law’ approach to
+international exchanges.25
+Historical evidence shows that industries such as agro-manufacturing,
+computer-related material, food manufacturing, energy and textiles actively support
+policies to harmonize international commercial laws by actively lobbying
+before the Argentine and Brazilian Congress.26 These industries have also pushed
+for the establishment of more effective and uniform procedures for dispute
+resolution mechanisms.27 For example, MERCOSUR’s provision for binational
+
+25The graph shows Venezuela as an outlier within the group. The linearized fit was tested and met.
+Moreover, the standard assumptions required by the regression analysis presented above have been
+met. 26 Id. at 56. 27This is a clear trend in public opinion observed in Gallup polls throughout the region. For more
+details, see Buscaglia and Dakolias 1995 . The results indicate that in samples of 60 Ž . 100 firms per
+country, the majority of these enterprises consider the role of the judiciary to be ‘deficient’. These
+businesses consider the lack of a reliable judiciary within MERCOSUR countries as one of the main
+reasons for seeking a predictable dispute resolution mechanism. Id. at pp. 2531.
+82 E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85
+
+Fig. 1. Number of legal treaties vs. average intra-sectoral trade, 18901990.
+
+corporations has led to the establishment of 11 Argentine-Brazilian joint ventures,
+particularly in communications, computer, and pharmaceutical industries that are
+designed to expand market operations.28 In addition, at least a hundred agreements
+for cross-border cooperation have been signed between Argentine and
+Brazilian companies in industries as diverse as automotive, banking, steel, aluminum
+and plastic.29 MERCOSUR has also provided the legal framework for sector-bysector
+agreements among private entrepreneurial associations that has contributed
+to the harmonization of rules aforementioned. For example, Argentine and Brazilian
+associations of steel producers have signed 34 and 30 accords regulating the
+treatment of patents, copyrights and trademarks.30 In contrast, for the reasons
+shown, the same degree of harmonization efforts is not observed among Uruguayan
+and Paraguayan firms and no legal integration initiatives have been advanced or
+accepted from the governments of Uruguay and Paraguay Ministry of Foreign Ž
+Affairs, 1994 ..
+
+4. Conclusion
+
+Social scientists have usually viewed regional institutional integration as a series
+of multiple interactions among national governments that would lead to the
+creation of new supranational decision-making institutions
+to which the national
+governments would gradually cede their authority over domestic issues. In this
+mainstream view, the citizens of those states would eventually and passively come
+to redefine their loyalties and extend their identification to encompass the new
+
+28 Id. at 34. 29Argentine Secretariat of Economic Planning, Document 341-TA, pp. 1213. 30 Id. at 34.
+E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85 83
+
+entity Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990 . In this context, during the 1960s and 70s, Ž .
+functional theorists viewed integration as a linear development and as a state-driven
+process in which such regional groupings would pass through successive stages of
+ever increasing institutionalization. It was assumed that initial state-by-state initiatives
+would lead to ‘spillover’ effects in which, as the scope of integration deepened
+and broadened, closer cooperation in one area would engender
+in a positive way
+the movement toward integration in other related areas as well.
+However, this mainstream account does not fit the historical evolution of legal
+and economic integration in developing countries in general and within Latin
+America specifically. Spillover effects failed to materialize Buscaglia and Long, Ž
+1997 . After some promising beginnings, most regional integration efforts in . Ž
+Africa, Asia and Latin America tended to lose steam and, after a period of time, .
+collapse. It has been argued that this linear theory of how integration develops is
+not really applicable to Latin America because the ‘balance between the push of
+formal institution building and the pull of informal interactions tends to be
+unstable and fragile’.31 Nonetheless, conventional theory posits that regional
+integration must be accompanied by a process of formal and state-driven institution-building
+if it hopes to survive Mols, 1993 . Ž .
+In contrast, our framework proposed here views legal harmonization of commercial
+rules of international trade as a result of a bottom-up process driven by related
+economic industries on different sides of international borders engaging in increasing
+intra-sectoral trade. This contrasts with the aforementioned top-down conventional
+approach used to understand past drives to legal and economic integration.
+In our framework, we showed that once a trade agreement has been organized, its
+future development and growth is much determined and driven by the private
+sector’s perceptions
+whether real or apparent
+of the issues and burdens they
+must face. In this context, history shows that the states that comprise a successful
+regional bloc must constantly deal and address the pros and cons of integration-related
+issues brought before them by a variety of private actors, domestic and
+international. How are integration-related benefits distributed among, and across,
+the member countries? In other words, who gains and who loses from integra- Ž .
+tion? Do the payoffs justify the effort? Do some partners reap benefits at the
+expense of others? In the final analysis, these are crucial considerations that also
+determine the ultimate success or failure of regional cooperationintegration over
+the long run. Yet, scholars of the so-called ‘realist’ school of international relations,
+which holds that states operate at the international level in a state of
+anarchy, must come to terms with the inisible hand behind the success or failure
+of their efforts. As shown above through the examination of our jurimetric
+evidence, international differences in the composition and nature of the economic
+structures of the countries involved will represent the real obstacle or promoter of
+legaleconomic integration. Given this context, foreign pressures on developing
+countries coupled with the compatibility of economic structures trading across
+
+31See van Klevener, supra note 65 at 24.
+84 E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85
+
+borders have all combined to create the incentives needed for the international
+harmonization of legal rules and standards.
+
+References
+
+Abbott, A.F., 1976. Latin America and international arbitration conventions: the quandary of non-ratification.
+Harvard Int. Law J. 17, 131137.
+Abramovitz, M., 1989. Thinking About Growth. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
+Acevedo, C., 1987. La Historia de la Integracion. Editorial El Planeta, Buenos Aires.
+Aragon, R., 1978a. Estudio Cuantitativo de la Codificacion Civil y Comercial en Latinoamerica.
+Editorial EUDEBA, Buenos Aires.
+Aragon, R., 1978b. Codificacion Civil en Latinoamerica. Editorial EUDEBA, Buenos Aires.
+Barragan, J., 1994. Como se Hacen las Leyes. Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires.
+Bureau of National Affairs BNA , 1996. International Trade Reporter, 12. BNA, Washington, DC, pp. Ž .
+766769 see also 3 Ž Ž. . 91 pp. 234-256. .
+Buscaglia, E., 1993. Law, Technological Progress, and Economic Development. Working Paper. No. 391.
+Hoover Institution, International Studies Program, Palo Alto, CA.
+Buscaglia, E., 1994a. Legal and economic development: the missing links. J. Inter-Am. Stud. World
+Affairs 35 4 , 153 Ž . 169.
+Buscaglia, E., 1994b. Legal and Economic Development in Latin America: The Missing Links. J.
+Inter-Am. Stud. World Affairs 18 4 , 45 Ž . 59.
+Buscaglia, E., 1996. Corrupcion y la oposicion a la ley de patentes. El Comercio 12, 16.
+Buscaglia, E., Dakolias, M., 1995. Judicial Crises: Court Delay and Backlogs in Latin America, Working
+Paper No. 87. Georgetown University School of Business.
+Buscaglia, E., Guerrero, J.L., 1995. A quantitative analysis of counterfeiting activities in developing
+countries during the pre-GATT period, Jurimetric J., 23: 3 , 23 Ž . 37.
+Buscaglia, E., Long, C., 1997. US Foreign Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in Latin America.
+Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Palo Alto, CA.
+Buscaglia, E., Ulen, T., 1996. 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association at
+Stanford University.
+Carcano, M.A., 1941. Historia Diplomatica Argentina en sus Relaciones Comerciales con la Region
+Latinoamericana. Editorial Perfil, Buenos Aires, pp. 5662.
+Clagett, H., 1952. La Administracion de Justicia en Latinoamerica. Oceana Publications, New York.
+Davey, W., Jackson, J., Sykes, A., 1995. Legal Problems of International Economic Relations. Harvard
+University Press, Boston, MA, pp. 23121.
+de Robertis, M., 1988. Un Analisis Legal Comparado de los Sistemas Latinoamericanos, Unpublished
+Manuscript, Conferencia de Analisis Juridico Hemisferico. Universidad Nacional de Busnos Aires,
+Buenos Aires.
+Dougherty, J., Pfaltzgraff Jr., L., 1990. Contending Theories in International Relations, 3rd ed Harper
+and Row, New York, p. 433.
+Edwards, S., 1991. Latin American Economic Reform. The World Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 2335.
+Garcia-Lopez, J., 1973. Las Leyes y las Instituciones Internacionales. Editorial ADEBA, pp. 1356.
+Karst, K., 1966. Latin American Legal Institutions: Problems for Comparative Study. Latin American
+Center, Los Angeles, CA.
+McKinnon, R., 1982. The order of economic liberalization: lessons from Chile and Argentina. K.
+Brunner and A. Metzler, ‘‘Economic Policy in a World of Change. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp.
+159186.
+Merryman, J.H., 1985a. The Civil Law Tradition, 2nd ed Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 2689.
+Merryman, J.H., 1985b. The Civil Law Tradition, 2nd ed Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 39.
+Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de Argentina Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Argentina , Ž .
+1994. Informe del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report no. Ž .
+1345HA34. May 29. Government of Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+E. Buscaglia Emerging Markets Reiew 2 2001 67 ( ) 85 85
+
+Mols, M., 1993. The integration agenda: a framework for comparison. In: Smith, P.H. Ed. , The Ž .
+Challenge of Integration: Europe and the Americas. University of Miami North-South Center, Coral
+Gables, FL, pp. 1217.
+Montenegro, R.J., 1980. Historia Economica del Nuevo Mundo. Editorial EUDEBA, pp. 56119.
+Muniz, V., 1951a. El Acercamiento de los Sistemas Legales en Latinoamerica. Editorial UBA, Buenos
+Aires, pp. 123256.
+Muniz, V., 1951b. El Acercamiento de los Sistemas Legales en Latinoamerica. Editorial UBA, Buenos
+Aires, pp. 2334.
+Muniz, V., 1951c. El Acercamiento de los Sistemas Legales en Latinoamerica. Editorial UBA, Buenos
+Aires, p. 116.
+Muniz, V., 1951d. El Acercamiento de los Sistemas Legales en Latinoamerica. Editorial UBA, Buenos
+Aires, pp. 121139.
+Nelson, R., Wright, G., 1992. The rise and fall of American technological leadership: the postwar era in
+historical perspective. J. Econ. Lit.
+North, D., 1982. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University
+Press, Cambridge.
+Olson, M., 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth. Inflation, and Social Rigidities.
+Yale University Press, pp, New Haven, pp. 3473.
+Perez, R., 1963a. La Adopcion y Debates de los Codigos en los Senados del Continente. Editorial Perfil,
+Buenos Aires.
+Perez, R., 1963b. La Adopcion y Debates de los Codigos en los Senados del Continente Editorial Perfil,
+Buenos Aires, 121134.
+Porter, M., 1985. Competitive Advantage. The Free Press, New York.
+Rosenberg, N., 1985. The commercial exploitation of science by American industry. Clark, K., R. Hayes,
+and C. Lorenz, ‘‘The Uneasy Alliance: Managing the Productivity Technology Dilemma. Harvard
+Business School Press, Boston, MA.
+Rosenthal, G., 1991. Un informe critico a 30 anos de integracion en America Latina. Nueva Sociedad
+113, 6065.
+Schumpeter, J.A., 1950. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper, New York.
+Schwartz, W., Sykes, A., 1996. Toward a positive theory of the most favored nation obligation and its
+exceptions in the WTOGATT System. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 16 1 , 27 Ž . 51.
+Urrutia, J.J., 1992. Los Acuerdos Comerciales Internacionales en el Continente Americano: Precedentes
+para la Region. Mexico, FCE Editorial.
+Urrutia, J.J., 1994. Los Acuerdos Comerciales Internacionales en el Continente Americano: Precedentes
+para la Region Informe Tecnico, GATT Doc. 2340-BTM 391.
+Vazquez, J., 1991. La Historia Economica de America del Sur. Editorial Atlantida, Rosario, Argentina,
+pp. 1217.
+Vazquez Presedo, V., 1981. Historia Economica del Cono Sur. Editorial EUDEBA, pp. 1245.
+Watson, A., 1983. The Civil Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 2478.
+Wright, G., 1990. The origins of American industrial success. Am. Econ. Rev. 107, 651668.
+
+Further reading
+
+Buscaglia, E., Ratliff, W., 1995. Judicial Reform in Latin America: A Framework for National
+Development. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA.
+Buscaglia, E., Ratliff, W., 2000. Law and Economics in Developing Countries. Hoover Press, Stanford,
+Palo Alto, CA.
+Schwartz, J., 1996. One hundred sixty countries set treaties on internet copyrights. Washington Post
+December 21, A1.
\ No newline at end of file
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+++ b/CALVO-GARCIA--Manuel--PICONTO-NOVALES--Teresa.-Empirical-investigation-in-the-scope-of-legal-sociology..md
@@ -0,0 +1,3769 @@
+The investigation
+
+empirical in
+the scope of
+
+legal sociology
+
+Manuel Calvo Garcia
+Teresa Piconto Novales
+
+PID_00184287
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184Z87
+
+Reconocimiento-NoComerciai-SinObraDerivada (BY-NC-ND) v.3.0 Espana de CreativeCommons. You could copy them, distribute them
+
+The empirical investigation within the context of a sociologist jurKHca
+
+no hagriis de ellos un usage comen:ial y ni derivative work . The complete license can be consulted at http:// creativecommons.orgl
+licenses/ by-nc-nd/ 3.0/ es/ legalcode.es
+http://www.exabyteinformatica.com
+
+Texts and images published in this work are subject to copyright - unless otherwise indicated - a license
+
+and transmit them publicly whenever the author is cited and sourced ( FUOC . Fundaci6n para la Universitat Oberta de Catalunya),
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+3. Some methodological questions................................................. ... 15
+
+1. Empirical investigation in the socio-legal sphere............
+
+2. Fields of application of socio-legal research.
+
+3.1. Quantitative or qualitative? .................................................................. ......
+
+5.4. The administration of justice before immigration and _
+
+5.2. Right and social exclusion in migratory experiences ........
+
+5.1. Barometers and opinion surveys on the Administration
+
+5.3. Attitudes of the Spaniards before the Criminal Justice
+
+3.2. The place of theory in empirical investigation .....................
+
+4.2.2. Data production techniques ..................................... _
+
+4.3. Analysis and presentation of results ..............................................
+
+3.3. The bureaucratic “ethos” of legal sociology ..........................
+
+22
+
+(secondary investigation) .............................................. ............ 38
+
+4.2.1. Use of existing data ........................................
+
+20
+
+4.2. Data collection techniques ............................................................. _ .......
+
+34
+
+4.1. Design of the investigation ................................................................ ............
+
+28
+
+of justice and legal professions ..............................................
+
+6
+
+18
+15
+
+26
+
+31
+
+Goals................................................. .................................................... ....
+
+26
+
+36
+
+gender violence (content analysis ) ............................... 39
+
+11
+
+Activities.................................................. .................................................
+
+Introduction.................................................. .............................................. 5
+
+45
+
+4. Socio-legal investigation ................................................. ............
+
+Bibliography................................................. .............................................
+
+Summary.................................................. .................................................... ....
+
+22
+
+46
+
+43
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+5. Analysis of some socio-legal investigations.................................. 34
+
+7
+
+Index
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+mentales, and we will introduce elemental knowledge about the design, the techniques
+
+After having reviewed in the previous module some basic plantings so
+
+the developments of empirical legal sociology and provide some basic tools for the
+
+analysis and evaluation of the investigations that are
+
+be able to help as a complement or clarification of what is set out here.
+
+modest. What is pursued is to provide basic information about
+
+on methodology and research in the social sciences accessible to those who
+
+the orientation of the theory of law and the legal sciences towards one
+
+module does not have to do with the training of expert persons, capable of carrying out
+
+socio-legal investigations. The plantings are much more
+
+field of empirical investigation. In any way , it can be useful for the study of this module to
+
+have a manual or some materials
+
+In definitive, the objectives and competencies that are intended to be achieved with this
+
+analyze the design of the investigations and critically evaluate them .
+
+further study for those who are interested in a specific preparation in it
+
+• the empirical sociology of the right
+
+will review some empirical investigations with the double purpose of taking
+
+of research methods and techniques . According to the case, well they will be given by
+
+conocidos to have been studied in another matter, the bien is referred to their
+
+• the sociological theory of law,
+
+contact with the substantive contents of the mismas and, mainly, to
+
+empirical within the scope of legal sociology.
+
+These and ways of conceiving socio-legal knowledge , grouping them into three typical
+
+general orientations:
+
+At the outset, it should be noted that we will not dwell on the revision at the bottom
+
+perform in this field.
+
+Regarding the perspectives of social theory on legal phenomena, in this module 3 we will
+
+present the contributions and developments of research in
+
+In module 1 we look at the presentation of the plurality of corridors
+
+5
+
+Introduction
+
+socio-legal perspective.
+
+techniques for data collection and analysis of results . As a complement, if
+
+•
+
+Consequently, in this module we will review the approach and fields of application of
+
+legal sociology; some deep methodological questions
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+6
+
+ridic.
+
+critically evaluate them .
+
+Goals
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+unilateral.
+
+8. Provide basic knowledge about design , recognition techniques
+
+nocer cuál es el estado de la cuestión al respecto.
+
+data management and the analysis and presentation of results.
+
+3. Deepen around the fields of socio-legal research and co
+
+know elementally which may be its main implications.
+7. Identify the reasons for the bureaucratic “ethos” in legal sociology and
+
+2. Evaluate the state of empirical research in the socio-juvenile sphere
+
+6. Reflect on what is the role of theory in empirical research.
+
+it is based on legal sociology oriented to empirical research.
+
+tacto con los contenidos nouns de las mismas; analyze your design and
+
+va and/or qualitative and value possible exits that superen plantations
+
+1. Know what the origin is and the epistemological foundations on which
+
+ner of analytical and critical tools on empirical research.
+
+The contents of these materials are:
+
+5. Deepen the foundations of the debate on quantitative methodology
+
+9. To review some empirical investigations with the aim of taking into account
+
+4. Explore some general methodological questions at the end of the dispo
+
+The objectives and competences that you will have to achieve once you have worked them
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+it does not in itself constitute empirical research, although it may have a socio-legal
+
+focus.
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation in the scope of legal sociology
+
+lesser fortune.
+
+7
+
+1. Empirical investigation in the social sphere
+legal
+
+how can it be the study of jurisprudence and legislative background,
+
+intersects with a long tradition within the scope of Anglo legal cultures
+
+authoritarian among those who participated Theodor W. Adorno and other critical authors
+
+Quantitatives ended up imposing themselves linked to the height of positive theories.
+
+empirical understanding of legal phenomena. This is a perspective that
+
+Thematic of data collection techniques and their analysis according to the appropriate
+
+methodologies . Second, the mere analysis of legal documents,
+
+empiricas en EE. UU. during the postwar period (Treves, 1988). Although, to be fair, it
+
+would have to be noted that investigations into personality
+
+methods and techniques of social investigation in order to provide knowledge
+
+Social. And, secondly, we restrict this terminology to the sis application
+
+within the scope of legal sociology, which aims to resort to the
+
+Social companies and a favorable context determined the peak of investigations
+
+mind the methods of sociology, as we also have to consider the techniques developed in
+
+other disciplines such as anthropology and psychology
+
+because for decades the heyday of functionalism pushed the development of sociology
+
+along theoretical paths. However , the positivist drift of science
+
+It's like the American way of doing sociology. We decide paradójically,
+
+Which means, in the first place, that we do not take into sole consideration
+
+talk about an empirical sociology. A specific orientation _
+
+and appear linked to the great classics of social sciences (Engels
+
+in front of the use of quantitative and qualitative methods proper to research in
+
+social sciences.
+
+socio-juridical right , we señalábamos en elmodulo 1 que también puede
+
+y Marx; Weber, Durkheim or Tönnies), the paradoxical empirical investigation is going
+
+to be developed in EE. UU. and even identifies himself at some point
+
+Despite the fact that the first empirical investigations took place in Europe
+
+Together with the contributions of social theory on the right and the theory
+
+We consider as empirical investigation the studies carried out in
+
+also played an essential role in the development of empirical investigation , contributing
+
+in an important way to the development of methods that
+
+sajonas and nordicas and that it would have been extended to all the countries with greater the
+
+more than the dominant quantitative methodology. However, the methods
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Note
+
+Note
+
+Note
+
+other British foundations.
+
+8
+
+These foundations provide
+resources to carry out costly
+empirical investigations into
+legal professions , the
+administration of justice or the
+Juror. This is to say, the
+investigations that characterize
+the development of legal
+sociology at that time.
+
+The creation of the Institute of
+Sociology at the University of
+Var Sovia, which has just
+completed fifty years , plays
+and continues to play a
+fundamental role in the
+development of legal sociology
+in that country and in Europe ,
+with important achievements,
+for example, with British research centres .
+
+The Nordic Association of
+Legal Sociology still has a
+great vitality and continues to
+have strong legal sociology
+departments , such as the
+one at the University of Lund.
+
+In addition to the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom , in the European
+
+panorama , Poland , Germany, Italy and France must also be mentioned .
+
+The European tradition has as a reference the empirical investigation in the Nordic
+
+Countries (Treves, 1988), from which it has as a basis the weight of Scandinavian
+
+realistic currents . Although smaller in scope and extension, legal sociology and
+
+empirical investigations developed in the Nordic countries had a greater weight in the
+
+development of European legal sociology in the sixties and seventies in the English
+
+countries.
+
+tas en el campo de las ciencias sociales. Until the point at which the investigation
+
+jones. However, in European countries they always had preponderant relevance to
+
+the theoretical orientations of legal sociology.
+
+this discipline in Spain. These initiatives came together with enthusiastic support
+
+people linked to sociology (Toharia, a medium path with the right and the group of the
+
+Autonomous University of Madrid) and the study of phenomena
+
+without ever reaching the relevance of this type of studies in the Anglosa countries
+
+among them that stands out la American.
+
+important in the work of numerous authors and research centers – even
+
+trends and will be favored by the support of large foundations,
+
+socio-juridical gods in Spain. However, with few exceptions, the development of legal
+
+sociology in Spain has been oriented towards theoretical aspects .
+
+and the agents of social control (Bergalli) propitiated the development of the studies
+
+Manfred Rehbinder (Treves, 1988), having had an extension im
+
+y Autonoma de Barcelona). These efforts and others arising from the activity of
+
+linked to some relevant figures such as JeanCarbonier, Renato Treves or
+
+dation (which spurred the creation of the Oxford Center for Socio-Legal Studies) and
+
+The empirical studies in the field of legal sociology are linked to these
+
+of some authors and groups directly linked to it (Universidad Autó noma de Madrid,
+
+Valencia or Zaragoza) or at (Universidad de Sevilla, Central
+
+from the seventies, in part thanks to the financing of the American Bar Foun
+
+from statistical tools.
+
+In Italy, France and Germany the empirical investigation appears initially
+
+mental in the development of research in other many countries and in part
+
+scientific knowledge is reduced to basic quantitative empirical investigation
+
+cular in the United Kingdom , where empirical investigation unfolds from
+
+In Spain, socio-legal investigation was driven directly by RenatoTreves , who was
+
+involved numerous times in attempts to develop this
+
+The investigative experience developed in EE. UU. will play a deep role
+
+empirical identity identifies with the American style of doing sociology and the field
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+auxiliary contributions to the knowledge of legal practice as from the possible
+
+contributions to the development of a socio-legal theory of law.
+
+questioned both by colleagues from the Facultades de Derecho and by those from the
+
+Facultades de Ciencias Sociales. However, as a result of the process
+
+vocation or conviction on the wave of legal sociology in our country
+
+tuciones and legal practices, to pulsate the trends and evaluate the cam
+
+siones del Genn Report on empirically oriented socio-legal research
+
+scientific foundation, ideological criticism and theoretical criminology tie , in general,
+
+to a high or very high scientific level; but the investigation only
+
+In general lines, making a balance on the current situation of sociology
+
+scope of socio-legal investigation can be considered cut and fragmentary . It's not
+
+just about the lack of a broader project than
+
+Twining (2009), who has defended the need for empirical research
+
+socio-juridical right .
+
+core of socio-legal studies is not constituted by investigations
+
+port refers fundamentally to the panorama of investigation in the Kingdom
+
+Those that have arisen on borderlands are only known by jurists , while investigations
+
+into legal professions and
+
+would be insufficient at all points, both from the point of view of fun
+
+Berlin in 2007 by the ISA and Juridical Research Committee
+
+a considerable volume of empirical investigations is EE. UU.; but, including
+
+what could be worse, the nucleus of people who are grouped by sympathy, by
+
+Empirical investigation is essential for the knowledge of the institutions
+
+were of a theoretical nature. It also has especially in mind the conclusion
+
+live a little behind the back of empirical research. The sociological theory, the
+
+bio- legal and for the development of any socio-legal approach. One of the authors
+
+who have recently spoken out in this regard is William
+
+richly in the United Kingdom , published with the suggestive title: “Law in the Real
+
+World” (Genn and others, 2006). This report concludes by stating that he
+
+the socio-legal scope in Spain is small, dispersed and, in addition, is being
+
+empirical tests carried out by people suitably trained for it. This re
+
+reviewed, there is an important set of contributions, the production in the
+
+socio-legal, except for a few meritorious exceptions, shines by its absence.
+
+for its interest and for being a necessary element for the development of a theory
+
+Vertebre , bell of its own meaning in the framework of legal sociology.
+
+juridically, it can be decided that while theoretical approaches enjoy a certain good
+
+health, empirical investigations are adolescence of clear weakness and
+
+Twining makes a pessimistic diagnosis based on the presentations made at the
+
+macro-congress (2,300 contributions) jointly organized in
+
+United, but extends this conclusion to other countries. The only country that presents
+
+By saying it quickly, it can be said that the empirical investigation in
+
+the Spanish legal culture is well received by the press; but little more. y
+
+the Asociación Derecho y Sociedad, in which the majority of the presentations
+
+9
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+only in this country, if original empirical investigations are considered , these
+
+fieldwork and that this discipline admits plural approaches . Now, once we find this
+
+punctuation, we are also clear, and we want to meet
+
+empirical tigaciones. Then, we coincide with the Geen Report (2006), in which this
+
+type of investigation must be promoted across all media ,
+
+represent a much smaller percentage in relative terms that they work
+
+that in some way is the guarantee that legal sociology is not
+
+continue to maintain it, that legal sociology must be fundamentally based
+
+purely theoretical and textual jos .
+
+build on air.
+
+you in empirical research. The development of legal sociology in recent decades has
+
+been important; but, as we warned, there is a cla
+
+Above , we have defended that socio-legal research should be based on empirical
+
+investigations and this small nuance led to the conclusion that
+
+There is a decompensation between theoretical and textual approaches and investments
+
+not all researchers within the scope of legal sociology must do
+
+10
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+2. Fields of application of social research
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 11 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+promulgation of norms born with the intention of being ineffective norms .
+
+prescriptive or operative character . Certainly, this is a field where there are
+
+practical.
+
+The preparation of white
+books and reports on the
+pertinence and content of
+legislative reforms are common
+in many countries and in
+general the approaches to
+making law (Maclean, 2011)
+are on the agenda in the
+empirical sociology of law.
+
+Note
+
+legal
+
+pyric. So, we started talking, in the first place, about producing norms ,
+
+gación, which for its influence this author has had in Spain deserves it
+
+ministry of justice. It is enough to decide that while I had dedicated only
+
+three pages to the previous fields, here the number of pages is multiplied by 3 and the
+
+emphasis placed on the description of this type of studios is much
+
+Secondly , it refers to the application of the norms, a field in which , in a fragmentary
+
+way , important investigations are also carried out re
+
+pity to be held in account. Trevés is following the logical iter of creation and
+
+mayor. Clear indications of the relevance that Treves assigns to this type of investment
+
+norms and legal institutions .
+
+Treves writes with the near horizon of the development of legal sociology
+
+in Italy, which is produced mainly from the 1970s onwards , and marks
+
+numerous investigations, with undoubted interest from a point of view
+
+legal pluralism; the alternative resolution of disputes, which already undertakes
+
+that would constitute the origin of the sociology of Italian law and,
+
+Renato Treves (1988) presents us with an overview of investment fields
+
+Fourthly , Treves refers to investigations into jueces and Ad
+
+ba apuntar en la 70s and 80s ; and the KOL investigations (knowledge and opinion
+
+about law) about the opinion and the social attitudes towards
+
+operators of law, among them that refer above all to the police.
+
+in good measure, it can be decided that they represent the horizon of themes that
+
+where he distinguishes between purely descriptive investigations and others of ca.
+
+that there are some important investigations that demonstrate that
+
+Sometimes legislators seek to carry out latent functions or conceal them within the
+
+related to the implementation and application of the right (Calvo, 2003).
+
+tigaciones. Likewise, the number of pages doubles when reference is made to
+
+investigations into the legal profession ; what is important
+
+Finally , Treves makes a reference from the past to the investigations on the relationships
+
+between legal systems, in which alienate the classic approaches of the
+
+application of the right to describe the situation of investigations in
+
+Thirdly , Treves refers to the non-application of standards, in the field
+
+Above all , we have an account that dedicates a specific section to others
+
+with references to the international plan. The fields of investigation a los
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+12
+
+legal sociology. Nadie started investigations into Admi
+
+there was a very clear tendency to consider that empirical research should be limited
+
+to quantitative methods and a clear preference should be given to
+
+We are rightly seen as “intruders” when we do research on it.
+
+politics or criminology and the same thing would happen with those of legal sciences.
+
+I don't have to decide that these plantings are not sustainable today . for that
+
+thematic quality, both from a general point of view and from the “interior” of
+
+social, deserve their own space as an object of empirical research in legal sociology.
+
+this field. It is clear that it is very focused on academia and research
+
+legal phenomena, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Cane y
+
+references to quantitative investigations predominate, there are also others
+
+How it can be appreciated in table III.1, where the various sections can be collected
+
+through those that are accounted for in the panorama of the empirical investigation
+
+ridic in the Italian universities which motivated, on the one hand, this impulse
+
+of the fields of application of legal sociology. In those moments there are
+
+of legal sociology and, in particular, of empirical investigations that take place within
+
+this scope.
+
+In this regard, the intention was expressly not to invade the fields of science
+
+investigations carried out through opinion polls .
+
+the question in socio-legal empirical investigation transmits a great ri
+
+All of us who do legal sociology know that in the faculties of
+
+Reason, there may be a need to expand these approaches. For this purpose, we will
+
+use a recent publication on the empirical investigation of
+
+the respective sections (Cane and Kritzer, 2011). The same can be decided from the
+
+point of view of the methodological approaches, given that aunque
+
+which may not be more reflective about the reason for a selection of
+
+referred to qualitative and mixed methodologies .
+
+of justice and the legal professions. Ni tan siquiera los ambitos del control
+
+family, juvenile criminal law or labor relations. These conditions contributed, at the
+
+outset, to the limitation of the perspectives of the
+
+Kritzer, 2011), which presents a good panorama of what is happening in
+
+In reality, it was the need to open a space of its own for sociology ju
+
+administration of justice, the jueces and the jueces or the people dedicated to the free
+
+exercise of law. But perhaps there is something more in this reductionist planting
+
+we are Anglosajonas, but they are also the greatest exponents
+
+In the socio-legal scope, the investigations on the
+
+identify themselves with socio-legal research in our country. reason for
+
+of empirical research and, on the other hand, the search for specific areas of
+
+investigation that do not collide with other related disciplines.
+
+The analysis of the fields that are covered by this review of the state of
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+fields of investigation so narrow, where only if you go further than in vestigaciones
+
+sobre la producción y aplicación del derecho, la Administración
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+pergeñado norm. The most important areas of private law and regulatory law deserve
+
+specific attention and, if we descend
+
+specific to other topics related to the transformations of rights,
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 13 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+28.Human rights
+
+31.Environment
+
+35.Alternative Dispute Resolution
+33.Legal pluralism
+
+3. Criminal proceedings and actions by the Tax Authority
+4. The preventive impact of criminal sanctions
+
+13. Personal injury disputes
+14. Jurors and legos in the justice system
+15. The culture of complaint and legal mobilization
+
+Box III.1. The state of the question of empirical legal research according to The Oxford handbook of empirical legal research
+
+11. Probation right
+
+1. Policia
+
+2. Delinquency and delinquents
+
+12. Collective actions
+
+18. Academy and training of jurists
+
+7. Administrative justice
+
+8. Administration of justice and civil procedure 9. Access to civil
+justice 10. Courts of appeal
+
+5. Images and public opinion of justice
+
+16. Selection, training and judicial career
+
+24.Families
+
+25.Housing and property
+
+32.Development and democratization in law and in legal decisions
+
+6. Courts and judicial adjudication
+
+17. Lawyers and other legal service providers
+
+Transformations
+
+Control
+
+Investigations
+
+Administration
+
+23.Regulation of professions
+
+19.Contracts and companies
+
+29.Constitutions
+
+20.Financial markets
+
+30.Social security and social welfare
+
+26. Work and labor laws
+
+34.How does international law work in a globalized society?
+
+21.Consumer protection _
+
+27. Occupational health and safety
+
+22. Bankruptcy and insolvency
+
+the content reviewed in the respective chapters, the investigations han si
+
+The books are dedicated to themes related to criminal justice and social control . As
+
+for the research topics related to the various
+
+Administration of justice and the legal professions, but the panorama if there is
+
+do numerous and have been concerned with all but the subjects susceptible to
+
+investigation within these scopes. Some sections are also dedicated
+
+legal disciplines, we see how these have considerable weight in the country
+
+notably enriched. Furthermore, it is significant that the first chapters
+
+to which we will refer in the module “socio-legal theory of law”.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+14
+
+Also see
+
+For more information on the
+Anglo -Sajón socio-legal
+context , consult the section
+“The institutionalization of
+legal sociology ” in the
+module “Socio-legal
+perspectives on rights” .
+
+Ultimately , in the last few decades, an important breakthrough had been produced
+
+which takes root fundamentally in the Anglo-Saxon socio-legal scope. en
+
+Linked to the Committee for Research in Sociología Jurídica de la Asociación
+
+thematic structure, due to which the horizon of socio-legal research
+
+International Sociology .
+
+In this sense, in addition to the very evolution of legal sociology in the last few decades ,
+
+the imprint, on the one hand, of the
+
+asociación there are people linked to the different legal fields. In another order of things,
+
+the fact that in this current there are investigators proce
+
+Law and Society has always contained disciplinary plans and the construction of a
+
+specialized field of investigation. On the contrary , invest
+
+teeth in the soil of sociology, bell also of anthropology, psychology
+
+tradition in the development of empirical investigations; and on the other hand, the weight
+
+social and other disciplines have contributed to providing a certain methodological plurality
+
+– despite the fact that a greater weight of investment is still observed
+
+gación is bound to all legal scopes , for the same reason that in it
+
+de la correente linked to the Law and Society association . The perspective of this
+
+association has always been broader than that of legal sociology
+
+ca would have expanded considerably. This impression is determined by the context from
+
+which this state of questioning has been produced ,
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+quantitative tigaciones.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+3. Some methodological questions
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 15 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+variables, standardized social indicators, codes, etc. how can it be
+
+social pains.
+
+themes of sociological positivism and are adequate to provide
+
+conceptually reflects social reality and filters it through concepts ,
+
+to be quantified , what they are can end up “decontextualizing” or only being
+
+subjected to a typical “contextualization” based on certain indicators .
+
+Data susceptible to statistical treatment. The object of the investigation bus
+
+techniques such as content analysis and secondary investigation that also
+
+not determined by the possibility of obtaining numerical data and analyzing it
+
+can give an account of social hechos and leyes and causal determinants
+
+As it has been possible to reach in the previous one, the titative-qualitative
+
+methodological tension has given rise to a debate, which is decisive both from the
+
+point of view of the thematic options and from the point of view of the style and the
+
+development alternatives of legal sociology, which is why it is important to briefly
+
+clarify the implications that derive from one or another methodological option. Let's do
+
+it from an open perspective and without having a profession of faith on one or another
+
+type of methodology. However, it is perhaps worth mentioning that , despite the
+
+advances that have been made in recent decades with regard to the use of qualitative
+
+techniques, the quantitative paradigm continues to be dominant in the panorama of
+
+social research, at least in what related to the specific field of sociology. However ,
+
+as has been pointed out, the strength of qualitative methods is a reality in the
+
+panorama of social research.
+
+counterproductive to valid knowledge, as a consequence
+
+The quantitative social investigation, in general, is identified with the realization
+
+of surveys through interviews with questionnaire, but there are others
+
+that los rigen. These data are collected in order to verify the hypotheses that
+
+This type of data collection techniques is based on episodic premises _
+
+Precisely, this quantitativism allows this type of investigation to
+
+the theoretical knowledge of researchers emerges and filters down to
+
+Note
+
+bién pueden ser quantitativas.
+
+statistically.
+
+You can cause the only data that interests you to be the only data that are susceptible
+
+earnestly. The design of the investigation and the presentation of results comes
+
+Apart from the above,
+exploring certain themes and
+handling certain types of data,
+such as the opinion of expert
+persons and the citizenry
+regarding the administration
+of justice, may require recourse
+to quantitative techniques –
+which is not obvious the need
+to consider the possible
+reductionism and the limits of these methods.
+
+For more information on
+quantitative techniques, see
+the “ Socio -legal investigation
+” section of this module.
+
+See also
+
+3.1. Quantitative or qualitative?
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+16
+
+symbolic that determine it. Therefore, the qualitative investigation tends to microsociología,
+
+the study of social processes in real contexts of co
+
+In other order of things, the quantitative methods allow to construct the illusion
+
+magnitude of fieldwork and the increasing complexity of methods
+
+words and behavior of the investigated subjects in their context, describing it by means of
+
+natural language, is decir, as it is.
+
+discover social reality from within . Investigation in this sense does not place itself on a
+
+different plane (scientific or ideological ) from that investigated as
+
+using these methods and ends up giving way to a mechanical application
+
+Facing a model of explanatory sociology, based on laws, causes and norms
+
+symbolizing the conjunction of quantitative methodologies with positivity
+
+of the investigated subjects, even being profane in the field of sociology, the experts of
+
+their world and, secondly, admitting the controlled implication of
+
+ristics of the object of the investigation, why so much the possibilities I put
+
+neutral, de las mismas. Its objectives are aimed at discovering theories, models or
+
+content analysis , etc., and is being supported by the critical review of the former
+
+applied in the framework in which social action and factors are developed
+
+If a “comprehensive” description of social reality is sought, the objective is
+
+Ultimately , from a technical point of view , quantitative investigation separates social theory
+
+from methodology, reducing the object of investigation
+
+munication. One seeks, definitively , to know the social reality through the
+
+In another order of things, the qualitative investigation is subordinated to the character
+
+and routine of data collection techniques that, in general , given there
+
+suele occur with the quantitative investigation . What do you suppose, first, to do?
+
+joke for the study of large social aggregates.
+
+as the themes to be investigated expand considerably. But
+
+quantitative ends up being assumed by companies or investigation offices
+
+of a sociology based on the scientific values of objectivity, coherence and truth . This is
+
+one of the arguments that most prevail and come
+
+mo sociological. The investigator or researcher, if you say, must focus on the knowledge
+
+of the social realities that he investigates and facilitate a technical description,
+
+Qualitative social investigation consists of techniques such as qualitative observation,
+
+open interviews, group discussions , and certain forms of analysis .
+
+but that determine the behavior of individuals, qualitative social investigation seeks to
+
+discover the individual understanding of immaterial subjects
+
+In general terms, you can decide that quantitative investigation is appropriate
+
+principles that are the reason for social phenomena, without projecting their harm or
+
+ideology onto them .
+
+cesos of sociological positivism. The traditional scientific values of sociology are reduced
+
+to which the results of investigation are valid and
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Social.
+
+researcher in the production of social knowledge.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+17
+
+quantitative tigation. Open to the qualitative methodology, just like us
+
+Obviously, also, the plotting reviewed breaks with the arguments
+
+socio-legal and, in addition, perfectly complementary – susceptible of use
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+radical and unilateral scientific rhetoric . But I would also break with the reaction
+
+calling for a profound methodological renewal, which is also being pursued in the field
+
+of legal sociology. In this sense, our proposal
+
+to use the best method , the methods suited to the objectives and requirements of the
+
+field of investigation. I'm apart, expansion is happening
+
+bring. In conclusion, in our opinion of the quantitative investigation and the
+
+ción de la investigación quantitative and qualitative as divergent and irreconcilable
+
+techniques and assume that they are simply techniques that respond
+
+we understand it , it is an option in favor of methodological plurality. The techniques
+
+and research methods are like a “ tool box ” –
+
+set or mixed techniques.
+
+imagination, can open perspectives still unsuspected in legal sociology .
+
+qualitatively, because this way it will be methodologically enriched and, also, because it
+
+will be possible to open the theme of the empirical sociology of law.
+
+can be suitable in both cases for the purposes of the investigation
+
+gación and, even, on occasions, integrate both perspectives. But in mode
+
+in research objectives and not in methodological faith professionals .
+
+socio-legal research addresses the analysis of legal phenomena in all its complexity.
+
+for years there has been an irreducible confrontation between the defenders
+
+positivists on the exclusivity of quantitative techniques, based on a
+
+the articulation of both types of techniques or a mixed technique.
+
+that we defend. On the contrary, we understand that there is a way to elude it considers
+
+qualitative that responds to quantitative sectarianism with another sign with
+
+Qualitatively, there are different ways to carry out social research and you will have to
+
+choose one type of technique or another according to the objectives of the investment
+
+for using the Wittgensteinian simile . The research person must select
+
+den to different methodological approaches for obtaining data ; but _
+
+should encourage improvisation and methodological creation . What is it for
+
+some would be exclusionary. Preferences for some or others must be established
+
+qualitative research and methodological renewal, if used with
+
+It is clear: socio-legal research must also be open to methodology
+
+Methodological plurality and thematic openness are necessary factors so that
+
+In many cases, as has been said, a good investigative design will require
+
+The matization that we advanced in the previous paragraph is important because
+
+aun, it is said that qualitative research has something of craftsmanship and that it
+
+The previous one does not want to decide, in any way, that it should be renounced instead
+
+sors of one type or another of techniques; but luckily this type of planting is being
+
+overcome. In the previous one, it 's clear that it's not planting
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+that the problem is planted until the analysis of the data and, by assumption, in
+
+conclusion that the qualitative methodology alone does not reject the connections
+
+reduces, in the first place, to the formulation of theoretical hypotheses to be verified,
+
+only the epistemological rupture that propitiates theoretical reflection makes it possible to overcome
+
+spontaneous sociology and the false systematizations of ideology that
+
+obtained through social investigation.
+
+Many people claim that theory is important, but they reduce it to the cliché of hi
+
+The epistemological requirement to pose in relation theory and research, when this thesis is coherently
+
+defied, overcomes the positive plans
+
+las quantitative theses. The peak of qualitative methods had an important collateral effect in allowing us to
+
+overcome “flat” theories of certain positions.
+
+scientists of a misunderstood empiricism. The investigation is reduced to
+
+them, never constructing events theoretically, actions or states
+
+Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1989) from a conscientious point of view
+
+proper representations of an understanding based on common sense. El
+18
+
+titatives of social research that contributed to the split between theory
+
+rich. According to this, “theory” is important before and after; but not during
+
+be present at all stages of the investigation, from the moment
+
+conceptually the aspects of social relationships susceptible to being
+
+Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+The people who carry out an investigation linked to the current methods
+
+the formulation of objectives and the design of the investigation. But then,
+
+hypothesis to be verified and the situation is de facto at the margin of the investigation. From the point of
+
+view of the quantitative methodology, the function of the theory falls
+
+The pretensions of objectivity and neutrality linked to these plans impose that the theory must be limited to
+
+the description of social “hechos”
+
+envelop social “hechos”.
+
+From the plantings left in the previous section, it is easy to get there
+
+tructivist, who they call “applied rationalism”, argues that the theoretical construction of the scientific object
+
+is fundamental to strip it of its
+
+that are “operationalized” to formulate variables and indicators. The place of theory from this perspective
+
+has a strong relationship with the plants
+
+not with social theory, but that seeks them. Something that is not so clear
+
+of opinions that are investigated to discover their hidden meanings or plant ideological ideas about them
+
+that are supported.
+
+activism, which greatly permeated the development of methods used
+
+formulation of theoretical hypotheses by the person with appropriate scientific knowledge and their
+
+verification through empirical investigation
+
+tas naive of quantitative methodology. As a result, the theory of
+
+3.2. The place of theory in empirical investigation
+
+and empirical investigation.
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287
+
+investigation. On the other hand, the statistical conditions of a methodology oriented to verify media, imply
+
+that the theory is reduced to filtering with
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+mechanical, without theory , as theory without empirical foundations. From this ma
+
+The intention is to develop a theory based on data. This theory
+
+spontaneous and scientifically construct the object from theoretical elements
+
+From the above, we can collect a reinforced strength of theory in its
+
+dominant activist to destroy the “ideology” that in his opinion envelops them
+
+empirical investigations. Therefore, the term “theory” has new implications
+
+ciological to the “duplication” of the same object of knowledge.
+
+To the previous theses , perhaps we would add some of Adorno 's points
+
+scientific knowledge of social reality requires overcoming this understanding
+
+logics and concepts developed from finished data. The theory
+
+face the prevailing ideology and limiting the possibilities of knowledge only
+
+appreciate it, we understand that it is positive for social awareness in general
+
+could be presented as the elaboration of the researcher or the researcher, the final
+
+product developed from the representations and the relationships
+
+Nera, understand that it will be possible to overcome the opposition between rationalism
+
+and empiricism and progress towards a better theoretical coherence and a greater
+
+determinants of the lack of critical capacity of social investigation, which ends up
+
+sanctioning as real the false appearances of the reality that enmasses
+
+and for socio-legal knowledge in particular. advanced reflections
+
+other order of things, renouncing theory and qualitative methods would be
+
+and interpretation of the same. Strauss and Corbin (1997; 2008) suggest that the
+
+development of theory is the culminating aspect of research, if real
+
+relationships with empirical research. Where, how could it have been
+
+On the contrary, the theory arises from the data collected, in the analysis phase
+
+main virtue would reside in its pretense of objectivity, would not serve to discover the
+
+conditions, institutions and real strengths of human acts . en
+
+caricature of the method of science in a strong sense. That's why his proposal to
+
+advance there is a rational method that aims to overcome both empiricism and
+
+and meanings of qualitative designs. One of the most important is that
+
+the subjects interviewed. According to this author, the empirical methods, whose main
+
+and the empiricism that reduced sociological methodology to a mere
+
+In qualitative investigations there is no theory that proves or verifies.
+
+with the theories produced in other studies.
+
+rich and systematic knowledge of sociology. This constructivist point of view implies a
+
+critical review of the plantings of positivism
+
+social “facts”, a limitation that invalidates the possibilities of this method to go further
+
+than a reality “stitched” into the subjective conscience of
+
+it must be the final result of the –qualitative– investigations and it would be elaborated
+
+from the data obtained, only in a second phase could it be contrasted
+
+(1973) in their dispute about positivism in social sciences. This author , from a critical
+
+perspective, questions the capacity of modern empiricism
+
+Leaving the previous aside, today, the greater strength of the qualitative methods is
+
+providing a new dimension to the uses of the theory in the
+19
+
+loyalty to the “real”.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 20 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+to the sources of power. As a result, social research rose
+
+social linkage and, on the other hand, indirectly, given the difficulties of obtaining
+
+a new type of bureaucracy – periodic reports, cost control , management
+
+legal logic . We would only add a further question, to make it clear that
+
+“sociology of jurists” and the “sociology of sociologists”. Which obliges
+
+lectuales and investigation promoters , intelligence executives _ _
+
+Carrying out empirical investigations obliges groups and researchers to embark on a
+
+complicated task of management . First, to get fi
+
+3.3. The bureaucratic “ethos” of legal sociology
+
+The bureaucratic “ethos” of sociology brings about, in good measure, the heyday
+
+manage contacts, get “porters”, permissions, access to reserved data ,
+
+Up to this point, from a general perspective, it also serves the partner
+
+I made it five decades ago, but his denouncement is still fully up-to-date.
+
+it only limits the selection of topics to be investigated according to the possibilities of
+
+resorting to quantitative methods for collecting data or no. Also
+
+theme of financing because the money promised does not arrive or is insufficient.
+
+what concerns socio-legal investigations the theory must drink and produce results in
+
+an interdisciplinary plan, which overcomes the split between
+
+the use of this type of techniques determines the “priority” of seeking financing. Where,
+
+on the one hand, the bureaucratic “ethos” of investment
+
+remit when the research group consolidates ; but then will arise
+
+dyna to the guidelines of the centers of political and economic power and gives way to
+
+a new version of the division of work among the inte
+
+Of the investigations to be carried out, they push sociology , in general, and legal
+
+science , in particular, towards a bureaucratic and sumisión dynamic
+
+social, on the one hand, and the young recruits, better defined as technicians in
+
+research than as social researchers, on the other.
+
+nanciación. Afterwards, if you have the luck to get it, to perform the act
+
+Bear in mind that the theoretical constructions to be carried out must be based both
+
+on the sources and on the symbolic keys of the social and legal aspects.
+
+financing, provides the greatest development of the sociological theory of law as an
+
+alternative to empirical research.
+
+ordinary, etc. – which also takes up your time. So things, the choice between one
+
+Charles Wright Mills (2000) denounced the bureaucratic “ethos” of sociology.
+
+of quantitative methods. The proposal for quantitative methodology in
+
+etc. Finally , it is not infrequent that you have to return to the load with the
+
+Methodological and academic reasons, linked to the financing problem
+
+it carries other types of problems, such as the economic one. The derived high costs
+
+By the way, it can happen until the “ protagonists” of the investigation change and
+
+there is a new story to start . These types of tasks only
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+projects of such groups.
+centers of academic, political and economic power that support them
+
+specialized in social sciences. It was not so much a question that the other disciplines
+
+had eaten into the terrain of legal sociology; bell too
+
+horizon of books and field work does not seem difficult for those who can
+
+technical and academic that results in strategies that “discipline” the areas
+
+tucionales, so as to be able to finance their investigations. Therefore , this way also
+
+favors the subordination of social research to _
+
+spontaneous laws and blocking access to non- initiates. The academic logic of
+
+specialized knowledge provides a tendency towards scientific autonomy
+
+to join academic groups with academic power and institutional contacts
+
+watertight compartments, where super -specialization and impiden control come
+
+Many times they are chosen with no other objective than to quickly carry out work
+
+and publish it. Furthermore, for the same reason, the researcher will tend
+
+developing social research . Firstly , if you have to do with
+
+academic career, the researcher is strongly tempted to choose the research topics
+
+based on the urgency that determines their need for research
+
+The structure of the academic “career” also decisively conditions the
+
+of academic and scientific development . In addition to the compartmentalization, the
+
+academic career, especially in the beginning of the same, provides the necessary
+
+legal sociology at the university level seems to confirm this .
+
+ability to quickly accumulate publications. In the first sections of your
+
+of his own vocation of autonomy of legal sociology as a strategy
+
+choose. Of course, the predominance of “theoretical” works in the scope of
+
+21
+
+publish publications. Both those and the research methodology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+4. The socio-legal investigation
+
+4.1. research design
+
+22
+
+bring a theme or select a research problem ; clarify it in focus, refine it or concrete it,
+
+and justify it; is to decide, evaluate if it is a
+
+field of empirical investigation. In any case, it would be convenient to have
+
+require inverting time and money. But there are also other conditions, such as the
+
+expertise of the researcher or the group and the availability of data
+
+practical actions, and in particular the availability of resources, will be fundamental
+
+in socio-legal research, conditioning in good measure
+
+further study for those who are interested in a specific preparation in it
+
+In theory, the first steps of the investigation process consist of finding
+
+The cost of socio-legal investigation is an important factor. Investigate
+
+for those known to have been studied in another matter, the good is referred to their
+
+In the manuals, the research process is supposed to be represented as a series of
+
+successive homogeneous phases, but in practice it is clear that these “stages” overlap
+
+and intersperse , allowing several activities of researchers to be in progress in
+
+unison . In addition, due to the fact that social research is always research in progress,
+
+one must be open to introducing new elements in the delimitation of the object and in
+
+the design of the investigation. However, this type of expositions should be useful to
+
+have a first impression on the processes that complicate the empirical investigation,
+
+which is why we will resort to that orderly presentation of the investigative activity.
+
+a discipline such as legal sociology . As a result, well it will happen
+
+cial and institutional. And there is also the relevance of what he pointed out about the
+
+bureaucratic ethos of social investigation in the previous section .
+
+of research in social sciences.
+
+requires time that exceeds the possibilities offered by programming
+
+the selection of themes. From there dependence with respect to the agents alone
+
+Empirical assessment is assumed as tools for methodology and techniques
+
+the objectives of this matter, which require a specific approach and
+
+In reality, the methodological specificities of socio-legal investigation
+
+in- depth study of research methodology does not fit between
+
+it focuses on objectives and a theoretical framework; but in the field of investment
+
+of the investigation that can determine the election of the object. Las limits
+
+I have a handbook on methodology and research in social sciences.
+
+As we mentioned in the presentation, in this section we will not delve deeper into the
+
+review of research methods and techniques . If you understand that he
+
+Note
+
+object to investigate and if you are interested.
+
+suggested by the state of the
+investigation in the sociolegal
+sphere or by the lines
+
+The selection of research
+themes may come from
+
+group research ; _ but in sociojuridical
+investigation , many
+times, the themes are facilitated
+by the institutions or social
+agents that promote the
+investigation.
+
+the suggestions found in
+readings related to legal
+sociology ; other times they are
+of personal interests or
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+23
+
+choose the ones that are most suitable to reach the foreseen objectives.
+
+develop to achieve research objectives . _ The design specifies the methodology to be
+
+used and the research techniques to be employed to obtain it
+
+more, it will be decisive for the research strategy .
+
+the problem posed and the objectives of the investigation that determine
+
+For some authors, the quantitative and qualitative methods are not only used by
+
+information needed. At the same time, you must resolve practical questions
+
+what should be the techniques to use for data collection . Therefore , the main condition
+
+for carrying out a good research design goes through
+
+choose the appropriate technique for this investigation.
+
+advance in the design of the investigation.
+
+provide it. It should lead to formulating the objectives or research questions and the
+
+techniques to be used . The specification of the objectives and of the
+
+methodologies. From this point of view, they are simply different approaches.
+
+The research design is an integral plan for operations and activities to
+
+population to which the investigation is directed is essential to protect us
+
+against the compilation of data that are irrelevant and unnecessary. Ade
+
+tes for the collection of data, so that the preferences for one or another or a hybrid
+
+approach will be based on punctual methodological questions. Son
+
+At the beginning of the investigation, both methodologies may have an alternative
+
+The investigator has to predict what data he needs to collect and what they are
+
+quantitative and qualitative are just different ways to carry out investment
+
+Once the theme is selected and the object of investigation is constructed , there is
+
+more adequate means to obtain this information and what population there may be
+
+social links, tools to be used appropriately according to the different objectives of the
+
+investigation and, even, if it is possible to integrate both
+
+research styles , rather than opposing paradigms. Therefore , the selection of
+
+If we assume that the distinction between quantitative and qualitative investigation
+
+strong points and weak points (Creswell, 2009; Bryman, 1992; 2008).
+
+that underlie the investigation and the necessary details for the execution of the project.
+
+The elaboration of the design must anticipate the possible alternatives and
+
+this is really a technical matter and the choice of another strategy will depend on its
+
+suitability to account for the questions raised in the country
+
+a quantitative or qualitative research strategy depends on the orientation that the
+
+investigative person has . For us, the methodologies
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Qualitative research is generally more appropriate when the main objective of the
+
+study requires qualitative information.
+
+the research orientation and its objectives on the march, which is extremely operative
+
+when exploring little-known themes or
+
+the ends or general objectives pursued with the investigation. I say it to someone else
+
+to collect and the appropriate procedures for obtaining them. In addition to them
+way, the objectives of the investigation will specify which are the data
+
+to collect information when the objectives of the investigation seek
+
+zones. Sometimes it is cited as a weakness, perhaps one of the strengths
+
+investigation. For us, there are no doubts about the need to consider
+
+of the research objectives . The objectives need which units are to be observed ,
+
+which is what we are going to observe about these
+
+highly structured investigation which implies the possibility of change
+The most important aspects of qualitative research are the absence of a design
+
+this type of reasons, apart from the naturalness of the investigation problem , at the
+
+time of choosing an investigation strategy .
+
+The first steps and the selection of an investigation strategy allow
+
+units , and how to structure the observation process to achieve
+
+Qualitative investigation is also necessary when it is a mere first exploration of the
+
+problem to be investigated, because there is not enough information .
+
+Quantitative investigation methods are appropriate and useful means
+
+mación predicted on the topic why it remains hidden for several reasons
+
+In other order of things , although it is not mentioned in the texts, there are also
+
+practical reasons when opting for one or another strategy of
+
+areas of social reality that can present unexpected facets that are
+
+Quantitative techniques can be applied mechanically and routinely , sometimes if
+
+relevant resources are available for much of the fieldwork
+
+researcher or the researcher formulates the project and advances towards completion
+
+objectives, for the project to be useful it is essential to develop it in detail –en
+
+samples relevant to ongoing research .
+
+y analysis is carried out by companies or auxiliary structures.
+
+a methodological section – the techniques to be used, the instruments to be used,
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 24 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Deepen the knowledge of
+social relationships with
+people, bring out latent beliefs
+and values or practices , or
+obtain first -hand information
+about certain social processes.
+
+Due to the need to analyze
+a wide range of cases or due
+to the need to count with
+numbers related to the effects
+of establishing comparisons
+when the specific requested
+information is familiar to
+those surveyed; y, of course ,
+when you try
+an important prior knowledge
+of the object of the investigation
+that allows the construction of
+the necessary variables from
+the existing theories. Finally ,
+we can point out that social
+surveys and quantitative
+experiments are preferable
+when trying to establish causes
+and effects .
+
+The training of the research group 's people can guide designs based on quantitative or
+qualitative techniques ; the time pressure and the need to manage a large amount of information
+or information coming from a very large universe of informants can condition the need to resort
+to quantitative methods ; the availability of resources, given that quantitative investigation is
+very expensive and requires auxiliary work (encounters, computer analysts, etc. ) which is very
+costly, which is why the people who start the investigation are not linked to a group consolidated
+will have the option of qualitative methodologies, much less
+
+Example
+
+Example
+
+costly.
+
+data that requires statistical treatment.
+
+Example
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+25
+
+qualitative practices or methodologies.
+
+social sciences uses a lot of words like hypotheses, operations
+
+statistics, and you can even decide on the calculation of the size of the sample
+
+it shows from where the data will be obtained .
+
+tación de la población the universe to investigate, with the end of making it possible
+
+All of them are areas of great technical complexity that we will not go into here
+
+of a theme to explore.
+
+(score survey , snow ball method , opinion samples, etc.) are not based on probability
+
+theory , unless strategically it tends to be
+
+views will suppose a reduction or increase in the sample error , respectively.
+
+verse of population to be studied using its geographic location and/or temporal limits,
+
+defining characteristics, etc. From there , select one
+
+such effect. I don't think that the probabilistic tests are more jokes from the point of view
+
+of the quantitative investigation, while
+
+It will depend on the level of confidence, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the
+
+population to be investigated, in addition to the number of interviews to be carried out. the same
+
+ticas and non- probabilistic ones. The first ones are based on statistical principles
+
+require the collaboration of experts. Developing a probabilistic survey by conglomerates
+
+or stratified requires experience and knowledge
+
+investigation. It must be done by taking care of the details and keeping in mind
+
+which would allow obtaining generalizable data. The non- probabilistic samples
+
+research issues and questions , but not hypotheses – something difficult when it comes to
+
+y del error sampler. That's what I had to add to the display of the museum. OK
+
+As far as the samples are concerned , their purpose is to provide a representation
+
+representation , this type of demonstrations will have obvious limitations to
+
+(Rodríguez Osuna, 2001; 2005). Simply remember that the sample error
+
+important to establish what is the universe of the investigation and select it
+
+poblacional variance and level of confidence, the greater the smaller number among
+
+generalization of the results. The first step will consist in defining the uni
+
+The dominant quantitative positivism has generated a specific language about research
+
+objectives . The technical language of investigation in
+
+intentional museums are more suitable for exploratory investigations
+
+lización, variables, indicators, etc. In reality these concepts only have validity in the scope
+
+of quantitative research and in the experimental designs
+
+Finally , understand that the design of the procedures to be followed for data collection
+
+will largely determine the reliability and validity of the
+
+sample of this population. There are two major types of samples, the probabilities
+
+The elaboration of a probabilistic sample is a technical task and can
+
+and the sequence of steps to follow in the use of these resources. It will also be
+
+but empiezan to be displaced by other terminologies. This occurs, above all, in the scope
+
+of qualitative research, where it is important to talk about objects
+
+and seek to be representative of the population according to these criteria, reason why
+
+mentales, where they mark the technical guidelines for the design of the investigation,
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+26
+
+to subray its relevance in the orientation of legal sociology towards
+
+previous documents that may have been archived in a database or published
+
+the research persons in training or with little experience, the analysis
+
+secondary has the advantage of expanding the methodological possibilities and au
+
+das. These sources include reports from public and social agents, institutional statistics
+
+or from civil society organizations , books and special magazines.
+
+As you have been repeatedly warned, this module is not intended to
+
+ensure the quality of the data obtained. The previous one apart, the advantage more
+
+much useless effort and it is a guarantee of good research, for what will be
+
+We focus specifically on secondary research for its usefulness and because it is within
+
+the reach of all people who are starting out in social research.
+
+mines, 1993). Among the advantages, it is worth highlighting those related to the savings
+
+a fundamental element of the research project .
+
+Secondary information ( Sierra Bravo, 2002; Stewart and Kammins, 1993) is obtained
+
+from the databases and from the information compiled in investigations
+
+of time and money. But more apart from the temporal and cost aspects , to
+
+impossible to obtain the financing you require.
+
+for empirical investigation, a selection of these techniques will be briefly mentioned . This
+
+aside, given your special interest at the time of carrying out work
+
+The data that has just been alluded to are available at many times at no cost to anyone
+
+and with minimal restrictions, thus providing quick and economical information that is
+
+especially useful in the first steps of the investigation. Apart from this use for preliminary
+
+or exploratory investigations , secondary data can be analyzed again in new
+
+investigations with different objectives.
+
+obstacles that may arise in the investigation. A good design will ahorrará
+
+or approaching exploratory socio-legal research , detendre us
+
+Secondary research will have advantages and disadvantages (Stewart and Kam
+
+cialized and, in many countries, archives of information where they are deposited
+
+evident from the secondary analysis of data is the saving in economic terms
+
+they will train researchers or provide a general knowledge of research techniques and
+
+methods . As a reminder , simply
+
+The data obtained from a multitude of surveys or quantitative and/or qualitative
+
+investigations .
+
+and of time. For many people at the beginning of their research careers,
+
+4.2.1. Use of existing data
+
+Carry out an opinion survey
+with a broad and technically
+rigorous sample . Secondary
+data can be brought at a small
+cost but will always be cheaper
+than obtaining quantitative data
+directly .
+
+4.2. Data collection techniques
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Note
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+the same procedures used in the evaluation of primary data.
+
+correctly the collected data?
+
+carefully.
+
+interests in the topic investigated, must be evaluated very carefully.
+
+sona responsable de la investigación has little experience or has one
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 27 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Note
+
+categories:
+
+tigación?
+
+They can be a good starting
+point and provide many
+valid perspectives for the
+design of investigations .
+Likewise, it has a lot of
+usefulness to facilitate
+comparisons and will contrast
+the research carried out with others. data is collected a menudo with a specific purpose, which can deter
+
+assumption under and/or temporal urgencies. That's it, whenever it's available
+
+• What was the purpose of the studio? Why and why was the investment made?
+
+cho relevant? Is this information still valid?
+
+of reliable and valid secondary data . For which habrán to be evaluated
+
+send them directly. Secondary data also offer advantages to experienced investigators .
+
+• How do I get the information ? What methodology was used? Is it considered
+
+adequate for the purposes of our investigation?
+
+and with a little preparation for ourselves we can start reanalyzing
+
+Also the antiquity of the data will be something to keep in mind, since secondary data
+
+is , by definition, old data.
+
+the information exists in advance and can be evaluated in advance. For
+
+Although secondary research has disadvantages and limitations, the general
+
+conclusion is favorable to this methodology, especially if it per
+
+to facilitate this evaluation , it has been planned that the researcher can resort to
+
+some fundamental questions that would be grouped into six
+
+• How was the information collected ? What indicators are used ?
+
+• When was the information collected ? Can I be affected by someone ?
+
+mine a deliberate or unintentional bias and other problems when reusing these data .
+
+When the data comes from institutions or agents with
+
+Also the time saving is important, the secondary data is already there
+
+The researcher who uses secondary sources, however , has an advantage:
+
+• Who was the person responsible for the investigation? Did you have a good one ?
+
+ron? In general, was the research design correct ? were analyzed
+
+On the other hand, secondary research also has disadvantages. Los
+
+The evaluation of secondary data (Stewart and Kamins, 1993) should follow
+
+professional qualification? What sources and techniques did you use? Could the
+
+results be fetched somehow ?
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+4.2.2. Data production techniques
+
+28
+
+Thus, general statistical
+information and other specific
+sources on legal institutions
+and their activity, in particular
+judicial statistics , statistics on
+delinquency , opinion
+barometers , etc., can be very
+useful for the socio-legal
+investigation of the investigation
+and is available at INE and at
+the Institutos de Estadística de
+las autonomas comunidads , at
+the Conse jo General del
+Poder Judicial, el
+
+For more information about it
+Use of the investigation
+would be essential, consult
+the section “Attitudes of Spanish
+people before Criminal Justice
+” in this module.
+
+Consejo General de la Abo
+gacía, las memorias del
+Ministerio Fiscal; the investigations
+of the CIS, the divisions and
+organs of the United Nations on
+crime and delinquency, etc.
+
+See also
+
+defends against possible biases in reused information.
+
+Note
+
+the variety of information is enormous and many of the documentary sources
+
+of opinion, the qualitative interviews, the discussion group and, we will conclude
+
+More specifically, we refer to observation as a technique where data is systematically
+
+recorded, directly or through a technical medium.
+
+Observation (Sierra Bravo, 2007; García Ferrando and others, 2003) as a technique
+
+As you can see, the main sources of statistics exist
+
+be documentary sources or databases and research archives . Per
+
+Obtaining data in databases or research files will allow you to obtain
+
+As we get closer to the top, empirical investigation in the field of
+
+spontaneous because it pursues objectives that respond to a systematic design
+
+• Is the information consistent with that obtained in other investigations
+
+variables , coding based on new categories, etc.) . In any case, it is obvious that the
+
+reuse of data must imply using them
+
+this scientific scope. We already have a reference to data reuse
+
+to contrast its validity and reliability. Sometimes, in scientific terminology
+
+The use of multiple sources of information is, ultimately, the best
+
+on the other hand, the documentary sources can be bibliographical sources; existing
+
+statistics or research reports , etc. _ (Scott, 1990). The volume
+
+analysis and, above all, new interpretations of reused information.
+
+planting more general techniques such as observation , surveys
+
+are accessible without cost.
+
+cia al set of social research methods (Sierra Bravo, 2007) . In
+
+These correspond with governmental or international bodies , although there are also
+
+some that come from private sources.
+
+As far as the sources of secondary research are concerned , these can
+
+with content analysis .
+
+research in the social sciences differs from observation
+
+unique, like the video, for example, which will be analyzed and interpreted
+
+of empirical investigation, which includes fieldwork for the collection of data and the
+
+analysis of the same, and which, finally , is subject to controls
+
+ner microdata and records that can be reanalyzed again (new raw
+
+legal sociology follows the methodological guidelines of the social sciences and, as a
+
+result, from the point of view of collecting data , uses the means of
+
+to respond to new objectives and creative work – from new
+
+Social associations , observation works in a broad sense to make a reference
+
+in secondary investigation. In this section we will make a brief reference to data
+
+production techniques . More specifically, we will review them
+
+similar?
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+29
+
+data that will later be analyzed and interpreted.
+
+create models of behavior and practices that for various reasons are hidden or remain
+
+hidden.
+
+tal de la encuesta given that it is through the questions of the same as if
+
+in experimental or laboratory investigations. In turn, the observation
+
+a quantitative methodology. In what follows we will pay attention to others
+
+tions object of observation or no. The experimental observation is observation
+
+analyzed statistically. The basic elements of this technique are there
+
+consequent process of “operationalization”, the variables are obtained and in
+
+controlled by the researcher, and can be carried out in field or field contexts .
+
+Depending on the type of interview and how the fieldwork is carried out , the survey
+
+can be by mail, telephone, through self-administered questionnaire or
+
+but it is very frequent to distinguish between open and closed questions , according to
+
+every seminal qualitative analysis, even in some case, as occurs with the analysis
+
+of the. This method can be used both in field investigations and
+
+within the scope of social psychology and anthropology, but there was still an impulse
+
+preparation of the questionnaire is a task of great technical complexity and must
+
+direct can be classified into participant or participant, depending on whether the person
+
+carrying out the observation keeps distance with the agents and location
+
+In general, it can be decided that they provide especially useful techniques for
+
+through personal interview. The questionnaire is the other fundamental element
+
+the interviews scheduled as field work to obtain them
+
+The survey (Sierra Bravo, 2007; García Ferrando and others, 2003) is the social
+
+investigation technique par excellence. Also here the terminology is ambiguous ,
+
+since it is possible to carry out surveys in general or by making reference to a specific
+
+quantitative technique in which a representative sample of a universe of population is
+
+questioned with the aim of obtaining data that will be
+
+trevista y el cuestionario.
+
+direct, however , it is not a simple observation, as it is carried out by studying groups
+
+or agents and phenomena prepared or manipulated, it is to say,
+
+will obtain the required data. From the hypotheses , based on the
+
+dicadores sobre los que se preguntas del cuestionario . The questions of a
+
+questionnaire can be classified according to its function or purpose,
+
+The survey through questionnaire is the prototype of a technique based on
+
+qualitative methods apart from observation, which could be considered a method
+
+laboratory. Observation methods have been used throughout _ _ _ _
+
+If the answer can be opened or categorized beforehand in the same question – which
+
+in turn can be dichotomous or multiple option. There
+
+content , observation can be based on quantitative techniques.
+
+important with ethnomethodology.
+
+It should be carried out with great care, a critical assessment and a pre-test of the
+
+same being advisable . Once the questionnaire has been drawn up , a
+
+See also
+
+On this topic, consult further
+in the section “ Barometers and
+opinion surveys on the
+Administración de justicia y
+las profesiones ju rídicas
+( surveys through
+cuestionario)” of this module.
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+30
+
+freely the discourse of the informant people.
+
+Qualitative interview data will be determined by the needs of the interviewee
+
+The informants are common to all interviews and, to be said briefly ,
+
+larized from between 6 and 8 people and seeks to surface the information sought,
+
+Consideration aside deserves the so-called group - focused interview and the group
+
+where questions are more or less predetermined, interviews are
+
+Temporary urgencies may advise resorting to semi -structured interviews
+
+investigation , recording and analyzing the person 's own speech
+
+of psychoanalytics–; semi-structured interviews, when there is a script
+
+substantially at the opening of the qualitative interview, in front of the interviews
+
+litatives, present their own profiles. In particular, the discussion group (García
+
+Ferrando and others, 2003; Ibáñez, 2003) can receive independent treatment
+
+The qualitative interview (García Ferrando and others, 2003; Taylor and Bogdan,
+
+In front of the perfectly structured questionnaires of the surveys, in which the questions
+
+are ordered sequentially and, even, can be
+
+For the rest, when it comes to preparation and development between them
+
+in the interviewee and the future of the interview; or structured, when there between
+
+ñez (2003; 1985) and has shown itself to be particularly effective both when it comes
+
+to speeding up data acquisition and when it comes to its quality
+
+According to the degree of standardization of interviews and the existence of a script
+
+meet with open conversational speeches, where there can be questions, but always
+
+leaving opening margins so that it can flow
+
+which are formulated in a predetermined order. He will come to one or another mode
+
+ethical or strategic. Furthermore , contact and approach techniques _ _
+
+may tend to remain hidden or latent for several reasons. The discussion group consists
+
+of bringing together a group of slightly different informants
+
+consider: in- depth interviews or open interviews – also call
+
+type of discussion, which, although variants of interviews can be considered
+
+vestigación, although it will also depend on practical constraints. So,
+
+han led to define the interview as a conversational act .
+
+participants within this scope of social relationships.
+
+patient. This technique was developed and disseminated among us by Jesús Ibá
+
+with some questions that are asked flexibly in the role of the person
+
+in depth.
+
+view is carried out based on a script that includes a fixed number of questions
+
+Properly understood views , the selection of informants will be less complicated than
+
+in quantitative techniques, being able to use samples in the probability
+
+adequacy for obtaining information related to speeches that
+
+closed and pre-categorized; In these qualitative interviews we will
+
+1986) implies a process of communicative interaction between the person and
+
+tured, which will mean a considerable amount of time in maintaining your
+
+interviewer and interviewees or informants, through which they seek to obtain first
+
+-hand information on problems and topics of
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+For more information on
+qualitative investigation,
+consult the following section
+of the “Derecho and exclusion
+in migratory experiences ( in
+qualitative investigation)” in
+this module .
+
+See also
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+See also
+
+For more information about
+content analysis , consult
+further below “ Administering
+justice before criminal justice
+and gender violence ( content
+analysis)” in this module.
+
+field work , which is very frequent – and productive, which allows us to identify emerging
+
+themes – in the analysis of research data
+
+polarized is very effective in bringing out information that would otherwise be
+
+from the perspective of social sciences. This is assuming that it is collected from
+
+In the following section we will analyze some investigations and we will be able to see
+
+including the analysis of the same ones according to the guidelines of other disciplines, such as the
+
+investigative activity. As a general rule , the analysis and interpretation of
+
+they will be registered in files or records following the guidelines of the protocol for
+
+Content analysis ( García Ferrando and others, 2003) is a technique of
+
+Once the field work has been carried out and the data obtained , these have to
+
+We will provide some brief details on how these questions are approached with the aim of
+
+understanding the tasks of empirical investigation in the context of
+
+The results of empirical investigation represent a fundamental step
+
+Content analysis , which emerged as a quantitative technique, can be
+
+however, it may be the case that the analysis anticipates the finalization
+
+initials and, above all, in field work , which sometimes concludes the low work expeditiously
+
+with a superficial analysis of data and without deepening
+
+there the differences already pointed out with the scientific-legal investigation on
+
+servicing and document analysis . Let us analyze its technical condition to differentiate the
+
+content analysis from the mere consultation of documents and
+
+jurisprudential analysis, for example. The content analysis responds to a scientific design
+
+and seeks a valid knowledge of legal phenomena
+
+in a practical way how to present the data. At this point it limits us
+
+person who moderates it. This dynamic of discussion in a group is slightly
+
+cluyen con la recogida de data. Of hecho, the analysis and the interpretation of
+
+data will be exhaustive or representative, as it may be based on more specific criteria ; y
+
+will be carried out systematically and following technical guidelines. Los da
+
+could not manifest.
+
+be analyzed and interpreted as a step prior to the presentation of results . I would have to
+
+reiterate again the cautions about the sequence of the
+
+social investigation oriented towards the analysis of social reality through observation _
+
+such that sometimes it is neglected. There has been so much energy spent on these phases
+
+the data collection . Once the information is collected , the technical and in -depth analysis
+
+of the data will be carried out . In this regard, it should be noted that
+
+Data are phases that are included between field work and the realization of the research
+
+report and other forms of data presentation . sin
+
+with a very open script, which must be handled very flexibly by it
+
+both quantitative and qualitative. As can be seen, it is not a mere reading or systematic
+
+exposition of the content of documentary sources, of
+
+qualitative.
+
+legislative texts and documentary sources.
+
+31
+
+4.3. Analysis and presentation of results
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+cover patrons and trends by working with data , while
+
+data from your experience and theoretical knowledge . Obviously, this
+
+data collection in the quantitative investigation will seek to confirm whether
+
+social actors investigated and will seek to open new spaces for them to flourish
+
+the investigation and cannot be neglected.
+
+statistics, seeking to show the variability of the same and quantify them
+
+starting point since the hypotheses of the investigation and
+
+founded and valid.
+
+Today, both the analysis of quantitative data and the data that
+
+Regarding the interpretative phase, there will also be differences depending on whether
+
+we are faced with a quantitative or qualitative methodology. Initially, she interprets
+
+An in- depth analysis of the speech must be carried out by means of which these data
+
+have been recorded, respecting the symbolic keys of this speech
+
+Quantitative task on the line of the highest point .
+
+first case (Bryman and Cramer, 2008) and qualitative analysis in the second
+
+breaking the barriers of this naive “scientist” planting, opening up
+
+The work with the data will be carried out from the speech itself and the categories for
+
+tion of data obtained with other perspectives on the scope of the relationship
+
+the false hypotheses of the parties that were broken were verified . Therefore , the
+
+interpretation of data will fall largely within the theoretical framework
+
+que all interpretations are possible . Tienen to be interpretations
+
+The data analysis in the quantitative methodology will be carried out using
+
+litatives are carried out with the help of computer and statistical programs in
+
+limited to recognizing or not as the “truth” of the theory since the investigation was
+
+designed . This aside, it's also clear that they can
+
+interpretation of the data. However , both are fundamental phases of
+
+There are more spaces for theory and interpretation of investment results
+
+relationships between the variables; while in qualitative investigations
+
+The usual terminology of scientific research distinguishes between analysis and
+
+interpretation of data . The analysis seeks to clarify these data and
+
+case (Revuelta and Sánchez, 2003).
+
+The interpretation implies a subsequent explanatory or comprehensive step , in which
+
+person or person is responsible for the investigation interpreting these
+
+In qualitative investigation, interpretation allows a greater correlation
+
+and the perspective of the informants. Therefore, in qualitative research,
+
+in the interpretation of the same. As a matter of fact, sometimes analysis and
+
+It assumes that the interpretation of data is open and can vary depending on the
+
+perspective from which it comes. What you don't want to say, not much less,
+
+the coding and analysis of discourse will emerge from real records
+
+lyzed.
+
+32
+
+See also
+
+For more information, consult
+the section “The place of
+theory in empirical research
+” in this module.
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+emerging questions. The interpretation of the qualitative data will offer more
+
+yor space for the emergence of new questions and theoretical elements and
+
+33
+
+visual to readers increasingly familiar with the images. As a result , the graphics
+
+represent a very estimable help for the presentation of
+
+for the analysis and presentation of data in the social sciences, as it offers a useful
+
+tool for handling large amounts of information
+
+data that is popularly appreciated; but it is convenient to leave it clear that
+
+in a simple and useful way. A simple table can provide more information
+
+it will be more conducive to a critical perspective.
+
+a graph does not add any information to the one that appears in a table.
+
+more than paragraphs and paragraphs of textual communication and what you can do
+
+with greater clarity. Unlike the tables, the use of graphic representation
+
+As far as data presentation is concerned in the strict sense, these can be presented
+
+through the use of tables and graphs, in the case of
+
+stay of the data has great predicament to provide an information
+
+quantitative investigation. The tablasestadísticas are a basic tool
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Note
+
+Note
+
+5. Analysis of some socio-legal investigations
+
+5.1. Barometers and opinion surveys on the Administration
+
+34
+
+• Metroscopy (2008). The law practice seen by lawyers. Third barometer
+
+General de la Abogacía Española.
+
+Consejo General de la Abogacía Española.
+
+Spanish city. Fourth external opinion barometer . Madrid: Consejo
+
+With the purpose of making
+these materials more
+accessible , documents that
+are accessible online were sought .
+
+To consult these investigations
+see links on the web.
+
+of justice and the legal professions
+
+of content. It is a question of seeing, in a practical way, what is it that gives you
+
+• Metroscopy (2011). The image of the lawyers and of the Justice in it
+
+cia entre la población general, on the one hand, and entre las personas que ejercen
+
+As announced , in this first point we are going to present some investigations carried
+
+out through opinion surveys in order to explore the application of quantitative methods
+
+in the scope of legal sociology . In addition, according to what has been pointed out
+
+above , reading the results of these investigations will provide us with information on
+
+the Administration of Justice and the activities related to the free exercise of profession
+
+or law . For this purpose, the following investigations will be analyzed :
+
+ridic. For this purpose , investigations carried out through
+
+In this section we are going to review some empirical investigations with the main
+
+objective of getting in touch with the praxis of socio-judicial research
+
+suggest the reading of some parts of these materials to deepen in al
+
+internal opinion of the Consejo General de la Abogacía Española Madrid:
+
+institutional social research agencies . _ The investigations carried out by Metroscopy
+
+for the General Council of Lawyers are also inci
+
+guns of the research themes of legal sociology .
+
+den in obtaining data to evaluate the image of Justice and the advocacy
+
+of questions related to the assessment in public opinion of legal institutions and
+
+phenomena. Your opinion about justice is important for
+
+the research methods of the social sciences applied to research
+
+ción de los legal phenomena. In addition, as a complementary objective, if
+
+Governments and this type of investigation are carried out periodically by
+
+• CIS (2011). Estudio 2861. 2011 February Barometer
+
+The CIS studio is an example of an opinion barometer we use
+
+opinion surveys ; discussion groups ; secondary research or analysis
+
+in this case because in addition to the general questions a battery is included
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+second , randomness provides the telephone tool assisted by
+
+interesting. In this case, the universe of investigation is not “the population
+
+As a result , we will also find differences relating to
+
+As a starting point, it is advisable to consult the technical sheet or the methodological
+
+note of the CIS barometer and the latest Metroscopy investigation . In that regard,
+
+accomplishing is very high, and that also , the percentages of error for them
+
+autonomous units sigan siendo muy alto. The margin of error will fluctuate between
+
+computer. In other respects, both investigations had important resources, much higher
+
+in the case of the investigation.
+
+the first that is observed are the differences in the administration of the cost
+
+± 5% and ±12%, when the error corresponds to the entire investigation
+
+bles explanatory that are also facilitated on the website of the studio. en los
+
+by a private company, managed by a researcher highlighted in the scope
+
+sampling is polyethapic , stratified by conglomerates, with selection of primary
+
+sampling units ( the 236 municipalities) and secondary units
+
+española mayor de 18 años”, sin un colectivo profesional: “abogados cole giados
+
+ejercientes”. Furthermore, if you want to obtain data that can be disaggregated
+
+find in the corresponding document, count the frequencies
+
+socio-legal, José Juan Toharia.
+
+you would give them (the sections within the primary units from where they can be collected)
+
+data) in a proportional random way, and of the last units (the people interviewed) by
+
+random routes and sex and age quotas . Mientras que en el
+
+by autonomous communities. This assumes that the number of interviews to
+
+mind for the people who carried out the interviews and in which they can
+
+data were processed statistically once . It is a very mental analysis, which can be
+
+completed by means of some crosses with some variations.
+
+elaboration of the sample. In both cases, we are faced with probabilistic samples that
+
+seek to be representative of the Spanish population as a whole .
+
+The 2008 Metroscopia investigation presents very technical characters
+
+the law in our country. In this case, these are investigations carried out
+
+But first , as is common in CIS investigations , he
+
+appreciate some interesting elements about the management of the interview and
+
+related to the codification of the questionnaire. The results, which can be
+
+CIS as a consequence of the fact that the interviews were personal , however
+
+are ±1.7.
+
+nario. In the first case, these are personal interviews carried out at home ; while in
+
+the second, the interviews are by phone. I have
+
+what this involves: greater complexity of the sample, need to count on interviewing
+
+people, etc.
+
+Next , it may also be interesting to review the questionnaires used. In the investigation
+
+of the CIS appears the questionnaire managed directly
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 35 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(1) See annex to the report, where
+there are files on the composition,
+object and most relevant
+circumstances of the same.
+
+Metroscopy studios , the questionnaire is facilitated with the global results.
+
+vestigación carried out from legal sociology .
+
+focus on legal aspects.
+
+cuados and greater methodological reliability. Questions that, as defended
+
+roles, regularization, rights, control, exclusion, etc. But it's not one in
+
+right and that consequently emerges in the immigrants ' speeches about
+
+5.2. Right and social exclusion in migratory experiences
+
+36
+
+At point 5.4 we will review a
+See also
+
+Colectivo IOE 2010. Discourses
+of the migrant population around
+their installation in Spain:
+Exploración cualita tiva. Madrid:
+CIS. See links on the web.
+
+investigation carried out by the
+Laboratorio de Sociología
+Jurídica of the University of
+Zaragoza on immigrants
+before the Administration of
+Justice for the General Council
+of the Judicial Power and
+focused on from a strict sociolegal
+perspective .
+
+grants.
+
+Recommended consultation
+
+opinion polls on the administration of justice . The usefulness of them
+
+As a colophon of these revisions, the reading of Toharia (2002) can be very interesting .
+
+This author is one of the greatest specialists in this field
+
+ciología y las de la sociología legal or other related disciplines, such as criminology.
+
+Thus, it is evident that the objectives of this investigation are not
+
+There is also a need to decide that it does not prevent you from subtracting the results of
+
+of the investigation, not only in our country, but also in the internal plan
+
+and contribute to putting in evidence a scope of the social reality on it
+this investigation is very interesting from a socio-legal perspective
+
+Qualitative is radical and therefore made clear in the title itself. It seeks to analyze the
+
+discourses of the migrant population and the tools used in the discussion group. In
+
+total , 22 discussion groups1 were held . The reasons for this
+
+They are very well-worked questionnaires that have a wide experience behind them,
+
+in this work, it is not yet at all resueltas.
+
+the study of the analyzed legal phenomenon and it incardinan in a universe
+
+tigaciones revised in the previous section. The bet for a methodology
+
+for what it deserves to study the formulation of the questions.
+
+In that sense, it offers the opportunity to confront the perspectives of the
+
+The investigation into the installation of the migrant population in Spain carried out by
+
+the Colectivo IOE (formed by Carlos Pereda, Miguel Ángel de Prada , Walter Actis and
+
+Mario Ortí) is not a socio-legal investigation. You are one
+
+More than the methodological aspects, it can be verified with the object
+
+normative and institutional. Ahora bien, once these differences are verified ,
+
+but in face of evaluating the situation of the same and possible alternatives for reforms
+
+would be unquestionable in your opinion. Ahora bien, eso requires diseños ade
+
+its incorporation into Spanish society: adaptation to norms, illegality,
+
+The methodology of this investigation contrasts with that used in research
+
+of the investigation and the questions that guide it do not focus directly
+
+investigation carried out by sociologists on a phenomenon that is not ajeno al
+
+that policies are legislated and implemented without having to account for the discourse and its
+
+tional, which is why your reflections can be very interesting to explore the practical
+
+purposes of socio-legal research and, in particular, the
+
+implications for living conditions and civic insertion of enemies
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+legal.
+
+This methodological proposal is made explicit in the methodological section, which deserves
+
+Now, as if you are aware of this investigation, there is that:
+
+latent ideological. The reading of the investigation report así lo pone de
+manifesto.
+
+numerous senses.
+
+go further, seeking, from a certain polarization , spontaneous debates
+
+“keep in mind that the representation of the discussion group is not of a statistical type; It is
+rather a question of capturing and representing typical positions, but also the extreme ones that
+make up the diversity of the studied social field ”.
+
+37
+
+a great utility to compare in particular the behaviors and opinion states of immigrants
+
+when they enter into a relationship with elements
+
+The first step before starting the investigation remains to be defined
+
+Thus, based on criteria such as the origin of migrants and the moment of the migratory
+
+trajectory, on the one hand, and the socio-economic status,
+
+the coexistence group and other sociodemographic variables, on the other hand, if there is
+
+the criteria that allow us to identify the population to be studied and its general and
+
+particular characteristics , given that it is a diverse population in
+
+and somewhat passionate, to bring out latent information that, with other techniques, could
+
+make the hubies emerge. It should be reiterated that this investigation
+
+strategically seeking the “representativeness” that demands the study and the polarization
+
+that requires the groups ’ own dynamics .
+
+It's worth analyzing . As we have pointed out further , this methodology
+
+previous state. The investigation is done for the CIS. This organization sought with a series
+
+of projects to complete the perspective of some studies already carried out
+
+allows access to the attitudes, values and expectations of migrant populations . The
+
+discussion group rests on qualitative plans; but
+
+zados that took as a basis the indigenous population and now intend to approach
+
+give both sets of documentation with different investigations. The Colectivo Ioé was
+
+awarded the study of the immigrant population. I am assuming that
+
+go, but the researcher cannot stay there, if he wants to delve deeper into it
+
+This is the key to achieving research objectives . Even though the investigation is not
+
+quantitative, it is necessary to design the groups with a composition
+
+The studied population is also the “Spanish population”, as in the article
+
+“representative” that allows access to the diversity of the migrant population.
+
+The analysis of the information obtained is the analysis of a specific discourse, which
+
+speech of the groups and bringing out the attitudes, expectations and elements
+
+ción is not happening from the perspective of legal sociology; but it results from
+
+Once the population to be studied is defined , the design of the discussion groups
+
+which requires specific guidelines (Ibáñez, 2003). This is a qualitative analysis
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+and address their coexistence
+relationships , their incardination in
+the labor market or their participation
+in political society .
+
+(3) Public opinion barometers of
+the General Council of the Ju dicial
+Power; a large number of studies
+and surveys of the Center for
+Sociological Research , and a
+survey of the Center for Research
+on Social Reality.
+
+Rev. Española de Investigaciones
+Sociológicas (nº 67, pgs.
+
+See also
+
+titled from the speeches
+of the migrants themselves aimed at
+understanding and interpreting how
+the migrant people understand
+
+C.. (1994). “ Spanish people
+before criminal justice :
+attitudes and expectations”.
+
+For more information on these
+reforms , please consult the
+section “ Regulatory regulation
+and the transformation of
+criminal law enforcement in the
+module “ Socio - legal theory of
+law”.
+
+The theses and plans outlined in a previous theoretical framework are not applied
+
+analysis carried out based on this discourse seems to suggest that the au
+
+tigadora has not carried out the surveys of the data . There is select
+
+data of interest for the objectives of his study of investigations into the Administration
+
+of Justice carried out by several institutions3 and ha
+
+to develop analytical tools on incorporation models in the corporate society and
+
+confirm starting hypotheses with data _ _ _
+
+a brief presentation of the data and on many occasions end up in the “ca
+
+jón” without analysis and further interpretations more profound and rigorous.
+
+The work we are analyzing is a secondary investigation of a quantitative nature . The
+
+data that is used has not been reanalyzed, which is why in some cases there is less
+
+analysis of greater statistical draft and the opportunity to have crossed the data
+
+handled with some explanatory variables . Apart from this , the reading of this work
+
+provides very interesting data and although it was carried out by a sociologist, the
+
+focus is attentive to disciplines such as criminology and legal sociology.
+
+borders and even goes beyond the limits of constitutional legality, as
+
+on the relationships between theory and empirical research.
+
+social response to insecurity at a time when reforms took place
+
+qualitative feedback the theory emerges from the investigation itself. In another order
+
+of things, the value given to the discourse of migrant people and construction
+
+planting can be analyzed as an example of how to invest
+
+Unlike the investigations analyzed in section 5.1 , here it is
+
+providing useful material, as in many cases investigations carried out by institutions
+
+are analyzed very simply to elaborate
+
+of the possibilities of secondary investigation and, secondly, because it will provide
+
+interesting information about punitive culture and reaction
+
+Legal laws are as important as the Ciudadana Security Law . In reality, this work
+
+highlights that the political foundations of a reform, which
+
+Here we want to highlight an aspect related to the highest point
+
+society are the migrant people themselves, and not the people who perform
+
+We selected this work, firstly, because it represents a good example
+
+arising from social research. Faced with this option , a typology of incorporation
+
+models was constructed in the host society2 . This one
+
+the investigation.
+
+With that purpose, it has interpreted the data of the referred investigations
+
+(secondary investigation)
+
+38
+
+5.3. Attitudes of the Spaniards before the Criminal Justice
+
+(2) defensive replication ,
+subaltern insertion , equal integration and
+guidelines for a review
+
+Recommended consultation
+used these data for the preparation of your article.
+
+technical experts on the incorporation of migrant people into our
+
+219-240). See links on the
+web.
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+M.. (dir.) (2002). Immigration and
+justice: The treatment of
+immigration within the scope of
+justice. Madrid: CGPJ.
+
+“it is possible that complaints of more severe punishments for criminals result in incentives for the
+perception of a State that does not fulfill, which fulfills on average, its role in maintaining the social
+order”.
+
+domestic in the Ad
+ministración de Justicia.
+Madrid : CGPJ.
+
+M.. (dir.) (2001). The
+treatment of violence _
+
+jurisdictional bodies referred to the topic reviewed.
+
+ended up signaling the Constitutional Court, supporting its legitimacy
+
+some jueces guarantee police intervention .
+
+punitive punishment. So, tell me that:
+
+expansion of judicial headquarters distributed across autonomous communities and types of
+
+Recommended queries
+
+Recommended websites
+
+39
+
+http://www.unizar.es/sociologia_juridica/inmigracion/InmiInf.pdf
+
+http://www.unizar.es/sociologia_juridica/viodomes/bdatos.htm
+
+gender violence (content analysis)
+
+http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder_Judicial/
+Consejo_General_del_Poder_Judicial/Actividad_del_CGPJ/
+Estudios/El_tratamiento_de_la_violencia_domestica_en_la_administracion_de_justicia
+
+http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder_Judicial/
+Consejo_General_del_Poder_Judicial/Actividad_del_CGPJ/
+
+Estudios /Inmigracion_y_justicia el_tratamiento_de_la_inmigracion_en_el_ambito_de_la_justicia
+
+of justice, connect with this hecho the fear of crime and the demands of endu
+
+The author of this article, brings some first sections where she focuses on the image and
+
+functioning of the Administración de Justicia, focuses her focus
+
+in 1999. The investigation had as its objective the recognition and analysis of
+
+the data of sentences and other documentary sources linked to the procedure, due to
+
+which the mismas are produced and their execution in a sample
+
+The object of the investigation into the treatment of domestic violence within the scope
+
+of the Administrative Court that constitutes the analysis of the consequences
+
+For this purpose , the technique of data content analysis was resorted to .
+
+which concerns questions related to the social reaction to insecurity and
+
+mentioned documents. In this investigation , 4648 records were carried out
+
+distributed between 15 autonomous communities and 26 provinces of the Spanish State
+
+that seemed to confer a public opinion contrary to the limits that imposed
+
+Something that in your opinion could represent a threat to stabilization
+
+5.4. The administration of justice before immigration and
+
+of democratic values.
+
+terminology in the use of that moment, which had been produced in the Administration
+
+of justice in the Spanish State in the corresponding time frame
+
+tences and respective procedures on domestic violence, according to
+
+ñol. Of the total number of registrations made, 538 were made in courts of law
+
+delincuence , and the criminal legal culture of Spanish people. After realizing the lack of
+
+credibility and criticism of the inefficiency of Administration
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+rolling a specific tool based on Lotus Notes, which is also
+
+discussion to obtain information on who designed the investigations or
+
+“knowing the response of the Administration of Justice to the demands of all types of nonnational
+people who remain in our territory, whether with a residence permit , a work permit, or
+without them; esto es, en situación de irregulares; and without distinction of time of stay, social
+affiliation, etc.”
+
+40
+
+qualitative to be stored in the data base , for your analysis quantitative or cua
+
+The register constitutes the unit of basic information for the collection of data , which
+
+is carried out through a technical sheet based on a protocol for the
+
+above all, with the aim of facilitating the interpretation of the data obtained
+
+with the fines with the ones used here.
+
+based on content analysis in instructional and criminal courts . _ _ _ _ Your use was,
+
+pues, merely auxiliary or complementary y, obviously
+
+data collection . This sheet was elaborated mainly thinking about collecting
+
+The methodology used in the investigation on the incidence of inmi
+
+grace in the scope of the Administration of justice was also carried out for the General
+
+Council of the Judicial Power, and this as an object, as determined
+
+How can you see the first chapter, where the plantings are described?
+
+show determined the collection of data in 297 courts, of which 107 years
+
+used to perform basic statistical analyses .
+
+interpretation, is increasingly frequent and even the most staunch as tativists resort
+
+to qualitative interviews and group interviews or groups of
+
+grace and, as far as possible, the treatment given to this phenomenon in
+
+corresponding to penal courts and 190 instructional courts .
+
+As a complement to the investigation, two discussion groups were held ,
+
+with the aim of expanding information on some punctual topics and
+
+Es decir, se tried to make known the incidence that en el ambito de la Admi
+
+the Administration of Justice. For what concerns the methodology employed,
+
+methodological and the scope of the investigation, was very similar to the study
+
+a posteriori litative . The file was computerized with the double purpose of allowing the
+
+creation of a documentary base and facilitating the analysis of the same ones
+
+qualitative in quantitative investigations, with the function of contributing to
+
+penal (12%) and 4,110 in Juzgados de Instrucción (88%). The distribution of _
+
+complement the data obtained and above all in order to facilitate its analysis and
+
+mind, has a scope and objectives very different to the employment of the group of
+
+the request for technical conditions of the contest,
+
+justice deduction and in the period studied tuvo the phenomenon of inmi
+
+of data susceptible to quantitative measurement, although exceptionally data not
+
+previously categorized and information of a nature have been collected
+
+discussion as a technique for collecting data . This use of techniques
+
+previous.
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+intervention in this context should go further than criminal intervention and
+
+Tips on attackers and the circumstances surrounding this phenomenon – it
+
+all for discoveries in the criminal sphere. At this point, it is worth highlighting that from
+
+the data obtained, it is evident that the immigrant on the ground is
+
+Can you understand the treatment of phenomena such as gender violence or
+
+user of justice from the opposite perspective – as a victim complainant . And it is as
+
+relevant in this second case as in the first
+
+the functioning of the Justice Administration , the need for resources,
+
+• to the ends of regulatory prevention tending to avoid these behaviors better than to
+
+sanction them;
+
+can be conjured;
+
+the Integral Law against Gender Violence.
+
+stereotype of the delinquent immigrant, to highlight the relevance of the immigrantvictim
+phenomenon . The immigrant is also, and in proportion to you
+
+These two investigations are clearly socio-legal investigations,
+
+The study allowed us to verify that the so-called domestic violence is gender violence .
+
+Something that is evident in the assumptions of violence in the couple, the
+
+of the accusation, and
+
+carried out allowed viewing other positions of immigrants in their relationship
+
+immigration within the scope of the Administration of Justice. Both the focus and the
+
+utility pursued seek to understand the effectiveness of legislation,
+
+ascendants or others and violence against minors descendants can be discussed in
+
+terms of gender violence . Secondly , the study concluded that
+
+• put in place punitive strategies tailored to the characteristics
+
+The second of the investigations we are analyzing has interest in
+
+design a broader and more complex normative model that meets:
+
+• to articulate an effective system of support and precautionary measures aimed at
+
+the effective defense of victims when the risk situation does not exist
+
+etc. They are the proper objectives of socio-legal investigation. Indeed , both are the
+
+cause of a contest called by the Consejo General del Poder Judi
+
+which undoubtedly leads to the need to go deeper into the penal system
+
+These are some conclusions that point towards the direction of what will be
+
+passive subject – denounced-detenido – of our criminal justice, is also
+
+ro. This is an important conclusion, since it clearly breaks with the
+
+From the point of view of the content, firstly , we would highlight that
+
+the design of procedures that do not focus on the victim or the weight
+
+milares, user of the justice system as a victim. In this sense, the investigation
+
+tenor of obtained data; but also in matters of violence against
+
+•
+
+41
+
+cial.
+
+classic.
+
+See also
+
+For more information on the
+Integral Law against Gender
+Violence , consult, later on, the
+section “El de recho regulativo
+y las transfor macões del right
+penal”
+in the module “ socio-legal
+theory of law”.
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+42
+
+with the Criminal Justice Administration to break with the source of information
+
+supuestos that concluded in sentence, a sample was elaborated from which in addition
+
+announced the penal reform of 2003 and in what related to immigration
+
+ción par excellence in this regard: the detentions and the prison population exist
+
+with insecurity, perhaps this was not what was sought. Perhaps this is the reason for
+
+the limited dissemination of this investigation, which was restricted in scope
+
+To collect information about these cases, data is also collected about cases that ended
+
+in supersession and were archived without sentencing. Given away
+
+try in our country.
+
+academic and a little hurtadillas – confirming what was said above
+
+that in many of these assumptions the immigrant appeared as a victim,
+
+This discovery was directly related to the design of the in
+
+on the bureaucratic “ethos” of legal sociology.
+
+data obtained present a more real panorama of the relations of the immigrant with the
+
+administration of justice. In a context where you are
+
+vestigation. Aunque el pliego del contest guided the investigation towards them
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+other studios.
+
+Summary
+
+43
+
+de las mismas and provide tools with which to critically evaluate
+
+the third, some fundamental methodological questions; in the apartado
+
+mind in the knowledge of legal phenomena.
+
+• Administration of justice and legal professionals; investigations about
+
+Secondly , the fields of application of the investigation are presented
+
+fourth, the design , the data collection techniques , the analysis, the interpretation and
+
+the presentation of results and finally in the fifth section, if there is
+
+• some themes related to the current transformations of the law.
+
+There are different ways of carrying out social research and will allow him to develop
+
+one type of technique or another according to the objectives of the investigation and, even,
+
+In this module, they were revised, in the first section, the focus of it in
+
+the antecedents of this approach have been reviewed and its importance has been highlighted
+
+The work presents a wide range of themes structured into four main areas:
+
+to have analytical and critical tools available on empirical research . Thus, at the outset,
+
+the debate on quantitative methodology has been addressed
+
+empirical research in the framework of socio-legal studies; apart from the second, the
+
+fields of application of legal sociology; in the apartment
+
+cia , subrayando the need to boost investigations by all means _
+
+empirical contributions as the foundation of a legal sociology grounded in reality
+
+• social control and criminal justice administration ;
+
+logic and an interdisciplinary approach.
+
+y/o qualitative concluding that the quantitative and qualitative investigation
+
+this perspective; a recent publication, The Oxford Handbook , has been reviewed
+
+In relation to the focus of the investigation in the socio-legal scope, if
+
+of Empirical Legal Research (Cane and Kritzer, 2011), to offer a current overview of
+
+problems and themes investigated by legal sociology. It is
+
+socio-legal role. Following a first revision of Renato Treves ' proposal
+
+As a conclusion , the existence of an important opening has been confirmed
+
+Thirdly , some methodological questions have been analyzed at the end
+
+sitting some empirical investigations with the purpose to analyze the design
+
+about the fields of legal sociology , based on the horizon of legal sociology of the
+
+seventies, and once highlighted the limitations of
+
+theme of this discipline, which would take place in a greater plurality of method
+
+matters related to various legal areas;
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 44 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Legal sociology, in particular , has a bureaucratic dynamic and its mission to the
+
+sources of power.
+
+socio-legal knowledge in particular . Y, in relation to what is there
+
+interpretation of the same for your presentation. The only point where
+
+a qualitative investigation based on the realization of discussion groups ;
+
+We have minimally extended this in relation to secondary investigation, this is, in the
+
+reuse of data from information
+
+called the bureaucratic “ethos” of sociology, it has been noted that both methodological
+
+and academic reasons are linked to the problem of finance
+
+an investigation into the attitudes of the Spanish people before the criminal justice system
+
+carried out from secondary data and , finally, two of the
+
+yet. Next , in a specific subsection , which are
+
+objectives and theoretical framework; but in the field of empirical research, methodology
+
+and research techniques are assumed as tools
+
+empirical with the purpose of making contact with the substantive contents of the
+
+same; analyze its design and evaluate it critically. So, if it was analyzed
+
+the role of theory in empirical investigation, betting on the strength of theory both
+
+within the scope of social knowledge in general and for
+
+of social sciences. Reason why, this section in the majority of the
+
+cases have not ceased to be a reminder of questions related to the design of
+
+investigation, data collection techniques and analysis and
+
+investigations carried out through opinion surveys with questionnaire;
+
+debates and other aspects related to the design of the investigations.
+
+In the fourth apartment, the starting point was the finding according to which the expectation
+
+exploratories to socio-legal research.
+
+on occasions, integrate both perspectives; but in some way it would be exclusive
+
+methodological specificities of socio-legal investigation if ciñen a los ob
+
+Finally , in the fifth section, some investigations were reviewed
+
+compiled in previous investigations and that can be accessible from face to face
+
+investigations carried out by the Laboratorio de sociología Jurídica in which the
+
+authors of these materials have participated . This panorama has served to
+
+ción de las investigations to be carried out, pushes sociology , in general, and
+
+new uses and analysis. Greater attention has been paid to this technique due to the
+
+interest that it may have to carry out work or approach the end
+
+see how some of the methodological questions are resolved in practice
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Activities
+
+45
+
+2. What do you think about the methodological plans outlined in section 3? A priori, from an
+epistemological point of view , why are the methodological options biased, quantitatively or
+qualitatively ? Why ?
+
+5. What advantages and disadvantages do you appreciate in secondary research? Ejemplified your
+response to the investigation analyzed in 5.3.
+
+3. Analyze the questionnaires of the investigations reviewed in section 5.1. In particular, we focus on
+the formulation of the questions : What is the most important thing that calls for the attention of these
+questions?
+
+1. Do you consider empirical research useful in the socio- legal field ? Why? Enumerate five themes
+or problems related to legal phenomena that can be empirically investigated
+
+6. Is it possible to analyze the incidence of mass media in the context of “ punitive populism”? Seeking
+first information on what punitive populism is and, once you have minimally delimited the object and
+the objectives of a possible investment, if it could be carried out resorting to the technique of content
+analysis . If it is possible, would it be quantitative or qualitative content analysis ? Why ?
+
+4. Information about the procedure for holding a discussion group . What differentiates between the
+discussion group and other types of group interviews ? Why in the investigation carried out in section
+5.2 is it explicitly stated that the technique employed has consisted of discussion groups ?
+
+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+
+Bryman, A.; Burgess, R. G. (1994). Analyzing Qualitative Data. London: Routledge.
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+CC-BY-NC-ND • PID_00184287 Empirical investigation within the scope of legal sociology
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+The social studies of quantification
+
+and its implications in sociology
+
+Claudia Daniel**
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo*
+
+With this objective in mind, this article offers a broad review of the field's
+literature, seeking to arouse the interest of the social scientist community for its
+heuristic potential. At the same time, an attempt is made to compile the
+contributions of social studies from quantification to sociology as a whole. The
+first section presents a historical account of the formation of this perspective of
+analysis, its main reference works and most significant contributions. The
+second section discusses the reasons why we understand that sociology should
+broaden its attention to operations and quantification regimes in contemporary
+societies. In addition, it examines the contributions that the field has to offer for
+reflection on the core issues of the discipline, such as the problem of the
+foundations of social order and political authority, the processes of social
+differentiation and configuration of subjectivities, social participation, the critique and transformative social agency.
+
+Keywords: sociology of quantification, history of statistics, government of
+numbers, population policy, classification categories.
+
+* Graduate Program in Political Sociology, Candido Mendes University, Rio
+
+** Center for Social Investigations, CIS, IDES, CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil.
+
+Summary
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia DOSSIER42 Daniel
+
+http://doi.org/10.1590/15174522-109768
+
+42
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+This work has a dual purpose: on the one hand, to present the relevance, scope
+and depth of historical and sociological studies on quantification; on the other
+hand, to reconstruct the origins of this field and the transformations it has known
+over the last few years. Along the way, we are interested in highlighting the links
+between the works that analyzed the processes of reasoning, valuing, measuring
+and comparing with numbers and the classic and contemporary concerns of sociology.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Directed by Alain Desrosières, this project resulted from the colloquia he
+
+organized in 1976, which brought together several historians of the
+Annales, such as Jean-Claude Perrot, Michele Perrot and Jacques Ozouf,
+
+consecrating a pioneering historiographical concern with statistics as a
+state instrument of territorial administration and the population.
+
+Introduction
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+This work has a double purpose: on the one hand, to show the relevance,
+
+On the other hand, the other trend is the Bielefeld group, close to the
+
+philosophy of science and historical epistemology, bringing together German
+
+and Anglo-Saxon authors, such as Lorraine Daston, Ian Hacking and Theodore
+
+Porter, and which publishes its manifesto in the work The probabilistic revolution
+
+breadth and depth of historical and sociological studies on
+
+The social social studies studies of quantification quantification and its implications implications in sociology sociology 43
+
+Two trends are constituted in this first phase. On the one hand, a
+
+political and institutional history of data production, highlighting state
+
+recording and counting practices over time, as in the two volumes of Pour
+
+une histoire de la statistique (INSEE, 1987).
+
+(1987), based on conferences held between 1982 and 1984. Inspired by
+
+the research program opened by Thomas Kuhn, this current dedicated itself to
+
+This interest initially leaned towards the genesis of sources, classifications
+
+and statistical instruments, underlining their social and political uses.
+
+Since the end of the 1970s, the production of statistics has come to be
+
+considered a social practice of interest to the social sciences, not only
+
+because of its political effects, but also because of its unique characteristics
+
+– the social relations involved in the statistical production chain, the
+
+confidence and authority that these numbers usually inspire, the classification
+
+schemes and representation of the world that they propose.
+
+quantification; on the other hand, to reconstruct the origins of
+this field and the transformations it has known over the last few years.
+Along the way, we are interested in highlighting the links between
+these analytical works on quantification processes and the classic and
+contemporary concerns of sociology.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In this text, we approach and examine a set of cross-sectional
+
+studies in the field of social sciences that share the consideration that
+
+quantification is not just a tool that scientists and administrators use to
+
+produce knowledge about the world, but that it is a social activity implied
+
+in relationships of power, and which produces effects on the reality that it
+
+purportedly describes.1
+
+to investigate the emergence of risk and the calculation of probabilities
+
+as new categories of perception of reality, their transit in the formation of
+
+the natural and human sciences throughout the 19th century, as epistemic
+
+conditions for the emergence of biopolitics and population management,
+
+and of various processes of rationalization of social life.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 44
+
+In the 21st century, social studies on quantification extended these
+
+limits a little and (self)identified themselves as those that try to analyze
+
+processes of production and communication of numbers, in general,
+
+understanding quantification as a social phenomenon in itself (Diaz
+
+Bone; Didier, 2016; Espeland; Stevens, 2008). Quantification would no
+
+longer be restricted to the practices of preparing and disseminating
+
+official statistics, but would encompass other operations and calculation
+
+technologies: accounting calculations, cost-benefit analysis, performance
+
+measurements, risk calculations, ratings and rankings. Quantification
+
+is conceived, then, as a fundamental feature of modern social life,
+
+which is evidenced by its close links with scientific activity, consolidation
+
+of modern states, management of complex organizations, evolution of
+
+markets and economic agency. Therefore, it is difficult to think of the
+
+isolated quantification of the questions that sociology has traditionally
+
+formulated about the reproduction of order, cohesion, social
+
+coordination, inequalities, hierarchies, conflicts, individualization and work organization.
+
+1Since studies on quantification are in full expansion, we do not intend to offer
+here a completely exhaustive review of the literature, but rather describe an
+overview of a set of studies that share certain common assumptions, outlining
+their main lines of investigation.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+In fact, the recursive effects of numbers on agency and the reality
+
+they describe is one of the main axes of analysis in quantification
+
+studies. The mere existence of the field presupposes overcoming an
+
+old debate in the social sciences, opposing methodological positivists
+
+– who take numerical proof as a coherent and realistic representation
+
+of reality – to theorists and ethnomethodologists – who accuse
+
+numbers of reducing how to how much, omitting or mutilating the
+
+phenomenon to be researched. While the former forget the work of
+
+objectification that surrounds every type of counting, contributing to
+
+mystify its effects of power, the latter ignore that quantification
+
+presupposes a conventional operational definition that gives it a social
+
+force, and that impels a standardized agency (Besson , 1995, p.
+
+25-67). For this reason, statistics must be understood, at the same
+
+time, based on two registers of language about reality, one realistic
+
+(objectivist) and the other relativist (constructivist) – that is, as being
+
+simultaneously conventional and real (Desrosières, 1993 , p. 398).
+
+In the first section of this work, we try to describe how a research
+
+agenda on quantification over time was configured, its theoretical
+
+matrices and most significant contributions. In the second section, we
+
+try to argue why we believe that sociologists should pay more attention
+
+to the different operations and quantification regimes, supporting
+
+ourselves on the idea that the studies carried out so far resume and
+
+illuminate at least three foundational concerns of the sociological
+
+discipline: i ) the issue of the foundations of social order and political
+
+authority in modernity; ii) the issue of social differentiation and the
+
+constitution of subjectivities; iii) the question about the foundations of
+criticism and transforming participation in the social world. In the last
+
+section, we develop a reflection summarizing the exposed argument.
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 45
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantification studies: genesis and approaches
+
+2Before that, it is worth noting that, without being articulated in research collectives, a
+series of works stand out outside these trajectories, as isolated contributions, which, in
+the mid-1970s and early 1980s, germinated the interest and the kind of questioning that
+still mobilizes quantification studies. We refer to the work of Michael Cullen (1975), who
+analyzes in a historical perspective the development of practices of recording, codification
+and enumeration of those who cultivated statistics as an applied science – not linked to
+the academic and intellectual community – in Victorian England, and who expanded our
+understanding of the process of emergence of statistical reason in modernity. In a similar
+direction, the work of Patricia Cohen (1982) focuses on the propensity to count and
+measure typical of North American culture, to carry out a historical study on the expansion
+of numeracy – or the generation of basic arithmetic skills, such as counting, numbering
+and counting . calculate – among the population of the United States during the 18th and
+19th centuries, and which resulted in the expansion of the domain of numbers on themes
+hitherto thought only in qualitative terms.
+
+46 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel
+
+As we stated, quantification studies consider statistical measurement
+
+practices and other quantification operations as a valid object of research.
+
+This presupposes recognizing the irremediably social character of the
+
+actions that contribute (and have contributed) to the mise en nombre
+
+of the world, transforming into quantities what until then was only thought of
+
+in terms of qualities. Starting from this common platform, we can group most
+
+of the most influential studies aligned with this perspective into two
+
+fundamental strands: on the one hand, the French current , which was
+
+formed at the intersection between the socio-history of statistics and the
+
+sociology of science; the economy of conventions and the sociology of
+
+criticism; on the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon current, linked – as we have
+
+already mentioned – to historical epistemology, the Anglo-Foucauldians and
+the Department of Accounting and Finance at the London School of
+
+Economics. We will examine these traditions in the following pages.2
+As a starting point, we can say that the field adopted the
+constructivist lexicon and vocabulary of the new French sociologies
+of the 1980s-2000s (Corcuff, 2015). It is a sociology clearly heir to
+the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, who promoted not only the
+use of statistics in the social sciences, but also an accurate
+
+reflection on the practices that presided over their elaboration. Bourdieu (2007)
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+One of the peculiarities of the French tradition of research in the
+history and sociology of statistics is that it originated in the national
+institute of statistics in that country, the Institut National de la Statistique
+et des Études Économiques – INSEE (Didier, 2016). Hence, between
+the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the first studies on
+the socio-professional categories officially employed in France emerged,
+which were analyzed from a diachronic and synchronic perspective,
+seeking to understand the mechanisms of categorization, with special
+attention to the processes of codification. Inspired by the economy of
+conventions, in particular the notion of plurality of logics of action, such
+works sought to show how classification categories adhere to the
+judgments and typifications that ordinary people make in different
+situations of everyday life (Boltanski, 1982; Desrosières ; Thévenot, 1988; Boltanski; Thévenot, 1991).
+
+Since then, the perceptive historical readings of Alain Desrosières
+and his successive contributions to the study of a language – statistics
+– which, for him, combined the authorities of science and the State,
+paved the way for the understanding of statistics as outil de preuve and
+outil of gouvernement, two poles in permanent articulation. As numerical
+evidence, statistics serves to describe reality and, as such, is an
+
+indisputable reference that precedes debates. In turn, as a State activity,
+statistics serves to prescribe and act on this very reality and, as such, is
+the target of denunciation and deconstruction of the pyramid of
+
+equivalences that sustain social distinction. In his major work, La
+politique des grands nombres (1993), Desrosières sought to reconcile
+the apparent divorce between the cognitive and political histories of
+statistics, a discipline whose meaning and content were changing
+between the 18th and 21st centuries.
+
+it bequeathed a quantitative sociology centered on issues of reproduction
+of inequalities and relations of domination between social classes,
+apprehended in its conceptual terms of habitus and field. This option
+demanded a critical reflection of the official nomenclatures, which would
+be carried out by his disciples.
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 47
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 48
+
+Then, this author adopted the term quantification, conceiving it as
+
+the synthesis of two moments – that of agreeing (convenir) and that of
+
+measuring (mesurer) –, starting to focus on the examination of the
+
+constraints, procedures and social and political effects of quantification.
+
+The methodological realism followed by this tradition introduces the
+
+social at the heart of the logic of metrology, dispelling the impression that
+
+the conventions of statistical forms are arbitrary (Desrosières, 2008). The
+
+real cannot be denied by an absolute constructivism, in which the
+
+measure totally creates the object. Conversely, the role of quantification
+
+in the government of people and things cannot be denied “by an absolute
+
+realism, in which things would have a prior existence independent of their measure”
+
+(Armatte, 2014, p. 22).
+
+In this way, they offer an empirical approach to the capillarized
+
+character of government in modern societies, through the notion of
+
+government at a distance, which they also applied to the politics of
+
+numbers (Rose, 1999). In this context, certain calculation instruments
+
+come to be examined in terms of “government technologies”, that is, as
+
+mechanisms through which government programs become operational
+(Miller, 2001; Miller; Power, 2013).
+
+In the Anglo-Saxon field, the sociology of quantification was
+
+nourished by contributions from governmentality studies carried out
+mainly in the United Kingdom and Australia. Postulating a style of
+
+analysis, more than a theoretical model, the works of Rose and Miller
+
+(1992), Rose (1999), Miller (2001), Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991)
+
+and Dean (1999) seek to explain the forms of rationality underlying
+
+different regimes of government, in order to demonstrate the connections
+between the ways in which we know ourselves and are led to know
+
+ourselves, and the ways in which we govern ourselves and are governed
+in the present. His works explore the resonances between Michel
+
+Foucault's (2008; 2009) latest reflections on population management and
+other intellectual projects, such as Bruno Latour's actor-network theory (2000).
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 49
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+A few years later, Theodore Porter's (1995) work, Trust in
+numbers, shifted the focus from science and state administration to
+the role of quantification in applied fields. Porter showed that the diffusion
+
+Accounting, for example, was recognized as one of the preeminent
+instruments of modern quantification, as a device that allows
+acting on the lives of individuals and inducing appropriate behaviors
+to certain economic objectives. Accounting practices require and
+inspire particular forms of organization, being linked to a strategic or
+programmatic ambition – to increase efficiency, foster responsibility,
+improve decision-making, increase competitiveness –, but
+fundamentally provide a means of acting on the individuals in order
+to influence their conduct, without losing their “freedom” of choice.
+Thus, accounting calculation practices , like other quantification tools,
+promote the government of individuals, inducing them to think of
+themselves as calculating selves (Miller, 2001).
+
+The work of two graduates of the aforementioned group from
+Bielefeld and exponents of the Anglo-Saxon tradition deserves
+special attention. The precursor works of the epistemologist Ian
+Hacking on the emergence and expansion of statistical reasoning
+rescued Foucault's concept of biopolitics, but focusing on an aspect
+little developed by the French philosopher – statistics. In the field of
+science, the erosion of determinism and the introduction of chance,
+even if “tamed” by calculation, boosted statistical rationality , a
+process followed in terms of State institutionality by the proliferation
+of data-producing agencies throughout Europe. The “avalanche of
+printed numbers” produced by these agencies, throughout the first
+half of the 19th century, promoted the formation of new categories of
+classification of people, in response to the need to uniformly count
+and number the population that was intended to govern (Hacking,
+1982; 1990). A historical process that will also result in the
+establishment of the idea of normality as a key concept for understanding social behavior.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Such antecedents inspired new perspectives on quantification at the
+
+turn of the century. The research agenda was expanded with the
+
+introduction of the analysis of reactivity (reactivity) generated by statistical
+
+measurements (Espeland; Sauder, 2007; Espeland; Stevens, 2008) as a
+
+way to recognize the reflexivity (and not the mere passivity) of the actors
+
+that are the object of the measurements, the feedback effects (feedback
+
+loops) and the performativity (performativity) of the statistics, in terms of
+
+their ability to affect the reality that the numbers do not just describe or reflect.
+
+The development – for many years in parallel – of the two currents
+
+or “traditions” mentioned here resulted in the illumination of the social
+
+and politico-cognitive dimensions of numbers, statistical objects and the
+
+categories of thought they propose. Detachment from classical
+
+epistemology, added to a conventionalist approach, opened up the
+
+possibility of investigating the choices, assumptions, agreements and
+
+commitments that are at the origin of every statistical measurement device.
+
+In this sense, we can identify a first step taken by all this literature,
+
+aiming to recover historicity, in order to break with the perception of
+
+numbers as simple technical objects – strongly related to the ideals of
+
+precision, objectivity or neutrality – and reveal their conventional
+
+character. The second step consisted in making visible the different
+
+social and political effects produced by numbers in modern societies.
+
+Thus, since the 19th century, competing professional groups have
+
+resorted to numbers to consolidate their position in the division of labor,
+
+producing new quantification devices and applying them to hitherto
+
+incommensurable domains, such as the calculation of insurance, in the
+
+hands of actuaries, and the cost-benefit analysis, pioneered by engineers.
+
+the statistical reason depended on the growing importance of mechanical
+
+objectivity in science and public life, that is, on the systematic preference
+
+for standardized analytical protocols and techniques over professional
+
+judgment based on practice, training, and personal experience.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 50
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Between the 1990s and the early 2000s, the varied range of case
+studies (Anderson, 1988; Beaud; Prévost, 1997; Blum; Mespoulet, 2003;
+Curtis, 2001; Loveman, 2009; Otero, 2006; Patriarca , 1996, among
+
+others), the strongly empirical character and socio-historical perspective
+of many of these works were fundamental in proving the hypothesis –
+central to sociology– that statistics contribute to establishing social reality
+before reflecting it. This aspect draws attention to the particular importance
+of the historical and historiographical approach in the affirmation of a
+relativist and constructivist perspective on a frontier object such as
+statistics.
+
+Thus, the very productive rapprochement between history and
+sociology seems to us to be a characteristic that is at the genesis of the
+field, and which translates the multidisciplinary character of its object. Not
+by chance, a large number of its authors have dual training and/or work at
+the interface between history and social sciences. In this sense, sociologists
+found the debate about the performative and recursive nature of numbers
+already fermented by these works of sociohistory and historical sociology,
+when they started to be more directly interested in ways of quantifying and
+inducing social agency in neoliberalism.
+
+This is a new quantification regime, which is just beginning to be
+problematized by the social sciences, attracting increasing attention
+(Espeland; Stevens, 2008).
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+The reflective and critical effects of the historical approach to
+statistics as an object of study, which lies at the origin of the field, have
+expanded the explanatory potential of more recent analyzes on
+quantification in present-day societies. From the 2000s onwards, new
+research topics were incorporated, such as performance measurements
+or evaluations, rankings (Espeland; Sauder, 2007), benchmarking
+(Bruno; Didier, 2013; Fougner , 2008) and the politics of Big Data (Rouvroy, 2014; 2016).
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 51
+
+Alongside history and sociology, but with less vigor, a third
+approach to quantification was created, which deserves to be
+mentioned. From an anthropological perspective, numbers are
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+3For all intents and purposes, we use the term “field” for expository purposes.
+
+However, it is worth remembering that, at the end of the 1980s, a pioneering
+
+work attempted to define something like a program specific to the sociology of
+
+statistics and design the path through which empirical investigations should be guided.
+
+focused on as a mediating element of the most different cultural
+
+practices, a foundational cognitive process, a constitutive phenomenon
+
+of all social life, as demonstrated by the pioneering work of Thomas
+
+Crump (1990). Numerical forms matter here in their convergence with
+
+secular and spiritual powers, the emotional states of ordinary people,
+
+and the experience of the transcendent. Numerology, gambling,
+
+accounting and probability appear interconnected, in their ability to
+
+mobilize, to calculate the occurrence of auspicious events, to compute
+
+the debts and merits of members of a religious community, but also to
+
+inform bets, lotteries and investment strategies. Anthropology rescues
+
+the magical character of the numbers that populate the modern and
+
+contemporary world, which is found in the arbitration of risks and
+
+uncertainties in finance, in the calculation of compensation due to
+
+victims, in the intended equivalence between crime or offense, on the
+
+one hand , and punishment, amnesty and conciliation, on the other
+
+(Guyer et al., 2010, p. 36-61). While sociology, solidly anchored in a
+
+historical sensitivity, calls into question the ways in which we govern
+
+ourselves through numbers and alternative ways of quantifying reality,
+
+works guided by ethnography are interested in the ways of inhabiting a world apprehended numerically.
+
+Some scholars describe quantification studies as a vibrant
+
+conversation that crosses different fields (Berman; Hirschman, 2018),
+
+others refer to it as a transdisciplinary scientific movement or an
+
+emerging field in the social sciences (Diaz-Bone; Didier, 2016) . The
+
+debate about whether or not a specialized field already exists has not yet been resolved3 .
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 52
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(Alonso; Starr, 1987).4 Retrospectively, there is no doubt that that initial
+
+program has spilled over onto different planes, in part because
+
+quantification as a social phenomenon has continued to expand,
+
+strengthen and acquire new forms in the present, accompanying the
+
+transformations suffered by the regime of capitalist accumulation, starting
+
+in the 1970s. The strong tendency towards financialization, the profusion
+
+of neoliberal modes of government, the development of information and
+
+communication technologies further stimulated academic interest in
+
+quantification. At the same time, exchanges between specialists from
+
+different latitudes have enriched the theoretical perspective, in such a
+
+way that the conceptual toolbox for the empirical investigation of
+
+quantification has been greatly expanded (Espeland; Stevens, 2008; Mennicken; Espeland, 2019).
+
+We consider that sociology should not leave numbers out of its
+
+powerful dereification lenses since, as Espeland and Stevens (2008, p.
+
+433) suggest, “numbers are strongly implicated in the central questions
+
+that cross the discipline”. Both the historical research reviewed above
+
+and the most recent sociological contributions converge in pointing out
+
+that statistics affect the way we perceive and interpret reality; how we
+
+classify and value others, ourselves, and shared situations; they intervene
+
+when we consider our options, decide and act, alone or in interrelationship
+
+with others; they make power relations operable and mediate the
+
+maintenance of – or resistance to – forms of domination. Therefore, we
+agree
+
+4Paul Starr proposed a research program on the social and cognitive structure of statistical
+systems (Alonso; Starr, 1987, p. 8-9). The social structure would correspond to the social
+relations between informants, state agencies, private companies, professional bodies and
+international associations involved in the production networks and uses of statistics. The
+cognitive structure, in turn, would consist of the determinants of the production and readability
+of the numbers: the links between the design of the questionnaires, the assumptions made
+about social reality, the classification principles, the measurement methods and the norms of
+interpretation and data presentation.
+
+Quantification and sociology: a common agenda
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 53
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+with Mennicken and Espeland (2019) when they point out that sociological
+
+research would have much to gain from being more interested in understanding
+
+the interactions between the different quantification regimes and their broader
+
+implications for the (re)creation of the social and political order.
+
+quantify and govern
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Other works were inserted at the crossroads between the social history of
+
+They are studies that re-read the process of construction of the State, of
+
+national spaces and of the regulation of conflicts based on the trajectory of
+censuses, in the United States (Anderson, 1988), in Italy (Patriarch, 1996), in Canada
+
+production of numbers and their relationship with political regimes, highlighting
+
+the functioning of statistical systems in totalitarian experiences, such as Nazi
+Germany (Tooze, 2001) and fascist Italy (Prévost, 2009). Equally important
+
+were works that sought to relate epistemological innovations to the
+
+strengthening of the State's governing capacity. This is the case, among
+
+others, of the analyzes on the political-cognitive revolution provoked by the
+
+adoption of probabilistic sampling in official statistics, through which the
+
+assembly
+
+(Curtis, 2001) and in Argentina (Otero, 2006). There were works that examined
+
+the relationship between regional statistics and political authority in the Soviet
+
+Union , where a supposedly more scientific “Stalinist demography” developed
+
+(Blum; Mespoulet, 2003).
+
+From its origins, social studies of quantification have drawn attention to
+
+the centrality of statistics and statistical systems in the construction of authority
+
+and social domination. While Foucauldian approaches analyzed the production
+
+of spaces and subjects of government through numbers, authors linked to
+
+pragmatic sociology, especially Desrosières and his followers, understood
+
+quantification as a system of conventions and a coordination tool.
+
+54 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel
+
+In the early 1990s, these two reading keys were empirically
+driven by a set of historiographical research.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of the institutional engineering of the social state, in the middle of the 20th
+
+century (Beaud; Prévost, 1998).
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Authors within the theoretical framework of governmentality studies, such
+
+as Nikolas Rose, Peter Miller and Mitchell Dean, dedicated themselves to
+
+analyzing the constitutive link between the quantification of public life and the
+
+liberal government. The numbers would be presented as an instrument of
+
+realization of the democratic promise of aligning the exercise of public authority
+
+with the private beliefs and values of the citizens.
+
+On the one hand, the numbers put a brake on the discretionary power of
+
+government officials and specialists, by forcing political choices and bureaucratic
+
+decisions to be subject to protocols that make them appear to be products of
+
+standardized analytical techniques. On the other hand, “democratic government
+
+requires vigilant and calculating citizens in relation to the effects of power and
+
+the risks of their private decisions”, constantly affected by opinion and market
+
+surveys, which shift and quantify perceptions of reality (Rose, 1999 , pp.
+
+197-198). The growing quantification of the contemporary world would be a
+
+phenomenon to be understood by two complementary dimensions that
+
+characterize the government of modern societies: the
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 55
+
+From the Foucaultian (2008; 2009) and Latourian (2000)
+perspective, maps, cartograms, censuses and statistics are approached
+as technologies of government at a distance, because they respect the
+autonomy of private spheres and suggest appropriate behaviors to
+particular conceptions of individual well-being and collective. In this
+register, statistics would be a liberal technology of government, because
+it proceeds by the delimitation of authority and the codification of
+domains of society, with their own economic processes and dynamics
+of cohesion, populated by individuals who act according to certain
+principles of interest, outside the legitimate scope of a direct intervention.
+Statistics is seen here as a device for transferring governmental activity
+to the surface of society, by structuring the field of possible actions, and
+“providing actors with norms and standards for their own judgments,
+aspirations and conduct” (Rose, 1999, p. 48-49).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+mutual vigilance and the induction of conduct through freedoms and
+autonomies produced and consumed by liberalism.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+These are issues sensitive to governmentality studies, but also to
+studies of quantification, insofar as they privilege the material, visual and
+spatial dimension of government, and call attention to the cartography of
+power and authority. It is assumed that the success of a government
+regime depends on how actors experience themselves through the
+capabilities (such as making rational decisions), qualities (such as having
+a job) and status (such as being an active citizen) encouraged and favored
+by it ( Dean, 1999, p. 32).
+
+Like Foucault, its authors linked public numbers to liberal and neoliberal
+governmentality, leaving aside the variations between statistical techniques
+and their correspondence with different modalities of criticism of reality,
+precisely what interested Desrosières and the French pragmatists (DiazBone
+; Didier, 2016, p. 15).
+
+In this sense, some heuristic questions become sociologically relevant
+for us to think about the relationship between quantification, domination
+and coordination: what can be visualized or, conversely, what remains
+obscure in certain moments or societies, when we look at devices such as
+censuses, maps, charts, tables and diagrams that form the visual field on
+what and who should be governed? How does statistics produce
+government subjects – from workers and consumers to the so-called risk
+groups? How do the numbers suggest or induce their expected abilities?
+How are individuals and populations led to identify with certain groups, in
+order to become virtuous and governable?
+
+Despite the fruitfulness of this theoretical perspective, evident for
+thinking the relationship between State, population and statistics as a
+governmental trinomial (Camargo, 2016), its radical constructivism does
+not take into account statistical science and its role in the coordination of social life .
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 56
+
+Since the early 1990s, Desrosières has been engaged in
+conceptually subsidizing an agenda of empirical and historical studies on the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 57
+
+statistical construction of an international space for the coordination of
+States, the market and the economic agency. In this sense, the
+relationship between statistical science – as an indisputable reference
+that precedes debates – and the national traditions of statistical
+systems was originally suggested as a research program. Although it
+has remained somewhat fluid and little theorized, the proposal to
+approach statistics “between universal science and national
+traditions” (Desrosières, 1995, p. 167-183) provided hitherto nonexistent
+“equivalence conditions” for a basis of comparative studies on quantification.
+In the 1990s and 2000s, in the wake opened by Desrosières, a
+series of works thematized the relationships between, on the one hand,
+the spread of statistical internationalism, pushing for the normalization
+of classifications, measurement instruments and population counting
+infrastructure – , and, on the other hand, the historical conformation of
+national statistical practices, whose profile is inseparable from the
+genealogy of States and local structures of domination. Years later,
+this proposal was expanded to a comparative analysis of statistical
+experiences in Europe, the United States and Canada (Beaud; Prévost,
+2000) and, later, also in Latin America (Senra; Camargo, 2010; Otero, 2018).
+Among the questions shared by these works, we find: the methods
+used in the censuses of the 19th and 20th centuries, the ways of
+presenting numerical information and its role in movements for
+construction and reform of the State; the institutions and actors who
+used statistics as a source of authority and intervention in social
+debates; the role of quantification technologies in the construction of
+science practices and audiences ; the importance of ways of reasoning
+and valuing with numbers for the formation of a capitalist economic
+ethos and for the modernization of labor relations. These and other
+questions gave an identity and a common interest to the social
+historians of statistics, who thus managed to partially overcome their
+initial dispersion, drawing attention to the conditions of comparability,
+given the national differences in the modes of production and circulation of quantified objects.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Thus, census technologies and population and production
+statistics would adjust to the needs of the “engineering State”; price
+statistics based on classical economic theory accompany the
+“liberal state”; labor statistics, budget surveys of working-class
+families, probability calculation techniques for determining social
+security are at the base of the political rationality of the “Providential
+State”; national accounting, research on consumption and
+employment and econometric techniques respond to the needs of the “Keynesian State”.
+
+As a result of the historical reconstruction of official statistical systems
+
+– or “national traditions” – the perspective also made it possible to highlight
+the relationship between socially relevant issues, which were placed on
+the public policy agenda at different historical moments, and the statistical
+tools created to objectify such issues, give them legibility and, thus, delimit
+areas of government action, with the purpose of acting on them. In this
+sense, the themes and limits of official statistical investigations would be
+reflecting the contours of the political agenda at every moment. In addition
+to the use – so common nowadays – of social indicators in the different
+stages of the cycle of formulating and evaluating public policies,
+Desrosières' proposal (1993) showed the profound interdependence
+between the ways of statistically objectifying reality and the institutional
+forms to manage it. The categories of statistical description are entangled
+in the modalities of State action.
+
+In L'État, le marché et les statistiques (2003), Desrosières would
+redefine that program by conceiving the concept of “political regimes of
+statistics”, identifying five ideal types of State, based on their relationship
+with the economy and economic conduct . In this way, he sought to
+demonstrate the associations between ways of quantifying and ways of governing.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+social networks were inspired by other proven successful tools
+
+Back then, still a promise, the investment in indicators aimed to
+give birth to a true “social accounting” matrix. The indicators
+
+58 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel
+
+It is worth mentioning here the expressive interest of the States in the
+elaboration of social indicators and in their use to guide public policies.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+in the second post-war period, such as national accounts and the calculation
+
+of the GDP, within the framework of the setting up of government planning,
+
+the reaffirmation of Keynesian economic principles and the political concern
+with the establishment of a social democracy based on redistributive measures.5
+
+Due to the limits of this article, we cannot dwell on its examination, but
+
+a few words are in order about benchmarking, this specific art of conducting
+
+organizations that, over the last few years, under the influence of the New
+
+Public Management paradigm, migrated from the scope from companies and
+
+private businesses to the administration of the States. Unlike official statistics,
+
+benchmarking is not intended to reflect and transform a reality conceived as
+
+objective and external.
+
+Following the crisis of the two previous and intertwined models, the
+“neoliberal State” puts an end to forecasting and planning techniques
+based on macroeconomic knowledge, in favor of the generalization of
+benchmarking techniques , which rest on the principle of rational
+anticipations and the promotion of competition between the actors,
+according to measurable goals and objectives, no longer according to the
+concrete relationships in which they take part (Armatte, 2014, p. 21).
+In one of his last articles, Le rôle du nombre dans le gouvernement
+de la cité neolibérale (2011), Desrosières' model is significantly
+
+sophisticated, with the incorporation of the notion of governmentality,
+in part a reflection of the late publication of Foucault's courses in the
+College de France. In it, Desrosières develops the central hypothesis
+that the feedback of indicators on the behavior of actors ceases to be
+the unforeseen effect of quantification techniques and becomes the
+purpose of the political rationality of neoliberalism. This idea quickly
+awakens the attention of many social scientists attracted by its
+explanatory value and by the proliferation of contemporary forms of
+quantification, especially big data and benchmarking, responsible for
+the rapid expansion known in the field in recent years.
+
+5For a description of the historical context of the emergence of social indicators and their
+progressive importance in Brazil, see Santagada (1992).
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 59
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+to the subjects, but modifying the behavior of the organizations' own
+actors in the course of the action, promoting a self-referential look at
+themselves, detached from the social relations in which they take part.
+This is because the indicators selected as references in the comparisons
+depend on the agents themselves to quantify and monitor their activities.
+
+To end this section, we point out some background trends.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+The very different origins and perspectives of the two great traditions of the
+field – French and Anglo-Saxon – have not prevented them from meeting
+in recent years, with the generalization of the concept of neoliberal
+governmentality, understood as a way of managing and quantifying the population.
+
+The prerogative of evaluators to evaluate themselves is presented as an
+advantage, an anti-bureaucratic weapon, since employees gain a significant
+margin of initiative, “supposedly freeing themselves from the shackles of
+hierarchy and the formalism of regulations” (Bruno; Didier, 2013, p . 17-27).
+
+Another important aspect, Alain Desrosières can be considered the
+main mediator of the two great moments in the development of the field.
+By placing statistics between science (outil de preuve) and national
+traditions (outil de gouvernement), he reduced the dispersion of hitherto
+existing historical studies and provided subsidies for comparative research,
+based on common assumptions. Years later, his project
+
+On the one hand, being public (or publicized), measures of quantified
+activities constrain those responsible to make an effort to avoid the
+humiliation of bad results. On the other hand, each action to be taken is
+
+judged in terms of failure to stigmatize or success to be rewarded, which
+has the effect of “disengaging public agents from society as a whole and
+emptying the perception of their social function” (Bruno; Didier, 2013 , p.
+51). According to these authors, by resorting to the incessant quantification
+of all activities according to the imperatives of “total quality” and
+“international competitiveness”, benchmarking “subjects individuals to an
+indefinite discipline, designed to guide their engagement in action and to
+govern the what is most personal: his initiatives” (p. 120).
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 60
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of relating ways of quantifying to ways of governing would appeal to social
+scientists, interested in generalizing quantification to levels of agency and
+domains of social life that were previously incommensurable.
+As we have seen, statistics studies began with a strong historiographical
+
+vocation, relating the elaboration of numbers to state-building processes ,
+the creation of images and representations of the nation. Even more, they
+formulated questions such as the construction of authority and the
+foundations of the legitimacy of the State's statistical services. Today, the
+State is just one of several organizations that promote government based
+on measurements and numbers, whether on a national or global scale.
+There is a growing role for international organizations (United Nations,
+World Bank, OECD), non-governmental organizations (in defense of human
+rights and the environment, in the fight against poverty and in favor of
+
+transparency) and transnational think tanks , together with actors that we
+could call private. Among the latter, risk assessment agencies, the World
+Economic Forum and the International Institute for Management
+Development (Fougner, 2008) stand out, whose role in developing indices,
+rankings and all types of numerical information caught the attention of
+social scientists. , marking a new trend in studies on quantification.
+
+Understanding the specificities of the exercise of power through
+numbers in the contemporary world involves highlighting this variety of
+actors with recognized reputation, central to the establishment of new
+modes of global and local governance, capable of concealing normative
+agendas under technical languages of neutral evaluation. .6 In parallel with
+the displacement of the State by the progressive “competence” of these
+actors in the elaboration of indices and rankings, the current scenario is
+crossed by a rapid process of privatization of data production, which,
+according to Diaz Bone (2019), presupposes the Invisibilization of the conventions on which it is based
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+6On NGOs, see Rosa (2014); on credit rating agencies, Fioramonti (2014); on
+OECD instruments such as PISA, Bogdandy and Goldmann (2012).
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 61
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+the generation of this data, allowing them to bypass justification requirements
+and, thus, reduce the possibilities for questioning and criticism.
+
+Quantify, classify and “invent” people
+
+7In the original: “enumeration demands kinds of things or people to count. Counting is hungry
+for categories. Many of the categories we now use to describe people are byproducts of the
+needs of enumeration”.
+
+According to Ian Hacking (1991), statistical language promoted a
+set of classifications through which people thought (and still think) about
+themselves. The vast accumulation of official data in Europe throughout
+the 19th century provided the empirical corpus on which this author
+based his concept of “dynamic nominalism” and which allowed him to
+illustrate the social process he called making up people – or “modeling of people”.
+
+In print, in the mid-nineteenth century, statistical bureaucrats established
+a series of classifications for counting, which allowed them to group
+people, classify them, and code them. The invention of categories in
+which each person could (and should) fit in was, at the same time, a way
+of managing and of strengthening the new concepts about the human
+being. The creation of these categories gave rise to other ways of
+conceiving people. Thus, for example, the classification according to
+aptitude for work, originally designed by factory inspectors, will be
+assimilated by the census on a population scale, consecrating a principle
+of categorization based on the role played by individuals in production
+relations. An innovation that helped institute the structure of occupations
+and classes, guiding the terms in which we see society and situate
+ourselves in relation to it.
+
+(Hacking, 2000). “Enumeration requires types of things or people to be
+counted. The count is thirsty for categories. Many of the categories we
+use today to describe people are derived from enumeration needs”7
+(Hacking, 1982, p. 280).
+During the phase of statistical enthusiasm and the avalanche of numbers
+
+62 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 63
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Anchored in their national statistical traditions, and through the new
+
+power to officially classify all inhabitants of a given territory, statisticians
+generated descriptions of the populations that would come to shape its
+“national character”. For Hacking, the ways of describing people are not
+alien to them, but rather constitute them, as they delimit the field of
+possibilities of their personality.
+
+Counting the population in order to build subject positions and thus
+solidify identities that are more real than others – traditional, family, local,
+regional – involved attributing legal and symbolic effects to categories that
+diluted individualities into individualizations. In this perspective, the “mother
+tongue” reflects less the language of the individual than the language of
+the nation to which he belongs and through which he perceives himself.
+Similarly, “ethnic origin” in western immigrant countries “has more to do
+with the presumption of belonging to another country of origin, not with the
+feeling of belonging” (Kertzer; Arel, 2002, p. 27). In this sense, the census
+appears alongside other state registries created to establish a monopoly
+on legitimate means of mobility and endow categories with symbolic
+efficacy, such as, for example, the use of identity documents to guarantee
+transit and distinguish citizens from foreigners. , or the nationals of the
+colonial subjects.
+
+Census categorization, in its relation to national statistical traditions,
+was the subject of a series of studies focused on the processes of
+ethnicization and racialization of populations. These are works that
+addressed censuses as a fundamental instrument for constructing and
+legitimizing national and (post)colonial identity. For this literature, censuses
+allow States to produce, represent and monitor collective identities and,
+thus, regulate the conflicts and social pressures that constitute public life
+(Kertzer; Arel, 2002).
+
+Another important point highlighted by this literature is that the
+ascription of legal and symbolic effects to census categories contributed to
+establishing the statistical conception of normality as recurrence, which
+reduces differences between individuals to a matter of measurement, according to the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+From 1890 on, this classification became more sophisticated, subdividing
+
+mulattoes into quadroons and octoroons, according to the atavistic fraction of
+
+In her social history of the US census, Margo Anderson (1988) showed
+how the secession war was built on a growing polarization , which had
+numbers as the common referent of conflicting points of view . In the
+1850 census, the desire of southern politicians to statistically demonstrate
+the superior longevity of the servile stratum, in relation to free blacks in
+the North, gave rise to a tripartite racial division – whites, blacks and
+mulattos –, which instituted the polygenist notion of population – until
+then considered a crime by religion –, while subordinated the colored
+groups in number and condition, condemning them to the rapid absorption
+by the white race. This system was designed to control the black
+population as a whole – not just those who came from captivity – and
+biologically isolate a white majority enlarged by immigration (Nobles, 2000).
+
+On the other hand, the conception of normality as recurrence subtly
+invites individuals to see themselves through statistical categories, either
+by reinforcing the stigma produced by the racialized geography of the
+State (by gender, color, language and ethnicity), or, more recently, by
+denouncing the domination by challenging classification criteria,
+redefining their uses and contents.
+
+average and the distribution of the normal curve (Hacking, 1990; Carson,
+2006). On the one hand, even the identities of “deviant” and racialized
+
+individuals become scalable, since it opens up the possibility (albeit
+hypothetical) that the performance of subclassified groups rises to that
+of the upper stratum, considered normative, which authorizes interventions
+more or less violent on their living and socialization conditions. These
+
+groups will be the most susceptible to markedly biopolitical population
+management strategies (Camargo, 2016).
+
+64 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel
+
+Some works addressed the relationship between racial categorization
+and the construction of the State itself. Let us think, for example, of the
+case of the United States, where the statistical comparison between free
+and slave, black and white, helped to crystallize the image of a divided country.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 65
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+laboratory for the pioneering introduction of an anthropological and
+biological conception of the population, even before scientific racism and
+social theory formalized some of its categories as explanatory concepts
+of social change (Schor, 2003).
+
+Another research group is situated within the framework of
+postcolonial studies , having examined the role of censuses in the setting
+up of the colonial enterprise and in national liberation movements.
+Following the path opened by Benedict Anderson (2008), these are
+works that explored the technological intersections between censuses
+and maps, in order to underpin the territoriality of the colonial State, fix
+its borders, prevent conflicts and distribute bureaucracy, remodeling the
+pre-existing ethnoracial hierarchy and thus modifying the terrain on which
+colonized populations live, feel and act (Scott, 1995; Chatterjee, 2004; Legg, 2006).
+In this mode of use, statistics would be strategic in overcoming local
+topography, which classified towns, markets and settlements according
+to their insertion in cultural traditions and religious stories. Such spaces,
+segmented for centuries , would be configured and reconfigured through
+censuses and maps, being rebuilt as territorially solid units and
+
+Comparative studies on census categories and racial policies in
+Brazil and the United States (Nobles, 2000) and on the relationship
+between census, State and society in Latin America also belong to this
+group. In this direction, the work of Mara Loveman (2014) stands out, for
+
+whom the censuses of the countries in the region were guided by two
+complementary political projects: a descriptive one, which, for that author,
+helped to define the cultural borders of the imagined community; another
+prescriptive, which established racial miscegenation as a positive
+singularity of these countries, before the international system of States.
+
+black blood. It would last until the 1920 census, when the principle of one
+drop, one rule was adopted, which liquidated the intermediate group of
+mulattoes, by making the drop of blood the criterion for defining blacks,
+and the purity of blood that for identifying blacks. whites. For this reason,
+some works have shown how the US census was constituted in a
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Statistics became a means of recognizing the identity and
+numerical importance of groups (ethnic, racial, gender, etc.) before
+the State. For this reason, certain social groups became interested
+in being counted and began to demand that public authorities and
+institutionalized statistical systems register and produce data that
+would make their groups visible in the public sphere. Racial and
+ethnic minorities, national collectivities and religious communities
+mobilized and publicly expressed their intention to participate in
+statistical and/or census definitions.
+
+From this angle, the history of statistics has shown how official
+categories contribute to dividing groups within a population,
+separating them and ordering them in codified hierarchies. Statistics
+not only establish these social divisions, they also fix these categories
+of people, even when the boundaries of groups are not clearly
+defined in social life (Alonso; Starr, 1987). In grouping work, official
+statistics can bring together people who, until then, were not
+considered part of the same category. Once subordinated to a
+common administrative and statistical status, it may also happen
+that their interests complement or combine. In this sense, as Starr
+said, official classifications not only register, but also rewrite the lines
+of social differentiation.
+
+delimited. Units endowed with a political and biographical narrative,
+“which gives them an unprecedented historical depth, attesting to the
+lasting and stable existence of a colonial domain” (Scott, 1995, p. 208).
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 66
+
+On the other hand, we should note that, as indicated above,
+studies of quantification are heirs to the concern with the ways in
+which devices allow shaping and influencing people's behavior and
+act as “technologies of the self”. Continuing with analyzes of
+disciplined subjectivity (Rose, 1996), some scholars have explored
+the more recent phenomenon of the increasingly diffuse penetration
+of quantification into everyday life, its expansion into personal life,
+and its influence on the configuration of the quantified- self (Nafus, 2016). The new technologies
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantify, resist and criticize
+
+For these approaches, it is clear that devices that quantify the
+self are intended to actively influence the behavior they track.
+Likewise , digitized metrics lead to new and varied schemes for
+classifying individuals, which are used by companies and
+corporations to create markets – for example, markets for credit or
+insurance, health, education, among others. – which in turn affects
+their chances and quality of life. In this sense, it is also evident here
+that the States and their official classifications tend to lose
+protagonism in the 21st century, while new quantification devices,
+created and disseminated by other actors become available –
+platform companies and social networks, financial companies,
+agencies national and international credit institutions,
+transnational foundations, etc. capable of molding and managing new subjectivities.
+
+Although statistics have a long history of articulation with the
+State, in its claim to control populations and exercise domination, it
+is no less true that they have been linked to social reform (Cullen,
+1975) and associated with denunciations of injustice, arbitrariness
+and social inequalities (Bruno; Didier; Previeux, 2014; Bruno; Didier;
+Vitale, 2014). As Desrosières (2014) highlighted, there is another
+history of the uses of statistics as an instrument of social criticism.
+While historical approaches related statistics to the exercise of
+power, favoring the pole of dominant groups, more recent studies
+have focused on statistics as a tool that enhances political action
+and criticism of reality, emphasizing the agency capacity of social
+actors, including subordinate groups, who also appropriate them to
+resist and try to reverse power relations.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+created the possibility for people to quantify themselves, routinely
+generating and analyzing their own data (self-tracking), in order to
+evaluate and qualify their actions and also those of others (Neff; Nafus, 2016).
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 67
+
+–, become
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+From a theoretical point of view, it is important to emphasize that this is
+an innovation inspired by the economy of conventions. The concept consists
+of a piece from the French intellectual field, after consecrating the passage
+from the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu to the sociology of criticism (or
+pragmatic sociology) of Boltanski and Thévenot. In Sociologie de la critique,
+Boltanski proposes a distinction between what he calls reality, which “tends to
+be confused with what seems to maintain itself by its own strength”, that is,
+with order, and, on the other hand, the world , the flow of events and
+
+combines a wide variety of militant and political action practices with numbers,
+and which has in common “the willingness to put statistics at the service of
+political emancipation” (Bruno; Didier; Previeux, 2014, p. 27). The last few
+years have witnessed the emergence of new social movements, as centers of
+resistance to the expansion of the means of quantification embraced by
+neoliberalism, which led these authors to formulate this descriptive concept –
+and, at the same time, optimistic –, capable of encompassing an activism
+social plural that is expressed through the language of statistics.
+
+One of the most important contributions of this literature was to show
+that, in addition to the authority of numbers being based on the intended
+objectivity and impartiality of techniques, and despite the fact that one of the
+great promises of modern statistics is the depoliticization of politics, numbers
+can be repoliticized in different ways. ways. A set of works has drawn attention
+to the renewed role that quantification assumes in the organization of political
+activism, social movements and various types of protests (Bruno; Didier;
+Previeux, 2014; Bruno; Didier; Vitale, 2014; Didier; Tasset , 2013). Activists
+from the most diverse causes resorted to statistical arguments and appropriated
+
+numerical information as a means of denouncing and criticizing the powerful.
+These situations demonstrated that quantification is not always, nor naturally,
+an instrument for imposing the interests of the elites – economic, technical
+and political –, or of those who are at the head of large organizations, whether
+public or private, national or transnational. It can also be a valuable tool for
+undermining authority and confronting institutionalized powers.
+
+According to the authors who coined the term, the notion of statactivisme
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+68 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It depends on the precision of the critical instruments, as well as the solidity
+of institutions and networks that support the numbers: “the success of social
+criticism expressed in statistical language cannot be based merely on the
+correctness of the arguments, but depends, to a large extent, on the political
+and social network in which it is inserted” (Desrosières, 2014, p. 357).8
+
+experiences, the possibility of which is not contained in the known totality
+(Boltanski, 2009, p. 93). In this approach, statistics is conceived as an
+institutional form that calls reality into question and paves the way for the
+world. In this way, the demand that sociology addresses modes of
+government and their investment in statistical forms, as well as critical
+operations involving different social actors, is justified .
+As Bruno and Didier's article in this dossier argues, the most recent
+research within this line of analysis has demonstrated that, both throughout
+history and today, statactivism has spread across different fields and with
+varying scope. In some cases, experiences of statistical activism consisted
+merely of denouncing the flaws, gaps or limitations of public statistics.
+
+Sometimes, it took the form of activism in favor of official statistics, taking
+
+into account aspects of reality hitherto neglected, denouncing the priorities
+
+established by measurement regimes, and highlighting the relevance of
+elements neglected by quantification practices. In other cases, an attempt
+was made to expose the internal contradictions of a statistical system or to
+expose the prejudices on which it is based, to show that statistics do not
+have the neutrality or impartiality that many claim.
+
+Among the statactivist practices is the elaboration of alternative
+indicators to the official ones as a source of political interventions, and
+as a statistical counter-discourse that allows the state's power of naming
+and describing reality to be confronted, to show a reality different from
+the official one. However, it is worth noting, with Desrosières (2014), that
+the success of a critical undertaking of this type is never guaranteed in advance.
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 69
+
+8In the original: “the success of the social critique expressed in the language of statistics
+cannot rely simply on the justice of the arguments, but depends largely on the political and
+social network in which it is inscribed”.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Statistical activism would be a step towards emancipation from the
+
+authority of official statistics, with a view to reclaiming the authority that
+
+such devices are capable of conferring on arguments in favor of the group
+whose interests this activism represents. This process ends up promoting
+the repoliticization of statistics.
+
+Various political groupings have aspired and still aspire to free themselves
+from relationships of subordination or struggle to reverse the conditions of
+inequality to which they are subjected. This is the case of Hispanics in the
+United States (Nobles, 2000), American indigenous peoples, religious
+minorities, among many others who sought to institutionalize themselves
+statistically in order to gain social recognition, translate their moral greatness
+into size and political weight, in a way to strengthen the legitimacy of their demands.
+
+But numbers, figures and indicators are not just political resources in
+the struggle for recognition led by previously organized minorities.
+
+In today's world, there are several networks for using numbers involving
+human rights associations and NGOs that produce and use original data on
+violence against minorities, helping to consolidate them as social categories.
+Studying one of these networks, Eugenia de Rosa (2014) showed how
+figures on violence are used in four phases of mobilizing public opinion by
+the gender equality movement: in the framing and categorization process,
+in the design and implementation of policies, in dissemination and
+awareness campaigns, and monitoring fluctuations. Throughout these four
+phases, networks of use provide consistency to the social aggregates that
+statistics allow us to establish.
+
+They are often at the very origin of their constitution as a social group. The
+case of the LGBTQ community is emblematic. As we know, the publication
+
+of the famous Kinsey report in 1948 created a major
+
+Another type of statactivism lies in the public denunciation of
+subjects or social groups made invisible or hidden by official statistics;
+action sometimes accompanied by the use of statistics themselves to
+create or consolidate these groups as institutionalized social categories.
+
+70 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This type of statistical activism presupposes the intervention
+of actors, both subjects and objects of measurement instruments,
+based on the convenient use of rules to influence their results.
+For example, by adapting or manipulating – for their own benefit
+– the rules involved in performance evaluations, which oblige
+individuals to achieve quantified goals in their workplaces (on
+police, Didier, 2018; on university ranking Espeland; Sauder , 2007).
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+The 71 social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology
+
+controversy over sexual practices in American society, undermining
+conventional views on the matter. In particular, the data produced
+in his research on homosexual behavior showed that the proportion
+of men who had had relationships exclusively with other men
+throughout their lives was much higher than previously thought,
+directly influencing the formation of a new “statistical community” ,
+which saw itself for the first time as a political group, organized on
+the basis of a shared culture and identity, which would soon give
+way to the rights movement (Michaels; Espeland, 2006). Therefore,
+statactivist experiences also involve social actors who mobilize
+quantification practices with the aim of creating or consolidating
+statistical categories, in which they find support to defend or claim rights.
+
+Thus, it is the social actors themselves who, through their
+participation in critical operations, repoliticize the ways of organizing and governing
+
+Although there were already several historical experiences of
+statistical activism, neoliberal governmentality produced specific
+conditions for the emergence of new ways of fighting numbers. By
+following Bruno, Didier and Previeux (2014), the notion of statactivisme
+acquires a particular meaning as a means of opposition to neoliberal
+forms of government. In the contemporary world, statactivist practices
+fundamentally consist in highlighting the rules for producing indicators,
+rankings and targets that integrate the political rationality of
+neoliberalism; benchmarking as a global government technology; and
+the managerial techniques currently applied in public and private
+organizations, especially taking advantage of the margins of freedom that such rules leave to agents.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The case of Guadalupe shows that “quantification helps to construct
+situations of social tension, by revealing or creating feelings of social injustice.
+
+by numbers, promoted through the application of “transparent”, “objective”
+and “neutral” technical tools. As highlighted by Didier and Tasset (2013),
+“quantifying is producing knowledge and, therefore, acquiring power.
+Therefore, it is a precious weapon that we can reuse.”9 Statistics can be
+resources to be used by any of the parties engaged in political disputes and
+social conflicts.
+However, if statactivisme can be thought of as “a challenge to the
+hegemonic logic of quantification established at a given moment” (Bruno;
+Didier; Previeux, 2014, p. 30), not all practices it encompasses call into
+question the principles on which the quantification is based. We can say
+that there are more radical modalities, others more reformist, and even
+conservative.10 Ultimately, there are different combinations between
+
+statistics and forms of violence. Take as an example the profound social
+
+conflict that occurred in Guadeloupe – a small archipelago in the Antilles
+that constitutes an overseas region of France due to the increase in the cost
+of living, in 2009, when numbers were involved in serious social tension.
+According to a study by Samuel (2014), statistics appeared both as
+mediation support for explosive popular reactions, and as tools of intimidation
+and coercion, leading to an escalation of violence.
+
+In this way, it contributes to triggering protest actions against the methods
+of 'government by numbers', motivating confrontations with the State and
+dominant actors” (Samuel, 2014, p. 254). In addition to exceptional situations
+like this, statistical arguments often appear in political conflict scenarios as
+a principle of evidence to erode authority.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 72
+
+–,
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+9In the original: “quantifier, c'est produire du savoir, donc acquérir du pouvoir. C’est donc une
+arme précieuse dont nous pouvons nous ressaisir”.
+10As Desrosières (2014) pointed out, criticism can be “reformist” and rely on “unquestionable
+numbers” or, on the contrary, more or less “radical”, and reject the calculations and tools
+used, or disqualify the mere use of them . The counterpoint between reformist and radical
+statactivism was also addressed by Didier and Tasset (2013).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In short, there are many reasons that justify greater attention to
+statistics as a political argument and as a tool for political action. What
+role do numbers play in formulating and framing a public discussion?
+What types of social criticism do they enable, restrict or strengthen? How
+did numbers transform the way actors engaged in politics? What specific
+effects do statistics produce when associated with social protests? How
+and under what circumstances can a persuasive device like statistics
+become a support for threat or coercion? To what extent does
+quantification promote or block democratic participation? Reflection on
+the intervention of statistical language in political debates and social
+disputes, its implications and effects are of great relevance for
+understanding the dynamics of contemporary societies.
+
+As we seek to demonstrate in this article, quantification practices
+deserve to be part of a legitimate research agenda in the social sciences.
+If we agree that quantification is both a knowledge and a government
+tool (Desrosières, 2008), its sociological investigation is not only relevant,
+but necessary. But why is a sociological reading of numbers so essential?
+
+Different empirical and theoretical research that we review here
+have shown that quantification operations are constitutive of social relations,
+
+public, as a resource in the dispute between political factions for access
+to government leadership, or as an instrument for mediating redistributive
+social conflicts (Hayes, 2011). On certain occasions, statactivism adopts
+another mode of expression, when the use of statistics against government
+authority involves the mobilization of a conservative critique in its
+foundations, which essentially accepts, sanctions and reinforces the
+established modes of quantification, restoring the conventions on which
+the measurement was based (Daniel; Lanata Briones, 2019).
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 73
+
+Final considerations
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+not just derived from them; that is, they are intrinsic to themselves,
+not secondary. Through the objects produced by quantification
+(numbers, indicators, rankings, series, graphs, tables) and the
+relationships they establish – between people, and
+between people and things, ways of exercising power. Quantification
+affects the way we perceive and construct social reality, the way we
+evaluate our actions and those of others, how we consider our options
+and objectives, how we manage organizations and manage life;
+quantification is not only present, but also directly influences the world
+we inhabit. It is important to recognize that, in contemporary societies,
+the extension of quantification to new previously non-commensurable
+domains is driven by a multiplicity of actors, institutions and processes,
+which, in turn, it helps to configure. Quantification operates as a
+device that acts on individuals and intervenes in their lives to
+guarantee a certain type of conduct or behavior. It is important to
+study the constitutive role of quantification practices, because they
+create a particular way of understanding, representing and acting on
+processes, events and subjectivities. Likewise, it is essential to
+recover its potential for social transformation, as these tools also
+allow us to mobilize criticism, denounce inequalities, define and give
+visibility to new problems, so that it is possible to intervene on them.
+Statistics are not and have not always been exclusive weapons of the
+powerful, their potential to challenge consensus and repoliticize social
+relations remains inexhaustible.
+Thinking sociologically about complex realities such as those in
+Latin America through a quantification approach is an urgent
+challenge, which leads us to cut out new objects of study and
+construct other axes of problematization. The deep social inequalities
+in the region – exacerbated by the covid19 pandemic – must be
+understood in their reproduction dynamics, which includes models of
+statistical objectification and their implications for the development of
+public policies. We believe it necessary to reveal the social nature of their patterned forms of
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 74
+
+–, are broadcast
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In this sense, our analysis showed that there is still much to be
+studied about the social and political impacts of quantification in
+democratic societies. To this end, sociology has very valuable tools at
+its disposal, which make it possible to highlight the effects produced by the devices of
+
+This work sought to highlight the contributions of social studies of
+quantification to sociology as a whole. The literature review made it
+possible to highlight the richness of this analytical perspective,
+recognizing that, in addition to disagreements about whether or not it is
+a specialized field, in the strict sense of the term, there is still a lack of
+a research program that goes beyond the common questions and
+affiliations of researchers located there.
+
+Another type of question arises when we observe the increasingly
+intense circulation of numbers (not only disparate, but often contradictory)
+in national public cultures, in terms of the role they play in democratic
+discussions, in a scenario of increasing political polarization in several
+countries. Of region. This approach also has the possibility of warning,
+on solid conceptual and empirical bases, about the “neo-colonization”
+of Latin American states, present in the tendency of recent governments
+(from the right to the left of the political spectrum) to be subordinated to
+the various modalities of the neoliberal metric, increasingly rooted in
+public administration, after the adoption of the managerial management
+model.
+
+measurement to build alternative quantifications, which allow us to
+envision other ways of resolving the region's impasses and problems.
+Social studies of quantification have expanded our understanding
+of the links between the State and ethnic, racial and sexual minorities
+
+in pluri-ethnic and diverse societies such as Latin America, both in the
+present and in the past. They highlighted the processes of configuring
+their identities, the recognition or invisibility of these groups, through
+the alteration or creation of classification categories, within the
+framework of political struggles for recognition of the State, as shown in
+Mara Loveman's article in this dossier . A path that deserves to be further explored.
+
+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 75
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+quantification between different social groups, discerning the variety of
+uses and applications to which they may be subject, as well as revealing
+the ways in which power relations operate, their limits and ambiguities. It
+remains for us to appeal to the community of social scientists, calling on
+them to nurture, strengthen and expand a research program whose
+
+fruitfulness we hope to have demonstrated in this article.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo has a PhD in Sociology from the Institute of Social and
+Political Studies of the State University of Rio de Janeiro (IESP/UERJ), adjunct professor at
+the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ) and the Postgraduate Program
+in Political Sociology from Candido Mendes University (UCAM). ÿ
+alexandre.camargo.2009@gmail.com
+
+Claudia Jorgelina Daniel has a PhD in Social Sciences from the University of Buenos Aires
+and a researcher at the Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, IDES – CONICET, Buenos
+Aires,
+Argentina. ÿ cdaniel@ides.org.ar
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo & Claudia Daniel 76
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+
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+
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+
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+62. MILLER, Peter; POWER, Michael. Accounting, organizing, and economizing:
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+
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+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Approved on: 21 Feb. 2021
+
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+Submitted on: 10 Dec. 2020.
+
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+economic knowledge, 1900-1945. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001.
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+Americas: towards an agenda of comparative historical studies. Rio de Janeiro:
+IBGE, 2010.
+
+75. ROUVROY, Antoinette. Des données et des hommes. Droits et libertés
+fondamentaux dans um monde de données massives. Strasbourg: Council of
+Europe, 2016.
+
+81. SCOTT, David. Colonial governmentality. Social Text, no. 43, p. 191-220, 1995.
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+États-Unis au XIXe siècle : théories raciales et questions de population dans le
+census américain. Annales de démographie historique, n. 105, p. 5-22, 2003.
+
+74. ROUVROY, Antoinette. Big data : from nouveaux outils à combiner aux savoirs
+établis et à encadrer par la délibération publique. Statistique et Société, v. 2, no.
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+
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+CambridgeUniversityPress, 1999.
+
+73. ROSE, Nikolas; MILLER, Peter. Political power beyond the state: problematics
+of government. British Journal of Sociology, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 172-205, 1992.
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+77. SANTAGADA, Salvatore. Social indicators: social context and brief history.
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+The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology 81
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 42-81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+Quantification, State and social
+
+participation: heuristic potentials
+
+of an emerging field
+
+Summary
+
+The article presents the analytical perspectives of the sociology of
+quantification, highlighting its potential to revisit theoretical debates and
+empirical issues that cross different fields, with an emphasis on violence
+and public safety, ethnic-racial relations, education and social movements,
+themes of the articles that make up this dossier. The aim is to map its
+emergence and still incipient development in the country and demonstrate
+how its frame of reference can be used to address, from a new angle, some
+of the central problems of Brazilian society, such as police lethality, racial
+inequality and the selective school system. and discriminatory. Contemporary
+forms of quantification are examined , their effects on social agency, their
+points of contact and their differences in promoting neoliberal rationality, a
+concern shared by the contributions gathered and reviewed here.
+
+Keywords: quantification, State, neoliberalism, social participation.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo*
+
+Daniel Veloso Hirata***
+Renato Sérgio de Lima**
+
+* Candido Mendes University, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil.
+** Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, SP, Brazil.
+*** Fluminense Federal University, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil.
+
+20 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso DOSSIER20 Hirata
+
+http://doi.org/10.1590/15174522-113100
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantification, Quantification, State and social social participation: participation: heuristic heuristic potentials potentials of an emerging emerging field 21
+
+Keywords: quantification, State, neoliberalism, social participation.
+
+The article presents the analytical perspectives of the sociology of quantification,
+highlighting its potential to revisit theoretical debates and empirical issues that
+cross different fields, with an emphasis on violence and public security, ethnicracial
+relations, education and social movements, which are subjects of the articles
+that compose this dossier. It seeks to map the appearance and still incipient
+development of the sociology of quantification in the country and demonstrate how
+its frame of reference can be used to address, under a new angle, some of the
+central problems of Brazilian society, such as police lethality, racial inequality and
+the selective and discriminatory school system. Contemporary forms of
+quantification, their effects on social agency, their points of contact and differences
+in the promotion of neoliberal rationality are examined, a concern shared by the
+contributions gathered and reviewed here.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+This dossier aims to present and strengthen the emerging field of sociology
+
+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic
+possibilities for an emerging field
+
+Abstract
+
+Brazilian social issues, in contributions brought together for the
+first time in a thematic issue of a Portuguese-language magazine. In
+this approach, statistics matter not as a scientific method or discipline,
+but as cultural objects, artifacts that result from social practices of
+classification, registration and comparison of different dimensions of
+reality, developed by public and private institutions.
+Figures, indicators, indices, percentages, rates and averages make
+up the arsenal of proof and inference of technical and scientific elites,
+going beyond the scope of application for which they were initially
+created, to become categories of perception for multiple actors. Your
+
+of quantification and its analysis perspectives in the sciences
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+22 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso Hirata
+
+The interest for the social sciences lies in the fact that they transcend
+
+purely mathematical language and acquire a public character. These are
+
+numbers that “receive media attention, translate interests of different
+
+social groups, provide arguments in the resolution of controversies, are
+
+subject to diverse appropriations, lend themselves to erudite and lay,
+
+theoretical and practical uses, being constantly readapted and resignified”
+(Daniel, 2013, p. 12).
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+As they are public, these numbers give consistency to aspects of
+reality considered socially problematic, but which are still diffuse and
+controversial. They reveal opaque or invisible dimensions of reality
+and the social bases of politics, the very essence of political sociology.
+The investment in statistical forms makes it possible to stabilize what
+is already present in the collective sensibility, but has not yet been
+agreed, giving dimension and scale to what until then could only be
+perceived in words, that is, qualitatively. For this reason, the
+quantification of social facts is an important – and, until recently,
+neglected – part of the processes of reproduction and transformation
+of modern societies.
+
+Over the last forty years, studies on quantification have been
+formed from reference works in different areas. In a somewhat
+abbreviated form , we point out some of the main ones. In historical
+epistemology, works on the role of probability calculation and the
+notion of risk in the formation of the human sciences and in the
+rationalization of social life stand out (Daston; Krüger; Heidelberger,
+1987; Hacking, 1990; Porter, 1995). Studies in Science, Technology
+and Society brought contributions on the role of numbers in public
+controversies and in the imposition of the definition of situation by
+“calculation centers”, such as the laboratory (Latour, 1988; 2000).
+
+Studies on identity, race and ethnicity revealed the role of censuses
+and their classifications in establishing new categories of people
+(Anderson, 1988; Anderson, 1993; Kertzer; Ariel, 1999; Loveman, 2014).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This is just one case of the more general trend pointed out by Boltanski
+
+(1982) and Desrosières (1993) that, to gain recognition, groups are
+
+interested in statistically institutionalizing categories compatible with their
+aspirations. More recently, we witnessed a similar process in the attempt by
+
+some French social scientists to introduce the category “precarious
+
+intellectuals”, encompassing different cultural professionals, whose moral
+
+greatness would be affected by the precariousness of work and the advance
+
+of an increasingly utilitarian way of life (Tasset, 2014 ). Both
+
+In turn, the reflections of the Anglo-Foucauldians on the regimes of
+
+government and population management addressed statistics as a
+technology for the production of “free” and calculating subjects, by providing
+
+actors with norms and standards for their own aspirations and conduct
+
+(Foucault , 2008; 2009; Rose; Miller, 1992; Rose, 1999; Miller, 2001; Dean,
+
+1999). Finally, under direct inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu (1979), the
+
+French pragmatism debate on equivalence conventions and the plurality of
+logics of action (Boltanski, 1982; Desrosières, Thévenot, 1988; Boltanski,
+
+Thévenot, 1991) provided a model to address the simultaneously real and
+
+conventional character of statistics and its correspondence with different
+
+modalities of criticism (Desrosières, 1993; Boltanski, 2009).
+
+Taken together, these works called into question the performativity of
+
+numbers in public and private life; its use as a social coordination tool ; its
+effects on the distribution of resources, knowledge and opportunities; its
+
+reactivity on people, transforming the ways they think and act about
+
+themselves, alone or in relation to others. After all, the conversion of
+qualities into quantities creates new things and new names, making certain
+
+identities more real than others.
+
+Although it originated from a solidarity movement between engineers and
+
+administrators in the late 1930s, its existence only became formalized when
+
+it became a statistical nomenclature in mobility and stratification analyses.
+
+One example is the construction of cadres, a term that designates salaried
+executives and which is fundamental to the occupational structure in France.
+
+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic potentials of an emerging field 23
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The examples above point to the heuristic potential of studies on
+quantification in renewing interest and approach to themes dear to
+the sociologies of work and stratification.
+Another important front opened by the sociology of quantification
+concerns the illumination of the statistical work of public agencies,
+such as INSEE, in France, the Census Bureau, in the United States,
+or IBGE and SEADE, in Brazil. In them, the space for creating work
+programs and research agendas is directly linked to bureaucratic
+microprocesses and power networks that determine what can and
+what should be part of the attention list of public statistical agencies,
+in which the technical domain gains great relevance. The negotiation
+of a research program involves, in this sense, not only the conviction
+of its political pertinence, but its technical viability, which depends on
+the conceptual soundness and the networks of use that make statistics
+stable and resistant to criticism (Desrosières, 2008).
+
+To understand the work programs of statistical agencies, it is
+necessary to analyze the clash of professional “truths”, who prefer to
+focus on primary research, whose rules, techniques and methods can
+be fully controlled (Lima, 2010). Data generated from administrative
+records are seen with great caution and, therefore, left in the
+background – with the exception of some economic and financial data
+
+More than that, the repertoire of technical-scientific knowledge
+effectively available in these agencies proves to be decisive in the
+incorporation of new themes into their research agendas, demanded
+by economic actors and social movements. Such is the case, for
+example, of the pressures for expanding the strictly economic concept
+of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which today involve the inclusion
+of domestic work, biodiversity and other forms of wealth compatible
+with social and sustainable development. This helps to explain why
+institutions that produce statistics seem more reluctant to quantify
+more fluid themes, whose legal and conceptual bases do not exist or
+remain in dispute (Comte, 1995).
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso Hirata 24
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic potentials of an emerging field 25
+
+public, which help to compose and construct relevant indicators for the IBGE
+
+agenda, such as national accounts. However, contemporary forms of
+
+objectifying reality pose considerable methodological challenges to the
+
+production of knowledge. For Lima, new technologies, combined with
+
+processes of compartmentalization and hyper-specialization of knowledge,
+
+generate complex scenarios – data in increasingly greater quantities;
+
+fragmented information that is not always capable of validation and/or
+
+confirmation, as in the example of the Internet and fake news; instant
+
+communication, social networks, among others – which are not capable of
+
+being apprehended just through the use of traditional techniques for measuring
+
+reality. In this process, public statistics agencies often find themselves without
+
+references on the agenda of topics covered in a national or regional statistics
+
+system and, as a result, end up reinforcing positions of institutional or even
+
+methodological insulation (Lima, 2010 ).
+
+The sociology of quantification not only allows us to understand the
+
+social determinants of this isolation, but also shows the different actors and
+
+organisms involved in the circuit of production, circulation and translation of
+
+numbers that there are limitations and choices implicit in all statistical
+
+procedures, insisting that it is impossible to offer technical solutions to conflicts
+
+of interest that cannot be accommodated. Furthermore , the sociology of
+
+quantification offers producers of statistical information reflective knowledge
+about the effects and constraints of their practices, which has the advantage
+
+of expanding their sociopolitical legitimacy, without compromising their
+
+technical-scientific credibility (Camargo, 2009).
+
+When presiding over the IBGE, Simon Schwartzman dedicated himself to
+
+thinking about the translations that take place in statistical controversies,
+
+taking into account the specific professional culture of data producers, guided by rules
+
+Interestingly, the first wave of Brazilian works that today would easily fit
+
+into the sociology of quantification were written by authors with academic
+
+activity and who, at the same time, integrated or directed the main data
+
+production agencies in the country. His concerns about the division of
+
+statistical labor reflected this insertion.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso Hirata 26
+
+and mixed values of science and bureaucracy, in an approach that is
+partly Latourian and partly Mertonian (Schwartzman, 1999). Inspired
+by this author, Nelson Senra, an IBGE researcher, focused on
+producers in institutional spaces, highlighting the importance of
+understanding who provides statistics and how this process is carried
+out. His work examined how statistics are strained by the process of
+distinguishing between what he called the “supply time” and “demand
+time” of information. There would be here two antagonistic discursive
+fields, which dispute an object for its ability to be counted or, on the
+contrary, for its intrinsic individualities, that is, conflicts over what to
+count and quantify, which cannot be completely accommodated
+(Senra, 2005). The doctoral thesis by Renato Sergio de Lima (2005),
+who was head of SEADE's division of socioeconomic studies, showed
+
+how the pressure for public control of police actions in redemocratization
+did not result in coordination between producers and users of criminal
+statistics, leading to to a simultaneous and paradoxical movement of
+growth in the stocks of data generated, on the one hand, and the
+reinforcement of the opacity of numbers in the design of public security policies, on the other.
+More recently, the proliferation of contemporary forms of
+quantification, marked by the advent of “algorithmic governmentality”
+(Rouvroy, 2015) and the dissemination of benchmarking in the State
+and public service (Bruno; Didier, 2013), increased the interest of
+social scientists beyond official statistics, including in Brazil. Different
+initiatives have sought to demonstrate that the sociology of quantification
+can be used to address, from a new angle, some of the central
+problems of Brazilian society. In dialogue with historical sociology, the
+doctoral thesis by Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo (2016) examined
+the slow construction of the authority of numbers in Brazil and the
+conditions of its conversion into a reference for collective action. A
+process that, for the author, extends between the Empire, when
+administrative statistics predominated over population ones, reflecting
+the rationality of the Territorial State, and the First Republic, when interdependence was outlined
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic potentials of an emerging field 27
+
+Then, the thematic dossier “quantifying in Brazil”, the result of
+approaches between Brazilian and French researchers interested in the
+topic, was organized by Emmanuel Didier for the magazine Statistique et Société
+
+On the one hand, the crossings that constitute the tension of statistics as
+
+instruments of proof and government, including new forms of quantification that
+
+establish the legibility and instrumentation of the government of territories and
+
+populations, highlight a model of contemporary rationality based on risk, surveillance
+
+and technology.
+
+Policy choices are presented as results of standardized analytical techniques;
+
+public services are commodified and monitored by the ability to satisfy a clientele
+
+made up of citizens, in a relationship that is reduced to efficiency and utility,
+
+emptied of the principle of universality and protection that until then characterized
+
+the modern State-
+
+(Didier, 2019). In various ways, the collective of researchers gathered tried to
+
+show, following the seminal tracks of Alain Desrosières, but also of Theodore
+
+Porter, how statistics are, at the same time, an instrument of proof and of
+
+government (Desrosières, 2008). From this intrinsic tension to the “science of the
+
+State”, it is possible, on the one hand, to understand how problematic it can be to
+
+quantify favelas (Motta, 2019), how illegal markets are produced by numbers as a
+
+problem to be fought in alliances between political and economic elites (Rabossi ,
+
+2019), the generalization of predictive surveillance and its promotion by quantifying
+
+intervention time (Cardoso, 2019), but also how the objectification of shootings and
+
+police operations by civil society creates new debates in the public space,
+
+previously hidden by the absence of numbers (Hirata; Couto; Grillo; Olliveira,
+
+2019). The articulations, therefore, of the use of numbers as instruments of proof
+
+and government, as well as different possibilities of thinking about the crossing
+
+between State and society, allow exploring, through a renewed perspective, classic
+
+themes of the social sciences and relevant public issues.
+
+health and social aspects of the country, giving rise to a new regime of action over
+
+the population.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+28 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso Hirata
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+In the field of public security, for example, the difficulty does not lie
+in the production of criminal data per se, which have existed in Brazil
+since 1871, but in the way in which they are compiled and how they are
+mobilized to justify regimes of truth that aim to maintain practices that
+feed back from the violence. That is, when choosing either to add the
+deaths resulting from police intervention in the total number of registered
+homicides and/or, on the contrary, when choosing to exclude such deaths
+from this sum, there is, after all, a huge dispute about the which means
+law, order and public safety. The clash moves from production time to
+use time, in the idea that there is consensus that the numbers should be
+generated, but there is conflict over what they translate and who can
+have access to the details that would allow broader analyzes of the problem (Lima, 2005).
+
+It can be said that the introduction of performance indicators was a
+considerable advance in relation to the so-called “bravery award” (better
+known as the “wild west bonus”), which, between 1995 and 1998,
+
+This clash is reflected on several levels, such as, for example, the
+incentives for police activity carried out by the governments of the State
+of Rio de Janeiro. Since 2009, the Public Security Institute (ISP/RJ)
+organizes the data for the “System of Goals and Follow-up of Results”,
+based on the “Strategic Indicators of Crime”. The managerial strategy,
+conceived by private consultants, is to build performance indicators
+capable of inducing the action of public security professionals in a certain
+direction . On this point, the profusion of data from some of the large
+national and international NGOs and think tanks present in Rio de Janeiro
+also seek to create evaluation parameters for public policies, effectiveness
+regimes for actions and programs, through performance indicators ,
+evaluation and rankings, typical of benchmarking (Bruno; Didier, 2013).
+
+nation. On the other hand, intense mobilizations in civil society are
+
+carried out through numbers, indicators and forms of classification that
+strain this standardized readability and punctuate the limits of civil rights
+violations.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic potentials of an emerging field 29
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+(Araújo, 2014).
+
+They are characterized by automation in relation to conventions, escaping
+
+the disputes of a public sphere that becomes opaque, guiding countless
+
+decisions by governments and companies that empty the channels of
+democratic deliberation.
+
+In dialogue with digital sociology, but demarcating its contribution, the
+
+sociology of quantification draws attention to the political rationality that
+brings together or separates the different ways of quantifying in neoliberalism.
+
+counted homicides resulting from police intervention as “productivity” to be
+
+subsidized, thus increasing the lethality of police action during the period
+
+(Cano, 1997). Despite progress, there seems to be a problem not only in
+
+relation to the criteria on which performance indicators rest , but also in the
+
+very use of indicators as government instruments. This is due to the known
+
+problem of gaming (Bevan; Hood, 2006), the strategic game of actors on
+
+such performance indicators and target systems, which seeks to control
+and direct their actions. Again, the case of Rio de Janeiro, in this regard, is
+
+exemplary: when police lethality emerged as a public issue, the number of
+
+missing persons began to grow in the same proportion as the number of
+“resistance acts” decreased.
+
+In the case of algorithms and benchmarking, both are based on collecting,
+
+Alongside the diffusion of benchmarking, its rankings and
+performance evaluations, the metrics of neoliberal governmentality pose
+other challenges to the public sphere and to democracy, which have
+deserved attention from social scientists. Algorithmic quantification is
+found in the application of mathematical models to population
+management. In this case, the massive circulation of microdata allows
+access to territories, groups, institutions, markets and countries in
+fractions of seconds. Automated knowledge emerges from correlations
+of non-previously selected, non-hierarchical and highly heterogeneous
+serial information , reducing human intervention and dispensing with
+hypotheses and conventions about the social world (Rouvroy, 2014). In stark contrast to official statistics, big data
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso Hirata 30
+
+It is no coincidence that social movements have never acted as
+
+much with statistics as they do today, as shown by the strong politicization
+of racial categories and the claim to quantify spaces that until recently
+were non-commensurable, such as biodiversity, forms of unpaid work ,
+
+the participation in cultural consumption, racial inequality and genderbased
+violence. These are domains considered problematic, which are
+progressively objectified and constructed by the numbers as public
+problems, which makes it possible to transform collective sensibilities in
+relation to them, and to give institutional forms to experiences and
+aspirations until then fragmented and diffuse, thus contributing directly
+to social change.
+
+The contributions gathered here address the production conditions
+and modes of use of official statistics and other contemporary forms of
+quantifying reality, especially benchmarking and performance evaluation
+by indicators and rankings, government devices that retroact on the
+actors and affect the constitution of subjectivities. In this reading, it is
+interesting to understand statistics as a technology for transferring risk
+to individuals, through which non- economic behaviors - such as
+criminality, police activity, judicial decisions, family life and social
+pathologies - are read by the analytical key of economics, through the
+quantification of human activities.
+At the same time, another perspective is equally necessary, as
+statistics are not and have not always been exclusive weapons of the
+powerful, their potential to challenge consensus and re-politicize social
+relations remains inexhaustible. Although there is a long tradition of
+using statistics to guarantee claims for rights, as in the most explicit case of indexing
+
+aggregation and decentralized analysis of data, in order to model,
+anticipate and affect behaviors. This is a distinctive characteristic of
+quantification in neoliberalism, which promotes interaction between
+social agents and autonomous technologies to make them subjects of
+their own observation and classification, monitors of their sociability
+(Camargo, 2021).
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic potentials of an emerging field 31
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+of salary and cost of living in union demands, some ways of intervening
+with numbers are quite recent, specifically aimed at attacking the methods
+of domination characteristic of neoliberal governmentality. It is important
+here to address the resistance of social movements when resorting to
+numbers against institutionalized powers, inequalities and the managerial
+management model. Numbers have political uses and are increasingly
+problematized and/or disputed, requiring constant epistemological
+vigilance over their methods and concepts so that they are not reduced
+to mere rhetorical resources in the construction of narratives typical of the
+post-modern era. truth and fake news.
+In this sense, the dossier intends to debate the transformations of
+the State and the modalities of social participation, from the point of view
+of their anchorage in public numbers and the political productivity of
+statistics, with the aim of uncovering new possibilities for criticizing the
+present and governing the present. future. As a starting point, the article
+“The social studies of quantification and its implications in sociology”, by
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo and Claudia Daniel, seeks to reconstruct
+the origins of the field and its transformations over recent years, drawing
+attention to the relationships between the sociology of quantification, the
+socio-history of statistics and, to a lesser extent, the anthropology of
+numbers. The author's objective is to stimulate a work program through
+which sociology should expand its attention to the operations and regimes
+of quantification in contemporary societies. And, to demonstrate this
+intention, they carry out a broad review of the literature and examine the
+
+contributions accumulated in this literature that directly dialogue with the
+central questions of sociology, such as the problem of the foundations of
+social order and political authority; the processes of social differentiation
+and configuration of subjectivities; critique and transformative social
+agency. In the end, there is a call for a research program that, arising
+from the sociological method, highlights the effects produced by
+quantification devices between different social groups, and reveals the
+ways in which power relations operate through the opacity of numbers.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+32 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso Hirata
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+In “The politics of a transformed data landscape: ethnoracial statistics
+in Brazil in a regional comparative perspective”, Mara Loveman examines
+Brazil's regional protagonism in overcoming the ethno-racial blindness
+that characterized Latin American censuses before the turn of the century.
+After outlining a historical panorama that reserves a prominent place for
+the census in the construction of the scientific-demographic fiction of
+whitening, the author addresses the growing politicization of the production of
+
+Stativism is a neologism created by Isabelle Bruno and Emmanuel
+Didier to name the growing field of number-based activism practices in
+different parts of the world. If, in previous works, the authors sought to
+understand, in the wake of thought and joint work with Alain Desrosières,
+the specific type of quantification typical of neoliberal government
+(Desrosières, 2014), more recently they sought to shed light on how the
+different forms of action through numbers punctuate a resistance field. In
+the article that makes up this dossier it is quite clear that this opposition
+is nuanced in the oppositions and relations between State and society.
+Starting their typology of stativism, the authors identify practices that
+precede the neoliberal government or are located within it, therefore with
+varying critical range, radical or reformist – taking this distinction from Luc
+Boltanski. They also show that the circumvention of the rules governing
+
+conduct imposed by the neoliberal government is done through a series
+of strategies of resistance to performance indicators , targets and
+rankings, typical of benchmarking, as in the case of police officers
+subjected to the famous Compstat, part of the project New York's "Zero
+Tolerance" They then describe the construction of new collective
+categories, such as those associated with the precarious work of artists
+and intellectuals in their demands for social and labor rights.
+And, finally, alternative public figures are reviewed, as is the case cited
+in the quantification of shootings and police operations in Rio de Janeiro,
+which make it possible to debate issues that were not previously present.
+As the authors say, not without humor, “other numbers are possible”, or
+other numbers help to institute other possible ones.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic potentials of an emerging field 33
+
+Following this, the article by Samira Bueno, Renato Sérgio de Lima
+and Arthur Trindade, “When the State kills: challenges to measure crimes
+against life committed by police officers”, highlights in a very clear and
+historically situated way the difference and discrepancies between
+production of official statistical data and its use as a way of reading the instruments of the
+
+numbers, starting in the 1980s, promoted by the coalition of activists,
+social scientists and international organizations, which pressured national
+statistical agencies to openly engage in the collection of ethnoracial data.
+The Brazilian experience is analyzed in detail as it serves as a model for
+other countries in the region, such as Colombia, Bolivia and Chile, where
+the composition of forces forged by epistemological and political alignment
+did not, however, have the same impact, due to reasons examined in the
+article . . Once institutionalized, ethnic-racial classification transformed
+politics throughout the region, giving rise to new spaces for the participation
+of groups of color, new subjectivities, driven by media campaigns that
+encouraged the recognition of African heritage and the consequent change
+in self-identification. , and new political demands.
+This situation produced new debates and tensions, such as the
+discrepancy between official categories, whose scope is considered too
+broad, and the objectives of policies to combat inequality, which result in
+distortions among beneficiaries. In turn, these tensions stimulate the
+
+outbreak of controversies and reactive subjectivities, which are configured
+in opposition to official categorization and emerge with the nationalist
+discourse of the new right, which insists on the resubordination of
+ethnoracial identities to an atavistic Brazilian identity. In conclusion, the
+author proposes a theoretical contribution, an alternative to the image of
+the “looping effect” coined by Ian Hacking (1986), when referring to the
+recursiveness of statistical classifications on the reality they describe. In
+light of transformations in the political field, he suggests the metaphor of a
+“spiral effect” to account for the unpredictable consequences of the creation
+and ways of using ethnoracial data, which can be both positive and
+negative for the objectives of those who produce them.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso Hirata 34
+
+Natália de Lacerda Gil closes the dossier with the article “ Quality
+quantification : some considerations on school failure rates in Brazil”.
+Inserting herself in the literature on the role of rankings in the construction
+of excellence (Bruno; Didier, 2013; Espeland; Sauder, 2016), the author
+questions what is meant by quality in education, implicit in the
+methodological choices and procedures for quantifying the school
+performance, emphasizing the importance of analyzing the image of
+efficiency that the indices seek to measure and promote. To this end,
+the article relates the search for the progressive democratization of
+elementary schooling to the systematic production of school statistics,
+begun in the Vargas Era, when the apprehension of failure started to
+present itself as a political-educational problem in the country. Based on
+this framework, the formation of a tradition characterized by the
+coexistence between the focus on poor school performance of students
+and the criticism of high failure rates, repudiated for causing selectivity and exclusion, is examined . Right away,
+
+public action. Reflecting on the way in which homicides committed by
+police officers were classified in Brazil, the authors problematize this
+interface between statistics and public action, normally taken as selfevident.
+To this end, they compare data from the area of public health
+and the criminal justice system, whose epistemic bases (medicalepidemiological
+and legal-police) guide different taxonomies, neither
+completely distinct nor absolutely compatible; highlight the disputes over
+nomenclatures and classifications regarding homicides committed by
+police officers as part of the political tensions that shape the conflictive
+field of the topic; and point out difficulties in constructing equivalences
+in the regional, national and international spaces. In the end, the authors
+argue, the classifications of homicides committed by police end up
+delimiting the field of meanings that the public debate takes, on the one
+hand, on the issue of homicides in general, in which the homicides
+carried out by police officers, as well as the perverse inversion processes
+that make victims of State violence become suspects or culprits.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic potentials of an emerging field 35
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+The works reviewed above and the variety of objects and themes
+covered by this dossier demonstrate the potential of quantification studies
+to renew theoretical debates and empirical questions that cross different
+thematic sociologies, with an emphasis on violence and public security,
+ethnic-racial relations, in education and social movements. Without any
+
+pretension to exhaustiveness, we seek to outline the emerging field of
+the sociology of quantification, in order to present its main references,
+map its emergence and still incipient development in the country, and
+relate some concrete problems in contemporary Brazil that become
+enriched by this analytical perspective . Possibly, some names and
+works were left out of our review, reflecting the dispersed nature of the
+field among us, which is why the image of a trail of intellectual production
+seems more pertinent to us than that of a map. At the same time, the
+dossier reflects and addresses the growing presence of quantification in
+Brazilian postgraduate studies, manifested in the volume of works that
+have been presented at SBS congresses and ANPOCS meetings.
+
+In an unusual way, the singularly difficult moment that the country is
+going through also points in the same direction. The Covid-19 pandemic
+that is ravaging the world, reserving an even worse fate for Brazil,
+highlights the role of ways of quantifying in the management and
+experience of the crisis as a collective experience. Predictive models
+aiming at “flattening the curve” (Motta, 2020), case and death figures staggering decisions
+
+New research and young researchers promise to reinforce the vocation
+of quantification as a vibrant conversation that crosses different fields,
+expanding your toolbox for understanding reality.
+
+the construction of the Basic Education Development Index and its
+
+articulation with the neoliberal policy of maximizing efficiency are
+discussed , which shifts the notion of quality as “equity” to the proposition
+of quality as “excellence”. The author concludes that the long tradition of
+evaluating the quality of teaching by measuring what students know is
+maintained at IDEB, which thus amplifies, rather than corrects, the
+distortions of a selective and discriminatory school culture.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+36 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso Hirata
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+about lockdown, reopening and isolation, bed occupancy rates in ICUs,
+the round numbers punctuating collective mourning are all milestones in
+the construction of temporality and the stretching of a present caught
+between the radical split with the non-anomalous past and the sky
+imaginary of a future without crisis. More than ever, the mobilizing power
+of numbers as a common referent and their feedback on social actors stands out.
+
+This picture reveals that public numbers assume a leading role not only
+in the structuring dimensions of social life, but also in the most essential
+disputes over the political agenda.
+We end with a thank you to the authors and to the authors who
+agreed to participate in this project. We would also like to thank Jalcione
+Almeida, editor-in-chief of Sociologies, for accepting our proposal to
+encourage sociological debate in a promising and relevant field, but still
+lacking in investigations and spaces for reflection in Brazil. We would like
+to thank Victor Alves Mourão, Eugênia Motta and Antônio Paulino for
+their interlocutions at different times and their support for initiatives that
+helped make this dossier possible. To the anonymous referees who
+evaluated the articles, we leave our recognition. And we invite you to
+read it, hoping that it inspires disciplinary dialogues.
+
+Likewise, the initial emptying and virtual cancellation of the 2020
+census risks plunging the country into obscurantism and ignorance of the
+most basic aspects of any population policy. At the same time, the cuts
+and dismantling of the census point to the centrality of statistics in the
+construction of different forms of inequality – regional, economic, racial,
+sexual and gender –, highlighting a fundamental front of the social
+struggle. On the one hand, the claim of what should and matters to be
+told, made by social movements; on the other, the destruction of the
+measure of inequality as a strategy for undermining truth and denying
+reality, shared by the new global right.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic potentials of an emerging field 37
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo is an Adjunct Professor in the Graduate Program in
+Political Sociology at Candido Mendes University. ÿ
+alexandre.camargo.2009@gmail.com
+
+Renato Sérgio de Lima is Professor at the Department of Public Management at Fundação
+Getúlio Vargas in São Paulo, Director-President of the Brazilian Public Security Forum. ÿ
+renato.lima@forumseguranca.org.br
+
+Daniel Veloso Hirata is an Adjunct Professor in the Postgraduate Program in Sociology at
+the Universidade Federal Fluminense and researcher 2 at
+CNPq. ÿ velosohirata@gmail.com
+
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+
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+Quantification, State and social participation: heuristic potentials of an emerging field 39
+
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+avec des nombres. Paris: La Découverte, 2014.
+
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+
+Approved on: 20 Apr. 2021.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 20-40.
+
+40 Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo, Renato Sérgio de Lima & Daniel Veloso Hirata
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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@@ -0,0 +1,1698 @@
+Rua Antonio Basílio, 123/701
+20511-190 – Rio de Janeiro – RJ – Brazil
+alexandre.camargo.2009@gmail.com
+
+We want to contribute with a brief
+reflection on the morphology and scientific
+culture of statistical institutions.
+
+Professor at the Department of History/Universidade Estácio de Sá
+
+Keywords: statistical institutions;
+information policy; political technologies;
+classification categories; historical research
+
+The article presents research
+possibilities revealed by the
+sociology of statistics. In the dimension of
+demand, it emphasizes the power for the
+foundation of the government
+technologies involved in the
+national States (political domain).
+In terms of use, it highlights its role
+in the formulation of categories of
+perception of reality (cognitive domain).
+In the sphere of production
+(institutional domain), it emphasizes
+the organization of activity in different
+temporalities. The tensions between the
+technical/normative advances
+recommended by scientific
+associations and the pragmatic
+demands of public administration are analyzed.
+The sociology of statistics: the possibilities of a new field
+
+of investigation
+
+Approved for publication in April 2009.
+
+Sociology of statistics: possibilities for a new field of investigation
+
+Received for publication in July 2008.
+
+Sociology of statistics
+
+Abstract
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+Keywords: statistical institutions;
+information policy; political
+technologies; classification categories;
+historical statistics research.
+
+into statistics.
+
+Sociology of statistics:
+possibilities for a new field of
+investigation. História, Ciências, Saúde
+– Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro, v.16, n.4,
+p.903-925.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Summary
+
+CAMARGO, Alexandre de Paiva Rio.
+
+This article presents the possibilities
+for investigation unveiled by the sociology
+of statistics. Of particular importance in
+the area of demand is the power to provide
+the fundamentals used in
+government technologies in nation
+states (political domain). In terms of the
+use of statistics, the role in forming
+the categories of perceptions of reality
+(cognitive domain) is highlighted. Within the
+scope of production (institutional domain),
+it is important to emphasize the organization
+of the activity into different temporal
+categories. The tensions between the
+technical/normative advances
+recommended by scientific
+associations and the pragmatic
+requirements of public administration are
+also examined. This article seeks to
+provide a brief reflection on the
+morphology of statistical institutions and their scientific culture.
+
+903
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This complex relationship between the pragmatic and scientific poles was well understood by Simon
+
+Schwartzman (2004), renowned sociologist and former president of the Brazilian Institute of Geography
+
+and Statistics (IBGE):
+
+904
+
+Statistical information is of special interest to the sociologist of science because it is
+produced by institutions that are, at the same time, research centers – involving,
+therefore, scientific and technological values, as well as perspectives and approaches
+typical of their fields of investigation – and public institutions or official, subject to the
+rules, values and restrictions of the public service. Published in the press, its products
+– numbers related to population, income, national product, urbanization, employment,
+birth rate, poverty and many others – are used both to support government policies and
+to evaluate their results, and can create or limit rights and legal and financial benefits
+for specific groups, institutions and individuals. This plurality of roles, contexts and
+perspectives associated with public statistics is at the very origin of this field (p.69).
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+History, Science, Health – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro
+
+Numbers that are, without reducing them, statistics mediate the formulation of public policies. But
+
+they also support the hypotheses of academic research and shape our categories of perception of
+
+reality, as we can see ourselves in the other, thanks to the comparative equivalences created by
+
+statistical classifications. This is the meaning of Nelson de Castro Senra's statement (2005, p.16): “the
+
+process of preparing statistics deconstructs the individualities that are part of previously idealized
+
+collectivities, in order, in the end, to rebuild them as individualizations: one in the other.” Immersing in
+
+everyday life, statistics referring to employment, inflation, income, fertility, among others, support the
+
+descriptions of economic situations, the denouncement of social injustices and the justification of
+
+political actions. We tend to determine the safety conditions of a country's highways from the number
+
+of accidents that occur on them, especially on holidays.
+
+The sociology of statistics, a fairly recent approach in academia, has
+
+Increasingly, statistics focus on subjective assessments and personal choices.
+
+as a research horizon the production, dissemination and use of public statistics by the broadest
+
+sectors of society and the State. The expression is not always commonly used among scholars, who
+
+often prefer to use just the term 'public statistics'. In any case, research is also inspired by this principle
+
+and this approach. Taking statistics as an object of study, and not as a means of analysis (the most
+
+common one), these studies seek, in the first place, to recognize the plurality of roles assumed by
+
+public statistics. Plurality that extends from the political demands of planning and coordination, which
+
+found and adjusted the offer of the statistical program, to the irreducible procedural and conceptual
+
+autonomy, present in the methods and techniques of elaboration of statistics, as well as in the values
+
+that integrate a scientific culture shared by statisticians, economists, demographers, cartographers,
+
+educators, sociologists and anthropologists – professionals involved in the production and analysis of
+
+statistics.
+
+How many people must have already hesitated to go to various social events, considering the latest
+
+news report, vulgarizing crime statistics, measurements of urban violence and public safety? More
+
+than ever, statistics weigh on
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It becomes possible, therefore, to think about the construction and performance of national states in terms of
+
+statistical knowledge, understood not in epistemological terms, but as a vast network comprising people (scientists,
+
+politicians and intellectuals), institutions, instruments and equipment. . The analysis of this network, we insist, must
+
+always consider the specificity of statistical activity, pressed by the domain of pragmatism and technoscience.
+
+In fact, the frontier position between the political-administrative scope of the State and the scientific field is
+
+perhaps the characteristic that most distinguishes public statistics. In this sense, they bear witness to both the state
+
+of a country's social disciplines (its themes, concepts, objects and approaches), and the state's political options,
+
+thanks to a logic that determines the attribution of material means (the censuses are the most expensive operation
+
+that a country can carry out in times of peace), for defining priorities and for resolving institutional conflicts. On the
+
+other hand, the scientific field offers the theoretical substrate on the modes of measurement and on the formalized
+
+representations of the social world. It is precisely because of this relative autonomy of the State apparatus that
+
+statistical information, once produced, escapes the objectives of its creator and allows its reuse by other users, who
+
+can even reinsert it into networks of uses very distant from the theoretical universe in question. that was conceived
+
+(Otero, 2006, p.25).
+
+Sociology of statistics
+
+In these terms, the study of the sources, procedures and uses, both intellectual and political, of statistical
+
+production operations is the ultimate goal to which the sociology of statistics aspires. This analytical care can be
+
+observed in what is considered one of the pioneering studies of the approach. In The sociology of official statistics,
+
+which, if I am not mistaken, names the field, Paul Starr (1983, p.8) already distinguished two structural organizations
+
+of the statistical system: the “social organization”, which, for the author, consists of the social relationship and
+
+economic among the agents involved in the analysis, distribution and use of statistical information (interviewees,
+
+State agencies, private companies, professional associations, international organizations); and “cognitive
+
+organization”, which consists of the process of
+
+assessment of the risks involved in the most different situations. The example of Anthony Giddens (1991, p.49)
+
+should suffice: “Anyone in a western country who decides to get married nowadays knows that the divorce rate is
+
+high... . Knowledge of the high divorce rate can affect the decision to marry itself, as well as decisions about related
+
+considerations – the regime of property, etc.”.
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+For Bruno Latour, the power of statistics resides in their being government technology, bringing people, objects
+
+and situations to the tables of those who are responsible for making political decisions, in the form of tables, graphs
+
+and cartograms. By doing so, they distinctly contribute to making distant and/or absent realities known, making
+
+them thinkable and, therefore, potentially manageable (Senra, 2005, p.15). The progressive imposition of matrices
+
+and statistical tables opened up the possibility of: (a) creating spaces of equivalence, from which the comparison
+
+between phenomena and units of analysis of different natures is guaranteed1; (b) summarize information based on
+
+synthetic indicators (averages, position measures and index numbers); and (c) laying the foundations of a technology
+
+of distance that seeks to analyze social reality from a continuous process of objectifying the social discourses at
+
+stake (Otero, 2006, p.46).
+
+905
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+As for cognitive organization, research in history can investigate the decision-making processes regarding the
+
+emergence or abandonment of statistical series2 on a technological platform,
+
+of this or that concept corpus, which constitutes a historical study on information policy.
+
+For all that has been said so far, the intimacy of statistics and statisticians, who think and formulate
+
+statistics, with national States and sciences prevails. It is this intimacy that we will be dealing with from now
+
+on.3
+
+906
+
+the adoption of this or that
+
+History, Science, Health – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Political Statistics and Technologies
+
+,
+
+structuring of information, that is, the intellectual construction of assumptions, rules, classification categories
+
+and measurement methods present in the production of information by statistical institutions.
+
+Ever since the formation of the first great states of antiquity, statistics have been desired. Early censuses
+
+proved to be valuable instruments of administration, helping the State to understand its territory and its
+
+population. In today's eyes, technical resources such as averages and sampling may seem overly simple,
+
+familiar as we are with complex measurement concepts. Military conscription, the regimentation of warriors,
+
+proved to be the most immediate function of the censuses and, certainly, it would not have been easy to carry
+
+out. Especially when we think of societies like the Greek and Roman ones, for which war was an endemic
+
+phenomenon, and the social mobilization required by 'waging war' occupied a large part of the productive life
+
+of its citizens.
+
+Borrowing the words of Alain Desrosières (1996, p.6; emphasis in the original),
+
+With regard to social organization, the use of historical research allows us to reveal the social foundations
+
+of the measurement process. There is the issue of setting up the population counting infrastructure (institutional
+
+innovation), related to the creation of the material means of domination of the national State, including the
+
+alliances established between the elites and the territorial pacts that promote the physical extension of central
+
+power.
+
+It would be necessary for state monopolies of a military and tributary order to advance, at the dawn of the
+
+Modern Age, for population surveys to grow in importance in the administrative structure. A pedagogical
+
+function would emerge for statistics, through the great descriptions of the territory and the subjects, destined
+
+to educate and guide the absolute sovereign. Between the 16th and 18th centuries, statistics assumed the role
+
+of 'the prince's mirror', showing him the greatness, in the form of his kingdom – the metaphorical extension of
+
+his body (Desrosières, 1998, p.26). In addition to the descriptive tables, quantified and periodic information,
+
+reserved for administrators, was added. After all, statistics were the basis of fiscal control of mercantilist
+
+policies. The world's wealth, it was believed, was limited, and expressed in favorable trade balances. The
+
+activities
+
+the joint evolution of the role of the State and its more material cognitive technologies provides
+a common thread for reading the history of statistics. There we find, for example, a crucial
+distinction between State activities that aim to deal with singular cases (courts, for example)
+and those that organize general policies, valid for the entire community.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Armed with civil lists, the States began to assert civil status, meaning that they alone would be responsible for
+
+enunciating the status of people, regardless of the religion adopted (Senra, 2005, p.59).
+
+907
+
+The relationship between the administrative centralization of the national State and the increase in the desire
+
+for statistics is undeniable. However, for a patrimonial state, in which goods and people are managed privately, as
+
+dependent on a sovereign lord, statistics would be seen as a prerogative of the monarch and, as such, a state
+
+secret. They did not inform a civil society distinct from the State, much less an autonomous public opinion. In this
+
+administrative framework, statistics were supposed to reveal not only the powers but also the weaknesses of states.
+
+Outwardly, so much the better if they were hidden from enemies, made confidential. Domestically, statistics would
+
+remain a material instrument of State power and surveillance. They were situated in the dimension of the coercive
+
+relationship between the sovereign and his subjects. Very different, therefore, from the contemporary meaning of
+
+statistics, marked by the environment of cooperation between citizens and their representatives, by the principle of
+
+credibility in carrying out census surveys, promoted by the policy of publicity of information and confidentiality of
+
+informants.
+
+Sociology of statistics
+
+Locating the historical origins of this profound change implies investigating the development of a 'statistical
+
+reason', in the wake of a 'reason of modernity'. We understand the latter as the advent of an acute historical
+
+awareness, in which man recognizes himself as an exteriority in relation to the domain of nature, which means the
+
+loss of the hegemony of metaphysical ideologies and the transformation of space-time conditioning into a kind of
+
+blank page. In the words of Michel de Certeau (1996, p.225), “a cut is made in the traditional cosmos, where the
+
+subject was possessed by the voices of the world. An autonomous surface is placed under the gaze of the subject
+
+who thus gives himself the field of his own doing”, circumscribing his own and distinct production space, in which he
+
+executes his will and action. The author continues, stating that “the revolution itself, this 'modern' idea, represents
+
+the scriptural project at the level of an entire society that has the ambition to constitute itself as a blank page in
+
+relation to the past, to write itself, as its own system, and to remake history by the model of what it manufactures (it
+
+will be 'progress')” (p.226-227; emphasis in the original).
+
+economic and financial sectors should submit themselves in toto to the State, aiming for the increasing increase of
+
+their power, under the control of the figure of the king. Only in secondary terms, was it aimed at improving the
+
+standard of living of the subjects, over whom the monarch had the right of life and death. For a world whose
+
+extension was expanding with the formation of colonial empires, it was essential to increase tax collection, create
+
+and apply taxes. More than anything, the numbers referring to subjects expressed the power and wealth of a
+
+national State, giving prestige to its sovereign, projecting it in competition with rival monarchies.
+
+In fact, the experience of the political revolution, like the French one, seems to have entirely re-dimensioned the
+
+attitude of the western portion of humanity. The rupture of modernity
+
+For all this, census records were not stopped, progressing in the making and innovative use of several others,
+
+including customs records on imports and exports, used to a large extent for taxation. They would be joined by birth,
+
+marriage and death records, separating them from religious records.
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The embryo of this rationale was perhaps already contained in what, since the 17th century, has been
+
+conventionally called 'state reason'. Michel Foucault (2006) was one of the first to relate the evocation of this reason
+
+to the reinvention of the notion of government, based on the perception of the exteriority of the political phenomenon:
+
+“the doctrine of reason of State tried to define in what ways the principles and methods of government state differed,
+
+for example, in the way in which God governed the world, the father, his family, or a superior, his community” (p.373).
+
+At that time, a rationality emerged about the art of governing States, separated from the sphere of nature, from
+
+respect for the general order of the world, from the Christian and judicial tradition, which intended that the government
+
+be profoundly fair. Contractualist philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who sought the ethicalpolitical
+origins of the State in the notion of a social contract, can be considered the forerunners of this doctrine. They
+
+thus depersonalized the exercise of power. Unlike Machiavelli, who was concerned with defining what maintains or
+
+reinforces the bond between prince and State, not with the existence and nature of the latter. Machiavelli was still
+
+concerned with the exercise of the sovereign's power over his territory; he did not see in the movements of the
+
+population the inexhaustible resources for the production of wealth.
+
+History, Science, Health – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro
+
+In these terms, the need to increase the power of the State and to know its strength, resisting the onslaught of
+
+others, creates an entirely new normative reality:
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+the government could not, therefore, limit itself to the sole application of the general principles of
+reason, wisdom, and prudence. A knowledge is necessary: a concrete, precise and measured
+knowledge referring to the power of the State. The art of governing, characteristic of the reason of
+State, is closely linked to the development of what was called statistics or political arithmetic – that
+is, to the knowledge of the respective strengths of the different States. Such knowledge was
+indispensable to good government (Foucault, 2006, p.376; emphasis in the original).
+
+with the 'traditional cosmos' knew no precedent. In defense of this idea, it is worth remembering the historian Ciro
+
+Flamarion Cardoso (quoted in Moraes, Rego, 2002, p.232):
+
+In the previous passage, Foucault makes reference to two distinct traditions – German Statistik, literally conceived
+
+as 'science of the State', and English political arithmetic – that developed between the 17th and 18th centuries. In
+
+common, both claimed a specific domain of State action, endowed with its own intelligibility, dedicating themselves
+
+to expanding its power and visibility in the international community. From the beginning, the Germanic current strived
+
+for the synthetic understanding of social activities and human groupings. This tradition focused on the study of
+
+communities, in states, regions, cities or professions, understood as a whole, endowed with particular powers and
+
+only described by the combination of numerous aspects: climate, natural resources, economic organization,
+
+a stable, recent universe (with around 6 thousand years of existence), where a humanity considered
+
+as inhabiting the center of this universe, created separately by God and placed ahead of other living
+beings on the planet, would organize itself in an also immutable way, has been giving way place,
+since the seventeenth century, to a different universe, as well as to a different perception of the
+human. Contemporary social and political revolutions – from the French one of 1789, to those of
+1830 and 1848, with their trajectories very variable depending on the case – demonstrated, when
+victorious, that human societies are changeable.
+
+908
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociology of statistics
+
+According to Alain Desrosières (1998, p.23), the administrative use of written records, their arrangement
+
+according to spatial clippings and their interpretation in terms of “numbers, weights and measures” makes political
+
+arithmetic the birth of material procedures of
+
+population, laws and customs. Gottfried Achenwall (1719-1772), credited with inventing the term statistik, was its
+
+greatest exponent. With a strongly descriptive character, at first it was not involved with the collection and analysis
+
+of numbers any more than history and geography did. Its task was description, and the use of numerical tabulations
+
+was limited to the convenience observed by its creator, as the case may be. It is not difficult to predict that, given
+
+the low operational level of these contributions, their authors would develop a solid academic background, without
+
+achieving, however, great practical application.
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925 909
+
+Even more surprising was the warning he addressed to the king that the funds spent on combating the plagues
+
+would bring greater rewards than the most profitable investments, while preserving part of the large sum spent on
+
+lives that, if abandoned to the plagues, would perish (Porter, 1986 , p.19). In order to calculate the number of
+
+subjects, which determined the power of the State, men like Petty, the merchant John Graunt (1620-1674) and the
+
+officer Davenant (1656-1714) created maxims of ethical virtue based on the desideratum of maximizing of the
+
+population. As 'apostles of procreation', they condemned alcohol consumption, gambling, prostitution, urban life,
+
+priestly celibacy and even war, which could be avoided by removing obstacles to natural demographic growth
+
+(p.19-20). It is easy to see how different he is from the German statisticians. They were not academic theorists
+
+constructing panels and logical descriptions of the State in general, but men from different backgrounds and
+
+backgrounds, who had forged a certain practical knowledge in the course of their activities, eager to offer it to the
+
+government. They were the first to resort to mathematics as an indirect method to estimate population growth, based
+
+on regularities observed in vital facts. They dealt a decisive blow to religious conceptions of death, until then seen
+
+as the result of chance or divine punishment, by conceiving the phenomenon as capable of being known and
+
+measured by universal laws.
+
+We must not underestimate the argumentative force of statistics as a true discourse, capable of silencing
+
+controversies in the face of reason, which was already perceived by these men. If, nowadays, statistics remove part
+
+of the legitimacy of its official status, in the moments that followed its invention, they proved to be indispensable to
+
+the foundation of the State's domination. In the second half of the 17th century, English political arithmeticians
+
+already had a clear understanding of the situation, and this is the reason for the term 'politics' that they affixed to the
+
+expression 'arithmetic'.4 Applying arithmetic operations in the use of administrative records (especially civil ones –
+
+birth , marriage and death), the physician William Petty (1623-1687) perhaps did not know that he was founding the
+
+calculation of statistics, a term that, as seen, would only be coined a few decades later, by Achenvall. But he was
+
+already aware of the value of numbers in official speeches, which he considered indispensable to the art of
+
+governing. In his book Political Arithmetic, only published in 1690, he talks about the creation of a specific method
+
+for the elaboration of statistics. Unfortunately, preoccupied with the task of advising the king, he symptomatically
+
+values his political ends more than he explains the means, that is, the method itself.5
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+a set constituted by the institutions, procedures, analyzes and reflections, calculations and tactics
+that allow the exercise of this specific and complex form of power, which has the population as its
+main target, political economy as its dominant form of knowledge and essential technical instruments.
+security devices..., provoking, on the one hand, the development of a whole series of specific
+government apparatuses and, on the other hand, the development of a whole series of knowledge
+(p.291-292).
+
+History, Science, Health – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro
+
+If the great challenge of the statesman becomes the government of the economy (hence the great success
+
+known by political economy), statistics become vital, since they 'build' the public spaces that the statesman must
+
+know and act upon:
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+statistics will gradually reveal that the population has its own regularity: numbers of dead, sick,
+accidents, etc.; statistics also reveal that the population has its own characteristics, which are
+irreducible to those of the family, such as the great epidemics, endemic mortality, the spiral of work
+and wealth. Finally, it reveals that through its displacements, its activities, the population produces
+specific effects (Foucault, 2000, p.288).
+
+objectification. The accumulation of biographical traits of individuals in writing enables statistical aggregation, which
+
+is a way of thinking about the collective based on and from the individual. And here we find the limits of statistical
+
+activity, under the framework of absolute monarchy. Social differentiation in the hierarchical structure of the Ancien
+
+Régime was severely restricted by the more general principle that subjects could be freely manipulated according to
+
+the will of the sovereign. In no case were we dealing with individuals or autonomous persons, but with members of
+
+orders and states. The basis of statistics, comparative equivalences could not be considered a measurement premise
+
+while the notions of personality and universality did not depose naturalized differences, based on privileges and
+
+corporations. Although political arithmetic and the German tradition were already, each in their own way, “a response
+
+from modern states in operational terms, ambition for knowledge inseparable from a will to manipulate men” (Furet,
+
+Ozouf, 1977, p.360) 6 , the constitution of a 'social mechanics', in which individuals are made comparable and
+
+interchangeable units, defined by what they have to be identical in terms of behavior and role, would only be possible
+
+after the French Revolution, in the midst of the liberal revolutions of 1830 and 1848.
+
+In spite of previous innovations, only from the 19th century onwards did censuses begin to record and count at
+
+an individual level, no longer referring exclusively to houses as the minimum enumeration unit, which occurs pari
+
+passu with publicity and the wide dissemination of information. . Even more significant is the separation of statistical
+
+agencies
+
+In any case, the 'consequences of modernity' have a very wide reach and have been felt since the 17th century.
+
+This is the case, for example, of the changes in political technology that occurred in the 18th century, which led to
+
+the overcoming of the family management model as the ideal of good government. This is when the notion of
+
+population is conceived, understood as a fundamental resource of State power, whose movements and composition
+
+must be known and controlled by specific knowledge, by State sciences. The rationalization of the exercise of power
+
+as a practice of government is defined by Michel Foucault (2000) as governmentality. According to the author, this is
+
+910
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Cultivated in this new environment, Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874), a mathematician who studied astronomy,
+
+would become one of the main founding fathers of statistics, especially if we consider the legacy he left for the
+
+formalization of social sciences. His intellectual activity began to stand out in the effervescent 1830s, when the
+
+revolutionary uncertainties of a changing society were experienced more than ever. The climate of insecurity led
+
+young Quetelet to dedicate himself to statistics, seeking in them a science of stability and forecasting. He was the
+
+first to see true scientific laws in numerical regularities, beyond the simple revelation of objective facts. Anticipating
+
+Comte, he coined and consecrated the expression la physique sociale, the title of his greatest work, to designate
+
+statistics. It remained for the precursor of positivism to baptize the study of the mechanics of social relations as
+
+sociology. Quetelet advocated the adoption of a single method for all sciences.
+
+911
+
+Combining the administrative vocation of statistics with the techniques of astronomers and mathematicians, it denied
+
+the competence of social reformers (doctors and hygienists) in the matter. The astronomer's love for the natural
+
+order would provide the foundation of statistical science.
+
+Sociology of statistics
+
+Until the 19th century, statistical regularities, such as the ratio between the births of men and women and the
+
+uniformity of murders, robberies and suicides, were explained in natural and theological terms, indicating the divine
+
+will, expressing the general order of the world. Quetelet proposed an alternative interpretation, based on cosmology
+
+that made regularity a natural process expected for all domains. In the words of Theodore Porter (1986, p.51-52),
+
+“Quetelet interpreted the regularities of crime as proof that statistical laws were true when applied to entire groups,
+
+even if they were false in relation to a particular individual. Furthermore, he believed that the obliteration of the
+
+particular by the collective was responsible for the very preservation of society.
+
+institutions responsible for tax collection and law enforcement, freeing these spaces from their former role of
+
+surveillance. In 1800, in Napoleonic France, the Bureau Statistique de la Republique is created. Endowed with
+
+institutional and administrative autonomy, the first official space dedicated exclusively to statistics emerges, an
+
+indispensable condition for the development of research methodologies and techniques, until then somewhat
+
+announced – as Petty did –, but very little effective.
+
+In this reasoning, society became independent of the idiosyncrasies of its constituent individuals. He stated the “law
+
+of large numbers”, in which he advocated that great social phenomena are produced by general causes, given that
+
+chance and accident cannot have an influence on facts considered collectively. He developed the notion of the
+
+average man, an abstract being, defined by the average of all human attributes in a given country, considered a
+
+'national type', representative of a society. Deviations would be canceled out by the resulting average. Responsibility
+
+for crimes and deviations could then be distributed to the entire community considered. Its great objective was to
+
+measure the changes experienced by the average man over time, in order to reveal the general law of development,
+
+discovering the forces that act on the social body, to predict its future course (p.54).
+
+Statistics and scientific concepts: brief considerations
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+As historian Peter Gay (1995, p.461) once wrote,
+
+Since the second half of the 19th century, pleasures, vices, violence and, more
+
+Decades before Durkheim, Quetelet plunged the bibliography into sociology. Once the social
+physicist had gathered enough solid information, it would be possible to show the probability of
+an 'individual choice' between embracing a life of crime or committing suicide, between
+becoming addicted to drink or remaining teetotal. But this determinism, protested Quetelet, a
+little defensively, did not make him fatalistic. The kind of collective knowledge he wished to
+propagate extends, rather than reduces, the sphere of freedom of the human soul.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+912
+In the incessant struggle for recognition of the scientific status of history and sociology, at a time when the
+paradigm of the natural sciences prevailed, authors such as Marx and Durkheim did not hesitate to resort to
+Quetelet's postulates of social physics.
+
+Quetelet's contribution to history and sociology was immense. It is worth dwelling on it, because among our
+
+purposes is to reveal the richness of the relationship between statisticians and the sciences, in the very
+
+constitution of their knowledge and their practice. Historian Henry Thomas Buckle, for example, in his History
+
+of civilization in England, denounced the importance given to corporate institutions by historiography, such as
+
+the State and the nobility, and religious institutions such as the Church, enshrining in their place the relationship
+
+between science and society. Eschewing the presentation of history as a chronicle of kings and battles, Buckle
+
+was one of the first and fiercest voices against traditional political history. The substance of history would not
+
+reside in politics but in society, in the slow and continuous diffusion of knowledge. An incorrigible enthusiast of
+
+material progress, Buckle took pleasure in the English liberalism of the 1850s. The fact is that the regularities
+
+of statistical science proved to the historian that the natural order of the universe did not admit exceptions,
+
+applying to the set of social phenomena (Porter, 1986 , p.63). Deviation is reduced to a minimum; the freedom
+
+and will of individuals are denied when considered collectively.
+
+History, Science, Health – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro
+
+They built the methodologies of their disciplines, based on borrowings from statistics, then the social science
+
+par excellence.
+
+A similar influence can be seen in Karl Marx and Émile Durkheim. The first used Quetelet's theory of the
+
+average man to define a uniform and universal category of work and to interpret the theory of the value of work.
+
+Durkheim's study of suicide also pays tribute to the master of statistics, as does his notion of a social fact, an
+
+objective phenomenon with its own regularities, isolated from the world of nature. This is the meaning of his
+
+assertions: “social force does not determine one individual more than another, it only requires a defined number
+
+of certain types of action”. And yet: “any phenomenon composed of independent facts must exhibit an
+
+impressive regularity when taken as a whole” (Durkheim, quoted in Porter, 1986, p.70).
+
+In addition to the obvious appropriation, there is a fundamental structural transformation, more obscure to
+
+our perception, albeit more diffuse and subtle. At least since Quetelet's formulations and the institutional
+
+organization of activity, which will be seen in the next section, statistics has built primacy in the conceptual
+
+classification of social experience. The consecration of probabilism by statistics raised to an extreme degree
+
+the demand for its ability to forecast and intervene in the movements and composition of society.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The strength of such encodings lies in the realism of the aggregations, whereby the
+conventional becomes real. This is the basis of the individualizing power of statistics. It is
+present in the appreciation of individuals in general on issues such as race, religion,
+health, inflation, income, unemployment, poverty, among many, referenced by statistics,
+which, thus, provide the terms of the public debate on all the problems they face. related.
+They promote descriptions of economic situations, denunciations of social injustices,
+justifications for political actions, organization of interest groups. In this way, they support
+truth discourses, which serve as support for decision-making by different agents
+(academies, governments, social groups, international organizations, etc.), interfering in
+the spatial distribution of public and private resources, a fact which results in clashes
+around what will be researched and the appropriate methodology. As references, the
+definitions and criteria that govern the classifications can be discussed and contested, but
+they themselves and their objects remain indisputable. Such is the realism of aggregations.
+
+Within the categories, individuals see themselves in the face of others no longer in their
+individualities, but in their individualizations. In this way, statistics uniquely express the
+subtlety with which power is exercised, as they do so in the symbolic order, as they build
+a homogeneous conception (a truth) about the things they enumerate and announce,
+which ends up making it possible to an agreement between intelligences. Regularities
+become perceived in their connections with deviant conduct: suicide, crime, prostitution,
+madness, illness are some of the phenomena that then begin to be codified and measured,
+fed by the notion of expanding control over the deviant population, from of its enumeration
+and classification (Hacking, 1990, p.3).
+
+recently, intimate issues such as sex, sleep, friendship and even public fears have been
+relentlessly tabulated.
+
+This first-order reality, which organizes the conceptual classification of social experience,
+also permeates all scientific production, constituting its true frame of reference. Since the
+mid-nineteenth century, and increasingly so, the construction of scientific concepts has
+been based on interpretations arising from the analysis of categories for classifying
+activities and social groups, as we can see in Ian Hacking's (1990) insightful commentary. ,
+p.3): “Marx attentively read the drafts of official statistics and the reports of factory
+inspectors. Someone may ask: who exercised
+
+At the pole of normalization/individualization, statistics found subject positions.
+
+As a government instrument, statistics technically underpin normalization policies and
+the individualization of deviant elements. At the pole of population regulation, of “power
+over life” (the expression is from Michel Foucault), they favor interventions that target the
+social body, a political anatomy focused on the body, on biological processes: propagation,
+births and deaths, state health, life expectancy and longevity. In contemporary capitalist
+society, they adjust the spatial distribution of men to the accumulation of capital, link the
+growth of groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential distribution of
+profits. They compartmentalize and rank the space, in which individuals can be isolated,
+easily accessed and located.
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
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+
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+On the one hand, they [statisticians and related professionals] will specify that measurement
+depends on conventions relating to the definition of objects and objectivation procedures.
+On the other hand, they will add that the measurement reflects a reality. The paradox is
+that, although both statements are incompatible, it is impossible to conceive of a different
+answer.
+
+History, Science, Health – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro
+
+Following the orientation proposed by Desrosières, we defend here the idea that statistics
+
+are situated in the plane of duality. A constitutive duality, which, it seems to me, runs through its
+
+entire production circuit, in conceptual, associative and procedural aspects. Going back to the
+
+beginning of this article, we see this perspective as a result of the double insertion of statistical
+
+activity, in the sociopolitical sphere, which founds and adjusts the statistical program, and in the
+
+techno-scientific domain, which formalizes the stability of its language and its references.
+
+Reading the section that follows may clarify my point of view.
+
+greater impact on class consciousness, Marx or the authors of the official reports, who created
+
+the classification by which people recognized themselves? If, as Buckle wanted, the substance
+
+of history resides in the gradual growth of the production and diffusion of knowledge,
+
+historiography should not dispense with the analysis of the procedures for objectifying statistics.
+
+Let us register the alert to historians of science, and even to scholars of reading practices.
+
+The cognitive duality that we have been dealing with already transpired at the time of
+
+creation of the Bureau Statistique de la Republique, in Paris in 1800. Knowing the departments
+
+and their municipalities was the imperative that fell on the body. Faced with the formation of the
+
+republican State, statistics would have to represent the nation in electoral terms, no longer
+
+being reduced to a 'mirror of the prince'. This was the horizon that justified the creation of the
+
+Bureau, its stability and relative institutional independence. We can imagine that your
+
+It would be up to the analyst to think of the objects of statistics simultaneously in their real
+
+existence and in their conventional character, a position in which the reality of the object is a
+
+methodological attitude: “the simultaneity of these interpretations underscores the linkage space
+
+between technical languages and their uses in the field”. social debate, reintegrating statistical
+
+reason into reflective scientific culture” (Desrosières, 1998, p.2).
+
+For all these reasons, numbers, tables, cartograms and classifications are taken as the
+
+reality of the picture they describe, which is essential for the discourses of truth they support,
+
+including the construction of scientific concepts. Thanks to the very stable and widely recognized
+
+language of statistics, reality and convention are confused. Reality consecrated by the strength
+
+of social representation, which imposes itself to the researcher as a fundamental problem to be
+
+investigated. It is present in the academic discussions of statisticians, as well as in the
+
+discourses of official statistical bodies with different social instances. These seek to reduce the
+
+conventional foundations of their production as much as possible, since the 'realism of the
+
+aggregates' is the source that attributes legitimacy to their activity, in addition to establishing
+
+agreement between intelligences, stabilizing social interactions.7 We have an impasse here ,
+
+noted by Alain Desrosières (1998, p.12; emphasis in the original):
+
+The institutional organization of statistical activity
+
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+
+Sociology of statistics
+
+While the first promoted written descriptions that facilitated narratives and memorization,
+criticizing the reductionist nature of tabulations, the second appreciated numerical precision
+and its laws, represented by equations. Duvillard thought that the information sent by
+departments and municipalities would only be accurate if their administrations preserved the
+records, as a prototype of codification procedures. They disapproved of each other, one
+disqualifying the other's premise: “dry tables” and “hermetic calculations” competed with the
+“elegant style of seductive politeness” (Desrosières, 1998, p.35-40).
+
+Peuchet and Duvillard had diverse followers, in France and around the world; compulsory
+disciples, who did not know their names, but who acted constrained by this fundamental duality
+of statistical activity. Its emphasis now falls on the conventional character
+
+The controversy itself already appears to us as a resource to provoke cultivated minds,
+drawing attention to the importance and need for statistics. Inviting a fraction of the intellectual
+elite to take sides in the debate, choosing between argumentative strength and numerical
+precision, these men sought to make their craft notable.
+
+of statistical knowledge, visible in the need to communicate/translate realities to the politicalpragmatic
+field, is sometimes based on the 'realism of aggregates', when the primacy is the
+formalization of its technoscientific space. It is true that the opposition between the parties was
+somewhat softened as the process of institutionalizing this knowledge accelerated. Once again,
+we rely on the lucid pen of Alain Desrosières (1998, p.39-40):
+
+However, perhaps unknowingly, they fermented a field of discussion and analysis from which,
+years later, Adolphe Quetelet, among other notables, would emerge. The accusations that
+Peuchet and Duvillard exchanged in the Bureau's memos and reports are the first official record
+of a tension constitutive of statistical activity.
+
+leaders, statisticians avant la lettre, would seek to surrender to the world of their activity, where
+almost everything remained to be done, identifying and asserting themselves through it.
+
+The defense of descriptive and didactic frameworks, of the adoption of a more accessible
+and literary language, practiced by Peuchet, can be associated with the administrative role of
+statistical activity, as an instrument of government. Translating languages and communicating
+realities to government officials is an indispensable task for formulating public policies. It should
+not be lost sight of the fact that the legitimacy of statistics rests on their official character. In the
+microcosm of Peuchet's actions, the struggle for visibility insinuates itself, always based on the
+State's ex ante demand , on the sociopolitical dimension of statistics.
+
+In this process, two radically opposed strategies prevail, assumed by Peuchet, director in
+charge of the organ between 1800 and 1805, and Duvillard, who replaced him in 1806.
+
+Duvillard was at the opposite pole. It underlined the technical component and professionalism
+involved in producing and interpreting the results. In other words, he was concerned with
+formalizing the activity, using the scientific parameters of his time to provide statistics with a
+stable language. This is the meaning of the relationship established between the records and
+the procedures necessary for codification.
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+Over time, the expression of these two modes of discourse became more refined, and
+the opposition between them less brutal than that of Peuchet and Duvillard. However, this
+basic tension is inherent to the nature of statistical institutes, whose credibility depends
+as much on their visibility as on technical aspects. The way in which this double requirement
+
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+To give unity to official works, it is necessary to relate them to a common center; it is necessary
+that the main officials, responsible for presenting the different segments of general statistics,
+can see and understand each other together, accepting the same divisions, adopting, after
+careful examination, the same names and the same numbers to represent the same objects,
+not leaving no gaps in the general tables and avoiding, on the other hand, duplications. The
+safest way to achieve the desired unity seems to be the creation, in each State, of a central
+statistical commission, or a similar institution, formed by representatives of the main public
+administrations, to which would be added some people who, for their part, studies and special
+knowledge, can illuminate practice and resolve essentially scientific difficulties.
+
+is approached and transformed, according to the era and country in question, is one of the main
+topics in the history of these institutes.
+
+The intended target, when organizing the Congress, was especially to promote the unification
+of official statistics that governments publish, promoting comparable results. Specific works will
+be easier when general bases are established that associate them and uniform nomenclatures
+and tables are adopted in different countries: this kind of universal language, simplifying the
+works, would ensure them more importance and solidity.
+
+... it is desirable, on the other hand, for central institutions from different countries to interact
+by promoting the exchange of their publications and table models used to gather documents,
+classify them and summarize them (Rapport..., 1983, p .4).
+
+History, Science, Health – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro
+
+We will find a similar duality again in the context of international statistics congresses, during
+
+the second half of the 19th century. A capital moment in the process of institutionalizing the activity,
+
+the structure of these events was designed by Quetelet, thus revealing himself to be the main
+
+organizing agent in the area. The first congress was held in Brussels, in 1853, and had the
+
+president of Belgium's central statistics commission, Quetelet himself, as its great advisor. In the
+
+minutes of its final report, we can read:
+
+In this long section, the organized attempt to consolidate and expand the international scientific
+
+community centered on statistical activity stands out. The main effort focuses on establishing the
+
+normative foundations (conceptual and operational) that should govern it, unifying numbers,
+
+nomenclatures and tables in the representation of objects. Quetelet and his consorts were, then,
+
+aware of the need to stabilize statistical language to promote another central objective of the
+
+congresses: creating equivalences that would allow comparison between the activities and wealth
+
+of nations. It is worth mentioning that a centralizing organization was being considered to give unity
+
+to the commissions in each country, each of which holds administrative records. Thus, coordination
+
+is thought of, in the development of coordination instruments (Senra, 2005, p.83). Among the
+
+inflection points of the congresses, there is the formation of the discipline. Special attention is given
+
+to professional training, which includes the basic knowledge that should make up the 'specialist'
+
+curriculum.
+
+We want to stimulate the development of national commissions, offering them technical support
+
+and a prestigious membership. But, to achieve this, it was necessary to fulfill another fundamental
+
+objective of the congresses: to win over the governments of the national states, convincing them
+
+that it would be advantageous to provide autonomy to their statistical commissions (to create, when
+
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+Sociology of statistics
+
+In fact, the problem of political viability was presented, at the same time, as a horizon and an
+
+obstacle to the success of congresses. The short journey of these events would come to an
+
+end in the ninth edition, held in Budapest in 1876, two years after the death of its inspirer,
+
+Adolphe Quetelet. Nelson Senra's diagnosis (2005, p.86; emphasis in the original) is succinct:
+
+Let us now move on to the analysis of the theoretical and procedural intimacy of statistical
+institutes, according to their techno-scientific profile. In Bruno Latour's line, these entities are
+'calculation centers'. They bring near and present distant and/or absent realities to the State,
+making them thinkable and, therefore, potentially governable. Thus, they constitute
+technologies of government, through action at a distance. They build social collectives, useful
+for regulation, by making them available on the decision-makers' desks, in the form of tables,
+graphs and cartograms.
+
+as the case may be) and spend large sums of public money on them. This intimacy with the
+
+politics of the States weighed on the deliberations of congresses. It was expressly
+
+recommended that national commissions be composed of “representatives of the main public
+
+administrations”, which meant bringing together prominent politicians, alongside intellectuals
+
+enlightened in statistical matters. In addition, several representatives of national governments
+
+attended the congresses, which gave an official character to the contests.
+
+Once again we are faced with the duality of a need. With the congresses, the technical
+formalization of the activity became more sophisticated, reaching new levels, in points such
+as standardization of codifications, disciplinary methodology, professional training,
+development of formal associations and dissemination of knowledge. At the same time, the
+congresses functioned as the embryo of a world body, capable of dialoguing directly with
+national governments. However, political visibility, present in the form of representation by
+national commissions and official delegations, was not enough to implement most of the
+scientific community's achievements. Yet another example of the tense and dynamic
+relationship between the sociopolitical translation/reception of public statistics and the
+technical formalization of its disciplinary field.
+
+This production takes place at the level of supply to national States, ex post demand , in
+
+Nelson Senra's expression. Dimension that does not reveal, in itself, the technical and
+operational complexity of the network in which statistical knowledge is produced. To analyze
+it, it is necessary to bring out the intimacy of the calculation center. There is, above all, a cycle
+of accumulation of inscriptions, thanks to which a relational coexistence is established between two
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+The fact is that the Statistical Congresses were never able to equate the controversial
+representation controversy. Representation at congresses should be public and official,
+that was the intention, precisely the source of the controversy. So, to what extent did
+participants actually represent their countries? To what extent could they deliberate and
+assume unequivocal commitments? To what extent, when they returned, with folders full
+of resolutions, were they able to implement them? By no means, without mincing words,
+that is, the representations, although official, were fragile, occasional, bureaucratic, often
+ignoring the daily routine of statistical preparation, hence the reduced application of resolutions.
+In addition to the resolutions being quite generic, even to reach consensus, which made
+practical applications difficult.
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+The dynamic relationship between the centers and their peripheries constitutes what
+
+Latour (2000a) called “the logistics of immutable furniture”. These are scientific
+objectification procedures, such as templates, totalizations, lists, graphs and tables, which
+enable the complementary processing of registrations by the calculation centers. In this
+sense, statistics are particularly effective in expanding the scope of inscriptions, when
+they use averages, and in controlling their dispersion, since the invention of variance and
+sampling (p.385-386). This cycle of capitalization of inscriptions transforms them into
+manageable information for governments, stable references for society and means of
+analysis for researchers.
+
+Again, a constitutive duality is scrutinized. Yes, because the scientific space of statistics
+is essential to meet the demand, which guides the statistical program. It guarantees the
+credibility of your products, stabilizing referrals from a series of social interactions.
+However, this argument favors the recurring illusion that such institutions are sufficiently
+distant, if not even isolated, from political and scientific networks, which, in fact, permeate
+their own production circuit.
+
+Let us examine a rather special example: the so-called delegate gaze postulate.
+
+places: a center (the coordinating agencies) acting at a distance on many other peripheral
+points (the survey and research zones). In this movement, it is absolutely necessary that
+there is portability and stability in the transmission of registrations (the forms distributed
+to field agents), so that it is possible to 'bring them back', and subsequent envoys can
+accumulate new registrations. Thus, a technology of distance over events, people and
+places is configured, based on three conditions: the calculation center must “invent means
+that (a) make them mobile so that they can be brought; (b) keep them stable so that they
+can be brought in and out without distortion, decay or deterioration; and (c) they are
+combinable in such a way that, whatever the material from which they are made, they can
+be accumulated or aggregated, shuffled like a pack of cards” (Latour, 2000a, p.362;
+emphasis in the original).
+
+Once the statistical program is carried out, the complexity of accumulation/capitalization
+cycles and the networks that move them emerge, formed by institutions, instruments,
+equipment and people, including scientists (economists, demographers, anthropologists
+and sociologists), but also by a bureaucracy branched out in states and municipalities,
+supervisors and field agents, collectors with various backgrounds, in addition to the
+informants themselves. In the eyes of the main users of statistics – governments, social
+organizations, academies – the complexity of their scientific network disappears. A fact
+undoubtedly corroborated by the widely recognized argument of the techno-scientific
+autonomy of statistical institutions.
+
+A dangerous representation, shared by most of those involved in the elaboration and use
+of public statistics.
+
+This foundation intends that the actions of the collection network are standardized by the
+research conception instance, the calculation center. It considers the uniformed procedures
+acquired in personnel training as the only reference for field agents, alongside the
+normative body of agent instruction manuals. Any possibility of interaction with the
+interviewees is formally denied, in view of the eventual
+
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+Sociology of statistics
+
+Given that inscriptions must be mobile, stable and combinable, the delegation of the gaze
+
+serves statistical research very well, allowing the expropriation of relativism from its observers.
+
+Central agencies need to overcome the perspectivism of observation and emerge as the only
+
+privileged observer. There is no other meaning in Latour's statement (2000b, p.39): “It is
+
+precisely because observers delegated from afar lose their privilege – relativism – that the
+
+central observer can elaborate his panopticon – relativity – and find himself present at the
+
+same time in all the places where, however, it does not reside”. All positions of the subject
+
+and all positions of the object are equivalent, in favor of the stable transport of information by
+
+the vector institution. From the relativism of the observers we pass to the relativity of the
+
+centers, condition of mobility and immutability of the inscriptions.
+
+Here we have a fundamental contribution that the sociology of science can provide to
+
+public statistics. By investigating the different actors who take part in its production, the
+
+complex translations, changes in meaning, interpretations and responsibilities that take place,
+
+the sociological approach shows to generating and user organisms that there are limitations
+
+and implicit choices present in all statistical procedures, insisting
+
+distortion of the conceptual framework that originated the forms. In short, the determination of
+
+the interview situation is here a predicted and reified data.
+
+The equivalence between positions emerges as the basic support of relativity. Nevertheless,
+
+the basic foundation of the delegation of the look must not obscure the perception of
+
+information networks in which statistical production is inserted. It should not obscure the
+
+recognition of the distances between the levels of the production chain, from the specialized
+
+bureaucracy of the calculation centers to the collection networks. After all, recognizing
+
+distances is already a step towards minimizing them. And here we follow Jean Peneff (1988, p.534):
+
+Amortizing the distances between the spheres of production assumes considering social
+
+interactions and, therefore, the different levels of approximation to the subject of the interview,
+
+variables according to the situations faced. There are empathies, but also antipathies, the
+
+hidden ones and the ones not always well disguised, as it is always a game of approximation
+
+that is at stake (Álvaro, 2006, p.4). This results in the paradox of the social relationship of the
+
+interview, as it demands, on the one hand, that the interviewer remain sufficiently distant from
+
+the interviewee so as not to lose his or her objectivity; on the other, that he gets close enough
+
+to the interviewee to gain his trust. It is therefore necessary to integrate the procedural
+
+dimension of the collection network into the research framework. This means recognizing
+
+symbolic interactions, negotiations, researchers' presentation strategies, adaptations of
+
+practices, procedures and even questionnaires to interview situations, which are always changeable.
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+On the one hand, there is bureaucratic control and supervision of routine cabinet work;
+on the other, almost total autonomy of field agents. This separation is aggravated by the
+absence of relationships and exchanges of information about the nature of work between
+the two levels. The top ignores the field and continues to believe in the effectiveness
+and relevance of standardization, because it is unable to appreciate the practical realities
+of field interviewers' work. If management began to understand this last job, the entire
+organization and its hierarchy would be in question.
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+
+On the other hand, there is a serious risk that this approach will be interpreted as a lack
+of competence of these official spaces, as a need to reinforce the technical and normative
+foundations, the same ones that remain silent about the uncertainties and tensions of the
+scientific process of the activity, because before Constituting research centers, these
+agencies are planning bodies, acting in the political and administrative conformation of the
+country. This is the reason why they are jealous of maintaining the integrity of their stability
+at all costs, distancing themselves from debates and polemics, academics included. Hence
+the imperative to implement and strengthen in these institutes a permanent environment of
+sociological and historical reflection, directed towards the analysis of knowledge and the
+practice of statistical activity. Revealing their intimacy, semantics (construction process) and
+syntactics (construction result), it becomes possible to suppress inconsistencies and translate
+the academic language of change into an effective gain in legitimacy, without prejudice to the indispensable credibility.
+
+We have therefore seen our hypothesis about the three levels at which the duality of
+statistical activity operates, each in its own case study. The cognitive aspect reveals the
+emphasis, on the part of the producers, that their research reflects reality, especially at the
+end of the capitalization of the information, when they disclose the results to the press, at the
+time of the ex-post demand .
+
+A particularly important level to analyze the process of institutionalization of the activity, since
+tensions and negotiations over the implementation of resolutions and advances in the
+disciplinary field appear there with more evidence.
+
+that it is impossible to offer technical solutions to conflicts of interest that cannot be
+
+accommodated (Schwartzman, 2004, p.98).
+
+The associative plan can be interesting for showing the value of argumentation,
+representation and political imbrications in the molding of the great international statistical
+organizations (International Statistical Institute – ISI; Inter-American Statistical Institute – Iasi;
+United Nations Organization for Agriculture and Food – FAO; International Labor Organization
+– ILO; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization – Unesco), in its close
+relationship with the different States.
+
+The procedural duality is the most delicate of all, when dealing with the hidden, or intended
+to be hidden, face of official public statistics bodies. It refers to the cognitive dimension, as
+both express the defense of technoscientific autonomy, in fact necessary for the stabilization
+of social interactions. It highlights the gears of the production process, choices and decisions,
+such as the preference for certain questions in research, to the detriment of others. In this
+way, we are taken to Bruno Latour's laboratory life , where hard facts are constructed,
+involving men, machines, experiences, roles and strategies. It is the locus of irreducible
+freedom of statistical activity. For this reason, it is the environment in which sociological and
+historical analysis can first bear fruit, helping statistical institutions to achieve their mission.
+By recognizing the interdependence of social instances, institutes can better meet demands
+and diversify supply, to the benefit of their technical autonomy.8
+
+Conclusion: the space of historical research
+
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+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+This perspective favors the understanding of the technical framework regarding the
+productive methods of major research, such as the postulate of the delegated gaze, social
+interactions in interviews, the generation of records, the configuration of classifications of
+activities and occupations, among many others. The same applies to the trajectories and
+evolutions of census themes and categories, such as the investigation of their conceptions and uses.
+
+Through historical research, it is possible to recover the trajectories of statisticians and,
+above all, their contributions to the composition of the main works interpreting nationality.
+Apparently opaque figures with a technical profile, their great works were devoid of the aura of
+luminosity and controversy that marked the prolific tradition of essayistic thought and that of
+representatives of disciplines strongly linked to social control (such as medicine and psychiatry).
+Located within the State apparatus, they were, to a large extent, marginalized by academic
+studies, which preferred to prioritize scientists from the university field. Bearing a dry language
+and strong statistical content, their works suffered the ambivalence of being excessively
+technical for social historians of ideas and too sociological for statistics scholars. Research
+must rehabilitate these central agents, focusing on the circularity that exists between, on the
+one hand, the intellectual discourses that forged the great national projects and, on the other,
+the material and conceptual procedures that made it possible to objectify the country's realities.9
+
+To this end, it is important to reveal the methodologies, the tensions surrounding technical
+conceptions, the external relations of statistical institutions, the symbolic disputes of the
+community of researchers, which characterize the plane of discovery, and not just the plane of
+justification, shaped in the period of 'normal science', in Thomas Kuhn's understanding. In the
+words of Gilberto Hochman (2008, p.25),
+
+Inserting public statistics into a broader agenda of reflection in the history of sciences
+scenario – this is the decisive contribution that the space of historical research can bring to
+statistical institutions. They make the documents produced and stored by such institutions
+more available and usable, ordering them according to the requirements of historiography.
+
+In the academic universe, in turn, historical research reveals the processes of intellectual
+construction of classification categories, as well as the meanings underlying their applications,
+based on the semantics attributed to them by different social groups. It is worth saying that the
+historian must start from an understanding of the methodologies applied to statistical
+productions to think about their meanings in political terms.
+
+More than anything, the new approach constitutes an entirely original field of investigation.
+In Jean-Claude Perrot's expression, a “concrete history of abstraction” is configured. A history
+of governing by numbers, in which the construction of the national State is analyzed through
+the prism of the materiality of policies and the instrumental rationality of
+
+From the 1990s onwards, a prolific and fruitful production emerged on science
+spaces in Brazil in which the IBGE and statistics were not included. The history of
+institutionally organized science in Brazil, more concerned with medicine, physics,
+biology, mathematics and human sciences, did not pay attention to other sciences and
+institutions that were at the center of the symbolic and material construction of Brazil.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+1 It is worth highlighting that the possible correlations between the phenomena and the units of analysis foreseen in
+the space of statistical tables of different temporalities support a central investigation into social representations,
+political conceptions and scientific concepts, implicitly or explicitly used in the production and use of statistical
+information. In this sense, warns Hernán Otero (2006, p.47): “it is necessary to read matrices and statistical tables as
+texts, through their translation into propositions and hypothesis systems, expressible in verbal language. Thus, for
+example, two tables on mortality levels tabulated according to the season of the year or according to the sociooccupational
+groups of the deceased refer to two scientific hypotheses and two radically different theoretical
+universes: mortality as a climatic fact or as a social fact”. This perspective of analysis becomes more important, as it
+reveals the implicit components of statistical ideology, understood as “a set of pseudoscientific, political and cultural
+criteria that underlie the selection and definition of variables, values and units of analysis; determine the type of
+statistical instrument to be privileged (forms of
+
+922
+In another direction, the formation of the community of researchers and spaces of
+symbolic mediation are examples of issues that contemplate the history of sciences. The
+creation of scientific societies and journals, intellectual influences (theoretical books,
+dissemination manuals, circuit of authors) and national technical training (schools, courses,
+curricula) are found in this research perspective. It is about understanding the process of
+specialization of statistical activity, its transition from a typically administrative profile,
+when the production of statistics is based on obtaining administrative records (from
+hospitals, schools, customs, courts), to a profile properly scientific, when sampling
+techniques and household surveys will be widely adopted by national statistical agencies,
+on a permanent and systematic basis.
+
+Finally, it was not our responsibility here to list an inventory of themes, approaches and
+objects appropriate to the historical perspective of statistical activity, still open ground that
+has only been begun on other occasions.11 Instead, we wanted to present some challenges
+and possibilities that the universe of public statistics can bring to the sociology of science.
+
+decision-making processes. A history of the uses and translations of statistics, in which
+their argumentative force as a discourse of truth, present in indicative planning, gradually
+transforms into the quantitative support of public policies, which guide techno-scientific
+planning.10 A history of the emergence of statistical mentality as the country's entry into
+modernity, taking as its starting point the moment in which the desire for statistics became
+established. Other dimensions to political and social history open up.
+
+These, then, begin to produce their own scientific records, configuring calculation centers
+– in Bruno Latour’s sense.
+
+History recovers and reveals the power of the documentary collection of statistical
+institutions to an entire community of academic users, enriching the possibilities of
+understanding methodologies and using statistics. Sociology, on the other hand, is guided
+by the prescriptive dimension, pointing to the precarious balance of the dividers of the
+statistical program: the model of the desirable in the sociopolitical sphere, not always
+technically executable, and the realism of the possible in the sphere of scientific production,
+not always understood socially. . In common, the two approaches are committed to the
+operating space of statistical institutions, so that they can increasingly fulfill their mission.
+
+GRADES
+
+History, Science, Health – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+7
+
+4
+
+3 It should be noted that several prestigious authors dedicated themselves to reflecting on the relationship between
+statistical knowledge and the construction of the social order. Among many names, it is worth highlighting those of
+Michel Foucault, Bruno Latour, Theodore Porter, Ian Hacking, Alain Desrosières, Laurent Thévenot, Nikolas Rose,
+Peter Miller, Hernán Otero, Jean-Pierre Beaud. In Brazil, Simon Schwartzman and Nelson Senra made valuable
+considerations, becoming mandatory references. Taken together, their studies prefigure horizons and tools for the
+analysis of public statistics, which, however, still lacks better formalization in a field of investigation, especially in
+Brazil.
+
+6 In this and other citations from texts in other languages, the translation is free.
+
+8 In a pioneering effort, Nelson Senra coordinated the collection History of Brazilian Statistics (1822- 2002). In its
+four volumes, the work maps the paths taken by the institutionalization of statistics among us. It is also worth
+checking out the article he authored, “Historical research on statistics: themes and sources”, published in this
+magazine (Senra, 2008), which recovers documents and suggests essential themes and chronologies for any
+analysis of statistical activity from a historical perspective .
+9 In Brazil, several names must be mentioned that left their personal mark on the organization of statistical activity,
+at different times, from the Empire to the New Republic. I mention a few, due to their undeniable centrality in the
+periods in which they worked: Roberto Jorge Haddock Lobo (1817-1864) and Joaquim Norberto de Souza e Silva
+(1820-1891), authors of reports with important methodological incursions; Sebastião Ferreira Soares (1820-1887),
+considered the first Brazilian statistician; Manoel Timóteo da Costa (1855-1934), director of the 1890 general
+census, responsible for introducing statistics into the positivist project at the beginning of the Republic; Aureliano
+Portugal (1851-1924) and Hilário de Gouveia (1843- 1923), health demographers, main statistics analysts in the
+First Republic; Oziel Bordeaux
+
+Sociology of statistics
+
+See, in this regard, the interesting work of Senra (2006) on English political arithmetic and its
+
+construction of tables, indicators and measures); they guide the interpretation of results and legitimize their uses,
+through discursive procedures” (p.50).
+
+A barely visible and vitally important function, statistics work to stabilize social interactions.
+
+appropriation in the administrative framework of imperial Brazil.
+
+923
+
+2 On this front, research into the construction and evolution of classification categories is of particular interest.
+Through the analysis of minutes, reports and opinions of commentators and census teams, it is possible to delimit
+the scope and meaning of these categories. Demographics, in general, are controversial and discontinuous, as to
+the scope of investigation adopted in statistical surveys: occupation, income, migration, fertility, education, work.
+The case of social categories, such as religion and color (color or race, according to the 2000 census) is even more
+serious. The options left for the census takers to include and classify themselves were rarely the same with regard
+to these questions, which shows that the research of categories is conditioned to the dominant social discourses
+and the image of the country that one wants to produce. The oscillation in the investigation of the different statistical
+categories and the plurality of meanings implied in the historical contexts of their production represent a great
+challenge to social analysis, demanding close attention from historians. With regard to racial classification, I make a
+preliminary approach elsewhere, comparing the appearance of the item in the 1872, 1890, 1920, 1940 and 1950
+censuses (Camargo, in press).
+
+According to Simon Schwartzman (2004, p.74), “the reasons why conflicts do not remain unresolved forever are the
+same that explain why other social conflicts are eventually overcome: in the long run, the collective gains of stabilized
+systems tend to to be greater than the private benefits obtained through conflicts fueled over a long time. Statistical
+concepts and technical devices play important roles in the process of stabilizing social interaction, a 'moral role' that
+is not immediately visible from its deceptively simple technical aspects”.
+
+5 In this book one can see the pragmatism resulting from the political concessions of William Petty (1983, p.111):
+“The method I adopted to do [the calculations presented] is still not very customary; instead of using only comparative
+and superlative words and intellectual arguments, I have tried (as an example of the political arithmetic that has long
+been my aim) to express myself in terms of number, weight and measure; to use only arguments based on the
+senses, and to consider only those causes that have a visible foundation in nature, leaving to the consideration of
+others those that depend on the minds, opinions, appetites and changeable passions of certain men... . Now, the
+observations expressed in number, weight and measure, on which I support the speech that follows, are either true,
+or not apparently false, and if they are not true in a certain and evident way, they may be true by the sovereign
+power, nam id certum est quod certum reddi potest [for what can be converted into right is certain]”.
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+REFERENCES
+
+The governmentality. In: Foucault, Michel.
+
+CERTEAU, Michel de.
+
+Rego (1874-1926), evaluator and systematizer of cultural and social statistics; José Luiz Sayão de Bulhões Carvalho
+(1866-1940), considered the founder of Brazilian statistics; Mario Augusto Teixeira de Freitas (1890-1956), creator of
+the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics and the National Statistical System, one of the greatest producers
+and analysts of educational statistics of all time; Rafael Xavier (1894-1982), main organizer of municipalism as an
+alternative path to national development; Lourival Câmara (1911-1973), responsible for structuring higher education
+courses in statistics; Giorgio Mortara (1885-1967), one of the greatest demographers of the 20th century, who took
+refuge from the war in Brazil (given his Jewish condition), where he formalized this disciplinary field, a task continued
+by João Lyra Madeira (1909-1979); Isaac Kerstenetzky (1926-1991), who transformed statistical institutions into
+techno-scientific centers capable of responding to the challenges of modern economic planning, producing his own
+records, social indicators and permanent sample and household surveys; Simon Schwartzman (1939- ) who rethought
+the National Statistical System when presiding over the IBGE and to whom we owe our first reflections on the
+sociology of statistics.
+
+Users of Social, Economic and Territorial Information.
+Paris: Insee/Crest. 1996.
+
+The cultivation of hate. Trans., Sérgio Goes de
+Paula, Viviane de Lamare Noronha. Sao
+Paulo: Company of Letters. 1995.
+
+11 It is worth mentioning some initiatives in this area: the document “Preliminary foundations for a line of historical
+research at IBGE”, which we prepared in partnership with Nelson Senra; the two meetings entitled Historical Research
+at IBGE, which took place in 2006, when several renowned historians and experts were interviewed, who helped to
+formalize a line of investigation; the aforementioned article “Historical research on statistics: themes and
+sources” (Senra, 2008).
+
+10 In this case, it is worth evaluating the reception of resolutions and recommendations from international organizations
+in Brazil, from the first congresses, held during the Empire, to the slow consolidation of the International Statistical
+Institute (ISI), founded in 1885. Examining the composition of official delegations from Brazil sent to major world
+meetings, the translation carried out by its members to different national governments, the efforts to institutionalize
+the activity with the creation of official bodies and formal associations, the exchange with private organizations in
+defense of related activities (such as the educational field and the municipalist movement, in the Brazilian case), the
+use of statistics in the periodical press, in school textbooks and in major works on national identity are some
+indispensable methodological horizons to investigate the construction of social recognition of statistical knowledge
+and position of the statistician.
+
+FOUCAULT, Michel.
+
+Lire et écrire: l'alphabetisation des français de
+Calvin à Jules Ferry. v.1. Paris: Editions de
+Minuit. 1977.
+
+GIDDENS, Anthony.
+DESROSIÈRES, Alain.
+
+Racial classifications and statistical field in Brazil
+(1870-1940). In: Senra, Nelson de Castro; Camargo,
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio (Org.).
+
+GAY, Peter.
+
+From the singular to the general: statistical information
+and the construction of the State. Paper presented
+at the 1st National Meeting of Producers and
+
+924
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Statistics in the Americas: towards an agenda of
+comparative historical studies. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE.
+(in press).
+
+IBGE knocks on the door: experience and perspective
+of those who work in data collection. Paper
+presented at the 2nd National Meeting of
+Producers and Users of Statistical, Social,
+Economic and Territorial Information, Aug. 2006.
+Rio de Janeiro. 2006.
+
+Microphysics of power. Org., introd., trans. and
+rev. technician, Roberto Machado. Rio de
+Janeiro: Graal Editions. p.277-293. 2000.
+
+The invention of everyday life: arts of making.
+Trans., Ephraim Ferreira Alves. Petropolis: Voices. 1996.
+
+CAMARGO, Alexandre de Paiva Rio.
+
+FURET, François; OZOUF, Jacques.
+
+DESROSIÈRES, Alain.
+The politics of large numbers: a history of
+statistical reasoning. Cambridge: Harvard
+University Press. 1998.
+
+Omnes et singulatim: a critique of political
+reason. In: Foucault, Michel. Strategy, power to
+know. Org. and selection of texts, Manoel Barros
+da Motta; trans., Vera Lucia Avellar Ribeiro. Rio de
+Janeiro: University Forensics. p.355-385. 2006.
+
+The consequences of modernity. Trans., Raul
+Fiker. São Paulo: Ed. Unesp. 1991.
+
+ALVARO, Maria Angela Gemaque.
+
+FOUCAULT, Michel.
+
+History, Science, Health – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+uuuUUU
+
+925
+
+Political arithmetic in Brazil: manifest political desires.
+In: Senra, Nelson de Castro (org.).
+
+SCHWARTZMAN, Simon.
+
+Estadística y nación: a conceptual history of census
+thinking [of] modern Argentina 1869-1914. Buenos Aires:
+Prometeo Libros. 2006.
+
+Sociology of statistics
+
+Preface. Of memory and history: the IBGE in
+transformation at the turn of the century. In: Senra,
+Nelson de Castro (org.). History of Brazilian statistics. v.
+4: Formalized statistics (c.
+
+The observers observed: French survey
+researchers at work. Social Problems, New York, v.35,
+n.5, p.520-535. 1988.
+
+The taming of chance. Cambridge: Cambridge
+University Press. nineteen ninety.
+
+LATOUR, Bruno.
+
+SENRA, Nelson de Castro.
+
+In: Schwartzman, Simon. The causes of poverty.
+Science in action: how to follow scientists and
+engineers through society. Trans., Ivone C.
+
+The knowledge and power of statistics: a history of
+statisticians' relations with national states and the
+sciences. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE/Center for
+Documentation and Information
+Dissemination. 2005.
+
+Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV. p.69-99. 2004.
+
+LATOUR, Bruno.
+
+PORTER, Theodore.
+
+PETTY, William.
+
+The sociology of official statistics. In: Alonso, William;
+Starr, Paul (Ed.). The politics of numbers. New
+York: Russell Sage Foundation. p.7-58. 1983.
+
+Historical research of statistics: themes and
+sources. História, Ciências, Saúde – Manguinhos, Rio
+de Janeiro, v.15, n.2, p.411-425. 2008.
+
+Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986.
+
+(Org.). The power of libraries: the memory of books in
+the West. Trans., Marcela Mortara. Rio de Janeiro: Ed.
+UFRJ. p.21-44. 2000b.
+
+Rapport des travaux des réunions plénaires du Congrés
+Internaional de Statistique, 1853-1876.
+
+Conversations with Brazilian historians. São
+Paulo: Editora 34. 2002.
+
+SENRA, Nelson de Castro.
+
+Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España.
+
+1983.
+
+OTERO, Hernán.
+
+HOCHMAN, Gilberto.
+
+Public statistics and the measurement of poverty.
+
+PENEFF, Jean.
+
+HACKING, Ian.
+
+1972- 2002). Rio de Janeiro: IBGE. p.21-29. 2008.
+
+History of Brazilian statistics (1822-2002). v.1: Desired
+Statistics (1822-c.1889). Rio de Janeiro: IBGE. p.61-82.
+2006.
+
+Henrique Lopes dos Santos, Paulo de Almeida.
+Sao Paulo: Abril Cultural. p.105-158 (The Economists
+Collection). 1983.
+
+STARR, Paul.
+
+Benedetti; rev. of translation, Paula Assis. São Paulo:
+Ed. Unesp. 2000a.
+
+The rise of statistical thinking: 1820-1900.
+
+Networks unknown to reason: laboratories, libraries,
+collections. In: Baratin, M.; Jacob, C.
+
+RAPPORT...
+
+SENRA, Nelson de Castro.
+
+Political arithmetic. In: Petty, William. Economic
+works. Apres., Roberto Campos, trans., Luiz
+
+MORAES, José Geraldo Vinci de; REGO, José Marcio.
+
+v.16, n.4, Oct.-Dec. 2009, p.903-925
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+1 Adjunct professor of the Postgraduate Program in Political Sociology at Candido Mendes
+University (PPGSP-UCAM). Rio de Janeiro - RJ. Brazil.
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo1
+
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+While words always have a contingent resonance, numbers
+make it possible to represent the seriousness and dimension of
+an event, since it is inserted in durable forms and stable series.
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+https://doi.org/10.1590/dados.2022.65.3.267 1-39
+
+ORIGINAL ARTICLES
+
+things are abstracted from judgments and decision-making
+
+Email: alexandre.camargo.2009@gmail.com.
+
+modern world, it is expected that the qualities of people and
+At the
+
+Thus, for example, the quality of a highway is taken by the number
+of accidents that occur on it; the legitimacy of an election arises, in
+part, from the number of voters present; the influence of an expert
+on public opinion corresponds to the number of interviews,
+appearances in news, quotes and references in columns and
+newspaper articles; the value of intellectual work is given by
+academic production indicators. Something similar happens in the
+cultural industry: the quality of a musical or literary work depends
+on the number of copies sold; the impact of a public performance
+is determined by the number of spectators or, more recently, views
+
+that involve allocation of resources and that produce effects on
+the destiny of individuals and social groups. Qualities result from
+particular perceptions and negotiations of meaning in local
+interactions, which is why they hardly inspire consensus on the
+definition of a situation or on the need and desirability of an
+intervention. For this to happen, qualities need to be converted into
+quantities, which provide objectivity protocols and, in liberal
+democracies, sources of discretionary power control. Quantifying
+social facts makes it possible to express and make exist, in
+numerical form, what could only be perceived in words before (Desrosières and Kott; 2005).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+This brief preamble points to the centrality of quantification, especially
+of public statistics, in the organization of modern society . Figures,
+indicators, indices, percentages, rates and averages make up the
+arsenal of proof and inference of the technical and scientific elites ,
+going beyond the scope of application for which they were initially
+created and becoming categories of perception of multiple and
+different social actors . Presenting itself as a synonym of objectivity
+and certainty, numbers and the statistical classifications mediated by
+them mark out the public sphere, adhering to the judgments and
+typifications that ordinary people make in different life situations
+(Desrosières and Thévenot, 1988).
+
+More than a discourse about reality, statistics is a government
+technology , which makes it a privileged object for understanding
+the contours assumed by the perception of a social phenomenon –
+such as inequality –, and its construction as a public problem.
+
+Advancing this reasoning, we can state that a table tabulated
+according to the distribution of suicide by the racial composition of
+the population differs radically from another that tabulates the relative
+participation of color groups in income and average education. These
+differences occur both in terms of the theoretical universe mobilized,
+as well as the conception of society and public agenda in force in
+each case. The same example leads us to different registers of
+inequality, whether in relation to its conditions of possibility – non-existent where and
+
+online; A celebrity's influence is directly proportional to the number of
+their followers on social media. In magazines and newspapers, the
+frequency with which certain themes are repeated in the politics,
+economics and behavior sections, day after day, week after week,
+establishes the relevant conducts for a successful life, as well as the
+necessary skills to face the bad weather. and the risks of social life.
+
+As a sociological object, statistics requires special methodological
+care. We must read matrices and tables as texts, through their
+translation into propositions and systems of hypotheses, expressible
+in verbal language. In this sense, Otero observes that “two tables on
+mortality levels tabulated according to the season of the year or
+according to the socio-occupational groups of the deceased refer to
+two scientific hypotheses and two very different theoretical universes:
+mortality as a climatic fact or as a fact social” (2006: 47).
+
+2-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This reflection is inspired by the sociology of quantification (Berman and Hirschman,
+
+2018; Camargo and Daniel, 2021; Desrosières, 2008a; Diaz-Bone and Didier, 2016;
+
+Espeland and Stevens, 2008). This field has been forming over the last few years, driven,
+
+in part, by the multiplication of practices of quantifying reality under neo-liberalism, which
+
+will be approached here as a political regime for population management (Dean, 1999;
+
+Foucault, 2009; Rose, 1999). Over the past few decades, increasing pressure to incorporate
+
+scientific evidence into policy decisions, to extend market discipline to governmental and
+
+non-profit organizations, and to coordinate different activities across long cultural and
+
+geographic distances has produced a large increase in in the ways of reasoning,
+
+evaluating, measuring and comparing with numbers (Espeland and Stevens, 2008).
+
+Therefore, this article shares these guidelines to discuss issues such as: the role of
+
+quantification procedures in the construction of the State and social routines; the ways of
+
+governing the population through numbers; and the modalities of statistical criticism of
+
+reality, in the processes of social change. To this end, it uses the contributions of Michel
+
+Foucault and governmentality studies on
+
+3-39
+
+when mortality is a climatic fact – either in relation to the visual field of what can be
+
+problematized and governed at a given moment: income inequality and job security, in the
+
+case of tabulating mortality by occupational groups; racial inequality, in the case of the
+
+intersection between color and education.
+
+In the wake of this movement, the sociology of quantification seeks to analyze the
+
+processes of production and communication of numbers, maps and graphs – as visual
+
+representations of numerical information –, in their effects of power on society. It follows
+
+the classic questions of sociology, relating quantification to social inequality, forms of
+
+evaluation and coordination of action, social knowledge, conflict and criticism, the
+
+rationalization of life and the organization of work; without failing to also approach it as an
+
+object in itself and in its own right. This analytical perspective is interested both in the
+
+processes of quantification in science or guided by it, as well as in the processes located
+
+on the border between politics, administration and public life – such as the implementation
+
+of numerical technologies, standardization procedures and bureaucratic management and
+
+the decision-making process and the formation of collective subjects (Diaz-Bone and
+
+Didier, 2016).
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+It is also based on the postulates of French pragmatic sociology, in
+particular the concept of “equivalence conventions” and the idea of
+“plurality of logics of action”, which allow us to understand the dual
+nature of statistics, as an instrument of proof and as an instrument of
+government . , proposed by Desrosières (1993). It then discusses the
+work of this author, highlighting his typology of State forms, which
+relates the ways of quantifying reality to the ways of governing the
+population (Desrosières, 2008b, 2014b). Finally, it makes critical use of
+this model to outline a genealogy of the levels of reflexivity mediated
+and enabled by numerical devices.
+
+Its contribution consists of (re)thinking the State and transformative
+social agency based on a synthesis between the constructivist
+perspective of the Anglo-Foucaultians, who relate forms of quantification
+to other technologies for inducing conduct, and the approach advocated
+by Desrosières , which prioritizes the science of statistics and its role
+in the coordination of social life. At the same time, it offers a substantial
+review of the social studies of quantification. In particular, its contributions
+to the construction of the State and the determinants of agency.
+
+Quantifying allows you to communicate and stabilize facts and meanings
+across broad networks of actors and institutions. This is because
+statistical devices translate the formulations of specialized knowledge,
+such as social sciences, into cognitive resources mobilized by practical
+consciousness in social existence. Thus, for example, the genesis of
+the price index in different countries was marked by the initiative, on
+the part of authorities and experts, to monitor inflation and regulate
+economic behavior. Immediately, the new statistical device proved
+incapable of defending social actors from rising prices – its declared
+purpose. This is precisely because they were socialized into a new
+culture of numbers, which allowed them to manipulate the difference
+between the counting units of the erudite economy and the payment
+units of the ordinary economy, anticipating their actions in view of the
+loss of value of money. Given the indexation of the economy and
+salaries, the feedback of statistics on actors, instead of containing it,
+contributed to stimulating inflation (Neiburg, 2011).
+
+the statistical induction of social agency in liberalism and neoliberalism,
+“government regimes” that produce and consume freedoms.
+
+4-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+QUANTIFY TO GOVERN AND CRITICIZE
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Authors situated within the theoretical framework of governmentality
+studies, such as Rose (1992, 1999), Miller (2001) and Dean (1999),
+dedicated themselves to analyzing the constitutive link between the
+quantification of public life and liberal government . Numbers would be
+presented as an instrument for realizing the democratic promise of
+aligning the exercise of public authority with the private beliefs and
+values of citizens. On the one hand, numbers impose a brake on the
+discretionary power of governments and experts by forcing political
+choices and bureaucratic decisions to be subject to protocols that
+make them appear to be products of standardized analytical
+techniques. On the other hand, democratic government requires
+vigilant and calculating citizens in relation to the effects of power and
+the risks of their private decisions, constantly affected by opinion and
+market research that displace and quantify perceptions of reality
+(Rose, 1999). The growing quantification of the contemporary world
+would be a phenomenon to be understood by two complementary
+dimensions that characterize modern governments : mutual surveillance
+and the induction of conduct through freedoms and autonomies produced and consumed by liberalism.
+
+From the perspectives of Foucault (2008, 2009) and Latour (1988,
+2000), maps, cartograms, censuses and statistics are approached as
+technologies of government at a distance, because they respect the
+autonomy of private spheres and suggest conduct appropriate to
+particular conceptions of individual and collective well-being. In this
+sense, statistics would be a liberal technology of government because
+it proceeds through the delimitation of authority and the codification of
+domains of society, populated by individuals who act in accordance
+with certain principles of interest and outside the legitimate scope of
+direct intervention, with their own economic processes and cohesion
+dynamics. Statistics are seen here as a device for transferring
+government activity to the surface of society; and it does so by
+structuring the field of possible actions and providing actors with norms
+and standards for their own judgments, aspirations and conduct (Rose, 1999: 48-49).
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 5-39
+
+In this sense, some heuristic questions become sociologically
+relevant to think about the relationship between quantification,
+agency and social change. What can be visualized or,
+conversely, what remains obscure in certain moments or
+societies, when we look at devices such as censuses, maps,
+graphs, tables and diagrams, which form the visual field of what
+and who should be governed? How statistics produces subjects of government, of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+workers and consumers to so-called risk groups? How do numbers suggest or
+induce the skills expected of them?
+
+This distinction allows us to conceive of statistics as an institutional form that
+calls reality into question and paves the way for the world. The logic of risk
+encompasses these two dimensions. As a technology for taming chance, it is
+designed based on the calculation of probabilities, based on measurable
+precision, according to relatively stabilized formats and tests. But risk also
+enshrines uncertainty as a principle of knowledge and collective action. Rejects
+the pretension to accuracy and control of events, introducing what is possible
+into order.
+
+In the methodological realism shared by pragmatism, the relationship between
+statistical devices and the constitution of reality is always established in a
+circular fashion. While the effectiveness of categorization rests on the
+previously consolidated legal basis, the numerical content that statistics
+confers on social entities inscribes them in a reality conceived as independent
+of individual actions and political decisions (Boltanski, 2014). For this reason,
+statistics would be one of the main mediators of the relationship between
+reality and the world, aligning itself with the reformist critique, which takes into
+account the resilience of the forms of the State in the face of the flow of events
+that disturb the order.
+
+How are individuals and populations led to identify with certain groups, in
+order to become virtuous and governable?
+
+6-39
+
+All of these are issues sensitive to governmentality studies and the sociology
+of quantification, insofar as they privilege the material, visual and spatial
+dimensions of government, and which draw attention to the cartographies of
+power and authority. It is assumed that the success of a government regime
+depends on how actors experience themselves through the capabilities (such
+as making rational decisions), qualities (such as having a job) and status (such
+as being an active citizen) encouraged and favored by it ( Dean, 1999).
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+In an entirely different register, the sociology of criticism by Boltanski (2009)
+considers the reflexivity of social actors and their ability to justify their actions
+and to mobilize their sense of justice with a view to establishing the societal
+bond. The distinction that the author makes between what he calls reality,
+which “tends to be confused with what seems to maintain itself by its own
+strength”, that is, with order, and, on the other hand, the world, the flow of
+events and experiences, the possibility of which is not contained in the known
+totality (Boltanski, 2009: 93).
+
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+The reformist critique can rely on statistical instruments based
+on preexisting forms, mainly when comparing different domains
+of reality and establishing correlations between variables. In
+turn, the radical and revolutionary position emphasizes the
+interdependence of the elements that make up reality, denying
+the possibility of their modification without transforming the whole at once.
+It is a type of criticism that finds it very difficult to resort to statistics,
+since it must be based on evidence that has not been the object of
+mappings and totalizations and that, therefore, are first presented
+to experience as singularities and exceptions. , approaching
+aesthetics and art more than social sciences (Boltanski, 2014).
+
+We thus see that, depending on the theoretical perspective
+chosen, quantification can be approached either as a technology
+of government and domination , or as a source of creation of
+publics and social collectives. It gives institutional form to scattered
+wills, feelings and concerns and, thus, formalizes the critique that
+leads to reform and emancipation. Underlying both strands –
+governmentality studies and French pragmatism – is the interest
+in the growing and accelerated penetration of quantification
+practices in different domains of everyday life, enabling the
+privatization of risks and their harmful effects on intimacy, work relationships and life management.
+
+Consequently, social action (which always develops in a concrete
+situation) is reduced to its result, as established by goals and
+performance levels previously set in an indefinite and autonomous
+cycle of comparative evaluations – which instill a spirit
+competitiveness and a compulsion for
+
+In fact, the production of subjectivities and freedoms that, in fact,
+camouflage the capture of initiatives and singularities, has never
+been as striking and comprehensive as it is today. Numbers have
+never been so dominated as under the neoliberal government.
+Public services are commodified and monitored by the ability to
+satisfy a clientele made up of citizens, in a relationship that boils
+down to efficiency and utility; emptied of the principle of
+universality and protection that until then characterized the
+modern nation-state. Such a change becomes possible thanks to
+benchmarking, the procedure for quantifying not only the agents'
+activities but also their organizational environment.
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 7-39
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+The new and perverse imperative of evaluating each activity by a
+single metric considered appropriate constrains the actors to
+report more and more to indicators, and less and less to
+judgments based on acquired skills. This is what happens in a
+variety of cases, such as the reduction in traffic safety due to the
+number of accidents and alcohol consumption tests; or, yet, the
+growing dependence of health professionals in relation to the
+number of consultations – one of the criteria for career progression
+and release of resources to hospitals.
+
+If benchmarking deposes the evaluation skills of actors in
+circumstances considered unique and singular, the generalization
+of quantification opens up new possibilities for criticizing reality
+and allows for another attitude towards public figures: that of
+giving visibility to the inequalities produced by global capitalism.
+Social movements have never used statistics as an instrument of
+resistance as they do today. This is what the strong politicization
+of racial classifications points to; the dispute over which categories
+are counted in crime statistics; or pressures against economic
+domination.
+
+This framework invites us to carry out an exploratory analysis of
+contemporary ways of reasoning, valuing, measuring and
+comparing with numbers , and which single out the ways of
+quantifying in neoliberalism when compared to other government
+regimes. On the next pages, a genealogy of the forms of reflexivity
+mediated and made possible by quantification devices will be
+outlined , in order to (re)introduce estrangement in relation to the
+increasingly quantified world in which we live, opening a new
+horizon of criticism of the present. It is, therefore, a preliminary
+investigation into long-term processes, which requires knowing
+which levels of agency and social life were progressively
+constructed as commensurable domains.
+
+“good practices” (Bruno and Didier, 2013: 13). As Desrosières
+stated , “once quantification procedures are codified and
+routinized, their products are reified. They tend to become
+'reality' through a ratchet effect, which is very difficult to
+reverse” (2008a: 12). Constrained by benchmarking, agents are
+obliged to achieve quantified objectives and to indefinitely
+intensify their performance in the area defined by the indicator.
+
+8-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+POLITICAL REGIMES AND STATISTICAL REASONING: ALAIN’S CONTRIBUTION
+
+From the point of view of statistical work, this dual attitude is reflected in the quest to
+
+create objects that remain, both for formal reasons – manufacturing indicators,
+
+classifications and models of coherent and realistic representation of reality – and for
+social reasons – the aspiration to legitimacy as a convention and in the constitution of
+society. Taken together, these properties would respond to the effectiveness
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+DESROSIÈRES
+
+9-39
+
+One of the founders of the sociology of quantification, the Frenchman Alain Des
+
+Rosières (1940-2013), was noted for his radically innovative approach to statistics,
+
+always highlighting its dual dimension of “instrument of proof” and “instrument of
+
+government”, present since his pioneering work on the socio-genesis of professional
+
+nomenclatures1. The book already showed the tension that would run through all of
+
+his work, between, on the one hand, an internalist approach to the procedures of
+
+scientific resource to numbers and, on the other, the destabilization of numerical proof
+through the denunciation of its construction by the dominant groups (Desrosières and
+Thévenot, 1988). From then on, his reflections were profoundly marked by the idea of
+the multiplicity of equivalence conventions and the plurality of the logics of action, one
+of the main postulates of the economy of conventions (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991;
+Thévenot, 1986). Desrosières emphasized that all quantification is necessarily preceded
+by a convention – the categorization of a phenomenon precedes its measurement –,
+which implies that statistics must be conceived simultaneously as conventional and real.
+
+This conception appears formulated for the first time in his book La politique des grands
+
+nombres (1993), in which the author carries out a sociological history of statistical
+
+reason, whose intelligibility resides in the permanent oscillation between its two opposite
+
+and complementary poles: numerical proof, which serves to describe reality and, as
+
+such, an indisputable reference that precedes debates; and State activity, which serves
+
+to prescribe and act on that same reality and, as such, is the target of denunciation and
+
+deconstruction of the pyramid of equivalences that sustain social distinction. These are,
+
+therefore, two registers of language that result in two attitudes towards reality that must
+
+also be taken into account in sociological analysis: one realistic (objectivist) and the
+
+other relativist (constructivist).
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+This reflection clearly comes close to the Foucaultian perspective
+on government regimes, especially with regard to the circularity
+between the field of knowledge (and numbers) and the modalities
+of public intervention. Although Desrosières only became aware of
+Foucault's lectures decades after the philosopher's death - with the
+late publication of his courses at the Collège de France it is possible
+to perceive the same underlying theoretical concern: what is the
+relationship between statistical instruments and the forms of
+subjectivation and induction of social agency?
+
+–,
+
+In L´État, le Marché et les Statistiques2 (2008b), Desrosières conceives
+the concept of “political regimes of statistics”, applying the epistemological
+framework developed in La politique des grands nombres as a theoretical
+solution for a more precise articulation between the poles of proof and
+the government. The text proposes to historicize public action by linking
+different types of State, different ways of governing the population and
+configurations of statistical practices.
+On the one hand, it is understood that the State does not have a single
+form and that its actions cannot be interpreted from the same rationality
+of intervention. On the other hand, the modalities of public action are
+related to the material and cognitive instruments historically constructed
+by the State and which enable interventions.
+
+There are important differences, however. As Diaz-Bone and Didier
+(2016) observed , Foucault linked statistics in general to neoliberal
+governmentality, leaving aside the variations between statistical
+techniques that correspond to different modalities of criticizing reality –
+precisely what interested Desrosières. Different statistical methods have
+different effects on population management, hence the importance of a
+research program aimed at demonstrating the associations between
+ways of quantifying and ways of governing.
+
+(2008) offers a tentative answer, identifying five ideal types of State
+forms based on their relationship with the economy and
+
+of statistics as a basis for the societal bond: “For these objects
+(categories, concepts, measures) to be permanent, they must be based
+on conventions, which must be unquestionable for life to follow its course
+and, however, debatable for that life can change course” (Desrosières,
+1993: 398).
+
+10-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+The model developed from L´État, le marché et les statistics
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+We recognize the fecundity of the model, especially in relation to the
+political-cognitive logic that presides over and links the ways of quantifying
+to the ways of governing the population in each ideal-typical configuration.
+
+economic conduct. In this way, census technologies and population and
+production statistics would adjust to the needs of the “Engineer State”;
+price statistics based on classical economic theory accompany the
+“Liberal State”; labor statistics , budget surveys of working families,
+probability calculation techniques for determining social insurance are
+the basis of the political rationality of the Providential State; national
+accounting, research on consumption and employment and econometric
+techniques respond to the needs of the “Keynesian State ”. Following
+the crisis of the two previous and intertwined models, the “Neoliberal
+State” puts an end to forecasting and planning techniques based on
+macroeconomic knowledge. Instead, it takes advantage of the
+generalization of benchmarking techniques that rest on the principle of
+rational anticipations and the promotion of competition between actors.
+And they do so according to measurable goals and objectives , and no
+longer according to the concrete relationships in which they take part
+(Armatte, 2014: 21).
+
+Although quite fruitful in the possibilities of analysis it reveals, the
+proposed approach, like most models of a logical nature, faces the
+difficulty of articulating abstract forms and concrete and situated historical
+regimes. This is the case of the “Engineer State”, which the author
+defines as strongly hierarchical and rationally organized , occupying the
+space of the private sector in order to plan long-term structural
+transformations through the production of demographic statistics and
+exchange tables between industrial sectors. trials (Desrosières, 2008b:
+41-44). The problem with this definition is that it remains historically too
+fluid, encompassing both Colbertism in absolutist France and the Soviet
+planning regime – in which statistics appears fully identified with the
+higher levels of bureaucracy and economic dirigisme, in its original
+meaning of “ state science”.
+
+We will weave a dialogue between the approach suggested by
+Desrosières and the reflections of Foucault and governmentality studies
+on biopolitics and the conditions of minimum government that
+characterize liberalism (Fou Cault, 2009). That is, the view of statistics
+understood as a technology of liberal government, insofar as it delimits authority through
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 11-39
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+codification of society's domains and respect for the autonomy of the private
+sphere, inducing appropriate conduct to particular conceptions of individual and
+collective well-being. The objective is to try to overcome typological limitations
+through a genealogical analysis, emphasizing the singularity of the events that
+sometimes sustain, sometimes discontinue government regimes. This option will
+allow us to examine the levels of social life progressively constructed as domains
+of commensuration and the modalities of criticism revealed by each of the
+configurations proposed by Desrosières3 .
+
+In the Liberal State, the economic government delimits the uses of statistics as
+a public regulator, ensuring that economic decisions are not supported by the will
+or authority of the rulers,
+
+12-39
+
+QUANTIFICATION IN THE LIBERAL STATE
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+In the Liberal State, the governmental reason turns to the configuration of the
+market as a source of veridiction of economic processes and self-limitation of
+political power. The market, as a naturalized stage of action, poses a limitation
+to the government every time it rehearses unwanted interventions, as unnatural,
+in the order of things and interests (Foucault, 2009: 44). It is in the self-regulated
+space of the market that economics seeks the essence of homo economicus –
+a form of subject that is supposed to be inscribed in nature and, therefore, in
+historical development.
+
+The ethical subject of government, guided by market transparency, must be
+calculating and prudent with regard to the effects of its choices and decisions, in
+addition to having a practical awareness of economic operations that promote its
+interests. In this framework, individuals are led to (re)cognize the dangers that
+constitute social life, threatening the freedoms that the government needs to
+produce the responsible subject and, thus, transfer governmental activity to the
+surface of society. It is up to the Liberal State to guarantee security mechanisms
+and encourage an education on danger, enabling individuals to experience it on
+a daily basis: from police literature to journalistic interest in crime; from hygiene
+campaigns to the framing of sexuality as a source of degeneration of the
+individual, nation and race. From the middle of the 19th century, “danger will
+progressively become the psychological and cultural correlate of
+liberalism” (Foucault, 2009: 90-91).
+
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+but in the regularities that constitute the economy and society. Statistics, alongside the
+
+unification of weights and measures and the harmonization of the timetable system,
+
+originates an information regime based on quantification, allowing sequences of activities
+
+to be synchronized in time and space (Camargo, 2016: 85).
+
+With regard to the production of a capitalist economic ethos, efforts to standardize
+
+international trade were important, aimed at regulating customs and exchange rates to
+
+enable the management of national currencies. It was not by chance that the International
+
+Statistical Congresses, created in 1853, were driven by the conviction that international
+
+trade statistics would undermine protectionism and state interventions in the market,
+
+revealing that “liberalism was the underlying tendency of internationalism this tistic”4
+
+(Gagnon, 2000: 193). From the end of the 19th century, with the need to regulate industrial
+
+concentration and establish a parameter for antitrust legislation, economic statistics
+
+became reflective, capturing the effects of price changes on the behavior of sellers and
+
+buyers (Desrosières, 2008b: 46 ).
+
+13-39
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Thus, statistical practices must be understood from the perspective of the market as a
+
+principle of social cohesion and self-limitation of the State, referring to the awareness of
+
+danger and the economic agency of the ethical subject of liberalism.
+
+In the first case, the criminal, demographic and health statistics of urban interventions
+
+stand out, which space crime, poverty and disease as an eminent risk of social life. Taken
+
+together, these statistics revealed the measure of crime, insanity, prostitution, vagrancy,
+
+and suicide. Phenomena that were previously considered residual and treated in the
+
+voluntaristic terms of virtue and vice and that now became categories of deviation to be
+known and measured because they represent a threat to the unity of society (Hacking,
+
+1982). Alongside detective novels, which explored the everyday life of criminality, the serial
+
+visualization of a varied grid of phenomena, previously inaccessible to comparison, was
+
+fundamental in shaping the eminently liberal notion of security. An inseparable notion of
+
+the internalization of violence, which resulted from the reduction of contrasts and emotional
+
+excitement to which individuals were subject before the pacification of social spaces (Elias,
+
+1993).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+QUANTIFICATION IN THE PROVIDENTIAL STATE
+
+Social insurance was the technology of government, generated in response
+to the crisis caused by the tension between capital and work, which
+fermented the revolutionary environment of the second half of the 19th
+century. It constituted the base from which the elements of the State would be built.
+
+14-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Courts, reformatories, schools, clinics, kindergartens and maternity
+hospitals are among the new institutions that link the fiscal and
+bureaucratic capacities of the State to the government of the social.
+Similarly, devices such as social insurance, accidents at work, the
+school hygiene booklet and unemployment and family budget statistics
+will make it possible to link the aspirations of authorities to the daily lives of individuals.
+
+The Welfare State corresponds to the rearticulation of the political
+rationality of liberalism in the face of the invention of the social. It seeks
+to promote the socialization of the risks produced by the division of
+labor through the organization of care and employment promotion
+devices . Rose and Miller (1992) propose that the “social” be
+understood as terrain brought into existence by the government itself;
+a space of unprecedented and specific problems, the target of
+technologies and programs aimed at guaranteeing social and economic
+objectives: the reversal of the decline in the birth rate; the control of
+delinquency and antisocial behavior; education and family socialization;
+the social consequences of unhealthy conditions and the advantages
+provided by a healthy population; the integration of citizens into the
+moral community of the civitas.
+
+The invention of the social as a register of society would expand the
+possibilities of action at a distance, making the State the fundamental
+vector of coordination of human activities and responsible for preventing
+the evils produced by the very organization of society: accidents,
+natural disabilities, hereditary and contagious diseases. , nail down.
+Far from violating the principle of minimal government, State intervention
+will be justified by the notion of debt to those exposed to the disastrous
+consequences of the division of labor, following the canon of liberal
+utilitarianism: repairing damages and remedying evils, in order to
+increase the chances successful collective actions of each one, through
+their own merits (Camargo, 2016). It is not a denial, but an unfolding of
+the political rationality of liberalism that reconfigures the relations
+between State, quantification and social agency.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+The fact that the reliability of these data is heavily criticized in no
+way compromises the points that interest us more closely: the
+beginning of regular monitoring of unemployment; the construction
+of the unemployed person as a subject position based on statistical series; your
+
+-unemployment and social assistance. Involving salaried workers'
+unions , research on the budget of working families and on consumer
+goods was established by investing social relations in statistical forms
+capable of providing a language for the expression of claims and
+negotiations resulting from class conflicts (Desrosières, 2014a: 55).
+
+In this framework, statistical practices will be redirected towards the
+production of new spaces and subjects of government, focusing on
+the indexation of wages, the extent of unemployment and the cost of
+living. It is worth highlighting here the statistical construction of the
+phenomenon of unemployment and the figure of the unemployed
+person. If during most of the 19th century political economists saw
+unemployment as a temporary phenomenon, due to the impossibility
+of balancing supply and demand, the 1880s and 1890s witnessed the
+consecration of the term “unemployed” as a synonym for a person
+who does not work. against your will. Introduced by Alfred Mashall,
+“unemployment” was soon defined as “the total amount of human
+labor power not employed in the production of social wealth” (Hobson
+apud Alberti, 2011: 2). With this precise meaning, “unemployed” has
+become a recurrent category in population censuses and in periodic
+surveys , another novelty inaugurated by the national departments of labor.
+
+The first censuses in which the unemployed appear were those of the
+USA (1880), Germany (1895), France (1896) and Italy (1901). Two
+aspects must be highlighted. First: it was these surveys, which brought
+the definition of unemployment as an involuntary condition, which
+allowed sewing for the first time the distinction between economically
+active and inactive population, allocating the unemployed as part of
+the first group. Second: the compilation of regular data on the subject
+involved, also in an unprecedented way, the cooperation between
+government agencies and workers' unions , which passed on the
+records of their members' activities in order to receive unemployment
+benefits and other corresponding benefits. , equally recent (Camargo,
+2016: 80).
+
+Keynesian: retirement based on age and length of work, social assistance
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 15-39
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+Therefore, alongside the development of a whole machinery for
+personnel management and well-being provision, such as new
+health facilities, recreation spaces and support for savings and
+loans, statistics was one of the fundamental technologies of
+transformation. mation of the workplace in a social domain.
+Together, the new resources shifted political conflicts from the
+workplace, transforming it into a space for risk distribution and
+accident prevention (Rose, 1999: 126). As Donzelot (1994:
+121-177) put it well , one of the most important effects of
+insurance was the de-dramatization of social conflicts, by
+eliminating the problem of assigning responsibility for the origins
+of public ills and reducing the impasse to a matter of technical
+choice. , among different parameters, to optimize jobs, wages and investments.
+
+From the point of view of the economy and economic agency,
+new indicators are invented, according to a principle of joint
+optimization of regulatory strategies, making the economy compatible with
+
+binding to concrete legal effects (benefits and penalties); and the
+deepening of interdependence through the expansion of the
+security/freedom game for work as the government's new visual
+field. In this way, the solidity and uses of statistical information
+are increased through the translation of interests and the
+organization of action in a network, involving bosses, employees,
+their respective unions, government agencies, statistical
+bureaucracy and social analysts, among others (Camargo, 2016: 81).
+
+The Keynesian State differs from the Providential State by the
+industrial scale of the social management mechanisms and by
+the ability to link a wide variety of local points to a center of
+government and calculation, which expands the possibilities of
+population monitoring. Employment agencies, rehabilitation
+clinics, health posts, courts, schools, asylums and factories
+become institutional spaces for identifying men, women and
+children as pathological individuals. If before these spaces were
+limited to prescribing reform measures, now they track risk
+groups benefiting from protection policies, mobilizing social
+workers and other specialists in a visible network (and subject to
+normalizing intervention) supported by a bureaucracy of pedagogy and care . (Rose, 1999: 131-133).
+
+QUANTIFICATION IN THE KEYNESIAN STATE
+
+16-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This phenomenon is best symbolized by the emergence of national accounting.
+
+Distinguishing themselves from the old estimates of countries' revenue, characteristic of
+
+the Liberal State, national accounts invest the national space in the form of a large
+
+company, calculating different variations in size and visualizing human activities as a flow
+
+of services and goods – innovation made possible by introduction of sample research5 .
+
+Secondly, although sample surveys have the census as their primary source of information,
+
+they show a political-cognitive revolution in the quantification of reality. The metrological
+
+realism of the census is based on the vision of the national territory as an organic totality
+
+and on the recognition of its internal division, in census districts and demographic regions.
+
+All subunit counts in this set refer to the national average, which defines what is accidental
+
+and/or exceptional. Random sampling, on the other hand, makes the part autonomous in
+
+relation to the whole as it deterritorializes the observation conditions of economic and
+
+social relations. While the census is marked by the exhaustiveness and accuracy of the
+
+count, which denote a conception of truth linked to correspondence with reality, the
+
+sampling has its authenticity guaranteed by its degree of precision, through the control of
+
+the margin of error, suggestively called “confidence interval”. In place of
+
+17-39
+
+social management. The main innovation lies in the presentation of wealth and production
+
+as a whole articulated in macroeconomic flows, capable of being measured and
+
+reconnected in theoretically coherent and exhaustive accounting tables (Desrosières,
+
+2008b: 50).
+
+The adoption of sampling in statistical research was much more than a mere technical
+
+innovation. Firstly, by covering a much more restricted universe of people and situations,
+
+representative sampling makes it possible to reduce the high costs of an exhaustive survey
+
+with a territorial and synchronic basis (such as the census) in addition to making its results
+
+available much more quickly. Dependence on the census as the only source of information
+
+on population movements gives way to continuous and monthly surveys of inflation (price
+
+index), unemployment (monthly job survey), consumption (household budget), industrial
+
+growth (input matrix). -product) and social development (GDP per capita), which enable
+
+the constant monitoring of flows according to the company's rationale and on a national
+
+scale.
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+(Rose, 1999: 135-136). In the crisis of the Keynesian State, individual
+conduct ceases to be socially determined, while the social becomes
+
+18-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+According to Desrosières (1988: 93-112), the policy of measurable
+precision, which is the basis of sampling, only emerges when local
+techniques for managing public problems, typical of previous
+regimes , give way to the management of a State that is presents
+itself as the center that subordinates and hierarchizes the peripheries of power.
+
+The effects of the sampling revolution on the performativity of
+numbers and the conditions of reflexivity will be felt at different
+levels. On the one hand, research that reveals the inequality of
+mobility between socio-professional categories begins to guide the
+career choices and advancement strategies of social actors. On the
+other hand, inflation and cost of living indicators become an
+obligatory point of reference for families' consumption options, for
+union pressure for wage indexation and for the construction of the
+economic crisis as a social fact.
+
+correspondence, an approximate truth is pursued in favor of the
+level of significance that the data can impart to the pragmatic action
+of the State and economic actors.
+
+Previously, economic agents relied on a general and diffuse
+knowledge of the conditions in which they operated to predict
+scenarios and anticipate situations. Now, their actions are constantly
+reoriented by a varied repertoire of fluctuating information about
+investment opportunities and the availability of resources that
+guarantee risk collectivization policies – such as “full employment”,
+social insurance, universal education and care for the elderly,
+children, the disabled and the alienated.
+
+The planned and planning State figures here as the main guarantor
+of individual freedom against the pathologies and risks that surround
+social life. Neoliberal criticism disqualifies this association between
+freedom and regulation, accusing joint responsibility of producing a
+culture of dependence that inhibits the individual's ability to undertake
+and optimize their well-being and quality of life.
+Through the new social form of “community” – an intermediary
+between the individual and society –, subjects will be produced by
+the consumption of identities to which values and belongings
+defined by ethnicity, lifestyle, sexuality, political affiliations, etc. are linked. .
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 19-39
+
+Therefore, the responsibility of individuals, families and
+communities increases , as risk minimization becomes an aspect
+of the choices they make as consumers, clients and service users.
+In the 19th century, prudence was limited to procreation,
+industrious behavior, sobriety and domestic frugality . In neoliberal
+governmentality, the virtuous and calculating subject needs to
+monitor the risks related to the most different domains of social
+life: physical and mental health, sexual life, chemical and emotional
+dependence, unemployment, helplessness in old age, school
+performance , professional failure, low self-esteem, exposure to
+crime, among others (Dean, 1999).
+
+From guarantor of public life and manager of the risks that
+constitute it, the State becomes a facilitator of the virtues that
+individuals must possess as active citizens, capable of making
+choices to satisfy their interests and live prudently. The action of
+public authorities aims to empower subjects through techniques
+to promote autonomy, such as examination of conscience, concern
+for self-esteem, alternative pedagogy and the rhetoric of voice and
+direct representation, which pass to reconfigure the role of statecertified
+institutions. Schools, hospitals, organizations
+
+The Neoliberal State is characterized by the generalization of the
+economic form of the market to society as a whole, functioning as
+a principle of intelligibility of social relations and individual
+behaviors (Foucault, 2009). The formalization of society, based
+on the company model, becomes an instrument that shapes
+administration by providing a new foundation for power that
+encompasses and goes beyond the old political and legal criticism
+of “excessive government”. This is because the market ceases to
+constitute the principle of self-limitation of the government, as
+occurred in classical liberalism, to become a kind of court through
+which non-economic behaviors – such as crime, judicial decisions,
+pathologies social and family life – are now read through the analytical key of economics.
+
+fragments into a myriad of communities understood as the new
+terrain on which individuals' dispositions, cultures, and
+pathologies can be problematized and reformed.
+
+QUANTIFICATION IN THE NEOLIBERAL STATE
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+tions, employment agencies and trade associations are transformed into
+partners in the government enterprise of welfare achievement (Rose, 1999:
+147).
+
+Public numbers become a relevant item of consumption and agencies that
+produce official data are redefined as providers of services determined by the
+needs of their users.
+They become companies that offer products in a market made up of customers
+who are sensitive to price and quality. There is pressure for the abandonment
+of research that does not meet consumer demand for information, judged to
+be expensive and inefficient due to the budgetary restriction policy. Statistical
+work is framed by the principles of marketing and total quality (which impose a
+calendar of pre-fixed dates for the publication of research) and good practice
+manuals for its validation: accessibility, transparency, independence,
+objectivity and secrecy are some of the demands that statisticians must face
+in the face of the dismemberment of the State and the retreat of trust in
+professional authority (Beaud and Prévost, 2010).
+
+This is about displacing the authority of experts, criticized for promoting
+exclusions and delegitimizing local forms of knowledge, infantilizing patients,
+students, unemployed people, retirees and all sorts of people assisted by the
+bureaucracy of pedagogy and care.
+
+The conversion of public goods into services offered to clientele not only
+reconfigures the State but also changes the forms of subjectivation. Subjection
+becomes a condition of freedom, as suggested by the example of the
+unemployed person, who only receives assistance if they commit to looking
+for work and matching the profile desired by companies. The support and
+guidance received by the consumer of employment agency services precedes
+and induces the freedom to be exercised by the worker.
+
+Experts will be trained and evaluated for their ability to observe the needs of
+their audiences and to respect the right to the body and the principle of selfdetermination,
+which preside over the need to explain protocols and share the
+risks involved in each position taken ( Rose and Miller, 1992).
+
+20-39
+
+The cooling of bureaucratic and professional domination reflects the
+dismemberment of the State into multiple service provision agencies, whose
+quality must be achieved through the same business management practices,
+and constantly guided by the needs of its consumers. The case of statistical
+institutions is emblematic.
+
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Benchmarking is a government technology, a specific art for conducting social
+
+organizations. According to Bruno and Didier (2013: 18), it is characterized by a sequence
+
+of actions: 1) definition of a series of statistical indicators that measure the performances
+
+of a certain number of pre-identified actors and activities; 2) setting a quantified objective
+
+to be achieved, for each indicator used; 3) delimitation of the time interval during which
+
+the
+
+lhador. It is a government regime marked by freedom practices that continually associate
+
+subjection and subjectivation. On the one hand, it promotes contract, consultation,
+
+negotiation, partnership, empowering forms of agency and choice of individuals, families,
+
+consumers, professionals, neighborhoods and communities. On the other hand, it
+
+establishes norms, goals, quality control, performance indicators and standards of good
+
+practice to monitor, measure and make calculable the performances of the most different
+
+actors and agencies (Dean, 1999: 165).
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+This last point constitutes the main difference between previous quantification practices
+
+and those of neoliberal governmentality.
+
+21-39
+
+While the statistics of the Keynesian State gave rise to the fight against unemployment
+
+and the defense of families' purchasing power, new measurement instruments were
+
+disseminated by the public administration to govern their own employees and the
+
+relationships they maintain with their users-clients - citizens, taxpayers, retirees and
+
+students. Feedback on the agency is significantly expanded with benchmarking, that is,
+
+the evaluation and classification according to goals and performance levels, which is made
+
+possible by the dissemination of the theory of rational anticipations and the adoption of
+
+mechanisms to encourage conduct.
+
+According to this theory, public policies tend to fail when actors integrate the anticipated
+
+effects of public decisions into their cognitive schemes. An understanding that underlies
+
+the decomposition of the State into several management centers, managed like companies,
+
+targets of the same incitement devices for objectives that guide other economic actors.
+
+Econometric models allow us to separate the expected effects of policies and isolate them
+
+from the results achieved, which are improved by the pressure of fiscal stimuli and codes
+
+of good practice (Desrosières, 2014b).
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+This is a fundamental difference between the indicators produced by
+INSEE or IBGE, on the situation or the price index, and the indicators
+that the actors produce about themselves for the purpose of optimizing
+management. In the first case, the numbers result from the observation
+of an external reality; in the second, a gaze directed at oneself in a
+continuous and self-referential manner. This reveals the essential
+tension of the new system, which depends on trusting those who are
+in a position to produce , because they know, and, at the same time,
+distrusting them, due to the permanent threat of fraud and lies (Bruno and Didier, 2013).
+
+From an organizational point of view, fraud and irregularities become
+tolerable as long as they do not cost more than the suppression of the
+surveillance apparatus saves. The evaluators' prerogative to evaluate
+themselves is presented as an advantage, an anti- bureaucratic
+weapon, as employees gain a significant margin of initiative, supposedly
+freeing themselves from the constraints of hierarchy and the formalism
+of regulations. Similarly, by being based on voluntary adherence and
+by remunerating work based on results – and not by hours worked –,
+the new regime would bring the additional advantage of valuing merit
+and creative capacity, when, in fact, agents are subjected to a more
+perverse and subtle domination than the old interference of the
+hierarchical superior, the law and the sovereign power.
+
+In this new regime of public quantification, the indicators depend
+on the agents themselves to quantify and monitor their activities.
+After all, who can know how many articles a researcher has
+published in a given year, other than himself? Who can know
+how many interventions a police patrol carries out in a day,
+other than the police themselves? How many patients were seen
+in a shift, if not the doctors on duty? The appraised who become
+their own appraisers, accounting and reporting the data that concern them.
+
+This is because, unlike public statistics, benchmarking is not
+intended to reflect and transform external reality, but to modify
+the behavior of the actors themselves based on the freedoms
+that it produces and consumes. On the one hand, being public,
+the measures of quantified activities constrain those responsible
+to make efforts to avoid the humiliation of bad results. On the other hand, each
+
+22-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+actors strive to achieve those objectives; and 4) planning
+meetings to compare the performances obtained and define the
+goals for the next cycle.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+“subjects individuals to an indefinite discipline, designed to guide
+their engagement in action and govern what is most personal:
+their initiatives” (idem: 120).
+
+In each case, the modalities of judgment and statistical formalization
+of these problems, the distribution of responsibilities between the
+actors, the means of a posteriori evaluation of public policies and their
+transformation depending on this evaluation are simultaneously
+elaborated and negotiated (Desrosières , 2008b).
+
+The new public quantification regime multiplies the places and
+domains of production and use of quantified information, always based
+on the performance of state initiatives and the co-responsibility of
+individual actors: environment, bioethics, child abuse, drug addiction,
+disease prevention sexually transmitted diseases, protection of cultural
+minorities, gender equality, safety of domestic and industrial equipment,
+quality standards for consumer goods.
+
+The action to be taken is judged in terms of failure to be stigmatized
+or success to be rewarded, which has the effect of deconsolidating
+public agents from society as a whole and deflating the perception of
+their social function (Bruno and Didier, 2013). By resorting to the
+incessant quantification of all activities, according to the imperatives
+of “ total quality” and “international competitiveness”, benchmarking
+
+A circularity is created between the efficiency of public action and the
+performances of individual actors, who increasingly rely on
+benchmarking and indicators and less and less on judgment based on
+acquired skills, to maintain and expand their position in the division. of
+work. The quantification of the ends and means of action, both for
+professionals and consumers, produces a new reference system in
+which the same indicators and classifications provide equivalence to
+measure different quantities. Take the case of alcohol consumption
+tests while driving, used by police officers and traffic agents as an
+indicator of their performance. While the former tend to evaluate their
+efficiency by increasing this figure, the latter justify their performance
+by decreasing it (Desrosières, 2014b).
+
+These are definitions of opposite situations, which result from the
+framing of agents by measurable objectives established by their
+respective institutions – police and municipal guard. Individuals are
+led to relate to phantasmagoric goals instead of the concrete situations
+in which they take part. In front of a painting
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 23-39
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of existential insecurity and psychological damage caused by continuous
+responsibility and self-surveillance, they try to maximize their opportunities for
+gain, often to the detriment of the collective interest – paradoxically sacrificed
+by the extreme individualization of working conditions promoted by
+benchmarking.
+
+Another characteristic phenomenon of the counting practices of the neoliberal
+government mentality is the change in the status of the subjective and its
+statistical treatment. Once the feedback of indicators is no longer the
+unforeseen effect of quantification techniques to become the purpose of
+political rationality anchored in benchmarking, measuring perception emerges
+as a possibility. Categories of origin, ethnicity, race and identity, previously
+considered “too subjective”, become privileged variables in surveys and
+research. The admission of self-declaration and belonging as a sufficient
+basis for counting indigenous and Afro-descendant populations demonstrates
+a break with the objectivist conceptions of metrological realism prevailing
+since the 19th century. The constructed character of identity is accepted to
+mitigate external factors that affect the performance of minority groups.
+
+24-39
+
+The measurement of subjective perception as the basis for moral recognition
+and the material existence of social groups changes the struggle for identity
+management. While social movements insist on counting as a way of resisting
+and making themselves exist, neoconservative sectors
+
+There are numerous examples in which agents seek to deceive with the rule.
+In the police, when the intention is to “make numbers”, small drug dealers with
+known addresses are approached. This allows police officers to count both
+drug seizures and the arrest of suspects and, in this way, meet their weekly
+target, taking advantage of the fact that the operation's metrics do not
+distinguish the volume of seizures, nor the hierarchy of trafficking. In the same
+vein, we have the procedure of registering a “verified fact” (e.g. car theft) in a
+city, such as Rio de Janeiro, with the suspect located in another city, such as
+São Paulo. In this case, the São Paulo police chief can count the interrogation
+as a “clarified fact” in the city, while Rio de Janeiro gains a “verified fact”.
+Conversely, if the level of crime is high, testifying against police performance,
+the police chief may refuse to make a police report, deterring the victim from
+his intention to file a complaint (Bruno and Didier, 2013).
+
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+These are mobilizations led by lay people, specialists, NGOs and local and
+
+municipal administration bodies in reaction to evaluation criteria that they perceive
+
+as discriminatory. In other cases, statactivisme is not against indicators, but
+
+consists of quantifying original data to make a problem visible and relevant:
+
+workers denounce the precariousness of their jobs using numbers to defend their
+
+rights; Pro-immigration activists estimate the cost of the deportation policy to show
+
+the price society pays for it. In general, the use of statistics is part of the contention
+
+repertoire and is an important resource for contemporary mobilizations (Bruno,
+
+Didier and Vitale, 2014: 200).
+
+pains accuse official classifications of creating racism or preventing it from being
+
+overcome. They argue that, instead of promoting cohesion and solidarity produced by
+
+national culture, these classifications emphasize cleavages that fragment society
+
+(Loveman, 2014).
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+The advance in quantification of individuals' intimate lives has produced an attitude of
+
+distrust in relation to numbers, especially visible in the way in which the results of censuses
+
+and statistical surveys have been received, being systematically discredited in countries
+
+with neoconservative and neopopulist governments, something unthinkable a long time
+
+ago. a decade or two ago. On the one hand, this skepticism was inflated on the right, by
+the advent of “post-truth” and the crisis of confidence in science, today under attack by
+irrationalists and reactionaries. On the other hand, there is a growing movement on the
+left of those who criticize the dehumanizing coldness of statistics and reject it in principle
+and en bloc, as if quantification were always and necessarily in favor of the State and
+capital.
+
+25-39
+
+This is a merely reactive attitude towards “quantomania”, which, paradoxically, ends up
+
+reinforcing the fetish for numbers.
+
+To quantify is to produce knowledge and gather power. It can therefore be a valuable
+
+means of overcoming sectoral criticism and restoring the dimension of the public and the
+
+universal, eroded by benchmarking. Statactivisme, a neologism proposed by Bruno, Didier
+
+and Prévieux (2014) and inspired by the sociology of criticism by Boltanski (2009), is a
+
+descriptive concept used to qualify the different experiences that aim to reappropriate the
+
+emancipatory power of statistics. Although the tradition of using statistics to guarantee
+
+demands for rights is long, some ways of intervening with numbers are quite recent,
+
+specifically those aimed at attacking the methods of domination characteristic of neoliberal
+
+governmentality:
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+Finally, we find the statistical construction of collective subjects,
+endowed with their own interests and will. More than individually
+escaping the authority of benchmarking, as at the first level, or
+denouncing the lies hidden in false promises of protection, as at
+the second level, it seeks to use statistics to redefine objectives
+pursued by institutions, with emancipatory purposes.
+
+26-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Bruno, Didier and Prévieux (2014) identify three ways of fighting
+with numbers. The first level consists of deceiving the rule, as we
+saw previously in the case of police officers. This is what happens
+when actors appropriate the data production rules that serve selfassessment
+to, more or less openly, adapt them to their own
+interests. Here we have a makeup of the numbers, as seen when
+an employee of a company uses time or work instruments for
+activities outside their function. However, as can be seen, the bias
+allows maximizing the autonomy of agents against the domination
+they face; however, it does not engender the conditions for its
+critique and reform.
+
+The second level, on the other hand, requires a deliberately critical
+and assertive positioning, which involves a certain degree of
+knowledge of the data production chain and an association of
+interests between different actors. It involves accessing a debate
+or a public platform to accuse a particular institution of quantifying
+the activities of its employees in order to misrepresent, rather than
+achieve, the goals it is supposed to pursue. Publicity is fundamental
+here, be it a documentary film or a sociological research, which
+reveal, for example, how the decrease in criminal statistics does
+not correspond to the greater efficiency of the security apparatus,
+which could be the result of manipulations in the codifications
+carried out by the state agencies (Silverman, 2014).
+
+Such is the case of the groups that gather around the transformation
+of the strictly economic concept of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
+in order to include biodiversity, domestic work and other forms of
+wealth, and, thus, promote justice and the promise of social equity.
+Or, even, the use of statistical information to boost the movement
+for gender equality. Eugenia de Rosa (2014) examined the
+relationships between human rights associations and NGOs that
+produce and use original data on gender violence. The author
+identified a network of number use in four
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+–, we found the practices of self-quantifi
+
+When social experiences no longer fit into the available formats, we
+witness a political and cognitive effort to build a new category
+compatible with the aspirations of a social group. To gain recognition,
+groups have an interest in institutionalizing themselves statistically.
+Tasset (2014) investigated two recent attempts of this type. First, the
+effort of some French social scientists to introduce the category
+“precarious intellectuals”, claiming that the established occupational
+nomenclatures were forged in the old social protection system, now in
+crisis. This would no longer be able to explain the impact of
+precariousness on the group of cultural professionals, which, for them,
+brings together researchers, professors , museum guides, librarians,
+editors, journalists; all young and graduated, without salary stability,
+whose moral greatness would be threatened by an increasingly
+utilitarian way of life. In addition to individual situations and competences,
+the category would be justified against a new standard of social
+functioning that devalues and makes intellectual work easier in general.
+
+In the opposite direction to this strategy, there are American
+economists , who aggregate young people with similar occupations,
+equally educated and professionally unstable, under the category
+“creative class”. What the French denounce as alienating and ambiguous
+is valued here as a permanent disposition for innovation. The social
+heterogeneity of cultural professions makes it possible to illustrate, at
+the same time, two opposing theses : on the one hand, a precariat
+organized as a political subject that bases its unity on civic legitimacy;
+on the other, a group of flexible and enterprising professionals, always
+willing to exercise their freedom in the labor market, seeing themselves
+as the vanguard of cognitive capitalism. In both cases, French social
+scientists and American economists seek to provide consistency to the
+social aggregates that they help to establish by quantifying them (Tasset, 2014).
+
+In addition to benchmarking, official statistics and alternative
+counts carried out by social groups – the last two mobilized by
+statistical activism and
+algorithmic modelling. We cannot dwell on its analysis, given
+the limits of this article, but we will outline a first
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 27-39
+
+mobilization phases: in the framing and categorization process, in
+the design and implementation of policies, in dissemination
+campaigns and in monitoring oscillations.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Algorithmic quantification is found in the application of mathematical models to
+population management. In this case, the massive circulation of microdata
+allows access to territories, groups, institutions, markets and countries in
+fractions of seconds. An automated statistical knowledge emerges from the
+correlations of previously selected, non-hierarchical and highly heterogeneous
+information, reducing human intervention and dispensing with hypotheses and
+conventions about the social world (Rouvroy, 2014). Apparently without any
+mediation, the objectivity and veracity of the results obtained seem to reach
+their maximum degree, since it is assumed that their hypotheses are the data
+in circulation. As a result, reality takes on the appearance of a public sphere.
+– however, controlled by private interests and with governments and companies
+collecting massive amounts of unclassified data that can come from the most
+diverse sources: social networks; blogs; news feeds; face, sound and image
+sensors; emails; games; geolocators and cell phone authorizations; card
+systems; marketing and advertising operations; scientific research; networks
+and security systems, etc. (Teles, 2018: 435).
+
+approximation. First, biosensing and self-tracking technologies and how they
+affect subjects who deliberately use them to monitor their performance and
+achieve the most varied goals: self-assessment (how to calculate their daily
+productivity), satisfying an aesthetic curiosity (how to visualize patterns on
+paths through digital maps), solving problems (such as identifying foods in a
+diet that cause frequent discomfort), and cultivating habits (such as setting
+goals that involve physical exertion).
+
+The main issue posed by algorithmic operations is the generation of control
+mechanisms without the need for support in speeches and ideologies. A truth
+is produced, detached from social conventions, which cannot be the object of
+debates or disagreements except in closed and targeted bubbles. A particularly
+
+Although it can sometimes improve the quality of life, self-quantification
+imparts a new intensity to the internalization of the discipline.
+
+28-39
+
+By being based on the constant mapping of the use of time, it produces the
+effect of the voluntary conversion of the subject into his own entrepreneur.
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+In addition, the practice of self-tracking highlights one of the most pressing
+issues of our time: the production of data that companies use to sell products
+and that employers use to embarrass their employees (Berman and Hirschman,
+2018).
+
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+How to act or react, in the neoliberal government, when numbers
+simultaneously become a source of domination and an instrument of
+the struggle for emancipation? On the one hand, performance
+indicators demonstrate the assessment and judgment skills of actors
+in situations considered unique and singular, therefore,
+incommensurable . On the other hand, statistical activism demands
+the generalization of commensuration to previously unquantifiable
+spaces (biodiversity , subjective perceptions, forms of unpaid work,
+participation in cultural consumption), in the name of expanding
+collective goods and denouncing the inequalities of capitalism. advanced.
+
+perverse when considering policy implementation and monitoring .
+This is the case of models that predict the chances of criminal
+recidivism – which use secret methods based on factors such as
+race, class, origin and other social cleavages. As a study by O'Neil
+(2017) showed, one of these models predicts that a prisoner from a
+poor, highly policed neighborhood is more likely to be incarcerated
+again, which would justify his confinement for longer. Upon leaving
+prison and returning to his neighborhood, the chance of reoffending
+would increase, given the extended period spent in the prison
+environment. In other words, getting out of prison confirms the
+prediction that offenders in this neighborhood will reoffend. The
+effectiveness of such a model lies in its recursive effects on reality,
+which accentuate the distortions of criminal justice rather than correcting them.
+
+Thus, big data is characterized by statistical automation in relation to
+conventions, escaping the disputes of a public sphere that becomes
+opaque and guiding countless decisions by governments and
+companies that empty the channels of democratic deliberation. It
+shares with bench marking the political rationality that rests on the
+collection, aggregation and decentralized analysis of data, in order to
+model, anticipate and affect behaviors. This is the main characteristic
+of quantification in neoliberalism, which, unlike previous government
+regimes, promotes interaction between social agents and autonomous
+technologies to make them subjects of their own observation and
+classification: monitors of their sociability.
+
+FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
+
+Between one pole and the other we find the practices of selfquantification
+, a freely chosen activity that, depending on the
+case and use, can both increase control and generate resources that
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 29-39
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+and the algorithm promise to encourage; but which, by subjecting
+them to an undefined discipline of comparative evaluation, end up, on
+the contrary , capturing and emptying.
+
+The counter-hegemonic categorization and numerical counterdiscourse
+promote a struggle that, as Foucault (2000) suggested,
+passes less and less through the mediation of intellectuals and
+spokespersons of conscience, opening space for polyphonic multiplicity
+and networked action. which is no longer run by parties, unions and corporations.
+
+In turn, statistical activism makes it possible to question reality and
+pave the way for other becomings, under the condition that we do not
+reject the emancipatory power of quantification in favor of an alleged
+superiority of qualities and singularities over quantities. Against the
+iron cage of economic reason, an “another number” is the entrance to
+“another world” (Didier and Tasset, 2013: 138). The statistical
+construction of new collective subjects and the reactions against
+institutions accused of quantifying the activities of their employees to
+misrepresent the objectives they were supposed to pursue constitute
+unprecedented forms of democratization of sovereignty.
+
+Hegemonic and exclusionary forms of quantification force social
+scientists to sophisticate their view of numbers as the privileged link
+between the State, science and public life. After all, the monopolization
+of data as resources about things and people is not only a growing
+problem for citizens, but also a threat to the infrastructure of social
+knowledge. Rather than vested and private interests, publicly debated
+scientific standards should provide the basis of counts, measures,
+and categories that allow for valuing and coordinating issues of
+common interest. This is perhaps the most urgent and neglected way
+of democratizing sovereignty at present: qualifying, through political
+experience and public deliberation, the freedoms and autonomies that
+benchmarking
+
+improve the quality of life. As Desrosières warned, these are
+apparently distant and irreconcilable attitudes, which can be
+brought closer together by a strategy of analyzing the relationships
+between the ways of thinking about society, the ways of acting
+on it and the appropriate quantification in each case. This
+approach makes it possible to highlight not only the forms of
+governmentality, but also the modalities of its critique (2014b: 57).
+
+30-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In the Keynesian State, sample research made it possible to
+generalize price and family consumption indices – hitherto
+restricted to salaried workers – to the population as a whole. In
+addition, it creates a global space for monitoring the economy by
+optimizing the GDP, on whose performance the construction of
+the economic crisis as a social fact now depends.
+
+Boltanski's sociology of criticism, which inspired the later works of
+Desrosières (2008b, 2014b), and the more recent ones of Bruno
+and Didier (2013, 2014), allowed us to have a finer understanding
+of agency and the categories upon which it rests. voluntary
+attempts to modify the foundations of social accounting. In this
+key, statistics give institutional form to scattered aspirations and
+concerns, enabling the formation of collective subjects mobilized
+by different senses of justice and the authenticity of their claims.
+Such an understanding illuminates the modes of criticism that
+correspond to different types of statistics and that lead to reform and emancipation.
+
+Finally, in the Neoliberal State, the feedback of indicators becomes
+the purpose of political rationality anchored in benchmarking and
+big data, even promoting the measurement of perception (on
+identity, origin, ethnicity and race) as a means of reforming
+conduct and induce social agency. In turn, the tradition of reform
+and fight against inequality, formerly verticalized by the State as
+the guarantor of public life, reappears in an expanded form with
+the statistical activism of social movements. Quantification practices produce a
+
+From this set of questions, the article introduces the concept of
+“political regimes of quantification”, taking inspiration from the
+contributions of Foucault and Desrosières, in order to specify
+which levels of agency and social life were progressively
+constructed as domains of commensuration. In the Liberal State,
+this domain is the market , built as a space for veridiction and the
+realization of justice – which presupposes the public availability of
+equal information to the different economic actors, who, thus,
+guide their behavior by production and price statistics. . In the
+Providential State, the construction of work as a social sphere
+involves the statistical creation of unemployment and the
+unemployed person, and their linkage to concrete legal effects.
+Thus enabling the indexation of wages and joint responsibility
+between employers, unions, employees, bureaucrats and social
+analysts, who begin to translate their interests based on cost of living and work accident statistics.
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 31-39
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+subject of a new type, who is no longer observed by the uniqueness of his experiences, but by
+
+the abstract representations of the data he himself produces, in a new form of self-knowledge
+
+through numbers.
+
+(Resubmitted on November 10, 2020)
+
+(Resubmitted on February 23, 2021)
+
+Since the 1970s, it has made an effort, on the one hand, to establish with statisticians a
+
+The 19th century was marked by the enthusiasm aroused by the creation of international
+
+rankings that, promising to increase the progress and moral cohesion of societies, measured
+
+and compared the performance of peoples and nations through indicators of industrialization,
+
+urbanization, health and education. The 21st century is born under the sign of distrust in relation
+
+to the advancement of quantification on the intimate and daily lives of individuals. Pressured by
+
+performance goals and objectives, obliged to constantly monitor the risks involved in our food
+
+and family, sexual and affective, medical and school, professional and personal life, we are
+
+confronted with the discomfort of those who must act and decide based on spreadsheets
+
+production charts, expense tables, insurance policies, accident statistics, opinion polls, laboratory
+
+tests and ergometric tests: an infinity of quantification devices that define our image of failure
+
+and success, as well as the fear and anxiety that correspond to them. Between the romantic
+
+optimism of the past and the posthumanist skepticism of our time, there is a third attitude
+
+towards numbers. An attitude that allows us to perceive the relationship between the ways in
+
+which we are led to know ourselves and the way in which we are led to govern ourselves, making
+
+room for criticizing the categories with which we think and represent reality and with which we
+
+desire and practice freedom.
+
+GRADES
+
+(Approved for publication on March 9, 2021)
+
+(Submitted for publication November 30, 2019)
+
+32-39
+
+1. Statistician and administrator at the Institut National de la Staistique et des Études Économiques
+
+(Resubmitted on August 15, 2020)
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+(INSEE), where he directly participated in the reform of the system of nomenclatures and
+professional categories, but also a sociologist, researcher and advisor of theses at the École
+des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Alain Desrosières was an articulator of
+disciplinary boundaries, and his perspective of analysis is marked by this hybridity.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+4. Statistical internationalism is the term by which the movement towards the globalization and
+standardization of statistical production became known in historiography, based on
+conventions emanating from collegiate decisions in specialized spaces - the so-called
+International Congresses of Statistics, held from 1853 to 1876, which they debated the
+fundamental issues of statistical practice, such as the normalization of classifications, the
+precision in defining categories, the clarity of questionnaires and the procedures that suited
+their application (Brian, 1999: 15-22).
+
+reflective culture regarding the historical and socially situated dimensions of the instruments
+of its practice; on the other hand, he always urged social scientists not to neglect the technical
+nature of quantification. This effort was shown, early on, in his project to make a political and
+administrative history of data production – at that first moment, not yet sociological. It is worth
+mentioning the two volumes of Pour une histoire de la statistique, the result of the colloquia
+he organized in 1976 and which brought together several Annales historians , such as JeanClaude
+Perrot, Michele Perrot and Jacques Ozouf.
+
+3. With the exception of the Engineer State, which, in addition to being historically fluid, is statecentric
+and, therefore, refractory to the modulation of social agency, an aspect that interests
+us more directly.
+
+5. Stratified random sampling was pioneered in the American Census Bureau's unemployment
+survey in 1936, by Morris Hansen and Edwards Deming. In the post-war period, it spread
+among national statistical institutions, promoting profound transformations at the level of
+statistical discourse, representations and work, analyzed by Beaud and Prévost (2010: 37-65).
+
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+Regarding the intellectual legacy of Alain Desrosières, check out the collection organized by
+Bruno, Jany-Catrice and Touchelay (2016).
+
+2. The text was revised and expanded several times by the author. Its first version appeared in
+2000, in the Courrier des Statistiques. It was followed by an entry in the Cambridge History of
+Science (2001), a chapter in the collection Historicités de l´action publique (2003) and,
+finally , a chapter in his book Pour une sociologie historique de la quantification (2008). It is
+this last edition that we take as a reference in our analysis of the argument (Armatte, 2014:
+21).
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 33-39
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+ALBERTI, Manfredi. (2011), “The Birth of Unemployment Statistics: a Comparison (1880-1914)”,
+
+BEAUD, Jean-Pierre; PREVOST, Jean-Guy. (2010), “L'Histoire de la Statistique Canadienne
+dans une Perspective Internationale et Panaméricaine”, in NC Senra and APR Camargo
+(eds.). Statistics in the Americas: towards an agenda of comparative historical studies.
+Rio de Janeiro, IBGE, pp. 37-65.
+
+in EUROPEAN CONGRESS ON WORLD AND GLOBAL HISTORY, 3th, 2011, London.
+
+REFERENCES
+
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+34-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+______.
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+______.
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+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+ROSE, Nikolas; MILLER, Peter. (1992), “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government”.
+
+British Journal of Sociology, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 172-205.
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+Encadrer par la Délibération Publique”. Statistique et Société, v. 2, no. 4, pp. 33-41.
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+Prévieux. Statactivism: Comment Lutter avec des Nombres. Paris, La Découverte, pp. 75-87.
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+Statactivism: Comment Lutter avec des Nombres. Paris, La Découverte, pp. 117-132.
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+
+n. 84, pp. 25-46.
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+Kriterion, n. 140, pp. 429-448.
+
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+O'NEIL, Cathy. (2017), Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and
+
+______. (2000), Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Across Society. They are
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+Threatens Democracy. New York, Crown.
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+Économiques. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 21-71.
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+LOVEMAN, Mara. (2014), National Colors: Racial Classification and the State in Latin America.
+Paulo, Editora Unesp.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+This article investigates the role of quantification practices in the construction of
+the State and social routines, in the ways of governing the population through
+numbers, in the modalities of statistical criticism of reality, and in the processes
+of social change. We seek to contribute with an original synthesis of two
+interpretive matrices: on the one hand, Anglo-Foucauldian studies on
+governmentality, which relate the forms of quantification to other technologies
+of induction of conduct, in liberalism and neoliberalism, “government regimes”
+that produce and consume freedoms. On the other hand, French pragmatic
+sociology, in particular the concept of “equivalence conventions” and the idea
+of a plurality of logics of action, allows us to understand the dual nature of
+statistics as an “instrument of proof” and as an “instrument of government”,
+formulated by Alain Desrosières, which prioritizes the science of numbers and
+its role in the coordination of social life. We propose a critical use of these models, rehearsing a genealogy of levels of
+
+The article investigates the role of quantification practices in the construction of
+the State and social routines, in the ways of governing the population through
+numbers, in the modalities of statistical criticism of reality and in the processes
+of social change. We seek to contribute with an original synthesis of two
+interpretative matrices : on the one hand, Anglo-Foucauldian studies on
+governmentality, which relate the forms of quantification to other technologies
+for inducing conduct, in liberalism and neoliberalism – “government regimes”
+that produce and consume freedoms. On the other hand, French pragmatic
+sociology, in particular the concept of “equivalence conventions” and the idea
+of a plurality of logics of action, which allow us to understand the dual nature of
+statistics as a “proof instrument” and as an “instrument of government”. ,
+formulated by Alain Desrosières, which prioritizes the science of numbers and
+their role in coordinating social life. We propose a critical use of these models,
+rehearsing a genealogy of levels of agency and social life that were progressively
+constructed as measurement domains. This option makes it possible to explain
+the singularity of quantification practices in the contemporary world, examined
+in its four main genres: benchmarking, statistical activism, self-tracking and the
+politics of algorithms.
+
+Keywords: sociology of quantification; sociology of the state;
+governmentality ; neoliberalism; population management
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 37-39
+
+State, Quantification and Agency: A Genealogical Analysis
+
+SUMMARY
+
+ABSTRACT
+
+State, Quantification and Agency: A Genealogical Analysis
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+State, quantification and agency: a genealogical analysis
+
+État, Quantification et Agence: Une Analyze Généalogique
+RESUME
+
+Keywords: Sociology of Quantification; Sociology of the State; Governmentality;
+Neoliberalism; Population Management.
+
+Mots-clés: Sociologie de la Quantification; Sociologie de l'État; Literary
+governance ; Néolibéralisme; Gestion de la Population.
+
+38-39 DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022
+
+agency and social life progressively constructed as measurement domains.
+This choice makes it possible to explain the singularity of quantification
+practices in the contemporary world, examined in its four main categories:
+benchmarking, statistical activism, self-tracking, and the politics of algorithms.
+
+This article interrogates the rôle des practices of quantification in the
+construction of l'État et des routines sociales, in the manières de gouverner la
+population par les nombres, in the modalities of critique statistics of the réalité
+et in the processes of social changement. Nous cherchons à contribuer à une
+synthèse orig inale deux matrices interprétatives: d'une part, les études anglofoucaultiennes
+sur la gouvernementalité, qui rattachent les forms de
+quantification à d'autres technologies d'induction de conduite, dans le
+libéralisme et le neoliberalism – les « régimes de gouvernement » qui produit
+produisent et consomment des libertés; d'autre part, la sociologie pragmatique
+française, en particulier le concept de « conventions d'equivalence » et l'idee
+de pluralité des logiques d'action, qui per attempt de comprendre la double
+nature de la statistique comme « instrument de preuve » et comme «
+instrument de gouvernement », formulated by Alain Des rosières, qui privilégie
+la science des nombres et son rôle dans la coordination de la vie sociale. Nous
+proposons une utilisation critique de ces modèles, en répétant une généalogie
+des niveaux d'agence et de vie sociale qui ont été progressivement construits
+comme domaines de mesure. This option allows for the unification of
+quantification practices in modern times, examinations in four major genres:
+benchmarking, statistical activism, self-tracking and political algorithms.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alexandre de Paiva Rio Camargo
+
+The article investigates the role of accounting practices in the construction
+of the State and social routines, in the ways of governing the population
+through numbers, in the modalities of statistical criticism of reality and in
+the processes of change Social. We seek to contribute to an original
+synthesis of two interpretative matrices: on the one hand, Anglo-Foucaultian
+studies on government , which link forms of measurement with other
+technologies of conduct induction, liberalism and neoliberalism – “
+government regimes ” that produce and consume freedoms. On the other
+hand, French pragmatic sociology , in particular the concept of “conventions
+of equivalence” and the idea of plurality of logics of action, which allow us
+to understand the double naturalness of statistics as “instrument of testing”
+and as “instrument of government”, formulated by Alain Desrosières, which
+prioritizes the science of numbers and its role in the coordination of social
+life. We propose a critical use of these models, testing a genealogy of
+levels of agency and social life that were progressively constructed as domains of measurement.
+This option allows for the uniqueness of measurement practices in the
+contemporary world, examined in four main genres: benchmarking,
+statistical activism, self-tracking and the politics of algorithms.
+
+Keywords: sociology of measurement; state sociology; guberna mentalism;
+neoliberalism; people management.
+
+DADOS, Rio de Janeiro, vol.65 (3): e20190278, 2022 39-39
+
+SUMMARY
+
+State, Quantification and Agency: A Genealogical Analysis
+
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/COLIMBO--Bruna-Armonas--BUCK--Pedro--BEZERRA--Vinicius-Miana.-Challenges-When-Using-Jurimetrics-in-Brazil-A-Survey-of-Courts.-Future-Internet--v.-9--p.-68--2017..md b/COLIMBO--Bruna-Armonas--BUCK--Pedro--BEZERRA--Vinicius-Miana.-Challenges-When-Using-Jurimetrics-in-Brazil-A-Survey-of-Courts.-Future-Internet--v.-9--p.-68--2017..md
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+++ b/COLIMBO--Bruna-Armonas--BUCK--Pedro--BEZERRA--Vinicius-Miana.-Challenges-When-Using-Jurimetrics-in-Brazil-A-Survey-of-Courts.-Future-Internet--v.-9--p.-68--2017..md
@@ -0,0 +1,797 @@
+future internet
+
+Article
+Challenges When Using Jurimetrics in Brazil—A
+Survey of Courts
+
+Bruna Armonas Colombo 1
+, Pedro Buck 1 and Vinicius Miana Bezerra 2,*
+ID
+
+1 Law School, Mackenzie University, São Paulo, SP 01302-907, Brazil; bruna.armonas@gmail.com (B.A.C.);
+pedrobuck@gmail.com (P.B.)
+2
+Informatics and Computing Department, Mackenzie University, São Paulo, SP 01302-907, Brazil
+* Correspondence: vinicius@miana.com.br; Tel.: +55-11-2114-8301
+Received: 1 October 2017; Accepted: 16 October 2017; Published: 25 October 2017
+
+Abstract: Jurimetrics is the application of quantitative methods, usually statistics, to law.
+An important step to implement a jurimetric analysis is to extract raw data from courts and organize
+that data in a way that can be processed. Most of the raw data is unstructured and written in natural
+language, which stands as a challenge to Computer Science experts. As it requires expertise in law,
+statistics, and computer science, jurimetrics is a multidisciplinary field. When trying to implement
+a jurimetric system in Brazil, additional challenges were identified due to the heterogeneity of the
+different court systems, the lack of standards, and how the open data laws in Brazil are interpreted
+and implemented. In this article, we present a survey of Brazilian courts in terms of readiness to
+implement a jurimetric system. Analyzing a sample of data, we have found, in light of Brazil’s open
+data regulation, privacy issues and technical issues. Finally, we propose a roadmap that encompasses
+both technology and public policy to meet those challenges.
+
+Keywords: jurimetrics; legal informatics; public policy; open data; computacional law; e-government
+
+1. Introduction
+
+Jurimetrics is the application of quantitative methods, usually statistics, to law. By using a
+quantitative approach to analyze judicial decisions, it is possible to identify patterns and outliers,
+making it possible to forecast the outcome of a court decision and thus making the law more predictable.
+Due to its nature Jurimetrics requires a multidisciplinary approach in which statistics and computer
+science and law experts work together to solve framework and access problems [1]. Such an approach
+also requires computer systems able to store and process the judicial decision, but mostly important an
+online access to such decisions are required.
+In Brazil, judicial process has been required to implement a digital mandatory procedure by 2006,
+when Federal Act n. 11.419/06 [2] fostered the use of electronic documents in the proceedings of a
+court of law. The law allowed the courts to implement systems to handle the judicial processes, but it
+did not require them to do so and did not define any standards for its format. It recommended the use
+of standards, open source, and that it should be accessible through the internet, but the courts were not
+legally required to do so. Slowly, many courts adopted the use of electronic documents but followed
+different paths. The Brazilian Freedom of Information Act (FIA)—Federal Act n. 12.527/2011 [3]—gave
+the courts the obligation to make the data available to every citizen, but the implementation of this law
+also varied widely.
+Empirical research in law is not a new field: jurimetric was defined in 1949 [1]. However, in Brazil,
+due to the late arrival of electronic documents and the difficulty to access information from courts,
+quantitative-driven research agendas gained some visibility only in 2011, when first papers were
+published in local journals. They were mainly focused in reviewing jurimetrics state of art and
+
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68; doi:10.3390/fi9040068 www.mdpi.com/journal/futureinternet
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 2 of 14
+
+mostly did not use statistics or computational techniques. The use of statistical analysis and the use
+of computational techniques for access and analysis of judicial decisions became more frequent by
+2013 [4]. For instance, Castro [4] uses descriptive statistics in order to identify the percentage of use of
+protective measures different from imprisonment by the judiciary, and Nunes and Trecenti [5] made
+use of computational techniques to capture, processing, and analyze 157,379 court rulings.
+This paper presents an exploratory study of the Brazilian courts through which we address the
+subject from a legal and technological point of view. The paper is composed of five parts. In the next
+section, we present the methodology used in the survey. Then we present the Brazilian Freedom of
+Information Act (FIA) [3] and all the legal framework in which we are inserted and how the laws are
+helping or hampering the implementation of jurimetric systems. Following that, we present the survey
+results and finally, the conclusions of this study.
+
+2. Methodology
+
+This work aims to determine the readiness of Brazilian courts for the implementation of jurimetric
+systems. In order to assess that, we started with the following hypothesis:
+
+• Hypothesis 1: The legal framework is not enough;
+• Hypothesis 2: Current systems are preventing progress in this area as they do not follow any
+standard and many have implemented measures that do now allow automated data gathering
+(robots);
+• Hypothesis 3: Courts are not prepared and neither abide by the current laws.
+
+In order to validate these hypothesis, this paper uses a multimethod approach. To validate
+hypothesis 1, we promote a review of the methodological literature regarding access to judicial
+data and the current laws in Brazil. To validate hypothesis 2, we evaluated courts website. Finally,
+to validate hypothesis 3, we employed a tool regulated by the Brazilian Freedom of Information Act
+(FIA) [3], entitled as Access to Information Procedure (AIP).
+The aforementioned tool allows citizens or researchers to contact public agencies either to obtain
+answers concerning their routines or to have access to whatever data sets they are responsible for.
+Once provoked, the agency has a 20-day period to provide an answer (which can be extended to a
+30-day response time deadline) [3].
+Due to this tool, we have addressed a court website survey before the 26 state courts, the DC court,
+and two national courts (Supreme Court of Justice and Superior Court of Justice), a set comprised of
+29 observations.
+With the results of the survey, we have organized the information into an analytical framework.
+
+3. Brazil’s Freedom of Information Act
+
+3.1. Legal Framework
+
+Access to information is a universal right, and the legal framework for it dates back to the
+Universal Declaration of Human Rights [6], where article 19 declares that every human being has the
+right to freedom of opinion and expression. The United Nations Convention against Corruption [7],
+in articles 10 and 13, also recommends that each state party shall take the necessary measures and
+actions to improve the transparency of public administration, thus providing access to information
+about your organization, operation, and, above all, of its decision-making processes. Finally, the fourth
+item of the Inter-American Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Speech [8] reaffirms the need for
+access to information and proclaims this as a fundamental right of the individual.
+In Brazil, the guarantee of access to information is ensured by item XXXIII of article 5 of the
+Brazilian Federal Constitution (1988) [9], which says: “everyone has the right to receive information
+from public information bodies of one’s particular, or collective or general interest.” However, despite
+the existence of this provision, formal and structured access only become nationally enforceable in
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 3 of 14
+
+2011 due to the enacting of a bill that regulated the forms of access to information [3], establishing that
+the information produced by the state is public and its secrecy the exception.
+This bill is the Federal Act 12,527/2011—Brazilian Freedom of Information Act (FIA) [3]—which
+establishes that the activity of agencies throughout the public administration shall be available to the
+public by default. In addition, sets forth a minimum list of information to be included in the agency
+internet sites, for example, institutional information, records of expenditure values and transfers, bids,
+contracts, general data allowing the monitoring of programs and projects, among others.
+In this context, the transparency of information can be divided into two categories: active and
+passive transparency. The first relates to the publication of information on the agency internet site.
+The second category relates to information that is not published and therefore there is a need to request
+it to the holder of the information. To make sure that information in the second category was made
+available, the law established a mechanism—the Access to Information Procedure (AIP) to request it
+as well as the duty of the agency to provide it when requested [3].
+Since 2009, the Brazilian National Council of Justice (CNJ) established the need for dissemination
+of information about the activities performed by Brazilian courts. Examples include the issue of
+Resolutions 79 [10] and 102 [11], both from 2009, which advocate for the dissemination of budget,
+management, governance, revenues, expenses and payroll. When the FIA was issued [3], the CNJ
+published a new resolution in order to clarify the need for dissemination of information on the amount
+spent with travel expenses, bonuses and reimbursements—Resolution 151/2012-CNJ [12].
+Finally, in 2015, the CNJ edited new Resolution 215/2015 [13], which incorporated the legal
+concepts of the previous regulations and compiled them in a single instrument that regulates the
+access to information. This normative instrument reaffirmed the guidelines and principles of FIA
+and, among other measures, determined the dissemination of information on the functioning of the
+Brazilian Justice in plain and accessible language, presented the minimum information that needs
+to be published, established which types of information will not be given and what information is
+restricted, and defined which trials should be publicized, establishing the need of live video stream for
+such sessions and that the recording and minutes should be available on the internet.
+
+3.2. Judicial Courts and the Access to Information Procedure (AIP)
+
+Despite the legal framework, which aims to ensure access to information, whenever one is willing
+to access information that goes beyond a query to a single process, the user finds many barriers,
+as computer systems to access data are not available for most information, and there are anti-robot
+barriers, including captchas that make downloading data in bulk, advanced searches, and other tasks
+important in a research a tedious, repetitive, and error prone task [14].
+The Open Society Justice Initiative [15], by analyzing this subject in countries of the Americas,
+stressed that the development of access to judicial information must follow the same purposes adopted
+by the Executive power: the guarantee of transparency, greater efficiency and effectiveness, and greater
+confidence in the Judiciary, and the concern about the exposure of sensitive information and how to
+curtain it without censorship. In this context, judicial information systems should be able to ensure:
+the independence of the judiciary; fair and efficient administration of Justice; protecting the privacy of
+the judges, the parties and other participants in the judicial process; ensure the safety of parties, judges
+and other participants in the process and guarantee the public and media access to the proceedings,
+in order to ensure the right of society to know what occurs in the Justice system.
+The study “Access to information and Transparency in the Judiciary developed by the World
+Bank Institute” [16] suggests that, with regard to the judicial function, access to information in the
+courts includes topics such as the publishing of rulings, access to proceedings in cases of corruption
+involving public officials, information on the operation of Upper Courts, transparency in the judicial
+sessions, and mechanisms for the participation of the civil society. According to this study, it is up to
+the Judiciary to ensure the transparency of the information while it is executing its core activities [16].
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 4 of 14
+
+Artigo 19, a Brazilian watchdog NGO concerned about the FIA [3] implementation, draws
+attention to the gray area that exists between the administrative and judicial information. This is
+because some court decisions go beyond individual conflicts and impact society as a whole, as for
+example in conflicts involving freedom of expression and information. In this regard, it is suggested
+that the observance of the FIA, in fact, is only one aspect of transparency in the judiciary [14].
+Therefore, the actions of the judiciary can only be considered transparent if the dissemination
+of information goes far beyond those determined by FIA. According to Artigo 19, the Judiciary must
+also publish information produced as result of its main activities, such as information about access to
+the judicial system and jurisprudence, information about an ongoing case progress, forms of social
+participation, disclosure of agendas and schedules of hearings of the magistrate,; information about
+the election of the Presidents of the courts and magistrate assignments, and information about the
+process of nomination and appointment of Ministers to the Supreme Court [14].
+
+3.3. Jurimetrics in the Context of the Fredoom of Information Act (FIA)
+
+Research in Law, as an applied social science, tends to produce qualitative studies, which is why
+quantitative research in this field is not common. The doctrine says that the quantitative method,
+although not very usual in this field, can be of great value when you want to understand legal
+phenomena of greater complexity [17].
+The advent of law 11.419/06 [2], which rules on the digitalization of the judicial process and the
+consequent use of integrated systems to handle the legal process, improved it productivity and it
+allowed for the registration, storage, and retrieval of information quickly and reliably, making room
+for the collection and analysis of judicial decisions to become systemic. This fact creates the possibility
+of a new analytical approach, where the jurimetric approach becomes feasible and can come into play.
+It allows for fast and objective gathering of data about how the law is being applied by querying
+massive amounts of rulings and other jurisprudence from the legal court databases.
+In 1971, Loevinger [1], in the article “Jurimetrics the Next Step Forward” published by the
+Minnesota Law Review, coined the term “jurimetrics” to conceptualize the union of legal theory
+with the computational and statistical methods with the purpose of analyzing jurisprudence in order
+to make use of the law more predictable. Brazilian authors such as Nunes [18] defined the study
+of jurimetrics as a form of empirical research that relies on a statistical approach. Nunes also says
+that jurimetrics is the discipline that aims to investigate the law through the application of statistics.
+Its purpose is to understand what the real causes that lead to the creation of standards that make up
+the legal system are and what effects they produce in society [18].
+In this context, the quantitative method depends on data collection and analysis to respond
+to research questions and test the assumptions laid down previously and relies on numerical
+measurement, counting of occurrences and in the use of statistics to establish with accuracy the
+behavior patterns of a given population [19].
+The legal system adopted in Brazil is civil law, and its legal system comprises ordinary justice,
+which is divided into State and Federal courts, and special justice, which is divided into Labor, Electoral,
+and Military specialties. Anything that falls outside the jurisdiction of the Federal or the Special Justice
+is handled by the State System. The organizational standards of the judicial branch are defined in the
+Federal Constitution [9,20].
+Currently, the Brazilian judicial system has the following courts: the Federal Supreme Court
+(STF), the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), the Superior Military Court (STM), the Superior Labor Court
+(TST), the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), five Federal regional courts (TRFs), 24 Regional Labor Courts
+(TRTs), 27 Regional Electoral Courts, three State Military Courts of Justice (TJMs), and 27 State Courts
+of Justice (TJs) [20].
+The Brazilian judiciary has 74 million litigations pending trial, where the State Courts are
+responsible for 69.3% of all the claims presented before the Judicial Branch, nonetheless being
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 5 of 14
+
+responsible for 79.8% of the pending courts’ docket [21]. For this reason, this research focuses its
+analysis on the 27 State Courts of Justice.
+
+3.4. Jurimetrics in the Context of Data Access
+
+Implementing jurimetric studies presents technological challenges, as the data is usually in a
+free form text, and a variety of techniques need to be applied to extract the requested information.
+Typically, a jurimetric study involves establishing a hypothesis and then gathering and processing the
+data that could corroborate or refute the hypothesis. Some other studies are meant to provide statistical
+information. In this case, instead of a hypothesis, we start with the definition of the data that we want
+to consolidate, but in the end, it boils down to gathering and processing data. In order to gather the
+data, information can be manually collected and typed in, or a script can be developed to gather the
+data. Needless to say, data gathering will be more effective when it can be automated by a script [22].
+To automate data gathering, one must create queries to get this data from its sources. Depending on
+how the data is organized and what interfaces are available to the source, this task may be simple or nearly
+impossible. Many sources impose blocks to automated querying, requiring human intervention. The most
+common implementation of this blocks are CAPTCHAS, where before delivering the results, a challenge
+that a machine would normally not be able to answer must be responded to [23]. These blocks are usually
+implemented for two reasons: to prevent data theft and to prevent the server from being overloaded from
+excessive queries. In the case of the courts, data theft is not an issue. However, there are some cases where
+allowing someone to download the entire court database might become an issue. For example, it is illegal
+for a potential employer to search for the labor lawsuits of a candidate. The Labor Court handles that by
+only allowing users to query data from the process number. Also, the second reason is relevant, as it may
+not be the best use of public money to finance servers that can handle automated queries.
+To allow automated queries, some companies adopt an API (Application Program Interface),
+which is a set of routines, protocols, and tools that allows software applications to talk to each other.
+In order to avoid excessive use and therefore extra costs, an API requires the user to register before
+using and imposes limits on hourly, daily, and/or monthly number of queries per user [24].
+When an API is not available, automated queries will likely resort to web-scraping, a technique
+that involves emulate a human browsing a web-site to gather the data. This process requires much more
+programming effort and consumes more client and server process and data-transfer, as most of the data
+is to make the information visually appealing to humans. To make matters worse, whenever a website
+layout changes, even if the same information is displayed, the web-scraping program likely stops
+working and needs to be updated. When a CAPTCHA is present, it is sometimes possible to implement
+some routine to automatically “break” the CAPTCHA. In most cases, the process becomes partially
+automatic, and the program halts for a human to answer the challenge to then resume web-scraping [25].
+Another important barrier to automate data gathering is the lack of standards. To make computer
+processing easier, the data should be organized and available in the same format in order to avoid
+expensive ETL (Extract, Transform, Load) processes. The FIA [3] makes no provision in this sense,
+and neither does any other regulation that followed it.
+
+4. Results and Discussion
+
+In order to verify if it was possible to gather judicial data from the Brazilian courts and its
+readiness for jurimetric research, we developed an exploratory survey encompassing 29 Brazilian
+courts of which two are Supreme Courts (STF and STJ) and 27 are the State Court of Justice belonging
+to of each one of the States and the Federal District and Territories of Brazil.
+The present study was divided into two parts. The first looked for official websites/search
+engines/APIs available for each court included in this study. They were evaluated regarding
+(1) standardization of systems available to search jurisprudence data, (2) standardization in relation to
+the data returned by search, (3) difference in attributes returned by the search, (4) use of CAPTCHA,
+and (5) possibility to download the full text of decisions.
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 6 of 14
+
+The second part was concerned with how the Access of Information Procedure (AIP) [3] was being
+implemented in the researched courts in terms of law abiding and information management. The survey
+looked into how each court handled the AIP requests sent, checking if they issue control number for the
+requests, if all the court cases were available in digital format, which cases are published, if the documents
+are universally accessible, and how often they update their public jurisprudence database. In total,
+145 requests were sent to request this information using the FIA [3] as the legal base for the request.
+
+4.1. Court Web Systems Survey
+
+After looking into each of the 27 State Courts and two Supreme Courts, we found that no API
+is provided to gather jurisprudence data, which means that any jurimetric study has to rely on
+web-scraping of the court website. By reviewing each court website, it was found that there are no
+standards in terms of search engine, search fields, and data shown as result of a search. Many courts
+had a CAPTCHA in place, making automated queries harder to implement. Also, not all of the courts
+allowed the download of the full court decision for a given case.
+During the research, we found that the courts of the States of Santa Catarina and Rio de Janeiro are
+changing their systems and provide two search engines for court cases, thus raising the total number
+of court case search engines to 31 systems.
+Regarding the development of these systems, the most commonly found option was in-house
+development by the information technology staff member of the courts. Twenty-two of the 31 systems
+were developed by the court’s own staff. As each one of these 22 systems were developed by a
+different team, one would end up with 22 different proprietary systems to interface with and to build
+a web-scraper for. In the case of the Rio de Janeiro State Court, the original system was developed
+in-house, and in the case of the second one, called GSA, we could not identify whether it was in-house
+or not. The remaining eight courts adopted the same system, called e-SAJ (Electronic System of
+Automated Justice), developed by Softplan, one of the largest software development companies in
+Brazil in the Justice, Infrastructure, and e-government segments (Figure 1). They did that regardless
+of the fact that the National Justice Council (CNJ) determined that the courts should adopt another
+system the Judicial Process Electronic System (PJe) [3,25].
+
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 6 of 14
+
+4.1. Court Web Systems Survey
+
+After looking into each of the 27 State Courts and two Supreme Courts, we found that no API is
+provided to gather jurisprudence data, which means that any jurimetric study has to rely on webscraping
+of the court website. By reviewing each court website, it was found that there are no
+standards in terms of search engine, search fields, and data shown as result of a search. Many courts
+had a CAPTCHA in place, making automated queries harder to implement. Also, not all of the courts
+allowed the download of the full court decision for a given case.
+During the research, we found that the courts of the States of Santa Catarina and Rio de Janeiro
+are changing their systems and provide two search engines for court cases, thus raising the total
+number of court case search engines to 31 systems.
+Regarding the development of these systems, the most commonly found option was in-house
+development by the information technology staff member of the courts. Twenty-two of the 31 systems
+were developed by the court’s own staff. As each one of these 22 systems were developed by a
+different team, one would end up with 22 different proprietary systems to interface with and to build
+a web-scraper for. In the case of the Rio de Janeiro State Court, the original system was developed inhouse,
+and in the case of the second one, called GSA, we could not identify whether it was in-house
+or not. The remaining eight courts adopted the same system, called e-SAJ (Electronic System of
+Automated Justice), developed by Softplan, one of the largest software development companies in
+Brazil in the Justice, Infrastructure, and e-government segments (Figure 1). They did that regardless
+of the fact that the National Justice Council (CNJ) determined that the courts should adopt another
+system the Judicial Process Electronic System (PJe) [3,25].
+
+Figure 1. Distribution of jurisprudential search engines regarding how they were developed.
+
+As to how one can search for information, the present study showed that there are no standards
+in the number and type of fields available to find court cases. Two courts offer only one field, namely
+search text, while there are courts that provide up to 20 fields. The same applies to the search results:
+there are no standards in what is displayed as result, and the number and type of attributes vary
+widely, as it can be seen in Figure 2.
+
+Figure 1. Distribution of jurisprudential search engines regarding how they were developed.
+
+As to how one can search for information, the present study showed that there are no standards
+in the number and type of fields available to find court cases. Two courts offer only one field, namely
+search text, while there are courts that provide up to 20 fields. The same applies to the search results:
+there are no standards in what is displayed as result, and the number and type of attributes vary
+widely, as it can be seen in Figure 2.
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 7 of 14
+
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 7 of 14
+
+Figure 2. Number of fields available in the search engine per court and corresponding number of
+attributes shown in results.
+
+That difference between court data available and search parameters carries significant impact
+on any research that involves a nationwide view of a comparison between Courts, as the search
+methodology may not be available or the desired attribute may not be in the result data. This finding
+corroborates with a report from Artigo 19 [14], which strongly advocates for standards in the
+jurisprudence search engines, as they see it as fundamental for judicial transparency.
+In relation to the use of CAPTCHA (Figure 3), which hinders the information requests that are
+made by a machine, it was found that of the 29 surveyed, nine courts use it, and six of the courts that
+use e-SAJ force the user to go through the challenge before have effective access to the content of
+decisions. Finally, with respect to access and download of the full text of the decisions, the courts of
+Justice of Espírito Santo and Goiás do not have this feature in their search engines. Another four
+courts, namely Pará, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro (both systems), and Tocantins have the feature in
+their web-system, but the feature does not work, which for practical terms is no different than the
+former. This is not in compliance with the second article of resolution 121/2010-CNJ [26], which
+ensures, to any person, the right to access to procedural information and the basic data of the
+processes, such as the number, class and process issues, name of the parties, and their lawyers,
+procedural timelines in lawsuits, and full text of the decisions, sentences, rulings, and votes, all of
+which should be available at any time. The consolidated results can be seen in Figure 3.
+
+Figure 2. Number of fields available in the search engine per court and corresponding number of
+attributes shown in results.
+
+That difference between court data available and search parameters carries significant impact
+on any research that involves a nationwide view of a comparison between Courts, as the search
+methodology may not be available or the desired attribute may not be in the result data. This
+finding corroborates with a report from Artigo 19 [14], which strongly advocates for standards in the
+jurisprudence search engines, as they see it as fundamental for judicial transparency.
+In relation to the use of CAPTCHA (Figure 3), which hinders the information requests that are
+made by a machine, it was found that of the 29 surveyed, nine courts use it, and six of the courts
+that use e-SAJ force the user to go through the challenge before have effective access to the content of
+decisions. Finally, with respect to access and download of the full text of the decisions, the courts of
+Justice of Espírito Santo and Goiás do not have this feature in their search engines. Another four courts,
+namely Pará, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro (both systems), and Tocantins have the feature in their
+web-system, but the feature does not work, which for practical terms is no different than the former.
+This is not in compliance with the second article of resolution 121/2010-CNJ [26], which ensures,
+to any person, the right to access to procedural information and the basic data of the processes, such as
+the number, class and process issues, name of the parties, and their lawyers, procedural timelines in
+lawsuits, and full text of the decisions, sentences, rulings, and votes, all of which should be available at
+any time. The consolidated results can be seen in Figure 3.
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 8 of 14
+
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 8 of 14
+
+Figure 3. Number of courts using CAPTCHA compared with the number of courts that allows
+download of the entire content of a case.
+
+4.2. Access Information Procedure Survey
+
+Law 12,527/11 [3] brings fundamental rules to ensure that a citizen can find information on
+government websites (active transparency) and is able to request information not previously
+provided by the government (passive transparency) through the Access Information Procedure (AIP)
+[27]. Thus, the second part of the study sought to assess how the courts comply with the AIP and (i)
+assess the information websites, (ii) map the procedure to be followed by a citizen if you want to
+formulate request under the AIP, (iii) identify whether the courts searched have information
+management policy, and (iv) analyze empirically the compliance by the courts that composed the
+sample surveyed.
+The study evaluated 29 Brazilian courts, the Courts of Justice of 27 States and Federal District
+and Territories, and two superior courts. Thus, 145 requests for access to information were
+formulated and sent from a single identity, through the internet, using the most relevant system in
+each court: platforms dedicated to FIA, Ombudsman, contact us tools, email, or any other means
+identified on their websites. For each court in the survey, we issued five requests under the AIP. All
+requests were submitted in a single day, 5 September 2017.
+The access requests had the following questions: (1) Does the Court have an information
+management policy? If so, please specify the normative instrument that defines it and where it can
+be found? (2) Are all court cases available in digital format? If so, are they available in the Court
+website? (3) What procedural parts of a Court case are published (application, contestation,
+dispatches, sentence, etc.)? (4) Are these documents universally accessible? In case of negative
+answer, what was the reason for such restriction? (5) How often is the court case database available
+in the Court website is updated?
+Once the requests were sent, we waited for the replies until 25 September 2017, which is the last
+day according to the AIP for the court to reply, in accordance with paragraph 1, article 11 of the LAI
+[3], which states that under the AIP, it shall not take longer than twenty days to provide a response
+or request for an extension of deadline.
+
+4.2.1. Comparative Analysis of Information Access Platforms
+
+The data contained in the Table 1 below refer to the platforms of all 29 courts that were object of
+analysis. The first column identifies whether the court possesses specific platform for submissions of
+applications for access to information request, in addition to the columns confirmation email,
+registration required, email notification, and if it was possible to make an appeal. These attributes
+were selected because they must be present in good transparency passive platforms, according to the
+Brazilian State and Transparency-Evaluating the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act
+
+Figure 3. Number of courts using CAPTCHA compared with the number of courts that allows
+download of the entire content of a case.
+
+4.2. Access Information Procedure Survey
+
+Law 12,527/11 [3] brings fundamental rules to ensure that a citizen can find information on
+government websites (active transparency) and is able to request information not previously provided
+by the government (passive transparency) through the Access Information Procedure (AIP) [27]. Thus,
+the second part of the study sought to assess how the courts comply with the AIP and (i) assess the
+information websites, (ii) map the procedure to be followed by a citizen if you want to formulate
+request under the AIP, (iii) identify whether the courts searched have information management policy,
+and (iv) analyze empirically the compliance by the courts that composed the sample surveyed.
+The study evaluated 29 Brazilian courts, the Courts of Justice of 27 States and Federal District
+and Territories, and two superior courts. Thus, 145 requests for access to information were formulated
+and sent from a single identity, through the internet, using the most relevant system in each court:
+platforms dedicated to FIA, Ombudsman, contact us tools, email, or any other means identified on
+their websites. For each court in the survey, we issued five requests under the AIP. All requests were
+submitted in a single day, 5 September 2017.
+The access requests had the following questions: (1) Does the Court have an information management
+policy? If so, please specify the normative instrument that defines it and where it can be found? (2) Are all
+court cases available in digital format? If so, are they available in the Court website? (3) What procedural
+parts of a Court case are published (application, contestation, dispatches, sentence, etc.)? (4) Are these
+documents universally accessible? In case of negative answer, what was the reason for such restriction?
+(5) How often is the court case database available in the Court website is updated?
+Once the requests were sent, we waited for the replies until 25 September 2017, which is the last
+day according to the AIP for the court to reply, in accordance with paragraph 1, article 11 of the LAI [3],
+which states that under the AIP, it shall not take longer than twenty days to provide a response or
+request for an extension of deadline.
+
+4.2.1. Comparative Analysis of Information Access Platforms
+
+The data contained in the Table 1 below refer to the platforms of all 29 courts that were object of
+analysis. The first column identifies whether the court possesses specific platform for submissions of
+applications for access to information request, in addition to the columns confirmation email, registration
+required, email notification, and if it was possible to make an appeal. These attributes were selected
+because they must be present in good transparency passive platforms, according to the Brazilian State and
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 9 of 14
+
+Transparency-Evaluating the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (FIA) [27]. The authors
+highlight that international best practices of transparency advocate that government agencies, including
+courts, making use of technology and adopt digital platforms to requests for access to information, as it
+already occurs in Mexico, Chile, Canada, and other countries [27].
+
+Table 1. Comparative analysis of information access platforms.
+
+Court Name Web Interface Issues Control
+Number
+Sends E-mail
+Confirmation Registered Users
+TJ do Acre No Yes Yes No
+TJ de Alagoas No Yes Yes No
+TJ do Amapá No Yes Yes Yes
+TJ do Amazonas No Yes Yes Yes
+TJ da Bahia No Yes Yes Yes
+TJ do Ceará No No No No
+TJ do Distrito Federal e Territórios No No Yes No
+TJ do Espírito Santo No Yes Yes No
+TJ de Goiás No Yes No Yes
+TJ do Maranhão No Yes Yes Yes
+TJ do Mato Grosso No Yes Yes No
+TJ do Mato Grosso do Sul No No Yes No
+TJ de Minas Gerais No Yes Yes No
+TJ do Pará No No No No
+TJ da Paraíba No No Yes No
+TJ do Paraná No Yes Yes Yes
+TJ de Pernambuco No Yes Yes No
+TJ do Piauí No Yes Yes No
+TJ do Rio de Janeiro No Yes Yes Yes
+TJ do Rio Grande do Norte No No No No
+TJ do Rio Grande do Sul Yes Yes Yes Yes
+TJ de Rondônia No Yes Yes Yes
+TJ de Roraima No No No No
+TJ de Santa Catarina No Yes Yes No
+TJ de São Paulo Yes Yes Yes No
+TJ de Sergipe No Yes Yes Yes
+TJ de Tocantins No Yes Yes No
+Superior Tribunal de Justiça Yes Yes Yes Yes
+Supremo Tribunal Federal Yes Yes Yes No
+
+Whereas the FIA [3] aims to guarantee constitutional right of access to information, the definition
+and use of a web-based platform different from the traditionally used channels for other purposes
+assumes importance in the implementation of law [27]. In this respect, it was found that 86.2% of
+the courts searched do not have their own platform to meet the requests for access to information,
+and make use of communication channels designed for other purposes, such as Ombudsman and
+Contact Us.
+There is, therefore, a misuse of communication channels that were meant for another purpose in
+order to provide a means to reply to information access requests, which many times does not comply
+with the FIA [3] and compromises the rights guaranteed by the Constitution [9]. As an example,
+the response sent by the Ombudsman of the Court Justice of Bahia informed us that the request was
+beyond their competence and forwarded the request to the Modernization and Information Secretary
+(SETIM), which then said that such request should be sent to the Information and Documentation
+Agency (NDI), without giving the NDI’s address or contact, which is clearly against what is stated in
+the AIP [3].
+Regarding the issuance of a control number for requests and a confirmation email, 24.1% and
+17.2% courts surveyed, respectively, do not provide a request control number nor a confirmation email.
+This practice does not allow citizens to check whether your demand was in fact received and registered
+by the Court and whether the necessary measures have been taken to respond to the request, making
+any attempt to follow up more difficult.
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 10 of 14
+
+In the study, transparency in the Brazilian State [27] that evaluated the application of FIA [3] by
+the Brazilian State, it was found that the various platforms used only allowed the citizen to access the
+response to request for information after inserting the control number generated at the moment of the
+request. They warn, however, that the platforms do not offer alternate means to access the response in
+the case of a loss of that number. In this context, the situation found by this survey verified that some
+platforms allow user registration to implement this alternative means. However, 62% of the analyzed
+platforms do not make use of the Login.
+Also, we found that the Court of Justice of the States of Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande do Norte, and
+Roraima are really behind because they do not provide a control number, do not send confirmation
+email, nor have a platform with Login or any other mean to follow up on the request for information.
+
+4.2.2. Analysis of Information Access Request Responses
+
+Once the deadline for the responses to the information access requests passed, analysis started
+including (i) response rate, (ii) response time, and (iii) quality of the answers. For each court surveyed,
+five requests for access to information were sent, totaling 145 requests, all sent from the same
+citizen, through the internet, using the most relevant system in each court dedicated to the AIP [3]:
+Ombudsman, Contact Us form, email, or any other mean available identified in their respective
+websites. The results were summarized on Table 2.
+
+Table 2. Information access request responses.
+
+Court Name Respected
+Deadline
+E-mail
+Notification
+Requested Deadline
+Extension Justified Allows Appeal
+
+TJ do Acre No No No - -
+TJ de Alagoas Yes Yes No - No
+TJ do Amapá No No No - -
+TJ do Amazonas No No No - -
+TJ da Bahia Yes Yes No - No
+TJ do Ceará No No No - No
+TJ do Distrito Federal e
+Territórios Yes Yes No - No
+TJ do Espírito Santo No No No - -
+TJ de Goiás No No No - -
+TJ do Maranhão No No No - -
+TJ do Mato Grosso Yes Yes No - No
+TJ do Mato Grosso do Sul No No No - -
+TJ de Minas Gerais No No No - -
+TJ do Pará No No No - -
+TJ da Paraíba No No No - -
+TJ do Paraná No No No - -
+TJ de Pernambuco Not Yet 1 Not Yet 1 Yes No -
+TJ do Piauí No No No - -
+TJ do Rio de Janeiro Partial Answer No No - No
+TJ do Rio Grande do Norte No No No - -
+TJ do Rio Grande do Sul Yes Yes No - No
+TJ de Rondônia No No No - No
+TJ de Roraima No No No - -
+TJ de Santa Catarina Yes Yes No - No
+TJ de São Paulo Yes Yes No - No
+TJ de Sergipe Partial Answer Yes No - No
+TJ de Tocantins Yes Yes No - No
+Superior Tribunal de Justiça Not Yet 1 Not Yet 1 Yes Yes -
+Supremo Tribunal Federal Yes Yes No - No
+1 These courts requested an10-day extension, as provided by the FIA [3].
+
+In terms of response rate, from a quantitative perspective, only 53 of the 145 requests were
+answered, which means that 63.4% of requests were unanswered. Of the 29 courts surveyed, only nine
+of them answered the five requests, and two courts responded to four of the five requests. The response
+rate found in this study concurs with the Transparency in the Brazilian State Study [27], which found
+similar numbers of unanswered requests (61%).
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 11 of 14
+
+It was noted also that the courts surveyed did not take advantage of requesting an extension to
+reply, which allowed than to extend their deadline by 10 days, as stated in the paragraph 1, Article
+11 of the FIA [3]. Only two courts requested an extension: the Court of the State of Pernambuco
+(TJPE) and the Superior Court of Justice (STJ). However, only the Superior Court of Justice offered the
+mandatory justification for the request for an extension.
+Thus, the fact that only two courts requested the extension shows that most of the courts either
+ignore that is possible to extend the deadline or do not care about complying with the FIA [3]. It also
+reinforces the fact that, on average, two in every three requests for information have been completely
+ignored and that, after two years of development of the Transparency in the Brazilian State study [27],
+nothing has changed.
+Furthermore, paragraph 4 of article 11 of the FIA [3] establishes the possibility of requesting an
+appeal in case of the denial of access to the request made by the Court, which remains impaired, since
+92 requests went unanswered. However, it should be noted that none of the surveyed platforms has a
+field for sending of an appeal. The Court of Justice of Santa Catarina denied the request for information
+to identify whether the Court possesses an information management policy, reasoning that the AIP
+request was incomprehensible or generic (art. 12, I, Resolution CNJ 215/2015) [13]. In spite of having
+been informed in the response that we could appeal to an authority that is hierarchically superior,
+it was not clarified how or where the appeal may be filed.
+In regard to the quality of the responses forwarded by the courts, the 53 responses were analyzed,
+and these are the findings:
+The first question asked about the court information management policy and the availability of
+the normative that defined it. It was identified that the theme of information management is still not
+properly understood in the context of the Brazilian judiciary, as most responses were confusing and
+mixed the concepts of information management and document management.
+Information management, broadly, can be understood as the management of processes and systems
+that create, acquire, organize, store, distribute and use information. The objective of information
+management is to help people and organizations to access, process and use information efficiently
+and effectively [28]. On the other hand, document management is the set of procedures and
+technical operations regarding the production, processing, use, evaluation, archiving, and disposal of
+documents [29]. Therefore, it represents first step towards the establishment of information management.
+In this context, the Court of Justice of the Federal District and Territories is the most advanced on
+the topic of information management. It has several regulatory norms on the subject outlining how the
+policy on the management of information security and has established a Corporate Information Security
+Policy that aims to establish, implement, maintain, and improve controls and mechanisms to promote the
+management of information security. To do so, they claim to have three norms that regulates this subject.
+The Court of the State of São Paulo and the Brazilian Supreme Court replied to the first question
+with classification of document rules and rules for disposal of the documents, which means that they
+can be considered in the first stage of information management.
+The most extreme case that confirms the difficulty of the courts to act in the subject was the
+denial of request for access by the Court of Justice of Santa Catarina, who argued that the concept of
+information management is very complex that such a request for access was not sufficiently clear to be
+responded to by the Court.
+The second question was about whether the court cases were available in the digital form and if so,
+if they are publicly available for consultation. It was found that after 11 years of the law 11,419/2006 [2],
+which established the electronic process in the Brazilian courts, physical processes on paper still coexist.
+There is thus a hybrid situation, since the courts still allow paper processes, where some courts are still
+scanning paper processes to convert it to digital format and comply with the law, while others only
+scan it after the case is closed.
+The third question asked about which procedural parts of the court case are published (petition
+initial dispute, dispatches, sentence, etc.). In this sense, it was identified that the courts follow the
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 12 of 14
+
+resolution 121/2010-CNJ [26], which determines the publication of the full text of the decisions,
+sentences, rulings and votes.
+The fourth question asked whether documents are universally accessible. If they were not, we also
+asked what criteria motivated the restricted access. The courts stated that documents were restricted
+only when demanded by confidentiality or secrecy of justice and that there was no technical issue
+preventing the universal access.
+Finally, the fifth question sought to identify the frequency of updating the database of judicial
+proceedings. With the exception to the Court of the Federal District and Territories that updates their
+database weekly, all others stated that the update occurs on a daily basis.
+
+5. Conclusions
+
+The survey found that doing quantitative research [30] or jurimetrics by querying jurisprudential
+databases of the Brazilian courts faces technical barriers and other non-technical barriers, as despite
+the legal framework provided by the FIA [3] and subsequent resolutions from the CNJ [10–13,25,26],
+few Courts comply with the law to its full extent. Also, the lack of standards to access those courts
+makes querying this information more resource intensive, requiring more programmer-hours to be
+implemented. The use of CAPTCHA in many search engines also makes the automation of the queries
+even harder. That did not prevent the growth of jurimetrics in Brazil, and some interesting results
+have been published since the enactment of the FIA [3–5,16,18,30]. Nevertheless, it is an important
+barrier and slows progress in this area. It would be of great value if the courts defined a common API
+to access their jurisprudential databases, where limits could be imposed per user, as it is done by many
+software companies.
+From the point of view of the access of information process (AIP) requests, when the researcher
+needs to address the court in search of an answer that is not published, even with the establishment
+of FIA [3] and the development of platform for the sending of requests, the courts in general do not
+comply with the regulations. There is also a great deficiency in the platforms used for the submission
+of requests for access to information that sometimes come with the minimum requirements set out in
+FIA (for example, the frequent absence of the field to appeal). At this point, the unification of platforms
+between the courts would represent a great gain.
+Also, it was found that is the courts are really behind in the application of current information
+management practices, since there is a confusion between the concepts of information management
+and document management.
+Regarding our initial hypothesizes:
+
+• Hypothesis 1: The legal framework is not enough—The framework provided by the FIA [3] is
+a great first step, and the resolutions from the CNJ [10–13] provided some progress in the right
+direction, but as it was pointed out by Artigo 19 [14], and comparing our current framework
+with international references as the Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
+Expression [8], that we still have a long way to go;
+• Hypothesis 2: Current systems are preventing progress in this area—As the survey showed,
+current systems are heterogeneous, many prevent automated queries, lots of processes are not
+digital, but digitized as paper scans, making the progress harder;
+• Hypothesis 3: Courts are not prepared and neither abide by the current laws—As the AIP survey
+showed, 63% of the courts did not reply the AIP [3] and there are no mechanisms for appealing to
+denied requests even if the law says so.
+
+Based on this results, we made the following recommendations as the next steps to a more
+transparent system:
+
+• Amend the FIA [3] by making digital process mandatory and defining standards based on best
+Open Data practices [16,17,22] to make this data available;
+Future Internet 2017, 9, 68 13 of 14
+
+• Ban the use of CAPTCHA, favoring the imposition of number of requests per user as a way to
+avoid server overloads, and have mechanisms for a user to request an increase on these limits
+upon justification (research for instance);
+• Adopt a common API for all courts;
+• Increase the supervision and establish mechanisms to punish courts that are not abiding by laws;
+• Increase resources, training, and provision of technical expertise to the courts that are lacking that
+to be compliant.
+
+Even though our gloomy hypothesis were confirmed by our research, we see a positive future for
+our society, as some progress was made, and watchdogs NGO like Artigo 19 [14] are putting more
+pressure on our judiciary. As a next step, our research will continue trying to determine what are the
+barriers to the implementation of jurimetric systems by developing our own legal database, as was
+done at Washington University with the implementation of the US Supreme Court Database [31]. Also,
+we want to look in how to generalize these findings from the Brazil’s example and how other countries
+are dealing with it. Finally, we want to get deeper when researching a given court, trying to find
+explanations for why the different states apply the law in different ways.
+
+Author Contributions: B.A.C., P.B., and V.M.B. conceived and designed the experiments; B.A.C. performed the
+experiments; B.A.C., P.B., and V.M.B. analyzed the data; B.A.C., P.B., and V.M.B. wrote the paper.
+Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
+
+References
+
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+2. Lei n. 11.419. Available online: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2006/lei/l11419.htm
+(accessed on 15 September 2017).
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+(accessed on 2 September 2017).
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+(accessed on 20 September 2017).
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+23. Von Ahn, L.; Blum, M.; Hopper, N.J.; Langford, J. CAPTCHA: Using Hard AI Problems for Security.
+In Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT; Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg,
+Germany, 2003; pp. 294–311. [CrossRef]
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+[CrossRef]
+25. Conselho Nacional de Justiça. Resolucao 185. Available online: http://www.cnj.jus.br/busca-atos-adm?
+documento=2492 (accessed on 30 September 2017).
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+documento=92 (accessed on 22 September 2017).
+27. Michener, G.; Moncau, L.F.; Velasco, R.B. Estado Brasileiro e Transparência Avaliando a Aplicação da Lei de
+Acesso à Informação. Fundação Getulio Vargas. Available online: http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/
+handle/10438/17936 (accessed on 17 September 2017).
+28. Deltor, B. Information Management. Int. J. Inf. Manag. 2010, 30, 103–108.
+29. Martins, S.d.C. Gestão da Informação: Estudo Comparativo de Modelos sob a Ótica Integrativa dos Recursos de
+Informação; Dissertação de Mestrado, Universidade Federal Fluminense: Niterói/Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2014.
+30. Gustin, M.B.d.S.; Lara, M.A.; Costa, M.B.L.C. Pesquisa Quantitativa na Produção de Conhecimento Jurídico;
+Revista Faculdade de Direito UFMG: Minas Gerais, Brazil, 2012; pp. 291–316.
+31. Spaeth, H.; Epstein, L.; Ruger, T.; Whittington, K.; Segal, J.; Martin, A.D. Supreme Court Database Code Book;
+Washington University Law: St. Louis, MO, USA, 2014.
+
+© 2017 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
+article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
+(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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+JURIMETRICS PLEASE !
+
+Richard De Mulder, [1] Kees van Noortwijk [2] and Lia Combrink-Kuiters [3]
+
+Cite as: De Mulder R., van Noortwijk K., & Combrink-Kuiters, “Jurimetrics Please”, in
+European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 1, Issue 1, 2010.
+
+Abstract
+
+Jurimetrics, the empirical study of the law, has never really come into existence.
+Although, given the way in which society has developed during the information age, it
+could have been expected that jurimetrics would become an important discipline, until
+now it has not conquered much ground in the universities or outside. In this article, some
+elements of the history of jurimetrics are presented as well as the academic and practical
+potential of this discipline. Finally, an attempt is made to explain the slow development
+of jurimetrics and a possible future perspective is given.
+
+1 Introduction
+
+'Jurimetrics' or 'jurimetrical' are not terms that are often used as qualifications for
+research activities. Even in the American journal called Jurimetrics, The Journal of Law,
+Science, and Technology, [4]which refers to itself as 'a forum for the publication and
+exchange of ideas and information about the relationships between law, science, and
+technology in all areas' and 'the oldest journal of law and science in the United States',
+very few of the articles mention the term jurimetrics. Furthermore, although the journal
+covers a variety of subjects such as:
+
+ Physical, life, and social sciences
+ Engineering, aerospace, communications, and computers
+ Logic, mathematics, and quantitative methods
+ The uses of science and technology in law practice, adjudication, and court and
+agency administration
+ Policy implications and legislative and administrative control of science and
+technology.
+
+The approaches adopted can hardly be said to belong to the realm of jurimetrics.
+
+It was the American Lee Loevinger who launched the term 'jurimetrics'. [5]He stressed
+the importance of scientific, and therefore statistical methods for lawyers. He saw a
+number of possibilities for using these applications in the law. Loevinger contended that
+knowledge about the law could be obtained by observation, rather than through
+speculation. 'Jurimetrics promises to cut windows in the house of law, so that those inside
+can see out, and to cut doors, so that those outside can get in.' [6] Loevinger's willingness
+to apply scientific methods to the law did not receive undivided support. In particular, his
+interpretation of scientific was criticised because it made no distinction between the
+activities of practising lawyers and those of academic researchers, as long as their work
+was of a quantitative nature. The quantitative approach became some headway in the
+United States in the 1960s and 1970s, but later appeared to go out of fashion.
+
+One of the problems that arose in those early days was how jurimetrics should be defined.
+For example, Franken [7] defined jurimetrics as 'the application of quantitative methods
+to legal problems'. Franken did not agree with the behavioural, positivist approach as
+proposed by Loevinger, but would only accept quantitative methods if applied on a
+theoretical basis with explicit ethical and political principles. He proposed cybernetic
+systems theory as candidate for this. [8]It has been argued that this definition is, on the
+one hand, rather broad, while, on the other, rather restrictive. The 'application' is not just
+meant as something done by researchers, but also by practising lawyers (e.g. the
+documentation of data), while jurimetrics is restricted to quantitative activities. It would
+seem, however, that jurimetrics should also involve at least some non-quantitative (but
+nevertheless mathematical) approaches. De Mulder [9] in 1984 equated 'jurimetrics' to
+'the empirical legal science', that should be concerned with the world of experience. He
+agreed with Loevinger that there are strong similarities between jurimetrics and
+econometrics, the scientific approach of economic phenomena. Lawyers, unfortunately,
+are not familiar with quantitative approaches and cannot build upon a tradition of
+mathematical models. This approach has had to be developed from the start. [10]
+
+2 Our definition
+
+In this article, we would like to use the following definition:
+
+Jurimetrics is the empirical study of the form, the meaning and the
+pragmatics (and the relationships between those) of demands and
+authorisations issuing from state organisations with the aid of mathematical
+models and using methodological individualism as the basic paradigm for the
+explanation and prediction of human behaviour .
+
+Or put more simply, it is a definition containing the following elements:
+
+ The empirical study of legal phenomena
+ With the aid of mathematical models
+ On the basis of methodological individualism (= rationality).
+
+With respect to the first element, the object of investigation for the legal scientist, the
+legal phenomena, is legal texts. Legal texts are analysed in a variety of ways - their form,
+their meaning, their effect and how and why these texts came into existence. The second
+element explains that jurimetrics research uses a model building approach. By this is
+meant that an attempt is made to express the theory in mathematical, for example
+statistical, models. This usually entails quantification, which is often unavoidable because
+of the necessity of calculating probability. The third element requires a theory to describe,
+explain and predict human behaviour. Over the years, a number of models of man have
+appeared and have been used in various disciplines. Many social scientists and most
+lawyers base their approach on a sociological image of man. In this theory, man's
+behaviour will conform to the norms of the group to which he belongs. However, the
+success of the market economies has coincided with a wider acceptance of the basic
+paradigm (in the sense of Kuhn [11]) which is used to study human behaviour and hence
+to explain, predict and direct it in modern economic theory: it is the 'homo economicus'
+or (resourceful, evaluating, maximising person, REMP, or REMM, resourceful,
+evaluating, maximizing model) which now provides the image of man. [12] Processes are
+studied from the point of view of methodological individualism. In other words,
+processes are described, explained and predicted on the basis of the behaviour of
+individuals. A REMP is a person who wants all his decisions to be of maximum use to
+himself. Ideologically, this may sound rather denigrating. Modern day newspaper articles
+accuse the REMP of being a 'calculating citizen'. Yet in practice this selfishness is not
+necessarily anti-social because REMPs realise that their own interests are better served by
+taking other people into account. Negotiation is the lifeblood of the model. The REMP
+model of man is similar to the economic model. However, the REMP model is based
+upon utility maximising and does not restrict itself to the maximising of money, which is
+the basis for the economic model.
+
+The criticism of the REMP model is usually based upon the fact that the REMP is a
+rational decision model whereas people do not always act rationally; emotions could
+affect decision-making. However, if the REMP model is understood properly, it is clear
+that emotions form a part of the utility function. The rationality of the model lies in the
+presumption that an individual will decide what will produce the most utility for that
+individual, and that includes emotional factors.
+
+The rational model would never have become as important as it is now, if it had just been
+a model to explain and predict individual human behaviour. On the basis of this model,
+Jensen and Meckling developed their principal agent theory that is now the dominant
+approach in organisation science. In Jensen and Meckling, general and specific
+knowledge, the degree to which decisions in organisations are made at a central level
+rather than locally, is explained from two kinds of costs: agency costs and information
+costs. [13] Fama and Jensen in "Separation of ownership and control", [14] explain how
+the individual interests of shareholders and managers lead to typical organisational
+structures such as public companies. Textbooks such as Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman
+[15]show that this approach, using the REMP model of man, has become the foundation
+of modern organisational theory.
+
+Those who would reject the REMP model as being ideologically coloured would,
+presumably, also reject the selection of this model as the basis for predicting human
+behaviour in jurimetrics research. However, there are good grounds for choosing the
+REMP, as the ability of this model to explain and predict is considerable. The model can
+be used as a basis for jurimetrical research, for example to analyse, explain and predict
+judicial decisions. It is the empirical, quantitative and economical approach to law that
+will enable lawyers to come up with advice that will be relevant, reliable and
+comprehensible to their clients. It makes finding results easier and more accessible for
+users in modern organisations, with their focus on costs and profits, while it also
+facilitates the use of knowledge from economics and business studies. Choosing the
+REMP model does not mean, however, that the achievements of sociology and
+psychology should be ignored in jurimetrics research. The REMP model gives direction
+to the research, it does not exclude elements from other disciplines. The REMP model,
+however, is essential in the empirical study of the law that concentrates on the
+pragmatics. Pragmatics is the core subject of law and economics.
+
+Below, several jurimetrical studies will be presented. These illustrate the variety of areas
+to which the approach can be applied. They also provide insight into the practical
+application of jurimetrical tools to legal problems.
+
+3 The form of legal language
+
+With respect to the form of legal texts, comparatively little research has been carried out.
+However, the form of legal texts should be studied scientifically. The foundation of legal
+empirical knowledge is, after all, the study of the properties of the form of legal texts. It
+is difficult to see how scientific knowledge can be gained about the meaning and
+pragmatics of legal decisions and legislation without systematic knowledge of the form of
+those texts, for example by comparing them to non-legal corpora.
+
+3.1 Quantitative linguistics
+
+For legal language, several aspects of the form could be studied. One of these is the
+structure of the word use in legal texts. An interesting question with respect to this is for
+instance if this word use differs measurably from word use in other text types. To
+examine this, methods from the field of quantitative linguistics (sometimes also referred
+to as statistical linguistics) [16] can be used. This is a branch of linguistic science in
+which the measurability of linguistic phenomena plays a central role. Quantitative
+linguistics provides a number of methods to analyse the word use in a set of documents,
+or 'corpus'. Characteristics which play an important role in these methods are for instance
+word frequency (how often does a certain word appear), frequency distribution (what is
+the pattern of the word frequencies of all the different words in a corpus) and distribution
+of word types (is a certain word used in every document in a corpus, or only in a subset of
+documents). These characteristics can be analysed by compiling a frequency list of the
+corpus. This is a list of all the different words (or 'word types') in the corpus, plus the
+number of times the word appears in the corpus and the number of documents of which it
+is a part. [17]This list is sorted according to word frequency, the most common word
+being at the top. Based on this frequency list a number of linguistic measurements can be
+made, such as the 'characteristic K of Yule/Herdan. [18]The value of these measurements
+provides a typology of what could be called the 'structure of word use'. Apart from these
+data, which characterise the way in which words are used, the words themselves have
+also been studied in this research project. Points which have been taken into account in
+this respect are, for instance, word lengths and the specific words which appear at the
+'head' of the frequency list (the most common words in a corpus).
+3.2 Legal language versus 'general Dutch'
+
+A study on the characteristics of legal word use, carried out with respect to the Dutch
+language a decade ago by Van Noortwijk, [19] showed interesting results. For instance,
+word frequency distributions (the 'pattern' of word use) proved to be quite different in
+legal texts than in 'general Dutch'. This is illustrated by the following conclusions that
+were drawn:
+
+ Word types (different words) are repeated more often in the legal texts than in
+general texts. General texts usually contain a higher number of different words.
+ For legal texts, the (most common) words at the top of the frequency list have
+higher frequencies than words at the same position on the list of general texts.
+Together with the former point, this means that in legal texts there is a smaller
+'core' vocabulary, of which every word type is used more often.
+ The same conclusion can be drawn from a comparison of the frequency
+distributions. Another fact which emerges from these distributions is that although
+the general Dutch texts contain a far greater number of different words, many of
+these words (a higher percentage than in the legal corpora) have very low
+frequencies (they appear less than ten times).
+ Word use in each of the corpora can be effectively characterised by several
+'linguistic constants'. The value of the characteristic K which was mentioned
+earlier, for instance, ranged from 0.0128 for the statute law corpus, via 0.0111 for
+the case law corpus, to 0.0106 for the general Dutch corpus.
+
+Given these differences that were found for Dutch legal texts, it would of course be
+interesting to investigate whether the same holds true for other languages and whether
+there would be differences between the characteristics of Dutch legal texts and texts in
+other languages. Therefore, a similar research project for British English texts was
+recently initiated at the Erasmus University. Two corpora containing thousands of legal
+documents (one containing legislation and one containing case reports) and a corpus
+containing general texts, all in British English, have since been compiled. The corpora are
+of roughly equal sizes (around 16 million words each). The 'general' corpus consists of a
+random sample from the British National Corpus, [20]the two legal corpora consist of
+legal texts available on the Internet. Cases for the case reports corpus have been selected
+in such a way that the percentage of cases heard by various courts in the British hierarchy
+of courts (House of Lords, Court of Appeal, High Court, County Court cases etc.) more
+or less corresponds to that in the ten year old Dutch case law corpus, which will facilitate
+inter-language comparison. Using these corpora, it is possible to map precisely the
+differences between word use in the respective language types.
+
+3.3 Characteristics of the English corpora
+
+In the field of quantitative linguistics, several characteristics (measurements) to compare
+corpora have been proposed. One of these is the so-called 'Characteristic K', as defined by
+Yule and Herdan. This is an indication of the average frequency of the repetition of word
+types. According to Yule, at least, this characteristic is therefore also an indication of the
+size of the vocabulary in a corpus (i.e. it could be used to predict the number of word
+types from any given number of word tokens). In the pilot project it was found that it
+appears to be sufficiently stable in samples of different size, taken from a corpus. [21] K
+can be calculated as follows:
+
+where r stands for the rank number of a frequency class, equal to the frequency in the
+corpus of the word types in that class, and nr stands for the number of word types in the
+class. These values for K are calculated for the three corpora:
+
+Table 1. Characteristic K for the different corpora
+
+The two legal corpora yield values that are almost identical, whereas the general language
+corpus yields a K that is considerably lower. In the Dutch pilot project similar results
+were found, but with an in-between score for the case law corpus. An explanation could
+be that the word use in British case law reports is rather formal - much like that in
+legislation texts - whereas Dutch case reports might contain a mixture of formal (legal)
+language and a more general discourse.
+
+Another relationship between the number of word tokens and word types, as defined by
+Erikstad, [22] has also proven to be relatively stable, no matter what the size of a corpus.
+In this relationship, the number of word types in a sample is considered equal to a power
+C of the number of word tokens in the sample, multiplied by a constant R.
+
+By using known values for the numbers of tokens and types in different samples, the
+values of C and R can be calculated by means of regression analysis. The results, for the
+British corpora as well as for the Dutch pilot, are given in Table 2.
+
+Table 2. Token/type ratio constants
+
+Explaining the different values is beyond the scope of this brief introduction to the
+subject. Interestingly, the British corpora show different values for R and C than perhaps
+could be expected from the pilot project. Because the square of the Pearson product
+moment correlation for the regression analysis underlying the values of these constants is
+very high (above 0,989 for all three corpora), the reliability of formula (2) for the
+estimation of the number of word types in a sample of any given size is also high. In the
+next section, we will describe a possibility to create a practical computer application
+based on word use statistics. The system which is being introduced has been developed in
+the past few years at Erasmus University. It makes use of the characteristics of the word
+use in documents in order to implement more intelligent [23](legal) document retrieval
+systems.
+
+4 The analysis of case law
+
+The analysis of case law with the aid of mathematical models is probably the most
+promising possibility for jurimetrics. The general idea of this research is to examine
+judicial decision-making or, more precisely, the relationship between the input - the
+identifiable case factors - and the output - the decision. A number of ways have been
+found to represent this relationship in simple mathematical formulae or just by using a
+conceptual model. As computers became more powerful, the interest in this kind of
+research initially increased strongly. However, interest in the computer-assisted analysis
+of case law quickly waned, probably because this method of research still remained very
+time consuming, despite the use of computers. A significant part of the work had to be
+done manually, as a legally trained individual must perform the coding operation. It is for
+this reason that most of the research has been limited to a pilot study. These studies
+showed that, with the use of a certain mathematical model, satisfactory results could be
+achieved.
+
+In making a case analysis, a list of factors must be drawn up. One of the case variables
+that have been examined is the role of the judge him/herself in the decision-making
+process. Some results indicate that the judge who makes the decision can be a
+determining factor in the result of a case. In one of the approaches, the so-called
+'behavioural approach', a relationship is supposed between the personal characteristics of
+judges and the content of their decisions. In this line of research two kinds of
+characteristics are distinguished: on the one hand, the opinions, preferences and attitudes
+of judges and, on the other, their personal attributes. Sometimes a third personal
+characteristic is mentioned: the group behaviour of judges. This kind of research studies
+the way judges communicate with their peers during their deliberations.
+
+Glendon Schubert's [24] bundle gave some examples of the case analysis focusing on the
+person of the judge as a factor. Stuart Nagel [25]reported a project in which the
+relationship between the attitude of judges with respect to 24 separate items and decisionmaking
+had been investigated. A correlation with progressivism was found. In an earlier
+study [26] Nagel had found that background factors such as family origin, religion,
+education and work experience influence judicial decision-making. Ulmer [27]
+investigated the influence on decision-making of the personal characteristic 'leadership in
+small groups' and obtained some positive results.
+
+Underlying this kind of jurimetrical research is the work of the North American 'legal
+realists'. The US judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that judicial decision-making was
+not simply a logical exercise in which an established rule of law was applied to the facts
+of a particular case:
+
+…. the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience. The felt
+necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
+public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
+with their fellow men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
+determining the rules by which men should be governed. [28]
+
+In the 1920s, Herman Oliphant, a late adept of this approach, was an outspoken critic of
+the usefulness of the ratio decidendi as a guide to the real grounds of a decision. [29]The
+legal realists contend that the arguments judges formulate in their decisions do not
+necessarily express their real considerations. Their decision-making is not determined by
+rules (law, treaties, doctrine, customs etc.) but depends upon specific factors in cases.
+'Fact-pattern' research tries to investigate all the possible case factors and not just those
+mentioned in the judicial argumentation. Kort [30] attempted to create mathematical
+models that could predict judicial decisions based on such case factors. In later research
+he started to apply linear regression models as well as other models to a number of legal
+areas. Kort's research revealed some relationships between case factors and decisions.
+ [31]Reed Lawlor's[32] approach was to identify a linear relationship between two
+'constant' factors, the person of the judge and the law, and a number of variable case
+factors. [33]He supposed that judges' opinions would not change over time. He
+developed an extensive manual for case analysis. [34]Lawlor's work showed some very
+promising results, although in the grey area between clear 'pro' and clear 'con' decisions
+the prediction was often not clear. Since the last legal realist (Reed Lawlor [35]) retired
+from research, the jurimetrics front has become rather quiet. Although Franken, Snijders,
+Tyree, De Mulder, Malsch, Combrink-Kuiters, Ashley, and Suyudi [36] can be mentioned
+as researchers involved in case analysis, at the moment there are only a few researchers in
+the whole world who are working on quantitative empirical research into judicial
+decision-making. The deep-structure research carried out by Smith and Deedman is, in
+essence, jurimetrical in nature and the same can be said as regards at least part of the
+research by Zeleznikow and Hunter into case-based reasoning. These researchers are also
+searching for structures and regularities within the process of judicial decision-making in
+order to implement these patterns into legal knowledge based systems. [37]
+
+4.1 Steps in a jurimetrical research plan
+
+Below is a description of how a jurimetrical research project is carried out. [38]The
+examples used here are from Combrink's study. [39]
+
+ A legal domain is chosen, based on the availability of (preferably) lower court
+cases and the suitability of the subject matter. Within the domain, at least one
+specific legal topic has to be chosen and 'operationalised' in the form of a 'legal
+item'. For instance, in the field of family law the legal item that has been used is
+whether or not the father was granted custody. The item has to be dichotomous:
+the answer is 'yes' (the father was granted custody) or 'no' (he was not).
+ A selection of cases within the chosen domains has to be made. All cases that are
+possible candidates for selection should be read and assessed. Only when the set
+of cases is homogeneous can a search be made to determine the influence of
+certain facts and circumstances. The decisions have to be on the same item.
+Insufficiently relevant cases must, therefore, be removed from the selection.
+All cases have to be thoroughly read and a list of factors has to be drawn up.
+
+Figure 1. List of factors
+
+An example of such a list is provided in figure 1.
+
+ All cases must then be manually coded by, preferably, at least two different
+assessors.
+ On the basis of the coded data, a statistical prediction model is calculated.
+Correlation between factors can be analysed in order to improve the prediction
+methods. Techniques for validation have to be applied. Factors that turned out to
+be important in the custody cases could be, for example, the expert's advice and
+which parent was already taking care of the child at the commencement of the
+court procedure. For each case a score is calculated on the basis of the weights of
+the factors. Without such scores, cases can only be ordered according to whether
+the judicial decision was 'for' or 'against'. See figure 2. [40]
+
+Figure 2. Cases ordered according to actual decision (+1/-1)
+
+Ordered according to the weight of the factors, the picture as shown in figure 3 emerges.
+
+Figure 3. Cases ordered according to weight of factors
+
+This graph shows that there are strong cases e.g. in favour of the father (at the left,
+particularly case 5), strong cases in favour of the mother (on the right, particularly case
+21) and some cases in the intermediate zone (for example case 18 and case 22). With the
+data depicted in this graph, the probability that a case would be decided for or against the
+father or the mother could be estimated.
+
+The outcome that would result from combining the two graphs is shown in figure 4.
+
+Particularly interesting here is case 19. This case was ranked between the 'for mother'
+cases, but was decided in favour of the father. Such a statistical 'outlier' is often
+particularly interesting from the legal point of view. Which were the factors that
+determined its position in the ranking?
+
+Figure 4. Data from figures 2 and 3 combined
+Furthers analyses can and often should be carried out at this point. Particularly important
+is the validation of the results: to what extent do the results provide information about the
+probabilities of positive or negative decisions? For example, if the 'a-priori' probability of
+a positive decision is far more or far less then 50%, then the a-priori outcome of a
+decision would often be the best predictor and the prediction method has to be relatively
+strong to improve on that. [41]
+
+4.2 Conceptual Retrieval Systems
+
+Selecting a series of cases with suitable characteristics is an essential step in a jurimetrics
+research project. Unfortunately, case law databases often fall short in this respect. The
+only retrieval mechanism these databases use consists of 'Boolean searching' (searching
+documents that contain certain (combinations of) words. This method, already in use for
+more than 50 years, focuses exclusively on the 'form': the words present in the
+documents. A more 'intelligent' retrieval system should have the ability to select
+documents based on their subject matter, in other words, based on their meaning. In
+Wildemast and De Mulder 1992 [42] an overview was given of attempts that have been
+made to build such 'conceptual' retrieval systems.
+
+The methods proposed in literature for legal conceptual retrieval are aimed at three
+different aspects of the retrieval process:
+
+ the interface with the users
+ the representation of documents
+ the search operation itself.
+
+It is the interface which makes communication between the user and the computer
+possible. It assists in the translation of the user's question into an actual search instruction
+for the computer. [43]When the search operation has been carried out, the interface is
+responsible for the presentation of the results. On the basis of these results, the user can
+decide to reformulate the request. Conceptual retrieval can be realised here by assisting
+the user in finding the right words to describe the concept and by providing the legal
+context in which concepts are described.
+
+As for the representation of documents, it would be impractical to let the computer search
+directly in the digital documents. They have to be 'indexed' in order that the computer can
+search in a list of words rather than in a list of documents. This indexing has to be done in
+a way that no information is lost and full text search remains possible.
+
+By search operation is understood the function which ensures that the concrete search
+instruction (whether or not already re-worked in the interface) is carried out on the
+documents represented in the system. Most search operations (for instance the 'Boolean'
+search mentioned earlier) make use of the occurrence of a term rather than, for example,
+the term frequency in a document. The result of the Boolean search operation is the
+answering of a yes/no question for each document as to whether the document satisfies
+the search instruction. Other search operations look for a standard which indicates the
+extent to which the document satisfies the search instruction. This may possibly be
+expressed in the form of an estimation of probability. [44] A similar result is achieved by
+search techniques which make use of 'neural networks'. Conceptual retrieval with the help
+of neural networks was proposed in Belew 1987 and in Rose and Belew 1989.
+
+The analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the techniques presented in current
+literature leads to the conclusion that, in most cases, the method of text representation, or
+the interface, does not allow the users to define their own concepts. It would, however, be
+desirable to allow users to search according to their own understanding of a concept.
+These concepts could then be more precisely re-defined on the basis of the results of
+search operations or interpretations by the interface. Such a system could store the user's
+concepts: it would become a 'learning' system.
+
+As regards the interface, it is especially important that the user can bring his or her
+knowledge into the system and modify his own concepts. We would argue that the quality
+of the interface is, therefore, the constraining factor in conceptual legal information
+retrieval at present. Research efforts should be concentrated on this area as a lot more can
+be done. For example, in the available literature hardly any attention is paid to the
+obvious method of allowing the user to make his own ideas explicit: the user can give the
+system examples of clearly relevant documents with which he is familiar. [45]The choice
+of search technique is not a crucial design decision as, given the design choices for
+interface and document representation, various search techniques can be used as
+alternatives or supplements to each other.
+
+A prototype of a system, which contains a very large collection of legal cases and
+legislation, operating with these techniques, has been constructed at the Erasmus
+University. It could be called a learning 'concept processor'. Using it for document
+retrieval purposes usually requires an initial training session. During this session, the user
+indicates example documents ('exemplars') that he considers to be relevant for his legal
+concept. Consequently, the searching facility of the system will search for documents that
+are similar to the exemplars. In order to fulfil this task, the programme compares the
+properties or attributes of potentially relevant documents with those of the exemplars.
+These attributes consist of the words used in the documents, their frequency, possibly the
+order in which the words appear and other properties of the text. The extent to which
+documents are similar can be calculated using statistical measures.
+
+By calculating the similarity between each document and all the exemplars, the system is
+capable of ordering documents according to their relevance. The documents that are
+ranked at the top of the list are the ones that the user will be interested in the most. If the
+system comes up with a document that the user identifies as relevant, he/she can decide to
+add it to the list of exemplars. The next search operation will then be based on more
+information than the initial one. Usually, several 'rounds' of adding (and possibly also
+removing) exemplars are necessary before the ranking becomes 'stable'.
+
+Documents the system initially ranks highly, but that the user identifies as not being
+relevant, also have a very important function. These documents can serve as 'counter
+exemplars' for that particular retrieval concept. Typically, the user would inform the
+system that documents that are put forward as candidates for relevant documents are in
+fact counter exemplars. These non-relevant documents will 'teach' the system the finesses
+of the concept the user has in mind. A concept, as used in such a conceptual retrieval
+system, could therefore be defined as follows:
+
+A concept is an ordered pair of sets of documents. The first set of the pair is
+the set of exemplars (of relevant documents). The second set of the pair is the
+set of counter exemplars (a set of non-relevant documents that are as similar
+as possible to the relevant documents).
+
+A concept can be referred to by a term that indicates membership of the first set of the
+pair, and stored accordingly. For example: '(documents which contain) civil law (cases)'.
+
+During the initial training session, users have to evaluate the results continuously. There
+is, for instance, always the possibility that a whole category of documents, which in fact
+belong to the concept and should therefore be selected from the database, are missing in
+the top part of the ranking. It is then necessary to look for at least one or two exemplars
+of this category, as it is probably not 'covered' by the concept yet. At a certain moment,
+the user will find that adding new (counter) exemplars hardly affects the ranking
+anymore. All relevant documents should now be positioned in the top part of the ranking.
+At this stage, the user's only remaining task is to find the exact point in the listing at
+which relevant documents stop and irrelevant documents begin. In some cases, a
+graphical representation of the final probability measures can be helpful in locating this
+point.
+
+The application of conceptual retrieval, for instance using the method described here,
+usually improves the recall (proportion of the available relevant documents that is
+actually retrieved) and the precision (proportion of the retrieved documents that are
+indeed relevant) of a search operation considerably. It can, therefore, be an extremely
+valuable tool in jurimetrics research projects, as described in sections 3 and 4, as the
+selection of a set of cases with the right characteristics is essential for the success of these
+projects.
+
+4.3 Advanced jurimetrical analysis of case law
+
+In spite of the new technological possibilities, as mentioned above, the main obstacle in
+carrying out jurimetrical research into judicial decision-making is the labour intensive
+and time-consuming manual preparation phase. This covers not only the process of
+selecting the most suitable cases, but in particular the coding, which is the actual data
+generation for all cases. These cases are coded with respect to the decisions ('for' or
+'against'), as well as with respect to all the factors that have been determined to be
+relevant. The coding process demands that a decision is made as to whether a factor
+appears and if so, depending on the kind of factor involved, the extent of appearance can
+also be coded. If this time-consuming preparation could be carried out in a more efficient
+way with the help of computer algorithms, this would lead to a number of positive
+effects. Firstly, it would increase the knowledge about juridical decision making because
+more cases, in a variety of domains, could be analysed. Secondly, because the research
+would become less tedious, more researchers would be attracted to this field.
+
+Given the enormous amount of potential data to be found in case law, this prospect would
+be both scientifically and socially significant. One such technique that could be applied is
+the conceptual technique for working with large databases described above. After all, in
+this technique, the probability is calculated for each document that it is relevant to a
+certain concept. Therefore the technique could be an aid both in the selection of suitable
+cases and in the factor coding procedure. This application is innovative, but on the basis
+of pilot studies it seems promising. [46] The kind of knowledge created in this way can
+also be used as input in legal decision support systems.
+
+The application of conceptual retrieval systems to facilitate the coding process is not the
+only way to improve the jurimetrical analysis of case law. By applying new mathematical
+models and techniques it is possible to improve the predictive value of the analysis. In
+most of the mathematical models that have been applied so far, the factors have not been
+ordered and are supposed to be independent of each other. Although these models are
+highly valid and robust, it is a theoretical challenge to develop mathematical models that
+would express more complexity. In particular, the nature of the relationships between the
+factors and the decision, the strength and the nature of the correlation between factors and
+the interaction effects should be further refined. It seems possible that, for example,
+organising the factors in a tree structure, or clustering correlating factors into a new
+factor, could improve the models. Here lies a possible link between legal theory,
+particularly argumentation theory, and jurimetrical research.
+
+5 Why is jurimetrical research important?
+
+There are good reasons why the jurimetrical analysis of case law, and the study of the
+form of legal language as a supporting discipline, should be a lot more popular than it is.
+Empirical and quantitative methods were accepted in the traditional scientific disciplines
+long before the advent of modern computer technology. Other disciplines have gone on to
+embrace the empirical approach during this century. Law is one of the very few
+disciplines which has not followed suit.
+
+The world has changed: the demands made by lawyers' clients will change. Unless
+lawyers are prepared to deal with data in a more technologically advanced and scientific
+way their profession will become obsolete. Lawyers will have to come up with more
+reliable and valid estimations of legal risks and costs. Knowledge management has,
+therefore, become a subject that has received a lot of attention from lawyers recently.
+Knowledge is a vital factor, used by almost every organization for the purpose of
+realizing its goals. With respect to legal organizations, knowledge is perhaps an even
+more fundamental requirement, as the very product on offer is legal knowledge and
+expertise. When a law firm tries to improve effectiveness and efficiency, knowledge
+management is increasingly the tool. [47]Essential questions when applying this tool are:
+'What knowledge is available to whom?' and 'Where is it needed the most?' People have
+to be able to learn from each other. This makes communication essential, and, therefore,
+facilities such as databases and knowledge-based systems will increasingly play a role.
+
+Knowledge management and information technology are closely connected. [48]The role
+of IT in collecting, assessing, applying and disseminating knowledge has become
+considerable. In the legal field, for instance, we see that case law databanks have already
+become indispensable. Together with traditional sources of information, these databanks
+are an important tool for legal knowledge management. They can play a role in direct
+knowledge sharing.
+
+At the state level, there is an important new use for jurimetrical case analysis. In modern
+democratic states there is an increasing demand for transparency of the functioning of
+state authorities and of the judiciary as a part of those. Monitoring and auditing are state
+functions that have strongly increased in importance. The instruments to perform these
+functions with respect to the judiciary will be empirical, quantitative and systematic
+research. Jurimetrical analysis is especially useful in the hands of those who have the task
+of monitoring the powers in the Trias Politica. This monitoring function will become
+increasingly important in the information age. [49]
+
+The need for jurimetrical analysis will become more critical in the future, as the volume
+of case law is constantly expanding. Although a few years ago carrying out jurimetrics
+research was difficult because case law was often not available in a digital form, that
+obstacle has now largely been overcome. Jurimetrical analysis has, therefore, become a
+practical option. However, jurimetrical techniques must be constantly upgraded in order
+to keep step with these developments. The older form of jurimetrical analysis is still
+feasible where the number of cases do not exceed the hundreds. Where large numbers of
+cases are involved, new forms of computer assistance, i.e. conceptual retrieval systems
+and similar techniques will be necessary to support the jurimetrical analysis. Fortunately,
+as outlined above, these techniques are in the process of being developed and promising
+results have been shown. Nonetheless, given their importance, surprisingly few people
+are active in the field.
+
+6 Hope and resistance
+
+With the possible exception of law and economics, there is simply not much research
+being done that could be labelled as jurimetrical research. As mentioned above, even in
+the journal Jurimetrics, the Journal of Law, Science, and Technology, most of the articles
+are not jurimetrical in the sense that they deal with the statistical analysis of case law or
+similar subjects, or even in the broader sense of our definition. The study of the form of
+legal texts as well as the study of legal linguistics is a neglected area. [50] So too is the
+quantitative empirical study of case law. Sometimes there is a glimmer of hope: the
+advent of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies could be mentioned. It contains
+empirical research, although the term 'jurimetrics' never appears to have been used since
+its inception in 2004. Most of its articles deal with qualitative research rather than
+quantitative, but there have been some contributions relevant for jurimetrics. [51]
+6.1 Law and economics
+
+The dynamic field of law and economics offers even more hope, although it never seems
+to use the term 'jurimetrics' as a proper label for its main activities and, more seriously,
+seems to avoid jurimetrical techniques when case law is studied. This is surprising. The
+third level of study in jurimetrics, the pragmatic level, is concerned with the social and
+economic effects of the law, as well as the way in which legal demands and
+authorizations are made. For example the work of Van den Berg and Visscher [52]is a
+straightforward application in this area. The law and economics field has produced a
+framework for optimal legal policies when individuals behave rationally. Within society,
+enforcement agents should aim at an optimal level, as the benefits of more enforcement
+have to be weighed against the costs. In the past, these areas were mainly studied within
+the sociology of law, but over the last decades this new discipline of law and economics
+seems to have conquered this field. Law and economics is an interesting and quickly
+developing new discipline.
+
+According to our definition, this research falls within the ambit of jurimetrics, but this is
+not how those who are active in the field see it. Based on the work of such pioneers as
+Posner, [53] they have built their own discipline, independent from law as well as
+economics. They have their own textbooks with foundations of the discipline, [54] their
+own Journal for Law and Economics, an America n Law and Economics Review, an
+International Review of Law and Economics, an Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics,
+etc. Furthermore, there is a European Masters for Law and Economics [55] and there are
+a number of cooperative networks such as the European Network for Better Regulation.
+[56]
+
+Although the approach of law and economics would seem to promote the empirical study
+of legal phenomena, there appears to be an almost oxymoronic tendency in this field to
+apply on the one hand, scientific economic methods to the study of legally relevant
+phenomena but, on the other hand, to avoid the empirical method when analyzing case
+law. A recent example is Arcuri [57] who is a strong proponent of the use of economic
+theories in order to improve 'contemporary legal systems', but who is disappointingly
+traditional [58] when she gives an overview of the relevant case law for her area of study.
+
+6.2 Some explanations
+
+The question that arises is why is there so much resistance to the development of
+jurimetrical research at universities and the use of jurimetrical techniques in legal
+practice? One possible explanation could be fear. New forms of technology are often
+initially greeted with resistance: buying train tickets from a machine rather than from a
+human being over the counter; using a pin number to get money from a cash point,
+buying products over the Internet are a few examples from everyday life of technology
+that was at first greeted by many with suspicion. Conservatism, a characteristic typical of
+the legal profession as a whole, could be another reason. It is 'new school' versus 'old
+school': a classical legal education is 'old school'; 'new school' would be to use the new
+techniques, and integrate them in legal practice and research in order to realise innovation
+and progress. [59]
+
+This resistance to jurimetrical methods is not necessarily irrational. It may be the case
+that lawyers do not consider it to be in their interest to switch to new methods that would
+require a different education. Leith and Hoey see this as a possible explanation:
+
+Of course the real difficulty in carrying out this work is that the researchers
+have to have both a legal background and a mathematical one. Few lawyers
+have this, and often those who have the mathematical understanding have a
+poor feeling for law. [60]
+
+Not only are most lawyers not familiar with mathematics, few seem to be eager to see
+mathematics as a part of legal education. It is also possible that lawyers do not wish to
+see the nature of their profession change. Arguably, it is in their own interest to keep legal
+knowledge individualized and personal rather than disseminated.
+
+7 Conclusion
+
+The world has changed, but law schools and legal professionals seem to be intent to turn
+a blind eye to science and technology. It could be expected that, in the modern
+competitive world, legal firms and professionals would be eager to apply the new
+techniques for innovation in their services. This would certainly be according to what the
+'New School of Law and Technology' proposes. In practice, however, the legal profession
+and legal services have hardly changed their modus operandi. Most lawyers are simply
+not familiar with quantitative, empirical or computer supported approaches. Furthermore,
+they try to avoid such contact as much as possible. In some cases this reluctance could
+possibly be explained in terms of a perception of their self-interests. This negative
+attitude towards innovation will, however, turn out to be too costly. In the modern world
+of globalisation, innovation is essential for all organisations and those in the legal field
+will not be an exception.
+
+Given the potential of the jurimetrics technology, it is very surprising that its
+implementation in the legal field has been so minimal. It is generally recognised that
+knowledge management is already an important part of modern management. Its
+significance will only increase. Since knowledge is such a fundamental aspect of legal
+services, law firms and other organisations that are active in the legal field will also need
+to understand how to manage this resource.
+
+With respect to case law, the trend worldwide is to make case law available in a digital
+form. Conceptual retrieval systems can make case law databases into an efficient and
+effective tool. They are an aid to the individual in searching the database, as personalized
+concepts can be stored and used again. These conceptual systems are also of great use for
+advanced jurimetrical research. The kind of techniques dealt with in this article can be
+applied quite easily, even by traditional lawyers. They do not have to be familiar with the
+rational model or even the mathematical techniques used. Specific training in order to
+carry out this work is hardly necessary anymore. There are, in fact, no more rational
+reasons for legal practices not to apply these techniques.
+
+Computer aided case prediction will become a reality. It is now possible to do a
+quantitative analysis of a set of cases within a reasonable time. Furthermore, better
+techniques for validation mean a more reliable prediction of new cases. This is useful for
+legal knowledge management, i.e. for the efficiency of legal firms and services.
+Furthermore, at the state level, jurimetrical analysis is useful if not necessary to maintain
+the transparency of the decision-making of the judiciary. These are exciting prospects for
+the legal field - professional as well as academic.
+
+Jurimetrics, the new legal science, will provide the necessary practical and theoretical
+structure for these developments. It comprises an empirical and mathematically supported
+study of the law and bases its description and explanation of human behaviour on the
+reliable REMP model. It is hard to conceive that jurimetrics, as an academic subject, as
+an instrument for monitoring state authorities and as a source of techniques for legal
+practice, can go on being ignored.
+
+[1] Professor of Computers and Law, Centre for Computers and Law, Erasmus University
+Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
+
+[2] Associate Professor, Centre for Computers and Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam,
+The Netherlands.
+
+[3] Senior Researcher, Dutch Legal Aid Board, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
+
+[4] (ISSN 0897-1277), published quarterly, is the journal of the American Bar
+Association Section of Science and Technology Law and the Center for the Study of Law,
+Science, and Technology at the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State
+University. Jurimetrics was first published in 1959 under the leadership of Layman Allen
+as Modern Uses of Logic i n Law (MULL). The current name was adopted in 1966.
+
+[5] Loevinger L., "Jurimetrics, the next step forward" (1949) Minn. Law Review 455.
+
+[6] Loevinger 1949, p. 490.
+
+[7] Franken H., Maat en regel (Arnhem: Gouda Quint 1975).
+
+[8] Franken H., Systeemtheorie en Rechtswetenschap. Preadvies voor de Vereniging voor
+Wijsbegeerte en het Recht Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Rechtsfilosofie en Rechtstheorie,
+1982.
+Franken H., "Jurist en computer: theoretische achtergronden", in A.H. de Wild and B.
+Eilders (eds.), Jurist en computer (Deventer: Kluwer 1983), 13-32.
+
+[9] De Mulder R.V., Een model voor juridische informatica [A Model for the application
+of computer science to law], with a summary in English (Lelystad: Vermande 1984) 239.
+
+[10] Mathematical models, however, are not necessarily quantitative.
+
+[11] Kuhn T.S., The Structure of scientific revolutions (Chicago and London: University
+of Chicago Press 1970).
+
+[12] Jensen M. and Meckling W., "The nature of man" (1994) 7:2 Journals of Applied
+Corporat e Finance 4-19.
+
+[13] Meckling W. and Jensen M., "Specific and general knowledge and organizational
+structure", in M. Jensen (ed.), Foundations o f organizational strategy (Cambridge, Mass:
+Harvard University Press 1998).
+
+[14] Fama E. and Jensen M., "Separation of ownership and control", in Jensen (ed.), ibid.,
+and (1983) Journal of Law and Economics 26. Available at SSRN:
+http://ssrn.com/abstract=94034 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.94034.
+
+[15] Brickley J., Smith C. Jr. and Zimmerman J., Managerial Economics and
+Organisationa l Architecture (Boston: McGraw-Hill 2007).
+
+[16] Guiraud P., Problèmes et Méthodes de la Statistique Linguistique (Dordrecht: Reidel
+1959) and Herdan G., The Advanced Theory of Language as Choice and Chance, (Berlin:
+Springer verlag 1966). For an overview of the developments in the field of quantitative
+linguistics, see Baayen R.H., A Corpus-based Approach to Morphological Productivity
+(Amsterdam: CWI Free University 1989); Bailey R.W., "Statistics and style: a historical
+survey", in: Dolezel, L. and Bailey R.W. (eds.), Statistics and Style (New York: Elsevier
+1969).
+
+[17] See for examples of the use of these characteristics for instance Kucera H., and
+Francis N.W., Computational Analysi s of Present-day American English (Providence:
+Brown University Press 1967).
+
+[18] Van Noortwijk C., Het woordgebruik meester. Een vergelijking van enkele
+kwantitatieve aspecten van het woordgebruik in juridische en algemeen Nederlands e
+teksten [Legal word use, a comparison of some quantitative aspects of the word use in
+legal and general Dutch texts], with a summary in English (Lelystad: Koninklijke
+Vermande 1995).
+
+[19] See Van Noortwijk, ibid.
+[20] The British National Corpus (BNC) is a 100 million word collection of samples of
+written and spoken language from a wide range of sources, designed to represent a wide
+cross-section of current British English. For this project, only the written sources were
+used. See http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/ (Accessed 20 August 2009).
+
+[21] See Van Noortwijk 1995, op. cit. 87.
+
+[22] Erikstad O.M., "Appropriate document units for text retrieval systems", in J. Bing
+and K.S. Selmer, A Decade o f Computers and Law (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1980)
+220-238, 223.
+
+[23] 'Conceptual' retrieval systems, such as developed by Smith J.C., Gelbert D., et al.,
+"Artificial intelligence and legal discourse: the Flexlaw legal text management system"
+(1995) 3 Artificial Intelligence and Law 55-95 and De Mulder et al. (1994) op. cit. 733.
+
+[24] Schubert G. (ed.), Judicial Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,
+1963).
+
+[25] Nagel S., "Off-the-bench judicial attitudes", in Schubert G. (ed.), Judicial DecisionMaking
+(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,1963) 30.
+
+[26] Nagel S., "Judicial backgrounds and criminal cases", Journal of Criminal Law,
+Criminology and Police Science (1962) vol. 53, 333-339, 333.
+
+[27] Ulmer S.S., "A leadership in the Michigan Supreme Court" in Schubert G. (ed.),
+Judicial Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,1963) 13.
+
+[28] Holmes O.W., The Common Law (Chicago and Boston: Little Brown 1881) 1.
+
+[29] Oliphant H., "A return to stare decisis", (1928) 14 ABA J 37.
+
+[30] Kort F., "Simultaneous equations and Boolean algebra in the analysis of judicial
+decisions" (1963) 28 Law & Contemporar y Problems 1.
+
+[31] Schubert, 1963, op. cit. 133
+
+[32] Reed Lawlor influenced Richard De Mulder's work substantially after the two met in
+Swansea, 1979 at a conference organized by Brian Niblett.
+
+[33] Lawlor R.C., "Personal stare decisis" (1967) 41:1 University of Southern Californi a
+Law Review, 73-118.
+
+[34] Lawlor R.C., "Case analysis manual, applied jurimetrics". Printed in the United
+States of America, 1969.
+[35] Lawlor R.C., "Personal stare decisis" (1967) 41:1 University of Southern Californi a
+Law Review 73-118, 73. C.f. Ulmer 1967, op. cit. p. 67. Goldman S., "Behavioral
+approaches to judicial decision-making: towards a theory of judicial voting behavior"
+(1971) March Jurimetrics Journa l 142.
+
+[36] Aria Suyudi performed an impressive analysis of several hundreds Supreme Court
+cases in Indonesia; Suyudi A., Insolvency systems and risk management in Asia. An
+inquiry to Indonesian judicial decision making behaviour on bankruptcy cases (1998-
+2002). A jurimetrical analysis (Jakarta: Center for Indonesian Law & Policies Studies,
+2004). http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/8/33933694.pdf
+
+[37] The work of the authors mentioned here can be found in the references below.
+
+[38] De Mulder R.V., Een model voor juridische informatica [A Model for the application
+of computer science to law], with a summary in English (Lelystad: Vermande 1984).
+
+[39] Combrink-Kuiters C.J.M., Kennis van zaken. Een jurimetrisch onderzoek naar
+rechterlijke besluitvorming inzake voogdij en omgang (Deventer: Gouda Quint 1998).
+
+[40] In the example, for simplicity only 23 cases are taken.
+
+[41] De Mulder R.V. and Combrink-Kuiters C.J.M., "Is a computer capable of
+interpreting case law?" (1996) 1 The Journa l of Information Law and Technology (JILT),
+<http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/elj/jilt/issue1/1demuldr/>.
+
+[42] Wildemast C.A.M. and De Mulder R.V., "Some design considerations for a
+conceptual legal information retrieval system", in Grütters C. et al. (eds.), Legal
+Knowledge Based Systems: Information Technology & Law, Jurix 1992 (Lelystad:
+Koninklijke Vermande 1992) 81-92.
+
+[43] de Vries W.S., van den Herik H.J. and Schmidt A.H.J., "Separate modelling of usersystem
+cooperation", in Breuker J.A. et al (eds.), Legal Knowledge Based Systems.
+Model-Based Legal Reasoning, Jurix 1991,(Lelystad: Koninklijke Vermande 1991) 28-
+39.
+
+[44] Salton G., Automatic Text Processing; The Transformation, Analysis, and Retrieval o
+f Information by Computer (Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 1989);
+Bookstein A. and Klein S.T., "Information retrieval tools for literary analysis", in Tjoa
+A.M. and Wagner R. (eds.), Database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA),
+Proceedings of the International Conference in Vienna, Austria: 1990, 1-7.
+
+[45] Bookstein A. and Klein S.T., ibid.
+
+[46] De Mulder & Combrink (1996), op. cit.
+[47] Apistola M. and Oskamp A., "Knowledge management for law practice: do we really
+need it?", (2002) Proceedings of the 17th Bileta Annual Conference, (Amsterdam: Bileta
+2002) 2
+
+[48] Gottschalk P., "Use of IT for knowledge management in law firms", The Journal of
+Information, Law and Technology (JILT), 1999 (3). http://www.law.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/99-
+3/gottschalk.html paragraph 2.3.
+
+[49] De Mulder R.V., "The digital revolution: from trias to tetras politica" in Snellen
+I.Th.M. and van de Donk W.B.H.J. (eds.), Public Administration in an Information Age
+(Amsterdam: IOS Press 1998) 47.
+
+[50] Mattila H., Comparative Legal Linguistics (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate 2006).
+
+[51] See for instance Evans M., et al., "Recounting the courts? Applying automated
+content analysis to enhance empirical legal research" (2007) 4:4 Journal of Empirical
+Legal Studies 1007-1039, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117994343/home;
+Spencer, B.D. "Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdics" (2007) 4:2 Journa l of
+Empirical Legal Studies 305329, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/
+117994343/home .Spencer 2007.
+
+[52] Van den Berg R. and Visscher L., "Optimal enforcement of safety law", in: De
+Mulder R.V. (ed.), Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security (Rotterdam:
+Erasmus University 2008).
+
+[53] Posner R.A., Economic Analysis of Law (6th edition) (New York: Aspen Publishers
+2003).
+
+[54] For example, Cooter R.D. and Ulen T.S., Law and Economics (4th Edition) (Boston:
+Pearson Addison Wesley 2004).
+
+[55] Supported by the European Union as an 'Erasmus Mundus' programme.
+
+[56] http://www.enbr.org/home.php (Accessed 090820).
+
+[57] Arcuri A., Governing the Risks of Ultra-hazardous Activities. Challenges for
+Contemporar y Lega l System s (Rotterdam: Erasmus University 2005).
+
+[58] 'Hermeneutic' is an appropriate qualification of her method here.
+
+[59] C.f. www.newschoollawtech.com. Old School means: fear of new technology, not
+using it, regulating against it. New School means: use new technology in a rational way,
+try to innovate, let new technology have its impact on society as well as on norms and
+rules.
+[60] Leith P. and Hoey A., The computerised lawyer (2nd edition) (London: SpringerVerlag
+1998). 212.
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,974 @@
+The politics of calculation
+Toward a sociology of quantification in governance
+
+David Demortain
+
+In Revue d'anthropologie des connaissances Volume 134, Issue 4, 2019, pages 953 to
+972
+Publishers S.A.C.
+
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+Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4 973
+
+Special issue: “The politics of calculation”
+
+The politics of calculation
+
+Towards a sociology of
+quantification in governance
+
+Davi
+d DEMORTAIN
+
+ABSTRACT
+A diversity of modes of quantification in contemporary societies have now been
+explored, following the path of scholars who inspired this field, such as Alain
+Desrosières. This introduction to the special issue of the Revue d'Anthropologie
+des Connaissances on the politics of calculation argues that there remains a gap
+between different strains of the sociology of quantification - one that emphasiz
+-
+es the governmentality it embodies and the discipline it establishes, the other
+that pays attention to the collective mobilization capacities it offers. It is sug
+-
+gested that public policy and governance is a good field of investigation, to
+understand how these two “regimes of quantification” are articulated together,
+and evaluate the extent to which actors external to the networks that control
+public policies can influence them by recalculating both the problems addressed
+and the effects of policy programs. Combining the sociology of science and
+technology and political sociology, this special issue thus hypothesizes that cal
+-
+culation is one of the ways of building coalitions in governance, and one of the
+objects of what is being debated in its arenas; and, conversely, that governance
+is one of the contexts in which contemporary forms of calculation are forged
+and algorithms invented.
+Keywords: Quantification, calculation, governmentality, Public policy,
+governance
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+The sociology of quantification, specifically the political sociology of it, has
+turned into a very rich field of investigation in France, in the path opened by the
+duly celebrated work of Alain Desrosières (Didier, 2016). This field, so it seems,
+is entering into a phase of maturation and consolidation. The various journal
+
+© S.A.C. | Téléchargé le 21/08/2023 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 177.96.165.163)
+© S.A.C. | Téléchargé le 21/08/2023 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 177.96.165.163)
+974 Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4
+
+special issues, edited volumes and literature reviews published in France and
+elsewhere testify to this (Bardet & Jany-Catrice, 2010; Bruno et al. 2016; Dagiral
+et al. 2016; Diaz-Bone & Didier, 2016; Berman & Hirshman, 2018; Mennicken
+& Espeland, 2019). They demonstrate the vitality of research in the field, the
+already recurring results and emerging theorizations, as well as the questions
+that remain unexplored. Many questions remain, in truth, because of the very
+curiosity of the people that publish in the field, and because its still young
+research programs — such as that of Espeland and Stevens (2008) — have not
+been fully completed yet.
+This special issue contributes to the ongoing development of the field. It
+builds on the observation that there remains a gap between several parts of the
+field, namely between the literature that approached quantification as a mate
+-
+rial and political rationality; and another literature that prefers emphasizing
+that quantification is also a mode of collective action and mobilization. The
+project shared by the authors that contributed to the special issue is to look
+at quantification in the context of political action towards public policies and
+governance, to better assess what political order quantification contributes to
+establish in contemporary societies. Public policy analysis and the sociology of
+public action, as known in French-speaking sociology and political science, with
+its rich analytical language to decipher political games and processes, offer the
+possibility, it is assumed, to assess whether quantification is a fixed technology
+of government, that reproduces a power structure, or on the contrary a tool
+that facilitates political action towards this structure, and its change.
+
+NUMBERS AS A TECHNOLOGY
+OF GOVERNMENT
+
+One of the most frequent claims in the sociology of quantification, and
+generic result of research in this area of the past two decades, is that numbers
+are a technology of government, and that one may “govern by numbers”. That
+quantification is the foundation of a capacity to intervene on societies and mar
+-
+kets, and govern them, is now well understood. Quantification is a generic tech
+-
+nology of government. Foucault trained us to recognize this, and people have
+subsequently confirmed his vision. Nikolas Rose, for instance, was among the
+first to explicate how and why “numbers here are an intrinsic part of the mecha
+-
+nisms for conferring legitimacy on political authority” (Rose, 1991: 673). With Peter
+Miller, he argued early on that the political rationalities of government could be
+captured by looking at the technologies employed — calculation being one of
+them (Rose & Miller, 1992: 175). More recently, in France, Alain Supiot, a legal
+scholar specializing in the sociology and history of law, has argued that numbers
+have replaced the law, as the main technology of government (Supiot, 2015).
+Putting things in numbers, establishing quantitative objective, the continuous
+
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+
+and imperative adjustment of behaviours to numbers, to meet these objectives
+– all of this has taken the place of a former mode of government and legitimacy,
+based on the negotiated and transparent application of the rule of law.
+The notion of a government of or by numbers is rooted in decades of his
+-
+torical, political and sociological investigation. Research has helped showing,
+among other things, that quantification is a form of expertise, hence power. It
+is a sort of knowledge that is deemed credible and authoritative. A government
+of numbers give power to those professional groups that have the legitimacy
+to collect, frame and interpret data, and who master the operations of classi
+-
+fication, standardization and aggregation by which credible numbers are made.
+Those groups contribute to the power of the state — most concretely of large
+public bureaucracies (Espeland & Stevens, 2008: 411) — to deploy large appara
+-
+tuses to collect information systematically about people, territories, and social
+and economic life.
+Quantification helps govern, because it restricts the frames for expressing
+or articulating issues, defining public problems and putting them on the gov
+-
+ernmental agenda. Quantification constitutes certain phenomena in objects of
+government, but gives these phenomena a standardized form. Set categories
+and rubrics are established, which serve to produce information in a systematic
+way, but restricts the expression of meanings attached to these phenomena. It
+circumscribes the possibility to discuss certain issues, and the possibility to rec
+-
+ognize new problematic situations, until they become tangible in the standard
+statistical tables and indicators that the state chooses to follow and monitor.
+Quantification, in this regard, is a way to manage unruly publics. It enhances
+the governability of societies and social groups, by excluding a wide variety of
+local issues and concerns from the set of problems that governments admin
+-
+ister. The sociologist Ida Hoos, investigating the rise of methods of quantitative
+systems analysis in the US government
+1
+ in the 1970s (Thomas, 2015), deplored
+what she called a quantomania, spreading across nearly all sectors of public
+administration: “What cannot be counted simply doesn’t count, and so we sys
+-
+tematically ignore large and important areas of concern. On the other hand,
+we sometimes conjure numbers out of assumptions so that we can make cal
+-
+culations. Once included, they become ‘hard data’, easily to be confused with
+‘facts’” (Hoos, 1979: 193)
+Much like other technologies of government, indicators, ratios or statis
+-
+tical tables, are in appearance only technical. They are owned, in fact, by pro
+-
+fessionals and specialists. They are designed and run “outside the spaces of
+democracy” (Lorrain, 2006, p. 429). They remove their moral and ideological
+character from the problems addressed, depoliticize them (Ogien, 2013; Rose,
+1991). Their use and outputs are imposed onto the governed. They establish a
+material, undebatable relationship between them and those who govern (Rose
+
+1 A method founded by physicists and economists, inheriting from war-time operations
+research, that consists in categorizing various things as systems (health, the city, politics), theorize
+its functioning, quantifying and optimizing its state.
+
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+
+& Miller, 1992; Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2005). They perform the authority of
+the State, as people, collectives or organizations are enrolled into these dis
+-
+positifs, and abide by the rules of collection of information as well as by the
+resulting numbers. For Espeland and Stevens, echoing Foucault, it is for this
+reason that one can argue that “Quantitative measures are a key mechanism for
+the simplifying, classifying, comparing, and evaluating that is at the heart of disci
+-
+plinary power” (Espeland & Stevens, 2008: 414).
+In more recent literature, this disciplinary effect has been linked with the
+authority gained by the ideology of the market. Not that of systems, or that of
+risks, but that of the comparative measurement of costs, benefits and efficiency
+(Boudia, 2014). Quantification comforts certain logics of government and man
+-
+agement, the first of which being a logic of managing administration according to
+its financial efficiency. Quantification, thus, is closely associated with the expan
+-
+sion of neoliberal schemes of thought in government (Halpern et al., 2014). This
+is an expression of the fact that price, cost and monetary value functions, in
+our societies, as the main way of measuring, and of making things commensu
+-
+rable. It is, one may say, a dominant metric, that has colonized worlds that one
+would thought, were incompatible with these criteria and scales. The example
+of cost-benefit analysis in environmental matters, is one of the most striking
+examples of this redefinition of policies aimed at qualitative, unstructured phe
+-
+nomena (Kysar, 2010). Healthcare is another blatant example: it has been remodelled
+as the product of a “system” by influential health economists (Serré,
+2002); a system which one could manage and optimize according to aggregate
+levels of demand, supply, cost or price; one in which one could micro-manage
+organizations, professionals and patients, so that they conform to what is best
+for the system (Juven, 2016).
+In sum, the drive to put things in numbers and govern society according to
+what agreed-upon numbers indicate, goes unabated. It reaches into more and
+more areas of social life, work, and government (Bardet & Jany-Catrice 2010).
+Although no unifying logic may be at work, most of what is going on can be
+related to a “neoliberal governmentality”, aptly captured by Alain Desrosières:
+
+“The neoliberal state capitalizes on microeconomic market dynamics,
+steering them, in part, through systems of incentives, endorsing the central
+assumptions of rational expectation theory […] Microeconomic models
+allow separating and insolating the specific effects of particular variables
+or tools of government on their performances, in view of improving the
+target variables, that constitute the true objectives of these incentivebased,
+and behaviouralist policies” (Desrosières, 2012: 273).
+
+The disciplining of individuals is effectuated by putting forward quantified
+good practices, and appropriate behaviours — benchmarking —, to which
+numbers provide natural authority (Bruno & Didier, 2013). Individuals are called
+to participate to that discipline, by self-quantifying their actions, and comparing
+their numbers with that of others. This neoliberal quantification, in practice,
+models behavior (Miller, 1992).
+
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+
+QUANTIFICATION, MOBILIZATION
+AND THE RULE OF DEMOCRACY
+
+One question remains, however, concerning the nature of the political order
+which quantification comforts or performs. The hypothesis that is most com
+-
+monly shared today is that the logic of numbers partakes in the expansion of
+a market logic, and a neoliberalization of societies and of their government. It
+legitimizes and facilitates the institutionalization of financial optimization and its
+tools in the government of societies and in public services.
+Now, quantification does not necessarily follow the same logic everytime
+and everywhere (Dagiral et al., 2015). To fully appreciate the political order that
+quantification establishes, and whether numbers are responsible for this alone
+(Salais, 2016), one needs to bring into dialogue the literature on the govern
+-
+ment of numbers, or governmentality, and another, as well-developed literature
+on quantification as a mode of collective action and mobilization. According to
+the literature review offered by Andrea Mennicken and Wendy Espeland, quan
+-
+tification is as often studied as a democratic mechanism. It is, in this guise, the
+foundation of another quantification regime, distinct from that of the govern
+-
+ment of numbers. In parallel with the claim that numbers institute a capacity to
+govern, and comforts the power of experts and bureaucracies, the sociology of
+quantification has come to argue that quantification
+
+“is often driven by the desire to hold to account, to counteract despo
+-
+tism and arbitrariness, and to make visible social and economic inequality.
+Numbers have come to be integral to how democracy is justified and
+operationalized as a particular set of mechanisms of rule” (Mennicken &
+Espeland, 2019: 224).
+
+Numbers “can also aid social mobilisation and critical debate”, and even repoliticise
+issues that had disappeared from the public and governmental
+agendas (Kurunmäki et al., 2016: 395). Alain Desrosières, in his time, spoke of
+the progressive relation to statistics and public numbers, which he construed
+as a “weapon at the service of democracy” (Desrosières 2012: 263), just as
+Ted Porter showed through his referential historical study of statistics and
+cost-benefit analysis as tools of transparency and trust in the US government
+(Porter, 1995).
+Mennicken and Espeland refer, to illustrate this regime of quantification, to
+the adaptation of statistical apparatuses to make minorities visible, and con
+-
+tribute to the formation of the political identity of groups labelled minorities
+according to large national statistical aggregates (Mora, 2014; Rodríguez-Muñiz,
+2017). The social movements that defend quality of life, environmental protec
+-
+tion or the health of particular groups, often work in a similar fashion, to not
+just build stories, but also to generate alternative indicators that might reveal
+the extent of the problem. Early illustrations of this are the movement for
+alternative social indicators, quantifying human development, gender equality
+
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+978 Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4
+
+(or the lack thereof), social progress and quality of life (Land, 1983). But what
+students of environmental mobilization have termed “popular epidemiology”
+(Brown, 1992) — or how groups of non-professionals and citizens engage in
+the production of quantitative knowledge about toxics wastes and associated
+diseases — would also qualify, as well as the “social impact assessment” move
+-
+ment (Freudenburg, 1986).
+Mennicken and Espeland formulate several propositions, to advance research
+on quantification and democracy and clarify the extent to which people resist
+quantification and its discipline, or subvert and appropriate it for other political
+enterprises — a question on which the literature remains ambiguous (Bardet &
+Jany-Catrice, 2010). The suggestion is to study: “public participation and inclu
+-
+sion of local knowledge in (uncertain) indicator design, including classification,
+measurement, and aggregation”; the development of alternative measures and
+counter-quantifications; the role “numbers play in generating and framing public
+discussion and deliberations about public goods such as higher education, pov
+-
+erty, sustainability, migration, incarceration, and health”, and a variety of other
+public goods (Mennicken & Espeland, 2019: 232-233).
+This program echoes some of the research that has been performed in
+France under the banner of “statactivism” (Desrosières, 2012), or the use of
+quantification and measurement as a tool for deliberation and emancipation.
+The various chapters of the eponymous edited volume (Bruno et al., 2015)
+echo what Neveu saw as a radical change in the repertoire of action of social
+movements and interest groups (Neveu, 2015) — calling upon numbers, and
+the scientific language and the register of facts and objectivity more gener
+-
+ally — and Ihl an “intensification of scholarly activism” (Ihl, 2004, p. 406). They
+also resonate with research on public policies, which demonstrate how public
+interest groups and non-governmental organizations, in an international con
+-
+text, succeed in both gaining a place in the arenas of power, and putting new
+issues on the agenda, after quantifying it thanks to creative, and credible, indi
+-
+cators (Aubert et al., 2016; Gaidet & Fouilleux, 2018; Milet 2005; Revet 2015).
+In short, those who fight for the recognition of new problems, do use num
+-
+bers and indicators (Bezes et al., 2016). Quantification, in this sense, partakes in
+the construction of public problems, as Gusfield showed (Gusfield, 1981; Stone,
+1989).
+
+BETWEEN GOVERNMENTALITY AND
+PLURALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
+
+The aim of this special issue to advance the combined discussion of govern
+-
+mentality and collective democratic action through numbers. What exactly is
+the relationship between quantification, government and democracy? If quanti
+-
+fication simultaneously, is a technology of government, and a tool that enables
+
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+Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4 979
+
+dominated groups to gain influence over governmental agendas and policies,
+how could one characterize its overall political effect? Does quantification par
+-
+take in the expansion of disciplinary power of existing institutions, or does it
+preserve, even augment, pluralism in governance, and the diversity of actors
+that wield influence over governmental action?
+To date, authors in the field have seldom tried to explicitly combine the
+various perspectives of quantification. For Berman and Hirschman, who
+offered another review of the whole field of study of quantification (Berman &
+Hirschman, 2018), “the sociology of quantification is still very far from having
+general claims or a common theoretical language” (Berman & Hirschman, 2018:
+258). Mennicken and Espeland are not far from arguing the same thing: the
+study of quantification is still fragmented, and lacks the structure of a proper
+field of studies. Students of quantification enlist in research about one or the
+other regime of quantification — administration being one, democracy another.
+The literature on quantification, thus, has not yet produced, or perhaps
+tested, whether the aggregate political effect of quantification, so to speak,
+pertained to governmentality, discipline and control in the administration of
+societies, or to capacities of collective action and democratization. Many of
+the seminal authors of the field juxtapose these politics, but do not really tell
+readers how they assemble (Rose, 1991; Desrosières, 2014; Bruno et al., 2016).
+This may be a result of the inspiration of Michel Foucault, who argued that one
+was the other, and vice versa. For Foucault, governmentality is not pure disci
+-
+pline, or subjection of the individual. Inherent in governmentality is a dialectic
+of constraint and capacity. The apparatuses and instruments that materialize
+the rationalities of government, both constrain and enable individuals. They “generate strategic stakes, who in turn make the power relationships that they are
+supposed to institute, unstable and reversible” (Foucault 1984: 584).
+Still, it may be worthwhile investigating quantification, bearing in mind what
+each of the spectacles may produce looking at the same object, and trying to
+harmonize the picture. Further research is key, first, because new technolo
+-
+gies of data collection and computation emerge, whose effects are unclear.
+Desrosières argued that each technology of quantification corresponds to a
+type of state, and a particular historical period. It is well worth perpetuating
+this approach, as new technologies emerge, and as politics is becoming, overall,
+digitalized (Ogien & Laugier, 2017).
+But the main to study government and democracy (or collective action and
+mobilization for that matter) by numbers in a combined way, is that the rela
+-
+tionship between these different contexts or regimes of quantification remain
+obscure. To date, it looks like a paradox. Aykut and Nadai (this special issue),
+for instance, note that the rising use of predictive models in public policies, can
+both be the sign of the endurance of technocracy, or of a new form of reflex
+-
+ivity and opening of governance. So, if technologies of quantification frame,
+silence problems and publics, and thus order governance, what then is the
+effect of the resistance to these technologies and, further, of the appropriation
+
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+980 Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4
+
+and reinvention of quantification by the governed? To what extent does quan
+-
+tification change the way in which policies are formed, negotiated and imple
+-
+mented? How far do interest groups, associations, trade unions, moral entre
+-
+preneurs, or else, succeed in coproducing public policies, thanks to the political
+resource of quantification, data or calculations on them? Is the invention and
+use of indicators, ratios, models and calculations by the varied set of actors of
+the governance of public problems best approached as a resistance to govern
+-
+ment, without effect on the rationality of government being deployed and the
+structure of established powers? Is it a form of marginal adaptation to the use
+of numbers of these powers? Or does it affect the structure of relationships
+between these very powers and the actors with which they negotiate policies?
+
+MAKING POLICIES THROUGH
+CALCULATIONS
+
+So, in the simplest possible terms, some questions remain about the politics
+of quantification: what do numbers change, overall? “When and how do numbers
+matter?’ (Berman & Hirschman, 2018: 258). The papers collected here do two
+things, to attempt to make strides on this front.
+One is to look at quantification in practice and in action, notably at the level
+of calculation. Desrosières used to argue that quantifying is agreeing on what to
+measure and how, and then measuring (Desrosières & Kott, 2005; Desrosières,
+2008a; Desrosières 2012). Despite the usefulness of this phrase to clarify what
+quantification means, terms continue to vary from author to author. Various
+terms are used interchangeably, or as a litany, including standardizing, normal
+-
+izing, categorizing, counting, measuring, quantifying, calculating… More and
+more often, these terms are organized as a suite of social operations. For
+Callon and Muniesa (2003), quantification has as its final step the “extraction
+of a result”. Mennicken and Espeland (2019) define a set of three operations
+— classification, control and aggregation — of which the third seems to stress
+what people do with numbers, putting them into relations, producing new
+quantities as a result. Stressing these operations, particularly these final opera
+-
+tions, means looking into how these are designed and operated, deposited into
+what is now commonly called algorithms, seeing the effects of the original num
+-
+bers that are produced, and thus approaching quantification as a practice, and
+form of agency.
+The second dimension in this special issue is the policy dimension. Public
+policy analysis and governance research in general offers rich, subtle tools to
+analyse how problems are governed and administered, and which actors has
+power of which part of these processes, overall (Hassenteufel, 2011; Genieys
+& Hassenteufel, 2012). Public policy-making and governance is the ideal ground
+
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+Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4 981
+
+to investigate the questions described above, and make the departure between
+disciplinary and emancipatory effects of calculation.
+The study of calculation is inspired by science and technology studies. What
+the papers in this special do is to cross-fertilize it with the study of public policy
+and governance, assuming that there is a two-way relationship between acting
+on and through calculations — elaborating data, infrastructures and algorithms
+to produce facts — and the socio-political organization of policy-making actors
+(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
+
+CALCULATING COALITIONS
+
+What the papers of the special issue have in common, is to show that the
+calculations that used in the formulation and implementation of policies are
+formed by particular coalitions, which they help form and lend influence to.
+The establishment of a database, and design of an algorithm to produce a given
+ratio, indicator, or discrete number, are operations through which heterog
+-
+enous actors assemble and come to act in a coordinated manner. Much like
+the advocacy coalitions conceptualized by Sabatier share beliefs (1988), these
+groups share assumptions about the virtue of the numbers that they produce,
+and of the methods that serve to generate them. They use those to articu
+-
+late problems, or advocate policies. As just hinted, these coalitions gather het
+-
+erogeneous actors. They may bring together administrative actors, and other
+actors who act outside the administrative sphere. Experts or specialists of
+numbers and of their calculation act as brokers, and stabilize the coalition.
+In this special issue, Stefan Aykut (Université de Hamburg) and Alain
+Nadai (CNRS, Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le
+Développement) deal with the development of models to compute the effects
+of choices of energy sources and modes of consumption, as well as the delib
+-
+eration around energy policy scenarios that these computations support.
+Computational models, research has already shown, are not simply helping
+to predict situations from the outside of government, and bring numbers on
+the table of policy-makers. They are designed and run according to assump
+-
+tions and visions that betray the modellers’ close involvement in the world
+of policy-making, and their ambition to shape policy action (Kieken, 2004). It
+is because of this intertwining of modelling and policy, that models and simu
+-
+lations are somehow performative (van Egmond & Zeiss 2011; Upham et al.,
+2015). Public interest groups and associations that contest climate or energy
+policies use this means to influence public policies. They can engage in model
+-
+ling to produce alternative simulations, and make other policy developments
+credible. Here, Aykut and Nadai illuminate the historical process by which
+models and scenarios for energy policy have diversified over time, owing to the
+ties between environmental activists and certain corners of the economics and
+
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+982 Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4
+
+of the environmental engineering discipline. They observe the rise of a policy
+assemblage, involving these activists, modelers, particular visions of desirable
+energy futures, and tools and data to make these visions actually tangible and
+debatable.
+Sylvain Parasie (Sciences Po) et François Dedieu (INRA, Laboratoire
+Interdisciplinaire Sciences Innovations Sociétés) show what citizen measure
+-
+ment of air pollution owes to the existence of an unlikely coalition, comprised
+of the heads of local environmental movements, academics and members of the
+state’s environmental protection agency. This coalition is technical, and works
+to forge credible and exhaustive measures of air pollution. The coalition helps
+to satisfy the necessarily standardized nature of air pollution monitoring (nec
+-
+essary to create state-level of indicators, and compare the situation of var
+-
+ious territories), and the need to have in-depth, and meaningful data that doc
+-
+ument the situation of particular communities and locales. This coalition is also
+a political coalition. It helps the state environmental agency deploy the envi
+-
+ronmental justice policy it has pledged to advance, academic epidemiologists
+to work towards health protection, and local activist to defend their people
+against the leaders of their county, with whom they are in conflict.
+The article authored by David Demortain (INRA, Laboratoire
+Interdisciplinaire Sciences Innovations Sociétés) recounts the history of the
+development and application of a technique to model the effects of chem
+-
+ical substances on the human body. This technique of Physiologically-Based
+PharmacoKinetics (PBPK) is accused of favouring the interests of the chemical
+industry: being designed to replace the safety factors that regulatory agencies
+apply to compute safe doses of chemicals, they mechanically lead to increase
+these doses of reference. The decisions that regulatory agencies take based on
+these models do not appear to confirm this bias. They nonetheless show that
+this particular way of computing the doses of chemicals is inseparable from the
+rise of a more collaborative mode of governance of chemicals, allowing a direct
+and close involvement of businesses and allied scientists in the definition of the
+right ways of evaluating chemicals and their risks. The paper also shows that an
+alternative modelling technique and algorithm — for quantitative uncertainty
+analysis — has taken root in regulatory processes, as regulatory agencies have
+coalesced with another family of modelers, more oriented towards the protec
+-
+tion of public health.
+Vincent-Arnaud Chappe (CNRS, CEMS) introduce us to the arcane concep
+-
+tion of indicators to measure social and gender inequalities within companies.
+He focuses on the “rapport de situation comparée”, a form of social reporting that
+every business of more than 50 employees in France must produce, to show
+the extent of inequalities among its workers. This report comprises a series of
+indicators, that have been designed – and negotiated – by the relevant admin
+-
+istration, trade unions and business associations. Chappe traces the history of
+the shifts that trade unions, in coalition with a fringe of academics, either soci
+-
+ologists or economists, as well as gender activists, have worked to impose to
+
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+Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4 983
+
+the gender inequality indicators negotiated in the statutory Conseil supérieur à
+l’égalité professionnelle (CSEP). In so doing, he shows how trade unions, at the
+centre of this coalition, gain a capacity to work within the constraints of the
+exiting legal and statistical infrastructure, employing existing categories and
+data to compute numbers that are more likely to reveal inequalities.
+Mehdi Arrignon (AgroParisTech, Laboratoire PACTE) closely investigates
+the way in which the French Commissionner for social affairs, during the pres
+-
+idency of Nicolas Sarkozy, set out to employ the method of the randomized
+clinical trial of economists, to produce the evidence of the efficiency of an inno
+-
+vative but contentious reform – the introduction of incentive-based system of
+social benefits for unemployed (Revenu de Solidarité Active). Against a purely tac
+-
+tical reading, Arrignon shows that the Commissionner and his advisers have
+teamed with economists in a genuine attempt to apply this standard method,
+convinced as they were that it would prove its efficiency. The policy reform,
+in this respect, is inseparable from the credibility of the method, and the pro
+-
+visional, yet effective coalition that it gave birth to, linking the Commission
+and his advisers to renowned economists and other elected officials (heads of
+French conseil généraux), on which the experiment depended.
+
+POLICY ARENAS AND THE
+EVALUATION OF NUMBERS
+
+One final theme emerges from the contributions to the issue: each of them
+shows in their own ways, that the evaluation of numbers and of underlying for
+-
+mulas, are a central element of the politics of policy-making. To put it simply,
+numbers and formulas are seldom accepted as such, but trialed, deconstructed
+and debated, often publicly (Andrews et al., 2017; Crawford, 2016).
+Aykut and Nadai put at the heart of their history the particular, provisional
+policy arena of the Debat National sur la Transition Energétique. This arena, in
+fact, is almost defined by the existence of an ecology of models and scenarios.
+The comparison and confrontation of these models is the raison d’être of the
+debate, the very institutional motivation to establish it, and its way of working.
+At the heart of the deliberation taking place on this stage, one finds the minute
+examination of models, assumptions, parameters, and strength of their resulting
+numbers. In Parasie and Dedieu’s case, local arenas, including local media
+arenas, play an essential role. Official measurements of air pollution are trialled
+there, accused of overlooking localized pollutions and the problematic levels of
+exposure of particular groups and neighbourhoods. In Demortain’s case, calcu
+-
+lations appear to be put in debate in a variety of interconnected public arenas
+– the national academies, the press, the judiciary, which open to the various
+voices that support or contest the numbers and algorithms on which decisions
+rest. The paper by Chappe is also a direct illustration of the joint political life
+
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+984 Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4
+
+of calculation and of arenas: his is a story of the negotiation surrounding indi
+-
+cators that trade unions and their allies have manufactured for the arena of the
+CSEP, in which they will get tested, perhaps endorsed. In the work of Arrignon,
+numbers and calculations get debated and judged in the parliamentary arena,
+among others, at this crucial moment where the Commissionner introduces
+the results of the experimentation to members of parliament hastened to vote
+his reform.
+Calculation, at the end of the day, does appear to be a mode of action on
+policies, and an integral component of the repertoire of a set of actors that
+engage with these policies — as much as a technology of government. It has
+become, too, one of the normal materials of the politics of policy-making. So,
+calculation is not necessarily a fixed instrument, reproducing the structure of
+powers and the relationship between governing actors and those governed.
+It would obviously be exaggerated to argue that, with quantification and cal
+-
+culative operations, come a full pluralization of governance, and the rise of
+the influence of actors that are peripheral to the policy sub-systems that usu
+-
+ally control them. In truth, the papers that are brought together here call
+for nuance: the appearance of coalitions and of new ways of calculating pollu
+-
+tion, inequality, chemical risks, or energy futures or rates of return to work
+of unemployed people, takes place during moments of reform of the policies
+in question. Though we are far from configurations of outright policy crises
+(Dobry, 1986), all of the policies surveyed here are fluid, and the systems taking
+care of them, partly open to external influences. The pluralization of numbers
+and algorithms that is observed in the various papers, probably has to do with
+these contexts of change. But then again, it is useful to think about calculation
+and policy as being in a recursive relationship: the perceived possibility to quan
+-
+tify things differently, or quantify other things, spur action, which in turn con
+-
+tributes to destabilize policies, and keep windows of change open. The extent
+to which the numbers and algorithms that are suggested during this moment,
+win the day and institutionalize into a material system, complete with its cate
+-
+gories, procedures of data collection, cadres of statisticians and calculators, is
+a further question that, from the perspective advocated here, would be well
+worth investigating.
+
+MOBILIZING THE EXPERTISE AND
+INFRASTRUCTURES OF CALCULATION
+
+Each of the contributions shows, in a sociological coproductionist perspec
+-
+tive as it were (Jasanoff 2004), that ways of calculating and the social organiza
+-
+tion of policy formulation, mutually influence each other. New forms of calcu
+-
+lation and new computations about public issues, help replace certain actors at
+
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+Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4 985
+
+the centre of the political space in which policies are formed, thanks to the alli
+-
+ance that these numbers help form.
+This comes in contrast with governmentality studies, that broadly show
+how the expertise of numbers and calculations, replace the authority of those
+who were in charge, inside public administration, of the quantification of issues.
+Desrosières was specifically worried that, under an era of neoliberal govern
+-
+mentality, the cadres of public statisticians and economists would be replaced
+by the specialists of benchmarking and rankings (Desrosières, 2012; 2014). A
+similar concern emerges today, as the digitalization of many aspects of life, and
+the capture of data by large commercial platforms, displaces power from public
+experts of statistics, to faceless computers of personal data (Davies, 2017).
+There are unmistakable signs of this trend in various areas of governmental
+work and public services. The production of new numbers, and predictions,
+thanks to more numerous and more fine-grained sets of data, help private
+experts enter into areas of public action where they were absent. Under the
+banner of data science, new types of experts are thus entering legal systems and
+policing (Christin, 2017; Benbouzid, 2019). As administrations consult new kinds
+of data providers and modelers, the professional groups and experts in place
+can be severely challenged, or displaced outright (Angeletti, 2011, Henriksen,
+2013).
+The papers included in this issue do not directly address the issue of the
+redistribution of expert power linked to the emergence of new types of infor
+-
+mation and analytical technologies, but one can infer from these studies that
+the rotation among experts may be less dramatic. They show, collectively, that
+there remains a degree of fluidity in the ways of putting policy issues in num
+-
+bers, and that calculatory expertise is in some sense distributed. Different
+actors work to produce and validate numbers, from within administration or
+outside. What is observed in this handful of cases is less the replacement of a
+professional group by another, and the displacement of the statistics produced
+by public administrations by private producers of data, than a reconfiguration
+of the alliances between actors that offer numbers, and others. These recon
+-
+figurations are facilitated by the contexts of reform and change in policies. The
+movement goes both ways: these coalitions are enabled by new numbers and
+methods to compute them; in turn, they make these ways of producing num
+-
+bers evolve.
+The fact that coalitions and arenas of calculation emerge is still puzzling,
+however, given the materiality and stability of the infrastructures that produce
+the data that actors who wish to calculate, need. Quantification is a form of
+governmentality because it rests on material infrastructures and on the stan
+-
+dards that command the production of formatted, homogenous data (Espeland
+& Stevens, 1998). Those infrastructures constitute a good part of the discipline
+that Foucault wrote about. They modify people, places and things. They require
+their participation, or even “complicity” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998, p. 331).
+They constitute people as agents of data systems, and make them governable.
+
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+986 Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4
+
+They allow states and firms to produce decisions routinely, about these people.
+They are most of the time invisible, even if they require immense, continuous
+coordination work to be established and function (Bowker & Star, 1999).
+Each of these motives — legitimacy, functionnality, coordination costs —
+explain why informational and data infrastructures can not multiply, or be easily
+altered to quantify something else. This simple fact is a barrier to the emer
+-
+gence of coalitions defined by alternative ways of counting and calculating. The
+papers in the issue provide an important element of explanation, for how coali
+-
+tions nonetheless emerge, and calculation gain in diversity. It relates to what
+one may term the accretion of infrastructures. The coalition and alliances that
+are observed here do not solely contest existing infrastructures, or construct
+alternative databases, using new categories and standards. They plug on existing
+infrastructures, and deviate them. They use these as much as possible, observe
+their limits, and find ways of completing the infrastructure. They add param
+-
+eters, informational items, or most importantly, develop formulas to produce
+new results based on the same data. Aykut and Nadai are most explicit about
+this dimension, when they show that new models and scenarios develop on
+the basis of the limits of former models, and because existing infrastructures
+allow new types of data to emerge – namely, energy consumption data (see
+also Aykut, 2019). Parasie and Dedieu speak about the politics of calibration,
+to show how the existence of other data, and associated collectives, is due to
+their capacity to align on the existing, official infrastructure, and apply the stan
+-
+dards of measurement that define it. In Demortain’s case, PBPK models, as
+an alternative mode of computing hazards and doses of chemicals, only exist
+because of the underlying sets of data produced through animal experiments.
+Models are data models in the first place, and could not exist without this vast
+infrastructure for standardized animal experimentation, that modellers none
+-
+theless criticize and aim to replace. Chappe, finally, is very explicit on this very
+point of the connection to existing infrastructures. The action of trade unions
+and their allies only makes sense because they are legitimate users of the data
+produced by businesses, and are able to recompute them.
+So, the discipline of quantification has its legitimacy. This legitimacy is linked
+to the capacity to commensurate things, and produce objective measures of
+things that are alike. One cannot easily counter-quantify without risking to
+be illegitimate, and less objective. Acting through calculation to shape policies
+does not involve the contestation of existing categories, data and standardized
+infrastructures in place, but help them grow and evolve, from within. There
+are margins of maneuver inside infrastructures, and calculations using already
+existing data, by actors who have access to these even though they don’t own
+the infrastructure, only accentuates and exploits these.
+
+Acknowledgements
+
+The idea of this special issue emerged during a collective research project on
+modelling and simulation in governance, funded by the French Agence Nationale
+
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+Revue d’anthropologie des connaissances – 2019/4 987
+
+de la Recherche (Innovation-in-Expertise project (INNOX), grant number ANR13-SOIN-005).
+I thank all members of the project, particularly Stefan Aykut and
+Bilel Benbouzid for fruitful and inspirig discussions throughout, as well as the many
+participants in the various events organized as part of it. Many thanks also to the
+editors of the Revue d’Anthropologie des Connaissances for the support given to
+its publication, and particularly to Elise Demeulenaere and Dominique Vinck.
+
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+
+David Demortain is a sociologist, research professor of the French
+National Institute for Agronomic Research (INRA), with the Laboratoire
+Interdisciplinaire Sciences Innovations Sociétés (LISIS).
+Address: Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire Sciences
+Innovations Sociétés (LISIS), 5 Boulevard Descartes,
+FR-77454 Marne-la-Vallée cedex 2 (France)
+Email: david.demortain@inra.fr
+
+© S.A.C. | Téléchargé le 21/08/2023 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 177.96.165.163)
+© S.A.C. | Téléchargé le 21/08/2023 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 177.96.165.163)
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+1
+
+but also management and public action. The central problem of this research
+
+domination, management and neoliberal governance.
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+Prof. Dr. Antonio Paulino De Sousa
+
+5- Economic and statistical crisis
+
+Alain Desrosières’ sociology of quantification: new ways of
+
+research interests for Statistics as an instrument not only of proof, but
+
+intends to analyze the contribution of Alain Desrosières to the emergence and
+
+4- Statistics as an instrument of proof and coordination.
+
+study empirically and reflexively from the point of view of statistics, the
+
+intellectuals who were concerned with the gouvernance des nombres turning their
+
+3 - Forms of State
+
+and, in that sense, they are of interest to sociology. The difficult task is
+
+and the social sciences. The present work historically situates this generation of
+
+own. Thus, the statistical categories become objects of research insofar as the products of
+
+the statistical reason (DESROSIÈRES, 1993) are constructions
+
+quantifications that are produced in a specific way and that have effects and uses
+
+2- Quantification as a sociological object
+
+A student of Pierre Bourdieu, Desrosières was interested in the relationship between statistics
+
+considers quantification practices as an object of research.
+
+at the National School of Statistics and Economic Administration (ENSAE), where he was
+
+1 - The relationship between sociology and statistics
+
+The world in which we live is dominated on all sides by
+
+Alain Desrosières belongs to the generation of French intellectuals marked
+
+Introduction
+
+by the influences of Bourdieu, Deleuze and Foucault. Statistician and sociologist, trained
+
+institutionalization of a discipline that is the sociology of quantification. It is
+
+Introduction
+
+Working Group:09
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+two
+
+adapt and legitimize new modes of governance centered on numbers.
+
+Desrosières' task was to think of the categories from which France
+
+on governability, whose intention is to develop a theory of the State based on
+
+ways of using it by the State that applies this type of knowledge
+
+as an instrument of proof, but this is not enough, as he must also have
+
+Starting from the reflection of Mauss and Durkheim, followed by Bourdieu, on the
+
+inspiration for Desrosières. Thus, technical competence tends to be incorporated
+
+resources and needs. The logic of the State, then, consists in elaborating
+
+coordination, that is, a common language between social actors. the social uses
+
+consensus between the typologies of professions established in the social reality of
+
+economic and guide political decisions.
+
+not only as a test instrument, but also for coordination and management. A
+
+socio-professional categories in France, but this problem is overcome by
+
+society and that these are, in fact, legacies of past struggles. The taxonomy,
+
+formation of a neoliberal political rationality based on instruments, on
+
+economics have real effects on the statistical instruments he always seeks
+
+World Cup and which were put into practice by French statistician Jean Porte. A
+
+knowledge system, Desrosières highlights the predominance of statistics and the
+
+deformations that are related to the position that the statistician occupies in the social,
+
+political and economic space (DESROSIÈRES, 1993). Foucault's research
+
+Thus, the statistical instrument must have a scientific legitimacy
+
+represented.
+
+constituted as techniques for thinking about the population as a totality of
+
+a perspective of practices, of the exercise of power, are also sources of
+
+social legitimacy to be able to play a role as an instrument of
+
+forms of classification, Alain Desrosières shows that this nomenclature was a
+
+instruments for public action and, in this sense, statistics are now used
+
+by the State through the dominant economists who develop policies
+
+work and the principles of logical classification that aim to have a value for the entire
+
+The notion of governability is used by Foucault to characterize the
+
+Desrosières' historical approach analytically describes that crises
+
+Desrosières in 1982. These are categories that were born after the Second World War
+
+specific government apparatuses and in a knowledge system. In that
+
+that precedes quantification, records only the state of struggles with
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+perceptible from the point of view of a sociology of quantification as it is
+
+Durkheim assumes that the notion of statistical probability is essential
+
+and at the same time form a conception of social relations (MERLEAU
+
+optimism and confidence in statistics in the 1950s to 1970s were linked to
+
+1 - The relationship between sociology and statistics
+
+social, so this phenomenological conception of Merleau-Ponty demands a theory of
+
+social sciences and statistics. From his first works Durkheim attributes a
+
+information provided by statistics was considered one of the major components of a
+
+democratic society (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.70-71). A
+
+first works, even using statistics as an instrument of rupture
+
+first, analyzing social facts as things, he is interested in this
+
+of statistical instruments are constituted as new modes of domination, of
+
+Durkheim, which is not the case with Bourdieu, where statistics occupies a place
+
+of reflection in his theory of practice.
+
+society by retroacting on the behavior of social actors, but this is more
+
+The problem of objectivity, present in Durkheim, makes us forget a principle
+
+according to which we cannot separate our experience from the world
+
+false impressions about reality when constructing quantitative data. The sociology of
+
+practiced by Alain Desrosières.
+
+for analysis of social reality and one of the instruments of empirical proof. O
+
+PONTY, 1960, p. 125). Objectivity exists in relation to the subjectivity of the agent
+
+reflexivity. Thus Bourdieu, close to this phenomenology, especially in his
+
+The emergence of sociology in France is marked by this relationship between
+
+a representation of your objectivity and impartiality. At the same time the
+
+3
+
+great importance to statistics as an objective instrument in the fight against notions
+
+The alleged impartiality of statistical categories was not the subject of the sociology of
+
+epistemological approach with common sense, transforms statistical categories into objects
+
+central.
+
+management and governance. Thus, the policy of statistical indicators dominates the
+
+discipline because it is a field of knowledge that allows you to demystify the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Between 1979 and 1982 Desrosières worked with Laurent Thévenot in a group
+
+give us an insight into the close relationship he had with statistics. Us
+
+used by Benzécri to describe and analyze the social space. During this period the
+
+can be thought of not only as an instrument of proof, but also as a
+
+are responsible for the main changes in this field. The task consisted of
+
+classification by Durkheim and Mauss (DURKHEIM & MAUSS, 1903) was the point of
+
+disciple Brigitte Cordier Escoffier to represent her theory of the field and the theory
+
+statistics as an object of sociology, but he considered it difficult to work
+
+correspondences that allows the visualization of the fields from frames
+
+to reflexively analyze statistical categories as an object of research.
+
+epistemological, as Bachelard would say, had been made viable with the reform of the categories
+
+empirical. It is in the anatomy “anatomie du goût” (anatomy of taste) that Bourdieu
+
+Statistics is for Bourdieu an excellent instrument of analysis and proof
+
+elaborated by Alain Desrosières that is inspired not only by Bourdieu, but
+
+instruments of a sociology of quantification.
+
+administrators of INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies)
+
+research commissioned to rethink French nomenclature; they
+
+Statistics is also the social production of meanings, in this sense statistics
+
+“La distinction” (BOURDIEU, 1976 and 1979). The analysis of the statistical data was
+
+1970s Bourdieu was inspired by the work of Jean-Paul Benzécri and his
+
+social sciences begin to massively use multiple correspondence analysis (BENZÉCRI,
+
+1977). What is noticeable is that the reading of the primitive forms of
+
+object of sociology. Thus, he begins to be interested in the categories
+
+rethink the paradigmatic instrument from which France represented itself.
+
+empirically with statistics and at the same time studying it reflexively (DESROSIÈRES,
+
+2003a). Overcoming this obstacle
+
+of share capital. They invented a new statistical tool: the analysis of
+
+starting point for Bourdieu to encourage the young statisticians with whom he worked,
+
+4
+
+statisticians who crossed individuals or social groups and observations
+
+Bourdieu did not develop a sociology of quantification as he had been
+
+socio-professionals in France in 1992, a crucial moment to elaborate the first
+
+also in Michel Foucault. Desrosières takes into account that the production
+
+empirical. The research he coordinated in Algeria, during the war, with
+
+mobilizes this method of data analysis for the first time and later in
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+5
+
+oriented aspects of classification struggles and, in this sense, has a value only for
+
+reflection by Marcel Mauss and Durkheim on the classifications that Bourdieu continued
+
+(DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.8).
+
+demonstrates that nomenclature is an “impure” product of the conjunction between
+
+resistance against outside pressures such as conflicting interests or
+
+professions are declared by respondents, but the statistician's task is to
+
+professions established in the social reality of work and classification principles
+
+socioprofessionals) was designed by INSEE in 1954 to classify individuals to
+
+Thus, in the 19th century, the difference between employers and employees appears;
+
+profession, economic activity, qualification, position in the social hierarchy and status.
+
+legacies of historical struggles. Thus, the instrument produces a representation
+
+by the diploma modified the representation of work. The nomenclature of the categories
+
+nomenclature of professions and tcategories socioprofessionnelles - PCS (Professions
+
+It was about resuming the list of subcategories as well as the organization of
+
+action is presumable. It is based on the idea that conventions, defining the
+
+in the induction from the observed professions but rather in the historical determinations
+
+by the history of the socio-professional categories and also part of the
+
+a restricted group of categories. When collecting data on the population, several
+
+Galès, 2012, p.34). Thus, the instrument creates inertial effects that make it possible to
+
+income and school level, but this method will be less used by public statistics (DESROSIÈRES,
+
+2008b. p.13-14).
+
+The nomenclature of socioprofessionnelles categories – CSP (Categories
+
+natural classifications and logical classifications; was an arrangement between typologies of
+
+more global political changes.
+
+then, in the 1930s, the expansion of legitimized qualification levels
+
+based on their professional conditions, taking into account several criteria such as
+
+logic claiming to have value for all societies when, in fact, they are
+
+The nomenclatures of this period were abandoned in 1982 and replaced by
+
+of the issue he addresses and “another modality of using statistics in the language of
+
+socio-professionals does not find its reason for existing in logical deduction, nor does it
+
+objects, actually engender realities to the extent that these objects resist the tests that befall
+
+them” (DEROSIÈRES apud Lascoumes et al.
+
+categories at various hierarchical levels. Desrosières is interested first
+
+and socio-professional categories) which are based on other criteria such as
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+6
+
+Center for the Sociology of Innovations around Bruno Latour and Michel Callon and
+
+same class and what the taxonomist registers is the status of these struggles with the
+
+analyzed as a group that has a high intellectual capital, but with little
+
+Lescadres (1982) and, in this book, the relationship between social categories and
+
+Based on these findings by Desrosières, a new type of
+
+social space. The problem for Desrosières is that the statistical institution
+
+and sociology gave rise to a new sociology interested in the “économies des
+
+It is from this verification that the nomenclature does not come solely from a logical
+
+category that the problem of its multidimensional dimension (as well as
+
+1970s, was very supportive of the social sciences. What is well demonstrated by the
+
+Thus, during the 1980s, a new way of thinking about
+
+Thévenot find Bourdieu's theory of total social capital, which is divided into economic capital
+
+and cultural capital (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.203-205). The lesson
+
+in classifying the population (in a restricted number of categories) into groups
+
+history of statistics) (GENET, 1990). At the same time, many researches were
+
+Desrosières played an important role because he built a relationship with the
+
+professions. This homogeneity presupposes a certain affinity between the people of a given
+
+with economists Robert Salais, André Orléan, François Eymard-Duvernay, Oliver
+
+Desrosières works privately with Luc Boltanski, who was writing
+
+were previously classified as a group others from the nomenclature were
+
+deformations that are linked to the position that the individual or group occupies in the
+
+income and were classified in the general group of cadres, by proximity in terms of cultural
+
+capital (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.9).
+
+Political representations are analyzed in detail. This relationship between the statistics
+
+grandeurs” (BOLTANSKI & THÉVENOT, 1987).
+
+represents using a legitimacy derived from the State and a more scientific one
+
+(DESROSIÈRES, 2003b, p.219).
+
+relationship between statistics and social sciences. The environment at INSEE in the years of
+
+as the double structure of social space), is thought and, in this case, Desrosières and
+
+Vaucresson congress in 1976: Pour une histoire de la statistique ( For a
+
+practice of the social sciences emerges in France and the sociology of the quantification of
+
+prepared in collaboration with a research group close to Bourdieu.
+
+socially homogeneous and without prejudice to the original characteristics of the
+
+of this research is that categories such as artists, teachers, priests, who
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+quantitative method and in particular econometrics.
+
+negotiation between social actors. This idea introduces a rupture with the conception
+
+dominant economic sciences are engaged in the construction process and
+
+social categories derived from statistics.
+
+scientific knowledge of quantitative techniques, which led Desrosières to analyze the relationship
+
+2- Quantification as a sociological object
+
+which is aimed at economic science (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.218-226). The notion
+
+Revue économique1 . The economy of conventions, together with the school of regulation, are
+
+two heterodox currents that emerged in France between the years of
+
+mathematics, considering it as torture. This discipline was thought of by him as
+
+of quantification. This notion comes from the work of Bruno Latour (2004) and the work on the
+
+economics of conventions in the 1930s (DESROSIÈRES, 2014).
+
+Facereau and Jean-Pierre Dupuy. The heterodox economic thought of the school of
+
+engineer linked to a fundamental component that is mathematics. The analysis that
+
+16 authors contributed to this manifesto. They worked at INSEE between 1970 and 1980:
+François Eymard-Duvernay, André Orléan, Robert Salais and Laurent Thévenot, Only JeanPierre
+Dupuy and Olivier Favereau had no connection with INSEE. The research elaborated
+from this new paradigm used the quantitative method.
+
+engineering graduates with a strong background in mathematics use little
+
+only in relation to reflexivity, but also in relation to the space that
+
+equivalent, as equivalence is not immediately given, it is built into the
+
+This thought provoked, from the 1980s onwards, a change in the status
+
+positivist approach to quantitative social sciences by putting an end to the naturalization of
+
+orientation of economic policies.
+
+Since his youth Desrosières had a conflicting relationship with the
+
+subtlety that exists between the concern with reflexivity and the demand for expertise
+
+The economics of the convention was launched in 1989 by a special issue of the
+
+7
+
+convention of equivalences is important for the emergence of a sociology
+
+1970 and 1980. In both cases the researchers have a
+
+an engineer's science, of power and that's why he was interested in a
+
+Desrosières elaborated from these two currents gives rise to a concern not
+
+convention economy, 1970-1980, whose economists were mostly
+
+The interest of this notion is that it combines a social notion of conventions, and a logical notion,
+
+that of equivalence. It is necessary to come together to agree with what it is
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+for this Marxist-inspired counter-formation. The young sociologist Bourdieu, who
+
+econometrics and a bit of sociology. Edmond Malinvaud, since the 1950s,
+
+economic transformations. In this context, “public information thus becomes
+
+Simiand and Ernest Labrousse and even with François Furet. Young economists
+
+choice, because the pair right to information/obligation to inform can appear as a new arcana of
+
+power” (LASCOUMES & GALÈS, 2012, p.29)
+
+research in the 1950s. This institute played an important role in
+
+On the other hand, quantifying and scientific optimism were accompanied by a
+
+des Mines by engineer Maurice Allais. This teaching was followed by students
+
+A mathematical economy is marked by probabilities and statistics
+
+unemployment (FOURQUET, 1980). Marxism was still influential, in 1965 the Union
+
+national accounting and socioeconomic research, since a period
+
+more social statistics and this was the proposal of the French school ENSAE. The paintings
+
+Haavelmo and Tjalling Koopmans, having been first used within the scope of
+
+regulation, such as Aglietta who graduated from ENSAE, were marked
+
+which offers high-level training in statistics, economics,
+
+met the young statisticians in Algeria during the war, worked with them until
+
+quantitative by Paul Lazarsfeld and developed in France after 1945. Finally, history at the Écoledes Annales
+
+became quantitative under the influence of François
+
+social sciences, more precisely quantitative, to monitor progress and
+
+taught at ENSAE the econometrics of the American Crowles Commission where he made
+
+a considerable issue that allows us to guide the demands and terms of
+
+Statisticians were formed by contradictory influences between the 1960s and 1970s.
+
+society with a strong growth rate and had a low rate of
+
+development of econometrics. From their earliest teachings, the mathematical economics of Walras and Pareto
+
+were not taught at the university, but at the École
+
+These social sciences have become quantitative since the 1930s and 1940s.
+
+8
+
+from ENSAE. In the same years 1950-1960, two instruments were developed: the
+
+inférentielle was born in the United States in the late 1940s, with Trygve
+
+of communist students was active in the student universe, including ENSAE (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.214).
+
+Keynesian macroeconomic models. Then by empirical sociology
+
+from INSEE, founded in 1960, are trained by a large school, ENSAE,
+
+of economic growth and great optimism about the potential of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of the objects that legitimize statistical practice are themselves products of political, social
+
+and technical investments (DESROSIÈRES, 1993, p. 21 and 413).
+
+conversions and the sociology of quantification.
+
+of the statistical reason and the period studied goes from the seventeenth century to the middle of the
+
+Desrosières' analysis of the forms of construction of statistical data, the
+
+elements such as survey techniques, econometrics, etc. It shows that everyone
+
+sciences, the economy of conventions and the critical sociology of Bourdieu and Luc
+
+The objects of statistics, for Desrosières, cannot be denied, as
+
+institute's research laboratory, but Desrosières remains part of the
+
+real and, finally, all statistical data are artificial because they are constructed by
+
+conventions. In fact, reality appears as the product of a series of
+
+Antropologie des sciences sociales et destechniques collection , coordinated by Bruno
+
+the 1980s and taught at ENSAE from 1963 to 1966. Bourdieu introduced
+
+has as its object the circularity of action and statistical representation, but not
+
+equivalence that found them are solidly forged from large investments in data collection
+
+(DESROSIÈRES, 1993, p. 21). the permanence
+
+and this is configured as the first steps that lead to the economy of
+
+This way you can better understand the current power of modern econometrics and more
+
+construction operations and the uses of statistical instruments, as well as the effects on the
+
+statistically constructed social reality. This is what the
+
+statistics (DESROSIÈRES, 1993). This book is a true historical analysis.
+
+Such sociology constituted an essential link between the sociology of
+
+XX. Research objects go beyond nomenclatures and Desrosières analyzes
+
+high costs and the consequences of the crystallization of statistical categories
+
+(DESROSIÈRES, 1993, 2008a).
+
+they exist, but at the same time they are social products and are nothing more than
+
+Boltanski. This relationship is well expressed when, even while continuing at INSEE, in the
+
+Statistical instruments are both logical and natural, constructed and
+
+Political and Moral Sociology Group (GSPM): qualifications and published in 1993, at
+
+human beings and real because they describe the world. The sociology of quantification
+
+material operations of inscription, classification, measurements and the conventions of
+
+only, since research in this area also aims at the set of
+
+concern with statistical practices that must be analyzed reflexively
+
+Latour and Michel Callon, La polititique des grands nombres. Une histoire de la raison
+
+9
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+analyzes the State from its practices.
+
+sheds light on sociological forms of statistical reasoning that are scientific and
+
+participates in the construction process of a space of cognitive equivalences
+
+manipulation of statistical instruments and its specific problem that is
+
+of the State, of governability understood as a specific way of exercising
+
+them or transform them. Statistical data are used and transported by
+
+statistical instrument. Desrosières inserts social coercion into this process; The
+
+how human beings describe the quality of their specific realities,
+
+statistical argument occupies a differentiated space in the scientific field.
+
+public. This activity is defined as the art of reasoning with numbers about
+
+can be quantified. It should be noted that there are a number of factors that give rise to
+
+instruments or statistical models with the social space in which they
+
+specifically the power of statistical reason. Desrosières shows how the
+
+public action are inseparable. In the case of France, technical competence tends to
+
+we can also highlight the French intellectual environment where Foucault's philosophy
+
+conditions of its duration in time suppose the denial or forgetting of the conditions of its
+
+genesis (DESROSIÈRES, 1995, p.13). In this way, he
+
+Foucault's theory of the State must be understood from the practices
+
+Gradually, concerns arise in relation to the different modes
+
+European countries since the 19th century allow us to understand how the State
+
+politicians and analyzes the forms of conventions established to build the
+
+elaborated for practical purposes, to describe human societies, manage
+
+classify, measure and quantify. Desrosières participated in research into the shape
+
+power, but it is from the 1970s onwards that Foucault develops a reflection on his
+
+that his interest was to show that there are certain human qualities that
+
+science has this double character of being cognitive and social at the same time and the
+
+multiple agents and the logic of the State consists of forging instruments for action
+
+The sociology of quantification analyzes the relationship between the formalization of
+
+objects relating to governability. In this sense, cognitive logic and the logic of
+
+his research on quantification as a sociological object and among them
+
+to be incorporated by the State through polytechnicians who became economists
+
+(DESROSIÈRES, 1993, p.203).
+
+statistical models are constructed and used for ideological purposes and that
+
+are produced. In this sense, the different forms of statistics in different
+
+10
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(LASCOUMES, 2004, p. 6). The public action instrument is defined as a
+
+The seminar on governance in the period 1978-1979 and the one in 1980 on the
+
+around the population in the broadest sense, what he calls economy.
+
+the rationalities that underlie the State’s practices. speak in terms of
+
+public and the population depending on the representations and meanings attributed
+
+moment when a new subject emerges, which is the population. Foucault considers
+
+Foucault begins to be interested in the material issues of State practices,
+
+exercise of power by a centralized authority; process resulting from
+
+Desrosières as a set of problems that are posed both by choice
+
+statistics reveals certain regularities and effects of family aggregation,
+
+population and it is precisely in this field that the essential mechanisms are the
+
+governance and instrumentation of public action.
+
+appears as the subject of needs, but also as an object in the hands of the
+
+seminars on governing oneself and others. During that period he
+
+considered as a science and at the same time as a technique of intervention and
+
+technicians, of instrumentalization as a central activity of the art of governing
+
+society, an approach that allows him to distance himself from the great ideological debates
+
+that marked the 1960s and 1970s (LASCOUMES E GALÈS, 2012, p.26)
+
+technical and social device that organizes specific relationships between power
+
+terms of ideologies to think about the State based on the instruments, processes and
+
+inseparable from the constitution of knowledge of all the processes that revolve
+
+reason of the State, are central to analyzing its conception of governability.
+
+For Foucault, the constitution of political economy was possible from the
+
+Governance means arguing for radical transformations in the forms of
+
+instruments. Statistics as an instrument of public action is defined by
+
+rationalization and technique. Foucault thus introduces the concept of technology of
+
+operational actions on the governance of subjects and the population. for him to
+
+that in the trilogy: sovereignty, discipline and government management the central focus is the
+
+since it allows to quantify specific phenomena of a population and this
+
+security devices (FOUCAULT, 2001, p. 653-654). The political economy is
+
+Foucault systematically demonstrates the importance of procedures
+
+governance (FOUCAULT, 2001, p. 655). Foucault distances himself from the analyzes in
+
+interest in cameral sciences, which is a form of concrete organization of
+
+government (FOUCAULT, 2001, p.651-652). He also tells us that governance is
+
+11
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+relevance of Desrosières' sociology of quantification.
+
+1993, p.401). “The notion of a public action instrument (IAP) allows us to overcome the
+
+formed by a technical substrate, a schematic representation of the organization
+
+quantifiable objectives and all benchmarking techniques. In 2001 it is
+
+This theory of Foucault's State is a source of inspiration for Desrosières who
+
+public policies, by considering public action from the angle of the instruments that structure
+
+their programs. It is in some way a work of deconstruction by the
+
+creation of new quantitative indicators of performativity that were
+
+approach is based on the history of techniques and the sociology of sciences that
+
+statistics, whereas Foucault is more concerned with political economy as a
+
+each agent must account quantitatively for his professional activities.
+
+by management instruments, their meanings in terms of power and the diffusion of
+
+as well as the use of instruments –technical, means of operating, devices – that
+
+arouse the interest of both Foucault and Desrosières. The latter observes
+
+themselves with neoliberalism (BRUNO, 2008; GINGRAS, 2014) made us realize the
+
+It is not only a matter of understanding rationally, but also of considering the social
+
+effects produced by political choices (DESROSIÈRES,
+
+3 - Forms of State
+
+France and all over the world. These were performance indicators,
+
+instrument, it shows the heterogeneous character of the management instruments that are
+
+functionalist approaches that are interested above all in the objectives of
+
+and a management philosophy (LASCOUMES, 2004, p.7).
+
+the organic law relating to finance laws (LOLF) was enacted and it enabled the
+
+implemented in several administrations including INSEE and these require that
+
+instruments. The instrumentation approach allows apprehending dimensions that would
+
+otherwise be barely visible” (LASCOUMES & GALÈS, 2012, p.21).
+
+is more interested in the ways in which the State uses the instruments
+
+denatured the techniques. Foucault seeks to understand the rules imposed
+
+instrument of governance. In this sense, it is the practices of public life that
+
+The various criticisms against these management instruments and the generalization of
+
+that, from the 2000s, new statistical instruments are disseminated in the
+
+allow the materialization and operationalization of government action.
+
+cognitive models. By equivalently using the terms of the device and
+
+12
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+builds with the great social and economic crisis at the end of the 19th century. You
+
+engineer, for example, encompasses different forms ranging from large
+
+happened. In the 1920s, random survey research into the ways
+
+orthodox Marxism due to the inability to understand the mechanisms of the apparatus
+
+precisely research on employment, on the needs of the worker
+
+revolution of 1917, with the objective was to quantify the needs of the population.
+
+case, the statistics are comparable to that of a large company that plans its
+
+2004, p.2)
+
+in wartime and implies an organized centralization of the productive forces.
+
+sophisticated statistics and many statisticians were shot. Just after the 1960s
+
+employees of the logic of market capitalism and to this end organizes the systems
+
+for a long time were the representatives of this technical and political conception
+
+By historically describing the five forms of governance and the
+
+quality or subject to all types of manipulation. The common point of these two
+
+worker health guaranteeing social security. Thus, the State
+
+it conserves elements of the previous phase and transforms them at the same time. The state
+
+statistical instruments are focused on wage labor, more
+
+analysis of this type of State is elaborated by Michel Foucault and he criticizes the
+
+In the case of Russian planning, two forms of quantification are
+
+France from Charles de Gaulle to the planned economies of socialism. In this
+
+of life of the population followed a mathematical tradition already present since the
+
+of the bourgeois State which did not change with the revolution (LASCOUMES,
+
+and the consumer price index. In this context, research on the
+
+The classical liberal State reduces State intervention to a minimum with the aim of
+
+liberating market forces. It is the dream of a stateless society, which is a utopia. In turn, the
+
+welfare state aims to protect workers
+
+atelier or an army managing its logistics. This concept develops
+
+In 1930 accounting linked to the authoritarian Stalinist Plan replaced this
+
+French engineers from the polytechnic school, a military school, during
+
+Soviet statistics were considered by the West to be of very poor quality.
+
+protection against unemployment, work incidents and concerns about the
+
+conceptions is the feedback of indicators on the quantified actors. One
+
+different uses of statistics, Desrosières shows well that each form of State
+
+(LASCOUMES, 2004).
+
+13
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+theory of rational anticipations. The state is divided into several centers of
+
+this conception emerges and dominates from 1945 to 1975. National accounting is
+
+a form, considered, at a given time, sometimes as significant and as communicable (LASCOUMES E
+
+GALÈS, 2012, p.35)
+
+particularly in Europe, since the beginning of the year 2000, that the central concept
+
+company. Agents are actors like any other, acting from the same
+
+dealer, those guided by different systems and accepts the main hypotheses of
+
+quantify inflation concern the entire population and not just the
+
+as if the sole purpose of academic work were the evaluation of research
+
+global demand (ARMATTE, 2010). In both the welfare state and the state
+
+feedback takes the form of benchmarking, evaluation, ranking, and
+
+Now, in the neoliberal State, evaluation results from individual procedures
+
+on the gross domestic product (GDP). The construction of indices supports the hypothesis that
+
+living conditions of the workers and the official statistics of this period are more
+
+management, collection, analysis and transmission of information (GINGRAS, 2014).
+
+public. This conception is totally different from the previous ones and is based on the
+
+The Keynesian State starts from a macroeconomic philosophy of society without contesting the
+
+character of the capitalist market. It is with the great crisis of 1930 that
+
+more or less autonomous direction and the agents generated almost as a
+
+that multiply, at the same time that the foundations for the construction of these statistical indicators are
+
+camouflaged. It is in the context of university reform,
+
+standardization of information by combining different measures under
+
+a central instrument (FOURQUET, 1980). The consumption and price indices that
+
+Finally, the neoliberal State is based on the dynamics of microeconomics
+
+became the evaluation. Thus, bibliometrics became synonymous with evaluation,
+
+(BRUNO, 2008; GINGRAS, 2014).
+
+salaried workers. Macroeconomic models confront supply and demand.
+
+theory of rational anticipations. This conception arises from the crisis of 1970 and
+
+14
+
+Keynesian, retroactions result from indexations on the price index or
+
+performance. It is observed that the technologies that are most developed today are the
+
+which aims to model the behavior of actors and even that of power
+
+In this sense, several indicators of excellence and quality are elaborated.
+
+focused on this topic.
+
+Dersosières insofar as “it is a currently trivialized technique of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+economic and its political use, but also contributes to establishing its different
+
+be measured according to a realistic metrology like the height of Mont-Blanc. A
+
+measure. Quantification makes us think of the creative sociological and cognitive dimension
+
+to an error insofar as it fails to consider that the quantification is the result of
+
+4- Statistics as an instrument of proof and coordination.
+
+world, but transforms and reconfigures it in another way. The historical precedent is the
+
+indicators in themselves and not social practices. The simple fact of resorting to
+
+The verb to quantify presupposes that a series of
+
+central to the sociology of quantification is that, as a set of conventions
+
+socially distinct. The verb quantify is used to express and make exist
+
+forms of modeling that any microeconomic actor (DESROSIÈRES, 2014,
+
+inscriptions, codes, codified procedures and calculations that lead to the
+
+think, represent the world and act on it. When the procedures of
+
+statistical tool and its social and cognitive context is provided by the history of ways of thinking
+
+about the role of the State in running the economy” (DESROSIÈRES apud LASCOUMES &
+
+GALÈS, 2012, p.31). Statistics not only validate models
+
+measure. The first is disregarded by economists, but it is as important as
+
+By contrast, the idea of measuring implies that something already exists in a form that can be
+
+social relationships.
+
+use in social sciences of the verb to measure, to evaluate public policies induces
+
+of this activity, for the simple fact that it not only offers a reflection of the
+
+invention of the concept of probability, in the 17th century, used to quantify uncertainty through
+
+numbers between 0 and 1 (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p. 39). the hypothesis
+
+Statistical rationalization can induce perverse effects by focusing on
+
+an equivalence convention.
+
+15
+
+verb to measure indicates that a direct relationship is established with metrology in the natural
+
+sciences. It is for this reason that Desrosières distinguishes between the verbs to quantify and
+
+to measure, a distinction whose objective is to analytically separate two historical moments and
+
+equivalence conventions that imply comparisons, negotiations, translations,
+
+socially admitted and measurement operations, a new form of
+
+numerical indicator. Thus, the quantification breaks down into agreeing(conveniring) and
+
+P. 44). For Desrosières, a “conductor thread for the analysis of relations between
+
+in numerical form what was previously expressed in words and not in numbers. In
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+de Statistique (IIS) played a preponderant role. In fact, the history of
+
+proof instrument that constitutes more like a more scientific dimension
+
+political dimension, its structure and content that is congruent with ways of thinking
+
+context of the creation of the welfare state. In each case we can
+
+on the different ways of thinking about the State and the role of statistics in the different
+
+possible forms of the State (DESROSIÈRES, 1993).
+
+the frequent references to Max's notions of rationalization and bureaucracy
+
+The pioneers in congresses, disciples of Quetelet, are comforted by the
+
+ways of exercising power “underlining the importance of devices embodying a legal, formal
+
+rationality in the development of capitalist societies,
+
+polls and instruments more forms of the mathematical type. Such instruments
+
+as a possibility of influencing public power and economic and
+
+classics centered mainly on the sovereignty and legitimacy of rulers”
+
+quantification are codified and enter everyday life, the initial conventions are forgotten and
+
+the quantified object is naturalized (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p. 40).
+
+cognitive processes and political philosophy is illustrated by hygienists' use of
+
+official, which becomes a state business and in this process the InstitutInternational
+
+coordination, administration and management that is more political and at the same time
+
+Statistics from that time are more about the history of the State itself
+
+Darwinists, 1880s and 1930s and the reappearance of the probing method 1895 and 1935 in
+
+rationalization taking into account the technical instruments of statistics in its
+
+prestigious. The conception of the scientific administration of the State became commonplace with
+
+society and to act on it. The sociology of quantification questions itself
+
+to analyze the modality of congruence between statistical formalisms and political types:
+
+hygienism, eugenics, Keynesianism and the welfare state.
+
+idea that they were the messengers of a new modernity, so it circulated
+
+Weber and Foucault's governance. But Max Weber was a pioneer in the analysis of
+
+The technical instruments are the nomenclatures or the modalities of
+
+16
+
+autonomized the place of government material technologies in relation to theories
+
+were discussed at statistics conferences. The congruence of the instruments
+
+social. The success of the pioneers is consolidated with the institutionalization of statistics
+
+friends of Quetelet between 1830 and 1860; the use of correlation and regression by
+
+Statistical quantification has this dual nature as it is an instrument of
+
+(LASCOUMES and GALÈS, 2012, p.23). Desrosières' interest is to analyze this
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+becomes a media object, arousing debates and contradictions about the effectiveness of
+
+as an instrument of proof, but this is not enough, as he must also have
+
+benchmarking, that is, the evaluation and classification of other types of governance
+
+in France by Edmond Malinvaud, is put into practice in models inspired by
+
+5- Economic and statistical crisis
+
+coordination, that is, a common language between social actors.
+
+rationale that delegitimizes Keynesian-inspired policies, establishing
+
+Quantification has a specific language that allows transfer,
+
+to explain the gravity of the situation, since each crisis equally corresponds to
+
+currency and the creation of the euro give the Bank a large institutional space
+
+products of the history of the State and modes of governance. This story allows
+
+(DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.99-100). In this sense, the relationship between statistics and
+
+economic policies. In this sense, there are also new forms of quantification and new
+
+statistical observation systems (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.87)
+
+by the European Central Bank (LEBARON, 2006). The publication of these results
+
+state science. The statistical instrument must have scientific legitimacy
+
+economic policies and the frequent manipulation of numbers.
+
+Claude Greson (FOURQUET, 1980). On the other hand, macroeconomics, introduced
+
+Neoliberal governance relies more on performance indicators and
+
+social legitimacy to be able to play a role as an instrument of
+
+such as that of the welfare state.
+
+Keynesian until the 1980s, before the intervention of anticipation theory
+
+thus the deregulation of the State. The creation in Europe of the economic union and
+
+(DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.104).
+
+For Desdorières, in major economic crises statistics are mobilized
+
+comparisons, aggregations and manipulations standardized by routine calculation and
+
+interpretations (DESROSIÈRES, 2008). Quantitative conventions are
+
+moments of debate about the role of the State in regulating and drafting
+
+Central Europe. Quarterly economic surveys are increasingly required
+
+1930 originated macroeconomic policies and national accounting founded by
+
+politics is very close to the point that Desrosières thinks of statistics as a
+
+make the contrast between neoliberal governability and previous relationships. A
+
+17
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Michel Foucault's philosophy and economics.
+
+Havard, analyzed the temporal distance between the variations of certain magnitudes
+
+assessments of social and ecological elements that were absent. The report was
+
+The sociology of quantification profoundly transformed the perception of
+
+social welfare. On the other hand, a Forum to analyze wealth indicators
+
+model failed by not anticipating the October 1929 crisis.
+
+way the State articulates with the development of markets and how each
+
+of companies and then with more sophisticated economic modeling (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.87). The
+
+1970 crisis gave rise to the neoliberal categories of microeconomics that induce new reforms of the
+
+centralized State on performativity indicators (DESROSIÈRES, 2014, p.85).
+
+Desrosières it is difficult to foresee the effects of the financial crisis that exploded in 2008 in
+
+is content to intervene, but at the same time creates a system of observation
+
+statistical indicators (LEBARON, 2010). In this case, the commission coordinated by
+
+Studies of economic cycles and concern with forecasts
+
+ecological and financial can be the basis for a new configuration of production
+
+offers another bias for analyzing neoliberalism that is different from the approach
+
+created in the 1920s in several countries. In the United States, the barometer of
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+proposals whose objective was to complement the national accounts through
+
+and sought evidence that could anticipate economic crises. but this
+
+delivered in 2010 and proposes a certain number of new indicators of
+
+relationship between statistics and politics. Desrosières makes us understand what
+
+historical period develops its own statistical instruments; the state does not
+
+space for surveys of the economic situation that are carried out with the chiefs
+
+was created (FAIR) and tends to promote a new debate in society. For
+
+The economic and cognitive crisis of 2008 gave rise to new debates about the
+
+terms of innovation of statistical indicators. However, for him the crises
+
+economy with different technical properties. The sociology of quantification
+
+and the uses of statistical indicators.
+
+economy gave rise to numerous research centers in economic conjuncture
+
+Amartya Senet Joseph Stiglitz was commissioned by the French government to draw up
+
+18
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+modeling. Paris : Preses des mines, 2010
+
+that is, comparable according to a numerical scale. The fact of putting into equivalence
+
+transformations of the modalities of use of statistical arguments. Several
+
+subject who becomes his own entrepreneur. The feedback of the indicators
+
+analyze mismatches. Paris : Le cahiers de l'analyse des donnés, volume 2, n°
+
+as politics of numbers and politics of large numbers by Desrosières. On one
+
+it has become a systematic instrument of governance by numbers. The indicators
+
+have serious repercussions on the person's own psychic life.
+
+5/23/2017)
+
+condition that social actors appropriate this language. A good example is the
+
+accounting results, performance indicators and on the other hand the models
+
+neoliberal based on numbers.
+
+being in a society. Today this conception is criticized for not being more
+
+The quantified and comparative evaluation of the performance of public action,
+
+its own management and accounts for its production based on a scale of measurements
+
+ARMATTE, M. La science économique comme ingénierie. Quantifications et
+
+decisive is the negotiation of the conventions that make things commensurable, or
+
+BENZÉCRI, JP Histoire et préhistoire de l'analyse des données. Part V
+
+is replaced by an indirect management, based on the internalization of constraints by the
+
+The emergence of the neoliberal state was an occasion for great
+
+the performance of different countries, or institutions, through the game of indicators,
+
+and new instruments and modes of use have emerged and these are classified
+
+quantitative data on individuals affects them at all times of life and can
+
+1, 1977 pp.9-40.http://www.numdam.org/item?id=CAD_1977__2_1_9_0. (Access
+
+quantification analyzes the practices of the State and the effects of the mode of domination
+
+statisticians contribute to the production of a common language, but with the
+
+side by side with quantification, understood as the transformation of words into numbers,
+
+language of the GDP, whose conception has been imposed since the 1950s to measure good
+
+econometric measures. In neoliberalism, the individual becomes responsible for
+
+References
+
+that are given by the management service of the companies and by the bosses. direct management
+
+called culture of results, began to be discussed in the 1980s.
+
+satisfactory.
+
+19
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+de Janeiro: Bertrand Brazil, 2003b.
+
+recherche en Sciences Sociales. Paris: Vol. 2, n°5, 1976, pp.2-81.www.persee.fr
+
+DESROSIÈRES, Alain, La politique des grands nombres. story of the reason
+
+Séries longues et conventions d'equivalence,
+
+____________________.
+
+classer et mesurer: les deux faces de l'argument
+
+BOLTANSKI, Luc and Thévenot, Les économies de la grandeur. Paris: presses
+
+____________________,
+
+Les catégories socioprofessionnelles, Courier des
+
+BOLTANSKI, Luc, Les cadres. La formation d'un groupe social. Paris:
+
+05/23/2017).
+
+23.05.2017).
+
+quantification. Paris : Presses des mines, 2008a.
+
+BRUNO, I, À Vos marquis, prêts...cherchez! The European strategy of
+
+BOURDIEU, Distinction. Critique social du jugement. Paris: Editions of
+
+statistics, In Laborier P. et TROM (coord) Historiciser l'action publique. Paris: Poof,
+
+__________________,
+
+BOURDIEU, Pierre & Saint-Martin, Monique, Anatomie du goût, Actes de la
+
+Pouvoir et gouverner. A political analysis of
+
+____________________,
+
+Croquant, 2008
+
+(accessed, 23.05.2017).
+
+statistics. Paris: La Découverte, 1993.
+
+Genèse, n°9 p.92-97, 1992. www.persee.fr (accessed 04/23/2017)
+
+published statistics. Paris : La découverte, 2014
+
+__________________, Statistique I. Pour une sociologie historique de la
+
+universities of France, 1987.
+
+statistics. Paris: Réseaux, Vol. 13, n°71, 1995, pp.11-29. www.persee.fr (access,
+
+statistiques, n°125, novembre-décembre, 2008b, www.persee.fr (access,
+
+20
+
+Editions de Minuit, 1982.
+
+____________________,Historiciser l'action publique, l'Etat, le marché et les
+
+An unlikely encounter and its two legacies. In ENCREVÉ,
+
+Pierre, and LAGRAVE, Rose-Marie (coord.), Working with Bourdieu. River
+
+___________________,
+
+2003a.
+
+Minute, 1979.
+
+Lisbonne, vers un marche de la recherche. Bellecombe-en-Bauges : Editions du
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+21
+
+www.persee.fr (accessed, 05/23/2017).
+
+croquant, 2010.
+
+à l'étude des représetations collectives. Paris: Année Sociologique, n°6, 1903.
+
+1783_1990_num_5_1_1648, access: 05/19/2017
+
+LEBARON, Frédéric. La croyance crisis économique. Paris: editions du
+
+DURKHEIM, E. & MAUSS, Marcel, Des formes de classification. Contribution
+
+Measure, vol. 5, No. 1, PP. 164-165, Paris, 1990. http://www.persee.fr/doc/hism_0982-
+
+LEBARON, Frédéric, Ordre monétaire or social grounds? La BCE et al
+
+neoliberal revolution. Paris : editions du croquant, 2006.
+
+GENET, Jean-Philippe, Pour une histoire de la statistique, revue Histoire &
+
+instruments, Post in Social Sciences Magazine, v.9 n.18 Jul/Dec. 2012.
+
+, 1980.
+
+LASCOUMES, Pierre and GALÈS, Patrick, Public action addressed by its
+
+nationale et du Plan. Paris : Editeur Recherches
+
+humaines, 2004, http://leportique.reveu.org/625, accessed 09/30/2016. (p.1-15).
+
+FOURQUET, F. Les Comptes de la puissance. History of compatibility
+
+Technologies du pouvoir, Le Portique :Revue de philosophie et de sciences
+LASCOUMES, Pierre, La gouvenementalité: de la critique de l'Etat aux
+
+MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice, Singes. Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1960.
+
+FOUCAULT, Michel, Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988. Paris: Gallimard, 2001.
+
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+bibliométrie. Paris: Editions Raisons d'Agir, 2014.
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+Vol.:(0123456789)
+
+Minerva (2023) 61:53–70
+https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-022-09481-w
+
+1 3
+
+The Challenge of Quantifcation: An Interdisciplinary
+Reading
+
+Monica Di Fiore1  · Marta Kuc‑Czarnecka2  · Samuele Lo Piano3  ·
+Arnald Puy4  · Andrea Saltelli5,6
+
+Accepted: 21 November 2022 / Published online: 21 December 2022
+© The Author(s) 2022
+
+Abstract The present work looks at what we call “the multiverse of quantifcation”,
+where visible and invisible numbers permeate all aspects and venues of life.
+We review the contributions of diferent authors who focus on the roles of quantifcation
+in society, with the aim of capturing diferent and sometimes separate voices.
+Several scholars, including economists, jurists, philosophers, sociologists, communication
+and data scientists, express concerns or identify critical areas of our relationship
+with new technologies of ‘numericization’. While mindful of the important
+
+* Monica Di Fiore
+monica.difore@istc.cnr.it
+* Marta Kuc-Czarnecka
+marta.kuc@pg.edu.pl
+* Samuele Lo Piano
+s.lopiano@reading.ac.uk
+* Andrea Saltelli
+andrea.saltelli@gmail.com
+Arnald Puy
+a.puy@bham.ac.uk
+
+1 Institute for Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Via San
+Martino della Battaglia, 44, Rome 00185, Italy
+2 Faculty of Management and Economics, Gdansk University of Technology, Traugutta 79,
+80-233 Gdańsk, Poland
+3 School of the Built Environment, University of Reading, JJ Thompson Building, Whiteknights
+Campus, RG6 6AF Reading, UK
+4 School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham,
+Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
+5 UPF Barcelona School of Management, Carrer de Balmes, 132, 08008 Barcelona, Spain
+6 Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities (SVT) - University of Bergen (UIB),
+Parkveien 9, PB, 7805, 5020 Bergen, Norway
+54 M. Di Fiore et al.
+
+1 3
+
+specifcities of the diferent families of quantifcation, we use our broad and holistic
+canvas to explore possible spaces for a more systematic investigation of incumbent
+and novel quantifcations, as to increase communication among disciplinary
+communities, and among these and society, in the pursuit a democratic agency and
+self-defence.
+
+Keywords Sociology of quantifcation · Metrics · Rating · Mathematical
+modelling · Algorithms · Ethics of quantifcation
+
+Introduction
+
+“Count what is countable, measure what is measurable, and what is not measurable,
+make measurable.” So taught Galileo, circa 1610, and his lesson was well taken
+in the four intervening centuries. According to historian Alfred W. Crosby (1996),
+new technologies of quantifcation and visualization of space and time gave rise in
+the XIV century to a true revolution in mathematics, music, painting, accounting,
+astronomy, cartography and other domains. For Crosby, these changes ensured the
+epochal success of the West and its eventual domination over the rest of the world
+achieved in the space of the subsequent XV and XVI centuries1
+. At present, it
+appears as if this process of ‘numericization of the real2
+, ‘avalanche of numbers’
+(Hacking 1990) or ‘data colonialism’3
+ (Couldry and Mejias 2019)—far from losing
+its momentum, is set on an accelerating pace, as shown by fourishing works and
+movements around the sociology of numbers (Mennicken and Espeland 2019; Mennicken
+and Salais 2022a; Popp Berman and Hirschman 2018), to mention just the
+most recent works. According to scholars, numbers are seductive and performative
+(Engle Merry 2016); they confer epistemic power and legitimacy (Porter 1995); they
+increasingly pervade (Bruno, Didier, and Vitale 2014a, b; Espeland and Stevens
+2008; Saltelli 2020; Saltelli and Di Fiore 2020) and colonize (Couldry and Mejias
+2019) diferent aspects of life. Quantifcation promises agency over the future and
+the taming of uncertainty (Scoones and Stirling 2020). It brings a class of quantifable
+issues to the fore, while simultaneously leaving issues less amenable to quantifcation
+in a background. This phenomenon has become more visible in relation to
+what numbers should be considered to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic (Didier
+2020; Miller 2022; Saltelli et al. 2020a).
+For some (O’Neil 2016; Popp Berman and Hirschman 2018), the present is confronted
+with a blurring of the distinction between visible numbers, such as those
+produced by models, metrics and statistical inference, and invisible ones, such as
+
+1 The theories explaining the success of the West are so numerous as to constitute a ‘genre’, see e.g.
+(Diamond 1999). 2 Crosby’s book is entitled “The Measure of Reality”. We and other authors also use expressions involving
+reality becoming numerical, but this does not confrm nor denies any specifc realist or anti-realist
+perspective. One of the distinctive features of Desrosières’ (1998) account of the genesis of statistical
+thinking is the refusal to take side for a purely realist or purely constructivist view of quantifcation.
+3 Couldry and Majas (2019) use here colonization not in a North-South meaning, but in that of private
+spaces of existence, such as leisure time, being increasingly occupied and measured by platforms.Query
+55
+
+1 3
+
+The Challenge of Quantifcation: An Interdisciplinary Reading
+
+those processed into proprietary software in artifcial intelligence, big data in algorithms,
+hidden to users and the general public4
+. Forms of quantifcation as diferent
+as infuencing of voters or consumers, cyberwarfare, ranking of higher education,
+policing, administering justice and so on, in a growing list (Zubof 2019),
+have increased in scope and reach. Today, dystopian futures are being imagined in
+relation to old and new technologies of quantifcation (Muller 2018; O’Neil 2016;
+Supiot 2007), in their present expanded capacity made possible by more data, faster
+processing and a new media landscape (Saltelli and Boulanger 2019), in what has
+been variously defned as platform capitalism (Lanier 2006; McAfee and Brynjolfsson
+2017) or surveillance capitalism (Zubof 2019). Numbers play a key role in our
+sociotechnical imaginary, understood as how visions of scientifc and technological
+progress carry with them implicit ideas about public purposes, collective futures,
+and the common good (Jasanof and Kim 2015).
+The voices heard includes those of sociologists, philosophers, economists, media
+experts, data scientists and jurists, all variously concerned with the transformative
+role of numbers at the social, economic and political dimensions, and with their
+capacity to transmit values and determine what is normal (Amoore 2020).
+In the present work (Section 1) we review recent contributions on quantifcation
+and complement them with what, in our view, constitutes relevant lines of analysis.
+Beside the already mentioned work of Crosby (1996), surprisingly ignored by
+reviews of sociology of quantifcation, we also include in our broad canvas the
+debate among statisticians – veritable statistical wars on the use and abuses of inferential
+statistics (Mayo 2018; Stark and Saltelli 2018), the debate on the mathematization
+of economics (Drechsler 2000; Mirowski 2013a), and fnally the discussion
+(or lack thereof) within the family of mathematical modelling (Saltelli et al. 2020a).
+We call this canvas the “multiverse of quantifcation”, to highlights that many of the
+authors and actors reviewed inhabit diferent worlds.
+While Mennicken and Espeland (2019) caution against unifying accounts of
+quantifcation, and highlight the importance of tracking quantifcation across diferent
+sites, we explore (Section  2) strategies and spaces for democratic agency and
+collective self-defence that might be seen as common to the various regions of the
+multiverse.
+
+Section 1. Voices from Diferent Disciplines
+
+We give in this section the voices from diferent disciplines. Occasionally we fag
+where these strands don’t talk to each other, or areas of high societal relevance that
+are less investigated by academic scholarship. If the section appears cacophonic,
+rather than polyphonic, this is because of the nature of the landscape.
+To be noted, the analysis of the excesses in quantifcation ofered in the present
+section is by no means a refutation of quantifcation. The critique of the economic
+
+4 Even in the specifc feld of mathematical models, one talks of ‘data-laden models, model-fltered
+data’, pointing to the end of the separation between the two key ingredients of quantifcation (Edwards
+1999).
+56 M. Di Fiore et al.
+
+1 3
+
+assessment and of the occasionally implausible cost-beneft analysis found here does
+not imply that economic analyses are systematically biased or wrong5
+. On the same
+ground, the critique of disciplines such as evolutionary or cognitive psychology does
+not imply that all contributions from these disciplines are damaging6
+. The critique of
+the present section targets excess not application, abuse and not use, the generation
+of knowledge asymmetries not the process of social discovery.
+
+Cartesian Anxiety: Numbers, Uncertainty, Ignorance
+
+Some scholars (Reinert et  al. 2021) propose a way to understand the penetration
+of numbers in all venues of life, and the faith in their logical assumptions, going
+back to the Cartesian Dream of certainty, neutrality, and control of man over nature
+made possible by natural philosophy (Davies and Hersh 1986; Pereira and Funtowicz
+2015; Toulmin 1992). This dream starts with Francis Bacon and William Petty
+in the XVII century, to continue with Condorcet’s Mathématique sociale (Feldman
+2005), continues through ages e.g. via Bentham’s utilitarianism in the XIX century,
+and the post-war decisionism inspired by the successes of operational research during
+World War II (Majone 1989), and reaches a high point with the prevalence of
+New Public Management theories in both private and public sectors started in the
+eighties (Mennicken and Salais 2022a).
+‘Decisionism’, the idea that decisions can always be systematically arrived at via
+computation, has powered a ‘procedural utopia’, assuming the existence of machinery
+to take the right decision based on a set of logical rules and methods (Millgram
+2015). Andrew Stirling (2019), commenting on the use of terms such as ‘expected
+utility’, ‘decision theory’, ‘life cycle assessment’, ‘ecosystem services’ ‘sound scientifc
+decisions’ and ‘evidence-based policy’ notes that “Each technique routinely
+delivers its answers with formidable levels of precision. Yet the resulting impression
+of accuracy is deeply misplaced7
+”. In a subsequent multi-authors volume, Scoones
+and Stirling (2020) ofer many relevant examples of compression of uncertainty
+in policy evaluations via technologies of quantifcation. The modern apparatus of
+computation does away with uncertainty and ambiguity, aiming to reduce them to
+(Knightian) risk, and, as in the case of fnancial mathematics, colonizes the future,
+transforming it into an occasion for proft in the present (Walter and Wansleben
+2020).
+
+5 To make an example from today’s post-Brexit debates, while the participation in a program such as the
+EU’s Erasmus is not only a matter of gain or losses, the ongoing discussion in the UK of whether money
+was gained or lost by exiting the program plays a legitimate role in the public discourse (Raphael 2021). 6 As an example, the role of cognitive psychology in investigating the human origins of mathematics
+(Lakof and Núñez 2001) is remarkable.
+7 In other words, ofering results with implausible number of digits (high precision) conveys in the
+reader an impression of corresponding accuracy (closeness to the object measured).
+57
+
+1 3
+
+The Challenge of Quantifcation: An Interdisciplinary Reading
+
+Numbers and Quantifcation: Diferent Takes
+
+In his classic work, Porter (1995) analysed the appealing aspects provided by numbers,
+such as trust, authority and legitimacy in a decision-making process. Numbers
+seem fair and impartial, and their “objectivity lends authority to ofcials who have
+very little of their own”. The purported objectivity of numbers (Daston 1992) can be
+used to defect contestation. This may enhance knowledge and power asymmetries,
+as “Fighting a number with a number”, as per the motto of statactivists (Bruno, Didier,
+and Prévieux 2014; Bruno, Didier, and Vitale 2014a, b), requires resources and
+infrastructures not available to the lay citizen (Mennicken and Espeland 2019; Salais
+2022; Samuel 2022).
+Numbers afect other numbers, they generate lock-in and path dependencies,
+which are resilient to change, due to what sociologist Sally Engle Merry (Engle
+Merry 2016) defned as “expertise inertia” and “data inertia”. Incumbent numbers
+afect whom, what and how society will count and will measure in the future. Moreover
+numbers generate “reactivity” (Espeland and Sauder 2016) among those who
+are subject to them, possibly generating “pernicious feedback loop[s]” that “create
+the environment that justifes their assumptions” (O’Neil 2016).
+Mennicken and Salais (2022a) in their introduction to the volume ‘The New Politics
+of Numbers’ ofer an agile introduction to the Foucauldian studies of governmentality
+- which frst fourished in the English-speaking world, and to the studies
+of state statistics known as ‘Economics of Convention’, developed in France,
+mostly at INSEE - Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (the
+French Statistical ofce), thanks to Alain Desrosières, Laurent Thévenot and the
+same Salais. The title of the volume of Mennicken and Salais points to Desrosières’
+(1998) own work ‘The Politics of Large Numbers’, an important text on the genesis
+of probability and statistics8
+. Also, to be mentioned in the French school is sociologist
+Luc Boltanski, collaborating with Thévenot on grammars of “Orders of worth”
+that are needed to make sense of how justice is itself justifed by diferent actors
+under diferent normative frames. So market-worth is distinguished from civicworth,
+industrial-worth, and others (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Thévenot 2022)
+9
+.
+In an early (2008) review of sociology of quantifcation, Espeland and Stevens
+observed the increasing political demand for social numbers and the emergence
+of what they call new regimes of measurement. Already ten years after, Popp Berman
+and Hirschman (Popp Berman and Hirschman 2018), portrayed a changing
+landscape, where “a proliferation of scholarship on numbers goes hand in hand
+with a proliferation of numbers itself”. Here, the quantifed-self and big data are
+the incumbent challenges due to the new technologies and the explosion of internet
+services. Berman and Hirschman observe that the spread of numbers has reinforced
+the “regimes of measurement” and has empowered diferent actors who co-shape
+
+8 This is not the subject of the present work, but important readings on the emergence of the concept
+of probability are from Hacking (e.g. 1990) and Daston (e.g. 1988). A thorough review is ofered in the
+work of Desrosières already mentioned (1998).
+9 In this framework, New Public Management can be interpreted as a push for the adoption of a market
+work against a civic one, see later in this work.
+58 M. Di Fiore et al.
+
+1 3
+
+the production and governance of numbers. A recent review of the feld over the
+four domains administration, democratic rule, economics, and personal life are concerned
+(Mennicken and Espeland 2019) confrms these trends. We do not have the
+ambition to reproduce here Mennicken and Espeland’s thorough review, inclusive
+of a history of numbers in the four domains. We focus on some elements we need in
+our analysis and add others from our own readings, especially in the dimension of
+statistical and mathematical modelling not covered by these authors10.
+For Shoshana Zubof (Zubof 2019), the extraordinary development of algorithms
+and big data has permitted to the owner of major platforms to conduct real time
+experiments of cognitive psychology at an unprecedented scale, endowing these
+actors with a new “instrumentarian power” of knowing and orienting the behaviour
+of consumers and voters in a way which challenges the prospects of democracy.
+The critique of the jurist Alain Supiot (2007) focuses on the uses of economic and
+social quantifcations in the pursuit of ideas of efciency and competitiveness in a
+global market. In his ‘Governance by Numbers’, Supiot contrasts a society governed
+by just laws with one governed by numbers. For this author, we have entered the era
+of the cybernetic imaginary, which revives the West’s age-old dream of grounding
+social harmony in calculations – the ‘Cartesian Dream’ just mentioned. According
+to Supiot, the term cybernetics refers to the fact that, following the theories of New
+Public Management, workers act to achieve predefned goals; in this post-Taylorian
+arrangement, salaried people no longer sell their hours of working time but subscribe
+to a regime of permanent mobilization in the pursuit of assigned objectives.
+This new regime leaves no option for populations or countries than to ride roughshod
+over social legislation, and pledge allegiance to those stronger than they are. In
+the pessimistic vision of Supiot, this amounts to a technology-driven (re)feudalization
+of society, as protection can only be obtained by a most powerful agent.
+The issues of democracy in decision-making processes led by numbers (Supiot
+2007; Zubof 2019) have led to a new feld of investigation: algorithmic governmentality,
+extending both quantitatively and qualitatively the scope of the classic use
+of statistics in the administration of a state (Rouvroy and Berns 2013). As noted by
+several scholars, a decision achieved by an algorithm evades a process of negotiation
+and deliberation, eliminating even the existence of an appealable trace (Brauneis and
+Goodman 2018).
+The clearest illustration of the complex relationship between measures and policies
+is ofered by Robert Salais (2022) in his “La Donnée n’est Pas Un Donné’:
+Statistics, Quantifcation and Democratic Choice”. Here Salais illustrates the progressive
+‘unmaking’ of statistics over the past four decades to achieve what he calls
+“governance driven quantifcation”. Following Desrosières (1998), Salais presents
+‘statistics’ as the activity of creating through the categorization and attribution of
+
+10 An exception is the volume of (Morgan and Morrison 1999). This work highlights the extraordinary
+versatility of models both as instruments to do things and as representations to reveal things, to perform a
+vast array of tasks. In discussing “Models as mediators” these authors argue that models are partly independent
+from both the theory and the world they represent: “models are not situated in the middle of a
+hierarchical structure between theory and the world”, p. 17. In this nature of model is the reason of their
+being pervasive.
+59
+
+1 3
+
+The Challenge of Quantifcation: An Interdisciplinary Reading
+
+statistical objects that work in the defnition and analysis of social problems, what
+we could call the basis for evidence-based policy, (see Table 1).
+Conversely for Salais “Governance-driven quantifcation” represents a “reversal
+of the statistical pyramid”, where the design of the measures follows the logic of
+proving that an objective is both desirable (justifcationism) and achieved (policybased
+evidence). The example ofered by Salais concerns employment policy, where
+the achievement of an objective, the maximization of employment rate, is pursued
+while emptying the meaning of employment, and hiding precariousness and insecurity.
+In the same volume (Mennicken and Salais 2022a), Ota De Leonardis (2022)
+develops a similar analysis for the case of inequality. Here De Leonardis shows
+how quantifcation of poverty and inequality were accompanied by a semantic
+shift obscuring the bonds of domination linking the subjects, and where inequality
+becomes “a distributive diference, a gap, a disparity: a distance, and no longer
+a tie”, realizing what she calls the dreams of “indiferent power”, shifting out of
+focus important dimensions of power, politics, and institutions. In the same volume,
+(Thévenot 2022) ofers an illuminating analysis of how quantifcation, as deployed
+in the setting of standards, helps to transform common goods – such as collective
+solidarity, environmental concerns and the role of traditions into commercial labels.
+In this way, civic worth, green worth and domestic worth are subsumed under the
+category of market worths.
+For data scientist Cathy O’Neil, models, indicators or algorithms used in decision-making
+have three attributes which can make them dangerous as “Weapons of
+Math Destruction”: they are opaque, damaging, and scalable (O’Neil 2016). Scalability
+here refers to the ease with which diferent form of quantifcation via visible
+(ranking) or invisible (algorithms) numbers can be scaled up both in geographically,
+from the local to the global, and across diferent sectors. As discussed in the conclusions,
+O’Neil’s work played an important hinge work between academia, society,
+and media.
+
+Finance and Economics
+
+Finance and economics (Drechsler 2000; Reinert 2000; Romer 2015) are perhaps
+the felds where the dangers of mathematization have been more visibly discussed,
+also in relation to the onset of the last recession (Porter 2012; Ravetz 2008; Wilmott
+and Orrell 2017). Mirowski (2013b) criticizes the normative propensity of
+mathematical models in macroeconomics. Romer, the former chief economist of the
+World Bank, argues that economic models are tools for regulatory choices, values
+
+Table 1 The changing relationship between measures and policies
+
+Evidence-based policy Statistics: creating statistical objects that hold together for the solution of practical
+problems (Desrosières, 1998).
+
+Policy-based evidence Governance-driven quantifcation: a reversal of the statistical pyramid
+(Salais, 2022), where the measure is selected as to confrm the efectiveness
+of policy.
+60 M. Di Fiore et al.
+
+1 3
+
+and interests, hidden under a veil of mathematics (Romer 2015). For (van Zwanenberg
+2020), economic quantifcation is linked to a form of technocratic orthodoxy,
+and to reductionism in the framing of human and social afairs. When the scientifc
+community joined the campaign “Doing Rights Not Rankings”, A relevant form of
+statactivism (though not under this name) emerged. With the support of over 360
+signatories from 80 countries, activists called the World Bank and its shareholders
+to end the Ease of Doing Business rankings (Ghosh 2020) for its perverse efect on
+social policies in developing and developed countries.
+
+Opening the Disciplinary Boxes
+
+The existing literature still lacks ‘general claims or a common theoretical language’,
+‘a well-defned object of study’ and a connection among studies on quantifcation
+across diferent disciplines (Popp Berman and Hirschman 2018). In fact, sociology
+of quantifcation still appears as “a genre, not a subfeld” (ibidem), although Mennicken
+and Espeland (2019) point out that this lack of connection is not necessarily a
+“bad thing”, given the specifcities of diferent practices.
+If one accepts that existing sociological studies of quantifcation, while precious
+in their own way, are nevertheless fragmented11, then strengthening the connection
+among studies on quantifcation across diferent disciplines and subfelds become
+both a necessity and an opportunity for multidisciplinary scholarship. The opening
+of the disciplinary boxes would allow escaping both “data inertia” and “expertise
+inertia” mentioned by (Engle Merry 2016).
+A worthy topic would be the quest for generalized quality assurance rules and the
+opening up of the entire process of quantifcation, including the underlying framings,
+assumptions, data, narratives, interests and stakes. This evidently calls for better dialogue
+between that two great science families12 – creating an agora where the mathematical
+and the ethical could be tackled side by side. The idea of an ethics of quantifcation,
+introduced by Espeland and Stevens (Espeland and Stevens 2008), appears
+promising, though not of easy application. Take for example algorithms: a common
+refrain in the present discourse of ethics of algorithms is that these should be corrected
+to become ‘good’ or ‘fair’ or at least ‘transparent’. A main difculty with this
+approach is that algorithms are not developed for this purpose. No bank would adopt
+a profling software that would give money to customers with no money. Moreover,
+as Amoore (2020) discussed, an algorithm is an “ethicopolitical arrangement of
+values, assumptions, and propositions about the world”. Once put in operation, the
+algorithm creates a new reality, with new practices, new norms of good or bad. As
+a clue of the ethical authority invested in algorithms, AI experts are actively investigating
+ethical machines, called artifcial autonomous moral agents (AAMAs), to
+function as a moral prompter (Lo Piano 2020), e.g. in the taking of medical decisions
+(Anderson and Leigh Anderson 2007). Otherwise said, technologists’ dreams
+
+11 The case of the domains of statistical inference and mathematical modelling – so close and so diferent
+in their level of analysis, is particularly relevant (Saltelli 2019). 12 To make an example, the theories of sociologist Luhmann could be usefully applied to the feld of
+indicators of development (Boulanger 2018).
+61
+
+1 3
+
+The Challenge of Quantifcation: An Interdisciplinary Reading
+
+to ‘moralize’ algorithms contrasts with the fact that what is moral is increasingly
+shaped by algorithms (Amoore 2020).
+Going back to a possible ethics of quantifcation as a vehicle for shared criteria
+of quality, Amartya Sen’s Informational Basis for Judgment of Justice (IBJJ) (Sen
+1990) suggest looking at quality along two axes: that of technical adequacy – for
+which presumably each family of quantifcation disposes of its own criteria, and
+that of fairness. Sen’s framework, also recommended by (Salais 2022), suggests to
+explore whether a given measure permits a fair, informed judgement of an issue.
+Fairness implies that a measure should weight the chances of individual to achieve
+their goal, in a way that is mindful of the individual condition (capability approach).
+Therefore, fairness does not correspond to equal material means for all, but to equal
+opportunities for all to fulfl one’s aspirations.
+
+Mathematical Models and Statistical Controversies
+
+There are two aspects why mathematical modelling, intended sensu lato as to cover
+diferent kinds of analytic constructs, could be central to an ethics of quantifcation.
+The frst is that mathematical modelling is pervasive, part and parcel of practically
+all quantifcation activities – from algorithms to ratings to the making of aggregate
+measures such as the now extremely popular family of composite indicators (KucCzarnecka,
+Lo Piano, and Saltelli 2020). Modelling is also central to the use of statistics.
+Yet, in the feld of statistics momentous changes have taken place. After years
+of soul-searching due to the poor use of statistical inference, the so called-reproducibility
+crisis in science (Saltelli and Funtowicz 2017) has pushed the discipline
+of statistics at the forefront of the controversy (Stark and Saltelli 2018). Statistical
+institutes urgently issue guidelines (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016), while a signifcant
+number of statistical professionals launch a petition to abolish the concept of signifcance
+altogether (Amrhein, Greenland, and McShane 2019; Gelman 2019). Statistical
+wars are now part of the new normal (Mayo 2018).
+While statistics sorts in the daylight what might constitute a set of norms for
+responsible inference, this situation is rather more obscure in the feld of mathematical
+modelling, which is not a discipline by itself. Thus diferent modelling communities
+are ‘united’ by a lack of standardized quality control procedures (Padilla
+et al. 2018). The extreme dependency of the inference by apparently inconsequential
+modelling choices never cease to surprise the same experts (Breznau et  al. 2021;
+Frigg et al. 2014).
+A recent manifesto on mathematical modelling highlighted the problems in relation
+to COVID-19 and the potentially dangerous role of model-generated numbers in
+the pandemic (Saltelli et al. 2020a). The manifesto stressed that modelling is a social
+activity–but the same can be said of any form of quantifcation, whose proper use
+demands that producers and users of numbers come to domesticate one another to
+the efect that numbers help rather than harm.
+The fve principles proposed in Saltelli et  al. (2020a) cover the transparency
+of assumptions, the proportionate use of modelling, the attention to the context
+62 M. Di Fiore et al.
+
+1 3
+
+of use, and the consequences of a quantifcation, and fnally a Socratic respect for
+ignorance.
+The literature has discussed the opportunism of the so-called “chameleon models”
+(Pfeiderer 2020), alternatively presenting themselves as tools for political prediction
+or as theoretical analysis according to the opportunities, taking refuge in the
+second role as they are caught out in the unwarranted exercise of the frst, e.g. when
+an undocumented research code is used as a policy tool.
+A present discussion is what part of models used in determining COVID-19 policies
+belong to this class (Saltelli, Bammer, et al. 2020b). The same source (Saltelli,
+Bammer, et al. 2020b) also wonders how concepts such as the value of a statistical
+life might have a place in choosing the best public-health policy. Since this metric
+can produce an appearance of rigour, it also runs the risk to disguise political decisions
+as technical ones, as shown by a recent debate about the depoliticizing tendencies
+of quantifcation (Mennicken and Espeland 2019). That numbers may have a
+de-politicizing tendency - used instrumentally by various actors, is indeed not new,
+and has been a recurring theme fagged by ecologists, e.g. in relation to risk or cost
+beneft analyses, see chapter 8 in (Winner 1989) and by scholars of science and technology
+studies from Daston (1992) to Jasanof (2003).
+The government by numbers has also created a system of networking of numbers,
+reinforcing the concept of inertia discussed by (Engle Merry 2016), and creating
+a meta- or second-order measurement that enables new forms of comparison and
+knowledge creation (Power 2004). Then, these numbers ‘take on a life of their own
+and are circulated and removed from their origins of production’ (Mennicken and
+Espeland 2019). Ranking of higher education might be seen as an example of this
+tendency, whereby a tool developed for local needs becomes global and every dean
+of the worldwide education system has to follow its indications (Éloire 2010).
+
+Section 2. What Spaces for Democratic Agency?
+
+Some authors have recently suggested the possibility of an observatory for ethics of
+quantifcation (Saltelli et al. 2021).
+A few examples of ‘missions’ that could be entrusted to an observatory for ethics
+of quantifcation are given below.
+
+• Mathematical models can be subject to a regime of investigation deploying tools
+such as sensitivity auditing (Saltelli et al. 2013), an extension of sensitivity analysis
+recommended for models to be used for policy (Science Advice for Policy
+by European Academies 2019). Similar concerns inspire the use of pedigrees in
+quantitative information, such as NUSAP (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; van der
+Sluijs et al. 2005), or the appeal of Sheila Jasanof for technologies of humility
+against technologies of hubris (Jasanof 2003).
+• “Algorithms of public relevance” (Gillespie 2014) are those with socio-political
+impacts. How to identify them? What to do once they are identifed? A relevant
+63
+
+1 3
+
+The Challenge of Quantifcation: An Interdisciplinary Reading
+
+example is ofered by O’Neil of ‘hackathons’ to reverse-engineering proprietary
+software and to identify normative or political bias (O’Neil 2016).
+• Given the prevailing narrative whereby numbers play as an assurance of neutrality
+prediction and control, a resistance should be based on unveiling the nonneutrality
+of numbers and methodologies (Saltelli et  al. 2020a, b, c) and their
+underlying, spoken and unspoken, frames and assumptions (Saltelli et al. 2013).
+This line of activity would go in the direction of contrasting numerical hubris
+with a ‘culture of humility’ (Jasanof 2003).
+• The neglect of ambiguity (Gupta 2001) and of ‘not-knowing’ limits the space
+of the possible policy solutions. As noted for the case of COVID-19, sciencebased,
+number-based policies may ofer politicians the opportunity to abdicate
+decisions by transforming a political decision into a technical one.
+
+ Modellers must not be permitted to project more certainty than their
+models deserve; and politicians must not be allowed to ofoad accountability
+to models of their choosing (Saltelli et al. 2020a).
+
+• As mentioned, several communities have attempted to reform the production of
+numbers (Algorithmic Justice League 2020; Bruno, Didier, and Prévieux 2014;
+Cardif University 2020; French National Research Institute for Sustainable
+Development 2020). These communities may beneft from further spaces, programs
+and synergies to achieve major impact.
+• Since those with the deepest pockets can purchase the most evidence and disseminate
+it more efciently (Drutman 2015; Laurens 2017; Saltelli 2018; Saltelli
+et al. 2020a, b, c), policing in which numbers populate the public arena is also a
+way to be active in these power games. As argued in (Foucart, Horel, and Laurens
+2020; Saltelli et al. 2020a, b, c) the sophistication of the strategy played by
+private interests are ever increasing, including occupying spaces created by wellmeaning
+participatory strategies (Mirowski 2020).
+• Alternative measures to quantitative metrics to break the exclusivity of metric
+regimes.
+
+Conclusion
+
+The present work and the literature it interrogates has examined the critical aspects
+of quantifcation. Yet these voices most likely constitute the view of a minority. In
+the present prevailing imaginary, the methodologies and technologies of datafcation
+provide humanity with unprecedented means to tame uncertainty and rule human
+afairs (Pinker 2018; Sunstein 2020)
+13. Coupled with nanotechnology, quantifcation
+with artifcial intelligence will allow a new “Fully Automated Luxury Capitalism”
+according to Bastani (2019). Though a ‘tongue in cheek’ use of the terms
+can be suspected here, the book reads as a serious run through technologists’ aspirations,
+e.g. to mine asteroids for precious minerals. Some intellectuals appear to
+consider the risk from datafcation remote, and at most in the risk of a future ‘digital
+
+13 For a critique of Pinker and Sunstein, see respectively (Gray 2018) and (Timms 2019).
+64 M. Di Fiore et al.
+
+1 3
+
+dictatorship’ or that of ‘hackable humans’, this latter posed by convergent AI and
+nano technologies (Harari 2018)
+14, against those who see such a dictature already
+in progress (Salais 2022; Supiot 2007) and the humans already hacked (The Social
+Dilemma 2020; Zubof 2019).
+For technologists McAfee and Brynjolfsson, our digital future needs to be harnessed
+(McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2017). In Europe, a digitalization agenda pervades
+European research, e.g. in the European Union Horizon Europe programme,
+to address environmental as well as social and health problems – see the concepts of
+‘green and digital transitions’ and ‘digital twins’ (European Commission 2020). It
+appears that–as with many contemporary issues, such as frontier technologies, e.g.
+transhumanism15, one side is mesmerized by the potentialities of what another side
+considers an impending dystopia.
+In our analysis, we have focused on both visible and invisible numbers, what we
+call “the multiverse of quantifcation”. Visible numbers densely populate the science
+policy interface, whereby no branch of government nor strand of public life
+escapes the use of numbers to adjudicate priorities. Distortion and abuses of quantifcation
+are well documented in the literature reviewed in the frst section of the
+present work.
+As per the invisible numbers, those of the algorithms, that are either produced by
+the users themselves or collected by platforms, institutions and other societal actors
+are coerced into submission by the existing knowledge asymmetry caused by the
+opacity of the algorithms, and by the speed of transformation whereby a new normal
+established itself (The Social Dilemma 2020).
+The existing regimes of measurement are the target of the activities of the proposed
+observatory for the ethics of quantifcation. The observatory can be seen as a
+dialectical opportunity between the depoliticizing tendencies of quantifcation and
+the need to re-politicize them as seen in old and new initiatives (Algorithmic Justice
+League 2020; Bruno, Didier, and Prévieux 2014; Cardif University 2020; Coded
+Bias 2020; French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development 2020;
+Radical Statistics Group 2020).
+Note also that if academia’s work were to be driven by an ideal societal demand,
+many aspects of bad pharma linked to misuse of quantifcation (Harris 2017; Ioannidis
+2016), or the high cost of adolescents’ lives lost to suicide apparently driven
+by the new media (The Social Dilemma 2020; Twenge et al. 2018), should receive
+more attention by academic work. We make these remarks to suggest that, while
+generous, the new wealth of scholarship in the domain of quantifcation may not be
+as impactful as society would need it to be, to avoid what Tristan Harris, a former
+
+14 The example of Harari suggests that a characteristic of techno-optimism is that of situating present
+dangers into the future.
+15 Hailed by Harari in Homo Deus (Harari 2016), trans-humanism is feared by Lent and others to produce
+a techno split of humanity between an afuent super-technological and possibly immortal minority,
+versus a useless and distracted majority left glued to its mobile phones and tablets (Lent 2017; Tintino
+2014).
+65
+
+1 3
+
+The Challenge of Quantifcation: An Interdisciplinary Reading
+
+design ethicist at Google, calls “checkmate on humanity16” (The Social Dilemma
+2020).
+Interdisciplinary work can help to bridge scholarship with society. ‘Coded Bias’
+(Coded Bias 2020) is a documentary on how the fght against facial recognition
+software gained momentum. ‘The Social Dilemma’ (2020), is also a documentary,
+narrated from the inside of technologists’ world, of the damage brought about on
+social and political life by the new media. More people have watched these productions17
+than will ever read Desrosiéres, Zubof or Supiot. Even ‘popular’ works such
+as O’Neil (2016), Muller (2018) or Lanier (2018; 2006) reach more readers than
+strictly academic productions, and help projecting academia outside academia–for
+example, the activist behind Coded Bias was inspired by O’Neil.
+Our work is more about bridges across disciplines than between academia and
+society. Mennicken and Espeland (2019) conclude their work noting:
+
+The challenge remains, however, for scholars of quantifcation to fnd each
+other, and this will always demand breadth in reading and, perhaps, articles
+like this.
+
+We can borrow, perhaps, the same closing line.
+
+Acknowledgments This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe
+research and Innovation programme I4Driving (Grant Agreement ID 101076165).
+
+Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
+which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
+as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
+licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
+are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
+material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not
+permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly
+from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
+
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+++ b/DIDIER, Emmanuel; BRUNO, Isabelle. Statism as a militant use of quantification.md	
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+82 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+http://doi.org/10.1590/15174522-105471
+
+DOSSIER82
+
+* Ecole Normale Supérieure-EHESS, Paris, France.
+
+ÿ A preliminary version of this text was published as an introduction to the book Statactivisme
+(Bruno; Didier; Prévieux, 2014).
+**University of Lille, Lille, France.
+
+ÿ Translation into Portuguese by Liana Fernandes.
+
+Emmanuel Didier*
+Isabelle Bruno**
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of
+
+quantification
+
+Resume
+
+Le «statactivisme» comme usage militant de la quantificationÿ
+
+Summary
+
+Mots clefs: statactivisme, sociologie de la quantification, émancipation, institutions, realité.
+
+Quatre types de statactivisme sont presentés : monitor les contradictions internales
+des institutions, prendre des libertés avec les règles, identify des groupes sociaux
+en struggle, et proposer des indicateurs alternatifs.
+
+This article presents stativism. It is both a concept that describes a set of statistical
+practices aimed at emancipation, and a slogan that calls on social actors to use the
+power of quantification in their struggles, instead of rejecting it and surrendering it. it
+to powerful institutions. Four forms of stativism are presented: showing the internal
+contradictions of institutions, making rules more flexible, identifying social groups in
+struggle and proposing alternative indicators.ÿ
+
+Cet article présente le statactivisme. Il s'agit à la fois d'un concept décrivant un
+ensemble de practices statistics qui visent à l'émancipation et d'un mot d'ordre
+enjoignant les acteurs sociaux à s'emparer de la force de la quantification dans leurs
+luttes sociales plutôt que de la refuser en la laissant aux institutions puissantes.
+
+Keywords: stativism, sociology of quantification, emancipation, institutions, reality.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+There of seems disarming to be no any better criticism example than today a number of an authority or a network capable of
+
+The effective instrumentalization of the neoliberal state is unique
+
+(Desrosières, 2008). Its hard core consists of a permanent quantitative
+and comparative assessment of the activity of agents, thus placed in
+competition through a technology that can be called benchmarking
+(Bruno; Didier, 2013). Assessment today is so systematic that it tends
+to be confused with the action itself. Now, “since the quantification procedures
+
+of numbers. Quantification often plays a prominent role in the
+production of the “authority of facts”, which has been at the heart of the
+difficulties encountered by the Frankfurt School in its effort to construct
+a theory of emancipation (Genel, 2013; Bruno, 2015).
+
+Despite the inaccuracies that the term raises, one can agree to call
+
+the current state of reality neoliberal. This, to a large extent, is shaped
+and consolidated by statistics, which in itself should not be surprising.
+
+As can be seen from the etymology of the word, statistics has been
+linked, since its origins, to power, in particular to the power of the State
+(Bourdieu, 2012), however, neither of the two has remained immutable.
+
+We believe that, for critical thinking, one of the ways of confronting
+the authority of facts is found, then, in the distinction, proposed by Luc
+Boltanski in De la Critique, between, on the one hand, “reality” which
+
+“tends to confuse oneself with what seems to be sustained in some way
+only by its strength, that is, by order”, and on the other, “the world” as
+“everything that happens”, the set of “events or experiences whose
+possibility is not inserted in the design of reality” (Boltanski, 2009, p.
+
+93-94). The first is organized based on “formats, determined under the
+coercion of an institutional power”, which tend to “address the world in
+
+its entirety” (Boltanski, 2009, p. 140). The second, “immersed in the flow
+of life”, consists of experiences that are difficult to “express in
+words” (Boltanski, 2009, p. 94). This opposition seems to us to be very
+useful for understanding the effects of domination and also the critical force attributed to statistics.
+
+“statativism” “statativism” as a militant militant use of quantification quantification 83
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(Champy, 2009). However, other authors generalized this complaint
+
+they are codified and routinized, their products are reified. They tend to
+become 'reality', through an irreversible ratchet effect” (Desrosières,
+
+2008, p. 12). We are then obliged to achieve quantified goals and
+
+indefinitely intensify our performance according to the values defined
+
+by the indicator. The practice refers to a baseline of optimal reproduction
+
+of the same, despite variations, experiments, accidents and unforeseen
+
+events. The insertion of actors into increasingly closed quantification
+
+networks therefore seems to be one of the main instruments for
+
+narrowing the practical possibilities offered to them.
+
+With the development of benchmarking, statistics became the
+
+target of much criticism and, ultimately, rejection on principle. The first
+
+to lose with these new neoliberal assessment methods, among which
+
+we can mention health, social service, education, justice, information
+
+and culture professionals , who came together in the Appel des appels1
+
+movement (Gori et al., 2009), They immediately felt the harmful effects
+
+of performance management techniques , which consist of quantifying
+
+and comparing the results obtained in the exercise of their professions.
+
+These professionals denounced such techniques due to the
+
+impenetrability of quantifying what sociologist Florent Champy calls
+
+“prudential practices”, that is , attention to particular cases, complex and specific situations.
+
+for any quantification, whatever it may be, drawing especially on
+
+arguments from different currents of Lacanian psychoanalysis (ECF,
+
+2008; Milner, 2011) or the paradigm of the gift (Caillé, 2012). This
+
+happened in such a way that statistics that have a very distant
+
+relationship with benchmarking and that, until then, enjoyed a very
+
+progressive image, became targets of criticism.
+
+1 NT: Appel des appels is a movement created in 2008 by psychoanalyst Roland Gori
+and supported by civil society that aims to unite professionals from different sectors of
+the public service in opposition to carrying out reforms and evaluating public action
+based mainly on economic criteria. More information at http://www.appeldesappels.org/.
+
+84 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+2 On May 15, 2012, a conference on “stativism” was organized in Paris, which gave
+rise to the work Statactivisme : comment lutter avec des nombres (Bruno; Didier;
+Prévieux, 2014).
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 85
+
+It was then possible to show the importance of stativism in the fight against
+
+the abuse of power by the police in France (Didier, 2018) or, even,
+
+Afterwards, a special edition in English of the Italian magazine
+
+Partecipazione e conflict made it more widely accessible (Bruno; Didier; Vitale, 2014).
+
+This neologism must, therefore, be understood both as a slogan to
+
+be brandished in struggles and as a descriptive concept, used to qualify
+
+experiments aimed at reappropriating the emancipatory power of statistics.
+
+Since 2012,2 successive works carried out by groups of researchers, as
+
+well as activists and artists, have made it possible, on the one hand, to
+
+map a set of practices related to this aspiration and, on the other, to
+
+explain the tensions and issues in which this use of quantification plunged
+
+us. These efforts resulted in many publications that nurtured and
+
+exemplified the concept of stativism. First, a book enabled its wide
+
+dissemination in France (Bruno; Didier; Prévieux, 2014).
+
+However, if today statistics are readily criticized for their collusion
+
+with power and sanction, the history of their links with social reform and
+
+emancipation is equally long and rich. Statistics also showed, in the past,
+
+that another reality was possible or made other possibilities real. That's
+
+why we don't react like those who totally reject them and shout “No to how
+
+much phrenia! No to numbers! Yes to the qualities!”, because, in doing so,
+
+they leave the monopoly of these instruments to the powerful. Well, there
+
+is no reason why quantification should always be on the side of the State
+
+and capital. It is important to move away from this state-centric view, which
+
+is particularly dominant in France (Didier, 2021), and to highlight other
+
+modes of production and other uses of numbers. To explore the field of
+
+these militant practices, using statistics as a resource of resistance, we
+
+coined a term to name the thing: “stativism”.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+they aim to emancipate themselves from the government methods typical of that model.
+
+Stativism has a broader and a restricted meaning. Firstly , it designates all
+
+statistical practices that serve to criticize and emancipate oneself from an authority,
+
+whatever it may be. These statistical practices have been around for a long time – we
+
+will return to them. In a second, more restricted sense, some of these practices are
+
+more specifically adapted to the type of power exercised within the scope of neoliberal
+
+governmentality;
+
+In other words, let us remember Desrosières' (2003) argument, according to which we
+
+can list five different forms of State, all of which use statistical tools to act, but each
+
+according to a specific modality. For example, the Keynesian State resorts to national
+
+accounting, as it allows it to control the flows useful for the consumption stimulus policy,
+
+while the neoliberal State prefers to mobilize performance indicators and quantified
+
+targets to evaluate the efficiency of its services. There is a correspondence between
+
+the form of action
+
+Finally, the concept has been used on numerous occasions to analyze the
+
+COVID-19 pandemic, which is also, without a doubt, a pandemic of numbers. For
+
+example, the indicators used by public authorities, such as the number of infections or
+
+deaths, could be questioned, as they would focus attention on medical problems,
+
+diverting it from the socioeconomic consequences of implemented policies, which, in
+
+turn, would be little statistically represented (Didier, 2020). On the other hand, the
+
+ethical tensions associated with quantitative epidemiological models were highlighted
+
+in an article published in Nature that invites, under the banner of statism, statisticians
+
+and modelers to act in a more “transparent and unpretentious” way , to disclose
+
+information such as the limitations of their data, and also to admit that scientific work is
+
+not apart from the social world, its contingencies and uncertainties, its conflicts and
+
+power relations (Saltelli et al. 2020).
+
+in Brazil, as shown in the special issue of the journal Statistique et société (v. 7, n. 1,
+
+2019), which focused on activist quantification in the country.
+
+86 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+If stativism consists of putting statistics at the service of
+
+emancipation, we can distinguish four different ways of proceeding.
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 87
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+The first indicates paths for the study of stativism in a broad sense; it
+
+allows, through a historical review, to question the degree of radicality
+
+of statistical criticism. Next, we will analyze more contemporary practices
+
+of stativism; they may be more or less specific to neoliberal government,
+
+as past forms of authority survive the emergence of new ones, and so
+
+do critical forms . The second part shows how to circumvent – individually
+
+and often secretly – the rules of accountability in order to appropriate
+
+the results of the exercise. The third mobilizes statistics to consolidate
+
+collective categories that provide bases for claiming rights and defending
+
+To face this governmentality that infiltrates a large number of
+
+normally compartmentalized worlds, stativism allows us to go beyond
+
+established borders. The May 2012 colloquium brought together
+
+researchers specialized in the study of statistics, activists accustomed
+
+to using numbers to advance their causes and, finally, visual artists
+
+whose inspiration lies in quantification and contemporary management
+
+techniques using numbers. We thus show that academic criticism, social
+
+criticism and artistic criticism converge.
+
+interests. Finally, the fourth produces alternative indicators to redefine
+
+the meaning of our actions.
+
+In this context, stativism takes on a particular meaning when it
+
+designates methods specifically linked to neoliberal government.
+
+public policy and the statistical tool (Desrosières, 2003). But this
+adequacy also applies to criticism tools, even when they are
+quantitative. Each form of authority has its own form of opposition.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+4 NT: In French, “Professions et categories socioprofessionnelles”.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+by Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, in which the authors showed that, in
+
+France, school did not mitigate cultural inequalities among children ; on the contrary,
+
+it aggravated them by recognizing and validating the cultural capital of those who
+
+received it from their families. This was demonstrated by crossing variables, in
+
+particular the father's Occupation Classification4 with different measures of student
+
+life and academic success, in order to show that they are the children of parents
+
+belonging to social categories who already have significant cultural capital that
+
+manage to enter the most prestigious academic careers. In this way, this work
+
+demonstrated what everyone, to some extent, already knew from experience. But it
+
+totaled a series of individual experiences that were statistically objective, thus giving
+
+each person a basis for understanding how this experience was the result, less of
+
+their personal academic virtue, and more of a system of domination imposed on
+
+everyone. Hence a guilt-removal effect.
+
+Let's go back to the past to better follow the trajectory of statistical innovations in this
+
+sense and, thus, better understand how, over time, they were accepted by the public.
+
+It is interesting to highlight here that the classifications used and crossed were
+
+official, that is, they were based on a reality consolidated by state institutions.
+
+Coming from the “system” itself, they show its internal contradictions. The public
+
+service of national education intends to remedy the injustices, appealing to the ethics
+
+of the gift of teachers, who supposedly offer their knowledge for the general interest,
+
+but, in fact, only restore and perpetuate the injustice.
+
+The history of the connection between statistics and social emancipation is old.
+
+An interesting example is offered by the book Les Héritiers (1964),3
+
+88 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+3 NT: Published in Portuguese as The heirs: students and culture. Florianópolis:
+Editora da UFSC, 2013.
+
+Radical or reformist criticism, examples drawn from
+the past
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The long controversy over the price index in France is another
+
+historical example of the critical reach of statistics (Desrosières, 2014;
+
+Touchelay, 2014). Historians show the trajectory of alternative price
+
+indices from the beginning of the 1970s until the 1990s. During this period,
+
+the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) published the results of an
+
+index of its own elaboration, different from that presented by the National
+
+Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). The CGT's argument
+
+was that the INSEE index was based on premises that were very much in
+
+line with the mode of consumption of the middle classes, very different
+from that of the working classes.
+
+Initially, the CGT index was very successful and was used – along
+
+with the INSEE index – in salary negotiations. Even the media sometimes
+took into account its variations (Piriou, 1992). However, from the end of
+
+the 1980s, it began to fall into disuse, until the CGT decided to completely
+
+stop its development during the 1990s. How could this index be accepted
+
+at first, until it gradually lost its appeal and , finally disappear altogether?
+
+Desrosières (2014) offers a sociological explanation: he considers that
+
+does not allow us to capture what this author calls existential
+criticism. These radical criticisms, which generally come from artists,
+consist of extracting important elements from the world, even if
+these have not been institutionalized in one way or another
+
+(Boltanski, 2014). Les Héritiers was not intended to prompt questions
+about the very existence of the school. In line with the Marxistinspired
+dichotomy between reformism and revolutionary radicalism
+that occurred at the time, the book proposed, above all, a reformist
+critique constructed from categories of institutional reality. The work
+criticized the institution based on this. Anyway , the publication of
+this book was a great success. According to Boltanski, the work
+even “played a significant role in the change of collective spirit that preceded May 1968”.
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 89
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+It can therefore be concluded, according to Luc Boltanski, that statistical criticism
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+90 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+5 Haacke also later published a book of dialogues with Pierre Bourdieu
+(Bourdieu; Haacke, 1994).
+
+On the opening day, the public found only one table, on which there were
+
+questionnaires with about twenty questions on sociodemographic
+
+characteristics and opinions on current events. A few days later, Haacke
+
+added the results of his research to the installation in the form of boxes
+
+representing graphs and histograms. These showed that the vast majority
+
+of visitors had professional connections with the art world, belonged to an
+
+educated middle class, with limited financial resources and who,
+
+predominantly, declared themselves “liberal”, in the American sense of the
+
+term. Haacke thus provided a contrast to another exhibition he was holding
+
+in New York at the same time, where he displayed, without comment, the
+
+many and opulent affiliations of the Guggenheim Museum trustees to the
+
+boards of directors of large capitalist corporations . Thus, within the
+
+institutional frameworks of the art world – prestigious New York galleries
+
+and a museum – and through very consolidated categories, Haacke
+
+exposed the political-social division that radically separated the public of
+
+contemporary art and the elite that sponsors it. The statistical critique was
+
+once again quite reformist, insofar as it relied on the institutions it intended
+
+to undermine.
+
+In the year that the CGT launched its index, the German artist Hans
+
+Haacke set up an exhibition at the New York gallery John Weber with
+
+similar objectives, one might say, to those of the aforementioned book The Heirs. 5
+
+In any case, the fact is that the developers of these indices agreed on
+
+the methodological apparatus that allowed them to be calculated and on
+
+their institutional uses. Even though it has modified the products considered
+
+in the consumer's “basket”, the CGT has appropriated the architecture of
+
+the economic concepts that make such an index relevant. In this sense, the
+critique was again reformist, not radical.
+
+Statistical arguments meet reception conditions that are more or less
+
+favorable to them and that can change over time.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+Based on established and institutionalized elements of reality–
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 91
+
+Bourdieu was part of the long sociological tradition of using statistics,
+
+which can be traced back to Durkheim's Suicide . Furthermore, he had
+
+personal ties with statisticians at the National Institute of Statistics and
+
+Economic Studies (INSEE) since the 1950s and even taught at the
+
+National School of Statistics and Economic Administration (ENSAE) –
+which trains the Institute's administrators – in the same year. of the
+
+release of Les héritiers. Likewise, the CGT continued a long tradition
+
+of producing social statistics that dates back, through trade unions, to
+
+the end of the 19th century (Topalov, 1994). As for Hans Haacke, if he
+
+apparently produced his questionnaires alone, he was also, in some
+
+way, assisted sociologically by Howard Becker. Representatives of
+
+this generation of stativists therefore used the rich intellectual and
+
+institutional resources to which they had access to produce statistics.
+
+ratings, product series, distribution network and dissemination of a
+medium, etc. –, these statistics do not radically question this reality
+
+that, at the same time, they denounce; rather, they make it possible to
+
+influence it, to reform it. Bourdieu and Passeron did not question the
+
+school's existence, but they made reform possible; the CGT built a
+
+tool that allowed it to exert more influence, but within the established
+
+framework of salary negotiations; Finally, Haacke helped to found a
+
+new movement called “Institutional Criticism”, which gained ground in
+the existing artistic milieu. Access to institutional statistical resources
+
+therefore had the joint effect of enabling reform and stabilizing the
+
+framework within which these reforms found their place. Statativism
+
+was, to use the title of Haacke's catalogue, Framing and being framed
+
+(1975), that is, accepting to place oneself within a pre-established framework, which in itself
+
+These three experiences, very much in line with the spirit of the
+
+1970s, have authors who, even though not all of them were specialists
+
+in statistics, were far from being at a disadvantage in relation to them.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In many industries, and more and more often, each person must
+keep a quantified report of his own activities, which is used
+regularly for his self-assessment against other people or teams
+against pre-established quantified objectives.
+
+Operations: circumvent the rule
+
+The scale of application of institutional statistics has changed a lot
+
+since the 1970s. Before, they were applied to large institutions, large
+
+aggregates – for example, the school system, salary negotiations by
+sector, the world of art –, and stativism developed on this scale. Today,
+
+in institutions, they are also used to evaluate individual agents.
+
+Let's now skip the forty years that separate us from those times
+
+In this way, a stativist practice, today very widespread, albeit quite
+
+discreetly, for actors located at the bottom of the hierarchy, consists of
+
+leaving room for maneuver within the scope of the statistical reports that
+
+are imposed on them. This way of resisting evaluation consists of
+
+behaving exactly like the managers, that is, not really trusting the letter of
+
+the rule, in order to adapt it in a sense that is more suitable to what it
+
+applies to . But the main difference between the top and the bottom of
+
+the hierarchy is that, at the bottom, these readjustments are kept secret,
+
+or, more accurately, they are carried out discreetly because they are
+
+considered illegitimate, while at the top they can be proclaimed to be
+
+nothing more than than salutary adaptations of the rule, demonstrations
+
+of complacency and flexibility (Boltanski, 2009). Stativist emancipation,
+
+in this case, consists, for the dominated, on the one hand, in a free
+
+interpretation of the rule and, on the other, in making public and legitimate a current practice, but kept hidden.
+
+heroics and explore the current descent of this use of statistics.
+
+92 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+it is not radical, but, at the same time, it finds sufficient margins
+of freedom to modify it, being, therefore, reforming.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Latin – Mexico City, Caracas in Venezuela, Santiago de Chile, etc.
+
+Citystat system appears in the famous television series The Wire.
+
+New York City, during the first term of Republican Mayor Rudy Giuliani,
+
+between 1994 and 2001. His police chief, William Bratton, at the time
+
+installed a police management system called Compstat (which, for some,
+
+means “computer statistics” . ” [computational statistics] and, for others,
+
+“comparative statistics” [comparative statistics]), which is fundamentally
+
+based on quantifying the activity of agents. Delegates from each district
+
+were responsible for quantifying their activities, in order to present very
+
+regular reports to the highest police hierarchy, which would allow them to
+
+prove that they took initiatives and were particularly “proactive”. As soon as
+
+this instrument was implemented, the number of registered crimes fell
+
+drastically. Some disputed the cause and effect relationship between the
+
+two things, saying that there was only concomitance, but others – such as
+
+the respected police sociologist Eli Silverman, who published an in-depth
+
+study on Compstat (Silverman, 1999) – spoke of a “miracle of New York". In
+
+any case, many police forces have imitated this system, in the United States
+
+and around the world, particularly in America.
+
+related to Compstat. Even Silverman questions its recent effects on
+agents very vigorously. The system would no longer encourage
+them to fight crime better, but, on the contrary, would be encouraging
+
+them to break their own rules. To show the systemic bias of
+Compstat, Silverman and a former police officer, John Eterno,
+developed and conducted a statistical survey (Eterno; Silverman, 2012). the union
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 93
+
+To illustrate this point, we chose the case of the police, which is
+
+interesting because its function is precisely to enforce the rules of social life.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+A few years ago, however, there was a spectacular shift in opinions
+
+During the 2000s, the police were subjected to what their detractors
+pejoratively call the “politics of numbers” and their sycophants the
+“culture of results”. It is customary to place the birth of this system in the
+
+(Mitchell; Beckett, 2008). This was particularly the case in Baltimore, whose
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This research has the virtue of showing – statistically, what is most
+
+important – that agents reappropriated Compstat rules in the way that suited
+
+them, but without expressly violating the rules. However, when asking the
+
+question in terms of transgression of ethics, there is the inconvenience of
+
+issuing a negative moral judgment about an activity that, seen in another way,
+
+is nothing more than a defense (Didier, 2018).
+
+of retired police officers gave them access to the files of its members. The
+
+latter were given an anonymous questionnaire asking whether they felt they
+
+had transformed the numbers or their own behavior under the influence of the
+
+numbers, in an unethical way, and whether they could attribute these behaviors
+
+to the establishment of Compstat. Among those interviewed, more than half
+
+responded that, since Compstat, their behaviors have actually deviated greatly
+
+from the norm, and a further quarter responded that they have deviated
+
+significantly.
+
+Paris Anti-Crime Brigade, through a friendly network, proposed that they
+
+participate in a statistical design workshop based on crime data observed in
+
+their districts. Officials used the complaints received at their stations of a
+
+series of infractions (theft, burglary, etc.). Prévieux then explained to them
+
+how to transform this data into a Voronoï diagram, a graphical representation
+
+similar to meteorological isobaric curves, which shows the volume of crimes
+
+through a greater density of traces. The police exercised their aesthetic sense
+
+by creating splendid drawings, on weekends, in their leisure time (and,
+
+perhaps, even during working hours, but no one can attest to that). The results
+
+were presented on several occasions at renowned exhibition venues , which
+
+undoubtedly attests to the artistic character of these productions.
+
+Some were sold to collectors and two drawings were acquired by a French
+
+museum of contemporary art. The margins for maneuver
+
+Julien Prévieux, plastic artist, pushes to paroxysm this freedom generated
+
+by the gap between the rule and its application by turning this occasion into
+
+an artistic activity. Having come into contact with young police officers from the
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+94 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Let us also dwell on a case of trickery with numbers
+
+persistent in the application of the police norm thus acquired an artistic value. It
+
+should also be noted that this activity is no more disinterested than the one that
+
+allowed them to present good results to their boss and thus boost their careers and
+
+generate bonuses, since it was agreed between the accredited artist and the police
+
+officers that they would share equally the product of potential sales.
+
+It is also observed that numbers are not necessarily an alternative to violence,
+
+contrary to what Weberian reasoning about the rationalization of the world suggests,
+
+but, instead, they can both support and be supported by it (Samuel, 2014).
+
+with regard to bipartisan negotiations. In 2009, Guadeloupe, a French department
+
+located in the Caribbean, was the scene of a very important popular movement to
+
+fight against price increases. The LKP, the group that gave rise to the movement, did
+
+not believe in the price index produced by the public administration and organized a
+
+survey among traders to establish its own index. They came to the negotiating table
+
+with this data, which allowed them to gain an advantage over the government advised
+
+by the employers' union. But suddenly, even during the discussions, Secretary of
+
+State Yves Jégo, who was in charge, was removed from the process, possibly
+
+because he was considered too open to activists. It was, on the part of the government,
+
+an attempt to transform the framework of the negotiations, at the center of which were
+
+the statistics, which seemed to be badly routed. The LKP reacted, changing the
+
+picture in turn: bonfires were lit at the main road crossings on the island, violent acts
+
+were practiced against commercial establishments, soon popular violence came to
+
+strengthen the negotiators, and the local numbers. The state had no choice but to
+
+grant them almost anything they asked for. It is seen here that the feint can occur not
+
+discreetly, but very openly, in negotiations related to numbers, as well as in any
+
+diplomatic relationship.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+“statativism” as a militant use of quantification 95
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The emancipatory effect of this second-level stativism is twofold.
+On the one hand, it seeks to highlight the possibility of an aggregated
+
+reality different from the one established by the institution. For example,
+
+he proclaims: “no, contrary to what the State says, we have shown that
+
+criminality is not in continuous decline, because this decline is better explained by
+
+These sociological, artistic, and militant cases illustrate a two-step
+
+stativism. At the first level, it concerns all agents of an administration and
+
+requires only minimal resources to be put into practice; in particular, it
+
+does not require statistical know-how , as this discipline is not taught to
+
+police officers. It consists of appropriating the data production rules that
+
+serve for self-assessment in order to, more or less discreetly, more or
+
+less openly, adapt them to one's own interests – which can range from
+
+pure weakness and flattery to the boss's expectations to the proudest
+
+independence in the production of works of art. Statistical activity requires
+
+coding, without which there would be no quantified data, but coding,
+
+which, in most cases, is left in the hands of the most dominated agents in
+
+the hierarchy, necessarily leaves them with room for manoeuvre. It always
+
+opens possibilities for them (Thévenot, 1983). To the extent that, as today,
+
+the coder is the person himself who will be evaluated by the data he
+
+encodes, he uses this possibility to his advantage. She emancipates
+
+herself.
+
+On a second level, stativism consists of bringing together all these
+
+local practices and showing that, however silent they may be, they are so
+
+common that the entire institution can be accused of not really pursuing
+
+the objectives it claims. The statist must then resolve the paradox of being
+
+both inside and outside the institution. In fact, it is impossible to obtain a
+
+trail of the coders' discreet operations without being with them inside the
+
+institution and, at the same time, one must have access to a public
+
+platform to report on an aggregate level what has been witnessed. This is
+
+why stativists tend to work in pairs or groups, the typical case being a
+
+police officer associated with a sociologist.
+
+96 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+coding manipulations by the police”. It then designates the
+possibility of a reality different from the official one. At the same
+time, it denounces, on the other hand, the institution's ability to falsify reality.
+
+Stativism, therefore, covers a variety of practices ranging from the
+most absolutely individual to the most collective level. It consists, on the
+
+one hand, in freeing oneself from the rules that authority imposes and, on
+
+the other hand, in revealing the lies it utters. But, at this stage, the
+
+collective he builds is not yet a political subject, endowed with interests
+
+and wills of its own. We will now demonstrate how this subjectification is
+
+statistically possible.
+
+Recent transformations in society have given rise to new social
+
+categories. As was shown in the case of executives (Boltanski, 1982), to
+
+gain recognition, social groups are interested in institutionalizing
+
+themselves statistically. The invention of new social categories – and their
+
+critique – is already, and should be even more so, an important field of
+
+stativism. It concerns, for example, the case of intellectuals in precarious
+
+working conditions, which we will detail here; but many other examples
+
+come to mind, in particular the struggles of ethnic minorities, which deserve long discussions.
+
+Here, the statement is: “the State has the means to lie to us”. It is,
+
+therefore, not about reality that the doubt weighs, but about the action of
+
+the State, which can claim to do one thing (fight crime) while doing another
+
+(manipulate public opinion). The state activists, then, denounce the
+
+possibilities of State action. The latter, of course, does not let himself be
+
+carried away and, as we were able to show elsewhere, when resuming
+
+the structure of fencing moves, the series of attacks and counter-attacks
+
+between the State and stativists is far from over (Didier, 2011b ).
+
+Among the social worlds most strongly affected by the
+development of neoliberal governmentality is that of artists and professions
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 97
+
+Subjects: defending new categories
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+is not the only
+
+one, although much greater than that of “precarious intellectuals”, it is similar
+
+to it, except for the fact that the characteristics negatively connoted by
+
+–,
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+98 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+In contrast to this bottom-up strategy, others prefer to go the other
+
+way. Richard Florida (2002) for example – although he notes the emergence
+
+of a “creative class”. This group,
+
+In this way, they encourage “precarious intellectuals” to come together and
+
+count on each other, a task to which they undertake by relating the statistical
+
+results they were able to obtain during their investigation.
+
+Rambach and Rambach are valued here. Not precarious, but always
+
+Efforts to group arts workers and intellectuals into new social categories
+
+have been studied by Cyprien Tasset (2014). This researcher describes
+
+two attempts in this direction, one operated by the base and the other by
+
+the top. The grassroots strategy is illustrated in the book Les intellos
+
+précaires (2001), by Anne and Marine Rambach. For these authors,
+
+“precarious intellectuals ” bring together people vulnerable to the current
+
+economic system, such as researchers without status, artists who struggle
+
+to be paid for their activities, freelance journalists, etc. They are often
+
+educated people , not always young, but who cannot find a stable job and,
+
+therefore, whose lifestyles do not correspond – far from it – to what their
+level of studies seemed to promise them. Rambach and Rambach's
+
+argument is that this situation transcends individual abilities and
+
+characteristics, and is attributable to a mode of social organization that
+
+devalues intellectual work and even seeks to make it submissive.
+
+intellectuals. The invasion of these professional professions by the
+
+quantifying instruments of managerial command provokes new experiences,
+
+which can reveal an ambivalent, strange, grotesque or, conversely,
+innovative and stimulating character. Furthermore, the invocation of social
+
+experiences that no longer fit into available formats fuels criticism of official
+classifications. It even happens that these experiences are inserted in
+
+political and cognitive work aimed at building a new social category capable
+
+of making demands.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+willing to exercise their freedom in the job market, members of the
+class studied by Florida would be looking for creative opportunities.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 99
+
+The struggles for definition between the new classes that intend to
+
+include precarious intellectuals or creatives or the exposure (and, in this
+
+case, the discreet denunciation) of new beings is an important front of
+
+statism involving statistical categories. They are part of the definition of
+
+the subject who will carry the desire and practice of emancipation. The
+
+group in question here has, by definition, quite rich cognitive resources
+
+that can apparently compensate for any specific ignorance in statistics.
+
+Faced with these attempts to aggregate a collective subject, the artist
+
+Once actors recognize the advantage of going through such arguments,
+
+they gather the resources they need (letters, “snowball ” research, wild
+
+desk research), or do not hesitate to turn to the experts who provide them
+
+(consultants, sociologists, statisticians). These associations of competences
+
+are also part of the constitution of the collective. It is not just a matter of
+
+including many individual cases in one
+
+They are not likely to become unnecessary, but rather are the spearheads
+
+of emerging cognitive capitalism.
+
+Brazilian artist Sonia Andrade offers a reconstitution of her own person
+
+and, consequently, of each one of us. In 2019, she presented at the
+
+exhibition ... to the accounts, at the Museum of Modern Art in Rio de
+
+Janeiro, a series of wires stretched from floor to ceiling, on which she
+
+hung all the bills she received, classified by the billing companies: water ,
+
+electricity, gas, followed by shorter collections, television, cell phone,
+
+internet provider. Walking through the exhibition, which is very poorly lit,
+
+we see a new being, very strange, made only of figures, in this case,
+
+monetary, which is what “counts” for all these companies to which we are
+
+“subscribers”, sometimes for a long time. It thus builds a new type of
+
+human, quantitative, consumer and held by the signature chains.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+single category, it's also a matter of aligning a number of diverse
+skills to that categorical set.
+
+100 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+Neoliberal governmentality makes great use of indicators. An indicator
+
+is a measurement that transforms a complex phenomenon into a single,
+
+simple value that varies over time. The price index, for example, must indicate
+
+the variation in the cost of products to the consumer – and, therefore, in the
+
+purchasing power of families – and allow variations to be monitored. The
+
+indicator is used to give meaning, to guide action. Anyone who wants to see
+
+an increase in purchasing power must find ways to control price developments.
+
+You can, for example, choose
+
+It differs from the case observed in the police, in which statism is of the order
+
+of revelation: it breaks the institutional reality that proclaims itself with
+
+quantified results, by showing the other reality of widespread cheating and
+
+tricks with numbers. Here, stativism is positive, it seeks to prove that a
+
+category actually exists, when it is not recognized as having existence, and
+
+seeks the means of action that allow its defense. Of course , disclosure and
+
+assertion are not mutually exclusive, and in many cases they are intertwined.
+
+However, these two notions allow us to trace an axis that goes from the
+
+denial of a pre-existing reality to the affirmation of entities that do not yet
+
+exist. But, once the axis has been drawn, the most interesting thing is to
+
+understand the complexity of the mixtures observed between the two extreme
+
+poles of the continuum. This is what the last part of this article is dedicated
+
+to, focusing on indicators.
+
+fight against monetary inflation. But, by construction, an indicator retains from
+
+the real only some aspects considered relevant: here, only those products
+
+that are taken into account in the “basket” of the average family, and no others.
+
+Emancipation, therefore, has a double meaning: it refers, firstly , to the
+
+activity of constituting this collective political subject and, secondly , to the
+
+alignment of a series of possibilities for action by this subject.
+
+Purposes: oppose alternative indicators to the institution
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+An even more violent case, this time occurring in Brazil, is the
+count of shootings in the favelas of the Rio de Janeiro region (Hirata;
+Couto; Grillo; Oliveira, 2017). In fact, in recent decades, exchanges
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 101
+
+Perverse effects can be counted in two ways. On the one hand,
+obviously unpleasant facts are placed in a series to make their
+systematic and repeated character visible. An even more effective case,
+which turns out to be extremely violent, is the case of the number of
+
+suicides at France Telecom, the French telephone company, which was
+being privatized in a very brutal way. Ivan Du Roy (2009) explains how
+trade unionists had to count the suicides that occurred in the company
+to reveal the harmfulness of the management methods that had been implemented.
+
+It thus contributes to consolidating only some aspects of reality and,
+therefore , neglecting others, which may, however, be considered
+priorities according to different points of view of the indicator. This can
+lead to serious political crises associated with these measures. Thus,
+in Argentina, in 2007, it was demonstrated that the government had
+tried to manipulate the price index by controlling only the prices taken
+into account by government statisticians (called upon to disclose them)
+and not other products. In response, a new index emerged, the “Billion
+Prices Project”, developed by private economists at MIT, who “mined”
+the prices offered on the internet by a small number of distributors and
+produced a different aggregation, but evolving day by day, and largely
+contradicting the official figures – which were devalued by the scandal
+(Lury; Gross, 2014). Many other stativist experiences intervene at this
+level: so that official statistics redistribute the institutions' action priorities,
+they advocate taking into account other aspects of reality and propose
+alternative indicators.
+
+Among the latter, some point to the unsuspected perverse effects
+of public or managerial policies. Others point to the importance and
+relevance of elements that are not taken into account by official
+quantitative measures. Some allow us to count what does not (yet)
+count, others to discuss the indisputable.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+6 See the website https://fogocruzado.org.br/.
+
+Among the struggles that use indicators as weapons or targets,
+that of the trade unionists at France Telecom must be treated
+separately. These stativists came up with this simple and devastating
+idea of counting suicides, which certainly doesn't require very
+sophisticated statistical skills, but rather human qualities to find the
+families of people who ended their lives, understand their desperate
+gesture and determine whether or not it is related. to their working conditions. In others
+
+As for artists, the Superflex group pushes criticism of activity
+indicators to the level of absurdity. The Visitors Numbers project
+consists of synchronizing the visitor counting mechanism at the
+entrance of a museum with a large counting board hanging outside,
+highlighted, as if this information were the most important of all, as if
+the only thing that mattered was the museum is very visited. It is ,
+therefore, with bitter irony, to highlight the neoliberal way of managing
+museums so much that its absurdity becomes tangible.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+102 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+cases, such as the Fogo Cruzado project, the fight against indicators
+
+shootings have multiplied in the daily lives of Rio de Janeiro residents,
+especially in favelas and urban outskirts. These places live under the
+“crossfire” of violent actions carried out, on the one hand, by police
+forces and, on the other, by armed groups of drug traffickers and
+militiamen who control these neighborhoods. Although ad hoc
+operations are one of the main reasons for crossfire and violent deaths
+in Rio de Janeiro, there is no available data on these actions that
+could fuel the public debate on public security in Rio de Janeiro. A
+collaborative research project between researchers and activists from
+the city of Rio de Janeiro enabled the construction of a database on
+“specific operations”, characterized as incursions by security agencies
+(civil and military) in favelas and popular neighborhoods.6 The project
+Collaborative aims, therefore, to expand collective reflection on the
+problem of public security in Brazil, building data that qualifies the
+guidance on the use of force by the State.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+When examining more contemporary practices, we saw that, firstly, they
+consist of highlighting and taking advantage of all the margins of freedom
+that the rules for producing ciphers leave to the agents who are subject to them.
+
+If we now return to the axis composed of revelation and affirmation, we
+will place the count of suicides on the side of the purest revelation, affirming
+nothing other than the emptiness of death in the face of the established
+
+order, and then the artistic act that consists in ridiculing this system, which it
+is not entirely negative in that it offers a new place where the system is
+displayed. Then comes the count of shootings, which aims to institute
+another measure of violence that takes into account that produced by the
+police. Many methods of emancipation therefore occur between the
+destruction of the institution's goals and the affirmation of alternative ends.
+
+Statativism is a banner that brings together a wide variety of practices
+that have in common that they place statistics at the service of emancipation.
+
+Statistics is not a body of immutable laws; on the contrary, those who
+practice it learn to play with it without making mistakes or infractions.
+Second , stativism consists of using various methods of quantification to
+produce groups, subjects that arise from an aspiration to emancipate
+themselves from the conditions to which they are subject. Unity is strength,
+and statistics are one of the first foundations of these unions. Finally, it
+consists of redefining the objectives pursued by institutions through statistics. No
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+Other numbers for other possible
+
+“statativism” as a militant use of quantification 103
+
+institutional means knowing them well enough to analyze, decompose and
+recompose them or, like Superflex, copy them and publish them elsewhere.
+This stativism requires certain technical knowledge. Its effectiveness,
+then, largely depends on knowing why institutional indicators should
+be questioned, and for what purpose. Once again, stativism is
+emancipatory to the extent that it gives the possibility of making
+certain material realities exist, using them for certain objectives,
+certain ends, which are yet to be determined.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Accurately denounced as the basic equipment of the “iron cage” of
+capitalist reason, quantification should not, however, be neglected in
+favor of the exaltation of qualities, singularities and the immeasurable.
+
+These practices cut across the fields of art, research and activism, all of which
+
+highlight the value of statistics as a political argument.
+
+Above all, if a certain form of activism by numbers has become essential
+
+today, it is, in the first place, due to the central role played by the instruments of
+
+quantification in maintaining the fatalities against which the struggles for
+
+emancipation begin. Indeed, coding, categories, indicators, in short, all statistical
+
+entities make a decisive contribution to building sustainable realities.
+
+Such a waiver would be a mistake, because the restrictive stability of statistical
+
+entities is not unshakable. On the contrary, the attention given to the instigation
+
+of measures and indicators reveals their creative character and, many times, their
+
+there is reason to let the elements of reality that determine the direction of our
+actions impose on us. In all three cases, it is a question of taking into account
+
+the authority of the facts, but without ever forgetting that we participate in its
+
+realization, in particular, thanks to statistics, which allow us to articulate it with
+
+the elements of the world to which we have privileged access.
+
+In particular, it dispels one of the misunderstandings that divide potential
+
+opposition to authoritarianism by numbers. In fact, although the Romantic
+
+tradition – developed with industrialization and still alive today in new forms – is
+
+a powerful source of criticism, it tends to perceive statistics only as an emanation
+
+of the “cold, quantifying spirit of the industrial age”, embodied, for example, by
+
+the character Thomas Gradgrind, in Dickens (Löwy; Sayre, 2010, p. 20).
+
+However, the range of statist experiences we have gathered includes uses of
+
+numbers that manage to keep in touch with the mechanisms of the neoliberal
+
+city, while at the same time being situated at the level of free creativity. Far from
+
+extending the existential desert of utilitarianism, protest inventions based on
+
+numbers extend the autonomy of actors and can, at times, present, in addition
+
+to their emancipatory scope, an aesthetic value.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+104 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+ability to eclipse the older ones. A means of reducing uncertainties or
+opening up practical possibilities, statistics is also a disciplinary
+crossroads (mathematics, social sciences, accounting, administration,
+
+etc.) where new encounters can be stimulated.
+
+From there, “another number is possible”: what a hegemonic logic of
+quantification has established, an informed statist practice can seek to
+undo or, at least, shake it. This deviation from the slogan of alterglobalization
+is not here the enchantment of an indeterminate possible,
+
+Bakhtin (1982) allows us to understand why. He shows, based on the
+work of François Rabelais, also peppered with games with numbers, that
+the structure of laughter is ambivalent. On the one hand, it depreciates
+official reality, through irony, parody and hyperbole. This is a well-known
+humorous lever, operated in particular by Superflex. But that is not all. On
+the other hand, laughter accompanies the joy of the counter-proposal, the
+materialization of a new unexpected reality, the freedom conquered from
+the shackles of the established reality, the productive transformation.
+Bakhtin speaks of the “ creative force of laughter” (Bakhtin, 1982, p. 80).
+He writes that “laughter debases and materializes” (p. 29), it is concomitant
+with the degradation of the officer who was great, and with the
+materialization and liberation, from the growth of what is most consistent
+with reality. The works of Le Chevalier, de Prévieux with the police of the
+14th arrondissement, illustrated this wonderfully. And also the works of
+Pierre Bourdieu, who said: “sociology should be fun” and tried to make his
+readers smile thanks to “a new use of statistics” (Gollac, 2004, p. 29).
+Emancipation can also take the form of collective laughter.7
+
+Finally, we will insist, like Ted Porter (2013), on the humor
+present in these statist approaches. We could, a priori, think that
+nothing is further from laughter than numbers, and yet this is not the case.
+
+“statativism” as a militant use of quantification 105
+
+7 Bakhtin insists that Rabelaisian laughter, productive and affirmative laughter, is popular. It is
+found in carnivals, fairs, on the stages of public theaters. This point allows us to reconsider the
+criticism that Boltanski (2009) qualifies as existential and that he previously attributes to artists
+who work in romantic solitude. Existential criticism can, without a doubt, also be humorous and
+collective.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Emmanuel Didier is Director of Research at CNRS, Center Maurice Halbwachs, Ecole
+Normale Supérieure-EHESS and Director of the Médecin-Humanité program at Ecole
+Normale Supérieure, Paris,
+France. ÿ edidier@ens.fr
+
+Isabelle Bruno is Professor of Political Science and Junior Fellow at the Institut universitaire
+de France (IUF), CERAPS (CNRS/University of Lille), Lille, France.
+ÿ isabelle.bruno@univ-lille.fr
+
+but a call for the production of quantified objects that reconfigure the
+possible in a direction desired and, it is hoped, favorable to the majority.
+Of course, the fate of an alternative indicator or the enumeration of a
+
+new social category is uncertain. These initiatives can “establish
+themselves” in the public space or go unnoticed. What is certain is that,
+in comparison with other intellectual productions, debates and disputes
+concerning numbers in society tend to take on a notable practical
+significance and, why not, a happy – even comic – comeback.
+
+References
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+106 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+5. BORIS, Samuel. Statistics and political violence: reflections on the social conflict
+in 2009 in Guadeloupe. Partecipazione & Conflitto, v. 7, no. 2, p. 237-257, 2014.
+
+4. BOLTANSKI, Luc. Quelles statistiques pour quelles critiques ? In: BRUNO,
+Isabelle; DIDIER, Emmanuel; PRÉVIEUX, Julien (eds.) Statactivisme : comment
+lutter avec des nombres. Paris: Zones, 2014. p. 33-50.
+
+2. BOLTANSKI, Luc. Les cadres : la formation d'un groupe social. Paris: Editions
+de Minuit, 1982.
+
+6. BOURDIEU, Pierre. Sur l'Etat. Cours au Collège de France (1989-1992). Paris:
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+
+3. BOLTANSKI, Luc. From the critique. Precis de sociologie de l'émancipation.
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+
+1. BAKHTIN, Mikhail. L'œuvre de François Rabelais et la culture populaire au
+Moyen Age et sous la Renaissance. Paris: Gallimard, 1982.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+police. Terrain, no. 57, p. 66-81, 2011.
+
+12. BRUNO, Isabelle; DIDIER, Emmanuel; VITALE, Tommaso. Statactivism: forms
+of action between disclosure and affirmation. Partecipazione & Conflitto, v. 7, no.
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+
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+de France, 2009.
+
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+2020. https://aoc.media/opinion/2020/04/15/politique-du-nombre-de-morts/
+
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+
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+
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+
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+
+Paris: Presses de l'Ecole des Mines, 2008.
+
+22. DU ROY, Ivan. Orange stressé. Paris: La Découverte, 2009.
+
+10. BRUNO, Isabelle; DIDIER, Emmanuel. Benchmarking. L'État sous pression
+statistique. Paris: La Découverte, 2013.
+
+17. DESROSIÈRES, Alain. La statistique, outil de libération ou outil de pouvoir ?
+
+11. BRUNO, Isabelle; DIDIER, Emmanuel; PREVIEUX, Julien (dir.). Statactivism.
+
+In: BRUNO, Isabelle; DIDIER, Emmanuel; PRÉVIEUX, Julien (eds.) Statactivisme :
+comment lutter avec des nombres. Paris: Zones, 2014. p. 51-66.
+
+Comment lutter avec des nombres. Paris: Zones, 2014.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 107
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+35. PORTER, Theodore. Funny numbers. Culture Unbound: Journal of Current
+Cultural Research, no. 4, p. 585-598, 2013.
+
+29. HAACKE, Hans; BECKER, Howard S.; BURNHAM, Jack; WALTON, John.
+
+36. RAMBACH, Anne; RAMBACH, Marine. Les precaires intellos. Paris: Fayard,
+2001.
+
+Hans Haacke: framing and being framed; 7 works 1970-75. Halifax: Press of the
+Nova Scotia Collage of Art and Design, 1975.
+
+37. SALTELLI, Andrea et al. Five ways to ensure that models serve society: a
+manifesto. Nature, no. 582, p. 482-484, 2020.
+
+30. HIRATA, Daniel; COUTO, Maria I.; GRILLO, Carolina; OLLIVEIRA, Cecilia. Tire
+changes. La production de données sur la violence armée dans des opérations de
+police à Rio de Janeiro. Statistics et société, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 31-39, 2019.
+
+38. SILVERMAN, Eli B. NYPD battles crime. Innovative strategies in policing.
+
+23. ECF - Ecole de la Cause Freudienne (ed.). Quelle liberté pour le sujet à
+l'époque de la folie quantitative. Paris: Pleins Feux, 2008.
+
+31. LÖWY, Michael; SAYRE, Robert. Spirits of feu. Figures of anti-capitalist
+romanticism. Paris: Editions du Sandre, 2010.
+
+Boston: Northwestern University Press, 1999.
+
+24. ETERNO, John E.; SILVERMAN, Eli B. The crime numbers game: management
+by manipulation. New York: CRC Press, 2012.
+
+32. LURY, Celia; GROSS, Ana. The downs and ups of the consumer price index in
+Argentina: from national statistics to big data. Partecipazione & Conflitto, v. 7, no.
+2, p. 258-277, 2014.
+
+25. FLORIDA, Richard. The rise of the creative class. And how it's transforming
+work, leisure and everyday life. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
+
+33. MILNER, Jean-Claude. La Politique des choses. Court traité politique I.
+
+26. GENEL, Katia. L'autorité des faits : Horkheimer face à la fermeture des possibles.
+Traces, v. 24, no. 1, p. 107-119, 2013.
+
+Lagrasse: Verdier, 2011.
+
+27. GOLLAC, Michel. La rigueur et la rigolade. À propos de l'usage des méthodes
+quantitatives par Pierre Bourdieu. Courrier des statistics, n. 112, p. 29-36, 2004.
+
+34. MITCHELL, Katharyne; BECKETT, Katherine. Securing the global city: crime,
+consulting, risk, and ratings in the production of urban space. Indiana Journal of
+Global Legal Studies, v. 15, no. 1, p. 75-99, 2008.
+
+28. GORI, Roland; CASSIN, Barbara; LAVAL, Christian (dir.). L'Appel des appels
+pour une insurrection des consciences. Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2009.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+108 Emmanuel Didier & Isabelle Bruno
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+43. TOPALOV, Christian. Naissance du chômeur : 1880-1910. Paris: Albin Michel,
+1994.
+
+39. PIRIOU, Jean Paul. L'indice des prix. Paris: La Découverte, 1992.
+
+40. STATISTIQUE ET SOCIETE. Paris. Société Française de Statistique (SFdS), v. 7,
+no. 1, June 2019.
+
+42. THEVENOT, Laurent. L'économie du codage social. Critiques de l'Economie
+Politique, n. 23-24, p. 188-222, 1983.
+
+44. TOUCHELAY, Beatrice. Les ordres de la mesure des prix. Political struggles,
+bureaucracies and social autour de l'indice des prix à la consommation (1911-
+2012). Politix, vol. 27, no. 105, p.117-138, 2014.
+
+41. TASSET, Cyprien. Les “Intellos précaires” et la class réative. In: BRUNO, Isabelle;
+DIDIER, Emmanuel; PRÉVIEUX, Julien (eds.) Statactivisme : comment lutter avec
+des nombres. Paris: Zones, 2014. p. 117-132.
+
+“Statativism” as a militant use of quantification 109
+
+Received on: 17 Dec. 2020
+
+Accepted on: 15 Mar. 2021
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 82-109.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+Firstly, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the focus was on “infrastructure and
+
+Reforms proposed by institutions of international economic cooperation with
+
+“third generation” reforms have turned their attention to “institutional improvement” as
+
+key to development, adopting the motto “getting the institutions right”. After a
+
+public investment programs”, and the privileged mechanism, the granting of assistance
+
+mainstream analyses, in the mid-1990s, reflecting developments
+
+2006, p. 253). Institutions matter, getting institutions right, good governance etc.: the turning point
+
+period in which the functioning of institutions, including legal ones, was ignored in
+
+intellectuals that characterized an “institutional turn”, they are now considered
+
+official support to development, or foreign aid. Secondly, corresponding to the
+
+institutional, with regard to developing countries and also to those recently left
+
+of the Soviet bloc, in the 1990s, was reflected in reform programs inspired by the rule of law
+
+paradigm, promoted by organizations such as the World Bank204, the IMF, among
+
+In the 1970s and 1980s, the so-called “second generation” reforms began to focus on
+
+relevant variables for economic development (cf. Schapiro, 2010, p. 216; Trubek,
+
+2006; Trubek; Santos, 2006).
+
+“macroeconomic adjustment” and to be guided by the motto “getting the prices right”, in line with the
+
+This third moment corresponds to the rise of the motto of good governance in
+
+CHAPTER 4 - EXPERTISE AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN THE SERVICE OF
+
+neoliberal notion that removing state distortions from price signals would
+
+fundamental to unleash the dynamism of the private sector (see section 3.3). In turn, the
+
+REFORMS
+
+aimed at promoting development went through three distinct phases or moments.
+
+international relations, discussed previously. It also corresponds to the centrality of
+
+concern with legal institutions in the discourse and practice of development (Santos,
+
+According to Alvaro Santos, in the 1990s, the World Bank supported 330 legal and judicial reform
+projects, based on the “rule of law” motto, in 100 countries (2006, p. 253). Mariana Mota Prado
+highlights, when observing this data, that the notion that institutions matter for development
+(institutions matter) has become “one of the most influential ideas in thinking about law and
+development today.” (Prado, 2010, p. 13; cf. Trebilcock; Prado, 2014) Within the World Bank, there
+are two groups that stand out in incorporating the notion of rule of law in a more instrumental way.
+One of them is the World Bank Institute, with the Governance Indicators project, inaugurated in 1996,
+which establishes correlations between countries' institutional components and per capita income.
+The approach allows countries to be placed along a governance quality ranking, from which reform
+proposals are suggested and substantiated (Santos, 2006, p. 293). This vision is largely inspired by
+materials provided by New Institutional Economics (NEI), giving numerical expression to the notion that countries with “bad” institutions, which create costs for market transactions, are
+
+204
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+343
+
+What were the reference frameworks for the reforms carried out under the paradigm
+
+Legally, the idea that dynamism resides in the private sector translates into
+
+development, understood primarily as economic growth.
+
+movements such as the New Law and Development (NDD) and the Legal Analysis of
+
+unencumbered access to markets is the key to economic efficiency and, therefore, to the
+
+reforms across the globe in the 1990s, the rule of law paradigm has been challenged
+
+promotion of good rules of the game, capable of supporting a stable economic environment and
+
+insurance for private transactions.” (Schapiro, 2010, p. 214) The institutional environment
+
+studies of the so-called New Institutional School (NEI), whose exponents are Douglass North
+
+and Oliver Williamson205. In terms of legal (or interdisciplinary, ideas of law and
+
+rule of law? In terms of ideas coming from economics, the main source was the
+
+others (see section 2.3). This paradigm focuses on “promoting development from the
+
+Despite having become, in practice, the most influential framework for conducting
+
+Law (AED) and the Law & Finance movement (Castro, 2011, p. 8) contributed with
+
+main dynamic element, inducing growth and well-being (cf. 2010, p. 217).
+
+intellectual materials for criticism of legal institutions linked to public policies and the
+
+Development Economics”, such as those by Ha-Joon Chang and Dani Rodrik (cf. section 3.4),
+
+economics), aspects of greater international notoriety, such as the Economic Analysis of
+
+“correct” is one that privileges private transactions in the markets, perceiving them as
+
+both in economics and in law. From the economy, there are contributions from the so-called “New
+
+“Privacy of private law over public law”:
+
+the NEI) the notion that the correct institutional environment, favorable to the functioning
+
+in addition to authors such as Alice Amsden, Peter Evans and Erik Reinert. From the law, there is
+
+economic policy, and drafting reform proposals. They share (with each other and with
+
+205
+
+less apt for economic growth. Another project consists of the Doing Business reports and the Ease of Doing
+Business indicators, from the Rapid Response Unit, which began in 2003. Although equally convergent with
+the NEI formulations, the most direct source of intellectual materials to structure it is the movement Law &
+Finance (Santos, 2006, p. 280), addressed in section 4.2.
+
+The notion of law underlying the Rule of law paradigm is that of a vehicle that
+promotes guarantee, predictability and calculability for private transactions. The
+existence of clear rules, adequate protection of private property, certainty of
+compliance with contractual adjustments and confidence in the rapid and
+independent functioning of the Judiciary began to be considered as necessary
+items to be met by legal-institutional environments. (Schapiro, 2010, p. 219)
+
+See subsection 4.1.4.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+an economic category is presented as having greater explanatory power: “it happens that the
+
+perceive, in plan, the existence of two groupings, dividing the four currents. Both
+
+that is, to legal and economic institutions and sensitivities regarding relations
+
+global legal system”). In this sense, they seek the construction of an alternative order.
+
+in its effort to autonomize law as an object of knowledge, including in
+
+main feature of the Economic Analysis of Law (AED), also known as
+
+law. They have affinities with the economic sensibility of neoliberalism (see section 3.3) and
+
+they face” (Friedman, 2000, p. 4). It is not exactly a project of autonomy of the
+
+main, in the following sections, of interdisciplinary expertise at the service of reforms, such as
+
+Friedman, who aims to understand legal systems through the “consequences that
+
+344
+
+recommendations of the prevailing paradigm. Its affinities with economic thought
+
+4.1 Economic Analysis of Law
+
+for the understanding of legal phenomena. Thus, the analysis of “justice” is ruled out because
+
+interdisciplinary groups that dispute the meaning of institutional reforms.
+
+statement could seem to have been taken from the Pure Theory of Law by Hans Kelsen (2011),
+
+regarding international relations, (see, for example, in subsection 2.3.5, the item “pluralism
+
+Rules we thought we supported because they were fair are actually efficient.” (2000, p. 4)
+
+This is a debate connected to elements of the trajectories described in chapters 2 and 3,
+
+relation to morals. The quote, however, belongs to the book Law's Order, by David Director
+
+“Law and Economics”, is precisely the use of typical economic tools to
+
+modulations in the use of legal and economic references in the composition of each aspect,
+
+resulting in convergences and divergences between the movements. It's possible
+
+first projects (AED and Law & Finance) are perspectives to support the rule of thumb paradigm
+
+produce in a world in which rational individuals adjust their actions to legal rules
+
+international. It is the background that gives meaning to the characterization of aspects
+
+with the motto of “good governance” (see section 2.3). The last two projects question the
+
+AED (4.1); Law & Finance (4.2); NDD (4.3) and AJPE (4.4).
+
+law in relation to moral concepts such as justice, but rather the use of economic categories
+
+This debate is the focus of this chapter. As you will see, there are significant
+
+Economic Policy (AJPE). A new and rich debate is set up between experts
+
+lie in heterodoxy (see section 3.4), and so does the legal thought to
+
+“[I] chose to completely ignore issues of fairness in carrying out the analysis.” Such
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+206
+
+207
+Brian Tamanaha clarifies that wealth maximization, in AED, is measured by willingness to pay for
+goods and services. This disposition, evidently, is a function of the ability to pay, which in turn “raises
+questions of fair distribution”, but which are marginalized in studies of this aspect (2006, p. 118-
+20).
+“Although Posner is a prolix writer and became known as the great exponent of AED, carried out
+along the lines propagated by professors at the University of Chicago, the ideas that really structured
+the analytical references of this approach came from Ronald Coase, an economist whose conceptions
+regarding of relations between law and economics date back to the 1930s, but were marginalized for
+several decades from the most prestigious academic debates.” (Castro, 2012, p. 207)
+
+345
+
+efficiency, understood above all as wealth maximization. The common law operates
+
+of methodology that “evokes mathematical precision and objectivity” (2006, p. 119), AED
+
+as an expression of a founding moment (cf. Salama, 2008, p. 12; Posner, 1998, p. 1).
+
+descriptive (or positive), there is the claim that common law rules tend to embody
+
+transaction”, had already been explored in one of his publications decades earlier, The nature
+
+of the firm, from 1937207. Finally, Coase remained in the mainstream of AED, that is, associated with
+
+microeconomics – had the publication of two articles, in the beginning of the 1960s,
+
+thoughts on risk distributions and the law of torts, by Guido Calabresi, in 1961.
+
+structure of incentives they establish and the consequences of changes in behavior
+
+of people in response to such incentives.” (Friedman, 2000, p. 11)
+
+transfer of activities, goods and services to those who value them most” (2006, p.
+primarily as a framework for conducting private transactions, “facilitating the
+
+understand, criticize and design legal rules. “Legal rules must be judged by the
+
+One was Ronald Coase's The Problem of Social Cost in 1960. Another was Some
+
+law, not just the common law – “should be oriented towards the maximization of wealth” (2006, p.
+
+that this is oriented towards promoting economic efficiency (cf. Tamanaha, 2006). Taking advantage
+
+119). The promotion of efficiency as a guiding criterion for efficiency shifts, in practice,
+
+Coase, for three reasons. First, Coase's publication precedes Calabresi's. In
+
+118-9). In the prescriptive (or normative) aspect, there is the proposition that the law – the entire
+
+These characteristics frame the AED as an instrumental view of law, since
+
+here, by addressing the origins of AED (subsection 4.1.1, below) in a delimited way to Ronald
+
+“Chicago School”, while Calabresi would become one of the names of a lineage
+
+it has descriptive and prescriptive claims regarding legal institutions. In appearance
+
+The tradition of judging legal institutions based on economic categories – and
+
+second, a base category in The problem of Social Cost (Coase, 1960), “costs of social
+
+redistribution issues (or the aspect of economic equity) to “outside the domains” of the
+
+AED206 (2006, p. 120).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+208 In this sense, “some refer to the article Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the law of Torts
+by Guido Calabresi, from 1961, as equivalent to Coase's contribution to the foundation of the
+economic analysis of law (law and economics). Others understand that Calabresi was the founder of
+the New Haven school of economic analysis of law, as distinct from the Chicago school of economic
+analysis of law.” (Harris, 2003, p. 662)
+
+following way. Subsection 4.1.1 proposes that Coase's contributions can be
+As a reflection of this, the characterization of AED aspects is structured in the same way as
+
+AED, after Coase, Becker and above all Posner, projected itself on the most diverse areas of
+
+AED to the rule of law paradigm, and mentions, albeit briefly, certain reforms of
+
+in Chicago.” (Harris, 2003, p. 662)
+
+a project focused on an area of law with quite striking economic tones, the
+
+common law efficiency. The subsection also has examples of reasoning based on
+
+by AED and aimed at legal institutions in Brazil. Finally, subsection 4.1.4 lists the
+
+main trunk from which variants emerged: “the official and internal history of the camp begins
+
+Jeremy Bentham's Utilitarianism. Then, subsection 4.1.2 turns to the consolidation of
+
+AED from the University of Chicago Law School antitrust project. In
+
+lo, attaches importance to the prominent place that efficiency assumes, as well as to the thesis of
+
+having been the strand with greater visibility and academic and practical influence, as well as the
+
+on economic criteria, such as North American legal realism, Marxism or even the
+
+time, points out the main characteristics of the AED mainstream, guided by Posner. By doing
+
+410). The approach taken here remains, however, focused on the Chicago AED, not only because of
+measure of state interventionism in the economy (Salama, 2008, p. 28; Mackaay, 2000, p.
+
+and which also involved, to some extent, the assessment of legal institutions on the basis of
+
+characterized as “neoliberal” in section 3.3 of the previous chapter. Subsection 4.1.3, in turn
+
+alternative – the “New Haven School”208, whose arguments tend to favor greater
+
+because the objective is not to make reference to other more “remote” intellectual movements,
+
+conservative ideas had for the growth and acquisition of political relevance of the AED.
+
+A prominent element in this description are the connections between the AED and the project
+
+346
+
+seen as the main immediate intellectual bases of AED. Here we say "immediate",
+
+right. The subsection also highlights the importance that foundations that promote the dissemination of
+
+legal institutions in Brazil that were supported based on this framework.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+According to Ronald Coase himself, the expression “Coase theorem” was not coined by him, but by George
+Stigler (cf. Coase, 1993, p. 249).
+
+A factor of production (or its owner) does not have to enter into a series of
+contracts with the factors with which it is cooperating within a firm, as would
+be necessary, of course, if this cooperation took place as a result of the
+functioning of price mechanisms. . A single contract replaces a series of others
+(Coase, 1937, p. 391).
+
+A more detailed and exemplified explanation of transaction costs is given by Coase in The problem of
+social costs: “To carry out market transactions it is necessary to find out who you want to negotiate with,
+inform people that you want to negotiate and on what terms, conduct negotiations that lead to an agreement, draft the
+contract, carry out the necessary inspection to ensure that the terms of the contract are being observed,
+and so on. These operations are often quite costly, costly enough to preclude many transactions from
+taking place that would be conducted in a world where the price system operated costlessly.” (Coase,
+1960, p. 15)
+
+209
+
+210
+
+a “change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so.” (1937, p. 387)
+
+by concluding a myriad of contracts in market transactions determined by
+unified structure of direction and command by an individual or group of individuals, than
+
+that an employee is allocated “from department Y to department X” not because of
+
+Coase210, based on formulations in The problem of social cost, published in 1960, and which is
+
+production and exchange, as an alternative to price signals. Thus, Coase exemplifies
+
+costs, in the real world, it becomes more viable to bring together the different production factors under one
+
+clearly not true in the real world.” (Coase, 1937, p. 390) There are costs to discovering prices, to
+
+negotiating and concluding contracts209 (1937, p. 390-1). Given the existence of such
+
+(Coase, 1937, p. 387) There are institutions, such as the firm, that also coordinate
+
+transaction costs – is also the basis of what would become known as the
+
+assumes that all prices in markets are known to individuals, but “this
+
+economic: that “the direction of resources depends directly on the price mechanism.”
+
+economic activities. So far, we are not in the field of AED. However, the same notion –
+Coase offers the firm an alternative means to price signals to coordinate
+
+In The Nature of the Firm, Coase criticizes a fundamental presumption of the theory
+
+resources – the firm – is the existence of transaction costs. Conventional economic theory
+For Coase, what determines the existence of this alternative system for the allocation of
+
+4.1.1 AED's immediate intellectual bases: Ronald Coase's contributions
+
+It can be seen that the notion of transaction costs is at the basis of the explanation that
+347
+
+which allocate the factors of production (1937, p. 388).
+
+price signals. The firm is seen, in this sense, as a bundle or nexus of contracts:
+
+Within the firm, the entrepreneur's orders, and not the market price signals,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+ammonia, which darkens fabrics produced on a neighboring property when interacting with bleach
+
+economic activity originates for third parties. Coase addresses a series of examples (some of
+
+negative externalities. The solutions to subsidize or tax, specifically, if
+
+chemical as causing the damage, resulting in a duty to compensate. Coase points out,
+
+recommendation that subsidies be used to promote positive externalities, and the
+
+This would be a simplified, or even mistaken, view of the meaning of “damage”. For Coase,
+
+And the problem thus becomes “avoiding the most serious damage” (Coase, 1960, p. 2), which is done by
+
+How these examples work implies the rejection of two common assumptions about
+
+who suggested such measures as ways of internalizing externalities. That is, as a means
+
+damage with regard to economic activities. Thus, interrupting the activity of the
+
+dyeing fabrics, as well as the presence of textile production, neighboring the chemical factory, is a
+
+activities of third parties, the answer to be given “is not clear, unless we know the value of the
+348
+
+The first of the rejected assumptions is that externalities must be
+
+of what is produced and sold.
+
+One of the examples is the situation of smoke emission generated in the production of sodium sulfate.
+
+economic entity that causes damage to third parties must be held monetarily responsible for it.
+
+that is, to the theme of externalities, arising from the welfare economy.
+
+of policies of the time for presenting this tendency (1960, p. 18), which is reversed in
+
+employed there (1960, p. 10-1). In such a situation, common analysis would identify the factory
+
+taxation or even prohibition of certain activities in defined locations occurs to
+
+This notion must be abandoned and replaced by another, which reflects the “reciprocal nature” of the
+
+however, the reciprocal nature of the damage: both the darkening is a “cost” for the activity of
+
+Externalities are beneficial or harmful effects that carrying out a
+
+“cost” for the latter. Given the reciprocity of the damage, that is, the imposition of costs on
+
+would fit into the “Pigovian” tradition, referred to as such due to the ideas of Arthur Pigou,
+
+which are mentioned below), with an emphasis on negative externalities. The way
+
+“causing” causes harm to you, in the same way that its continuation causes harm to third parties.
+
+situations in which the economic activity of one person generates harm to others.
+
+a cost analysis.
+
+so that the effects of an economic activity on third parties become part of the price
+
+This, yes – that is, the Coase theorem – would become the basis of the AED formulations.
+
+handled through government regulation. Coase criticizes economists and formulators
+
+dedicated “to the actions of companies that have harmful effects on third parties” (Coase, 1960, p. 1),
+
+The second presupposition rejected by Coase is the common notion that the agent
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+211
+
+212
+211
+
+to conduct a limited list of actions.”
+
+death of fish) by effluents discharged by a factory. Again, by sight
+The point becomes clearer when the example taken is the contamination of a stream (and
+
+employs as a factor of production, but what the land owner actually has is a right
+
+(such as environmental preservation), only for values that can be expressed monetarily, that
+
+is, for things that can be traded in the markets212. This leads to
+
+As can be seen, there is no room, in this type of analysis, for intrinsic values
+
+It is more appropriate to consider them as rights. “We can say that a person owns land and
+
+(Coase, 1960, p. 44) When factor analysis
+
+considers as physical or material entities – land, capital, work... – whereas it would be
+
+production): the cost-effectiveness test.
+should be the basis for attributing or not to the factory a “right to pollute” (as a factor of
+
+For Coase, the economic conception of production factors is flawed because
+
+value of production that stream contamination makes possible”? (Coase, 1960, p. 2) This
+
+necessary to answer: which of the activities maximizes the value of production?
+
+The exercise of such rights has opportunity costs:
+etc.) is also a factor of production.” (Coase, 1960, p. 44) From this, Coase highlights that
+
+what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it.” (1960, p. 2) In other
+
+words, the question of who should compensate will depend on a cost-benefit analysis. And before
+
+Thus, “the question to be decided is: is the value of fish lost greater or less than the
+Coase's view, however, the environmental issue represents a “cost” for the factory's activity.
+
+349
+
+right to do something that has a harmful effect (such as generating smoke, noise, odors
+
+Conventionally, environmental damage is the responsibility of the factory, which must compensate. At
+
+of production starts to see them in terms of rights, “it becomes easier to understand that the
+
+On the other hand, Ivo Gico Jr. maintains: “situations in which human behavior has as its central
+motivation immaterial or psychological elements, such as prestige (eg academia), power (eg, politics)
+or even altruism (eg family)." (Gico Jr., 2012, p. 23) However, as AED proceeds from the theory of
+prices, the economic analysis, in this case, will need to estimate values for such immaterial or
+psychological elements, that is, price them. In fact, this expedient is even made by authors of the
+Chicago-style AED, such as Posner himself, who in a certain passage focused on the analysis of
+pedestrians being run over and the costs of safety measures linked to railroads, employs reasoning
+that makes use of expressions from the like: “[s]uppose that the life of a child is worth as much as
+that of the one who rescued him, say if, $X” (Posner, 1998, p. 6). The same occurs with the approach to crimes such as rape, in which Posner supposes
+
+land, but a bundle of rights related to a piece of land.” (Friedman, 2000, p. 14)
+
+The cost of exercising a right (of using a factor of production) is always the
+loss incurred elsewhere as a consequence of using that right – the
+impossibility of crossing a property, parking a car, building a house, enjoying
+a landscape, having peace and quiet or breathe fresh air. (Coase, 1960, p. 44)
+
+The same idea is mirrored in a didactic way by David Friedman: “what you own is not a piece of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+values based on estimated preferences for both the perpetrator and the victim, as Buchanan reports:
+“if the benefits achieved by the potential rapist exceed the losses suffered by the potential victim,
+mutual gains from the transaction [in the Kaldor-Hicks sense] must exist, and such transactions
+must take place.”[!] (Buchanan, 1974, p. 485) This type of reasoning enables those who use AED to
+speak of an “efficient level” or “optimal” for the occurrence of crimes in a society. Reasoning based
+on “optimal levels” is used to validate, as can be seen, the permanence of unfair and unwanted
+situations by adversely affected individuals and groups.
+
+causing damage will be subject to a transaction between the parties. Negotiations will necessarily take
+
+polluting are smaller than those of measures designed to avoid it, the author considers that
+
+to compare the gains that would come from eliminating these harmful effects with the gains that
+
+“optimal level” of pollution, is the element that Coase intends to apply to guide the vision
+
+imaginary in which there are no transaction costs, a situation that Coase had already rejected
+
+the 3rd.
+
+district inhabitants to move elsewhere or make other adjustments to avoid the
+
+offers is to treat the problems of damage to third parties not as liability situations
+
+significant. As a result of this modulation, there are different effects from the setting
+
+350
+
+pollution generated by smoke, but that of ensuring the optimum amount of smoke pollution,
+
+damage – so to speak – become transactable.
+
+caused to third parties will simply not be relevant (1960, p. 8). This is because the right to
+
+Coase.” This theorem involves two situations. One is hypothetical: it refers to a world
+
+maximization of production or wealth, that is, of economically optimal results.
+
+The economic logic of maximizing production value, which allows us to speak in a
+
+the same result: the continuation of the activity of greater economic value, which results
+
+legal issues involving the generation of damages to third parties. “Everything is a matter
+
+as unrealistic in The Nature of the Firm (Coase, 1937). In another, transaction costs are
+
+a neighboring factory. Starting from an arithmetic assumption that the costs to continue
+
+are obtained by allowing its continuation.” (1960, p. 26) From this, the solution that Coase
+
+“there would be a gain in production value [...] if the factory continued to emit smoke and the
+
+of who is or is not legally responsible for the existence of a damage or cost to
+
+damage." (1960, p. 41) In this context, the objective of regulation should not be to “eliminate the
+
+Since there are no transaction costs, the legal definition of liability for damages
+
+(as a jurist would normally do), but as situations in which rights to cause
+
+This same logic is applied in the situation of a population affected by smoke emitted by
+
+which is the quantity that will maximize the value of production.” (1960, p. 42)
+
+Coase's argument to the assertion of a right to pollute that is a function of
+
+Here, we are actually entering the path that leads to the statement of the “theorem of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+to what would hypothetically be the “optimal” allocation based on the free negotiation of the parties in a
+
+activities. If the factory is not initially held accountable, “resource allocation will be
+
+If there are transaction costs, as in the real world, the situation changes. You
+
+common law, although they do not always see their decisions in reasoning explicitly
+
+rearrangement of rights will always occur if it is conducive to an increase in the value of production.”
+
+due to transaction costs –, judges should seek to base their decisions on the criterion
+
+your decisions.” (Coase, 1960, p. 19)
+
+responsible for the damage caused.” (Coase, 1960, p. 6) That is, legally
+
+negotiate are lower than the benefit that would result from the negotiation. “In such conditions the
+
+economic consequences of their decisions and should, as far as is possible without creating too much
+
+cases of damage to third parties. In other words, there is a tendency for judicial decisions to be
+
+351
+
+negotiations with other affected parties, in this scenario where transaction costs are
+
+opera." (1960, p. 15-6) Therefore, decisions by judges about who will be held accountable for
+
+maximize economic efficiency by making an initial assignment of rights that matches
+
+assignment of rights, in practice, may not be modified by free negotiation of the parties –
+
+factory will or will not be held responsible for the pollution that reaches the neighborhood. If the
+
+market transactions. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such
+
+scenario in which there are no transaction costs. In this regard, Coase notes that judges in
+
+(1960, p. 15)
+
+maximizing production value: “It seems desirable that courts should understand the
+
+economic, tended to incorporate economic rationales implicitly when deciding on
+
+will buy from them what can be considered a right to pollute, continuing with their
+
+efficient.
+
+rights initially assigned will only undergo rearrangements if the costs for the parties to
+
+the same in that situation as it would be if the offending business were considered
+
+uncertainty about the legal position itself, take these consequences into account for decision-making
+
+liable or not, the factory could “circumvent” the legal restrictions through
+
+In other words, Coase is saying that judges must decide in a way that
+
+initial delimitation of rights has an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system
+
+factory activity results in greater economic value, it will trade with neighbors and
+
+presumed null. “It is always possible to modify the initial delimitation of rights by
+
+a more efficient, or optimal, allocation of resources (1960, p. 6). So, it doesn't matter if the
+
+damages to third parties have a direct influence on economic efficiency. Knowing that this
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It is necessary to know whether or not the harmful economic activity is
+responsible for the damage caused because, without this initial delimitation of
+established rights, there may not be market transactions to transfer and
+recombine these rights. But the final result (which maximizes the value of
+production) is independent of the legal position when the price mechanism is presumed to operate costlessly.
+(Coase, 1960, p. 8)
+
+traditional analyzes of economists, which tend to exclude (or assume) the
+
+legal institutions. This implies that the economic consequences of legal institutions
+
+(Coase, 1993, p. 252)
+
+relevance of legal institutions. From the finding that there are impediments to the
+
+restrictive – “is completely unnecessary given the presumptions of its analytical system.”
+
+evident is the choice of economic efficiency as a criterion for judging the suitability of
+
+sense, that Coase points to the existence of transaction costs as an element that makes
+
+who should be held responsible and who should receive reparations for harm suffered – as if
+
+these could be freely negotiated in the absence of transaction costs. It's curious, in this
+
+Coase's analyzes are laden with normative implications. More
+
+economists thought was necessary” – such as taxation and other forms of regulation
+involving the initial delimitation of rights, “the type of government action that
+
+(cf. Friedman, 2000, p. 39). Judges should seek to assign rights – that is, define who
+
+how markets are assumed to automatically solve problems
+
+into account, or when not, the Coase theorem remains a defense of laissez-faire
+would occur if there were no transaction costs. Whether when transaction costs are taken
+
+legal institutions in the scenarios of existence and non-existence of transaction costs:
+
+normative concerns the hypothesis of markets functioning without transaction costs:
+
+for the participation of state regulation. On the contrary, the suggested recipe consists of seeking
+
+above all, the change in approach I propose.” (Coase, 1960, p. 44) Another consequence
+
+In summary, the “Coase theorem” brings together two statements about the consequences of
+
+Coase takes away from the presence of transaction costs is not that the state should seek to
+
+regulate the activities of those causing harm. It is, on the contrary, a solution that seeks to “simulate” what
+
+continues to be the criterion for guiding ideal legal decisions: the normative implication that
+
+352
+
+designing or choosing between social arrangements, we must consider total effects. This is,
+
+proper functioning of markets does not, however, derive a recipe for greater openness
+
+Even when transaction costs come back into the analysis, the “efficiency of markets”
+
+should be taken as relevant for its validation. In this sense, Coase states: “By
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Therefore, for Coase, if there is any economic action that causes harm to
+someone, it can remain defensible under the argument that the resources
+“used” by the same action must be considered as part of its economic
+“costs” – without the action any connotation of illegality is attributed. A
+consequence of this is that conduct perceived by some as causing
+unacceptable harm, and which can be legally characterized as an “offense
+to a subjective right”, becomes economically justifiable. And, being applied
+generically to legal analysis, as advocates of the Chicago-style AED,
+conduct seen as offensive from a legal perspective
+
+unimpeded transactions in the markets.
+
+When there are no transaction costs, rights spontaneously migrate to the party that owns them.
+
+compensate those who suffer damage caused by the locomotives.” (Coase, 1960, p. 31) In
+
+implications. Coase takes the case of the railroad whose sparks generate fires in the forests of
+
+which are too expensive for such bargains to occur.” (1960, p. 31) In this situation, Coase
+
+(1960, p. 34) The criterion used is cost-benefit analysis. The court decision must
+
+rights according to what would be the result of free private bargaining in the absence of such
+
+decided on its duty to indemnify neighboring landowners, the railroad could negotiate
+
+neighbors: “from an economic point of view, the situation in which there is 'uncompensated damage to
+
+353
+
+– come “in the game” only as remedies against high transaction costs that interfere
+
+initial entitlement does not matter for the scenario of no transaction costs: the free
+
+lost” (Coase, 1960, p. 44) – since this would be the result achieved, after all, by the occurrence
+
+consists of whether or not it is desirable to make the railway liable for damage to conditions in
+
+transaction costs and cost-benefit analysis.
+
+An additional example may help to clarify the use of the theorem and some of its
+
+neighboring properties. “It is not necessarily desirable that the railroad should be obliged to
+
+suggests that judges should rule on the railroad's right to harm property owners
+
+externalities are better resolved along the lines of private negotiations.
+
+absence of transaction costs, even if the railway activity were more valuable and judges
+
+value more. When there are transaction costs, courts must assign responsibilities and
+
+neighboring bushes of sparks from locomotives' is not necessarily undesirable.”
+
+costs. The privileged place of efficiency is the private sphere. The courts – as hands of the state
+
+validate economic activities in which “what is gained is worth more than what is
+
+with these and buy them the “right to set fire”. As mentioned earlier, the allocation
+
+Still another implication of Coase's reasoning is the notion that the problems of
+
+on the private ability to negotiate.
+
+imitate the allocation mechanisms of markets by hypothetical exercises of subtraction of
+
+bargaining between the parties will lead to the most economically efficient outcome. "The problem
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+liberal politics in America” (van Horn; Mirowski, 2009, p. 141). Among the Volker Fund's contributions
+are the payment of air tickets for North American academics to attend MPS meetings; the funding of
+Hayek's 1946 US tour; financial support to Henry Simons and Aaron Director at the University of
+Chicago Law School, granting of scholarships, among others (cf. van Horn; Mirowski, 2009, p. 150-9;
+Teles, 2008, p. 93 -5; Coase, 1993, p. 243).
+
+The Volker Fund was a foundation chaired by Harold Lunhow, a member of the MPS and “strident
+anti-New Deal conservative.” The foundation was focused on financing projects that promoted the “rethinking of
+
+Coase assesses that Hayek not only played a crucial role in the formation of the Mont-Pèlerin
+Society but also “in the events that would lead to the formation of the Law and Economics program
+at the University of Chicago Law School.” (Coase, 1993, p. 246)
+
+convention are now considered legally valid if they are economically
+justifiable. (Castro, 2012, p. 208-9)
+
+213
+
+214
+
+University of Chicago Law School which, due to the existence of the
+
+his career at the University of Chicago Law School, contributing to
+245; Teles, 2008, p. 91) and (iii) received financial support from the Volker Fund214, which boosted
+
+more evident economic tones, such as antitrust law. This was what happened in
+
+James Buchanan and Gary Becker.
+even its presidents (cf. Plehwe, 2009, p. 8) – such as Ronald Coase, Richard Posner,
+
+Evaluating legal institutions based on economics was already applied to areas of law with
+
+edition of Hayek's The road to serfdom, by the University of Chicago; (Coase, 1993, p.
+become a member; (ii) had helped to publish in the United States, in 1944, a
+
+to evaluate institutions in the most varied areas of law. Before, the procedure for
+
+fact that many of the exponents of the first were also members of the second – and some,
+
+the connections: Simons (i) had participated in the founding meeting of the MPS, despite not having
+
+Coase's contributions demonstrated that it is possible to employ economic criteria
+
+to be the Chicago-style AED and the MPS project (neoliberalism) are strengthened by
+University of Chicago.” (2009, p. 159) Beyond Simons, the connections between what would come
+
+4.1.2 Expanding AED: From Chicago Antitrust Niche to Pervasive and Influential AED
+
+The insertion is suggestive of the influence of Hayek and the Mont-Pèlerin Society (MPS, see
+
+section 3.3) within the Chicago School213, an early mark of its pro-market orientation. Are several
+
+The first economist hired by the Law School was Henry Simons. Your
+
+profitable, its headquarters were “formally registered as located at the Faculty of Law of
+P. 143). Interestingly, when MPS was formally constituted as a non-profit entity
+
+354
+
+members of its faculty.
+
+leave a “marginal position” towards the “center of gravity” (van Horn; Mirowski, 2009,
+
+interdisciplinary project on antitrust law, now includes economists such as
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Initially, Director taught the Economic Analysis and Public Policy course,
+essentially a price theory course, but he was later invited by Edward Levi
+to collaborate on the antitrust course. After an attempt to teach together,
+they decided to divide the lessons into four days for Levi and one for
+Director. What happened was described by some who took the course.
+Wesley Leiberler said this: “For four days each week, Ed Levi would
+approach the law and use traditional techniques of legal reasoning to relate
+cases to each other, and create a synthesis of the kind that jurists are
+accustomed to explaining and rationalizing cases. cases. It was a
+considerable feat. For four days, Ed would do this, and for one day each
+week, Aaron Director would tell us that everything Levi had told us over the
+previous four days was nonsense. He used economic analysis to show us
+that legal analysis simply didn’t hold up.” [...] From then on, the superiority
+of legal economic analysis, at least in the area of antitrust, became firmly
+established at the University of Chicago Law School. (Coase, 1993, p. 247 – emphasis added)
+
+Until the publication of Coase's article in 1960, the Journal of Law and Economics had focused on
+issues of antitrust law (cf. Posner, 1998, p. 1).
+215
+
+P. 246; cf. van Horn, 2009). The study was not completed (van Horn, 2009, p. 213),
+
+saw, Coase's fundamental importance lay in the innovative expansion of economic analysis
+took over the editorship of the Journal of Law and Economics jointly with Director. As if
+
+study of the legal and institutional framework for an effective competitive system” (Coase, 1993,
+
+was consolidated with the publication of The economic analysis of law, by Richard Posner, in
+
+received from Hayek the task of conducting a project entitled A free market study, “a
+
+Ronald Coase himself, in 1964, and Gary Becker, in 1968 (cf. Teles, 2008, p. 96-8). Coase
+Other important economists hired by the Faculty of Law were
+
+in Chicago. In addition to taking over for Simons in antitrust law classes, Director
+
+The expansion project of economic analysis to the most diverse areas of law
+2003, p. 663; cf. Mercury; Medema, 1997, p. 56).
+
+Volker Fund, accordingly, paid part of the Director's remuneration during his career
+
+such as the economic analysis of racial discrimination, family relations and crime (Harris,
+
+Chicago Law School, and obtained financial support from the Volker Fund to carry it out. O
+
+Ronald Coase:
+of the merits of using economic instruments to analyze legal institutions, as narrated
+
+Hayek and Simons jointly orchestrated the College's hiring of Aaron Director
+
+importance of Gary Becker lies in deepening this project into unexplored areas,
+evident interdisciplinarity with economics, such as civil liability. A
+
+355
+
+Medema, 1997, p. 53). The second was the persuasion of several law students regarding
+
+– beyond antitrust – to areas of law that until then were not perceived as having
+
+but Director left at least two significant legacies for the trajectory of AED. The first of these
+
+was involvement in the creation of the Journal of Law and Economics215 (Mercuro;
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+attractive to corporations who recognized that the growth of federal
+regulation was not a myth. Whether the appeal was to antitrust, which hit
+the interests of large corporations squarely, or to the new “social regulation”
+of the early 1970s, regulation was inescapable, growing, and connected to
+a powerful support structure in universities. (Teles, 2008, p. 116)
+
+establish law and economics as a respectable field,
+
+political". The same can be said in relation to other areas of law. Further ahead, Posner
+
+with the law than standard legal vocabulary.” The new application of this tool was
+
+1973, a book that is currently in its ninth edition. This was the “work that, so
+
+of Posner, do not alone account for the growth and influence of the AED. In The rise of the
+
+microeconomic assumptions for the process of determining the 'forms' of
+
+Posner – hired by Chicago Law School in 1969 (Teles, 2008, p.
+
+intellectual developments of the Coase theorem resulted in the promotion of “solutions of
+
+(subsection 4.1.3).
+
+it was the rise of Richard Posner that made it a first-class academic phenomenon
+
+adds: “it was, of course, a reaction to excessive regulation” (Posner apud
+
+foreigners in the elite divisions of legal academia” (2008, p. 278), as well as in the
+
+jurisprudence.” (Castro, 2012, p. 207) “While the work of Director and Coase helped to
+
+an effort to reform the law and make antitrust law more economical and less
+
+political prominence, conservative groups (i.e., those in favor of the free market, autonomy
+
+conservative legal movement was.” (Teles, 2008, p. 218) One of these support foundations
+
+say, 'codified' this style of legal analysis, developed with the intention of adopting
+
+conservative legal movement, Stephen Teles (2008) links the rise of the AED to its
+
+guided by a certain specific political-economic inclination. In Posner’s words, “we
+
+As a result of these affinities, the AED movement received “support
+
+356
+
+Even the most visible intellectual contributions of the Chicago School, such as
+
+98) – saw AED as a source of “much sharper analytical tools to deal with
+
+private sector and limited government, against income redistribution measures, etc.), “they felt like
+
+market” for public policy problems, which made the AED
+
+greatness." (Teles, 2008, p. 96; cf. Coase, 1993, p. 254)
+
+judiciary and the legal profession. AED's orientation towards economic efficiency and
+
+Teles, 2008, p. 98). Certain aspects of Posner's thought will be highlighted below
+
+1970s I was quite conservative, so certainly part of my interest in [AED] was
+
+convergences with the political project of conservative groups. In the 1970s, despite its
+
+substantial financial support from corporations and foundations in a way that no other
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Manne's institutes for professors of law equipped a considerable number
+of legal scholars with the techniques necessary to apply economic analysis
+of law to the field, and increased the profession's receptivity to the insights
+of these scholars. At the same time, Manne's programs for federal judges
+ensured that many members of the federal bar could understand the
+concepts these professors were developing, which meant that courts
+would not have to wait for a completely new generation of judges to absorb
+these new theories. (Teles, 2008, p. 133)
+
+others (2008, p. 200-3). “By supporting the economic analysis of law, the foundation hoped
+
+(2008, p. 105). In a second moment, the course had a version aimed at
+
+(2008, p. 109).
+such as granting scholarships to economists seeking additional degrees in law
+
+intensive introduction to microeconomics, initially aimed at law teachers
+
+research projects at institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Stanford, Columbia and
+directed its investments towards holding conferences, granting scholarships and supporting
+
+(Teles, 2008, p. 101) From the 1970s onwards, Manne began offering courses
+
+conferences and the creation of AED institutes in various parts of the United States, as well as
+(2008, p. 113). The Liberty Fund also supported Manne's projects to carry out
+
+academic production of economic analysis of law both in academia and in the judiciary.”
+
+in terms of configuration of the academic curriculum (cf. Teles, 2008, p. 202). That way,
+
+of federal judges and 67% of members of federal appeals courts in the United States
+
+The Liberty Fund supported Henry Manne's project to expand the “audience for
+
+rest of the academy would base its production on what happens in the big faculties, including
+such as that of the University of Toronto – also abroad, based on the notion that the
+
+93). Other relevant sources of funding were the Liberty Fund and the Olin Foundation.
+
+Samuelson [etc.]” (2008, p. 112) By the 1990s, Manne’s courses had covered 40%
+luxury accommodations [...] and top-notch instructors such as Milton Friedman, Paul
+
+The diffusion of pro-market ideas has already been mentioned previously: the Volker Fund (2008, p.
+
+strategy of AED in elite law schools in the United States and, in certain cases –
+In turn, the Olin Foundation oriented its investments towards positioning
+
+357
+
+before having gained a reputation among federal judges, were its price (free),
+
+establish a 'foothold' for conservatives in law schools, and
+
+magistrates of the North American federal judiciary. “The attractions of the program, especially
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+216
+
+216
+
+relevant to economic efficiency and therefore to economic growth.
+
+intellectual overlaps should not be overlooked. Both the AED and the economists
+
+The elements raised throughout this subsection allow us to perceive that AED when
+
+4.1.3 Main characteristics and theses of Chicago-style AED
+
+As much as these “practical” elements reveal the strength of the connections, the
+
+had “internalized”, considering the formats assumed by legal institutions as
+still regarded “institutions” as presuppositions of their analysis, whereas the AED already
+
+“in synergy” with this project.
+conservatively oriented foundations such as the Liberty Fund and the Olin Foundation operated
+
+(Teles, 2008, p. 206) What happened at Harvard
+
+same. One difference, however, lies in the fact that, in the 1970s, economists
+
+connections are financial. The Volker Fund is a link between MPS and Chicago. Others
+
+exemplifies this strategic orientation of supporting AED as part of a
+
+that the basic analytical tools and their policy orientations are essentially the
+it is not surprising that the recommendations made by the two groups converge, given
+
+provide a ‘counterweight’ against the liberals.”
+
+of Chicago and the transnational intellectual space of the MPS, headed by Hayek. Others
+
+laws are related to economic performance. In this sense, modulations in the
+
+organizational or even personal, such as contacts and overlaps between supporters of the School
+
+privilege the use of neoclassical microeconomics as a method of analysis. As a result,
+
+legal norms and procedures affect the incentive structure of individuals,
+
+state intervention and in particular income redistribution measures. In addition, both
+
+358
+
+intellectual as well as practical connections. Some connections are of order
+
+AED formulations are permeated by the reasoning that institutions
+
+aligned with the neoliberal paradigm share the pro-market bias and aversion to
+
+Chicago style has not only affinities with the economic sensibility of neoliberalism
+
+ideological redirection of the law school and defeat of its most dynamic faction,
+critical legal studies (CLS). [...] In the minds of these conservatives, the
+economic analysis of law was the only movement capable of providing an
+intellectually respectable alternative, and the foundation poured millions of dollars into its support.
+
+The meaning of the expression “liberals”, here, must be understood in the context of United States
+politics, that is, as a reference to the political inclination that favors greater presence of the State in the
+economy, greater concern with social welfare and redistributive measures, etc.
+
+(Teles, 2008, p. 191)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(1) individuals are rational maximizers of their satisfactions in their behavior
+outside and inside markets; (2) individuals respond to price incentives in their
+behavior outside and inside markets; and (3) legal rules and legal outcomes
+can be evaluated based on their efficiency properties, along with which comes
+the normative prescription that legal decisions must promote efficiency.
+(Mercuro; Medema, 1997, p. 57)
+
+“Rationality means [...] the willingness to choose, consciously or unconsciously, a means capable of
+achieving whatever objectives the maker of the choice has in view. [...] It does not presuppose
+consciousness, and it certainly does not presuppose omniscience.” (Posner, 2003, p. 17)
+In an alternative but convergent description, Ejan Mackaay breaks down these same assumptions into
+four fundamental premises: (i) methodological individualism; (ii) rational choice; (iii) stable preferences
+and (iv) the use of the notion of market equilibrium (Mackaay, 2000, p. 408-9).
+Of course, there are exceptions, such as the “economic analysis of crime” carried out by Shikida and
+Amaral (2012), whose conclusion, in the sense that “criminals migrated to illegal activities in the hope
+that the expected gains would outweigh the risks of the activity” (2012, p. 316), is based on data collected
+through questionnaires administered to more than 500 individuals incarcerated in Paraná between 2000 and 2009.
+
+neoclassical. AED analyzes legal institutions based on price signals that
+
+apply the AED, hypothetically “released” prices, from which arguments are
+
+represent incentives for individual behavior), are also often assumed rather than
+
+empirically measured. It is common, in this sense, to find, in publications that
+
+right fields. This is the use of the theory of prices, derived from microeconomics
+is given by a specific linking element, capable of connecting norms in the most different
+
+central to the analysis proposed in this tradition (after all, it is the price signals that
+
+of Posner, does not study the empirical behavior of individuals, that is, it is “presumed
+
+rather than studied.”219 (Harris, 2003, p. 665) “Prices”, another element
+
+deep' of law that exhibits considerable coherence” (Posner, 1998, p. 5-6). this coherence
+
+Despite starting from the individual as a unit of analysis, AED, at least in the traditional
+
+Drawing on this logic, AED practitioners are able to identify “a 'structure'
+
+abstracts to deal with the analysis of legal institutions.
+
+economic activities (Mercuro; Medema, 1997, p. 22).
+
+incentives” (Posner, 2003, p. 4). In other words, different areas of law become
+
+interchangeable under the eyes of the AED due to its adoption of the following assumptions218:
+
+causing changes in behavior and, ultimately, impacting the
+
+Chicago style in general, have followed this tradition of using models
+worth a lot, it is not surprising that Posner, as well as AED practitioners around
+
+359
+
+areas of life, not just in 'economic' matters” and that “people respond to
+
+illustrated. The use of arithmetic guesses is a procedure that Ronald Coase relied on.
+
+emit, and which are reflected in the behavior of individuals. At the basis of this usage are
+
+the assumptions that “man is a rational maximizer217 of utility in all
+
+217
+
+218
+
+219
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+generally considered the domain par excellence of morals rather than thought
+
+This type of vision produces conceptions of the criminal “as a 'businessman' [...], a
+
+of detection and punishment, the severity of the applicable penalties, and the costs of carrying out the offense
+
+Examples of AED application
+
+idea of an optimal level of crime.
+
+economic efficiency – wealth maximization or “optimal allocation of resources” – can be
+
+under a single economic rationale, covering even areas that were not commonly
+
+viewed as individuals carrying out cost-benefit analyzes by weighting
+
+illicit behavior are part of the optimal allocation of resources.” (Becker, 1974, p. 45)
+
+the affirmation of “the criminal sector as the de facto employer of last resort” (Posner,
+
+economic in law, has an impressive economic logic.” (Posner, 1985, p. 1230)
+
+agent that will organize its production, bringing together the available production factors,
+
+additional costs in repressing crime, but which exceed in costs the value of the damage caused by the
+
+basis, the authors evaluate contract law institutions. find a rationale
+
+associated with common business sense. This is the case of criminal law, which, “although
+
+employed in another legal or illegal activity).
+
+damage caused by the crime, as well as the costs of detection, seizure, conviction and
+
+characterize as efficient contracts whose economic surplus – corresponding to the
+
+Using the theory of prices, the AED manages to unite the different areas of law
+
+This is identified as the equilibrium point that minimizes social losses
+
+(which can range from the costs associated with obtaining a weapon to the costs of
+
+found in analyzes that cover other areas of law.
+
+360
+
+2003, p. 476). It also produces consequences in terms of criminal policy, guided by the
+
+between, on the one hand, the utility to be obtained from the crime in case of success and, on the other, the chances
+
+execution of sentences (Becker, 1974, p. 43). This idea stems from the notion that investments
+
+The same fundamental logic of modulating price signals in search of
+
+increase in society’s total wealth – is greater than zero (2012, p. 161). from that
+
+Criminal sanctions are seen as “costs” for perpetrators of crimes and misdemeanors,
+
+criminal activity, will be ineffective. Therefore, “the optimal policies to combat
+
+assuming the risks inherent to criminal activity” (Shikida; Amaral, 2012, p. 297); and allows
+
+opportunity involved in the time invested in criminal practice, and which could be
+
+arising from criminal activities. “Social losses” exist not only as a result of
+
+In an “economic analysis of contracts”, for example, Timm and Guarisse (2012)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It is easy to see why the rule in contract law is non-intervention in the
+freedom of the parties. According to the Coase Theorem, the parties'
+agreement tends, in fact, to socially efficient solutions. Thus, state
+intervention will only make sense when it leads to better and more efficient
+solutions than the parties' agreement alone could achieve. (Timm; Guarisse, 2012, p. 174)
+
+Another example of second-order adverse effects from state interference in the will of the parties
+is provided by the authors: “In many cases the legislator's interventions seem to favor a certain
+group, but a deeper analysis shows that this alleged benefit carries with it a cost . An example is the
+application, in Germany, of the European Directive [...] which determines the seller's liability for
+defects in used cars for a period of one year after purchase. This resulted in a significant increase in
+the price of used cars in Germany, as car dealers would now need to take out insurance to protect
+themselves from possible claims.” (Timm; Guarisse, 2012, p. 177-8)
+
+any area of private law, including property and contracts, is not recognized
+as an efficient tool for redistributive policies because it often entails four
+groups of undesirable flaws: (1) risks of imprecise targets (hitting the
+wrong people or institutions); (2) unpredictable effects (the result does not
+correspond to the initial objective); (3) high transaction costs; and (4)
+distortions in incentives. (Vera, 2012, p. 211)
+
+interest in banking contracts with consumers may have the effect of reducing
+
+“lubricate transactions and reduce transaction costs”, because the “individuals who make up the
+The existence of clear definition and strong protection of property is fundamental to
+
+private sector is inadvisable, due to the so-called second-order effects: “the change
+judicial override of the will of the parties, the conduct of redistributive policies via law
+
+According to the author,
+
+which “serves to reduce transaction costs.” (2102, p. 172) When the subject is the
+
+invoked against uses of the “social function of property”:
+
+contains the same meaning contrary to state intervention with redistributive intentions.
+
+seek what is best for you.” The same occurs with the “principle of freedom of form”,
+
+distortions in the market.” (2012, p. 211) In turn, the notion of second-order effects is
+justification for expropriation, State intervention in the property will always entail
+
+reaching Pareto optimal situations, contract law should leave the parties free to
+
+Another study, which carries out an “economic analysis of property” (Vera, 2012),
+
+even if preceded by compensation: “[what]ever the form of compensation or
+
+economic theory to the “principle of autonomy of will”: “since contracts will create wealth,
+
+State interventions in private property are seen as economically perverse,
+
+361
+
+application of the Coase theorem to contract law:
+
+Markets need security to operate well, to transact.” (2012, p. 208-9)
+
+of offering this type of contract, probably generating a socially inefficient
+
+situation.”220(2012, p. 174) Basically, all these recommendations are in line with the
+
+220
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+under certain circumstances, taking more precaution may not be effective.
+
+When a magistrate in an eviction process decides to protect the elderly
+who have not paid the rent for some time (the supposedly weaker party) to
+the detriment of the landlords (the supposedly stronger party), even with
+the good intention of doing social justice, he signals to everyone other
+property owners not to rent to seniors. It ends up hurting the elderly. The
+market is relentless and responds to interventions like this to the detriment
+of the group that the judge intended to protect. (Vera, 2012, p. 218)
+
+Excessively costly preventive measures that do not significantly reduce
+the chances of harm occurring tend to be ineffective. In the same way that
+failure to adopt reasonable precautionary measures can lead to undesirable
+results, the adoption of excessively onerous and unjustified measures
+generates social losses. (Porto, 2012, p. 181)
+
+as process, taxation, and (despite its controversial classification) work.
+
+that achieves the optimal result in all cases.” (Porto, 2012, p. 199) It is worth remembering that,
+
+assign the duty of reparation to the individual guilty of a damage. It must abide by the rules of
+
+The AED approach tends to see the judiciary as the protector of inviolability
+
+of the costs involved in each hypothetical situation, with no “responsibility rule
+
+In the field of civil liability, the AED does not start from the preponderant criterion of
+
+The same bias is perceived when the AED is projected onto areas of public law,
+inducing inefficiencies.
+
+of what is yours, could solve the problem in certain cases.” (Vera, 2012, p. 221-2)
+
+reduce negative externalities at the lowest cost. This attribution depends on an analysis
+liability for damages must fall on the cheapest cost avoider, the one capable of
+
+on private properties, whose accountability is internalized and each owner protects and cares for
+
+as a factor of economic dynamism to be protected from state interference, perceived as
+
+The analyzes of civil liability produce, as a result, the statement that the
+
+environmental issues, such as deforestation in the Amazon. “Transforming communal or public lands
+
+non-voluntary transactions, which are related to the identification of the private sector
+time, of preferences for solutions that incorporate market mechanisms rather than
+
+Private property is even presented as a solution to problems
+
+contracts is perceived as fundamental to preserve individual incentives to
+
+such as subsidies and taxation, in line with Coase's reasoning (1960). It is, one more
+civil liability are preferable to “Pigovian” measures to deal with externalities,
+
+362
+
+efficient results, that is, that lead to the “optimal level of precaution”:
+
+of the private sphere in the face of State incursion attempts. The security of property and
+
+In terms of implications for public policies, the AED suggests that modulations in
+
+accountability, rather, the promotion of incentives for behaviors that lead to
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+in cases where the individual does not have incentives to use arbitration in
+dispute resolution, his choice for state jurisdiction will depend on the
+efficiency of judicial institutions. The inefficiency of the state courts will be
+an incentive for the individual to resolve their disputes by changing their
+business standards, in order to avoid or make legal disputes unnecessary.
+Potentially, this process even involves reducing economic activity as a
+whole [to avoid dispute settlement costs]. (Salama, 2012, p. 388)
+
+First, arbitration may reduce transaction costs directly related to dispute
+resolution. Secondly, arbitration can favor the establishment of a more
+adequate incentive system for the fulfillment of contracts, maximizing gains
+in the contractual relationship between the parties. (Salama, 2012, p. 383)
+
+The basic hypothesis that I bring here is that the dynamics of the supply
+and demand relationship for dispute resolution services has contours
+similar to those of supply and demand for products and services in the
+markets. Microeconomic theory suggests that, in markets, competition
+generally leads to lower prices. Likewise, I will argue that competition
+between the state model and the private model can reduce transaction
+costs in providing the dispute resolution service. (Salama, 2012, p. 388)
+
+main reasons:
+
+organizations involved in these models are subject to the laws of supply and demand:
+arbitrations).” (Salama, 2012, p. 387) The existence of these two levels of competition means that
+
+controversies, such as arbitration, which must exist as an alternative to the judiciary for two
+with the above concerns, AED privileges privatized formats of process and solution of
+
+the public model (state courts) and, on the other hand, the private model (arbiters and chambers
+curious, because the existence of arbitration promotes a competition that “opposes, on the one hand,
+
+transaction costs. In addition to reforms that induce judicial behavior aligned
+
+compete with each other for dispute resolution services”. The second aspect is the most
+
+predictability and constancy – as well as speed – in decisions is a factor in increasing
+
+The existence of arbitration to individuals can affect the level of economic activity:
+basic unit to understand the operation of the economy, the signals issued by the
+
+security is linked to judicial behavior, since the absence of
+
+incentives for arbitration to provide good results because “arbiters and chambers
+market introduced at two levels: intra-model and inter-model. In the first aspect, there
+
+engagement in market transactions, leading to economic growth. It is
+
+by the same logic of supply and demand. As individual behavior is, for AED, the
+Interinstitutional competition, in turn, affects the behavior of individuals
+
+363
+
+An interesting point in the pro-arbitration argument is the competition logic of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+221
+
+linked to content that is not freely negotiable and derived from public policies, such as the
+
+contracts and property, in addition to providing security and resolving disputes –, the
+
+need with harmful effects on private initiative, the analysis uses the notion of
+
+additional remuneration of one third during vacations, the Severance Indemnity Fund
+
+(FGTS), the Christmas bonus, among others221. The economic analysis of the right of
+
+of the market and also generates negative social cost. (2012, p. 258) To reconcile his
+
+provides “public goods” essential to the functioning of markets – such as protection of
+
+greater margin of freedom for the private definition of contractual contents, and it would be less
+private law, not public law. If so, this branch would be subject to
+
+the need for taxation for the functioning of the state machine, which ultimately
+
+Neoclassical economics that taxation often distorts the price system
+is captured by the category of “deadweight loss” generated by taxation: “it is almost an axiom in the
+
+a concern centered on individual autonomy, in the private sphere. despite recognizing
+
+It is certain that, for the proponents of the AED, labor law should be seen as a branch
+
+market suffers noise, causing an imbalance in supply and demand.” (2012, p. 259) This notion
+
+citizens.” (2012, p. 246) As in other analyses, taxation is approximated from
+
+can be found in the “economic analysis of labor law” (Yeung, 2012). Looks
+A final example of Brazilian studies instructed by AED in the Chicago style
+
+taxes signal human behavior, capable of “altering choices and actions of
+
+State institutes some tax incident on economic exchanges, the price system of the
+(2012, p. 60) Since this is the background bias, it is not surprising the statement that, “[w]hen the
+
+The “economic analysis of taxation” (Carvalho, 2012) starts from the incentives that
+
+generator of wealth for society.” (2012, p. 260)
+limitation of taxation at a point that does not make private activity unfeasible, the only
+
+364
+
+“We cannot forget that resources are always better managed by the private sphere.”
+
+“optimal point” of taxation: “[what] is desired, from the point of view of economic efficiency, is the
+
+the focus is on the tendency of taxation to induce economic inefficiencies (2012, p. 259-60).
+
+In Yeung's conception, these are three institutions that induce economic inefficiencies. The
+analysis does not allow room for redistributive implications of labor law norms. Thus, the vacation
+third, “in the eyes of foreigners, constitutes one of the most peculiar rules of Brazilian labor
+legislation: the right to a salary plus a third during the vacation period, when the worker is not active.” (2012, p. 328)
+As for the FGTS, “it is nothing more than forced savings for specific uses and its existence is yet
+another evidence that the Brazilian State looks at its citizens (in this case, workers) as irrational
+beings, incapable of making adequate decisions for themselves. themselves, who need the law to
+protect them and tell them when and how much to save and when to spend.” (2012, p. 329) In turn,
+the joint existence of these two institutions, added to the thirteenth, produces the following analysis:
+“one can believe that they are part of the explanation of the low rates of domestic savings in the
+country. Now, anywhere, at any time in history, end of year parties, vacations, retirement and home ownership are the main reasons why
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+workers save part of their regular income.” (2012, p. 329) As can be seen, the analysis leaves aside
+the aspect that, as most workers have low incomes, most of their remuneration tends to be allocated
+to immediate consumption needs. In the absence of such “forced savings mechanisms”, it is
+doubtful that individual planning, given this situation, could supply them.
+
+Institutional (NEI), whose exponents are Douglass North and Oliver Williamson. However, the
+
+law remains excessively regulated and excessively detailed” (2012, p. 318); create one
+
+From these examples of AED application, a strong pro-market bias can be seen, in
+
+and “follow a rule for correcting inefficiencies, that is, reducing society’s losses
+
+redistributive policies are marginalized or explicitly rejected as inducing
+
+institutional reform by multilateral financial institutions and other organizations
+
+court in the workplace” (2012, p. 320), and induces “disincentives for the creation of
+
+the occurrence of free transactions. Recurring elements in these analyzes are the application of
+
+4.1.4 AED proposals and theses and their convergence with the “rule of law” paradigm
+365
+
+Brazilian is not a good quality institution”, which results from the judgment that “the laws
+
+benefit”, which generally lead to the affirmation of the existence of an “optimal point” beyond the
+
+directly contributed to the consolidation of this paradigm was the New Economy
+
+with the aspect of economic efficiency, at the same time as considerations
+
+labor relations where transaction costs may be lower. In these cases, a
+
+according to this vision, “create an environment more conducive to cooperative bargaining” (2012, p. 321),
+
+NEI and AED have notable convergences in their intellectual elaborations (points of
+
+as a whole." (2012, p. 322)
+
+inefficiencies.
+
+determined by the parties negotiating with each other.” (Yeung, 2012, p. 321) Since, however, “the
+
+sense that legal institutions must be formulated according to the objective of promoting
+
+excessive financial burden on employers”, fosters “an environment conducive to litigation
+
+As previously pointed out, the rule of law paradigm packed interventions of
+
+jobs” (2012, p. 322) among other factors, the conclusion suggests that “Labor Law
+
+international institutions, from the 1990s onwards. Certainly, the reference that is closest and
+
+price theory, Coase theorem, and the use of “cost
+
+legal intervention is not only unnecessary but useless, as the result will be
+
+workers are not efficient.” (2012, p. 330) Instead, labor law should,
+
+work also starts from the Coase theorem, and suggests the existence of “some situations in
+
+which state behavior should not pass. In addition to these, there is a marked concern
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+a version of the so-called “Coase Theorem”, as an instrument for analyzing
+economic development: if property rights are well defined and guaranteed,
+there will be no externalities, investments will be at the appropriate level
+and development will take place. (Fiani, 2011, p. 175)
+
+The rule of law paradigm forms the “second moment” of law and development studies, from the
+perspective of authors included in the NDD (see section 4.3). One of these authors is Diogo Coutinho,
+who considers, regarding this second moment and its reform agenda: “Arguments derived from the economic analysis of the
+law (law and economics), both in its descriptive-empirical bias and in its normative version, which
+suggest that law should mimic markets performing the function of maximizing aggregate social
+wealth [...], become increasingly common .” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 88)
+
+policies. In this sense, several statements by Douglass North, after knowing the
+
+Although personal relationships and organizational overlaps must be approached with
+
+Ronaldo Fiani, as
+studies instructed by the AED (cf. Williamson, 2015). The NEI comes to be seen, for
+
+countries, an aspect that is not central in the preparation of the AED.
+
+existence of adequate institutional environments, which goes through legal institutions and
+What the NEI does is link the problem of development more explicitly to
+
+however, the NEI incorporates a comparative component of institutions between
+
+Coase theorem, which also occupies – as noted earlier – nuclear position for
+account must be taken of the fact that NEI develops its formulations based on the
+
+to project internationally (cf. Castro, 2011, p. 8). An essential difference seems to be,
+
+(Nicita; Pagano, 2008, p. 417).
+
+and Friedrich Hayek (see section 3.3). Moreover, already on the “intellectual” merit of this convergence,
+
+reforms that the NEI subsequently contributed – as did Law & Finance –
+
+two strands based on similarities of vision of authors such as Coase, Posner and Williamson
+integrated into its framework (Mercuro; Medema, 1997), and which highlight convergences between
+
+allow us to affirm that the AED's contributions were instrumental in shaping the rule of law
+
+paradigm222 . In this sense, AED promotes an agenda of
+
+and Douglass North, as well as other neoliberal thinkers such as Milton Friedman
+Foundation – conservative think tank founded in 1973 – had Ronald Coase as members
+
+departure and arrival), historical, personal and organizational links. These convergences
+
+as a “refinement” of the basic theory of AED (Newton, 2006, p. 192) or as an approach
+As a result, it is common to find academic approaches that consider the NIS
+
+366
+
+intellectual movements. In this sense, it is worth remembering that Heritage
+
+institutions interfere with the incentives for individual behavior and are able to
+contours of AED, are not exactly “new”. Thus, North claims that the
+
+Be careful, its usefulness cannot be discarded in the assessment of convergences between
+
+222
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Transaction cost economics holds that microeconomic institutions play a
+crucial, subtle, and relatively neglected role in explaining differing economic
+performances—across time, within and across industries, within and
+across states and sociopolitical systems (Williamson, 1985, p. 408).
+
+in North, it undergoes institutional reforms aimed at reducing transaction costs.
+
+The role of the State, in both, is to provide the institutional environment conducive to
+
+developing countries. Thus, “countries like Brazil and Argentina inaugurated, in
+
+a judiciary that does not provide constancy and predictability, are factors that induce high
+
+induce the economy to grow, stagnate or even contract (North, 1991, p. 97). The key to
+
+“correct” institutional environment, transaction costs will be reduced, the market will function
+
+specialization and labor productivity (1991, p. 33), while high labor costs
+
+topics. For North, as for Chicago-style AED practitioners, the definition
+
+economic growth.
+
+markets. Both AED and NEI can be framed within what Ronaldo Fiani
+
+As the Coase theorem underlies both AED and NEI, it is not surprising
+
+private transactions. Both take a stand against state interference in the domain
+
+policies) be reformed to reduce transaction costs, the free operation of markets
+
+transaction tend to cause economic recessions. Thus, the objective of development,
+
+convergences of AED and NEI, contains the recipe for what Rodrik described as “markets as
+
+(Schapiro, 2010, p. 222) In the case of Brazil, several reforms converge with
+
+knowing the result is reminiscent of Coase: low transaction costs represent incentives for exchange,
+
+in an “optimal” way, and will be in charge of operating the development.
+
+transaction costs. The same trait is present in Williamson, who makes reference to his
+
+1990s, an audacious program of economic reforms, oriented to
+
+367
+
+(2011) describes as “institutional environments approach”, according to which, given the
+
+imprecise and weak protection of private property and contracts, as well as the existence of
+
+the magic bullet”. After all, there is a belief that, since legal institutions (and
+
+The application of this paradigm has informed World Bank-supported reforms in
+
+that reform recommendations to reduce transaction costs go through the same
+
+will lead to development, primarily understood, in this paradigm, as
+
+economic, in addition to what is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the
+
+approach such as “transaction cost economics”:
+
+Basically, the “rule of law” framework, as instructed by the contributions
+
+promotion of the market environment, similar to what had already been done in Chile.”
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+223
+
+224
+
+Behind this notion there is the discussion of Pareto and Kaldor Hicks efficiency
+
+criteria. By the Pareto criterion, a situation or equilibrium224 is efficient when it is not
+
+The understanding of certain proposals, theses and contours of the AED, especially from
+
+means wealth maximization, or “that allocation of resources in which value is
+must be configured in a way that favors economic efficiency. For Posner, efficiency
+
+Bankruptcy, the Brazilian Corporate Law (2012, p. 222) and, one might add, the Arbitration Law;
+
+and (v) the introduction of self-regulated markets on Bovespa223 (2012, p. 222).
+
+no superior relocation is possible.
+realize that the notion of efficiency is linked to the “optimal” allocation of resources, in which
+
+dedicated to supporting the list of legal protection for investors and creditors", such as the Law of
+
+One of the AED's most significant proposals is that legal institutions
+
+4.1.4.1 The place of efficiency in relation to legal institutions
+
+privatization/privatization programs for public companies; (iv) “legislative changes
+
+value, we say they are being employed efficiently.” (Posner, 2003, p. 10) One can
+
+marginalization or exclusion of redistributive purposes for public policies (4.1.4.4).
+
+(such as the Concessions, Telecommunications, Petroleum and Electricity Law); (iii)
+
+where its value is greatest, or equivalently, where no reallocation would increase its value
+appreciation of scarce economic resources: “[w]hen resources are being used
+
+in the economy (ECs 5, 8, 9 and 19); (ii) “new regulatory frameworks in privatized sectors”
+
+law (4.1.4.2); (iii) the use of the “efficient markets hypothesis” (4.1.4.3) and (iv) the
+place of efficiency in relation to law (item 4.1.4.1); (ii) the common efficiency thesis
+
+the AED prescription, such as: (i) constitutional amendments that changed the presence of the State
+
+economic when they induce voluntary, unimpeded exchanges, because these lead to more
+This proposal incorporates the thesis that legal norms lead to efficiency
+
+368
+
+incorporated into the rule of law paradigm. Four aspects will be highlighted for this purpose: (i) the
+
+maximized” (Posner, 2003, p. 11).
+
+Posner, will contribute to clarify other points of convergence with the NEI and which were
+
+align Brazilian law with an agenda of public policy reforms similar to those associated with the objectives of
+conservative groups (against state activism, income redistribution programs, etc.) in the United States,
+especially since the Richard Nixon government, in 1970s.” (Castro, 2011, p. 8)
+
+“'Equilibrium' means the stable point, that is, the point at which, unless demand or supply conditions
+change, there is no incentive for sellers to change prices or quantities produced.” (Posner,
+
+In this regard, Marcus Faro de Castro states that “the defense of the adoption of the AED responds to the interest in
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+2003, p. 8) Ivo Gico Jr. relates the notion of balance to autonomy of will and efficiency: “Balance is a
+technical concept used to explain what will be the likely result of a change in the incentive structure of
+agents. [...] As equilibrium results from the free interaction of agents until all possibilities of beneficial
+exchanges are exhausted, it is said that a market in equilibrium has a property
+socially valuable: its result has eliminated all waste, that is, it is efficient.” (Gico Jr., 2012, p. 21)
+In this regard, Marcus Faro de Castro observes that “the AED, when proceeding through the so-called
+'cost-benefit analysis', does not take into account the relationships between material interests and noneconomic
+values, which are relevant to the promotion of justice. economic.” (Castro, 2009, p. 21)
+
+unjust” (cf. Salama, 2008, p. 28), which is equivalent to saying that it equated – at least in one
+
+(2003, p. 13).
+
+wealth maximization) is best promoted by the private sphere, not by public initiative.
+
+first phase, which Bruno Salama (2008) calls “foundational” – to justice itself. This one
+
+The AED privileges, as it was already possible to observe, the notion that efficiency (as
+
+applicability in the real world, because most transactions have effects on third parties
+
+Posner worked efficiency as an ethical criterion to “distinguish fair rules from
+“optimal” balance.
+
+protector of the status quo. Posner considers that the Pareto superiority criterion has little
+
+by comparing the costs or losses suffered by these groups with the benefits or gains obtained
+
+by others, that is, by a cost-benefit analysis225 .
+
+Even if some groups are adversely affected, such a framework remains valid.
+
+efficient if it represented a loss for an individual. This is essentially a design
+
+performance, when necessary (as with taxation), must not exceed points
+
+legal entities must create an incentive structure that favors the maximization of wealth.
+
+economic change increased the total well-being of society, it would not be considered
+
+as a provider of the institutional environment that favors low transaction costs, and its
+etc.), or according to redistributive purposes (a point discussed below). The State is seen
+
+that is, any improvement for some would imply a loss for others. In this way, even though the
+
+losers, whether they do it or not.” (Posner, 2003, p. 13) In other words, the norms
+reallocation of resources promotes the increase of wealth and the “winners can compensate the losers”.
+
+possible to promote a reallocation of resources without harming at least one individual. Or
+
+as an “entrepreneur” (in sectors such as energy, natural resources, transport, communications
+give the State active roles in the economic scenario, whether in the format of its participation
+
+369
+
+“less austere efficiency”, according to which economic efficiency still exists when
+
+trace refers to the quotation used at the opening of this section, by David Director Friedman, who
+
+In this sense, the use of this notion is the key to “dismantling” legal institutions that
+
+The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion gets around the problem of requiring that no one
+
+be made worse off by a certain change in equilibrium. It's a concept
+
+225
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(Posner, 2003, p. 16)
+
+every definition of justice should have as a necessary, although not sufficient,
+condition the elimination of waste (ie, efficiency). We don't know what is fair,
+but we know that inefficiency is always unfair, so I can't see any conflict
+between efficiency and justice, quite the contrary, one is a condition for the
+other's existence. (Gico Jr, 2012, p. 28)
+
+To what extent should Law, as a 'normative science', integrate cost and benefit calculations?” (Salama,
+2008, p. 26) This question arises from the author's proposal that “the analysis of the incentives provided
+by legislation is where the discussion of fairness begins; not where it ends. The point is not to replace the
+discussion of justice with a discussion of efficiency, but rather to enrich legal grammar by integrating the
+discussion of efficiency into the discussion of fairness.” (Salama, 2008, p. 7) Despite such reservations,
+practical applications of the AED, as illustrated below, remain in the use of efficiency as a central point for
+criticizing legal institutions and for preparing reform proposals.
+
+what wealth makes possible – not only or primarily voluptuous goods, but also
+leisure, comfort, modern medicine, and opportunities for self-expression and
+self-fulfillment – are important components of most people's happiness, so
+wealth maximization is instrumental to maximization of usefulness.
+
+Salama questions himself, however: “But to what extent is wealth maximization related to justice?
+
+sufficient operative to evaluate the questions posed to the Law, regarding the notion that the
+
+a concrete reorientation in the production of AED. That's because Posner and AED practitioners
+efficiency seems, however, to have been much more a resentful concession to criticism than
+
+In this sense, Posner would have discarded both the use of efficiency as a “criterion
+efficiency argument in a version that Salama (2008, p. 31-2) calls “pragmatic”.
+
+The conversion of the “foundational” version to the “pragmatic” version regarding the position of
+
+In a second phase, after suffering heavy criticism, Posner began to present the
+
+Gico Jr. states that:
+
+(Friedman, 2000, p. 22) The same seems to be true of Posner.
+
+resources is, at the very least, undesirable. There is, therefore, something intuitive in the pairing
+
+between efficiency (which corresponds to the absence of waste) and justice.”226 Likewise, Ivo
+
+This is because, for him, “there is a surprising correspondence between justice and efficiency.”
+
+of efficiency as wealth maximization:
+appreciated. The following speech by Posner, in the sixth edition of his treatise, exemplifies the new use
+
+stated the purpose of deliberately ignoring questions of fairness throughout his book.
+
+rejection of legal norms. Thus, for example, Salama observes that the “waste of
+justice, continued, in practice, to employ efficiency as a criterion for validation or
+
+370
+
+law – such as efficiency – began to be presented as means to social ends
+
+Chicago style, even though they have accepted limitations to the equation between efficiency and
+
+efficiency should take precedence over other values of society.” (Salama, 2008, p. 32) The
+
+226
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+remains, for the AED, as a criterion for the evaluation of legal institutions. this view
+
+economic, excluding other criteria. In the NEI, the existence of institutions (including
+
+furthermore, that the promotion of efficiency is linked, in both proposals, to the right
+
+The conclusion is drawn that, in Posner, efficiency (maximization of wealth) was
+
+economic growth is favored by the existence of institutions that reduce costs of
+
+In either case, it is easy to derive proposals for institutional reform from this recipe.
+
+subsequently mitigated by the claim that efficiency could be considered a means
+
+effective and efficient, to promote instrumental thinking and greater sensitivity to
+
+institutions is reflected in the positioning of institutions of the Anglo-American model, and more
+
+strong ownership, contracts and a swift and independent judiciary – are seen as
+
+instrumental – according to which law is a function of efficiency – is also present
+
+legal) that induce higher transaction costs is correlated with lower degrees of
+
+the claim that common law institutions are more conducive to efficiency than
+
+for other ends, rather than ends in themselves. Whether equated with justice or not, efficiency
+
+In short, in the AED, legal institutions are judged by the sieve of efficiency
+
+Another point of convergence between the AED and the NEI is the perception of common law
+
+In The problem of social cost, Ronald Coase, based on the analysis of several judgments
+
+initially presented as a criterion equal to the very notion of justice, a position
+
+transaction is the point of convergence between the two approaches.
+
+“understood as a foundation for market relations and as a limit to the State” (Trubek;
+
+that go through the suggestion of “transplants” from common law institutions to countries in
+
+371
+
+promoters of economic growth. Basically, the notion that efficiency or
+
+public policy concerns.” (Trubek, 2006, p. 86) It is worth remembering,
+
+as a matrix of institutions tending towards efficiency or economic growth. At AED, there is
+
+specifically the United States, as more favorable to economic growth.
+
+19th century British and North American judges, had proposed that common law judges
+
+in the rule of law paradigm, which sustains the “need to make legal systems more
+
+those of civil law. At NEI, a strong component of international model comparison
+
+development, while institutions that reduce transaction costs – such as protection
+
+Santos, 2006, p. 2), an “instrument for harboring private transactions.” (2006, p. 5)
+
+4.1.4.2 The common law efficiency thesis
+
+development.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+ethnocentric to this project. In addition to AED and NEI, another interdisciplinary expertise that
+universalization of institutions derived from common law, which gives different tones
+
+from Chicago, accompanies this thesis:
+
+economic efficiency than statutory or legislated law, as is the case with civil law systems227 (cf.
+
+Friedman, 2000, p. 110). Posner, as well as AED supporters in the style
+
+project for the international dissemination of “good governance” (see section 2.3.3), contains the meaning of
+all countries” (Trubek, 2006, p. 86). In other words, the promotion of the rule of law, as part of the
+
+– and it is precisely these that the Coase theorem appreciates – is more likely to promote
+
+low”, based on a single legal model (inspired by common law) that “would make sense for
+
+common law, especially because it is a legal framework that favors voluntary transactions
+explicitly use economic criteria to guide their decisions. This is the thesis that the
+
+of law. After all, they are guided by “institutional transplants” conducted “from the top to
+The thesis is also present in the reform proposals guided by the rule paradigm
+
+decided according to the economic rationality of efficiency even if they did not use
+
+Law and Finance movement, discussed in section 4.2.
+
+372
+
+fostered global institutional convergences around common law institutions was the
+
+One of the implications of this thesis – in which it is possible to note the presence of antiredistributive
+nuances228 – is
+
+228
+
+227
+
+The theory is that common law is best (but not perfectly) explained as a system
+for maximizing wealth in society. Statutory or constitutional law, as fields
+distinct from common law, are less likely to promote efficiency. (Posner, 2003,
+p. 25)
+
+For Posner, common law subordinates distributive considerations to efficiency considerations
+(Posner, 2003, p. 532).
+
+In James Buchanan's reading, Posner's fundamental book contains a “normative theory”, that is, the
+suggestion that “the common law, as it has developed, has been at least indirectly guided by the
+efficiency criterion of orthodox economists. ” This normative thesis contains the implication that
+“common law made by judges is superior to legislation, to decisions that emerge from the activities of political representatives.”
+
+serve as an ideological barrier to the general promotion of statutory law – more
+specifically, as a barrier to the passage of laws. [...] Whenever the market fails
+to provide an efficient allocation of resources due to externalities or any other
+market failure, common law and the attribution of damage measures can be
+relied upon [...] to give the market a gentle nudge in the direction of maximum
+social welfare. (Mercurus; Medema, 1997, p. 66)
+
+(Buchanan, 1974, p. 488)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+markets. In line with the AED's comprehensive application of price theory, one can
+
+The “efficient markets hypothesis” (Posner, 2003, p. 451) seems, however, to have
+
+been designed specifically to deal with financial markets229. From there, the AED
+
+when the State proposes to intervene or regulate beyond the “optimal point”, the results are
+
+4.1.4.3 AED and the “efficient markets hypothesis”
+
+financial assets than an anticipation of depression” (2003, p. 457). Here is the suggestion
+
+products sold.” (Posner, 2003, p. 457)
+
+common law efficiency thesis when considering that both privilege institutions
+
+According to Posner, the free operation of markets is the most efficient way of
+
+prices, and that this is enough to guide the behavior of the agents involved: “[o]s
+
+misconception about the great depression of the 1930s.” So, the break of
+
+to say: basically, the recommendation of both is that the State avoids influencing the operation of the
+
+derives anti-regulation recommendations.
+
+must be achieved by legal institutions that bring content from policies
+
+legal measures to discourage intervention and direct regulation by the State in relation to
+
+private property encourages investment.” (Posner, 2003, p. 18)
+
+prevent another 1929-style crisis.” Deep down, the basis for sustaining the unnecessary
+
+The use of the “efficient markets hypothesis” by the AED is consistent with the
+
+that markets anticipate regulation, frustrating it. “If this is correct, there is
+
+negatives. Thus, for example, “price controls lead to queues, black markets and
+
+373
+
+New York Stock Exchange in 1929 would have been “less the result of abuses in the stock markets than
+
+to put resources to their most valued use. Differently,
+
+state regulation of financial markets – that is, to say that this is an area that
+
+Capital markets are competitive, and competitive markets generate information about
+
+price mechanism, that is, “contaminate” its signals.
+
+public – is the belief that the information generated by the markets translates into signaling of
+
+For Posner, the regulation of financial assets “had its origins, in part, in a
+
+shortages; competition and free trade promote productivity, and
+
+right to be skeptical about aspects of financial asset regulation that are designed to
+
+To understand the role of supporting financial deregulation that the efficient markets hypothesis
+played in the legal field, as well as its counterpoint, represented by the characterization of markets
+financial as inherently unstable, by Hyman Minsky, see the works of Pistor (2012) and Valadares
+(2015).
+
+229
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The presence of this element – the other side of the policy aversion coin
+
+It should be noted that, as a reaction to the 2008 crisis, Posner published the book A failure of
+
+written since the 1970s.
+
+redistributive – is illustrated in the following passage from Posner, in which the author considers the
+
+that Posner ended up rejecting the “efficient markets hypothesis”, favored by his
+
+which “man makes himself.”
+
+notion conceives that individuals enjoy economic conditions consistent with their choices
+
+and behavior. It is an essentially liberal vision, translated by the second motto
+
+primary objective of institutional reforms
+
+finances also came crashing down.” (Heinen, 2013, p. 366) In this sense, one should consider
+The interweaving of the financial industry meant that when one bank failed, the entire system
+
+promoting growth in developing countries and, in line with this, defines how
+
+they are also projected on the rule of law paradigm, and not on substantive equality. That
+
+financial situation ended up making banks assume excessive risks and the great
+
+sees foreign investment (mainly private) as a highly important factor in
+
+economic equity. In this sense, the AED privileges notions of formal equality, which
+various social purposes), continues to have a marked bias of marginalization of the aspect of
+
+with the Law & Finance perspective) are replicated in the rule of law paradigm, which
+
+in 1970.” With regard to the latter aspect, he considered that “deregulation
+
+mobility (free choice) of individuals in relation to the economic positions they occupy:
+
+interest rates in the early 2000s and the deregulation movement, which began
+
+Once again, the AED's formulations (which at this point sharply converge
+
+foundational (efficiency as justice), or in the pragmatic version (efficiency as a means to
+The notion of efficiency as justice, used in AED either in its version
+
+374
+
+occurrence of the new economic depression to the “confluence of two dangerous factors: low
+
+income inequality from an essentially private point of view, which presumes free
+
+4.1.4.4 AED and redistributive public policies
+
+capitalism: the crisis of '08 and the descent into depression. In this work, Posner attributed to
+
+make national economies more attractive to foreign investors. To that end,
+property and other economic rights must be protected, and government
+intervention limited. At the same time, this view emphasizes the importance
+of legal harmonization measures and the elimination of any discrimination
+against foreigners so that national economies become more easily linked
+to broader economic or global entities. (Trubek, 2006, p. 89)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+way in which wealth is allocated among the groups that make up the social whole. Posner brings, in addition
+
+the suggestion emerges that there is no need for public policies designed to correct
+
+average is rising, [...] the incomes of the poor may be rising even as
+
+of the economic justification of the trickle down (drip redistribution of income, or
+
+are in a low-income situation. Posner also reflects this lineage: “[if] income
+
+impede the savings necessary for investments, etc. do not enter the account. As a result,
+
+should reside in wealth maximization, or “growing the pie” in general, rather than in
+income inequality is not a problem to be directly addressed by the law. The focus
+
+more in education: lack of opportunities, other income constraints that
+
+redistribution of income, to deal with welfare issues of people who
+neoliberal for the notion of trickle down economics, rather than welfare state or direct measures
+
+Thus, the carpenter's lower income is justified as the result of a choice not to invest
+
+“distributional consequences.” (Trubek, 2006, p. 89) In the same vein, for Posner's AED,
+
+In section 3.3 of the previous chapter, the preference of economic thought was mentioned
+
+basis of reasoning), individuals obtain the economic results of their private decisions.
+
+efficient, [...] a framework for the efficient allocation of resources”, leaving aside the
+The rule of law paradigm emphasizes the “role of law in making the economy more
+
+In the scenario imagined by Posner (note the use of arithmetic assumptions in the
+
+economic activity –, which is reflected in his criticism of redistributive legal institutions.
+Keynesian concerns with the need to encourage demand to maintain the level of
+
+strong connection with the rule of law paradigm driven by the NEI, which
+
+375
+
+Posner's economic thinking is essentially supply-side - rejecting
+
+income distribution is becoming more unequal.” (Posner, 2003, p. 473) This is a
+
+income inequalities.
+
+Consider a simple distribution of four incomes: a 20-year-old carpenter, who
+earns $20,000; a 20-year-old student who earns nothing; a 30-year-old
+carpenter, who earns $30,000, and a college educated person, who earns
+$40,000. The picture is one of substantial inequality, but there may be none
+in reality. The student's zero income represents an investment in education,
+which he recovers throughout his working life with a higher salary. The extra
+$10,0000 he receives at age 30, compared to the carpenter, who worked
+while the student was still in college, may simply represent the repayment
+with interest of part of the capital contribution in the form of school fees
+paid [tuition] and the income he or his family gave up in his earlier student
+years. (Posner, 2003, p. 469)
+
+accepts poverty alleviation as a goal, but in the robust version of this creed,
+there is no need for direct action to alleviate poverty because it would result
+from economic growth itself – more of a “drip” idea in a field plagued by
+such notions. (Trubek, 2006, p. 89)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+230
+
+230
+
+legislation or statutes, since the judiciary is perceived as more favorable to safeguarding the
+
+highlighted, and concern (i) the division of tasks between the judiciary and parliaments; (ii) to
+
+This lineage holds that the intention to redistribute across the courts is often
+
+autonomy of the private will against state incursions.
+
+leave it to the legislatures to dispute how it should be divided.” (Friedman, 2000, p. 298)
+
+AED's criticisms of redistributive policies are broad. Three of them will be
+
+normative implication that one should avoid modulating legal institutions through
+redistributive policies by the legislature is, in a sense, “closed” when combined with
+
+total income in maintaining social peace and political stability.”
+
+focus on maximizing the size of the social pie [...] and that
+strand states, for example, that it is “prudent that judges, even egalitarian judges,
+
+(2003, p. 472)
+
+the bias contrary to the adoption of the legislated right. Thus, the apparent openness to conducting
+
+redistributive policies involving private law. In this sense, an author of this
+
+However, as seen earlier, the common law efficiency thesis has the implication
+Redistributive policies should therefore not be conducted through the courts. At the
+
+policies about it: “[t]he income inequality may be much less important than the
+
+as efficient, in line with the theses of Coase and Posner, and emphasize that there is no place for
+AED supporters often describe the common law produced by judges
+
+indirect effects – cf. section 3.3) for the permanence of inequality, also considerations
+
+376
+
+Division of tasks between the judiciary and parliaments
+
+inefficient when thwarted by so-called “second-order effects”:
+
+taxation; and (iii) other income redistribution measures.
+
+If courts persistently interpret contracts in favor of a particular class of
+litigants, such as tenants in dispute with landlords, for example, or employees
+in dispute with their employers, other features of the transactions will come
+into play; rents will go up or wages will go down to keep up with the changed
+terms. The end result is unlikely to benefit the favored class [by the court
+decisions] and may well harm both sides by forcing them to adopt less efficient
+clauses than those they would have agreed to on their own.
+(Friedman, 2000, p. 298)
+
+In contrast, for the current AED from the New Haven school – which is not the mainstream–, associated
+with the names of Calabresi and Susan Rose-Ackerman, “distributional questions remain central. Market
+failures are seen as more prevalent than in the economic analysis of Chicago law, and government
+intervention is expected to be able to correct them, although it may not be successful in all
+circumstances.” (Mackaay, 2000, p. 412) The New Haven and Chicago AED, despite differing political
+orientations, share the use of the microeconomic theory of prices to scrutinize legal institutions.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+social wealth. In other words, the proposal would be that the economic costs of the measure
+
+mostly indirect) than one might think, they receive even more in transfers than
+
+In the passage below, Posner submits the right to education of children with
+
+did not go beyond the benefit to the social whole.
+
+Free education, as a social right, is one of the forms of indirect income redistribution.
+
+Thus, the regressive character of taxation: “in fact, the poor, although they pay more taxes (the
+
+point at which they equal, but do not exceed, the contribution (at the margin) of these children to the
+A possible answer would be the following: spending on the education of these children should go to the end of
+
+manifestation of its supply-side economic orientation. What Posner advocates is, of course,
+
+modalities of income redistribution policies are subject to the efficiency veto. A
+given that both paths compromise economic efficiency. also other
+
+economic” (2003, p. 473) by removing incentives for property accumulation, in a
+
+positioned as provocations to thought). Judging by the central point of the work, a
+
+Redistribution should not be carried out either by the judiciary or through taxation,
+
+In this regard, Posner considers that strongly progressive taxation “reduces the efficiency
+
+Posner does not provide the answer explicitly (the book is full of questions
+
+One possible way to carry out income redistribution policies is taxation.
+
+Other forms of redistribution
+
+public services, bear a higher tax burden.
+
+Redistribution by taxation
+
+377
+
+argument to be coherent that the poorest, as they are the most frequent users of
+
+special needs to cost-benefit analysis:
+
+they pay in tribute, though perhaps only a little more.” (2003, p. 469) Thus, does the
+
+Consider the federal law requirement [...] that every child with a disability
+receive “appropriate, free public education.” The idea is to give children, at
+public expense, the education they need to maximize their learning, whatever
+the cost. If the child has severe physical or mental limitations, the cost can be
+astronomical. And the program is not limited to the [economically] needy.
+While it might be argued that some measure of assistance for the education of
+the handicapped is a method of social insurance against dire misfortune, [...]
+although endless expenditures may be required to bring some of these children
+up to the level of non-disabled children.
+
+Question: what would be the efficiency-maximizing criterion for deciding how
+much to spend on the education of a disabled child? (Posner, 2003, p. 485)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+expressive than AED. The various points of convergence allow, however, the
+
+further in the emphasis that these analyzes attribute to typical mechanisms of private law, and not
+
+than those of civil law; (iv) adoption of the “efficient markets hypothesis” to encourage the
+
+The above considerations allow positioning the AED as a source of materials
+
+Law & Finance, covered in the next section.
+
+with the intellectual endeavor of NEI, given that the two currents link the development
+
+rule of law. This paradigm, as seen, was consolidated in the 1990s in a more
+
+efficiency to validate legal institutions; (iii) assertion that the typical institutions of the
+
+financial markets to legal endowments considered “correct”,
+
+international comparative – packaging reform proposals inspired by the rule paradigm
+
+characterization of AED and NEI as two tributaries of the same paradigm, which
+
+of public law.
+
+with several joint publications (for which they became known as “LLSV”).
+
+close to the contributions of the NEI, with international and comparative components more
+
+typically pro-market economic sensitivity of neoliberalism, gaining expression
+
+as Legal Origins Theory. The main exponents of this
+
+intellectual support to the agenda of institutional reforms promoted according to the paradigm
+
+4.2 Law & Finance or Theory of Legal Origins
+
+financial deregulation; and (v) a supply-side bias that reverses into a shift away from
+
+378
+
+of law (and therefore also convergent with the NEI prescriptions) consisted of the movement
+
+common law are more likely to promote efficiency or economic growth than
+
+strand are Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanez, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny,
+
+resulting in institutional environments that are efficient in attracting investors. There are affinities
+
+incorporated traits such as (i) institutional analyzes based on transaction costs; (ii) use of
+
+The main point of this lineage consists of the link between the good performance of
+
+Alongside AED, another source of legal analysis – this time with greater content
+
+redistributive policies. Basically, all these points converge, still, with the
+
+Another legal literature supporting the rule of law paradigm, but with links to
+
+institutions such as the World Bank231, is the Law & Finance movement, also known as
+
+It is considered, here, that the influence of the intellectual contributions of the AED on the
+proposals for institutional reform of international economic cooperation organizations were more
+indirect, having been mediated by the NEI, which in turn is directly used in the basis of part of the
+proposals for Bank reform.
+
+231
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+economic performance variables. In general terms, the studies by La Porta and
+
+question. In any case, the formulations above make up the intellectual foundation of the recipes for
+
+broad and dynamic financial resources to its own development. This association – or rather,
+
+– understood primarily as economic growth – to the existence of “correct” institutional
+
+environments, that is, conducive to business, pro-markets232 .
+
+statistics certainly contributed to LLSV elaborations becoming “highly
+
+inform these reports, the Law & Finance movement was at the base of the elaboration of the
+
+marked by institutional comparisons between countries, made based on surveys
+
+common law are more likely to have better and larger financial markets than those
+
+levels of economic performance in the world are presented as benchmarks, or better
+
+common law institutions.
+
+Collaborators (1997; 1998; 2008) make two fundamental statements. Firstly, your
+
+Law & Finance for institutional reforms aimed at promoting development in
+
+for business.” (Santos, 2006, p. 280) Since 2003, Doing Business has produced reports
+
+empirical data, and which relate legal institutions to financial markets and
+
+better for the economy: something that the occurrence of the subprime crisis in 2008 puts into question
+
+Business, of the World Bank, which “claims to have discovered which legal rules promote the
+
+Law & Finance studies came into being at the end of the 1990s and are
+
+influential” both in academia and among policy makers (cf. Milhaupt;
+
+correlation – assumes the sense of causality: finance promotes economic growth.
+
+379
+
+The presentation of arguments based on numerical language and correlations
+
+whose law has roots in civil law. Secondly, they associate the existence of markets
+
+growth and recommends its adoption in developing countries as best practices
+
+practices, for legal institutions in developing countries (2006, p. 294). In addition to
+
+comparative analyzes lead to the assertion that countries with “legal endowment” of the
+
+annual surveys that currently cover 189 countries. Legal institutions associated with major
+
+different points in the world; revenues that consist, essentially, in the universalization of
+
+In addition, there is the incorporation of the assumption that the larger the financial markets,
+
+Pistor, 2008, p. 20; Santos, 2006). Such contributions form the basis of the Doing project
+
+Douglas Arner clarifies this connection when he states: “Departing from the theoretical foundation
+developed by North, an empirical literature rapidly developed in the late 1990s as North's theories
+were modeled and tested. The most influential consisted of a series of studies by La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes,
+Shleifer and Robert Vishny, which are commonly referred to collectively as 'LLSV'.” (Arner,
+2007, p. 48) Emerso Fabiani also highlights the affinities between the NEI and the Law & Finance
+literature: “These contributions can be grouped within the perspective of institutional endowment,
+which sees law as a primary investment without which the development process cannot begin.” (Fabiani, 2011, p. 38)
+
+232
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The methods of quantification and statistical processing of data, from which they derive
+
+policies – makes it possible to circumvent the prohibition of interference in the domestic
+
+politics of countries, which falls on the Bank as a result of the Bretton Woods Accords235 .
+
+(hypothetical scenarios in which prices are estimated to reflect preferences of individuals in
+
+the arguments of Law & Finance, allow authors in this tradition – and the Bank
+
+380
+
+Law & Finance's methods are different from those used by AED. To the
+
+World Cup, by using this framework – be able to cover their recommendations for reform
+
+“Ease of Doing Business” indicator, which ranks countries according to the degree to which
+
+their institutions are judged favorable to the business environment233 .
+
+step that is common to find in AED studies – starting with Coase (cf. 1960), but
+
+legal status of a “technical necessity” (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 20), in a way that is
+
+unencumbered by – or impermeable to – other political considerations234. In practice, the
+
+especially in Posner (1973) and followers – arguments based on arithmetic assumptions
+
+assertion that reform proposals are derived from technocratic considerations – not
+
+233
+
+234
+
+235
+“Since the creation of the Doing Business project by the Private Sector Development Group of
+the World Bank (WB), the Law and Finance literature has come to play a prominent role in the
+practical field of legal reforms, since its methods of measuring the quality of the law were adopted
+to support comparative research on the business environment in World Bank member countries.
+They thus began to influence investment decisions by private actors and the BM itself. As a result,
+the rules valued as inducing financial development began to be taken as a reference by national
+reformers who intended to create better conditions for private investment, especially by those who
+demanded resources from the World Bank for the implementation of these reforms. Recently, this
+has been reinforced by the fact that other areas of the WB have started to adopt the indicators of the
+Doing Business project to assess the impact of reforms financed by the World Bank.” (Fabiani, 2011, p. 53-4)
+
+The prohibition against engaging in political activities is found in Section 10 of Article IV of the
+Agreement Establishing the World Bank: “The Bank and its staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any
+
+With the help of La Porta and collaborators, the World Bank established a
+database that assigns a numerical indicator to each country for a range of
+institutions ranging from shareholder and creditor rights to labor protection,
+the functioning of the courts, and so on. onwards. [...] More specifically,
+the endowment perspective, supported by the law and finance literature,
+has guided the legal reform policies of the World Bank and other
+international organizations. (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 20)
+
+Although he does not specifically refer to the influence of the Law & Finance movement, João
+Márcio Mendes Pereira's thesis on the World Bank highlights the instrumental role that banners such
+as "good governance" played for the Bank, in the sense of "providing an apparently technique for
+[...] transforming Eastern European countries and the former USSR into 'market economies'”, as well
+as promoting reforms in developing countries (cf. Pereira, 2009, p. 208 and passim). The pretense of
+presenting technocratic modes as depoliticized tools for organizing economic and social relations
+refers to the political function that it actually performs, and which is suggested in the title of the
+work: The World Bank as a political, intellectual and financial actor (Pereira, 2009 ).
+
+any of its members, nor will they be influenced in their decisions by the political characteristics of
+the member or members in question. Only economic considerations will be relevant to its decisions,
+and these considerations shall be impartially weighed in order to achieve the purposes stated in
+Article I [reconstruction and development; promotion of external private investments and balanced
+development, among others].”
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+aspects they support (rule of law) and the direction of reforms they seek to promote (institutions
+
+of economic performance of 49 countries (La Porta et al, 1997; 1998). The sample was divided
+
+their elaborations. Finally, subsection 4.2.3 discusses examples of reforms in institutions
+
+markets), Law & Finance analyzes are based on statistical correlations between
+
+American. On the other hand, the remaining 31 countries were classified into three subgroups
+
+expropriations by managers” of companies (La Porta et al, 1998, p. 1115). the protection
+
+Finance brings the “international” and “comparative” element to the center of its analyses, and
+
+development, and in opposition to movements such as the NDD and AJPE.
+
+financial. Thus, the protection of shareholders is evaluated in terms of their “voting powers,
+
+alternative name of Law & Finance: “theory of legal origins” (cf. La Porta et al., 2008,
+
+pro-market, shaped according to common law) are essentially the same, allowing
+
+into two large groups, according to the historical lineage of the legal systems of the countries,
+
+Based on this division of origins, LLSV delineate and quantify legal variables
+
+these are not special AED focuses. Despite these differences, the paradigm that the two
+
+The inaugural Law & Finance studies compared legal and variable allocations
+
+its focus is mainly on the comparison between “the common law and the French civil law.” (La Porta
+
+variables constructed from empirical surveys. Furthermore, the Law &
+
+corresponding to three origins of civil law: 21 in French civil law, 6 in German, and 3 in
+
+Brazilian legal procedures conducted based on this framework.
+
+381
+
+P. 286). On the one hand, 18 countries were identified with the Anglo common law tradition.
+
+Next, aspects of the main theses of Law & Finance are presented (4.2.1), while the
+
+subsequent subsection (4.2.2) exposes some of the main criticisms236 directed at
+
+et al, 2008, p. 290)
+
+ease of participation in corporate deliberations, and legal protections against
+
+that the two be placed on the same side of the contemporary debate about law and
+
+relating to the protection of investors and shareholders – or, more generally, creditors – in markets
+
+addressed as endowments or legal endowments. From this derives, moreover, the
+
+4.2.1 Aspects of the main theses of Law & Finance
+
+Scandinavian. Despite making three categorizations of civil law, the authors state that
+
+Finance, as well as AED.
+The movements addressed in sections 4.3 and 4.4 must also be seen as criticisms of Law &
+236
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+norms (enforcement). Basically – and in order to simplify the meaning of this wide range of
+
+financial environment is correlated to other institutional and performance factors
+
+This stage of the Law & Finance analysis already produces statistical conclusions. LLSV
+
+to creditors in general is addressed by measurements that include “respect for the guarantee
+
+variables produces multiple and concatenated conclusions regarding the impact of origins
+
+This configuration produces adverse effects on the growth of financial markets,
+
+possibility for administrators to unilaterally seek protection against their creditors.
+
+State. In fact, rule of law is an expression that appears expressly and repeatedly in these
+
+control over the company's administration, tend to be able to guarantee returns to their
+
+external factors, the size and dynamism of financial markets, the country's per capita income, etc. O
+
+variables – it can be interpreted that LLSV seek to evaluate the rule of law in the relationships between
+
+economic. Among them, the degree of concentration or diversification of shareholders in a company
+
+the quality of investor protection is worse, there is a greater degree of corporate concentration. You
+
+(1998, p. 1115-6). Another variable included in the analyzes is the effectiveness in applying the
+
+weaker.” (1998, p. 1138) In turn, the variation in the degree of rule of law relative to the
+
+below, for a schematic representation of the connections highlighted in this paragraph).
+
+of loans, the ease of pledging assets in case of default, and the restriction on
+
+legal concerns about the size and performance of financial markets. In turn, the authors
+
+conclude, therefore, that “common law countries offer creditors more legal protection
+
+382
+
+crossing between data relating to legal institutions with this second group of
+
+studies (La Porta et al, 1997; 1998).
+
+One of the conclusions derived from data crossing suggests that in countries where
+
+investments in these scenarios of low legal protection (1998, p. 1145). According to LLSV,
+
+investors, shareholders, company administrators and – one cannot leave out – the
+
+French civil law countries have the worst shareholder protection rates and the highest corporate
+
+concentration rates237 (1998, p. 1146). Only large shareholders, with
+
+(hereinafter referred to as “corporate concentration”), the ease of attracting capital
+
+strong against administrators”, while “French civil law countries offer the protections
+
+link general economic growth to the dynamism of finance (see Table 4.1,
+
+The lowest levels of corporate concentration are attributed to German civil law countries,
+while common law countries are positioned in an intermediate situation. LLSV point out, however,
+that many of the countries classified as belonging to German civil law are from East Asia, where
+“corporate law was significantly influenced by the United States, rather than by Germany, Austria
+or Switzerland.” (1998, p. 1146) From this modulation in the origins of the legal system of these
+countries, LLSV maintains the general conclusion that common law institutions are more
+conducive to the adequate development of financial markets, instead of taking the cases of countries of the East Asia as a source of doubt for this conclusion.
+
+237
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+firms.” (1998, p. 1114)
+
+are more protective of outside investors than those of the civil law, “in particular than the
+Once again, the analyzes produced by the authors point out that common law norms
+
+since “the protection that investors receive determines their willingness to finance
+
+–,
+
+funding for their business activities, which affects overall economic performance,
+
+creditors is correlated with the attractiveness of the local economy to foreign investment.
+particularly intensive in external funding.” (1998, p. 1152) Strong protection
+
+diversified range of shareholders, companies in these countries have more restricted channels of
+
+extensive information about trends in legal environments based on their origins: “we support
+
+“superior growth in capital-intensive sectors that rely heavily on
+
+expropriation by company administrators. On the other hand, with bases less
+
+The differences between systems, so far reported, are brought together in more detailed considerations.
+compared to common law countries” (1997, p. 1149).
+
+acquire a controlling interest – lose incentives to invest in the face of the possibility of
+
+LLSV conclude that countries with better debt guarantee mechanisms demonstrate
+With regard to the protection of creditors in general – and not just shareholders
+
+above all, by alienating small investors, including foreigners. These – who cannot
+
+investors and less developed capital markets, especially when
+civil law, and in particular French civil law, has both the lowest levels of protection
+
+383
+
+French civil law countries” (2008, p. 286). Or yet: “[n]our results demonstrate that the
+
+Table 4.1 – representation of causal chains suggested by the Law & Finance literature
+
+Source: based on La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; 2008; Pistor, 2009, p. 1648.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+AED, but also present in NEI. Differently, however, Law & Finance does not need to
+
+policies such as nationalization and direct state control figure more prominently; at the
+
+(1998, p. 1152)
+
+of the following excerpts, comparable to the applications (and the biases incorporated therein) of the AED
+
+that the common law promotes the strategy of social control that seeks to support the
+
+regulatory agencies seek to support markets rather than replace them.” (2008, p. 310) Finally, the
+
+operation by allocations determined by the State.” (2008, p. 286)
+
+common law is the result of correlations between the variables used in the analysis, based on
+
+common law are more conducive to economic growth than civil law,
+
+legal origins, would be the basis of explanations for variations in the degree of prosperity
+
+base your arguments explicitly in terms of transaction costs. Instead of
+
+tools of common law countries include litigation and regulation in support of
+
+(2008, p. 294). And the rule of law for finance, in turn, has variations based on its origins
+
+Here, there is a strong approximation with the thesis of the efficiency of the common law, led by the
+
+This consideration is complemented by another: “in the tools of civil law countries
+
+per capita income levels are associated with the degree of development of markets
+
+In this sense, the reforms seek to introduce, in developing countries, institutions
+
+functioning of private markets, while civil law seeks to replace this
+
+size and dynamism of financial markets is correlated with growth itself
+
+narrated in the previous section (cf. 4.1.3):
+
+The assertion of the superiority of common law by Law & Finance – correlative of the thesis
+
+384
+
+finance: “[c]ommon law countries are successful in finance because their strategies
+
+empirical. Although versed in different languages, the conclusions converge, for example
+
+financial, while this is a function of the degree of protection for investors
+
+establishing a “link that goes from the legal system to economic development.”
+
+legal support for the functioning of financial markets, which translates into greater
+
+hypothetical reasoning based on Coase's theorem, the assertion of the superiority of
+
+legal. The chain of variables leads to the conclusion that, deep down, the institutions of the
+
+markets.” (2008, p. 308) These style differences, proposed as intrinsic to the different
+
+economic status of countries (1998, p. 1152; 2008, p. 294). The authors suggest, in this sense, that
+
+of the efficiency of common law, in the AED – is the basis for producing reform proposals.
+
+[...] the emphasis of the common law on the judicial resolution of private disputes,
+rather than on legislation, as a solution to social problems, suggests that it is
+more likely to find greater emphasis on private contracts and ordinances, and
+less emphasis on government regulation, on the common law countries. (2008, p. 305)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 219-21).
+
+fend off new investments (1998, p. 1135). As happened in bankruptcy legislation
+
+debtors dissipate their capital. To favor development, these countries must
+
+degrees of protection for shareholders, investors and creditors in general, as well as other measures
+
+steps involved in starting a business, reducing the State's participation in the economy in
+
+predate the occurrence of the 2008 crisis, after which the relationship between deregulation of
+
+growth comes to consist of institutional “transplants” derived from countries of the common
+
+existence of ample possibility of appeal is linked to results of “massive destruction of
+
+which is the superiority of the common law and the link between the size and dynamism of
+
+examples of the wide range of legal reform recommendations designed to galvanize
+
+Thus, for example, the existence of “frequent interlocutory resources in
+
+(see section 4.2.3), the Law & Finance movement favors reforms in the order of
+
+Law & Finance has received criticism ranging from the methodology used in the
+
+law and, in particular, the legal system of the United States (cf. Woo, 2007, p. 172;
+
+tax on other creditors with real guarantees is pointed out as having the effect of
+
+less formalized, and more capable of providing security to contracts and property rights238
+
+(cf. 2008, p. 298).
+
+aimed at increasing the rule of law in finance, such as judicial reforms. The recipe for
+
+general, through privatizations, lower participation in the banking system and deregulation
+
+reform the bankruptcy process to make it faster. Another criticism is directed at the order of
+
+finance – which Law & Finance actively promotes – and economic instability came to the fore.
+
+385
+
+financial markets and cause growth, such as: facilitating the attachment of assets, reducing
+
+value in bankruptcies” (2008, p. 323), given that the postponement of proceedings makes room for
+
+4.2.2 Some criticisms of Law & Finance
+
+financial markets with the economic growth of countries. Many of these criticisms
+
+bankruptcy procedures” of civil law countries is criticized. The delay involved in
+
+analyzes to the meaning of proposed reforms, going through their conclusions or theses, among
+
+preference to increase the priority given to investors. Those are just a few
+
+preference for credits in bankruptcies. The absolute priority given to labor claims and
+
+of finance. There are also formulations designed to make the judiciary more independent,
+
+Including through training programs aimed at judges, with support from the World Bank (cf.
+Santos, 2006, p. 282; Castro, 2005a, p. 128-9; 2014, p. 40).
+238
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+countries of this lineage “adopted common law modes” (2006, p. 476), and an expression of this is
+
+criticism of theses and meanings of Law & Finance reforms.
+
+robust financial resources, but one that is linked to politics, not “legal endowments”: the occupation
+
+the greater practical importance that precedents have come to have in their legal systems.
+
+Paraphrasing Milton Friedman239, Roe states: “we are all coders now”
+
+presentation of a variable that strongly correlates with the development of markets
+
+It should also be remembered that the perspectives addressed in sections 4.3 and 4.4 are also
+
+Exchange Commission (2006, p. 473) –, projecting a typical feature of civil law, also the
+both started to “regulate and codify” – even the United States, via Securities and
+
+reforms that, in the case of Law & Finance, replicate common law recipes.
+
+legal institutions that focus on finance. Another attack is made using the
+& Finance: the existence of significant differences between common law and civil law in terms of
+
+from contestation to the promotion of global institutional convergences, or adoption of packages
+
+the two systems have grown closer, eroding the distinction (2006, p. 475-8). While
+
+empirical studies by LLSV. A first attack concerns the Law's most essential assumption.
+
+the literature of “varieties of capitalism”. All, after all, can be read as contributions
+
+centrality in legislation. However, at least with regard to financial regulation,
+normative centered on judicial precedent and prudence, while civil law has
+
+new development economics, discussed in section 3.4. There are also points of contact with
+
+contributing to casting doubts on the consistency of the statistical treatment of the data
+Mark Roe (2006) is one of the authors who attack the Law & Finance methodology,
+
+Several of the criticisms addressed below are close to formulations of the
+
+different from each other. Conventionally, the common law is described as a production system.
+In the first aspect, Roe points out that common law and civil law are no longer as
+386
+
+about finance
+
+(2006, p. 479), and summarizes this first argument:
+
+by a foreign power during World War II.
+
+4.2.2.1 Approximations between civil law and common law and effects of the Second World War
+
+239
+
+Differences in legal origins were probably never strong enough to explain
+differences in financial development well. Whatever general differences
+there may have been has been greatly eroded. Common law systems
+regulate and legislate, as do civil law nations.
+
+“We're all Keynesians now.”
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of investor protection, the shape and size of financial markets and, ultimately,
+
+Second war." (2006, p. 482) In this environment, the institutional reconstruction of countries
+
+institutions of the two groups of countries: while the main common law countries do not
+
+linked to its human capital.” (2006, p. 498) As a result, in civil law countries
+
+since such origins are significantly different, they could not be used as
+
+suffered military invasion and devastation during the 20th century, and especially during World War II.
+
+resulting in a survival
+
+Roe presents the hypothesis that such voters “would care little about protecting the
+
+the degree of economic development. Roe proposes that another variable is correlated to
+
+devastated countries tended to privilege the protection of labor markets and the public allocation of
+
+financial (2006, p. 495). Roe employs the case of Switzerland – country with financial markets
+
+independent variables to explain effects on the shape of legal institutions, the degree
+
+law, whose “institutions were destroyed and then rebuilt in the political environment of the post
+
+In contrast, major common law countries were relatively less
+
+the “financial [d]ifferences between occupied and unoccupied nations, and between civilian and
+
+Thus, there would be a construction error in the theory of legal origins, since, not
+
+affected by the conflict, the political scenario was not market-friendly
+
+suffered invasion – like the United States and Great Britain
+
+Another element pointed out by Roe to cast doubt on the theory of origins, and
+
+387
+
+financial capital because they had little of it and because their well-being was more
+
+World War. The author states that the conflict produced different effects on the
+
+affected by destruction, which Roe associates with more market-friendly institutions
+
+–,
+
+the latter, based on the fact that almost all central civil law nations
+
+“solidos” (2006, p. 508) –, to reinforce this thesis:
+
+capital, reflecting preferences of a constituency whose wealth had been affected by the conflict.
+
+"more or less intact" of its institutions, the same did not happen with the countries of civil
+
+(2006, p. 502).
+
+to reinforce the explanation based on the effects of the military conflict, lies in the finding that
+
+I suspect it is no accident that Switzerland – a civil law nation – has
+securities markets and ownership separation numbers closer to those of
+the United States and Great Britain than those of France or Germany: the
+Switzerland is one of the few core civil law countries that was not destroyed
+during the 20th century. (2006, p. 498-9)
+
+Furthermore, the function sought – investor protection specifically, and
+property rights in general – can be achieved by multiple means. (Roe, 2006,
+p. 516)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+United States – provides the closest model to what would be the ideal rule of law. That
+
+Law & Finance makes spurious correlations between, on the one hand, the size and dynamism of
+
+“legal endowment” as a possible determinant of economic outcomes; (iii) the approach to
+rule of law) for promoting economic growth; (ii) the static conception of
+
+temporary. Roe's two attacks can be synthesized in a single statement: the movement
+
+that the common law system – particularly that embodied in the legal institutions of the
+(Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 21) Once this relationship is configured, there is the additional statement that
+
+finance are attuned to conflict, political economy, localized circumstances, and
+
+superiority of the common law (which contains broader questions about the role
+Such criticisms focus on four main points, which concern (i) the thesis of
+
+For Roe, therefore, the elements that explain the institutional differences linked to
+
+that “runs in one direction: from law to economic institutions and growth.”
+
+raising aspects and foundations different from those approached by Mark Roe (2006).
+
+supports economic growth via financial markets. A causal relationship is assumed
+In the Law & Finance approach, the existence of the rule of law is the element that
+
+distant.” (2006, p. 510)
+
+Another series of criticisms240 attacks Law & Finance even more comprehensively,
+
+4.2.2.2 Extending criticism to Law & Finance
+
+of the common law, faded in the rich West as the year 1945 became more
+
+“Rule of law” and superiority of “common law”
+
+right with a reduced focus on its “protective” function. These aspects are discussed below.
+388
+
+legal systems.
+
+reforms as a formal, technocratic and politically neutral matter and (iv) the approach of
+
+financial markets today and, on the other hand, the medieval origins, quite remote, of the
+
+240 Such criticisms were raised based, above all, on Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) and Pistor (2009).
+Certain aspects of Woo (2007) and Kennedy (2011) converge with these criticisms and were used in a way
+
+The dissipation over the last decade of major post-World War II financial
+effects in the rich West tells us that differences in finance were likely local
+and temporary, not the result of persistent features embedded in legal
+origins, but of post-war variations in politics, public policies, and economic
+tasks. (2006, p. 517)
+
+additional.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+understood and discussed in contemporary literature.” (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 220) This
+
+period between 1870 and 2000, and found that “[i]n all periods, countries
+1960. In contrast, Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) repeated the LLSV correlations for the
+
+many countries preceded the establishment of the “rule of law as that term is widely
+in line with Chang (2002) in Kicking away the ladder – that the early development of
+
+mainly to the 1990s and, only in the case of some studies, they extend to the years
+association between common law and economic growth. These data refer
+
+to explain “some of the most important economic success stories of the 20th century, such
+
+as those of Japan, South Korea241 and , more recently, China.” Furthermore, they highlight –
+
+common law to its features of supporting private transactions in markets and encouraging
+
+This attack targets the way LLSV handled the data that resulted in
+
+Milhaupt and Pistor (2008, p. 5) point out, however, that relationships like these do not serve
+
+As previously noted, Law & Finance literature attributes the superiority of
+220)
+
+standardization of legal reforms” (2008, p. 5) to other corners of the globe.
+
+contradict the assertion of superiority of institutions shaped according to common law.
+Still in relation to the rule of law argument, Milhaupt and Pistor (2008)
+
+model is taken, therefore, as the “benchmark” from which a “very
+
+a single type of legal system exclusively associated with economic success.” (2008, p.
+common law (2008, p. 23). This finding allows, in turn, the statement that “there is no
+
+389
+
+first, economic growth next.
+
+belonging to at least some civil law family grew faster than the countries of the
+
+temporal inversion compromises the conception of causality that LLSV propose: rule of law
+
+Milhaupt and Pistor point out that “extralegal devices” operating in Japan, South Korea and China
+can “serve as a foundation for economic success, at least to some extent.” (2009, p. 39) Among
+them is the practice of administrative guidance, or administrative guidance of business activity by
+the State (2009, p. 41). Meredith Woo's study in Chang's (2007) work addresses this practice with
+greater attention, focusing on the cases of Japan and South Korea. Administrative guidance is
+defined there as a state practice whereby “economic policy is formatted and implemented by
+mechanisms informal bodies, consciously insulated from the interference of the formal legal
+system.” (Woo, 2007, p. 162) As a result, there is “wide discretion for the bureaucracy to make,
+interpret and apply detailed rules of economic behavior.” (2007, p. 164) Woo argues, in particular,
+that the use of administrative guidance was even more important for the development of South Korea
+than in the case of Japan, as it was not just used to give “pushes” (to nudge) in the economy, but
+also to reform it through “the industrial reorganization of 1998, which proposed finding the
+comparative industrial advantage of each conglomerate and then requiring firms to stick to it. The
+ultimate goal was to reduce overinvestment by reducing the number of firms in the same industrial
+sector, forcing firms to focus on their 'core competence' after years of excessive and redundant
+diversification.” (2007, p. 168) In other words, state orientation organized competition between
+Korean industrial conglomerates, allowing them to safely specialize and acquire scale gains in production, which favored their strategic positioning as companies globally.
+competitive in technology-intensive sectors.
+
+241
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+economic institutions, and not just institutions “on paper” – a point that converges with criticisms of the
+
+sustained growth” (2009, p. 1660), as it is doubtful that “bigger markets of
+
+as exogenous and fixed.” (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 21) In contrast to this notion, Milhaupt
+
+lineage of Ha-Joon Chang (cf. 2007a; 2007b) to conventional institutional approaches.
+
+economic changes: “the position of the legal system in relation to markets is seen
+
+that “market-friendly public policies are not always producing
+
+This point encompasses the importance of informal institutions for outcomes.
+
+2008 contributed to call into question the validity of this normative element, both in terms of
+
+exogenous and independent, and not as an element that interacts with its context and responds to
+economic outcomes through time. Furthermore, the right is taken as the variable
+
+less regulated is better. However, the occurrence of the global financial crisis of
+
+Law & Finance that Pistor (2009) formulates as follows:
+
+the medieval origins of legal systems maintain their determinative effects of
+
+(Pistor, 2009, p. 1659), which assumes that larger financial markets and
+
+more to “how legal systems” change in practice, resulting in an attack on the literature of
+importance to the remote origins of a legal order and its formal characteristics, and
+
+Underlying the LLSV approach is “market friendliness.”
+
+“endowments” or historical legacies. There is a static element in this conception, according to which
+
+forms as a legal change strategy favored by Law & Finance.
+
+Law & Finance productions see legal institutions as the result of
+
+expansion of finances. When considering these factors, Pistor argues that the normative element
+
+rolling, not an endowment.” (2008, p. 219) This change of view implies attributing less
+law and markets: “the law should not be seen as fixed, but fluid: a relationship
+
+390
+
+“Static” perspective of the legal endowment
+
+This aspect, in turn, is related to the topic of transplants from institutions
+
+and Pistor propose a dynamic conception of a “rolling relation” between
+
+actions or credit are necessarily the best” (2009, p. 1652).
+
+if – as we have suggested – legal and economic systems engage in a
+rolling relationship, attempts to find the ultimate determinants for observed
+outcomes in either law or economics (or politics, for that matter) must be
+futile, as this suggests that the relationship between these different factors
+is highly endogenous. (Pistor, 2009, p. 1664)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+of Law & Finance and its “disembedded” conception of legal institutions and markets
+
+local context stems from a supply-side approach to institutions
+
+policy and the existing demand for them to exist. There is a need for local demand for
+
+of social institutions. Instead, they propose a demand-side approach to
+
+policy” of legal institutions. Legal institutions are not independent of the system
+
+whether and how the transplant will work.” (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 208) Part of the lack of attention to
+
+In other words, Milhaupt and Pistor criticize the supply-side approach to reforms
+
+which it is incorporated into the institutional structure of the country that receives it significantly affects
+
+Milhaupt & Pistor propose to face the problem in terms of an “economy
+of society (cf. Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 20).
+
+aside considerations that “the nature of the demand for the transplanted right and process for
+
+local institutions, formal institutions will remain on paper:
+
+neutral, reflecting a disembedded conception of law and markets
+
+formal legal institutions through “transplants” from the common law, no longer
+
+demand." (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 206) Without there being a demand for relevant actors
+can be challenged and adapted to the changing socioeconomic environment in response to
+
+The reforms proposed by Law & Finance studies emphasize changes in
+
+supply-side approach, reforms are technically, politically
+expanding financial markets and therefore developing. To the
+
+Transplants as a formal, technocratic and apolitical undertaking
+
+challenge mechanisms, or “the process by which existing governance structures
+work. In the absence of demand, the transplant can be rejected in practice by
+
+391
+
+benchmark of Anglo-American law, will result in an institutional environment favorable to the
+
+understand local adherence to the intended reforms, favoring the vision of institutions
+
+institutions offered by institutions such as the World Bank so that they can actually
+
+legal. In this conception, the provision of the “correct” legal institutions, along the lines of the
+
+the performance of a legal transplant depends on the extent to which the
+changes are in line with the conduct of lawyers, judges and bureaucrats in
+applying and enforcing the law. And as with a domestically made law,
+enforcement conduct is profoundly affected by the demand for legal
+transplantation among the relevant actors (relevant constituencies) that
+support the existing governance system. Our theory is that the legal
+transplant will fit the receiving jurisdiction if it is sufficiently responsive to
+demand for the legal community to integrate the transplanted law into the
+surrounding legal system. (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 210)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+emphasized in the literature of varieties of capitalism regarding legal determination,
+
+(Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 21, 31; Pistor, 2009, p. 1666-7). “No serious consideration is
+
+society:
+to support market activities, these being the core of the organization’s conception of
+
+correlated to the dynamism of the private sphere and in particular the financial markets
+
+economy the administrative guidance practices, already mentioned, in addition to the very
+Pistor, 2008, p. 34) These are examples of the use of the coordinative function of law in relation to
+
+mainly to property rights and contracts, but also to individual rights
+
+transversal to several literatures: the notion that institutions should be molded in a way
+limitation of the right to an exclusively protective function is reconciled, in essence, with a theme
+
+Law & Finance analyzes attribute to law a protective function, directed
+
+coordination as opposed to individualized enforcement of rights.” (Milhaupt;
+
+market, and that providing them will promote efficiency and growth.” (Kennedy, 2011, p. 2)
+
+The exclusively protective function of the right
+
+can be used to reflect social and political preferences for collective bargaining and
+protection, coordination of economic relations. After all, the “design of legal systems
+
+20), which interact with them and affect their practical functioning.
+
+'strong and clear' ownership are prerequisite for the functioning of a
+neoliberal economic rights” – in particular advanced by the NEI – that “rights to
+
+legal “embedded in a range of other complementary rules and institutions” (2009, p.
+
+basic and two supplementary functions. Among the basic functions are, in addition to
+Milhaupt and Pistor emphasize, however, multiple functionalities of the law242. There's two
+
+392
+
+economic activity." (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 21) This conception reflects “prescriptions
+
+are elected by employees (cf. Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 181). To know if a system
+existing in Germany, that half of the board members of companies
+
+made regarding the possibility that law can perform other functions in support of
+
+242
+
+The market in the state of nature remains the ideal type against which real-world
+markets are benchmarked. Institutional elements are complements, not
+constituents of markets. Its function is to bring markets closer to their supposed
+true nature. The implication is that there is only one optimal (efficient) market
+model and only one optimal set of rules that can lead to it. (Pistor, 2009, p. 1652)
+
+For another conception of roles and functions of law, with points of contact with the characterization of
+Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) addressed here, cf. Coutinho (2013, p. 95-101).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+elements involved in the protective function of law ends up covering aspects of
+
+interpretation finds supporting elements in aspects raised by David Kennedy,
+
+entitlements will be safeguards, and to the detriment of others. Even the definition of
+
+to protect already involves a coordinating function of law, at least in a broad sense. That
+possible to read it in the sense that the very choice of property rights to
+
+obscure the choices underlying the definition of a property regime: especially which
+clarity of property rights appears, from these considerations, to be inadequate for
+
+Despite introducing this criterion of differentiation, the functions of law are not seen
+
+as mutually exclusive, but complementary (2008, p. 36). And even
+
+The development approach versed in terms of protection increments and
+
+proposes to resolve conflicting interests”:
+law leans more towards protection or coordination, the authors propose that “how it
+
+393
+
+development and the element of choice between ownerships imbricated in them:
+
+coordination – not so much in terms of establishing collective bargaining mechanisms
+
+that emphasizes the variety of property regimes involved in different
+
+243
+
+the advanced economies of the modern West have experienced periods of
+aggressive industrialization and economic growth with a wide range of
+different ownership regimes in operation. Property regimes differ, sometimes
+dramatically, across industrialized societies, and all these societies harbor a
+variety of different formal and informal regimes.
+
+Some systems opt for litigation between opposing claimants, each claiming
+to have an exclusive right [...]. Contrast this with systems that openly
+discourage formal dispute resolution mechanisms and instead encourage or
+constrain opposing claimants to use less formal channels of bargaining and
+coordination. (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 181)243
+
+Economic growth has often depended on the erosion or elimination of
+traditional entitlements, as well as generating new rights and new forms of
+ownership. [...] Using property as an instrument for development strategy
+requires choosing – between varied economic interests and between modes
+of entitlement. The strategic instrument may well be the relative strength or
+clarity of one, rather than another, legal interest. In any property regime, some
+entitlements will be weak and vague, others will be strong or clear. The
+strategic configuration of a property regime requires careful consideration of
+the economic impact of making some rights strong or some entitlements clear
+over others. (Kennedy, 2011, p. 6)
+
+David Kennedy complements this point by stating: “Economic activity, in this view, takes place
+outside state power and thrives best when left alone. Today, it might seem that modernization and
+growth in the less developed regions of the world require that this economic domain be freed from
+developmental state control just as it was once freed from feudalism and mercantilism. [...] It is not
+uncommon to associate strong and clear property rights with a strongly restrained State and
+concomitantly with a robust private market, capable of functioning as an engine of growth and guarantor of efficiency.”
+(Kennedy, 2011, p. 7)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+development based on the rule of law paradigm (and its recommendations for reforms
+
+restricted corresponds to the “market-friendly” vision and which views the actions
+
+for public policies), is the topic of section 4.3, below.
+
+protective function of legal systems. Ultimately, however, the focus of this literature on this function
+
+of a strategic nature:
+
+legal. This new intellectual configuration, critical of legal approaches to
+practically exclusive in terms of economic growth – starts to incorporate objectives
+
+incorporate into the pricing mechanism. In view of this, the signs of law can take on
+
+Milhaupt and Pistor criticize the Law & Finance approach in its exclusive focus on
+By highlighting this variety of functions of law in relation to economic activity,
+
+right. Signaling is linked to the transmission of information, which in markets tends to be
+
+In this new moment, the very notion of development – previously understood in a
+
+zero." (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 35)
+
+(2008) relate signaling and providing credibility as supplementary roles of
+
+for legal institutions and the State in the economy, without undermining private action.
+development that, among other features, highlights the importance of more prominent functions
+
+In addition to the basic functions (protective, coordinative) of law, Milhaupt and Pistor
+
+of such governance structures, each outcome needs to be bargained for and implemented
+agents believe in the State's signals and act accordingly. “In the absence
+
+instead of avenues for individual litigation (stricter sense), but rather a state choice with
+
+collective and strategic economic implications (broader sense)244 .
+
+element is a reflection of the formation of a new moment in discussions about law and
+Pistor corresponds to more active roles of the State in the markets. In a way, this
+
+394
+
+provided by the State.” (Milhaupt; Pistor, 2008, p. 35) The law provides conditions for
+
+state in the economy, while the expansion of the functionalities of Milhaupt and
+
+Finally, law performs the function of providing credibility “to governance structures
+
+244
+
+See, in the previous chapter, item 3.4.2.1.
+
+Law not only helps to establish the rules by which market activities take place,
+but also to make broader statements about government priorities, the future
+direction of public policy, the relative strength of interest groups on a specific
+issue, and other information that can be useful to actors in markets. (Milhaupt;
+Pistor, 2008, p. 34)
+
+These considerations refer to the role of the State as “conflict manager” in Ha-Joon Chang (1994).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+legal innovation favored predictability and speed “in the constitution of guarantees and in the
+
+them is the decision to expand the “degree of opening of the banking sector to foreign capital”,
+
+financial institutions – usually needed to go through two distinct procedural modalities to
+
+judicial collection of debts”, with “exact correspondences between the measure
+
+bank by Provisional Measure 1925/1999. Before, creditors – including institutions
+
+preceded the influence of Law & Finance on the guidelines at the World Bank. In between
+
+to have a legal form that gave them executive force (Fabiani, 2011, p. 61-2). A
+cash payment made to a financial institution in credit operations”, began to
+
+Certain reforms in public policies related to bank credit in Brazil
+
+The first of the reforms analyzed by Fabiani is the creation of the credit note
+
+bank credit, not only credit opening contracts, but also “every promise of
+
+Brazil
+
+proceed directly to the execution process. With the reform that introduced the
+
+4.2.3 Some applications of Law & Finance in reforms in the banking credit sector in
+
+of Justice (STJ), preventing creditors from “skipping” the stage of the knowledge and
+
+Brazilian according to the Law & Finance guidelines, critically reported in the work Law
+
+and banking credit in Brazil, by Emerson Fabiani245 (2011).
+
+Informative explanations of reforms:
+would occur from 1999, when Law & Finance hypotheses began to integrate
+
+Next, subsection 4.2.3 offers examples of reforms that have occurred in the law
+
+considered an extrajudicial enforceable title. The point was summed up by the Superior Court
+In this context, the credit opening agreement in financial institutions was not
+
+395
+
+economic order and, when microeconomic, with a competitive bias.” Something different
+
+implemented and the rules valued by Law and Finance.” (2011, p. 64)
+
+the judicial obtaining of the payment of debts: the process of acknowledgment and execution.
+
+in 1995 (Fabiani, 2011, p. 30). Changes like these were informed by analyzes “of
+
+245
+
+Institutional flaws would also be fundamental explanatory factors for the poor
+development of the credit market. This increasingly widespread conjecture
+points to the weakness of the investor protection regime and the inability of
+the judicial system to enforce contracts (lack of enforcement) as the main
+reasons for the low volume and high costs of credit in circulation.
+(Fabiani, 2011, p. 32)
+
+Author who fits into the NDD framework (see section 4.3 below; cf. Castro, 2014a).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+removing “the decision on whether or not to perform the contract from the sphere of control of the
+
+allowed the “fiduciary sale of shares in corporations” and real estate. A
+
+The third modification was the recognition of the agreement for compensation of
+
+administrator of the mass, in the name of the regularity of behaviors and the healthiness of the
+
+Provisional 2192/2001 introduced the compensation of payments in bankruptcy proceedings,
+
+restriction on movable property has changed over time. Modifications prior to 1999
+
+of future claims with the same bankrupt company.” (Fabiani, 2011, p. 70-1) The Measure
+
+debtor, who became the direct owner of the good in question. (Fabiani, 2011, p. 66) This
+
+in the direct and indirect possession of the creditor.” (2011, p. 66) Fabiani considers that
+contractual provision to the contrary, the assets object of alienation or fiduciary assignment “will remain
+
+of movable property to the creditor, as a guarantee of the fulfillment of an obligation by the
+
+solvent party is “obligated to settle current debts, regardless of the existence
+
+involvement of the Judiciary in the realization of the guarantee” by stipulating that, in the absence of
+
+fiduciary alienation meant the “transfer of resolvable property and indirect possession
+
+bankruptcy chooses “which contracts must be fulfilled and which must not”, so that the
+contractual.” There is, however, room for the administrator of a company in the process of
+
+of fiduciary alienation and assignment. In the 1960s, the introduction of the legal institution of
+
+fiduciary guarantee” in financial transactions, but also dispensed with “formalities or the
+2011, p. 66) The changes not only expanded the “range of objects capable of serving as
+
+Another reform that reflects recommendations from this perspective was the increase in the reach
+
+circumstances, “obligations are presumed to be fulfilled as the deadlines
+and debtor of each other due to entering into several contracts at the same time. in these
+
+396
+
+“fungible things in operations within the scope of the financial and capital markets.” (Fabiani,
+
+financial system.” (Fabiani, 2011, p. 73)
+
+payments. In the financial market, it is common for two parties to be creditors at the same time
+
+Provisional Measure 2160/2001 further expanded this role, allowing incidence on
+
+the measure to extend the scope of fiduciary alienation increases the level of
+protection for creditors in the dimensions of predictability and celerity, as it
+provides mechanisms to mitigate the risks of opportunistic behavior on the
+part of the debtor, provides unequivocal solutions to issues that were the
+subject of judicial discussions and provides more agility for the processes of
+setting up and realizing guarantees. (Fabiani, 2011, p. 69)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+appropriateness of the interlocutory appeal in civil proceedings and the introduction of treatment
+
+mercantile.” (Fabiani, 2011, p. 74-5) In practice, it created “a new credit instrument, marked
+
+Brazilian companies. The logic of intervention consisted of increasing the position of creditors
+
+devaluation of assets in bankruptcy proceedings, to the detriment of creditors (Fabiani,
+
+Finally, Fabiani groups together a series of changes corresponding to the rationalization of
+
+P. 87-92). The changes were intended to speed up the means of execution and to
+
+cheaper for the borrower.” (Fabiani, 2011, p. 75)
+
+binding, mandatory application by all judges and the Public Administration; (ii)
+
+“quantitative limitation of labor credits to be satisfied as a priority” and
+
+congestion in the Judiciary.” (Fabiani, 2011, p. 88) Among the measures introduced
+
+397
+
+In addition, acquirers of branches, isolated production units or assets no longer become
+
+Brazilian bankruptcy that was in force until 2005, among other aspects, gave unlimited priority to
+
+Debtors; (iii) removal of appeal possibilities, such as limiting the possibilities of
+
+possibility of CLT employees, retirees and pensioners of the National Institute of
+
+bankruptcy (Fabiani, 2011, p. 82).
+
+in their tax debts (Fabiani, 2011, p. 78). This setting corresponded to diagnostics
+
+differentiated – with sampling decision – for repetitive resources, etc. (cf. Fabiani, 2011,
+
+2011, p. 80). It also sent a message of additional risk for investments in
+
+judicial processes, that is, the “removal of procedural obstacles that cause
+
+“reduce the possibilities of opportunistic behavior by the debtor” (Fabiani, 2011, p. 93),
+
+current debts from loan, financing and leasing contracts
+
+low risk of default and, therefore, more attractive to financial institutions and
+
+with real guarantees in bankruptcy contexts, with temporary suspension of executions and
+
+are (i) the power granted to the Federal Supreme Court (STF) to edit precedents
+
+The fifth measure analyzed by Fabiani was the reform of bankruptcy law. The legislation
+
+modifications to the civil procedure designed to simplify the subpoena and seizure of property
+
+decrease in the order of preference for tax credits (Fabiani, 2011, p. 81-2). In addition
+
+Social Security (INSS) “authorize the deduction, directly from the payroll, of
+
+The fourth change aligned with Law & Finance was the legal provision for payroll credit,
+
+introduced by Law 10820/2003246, and which established the
+
+labor and tax credits, in addition to making the acquirer of assets from the bankrupt estate the successor
+
+successors of the tax obligations of companies undergoing judicial recovery or
+
+consignable as payment guarantee in credit contracts.
+Recently, Provisional Measure 681/2015 extended the amount of remuneration from 30% to 35% 246
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+to form a “field” in its own right. However, the grouped criticisms contain elements
+
+literature from Law & Finance and NEI, which influences the World Bank. In that
+
+for the formation of legal institutions linked to economic policy and public policies
+
+enough in common so that we can talk about a new moment in the debate on law
+
+Fabiani's research highlights the practical relevance of Law & Finance studies
+
+proposals and the prescription of the “institutional endowment perspective” – the amalgam between the
+
+prevalence. The new contributions have varied nuances, and there are doubts about whether they reach
+across the globe, certain critical perspectives, in recent years, have emerged and questioned their
+
+the legislative changes characterized above, noting correspondence between the measures
+
+financial markets.
+attributes of institutional environments considered conducive to the development of
+
+Economic Policy of the Ministry of Finance between 1999 and 2006, and which instructed
+
+law and development and guided the direction of institutional reforms at various points
+
+behaviors” and the “procedural speed” of Brazilian law (Fabiani, 2011, p. 122),
+
+Fabiani analyzes documents prepared by the Central Bank of Brazil and the Secretariat of
+
+Although the rule of law paradigm has informed the mainstream literature on
+
+4.3 New Law and Development
+
+debt payment.
+
+banking sector assumed the common meaning of increasing the “predictability of
+
+institutional practices to which they refer: “New Law and Development”
+
+Specifically, transformations in legal institutions linked to credit
+
+via a reduction in the mechanisms that made the judiciary a means of delaying
+
+moment of the legal ordering of international relations discussed in section 2.3.
+national legal system to cross-border developments, which correspond to the
+
+398
+
+and development. Various terms are employed to label these contributions and new
+
+in Brazil. It also exemplifies the permeability of the normative genesis processes of the
+
+This leads to two main conclusions:
+
+(a) to support the proposition of some measures, official documents cite
+theoretical references from the perspective of institutional endowment;
+and (b) the measures analyzed are all mentioned in World Bank reports as
+preparatory activities for obtaining financing or as a result of financed
+projects. (Fabiani, 2011, p. 122)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+manifestation of these in the institutional field, through the rule of law paradigm – whose support, since
+
+started by David Trubek in 2007, with transnational coverage (University of
+
+focus on different aspects of public policies.
+
+the law, were covered in sections 4.1 and 4.2. The following items seek to further characterize
+
+(Trubek; Alviar Garcia; Coutinho; Santos, 2013), with contributions from various authors and
+
+In the wake of its publication, the LANDS project – Law and the New Developmental State – was
+
+decades of 1980s and 1990s, marked by ideas associated with neoliberalism and, as
+
+The first of these began to take shape in the 1960s and went into crisis in the 1970s. It was the
+
+right of the developmental State247. The second, in turn, dominated the
+
+Santos, in 2006. The book proved to be an important reference for further studies. At
+
+and Law and the new developmental state: the Brazilian experience in Latin American context
+Law and development stand out: a dialogue between the BRICS (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012)
+
+law and economic development: a critical appraisal, organized by David Trubek and Alvaro
+
+The New Law and Development (NDD) was preceded by two other moments. O
+
+result, in recent years, in the publication of works relevant to the NDD, among which
+
+A defining moment for NDD formulations was the publication of The New
+
+4.3.1 Moments preceding the New Law and Development
+
+that fit into the NDD framework are brought up in subsection 4.3.3.
+
+state”, “law and development in the 21st century”, etc.
+
+it is linked to LANDS articulations (cf. CGLAD, 2015). These projects have
+(cf. LANDS, 2015). In Brazil, the Conference on Global Law and Development project
+
+(NDD), “new developmentalism”, “new developmental state”, “new activism
+
+Finally, some selected examples of legal analyzes of public policies in Brazil
+of its historical precedents, its contours are better specified in subsection 4.3.2.
+
+399
+
+and Faculty of Law at the University of Los Andes – Colombia) and support from the Ford Foundation
+
+Briefly, the context that serves as a counterpoint to the NDD ideas.
+
+While subsection 4.3.1 seeks to contextualize these new contributions in light of
+
+Wisconsin, GV Law - São Paulo, Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning – CEBRAP,
+
+Regarding this temporal delimitation, see the reservation below, in item 4.3.1.1. 247
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+–, at first, the private sector was not seen as a source of in sections 4.1 and 4.2
+
+conceived as an instrument for state policies aimed at economic growth. That
+
+interest in the style of legal reforms proposed at first declined in
+
+this first moment of the debate on law and development lost strength before having
+
+notion of development linked to modernization and measured in terms of growth
+
+sustained development. The presence of traditional social sectors represented
+
+discussions about development, the legal aspect had reduced interest compared to other
+
+overcoming the economic gap” and pointed to the State as a privileged place for
+
+build a sustainable foundation in academia.” (Trubek, 2014, p. 7) Despite this, both in
+
+balanced, unbalanced development or even dependency theory – all of them
+
+undermined their private interests. And there were “market failures”. As
+
+400
+
+“on the nature of law and on the characteristics of development” were
+
+were dominated by economists, with a late insertion of jurists
+
+Unlike conceptions aligned with the second moment – such as those described
+
+Part of the development assistance in the post-Second World War assumed the
+
+While it lasted, the vision of “developmental State law” favored a certain
+
+Despite the existence of some interest and practical initiatives for legal reform,
+
+dynamism. It was perceived as too weak to take off towards the
+
+consolidated into a “field or discipline.” (Trubek; Galanter, 2007, p. 265) According to Trubek,
+
+economic. Whichever strand of development theory was employed –
+
+resistance to changes that, although intended to promote economic growth,
+
+development organizations and foundations have shown some interest in articulations of the law that
+
+This moment became known as law and the developmental state, or even as ancient law and
+
+development. It is important to point out, however, that at a broader level of
+
+1970s and “lost support from development agencies before it could
+
+regarded the accumulation of wealth and industrialization as “key points for the
+
+actions associated with its promotion, in a scenario in which debates on development
+
+solution of collective action problems (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 31).
+
+academia and development agencies, some fundamental ideas
+
+form of reform programs in legal institutions. In the 1960s, certain agencies
+
+4.3.1.1 First moment: law and the developmental state
+
+(Trubek; Galanter, 2007 [1974], p. 264).
+
+shared (Trubek; Galanter, 2007, p. 265).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+development – were not post-war novelties, having preceded the formulations of
+
+a regulated market economy in which the state played an active role, not
+development harbors the strategies of the developmental State, by postulating the model “of
+
+It should be noted that many of these strategies - with the exception of official assistance to the
+
+legal provisions could set up barriers to economic development and serve to perpetuate
+
+external, official development assistance flows.
+
+(Castro, 2013; Castro, 2014a, p. 35). In any case, the first moment of law and
+until the late 1980s – found support in administrative law doctrines
+
+for the growth and state ownership of industries and public services – in addition to, in the
+
+every right was associated with the transforming dynamism of the state. certain institutions
+
+reforms in government programs corresponding to the developmental state – that is,
+
+of imports, state planning of investments in areas considered strategic
+
+changes necessary for economic growth: a “vector for transforming society.”248
+
+(Coutinho, 2013, p. 91) For no other reason, the focus falls on public law institutions,
+
+vehicles for state impulses in public policies249. However, neither
+
+for developmental states to intervene in the economy and promote
+
+These, in many Latin American countries, consisted of industrialization by substitution
+
+other legal references. In the case of Brazil, as Marcus Faro de Castro points out, the
+1980 (Trubek; Coutinho; Schapiro, 2012, p. 4). These policies were supported, however, by
+
+As a result, the public sector headed the strategies to promote development.
+
+In this context, the role of law was essentially instrumental: a tool
+owned by major industries and utilities.” (Trubek, 2006, p. 75)
+
+401
+
+developmentalism took place over a broader period, from the 1930s to the
+
+only by varied forms of planning and industrial policy, but also by the
+
+law and development referred to here. The policies associated with the State model
+
+“Several legal tools are used in this context: price control, subsidies, tariffs, quotas, lines of credit,
+public tenders and purchases, tax incentives and waivers, monopolies and public banks. The fields of
+economic, administrative, financial, tax, commercial and corporate law are pragmatically mobilized to
+put in place an industrial development project led by a State that knows adequate means to achieve
+legitimate ends, including increasing the population's income. .”
+(Coutinho, 2013, p. 87)
+
+“To this ideal typical model of the State, dedicated to a national policy of economic development
+that is still dissociated from the social dimension, corresponds to a type of legal framework that has
+the primary task of institutionalizing and operationalizing the modernizing and industrializing impulse.
+Law enables the structuring of a technocracy focused on the administration of the public apparatus,
+including the management of bodies, companies and institutional interfaces, as well as sectoral
+regulation, which leads to an abundant normative production. Legal rules are used both to structure
+the State itself and to stimulate specific sectors such as steel, civil construction, mining, petrochemicals,
+gas and oil, for example. Ultimately, the law is used to create non-existent markets, stimulating flows
+and transactions that otherwise would not exist.” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 87)
+249
+
+248
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Galanter, 2007, p. 265).
+
+too formalistic and lacking in “attention to public policy objectives”, and therefore
+
+Legal reform programs guided by this conception have failed to
+
+reform of this period consisted of legal education (Trubek, 2014, p. 5; cf. Trubek;
+
+'development') and not agents that would defend interests of segments relatively
+
+law would in fact be able to bring about the intended social transformations (Trubek;
+
+law and development sought to “modernize” the right of “third world” countries to
+
+Proponents of this style of reform argued that, “by training jurists who think
+
+conception of law as something neutral, in the sense of being stronger than the inclinations
+
+402
+
+of Europe represented an advanced 'modern' form of law.” Another part emphasized the
+
+distance between the current performance of legal professions and their possibilities, related
+
+development
+
+“legal professions were, or would become, representatives of the public interest (interests of
+
+principles of legal modernization”, which is why one of the main focuses of the
+
+legal restrictions could reduce investment incentives and increase the costs of innovation”
+
+Galanter, 2006). The legal culture of Latin American countries was seen as
+
+little ones of society.” (Trubek; Galanter, 2006, p. 275) That is, they favored a
+
+promote the expected changes. “Investments in the teaching of law aimed at
+
+channeling transforming state action – how much to put obstacles in it (cf. Trubek;
+
+as a source of obstacles to development policies (Trubek, 2006, p. 76). You
+
+Faced with these possibilities, part of the articulated reforms based on this first
+
+individuals, while seeing him as good and powerful, in the sense that the
+
+from transplants: “scholars and agencies assumed that the laws of the United States and
+
+Galanter, 2006, p. 290). According to Trubek and Galanter, this way of thinking about law and
+
+more instrumentally, colleges could initiate a change that would lessen the
+
+(Trubek, 2014, p. 4). Therefore, the law could either facilitate development –
+
+the need for changes in the legal culture and considered the faculties of law “agents
+
+of traditional sectors considered retrograde, since “the wrong kind of rules and practices
+
+to development.” (Trubek; Galanter, 2006, p. 271-2) They assumed, however, that the
+
+(Trubek; Galanter, 2006, p. 275)
+
+led relief efforts to focus on reforming formal norms; to work with established
+professions, to believe that changes in the training of professionals would
+ultimately produce the desired social changes and, above all, to assume,
+almost automatically, that any activity aimed at transforming the legal
+institutions of Third World countries with the end of bringing them closer to
+those of the United States would have effective and moral value.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+takes a different direction. It is no longer a vehicle to channel transformative impulses from the
+
+superiority of the common law over the rule of law paradigm, characteristic of the second
+
+The prevailing conception of development in this changed scenario no longer sees the
+2006, p. 83).
+
+(Trubek; Galanter, 2006, p. 275-6; Trubek, 2006, p. 80). However, influence of the thesis of
+
+attributed an instrumental role to legal institutions. However, this instrumentality
+The second moment of law and development, like the first, also
+
+adverse economic conditions in the 1970s and 1980s, already covered in chapter 3. In its
+
+moment of crisis, the ethnocentric250 aspect of the proposed reforms was also criticized
+
+aimed at the foreign market; and from public to private flows of capital (Trubek,
+State to the market; of growth strategies aimed at the domestic market for those
+
+was a reflection of the exhaustion of the developmental state model due to conditions
+
+market leadership.” (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 34)
+
+consolidated in the 1980s, was marked by three major general changes in emphasis: from
+
+Trubek, 2014, p. 9) The failure of the first moment of law and development also
+
+economy was undermined by analyzes of government failures and opened space for
+proclaimed Washington Consensus. The identification of the State as a sector of leadership
+
+The passage from the first to the second moment of law and development,
+
+performance of law and in social relations.” (Trubek; Galanter, 2006, p. 278, cf.
+
+4.3.1.2 Second moment: law and neoliberal development or the rule of law paradigm
+
+transforming the orientation and role of jurists resulted in little change, either in the
+
+(Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 36). “The theory of development gave rise to the propositions of
+new role is that of “institutional guarantor”, guarantor of “stability of the rules of the game”
+
+403
+
+the ethnocentric aspect of institutional reforms was abandoned.
+
+State as a driver of socioeconomic transformations linked to growth. Your
+
+moment of law and development, demonstrates that this criticism was not enough for
+
+“It became clear that many designers had employed a linear model of development. In this model,
+it was assumed that all nations went through similar stages to achieve a common end, represented,
+in this type of thinking, by the legal, economic and social structures of the United States and Western
+Europe.” (Trubek, 2006, p. 80) The conception of development stages in a linear sequence refers to
+the formulations of Walt Rostow (1964 [1960]), in Stages of economic development. According to
+this author, it would be “possible to classify all societies, in their economic dimensions, within one
+of the following five categories: traditional society; the preconditions for the take-off, the take-off,
+the march to maturity and the era of mass consumption.” (Rostow, 1964, p. 14)
+
+250
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+with the emphasis on public law in the first instance, private law is the privileged vehicle of
+
+governance252 (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 28).
+
+preceded it. With the help of its influxes, the field of law and development gained
+that have become the mainstream of law and development, not the developmentalism that
+
+private and spontaneous market transactions.” (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 35) In contrast
+
+2014, p. 17) These three aspects refer to the three elements raised by Schapiro and Trubek
+of state activism, and new questions for the field of law and development.” (Trubek,
+
+development model less anchored in public coordination and more confident in
+
+these conceptions – refractory to active roles of the State in promoting development –
+pro-market reform agenda already outlined in the aforementioned sections. Interestingly, they were
+
+private interests of economic agents”, that is, “to guarantee the bases of support for a
+
+in the 21st century in a scenario of “new ideas in development economics, new forms of
+
+economic field, find shelter in the NEI of North and Williamson –, boosting the
+
+began to be articulated in support of the “privatization of economies” and to “reinforce the rights
+
+The third moment of the debate on law and development – the NDD – was formed
+
+4.3.2 Outlines of the New Law and Development
+
+Law & Finance integrate the articulations of “neoliberal law and development” – which in the
+
+tool to contain the power of the State against the private sphere. As a result, the right
+
+supporting legal formulations, discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.2. In other words, the AED and
+
+State in society, but rather a framework for market activities251 and a
+
+11).
+development, becoming “big business” in the 1990s (Trubek; Santos, 2006, p.
+
+404
+
+law and development marries the institutionalist paradigm of the rule of law and its
+
+academic space and consolidated its influence with international agencies of
+
+From these aspects, it is possible to note that the characterization of the second moment of the
+
+“In terms of legal tools, Moment 2 corresponds, synthetically, to the use of the apparatus
+to 'liberalize' markets. A state intervention considered intrusive is rejected through the introduction
+of incentives for competition and rivalry between economic agents, the deregulation of sectors
+hitherto subordinated to norms that provided for technical and technological standards, performance
+targets, as well as controlling entry and exit of agents in the markets.” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 88)
+The reforms in public law corresponding to this second moment sought to contain the role of the
+State in the economy. “Economic and administrative law in several countries is used to, through
+privatization processes, remove the State from the economy, sell public assets, giving the Public
+Power the role of regulator in a game in which the players are private actors. The clear definition and
+secure enforcement of property rights and the function of reducing transaction costs in favor of the
+fluidity of market exchanges summarize the essential functions of an efficient legal order.” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 88)
+
+252
+
+251
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+legal reforms were intended to promote economic growth. In the NDD, the
+
+some examples of approaches corresponding to this third moment of law and
+
+for the development. Instead of technocratic, top-down interventions, according to
+
+economic and social aspects”, is now incorporated as an objective in its own right by the
+
+“rules of the game”, while at the same time emphasizing the need for their partnership or
+
+Quite important, even with regard to the incorporation of new formulations
+
+starting to include legal, social and political elements in its definition, which in Sen
+
+4.3.2.1 NDD and new concepts about development
+
+development, based on experimentation, discovery, democratic dialogue in the elaboration
+
+ideas from Amartya Sen (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 42; Trubek, 2014, p. 17). this view
+
+405
+
+closely with authors of heterodox economic contributions, such as Ha-Joon Chang,
+
+between countries). In short, instead of preaching that the best path is to follow a
+
+narrated above attributed to the right an instrumental function in relation to development. To the
+
+development alternatives (cf. Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 53).
+
+These authors' elaborations attribute more active roles to the State than that of provider of
+
+development used; (ii) the sector identified as the protagonist for its promotion and (iii) the
+
+“legal protection of constitutional values and human rights, including human rights
+
+synergy with the private sector. There is also rejection of solutions that follow pre-fixed recipes
+
+economic developments by NDD, is the expanded conception of development itself, which absorbs
+
+development. That is, more than an instrumental function, the law receives a role
+
+characterize the main aspects of the NDD. Subsequently, subsection 4.3.3 depicts
+
+one-size-fits all, this line of thinking emphasizes the plurality of possible paths to
+
+development.
+
+breaks the practically exclusive association between development and economic growth,
+
+When it comes to new ideas about development, the NDD talks
+
+appear under the name “freedoms” (see section 1.2). The first and second moments
+
+of public policies and horizontal dialogue (observation and exchange of institutional experiences
+
+emphasized governance vehicle. Items 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.3 employ these elements to
+
+Dani Rodrik, Erik Reinert, Peter Evans and Alice Amsden, among others (see section 3.4). To the
+
+(2012, p. 28) to distinguish moments of law and development: (i) the conception of
+
+script, these authors make the context of each country central in discovering their own
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+“mechanism oriented towards inducing business discovery and not towards programming
+
+less absolute and closed notion of development. (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 42) There are
+
+expanded role for the State in promoting development. “State intervention is
+
+is not taken as a tool of public direction, through which the State
+
+4.3.2.2 NDD and new forms of state activism
+
+2012, p. 3) The approach seeks to support institutional configurations that favor
+
+of private protection.” (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 49)
+
+culturally particular”, by Balakrishnan Rajagopal (2003, p. 138), which diverges from notions
+
+investment, weak innovation systems, and low levels of private investment in
+
+private” (Trubek, 2013, p. 8). Unlike previous moments, “there is no
+
+“effective public development policies require close coordination between actors
+
+406
+
+development conceptions also refer to the greater space attributed to policies
+
+proposal of the developmental State of the first moment, which did not provide greater
+
+economic intervention policies – such as industrial policy, but not only – such as
+
+State seeks to “stimulate, not replace, the private sector.” (Trubek; Coutinho; Schapiro,
+
+aspect taken up later (4.3.2.3).
+
+P. 17, 19; Trubek; Santos, 2006, p. 9).
+
+results to be achieved by private agents.” In this sense, the “industrial policy
+
+Another hallmark of the third moment of law and development is the recognition of the
+
+“strong markets and strong States”, emphasizing the “importance of public collaboration
+
+would establish the means and goals.” (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 46) This conception states that
+
+industrialization, sometimes to market fundamentalism, recent works suggest a
+
+necessary due to structural obstacles to growth”, such as “low propensity to
+
+approaches with the vision of “development as a discourse based on values,
+
+sole protagonism, neither for state intervention devices nor for mechanisms
+
+univocal development guidelines, conceived and applied top-down. The opening alluded to in the
+
+The difference in focus corresponding to the new state activism is reversed in the use of
+
+research and development (R&D)” (Trubek, 2013, p. 8). This is not, however, a return to
+
+As a result, “unlike the previous propositions, now focused on
+
+redistributive, to the reduction of inequalities, in the intellectual framework offered by the NDD –
+
+constitutive in relation to development, becoming part of its definition (Trubek, 2014,
+
+importance to the initiatives of private agents in the markets. This new form of activism
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+industrialization was sought, in many Latin American countries, according to the
+
+NDD contrasts in many aspects with what happened in previous moments. The items below
+The way in which law, in its relationship with development, is approached by
+
+internal market is related to the external one. In old developmentalism, the
+Another distinction between new and old state activism is the way in which
+
+4.3.2.3 NDD and new conceptions of law as a governance vehicle
+
+between the State and private agents.
+conditions of global competition for local economic sectors, via strategic partnerships
+
+specific contexts.” (Trubek, 2013, p. 10) This new sense of state activism – in which the
+
+state does not suppress the private – is identified with what happened in Brazil253:
+
+Schapiro, 2012, p. two). In other words, industrial policy starts to take on the meaning of promoting
+
+investment, and the careful shaping of public action to address needs and
+
+but of integration into international markets (Trubek, 2013, p. 9; Trubek; Coutinho;
+
+public and private, joint experimentation and search for new opportunities for
+
+407
+
+relative to external competitors. In contrast, NDD does not encourage isolation strategies,
+import substitution, which implied a certain degree of isolation of the national industry in
+
+When Brazil began to develop new forms of state activism, it did not
+renationalize state-owned companies that had been privatized, impose price
+controls, create a top-down development plan, discourage foreign
+investment, declare a moratorium on its international obligations, carry out
+deficit spending, or closed its markets to foreign industries. Efforts focused
+on building new forms of industrial policy that emphasized innovation and
+partnership with industry. At the same time, it has placed substantial
+emphasis on social policies and redistribution and has aimed to combine
+its social policy and industrial growth strategies. (Trubek; Coutinho;
+Schapiro, 2012, p. 13)
+
+(Trubek, 2013, p. 12), given the preservation of previous policies such as inflation control, openness
+to foreign investment and macroeconomic policy in general (Trubek; Coutinho; Schapiro, 2012, p. 8).
+The recovery occurred in 2004, with the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE),
+which focused on financial support and the promotion of innovation in four sectors: semiconductors,
+software, capital goods and medicines. Part of PITCE’s strategy was to “facilitate partnerships and
+synergy between universities, companies and research institutes” as well as to provide “government
+support for university research.” (Trubek; Coutinho; Schapiro, 2012, p. 9, cf. Schapiro; Trubek, 2012,
+p. 48) In 2008, the Productive Development Policy (PDP) replaced PITCE as a “much more ambitious
+and complex” industrial policy and which “placed special emphasis on collaboration between the
+public and private sectors” in a more varied range of industries (Trubek; Coutinho; Schapiro, 2012,
+p. 9-10; cf. Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 50). This lineage of industrial policy based on public-private
+coordination continued with the “Brasil Maior” program, started in 2011, and which identified 20
+priority sectors for economic development (Trubek; Coutinho; Schapiro, 2012, p. 11).
+
+The new state activism in Brazil corresponds to the resumption of industrial policy instruments
+in the 21st century, which had been abandoned in the 1990s in favor of market-centered approaches.
+The new style of economic policy did not completely suppress the previous model, but resulted in a “hybrid”
+253
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+characterization encompasses four roles corresponding to four legal dimensions.
+
+At first, the privileged vehicle of governance was public law. At the
+
+combinations of elements of public and private law. There is no single legal tool
+
+of arrival'” of public policies (2013, p. 99). This function corresponds to the dimension
+
+third moment promotes the opening of a range of possibilities for arrangements
+
+In addition to opening up this range of combinations of legal institutions, other
+
+Coutinho, law “not only defines and crystallizes, in its own way, substantive purposes, but also
+
+“law cannot simply be a tool for direct state intervention, nor
+
+a greater “selectivity of means of intervention.” (Schapiro; Trubek, 2012, p. 49) The NDD,
+
+development and that, although they have some points of contact with those described by
+
+408
+
+roles attributed to law, is to promote “partnerships between the public and private sectors and
+
+institutional “best practices”) and privileges elaborations based on “experimentalism
+
+processes designed to implement public policies.” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 96) This
+
+Multiple functions and dimensions of law
+
+development pathways.” (Trubek, 2014, p. 18) As a result, the conception of
+
+dimensions attributed to law, rather than social or redistributive policies, as well as
+
+The law can be seen “as an objective” by “formalizing goals and indicating the 'points
+
+institutional, whose suitability must be judged depending on the context, allowing different
+
+contributions that fit the NDD emphasize different roles and functions of law and
+
+Governance vehicle: public or private law?
+
+suitable for promoting development, but a plurality of possible configurations,
+
+second, private law. At the moment corresponding to the new state activism, however, the
+
+Milhaupt and Pistor (2008), narrated in section 4.2, focus on other aspects. for Diogo
+
+merely a neutral framework for private decisions.” (Trubek, 2014, p. 18) Among the
+
+molds and forges institutions charged with persecuting them, also influencing the actions and
+
+after all, it displaces ready-made institutional recipes (global standard institutions,
+
+in other aspects of the legal approach.
+
+to institutionalize a process of mutual search for innovative and better solutions
+
+highlight differences in the privileged branch as a governance vehicle, in the functions and
+
+democratic”, in discovery, in learning (cf. Trubek, 2014, p. 13).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+for more than one purpose.” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 100)
+
+Legal norms can lead public policies to be more democratic since, through
+procedural rules that govern public consultations and hearings and the publicity
+of administrative acts, they force them to be open to input from a plurality of
+actors. (Coutinho, 2013, p. 101)
+
+Flexibility is defined as “the possibility of the legal framework that structures public policy serving
+
+Coutinho defines revisibility as “the characteristic that public policy contains adjustment and adaptation
+mechanisms in its own legal body.” (2013, p. 100)
+255
+254
+
+In this sense, Coutinho reinforces that the
+
+more adequate administrative law instruments”, the “design of mechanisms of
+
+in the choice of tools, so that there is no, from the point of view of the division of tasks,
+“legal structures capable of converting objectives into actions based on
+
+(Coutinho, 2013, p. 99) This instrumental dimension (2013, p. 102) involves “the choice of
+
+technocratic decision-making) in the definition of public policies and economic policy.
+defended by the NDD, as well as with the existence of policy space (in contrast to the
+
+means to be employed to pursue the predefined objectives are a legal work.”
+
+“responsibilities between public and private actors” in conducting a policy and defining
+In its third function, law acts as an “institutional arrangement”, sharing
+
+Law also plays the role of a “tool”, because the “selection and formatting of
+
+relates to the creation of mechanisms conducive to “democratic experimentalism”
+
+the NDD encourages.
+
+Coutinho, 2013, p. 99).
+
+joint decision” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 101). This legitimizing dimension of law
+deprive) policies of mechanisms for deliberation, participation, consultation, collaboration and
+
+it can favor experimentation and interactions between the public and private sectors, such as
+
+example of what happens with programmatic norms present in the 1988 Constitution (cf.
+
+previous ones, of considering law as having a merely instrumental role. in the first and
+
+public policy. Depending on the legal means chosen, public policy can be endowed with
+
+greater or lesser flexibility254 and revisibility255, which is related to the degree to which
+
+substantive (2013, p. 102), from defining desired contents for government action, to
+
+Finally, the law exercises the function of “voice of demands”, being able to “provide (or
+the structuring dimension of law, according to Coutinho (2013, p. 102).
+
+409
+
+behaviors, and the “selection of the type of norm to be used” in the implementation of a
+
+This expansion of functionalities breaks with the existing trend, at times
+
+overlaps, gaps or rivalries in public policies.” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 100) This is
+
+inducement or reward”, as well as sanctions, to encourage or discourage
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+structural." (Trubek, 2013, p. 8)
+
+private in the markets. Furthermore, it is possible to interpret that the definition of law “as
+
+conducting social and redistributive policies (Coutinho, 2013, p. 89). This was, after all, the
+
+economy of neoliberalism, favored the subordination of public spending “to objectives
+
+of economic equity. The use of efficiency subsumed to the redistributive purpose appears,
+
+Broadly, the NDD “places great emphasis on the need for active social policies to overcome the
+
+of economic aspects relating to industrialization and growth, also aspects
+
+economical. Distributional issues were addressed by the trickle-down concept
+
+help reduce the inefficiencies of redistributive public policies, contributing to the
+
+410
+
+arrival of the development process of societies.
+
+In contrast, in the NDD, one of the facets of the new state activism is the conduct of
+
+competitiveness by promoting training and reducing the social costs of change
+
+Coutinho, 2013). The concern with efficiency is given new meaning and reconciled with the
+
+The second moment of law and development, by reflecting the sensitivity
+
+which take on opposite meanings. In the first case, law is a tool for
+
+macroeconomic measures of stabilization and fiscal austerity”, reducing the space for
+
+for example, in Coutinho: “the legal framework can perform the important task of
+
+provide the security and predictability necessary to safeguard the dynamism of the initiative
+
+moment of emphasis on the efficiency of law, not on the equitable distribution of gains
+
+objective” allows for the expanded conception of development to include, in addition to
+
+efforts to reduce inequality and eradicate poverty.” (2013, p. 91) In a broader sense
+
+political, social and legal. In other words, for rights to be incorporated as a point of
+
+social exclusion, reduce poverty, maintain demand, and contribute to the objective of increasing
+
+economics (see section 3.3), which was incorporated by the rule of law paradigm.
+
+modernizing social and economic transformation. In the second, it works as a frame for
+
+Law and social or redistributive policies
+
+second moments, law is a means for economic growth, but with strategies
+
+social policies with a redistributive character (cf. Trubek; Coutinho; Schapiro, 2012, p. 2, 11-2;
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+411
+
+state
+
+Source: based on Trubek; Santos, 2006; Trubek, 2006; 2014; Schapiro; Trubek, 2012; Coutinho, 2013.
+
+3rd
+
+Expanded conception of
+development as
+freedom, with
+economic,
+political, social and
+legal components
+
+legitimizing, the law is
+also taken in its
+substantial function,
+configuring a development
+objective in its own
+right. Range
+of possibilities for
+constructing institutional
+arrangements appropriate
+to each context. Rejection
+of one-size-fits-all
+models and
+institutional transplants.
+Openness to
+experimentalism,
+discovery and horizontal
+dialogue to
+exchange institutional experiences.
+
+1980s-90s
+
+state
+
+Main
+development
+strategies
+
+Law and the
+developmental state
+
+Seeking partnerships
+between public and private sectors
+
+Import substitution
+industrialization; conducting
+strategic economic
+activities via public
+companies; public
+targeting of investments to
+strategic sectors; AOD
+
+Private right. Emphasis
+on the rule of
+law and above all on
+the strong and clear
+protection of property
+rights and contracts, as
+well as the existence of
+a predictable,
+speedy and independent
+judiciary. Reforms
+promoted from
+transplants originating in the common law
+
+advanced states; reforms in
+legal education
+
+labels
+
+Economic growth.
+
+Instrumental: tool for
+
+configuring the
+framework for private
+activity in the markets
+and for limiting the power of the
+
+Privileged
+branch of legal
+action and its reform
+
+Private agents in
+markets
+
+1965-80
+
+Moments
+
+Instrumental: State
+intervention tool and vector
+of transformations in
+the economy and society
+
+2000s onwards
+
+Removal of economic
+distortions caused by
+state intervention
+(getting prices right),
+freedom of trade and
+finance, fiscal discipline,
+reforms designed to
+encourage foreign
+investment
+
+role of law
+
+2nd
+
+Public right; transplants of
+normative models of
+
+Erosion of the rigid
+division between state and markets.
+
+NDD, new state
+activism, law
+and development in
+the 21st century
+
+Mixture of different
+
+ideas for development
+policies. Focus on
+discovery,
+experimentation,
+strategies appropriate to
+the context
+
+Law and neoliberal
+market
+
+"Third World"
+
+Multiple roles for law.
+In addition to
+instrumental, structuring
+and
+
+Development
+conception
+
+1st
+
+Approximate
+temporal
+characterization
+
+Table 4.2 – Three moments of the debate on law and development
+
+Protagonist sector
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+groups and individuals, thus promoting both freedom and development.” (2014a,
+
+The first of these aspects reflects the criticism, generally directed at the perspectives of the
+
+subsection 4.3.3.
+
+The contours exposed above allow the characterization of the NDD as a reference
+
+empirical analysis of legal institutions (Trubek, 2014, p. 20) is projected, in studies included in the
+
+NDD have a point of convergence in consequentialism (as well as AJPE – see section
+
+inserted in the lineage of NDD as a “Capital Public Management approach” (Castro,
+
+the books) and leave its practical operation (law in action) in the background, including by
+
+of NDD: “a vital concern with results is very visible in this approach.”
+
+Finally, another salient characteristic of the NDD is the centrality of the concern of
+
+The characterization made here runs the risk of suggesting, however, a degree of intellectual cohesion
+
+412
+
+NDD “learned that in order to understand the relationship between law and
+
+format recommendations or paths for public policies in the abstract, as it happens
+
+on the “importance of the structure of financial flows for the realization of legal purposes by
+
+P. 20-1). By the way, despite being opposed in many aspects, the AED and the
+
+a ‘law in action’ approach.” (Trubek, 2013, p. 15) This concern with the aspect
+
+In addition to the aspects already raised, the NDD approach is marked by its focus
+
+P. 37)
+
+framework of the NDD, in the form of case studies, like the contributions featured in the
+
+4.4).
+
+for public policy alternative to the mainstream debate on law and development.
+
+financial.
+
+A second aspect is the taking of a consequentialist perspective in the approaches
+
+second moment, of tending to take into account only formal legal institutions (law in
+
+financial flows. This aspect is highlighted by Marcus Faro de Castro, who calls studies
+
+interaction with informal institutions. In this sense, Trubek states that supporters of the
+
+2014a, p. 37). The name derives from the emphasis on new state activism in economic policy and
+
+(Castro, 2014a, p. 38) In this sense, the legal reasoning of the NDD does not proceed to
+
+empirical approach, consequentialism and also attention to the relationship between law and flows
+
+development today, it is necessary to go beyond the study of legal rules and apply
+
+Other characteristics of the legal approach in the NDD
+
+with the typically formalist way of proceeding by “weighting values” (cf. Castro, 2009,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+256
+
+Ratton Sanchez Badin and Daniela Helena Godoy (2012).
+
+“trade and development, finance and development, human rights and
+
+public policies in Brazil that suggest the occurrence of a new state activism, conforming
+
+of corporate credit in Brazil, based on the perspective of Mario Gomes Schapiro (2010).
+
+4.3.3 New state activism and legal analyzes of public policies in Brazil
+
+also cover equitable aspects of income distribution. The report is made based on the
+
+industrial, technological and commercial. In particular, there is the suggestion that formats
+
+development, and so on.” (Trubek, 2014, p. 23) In this sense, NDD can be
+
+are emphasized in these examples. The first of them, addressed in item 4.3.3.1, addresses aspects
+
+The second example (4.3.3.2) briefly focuses on three policy moments
+
+413
+
+certain common fundamental characteristics than a paradigm for public policy – the
+
+accentuated redistribution and new supporting legal elaborations. State participation
+
+own debate on law and development. This item is based on Michelle's review
+
+development, which transcends the focus on economic efficiency and growth to
+
+methodological – among its members.
+
+“fragmented”, without there being a single dominant approach or consensus on policies
+
+Finally, item 4.3.3.3 focuses on aspects of institutional arrangements for the market
+
+The purpose of this subsection is to provide examples of legal analysis of policies
+
+study by Diogo Coutinho (2013).
+
+emphasized in studies, although they are interdependent dimensions (Trubek, 2014, p. 26):
+
+studies that can be considered relevant to the NDD framework. Different dimensions
+
+development, women's rights and development, environment and
+
+public documents relating to fuel ethanol in Brazil, covering aspects of agricultural policy,
+
+more appropriately considered an intellectual framework that houses contributions with
+
+assumed by these policies have a strong correspondence with the three moments of
+
+of new social policies in Brazil from the 2000s onwards, marked by a
+
+desirable (Trubek, 2014, p. 21). This fragmentation also refers to the different topics
+
+which would require greater degrees of autonomy, cohesion and consensus – including on issues
+
+which in reality is not configured256. The third moment of law and development is
+
+increase in this sector corresponds to the expanded conception of
+
+In this sense, contrary to what is suggested by the division between sections 4.1 and 4.3 in this chapter,
+there are formulations that propose overlap between the contributions of the AED and the NDD (cf. Prado,
+2014). In this vision, the AED would form the framework for approaches to the third stage of the debate on law and development.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+12.5 million families (2013, p. 117).
+
+Brazil is resistant to reform attempts inspired by the rule of law, with persistence of
+
+mentioned below, sees law as a “technology of development” – a
+
+juridical in its relationship with public policies, previously mentioned. in the first
+
+unequal structuring of taxation, retirements and pensions – in recent years it has contributed
+
+In this sense, the legal apparatus related to the structuring of the Bolsa Família Program (PBF) is
+
+grants cash benefits to “poor families with a monthly income per person between R$70 and
+
+Capital".
+
+concrete” – capable of both preventing and promoting it (2013, p. 131). For the author, the
+
+equality” of development.
+
+414
+
+In the work Law, inequality and development, Diogo Coutinho (2013) considers
+
+– as “high levels of income inequality [...] produce negative outcomes for
+
+resources directed to the program represent 0.35% of GDP (2013, p. 118) and coverage of
+
+and questionable from an ethical, moral, philosophical and legal point of view” (2013, p. 50). In that
+
+favored “regressive results” in terms of income distribution – such as
+
+technological and commercial, the characterization made by Schapiro serves to illustrate three
+
+Coutinho's analysis of the PBF emphasizes the four functionalities of the apparatus
+
+so that “gains of equity” could be achieved (2013, p. 110, 130). Coutinho, as already
+
+taken as an example of the use of legal technology to favor the “dimension of
+
+aspect – law as a goal – the author points out that the program promoted the “juridification”
+
+development. In particular, it is suggested to trace an institutional trajectory peculiar to the
+
+“a kind of transmission belt that connects general and abstract norms [...] to results
+
+legal arrangement to support what Marcus Faro de Castro (2014a) calls “Public Management of
+
+The PBF is a conditional cash transfer program, started in 2013, which
+
+4.3.3.1 Bolsa Família Program and redistributive dimension of development
+
+BRL 140”, upon compliance with conditionalities (Coutinho, 2013, p. 112-3). You
+
+aspect of equality composes the definition of development not only for instrumental reasons
+
+moments of credit policy in Brazil, corresponding to different orientations of law and
+
+that the legal apparatus that structures public policies in Brazil, although it has historically
+
+In a similar way to what item 4.3.3.2 means for agricultural, industrial,
+
+capitalist economies” (2013, p. 129), but also intrinsic: “inequality is debatable
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+and health, including: minimum school enrollment and attendance for children and adolescents,
+
+'over-the-counter politics', whereby political leaders compete for government resources
+
+ones. Municipalities collect information that is forwarded to Caixa Econômica Federal
+
+The registry is part of the legal tools of administrative law aimed at implementing
+
+the program's objectives (2013, p. 116). It is the means of identifying
+
+fraudulently”, representing incentives for registration only of families that
+
+behavioral and alert. In the first aspect, they incorporate a mechanism of
+
+under its influence.” (2013, p. 114) Thus, a “macro” objective of the program would consist of
+
+Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS) which, in turn, authorizes the realization of
+
+Another use of the legal apparatus as a tool in conducting public policy
+
+415
+
+Social. Beneficiaries would no longer be “clients” of their political benefactors in
+
+of beneficiaries that each city can have”, functioning as a mechanism for “focusing” the
+
+a series of conditions, which in turn concern other rights in the area of education
+
+other public authorities, for political reasons, register people indiscriminately or
+
+common, including:
+
+families that, registered in a “single register”, meet the conditions of the program.
+
+compliance with the vaccination schedule and nutritional monitoring of children
+
+beneficiaries of the program, and the responsibility for its operation is divided among several
+
+“they really need the benefit.” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 117)
+
+The juridification of these objectives is seen as a means of reducing the “so-called
+
+(CEF), are consolidated for the decision of eligible beneficiaries by the Ministry of
+
+federal funding (voluntary transfers) to meet the emergency needs of populations
+
+consists of using the aforementioned conditionalities as an induction instrument
+
+in changing the way in which public resources are allocated in this care sector
+
+incentives and sanctions. The granting of the benefit is linked to compliance with
+
+CEF payments. The PBF also has municipal quotas that “limit the amount
+
+customized. Income transfer becomes impersonal when treated as a right of
+
+of public policy objectives that, although distinct, have been grouped under one umbrella
+
+public policy. In this sense, quotas would be important to prevent “mayors and
+
+promote access to the public service network, in particular health, education
+and social assistance, combat hunger and promote food and nutritional
+security, encourage the sustained emancipation of families living in
+situations of poverty and extreme poverty, combat poverty and to promote
+intersectoriality, complementarity and synergy of the public authorities'
+social actions. (Coutinho, 2013, p. 114)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+“decentralization, through intersectorality and cooperation among a plurality of
+
+progress to suspension of the benefit for two months in the third and fourth violations, and only
+
+(Coutinho, 2013, p. 120) In this sense, the conditionalities incorporate a mechanism of
+
+control bodies, such as the Public Ministry, the General Comptroller of the Union and the Court of
+
+absence of essential public services, which, in turn, would motivate the Ministry of Health
+
+1, based on which the performance of each municipality is evaluated, which in turn guides the
+
+In the aspect of law as an institutional arrangement, Coutinho points out that the PBF
+
+of this mechanism of conditionalities and progressive sanctions turns out to be aimed at reinforcing
+
+Still regarding the instrumental function of the legal apparatus, Coutinho highlights
+
+the creation of the “Decentralized Management Index” (IGD) to measure the performance of municipalities in
+
+structure relationships between federative entities:
+
+416
+
+118).
+
+variables: “registration coverage rate, registration update rate, rate of children
+
+distinct federative bodies) and horizontal (between distinct bodies and entities), marked by
+
+health conditions.” (2013, p. 12) These data make up a score, which varies from 0 to
+
+need for public investment, since its “non-compliance could reveal the
+
+children out of child labor etc. (Coutinho, 2013, p. 118)
+
+actors at all levels of government”, public banks, “ministries, state governments and
+
+or Education to address the need more quickly than would otherwise occur.”
+
+allocation of new resources. This is a “legal-institutional innovation” in the form of
+
+Union Accounts.” (Coutinho, 2013, p. 122-3)
+
+warning, go through blocking the benefit for one month in case of recurrence,
+
+transmission of information that can be used to reorient public policy.
+
+then, in the fifth violation, they give rise to the cancellation of the benefit (2013, p. 119). The drawing
+
+rights and not restricting access to income transfer benefits (2013, p.
+
+involves a web of articulation of public policies with a vertical dimension (between
+
+management of the program and its unique registration. The indicator is calculated from four
+
+In case of non-compliance, there is a gradual imposition of sanctions, which begin with the
+
+The conditionalities also operate as alert providers and signalers of the
+
+children under 7 years of age, prenatal medical care for pregnant women, maintenance of
+
+with information on school attendance and rate of families with monitoring of
+
+Its rationale, based on the behavioral stimulus of the municipalities (and
+not on the possibility of imposing punitive sanctions), is not familiar to the
+type of law and the configuration of legal norms that mark federative
+relations in Brazil, historically centralized. (Coutinho, 2013, p. 122)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Proálcool was based on strong state activism for the creation of a market
+
+consider that this “alert mechanism” is also a form of vocalization of
+
+distributive to trickle-down notions and preached the retraction of the welfare state.
+contrast with the previous conception – of the second moment –, which relegated questions
+
+are treated by Coutinho as reflections of the use of law as a tool, one can
+
+implementation relied on instruments such as:
+
+after the oil crisis and the drop in the price of sugar on the international market. In the midst of
+
+these turbulences, the National Alcohol Program (Proálcool) was created, and its
+
+126). By the way, although the signs of non-compliance with PBF conditionalities
+
+active in its realization) as part of the roles of law in development, in marked
+still, a practical illustration of the incorporation of redistributive objectives (and state posture
+
+the PBF, while another party promoted the adaptation of existing councils (2013, p.
+
+In the 1970s, Brazilian ethanol production was negligible, only assuming relevance
+
+underdevelopment”, in contrast to the conservative role, “in the sense of fossilizing inequalities”,
+
+which the legal framework can also fulfill (Coutinho, 2013, p. 129). AND,
+
+from the program. According to Coutinho, part of the municipalities created new councils to deal with
+
+According to Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin and Daniela Helena Godoy (2012), until mid-
+“moments” referred to in this section 4.3.
+
+that is, in favor of the poorest, thus playing a key role in overcoming the
+
+the legal requirement for the existence of Social Control Instances (ICS) as part of management
+
+of the PBF points to the potential for using the right to “privilege progressive results,
+
+Finally, the PBF incorporates the dimension of law as a vocalizer of demands, given
+
+general, correspond to the three conceptions of law and development that shaped the
+The Brazilian experience with ethanol is marked by three conformations that, along
+417
+
+Coutinho's approach to the four roles or functions of law in driving
+
+domestic market for ethanol, especially as an energy alternative for automotive transport.
+
+4.3.3.2 Three moments of Brazilian policy regarding the production and trade of ethanol
+
+demands.
+
+economic policies (price fixing, subsidies, transfers); Mandatory blending
+mandate; cost equalization; tax exemptions; payment and purchase
+guarantee to producers; financing for agricultural production, industry,
+logistics and the creation of alcohol-powered vehicles. (Sanchez Badin;
+Godoy, 2012, p. 2004)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+At the turn of the century, the positioning of ethanol as a strategic product for the
+
+“dependence of the private sector on the public sector, especially on the front of
+
+led to debt renegotiation agreements with the IMF, which included conditionalities of
+
+the relevance of the product for the domestic market and the new impetus to achieve projection
+
+abandoned in the following decade. The external debt crisis in the 1980s, in addition to
+
+private sector in relation to government stimuli and controls, the withdrawal of the State
+
+deregulation and withdrawal from the State proclaimed by the “Washington Consensus”, already in
+
+assumed the meaning of “closing the economy and protecting the domestic industry from
+
+supply chains that shook consumer confidence and caused sales of
+
+fuel “remained as a complementary product to sugar production, without any
+
+NDD formulations. In part, the change in position was due to an environment
+
+energy”, “repeated increases in the international price of oil” and “the strength acquired by
+418
+
+Brazilian ethanol industry in the 1970s was marked by strong state management and a focus on
+
+1990, Proálcool was gradually “dismantled”, with successive stages of liberalization
+
+ethanol in the Brazilian energy matrix.
+
+suppression of purchase subsidies and guarantees (2012, p. 208). As a reflection of dependence on
+
+The foundations of Proálcool were shaken in the 1980s and the program was
+
+an inexpressive share in the late 1970s, reached 66% of the fleet in 1986,
+
+Brazil responded to new multifaceted strategies of public-private action, to rescue
+
+compromising the government's ability to bear the costs of promoting ethanol,
+
+implied the closure of a significant portion of the ethanol production units. O
+
+international level in the sector, in a policy style that can be considered closer to the
+
+fuels (Sanchez Badin; Godoy, 2012, p. 204). The policy was marked by
+
+more propitious international market, which included “the continued increase in global demand for
+
+“review of government subsidy policies”. In addition, the period had crises of
+
+financing of private activities. Furthermore, the relationship between the State and the private sector
+
+strategic projection” (2012, p. 209). In this second moment, corresponding to the
+
+international trade activities. (2012, p. 205) This first moment of politics
+
+1990s, there is an abandonment of state activism in the sector and the claim to relevance of the sector.
+
+vehicles powered by ethanol (Sanchez Badin; Godoy, 2012, p. 206). Throughout the decade of
+
+corresponding to a jump from 1% to 55% of the share of ethanol in the consumption of
+
+internal market, in line with the conceptions of the developmental State.
+
+One of its main elements was the introduction of alcohol-powered automobiles, which
+
+of production and marketing, extinction of production quotas, liberalization of prices and
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+relies on “mobilization of the private sector around its own initiatives to face
+
+(presentation of ethanol as “clean energy”) and job creation (2012, p. 219).
+
+single classification by the harmonized system of international trade. Ethanol “does not
+
+international marketing and lobbying campaigns aimed at promoting the use of ethanol as energy
+
+48% in global ethanol exports.” (2012, p. 224) However, the creation and expansion of
+
+“strengthening Brazil in these markets as a reference in technology associated with
+
+relevant. The objective of international insertion of Brazilian ethanol and expansion of the bases of
+
+with tax exemption stimuli by the government.” The measure resulted in a 4% expansion for
+
+fuel ethanol and alcohol used in the manufacture of beverages (2012, p. 215). Furthermore,
+
+national producers. (2012, p. 229)
+
+public and private institutions to open international markets for both ethanol exports
+
+419
+
+domestic consumer market for ethanol, whose sales quintupled and surpassed
+
+has invested in special provisions and concessions in bilateral agreements and memorandums,
+
+internationalization of Brazilian companies” (2012, p. 238). In addition, this new moment
+
+237) Still on the international axis, another government initiative consists of “expanding
+
+the base of producing countries” of ethanol, especially in Central America and Africa, with a view to
+
+ethanol policy does not restrict its focus to the domestic market. Brazil has “participation of
+
+was a reflection of the political option for attributing a strategic role to ethanol in the
+
+limits on access to the international market” (2012, p. 236) – including through strategies
+
+international markets have obstacles. The first one refers to the absence of
+
+production (such as machines and fertilizers) and the expansion of investment spaces for
+
+clean and access to markets (2012, p. 234). Efforts can be observed
+
+energy security (reduction of dependence on oil), with environmental issues
+
+and for new investment opportunities in its production abroad.
+
+fits a standard customs nomenclature”, with bureaucratic confusions between the
+
+An important axis of this policy was the “introduction of flex-fuel vehicles, in 2003,
+
+In this last aspect, the participation of the private sector becomes particularly
+
+90% of flex vehicles between 2003 and 2008, with the corresponding creation of expressive
+
+production in the world is reconciled with the purpose of “strengthening the process of
+
+there are significant tariff and non-tariff barriers. Given this scenario, “the Brazilian government
+
+Brazilian development, which occurred with the Lula government, based on concerns about
+
+of gasoline (2012, p. 219). Unlike what happened in the 1970s, however, the new
+
+environmental issues” (2012, p. 218). Elsewhere, the new state activism in the ethanol sector
+
+in addition to the standard strategy in the WTO and others for the liberalization of the agricultural sector.” (2012, p.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+257 In this regard, Schapiro points out that the BNDES “not only was the main national provider of
+resources for corporate undertakings (public and private), but also did so in such a way as to link its
+intervention to government priorities, favoring segments identified as strategic for the country's
+industrial transformation program” (Schapiro, 2010, p. 230).
+
+Similarly, neither did the stock market, in this Brazilian context, act as a
+
+suggestive that the meanings assumed by the Brazilian treatment of ethanol in the 1990s
+
+NDD.
+
+main source of capital for national development. This role was played by
+
+similar. It configures, moreover, another example of studies that fit the frame of the
+
+international legal services to the creation and expansion of markets abroad. This characterization is
+
+riskier and long-term financing, such as those involved in industrialization. In
+bank charges that resulted in overpriced loans. His work was not aimed at
+
+resignified in the sector, with public-private partnerships and a new front of attention to obstacles
+
+(2010) regarding the Brazilian trajectory of corporate finance allows consideration
+moment of redefining the roles of the State. The story of Mario Gomes Schapiro
+
+development, the third moment of this public policy corresponded to state activism
+
+“short-term, low-risk financial intermediation”, working with high spreads
+
+initial state, retraction of this and opening to greater action of market forces, and third
+
+strategic policies for ethanol, corresponding to the second moment of law and
+
+public capital, with a strong presence of public banks. Private banks operated in the
+in the current acronym “BNDES”) marked the construction of a model based on the allocation
+
+Ethanol policy in Brazil was not the only one to go through the trajectory of strong activism
+
+developmentalism of the “first moment”, another of withdrawal of the State and abandonment of
+
+4.3.3.3 Institutional alternatives for corporate financing
+
+After a phase of state activism and focus on the domestic market, in the style of
+
+Economic Development (to whose name the expression “and Social” would be added, resulting
+law and development. In the 1950s, the creation of the National Bank of
+
+420
+
+on law and development referred to in this section.
+
+public banks, as an expression of a finance model “based on the institutional regulation of
+
+the banking system”257:
+
+Schapiro (2010) starts from a historical retrospective, referring to the period of the first
+
+1970 to the present day, serve as a practical illustration of the three moments of conceptions
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+“Level 1 rules are particularly geared towards ensuring a higher level of transparency; Level 2 rules,
+in addition to transparency, present requirements related to the financial statement standard and the
+possibility of voting for preferred shareholders in some situations, such as mergers and acquisitions.
+The Novo Mercado brings together a more comprehensive and incisive set of governance rules”
+(Schapiro, 2010, p. 235).
+
+As in other developing countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan and Mexico, it
+was the state agents who made up for both absences in Brazil, the capital
+market and the banking sector, taking charge of making resources available.
+required for higher risk investments with long term returns. To this extent, the
+role played by law went beyond the function of merely guaranteeing the
+interests of private shareholders and creditors. Its effective function was to
+constitute a long-term financing system, for which it was necessary to establish
+a regime of state ownership in the banking sector, thus supplying the need for
+private investors. Since then, the Brazilian financing model has been based on
+these two elements: (i) compulsory savings, formed through the State's tax
+collection power and (ii) the directing of resources by state agents (by public
+banks). (Schapiro, 2010, p. 229)
+
+258
+
+reform axes.
+
+Brazilian credit sector: the high cost of spreads in credit operations.” Measure
+international”, aimed at “responding, via increased competition, to a chronic problem in
+
+stock market for financing business activities. There were three main
+public capital to another, based on private banks and the increased importance of
+
+The second axis consisted of “opening the banking segment to competition
+“50.91%, in 1996, to 29.64%, in 2006” (2010, p. 236).
+
+Generally speaking, the changes attempted to migrate from an allocation-based model
+
+Correspondingly, the share of federal and state public banks declined by
+
+particularly in Law & Finance – promoted changes in the national financial environment. In
+
+traditional) of shares with voluntary adherence rules and progressively more demanding
+
+standards by listed companies: Level 1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado258. In 2001, the reform
+
+capitals”. In 2000, Bovespa established three other market levels (besides the
+
+corporate governance similar to that of other financial institutions.” (2010, p. 233-4)
+
+In the context of the 1990s, reforms inspired by the rule of law paradigm – and by
+
+restructuring of federal banks, which “started to adopt operating standards and rules of
+
+Finally, there were “legislative changes and self-regulation initiatives in the
+bank employees in Brazil, from 10.51% in 1996 to 21.70% in 2006 (Schapiro, 2010, p. 234).
+
+421
+
+privatization of state banks (which went from 32 in 1995 to 14 in 2003) and in the
+
+resulted in the expansion of the participation of foreign capital in the composition of assets
+
+Firstly, the “reorganization of the public financial segment”, which resulted in the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+259 “In addition to establishing a new proportion between shares with and without voting rights, setting
+the limit of preferred shares at 50% of the capital, the new law reestablished protection for minority
+shareholders in cases of transfer of control of the company by the majority (tag along) . The original
+wording of the Corporate Law authorized corporations to issue up to two-thirds of non-voting shares,
+which was understood to be detrimental to the intra-company balance of power. The tag along, although
+provided for in Law 6404/76, had been suppressed in 1997 by Law 9457.” (Schapiro, 2010, p. 235)
+
+in the notion of “correct institutions” and in the protective function of the law regarding the rights of
+
+Although reforms inspired by the rule of law paradigm have managed to increase
+
+the Brazilian model also proved to be unique in this respect, with a strong presence of the BNDES,
+
+result of a national arrangement, but rather as a pathology, a product of failures
+
+approaching their prices to those that were already practiced here. As for the attempt to expand
+
+moment, remains centered on the relevance of public banks, and in particular the BNDES,
+
+forced savings, such as the Workers' Support Fund (FAT) and the
+
+enough to change the central feature of the Brazilian financing model”, in
+
+financing of business activities via the stock market in Brazil has a strong
+
+strategy of public banks as financial intermediation agents in Brazil is
+
+422
+
+236) The bet that foreign competition would reduce high bank spreads
+
+is lower than the volume of bank loans disbursed by the BNDES (2010,
+
+institutional framework of this model goes against the recipes for organizing the financial system founded
+
+As a result, despite the reforms, the Brazilian model, in a third and more current
+
+access to the Brazilian market an opportunity for greater profitability in its activities,
+
+throughout the 2000s, alongside the increased participation of private banks and
+
+creditors and investors. This conception does not see the presence of public banks “as
+
+funding sources other than the banking sector, through the stock market,
+
+for long-term financing, higher risk and lower cost. In part, the position
+
+was increased” (Schapiro, 2010, p. 236).
+
+“holder of the largest stock portfolio in the country” (Schapiro, 2010, p. 239). That is, even the
+
+the participation of private resources in Brazilian corporate financing, they “were not
+
+composed of legally established access to preferential interest rates and mechanisms
+
+which “long-term and high-risk operations still depend on state agents.” (2010, p.
+
+for Time of Service (FGTS), resulting in lower funding costs. The legal basis
+
+presence of the public sector. In addition, fundraising in the stock market in Brazil
+
+foreigners in the financial market, the “volume of operations in the capital market also
+
+practiced in Brazil did not lead to the expected result: on the contrary, these banks
+
+in the Corporate Law granted new rights to minority shareholders259. To the
+
+P. 238).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In the Brazilian scenario, the trajectory of the BNDES, in addition to
+challenging the expectations of economic reforms conducted along the
+lines of the Rule of Law, has also been a significant example of what an
+institutional reprogramming exercise can be. Although the Bank was
+constituted as a support agent for developmental programs, adapted to the
+State-centered pattern of development and import substitution strategies,
+its intervention has been redesigned in the last twenty years. From an actor
+in charge of the goals inscribed in the government's development plans,
+the BNDES has become a relevant agent for the capital market and for
+corporate strategies in tune with an internationalized economy. (Schapiro,
+2010, p. 244)
+
+uniqueness of the Brazilian institutional arrangement. This trait corresponds, in turn, to the
+
+although it shares with the rule of law “the assumption that there is a positive correlation between
+
+with the rule of law paradigm, validate the configuration of the national financial market in which
+
+appreciation of institutional arrangements that favor development strategies
+
+existing”, results in the production of legal arguments that, unlike what happens
+
+of the NDD – which in its text appears as a “paradigm of institutional alternatives”
+
+as structured analyzes according to the rule of law paradigm do, sees it as
+in public banks as a “deviation” from the “correct” format of institutions –
+
+of state allocation of resources. (Schapiro, 2010, p. 241) For Schapiro, the approach
+
+Valuing the context, the “given social fabric”, the “institutional trajectory
+based on unique models and transplants from formal legal institutions.
+
+savers and investors, making use of compulsory savings devices and
+
+It is observed that this approach, instead of dealing with the financing model based on
+
+(2010, p. 243). The contrast represented by this last point implies discarding solutions
+
+public financial system in which state agents establish mediations between
+
+Has as
+
+social given, focusing on a reprogramming of the existing institutional trajectory”
+
+Brazilian trajectory reveals that the law can have another role, namely, “that of building a
+
+global standard institutions, in line with the general characteristics of the NDD.
+
+contrast the use “of the premise that these drawings should have as a starting point the plot
+
+existing in the legal protection of private investors” (Schapiro, 2010, p. 242). But
+
+–,
+
+and in the stock market, highlighting the activities of the BNDES:
+
+423
+
+productivity, growth and income – that is, the consequentialist analysis –,
+
+appropriate to the context, rather than derived from standard recipes, “best practices” or
+
+the public sector corresponds to an important share of participation both in the banking sector
+
+the design of legal-institutional arrangements and the achievement of good indicators of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+262
+
+260
+
+263
+
+261
+crucial aspects of production, exchange, and consumption practices in social life. (Castro, 2009, p. 22)
+Henceforth, the expression “public policies” will be used to encompass economic policy measures.
+
+In Legal Forms and Social Change, it is suggested that the formalism, conceptual closure, and inability to deal
+adequately with empirical transformations characteristic of legal approaches
+
+Understood as a “set of legally established rules and principles that organize many aspects
+
+Reference to “options available” includes: (i) formal and (ii) substantive interpretation of the law and the constitution;
+(iii) “abstract and generic prudential calculation” (weighting of values) and (iv) the AED, which, “when proceeding through
+the so-called 'cost-benefit analysis', does not take into account the relationships between material interests and noneconomic
+values, which are relevant to the promotion of economic justice.” (Castro, 2009, p. 21)
+
+most recent contribution to the debate was developed based on publications by Marcus Faro
+
+and in one-size-fits all models; adopts greater degrees of interdisciplinary openness, which
+institutions based on promoting the unrestricted freedom of markets (financial or otherwise)
+
+Legal Analysis of Economic Policy (AJPE) shares these characteristics. It is
+
+situations that are prima facie unjust” (Castro, 2009, p. 20). Contrary to the formalist character
+
+of conventional legal approaches263 (cf. Castro, 2012), in AJPE, the
+
+The main feature of the AJPE is the use of new categories and methods for the critical
+
+analysis of legal institutions linked to economic policy260 and public policies261, given the
+
+lack of “options available to legal operators262, in the face of
+
+development, and the valuation of consequences in the analysis of legal institutions. A
+
+of the latter, the AJPE, like the NDD, rejects the assumption of superiority of solutions
+that instruct the rule of law paradigm, such as AED and Law & Finance. Differently
+
+of knowledge, the adoption of the assumption that institutions matter for the
+
+aspects.
+
+characteristics of the AJPE bring it closer to the NDD, establishing a contrast with the references
+
+common features such as the interdisciplinary gap between law and at least one other area
+
+themselves, which singularize it. This section seeks to identify them and present their main
+affinities and convergences with NDD, AJPE works with new categories and methods and
+
+Not everything, however, is similar to the other aspects. In reality, certain
+
+The strands of the debate on law and development described so far have in mind
+
+Brasilia.
+
+4.4 Legal Analysis of Economic Policy
+
+innovative and contextually specific institutional frameworks, among other traits. Despite
+historical background; harbors greater space to justify state economic activism and arrangements
+
+424
+
+public policies in the Law, Economy and Society research group at the University of
+
+restricts it to microeconomic categories or to international comparative statistical analysis of
+
+de Castro (2009; 2010; 2011) and has been the subject of discussion and application in the analysis of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+conventional ones, were at the base of the loss of space of law as a frame of reference for public
+policies. Throughout the 20th century, this loss corresponded to the qualification of economic and
+technocratic knowledge as languages more suited to the basis and orientation of the exercise of
+authority, which corresponds to the justification for the permanence of unjust social and economic
+situations. The work also suggests that rescuing the guiding potential of law is linked to its
+reinvention (cf. Castro, 2012). For a specific application of this critique to Brazilian constitutional
+law, see Globalization, democracy and constitutional law: legacies received and possibilities for
+change (Castro, 2014b). These texts harbor criticisms of conventional ways of conceiving and
+working the law, in relation to which the AJPE presents itself as an alternative.
+Empirical fruition is understood as the “enjoyment of rights as a social experience that occurs in
+a specific context.” (Castro, 2013, p. 12)
+264
+
+empirical is linked to another important characteristic of the AJPE approach: its proposal to
+
+institutional reforms that promote economic justice.
+critical legal engagement with the facts of reality has the ultimate goal of fostering
+
+fundamental and human rights.” (Castro, 2011, p. 18) In turn, the focus on enjoyment
+
+addressed in this chapter.
+contrasts between the AJPE and the other strands of the debate on law and development,
+
+both technocratic and legal representations – about the empirical enjoyment of rights
+
+on the theory of transnational legal orders). AJPE's aspiration to strengthen the
+recognition of transnational legal processes (see, in section 2.3, item
+
+focus on research into the concrete effects of public policies – which have always
+
+methods in research that applied the AJPE. Finally, subsection 4.4.3 highlights connections and
+
+international. In this aspect, in particular, there is a strong connection with the proposal for
+
+In this sense, according to the AJPE approach, the “jurist’s work must be
+
+Portfolio Analysis. Subsection 4.4.2 also proceeds to illustrate the use of these
+to the Positional Analysis, and item 4.4.2.2, to the New Contractual Analysis, also known as
+
+interest for this thesis, it gives legal importance to elements of relations
+
+which gives it another distinctive feature.
+
+4) In the case of AJPE, this opening is broad, not restricted to the economy and, especially
+
+The jurist's engagement with such institutions and situations does not take place in the abstract.
+
+Instead, there is a strong emphasis on the “empirical enjoyment” of subjective rights linked to public policies264, which
+
+methods, in turn, are characterized in subsection 4.4.2, in which item 4.4.2.1 is dedicated
+as well as the relations established between them and with the analytical methods. these new
+425
+
+of the jurist to critically engage with the empirical facts of reality.” (Castro, 2011, p.
+
+Next, subsection 4.4.1 presents the main categories of work of AJPE,
+
+“interdisciplinary opening of the study of law, with the aim of strengthening and organizing the capacity
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+housing” (public policy language) or as measures designed to give effect to the
+
+sense of making legal discourse reach – above all, but not only – elements of
+
+The very definition of economic policy, an expression present in the acronym itself
+
+converges with the NDD perspective – reinforces the importance of legal institutions for the
+
+of economic policy and public policy have on the rights of individuals and groups. There is, in this
+
+they refer to is the same. The same occurs with “peers” such as: health policy/right to
+
+economic activities, activities in markets – that is, the relations of production, exchange and consumption –
+
+economic policy involving preferential interest rates in the financing of new
+
+legally instituted practices that organize production, exchange and consumption in social life
+
+present), or should be, their rights.” (2009, p. 24) Secondly, due to the
+
+transportation, etc. The correspondence between these pairs points to the absence of “criteria
+
+426
+
+AJPE ends up relating it, on multiple fronts, to another category: rights
+
+merely auxiliary to the functioning of markets, but are at the very basis of their
+
+main source of funds for this purpose, can be read as aspects of the “policy of
+
+departure – which is associated with the contributions of Karl Polanyi (2001[1944]) and
+
+Firstly, this relationship exists due to the varied impacts that decisions
+
+The categories that make up the conceptual basis of AJPE are characterized by the
+
+“right to housing” (legal language). Basically, the set of phenomena and institutions to be
+
+functioning of the economy.
+
+sense, “reflections on the formation of their conceptions about what they are (in terms of fruition
+
+health; employment policy/right to work; urban mobility policy/right to
+
+be read, as a whole, as an undertaking of “interdisciplinary translation”, in the
+
+definitive for the complete separation between what the jurist, from his angle, sees as 'right' and what
+
+economy. This trait reflects the adoption, by AJPE, of the assumption that practices
+
+“AJPE”, is versed in legal terms. It is the set of rules and principles
+
+overlap between languages of “public policies” and “rights”. Measures of
+
+they are permeated by legal institutions. Thus, legal institutions are not
+
+housing, as well as access by public banks to forced savings mechanisms such as
+
+(Castro, 2014a, p. 43; cf. 2009, p. 22; 2006, p. 42). By defining economic policy in this way,
+
+establishment of “bridges” between legal and economic elements. Basically, they can
+
+4.4.1 Main categories and relationships of AJPE
+
+training, that is, they play a constitutive role in economic activity. This point of
+
+subjective.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+consistent with possibilities for innovation and institutional experimentation. Finally, the
+
+Linking rights to economic policy and public policy implies recognizing that these
+
+On the one hand, this fluid conception of subjective rights implies recognizing that their
+
+2011, p. 17). Considering that these elements are relevant to the legal experience, the
+
+scope of international economic cooperation) are reformed with a view to expanding the
+
+should be due to the expansion of the enjoyment of rights (which involves the need to
+
+linked to provisional contents corresponding to public policies, to changes in the “style of
+
+“emerging interests” in society, will be legally recognized and treated
+
+those pertaining to international relations. On the other hand, the detachment from
+
+groups in each context.
+
+427
+
+attributing an interesting aspect of freedom in the definition of what subjective rights are,
+
+pragmatics of consumption and investment. (2006, p. 52) They are also connected to fluctuations
+
+democracies, the opinion of individuals and groups “about what their rights are and should be”
+
+from contractual network to contractual network, and reach international relations (cf. Castro, 2006;
+
+possibility that the institutions that organize production, exchange and consumption (including in
+
+of one or more public policies. (2009, p. 36) In connection with the overlay here
+
+empirical fruition (cf. Castro, 2009, p. 26). That is, the AJPE conceives that public policies
+
+AJPE conceives that subjective rights are configured in flux.
+
+empirical enjoyment of subjective rights, molded according to the aspirations of individuals and
+
+they have no fixed or immutable contents. The meaning assumed by subjective rights is
+
+contents cannot be absolutely isolated from economic, political and
+
+The fluidity of its definition thus allows new contents, corresponding to
+
+actions of the authorities and in the institutional processes that determine the possibilities
+
+as subjective rights (2010, p. 162). In this regard, the AJPE considers that, in
+
+fixed forms – derived from an abstract conceptual system or from the positivized text – turns out to be
+
+pointed out, the AJPE aims to understand
+
+administrator characterizes, from his point of view, at least in part, as being the field
+
+in economic variables, to monetary impacts that are transmitted from contract to contract, and
+
+must guide economic policies and public policies to give them concreteness, in terms of
+
+what is the set up system of economic policy, what are its transformations,
+what are its practical effects, including especially its influence on the
+empirical enjoyment of subjective rights considered fundamental, and also
+understand how the “current law” contributes to make everything this
+intelligible, or – on the contrary – obscure (Castro, 2011, p. 16).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+a legal translation of justice (also versed in subjective rights) that performs
+
+terms, “the contractual architecture of the national economy must 'balance' the protection of
+human rights by members of society as a whole.” (2011, p. 16) In others
+
+production and, simultaneously, consumption rights (cf. 2009, p. 41, 49). Again, this is
+economic justice, which can be understood as the broad and effective enjoyment of the rights of
+
+without at the same time ensuring the effective enjoyment of fundamental rights and
+“It should not be considered acceptable, from a legal point of view, for an economy to grow,
+
+Not only is economic policy defined in legal terms, but also the category of
+
+these two aspects, corresponding to two spheres of rights, are achieved together:
+
+profit” (Castro, 2011, p. 20), being “centrally involved in the spheres of production and
+
+economic exchange.” Examples are “the right to property266 and freedom of
+
+recommended? Production rights are related to practices “oriented to obtaining
+
+below) in line with expectations of individuals and groups:
+
+with consumer rights reflects the economic aspect of equity, income distribution, equitable
+
+enjoyment of economic gains, etc265. Economic justice is achieved when
+
+economic growth, productivity, profitability, efficiency, etc. On the other hand, the concern
+
+that the jurist is qualified to critically appreciate them and indicate reforms, an aspect taken up
+
+But what are production and consumption rights, based on the definition above
+conditions to compete in the global economy.” (2013, p. 22)
+
+428
+
+production refers to the economic aspect of competitiveness, which includes considerations about
+
+consumer rights with the ability of commercial property holders to maintain
+
+bridges with economic aspects. On the one hand, the concern with the enjoyment of rights of
+
+In connection with the differentiation between production and consumption rights, the AJPE
+distinguishes property rights into three types (one of which occupies an intermediate position). In
+addition to commercial property, which is the meaning referred to in the excerpt above, there is also
+civil and hybrid property. Commercial property is seen as a right to production and is directed to
+“primarily commercial purposes and to obtain profit.” (2009, p. 50) Its characteristic is a strong
+connection with the monetary economy, because its very existence depends on the comparison
+between its profitability and the profitability of speculative investment (cf. 2009, p. 52). In other words,
+investment in commercial property is subject to constant comparison between profit prospects and interest rates obtainable in financial markets. Therefore, the property structure
+
+The AJPE presupposes that institutions and policies should serve orders
+compatible with the equal enjoyment of human and fundamental rights and
+that individuals and groups should not be enslaved to institutions whose
+structure opposes obstacles to such enjoyment. Being fully conventional, it
+is the institutions (public policies, economic policies, international
+cooperation mechanisms) that must be changed to adapt to the exercise of
+the enjoyment of human and fundamental rights, not the opposite. (Castro, 2009, p. 46)
+
+In this sense, for Marcus Faro de Castro, economic justice implies “reconciling the functionality
+and productivity of the economy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the equal protection of the
+fundamental rights of individuals and groups” (Castro, 2009, p. 21) .
+265
+
+266
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+exchange and consumption (cf. 2009, p. 32, 34). For the structuring of reasoning and legal criticism
+
+the conception of subjective rights in flux, the AJPE articulates the fruition of rights in terms
+
+The translations of economic aspects into legal terms, which permeate the AJPE, are
+Positional, addressed in item 4.4.2.1.
+
+social” that can promote or block it (2013, p. 13). In line – once again – with
+
+privately and publicly agreed upon, which affect the organization of production,
+fruition of rights” (2013, p. 13). Such crisscrossed contracts bring components both
+
+The enjoyment of these two groups of rights is linked to “institutional actions and
+
+measurement and criticism of the position or economic qualification of individuals and groups: the Analysis
+groups in unwanted positions” (2013, p. 16). AJPE proposes a method for
+
+49-50)
+
+AJPE to express “patterns of social and institutional actions that have impacts on the
+
+blocking this fruition, implying the permanence or “'freezing' of individuals or
+
+“food, housing, transportation, health, education and other compatibles.” (Castro, 2009, p.
+
+in contracts. More precisely, in contractual aggregates, which are the analytical category of
+of economic aspects consists of the view of the market economy as being structured
+
+improvement in the position of individuals and groups. Economic disqualification refers to the worsening or
+
+and include the so-called “social, economic and cultural rights”, such as the rights to
+
+economy corresponds to the increase in the enjoyment of production and consumption rights, with
+
+hire” (2009, p. 50). Consumer rights, in turn, are linked to consumer practices
+
+of subjective rights. Another representative category of this legal configuration strategy
+criticize and (re)orient economic policy measures and public policies related to the fruition
+
+429
+
+differentiated insertion or economic qualification (2010, p. 160-1). The qualification
+
+a “key” to promote (through new methods of analysis) the legal capacity of
+
+of positions in which individuals and groups find themselves. These correspond to degrees
+
+business is more fluid. Civil property is linked to consumption practices. Its connection with the
+monetary economy is purposely more indirect and limited (2009, p. 53), which reflects the attribution
+of importance beyond the economic aspect to the consumption practices to which it refers, such as
+legal institutions of “unavailability reserve ” (cf. 2010, p. 161), as in the cases of family property and
+limitations on attachment that affect some properties and wages. As an example of this distinction,
+a “package of rice on the shelf of a supermarket or in the pantry of a restaurant” is treated as
+commercial property, while the same package, in the cupboard of a domestic kitchen, represents civil property (2009, p 50).
+Finally, in the case of hybrid property, “productive consumption practices are very close to those of
+final consumption”, as occurs with home or “backyard” industries, small family farming properties
+and informal economy practices (2009, p. 51).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+AJPE proceed in order to build bridges so that the legal discourse encompasses elements
+
+instrument for evaluating the degree of empirical fruition of subjective rights in contexts
+public policy. One of them, Positional Analysis, (discussed in item 4.4.2.1) is a
+
+From the considerations made in this subsection, it is possible to notice that the categories of
+Contractual or Portfolio Analysis, addressed in item 4.4.2.2.
+
+The AJPE proposes two new methods for legal criticism and proposing legal reforms.
+
+4.4.2 New legal analysis methodologies and examples of their application
+
+reconfigure categories of contract law, embodied in the New Analysis
+
+Positional Analysis, and between contractual aggregates and the New Contractual Analysis.
+
+public of contractual aggregates), the AJPE proposes analysis procedures that
+
+next subsection, such as the connections between position or economic qualification and the
+
+economy and public policy actions are understood as contents of interest
+
+maintain relationships with each other, the categories are reflected in the proposed new methods, object of
+
+regarding a contractually organized economy267 (in which policy measures
+
+in the form of indices that reflect the contrast between the empirical enjoyment of a subjective right
+
+and the degree that would correspond to the desirable economic qualification for individuals or groups268 .
+
+430
+
+corresponding to public policy contents and economic policy measures. In addition to
+
+specific. This method highlights the possibility of structuring the legal argument
+
+spheres related to the empirical fruition of subjective rights, among which those
+
+268
+
+267
+
+Indexes occupy a central position in the Positional Analysis procedure. This way of providing
+legal arguments with numerical expression reflects the recognition, by AJPE, that the articulation of
+knowledge in the form of mathematical indicators is of great relevance for guiding the behavior of
+different actors, including public authorities and private agents. Globally, a variety of indicators
+(including those from private sources, see section 2.3) have been used as guides for the development
+of public policies and also as tools for their evaluation, in the most varied areas and themes. The
+normative implications of indicators are already recognized in recent legal literature, such as the
+work Governance by indicators: global power through quantification and rankings, by Davis et al
+(2012). In addition to its normative implications, another relevant aspect of using indicators or
+argumentation in statistical form is its use for social criticism. As Alain Desrosières points out,
+indices have historically been used to make visible – and bring to the agenda of public discussions
+about – economic and social phenomena that previously remained hidden, through the measurement,
+for example, of unemployment, poverty and the creation of indices of income inequality, among others (cf. Desrosières, 2014).
+
+The view of the economy as being organized in contracts is close to the writings of Ronald Coase
+in The nature of the firm (1937), in which institutions such as “firms” are seen as “connections of
+contracts”. See section 4.1.
+
+therefore become the object of action. This aspect is also embodied by AJPE.
+In this sense, indices can be used to construct new cognitive realities, that is, so that new phenomena
+– or phenomena that remained obscure – begin to be recognized as social facts and therefore
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The first consists of identifying public policy subject to controversy, which
+
+importance is given to the notion of interportfolio monetary deflection. She also contributes to
+
+Individual Microentrepreneur (Lima, 2014; Castro; Lima, 2015) and the National Program for
+
+Some examples of the use of these new methods are pointed out throughout the items to be
+
+express the level of enjoyment corresponding to its legal validation. The result of this
+
+subjective right that correlates with it, which can be seen from the perspective of rights
+
+conformers of civil, commercial or strategic currency. The central feature of the method
+
+indication of “possible corrective reforms” (2011, p. 20; cf. 2013, p. 12), which can be
+
+4.4.2.1 Positional Analysis
+
+'realization' or 'effectiveness' of fundamental rights and human rights.” (Castro, 2009,
+
+analysis.
+
+431
+
+individuals and groups regarding the empirical fruition of subjective rights of production or consumption.
+
+contracts, in order to facilitate the structuring of reform proposals consistent with the
+
+a procedure consisting of five steps.
+
+corresponds to the definition of economic justice in the AJPE.
+
+represent the degree of enjoyment of rights related to a certain public policy, and another for
+
+(item 4.4.2.2), involves, as previously mentioned, the reconfiguration of categories of
+
+must be translated into legal terms. That is, at this stage, the jurist also identifies the
+
+below, with a focus on research that applied AJPE to public policies such as the Programa
+
+Comparison makes it possible to assess whether a given public policy “meets the requirements of
+
+production or consumption. It is, in simplified terms, the identification of the object of
+
+contractual aggregates that make up market economies. In it, it assumes particular
+
+characterize different possible configurations of institutional monetary environments,
+
+Broadband (Fontes, 2014; Castro; Fontes, 2014).
+
+P. 40) If the empirical fruition verified proves to be unsatisfactory, the jurist must proceed to the
+
+consists of the use of an analytical matrix to identify and position the contents of the aggregates
+
+done with the help of the New Contractual Analysis (cf. item 4.4.2.2). These are the general lines of
+
+Positional Analysis is the method proposed by AJPE to evaluate the position of
+
+contractual law to account for the effects of the incidence of public policies on
+
+In turn, the New Contract Analysis, also referred to as Portfolio Analysis
+
+conciliated expansion of the enjoyment of production and consumption rights, which in turn
+
+The core of the method is the construction of, and comparison between, two indices: one for
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+3 Improvement in trading conditions
+4 Level of difficulty in business management
+
+2 Speed (in Mbps)
+3 Population coverage or penetration (in percentage of households)
+
+5 Support in formalization
+
+1 Ease of obtaining credit
+
+6 Ease of payment of the Simplified Collection Document
+
+2 Ease of hiring employees
+
+1 Price of broadband internet access (in US dollars)
+
+Microentrepreneur
+
+Positional
+dismemberment of
+
+National Band Freedom of Expression Program;
+
+2 - Analytical breakdown of subjective right
+
+Microentrepreneur production rights
+
+Application by Lima,
+2014
+
+emphasized aspect
+
+Public policy
+
+Source: prepared based on Lima, 2014; Sources, 2014
+
+Analysis Stage
+
+Sources, 2014
+
+public policy analyzed
+
+Application by
+
+Program
+
+Source: based on Lima, 2014; Sources, 2014
+
+Program
+commercial property
+
+Table 4.4 – Second stage of Positional Analysis and examples of its application
+
+Individual
+
+Positional Analysis was also used by Paulo Soares Sampaio in a dissertation that evaluated the enjoyment of
+rights to social opportunities, understood as a grouping of diverse rights, of participants in the National Oriented
+Productive Microcredit Program. The analysis included data collection in field research, based on interviews carried
+out in different parts of the Brazilian territory. The greater complexity of the analysis procedure used – with indices
+composed of a large number of variables (13 variables that include school attendance, literacy, aspects linked to
+nutrition and health, quality of housing and basic sanitation, access to electricity, among others) – generates
+difficulties in its synthetic exposition, which is why, instead of being covered in this section, it is suggested to
+consult the original research (Sampaio, 2014).
+
+Individual
+
+consumer rights
+
+Decomposed variables (indicators)
+
+Application by
+
+Analysis Stage
+
+Positional
+dismemberment of
+
+National Broadband
+Program
+
+1 - Identification of controversial public policy and related subjective right
+
+Wide access to information
+
+related subjective
+right
+
+Application by Lima,
+2014
+
+stage
+
+Table 4.3 – First stage of Positional Analysis and examples of its application
+
+stage
+
+Sources, 2014
+
+contractual aggregates”. This step corresponds, therefore, to the delineation of the “components
+
+432
+
+In other words, at this stage the jurist surveys or constructs the variables
+
+or indicators that will compose your analysis. A fundamental criterion for the election or
+
+benefits” of public policy, which are linked to the empirical fruition of the analyzed law.
+
+Table 4.3, below, brings together examples of characterizations of this first stage in
+
+subjective rights involved in public policy. For AJPE, “public policies acquire
+The second stage corresponds to the analytical decomposition of the relational content of the
+
+(Castro, 2009, p. 41)
+
+applications of AJPE in recent dissertations269 .
+
+the forms of content of public interest inserted in contracts organized in networks or
+
+269
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+law which, although mathematized, admits, as with reasoning based on
+
+with the public policy object of the research. In the quantification of the decomposed variables, the
+
+In other words, there is no specific or necessary composition for IFE
+
+composition of the formula, the lawyer can assign different weights to the variables or contents
+
+formal “weighting of values” forms (which are also open to multiple outcomes), the
+
+in which Daniele Fontes (2014) composed an IFE on broadband internet access in Brazil that
+
+open to a plurality of interpretations on the means to achieve economic justice.
+
+corresponding to the variables that comprise it, obtaining a numerical result. The applications
+
+empirical aspect of the enjoyment of rights, which cannot, by definition, be done in the abstract.
+
+433
+
+may be more appropriately viewed as a component of an argumentation strategy
+
+quantification of the decomposed variables. The IFE is obtained by organizing the indicators
+
+complexity. In the examples discussed here, the construction of the IFE was done with 3 and 6
+
+gives quantitative expression to the empirical enjoyment of the right in question (Castro, 2009, p. 43). At
+
+statistics, multiple interpretations and challenges. Unlike, however, procedures
+
+contrast between the indices that form the core of Positional Analysis. In other terms, the
+
+The first is the case of research on the National Broadband Program (PNBL),
+
+provisions of the public policy analyzed, a procedure that is prudential in nature.
+
+analysis based on the elaboration of the IFE is characterized by the necessary engagement with the
+
+empirical – and translatable into numerical expression – of the identified service content
+
+jurist
+
+corresponding to a subjective right related to a certain public policy. Its elaboration is
+
+Once the IFE has been prepared, the jurist inserts the quantitative data into its formula
+
+The third stage consists of forming the Empirical Fruition Index (IFE) from the
+
+of the AJPE in recent dissertations relied on elaborations of IFEs with varying degrees of
+
+That is, instead of being an instrument for “revealing” an unquestionable reality, the IFE
+
+stage of the analytical decomposition needs to take into account the possibility of raising
+
+formulation of these variables is the feasibility of their quantification, since they will compose the
+
+analytically decomposed – the identified variables – into a mathematical formula, which
+
+variables.
+
+You can choose to use data and information already produced by authorities
+or experts, or you can produce new data and information. There is, of
+course, also the possibility of using ready-made data, but in combination
+with data produced by the jurist researcher himself. In any case, the
+objective of quantification is to produce quantitative indices that can give
+precision to the characterization of the empirical experience of enjoyment. (Castro, 2009, p. 41-2)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+indicators obtained in its analytical decomposition, already mentioned above. Some of these
+
+at a price of R$30 (value converted into February 2014 dollars):
+aims to reach coverage of 70% of homes, with broadband speed of 1 Mbps,
+
+Individual Microentrepreneur Program. Albério Lima (2014) composed an IFE with six
+Before moving on to it, it is worth presenting another example, relating to research on the
+
+taken as proxies for the empirical enjoyment of broadband access. Public policy
+quantifications reflect the PNBL goals, approved by Decree 7175/2010, and which were
+
+broadband in Brazil:
+
+contrast with the “Legal Validation Standard” (PVJ), a step discussed later.
+
+relative to the variables that compose it. In the case of Fontes' research (2014, p. 107), the
+
+first step in the legal evaluation of this public policy, which still depends on its
+
+were divided by three, in order to obtain an average to represent the quality of enjoyment at the
+
+enjoyment of broadband access in Brazil based on PNBL goals. This index is the
+
+In the next step, the IFE formula was “fed” with quantitative data
+
+speed in Mbps (“Y”) and population coverage (“Z”). In the formula, the indicators
+
+As a result, Fontes obtained IFE with a value of “28.73”, which is the expression of the level of
+
+involved a price in United States dollars (represented, in the formula below, by “X”), the
+
+had their weight reduced in the formula, reflecting the author's prudential assessment that
+434
+
+indicators (ease of hiring employees and improving negotiation conditions)
+
+X = Price of broadband access, in US dollars.
+
+Y = Speed, in Mbps
+
+Table 4.6 – IFE formula fed with quantitative data, in Fontes (2014)
+
+Z = Population coverage (% of households)
+
+Table 4.5 - Structure of the IFE used in the research by Fontes (2014)
+
+Source: Fontes, 2014, p. 107
+
+Source: Fontes, 2014, p. 106-7
+
+Where:
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+from IFE. While, however, the data that feed the IFE formula must refer to the
+considered." (2009, p. 44) The PVJ formula, in fact, assumes the same aspect as the one
+in quantitative terms, to the legally validated empirical effectiveness of the right
+
+Sebrae, referring to the years 2012 and 2013, and with national coverage:
+In the case of your research, the numbers were obtained from surveys published by
+
+The PVJ is a “standard” or benchmark used to characterize what would correspond,
+
+Next, Lima inserted the quantitative data referring to the variables in the formula.
+
+Legal” (PVJ) in the fourth stage of the Positional Analysis, set out below.
+case of Fontes (2014), this number is the basis for the contrast with the “Validation Standard
+
+variables that make up your formula:
+
+conceived as a numerical image of the sphere of being (it has a descriptive function), while
+
+individual microentrepreneurs in Brazil between 2012 and 2013.
+
+these aspects are less important for the enjoyment of the right in question than the other
+
+as a numerical expression of the empirical enjoyment of the right to commercial property by
+
+435
+
+as the desirable degree of enjoyment of the right in question. In other words, the IFE is
+
+As a result of the arithmetic operations, Lima (2014, p. 102) obtains “IFE=39.683”
+
+empirical fruition, the PVJ is composed of ideal values, corresponding to what the jurist evaluates
+
+Mm = Market access improvement (trading conditions)
+
+DG = Difficulty in business management
+
+Where:
+
+Source: Lima, 2014, p. 102
+
+ApF= Support in formalization
+
+C = Ease of obtaining credit
+
+Fp = Ease of payment of the Individual Microentrepreneur's booklet
+
+Table 4.8 – IFE formula fed with quantitative data, in Lima (2014)
+
+Ce = Employee hiring
+
+Source: Lima, 2014, p. 101
+
+Table 4.7 - Structure of the IFE used in the Lima survey (2014)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+legally valid form of its participants, Lima adopted the corporate mortality rate
+
+Another aspect of the contextual – and even contingent – character of this validation is
+
+in which fruition is researched.” (Castro, 2009, p. 45) This opening in the elaboration of the PVJ
+
+in general, 24.4%, as a criterion for the period researched. That is, by proceeding from this
+
+can be adapted, as well as criticized, in view of the specificities of the contexts
+
+Individual Microentrepreneur results in a business survival rate
+found in research by Albério Lima (2014). To assess whether the Program
+
+which expresses legal validation in a given context. So, for example:
+
+adoption of ready-made normative references: “[the] indices produced by these entities
+stipulated by international organizations.” (Castro, 2009, p. 45) There is, however, no limitation to the
+
+imprecise and generic 'weighting of values'” (Castro, 2009, p. 48), instead focusing on
+
+A practical example of preparing the PVJ based on mixed criteria can be
+
+goals contained in law or normative regulations of government authorities, or
+
+social situation to which it refers. In his formulation, the jurist must avoid “abstract exercises,
+
+discovery and institutional innovation, in order to converge with the NDD.
+Positional reveals its affinity with proposals for democratic experimentalism,
+
+In preparing the PVJ, the jurist can adopt, as references, “the recommendations or
+
+sieve for universal validation of the enjoyment of a right, regardless of location or group
+
+guide public policies and economic policy in democracies. At this point, the Analysis
+
+the PVJ reflects the duty to be (has a normative function)270. The PVJ, however, does not lend itself as a
+
+opinion of individuals as to what should be the present and future enjoyment of their rights
+
+436
+
+of a subjective right in a subsequent moment. In this sense, PVJs:
+
+In this way, the policy aimed at individual microentrepreneurs will have been legally
+
+reflects the assumption adopted by the AJPE, mentioned earlier, in the sense that the
+
+temporal. The PVJ created for a moment may fail to reflect what would be ideal enjoyment
+
+The presence of the PVJ in the Positional Analysis seems to reflect, in the classification used by
+Coutinho (2013), the role of law as an objective, since the PVJ lends itself to pointing out what would
+be the “arrival points” of public policies, in terms of fruition of rights.
+
+they refer directly to concrete contexts and need to be continually updated
+as much as public policies need to be reformed, given new inventions,
+institutional changes, technological achievements and fluctuations in
+people's perceptions of the desirable social order. (Castro, 2009, p. 48)
+
+the characteristics of enjoyment considered “standard of legal validation”
+in one culture may be different in another. The PVJ relating to the “right to
+food” in a society or regional population may correspond to a daily diet
+different from that represented in the PVJ of other societies or regional
+populations. (Castro, 2009, p. 45)
+
+270
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+existence of deficiencies in the PNBL goals, indicating the need for reforms.
+
+Sources (2014) on the PNBL. In this case, the criteria for assessing the legal validity of the
+A different procedure for composing the PVJ was adopted in Daniele's research
+
+individual microentrepreneur (cf. Lima, 2014, p. 103-7).
+
+law of public policy. In contrast to the IFE of “28.73”, the comparison suggests the
+The application of the PVJ formula generates the numerical reference of “35.5” for validation
+
+– which maintained a 2% loan rejection margin
+
+related to that right. This fifth and final step will be discussed later.
+for its legal validation, signaling the need for reforms in public policy
+
+other indicators, with the exception of the ease of obtaining credit (represented by “C”)
+
+dollars (X) – see Table 4.10, below.
+
+individual microentrepreneurs to commercial property falls short of the established criteria
+
+employees. Thus, the enjoyment considered ideal was determined at 100% for all
+
+of households (Z), with a broadband speed of 19.15 Mbps (Y), at a price of 3.95
+Fontes considered that the criterion for validating public policy would be coverage of 83.3%
+
+than the PVJ, translates into the assessment that the empirical enjoyment of the right to
+
+common business companies. For other variables, different validation criteria were
+
+contrast with the IFE previously obtained, with a value of “39.683”. This situation, of smaller IFE
+
+validated, in this aspect, if their business mortality is equivalent to or lower than that of
+
+(cf. Fontes, 2014, p. 108-19). As a result of the aggregation of these expectations and goals,
+expectations of Brazilian civil society and the goals of broadband plans in other countries
+
+437
+
+As a result, Albério Lima obtained “PVJ = 74.72” (2014, p. 106), which meant
+
+public policy were composed from a “basket” of references, which added
+
+Source: Lima, 2014, p. 106
+
+Table 4.9 – PVJ, as a projection of ideal values of indicators that make up the IFE, in Lima (2014)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+exercise of the enjoyment of human and fundamental rights, not the other way around.” (Castro, 2009, p. 46)
+
+serves as a guide for the jurist to identify the provisional contents of the public policy that
+
+suggests proximity of the AJPE with other previously discussed references: from the
+
+Based on the objective of expanding the empirical enjoyment of rights, the jurist “must be
+
+derived from standardized recommendations (one-size-fits-all reforms). This aspect
+
+45-6). The comparison between the values attributed to the variables that make up the IFE and the PVJ
+
+international cooperation mechanisms) that must be changed to adapt to the
+production and consumption: “they are the institutions (public policies, economic policies,
+
+legal validation, representing insufficient or non-existent effectiveness (cf. Castro, 2009, p.
+
+mechanism, in Positional Analysis, is that there is no place for ready-made institutional prescriptions,
+works for each context, and what needs to be changed. A consequence of this
+
+justifies if the empirical enjoyment of the analyzed law is discrepant from its standard of
+
+existing institutions that act as obstacles to the adequate enjoyment of the rights of
+
+values assumed by the IFE and the PVJ is appointed as an instrument to measure what
+
+The fifth and final stage of the Positional Analysis – the recommendation for reforms – can only be
+
+are not “given”, but “conventional”, suggests that the jurist does not stop before
+When recommending reforms, the AJPE, considering that the institutions
+
+learning and discovery. In other words, the degree of proximity or distance between the
+
+recommendations can progress to recommending reforms in the policies under consideration.
+
+fits, once again, in the broader proposal of democratic experimentalism,
+
+interdisciplinary studies of law and economics, once again, with the NDD.
+heterodox contributions of development economics, and from the currents
+
+438
+
+according to the needs identified through the comparison of indices, which
+
+prepared to recommend 'bottom-up' reforms”, and “the sequence of reforms
+
+international law, with the aspect of global legal pluralism; from the economy, with
+
+are more problematic. The ultimate goal is for the policy to be reformed
+
+Source: Fontes, 2014, p. 119
+
+Table 4.10 – PVJ, as a projection of ideal values of indicators that make up the IFE, in Fontes (2014)
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+PVJ regarding the PNBL the conduct of public policy under a “competitive” model of
+
+social policies), the jurist must be free to recommend reforms in these devices
+
+economic, as a base category of the AJPE, introduces certain limitations. This is because the
+
+If, on the one hand, encouraging “bottom-up” reforms represents a great
+
+indication of reforms aimed at maximizing service content corresponding to
+
+reform measures to overcome this obstacle, the author suggested more space for the
+
+deficit consists in the absence of international support for the state debt, the jurist
+
+The application of Positional Analysis in surveys conducted using the AJPE resulted in
+
+consumption, that is, the conjugation between the aspects of economic efficiency and equity.
+
+lose sight, in this sense, that the AJPE values the analysis of the consequences of
+
+broadband, complemented by the competitive model (2014, p. 131-2, 136). In
+
+broadband in Brazil could be favored by the expansion of the infrastructure with resources
+
+439
+
+increased enjoyment of the right to commercial property (profitability, survival of
+
+to correspond, for example, to the migration of a model based on flows
+
+Fontes (2014) identified as the main obstacle to explain the distance between the IFE and
+
+managed.
+
+problematic. The opposite is also true: it would not be in line with the AJPE proposal to
+
+deficit of the State are identified as an obstacle to the proper enjoyment of the right to
+
+telecommunications, which did not result in the universalization of broadband access. As
+
+freedom for the institutional imagination of the jurist, on the other hand, the very conception of justice
+
+social rights without paying attention to the impacts on production rights. It should not
+
+state activism, with a public regulatory regime as the main front for the expansion of
+
+the contraction of government spending) or consumer rights (due to cuts in
+
+consonance with this main proposal for reform, suggested that increasing access to
+
+constricting legal provisions. If, in the same context, it is identified that another barrier to expenditure
+
+concept proposes the conciliated expansion of the empirical fruition of production rights and
+
+changes in legal institutions.
+
+may recommend the reformulation of the institutions of international economic cooperation
+
+on reform recommendations that illustrate this fifth step. So, for example, Daniel
+
+In this way, from the perspective of production rights, reforms that seek, for example, the
+
+commercial property (such as increases in the death rate of companies due to
+
+international cooperation." (Castro, 2009, p. 46) As an example, if legal restrictions on expenditure
+
+private cross-border flows to another, with a greater presence of publicly traded capital flows
+
+companies), but imply a decrease in the enjoyment of consumer rights, are shown to be
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+being structured by pluralities of contracts that, instead of being isolated
+
+right to commercial property by individual microentrepreneurs in Brazil, two of the
+
+As it was possible to observe, at the center of the Positional Analysis is a proposal for
+
+networks – as from one network to another – there are mutual impacts, mainly through deflection
+
+of taxes. Albério Lima suggested, in this regard, the inclusion of social security payments,
+
+“freezing” of individuals and groups, corresponding to degrees of empirical fruition
+
+4.4.2.2 New Contract Analysis or Portfolio Analysis
+
+of them was the existence of restrictions on access to credit due to difficulties in
+
+indices – one for the verified fruition, another for its legal validation – is the basis for the
+
+way, related to the role of law as a vocalizer of demands, raised by Coutinho
+
+architecture of contractual aggregates and related phenomena.
+
+440
+
+reform, the author indicates the adoption of the “solidarity endorsement” as modalities for guaranteeing the
+
+or reform proposals. In this sense, through Positional Analysis, AJPE incorporates it
+
+carried out through Positional Analysis. The AJPE conceives the market economy as
+
+public policy. The method also lends itself to giving visibility to “hidden” realities of
+
+problematic point pointed out was the degree of bureaucratic density involved in the collection
+
+Telecommunications Universalization Fund as a direct subsidy to users
+
+or atomized, form networks or aggregates (Castro, 2011, p. 19). Both within these
+
+ISS and ICMS in the “Simples” regime (2014, p. 119).
+
+inadequate subjective rights. This last aspect makes Positional Analysis, in a certain way,
+
+currency, resumed later. The New Contractual Analysis is the tool to represent the
+
+The research by Albério Lima (2014) identified several obstacles to the fruition of
+
+legal criticism of public policies that uses numerical language. The comparison between
+
+which will be mentioned here to illustrate the corresponding reform proposals. One
+
+(2013).
+
+offering guarantees for contracting bank loans. How possible
+
+In many respects, the New Contract Analysis complements and assists the assessments
+
+legal argumentation that can lead to the confirmation of the effectiveness of a certain public policy
+
+service contractors (2014, p. 140).
+
+bank debts contracted by individual microentrepreneurs (2014, p. 109). Other
+
+partially public (2014, p. 133), including the use of funds from the
+
+indices or indicators to the legal discourse, using them to validate, reject or reform
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Table 4.11 - New Contract Analysis Matrix
+
+Source: Castro, 2013, p. 17; 2011, p. 42.
+
+consumption suffer the incidence of content linked to public policies. In second,
+
+along the horizontal axis of the matrix. Utility clauses (U) are objects of contracts
+The utility and monetary contents of contracts are analytically decomposed
+
+It is a means of obtaining clarity about which aspects of the relations of production, exchange and
+
+main object negotiated is a monetary asset (Castro, 2011, p. 21). In the case of a
+
+public. There is a type of contract in which the utility clause, however, does not refer to real
+
+economic interests, but monetary ones. This is the case with financial contracts, in which the
+
+private and public. The matrix allows performing different analysis functions. Firstly,
+
+health center and the deadline for delivery of the work, in the case of a bidding carried out by the power
+
+contractual contents in utility and monetary clauses, and in another axis, of interest
+
+structure of said matrix:
+
+(Castro, 2009, p. 36) The means for this is a matrix that analytically separates, on an axis,
+
+schedules and breaks, in the case of individual employment contracts and (iii) the construction of a
+products, the declaration on nutrients” (Castro, 2009, p. 36); (ii) task specifications,
+
+as a result, the identification of points subject to reform. The chart below illustrates the
+
+allow the “inclusion of public policies as an element covered by the legal analysis.”
+
+analytical decomposition of public policies into provisional components and, by
+
+To do so, it makes use of redefinitions of contract law categories, aimed at
+
+utility: (i) “[the] obligation of food industries to include, on the labels of their
+main object of what is being negotiated. Thus, for example, they illustrate clauses of
+
+441
+
+chain effects transmissions in the economy (currency deflection). Furthermore, it facilitates
+
+that reflect “material interests of the real economy” (2011, p. 21; cf. 2013, p. 17), that is, the
+
+makes it possible to explain intercontractual relations, especially of a monetary nature, accompanying
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Federal in 2008. In addition to these, employment contracts have the incidence of
+
+financial (Castro, 2009, p. 32), which include counterparts of the utility clause – the
+
+practically exclusively for content of private interest consists of derivatives
+
+public of contractual aggregates, such as those exemplified above, are symbolized, in the
+
+principle, freely negotiated and not subject to the requirement of wide publicity (Castro,
+
+dispute resolution, etc. Thus, as an example of the incidence of
+
+collective work agreements. Judicial decisions, as mentioned, also participate in the definition
+
+of these contents of public interest. This is the case with the prohibition that the
+
+contractor's remuneration -, but also taxes and other pecuniary benefits, such as
+
+system (cf. 2009, p. 59), already discussed in chapter 3.
+
+incidence of constitutional norms, such as the one that determines that remuneration is not
+
+currency (U' and M'). Analytically, when public policies affect aggregates
+
+442
+
+Along the vertical axis, the New Contractual Analysis matrix organizes content of
+
+wide publicity, such as by legislative, administrative or judicial means (Castro, 2009, p. 34;
+
+public servant or employee, established by binding precedent of the Supreme Court
+
+binding resolutions of international organizations, decisions of international mechanisms
+
+derive. Contents of private interest have the main characteristic of being, in
+
+matrix, while the contracted interest is its monetary counterpart (M).
+
+content derived from ILO conventions ratified by Brazil. Contents of interest
+
+2009, p. 34; cf. 2011, p. 21). An extreme example of contracts formed in such a way
+
+public interest on contractual aggregates, the negotiation of labor contracts suffers from
+
+matrix of the New Contractual Analysis, by adding an apostrophe to the utility clauses and
+
+currency.” (Castro, 2011, p. 21) They correspond to a pecuniary benefit or obligation
+
+contractual, they do so by adding contents U' and M'.
+
+financial instruments traded in the so-called “over-the-counter markets”, that is, in shadow banking
+
+examples of the price paid to purchase food, the employee's salary and the
+
+lower than the minimum wage, as well as other legal norms and those arising from
+
+interest and exchange rates.
+
+minimum wage is used as an index for calculating the remuneration advantage of
+
+Contents of public interest are determined by procedures subject to
+
+Monetary clauses (M) embody “material interests that acquire form
+
+of private and public interest. What differentiates them is the character of the negotiation they
+
+bank loan agreement, for example, the borrowed capital is part of the “U” box of the
+
+cf. 2011, p. 21). To these avenues, international negotiations, decisions and
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+alternative destination of its capital. If the profitability of your investment in the economy
+
+AJPE employs the notion of interportfolio monetary deflection – or
+
+mentioned above: links or monetary settings between different contracts (Castro, 2010, p.
+
+basic interest rates charged.
+
+loan the capital for the production and commercialization of that good, there is always the possibility
+currency. From the perspective of the tire producer and reseller, who own or take
+
+monetary (cf. Castro, 2011, p. 23-4). This is a pervasive and important effect of rates
+
+Basically, it functions as a sieve for decisions about investments in the real economy or
+
+real economy cease to exist, to give way to hiring corresponding to the economy
+enough to make financial investments more attractive. As a result, contracts
+
+draw attention to the presence of the element “basic interest rate of the economy” (in M').
+
+resale, or in payment for the factors to produce it, if the base interest rate is high or
+
+Among the various contents that are not subject to free private negotiation, it is worth
+
+private incentives, it will not pay to invest in the purchase of a stock of tires for
+
+of a purely illustrative nature, the outline of the clauses is not exhaustive in nature.
+
+162). Price signals, in this sense, “travel” through contractual networks. They are varied
+
+example are the purchase and sale of tires between companies and final consumers in Brazil. for being
+
+443
+
+may opt for “disinvestment” in production or trade. From the point of view of
+
+intercontractual exchange of monetary values – to refer to phenomena such as the
+
+The table above (4.12) provides an application illustration. The contracts used in
+
+real is lower than the profitability offered by financial investments, these entrepreneurs
+
+•
+
+Source: Castro; Pena, 2015, p. 16.
+
+Public
+
+(M)
+
+(U')
+• ABNT standards for
+measures and safety; •
+obligations for the appropriate
+environmental disposal of
+unusable tires by new or
+remolded tires introduced
+onto the market.
+
+Interest
+•
+
+(U)
+the tire sold; • possible
+installation service; • any
+additional
+guarantee provided by the company;
+
+(M')
+taxes levied on the transaction,
+
+including tariffs applicable to
+foreign trade; • the
+economy's
+basic interest rate.
+
+Monetary Clause
+
+•
+
+Utility Clause
+
+the price charged to
+the consumer;
+
+Table 4.12 – Example of application of the New Contract Analysis Matrix
+
+Private
+Interest
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+investment by industries, and encourage phenomena of “business migration” and
+
+production, entrepreneurs readjust their prices, which are transmitted in a chain to the
+
+its local and international dimension” (Castro, 2006, p. 60). International differences
+
+It is worth remembering that, as suggested for other types of deflection
+
+transnationally. After all, contractual aggregates harbor “contractual interconnectivities
+
+interest rates, directly linked to the costs of accessing capital to finance the
+
+given that its competitors, in these other markets, may have access to the “capital” factor to
+
+access to capital tends to make companies incorporate this increase in prices
+
+survival of a company against its competitors. Thus, the depreciation of the Real
+
+higher interest rates in Brazil than in other parts of the world, such as Europe, Japan
+
+prices) spread through the contractual networks that make up the economy. Thus, the closure
+
+employees, less income in circulation, less taxes collected, etc. In turn, the
+
+444
+
+fast and comprehensive by the contractual aggregates that form the economy (cf. Castro, 2014a, p.
+
+foreigners, while the appreciation of the Brazilian currency against the dollar corresponds to the
+
+International differentials in the price of labor are linked to decisions on
+
+competitiveness of local companies (cf. Castro, 2014c). Something similar happens with rates
+
+Monetary deflection may also concern price signals that travel
+
+between the real and monetary economy. But there are also transmissions or reflections
+
+internationalization of production chains.
+
+that establish multiple links between the real economy and the monetary economy, both in
+
+entrepreneurial activities (as well as consumption and new investments). The existence of
+
+currency, as well as those resulting from international differentials (exchange rates, interest rates and other
+
+contractual. The main example is inflation. Noticing increases in your operating costs
+
+of a local industry due to these differentials corresponds to fewer workers
+
+exchange rates, interest rates and local production costs are relevant factors for the
+
+final costumer. The same occurs with increases in interest rates: the increase in
+
+and the United States, represents an obstacle to the competitive insertion of Brazilian companies,
+
+practiced for the sale of their products. Readjustments like these can spread so
+
+lower costs. The same occurs with the costs of other factors of production, such as labor.
+
+may boost exports of Brazilian products to the detriment of competitors
+
+monetary values between contracts positioned along the same chain or aggregate
+
+29).
+
+the interconnect types captured by this category. As the example above suggests, a
+
+facilitated access of imported goods to the national market, compromising the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Contractual analysis procedure reflects the consequentialist component of his approach.
+
+social transformation”, corresponding to “changes in inherited social hierarchies, not
+inducing and enabling change, a means for exercising the “practical power of
+
+The importance that AJPE attaches to inter-portfolio monetary deflection in its
+
+civil or social monetary corresponds to the presence of protection-oriented M' contents
+consumption and civil property. In terms of the New Contract Analysis, the environment
+
+(Castro, 2009, p. 27) captured by the New Contractual Analysis matrix. At the same time, it is
+of interests for productive and trade purposes”, alongside the “contractual complements”
+
+public interest in protecting consumer practices”. Therefore, it is related to rights
+
+and as an enabler of change. Currency “enables the mobilization and coordination
+
+4.13 seeks to illustrate these inter-contractual monetary linkages.
+
+simply, “civil currency”. It is composed of “instruments and policies that incorporate the
+The first of these is the civil or social monetary institutional environment, or,
+
+consideration of money both as an ordering institution of economic and social relations,
+
+the more favorable exchange ratios, tends to correspond to opposite impacts. The board
+
+contracts that integrate the economy. Another aspect that reflects this importance is the
+
+installation of the factory that "migrated" to where interest rates are lower, cheaper labor, or
+
+institutional monetary instruments”, also referred to simply as “currencies”.
+This range of possibilities is captured, in AJPE, by categorizing three “environments
+445
+
+cannot fail to take into account the fact that price signals travel across
+
+negotiated in the present, and which define the current order of society.” (Castro, 2009, p. 30)
+
+The jurist, both to criticize and to present reform proposals to public policies,
+
+Table 4.13 - Representation of interportfolio monetary deflection
+
+Source: Castro; Pena, 2015, p. 17
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+From the outline above, it is possible to see that the New Contractual Analysis
+
+a property in relation to foreclosures, protecting the practice of consumption of a good considered
+
+institutional monetary environment (Castro, 2009, p. 59). But not all environments
+
+is usually referred to as trade, industry, and technology policies, as well as
+
+trading and installments may not have the requirement of wide publicity.” (Castro, 2009, p.
+
+institutional monetary instruments intertwine, because “strategic currency” instruments can
+
+(including opening credit lines with preferential interest rates), imposition of
+
+that Brazilian law confers special protection refers to “temples of any cult”,
+
+“over-the-counter markets”. Many of them are permeated by strategic monetary instruments.
+
+as M' components, the varied strategies of state intervention that correspond to
+
+of utility and monetary, of public and private interest, AJPE contributes to make them more
+
+use in analyzes used in reforms that provide broader degrees of fruition
+
+446
+
+The second institutional monetary environment is the commercial, or commercial currency,
+
+translate into contents of the State's 'strategy'” and that can be aimed at “expanding the
+
+exchange rate, government purchases, etc.
+
+strategies in economic and international relations.” Basically, the three environments
+
+private actors in the banking and financial markets”, whose “procedural rules of
+
+extraeconomic. Thus, for example, home financing contracts rely on
+
+offers a language to situate, in legal terms (resignified and expanded) what
+
+59) The “markets for various over-the-counter transactional assets” exemplify this type of
+
+be “grafted” into civil and commercial currency (Castro, 2009, p. 59). This category includes,
+
+economic policy measures. By translating these elements into categories such as clauses
+
+2009, p. 59). In the same way, the institution of the “familiar property” grants legal immunity to
+
+closer to discourse and legal concerns, and in particular for their guidance to
+
+institutional monetary instruments are as insulated from the incidence of public policy as the
+
+special (home). Another practice of using immovable property with an extra-economic character and the
+
+trade, industrial and technology policies, including export subsidies
+
+who are immune from the incidence of taxes due to a constitutional norm.
+
+tariff barriers, concession of tax benefits, strategic modulations of the rate of
+
+Finally, “strategic currency” refers to “instruments and policies that
+
+differentiated monetary contents, which are related to the right to housing (cf. Castro
+
+corresponding to “monetary and financial instruments of the free contractual creativity of
+
+of (or promotion of) consumption practices that may be (including) of a character
+
+competitiveness of investments”, “protect consumption practices” or “acquire positions
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Source: translated from Castro; Lima, 2015, p. 25
+
+Utility Clause
+
+Interest
+
+Private
+
+Monetary Clause
+
+Public
+
+Table 4.14 – Portfolio analysis of the right to commercial property by Program participants
+
+Individual Microentrepreneur
+
+Interest
+
+stage of analytical decomposition of public policy or subjective right into components
+
+but in different combinations between the two. This is an opening point for new
+exclusively private, nor content exclusively related to public policies:
+
+Contract serves as a complement to Positional Analysis, in particular with regard to the
+In addition to fulfilling this broader objective, the use of the New Analysis
+
+perception that the economy is not structured even based on contractual content
+institutional reforms. It is also worth highlighting that the New Contractual Analysis favors the
+
+become subject to legal criticism.
+
+In other words, the matrix is also useful for analytically situating the proposition of
+
+of being subject to discussion and decision only if versed in technocratic terms,
+
+jurist's imagination regarding new possible components, and their scope of incidence.
+
+themes that are normally found “mystified”, or involved (and isolated) by the notion
+
+installment components that rely on the impact of public policies, as well as the
+
+reconciled empirical theory of production and consumption rights, or economic justice. In that regard,
+
+also characterizes NDD formulations.
+
+447
+
+(U' and M') in the contractual aggregates chosen for analysis facilitates the delineation of the
+
+institutional conceptions of joint action between the public and private sectors, a feature that
+
+benefits that can be quantified. Identification of elements of “public interest”
+
+Positional Analysis (ease of access to credit, ease
+of hiring employees, market, difficulties in
+managing the business, ease of
+dealing with tax documentation)
+
++
+
+Adequate access to capital
+(with adjustments in forms
+of credit that reasonably
+compensate for international
+differentials in interest
+rates)
+• More content added from legal documents (e.g.
+ILO recommendations) and opinion polls from
+participants in the Individual Microentrepreneur
+Program.
+
+access
+
+(M')
+
+to the
+
+(U) (M)
+Prices of goods and
+services (with analytical
+exclusion of M' content)
+Privately negotiated technical characteristics of
+goods and services
+
+(U')
+• Pre-opening assistance, opening business
+development, including institutional conditions
+specified by the
+
+It is
+
+Tax incentives
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Source: translated from Castro; Fontes, 2014, p. 26.
+
+Interest
+
+Table 4.15 – Analysis of investment portfolio in broadband services in Brazil
+
+Interest
+
+Public
+
+Monetary Clause
+
+Private
+
+Utility Clause
+
+content of public interest – reflects the authors' perception that the gap between
+
+references addressed in this chapter form a rich debate. One of the ways to
+
+(see Table 4.14, above). In the example above, the densification of contents U' and M' –
+
+analysis of legal institutions. Despite sharing certain common characteristics, the
+
+commercial property, as well as possibilities for reforms aimed at expanding it
+
+institutions are important for development, and consequentialism as an integral part
+
+Brazil:
+
+pointing to elements of public policies related to the enjoyment of their right to
+
+AJPE have in common the use of interdisciplinary approaches, the adoption of the assumption that
+
+shared with another example, referring to broadband internet access in
+
+and Lima (2015) analyze contractual aggregates involving individual microentrepreneurs,
+
+As previously pointed out in this section, AED, Law & Finance, NDD and
+
+The recommendation of easy access to credit is an indication of change
+
+Contractual, in a manner related to the research already mentioned in the previous item. Thus, Castro
+
+development
+
+components corresponding to public policies.
+
+Two recent works serve as examples of application of the New Analysis matrix
+
+4.4.3 AJPE: connections and contrasts with other aspects of the debate on law and
+
+448
+
+Brazilians, determined through the Positional Analysis, needs to have reconfigured the
+the IFE and the PVJ in the fruition of the right to commercial property of individual microentrepreneurs
+
++
+
+Additional price for speed equal
+to or greater than 1 Mbps and
+for other additional services.
+
+Tax incentives
+
+(M)
+
+Price up to USD 7.00 per Mb
+
+Privately negotiated broadband service
+features
+
+Special lines of credit
+
+(U)
+
+(U')
+
+Speed greater than or equal to 1 Mbps
+
+Various other service quality
+regulations
+
++
+
++
+
+(M')
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+methodological differences (the first is based on cost-benefit analysis, the second on
+
+common law legal institutions are superior to those of the civil law in bringing about the
+
+of the AJPE, this recommendation corresponds to the emptying of contents U' and M' in the
+
+to understand it is to start from a division between perspectives that instruct the rule of thumb paradigm.
+
+(except for the rule of law necessary for the proper functioning
+
+do not share the rule of law paradigm. In these lines of analysis, the law is not
+
+these.
+
+private freedom of transaction. Legal institutions are placed as guarantors of a
+
+At AED as at Law & Finance, law is a function of the economy.
+
+in common, also, a notion of development linked to economic growth via
+
+correlations of variables from statistical series), these lines of analysis propose, in
+
+development, precisely because they are perceived as more likely to create the environment
+
+economic resources. It is suggested that legal institutions that offer obstacles to
+
+goal – but which explicitly incorporate redistributive and legal aspects. At AJPE,
+
+In the first group, as seen, are AED and Law & Finance. Despite your
+
+derived from common law. In particular, their arguments lead to the conclusion that
+
+in order to converge to the common law model, with minimal public regulation of the
+
+of law is even reflected in the adoption of conceptions of development that are not
+
+contractual aggregates that make up the economy. The strategy favored by AED and Law
+
+markets). These are approaches that propose, in short, pro-market reforms. In terms
+
+law and the recommendations derived from it, and those that place themselves in a critical position in relation to
+
+conceived only in its instrumental function in relation to markets. More than that,
+
+449
+
+“market”, remaining averse to accepting redistributive policies or other elements
+
+dynamism situated essentially in the private sphere. In terms of the New Contract Analysis
+
+commerce and finance, and with a predominance of private allocation mechanisms of
+
+Jointly, NDD and AJPE offer institutional reform contributions that
+
+restrict economic growth – although, evidently, they do not exclude it as
+
+essence, that the best format for legal institutions is one that fosters
+
+economic efficiency (or, specifically, financial markets) must be removed.
+
+institutional incentive to private transactions. Both (AED and Law & Finance) employ
+
+& Finance for reform in legal institutions consists of model transplants
+
+of a global project, the ideal vision would be the institutional homogenization/harmonization of countries
+
+Legal institutions are seen as constitutive of markets. This new positioning
+
+the emphasis on the redistributive aspect appears not only in the definition of economic justice but also
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+While the NDD approach establishes several links between legal analysis
+and arguments derived from the literature on economic development and
+also from searches for “new functionalities” of law, the AJPE perspective
+places significant emphasis on reconstructing legal categories and
+approaching facts with the assistance of varied interdisciplinary engagement
+of legal discourse with the sociopolitical analysis of public policy projects
+and their implementation. (Castro; Lima, 2015, p. 5)
+
+“development” in the NDD, both harboring both redistributive and
+
+but rejection from global standard institutions. The “global project” implied by the NDD and the
+
+economy involve contents corresponding to actions of the two sectors. In others
+
+situation of broad and reconciled fruition of production and consumption rights, but also in the
+
+and Law & Finance in the grouping of views supporting the rule of law paradigm – have
+
+to embrace them. Thus, AJPE is marked by the adoption of its own categories and methods of
+
+groups, that is, their degree of economic qualification or disability. The category of "justice
+
+can be seen as contributions that seek to overcome the divisions between market and state,
+
+working in such a way as to heterodox economic contributions, proceeds in such a way as to subsume
+
+their respective peoples.
+
+definitions of “good” that include legal purposes. Rather than the exclusive emphasis on
+
+AJPE is essentially pluralistic: opening space for the adoption of solutions
+
+a current debate. In this sense, the NDD differs from all other currents analyzed
+
+economic” plays, in the AJPE, a role equivalent to that of the expanded category of
+
+democracy, discovery and innovation. There is openness to horizontal dialogues between countries,
+
+there is the adoption of its own methodological tools, which allow precise definitions of its
+
+terms, both open space for the construction of arguments in support of the new activism
+
+relevant differences. The NDD brings together ideas about legal institutions that establish
+
+adoption of analytical procedures designed to assess changes in the position of individuals and
+
+legal analysis, as pointed out in the following excerpt:
+
+450
+
+However, despite their affinities and convergences, the NDD and the AJPE – like the AED
+
+favoring the conception that the best strategies for development or justice
+
+contours. As mentioned in section 4.3, its very characterization as a “field” integrates
+
+economic aspects through the generation of new categories and legal methods,
+
+institutional formats that favor the dynamism of the private sphere, the NDD and the AJPE
+
+hitherto, by the absence of a characteristic analytical method. The AJPE, despite also
+
+contextually appropriate, specific institutional institutions that dialogue with the aspirations of
+
+state-owned. The preferred institutional reform strategies are experimentation
+
+close dialogue with heterodox contributions from development economics, but not
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+subjective.
+
+Table 4.16, on the following page, seeks to bring together the main characteristics that
+
+is also translated into legal terms, captured from the definition of “justice
+
+451
+
+allow approximations and contrasts between interdisciplinary expertise in the service of
+
+economic.” In other words, AJPE has its own definition for its conception of “good”
+
+reforms, discussed in this chapter.
+
+Furthermore, with regard to the notion of “good” that instructs the analyses, while the
+
+and “desirable”, which receives an interpretation directly versed in the language of rights
+
+NDD adopts the expanded category of “development”, absorbing a trend
+
+relatively recent in heterodox economics, the concern with this aspect, in AJPE,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+AJPE
+
+Amalgamation
+of different
+
+and
+broad
+methodological
+possibilities,
+tendency to
+conduct case studies
+
+role of law
+
+Use of historical
+statistical
+
+series to
+correlate
+
+origins of
+legal
+institutions
+with variables
+related to
+financial markets
+
+Table 4.16 – Approximations and contrasts between interdisciplinary expertise in the service of reforms
+
+Instrumental, with
+emphasis on
+protective function.
+
+consumption
+
+Law & Finance
+
+Trend direction of
+reforms
+
+2nd - rule of law
+
+Multiple roles, Multiple roles.
+including as
+
+“arrival
+point”.
+
+Economic
+growth via
+financial
+markets
+
+Configure pro-market institutional
+environments; strengthen property and
+contract rights; seek independence
+and speed of the judiciary;
+deregulate finances
+
+NDD
+
+Instrumental, with
+emphasis on
+protective function.
+
+Analysis
+
+Economic
+growth via
+institutional
+designs to
+stimulate
+efficiency
+
+Trickle down; spillover: deliberate
+redistribution policies tend to be seen as
+distortions
+
+AED
+
+Coase; use of
+arithmetic
+guesses
+
+Contractual;
+
+Private right
+
+Private initiative
+
+Source: prepared by the author based on the characterizations made in this chapter.
+
+Cost-benefit
+analysis of
+legal
+institutions;
+employment of
+
+Law is a means
+
+to economic
+efficiency
+
+Expertise/aspect
+
+Coupling public and private law content
+in contextually specific
+institutional arrangements
+
+Main protagonist
+sector
+
+Public policy
+
+Institutional transplants inspired by
+common law, global institutional
+convergence or harmonization,
+adoption of global strandard institutions
+
+3rd - new state activism
+
+Legal
+institutions
+are constitutive
+of markets
+
+Law used as a
+reference for
+criticism and
+reform of
+public policies and
+economic
+policy
+
+Main
+methodological
+
+characteristics of
+the analyzes
+
+Multifaceted
+conception of
+development as
+freedom, with
+economic, political,
+social and
+legal components
+Development
+
+Privileged
+redistribution
+strategy
+Configure contextually specific
+institutional arrangements with space
+for public sector participation without
+suppressing the dynamic potential of
+the private sector Emphasis on
+contextually appropriate solutions;
+democratic experimentalism,
+imagination and institutional discovery,
+learning, horizontal dialogue, global
+institutional pluralism.
+
+Moment of debate on
+law and
+development
+
+Positional; focus
+on the
+empirical
+fruition of subjective rights
+
+Law is a means
+
+of expanding and
+dynamizing
+financial
+markets
+
+Theorem of
+
+New Analysis
+
+Emphasis
+
+on legal institutions of
+
+Economic justice as
+a reconciled
+expansion of
+the enjoyment of
+production rights and
+
+Valuing public and private performance
+potential
+
+Favored
+reform strategies
+
+452
+
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/Ethics-of-Quantification--Illumination--Obfuscation-and-Performative-Legitimation.md b/Ethics-of-Quantification--Illumination--Obfuscation-and-Performative-Legitimation.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
+COMMENT
+
+Ethics of quantification: illumination, obfuscation
+and performative legitimation
+
+Siddharth Sareen 1,2*, Andrea Saltelli 2 & Kjetil Rommetveit2
+
+ABSTRACT
+The increasing use of quantification in all spheres of society is paralleled by the
+rise of digitalisation. These intertwining developments not only revolutionise
+data treatment, but also its societal effects. On the one hand, they have wonderfully
+enabling societal effects. On the other hand, they give rise to complex
+ethical dilemmas that motivate this call for an ethics of quantification. The
+central claim of this Comment is that quantification necessarily has two faces:
+illumination and obfuscation. Aspects that can be socially legitimated are illuminated,
+while those that cannot be so legitimated are obfuscated. This obfuscation
+poses ethical problems, hence its effects require rigorous analysis. Three
+ontologies of quantification are delineated to enable such examination: (i) as the
+disembodied practice of data processing in the ‘ether’—this foregrounds elements
+of big data and artificial intelligence; (ii) as the situated practice and
+effects of quantification within societal contexts—this attends to governing
+subjects through numbers; and (iii) as increasingly incorporated in physical
+reality—this focuses on governmentality of behaviours and behavioural change
+as mediated through everyday objects through an ‘Internet of Things’. Drawing
+on scholarship from the emerging sociology of quantification, the ethics of
+quantification is defined as the iterative illumination of obfuscation in legitimation
+by quantification. This is key for ensuring contextually desirable illuminating
+functions of quantification in all three ontologies.
+
+https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5 OPEN
+
+1Department of Geography, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway. 2 Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities, University of Bergen,
+Bergen, Norway. *email: Siddharth.Sareen@uib.no
+
+PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 6:20 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5 | www.nature.com/palcomms 1
+
+1234567890():,;
+Introduction: The case for an ethics of quantification
+Entering the 2020s, we live in an era marked by the ubiquity
+of quantification. Variants of the adage “not all that counts
+can be counted, but what is counted counts” have proliferated.
+Metrics accompany many of us in a bewildering array of
+activities. These range from the formal (giving satisfaction ratings
+after a meeting or hotel stay, submitting credit ratings to take on a
+mortgage, checking domestic electricity consumption when paying
+monthly utility bills) to the informal and everyday (tracking
+one’s daily run speed and distance, reviewing new beers drunk at
+a bar on a smartphone application to notch up experience points,
+monitoring one’s sleep patterns using a smart watch). They can
+be distant (tapping a smiley button to rate the experience of going
+through airport security protocols) or intimate (registering biometrics
+such as one’s fingerprints to go through immigration
+border controls). They can be voluntary (a citizen filling out a
+national survey to feed their household characteristics into a
+demographics database) or coercive (public surveillance linked
+with a facial recognition database to fine jaywalkers). They can be
+clearly signposted (traffic counters along bicycle routes) or
+stealthy (sensors like WiFi signals that collect information such as
+purchase histories from proximate smartphones for efficient realtime
+targeted advertising at passers-by in public spaces). They can
+result in the production of a tangible number (e.g., an indicator, a
+rating) or decision, where the number crunching is out of sight,
+e.g., in facial recognition (O’Neil, 2016). The data, data points and
+pieces of information are increasingly incorporated into largescale
+information infrastructures operating across policy and
+everyday domains, as well as across territorial and sovereign
+borders. Streams of metrics along these spectra are constantly
+collected, processed and used in ways that we increasingly take
+for granted.
+This unprecedented generation of data to metricise innumerable
+aspects of everyday life is paralleled by unprecedented
+computing power and technological sophistication to process
+such vast quantities of data (Savage, 2013). Data is organised into
+an assortment of data points, information, statistics and metrics
+by a wide variety of actors who deploy them for such versatile
+purposes that their direct and indirect effects are far from clear.
+What is resoundingly clear, however, is that these effects have
+significant political and ethical implications. Quantification of the
+self, combined with digitalisation on steroids, has systemic effects;
+it reconfigures intimate matters like healthcare not only for
+individuals but as a vital socio-economic sector acted upon at the
+aggregate level (Lupton, 2016). Prior distinctions between facts
+and values, so central to modern western societies, collapse in
+streams of raw data feeding algorithms that learn and reason, and
+connect data from unexpected sites and sources. The intermeshing
+of big data and algorithms increasingly blurs distinctions
+between different forms and indeed purposes of quantification.
+They cut across the infinitely small (i.e., nano-molecules) and the
+infinitely big (Planet Earth), and apply to seemingly any process,
+from education to traffic management to biomedical research.
+Berman and Hirschman (2018) enquire: “What qualities are
+specific to rankings, or indicators, or models, or algorithms?”
+There is appetite to scrutinise quantification for perceived
+misuse of existing methodologies. For instance, the convulsions of
+significance testing in statistics have received wide attention
+(Amrhein et al., 2019), whereas mathematical modelling is a field
+with severe uncharted problems (Saltelli, 2019). Algorithms pose
+the risk of non-transparent, oft-proprietary tools used in
+decision-making and for policy support. Much quantification
+carries the conundrum that, without representing context and
+purpose of production, numbers can obfuscate as much as illuminate.
+Yet measurements generate traction for issues, hence
+acting within society often requires an appreciation of and
+
+entanglement with data politics (Bigo et al., 2019). The time is
+thus ripe for an ethics of quantification (Saltelli, 2020).
+
+Ethical dilemmas in the societal legitimation of quantification
+As Dencik et al. (2019) point out, the way data and society act
+upon each other is changing the meaning of justice, specifically
+data justice for society. Quantification is performative; it serves a
+legitimating function (Porter, 1996) because it can in principle
+illuminate and make hitherto intangible things commensurable.
+Ever increasing sophistication in the metricisation of data has
+reconstituted fields like global health in deep entanglement with
+financial markets and data management systems, quantifying
+attributes of bodies and populations in ways that impact the
+distribution of certainty and risk in healthcare (Adams, 2016).
+This raises the question of what basis actors use to claim commensurability.
+As a case in point, the Stat-Activisme movement
+in France aims to ‘fight against’ and ‘fight with’ numbers; it uses
+‘statistical judo’ to expose the vacuity of existing metrics, and to
+statistically identify exclusion and neglect (Bruno et al., 2014).
+This can be read as an attempt to open the ‘black box’ of quantification
+and challenge its predominant modality of legitimation
+in terms of simply ‘more data’ or ‘more efficiency’ or ‘improved
+competitiveness’.
+An even more radical critique is offered by the French jurist
+Alain Supiot (2007), for whom the neoliberal market ideology has
+embraced quantification, so as to implement a sort of cybernetic,
+homoeostatic, horizontal society. This replaces the previous
+Fordist and Taylorist mechanical models. In the new model, the
+labour force is constantly mobilised though management by
+objectives. Here, numbers replace laws to create a world of dystopian
+injustice and dysfunction, where the only solution for
+individuals is to revert to a system of allegiance to the strongest
+actors (Supiot, 2007). This happens even as many (or most) of
+today’s societal problems are of a nature that cannot be quantified,
+such as the consequences of species extinction, the impacts
+of a major terrorist attack, or the possible consequences of artificial
+intelligence (AI) systems that operate critical infrastructures
+going out of control. Neoliberal regimes of innovation and governance
+are premised on entrepreneurs actively embracing the incalculability
+and subjective perceptions of risk and uncertainty,
+following the epistemic principle to ‘run-it-and-see-what-happens’
+(Rommetveit and Wynne, 2017) or Facebook’s celebrated—
+or execrated—‘move fast and break things’.
+Governance regimes that rely on quantification invariably use
+it to legitimate decisions and activities, such as resource allocation,
+and highlight that which is socially legitimatable (we define
+legitimatable to mean ‘that which can be legitimated’). Yet where
+there is scope for interpretation, there is room for strategic
+manoeuvre. Hence there is a risk that things that are not socially
+legitimatable may be hidden, for instance when citizens are not
+able to register with a biometric system, such as Aadhaar in India,
+thus becoming invisible to and being made invisible by the biometricising
+state (Dandurand, 2019; Wevers, 2018). When such
+sleight of hand—even if unwittingly executed by a benevolent
+actor—is not detected and challenged, the effect of an impulse to
+quantify can be to distort what it quantifies and why.
+For instance, any national government asking all its citizens to
+embed a chip in their wrist to share their real-time location is
+likely to be met with resistance despite assurances of maintaining
+anonymity in its use of data; yet a majority of citizens in most
+Western democracies today carry a smartphone on their person
+and consent to sharing their location with a number of applications
+owned by multinational private corporations on an everyday
+basis, most commonly to facilitate their live use of local maps.
+
+COMMENT PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5
+
+2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 6:20 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5 | www.nature.com/palcomms
+This ability to track location is routinely combined with a great
+deal of other background information (often by third parties) and
+constitutes a remarkably potent resource for commercial (and
+potentially other) uses within surveillance capitalism. Users
+consent to this, not merely to being users, but effectively also the
+products on sale, when they install smartphone applications. But
+the users are rarely if ever presented with a comprehensive and
+comprehensible explanation of such uses, which is relegated to
+the fine-print of the terms and conditions that apply. We want to
+use mapping services, but forcibly we also end up consenting to
+surveillance. The socially legitimatable use is highlighted; not
+socially legitimatable uses are obfuscated.
+Markham et al. (2018) warn that a grand narrative around data
+analytics that accords truth value to knowledge based on objectivity
+claims and sheer volume can obscure processual human
+decisions. These authors forge ways to work with the awareness
+that, as algorithmic governance becomes ubiquitous, an
+accountability crisis is unfolding in the way societal interventions
+are deployed, based as they are on incomplete assumptions about
+big data. Not only do actors who perform algorithmic governance
+selectively play up its socially legitimatable uses, over time this
+mode of governance acts on society to expand the ambit of what
+can be socially legitimated. In Europe and globally, this is to some
+extent becoming recognised, for instance in up-scaled data protection
+frameworks, ethical guidelines for AI, and ‘ethically
+aligned designs’ of autonomous systems (IEEE, 2018). Yet, the
+question remains to what extent and at what speed such governance
+frameworks can remedy the democratic and regulatory
+deficits.
+Never as today have the media been so determinant in accelerating
+the transactions taking place between science, technology,
+society and law (Saltelli and Boulager, 2020). For these authors,
+who look at the present with the lenses of Niklas Luhmann’s
+social system theory, we are witnessing one social system—the
+media—irritating other systems, such as science, policy and
+technology up to the point of incapacitating some of the internal
+(autopoietic) functions of the systems themselves. When social
+media networks first came into being, few could have imagined
+sharing as much of their personal information online as many
+people do now without much consideration. This iterative trend
+feeds a quantification machine that in turn changes what personal
+means, and even who a person is. At such a juncture of flux, Hesse
+et al. (2019) think through the continuing relevance of qualitative
+data. They advocate for methodological diversity, contextualised
+and inclusive research, nuanced discussion of ethical dilemmas
+that transcend legality, translocal and transdisciplinary conversations,
+and responsible research and data infrastructures.
+Research must now respond to the need to examine at depth
+the issues flagged by the forays discussed above. We frame this
+collective task as showing that analysis of the ethics of quantification
+can draw out, in various ways, how quantification obfuscates
+to legitimate. Understanding how such obfuscation happens
+and is performed can equip us with the means to confront it in
+practice, and to support the illuminating function of quantification
+in context-specific ways.
+Whilst the present juncture intensifies the effect of quantification,
+our claim holds true at all times. The introduction of
+statistics and data collection on demographics from the mid-18th
+century onwards (Hacking, 1990) gradually eclipsed other ways of
+knowing and came to structure practices like national budgets,
+enabling key instruments of state power. While such quantification
+enhanced abilities for centralised planning, by the same
+token it eroded power at local scales where local knowledge was
+not, and could not be, quantified in national databases, but
+informed decisions through its everyday embodiment in the
+bodies of local planners. To take another noted example: John
+
+Snow quantified and spatially mapped London’s cholera deaths to
+reveal that the epidemic was linked to water from specific wells, a
+novel methodology at the time whose success led to wide
+acceptance. Laudable in itself, this instance is not innocent; it
+could have been used as a basis to avoid investing in preventive
+measures to safeguard against contamination in less affluent
+areas, citing the methodology as a means to spatially limit an
+epidemic in case it occurred there. The Aadhaar example is a case
+in point of institutionalising non-innocent metrics. Despite clear
+evidence of limited data infrastructure to support reliable use of
+biometrics for benchmarking, and consequent risks of misdistribution
+in public schemes (Dandurand, 2019) or exclusion of
+marginalised groups like hard-working labourers with “Lost fingers,
+damaged fingertips, and rubbed‐off skin contours” that
+make fingerprints unreadable (Rao, 2013, p. 74), the programme
+is backed by the state at the cost of vulnerable people (Drèze et al.,
+2017).
+A listing of similar examples of non-innocent use of quantification
+would invoke a rich body of literature related to the misuse
+of metrics (Muller, 2018), algorithms (O’Neil, 2016) and statistical
+and mathematical modelling (Saltelli, 2020). Take the role of
+numbers produced in the financial centres of computation and
+held responsible for the onset of the most recent recession
+(Porter, 2012; Wilmott and Orrell, 2017; Ravetz, 2008). Bold
+intellectual manoeuvres such as those of Steven Pinker (2018),
+that deluge the reader with a profusion of numbers and graphs to
+argue that humankind has never had it so good, that inequality is
+non-existent or irrelevant, and that racism is receding, may also
+be classified as non-innocent (Lent, 2018; Riskin, 2019). In this
+specific example, Pinker adopts an aggressive stance against the
+purported enemies of Enlightenment—a broad category spanning
+from Nietzsche to Pope Francis via the Frankfurt School, the New
+York Times, and the discipline of Science Studies. In doing so,
+Pinker mobilises genuine and quantified instances of progress to
+advance the author’s political stance and worldview via the
+selective use of measures. As discussed in Saltelli (2020), a heterogeneous
+community increasingly perceives and indicts
+quantification as instrumental to domination, including technologists
+(Lanier, 2006), jurists (Supiot, 2007) and economists
+(Zuboff, 2019).
+Thus, any exercise of quantification demands an ethics to
+situate it within a given social context, not least because quantification
+acts in reflexive relation to the object and the environment
+that is quantified (Sareen et al., 2020; Saltelli, 2020).
+
+A definition and three ontologies for the ethics of
+quantification
+Whether as citizens or as users, our bodies and lives are governed
+as subjects, yet within the new data economy we also occur as
+mere data sources. The expanding creep of quantification subtracts
+decisional space from the governed subjects to governing
+ones, reducing the space for democratic objections, which would
+instead question the desirability of the new practices. This new
+brand of quantification banks on the social legitimacy of the
+models it deploys as proxies for reality. Complex as these are,
+these artefacts of quantification are simplified representations of
+reality and thus liable to be flawed. Their defensibility is a sleight
+of hand justified by pragmatic necessity. Practicing an ethics of
+quantification entails constant awareness of its intrinsic nature as
+a legitimation device that must be subjected to scrutiny and held
+to account by an active societal movement of resistance (Bruno
+et al., 2014; Saltelli, 2020). We can thus define an ethics of
+quantification as the iterative illumination of obfuscation in
+legitimation by quantification. Only then can quantification perform
+its illuminating function.
+
+PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5 COMMENT
+
+PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 6:20 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5 | www.nature.com/palcomms 3
+We heuristically distinguish between and address three ontologies
+of quantification:
+
+● as the disembodied practice of data processing in the ‘ether’; ● as the situated practice and effects of quantification within
+societal contexts; and ● as increasingly incorporated in physical reality itself (through
+the ubiquitous use of sensors, radio frequency identification
+and the like).
+The first ontology foregrounds elements of big data and AI; the
+second ontology attends to governing subjects through numbers;
+and the third introduces governmentality of behaviours and
+behavioural change as mediated through everyday objects and
+things through an ‘Internet of Things’.
+Foregrounding big data, AI and the increasing automation of
+tasks—which combine so that computing can feed off of vast
+quantities of societally generated data using trial and error, commonly
+referred to as machine learning—focuses our attention on
+the ethical concerns implicated in the practice of quantification
+itself. Life in the 2020s is permeated by advertisements, news feeds,
+information access, personal search histories, social media cookies
+and cloud-based personal data repositories. These artefacts render
+big data and AI pervasive to a degree that impacts the qualitative
+implications of quantification. By tapping into, acting upon and
+becoming imbricated into everyday infrastructures, quantification
+becomes co-constitutive of everyday life. It becomes an adaptive
+structuring force that interplays with institutional structures and
+individual agency (Supiot, 2007). Addressing how AI impacts
+cognitive capacity and privacy, and what is lost and gained in the
+process, is thus inextricably linked with the ethics of quantification.
+The sets of big data that feed AI are generated in societal
+contexts that feature deeply entrenched inequities and injustices.
+There is thus a risk of reinforcing effects, reifying tendencies and
+rigidifying divisions through vicious cycles. Hence, we are particularly
+interested in scrutinising how AI differs from societal traits
+such as prioritising and privileging ‘similar others’, and whether it
+reproduces or exacerbates them. A thorough understanding of
+these mechanisms has implications for standards and regulations
+around expanding AI and big data use.
+Attending to the situated practice and effects of quantification
+within societal contexts and infrastructures places the focus on
+sociological and socio-material aspects of the ethics of quantification—which
+calls for the combined efforts of technologists,
+sociologists, jurists, statisticians and data scientists. This requires
+probing how citizens interact with quantification and become
+quantified subjects who are governed through numbers in vital
+aspects of their lives in incredibly powerful ways. It also requires
+tracing the networks and practices of increasingly coordinated
+transnational infrastructures that underpin the new ‘data economy’.
+The modalities of quantification are typically decided at
+higher levels of decision-making than the individual level that is
+being quantified through data extraction, posing the question of
+whose seeing is enabled and empowered, and who is merely
+‘being seen’ without the required mechanisms for checks and
+balances on the watchers (Sareen and Rommetveit, 2019). Major
+decisions often take place in a socio-spatially centralised manner,
+with little room for representation of individual concerns and
+preferences by the citizens they affect. There are thus elements of
+uneven scalar effects (in terms of both hierarchical levels and
+spatial scales) to consider in relation to modalities such as what is
+quantified about citizens as subjects and about everyday phenomena
+like consumption, metrical performance, environmental
+interaction and death.
+We discern a need to articulate the relationship between
+measurement and subjecthood in order to understand the ethical
+implications of how quantification acts on its subjects. This
+
+means recognising as inherently political the very act of choosing
+quantifiable proxy variables that render particular characteristics
+of messy reality commensurable and then serve to represent
+them. This movement is not new, and has precedents in the
+decadal fight of sociologists and ecologists against the numerification
+of everything, whereby both society and the environment
+can be seen as subject to neat systems of prediction and control
+(Pereira and Funtowicz, 2015; Stirling, 2019, 2008). Whether it is
+representative or not, quantification provides an evidence base to
+make claims about how things are. In doing so, it impacts both
+public understandings and societal commitments to particular
+configurations of resource allocation. Unpacking its evolving
+modalities has thus become critical to engagement with the
+embodied socio-material conditions of life in the 2020s.
+
+Received: 9 December 2019; Accepted: 17 January 2020;
+
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+COMMENT PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5
+
+4 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 6:20 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5 | www.nature.com/palcomms
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+Wilmott P, Orrell D (2017) The money formula. Wiley & Sons
+Zuboff S (2019) The age of surveillance capitalism: the fight for a human future at
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+
+Acknowledgements
+The authors are grateful for support from the Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the
+Humanities, University of Bergen, which made this contribution and collaboration
+possible.
+
+Competing interests
+The authors declare no competing interests.
+
+Additional information
+Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to S.S.
+
+Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.nature.com/reprints
+
+Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
+published maps and institutional affiliations.
+
+Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
+Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
+adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
+appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
+Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party
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+indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the
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+regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
+the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/
+licenses/by/4.0/.
+
+© The Author(s) 2020
+
+PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5 COMMENT
+
+PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 6:20 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0396-5 | www.nature.com/palcomms 5
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+Summary
+
+* Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+In this article, I present an analysis of the relationships, observable in the
+Brazilian case, between school failure rates and the measurement of teaching
+quality. The option was to focus the discussions on the possibility of quantifying
+the quality of teaching since the 20th century. Initially, it was necessary to
+consider the polysemy of the term quality and its implications for quantification
+processes. Examination of the documentation allowed us to see that, in Brazil,
+the naturalization of the poor school performance of students and criticism of
+the high failure rates, repudiated as a mechanism of selectivity and exclusion ,
+coexisted for a long time . The link between school failure and teaching quality
+is, even today, perceptible in the Brazilian educational context, as observed by
+the analysis of the construction method of the Basic Education Development
+Index (IDEB) which, since 2007, seeks to quantify the quality of the school in
+Brazil. In this index, measuring the school knowledge that students master is not
+a sufficient condition to consider quality education. It has also been assumed
+that it is necessary to guarantee a normalized school flow, with a low incidence of failure and dropout.
+
+Keywords: education, statistics, IDEB, education quality, teaching evaluation.
+
+184 Natália de Lacerda Gil
+
+http://doi.org/10.1590/15174522-109753
+
+DOSSIER 184
+
+Quantifying quality: some
+
+considerations about
+
+school failure rates in Brazil
+
+Natalia de Lacerda Gil*
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Brazilian.1 The media constantly publicize
+
+Quantifying quality... 185
+
+2 As an example, see “Brazil is the second country with the worst level of learning, according
+to an OECD study”, published on 02/10/2016 and available at https://educacao.uol.com.br/
+
+4 In Brazil, Basic Education is divided into three levels: Early Childhood Education, for
+children aged 0 to 5; Elementary Education, lasting 9 years; and High School, lasting 3 years.
+
+3 Data available at https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-sala-de-imprensa/2013-
+
+1 I would like to thank Célia Caregnato for carefully reading the preliminary version and for
+her valuable suggestions. The problems and incompleteness of this study, obviously, are
+my sole responsibility.
+
+noticias/agencia-estado/2016/02/10/brazil-and-second-country-with-the-worst-level-oflearning
+points to-ocde-study.htm and “São Paulo has only one school in the top 10 of the
+Enem 2019”, published on 06/27/2020 and available at https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/
+
+agencia-de-noticias/releases/21253-pnad-continues-2017-number-of-youths-who-neitherstudy-nor-work-or-qualify-grows-5-9-in-one-year.
+Accessed on 07/11/2020.
+
+agencia-estado/2020/06/27/sp-so-tem-uma-escola-no-top-10-do-enem-de-2019.htm.
+
+Introduction
+
+indices and rankings that seek to highlight which would be
+the good schools and rejoice or are amazed, too, in reporting what
+basic education students know (more often, what they do not know).2
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Currently, there is a clear concern about the quality of education
+
+Academic research and the action of private non-profit organizations
+have also devoted attention to measuring and/or debating the quality
+
+of teaching. If measured by the right to access school institutions, the
+quality of education would have improved, but still presenting
+problems. It is positive that 99.2% of young people aged 6 to 14
+attended school in 2017,3 but it is worth remembering that this means
+that more than 211,000 people in this age group were out of school
+(IBGE, 2018). In 2017, the average number of years of study for
+people aged 25 or over in Brazil was 9.1 years, with 10.1 among
+white people and 8.2 for the black population. If one prefers to
+consider school flow indices, that is, statistics that indicate whether
+those who enter the system regularly follow the school path
+established by law, we have, in general terms, the following table:
+between the 1st and 5th year of Education Fundamental4 failure, in
+2017, was 5.2%; between the 6th and 9th years, it increased to 10.1%; in high school, the school failure rate
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+7According to the interpretation of QEdu, from the Lemann Foundation. Available at https://qedu.org.br/
+gov.br/prova-brasil.
+
+brasil/proficiencia?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIovKGq7rF6gIVVQmRCh1BygDbEAAYASAAEgLfCvD_BwE.
+
+5 Data available at http://portal.inep.gov.br/artigo/-/asset_publisher/B4AQV9zFY7Bv/
+
+In the socioeconomic questionnaire, students provide information about contextual factors that may be
+associated with performance”. Available at http://portal.mec.
+
+content/inep-discloses-rates-of-school-performance-numbers-show-historical-trends of improvement/
+21206.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+186 Natália de Lacerda Gil
+
+6 “Prova Brasil and the National Basic Education Assessment System (Saeb) are
+large-scale diagnostic assessments developed by the Anísio Teixeira National
+Institute of Educational Studies and Research (Inep/MEC). They aim to assess the
+quality of teaching offered by the Brazilian educational system based on standardized
+tests and socioeconomic questionnaires. In the tests applied in the fourth and eighth
+grades (fifth and ninth years) of elementary school, students respond to items
+(questions) in Portuguese, with a focus on reading, and mathematics, with a focus on problem solving.
+
+it reached 10.8%.5 As failure is significant in Brazilian schools, we have
+another index that we can use: the age-grade distortion. Thus, we know
+that 95.5% of children aged 6 to 10 attended the initial years of Elementary
+School at the expected age, with no significant difference between the
+sexes. In the age group from 11 to 14 years old, the rate was 83.3% of
+men and 88.0% of women at the age at which they ideally should attend
+the final years of Elementary School. For those who are more concerned
+with knowing how much students learn, we have, for example, data from
+the Prova Brasil.6 In this case, a possible interpretation, based on the
+scores obtained in the standardized tests, is that, among 5th grade
+students , 56% present expected learning or beyond expectations in
+reading and 44% in Mathematics; among those in the 9th grade, these
+percentages would be 34% and 15% respectively.7
+Despite the profusion of numbers, it is not unreasonable to ask: is it
+possible to effectively quantify quality? What is the limit of statistics in the
+task of allowing us to know the results of a country's education?
+And, after all, what is quality? The issue is thorny, as we will see later,
+and those who produce and analyze educational statistics generally know
+this. However, such numbers are formulated and presented in such a
+way as to make one believe that it is indeed possible to quantify quality.
+The perspective is encouraging and, almost always, the excitement is
+enough to end the discussion and move on to analyzing the numbers.
+Hence, the difficulty in quantifying quality is considered a minor problem, at most
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+ritually at the mention of recognizing this methodological problem and follows
+
+the enjoyment of the many advantages that quantitative analysis appears to have.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Quantifying quality... 187
+
+the social order partly owes its permanence to the imposition of classification
+schemes which, by adjusting to objective classifications, end up producing
+a form of recognition of this order that implies precisely the lack of
+knowledge of the arbitrariness of its foundations: the correspondence
+between objective divisions and the classificatory schemes, between
+objective structures and mental structures, is at the root of a type of original
+adherence to the established order.
+
+Reification is just one of the difficulties that must be dealt with if one
+intends to think with statistics. Such difficulties do not allow us to advocate the
+abandonment of quantitative analyses. They are useful, very useful, they
+undoubtedly contribute to the task of providing intelligibility to complex
+situations, such as education. Perhaps the problem is succumbing to the
+seduction of numbers and the necessary effort should be to distrust the feeling
+
+of objectivity they give us. No, statistics are not objective. They are a useful
+objectification resource – which is different – and they carry risks, side effects,
+which we cannot ignore or disregard.
+
+In the last three decades, an important critical literature on quantification
+has emphasized that statistics are not a simple description of reality, they are,
+on the contrary, the result of objectification processes defined by the categories
+used, by the choice of what to measure, by the modes to observe (Hacking,
+1990; Rose, 1991, 1999; Porter, 1995; Desrosières, 2000; Popkewitz, 2011,
+among others). Such processes give numbers symbolic power and, being
+produced and used by and for people, they also produce devices of
+subjectivation. Bourdieu (1998, p. 117-118) highlights that
+
+From scientific research to wide dissemination, the problem deteriorates.
+Because, when it makes headlines in the newspapers, the “quality” of
+education has already become a thing, we then have the reification of quality,
+and there is no need to discuss what we are actually talking about again. The
+numbers gain fluidity and circulate happily, from news to news, allowing for
+good insights, but also almost any type of interpretative abuse.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It is in the sense of contributing to a critical analysis of education
+statistics that, in this article, the focus is on the ways of quantifying the
+quality of teaching. More especially, what I intended was to scrutinize
+how, in the Brazilian case, school failure was taken as an indicator of the
+lack of quality in Brazilian schools.8 To do so, I return the analysis to the
+beginning of the 20th century, when we have for the first time the
+systematic organization of education statistics in the country. This retreat
+is explained by the intention to know how the arguments were presented
+when establishing the democratic school in Brazil.9 As suggested by
+Bourdieu (2014, p. 103), “the interest of the return to the genesis is that it
+is very important because there is debates in the early days in which
+things are said in all letters that later appear as provocative revelations to sociologists”.
+The text is organized into three parts. Firstly, using the available
+literature on the subject, although without being exhaustive, I analyze the
+notion of quality in education. The polysemy that characterizes the term
+makes the task difficult, but, even so, such an examination is unavoidable
+if the intention is to quantify quality. Next, I locate, in Brazilian educational
+debates, traces of what were considered to be elements articulated
+around school quality and its measurement.
+In this sense, it is important to observe that the quantification referred,
+initially, to the characteristics and abilities of the student body; over time,
+it also began to be mobilized to denounce the school's inability to comply with
+
+Statistics produce what Bourdieu (1998) called a “ theory effect”,
+that is, as they seek to provide forms of intelligibility of the world,
+they collaborate in the construction of the conditions of existence of
+what they intend to describe.
+
+188 Natália de Lacerda Gil
+
+Such defenses had a strong influence on the way in which the Brazilian school was established
+in legislation.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+8 In common sense, however, a high failure rate is often considered an expression of quality.
+Even many professors still think this way, despite official documents and specialized literature
+for more than a century indicating the opposite. However, I will not deal with this in this article,
+although it is a very important issue and still little studied.
+
+9 In the 1930s, liberal educators defended the expansion of the democratic school,
+understanding it as an institution that would guarantee equal opportunities for all and would
+proceed with a selection that was considered fair because it was based on the innate talents of students.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Several authors highlight that the concern with the quality of education
+does not cancel out the continuous attention that must be given to
+guaranteeing access to schooling, embodied in the existence of places
+in schools in sufficient quantities to meet all demand. In this sense, it is
+worth noting that, as education has been proposed in most
+
+After all, what is quality? This is difficult terrain, full of rocks and
+tripping hazards. Initially, it is important to state that quality, especially
+in education, is a polysemic concept. As for this observation, the many
+authors who dedicate themselves to the examination of the question
+are in agreement. There are several elements to take into account.
+Without intending to establish a temporal sequence and, even less, any
+hierarchy, let's start by noting that it is a historical concept, because it
+changes over time, articulating itself to values, knowledge and
+expectations socially shared in different periods. It is frequent that the
+mention suggests a linear and progressive temporal succession, which
+leads to believe that the variation of meaning of the term quality of
+education would establish, in the historical transitions, total alterations
+of meaning. Now, as we intend to argue throughout this article, the
+analysis of historical processes leads us not to the understanding of a
+sequence of meanings of quality that would replace their precedents,
+but to the perception of the coexistence of meanings formulated in different temporalities.
+Another aspect to be observed refers to the understanding, in the
+case of education, that quality and quantity are complementary.
+
+its social role. Finally, I present the concepts that guide the construction
+of the Basic Education Development Index (IDEB), created in 2007,
+and present some of its limits and recurrent criticisms. The intention
+was not to carry out a detailed historical analysis, but rather to pursue,
+with methodological rigor, the arguments that coexist, often in a
+contradictory way, in debates on the quality of Brazilian education over
+time.
+
+How to quantify quality in education?
+
+Quantifying quality... 189
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In contemporary societies as a universal right, quality education
+only for a few people configures privilege and, therefore, lack of
+quality from a social point of view.
+
+190 Natália de Lacerda Gil
+
+Understanding quality and quantity as articulated aspects makes it
+possible to identify why, in Brazilian history, as in other countries, the
+discussion appears to be strongly associated with enrollment totals. But
+it doesn't hurt to remember a fact already widely evidenced in several
+studies: “extending schooling is not, by itself, a guarantee of school justice.
+In fact, everything depends on how the school is organized and what is
+done in it” (Dubet, Duru-Bellat; Vérétout, 2012, p. 35). The notion of
+quality in education associated with guaranteeing access for all to the
+same school – of quality – has some pitfalls. Defending that everyone
+has access to a quality school seems a noble and indisputable intention
+in democratic societies. However, in this case, who is it about quality?
+
+In what perspective? In line with which society project? As Esteban
+(2008, p. 6-7) highlights,
+
+quality is a polysemic, plastic word, which contains virtualities and
+positivities, expresses a convergence of concerns, allowing the rapid
+construction of a consensus by creating the idea of aggregation around
+common commitments. These characteristics hide how much their
+different meanings hold opposing and contradictory possibilities of
+organizing the school as a social project.
+
+By obliterating the polysemy of the term, the meaning constituted
+in specific contexts is assumed to be universal and timeless. This
+proceeds to “maintain the historical process of coloniality of power in
+which relations of subordination are woven” (Esteban, 2008, p. 7).
+Regarding the discourses that refer to the rights of “all children”,
+Popkewitz (2011) observes that they give rise to practices of
+identifying those who do not share the characteristics of “all children”,
+that is, those who would need to be rescued and saved from their
+original contexts because they were considered inadequate. When a standard is established
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+On the other hand, the function of the school, in the context of
+globalization and in the face of neoliberal policies, strengthens the focus on
+preparing individuals with mastery of applicable knowledge and in compliance
+with demands of an economic nature (Stromquist, 2012). Thus, the
+standardization of school content and evaluation processes is defended as
+decisive for guaranteeing the quality of teaching. In this sense, it is necessary
+to remember that, in recent decades, the discussion about quality has been
+particularly prominent in business circles and this is not without consequences
+in the area of education. According to Oliveira and Araújo (2005, p. 7),
+
+On the one hand, there is the understanding of the role of the school for
+human development, on the other hand, there are arguments that advocate
+the role of the school for economic development. In the first case, the school
+would be associated with the construction of a democratic society. Virginio
+(2012, p. 179) highlights the difficulty of guaranteeing the full performance of
+this function in the face of standardized evaluation criteria:
+
+Thus, perhaps the most crucial aspect for the discussion on polysemy is
+the notion that quality is linked to the conception of education considered. That
+is, different educational paradigms – or, if you prefer, educational projects –
+will engender distinct quality criteria and different perceptions of what quality
+education is. If it is a fact that there are many conceptions of education that
+can be described, it happens that two are the most recurrent in the debates
+around the theme.
+
+unique quality, there is the production of invisibility and subalternity of subjects
+who do not fit the standard (Esteban, 2008).
+
+This distinction is important as it draws attention to the fact that the
+concept of quality, even in the business world, carries significant meanings.
+
+Quantifying quality... 191
+
+public policies and the efforts that have been undertaken, in the sense
+of guaranteeing school success, can ensure a better performance in
+terms of expectations of success in relation to certain curricular
+prescriptions. However, they are insufficient to account for the need
+for an education consistent with a democratic society. It is about
+thinking beyond the criterion of merit, or even the instrumental character of knowledge.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+and different procedures. One should also not lose sight of the fact that a
+significant part of the debate on quality in education is imported from the
+business world and, even so, in this restricted scope, it embodies different meanings.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+192 Natalia de Lacerda Gil
+
+Thus, statistics cannot be a basic element to assess what is important –
+as if only what is expressed in numbers were important.
+
+If there is no agreement on what quality of education is, how would
+it be possible to quantify it? The answer to this question is political, but it
+also involves technical aspects. It is a political issue because it depends
+on which social group has the most strength to impose its way of seeing.
+The elites have greater power to reify quality, according to their conceptions
+of school and society (Bourdieu, 2014). Having become a “thing”, quality
+can be quantified, inevitably leaving out of the count a wide range of
+aspects whose importance in the educational process is undeniable (such
+as the development of empathy and learning to respect others, the
+establishment of links between different generations, building self-esteem,
+creative ability, among others). Now, this is an unavoidable effect of
+quantification. As Afonso (2009, p. 13) argues , “not everything that counts
+in education is measurable or comparable”.
+
+The answer to the possibility of quantifying quality is also technical,
+because it implies excluding everything that, even if consensually
+considered relevant, cannot be expressed in numbers: for example, how
+to objectively assess students' satisfaction in learning new knowledge?
+How to know the development of students regarding
+
+According to these authors, in some circumstances, the quality of
+education has referred to the “final product”, the student who learned, or
+it may also be an indication of a low cost process, especially low cost for
+the State.
+
+This becomes a problem when one loses sight of the fact that the
+statistical representation of a phenomenon is just a way of seeing it,
+meeting the criteria of the spaces of power; it may even be very useful in
+certain circumstances, but it does not correspond to the totality of what is accounted for.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quality of students or quality of teaching?
+
+Quantifying quality... 193
+
+self-esteem, social skills and creativity? Or how to measure the
+importance of the bond between generations established throughout
+the educational process? The risk is that, as they cannot be
+expressed in objective indices, attention and time will not be
+devoted to such aspects that are essential in youth development
+processes. This shows that the choice of categories in statistical
+surveys, supposedly a purely technical issue, has an indelible
+political dimension. As Rose (1991, p. 674) states,
+
+The lack of consensus and all the complexity involved in
+defining what “quality of education” means, however , have not
+prevented quantification from being carried out for a long time.
+Tacitly operating with this multiplicity of issues, concepts and
+actions to quantify the quality of education were overlapping over
+time. In the Brazilian case, as we will see below, measurement
+dates back to the 1930s and was improved amid the debate about
+what and how to quantify in quality. A brief historical excursion
+allows us to examine the arguments and note the origin of the
+“layers” of meaning that exist in the discussion today.
+
+School failure was not always a problem in Brazilian schools
+(Gil, 2018). Although since the installation of the first colleges, still
+in the colonial period, there were school exams that students could
+fail – a practice that continued in public classes during the imperial
+period –, this occurrence is not mentioned in the documentation of
+both periods as frequent or as problem. The apprehension of
+school failure as a problem stems basically from the association of
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+paradoxically, in the same process in which numbers reach a privileged
+status in political decisions, they simultaneously promise a
+“depoliticization” of politics, redrawing the boundaries between politics
+and objectivity, intending to act as automatic technical mechanisms to
+make judgments, prioritize problems and allocate the scarce ones. resources.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+11
+10 For a deeper understanding of the conceptions and criticisms of IQ tests, see Gould (2003).
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+194 Natalia de Lacerda Gil
+
+However, even before this school phenomenon gained prominence
+and could be statistically measured, the quantification of student
+performance took its first steps in Brazil. Following the example of France,
+initiatives were organized to apply psychological tests to students in order
+to identify their capabilities and classify them by intelligence level. It is
+important to note that the development of such measurements in France
+took place at the request of the Ministry of Education, which intended to
+solve the problem of students lagging behind in school learning, selecting
+them to be taught in special classes, adapted to their needs. The difficulty
+in ensuring the democratic principle of the right to education for all
+resulted in the demand made by the French government to Alfred Binet,
+in 1904, to “develop techniques for identifying children whose school
+failure suggested the need for some form of special education” (Gould ,
+2003, p. 152).
+
+two aspects: on the one hand, the progressive adherence of Brazilian
+society to the notion of democratizing schooling as a right and, on the
+other, the production, since the 1930s, of more reliable, comprehensive
+and regular education statistics.
+
+In Brazil, such tests were assumed with optimism by educators at the
+head of the school democratization project, in the 1920s and 1930s, who
+were fully convinced of meritocratic principles and saw in schools an
+institution capable of carrying out the fair selection of innate talents. 11
+Statistics, in this sense, fulfilled the role of measuring the distance of
+each individual in relation to the standard norm. Thus, a spectrum of
+abnormality was created (Lima, 2018) which, based on performances in
+psychological tests, served to classify students and engendered
+processes of subjectivation. As Rose (1999) points out, statistics are part of
+
+The intelligence tests developed by Binet allowed the creation of
+scales for measuring IQ (intelligence quotient) and these scales traveled
+the world, being adapted to different national contexts.10
+
+It is important to note that the understanding of innate talents as a fair resource for the
+selection and classification of students will have a long life in educational debates. For a
+critique of the ideology of natural aptitudes, see Bisseret (1974).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+“technologies of the self” collaborating in the establishment of forms
+of self-government, considered appropriate in a given historical moment.
+
+in the initial classification for class groupings and application of teaching
+programs etc., and in the periodical evaluations of the intimate process of
+educational work and its practical effects, considering the extension and
+composition of these programs, in addition to other objective tests, the
+mental tests and pedagogical or schooling tests, those for the verification
+and measurement of mental qualities, these for the verification of the
+students' performance in the different disciplines.
+
+The Brazilian educators who occupied prominent positions in the
+bodies responsible for conducting educational policies, in the period,
+showed strong adherence to liberal ideals. In the first decades of the
+twentieth century, they vigorously defended the democratic school,
+understanding by this expression a school in which absolutely all
+children were guaranteed enrollment, whether boys or girls, poor or
+rich. Enrollment guaranteed to all, the school would select, through its
+own processes, the best of each generation. These would be provided
+with a long schooling, so as not to waste their talents. For the others, it
+would be foreseen courses of preparation for work, leading each person
+to the position consistent with their abilities, so that each one would
+give the best of himself for the progress of the nation. As an example,
+observe what Teixeira de Freitas, one of the founders of the IBGE and
+who, for many years, was at the forefront of the statistics produced by
+the Ministry of Education and Health, says: “to be fair, education must
+be extended to all citizens, with no privileges save the natural endowments of personal receptivity.”
+(Freitas, 1945, p. 348). Jardim (1946, p. 460, emphasis added), from
+the Education and Health Statistics Service of the Ministry of Education
+and Health, in line with his contemporaries, considered tests to be a
+fundamental resource for organizing education:
+
+Quantifying quality... 195
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Rose (1999) also points out that statistics are also ways of producing
+knowledge about students in order to support government actions on
+specific populations, by proposing strategies for reform and prevention
+of behaviors considered undesirable in the exercise of micropower.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+the new student appears as an unknown; always offers a field for the
+development of hopes: perhaps he is strong at work, an element that fits
+well with the group, interested in school activities, compensating for the
+efforts spent. The repeater is a failure – he has already revealed himself,
+nothing is expected of him. Is it really worth keeping him in the school,
+filling a vacancy and preventing, with his presence, the admission of another student?
+
+failures are exact numerical data; but the criteria that determine them, as we
+know, change from school to school. Will the 60% promoted in school A be
+equivalent, in terms of educational level, to the 60% in school B? Perhaps
+yes; maybe not. It is the school authority that examines – the inspector or
+principal – and as there are “low” authorities, who are satisfied with little, there
+are also “high” ones, willing to tighten the scrutiny of approvals (São Paulo, 1936, p. 3 ).
+
+There is also mention of the recognition that, as school
+approval was based on the results of the exams, it was possible
+for teachers to start training students specifically for the tests, as
+a way of improving the rates. Almeida Junior stated that “the fact
+that we focus attention on the phenomenon of failures does not mean
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+196 Natalia de Lacerda Gil
+
+But there is also, in the period, a specific debate about the
+measurement instruments. The criteria considered by the teachers during
+the exams differed from one school to another. Thus, for example, to
+explain the approval rate of 1935, which was a little more favorable in
+some educational institutions, Almeida Junior, who held the position of
+manager of the state education system in São Paulo, mentioned the
+variation in exam requirements as an explanation for differences:
+
+In this sense, it is important to note that, in the early debates, the
+notion of quality was associated with the innate abilities of students. In
+other words, the problem of low performance in Brazilian schools,
+expressed in high rates of failure and school dropout, would be, at least in
+part, due to the lack of quality of the children who arrived at school . There
+was an evident naturalization of low school performance in Brazil,
+sometimes even expressed as inevitable. Cardoso's statement (1949, p.
+74, author's emphasis) serves as an example :
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Since the 1930s, Teixeira de Freitas indicated that the exclusive concern with
+
+the expansion of the school, verified by the increase in enrollments, was insufficient.
+
+According to him, the main problem of Brazilian schools concerned its low efficiency,
+
+since the school had difficulty attracting the school-age population, as well as
+
+maintaining attendance and guaranteeing approval of students from one grade to
+
+the next. He was against the uncritical expansion of a school that, in his opinion,
+
+needed to improve.
+
+that the only thing we are asking of schools is to prepare students for exams” (São
+
+Paulo, 1936, p. 3).
+
+Anísio Teixeira (1935, p. 74), who was Director of Public Instruction in the
+
+Federal District, also emphasized that the school failed to fulfill its social function by
+
+failing and rejecting a significant part of the student body:
+
+Throughout the period, the analysis of debates on Brazilian education allows
+
+us to see the emergence of a discussion that shifts the cause of failure: from
+
+evidence of the low capacity of students, it also becomes possible to indicate the
+
+inability of the school to fulfill its social role . . So let's move on to this debate.
+
+That's why I considered that
+
+[...] the slogan that best expressed the demands of Brazilian children
+in terms of primary education would have to be, in our view, this:
+“before more schools, better schools”. Understood as such, an inviting
+School, which retains, protects, teaches and truly educates the children
+entrusted to it (Freitas, 1946, p. 43).
+
+Quantifying quality... 197
+
+it is not enough to have schools for the most capable, it is essential that there are
+
+schools for everyone. It is not enough to have schools for everyone, it is essential that
+
+everyone learn.
+
+It is not difficult to assess how much the modification came to influence the concept
+
+of school performance. Before, given the selective character, failure was almost the
+
+index of teaching quality. If many failed, this meant that the judging criteria were really
+
+efficient and the fine flower of the population was being purified for the formation of
+
+intellectual and professional elites.
+
+If, however, the school has the duty to teach everyone, because everyone needs the
+
+fundamental elements of culture to live in modern society,
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Such debates gave rise to policies that adopted alternative forms of
+assessment and student flow in order to reduce school exclusion
+
+(Mainardes, 1998). From the 1960s onwards, reaching its peak in the
+1990s, the discussion on school flow problems stands out, with an emphasis on reporting
+
+the problem is reversed. A failed student does not mean the success of the
+selection apparatus, but the failure of the institution of fundamental preparation
+of citizens, men and women, for common life.
+
+But this debate only echoed in the area of education from the 1950s
+onwards, when criticism of the high rates of school failure increased,
+sometimes associated with explanations for school failure that blamed
+students and their families (Patto, 1993), sometimes around the
+
+discussion about a solution to the problem. In this sense, it is interesting
+to note that the Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagógicos, official
+journal of the National Institute of Educational Studies and Research
+Anísio Teixeira (INEP), will serve as a space for assessing the
+advantages and risks of establishing in Brazil the automatic promotion
+(Fernandes, 2000). The arguments in favor pointed to the recognition
+that education as a right for all could not be anchored in selective
+pedagogical practices. Luiz Alves de Matos, for example, in an article
+published in 1956, pointed out “that the elementary school is a matter of
+law and that it should not become an agency for selecting privileged
+talents, but should be a disseminator of education and culture at the
+service of youth and democracy'” (Fernandes, 2000, p. 82). The
+opposing arguments did not differ from the principle of the democratic
+school, but warned of the risks of hasty action that could be inappropriate
+for the Brazilian context. In this sense, Luiz Pereira, in an article from 1958, quoted by Fernandes (2000, p. 84), denounced
+
+198 Natália de Lacerda Gil
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+that repetition is the consequence of a series of serious problems and that
+automatic promotion, although “eliminating high percentages of repetition,
+would not directly and profoundly affect the factors of this phenomenon
+and would lead to the loss of a valuable thermometer of the functioning of
+the system primary school – repetition rates”.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quality measurement: IDEB as a measuring
+instrument
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Quantifying quality... 199
+
+The end of the 20th century was also the period in which there was
+wide diffusion of neoliberal policies. It was important, in this sense, to
+achieve maximum efficiency with a minimum of public investment. Although
+States still want schools to guarantee some level of social cohesion, in this
+new context, they tend to reduce their participation in the provision of public
+education (Stromquist, 2012). Alternatively, they began to focus attention
+on processes of privatization, decentralization and accountability. Among
+the control strategies that characterize neoliberalism, great importance has
+been given to large-scale evaluations, which aim to measure the quality of
+teaching as a way of inducing its increase, for example, through the
+competitiveness generated between schools.
+
+The elimination of school failure raised, however, questions about whether
+it would not be just a way of “formally solving school failure (failure rates),
+but not the real problem – that of student learning [...]” (Mainardes, 1998 ,
+p. 25). In other words, these policies resulted in a significant reduction in
+the failure rates in the networks where they were implemented, but they
+suffered several criticisms and generated distrust about the ability to
+maintain the quality of education in this way.
+
+the marginalization and exclusion of the poorest. Some important public
+education networks began to adopt cycles or continuous progression in the
+organization of their schools, abandoning the annual serial progression that
+provided for the possibility of failure at the end of the year, if the student
+did not reach a sufficient score in the assessments carried out by each teacher.
+
+From the 1990s onwards, guidelines on education produced by
+international organizations emphasized the notion of equity as an
+essential aspect (Klein, 2017). The World Conference on Education
+for All, held in 1990 in Jomtien (Thailand), reiterated education as a
+fundamental right for all and the World Declaration on Education for All:
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+12 INEP conceptualizes school dropout as the situation of a student who stops
+attending school before the end of the school year, without having formalized a
+transfer request. Available at http://download.inep.gov.br/educacao_basica/censo_escolar/
+
+satisfaction of basic learning needs, signed by the participating
+countries , established that “basic education must be provided to all
+children, youth and adults. Therefore, it is necessary to universalize
+it and improve quality, as well as to take effective measures to
+reduce inequalities” (Unesco, 1990, p. 4). The intention to guarantee
+a “ minimum standard of learning quality” was linked to the
+recommendation to “implement performance evaluation systems” (Unesco, 1990, p. 4).
+Brazil followed this movement and, since that period, began to build
+instruments to measure the quality of education that intended to assess
+what students learned at school. In 1991, the Ministry of Education
+instituted the Basic Education Assessment System (SAEB) whose
+objective was to assess the quality of teaching through a sample
+assessment, carried out every two years, of student performance in
+standardized tests (Bonamino; Sousa, 2012) . In 1998, the National High
+School Examination (ENEM) was created and, in 2005, the Prova Brasil
+was added to the system , establishing non-sampling forms of assessment
+that would allow the individualization of results by school. More than
+providing parameters for measuring the teaching carried out, such policies
+aim to direct curricular contents and pedagogical work. Bonamino and
+Zákia Sousa (2012, p. 380, authors' highlights) analyze that
+
+However, as, in the Brazilian case, the guarantee of access to basic
+school was delayed and as permanence is not assured, the concerns with
+the measurement of learning could not be disarticulated from the measures
+of failure and school dropout,12 phenomena that are still very recurrent.
+
+the dissemination media strategy, through rankings, although not official,
+together with the distribution in schools of the content and skills matrix
+used in the preparation of Portuguese language and mathematics tests,
+introduces concrete perspectives of more direct interference in what
+schools do and how they do it.
+
+200 Natalia de Lacerda Gil
+
+nota_tecnica/2015/note_tecnica_indicadores_de_rendimento_2012.pdf.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+an educational system that systematically fails its students, causing
+a large number of them to drop out of school before completing
+basic education, is not desirable, even if those who complete this
+stage achieve high scores in standardized exams. On the other
+hand, a system in which students complete high school in the
+correct period is not of interest if they learn very little. In short, an
+ideal system would be one in which all children and adolescents
+have access to school, do not waste time with repetition, do not
+drop out of school early and, at the end of it all, learn.
+
+Thus, a school whose students show good proficiency in the Prova Brasil,
+has its IDEB penalized if it presents high rates of failure and dropout. This
+evidences, in the conformation of the instrument, the concern with the
+fulfillment of the legal precept of education as a right of all. It is also
+consistent with what the National Education Plans (2001-2010 and
+2014-2024) have been proposing when they indicate, among the goals, the
+demand for regularization of school flow, intending to progressively make
+failure and dropout rare events. In 2014, the PNE began to include
+quantitative targets, however, without specifying the basis on which the
+averages intended to be achieved were established. Detached from the
+assessment of the objective conditions for achieving the indicated goals,
+the numbers become random and express wishes disconnected from reality.
+
+in the country. In 2007, therefore, INEP created an index that associated
+both aspects. As stated by Fernandes (2007, p. 7),
+
+With regard to performance, the data come from the Prova Brasil applied
+every two years to students enrolled in the 5th and 9th years of Elementary
+School and in the 3rd year of High School. With regard to performance,
+passing allows assessing problems in the school flow, since the calculation
+is made by the difference between those enrolled at the beginning of the
+year and those approved, thus allowing to know the numbers of failure and dropout.
+
+With that in mind, at that time, the Basic Education Development Index
+(IDEB) was proposed , whose formula associates information on student
+performance in standardized Portuguese and Mathematics exams and on
+performance, by pass rates.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Quantifying quality... 201
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The IDEB was proposed as a way to establish a quality standard
+in education in the country. This is an index designed to monitor
+results by school, with the aim of providing information to education
+network managers, supposedly accessible information to families
+about the institutions where their children are enrolled, as well as
+elements for evaluating Brazilian education as a whole. . Thus, it is
+intended that the index serves to guide educational policies as well
+as for social control over the quality of teaching. The specialized
+literature has, however, pointed out some of its risks and limits, many
+of which result from the inappropriate use of numbers. A central
+aspect, in this sense, is that educational indexes foster the illusion
+that it is possible to know objectively the quality of educational institutions. question the
+
+5.7
+
+4.7
+
+IDEB
+
+5.2
+5.0
+Early Years of Elementary School
+
+5.2
+
+Source: PNE 2014-2024
+4.3
+Final years of Elementary School
+
+High school
+
+2015 2017 2019
+
+4.7 5.0
+
+5.2
+
+13 Although the IDEB has a scale from 0 to 10, it does not behave like the traditional school assessment.
+Depending on how the calculation is done, 6.0 corresponds to a high IDEB and the difference between 4.0
+and 6.0 is greater than it might seem. Grades below 2.0 and above 8.0 are extremely rare. For more
+information on technical aspects, see Soares and Xavier (2013).
+
+2021
+
+5.5 6.013
+
+5.5
+
+Table - National Education Plan 2014-2024 - projected averages
+
+Goal 7: To promote the quality of basic education in all stages and modalities, with improvement of the
+
+school and learning flow in order to reach the following national averages for Ideb
+
+use of the results of large-scale assessments and the indices created
+by them as the only source for analyzing the work carried out by
+schools, considering that the average performances obtained cannot be
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+202 Natalia de Lacerda Gil
+
+Goal 7 of the National Education Plan explains that it intends to
+establish, for Brazil, tangible goals in terms of quality of education
+and make accountability viable, for which quantification is considered
+fundamental.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It is also necessary to bear in mind that the IDEB does not allow the
+assessment of added value (that is, the difference in proficiency between the
+beginning and the end of schooling) and, also, that the standardized proficiency
+exams do not assess content that is important to the training of students,
+restricting up to reading and math. For example, components such as
+Geography, Art and Science are left out , or even competences such as
+valuing the diversity of knowledge, caring for oneself, others and the planet,
+collaborating with the construction of a just society, democratic and inclusive
+(Brasil, 2018, p. 9).
+
+In addition, there has been unanimous criticism of the fact that the index
+disregards the students' socioeconomic level, leading to the belief that schools
+with a high IDEB would have better teaching than the others, when it is known
+that the correlation between student performance and socioeconomic level is
+always high.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Quantifying quality... 203
+
+Thus, by attributing to this indicator the status of synthesis of the quality of
+education, it is assumed that the school can overcome all exclusion promoted by society.
+
+translated as a faithful portrait of the quality of institutions (Almeida; Dalben;
+Freitas, 2013, p. 1155).
+
+14 It should be noted that there are differences between what the technical teams
+producing statistics want from the numbers and what the managers intend when
+ordering the creation of indexes. For these, the objective of inducing policies provided
+by the dissemination of statistics is often more explicit, which, in their speech, appears
+more as a distortion or abuse in the use of numbers. This aspect was not systematically
+verified here, but it constitutes an important issue that deserves more accurate studies.
+
+In spite of these considerations, widely known and considered by
+statisticians and researchers who study the subject, the circulation of
+numbers is detached from these reading keys and the figures gain
+autonomy. The effects of the indices go beyond their initial propositions.14
+
+There is a wealth of literature that shows that this is impossible. All
+students have the right to learn, and the knowledge and skills specified
+for basic education must be the same for all. However, obtaining this
+learning in schools that serve students who bring less of their families
+is much more difficult, a fact that must be considered when using the
+learning indicator to compare schools and identify successes (Soares, 2011).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+the use of an indicator as the sole measure of school and systems
+quality will naturally make schools seek to maximize it and, as this
+can be done in ways that are pedagogically inappropriate, it can
+lead to a dysfunctional educational system.
+
+204 Natália de Lacerda Gil
+
+Less than a functioning distortion, this is one of the characteristics of
+quantification processes.
+
+Assuming education statistics as an object of analysis, seeking to
+scrutinize the way they are constructed and interpreted, corresponds
+here to considering them as participants in educational processes – and
+not mere measuring instruments. With regard to the quantification of
+quality, the difficulty already begins with the definition of what an education of
+
+Thus, for example, the reception of the index by schools can result in
+actions whose only objective is to improve the index and not necessarily
+to improve the quality of the pedagogical work. Soares and Xavier (2013,
+p. 915), point out that
+
+It is therefore necessary to consider the subjectivation effects that
+IDEB causes in the school space (Klein, 2017). Establishing a set of
+aspects from which quality is inferred, even if it is a methodologically
+relevant resource, comes up against the fact that reception of the index
+ends up limiting efforts only with regard to this restricted set. That is, if
+the verified proficiency is limited to reading and mathematics, it is not
+necessarily because the formulators of the index consider that this is the
+only task of the school, but because this would be a sufficient parameter
+for a standardized calculation. However, school subjects, education
+network managers and the mainstream press tend to receive this
+methodological restriction as a pedagogical prescription regarding the
+curricular contents with which they should deal. Such effects are beyond
+the control of statisticians, causing the measuring instrument to act in
+the construction of what it supposedly should only measure.
+
+Final considerations
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+describe the objective mechanisms that determine the continued elimination
+of disadvantaged children. Indeed, it seems that the sociological explanation
+can fully account for the differences in success that are most often attributed
+to differences in gifts. [...] The cultural heritage, which differs [...] according
+to social classes, is responsible for the initial difference of children in the
+face of the school experience and, consequently, for the success rates
+(Bourdieu, 2012, p. 41-42 ).
+
+Quantifying quality... 205
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+quality. Far from being a simple and consensual issue, what I sought to
+underline was the fact that such conceptions are the result of sociohistorical
+processes that, in the midst of constant disputes, engender the
+coexistence of meanings that do not always agree. Such meanings, in
+turn, are mobilized in current debates, with varying weight and effectiveness.
+The second element that I intended to highlight in this article was the
+understanding, resulting from the analysis of historical sources, that,
+frequently, what is considered as a measure of the quality of teaching is
+the examination of the student's capacities. Here it is worth explaining an
+important sociological issue, addressed by Bourdieu in several of his
+works. The analysis of the quantification processes of school failure has
+contributed to
+
+The tradition of assessing the quality of teaching by measuring what
+students know is maintained at IDEB. Although this index seeks to balance
+verification of student performance in standardized tests with quantitative
+data on school flow, the focus remains limited to students. There is no
+mention of the infrastructure conditions of the schools, there is no
+consideration given to the training and remuneration of teachers and other
+education workers, the public and/or private expenditure per student is not
+taken into account, that is, the socioeconomic level of the students is not
+included in the calculation. families and resources devoted to education.
+This way of quantifying quality suggests an equation that is too simple,
+leaving out of the analysis an important part of the complexity of the social
+structure that permeates and constitutes the school institution.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Natalia de Lacerda Gil has a PhD in Education and is a professor and researcher at the
+Faculty of Education of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
+(UFRGS). ÿ natalia.gil@uol.com.br
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+206 Natália de Lacerda Gil
+
+Thus, one of the effects of quality quantification that I intended to
+emphasize in this article concerns the excessive simplification of the issue
+of quality in education expressed by statistics. If, on the one hand, numbers
+are a useful objectification resource that helps in the analysis of complex
+situations and in making political and educational decisions, on the other,
+they lead us to assume that everything that matters would be expressed statistically.
+As Desrosières (2000, p. 9) highlights, it is necessary to understand how
+social facts are transformed into statistics, taking into account that “the
+history of its gestation allows us to outline, retracing old controversies and
+debates, a space for articulations between technical languages and their
+uses in social debate”. From my point of view, it is not a question of
+abandoning the use of numbers, but of being more attentive to its risks and
+limits (Gil, 2019).
+
+Since quality education is a right guaranteed by Brazilian legislation, it
+is necessary to take into account yet another fundamental aspect. In a
+society enthusiastic about “objectivity”, to tell something is, as already
+mentioned, to describe it, to make it exist. Hence a dilemma: how to
+guarantee the right to education without measures, without parameters,
+without statistics? Given this, some authors defend the indispensability of
+objectively establishing quality standards in education (Oliveira; Araújo,
+2005). The question is not of little importance, but its positive aspect does
+not eliminate the risks already mentioned. The space for clashes – of ideas
+and policies – is, of course, open. Understanding statistics as an element
+mobilized in this game is already a less restricted way of taking it into
+consideration.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+References
+
+Quantifying quality... 207
+
+9. CARDOSO, Ofélia B. The problem of grade repetition in primary school.
+
+1. AFONSO, Almerindo J. Not everything that counts in education is measurable or
+comparable. Criticism of accountability based on standardized tests and school
+rankings. Lusophone Journal of Education, n. 13, p. 13-29, 2009.
+
+2. ALMEIDA, Luana C.; DALBEN, Adilson; FREITAS, Luiz Carlos de. IDEB: limits
+and illusions of an educational policy. Education & Society, v. 34, no. 135, p.
+1153-1174, 2013.
+
+Brazilian Journal of Pedagogical Studies, v. 13, no. 35, p. 74-88, 1949.
+
+3. BISSERET, Noële. The ideology of natural aptitudes. In: DURAND, José Carlos.
+(org.). Education and class hegemony. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1974. p. 30-67.
+
+10. DESROSIÈRES, Alain. La politique des grands nombres : histoire de la raison
+statistic. Paris: La Découverte, 2000.
+
+4. BONAMINO, Alicia; SOUSA, Sandra Z. Three generations of basic education
+assessment in Brazil: interfaces with the school curriculum. Education and
+Research, v. 38, no. 2, p. 373-388, Apr.-Jun. 2012.
+
+11. DUBET, François; DURU-BELLAT, Marie; VÉRÉTOUT, Antoine. School
+inequalities before and after school: school organization and the influence of
+diplomas. Sociologies, v. 14, no. 29, p. 22-70, 2012.
+
+5. BOURDIEU, Pierre. The economy of linguistic exchanges: what talking means.
+São Paulo: EDUSP, 1998.
+
+12. ESTEBAN, Maria Teresa. Silencing polysemy and making subjects invisible:
+questions about the discourse on the quality of education. Portuguese Journal of
+Education, v. 21, no. 1, p. 5-31, 2008.
+
+6. BOURDIEU, Pierre. The conservative school: inequalities in school and culture.
+In: NOGUEIRA, Maria Alice; CATANI, Afrânio (Orgs.). Education writings. 13. ed.
+Petrópolis: Vozes, 2012. p. 39-64.
+
+13. FERNANDES, Claudia de O. Automatic promotion in the 50s: a bibliographic
+review in the RBEP. Brazilian Journal of Pedagogical Studies, v. 81, no. 197, p.
+76-88, 2000.
+
+7. BOURDIEU, Pierre. About the State: courses at the Collège de France (1989-92).
+
+14. FERNANDES, Reynaldo. Basic Education Development Index (Ideb). Brasilia:
+National Institute of Educational Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira, 2007.
+
+São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014.
+
+15. FREITAS, Mário AT de. New goals for education in Brazil. Brazilian Journal of
+Pedagogical Studies, v. 4, no. 12, p. 346-360, 1945.
+
+8. BRAZIL. Ministry of Education. Common national curriculum base. Brasília:
+MEC, 2018.
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+208 Natália de Lacerda Gil
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+24. LIMA, Ana Laura G. The “problem-child” in the Brazilian school. Curitiba:
+Appris, 2018.
+
+1941. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1946.
+
+17. GIL, Natália de L. School failure in Brazil: history of the configuration of a
+political-educational problem. Brazilian Journal of Education, v. 23, p. 1-23,
+2018.
+
+25. MAINARDES, J. Automatic promotion in question: arguments, implications
+and possibilities. Brazilian Journal of Pedagogical Studies, v. 79, no. 192, p. 16-
+
+18. GIL, Natália de L. Statistics and education: considerations on the need for a
+careful look. Thinking Education in Review, v. 5, no. 2, p. 1-29, Jun.-Aug. 2019.
+
+29, 1998.
+
+19. GOULD, Stephen J. The Mismeasure of Man. São Paulo: Martins Fontes,
+2003.
+
+26. MATOS, Luiz A. de. School approval and failure. Brazilian Journal of
+Pedagogical Studies, v. 26, no. 63, p. 254-257, 1956.
+
+20. HACKING, Ian. The taming of chance. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity,
+
+27. OLIVEIRA, Romualdo P. de; ARAUJO, Gilda C.de. Teaching quality: a new
+dimension in the fight for the right to education. Brazilian Education Magazine,
+n. 28, p. 5-23, 2005.
+
+nineteen ninety.
+
+28. PATTO, Maria Helena S. The production of school failure. Sao Paulo: TA
+
+21. IBGE – Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. Education 2017.
+Continuous PNAD. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE - Directorate of Research, Work and
+Income Coordination, 2018.
+
+Queiroz, 1993.
+
+22. GARDEN, Germano. Collecting educational statistics IV. Brazilian Journal
+of Pedagogical Studies v. 7, no. 21, p. 452-463, 1946.
+
+29. PEREIRA, Luiz. Automatic promotion in primary school. Brazilian Journal of
+Pedagogical Studies, v. 30, no. 2, p. 105-107, Oct./Dec. 1958.
+
+16. FREITAS, Mário AT de. Brazilian primary education in the 1932-
+
+23. KLEIN, Delci H. IDEB and machinery: the production, quantification and
+expression of the quality of Brazilian education. 2017. Thesis (Doctorate in
+Education). Education University. Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto
+Alegre, 2017.
+
+30. POPKEWITZ, Thomas. PISA: numbers, standardizing conduct, and the
+alchemy of school subjects. In: PEREYRA, Miguel A.; KOTTHOFF, Hans-Georg;
+COWEN, Robert (eds.). PISA under examination: changing knowledge,
+changing tests, and changing schools. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2011. p. 31-46.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Quantifying quality... 209
+
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, year 23, n. 56, Jan-Apr 2021, p. 184-209.
+
+Failure in primary school (The phenomenon of failure. Analysis of causes. Measures
+against evil. Statistical data). Bulletin n. 7, 1936.
+
+37. STROMQUIST, Nelly P. Latin American education in globalized times.
+
+34. SÃO PAULO. Secretary of Education and Public Health. Board of Education.
+
+40. VIRGINIO, Alexandre S. Education and democratic society: sociological
+interpretations and challenges to the political education of educators. Sociologies,
+v. 14, no. 29, p. 176-212, 2012.
+
+36. SOARES, José Francisco; XAVIER, Flávia P. IDEB educational and statistical
+assumptions. Education & Society, vol. 34, no. 135, p. 903-923, 2013.
+
+39. UNESCO. World Declaration on Education for All: Meeting basic learning
+needs. Jumtien: UNESCO, 1990.
+
+33. ROSE, Nikolas. Powers of freedom: reframing political thought. Cambridge:
+CambridgeUniversityPress, 1999.
+
+Received: 9 Dec. 2020.
+
+31. PORTER, Theodore M. Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objectivity in science
+and public life. Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1995.
+
+32. ROSE, Nikolas. Governing by numbers: figuring out democracy. Accounting
+Organizations and Society, v. 16, no. 7, p. 673-692, 1991.
+
+35. SOARES, José Francisco. José Francisco Soares: IDEB in the law? Simon's
+Site, 13 Jul. 2011. Available at https://www.schwartzman.org.br/sitesimon/?p=2352
+
+Sociologies, v. 14, no. 29, p. 72-99, Jan./Apr. 2012.
+
+38. TEIXEIRA, Anísio. Public education: administration and development. Rio de
+Janeiro: Officina Graphica of the Department of Education, 1935.
+
+Accepted: 15 Mar. 2021.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/GILBOURN--David--WARMINGTON--Paul--DEMACK--Sean.-QuantCrit--Education--policy---Big-Data--and-principles-for-a-critical-race-theory-of-statistics.-Race--Ethnicity-and-Education.-2017..md b/GILBOURN--David--WARMINGTON--Paul--DEMACK--Sean.-QuantCrit--Education--policy---Big-Data--and-principles-for-a-critical-race-theory-of-statistics.-Race--Ethnicity-and-Education.-2017..md
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@@ -0,0 +1,1773 @@
+QuantCrit: education, policy, ‘Big Data’ and principles for a
+critical race theory of statistics
+
+GILBOURN, David, WARMINGTON, Paul and DEMACK, Sean
+<http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2953-1337>
+
+Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
+
+http://shura.shu.ac.uk/16657/
+
+This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the
+publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
+
+Published version
+
+GILBOURN, David, WARMINGTON, Paul and DEMACK, Sean (2017). QuantCrit:
+education, policy, ‘Big Data’ and principles for a critical race theory of statistics.
+Race, Ethnicity and Education.
+
+Copyright and re-use policy
+
+See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
+
+Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
+http://shura.shu.ac.uk
+0
+
+QuantCrit: education, policy,
+‘Big Data’ and principles for a critical race
+
+theory of statistics
+
+David Gillborn, University of Birmingham, UK. d.gillborn@bham.ac.uk
+
+Paul Warmington, University of Warwick, UK. P.Warmington@warwick.ac.uk
+
+Sean Demack, Sheffield Hallam University, UK. S.Demack@shu.ac.uk
+
+Keywords:
+
+critical race theory; quantitative research methods; statistics; race; racism; education policy;
+
+Big Data.
+
+ABSTRACT
+
+Quantitative research enjoys heightened esteem among policy-makers, media and the general public.
+
+Whereas qualitative research is frequently dismissed as subjective and impressionistic, statistics are
+
+often assumed to be objective and factual. We argue that these distinctions are wholly false;
+
+quantitative data is no less socially constructed than any other form of research material. The first part
+
+of the paper presents a conceptual critique of the field with empirical examples that expose and
+
+challenge hidden assumptions that frequently encode racist perspectives beneath the façade of
+
+supposed quantitative objectivity. The second part of the paper draws on the tenets of Critical Race
+
+Theory (CRT) to set out some principles to guide the future use and analysis of quantitative data.
+
+These ‘QuantCrit’ ideas concern (1) the centrality of racism as a complex and deeply-rooted aspect of
+
+society that is not readily amenable to quantification; (2) numbers are not neutral and should be
+
+interrogated for their role in promoting deficit analyses that serve White racial interests; (3) categories
+
+are neither ‘natural’ nor given and so the units and forms of analysis must be critically evaluated; (4)
+
+voice and insight are vital: data cannot ‘speak for itself’ and critical analyses should be informed by
+
+the experiential knowledge of marginalized groups; (5) statistical analyses have no inherent value but
+
+can play a role in struggles for social justice.
+1
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+1988
+
+St. George’s Hospital Medical School has been found guilty by the Commission for Racial
+
+Equality of practising racial and sexual discrimination in its admissions policy … a computer
+
+program used in the initial screening of applicants for places at the school unfairly
+
+discriminated against women and people with non-European sounding names… By 1988 all
+
+initial selection was being done by computer ... Women and those from racial minorities had a
+
+reduced chance of being interviewed independent of academic considerations. (Lowry &
+
+Macpherson 1988)
+
+2016
+
+…judges, police forces and parole officers across the US are now using a computer program
+
+to decide whether a criminal defendant is likely to reoffend or not. The basic idea is that an
+
+algorithm is likely to be more ‘objective’ and consistent than the more subjective judgment of
+
+human officials ... But guess what? The algorithm is not colour blind. Black defendants who
+
+did not reoffend over a two-year period were nearly twice as likely to be misclassified as
+
+higher risk compared with their white counterparts; white defendants who reoffended within
+
+the next two years had been mistakenly labelled low risk almost twice as often as black
+
+reoffenders. (Naughton 2016).
+
+These quotations describe how calculations made by computers, assumed by definition to be objective
+
+and free from human bias, not only reflected existing racist stereotypes but then acted upon those
+
+stereotypes to create yet further racial injustice. The incidents are separated by an ocean and almost 30
+
+years; the first refers to an English medical school, the second to a program used across the US. But
+
+the news coverage generated by the events is strikingly similar. In both cases there was a sense of
+
+amazement that computer calculations could make such gross and racially patterned errors. In the US
+
+example the reporters who found the problem note that ‘even when controlling for prior crimes, future
+
+recidivism, age, and gender, black defendants were 77 percent more likely to be assigned higher risk
+
+scores than white defendants’ (Larson, Mattu, Kirchner & Angwin 2016). A UK news story on
+
+the findings was entitled ‘Even algorithms are biased against black men’ (Naughton 2016
+
+emphasis added). The surprise that accompanies such findings reflects the central problem
+
+that we address in this paper; we argue that, far from being surprised that quantitative
+
+calculations can re-produce human bias and racist stereotypes, such patterns are entirely
+
+predictable and should lead us to treat quantitative analyses with at least as much caution as
+
+when considering qualitative research and its findings. Computer programs, the ‘models’ that
+2
+
+they run, and the calculations that they perform, are all the product of human labour. Simply
+
+because the mechanics of an analysis are performed by a machine does not mean that any
+
+biases are automatically stripped from the calculations. On the contrary, not only can
+
+computer-generated quantitative analyses embody human biases, such as racism, they also
+
+represent the added danger that their assumed objectivity can give the biases enhanced
+
+respectability and persuasiveness. Contrary to popular belief, and the assertions of many
+
+quantitative researchers, numbers are neither objective nor color-blind.
+
+Our Position and the Aims of this Paper
+
+We write from a perspective that foregrounds the need to think critically about how race
+
+inequity is routinely embedded in the everyday mundane realities that shape society, from the
+
+economy, to education, and the academy. The social locations of the authors of this paper
+
+differ in some respects and overlap in others. One of us is biracial (in the current dominant
+
+language of UK census categories, Black Caribbean/White British); two are White British.
+
+All of us are British-born male academics from working-class family backgrounds. As
+
+scholars, we have converged around our use of Critical Race Theory (CRT) as a framework
+
+for approaching issues of education and social justice. Our commitment to confronting the
+
+persistence of racism within the socio-educational formation derives from our own personal
+
+experiences of educational inequalities as students in state education and our concerns as
+
+educators/activists - particularly our frustration with the ‘colour-blindness’ that is the default
+
+in British education policy (Gillborn 2008; Warmington 2014). This paper is grounded in
+
+CRT’s understanding that ‘race and races are products of social thought and relations’ and
+
+that racism is non-aberrational (Delgado & Stefancic 2001, 7). In precise terms our position is
+
+one of ‘race ambivalence’ (Leonardo 2011, 675). That is, we understand that while race may
+
+be ‘unreal’ as a scientific category, its ‘modes of existence’ are real and have innumerable
+
+material and social consequences (Leonardo 2005, 409). It is indefensible, therefore, merely
+
+to regard race as a technology of other supposedly more ‘real’ relationships, such as social
+
+class.
+
+In this paper we apply a critical race perspective to the guiding questions that shaped this
+
+special issue of the journal ‘Race Ethnicity and Education’. In particular, we respond to the
+
+editors’ provocation to consider how quantitative methods - long critiqued for their inability
+
+to capture the nuance of everyday experience - might support and further a critical race
+
+agenda in educational research? Our answer is that different methods are appropriate for
+3
+
+different aspects of social research and critique. Quantitative methods cannot match
+
+qualitative approaches in terms of their suitability for understanding the nuances of the
+
+numerous social processes that shape and legitimate race inequity. However, quantitative
+
+methods are well placed to chart the wider structures, within which individuals live their
+
+everyday experiences, and to highlight the structural barriers and inequalities that differently
+
+racialized groups must navigate.
+
+Alongside the possible use of quantitative methods to aid a critical race analysis, we are
+
+especially aware that statistics are frequently mobilized to obfuscate, camouflage and even to
+
+further legitimate racist inequities. This paper attempts to show how such misuses occur and
+
+set out a range of CRT principles that can provide a lens through which to read and critique
+
+ostensibly ‘neutral’, ‘objective’ numbers and reporting that, in fact, conceal racist
+
+assumptions. We present our arguments in two main sections, combining a conceptual
+
+critique of the field with empirical examples that expose and challenge the hidden
+
+assumptions that frequently pattern quantitative analyses of race inequity.
+
+First, we look at how numbers are used to disguise racism in education and protect the racist
+
+status quo, that is, a position of White supremacy where the assumptions, interests, fears and
+
+fantasies of White people are placed at the heart of everyday politics and policy-making. We
+
+critique the special status that is wrongly accorded to quantitative data and debunk the truth
+
+claims associated with statistical research. In particular, we show how numbers have been
+
+deployed in recent education policy that claims to address issues of accountability and equity.
+
+Many of the most dangerous aspects of quantitative hyperbole coalesce in the emerging field
+
+of ‘Big Data’, where advocates argue that ‘numbers speak for themselves’ (Anderson 2008)
+
+and human reasoning (and experience) simply get in the way.
+
+The second part of the paper argues that, with appropriate safeguards and reflexivity,
+
+quantitative material has the potential to contribute to a radical project for greater equity in
+
+education. We build upon previous relevant research and go further by explicitly drawing on
+
+classic work in CRT to set out key principles that might usefully guide the use of quantitative
+
+material as part of the wider struggle for racial justice in education.
+
+MAGIC NUMBERS?
+
+CHALLENGING THE SPECIAL STATUS ACCORDED TO QUANTITATIVE DATA
+4
+
+Numbers and Truth Claims
+
+Policy-makers, the media and many academics treat quantitative material as if it is fundamentally
+
+different and superior to qualitative data. Numbers are assumed to report ‘the facts’; they are seen as
+
+authoritative, neutral, dispassionate and objective. Indeed, governments do not use numbers merely to
+
+describe the world, they increasingly use statistics as an essential part of the technology by which they
+
+seek to re/shape educational systems. In this way, numbers play a key role in how inequality is
+
+shaped, legitimized and protected. This has been called ‘policy as numbers’ (Rose 1999; Ozga &
+
+Lingard 2007; Rizvi & Lingard 2010):
+
+neo-liberalism has enhanced the significance of numbers and statistics as technologies of
+
+governance, as central to what Power (1997) calls the rise of the ‘audit society’ and what
+
+Neave (1998) has called ‘the evaluative state’. (Lingard 2011, 359) [
+1
+]
+
+Numbers are increasingly used to justify policy priorities and to label teachers, schools, districts, and
+
+even entire countries, as educational successes and failures. National testing programs, such as the No
+
+Child Left Behind (NCLB) reforms in the US and the use of school performance tables in England,
+
+have popularized the idea that numbers can be used to expose (and change) failing schools (Barber
+
+2012; Darling-Hammond, 2007; Gillborn & Youdell 2000). For example, across the globe politicians
+
+and pressure-groups frequently try to make their case by quoting results from PISA (Program of
+
+International Student Assessment) – which is run by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
+
+Development (OECD). Prominent examples exist in the States, the UK and Australia (see Lingard,
+
+Creagh & Vass 2012). Countries’ positions in the PISA tables are often cited as if they
+
+unambiguously and accurately represent the relative quality of schooling in different nations (despite
+
+their very different populations and education systems). And yet the commentaries rarely include any
+
+detail about the relatively small samples (less than 200 schools in all but one of the US returns since
+
+2000)(NCES nd); the selective curricular coverage of the tests (in reading, math and science); nor the
+
+fact that students in different countries sometimes take different assessments or miss certain
+
+assessments altogether (Stewart 2013). Despite these severe limitations, the UK government
+
+frequently cites PISA results as evidence of the need for change (cf. DfE 2015, 8) and has stated that
+
+it will ‘measure the increased performance of the school system as a whole by reference to
+
+international tables of student attainment, such as PISA’ (quoted in Scott 2016). Compare the
+
+confident use of PISA (below), by the then-Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove, and the
+
+more circumspect view offered by an academic critic:
+
+Since the 1990s our performance in these league tables has been at best, stagnant, at worst
+
+declining. In the latest results we are 21st amongst 65 participants in the world for science,
+
+23rd for reading and 26th for mathematics. For all the well-intentioned efforts of past
+5
+
+governments we are still falling further behind the best-performing school systems in the
+
+world. (Gove 2013)
+
+‘There are very few things you can summarise with a number and yet Pisa claims to be able to
+
+capture a country’s entire education system in just three of them. It can’t be possible.’ Dr
+
+Hugh Morrison, Queen’s University Belfast (quoted in Stewart 2013).
+
+Numbers and Accountability
+
+On both sides of the Atlantic, policy-makers have argued that statistics will allow greater
+
+‘accountability’ in education. But the thinking behind such claims is flawed in numerous ways. As
+
+Linda Darling-Hammond (2007) has noted, for example, under NCLB the numerous wider structural
+
+inequities that shape educational outcomes are ignored by focusing attention at the school level:
+
+…the wealthiest US public schools spend at least 10 times more than the poorest schools …
+
+Although the Act orders schools to ensure that 100% of students test at levels identified as
+
+‘proficient’ … the small per-pupil dollar allocation the law makes to schools serving lowincome
+students is well under 10% of schools’ total spending, far too little to correct these
+
+conditions (247-8)
+
+Additionally, the use of quantitative measures as a form of accountability assumes that the measures
+
+are valid, that is, that the recorded data bear some relevance to the issue/s that lie behind the targets.
+
+But there is often scope for cheating and some high-profile cases have emerged. In England, for
+
+example, documented cases include teachers altering students’ work and a school that removed lowattaining
+students from its official roll in advance of high-stakes testing, thereby artificially raising the
+
+proportion of students deemed ‘successful’ (Harding 2015).In the US, David Hursh notes that gaming
+
+the system can produce considerable rewards:
+
+Rodney Paige, as superintendent of the Houston Independent School District (and later
+
+chosen to be President [GW] Bush’s first Secretary of Education) … [ordered] principals to
+
+not list a student as dropping out but as having left for another school or some reason other
+
+than dropping out. Such creative book-keeping resulted in the district claiming a greatly
+
+reduced dropout rate of 1.5% in 2001–02 and winning a national award for excellence (Hursh
+
+2007, 302)
+
+Numbers and Equity
+
+In the UK, government policy puts numbers at the heart of its proclaimed strategy to create a fairer
+
+society. The Conservative Party, which formed the dominant partner in the Coalition Government
+6
+
+(2010-2015), went into the 2010 general election with arguments about ‘transparency’ threaded
+
+throughout their Party Manifesto. This included the promise, emphasized as a bold sub-heading, to
+
+‘Publish data so the public can hold government to account’ (Conservative Party 2010, 69).
+
+Subsequently the rhetoric was translated into a policy that envisaged ‘the public’ using statistics to
+
+understand, challenge and then change the behaviour of public authorities, including the Government
+
+itself:
+
+
+
+‘Our proposals,’ the Government Equalities Office (GEO) has said, ‘use the power of
+
+transparency to help public bodies to fulfil the aims of the Equality Duty to eliminate
+
+discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between different
+
+groups. This means that public bodies will be judged by citizens on the basis of clear
+
+information about the equality results they achieve… Public authorities will have flexibility in
+
+deciding what information to publish, and will be held to account by the people they serve.’
+
+(quoted by Instead Consultancy 2011)
+
+This approach embodies a series of assumptions that imbue numbers with an almost magical status
+
+and power. First, it is assumed that relevant and useful data will be made available (despite the
+
+selection being in the gift of the very authorities that ‘the public’ are expected to challenge). Second,
+
+this model of transparent data and active citizenship assumes that the citizenry have the time,
+
+resources and expertise to access the data and then analyse it. Finally, the approach takes for granted
+
+that public bodies will automatically change their behaviour if the data reveal poor ‘equality results’.
+
+Unfortunately, in the real world, none of these assumptions is true.
+
+Statistics do not simply lie around waiting for interested citizens to pick them up and use them.
+
+Numbers are no more obvious, neutral and factual than any other form of data. Statistics are socially
+
+constructed in exactly the same way that interview data and survey returns are constructed, i.e.
+
+through a design process that includes, for example, decisions about which issues should (and should
+
+not) be researched, what kinds of question should be asked, how information is to be analysed, and
+
+which findings should be shared publicly. Even given the very best intentions (and notwithstanding
+
+the opportunity for game-playing and ‘creative book-keeping’ of the sort already documented above)
+
+at every stage there is the possibility for decisions to be taken that obscure or misrepresent issues that
+
+could be vital to those concerned with social justice. In view of the limits of space, a single – but
+
+important – example will suffice. It concerns racial justice and the question of access to, and
+
+achievement in, UK higher education.
+
+It is a scandal that ethnic minority kids are more likely to go to university than poor white
+
+ones
+7
+
+The Telegraph (Kirkup 2015)
+
+White British pupils least likely to go to university, says research
+
+The Guardian (Khomami 2015)
+
+White British pupils fall behind ethnic groups in race for university: All minorities now more
+
+likely to go into higher education
+
+Daily Mail (Doughty 2015)
+
+These headlines appeared in the British daily press in November 2015 when an economic think tank
+
+(the Institute for Fiscal Studies - IFS) publicized a review of government figures showing the
+
+proportion of young people going into university from different ethnic groups (Crawford & Greaves
+
+2015). First, as we might expect when applying a CRT perspective that is sensitive to the positioning
+
+of White people at the heart of contemporary politics, it is striking that the relatively low rate for
+
+White students is the angle highlighted by all news outlets regardless of their political positioning.
+
+Including, for example, the most left-wing (Guardian) and right-wing (Telegraph and Mail) parts of
+
+the mainstream British media.
+
+A second important aspect to this story, that may surprise some readers, is that there is nothing new in
+
+the fact that White students are less likely to enter British universities than their peers in most
+
+minoritized groups. This pattern was already known 18 years before these headlines: ‘relative to their
+
+share in the population … ethnic minorities overall are now better represented in HE than whites’
+
+(Coffield & Vignoles 1997 original emphasis).
+
+From the perspective of this paper, focusing on the mis/uses of numbers in race analyses, perhaps the
+
+most important aspect of the IFS report, and the associated newspaper headlines, is that a focus on
+
+access statistics in isolation gives an extremely partial, indeed biased, view of race and Higher
+
+Education in Britain. Simply looking at who goes to university ignores long-standing and significant
+
+race inequities in the status of the universities attended and the level of final degree achievement.
+
+Figure 1 about here
+
+Figure 1 shows the likelihood of attending an elite research-intensive university in the UK (the socalled
+‘Russell Group’ of universities).[
+2
+] White and minoritized students appear to have roughly
+
+similar chances of attending elite universities if all minoritized students are lumped together in a
+
+single ‘non-White’ group, usually referred to as BME in the UK (Black and Minority Ethnic).
+
+However, if the minoritized students are disaggregated into smaller and more meaningful groups,
+8
+
+some important differences emerge. Figure 2 compares the proportion of White young people entering
+
+Russell Group universities against the rate for the most- and least-likely minority ethnic groups,
+
+Indian and Black Caribbean students respectively.[
+3
+] White British students are almost five times more
+
+likely to gain access to elite research-intensive universities than their peers of Black Caribbean
+
+background. This is a sizeable inequality of opportunity but is invisible in calculations that simply
+
+aggregate all minoritized students (such as Figure 1) or which look at access to all universities
+
+regardless of their standing (such as the national headlines quoted above).
+
+Figure 2 about here
+
+The inflammatory headlines that proclaimed the ‘scandal’ of White rates of access to university
+
+(above) draw attention away from a further facet of race inequity in the system, i.e. differing levels of
+
+achievement between ethnic groups. Table 1 shows the proportions of students in each main ethnic
+
+group attaining the different classes of degree available at the end of their undergraduate studies;
+
+ranging from the very best result (a first class degree) through to a ‘third’ or ‘pass’ degree
+
+classification. White students are more likely to gain a ‘First’ than any other group (22.4%); Black
+
+students are the least likely to be awarded first class degrees (8.7% of Black students overall). This
+
+means that the odds of White undergraduates achieving the highest degree classification are around
+
+three times higher than their Black peers.[4
+] This is a significant ethnic inequality but, perhaps
+
+because the beneficiaries are White, it goes entirely unremarked in the press furore about the overall
+
+access statistics (above).
+
+Table 1 about here
+
+It is clear, therefore, that there is nothing obvious, neutral nor simple about education statistics and
+
+race. In this section, we have reviewed official data that describe differences in university access and
+
+achievement in relation to the ethnic origin of undergraduates in British universities. The government,
+
+an economic think tank and the mainstream media all chose to highlight the apparent underrepresentation
+of White students (when looking at access across the entire system). This played into
+
+the ongoing high-profile political and media narrative that paints White people as race-victims in
+
+contemporary Britain (see Gillborn 2008 & 2010b; Sveinsson 2009 for critical commentaries). But a
+
+very different picture emerges if the data are questioned in relation to a critical understanding of past
+
+race inequities in education. Such a perspective prompts us to explore differences in the status of
+
+institutions and the levels of achievement at the end of higher education. In both cases, White students
+
+appear to do rather well and, in terms of achievement, better than every other group. Indeed, there is
+
+perhaps scope for further headlines questioning what is happening in British higher education when
+
+the ethnic group that is least likely to go to university nevertheless enjoys the best chance of achieving
+9
+
+the top grade. Were this a minoritized group there might be headlines about ‘scandals’ and shocks but,
+
+since the group in question is White, their high attainment fits with the basic expectations of a White
+
+supremacist media and polity and so the pattern goes entirely unremarked.
+
+Big Data: big trouble?
+
+The world’s capacity to store, broadcast and compute information is growing exponentially.
+
+The numbers involved have already passed well beyond the scales we are used to in our
+
+everyday lives. Counting across all forms of storage, from mobile phone memory to DVD,
+
+Blu-Ray and hard disks, we estimate that the world’s installed capacity to store information
+
+will reach around 2.5 zettabytes this year … If we stored all this data on DVDs and piled
+
+them up, the stack of discs would stretch one-and-a-half times the distance from the earth to
+
+the moon. What’s more, this figure is growing by over 50% year-on-year. (Yiu 2012, 10)
+
+‘Big data’ is an increasingly popular phrase used to describe sets of numeric data that are, according
+
+to its advocates, simply too huge for traditional forms of human analysis. Big Data has become big
+
+business. A recent google search for the phrase produced almost 300,000,000 hits[
+5
+] and governments
+
+on both sides of the Atlantic are investing heavily in the technology and talking up its transformative
+
+powers:
+
+Big Data is a Big Deal … Today, the Obama Administration is announcing the “Big Data
+
+Research and Development Initiative.” By improving our ability to extract knowledge and
+
+insights from large and complex collections of digital data, the initiative promises to help
+
+accelerate the pace of discovery in science and engineering, strengthen our national security,
+
+and transform teaching and learning. (WhiteHouse.gov 2012)
+
+It is estimated that the big data market will benefit the UK economy by £216 billion and
+
+create 58,000 new jobs before 2017 … Universities and Science Minister David Willetts
+
+said: “Big data is 1 of the 8 great technologies of the future and a priority for government. It
+
+has the potential to transform public and private sector organisations, drive research and
+
+development, increase productivity and innovation, and enable market-changing products and
+
+services.” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2014 )
+
+Big Data advocates promote a hard sell about the fabulous powers of Big Data. They describe a world
+
+where new possibilities are revealed by an analysis entirely driven by machines and where, most
+
+significantly, theories and human reasoning are rendered obsolete because the ‘numbers speak for
+10
+
+themselves’: the following extract is from an article in Wired magazine, entitled ‘The End of Theory’,
+
+which did much to popularize the idea:
+
+This is a world where massive amounts of data and applied mathematics replace every other
+
+tool that might be brought to bear. Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics
+
+to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what
+
+they do? The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity.
+
+With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves. (Anderson 2008)
+
+The argument that numbers can now ‘speak for themselves’ is a popular refrain in Big Data
+
+discussions. Speaking on BBC radio in 2013, for example, author Kenneth Cukier stated:
+
+‘We have to let the data speak for itself. (…) When we trust the data – look at the data – it is a
+
+little bit less biased - in some respects, not in all respects - than we are. And therefore it can
+
+find correlations that we simply, as human beings, can’t because we have limited capacity
+
+(…) the vast amount of data has expanded, we now have to give it to the machine to do what
+
+it does best, and that is parse through it to come up with insights.’[
+6
+]
+
+Cukier’s emphasis on correlations echoes part of Anderson’s argument from Wired:
+
+"Correlation is enough." We can stop looking for models. We can analyze the data without
+
+hypotheses about what it might show. (Anderson 2008)
+
+This is a deliberate and self-conscious rejection of the traditional warning that correlation should not
+
+be mistaken for causation. When Big Data advocates ask us to ‘trust the data’ they paint a picture of
+
+analysis as an almost mystical process that takes place inside machines and is too complex for human
+
+beings to comprehend: ‘We can throw the numbers into the biggest computing clusters the world has
+
+ever seen and let statistical algorithms find patterns where science cannot’ (Anderson 2008). As we
+
+noted at the very start of this paper, however, algorithms are not free from bias: ‘Even algorithms are
+
+biased against black men’ (Naughton 2016; see also Larson et al. 2016). And the reason that
+
+algorithms can be racist is that they are created and interpreted by human beings, many of whom
+
+share commonly held racist stereotypes.
+
+As we have argued above, all data is manufactured and all analysis is driven by human decisions.
+
+Although ‘Big Data’ advocates proclaim its insight and authority with almost evangelical fervour, the
+
+limits of the approach can be found lurking in the small print. For example, in a book whose sub-title
+11
+
+proclaims Big Data as a ‘revolution that will transform how we live, work and think’, Cukier and his
+
+co-author accept (contrary to Anderson’s proclamation of the ‘end of theory’) that:
+
+‘… big-data analysis is based on theories, we can’t escape them. They shape both our
+
+methods and our results. It begins with how we select the data. Our decisions may be driven
+
+by convenience: Is the data readily available? Or by economics: Can the data be captured
+
+cheaply? Our choices are influenced by theories. What we choose influences what we find…
+
+(Mayer-Schonberger & Cukier 2013, 72 emphasis added).
+
+This echoes our key argument that all data gathering and analysis is shaped by theories and beliefs
+
+that are susceptible to racial bias. In the next part of the paper we set out some ideas for how the
+
+analysis of quantitative data might usefully be informed by the principles of Critical Race Theory
+
+(CRT).
+
+QuantCrit: TOWARDS A CRITICAL RACE THEORY OF STATISTICS
+
+We [have] defined ‘White logic’ as ‘the epistemological arm of White supremacy’. Rather
+
+than leading to a science of objectivity, White logic has fostered an ethnocentric orientation.
+
+Most researchers have embraced the assumptions of White supremacy. (Zuberi & BonillaSilva
+2008, 332)
+
+Critical race-conscious scholars have long questioned the assumptions that shape the accepted
+
+‘mainstream’ definitions of science and rationality. Indeed, ‘challenging claims of neutrality’ and
+
+‘objectivity’ was highlighted as a defining characteristic of CRT in educational studies from the very
+
+start (Ladson-Billings & Tate 1995, 56). In this section of our paper we wish to build upon these
+
+previous studies in order to identify some principles that are explicitly derived from CRT to guide the
+
+interpretation and use of quantitative data.
+
+Critical Race Theory has enjoyed a huge growth in awareness and popularity over the last decade or
+
+so. There is no space (nor need) to recap on the detail of the movement here, suffice it to say that CRT
+
+is now recognized as one of the most important approaches globally for scholars researching, and
+
+opposing, race inequity. CRT has grown rapidly since its early development as an insurgent
+
+movement among US legal scholars of color in the 1970s and 1980s (Bell 1980a & 1980b; Crenshaw
+
+2002; Delgado 1995; Delgado & Stefancic 2001; Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado & Crenshaw 1993).
+
+CRT has spread into numerous disciplines and now enjoys a global reach, especially in the field of
+
+education (Dixson & Rousseau 2006; Gillborn 2005; Ladson-Billings 1998; Ladson-Billings & Tate
+12
+
+1995; Lynn & Dixson 2013; Parker 1998; Solórzano & Yosso 2002; Taylor 2000; Warmington 2012).
+
+One of the most exciting aspects in the growth of CRT has been the development of off-shoot
+
+movements that apply the principles of CRT to the particular experience of one or more monoritized
+
+group, such as Latino CRT (LatCrit)(Montoya & Valdes 2009; Solórzano & Delgado Bernal 2001). A
+
+particularly important recent development has been the move by critical disability scholars to
+
+consciously apply CRT principles in an attempt to generate new insights through a combination of
+
+approaches that they term Disability Critical Race Theory (DisCrit)(Annamma, Connor & Ferri 2013;
+
+Connor, Ferri & Annamma 2016). DisCrit was consciously shaped through the development of a
+
+series of tenets that would provide a starting point for scholars seeking to advance intersectional
+
+research on racism and disability (Annamma et al. 2013, 11). We believe that a similar approach
+
+offers a sound basis for developing key principles to help guide the use of statistics using the insights
+
+of CRT.
+
+Of course, we are not the first to apply CRT to quantitative data and analyses; here we seek to build
+
+on and extend previous approaches. For example, Earnestyne Sullivan and colleagues have used the
+
+term ‘CritQuant’ to describe an approach to quantitative policy analyses that seeks to embody two
+
+‘CRT tenets’, namely the ‘permanence of racism and critique of liberalism’ (Sullivan 2007; Sullivan,
+
+Larke & Webb-Hasan 2010, 77). This is a useful start but we see potential in going beyond just two
+
+tenets and, like the proponents of DisCrit, wish to build a series of sensitizing concepts and principles
+
+that embody a more holistic view of CRT. In order to distinguish our approach, therefore, we have
+
+reversed the elements of Sullivan’s label and directly echo the formulation adopted by Annamma and
+
+colleagues, by adopting ‘QuantCrit’ as a shorthand for our approach.
+
+QuantCrit seeks to extend some of the earlier criticisms of quantitative research on race and
+
+education, made by one of us (Gillborn 2010a), and shares key aspirations with the framework for
+
+‘Critical Race Quantitative Intersectionality’ (CRQI) outlined by Alejandro Covarrubias and Verónica
+
+Vélez (2013). Like them, we seek to generate ‘a framework guided by CRT’ (2013, 275) not a new
+
+theory in its own right. In particular, we wish to emphasize that we do not view this as in any way an
+
+off-shoot movement of CRT; we see the following QuantCrit principles as a kind of toolkit that
+
+embodies the need to apply CRT understandings and insights whenever quantitative data is used in
+
+research and/or encountered in policy and practice. Our approach shares many core assumptions with
+
+Covarrubias & Vélez’s critique including, for example, the view that numbers do not ‘speak for
+
+themselves’ (2013, 278). However, unlike CRQI, we remain fundamentally sceptical about the
+
+possibility that numbers can ever fully capture the ‘material impact’ of intersectional racism or ‘grant
+
+us greater opportunities to effect change at the policy level’ (2013, 282). History suggests that
+
+progress toward race equity occurs when White interests are thought to align with greater social
+
+justice (Bell 1980b; Delgado 2006; Donnor, J. 2016) rather than following from the style and
+13
+
+persuasiveness of data that are provided in service of the argument (Covarrubias & Vélez 2013, 271).
+
+This is because, as we have noted above and detail further below, numbers have no objective reality
+
+beyond the frameworks of meaning and politics that create them.
+
+In the rest of this section we outline some first principles for QuantCrit, which can be summarized as
+
+follows:
+
+1. the centrality of racism
+
+2. numbers are not neutral
+
+3. categories are neither ‘natural’ nor given: for ‘race’ read ‘racism’
+
+4. voice and insight: data cannot ‘speak for itself’
+
+5. using numbers for social justice
+
+1. The Centrality of Racism: QuantCrit recognizes that racism is a complex, fluid and changing
+
+characteristic of society that is not automatically nor obviously amenable to statistical inquiry. In the
+
+absence of a critical race-conscious perspective, quantitative analyses will tend to remake and
+
+legitimate existing race inequities.
+
+At the heart of our approach is an understanding that ‘race’ is ‘more than just a variable’ (Dixson &
+
+Lynn 2013, 3). This is more than a methodological statement, it is also a political statement that is
+
+integral to CRT’s model of the social. Social relationships are not readily amenable to quantification;
+
+statistical significance is an arbitrary measure, proving nothing, that is entirely different to social/
+
+historical significance (Ziliak & McCloskey 2008). Of central importance here is the realization that
+
+‘race’ is only ever a social construct - a dynamic of power (history, culture, economics,
+
+representation):
+
+Placing race at the center is less easy than one might expect, for one must do this with due
+
+recognition of its complexity. Race is not a stable category ... ‘It’ is not a thing, a reified object
+
+that can be measured as if it were a simple biological entity. Race is a construction, a set of fully
+
+social relationships.’ (Apple 2001, 204 original emphasis)
+
+It follows that every attempt to ‘measure’ the social in relation to ‘race’ can only offer a crude
+
+approximation that risks fundamentally misunderstanding and misrepresenting the true nature of the
+
+social dynamics that are at play. We noted earlier that quantitative data are frequently assumed to be
+
+more trustworthy and robust than qualitative evidence; but this is turned on its head when we take
+
+seriously the social character of ‘race’. Even the most basic numbers in relation to race equality are
+
+open to multiple and profound threats to their meaning and use. In view of these problems (and the
+14
+
+societal dominance of perspectives that are shaped by the interests, perceptions and assumptions of
+
+White people) a sensible starting point in any quantitative analysis is to interrogate the collection,
+
+analysis and representation of statistical material for likely bias in favour of the racial status quo.
+
+2. Numbers are not neutral: QuantCrit exposes how quantitative data is often gathered and analyzed
+
+in ways that reflect the interests, assumptions and perceptions of White elites. One of the tasks of
+
+QuantCrit is to challenge the past and current ways in which quantitative research has served White
+
+Supremacy, e.g. by lending support to deficit theories without acknowledging alternative critical and
+
+radical interpretations; by removing racism from discussion by using tools, models and techniques
+
+that fail to take account of racism as a central factor in daily life; and by lending supposedly
+
+‘objective’ support to Eurocentric and White Supremacist ideas.
+
+In the same way that CRT rejects ideologies of neutrality and meritocracy as ‘camouflages’ for racist
+
+interests (Tate 1997, 235), QuantCrit prompts researchers to examine behind the numbers in order to
+
+understand how findings have been generated and identify the racist logics that may have shaped
+
+conclusions. For example, there is a tendency in some quantitative analyses to disguise and even
+
+normalize race inequity. Alice Bradbury (2011) has shown how an expectation of lower achievement
+
+by Black Caribbean students is built into the fabric of quantitative systems by which English schools
+
+are judged. In order to be ‘fair’ to schools, when calculating the amount of progress that their students
+
+made (‘growth’ in US terms), the notion of ‘Contextual Value Added’ (CVA) was developed. This
+
+system calculated the amount of progress that students would usually be expected to make in view of
+
+certain ‘factors’ known to be associated with different rates of attainment, including social
+
+disadvantage and ethnic origin. Schools suffered no penalty if their Black Caribbean students failed to
+
+match the attainment of White British students because the system expected such a pattern and
+
+‘corrected’ for it. As Bradbury notes, ‘whatever the pattern of the coefficients the principle that is
+
+legitimised by CVA is the same: that ethnicity affects how much progress you should be expected to
+
+make’ (2011, 238). This system takes an existing inequity (the lower attainment of previous
+
+generations of Black students) and uses it to ‘predict’ a future where such inequity is normal.
+
+This normalization of lower racialized attainment is not restricted to official analyses; the same kind
+
+of thinking can be found in academic treatments. Stephen Gorard & Emma Smith, for example, have
+
+followed Thorndike (1963, 19) in arguing that ‘under-achievement’ should be defined as
+
+‘achievement falling below what would be forecast from our most informed and accurate prediction,
+
+based on a team of predictor variables’ (2008, 708, emphasis added). In this way, statisticians would
+
+re-define certain levels of achievement inequity as unproblematic; if Black students do as badly as
+
+they are predicted (based on previous cohorts) then they would no longer be ‘under-achieving’. As
+
+Power & Frandji (2010) have noted, these sorts of calculation may sometimes spring from good
+15
+
+intentions, e.g. to recognize the relative achievements of traditionally disadvantaged groups, or to
+
+avoid schools being ranked as failures based on raw attainment data that ignores the multiple and
+
+severe challenges facing some communities. Regardless of intent, however, such moves threaten to
+
+enshrine the lower average achievements of some groups as normal, even inevitable:
+
+To some extent, the attempt to valorise the relative successes of disadvantaged schools and
+
+disadvantaged children is to accept their educational inferiority as inevitable and insurmountable
+
+…Rather than insist on the need to level the playing field, we change the definition of success.
+
+And setting different criteria of success for different kinds of pupils inscribes their failure as
+
+‘normal’ and ‘natural’. Through ‘correcting’ schools’ unequal attainments in this way, the new
+
+politics of recognition introduces a disempowering fatalism into the education system. (Power &
+
+Frandji 2010, 393)
+
+These problems amount to the colonisation of interpretation, i.e. by mobilizing statistics in these ways
+
+commentators (including governments and independent academics) act to redefine the facts of
+
+educational achievement and equity. By presenting numbers as a neutral technology (free from
+
+political interference and sentimentality) statisticians sometimes act to assert that their view is the
+
+only true or legitimate understanding of the world, a view where inequitable educational achievement
+
+by some minoritized groups is taken for granted, normalized, and consequently erased from the
+
+agenda.
+
+3. Categories/Groups are neither ‘natural’ nor given: for ‘race’ read ‘racism’. QuantCrit
+
+interrogates the nature and consequences of the categories that are used within quantitative research.
+
+In particular, we must always remain sensitive for possibilities of ‘categorical alignment’ (Artiles
+
+2011, Epstein 2007) where complex, historically situated and contested terms (like race and
+
+dis/ability) are normalized and mobilized as labeling, organizing and controlling devices in research
+
+and measurement. Where ‘race’ is associated with an unequal outcome it is likely to indicate the
+
+operation of racism but mainstream interpretations may erroneously impute ‘race’ as a cause in its
+
+own right, as if the minoritized group is inherently deficient somehow.
+
+Even the most basic decisions in research design can have fundamental consequences for the
+
+re/presentation of race inequity. Many studies do not include race/ethnicity as a variable at all; the
+
+absence of race ‘findings’ may then be taken by readers to mean that race/racism is unimportant
+
+whereas it was simply not considered. If ‘race’ is to be included, we have already shown (above)
+
+some of the numerous ways in which the complex and fluid operation of racist labels can come to be
+
+treated as if these social constructs (which change between time and place) represent real ‘things’ –
+
+facts of biology and/or fate.
+16
+
+If race and/or ethnicity are to be included in a study then how these ideas are operationalized will
+
+shape the findings. For example, we have noted above, in relation to access to elite British
+
+universities, that White students appear to be disadvantaged when compared with a crude BME
+
+composite group (that lumps together all minoritized students); and yet the same White students
+
+emerge as relatively privileged when compared with their Black Caribbean peers (see Figures 1 & 2).
+
+We have frequently encountered White analysts who proclaim that race was not a factor when, in fact,
+
+they have simply compared White students against everyone else (in a crude non-white composite).
+
+Critical race scholars instantly recognize the meaninglessness of such a binary comparison but trying
+
+to be more sensitive to race complexities is no easy matter. If using too few ethnic categories is one
+
+way to produce meaningless results, then using too many categories can be almost as bad. For
+
+example, we once worked with a school that claimed to conduct rigorous ethnic monitoring and found
+
+no significant differences between ethnic groups’ attainment; on closer inspection we discovered that
+
+the school used a list of more than 70 separate ethnic categories, meaning that few of the cell sizes
+
+contained enough students to have any confidence in the results.
+
+A particular problem in quantitative research on race is that ‘race’ is frequently interpreted as if it
+
+signals a pre-existing fixed quality (or lack of it). In particular, Black groups in the UK and African
+
+American and Latinex students in the US, are often viewed through a deficit lens by politicians,
+
+teachers and academics alike. This means that research which may have been intended to expose and
+
+challenge a race inequity becomes yet more fodder for racist practices and beliefs. Imagine, for
+
+example, that a project finds that ‘race was significantly correlated with lower achievement’. A
+
+critical race theorist will likely interpret the sentence to mean that racism is a significant factor that
+
+affects the chances of achieving. But uncritical White observers, practitioners and policy-makers may
+
+take away the message that some races are less able to achieve. One way of prompting ourselves to
+
+question such thinking is to automatically replace terms like ‘race’ and ‘ethnic origin’ with the couplet
+
+‘race/racism’. The idea of ‘race’ always carries the inherent threat of racist assumptions and actions
+
+(Leonardo 2013; Omi & Winant 1993) and so the move is conceptually legitimate and useful in the
+
+practical sense of prompting the reader to view race critically as a social construct that historically
+
+separates and oppresses particular groups.
+
+Unfortunately, academic research and education policy is replete with examples where race is treated
+
+as having a priori existence that explains inequality by reference to assumed deficits on the part of
+
+minoritized groups. The following example is from the first education policy statement issued by a
+
+newly elected British government in 2010:
+17
+
+We must also address serious issues of inequality – both black boys and pupils receiving free
+
+school meals are three times more likely to be excluded than average. Giving teachers the
+
+power to intervene early and firmly to tackle disruptive behaviour can get these children’s
+
+lives back on track. (DfE 2010, para 3.5)
+
+It is sobering that disproportionate expulsion from school is highlighted as a ‘serious’ issue of
+
+‘inequality’ and yet the proposed solution is to give teachers more powers to penalize ‘disruptive
+
+behavior.’ Clearly the government assumed that the exclusion problem lay in the behavior of Black
+
+students and not the racialised disciplinary regimes that historically over-exclude Black students from
+
+British schools (see Blair 2001; Gillborn 2008). As usual, good-intentions are no protection against
+
+slipping into the erroneous belief in race as a fixed identity and a causal factor in its own right. Under
+
+the heading ‘equality areas’, for example, a report seeking to identify inequalities in British higher
+
+education offered the following definition:
+
+Black and minority ethnic
+
+This definition is widely recognised and used to identify patterns of marginalisation and
+
+segregation caused by an individual’s ethnicity. (Equality Challenge Unit 2014, 5).
+
+Racist patterns of inequality (in access, graduation and achievement) are associated with ethnic
+
+origin; a critical scholar would look to identify ways in which racism has shaped these outcomes; but
+
+such ‘patterns’ are in no way ‘caused by an individual’s ethnicity’. Adopting our suggested technique
+
+of using a ‘race/racism’ couplet (above) helps to disrupt such thinking; the sentence would now read:
+
+This definition is widely recognised and used to identify patterns of marginalisation and
+
+segregation caused by race/racism.
+
+4. Voice and Insight: data cannot ‘speak for itself’. QuantCrit recognizes that data is open to
+
+numerous (and conflicting) interpretations and, therefore, QuantCrit assigns particular importance to
+
+the experiential knowledge of people of color and other ‘outsider’ groups (including those
+
+marginalized by assumptions around class, gender, sexuality, and dis/ability) and seeks to foreground
+
+their insights, knowledge and understandings to inform research, analyses, and critique.
+
+As we have already noted (see above in relation to Big Data), numbers are social constructs and likely
+
+to embody the dominant (racist) assumptions that shape contemporary society. At every stage in the
+
+production of statistics there is the opportunity for racialized assumptions to come into play.
+
+Consequently, in many cases, numbers speak for White racial interests; their presentation, as objective
+18
+
+and factual, merely adds to the danger of racist stereotyping where uncritical taken-for-granted
+
+understandings lay at the heart of analyses.
+
+Quantitative analyses that claim to control for the separate influence of different factors are especially
+
+prone to misunderstanding and misrepresentation. Such ‘regression’ analyses rely on statistical
+
+models that are complex and often only partially explained in published accounts. Nevertheless, the
+
+results are frequently reported as if they describe the real world rather than being an artifact of
+
+statistical manipulations. Regression analyses can turn reality on its head. In an earlier paper, for
+
+example, we described a prominent research study in which several minoritized groups were less
+
+likely to gain access to a higher level of teaching and assessment. However, the researchers performed
+
+a regression analysis that claimed to control for the separate influence of numerous factors (such as
+
+maternal education, socio-economic background and prior attainment); the regression analysis
+
+described most of the minority groups as being over-represented (the reverse of their representation in
+
+the real world) and this was the finding that was reported in the press (Gillborn 2010a, 261-3).
+
+A vital problem lies in the failure of many analysts to realize that racism does not operate separately
+
+to factors such as prior attainment, income, and maternal education. Racism operates through and
+
+between many of these factors simultaneously. In a society that is structured by racial domination, the
+
+impact of racism will be reflected across many different indicators simultaneously. By trying to
+
+disentangle these elements regression analyses imagine that numerous factors (including prior
+
+attainment, socio-economic status and parental education) are entirely independent of racist
+
+influences. Worse still, they treat inequalities in those indicators as if they are a sign of internal deficit
+
+on the part of the minoritized group rather than a socially constituted injustice. The use of ‘prior
+
+attainment’ scores is a particularly important example of this. Quantitative researchers frequently use
+
+students’ test results at an earlier stage of their education as a way to group students of similar
+
+‘ability’, comparing ‘like-with-like’, but this erases racism and blames the students:
+
+the racism that the kids experience on a daily basis [in ranked teaching groups, with restricted
+
+curricula and less-experienced teachers] translates into lower scores … But those scores are
+
+then used to gauge “ability” and “prior attainment” …the differences in prior attainment are
+
+treated as if they were deficits in the students themselves and nothing to do with their schools
+
+(Gillborn 2010a, 266).
+
+5. Social justice/equity orientation: QuantCrit rejects false and self-serving notions of statistical
+
+research as value-free and politically neutral. CRT scholarship is oriented to support social justice
+
+goals and work to achieve equity, e.g. by critiquing official analyses that trade on deficit assumptions,
+19
+
+and working with minoritized communities and activist groups to provide more insightful, sensitive
+
+and useful research that adds a quantitative dimension to anti-oppressive praxis.
+
+This does not mean that critical race theorists should dispense with quantitative approaches but that
+
+they should adopt a position of principled ambivalence, neither rejecting numbers out of hand nor
+
+falling into the trap of imagining that numeric data have any kind of enhanced status, value, or
+
+neutrality. This is a stance that anti-racist scholars and activists have long practiced, for example,
+
+when they contest supposedly scientific claims about the biological nature of race - sometimes by
+
+invoking what science tells us about the unscientific status of race (Warmington 2009). Critical race
+
+theorists work simultaneously with and against race, i.e. we know that race only exists as a social
+
+construct, but we recognize the sometimes murderous power of the fiction and seek to engage, resist
+
+and ultimately destroy race/racism. Similarly, QuantCrit should work with/against numbers by
+
+engaging with statistics as a fully social aspect of how race/racism is constantly made and legitimated
+
+in society. Like Covarrubias & Vélez (2013, 271) we see hope in the fact that policy-makers
+
+preference for numbers might offer a role for statistics in the radical critique of White supremacy, but
+
+we emphasize that this is a deeply misguided preference which has a habit of evaporating when the
+
+numbers tell an unwelcome story:
+
+Humanism’s search for an originary, or genetic, human experience is quickly betrayed when,
+
+upon deconstruction, human experience appears cultural or racial (usually Eurocentric or
+
+White), and not universal. So what initially appears as general becomes a front for the
+
+universalization of a particular racialized experience. (Leonardo 2005, 405)
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+‘The real danger is not that computers will begin to think like men, but that men will begin to
+
+think like computers.’ Sydney J. Harris (in O’Hagan 2011)
+
+Quantitative data is often used to shut down, silence and belittle equity work. Whenever governments,
+
+employers, or educators, are challenged on their poor performance in relation to an under-represented
+
+group, they will typically reach for statistics in an effort to show that they are really much better than
+
+you might think. Such responses usually involve highly selective decisions about which populations
+
+to include in the calculations, how recently the data were collected, and which other variables might
+
+be used to recalculate the numbers and produce a result more to the liking of the institution that is
+
+under fire. Despite all these numerous decisions and manipulations, many people continue to assume
+
+that numbers have some form of inherent value – more objective, factual and real than ‘mere’
+20
+
+testimony or human experience. Such assumptions are not only incorrect, they are dangerous. In this
+
+paper we have argued that quantitative data are socially constructed in exactly the same way as other
+
+forms of research material (including interviews and ethnographic observations). Numbers’
+
+authoritative façade often hides a series of assumptions and practices which mean, more often than
+
+not, that statistics will embody the dominant assumptions that shape inequity in society. Radical
+
+scholars are right to be suspicious of quantitative material; the data are often generated and analyzed
+
+by people with little interest in, or understanding of, social inequality. Qualitative data, exploring
+
+people’s complex and multifaceted experiences and perspectives, may be inherently better suited to
+
+exposing and opposing racist social processes. However, we believe that there is value in trying to use
+
+statistics responsibly and toward radical egalitarian ends; we have proposed that a useful way ahead
+
+would be to adapt some of the tenets of critical race theory and apply them to the specific issues faced
+
+when handling quantitative data.
+
+We have proposed five principles that might usefully guide early attempts to practice quantitative
+
+critical race theory (or ‘QuantCrit’).
+
+1. the centrality of racism
+
+2. numbers are not neutral
+
+3. categories are neither ‘natural’ nor given: for ‘race’ read ‘racism’
+
+4. voice and insight: data cannot ‘speak for itself’
+
+5. using numbers for social justice
+
+The principles are explicitly modeled on the basic tenets of CRT and we expect that, like CRT itself,
+
+QuantCrit will take on new forms as it is practiced by scholars facing a range of challenges in
+
+different contexts. To date, quantitative data have not featured significantly in CRT scholarship and,
+
+as we have shown, there is good reason for this. Nevertheless, we believe that statistical analyses have
+
+the potential to be used in the service of equity goals, not least to expose and delegitimize the racist
+
+(and sexist, classist, hetero-normative, and ablest) assumptions, policies and practices that are
+
+currently supported by the uncritical use of quantitative data.
+21
+
+Acknowledgements
+
+This paper draws on research conducted for the project ‘Race, Racism and Education: inequality,
+
+resilience and reform’, funded by the 2013 Research Award by the Society for Educational Studies
+
+(SES). We are especially grateful to our advisory group for their support and advice; especially Sir
+
+Keith Ajegbo, Hilary Cremin, Diane Rutherford, Sally Tomlinson and Joy Warmington. We are
+
+indebted to the editors of this special issue for their detailed comments on the text and to our
+
+colleague Claire E. Crawford for her help with final revisions.
+
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+Khomami, N. 2015. White British pupils least likely to go to university, says research, The Guardian,
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+11 November, http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/nov/11/white-british-pupils-leastlikely-to-go-to-university-reportKirkup,
+J. 2015. It is a scandal that ethnic minority kids are more likely to go to university than poor
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+white ones, The Telegraph, 10 November,
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+http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/universityeducation/11986204/It-is-a-scandal-thatethnic-minority-kids-are-more-likely-to-go-to-university-than-white-ones.htmlLadson-Billings,
+G. 1998. Just what is critical race theory and what’s it doing in a nice field like
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+Ladson-Billings, G. & Tate, W.F. 1995. Toward a critical race theory of education, Teachers College
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+Larson, J., Mattu, S., Kirchner, L. & Angwin, J. 2016. How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism
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+Algorithm, ProPublica: Journalism in the Public Interest,
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+https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm
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+
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+
+Naughton, J. 2016. Even algorithms are biased against black men, The Guardian, 26 June,
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+https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/26/algorithms-racial-bias-offendersfloridaNeave,
+G. 1998. The evaluative state reconsidered. European Journal of Education, 33, no. 3: 265–
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+26
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+
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+
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+
+UCL Institute of Education. no date. Welcome to Next Steps (LSYPE)
+
+http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/page.aspx?&sitesectionid=1246&sitesectiontitle=Welcome+to+Next
+
++Steps+(LSYPE)
+
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+
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+
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+
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+
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+
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+
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+C. 2012. The Big Data Opportunity: Making Government Faster, Smarter and More Personal.
+
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+
+Ziliak, S.T., and D.N. McCloskey. 2008. The cult of statistical significance: How the standard error
+
+costs us jobs, justice, and lives. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
+
+Zuberi, T. & Bonilla-Silva, E. 2008. Telling the real tale of the hunt: toward a race conscious
+
+sociology of racial stratification, in T. Zuberi & E. Bonilla-Silva. Eds. 2008. White Logic,
+
+White Methods: Racism and Methodology. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.
+
+Notes
+
+ 1 Neo-liberalism refers to the dominant policy lens in contemporary states such as the US and UK. The
+approach emphasizes an individualized view of the world and assumes that the free market offers the
+most efficient and fairest means of meeting societal needs (Lauder, Brown, Dillabough, & Halsey
+2006). Neoliberalism typically assumes that success reflects individual merit and hard work, and that
+private provision is inherently superior to public. Neoliberalism often works through colour-blind
+language that dismisses race-conscious criticism as irrelevant, meaningless and/or inflammatory (see
+Gillborn 2014).
+
+2 Data here is taken from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE1). These
+students entered university in 2008/09 and 2009/10. For further details on the LSYPE see UCL
+Institute of Education (no date).
+
+3 These are the ethnic group categories used in the UK census and, consequently, in most academic
+research in the UK; the combination of race/colour and national identifiers is far from satisfactory and
+can be misleading. For example, the majority of children in each of these groups were born in the UK
+and enjoy full UK citizenship (see Office for National Statistics 2012).
+27
+
+ 4 This is based on the ‘odds ratio’ (also known as ‘cross-product ratio’) calculated by comparing the
+odds of success for White students compared with the odds of success for Black students (see
+Connolly 2007, 107-8).
+
+5 On 9 August 2016 a google search for the phrase ‘big data’ returned ‘about 296,000,000 results’. A
+similar search performed three years earlier returned 158,000,000 results.
+
+6 Verbatim transcription from the podcast ‘Start the Week’, BBC Radio 4 (2013).
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+economic controversies
+
+Innovative and thought-provoking, the Economic Controversies
+series strips back the often impenetrable facade of economic
+jargon to present bold new ways of looking at pressing issues,
+while explaining the hidden mechanics behind them. Concise
+and accessible, the books bring a fresh, unorthodox approach to
+a variety of controversial subjects.
+
+Also available in the Economic Controversies series:
+
+Yanis Varoufakis, The Global Minotaur: America, Europe and the
+Future of the World Economy
+Robert R. Locke and J.-C. Spender, Confronting Managerialism:
+How the Business Elite and Their Schools Threw Our Lives
+Out of Balance
+Lorenzo Fioramonti, Gross Domestic Problem: The Politics Behind
+the World’s Most Powerful Number
+Heikki Patomäki, The Great Eurozone Disaster: From Crisis to
+Global New Deal
+Richard Javad Heydarian, How Capitalism Failed the Arab World:
+The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East
+Uprisings
+about the author
+
+Lorenzo Fioramonti (@globalreboot) is Associate Professor
+and Jean Monnet Chair in Regional Integration and Governance
+Studies at the University of Pretoria (South Africa), where he
+directs the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation. He
+is also Senior Fellow at the Centre for Social Investment of the
+University of Heidelberg and at the Hertie School of Governance,
+Germany, as well as Associate Fellow at the United Nations
+University. He is the author of several books about development
+policies, global and regional governance, alternative economies
+and social progress indicators, including Gross Domestic Problem:
+The Politics Behind the World’s Most Powerful Number (Zed
+Books, 2013). He blogs at www.globalreboot.org.
+How Numbers Rule the World
+
+The Use and Abuse of Statistics in Global Politics
+
+lorenzo fioramonti
+
+Zed Books
+london | new york
+How Numbers Rule the World: The Use and Abuse
+of Statistics in Global Politics was first published in 2014 by
+Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street, London n1 9jf, uk and
+Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, ny 10010, usa
+
+www.zedbooks.co.uk
+
+Copyright © Lorenzo Fioramonti 2014
+
+The right of Lorenzo Fioramonti to be identified as the
+author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance
+with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
+
+Designed and typeset in Monotype Bulmer
+by illuminati, Grosmont
+Index by John Barker
+Cover design: www.roguefour.co.uk
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
+reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any
+form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or
+otherwise, without the prior permission of Zed Books Ltd.
+
+A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
+Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data available
+
+isbn 978 1 78032 269 8
+Contents
+
+ acknowledgements vi
+
+introduction The politics of statistics 1
+
+chapter 1 The power of numbers 10
+
+chapter 2 New global rulers: the untameable
+power of credit rating 39
+
+chapter 3 Fiddling while the planet burns:
+the marketization of climate change 68
+
+chapter 4 Measuring the unmeasurable:
+the financialization of nature 104
+
+chapter 5 Numbers for good? The quest for
+aid effectiveness and social impact 144
+
+conclusion Rethinking numbers, rethinking
+governance 192
+
+ notes 214
+ bibliography 246
+ index 261
+Acknowledgements
+
+After the publication of Gross Domestic Problem: The Politics
+Behind the World’s Most Powerful Number I received a number of
+invitations to discuss the book throughout the world. I set out on
+a journey on which I encountered wonderful people: academics,
+journalists, radio hosts, activists and concerned citizens, who are
+committed to profound, sustainable and radical change. They
+asked questions, were keen to challenge conventional wisdom
+and were looking for new ideas to inform their work. So, my first
+thanks go to them, as they were a profound source of inspiration.
+With Georg Mildenberger and Ekkehard Thümler of the
+Centre for Social Investment at the University of Heidelberg,
+I have reflected a lot on the role of civil society and markets in
+governance, while Maxi Schoeman, Mzukisi Qobo and Camilla
+Adelle at the University of Pretoria accompanied me in the intellectual
+journey that has culminated in the establishment of the
+Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, where most of
+the topics you find in this book have finally found a research
+home. I would also like to thank various colleagues with whom I
+share concerns regarding issues that range from measurement of
+economic performance to sustainability and market dominance,
+acknowledgements vii
+
+in particular Saamah Abdallah and Tony Greenham at the New
+Economics Foundation; Lew Daly, who leads the sustainable progress
+initiative at Demos; Claudius Van Wyk of Transformation
+Strategies; Mark Swilling, director of the Sustainability Institute
+at Stellenbosch University; Patrick Bond of the Centre for Civil
+Society at the University of KwaZulu–Natal; and Sidney Luckett.
+Because of her commitment, friendship and intellectual guidance,
+I owe a lot to Susan George.
+Ken Barlow, my editor at Zed Books, convinced me to finish
+this book in record time, as he believed that it would be a perfect
+complement to Gross Domestic Problem. He patiently reviewed
+the manuscript, corrected a number of mistakes and helped me
+improve the readability of the text, despite the complexity of the
+theme. My wife Janine has been a constant companion and an
+attentive reader of the manuscript. No offence to my colleagues,
+but she is the best intellect I know.
+Finally I would like to thank my students, who have engaged
+me in fruitful and often challenging conversations, making me
+realize how important it is to teach with passion. They are full
+of ideas, but conventional teaching approaches tend to suppress
+their energy. I hope this book, like the previous ones, will further
+stimulate their free-thinking.
+Needless to say, any flaws you find in the volume are mine
+alone.
+To my children and to the world in which they will grow up
+introduction
+
+The politics of statistics
+
+We make constant use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose
+meaning we do not understand, [which] have in turn become
+the foundation of the civilization we have built up.
+F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 1945
+
+The most important things cannot be measured.
+W. E. Deming
+
+In the romantic slapstick comedy She’s Out of My League, the protagonist
+asks himself: ‘How can a 10 go for a 5?’ The plot revolves
+around a love story between an ordinary airport security guy
+named Kirk and Molly, a beautiful lawyer-turned-event planner.
+On a scale of attractiveness, she is a ‘hard’ 10 (gorgeous, smart
+and rich) and he is just a 5 (below average, skinny, working-class
+young man). Although Kirk is in love with Molly, and she is
+visibly interested in him, they act awkwardly as all odds appear
+stacked against them: a 10 can perhaps go with an 8 – as Kirk’s
+friends explain – and a 5 might manage to reach a 7, but there is
+no way it can possibly work out between a 5 and a 10. Mathematics
+is no opinion: the distance is just too wide. The numbers’
+rule is clear. All side characters (Kirk’s and Molly’s families,
+how numbers rule the world
+
+their best friends and their respective ex-partners) agree that the
+relationship is impossible and actively conspire against it by trying
+to convince the two young lovers to give up. In an admittedly
+predictable (yet funny) spiral of events, the two protagonists grow
+distant from and suspicious of one another. Their interaction
+is unnatural, apparently insignificant events are blown out of
+proportion and misunderstanding becomes pervasive. The two
+lovers get confused. They no longer know what they feel for each
+other. The relationship collapses and each of them is brought back
+to their respective worlds. The 10s and the 5s cannot possibly
+be a happy couple. Or so it seems. In the end, of course, Kirk
+and Molly get together and live happily ever after. Despite the
+negative odds, love triumphs. Both protagonists overcome the
+number syndrome and let their hearts prevail. What appeared
+to be mathematically impossible is defeated by the irrationality
+of love. Romantic comedies are notorious for predictable and
+rather cheesy endings.
+According to English statistician and biologist Ronald A.
+Fisher, statistics is ‘the peculiar aspect of human progress’,
+which has given ‘to the twentieth century, its special character’.1
+Whether or not we agree with this statement, we cannot dispute
+that numbers largely run our societies. They have become driving
+forces behind our social, economic and political decisions. Just as
+with Kirk and Molly, numbers influence our behaviour and that
+of the people around us. We measure and compare every day.
+We continually assess ourselves based on general (and generic)
+scales of beauty, intelligence, smartness and success. We quantify
+everything, from income to sexual performance, quality of life
+and happiness. Our life is surrounded by numbers. We are so
+accustomed to them that we do not realize their power anymore.
+Just take a look at the variety of specific thematic indexes
+and indicators produced by research organizations and private
+agencies in fields as varied as environmental policy, well-being
+the politics of statistics
+
+and governance. My own count, which is undoubtedly reductive,
+is that there are over 300 aggregated indexes available for the
+social sciences, which account for tens of thousands of individual
+indicators. Such a figure does not even include all the numbers
+produced by governmental statistical offices. Moreover, such selection
+is grossly incomplete as it only deals with some specific
+sectors of research, such as development and governance, which
+are those I have covered in my own academic experience. It
+does not even incorporate the arguably endless list of numbers
+produced by natural scientists, engineers, doctors, architects and
+other representatives of ‘hard’ disciplines.
+Every week, month or year, hundreds of think-tanks, nongovernmental
+organizations (NGOs) and research centres the
+world over produce numbers to assess the state of the economy,
+the quality of life in cities, the competitiveness of firms, the speed
+of development in low-income countries, the quality of education,
+the service delivery in welfare systems, the amount of corruption
+ravaging societies and the performance of an endless range of
+institutions, just to name very few. They even measure apparently
+trivial economic aspects, such as the comparative cost of a Big
+Mac around the world, or the ease with which wealth can cross
+borders, the number of days it takes a firm to get a licence to
+operate in a given country, all possible country risks (from war
+to terrorism to economic instability), the ratings of banks, corporations
+and sovereign debt, tourism competitiveness, computer
+literacy, education attainment, global hunger, food insecurity and
+so on and so forth.
+These numbers are used to assess development strategies,
+measure performance, inform policy-making and guide reforms.
+In a word, they drive global and national governance.2
+ For instance,
+performance indexes have become key criteria to allocate
+foreign aid or investment, which gives them an enormous power
+to affect a country’s economy. Credit ratings published by private
+how numbers rule the world
+
+agencies are perhaps the most visible example of the political and
+economic power of these numbers. Equally, the financial assessments
+published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can
+unilaterally coerce entire nations into obedience. In many sectors,
+the proliferation of numbers has blurred the distinction between
+public and private authority, in so far as the procedures established
+by governments are complemented by (and often enforced
+through) numerical benchmarks, ratings and rankings produced
+by companies, agencies, consultants, auditors and NGOs. To
+capture the impact of numbers in political and economic affairs,
+along with the integration of public and private forms of authority,
+various analysts have introduced terms such as ‘meta-governance’
+and ‘transnational private governance’.3
+The range of application of statistical measurement is nowadays
+unlimited. There is no field in which numbers have not been
+able to exert dominance. Even sports are largely dependent on
+numerical examination, as experts fill up television shows with
+measurements of players’ performance and strategic models. Take
+baseball, which is the best-known example of a sport whose
+tradition has been deeply intertwined with numbers. In his 1868
+book The Game of Base Ball: How to Learn It, How to Play
+It, and How to Teach It, the father of modern baseball, Henry
+Chadwick, systematically applied statistical reasoning to the rules
+of what was soon to become the most popular sport in America.
+A former cricket reporter, Chadwick had a passion for statistics
+and produced the first baseball dataset in history. He listed all
+games played, including specific details such as the number and
+frequency of outs, runs, home runs, and strikeouts for hitters of
+prominent clubs. For him, certain statistics reflected real virtues,
+while others did not. He deprecated home run hitters (and the
+whole home run category) as overly ‘showy’ and lobbied hard
+to stop the practice of counting bases reached on field errors
+towards batters’ averages, since these clearly did not demonstrate
+the politics of statistics
+
+batting skill. He wanted to use statistics to revolutionize the
+game ‘from the almost simple field exercise it was some twenty
+years ago up to the manly, scientific game of ball it is now’.4 The
+power of numbers in baseball provided the narrative thread to
+the 2003 bestseller Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair
+Game, which was then turned into a Hollywood film starring
+Brad Pitt. The focus of the book is on the strategy adopted
+by the Oakland Athletics (popularly known as the As), which
+used analytical, evidence-based, in-game statistical analysis (the
+so-called sabermetric, after the Society for American Baseball
+Research) to assemble a competitive team in spite of a limited
+budget. The central premiss of ‘moneyball’ is that traditional
+knowledge in the baseball community systematically misses out
+on important underlying factors, which make a critical difference
+between winning and losing a game. Factors such as stolen bases,
+runs batted in, and batting average, which have been typically
+used to gauge players and establish their salaries, are antiquated
+forms of valuing success for a team. By contrast, rigorous statistical
+analysis shows that other factors, such as on-base and slugging
+percentage, are better indicators of success, albeit not very
+spectacular for viewers. As such observations often flew in the
+face of traditional baseball knowledge, the As were able to recruit
+players that performed well according to these ‘new’ indicators
+for a relatively modest amount of money, as the baseball market
+was systematically undervaluing them. According to Harvard
+philosopher Michael Sandel, who discusses the A’s systematic use
+of modern statistical models in his book What Money Can’t Buy,
+the team ‘brought to baseball what the new breed of quantitative
+traders brought to Wall Street – an ability to use computer-driven
+analysis to gain an edge over old-timers who relied on gut instinct
+and personal experience’.5
+ Sandel analyses the case of the As to
+show the profound connection between statistical reasoning and
+markets, particularly in so far as quantitative methods can be
+how numbers rule the world
+
+used to produce more efficient pricing mechanisms and gain a
+competitive advantage against rivals. The As strategy succeeded
+for a time, as the team won the western division of the American
+League in 2002. But then moneyball became a victim of its own
+success when other teams jumped on the bandwagon and hired
+the most brilliant statisticians to help them outbid less wealthy
+competitors. Nowadays, the richest teams, from the Red Sox to
+the New York Yankees, make systematic use of computer-based
+statistical models to draw strategies and assess the value of players.
+The game itself has changed, as the power of numbers has taken
+over more instinctual components. Passion has somehow subsided
+to rigour. Paradoxically, ‘money came to matter more, not less,
+in determining the winning percentage of major league teams’.6
+ If
+there is one lesson that we can learn from baseball it is that the
+proliferation of numbers in virtually all sectors of our social and
+political life has directly or indirectly resulted in the unstoppable
+expansion of markets, despite the credibility blow dealt to them
+by the global economic crisis. This, in turn, has undermined the
+public sphere as an arena of participation and deliberation, in
+which ideas are discussed, debated and promoted.
+This is what this book is all about. The next chapters will
+show how numbers have been used and abused in governance
+processes to entrench the power of markets and undermine
+public debate. By referring to research in the history of science,
+we will discuss in Chapter 1 how certain statistics came to be
+incorporated into policy-making processes. Indeed, the bureaucratization
+of statistics is a defining character of modern states,
+in particular since the late 1800s, which saw the growth of public
+infrastructure works and the measurement of costs, tolls and
+taxes that this involved. After this general overview of the power
+of numbers, we will delve into the first empirical case: that of
+credit-rating agencies and their influence on global governance.
+Chapter 2 analyses the history of rating and the conflicts of
+the politics of statistics
+
+interest characterizing the role of rating agencies in the evolution
+of public financial governance. By providing a thorough account
+of how credit rating came to be hardwired into national and
+international policies, the chapter shows that the incorporation
+of ratings into virtually every country’s public governance has
+resulted in strengthening certain segments within the financial
+markets at the expense of democratic accountability. Chapter 3
+then engages with the thorny issue of climate change mitigation,
+another fundamental area of global governance. In this field, the
+politics of statistics has triggered clashes between climate scientists
+and the so-called ‘sceptics’, in which each camp has used
+a set of numbers to prove different (when not opposite) truths.
+Various degrees of manipulation occurred in both camps and,
+ultimately, cost–benefit analyses were adopted to choose the best
+policies to mitigate the environmental consequences of industrial
+growth. These types of analyses, which rely on the monetization
+of costs and benefits through a set of critical assumptions
+and econometric models, have supported the establishment of
+carbon markets, offset schemes and emission trading. Chapter 4
+delves into the delicate nexus between the politics of statistics and
+environmental governance by analysing new methodologies for
+the valuation of natural capital and ecosystem services. Although
+designed to ‘correct’ GDP by incorporating the costs of environmental
+degradation, some of these methods have encouraged
+the proliferation of financial markets for the natural world, with
+potentially dangerous consequences for the world’s ecosystems.
+Finally, Chapter 5 looks at how certain types of measurements
+have affected the development aid sector and the global fight
+against poverty by reinforcing the appeal of tools borrowed from
+the business sector. Such a business-like approach to development
+has not only been confined to the way in which aid agencies
+nowadays measure impact and effectiveness in the so-called
+developing countries, but has also influenced how social change
+how numbers rule the world
+
+is promoted in industrialized nations, with perilous impacts on
+the role of civil society, the nonprofit and the modus operandi of
+philanthropic foundations.
+This book does not dispute the importance of statistics for
+the improvement of society. Without statistics, policies would be
+simply dominated by impressionistic considerations and rhetorical
+arguments. Measuring is a fundamental component of human
+life. Our education, health care and housing – to name just a few
+fundamental areas of development – depend on measurements. At
+the same time, however, we should not credulously accept that
+numbers always reveal facts. In the social field, the incorporation
+of statistics is invariably driven by critical assumptions, which
+should be taken into account when taking decisions that affect
+society as a whole. More often than not, these assumptions are
+driven by a narrow econometric approach at the expense of more
+holistic considerations. We can measure the amount of time a
+couple spend together, the issues they talk about, the times they
+go out, how much they earn, how often they have sex and so on
+and so forth. Yet, the sum of all of these does not equate love,
+as Kirk and Molly have learned the hard way. Standardized tests
+may be useful in some schools, but they should not be seen as
+measures of education. Most performance assessments may help
+us identify gaps, but they hide more than they reveal. This is
+why a healthy society should be able to distinguish between
+policy areas in which measurement is useful, and policy areas in
+which it is not. There are limits to what we can measure. If we
+stretch our numerical reasoning too far, we end up oversimplifying
+reality. When this happens, our measurement tools become
+more important than what they measure. We end up wanting what
+we can measure, rather than measuring what we want. Pupils end
+up studying only what is relevant for the tests, couples focus on
+the quantity rather than on the quality of affection, and workers
+of all kinds become enslaved by productivity parameters imposed
+the politics of statistics
+
+on them. In other areas, such as that of ecological governance,
+the natural world is monetized by auditors of all sorts who claim
+to do so with a view to protecting the environment. Ultimately,
+obsessive measurement can lead to the commodification of social
+relations and the natural world. In part, this is why markets have
+become so powerful in the era of measurement. Markets, as the
+locus of economic transactions, are more malleable to measurement.
+Their concepts, principles and functionings are extremely
+appropriate to economic and statistical categorization.
+This book is about how numbers have been used to strengthen
+technocracy in some of the most critical fields of contemporary
+governance. It is about numbers reinforcing the grip of markets
+on our social and political life. In a word, it is about how numbers
+have curtailed public participation and rational debate, thus impoverishing
+our already battered and weak democracy.
+chapter 1
+
+The power of numbers
+
+Numbers saturate the news, politics, and life. For good or ill,
+they are today’s preeminent public language – and those who
+speak it rule.
+M. Blastland and A. Dilnot, The Numbers Game, 2009
+
+Counting promotes the counter and demotes the counted.
+Robert Chambers, Whose Reality Counts?
+
+The Greek philosopher and mathematician Pythagoras of Samos
+was a deep believer in the power of numbers. Not only did he
+dedicate his entire life to the study of mathematics (still nowadays
+his theorem is a fundamental component of trigonometry), but he
+also developed an entire philosophy and religious system based
+on numbers. The cult of Pythagoreanism became quite popular in
+Magna Graecia (currently southern Italy), where the philosopher
+had established a ‘Pythagorean brotherhood’ in the city of Croton.
+The brotherhood took an active role in politics, proposing a
+number of reforms and promoting a culture of equality, including
+extremely progressive views on women and their role in society.
+Pythagoras saw for himself the role of philosopher–ruler, a concept
+that would later influence Plato’s political thought, especially his
+the power of numbers
+
+masterpiece The Republic, in which he developed the idea of ‘a
+tightly organized community of like-minded thinkers’, who should
+‘provide guidance (even governance) for the polity in which they
+lived’.1
+ According to the British philosopher Bertrand Russell,
+Pythagoras’ view of numbers as the driving force behind nature
+deeply influenced Plato’s philosophy and, as a consequence, most
+Western philosophical thought.2
+ Pythagoras also inspired one of
+Plato’s central ideas, ‘that mathematics, and abstract thinking
+generally, including logic, can provide a secure basis, not only for
+philosophy in the modern sense, but also for substantial theses in
+sciences and in morals’.3
+ Both Pythagoras and Plato were harshly
+criticized by Aristotle, who by contrast highlighted the crucial
+difference between form and matter and pointed out ‘the equally
+important error of thinking that [numbers] can by themselves
+establish conclusions of substance about the physical world’.4
+Although details about Pythagoras’ life are scarce, we know
+that his use of numbers for political purposes was mainly based
+on persuasion. His models aimed at crafting and running the
+perfect society, in which conflicts and diversity of opinions were
+considered detrimental to stability and order. His political experience
+lasted about twenty years, a rather long period given the
+volatility of the political system at that time, but ended with a
+revolution. All the places sacred to his brotherhood were destroyed
+and most of his fellows got killed. Pythagoras himself
+had to flee Croton and died in exile. His legacy, however, exerted
+a lasting effect on a number of esoteric traditions, including the
+Freemasonry and Rosicrucianism, two secret societies established
+in the Middle Ages.
+The Latin root of the word validity (validitas) is strength
+and force. The validity of a person as well as an argument is the
+capacity to command obedience. In a word, validity is power.
+But validity is also a fundamental concept in statistics, where
+it indicates the extent to which a measurement corresponds
+how numbers rule the world
+
+accurately to what it intends to measure. In social research, validity
+is defined in various ways (e.g. face validity, criterion validity,
+construct validity, etc.), which point to the need for measures to
+be as closely as possible aligned with the underlying phenomenon
+they wish to describe in order to produce any meaningful inference
+about real life. The key underlying assumption here is that
+statistics can have a significant impact on the way in which we
+experience the world and learn from it. In turn, this affects our
+decisions and how we govern ourselves as a collectivity. Validity
+is, then, essential for numbers to be truthful. At the same time,
+however, validity is about the power of persuasion, just as it was
+during Pythagoras’ time.
+Public statistics have been fundamental in ordering societies and
+supporting power structures. The first ever attempt at measuring a
+country’s wealth (the forerunner of contemporary gross domestic
+product) was conducted in 1652 by the economist William Petty,
+as part of a land redistribution programme promised by Oliver
+Cromwell to his troops in Ireland. The survey was designed to
+serve the interests of the British government, whose main goal
+was to put its Irish problem to rest by expropriating the country’s
+populace (especially its Catholic component) of productive land
+and turning it into a source of income for a permanent military occupation.
+Some historians have demonstrated the extent to which
+this statistical undertaking helped eradicate Ireland’s indigenous
+culture,5
+ while others have described it as a ‘gigantic experiment
+in primitive accumulation’.6
+ Petty’s work was also instrumental
+in equipping government with new information to raise taxes
+and limit the amount of wealth owned by private individuals, a
+useful piece of intelligence to restrain local autonomy and avoid
+concentration of capital in the hands of potential opponents. The
+father of modern chemistry, Antoine Lavoisier, who attempted to
+draw up the first system of national accounts in France in the late
+1700s, was an administrator of the powerful Ferme Generale, an
+the power of numbers
+
+outsourced customs and excise operation that collected duties on
+behalf of the king and reinforced the tax collection mechanisms
+of the Ancien Régime.
+7
+ After the French Revolution, Napoleon
+Bonaparte wanted statistical offices to provide specific information
+on citizens with a view to making military conscription more
+effective, while strengthening the state’s capacity to collect taxes
+and requisitions, as well as design better ways to manage the
+economy in wartime. During the Second World War, the national
+income accounts produced by the US Department of Commerce
+were systematically used to assess the feasibility of President
+Roosevelt’s Victory Program and to coordinate the American
+involvement in the conflict.
+In contemporary governance, international rankings have
+become crucial for the credibility of states in a globalized world.
+Research has shown that competitiveness indexes, such as
+those produced by the World Economic Forum, have reinforced
+neoliberal practices that increasingly change the role of governments
+from promoters of public interest to supporters of market
+expansion.8 This trend has been reinforced by the integration
+of credit ratings into public policies and international treaties.9
+Various types of good governance indicators, including those
+focusing on state effectiveness, corruption and market openness,
+are important to define global hierarchies among states as well as
+international ‘blacklists’ of pariahs, while measures of economic
+performance (mainly through the calculation of GDP) are the
+leading parameters to design global governance institutions, from
+the G8–G20 to the composition of the Organisation for Economic
+Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the distribution of
+power at the World Bank and the IMF.10
+French novelist Honoré de Balzac once argued that society
+is organized according to the instructions of statisticians, who
+hold significant sway in the rooms of power. Through numbers,
+‘Society isolates everyone, the better to dominate them, divides
+how numbers rule the world
+
+everything to weaken it. It reigns over the units, over numerical
+figures piled up like grains of wheat in a heap.’11 Whether numbers
+are used to strengthen institutions or to promote reforms, their
+capacity to influence politics is probably unparalleled by any other
+social construct. Take the question of measuring a population, for
+example. In principle, counting people should not be particularly
+problematic. In fact, there are important political issues involved,
+as demographics can affect the outcome of elections and lead
+to a change in the distribution of resources. In the USA, for
+instance, various attempts have been made at correcting for the
+under-representation of homeless people or citizens with double
+residence.12 Yet, as each correction has an impact on specific
+jurisdictions, racial or ethnic categories and the distribution of
+federal revenues, heated contestations have historically marred
+the issue. As James Madison had already written in ‘Federalist
+No. 54’,
+
+it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias
+as possible, to swell or reduce the amount of their numbers.
+Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this
+rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants.
+Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a
+contrary temptation would prevail.13
+
+Numbers and politics
+
+The relationship between statistics and politics (and political interests)
+has a long history. The forerunner of statistics was called
+‘political arithmetic’, a discipline that emerged in England and
+France in the 1600s, which focused primarily on measuring demographic
+trends and life expectancy for urban planning purposes.
+Over time these calculations were systematically integrated into
+public decision-making, thus becoming one of the key components
+of state policy. The etymology of the word ‘statistics’ stems from
+the power of numbers
+
+such an inherent relationship between numbers and government:
+statistics became the science of using numbers to strengthen the
+state. And ‘statists’ were those conducting such numeric studies.14
+The first statists believed that by quantifying phenomena their
+models could help identify underlying patterns and thus tackle
+some of the most critical social problems their societies were
+facing. Behind the very philosophy of statistics, there was a sense
+that social reality was based on some social order, which numbers
+could reveal with powerful accuracy. Karl Pearson, the founder
+of modern mathematical statistics, fully embodied the ‘positivist
+mania for quantification with vast social ambitions’.15 For Pearson,
+the world was not made up of real objects, but of perceptions.
+Nature itself did not possess a definite form. Hence, the goal of
+science was to put nature in order through a clear method. In
+his magnum opus, The Grammar of Science, Pearson maintained
+that ‘The field of science is unlimited; its material is endless,
+every group of natural phenomena, every stage of past or present
+development is material for science. The unity of all science
+consists alone in its method, not in its material.’16
+Undeniably, Pearson’s philosophy had more to do with managing
+the world than understanding it. As remarked by historian
+Theodore Porter, author of the book Trust in Numbers, quantification
+is ‘a social technology’. Unlike modern mathematics, which
+has its roots in ancient geometry, emphasizes theoretical demonstration
+‘and was largely separate from the domain of number’,
+arithmetic and algebra, which are the cornerstones of statistics,
+‘were born as practical arts’.17 In modern societies, the process
+of quantification plays a central role in experimental practices.
+One of its main goals is ‘to serve as a bridge between the material
+culture of the laboratory and the predictions derived from formal
+theory’. Although most of us believe that this theory-testing role
+is the decisive task of data quantification processes, this is often
+not true in practice: ‘Researchers on topics that lack mathematical
+how numbers rule the world
+
+theory are often equally assiduous in reporting methods as well as
+results in quantitative form, and filtering out findings that cannot
+be so expressed.’
+18
+
+The application of this type of reasoning, permeated by the
+aspiration to order and signify social life, inevitably blurs the
+alleged distance between the subject and the object of investigation.
+In the real world, the way in which we measure things has
+an unavoidable impact on the things themselves. ‘Social statistics
+describe society; but they are also products of our social arrangements’,
+argues Joel Best, professor of sociology at the University
+of Delaware and author of Damned Lies and Statistics:
+
+The people who bring social statistics to our attention have
+reasons for doing so; they inevitably want something, just as
+reporters and the other media figures who repeat and publicize
+statistics have their own goals. Statistics are tools, used for
+particular purposes. Thinking critically about statistics requires
+understanding their place in society.19
+
+Michael Blastland and Andrew Dilnot, former hosts of the BBC
+radio show More or Less, compare the way in which statistics are
+used in the social field to the Indian fable The Blind Men and
+the Elephant:
+
+It was six men of Indostan
+To learning much inclined,
+Who went to see the Elephant
+(Though all of them were blind),
+That each by observation
+Might satisfy his mind.20
+
+As we know, although the men were really inclined to learn
+from observation (rather than theory), they could only touch one
+part of the elephant at a time. So, for the man who touches the
+side of the animal, the elephant is just a wall. For the one who
+touches the trunk, it is a snake. For he who touches the legs, it
+the power of numbers
+
+must be a tree, or a rope for he who touches the tail. And they
+‘disputed loud and long, / … Though each was partly in the
+right, / And all were in the wrong!’ Statistics are, by definition,
+static: ‘Things have to keep static if you’re going to count them’,
+argues David Boyle, fellow at the New Economics Foundation
+and author of The Tyranny of Numbers: ‘But real life isn’t still.’21
+According to the sociologist Paul Starr, winner of the Pulitzer
+Prize and co-editor of a volume on US demographics titled The
+Politics of Numbers, numbers are like photographs: they ‘seem
+to arrest the flow of human activity and fix it for more detached
+inspection’.22 While mere words resemble paintings, as they carry
+the need to be interpreted, numbers purport to represent reality
+as it is. In fact, though, ‘statistics not only lend themselves to
+many interpretations; they contain them. And because statistics
+do not simply reproduce reality, statistical systems represent an
+independent factor in social life.’
+As Blastland and Dilnot note, the problem is not just one of
+confusion and misunderstanding. As statistics are applied to
+policymaking, they generate all sorts of consequences, most of
+which we do not control: ‘There is also a tendency for the parts
+we do not measure to do odd things when our backs are turned:
+while measuring the legs, the trunk starts to misbehave.’23 In
+health care, for instance, performance assessments (and therefore
+the distribution of public funds) are generally associated with
+a limited set of indicators: for example, the number of patients
+surviving an operation versus the number of those dying while
+in hospital care. In the USA (and also increasingly in European
+countries), this has generated perverse incentives for doctors,
+who are less inclined to take on hard cases and prefer dismissing
+patients (or not booking them in altogether) when risks of
+failure are too high. Similarly, in the UK, where public hospitals
+have been assessed on waiting times, public investigations have
+identified a number of tricks, manipulations and other perverse
+how numbers rule the world
+
+consequences that managers come up with, such as avoiding
+follow-up visits. According to a 2003 parliamentary investigation
+into one ‘suspicious’ hospital, the avoidance of follow-up visits
+led to at least twenty-five patients going blind for lack of due
+post-operation care.24
+This politics of targets based on standardized assessments
+has conquered most areas of public management, invading territories
+where subjectivity and freedom were considered of utmost
+importance. Nowadays, for instance, education is fundamentally
+trapped within specific parameters of attainment. Schools are
+rated on the basis of standardized tests and are encouraged
+to compete with one another for public funding or to attract
+wealthy students (and their families’ donations). The No Child
+Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 was introduced in the USA
+by a large bipartisan coalition, arguably animated by a genuine
+interest to improve the way American public schools serve poor
+children. The NCLB promotes accountability and performance
+by making federal funds contingent on the acceptance of a system
+of tests and sanctions, thus altering the operational philosophy of
+schools around the country. According to critics, who include a
+vast coalition of teaching professionals, civil society groups and
+NGOs, the law is undermining public schools and the ability of
+the public education system to serve poor and minority children.
+In the volume Many Children Left Behind, a range of academics,
+activists and teachers maintain that ‘NCLB punishes rather than
+helps poor/minority kids (and their schools)’ and sustains an
+agenda of privatization of public education, while the ‘focus on
+testing and test preparation dumbs down classrooms’.25 A survey
+conducted by Teachers Network in 2007 showed that for the
+majority of teachers the emphasis of NCLB on high-stakes testing
+did not work. Only 37 per cent of respondents found standardized
+tests ‘somewhat useful’, while 42 per cent deemed them ‘not at
+all’ helpful to their teaching. Moreover, over 40 per cent claimed
+the power of numbers
+
+that these tests were encouraging them to use rote drill, and 44
+per cent reported that standardized tests were pushing them
+to eliminate curriculum material not tested.26 According to the
+National Center for Fair and Open Testing, standardized tests
+‘reward quick answers to superficial questions’, ‘do not measure
+the ability to think deeply or creatively in any field’ and ‘their
+use encourages a narrowed curriculum, outdated methods of
+instruction, and harmful practices such as grade retention and
+tracking’.27 In late 2012, the Obama administration promised to
+revise and improve the policy, while granting waivers to more
+than thirty states.
+Boyle notes that ‘because it is so hard to measure what is
+really important, governments and institutions try to pin down
+something else. They have to. But the consequences of pinning
+down the wrong thing can be severe.’ He mentions the case of
+school league tables in the UK, which have been introduced to
+instil competition among schools through the almighty power of
+standardized testing: ‘The trouble was that schools concentrated
+on the test results to improve their position on the tables. That
+meant excluding pupils who may drag down the results, concentrating
+on the D grade pupils – the only ones who could make a
+difference in exam result league tables – to the detriment of the
+others.’ And he concludes: ‘If you choose the wrong measure, you
+sometimes get the opposite of what you wanted.’28
+
+Trust in numbers
+
+It requires a degree of coercion to establish valid measures in
+public life. For instance, enforcing common standards in the construction
+sector requires both compliance on the side of private
+firms and a disciplined labour force. At the same time, numbers
+are also potent ammunition for persuasion. Drawing on French
+philosopher Michel Foucault’s analysis of the indirect means
+how numbers rule the world
+
+through which government exercises power, one may argue that
+the construction of ‘objective’ measures for evaluation allows not
+only for ‘the possibility of being subject to regulation or control
+by someone else’ but also for shaping ‘one’s own identity … by
+self-knowledge and self-regulation’.29 In a nutshell, the rule by
+numbers is more complicated than simple top-down coercion: it
+involves a significant degree of complacency and fundamentally
+shapes the way in which subjects behave. In short, it is a system
+of voluntary acquiescence. It thus becomes a key aspect of what
+Foucault identifies as governmental rationality, or ‘governmentality’
+– that is, a technology to ‘conduct the conduct’ and affect behaviour
+‘from a distance’; in short, ‘the right manner of disposing
+things’ according to ‘specific finalities’ and ‘multiform tactics’.30
+Numbers are also fundamental in defining the modus operandi
+of modern bureaucratic systems of governance. New modes
+of knowledge have indeed been critical to the definition of an
+institutional body of decision-makers whose choices must be
+guided by parameters other than political discretion.31 According
+to the forefather of modern bureaucracy studies, Max Weber,
+the essence of a bureaucracy is the power of technology, which
+leads to the marginalization of all irrational and emotional elements
+generally associated with political conflict – that is, human
+factors which escape the precision of calculation. The Weberian
+approach emphasizes ‘the ways in which the ordering of public
+administration enabled distance, rationality, objectivity and authority
+– and a calculative machinery’.32 As remarked by historian
+Theodore Porter, who has been studying the historical evolution
+of our society’s trust in numbers, the process of quantification is
+inherently linked with the growth of bureaucratic administration.
+For legal and political reasons, administrative discretion was
+regarded suspiciously, ‘so the regulators had little alternative
+but to search relentlessly for facts and to reduce them, if at all
+possible, to a few decisive numbers’.33 Especially in pluralist
+the power of numbers
+
+democracies such as the USA, where interest groups competed
+for visibility and access to policymaking, the proliferation of
+statistics-based decision-making was instrumental to align the
+interests of government, business and society at large: ‘Where
+values clash and consensus is elusive, numbers and the techniques
+that manipulate them are esteemed for their ostensible neutrality.
+With statistics, hotly debated issues can seemingly be turned into
+problems to be solved.’34
+In the 1930s, amid the Great Depression, American statisticians
+and economists saw their role in public policymaking grow
+exponentially. A series of environmental disasters, in particular
+the exceptional Mississippi River floods of 1927, created excellent
+conditions for a massive use of statistics-based risk assessments
+for infrastructure projects, coupled with the first tentative studies
+to evaluate the costs and benefits of prevention policies. As the
+economic downturn kept on shrinking public budgets, new tools
+were introduced to guide the allocation of ‘limited’ resources and
+avoid political controversy. In 1936, the Flood Control Act for the
+first time introduced a cost–benefit analysis in public policy by
+stating that no flood-control programme would receive federal
+funding unless it was proved that its benefits would exceed its
+costs. Initially, cost–benefit methods were designed to encourage
+openness and neutrality in highly contested sectors, such
+as the prevention of environmental disasters and its correlation
+with public infrastructure projects and industrialization. And, of
+course, the credibility of numbers was couched in the rhetoric of
+professionalism, scientific neutrality and transparency. According
+to the senators who inserted the cost–benefit provision into the
+1936 Flood Control Act, the experts in charge of the econometric
+analyses of these projects are ‘honorable, straightforward, patriotic
+men’ as the new system of evaluation requires ‘an independent,
+nonpolitical, unprejudiced decision as to priorities’.35 Because of
+their expertise and reputation, the offices tasked with crunching
+how numbers rule the world
+
+numbers began to enjoy a growing influence, which in turn was
+used to develop cosy relations with powerful private interests
+and corporations. According to Harold Ickes, secretary of the
+interior under Roosevelt, the bureaucrats in charge of the quantification
+process were ‘the most powerful and ambitious lobby
+in Washington’, strongly connected with military divisions and
+‘the perfect flower of bureaucracy’.36
+During the 1960s and 1970s, the various models applied to
+measure costs and benefits and assess the effectiveness of public
+infrastructure projects were transformed ‘from a collection of
+local bureaucratic practices into a set of rationalized economic
+principles’. In the American political context of ‘systematic
+distrust’ for government, the champions of statistical analyses
+introduced these tools in all sorts of fields, from the assessment
+of social welfare projects to the running of prisons, claiming
+‘almost universal validity’ for econometric evaluations of public
+policies.37 In particular, cost–benefit analyses and experimental
+testing procedures began to be implemented by a variety of subsidiary
+agencies and private firms, which sold their expertise to
+government departments or to companies tendering for public
+projects. As Porter underlines, during this phase there was a
+clear alignment ‘between the interests of science and those of the
+state and large industries’. The Bureau of Standards, for instance,
+regularly encouraged a strict collaboration between government
+and the relevant industrial sectors, despite the notorious and
+unsuccessful appeal made by US president Ulysses Grant to
+Congress in 1877, in which he pleaded that private-sector testing
+and evaluations be separate from those required by the state:
+‘These experiments cannot be properly conducted by private
+firms, not only on account of the expense, but because the results
+must rest upon the authority of disinterested persons.’38
+During the 1990s, new practices of quantified evaluation
+emerged as part of the ‘audit explosion’. In addition to the
+the power of numbers
+
+regulation of private company accounting by financial audit,
+‘practices of environmental audit, value for money audit, management
+audit, forensic audit, data audit, intellectual property audit,
+medical audit, teaching audit, and technology audit emerged and,
+to varying degrees, acquired a degree of institutional stability
+and acceptance.’39 According to Michael Power, author of The
+Audit Society, the practice of accounting further strengthened
+the focus on numbers and contributed to the ‘myth structure
+of rationalized societies’: ‘The audit explosion has its roots in
+a programmatic restructuring of organizational life and a new
+‘rationality of governance’.40
+Such a restructuring has afforded unprecedented influence
+to so-called experts – that is, individuals and organizations who
+produce data. In the words of German psychologist Gert Gigerenzer
+and his colleagues, authors of The Empire of Chance: How
+Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life, the authority of
+experts has been enormously enhanced by the incorporation of
+statistical and econometric calculations in public policymaking:
+‘Indeed, the explosion of numbers has created a new kind of
+expert, one whose claims rest more on information and formal
+techniques than on concrete experience and personal judgement.
+Not since Pythagoras has the prestige of numbers been so great,
+and this has been both a boon and a temptation to the new-style
+experts.’41 The standardization procedures animating the work
+of these ‘new’ experts ‘parallel the impartiality and rules of the
+modern bureaucrat’, who seeks to exclude ‘personal discretion
+and emphasize the consistent and even mechanical application
+of established procedures across the board to avoid bias, the one
+aiming at truth to fact, and the other at fairness’.42
+Most audit reports, however, do not communicate valuable
+information. They are not evidence-based, self-explanatory documentations
+for external users. By and large, such reports are selfcontained,
+non-transparent records that fundamentally rely on a
+how numbers rule the world
+
+language of ‘neutrality, objectivity, dispassion, expertise’.43 What
+this means in practice is that full disclosure, transparency and
+accountability to the public at large are restrained via the expert
+certification. The audit process thus becomes a short cut, which
+is founded on our society’s ingrained trust in experts, rather
+than a basis for a rational public deliberation: ‘It is a dead end in
+the chain of accountability.’44 In short, more numbers and more
+accounting do not necessarily equate with better accountability.
+To the contrary, they can reduce ‘public curiosity and inquiry’,
+which are compelled by the fact that the end users of professional
+audits are not the public at large, but ‘a mythical reference point
+within experts’ discourses’.45 This is one of the many paradoxes
+of counting. Although the audit explosion has occurred in the
+name of accountability, ‘giving an account is seen to be a way
+of avoiding an account’, in so far as numbers stifle political and
+social discussion by purporting to provide incontestable facts.46
+Paradoxically, ‘the audit society threatens to become an increasingly
+closed society, albeit one whose declared programmatic
+foundation is openness and accountability.’47
+Experts who use numbers become the guardians of this social
+trust. The power of numbers and their guardians fundamentally
+upsets the principal–agent relationship underpinning social and
+political relations. Citizens, elected representatives and other
+stakeholders (the principals) are held hostage by experts (the
+agents). And the profound institutionalization of governance
+mechanisms based on numbers further reinforces itself, as
+‘we foster all kinds of ancillary certifications or guarantees of
+trustworthiness … that are readily manipulated yet are now essential
+to principals who have abdicated their distrust to these
+new guardians.’48 And we all trust people with numbers – even
+when we recognize how easy it is to fudge data for all sorts of
+purposes. In the field of academic research, hundreds of cases
+of manipulation are spotted every year, including in some of the
+the power of numbers
+
+world’s leading universities. Most of them, of course, do not make
+headlines around the world. But some do. In 1986, for instance,
+the Nobel prizewinner biologist David Baltimore caused a global
+stir for getting involved in a case of allegedly fabricated data
+supporting new discoveries in the study of immune systems.49
+Although Baltimore was eventually cleared of all charges, the
+blow was felt in the discipline. In social research, too, there
+have been plenty of examples. Notorious is the case of historian
+Michael Bellesiles, who manipulated his ‘unique’ dataset about
+the distribution of small weapons across the American populace
+over centuries. His bestselling book Arming America was praised
+by the magazine The Economist and won Bellesiles the prestigious
+Bancroft Prize, before the academic community realized that his
+numbers were fake and forced him to resign.50
+In 2010, Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth
+Rogoff, celebrated authors of the most influential historical
+account of financial crises, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries
+of Financial Folly, published a follow-up study for the
+National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which quickly
+became a reference point for all governments and conservative
+forces advocating for austerity programmes in Europe and
+America (both EU Commissioner Olli Rehn and US Republican
+Paul Ryan quoted the study). Their paper, titled ‘Growth in a
+Time of Debt’, employed time series data for ‘forty-four countries
+spanning about two-hundred years’ and ‘3,700 annual observations
+covering a wide range of political systems, institutions,
+exchange rate arrangements, and historic circumstances’.51 Its
+main evidence-based conclusion was that countries should never
+surpass a 90 per cent ratio between debt and GDP, as this automatically
+triggers slow growth and the risk of a systematic
+recession. Then, in 2013, a young student from the University of
+Massachusetts Amherst was given the assignment of replicating
+the results of a famous paper in economic research. He chose
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Reinhart and Rogoff’s as their work was on everybody’s mind
+due to its influence on the political management of the economic
+crisis. Yet, after several attempts, the student did not manage to
+replicate the results. Advised by his supervisors to contact the
+authors, he finally received the original spreadsheet and spotted
+numerous basic computation errors, including wrong averages,
+which largely undermined the results of the study.52 Both Reinhart
+and Rogoff publicly apologized for the mistakes, yet stood
+by their overall conclusion, while Keynesian economists attacked
+them for misguiding policymakers.53 Criticizing the results of
+the study and the justification it offered to the austerity policies
+which have been generating much popular discontent in America
+and Europe, the Center for Economic and Policy Research
+rhetorically asked: ‘How much unemployment was caused by
+Reinhart and Rogoff’s arithmetic mistake?’ Daniel Hamermesh,
+professor of economics at the University of London, doubts that
+jobs were lost directly because of the policy applications of the
+study: ‘but it provides an intellectual rationalisation for things
+that affect how people think about the world. And how people
+think about the world, especially politicians, eventually affects
+how the world works.’54
+How could two renowned scholars commit such basic mistakes
+and get away with it for so long? How could they publish with the
+NBER, the most prestigious economic think-tank in the world,
+which prides itself on having been home to twenty-two Nobel
+prizewinners, and have nobody notice the wrong averages? National
+and international newspapers, as well as institutions such
+as the IMF, where both economists had worked before joining
+academia, glorified the two economists’ work. How come nobody
+had spotted such gross errors? Of course, this issue seriously
+questions the credibility of the so-called peer review process
+and makes us wonder how many other studies out there, which
+influence policies everyday, suffer from similar bias.
+the power of numbers
+
+And this is not just a problem in the USA. In Europe, the
+social psychologist Diederik Stapel, author of widely cited papers
+published in prestigious journals such as Science, admitted in
+2012 to having ‘adapted research data and fabricated research’,
+‘not once, but several times’, ‘not for a short period, but over a
+longer period of time’. Arguably his entire research career, which
+had influenced educational programmes and policies in the field
+of social stereotypes, was based on fake numbers. In his recent
+memoirs Ontsporing (Derailed), Stapel describes the process of
+manipulating datasets with powerful narrative verve:
+
+I preferred to do it at home, late in the evening, when everyone
+was asleep. I made myself some tea, put my computer on the
+table, took my notes from my bag, and used my fountain pen to
+write down a neat list of research projects and effects I had to
+produce.… Subsequently I began to enter my own data, row for
+row, column for column … 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 4, 5, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 5, 4, 3,
+3, 2. When I was finished, I would do the first analyses. Often,
+these would not immediately produce the right results. Back to
+the matrix and alter data. 4, 6, 7, 5, 4, 7, 8, 2, 4, 4, 6, 5, 6, 7, 8,
+5, 4. Just as long until all analyses worked out as planned.55
+
+As Stapel candidly admitted to the inquiry committee set up
+by his university: ‘I did not withstand the pressure to score, to
+publish, the pressure to get better in time.… In a system where
+there are few checks and balances, where people work alone, I
+took the wrong turn.’
+
+Numbers, markets and democracy
+
+In his book Chartism, the Scottish social commentator Thomas
+Carlyle wrote that a witty statesman ‘might prove anything with
+figures’. We all know the notorious aphorism ‘There are lies,
+damned lies and statistics.’ In the words of Gigerenzer and
+colleagues, if our societies have come to believe that statistics
+how numbers rule the world
+
+can prove anything, ‘that is because they are so often (mis)used
+to prove things’. And when experts claim too much, ‘it is the
+political and social system that permits, even encourages their
+pretensions’.56 The French philosopher Jacques Ellul once wrote
+that ‘modern man needs a relation to facts’, which is a ‘selfjustification
+to convince himself that by acting in a certain way, he
+is obeying reason and proved experience’. But he was not referring
+to science. His focus of analysis was the meaning and forms of
+propaganda. In Ellul’s understanding the use of numbers was
+essential ‘to create an irrational response on the basis of rational
+and factual elements’.57
+In order to be part of the social debate, individuals and groups
+have to produce numbers. Without numbers, arguments are
+viewed as lacking credibility and based on purely anecdotal evidence.
+As maintained by Best, ‘Numbers are created and repeated
+because they supply ammunition for political struggles, and this
+political purpose is often hidden behind assertions that numbers,
+simply because they are numbers, must be correct.’58 The media
+further amplify the degree of manipulation in this regard. The
+media are in desperate need for easy storylines. They are striving
+to report ‘facts’, and crude numbers are powerful marketing tools,
+as they catch the eye, stir controversy and simplify the job of a
+journalist, who does not need to dissect opinions and nuances.
+As recognized by a lecturer at the Graduate School of Journalism
+of Columbia University, ‘I was trained to believe only in what is
+observable and quantifiable … Journalists feel most secure with
+the batting average, the stock price, the body count, the vote
+tally.’59
+Charles Seife, author of Proofiness: The Dark Arts of Mathematical
+Deception, cites the example of evaluations systems
+produced by the Pentagon during the Vietnam War, which used
+sophisticated computers to feed the media with all sorts of statistics
+to show that America was winning the conflict in the
+the power of numbers
+
+Southeast Asian nation. But, of course, it was not: ‘This sort of
+information is the raw fuel of journalism. It is what gives journalists
+their voices; without hard facts to pin our words to, we are
+powerless to express ourselves.’60As soon as a certain number
+appears on news reports, it takes on a life of its own, and it goes
+through a process of ‘number laundering’.61 Its dubious origins
+are immediately forgotten and, through repetition, it comes to
+be treated as a straightforward fact, ‘accurate and authoritative’.
+Soon the trail becomes muddy: ‘People lose track of the estimate’s
+original source, but they assume the number must be correct
+because it appears everywhere.’62
+Just as the Pentagon produced its bogus statistics to feed the
+propaganda of conservative US media, which cited the body
+counts, numbers of weapons captured and the head counts of
+troops to ‘paint a rosy picture of the war’, anti-environmentalist
+lobbies have been producing studies and statistical models
+demonstrating all sorts of phony connections, from the better
+environmental performance of gas-guzzling SUVs as compared to
+hybrid cars to the non-existence of global warming. The application
+of statistical reasoning has often paved the way to a form of
+systematic denial, which has been fed – especially in the USA – by
+powerful interest groups. Counterintuitive as it may seem, the
+production of statistical ‘lies’ has been meant not to convince
+ideological enemies, but to provide an arsenal of numbers to
+allies. When, in 2007, a marketing research group published a
+study showing that the notorious gas-guzzling Hummer H3 was
+more energy-efficient than the Toyota Prius (they reached such a
+conclusion by using a model that attributed the Hummer a longer
+lifespan and mileage capacity than the Prius, thus reducing the
+overall environmental impact of the former), anti-green pundits
+and global warming sceptics got re-energized. The bogus evidence
+made it quickly into mainstream media and the Washington Post
+hosted op-eds by climate-change deniers, calling for people to
+how numbers rule the world
+
+buy a Hummer and ‘squash a Prius with it’. As historians Naomi
+Oreskes and Erik M. Conway show in their analysis of the power
+of contrarian science in the field of medical and environmental
+research, the media have been a complacent supporter of phony
+numbers, as journalists have come to consider statistics as a
+source of incontestable evidence.63 Given that reporers are trained
+to represent a neutral viewpoint, the production of numbers has
+become a powerful weapon in the hands of those interested in
+spreading doubts and slowing down reform in some critical fields,
+such as the application of the precautionary principle to health
+and environmental regulations: ‘No matter how ridiculous one
+side of the argument is, no matter how dependent it might be
+upon proofiness, the press dutifully broadcasts it and amplifies
+it, giving manufactured “facts” a life of their own.’64
+The intimate relationship between media and numbers is best
+exemplified by news reports’ obsession with stock market indexes.
+Until the 1980s, only specialized media outlets provided dedicated
+information about national and international markets and very few
+of them made any reference to stock indexes. For instance, the
+Dow Jones Industrial Average (more commonly known as Dow
+Jones), which is arguably the world’s best-known stock index, was
+invented in 1896; although popular among investors throughout
+the twentieth century and enjoying temporary notoriety during
+the Great Depression, it only entered the popular imaginary in
+the 1990s, when generalist newspapers and television began to
+introduce stock market information in their regular publications
+and broadcasts. Similarly, the Standard & Poor’s 500, formally
+established in the 1950s, only rose to global fame in the early
+2000s. The Nasdaq Composite began to operate in 1971, but made
+global headlines only in the late 1990s, with the dotcom bubble.
+Ever since, these numbers (along with a variety of national and
+regional indexes) have become protagonists of virtually every
+nation’s public debate. Each and every day, our media feed us
+the power of numbers
+
+with matrices and time series based on averages and estimates of
+stock markets’ activity. Pundits of all sorts provide commentaries,
+while numbers scroll in the background. Animated graphs
+and sophisticated tables give these figures an additional aura of
+importance. The media systematically convey the impression
+that stock indexes are a public good, indicators of the health of
+a nation’s economy. When trading volumes are low, it is a bad
+day for the country. When they are high, the media celebrate.
+And this affects society as a whole: when the indexes rise, we
+cheer; when they shrink, we mourn. But what do stock indexes
+actually describe? Far from being a public good, these numbers
+simply describe subsets of private market transactions. They only
+include companies that are publicly traded in the stock market,
+which are essentially a small fraction of the global private sector.
+Moreover, only the largest of these companies (in terms of overall
+stock value, not in terms of capital or labour force) are covered
+by such indexes. The Dow Jones, for example, has only thirty
+stocks; although it represents roughly a quarter of the value
+of the total stock market, it systematically excludes small and
+mid-size companies. Yet it is presented as the principal market
+barometer in the USA. The S&P 500 does better in terms of
+overall coverage, but since it is a market capitalization weighted
+index, it privileges larger companies. Finally, the Nasdaq only
+focuses on technology stocks. The same can be said about all
+stock market statistics. As these indexes are used to capture the
+capital of investors, they attract money that could otherwise be
+invested in small companies and local economies. In many parts
+of the world, the real economy is likely to suffer from stock index
+euphoria. Rather than being signals of economic development,
+these numbers skew the markets by reinforcing big capital at the
+expense of small and medium enterprises.
+None of these indexes is a real indicator of market dynamism,
+let alone an indicator of economic health. Yet the media
+how numbers rule the world
+
+frenzy has succeeded at integrating these statistics into our social
+psyche, thereby strengthening the political grip of financial capitalism.
+Weber himself connected the power of numbers with the
+hegemonic affirmation of the capitalist ideology. He defined the
+capitalist establishment as ‘one with capital accounting, that is,
+an establishment which determines its income yielding power by
+calculation according to modern book-keeping and the striking
+of a balance’.65 Moreover, the popularity of these numbers has
+affected our understanding of value. Stock market indexes do
+not measure the actual value of companies. They reflect the
+projected exchange value of stocks; that is, how much investors
+would be willing to pay to purchase shares. They grow during
+booms, when investors feel confident, and collapse during busts.
+As underlined by Joel Kurtzman, former editor of the Harvard
+Business Review, ‘No longer do institutions buy stocks to hold
+because they believe in the underlying value of the company.’
+Much to the contrary, they trade in and out of stocks, keeping
+their holdings for decreasing periods of time, with ‘the aid of a
+few mathematical formulas’.66 As argued by international political
+economist Ronen Palan, ‘the numbers that we take to represent
+stock evaluations, profits and wealth no longer stand for “real”
+tangible goods, the numbers measure “power” as pure relations.’67
+Yet, thanks to their own numerical assertiveness and the lack
+of critical analysis by the media, these indexes convey the false
+message that actual wealth is being created when numbers are on
+the rise. In turn, we feel rich when the markets are euphoric, and
+we feel suddenly poor when this ‘fake’ wealth evaporates. Thanks
+to these numbers, we have all become unconscious stakeholders
+of the market society.
+Some numbers are particularly insidious as they are inherently
+subtle. They do not present themselves in conventional statistical
+formats. They do not emerge out of complicated formulae.
+They are so straightforward that we forget they are numbers,
+the power of numbers
+
+abstractions, inventions. Prices are the perfect case in point. We
+are surrounded by prices. Most of us view the world through
+price tags. We let them define our decisions. Whether it concerns
+a holiday destination, a school for our children or a visit to our
+parents, we use prices as the fundamental parameter driving
+our choices. Prices have become the most powerful indication of
+value. Things are worth what they cost, or what we are willing
+to pay for them. As Oscar Wilde famously noted in The Picture
+of Dorian Gray, ‘Nowadays people know the price of everything
+and the value of nothing.’
+Prices are pervasive not only in our daily lives, but also in
+the way in which macro-economic statistics function. For instance,
+the most powerful indicator of all times, the almighty
+gross domestic product (GDP), is nothing else than the sum
+of goods and services measured in terms of market prices. I
+have discussed the politics of GDP in my previous book Gross
+Domestic Problem. Here it suffices to say that GDP is ‘gross’ in
+so far as it does not include the depreciation of assets utilized
+in the production process (such as machineries, tools, vehicles,
+etc.). Whatever is exchanged outside the market (e.g. within
+households, in the informal economies, through barter, etc.)
+does not count. In addition, GDP disregards the value of the
+natural resources consumed in the process of economic growth,
+as these are obtained free of charge from nature. Moreover, it
+does not even consider the economic costs of pollution and
+environmental degradation, which are obvious consequences
+of industrial development. All these important omissions make
+GDP a very selective (some may rightly say myopic) measure of
+economic performance. Household services, for instance, have a
+fundamental economic impact even though they are not priced
+and exchanged in the market. If governments had to pay for the
+innumerable services rendered at the household level (from child
+and frail care to education), our economies would arguably grind
+how numbers rule the world
+
+to a halt. According to a recent study, which estimated the value
+of household production in the USA, the various productive
+activities carried out within homes accounted for over 30 per cent
+of economic output every year from 1965 to 2010 with a peak of
+39 per cent in 1965, declining to 25.7 per cent in 2010.
+68 In many
+countries, the ‘odd jobs’ and the goods and services exchanged
+informally provide the necessary subsistence to millions of people
+and often constitute the backbone of the real economy, although
+they do not feature in GDP. Similarly, disregarding the input
+of natural resources just because they are not priced by nature
+makes us forget that economic growth is only possible because
+of a continuous provision of ‘capital’ from our ecosystems. Agricultural
+production would not be attainable without clean soil,
+water, air and other essential natural processes. Industrialization
+would have not been achieved without the fossil fuels, hydrocarbons
+and energy sources made available by the planet. When
+these resources are depleted, however, we risk endangering not
+only economic progress, but also the very natural equilibrium
+that makes life possible. Accounting 101 tells us that profit equals
+income minus ‘all’ costs. As GDP systematically disregards key
+sectors in the economy and neglects critical costs, no reasonable
+businessman would use it to run a company. Yet it has become
+the key parameter to run entire societies. As mentioned in an
+article published by the OECD Observer,
+
+If ever there was a controversial icon from the statistics world,
+GDP is it. It measures income, but not equality, it measures
+growth, but not destruction, and it ignores values like social
+cohesion and the environment. Yet, governments, businesses
+and probably most people swear by it.69
+
+The application of pricing mechanisms to design public
+policy has a long history, which dates back to the development
+of modern engineering in Europe and in the USA, as the building
+the power of numbers
+
+of infrastructure required numerical assessment tools with a
+direct bearing on tax collection. Quantitative public management
+became a rather common practice in the second half of the
+1800s, especially in the pricing of public works, to assign tenders,
+and for the calculation of tolls citizens had to pay to use bridges
+and railroads. For instance, the French engineer Jules Dupuit
+was among the first to introduce concepts such as diminishing
+marginal utility in the calculation of fares for rail travel. Dupuit
+believed the certainty of mathematical reasoning to be essential
+for good political economic analysis. The proper role of the
+lawmaker, he explained, is to ‘consecrate those facts demonstrated
+by political economy’.70
+Friedrich August von Hayek, the forefather of free-market
+economics, was the first to develop a comprehensive theory of
+prices as indicators – that is, signals of information. As he wrote
+in ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, an influential article published
+in the American Economic Review in 1945, the price system
+is ‘as a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of
+telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch
+merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might
+watch the hands of a few dials’.71 According to Hayek, society is
+‘a system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed
+among many people’. And in this kaleidoscope of partial information,
+‘prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different
+people in the same way as subjective values help the individual
+to coordinate the parts of his plan.’ Yet, despite his enthusiasm
+for the communicative power of prices, Hayek recognized that a
+price is just ‘a numerical index which cannot be derived from any
+property possessed by that particular thing, but which reflects,
+or in which is condensed, its significance in view of the whole
+means–end structure.’
+Following Hayek’s definition of prices as information signals,
+economists Fischer Black, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton
+how numbers rule the world
+
+developed sophisticated formulae to predict prices in all sorts
+of financial interactions, particularly in the derivative markets.
+The Black–Scholes–Merton model, which earned its creators a
+Nobel Prize in 1997, soon became the be all and end all of pricing
+methods in global finance. As the world economy grew increasingly
+financialized, prices became perfect substitutes for values
+and financial markets were turned into the elective space for the
+allocation of resources, thus affecting our governance model and
+the way in which society assesses wealth.
+That is, until September 2008, when the world of perfect
+pricing collapsed. As recognized by former chairman of the
+Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan in a notorious hearing at the
+House Committee of Oversight and Reform, ‘A Nobel Prize was
+awarded for the discovery of the pricing model that underpins
+much of the advance in derivatives markets. This modern risk
+management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual
+edifice, however, collapsed.’72 And that was just the beginning
+of a global financial crisis that has since spanned the world
+and turned into the most devastating recession since the Great
+Depression. Yet the grip of prices on our societies is unchallenged
+by the economic chaos produced by the financial world and, more
+than ever, the power of numbers has been reinforcing markets in
+an age of crisis.
+Prices are indexes. They are aggregate parameters defined
+by the encounter of supply and demand, in a context of scarce
+resources. In theory, prices should by and large correspond to
+the marginal utility that goods and services bring to individual
+consumers. Actually, in most real economies, prices are not at all
+(or only partly) constituted by the preferences and priorities of
+consumers. In general, prices are easily affected by dynamics that
+are external to the virtuous match of supply and demand, which
+include taxation, subsidies, lobbying, cartels, monopolies, not to
+speak of political allegiances that can afford certain industries
+the power of numbers
+
+preferential treatments not available to other competitors. As
+prices (and money) depend on credit, the discount rates of financiers,
+investors, bankers and insurers largely determine what
+things are worth. Our economies are, more than ever, determined
+by the preferences of a few.
+Prices and markets go hand in hand, as the former are indicators
+of an exchange value. What has a price tag on can – by definition
+– be bought and sold. So, the pervasiveness of prices has
+resulted in the growth of markets well beyond the conventional
+boundaries traditionally associated with profit-based interaction.73
+We now have carbon prices and their relative emission markets.
+We have financial models applied to the nonprofit sector. We
+have offset markets and prices for biodiversity, carbon emission
+and forestation. We value human life based on the rates provided
+by insurance policies. Economic concepts such as cost–benefit,
+willingness to pay, replacement costs and return on investment
+are dominating our governance models, both locally – where
+most of our public institutions have adopted managerial formulas
+borrowed from business – and globally – where market-based
+mechanisms have been introduced to deal with issues such as
+climate change and environmental degradation. Some recent
+research has also shown how principles of numerical organization
+– that is, the representation of wealth through the synthesis
+of numbers – facilitate the movement of capital in the offshore
+economy, thus reinforcing global divides between the super-rich
+and the rest, as well as undermining the capacity of states to
+sustain their welfare systems.74
+In 2004, while president of Harvard, the economist Larry
+Summers celebrated the triumph of numbers in society. He commended
+Moneyball for having become the most predictive model
+of success in baseball and maintained that ‘what’s true of baseball
+is actually true of a much wider range of human activity than has
+been the case before’:
+how numbers rule the world
+
+In the last 30 years, the field of investment banking has been
+transformed from a field that was dominated by people who
+were good at meeting clients at the 19th hole, to people who
+were good at solving very difficult mathematical problems
+that were involved in pricing derivative securities. The field
+of environmental regulation has substantially given way in its
+actual application from people who were committed activists and
+attorneys to people who were skilled in performing cost–benefit
+analyses. The presidential campaigns that at one time put out
+the call for a group of bright lawyers to staff them, now put out
+the call for bright economists and bright MBAs to staff them.
+And I could go on and on with these examples, suggesting that
+the kind of analytical techniques that come out of social science
+are finding more and more widespread application.75
+
+The global market ‘turn’ has been strengthened by the unfettered
+trust in numbers. As is the case with Adam Smith’s
+invisible hand – that is, the founding hypothesis of market efficiency
+at allocating resources and resolving complex distributional
+issues – there is nowadays a generalized ‘belief that
+numbers will finally start to work ‘automatically’, by themselves,
+so to speak’.76 But numbers do very little on their own. They hide
+conflicts, do not solve them. They conceal politics and oppression
+by masking them with a cloak of inevitability. There is no doubt
+that numbers are important tools for the progress of knowledge
+and the improvement of governance. At the same time, they can
+be powerful instruments in the hands of those who would like
+to preserve the status quo.
+chapter 2
+
+New global rulers:
+
+the untameable power of credit rating
+
+There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion.
+There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating
+Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping
+bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your
+bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who’s more
+powerful.
+Thomas Friedman1
+
+When S&P or Moody’s speak, that’s not the voice of ‘the
+market’. It’s just some guys with an agenda, and a very poor
+track record. And we have no idea how much effect their
+actions will have.
+Paul Krugman2
+
+Credit ratings are among the most powerful numbers in global
+affairs. Their reach knows virtually no limit. Corporations,
+banks, insurance companies and even sovereign states need
+ratings to operate. Although they are usually expressed through
+alphanumerical characters, ratings are no different from any other
+measurement, indicator or index. In many regards, in fact, ratings
+are the most distinctive example of the global power of numbers.
+Moreover, since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, ratings
+how numbers rule the world
+
+sit at the intersection of a kaleidoscope of forces determining the
+politics of statistics. Indeed, there is no other field in which the
+conflicts of interest, the power of technocrats and the influence
+of markets are so evident. Think of this. Five days before the
+bankruptcy of the energy giant Enron in 2001, the major credit
+rating agencies considered its bonds to be ‘investment grade’.3
+Three days before the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman
+Brothers in 2008, its bonds were given the highest possible grade
+by the major agencies. Even on the morning of its collapse, credit
+analysts thought Lehman Brothers to be worth a good investment.4
+The insurance giants American International Group and
+Washington Mutual held prime ratings until the moment they
+collapsed, triggering massive public bailouts. A report by the
+US Congress found that rating agencies had no incentive ‘to
+assign tougher credit ratings to the very securities that for a short
+while increased their revenues, boosted their stock prices, and
+expanded their executive compensation’.5
+In January 2011, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
+appointed by the American government reported that the leading
+credit rating agencies were ‘essential cogs in the wheel of financial
+destruction’:
+
+the mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could
+not have been marketed and sold without their seal of approval.
+Investors relied on them, often blindly. In some cases, they
+were obligated to use them, or regulatory capital standards were
+hinged on them. This crisis could not have happened without
+the rating agencies. Their ratings helped the market soar and
+their downgrades through 2007 and 2008 wreaked havoc across
+markets and firms.6
+
+Funnily enough, though, rating agencies had warned against
+the inaccuracy of their assessments: ‘Any user of the information
+contained herein should not rely on any credit rating or other
+new global rulers
+
+opinion contained herein in making any investment decision’,
+reads the disclaimer at the bottom of all reports published by the
+largest agency in the world.7
+But what is a credit rating agency? It is a ‘company that assesses
+the debt instruments (bonds and other securities) issued
+by firms or governments and assigns “credit ratings” to these
+instruments based on the likelihood that the debt will be repaid.’8
+These organizations rate the creditworthiness of debt issuers and
+evaluate the investment risk – that is, the likelihood of default or
+repayment irregularities. They publish regular reports assigning
+bonds a set of grades, from AAA (prime grade) to D (in default),
+which provide comparable risk estimates in order to overcome
+problems of information in financial markets. As companies
+(that is, the borrowers) always possess better information about
+their own financial profile than any external investor (that is, the
+lender), rating agencies try to bridge this ‘asymmetry’ by looking
+at the nuts and bolts of a borrowing institution and producing an
+assessment of its financial credibility. The level of risk determines
+the interest rate for the investment and, consequently, the cost
+of debt and the debtor’s access to new investments. Moreover,
+ratings determine the eligibility of debt for the portfolios of
+certain institutional investors, due to national regulations that
+restrict investment in speculative bonds. Likewise, regulators
+use credit ratings to ascertain the strength of the reserves held
+by insurance companies.
+As a result, these agencies have an enormous influence on
+global capital flows and, inevitably, on global governance. Nowadays,
+three big agencies (the so-called Big Three), Standard
+& Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Service and Fitch Ratings, control
+over 95 per cent of the global rating market. At the moment of
+the collapse of Wall Street, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) controlled
+roughly 40 per cent of the market, Moody’s about 39 per cent
+how numbers rule the world
+
+and Fitch another 16 per cent.9
+ As the last is mostly working in
+specialized markets, Moody’s and S&P effectively form a duopoly
+in the global rating sector.10 Such a skewed distribution of market
+access makes it virtually impossible for any large company or
+government interested in attracting foreign investment to operate
+without these agencies’ stamp of approval. Rating agencies are a
+powerful example of what political scientist Colin Crouch has
+termed ‘giant firms’: they are both multinational – with branches
+all over the world – and their numbers exert market dominance.
+Given the lack of regulation at the global level, these firms are
+in a position to set their own standards and thereby determine
+regulation in the global economy.11
+Rating agencies are ‘odd beasts’ in global governance: they
+are private firms with public purposes – ‘hence the term credit
+rating agencies, not credit rating firms’ – but they are fully
+private in terms of ownership, employees and revenues.12 Some
+authors see the regulatory role of rating agencies as a clear
+instance of the ongoing ‘privatization of world politics’.13 The
+private governance function of these companies can thus be
+interpreted as an indication of the long-term shift in the locus
+of authority, especially within the realm of the global economy:
+private actors have become the ‘real players’ while the authority
+of states continuously declines and their autonomy weakens.14
+For some, rating agencies should be ‘more properly viewed as
+quasi-government entities’.15 For others, rating processes have
+generated a system of ‘governance without government’,16 making
+these powerful producers of numbers ‘de facto private makers of
+global public policy’.17 No matter what specific view one endorses,
+it is clear that their power curtails the capacity of states and other
+public authorities to support public policy interventions not in
+line with market diktats.18 This chapter traces the history of
+ratings and how these numbers became an all-powerful weapon
+in contemporary global politics.
+new global rulers
+
+Credit rating agencies:
+from market analysts to oligopolists
+
+Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have not always been as influential
+as they are today. In order to understand their privileged
+position, it is necessary to look at the evolution of the global
+financial architecture over more than a century.19 Their story
+begins at the crossroads of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
+in America, when US corporations grew in number and size, especially
+those building long-distance railroads. While previously
+funded through local savings, the scale of industrial development
+soon required an increasing amount of capital, which could no
+longer originate exclusively within the circles of local investors.
+Other, more distant markets needed to be tapped into. But, of
+course, these new investors did not have first-hand knowledge
+of what they were investing in and, before putting their money
+into any new venture, they demanded some form of third-party
+assessment of the risks associated with their investment. It was
+because of this growing demand – on the one hand, investors
+interested in buying bonds with a greater degree of certainty
+and, on the other, companies aiming to enlarge the spectrum of
+their potential funders – that credit agents found their niche.20
+The financial analyst Henry Varnum Poor was among the first
+to cater systematically to this growing hunger for more precise
+analysis of the type of industrial development under way. In 1868,
+his Manual of the Railroads of the United States provided the first
+systematic account of the sector: ‘their mileage, stocks, bonds,
+costs, earnings, expenses, and organizations; with a sketch of
+their rise, progress and influence’.21
+During the early years of operation, CRAs concentrated on
+rating companies operating in the field of railroad, tracks and
+rolling stock. They assessed debt instruments, such as bonds
+and securities, issued by firms and assigned ‘ratings’ based on
+how numbers rule the world
+
+the likelihood of debt repayment. These publications were sold
+to investors, thus making credit rating originally a relationship
+between the agencies and the investors’ community.
+CRAs have played a major part in the US financial system since
+1900, when the analyst John Moody published his first market
+assessment, titled Moody’s Manual of Industrial and Miscellaneous
+Securities, and established John Moody & Company, the first
+rating agency.22 For a few decades, ratings were nothing more than
+private assessments, no different from any other form of consultancy
+provided to investors. Born out of a need in the burgeoning
+industrial world of the late nineteenth century, the power of credit
+agencies increased with the shift affecting the financial industry in
+the interwar period, especially the banking sector. Traditionally,
+banks had been the primary source of funding for firms and
+corporations. They were the link between lenders (mostly private
+savings, i.e. deposits) and borrowers. Credit defaults (and the
+risk thereof) were shouldered by them and usually did not affect
+depositors. Therefore banks ‘acted as hybrid institutions of collective
+action, between the state and the market’, controlling the
+risk and reducing ‘the uncertainties for the political authorities, as
+well as for borrowers and lenders’.23 Yet the increased downward
+pressure on capital costs experienced during and after the Great
+Depression incentivized direct market participation for banks
+(in form of financial and investment products) and eventually
+decreased their role as mediators between lenders and borrowers.
+As a result, such ‘disintermediation’ transformed banks from
+agents of self-regulation to market participants. The decentralization
+of capital allocation (away from banks), directly connecting
+borrowers and lenders, accentuated the problem of asymmetrical
+information in the market and thereby strengthened the role of
+rating agencies.24
+In 1936, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency institutionalized
+ratings by mandating that banks must hold bonds
+new global rulers
+
+rated at least low-to-medium risk. This regulation was introduced
+to keep banks from engaging in ‘speculative investments’ with
+public money, but had the indirect effect of giving CRAs power
+over banks’ bond holdings by assigning to their ratings the ‘force
+of law’.25 Four agencies were given this quasi-institutional role:
+Standard Statistics Bureau, H.V. and H.W. Poor & Co. (these
+would later merge to become S&P), John Moody and Company,
+and the Fitch Publishing Company.
+This position was further entrenched in 1975 when the Securities
+and Exchange Commission (SEC),26 the institution tasked
+with overseeing financial markets in the USA, mandated that
+brokers honour their capital requirements with highly rated
+assets.27 Since the SEC was concerned that unaccredited agencies
+might inflate the market of ratings, they came up with the concept
+of ‘nationally recognized statistical rating organization’ (NRSRO)
+and granted this status to the three largest agencies, the so-called
+Big Three: Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Ratings. From then on, only
+their ratings would be acceptable for public regulation purposes.
+Other financial regulators followed suit, so that ‘these three firms’
+judgments of bonds’ safety came to be official determinants of the
+bond portfolios of most major American financial institutions.’28
+In theory, CRAs should enhance the efficiency of financial
+intermediation by redressing the informational asymmetry between
+lenders and borrowers.29 Economists like describing this issue in
+terms of principals and agents – that is, those investing the money
+and those tasked with making the investment bear fruit.30 In this
+view, rating agencies are described as ‘neutral’ institutions, which
+gather and provide information in an objective and technical way
+to market participants. This view also mirrors the preferred selfimage
+of the rating agencies themselves. For instance, according
+to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, a
+group of investment bankers, a credit rating agency ‘objectively
+analyzes the credit worthiness of a company or security’.31
+how numbers rule the world
+
+For the first few decades of their existence, CRAs earned
+their money by rating bond-issuing corporations and charging
+subscription fees to investors.32 By and large, this made agencies
+accountable and transparent to the investment community. Such
+a state of affairs changed in the 1970s, mainly because of a series
+of developments in the international political economy. With the
+collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the ensuing global
+liberalization of financial capital markets, the demand for credit
+ratings grew exponentially, as these helped investors assess and
+compare the creditworthiness and associated risks of financial
+instruments in the global market. Consequently, CRAs enlarged
+their portfolios from the assessment of corporations to the rating
+of a wide range of financial products, which would soon become
+their main source of revenue. Unlike the evaluation of flesh-andblood
+industries (which is often referred to as the ‘real economy’),
+the study of the financial industry required a significant level of
+abstraction that increased the complexity of ratings and made
+methodologies less intuitive and open to scrutiny. In the meantime,
+as it had become increasingly hard to prevent investors from
+sharing ratings (which threatened the capacity of CRAs to sell
+them as copyrighted material), the agencies’ business model took
+a fundamental U-turn, moving away from subscription fees to
+rating fees. In this new arrangement, rated corporations began to
+pay for the CRAs’ assessment, while investors got reports for free.
+Needless to say, the new business model triggered conflicts of
+interest at all levels. With corporations paying for their own ratings,
+CRAs had an incentive to give inflated assessments in order to
+satisfy and keep their customers. In theory, the issuer-pays model
+should have its fail-safes: as CRAs compete for reputation in the
+investment community, they should refrain from giving inflated
+grades that would then result in a weakening of their credibility.
+Yes, in theory. In fact, the oligopolistic distribution of power in
+the field, with the overarching dominance of only three agencies,
+new global rulers
+
+has ever since reduced the degree of competition and, by contrast,
+has encouraged common strategies and cartels. Although there
+are now several NRSROs in the USA, assessing millions of debt
+issues, only the Big Three have the power to unbalance markets
+and states. The lack of competition in this sector is accompanied
+by high barriers to entry and is demonstrated by the oligopolists’
+high profit margins. Before the financial meltdown, between 2005
+and 2007 S&P operating profit rose by 73 per cent compared
+to the three-year period ending in 2004.
+33 Investigations into
+their rating practices of the past few decades – prior to the 2008
+housing bust – have revealed that factors such as ‘the drive for
+market share, pressure from investment banks to inflate ratings,
+inaccurate rating models, and inadequate rating and surveillance
+resources’ have resulted in deficient and questionable ratings.34
+
+Behind the numbers: a shady business
+
+One question strikes to the core of the CRAs’ work: what is the
+risk that investors will not get their money back (plus their promised
+interest) when investing in a bond or other type of obligation?
+As risk managers, CRAs come up with apparently sophisticated
+systems to turn ‘risk’ into a measurable output. They look at the
+assets’ characteristics and quality.35 They conduct interviews
+with informants, insiders and other so-called experts. After an
+initial assessment, they inform the issuer of a tentative rating,
+providing the latter with an opportunity to appeal. Although
+rating scales vary across CRAs, they follow a very similar model
+based on alphanumeric symbols. The Big Three use AAA to
+indicate prime-grade investments. Investments above BBB (or Baa
+for Moody’s) are considered ‘investment grade’. The closer to C,
+the more speculative the ratings become. For S&P and Fitch, D
+is default. Although they take the form of letter symbols, these
+ratings are scores assigned by analysts, whose methodology is not
+how numbers rule the world
+
+open to scrutiny. After the rating is issued, the agency monitors
+the rated bonds, potentially upgrading or downgrading them,
+or putting them on a ‘watch list’. As regulations oblige issuers to
+write lengthy prospectuses outlining their portfolios, many investors
+simply rely on the CRAs’ ratings as a ‘Good Housekeeping
+Seal of Approval’.36 The power of brevity, exemplified by the
+CRAs’ scores, prevails over the complexity of financial analyses.
+Markets use ratings as a guide for investment, resulting in the fact
+that the credit rating alone is often considered enough to decide
+to buy or sell bonds.
+CRAs guide and shape investors’ decisions, thus creating
+an institutional framework that steers market behaviour. As is
+often the case with numbers in governance, most investors trust
+the ratings ‘with a surrendering of individual judgment’, and
+believe in their authority ‘based not on the merits of any particular
+pronouncement, but on a belief in the rightness of the
+authority itself’.37 CRAs shield themselves behind the reputational
+argument. For example, S&P claims that ‘reputation is more
+important than revenues’.38 Moody’s once stated that ‘we are
+in a business where reputational capital is more important’ and
+that ‘what’s driving us is primarily the issue of preserving our
+track record. That’s our bread and butter.’39 Yet, some critics
+have argued that ‘the reputation argument only works when a
+large fraction of the CRA income comes from other sources than
+rating complex products’, which is no longer the case.40 Others
+have maintained that, as ratings do not look at other noteworthy
+aspects such as liquidity or price volatility, they are not designed
+to comprehensively guide investment decisions.41
+It could also be claimed that rating agencies merely follow
+markets that have already identified problematic debtors. Several
+empirical studies have concluded ‘that ratings have little or no
+informational value added compared to market signals’.42 Markets
+appear to move slowly when a sovereign debt rises, but can also
+new global rulers
+
+at times act rapidly – and imprudently. Consequently, the rating
+system simply relies on the ‘trust in the trust’ that others will also
+use the agencies’ assessments to guide their decisions, which is
+why snowball effects occur so frequently.43
+As early as 1985, the sociologist Harrison White argued that,
+due to rising specialization in the financial industry, there is a
+tendency towards control reversal: ‘the principal comes under
+the control of the agent after the latter becomes a specialized
+purveyor’.44 The core problem is that CRAs interfere with the
+assumed rational, atomistic and therefore independent choices of
+capital allocation made in a decentralized market. CRAs have the
+power to shift capital flows, transcending the ‘atomistic cognitive
+behavior of the single transaction’.45 As a result, ratings can easily
+become self-fulfilling prophecies, as CRAs strongly influence the
+choices of millions of small and large investors.46 In addition,
+such ratings are frequently pro-cyclical and therefore reinforce
+business cycles artificially.47 Due to their size and market power,
+CRAs can distort the credit market in ways that exceed their role
+as information providers.
+Complicating matters, agencies claim that their ratings are
+opinions. CRAs under threat from prosecution in the USA have
+repeatedly invoked the constitutional First Amendment and
+charges against them have been dropped on the grounds that
+ratings are protected as freedom of speech and expression.48
+Rating agencies like to compare themselves to publishing companies
+and financial journalists who are merely issuing opinions.49
+As a result, the treatment of rating agencies has been paradoxical:
+regulatory standards are predicated on credit ratings, but there
+has been little direct oversight of how the ratings are made.50 As
+underlined by a discussion paper of the UN Conference on Trade
+and Development (UNCTAD), rating agencies ‘provide little
+guidance as to how they assign relative weights to each factor’.51
+It is also quite difficult to establish clear connections between
+how numbers rule the world
+
+the general criteria they use and the actual ratings. The ‘opinion’
+enjoyed by the ratings has largely exempted CRAs from satisfying
+minimum transparency and accountability requirements applied
+to traditional forms of investment advice, which ‘has helped shield
+rating agencies from private litigation for inaccurate or misleading
+statements’.52 Moreover, ‘Investors have not historically invested
+large resources in improving rating agencies’ behaviour perhaps
+because there was insufficient transparency on the way CRAs
+operated to facilitate this.’53
+The major CRAs make their profits by payment from the
+private issuers that they assess, which provides them with a
+powerful incentive to give out good ratings as this ensures the
+issuer will return to them the next time, instead of looking for
+another agency. 54 As a general practice, investment banks have
+‘shopped around’ for the best ratings and sometimes even played
+‘one rating agency against another when informally consulting
+them to achieve high ratings’.55 In essence, CRAs purport to
+achieve two main objectives, which are very often mutually exclusive:
+maximizing profit and objectively gauging the performance
+of their clients, who in turn determine the agencies’ profits. This
+creates a bias, making the main goal of objectivity much harder to
+achieve. As revealed by W.J. Harrington, a former senior analyst at
+Moody’s, top managers are ultimately in control. They would say
+to the analysts: ‘Time’s up, let’s convene in a committee and we’ll
+all vote “yes”.’ Issues brought up by analysts would be dismissed
+or simply parked, saying ‘Let’s make a note of that’ or ‘I am glad
+you’re raising it’, but nothing would happen.56
+Because of the payment structure, the issuers of debt (as the
+client) can exercise significant influence on the agency (as the
+service provider). In a survey of 1,956 investment professionals
+carried out by the CFA Institute in 2008, 11 per cent said ‘they
+had seen a credit rating agency change a bond grade in response
+to pressure from an issuer, underwriter or investor’.57 Roughly
+new global rulers
+
+half these respondents maintained that the pressure took the
+form of a threat ‘to take future ratings business to other’ rating
+agencies. The CFA survey went further to reveal that many respondents
+felt the most harmful conflict of interest results ‘from
+the payment structure’ under which rating agencies operate. Obviously,
+debt-issuing organizations have an interest in achieving the
+highest possible rating. As they pay for their assessments, they
+have the upper hand. It thus comes as no surprise that all the
+major CRAs gave Enron their highest ratings before the company
+filed for bankruptcy in 2001. As Enron’s top management feared
+that lower ratings would jeopardize its imminent takeover by
+the energy company Dynergy, it pressed for a good assessment,
+and the CRAs seemingly cooperated.58 When, in 2004, the food
+multinational Parmalat’s collapse revealed that the company had
+‘cooked the books’ with the support of some financial advisers
+and the collusion of rating agents, the EU called for more stringent
+rules.59 The European Commission and the European Central
+Bank set out to report on ratings agencies’ conflicts of interest over
+advising institutions on how to package debt, while also awarding
+them AAA ratings, as well as on their failure to alert investors to
+dangers in the subprime mortgage market.60 Most of these plans,
+however, fell by the wayside, as they were deemed unnecessary
+by the Committee for European Banking Supervisors.61
+Commenting on the methodologies adopted by most CRAs,
+some insiders have confirmed that the assessment process
+surpasses simple review and evaluation, and often takes more
+‘personal’ twists. It seems to be common practice for reviewers to
+meet with their clients to discuss options for maintaining a certain
+rating or even upgrading it. As recalled by a former president of
+the Federal Home Loan Bank in Chicago (a bank traditionally
+awarded a AAA rating by both Moody’s and S&P), visits from the
+representatives of rating agencies were a common routine. ‘They’d
+say, “Here’s what it’s going to cost.” I’d say, “That’s outrageous.”
+how numbers rule the world
+
+They’d repeat, “This is what it’s going to cost.” Finally, I’d say,
+“OK.” With no ratings, you can’t sell your debt.’62 Some CRAs
+were also accused of blackmailing their clients with the threat
+of an immediate downgrade should they switch providers.63 In
+2007, at the Hearing of the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee
+on Investigations, an anonymous managing director of Moody’s
+Investors Services rhetorically asked,
+
+[W]hy didn’t we envision that credit would tighten after being
+loose, and housing prices would fall after rising? After all most
+economic events are cyclical and bubbles inevitably burst.
+Combined, these errors make us look either incompetent at
+credit analysis, or like we sold our soul to the devil for revenue,
+or a little bit of both.64
+
+The politics of ratings and the global financial crisis
+
+The range of products analysed by CRAs has grown along with
+the diversification of financial markets, expanding from commercial
+bonds to companies as a whole, to sovereign debt and
+finally to the myriad new debt instruments introduced in the past
+decades, most notably securitizations, including the infamous
+collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps
+(CDS).65 CRAs reaped a bonanza in fees from the late 1990s on,
+as they worked with financial firms to manufacture CDOs based
+on subprime mortgages. Ever since, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch have
+been winning up to three times as much in fees for grading these
+securities as they charge for rating ordinary bonds.66
+Also, with the increasing integration and globalization of financial
+markets, what was formerly a US phenomenon became
+a global standard. Since the 1990s, CRAs have penetrated
+international markets virtually everywhere. CRAs’ offices have
+mushroomed across Europe and Asia. Obtaining a rating from
+any (or both) of the two dominating firms, S&P and Moody’s, is
+new global rulers
+
+by now deemed indispensable by debt issuers all over the world,
+especially in less industrialized countries.67 In Latin America,
+after the 1980s debt crisis, the growing bond market drove up the
+demand for sovereign credit ratings.68 Being issued by developing
+economies, these obligations carried a certain risk but also high
+returns, which propped up the need for third-party information
+about these countries’ financial credibility. In April 2002, the then
+secretary of state Colin Powell announced that the US government
+was planning to help African countries obtain sovereign
+ratings, as this would help economic growth by giving ‘courage
+to capital’.69 Just a month later, the United Nations Development
+Programme (UNDP) launched a partnership with S&P to
+support the introduction of systematic sovereign credit ratings
+throughout Africa. In 2003, it hosted the first African Capital
+Markets Development Forum in cooperation with the New York
+Stock Exchange and the African Stock Exchanges Association.70
+While originally sovereign issuers (that is, states) did seek ratings
+to contemplate debt issuance, over time the attribution of high
+ratings became a matter of international status. It helped governments
+profile themselves globally as transparent and accountable
+investment partners. Through ratings, countries around the world
+strived to ‘gain “stamps of approval” from international capital
+markets’.71
+CRAs do not derive their current influence solely from the
+trust of market participants. States, too, have actively advanced
+and institutionalized them by integrating ratings into financial
+regulations. According to some observers, rating agencies ‘are
+granted reference status both by widespread market practice and
+by public regulation’.72 By deflecting their own due diligence responsibilities
+in the regulation of global financial markets, public
+authorities have for the most part referred to the judgement of
+private CRAs to determine the eligibility of collateral for central
+banks and assess the investment decisions of public and sovereign
+how numbers rule the world
+
+wealth funds.73 As early as the 1930s, US pension funds were
+only allowed to hold assets in proportion to their relative ratings;
+since then, whenever a quality assessment of debt is needed, US
+financial regulators have resorted to the evaluations of the CRAs.74
+Across the American economy, credit ratings have been used to
+increase the risk sensitivity of investment restrictions for certain
+financial institutions (e.g. banks and insurance companies), to
+define differential disclosure requirements for issuers of rated
+bonds, and to adjust capital reserve requirements for commercial
+and investment banks.75 In the European Union, a similar trend
+was encouraged by the 1993 Capital Adequacy Directive, which
+specified that companies must set aside more capital for their noninvestment
+grade holding. Specifically, the Directive established
+that the default risk associated with financial instruments traded
+within the EU must be evaluated ‘by at least two credit-rating
+agencies recognized by the competent authorities’, or alternatively
+‘by only one such credit-rating agency’ so long as they are not
+rated below investment grade by other agencies.76 Given the strong
+cartel tendencies of the major CRAs, it comes as no surprise that
+ratings were generally in line with the authorities’ requirements.
+The influence of rating organizations has been further underpinned
+by the Basel Accords, a series of inter-banking regulations
+set out by central bank governors outlining requirements and
+recommendations for the banking industry. In particular, the
+Basel II accord (established in 2004) created an international
+standard to control how much capital banks need to put aside
+to guard against various types of financial and operational risks.
+Originally designed to protect the international financial system
+from the cascading effect of major banks’ collapse, it generated a
+distorted system of control and assessment by ultimately giving
+CRAs the power to determine banks’ net capital reserve requirements;
+that is, how much capital a bank must set aside in reserves
+against potential losses.77
+new global rulers
+
+Nowadays, issuers are legally obliged to seek a rating in order
+to sell their bonds and get access to international capital markets,
+which makes credit ratings extremely valuable to them not because
+of the information they possess, but rather because they grant a
+regulatory licence of sorts. According to the financial news agency
+Bloomberg, the reach of CRAs ‘extends into virtually every corner
+of the financial system. Everyone from banks to the agencies that
+regulate them is hooked on ratings.’78
+The use of CRAs’ assessments in financial market regulation
+thereby effectively becomes the abdication of regulatory authority
+to a privately controlled oligopoly for the provision of an information
+public good. Their informal status as de facto regulators,
+bestowed by governments in order to avoid what free-market
+economists viewed as ‘messy regulation’ and ‘costly oversight’,
+has morphed into an instance of gross public negligence. As a
+consequence, the resulting regulatory failure by national and
+supranational authorities has exacerbated the continuous failure
+of markets, which is now amplified by the global integration
+of banking systems. This set of policies has resulted in CRAs
+becoming much more than the original intermediaries purported
+to facilitate the exchange of information and decrease transaction
+costs. As states have ‘outsourced many regulatory functions to
+rating agencies’, the latter have become the most powerful market
+gatekeepers in the world.79
+Some attempts at reforming the sector were put in place both
+in the USA and in Europe, but little change occurred in terms of
+regulatory and market access practice. In 2006, the US administration
+passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, which made
+the SEC responsible for oversight in the sector.80 The same year,
+the EU revised its directive on capital adequacy by reframing
+the role of credit agencies, while confirming the obligation of
+investment firms to trade in highly rated products.81 Furthermore,
+the European Securities and Markets Authority was entrusted
+how numbers rule the world
+
+with launching investigations, conducting inspections, proposing
+fines and prohibiting operations. Throughout the world, CRAs
+are also subject to the 2004 Code of Conduct Fundamentals for
+Credit Rating Agencies adopted by the International Organization
+of Securities Commissions. Yet adherence is voluntary, which
+safeguards ‘the independence of CRAs or their ability to issue
+timely ratings opinions’.82
+That the Big Three had retained all their power and influence
+in spite of public authorities’ efforts at reforming the
+sector became all the more evident with the eruption of the
+financial crisis in 2008 and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis
+in both the US and Europe. Because of their lag in modifying
+ratings following legislation developments and the ‘abruptness
+of unexpected downgrades’ of state bonds, CRAs were able to
+throw markets out of balance and fundamentally affect the public
+finances of the world’s major economies.83 In 2011, S&P took the
+unprecedented step of ‘removing the United States government
+from its list of risk-free borrowers’, a downgrade that elicited the
+indignation of the Obama administration.84 The US government
+attacked the agency, arguing that ‘the company had made a
+significant mathematical mistake’ and, in cooperation with the
+SEC, launched an investigation on the S&P’s ‘overwhelmingly
+positive ratings of mortgage-backed securities during the housing
+boom’.85 State investigators also looked at cases in which the
+company’s analysts wanted to award lower ratings on mortgage
+bonds but were overruled by their managers. For the SEC,
+rating agencies ‘just abjectly failed in serving the interests of
+investors’.86 In 2013, the Department of Justice filed civil fraud
+charges against S&P, ‘accusing the firm of inflating the ratings
+of mortgage investments and setting them up for a crash when
+the financial crisis struck’.87
+The historic US downgrade was not based just on purely
+financial assessments, but rather on a general evaluation of
+new global rulers
+
+Washington’s political strategy, a type of assessment that one
+would not expect from financial analysts. In their justification
+for the downgrade, S&P’s analysts wrote:
+
+More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness,
+stability, and predictability of American policymaking and
+political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal
+and economic challenges.88
+
+So governments had not only given ratings ‘the force of law’, but
+also a say over nations’ political strategies. In Europe, the Big
+Three set out to downgrade countries such as Greece, Ireland
+and Portugal to ‘junk status’ in spite of the several bailout plans
+put forward by European authorities throughout 2010 and 2011. A
+heated debate erupted in the EU, championed by Michel Barnier,
+the commissioner for internal markets and services, who lashed
+out at CRAs, arguing that ‘[w]e need to rebuild our political sovereignty
+so we’re not subject to the sovereignty of the markets’.89
+Also former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt maintained that
+‘[s]ome rating agencies have taken the politically liable governments
+in Europe hostage’.90
+In order to rein in the power of CRAs, a number of proposals
+were laid out by the European Commission, including the need
+for financial firms to rotate the agencies they use every three years,
+for analysts to step down from an account after four years, and
+for agencies to be prevented from rating products or institutions
+where their shareholders have a financial interest. Moreover, it
+was decided that sovereign downgrades would need to be notified
+to governments at least twenty-four hours before they are made
+public (as opposed to twelve hours, as was previously the case)
+and could only be issued after markets closed.91 As it was felt
+that repeated downgrades revealed an ‘excessive speculation by
+the U.S. agencies over European debt’, some went so far as to
+propose the constitution of a Europe-based credit rating agency.92
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Even the chairman of the European Commission, José Manuel
+Barroso, took issue with the rating agencies:
+
+It is quite strange that the market is dominated by only three
+players and not a single agency is coming from Europe. It
+shows there may be some bias in the market when it comes to
+evaluation of issues in Europe, that Europeans know better than
+others.93
+
+When in October 2011 Moody’s downgraded Italy for the first
+time in over two decades, it legitimized its decision by arguing
+that fiscal consolidation remained ‘vulnerable to the high level of
+uncertainty around economic growth in Italy and elsewhere in the
+EU’.94 Within a few weeks the Italian government was forced to its
+knees. The then prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, whose grip on
+power had endured civil society protests, strikes and a number of
+judicial processes for corruption and prostitution over a period of
+seventeen years, had to bend to the authority of rating agencies
+and resigned. On 13 January 2012 (soon dubbed the Eurozone’s
+‘black Friday’), S&P downgraded nine European countries, stripping
+nations such as France and Austria of their coveted AAA
+rating.95 Public institutions in Europe tried to prosecute CRAs on
+several grounds, including accusations of manipulation directed
+against S&P former president Deven Sharma.96 As the Euro-crisis
+deepened a draft European Commission paper on rating regulation
+suggested that CRAs should be forbidden from issuing downgrades
+of sovereign debt in cases of financial distress.
+Such attempts at altering the position of CRAs were met with
+hostility by the industry. In the USA, ratings agencies refused to
+give ratings to bond issuers, effectively halting their issuance. The
+situation was fixed in the short term with the SEC waiving the
+rating requirement for the time being. In Europe, the Big Three
+responded by placing all countries of the Eurozone on negative
+credit watch, spooking investors and adding further tensions to
+new global rulers
+
+an already fraught situation. Then, in July 2012, Moody’s directly
+targeted Europe’s powerhouse, Germany, shifting its outlook from
+positive to negative.97
+Policymakers were finally realizing that, due to negligent regulations
+put in place by governments and central banks, CRAs had
+become deeply hard-wired into banking and financial market
+regulations. Governments had made themselves unable to act
+when successive rating adjustments triggered a cascade of secondorder
+write-offs throughout nations and continents. On the one
+hand, CRAs’ increasing capacity to affect national and supranational
+policymaking effectively resulted in a narrowing down of
+the legitimate sphere of government intervention.98 On the other
+hand, their approach to financial stability clashed with politicians’
+short-term preoccupations, resulting in perverse mechanisms of
+financial punishment when social justice reforms were proposed
+and of approval when austerity measures were introduced. Rating
+decisions reinforced social distress in Europe, given that ‘[h]igher
+interest rates on government borrowing mean more taxpayer
+money gets paid to financial investors rather than being spent
+on popular public services and investments’.99 So, instead of
+contributing to solving the sovereign debt problem, rating agencies
+seemed set to worsen social conditions throughout the world.
+For borrowing countries, a rating downgrade has negative
+effects on their access to credit and the cost of borrowing.
+Furthermore, the lowering of a credit score by a CRA can create
+a vicious cycle, as not only do interest rates for that country
+increase, but other contracts with financial institutions may also
+be affected adversely, causing, in response, further expenses and
+reductions in creditworthiness.100 According to some, rating agencies
+provide a good example of agents manifesting ‘tunnel vision’.
+By ‘producing “certainty equivalents” rating agencies contribute
+both to absorbing and to (re)producing uncertainty’, instead of
+strengthening financial stability. 101
+how numbers rule the world
+
+The behaviour of CRAs during financial and economic crises
+is essentially conservative; that is, they either downgrade or at
+most confirm previous scores.102 A rating downgrade, or threat of
+downgrade, weakens the financial position of the state as issuer
+of debt obligations. Worse scores are an official recognition that
+the state’s debt has become riskier, which is compensated by an
+increase in rates of return for those obligations. Higher rates of
+return hinder treasuries’ ability to refinance the stock of existing
+debt, to issue new debt, to tackle short-term macroeconomic
+shocks through fiscal policy, and to manage short-term investments
+aimed at increasing fiscal revenues to repay debt. Since
+tax income is cyclical, it is considered less reliable by CRAs,
+which generally prefer privatization and austerity measures – that
+is, liquidation of public resources and reduced spending.103 The
+influence of the state over the market is increasingly restricted,
+while market mechanisms are sought to provide ever-larger shares
+of hitherto public services.
+Although sovereign ratings are provided without a fee for
+the country, there are nonetheless perverse incentives involved.
+Having missed the crisis in 2007/08, and the Latin American
+and Asian debt crises as well as the default of Enron and other
+fraudulent corporations before that, rating agencies have become
+overly sensitive to market movements, to the extent that they
+are erratic in their evaluations. Moreover, inflation of optimistic
+ratings during booms and abrupt downgrades during busts raise
+suspicions of corrupt practices.104 This is particularly problematic
+when these agencies sell advisory services to the same clients to
+whom they sell ratings, as in the case of advising a government
+on how to structure a security and then rating it on the basis of
+those recommendations.
+The global financial crisis has confirmed that rating agencies
+are potent political actors. CRAs not only provide information
+but help construct the context in which corporations and public
+new global rulers
+
+bodies make decisions.105 Rating agencies are not the neutral,
+technical and objective arbitrators they presume to be. Instead,
+they organize, coordinate and ‘make’ capital markets in the first
+place by controlling information and shaping judgements. At
+the very least, they possess a formidable ‘epistemic authority’,
+arguably like no other private institution in the world.106 Their
+numbers influence macroeconomic policies. Their assessments
+can doom entire countries and their peoples.
+
+Ratings and irrationality
+
+CRAs are important to investors not because of the informational
+function they fulfil, but rather because market participants
+believe CRAs’ numbers to be consequential: that is, they believe
+that they will influence the behaviour of other investors. Public
+expectations of CRAs as revealing some type of ‘truth’ about
+financial flows and creditworthiness are falsely grounded on a
+rationalist understanding of market behaviour.107 When looking
+at how markets operate, it becomes clear that financial actors are
+much more influenced by their expectations of how other market
+participants react than evidence-based analysis. This endogenous
+perspective, first voiced by Keynes in the late 1920s, implies that
+market participants are focused on anticipating what other traders
+are likely to do, in order to derive profits from predicting moves
+and subsequent market changes.108 Markets are generally not interested
+in finding a good or a better investment. They do not care
+too much about distinguishing between evidence and rumours. If
+they believe that enough investors will believe the rumour, then
+the latter becomes evidence – enough, that is, to switch investment
+plans and sell stocks or bonds. Social and psychological
+drivers of financial markets, such as fads, herd mentality and
+other features of collective irrationality, clearly upset the ideal of
+purely self-regulating efficient markets and help explain the ever
+how numbers rule the world
+
+more frequent rise of irrational exuberance. This is what Keynes
+termed ‘animal spirits’, naturally and periodically giving rise to
+financial crises.109 Nobel prizewinner Paul Krugman argues that
+CRAs’ ratings promote markets’ irrationality and, as such, should
+be disregarded for the purpose of regulation. He believes that,
+instead of relying on market agents for self-regulation, policymakers
+should work towards the establishment of reliable rules
+and steering mechanisms to avoid market failures.110 A number of
+experts and consultants (including analysts within the derivatives
+industry) have supported the idea of abolishing ratings as a way of
+‘weaning investors and regulators off’ what appears to be ‘like a
+drug’.111 Even the free-market think-tank Cato Institute advocates
+for policymakers to stop using ratings for regulatory purposes,
+recognizing the ‘de facto oligopoly’ in the sector.112
+According to UNCTAD, ‘ratings tend to be sticky, lagging
+markets, and overreact when they do change’, which aggravates
+financial crises and contributes to cross-country contagion.113
+During the 1997–98 Asian crisis, for instance, rating agencies
+reinforced boom-and-bust trends by lagging instead of leading
+events and by overreacting during critical phases, thus amplifying
+cycles.114 Studies looking at the role of CRAs during the
+Mexican crisis in the mid-1990s also concluded that negative
+announcements on sovereign ratings from the largest agencies
+significantly raised bond yields and stock market volatility and
+thus contributed to destabilizing international capital flows.115 As
+we have seen, downgrades often result in fewer investors wanting
+to purchase government bonds, thus triggering higher yield rates.
+This spike is then reflected in higher interest rates for future
+auctions, making the borrowing even more costly and thereby
+contributing to an increasing budget deficit, which in turn can
+lead to a further downgrading, starting the spiral once again.
+According to the agencies, such sluggishness in adjusting
+ratings is justified by their aim of providing long-term perspectives
+new global rulers
+
+rather than immediate assessments. This strategy implies that
+CRAs will always have a delay in perceiving that any particular
+reform is not just the initial part of a reversible cycle, but instead
+the commencement of a sustained process. As a result, a country’s
+effort to improve its financial situation, for instance, might be long
+undermined by a persistently negative (though incorrect) outlook
+on its capacity to service its debt. This situation reinforces the
+view that the numbers produced by CRAs do not really provide
+any informational added value, but simply impact investors unilaterally,
+hindering the state’s ability to recover from negative
+shocks and forcing it to embark on austerity measures that may
+turn out to have a limited impact on markets’ recovery while
+putting a sizable burden on the population.
+Historically, less than 1 per cent of investments with AAA
+ratings experienced outright default. But after the housing bubble
+burst in the USA, ‘a vast majority of securities with AAA ratings
+incurred substantial losses; some failed outright.’116 About 80 per
+cent of the CDOs that were rated AAA by S&P’s between 2005
+and 2007 were downgraded below investment grade in the turmoil
+of the US real estate crisis.117
+The US Senate’s investigation panel came to the conclusion
+that overly positive ratings supported market soar, then ‘sudden
+mass downgrades … were the immediate trigger for the financial
+crisis’.118 The chief economist at the Organization for Economic
+Cooperation and Development declared that CRAs ‘express
+judgements that speed up trends already underway’ and concluded:
+‘It is like pushing someone who is standing on the edge
+of a cliff.’119
+In spite of their evident realization of the power of CRAs,
+public regulators have continued relying on ratings to design
+policies aimed at curbing the global financial crisis. The Federal
+Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which
+financed the purchase by taxpayers of some trillions of new
+how numbers rule the world
+
+securities to sustain the economy, based the acquisition of these
+loans ‘on the condition they have triple A ratings’. 120 Moreover,
+the Fed accepted to buy commercial paper directly from companies,
+‘only if the debt has at least the equivalent of an A-1
+rating, the second highest for short-term credit.’ Because of these
+decisions, which once again put CRAs at the centre of financial
+market regulation, it was estimated that the Big Three may have
+enjoyed as much as $400 million in fees, coming from taxpayer
+money, in 2009. During the 2008 economic collapse, Moody’s
+alone reported revenue of $1.76 billion, a profit margin of 41 per
+cent.
+In Europe, a 2009 directive made registration with the Committee
+of European Securities Regulators mandatory for CRAs intending
+to operate in the EU market.121 Key additional provisions
+included prohibiting rating agencies from providing advisory
+services, preventing them from rating financial instruments if
+they do not have sufficient quality information, and forcing them
+to disclose their models, methodologies and key assumptions. As
+recognized by the news agency Bloomberg, public institutions
+have taken numerous steps to find a way out of the deepest
+recession in recent history. Yet ‘no one has taken steps that would
+substantially fix a broken ratings system.’122
+In the opinion of Peter Fischer, managing director and co-head
+of fixed income at the New York-based BlackRock, the largest
+publicly traded asset management company in the USA, rating
+agencies should simply be replaced. While at the beginning of the
+twentieth century, when equities were thought to be complicated
+and bonds were viewed as simple, it appeared to make sense to
+have a few rating agencies set up to tell us all what bonds to buy:
+‘But flash forward to the slicing and dicing of credit today, and it’s
+really a pretty wacky concept.’123 In his view, the entire licensing
+process is flawed, as it gives a few companies complete control
+over markets and regulations. By eliminating public licences,
+new global rulers
+
+rating agencies would become just like equity analysts, paid for
+their opinion directly by investors.
+Economic thinking is completely comfortable with the concept
+of risk. Indeed, risk is quantifiable: it can be measured and,
+therefore, controlled. Whoever controls risk can predict the
+future. And those who predict the future are the new rulers.
+By contrast, uncertainty implies subjectivity. It is the realm of
+guessing, where common sense and rules of thumb are the only
+parameters to guide decisions. Uncertainty can be defined as pure
+possibility, which cannot be trapped into numbers. And without
+numbers, which convey a sense of authority, there is no political
+influence. In the realm of uncertainty and subjectivity, everybody
+is equal. According to the economist Frank Knight, the founder
+of the free-market Chicago School, uncertain conditions make
+it impossible for agents to assign probabilities and anticipate
+evolutions.124 For one of his historical opponents, John Keynes,
+uncertainty eliminates the power of numbers, as it prevents the
+forecasting of such things as prices, war or future interest rates.125
+In spite of their opposing views on political economy, both Knight
+and Keynes agreed that uncertainty is a constant facet of economic
+activity, providing opportunities for profit while inevitably exposing
+markets to the possibility of losses. It is perhaps this open
+entrepreneurial spirit, marked by unforeseeable possibilities, that
+rating agencies have tried to tame by resorting to apparently
+complex calculations aided by shady statistical methodologies.
+Through the apparent objectivity of mathematics, they have
+purported to transform uncertainties into risks.126 Undoubtedly,
+a certain progress in computing technologies has enabled them
+to diffuse the margins of indeterminacy with a view to translating
+more contingent events into statistical probabilities.
+In economics, risk is typically associated with optimal equilibria.
+It is a function of fancy models, which can get you published
+in peer-reviewed journals or hired by multi-billion-dollar hedge
+how numbers rule the world
+
+funds. Uncertainties are simply unknown risks. As such, they
+will never get you anywhere. Risk managers are well respected
+and remunerated. Uncertainty specialists, just like wizards, exist
+only in fairy tales.
+The rating process is at the core of a risk society. Through
+the apparently scientific neutrality of numbers (or alphanumeric
+characters, in the case of ratings), it conveys a false sense of
+control and predictability. Even Moody’s concedes that ‘credit
+rating is by nature subjective’ and that ‘any attempt to reduce
+credit rating to a formulaic methodology would be misleading and
+would lead to serious mistakes.’127 Similarly, the former president
+of S&P recognized that ratings are too enmeshed in regulatory
+frameworks. He pleaded with the SEC to get rid of references to
+rating companies in regulations as he felt that ‘there’s too much
+risk of being overused and inappropriately used’.128
+In the end, it may be argued that CRAs are simply products
+of a society unable to deal with the unbearable lightness of uncertainty.
+CRAs have thrived because they have been extremely
+crafty at using the ‘objectifying cloak of economic and financial
+analysis’.129 They have been hiding behind numbers ‘when it
+is easier than justifying what may, in fact, be a difficult judgment’.130
+By resorting to catchy computations, which hide the
+fundamental sketchiness of data collection, these agencies project
+an idea of reality that corporations, politicians and investors
+have traditionally found very comfortable. Through their ratings,
+CRAs have in fact provided a false sense of confidence, which
+has suited policymakers and ultimately explains their eagerness
+to invest these ‘opinion makers’ with unprecedented authority.
+Yet, socio-political events do not readily lend themselves to being
+captured as a numerical probability. This is why crises reveal the
+underlying fiction of risk management and catapult societies back
+onto the playing field of uncertainty.
+new global rulers
+
+In their political manifestation, CRAs’ ratings have thrived in
+an age marked by a short-sighted narrative: that of the obsolete
+and dysfunctional state being overtaken by the victorious and
+effective capital market. In the world designed by ratings, which
+quickly collapsed under the irrationality of financial distress, it
+was the politics of numbers, not the politics of citizens, which
+decided how to govern our societies. Ultimately, the power of
+ratings is a function of the impoverishment of democracy.
+As discussed in the previous chapter, it is not only the manipulation
+of numbers that skews governance processes, but also the
+inherent trust in measurements and in those who produce them.
+In many regards, the rating agencies perfectly exemplify our
+society’s trust in numbers and the burgeoning power of auditors.
+In the next chapter we move from the financial world to that of
+the politics and economics of climate change, where numbers
+have provided munitions for heated contestations between climate
+scientists and the so-called sceptics, ultimately rewarding market
+forces through the adoption of policies based on a narrow conceptualization
+of costs and benefits.
+chapter 3
+
+Fiddling while the planet burns:
+
+the marketization of climate change
+
+Public policy could itself become the captive of a scientifictechnological
+elite. The prospect of domination of the
+nation’s scholars by … project allocations, and the power of
+money is ever present – and is gravely to be regarded.
+
+Dwight Eisenhower
+
+Although the politics of statistics and the power of numbers in
+global governance are most powerfully exemplified by the role of
+credit rating agencies, there are many other critical areas where
+measurements have taken centre stage in informing public policy.
+Environmental governance, and in particular the climate change
+debate, has been the field in which fully fledged ‘stat wars’ have
+been waged in the past forty years, with different camps using
+numbers, measurements, models and indexes to pursue opposing
+agendas. In this field, too, just like in that of ratings, a burgeoning
+industry of auditors has taken centre stage, with an enormous
+quantity of money to be made.
+These four decades have been characterized by growing concerns
+regarding the overall state of the world’s environment, with
+a series of high-level summits inaugurated by the United Nations
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+Conference on the Human Environment (usually referred to as
+the Stockholm Conference) in 1972 and the World Commission
+on Environment and Development, better known as the Bruntland
+Commission, which published the first report on sustainable
+development in 1987.
+1 With the creation of the Intergovernmental
+Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established by the World
+Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment
+Programme in 1988, scientists from all over the world began to
+work on collating information with a view to generating consensus
+on the state of the planet’s climate. Their main goal was to review
+piles of numbers and clarify whether the globe was warming or
+not. Politicians waited for statistics to move forward, so scientists
+felt pressed to prove, beyond any reasonable doubt, that global
+warming was really happening. At the same time, a series of
+think-tanks and contrarian scientists began to produce alternative
+research with the aim of debunking the work conducted by the
+IPCC. In parallel, economists of all sorts introduced a variety of
+models to estimate the pros and cons of climate-change-inspired
+reforms, triggering debates, controversies and profound contrast
+within the social sciences. Among them, the battle of numbers
+saw a profound division between those who advocated action and
+those who demonstrated the economic advantages of inaction.
+Much was at stake, as environmental groups, social movements
+and various voices in civil society started calling into question the
+very foundation of the development model pursued by advanced
+economies since the Industrial Revolution.
+During these years, the politics of numbers sealed the intimate
+connection between market approaches and the environment,
+eventually accepting – albeit indirectly, as we will see – the
+proposals put forward by climate sceptics and the fossil fuel
+industry. Narrow economic reasoning and some of its traditional
+methodologies, especially cost–benefit analysis, were introduced
+in climate change governance with a view to identifying acceptable
+how numbers rule the world
+
+equilibria between the interests of markets and those of nature.
+The apparent neutrality of numerical models ultimately led to a
+marketization of the climate debate, in which concepts such as
+sustainable development, cap and trade or green growth became
+linguistic devices to strengthen the grip of markets on the alleged
+transition to a low carbon society.
+
+Environmental scepticism
+and the rise of cost–benefit analysis
+
+In their book Merchants of Doubt, historians Naomi Oreskes
+and Erik M. Conway provide a detailed analysis of the connections
+between some industrial lobbies, conservative ‘think-tanks’,
+private foundations and the so-called environmental sceptics,
+particularly in the USA.2 They show the tentacular reach of this
+‘industry of denial’ and its impact on American political institutions.
+Ever since the 1970s, this industry’s strategy has been to
+stir controversy in areas where scientific consensus was reached
+(famously, for instance, in the research on the link between cancer
+and tobacco smoke) and to manufacture doubt. The overall objective
+of their ‘counter-science’ has been to oppose governmental
+regulation in a variety of fields and protect consolidated industrial
+interests, especially in the fossil fuel sector and in the military–
+industrial complex, which they did – for example – by providing
+scientific reports backing President Reagan’s strategic defence
+initiative (popularly known as the Star Wars plan). Championed
+by the Tobacco Institute, this strategy was consistently adopted
+throughout the past decades to derail reforms in the field of,
+among others, acid rain, the ozone hole and climate change. The
+main promoters of this view have been powerful scientists such as
+the physicist William Nierenberg, who had been involved in the
+Manhattan Project during the Second World War; Fredrick Seitz,
+the former president of the US National Academy of Sciences and
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+NATO consultant; US Navy scientist Siegfried Fred Singer; and
+climatologist Patrick (Pat) Michaels, research fellow at the libertarian
+Cato Institute and author of books like Meltdown: The Predictable
+Distortion of Global Warming by Scientists, Politicians,
+and the Media. All of them have been, in one way or another,
+connected with fossil fuel lobbies and the military–industrial
+complex, and played a pivotal role in informing the environmental
+policies enacted during the Reagan administrations (1981–89)
+and George H.W. Bush’s tenure (1989–93). Among other activities,
+Nierenberg and Seitz co-founded the George C. Marshall
+Institute, a powerful conservative think-tank established in 1984
+to support Reagan’s nuclear defence plans against the criticisms
+of progressive scientific organizations such as the Union of Concerned
+Scientists. In the following years the Institute moved on
+to fund ‘alternative’ research disputing the carcinogenic nature
+of tobacco smoking (including passive smoking), the cause and
+consequences of acid rain and the depletion of the ozone layer.3
+Fred Singer consulted for oil companies such as Exxon and Shell
+and for military corporations such as Lockheed Martin, before
+joining the University of Virginia, where he founded the Science
+and Environmental Policy Project, an advocacy group disputing
+mainstream scientific consensus on environmental problems. In
+an interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Pat Michaels admitted
+that roughly ‘40 per cent’ of his income and research funds
+comes from the petroleum industry, triggering accusations by US
+policymakers that he had ‘misled’ Congress in a testimony before
+the Energy and Commerce Committee held in 2009.
+4
+
+For the past few decades, a dense web of foundations and
+think-tanks has been actively supporting the environmental sceptics
+in the USA, whose controversial stance has been further amplified
+by complacent media, some of which have given credit to
+unorthodox views intentionally, while others have simply played
+by the so-called ‘fairness doctrine’, a code established in 1949
+how numbers rule the world
+
+in conjunction with the rise of television that requires broadcast
+journalists to dedicate equivalent airtime to opposing parties in
+the coverage of controversial issues of public concern.5
+ According
+to sociologists Riley Dunlap and Aaron McCright, who contributed
+a chapter on the theme to the 2011 Oxford Handbook of
+Climate Change and Society, the ‘climate change denial machine’
+revolves around a handful of business groups (including fossil fuel
+giants such as ExxonMobil, the American Petroleum Institute,
+the Western Fuels Association and natural resources industries
+such as the National Mining Association and the American Forest
+and Paper Association), which have provided systematic funding
+to think-tanks such as the George C. Marshall Institute, the
+American Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, the Competitive
+Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation.6 Their lobbying
+and research work over the past decades has been successful
+at creating an aura of ‘doubt’ about the scientific consensus on
+climate change, its causes and impacts. In a few instances, they
+have also succeeded at initiating more popular movements, such
+as the Global Climate Coalition (a business campaign opposing
+reduction in greenhouse gases) and the American Coalition for
+Clean Coal Electricity (recently renamed America’s Power).
+Although their arguments have been refuted innumerable
+times by the scientific community, the sceptics’ most significant
+(and enduring) success has been the popularization of utilitarian
+reasoning as the best way to deal with policy decisions in
+environmental governance. Their intimate connections with the
+Reagan administration allowed them to shape not only the president’s
+views on environmental issues, but also his inclination to
+adopt a market-based approach to the resolution of any potential
+trade-off between business interests and ecological concerns.
+These scholars were instrumental in forging a broad consensus
+among policymakers (which is still dominant today) that environmental
+protection (and preservation) should not be seen
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+as a fundamental value for the promotion of human well-being,
+but rather as an obstacle to economic development. By framing
+the three components of sustainability (economic, social and
+environmental) not as mutually reinforcing, but as in constant
+trade-off with one another, they called for the systematic application
+of utility-based criteria to guide policy decisions. Fred
+Singer himself, for instance, was among the first to champion the
+use of cost–benefit analysis in dealing with environmental problems.
+Cost–benefit analysis is a comparative measurement of the
+costs and benefits associated with a particular decision, project
+or government policy, which has nowadays become common
+practice for the ex-ante assessment of environmental policies in
+most countries. To be comparable, costs and benefits must be
+expressed in monetary terms and adjusted for a particular time
+horizon. As often costs and benefits occur at different points in
+time, especially in fields such as environmental protection (where
+costs are borne by present generations and most of the benefits
+enjoyed by the future), economists apply discount rates for future
+benefits: in theory, this should make it possible to equalize the
+time difference and gauge if overall benefits outweigh overall costs
+(the so-called ‘net present value’). When costs outweigh benefits
+(measured in terms of market prices), economic rationality
+calls for inaction: it would make economic sense simply to do
+nothing. In a 1979 report on the costs and benefits of air pollution
+control commissioned by the Mitre Corporation, a leading force
+in the US military apparatus, Singer took exactly such a position,
+arguing for ‘a conservative approach to air pollution control’ and
+making the case for alternative options to ‘lower national costs’.7
+In 1982, he was rewarded for his contribution to the application
+of cost–benefit methodologies in the field of environmental assessment
+and invited to join President Reagan’s Acid Rain Peer
+Review Panel, which was chaired by his friend and fellow sceptic
+William Nierenberg.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+There are numerous conceptual and methodological problems
+with cost–benefit analysis, which almost invariably lead
+to contrasting outcomes and endless disputes among those who
+use this method. Take, for instance, the results of cost–benefit
+studies dealing with global warming mitigation. According to
+the famous review on the economics of climate change carried
+out by LSE professor Nicholas Stern for the UK government in
+2006, the benefits of strong and early action on climate change far
+outweigh the costs of not acting. For the review, climate change
+would cause a loss of between 5 and 10 per cent of GDP every
+year, while the costs of introducing measures to avoid most of
+the harm would amount to roughly 1 per cent of global income.
+However, alternative calculations produced by other economists,
+including Nobel prizewinner William Nordhaus, reached opposite
+results.8 One study carried out by the Cato Institute sets
+the bar much higher, arguing that emission cuts would only be
+worth it in the event of climate change reducing GDP by at least
+10 per cent a year.9
+ Yale professor Robert Mendelsohn, following
+Nordhaus’s reasoning that society should balance marginal
+mitigation costs with marginal damages, maintained that ‘[c]osts
+borne in the present are more burdensome than costs born in the
+future’, which led him to the obvious conclusion that the current
+generation should only invest in climate change mitigation policies
+that earn ‘the same rate of return as competitive investments in
+a myriad of market sector alternatives’.10 Interestingly, in a paper
+published in April 2008, Stern rebutted his critics by pointing
+out a traditional weapon employed by environmental sceptics: that
+is, that ‘[u]ncertainty, and the prospect of resolving some of it in
+the future, is often used as a justification for delaying action’.11
+He added that results of the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report in
+2007 vindicated his claim that bold reforms were needed as soon
+as possible and emphasized that, while economists seem willing
+to accept high risks as they fall primarily on future generations,
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+‘most people would find this conclusion unethical’. Then he conceded
+that his review probably erred, but on the side of caution:
+‘We underestimated the risks … We underestimated the damage
+associated with temperature increase … and we underestimated
+the probabilities of temperature increases.’12
+The discount rates on which the very concept of cost–benefit
+analysis is based are, ultimately, personal value judgements made
+by researchers.13 In general, economists are fond of assigning
+a lower value to benefits occurring in the future because they
+assume that income will be higher then, which, in view of the
+principle of diminishing marginal utility, should make it easier for
+future generations to bear the costs of lower consumption. They
+also assume that technological progress will find more efficient
+ways to address environmental problems. Moreover, their models
+give priority to the utility of people living in the present (inherent
+discounting), thus rejecting values such as intergenerational
+solidarity and long-term sustainability.14 As Berkeley economist
+and former deputy assistant secretary of the US Treasury Brad
+Delong puts it, there is a fundamental ‘flaw in our reasoning’ as we
+are ‘impatient in the sense of valuing the present and near-future
+much more than we value the distant future’ and always prefer
+‘a bird in the hand to two in the bush’.15 Indeed, no matter how
+‘elegant’ some cost–benefit models may seem, the fact remains
+that no one can measure how much future generations will value
+decisions we take today or, by contrast, how much we value the
+benefits that future generations will enjoy because of our decision
+to bear certain costs in the present.
+Due to all these assumptions, Singer’s contribution to the
+Acid Rain Panel’s report in 1984 concluded that it was simply
+too difficult to quantify the costs and benefits of air pollution
+control (he actually ventured into an infamous off-the-cuff
+estimate of ‘one-billion dollar solution to a one-million dollar
+problem’ without providing any information as to how he had
+how numbers rule the world
+
+computed such figures), although in 1979 the White House
+Council on Environmental Quality had already estimated the
+economic benefit of clean air at US$ 21.4 billion – a year.16 He
+suggested, instead, adopting a market-based system of transferable
+emissions credits, in which government would simply need to set
+a maximum allowance (today we would call it a ‘cap’) and sell
+these rights to companies, which would use them or trade them
+for a financial return.17 In the end, this is exactly what the Bush
+administration did. Following Singer’s advice, the US government
+launched the first large-scale trading scheme in the world,
+which was established in 1990 with a view to curbing emissions
+of sulphur dioxide, the gas responsible for acid rain. In 2003,
+the Environmental Protection Agency quantified the overall cost
+of acid rain provisions for the previous decade at about US$8.8
+billion per year, while estimating benefits at the tune of more
+than ten times as much (between US$101 and US$109 billion
+per year), thus debunking Singer’s early analysis. Despite all its
+flaws, Singer’s approach would ultimately be victorious in the
+battle of ideas on environmental governance. Indeed, the rapid
+diffusion of emission trading schemes since the adoption of the
+Kyoto Protocol confirmed the global appeal of the sceptics’ main
+argument: avoid regulation at all costs and let the market rule.
+
+Climategate: twisting numbers for the climate
+
+In the years from the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol to the
+outbreak of the global economic crisis, climate change gained
+centre stage in international politics, with a series of high-level
+summits and growing commitments made by governments and
+political leaders across the globe, despite the sceptics’ attempts to
+convince public opinion that science was inconclusive. In 2007,
+the IPCC shared the Nobel Peace Prize with former US vice
+president Al Gore, by then one of the leading activists in the fight
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+against global warming. Global campaigns such as those organized
+by the environmental coalition 350.org galvanized millions
+of people in all continents. The election of Barack Obama to the
+White House, coupled with a large majority of Democrats in both
+branches of Congress, seemed to reassure the world that the USA
+was finally ready to commit to an international binding treaty,
+after almost two decades of opposition to any form of international
+cooperation. Meanwhile, the nations of the world were negotiating
+a new treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol and all eyes were on
+the preparation of the United Nations Framework Conference
+on Climate Change, which was to take place in Copenhagen in
+December 2009. Then came the ‘climategate’ affair, which shed
+a dark shadow over the tenability of some numbers produced
+by climate scientists to demonstrate the planet’s warming. As
+most policy and economic analyses (including the Stern Review)
+relied on data produced by climate scientists, what better way
+for sceptics to discredit the source of all forecasts and bring
+controversy into the picture?
+For most of his academic career, Phil Jones was a productive,
+but rather obscure climate scientist. Since 1998, he had been the
+director of the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East
+Anglia, in the UK. Jones worked quite closely with the British
+National Weather Service to gather information from thousands
+of meteorological stations around the world. He was in charge
+of the so-called instrumental temperature record; that is, a time
+series of temperature fluctuations of the global land surface and
+oceans dating back hundreds of years. In 2001, his studies of
+the planet’s temperature were featured rather prominently in the
+Third Assessment Report of the IPCC and then, in 2007, his
+work deeply influenced the conclusions of the Fourth Assessment
+Report, which stated that ‘warming of the climate system is
+unequivocal’, and that ‘most of the observed increase in global
+average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely
+how numbers rule the world
+
+due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas
+concentrations.’18
+Then, quite abruptly, Jones’s relatively uneventful life was
+steamrollered by a scandal of global proportions. On 19 November
+2009, the server of the Climate Research Unit was hacked and
+thousands of emails and documents were stolen. The hacked
+information was sent to a handful of climate sceptics’ websites,
+including Climate Audit, arguably one of the best-known dissident
+blogs in the field, developed by Steve McIntyre, a Canadian
+mathematician and former mining consultant with links
+to the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a think-tank that had
+long disputed the validity of official data on global temperatures.
+Jones’s private correspondence was dissected and then fed to
+the Internet. Thousands of websites and social networks started
+to relay the content of these documents and, finally, the media
+broke the news.19
+Jones’s emails were embarrassing, to say the least. In some
+messages, he regularly instructed collaborators and colleagues to
+avoid putting their data in the public domain, lest they may be
+used by opponents. This was in clear violation of scientific openness
+and of the UK Freedom of Information Act, which granted
+access to scientific studies to all those interested. He lamented
+that McIntyre and his co-author, the economist Ross McKitrick,
+had been after his data for years: ‘If they ever hear there is a
+Freedom of Information Act now in the UK, I think I’ll delete
+the file rather than send to anyone.’20 Other messages revealed
+the collusion of climate scientists to ‘pressure journal editors who
+published work questioning the climate science-consensus’ and to
+keep some more critical analyses out of the IPCC official reports,
+‘even if we have to redefine what the peer-review literature is’.21
+Jones’s deputy, Keith Briffa, admitted in an email that he had
+worked ‘hard to balance the needs of the science and the IPCC,
+which were not always the same’.
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+They complained to the Royal Meteorological Society when it
+requested that all authors of its journals publicize their data. Jones
+threatened not to submit ‘any more papers to any RMS journal’.
+In an email dated 3 January 2009, Mike McCracken of the Climate
+Institute raised concerns that predictions regarding the warming
+of the planet’s temperature may be wrong. He suggested thinking
+of a backup plan by arguing, for instance, that sulphates were
+causing global cooling: ‘Otherwise, the skeptics will be all over
+us – the world is really cooling, the models are no good, etc. And
+all this just as the US is about ready to get serious on the issue.’22
+Quite astonishing were the entries retrieved from the journal
+kept by Ian Harris, the researcher and programmer in charge of
+updating the Unit’s datasets. In the so-called ‘Harry ReadMe File’,
+Harris pointed out the presence of missing cases that weakened
+statistical correlations: ‘What the hell is supposed to happen here?
+Oh yeah – there is no “supposed”, I can make it up. So I have
+:-).’ He went on, lamenting ‘the hopeless state of our databases’,
+in which ‘there is no uniform data integrity, it’s just a catalogue
+of issues that continues to grow as they’re found.’ He concluded:
+
+You can’t imagine what this has cost me – to actually allow the
+operator to assign false WMO codes!! But what else is there in
+such situations? Especially when dealing with a ‘Master’ database
+of dubious provenance (which, er, they all are and always
+will be).23
+
+The most compromising message, however, was sent by Jones
+himself. In conversations with Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley
+and Malcolm Hughes, distinguished authors of a 1998 paper
+published in Nature that analysed global-scale temperature patterns,
+he boasted the use of some methodological ‘trick’ to hide
+the decline in temperatures over the previous five decades.24
+Jones, Mann and colleagues argued that these statements were
+taken out of context and largely misinterpreted.25 Yet Jones’s
+how numbers rule the world
+
+admissions cast doubt over the reliability of the most popular
+icon of the climate change debate, the so-called hockey stick
+graph. Developed by Mann and his colleagues, the hockey stick
+graph shows the average temperature over the past six centuries,
+by plotting data gathered via instruments against reconstructions
+based on the varying widths of tree rings from ancient trees, a
+proxy for the variation of temperatures in the past.26 According
+to their calculations, there was little or no variation in global
+temperatures until the late 1800s. Then, in the twentieth century,
+numbers go up, thus causing a sharp rise in the graph, just like
+the blade of a hockey stick. For many, not only in the scientific
+community, the graph shows quite intuitively that mankind, ever
+since the Industrial Revolution, has somehow managed to alter
+an otherwise stable climate pattern.
+This was what climate sceptics had been waiting for. In their
+view, it proved that climatologists had been tinkering with their
+data to show that temperatures were on the rise, a conclusion
+notoriously disputed by a spate of critics. Among them was the
+influential Frederick Seitz, founding chairman of the sceptics’
+stronghold, the George C. Marshall Institute, who in a 1996 editorial
+in the Wall Street Journal had harshly criticized the IPCC
+report by affirming that ‘in my more than 60 years as a member
+of the American scientific community, I have never witnessed a
+more disturbing corruption of the peer review process.’27 Sceptics
+argued that the so-called ‘hacker’ was in fact an internal source
+who, unhappy with the methods employed by the research unit,
+decided to act as a whistle-blower.28 McIntyre and McKitrick,
+who had written a number of papers contesting the validity of
+the hockey stick graph and the conclusion that the last century
+had been experiencing extraordinarily high temperatures, felt
+vindicated.29
+In a few days, Jones’s mailbox was stormed by abusive
+emails, some of them threatening his life and those of his family.
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+Embarrassed and worried, Jones stepped down. In an interview
+with the Sunday Times, he confessed to having considered
+suicide.30 Several official investigations were launched. The most
+important of them was undertaken by the House of Commons’
+Science and Technology Select Committee, which concluded that
+there was no real case against Jones and his team. The group of
+scientists had adopted a debatable communication style, but no
+evidence of omission or manipulation was found.31 In 2010, Jones
+was indeed reinstated in his academic capacity, although with
+another job, after a further investigation found no fault with the
+‘rigour and honesty as scientists’ of Jones and his collaborators.32
+It conceded, however, that the Climate Research Unit had not
+lived up to the spirit of openness that is generally expected of
+scientists, mainly because of their resistance to share information
+and data. Michael Mann was also subject to an investigation by
+Penn State University, where he was director of the Earth System
+Science Center. The panel that reviewed his case concluded that
+there was no evidence of data falsification or destruction, and
+that Mann had not engaged in any misuse of privileged or confidential
+information. Yet it left open the question of whether the
+scientist ‘deviated from accepted practices within the academic
+community’.33
+The damage was done. Never mind that no evidence of malfeasance
+was found. Never mind that researchers were able to
+resume their work as planned. And, most importantly, never mind
+that the scientific validity of their contribution to the study of
+global warming was confirmed by the international community.
+As the media had jumped on the bandwagon of ‘climate bashers’,
+what should have been treated as a minor public relations issue
+became a historic opportunity to sling mud at decades of scientific
+research. For example, the IPCC was accused of having suppressed
+critical chapters in its Fourth Report. Although the IPCC
+denied such allegations, a number of errors were identified in its
+how numbers rule the world
+
+publications, forcing the UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon to
+call for an independent review.34 Given that American scientists
+had been involved in the suspicious email exchange, Republican
+members of the US Congress called for a criminal investigation
+by the Department of Justice. They maintained that the implicated
+climatologists had been ‘manipulating data and knowingly
+using flawed climate models to reach preconceived conclusions’
+and, as a consequence, the IPCC consensus that ‘anthropogenic
+emissions are inexorably leading to environmental catastrophes’
+had been irremediably compromised. They also called on the US
+Environmental Protection Agency to review its stance on the risks
+associated with greenhouse gases, suggesting that the so-called
+endangerment finding, which states that industrial and motor
+emissions threaten the public health and welfare of current and
+future generations, ‘should be thrown out’.35
+As remarked by the magazine Nature, ‘huge damage has been
+done to the reputation of climate science, and arguably to science
+as a whole.’36 The very name ‘climategate’, widely adopted by
+the media to describe the incident, undoubtedly contributed
+to creating an aura of suspicion and manipulation, as if climate
+scientists – in their dark university rooms and laboratories –
+had been orchestrating a fear-mongering plan to take control of
+environmental governance. Quite expectedly, conspiracy theories
+abounded. A much-downloaded report published by the Science
+and Public Policy Institute (SPPI), a think-tank opposing ‘prodigious
+economic or political sacrifices for the sake of negligible
+benefits’, maintained that the Climate Research Unit ‘had conspired
+in an attempt to redefine what is and is not peer-reviewed
+science’.37 It called for these ‘climate criminals’ to be ‘imprisoned
+for their fraudulent tampering with scientific data, and for their
+suppression of results uncongenial to their politicized viewpoint’
+and concluded that ‘the manufactured non-problem of “global
+warming” should be put on hold forthwith, and no further public
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+policy measures should be instituted at any future time.’ The
+author of the report, the British commentator Christopher Monckton,
+used to be a scientific adviser to prime minister Margaret
+Thatcher in the 1980s and had made himself infamous for his
+views on AIDS, against whose spread he recommended ‘to screen
+the entire population regularly and to quarantine all carriers of
+the disease for life’.38 In what appeared as a coordinated attack
+against mainstream scientific findings, the SPPI launched a series
+of smear campaigns, including a public call for the suppression
+of the IPCC and the arrest of Al Gore. With the support of
+another sceptics’ institution, the Center for the Study of Carbon
+Dioxide and Global Change, they gathered evidence from what
+they claimed to be more than 1,000 scientists from more than
+600 institutions in more than 40 countries to demonstrate what
+they believed to be the fallacies in the IPCC’s consensus on the
+trend of global temperatures. Their latest book is aptly titled The
+Many Benefits of Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment.
+39
+
+The timing of climategate could have not been more propitious
+for the sceptics and the lobbies they represented. Just a
+few weeks after the hacking, world leaders met in Copenhagen
+to discuss the future of the Kyoto Protocol. The 17th Conference
+of Parties (commonly dubbed COP17) turned out to be a colossal
+disappointment for environmentalists and concerned citizens. Not
+only did the international community reject the possibility of a
+common long-term agreement, but ever since all international
+summits have turned out to be no more than very expensive opportunities
+to postpone the problem. The USA, the stronghold of
+environmental scepticism, also saw a sharp decline in the public’s
+concern with climate change. In 2008, 71 per cent of American
+citizens believed that global warming was happening. By 2010,
+however, this number had dropped to 57 per cent (with those who
+did not believe in climate change at 20 per cent from 10 per cent
+in 2008, and those who were uncertain increasing to 23 per cent).
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Among those who believed in climate change, however, only 59
+per cent were ‘very’ or ‘extremely sure’ that it was happening,
+about a 13 per cent drop from 2008. Similarly, only about half of
+Americans were ‘worried’ about climate change, while in 2008
+the same belief was held by 63 per cent of the population.40
+One of the think-tanks that has profited most from the climategate
+controversy is the Copenhagen Consensus Center
+(CCC). Founded in 2002 by the ‘sceptical environmentalist’ Bjørn
+Lomborg, the Copenhagen Consensus comprises a small group
+of researchers, with a wide network of collaborators, including
+several economists of Nobel fame. According to its mission, the
+CCC ‘improves knowledge and gives an overview of research and
+facts within a given problem, which means that the prioritization
+is based on evidence’. The reference to ‘evidence’ is of course a
+powerful one, but no further specification is made as to what
+such evidence would consist of. The Center purports to shy away
+from ideology and political agendas, by relying exclusively on
+numbers and economic reasoning. Through a systematic use of
+cost–benefit analysis, they present themselves as the new frontier
+of global problem-solving. In 2008, through the input of a panel
+of five well-known economists (including free-marketeer Jagdish
+Baghwati and Austrian economist Vernon Smith), they came up
+with a list of the best and worst ways to fight climate change.
+Quite expectedly, the best ways focused on non-regulatory approaches,
+such as technological innovation and climate engineering,
+including carbon sequestration. They also recommended
+a wider use of technology transfers from more industrialized
+to less industrialized countries and funding for climate adaptation
+– that is, projects aimed at preparing societies to deal with
+harsher climates, instead of focusing on social justice proposals
+for mitigation, such as the introduction of carbon taxes in rich
+countries to deal with the climate debt. In a paper published in
+2009, the CCC dished out a series of numbers to make its point.
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+It estimated that the welfare loss induced by climate change in the
+year 2100 would be in the same order as losing a few percentage
+points of income: ‘That is, a century worth of climate change is
+about as bad as losing one or two years of economic growth.’41
+Why bother then? Their conclusion was that climate change
+should not be a priority for policymakers, at least not yet. Specific
+measures should only be introduced later on, when the costs for
+society will be more acceptable.
+According to its founder, the CCC promotes evidence-based
+reflections on climate change by championing ‘an economic approach
+to the environment’.42 As a consequence, they privilege
+solutions that are based on the monetization of resources. For
+instance, to address food scarcity while preserving biodiversity,
+they stress the importance of increasing agricultural yields
+through research and development, ‘making it possible to feed
+more people with less land’.43 They estimate that with a $14.5
+billion annual infusion into research it is possible to achieve a 20
+per cent higher annual growth of crops and 40 per cent higher
+growth for livestock, which over the next four decades should
+reduce pressure on nature and thus help biodiversity. In total,
+the alleged benefits will be in the order of $53 billion: ‘for every
+dollar spent, we will do about 7 dollars worth of good both for
+biodiversity and climate.’
+In 2012, the CCC published a new ‘consensus’, outlining
+the most important global challenges for the years to come. For
+climate change, which they ranked at the bottom of the list,
+the CCC experts recommended spending just a small amount
+of public money (roughly $1 billion) to explore new frontiers
+in climate engineering, such as Stratospheric Aerosol Injection
+(whereby a precursor of sulphur dioxide – the gas causing acid
+rains! – is continuously injected into the stratosphere, forming a
+layer of aerosols to reflect sunlight) or Marine Cloud Whitening
+(whereby seawater is mixed into the atmosphere to make the
+how numbers rule the world
+
+clouds whiter and more reflective). They also asserted that the
+economic impact of climate change is grossly overstated. In their
+view, the most negative impacts will be felt in agriculture and
+tourism, ‘where nations will lose, on average, about half a percent
+of GDP from each by mid-century’. However, they pointed out
+that people adapting to changes in their environment would avoid
+much of this damage. Farmers will choose plants that thrive
+in the heat. New houses will be designed to deal with warmer
+temperatures: ‘Taking adaptation into account, rich countries will
+adapt to the negative impacts of global warming and exploit the
+positive changes, creating a total positive effect of global warming
+worth about half a percentage point of GDP.’ Once again, no big
+deal. Much to the contrary, climate change may turn out to be
+an economic blessing for all.
+The use of economic reasoning, with its claim of neutrality,
+can be quite alluring. In fact, the reliance on cost–benefit analysis
+is a fundamentally macabre exercise, which overly simplifies the
+multidimensional character of social problems and makes us blind
+to the persistence of power structures that oppose the resolution
+of longstanding global problems. In the next sections, we see why.
+
+Markets for climate
+
+One of the main accusations sceptics advance against climate
+scientists is that their conclusions on the state of the planet’s
+temperature have led to the creation of a moneymaking industry
+composed of ‘green economy’ investors, carbon trading markets
+and offset schemes. A report by climate sceptics points to this
+issue in a rather straightforward and aggressive way:
+
+all ‘global-warming’ profiteers who are making money out of
+carbon-trading or ‘green investment’ or UN climate boondoggles
+of whatever kind should be warned, and clearly warned, that
+now that the basis for their profitable activities is known to be
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+hollow and fraudulent, they themselves will be indicted, prosecuted,
+and jailed for fraud, and their profits confiscated as the
+fruits of money-laundering.44
+
+It is at least ungenerous (and, in some respects, offensive) to
+link climate scientists with speculators in the green industry.
+Climatologists have highlighted a problem (i.e. the rising temperature
+of the planet and the concentration of greenhouse gases),
+but have never taken a stance on what would be the best policy
+to tackle this issue. In fact, the ‘green growth’ paradigm has
+been invented by business and policymakers (and their economic
+advisers), not by climate scientists. Most investment in this field
+is actually coming from the very polluting corporations (from
+oil companies to extractive industries) that have long benefited
+from climate denialism and deregulation. The petroleum and coal
+industries are largely in control of carbon markets throughout
+the world, and are also responsible for most of the investment
+in climate engineering (e.g. carbon capture and storage). For
+many of them, climate change has become a lucrative business.
+As we have seen, climate sceptic Fred Singer was an influential
+champion of market-based solutions to address environmental
+concerns. The policy he supported, the Acid Rain Program,
+became the first large-scale system of emissions trading in history,
+which the rest of the world would use as an example to design
+market-driven mitigation policies for climate change. Carbon
+markets are nowadays available in most continents, including the
+European Union, North America (e.g. the Regional Greenhouse
+Gas Initiative and the new California cap-and-trade mechanism,
+the largest in the USA), New Zealand, Australia, Japan (in the
+city of Tokyo) and China.45
+There are various mechanisms for the design of an emissions
+trading scheme. The most general distinction is between ‘cap
+and trade’ and ‘baseline and credit’. In the former case, public
+authorities set a specific cap on emissions (e.g. by gauging the
+how numbers rule the world
+
+limit of greenhouse gases acceptable to avoid climate change’s
+disastrous effects) and then allocate or auction an equivalent
+number of allowances to polluting companies, which are free to
+use them as permits or trade them in the open market. In a baseline
+and credit system, specific performance targets (also known
+as ‘notional baselines’ set against business-as-usual estimates) are
+given to polluting companies, which can generate tradable credits
+by beating their emissions targets.46
+Advocates of these mechanisms claim that trading systems
+are more efficient and flexible than top-down regulatory policies
+(like, for instance, a carbon tax) because they capitalize on companies’
+inherent drive for innovation.47 Unlike across-the-board
+regulations, which affect all industries in the same way, emissions
+markets are seen as building on ingenuity and comparative
+advantages, thus providing incentives for compliance. Companies
+that innovate more quickly and effectively can sell their permits
+to less innovative businesses, which are therefore given more time
+to catch up, thus allowing for a flexible and gradual transition to
+a low-carbon economy compatible with internal market dynamics.
+Moreover, trading would give entrepreneurs ‘the freedom to
+choose how to deal with their polluting activities’ by deciding ‘not
+only the extent of reductions that is cost-effective for their operations
+but also how to reduce emissions in order to reduce permit
+costs’.48 This would ensure that emissions are reduced at the most
+cost-effective location and that a clear price for carbon emissions
+is produced organically from within the market, instead of being
+imposed from the outside.It is also assumed that trading schemes
+lower regulatory costs because, once established, the market will
+run according to its own internal supply and demand.49 Moreover,
+these systems are said to reduce the dangers of regulatory
+capture – that is, the process whereby private interests control
+public oversight bodies – given that in a trading scheme markets
+basically control themselves.50
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+Despite a number of alleged virtues, emissions-trading schemes
+have evolved into precarious and potentially dangerous mechanisms,
+practically outweighing most (if not all) of their presumed
+strengths. In several cases, they have simply marketized climate
+change, turning it into another opportunity for speculation and
+financial hazard. Possibly nowhere is the vulnerability of the
+carbon market felt as strongly as in Europe, which is home to the
+largest trading scheme in the world. The European Union’s Emissions
+Trading System (ETS) was launched in 2005 as one of the
+founding pillars of the EU’s widely heralded approach to the fight
+against climate change. The scheme, which includes all twentyseven
+Member States plus Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, is
+already into its third iteration, whose cycle will be concluded
+in 2020, when the EU is set to meet its reduction targets under
+current UN-backed protocols. The ETS covers over 11,000 factories,
+power stations and other types of installations (collectively
+responsible for 40 per cent of Europe’s total emissions), and in
+January 2012 was extended to the civil aviation sector.51 Despite
+having been presented as a global best practice by EU authorities,
+the ETS has been grossly flawed ever since its inception.
+The initial allocation of tradable allowances (Phase 1, from 2005
+to 2007) was marred by lax targets, generous dispensations to
+powerful interest groups and overallocation of permits.52 Intense
+lobbying by the fossil fuel industry took place in Brussels and
+in European capitals, where the actual volume of allocations
+was being decided upon.53 According to the think-tank Open
+Europe, European governments ‘handed out permits for 1,829
+million tonnes of CO2 in 2005, while emissions were only 1,785
+million tonnes’.54 The scheme proved a source of windfalls for
+Europe’s worst corporate polluters, as free-of-charge allocations
+were based on each industry’s historic emissions (a process known
+as ‘grandfathering’) and gauged against their future projections,
+inevitably rewarding bad performers.55 In Germany, which is
+how numbers rule the world
+
+the most polluting nation in Europe and accounts for the largest
+carbon emissions market, the environment minister accused the
+country’s four biggest energy companies – Eon, RWE, Vattenfall
+and EnBW – of profiteering from the ETS at the expense
+of consumers by stoking earnings up to €8 billion in 2006.
+56
+
+The environmental organization Greenpeace dubbed the ETS
+‘a licence for polluters to print money’, arguing that relying on
+future emissions projections (which can be easily inflated by the
+industry) resulted in handing out permits for free that were then
+sold for profit.57
+In 2006, when such loose targets and overallocations were
+confirmed, the price of emissions credits crashed in a matter of
+days, from the official price of roughly €30 a tonne (which was
+considered the minimum to achieve reduction targets) to a meagre
+€9 a tonne. Then in mid-2007, the nominal value of permits
+plummeted to zero, with the carbon market grinding to a halt.58
+According to the accounting firm Ernst & Young, the ETS created
+volatility in carbon prices rather than encouraging sustainable investment
+in renewable energies. Contrary to its alleged objectives,
+‘the scheme has encouraged the short-term trading of positions to
+optimise return and minimise financial risk.’59
+The tenability of the emissions market is also affected by
+new policies. For instance, when the EU sells additional permits
+to raise revenues aimed at funding green energy programmes,
+this inevitably adds to an already inflated market.60 Moreover,
+revised regulations on energy efficiency also result in emissions
+reductions, which are however not incorporated into the preexisting
+cap, thus leading to additional drops in the price of
+carbon. As prices are by nature unstable (as they are affected
+by various market and non-market dynamics), investors have
+projected a significant surplus of ‘hot air’ of some 845 million
+extra permits by the deadline of 2020, against a planned cap that
+year of 1.8 billion.61
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+In a memorandum submitted to the UK Parliament in 2009,
+David Newbery, research director of the Electric Policy Research
+Group at the University of Cambridge, confirmed that the ETS
+‘cannot deliver the predictable and stable carbon price needed
+for long-term low-carbon investment decisions’.62 In 2004, the
+UK secretary of state for trade and industry Patricia Hewitt had
+already written to then European Commission president Romano
+Prodi to complain about the way in which the ETS was set up and
+managed by Member States. She warned that ‘allocations beyond
+need are in effect gifting companies a free asset’ and that there
+was ‘a very real risk that overallocation will mean that little or no
+trading occurs’, so that ‘the credibility of the trading mechanism
+could be undermined, and the EU and its Member States would
+need to find other less flexible and more costly regulatory instruments
+to meet [their] obligations’.63 With the sale of new permits
+in Phase 2 (2008–12), prices once again hovered around €30 for
+some time, but then dropped to less than €10.
+In 2012, the European market lost a third of its value (from
+US$148 billion to about US$100 billion), increasing pressure
+on European governments to provide additional support. In December
+2012, the EU sold 5.58 million carbon permits (as part of
+Phase 3) at a value of €6.45 million, way too low to prod firms
+into making serious investments towards a low carbon economy.64
+As the European Commission recently recognized, plummeting
+carbon prices may actually reverse the trend of emissions cuts
+and lead to investments in high-emitting technology.65 Moreover,
+constantly low prices have also shifted the perceptions of investors
+in the market, who are no longer willing to buy allowances for
+more than €10 per tonne.66 Finally, on 16 April 2013, when the
+European Parliament rejected a proposal to reduce carbon credits
+for the coming years, the price of carbon fell about 50 per cent,
+to €2.63 from nearly €5, in ten minutes. With these prices, all
+analysts agree, the ETS is actually discouraging investment in
+how numbers rule the world
+
+alternative energies, making it more profitable to support ‘dirty’
+industries.67
+The ETS’s curse, however, did not end with its pricing
+debacle. When the market volume peaked in mid-2009, with
+several hundred million allowances traded at an ever-descending
+value of around €12 per tonne, the Europol (the Europe-wide
+police force) began an investigation, which led to the discovery
+that ‘as much as 90 per cent of the entire market volume on emissions
+exchanges was caused by fraudulent activity, undermining
+the very viability of the ETS’.68 More than a hundred people
+were arrested for a crime known as ‘missing trader’ (a form of
+Value Added Tax evasion) and losses for Europe’s tax revenues
+were quantified at around €5 billion across eleven countries.
+The Europol report highlighted two major problems with the
+system: the intangible nature of carbon markets (which makes
+them similar to speculative financial markets, in which public
+authorities have limited control and tracking capacity over money
+flows) and the registration procedures for carbon traders (which
+were lax and mainly based on self-monitoring, thus increasing
+the risk of money laundering).69
+The ETS has proven particularly vulnerable to internal shocks,
+speculation and organized crime. A series of ‘phishing attacks’,
+involving emails prompting users to reveal their identification
+codes, led to the shutdown of national registries throughout
+Europe in 2010. Financial hackers also managed to access servers
+of firms and sell allowances on the ‘spot’ market, which allows for
+the instantaneous trading of permits in exchange for cash. The
+spot market increased 450 per cent over 2008, totalling 1.4 billion
+tonnes, and in 2009 spot volumes went up by 75 times. The
+first ‘theft’ occurred in Germany in 2010, but public authorities
+turned a blind eye. Then, in 2011, allowances stolen from several
+countries totalling over €30 million caused spot trading markets,
+which account for about 20 per cent of the sector, to close for
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+several days.70 Only then did governments call for a thorough
+investigation.
+The numerous flaws of the ETS have alarmed environmental
+groups, which point out that much of the EU’s leadership in the
+fight against climate change may be the result of an auditing trick,
+masked by numbers that simply do not add up in the real world:
+financial operations that are not mirrored by the trend in actual
+mitigation targets. As pointed out by the WWF, ‘there’s so much
+credit around, it’s undermining the European emissions trading
+system and allowing the EU to keep emitting while still claiming
+to meet reduction targets. [I]t could mean Europe is actively
+making climate change worse, not better.’71 Similarly, the thinktank
+Open Europe has described the ETS as ‘an environmental
+and economic failure’.
+Such issues have been compounded by other market-based
+applications, particularly carbon offsetting mechanisms, which
+have added further risks and distortions to the fight against
+climate change. Carbon offsets allow corporations and individuals
+to pay for reductions in greenhouse gases that are made elsewhere.
+Offsets are quantified in metric tonnes of carbon dioxide
+equivalent (CO2e), certified by accredited institutions and then
+traded in the form of ‘credits’, just like in a conventional emissions
+trading scheme. Ever since the establishment of the Kyoto
+Protocol in 2005 the offset industry has grown exponentially.
+The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is an international
+framework established by the Kyoto Protocol, is the
+world’s largest offset programme in terms of geographical scope
+and volume and the second largest carbon market. To date, the
+mechanism has issued over 1.14 billion credits. In 2007 its value
+was estimated at over US$33 billion.72 Yet, just like the ETS, the
+price of CDM offsets has collapsed 90 per cent year on year to
+around 40 cents in 2012, roughly 10 cents below ‘what analysts
+say it costs developers in fees to get issued with credits and well
+how numbers rule the world
+
+below costs involved in investing in carbon-cutting equipment’.73
+Nowadays, it is very easy to offset the emissions generated by one’s
+daily commuting, by vacations and holidays or by any other type
+of economic activity simply by clicking on any of the thousands
+of dedicated websites and paying via credit card. Cleaning one’s
+ecological footprint has never been so easy and cheap.
+For the offset market to have any consequence, the certification
+process is paramount. If an offset claims to have reduced
+greenhouse gas emissions by a certain degree, then this needs to
+be reflected in real reduction.74 However, determining businessas-usual
+baselines – that is, measurements of what would be
+the emission scenario in the absence of the offset project – is
+subject to numerous methodological and conceptual challenges.
+How does one distinguish between reductions that would have
+occurred anyway and those that are made possible only by the
+existence of an offset scheme? This is what experts call the
+principle of additionality: a genuine offset must be a reaction to
+a market incentive and must therefore occur in addition to what
+would happen anyway. One can distinguish between two types
+of approach to determine additionality: a project-specific and
+a standardized one. Project-specific methods are based on an
+evaluation of the proposed outputs of the offset scheme, which
+are then discounted from the outputs of the most viable and
+probable scenario (against a variety of benchmarks) in the absence
+of carbon markets. Standardized methods, by contrast, simply
+assess offset projects against a predetermined set of criteria, which
+usually require that the project must not be mandated by law,
+must involve a specific pre-approved technology, and must have
+an emissions rate lower than most others in its class.75
+Another essential parameter is that of permanence: emission
+reductions must be permanent if they are to result in a genuine
+offset. Indeed, if emissions are released back into the atmosphere,
+the overall amount of greenhouse gases would grow rather than
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+diminish. The issue of permanence is quite crucial for offset
+schemes, but particularly for those projects (which are often
+the majority) in which emissions have been sequestered through
+processes that may be reverted over time. A case in point is
+reforestation (re-establishment of existing forests) or afforestation
+(creation of new forests). While there is broad consensus that
+planting trees helps capture emissions, in the medium to long
+term the decay of forests and fires would result in more emissions
+being injected back into the atmosphere, thus cancelling out the
+assumed benefit of the offsets. Similarly, geological sequestration
+(e.g. carbon capture and storage) is at risk of leakage, especially
+if one takes into account the possibility of subterranean dynamics.
+Offset auditors have developed a variety of market-based
+mechanisms to measure and pre-empt the risks of reversal, including
+the purchase of specifically designed insurance policies, the
+development of reserve ‘buffer pools’ of credits and the issuance
+of temporary credits that must be recertified or replaced in the
+future. However, all these additional guarantees increase costs
+and slow down trade volumes.
+Because of criteria, benchmarks and quantification methodologies,
+the entire offset industry relies on the third-party certification
+of so-called Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) – that
+is, specialized auditors that run evaluations, carry out measurements
+and certify the credibility of offset projects so that they may
+be marketed in a cap and trade system. In the case of the CDM,
+these are independent auditors accredited ‘to validate project
+proposals or verify whether implemented projects have achieved
+planned greenhouse gas emission reductions’.76
+In spite of the fundamental role they play, the accreditation
+standards for DOEs are quite generic (e.g. they have to posses
+sufficient human resources and experience in financial reporting
+system), the only constraint being that to qualify as a DOE
+a company should not have any pending ‘judicial process for
+how numbers rule the world
+
+malpractice, fraud and/or other function incompatible with its
+functions as a designated operational entity’.77 In order to safeguard
+impartiality, a DOE is required to work ‘in a credible,
+independent, non-discriminatory and transparent manner’, and
+in cases in which different sectors in the company serve different
+clients must ‘clearly define the links with other parts of the organization,
+demonstrating that no conflicts of interest exist’ and show
+it is not involved ‘in any commercial, financial or other processes
+which might influence its judgement or endanger trust in its
+independence of judgement and integrity in relation to its functions’.
+When conflicts of interest arise, then DOEs are expected
+to clarify how these can be managed. They are also expected to
+promote a ‘culture’ of impartiality throughout the management
+structure and publicize their policy on their website. The only
+institutional requirement is for DOEs to establish an internal
+‘impartiality committee’ which reports to top management.
+Basically, these organizations are expected to monitor themselves.
+Public authorities assume that, by virtue of an unspecified
+culture of impartiality, auditors will do their job with no undue
+influence. Once again, the overall principle of self-regulation prevails
+in the governance of climate mitigation. The adoption of numerical
+models and quantification procedures, mostly developed
+by financial banks and audit firms, gives a false impression of
+neutrality. As is the case with credit ratings or with the discount
+rates in cost–benefit analysis, the assessment of additionality,
+permanence and future risks of reversal is, ultimately, a subjective
+assessment.78 And when subjectivity reigns in a field characterized
+by growing financial resources, then conflicts of interest are
+bound to occur. DOEs can be easily corrupted by their clients
+into offering certifications that are skewed. As most DOEs are also
+financial auditors, they might find themselves validating clients
+to which they are providing other types of consultancy. Sectoral
+acquaintances and common networks also create conditions for
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+risky ‘familiarity’ among DOEs and their counterparts. Finally,
+intimidation is always possible, whether it happens overtly or
+secretly. As reported by the professional service firm Deloitte
+(one of the Big 4 global audit firms, with Ernst & Young, KPMG
+and PWC, all involved in the offset market), because of the ‘lack
+of regulation and enforcement agency regarding both verifiers
+and carbon offset providers, there’s a high risk of fraud in these
+voluntary carbon markets’.79 PWC climate service experts have
+also noted that there are situations in which ‘project proponents
+are motivated to try and raise money before the project gets up
+and running’, which means that one ends up ‘selling credits before
+they actually exist’. Moreover, as ‘there is not a global registry for
+carbon credits’, companies ‘could sell the same credit into several
+different markets’.80
+Given the lack of a credible external enforcement system to
+guarantee the impartiality of DOEs and the essential subjectivity
+of their assessments, it is not surprising that cases of poor
+auditing and outright misbehaviour have abounded. In 2007 a
+study commissioned by the WWF called into question the role of
+independent auditors, showing that many CDM projects suffered
+from poor quality and did not lead to emissions reductions.81 In
+2010, a new study found no improvement in the work of evaluators
+assessing more than 900 offset projects in developing countries.
+On a scale between A (best) to F (worst), the maximum grade
+obtained (only by a single evaluator) was a paltry D.82 The report
+concluded that attempts at providing additionality had miserably
+failed: ‘Due to the shortcomings in project evaluation, large
+amounts of non-additional CO2 certificates might be awarded.
+This might lead to a boosting of global emissions, quite contrary
+to the intended reductions for which the system was put in place.’
+In 2010 alone, the UN Climate Change Secretariat was forced
+to suspend four DOEs after evidence of wrongdoing. One of these
+companies, the German Tüv Süd, a giant in the field of climate
+how numbers rule the world
+
+accounting, responsible for 21 per cent of the 395 million tonnes
+verified until then, was found guilty of not following procedures
+and granting ‘a positive validation opinion to some projects even
+though it had concerns about additionality’.83 Interestingly, Tüv
+Süd was the only D-rated auditor in the 2010 WWF report. According
+to a 2012 survey conducted by Point Carbon, the outlook
+for CDM investments ‘is gloomy’.84 Most offset projects take place
+in China and India, where analysts report a growing number of
+instances of corruption and fraud in emissions reduction projects.
+Moreover, many investors ‘plan to decrease or completely stop
+investing in CDM projects’. The report published by the HighLevel
+Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue has also recognized
+that the offset market is ‘imperiled’.85 They acknowledge the fall
+in prices (70 per cent in 2012 alone) and project further decline
+in the coming years. Public and private investors alike ‘are losing
+confidence in the CDM market’ and mitigation targets ‘are so
+modest that they no longer create strong incentives for private
+international investment’, thus weakening the ‘global carbon
+market technical capacity’.
+
+Conclusion: when numbers
+become dangerous distractions
+
+As both the ETS and the offset schemes demonstrate, the reality
+is very different from the numbers underpinning market-based
+policies. Echoing the case of credit rating agencies, power
+positions, informational asymmetries and conflicts of interest
+are common phenomena in real life. The capacity of powerful
+corporate interests to affect the rules of the game is unmatched
+by other sectors in society, be it public interest groups or nongovernmental
+organizations.86 And the rise of renewable energy
+companies has not yet changed the market dominance of the
+fossil fuel industry. According to Transparency International, the
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+lobbying investment of oil and gas firms in the USA surpassed
+that of the clean energy sector by a factor of eight in 2009. In the
+EU, the policy positions of business groups largely outweigh those
+presented by environmental groups.87 Just like the financial sector,
+the new carbon markets are prone to all sorts of aberrations,
+including fraud and criminal activities. Some analysts estimate
+that total climate change investments in mitigation will reach the
+staggering figure of US$700 billion by 2020, with a projected
+annual public investment of at least US$250 billion per annum.
+In such a gigantic financial market, the risk of malfeasance is
+extremely high, particularly due to the level of ‘complexity, uncertainty
+and novelty that surrounds many climate issues’, including
+‘what should count as a forest, or how to establish additionality’,
+while ‘tools to measure the environmental integrity of carbon
+offsets are relatively untested’. 88
+The various actors pulling the strings of the climate denial
+machine have been animated by a variety of motives. Arguably,
+the fossil fuel industry’s main goal has been to keep its grip
+on power by steering the policy agenda. By providing timely
+counter-evidence to policymakers, while funding most of their
+electoral campaigns, the petroleum and coal conglomerate has
+virtually held the US political system hostage, while extending
+its tentacular reach to the rest of the world. Possibly no country
+nowadays, from China to Russia and Brazil, is immune from the
+immense pressure exerted by fossil fuel business. For this powerful
+corporate complex, any delays in (or obstructions to) environmental
+regulations mean prolonged privileges and advantages. For the
+scientists carrying the flag of scepticism, there have been rewards
+in terms of funding and prestige. As controversy around climate
+issues has grown over time, most of these unorthodox ‘experts’
+have enjoyed unprecedented media coverage. Their papers, books
+and films (e.g. Cool It, the film documentary featuring Lomborg)
+have become popular among a wide audience, including those
+how numbers rule the world
+
+citizens looking for some evidence that business-as-usual works
+just fine. It pays to be against the mainstream, when you are supported
+by the most powerful and rich corporations in the world.
+While climate-change advocates are swimming in an ocean of
+collective scientific research, which makes them largely unknown
+as their individual contribution is just a small piece into a huge
+jigsaw puzzle, contrarians have enjoyed their comfortable position
+in a small pond of counter-propaganda. In a normal world,
+scepticism should have been relegated to the cultural curio shops,
+as is the case with creationism and Holocaust denial. But when
+journals, newspapers and television fall into the controversy trap,
+then the pond is elevated to ocean status. Both sides are given
+the same airtime and access to the public. That is when benefits
+become immense. Visibility turns into pay cheques, speaking fees
+and royalties. And, in a world of marketized academia, celebrity
+can get you a job at the most prestigious universities.
+Dunlap and McCright maintain that, never mind the variety
+of motives behind these groups and individuals, ‘the glue that
+holds most of them together is shared opposition to government
+regulatory efforts’.89 While the claims of contrarian scientists
+invariably evolve over time, the theme of ‘no need for regulations’
+remains constant: ‘A staunch commitment to free markets
+and disdain of governmental regulations reflect the conservative
+political ideology that is almost universally shared by the climate
+change denial community.’90
+Utilitarian reasoning has been their most powerful weapon.
+Whereas their scientific claims (e.g. climate change is a hoax, it
+is not caused by humans, it may not be that bad for the planet)
+have been proven wrong time and again, their econometric models
+have become mainstream in the economics of climate change.
+Cost–benefit analyses and market-based instruments are now the
+founding pillars of environmental policymaking. Discounting the
+future is an accepted approach to the monetization of marginal
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+utilities. Carbon trading is broadly viewed as the most costeffective
+response to climate change.91 Climate accounting has
+become a burgeoning industry worth billions of dollars and offset
+schemes have mushroomed across more and less industrialized
+nations. Thousands of companies (and millions of well-meaning
+people) buy and sell carbon credits every day. Who are the main
+beneficiaries of all these new financial markets? Mostly fossil fuel
+corporations and banks, the very institutions responsible for the
+global climate and financial crises. Windfall profits have been
+made by polluting industries through emissions trading (mostly
+in ‘progressive’ Europe), while investment and commercial banks
+have been in charge of designing most (if not all) existing trading
+facilities. Meanwhile, the price of carbon has plummeted to ridiculously
+low values, generating enormous losses in tax revenues for
+governments and demanding additional public resources (a form
+of ‘carbon bailout’), at a time when public authorities throughout
+the world are in unprecedented financial distress.
+Has this at least contributed to abating CO2 emissions? There
+is much doubt about that, as accounting systems are sketchy and
+ultimately controversial. The numbers published by international
+authorities such as the International Energy Agency, for instance,
+are gathered by polluting industries (e.g. oil, coal and gas corporations,
+cement companies, construction industry, manufacturers,
+etc.) as part of their carbon reporting requirements, which raises
+doubts about the accuracy and validity of the final data. In any
+case, according to the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric
+Research, global emissions of CO2, which is the main
+cause of global warming, have continued to grow over the past
+decade. In 2012 (the most recent report available at the time of
+writing), they increased by 3 per cent, ‘reaching an all-time high
+of 34 billion tonnes’.92 Currently, there is an estimated total of 420
+billion tonnes of CO2 in the atmosphere ‘cumulatively emitted
+due to human activities’.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+The apparent neutrality of cost–benefit analyses hides an important
+underlying reality. Although economic reasoning tends
+to treat all costs as equal, in real life this is not necessarily true.
+Costs are not spread equally in society. In general, decisions that
+spread costs proportionally to capabilities are seen as fair. In
+some instances, it may even be appropriate to concentrate costs
+on certain categories rather than others. In deciding between two
+alternative ways of bearing costs, the overall total may matter
+less than how it is distributed. For instance, a society may legitimately
+select a more expensive governance option whose costs
+are distributed fairly (in terms of proportionality and capabilities)
+instead of a cheaper one in which distribution is viewed as
+unfair. If certain industries have benefited more from traditional
+arrangements and competitive advantages, it would be fair to ask
+them to bear most of the costs for the transition to a low carbon
+(or, ideally, a no-carbon) economy. Cost–benefit analyses, by
+contrast, spread costs across societies uniformly and, ultimately,
+place greater emphasis on the ‘cheapest’ alternatives. Invariably,
+this mode of reasoning rewards business.
+The ETS, just like most trading schemes, may very well be
+the most cost-effective option on the table. But cost-effective for
+whom? Definitely for the fossil fuel industry: as we have seen,
+it has resulted in a redistribution of resources from the public
+to the private sector. But was it also cost-effective for citizens?
+Probably not, as most energy utilities simply charge the higher
+costs of buying permits to their clients’ energy bills. While the
+ETS produced a big plus on the books of business, it generated
+a minus in the budgets of households.
+In the battle of ideas for environmental governance, sceptics
+have ultimately been victorious. Their cost–benefit analyses,
+which turned everything into numbers, and numbers into prices,
+have had a long-lasting impact on our societies. They have been
+a dangerous distraction for the international community, leading
+fiddling while the planet burns
+
+the world into a vicious circle of market supremacy and ecological
+collapse. Although there has been evidence of anthropogenic
+climate change since at least the 1960s (and scientific consensus
+since the late 1980s), the world has been waiting. Waiting
+for economics to do the trick. Waiting for accountants to do
+their measurements and for auditors to certify them. Forgetting,
+however, that nature does not follow economic models and, more
+importantly, does not sign off on auditors’ checklists.
+While this chapter has focused on how the politics of statistics
+has paved the way for market-based approaches to climate change
+mitigation, the next chapter will delve into another critical sector
+of environmental governance, namely the valuation of natural
+capital and ecosystem services. Both sectors are indeed closely
+related. We may say that, if the marketization of climate change
+has now become a reality through emissions trading and offsets,
+the introduction of similar ‘markets’ for the preservation of nature
+may ultimately lead to the financialization of the natural world. As
+is the case with carbon markets, numerical models lead us to think
+that we can price anything. But in trying to measure the price of
+nature – even if with the genuine intention to preserve it – our
+generation is treading on a rather treacherous terrain populated
+by speculative markets, investment ventures and private auditing
+companies.
+chapter 4
+
+Measuring the unmeasurable:
+
+the financialization of nature
+
+To measure the unmeasurable is absurd and constitutes but
+an elaborate method of moving from preconceived notions
+to foregone conclusions. The logical absurdity, however, is
+not the greatest fault of the undertaking: what is worse, and
+destructive of civilisation, is the pretence that everything has
+a price or, in other words, that money is the highest of all
+values.
+E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study
+of Economics as if People Mattered, 1973
+
+The only common measure the nature of things affords is
+money.
+Jeremy Bentham
+
+The spread of economic reasoning and market approaches has
+not been confined to the controversial field of climate change
+mitigation. It has become a dominant trend in the way in which
+we interact with nature as a whole. There are two fields in which
+methods for the monetization of non-market phenomena have
+seen an unexpected and unprecedented growth in the past few
+years: natural capital and ecosystem services. The difference
+between these two accounting areas is rather fictitious. One way
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+to describe it is to say that natural capital accounting aims to
+measure the depletion of environmental ‘capital’ consumed in
+conventional economic process (as measured in terms of GDP),
+while ecosystem accounting tries to measure the economic values
+of natural services in general. As a field of economic research,
+natural capital/ecosystem accounting has emerged out of the
+need to assess the complex interaction between human economic
+systems and nature, as the latter regularly provides essential services
+to mankind, which are however not delineated by property
+rights and market dynamics.
+As we have seen in Chapter 1, the national income accounts
+on which GDP is based neglect the economic value of a number
+of non-market goods, including unpaid work, the gift economy,
+all forms of ‘prosumerism’ (that is, people producing for their
+own consumption) and natural resources. Critics point out that
+official metrics of economic performance treat natural resources
+as disposable income while they should instead be treated as
+capital which is not renewable and must be replenished if the
+process of economic growth is to go on. Their argument is that
+if Mother Nature was to be properly valued and incorporated into
+the calculations of economic performance, we could not avoid
+recognizing how critical its services are to economic welfare.1
+Such recognition would result in very different macroeconomic
+policies, in which environmental preservation would come to
+occupy centre stage. With this objective in mind, since the
+1980s pioneers in the field of economic performance metrics
+have been producing measures of ‘genuine progress’ and ‘green’
+accounting. They have developed various methodologies to take
+into consideration the value of natural non-renewable resources
+consumed during economic processes with a view to subtracting
+it from GDP, just like capital consumption is subtracted from
+‘net’ estimates of domestic product.2
+ In 1992, the US Bureau of
+Economic Analysis began to work on a set of satellite accounts to
+how numbers rule the world
+
+capture the economic impact of subsoil mineral resources. Two
+years later, however, the US government halted the initiative,
+as some of the findings were being attacked by the extractive
+industries, and called for an external evaluation. A high-level
+panel chaired by William Nordhaus and made up of some of the
+most renowned experts in the field of national income accounting,
+including Robert Eisner, who in the 1980s had developed a ‘total
+income’ system of accounts, concluded that measuring natural
+resources and the environment was ‘an important goal’.3
+ In their
+final report, published in 1999 and titled Nature’s Numbers,
+the panel recommended a phased approach, focusing primarily
+on constructing forest accounts and then moving on to agricultural
+assets, fisheries and water resources. Nevertheless, they
+recognized the methodological challenges involved in developing
+these new accounts: ‘The process will require resolving major
+conceptual issues, developing appropriate physical measures, and
+valuing the relevant flows and stocks.’4
+In general, these methods of accounting have aimed to achieve
+a double goal: on the one hand, to reform the international system
+of national accounts by taking into consideration the derivation
+of income from non-sustainable consumption of natural resources
+and other environmental services; on the other hand, to produce
+numerical information about the economic value of natural ecosystems
+with a view to emphasizing how important nature is to
+human well-being and economic growth. As remarked by economist
+Simon Hicks in the 1940s, any measure of income should
+gauge the capacity of individuals (or societies) to produce wealth
+without undermining future capacities to consume ad infinitum.5
+But if contemporary income measures are mostly based on an
+unaccounted depletion of non-renewable ecosystemic resources, it
+results that such consumption patterns are not sustainable in the
+long term. In the words of Robert Repetto and his team, who in
+1989 conducted one of the first studies of how natural resources
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+may be integrated in national income accounts, ‘A country could
+exhaust its mineral resources, cut down its forests, erode its soil,
+pollute its aquifers and hunt its wildlife and fisheries to extinction,
+but measured income would not be affected as these assets disappeared.’6
+According to a 2013 study measuring the world’s genuine
+progress, global GDP growth correlated to general improvements
+in human welfare up until 1978. After that date, increases in
+economic growth (at the aggregate level) led to the deterioration
+of human, social and natural equilibria.7
+Natural capital adds to human well-being in multiple ways,
+which are systematically neglected by official GDP statistics.
+It produces goods that are marketed, as is the case with most
+products in the agricultural sector. It also produces ecological services
+and amenities that directly contribute to economic growth
+and human welfare, such as water provision, soil fertilization,
+pollination, which however are not channelled through markets
+(e.g. nature provides us with water free of charge). At the same
+time, there are economic processes that have a negative impact
+both on human welfare and on natural capital. Waste production,
+pollution and contamination are consequences of economic
+growth which are detrimental to the environment and harmful
+to human beings. As human welfare is a function of much more
+than the consumption of economic goods and services, then the
+fundamental role played by nature cannot be disregarded. But
+can nature be priced? What are the inherent methodological
+and conceptual problems with that? Do other political agendas
+hide behind such an apparently benign attempt to ‘value’ nature?
+This chapter looks at how the politics of statistics has affected
+the global debate on the conservation of biodiversity. It discusses
+the historical evolution of key methodologies to translate nature
+into numbers and also dissects the strengths and weaknesses
+of existing approaches. As this book is mainly concerned with
+the political role that numbers play in governance, the chapter
+how numbers rule the world
+
+argues that such new trends in the field of natural capital accounting
+and ecosystem services have the potential to spiral out
+of control. As investment banks, private auditors and a varied
+range of consulting companies become interested in these new
+‘markets’, there is a serious risk that what was initially a genuinely
+good cause (i.e. ‘valuing’ nature to preserve it) may actually lead
+to the financialization of the world’s natural wonders.
+
+Measuring the value of nature:
+statistical evolutions in global governance
+
+In 2007, world leaders gathered for the G8 in Heiligendamm,
+Germany. They endorsed, among others, a proposal submitted
+by their environment ministers to ‘initiate the process of
+analysing the global economic benefit of biological diversity, the
+costs of the loss of biodiversity and the failure to take protective
+measures versus the costs of effective conservation’.8 They wanted
+to develop a clear and sound cost–benefit analysis of environmental
+governance objectives, based on indisputable numbers
+and reflecting accurate prices. Not ideas, not generic goals, but
+crude statistics that, in the form of market values, would be
+easier to integrate into economic planning and also resonate more
+widely with society’s focus on economic growth. This initiative
+resulted in a study coordinated by the European Commission
+and the German government on ‘the economics of ecosystems
+and biodiversity’ (commonly known as TEEB), which presented
+a state-of-the art collation of monetary valuation techniques with a
+view to defining a common framework for policy application.9
+ In
+the introduction, the project’s report acknowledged the complexity
+and the importance of the task at hand:
+
+[W]e are still struggling to find the ‘value of nature’. Nature
+is the source of much value to us every day, and yet it mostly
+bypasses markets, escapes pricing and defies valuation. This lack
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+of valuation is, we are discovering, an underlying cause for the
+observed degradation of ecosystems and the loss of biodiversity.10
+
+As interest in the valuation of natural capital grew, more institutions
+joined in. In 2010, the World Bank launched the ‘Wealth
+Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services’ (WAVES), a
+global partnership to build consensus on a common methodology
+to measure the economic value of natural resources.11 WAVES’
+main objective is ‘to promote sustainable development by ensuring
+that the national accounts used to measure and plan for economic
+growth include the value of natural resources’. It focuses specifically
+on building synergies between public and private sectors
+to include natural capital considerations in the strategic choices
+of the corporate world. The Bank’s approach to natural capital
+accounting builds on its decade-long work on new measures of
+‘total wealth’, which have been inspired by ‘the ideas of the classical
+economists, who viewed land, labor, and produced capital
+as the primary factors of production’. One of the key indicators
+employed in these studies is the so-called adjusted net savings,
+better known as genuine savings, which purports to be a measure
+of sustainability by looking at how much countries provide for
+the future.12 Total wealth indicators, such as the Inclusive Wealth
+Index backed by the UN, distinguish between produced capital
+(including the sum of machinery, equipment, infrastructure and
+urban land), natural capital (including land resources, forests and
+sub-soil assets) and intangible capital (a wide array of assets such
+as human capital, quality of institutions and governance). In a
+report titled Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital
+for the 21st Century, the Bank asserted that ‘in poorer countries,
+natural capital is more important than produced capital’, thus suggesting
+that the careful management of natural resources should
+become a fundamental component of development strategies,
+‘particularly since the poorest households in those countries
+are usually the most dependent on these resources’.13 It must be
+how numbers rule the world
+
+underlined, however, that these types of indicator adopt a ‘weak’
+sustainability approach, which states that the depletion of natural
+resources can be offset by, for instance, an equivalent investment
+in other fields. As a consequence, the removal of a park to build
+a kindergarten would result in a perfectly balanced sheet, with
+no negative impact on sustainable development or, in economic
+terms, with a net opportunity cost for future generations equivalent
+to zero. In this model of accounting, what we take away from
+nature is rebalanced by what we invest in human development.
+It was only in 2012, though, that the UN Statistical Commission
+adopted the first international standard for the valuation of
+natural capital: the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting
+(SEEA).14 The origins of SEEA date back to the revision
+of the system of national accounts in the late 1980s and early
+1990s, when historic shifts in the world’s political and economic
+arena (from the end of the Cold War to the growth of globalized
+markets) led to a major revision of UN accounting standards,
+with new guidelines being published in 1993.
+15 At that time, UN
+reviewers rejected the call for an outright revision of GDP because
+of their reluctance to add any further imputations to the national
+accounts. In their motivations, they criticized environmental
+advocates for trying to impose ‘normative measures’ on calculations
+of economic performance.16 They also maintained that,
+since natural resources are not ‘purchased’ from Mother Nature,
+whatever valuation one may come up with would inevitably be
+artificial and controversial. Hence, better no valuation at all than
+a distorted one. They distinguished between depletion (of natural
+resources) and depreciation (of man-made assets): unlike the first,
+the second refers to consumption of goods ‘whose production has
+already been fully accounted for in the system’.17 UN statisticians
+did not recognize nature as a factor of production (in line with
+mainstream neoclassical economic thinking), thus making traditional
+national accounts unsuitable for environmental accounting.
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+For the same reason, the next round of reform in 2008 discarded
+the possibility of taking into account natural capital depletion.
+This revision process reaffirmed the principle that a ‘necessary
+condition’ for an activity to be treated as productive is that ‘it
+must be carried out under the instigation, control and responsibility
+of some institutional unit that exercises ownership rights
+over whatever is produced’.18 For example, the natural growth
+of stocks of fish in the high seas not subject to international
+quotas is not counted as production, given that no proprietary
+institution manages the process and the fish do not belong to any
+organization or company. By contrast, the growth of fish in fish
+farms is treated as a process of production and therefore adds to
+GDP. Also the ‘natural growth of wild, uncultivated forests or
+wild fruits or berries’ is excluded from production, whereas the
+‘cultivation of crop-bearing trees, or trees grown for timber or
+other uses’, is counted in the same way as the growing of annual
+crops. Similarly, the ‘deliberate felling of trees in wild forests’
+and ‘the gathering of wild fruit or berries, and also firewood’
+counts as production.19 Following the same logic, ‘rainfall and
+the flow of water down natural watercourses’ are not processes
+of production, whereas ‘storing water in reservoirs or dams and
+the piping or carrying of water from one location to another’ all
+constitute a positive increment to national income.
+While the subtraction of natural capital depletion from official
+GDP statistics encountered resistance among UN statisticians,
+much easier was to incorporate it into the system of satellite
+accounts, a parallel set of calculations covering, among others,
+indicators to gauge the scope of the informal sector, tourism
+(which is only marginally captured in GDP accounts) and unpaid
+work.20 It was in this area that the SEEA was developed as a
+complementary system of accounts. The SEEA provides a general
+framework for the standardization of assessments dealing with the
+direct physical flows of materials and energy between the economy
+how numbers rule the world
+
+and the environment, the stocks of environmental assets and the
+economic transactions related to the environment. As depicted
+in Figure 4.1, the SEEA views natural capital and ecosystems as
+factors of production and measures their contribution to specific
+economic activities. In its language, conceptual framework and
+methodology, the SEEA mirrors the logic of the GDP accounts
+by extending them to the assessment of nature’s contribution to
+economic growth.
+Due to its exclusive focus on the material benefits deriving
+from the direct use of environmental assets as natural inputs to the
+economy, the SEEA is not a comprehensive framework for the assessment
+of ecosystem services in general. The SEEA only provides
+‘guidance’ on the valuation of renewable and non-renewable natural
+resources and land within the asset boundary of national income
+statistics as reflected in GDP. It does not aim to measure natural
+assets and related stocks and flows that go beyond traditional
+
+Industries
+
+Households
+
+Government
+
+Natural inputs
+(including mineral, timber
+aquatic and water resources) Products
+(goods and
+services
+produced and
+consumed in
+the economy)
+
+Residuals
+(including air emissions,
+return flows of
+water)
+
+Eco n omy
+
+E n v ir o n m en t
+
+figure 4.1 Conceptualizing nature’s contribution to the economy
+Source: UN Statistical Commission et al., System of Environmental-Economic Accounting.
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+systems of national accounts. At the time of writing, the development
+of an ecosystem assessment methodology was still under
+discussion at the UN level. They had planned the publication of
+a report on ‘experimental ecosystem accounts’, which would deal
+with the measurement of both material and non-material (as well
+as direct and indirect) benefits to humanity as a whole. Yet they
+clarified that it would ‘not be a statistical standard, but will provide
+a consistent and coherent summary of the state of the art of using a
+systems approach to the measurement of ecosystems’.21
+In the SEEA, the scope of valuation is limited to economic
+actors. Following the GDP accounts, which are based on clear
+production and property boundaries, it only measures the benefits
+that accrue to economic owners, defined as ‘the institutional unit
+entitled to claim the benefits associated with the use of an asset
+in the course of an economic activity by virtue of accepting the
+associated risks’.22 In the case of environmental assets, such benefits
+are recorded in the form of ‘operating surplus from the sale
+of natural resources and cultivated biological resources’, as rent
+earned on ‘permitting the use or extraction of an environmental
+asset’, or in the form of ‘net receipts’ (i.e. excluding transaction
+costs) when an environmental asset is sold (e.g. sale of land).
+When market prices do not exist for such ‘transactions’, the
+estimation of values must be based on conceptual assumptions
+and numerical models, for which SEEA makes a series of recommendations.
+Whenever possible, direct observations of the prices
+of assets traded in real markets should be used to price similar
+assets that are not traded. For example, information on sales of
+land, timber and minerals may be used to estimate the value
+of similar goods that have not (yet) been sold. Another method
+may be to look at replacement costs, especially for natural assets
+that cannot be or are not commonly traded. According to this
+approach, the value of a natural asset is equal to the current
+acquisition price of an equivalent new asset, after deducting its
+how numbers rule the world
+
+depreciation. Just as the price of a second-hand car corresponds
+to the cost of a new car minus the depreciation of value over the
+course of its life and mileage, ‘this approach may be applied to
+estimate the value of the stock of cultivated biological resources
+that are fixed assets, for example, orchards.’23
+When these two approaches are not possible (because, for
+example, there are no relevant market transactions or acquisition
+prices), the SEEA recommends adopting a mathematically more
+sophisticated (yet fundamentally elusive) method, which bases the
+price of natural flows on the discounted value of future returns, as
+is the case with conventional cost–benefit analysis, which we have
+already encountered in Chapter 3. The discounted value of future
+returns is commonly referred to as the Net Present Value (NPV)
+and ‘uses projections of the future rate of extraction of the asset
+together with projections of its price to generate a time series of
+expected returns’.24 In line with conventional economic thinking,
+which assumes that returns earned in the present are worth more
+than those earned in the future, the stream of expected returns
+is discounted to reflect ‘the value a buyer would be prepared to
+pay for the asset in the current period’. Moreover, to ensure that
+the valuation is aligned to the general concept of market prices,
+the UN statisticians advise auditors of natural capital to apply a
+market-based discount rate equal to the assumed rate of return on
+produced assets. For the NPV approach, indeed, an asset with no
+expected returns has no value in economic terms. However, since
+expected returns are, by definition, not observed in reality, only
+estimations and projections can be made, thus shifting the entire
+argument from statistical accounting (which is often portrayed as
+the art of neutral collection of data) to financial analysis (which
+is the realm of value judgements and risk assessment). But SEEA
+was written after the 2008 financial crisis and its authors are
+aware that private markets ‘may not be sufficiently developed to
+provide robust estimates of these specific rates of return’. Thus,
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+in what appears more like a policy recommendation based on
+anecdotal evidence rather than sound economic analysis, they
+suggest using real-life rates of return such as ‘government bond
+rates’.25 In their opinion, the return on investment produced by
+the possession of natural resources should be roughly equivalent
+to that of sovereign bonds. Evidently, the report must have been
+written before the sovereign bonds downgrades experienced by
+most advanced economies since 2011.
+Looking beyond the models’ apparent neutrality, the UN
+Statistical Commission recognizes that all these approaches are
+problematic and fundamentally subjective. It also admits that its
+framework intentionally rejects the attribution of value to ‘all of
+the benefits that may accrue to current and future generations’,
+thus refuting the adoption of ‘what might be regarded as social
+valuations of environmental assets’.26 In addition, its narrow focus
+on specific property boundaries and direct input to the economy
+neglects the broader societal implications of natural capital. UN
+statisticians agree that a better methodology should apply ‘social
+discount rates’ in the valuation of environmental assets, rather
+than market-based discount rates, given that the former reflect
+‘broad and long term value to society as a whole’ while the latter
+are computed ‘solely in relation to their value to a present day
+extractor’. And so they conclude, albeit in a marginal note, that
+one of the main arguments supporting the use of social discount
+rates is that these ‘place higher relative importance on income
+earned by future generations’, whereas estimates of NPV using
+market-based discount rates ‘do not value future generations’.27
+
+Putting a price on ecosystems
+
+In 1997, a team of researchers led by ecological economist Robert
+Costanza of the University of Maryland made the first attempt at
+producing an estimate of the total value of ecosystem services
+how numbers rule the world
+
+– that is, the worldwide variety of processes that nature provides
+for free to economic activity, from water supply to pollination. In
+a paper published in Nature, they gathered all studies available to
+date and estimated the overall value of the entire biosphere to be
+(on average) US$33 trillion per annum.28 At the time, this figure
+was almost twice the value of global GDP, which hovered around
+US$18 trillion a year. The researchers were animated by genuine
+environmental concerns. They were, of course, aware that many
+people believe that ‘valuation of ecosystems is either impossible or
+unwise’ and that ‘we cannot place a value on such “intangibles”
+as human life, environmental aesthetics, or long-term ecological
+benefits.’29 Yet their conclusion was that, in the absence of any
+clear and transparent valuation, ecosystems will continue being
+given ‘too little weight in policy decisions’, ultimately compromising
+‘the sustainability of humans in the biosphere’.30 In a follow-up
+study published in Science in 2002, they concluded that the net
+benefits of nature conservation worldwide (measured in terms of
+NPV) outweighed the costs by a margin of 100 to 1.
+31 Each dollar
+invested in the preservation of natural ecosystems would yield
+one hundred times in financial returns. From an investment point
+of view, no financial bubble or speculative derivative could ever
+produce so much money. As remarked by some commentators,
+‘even in the heady pre-Sept. 11 days of the dot-com craze, numbers
+like this would have made any day trader giddy.’32 But what was
+behind these numbers?
+As exemplified by the evolution of the SEEA framework,
+valuation methods for natural capital are fraught with fallacies
+and risks. These are further compounded when the field of
+analysis is expanded to include the arguably endless variety of
+ecosystem services, which must be valued not only in terms of
+their direct contribution to economic growth in certain sectors
+(as the SEEA does) but also (and more importantly) in terms of
+their overall impact on humanity’s well-being. In their pivotal
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+research, Costanza and colleagues acknowledged the ‘conceptual
+and empirical problems inherent in producing such an estimate’.33
+Their approach was inevitably simplistic. They calculated average
+value per hectare of seventeen types of service across sixteen
+biomes – that is, geographically defined areas of the planet characterized
+by similar climatic conditions – and then multiplied this
+value for the extent of the terrestrial surface. As it turned out,
+much of the data was missing. In their paper, for instance, they
+could not find valuation studies for some major biomes such as
+deserts, tundra, ice/rock and cropland. They also remarked that
+estimates inevitably result in a ‘static snapshot’ of what, in fact, is
+a very complex, non-linear and interdependent system. Moreover,
+the monetization frameworks assume that there are no ‘sharp
+thresholds, discontinuities or irreversibilities in the ecosystem
+response function’, which is ‘almost certainly not the case’.34
+There are also critical issues of scale that limit the policy and
+societal impact of studies monetizing ecosystem services. Take the
+infamous figure of US$33 trillion. Is that a high or a low figure
+for an average citizen or a policymaker? Even a simple question
+such as this proves very difficult to answer. Although some people
+may find it hard to make sense of such an enormous volume of
+money (just as much as they struggle to fathom the scale of the
+global economy), a closer look reveals that the figure may actually
+be extremely low. If nature is worth the equivalent of two global
+GDPs, then some may conclude that, in the worst-case scenario,
+should ecosystems collapse entirely, it would be enough to triple
+the world economy to replace all natural capital. If all workers
+were to produce three times as much and if all companies were
+willing to commit to triple production targets, then mankind
+could do without nature. We could successfully replace rainfall,
+pollination, water sources and so on. Nothing short of a very
+cheap bailout of nature. Would that be possible? Many of us
+would recoil at such an idea, considering these extrapolations
+how numbers rule the world
+
+just some type of economic extravagance or outright political
+madness. Twice the global economy? Even three, four, fifty times
+as much would still be a foolish ‘underestimation of infinity’.35
+Point taken. However, a calculation that leads to infinity would
+never trigger policy reforms. It would simply be a generic statement
+with no real teeth in practice. As often happens, when
+figures are much higher than our daily experience (quadrillions,
+light years, infinity), we fail to grasp their actual magnitude. And
+when numbers are too ‘big’ to comprehend, then it is unlikely that
+policies will change. But when they are relatively small, there is
+the opposite risk.
+Because of this inevitable valuation dilemma, many observers
+have maintained that the ambition to monetize ecosystems (or,
+as is often put, to put a price on infinity) is both impossible
+and unwise. There are obvious reasons to be suspicious of a
+utilitarian calculation of economic value applied to ‘intangibles’
+such as human life, environmental beauty or long-term ecological
+benefits.36 Since the publication of the Nature paper, numerous
+ecological economists have questioned various technical aspects
+of the methods for the valuation of ecosystem services, especially
+the reliance on a mix of scattered surveys and estimates of replacement
+costs, which are further undermined by the always-present
+risk of double counting.37
+There exist a variety of methodologies to monetize ecosystems.
+Some of these assess the value of environmental ‘goods’ indirectly,
+by tracking prices in related markets. For instance, hedonic
+methods applied to the price of housing stock are used to estimate
+the value of local environmental quality. Take the case of two
+flats. They are roughly the same size and quality, but one is
+located near a park (and is therefore more expensive) while the
+other is not. What would then be the estimated price of the
+park? An algorithm based on price differential between the two
+flats answers this question. Similarly, the travel costs incurred
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+by visitors have been used as proxies of the value of recreational
+areas, while the costs borne by people who try to protect themselves
+against environmental risks (e.g. drinking bottled water,
+medical expenses, etc.) have been employed to monetize the
+value of ecological preservation.38 Most techniques, however,
+are more ‘direct’ and follow the conceptual frameworks of the
+so-called ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) approach, a survey method
+that tries to estimate prices as a function of the willingness of
+potential buyers to acquire certain goods. To the distaste of many
+genuine environmentalists, the WTP was developed by marketing
+research and ultimately popularized by big corporations, as a
+rather mainstream approach used to gauge pricing decisions in the
+development of new products. Companies usually adopt WTP to
+develop an optimal pricing strategy (and thus outcompete rivals
+and increase their market share), to forecast market response
+to price changes, to model demand functions and to measure
+the added value of a brand to a specific product vis-à-vis an
+unbranded baseline product. The underlying principle is that,
+when we buy something, we base our assessment on a series
+of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ parameters. Some of the objective
+parameters include functionality, newness, usefulness and the
+like. Some of the subjective parameters include its desirability
+and social status, given that not everything that we buy has a
+use-value. Moreover, the act of buying does not happen in a
+vacuum but is part of a complex social dynamic characterized
+by traditions and expectations. Our WTP is based on all these
+parameters, and when the market price equals (or approaches)
+our criteria then we are likely to make the purchase. This is why
+companies compete to know as much as possible about consumers’
+preferences. They collect data on our shopping habits, they
+want to know what we look for when we surf the Internet and what
+goods we cherish. If they could read our WTP on our foreheads,
+they could set prices accordingly and see their sales skyrocket. In
+how numbers rule the world
+
+their marketing strategies, however, they are not simply passively
+guessing how much we would be willing to pay for a given good.
+They are actively influencing our mental processes of valuation,
+mainly via advertisements and branding. They want our WTP to
+mirror their expectations and profit margins. In this continuous
+mutual exchange, measuring WTP becomes both a heuristic task
+and a psychological battle.
+Most WTP methods can be divided into two main groups:
+those based on revealed preferences and those relying on stated
+preferences. Among the first we find experiments such as Vickrey
+auctions, in which participants submit sealed bids without
+knowing the valuations of the other bidders, similar to the online
+proxy bidding auctions popularized by, among others, the website
+eBay. In these experiments successful bidders are requested to
+buy the good for the bid price, although the price is set on the
+level of the second best bidder (second price auctions).39 A similar
+experiment involves participants simultaneously submitting offer
+prices, with the sale price randomly drawn from a distribution
+of prices ranging from zero to the commonly agreed maximum
+price.40 Bidders whose bids are greater than the sale price receive
+a unit of the item, but only pay an amount equal to the sale price.
+Both auction mechanisms are designed to encourage participants
+to disclose their true valuations, a principle which is generally
+defined by economists as incentive compatibility: as their acquisition
+of the auctioned good is not based on the highest possible
+bid, participants have an incentive not to gamble against the
+process (overbidding).
+In the second group, we find survey-based techniques in which
+participants are either asked to rank their WTP for a certain set
+of items (e.g. a preference structure) or directly invited to identify
+a minimum–maximum prince range. In some cases, limited
+resources and time constraints make the use of focus groups
+preferable to more bottom-up techniques such as experiments and
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+surveys. Expert judgements, in this regard, become ‘a heuristic to
+assess customers’ willingness to pay as well as to provide generic
+estimates of demand in response to different price levels’.41 As a
+matter of fact, it is widely recognized that survey approaches to
+measure the WTP are fundamentally problematic and unstable.
+Respondents do not have an incentive to reveal their true preferences
+as a number of other considerations come into play. For
+instance, some may tend to overstate prices because of ‘prestige
+effects’ or so as not to appear ‘stingy’.42 By contrast, they may
+attempt to quote artificially lower prices, since many people
+perceive their role ‘as conscientious buyers as that of helping to
+keep prices down’.43 Buyers have little capacity to estimate the
+price of a product, especially if it is not a high-frequency purchase,
+which can lead to a sudden change in the declared WTP
+once respondents learn what the actual market price is.44 Quite
+often, personal interviews can result in contradictory results and
+even reversals.45 Moreover, market researchers are aware of the
+irreconcilable schism between hypothetical pricing and actual
+purchasing: even when respondents reveal their WTP, this does
+not automatically translate into actual purchasing behaviour.46
+In many cases, it is easier to decide whether the specific price
+for a product is acceptable rather than directly assign one.47
+Apparently insignificant technical tools, such closed-ended
+questions (in which respondents choose among prices posted by
+the interviewer) or open-ended formats (in which respondents
+have to come up with their own estimates), yield very different
+results.48 Unsurprisingly, closed-ended dichotomous options (that
+is, only two alternatives to choose from) tend to produce more
+reliable results. Also indirect surveys, in which respondents are
+presented product profiles with varying prices and are asked
+to indicate whether they would purchase the good at that price
+or not, produce very different and inconsistent results across
+respondents.49
+how numbers rule the world
+
+All these difficulties with estimates of WTP are common in
+conventional marketing fields. Even more complicated is when
+markets do not exist, as is the case with ecosystem services. In
+this context, the process must be simulated through so-called
+contingent valuations: instead of setting prices to estimate buyers’
+willingness to pay, the latter is used to gauge the former.50 Thus,
+in the absence of a real-life price against which to check the results
+of the survey, what people are willing to pay becomes the de facto
+price of nature. The first published reference to this methodology
+appeared in the late 1940s, when researchers mentioned the possibility
+of conducting surveys based on the WTP to measure the
+financial ‘returns’ of preventing soil erosion.51 It was only in the
+1960s, though, that contingent valuations began to be used more
+systematically in studies focusing on a diverse range of topics,
+from the value of nature reserves to the right to hunt waterfowl
+and the value of duck hunting permits.52 Contingent valuations
+began to be used also in research dealing with non-environmental
+issues, such as policies to reduce the risk of death from heart
+attack, prevention of respiratory disease and improved information
+about grocery shop prices.53
+In the 1980s, contingent valuation methods were also incorporated
+into policy reforms, especially in the field of natural damage
+assessment, which stirred significant debate within academic and
+business circles. An interesting case was the establishment of
+the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
+Liability Act of 1980, also referred to as CERCLA or, more commonly,
+as the Superfund law, which gave US government agencies
+the right to sue companies for damages to the natural resources for
+which they were trustees (which included lakes, streams, forests,
+bays, marshes, land masses and the like) and established that
+contingent valuations may be used to provide estimates not only
+of direct damage to users, but also of implications for society as
+a whole. Then, in March 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling
+11 million gallons of crude oil into the sea, causing the hitherto
+worst environmental disaster in the history of America. Following
+public outrage, the US Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act and
+contingent valuations made it for the first time into the litigation
+field.54 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
+was tasked with the job of defining a methodology to monetize
+damage, and a blue ribbon panel of experts, led by Nobel laureate
+economists Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow, carried out
+a review of the pros and cons of contingent valuation methods.
+Most business associations, championed by the American oil
+and mining sector, fought against the legitimacy of contingent
+valuation methods, as they believed that such ‘subjective’ methods
+would only be used to support expansive regulation and large
+damage awards. Much to their surprise, this was not the case.
+The blue ribbon panel only gave a lukewarm endorsement to contingent
+valuations, setting a number of parameters for its future
+usage. Moreover, the diversity of opinions among consultants led
+government agencies to settle the Exxon Valdez suit out of court,
+for a compensation of US$1.15 billion (against estimates of total
+losses averaging nearly US$3 billion).55 Exxon corporation itself
+funded several ‘counter studies’, initially to dismiss the reliability
+of the valuations commissioned by the plaintiffs and, later on,
+to influence the methods and techniques used by experts. Ever
+since, research in the field of contingent valuation methods for
+ecological damage assessment has been greatly influenced by the
+oil industry itself.56
+Needless to say, contingent valuation methods have been controversial
+not only for their potential politicization, but also for
+self-evident conceptual problems.57 If market researchers acknowledge
+the intrinsic difficulty of estimating WTP for conventional
+market goods, then it goes without saying that problems are
+further compounded in surveying unfamiliar goods and concepts,
+how numbers rule the world
+
+such as the total economic value (TEV) of ecosystem services.
+By TEV, economists understand the combination of use-value,
+non-use (or existence) value and option value. Use-value, a classical
+concept in economics, denotes the utility that people derive
+from using a specific good (often, but not exclusively, to achieve
+some other specific objectives). The value of a hammer is commensurate
+to what I can actually do with it. As an instrumental
+concept, use-value is fundamental in the valuation of natural
+resources such as timber, fish, oil, water and the like, which can
+be converted into building materials, food and energy. However,
+nature is not only valuable for its specific uses. It also has an
+intrinsic non-use value. The pleasure (or utility) one derives from
+gazing into a sunset or admiring a spectacular landscape is not
+due to the use one can make of it, but rather to its mere existence
+(which is why non-use value is also known as existence value).
+Finally, nature is a source of utility with manifold applications,
+some of which may not be appreciated or known at present. So,
+its overall value is not only a function of its use and non-use, but
+also of its potential use. This is what cost–benefit analysts call
+option value, denoting the utility derived by the preservation of
+a resource that may be available for use in the future.58
+These distinct (and complementary) definitions of value are not
+only relevant from a conceptual perspective. They have important
+political (and legal) implications too. Take the case of environmental
+damage litigation. While damage calculated on use-value
+can only be claimed by those who can demonstrate their direct
+economic loss from a particular ecosystemic degradation (e.g.
+farmers for diminishing rainfall, fishermen for water contamination,
+local residents for poor air quality), in the case of both
+non-use and option value anybody could – in theory – claim compensation
+(also known as passive loss). Never mind the evident
+difficulties in gauging the use-value of ecosystems, which have
+a fundamental yet largely neglected impact on human life. But
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+the estimation of both non-use and option value is fraught with
+insurmountable complications due to subjectivity problems and
+cognitive (and cultural) constraints, which make it almost impossible
+to produce any meaningful valuation. For instance, a study
+commissioned by the Exxon Corporation to challenge the acceptability
+of contingent valuations in court found that respondents
+gave the same valuation answer in a survey for protecting 2,000,
+20,000 or 200,000 birds, thus disproving the alleged capacity
+of respondents to accurately monetize ecological preservation.59
+Rather, one may argue that respondents were simply using their
+common sense, which suggested that protecting birds, no matter
+how many they are, is simply a value in its own right. Perhaps
+they thought birdlife was something that could not be priced. Or
+perhaps they just had no idea. As recognized by Costanza and
+colleagues, respondents ‘may be ill-informed’ and their preferences
+‘may not adequately incorporate social fairness, ecological
+sustainability and other important goals’. In other words,
+
+if we actually lived in a world that was ecologically sustainable,
+socially fair and where everyone had perfect knowledge of
+their connection to ecosystem services, both market prices and
+surveys of willingness-to-pay would yield very different results
+than they currently do, and the value of ecosystem services
+would probably increase.60
+
+In a society where short-term utility, self-interest and consumption
+have been elevated to structural codes of conduct, it
+is doubtful that the personal preferences of a few experiments’
+participants or survey respondents (let alone so-called experts’
+focus groups) can result in a reliable valuation of the world’s
+natural capital. Moreover, all these approaches take for granted an
+anthropocentric view of valuation (nature is worth what humans
+can extract from it), entirely disregarding the possibility that the
+environment may have an intrinsic value, an issue often raised by
+how numbers rule the world
+
+ethicists as well as natural scientists, and neglecting the broader
+implications of ecosystem-centric and eco-centric perspectives on
+nature. As we have discussed in Chapter 3, cost–benefit analysis
+and economic evaluation are dangerous simplifications, which
+may easily mislead policy makers. Even those who accept the
+validity of monetary valuation need to recognize that there are
+‘simply too many empirical uncertainties about these values’,
+which ‘reflect our limited understanding of the physical world.’61
+Indeed, any natural scientist would agree that humans do not
+know all the ways in which ecosystems provide services and how
+these change over time. Evaluators, too, change their views on
+the role of ecosystems as their informational basis shifts and their
+social context evolves over time and generations.
+In many regards, the findings of the 1997 Nature article and
+its 2002 follow up in Science can be seen as a ‘political manifesto’
+more than a scientific measurement. Both studies were meant
+to ‘stimulate additional research and debate’ and overcome the
+fact that, for many decades, the valuation of nature had been
+dominated by a narrow focus on individual utility maximization.62
+Aware of the contradictions and limitations of their original
+approach to valuing natural capital, these scholars pledged to
+investigate new ways to capture two important additional goals,
+namely ecological sustainability and social distributional fairness,
+as they became aware that ‘basing valuation on current
+individual preferences and utility maximization alone, as is done
+in conventional analysis, does not necessarily lead to ecological
+sustainability or social fairness.’63 A fairness base value requires
+that individuals choose their preferences as members of the
+community, not as individuals. This, however, would need a
+very different process, involving open debate and consultations
+throughout society in order to reach ‘consensus on the values that
+would be fair to all members of the current and future community
+(including non-human species)’.64 As there are always winners
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+and losers in a valuation process, a collective debate would only
+be fruitful if participants adopt a ‘veil of ignorance’, as in John
+Rawls’s theory of justice, where everyone votes ‘as if they were
+operating with no knowledge of their own individual status in
+current or future society’.65 Finally, a sustainability-based value
+would require a comprehensive assessment of the way in which
+ecosystem services are connected to the physical, chemical and
+biological functioning of the global system. If it is accepted that
+all species, no matter how seemingly uninteresting or lacking an
+immediate utility from an anthropocentric perspective, have a
+fundamental role to play in natural ecosystems, then the valuation
+of ecosystems should have no direct reference to human
+preferences. For too long, human beings have operated within
+ecosystems ‘as if they were representatives of the whole system’.
+By contrast, a true sustainability approach would need to focus
+on an overall assessment of the ‘evolutionary contribution to the
+survival of the linked ecological economic system’ as well as ‘the
+opportunities of choice for future generations’. Needless to say,
+such objectives would require a totally different methodology.
+And, because of ‘the large uncertainties involved’, any model
+would need to be used in a precautionary way, ‘looking for the
+range of possible values and erring on the side of caution’.66
+
+The financialization of nature
+
+But has this been the case? Have new models been treated
+with the necessary carefulness, trying to incorporate a holistic
+understanding of value and always erring on the side of caution?
+Quite the opposite. Just like the burgeoning offset industry in
+the field of climate change mitigation, natural capital accounting
+has become a new business for private consultancies, banks and
+investment groups, mostly aided by new forms of governance at
+the global level.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+In 2006, the United Nations Environment Programme commissioned
+a study to estimate the value of coral reefs in the
+Caribbean and the Indian Ocean, where they are among the most
+important tourist attractions for scuba divers and an important
+source of fisheries, generating revenues for the local economy.
+Result: between US$100,000 and 600,000 a year for reefs and
+between US$200,000 and 900,000 for mangroves. In areas where
+these ecosystems contributed to maintaining white sandy beaches
+(another important tourist attraction), the estimated value shot
+up to US$1 million per year.67 Another study conducted in the
+same year argued that various types of insect (in particular the
+declining population of honeybees) contributed at least US$57
+billion per annum to the US economy.68
+In 2009, The Economist ran the story of Iwokrama, a 370,000-
+hectare rainforest in central Guyana, which had just entered the
+‘global economy’.69 Aware that donations would not be enough
+to maintain the forest, Iwokrama’s board of trustees went to
+the market. First, it introduced moneymaking schemes such as
+timber extraction, ecotourism programmes, commercialization
+of forest products such as honey and oils, bio-prospecting and
+forestry research. Then it decided to sell a licence for the measurement
+and valuation of the forest’s ecosystem services, which
+was bought by a London-based investment company, Canopy
+Capital. Ever since, the latter has been marketing ‘ecosystem
+service certificates’, which are attached to a 10-year tradable bond,
+betting on the rising cost of carbon and the financialization of
+reforestation projects as part of the offset mechanisms REDD
+(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation)
+and REDD+, two global schemes introduced by the Kyoto
+Protocol. As declared by Canopy Capital, countries that monetize
+their natural patrimonies and conserve their forests are likely to
+see these transformed into global assets worth billions of dollars
+a year: ‘The investment community is beginning to wake up to
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+this opportunity.’70 The Global Canopy Project, a joint venture
+between scientists and investors, has been leading the global quest
+for the monetization of tropical forests and has produced popular
+publications such as the Little Book of Forest Finance and the
+Little Book of Biodiversity Finance which explain the seemingly
+endless possibilities of financial returns in the field of natural
+capital. Perhaps not surprisingly, the project’s board of trustees
+is dominated by investment bankers and financiers.71 In 2011,
+Canopy Capital ran a workshop titled ‘Unlocking Forest Bonds’,
+which was funded and supported by the world’s largest investment
+bank, Goldman Sachs. Participants in the event agreed that ‘The
+issuance of bonds directly addresses the concerns of time and
+scale, enabling issuers to raise large-scale finance now that will be
+repaid by existing and anticipated future income.’72 Nevertheless
+they highlighted the challenge for bond issuers of convincing
+investors ‘that the cash flows they plan to pay the bond back
+with are sufficiently secure and predictable’, especially now that
+carbon markets have become less reliable. Thus, as a way to make
+forests look profitable, they recommended introducing ‘ecosystem
+service markets (e.g. water, biodiversity), sustainable timber and
+agricultural markets, regulation (e.g. taxes, liability regulation),
+and forest-friendly lending (e.g. to ecosystem-dependent smalland
+medium-sized enterprises)’, which would need to receive
+the necessary support from governments ‘to ensure that these
+cash flows materialise, making forest preservation an attractive
+investment’.
+The Green Development Mechanism 2010 Initiative, recently
+renamed Green Development Initiative, is a public–private partnership
+to develop ‘innovative market-based financial mechanisms’
+under the UN-backed Convention on Biological Diversity.73 Its
+main goal is to guide private investment in the management of
+biodiversity according to certified standards and independent
+audits, which require an assessment of the economic value of
+how numbers rule the world
+
+biodiversity. As argued by the specialized magazine Ecosystem
+Marketplace, certified agricultural and forest products, private
+land trusts, payments for watersheds and other environmental
+services, and offsets for biodiversity loss could soon come to
+rival the billions of dollars generated by offset schemes under
+the Clean Development Mechanism.74 In Australia, biodiversity
+banks (also known as ‘biobanks’) have been introduced to certify
+biodiversity credits generated by landowners who commit to
+enhance and protect biodiversity values, which can then be sold
+to developers with a view to counterbalancing (or offsetting) the
+impacts on biodiversity values that are likely to occur as a result of
+new construction projects.75 In 2011, a bunch of global businesses,
+including the two largest consumer goods companies in the world,
+Nestlé and Unilever, joined a natural capital leadership compact,
+allegedly with a view to stimulating changes in the business
+response to nature.76 At the Rio+20 summit in June 2012, two
+dozen multinational corporations, including Coca-Cola, Dow
+Chemical and Nike, vowed to introduce methods to value natural
+capital in the running of their operations and investments. In
+their report titled The New Business Imperative: Valuing Natural
+Capital they identified the range of benefits that accrue from
+such an initiative.77 During the same summit, some of the world’s
+leading private financial institutions signed a ‘natural capital
+declaration’, in which they pledged to integrate environmental
+accounting into their investment plans and operations.78 In their
+words, ‘every economic activity can have an impact on natural
+capital. … These impacts can lead to material financial risks, but
+also to relevant business opportunities.’79
+While these new governance trends are presented as important
+breakthroughs, the growing involvement of private financial
+groups and corporate giants in natural capital accounting and
+the economics of ecosystems should be viewed with suspicion.
+It also raises important issues as to the integrity of most of these
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+allegedly ‘green’ programmes. For starters, the involvement of
+Goldman Sachs in the new business of forest bonds raises serious
+concerns, given the bank’s involvement in triggering the global
+financial crisis and, more specifically, its dubious role in the
+Greek sovereign debt crisis, when the bank was hired to help this
+country’s leadership disguise its actual financial status vis-à-vis
+European authorities.80 Most of the other commercial and investment
+banks participating in these new ‘deals’ have also been
+deeply involved in the marketization of the very financial products
+that caused the Euro-crisis. One of the signatories of the natural
+capital declaration, the Italian banking giant UniCredit, which
+boasts operations in over twenty countries, has been taken to
+court by Italian authorities for tax evasion and for having actively
+passed toxic derivative contracts onto investors and consumers in
+order to clean up its books.81 The mastermind behind the TEEB
+programme was also managing director in the global markets
+division at Deutsche Bank, an organization that has become the
+utmost symbol of Europe’s banking elite and one of the major
+drivers of the collateralized debt obligations in this continent,
+already investigated for fraud, espionage, tax evasion and interest
+rate fixing in the Libor and Euribor scandals.82 The same can
+be said with respect to some of the companies leading corporate
+involvement in this field. A corporation like Nestlé, for instance,
+has a rather questionable track record with respect to food production
+and distribution. Ever since the 1970s, civil society groups
+around the world have been leading an international boycott of
+Nestlé’s products because of what they claim is the company’s
+aggressive and unethical marketing of breast milk substitutes
+(infant formula) in African countries, which has allegedly resulted
+in malnourishment and deaths.83 The company has also
+been criticized by health groups for refusing to label genetically
+modified food, by environmental NGOs for buying palm oil from
+subsidiaries that trash rain forests, by human rights defenders for
+how numbers rule the world
+
+doing business with the military junta in Burma/Myanmar, and
+by trade unions for exploiting farmers and undermining workers’
+rights.84 In a 2005 film documentary the then CEO of Nestlé,
+Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, attacked organic farming, argued in
+favour of the massive commercialization of genetically modified
+food and candidly accused NGOs of extremism for defending
+water as a public right.85 The Coca-Cola Company, too, cannot
+boast a shining resumé in environmental protection. Besides
+having been denounced for union busting in South America, the
+soft drink giant has built an oligopolistic control of water distribution
+in countries like India, where its plants have been accused
+of draining public water resources available to local farmers
+and have been investigated by federal and local government for
+massive use of pesticides.86 Not only was Dow Chemical Company
+one of the main producers of the infamous Agent Orange used by
+US troops in Vietnam, but it consistently refused to clean up the
+contamination caused by the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy, the world’s
+worst industrial disaster, which was caused by an India-based
+pesticide plant owned by Union Carbide, a company acquired
+by Dow in 2001.
+87
+
+The global consultancy company McKinsey, which besides
+working with some of the largest and most powerful companies in
+the world (they also pride themselves to be listed in the top 10 on
+Fortune magazine’s World’s Best Companies for Leaders) is also a
+leader in advising governments on reforestation and afforestation
+policies as part of the REDD+ scheme, has been involved in
+some of the most spectacular financial scandals in recent times.
+Jeff Skilling, the CEO of energy giant Enron, who is currently
+serving a fourteen-year prison sentence (reduced in a deal from
+twenty-four years) for fraud and other federal felonies, used to be
+a prominent partner at McKinsey. As reported by the Wall Street
+Journal, McKinsey itself was a strategic adviser to Enron during
+the years that led to the company’s collapse (at the time, the largest
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+corporate bankruptcy in America’s history), raising questions of
+consultancy liability, given the finding that Enron’s financial
+condition and operations had been sustained over various years
+through a systematic accounting fraud.88 More recently, McKinsey
+was implicated in the Galleon scandal, the biggest insider-trading
+case ever.89 According to prosecutors, the Galleon hedge fund
+was fed lucrative and illegal tips about McKinsey clients by some
+of the consultancy’s top executives, including Anil Kumar, top
+senior partner and director, who pleaded guilty to securities fraud
+and cooperated with the government, revealing the involvement
+of Rajat Gupta, former CEO of McKinsey, who was sentenced to
+two years in prison in 2012.
+90
+
+In environmental governance, McKinsey has risen to prominence
+thanks to the wide adoption of its global greenhouse gas
+abatement cost curve, a cost–benefit analysis conceived in 2007
+outlining different options for a gradual reduction of emissions,
+in which height represents cost and the width of each segment indicates
+the relative amount of carbon abatement.91 The cost curve
+has become rather popular among policymakers, particularly as
+it places more emphasis on cost-effective (read low cost for business)
+measures. According to environmental group Greenpeace,
+though, McKinsey’s approach oversimplifies reality and is flawed
+by unrealistic assumptions about comparative costs:
+
+if the true costs of displacing local subsistence farming are
+underestimated … by ignoring transaction costs and wider
+social and environmental impacts, whilst the costs of addressing
+industrial logging are overestimated (for example by exaggerating
+the economic value of logging to the economy), and these
+assumptions are built-in to the cost curve, then every policy
+decision flowing from the use of the curve will tend to favour
+logging interests over those of small-scale farmers. The result
+will not just be socially destructive, but may prove impossible to
+implement, economically irrational, and ineffective in reducing
+emissions.92
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Greenpeace also lamented that, while McKinsey claims to ‘rely
+on facts’, it refuses to disclose the data and models on which it
+bases its calculations, justifying it with the company’s application
+of intellectual property rights: ‘the outside world has no way of
+knowing how McKinsey arrives at the different cost estimates
+attributed to various abatement measures.’93
+Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that among the
+frequently asked questions posted by the UK natural capital
+committee we find: ‘Can we trust accountants and economists
+to capture the true value of nature?’ Although the committee
+has taken great pains to explain that valuation processes are
+the result of a multidisciplinary process involving both social
+and natural scientists, the evident link between financial and
+corporate powers, on the one hand, and most initiatives aimed at
+measuring the value of nature, on the other, remains troubling. As
+journalist Christine MacDonald showed in her book Green, Inc.:
+An Environmental Insider Reveals How a Good Cause Has Gone
+Bad, most of these policies simply provide green makeovers to
+companies that are notorious for their negligence and disregard
+of basic rights.94
+Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the potential
+launch of a Green Development Mechanism, which would
+apply the rationale of Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism
+to support biodiversity, has been criticized by environmental
+movements across the world. Many doubt the genuineness of
+private investors’ motives to support biodiversity, arguing that
+if a genuine corporate interest in biodiversity existed, ‘there
+would not be a problem with biodiversity loss in the first place’.95
+Fame, wealth and power are viewed as fundamental driving
+forces behind the new interest in the ‘environmental cause’.96
+Others, especially in less industrialized countries, warn that the
+financialization of biodiversity will ultimately result in a global
+process of dispossession, displacement and violence against local
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+populations, including indigenous movements, who are the true
+guardians of biodiversity.97 Apparently harmless concepts such
+as eco-tourism have triggered consumptive desires in many local
+communities and introduced non-local lifestyles and agendas,
+invariably impacting the traditional equilibria of hitherto pristine
+ecosystems. Autonomous food production systems which have
+sustained communities over centuries have also been negatively
+affected by corporate and financial interests in biodiversity.98
+In his book Imperial Nature, sociologist Michael Goldman
+noted that,
+
+In remarkable synchronicity, the sustainability crowd and the
+neoliberal development crowd have united to remake nature
+in the South, transforming vast areas of community-managed
+uncapitalized lands into transnationally regulated zones for
+commercial logging, pharmaceutical bio-prospecting, export
+orientated cash cropping, megafauna preservation and elite
+eco-tourism.99
+
+Biodiversity preservation has thus become an excuse for a
+massive wave of ‘green grabbing’, in which large tracts of land are
+acquired for biodiversity conservation, biocarbon sequestration,
+biofuels, ecosystem services, eco-tourism and emissions offsets.100
+Such a global excitement for environmental preservation is led by
+an extraordinary new range of actors and unlikely alliances, which
+include ‘pension funds and venture capitalists, commodity traders
+and consultants, GIS service providers and business entrepreneurs,
+ecotourism companies and the military, green activists and anxious
+consumers’.101 Adding to its legitimacy is the host of international
+conventions, institutional reforms and governance agreements that
+purportedly aim to save nature and fight climate change, but may
+ultimately result in a global ‘enclosure’ of the commons.102
+Environmental scholars Bram Büscher, Sian Sullivan and
+their colleagues have described these trends in both the corporate
+and the financial world as a case of ‘neoliberal biodiversity
+how numbers rule the world
+
+conservation’, by which they mean ‘an amalgamation of ideology
+and techniques informed by the premiss that nature can only
+be “saved” through its submission to capital and its subsequent
+revaluation in capitalist terms’.103 In their view, such a hegemonic
+discourse is essential for current capitalism as it opens investment
+opportunities and new areas of accumulation, while ‘consolidating
+the appearance of general consensus’ on what, in fact, are very
+controversial values and methods. Through numbers, prices,
+cost curves and other derivatives, this process of financialization
+is ‘able to place itself outside of the realm of contradictions it
+stimulates, even while appropriating and misrepresenting these
+contradictions in critical ways’.104
+
+Conclusion: Nature Inc.
+
+In 2008, the BBC launched a documentary series titled Nature
+Inc., which promised to open everybody’s eyes ‘to just how much
+we rely on nature to keep our economy going’.105 Supported in
+part by the UN Environment Programme, the series featured
+scientists, investors in the biodiversity business and financial
+experts. No other title could have better summarized the process
+of marketization of natural capital that has been unfolding in the
+past decade, mostly under the radar screen of public scrutiny and
+civil society debate.106 The experimentation with new accounting
+models, contingent valuation methods and other forms of
+monetization of natural capital has ultimately led to a dangerous
+collusion between entrenched financial and corporate interests,
+on the one hand, and entire natural ecosystems, on the other. As
+in the case of climate change mitigation discussed in the previous
+chapter, economic reasoning and the use of numerical models
+have been instrumental in generating an aura of neutrality behind
+the valuation of nature. Numbers have been used to give tangible
+authority to abstract concepts such as costs, benefits, values and
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+prices. The very process of monetization of nature has relied on
+the capacity of numbers to provide objectivity when, in reality,
+subjective decisions are being made.
+Many of these initiatives are probably genuine in their ultimate
+goal. They may be honestly trying to use economic models for
+the preservation of social and environmental quality. In their
+view, pricing would force people into ‘a rational decision-making
+frame of mind’ to analyse the ‘gains and losses’ of a certain type
+of development trajectory.107 Sportswear giant Puma is the first
+company to commit to disclosing ‘an environmental profit and
+loss account’, spearheading a coalition of businesses willing to
+include environmental costs on price tags. According to Puma’s
+boss: ‘By showing environmental costs in euros and cents, our
+new Puma product EP&L visualises the environmental impacts
+Puma products cause and makes comparing products in terms
+of sustainability easy for everyone.’108 In 2014, the data agency
+Trucost launched the Natural Capital Leaders index to assess
+business commitment to natural capital preservation. The resistance
+that oil and mining companies initially displayed to the
+integration of contingent valuation methods in the calculation of
+environment damage costs attests to the fact that natural capital
+‘subjective’ valuations can also be detrimental to corporate interests.
+The tool can cut both ways.
+The Global Canopy Programme argues that market schemes
+can help pool resources to prevent the power of speculation
+against biodiversity, especially in agricultural commodities: ‘We
+need to demystify and explore innovative finance mechanisms that
+could help stimulate a new natural-capital-inclusive economy.’109
+If international markets are destroying tropical forests through
+the support of commodities such as beef, soy and palm oil, then
+an equally powerful but opposite response can come from within
+markets themselves. For them, market can be used to fight market.
+The only way to save nature is to sell it.110
+how numbers rule the world
+
+There is little doubt that international finance and corporate
+powers have been able to exploit the environmental crisis to get a
+new lease from society. By purporting to take in hand the saving
+of the environment, they have been seeking a new legitimization
+for themselves, especially in the wake of the 2008 financial
+crisis. Their approach has been reinforced by ‘the politics of
+environmental discourse’, centred on concepts such as rationality,
+sustainability, managerialism and modernization, and based on
+the commandments of cost effectiveness and utility maximization.111
+The logic of imbuing conservation strategies with the
+potential for future economic profit extends to the assumption
+that human motivation is directed primarily by personal gain,
+and that the aggregate effect invariably leads to collective wealth
+and well-being.112 In this vision of the world, economic models
+can combine profitability and healthy ecosystem in what looks
+like the most successful win–win scenario.
+Market models (whether to destroy or to repair nature) have
+been built on a particular anthropological paradigm, which is
+usually defined as Homo economicus. The preferences of Homo
+economicus are given (that is, they are not culturally and socially
+produced) and cost–benefit calculations govern his self-interested
+rationality. In the reality of Homo economicus, markets are everywhere.
+If for certain resources or services there are no markets,
+then ‘a pseudo market can be simulated’ through experiments and
+questionnaires.113 As we have seen, the numerical representations
+of costs, prices and benefits unduly simplify the complexity of
+real-life processes. Reducing ecosystems to priceable goods has
+the powerful consequence of subjecting nature to the artificial
+rules of economics. More importantly, it flattens distributional
+issues by hiding the fact that there are always losers and winners
+in environmental governance (something that Homo economicus
+is not willing to accept). The very concept of cost is misleading.
+Costs are based on prices, and prices are social artefacts. Prices
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+do not exist in reality. What exists is the willingness to attribute
+a nominal value to a product based on a variety of factors, which
+include scarcity and desirability, but also tradition, customs and
+other types of social influence. All of these factors are transient:
+by definition, they change over time. To build entire governance
+systems on such subjective and temporary constructs is, at best,
+short-sighted.
+It is interesting to note how natural scientists, who normally
+pride themselves on being data-driven, are loath to apply highly
+abstract models to the field of environmental governance. As
+remarked by biologist David Ehrenfeld, founding editor of the
+Society for Conservation Biology’s official journal,
+
+The reduction of all conservation problems to economic terms
+is counter-productive and dangerous. Trusting to market forces
+and the laws of supply and demand to correct inequities and
+restore healthy equilibria does not work in economics and
+certainly does not work in conservation.114
+
+To paraphrase social constructivism, we may say that costs are
+‘what we want them to be’. Ultimately, we decide what costs are.
+Or do we? As my discount rate is different from yours, it becomes
+particularly appropriate to wonder whose discount rates are being
+used in the valuation of nature. And the answer often is: market
+rates. This means that the expectations and projections shared by
+financial markets become parameters to guide the financialization
+of nature. Never mind whether this is done through the UNsponsored
+SEEA, which adopts the GDP framework to measure
+the contribution of natural capital to economic growth, through
+the contingent valuations carried out by consultants for the oil
+industry, or through the marketing models adopted to gauge the
+WTP for ecosystem services.
+As discussed in the previous chapter, what is cheap in terms
+of cost–benefit analyses, especially in the environmental sector,
+how numbers rule the world
+
+tends to be more expensive for society at large. All cost-based
+functions can only measure a limited range of dimensions. The
+process of pricing is very selective and tends to neglect fundamental
+elements just because they cannot be valued in market
+conditions. What cannot be priced has no cost and, as such,
+does not enter the cost–benefit equation. But whether it has a cost
+or not, somebody will eventually have to ‘pay’ for it. And these
+payers of last resort are, normally, us. In some cases, the current
+us; in others, future generations.
+Putting a price on ecosystems may force us to realize the
+economic contribution of nature. Yet, it may also open up dangerous
+possibilities for the commodification of natural resources,
+given that anything that has a price can be bought and sold. As
+discussed in this chapter, most people do not easily grasp the
+complex articulations of use, non-use and option value. When
+we see a price we think of another type of value: exchange value.
+Prices invariably lead us to think that goods are exchangeable.
+Indeed, what has a price can be sold, or exchanged for something
+of the same value. Prices create the illusion that natural goods
+and services can be exchanged on the market as if they are conventional
+factors of production. The natural sciences’ concept of
+‘strong sustainability’ – that is, the idea that certain resources
+are scarce and irreplaceable and therefore human activities must
+be subject to the limitations of the planet’s capacity – tends to
+be replaced by the economic principle of ‘weak sustainability’,
+which holds that any type of capital is perfectly substitutable
+for natural capital as an input to production.115 The tautological
+consequence of this logic is that mankind can subjugate and
+ultimately rescue nature from itself. No surprise then if, in a
+world in which states are running out of cash (because of, among
+other factors, continuous financial bailouts to private banks), the
+investment fund Climate Change Capital maintains that what the
+world needs is a ‘habitat banking system’: ‘we need a paradigm
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+shift in the way we raise capital for nature conservation and that
+progress will require us to rapidly increase the money available
+from the private sector.’ We need a new ‘currency’, with established
+equivalences or ‘exchange rates’, for biodiversity credits,
+which ‘will be essential for attracting investment by creating a
+deeper and more liquid market’.116 In a word, the only solution
+to environmental problems is to bring nature under the control,
+language and jurisdiction of private investment markets.
+Biologists are taught that ecosystems are the result of complex,
+multifaceted equilibria and continuous evolutions, in which all
+parts hang together. For natural scientists, the web of interconnections
+making up the Earth is a kaleidoscope of mutual dependencies,
+in which each segment is fundamental to the resilience of
+the whole. There is no mankind without nature. By contrast,
+the financialization of nature splits, separates, fragments and
+ultimately alienates ecosystems in various ‘sellable’ packages,
+which are measured, valued and exchanged.117 Just as in the
+financial industry, the market of ‘nature derivatives’ must be sliced
+and diced to suit the demand of investors and their expectations
+in terms of financial returns.
+This reasoning has generated evident paradoxes. In 2000, the
+UN secretary general called for a ‘millennium ecosystem assessment’
+to provide a state-of-the-art analysis of natural capital and
+its relationship with humanity. The results of this survey were
+released in 2005, after more than 1,300 scientists compiled reports
+and estimates. The conclusion was that human activities had
+taken ‘the planet to the edge of a massive wave of species extinctions’
+and that the ‘pressures on ecosystems will increase globally
+in coming decades unless human attitudes and actions change’.118
+Yet the report also found that human well-being had increased
+despite such a collapse in ecosystem services. This finding ran
+counter to decades of environmental campaigns arguing that
+ecological degradation would ultimately lead to declines in the
+how numbers rule the world
+
+well-being of people.119 What came to be known as the environmentalist’s
+paradox appeared to confirm that both technology
+and modernity had finally decoupled human well-being from
+the course of nature: the paradox suggested that more well-being
+could be successfully exchanged for natural losses.
+Reacting against the growing excitement surrounding the monetization
+of ecosystem services, the environmental advocacy group
+Greenpeace pointed out that giving numerical values to ‘deeply
+interconnected natural systems is inherently speculative and not
+always sensible’.120 The reduction of nature to crude numbers can
+be dangerously misleading as it ignores ‘the interconnectedness
+of natural systems’ and the ‘possibility of tipping points and
+abrupt changes’. Moreover, it gives the impression that mankind
+can control nature as ‘assets’ so as to have a possibility to ‘bail
+out’ Earth systems when they break down. But the Earth is not a
+financial market and if we ignore planetary boundaries ‘a bailout
+may be too late, and no money in the world will be able to help
+us’.121
+As this chapter has shown, a good cause can easily turn into
+an extremely dangerous business, given that statistics can be used
+and abused to serve different interests. Saving our ecosystems
+is a laudable mission and, in a world obsessed with numbers,
+some form of measurement may be inevitable to gauge the size
+and scope of conservation policies. But when these measurements
+turn into prices, as they systematically do in the field of
+natural capital and ecosystem services accounting, then markets
+crowd out other forms of governance. Through a set of apparently
+neutral methodologies, the invaluable is valued, priced and then
+turned into a commodity. The translation of the complexity of
+nature into the simplicity of numbers thus paves the way for a
+narrow economic approach that sees nature as an investment
+which must yield financial returns. For nature to count, it must be
+owned and made ‘productive’. In a world in crisis, where financial
+measuring the unmeasurable
+
+markets need to expand into new areas to generate profits, the
+financialization of nature may very well open up new possibilities
+for capital accumulation and speculation, to the utmost detriment
+of our ecosystems and societies.
+As famously remarked by John Maynard Keynes in his ‘National
+Self-Sufficiency’ address at the University College Dublin
+in 1933,
+
+We destroy the beauty of the countryside because the unappropriated
+splendours of nature have non-economic value. We
+are capable of shutting off the sun and stars because they pay no
+dividend.… But once we allow ourselves to be disobedient to
+the test of an accountant’s profit, we have begun to change our
+civilization.122
+chapter 5
+
+Numbers for good?
+
+The quest for aid effectiveness
+
+and social impact
+
+Not everything that counts can be counted. And not everything
+that can be counted counts.
+Albert Einstein
+
+The strength of ‘development’ discourse comes of its power
+to seduce, in every sense of the term: to charm, to please, to
+fascinate, to set dreaming, but also to abuse, to turn away
+from the truth, to deceive.
+Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From
+Western Origins to Global Faith, 1997
+
+Measurements help us gauge if and to what extent we are achieving
+intended results. Doctors rely on numbers to monitor the
+effects of medical treatments on patients, engineers develop
+numbers to assess the stability of buildings, and mechanics use
+them to measure the amounts of water, oil and fuel that go into
+a vehicle. As we have seen, while numbers do not possess any
+intrinsic normative value, their power is derived from the capacity
+to reduce complexity to a few observable facts. This is why,
+when numerical reasoning is systematically applied to the world
+numbers for good?
+
+of human interactions, it can lead to all sorts of aberrations.
+In no field is this as evident as in the policies of development
+cooperation and social change, where statistical measurements
+have become the cornerstones to design and evaluate programmes
+and projects across the world. The international debate on aid effectiveness
+is fundamentally trapped in a global quest to produce
+quantitative indicators of all sorts to show that development policies
+work. In the field of social change, impact evaluations are
+largely dominated by econometric models, in which the complexity
+of social relations is lost through the cracks of mathematical
+algorithms. As is the case with climate change and natural capital
+accounting, these new measurements of success have paved the
+way to a transfer of technical tools from the business sector to the
+world of philanthropy and the nonprofit. Concepts such as social
+investment ratings, social return on investment, cost-effectiveness
+and standardized assessments have become particularly popular
+in a sector traditionally characterized by qualitative analyses,
+long-term horizons and social engagement.
+As a young and inexperienced academic, I lived through this
+change myself. In the mid-2000s I got invited to advise one of
+the largest development organizations in Europe, whose name
+(for obvious reasons) shall not be mentioned. At that time I was
+consulting for NGOs and governments on how to construct social
+indicators and develop participatory evaluation tools. I remember
+that it was a beautiful day in September and my client boasted an
+impressive multi-storey office, whose main entrance opened onto
+a touristy street, right in the middle of town, in an area where
+most international development agencies had their headquarters.
+With pictures of needy African children, natural disasters and
+melting ice caps on the wall, the building’s hall really made one
+feel as if that was the place where all the problems of the world
+were coming together to be tackled at once. It was a powerful
+albeit depressing vision.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+They had invited me to help them improve their impact assessment
+tools. I have always been sceptical of impact assessments,
+as I recognize – just like any reasonable person with a little bit of
+common sense – that tracing causal processes in real-life social
+phenomena is a very daunting task, marred by conceptual and
+methodological complexities, more often than not impossible to
+solve. At the same time, I have been equally aware that simply
+averting the ‘impact’ question by refusing to introduce assessment
+tools would be just as naive. Experience indeed shows that when
+no methodologies are used to measure impact, then space is left
+for all sorts of rhetorical arguments. It is a troubling dilemma:
+measuring impact is difficult and often impossible, but not doing
+it means that marketing strategies (e.g. PR campaigns, moving
+pictures and other forms of unsubstantiated claims) will fill the
+gap, trying to capture the public eye in the absence of clear
+evidence of success. This is why I had accepted the job. I was
+sincerely committed to helping move the impact agenda forward
+by finding new and promising tools.
+This was a time when most traditional donors, such as OECD
+governments and traditional philanthropic foundations, were suffering
+from a generalized development ‘fatigue’. After decades of
+work in the so-called developing world, there was little evidence
+(if anything) to argue for a continuation of development aid
+flows. Injustices, inequalities and endemic poverty had remained
+rampant. Recipient countries seemed trapped in a vicious circle of
+corruption and social imbalances, with timid progress invariably
+followed by new breakdowns. Moreover, the electoral success of
+right-wing parties across Europe had led to a generalized ‘aid
+bashing’ public debate. More and more people were questioning
+whether it made sense to continue investing in overseas development
+aid when money was running out at home. Public budgets
+were being cut, spending reviews were trimming welfare systems,
+while unemployment and xenophobia were becoming daily issues.
+numbers for good?
+
+If the development industry were to survive, it needed to show
+convincingly that it was worth it.
+Although aware of the challenges, I was up to the task and
+wanted my clients to think out of the box. This is why I delivered
+a presentation focused on the need for multi-sectoral analysis
+and bottom-up participation. I emphasized the importance of
+participatory methods, which could then be scaled up through
+the adoption of online tools such as ‘wikis’, with a view to
+harnessing the potential of mass collaboration in areas where
+top-down traditional evaluations could never have succeeded.
+I wanted them to realize that information exchange and open
+participatory processes would have helped reduce the costs of
+impact assessment while tracing a multitude of direct and indirect
+effects of projects funded across the world. Moreover, I made
+the argument that an integrated participatory process of impact
+assessment should not be seen as an add-on, an additional burden
+on already tight budgets and overworked development professionals.
+Rather, an integrated system of assessment should be seen as
+part and parcel of development work. A good participatory and
+ongoing process of impact assessment could indeed reinforce the
+projects themselves, or even prove to be the most effective way to
+exert sustainable impact, as empowerment of participants is the
+precondition for any type of social and economic development.
+When I concluded, they looked at me in disbelief. They were
+evidently unimpressed by my participatory, bottom-up approach
+and did not seem to grasp the alleged wonders of mass collaboration.
+Silence reigned in the room for a few long seconds.
+Then the CEO, a charismatic lady in her late fifties, grabbed the
+microphone and told me without hesitation: ‘Dr Fioramonti, there
+must have been a misunderstanding. We don’t want any wiki and
+we are not interested in any participatory integrated assessment.
+We want you to develop one number which can tell us if what
+we do works or doesn’t. As simple as that.’
+how numbers rule the world
+
+The politics of aid effectiveness:
+a brief historical overview
+
+We live in a world in which the so-called ‘rich’ countries spend
+billions on development aid to low-income nations every year.
+This is just a fraction of the estimated minimum of $1.7 trillion
+of international flows targeting what we conventionally (and, I
+believe, erroneously) call the developing world. These various
+forms of development financing include official development
+assistance (also known as ODA, which is the development aid
+disbursed by governments), public and private borrowing, programmes
+run by foundations and non-governmental organizations
+(NGOs), remittances by migrant workers and other types of aid
+schemes funded by countries outside of the OECD, which has
+a dedicated Development Assistance Committee. Although this
+total aid amounts to only 2.5 per cent of the global economic
+output (global GDP was about $69 trillion in 2012), it is nevertheless
+a huge industry by any measure.
+The international aid system was born out of the ruins of
+the Second World War, with the Bretton Woods conference and
+the effort to rebuild post-war Europe through the International
+Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now incorporated
+into the World Bank group, and the International Monetary Fund
+(IMF). The European Recovery Program, commonly known as
+the Marshall Plan, was established in 1948 and ran until 1952,
+leading to the creation of the Economic Cooperation Administration,
+the precursor of the United States Agency for International
+Development (USAID). In 1949, President Harry Truman gave an
+inaugural speech that would go down in history as the beginning
+of the ‘development age’. Besides reiterating the US government’s
+commitment to the UN and to the reconstruction of Europe via
+financing and military cooperation (an element that would be
+sealed after a few months with the creation of the North Atlantic
+numbers for good?
+
+Treaty Organization, NATO), Truman also mentioned a ‘fourth’
+point:
+
+Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the
+benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available
+for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.
+… Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. … For the first
+time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to
+relieve the suffering of these people.1
+
+Truman and his advisers were disciples of the New Deal and
+had personally witnessed how the invention of GDP accounts
+had helped America not only win the war, but also build a mass
+consumption society which was unparalleled in the world. For
+them, development was the result of economic technology. This is
+why, in his speech, the president made it plain that such development
+efforts for ‘underdeveloped areas’ would not just translate
+into funding, but would serve mainly as a form of ‘technical
+assistance’. He explained that ‘The material resources which we
+can afford to use for assistance to other peoples are limited. But
+our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly
+growing and are inexhaustible.’2 Truman’s fourth point connected,
+in a few paragraphs, to the essence of the development paradigm:
+transferring economic knowledge and market-based governance
+from the ‘developed’ countries to the ‘underdeveloped’ world.
+Not only did this view profoundly influence our understanding
+of what it means to be developed by fundamentally labelling nonmarket
+less formalized economies as backward, but it also framed
+the quest for development as nothing more than a technology: the
+transposition of key economic (read market-based) principles and
+institutions to the developing world.
+Following Truman’s fourth point, the UN General Assembly
+approved the creation of an ‘Expanded Programme of Technical
+Assistance’, which focused on sending technical experts to developing
+countries to train managerial personnel; this would later
+how numbers rule the world
+
+become the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
+In 1951, the UN issued a report titled ‘Measures for the Economic
+Development of Under-Developed Countries’ (also known as the
+Lewis Report), which proposed the creation of an International
+Finance Corporation, mainly designed to make investments in
+the equity market and lend to private companies, which was then
+established by the World Bank in 1956. In the USA, a national
+system of development aid was instituted in the early 1950s, with
+the adoption of the ‘Mutual Security Act’, which provided for
+major technical assistance programmes targeting countries in
+Asia. As its very name suggests, the Act was conceived to build
+a security wall against the spread of Communism in the Far East.
+Unsurprisingly, the first countries to become recipients of US aid
+were South Korea (against North Korea), Taiwan (against China),
+the Shah’s Iran (to exercise control in the Middle East) and
+Pakistan (against India and China). In 1957, the then European
+Community followed a rather similar approach with the establishment
+of the European Development Fund, a joint ‘pot’ of money
+seconded by France to support ex-European colonies around the
+world, especially in Africa. During this period, the international
+aid system was fully integrated into the security framework of
+the Cold War and used as leverage to support the foreign policy
+agenda of donor countries, especially vis-à-vis allied nations and
+client states in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
+In the 1960s, the aid system grew more complex both institutionally
+and financially. In 1958, the World Council of Churches
+tabled a proposal to the leading countries represented at the UN
+Assembly which, for the first time, called for a minimum ratio
+between development aid and national GDP: they identified a 1
+per cent target, but in the following decades the goal would be
+revised downward to 0.7 per cent. In 1960, the then Organisation
+for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) became the Organisation
+for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
+numbers for good?
+
+and the leading donor countries formed the Development Assistance
+Group (DAG, currently DAC), a forum for consultation
+initially including only European countries (Belgium, France,
+Germany, Italy, Portugal and the UK), their North American
+counterparts (Canada and the USA) and Japan. The 1970s saw
+the growth of multilateral assistance, which came to complement
+bilateral forms of cooperation. With the growing support
+of the Bretton Woods institutions, international development
+assistance shifted from a loose focus on poverty alleviation to
+economic growth, which was increasingly viewed as the best
+way to ‘develop’ societies. Aid policies became intertwined with
+multilateral loan schemes administered by the World Bank and
+the IMF, which were fundamentally designed to promote (free)
+market reforms in low-income countries.
+As Gilbert Rist documents in his detailed history of how
+development went from being a ‘Western invention to a global
+faith’, economic evolutionist theories profoundly influenced this
+phase of development policy. In particular, Walt Rostow’s The
+Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto became
+a classical blueprint for the emancipation of the ‘underdeveloped’
+world, as it powerfully resonated with the USA’s emphasis on
+market supremacy and its approach to development as a social
+technology. Rostow’s model identified five successive categories of
+economic development: the traditional society, the preconditions
+for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of
+high mass consumption.3
+ By depicting developing societies as an
+airplane speeding along the runway and then through the sky,
+Rostow intentionally conveyed the idea of economic development
+as an aerodynamic trajectory, in which the flight is made
+possible by an optimal market performance. In his book, Rostow
+celebrated ‘the powerful arithmetic of compound interest’, which
+made growth the essential prerequisite of economic stability in a
+world in which money was based on credit.4
+ In this theorization,
+how numbers rule the world
+
+growth is sustained by an almost divine force, which ensures that
+‘the age of high-mass consumption becomes universal’.5 Of little
+use was Rostow’s disclaimer that such ‘stages-of-growth are an
+arbitrary and limited way of looking at the sequence of modern
+history; and they are, in no absolute sense, a correct way.’6
+ His
+model became the law.
+Throughout the years, as economic growth could be achieved
+more quickly through the sale of raw materials (e.g. under-soil
+resources such as minerals and fossil fuels), developing countries
+were largely re-engineered as export-oriented economies
+and loans were granted to their (often authoritarian) regimes to
+carry out social and economic structural adjustments. As recipient
+countries defaulted on their debt obligations throughout the
+1980s, more money was lent to minimize the role of the state,
+privatize national industries and liberalize trade. With the end
+of the Cold War, the common policy of turning a blind eye to
+issues of democratic accountability in client states began to fade
+away. The aid industry started to pay attention (or perhaps lip
+service) to ‘softer’ issues, such as human rights, corruption and
+civil society. While the emphasis on growth remained central to
+donors’ agendas, elements of good governance became important
+too. Yet, despite the reorientation of the industry, success stories
+were lacking. Most developing countries, especially in Africa,
+appeared trapped in a vicious circle of instabilities and political
+and economic crises, while endemic poverty and other forms of
+destitution remained prevalent.
+It is against this background that the aid-effectiveness debate
+began to take shape in the late 1990s. Institutional donors, aid
+agencies and private foundations started cooperating with one
+another, and with receiving countries, in a desperate bid to prove
+that aid works. In 2000, the United Nations promulgated the
+so-called Millennium Development Goals, a list of eight global
+objectives to attain by 2015, which included specific targets such
+numbers for good?
+
+as the eradication of extreme poverty by halving the number
+of people living on less than $1.25 a day, a reduction in child
+mortality rates by two-thirds, decreasing maternal mortality
+by three-quarters, as well as vague commitments to building a
+global partnership for development. While the MDGs have been
+heralded as a progressive turn in the politics of international
+development, there is little doubt that they have also contributed
+to reinforcing the supremacy of numbers in the development
+industry. One reason why they have gained widespread attention
+is because of their measurability and their declination in terms of
+numerical targets. At the same time, however, voices within the
+UN itself have lamented that the MDGs have been largely taken
+out of context and, because of their numerical structure, they
+have used a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to development, which has
+misguided aid allocation policies and condemned ‘more than half
+of the countries to the category of ‘poor’ performers – thereby
+undermining the support for the global targets among politicians
+and the public at large’.7 Within the UNDP, which was tasked
+with leading the MDG agenda, new departments were created to
+implement the results-based management of aid policies. Indicators
+proliferated at all levels, often diluting the UNDP’s traditional
+focus on capacity development as a gradual process of nurturing
+local skills, institutions and relationships. As some have argued,
+such a focus on numbers represented ‘a divergence within the
+UNDP between advocacy in achieving qualitative outcomes and
+the trend towards seeking ‘simplicity and measurability’ through
+quantitative results’, albeit in line with the agency’s new focus on
+credit rating, as discussed in Chapter 2.
+The MDGs also reiterated the call for international donors to
+give more aid and the 0.7 per cent of GDP target was reaffirmed
+(as of 2013, however, only five countries – Norway, Sweden,
+Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – had reached this
+target). The quest for effectiveness gained momentum in 2002,
+how numbers rule the world
+
+with the International Conference on Financing for Development
+held in Monterrey, Mexico. A new jargon of partnership
+replaced the more traditional (patron–client or donor–recipient)
+relationship and, in 2005, the aid community endorsed the Paris
+Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which committed donors to
+focus systematically on measurable results and tangible outcomes.
+In parallel with the redefinition of the aid system, the effectiveness
+debate also entered academic circles, triggering heated confrontations
+between proponents and detractors of the development
+cooperation industry. According to former World Bank economist
+William Easterly, who has made a name for himself as a leading
+critic of the aid industry, the problem with aid is aid itself. In his
+2006 book The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures
+and Misadventures in the Tropics, Easterly reviews decades of
+development programmes and concludes that the aid industry
+has generated a parasitic attitude in low-GDP economies, further
+exacerbated by the ‘benevolence’ with which aid has been offered
+to corrupt governments.8
+ A firm believer in free markets, Easterly
+maintains that the nature of aid does not take into account how
+humans react to economic incentives. Because of the continuous
+inflow of development funding, governments have had no serious
+incentives to promote systemic reforms, liberalizations were
+delayed and true competition (both at the political and economic
+level) was stifled. For Easterly aid has only been a ‘carrot’, never
+a ‘stick’ with which to coerce countries into supporting long-term
+and deep economic reforms. Moreover, the tendency to cancel
+debt has produced moral hazards. For Easterly, the aid industry is
+founded on poor economic thinking and does not recognize that
+‘true’ development can only happen when genuine market forces
+are unleashed, good performance is rewarded and competition is
+encouraged. In 2007, Easterly reiterated the critique in his book
+The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest
+Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good.
+numbers for good?
+
+A similar argument has been put forward by former Goldman
+Sachs economist and bestselling author Dambisa Moyo, who
+argues that ‘by encouraging corruption, creating dependency,
+fueling inflation, creating debt burdens and disenfranchising
+Africans (to name a few), an aid-based strategy hurts more that
+it helps.’9
+ Moyo recognizes that interventions such as the Marshall
+Plan in Europe ‘played vital roles in economic (re)construction.’
+However, she remarks that the ‘key and (often ignored) difference’
+between such interventions and those carried out throughout
+the world today ‘is that the former were short, sharp and finite,
+whereas the latter are open-ended commitments with no end in
+sight’. Following Easterly’s argument, she is adamant that such
+open-ended systems provide governments with ‘no incentive to
+look for other, better, ways of financing their development’. Along
+the same lines, the British economist Paul Collier has been referring
+to the ‘diminishing returns’ of aid, whereby the transfer of
+more money towards recipient countries (as indicated by the 0.7
+per cent goal) does not necessarily add value. By citing a series
+of examples, Collier shows that just a small fraction (roughly 1–2
+per cent) of all the funding given to the aid industry actually ever
+reaches the intended targets.10
+Such negative views on aid have been rejected by more optimistic
+commentators. The best-known ‘defence’ was made in 2005 by
+the director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University Jeffrey
+Sachs, with his book The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities
+for Our Time, in which he argues that ‘aid is fundamental and,
+when used efficiently, it can achieve durable and sustainable
+goals’.11 Sachs got involved in a personal spat with both Easterly
+and Moyo and accused them of ‘peddling their simplistic concoction
+of free markets and self-help’. By pointing out that both critics
+had actually benefited from the aid industry (Easterly was at the
+World Bank and his research was funded by philanthropic institutions,
+while Moyo studied at Harvard thanks to an aid-funded
+how numbers rule the world
+
+scholarship for young Africans), Sachs emphasizes ‘the realities
+of life, in which all of us need help at some time or other and
+in countless ways, and even more importantly we should think
+about the life-and-death consequences for impoverished people
+who are denied that help’.
+Despite their differences and vested interests (e.g. Easterly was
+himself involved in Ghana’s structural adjustment programme
+during his stint at the World Bank, and Sachs advises development
+organizations, big charities and international philanthropists), the
+protagonists of the aid effectiveness dispute agree on one issue:
+the aid industry needs more sophisticated approaches based on
+statistical evidence, which can inform meaningful generalizations
+and show which approaches work and which do not. For
+most of them, the sector can only achieve effectiveness (that is,
+promote durable results) by adopting sophisticated methods of
+measurement to inform better funding allocation. Without this
+type of clarity, criticism and praise will continue to be based on
+anecdotal evidence and personal preferences.
+
+The quest for evidence
+
+Most critics of the aid industry point to a number of methodological
+solutions, including the application of experimental tools to
+assess the effectiveness of interventions. The centrality of experiments
+in scientific knowledge is not a new topic. The founder of
+modern science, the Italian Galileo Galilei, championed the use of
+experiments and redefined the scientific method of investigation
+as based on inductive enquiry rather than deductive reasoning.
+In 1849, the physicist Michael Faraday wrote that ‘Nothing is
+too wonderful to be true, if it be consistent with laws of nature
+and, in such things as these, experiment is the best test of such
+consistency.’12Also Charles Darwin emphasized the use of experimental
+techniques in agriculture and biology.13 In the biomedical
+numbers for good?
+
+field, too, the use of experimental methods has become routine
+to assess the effectiveness of drugs, protocols and treatments.
+The most common approach in this field is represented by the
+randomized controlled trial (RCT). RCT is an evaluation method
+designed to isolate potential causal relations through the random
+selection of participants in the intervention group, which includes
+only individuals having received the ‘treatment’, and in the socalled
+control group, which – by contrast – has not been subject
+to the intervention. As aid providers and their consultants are
+interested in establishing ‘causal’ inferences using various types
+of economic technique, randomized experiments have become
+extremely popular in the development field and, more generally,
+in economic and social research.14
+Although nowadays there is a vast array of RCT specialists
+operating in the international development sector, a leading role
+is played by a group of economists based at the Massachusetts
+Institute of Technology (MIT), where the Abdul Latif Jameel
+Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) was established in 2003. J-PAL is a
+‘global network of researchers who use randomized evaluations
+to answer critical policy questions in the fight against poverty’.
+The lab is headed by Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee and Esther Duflo,
+two development economists who have dedicated their careers
+to the incorporation of randomized trials into development
+impact assessments. Their 2011 book Poor Economics, recipient
+of the Financial Times/Goldman Sachs Business Book of the
+Year award, has become the most cited resource in the field. It
+provides an overview of over fifteen years of evidence generated
+through the implementation of RCTs across the world. The book
+emphasizes the need to develop ‘theories that help us make sense
+of both what the poor are able to achieve, and where and for what
+they need a push’.15 Indeed, J-PAL researchers believe that ‘all
+too often development policy is based on fads, and randomized
+evaluations could allow it to be based on evidence.’16 With a view
+how numbers rule the world
+
+to ‘fighting global poverty with hard numbers’, they encourage a
+systematic application of RCTs to ‘produce unbiased estimates
+of the true impact of a program or policy in the field’, thus
+overcoming the paradox that while enormous resources are spent
+every day on development programmes, there is ‘surprisingly
+little hard evidence on what are the most effective ways to reduce
+poverty’.17 For the J-PAL researchers, poverty is the outcome of
+irrational behaviour, the consequence of suboptimal economic
+decisions; Poor Economics shows ‘how the stress of living on less
+than 99 cents per day encourages the poor to make questionable
+decisions that feed – not fight – poverty’. In this regard, the role
+of researchers is to study how the poor behave, what mistakes
+they make and how aid can be used to correct them.
+J-PAL works closely with the think-tank Innovations for Poverty
+Action (IPA), which also leads the field through a systematic
+use of randomized evaluations ‘to determine the actual impact
+and cost effectiveness of different programmes’.18 Unlike J-PAL,
+which retains a more academic profile, IPA has a clear hands-on
+approach to technical assistance and purports ‘to disseminate
+the lessons to policymakers, practitioners, investors and donors
+around the world’. Their language is also bold. In their reports,
+they speak about ‘funding what works’, identifying ‘cost-effective’
+solutions and undertaking ‘rigorous evaluations’. Interestingly,
+they single out microcredit as the ‘perfect example of an idea that
+generated tremendous enthusiasm and support long before there
+was evidence on its impact’, even though it was ‘predicated on
+a double standard about the useful role of high-interest debt’.19
+Basing their focus on evidence, they set out to scientifically scrutinize
+unconventional options, with a view to checking whether
+or not they confirm our preconceived notions and expectations.
+Of particular interest is their Proven Impact initiative, the organization’s
+flagship selection of what approaches to development
+have produced intended results. In order for an intervention to be
+numbers for good?
+
+selected as part of the initiative, it must be tested ‘at least in one
+context’, must be assessed ‘using scientifically rigorous methods
+(randomized controlled trials)’ and must pass ‘cost-effectiveness
+tests’. A selection committee is in charge of the scientific review
+and selection process: ideas designated as ‘proven’ are deemed
+ready for scale-up with some or no additional operational research;
+those designated as ‘promising’ will need to meet additional
+criteria before being declared fit for replication. The Proven
+Impact initiative even has a dedicated fund, which showcases
+good practices and encourages investors to target their donations
+accordingly. In his recent book, More than Good Intentions: How
+a New Economics is Helping Solve Global Problems, IPA’s funder
+Dean Karlan recalls the main camps in the aid-effectiveness
+debate and their apparently irreconcilable support/criticism of
+development aid: ‘My hunch is that, at the end of the day, even
+Sachs and Easterly could agree on the following: Sometimes
+aid works, and sometimes it does not.’20 For Karlan, the critical
+question is: which aid works? Instead of getting hung up on the
+extremes, answers can be found on the ground. Look at a specific
+challenge, propose a potential solution, and then measure it to
+see if it works: this is the only ‘real, measurable, and meaningful
+progress toward eradicating [poverty]’.21
+Despite their bold approach, however, IPA’s ‘proven’ impact
+areas are far from being unconventional. Their list includes: chlorine
+dispensers, school-based deworming, incentives for vaccines,
+investment vouchers and reminders to save. The ‘promising’
+ideas are remedial education and free bed nets. In spite of the
+assertiveness with which they are presented, these ideas do not
+really strike the reader as the most radical. This is not to argue
+that chlorine is useless or that deworming school children is not
+effective. Common sense suggests that both are important for
+sanitation and health purposes. Also one cannot dispute that
+bed nets protect people from mosquitoes. Similarly, providing
+how numbers rule the world
+
+incentives for families to vaccinate their children or to save money
+seems like a reasonable suggestion. But is this the new economics
+that ‘is helping solve global problems’, as the subtitle of Karlan’s
+book suggests? Are these the solutions to the world’s most enduring
+social injustices?
+Echoing J-PAL’s approach combining traditional and behavioural
+economics, Karlan and his colleagues argue that, just
+like everyone else, ‘poor people make mistakes that end up
+making them poorer, sicker, and less happy’. And then they add,
+jokingly: ‘If they didn’t, they could quickly escape poverty by
+selling self-help classes to the rest of us.’ Together with J-PAL,
+IPA’s job is to use hard data and scientific reasoning to correct
+these mistakes. Take the case of agriculture, for instance. If
+fertilizers and ‘improved’ seeds (that is, genetically modified
+seeds) can improve crop yields, ‘shouldn’t more farmers be investing
+in them?’ ask IPA researchers on their website.22 Yes, is
+their answer, but only if the right incentives are provided at the
+right time. By relying on models of procrastination in psychology
+and economics, these economists ‘know that many people
+value present over future consumption, leading them to delay a
+profitable investment even if they are certain they would like to
+make it’ (emphasis added). As farmers procrastinate, they risk
+missing ‘the point in the season when investing in fertilizers or
+other agricultural investments will be profitable’. This inherent
+inability to understand the real value of investment is ‘why
+marketing fertilizers door-to-door, right after the last season’s
+harvest (when farmers are more likely to have cash on hand) and
+including time-limited discounts, like free delivery for pre-paid
+fertilizer, can counteract some of these behavioural tendencies’.
+Following the same reasoning, IPA encourages the use of voucher
+systems and smart subsidies ‘to help individuals budget for the
+coming season, such as the planting season, or, in an educational
+context, the back-to-school season’.
+numbers for good?
+
+The language adopted by Karlan and his colleagues is not
+particularly different from that utilized by the most conservative
+proponents of cost–benefit analyses. According to this approach,
+the only way to make individuals behave rationally is to present
+them with vouchers, time-bound subsidies and other forms of
+financial persuasion. It is interesting to note that most of these
+claims run counter to studies conducted by another proponent of
+hard data, the consultancy Bridgespan, which has showcased the
+nonprofit Give Directly as a best practice. Give Directly, which
+in 2012 was one of the recipients of the Global Impact Awards,
+Google’s programme to support entrepreneurial nonprofits, has
+used randomized controlled trials to show that the best way to
+help people is through direct cash transfers. Their ‘rigorous approach’
+leads them to disagree with both J-PAL and IPA in so far
+as Give Directly maintains that no-strings-attached cash transfers
+improve health and downstream financial gains, as poor people
+invest in everything from food for starving children to long-term
+assets, including land, livestock and housing.23 For them, poor
+people are rational enough to know what they need and how
+to get it. They do not require development consultants to make
+them behave rationally. Who’s right? Can the same data produce
+opposing results?
+It is interesting to note that, although IPA affirms to reject simplistic
+economic approaches to development, its solutions are not
+particularly different from those advanced by the free-market Copenhagen
+Consensus Centre (CCC), an acquaintance of ours from
+Chapter 3, whose researchers have become the global champions of
+‘techno-fixes’ for the world’s problems. In 2008, the CCC’s ‘dream
+team’ of Nobel laureate economists found that micronutrient interventions
+– fortification and supplements designed to increase nutrient
+intake – were the most effective investment against malnutrition
+in developing countries, ‘with massive benefits for a tiny price-tag’,
+echoing some of the proposals put forward by IPA. In 2012, the
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Consensus researchers maintained that for less than $700 million
+per year, ‘the problem of hunger can be solved’ (sic). Similar
+to IPA, their recipe was a list of technical solutions: ‘bundling
+nutrition interventions; increasing global food production; and
+improving market functioning through better communications
+and increased competition in fertilizer markets’.24 Obviously they
+conceded that ‘increasing global food production might seem a
+strange proposal given that globally, food production exceeds
+food needs.’ However, they maintained that ‘lower prices are
+necessary to make food more affordable’ and ‘to provide a buffer
+against some of the negative consequences of climate change’. No
+surprise, then, that their conclusions were essentially in line with
+the key corporate interests in the food industry: ensure higher
+yields through extensive breeding; increase tolerance to drought,
+heat and salt; identify and disseminate the best varieties of crops;
+and ensure the optimal use of fertilizers. They also recommended
+introducing programmes that send market information via SMS
+to farmers (for a monthly fee) and reducing barriers to fertilizer
+access, for instance by marketing them door to door. According to
+the CCC economists, these ‘innovations’ would yield ‘up to 8.35
+in return for every dollar spent’.
+Fertilizers, genetically modified seeds, SMS reminders, doorto-door
+marketing: thanks to its hard data approach, the CCC’s
+macroeconomic analysis comes to conclusions that are very
+similar to those reached by the IPA at the micro-level of individual
+behaviour. Of course the CCC researchers acknowledge that
+‘there have been mixed results from policies designed to stimulate
+sustainable fertilizer use’, given that ‘a small number of countries
+control most of the production capacity for the main nitrogen,
+phosphate, and potash fertilizers’ and ‘the top four firms control
+more than half of each country’s production capacity’. Yet, to
+address this problem they would discourage policymakers from
+considering ‘the forcible break-up of this concentrated industry’,
+numbers for good?
+
+as this would cause ‘disruption’ and would lead to ‘a loss of
+economies of scale’. They would also discourage regulation, as
+this would lead to ‘unproductive rent-seeking’. Instead, the researchers
+propose public investment ‘in the construction of new
+production capacity [to] be turned over to the private sector’. The
+goal would be to build two major conglomerates, one in Asia and
+one in Africa, for an overall cost (taxpayers’ money) of roughly
+US$ 1.3 billion. These Asian and African equivalents of Monsanto
+would then distribute fertilizers and genetically modified seeds
+to their countries, with a net return of $12.5 billion.
+Busy as they are to calculate cost–benefit ratios, both the IPA
+and the CCC forget to mention something that a wide range
+of research has demonstrated over the past few decades, that
+the market-driven destruction of localized farming is perhaps
+the most important reason why much of the world has become
+food ‘insecure’.25 India is the perfect example in this regard. In
+the past, Indian peasants used to rely on natural processes to
+grow their crops. Good seasons would result in better yields
+and whatever surplus in production and seeds would be used
+to mitigate the negative impact of bad years. Men and women
+followed the rhythm of nature, which meant that food production
+remained a subsistence activity. Peasants were not enriching
+themselves. They were officially ‘poor’ but, unless some major
+natural disaster occurred, their villages would have enough locally
+produced food to feed themselves. Then, starting in the 1980s,
+the Indian government began to listen to aid experts, development
+economists and food corporations, who recommended harnessing
+the pro-poor potential of new technologies. As a consequence,
+the state introduced genetically modified (GM) seeds to help
+peasants move out of subsistence farming with a view to achieving
+large-scale production. Ever since, these ‘improved’ seeds have
+been marketed door to door, with the first batches made available
+for free or sold with a discount at the end of each season, when
+how numbers rule the world
+
+farmers have more cash on their hands, just like the IPA experts
+recommend. Massive advertising campaigns have led thousands
+of peasants to believe that there is an easy way to produce more
+with less effort. Thus, over the course of a few decades, entire
+districts in India have switched from natural seeds to genetically
+modified ones, which are patented and commercialized by one of
+the world’s leading multinational corporations, Monsanto. These
+new seeds hold the promise of resisting attacks from a variety
+of parasites, including the much-dreaded mealybug. As they are
+not freely available in nature, the GM seeds must be bought on
+the commercial market, which often requires peasants to take
+out a loan to front-load enough capital for the investment.26 In a
+society in which banks are loath to lend to the poor, this means
+that many small farmers have to accept the conditions imposed
+by loan sharks, which generally involve a property transfer of the
+land in case of non-repayment. And that is when things spiral out
+of control. As the power of GM seeds falls short of expectations
+and yields are only moderately better than those achieved through
+natural (cost-free) techniques, peasants end up worse off. They
+realize that their income is no longer enough to repay their debt,
+feed their families and, at the same time, save enough capital to
+buy a new set of seeds for next year’s crops. In the short run, costs
+invariably outweigh benefits. No surprise, then, that an agrarian
+country like India, where more than half the population depends
+on agriculture, has become notorious for the huge increase in the
+rate of suicides among peasants. Most estimates put the number
+of farmers’ suicides at around 17,000 every year.27 According to
+a survey conducted by India’s National Crime Records Bureau,
+the number of suicides between 1997 and 2008 totalled 199,132.
+28
+
+Yet these figures may significantly underestimate the scale of the
+tragedy. For starters, only individuals with an explicit title to land
+are ‘counted’ as farmers, which by default excludes women and
+tenant farmers. Moreover, the definition of farmers includes both
+numbers for good?
+
+full-time peasants and individuals who farm more sporadically.
+As a result, ‘we are saddled with figures that undercount farm
+suicides but overcount the number of “farmers”.’29
+These peasants are not killing themselves because of weather
+patterns, stronger parasites or effects of climate change. Their
+suicides are an extreme reaction against the loss of dignity that
+indebtedness causes, especially when this is coupled with the loss
+of their only source of social status and income: land. And peasants
+are not simply dying. Many of them, deprived of an income,
+are abandoning rural areas to move to urban settlements. They
+turn into squatters, servants and beggars, filling the ranks of the
+swelling slums of India’s metropolitan areas. In the end, farmers’
+suicides, land dispossession and commercialization of seeds are
+simply components of a fundamental process of privatization of
+the commons, which is often touted as a precondition for India’s
+shift from underdevelopment to global powerhouse.
+In 2013, the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, the largest
+professional engineering association in the UK, reported that over
+a third of all food produced globally (roughly 2 billion tonnes)
+‘never reaches a human stomach’. It simply goes to waste due
+to a combination of ‘market and consumer wastage’.30 While
+this problem is particularly widespread in less industrialized
+nations, where land ownership and commercial agriculture have
+generally deprived local communities of access to land and food,
+market-based food wastage is also a widespread phenomenon
+in the so-called developed world. Major supermarkets routinely
+reject entire crops of perfectly edible fruit and vegetables ‘because
+they do not meet exacting marketing standards for their physical
+characteristics, such as size and appearance’. In Great Britain, for
+example, up to 30 per cent of the vegetable crop is never harvested
+‘as a result of such practices’. At the global level, the largest
+retailers ‘generate 1.6 million tonnes of food waste annually in
+this way’. Moreover, marketing strategies and sales promotions
+how numbers rule the world
+
+encourage customers to purchase more than they actually need,
+which inevitably generates wastage at home: ‘between 30 per
+cent and 50 per cent of what has been bought in developed
+countries is thrown away by the purchaser’. As the professional
+association of engineers concludes, the capacity to control and
+reduce the level of wastage is ‘beyond the capability of the
+individual farmer, distributor or consumer, since it depends on
+market philosophies’.31
+Inevitably the question, then, is: how much of this is captured
+in the randomized trials? To what extent can experimental
+methods and cost–benefit analyses grasp the profound dynamics
+leading to poverty and destitution? If it is true that a new
+economic revolution is helping solve global problems, shouldn’t
+it start from the re-embedding of the subjects of research within
+a social context dominated by power dynamics and institutional
+failures? Much to the contrary, the focus on evidence is pushing
+the aid industry towards an even greater reliance on technocratic
+solutions and short-term returns. As argued by Morten Jerven,
+author of Poor Numbers, a book focusing on how statistics in
+developing countries can mislead policies, randomized trials
+reveal no understanding of ‘the political dimensions’ of social
+life: ‘studying these issues in laboratory-like experiments may
+misguide scholars and policymakers; arguably, it is the differences,
+not the similarities, between the political economy and
+the laboratories that are most important.’32
+
+The rise of philanthrocapitalism
+
+The focus on hard data and its declination in terms of both
+efficiency and effectiveness (which are concepts largely drawn
+from the business jargon) have driven a new trend in the aid
+industry, quite aptly captured by the term ‘philanthrocapitalism’.
+This idea was launched in 2006 by Matthew Bishop, US business
+numbers for good?
+
+editor of The Economist, and then turned into a bestselling book
+in 2008, Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich Can Save the World.
+Ironically, the book was launched in New York just a few months
+before the fall of Lehman Brothers and the collapse of global
+capital finance, when the rich appeared intent on sinking rather
+than saving the world. The idea behind philanthrocapitalism
+is simple: in order to succeed at fighting poverty, we must let
+the champions (and the principles) of market success take over
+the aid industry. While decades of traditional aid policies have
+not generated tangible results, global markets and their business
+leaders have multiplied wealth to unprecedented levels. This stark
+contrast alone – as the philanthrocapitalist creed has it – would
+justify the role of business in solving the world’s most pressing
+problems. How? By reinventing methods to assess what works
+and what does not, just like the randomized revolution.
+As the book’s synopsis reads, ‘Proceeding from interviews
+with some of the most powerful people on the planet … [the
+authors] show how a web of motivated givers has set out to
+change the world.’33 Also known as the Good Club, arguably
+the most elite and powerful group in the world, the network
+of philanthrocapitalists includes billionaires such as Bill Gates,
+Warren Buffet, Richard Branson and former US president Bill
+Clinton.34 According to City University of New York sociologist
+Robin Rogers, ‘if you want to understand philanthrocapitalism,
+start with the three M’s: Money, Markets, and Measurement’:
+
+The first M, money, is the idea that the wealthy, particularly the
+super wealthy, should take greater responsibility for using their
+wealth for the common good. … The second M, markets, is
+the idea that market forces should sort effective social programs
+from ineffective social programs. The third M, measurement, is
+the idea that resources should be used in a targeted and rational
+way based on data in order to identify and scale successful social
+programs.35
+how numbers rule the world
+
+A core element of the philanthrocapitalists’ approach to
+development is problem-solving: as they see poverty as a discrete
+problem – that is, something separate from complex social
+and economic structures – they look for innovative methods
+to ‘fix it’. By adopting the very business frameworks in which
+they have excelled as entrepreneurs, philanthrocapitalists are
+convinced that they can find better, quicker and more efficient
+ways to resolve deep-seated social predicaments. For instance,
+the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has been leading the
+development sector in the field of health care and related issues,
+such as nutrition, water, sanitation and agricultural development.
+With an asset trust endowment of over $36 billion (and annual
+donations to the health sector equivalent to the budget of the
+World Health Organization), the Gates Foundation has become
+the world’s largest and most influential private philanthropy. In
+their ‘letter to the foundation’, Bill and Melinda Gates explain
+that their focus is on identifying ‘new techniques to help farmers
+in developing countries grow more food and earn more money;
+new tools to prevent and treat deadly diseases; new methods
+to help students and teachers in the classroom’.36 In the agricultural
+sector, for instance, they emphasize the importance of
+‘improved’ seeds and access to better soil, water and livestock
+solutions. They also intend to ‘help farmers hone their business
+management skills, gain greater purchasing power and marketing
+leverage, and improve their crop and resource management skills’.
+In January 2003, the Foundation launched an initiative called
+Grand Challenges in Global Health, which aimed to stimulate
+scientific research into ‘solutions to critical scientific and technological
+problems that, if solved, could lead to important advances
+against diseases in the developing world’.37 The grand challenges
+included the attainment of a series of technical objectives, ranging
+from creating effective single-dose vaccines to be used right
+after birth to developing technologies to quantitatively assess a
+numbers for good?
+
+population’s health status. Indeed, one aspect the Foundation is
+insisting on is the importance of evidence-based results. In an
+op-ed titled ‘My Plan to Fix the World’s Biggest Problems’ and
+published by the Wall Street Journal in January 2013, Bill Gates
+emphasized how important ‘measurement’ is to improving the
+human condition: ‘You can achieve incredible progress if you set a
+clear goal and find a measure that will drive progress toward that
+goal.’38 After reviewing the many fields in which his philanthropy
+has been active, Gates maintained that the lives of the poorest
+have improved more rapidly in the past decade because of new
+measurements and business-like approaches. And he concluded
+that, ‘thanks to measurement, progress isn’t doomed to be rare
+and erratic. We can, in fact, make it commonplace.’
+According to Mike Edwards, former director of the ‘traditional’
+Ford Foundation, arguably the most vocal critic of this new trend
+in the aid industry, the Good Club leaders present themselves
+as venture philanthropists, emphasizing the fact that their social
+missions are founded on market methods. In their jargon, they
+make continuous reference to ‘new’, ‘engaged’, ‘strategic’, ‘effective’
+or ‘impact’ philanthropy, ‘but these terms are not very useful
+as definitions because they are so inclusive – unless there are
+foundations who deliberately seek to be distant and ineffective’.39
+As a matter of fact, the very concept of venture philanthropy
+is somewhat confusing. The etymology of the word ‘venture’
+implies a high degree of uncertainty, as well as the willingness to
+support causes in the face of risk. By contrast, the rhetoric of these
+new donors is permeated by references to ‘high-performance’,
+‘results-based’ and ‘data-driven’ and they champion cost–benefit
+analyses as tools to decide in what fields to intervene and how,
+which makes them decisively risk-adverse and less prone to
+embark on the more ‘political’ terrain. Adam Waldman, founder
+and president of the Endeavor Group, a Washington-based philanthropic
+consultancy, believes that the hallmarks of the new
+how numbers rule the world
+
+philanthropy are ‘an entrepreneurial results-oriented framework,
+leverage, personal engagement, and impatience’.40 According to
+Kavita Ramdas, former president of the Global Fund for Women,
+these new philanthropic practices are animated by the very same
+‘fix-the-problem’ mentality that has made their leaders successful
+as hedge-fund managers, financial mavericks, ICT entrepreneurs
+and software developers.41 Their approach to international
+development is designed ‘to yield measurable and fairly quick
+solutions’, which is so evidently reflected in the professional
+profiles their ‘mega-philanthropies’ are looking for: ‘managers,
+consultants, engineers, business practitioners, former industry
+leaders or lobbyists’. Their focus is exclusively on efficiency and
+sectoral technical expertise, while ‘the realization that development
+has to do with people, with human and social complexity,
+with cultural and traditional realities … [has] no cachet in this
+metrics-driven, efficiency-seeking, technology-focused approach
+to social change.’42 Such a view is echoed by Melanie Schnoll
+Begun, managing director and head of philanthropy management
+at Morgan Stanley Private Wealth Management, for whom ‘the
+generation we are dealing with today has an unending thirst and
+desire for sudden impact, they want results. … Is it fair? No. Is
+it right? No. Organisations need to take a step back and educate
+donors about how difficult it is to measure results.’43
+As sustainable development is a long-term process aimed at
+designing and reinforcing cultural ties and economic and political
+institutions, rather than a set of successful aid-funded projects, the
+data-driven ‘impatience’ of philanthrocapitalists can profoundly
+undermine the capacity of countries around the world to achieve
+durable and equitable objectives. In many regards, the current
+debate on aid-effectiveness and its results-based approach is likely
+to generate counterproductive tendencies, as the focus of the
+debate shifts from what is needed to what is measurable. This
+trend also influences the operations and priorities of publicly
+numbers for good?
+
+funded development agencies, which – similarly to my experience
+with the European aid organization mentioned above – feel the
+pressure of domestic constituencies to make ‘the results of aid programs
+visible, quantifiable, and directly attributable to the donor’s
+activities – even when doing so reduces the developmental impact
+of aid’.44 This is why proponents of the ‘measuring what works’
+philosophy have gone so far as to argue that development funding
+should exclusively be channelled to interventions that pass ‘hard’
+evidence tests based on statistical experimental methods.45 As
+the beneficiaries of development projects are largely voiceless,
+the capacity to produce numbers to please either taxpayers or
+investors becomes more important than listening to the needs of
+those on the ground. The increasing importance of results-based
+development work has turned numerical models into a key factor to
+decide what gets funded and what does not. In the case of RCTs,
+for instance, not all types of development interventions can be
+randomized. Macro-level projects that deal with economic reform,
+institutional development, community empowerment and the like
+are often impossible to assess with standardized models. Generally,
+the bigger and more complex the intervention, the harder it is
+to design a model to evaluate it. In this regard, advocates of standardization
+have fiercely criticized new trends in the development
+sector, such as national budget support. It is useful to remember,
+however, that national budget support (the process of channelling
+aid through the recipient governments’ policy priorities) was
+designed precisely as a response to the fragmentation and the
+lack of coordination within the development industry. Moreover,
+the focus on partnership and local ownership in the development
+sector inherently calls for an alignment between the national priorities
+set out by recipient nations and those supported by donor
+countries, hence the growing stress on funding national budgets
+rather than individual projects. However, proponents of evidencebased
+methods such as Banerjee and Duflo regard national budget
+how numbers rule the world
+
+support as ‘disastrous’, in so far as it pools various resources
+together, thus making it impossible to disentangle clear causal
+relations between aid and expected results.46 This criticism is also
+having an impact on donors. In particular the new philanthropic
+foundations (but also the World Bank) have become unwilling
+to finance projects that cannot be evaluated using experimental
+tests based on ‘hard’ data.47 ‘In the end’, as some analysts warn,
+‘the methodology may end up determining what questions to ask,
+rather than letting an analysis of our knowledge gaps determine
+where to look for the answers.’48 Moreover, as hard data tends to
+focus on those variables that can be more easily observed and
+quantified, thus neglecting larger and more influential dynamics,
+the application of standardized models is likely to produce ‘clear
+answers to the wrong question’.49 Things that really matter, such
+as cultural learning, social trust and institutional development,
+may very well become secondary factors (or even be treated as
+externalities) when they cannot be counted in the same way as
+the number of children being vaccinated, the number of start-up
+businesses made possible by micro-finance projects, the sets of
+malaria bed nets distributed to local villages or students’ scores
+in elementary school tests.
+It thus becomes clear that there is a trade-off between focusing
+on tangible results in the short term (the much-heralded
+‘impatience’ of philanthrocapitalists, which has become a mantra
+of the whole development industry in the age of aid effectiveness)
+and the uncertainty and risks of promoting grassroots empowerment
+in the long run. Self-interested aid agencies, whether
+because of pressure from their own constituencies (taxpayers) or
+to improve their public image (as is often the case with the new
+megaphilanthropies), are more likely to opt for short project cycles
+and verifiable results. The quest for accountability, a welcome
+principle in public debate, has paradoxically triggered undesired
+effects by privileging results-driven short-termism. Through the
+numbers for good?
+
+lens of the technocratic data-driven philosophy, development
+becomes the outcome of technical operations within the existing
+economic, political and social frameworks, thus neglecting the
+possibility of deeper and more radical social change.
+One may very well wonder how it is possible that amid the
+largest bailouts and public takeovers of private companies in
+history, the argument that business techniques are inherently
+superior to government and charity may still find a (growing)
+audience. Indeed, one may even cheekily point out the ‘inauspicious
+timing’ of the philanthrocapitalist manifesto, starting with
+its 2008 release, just a few weeks before the collapse of Wall
+Street. However, with the worsening of the crisis, the lack of
+resources available to conventional aid projects has generated a
+greater opportunity to bring business and market approaches into
+the aid industry. With the global recession, many development
+organizations, NGOs and nonprofits have been scrambling to
+stay afloat. And, of course, in a world in which public budgets
+are shrinking and governments are increasingly unable to meet
+the demands of their own citizens (let alone worry about overseas
+development goals), there is growing room for private action by
+the global billionaires. As the authors of Philanthrocapitalism
+argue,
+
+the fiscal fallout of the financial crisis of 2008 also means that
+public budgets and government ambitions are going to have to
+be scaled back for at least a generation. … The philanthrocapitalism
+revolution will have huge implications. As governments
+cut back their spending on social causes, giving may be the
+greatest force for societal change in our world.50
+
+The focus on results and data is already changing the way in
+which global philanthropy operates. As philanthropists behave
+more and more like investors, gauging the feasibility of development
+projects by staring at a set of statistics, there is an increasing
+need for catchy assessments of ‘worthiness’. This new market
+how numbers rule the world
+
+requires an infrastructure, which includes the philanthropic
+equivalent of stock markets, investment banks, research houses
+and management consultants, based no more on principles, missions
+and value judgements, but on factual ratings. And in the age
+of spending reviews and public austerity, the reach of the three
+Ms (money, markets and measurement) is no longer confined to
+aid policies in low-income countries, but has made its powerful
+entry also into more affluent societies.
+
+Numbers strike back home:
+the politics of impact assessment in the social field
+
+In 1957, the sociologist Donald Campbell published a book that
+would have a lasting impact in the social sciences. In Factors Relevant
+to the Validity of Experiments in Social Settings, Campbell
+introduced concepts that have nowadays become common jargon
+in the methodology of social research, including internal/external
+validity and (quasi-)experimental design. He preferred the use of
+randomization techniques, but – as a practical man – was aware
+that quasi-experiments would need to suffice in most cases, due
+to resource constraints and real-life limitations. His writings
+on the ‘experimenting society’ became a blueprint for a world
+‘committed to identifying effective reforms suitable for broad
+implementation’.51 His focus on ‘hard’ evaluation techniques was
+entirely based on the conviction that scientific enquiry could
+always identify a clear link between cause and effect. In the academic
+community, Campbell has become the icon of experimental
+methods and positivistic approaches to evaluation in the social
+field. The Campbell Collaborative, an initiative named in his
+honour, was established in 2000 to produce systematic reviews of
+the effects of social interventions, including education, crime and
+justice, and social welfare. Just like J-PAL has been advocating
+the adoption of randomized control trials in foreign aid projects,
+numbers for good?
+
+the Campbell Collaborative has become one of the most vocal
+proponents of these experimental techniques to assess social
+work in the USA.
+Besides being an integral component of the social sciences’
+methodological debate, the practice of impact assessment goes
+back to the first systematic attempts by government to understand
+the effects of public service programmes. For instance, in 1964
+the US administration launched the ‘War on Poverty’ initiative,
+which led to the establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity,
+with a dedicated research and evaluation team. In
+1968, the Office carried out a field experiment in New Jersey
+to test the real-world feasibility of a negative income tax, which
+would go down in history as the first large-scale social science
+experiment to use randomized controlled trials. Also in the field
+of environmental impact assessment, various forms of assessment
+of costs and benefits as well as social impacts were introduced
+by the National Environmental Policy Act and endorsed by the
+Council of the American Sociological Association. The term
+‘social impact assessment’ was first used by the Department of
+the Interior while preparing an Environmental Impact Statement
+in 1973, and in 1974 the Ford Foundation along with a number
+of federal agencies established the Manpower Demonstration Research
+Corporation (MDRC), a nonprofit research organization
+that pioneered the use of randomization ‘to shape legislation,
+program design, and operational practices across the country’.52
+As declared on the MDRC’s website, they work ‘in fields where
+emotion and ideology often dominate public debates’ and strive to
+be ‘a source of objective, unbiased evidence about cost-effective
+solutions that can be replicated and expanded to scale’. In the
+1980s, social impact assessments began to be integrated into the
+development work of the World Bank, and in the 1990s the US
+government constituted the Interorganizational Committee on
+Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment, which
+how numbers rule the world
+
+developed standards and requirements for federal agencies’ evaluation
+methods.
+Since then, foundations, non-profits, venture philanthropists
+and social investors have entered the assessment field, experimenting
+with a range of models, approaches and formulas for
+hard-core impact evaluation. A leading role in this regard has
+been played by the San Francisco-based Roberts Enterprise
+Development Foundation (REDF). REDF was founded in 1997
+by former Bear Stearns financier George Roberts, who had made
+himself known to the world for having led the largest leveraged
+buyout in the history of global finance: the $25 billion takeover
+of the tobacco company RJR Nabisco in 1989. A leveraged buyout
+is the acquisition of a company using a significant amount of
+borrowed money (usually a ratio of 90 per cent debt to 10 per
+cent equity, but there have been cases of 100 per cent debt operations),
+through the issuance of bonds by ‘friendly’ banks (in some
+instances, these bonds are non-investment grade and are referred
+to as ‘junk bonds’). As the target company’s current success (or
+expected projection) can be used as collateral by a hostile bidder,
+leveraged buyouts have tended to become ruthless and predatory
+tactics, particularly to acquire and/or destroy competitors, as the
+more successful a company is the more likely it is to be ‘attacked’.
+According to G.A. Jarrell, former chief economist at the US
+Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the vulnerability of
+leveraged buyouts stems from the ‘value gap’ – that is, the difference
+between a company’s current value and the expected higher
+value of the stock, which often results in the overindebtedness
+of the target firm in the case of successful takeover or in trying
+to protect itself against it.53 Critics of leveraged buyouts, which
+include the former chairmen of the Fed and the SEC, Paul
+Volcker and John Shad, have traditionally pointed to the high
+risks that these debt-fuelled takeovers impose on shareholders,
+bondholders, employees, customers, suppliers, local communities
+numbers for good?
+
+and taxpayers, thus increasing the likelihood of a financial crash,
+destroying assets and jobs.54 The Nabisco episode marked the
+history of hostile financial takeovers, with the magazine Time
+dedicating a full cover page to it in 1988 (aptly titled ‘A Game
+of Greed’) and the movie industry producing a television film in
+1993, Barbarians at the Gate, which criticized the excess of the
+up-and-coming financial tycoons and their connections with Wall
+Street investment banks.55
+Against this backdrop it probably comes as no surprise that
+it was precisely Roberts’s nonprofit creation, the REDF, that
+pioneered the use of financial models to assess the success of
+social projects. In particular, the REDF was instrumental in
+introducing the idea of social return on investment (SROI) among
+philanthropists and non-profits. SROI follows the same rationale
+as cost–benefit analysis by measuring the value of social benefits
+generated by a social intervention (or the activities of a whole
+organization) as compared to the relative scale of the investment
+needed to achieve those benefits.56 By assigning monetary values
+to social (and also environmental) returns, SROI aims to use
+‘hard’ economic data to demonstrate value creation in the social
+field.57
+The SROI can be generically described like this:
+
+Net present value of benefits
+Net present value of investment58
+
+The result is a simple ratio of monetized value. For example, an
+SROI ratio of 4:1 indicates that an investment of $1 delivers $4 of
+social value. It is impressively simple and, of course, powerfully
+convincing for social investors the world over. Nowadays there are
+endless types of SROI analyses being implemented by academics,
+evaluators, consultants and social workers. Some of them have
+a clearly evaluative nature – that is, they are used to assess past
+interventions. Some, by contrast, are prospective; that is, they are
+how numbers rule the world
+
+used to forecast the potential social value of new interventions
+and are mainly targeted at philanthropists and social investors
+interested in getting good ‘social’ bangs for their bucks.59 In some
+cases, SROI is also used as a feasibility methodology (in this case
+it is also referred to as ‘break-even’ analysis), designed to indicate
+how successful a given intervention would need to be in order for
+the social value of its results to outweigh the costs.
+As we already know from the previous chapters, the ‘net
+present value’ is an extremely controversial concept. It is calculated
+through a discount rate applied to future returns, which
+postulates that ‘people prefer to receive money today rather than
+tomorrow because there is a risk (e.g., that the money will not
+be paid) or because there is an opportunity cost (e.g., potential
+gains from investing the money elsewhere).’60 The 2012 Guide
+to SROI acknowledges that this approach ‘encourages shorttermism
+by discounting the future’ and ‘betrays the extent to
+which people actually value their future and their children’s
+future’.61 Yet discount rates are officially applied everywhere in
+the implementation of SROI analyses. In the UK, for instance, the
+basic rate recommended by the Treasury’s Green Book, which sets
+out the framework for the appraisal and evaluation of all policies,
+programmes and projects, is 3.5 per cent.
+In the European context, the UK-based New Philanthropy
+Capital (NPC) has become a recognized leader in the SROI field.
+For them, one way of thinking about SROI ‘is to ask whether
+the stakeholders would rather receive money directly or receive
+whatever service it is that the charity offers’:
+
+For example, giving £100 to a lonely pensioner might improve
+their life in the very short term; they could use the money to
+pay for services or buy goods or might just appreciate the extra
+financial security it gives them. But giving £100 to a charity that
+runs social activities for pensioners might help that person to
+form and maintain lasting friendships. Many of the older people
+numbers for good?
+
+the charity works with feel that the ‘social value’ that they
+receive is far in excess of £100. The goal of SROI is to quantify
+this value – to say by how much it exceeds the financial inputs
+(if, indeed, it does exceed them). … By putting outcomes in
+financial terms we see whether particular activities are worth the
+money that we spend on them.62
+
+Measuring costs and benefits is paramount for the NPC’s approach
+to philanthropy. They argue that, although ‘we all know
+that the environment is important’, ‘it was not until environmental
+economists managed to value the environment, and compared
+this value to the costs of protecting it, that governments were
+motivated to act to combat global warming.’63 It is peculiar for
+the NPC to draw a comparison between SROI and the use of
+cost–benefit analyses in the field of environmental governance. As
+Chapters 3 and 4 in this book have shown, things went the other
+way around: governments were pushed to introduce environmental
+regulations by the mounting pressure of social movements
+and civil society, until economists decided to use cost–benefit
+analyses to assess pros and cons of regulations, which paved the
+way for the introduction of market-based mechanisms such as
+emissions trading. Ever since, progress on a number of crucial
+environmental fronts has stalled.
+SROI analyses generally follow a set of predetermined steps.
+First of all, researchers identify the target community (that is,
+the stakeholders) and map both inputs and outputs. Among the
+first we find rather conventional factors such as salaries of staff,
+volunteers’ time, rental costs and other forms of investment that
+go into the specific intervention. Among the outputs we find the
+number of people targeted by the project, the quantity of services
+provided to them and other elements directly associated with
+the type of intervention being assessed (e.g. school performance
+if we are analysing an educational project). In order to gather
+such information, questionnaires need to be administered to
+how numbers rule the world
+
+stakeholders and additional ‘hard’ data must be collected (e.g.
+health reports on the target population in the case of health-care
+projects). Ideally, an SROI should also be able to trace the link
+between direct outputs (which are the immediate results of the
+intervention) and ‘indirect’ outcomes, which describe the wider
+range of effects the intervention may have on the community at
+large. In a literacy project, outputs would include the amount of
+teaching hours provided, the number of students enrolled and
+the results of their exam tests, while outcomes would include
+the overall socio-economic, cultural and physical well-being of
+the learners. Yet ‘outcomes are trickier’ to assess, let alone trace
+back directly to the intervention that is being evaluated. Then,
+of course, all of these (inputs, outputs and outcomes) must be
+monetized. In this regard, the NPC suggests adopting ‘robust’
+willingness-to-pay studies, as these can better incorporate a
+‘stakeholder perspective’, which is considered one of the key goals
+of SROI.64 It is not clear, however, what they mean by robust, as
+the problems associated with willingness-to-pay surveys remain
+critical, as we have seen in Chapter 4.
+SROI proponents are aware that it is ‘not easy to assess directly
+the value various stakeholders place on outcomes’, which
+is why they often use financial proxies.65 These are estimates
+of value based on service costs (e.g. how much the reduction
+of crimes saves the police service or the total costs of hospital
+bed spaces saved due to better health) or market values (e.g.
+the cost of accommodation averted by a housing project). In the
+UK, both the Cabinet Office and the Scottish government have
+been working to develop a database of indicators and financial
+proxies to standardize the valuation process of SROI analyses and
+improve their reliability. As two of the key principles of SROI
+are to ‘value the things that matter’ and ‘only include what is
+material’, preference goes to inputting financial costs ‘in order that
+value of the outcomes can be recognised’.66 Yet, using financial
+numbers for good?
+
+proxies inevitably reduces the capacity of SROI evaluations to
+capture the ‘stakeholder’ perspective. This is why some evaluators
+(a minority, it is true) prefer to carry out SROI analyses without
+attributing specific financial value to results (in this case, experts
+speak of a cost-effectiveness approach rather than cost–benefit
+analysis). The Global Reporting Initiative has produced a wide
+range of guidelines to strengthen monitoring and assessment
+tools to measure value other than financial. The Centre for Social
+Investment at the University of Heidelberg in Germany, where I
+worked between 2010 and 2012 (and where I’m still a fellow), has
+devised a number of methods to employ the SROI framework
+without turning everything into monetary values.67
+Evidently, conventional SROI approaches pose significant
+methodological problems. While finding the financial value of a
+housing project may be relatively uncontroversial (even though
+one could easily argue that the value of having a ‘home’ cannot
+be reduced to its market price), it is impossible to attribute a
+figure to ‘soft’ outcomes such as empowerment, emancipation or
+human rights education, which involve a number of qualitative
+and nuanced non-market considerations.68 Inevitably, here we find
+the same degree of selectivity encountered in the analysis of other
+evidence-based tools, such as the randomized trials. Furthermore,
+SROI requires some idea of ‘what would have happened anyway’,
+but this counterfactual evidence is obviously not available, and
+whatever approximation/estimation one comes up with may easily
+result in calculation errors.69 All these methodological constraints
+and the high risk of producing inconsistent data mean that it is
+impossible to compare SROI ratios across different organizations,
+thus limiting the capacity to learn from each other and assess what
+works best.70 At the same time, measuring returns on investment is
+a resource-intensive effort. Most non-profits and social enterprises
+are likely to see this type of measurement as a burden, rather than
+a source of competitive advantage or a useful activity.71 SROI
+how numbers rule the world
+
+requires an organization to have a systematic data collection
+mechanism, which is likely to drain resources (e.g. people, time
+and money) away from the social intervention. In turn, this poses
+an unavoidable moral question: should social work be more about
+helping people or about studying them?
+Despite all its evident limitations, SROI has been growing in
+popularity because it is attractive to donors and investors, who
+are keen to adapt the analytical framework of financial markets to
+the charity world. When considering this, it may perhaps come
+as no surprise that a leading role in this field is played by the
+Goldman Sachs Foundation, the nonprofit grant-making arm of
+investment bank Goldman Sachs. In 2003, the Foundation hosted
+a meeting among grant-makers at its New York headquarters to
+discuss the future of impact assessment. All participants, most
+of whom were venture philanthropists and investment bankers,
+agreed that the era of traditional nonprofit work was over and a
+new impulse to social causes could be given by adopting best
+practices and modi operandi from the financial sector. As the
+meeting’s report highlighted,
+
+The past decade has witnessed a marked shift from project-related
+grantmaking toward venture-type philanthropic investment
+characterized by … heightened emphasis on measurement and
+results. Investors are now insisting on greater transparency and
+accountability. They want to understand the impact that their
+dollars are having on the world.72
+
+Although there is a learning component to SROI, it is clear
+that the fundamental goal of some SROI supporters is to create
+an investment market for social goals which is designed along the
+lines of conventional financial markets. Gavyin Davies and Peter
+Wheeler, the founders of NPC, were partners at Goldman Sachs
+and the idea of founding a service company for philanthropists
+came during a conversation they had at the bank’s cafeteria in
+London. Reflecting on their decision to found NPC, Davies says:
+numbers for good?
+
+In financial markets in the late 1990s there was an enormous
+industry dedicated to putting capital to use where it gets the
+highest returns. So why couldn’t the same be true of philanthropy?
+We found there wasn’t enough information produced
+in a hardheaded, independent, high-quality way.73
+
+In Europe, the UK has been at the forefront of the ‘social’
+market revolution. Although enthusiasm for ‘hard’ measurement
+had already begun during the New Labour tenure, the Tory-led
+government of David Cameron has further insisted on adopting
+tools that can help the growth of social enterprises and private
+investment, as this resonates well with its concept of a Big
+Society.74 In this field, the government has launched, among other
+initiatives, Big Society Capital, a £600 million fund to support
+the creation of a fully fledged social investment market.75 There
+has also been increasing interest in so-called social impact bonds
+(SIBs), a form of outcomes-based contracting which enables
+philanthropic investors to lend their money to projects aimed at
+tackling social problems while guaranteeing a financial return if
+the expected social outcomes are achieved. SIBs are being tested
+in programmes aimed at, for example, reducing reoffending rates
+among short-term prisoners, decreasing the number of children
+sent to correctional services, diverting persistent women offenders
+from prison, and developing more effective drug rehabilitation
+projects.
+Following the NPC’s approach, the German-based Phineo has
+developed a rating methodology for non-profits, which they use
+to guide social investors and cater for their philanthropic plans.
+Similar to the analytical work of credit rating agencies, Phineo
+and its associates conduct quality assessments of nonprofit organizations
+and award the highest rating (what they call the ‘impact
+label’) to those likely to bring the highest returns on investment.76
+Some opinion leaders in the social investment arena, such as
+Howard Husock of the Manhattan Institute, have been working
+how numbers rule the world
+
+to establish nonprofit ‘stock markets’.77 Steven Goldberg, author of
+Billions of Drops in Millions of Buckets, has proposed the adoption
+of an ‘impact index’, following the model of prediction markets
+and stock-picking websites that have proliferated on the Internet,
+through which millions of people every day bet on the results of
+football games, political elections, stock prices and even the death
+of celebrities.78 By noting that these forms of collective prediction
+have been rather accurate at forecasting events, Goldberg
+advocates using the same approach to measure the worthiness
+of charitable causes. In the words of philanthrocapitalist guru
+Matthew Bishop and his co-author Michael Green, who support
+Goldberg’s idea, ‘IMPEX [the impact index] is about harnessing
+the wisdom of crowds to assess and rank nonprofit performance,
+flooding the market with new information about where donors
+think they will get the most bangs for their bucks.’79
+
+The marketization of ‘doing good’
+
+We are faced with an apparent paradox. The quest for aideffectiveness
+and impact assessment, two noble goals in their
+own right, has ended up subordinating social change to the
+imperatives of market efficiency. Tools and methods designed
+to increase transparency and accountability, two other worthy
+principles by any means, have become Trojan Horses in a strategy
+aimed at marketizing charity, whether at the international or
+the domestic level.80 Perhaps this is not so new. I personally am
+among those who have always been sceptical of the very essence
+of philanthropy. As an admirer of the novelist John Steinbeck,
+I agree with him that ‘perhaps the most overrated virtue in our
+list of shoddy virtues is that of giving.’
+
+Giving builds the ego of the giver, makes him superior and
+higher and larger than the receiver. Nearly always, giving is a
+selfish pleasure, and in many cases is a downright destructive
+numbers for good?
+
+and evil thing. One has only to remember some of our wolfish
+financiers who spend two-thirds of their lives clawing fortunes
+out of the guts of society and the latter third pushing it back.81
+
+Regardless of how we feel about philanthropy per se, there
+is little doubt that, as the global economic crisis worsens and
+governments struggle to find revenues to sustain their welfare
+systems, market forces have become more assertive. They aim
+to reinvent development cooperation and revolutionize social
+work through business frameworks, which in turn deeply affects
+the type of society in which we all live. The new ‘do-gooders’
+scrutinize social causes as they would do for any other type of
+financial investment. This is why they need metrics to assess potential,
+scalability and likelihood of short-term returns. They are
+impatient. They have no time for step-by-step development. They
+want it all and quickly, ‘consistent with their own results-oriented
+values and their own patterns of behavior’.82 Their understanding
+of venture philanthropy has nothing to do with the inevitable
+risk of promoting social and political change: it is founded on
+the certainty of business success. Where most of us see persistent
+injustices, they simply see a lack of efficient methods. Where we
+see power imbalances that keep people in poverty and destitution,
+they see the need to promote entrepreneurial opportunities. While
+we stress the importance of social and political empowerment,
+they believe in a technocratic approach to problem-solving based
+on ‘hard’ data and economic models: ‘They want a ROI (return
+on investment), a SROI (social return on investment), FROI
+(financial return on investment), and an EROI (emotional return
+on investment).’83
+These new philanthropists are doers, not social scientists.
+For them, things are easy. They have managed to build successful
+corporations (some of which are wealthier than most of the
+countries their benevolent projects are targeting); why should they
+not also aspire to fix the world’s biggest problems, as Bill Gates
+how numbers rule the world
+
+would put it? ‘Just do it’, as the notorious slogan by shoemaking
+company Nike has it (incidentally, both the Nike Foundation and
+Nike’s founder, Phil Knight, are leading venture philanthropists).
+They love technical problems because they are clear, identifiable
+and measurable. Take vaccinations, for instance, one of
+the campaigns championed by the Gates Foundation. There is
+a problem (a disease), with a clear cause (a virus) that can be
+prevented through a specific intervention (a vaccine). But is this
+the root cause of poor health conditions in low-income countries
+around the world? An article published in 2005 in the medical
+review The Lancet takes a critical position vis-à-vis the Gates
+Foundation’s involvement in the health-care sector. The article
+argues that ‘the Gates Foundation has turned to a narrowly conceived
+understanding of health as the product of technical interventions
+divorced from economic, social, and political contexts.’84
+Looking at the historical evolution of medical technologies and
+health-care reforms, The Lancet argues that longer life expectancy
+and well-being have always been the outcome of a functioning
+and universally accessible public health system, rather than the
+availability of medical technologies (without, of course, disputing
+the complementary importance of the latter). But a public
+health-care infrastructure requires patience, long-term commitment
+and political will. Moreover, it necessitates a significant
+dose of risk-taking to oppose those interests (especially among
+private health-care providers) that militate against a universal
+public health-care system. The magnitude of the challenges and
+vested interests involved are well exemplified by how hard it has
+been for the Obama administration to establish a public healthcare
+programme in the USA. Vaccinations are simpler, quicker
+and do not require a fundamental rethinking of our political
+and economic systems. At the same time, though, vaccinations
+(especially when imposed on populations without their consent)
+continue to be a subject of debate among medical experts. For
+numbers for good?
+
+instance, the development of single-dose or needle-free vaccines,
+while certainly cost-effective, might decrease the number of wellbaby
+visits, ‘which are essential to monitoring healthy growth and
+development’. In some cases, effective vaccines against conditions
+such as diarrhoea could make the problem of extending clean
+water and sanitation seem ‘far less pressing’ to governments facing
+budget constraints.85
+The controversy is further amplified by the Gates Foundation’s
+insistence that vaccinating children is the best way to reduce
+global population growth and thus mitigate climate change (both
+problems are considered the most important challenges of our
+time by the Good Club). Vaccines are expected to slow global
+population growth and climate change: how could Gates substantiate
+such a counterintuitive claim? Hard data is the answer.
+His foundation has built models demonstrating that increased life
+expectancy in children is positively correlated with fewer births.86
+Fair enough. Common sense and historical evidence tell us that
+better living conditions are very likely to lead to lower birth rates
+(although countries like France and Germany have been able to
+marry high living standards with a resurgence of natality). But,
+regardless of whether we agree or not with the finding, can we
+concur with the claim that this is a response to climate change?
+The answer is a resounding no. Last time I checked, large African
+families were not at all responsible for the greenhouse gas emissions
+engulfing our atmosphere: the demographically shrinking
+old West is to be blamed for them. It is the consumption model
+in most low-birth-rate countries that is incompatible with the
+planet, not the way in which (large) African families behave.
+This is not to dispute the importance of vaccinations, of course.
+But simplistically linking them to demographic control and then
+associating this very delicate issue with climate change mitigation
+is just incorrect. Much to the contrary, exporting our unequal and
+unsustainable development model to these countries can easily
+how numbers rule the world
+
+worsen climate change, as we would end up generating billions
+of new hyper-consumers.
+Contradictions, of course, abounds at all levels. The Gates
+Foundation has been criticized for all sorts of reasons, including
+the fact that its mother company, Microsoft, has always championed
+strict regulation in the field of intellectual property rights,
+which is the primary reason why generic pharmaceuticals are
+difficult to access in the poorest countries of the world. Moreover,
+Microsoft’s aggressive policies and de facto monopoly in the field
+of software has limited the capacity of new social enterprises
+to produce the very innovations Gates is fond of. As we know,
+most innovations in this field (from new web browsers to applets)
+have been developed by open-source mass collaborations among
+programmers, which have been fiercely opposed by Microsoft and
+its founder. Quite interestingly, one of Gates’s best friends and
+a leading benefactor, the billionaire Warren Buffet, has opposed
+the introduction of the very rating systems he favours in the
+nonprofit world for the assessment of corporate conduct. When
+accused by consumers’ groups of having allowed his company
+Berkshire Hathaway to invest in businesses that violate environmental
+and human rights standards, he considered ‘efforts to
+rate the performance of companies on social, human rights or
+environmental measures to be of dubious merit and would not
+consider such factors when selecting investments’.87 So much for
+the consistency and coherence of the philanthrocapitalists’ creed
+in results and measurement.
+Edwards has argued that the hard-data technical evaluations
+(often reinforced by graphics and statistical calculations)
+promoted by Gates and his colleagues in the social field ‘show
+a high degree of failure in terms of the quality, quantity and
+sustainability of their results’.88 Moreover, through rating systems
+and investment models based on ‘objective numbers’, these new
+forms of social engagement are supporting a culture of ‘junk food
+numbers for good?
+
+participation’, whereby one can simply follow nonprofit stock
+markets on a computer screen, shift social investments accordingly
+and then ‘write it off to tax’. He contrasts the approach of
+philanthrocapitalists to that of civic groups and social movements,
+which are characterized by looser objectives and longer time
+horizons, and maintains that ‘business metrics and measures of
+success privilege size, growth and market share, as opposed to
+the quality of interactions between people in civil society and the
+capacities and institutions they help to create’.89 ‘The reason the
+nonprofit sector exists at all is because it can fund and invest in
+social issues that the for-profit market can’t touch because they
+can’t be measured’, remarks Paul Shoemaker, executive director of
+the Seattle affiliate of Social Venture Partners International: ‘The
+nonprofit “market” is not designed to be efficient in that way. Yet
+we’re applying the same efficiency metrics to both sectors.’90 What
+happens is that when the focus is switched from social change
+to results-based accounting, the long-term effectiveness is traded
+for short-term efficiency. As a consequence, externally funded
+non-profits and non-governmental organizations are gradually
+discouraged from focusing on political advocacy or working for
+social change, which require ‘deep resources and the ability to
+change tactics overnight if the situation demands it’.91
+As some have underlined, the process of turning social work
+into a series of statistics and abstract models is particularly insidious
+because it creates ‘the false impression that marketized
+philanthropy leads to systemic change rather than stabilization’.92
+Much to the contrary, by establishing net returns, cost–benefit
+ratios and causal relations based on randomized trials, the new aid
+industry is building a ‘veiled discourse of stabilization that freezes
+the world falsely into ontological permanence’.93 With its emphasis
+on numbers and outcomes, it appears to reinforce ‘the very system
+that results in poverty, disease, and environmental destruction’.94
+It is interesting to note that most of the new mega-philanthropists
+how numbers rule the world
+
+are blurring the boundaries between the market and civil society
+also through the way in which they provide funding, as most of
+their donations are not made in cash but in stocks. While this
+makes beneficiaries able to benefit further from the ‘gift’ in times
+of financial bonanza, it also exposes them to serious risks during
+economic slumps. But, more critically, this type of donation turns
+recipients into involuntary stakeholders of the financial markets.
+As reported in 2013 by the magazine Chronicle of Philanthropy,
+the donations of America’s wealthiest individuals have been falling
+in the past few years due to the turmoil in the financial world,
+thus creating further volatility and pro-cyclical tendencies also
+in the social field.95
+The new global givers have no interest in asking deeper questions.
+Their technocratic lens does not allow for exploring systemic
+issues, including the obvious elephant in the room of whether we
+can accept a global economic paradigm that appears designed
+to produce endemic inequalities and concentrate wealth (and
+resources) in the hands of a few individuals. Moreover, as argued
+by Ramdas, while the downsides of so-called ‘development’ in
+the global North become more evident by the day (among them
+we can include growing inequality, unsustainable consumption
+patterns, financial systems that systematically favour elites, and
+widespread lifestyle-related health problems), philanthrocapitalism
+‘seeks to invest in efforts and initiatives that can bring the
+wonders of this model of development to people and communities
+around the globe’.96 The more the so-called West learns about
+the food insecurity produced by commercial agriculture, the
+environmental and social consequences of an over-reliance on
+fossil fuels, the instabilities produced by an economic model
+built on the systematic exploitation of natural resources and the
+political bankruptcy of democratic systems regularly captured by
+the interests of corporate power, ‘the more it seems determined
+numbers for good?
+
+to share its successful development strategies with the so-called
+“developing” world’.
+As statistics tend to separate complex phenomena in measurable
+units, they hide the interconnectedness between systemic
+poverty, economic imbalances and uneven access to resources. As
+social measurements inevitably simplify what is being measured,
+the risk is to end up with results that distort reality and mislead
+policies. Because of their own nature, these metrics reward easy
+fixes and just-do-it approaches, which can be better captured by
+numbers and tested through standardized experiments. They
+focus our attention on technical solutions, although history has
+often shown that sustainable and long-term social change can only
+be achieved through participation, confrontation and political
+action. While numbers tend to emphasize the importance of business
+and its capacity to find ‘solutions’, the reality is much more
+complex. Most of the injustices we face today are the outcome
+of deep-seated power structures. ‘It’s politics, stupid!’ one may
+say paraphrasing president Clinton’s famous electoral slogan. But
+numbers do not reveal that. They highlight the tip of the iceberg,
+thereby hiding the rotten political and economic structures that
+entrench and perpetuate inequalities.
+conclusion
+
+Rethinking numbers,
+
+rethinking governance
+
+If numbers are a mysterious aspect of the universe put there
+by God, we tend to become subject to control and manipulation
+by accountant priests. If they are a method by which
+humanity can control chaos, they become part of the tools of
+a technocratic scientific elite.
+D. Boyle, The Tyranny of Numbers, 2001
+
+How can one argue with numbers? As this book has shown, the
+very nature of statistics is to convey the essence of facts. Never
+mind whether they actually do so. We know that statistics are
+partial representations of social phenomena and are often scientifically
+or politically manipulated. Yet, their appearance and design
+are structured around the notion of evidence – neutral evidence.
+When we see a number, we perceive certainty – factual information.
+Numbers are not like words, which require interpretation.
+Numbers are a source of authority in so far as they reveal truth.
+And truth cannot be disputed.
+This is not to say, of course, that statistical studies are never
+contested. In academic circles, we often argue about numbers.
+We discuss methodologies and strive to guarantee full disclosure.
+Our students know this very well. When presenting their
+rethinking numbers
+
+research work, they fear the inevitable question: ‘Where did you
+get this number from?’ In our publications, it is usual practice to
+include disclaimers, especially when statistical models constitute
+the backbone of our analysis. We, as academics, are fond of
+warning readers that our data may be incomplete and that the
+critical assumptions upon which we base our models may be
+oversimplifying real life. Usually we deal with such weaknesses
+through footnotes, endnotes, asterisks and appendices, perhaps
+because we know that those are the sections very few people
+read. It is a bit like in advertising, when after publicizing all the
+incredible features of a new product companies add the sentence
+‘Terms and conditions apply’, in minuscule font, at the bottom
+of the advert, where it is hard to see.
+Having some numbers to substantiate academic analyses is
+now, by and large, a precondition to publishing. The best-known
+journals in the social sciences have become reluctant to publish
+any research that does not have at least an equation, a couple of regressions
+or a factor analysis. These are hard times for ‘qualitative’
+researchers. Unfortunately, the scramble for numbers inevitably
+reduces the analytical depth of our work. As we desperately look
+for correlations and statistical significance across our data sets,
+we seldom wonder about the real quality of our numbers. And
+reviewing the quality does not mean ensuring that averages are
+correct or that missing data do not influence the results. It means
+questioning the ultimate validity of numbers as good descriptors
+of the social phenomena we are investigating. Do these numbers
+really tell us anything valuable about society? Are we not forcing
+complexity into claustrophobic metrics which deprive reality of
+any meaning? Do numbers simply describe social reality or have
+they become normative tools through which we shape society?
+And, importantly, are we teaching our students to view numbers
+with a critical eye? Unfortunately, intellectual complacency is
+pervasive in academia, with detrimental effects on the originality
+how numbers rule the world
+
+of our thinking and the capacity to deviate from preconceived
+notions. And disclaimers, no matter how sincere, may not be
+enough to ‘deliver us from evil’.
+There is no doubt that numbers have come to dominate not
+only academic thinking, but also our own understanding of
+the role of academia. For starters, we are continually subject to
+standardized performance assessments. Such a trend originated
+in North America and the UK in the 1970s, and then spread to
+Europe and most emerging countries in Asia, South America
+and Africa. Our existence revolves around a critical number, the
+so-called H-Index, which is a sophisticated way of calculating
+how regularly citations of our work pop up in the academic
+literature. Google Scholar, which is a formidable resource in the
+age of the digital revolution, has also become a curse for many of
+us, as most indexes are based on the automatic calculations made
+by Google. And when Google does not pick up on one of our
+papers, then we are in trouble. ‘Publish or perish’ has become
+our mantra. ‘Cite and be cited’ is our new iron law. Another
+fundamental number in academic life is the so-called ‘impact
+factor’, which is calculated by the information agency Thomson
+Reuters and indicates the average number of article citations of
+a given journal. If you want to survive in the academic jungle of
+numbers, you need to elbow your way into high-impact journals.
+The rest is irrelevant. But do these statistics really tell us anything
+about the quality of research? Perhaps. At the same time,
+though, they generate perverse incentives. As quantity becomes
+paramount, academics feel the pressure of meeting standardized
+requirements. When numbers drop, entire faculties fret. Special
+meetings are called and jobs are on the line. Name and shame
+has become routine. It is not unusual to find colleagues who
+agree to cite one another in their respective work. Self-citations
+abound. Reviewers often subject the acceptance of a paper for
+publication to the citation of one or more of their works. All these
+rethinking numbers
+
+statistics have become the most critical asset for those seeking
+promotion, a salary raise or a job at an Ivy League university.
+They have a fundamental ‘impact’ not only on our reputation,
+but also on our bank account. And amid this numbers-led frenzy,
+it is not surprising that many academics are caught plagiarizing,
+replicating publications and forging data, as a desperate attempt
+to keep up with the performance treadmill.
+
+In defence of numbers
+
+This book does not intend to dispute the importance of numbers
+for the advancement of knowledge and for the betterment of
+society. Nor does it deny the critical role that numbers play in
+supporting decisions and policies. I am fully aware that public
+decision-making without statistics would be dominated by gut
+feelings and shallow rhetorical arguments, which is one of the
+reasons why authoritarian governments have an excellent track
+record of not releasing regular statistics or of withholding data
+altogether. Just as the scientific revolution questioned the religious
+explanation of the universe, thereby weakening the secular
+power of the churches and ushering in the modern era, numbers
+have had (and can have) an emancipatory potential: they can
+empower people and weaken dictators. Numbers can empower
+young students who use them to challenge professors and their
+‘bogus’ data. Numbers can help environmental organizations take
+polluting corporations to court for ecological damage. Numbers
+can help citizens understand whom to vote for and what policies
+to support. In academia, too, numbers are critical. No matter
+how much one can criticize inventions such as the H-index and
+the impact factor, the pursuit of excellence requires some form
+of assessment of academic quality. Nobody wants a lethargic
+academia, where professors have no incentives, be it reputational
+or economic, to generate good research and outstanding teaching.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Public policy, too, needs numbers to function. As the physicist
+Lord Kelvin once said, ‘if you cannot measure it, you cannot
+improve it.’ And, as an oft-quoted aphorism by business guru
+W.E. Deming goes, ‘you cannot manage what you can’t measure.’
+Measuring is a fundamental component of human life. We measure
+things every day and we base our decisions on that. Rejecting
+measurement per se would not only be naive, but impossible
+for society. It would take away a significant part of what defines
+human nature. Measurements are also fundamental to communicate.
+Without scales, there would be no local markets. Without
+thermometers, there would be no doctors. Without meters, there
+would be no carpenters. Our education, health care and housing
+depend on measurements. And we appreciate that as a sign of
+progress.
+At the same time, though, there are many things that we
+refuse to measure, and we have very good reasons for that. For
+instance, we consider it awkward to measure art. We believe
+that the value of art cannot be translated into crude numbers.
+Of course, we often put a price on art crafts, but we would
+find it odd to measure the beauty of the Statue of Liberty or
+the Pyramids and then assess which one is stronger, better or
+more valuable. We also reject quantitative measures of friendship.
+Some people may very well consider themselves lucky for
+having more Facebook friends than others, but nobody would
+seriously believe that the number of friends (whether in person
+or on line) is a proxy of the quality of friendship. Much to the
+contrary, we feel that if we were to measure friendship according
+to some numerical parameter, we would somehow offend the
+very nature of it. By measuring it, we would turn friendship
+into something else: a numerical unit, deprived of that human
+feeling that makes it so important in the first place. Similarly,
+we refuse to measure love. We do not use scales to quantify the
+goodness of parents or the harmony of a couple. Although some
+rethinking numbers
+
+economists and psychologists may adopt metrics to measure
+these ‘soft’ elements of social life, we – as a society – recoil at
+the idea of introducing standardized assessments of parenting
+or married life.
+In the natural sciences, numbers are used to describe physical
+phenomena. And there are good and bad numbers there too. As
+historians have shown, hard sciences are not immune to oversimplifications
+and paradigmatic shifts. Quite to the contrary,
+the historical evolution of sciences has been that of questioning
+dominant models (and their numbers) with a view to replacing
+them with better theories, which in turn have been challenged
+again in a continuous process of scientific revolution.1
+ Good
+or bad, however, the numbers of physics can hardly affect the
+behaviour of the atom. This is not true when numbers are applied
+to human phenomena. As measurements enter social life, they
+contribute to shaping reality. Standardized assessments, for instance,
+are not just tools to analyse performance. They are tools
+to guide it. If what counts is quantity, then academics will strive
+to publish every little piece of research they have, not matter how
+dubious its quality may be. If what counts is to have more friends
+on Facebook, then users will try their best to accumulate new
+connections rather than strengthen the intimacy of those they
+already have. If the quantity of love becomes the explanatory
+criterion to measure a good family structure, then parents may
+decide to pay more attention to what can be measured, such as the
+number of outings, toys and time they spend with their children,
+rather than the quality of such interactions. The risk is not just
+that of being misled in how we define our priorities. There is also
+a clear risk of losing the capacity to appreciate the value of what
+is intangible. Paraphrasing the German political theorist Hannah
+Arendt, we may say that the problem with systematic application
+of numbers to social life ‘is not that they are wrong, but that they
+could become true’.2
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Beyond good and bad numbers
+
+From a governance perspective, there is a double problem with
+the influence of numbers in policymaking. As we have seen
+throughout the book, some numbers are simply ‘bad’. The quality
+of statistical surveys, such as those forming the national income
+accounts on which the calculation of GDP is based, varies dramatically
+across the world. In many African countries, income
+statistics are incomplete and largely rely on imputations made by
+local statisticians, which generate all sorts of inconsistencies. Yet,
+policymakers and international donors use these ‘poor numbers’
+every day to gauge the effectiveness of structural reforms, development
+aid and macro-economic policies.3 The Bureau of Economic
+Analysis, too, has admitted that GDP statistics in the USA are
+not always of good quality, especially during economic crises.4
+Moreover, numbers are continually revised, adjusted and recalculated
+in different ways by each statistical agency, which makes
+international comparisons harder than we are made to believe.
+For instance, in mid-2013 the Bureau introduced a reform to the
+GDP accounts for the calculation of expenditures in research and
+development, entertainment, literary and other artistic originals.5
+Traditionally treated as business costs, they are now dealt with
+as fixed investments, thus adding fully to national income. This
+spurred criticism that the US government was desperately trying
+to inflate its estimate of economic growth with a view to downplaying
+the increase in national debt as a percentage of GDP.6
+We also know that many data sets have been manipulated or
+completely fabricated. Rating agencies, for instance, have admitted
+adapting credit ratings to suit their clients, and investment
+banks have manipulated sovereign debt statistics. Academics have
+been caught out using fake data, and in some cases bestselling
+books and entire careers have been based on bogus evidence. We
+also know that the peer review system leaves much to be desired,
+rethinking numbers
+
+as many journals, including those with the highest impact factor,
+have fallen into the numbers trap, taking as uncontested evidence
+what is in fact man-made fabrication. The phrase ‘garbage in,
+garbage out’, which has become a common expression in computer
+science, indicates that statistical models unquestioningly
+reproduce whatever ‘garbage’ one feeds them with. If nonsensical
+information is inputted, the models will produce nonsensical
+results, which will however look evidence-based to all of us.
+Numbers can also be twisted to serve particular political
+agendas. Environmental sceptics have used data to prove that a
+Hummer is more energy efficient than a Prius, while contrarian
+scientists have employed randomized trials to show that tobacco
+smoking does not cause cancer. In 1954, the American writer
+Darrell Huff published a little book, How to Lie with Statistics,
+which has become a classic read for all students sceptical
+of numbers. Through a lively and captivating narrative, Huff
+pointed out all sorts of manipulations that can occur when data
+is misrepresented (for instance, by truncating graphs to overemphasize
+minor differences) or when it is poorly interpreted.7
+ As we
+have learned, ‘Proofiness is the raw material that arms partisans
+to fight off the assault of knowledge, to clothe irrationality in the
+garb of the rational and the scientific.’8
+However, if the quality of data were the only problem with
+numbers, then it could be easily resolved through stricter observation,
+transparency and regulation. Unfortunately, numbers
+can mislead decisionmaking even when they are not overtly
+manipulated. As numbers focus attention only on what can be
+measured, this inevitably influences our priorities, given that
+what is not measurable is left out. To use Descartes’s classical
+distinction between res extensa (the measured reality) and res
+cogitans (the spiritual reality), what is measured becomes the
+only reality that matters. The rest is useless and valueless. Take,
+once again, the case of GDP. Even if we were able to improve its
+how numbers rule the world
+
+statistical quality (and several attempts are being made), GDP
+would still be a measure of market output, which is by no means a
+complete picture of the overall economy. As we know, what is not
+exchanged through the mediation of the market is not included in
+the national income accounts. As a consequence, by using GDP
+as a measure of economic performance, our governments pursue
+policies that strengthen the market at the expense of informal
+economic areas, such as household services, the care economy
+and the gift economy. Moreover, as GDP is based on market
+prices, what is not priced becomes valueless. As this book has
+shown, such an emphasis on prices generates perverse incentives.
+On the one hand, our governance systems tend to privilege a
+model of development that disregards what is free, such as natural
+resources. On the other hand, policymakers are encouraged to
+privatize and marketize common resources in order to make
+them productive in GDP terms. Within the GDP framework of
+governance, only what is monetized counts. Therefore, for the
+environment to be taken seriously, it needs to be measured and
+monetized. Many economists will tell you that it is possible to
+price anything. Even when there are no markets, prices can be
+simply simulated. Basically, for many of them, refining GDP is just
+a matter of technical adjustments and more accurate models. But
+this monetization ‘trap’ reveals all sorts of inconsistencies, as we
+have seen throughout the book. In fact, the very idea of accuracy
+becomes a metaphysical concept. How can we accurately measure
+the value of nature? Who measures nature? According to which
+standards? Do we choose an anthropocentric approach, whereby
+nature is worth how much human beings decide? Or do we
+adopt a holistic ecosystemic approach, which takes into account
+the interconnectedness of the natural world? We have analysed
+all conceptual shortcomings affecting available methodologies,
+from willingness-to-pay surveys to the calculation of replacement
+costs or the identification of proxy markets. All these valuation
+rethinking numbers
+
+methods rest on weak assumptions and reveal basic conceptual
+flaws. When they are applied to governance models, even in the
+absence of intentional manipulations and conflicts of interest
+(which systematically occur), they become dangerous policy tools.
+In the business community, too, there have been fervent
+debates as to whether numbers help build financial success or
+kill innovation. Two well-known academics, Robert Kaplan of
+Harvard Business School and Thomas Johnson of Portland State
+University, have personally embodied such a battle of ideas. In
+the late 1980s, Kaplan and Johnson co-authored the bestseller
+Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting,
+which maintained that while cost accounting had been the key
+feature driving the expansion of the new corporations in the
+nineteenth century, these metrics had become fundamentally
+‘toxic’ for business in the globalized age, as they separated managers
+from the productive components of their companies, thus
+making them even more dependent on abstract calculations for the
+estimate of costs, prices and returns on investment. Ever since,
+however, their intellectual paths have grown further apart, with
+Kaplan supporting the adoption of all sorts of econometric models
+to run successful businesses and Johnson arguing for hands-on
+management and human judgement. Through a series of successful
+management books, Kaplan has been advocating the systematic
+use of activity-based costing and balanced scorecards, which
+help managers ‘draw forth from a mass of numerical data those
+few statistics and results that genuinely matter’. For Johnson, by
+contrast, these economics-dominated metrics force managers to
+lead companies through quantitative data, rather than through
+detailed knowledge of how business works. In turn, this has
+contributed ‘to the modern obsession in business with “looking
+good” by the numbers … no matter what damage [it] does to
+the underlying system of relationships that sustain any human
+organization’.9
+how numbers rule the world
+
+The problem with numbers is therefore more philosophical
+than the simplistic distinction between good and bad numbers.
+In a sense it is an issue that goes back to the battle of ideas
+between Plato and Aristotle. For the first, numbers are symbols
+of truth. For the second, numbers are tools to advance knowledge.
+Following Pythagoras, Plato believed in numbers as revealing
+the essence of the world. By contrast, Aristotle saw the world as
+a messy object of study, in which mathematical reasoning could
+guide knowledge, but never represent a higher truth. For him,
+numbers do not reveal ‘forms’, as opposed to the more mundane
+‘substance’. They are heuristic devices to dissect the intricacy
+of nature. They are not more perfect than the substance they
+attempt to describe.
+Such a classical distinction between numbers as essences and
+numbers as tools is still influencing our contemporary societies.
+And, by and large, Plato has been victorious. Indeed, despite
+their imperfections and partiality, numbers tend to acquire a life
+of their own. They abstract themselves from the real world and
+generate a fictitious ‘hyperuranium’. They embody evidence.
+They cease to represent a phenomenon; they become the phenomenon
+itself. Since the very idea of representation is by definition
+imperfect, numbers cannot represent; they must signify reality.
+This inherent power of numbers, which is founded on our
+innate search for truth, explains why all sorts of data, good or
+bad, can become a potent weapon to shape complacency and
+subservience in society. Although they are presented as tools that
+advance knowledge, in so far as they remove our collective capacity
+to exercise our critical mind, they run the risk of fostering
+stupidity. A society based on numbers ‘endangers itself because it
+invests too heavily in shallow rituals of verification at the expense
+of other forms of organizational intelligence’, argues LSE accounting
+professor Michael Power. Through numerical-based
+auditing systems, it becomes ‘a form of learned ignorance’.10 These
+rethinking numbers
+
+standardized approaches ‘support abstract managerial values at
+the expense of other cultures of performance evaluation’ and
+‘tend to prioritize that which can be measured and audited in
+economic terms’.11
+
+Governance, numbers and the public sphere
+
+In political studies, it has become rather common to talk about
+decision-making processes in terms of governance. The word
+indicates the fragmentation of authority in contemporary societies,
+where national governments have become facilitators rather
+than monopolists of policymaking power, in closer cooperation
+with global institutions and private entities, from corporations to
+NGOs.12 In studying governance, one can identify three distinct
+but connected sectors: the state, the market and civil society.
+Obviously, this is by no means an accurate description. The
+boundaries between these three areas of collective action are
+not so well defined as we may believe. For instance, the public
+(state) and the private (market) sectors have significant areas of
+overlap, especially when public–private partnerships proliferate
+in the design, execution and management of a number of
+policies.13 Similarly, the distinction between for-profit (market)
+and nonprofit (state and civil society) functions is increasingly
+challenged by ‘hybrid’ organizations which merge solidarity-based
+features with profit functions (e.g. social enterprises), or public
+utility companies which are controlled by government but follow
+market principles.
+As boundaries become increasingly blurred, the three sectors
+not only cooperate but also compete for power. As governance
+mechanisms open new opportunities to exert influence in
+decision-making, the state, the market and civil society enter
+a dynamic relationship of mutual balancing, where the risk of
+unidimensional takeover is, however, always present. Governance
+how numbers rule the world
+
+can therefore be seen as the new terrain of political confrontation,
+in which different (albeit often complementary) principles and
+values clash or cooperate to arrive at collective decisions. In short,
+governance is the process whereby cultural, social, economic and
+political hegemony is constructed.
+Arguably, the most complex of the three sectors is what
+we generally (and perhaps too simplistically) call civil society.
+What is civil society? This question has been part and parcel
+of philosophical debates since time immemorial. In the history
+of political thought we can distinguish several complementary
+(and at times opposing) ways in which civil society has been conceptualized.14
+In classical Greek political thought, the term ‘civil
+society’ described the ‘good’ society: that is, the set of manners,
+rules and forms of participation that characterized the polis
+vis-à-vis other forms of government. For Aristotle, civil society
+was society organized through self-government as opposed to the
+savage world of the ‘barbarians’. It was civil because of ‘civility’.
+In Rome’s republican tradition, civil society was the ensemble of
+active citizens, who regularly contributed to the various social,
+cultural, economic and political splendour of the republic. It
+was civil because of the civis, the Latin word for citizen. The
+concept of vita activa, which fundamentally identified the roles
+and responsibilities of citizens in the Roman tradition, was later
+popularized by Machiavelli in the 1500s and by Hannah Arendt
+in the mid-1900s. In modern political philosophy, the idea of civil
+society resurfaced with the development of personal liberties and
+rights. For John Locke and Adam Ferguson, two forefathers of
+modern liberalism, civil society was the expression of the modern
+proprietary class, which created spaces of autonomy and selfdetermination
+within a state characterized by inherent oppressive
+tendencies. For these thinkers civil society was a fundamentally
+political concept, a bastion against the tendency of the state to
+override individual rights.15
+rethinking numbers
+
+Similarly, Alexis de Tocqueville treated civil society as the
+locus of self-organization as opposed to government, which was
+by contrast viewed as the source of coercion. This self-organized
+world is characterized by associations and networks that cut
+across and transcend traditional social relationships founded
+on patron–client ties. In this conception, civil society provides
+a breeding ground for democratic values and a formidable curb
+against oppression. Moreover, as Harvard political scientist
+Robert Putnam demonstrated, such horizontal interaction contributes
+deeply to the diffusion and production of social capital.16
+Another tradition of thought, tracing its origins to Hegel, sees
+civil society as the ensemble of all those groups and entities
+that exist between the state and the family. This view portrays
+organizations and groups as vehicles of cultural permeation
+throughout society according to the order imposed by the state,
+and deeply influenced Marx’s notion of civil society as the core
+of the capitalist system (the bourgeoisie).17 Re-elaborating on
+Marx, the Italian intellectual Antonio Gramsci understood civil
+society as the realm of hegemony, constructed around the notion
+of consent, as opposed to the realm of force that pertains to the
+domination exerted by the state.18 He saw greater potential in civil
+society than Marx, noting that it could also provide the space
+needed for people to rebel against capitalist dominant structures.
+For the social anthropologist Ernest Gellner, civil society has been
+the defining character of Western liberalism vis-à-vis other forms
+of political ideology.19
+According to the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, civil
+society should be seen as the locus of communicative action, the
+so-called ‘public sphere’, in which ideas and values are discussed
+and processed. In this view, civil society becomes the foundation
+of a dialogic society.20 This sphere lies between the state and the
+private realm: it is the space where public debate takes place and
+information is exchanged and where groups and individuals can
+how numbers rule the world
+
+express their views and interests, discuss common objectives as
+well as confront their biases and prejudices. In this regard, civil
+society is the arena where discursive interaction – that is, a continuous
+process of confrontation, argumentation and deliberation
+– sustains the very essence of democracy. The public sphere is
+not static. It is an ever-evolving dynamic, in which confrontation
+leads to change; in turn, this affects the identity and values of
+participants, thus redesigning the contours of the civil society
+arena itself. The idea of civil society as the public sphere inherently
+presupposes conflicting ideas and goals. Communication,
+confrontation and debate cannot take place where uniformity
+reigns. As Gramsci suggested in his analysis of hegemony, civil
+society is a social sphere characterized by an inherent potential
+transformative power.
+Whether one agrees with classical theorists who underlined
+the opposition of civil society to the state and the market, or
+with those who see civil society as the locus of participation and
+deliberation, it is clear that in the world of numbers the very
+political nature of civil society as the locus of change is increasingly
+challenged. By virtue of their own nature, numbers reduce
+debate. They are not dynamic entities. To the contrary, their
+essence is static. As we have discussed in Chapter 1, statistics were
+designed to eliminate discretion and avoid political contestation
+in modern bureaucracies. They were invented to control, albeit
+without giving the impression of control. They were designed to
+rule, without coercion. In Foucault’s terms, they were instruments
+of governmentality. The subtlety of numbers is that they do not
+eliminate power; they hide it. And it is precisely this cloaking
+capacity that makes them so influential in politics and dangerous
+for public debate.
+Statistics, ratings, results, measurements and all the other
+forms that numbers can assume in public policy have had the
+effect of ‘depoliticizing governance’, thereby stripping civil society
+rethinking numbers
+
+of its truly transformative potential. By reducing different values,
+principles and ideas to measurements, numbers have fundamentally
+altered the political interaction between the state, the market
+and civil society. The continual confrontation of ideas that should
+characterize the public sphere has become a unidimensional quest
+for efficiency in decision-making. The political nature of public
+debate has been replaced by the efficiency of numbers as cognitive
+devices to identify the best solutions to the world’s problems.
+On the one hand, this has grossly centralized policymaking, by
+affording increasing power to the masters of numbers – that is, the
+so-called experts and technocrats. On the other hand, as markets
+are considered the ideal locus of numerical reasoning, such a trend
+has propelled a new form of market supremacy, characterized by
+the narrow form of economic thinking dominating contemporary
+societies. As I have discussed at length in Gross Domestic Problem,
+the invention of GDP has been instrumental in generating the
+most powerful narrative of all times: that is, that markets are the
+only producers of wealth and that endless market production is
+the ultimate objective of politics. GDP has also provided a critical
+face-lift to all polluting industries, which have seen all their ‘bads’
+disappear, while subjugating trade unions in a state of subservience
+and undermining the capacity of environmental movements
+to stimulate a meaningful debate on the desirability and feasibility
+of economic growth. Governance institutions, whether locally or
+nationally, have been crafted around the prestige bestowed by this
+almighty number, while alternative economic thinking has been
+sidelined and non-market, less formalized economies have been
+destroyed. Moreover, GDP has afforded immense power to central
+bankers, economic advisers, development consultants, IMF specialists,
+World Bank-ers and the like, as these technocrats know
+best how to propel economic growth and manage the business
+cycle. The power of technocracy has become all the more evident
+in the industry of credit rating, where a few private companies
+how numbers rule the world
+
+largely rule the planet. Their numbers dictate policies throughout
+the world and force entire nations into austerity programmes to
+the detriment of social justice and collective well-being. Here
+again, numbers have been used to strengthen the grip of markets
+over other sectors of social life, while affording immense power
+to a few gatekeepers.
+Nowadays, there is virtually no social or environmental policy
+that is not vetted through cost–benefit analyses. At first sight,
+these methodologies appear rational. It makes sense to measure
+the costs and benefits of a policy before adopting it. But, when
+looking more closely, we notice unreasonable assumptions and
+biased conceptualizations. Discount rates systematically assign
+a higher value to the present at the expense of the future, thus
+producing a clear bias towards short-term approaches. Moreover,
+the conflation of costs and benefits into one number hides
+a fundamental question: whose costs and whose benefits? In
+society, costs and benefits are not shared equally by all members.
+When it comes to regulation (especially in the environmental
+field), costs are generally borne by companies and benefits shared
+by society at large. But cost–benefit analyses unduly present
+their costs and our benefits as if they were on the same level,
+with the consequence that allegedly cost-effective solutions are
+systematically preferred to those based on principles such as
+social justice and environmental sustainability. This has been the
+case with all major environmental regulations of the past decades,
+best exemplified by the triumph of markets in the governance of
+climate-change mitigation. Behind this approach is the idea that
+climate change can be fixed through the right formulas, by identifying
+critical equilibria and optimal pricing mechanisms. But as
+numerous analysts have observed, ‘climate change is not amenable
+to an elegant solution because it is not a discrete problem. It is
+better understood as a symptom of a particular development
+path’, which forms ‘a complex nexus of mutually reinforcing,
+rethinking numbers
+
+intertwined patterns of human behaviour, physical materials and
+the resulting technology. It is impossible to change such complex
+systems in desired ways by focusing on just one thing.’21
+As this book has shown, no matter how many times markets
+fail (e.g. with credit ratings and carbon trading), the power of
+numbers seems to resuscitate ideas and approaches that should be
+viewed as bankrupt beyond any reasonable doubt. The growing
+power of ‘philanthrocapitalists’ is a clear example of a field in
+which a metric-driven business mentality is virtually hegemonic,
+in terms of both resources and modus operandi. According to
+Edwards, civil society ‘works best when its ecosystems are healthy
+and diverse’. But because of the metric-driven ideology endorsed
+by philanthrocapitalists, ‘distance is increasing between intermediary
+advocacy groups and NGOs, and the constituencies on
+whose behalf they are supposed to work’, and ‘older associations
+that used to bring citizens together across the lines of class, geography
+and (less so) race are disappearing’.22 A report published
+by the Kellogg Foundation in 2003 maintained that the emphasis
+on ‘efficiency and market share has the potential to endanger the
+most basic value of the nonprofit sector – the availability of “free
+space” within society for people to invent solutions to social
+problems and serve the public good’.23
+We have seen how the proliferation of markets is also evident
+in the governance of biodiversity conservation. New measurement
+tools, audits and other quantitative methodologies are being
+continually developed by financial firms to put a price on nature,
+as measuring natural capital has become a lucrative business. But
+behind these numbers lies a world of conflicts of interest, speculative
+deals and other hazardous tendencies, which are cloaked
+under the apparent neutrality of numerical models. Through a
+system of governance by numbers, we deal with nature as if it
+were a counterpart in a financial transaction. We allow so-called
+experts to set thresholds and assess risk. Then, based on these
+how numbers rule the world
+
+statistics, we play a dangerous game with Mother Earth, in which
+we gauge our moves based on estimates of ecological damage,
+environmental risk and climate change. Instead of encouraging an
+open debate on what the developmental path of mankind should
+be in order to marry social, economic and environmental wellbeing,
+we use a variety of dubious models to ‘gamble’ with nature
+in order to achieve the maximum results with the least effort.
+
+What now? Governance of complexity
+
+By obscuring the politics of numbers, the current model of governance
+is stifling a rational public debate on some of the most
+profound injustices marring our societies. As some have argued,
+governance by numbers ‘can rob us of our democratic right to
+think for ourselves’.24 The systematic application of measurements,
+ratings, cost–benefit analyses, standardized assessments,
+returns on investment and pricing models has resulted in what
+one could call ‘the inevitability of the market’. As our conceptual
+tools are so deeply influenced by numerical reasoning, we cannot
+think outside of the market ‘box’. Paraphrasing Yale economist
+Charles Lindblom, we may say that markets have become ‘conceptual
+prisons’.25 No matter how many times they fail, no matter
+how many times we realize the inherent short-termism of the
+market philosophy, we seem bound to acquiesce to its almighty
+dominance not only of our governance systems but also of our
+intellect.
+Our ideas are imprisoned by numbers. This is why we respond
+to their failures with even more trust. In an article published in
+1987, sociologist Susan Shapiro analysed what she called ‘the
+social control of impersonal trust’. She reflected on the classical
+question ‘who guards the guardians?’ and noted that society
+assumes that guardians will ‘tell the truth, fulfil their obligations
+competently, follow established procedures, and act like
+rethinking numbers
+
+disinterested fiduciaries’.26 But when they fail us, instead of rethinking
+political and social mechanisms, we ‘throw ‘good’ money
+after bad’; that is, we ‘protect trust and respond to its failures
+by conferring even more trust’.27 In the words of David Boyle, it
+is ‘one of the paradoxes of the modern world that the failure of
+auditors is expected to be solved by employing more auditors.’28
+Why do we do that? Perhaps it is because, as social animals,
+we have no choice but to trust. Society is, in the end, based on
+interpersonal trust. However, I find this answer unsatisfactory.
+As a matter of fact, we live in a world in which social distrust is
+rampant. We protect our homes with security gates. We seldom
+interact with our neighbours. We expect contracts to include liability
+provisions. We hold on to our wallets when we walk down
+the street. But then, almost magically, all this distrust evaporates
+when it comes to market governance models. In this case, we
+consciously or unconsciously commit to believe in the wonders
+of ratings, carbon markets, offset mechanisms and biodiversity
+credits. Although we would carefully check if the street vendor
+has given us the correct change, we unquestioningly assume that
+the cost–benefit analyses run by a team of economists or the social
+return on investment carried out by some experts are truthful.
+This book’s answer to such a paradox is that numbers turn
+the governance field into a technical process, which projects
+an image of expertise and professionalism. Moreover, numbers
+transform the governance process into something that can be
+managed with the appropriate technology. To be sure, this idea
+is quite comforting. It simplifies the world. It indicates that there
+are discrete solutions to discrete problems. Most importantly, it
+shows that, through the right formulas, we can make decisions
+in which everybody wins: you and I, the poor and the rich,
+polluters and Mother Nature. In a world in which every day
+looks more arduous, I suppose many people find it reassuring to
+hear that there are easy solutions to our overarching problems,
+how numbers rule the world
+
+from the financial crisis to climate change and global poverty. By
+delegating the task of fixing the world to the masters of numbers,
+our ultimate objective seems to be that of enjoying the lightness
+of our daily disempowerment.
+As comforting as this sense of delegation may be, the reality
+is that we live in a complex world. Numbers, albeit critical to
+human progress, are double-edged swords, which can surreptitiously
+reduce the complexity of social phenomena and ultimately
+lead us in the wrong direction. Just like a conscientious mother
+would never reduce her role to that summarized in an algorithm,
+we should not expect governance systems to be automatically
+driven by econometric models. Governance is a public good:
+the most important public good. Not only our future as human
+beings but that of the whole planet depends on our commitment
+to governance, in all its ramifications, from the global to the local
+level. The more the public sphere retracts under the increasing
+pressure of market rationalism, the more we lose the capacity to
+regain control over our democratic institutions. More dangerously,
+as market mechanisms crowd out other forms of social interaction,
+we extirpate alternative forms of socialization. As they cannot
+be measured in conventional terms, gift economies, communitybased
+reciprocity schemes and other types of informal dynamics
+tend to disappear under the pressure of formal market structures.
+In this process we are losing not only entire communities and
+ecosystems, but also millennia of knowledge.
+By subscribing to a metrics-based ‘learned ignorance’, we
+unlearn other ways of life. We become unidimensional human
+beings: utility maximers, who increasingly fit the numerical
+models applied to them. In 2009, Elinor Ostrom won the
+Nobel Prize in Economics for her work on the governance of the
+commons. A woman trained as a political scientist, she had the
+courage to oppose centuries of conventional wisdom in economics
+by arguing that there was another way. She believed that
+rethinking numbers
+
+privatization and commodification, on the one hand, or top-down
+regulation, on the other hand, were not the only ways in which
+human beings could govern their common resources.29 She travelled
+across the world, from Japan to Switzerland, from California
+to the Philippines, from Canada to Turkey to demonstrate that
+bottom-up systems of collective governance, in which citizens
+build shared institutions and collective cooperative mechanisms,
+not only achieve better governance results, but are also resilient,
+balanced and long-lasting. This is why the public sphere is so
+important. All those soft elements of social life, from mutual
+respect to solidarity, which systematically escape our obsession
+with measurement, are ultimately much more important than what
+is integrated into the numerical models driving contemporary
+governance. True, participation can be a painful experience. The
+process of interacting, debating, compromising and deliberating
+can be tedious and frustrating. Yet, we have no other way. We are
+social animals and live in a profoundly interconnected world. As
+remarked by Raj Patel, the solution will not come from market
+society but ‘from the liberty of living together and engaging in the
+democratic politics that will help us value our common future’.30
+Numbers will not save us. We will need to do it ourselves.
+Notes
+
+introduction
+1. R.A. Fisher, ‘The Expansion of Statistics’, American Scientist 42 (1954):
+276.
+2. H.K. Hansen and A. Muhlen-Schulte, ‘The Power of Numbers in Global
+Governance’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 15 (4)
+(2012): 455–65.
+3. A.C. Cutler, V. Haufler and T. Porter (eds), Private Authority and International
+Affairs (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999);
+R.B. Hall and T. J. Biersteker (eds), The Emergence of Private Authority
+in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002);
+J.C. Graz and A. Nolke (eds), Transnational Private Governance and its
+Limits (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).
+4. Quoted in G. Gigerenzer et al., The Empire of Chance: How Probability
+Changed Science and Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University
+Press, 1989), p. 238.
+5. M.J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New
+York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2012), p. 177.
+6. Ibid., p. 179.
+
+chapter 1
+1. R.M. Hare, Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 [1982]), p. 10.
+2. B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster,
+1967).
+3. Hare, Plato, p. 11.
+4. Ibid.
+notes
+
+5. N. Canny, From Reformation to Resistance: Ireland, 1534–1660 (Dublin:
+Helicon, 1987).
+6. A. Roncaglia, Petty: The Origins of Political Economy (Armonk, NY:
+M.E. Sharpe, 1985), p. 5.
+7. Lavoisier’s study of the wealth of France was published with the title De
+la richesse territoriale du royaume de France.
+8. T. Fougner, ‘Neoliberal Governance of States: The Role of Competitiveness
+Indexing and Benchmarking’, Millennium: Journal of International
+Studies, 37(2) (2008): 303–26.
+9. T.J. Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies
+and the Politics of Creditworthiness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
+Press, 2005).
+10. O. Lowenheim, ‘Examining the State: A Foucauldian Perspective on
+International “Governance Indicators’’’, Third World Quarterly, 29 (2)
+(2008): 255–74. See also J.C. Sharman, ‘The Bark Is the Bite: International
+Organizations and Blacklisting’, Review of International Political
+Economy, 16 (4) (2009): 573–96.
+11. Cited by T.M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in
+Science and Public Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995),
+p. 37.
+12. ‘Democrats Optimistic about Census’, New York Times, 21 December 2010,
+http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/democrats-optimisticabout-census
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+13. A. Hamilton, J. Jay and J. Madison, The Federalist Papers (New York:
+Cosimo Books, 2006 [1787]), p. 359.
+14. M.J. Cullen, The Statistical Movement in Early Victorian Britain: The
+Foundations of Empirical Social Research (Hassocks: Harvester Press,
+1975); T.M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900 (Princeton,
+NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
+15. Porter, Trust in Numbers, p. 21
+16. K. Pearson, The Grammar of Science (New York: Cosimo Books, 2007
+[1911]), p. 12.
+17. Porter, Trust in Numbers, p. 49.
+18. Ibid., p. 49 (emphasis added).
+19. J. Best, Damned Lies and Statistics: Untangling Numbers from the Media,
+Politicians and Activists (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
+California Press, 2001), p. 7.
+20. M. Blastland and A. Dilnot, The Numbers Game: The Commonsense
+Guide to Understanding Numbers in the News, in Politics, and in Life
+(New York: Gotham Books, 2009), p. 79.
+21. ‘You Can Count Me Out’, Observer, 14 January 2001, www.guardian.
+co.uk/theobserver/2001/jan/14/featuresreview.review (accessed 30 June
+2013).
+22. P. Starr, ‘The Sociology of Official Statistics’, in W. Alonso and P. Starr
+how numbers rule the world
+
+(eds), The Politics of Numbers (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
+1987), p. 52.
+23. Blastland and Dilnot, The Numbers Game, p. 80.
+24. Ibid., p. 85.
+25. D. Meier et al., Many Children Left Behind (Boston, MA: Beacon Press,
+2004).
+26. ‘TNLI Survey: No Child Left Behind Highlight’, Teachers Network,
+http://teachersnetwork.org/tnli/survey_highlights.htm (accessed 30 June
+2013).
+27. ‘What’s Wrong With Standardized Tests?’, The National Center for Fair
+and Open Testing, 22 May 2012, www.fairtest.org/facts/whatwron.htm
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+28. ‘You Can Count Me Out’.
+29. The citation is from P. Miller, ‘Accounting and Objectivity: The Invention
+of Calculating Selves and Calculable Spaces’, in A. Megill (ed.),
+Rethinking Objectivity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994).
+30. M. Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P.Miller
+(eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University
+of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 95.
+31. P. Becker and W. Clark (eds), Little Tools of Knowledge: Historical Essays
+on Academic and Bureaucratic Practices (Ann Arbor: University of
+Michigan Press, 2001).
+32. K. Asdal, ‘The Office: Weakness of Numbers and the Production of Nonauthority’,
+Accounting, Organizations and Society, 36 (1) (2011): 1–9, p. 1.
+33. Porter, Trust in Numbers, p. 152.
+34. Gigerenzer et al., The Empire of Chance, pp. 236–7.
+35. Porter, Trust in Numbers, p. 157.
+36. Ibid., p. 148.
+37. Ibid., p. 149.
+38. Ibid., p. 27.
+39. M. Power, The Audit Society. Rituals of Verification (Oxford and New
+York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 3.
+40. Ibid., pp. 8, 10.
+41. Gigerenzer et al., Empire of Chance, pp. 235–6.
+42. Ibid., p. 236.
+43. J. Van Maanen and B. Pentland, ‘Cops and Auditors: The Rhetoric of
+Records’, in S.B. Sitkin and R.J Bies (eds), The Legalistic Organization
+(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), p. 54.
+44. P. Day ad R. Klein, Accountabilities: Five Public Services (London: Tavistock,
+1987), p. 244.
+45. Power, The Audit Society, p. 127.
+46. Day and Klein, Accountabilities, p. 171.
+47. Power, The Audit Society, p. 128.
+48. S.P. Shapiro, ‘The Social Control of Impersonal Trust’, American
+notes
+
+Journal of Sociology, 93 (3) 1987: 623–58; quotations from pp. 649, 651.
+49. D.J. Kevles, The Baltimore Case: A Trial of Politics, Science and Character
+(New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).
+50. ‘Just Another Piece of Furniture’, The Economist, 7 March 2002, www.
+economist.com/node/1021660 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+51. C.M. Reinhart and K.S. Rogoff, ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’, National
+Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 15639, January 2010, p.
+3, www.nber.org/papers/w15639 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+52. ‘Reinhart, Rogoff … and Herndon: The Student Who Caught Out the
+Profs’, BBC News, 19 April 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22223190
+(accessed 30 June 2013). See also T. Herndon, M. Ash and R. Pollin,
+‘Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique
+of Reinhart and Rogoff’, Political Economy Research Institute
+Working Paper No. 322, April 2013.
+53. ‘Rogoff and Reinhart Defend Their Numbers’, Guardian, 17 April 2013,
+www.guardian.co.uk/business/economics-blog/2013/apr/17/rogoff-reinhart-defend-debt-study
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+54. ‘Reinhart, Rogoff … and Herndon: The Student Who Caught Out the
+Profs’.
+55. D. Stape, Ontsporing (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2012), p. 167. The quotation
+is taken from the book review published by Observer 26 (1) (January
+2013), the magazine of the Association for Psychological Science.
+56. Gigerenzer et al., Empire of Chance, p. 236.
+57. J. Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York:
+Knopf, 1965), p. 84.
+58. Best, Damned Lies and Statistics, p. 13.
+59. Cited by C. Seife, Proofiness: The Dark Arts of Mathematical Deception
+(Viking: New York, 2010), p. 226.
+60. Ibid., pp. 226–7.
+61. Best, Damned Lies and Statistics, p. 35.
+62. Ibid., p. 35.
+63. N. Oreskes and E.M Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of
+Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global
+Warming (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010).
+64. Seife, Proofiness, p. 229.
+65. M. Weber, General Economic History (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
+Books 1981 [1927]), p. 275. See also B.S. Yamey, ‘Scientific Bookkeeping
+and the Rise of Capitalism’, Economic History Review, 1 (2/3) (1949):
+99–113.
+66. Cited in R. Palan, The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places,
+and Nomad Millionaires (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 2006),
+p. 171.
+67. Ibid., p. 174.
+68. B. Bridgman et al., ‘Accounting for Household Production in the National
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Accounts, 1965–2010’, Survey of Current Business, 92 (5) (2012): 23–36.
+69. See www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/1518/Is_GDP_a_
+satisfactory_measure_of_growth_.html (accessed 30 June 2013).
+70. Cited by Porter, Trust in Numbers, p. 63.
+71. F.H. Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, American Economic
+Review, 35 (4) (1945): 525ff.
+72. ‘Greenspan Testimony on Sources of Financial Crisis’, Wall Street
+Journal, 23 October 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/10/23/
+greenspan-testimony-on-sources-of-financial-crisis (accessed 30 June
+2013).
+73. R. Patel, The Value of Nothing: How to Reshape Market Society and Redefine
+Democracy (London: Portobello Books, 2009).
+74. Palan, The Offshore World.
+75. L.H. Summers, Fourth Annual Marshall J. Seidman Lecture on Health
+Policy, 27 April 2004, www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/files/SummersLecture.pdf
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+76. Asdal, ‘The Office’, p. 8.
+
+chapter 2
+1. Cited by R. Sylla, ‘An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating’,
+in R.M. Levich, G. Majnoni and C. Reinhart (eds), Ratings, Rating
+Agencies and the Global Financial System (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic,
+2002), p. 35; emphasis added.
+2. ‘Moody’s Blues, Poor Standards, and the Debt’, New York Times, 24 July
+2011, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/moodys-blues-poorstandards-and-the-debt
+(accessed 30 June 2013; emphasis added).
+3. C.A. Hill, ‘Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime
+Securities?’, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper 10–18 (2010),
+p. 14.
+4. L.J. White, ‘Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies’, Journal of Economic
+Perspectives, 24 (2) (2010): 211–26.
+5. ‘Credit Rating Agencies Triggered Financial Crisis, U.S. Congressional
+Report Finds’, Huffington Post, 13 April 2011.
+6. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Final Report of the National Commission
+on the Causes of the Financial Crisis in the United States (Washington,
+DC: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011), p. xxv.
+7. This disclaimer is available on S&P’s website: www.structuredfinanceinterface.com/CdoOnlineWeb/Help/disclaimer_popup.html
+(accessed
+30 June 2013).
+8. M.C. Rom, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess:
+Greedy, Ignorant, and Stressed?’, Public Administration Review, 69 (4)
+(2009): 641.
+9. J.M. Whitehead and H.S. Mathis, ‘Finding a Way Out of the Rating
+notes
+
+Agency Morass’, statement submitted to the US House Financial Services
+Committee. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government
+Sponsored Enterprises, 27 September 2007.
+10. D. Kerwer, ‘Holding Global Regulators Accountable: The Case of Credit
+Rating Agencies’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration,
+and Institutions, 18 (3) (2005): 453–75.
+11. C. Crouch, ‘The Global Firm: The Problem of the Giant Firm in Democratic
+Capitalism’, in D. Coen, W. Grant and G. Wilson (eds), Oxford
+Handbook of Business and Government (Oxford: Oxford University
+Press, 2010).
+12. Rom, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess’, p. 641.
+13. P. Pattberg, ‘The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How
+Business and Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules’,
+Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and
+Institutions, 18 (4) (2005): 589–610. See also B. Cashore, ‘Legitimacy and
+the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State MarketDriven
+(NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority’,
+Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and
+Institutions, 15 (4) (2002): 503–29.
+14. S. Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World
+Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
+15. J.R. Macey, ‘Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental
+Affairs’, 20 March 2002, in Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit
+Rating Agencies, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Governmental
+Affairs (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 1.
+16. T.J. Sinclair, ‘Passing Judgment: Credit Rating Processes as Regulatory
+Mechanisms of Governance in the Emerging World Order’, Review of
+International Political Economy, 1 (1) (1994): 133–59.
+17. T.J. Sinclair, ‘Private Makers of Public Policy: Bond Rating Agencies
+and the New Global Finance’, in A. Héritier (ed.), Common Goods and
+Governance (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 279.
+18. T.J. Sinclair, ‘The Infrastructure of Global Governance: Quasi-Regulatory
+Mechanisms and the New Global Finance’, Global Governance, 7(4)
+(2001): 441–51.
+19. Sylla, ‘An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating’.
+20. T.J. Sinclair, ‘Global Monitor. Bond Rating Agencies’, New Political
+Economy, 8 (1) (2003): 147–61.
+21. H.V. Poor, Manual of the Railroads of the United States (New York: H.V.
+& H.W. Poor, 1868), cited by B. Paudyn, ‘The Analytics of Ratings:
+European Union Attempts to Regulate Credit Rating Agencies’, paper
+presented at the International Studies Association annual convention,
+Montreal, 16–20 March 2010.
+22. ‘Moody’s History: A Century of Market Leadership, Moody’s, www.
+moodys.com/Pages/atc001.aspx (accessed 30 June 2013).
+how numbers rule the world
+
+23. M. Taylor and S. Singleton, ‘The Communal Resource: Transaction
+Costs and the Solution of Collective Action Problems’, Politics and Society,
+21 (2) (1993): 204.
+24. T.J. Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies
+and the Politics of Creditworthiness (New York: Cornell University
+Press, 2005).
+25. L.J. White, ‘The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle’,
+Critical Review, 21 (2–3) (2009): 391.
+26. The Security and Exchange Commission is a public oversight body established
+by the US Congress in 1934 as an independent, quasi-judicial
+regulatory agency to regulate the stock market and prevent corporate
+abuses relating to the offering and sale of securities and corporate reporting.
+The SEC was given the power to license and regulate stock exchanges,
+the companies whose securities traded on them, and the brokers
+and dealers who conducted the trading.
+27. Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital.
+28. White, ‘The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle’, p. 391.
+29. D. Kerwer, ‘Standardising as Governance: The Case of Credit Rating
+Agencies’, in A. Heritier (ed.), Common Goods: Reinventing European
+and International Governance (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
+2002).
+30. J.W. Pratt and R.J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure
+of Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
+31. See www.sifma.org/issues/regulatory-reform/credit-rating-agencies/overview
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+32. Hill, ‘Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime
+Securities?’, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper no. 10–18.
+33. ‘Insight. When Rating Agencies Judge the World’, Reuters, 2 August 2011,
+www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/02/us-ratings-insight-idUSTRE7714
+TI20110802 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+34. US Senate, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial
+Collapse, Majority and Minority Staff Report of the Permanent Subcommittee
+on Investigations for the Committee on Homeland Security and
+Governmental Affairs, 14 April 2011 (Washington, DC: US Senate), p.
+267.
+35. Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital.
+36. Rom, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess’, p. 642.
+37. A.V. Cutler, V. Haufler, V. and T. Porter, ‘The Contours and Significance
+of Private Authority in International Affairs’, in A.C. Cutler, V. Haufler,
+V. and T. Porter (eds), Private Authority and International Affairs (New
+York: State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 334.
+38. B. Becker and T. Milbourn, ‘How Did Increased Competition Affect
+Credit Ratings?’ Working Paper 09–051 (2010), Harvard Business
+School, p. 6.
+notes
+
+39. The first quotation is from ‘Moody’s, S&P Defer Cuts on AAA Subprime,
+Hiding Loss’, Bloomberg, 11 March 2011, www.bloomberg.com/
+apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aRLWzHsF16lY (accessed 30 June
+2013). The second quotation is from ‘Why a Rating Agency Should Be
+Concerned about the Survival of the Company It’s Assessing’, MIT Sloan
+Experts, 21 June 2011, http://mitsloanexperts.com/2011/06/13/why-arating-agency-should-be-concerned-about-the-survival-of-the-companyit%E2%80%99s-assessing
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+40. J. Mathis, J. McAndrews and J.-C. Rochet, ‘Rating the Raters: Are
+Reputation Concerns Powerful Enough to Discipline Rating Agencies?’,
+Journal of Monetary Economics, 56 (5) (2009): 657.
+41. N. Véron, ‘Rate Expectations: What Can and Cannot be Done about
+Rating Agencies’, Bruegel Policy Contribution, issue 2011/14 (2011).
+42. N. Véron, ‘Rating Agencies: An Information Privilege Whose Time Has
+Passed’, Bruegel Policy Contribution, issue 2009/01 (2009), p. 2.
+43. T. Strulik, ‘Rating Agencies and Systemic Risk: Paradoxes of Governance’,
+in A. Héritier (ed.), Common Goods and Governance (Oxford:
+Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
+44. H. White, ‘Agency as Control’, in J.W. Pratt and R.J. Zeckhauser (eds),
+Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
+University Press, 1985), p. 205.
+45. Ibid., p. 204.
+46. M. Tyrell and C. Bannier, ‘Modeling the Role of Credit Rating Agencies:
+Do They Spark Off a Virtuous Circle?’, Working Papers Series
+in Finance and Accounting, Paper no. 160 (Frankfurt: Johann Wolfgang
+Goethe Universität, 2005).
+47. J. Stiglitz, G. Ferri and G. Liu, ‘The Procyclical Role of Rating Agencies:
+Evidence from the East Asian Crisis’, Economic Notes, 28 (3) (1999):
+335–55.
+48. S&P used the First Amendment defence in 1996 when it was sued for professional
+negligence by Orange County, California. S&P had given the
+county an AA rating before the county filed for the largest-ever municipal
+bankruptcy. The US District Court in Santa Ana, California, found that
+the credit agency could not be held liable for mere negligence, agreeing
+with S&P that it was shielded by the First Amendment. See Kerwer,
+‘Holding Global Regulators Accountable’; D. Muegge, ‘From Pragmatism
+to Dogmatism: EU Governance, Policy Paradigms and Financial
+Meltdown’, Journal of New Political Economy, 16 (2) (2011): 185–206.
+49. F. Partnoy, ‘How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
+Gatekeepers’, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
+07-46, May 2006, University of San Diego, California.
+50. J. Katz, E. Salinas and C. Stephanou, ‘Credit Rating Agencies: No Easy
+Regulatory Solutions’, Crisis Response, Note No. 8, October 2009.
+51. M. Elkhoury, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and Their Potential Impact on
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Developing Countries’, UNCTAD Discussion Paper 186 (2008), p. 4.
+52. Katz, Salinas and Stephanou, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’, p. 2.
+53. CESR, Technical Advice to the European Commission on Possible Measures
+Concerning Credit Rating Agencies (Paris: Committee of European
+Security Regulators, 2005), p. 51.
+54. One exception is the agency Egan–Jones. See C. Bruner and R. Abdelal,
+‘To Judge Leviathan: Sovereign Credit Ratings, National Law and the
+World Economy’, Journal of Public Policy, 25 (2) (2005): 191–217.
+55. Katz, Salinas and Stephanou, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’, p. 4.
+56. ‘Ex-Moody’s Analyst: “By 2006 It Was Toxic Everywhere”’, Guardian,
+17 December 2012.
+57. ‘Investors Cite Rating Agencies’ Conflicts of Interest’, Financial Week, 8 July
+2008, www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080708/
+REG/689125144/-1/FWDailyAlert01 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+58. ‘Debt Ranking Finally Fizzled, but the Deal Fizzled First’, New York
+Times, 29 November 2001.
+59. Several of the world’s largest financial firms were implicated in this multifaceted
+fraud, including Bank of America, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank,
+J.P. Morgan and ABN.
+60. ‘If You Try to Control Everything It Would Probably Kill Capitalism’,
+Guardian, 3 October 2007.
+61. Paudyn, ‘The Analytics of Ratings’.
+62. ‘Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators Fail’, Bloomberg, 29
+April 2009, www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=au4oIx.judz4&pid=
+newsarchive (accessed 30 June 2013).
+63. J.B. Taylor, ‘The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical
+Analysis of What Went Wrong’, NBER Working Paper no. 14631
+(2009), www.nber.org/papers/w14631 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+64. US Senate, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial
+Collapse, p. 245.
+65. Sinclair, ‘Global Monitor. Bond Rating Agencies’.
+66. ‘Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators Fail’, Bloomberg, 29
+April 2009, www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=au4oIx.judz4&pid=
+newsarchive (accessed 30 June 2013).
+67. Hill, ‘Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime
+Securities?’
+68. A clear example of this trend was the introduction of so-called Brady
+bonds (after the US treasury secretary Nicholas Brady, who proposed
+them), which were dollar-nominated obligations allowing banks to trade
+their claims on developing countries and thus spread the risk and get debt
+off their balance sheets. After that most of these states defaulted on their
+repayment promises.
+69. A. Mühlen-Schulte, ‘Full Faith in Credit? The Power of Numbers in
+Rating Frontier Sovereigns and the Global Governance of Development
+notes
+
+by the UNDP’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 15
+(4) (2012): 471.
+70. Mühlen-Schulte, ‘Full Faith in Credit? See also J. Vandemoortele, ‘Credit
+Quality Moves Center Stage as African Countries Seek to Improve their
+Economic Performance’, in Standard & Poor’s, Sovereign Ratings in Africa
+(New York: Standard & Poor’s, 2004).
+71. Bruner and Abdelal, ‘To Judge Leviathan’, p. 195.
+72. Véron, ‘Rating Agencies, p. 2.
+73. P. Gavras, ‘Regulatory Abdication as Public Policy: Government Failure
+and the Real Conflicts of Interest of Credit Rating Agencies’, Journal of
+Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10 (4) (2010): 475–88.
+74. Katz, Salinas and Stephanou, ‘Credit Rating Agencies; Hill, ‘Why Did
+Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?’
+75. Kerwer, ‘Standardising as Governance’.
+76. Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy
+of investments firms and credit institutions.
+77. A. Kruck, Private Ratings, Public Regulations: Credit Rating Agencies
+and Global Financial Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
+2011). See also L.J. White, ‘Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies’, Journal
+of Economic Perspectives, 24 (2) (2010): 211–26.
+78. ‘Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators Fail’.
+79. Katz, Salinas and Stephanou, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’, p. 3. See also
+Partnoy, ‘How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
+Gatekeepers’.
+80. Rom, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess’.
+81. Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
+14 June 2006 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit
+Institutions (Recast), L 177/201.
+82. IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies
+(Madrid: International Organization of Securities Commission, 2004).
+83. Véron, ‘Rating Agencies’, p. 2.
+84. ‘S.& P. Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. for the First Time’, New York
+Times, 5 August 2011.
+85. ‘Standard & Poor’s’, New York Times, 11 November 2011.
+86. ‘Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators Fail’.
+87. ‘US Accuses S&P of Fraud in Suit on Loan Bundles’, New York Times,
+4 February 2013.
+88. ‘US Loses AAA Credit Rating as S&P Slams Debt Levels, Political
+Process’, Bloomberg, 6 August 2011.
+89. ‘EU to Curb Power of Rating Agencies in Rule Shake-up’, Independent,
+16 November 2011, www.independent.ie/business/european/eu-to-curbpower-of-rating-agencies-in-rule-shakeup-2935623.html
+(accessed 30 June
+2013).
+90. ‘Rede von Helmut Schmidt im Wortlaut’, Bild, 4 December 2011.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+91. ‘EU to Curb Power of Rating Agencies in Rule Shake-up’.
+92. ‘The Credit Rating Controversy’, Council on Foreign Relations, 19 January
+2012, www.cfr.org/united-states/credit-rating-controversy/p22328
+(accessed 30 June 2013). See also ‘EU Steps Up Attack on Major Credit
+Rating Agencies’, Guardian, 11 November 2011.
+93. ‘Barroso to Rating Agencies: We Know Better’, EU Observer, 6 July 2011,
+http://euobserver.com/19/32597 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+94. ‘Moody’s Downgrades Italy’s Government Bond Ratings to A2 with a
+Negative Outlook’, Moody’s, 4 October 2011, www.moodys.com/research/
+Moodys-downgrades-Italys-government-bond-ratings-to-A2–with-a--
+PR_227333 (accessed 30 June 2013). See also ‘Moody’s Downgrades Italy
+for First Time in Two Decades’, Telegraph, 4 October 2011.
+95. ‘S&P Downgrades Nine Euro Zone Countries’, Reuters, 14 January 2012,
+www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/14/us-eurozone-sp-idUSTRE80C1
+BC20120114 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+96. ‘S&P: ‘Nel report sull’Italia c’é un errore’. Una mail dell’inchiesta inchioda
+l’agenzia’, La Repubblica, 29 June 2012, www.repubblica.it/economia/2012/06/29/news/s_p_sull_italia_abbiamo_sbagliato-38221657/?ref=HREA-1
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+97. ‘Germany’s AAA Credit Rating on “Negative Outlook’”’, BBC News,
+24 July 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18963810 (accessed 30 June
+2013).
+98. Sinclair, ‘Private Makers of Public Policy’, p. 279.
+99. A. Hersh, ‘The Folly of S&P’, Center for American Progress, 12 August
+2011.
+100. Katz, Salinas and Stephanou, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’.
+101. The first quotation is from P. Seabright, The Company of Strangers: A
+Natural History of Economic Life, rev. edn (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
+University Press, 2010), p. 20. The second quotation is from Strulik,
+‘Rating Agencies and Systemic Risk, p. 318.
+102. W.H. Buiter, ‘Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis’, CEPR, Policy
+Insight No. 18 (December 2007).
+103. Sinclair, ‘Passing Judgment’.
+104. J.A.C. Santos, ‘Why Firm Access to the Bond Market Differs over the
+Business Cycle: A Theory and Some Evidence’, Journal of Banking and
+Finance, 30 (10) (2003): 2715–36; P. Bolton, X. Freixas and J. Shapiro,
+‘The Credit Ratings Game’, National Bureau for Economic Research,
+Working Paper No. 14712, 2009, www.nber.org/papers/w14712 (accessed
+30 June 2013).
+105. Sinclair, ‘Passing Judgment’; Sinclair, ‘The Infrastructure of Global
+Governance’.
+106. Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital.
+107. T. Sinclair, ‘Round Up the Usual Suspects: Blame and the Subprime
+Crisis’, Journal of New Political Economy, 15 (1) (2010): 91–107.
+notes
+
+108. Ibid.
+109. J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
+(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1997 [1936]).
+110. ‘Appeasing the Bond Gods’, New York Times, 19 August 2010.
+111. ‘Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators Fail’. See also F.
+Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial
+Markets (New York: Times Books, 2003).
+112. E. McClintock Ekins and M.A. Calabria, ‘Regulation, Market Structure,
+and the Role of Credit Rating Agencies’, Policy Analysis 704, 1 August
+2012, p. 2.
+113. Elkhoury, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and their Potential Impact on Developing
+Countries’, p. 16.
+114. Ibid.
+115. H. Reisen and J. von Maltzan, ‘Sovereign Credit Ratings, Emerging Market
+Risk and Financial Market Volatility’, Intereconomics, March/April
+1998: 73–82.
+116. US Senate, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial
+Collapse, p. 244.
+117. Rom, ‘The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess’; White,
+‘Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies’.
+118. ‘Credit Rating Agencies Triggered Financial Crisis, U.S. Congressional
+Report Finds’.
+119. ‘Dalla Ue Guerra alle Agenzie di Rating … Americane’, Business People,
+7 July 2011, http://businesspeople.it/Business/Finanza/Dall-Ue-guerraalle-agenzie-di-rating-americane_21987
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+120. ‘Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators Fail’.
+121. European Parliament and Council, ‘CRA Regulation (EC) No. 1060/
+2009’, 16 September 2009.
+122. ‘Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators Fail’, Bloomberg, 29
+April 2009.
+123. Ibid.
+124. F. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1964
+[1921]).
+125. J.M. Keynes, Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan, 1921; AMS
+Press Reprint, 1979).
+126. S. Reddy, ‘Claims to Expert Knowledge and the Subversion of Democracy:
+The Triumph of Risk over Uncertainty’, Economy and Society, 25
+(2) (1996): 222–54.
+127. ‘Ratings and Policy Approach’, Moody’s, www.moodys.com/Pages/
+amr002003.aspx (accessed 30 June 2013).
+128. ‘Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators Fail’.
+129. Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital, p. 34.
+130. Ibid.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+chapter 3
+
+1. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common
+Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), ch. 2.
+2. N. Oreskes and E.M Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of
+Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global
+Warming (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 5.
+3. Ibid.
+4. ‘Cato’s Michales Admits 40% of Funding Comes from Big Oil’, Think Progress,
+16 August 2010, http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2010/08/16/113717/
+oil-fueled-pat-michaels/?mobile=nc (accessed 30 June 2013). The interview
+with CNN is also viewable at the same link. For the US Congress inquiry,
+see ‘Rep. Waxman Presses for Inquiry on Global Warming Denier
+Pat Michaels’, Huffington Post, 25 January 2011, www.huffingtonpost.
+com/kert-davies/rep-waxman-presses-for-in_b_813251.html (accessed 30
+June 2013).
+5. Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt.
+6. R.E. Dunlap and A.M. McCright, ‘Organized Climate Change Denial’,
+in J.S. Dryzek, R.B. Noorgard and D. Schlosberg (eds), Oxford Handbook
+of Climate Change and Society (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
+Press, 2011), p. 147.
+7. S.F. Singer, Cost–Benefit Analysis as an Aid to Environmental DecisionMaking,
+Report M77–106 (McLean, VA: Metrek Division, Mitre Corporation,
+1979), p. 3.
+8. W.D. Nordhaus and J. Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Models for
+Global Warming (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). See also W.D.
+Nordhaus, ‘The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change’,
+National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 12741 (Cambridge,
+MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006).
+9. ‘Global Warming Costs and Benefits’, Cato at Liberty, 3 November 2006,
+www.cato.org/blog/global-warming-costs-benefits (accessed 30 June
+2013).
+10. R. Mendelsohn, ‘Comments on Simon Dietz and Nicholas Stern’s Why
+Economic Analysis Supports Strong Action on Climate Change: A Response
+to the Stern Review’s Critics’, Review of Environmental Economics and
+Policy, 2 (2) (2008): 309, 310.
+11. S. Dietz and N. Stern, ‘Why Economic Analysis Supports Strong Action
+on Climate Change: A Response to the Stern Review’s Critics’, Review
+of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2 (1) (2008): 95.
+12. ‘Stern Takes Bleaker View on Warming’, Financial Times, 16 April 2008.
+13. H.R. Varian, ‘Recalculating the Costs of Climate Change’, New York
+Times, 14 December 2006.
+14. J. Quiggin, ‘Stern and His Critics on Discounting and Climate Change:
+An Editorial Essay’, Climatic Change, 89 (3–4) (2008): 195–205.
+notes
+
+15. This quotation is from Delong’s personal blog, http://delong.typepad.
+com/sdj/2006/12/do_unto_others.html (accessed 30 June 2013).
+16. Oreskes and Conway, Merchants of Doubt, p. 92.
+17. S.F. Singer, Report of the Acid Rain Peer Review Panel. Final Report,
+July 1984, Office of Science and Technology Policy (Washington, DC:
+US Government Printing Office), Appendix 5, A5–8.
+18. Jones was one of the authors of Chapter 12, ‘Detection of Climate Change
+and Attribution of Causes’ in the Third Report and the lead author of
+Chapter 3, ‘Observations: Surface and Atmospheric Climate Change’ in
+the Fourth Report.
+19. F. Pearce, The Climate Files: The Battle for the Truth about Global
+Warming (London: Guardian Books, 2010).
+20. ‘Climate Scientists Shut Out Critics by Turning Down Data Requests’,
+Guardian, 3 February 2010.
+21. For the transcripts of most emails and other documents, see US Senate,
+United States Senate Report ‘Consensus Exposed’: The CRU Controversy,
+US Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
+Minority Staff, Washington, DC; http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.
+cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=7db3fbd8–f1b4–4fdf-bd15–
+12b7df1a0b63 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+22. Ibid., p. 21.
+23. Ibid., p. 23.
+24. The text of this email was reported by the climate sceptic Antony Watts
+in his blog, Watts Up With That, on 19 November 2009. See http://
+wattsupwiththat.com/2009/11/19/breaking-news-story-hadley-cru-hasapparently-been-hacked-hundreds-of-files-released
+(accessed 30 June
+2013). See also www.nature.com/news/2010/101115/full/468362a.html
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+25. ‘Hacked E-mails Is New Fodder for Climate Dispute’, New York Times, 20
+November 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/science/earth/21climate.
+html?_r=1 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+26. M.E. Mann, R.S. Bradley and M.K. Hughes, ‘Global Scale Temperature
+Patterns and Climate Forcing over the Past Six Centuries’, Nature 392
+(1998): 779–87.
+27. Quoted in Pearce, The Climate Files, p. 107.
+28. ‘Scientists Behaving Badly: A Corrupt Cabal of Global Warming Alarmists
+Are Exposed by a Massive Document Leak’, Weekly Standard, 14
+December 2009, www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/
+000/000/017/300ubchn.asp (accessed 30 June 2013).
+29. S. McIntyre and R. McKitrick, ‘Corrections to the Mann et. al. (1998)
+Proxy Data Base and Northern Hemispheric Average Temperature Series’,
+Energy and Environment, 14 (6) (2003): 751–71. A similar critique
+was raised by Harvard scientists Sallie Balunias and Willie Soon; see
+‘20th Century Climate Not So Hot’, press release, Harvard–Smithsonian
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Center for Astrophysics, 31 March 2003.
+30. ‘I Thought Of Killing Myself, Says Scandal Professor Phil Jones’, Sunday
+Times, 9 February 2010.
+31. ‘Climate Researchers “Secrecy” Criticised – but MPs Say Science Remains
+Intact’, Guardian, 31 March 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/mar/31/climate-mails-inquiry-jones-cleared
+(accessed 30 June
+2013).
+32. ‘Conspiracy Theories Finally Laid to Rest by Report on Leaked Climate
+Change Emails’, Independent, 8 July 2010, www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/conspiracy-theories-finally-laid-to-rest-byreport-on-leaked-climate-change-emails-2021222.html
+(accessed 30 June
+2013).
+33. ‘RA-10 Inquiry Report: Concerning the Allegations of Research
+Misconduct Against Dr. Michael E. Mann, Department of Meteorology,
+College of Earth and Mineral Sciences’, Penn State University, p. 6;
+www.research.psu.edu/orp/documents/Findings_Mann_Inquiry.pdf.
+34. ‘Scientists to Review Climate Body’, BBC News, 10 March 2010; http://
+news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8561004.stm.
+35. US Senate, United States Senate Report ‘Consensus Exposed’, p. 34.
+36. ‘Climate: The Hottest Year’, Nature 468: 362–4.
+37. C. Monckton, Caught Green-Handed: Cold Facts About the Hot Topic of
+Global Temperature Change After the Climategate Scandal (Haymarket,
+VA: Science and Public Policy Institute, 2009), pp. 38–9.
+38. C. Monckton, ‘AIDS: A British View’, American Spectator, 20 (1) (1987):
+29.
+39. For more info, see: http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org and www.co2science.org.40.
+A.A. Leiserowitz et al., ‘Climategate, Public Opinion and the Loss of
+Trust’, Working Paper of the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication,
+2010, http://environment.yale.edu/climate/publications/
+climategate-public-opinion-and-the-loss-of-trust (accessed 30 June 2013).
+41. Prof. Dr Richard S.J. Tol, ‘An Analysis of Mitigation as a Response to
+Climate Change’, Copenhagen Consensus Center, 14 August 2009.
+42. B. Lomborg, ‘An Economic Approach to the Environment’, Wall Street
+Journal, 24 April 2012.
+43. Ibid.
+44. Monckton, Caught Green-Handed, p. 40.
+45. Point Carbon, Carbon 2012: A Market Waiting for Godot (Oslo: Point
+Carbon, 2012).
+46. For a review of the regulatory aspects of emission trading schemes, see R.
+Baldwin, ‘Regulation Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading’, Regulation
+and Governance 2 (2008): 193–215.
+47. D. Ellerman, R. Schmalensee, F. Bailey, P. Joskow and J.-P. Montero, Markets
+for Clean Air: The US Acid Rain Program (Cambridge: Cambridge
+notes
+
+University Press, 2000). See also D. Burtraw, ‘Cost Savings Sans Allowance
+Trades? Evaluating the SO2 Emission Trading Program to Date’,
+Resources For the Future Discussion Paper 95–30–REV (1996), www.rff.
+org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=17551
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+48. Baldwin, ‘Regulation Lite’, p. 195.
+49. T. Tietenberg, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (New
+York: HarperCollins, 1996).
+50. R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory,
+Strategy and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
+51. For more information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/
+aviation/index_en.htm (accessed 30 June 2013).
+52. S. Butzengeiger and A. Michaelowa, ‘The EU Emissions Trading Scheme
+– Issues and Challenges’, Intereconomics, May/June 2004: 116–18
+53. G. Svendsen, ‘Lobbying and CO2 Trade in the EU’, in B. Hansjurgens
+(ed.), Emission Trading for Climate Policy (New York: Cambridge University
+Press, 2005).
+54. Open Europe, The High Cost of Hot Air: Why the EU Emissions Trading
+Scheme Is an Environmental and Economic Failure (London: Open
+Europe, 2006).
+55. ‘A Permit to Print Money’, Guardian, 12 September 2008.
+56. ‘Power Tool’, Guardian, 17 May 2006, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/may/17/europeanunion.climatechange
+(accessed 30 June
+2013).
+57. Greenpeace’s citation is from Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding
+Regulation, p. 203.
+58. Committee on Climate Change, Building a Low-Carbon Economy: The
+UK’s Contribution to Tackling Climate Change (London: CCC, 2008),
+p. 150.
+59. ‘UK Above Quota, Germany Within’, Telegraph, 16 May 2006.
+60. ‘EU to Sell 300 Million CO2 Permits by End-12 for Aid’, Bloomberg, 9
+November 2012.
+61. ‘Breathing Difficulties: A Market in Need of a Miracle’, The Economist,
+3 March 2012.
+62. ‘The Role of Carbon Markets in Preventing Dangerous Climate Change’,
+Environmental Audit Committee. Memorandum submitted by David
+Newbery, Research Director, Electric Policy Research Group, University
+of Cambridge, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/
+cmenvaud/290/290we33.htm (accessed 30 June 2013).
+63. Cited in Open Europe, The High Cost of Hot Air, p. 6.
+64. ‘EU auctions 5.58 mln phase 3 EUAs at 6.45 euros: traders’, Point Carbon,
+18 December 2012.
+65. See Point Carbon, Carbon 2012, p. 3.
+66. Ibid., p. 4.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+67. ‘Low Price Saps Carbon Market’s Effectiveness’, New York Times, 22
+April 2013.
+68. ‘EU Emissions Trading an “Open Door” for Crime, Europol says’, EU
+Observer, 10 December 2009, http://euobserver.com/environment/29132
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+69. ‘Further Investigations into VAT Fraud Linked to the Carbon Emission
+Trading Scheme’, Europol press release, 28 December 2010, https://
+www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/further-investigations-vat-fraudlinked-carbon-emissions-trading-system-641
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+70. ‘Carbon Trading: Into Thin Air’, Financial Times, 14 February 2011.
+71. ‘Real Emission Cuts in Europe Preferable to Dubious Offsets Elsewhere’,
+WWF Global, press release, 30 June 2010, http://wwf.panda.org/?194029/
+Real-emissions-cuts-in-Europe-preferable-to-dubious-offsets-elsewhere
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+72. K. Capoor and P. Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008
+(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008).
+73. ‘U.N. Issues First Offsets to CDM Programme’, Point Carbon, 28 December
+2012.
+74. A number of standardized procedures are available. In particular, the
+Greenhouse Gas Protocol for Project Accounting, developed by the
+World Resources Institute and World Business Council for Sustainable
+Development, and the ISO 14064, developed by the International Organization
+for Standardization, both provide a general framework for
+quantifying emissions reductions from offset projects. A truly standardized
+commodity for carbon offsets, however, requires elaborating these
+general requirements into ‘methodologies’, or protocols, aimed at specific
+types of project.
+75. J. Goodward and A. Kelly, ‘The Bottom Line on Offsets’, World Resource
+Institute, Issue 17 (2010), www.wri.org/publication/bottom-line-offsets
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+76. See: http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/index.html (accessed 30 June 2013).
+77. See: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Manuals/accr_stan01.pdf (accessed
+30 June 2013).
+78. D. Broekhoff and K. Zyla, ‘Outside the Cap: Opportunities and Limitations
+of Greenhouse Gases Offsets’, Climate and Energy Policy Series,
+World Resources Institute, December 2008, www.wri.org/publication/
+outside-the-cap (accessed 30 June 2013).
+79. ‘A Market Time Bomb in the Making?’, The Bottom Line: An Independent
+Voice for Canada’s Accounting and Financial Professionals, June 2009,
+www.thebottomlinenews.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=386
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+80. Ibid.
+81. ‘Real Emission Cuts in Europe Preferable to Dubious Offset Elsewhere’,
+WWF Global, 30 June 2010, wwf.panda.org/?194029/Real-
+notes
+
+emissions-cuts-in-Europe-preferable-to-dubious-offsets-elsewhere (accessed
+30 June 2013).
+82. ‘Bad Grades for Offset Reviewers’, WWF European Policy Office, 28
+June 2010, www.wwf.eu/?194004/Bad-grades-for-carbon-offset-reviewers
+(accessed 30 June 2013). The report, prepared by the Institute for Applied
+Ecology in 2009, can be downloaded from: www.oeko.de/oekodoc/902/2009–020–en.pdf
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+83. ‘UN Panel Suspends Two More Emissions Auditors’, Reuters, 26 March
+2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/03/26/us-carbon-un-suspensions-idUKTRE62P5E420100326
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+84. Point Carbon, Carbon 2012, p. iii.
+85. High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, A Call to Action (New
+Work: UNFCCC, 2012).
+86. J.A. Scholte, ‘Civil Society and Financial Markets: What Is Not Happening
+and Why’, in L. Fioramonti and E. Thumler (eds), Citizens Vs.
+Markets: How Civil Society is Reshaping the Economy In a Time of Crises
+(London: Routledge, 2013).
+87. Transparency International, Global Corruption Report: Climate Change
+(London: Earthscan, 2011).
+88. Ibid., p. xxvi.
+89. Dunlap and McCright, ‘Organized Climate Change Denial’, p. 144.
+90. Ibid.
+91. Point Carbon, Carbon 2012.
+92. European Commission, Trends in Global CO2
+ Emissions: 2012 Report
+(Brussels: European Commission, 2012), p. 6, edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
+CO2REPORT2012.pdf (accessed 30 June 2013).
+
+chapter 4
+1. I have discussed these issues at length in a previous book: L. Fioramonti,
+Gross Domestic Problem: The Politics Behind the World’s Most Powerful
+Number (London: Zed Books, 2013).
+2. See H. Daly, ‘Toward a Measure of Sustainable Net National Product’,
+in Y. Ahmad, S. El Serafy and E. Lutz (eds), Environmental Accounting
+for Sustainable Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989);
+A.M. Friend, ‘UNEP/World Bank Expert Meeting on Environmental
+Accounting and the SNA, Paris, 21–22 November 1988’, Ecological Economics
+1 (1989): 283–5; A.M. Friend and D.J. Rapport, ‘The Evolution of
+Information Systems for Sustainable Development’, Ecological Economics
+3 (1991): 59–76.
+3. W.D. Nordhaus and E.C. Kokkelenberg (eds), Nature’s Numbers: Expanding
+the National Economic Accounts to Include the Environment
+(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999), p. 2.
+4. Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg, Nature’s Numbers, p. 3.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+5. S. Hicks, Value and Capital (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946).
+6. R. Repetto et al., Wasting Assets: Natural Resources in the National Income
+Accounts (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1989), p. 2.
+7. I. Kubiszewski et al., ‘Beyond GDP: Measuring and Achieving Global
+Genuine Progress’, Ecological Economics 93: 57–68.
+8. See the history of the international programme The Economics of Ecosystems
+and Biodiversity (TEEB) at www.teebweb.org/about/overview/
+history (accessed 30 June 2013).
+9. K.I. MacDonald and C. Corson, ‘TEEB Begins Now’: A Virtual Moment
+in the Production of Natural Capital’, Development and Change, 43 (1)
+(2012): 159–84.
+10. European Union, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: An
+Interim Report (Brussels: European Commission, 2008), http://
+ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/economics (accessed 30
+June 2013).
+11. For more information, see: www.wavespartnership.org (accessed 30 June
+2013).
+12. This indicator was introduced by D.W. Pearce and G.D. Atkinson, ‘Capital
+Theory and the Measurement of Weak Sustainable Development: An
+Indicator of Weak Sustainability’, Ecological Economics 8 (1993): 103–8.
+13. World Bank, Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital for the
+21st Century (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), p. xvi.
+14. UN Statistical Commission et al., System of Environmental-Economic
+Accounting (New York: United Nations, 2012).
+15. UN et al., System of National Accounts 1993 (Brussels/Luxembourg, New
+York, Paris, Washington DC: UN, World Bank, International Monetary
+Fund, European Commission, OECD, 1993).
+16. D. Blades, ‘Revision of the System of National Accounts: A Note on Objectives
+and Key Issues’, OECD Economic Studies, No. 12 (Paris: OECD,
+1989), p. 214.
+17. Ibid., p. 215.
+18. UN et al. (2008) System of National Accounts 2008 (Brussels/Luxembourg,
+New York, Paris, Washington DC: UN, World Bank, International
+Monetary Fund, European Commission, OECD), p. 7.
+19. Ibid., p. 7.
+20. More on this can be found in Fioramonti, Gross Domestic Problem.
+21. UN Statistical Commission et al., System of Environmental-Economic
+Accounting, p. xi.
+22. Ibid., p. 127.
+23. Ibid., p. 140.
+24. Ibid.
+25. Ibid., p. 145.
+26. Ibid., p. 27.
+27. Ibid., p. 145.
+notes
+
+28. R. Costanza et al., ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and
+Natural Capital’, Nature 387, 15 May 1997: 253–70.
+29. Ibid., p. 258.
+30. Ibid., p. 253.
+31. A. Balmford ‘Economic Reasons for Conserving Wild Nature’, Science,
+297 (5583) (2002): 950–53.
+32. ‘Ecological Economist Robert Costanza Puts a Price Tag on Nature’,
+Grist, 9 April 2003, http://grist.org/article/what2 (accessed 30 June
+2013).
+33. Costanza et al., ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
+Capital’, p. 258.
+34. Ibid.
+35. M. Toman, ‘Why Not to Calculate the Value of the World’s Ecosystem
+Services and Natural Capital’, Special Section: Forum on Valuation of
+Ecosystem Services, Ecological Economics 25 (1998): 58.
+36. Costanza et al., ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
+Capital’.
+37. Toman, ‘Why Not to Calculate the Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services
+and Natural Capital’.
+38. See R.K. Davis, ‘Recreation Planning as an Economic Problem’, Natural
+Resources Journal, 3 (2) (1963): 239–49; G.C. Blomquist, ‘Self-Protection
+and Averting Behavior, Values of Statistical Lives, and Benefit Cost Analysis
+of Environmental Policy’, Review of the Economics of the Household,
+2 (1) (2004): 89–110.
+39. W. Vickrey, ‘Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed
+Tenders’, Journal of Finance, 16 (1) (1961): 8–37
+40. This is also known as the BDM method, after the names of the authors of
+the first experiment in this field. See G.M. Becker, M.H. DeGroot and J.
+Marschal, ‘Measuring Utility by a Single Response Sequential Method’,
+Behavioral Science, 9 (3) (1964): 226–32.
+41. C. Breidert, M. Hahsler and T. Reutterer, ‘A Review of Methods for
+Measuring Willingness to Pay’, Innovative Marketing, 2 (4) (2006), p. 13.
+42. T.T. Nagle and R.K. Holden, The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing (Upper
+Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 344.
+43. H. Nessim and R. Dodge, Pricing-Policies and Procedures (London:
+Macmillan, 1995), p. 72.
+44. Y. Marbeau, ‘What Value Pricing Research Today?’ Journal of the Market
+Research Society, 29 (2) (1987): 153–82.
+45. R.G. Stout, ‘Developing Data to Estimate Price–Quantity Relationships’,
+Journal of Marketing, 33 (2) (1969): 34–6.
+46. Nessim and Dodge, Pricing-Policies and Procedures, p. 72.
+47. T.C. Brown, P.A. Champ, R.C. Bishop and D.W. McCollum, ‘Which Response
+Format Reveals the Truth About Donations to a Public Good?’,
+Land Economics, 72 (2) 1996: 152–66.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+48. R.C. Bishop and T.A. Heberlein, ‘Measuring Values of Extra-Market
+Goods: Are Indirect Methods Biased?’, American Journal of Agricultural
+Economics, 61 (5) (1979): 926–30.
+49. Breidert, Hahsler and Reutterer, ‘A Review of Methods for Measuring
+Willingness to Pay’.
+50. R.C. Mitchell and R.T. Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods:
+The Contingent Valuation Method (Washington, DC: Resources for the
+Future, 1989).
+51. S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, ‘Capital Returns from Soil Conservation Practices’,
+Journal of Farm Economics 29 (November 1947): 1181–96.
+52. Davis, ‘Recreation Planning as an Economic Problem’; R. Ridker, The
+Economic Cost of Air Pollution (New York: Praeger, 1967); J. Hammack
+and G. Brown, Waterfowl and Wetlands: Toward Bioeconomic Analysis
+(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); R. Bishop and T. Heberlein,
+‘Measuring Values of Extramarket Goods: Are Indirect Measures
+Biased?’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61 (1979): 926–30.
+53. J. Acton, Evaluating Public Progress to Save Lives: The Case of Heart
+Attacks, RAND Research Report R-73–02 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,
+1973); A. Krupnick and M. Cropper, ‘The Effect of Information
+on Health Risk Valuation’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2 (1992):
+29–48; D.G. Devine and B. Marion, ‘The Influence of Consumer Price
+Information on Retail Pricing and Consumer Behavior’, American Journal
+of Agricultural Economics 61 (1979): 228–37.
+54. P.R. Portney, ‘The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists
+Should Care’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (4) (1994): 3–17.
+55. R. Carson et al., A Contingent Valuation Study of Lost Passive Use Values
+Resulting From the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Report to the Attorney
+General of the State of Alaska (La Jolla, CA: Natural Resource Damage
+Assessment, Inc., 1992).
+56. W.H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Nonuse Damages Using Contingent
+Valuation: An Experimental Evaluation of Accuracy (Research Triangle
+Park, NC: RTI International, 2010 [1992]), www.rti.org/pubs/bk-0001–
+1009_web.pdf (accessed 30 June 2013).
+57. R. Carson et al., A Bibliography of Contingent Valuation Studies and Papers
+(La Jolla, CA: Natural Resources Damage Assessment, Inc., 1994).
+58. B. Weisbrod, ‘Collective Consumption Services of Individual Consumption
+Goods’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78 (3) (1964): 472.
+59. Desvousges et al., Measuring Nonuse Damages Using Contingent
+Valuation.
+60. Costanza et al., ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
+Capital’, p. 258.
+61. Toman, ‘Why Not to Calculate the Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services
+and Natural Capital’, p. 59.
+62. Ibid., p. 57. For an overview of approaches based on individual utility
+notes
+
+maximization, see D. Pearce, Economic Values and the Natural World
+(London: Earthscan, 1993).
+63. R. Costanza, ‘Social Goals and the Valuation of Natural Capital’, Environmental
+Monitoring and Assessment 86 (2003): 24.
+64. Ibid., p. 26.
+65. Ibid.
+66. Ibid.
+67. UNEP, In the Front Line: Shoreline Protection and Other Ecosystem Services
+From Mangroves and Coral Reefs (Cambridge: UNEP World Conservation
+Monitoring Centre, 2006).
+68. ‘Bugs plug $57 billion into U.S. Economy’, Associate Press, 1 April 2006,
+www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12103021/#.UNg_64X4bIU.
+69. ‘Growing on Trees: A Profitable Rainforest’, The Economist, 18 May
+2009.
+70. See Canopy Capital’s website at: http://canopycapital.co.uk/page.
+asp?p=5452 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+71. For more info, see: www.globalcanopy.org (accessed 30 June 2013).
+72. M. Cranford et al., Unlocking Forest Bonds: A High-Level Workshop on
+Innovative Finance for Tropical Forests, Workshop Report, WWF Forest
+& Climate Initiative, Global Canopy Programme and Climate Bonds
+Initiative, 2011.
+73. See http://gdm.earthmind.net (accessed 30 June 2013)
+74. ‘A Green Development Mechanism for Bioversity’, Ecosystem Marketplace,
+21 October 2010, www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=7786
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+75. Department of Environment and Climate Change NSW, Biobanking:
+Biodiversity Banking and Offset Scheme (Sidney: DECC NSW, 2007),
+www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/biobanking/biobankingoverview07528.pdf
+(accessed 30 June 2013)
+76. See www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk/Business-Platforms/Natural-Capital-LeadersPlatform.aspx.77.
+The New Business Imperative: Valuing Natural Capital, pp. 6, 9, www.
+corporateecoforum.com/valuingnaturalcapital/offline/download.pdf (accessed
+30 June 2013).
+78. The list of signatories includes: Athelia Ecosphere, ASN Bank, Banca
+Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Multiva, Banco Pichincha, Banorte
+– Ixe, Caisse des Depots, Caixa Econômica Federal, Caledonia Wealth
+Management Ltd., Calvert Investments, CDC Climat, China Merchants
+Bank, CIBanco, Cyrte Investments, Financiera Rural, FIRA – Banco de
+Mexico, Fundación Social, Infraprev, International Finance Corporation,
+MN, Mongeral Aegon, Mutualista Pichincha, National Australia
+Bank, Nedbank, Oppenheim, PaxWorld Management, Rabobank Group,
+Robeco, Shenzhen Development Bank, SNS Asset Management, Société
+Forestière, Sovereign, Standard Chartered, Sumitomo Mitsui Trust
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Holding, UniCredit, Vision Banco, Zevin Asset Management. See also
+‘Natural Capital Could Create a Market Value for Biodiversity’, Guardian,
+21 November 2012.
+79. Besides a number of institutions belonging to the World Bank Group, signatories
+of the Natural Capital Declaration include private banks such as
+China Merchants Bank, Standard Chartered and Unicredit. See: www.
+naturalcapitaldeclaration.org (accessed 30 June 2013).
+80. ‘How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask Its True Debt’, Spiegel Online,
+8 February 2010, www.spiegel.de/international/europe/greek-debtcrisis-how-goldman-sachs-helped-greece-to-mask-its-true-debt-a-676634.html
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+81. ‘Derivati, UniCredit Finisce alla Sbarra’, Il Fatto Quotidiano, 29 September
+2012, www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2012/09/29/derivati-unicredit-finiscealla-sbarra/367575
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+82. ‘Deutsche Bank Convicted in Italy in Widening Scandal’, EU Observer,
+20 December 2012, http://euobserver.com/economic/118581 (accessed 30
+June 2013).
+83. See the website of the group Baby Milk Action at http://info.babymilkaction.org
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+84. See Greenpeace’s campaign ‘Ask Nestlé to Give Rainforests a Break’ at
+www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate-change/kitkat
+(accessed 30 June 2013). In 2012, Nestlé lost a court case in Brazil, which
+has now ordered the company to label genetically modified products.
+See more here: www.foodworldnews.com/articles/2017/20120827/brazilcourt-rule-food-nestle-gm-monsanto.htm
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+85. You can view the documentary We Feed The World here: www.we-feedthe-world.at/en/film.htm
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+86. ‘How a Global Web of Activists Gives Coke Problems in India’, Wall
+Street Journal, 7 June 2005.
+87. ‘Dow Chemical: Liable for Bhopal?’ Bloomberg Business Week Magazine,
+27 May 2008, www.businessweek.com/stories/2008–05–27/dow-chemical-liable-for-bhopal
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+88. ‘McKinsey’s Close Relationship with Enron Raises Questions of Consultancy
+Liability’, Wall Street Journal, 17 January 2002.
+89. ‘A Star Partner’s Galleon Arrest Shakes up Ranks and McKinsey’, Wall
+Street Journal, 21 October 2009.
+90. ‘McKinsey Implicated in Galleon Trial’, Guardian, 14 March 2011.
+91. For an introdution to McKinsey’s Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve,
+see: www.mckinsey.com/client_service/sustainability/latest_thinking/
+greenhouse_gas_abatement_cost_curves (accessed 30 June 2013).
+92. Greenpeace, Bad Influence: How McKinsey-inspired Plans Lead to Rainforest
+Destruction (Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 2011), p. 11,
+www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/reports/Bad-Influen
+ce/?accept=d81175f13c50770ed778339fcb66d566 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+notes
+
+93. Ibid., p. 11.
+94. C. MacDonald, Green, Inc.: An Environmental Insider Reveals How a
+Good Cause Has Gone Bad (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2008).
+95. ‘Environment: Market-based Conservation Brewing in Nairobi’, Inter
+Press Service, 1 June 2010, www.ipsnews.net/2010/06/environment-market-based-conservation-brewing-in-nairobi
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+96. D. Brockington, Celebrity and the Environment: Fame, Wealth and Power
+in Conservation (London: Zed Books, 2009).
+97. M. Dowie, Conservation Refugees: The Hundred-year Conflict between
+Global Conservation and Native Peoples (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
+2009).
+98. Brockington, Celebrity and the Environment.
+99. M. Goldman, Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social
+Justice in the Age of Globalization (New Haven, CT: Yale University
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+101. Ibid., p. 237.
+102. C. Corson and K.I. MacDonald, ‘Enclosing the Global Commons: The
+Convention on Biological Diversity and Green Grabbing’, Journal of
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+103. B. Büscher, S. Sullivan et al., ‘Towards a Synthesized Critique of Neoliberal
+Biodiversity Conservation’, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 23 (2)
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+104. Ibid., p. 15.
+105. ‘Nature Inc.: A New Kind of TV Show’, Planet Green, 8 October 2009,
+http://planetgreen.discovery.com/tv/nature-inc/nature-kind-show.html
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+106. M. Arsel and B. Büscher, ‘Nature™ Inc.: Changes and Continuities in
+Neoliberal Conservation and Market-based Environmental Policy’, Development
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+108. ‘Puma Scales up Environmental Profit and Loss Reporting to a Product
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+109. ‘Natural Capital Could Create a Market Value for Biodiversity’, Guardian,
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+110. K. MacAfee, ‘Selling Nature to Save It? Biodiversity and Green Developmentalism’,
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+111. M. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization
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+Ecology of the Conservation Debate’, Conservation and Society, 8
+(3) (2010): 171–81.
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+113. Costanza, ‘Social Goals and the Valuation of Natural Capital’, p. 26.
+114. D. Ehrenfeld, ‘Neoliberalization of Conservation’, Conservation Biology,
+22 (5) (2008): 1092.
+115. The principle of weak sustainability is generally known in economics as
+the Hartwick’s rule, which defines the amount of investment in produced
+capital that is necessary to offset declining stocks of non-renewable resources.
+This approach has informed, among others, a number of estimates
+of ‘genuine saving’ produced by the World Bank.
+116. B. Caldecott and I. Dickie, Habitat Banking: Scaling up Private Investment
+in the Protection and Restoration of Our Natural World (London:
+CCC & eftec, 2011), www.climatechangecapital.com/news-and-events/
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+(accessed 30 June
+2013).
+117. J. Kovel, The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism, or the End of the
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+118. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being:
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+119. C. Raudsepp-Hearne, ‘Untangling the Environmentalist Paradox: Why
+Is Human Well-being Increasing as Ecosystem Services Degrade?’, BioScience,
+60 (8) (2010): 576–89.
+120. Kaisa Kosonen, ‘Beyond GDP: Measuring What Really Matters to Our
+Prosperity and Future’ (Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, June
+2012).
+121. Ibid.
+122. J.M. Keynes, ‘National Self-Sufficiency’, Yale Review, 22 (4) (June 1933):
+755–69.
+
+chapter 5
+1. The speech is reported by G. Rist, The History of Development: From
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+2. Ibid., p. 71.
+3. W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto
+(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 4.
+4. Ibid., p. 9.
+5. Ibid., p. 167.
+6. Ibid., p. 1.
+7. J. Vandemoortele, ‘The MDGs: ‘M’ for Misunderstood?’, World Institute
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+Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
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+Way for Africa (New York and London: Allen Lane, 2009). The
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+Huffington Post, 26 May 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/dambisa-moyo/
+aid-ironies-a-response-to_b_207772.html (accessed 30 June 2013).
+10. P. Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and
+What Can Be Done about It (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
+Press, 2008). See also T. Wallace, L. Bornstein and J. Chapman, The
+Aid Chain: Coercion and Commitment in NGO Development Funding
+(Rugby: ITDG Press, 2006).
+11. J. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New
+York: Penguin, 2005). See also J. Sachs, ‘Aid Ironies’, Huffington Post, 24
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+12. M. Faraday, Experimental Researches in Chemistry and Physics (London:
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+Way to Fight Global Poverty (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. x.
+16. E. Duflo and M. Kremer, ‘Use of Randomization in the Evaluation of
+Development Effectiveness’, paper prepared for the World Bank Operations
+Evaluation Department (OED) Conference on Evaluation and
+Development Effectiveness, Washington DC, 15–16 July 2003, p. 3.
+17. ‘Fighting Global Poverty with Hard Numbers’, Chicago Policy Review,
+4 April 2012, http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2012/04/04/fighting-globalpoverty-with-hard-numbers
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+18. See IPA’s website at: www.poverty-action.org/scaling-up-what-works (accessed
+30 June 2013).
+19. D. Karlan and J. Appel, More than Good Intentions: How a New Economics
+is Helping Solve Global Problems (New York: Dutton Press, 2011), p. 9.
+20. Ibid., p. 5.
+21. Ibid.
+22. See www.poverty-action.org/provenimpact/investments/challenge (accessed
+30 June 2013).
+23. See www.givedirectly.org/evidence.php and http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/
+2013/03/want_to_help_people_ just_give.html (accessed 30 June 2013).
+24. See www.copenhagenconsensus.com/projects/copenhagen-consensus2012/research/hunger-and-malnutrition
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+how numbers rule the world
+
+25. R. Patel, Stuffed and Starved: The Hidden Battle for the World Food
+System (New York and London: Melville House, 2007).
+26. ‘The GM Genocide: Thousands of Indian Farmers Are Committing Suicide
+after Using Genetically Modified Crops’, Daily Mail, 3 November
+2008, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1082559/The-GM-genocideThousands-Indian-farmers-committing-suicide-using-genetically-modified-crops.html
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+27. Patel, Stuffed and Starved.
+28. ‘Nearly 2 lakh Farm Suicides since 1997’, India Together, 25 January
+2010, www.indiatogether.org/2010/jan/psa-suicides.htm (accessed 30
+June 2013).
+29. ‘Farm Suicides Worse After 2001 – Study’, The Hindu, 13 November 2001,
+www.hindu.com/2007/11/13/stories/2007111352250900.htm (accessed 30
+June 2013).
+30. ImechE, Global Food Waste Not, Want Not (London: Institution of Mechanical
+Engineers, 2013), www.imeche.org/knowledge/themes/environment/global-food
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+31. Ibid., p. 3.
+32. M. Jerven, Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled By African Development
+Statistics and What To Do About It (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
+2013), p. 90.
+33. See: www.philanthrocapitalism.net/about/synopsis (accessed 30 June
+2013).
+34. ‘They Are Called the Good Club and They Want to Save the World’,
+Guardian, 31 May 2009.
+35. R. Rogers, ‘Why Philanthro-policymaking Matters’, Society, 48 (5)
+(2011): 378.
+36. See www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/Letter-from-Bill-and-Melinda-Gates
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+37. See the Grand Challenges website: www.grandchallenges.org (accessed
+30 June 2013).
+38. B. Gates, ‘My Plan to Fix the World’s Biggest Problems’, Wall Street
+Journal, 25 January 2013.
+39. M. Edwards,Just Another Emperor? The Myths and Realities of Philanthrocapitalism
+(New York: Demos, 2008), p. 20.
+40. ‘A Businesslike Approach to Charity’, Financial Times, 10 December
+2007.
+41. K.N. Ramdas, ‘Philanthrocapitalism: Reflections on Politics and Policy
+Making’, Society, 48 (5) (2011): 395.
+42. Ibid.
+43. ‘A Businesslike Approach to Charity’.
+44. S. Knack and A. Rahman, ‘Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality
+in Aid Recipient Countries’, Journal of Development Economics, 83(1)
+(2007): 177.
+notes
+
+45. A. Banerjee, Making Aid Work (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).
+46. Ibid., p. 21.
+47. A. Banerjee and E. Duflo, ‘The Experimental Approach to Development
+Economics’, Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews 1 (1) (2009):
+151–78.
+48. A. Olofsgard, ‘The Politics of Aid Effectiveness: Why Better Tools Can
+Make for Worse Outcomes’, Working Paper No. 16 (2012), Stockholm
+Institute of Transition Economies, p. 11.
+49. J.J. Heckman, ‘Randomization and Social Policy Evaluation’, in C.F.
+Manski and I. Garfinkel (eds), Evaluating Welfare and Training Programs
+(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 218.
+50. See www.philanthrocapitalism.net/oldsite (accessed 30 June 2013).
+51. W.R. Shadish and J.K. Luellen, ‘Donald Campbell: The Accidental
+Evaluator’, in M.C. Alkin (ed.), Evaluation Roots: Tracing Theorists’
+Views and Influences (London: Sage, 2004), p. 81.
+52. See the MDRC’s website at: www.mdrc.org/about/about-mdrc-history
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+53. See Jarrell’s entry in the Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics, available
+online at: www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/TakeoversandLeveragedBuyouts.html
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+54. J. Thackaray, ‘Leveraged Buyouts: The LBO Craze Flourishes Amid Warnings
+of Disaster’, Euromoney, February 1986, www.euromoney.com/Article/1451496/Leveraged-buyouts-The-LBO-craze-flourishes-amid-warnings.html?single=true)&copyrightInfo=true
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+55. See Time, 132 (23), 5 December 1988.
+56. J. Emerson and F. Twersky, New Social Entrepreneurs: The Success, Challenge
+and Lessons of Non-profit Enterprise Creation (San Francisco: Roberts
+Foundation, 1996).
+57. N. Rotheroe and A. Richards, ‘Social Return on Investment and Social
+Enterprise: Transparent Accountability for Sustainable Development’,
+Social Enterprise Journal, 3 (1) (2007): 31–48.
+58. R. Millar and K. Hall, ‘Social Return on Investment (SROI) and Performance
+Management’, Public Management Review, 14 (5) (2012).
+59. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
+60. J. Nicholls et al., A Guide to Social Return on Investment (London: SROI
+Network, 2012), p. 67.
+61. Ibid.
+62. New Philanthropy Capital, Social Return on Investment Position Paper
+(London: NPC, 2010), p. 2.
+63. Ibid.
+64. Ibid., pp. 3ff.
+65. Ibid., p. 7.
+66. See the SROI Network’s seven principles at: www.thesroinetwork.org
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+how numbers rule the world
+
+67. CSI, ‘Social Return’: Eine sozioökonomische Mehrwertanalyse gemeinschaftlicher
+Wohnprojekte, Zukunft Quartier – Lebensräume zum Älterwerden,
+vol. 3 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009). See also V. Then
+et al., Creating Impact in Southern Norway: A Social Return on Investment
+Report to the Competence Development Fund of Southern Norway
+(Heidelberg: Centre for Social Investment, 2012) https://www.csi.uniheidelberg.de/downloads/Creating_Impact_in_Southern_Norway.pdf(accessed
+30 June 2013).
+68. K. Sheridan, ‘Measuring the Impact of Social Enterprise’, British Journal
+of Healthcare Management, 17 (4) (2011): 152–6.
+69. New Economics Foundation (NEF), Social Return on Investment: Valuing
+What Matters (London: New Economics Foundation, 2004).
+70. P.W. Ryan and I. Lyne, ‘Social Enterprise and the Measurement of Social
+Value: Methodological Issues with the Calculation and Application of the
+Social Return on Investment’, Education, Knowledge and Economy, 2 (3)
+(2008): 223–337.
+71. Millar and Hall, ‘Social Return on Investment (SROI) and Performance
+Management’, p. 6.
+72. Goldman Sachs Foundation, Social Impact Assessment: A Discussion
+among Grantmakers (New York: Goldman Sachs, 2003).
+73. Quotation from www.thinknpc.org/about-npc/our-history (accessed 30
+June 2013).
+74. S. Daly, ‘Philanthropy, the Big Society and Emerging Philanthropic
+Relationships in the UK’, Public Management Review, 13(8) (2011):
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+75. Cabinet Office, Growing the Social Investment Market: A Vision and
+Strategy (London: Cabinet Office, 2011).
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+77. H. Husock, ‘Stock Market for Nonprofits’, Society, 44 (3) (2007): 16–23.
+78. S. Goldberg, Billions of Drops in Millions of Buckets: Why Philanthropy
+Doesn’t Advance Social Progress (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009).
+79. M. Bishop and M. Green, ‘The Man with a Plan’, Philanthropy Magazine,
+Spring 2010, www.philanthropyroundtable.org/topic/excellence_
+in_philanthropy/the_man_with_a_plan (accessed 30 June 2013).
+80. A.M. Eikenberry and J.D. Kluver, ‘The Marketization of the Nonprofit
+Sector: Civil Society at Risk?’, Public Administration Review, 64 (2)
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+81. J. Steinbeck, The Log from the Sea of Cortez (London and New York:
+Penguin Books, 1941), p. 272.
+82. C. Pozorski, ‘Social Venture Partners: “Venture Capital” Grantmaking
+in Practice’, Grantmanship Center Magazine, Fall 2000: 24.
+83. Eikenberry and Kluver, ‘The Marketization of the Nonprofit Sector’, p. 134.
+84. A.E. Birn, ‘Gates’s Grandest Challenge: Transcending Technology as
+Public Health Ideology’, The Lancet, 366 (9484) (2005): 515.
+notes
+
+85. Ibid.
+86. See the Gates Foundation’s scientific claims at: www.gatesfoundation.
+org/who-we-are/resources-and-media/annual-letters-list/annual-letter-2009
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+87. ‘Buffet Won’t Judge Firms’, Los Angeles Times, 7 May 2007, http://articles.
+latimes.com/2007/may/07/nation/na-berkshire7 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+88. M. Edwards, ‘Impact, Accountability and Philanthrocapitalism’, Society,
+48 (5) (2011): 390.
+89. Edwards, Just Another Emperor?, p. 66.
+90. ‘Can Foundations Take the Long View Again?’ New York Times, 6 January
+2008.
+91. Ibid.
+92. P.M. Nickel and A.M. Eikenberry, ‘A Critique of the Discourse of Marketized
+Philanthropy’, American Behavioral Scientist, 52 (7) (2009): 975
+93. Ibid.
+94. Ibid.
+95. ‘America’s Wealthiest Donors Slow their Giving’, Chronicle of Philanthropy,
+1 January 2013, http://philanthropy.com/article/America-s-WealthiestDonors/136405
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+96. Ramdas, ‘Philanthrocapitalism’, p. 394.
+
+conclusion
+1. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edn (Chicago: University
+of Chicago Press, 1996 [1962]).
+2. H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago
+Press, 1958), p. 322.
+3. M. Jerven, Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development
+Statistics and What to Do About It (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
+2013).
+4. ‘How Did the Recent GDP Revisions Change the Picture of the 2007–
+2009 Recession and the Recovery?’, Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.
+bea.gov/faq/index.cfm?faq_id=1004 (accessed 30 June 2013).
+5. Bureau of Economic Analysis, ‘Preview of the 2013 Comprehensive Revision
+of the National Income and Product Accounts’, US Department of
+Commerce, March 2013, www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2013/03%20March/0313_
+nipa_comprehensive_revision_preview.pdf (accessed 30 June 2013).
+6. ‘Changes in GDP Measurement Create Growth Out of Thin Air’, Daily
+Caller, 30 April 2013, http://dailycaller.com/2013/04/30/changes-in-gdpmeasurement-create-growth-out-of-thin-air
+(accessed 30 June 2013).
+7. D. Huff, How to Lie With Statistics (New York and London: W.W.
+Norton, 1954).
+8. C. Seife, Proofiness: The Dark Arts of Mathematical Deception (Viking:
+New York, 2010), p. 236.
+how numbers rule the world
+
+9. For a full account of this debate, see A. Kleiner, ‘What are the Measures
+that Matter?’ Strategy + Business 26 (2002): 1–6.
+10. M. Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford and New
+York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 123.
+11. Ibid., p. 13.
+12. P. Genschel and B. Zangl, ‘Transformations of the State: From Monopolist
+to Manager of Political Authority’, TranState Working Papers no. 76
+(2008), University of Bremen.
+13. V.F. Heinrich and L. Fioramonti, Global Survey of the State of Civil
+Society: Comparative Perspectives (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2007);
+L. Fioramonti and E. Thumler, ‘Accountability, Democracy and PostGrowth:
+Civil Society Rethinking Political Economy and Finance’, Journal
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+‘Civil Society After Democracy: The Evolution of Civic Activism in
+South Africa and Korea’, Journal of Civil Society, 6 (1) (2010): 25–40.
+14. M. Edwards, Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
+15. A.B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: MacMillan, 1992);
+C. Calhoun, ‘Civil Society/Public Sphere: History of the Concept’, in
+N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds), International Encyclopaedia of the
+Social and Behavioural Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001).
+16. R.D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
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+17. G. Hunt, ‘The Development of the Concept of Civil Society in Marx’, in
+B. Jessop and C. Malcolm-Brown (eds), Karl Marx’s Social and Political
+Thought: Critical Assessments (London and New York: Routledge, 1990).
+18. A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci
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+19. E. Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (New York:
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+21. G. Prins and S. Rayner, ‘Time To Ditch Kyoto’, Nature 449 (7165) (2007):
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+22. M. Edwards, Just Another Emperor? The Myths and Realities of Philanthrocapitalism
+(New York: Demos, 2008), p. 107.
+23. Kellogg Foundation, Blurred Boundaries, p. 26.
+24. Seife, Proofiness, p. 236.
+25. C. Lindblom, ‘The Market as a Prison’, Journal of Politics 44 (1982):
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+of Sociology, 93 (3) (1987): 645.
+27. Ibid., p. 623.
+28. D. Boyle, The Tyranny of Numbers (London: Flamingo, 2001), p. 39.
+29. E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
+notes
+
+Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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+Index
+
+academics, pressures on, 193–5
+Acid Rain Program, 87
+additionality, 94, 96–7, 99
+African Capital Markets Development
+Forum, 53
+African Stock Exchanges Association,
+53
+Agent Orange, Vietnam use, 132
+aid ‘industry’, 148; ‘bashing’ of, 146;
+‘diminishing returns’, 155;
+governance obsession, 152; policies,
+151; RCTs, 158; self-interested
+agencies, 172; ‘veiled discourse of
+stabilization’, 189
+AIDS, 83
+American Coalition for Clean Coal
+Electricity, 72
+American Enterprise Institute, 72
+American Forest and Paper
+Association, 72
+American Investment Group, credit
+rating, 40
+American Petroleum Institute, 72
+anti-environmentalist lobbies, 29
+Arendt, Hannah, 197, 204
+Aristotle, 11, 202, 204
+Arrow, Kenneth, 123
+Asian debt crisis, 62; CRA missed, 60
+
+audits/auditors, 23–4, 67–8, 96, 98,
+103, 108; environment monetized, 9
+failure of, 211; 1990s ‘audit
+explosion’, 22; offset, 95
+austerity policies, justification, 26
+Australia, biobanks, 130
+Austria, AAA rating downgrade, 58
+
+Baghwati, Jagdish, 84
+Baltimore, David, 25
+Ban Ki Moon, 82
+Bancroft Prize, 25
+Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak, 157, 171
+banks, capital reserves, CRA
+determined, 54; interwar years, 44
+Barnier, Michel, 57
+Barroso, José Manuel, 58
+baseball, statistics use, 4–5
+Basel Accords, 54
+BBC, Nature Inc. series, 136
+Begun, Melanie Schnoll, 170
+Bellesiles, Michael, numbers faking, 25
+Bentham, Jeremy, 104
+Berkshire Hathaway, 188
+Berlusconi, Silvio, 58
+Best, Joel, 28; Damned Lies and
+Statistics, 16
+Big Mac, comparative costs, 3
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Big Society Capital, 183
+Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
+168–9, 186–8
+‘biobanks’, Australia, 130
+biodiversity: conservation governance
+of, 209; credits, 141; financialization
+of, 134–5; offsets market, 130
+Bishop, Matthew, 166, 184
+Black, Fischer, 35; Black–Scholes–
+Merton model, 36
+BlackRock Inc., 64
+Blastland, Michael, 10, 16–17
+Bligh Reef oil spill, 123
+Bloomberg, 55, 64
+boom-and-bust trends, CRAs
+reinforced, 62
+Boyle, David, 19, 211; The Tyranny of
+Numbers, 17
+Brabeck-Letmathe, Peter, 132
+Bradley, Raymond, 79
+Branson, Richard, 167
+‘break-even’ analysis, 178
+Bretton Woods; collapse of system, 46;
+conference, 148; institutions, 151
+Bridgespan consultancy, 161
+Briffa, Keith, 78
+British National Weather Service, 77
+Büscher, Bram, 135
+Buffet, Warren, 167, 188
+Bureau of Standards, USA, 22
+bureaucracy, quantification, 20
+Burma/Myanmar, 132
+Bush, G.H.W., 71, 76
+
+Cambridge University, Electric Policy
+Research Group, 91
+Cameron, David, Big Society notion,
+183
+Campbell Collaborative, 174–5
+Campbell, Donald, 174
+Canopy Capital, 128–9
+capitalism: allocation decentralization,
+44; new areas of accumulation, 136
+carbon emissions markets, 7, 37, 87, 90,
+101; aberrations, 99; ETS, see below;
+intangible nature, 92; offsets price,
+93; restrictions, 94; trading industry,
+101; transferable credits, 76
+
+Carlyle, Thomas, 27
+Cato Institute, 62, 71–2, 74
+CDOs (collateralized debt obligations),
+52, 113, 131; AAA ratings, 63
+CDS (credit default swaps), 52
+Center for the Study of Carbon
+Dioxide and Global Change, 83
+Center for Economic and Policy
+Research, 26
+Centre for Social Investment, 181
+CERCLA (Superfund) law, USA, 122
+‘certainty equivalents’, CRAs, 59
+CFA Institute, 50–51
+Chadwick, Henry, 4
+Chambers, Robert, 10
+Chicago School, 65
+China, emissions reduction projects,
+98
+City University of New York, 167
+civil society, idea of, 204–6
+Clean Development Mechanism, 95,
+130; investments, 97–8; offsets, 93
+Climate Audit blog, 78
+climate change, 187; ‘Climategate’, 77,
+82; cost–benefit analysis, 7; deniers/
+sceptics, see below; market-based
+approaches, 89, 103; ‘stat wars’, 68
+climate change, deniers/sceptics, 29,
+70; benefits, 100; corporate financed,
+71–2, 123; fossil fuel industry, 69;
+market-based approaches, 103;
+media coverage, 99
+Climate Change Capital, 104, 140
+Climate Research Institute, 79
+Climate Research Unit, University of
+East Anglia, 77–8, 81–2
+Clinton, Bill, 167, 191
+Coca-Cola corporation, 130;
+accusations against, 132
+Code of Conduct Fundamentals for
+Credit Rating Agencies, 56
+Cold War, 150; end of, 152
+Collier, Paul, 155
+Columbia University, Graduate School
+of Journalism, 28
+Committee for European Banking
+Supervisors, 51
+Committee of European Securities
+index
+
+Regulators, 64
+commons, the: global enclosure, 135;
+marketized, 165, 200
+Competitive Enterprise Institute, 72,
+78
+conflicts of interest, 40, 51, 60, 96
+consultancy liability, questions of, 133
+contingent valuation methods, 122,
+136–7
+contrarian science, power of, 30
+Convention on Biological Diversity,
+UN-backed, 129
+Conway, Erik M., 30, 70
+COP17, 83
+Copenhagen Consensus Centre (CCC),
+83–5, 161–3
+coral reefs, value estimation, 128
+corporations, rating fees, 46
+cost–benefit analysis, 7, 84, 100, 114,
+126, 133, 138, 161, 163, 181, 189;
+analysts, 124; apparent neutrality,
+102; climate change, 69; conceptual
+problems with, 74; distortions, 73;
+environmental governance, 108;
+neutrality claim, 86; public
+infrastructure, 21, 22; value
+judgements, 75
+Costanza, Robert, 115, 117, 125
+costs: activity-based costing, 201;
+benefits conflation, 208; subjective,
+139
+Council of the American Sociological
+Association, 175
+‘counter studies’, corporate financed,
+123
+credit ratings agency, 3, 6, 44, 208;
+Agency Reform Act, 55; as official
+determinants, 45; austerity measures
+impact, 63; blackmail accusation,
+52; conflicts of interest, 40, 51, 60;
+cost of borrowing effect, 59–60; de
+facto regulatory role, 13, 53–5, 64;
+‘epistemic authority’, 61; financial
+products, 46; global offices, 52;
+grades, 41; hiding behind numbers,
+66; informational added value lack,
+63; market irrationality promoting,
+62; ‘neutral’ self-image, 45; oligopoly,
+
+42, 46–7, 62; political influence, 57,
+59; power evolution, 39, 43; profits,
+50; replacement call, 64; SEC
+counter-offensive, 58; self-fulfilling
+prophecies, 49; state bonds
+downgrades, 56; ‘watch lists’, 48
+Cromwell, Oliver, 12
+Crouch, Colin, 42
+
+Darwin, Charles, 156
+data: ‘hard’, 172, 185, 188; necessary
+qualifications, 193; power of, 23;
+quantitive obsession, 201
+Davies, Gavyn, 182
+de Balzac, Honoré, 13
+de Tocqueville, Alexis, 205
+debt, CRA cost influence, 50
+Deloitte, 97
+Delong, Brad, 75
+Deming, W.E., 1, 196
+demographics, election use, 14
+Department of Justice, USA, 56, 82
+derivatives, 36
+Descartes, René, 199
+Designated Operational Entities, 96–7;
+certification of, 95
+Deutsche Bank, 131
+‘development’: agencies measurement
+pressures, 171; ‘fatigue’, 146;
+measuring strategies, 3, 7;
+sustainable, 170
+Development Assistance Group, 151
+Dilnot, Andrew, 10, 16–17
+discount ratings, 208
+‘disintermediation’ banks transforming,
+44
+distributional issues, cost–benefit
+flattened, 138
+doubt, self-interested manufacture of,
+70, 72
+Dow Chemical Company, 130,
+132
+Dow Jones, 31; Industrial Average
+popular imaginary, 30
+Duflo, E., 171
+Dunlap, Riley, 72, 100
+Dupuit, Jules, 35
+Dynergy, credit rating, 51
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Earth Institute, Columbia University,
+155
+Earth System Science Centre, Penn
+State University, 81
+Easterly, William, 154–6
+eco-tourism, 135
+Economic Cooperation Administration,
+148
+economic performance metrics, 105
+Ecosystem Marketplace, 130
+ecosystem(s), monetized, 117–18;
+auction mechanisms, 120; service
+certificates, 128; total economic
+value, 124
+education, standardized tests, 8, 19
+Edwards, Mike, 169, 188, 209
+Ehrenfeld, David, 139
+Eisenhower, Dwight, 68
+Eisner, Robert, 106
+Ellul, Jacques, 28
+emissions, free-of-charge allocations,
+89
+Emissions Database for Global
+Atmospheric Research, 101
+Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS),
+87–9, 98, 102; flaws, 92–3;
+overallocation, 91; profiteering, 90
+EnBW corporation, 90
+Endeavour Group, 169
+energy efficiency, revised regulations,
+90
+Enron, 132; credit rating, 40, 51; default
+missed, 60; McKinsey role, 133
+environment: anti-environmentalist
+lobbies, 29; assets social discount
+rates’ valuation, 115; contingent
+valuation method, 123; crisis
+corporate exploitation, 138; damage
+litigation, 124; sceptics, 199
+Eon corporation, 90
+Ernst & Young, 90, 97
+Euribor scandal, 131
+European Central Bank, 51
+European Development Fund, 150
+European Commission, 91, 108; CRAs
+proposals, 57
+European Parliament, 91
+European Recovery Program, 148
+
+European Securities and Markets
+Authority, 56
+European Union: capital adequacy
+directive, 54–5; CRAs debate, 57;
+ETS, 89
+Europol, 92
+evaluation ‘hard’ techniques, 174, 176;
+‘stakeholder’ perspective, 181
+‘evidence’, 84
+exchange value, 140
+experts: ‘discourses’, 24; statistics
+authority use, 23
+Exxon, 71, 72, 125; ‘counter-studies’;
+financed, 123
+Exxon Valdez, oil spill, 122; out-ofcourt
+settlement, 123
+
+‘fairness doctrine’, television, 71
+Faraday, Michael, 156
+Federal Home Loan Bank Chicago, 51
+Ferguson, Adam, 204
+Ferme Generale, 13
+fertilizers, access, 162
+Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
+40
+financial markets; ‘animal spirits’, 62;
+control reversal, 49; real drivers of,
+61; regulations outsourced, 54–5
+Fischer, Peter, 64
+Fisher, Ronald A., 2
+Fitch publishing/ratings company, 41,
+45, 47; fees, 52
+Flood Control Act 1936, 22
+food: genetically modified, 131–2;
+insecurity, 190 wastage cost–benefit,
+166
+Ford Foundation, 169, 175
+forest bonds, 131
+fossil fuel corporations, 98, 101;
+lobbying, 89, 99
+Foucault, Michel, 19–20, 206
+France, AAA rating downgrade, 58;
+French Revolution, 13
+Freemasonry, 11
+Friedman, Thomas, 39
+
+G8, 2007 meeting, 108; G8–G20, 13
+Galileo Galilei, 156
+index
+
+Galleon scandal, McKinsey role, 133
+Gates, Bill, 167, 169, 185
+GDP (gross domestic product), 113;
+biosphere value, 116; debt ratio, 25;
+global growth, 107; ‘gross’, 33;
+incompleteness of, 200;
+inconsistencies, 198; invention of,
+207; natural resources disregarded,
+34; non-market goods neglect, 105
+Gellner, Ernest, 205
+geological sequestration, risk of
+leakage, 95
+George C. Marshall Institute, 71–2, 80
+Germany, 89–90, 108; Moody’s
+outlook, 59
+Ghana, SAP, 156
+Gigerenzer, Gert, 23, 27
+Give Directly, 161
+Global Canopy Project: board of
+trustees, 129; Programme, 137
+Global Climate Coalition, 72
+global financial architecture, evolution
+of, 43
+Global Fund for Women, 170
+Global Impact Awards, 161
+Global Reporting Initiative, 181
+GM seeds, 132; yield disappointment,
+164
+Goldberg, Steven, 184
+Goldman Sachs, 129, 131, 155;
+Foundation, 182
+Goldman, Michael, 135
+Good Club, 167, 169, 187
+Google Scholar, 194
+Gore, Al, 76, 83
+governance, 204; bottom-up collective,
+213; climate change, 208;
+‘depoliticizing’, 206; econometric
+models, 212; environmental, 7, 9,
+139, 179; market-based, 142, 149;
+mechanisms, 24; meta-, 4; numbers
+driven, 3; without government, 206
+‘governmentality’, 20; instruments, 206
+Gramsci, Antonio, 205–6
+Grand Challenges in Global Health,
+168
+Grant, Ulysses, 22
+Great Depression, statisticians role, 21
+
+Greece, 57
+‘green’: accounting, 105; economy, 86;
+‘land grabbing’ 135; ‘growth’
+paradigm, 87
+Green Development Mechanism, 134;
+2010 Initiative, 129
+Green, Michael, 184
+greenhouse gas, abatement cost curve,
+133
+Greenpeace, 90, 133–4, 142
+Greenspan, Alan, 36
+Gupta, Rajat, 133
+
+H-index, 194–5
+H.V. and H.W. Poor & Co., 45
+Habermas, Jürgen, 205
+Hamermesh, Daniel, 26
+Harrington, W., 50
+Harris, Ian, 79
+Harvard University, 155, 205; Business
+School, 210
+Hayek, see von Hayek
+Hegel, G.W.F., 205
+Heritage Foundation, 72
+Hewitt, Patricia, 91
+Hicks, Simon, 106
+hockey stick graph, 80
+honeybees, USA valuation, 128
+House of Commons Science and
+Technology Select Committee, 81
+household services, GDP ignored,
+33–4
+Huff, Darrell, 199
+Hughes, Malcolm, 79
+Hummer H3, bogus evidence, 29–30
+Husock, Howard, 183
+
+Iceland, 89
+Ickes, Harold, 22
+IMF (International Monetary Fund),
+13, 26, 148, 151; financial
+assessments, 4
+‘impact assessment’, 182; tools, 146
+‘Impact index’, proposed, 184
+impersonal trust, 211
+indexes: competitiveness, 13; Inclusive
+Wealth, 109; social sciences
+proliferation, 3; stock markets, 30, 32
+how numbers rule the world
+
+India, 165; emissions reduction
+projects, 98; GM seeds, 163 peasant
+suicides, 164
+informal economic areas, GDP ignored,
+200
+Innovations for Poverty Action, 158,
+159, 160–4
+Institute of Mechanical Engineers, 165
+Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
+Change, 69, 76, 83; Fourth
+Assessment, 77; Fourth Report, 81;
+Third Assessment Report, 74
+International Bank for Reconstruction
+and Development, 148
+International Conference on Financing
+for Development, 154
+International Energy Agency, 101
+International Finance Corporation,
+proposed, 150
+International Organization of
+Securities Commission, 56
+investment banks, ratings ‘shopping’,
+50
+investor decisions, CRAs power, 48
+Ireland, 57; land survey, 12
+Italy, Moody’s downgrade, 58
+Iwokrama rainforest, Guyana, 128
+
+J-PAL, 157–8, 160–61, 174
+Jarrell, G.A., 176
+Jerven, Morten, 166
+John Moody and Company, 45
+Johnson, Thomas, 201
+Jones, Phil, 77–81
+
+Kaplan, Robert, 201
+Karlan, Dean, 159–61
+Kellogg Foundation, 209
+Kelvin, Lord, 196
+Keynes, John Maynard, 61–2, 65, 143
+Knight, Frank, 65
+Knight, Phil, 186
+KPMG, 97
+Krugman, Paul, 39, 62
+Kurtzman, Joel, 32
+Kyoto Protocol, 76–7, 83, 93, 128;
+Clean Development Mechanism,
+134
+
+land dispossession, India, 165
+Latin America debt crisis, CRA
+missed, 60
+Lavoisier, Antoine, 12
+‘learned ignorance’, metrics-based, 212
+Lehman Brothers, credit rating, 40;
+fall of, 167
+leveraged buyouts, 176
+Lewis Report, 150
+Libor scandal, 131
+Lichtenstein, 89
+Lindblom, Charles, 210
+localized farming, destruction, 163, 165
+Locke, John, 204
+Lockheed Martin, 71
+Lomborg, Bjørn, 84, 99
+London School of Economics, 74
+
+MacDonald, Christine, 134
+Machiavelli, Niccolò, 204
+Madison, James, ‘Federalist No. 54’, 14
+Manhattan Institute, 183
+Manhattan Project, 70
+Mann, Michael, 79, 81
+Manpower Demonstration Research
+Corporation, 175
+marginal utility, 35–6
+Marine Cloud Whitening, 85
+markets: ‘conceptual prisons’, 210;
+governance models, 211; numerical
+reasoning, 207; proliferation of, 209;
+scope extension, 37
+Marshall Plan, 148, 155
+Marx, Karl, 205
+McCracken, Mike, 79
+McCright, Aaron, 72, 100
+McIntyre, Steve, 78, 80
+McKinsey, consultancy, 134; Enron
+role, 132–3
+McKitrick, Ross, 78, 80
+MDGs (Millennium Development
+Goals), 152; numerical targets, 153
+measurement: limits to, 196; perverse
+outcomes, 19; prioritized, 169;
+obsessive, 9
+media: financial indexes critical
+analysis lack, 30, 32
+Mendelsohn, Robert, 74
+index
+
+Merton, Robert, 35
+Mexican peso crisis, CRAs’ role, 62
+Michaels, Patrick (Pat), 71
+microcredit, 158
+Microsoft, 188
+‘missing trader’ crime, 92
+Mississippi River floods 1927, 21
+MIT (Massachussetts Institute of
+Technology), 157
+Mitre Corporation, 73
+Monckton, Christopher, 83
+‘Moneyball’, 5–6, 37
+Monsanto, 163–4
+Moody, John, 44
+Moody’s credit ratings agency 47–8,
+50–51, 64, 66; fees, 52; Germany
+targeting, 59; Investor Service, 41;
+Italy downgrade, 58
+Morgan Stanley Private Wealth
+Management, 170
+Moyo, Dambisa, 155
+
+Napoleon Bonaparte, statistical offices,
+13
+Nasdaq Composite, 30–31
+National Bureau of Economic
+Research, USA (NBER), 25–6
+National Center for Fair and Open
+Testing, USA, 19
+National Crime Records Bureau, India,
+164
+National Environmental Policy Act,
+USA, 175
+national income accounts, 105–7;
+statistics, 112
+National Mining Association, USA, 72
+National Oceanic and Atmospheric
+Administration, 123
+NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
+Organization), 71, 148
+natural capital, 107, 125, 130;
+accounting, 105, 108, 127; assets
+replacement cost, 113; auditors, 114;
+declaration, 130 depletion, 111; GDP
+disregarded, 33; monetization, 136;
+valuing, 112, 126
+nature: conservation net benefits, 116;
+financialized, 139, 141; global
+
+valuation, 117; non-use value, 124;
+‘valuation’ political agendas, 107, 134
+Nature’s Numbers, 106
+Nature, 118, 126
+Nestlé, 130; accusations against, 131–2
+Net Present Value (NPV), 114–15, 182
+‘net receipts’, 113
+net savings, adjusted, 109
+neutrality: aura generation, 136; false
+impressions of, 96
+New Deal, USA, 149
+New Economics Foundation, 17
+New Labour government, UK, 183
+New Philanthropy Capital, UK,
+178–80, 183
+New York Stock Exchange, 53
+New York Yankees, statistics use, 6
+Newbery, David, 91
+Nierenberg, William, 70–71, 73
+Nike, 130; Foundation, 186
+No Child Left Behind Act USA,
+perverse outcomes, 18
+‘no need for regulations’, constant
+themes, 100
+non-market phenomena, monetization
+of, 104
+‘nonprofit market’, 189; ratings
+methodologies, 183
+Nordhaus, William, 74, 106
+Norway, 89
+numbers: apparent neutrality, 65, 70;
+emancipatory potential, 195;
+‘laundering’ of, 29; manipulation use,
+21, 24, 28; policy influenced, 14;
+production of, 3; proliferation of, 6;
+syndrome, 2
+numerical models, apparent neutrality,
+70
+
+Oakland, 6; Oakland Athletic (As), 5
+Obama, Barack, administration of 19,
+56, 186
+‘objective’ measures, construction of, 20
+OECD (Organization for Economic
+Cooperation and Development), 13,
+63, 146, 150; Development
+Assistance Committee, 148;
+Observer, 34
+how numbers rule the world
+
+offset industry/markets, 127;
+certification process, 94; cost–
+benefit analysis, 37; permanence
+issue, 95–6
+oil spills, monetized damage, 123
+OPEC , 80
+Open Europe, think-tank, 89, 93
+opinions, CRAs’ defence, 49–50
+option value, non-use, 125
+Oreskes, Naomi, 30, 70
+Ostrom, Elinor, 212–13
+ownership rights, 111; natural
+resources, 113
+
+Pakistan, US aid, 150
+Palan, Ronen, 32
+palm oil, 131
+Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,
+154
+Parmalat, credit rating, 51
+participatory process, impact
+assessment, 147
+Patel, Raj, 213
+Pearson, Karl, The Grammar of
+Science, 15
+peer review systems, weakness of, 198
+Pentagon, Vietnam bogus statistics, 29
+performance assessment: indexes, 3;
+perverse incentives, 17
+Petty, William, 12
+philanthrocapitalism, 166–8, 173,
+188–90, 209
+philanthropists, venture, 186
+Phineo, 183
+Pitt, Brad, 5
+Plato, 10, 202; The Republic, 11
+Point Carbon, 98
+Poor, Henry Varnum, 43
+Porter, Theodore, 15, 20, 22
+Portland State University, 201
+Portugal, 57
+poverty: as discrete problem, 168;
+victim blame, 160
+Powell, Colin, 53
+Power, Michael, 202; The Audit Society,
+23
+present–future value relation, 75
+prices/pricing, 33, 102–3, 119, 121–2; as
+
+indicators, 35; carbon, 91;
+instability of, 90; market, 73;
+mechanisms, 34; pervasiveness, 37;
+public works, 35; selective, 140;
+value substitutes, 36
+primitive accumulation, 12
+Prodi, Romano, 91
+professionalism, rhetoric of, 21
+Proven Impact initiative, 158–9
+public debate: governance stifling, 210;
+numbers undermined, 6
+public education, USA privatizing, 18
+public health care, infrastructure, 186
+public management: econometric
+evaluations, 22; quantitative, 35
+public–private blurring, 4, 109, 203
+Puma, 137
+Putnam, Robert, 205
+Pythagoras, 11–12, 23, 202; Croton
+brotherhood, 10
+
+quantification, ‘social technology’, 15
+
+rainforests, valuation, 128
+Ramdas, Kavita, 170
+randomization techniques, 174
+randomized controlled trials, 157, 171,
+174, 175
+ratings: inflation pressure, 47;
+informational value lack, 48
+‘rationalized structures’, myth structure
+of, 23
+Rawls, John, 127
+Reagan, Ronald, 70–72; Acid Rain
+Peer Review Panel, 73, 75
+Red Sox, statistics use, 6
+REDD, 128; REDD+ scheme, 132
+reforestation, 95
+Rehen, Olli, 25
+Reinhart, errors unspotted, 26
+Remhart, Carmen, 25
+repetition, numbers authority, 29
+Repetto, Robert, 106
+reputational capital, CRAs, 48
+Rio+ 20 summit, 130
+risk, 41; banks role, 44; fiction of
+management, 66; investment
+assessment, 43; measurable output,
+index
+
+47; quantifiable, 65
+Rist, Gilbert, 144, 151
+RJR Nabisco, 177; leveraged buyout,
+176
+Roberts Enterprise Development
+Foundation, 176–7
+Rogers, Robin, 167
+Rogoff, Kenneth, 25; errors unspotted,
+26
+Rome, republican tradition, 204
+Roosevelt, F.D., 22; Victory Program,
+13
+Rosicrucianism, 11
+Rostow, Walt, 151; ‘stages of growth’,
+152
+Royal Metereological Society, 79
+Russell, Bertrand, 11
+RWE corporation 90
+Ryan, Paul, 25
+
+Sachs, Jeffrey, 155–6, 159
+Sandel, Michael, What Money Can’t
+Buy, 5
+scales, comparative, 2
+Schmidt, Helmut, 57
+Scholes, Myron, 35
+schools, standardized tests, 8
+Schumaker, E.F., 104
+science, experimental methods, 156–7
+Science, 126
+Science and Public Policy Institute,
+82–3
+Securities Industry and Financial
+Markets Association, 45
+SEEA (System of EnvironmentalEconomic
+Accounting), 110–11,
+113–14; fallacies, 116; GDP
+framework, 112, 139; simplistic, 117
+Seife, Charles, 28
+Seitz, Frederick, 70–71, 80
+self-regulation, principle of, 96
+Shad, John, 176
+Shapiro, Susan, 210
+Sharma, Deven, 58
+She’s Out of My League, 1
+Shell, 71
+Shoemaker, Paul, 189
+Siegried Fred Singer, 71, 73, 75–6, 87
+
+Skilling, Jeff, 132
+Smith, Adam, 38
+Smith, Vernon, 84
+social enterprises, 203
+social impact bonds, 183
+Social investment ratings, 145
+social movements, pressure on, 179
+social research: aggregated indexes, 3;
+randomized experiments, 157
+Social Venture Partners International,
+189
+social work, marketized, 185
+Society for Conservation Biology, 139
+Solow, Robert, 123
+South Korea, US aid, 150
+sovereign credit ratings, 53; debt
+worsening impact, 59; Greek debt
+crisis, 131
+SROI (social return on investment),
+177, 179, 185; discount rates, 178;
+evaluations, 181; popularity growth,
+182; standardized valuation, 180
+‘stamps of approval’, ratings, 53
+Standard & Poor’s; 41, 48, 51, 53, 58,
+63, 65; civil fraud case, 56; fees, 52;
+500, 30–31; operating profit, 47
+Standard Statistics Bureau, 45
+standardized performance assessments,
+194, 197
+standardization procedures, 18, 23;
+school tests, 8
+Stapel, Diederik, fake numbers, 27
+Starr, Paul, The Politics of Numbers, 17
+state, the, large industries alignment,
+22
+statistics, 2; assumptions based, 8;
+bureaucratization, 6; etymology,
+14–15; public, 12; unlimited
+application, 4; see also numbers
+Steinbeck, John, 184
+Stern, Nicholas, 74–7
+stock market indexes, new obsession
+with, 30; public good presentation,
+31
+Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, 85
+structural adjustment policies, 152
+success evaluation, baseball, 5
+Sullivan, Sian, 135
+how numbers rule the world
+
+Summers, Larry, 37
+supermarkets, food practices, 165
+sustainability: precautionary approach,
+127; strong/weak, 140
+
+Taiwan, US aid, 150
+targets, politics of
+tax, cyclical income, 60
+technocracy, power of, 207; ‘technofixes’,
+161
+technology transfers, 84
+TEEB (economics of ecosystems and
+biodiversity), 108, 131
+Thatcher, Margaret, 83
+think-tanks, 71–2
+Thomson Reuters, 194
+timescale, cost–benefit analysis, 73
+Tobacco Institute, 70
+traditional aid donors, 146
+transnational private governance, 4
+Transparency International, 98
+tropical forests, monetization, 129
+Trucost, Natural Capital Leaders
+index, 137
+Truman, Harry, inaugural speech, 148,
+149
+Tüv Süd, 97–8
+
+UK (United Kingdom): Freedom of
+Information Act, 78; natural capital
+committee, 134; NHS follow-up
+visits, 18; public hospitals, 17;
+school league tables, 19
+UN (United Nations), 109; Climate
+Change Secretariat, 97; Conference
+on the Human Environment, 68;
+Development Programme, 53, 150,
+153; ecosystem assessment
+methodology discussion, 113;
+Environment Programme, 69, 128,
+136; ‘Expanded Programme of
+Technical Assistance’, 149;
+Framework Conference on Climate
+Change, 77; MDGs, see above;
+‘millennium ecosystem assessment’,
+141, 193; accounting standards
+revision, 110–11; Statistical
+Commission, 110, 115; statisticians,
+
+114; UNCTAD, 49, 62
+uncertainty, unknown risks, 65–6
+UniCredit, 131
+Unilever, 130
+Union Carbide, Bhopal tragedy, 132
+Union of Concerned Scientists, 71
+University College Dublin, 143
+University of Delaware, 16
+University of Heidelberg, 181
+University of London, 26
+University of Maryland, 115
+University of Massachusetts Amherst,
+25
+USA (United States of America), 83;
+Bureau of Economic Analysis, 105,
+198; Congress, 40; conservative
+media, 29; Department of
+Commerce, 13; Department of the
+Interior, 175; Environmental
+Protection Agency, 76, 82; Federal
+Reserve, 63; GDP statistics, 198;
+House Committee of Oversight and
+Reform, 36; interest groups, 21;
+Mutual Security Act, 150; National
+Academy of Sciences, 70; Office of
+Economic Opportunity, 175; Office
+of the Comptroller of the Currency,
+44; Oil Pollution Act, 123; pension
+funds, 54; real estate crisis, 63;
+S&P downgrade, 56; SEC
+(Securities Exchange Commission),
+45, 55–6, 58, 66, 176; USAID, 148
+
+vaccinations, 186–7
+validity, statistics, 11–12
+valuation(s): anthropocentric view,
+125; contingent, 122, 136–7
+value, sustainability-based, 127
+Vattenfall corporation, 90
+verification, shallow rituals, 202
+Vickrey auctions, 120
+Vietnam War, Pentagon evaluation
+systems, 28
+Volcker, Paul, 176
+von Hayek, Friedrich, 1, 35
+
+Waldman, Adam, 169
+‘War on Poverty’, 175
+index
+
+Washington Mutual, credit rating, 40
+Wealth Accounting and Valuation of
+Ecosystem Service, 109
+Weber, Max, 20, 32
+Western Fuels Association, 72
+Wheeler, Peter, 182
+White House Council on
+Environmental Quality, 76
+White, Harrison, 49
+wikis, 147
+‘willingness to pay’ approach/principle,
+119, 122–3, 139; inconsistencies, 121;
+marketing strategies, 120; ‘robust’,
+180
+World Bank, 13, 109, 148, 150, 151,
+
+154–6, 175
+World Commission on Environment
+and Development, 69
+World Council of Churches, 150
+World Economic Forum, 13
+World Meteorological Organization,
+69
+‘worthiness’: aid industry, 173; measure
+of, 184
+WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature),
+93, 97, 98
+
+Yale University, 210
+
+Zakaria, Fareed, 71
diff --git "a/JAEGENDORF--Filipe--SILVEIRA--Fabiano-Feij\303\263.-Jurimetrics--Statistics-applied-in-the-law.-In--Law-and-Liberty-Magazine.-Porto-Alegre--Rio-Grande-do-Sul--Brazil--2014..md" "b/JAEGENDORF--Filipe--SILVEIRA--Fabiano-Feij\303\263.-Jurimetrics--Statistics-applied-in-the-law.-In--Law-and-Liberty-Magazine.-Porto-Alegre--Rio-Grande-do-Sul--Brazil--2014..md"
new file mode 100644
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+++ "b/JAEGENDORF--Filipe--SILVEIRA--Fabiano-Feij\303\263.-Jurimetrics--Statistics-applied-in-the-law.-In--Law-and-Liberty-Magazine.-Porto-Alegre--Rio-Grande-do-Sul--Brazil--2014..md"
@@ -0,0 +1,930 @@
+provided by Legal Digital Library of the Superior Court of Justice
+
+Filipe Jaeger Zabala*
+
+JURIMETRICS: STATISTICS APPLIED IN THE LAW
+
+CONTENTS: 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 CONCEPTS; 2.1 INFORMATION, STATISTICS AND LAW; 2.2
+JURIMETRY; 3 THE THREE PRISMS OF JURIMETRY; 3.1 LEGISLATIVE PREPARATION AND
+PUBLIC MANAGEMENT; 3.2 THE JUDICIAL DECISION; 3.3 THE PROBATORY INSTRUCTION; 4
+EXAMPLES; 4.1 ANTICIPATION OF GUARDIANSHIP; 4.2 FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF LEGAL
+ACTIONS IN LEASING CONTRACTS; 4.3 SUSPECTED RACISM IN NEW JERSEY POLICE
+APPROACH; 4.4 THE ALLEGED FALL OF THE MYTH OF MORAL DAMAGE; 5 CONCLUSION;
+REFERENCES.
+
+JURISDICTION: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+from the most diverse areas. Economics makes use of such techniques to evaluate its models
+Quantitative methods have been used for centuries to solve practical problems.
+
+Fabiano Feijó Silveira**
+
+73
+
+1. INTRODUCTION
+
+Keywords: Jurimetry. Right. Statistic. Lee Loevinger.
+
+Keywords: Jurimetrics. Law. Statistics. Lee Loevinger.
+
+Specialist in Civil Law and Civil Procedure by the Instituto de Desenvolvimento Cultural Faculty – IDC/RS. Bachelor
+in Legal and Social Sciences from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul – PUC/RS. Attorney. Porto
+Alegre – Rio Grande do Sul – Brazil.
+
+ABSTRACT: This article reviews the available literature on Jurimetry, as well as relevant considerations and
+suggestions for practical and theoretical applications of the subject. It proposes the division of Jurimetry into three
+prisms, allowing a broad and direct approach for anyone interested in using quantitative tools in Law. A connection is
+made between the institutes of Law and Statistics, in order to make the immediate application of quantitative methods
+in legal matters. The examples presented have a theoretical and applied character, demonstrating in part the
+applicability of the theme in different contexts, raising fundamental questions for the modern use in Brazilian Law.
+
+quantitative methods in legal matters. The examples have theoretical and practical nature, in part demonstrating the
+applicability of the theme in different contexts, raising fundamental questions for modern use under Brazilian Law.
+
+Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul – PUC/RS. Porto Alegre – Rio Grande do Sul –
+Brazil.
+
+and suggestions for practical and theoretical applications of the subject. The division of Jurimetria three prisms is
+proposed, allowing a wide and direct approach for anyone interested in using quantitative tool in law. The connection
+between the institutes of Law and Statistics is made so as to make ready the application of
+
+ABSTRACT: This article is a review of the available literature on Jurimetrics as well as relevant considerations
+
+Master in Statistics from the Institute of Mathematics and Statistics of the University of São Paulo – IME-USP.
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+**
+
+*
+
+ISSN Print 1809-3280 | Electronic ISSN 2177-1758
+www.esmarn.tjrn.jus.br/revistas
+
+View Machine Translated by Google metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE
+For more information, visit the website: www.law.asu.edu/jurimetrics
+Kadane and Lehoczky (1976).
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+JURISDICTION: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+1
+
+two
+
+Biostatistics a way of dealing with its immense volumes of data and dealing with the
+
+trust in witnesses and probability of innocence of an accused (BERNOULLI, 1709;
+
+alleged moral damage industry, discussed by Püschel et al (2010) and Meyerhof Salama
+
+the master of economics”, pointing out the need to develop a thought
+
+relevant scientific studies to date. The only formally described case is in Bertran
+
+its application, does not formally use quantitative methods in its day-to-day activities, although
+
+Law, Computational Methods and Statistics in order to analyze jurisprudence and make the use
+
+of Law more predictable. The Jurimetrics Journal1 is a quarterly journal
+
+Statistical Inference techniques in the evaluation of leasing contracts
+
+74
+
+Law, Science, Computing and Statistics. Joseph Kadane, from Carnegie Mellon University, has
+
+been a reference in the field since 19762
+
+The first known work in literature was presented in 1709 by Nicholas I
+
+scientific method; most of them rely on insufficient techniques, applied in sets of
+
+general, main scientific objective. An example of data restriction is the investigation of
+
+of people's survival, insurance pricing, lottery prices, inheritance issues,
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+theorists in a subfield known as Econometrics. Biology has found
+
+taxes, business law issues, discrimination cases, election scenarios and
+
+(2011), detailed in Section 4.4.
+
+HALD, 1998). Holmes (1897, p. 9) declares: “the man of the future is the man of statistics and
+
+In Brazil there is a growing interest in the subject, but with few developments
+
+uncertainties inherent to the study of living beings. The Law, even with uncertainty at the heart of
+
+quantitative. Loevinger (1948) coined the term jurimetrics, which for the first time united Theory
+
+(2006, 2007) and in the technical report by Wechsler (2006). In this work were used
+
+indexed to the dollar in 1999. However, few studies in Brazilian law make use of the
+
+this association is long-standing.
+
+created and maintained by the American Bar Association since 1959, and brings themes related to
+
+, applying statistics in the selection of jurors, audits of
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+Bernoulli, with the thesis De Usu Artis Conjectandi in Jure. It deals with topics such as probability
+
+data with severe constraints. This type of approach makes it impossible to formalize rules
+
+performing essays on ethics in the presentation of quantitative methods in juries.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Law 5869/73, Art. 273. The judge may, at the request of the party, anticipate, in whole or in part, the effects of the
+protection sought in the initial request, provided that, in the presence of unequivocal evidence, he is convinced of
+the verisimilitude of the allegation and: I - there is founded fear of irreparable or difficult to repair damage (BRASIL, 1973).
+
+Such unknown quantities can be values, measurements of time, probability or any quantity of interest.
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+JURIMETRY: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+4
+
+3
+
+2.1 INFORMATION, STATISTICS AND LAW
+
+It offers tools to analyze
+
+making the connection
+
+As other possible applications, one can think of simple evaluations, such as estimates
+
+opinion". In addition to the intuitive definition, Stern and Pereira (2012) present a set of tools
+
+Jurists require the presentation of evidence to support any
+
+major issues of law through expert opinion, probabilistic models and
+
+75
+
+your solutions. Law is also guided by the experience of advocates and decision-makers
+
+as there will certainly be a gain of 33% of information or with probability 56% the gain
+
+2.2 JURIMETRY
+
+such as Statistics, Computing, Linguistics, Human Behavior and Science in its
+
+information, measure uncertainties and assist in decision making. It has corresponding concepts
+
+in Law – such as the institute of verisimilitude4 -,
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+2 CONCEPTS
+
+data with the opinion of an expert, in a subarea entitled Decision Theory
+
+.
+
+which is necessary to cross-reference procedural information and the judge’s experience.
+
+Basu and Ghosh (1988, p. 21) define information as “that which changes its
+
+between the two areas fairly straightforward.
+
+about times and values of processes, until the creation of elaborate solutions, involving the
+
+other scientific information.
+
+theory to quantify the information. From such methods it is possible to make declarations
+
+argumentation, in the same way that statisticians use data observation to suggest
+
+involved, as well as in the statistical environment. There are formal methods for aggregating information from
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+of information will be 60%. One of the purposes of Statistics is to extract information about
+
+quantities of interest but unknown3
+
+The definitions of Jurimetria vary from author to author, passing through topics
+
+(DEGROOT, 2005; CAMPELLO, 2007). The most direct example is the work of judges, for the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+5
+JURIMETRY: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+Jurimetrics is concerned with such matters as the quantitative analysis of judicial
+behavior, the application of communication and information theory to legal expression,
+the use of mathematical logic in law, the retrieval of legal data by electronic and
+mechanical means, and the formulation of a calculus of legal predictability.
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+"Jurimetrics is […] the empirical study of the form, the meaning and the pragmatics (and the relationships between
+those) of demands and authorizations issuing from state organizations with the aid of mathematical models and
+using methodological individualism as the basic paradigm for the explanation and prediction of human behavior".
+
+numerical. The Law of Information Technology (VIANNA, 2003) deals with legal aspects of the use of
+
+more general. De Mulder et al (2010, p. 147) define the theme in a somewhat complex way5 and
+
+didactic approach, a segmentation of Jurimetry in three prisms is suggested below. In the
+
+little useful in practice. The association between Law and Statistics is well described in the literature.
+
+electronic equipment, not being a sub-area of Jurimetria, even though it may use
+
+The next sections will present the fundamentals of each prism, pointing out
+
+Loevingeriana, and the concepts used by both areas are, in fact, quite
+
+of jurimetric techniques in the evaluation of IT problems related to the Law.
+
+applied examples.
+
+similar. Loevinger (1963, p. 8) talks about the use of quantitative and computational methods in the
+
+3 THE THREE PRISMS OF JURIMETRY
+
+search for legal predictability by stating that
+
+When the topic began to gain strength in Brazil, there was discussion about how the
+
+reading and execution of Jurimetry. With legislators, decision-makers and lawyers being the main
+
+76
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+In light of Loevinger's ideas, Jurimetry is defined as the application of methods
+
+users of this tool, there was an idea that conflicts and inconsistencies could arise
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+quantitative in law. The computational issue is not explicitly present in the
+
+in jurimetric applications, for the simple fact that there are different understandings of the
+
+concept, since technological resources are naturally used in problems
+
+possibilities envisioned by the new paradigm. Inspired by this fact and aiming for a
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+http://blogdoadeli.blogspot.com.br/2012/03/vereador-pede-500-novos-taxis-em-porto.html
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+JURIMETRY: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+6
+
+Currently, Brazilian legislative elaboration is carried out in an essentially
+
+volume of existing information. With the support of experts, legislators can take advantage of the
+
+estimated five hundred new taxi licenses, Beltranos spoke of seventy-five, while
+
+base the creation and maintenance of contemporary legislation.
+
+application.
+
+evaluations of a scientific nature are carried out so that there is an increasingly better understanding
+
+observed between text and reality. There are no accurate analyzes to support
+
+organized in public databases, essential for understanding the situation
+
+of São Paulo Traffic (CET, 1978), with the aim of characterizing the role of taxis in
+
+defend suppression, stating that it is worth reducing the defenders' alternatives in favor of
+
+public implies laws that end up ignored in practice, even if the legislator has good
+
+favorable for the production of coherent laws, creating a common foundation for discussions
+
+survey regarding the situation of public transport in the capital of Rio Grande do Sul. so-and-so
+
+highly complex problems, for which the technical evaluation would fit using the great
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+3.1 LEGISLATIVE ELABORATION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
+
+fundamental, even if in more specific cases. The common point is that they both emit
+
+Cicranos pointed out a surplus in the fleet. In the Southeast region, the Engineering Company
+
+analysis of the facts described in the records, as well as the jurisprudence itself as a way of
+
+positions, being a clear example of the asynchrony between the theoretical legal content and its
+
+policy. Although there are qualified analysts working on the production of new laws, few
+
+In certain changes to the Civil Procedure Code, the disparity
+
+One of Jurimetrics' most notable activities is the analysis of information
+
+current socioeconomic status. Data organization and analysis provide an environment
+
+close to reality. The lack of methodological rigor to evaluate information of interest
+
+such changes, dividing opinions in cases such as the suppression of resources. There are those who
+
+capital of São Paulo, conducted a survey published in Technical Note. For this, it assessed the
+
+procedural agility. Others dispute this view, arguing that resources are
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+intention in their proposals. In general, one is faced with the question of positioning oneself in relation to
+
+policies. In 2010, the theme of the shortage of taxis versus new concessions of licenses in Porto
+
+Alegre6 was raised . From a jurimetric perspective, the political debate preceded a
+
+77
+
+their opinions without having considered the use of reliable information to support their
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+JURIMETRY: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+Telephone companies are at the top of the list. Thus, prioritizing more efficient laws in light of
+
+Brazilian capitals and the evolution of the supply of taxis per inhabitant in the city of São Paulo.
+
+When considering the Jurimetrics approach from the perspective of Judicial Decision,
+
+analogous, the legal decision-maker can use an exempt tool to support his
+
+pillars for all factors related to the decision-making process. Within this context, the expert
+
+3.2 THE JUDICIAL DECISION
+
+(SMT) and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), allowing the validation and
+
+consequent loss of autonomy on the part of the judge. However, it must be considered that the
+
+perceived from different perspectives, adding their expertise to then decide on something that is
+
+Legislative drafting can also make use of quantitative analyzes with
+
+current procedure in Science. Econometricians manage their asset portfolios
+
+participation of taxis in travel modes, vehicle fleet composition in the main
+
+finite. Engineers base their proposals for process improvement through the
+
+same socioeconomic issues as the other powers. A direct application is the creation of
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+All information is from official sources such as the Municipal Traffic Superintendence
+
+available information can drastically reduce processing time and procedural cost.
+
+Statistics that predict multiple decision scenarios, allow you to direct the solution in light of
+
+commercial, political and managerial issues not included in the calculations. in a way
+
+by the National Council of Justice (CNJ, 2011) points out that banks, public agencies and
+
+Judicial decision is immediate.
+
+contestation of the São Paulo study.
+
+The judge has the difficult task of extracting concrete information in cases
+
+evaluation of information from surveys for decision making is a
+
+78
+
+there is an instantaneous reaction of caution, motivated by the fear of decision mechanization and
+
+position. From any possible perspective, the judge's knowledge and opinion are
+
+considered reasonable within a pre-established paradigm. Decision Theory, a branch of
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+Executive and Judiciary databases, since the Legislative regulates the
+
+based on their models, but never disregarding the human factor in the use of resources
+
+available information. In this way, the transposition of its concepts and methods to
+
+new regulations concerning the country's largest litigants. The published technical report
+
+evaluation of signals captured over time, but always taking into account
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+JURIMETRY: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+of DNA as you might initially imagine, but a comparison of the patterns in the code
+
+Jurimetric methods are naturally applied in law, which can do
+
+chances of winning or losing a case. One can also study the economic viability
+
+procedural information available. The aim is to measure the uncertainties about the case and
+
+by the magistrate, with the use and contestation of the methods used being at his discretion.
+
+measurable -- for the occurrence of random matches. To assess the magnitude of this
+
+argumentation, which becomes based on statistical concepts and models. These models are
+
+histories of similar evaluations. Such methods result in the probability that the individual
+
+An example of legal quantification is the case of the 'founded fear of damage
+
+without ever replacing it.
+
+jurimetrist has the role of executing an accurate modeling process and making use of the
+
+of having sequelae to the patient, if the required medication is not taken in a
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+A current example is in criminal or paternity cases in which the
+
+therefore as an intelligent data processor, providing accurate analysis as
+
+provide the technical basis for the judge. Such basis may or may not be considered
+
+(microsatellite) into parts of the DNA. This leaves margin -- however small and
+
+DNA beats, these methods are not foolproof. There is no assessment of the entire chain
+
+3.3 THE EVIDENCE INSTRUCTION
+
+In this way, the available information is added to the judge's opinion in an intuitive way,
+
+margin, statistical methods can be used based on the case files and on data
+
+constructed from available data and the experience of those involved.
+
+preference for public data. Another interesting resource is the possibility to evaluate the
+
+use of measures of evidence in lawsuits. Such measures of evidence support the
+
+79
+
+gave rise to that specific DNA sample. The jurimetric tool works
+
+irreparable or difficult to repair' in the request for injunctive relief in actions involving the order
+
+of medicines. Is it possible to present a statistical analysis that indicates the chance
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+Currently, the Brazilian Judiciary uses technical reports issued by experts.
+
+deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Although common sense assigns 100% certainty in
+
+judge support.
+
+urgent. Such information must be calculated from easily accessible data, giving
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+Credit bureaus maintain an updated register of the country's debtors .
+
+JURIMETRY: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+7
+4 EXAMPLES
+
+estimated percentage of unrealized sales due to the problem of incorrect negation.
+
+each case.
+
+and consolidated jurisprudence for mass action cases. Using some
+
+Suppose Company X has daily sales and has been incorrectly listed in some
+
+credit bureau7
+
+uncertainty measures. These loss estimates are currently made by
+
+bureaus in search of information regarding the suitability of the supplier company, there is
+
+stochastic in their calculations.
+
+charged in cases of fees conditional on success. Anticipate results with relative
+
+before initiating a lawsuit, based on historical data and specific elements of
+
+the chance of your customer losing a considerable number of sales, in addition to improving
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+more security with respect to the filing of actions. Statistical models allow
+
+considerable sales due to the negative entry error. Based on the information
+
+It is possible to quantify the chance of success based on the analysis of common variables
+
+4.1 ADVANCE OF GUARDIANSHIP
+
+desk.
+
+records of company X and compare with historical queries and sales, providing a
+
+measure of 'chance of success', it is possible to measure more precisely the values to be
+
+. How do companies usually consult such
+
+financial and accounting professionals, who generally do not consider structures
+
+In addition, estimates of expected damage are made more accurate by inserting such
+
+80
+
+a verifiable chance that company X will lose a number
+
+The lawyer for company
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+efficiency is, therefore, one of the many possibilities of a well-planned jurimetric
+
+application. In light of past decisions and other process variables, it is possible to decide very
+
+provide more solid subsidies to clients, being a security for the lawyer himself or
+
+made available by credit bureaus, it is possible to assess how many companies consulted the
+
+estimate of financial loss. For the judge, this information can help in the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+There is information omitted for didactic reasons, detailed in Kadane (2008).
+Portuguese term for leasing.
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+JURISDICTION: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+9
+8
+4.3 SUSPECTED RACISM IN NEW JERSEY POLICE APPROACH
+
+New Jersey census and DMV. To assess whether the difference 46.2% -
+
+methodological.
+
+81
+
+Leasing
+
+Americans claim that their arrests were motivated by racist attacks carried out
+
+chance, ie, the probability that the stops were made in a non-racist way. It is
+
+divided between defense and prosecution, in order to probabilistically evaluate the allegations.
+
+0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000043498%,
+
+in 1999. This model was based on the user's opinion regarding how favorable the
+
+basis of the decision, in addition to making any possible contestation more objective
+
+.
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+value of the installment or number of open installments, updating the values in
+
+46.2% stops with vehicles containing black occupants. As a comparison, they observed
+
+4.2 FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ACTIONS IN CONTRACTS
+
+Kadane (2008) brings an interesting case, in which seventeen African defendants
+
+For example, the probability of success in an action in the case of a specific client.
+
+an observation of 13.5% of vehicles with black occupants, a number compatible with data
+
+Wechsler et al (2006) build a model to support the decision to file or not to file a lawsuit in
+
+the case of dollar-indexed lease agreements8
+
+by New Jersey State Police. Experts were hired by the court, with costs
+
+probability is equal to
+
+13.5% = 32.7% is significant or not, the probability that it is due to the
+
+In 275 approaches carried out by the police team that was being accused, there were
+
+what led the judge to decide to incriminate the police for racism9
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+scenario when deciding for the customer, adding customer-specific information, such as
+
+function of exchange rate and other relevant financial factors. The methods created indicate, for
+
+42706 vehicles were collected on days and times randomly chosen by the experts, resulting in
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+JURISDICTION: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+Meyerhof Salama (2011).
+
+Instead of sticking to the 32.7% difference, defense and prosecution had to
+
+a manual search for pre-defined key phrases in court domains
+
+argue considering the calculated probability. A clear change in
+
+Püschel (2010, p. 6) debates whether there is sufficient legal certainty in the current system.
+
+selected, whose overlap was not analyzed, because (p. 36):
+
+82
+
+paradigm when there is scientific rigor when defending a thesis, reducing the possibility of
+
+In subarticle II. Results of the jurisprudential survey, Püschel et al (2010, p. 37)
+
+personal opinions and false judgments. Even if the counterparty disagrees with what was proposed,
+
+present the methodology used to evaluate the judgments of Federal courts,
+
+Faced with all the assumptions that support the method developed by Püschel
+
+one should stick to the search for methodological flaws in the analysis presented, suggesting eventual
+
+State and Labour. Regarding the availability of information, the authors point out
+
+et al (2010, p. 37/235), it is assumed that quantitative generalizations are problematic and
+
+changes.
+
+that courts are not directly concerned with the transparency of jurisprudence
+
+need to be done with caution. Basic exploratory analyzes were carried out, in which
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+4.4 THE SUPPOSED BREAKDOWN OF THE MYTH OF MORAL DAMAGE
+
+public opinion (general or specialized), but with the specific needs of
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+In 2012 it was widely publicized that 'the moral damage industry would be a
+
+parties and their lawyers. According to the authors (p. 31), the great difficulty was accessing the
+
+some conclusions listed below, also used by Meyerhof
+
+myth'. This conclusion was based on the technical report by Püschel (2010) and the article by
+
+immense number of judicial decisions dealing with the calculation of moral damages. It was made
+
+Salama (2011, p. 53-55).
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+[...] to verify exactly the degree to which the various sets of judgments raised for each
+court overlap, it would be necessary to make lists with all the keywords and combinations
+and cross them, to verify repetitions. However, given the excessive number of judgments,
+such a procedure was not feasible. It was only possible to make lists with all the
+keywords and cross them to the Federal Court, which presents a smaller number of
+decisions and, therefore, manageable.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+(a) official requests for extracting databases directly from the analyzed bodies, based
+on the Access to Information Law of November 8, 2011.
+
+(i) The amounts awarded as compensation for moral damages tend to be low, with cases
+exceeding the barrier of one hundred thousand reais being exceptional.
+
+By law, all Brazilian citizens have the right to possess non-confidential information from
+the Government; (b) definition of
+'population' and 'sample' so that it is possible to envision generalizations, the main
+scientific objective. In possession of complete official databases, it is sufficient to
+analyze the descriptive statistics of interest. In the case of using a sample, it is necessary
+to present the sampling plan used, as well as the estimates and errors that support each
+conclusion; (c) application of 'hypertext' search methods, with
+solutions available through algorithms developed by Computer Science10; (d) evaluation
+of 'constellations', 'types of damage' and other groupings
+through multivariate methods, such as 'discriminant analysis', 'factorial' or 'principal
+components', as well as 'machine learning' methods11 .
+
+Brin and Page (1998).
+Hastie et al (2005).
+
+Therefore, the feared industry of millionaire repairs is not a reality in Brazil, even in the
+current situation of absence of legal criteria for calculating the value of compensation
+for moral damages. (ii) There are no
+indications that the lack of legislative calculation criteria has led case law to a situation
+of disrespect for the principle of equality. On the contrary, the analysis of the
+constellations of frequent cases indicates a reasonable consistency of decisions
+regarding values. (iii) Finding the widespread use
+of punitive criteria in justifying the calculation of moral damages to be compensated.
+This indicates that, despite the doctrinal divergences that still exist, the jurisprudence
+accepts the idea that civil liability for moral damages should serve to punish/dissuade
+the author of illicit acts.
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+JURISDICTION: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+11
+10
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+in a non-probabilistic sample of size n=1044, from a universe of size N not
+Under the jurimetric approach, it can be considered that the conclusions are based on
+
+methodological improvements, such as
+generalizations without considering the chances of errors occurring. You can still think about
+
+In the light of these facts, it is suggested to review the conclusions discussed by Püschel et al.
+
+(2010) and Meyerhof Salama (2011). Likewise, further studies are encouraged.
+
+deepening in this and other applied themes.
+
+declared. Therefore, it is unreasonable to use deterministic statements such as "is not" as well as
+
+83
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+JURISDICTION: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+strive to understand and translate these questions in the best possible way.
+
+5 CONCLUSION
+
+BASU, D.; GHOSH, JK Statistical information and likelihood: a collection of critical essays.
+Springer: Verlag, 1988.
+
+By placing Law at the level of Science, the disparity between the use
+
+Jurimetry is therefore an essential tool in the methodological basis and in the
+
+BERNOULLI, N. De usu artis conjectandi in jure. Phd thesis, typis Johannis Conradi à
+Mechel, 1709.
+
+of the Brazilian judiciary and the state-of-the-art of the methods that can be used in
+
+creation of structured processes, making the legal application coherent, standardized and, therefore,
+
+BERTRAN, MP Economic analysis as a guiding criterion for judicial decisions:
+applications and limits. Study based on the review of leasing contracts with exchange
+rate parity. Master's dissertation, University of São Paulo - Faculty of Law, 2006.
+
+favor of a process of continuous improvement of the judiciary. The main issue when it comes to
+
+result, closer to reality. The formation of complete databases, with the
+
+BERTRAN, MP Take one and pay two: unusual legal consequences of currency
+devaluation. Report on the review of dollar-indexed leasing agreements. Rio de Janeiro:
+Getulio Vargas Foundation, 2007.
+
+of scientific methodology in multidisciplinary work is to make clear the role of each
+
+application of analysis methods that allow the intuitive translation of this mass of data
+
+84
+
+professional involved. Statisticians who apply their knowledge in the legal area do not
+
+lead the way towards the predictability of Loevinger's judicial decisions.
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+come to dominate the subject completely, in the same way that jurists do not become experts
+
+Together with free access to public information, a right of all citizens, Jurimetry becomes
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+in exact sciences for using quantitative thinking. Right users should
+
+important piece in the creation of a fairer society committed to the future.
+
+be able to formulate questions clearly and objectively, while statisticians must
+
+REFERENCES
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+JURISDICTION: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+HOLMES JR, OW The path of the law. [Sl]: The Floating Press, 2009.
+
+BRAZIL. Law No. 5,869, of January 11, 1973. Establishes the Code of Civil Procedure.
+
+85
+
+Available at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l5869compilada.htm>. Accessed on: 10
+Oct. 2013.
+
+KADANE, JB; FIENBERG, SE; DEGROOT, MH Statistics in the Law. United Kingdom:
+Oxford University Press, 2008.
+
+CAMPELLO E SOUZA, Fernando Menezes. Rational decisions in situations of uncertainty. 2nd
+ed. rev. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2007. (Vade Mecum).
+
+KADANE, JB; LEHOCZKY, JP Random juror selection from multiple lists. Operations Research,
+vol. 24, no. 2, p. 207-219, 1976.
+
+SAO PAULO TRAFFIC ENGINEERING COMPANY – CET. Role of taxi services in the city of São
+Paulo in the context of public transport. Technical Notes NT008/78, 1978.
+
+LOEVINGER, L. Jurimetrics: The Next Step Forward. Minnesota. LawReview, v. 33, 1948.
+
+NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE, CNJ. 100 Greatest Litigators. Available at:
+<www.cnj.jus.br>. Accessed on: 12 Mar. 2011.
+
+LOEVINGER, L. Jurimetrics: The methodology of legal inquiry. Law & Contemp. Probs., v. 28,
+1963.
+
+DEGROOT, Morris H. Optimal statistical decisions. Wiley-Interscience, 2005.
+
+MEYERHOF SALAMA, B. Moral damage in Brazil. Brasília: Secretariat of Legislative
+Affairs of the Ministry of Justice, 2011. (Series Thinking about Law 37). Available at: <file:///
+C:/Users/Fam%C3%ADlia%20Costa/Downloads/37Pensando_Direito.pdf>. Accessed on: 12
+Mar. 2011.
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+DE MULDER, R.; VAN NOORTWIJK, K; COMBRINK-KUITERS, L. Jurimetrics please!.
+
+PÜSCHEL, FP Moral damage. Thinking the Law Project 37, 2010. Available at: <http://
+participacao.mj.gov.br/pensandoodireito/wp content/
+uploads/2012/11/37Pensando_Direito.pdf> Accessed on: 29 Apr. 2014.
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+A history of legal informatics, lefis series, v. 9, no. 5, p. 147-178, 2010.
+
+STERN, Rafael B.; PEREIRA, Carlos A. de B. Statistical Information: A Bayesian
+Perspective. Entropy, v. 14, no. 11, p. 2254-2264, 2012.
+
+HALD, A. A History of Mathematical Statistics from 1750 to 1930. New York: Wiley, 1998.
+
+VIANNA, Tulio Lima. Fundamentals of computer criminal law: unauthorized access to
+computer systems. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2003.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+JURISDICTION: STATISTICS APPLIED TO LAW
+
+Reference note:
+
+ZABALA, Philip Jaeger. Jurimetry: statistics applied to law. Law and Freedom Magazine, Natal, v.
+16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014. Quarterly.
+
+Law and Liberty Magazine – RDL – ESMARN – v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+FILIPE JAEGER ZABALA
+
+Filipe Jaeger Zabala
+Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul – PUC/RS, Av. Ipiranga, 6681,
+Partenon, CEP 90.619-900. Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil.
+
+Correspondence | Correspondence:
+
+Received: 02/18/2014.
+
+Email: filipezabala@gmail.com
+
+86
+
+Statistical analysis report on the project: “Economic Analysis of Law applied to judicial
+decisions: the case of leasing contracts for the purchase of vehicles with readjustment
+clauses associated with the dollar”. IME-USP Technical Report. São Paulo, IME-USP, RAE -
+CEA - 06P06, 2006.
+
+WECHSLER, S. AND COLOMBO, DK AND BONASSI, FV AND REGINATO LGM
+
+Phone: (51) 3320.3500.
+
+Approved: 04/14/2014.
+
+FABIANO FEIJÓ SILVEIRA
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+FIRST PAGES
+Jurimetry
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Machine Translated by Google
+Machine Translated by Google
+Machine Translated by Google
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Jurimetry
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+ABOUT THE AUTHOR
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+MARCELO GUEDES NUNES
+
+Researcher interested in the areas of Business Law, evaluation of public policies
+and regulatory impact studies. Lawyer.
+Professor of Law at PUC/SP. President of the Brazilian Association of Jurimetry - ABJ.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Jurimetry
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+
+THANKS
+
+Gone are the days when research in Law was synonymous with the seclusion of a
+jurist in his library, inspecting alphabets in search of arguments of authority and the
+Roman origin of some norm. Society is clamoring for results and modern legal
+research, responding to this clamor with some delay, is becoming increasingly
+interdisciplinary and therefore based on teamwork. Only group work can launch
+research capable of understanding the factors that animate the complex, numerous
+and decentralized reality of the current legal world. The thanks I express here are,
+therefore, more than a formal “thank you very much for your support”: they are, in
+reality, the recognition of teamwork, without which this book would not even be
+conceivable. I would like to express my reverent thanks to my advisor and friend
+Fábio Ulhoa Coelho, to my trench companions Luiz Ernesto Oliveira and Pedro
+Roquim, partners and inseparable brothers, to the mathematicians Adilson Simonis,
+Carlos Pereira, Flávio Ulhoa Coelho, Julio Stern, Rafael Stern and Julio Trecenti, to
+professors and colleagues Ivo Waisberg, Manoel Queiroz Pereira Calças and Jairo
+Saddi, whose comments on the doctoral committee were of inestimable value, and to
+all the advisors, directors, associates and partners of the Brazilian Jurimetrics
+Association. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Maria Isabel, for her careful review
+of the originals, which corrected numerous excesses and obscurities in the text. Bel's
+intelligence and fine elegance made her my ideal reader model and, at the end of the
+day, everything I write aims to please her. My biggest wish for this book is that, to some extent, I have succeeded.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Jurimetry
+PREFACE
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+PREFACE
+
+The trajectory that marks the birth of the philosophy of Law is expressed through a
+normative epistemology. In its beginning and in the end, there is Kelsen: the methodological
+cuts of the pure theory of Law inaugurate it and the Kelsenian hermeneutics inadvertently
+exhausts it. The epistemology characteristic of this founding trajectory of the philosophy
+of law is normative because it delimits the conditions from which legal knowledge could
+be classified as scientific.
+
+When Scandinavian realism flourished in the 1960s, statistics had not yet experienced
+the extraordinary boost of recent decades. At least he hadn't developed to the point of
+attracting Alf Ross's attention. I believe it is indisputable that it would have a lot to dialogue
+with statistics, if the conditions that favored the emergence of Jurimetria had been
+anticipated half a century.
+
+The first reflection to which the philosophy of law was dedicated created what we could
+identify as a trajectory, quite clear, destined to reflect on the status of legal knowledge.
+Lately inserted in positivism, the philosophy of law was built on the discussion of the
+premises for the recognition of its scientific nature. Legal knowledge thus expressed the
+same "inferiority complex" nurtured by the social sciences, envious of the extraordinary
+achievements achieved by mathematics and the natural sciences.
+
+Among the legal philosophers included in the scientific trajectory, reference should be
+made to the Danish Alf Ross. An exponent of Scandinavian realism, he formulated the
+interesting notion of degrees of validity of legal norms. By bringing validity closer to the
+norm's effectiveness, it moved away from the validity/invalidity binomial. The norm will be
+more valid the more effective the judges' decisions give it. Therefore, a norm that is
+incompatible with a later or higher hierarchy is not invalid; is ineffective, as it is not
+generally applied by judges.
+
+In terms of legal epistemology, the graduation of the validity of the norm in terms of
+effectiveness, measured by the judicial decisions that apply it, leads to a normative agenda
+of scientificity that is very different from that dictated by the pure theory of Law. Once
+Ross' assumptions were accepted, a scientist would be a jurist who managed to anticipate
+the probability of a certain judicial decision. The method would consist of knowing how
+the judges are interpreting the norm under study, identifying the different interpretative
+aspects that surround it, in order to be able to anticipate not the decision to be taken in a
+specific case, but its probability. The jurist would, therefore, be a scientist to the extent
+that he managed to state, based on the examination of jurisprudence, whether there is
+greater or lesser, and to what degree, the chance of being given, in a specific case, a certain interpretation to
+
+At the same time as the emergence of Scandinavian realism, the philosophy of law opened up
+
+The Philosophy of Law was born in the 20th century. Of course, philosophers have
+always reflected on justice and law (Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, Hegel). But while philosophers
+philosophize, there is not yet properly philosophy of law. This specialized knowledge
+arises when jurists start to do philosophy.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+As I understand the issue, depending on the purpose of the knowing subject who
+focuses on the norm, his knowledge will have scientific status or not. If you aim to
+understand the reasons why a certain society was governed by a certain norm, the
+conclusions you reach can be scientific, if the correct method is adopted. But if the
+objective is to understand how a legal norm should be interpreted, the conclusions
+reached will not be scientific. Science, here, is knowledge whose statements can be
+valued as true or false. The truth value (faithful description of the real) is attributable
+to that statement submitted to methodical verification subject to confirmation and
+reconfirmation. No statement about how a legal norm is interpreted meets this
+condition.
+
+It is a rhetorical knowledge. We, jurists, know how to convince the interlocutor
+that norm x should be interpreted in way y and not in way z. We know how to operate
+with a given repertoire (text of the law, implicit principles, hermeneutic rules,
+jurisprudence precedents, doctrinal lessons, etc.) to try to make the interlocutor,
+also familiar with the same repertoire, share the same conviction about the
+interpretation of the norms that should guide the overcoming of a certain conflict.
+
+to a perspective quite different from that explored by normative epistemology. An
+anti-positivist (anti-scientificist) rupture redirects the philosophy of law. Legal
+epistemology abandons the normative bias of its founding trajectory and returns to
+the description of its object, legal knowledge. The main philosophers of law who
+inspired the rupture were Theodor Viehweg (in his study on the topical nature of
+legal concepts), Chaïm Perelman (with the rescue of rhetoric in the Aristotelian view,
+as knowledge worthy of attention) and Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Jr. ( when classifying
+legal dogmatics as technology).
+
+Technology, in turn, is the knowledge of appropriate means to achieve ends
+external to knowledge. Anyone who knows the interpretation (better, the
+interpretations) of a given legal rule, knows what means (more or less fair, more or
+less efficient, etc.) exist for society to deal with conflicts of interest.
+
+In doctrine, scientific and technological statements come together, but not in
+equal measures, with those from the latter category significantly predominating.
+
+Jurimetry is the approximation of two types of knowledge, legal and statistical. It
+can be defined as knowledge about the measurement of legal facts, understood as
+judicial and administrative decisions, signing of contracts, carrying out corporate
+operations, decreeing bankruptcy, filing company recoveries, growth in the number
+of lawsuits in progress , relationship between the number of judges and the
+population, etc. This new legal discipline helps the two levels of doctrinal knowledge.
+To science, it helps to identify the norms that should be adopted to guide the
+overcoming of conflicts of interest. It is an instrument of legal public policy. With
+legal technology, it collaborates in the definition of argumentative strategies and in
+the rationalization of a new type of argument.
+
+It collaborates with the science of Law, providing the methodology for gathering
+the empirical data necessary for the formulation of legal public policy. I register that,
+in Brazil, legal professionals are formed by acquiring only skills related to the
+resolution of conflicts of interest, in the judicial or arbitral scope, guided mainly by
+the law, but also by some other references (case law, doctrine, uses etc.). This is
+exclusively the knowledge transmitted to law students, since the implementation of
+the first legal courses among us, in 1827.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In this context, it is clear that, for some time now, attention has been paid to what we
+might call "quantitative" arguments, that is, based on statistical measurements. Its
+use is still incipient in judicial reasoning, jurisprudence and doctrine, but a
+considerable increase in this "new" form of argumentation is foreseen.
+
+This is because they are different knowledge. On the one hand, those that need to
+be mastered by the competent legal professional to act as a lawyer, judge, prosecutor,
+etc.; and on the other, those necessary for those involved in broader changes in the
+legal system. It is inappropriate and, in general, leads to disastrous results, to try to
+act in legal public policy, making use only of the knowledge employed in the
+application of the Law. In a petition, it is usual and appropriate for the lawyer to rely
+on authoritative arguments, represented by transcripts of lessons from recognized
+and consecrated doctrinaires. It is also usual and appropriate for the judge to
+mention, in the Judgment, that he is judging based on precedents in the same sense.
+They are rhetorical resources, more or less efficient, but undeniably appropriate for
+the institutionalized solution of conflicts of interest, in the judicial or arbitration
+environment. Well then, arguments from authority and precedents are irrelevant
+when discussing, for example, the pertinence and content of the amendment of a
+certain law. More than irrelevant, they are harmful to the discussion around this and
+other public policy hypotheses - when different methods must be used, including Jurimetry.
+
+Training professionals to act in the institutionalized solution of conflicts of
+interest, guided by the law and other references, does not mean, in short, preparing
+them to participate in debates around public policies in the legal area. The jurist,
+however respected and competent he may be in his work, does not necessarily meet
+the conditions to contribute, in a satisfactory way, in the elaboration of bills, drafts
+of infralegal norms, in the improvement of the administration of Justice, in the
+organization of movements academics, in the improvement of legal education or in
+any other public policy of a legal nature.
+
+superior juridical, with the training of professionals equally able to formulate, develop
+and implement public policies.
+
+The arguments are historical, that is, those that are convincing in a given time or
+situation may not be convincing in other contexts. Arguing, today, around the
+autonomy of the will and binding to the contract, adopting the same foundations as
+those that circulated a hundred years ago, is clearly unconvincing, inefficient.
+
+In terms of legal technology, Jurimetrics also has a unique contribution to make.
+Technological knowledge of Law is, as seen, composed of argumentative statements,
+designed to convince the interlocutor. Every scientific discourse has some amount
+of argumentation, since it is always addressed to other scientists in the same area of
+knowledge. But knowledge of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. don't exhaust yourself
+in argument-building technology. Lawyers, judges and scholars, if they know
+anything, know how to formulate convincing arguments, starting from certain
+premises (the rule of law, mainly).
+
+The most competent lawyer or magistrate simply may not be in a position to
+participate efficiently in public policy discussions, even those related specifically to
+his area of professional expertise. A renowned professor of procedural law is not
+necessarily prepared to contribute to improving the management of the Judiciary;
+the best-prepared civil lawyers eventually fails to collaborate, in any way, in the
+reform of the Civil Code - these are examples that could perfectly relate to any other
+field of legal knowledge: commercial, tax, criminal, etc.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The quantitative legal argument differs from the non-quantitative (qualitative?)
+ones by one particularity. It can be mathematically (statistically) tested. Anyone who
+intends to oppose the non-quantitative argument can question any passage in the
+interlocutor's speech, but will never be able to subject it to any type of test. The
+quantitative argument, in addition to being questioned in any passage of the
+reasoning constructed (statistical methodology adopted, for example), can be
+discredited in terms of the measurements made.
+
+Brazilian Jurimetry was born at PUC-SP, in the research that preceded the
+preparation of Marcelo Guedes Nunes' doctoral thesis, under my guidance. The
+project, initially, was not focused on empirical research, mentioned only as a possible
+derivation. In my role as advisor, I suggested that you pay greater attention to the
+statistical study of the corporate question. I was concerned about a certain
+improvisation and superficiality in some legal works that had ventured into empirical
+studies and, therefore, I tried to encourage Marcelo to seek the adequate rooting of
+his reflections in statistics. It was, of course, a huge challenge. Fortunately, it was
+sent to one of those rare doctoral students, whose motivation is directly proportional
+to the difficulties raised by the progress of the research; and has seriousness,
+professional experience, academic sensitivity and intellectual capacity more than enough to face them.
+
+In other words, whoever argues that the significant majority of judicial decisions
+gave interpretation y to norm x, and quantifies this predominance of jurisprudential
+understanding, can face counter-arguments of two orders. On the one hand, someone
+may call into question the usefulness of the quantification itself (if a minority gave a
+different interpretation to the same norm, another judge can also validly give it), or
+the statistical methodology employed (not all the courts in the country were
+considered; whether a long or short time cut etc.). In these cases, we will still be on
+the level of incommensurability, and the quantitative argument has nothing specific
+in relation to the others. On the other hand, someone can redo the calculations,
+starting from the same raw data and following, or not, the same methodology, and
+arrive at different quantitative results. Here, the test of the argument took place, in a
+counter-argumentative resource that does not find a similar one in the context of
+traditional legal argumentation.
+
+If the perception that quantitative arguments and counter-arguments tend to grow
+is relevant, in the context of legal discourse, legal professionals should become
+familiar with Jurimetry. Both to build arguments and to efficiently test those of the
+opposing party.
+
+At that time, my brother, Flávio Ulhoa Coelho, happened to be the Director of the
+Institute of Mathematics and Statistics of the University of São Paulo (IME-USP). he promptly
+
+Of course, if the lawyer of one of the parties, based on accurate jurimetric
+research, articulates a quantitative argument, demonstrating that 100% of the judges'
+decisions on similar causes, gave prestige to the interpretation for which he strives,
+the other lawyer will always be open to the alternative of questioning the relevance
+of this. After all, it is the essence of Law to evolve also thanks to innovative interpretations accepted by
+
+Sustaining the pertinence, or impertinence, of a certain understanding of the law in
+statistical data corresponds to the way of organizing reasoning that is entirely
+compatible with contemporary discourse; it is inevitable that it reflects on the legal argumentation.
+
+Of course, this last lawyer will have the task of convincingly arguing for the judge to
+be convinced that all his fellow magistrates, up to that point, were wrong. The task
+will be made difficult by the need to counter the quantitative argument, but it will by
+no means be made impossible.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Marcelo not only accepted the challenge and handled it, he went beyond, much beyond.
+
+Brazilian Jurimetry, under Marcelo's leadership, impresses specialized audiences
+around the world. The other preface to this book, Christoph Engel, director of the Max
+Plank Institute, testifies to how much Brazilian legal empirical research brings together
+unique conditions to participate in a privileged way in foreign and international forums.
+
+While developing research for his doctorate, he adopted fundamental initiatives for
+the dissemination and consolidation of empirical studies in Brazilian Law. It held
+annual meetings, with the aim of bringing together legal scholars interested in
+statistics, and statisticians interested in legal issues. These are events in which all
+those involved in legal empirical research in Brazil, each with their specificities and
+motivations, find a favorable environment to exchange experiences, disseminate
+results and mutually enrich themselves.
+
+In 2012, Marcelo led the founding of ABJ - Associação Brasileira de Jurimetria. This
+entity has already developed important studies for the National Council of Justice, the
+Court of Justice of São Paulo, the Public Ministry, the National Confederation of
+Industry, the Sou da Paz Institute, among others.
+
+Marcelo defended his thesis at PUC-SP on May 31, 2012. It was the first and,
+probably to date, the only multidisciplinary doctoral committee with jurists and
+statisticians at a Brazilian University. The thesis was approved with full marks, after a
+very rich epistemological debate and fertile discussion about the perspectives opened
+by the innovative approach to empirical research and its limits, without neglecting to
+consider the elucidations reached on the societal issue. Many of its conclusions
+guided the norms of the new Code of Civil Procedure, governing actions for the partial
+dissolution of a company (art. 599 et seq.), and provided subsidies to the corporate
+law book of the Commercial Code Project pending in the Senate (PLS 487/2013).
+
+This book is based on the first part of Marcelo's thesis. I insisted a lot that he find
+time, in his always busy schedule, to proceed with the preparation of this work for
+publication purposes. I insisted, in fact, because I considered this to be my last task
+in guiding the seminal work of Brazilian Jurimetry. I am very happy with the publication
+of this book, which makes the fundamentals of Jurimetry accessible to Brazilian law
+students and professionals.
+
+From the beginning, he was concerned with inserting Brazilian Jurimetrics into the
+main circles dedicated to empirical research into Law abroad. He participated in the
+events of the Society of Empirical Legal Studies - SELS, gave a lecture at the Max
+Plank Institute and always invites professors who are international references in the
+field, such as Michael Heisel, Kuo-ChangHuang, Cristoph Engel and Theodore Eisenberg, to the annual Brazilian
+
+understood the scope of the project to seek a closer academic dialogue between law
+and statistics. Flávio created the conditions for Marcelo's fruitful approach to some of
+the most distinguished Brazilian mathematicians and statisticians: Carlos Pereira,
+Adilson Simonis, Julio Stern, Sergio Oliva. This approach also involved a young
+statistician, Julio Trecenti, then in his final year of graduation.
+
+In June 2014, Marcelo and I attended the founding meeting of the Global Society of
+Empirical Legal Studies -GSELS. Representatives of prestigious academic institutions
+from the USA, Germany, Italy, India, Israel, Singapore and England participated in this
+important event. ABJ is the only entity in Latin America invited to join the GSELS.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Fabio Ulhoa Coelho
+
+Full Professor of Commercial Law at PUC-SP.
+
+Jurimetry is a new discipline in the inexhaustibly fascinating legal knowledge. I had
+the privilege of accompanying his birth in Brazil. I dare say that my happiness in
+preface to this book is perhaps equal to that which takes the spirit of the astronomer
+when he discovers a new star.
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Jurimetry
+
+PRESENTATION
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+PRESENTATION
+
+The empirical movement in law is advancing rapidly. All the big US schools want
+to hire empirical lawyers and scholars. The Conference on Legal Empirical Studies
+has had a growing audience. The Journal of Empirical Legal Studies is thriving, as
+are its competitors. Increasingly, the best of Academia Jurídica is published in
+specialized journals and much of this work is empirical. And like every change of
+reference, the emergence of legal (read: quantitative) empiricism has more than one
+cause. Technology is certainly not the most important thing. Some statistical
+techniques that arguably suit legal research questions require powerful computation:
+Bayesian analysis, structural equation models, and bootstrapping are examples.
+More importantly, the almost ubiquitous availability of computers makes it possible
+to compile huge databases that originate directly from the court system. Some
+countries have shifted the exchange of documents at trial to computerized interaction.
+Then the raw material of the empirical work will already be available in an electronic
+form. Even better if that raw material isn't just images of text, but already encoded
+and ready for analysis. Brazil is at the forefront of this development. It has a database
+of unique, unprecedented breadth and depth. And Marcelo Guedes Nunes is at the
+forefront of analysis, generating these datasets, making them available to the legal
+community and exploiting them to increase our knowledge of what the law is.
+
+After all, Law is not (just) another Social Science. For Law, sophistication is not a
+value per se, nor is elegance, or the surprising ability to solve a seemingly intractable
+statistical problem. Law governs people's lives. A good scholarly production does
+not lose touch with this final purpose of any legal reasoning. How does the
+fundamentally different definition of research purpose affect the use of quantitative
+techniques in legal research?
+
+When legal theorists began to organize an argument around the "scientific" concept
+of causality, natural science had already become skeptical. He reports on the many
+reasons why one might question Mother Nature's determinism and explains why a
+probabilistic model can seem appealing. Now, if physics and biology already move
+away from deterministic models, shouldn't those interested in social reality adopt
+the same posture a fortiori? Undoubtedly, the interaction of human actors adds so
+many other levels of complexity that in this field it seems even less plausible to
+assume the existence of certainties or "natural laws".
+
+Everyone would understand if Marcelo Guedes Nunes had written a book that
+extolled the technical achievements of his country and the role that the Brazilian
+Association of Jurimetry - of which he is president - plays. Such a book could also
+be an opportunity to boast your technical skills or surprise the legal community in
+Brazil and abroad with the incredible power of Brazilian data. He wisely chose not to.
+
+This question both motivates and organizes the book. It begins with a troubling
+question from legal theory: Is the statistical approach to legal questions inappropriate
+in the first place? Digging deep into legal philosophy and contrasting it with (nonlegal)
+epistemology, Marcelo Guedes Nunes gives us a surprising answer.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Against this background, Marcelo Guedes Nunes defines the appropriate scope of
+empirical knowledge in Law. He makes his readers understand the seemingly
+paradoxical nature of the enterprise. Didn't we want to "become scientific" in order to
+give more confidence to our judgments? And now you come to tell me that all
+quantitative statements are, at best, probably true?! Or, more precisely, that the
+probability of a statement being false is small enough that we can assume it is true,
+"small enough" here being a matter of convention. Why would a lawyer be willing to
+adopt such a weak methodology? Marcelo Guedes Nunes gives two answers: (1) first,
+because the (social) world of interest of Law is not deterministic, (2) and even if some
+phenomenon of interest really were deterministic, Law would not have direct access
+to it . He needs to make inferences from the observations he is capable of making.
+
+Christoph Engel
+
+Executive Director of the Max Planck Institute, Humanities Sector.
+
+The book thus provides a highly valuable service to the legal community. He not
+only introduces jurists to the nature, power, and limitations of quantitative empirical
+analyses. The book also makes lawyers understand what quantitative analysis can
+really give them: no magical extinction of legal uncertainty, but a much more controlled
+way of dealing with that uncertainty, of reducing it to the limit of the possible and of
+quantifying the remaining risk. of fallibility. For this reason, the book should not be
+read only by legal scholars interested in better understanding this empirical movement.
+Nor should the book be read only by traditional lawyers interested in better
+understanding what they stand to gain from quantitative analysis. The book should be
+read by all legal practitioners interested in a lucid analysis of the nature of legal
+decision-making.
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+1
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+Jurimetria
+CHAPTER 1. THE END OF BIBLIOGRAPHIC WEIGHTLING
+
+Chapter 1. The end of bibliographic weightlifting
+
+Interestingly, the social sciences were still trying, at the end of the 19th century, to realize a deterministic
+ideal, when the great classical sciences had already become disillusioned with the explanatory potential of
+theories based on the idea of exact natural laws. Human behavior researchers - in essence, highly complex,
+uncertain and variable - were slow to become aware of the value that statistical techniques could add to
+social research and insisted on developing mechanistic theories about man.
+
+The 20th century saw a drastic change in the relationship with knowledge. The classical model of
+science germinated in Greek antiquity, which repudiates uncertainty and admits only knowledge associated
+with absolute truth, was gradually replaced by a stochastic model, which accepts variability and uncertainty.
+In several branches of science, including the more traditional ones (such as physics and chemistry),
+knowing no longer means having control over all causes of production of a fact and over its future behavior.
+The researcher's object is no longer the discovery of invariable natural laws and universal cogency, capable
+of predetermining the results of experiments with any degree of precision.
+
+This scenario was modified throughout the 20th century and today geography, medicine, sociology,
+administration and economics, to name a few examples, are branches of
+
+"The true journey of discovery consists not in looking for new landscapes, but in
+
+Currently, researchers are aware that the complexity of certain processes makes it impossible to reduce
+their causes to a deterministic model. Science has abandoned its claim to be exhaustive in the investigation
+of causes and accurate in predicting the future, to admit an incomplete knowledge, which seeks only to
+make less mistakes. Within this new and more modest approach, traditional components of scientific
+thought take on new features. Instead of natural laws, we have probabilistic models. Instead of deterministic
+causal relationships, we have correlation and regression indices. And instead of certain results, we have
+distribution frequencies of possible
+
+results.
+
+Such changes led historians to coin the expression "Statistical Revolution" to describe this shift in
+trajectory described by human knowledge. From the second half of the 19th century, statistical methods
+gradually began to be used in all fields of knowledge, including the bastions of classical scientific thought
+such as astronomy and physics. The focus of scientific research ceases to be the isolated individual,
+governed by mechanical laws, and becomes the study of the different characteristics of a population. The
+new model of knowledge begins to be based on the pragmatism of statistics, with its techniques for
+controlling uncertainties and measuring variability, and aimed not at the exact study of a single individual,
+but at the approximate description of entire populations.
+
+see with new eyes"
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+humanities that largely use statistical techniques and probability models.
+
+Law is a latecomer science in this movement towards statistics. The jurist studies
+the laws without worrying about their practical results. Law graduates (future lawyers,
+judges, legislative consultants, prosecutors and legal directors of companies) are
+trained to discuss ad nauseum all the hypothetical meanings attributable to a law,
+but, due to the lack of basic knowledge in statistics and empirical research, they do
+not have any preparation to verify the practical consequences that these senses
+produce. Our theses are still carried out exclusively within libraries and are limited
+to compiling mountains of citations, in the academic modality that I usually call
+bibliographic weightlifting. As a result, we know almost everything other jurists have
+said about the law, but we know almost nothing about what goes on in the outside
+world. This bibliophile fetish of ours is reminiscent of the joke of the fanatical
+gourmet who defined life as a boring interval between meals. For jurists, life is that
+boring space between one visit to the library and another.
+
+Part of this alienation can be explained by the idea of mechanical jurisprudence.
+Fans of mechanical jurisprudence believe that the law predetermines judicial
+decisions and that, therefore, its meaning can be understood independently of the
+courts' practice. Within this mechanistic logic, the judge has no will of his own and
+serves as an inert means through which the meaning of the law is manifested. Hence
+the reason for the study of court practice to be overlooked as a predictable particular
+manifestation of the general meaning of one of the possible meanings of the law,
+within the limits in which it was defined by doctrinal theory.
+
+Not by chance, the mechanistic view of law has always found a focus of resistance
+in commercialist lawyers. The entrepreneur's creativity and market dynamics meant
+that the role of the courts in the construction of commercial law was different. If in
+public law (as in tax or criminal law) the idea of legality
+
+No laboratory launches a medicine or treatment without its effectiveness and side
+effects having been subjected to rigorous statistical control tests. Administration
+and sociology also carry out research using empirical methodologies, largely
+dependent on the elaboration of statistical inferences. Economics was, without a
+doubt, the human science that best knew how to explore, through econometrics, the
+potential that statistical techniques offer to explain people's behavior. This is the
+reason why economics went from being a subject in law curricula to becoming the
+most influential social science in history in just over 50 years.
+
+This premise is, however, false. The meaning of the law as defined in the manuals
+is just one of the factors that interfere in the conformation of concrete law, defined
+here as the set of individual orders addressed to specific citizens (such as judgments
+and contracts). If we take, for example, a court ruling, it is reasonable to assume that
+its ultimate meaning is the product not only of what the law says, but also of an
+intricate and complex set of social, economic and cultural factors involved in an
+elaborate psychosocial process of conviction. , influenced by factors such as the
+political and personal values of the magistrate, empathy with the parties, the line of
+argument chosen by them, the life experience of the judge, the institutional pressure
+exerted by control bodies of the Judiciary, the meaning of precedents given in similar
+cases, among countless others. To evaluate concrete law, investigating the
+hypothetical meanings of the law only solves part of the problem. It is also necessary
+to build models capable of describing individual cases and understanding how they
+arose and why they are being resolved in this or that way.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Through Constitutional
+
+Amendment n. 45 of December 30, 2004, the National Council of Justice - CNJ was
+then created, which aims to control the administrative and financial performance of
+the courts and supervise the fulfillment of functional duties by the judges.
+
+strict unilaterally imposed by state authority makes sense, in private law, especially
+in commercial law, it is common for disputes to arise involving situations without
+legal provision, in which judges need to create law where it does not exist. It was like
+this with corporations, with franchising, with the internet and it will continue to be
+like this with bioengineering, robotics and other cutting-edge areas.
+
+With the aim of collecting data about the system, the CNJ began a series of
+research to understand how many and what processes were taking place in Brazil,
+with special interest in investigating the causes of slowness. These initiatives sought
+to provide elements for the adequate fulfillment of Resolution no. 70 of March 18,
+2009, which instituted for the first time the elaboration of strategic planning for the
+Judiciary. The planning aimed to build an overview of the situation of the courts,
+including the number of judges, employees and processes. Therefore, one of the
+first surveys conceived was called "100 biggest litigants" and its purpose was to list
+the one hundred largest entities and legal entities involved in processes in the
+Brazilian Judiciary, excluding the Public Ministry and the processes that were being
+processed in the Criminal, Electoral, Military and Children and Youth.
+
+The first data, released in 2011 with files not filed until December 31, 2010, revealed
+surprising numbers. The report estimated that these 100 entities (including Banco
+do Brasil and União) accounted for approximately 20% of the total number of cases
+pending in the country.
+
+Hence the reason why American commercialists of the early 20th century, such
+as Karl Llewellyn, Theodore S. Hope, Jerome Frank and William Underhill Moore, led
+efforts to recognize the creative role of courts in the formation of law, in the
+movement known as legal realism. In Brazil, the arrival of this realistic vision ended
+up taking a while, but today it has finally arrived and has brought together high-level
+researchers from most regions of the country, including professors from the law
+schools of the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, the University of São Paulo
+and the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in Rio and São Paulo, to name a few examples.
+The movement in Brazil is also characterized by the active participation of the
+Judiciary which, pressured by a slow system and incapable of managing an
+enormous mass of tens of millions of cases, ended up being forced to react. The
+example of the survey of the 100 largest litigators illustrates how Brazilian judges
+have been participating in this transformation. Until 2004, the Brazilian Judiciary did
+not have a central body dedicated to managing its operation. At that time, the
+president of the Federal Supreme Court assumed the administration of the judicial
+system without even knowing how many cases were being processed in the 91 courts of the federation.
+
+In addition, it was
+
+the Public Power itself, at the Federal, State and Municipal level, which was
+responsible for most of the cases involving the biggest litigants, such as the National
+Institute of Social Security - INSS, with 22.33%, alongside heavyweights of the
+economy, such as Caixa Econômica Federal - CEF, with 8.50%. This concentration
+of litigiousness in a few people and in specific branches of economic activity shed
+light on the discussion on the improvement of jurisdictional provision. In addition to
+the traditional solutions, involving reforms in the structure of justice and procedural
+legislation, it was perceived that the solution to the clogging of the courts involved
+the creation of a channel of understanding with these entities. A significant part of
+the problems could be resolved if only fifteen of those hundred people sat down at a
+table for a frank conversation with the Judiciary. Thus, for the first time, a consensus
+was reached that not only judges and legislators had a role to play in solving the problem of hyperlitigation,
+
+two
+
+4
+
+3
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+And that's exactly what happened. The discomfort arising from the inclusion of their
+names on the list and the fear of reprisal encouraged a healthy race among the major
+litigants to reduce this mass of processes. Banco Itaú, for example, carried out a review
+of its internal management practices to distinguish cases in which the bank had a real
+right to be defended, from others in which an error against the customer had actually
+been committed. For these last cases, a policy called defense of the agreement was
+instituted , in which the bank's objective was not to win the lawsuit, but to obtain a
+friendly settlement with the client. Caixa Econômica Federal also started a policy of
+withdrawing proposed appeals against contrary theses already pacified in higher courts
+and which had been brought only to fulfill the institutional duty to appeal to the end. In
+2014, these efforts resulted in an agreement between banks, governments and telephone
+companies around a National Non-Judicialization Strategy (Enajud), with the aim of
+unburdening justice.
+
+Of course, the problem of litigation in Brazil is far from being resolved and since the
+creation of the CNJ the numbers have been getting worse. But the lesson of this first
+decade reinforces the need for public administrators to put aside improvisation and
+intuition in order to become professional and objectively investigate how the legal order
+works. And that's what empirical research is about: knowing reality to solve problems.
+This statement may sound like a platitude, but for the law it still expresses a truth that is
+not always remembered: a serious scientific effort must first investigate reality and then
+propose solutions. It is the impartial observation of things that allows us to understand
+how the system operates and detect the causes behind the problems in our daily lives.
+Jurists need to get off their books, leave the libraries for a moment and start investigating
+the real world. Literary erudition was already impressive in the past, before access to
+information was popularized on the internet.
+Today, what is impressive is the creation of an original solution to an effective problem.
+It has never been so easy to quote others' ideas. It's hard to come up with an original idea.
+
+Associação Brasileira de Jurimetria - ABJ, to name a few. What is this change
+due to? I believe that several factors collaborated, from the emergence of new
+technologies to the increase in the complexity of legal activity in general. There are
+several explanations, of which I list here the six that I consider the most important.
+
+but the big litigants also needed to review their internal practices to combat the underlying
+causes of this colossal volume of proceedings.
+
+First, the insufficiency of theoretical efforts to understand the law and promote
+reforms. Second, the increase in complexity and number of legal institutes in Brazil,
+creating a mass of cases impossible to manage without the help of empirical
+methodologies. Third, but not least, the computerization of courts, local authorities, law
+firms and entities linked to law in general, which facilitates access to data on the
+functioning of law. Fourth, the development of statistical techniques and the increase in
+the calculation capacity of computers. Fifth, the increasing influence of empirical research
+methodologies in the social sciences. And, finally, sixthly, the development of society,
+which is increasingly demanding quality services.
+
+It is true that, despite some isolated pockets of resistance, this is a message that
+many legal practitioners have already understood. In parallel to the CNJ's research
+programs, several empirical investigation efforts began to emerge in Brazil, including
+initiatives by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation - FGV, the Brazilian Society of Public Law -
+SBDP, the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo - PUCSP, the of Applied Economic
+Research - IPEA, the University of São Paulo - USP and the
+6
+
+5
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+FOOTNOTES
+
+Namely: 24 courts of Labor Justice, 27 courts of State Justice and 5 federal courts, 5 special courts
+
+(STF, STJ, TST, STM and TSE), 3 courts of State Military Justice and 27 courts of State Electoral
+
+Justice.'
+
+[www.cnj.jus.br/images/pesquisas
+
+Available [espaco-vital.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/2629087/saiu-o-listao-dos-maiores-litigantes-najustica-brasileirao-estado-do-rs-figura-num-indesejavel-1-lugar-como
+-author-and-or-reuin:Availablejudiciarias/pesquisa_100_maiores_litigantes.pdf].in:In
+the original: Le véritable voyage de découverte ne consiste pas à chercher de nouveaux
+paysages, mais à avoir de nouveaux yeux. Marcel Proust in A la recherche du temps perdus.
+
+two
+
+3
+
+4
+1
+Every time statistical techniques are applied to understand some dimension of
+law - for example, a type of judicial conflict, or the behavior of witnesses in court, or
+bills that deal with criminal matters in the National Congress, or fiscal executions - a
+plethora of new results appear, many of which are counterintuitive. It's like traveling
+for the first time on a newly discovered continent, where everything is new and
+interesting. Empirical research opens our horizons of knowledge and allows us to
+investigate the concrete plane of law and the institutional spaces where norms are
+created. This is privileged access to what actually happens in the legal world: which
+real conflicts are knocking on the doors of the courts, which aspects of the law do
+not meet the demands of the population, which concrete effects a new legal provision
+has on society.
+
+Due to the richness of the results, the pressure to use statistics in the study of
+law is giving rise to a new area of knowledge: Jurimetrics . Jurimetrics starts from
+the premise that law is not limited to the theoretical study of laws. We must also
+study the decision-making processes through which all norms, general and
+individual, are formulated. Jurimetrics also assumes that this study needs to be
+concrete, that is, it must locate its object in time and space and investigate the main
+factors capable of interfering in its results. And Jurimetria believes that the study of
+decision-making processes must abandon deterministic pretensions and admit in
+the academic environment what has always been admitted in the professional
+environment: that the complexity of the legal order does not allow absolute
+statements and that the law, like everything that involves the will human, is variable
+and uncertain. Therefore, understanding the law is, first of all, describing its variabilities and controlling
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+5
+
+6
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+in-the-demands-placed-in-the-state-justice-departments-all-over].
+
+Available at: [www.gazetadopovo.com.br/Economia/conteudo.phtml?id=1480836].
+
+For an overview of legal consequentialism in Brazil: Salama, Bruno Meyerhof and Pargendler,
+Mariana. Law and Consequence in Brazil: in search of a discourse on the method, In:
+Revista de Direito Administrativo (RDA) 262 (2013): 95-144.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Greek contributions to mathematics emerged as a result of a civilization focused on
+theoretical speculation about the world, a cosmopolitan culture that valued exact and
+universal knowledge. Mathematics, philosophy and religion made up, for the Greeks, a
+common area aimed, at the same time, at understanding the genesis of the world, solving
+practical day-to-day problems (such as, for example, the cure of diseases and the
+development of civil construction projects) and the moral rules of good living (what is
+good, how to act correctly). Understanding the relationship of the Greeks with knowledge
+presupposes understanding the role of mathematics as a reference for perfect and
+rigorous knowledge, associated with absolute, infallible knowledge, disconnected from the needs of everyday
+
+The story of Pythagoras (570 BC-495 BC) illustrates this relationship. Little is known
+about the life of this philosopher. The main records date from the 3rd and 4th centuries
+after Christ and are authored by Diogenes Laertius and the Neoplatonists, Porphyry and
+Iamblichus. Pythagoras is known to have founded a religious movement known as
+Pythagoreanism, which flourished in what is now the Crotona region of southern Italy.
+His followers, the Pythagoreans, are responsible for the first effort to create a general
+philosophy based on mathematical abstraction. The Pythagorean "ecolé" (from the Greek
+ÿÿÿÿÿ, or idleness) was dedicated to the observation of the world and theoretical bios
+(from the Greek ÿÿÿÿ ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ, or life of contemplation), disconnected from work and
+practical problems. The Pythagoreans venerated numbers and geometric figures and
+recognized in them an abstract and independent existence that, despite being immaterial,
+is capable of offering resistance to the intellect. For the Pythagoreans, numbers
+constituted the immutable essence of the universe, and there was a coincidence between the acquisition of
+
+As early as 600 BC, Thales of Miletus recorded that the diameter of a
+circle divided it into two identical semicircles, and that in an isosceles triangle, the angles
+facing equal sides were also equal. The Pythagoreans, in their veneration for numbers
+and geometric shapes, transformed geometry into an object of worship and, consequently,
+already in the fifth century before Christ, had developed much of the geometry that
+centuries later would compose books I, II, IV and VI of Euclid's Elements.
+
+The Greeks were known for their mathematical genius, with seminal contributions to
+geometry, arithmetic, trigonometry and algebra. The list of great Hellenic mathematicians
+including Diophantus of Alexandria (240 BC-170 BC), Archimedes of Syracuse (287
+BC-212 BC), Euclid of Alexandria (360 BC-295 BC), Pythagoras of Samos (570 BC-495
+BC ) and Thales of Miletus (624 BC-546 BC), coincides with a significant portion of the
+parentage of this subject.
+
+"The most important conceptual event in physics in the 20th century was the
+discovery that the world is not deterministic. Causality, long the bastion of
+metaphysics, has been overthrown, or at least shaken: the past does not exactly
+determine what happens in the future. future. This event was preceded by a more
+gradual change. During the 19th century, it could be realized that the world can be regular and still
+universals of nature. A space had been opened up for chance."
+
+I. Greek Mathematics
+
+1
+
+two
+
+3
+
+Chapter 2. Determinism and the Statistical Revolution
+
+Jurimetry
+CHAPTER 2. DETERMINISM AND STATISTICAL REVOLUTION
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It is said that the Pythagorean school would have separated into two currents. One
+more focused on religious and ritualistic aspects, called "acousmaticoi" (from the Greek
+ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ), meaning those who speak and hear, and another dedicated to the study of
+numbers and their relationships, known as "mathematicoi" (from the Greek ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ), or those who investigate.
+
+Another example is Plato's relationship with geometry. Plato (428 BC-348 BC), alongside
+Socrates, of whom he was a student, and Aristotle, of whom he was a teacher, forms part
+of the great triad of classical Greek philosophy. Plato lived in Athens and is the author of
+the most important philosophical record of Antiquity, the thirty-six Socratic dialogues. The
+intimate connection between Plato's philosophy and geometry appears in the dialogue
+Timaeus in which Socrates debates with Critias, Hemocrates and Timaeus of Locri, the
+latter a Pythagorean philosopher, his cosmogony (ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ, or origin of the world).
+
+The "acousmata" were orally transmitted maxims relating to habits, such as, for example,
+the prohibition against eating broad beans, picking up crumbs on the floor, eating meat
+(the Pythagoreans were vegetarians) and wearing white in religious ceremonies. The
+"mathematicoi" dedicated themselves to the study of mathematical demonstrations and
+relationships whose truth was independent of oral traditions and could be revealed directly by the intellect.
+
+In the dialogue, Timaeus distinguishes the physical world (changeable, unstable and
+precarious) from the eternal world (immutable, fixed and intelligible) and, starting from the
+premise that everything has a cause, suggests that the physical world would have been
+created by a first cause, or causeless cause, called Demiurge, based on an ideal model of
+perfect geometric shapes. Timaeus claimed that the universe is spherical, as the sphere is
+the most perfect, proportional and omnimorphic figure known, and reduces the apparent
+reality of the world to five basic polyhedral figures, the first four associated with the four
+natural elements: the tetrahedron with fire, the octahedron in air, the icosahedron in water
+and the cube on earth. According to this geometric cosmogony, with the exception of the
+cube, the other three polyhedra result from combinations of equilateral triangles (four,
+eight and twenty) and the faces of each of these polyhedra can be divided into straight,
+scalene or isosceles triangles, with the properties Physics of the elements (such as the
+immobility of earth or the ability of water to put out fire) were attributed to the relationships between the sides
+
+One of the main "acousmata" attributed a mystical character to the first four numbers
+(1, 2, 3 and 4), the "tetraktýs", due to the relationships and mathematical demonstrations.
+For example, the four numbers of "tetraktýs" combine in pairs, forming the musical
+intervals of the octave (2/1, 3/2 and 4/3). Furthermore, the sum of the "tetraktýs" is
+equivalent to the perfect number 10, which is the second triangular number, after six.
+Triangular numbers have the same structure as quadratic numbers, but with one difference.
+While quadratic numbers are those that, organized in points, draw a square, for example,
+the number 16 makes up a square with 4 points on each side (hence the name square root),
+triangular numbers draw an equilateral triangle, for example, the number 10 makes up a
+triangle with 4 points on each side.
+
+5
+
+4
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The Greeks identified the knowledge of truth with exact and invariable formulations.
+His model of science was arithmetic and geometry. Initially developed for practical
+applications, such as measuring the height of buildings by shadow length and plotting
+rural areas, geometry (from the Greek ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ, measure of the earth) and arithmetic
+(from the Greek ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ, number) were absorbed from Egypt and Asia by the Greek
+culture and there they developed until they were united in an abstract theory. Under the
+influence of Greek thought, mathematics ceased to be a measurement tool to become an
+autonomous language, with elements and rules independent of the concrete world. What
+was an applied science gradually became an abstract form of contemplation of ideal
+objects turned to the immaterial, perfect and immutable reality of numbers, geometric
+figures and their relationships.
+
+Therefore, for classical Greek thought, knowing meant the same as apprehending an
+immutable, invariable and absolute truth. Knowledge was situated in the field
+
+Most of the ideas in the work were not his own. However,
+
+Euclid's genius appears not in the conception of the theorems, but in the structuring of
+their presentation. The Elements is the first work that systematizes a field of knowledge,
+fixing self-evident axioms from which all theorems are deduced. There are twenty-three
+definitions, five geometric postulates and five additional postulates, from which four
+hundred and sixty-five theorems are deduced. The book forms a logically coherent
+whole, in which each statement is proved, only accepted logical rules are applied, and all
+reasoning is explicit.
+
+But the best approximation to what mathematics (especially geometry) meant in the
+Greek world is in the work of Euclid.
+
+Despite being one of the cradles of mathematics, it is noteworthy that the Greek
+civilization did not record any contribution linked to what is now called Statistics. It is
+interesting to think about the reasons for the distance between this great mathematical
+culture of antiquity and the set of measurement methods most used today.
+
+Euclid lived and taught in Alexandria (around 300
+BC) and, once again, little is known about his life and work, much of which has disappeared.
+
+The concern with the description of the geometric structure of the world also appears
+in book VII of the Republic, in which Plato prescribes what would be the ideal education
+to be given to young Athenian citizens, who would be responsible for the government of
+his ideal state. Education should be based exclusively on the four branches of
+mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, stereometry and astronomy), considered the only
+true knowledge and therefore useful and worthy of being transmitted. What is interesting
+here is that the value of mathematics is not in the practical possibility of calculating
+supplies or movements of war battalions, but rather in its ability to train intelligence and
+bring the intellect closer to the ideals of goodness 8 and beauty .
+
+Euclid is recognized as the first to use the expression "as we wanted to
+demonstrate" (from the Greek ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ - hòper èdei dèixai or, in Latin, quod erat
+demonstrandum). There are no intuitions, digressions, fallacies, hidden reasonings or
+unnecessary concepts, so that the argumentation can be accompanied, step by step,
+from the premises (the postulates or axioms) to its conclusions (the theorems), through
+a route as rigorous and economical. The work organized all knowledge of classical
+geometry, which, since then, came to be known as Euclidean geometry, and set the
+premises on which the subsequent study of the so-called Euclidean space was built.
+
+Tradition says that he was educated by Neoplatonists, in Athens, and that he was
+Ptolemy's teacher. Euclid wrote the most influential scientific work of all time, The
+Elements, a compendium organized into thirteen books that contained all the geometric
+knowledge of his time.
+6
+
+10
+
+11
+
+7
+
+9
+
+II. Aversion to Statistics
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In its broadest version, determinism is the conception that the current states in the
+universe are the unique and necessary result of the states that preceded them. Nature
+is investigated as a system composed of chains of facts, all linked together by causal
+relationships. Each fact is at the same time an effect of previous causes and a cause of
+subsequent effects, in a chain in which there is no room for variation. Deterministic
+thinking assumes that each event is entirely contained in its causes and, therefore,
+exhaustive knowledge of the causes is sufficient to access integral knowledge of its
+future effects.
+
+As a result, despite being at the same time expert gamblers, inspired philosophers
+and brilliant mathematicians, the Greeks were not able to unite these three qualities and
+develop statistical methods and a theory of probability to deal with problems that
+involved some degree of uncertainty and unpredictability. Israeli historian Samuel
+Sambursky credits this difficulty to the rigid distinction drawn by the Greeks between
+truth and probability. Plato, for example, separated truth from mere
+possibility, which would be incompatible with the theoretical edifice of geometry, then
+already in an advanced state of construction.
+
+Peter Bernstein, American economist and historian, also sees in this aversion to
+approximation knowledge the origin of the Greeks' relative lack of interest in probability.
+Despite "probability being a discipline tailor-made for the Greeks, given their fondness
+for games, their mathematical skills, their mastery of logic and their obsession with
+proof", unfortunately this civilization never seriously "ventured into this fascinating
+world", because for them the truth "was only what could be demonstrated by logic and
+its axioms", disqualifying as precarious the apparent truths that could be demonstrated
+only through empirical experimentation.
+
+As a consequence, deterministic sciences aim to
+
+Scientific determinism consists of the belief that the universe is a system governed
+by absolute laws, which allow the rational prediction of any future event with any degree
+of accuracy.
+
+This separation between knowledge and uncertainty (to whatever degree) is
+responsible for defining, over the next eighteen hundred years, the Western concept of
+science. Due to Greek influence, the universe came to be seen as a system that could
+be fully explained rationally, and knowledge was associated with theories capable of
+apprehending, in its entirety, the explanation of its exact functioning, without any room
+for doubt. Thus, the essential philosophical assumption of modern knowledge and the
+antagonistic pole of statistical thinking was fixed: scientific determinism.
+
+dogmatic of certainty, so that the contingent aspects of everyday life, such as the result
+of a harvest, the chances of a game or a defeat in a battle, despite being relevant from a
+practical point of view, ended up being relegated to the mystical speculation of the
+oracles. Despite being skilful players, the Greeks understood that luck and fortune,
+constantly present in all everyday problems, were opposed to mathematical knowledge,
+so that the accidents and fortuities of earthly life did not constitute suitable objects for
+the speculation of the philosophers and mathematicians. They were whims of
+unfathomable divine designs.
+
+Within a deterministic perspective, the position of each element of
+the system is a necessary result of the immediately previous position of all other
+elements. Knowing means accessing the relationship between initial and final conditions
+of an event, including not only an omniscience of the causes involved, but also mastery
+over the laws that govern the transformation between states. Thus, with knowledge of
+an initial state and the laws that govern its transformation, it would be possible to
+predetermine all future states of a system. 15
+12
+
+14
+
+16
+
+13
+
+III. Scientific determinism
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Democritus (460 BC-370 BC) is, alongside his teacher, Leucippus, the father of the
+doctrine called atomism. The records of atomism are mainly due to Aristotle, who saw in
+its mechanism and repudiation of theology a dangerous opposition to his own doctrine.
+For the atomists, matter was not infinitely divisible and was composed of indivisible
+particles, the atoms (from the Greek ÿÿÿÿÿÿ, without division), of different shapes and
+weights, eternally in motion and mechanically interacting in the midst of chaos (from the
+Greek ÿÿÿÿ, void ). For the atomists, the movement of the stars, earthquakes, the gallop of
+a horse or human behavior were all effects of the movement of these particles.
+
+The strength of determinism lies in the predictability of its statements, since, once the
+initial conditions and transformation laws are known, there are ways to accurately
+predetermine the future states to be assumed by the system. In determinism, time is
+considered illusory. Once the laws of nature are known, understanding a given present
+state would allow immediate visualization of the past state that originated it, and the future
+state that will result from it. Furthermore, for the determinist, time is reversible, since past,
+present and future are interchangeable, and uncertainties are the consequence of a
+cognitive limitation, which prevents us from understanding the functioning of what we propose to analyze.
+
+The search for a timeless and infallible knowledge of determinism, capable of
+overcoming the contingencies and limitations of the uncertainties of earthly life, is also
+associated with a scientific form of divinization of man.
+
+The rigorous mechanical principles that govern this interaction of atoms and to which,
+therefore, the functioning of the universe would obey is the first major historical reference
+to the principle of natural legality.
+
+This claim to achieve knowledge with divinizing characteristics permeated the history
+of science. From Antiquity until 1905 (the year of the special theory of relativity), science
+was mostly deterministic, as illustrated by three historical examples: Democritus, Laplace
+and Hobbes.
+
+Pierre-Simon Laplace, astronomer, physicist and mathematician, was born and lived in
+18th century France. Despite being the author of an exhaustive work on probability
+( Analytical Theory of Probabilities, from 1812), Laplace believed that the universe
+comprised an invariable whole, in which past, present and future are linked in a chain of
+infinite causality. Trapped in this succession of events, the future would already be
+defined today and the uncertainty regarding tomorrow would only arise from our ignorance regarding the current
+
+Nobel Prize-winning biologist Ilya Prigogine, taking
+advantage of Leibniz's ideas, summarizes the automated view of nature and its relationship
+with religion by stating that for the determinist, nature is an automaton mechanism in
+which there is no room for choice. Free will is just an illusion of those who do not perceive
+the forces that move everything in the universe, and the closer we get to knowing these
+forces, the closer we are to a divine perspective of the world.
+
+Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury was a social theorist born in England in 1588 and
+
+build exhaustive theories, capable of identifying general laws and accurately predetermining
+the evolution of the systems they analyze.
+
+Thus, for an intellect that knew the laws of transformation and the positions of a given
+state of nature, nothing would be uncertain, and the entire future, as well as the past,
+would be present before its eyes. This omniscient intellect became known as Laplace's
+Demon, and its consciousness can be seen as the deterministic ideal: the mastery of the
+natural laws of transformation added to an exhaustive knowledge of present states, which
+culminates in an absolute ability to predict the future.
+
+19
+
+18
+
+20
+
+21
+17
+
+22
+
+IV. Exponents of determinism
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Hobbes declares himself a materialist and lists,
+
+along the lines of Os Elementos, by Euclides, the axiomatic definitions of his theory,
+based on the notion of movement and on the ideas of memory, passion and imagination.
+From this structure of movement, attraction and repulsion, nineteen natural laws are
+presented that predetermine human behavior. For Hobbes, man is a mechanical entity
+composed of matter and movement, governed, therefore, by the same laws as physical
+facts. As in Democritus, human life is reduced to movement, and the passions are
+explained as forces of attraction and aversion, transforming man into a mechanical
+figure, moved by impulses of attraction for pleasure and repulsion for pain. Free will is
+denied and the state of nature is described as the pre-contractual situation in which
+men fight driven by passions for the dominion of one over the other (from the Latin bellum omnium contra
+
+Finally, Karl Popper created a famous metaphor using the images of clouds and
+clocks to explain what would ultimately be determinism. Intuitively, we
+associate clocks with mechanisms with regular and predictable functioning, while
+clouds are seen as objects with erratic and unpredictable behavior. For the determinist,
+the distinction between clouds and clocks would not be real, but just a consequence of
+the degree of understanding we have of one and the other. All the clouds would work
+with the same regularity as the clocks, but because they operate a simpler mechanism,
+we have detailed knowledge about how the clocks work, while the mass of molecules in
+the clouds would not allow this same level of detail.
+
+In his main work, The Leviathan,
+
+However, the peak of a movement is the harbinger of its exhaustion, and, from the
+19th century onwards, determinism began to expose its limitations. The reaction of
+scientists to the new difficulties posed by deterministic explanations marks one of the
+most important moments in the history of the evolution of knowledge, called the Statistical Revolution.
+
+Since Euclid, no other theory has strengthened deterministic ideals more than
+Newtonian mechanics, one of the most important scientific discoveries in history.
+Gravitation expressed the deterministic ideal: a mechanical, simplifying theory, of
+universal validity and with a high capacity for prediction. If Euclid's work referred to
+postulates and relationships between figures from the ideal world of geometry, Newton's
+studies united, under a single set of laws, the movement of planets in space to the
+movement of falling objects in our daily lives, using what he himself called the
+"synthesis analysis" method, today known as the inductive-deductive method.
+
+regarded as the father of modern political philosophy. Assistant to Francis Bacon (for
+whom he translated from English into Latin), Hobbes maintained contacts with René
+Descartes, in France, and Galileo Galilei, in Italy, figures who inspired him to produce a
+social theory declaredly based on the systematization of the geometry program , with
+whom he had late contact, at the age of 40. Despite his admiration for deductive logic
+and Euclidean geometry, Hobbes is regarded as a philosopher without mathematical
+talent, especially after an unsuccessful dispute with an Oxford mathematics professor
+over the problem of squaring the circle, for which he believed he had found a solution.
+
+The discovery of universal gravitation and the three laws of motion nurtured the hope
+that planets, moons and bodies in outer and terrestrial space would behave like a simple
+and regular mechanical clock. The impression, indelibly marked on the scholars of the
+time, was that if we tried hard enough, all the clouds could one day be reduced to clocks
+and that the revelation of the deterministic laws of the universe depended only on our
+intellectual capacity. The universe would be predictable if we were able to identify the
+laws that govern it. Due to universal gravitation, the 18th and 19th centuries were
+scientistic, in the strict sense of scientific determinism and the search for elegant
+unified theories capable of explaining an apparently chaotic variety of events, including
+human behavior and the functioning of Law, morals and of society.
+
+25
+
+23
+
+27
+
+24
+
+26
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+V. Statistical Revolution
+
+Although games of chance have been part of the history of civilization since its dawn
+(the astralagus and talus, mammalian heel bones from which data found in Egypt were
+prepared, are a record of this fact), there is no news of any efforts of measuring
+uncertainty until the Renaissance.
+
+The problem that the researchers faced was that the practical results of the
+experiments did not respect the theories. At least not with the expected accuracy.
+Experimental observations presented an embarrassing variation, which prevented the
+exact demonstration of the validity of natural laws. Even astronomy, equipped with the
+powerful law of universal gravitation, did not achieve the expected success in comparing
+the results of calculations and observations. The actual movement of the stars varied
+slightly in relation to expected calculations, disturbing astronomers' efforts to empirically
+prove the laws of astronomy. Reconciling the real movement of the moon and stars with
+the results of mathematical predictions became an obsession. At the same time,
+experimental physics measured phenomena related to, among others, heat, electricity,
+light and magnetism, encountering the same obstacles: inaccuracy and variability. The
+results of the experiments presented fluctuations that prevented the inductive proof of
+general laws capable of explaining the phenomena.
+
+And even between the middle of the
+
+17th century and the beginning of the 19th, specific studies of statistics and probability
+were relegated to a few state demographic surveys and the improvement of gambling techniques.
+There were, then, two areas of knowledge: low science, such as medicine and alchemy,
+restricted to judgments of opinion; and high science, such as astronomy and mechanics,
+capable of boasting demonstrable knowledge.
+
+Faced with the insistent variability, the scientists' first reaction was to disregard
+results considered anomalous and, based on subjective criteria, choose the one
+considered most correct. Guided by a deterministic epistemological perspective,
+scientists sought a golden number, which expressed the most precise experimental
+result, and refused to consider all results from a series of divergent measurements
+because they understood that variation weakened accuracy and, therefore, credibility.
+of your job. The perception was that, once aggregated, variations would accumulate
+instead of compensating, increasing the discrepancy between what was measured and
+what would have happened in reality.
+
+Statistician and historian Stephen Stigler, son of economist and Nobel Prize winner
+George Stigler, reports that "until the middle of the eighteenth century there is little
+indication in the extensive literature of astronomers combining observations and that in
+reality, as in the case of Euler, In 1748, there was actually a vehement rejection of this
+practice." At that time, "astronomers even took simple averages of perfectly replicated
+quantities, but the idea that the aceracea could be increased by combining measurements
+taken under different conditions was distant. They feared that the errors in one
+observation would be contaminated by others, that the errors would multiply, not compensate".
+
+Needless to say, only the knowledge produced
+by high science was worthy of respect.
+
+The origins of statistics date back to 1700, a period in which physicists and
+astronomers were faced with serious measurement problems. Isaac Newton's discoveries
+about universal gravitation led astronomers to try to predetermine the position of
+celestial bodies through mathematical calculations. Armed with a rigorous group of
+exact laws, scientific calculations sought to mathematically reproduce the movements
+that stars, planets and moons were predestined to undergo. The same was true of
+physics and chemistry. The behavior of masses and chemical reagents in the laboratory
+should obey rigorous relationships and proportions, which, once identified, would make
+researchers capable of accurately anticipating the results of experiments.
+
+28
+
+30
+
+31
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+As the divergent measurements could not be combined, scientists tried to identify
+the best among all those observed. The concept of golden result (the golden measure,
+the most correct among all) would indicate the one that was least distant from the
+expected result, embedding a value judgment incompatible with the objectivity of the
+experiment. The choices of golden numbers were intuitive, and often turned out to be
+false. Then began to appear the fear that the exact value of a real phenomenon could be
+elusive, since no measurement would be sufficiently accurate. The concern was that
+everyone was after a chimera, direct access to a physical reality that would ultimately
+be inaccessible.
+
+Thus, it was discovered over the years that there was no single golden number to be
+chosen among all the experiments. The complete set of results obtained was necessary
+for an estimate of the real value, and the more observations, even under different
+conditions, the closer the average would be to the true result. From that point on,
+especially in the astronomy of the second half of the 18th century, scientists progressed
+from calculating arithmetic means and weighted averages to creating linear models and,
+by the beginning of the 19th century, had reached what is now considered a theory.
+complete statistics.
+
+Another important factor in the development of statistics was the avalanche of
+numbers that invaded Europe during the Napoleonic era. State senses were reborn to
+help a new bureaucracy to exercise its power of government, classifying, locating and
+measuring the characteristics of citizens. More importantly, this information began to
+be published, known and discussed outside the limits of the state bureaucracy. The
+citizen began to see himself through statistics, identifying his position in the social
+stratum, his purchasing power and his location in accordance with the senses.
+
+Also the categories with which the information was classified, the forms of tabulation,
+the techniques of correct interpretation of these results and their probabilistic laws
+started to be debated in the academy. With this avalanche of data, statistical concepts
+about normality, average and deviations began to become familiar.
+
+Finally, a final factor concerns the cultural environment where these ideas flourished.
+If the great liberal revolutions, American (1763) and French (1789), were triggered in the
+second half of the 18th century, it is in the 19th century that they consolidate and
+expand their influence. The concept of democracy and the valuation of the individual
+and freedom of choice are the basis for abandoning mechanistic proposals of man, in
+favor of an indeterministic position, in which chance and will play a prominent role.
+
+That is why, in parallel with the search for golden results, some researchers began
+to realize that the complete set of measurements could provide relevant information for
+understanding the phenomena. If there was no golden number, the researcher should
+compute all the results of successive measurements, since the accumulated divergences
+would be compensated in a combination that would tend to approach the real value, in
+an application of the central limit theorem. In general lines, this theorem states that the
+distribution of the results of a sufficiently large number of experiments will tend to a
+normal distribution, in which the mean of the observations will be very close to the true
+result.
+
+The changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution were also relevant.
+Urbanization motivated the realization of demographic senses in cities, the search for
+quality and regularity in industrial line production gave practical contours to the
+concepts of standard and margin of error. Thus, whether in the administration of cities
+or factories, statistics gained new fields of ready application. Felipe Fernández-Armesto,
+an Oxford historian, explains the relationship between individualism and the crisis of determinism in the West
+
+34
+
+32
+
+33
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The rise of statistical thinking as a revolution is controversial. Stephen Stigler, for
+example, agrees with this qualification and speaks of a revolutionary conceptual
+framework when dealing with the rise of statistical methods in the 19th century.
+
+Today, statistics is a set of methods used in virtually every aspect of our lives, from
+the public (conducting opinion polls) to the private (DNA tests); from government
+(implementation of public vaccination policies) to private (development of business
+administration techniques); from professional (stock investment models) to recreational
+(sports statistics). Setting aside the deterministic pretensions of the 19th century, we all
+started to live in a society that thinks and sees itself through statistics.
+
+This epistemological turn had a great impact on researchers’ working methodology
+and their vision of what it means to do science. An impact whose seismic effects have
+not been exhausted, and are still being felt in the current scientific debate. It can be said
+that between 1700 and 1900 statistics underwent a vertical evolution (in the sophistication
+of its technique) and horizontal evolution (in the breadth of its application).
+
+From a horizontal point of view, statistics departed from astronomy and began to be
+applied in several other fields of knowledge, including areas as disparate as chemistry,
+engineering, medicine, geography or biology. From the vertical point of view, statistics
+deepened its techniques for measuring uncertainty, starting from arithmetic means and
+the study of frequencies to reach statistical inference and causality studies.
+
+Lorenz Kruger,
+Lorraine J. Daston, Michael Heidelberger, Gerd Gigerenzer and Mary Morgan, professors
+at the Max Planck Institute and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, edited a work
+in which the ideological and historical aspects of the statistics insurgency are dissected
+in the context of a revolution .
+
+Differing on the occurrence of a revolution is Bernard Cohen, professor of history at
+Harvard, who refutes the ideas of a knowledge revolution and speaks of the emergence
+
+Theodore Eisenberg, one of the exponents of the empirical study
+of law, also speaks of the resurgence of this form of research in the context of a
+statistical revolution.
+
+Richard Von Mises, brother of the economist Ludwig von Mises and one of the
+fathers of modern statistics, believed that the attempt to extend the application of the
+exact sciences without limit was a characteristic of eighteenth-century rationalism.
+
+from Descartes: "The Cartesian maxim - 'I think, therefore I am' - called into question
+the key to the only possible certainty. Struggling to escape the suspicion that all
+appearances are illusory, Descartes reasoned that the reality of his mind was proven
+through self-doubt. Descartes defined created laissez-faire economics and the doctrine
+of human rights, transforming freedom into the highest value in a strictly limited
+spectrum of self-evident truths.
+
+And Ilya Prigogine,
+already quoted here, was adamant about the reasons for this delay, among which he
+included "the desire [of man] to reach an almost divine point of view about nature", the
+need to create a "new arsenal mathematical, in which generalized functions, 'fractals',
+as Mandelbrot called them, play an important role" and a resistance to the relative
+disorder arising from a relativistic view of the world, subject to "an even stronger form
+of dynamic instability, such that [deterministic] trajectories are destroyed whatever the
+precision of the description."
+
+38
+
+39
+
+36
+
+37
+
+35
+
+40
+
+SAW. revolution and evolution
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+But, beyond considerations about the meaning of the expression scientific revolution,
+the main aspect that demonstrates the transformative nature of this new methodology
+are its practical consequences.
+
+Unlike a revolution in science, the rise of statistics corresponds to the birth of a new
+methodology of analysis, capable of affecting not only science but everyday life and art.
+
+Unlike previous revolutions, the statistical revolution did not depend on the emergence
+of new facts. There was no emergence of a new inductive theory, capable of explaining
+all the facts covered by the previous theory and also adding an additional set of facts
+under a new theoretical model. What happened was a change in the relationship scientists
+have with knowledge and a change in purpose. Science ceases to be the search for
+absolute truths and becomes an effort to approximate the truth. It is about creating a new
+approach to knowledge, based on a new set of techniques and aimed at a new purpose:
+instead of seeking certainty, we start trying to control uncertainty. A less divinizing and
+more pragmatic approach, based on probability laws rather than deterministic laws.
+
+The move away from the deterministic point of view and the intellectual approach to
+the world of "eikos", probability and uncertainty, did not imply the replacement of
+progress with return. Quite the contrary, the improvement of probability theory is at the
+root of the technological and scientific development that began in the 19th century and
+accelerated from the first half of the 20th century, and, mainly, the surprising increase in
+the living conditions of the population in general.
+
+Ian Hacking, despite disliking the use of the expression statistical revolution in the
+vulgar sense (that is, divergent from the sense of scientific revolution used by Thomas
+Kuhn), describes the process of growth of the methodological influence of probability
+and statistics in scientific work as a change even deeper than a revolution. For Hacking,
+unlike a traditional revolution in science, in which the discovery of new facts leads to a
+reassessment of theories, the entry of statistics corresponds to a methodological turn
+that, regardless of the discovery of new facts, alters the scientist's relationship with the
+knowledge and leads to a complete reassessment of our perspective on the world.
+
+Felipe Fernández-Armesto explains the statistical revolution by comparing it to a
+movement of retraction of the truth: "The retraction of the truth is one of the most
+dramatic and least told 'stories' in history, we need to make an attempt to trace its course,
+as this can help us explain one of the great enigmas of the modern world. For academic
+professionals in the affected disciplines, becoming indifferent to the truth is an
+extraordinary reversal of traditional obligations, as if doctors renounced the obligation
+to maintain life, or theologians lost the interest in god - formerly unthinkable processes
+that now loom as truth retracts".
+
+The attachment to deterministic theories, instead of promoting the progress of humanity, had
+
+of a new area. According to Cohen, the strengthening of statistics would not be, as
+occurred in other revolutions in science, attributable to a group of individuals, would not
+affect a specific area of research and would not characterize a break with natural laws.
+
+Despite disagreements regarding the use of the expression, there is a consensus that
+the use of statistics as a methodology for scientific investigation has had a profound
+impact on the history of thought, which I consider sufficient to speak of revolution, if not
+in its "Kuhnian" sense. , at least in its ordinary sense. It is, however, a revolution distinct
+from those that occurred previously, such as those resulting from the discovery of the
+law of universal gravitation or the theory of relativity.
+
+44
+
+41
+
+43
+
+42
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+narrowed our understanding of the world and reduced our ability to take advantage of
+available human, financial and natural resources. Statistics not only revolutionized the
+various fields of scientific knowledge, opening new conceptual horizons, but was also
+responsible for enabling financial products that provide economic support to human
+activities, including scientific and technological research centers.
+
+Finally, an explanation of the epistemological consequences of the statistical
+revolution. The notion that there is approximation knowledge is present in all intellects
+that dedicate themselves to studying an object in more depth. We are not always (not to
+say never) able to build a correct, exact and exhaustive theory about what we observe,
+but as we study our object and gather successive information about it, we are clearly
+aware that we are closer to our goals than we were at the beginning, and that, although
+we do not have complete control, we understand more. We cultivate an ideal of exact
+and absolute knowledge, however, in practice, we deal with approximation,
+circumstantial, limited and essentially precarious knowledge.
+
+Learning to live with these limitations and recognizing the value of incomplete
+knowledge, which involves risk and margin for error, are attitudes that define modern
+thinking. The hope of our ancestors that the development of increasingly precise
+measuring equipment, added to the accumulation of empirical observations, would
+create conditions for exact knowledge, causing determinism to extend its domains
+beyond geometry and physics, reaching the human and social sciences, did not
+materialize.
+
+The statistical revolution marks the abandonment of belief in a deterministic world.
+However, the end of determinism has not hurled us into an irrational or unintelligible
+world. There are no laws for the exact control of the world, but that doesn't mean that
+we can't influence and, to some extent, direct reality according to our purposes. On the
+contrary, at the same time that it weakened the cogent force of deterministic laws, the
+statistical revolution strengthened human freedom, detaching it from the gears of a
+mechanical world and making room for our will to exercise greater control over the
+consequences of our actions.
+
+The 19th century brought notable progress in statistics, however, this progress was
+not used, at least not with adequate intensity, by the social sciences. It was only in the
+twentieth century that the social sciences, especially economics, woke up to the benefits of
+
+As Peter Bernstein abundantly exemplifies, "without a theory of probability and other
+risk control instruments, engineers would never have built bridges that cross our widest
+rivers, houses would continue to be heated by fireplaces, household appliances would
+not exist, polio would still kill children, airliners would not fly and travel to space would
+be just a dream. Without insurance, the death of the breadwinner would reduce entire
+families to poverty and extinction, most people would not have access to medical care
+and only the richest could buy your own house. If farmers couldn't sell their produce at
+a fixed price before harvest, they would produce much less food than they actually do."
+
+What we saw was the opposite. Even physics (with statistical mechanics), the
+historical stronghold of determinism, has drifted towards probabilistic theories. As Ian
+Hacking explains in the epigraph of this chapter, the fundamental mark of scientific
+thought in the 20th century was the fall of determinism, the break with the principle of
+causality and its strict link between past, present and future and the discovery that
+there are laws of regularity , which are not deterministic natural laws.
+
+46
+
+45
+
+VII. Delay of the social sciences
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This intermediate goal pursued by social science is also, not coincidentally, the main
+scope of political debates.
+
+Because of this overlap with political objectives, discussions around the
+
+Graunt's work, at the time called political arithmetic, had a strong impact because
+the population estimated by his study proved to be much higher than that intuited by
+the authorities at the time. The work even earned him a seat at the Royal Society, an
+unusual fact for a merchant. The use of statistics in the study of the human population,
+however, did not continue over the next two hundred years, until William Farr, one of
+the first epidemiologists, took up Graunt's project at the end of the 19th century and
+began to systematize demographic records. from England.
+
+Social scientists, despite suffering from the effects of variability and uncertainty
+inherent in human behavior, offered greater resistance to the use of statistical methods
+in their research. An example of this resistance is the criticism directed at the English
+economist and logician William Stanley Jevons, one of the fathers of Econometrics,
+who, still in the 19th century, used in a study on the variation in the price of gold a
+reference index composed of a basket of several other commodities.
+
+Critics of Jevons' work complained of a lack of rigor in the approach. The scientific
+work had as its basic premise the choice of a single object of study, in this case gold,
+whose price behavior would have nothing to do with that of other products on the
+market subject to different factors and influences. At the time, the idea that combining
+the prices of several commodities into a single metric (for example, the variation in Latin
+American commodities , or mining, or agricultural, or a given period) could be illuminating
+regarding behavior of the prices of each of the products.
+
+The carrying out of demographic
+censuses gradually spread across several countries, just as the techniques for statistical
+investigation of these data ended up being occasionally appropriated by some social
+sciences, especially Demography and Economics.
+
+Social scientists, before and after John Graunt, always found variations in their
+observations: in people's age, weight and height, in the number of children, in the price
+of goods and in family income, among many others. Why, then, the resistance to using
+statistics? Why not seek to reduce uncertainty by understanding how these variations
+occurred? This antipathy to the quantitative approach has a remarkable historical
+persistence, which led me to think about the origins of the problem beyond the ironic
+blindness suggested by Stephen Stigler.
+
+The influence of statistics on the social sciences began timidly with the creation of
+censuses of mortality and epidemic diseases. The first demographic record was
+prepared by John Graunt, a wealthy London merchant of trimmings, based on death
+records of the population of London, started in 1603. Based on the organization of these
+data, Graunt elaborated the first table of life expectancy by range age ( Natural and
+political observations upon the bills of mortality, 1662).
+
+quantification of social facts and for the usefulness of probabilistic models and
+statistical inferences in the description, study and understanding of social behavior, in
+a delay that Stephen Stigler ironically attributes to the influence of the blind or illiterate.
+
+A likely explanation is related to the strong influence of the political dimension in
+discussions about the dynamics of life in society. Social science's immediate objective
+is to understand man's gregarious behavior, but its immediate objective is to contribute
+to improving the functioning of society and improving people's living conditions.
+
+And based
+
+on the city's death rate (number of deaths per number of inhabitants), Graunt was able
+to promote the first statistical inference regarding the size of a human population, in
+this case, the inhabitants of the city of London.
+
+48
+
+50
+
+51
+
+47
+
+49
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Thus, both extreme conservatism, of those who try to prevent any change in the status
+quo, on the one hand, and radical revolutionaryism, of those who seek to impose
+changes only with the intention of shifting the center of power, on the other, reduce the
+space for a empirical, cautious and consequentialist approach in the study of public
+policies.
+
+There is, however, a noticeable evolution in the quality of the debate, partly made
+possible by the dissemination of statistical information on the situation in society.
+Statistical indicators are capable of summarizing the general performance of a
+government, allowing the comparison of projects presented in campaigns and the
+effective results of management. If candidates are still evaluated emotionally today,
+whether based on their social origin, the way they dress or based on personal
+experiences (the candidate paved my street when he was mayor or gave the voter a set
+of teeth), increasingly the technical and impersonal debate gains space, with an agenda
+essentially based on the discussion of socioeconomic indicators, such as inflation rates, crime and unemployment.
+
+Furthermore, every political discussion revolves around proposals about ideals of
+society, whose counterfactual character is not subject to empirical tests. Do we want an
+egalitarian or meritocratic society? Do we want a freer or safer society?
+No statistical methodology is able to compare which of these aspirations is better. No
+test will succeed in proving that equality is worth more than prosperity, or that security
+is worth more than freedom. Statistics is a neutral tool for analyzing society as it is,
+always realistic and sometimes uncomfortable, which can contribute to its improvement
+through an analysis of the adequacy of means to given ends, but which does not have
+much to contribute to the choice of these purposes.
+
+Before the
+creation of these indicators, voters would not even have access to the information
+necessary for an objective analysis of a government's performance.
+
+The desire for technical management of society and a more objective public debate
+explains the rise of economics, a subject of law courses until the second half of the 19th
+century, to the most powerful social science today. Driven by econometrics and the
+pioneering use of statistics and empirical research in the study of human behavior,
+economics gained its curricular independence from the beginning of the 20th century
+(the first school of economics, the London School of Economics, was founded in 1895)
+and in less than a hundred years it became the main tool for formulating public policies,
+displacing law from its historical position. Even in Brazil, where the USP Faculty of
+Economics was only founded in 1946, in just two decades its first former students were
+already assuming prominent roles in the federal government, pointing to a trend that
+would become preponderant in the future.
+
+In comparison, politics is the field of ideal proposals, the trafficking of dreams and
+aspirations. It is an area of people essentially concerned with final objectives, who
+conveniently forget to deal with the means necessary for their implementation.
+
+Social science purposes have the potential to affect the power spaces occupied by
+interest groups. This interference transmutes a discussion that could be academic,
+objective and impartial into a debate of a partisan political nature, in which the
+protagonists often start to defend private interests to the detriment of common objectives.
+
+Debate over the viability of any proposal usually entails a discussion of its costs. And
+costs are always a pain to remember, especially during election campaigns. Hence
+politics' aversion, at least in its lowest and most irresponsible manifestations, to
+consequentialist discourse. No one wins an election by promising a government
+spending cut or a tight fiscal adjustment. You win by promising to pave streets, build
+thousands of schools, health centers and houses, even if there are no resources for
+that. This emphasis on ideal objectives combined with the disregard for the real means
+of implementing them is still a factor that distances politics from statistics.
+
+52
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+FOOTNOTES
+
+In the original: "The most decisive conceptual event of the twentieth century physics has been
+the discovery that the world is not deterministic. Causality, long the bastion of metaphysics, was
+toppled, or at least tilted: the past does not determine exactly what happens next . This event
+was preceded by a more gradual transformation. During the nineteenth century it became
+possible to see that the world might be regular and yet not subject to universal laws of nature. A
+space was cleared for chance". HACKING, Ian. The taming of chance. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. p.
+
+"The pre-eminence of the Greeks appears more clearly in mathematics and astronomy than in
+anything else. What they did in art, literature and philosophy can be judged better or worse
+according to taste, but what they accomplished in geometry is entirely beyond question. They
+learned something from Egypt and a little less from Babylon; but what they obtained from these
+sources was, in mathematics, mainly rudimentary rules and, in astronomy, records of observations
+extending over very long periods. The art of mathematical proof was almost entirely Greek in
+origin." RUSSEL, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy. 3rd ed. São Paulo: Companhia Editora
+Nacional, 1969, vol. 1, p. 242. Author's translation.
+
+For a complete overview of the history of Greek mathematics: HEATH, Thomas Little. A history
+of Greek mathematics. New York: Dover, 1981.
+
+HUFFMAN, Carl A. The Pythagorean Tradition. In: LONG, AA Early Greek Philosophy (org.). São
+Paulo: Ideas and Letters, 2008. p. 130; and HEATH, Thomas Little. A history of Greek mathematics.
+New York: Dover, 1981. p. 11-12.
+
+Today, two of the main challenges facing democratic governments revolve around
+statistics. The first is to increase and improve social indicators, making updated data
+available to the population, certified by independent entities that guarantee their
+integrity, accompanied by their serious histories. In mass societies and countries of
+continental dimensions, the people can only see their government through statistics.
+The second is to educate the population and make them understand the function of
+these indicators. High school statistics classes are just as important as math classes.
+Explain to a low-income student what the inflation rate is and how it is capable of
+eroding your father's salary in a few years, or how the crime rate in your neighborhood
+is calculated and why it is higher than in other neighborhoods wealthy, is a means of
+social awareness. If mathematics is the path to inclusion in the job market, statistics is
+the path to citizenship and inclusion in modern political life.
+
+3
+1
+
+4
+two
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+10
+
+8
+6
+
+13
+
+9
+
+11
+
+7
+5
+
+12
+
+See TAYLOR, Thomas. The commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato, in five books.
+London: AJ Valpy, 1820. See also: Plato. Timaeus. Fairfield: World Library Books, 2008.
+
+SAMBURSKY, Samuel. The physical world of the Greeks. London: Routledge & Keagan Paul,
+1987. p. 179.
+
+HEATH, Thomas Little. Euclid in Greek. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920.
+
+ADAM, James. The republic of Plato edited with critical notes and appendices. Cambridge:
+Cambridge University Press, 1902.
+
+CORNFORD, Francis MacDonald. Plato's cosmology, the Timeaus of Plato translated with a
+running commentary. London: Compton Printing Ltd., 1937; HEATH, Thomas Little. A history of
+Greek mathematics. New York: Dover, 1981. p. 284.
+
+The point is summarized in the following passage: "The Greeks believed that order is to be found
+only in the skies where the planets and stars appear regularly in their appointed places with an
+unmatched regularity. To this harmonious performance, the Greeks paid deep respect, and their mathematicians
+
+DOGSON, Charles L. Euclid and his modern rivals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1879.
+
+RUSSEL, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy. 3rd ed. vol. 1. São Paulo: Companhia Editora
+Nacional, 1969, p. 245-246; HEATH, Thomas Little. Euclid in Greek. vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge
+University Press, 1920. p. 3-40. Only with the work of Carl Friedrich Gauss in the 19th century
+and the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries was Euclid's legacy relativized.
+
+Part of geometry that studies the measurement of solids.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+studied it intensely. But the perfection of the heavens served only to highlight the disarray of
+life on earth. Moreover, the predictability of the firmament contrasted sharply with the behavior
+of the flickle, foolish gods who dwelt on high." BERNSTEIN, Peter L. Against the gods: The
+remarkable story of the risk. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1998. p.70-71.
+
+According to Karl Popper, determinism can be classified, according to its scope, into
+philosophical, physical and psychological, or, according to its origin, into religious, scientific
+and metaphysical. Here we deal with physical and scientific determinism. POPPER, Karl. The
+open universe: an argument for indeterminism. London: Cambridge University Press, 1982. p. 7.
+
+The intuitive idea of determinism may be summed up by saying that the world is like a motion
+picture film: the picture or still that is just being projected is the present. Those parts of the
+film which have already been shown constitute the past. And those which have not yet been
+shown constitute the future.
+
+In the film, the future co-exists with the past; and the future is fixed, in the exact same sense
+as the past. Though the spectator may not know the future, every future event, without
+exception, might in principle been known with certainty, exactly like the past, since it exists in
+the same sense in which the past exists. In fact the future will be known to the producer of the
+film, to the Creator of the world." POPPER, Karl. The open universe: an argument for
+indeterminism. London: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 1, 2,5 .
+
+"To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement which describes it,
+using the premises of the deduction one or more universal laws, together with certain singular
+statements, the initial conditions". POPPER, Karl. The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Basic Books, 1959. p.
+
+In the words of Niehls Bohr: "We would go too far if we recalled in detail how, with the
+elimination of mythical cosmological ideas and arguments concerning the purpose of our
+actions, a coherent scheme of mechanics was constructed, based on the pioneering work of
+Galileo, which reached great perfection through Newton's mastery. Above all, the principles of
+Newtonian mechanics meant a broad clarification of the problem of cause and effect, allowing,
+from the state of a physical system defined at a given instant by measurable quantities, the
+prediction of his state on any subsequent occasion. It is well known how much this kind of
+
+In the words of Karl Popper: "My central problem is to examine the validity of the arguments in
+favor of what I call 'scientific determinism'; that is to say, the doctrine that the structure of the
+world is such that any event can be rationally predicted, with any desired degree of precision,
+if we are given a sufficiently precise description of past events, together with all the laws of nature. ( omissis)
+
+17
+
+15
+
+16
+
+14
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+"[In determinism] The laws of nature enunciated by physics are of the sphere, therefore, of an
+ideal knowledge that reaches certainty. Once the initial conditions are given, everything is
+determined. Nature is an automaton that we can control, by the least in principle.Novelty, choice,
+spontaneous activity are only appearances, relative only to the human point of view.
+
+In determinism, probability is a state of mind, a measure of our ignorance, not an objective quality
+of reality. GIRENZER, Gerd. The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Every
+Day Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 11 sec.
+
+TAYLOR, CCW The atomists, Leucippus and Democritus: fragments, a text, a translation and
+commentaries. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. p. 157-200.
+
+Many historians emphasize the essential role played by the figure of the Christian God, understood
+in the 17th century as an all-powerful legislator, in this formulation of laws of nature. Theology
+and science converged at the time. Leibnz wrote: 'in the smallest of substances, eyes as keen as
+God's could at once read the whole sequence of things in the universe.
+Quae sint, quasi fuerint, quae mox futuro trahantur (What are, what were, what will happen in the future)'.
+
+This is the "theological" meaning of the phrase attributed to Albert Einstein: "when the answer is
+simple, God is speaking". Despite being widely referenced in other works, we were unable to
+locate the origin of the citation in Einstein's works.
+
+deterministic or causal explanation led to the mechanistic conception of nature and came to
+figure as an ideal of scientific explanation in all fields of knowledge, regardless of the way in
+which knowledge was obtained.". BOHR, Niehls. Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge: Essays
+1932- 1957. São Paulo: Contratempo, 1996. p. 87.
+
+The submission of nature to deterministic laws thus brought human knowledge closer to the
+timeless divine point of view."PRIGOGINE, Ilya. The end of certainties. São Paulo: Unesp, 1996. p. 19-20.
+
+HAHN, Roger. Pierre-Simon Laplace: a determined scientist. Cambridge: Harvard Press, 2005. p.
+168-179; GILLISPIE, Charles C. Pierre-Simon Laplace: a life in exact science. Princeton: Princeton
+University Press, 1997. p. 271-279.
+
+23
+
+21
+
+18
+
+20
+
+19
+
+22
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+30
+
+26
+
+HACKING, Ian. The emergence of probability. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 39-48.
+
+STIGLER, Stephen. The history of statistics. The measurement of uncertainty before 1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
+
+1986. p. 11 ff.
+
+POPPER, Karl. The open universe: and argument for indeterminism. London: Cambridge University Press, 1982. See also: POPPER,
+
+Karl. Objective knowledge, corrected edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1972. p. 227.
+
+27
+
+STIGLER, Stephen. The history of statistics. The measurement of uncertainty before 1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
+
+1986. p. 4-5.
+
+Meteorology is often remembered as an example of the limitations of a science that seeks to predict, only through observation and
+
+without resorting to experiments, the behavior of complex systems.
+
+31
+
+HOBBES, Thomas. Leviathan. Parts I and II. Rev. AP Matirnich and Brian Battiste. Ontario: Broadview, 2011.
+
+28
+
+The Central Limit Theorem states that the distribution of successive sample means approximates
+
+HALD, Anders. A history of statistics and probability and their application before 1750. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2003. p.
+
+172-176.
+
+32
+
+RAPHAEL, David D. Hobbes: morals and politics. London: Routledge, 2004. p. 9-15.
+
+29
+
+25
+
+24
+
+HACKING, Ian. The emergence of probability. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 1-10.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+39
+
+35
+
+STIGLER, Stephen. The history of statistics. The measurement of uncertainty before 1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
+
+1986, p. 8.
+
+LORENZ KRUGER, Lorraine J. Daston, Michael Heidelberger, Gerd Gigerenzer and Mary Morgan. The probabilistic revolution. (Vol 1.
+
+Ideas in History. Vol. 2. Ideas in Science). Massachusetts: MIT Press,
+
+HACKING, Ian. The emergence of probability. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.xviii.
+
+36
+
+40
+
+FERNÁNDEZ-ARMESTO, Felipe. Truth: a story. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2000. p. 195.
+
+nineteen ninety.
+
+more and more of a normal distribution as the number of samples increases.
+
+37
+
+VON MISES, Richard. Probability, statistics and truth. New York: Dover Publications, 1981. p. 12.
+
+"ELS [empircal legal studies] is not, in my view, a competitor with other 'law and' social science disciplines. It is complementary to
+
+them and helps the study of Law and the legal system to join part of a larger probabilistic revolution. That revolution has been said
+
+to encompass the web of changes that made probability a part of philosophy, scientific theories and practice, social policy, and daily
+
+life between circa 1800 and 1950, and has obviously been accelerated by the growth of personal computer." EISENBERG, Theodore.
+
+The origins, nature, and promise of empirical legal studies and a response to concerns. University of Illinois Law Review. v. 5, 2011.
+
+p. 1719.
+
+"During the course of the 18th century astronomers progressed from the simple means to linear models and, with the aid of
+
+Newtonian theories, were able to reach a mature statistical theory in the first two decades of the 19th century." STIGLER, Stephen.
+
+The history of statistics. The measurement of uncertainty before 1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. 29.
+
+38
+
+34
+
+33
+
+PRIGOGINE, Ilya. The end of certainties. São Paulo: Unesp, 1996,. P. 39-40.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+FERNÁNDEZ-ARMESTO, Felipe. Truth: a story. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2000. p. 193.
+
+"Was there such a thing [like a probabilistic revolution]? Yes, if we mean revolution in an ordinary
+
+present-day generous sense. As the second collective product, The Empire of Chance, put it in its
+subtitle, How Probability Changed Science and Every Day Life. Those changes were truly revolutionary
+(in the ordinary manner of speaking). I have also tried to give a more narrow definition to those words,
+'probabilistic revolution', taking off an idea of Kuhn's about a 'second scientific revolution' early in
+the nineteenth century. The emergence of probability, however, was a change more fundamental than
+any revolution. A new thinking cap." HACKING, Ian. The emergence of probability. New York:
+Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. xix.
+
+HACKING, Ian. The taming of chance. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
+
+BERNSTEIN, Peter. Against the gods. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996. p. two.
+
+The beauty and challenges of this historical moment are expressed by Ilya Prigogine in the last
+
+paragraphs of his work The End of Certainties: "Pure chance is as much a denial of reality and our
+demand to understand the world as determinism is. What what we seek to build is a narrow path
+between these two conceptions that equally lead to alienation, that of a world governed by laws that
+leave no room for novelty, and that of an absurd world, the causal one, where nothing can be predicted
+or described in any way. general terms. ( omissis) What emerges today is, therefore, an average
+description, situated between two alienating representations, that of a deterministic world and that of
+an arbitrary world subjected only to chance. Laws do not govern the world, but neither does this is
+governed by chance. Physical laws correspond to a new form of intelligibility that irreducible
+probabilistic representations express. They are associated with instability and, whether at the
+macroscopic or microscopic level, describe events as possible, without reducing them to deducible
+consequences or predictable deterministic laws. Perhaps this distinction between what can be
+predicted and controlled and what cannot be would have satisfied the quest for intelligibility of nature
+at the heart of Einstein's work? In this process of building a narrow path between blind laws and
+arbitrary events, we discovered that a large part of the world around us had until then 'slipped between
+the meshes of the scientific network', to resume an expression of
+
+COHEN, I Bernard. Revolution in science. Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1985. p. 23-44.
+
+42
+
+43
+
+44
+
+45
+
+46
+
+41
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+MERRIL, Ray M. & Timmrech, Thomas C. Introduction to epidemiology. 4th ed. Ontario: Johns and Bartlet, 2002. p. 33-34.
+
+47
+
+There is a historical dispute regarding the authorship of this work, attributing it to John Graunt or the English economist and philosopher Sir
+
+William Petty. William Petty himself, however, recognizes the authorship of Graunt, who had his name attributed to the work in all publications
+
+published while he was alive. For details: PETTY, Sir William. The economic writings of Sir William Petty. London: Routledge, 1997. p. xliii.
+
+"By the 1830's statistical methods were widely used in astronomy, and we can find reasonably accessible texts from that period that bear at least
+
+a cousinly resemblance to modern elementary texts. Yet it is only in the twentieth century that we find these same methods making substantial
+
+inroads into the social sciences. Were nineteenth-century social scientists unable to read? And even if they were neither illiterate nor too dense
+
+to see the need for the quantification of uncertainty in their data, why did they ignore what was so obvious a century later ?" STIGLER, Stephen.
+
+The history of statistics. The measurement of uncertainty before 1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. two.
+
+48
+
+50
+
+PETTY, Sir William. The economic writings of Sir William Petty. London: Routledge, 1997. p. xxxiv xxxviii. The complete report is in HALD,
+
+Anders. A history of statistics and probability and their application before 1750. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2003. p. 81-105.
+
+52
+
+STIGLER, Stephen. The history of statistics. The measurement of uncertainty before 1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. 5.
+
+The two main socioeconomic indicators are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Human Development Index (HDI). The creators of both
+
+were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. Simon Smith Kuznets, Russian economist and creator of the GDP concept, was awarded in 1971.
+
+Amartya Sem, Indian economist and one of the creators of the HDI, was awarded in 1998.
+
+Whitehead. We discern new horizons, new questions, new risks. We live in a privileged moment in the history of science."PRIGOGINE, Ilya. The
+
+end of certainties. São Paulo: Unesp, 1996. p. 197-199.
+
+51
+
+49
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+two
+
+3
+1
+
+5
+
+6
+
+I. Definition of statistics
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+Jurimetry
+CHAPTER 3. STATISTICAL METHODS
+
+Chapter 3. Statistical Methods
+
+Gottfried Achenwall, Germanic philosopher, to assign the study of economic and population data to the State
+Others argue that the first modern statistical description is by the Englishman John Graunt in his study on
+mortality in London in 1662. Graunt, however, did not use the statistical expression, choosing to call it "political
+arithmetic". For the English, the expression statistics was only used for the first time by J. Sinclair in the work
+Statistical account of Scotland drawn up from the communications of the ministers of the different parishes,
+prepared 4 between 1791 and 1799.
+
+One way to control for the effect of other variables on patients' healing is to divide them into three groups:
+one not medicated, another receiving placebo, and a last one medicated. The verification of the results in each
+of the groups is capable of isolating the effects of the medicine and controlling the effects of time and of the
+placebo on the patients, strengthening the conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the first one. The main objective of planning is, therefore,
+
+.
+
+For example, a researcher intends to test whether a drug is capable of curing headaches. One way to answer
+this question is to gather a group of people with a headache and administer the medicine, then measuring
+(through questionnaires and tests) how many patients were cured. This test, however, does not allow rejecting
+the possibility that the improvement would be a consequence of other factors, such as a placebo effect or a
+spontaneous improvement resulting from the passage of time.
+
+"In God we believe; everyone else needs to bring data."
+
+Statistics analyze data from different sources, such as prices, weight of animals, temperatures, position of
+celestial bodies, height of people, results of medical treatments or chemical reactions. In common, the
+information that can be analyzed through this method exhibit some degree of variability, allowing the distribution
+of its results in categories or ranges. For example, income variation allows the distribution of the Brazilian
+population between high, middle and low social classes; the variation of rites enables the distribution (in a
+statistical and non-procedural sense) of lawsuits between ordinary, execution or special procedures. For each
+of these populations there is a degree of uncertainty. I don't know exactly how many enforcement actions are
+being processed in Brazil, because every hour some actions are distributed and others are extinguished.
+However, a periodic sampling can tell me approximately how the actions are in Brazil in relation to the type of
+procedure and how many enforcement processes there are.
+
+Statistics deals with the collection, organization and analysis of data sets. Your objective is to describe these
+sets and obtain, from them, the greatest amount of knowledge possible. The object of statistics is not ideal or
+abstract. Its purpose is to offer solutions to combine measurements and analyze sets or series of information
+collected in the most diverse fields of knowledge.
+
+A comparison of dates is enough to realize that the reason lies with the Germans.
+
+The word statistics has its etymological origin in the Latin expression statisticum collegium and since the
+16th century it has been used in Italy with the purpose of designating a collection of facts (verbal reports,
+topographical and geographical descriptions) for the information of State officials. The modern meaning of
+statistics, indicating a collection of data regarding the population and finances of a State, is the subject of controversy.
+
+Planning a
+research involves several steps, including formulating hypotheses, choosing the type of test, choosing a
+significance level, collecting data, determining the critical value, and presenting the results.
+
+Unlike the sciences that are defined by their objects (biology studies life, chemistry studies the
+transformations of matter, etc.), statistics is a discipline defined by its methodology and can be applied to any
+object capable of experimentation and observation . In Stephen Stigler's definition: "Modern statistics offers
+quantitative technology for empirical science; it is a logic and methodology for measuring uncertainty and for
+examining the consequences of that uncertainty in the design and interpretation of experimentation and observation."
+
+Statistics is a research methodology, which aims to plan and carry out hypothesis tests.
+
+Some historians claim that the expression was appropriated from the German statistik, a term introduced in 1749 by
+
+The planning of a research involves the choice of variables and a careful delineation of its objectives.
+
+The connection with problems of practical application makes statistics to be considered a set of methods
+different from mathematics. An important part of statistics involves non-mathematical problems such as, for
+example, identifying the source of data, choosing tests capable of strengthening conclusions or how to visualize
+results in graphs and tables.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In an experiment, I roll a die 20 times and observe the following results (R): R1) 3; R2) 4; R3) 3; R4) 3; R5) 4; R6) 3. This
+is the absolute frequency distribution of the variable "data result". The relative frequency distribution is the percentage
+results: R1) 15%; R2) 20%; R3) 15%; R4) 15%; R5) 20%; and R6) 15%; whose sum gives 100%. In other words, the
+frequency distribution indicates the number of realizations of each value of a variable (when absolute) or the percentage
+of realization of these values (when relative).
+Another fundamental concept is the summary measure. Summary measures are indicators capable of summarizing
+information about a large amount of data. The best-known summary measure is the mean. For example, if I say that on
+average a lawsuit takes 4 years to be judged by a court, I am summarizing in a single measure the thousands of results
+of the variable "time of lawsuit" observed in a survey. There are several other summary measures that are not as
+famous as the mean, so much so that they are classified into measures of position and dispersion.
+
+It is important to explain, albeit occasionally, how data is described. I start with a classic example, which helps us
+understand the concept of frequency distribution of a variable: the game of dice. When rolling a dice, you have a
+variable with six possible outcomes, the numbers one through six, corresponding to each face.
+
+Statistical research can only provide a description of what has been observed. However, it can also move on to
+considerations about what has not been directly observed and make inferences about, for example, the future behavior
+of variables, the association between two or more variables, or the characteristics of an unobserved portion of the
+population. These approaches divide statistics into two distinct subareas: descriptive and inferential.
+
+Or you might be interested in understanding whether the distribution of actions between ordinary, enforcement or
+special procedures is or is not associated with the twelve months of the year. This is a bivariate analysis focusing on
+the variables "procedure" and "month of the year".
+
+The mean expresses a central tendency because it indicates an intermediate
+
+position between the observed results. It, however, does not indicate the distance between these results. When I say
+that the average between two numbers equals 50, these two numbers can be 49 and 51, very close results, or they can
+be 1 and 99, farther results.
+
+Summary measures of position (also known as measures of central tendency) indicate the values around which the
+data set focuses. Examples of position summary measures are: the arithmetic mean, the mode and the median. The
+arithmetic mean is the sum of the observed results, divided by the number of results. Mode is the most frequent result.
+And the median is the result that occupies the central position, when the observations 13 are ordered in ascending
+order.
+
+foresee possible weaknesses and design the tests in order to strengthen, as much as possible, the conclusions of a
+research.
+
+The standard deviation is the best-known measure of dispersion because it
+
+expresses how far each result is approximately from the mean. In the example above, the first two results (49 + 51) are
+very close to the mean and have variance equal to 1, because {[(12 + (-12)] ÷ 2 = 1}. Since the square root of 1 is equal a
+1, the standard deviation is also 1. The variance of the other two results (1 + 99) is equal to 2041, because {[(492 + (-492)]
+÷ 2 = 2041}. Extracting the square root of 2041 we arrive at a standard deviation of 49, which means that each result is
+49 points away from the mean.
+
+That's what summary measures of dispersion are for: to indicate how much the results deviate from the measures
+of position. Examples of measures of dispersion are variance and standard deviation. The variance corresponds to the
+mean of the squares of the differences between, on the one hand, each observed result and, on the other hand, the
+arithmetic mean. The standard deviation is the square root of the variance.
+
+The hypotheses may contain doubts about the behavior of a variable, in the so-called univariate analysis, or about
+the association between two or more variables, in the so-called bivariate and multivariate analyses.
+
+When you have access to a certain amount of data, the first task is to understand what kind of information this data
+brings. This area of statistics is limited to what can be observed directly and it only describes, in an exhaustive or
+summarized way, the set of collected data. Hence its name. This description can be presented in several ways, through
+a frequency distribution of each variable, by calculating summary measures, by tabulating results and by visualizing
+them through tables and graphs.
+
+To obtain this number, the researchers counted the duration, between the distribution and
+
+judgment of the appeal in the second instance, of a sample with 718 dissolution actions in the 27 states of the federation.
+Adding all the times and dividing by the number of actions in the sample, an average of 1,782 days was obtained, that
+is, 4 years, 10 months and 22 days.
+
+You may be
+
+interested in knowing, returning to the example of lawsuits, how lawsuits are distributed in Brazil between ordinary,
+execution or special procedures. This is a univariate analysis focusing on the procedure variable.
+
+Descriptive statistics is the area that studies the process of exploring, visualizing and summarizing data.
+
+Therefore, it is very important to reinforce that each summary measure should, whenever possible, be analyzed
+together with as many other measures as possible. See this example: a survey conducted with the support of the
+Associação Brasileira de Jurimetria - ABJ sought to estimate the average duration of an action for the dissolution of a
+business company in Brazil.
+
+II. Descriptive statistics
+
+14
+
+7
+
+8
+
+15
+
+9
+
+16
+
+11
+
+10
+
+12
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Statistical inference usually works with samples. The sample corresponds to a subset of 19 It is the correct use of individuals from
+a population separated for analysis using a certain methodology. methodology in constructing the sample that validates the
+extrapolation of observations to the population, establishing a known and accepted margin of error. The definition of the methodology
+for constructing a sample takes place through the elaboration of a sampling plan.
+
+17
+
+Inferential statistics complement descriptive
+
+statistics. While the latter summarizes, explores and describes the data, the former makes statements that go beyond the mere
+description of the data, such as, for example, (i) inferences about a population (if the data constitute a sample), (ii) predictions about
+behavior future of the variables and (iii) recognition of trends, associations and correlations in the variables.
+
+18
+
+They just mean different things. The average value expresses the sum of all values, divided by the number of cases. It is higher
+because a few executions of hundreds of millions of reais are capable of raising the average value. The median indicates the central
+value when the results of all processes are listed in ascending order. For that reason, it is less affected by extreme outcomes. To
+better understand the distinction, consider, for example, the following hypothetical list of results from a survey on the value in reais of
+moral damage convictions granted by a civil court, based on a sample of 13 lawsuits:
+
+The underlined value is the central or median result. Adding up all the values, it comes to R$ 43,000.00, which, divided by 13,
+gives the average value per process of R$ 3,307.69. The median is R$ 1,000.00. The fact that the average indicates a value three
+times greater than the median is explained by the effect that the last two results in the list (10 and 20 thousand) have on the total
+value of the sum of the results. The mean is by definition sensitive to the inclusion of cases with extreme values, while the median is
+not.
+
+21
+
+200, 300, 500, 500, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1500, 5000, 10000 and 20000
+
+20
+
+However, the average is not a good reference for how long a dissolution action in Brazil will take, because the standard deviation
+observed in the results was too large. As in a group of dwarfs and basketball players, in which the average is that of an average
+person, but no one in the population is of normal height, in the population of processes there were many actions that were absurdly
+time consuming and others much faster. Thus, despite having an average close to five years, the standard deviation was 1,063 days,
+indicating that the observed processes were 2 years, 11 months and 3 days above or below the average, with many actions lasting
+more than 7 years and others being closed after only 3 years. Only through the joint analysis of these two summary measures was it
+possible to visualize the enormous disparity in behavior within the Brazilian Judiciary and to understand in practice what the real
+possibilities of duration of a process of dissolution of society are.
+
+As it is less susceptible to extreme cases, the median value is closer to the reality of most tax foreclosures in the daily life of the
+Judiciary. Therefore, the fact that the average value of tax executions carried out by the PGFN is R$ 26,303.25 does not lead to the
+conclusion that the process is being used efficiently. The value to be observed is the median, of only R$ 3,154.39, well below the
+average unit cost of these actions. In fact, according to IPEA, considering that the probability of full recovery of the credit is 25.8%,
+the minimum value for filing a tax enforcement action by the PGFN is R$21,731.45. For execution values below this threshold, which
+the median indicates are many, the public administration will be spending more than it will probably receive.
+
+A
+
+Imagine, making the example more sophisticated, that a fourteenth case was included in the list and its value for moral damages
+was an extraordinary R$200,000.00, paid for the loss of an arm in a car accident. Due to this single additional case, the average
+would increase six times, rising to R$18,692.30, while the median would move one house to the side and remain at the same
+R$1,000.00. This is the reason why the average and median value of fiscal execution in the IPEA survey differ substantially. It is likely
+that some tax foreclosures at the end of the list of cases analyzed presented extreme values, capable of pulling the sum of all results
+and increasing the average. As in the example of moral damage, these same cases were not able to affect the median value.
+
+The population of interest corresponds to the universe of all individuals from which the sample was obtained.
+
+The results showed that the average amount charged in actions filed by the Attorney General of the National Treasury is R$ 26,303.25.
+However, the median of these amounts was only BRL 3,154.39. The first amount is well above the average unit cost of a tax
+foreclosure carried out by the Attorney General of the National Treasury, calculated at R$ 5,606.67. The second is slightly below.
+
+Inferential statistics is the area that studies how certain conclusions can be logically induced from the analysis of a set of data
+subject to random variation.
+
+What do these values mean and which one is more correct? The answer is that neither is more correct.
+
+Even measures of position must be combined and analyzed together. The combination between mean and median, for example,
+is often illuminating. In another survey, the Institute of Applied Economic Research - IPEA, at the request of the National Council of
+Justice - CNJ, conducted between 2009 and 2011 a study on the unit cost and time of the tax enforcement process in Brazil.
+Concerned about the number of tax foreclosures, the CNJ decided to investigate how much these foreclosures cost the Public Power
+and what value they effectively recovered.
+
+III. Inferential statistics
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+23
+
+22
+
+24
+
+IV. definition of probability
+
+Every time we make statements
+about a population from a sample or analyze whether the change in behavior of a variable is statistically
+significant, we are speaking the language of inferential statistics.
+
+The graph below, produced based on data provided by SERASA between 1997 and 2014, helps to understand
+the situation of bankruptcy filings in Brazil before and after the law. If before 2005 the graph resembles that of
+a cardiac patient having a heart attack, since the new law there has been an impressive reduction in the number
+of bankruptcies required, followed by a stabilization at a level close to what can be interpreted as a possible natural rate.
+
+The word probability originates from the Latin word probitas, which means "honesty". Roman probitas
+expressed a quality attributable to people who performed public functions, such as politicians, government
+officials, and witnesses . The association of the word probitas with witnesses gave rise to the term "probable"
+in modern Portuguese, indicating a coherent and honest testimony, liable to be admitted in court as a
+demonstration of controversial occurrences. Probability, proof, probable and probity are words of common
+origin, all related to the attempt to obtain some degree of reliability in the midst of uncertainty.
+
+An example of an important statistical inference for Jurimetrics is regulatory impact analysis. We often want
+to understand how changing a law affected the behavior of the parties and judges in handling conflicts.
+Empirical research that aims to evaluate changes resulting from changes in regulation is Through this, the
+effects of changes can be monitored, called regulatory impact assessment. implemented in legal
+regimes, or even to assess, preventively, whether a proposed law, once enacted, will or will not produce the
+desired effects.
+
+The fact that we can visualize the variation in the graph (as drastic as it appears to be) does not allow us to
+say that it means anything from a statistical perspective. Variables, pardon the redundancy, vary by nature and
+one of the goals of inferential statistics is to distinguish significant variations from others that may be the result
+of random fluctuations. This theme will be discussed in greater detail in the topics below, but for now, it is
+enough to state that, after carrying out the inferential tests of significance, the researchers concluded that the
+reduction in the number of bankruptcy filings observed from 2005 onwards had a 1% probability of being result
+of chance and that, therefore, it was statistically significant. With this, they concluded that, with a high
+probability of success, the new law had produced an important part of the results desired by the legislator.
+
+Some studies demonstrate how this analysis works. Law 11,101, which deals with Bankruptcy and Company
+Recovery, enacted on February 9, 2005, had as one of its objectives to reduce the exposure of companies in
+crisis to the risk of bankruptcy and to reduce the number of opportunistic bankruptcy filings ( used as a means
+of pressuring the debtor to prioritize payment from the person making the request). At the request of the
+Ministry of Justice (in the series Thinking about Law), the Getúlio Vargas Foundation of Rio de Janeiro sought
+to answer this question (whether the law met its objective) through an impact analysis, in which the effect of
+the new law on the amount of bankruptcies.
+
+Sample is by definition a subset of the population of interest. By identifying certain characteristics of a sample,
+it is possible to estimate the population parameters with some precision.
+
+The results of the study were the following: with regard to the number of bankruptcies declared, the new law
+reduced the average of 266 bankruptcies declared in the period of 12 months prior to the entry into force of the
+new Law to an average of 185 in the following 12 months (reduction of 30.45%). The same was observed in the
+requested bankruptcies. The number of bankruptcy filings before the enactment of the new law went from an
+average of 1,030 filings per month in the 12 months prior to the new law coming into force, to an average of 452
+in the following 12 months (a reduction of 56. 11%).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+
+We saw that determinism has its origins in the speculation of Greek philosophers, with their characteristic
+love for absolute truth and their contempt for money and practical everyday problems. Probability, however,
+bears a less noble and more argent birth certificate. The concern with probability has its origin with the
+appearance of games of chance and with the expectation of result. The Cairo Museum has specimens of
+astralagus, cow heel bones and bristles polished and engraved with symbols, the shape of which allowed them
+to be used in games of chance. The shape that these pieces maintain to this day and their ability, artificially
+created by artisans, to be thrown like dice with each symbol having the same chance of coming out
+(equiprobable results), prove that the Egyptians dominated and had fun with probability and the concept. relative frequency.
+It is from this relationship with games of chance that the study of probability is born. The initial steps
+towards a theory of probability were taken by pragmatic men, concerned with improving their betting
+performance and making a fortune.
+
+A variable has a probability distribution if the values it assumes are random, but the probability of it assuming
+any value within the sample space can be calculated. The essence of probability lies in its way of facing the
+limits of our knowledge, as it assumes a state of ignorance and proposes to make predictions regarding the
+possible values that a given variable can assume.
+
+The probability of something occurring is a
+function of how often that something has happened in the past. This is an objective interpretation, since
+probability is seen as a latent characteristic of the observed object. For example, the probability of a 25-yearold,
+single adult living in São Paulo being involved in a vehicle collision is equivalent to the relative frequency
+of the number of times that other people with the same characteristic were involved in accidents in the past.
+Likewise, if throwing an unlucky die a sufficiently large number of times yields the result three 40% of the time
+(when the expected would be almost 16.67%), for the frequentist, the die is objectively considered biased . and
+the probability of outcome three is close to 40%.
+
+Girolamo, son of Fazio Cardano, a lawyer friend of
+Leonardo da Vinci, wrote in 1526 the Liber de ludo aleae (published in 1663), a treatise that, under the pretext
+of teaching techniques for gambling, brings the first systematic study of related problems the likelihood.
+Cardano studied probability with the aim of raising money to pay for his medical studies (his father wanted him
+to be a lawyer) and his own support.
+
+From a Bayesian point of view , probability is not a property of an object (such as biased data, whose
+disproportion of chances in favor of an outcome is intrinsic to it), but it is a subject's belief regarding the
+behavior of that object. . Probability is, for the Bayesian, the measure of an observer's uncertainty regarding
+the chances of an event occurring, which, like any opinion, can change as the subject acquires more information
+about the object.
+
+The first Western scholar of probability was Girolamo Cardano, an Italian physician
+who lived in Pavia, in present-day Italy, between 1501 and 1576.
+
+It is necessary to distinguish between the definition and interpretation of the concept of probability.
+
+Probability depends on the degree of uncertainty about an event, that is, it depends on randomness. There
+is randomness whenever the outcome of a given variable does not describe a deterministic pattern, but presents
+
+For example, Marcos works for an insurance company and needs to assess the chances of a dam bursting
+in order to calculate the cost of insurance. There is no frequency of times this dam has burst in the past to be
+considered. It is possible to calculate a worldwide frequency of dam failures, it is true, but replicating this
+frequency disregards the differences that exist between each dam. Marcos, a civil engineer, decides to do the
+following: first he calculates the generic rate of dam failure, arriving at an initial probability of, say, 1 in 462
+thousand, called " a priori probability". Marcos then evaluates the quality of the project and the materials used
+in the construction of that specific dam, the volume of water in the dam, the rainfall in the region over the last
+20 years and the chances of a seismic shock in that area, adjusting its a priori probability . and starting to
+believe that there are chances of 1 in 837 thousand of the breakup happening, the so-called " posterior
+probability".
+
+The definition of probability cannot be confused with its possible interpretations. The interpretation of
+probability has two main strands, which correspond to two schools of statistical thought: Bayesian and
+frequentist.
+
+a sample space (set of possible outcomes) to which a probability distribution can be assigned.
+
+Cardano is credited with creating the concept of sample space (ÿ or U notation for universe), which
+corresponds to the set of all possible values of a random variable. The concept of sample space can be
+illustrated by the data. In a die, the sample space is ÿ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, with the probability of occurrence of
+each of the numbers equal to 1/6 if the die is fair or equiprobable. The importance of the sample space is to provide a view
+
+From a frequentist point of view , the probability corresponds to the relative frequency of an experiment
+repeated infinitely or, at least, for a very large number of times.
+
+Probability is defined in mathematics by satisfying the axioms of Russian mathematician Andrei Nikolaevich
+Kolmogorov (1903-1987). Kolmogorov's axioms start from the notion that every event has a sample space and
+that: 1) each event in that sample space has a probability equal to a non-negative number, 2) the probability of
+all events together is equal to one and 3) for any two disjoint events, the probability of their union is equal to
+the sum of their probabilities. Probability is therefore defined as a mathematical function that satisfies
+Kolmogorov's three axioms.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+
+V. Probabilistic causality
+
+But how do statistics and probability deal with knowing the truth? "Probability, statistics and truth" is the title
+of the main work of Richard von Mises, considered one of the great names of modern statistics and brother of
+economist Ludwig von Mises, first published in 1928.
+
+For those who propose to investigate reality, statistics are more than an instrument for making a good guess,
+what the Anglo-Saxons call an "educated guess". It is a technique that allows controlling uncertainty and making
+inferences to understand and control uncertainty. Thus, despite not producing absolute truths,
+statistics does not fall into a sterile skepticism, incapable of measuring the degree of significance of its
+statements. Statistics is a tool capable of reducing our ignorance, a state in which it is not possible to make
+meaningful statements, to modelable uncertainty, in which the chances of each event are quantified. But the
+question that arises is: how to produce a statement in the midst of uncertainty? In order to clarify this point, the
+topics below deal with some techniques for producing meaningful statements in the midst of uncertainty.
+
+The argument goes like this: God may or may not exist, and there is no rational way to defend in absolute terms
+either alternative. The solution is to bet. Faced with the two options (to believe or not to believe), believing in the
+existence of God is the one with the greatest expected gain, since the multiplication of any number greater than
+zero (relative to the chance of God's existence) by infinity (relative to the expected benefit with the grace of God)
+is equal to infinity. Thus, no matter how small the probability that God exists, betting on his existence brings infinite benefit.
+
+We learned that the law investigates the world of the must-be, where there would be no causal relationships,
+only imputation. When a legal norm imputes a sanction to a conduct - for example, a prison sentence for those who
+
+The main historical milestone in probability is the work of the Frenchmen Blaise Pascal (1623 to 1662) and
+Pierre de Fermat (1601 to 1665), around what became known as the problem of points. Pascal was one of the few
+geniuses of the first magnitude of humanity. Defining his occupation is somewhat complicated, as his
+contributions include mathematics, philosophy, physics and literature. What interests me here is his role as the father of Probability Theory.
+In 1654, Pascal was approached by his friend, writer and gambler Antoine Gombaud, the Chevalier de Méré, with
+the following problem: two players intend to end a game of chance early, dividing the prize fairly based on the
+chances of each one win the game. Taking into account the points scored by each, as well as the remaining
+rounds, in what proportion should the prize be divided?
+
+Pascal de Fermat's efforts were the first step towards the creation of a mathematical theory aimed at the study
+of uncertainty, where fundamental concepts such as probabilistic event and probability distribution were already
+articulated. Probability is important to statistics because of its ability to produce models capable of estimating
+the occurrence of future events. It is through probability that statistics in general, and all empirical disciplines
+based on it, are able to make prospective judgments about the future behavior of their object of study.
+
+The association of terms raised
+by the title leads to an important question, which is at the root of the late development of this branch of study:
+amidst only uncertainty, how to distinguish significant from non-significant inference? Or more broadly: in the
+absence of absolute criteria of truth, typical of stochastic reasoning, what does it mean to know the "true"
+probability of an event? There are those who see a paradox in the attempt to organize knowledge based on
+uncertainty. In the phrase of Leslie Ellis, polymath (from the Greek ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ, varied knowledge) and English
+mathematician: "Mere ignorance is no ground for any inference whatever. Ex nihilo nihil".
+Although witty, Ellis' phrase does not correspond to the fallible knowledge that we are used to dealing with
+when we try to explain physical reality, always changing and expanding. Rarely are we faced with absolutely true
+knowledge, which does not involve some kind of uncertainty. Science differs from other dogmatic approaches
+precisely because it always admits a probability of being wrong in its conclusions.
+
+Pascal introduced the problem in his correspondence with Pierre de Fermat, a French lawyer and amateur
+mathematician. The answer offered by both is considered the cornerstone of probability theory. The solution
+takes into account two phases of the game: the one already completed (determined points) and the one to be
+completed (undetermined points). First, the sample space of the possible results of the step to be performed is
+constructed. Then, the points of the stage already completed are added to the points of each of the possible
+stages to be carried out, bringing together all the alternative endings of the match. According to the PascalFermat
+solution, each player must receive the share of the prize proportional to his wins in relation to the totality
+of the alternative endings. The solution to the problem of points is the first explanation of the current concept of expected value, which
+
+general over all possible values that a random variable can take, allowing a probability to be assigned to each
+possible event. Events, it should be clarified, are combinations of elementary results from a sample space. For
+example, the face of the die takes on an even value, where the event is {2, 4, 6} or the face of the die takes on a
+value of three, where the event is {3}.
+
+Our reality horizons expand every day and science must always be open to new facts that force the revision of
+established theories. For those who, like Ellis, only admit absolute certainties, the recommendation is to follow
+the example of the Pythagoreans: abandon reality and turn your interest to ideal objects. In the ideal world, 2 + 2
+will always equal 4.
+
+At the end of his life, already in his notorious phase of religious fervor, Pascal used this concept again in his
+Thoughts, in a probabilistic argument to justify belief in God known as Pascal's wager.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+
+In practice, however, the consequences of enforcing the rules matter a great deal. Law is a mechanism of
+social control that depends on adherence to reality. If I sit down this afternoon and write in my living room the
+constitution of a country that has my neighborhood as its territory, it will not be law for the simple reason that
+society does not recognize these rules as binding. To be considered part of a legal order, norms need to be
+obeyed to a minimum degree and, therefore, law is not just a set of abstract texts, which imposes sanctions on
+conduct: it is an established authority capable of controlling the behavior of people. people.
+
+It is the same with law. Adopting an anti-legal conduct does not cause a sanction in the deterministic sense,
+because the application of the sanction needs to be mediated by an authority, which can be omitted. But in the
+probabilistic sense, in which there is room for these possible omissions, it may be possible to speak of an
+indirect causal relationship between a conduct and its sanction, provided that there is a strong non-spurious
+correlation. Tax evasion can be a probabilistic cause of imprisonment, since the act of evasion significantly
+increases the probability of the tax evader being arrested. Similarly, non-compliance with a contract can be the
+probabilistic cause of execution, provided that non-compliance increases the probability of execution. In fact,
+the less causal the norms are in the probabilistic sense, the closer to my fictitious constitution they will be.
+
+Of course, an infallible legal order is a fiction. The rules are not applied in all cases. The police fail, judges
+make mistakes and there are many cases in which the law should be applied and is not. Fallibility, however,
+does not make Law immune to causality, at least not to the modern concept of causality. After the statistical
+revolution, the idea of deterministic causality, in which the effect is necessarily associated with the cause, was
+replaced by the notion of probabilistic causality, in which the effect is probably associated with the cause.
+There is probabilistic causality when the realization of a given variable is capable of significantly increasing the
+probability of realizing another variable. Thus, even if a certain cause is not always followed by the expected effect, the relationship
+exists as long as there are high chances that this effect will occur.
+
+Speaking of spurious correlation, it is important to underline here the difference between correlation and
+causality. The fact that two variables are associated does not mean that one is the effect of the other. For
+example, there is a correlation between the size of children's feet and their ability to solve math problems. While
+this relationship is true, it is wrong to assume that growing feet causes increased intelligence. As we know, the
+growth of the feet is associated with the general development of the child, including their neuropsychic
+structure and their school training, which imply a greater ability to solve mathematical problems.
+There is an American site dedicated to gathering absurd correlations, full of funny real cases, which show
+how this confusion, if taken seriously, can be dangerous. Some examples: Between 1999 and 2009, the number
+of people drowning in swimming pools in the US is correlated with the number of films in which actor Nicolas
+Cage appears. Over the same period, per capita consumption of mozzarella cheese is correlated with the number
+of civil engineering doctorates and the number of people electrocuted on power lines is correlated with the
+number of marriages in Alabama. In other words, if we want to save lives, are we going to retire Nicolas Cage
+and abolish marriage in Alabama? And as there is a lack of engineers in Brazil, are we going to encourage the
+consumption of mozzarella cheese? Obviously not. But how to distinguish spurious correlation from causation?
+Identifying whether a given variable is the probabilistic cause of another is a complicated problem. One of the
+most common ways to try to solve this problem is through control group experimentation.
+Control groups are subdivisions of a sample or population that allow experimental study of one variable at a
+time.
+
+This type of relationship is especially appropriate for the study of human society, where the search for
+deterministic certainty is replaced by the identification of trends and propensities. Let me explain: Rain, for
+example, is a probabilistic cause of car accidents, but that does not mean that if it rains, all the cars on the street will have an accident.
+
+committing homicide -, the conduct would not cause the application of the penalty in the same sense that the
+combination of acid and base causes a chemical reaction that results in water and salt. The norm would only
+attribute a sanction to a conduct, idealizing, but not necessarily implying, its application by the authorities.
+Causality, a relationship proper to all sciences, and the study of the real consequences produced by the norm
+in society would, therefore, be alien to Law, a science of normative character that would not study a portion of
+the real world, but only the logical relations established through of legal commands.
+
+The following thought experiment may help with understanding. As a consequence of the
+principle of the natural judge and freedom of conviction, judges are free to sentence their cases according to
+their conviction. As a result of this discretion, we can believe that the sentences vary according to the
+background, values and personality of each judge. In order to test this hypothesis, a researcher decides to
+investigate the relationship between the judge's training and the level of severity of the sentence. In a first step,
+this study is carried out through a survey in which the characteristics of actual sentences handed down and
+their relationship with the socioeconomic background of the magistrate are verified. The observed results
+indicate that the judges formed by the five colleges best ranked by the OAB Examination deliver sentences, on average, 25% more severe
+
+It just means that the number of accidents tends to increase on a prolonged rainy day. Tobacco is a probabilistic
+cause of lung cancer, not because it is enough to predetermine the disease, but because its consumption
+increases the probability of incidence of cancer in that organ. And it is clear that the fact that some smokers
+have not developed lung cancer is not evidence capable of invalidating the relationship between this disease
+and smoking.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+SAW. Statistical error, p-value and significance
+
+47 48
+
+45
+
+44
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+43
+
+46
+
+statistic and the p-value. The p-value is defined as the probability of a hypothesis being rejected when it is true.
+
+while the non-rejection of a false null hypothesis characterizes type II error.
+
+In the example of bankruptcy law, the probability that the drop in the number of bankruptcy filings occurred due
+to chance was only 1%. Hypotheses are of two types: null and alternative.
+
+The answer is no, at least not based on this result alone. It is possible that the increase in sentences is due, as
+anticipated above, to a difference in the profile of cases judged by judges, assuming that crime in large cities is
+more organized and violent. Furthermore, cities with greater population density have higher income, greater social
+disparity and, therefore, may constitute an environment prone to generating more offensive criminal conduct. If
+this distinction is confirmed, the place of jurisdiction would be a spurious variable in relation to the severity of the
+penalties.
+
+Instead of dealing with the concept of truth, statistics works with the idea of statistical significance.
+A result is considered statistically significant when the probability of being the product of a random fluctuation is
+sufficiently small.
+
+Statistical error, in turn, consists of the mistaken acceptance or rejection of a null hypothesis. In the example
+above, the null hypothesis is that music therapy has no effect on a criminal's recidivism. On the other hand, the
+alternative hypothesis is that the therapy has an effect.
+
+True to its anti-determinist roots, statistical testing never declares a hypothesis to be true or false. It just
+recognizes that the probability that the null hypothesis was wrongly rejected is small enough to declare the result
+statistically significant. As it is a measure of probability, the p-value can vary between 0 and 1. The p-value level
+to be established for rejecting or not a null hypothesis is called the level of probability.
+
+Probabilistic reasoning and the logic on which it is based, inductive logic, is distinguished from other logics
+(aletic and apophantic) by the role played by risk. Probabilistic reasoning always incorporates a risk component .
+
+The null hypothesis is the one
+that denies the existence of a relationship between the observed sample and the parameter to be estimated. The
+alternative hypothesis is that it admits the existence of this relationship. Still in the example, the null hypothesis
+was that the drop in the number of bankruptcy filings was not due to the new law, while the alternative hypothesis
+stated that these two factors were associated.
+
+graduates from other faculties.
+
+One
+
+The rejection of a true null hypothesis characterizes the type
+
+I error, Still in the example, the p-value of the research is the relative probability that, at the moment of the division
+of the two groups, 89 or more of the 101 men who would not relapse had been drawn for the therapy-exposed
+group. That is, the probability of a Type I error.
+
+The conclusion is that simple observational research would not be enough to answer researchers' questions.
+One solution would be to carry out an experiment, in which two groups of judges would be asked to deliver
+sentences on the same set of hypothetical cases. The groups would be divided according to the magistrate's
+training institution. The creation of two groups helps to isolate the differences between the cases and to control
+only the effects of the magistrate's training. With this, the sentences given by each group could be compared in
+relation to cases of equal complexity and the results controlled according to the variable of interest in the study.
+
+The issue of statistical significance is related to two other equally important concepts: error
+
+Another function of control groups is to identify spurious correlations. Spurious are statistical correlations that
+do not express a causal relationship. One more example may help: imagine that a researcher hypothesizes that
+judges in cities with more than a million inhabitants hand down sentences with more severe penalties than judges
+in smaller cities. A survey carried out revealed that sentences handed down by judges in big cities impose
+sentences on average 37% higher than those handed down by judges in small towns. From this research, can we
+conclude that the judge's residence in a large city is a cause of increased sentences?
+
+However, the research is criticized for its lack of robustness. As each case has unique characteristics, the
+validity of the result is questioned due to the possibility that the differences in the sentences result from the
+peculiarities of each case, and not from the training of the judges. The position occupied by judges trained in the
+best colleges could, for example, be associated with districts with more disputed entrances, which in turn
+correspond to more populous cities. And the crimes committed in large urban centers may be characterized by
+greater organization, thus explaining the more severe sentences. Thus, the severity of the decisions could be
+explained not by the judge's training, but by the location where it was handed down.
+
+Imagine an Orwellian example : an experiment aims to study the effect of musical therapy on the recidivism of
+criminals. The therapy, consisting of lessons on any instrument and attendance at classical concerts, is
+administered to a group of 100 criminals and the effects are compared with another group of criminals of the same
+size who were not subjected to therapy. The result is that 89% of criminals who attended classes and concerts,
+once released, did not repeat any criminal activity, compared to 52% of criminals in the group not undergoing
+therapy. Given these results, the question that statisticians ask themselves is: assuming that the therapy would
+not be effective anyway, what is the probability that 89 or more of the 101 men who would not reoffend would have
+been, by coincidence, drawn into the same group? ? If this probability is small enough, the result of the experiment
+is significant and we can say that anti-recidivism musical therapy actually works.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+51
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+53
+
+55
+
+VII. Bias and sampling
+
+The importance of sampling stems from practical circumstances related to the inaccessibility of the population
+or 54 It is impracticable to directly question all voters and the cost and time required to carry out a census. each
+survey regarding their voting intentions, since, due to the dimensions, the result of this census would be calculated
+after the date of the election. Likewise, the cost of censuses on the audience of a television program with all viewers
+or the degree of satisfaction of all consumers of a product can make the investment uneconomical. And, in addition,
+even if it does not make the investment unfeasible, if the results of a correctly performed sampling are sufficiently
+accurate, carrying out a costly census becomes an unnecessary waste of resources and time.
+
+No sample is a perfect representation of the population and therefore there will always be a difference between
+the estimator and the parameter. This difference is called sampling error.For the same reason, any two non-identical
+samples will almost always show different results, simply because they are composed of different elements. One of
+the efforts of sampling techniques is to control and reduce this error as much as possible. The idea behind error
+control is that successive samplings will produce a distribution of values in which the central point, called the
+expected value of the estimator, tends to coincide with the value of the parameter.
+
+Because they allow estimation, the sample characteristics are
+
+56 costly.
+
+The calculation of the p-value and its comparison with a significance level can be illustrated through one more
+example: an association filed a lawsuit against an industry, alleging that the use of a product it manufactures is the
+cause of a disease. To prove this correlation, a laboratory study with rats was commissioned. This is an experiment
+with control groups, in which 1,000 animals were exposed to the product and another 1,000 were not exposed. The
+result of the experiment indicated that, from the group exposed to the product, 100 animals developed the disease,
+while in the control group, 92 animals developed the disease. In percentage terms, we have 10% versus 9.2%, a
+difference of 0.8% and a relative risk of 1.09 (10 ÷ 9.2). Some may consider this difference large enough to recognize
+the cause of the disease in the product, while others may not.
+
+To try to objectify this opinion, we have to calculate the p-value. Let us assume that the null hypothesis has not
+been rejected and therefore the product is not a cause of the disease. Thus, the 192 rats would develop the disease
+anyway, whether or not they were in the group exposed to the product. The 2000 rats in the experiment can be
+randomly divided into two groups of 1000 rats, in which the 192 patients appear in varying proportions, from all 192
+rats in the exposed group to the opposite, with the same 192 rats in the control group. In 54% of the draws (p-value
+0.54) between 100 and 192 diseased rats would anyway be allocated concentrated, by sheer chance, into one of the
+two groups (exposed or control), producing an equal or even more extreme result than observed. The p-value 0.54
+is high enough for us to assume that the difference pointed out by the study may have been a coincidence and not
+an effect of the product's action on people, in such a way that the null hypothesis of the experiment should not be
+rejected.
+
+the value of
+
+The problem is that, if there is a bias in the sample, this coincidence will not occur and the estimator will
+systematically differ from the parameter. For this reason, bias is defined as a systematic divergence between the
+expected value of the estimator and the value of the parameter. The bias stems from problems in choosing the
+sample estimator, in particular the intentionality in selecting its elements. Intentionality corresponds to a subjective
+interference in the composition of the sample. Bias can be illustrated, for example, through customs inspection
+processes. Given the large volume of goods that enter the country daily, customs inspection is carried out by
+sampling. If inspectors do not conduct a random sampling and choose to select containers that are closer or easier
+to access, traffickers and smugglers can bypass customs inspections by hiding illicit goods in containers that are
+difficult to access.
+
+The customs example shows why the most common sampling method is random or probabilistic. In random
+sampling, each member of the population has an equal, or at least known, probability of being selected for the
+sample. There is no intentionality because the researcher does not choose on a case-by-case basis which elements
+of the population will be selected. Luck will define which elements will make up the sample. For random selection,
+it is necessary that the population is delimited and all its elements are accessible. Problems in inference normally
+arise when portions of the population are excluded from sampling because they are difficult to access or In addition
+to making estimation viable, random sampling allows the calculation of the margin of error, which is the
+statistical measure of sampling error. The margin of error corresponds to the amplitude of the confidence interval
+around the estimator. This interval is random and may or may not contain the parameter, with fixed probability.
+
+meaningfulness. The choice of p-value is a subjective choice, which depends on the degree of confidence required
+by the researcher. It is evident, however, that the level of significance is a low value, varying, for most cases,
+between 0.05 and 0.01.
+
+characteristics of the population to which they
+belong. called estimators, while the characteristics of the population are called parameters. estimate
+is the estimate. It is important to clarify that samples do not represent populations and it is not correct to say, as is
+commonly done, that a sample is representative of a population. Samples only allow, in certain circumstances,
+knowledge by approximation of some of the characteristics of the population.
+
+Sampling is the procedure through which a subset of elements is selected to estimate the
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+VIII. power and certainty
+
+63
+
+64
+
+60
+
+65
+
+58
+
+61
+
+62
+
+59
+
+However, it is the belief in maintaining this
+standard that allows us to bet, even under some degree of uncertainty, on the creation of new knowledge, since
+deduction, totally averse to risk and entirely rational, ends up in creative sterility: deduction only organizes and
+specifies what we already know. The inductive method is, therefore, the route of access to external objects and the
+means capable of revealing, through repeated and systematic observation of objects, the universal order that science
+believes exists.
+
+In probabilistic induction, different degrees of probability are
+attributed to scientific hypotheses, depending on whether the observed facts confirm their veracity or not. Probability
+incorporates variability as part of its explanations. And the observation of occurrences that contradict a hypothesis
+does not make it false, they only reduce its level of significance. There is, therefore, no falsifiability from a statistical
+perspective, for the simple fact that there is no absolute truth to be falsified .
+
+For this reason, there is no certainty in the result of a test, only different levels of statistical power. The power of
+the test statistic is the probability that a hypothesis test will not make a Type II error.
+
+Unlike deduction, which is based on fixed premises, induction relies on the belief that patterns observed in the
+past will repeat themselves in the future. No logical or self-evident assumption guarantees that there is such an order,
+whereby an observed pattern of the past must repeat itself in the future.
+
+Within a deterministic perspective, inductive inference leads to a valid result only when all observations, without
+exception, confirm the general law. Deterministic induction does not tolerate variations and a single divergent
+observation, even among thousands of previous confirmations, makes the law false. This subjection to contradiction
+is called falsifiability.
+
+Denying the error is the quickest way to incur it.
+
+Type II error is one in
+which a false null hypothesis is not rejected. As the power of a test increases, the chance of a Type II error decreases.
+The factors capable of influencing the power of a test are the statistical significance criterion and the sample size.
+
+Concluding this part, I can even agree that the ideal of knowledge is certainty. However, the vast majority of issues
+in our personal, professional and academic lives, especially those involving law, such as negotiating contracts or
+defending a lawsuit, involve different degrees of risk and uncertainty.
+
+Defining the sample size and structure is another important aspect. Contrary to common sense, the sample does
+not need to be larger just because the population is large. The definition of sample size depends on two factors: the
+population variance and the margin of error considered acceptable. Given a certain degree of precision with which a
+parameter must be estimated, the greater the variance of that parameter, the larger the sample must be. Likewise,
+given a variance of a parameter, the larger the sample, the smaller the margin of error in the estimation. Another
+common sense to be demystified concerns the relationship between sample size and margin of error. Doubling the
+sample size does not double the estimation precision. In fact, this relationship is expressed by the square root of the
+ratio in sample increase. Thus, if the sample size is quadrupled, the estimation precision will only be doubled.
+
+To understand what induction
+is, I will also review the antithetical concept of deduction. While deductive inference is a path independent of
+experience, which starts from the general (major premise) to the particular (minor premise) towards a valid conclusion,
+inductive inference takes the opposite path, starting from the particular (observations of facts) to general (identification
+of regularities that express a law).
+
+To conclude, it is worth speculating a little more about the logic of statistical thinking and its confrontation with
+the foundations of knowledge that, since Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton, we have called exact sciences. The exact
+sciences are associated with deterministic induction, replicability and falsifiability.
+
+The results of a statistical test always include a component of uncertainty. Margin of error, p-value and significance
+level are indications of approximation, which do not have the purpose or intention of eliminating uncertainty.
+
+The divergence between the induction of probability and determinism lies in the degree of uncertainty that the
+researcher is willing to assume.
+
+Europeans first saw a black swan in 1697, when Willem de Vlamingh was
+exploring the Swan River in Western Australia. The identification of the bird falsified the centuries-old conclusion that
+all swans were white, became an allegory for the weaknesses of the inductive method and caused the expression
+black swan to stop meaning an impossible event and refer to a highly improbable event. however capable of
+drastically affecting our convictions.
+
+For statistics, the truth is a wild animal that allows itself to be observed from some distance, but that will never allow
+itself to be imprisoned. Error is part of human knowledge and, in addition to being a sign of honesty and intellectual
+maturity, admitting its presence is the only known way to minimize and control its effects.
+
+The deductive inference is exemplified by the famous syllogism: every man is mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore
+Socrates is mortal. And inductive inference is illustrated by the famous example of observing swans. All swans seen
+by Europeans until the 17th century were white. This regularity led to the generalization that all swans would be white
+and caused the expression "black swan" to acquire, since ancient times, the popular meaning of something
+impossible to happen, as in the poet Juvenal's phrase, ironically comparing honest people to a "rare bird on earth,
+resembling a black swan".
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+FOOTNOTES
+
+82.
+
+CHURCHILL, Gilbert A. & BROWN, Tom J. & SUTER, Tracy A. Basic marketing research. São Paulo: Cengage Learning, 2011,
+p. 65 to 67. COOPER, Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in administration. 7. Ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman,
+2003, p. 390.
+
+ZEIZEL, Hans; KAYE, David. Prove it with figures: empirical methods in law and litigation. New York: Springer-Verlag. 1997.
+See especially chap. 1. The search for causes.
+
+COOPER, Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in administration. Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2003, p. 420 to 471.
+
+In the original: "In God we trust; all the others must bring data". Popularly attributed to statistician William Edwards Deming.
+
+ACHENWALL, Gottfried. StaatssissenchaftdervornehmenEuropaischenReiche und Republiken. 1749. In the following editions
+it was published as Staatsverfassung der Europaischen Reiche in Grundrisse (1752), in Portuguese: "Constitution of the main
+European states". This work presents information regarding agriculture, manufacturing, commerce and population of the main
+European states, whenever possible through statistics. This is the first work that summarizes the configuration of State
+Economies, allowing a direct comparison between their main characteristics.
+
+For an in-depth look at research planning: COOPER, Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in administration.
+Porto Alegre: Bookman., 2003, p. 66 to 107 and 126 to 147. BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6.
+Ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010, p. 1. MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6. Ed., Porto Alegre:
+Bookman, 2012, p. 57 to 198 and 365 to 368.
+
+For various definitions: COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. reprint São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p. 30.
+BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. Ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010. p. 330 to 339.
+
+HALD, Anders. A history of statistics and probability and their application before 1750. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.
+
+ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneer Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 103 to 109 and 442
+to 446. MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6. Ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012, p. 365 to 367.
+
+STIGLER, Stephen. The history of statistics. The measurement of uncertainty before 1900. Cambridge: Harvard University
+Press, 1986, p. 1.
+
+8
+3
+
+6
+1
+
+5
+4
+
+7
+two
+
+Consequently, we are forced to make decisions, armed with insufficient or contradictory information. Within
+this world full of stochastic surprises, statistics is the research method capable of controlling uncertainty,
+measuring the probability of success of arguments and, therefore, helping us make decisions with insufficient
+information and surrounded by doubts.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010. p. 35. MALHOTRA, Naresh.
+
+17
+
+11
+
+13
+
+Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6. ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012. p. 363. ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneira Thompson
+
+Learning, 2006, p. 389 to 391.
+
+NUNES, Marcelo Guedes. Jurimetry of Corporate Law: A Statistical Study of Company Dissolution in Brazil. PhD final thesis. PUCSP, 2012.
+
+BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. Ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010. p. 9 to 252. ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São
+
+Paulo: Pioneira Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 50 to 52.
+
+Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 261 to 263. MALHOTRA, Naresh.
+
+BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010. p. 37 to 40. MALHOTRA, Naresh.
+
+Technical note: Cost and time of the tax enforcement process promoted by the Attorney General of the National Treasury. Available at: [www.ipea.gov.br/agencia/images/stories/
+
+PDFs/nota_tecnica/111230_notatecnicadiest1.pdf]. Accessed on: 07/30/2013).
+
+COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p. 286. BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. ed., São
+
+Paulo: Saraiva, 2010. p. 261 to 266. ZICKMUND, William G.
+
+BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. Ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010. p 11 to 14. COZBY, Paul C.
+
+14
+
+18
+
+9
+
+12
+
+15
+
+Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6. Ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012, p. 360. CHURCHILL, Gilbert A. & BROWN, Tom J. & SUTER, Tracy A. Basic marketing research.
+
+São Paulo: Cengage Learning. 2011. p. 374 to 375.
+
+Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6th ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012, p. 364. ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of Marketing Research. São Paulo: Pioneer Thompson
+
+Learning. 2006. p. 391 to 395.
+
+Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneira Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 52 to 53.
+
+10
+
+379 to 382.
+
+16
+
+COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. reprint., São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 261 to 264.
+
+ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneira Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 386. MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation.
+
+6. Ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012. p. 58 to 67.
+
+CHURCHILL, Gilbert A. & BROWN, Tom J. & SUTER, Tracy A. Basic marketing research. São Paulo: Cengage Learning, 2011, p.
+
+There are also other types of summary measures, such as measures of symmetry in the distribution (obliquity) or measures of description of unusual or exotic results (outliers),
+
+but measures of position and dispersion are by far the most relevant.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+in:
+
+DE GROOT, Morris H. Probability and statistics. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1989, p. 4.
+
+BOLFARINE, Heleno & BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005, p. 37.
+
+Guidelines.
+
+MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6th ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012, p. 269 to 288.
+
+Available for download at:
+
+According to the report, "the result - significant at the 1% level - indicates that the new Law provided a drop of approximately
+87 bankruptcies per month, which means an average reduction of approximately 33% in relation to the period from June 2004
+to June 2005. The result for requested bankruptcies indicates a reduction of 561 bankruptcy requests, after the entry into force
+of the new Law. These numbers represent an average reduction of 54% in the number of bankruptcy requests in relation to the
+period from June 2004 to June 2005". Thinking about Law Series Report n. 22/2010: Analysis of the new bankruptcy law, p. 21.
+
+C0708AAE5DB1%257D&ei="v_XyUZu3GMXF4APlyoDgBw&usg=AFQjCNEAYy7B-37ipn9s_C9tlv4JjdSBYA&sig2=8foV
+c7k14tMKCvJw1ht4A&bvm=bv.49784469,d.dmg]." Accessed on: 7/30/2013).
+
+ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneira Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 357 to 360.
+
+[www.portal.mj.gov.br%2Fservices%2FDocumentManagement%2FFileDownload.EZTSvc.asp%3FDocumentID%3D%257B68E6736C
+4DF7-498B-ABC3-DBCFE29195F6%257D%26ServiceInstUID%3D%257B0831095E-D6E4- 49AB-B405-
+
+Assessment
+
+DEGROOT, Morris H. Probability and statistics. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1989, p. 2. BUSSAB, Wilson de
+O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010, p. 103.
+
+BOLFARINE, Heleno & BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005, p. 42 to 47. COOPER, Donald R. &
+SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in management. 7. ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2003, p. 148 to 162. CHURCHILL,
+Gilbert A. & BROWN, Tom J. & SUTER, Tracy A. Basic marketing research. São Paulo: Cengage Learning, 2011, p. 286 to 301.
+
+See in general: BOLFARINE, Heleno & BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005. See also: BUSSAB,
+Wilson de O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010, p. 262. COZBY, Paul C. Research Methods
+in the Behavioral Sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p. 145 to 154.
+
+Regulatory impact assessment is a mandatory phase of the legislative process in many countries. At the European Commission,
+Impact Available [http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf].
+They recommend regulatory impact assessment as a preliminary step to the promulgation of a new regulation or the
+implementation of a public policy. In the USA, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs - OIRA, according to a statement
+from its Executive Committee, seeks to evaluate the cost-benefit of implementing proposals and estimate the impact of future
+regulations. Available at: [www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_default].
+
+25
+
+27
+
+22
+
+20
+
+26
+
+21
+
+19
+
+23
+
+24
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+28
+
+32
+
+30
+
+34
+
+36
+
+29
+
+31
+
+35
+
+33
+
+Quoted by: KEYNES, John Maynard. A treatise on probability. London: MacMillan, 1921, p. 85. The so-called "lottery paradox"
+is an interesting example of criticism of probabilistic thinking. Accepting the idea of hypothesis testing, we assume that a
+hypothesis should be rejected if the probability associated with it, from observations, is very small. In a lottery with 10,000
+tickets, each one of them has a probability of 0.0001 of being drawn, which would lead us to reject, for each one of them, the
+hypothesis of its drawing. The test leads us to the mistaken conclusion that no tickets will be drawn. The example is in
+COHEN, Laurence Jonathan. An introduction to the philosophy of induction and probability. London: Clarendon Press, 1989,
+p. 208.
+
+The attribution stems from Cardano being the first to write a work dedicated to the study of probability. There are, however,
+those who recognize the origin in the poem De Vetula, of controversial authorship, attributed by some to the Roman Ovid (43
+BC-17 AD) and by others to the Frenchman Richard de Fournival (13th century). For more details, see HEIDE, C. & SENETA, E.
+
+The full account of the points problem and the concept of expected value can be found in: HEIDE, C. & SENETA, E.
+
+HACKING, Ian. The emergency of probability. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 10-11.
+
+Statistics of the centuries. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2001, p. 116 to 122.
+
+MISES, Richard von. Probability, statistics and truth. London: Dover, 1981.
+
+Statistics of the centuries. New York: Springer-Verlag. 2001, p. 227 to 269. See also: TODHUNTER, Issac. A history of the
+mathematical theory of probability from the time of Pascal to that of Laplace. London: Mc Millian & Co, 1865, p. 7 to 21.
+
+Not by coincidence, the word "fortune", disseminated in modern times by the work of Niccolò Machiavelli (The Prince), bears
+both the meaning of luck and that of accumulated wealth.
+
+Popper explains chance as follows: "One sometimes hears it said that the movements of the planets obey strict laws, whilst
+the fall of a die is fortuitous, or subject to chance. In my view, the difference lies in the fact that we have so far been able to
+predict the movement of the planets successfully, but not the individual result of a throwing dice. In order to deduce
+predictions one needs laws and initial conditions; if no suitable laws are available or if the initial conditions cannot be
+ascertained, the scientific way of prediction breaks down. In throwing dice, what lack is, clearly, sufficient knowledge of
+initial condition. With sufficient precision measurements of initial conditions it would be possible to make predictions in this
+case also; (... ) I speak of chance when our knowledge does not suffice for prediction; as in the case of dicing, where we
+speak of chance because we have no knowledge of initial conditions." POPPER, Karl. The logic of scientific discovery. New
+York: Routledge, 1959, p.205.
+
+HEIDE, C. & SENETA, E. Statisticians of the Centuries. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2001, p. 128 to 134. HALD, Anders. A
+history of statistics and probability and their application before 1750. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p. 31 to 41.
+
+PASCAL, Blaise. Les Pensées de Bl. Pascal suivies d'une nouvelle table analytique. Paris: Chez Lefrèvre Librarie, 1826, p. 252.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+43
+
+39
+
+According to Ian Hacking: "Inductive logic is about risky arguments. It analyzes inductive arguments using probability. There are other kinds of risky arguments. There is inference
+
+to the best explanation, and there are arguments based on testimony. Valid arguments are risk-free. Inductive logic studies risky arguments. A risky argument can be a very good
+
+one, and yet its conclusion can be false, even when the premises are true. Most of our arguments are risky." HACKING, Ian. Introduction to probability and inductive logic. New York:
+
+Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 11.
+
+ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneira Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 443. COOPER,
+
+Hans Zeizel and David Kaye explain the importance that the identification of causalities has for the scientific effort, including statistical investigations into the functioning of the legal
+
+order: "Among the many questions that are central to legal proceedings, the question whether one thing caused another is the most frequent. It occurs in civil and criminal litigation.
+
+Does capital punishment deter crimes? Does a food additive cause cancer? Does a headache tablet work as advertised? Would additional information in a securities prospectus
+
+have discouraged potential investors from an unwise purchase? Does the similarity in the names of two products lead consumers to buy one because of their familiarity with the
+
+other, well-known respected brand? The list is endless.At least some of these questions can be addressed by collection and analyzing data rather than relying solely on seat-of-thepants
+judgments". ZEIZEL, Hans; KAYE, David. Prove it with figures: empirical methods in law and litigation. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997, p. 1.
+
+40
+
+Association is therefore different from causation. About association, see BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & Morettin, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010, p. 399 to
+
+401. About the difference, see: ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneira Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 471.
+
+Wilton Bussab and Pedro Morettin summarize what these investigation techniques would be based almost essentially on frequency distributions: "(omissis) the analysis of a set of
+
+data through numerical and graphical techniques allows us to have a good idea of the distribution of this set . In particular, the frequency distribution is an important tool for evaluating
+
+the variability of observations of a random phenomenon. From these observed frequencies we can calculate measures of position and variability, such as mean, median, standard
+
+deviation, etc. These frequencies and measures calculated from the data are estimates of unknown quantities, generally associated with populations from which the data were
+
+extracted in the form of samples. In particular, the (relative) frequencies are estimators of the probability of occurrence of certain events of interest. With appropriate assumptions ,
+
+and without directly observing the random phenomenon of interest, we can create a theoretical model that reasonably reproduces the distribution of frequencies when the
+
+phenomenon is directly observed". BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & MORETTIN, Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6. ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010, p. 103.
+
+41
+
+COOPER, Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in administration. 7. ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2003, p. 137 to 142.
+
+MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6th ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012, p. 174. CHURCHILL, Gilbert A. & BROWN, Tom J. & SUTER, Tracy A.
+
+Basic marketing research. São Paulo: Cengage Learning, 2011, p. 100. COZBY, Paul C. Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p. 95 to
+
+97.
+
+42
+
+38
+
+37
+
+ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneira Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 463. MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation.
+
+6th ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012, p. 179 to 180.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+44
+
+46
+
+53
+
+51
+
+49
+
+47
+
+45
+
+52
+
+50
+
+48
+
+54
+
+COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 296 to 300. COOPER, Donald
+R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in administration. 7th ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2003, p. 395.
+
+BOLFARINE, Heleno & BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005, p. 5.
+
+Census is the exhaustive procedure of collecting and recording data about a population. See BOLFARINE, Heleno &
+BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005, p. 21.
+
+ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneer Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 442. COOPER,
+Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in administration. 7th ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2003, p. 392.
+
+Zeizel and Kaye explain the concept of sampling as follows: "Sampling of some sort must be as old as trade and commerce.
+If merchandise is shipped, the recipient, before accepting the goods, will try to determine through sampling whether the
+oranges were fresh , whether the glasses were not broken, whether the tobacco was of the promised quality.In such
+acceptance sampling, as it was later named, the careful recipient avoided the trap of looking only at the top layer of a case.
+
+The correct statistical definition is that the p-value is the probability of obtaining a test statistic equal to or more extreme
+than that observed in a sample, assuming the null hypothesis is true.
+
+BOLFARINE, Heleno & BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005, p. 52 to 54.
+
+COOPER, Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in administration. 7th ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2003, p. 394.
+
+COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 300-301.
+
+COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p. 286 to 287.
+
+By sampling from several odd places, he laid the roots to the basic modern sampling principle that gives all units of the
+population from which the sample is drawn a known, nonzero probability of failing into the sample". ZEIZEL, Hans; KAYE,
+David. Prove it with figures: empirical methods in law and litigation. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997, p. 66.
+
+Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Management research methods. 7. ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2003, p. 392.
+
+MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6. ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012, p. 269 . BOLFARINE,
+Heleno & BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005, p. 37 to 41. BUSSAB, Wilson de O. & MORETTIN,
+Pedro A. Basic statistics. 6th ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010, p. 261 to 264.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Prolegomena Apology Pragmatism. [www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/
+prolegomena.html]. Accessed on: 08.07.2012. See also: ECO, Umberto. On mirrors and other essays. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1989,
+p. 159 to 161. COOPER, Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S.
+
+In the original Latin: "rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno".
+
+Methods of research in the field of administration. 7th ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2003, p. 48-49.
+
+Charles Sanders Peirce mentions a third genre, abductive reasoning, equated to a guess by free association ("guessing"). According to
+Pierce, it is through abduction that we formulate hypotheses to be tested. "Let us now consider non-necessary reasoning. This divides
+itself, according to the different ways in which it may be valid, into three classes: probable deduction; experimental reasoning, which I
+now call Induction; and processes of thought capable of producing no conclusion more definite than a conjecture, which I now call
+Abduction. [---] Abduction is no more nor less than guessing, a faculty attributed to Yankees. [---] Such validity as this has consists in the
+generalization that no new truth is ever otherwise reached while some new truths are thus reached. This is a result of Induction; and
+therefore in a remote way Abduction rests upon diagrammatic reasoning".
+
+ZEIZEL, Hans; KAYE, David. Prove it with figures: empirical methods in law and litigation. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997, p.
+
+Available
+
+106-107.
+
+for
+
+This modern meaning gained notoriety through the book by Nicholas Nassim Taleb. The black swan: the impact of the highly improbable.
+New York: Randon House, 2007.
+
+I'm
+
+Cozby, Paul C. Research Methods in Behavioral Sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p. 303-304.
+
+In:
+
+As Ian Hacking explains: "We are determined by custom alone to suppose the future conformable to the past. When a see a billiard ball
+moving toward another, my mind is immediately carried by habit to the usual effect, and anticipates my sight by conceiving the second
+ball in motion. There is nothing in these objects - abstractly considered - which leads me to form any such conclusion: and even after I
+have had experience of many repeated effects of this kind, there is no argument which determines me to suppose that the effect will be
+conformable to past experience. It is not therefore reason which is the guide of life, but custom. That alone determines the mind in all
+instances to suppose the future conformable to the past. However easy
+
+in:
+
+If the distribution of the variable to be estimated is too asymmetric, the sample can be stratified. For example, as there are marked
+differences in the number and size of companies in the national territory, to study bankruptcy cases in Brazil, samples can be selected by
+region (stratum), so that their results can later be combined into a more accurate estimate of the population. See BOLFARINE, Heleno &
+BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005, p. 93 to 111.
+
+BOLFARINE, Heleno & BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005, p. 28 to 29.
+
+Cozby, Paul C. Research Methods in Behavioral Sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p. 19 to 21.
+
+an
+
+62
+
+56
+
+60
+
+58
+
+63
+
+61
+
+57
+
+55
+
+59
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+64
+
+COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p. 19.
+
+Inductive reasoning is criticized for rushing uncertain conclusions based on limited observations. Sextus Empiricus, David Hume and Karl Popper
+are remembered for discussing what became known in philosophy as the problem of induction.
+According to Hume, we believe in induction because the patterns observed in reality keep repeating themselves. Such justification, however, is
+fallacious by begging the question, as it justifies the validity of induction through induction itself. Still, Hume admits that induction is the only
+method capable of creating knowledge and that even deductive reasoning depends on induction for the construction of its major premises. See:
+HUME, David. An inquiry concerning human understanding.
+
+66
+
+As John Maynard Keynes explains, arguments based on some degree of uncertainty make up most of our reasoning and, the fact that they are
+not deterministic, does not make them stop being rational. To ignore these methods of investigation is to leave aside most of the judgments we
+make throughout our intellectual lives: "In most branches of academic logic, such as the theory of the syllogism or the geometry of ideal space, all
+the arguments aim at demonstrative certainty. They claim to be conclusive. But many other arguments are rational and claim some weight without
+pretending to be certain. In Metaphysics, in Science, and in Conduct, most of the arguments, upon which we habitually base our rational beliefs,
+are admitted to be inconclusive in a greater or less degree. Thus for a philosophical treatment of these branches of knowledge, the study of
+probability is required. The course which the history of thought has led Logic to follow has encouraged the view that doubtful arguments are not
+within its scope. But in the actual exercise of reason we do not wait on certainty, or deem it irrational to depend on a doubtful argument. If logic
+investigates the general principles of valid thought, the study of arguments, to which it is rational to attaches some weight, is as much a part of it
+as the study of those which are demonstrative". Keynes, John Maynard. A Treatise on Probability. London: Dover, 2004, p. 8.
+
+Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1977. Paragraphs IV and V. See also: Empiricus, Sextus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cambridge: Harvard
+University Press, 1933, p. 283.
+
+this step may seen, reason would never, to all eternity, be able to make it." HACKING, Ian. An introduction to probability and inductive logic. New
+York: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 247.
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+65
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+dominated by statisticians and economists."
+
+the special appeal due to jurisprudential divergence
+or even the appeals against decisions that violate abstract norms, either
+federal law (such as the special appeal
+
+,
+
+Consistency and predictability have always been ideals of law, expressed even in
+the principles of legal certainty and equality. Knowing in advance that you will receive
+the same treatment as your fellow man is a measure of the degree of civility in a
+society. However, no matter how great the theoretical and practical efforts to
+systematize the legal order have been, the uncertainties of Law have never been
+eradicated. Even with the enactment of laws and the creation of consistency control
+mechanisms, the act of judging continues to display an essentially human component
+in which the law plays an important role, but no more than the intimate perception
+that the judge has of the parties, their lawyers and the facts brought before them.
+
+The relationship between law and statistics is old. The affliction of the party who
+appears before a court and does not find ways to predict how his case will be decided,
+or of the judge who tries, based on a set of evidence, to understand the truth of facts
+that he did not witness, has always accompanied the life of Law. Overcoming this
+anguish, bringing a greater degree of security and predictability to the Law, was an
+aspiration nurtured by great exponents of this matter. The enactment of laws to guide
+judges stems from the concern to give predictability to judicial decisions, reducing
+arbitrariness and inconsistency resulting from the different opinions of magistrates.
+
+"Today the study of Law is still an activity of booksellers; but in the future it will be
+
+Those who work in the courts know how sensitive the dynamics of judgment are
+and how the outcome of a case can be affected by apparently irrelevant occurrences.
+
+In addition to issuing general laws, several mechanisms seek to give greater
+consistency to the legal order, such as, for example, resources to re-discuss decisions
+handed down by a majority (and not unanimity), as is the case of embargoes infringing
+the creation of judicial instances aimed at reviewing conflicting judgments with those
+of similar cases, such as the embargoes of divergence, the incident of standardization
+of jurisprudence, and the summary
+binding,
+those relating to the jurisdiction (such as the
+claim, violation of federal law) or the Federal Constitution (such as the extraordinary appeal).
+
+Research conducted by Columbia University in New York and Ben Gurion University
+in Tel Aviv over ten months analyzed 1,112 decisions handed down by eight judges in
+Israel on parole. In order to classify the decisions, each judge's day was divided into
+three periods with two meal breaks: lunch and a snack. The results indicated that
+immediately after meal breaks, judges granted approximately 65% of requests, a
+percentage that fell
+
+I. Beginnings
+
+3
+
+8
+
+9
+7
+
+4
+
+1
+
+two
+
+5 6
+
+Chapter 4. Origins of Jurimetria
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+Jurimetry
+CHAPTER 4. ORIGINS OF JURIMETRY
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+10
+
+11
+
+15
+
+12
+
+16
+
+13
+
+17
+
+14 is
+
+of life expectancy to determine the presumed date of death.
+
+Another notorious example is that of the Bernoulli family, especially the
+mathematicians Jacob and Nicholas. Jacob Bernoulli, Swiss mathematician (1654-1705),
+is the author of Ars Conjectandi, a fundamental work of probability theory, in which the
+law of large numbers is defined for the first time.
+
+This research, although surprising in the way it quantifies bias, illustrates what
+every experienced lawyer knows. A trial is a highly complex event, which can have
+its outcome affected by seemingly irrelevant details. A clumsy answer, a cry at the
+right time, a delay or an extravagant tie can change the outcome of a trial. This
+complex interaction between facts, perceptions, personalities and beliefs increases
+the degree of complexity of the process and, consequently, makes the meaning of
+any judicial decision ultimately uncertain.
+
+Faced with the impossibility of eliminating uncertainty from law, all that was left
+was to try to control it. Blaise Pascal was still alive when some first-level intellects
+realized that the new statistical theoretical tools could be used to model judicial
+decisions. These intellects were few but valuable. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, a
+seventeenth-century German philosopher, graduated in law in 1655 with a thesis
+called De Conditionibus, in which he studied what he called conditioned law, defined
+as the future and uncertain events to which an obligation is subordinated.
+
+Written between 1684 and 1689, this work, first published only in
+1713, covers several topics related to probability and combinatorial analysis, such
+as permutation, arrangement and combination, being considered the seminal work
+in both areas. The title Ars Conjectandi (Art of Conjecture) alludes to the
+work Ars Cogitandi (Art of Reasoning), a guide to exact rationality and the main
+manual of apophantic logic at the time.The art of reasoning was the logical deduction
+applicable to statements about which we assume we are certain, while the art of
+cogitation would apply to statements about which we have some degree of doubt.
+
+According to Leibniz, the conditioned right would occupy the intermediate space
+between jus nullum (non-existent right) and jus purum (guaranteed right). Linking to
+a random future event attributes a probabilistic nature to the condition, whose
+chance of occurrence can be measured between zero and one.
+
+to close to zero as the judge went without eating, returning to the original 65%
+shortly after the second interval. As the cases were considered in the random order
+in which the lawyers arrived, without being organized by complexity or severity, the
+conclusion of the study is that the defendants with requests considered, right after
+the judge had eaten, had an advantage over the others.
+
+Nicholas Bernoulli was Jacob's nephew. He studied Law in Basel and defended a
+doctoral thesis, in which he sought to explore the possible applications of his uncle's
+Ars Conjectandi in the legal universe. The title of the thesis is a statement of purposes:
+De usu artis conjectandi in juri, or (in a free translation) of the use of the art of
+conjecture in law. In this work, Nicholas exercises several aspects of the relationship
+between law and probability, stating, for example, that the value of contracts relating
+to uncertain events can be calculated based on the frequency of these events.
+Bernoulli is the first to carry out frequency research on judicial decisions and to suggest the use of tables
+
+Leibniz did not develop questions related to the
+calculation of conditional probability or the applications of these concepts in
+concrete legal cases, but he deserves the merit of associating probability for the first
+time with an epistemic state of doubt about an event (and not with frequencies of
+results ) and to apply it to problems unrelated to gambling.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+20
+
+21
+
+22
+
+23
+
+19
+
+18
+
+II. Holmes and the behavior of the courts
+
+Jacob Bernoulli's explanation of what it means to conjecture about human
+behavior is important because it links, for the first time, probability to a decision
+theory, associating this set of methods with a guidance instrument for decision
+making not only in gambling, but in any environment where there is uncertainty. For
+Jacob, the essence of the wisdom of the philosopher and statesman is not in
+mastering an arsenal of metaphysical or humanist concepts, but in the knowledge of
+probability.
+
+The notion that the objective of studying law is to anticipate the understanding of
+the courts has strengthened mainly in the United States, due to the case law structure
+and pragmatism of that country. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., judge of the American
+Supreme Court and one of the most prestigious and influential scholars in the USA,
+in a text written at the end of the 19th century, removes the philosophical veneer of
+legal academicism and returns law to its concrete plane, closely related to the
+uncertainties of human experience, stating that the work of jurists and lawyers is
+limited to anticipating what the courts will decide. In his phrase, which has become
+a slogan: "Predicting what the courts will actually do, without any additional pretense, is what I
+
+These seminal works, however, did not promote a sustainable line of research in
+law. The legal studies that followed remained linked to a theoretical and dogmatic
+stance focused on the interpretation of abstract norms and discussions of an
+axiological essence. The seeds of the statistical approach to the study of law
+hibernated for more than two hundred years, until the union of the pragmatic spirit
+of a country undergoing rapid economic development with a customary caselaw
+system allowed the resumption of this proposal in a new context .
+
+The origin of court decisions was, for Holmes, not in rational logic, but in the
+experience of those who judge. The job of legal operators was, therefore, to
+anticipate, based on the history of previous decisions, in which direction future
+orders would be issued. Due to the emphasis on predictability and the frequency of
+decisions, it was natural that this way of thinking resulted in an approximation
+between statistics and law, relativizing the importance of the dogmatic study of
+principles and abstract general rules. Holmes' conclusion is, as expressed in the
+epigraph of this chapter, exhaustive: the jurist of the future will have mastery of
+Statistics and will be able to bring the study of Law closer to a true "science". The
+ideal to be pursued is predictability of what the courts will decide, which statistics and probability can
+
+I understand right."
+
+The idea that the judge's work is not just limited to declaring the will of the law
+and that, therefore, judicial activity involved other operations in addition to the effort
+to find previously established general rules, was innovative. At the end of the 19th
+century, American law schools continued to focus on the study of general legal
+principles and rules, understanding the philosophical foundations of law, as well as
+investigating the logical relationships between rules. American doctrine was then
+experiencing the end of its Era of Formalism, based on the doctrine of stare decisis
+and the generalization of logical principles and abstract rules, which, in the end,
+were compacted into voluminous investigative treatises.There was no appreciation among jurists for
+other approaches, today called consequentialist or functional, characterized by the
+search for a greater understanding of the influence of social facts on judicial
+decisions. Nor was much importance given to the practical consequences resulting
+from this application and, therefore, support was not sought in other areas of knowledge such as
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+III. Pound and Cardozo
+
+24
+
+25
+
+27
+
+26
+
+same genre, which are still successful today.
+
+The path of law was first published (there have been several reprints over the years)
+in vol. 10 of the Harvard Law Review, in 1897. Holmes conceived the ideas exposed in
+the text in the midst of the American Gilded Age , a period between the years 1850 and
+1900 in which the United States ceased to be an agrarian society to become an
+industrial power. In this fifty-year interval, a structure of judicial precedents, designed
+for disputes characteristic of rural communities and fairground traders, was subjected
+to a new reality, in which large corporations, unions, investors in an emerging capital
+market, and consumers increasingly interacted. more frequently. No wonder, Holmes'
+words echoed deeply in the jurists of his time, reverberating in all centers of study
+and were investigated in depth by two other great American jurists, Benjamin Nathan
+Cardozo and Nathan Roscoe Pound, two leaders in the transition between "Age of
+Formalism" and the "Age of Legal Realism", which then began.
+
+Nathan Roscoe Pound, originally trained in botany, was one of the most influential
+American jurists, dean of Harvard Law School between 1916 and 1936 and advocate of
+a sociological approach to law ("sociological jurisprudence"). Pound published an
+article in 1908, while he was president of the University of Nebraska, with the title
+Mechanical jurisprudence, harshly criticizing those who saw in the activity
+
+Faced with the relative impotence of old precedents, it was imperative that legal
+formalism be relativized, giving way to more pragmatic approaches that were also
+capable of illuminating interesting aspects of law. The relativization of formalism
+presupposed a new vision of law, in which general rules were momentarily left aside
+and concrete judicial decisions, including the analysis of the facts discussed therein,
+occupied a more important position.
+
+Cardozo dedicated each of his lectures to
+one of the elements that affect the decision to judge: philosophy, history, sociology
+and precedents.
+
+of the judicial process. This work is considered the first attempt to explain in an
+organized way how judges decide their cases and starting a lineage of books from the
+
+In explaining the nature of the judicial process, Cardozo does not deny the role of
+logic in forming the judge's conviction. However, his lectures are among the first to
+state that the judge creates and not just declares the law ("judge as a legislator"), and
+that the act of judging is not limited to deducing concrete solutions from abstract
+principles. Cardozo states that there are several cases for which there are no
+precedents or applicable general rules, forcing the judge to create the norm. When
+assessing the set of elements capable of influencing the decision, the judge must
+decide in a consequentialist way, with a view to the benefit of his community.
+
+Alongside Holmes, Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo are considered the main
+precursors of legal realism.
+
+Psychology, Sociology, Statistics and Economics. This reality, however, was about to
+change in the first decades of the revolutionary 20th century.
+
+Benjamin Nathan Cardozo was a lawyer and renowned judge of the American
+Supreme Court, occupying the vacancy left by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. On four
+straight nights in February 1921, already as a judge on the New York Court of Appeals,
+but before moving on to the Supreme Court Court, Cardozo gave a series of lectures
+at Yale Law School (the Storrs Lectures), later published in book form under the title of The Nature
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+28
+
+29
+
+31
+
+30
+
+IV. legal realism
+
+jurisdiction the mere mechanical application of principles and abstract general rules.
+For Pound, the formalist view of law petrifies the judiciary and prevents the judge's
+creative activity from being mobilized to resolve new controversies and to critically
+adapt old solutions that, whether due to overcoming or due to incompatibility, are no
+longer satisfactory.
+
+At the origins of jurimetrics and other academic currents that use empirical
+methodologies in the investigation of law, legal realism occupies a prominent place.
+This importance arises from the realists' emphasis on understanding law not as a
+set of abstract principles and values, but as an everyday and concrete fact integrated
+into social reality. This emphasis on law as a social fact inaugurates a modern path
+of interdisciplinary studies between, for example, Law and Sociology, Psychology
+and Economics, based on field research, interviews, experiments and observations.
+And also because of this emphasis on people's real behavior, realists believe that
+understanding the law involves studying court decisions, which, ultimately, are the
+institutions in which various social factors interact and combine into judicial orders.
+concrete with obligations of defined content and certain recipient. The reality of the
+courts is, for realists, true law.
+
+The botanical Pound can be recognized in the jurist's writings. Pound defended
+an organic law, sensitive to social changes and capable of evolving and adapting to
+the social environment. He also believed that legal conceptualism, understood as
+the search for theoretical solutions to cases, was destined to disappear. Concepts
+are fixed and it is impossible to deduce from them all the solutions for the cases that
+come before the courts. Solutions should not be based on logical calculations or
+historical definitions, but on considerations of what is best for today's society.
+
+Legal realism is a polymorphous movement, originating in both the United States
+and Europe. In this, the movement appears in the 1940s through Scandinavian
+realism, also known as the Uppsala school. The movement had as exponents the
+Swedish lawyer Anders Vilhelm Lundstedt (1882-1955), professor of law at the
+University of Uppsala; Karl Olivecrona (1897-1980), professor of law at Lund
+University; and the Danish philosopher and lawyer Alf Ross (1899-1979), professor
+of law at the University of Copenhagen. Alf Ross is arguably the most well-known
+name.
+
+Ross distinguishes three types of grammatical sentences (directive, assertive and
+exclamation) and states that the rules of Law are of the directive type, as they aim to
+direct people's behavior. For Ross, Law is created to influence human
+behavior and, consequently, effectiveness is an essential quality of norms. Therefore,
+a directive becomes valid not when it is promulgated, but from the moment it proves
+capable of effectively directing people's behavior. A completely ineffective rule is not
+a legal directive. In a chess game, it is not enough for a manual to list the rules for
+moving the pieces for these directives to be valid. Players need to feel connected and
+
+Oliver Holmes, Roscoe Pound and Benjamin Cardozo are thinkers who reached
+the peak of their intellectual influence in the first three decades of the twentieth
+century. They are considered precursors of legal realism, the most influential school
+in the history of American legal thought, which emerged around the 1930s and
+extended its influence throughout the 20th century, profoundly changing the profile
+of American law schools and the way legal institutions of that country work.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+37
+
+33
+
+36
+
+35
+
+34
+
+38
+
+32
+
+based not on abstract law but on a reaction to the concrete facts brought before the court.
+
+The division of law, into a scheme of interpretation and behavior in action of the
+players, gives rise to what Ross called doctrinal and sociological studies of Law. The
+doctrinal study investigates the abstract meaning of the directives and does not
+intend. The sociological study seeks to understand the
+
+The main target of the realists was the dogmatic way of studying law. The
+expressions used by its defenders speak for themselves. Jerome Frank harshly
+attacks the "basic myth", "legal fetishism" and the atavistic search for "paternal
+authority", responsible for this belief in general rules capable of supporting all court
+decisions.
+
+As laws are addressed to judges (for application in disputes
+submitted to jurisdiction), the sociology of law proposes to verify the degree of
+adherence of these directives to specific cases brought to court. For Ross, the
+Sociology of Law is an empirical science whose object does not end with the study
+of the meaning of legal commands. Its main object is to verify the adherence of
+human behavior to these commands and, therefore, their degree of validity.
+
+Karl Nickerson Llewellyn referred to general rules as "cute
+toys", which were manipulated, discarded and replaced at the judge's convenience.
+
+American realists, like their European counterparts, believed that the judge was
+not a mere enforcer of rules but a creator of law. However, some more radical
+currents, driven by the flexible environment of Common Law, expressed an aversion
+to the theoretical study of Law. The most extreme argued that the study of the
+abstract plan should be replaced by the investigation of the behavior of the courts
+and the interaction between parties and government authorities, and that the law
+suffered from a congenital indeterminacy, which limited its operational capacity to
+offer solutions to problems. cases. That would be the reason why most of the judges' decisions
+
+master any forecasting ability. real law in
+action and aims to predict the concrete behavior of the subjects to whom the
+
+The attack was clearly directed at the idea, disseminated
+by faculties, that law was reduced to a static and abstract body of principles, laws
+and general rules and that the operators' job was to identify, for each specific case,
+which of them would be applied.
+
+Scandinavian realism had repercussions, but arguably the American movement
+was historically broader, complex, influential, and perennial. Counting on ranks of
+reformist intellectuals, American realism gained momentum at the time of the Great
+Depression and the stock market crash of 1929, which explains the fact that many
+were involved in the formulation of President Theodore Roosevelt's New Deal
+policies . His influence on the history of American legal thought is remarkable and
+definitive. From a historical point of view, realists were looking for a justification to
+relativize the application of centuries-old legal rules, most of them liberal in nature
+(binding of parties to the contract, property rights), paving the way for the institutional
+reforms they intended to implement.
+
+To combat old orthodoxies, realists also claimed that this body of
+
+behave according to the rules, moving the knight in "L", the rook in rows and
+columns, the bishop in diagonal and so on. The norm therefore serves as an
+interpretation scheme for the phenomenon of Law in action, capable of giving
+meaning and coherence to the set of behaviors of judges and players, being valid
+only when it is complied with.
+
+Realism was, in this sense, a
+
+movement of reform and opposition to the classical way of researching and studying
+law, which proposes a more proactive and pragmatic attitude, and acquires strength
+in a time of economic crisis.
+
+directives address.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+39 40
+
+41
+
+In both the American and Scandinavian aspects, legal realism contributed to the
+fact that, from the second half of the 20th century onwards, Law began to adopt
+empirical research methodology in its investigation processes. This contribution
+stems from the following factors.
+
+It is interesting to note that among the main American realist leaders there were a
+considerable number of lawyers and professors of Commercial Law. Karl Nickerson
+Llewellyn, for example, an exponent of the movement at Columbia University, was
+one of the authors of the first edition of the American Uniform Commercial Code , in
+1952. William Underhill Moore, from Yale Law School, worked as a lawyer and taught
+Banking Law. Jerome New Frank, also from Columbia, was a specialist in capital
+markets and was chairman of the Security Exchange Commission between 1939 and
+1941. Theodore S. Hope Jr., co-author of articles with Underhill Moore, was a
+corporate law attorney in New York.
+
+An explanation for this preponderance lies in the distinction between the dynamics
+of public law and private law. In the branches of Public Law (such
+as Criminal Law, Tax Law and Administrative Law), the relationship between the
+jurisdiction and the State is one of subservience and is established "from top to
+bottom", through rules whose obligation and sanction are delimited: if the citizen
+earns income, he must pay tribute; if he kills someone, he must suffer a sentence of
+deprivation of liberty. The justification for the norm is the will of the State, its best
+interpretation is that which favors the public interest (almost always confused with
+the interest of the State) and its analytical structure is clearly exposed in the law itself.
+
+and Herman Oliphant ,
+
+First, through a shift from the abstract plane of the rules to the concrete plane of
+the courts. By placing the populations of judicial decisions in the position of main
+object, realism created the conditions for statistics to enter the scene. As long as the
+law orbited the plane of singular norms of the abstract plane, that space did not exist.
+
+In the areas of private law, illustrated by commercial law, the parties are "equal to
+equal" and build legal relationships whose meaning does not derive from the
+supremacy of the interest of one of them, but from a pragmatic, complex and, often,
+nebulous context. for judges and for lawyers themselves. Private norms appear
+unstructured in verbal contracts, which are laconic, antinomic or summarily written
+(to reduce costs), in addition to being surrounded by "recitals", which refer to facts
+and social situations. As a result, private operators are often pushed towards a law
+of uncertainty, in which the interpretation of facts is more important than the
+interpretation of norms. This is why tax, criminal and proceduralists have greater
+affinity with analytical schools of Law, while commercialists tend to adopt empirical
+stances.
+
+Second, but not least, realists were brave in assuming that the
+
+general rules was incomplete, contradictory and unstable. If for Scandinavian realists
+the law served as an interpretative scheme for human behavior, without which there
+would be no Law, for Americans laws were dysfunctional (not to say useless), as
+they were full of gray areas and gaps and, above all, because they are constantly
+changing. For American realists, law is created by the courts and there is no abstract
+legal plan capable of predetermining exactly what is the "correct" law to be applied.
+Finally, realists believe that court orders respond to various stimuli such as the
+peculiarity of the facts, the judge's training and values, and interaction with lawyers
+and parties. For this reason, there would be an indeterminacy inherent to the activity
+of judges, who are obliged to invent certainty where it does not exist.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+V. The expression jurimetry
+
+43
+
+44
+
+42
+
+At the time of Loevinger, American jurisprudential precedents accumulated by the
+thousands and began to be archived in the first computer systems of the courts. As
+the study of precedents is the basis of American law, Loevinger offered to create a
+mechanism capable of transferring these precedents to electronic media, in order to
+facilitate the storage and location of decisions through search engines. In addition to
+facilitating searches, such a mechanism would have a great advantage over the
+casuistic practices of traditional research: measuring the frequency of decisions
+through an objective methodology subject to veracity tests. For Loevinger, true
+science must be falsifiable and this new methodology would describe the legal
+phenomenon in an impartial and comprehensive way, measuring the Law within
+falsifiability standards.
+
+Third, while judicial decisions were seen as corollaries of general rules, it was up
+to the jurist to analytically study this abstract plan and deduce from it the only correct
+solution for each case. Legal realism broke with this dogmatic tradition by seeing the
+decision as the result of a convergence of social, economic, political, ideological and
+personal factors. The analysis of these factors brings with it different methodological
+requirements and demands the use of statistical models.
+
+step forward, published by Loevinger in 1949. The influence of American realism on
+
+With its new formulations, legal realism opened a door for Statistics and
+Right, after some historical delay, they finally found each other.
+
+then as technologically impractical.
+
+From a young age, Loevinger was interested in the relationship between law and
+new technologies and produced articles on radio and television transmissions, as
+well as on storage and retrieval of computational data. Loevinger was also interested
+in issues related to research methodology in law, attested by his initial studies in
+legal logic.
+
+The expression jurimetrics was used for the first time in the article Jurimetrics: the next
+
+law has an insurmountable component of uncertainty, arising from the complexity of
+the human decision-making process. While law was dedicated only to the subjective
+certainties of the duty plan, of opinions on how a judge should decide, discussions
+revolved around what was the most theoretically correct interpretation. When realism
+proposed to invade the swampy plane of judicial prognoses, of predictions about how
+a judge might decide, a wide space was opened for statistics.
+
+Probably due to his contact with economic
+studies during his work in the antitrust division, Lee Loevinger intuited that a
+methodology similar to that of econometrics could be used to describe the legal
+phenomenon.
+
+The word jurimetry is a neologism created by the American lawyer Lee Loevinger,
+an admitted admirer of legal realism. Loevinger was born in 1913, in the city of Saint
+Paul, Minnesota, and served as a judge of the Supreme Court of that state between
+1960 and 1961, until he was invited by President John Kennedy to assume the position
+of attorney general of the antitrust division of the American Federal Government, at
+the time headed by the president's brother, lawyer Robert Kennedy. After three years
+fighting cartels, Lee Loevinger assumed the position of director of the Federal
+Communication Commission - FCC (the American version of the National
+Telecommunications Agency - ANATEL), an opportunity in which, armed with a
+pragmatic spirit, he demanded from the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (the AT&T) the creation
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+46
+
+47
+
+45
+
+SAW. uncertainty in law
+
+What exactly this general program
+would be is not clear. Loevinger only clarifies that jurimetrics intends to describe the
+behavior of witnesses, parties and judges, investigating why the former lack the
+truth and how judges judge. In addition, it would help to make legal language more
+objective, speed up processes, avoid inappropriate behavior and prevent crimes.
+
+work is evident, starting with the title of the article, which refers to the classic text by
+Karl Llewenllyn, A realistic jurisprudence: the next step.
+
+The examples of jurimetry cited by Loevinger refer to the first programs for
+computerizing judgments, which were beginning to be accumulated in data storage
+systems in American courts. Much is said about the cataloging of decisions and the
+use of keyword searches, which at the time were presented as a novelty, but which
+are now commonplace. There is also great emphasis on the association of jurimetry
+with the use of computers, which largely explains the confusion between jurimetry
+and legal informatics. On the other hand, Loevinger is not concerned with defining
+what this scientific approach to law would be, nor does he make direct reference, at
+least in the first articles, to the use of statistics, which had already been applied in
+econometrics with expressive results. Despite referring to jurimetry as a legal
+investigation methodology ("methodology of legal inquiry"), Loevinger's texts lack a
+more detailed explanation of what this methodology would become.
+
+Loevinger presents jurimetry as a step forward from that already taken by
+American realism a few decades earlier. However, when delimiting what this new
+field would be, Loevinger chooses to leave the definition open, moved by a radical
+rejection of conceptualism and theorization. When citing the expression for the first
+time, Loevinger states in a footnote that the term itself would not be important as
+long as it referred to a scientific discipline with a general program. The expression
+jurimetry seemed adequate to him, because it was different and referred to other
+similar expressions, such as econometrics and biometrics, but it could be replaced
+by any other that adequately fulfilled the same function.
+Loevinger is a supporter of
+the realists' main criticisms of traditional research, especially the rejection of
+mechanistic conceptions of law, the conceptual confusion of legal theory, decisionmaking
+based on assumptions and the need for accurate predictions to replace
+idiosyncratic opinions. Law needed to free itself from its superstitions and appropriate
+scientific methods of analysis, getting rid of the old experts and their authoritative
+arguments.
+
+In another article, still faithful to his anti-theoretical convictions, Loevinger states
+that no definition of Jurimetry would be compatible with the pragmatism of this field.
+It would be up to future jurists to define the limits of this new area of knowledge in
+an ostensive way and illustrate its content through practical activities. Loevinger
+believed that this new discipline would be in constant mutation and expansion and
+that its contours would be distinguishable only through a comparison with the
+traditional method of studying law, called jurisprudence in the USA. The classical
+method would be concerned with the study of the nature, sources, formal structure,
+concepts and purposes of law. Jurimetry, on the other hand, would focus on the
+quantitative study of judicial behavior, the application of information theory and
+mathematical logic in Law, the recovery of legal data mechanically and electronically
+and the development of predictive calculations on the outcome of cases.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Loevinger's main merit was to create the expression jurimetria. However, the misunderstanding of the
+role of statistics in social research, the insistence on a deterministic view of knowledge, the excitement
+about information technology and conceptual uncertainty ended up harming the idea. Like most scientists
+until the 19th century, he believed that knowledge was associated with accuracy and that speculation
+surrounding the indeterminacy of law undermined the foundations for the construction of true knowledge.
+Bound by the concept of deterministic causality, Loevinger understood that uncertainty would deprive the
+scientist of the means of identifying the causes of a phenomenon, preventing him from formulating
+predictions regarding its future behavior.
+
+Loevinger's approximation with the realists, to whom he pays significant tribute, ends in the
+discussion of the problem of the indeterminacy of law. For Loevinger, by stating that Law would be
+indeterminate, realists would have abandoned this in a space of irrationality inaccessible to scientific
+thought and prevented the so-called legal science from progressing through pragmatic field investigations.
+Indetermination would involve a speculative, non-measurable, non-falsifiable and therefore non-scientific
+discussion.
+
+Jurimetrics: science and prediction in the field of law, written in 1961, 12 years after the
+
+Loevinger criticizes the works of realists Jerome Frank and TW Arnold for resuming what he calls the
+"search for the philosopher's stone", that is, a discussion about the essence of law. Despite opting for a
+new answer - the essence of law is indeterminate and its sources are hidden - realists tried to answer an
+old question, and ended up falling into the same conceptual trap as their predecessors, whose answers,
+old or new, are all the result of "armchair speculation". Legal realism would be a revamped speculative
+approach, with new clothes and a According to Loevinger, realists should not speculate around the
+indeterminacy of law. The correct scientific stance would be to advance in field research and objectively
+investigate the law in all its dimensions, measuring the behavior of agents
+(legislators, witnesses, parties and judges).
+
+Loevinger did not realize that randomness is a precondition for the application of statistics in the study of
+judicial decisions and that the recognition of uncertainty in Law does not compromise the construction of
+consistent and useful knowledge.
+
+publication of the first article on the subject.
+
+modern vocabulary.
+
+Despite continuing to define jurimetry in a generic
+
+way, as the application of a supposed scientific method of law, Loevinger recognizes for the first and only
+time that this application should take place in the branch of mathematics that is best adapted to the study
+of social phenomena: statistics . Loevinger observes that the objective of statistics is to extract probability
+judgments about how reality will shape itself in the future, which, moreover, would be the objective of any
+and all sciences, always based on inductive studies of the regularity of observable and measurable events.
+Furthermore, without realizing that the premise of the use of statistics is the randomness (and, therefore, a
+controllable degree of indeterminacy) of events, he tries once again to dispel the specter of indeterminacy,
+stating that the law would not be uncertain to the point of prevent its scientific study and that, if there is
+any uncertainty in the legal field, it would be neither greater nor less than the uncertainty inherent to other
+scientific experiments.
+
+This radical pragmatism, which seeks to extract all knowledge from experience and which denies the
+validity of any conceptual articulation, becomes unfeasible because science is also a field in which abstract
+ideas are tested and developed. Without ideas, concepts and definitions it is impossible to build a science
+capable of articulating data from reality with our intellects. Despite using empirical research as a means of
+
+Loevinger's most interesting work on Jurimetry is the essay
+
+48
+
+50
+
+49
+
+51
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+53
+
+52
+
+54
+
+55
+
+VII. Developments of the idea
+
+Hence the mention of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical school and the centrality
+of the computer, the only tool capable of absorbing the avalanche of judicial data and
+carrying out the complicated probabilistic calculations associated with human behavior.
+
+When publishing the collection,
+
+The space left by Loevinger was filled by his successors. The first and foremost of
+these was Hans Baade, Professor of Civil Law at the University of Texas. In 1963, when
+he was a professor at Duke University, Hans Baade organized a symposium that gave
+rise to a compendium of studies with contributions from several professors on the
+concept of jurimetrics.
+
+The association with electronic data and consistent logic ended up reducing
+jurimetry to a branch of computer science. This diversion flowed directly into Italy and
+Brazil ten years later. Relegating its realistic and statistical foundations, supporters of
+jurimetrics combined computation, formal language and determinism to begin a
+discussion about the possible development of programs capable of processing legal
+problems in formal language and automatically rendering judicial decisions.
+The initial purpose of jurimetrics, which was to measure the law and control its
+uncertainty, analogous to that of econometrics, biometrics and sociometrics, was lost
+among so many other references considered scientific by future generations of
+jurimetricians, to whom Loevinger deposited the responsibility of defining the area.
+
+Baade wrote a preface in which he
+declared that he believed that jurimetry was the victim of a conspiratorial silence from
+the academic class. The purpose of the symposium was to break this silence and
+publicize the advances resulting from effervescent legal studies, based on databases
+accumulated in previous years. Baade stated there that computational advances
+allowed the creation of a data storage and search system capable of specifying legal
+concepts and organizing millions of jurisprudential precedents into stable vectors.
+For Baade, judicial decisions needed to be translated into a logical language suitable
+for computer calculation. From this symposium onwards, jurimetrics became
+associated with information technology and with an effort to reduce law to a language
+that could be processed by electronic computers.
+
+research, science has the ultimate goal of formulating and testing theories about the
+world. It is therefore impossible to practice science without making use of abstract
+ideas. If the Brazilian Society of Public Law - SBDP decides to carry out, as in fact it
+did, an investigation into general repercussions for the Ministry of Justice, it will need
+to articulate several legal and methodological concepts in planning its research, such
+as general repercussion, jurisdiction, precedent, bylaws, sampling, population of
+interest, statistical inference, among others.
+
+Randolph Block, a professor at the University of Chicago, has summarized the
+inconsistencies of what he calls the "fuzzy definition" of jurimetrics and the hodgepodge of subjects that,
+
+Baade argued in his preface that, as a result of a computational (and not a statistical)
+revolution, three areas of jurimetrics had emerged, related to the following activities:
+(i) storage and retrieval of electronic data; (ii) behaviorist study of judicial decisions;
+and (iii) use of symbolic logic. The explanation of what these three areas would be
+combined unusual and, in some cases, epistemologically incompatible concepts, such
+as computational language, philosophy of language and computer science, in an effort
+to predict judicial behavior through mathematical calculations. As the explosion in the
+number of texts caused by data storage could only be processed through the use of
+computing, the new jurimetricians defended the reduction of the right to a modern and
+sophisticated formal logic, so that decisions could be processed mathematically by
+computers. .
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+56
+
+58
+
+59
+
+57
+
+VIII. Jurimetry in Brazil
+
+It is important here that we go into detail in the criticisms. Losano defines jurimetry
+as a method of applying exact and natural sciences to law through computers and
+computer methods.
+
+According to Block, the agenda of the Jurimetrics Journal, published by the University
+of Minnesota, illustrates the confusion resulting from this lack of methodological
+rigor. The agenda would involve three distinct areas: (1) legal logic, (2) data recovery
+and (3) use of quantitative methods to predict judicial decisions, all with the purpose
+of discussing the effects of technological development on law. Of the three areas,
+only one is relevant. Legal logic has nothing to do with the measurement of law and,
+therefore, nothing to do with jurimetry. Data recovery is an area of computing common
+to any database structuring problem. Technological development involves everything
+from bioethics to sharing the orbit of satellites. The only activity proper to a coherent
+definition of jurimetry is the use of methods
+
+In Brazil, jurimetry appears for the first time in 1973, in a series of lectures given
+by the Italian Mario Losano, professor of philosophy at the Universities of Milan and
+Turin, in São Paulo.
+
+He also criticizes what is the most legitimate claim of
+jurimetrics, with which even the most severe critics of Loevinger and Baade's
+contributions agree, namely: the attempt to predict the behavior of courts. Losano,
+accustomed to the idea of mechanical jurisprudence, understands that the sentence
+would only be predictable if its content could be deduced from the law or from precedents. However, not
+
+quantitative data to predict judicial decisions.
+
+Mario Losano came to Brazil at the invitation of the then
+
+rector of the University of São Paulo, Miguel Reale, who had been in contact with a
+work published by the Italian professor, entitled Giuscibernetica. The work, focused on the study
+of the relationship between information technology and law, caused some impact in
+the Italian legal community and, due to the historical links between the Faculty of Law
+of the University of São Paulo and the study centers of that country, soon arrived in Brazil .
+
+Loevinger's "indefinite definition" allowed this confusion between, on the one
+hand, a new methodology for investigating the concrete plane of law and, on the
+other, strange elements (such as logic and technological developments) or accidental
+(such as computation and retrieval). of data), which do not clarify anything about the
+content and usefulness of this new methodology. Stating that jurimetrics is a
+discipline that uses computers to understand law is the same as defining civil
+engineering as the use of calculators to construct buildings. In both definitions,
+excessive emphasis is given to a mere working tool and the set of methods and
+techniques used to operate the two types of knowledge is neglected. Like the
+calculator, the computer is just an inert tool that only knows how to perform
+calculations ordered by the operator.
+
+since the publication of Hans Baade's work, have been associated with this field of study.
+
+Losano's attempt to associate cybernetics, law and technology adopts as a starting
+point the need to overcome Jurimetrics. Based on the areas of application defined by
+Hans Baade (analysis of judicial behavior, retrieval of legal databases and use of
+legal logic), Losano claims that Loevinger's refusal to define Jurimetrics stemmed
+from the heterogeneity of these three aspects and that the The only thing in common
+between them was the use of the computer. In addition, the Italian scholar also did
+not agree with the idea of quantifying law and rejected statistics for considering it
+incompatible with law in all its scope, including the study of general norms, principles
+and social values.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+63
+
+61
+
+64
+
+65
+
+62
+
+60
+
+Assuming this link with computer science, for Losano jurimetry would be just an
+initial historical phase already overcome of what he called juscybernetics.
+Cibernétes (from the Greek ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ) is a Greek expression that designated the
+command of a vessel. In 1951, Norbert Wiener (1894-1964) created the term
+cybernetics to refer to the study of the laws that govern the communication and
+control of machines and animals.
+
+Mario Losano's work has the merit of being a pioneer in tackling the concept and
+proposals of jurimetrics in Italy and Brazil and, exactly for this reason, it deserves to
+have some of its points rediscussed with greater care. There are four of Losano's
+criticisms of jurimetrics, an expression that he suggests reserving to refer to an
+initial phase of the application of information technology to law, located between 1949 and 1969.
+
+information are called "cybernetic" or "adaptive" systems.
+
+First, Losano believed that the use of statistics had been abandoned "due to the
+lack of flexibility of mathematical instruments".
+
+This concept was later re-elaborated to refer to the study of systems with
+the capacity to monitor how the environment reacts to their actions and adapt their
+action strategies to these reactions. These systems can coincide with an animal
+population within an evolutionary competition, a company operating in a market or
+even a robot that is assigned a domestic task. In common, the animal population,
+company and robot share the quality of being systems in search of achieving certain
+objectives and which have the ability to evaluate, through information received from
+their environment (number of deaths, prices, owner satisfaction, etc.) whether or not
+your strategies are contributing to the achievement of the objective. The information
+received about how the environment reacted to your action is the feedback and the systems capable of
+
+logical corollary of the law, given that the parameters that interfere with its
+conformation are not formalizable, predicting the content of a sentence would be
+unfeasible. Losano claims that the scope of discretion given to the judge to decide a
+case creates a voluntaristic element capable of preventing any prediction. Thus, it
+would be possible to program a computer to play a game of chess, which has fixed
+rules, but not to predict the behavior of a judge, who responds to non-formalizable
+rules.
+
+The aim of juscybernetics would be to create a theory that explains the
+communications and controls involved in the entire legal system, from the abstract
+plane, in which law is seen as a social subsystem, to the concrete plane of its
+application by the courts. According to Losano, juscibernetics would have four fields
+of research: 1) Law as a subsystem of the social system. 2) Law as a normative,
+dynamic and self-regulating system. 3) Formalization of legal language to adapt it to
+the computer. 4) Treatment of legal norms as information accessible to computers.
+The first two fields would comprise cybernetic modeling (theoretical field) and the
+last two would comprise legal informatics (empirical field), based on the use of
+computers and the technological treatment of legal information.
+
+There is a confusion here
+between mathematics and statistics. Mathematics is a unique body of axioms and
+theorems. Statistics is a set of methods aimed at collecting, organizing and
+interpreting data. Statistics uses mathematics, mainly probability theory, but is not
+limited to it, encompassing other practical methods aimed at, for example, collecting
+data or visualizing results. Its flexibility comes from the fact that it was created to
+deal with situations in which the analytical rigidity of determinism proved impotent.
+Furthermore, the criticism disregards the dissemination of statistical methodology
+across the most diverse branches of knowledge such as econometrics, sociometrics,
+statistical geography, demography and biometrics.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+69
+
+1
+
+66
+
+68
+
+67
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+A discipline depends on a
+
+powerful methodology, capable of transforming this data into useful information for
+decision-making. The jurimetrics methodology could not be the use of a computer, for the
+simple fact that a computer is an object, not a method. The methodology of jurimetry is
+statistics. how econometrics and
+biometrics were born from the conjunction between an object of interest and statistical
+methodology. The association of measurement in the right to computer use, and not
+statistics, is a confusion that can be explained by the fact that the "reality" of jurimetrics
+is largely documented within databases.
+
+The computer is a tool and the data
+
+is the input for jurimetrics.
+
+Third, Losano states that the main value of juscybernetics would be in understanding
+how the law could process informational feedback from society to improve its action
+strategies. The question that remains is: but what would this feedback be, if not an
+extensive database with judicial decisions, contracts, complaints, requests and resources
+that can be investigated using statistical methods? There is no denying that a powerful
+way of evaluating the impact of legislation is to measure the behavior of judges and
+parties, before and after its entry into force, in order to isolate the concrete effects of a
+public policy. Information in a computational society is always aggregated in databases,
+the exploration of which is the essence of statistics.
+
+Fourth, Losano criticizes jurimetrics for not explaining the entirety of law, leaving aside
+the abstract plane of values without being able, on the other hand, to develop a model
+capable of accurately predicting the behavior of subjects on a concrete plane. The mistake
+here is twofold. Jurimetrics does not take abstractly considered values as its object for
+the simple fact that nothing that is not concrete can be measured. Measurement
+presupposes the existence of an object with extension, located in time and space.
+Furthermore, jurimetrics, at least in the definition presented here, does not propose to
+create models capable of accurately predetermining the behavior of the parties or the
+meaning of judicial decisions. The prediction proposed by jurimetrics has a probabilistic
+and non-deterministic character.
+
+Overcoming these misconceptions and recovering the concept of jurimetrics are the
+objectives of the next two chapters.
+
+It is important to clarify that I am not denying here the importance for jurimetrics of the
+accumulation of extensive databases and the development of computers capable of
+processing the analysis of this information.
+
+Second, Losano falls into Loevinger and Baade's mistake when defining jurimetrics as
+the application of information technology to law. A discipline is not built through the
+accumulation of databases and keyword search systems.
+
+Furthermore, all other "metric sciences"
+
+The problem arises when these undoubtedly
+
+important technological advances begin to be taken as the very essence of the discipline.
+The technological computing tools, widely used by Jurimetrics, should not be confused
+with its methodology, especially because computers can operate with languages other
+than statistics and statistical tests can be carried out without the intermediation of a
+computer.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+8
+6
+4
+two
+
+9
+7
+5
+3
+
+10
+
+Art. 103-A of CF/1988.
+
+Harvard Law Review. v. 10. The path of the law, 1897, p. 208.
+
+Arts. 102, I, and 105, I, of CF/1988.
+
+Nature Magazine Report : Hungry Judges Dispense Rough Justice. Available from: [www.scientificamerican.com/
+
+article.cfm?id="hungry-judges-dispense-rough-justice]." Access
+
+Art. 105 of CF/1988 and arts. 541 to 545 of the CPC.
+
+On the modern applications of Statistics in Law, especially in the production of expert evidence, see: Kadane, Joseph
+
+B. Statistics in the Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
+
+Art. 546, I and II, of the CPC.
+
+on: 7/30/2013.
+
+Art. 103, II, of CF/1988.
+
+In the original: "For the rational study of the law the blackletter man may be man of the present, but the man of the
+
+future is the man of statistics and the master of economics" HOLMES, Oliver W.
+
+Arts. 476 to 479 of the CPC.
+
+Arts. 530 to 534 of the CPC.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The current condition of art. 121 of the Civil Code - CC.
+
+London: Cambridge, 1986, p. 63-70.
+
+The law of large numbers is a theorem that describes the result of performing an experiment a large
+
+number of times. According to the law, the average of the values obtained in a large number of
+
+experiments will tend to approach its expected value. The classic example is the fair dice, in which each
+
+of the six faces has an equal probability of appearing with each throw. The expected value for the mean
+
+of the results is 1+2+3+4+5+6= 21 ÷ 6 = 3.5. It is possible that, in the first three throws, the number 5
+
+appears twice and the 6 once, with an average equal to 5.33; but after 1,000 throws, the average value
+
+of the results is very close to 3.5, which is the expected value.
+
+The full title is: Ars Cogitandi, sive scientia cogitationum cogitantum, cogitationibus necessarii instructa
+
+et a peregrinis liberata (1702) by Gottlieb Gerhard Titius.
+
+Hacking, Ian. The emergency of probability. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 85-91.
+
+Bernoulli, Jacob. The art of conjecturing. Together with letter to a friend on sets in court tennis.
+
+Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. From Conditionibus. Paris: Librarie philosophique J. VRIN, 2002, p. 9-66
+
+(Introduction).
+
+Hald, Anders. A history of statistics and probability and their application before 1750. New Jersey: John
+
+Wiley and Sons, 2003, p. 375-396. See also the historical introduction to Bernoulli's edition, Jacob. The
+
+art of conjecturing. Together with letters to a friend on sets in court tennis. Baltimore: The John Hopkins
+
+University Press, 2006. (Introduction)
+
+Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006.
+
+Heide, C. & Seneta, E. Statistics of the centuries. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2001, p. 421-489.
+
+See also Stigler, S. The history of statistics: The measurement of uncertainty before 1900.
+
+12
+
+11
+
+14
+
+13
+
+16
+
+15
+
+17
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Grant Gilmore divides the legal thought of that country into three periods. The "Age of Discovery", which runs from the beginning of the
+
+legal system until the Civil War, the "Age of Formalism", which runs from the end of the Civil War until 1920, and the "Age of Realism",
+
+which begins in 1920 until the current.
+
+"To conjecture about something is to measure its probability. The Art of Conjecturing or the Stochastic Art is therefore defined as the art
+
+of measuring as exactly as possible the probabilities of things so that in our judgments and actions we can always choose or follow that
+
+which seems to be better, more satisfactory, safer and more considered. In this alone consists all the wisdom of the Philosopher and the
+
+prudence of the Statesman." Quoted by Hald, Anders. A history of statistics and probability and their application before 1750. New Jersey:
+
+John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p. 220.
+
+Friedman, Lawrence M. American law in the 20th century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, Ll.6973.
+
+In the original: ""The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the Law."" HOLMES,
+
+Oliver W. The path of the law. Harvard Law Review, vol. 10, 1897. p. 208.
+
+19
+
+There are several bibliographical sources on the life of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., including a Broadway show, The magnificent Yankee,
+
+released in 1951. For an overview: White, G. Edward. Patterns of American legal thought. New Orleans: Quid Pro Law Books, 2010,
+
+Friedman, Lawrence M. A history of American law. 3rd ed., New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.
+
+21
+
+"Very likely it may be that with all the help that statistics and every modern appliance can bring us there will never be a commonwealth in
+
+which science is everywhere supreme. But it is an ideal, and without ideals what is life worth?" Holmes, Oliver W. Law in science and
+
+science in law. Harvard Law Review, v.12, n. 7, 1899, p. 231.
+
+Gilmore, Grant. The ages of American law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
+
+Part III: American law to the close of 19th century and Part IV: The 20th century, and Friedman, Lawrence M. American law in the 20th
+
+century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. Part I: The old order.
+
+23
+
+18
+
+22
+
+20
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+For biographical details, see introduction to: Pound, Roscoe. Criminal justice in America, with
+
+a new introduction by Ron Christenson. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1998.
+
+See chapter on the "Age of Realism" in Gilmore, Grant. The ages of American law. New Haven:
+Yale University Press, 1977. For a divergent view, which considers the opposition between
+formalists and realists to be artificial, see: Tamanaha, Brian Z. Beyond the formalist-realist
+divide. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010.
+
+As with the followers of most social movements with wide repercussions, realists identify
+
+themselves more by what they fought than by the positive proposals they formulated. Explains
+
+Lawrence Friedman: "It is not easy to say what legal realism consisted of; much easier to say
+
+what it was not. It was not formalist, and it rejected the cold, deductive style of CC Langdell.
+
+The "realists" were a variegated bunch. What they had in common was the idea that the law
+
+needed fixing; it was out of step with reality - limping behind society, in a changing world. Legal
+
+realism was of a piece, perhaps, with other strands of American social thought: skeptical,
+
+inclined to look for social explanations and for social situations, critical of old
+
+orthodoxies."Friedman, Lawrence M. American law in the 20th century. New Haven: Yale
+University Press, 2002, p. 6845-6847. The very division between realists and formalists has been
+criticized. Brian Tamanaha, for example, conducted extensive research into what authors
+usually labeled formalists actually say and, based on a vast comparison of citations, concluded
+that there is no such striking difference in positions.
+
+Cardozo, Benjamin N. The nature of judicial process. New Orleans: Quid Pro Law Books, 2010.
+
+Roolenberg, Richard. The World of Benjamin Cardozo. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
+1997.
+
+The last one, authored by one of the most influential jurists of our time: Posner, Richard. How
+
+judges think. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.
+
+Pound, N. Roscoe. Mechanical jurisprudence. Columbia Law Review, vol. 8, 1908.
+
+25
+
+26
+
+24
+
+29
+
+30
+
+28
+
+27
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+35
+
+31
+
+Brian Leiter explains how the idea of law's indeterminacy and irrationality led realists to disregard efforts to systematically
+
+study the abstract plane of Law: "The realists
+
+Sociology of Law. Sociology of fundamental Law: addresses general aspects of the functioning of Law. You can specialize in
+
+large areas, such as criminal, commercial, etc.
+
+Directive sentences are distinguished from assertion sentences, which describe a state of affairs, and exclamation sentences,
+
+which express a state of mood. The law is made up of directive sentences, but the doctrine uses assertion sentences to
+
+describe legal directives. Ross, Alf. On law and justice, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2004. p. 38-51.
+
+32
+
+Applied Sociology of Law: conforms to practical problems. Ross, Alf. On law and justice, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange,
+
+2004. p. 23.
+
+34
+
+Friedman, Lawrence M. American law in the 20th century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, Ll. 6882.
+
+Doctrinal study can be divided into stricto sensu, that is, History of Law and Comparative Law; The Sociology of Law can be
+
+divided into fundamental and applied. Doctrinal study in the strict sense: studies a specific system in the present. Historical
+
+doctrinal study: studies a specific system in the past. Comparative doctrinal study: studies the comparison of different systems
+
+of the past and present. Ross, Alf. On law and justice, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2004. p. 19-23.
+
+36
+
+how much the authors classified as realists want to make us believe. Tamanaha, Brian Z., Beyond the formalist-realist divide:
+
+the role of politics in judging. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010. See also Rubin, Edward. The real
+
+formalists, the real realists and what they tell us about judicial decision making. Michigan Law Review, vol. 109, p. 863-882.
+
+"a national law system, considered as a valid system of norms, can accordingly be defined as the norms which actually are
+
+operative in the mind of the judge, became they are felt by him to be socially binding and therefore obeyed." Ross, Alf. On law
+
+and justice, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2004. p. 35.
+
+33
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+39
+
+37
+
+38
+
+42
+
+41
+
+40
+
+Frank, Jerome. The law and the modern mind. With a new introduction by Brian H. Bix. New
+Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
+
+famously argued that the law was "indeterminate". By this, they meant two things: first, that
+the law was rationally indeterminate, in the sense that the available class of legal reasons
+did not justify a unique decision (at least in those cases that reached the stage of appellate
+review); but second, that the law was also causally and explanatorily indeterminate, in the
+sense that legal reasons did not suffice to explain why judges decided as they did. Causal
+indeterminacy implies rational indeterminacy on the assumption that judges are responsive
+to applicable (justificatory) legal reasons." LEITER, Brian. American legal realism. Public law
+and legal theory research paper n. 2,2002. p. 4. Accessible at ssrn. com/abstract_id="339562." Accessed on 7/8/2012.
+
+In Portuguese: "pretty playthings". Llewellyn, Karl: The bramble bush lectures: the classic
+lectures on the Law and Law Schools. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
+
+The distinction between Public Law and Private Law goes back to Ulpian's comments on the
+Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, which states: Par. 4º. Hujus studii duae sunt positiones,
+publicum et privatum. Publicum jus est, quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum,
+quod ad singulorum utilitatem pertinent. In Portuguese: "For this study there are two
+positions, public and private. Law is public when the Roman state of affairs is at stake, and
+it is private when it deals with private interests." There are controversies about the accuracy
+of this distinction. Mears, T Lambert. The institutes of Gaius and Justinian, the twelve tables,
+and the CXVIIIth and CXXVIIth novels, with introduction and translations. London: Stevens and Sons, 1882, p. 3.
+
+Information extracted from Lee Loevinger's obituary available at: www.pdfio.com/k
+1626007.html#. Accessed on 7/8/2012.
+
+Oliphant, Herman. A study of day calendars. New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1932.
+
+Moore, Underhill. & Hope, Theodore. An institutional approach to the Law of commercial
+banking. Yale Law Journal, v. 38, 1929.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+As in any pragmatic discipline, the definition will be given by the activities of its practitioners,
+and will undoubtedly change and expand as experiment and experience give answers to
+specific questions. The distinction between jurisprudence and jurimetrics is already evident.
+
+Loevinger, Lee. An introduction to Legal Logic. Indiana Law Journal, v. 27, 1952, p. 471-522.
+
+After disdaining the talk around which the philosophy of Law would revolve, Loevinger pays
+a significant tribute to the realists, to whom he refers in capital letters, who would have
+removed Law from a celestial plane, transforming it from a supernatural superstition into an
+object real, capable of being known by men: "Some service has indeed been rendered by
+the modern thinkers, Benthan, Jhering, Holmes, Pound, the Realists, and others of similar
+
+Jurisprudence is concerned with such matters as the nature and sources of the law, the
+formal bases of law, the province and function of law, the ends of law and the analysis of
+general juristic concepts. Jurimetrics is concerned with such matters as the quantitative
+analysis of judicial behavior, the application of communication and information theory to
+legal expression, the use of mathematical logic in law, the retrieval of legal data by electronic
+and mechanical means, and the formulation of a calculus of legal predictability. Jurisprudence
+is primarily an undertaking of rationalism; jurimetrics is an effort to utilize scientific methods
+in the field of law. The conclusions of jurisprudence are merely debatable; the conclusions of jurimetrics are testable.
+
+Loevinger, Lee. Jurimetrics: the next step forward. Minnesota Law Review, v. 33, 1949.
+
+"Of course it is not important what term is used to indicate the scientific discipline
+suggested. It is important that it has a distinctive name, as well as a general program. The
+name suggested here, seems to the author, as good as any, since it seems to indicate the
+nature of the subject matter, and corresponds to other similar terms, such as biometrics
+and econometrics." Loevinger, Lee. Jurimetrics: the next step forward. Minnesota Law Review, v. 33, 1949. Note
+
+Jurisprudence cogitates essences and ends and values. Jurimetrics investigates methods
+of inquiry." Loevinger, Lee. Jurimetrics: the methodology of legal inquiry. Law and
+contemporary problems, v. 28, 1963, p. 8.
+
+"It is unnecessary, and perhaps impossible, to give a precise definition to the field of jurimetrics.
+
+Llewenllyn, Karl N. A realistic jurisprudence: the next step. Columbia Law Review, v. 30, 1930.
+
+44
+
+43
+
+45
+
+48
+
+47
+
+46
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+51
+
+49
+
+52
+
+53
+
+50
+
+Baade, Hans. Jurimetrics. New York and London: Basic Books, 1963.
+
+Loevinger, Lee. Jurimetrics: the next step forward. Minnesota Law Review, V. 33, 1949, p.13.
+
+volume no. 40 of the Thinking about Law Series, "General repercussion and the Brazilian
+system of precedents": http://portal.mj.gov.br/main.asp?View="{329D6EB2-8AB0-4606-B054-
+4CAD3C53EE73}" Access on July 30th.
+
+"Frank insists that uncertainty is inherent in the legal process, and that the grasping for
+certainty in general principles is simply an expression of infantile emotional attitudes which
+had persisted into adulthood. Arnold finds the explanation of the inconsistencies and
+absurdities in the fact that all our social institutions are mere symbols of our dreams and
+aspirations. But all this is merely a continuation of the ancient quest for the philosopher's
+stone. The new school seeks it in some scientific, rather than some moral explanation or
+principle, but the fallacy is the same . This is simply a new jurisprudence with a new
+vocabulary. The argument seeks to substitute a modern analysis for an ancient one, but the
+traditional techniques are still in use. It is all armchair speculation." Loevinger, Lee.
+Jurimetrics: the next step forward. Minnesota Law Review, v. 33, 1949, p. 18.
+
+"The branch of mathematics that appears to be the most immediate practical utility in the
+fields of law and the behavioral sciences is statistics. There is much in statistics that is of
+present practical application in day-to-day legal problems and it has good claim to be included
+in every law school curriculum.
+
+The two conditions for the use of statistical methods are (1) that we be dealing with numerical
+data and (2) that we be dealing with a universe of which we have either a complete census or
+a representative sample." Loevinger, Lee. Jurimetrics : science and prediction in the field of law.
+Minnesota Law Review, v. 46, 1961, p. 262.
+
+views, in bringing law out of the sky and down to earth. (...) Their combined effect has been to
+
+change law from a supernatural superstition to a human institution. The subject which could
+formerly be known only by mystical intuition may now, at least, be studied by mundane minds."
+
+Loevinger, Lee. Jurimetrics: science and prediction in the field of law. Minnesota Law Review,
+V. 46, 1961, p. 255.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The uses of quantitative methods for the analysis of decision making; and
+
+The collection was first published as v. 28 of the magazine Law and Contemporary Problems of 1963.
+
+This magazine was later republished in the form of a book, under the title Jurimetrics, by Basic Books, in
+
+that same year.
+
+This remarkably indefinite definition, though it has been useful in the past, has become less a demarcation
+
+of an area of endeavor than a reflection of the interests of a particular constituency.
+
+55
+
+"The term jurimetrics was introduced into the legal vocabulary by Lee Loevinger about fifteen years ago.
+
+It signifies the scientific investigation of legal problems. Although this field is as vast as law itself,
+
+jurimetrics research has up to now concentrated on three areas: electronic data storage and retrieval;
+
+behavioral analysis of decisions; and the use of symbolic logic. To some extent, each of these areas is
+
+independent of the others. Electronic data processing is a response to what might be termed the source
+
+material explosion - a proliferation of textual material which has been said to present scholars with the
+
+choice to be reading or writing. Behavioral research of the decision process reflects the growing self
+
+confidence of American social scientism. The use of modern, sophisticated logical methods in the analysis
+
+of legal problems can be traced to the spread of a new school of formalistic philosophy, commonly
+
+associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein.Nevertheless, the three areas of jurimetrics are closely
+
+interconnected; they all are, at least for present practical purposes, products of the "computer revolution".
+
+Only the electronic computer, it seems, can cope with the continuing avalanche of relevant source
+
+materials; only the computer, again, can efficiently undertake the complicated calculations required for
+
+behavioral probability analysis. And the computer will not digest anything that cannot be dissected with
+
+logical consistency." Baade, Hans. Jurimetrics. New York and London: Basic Books, 1963, p. 1. See
+
+Preface.
+
+The contests of any volume of the Jurimetrics Journal manifest the consequences of this indefinitiveness.
+
+Indeed, its preamble sets out four distinct domains within jurimetrics:
+
+The uses of modern logic in law;
+
+The relationship between (a) developments in science and technology and (b) law.
+
+56
+
+The first of these areas is an application of logic: it has nothing to do with measuring anything, and
+
+therefore is a misapplication of the term "jurimetrics". The second has nothing to do with "scientific
+
+investigation" or measurement it deals with the use of computer technology in law for any number of
+
+purposes. The four of these areas is a fan's classification, the inclusion of which
+
+54
+
+The uses of modern methods of information retrieval in law;
+
+"Jurimetrics, we have been told, is a field devoted to the scientific investigation of legal problems.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Jurimetry is, therefore, the application of the method of the exact and natural sciences to Law: not, however,
+
+in an abstract way, but through the use of the computer. Since Law expressed in natural language cannot
+
+be treated directly with a computer tool, the 'use of scientific methods in Law' imposes, above all, the use of
+
+methods and instruments made available to the (then) young computer science." Losano, Mario G. System
+
+and structure in Law: from the 20th century to postmodernity, v. 3, São Paulo: WMF Martins Fontes, 2011,
+
+p. 56-57. See also Losano, Mario G. Informatica per le scienze sociali. Torino: Einaudi, 1985.
+
+Accordingly, jurimetrics is compared with econometrics and psychometrics in that each uses the method of
+
+quantitative analysis to look for patterns in human behavior." Block, Randolph. Book review: Supreme Court
+
+Policu Making: Explanation and Prediction. (by Harold J. Spaeth) .
+
+58
+
+American Bar Foundation Research Journal, v. 3, 1980, p. 618.
+
+57
+
+Translated into Portuguese: Losano, Mario G. Legal informatics. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1976.
+
+59
+
+60
+
+Losano's lectures on juscibernetics took place in 1973 at the Faculty of Law of the University of São Paulo
+
+and led to the creation of the discipline Legal Informatics, taught by Dinio de Santis Garcia, with the
+
+assistance of Pedro Luiz Ricardo Gagliardi, the latter retired judge and Director of the School Paulista da
+
+Magistratura. The subject was closed, but Pedro Luiz Ricardo Gagliardi recovered the idea of Jurimetry in
+
+the swearing-in ceremony of the Board of the Escola Paulista da Magistratura for the biennium 2010/2012.
+
+Accessible speech at www.epm.sp.gov.br/Internas/ArtigosView.aspx?ID="5039." Accessed on 07/08/2012.
+
+See also Garcia, Dinio de Santis. Introduction to legal informatics. São Paulo: José Bushatsky, 1976, p.
+
+7-11.
+
+"In both systems ['Common Law' and 'Civil Law'], the judge has a range of discretion that depends on his
+
+assessment, that is, on his will. It is precisely this voluntarist element that led the last Kelsen to review his
+
+theory on the judge's activity, denying that it follows a deductive scheme of a logical type: the will is irrational.
+
+Piero Calamandrei, sensible prince of Italian proceduralists, shared, in 1930, a logical-mechanical conception
+
+of legal reasoning and saw 'the sentence as a progression of chain syllogisms'; twenty years later, the
+
+has caused the Jurimetrics Journal to be something of a Popular Science for lawyers. That leaves the third
+
+domain as the only legitimate claimant among the four to the title of jurimetrics.
+
+"Jurimetrics is a pragmatic method for the use of the first computers.
+
+See also the article by Ivan César Ribeiro, who in 2008 mentions the existence of "analyses and jurimetric
+
+models" in valuations for provision of companies: Ribeiro, Ivan César, Good governance, provisions and
+
+contingencies. Valor Econômico newspaper. São Paulo, p. E 3, March 26, 2008.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Losano, Mario G. Legal informatics. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1976, p. 14-15.
+
+Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1965.
+
+Some interesting facts about Norbert Wiener's life deserve to be mentioned. Norbert was an
+
+American mathematician of the century. XX. Educated at home by his father, Leo Weiner, a
+
+Polish Jew who emigrated to the United States, Norbert proved to be a child prodigy. He
+
+graduated from school at 11 and got his degree in mathematics at 14. He went to Harvard where
+
+he studied biology and mathematics, obtaining his Ph.D at the age of 17, under the guidance of Karl Schmidt.
+
+He earned his living as a professor in the mathematics department at the Massachusetts Institute
+
+of Technology - MIT, which since 1967 has offered the Norbert Wiener Prize in Applied Mathematics.
+
+Steinbruner, John D. The cybernetic theory of decision: new dimensions of political analysis.
+New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1974. p. 47-87.
+
+Losano, Mario G. Legal informatics. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1976, p. 76. A summary of Mario
+Losano's proposal can also be found in: Pimentel, Alendre Freire. Cyber law, a theoretical and
+logical application approach.Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2000, p. 166-206.
+
+also at the expense of a long experience as a lawyer, he asked himself: 'Is it really that, in the
+
+system of legality, the judge's sentence is surely predictable?; Let's say it in secret, among us
+
+lawyers who can predict in advance the success of a case?' And he concluded by resigningly
+
+accepting the Roman proverb habent sua sidera lites: "a just cause is also lost because the
+stars are unfavorable". With the current improvements in computers and programs, it is possible
+to program the computer to play a good game of chess, as the rules of the game are fixed;
+however, the computer itself cannot predict a judge's behavior, as legal rules are interpretable
+according to parameters that today's techniques cannot formalize." Losano, Mario G. System
+and structure in law: from the 20th century to post modernity , Vol . _
+
+Wiener, Norbert. Cybernetics: or control and communication in the animal and the machine.
+
+64
+
+62
+
+61
+
+66
+
+63
+
+65
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Instructors are urged, however, to use computers in the course as much as is feasible. A small
+
+(...)
+
+Loevinger himself understood that the computer was not the key to the success of a new approach,
+
+but the models to be used: "It is neither reasonable nor realistic to expect the invention of a machine
+
+that will do for us, only more rapidly and with less human effort, the same thing that we have been
+
+doing inefficiently for ourselves.Rather, what science offer us is tools that will allow the same things
+
+to be done in a new way or things to be done that could not be attempted previously. (...) The most
+
+useful and significant tools that science now offers to law are intellectual rather than mechanical."
+
+Loevinger, Lee. Jurimetrics: science and prediction in the field of law. Minnesota Law Review, vol. 46,
+
+p. 5.
+
+In addition, developments in computer hardware and software have dramatically increased researchers
+
+access to the necessary computational power. Desktop (even a lap top) computers now possess
+
+computational capacities that are more than ample to perform functions that less than one generation
+
+earlier required large, expensive mainframe computers. Fully exploiting exploding computation
+
+capacity of computers, software developers have made statistical software programs for personal
+
+computers that can manage many of the most sophisticated analysis."Heise, Michael. The past,
+
+present, and future of empirical legal scholarship: judicial decision making and the new empiricism.
+
+University of Illinois Law Review, v. 4, 2002, pp. 829-831.
+
+"The development of data is critical, since without data, empirical research is not possible.
+
+Losano believed that Jurimetria was limited to search programs for decisions by keyword: "Therefore,
+
+with Jurimetria we are still on the threshold of legal informatics: informatics is applied to the document
+
+that contains the Law, but it is not taken into the Law. ". Losano, Mario G. System and structure in
+
+Law: of the century. XX to postmodernity, V. 3, São Paulo: WMF Martins Fontes, 2011, p. 64.
+
+For the avoidance of doubt, Morris H. DeGroot, right in the preface of what is the main introductory
+
+course in Statistics and Probability, gives the following recommendation to students: "Although a
+
+computer can be a valuable adjunct in a course in probability and statistics such as this one, none of
+
+the exercises in this book require access to a computer or knowledge of programming.For this reason,
+
+the use of this book is not tied to a computer in any way.
+
+Unfortunately, data gathering is frequently labor-intensive and time-consuming and, consequently,
+
+often quite expensive. While literally billions of research dollars in the United States are directed
+
+towards all sorts of research projects, only a minute silver of this research pie flows into legal research
+
+projects of any kind, let alone empirical ones. Such research funding is crucial for the developments
+
+of new datasets, the backbone of our knowledge base.
+
+69
+
+68
+
+67
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+calculator is a useful aid for solving some numerical exercises in the second half of the book."
+DeGroot, Morris H. Probability and statistics. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing
+Co, 1989. p. 4.
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+two
+
+Jurimetry CHAPTER
+
+5. CONCEPT OF JURIMETRY
+
+I. Definition of Jurimetry
+
+Chapter 5. Concept of Jurimetry
+
+"In order to indicate how a good reform of the judiciary would be possible, it would be necessary to
+have knowledge that I do not have, that is, to know the number of cases in each branch, the place of
+each branch and each court, the number of judges in the courts, what schedule they perform and the
+distribution of their achievements. This is a subject that must be studied in depth. It is not possible to appeal
+
+The definition of a new area of knowledge is problematic. The difficulties stem from the
+accommodation under the same conceptual roof of a not always homogeneous set of experiments,
+methodologies and results witnessed for the first time.
+This difficulty is further increased when this area of knowledge uses different methodologies and
+references concepts from more than one discipline. Debates around the concept of econometrics are an
+example of how the search for a definition of applied disciplines suffers from similar difficulties. Peter
+Kennedy, econometrician, explains the difficulties faced in defining his field of research, econometrics.
+The difficulty arises from the fact that econometricians wear different hats. According to Kennedy,
+econometricians are economists capable of using statistical methods to test their theories; they are also
+mathematicians capable of formulating theories in a language that can be statistically tested, they are
+also accountants capable of collecting and storing economic data; and are statisticians capable of
+estimating relationships and predicting economic events.
+
+This issue of how certain problems are addressed in Law courses is also fundamental for
+understanding Jurimetrics. When we learn law in colleges, we essentially study codes. Starting from a
+mechanistic premise, Law is presented to students as a synonym of law, and the judge's activity is
+described as the simple application of these general commands, predetermined in the legal system, to
+concrete cases. The judge is, in the Francophile expression, the mouth of the law ("la bouche de la
+lois"). The study of the concrete plane of Law, especially precedents
+
+1
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+Transposed to the legal universe, the difficulties are the same. Jurimetry has three operational
+pillars: legal, statistical and computational. The ideal jurist would, therefore, be a law graduate capable
+of speculating on the functioning of the legal order and familiar with concepts of procedural and
+substantive law; a statistician capable of discussing research design and designing tests for your
+working hypotheses; and a computer scientist capable of operating programs to mine and collect data.
+Of course, bringing these specialties together in one person is now rare. In Brazil and in most of the
+world, there are no courses capable of providing those interested with these three training courses, and
+that is why the practice of Jurimetry has been developed in a laboratory environment in which bachelors,
+statisticians and computer scientists join efforts in solving problems. .
+
+to improvisation to carry out reform."
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+By taking the concrete plan as the main reference, Jurimetry requires the adoption of a
+new methodology. The abstract plane of Law is composed of singular norms that are
+intended to resolve alone a universe of cases to which their meaning refers. The concrete
+plan is composed of thousands of norms, such as sentences, judgments or contracts,
+aimed at resolving specific conflicts. The analysis of the meaning of an abstract norm can
+be done through the different methodologies with which we are traditionally used to dealing
+in colleges. We can interpret its meaning from a historical point of view, investigating the
+social context at the time of its enactment; systematic, investigating the relationship that
+the norm has with the other abstract commands of the order; grammatical, referring to the
+pure semantic meaning found in dictionaries; or authentic, researching the purposes of the
+author of the standard when he prepared it. To name just a few. The traditional study of
+Law aims to elaborate menus of possible meanings for norms, construct definitions and
+general typologies for their elements and undertake a taxonomic effort of classification.
+
+In addition to being a tool for population description and inference, statistics also adds
+other important features for the legal world. With regard to the description of populations,
+statistics allow the study of the collective behavior of legal subjects (legal agents), whose
+causes and characteristics, due to the discontinuity between the particular and the general,
+are not confused with those of the behavior of each individual. By discontinuity we mean
+the following: even though man's will is free and each person has intimate reasons for
+making decisions, people's joint behavior manifests itself through regular patterns that
+respond to collective causes. For example: there is no more act
+
+Jurimetria proposes an epistemological turn, analogous to that proposed by the realists,
+shifting the center of research interest from the abstract plane to the concrete plane. The
+guiding concept of this turn is that the effective law, the one capable of affecting the
+relationship between subjects, corresponds to the sentences, judgments, contracts and
+other legal orders produced in the concrete plane. The law is a statement of intentions by
+the legislator, which often proves to be plurivocal, contradictory and lacking. For jurimetry,
+it is on the concrete level that the Law reveals itself, the law being just one of the factors -
+alongside personal values, religion, empathy, personal life experience and many others -,
+capable of influencing the process of implementing norms of Law. For this reason, the Law
+cannot be reduced to a set of norms edited by competent authorities and must be seen,
+yes, as an apparatus of conflict resolution, in which the law plays an important role, but not
+enough.
+
+From the moment that the central approach becomes the concrete plan, these traditional
+methodologies are shown to be inadequate. It is easy to conceive of research into the
+authentic interpretation, for example, of art. 50 of the CC, which deals with disregard of
+legal personality. However, identifying what would have been the intention of thousands of
+magistrates who, over the last ten years, delivered in the Labor Court more than one
+hundred thousand decisions disregarding the legal personality is a very different task,
+which requires, before any step , at least an approximate notion of what they are, when
+they were made and where these hundred thousand decisions are. The most appropriate
+methodology to enable the investigation of hundreds of thousands of concrete plan
+decisions, allowing the description of the characteristics of these populations and enabling
+inferences about possible associations and future behavior, is statistics.
+
+jurisprudence, becomes secondary insofar as, by knowing the law, the student would
+already know what the judge should do. And if the judge does not comply with the law, his
+decision is nothing more than a judicial error, unworthy of academic study.
+
+3
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Thus, alongside the particular causes capable of explaining the motivations of each
+suicide, there are collective causes that can explain suicide as a social fact.
+
+As for the control of uncertainties in Law, statistics help in the following way: the
+legal order produces uncertainties and the essence of the work of Law operators is
+to try to mitigate them. Lawyers work to predict and control the outcome of the case:
+they want to win. Judges work to predict and control the consequences of their
+decision: they want to do justice. Lawmakers work to predict and control the outcome
+of their public policy: they want to build a better society. All acts and decisions of
+legal operators are taken in the present, but are aimed at the future. On the other
+hand, the human will can be stimulated or repressed through positive and negative
+sanctions, a possibility from which the Law operates, an institutional arrangement
+whose function is to apply sanctions and motivate socially desired conduct. The
+possibility of suffering the application of a custodial sentence, for example, represses
+the subject's desire to commit a crime, just as the possibility of paying a fine
+encourages the taxpayer to pay their taxes on time.
+
+Having made this clarification, I can define Jurimetria as the discipline of
+knowledge that uses statistical methodology to investigate the functioning of a legal
+order. From it, it is clear that Jurimetrics is distinguished from other legal disciplines
+both by the object and by the methodology used in its analysis.
+
+The relationship between the stimuli created by law and the conduct observed in
+society is the essence of the success of a legal order. The closer people's actual
+behavior is to expected behavior (what we might call the adherence of laws to reality),
+the more organized society will be and the more successful the law will be. As a
+result, the use of statistics in the study of collective behavior as a function of legal
+norms, either to understand how they are produced or, even, how they conform to
+the reaction of the recipients when they are applied, allows not only an understanding
+of the functioning of the Law , but, what is more important, it enables the creation of
+models capable of bringing the results produced by the legal system closer to
+society's expectations and aspirations. With this, the application of statistics to Law
+provides valuable assistance so that, for example, the judge understands in greater
+depth the possible consequences of his decisions, the lawyer understands the
+factors that interfere with his strategy and can better advise his client, and the
+legislator anticipates the results of the political proposals discussed in the legislature.
+
+Likewise, once associations and causalities have been identified, it would be
+possible to predict collective reactions to changes in the social environment using
+probabilistic models. In the comparative example of suicide rates between Brazil and
+Japan, it is to be expected that the growing tendency towards aging and the
+urbanization of the Brazilian population also indicate a corresponding increase in
+the annual rate of suicides in the country. For this reason, Statistics is the ideal
+methodology for describing human behavior and evaluating how stimuli generated
+through public policies can be managed in order to achieve socially desired goals.
+
+intimate than suicide and it is correct to assume that each suicide has very personal
+reasons, often unconfessable, for taking their own life. Despite this, suicide rates are
+constant in Brazil (less than 6.5 per 100,000 inhabitants) and Japan (over 24 per
+100,000 inhabitants), mainly due to social causes associated with the advanced age
+of the population, the male majority and the high rate of urbanization.
+
+From an objective perspective, the object of Jurimetry is not the legal norm
+considered in isolation, but the legal norm articulated, on the one hand, as
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+6
+
+4
+
+5
+
+7
+
+8
+
+9
+
+II. Order, ordering and coordination
+
+From a methodological perspective, Jurimetria uses statistics to re-establish an
+element of causality and investigate the multiple factors (social, economic,
+geographic, ethical, etc.) that influence the behavior of legal agents.
+
+Under a consequentialist perspective, understanding the functioning of a legal
+order basically consists of understanding the factors that influence the production of
+norms, as well as monitoring the reaction that these norms will provoke in their
+addressees. It is not, therefore, a formal study of the production of a law through the
+investigation of previous procedures established in other norms, proper from an
+abstract and analytical perspective. It is, on the contrary, an investigation of the
+substantive factors (social, economic, geographic, cultural, values) that influenced a
+certain judge or a group of legislators to, at a given moment, opt for the production
+of a specific normative content, as well as as in an analysis of the behavior of
+recipients against whom sanctions have been or may be applied. The object of
+Jurimetry is not the norm considered in itself or in relation to other norms, but the
+study of the conduct of those who regulate or are regulated by the Law, that is, human
+behavior in terms of legal norms. Hence the term functioning of law. And precisely
+for this reason, the legal norm is not an exclusive object of interest for Jurimetrics,
+but an inflection point, which establishes the moment of a human decision, records
+its meaning and demarcates important aspects of its motivation.
+
+The object of Jurimetry is the investigation of the functioning of the legal order.
+The legal order is defined here as the set of legal norms, which aims to influence
+human behavior through the application of sanctions. All the legal
+norms of an order are united by a formal foundation, namely, a common authority
+foundation.
+
+Because they are two defining elements of this discipline, in the topics below I will try to
+
+But what is the legal order? The traditional study of Law emphasizes abstract
+norms, laws and codes, with jurisprudence being an allegory that only serves to
+illustrate cases and reinforce a theoretical position by example. This tradition also
+treats the expressions "order" and "legal order" as synonymous, both referring to
+the set of abstract norms of Law and relegating judicial decisions to the amorphous
+and casuistic pile called jurisprudence. Jurimetrics subverts this approach and brings
+the concrete norm, the courts and the law produced through the judgment of concrete
+cases to the center of its interest. Jurisprudence becomes an important part of Law
+and requires a methodology and a set of concepts appropriate to its study.
+
+Both the threat of deprivation of liberty, which seeks to
+discourage theft, and the threat of confiscation of property, which seeks to encourage
+the payment of debts, or the threat of imposition of a sentence of confiscation, which
+seeks to encourage the payment of taxes, are normative sanctions handed down by
+authorities whose delegated power can be traced back to a fundamental norm.
+
+describe in more detail the object and methodology of Jurimetry.
+
+result (effect) of the behavior of regulators and, on the other, as a stimulus (cause) in
+the behavior of their recipients. The legal norm is studied as a factor capable of
+influencing the decision-making processes of judges and citizens.
+
+The legal order is, therefore, a set of norms for regulating conduct imposed by the
+State through the use of controlled institutional violence.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Hierarchical
+
+Legal system
+
+unsystematic
+
+municipal
+
+Legal order
+
+Legal coordination
+
+Legislative
+
+An important point of Jurimetria is to understand how ordering and coordination are related. It is evident
+that the legal system influences coordination through the issuing of commands from legislators to judges.
+Improving this emission, making commands clearer and more effective, is one of the objectives of Law in
+general and of Jurimetry in particular. This, by the way, has a relevant contribution to offer through the
+investigation of the characteristics of general norms with greater adherence in coordination (the so-called
+"laws that stick"). Furthermore, the study of coordination is capable of revealing circumstances that lead those
+under jurisdiction to go to court and, indirectly, showing which afflictions must be regulated by the legal system,
+so that the
+
+The first redefinition concerns the very expression jurisprudence, which is associated with this idea of
+alienation between scientific law and court decisions.
+
+Abstract
+
+jurisdictional
+
+There are some distinctive traits that can help with this definition. The legal system is characterized by
+being: abstract, as its norms do not refer to behaviors located in time and space; systematizer, for operating
+an internal consistency control mechanism; and hierarchical, since the norms are organized according to an
+order of superiority. Legal coordination, on the other hand, is characterized by being: concrete, as its norms
+refer to situations in time and space; unsystematic, for not operating a consistency control mechanism; and
+autarkic, because the norms are all on the same plane and are not organized according to an order of
+superiority. Furthermore, the order usually has a legislative origin and the coordination has a judicial origin,
+although there is the possibility of both powers carrying out atypical activities in which the roles are reversed.
+And the legal order is the result of the sum of legal ordering and legal coordination.
+
+Systematic
+
+In short, the order has the function of ordering predetermined solutions for abstract conflicts, while
+coordination coordinates the countless factors influencing the application of Law, including the commands
+issued by the order, for the solution of concrete cases. The table below summarizes the characteristics of
+each normative space:
+
+When we talk about jurisprudence as opposed to the legal system, we have the image that Law is the legal
+system while jurisprudence, subject to the mistakes and successes of judges, is just an accidental by-product
+of questionable quality. Thinking of a way to reintegrate jurisprudence into scientific Law, I reserved the
+expression legal order to refer to the set of all norms, individual and general, and I began to call legal
+coordination the individual and concrete plan, in which all the judgments, judgments and interlocutory decisions.
+The expression legal system was restricted to the general and abstract plane, in which the constitution, laws,
+decrees, instructions, etc. are found.
+
+Concrete
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+10
+
+This preponderance, it is important to repeat, does not exclude the possibility of a
+Jurimetry of general norms, analyzing, for example, the direct consequences of the
+promulgation of a new legal regime on social behavior or, even, changes in interest
+in the voting agenda of a legislative house. Such an analysis, however, will depend
+on a realization of the general norm that, to be investigated as a cause or effect of
+other influencing factors, needs to be situated in a specific place and period of time.
+For example: Fundação Getúlio Vargas carried out research on 100 legislative
+proposals on criminal matters that were processed in the Chamber of Deputies after
+the Federal Constitution was enacted between 1988 and 2006. The object of analysis
+was both the content of bills and constitutional amendments, as well as the
+justifications presented.
+
+The results are as interesting as they are alarming. Of the 579 proposed standards
+of behavior , none sought to decriminalize conduct. Leaving aside 7 that promoted
+mere style changes, 531 created new crimes, 39 expanded the scope of application
+of already foreseen crimes and only 2 reduced this scope. Of the 891 proposed
+sanction rules , no less than 837 of them created new sanctions and only 54 modified preexisting
+sanctions. In addition, the research shows an increase in the severity of the
+legislator in the penalties, since 509 of the 837 norms of creation proposed prison
+sentences. In addition to being severe, the research showed that the legislator is
+succinct in explaining his reasons. The survey identified that 38% of justifications for
+legislative proposals had up to half a page and 31% between half and one and a half
+pages. The same was observed even in the proposed amendments to the Federal
+Constitution. Of the 23 justifications analyzed, 13 were no longer than one page. The
+conclusion of the study is that the Brazilian legislator, in terms of penalties, is more
+severe and laconic. When proposing reforms that restrict citizens' freedom, the
+legislator fails to explain the problem sufficiently, does not inform the experiences
+that served as the basis for the proposal, nor does it justify its adequacy to the
+solution of the problem. The discussion of Brazilian criminal law lacks minimal
+elements for the study of legislative impact and laws are enacted in a rush and based on intuitive impulses.
+
+In an effort to understand the functioning of the legal order, Jurimetria analyzes
+the factors that interfere in the production of sentences. The meaning of the laws, despite not being
+
+As stated, Jurimetrics also (but not exclusively) focuses on the study of individual
+norms, especially judicial decisions, and is sometimes confused with a type of
+sociology of the courts. This preponderance stems mainly from the interest of
+Jurimetry in changes in social behavior produced by the legal order, the occurrence
+of which depends on some degree of effectiveness of the norms. The general norm
+is, as a rule, an abstract formulation subject to divergent interpretations, whose
+effectiveness depends on the mediation of a judge. It is the individual norms and the
+processes from which they are issued that register the characteristics of the conflicts
+and the legal solutions operated in their overcoming.
+
+The research classified the norms into four categories:
+behavior (dealing with conduct), sanction (dealing with the penalty), process (dealing
+with the criminal process) and allocation (dealing with the allocation of the crime in a
+regime of heinous conduct). In addition, we sought to verify the length (in pages) and
+quality of the reasoning for each justification.
+
+law is less idiosyncratic and more realistic. In short, investigate the relationship
+between planning and coordination plans, learn about the reality of the Judiciary and
+legal practice, study the results of the application of law by the courts, analyze the
+different degrees of adherence to laws and understand the situations in which they
+are no longer applied, these are the objectives of Jurimetria. In a sentence, the
+proposal of Jurimetria is to understand how the legal order works in practice.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+11
+
+15
+
+12
+
+14
+
+Traditional law tries to convince us that all norms, general (such as laws) and
+individual (such as sentences) make up a consistent legal system, capable of This is,
+evidently, an objective to bridge its gaps and overcome its antinomies. ambitious,
+even more so if we consider, on the one hand, the profusion of general norms enacted
+(laws, decrees, regulations, ordinances, normative instructions) and, on the other,
+the mass of conflicts that knock on the doors of the courts. To give an idea of the
+legal hypertrophy that we are experiencing, only the Brazilian National Congress has
+created, among legislative decrees, resolutions, constitutional amendments, ordinary
+and complementary laws on the initiative of the Chamber of Deputies, the Federal Senate, the Superior
+
+13 2010.
+
+In order to systematize this profusion of norms, the legal system adopts one based
+on the criteria of hierarchy, specialty
+and precedence. Once two antagonistic norms have been identified, this mechanism
+would allow the antagonism to be overcome and indicate which should prevail: the
+later one in relation to the previous one; the special in relation to the generic; and the upper in relation
+
+consistency control mechanism
+
+Jurimetrics seeks to observe human behavior according to a legal order.
+Observation, in a broad sense, characterizes research as empirical, because the
+
+Thus, in the event of a contradiction between general norms, there would be ways to
+identify which one should prevail and thus find a unique solution for each conflict.
+
+The mechanism, however, is not enough to extirpate any vestige of uncertainty
+from the Law. On the one hand, the criteria for overcoming antinomies can also
+collide with each other. There are several cases of general later norms that conflict
+with special earlier norms. So which would prevail? Posterity or specialty? On the
+other hand, there is also the possibility of contradiction between the meanings of the
+same norm. There are no criteria for overcoming hermeneutical divergences regarding
+the same article of law, which also opens space for the emergence of divergent
+doctrinal and jurisprudential currents regarding the application of each norm. It is for
+this reason that Jurimetry is stochastic. Instead of seeking to find univocity in the
+legal order, Jurimetrics admits that Law is contradictory and begins to study the
+relationships between legal uncertainty and people's behavior.
+
+Republic and the Attorney General's Office, 3 general norms per working day in
+2008, against 93,076 new cases per working day received by the Brazilian Judiciary in
+
+Methodology is a coordinated set of methods used to solve theoretical or practical
+problems. The jurimetrics methodology corresponds to a set of statistical methods
+capable of gathering objective information about the functioning of a legal order, as
+well as making predictions regarding its future behavior. Through this set of methods,
+the researcher is able to collect, describe, summarize and critically analyze the
+production of standards, as well as anticipate their consequences.
+
+determinant, is an important factor influencing the judge's decision. The discussion
+about a conflict goes through the investigation of the possible solutions previously
+established in the law. Usually, however, the law includes more than one solution,
+either because of the existence of more than one rule applicable to the case, or
+because of the plurivocity of meanings of each general rule. The final solution,
+therefore, goes through a process of volitional confirmation by the judge, who can
+interfere, change or even reject the solutions indicated by the law when issuing a concrete decision for
+
+III. Methodology, empiricism and Jurimetry
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+16
+
+17
+
+18
+
+However,
+
+observation also has a strict meaning. An object can be empirically investigated
+through two types of study: observational or experimental. Observational research is
+one in which the researcher has no control over the composition of the study groups,
+limiting himself to observing the arrangements generated spontaneously in the
+population.
+
+The fundamental difference between the jurimetric and dogmatic approaches is the
+use of empirical methodology. In Jurimetrics, a researcher presents his assumption
+about some characteristic of the legal order and then goes into the field to collect data
+to confirm or reject it. For example, one could test the claim that medical malpractice
+lawsuits in Brazil have grown 140% in the Supreme Court of Justice in the last 4 years.
+Testing this assumption depends on collecting information about this type of
+conflict in the courts, which can be done through the extraction and summarization of
+data relating to these actions. In Jurimetry, it is the confrontation between empirical
+data and the assumption of the researcher that gives rise to knowledge.
+
+independent of the effects of other variables.
+Experimental research is research in which the researcher controls the
+composition of groups with the aim of isolating the effects produced by a variable
+
+The dogmatic approach does not require the empirical step. As his object of study
+is the meaning of legal texts, the researcher builds his thesis through the elaboration
+of a rhetorical speech, which seeks to attribute a specific meaning to these norms.
+This discourse can be logical or political. As logical discourse has narrow limitations,
+in particular the impossibility of overcoming the multiple meanings of each norm, the
+dogmatic researcher almost always resorts to political expedients to attribute the
+meaning of his preference to the norm, thus operating a reversal of procedure. Instead
+of testing his assumption by comparing it with data from reality, the researcher
+assumes that his intuition is true and starts to defend it rhetorically, through doctrinal
+citations and intentionally selected jurisprudential positions. Dogmatic research
+dispenses with the systematic verification of data about reality and uses only the
+collections of legal libraries in the construction of a rhetorical discourse capable of
+supporting a position.
+
+For example, the study of the abortifacient effects of a medicine on a group of
+women is observational because the researcher cannot control which women will or
+will not consume the product. It simply observes the history of a group of women who
+spontaneously took the medication and compares it with the group of women who did not take it.
+
+19
+years.
+
+On the other hand, a study in which two groups of mice are randomly selected and
+each of them is given the same medication is experimental because the researcher
+controls which mice will receive the medication in order to try to isolate its effects
+from other variables. Jurimetrics is, in this sense, predominantly observational,
+because the carrying out of social experiments is limited by ethical, legal and budgetary
+restrictions.
+
+For this reason, most legal research is based on observing the legal order and the
+spontaneous behavior of regulators and recipients, without carrying out experiments.
+It is true that institutional reforms implemented by the government and civil society,
+which have an impact on the functioning of the legal order, can sometimes be treated
+as semi-experiments. Although they are not controlled by researchers, these reforms
+can make it possible to test hypotheses by monitoring their effect on different groups.
+Legislative impact assessment, for example, should be mandatory. If we cannot test
+the success of a policy before its implementation, let us at least take the opportunity
+of enacting the law to learn from its results.
+
+legal. Observation, in a broad sense, characterizes research as empirical, because its
+objective is to understand a portion of the reality in which we live.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Jurimetry subverts this logic and presents another vision, of an inductive nature,
+which seeks to understand Law from the bottom up. Let me explain: for Jurimetry,
+the real Law is the applied Law, the Law practiced by the courts, applied and
+complied with by the addressees of the norms. It is no use for the law to state that
+the legal consequence of certain conduct is prohibited if the courts understand that
+it is permitted. For example, art. 1077 of the Civil Code states that the shareholder of
+a limited liability company can only withdraw (ask to leave the company with the
+reimbursement of his share) if there is a modification of the contract, merger or
+incorporation of the society. The overwhelming majority of case law, however,
+recognizes the Right of Unjustified Withdrawal. What is Law in this case? What do
+the courts decide or what is written in the law? By the principle of legality, which is
+in the law. But the principle of legality is also an abstract rule, which depends on the
+courts for application and, after all, what good is a law without a minimum of effectiveness?
+
+I recognize that an important part of the study of law is based on the interpretation
+of the law and the investigation of the legal system. But the identification of decisionmaking
+standards from the administrative and judicial instances makes the
+understanding of coordination equally important. The law cannot be understood in
+an abstract way, separated from its application. And the application of Law is not studied on a case-byBefore
+I finish, a last word about inductive inference in law. In the topic dealing
+with the distinction between statistical power and certainty, I quickly explained the
+distinction between deduction and induction and recalled that it is through the
+observation of regularities and inductive inference that scientists formulate general
+laws. The dogmatic approach, however, aims at deductive certainty, which has little
+to do with the production of scientific knowledge. In procedural law lessons, we
+learned that a good initial petition has a logical-deductive structure. The final request
+would be the logical conclusion of the copulation (in Law, called subsumption)
+between a major premise, which is the law, and a minor premise, which are the facts:
+whoever causes harm to another must pay compensation; Joseph harmed John;
+therefore, José must indemnify João. If the judge concludes something off the rails,
+the conclusion is wrong and must be disregarded. This is the top-down view of the
+dogmatic approach, in which the definition of the meanings of the law determines a
+single and necessary legal consequence to the facts. Hence the efforts that traditional research invests
+
+The ideal, of course, is that these two plans (ordering and coordination) work
+harmoniously, but the reality of law is not docilely subject to the will of the legislator.
+Laws sometimes don't catch on, sometimes they catch on unexpectedly, and
+inevitably every law depends on the courts for its ultimate meaning to be defined.
+
+Therefore, it is not surprising that the arguments used in courts (where there is
+no scientific commitment to the truth) have been transplanted to academia, where
+much of the work presented is based almost exclusively on quotations, categorical
+statements and fallacious arguments. ad verecundiam, ad populum and ad hominem.
+The investigation of reality is replaced by research in libraries, as if the answers to
+all legal problems had already been answered by some author from the past.
+Hypothesis, from the Greek ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ or "hipothesi", literally translates as subposition
+or supposition. Thesis, therefore, is a hypothesis that has passed a confirmation
+test. As there are no confirmation tests or assumptions in the dogmatic approach to
+Law, there is also no need to talk about legal theses. What is traditionally written in
+academia as a prerequisite for obtaining degrees in Law would be better designated
+by the neologism etíthesis. If the hypothesis is an assumption that can be confirmed
+or rejected after a test, etíthesis, from the Greek ÿÿÿ ("etí" meaning that which is
+superimposed), is the superposition or repetition of the same idea with the aim of
+emphasizing a position .
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+IV. Kelsen and sociologism
+
+22
+20
+
+24
+
+23
+
+21
+
+Finding, through induction, the meanings of a law when applied by the courts requires
+rigorous statistical methods, capable of identifying, describing and organizing
+jurisprudential patterns and trends.
+
+It is interesting to note that Kelsen, when delimiting his idea of the pure science of
+Law, sought to distance two influences: political ideology and what he calls elements
+of natural science. Regarding political ideology, I have little to add. It seems correct
+to me to assume that the aim of science is to describe reality objectively and without
+interference from the researcher's subjective inclinations. Reality is what it is, whether
+we like it or not, and it is not up to the researcher to distort the facts so that reality
+accommodates their political preferences. On the other hand, the question of the
+relationship between Law and natural science arouses curiosity. If it is not part of
+nature, what would be this reality that Law tries to understand? For Kelsen, Law has
+as its object the description of the sphere of social values that determine how human
+conduct should be processed. This social reality makes Law a unique science, "which
+does not describe how human conduct determined by causal laws is processed in
+the domain of natural reality, but how it is determined by positive norms, that is, by
+norms established through human acts , must be processed".That is, the reality investigated by
+Law is not that of effective human action as part of natural reality, but rather the
+norms that establish how man should act. Hence Kelsen's distinction between
+normative science, which describes how human conduct should be, and natural
+science, which describes how conduct is.
+
+When criticizing the
+sociologism of the realists, Kelsen objects that values are not located in natural
+reality, but in a parallel social reality and that "legal norms are not, as already pointed out,
+
+Kelsen admits that a natural science on human behavior would be theoretically
+possible and recognizes that "there is no sufficient reason not to conceive human
+behavior also as an element of nature, that is, as determined by the principle of
+causality, that is, for the not explain, like the facts of nature, like cause and effect.
+
+Hans Kelsen is a jurist for whom I have deep admiration. He was the philosopher
+who worked hardest to keep the Law away from political interference and who made
+a consistent effort to problematize issues related to the concept of the science of Law.
+
+It cannot be doubted that such an explanation - at least to some degree - is possible
+and (...) such a social science cannot be essentially distinguished from the natural sciences".
+
+The account he gives of the objectives of his work is illuminating regarding his main
+concerns: "For more than two decades I have undertaken to develop a pure legal
+theory, that is, purified of all political ideology and all the elements of natural science,
+a legal theory aware of its specificity because it is aware of the specific legality of its
+object. of the spirit. It was interesting to explain, not its tendencies addressed to the
+formation of Law, but its tendencies exclusively directed to the knowledge of Law,
+and to approximate as much as possible its results to the ideal of all science:
+objectivity and accuracy".
+
+intentionally chosen to bias what we would like the law to say.
+
+This
+
+natural science of man would be the sociology of law. However, the sociology of Law
+should not be confused with legal sociologism, a nickname intended for the studies
+of "eminent representatives of the so-called 'realistic' American jurisprudence who
+claim that Law - the Law - is nothing more than a prophecy about how the courts will
+decide, that the law is a predictive science".
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+27
+25
+
+29
+
+26
+
+Kelsen makes an important contribution by distinguishing the imputation
+relationship, typical of the legal norm, from the causality relationship, present in
+nature, as well as by defining the boundary between being and having to be. However,
+the question that underlies this discussion is uncomfortable: is Law just a set of
+deontic propositions about what an ideal world would be like, insensitive to people's
+real behavior? Or, to put it another way: Is the purpose of law just to indicate how
+people should act, without any concern about how they actually act? And, finally, if
+this is true, how is it possible to distinguish valid State law, which obliges us to pay
+taxes and not to drive above the speed limit on a highway, from other orders of
+behavior, such as that of the Church or our teachers in school?
+
+statements either about future events or about past events. As a rule, they actually
+refer to future human conduct. However, they say nothing about this conduct, but
+prescribe it, authorize it or permit it".
+
+This answer works if we are facing a single robber, who issues only one order.
+But if we enter an extensive territory, dominated by a group of robbers hierarchically
+organized, around a system of rules and under a single command, what is the
+difference between the band of robbers and the State? Saint Augustine, in Civitas
+Dei, says that the difference lies in the justice of the rules and asks: what are empires
+without justice, if not large bands of robbers? And what are bands of robbers, if not
+small empires? Kelsen, however, averse to the relativism of the idea of justice,
+disagrees: "If justice is taken as a criterion of the normative order to be designated
+as Law, then the capitalist coercive orders of the Western world are not at all Law
+from the point of view of the communist ideal of Law, and the coercive order of the
+Soviet Union is also not at all Law from the point of view of the capitalist ideal of
+justice".
+
+These issues are tackled by Kelsen with the Augustinian example of the band of
+robbers. By defining the legal norm as an order of coercion, Kelsen wonders about
+the difference between the command of a government tax collector (pay tribute,
+under penalty of imprisonment) and the command of a highwayman (money or life). .
+Why is the first command valid and the second not? The initial response is that the
+robber's command is an isolated act, while the tax collector's command is part of a
+legal system: "If it is a question of the isolated act of a single individual, such an act
+cannot be considered a legal act and its meaning cannot be considered as a legal
+norm, due to the fact that Law - as we have already highlighted - is not an isolated
+norm, but a system of norms, a social order, and a particular norm can only be
+considered as a legal norm to the extent belonging to such an order".
+
+In other
+words, law would not care about what will happen in the future, but only with it being
+the mistake of realists to try what should happen according to norms, to reduce
+a statement about what should be (a legal norm) to a statement about what will be (a
+conduct), dissolving the normative character of the Law.
+
+For Kelsen, the distinction between the State and the band of robbers is not the
+justice of the norms, but their effectiveness and their ability to exclude other orders
+of coercion. Thus, if "this order of coercion is limited in its territorial domain of
+validity to a certain territory and, within that territory, is so effective that it excludes
+any and all other orders of coercion, it can be considered as a legal order and the
+community through it constituted as a 'State', even when it carries out externally -
+according to positive international law - an activity considered criminal ".
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It can be seen here that, by justifying the law through force and not justice, Kelsen
+admits that norms are not commands alien to reality, which are limited to issuing
+statements about how people should behave. To be Law, these commands need to
+have an effect on the behavior of their recipients and need to be, to some extent,
+effective. If the commands of a legislator are not applied by jurisdictional authorities
+and are not obeyed by anyone, if these commands do not have sufficient force to
+exclude other coercive orders from their territory, then they are not Law. Had Kelsen
+been a jusnaturalist like Saint Augustine, the exclusively deonic sense of Law could
+have been preserved. Valid legal norms are those that declare an ideal of justice,
+even if no one respects them. But by basing the Law on its effectiveness, on the
+conduct of its recipients, this exclusively deontic sense has an ontic dimension, in
+which the understanding of how people behave assumes a fundamental weight.
+
+Hence the danger of Kelsen's precocious criticism of legal realism and the
+investigative effort of the courts. If the 16,000 judges active today in Brazil refused
+to apply the laws promulgated by the National Congress, the Law as we know it
+would cease to exist and a new Law, of praetorian origin, would come into force.
+Likewise, if citizens decided to disregard court orders and the police and army
+refused to execute them, the Law would also dissolve and give way to a new
+spontaneous order or anarchy. Therefore, knowing the Law is not limited to the
+interpretation of abstract norms contained in codes and laws. Knowing the law also
+means understanding how judges and, in the end, how people react to these
+commands. As it is the magistrates who first attribute effectiveness to the Law,
+defining how norms should be interpreted, removing inappropriate norms and filling
+gaps, it is not possible to understand what Law is without investigating the
+relationship between abstract norms and the behavior of the courts.
+
+The legal order has the immediate objective of regulating conduct and applying
+sanctions, but its immediate objective is to promote changes in people's behavior.
+In creating and enforcing norms, operators don't just want to publicly declare what's
+right and punish disobedients. They aim to spread socially desired attitudes, promote
+the reduction of crimes, the prevention of illicit acts, the satisfaction of debts, the
+preservation of companies, the payment of taxes, the protection of the family and
+minorities. The legal order is not a set of statements about what ought to be. It is a
+social control tool, which aims to repress unwanted behavior and disseminate
+desirable ones.
+
+Hence the importance of conceptualizing and studying the legal coordination
+plan, which is the institutional space where legal norms are individualized and
+implemented. If the study of the planning plan reveals the abstract meanings of the
+norms enacted by the legislator, the investigation of the coordination plan shows us
+if and how these norms are fulfilled. Therefore, a discipline that proposes to
+understand in a holistic way how the Law works needs to overcome reductionisms.
+Legal positivism reduces Law to the abstract commands of the legal system and
+legal sociologism reduces it to concrete commands of legal coordination. For
+Jurimetry, however, the study of Law combines the relationship between these two
+plans, in order to investigate, first, which abstract norms are socially effective and,
+second, to understand the reasons for the ineffectiveness of those that are not
+obeyed. A norm is not complied with for three reasons: because it was poorly drafted,
+because it collides with society's values or because sanctions are not sufficiently
+dissuasive. Each of these reasons implies different solutions for the improvement of
+coexistence in society, being one of the most important tasks of the jurist to face these questions.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+I return once more to Kelsen, who urges the pure science of Law to leave aside
+the natural behavior of men as an object, to focus on the "normative order of human
+conduct", which is an "object different from the causal order of nature". .
+
+In these passages, Kelsen begins to construct the distinction between the
+concepts of causality and imputation. The so-called normative science of law has as
+its object the legal norm and describes deontic propositions about how man should
+behave: which norms regulate certain conduct and how these norms are
+systematically adjusted to predetermine whether the conduct is permitted, prohibited
+or obligatory. The natural science of legal sociology, on the other hand, has human
+action as its object and describes ontic propositions about how man behaves: what
+factors are associated with a behavior and how these factors combine to determine
+how the conduct will be. For Kelsen, Law deals with the study of imputation
+relationships, that is, relationships in which the occurrence of an antecedent implies
+a consequent that should occur: if A is, then B must be; and natural science
+describes causal relationships in which the occurrence of a cause implies a necessary effect: if A is, then
+
+In an effort to recover the importance of the study of causality for Law (as, indeed,
+for any field of knowledge that claims to be something more
+
+To
+
+elaborate the distinction between natural science and normative science, Kelsen
+states that "nature is, according to one of many definitions of this object, a certain
+order of things or a system of elements that are connected with each other as cause
+and effect, or be, therefore, according to a principle that we designate as causality.
+The so-called natural laws, with which science describes this object - such as, for
+example, this proposition: when a metal is heated, it expands - are applications of
+this principle. that intervenes between heat and expansion is cause and effect."
+However, in relation to law, when "one proceeds to the analysis of our statements
+about human conduct, it is found that we connect acts of human conduct with each
+other and with other facts, not only according to the principle of causality, that is ,
+as cause and effect, but also according to another type of principle that is completely
+different from that of causality, according to a principle for which there is as yet no
+generally accepted designation in science".
+
+Jurimetry sees the main function of law in improving social interaction. There is,
+therefore, a causal relationship between legal regulation and the quality of
+coexistence between people, which is, in a certain sense, a platitude. If criminal
+justice does not function properly, crimes increase. If taxes are too high, the economy
+slows down. Although intuitively these cause and effect relationships are quite
+evident, there is an interesting discussion about the pertinence of talking about
+causality in Law.
+
+This distinction between natural science, based on causal relations, and normative
+science, founded on imputation relations, caused Kelsen and, to a large extent, all
+faculties, to reduce Law to the study of the abstract rules of the legal system and to
+refrain from dealing with of the methodologies and problems that involve the study
+of causality in human behavior, depriving operators of the necessary tools to
+evaluate the success or failure of regulatory solutions.
+Studying Law has become synonymous with studying the meaning of laws, without
+major concerns about understanding the effects and consequences that these laws
+produce in society. Jurists are able to interpret what the letter of the law
+predetermines, but they are unable to go beyond conclusions and analogies with
+personal experiences to intuit the practical consequences of its application.
+
+31 32
+
+33
+
+V. Causality and attribution
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+34
+
+The criticism of the false expectation of future repetition of past facts is a reedition
+of the well-known problem of induction, addressed by several philosophers
+of science, such as Hume, Sextus Empiricus and Karl Popper. Basically, the problem
+states that induction (non-deductive arguments, whose conclusions are more general
+than the premises) is not capable of leading to secure knowledge. For example,
+although all forms of life known to date have carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen,
+phosphorus and sulfur (the biogenic elements), the possibility of finding an unknown
+form that organizes itself without using any of these elements will always exist.
+
+The criticism is unfounded, because it accuses science of not being something it
+never sought to be: infallible. If logic and faith aim at absolute truths, the empirical
+sciences are aware of the precariousness of their laws and their subjection to
+dissonant observations. By the principle of falsifiability, any pattern of regularity, no
+matter how long, runs the risk of being broken by an unexpected event. If every time
+we mix acid and base the reaction produces water and salt, then we can generalize
+our observations into a law of chemical transformation. What guarantees that there
+will not be a disruption of this regularity and the law will be invalidated? From a
+logical point of view, there is no guarantee, but scientific law is not logical: it is an
+inductive law and therefore falsifiable. And induction (deterministic or probabilistic)
+is the only means of access to knowledge and investigation of an order in reality, be it natural or social.
+
+Freedom would be a
+
+component of order disturbance capable of making predictions unfeasible.
+
+The first criticism is directly related to the idea of a pure science of law, in such a
+way that all the comments in the topic above (Kelsen and sociologism) about the
+proposal of a normative science and about the importance of court behavior for
+understanding Law fit here . I would just add that, ultimately, the effort to reduce Law
+to the study of the meaning of the letter of the norms fails to create a category of
+science that does not take as its object a portion of reality. All science, by definition,
+studies objects that are part of reality. Science describes its object by placing it in
+time and space, explaining what caused it and how it affects the existence of other
+objects. Reality, causality, falsifiability and predictability are, therefore, essential
+qualities of scientific thinking. Access to abstract meanings, involving values and
+opinions about how the world should be, are not science due to the insurmountable
+incompatibility with these qualities.
+
+Thus, it does not matter how many species we have discovered, nor the fact that all
+species found to date are built from biogenic elements. Still, we cannot infer from
+these observations that all forms of life in the universe, including those we may never
+encounter, have this structure.
+
+The third criticism concerns the role of free will in law. Kelsen states that the
+intervention of human will in shaping the legal norm (the choice of a judge before
+sentencing; or of a group of legislators before enacting a law) would make the
+characterization of causality relationships unfeasible. Being free, the will would not
+allow the kind of regularity, typical of cause and effect relationships, which makes
+inductive generalization possible in the natural sciences. Furthermore, natural
+causality would present mechanical traits and would act independently of the
+intervention of any volitional action and, therefore, would not be applicable to human behavior.
+
+than mere literature), I will summarize and comment here, due to their relevance,
+Kelsen's three main criticisms of this idea: first, the notion that imputation, and not
+causality, is the relationship that translates the specific meaning of the law ; second,
+the belief that the past will repeat itself in the future does not serve as a basis for
+prediction; and third, the idea that interference with free will would be incompatible
+with regular causal relations.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+However, the practice of Law operates on a daily basis with considerations of a different
+nature, consisting of judgments about what is likely to happen. These are not judgments
+about what happens, or about what should happen, but about the chances that something
+may happen, the so-called probability judgments. Take the example of a mother who visits
+a lawyer because her son has been arrested on drug trafficking charges. The mother
+confirms the possession of the drug and questions the lawyer about what could happen.
+From a normative perspective, the lawyer would observe the abstract legal norm and
+restrict himself to answering that, according to the law, the boy should be arrested.
+
+Criticism errs in overestimating the disorder produced by freedom. The human will,
+although free, manifests itself through observable patterns. It is partly a free will, but partly
+restricted by natural, psychological, cultural, ethical, legal and economic barriers.
+Unfortunately, we are not as free as we think we are. For this reason, it seems to me
+perfectly feasible to identify patterns of regularity in people's behavior and, in some cases
+and under certain conditions, laws capable of predicting human behavior. There are
+numerous surveys that have detected behavioral patterns (consumption, crime, habits)
+and there are entire markets that are based on this type of forecast, such as insurance. In
+addition, the creation of a legal order is based precisely on the premise that men will, at
+least the vast majority, react positively and comply with legal commands, and therefore, it
+is possible to anticipate and control social behavior through the administration of
+penalties. . Therefore, it seems to me that the existence of regular causes of the human will
+is not contrary to the Law, being in fact the basis of the functioning of any legal order.
+
+How old are you? Study or work? What social class do you belong to? What is your
+education level? Lives with the parents? Have you ever been hospitalized for addiction?
+On the other hand: is there already a judge? How old are you? Where did he study? Do you
+have published books? Does the court specialize in criminal law? Are there precedents judged in similar cases?
+
+However, the lawyer knows that this answer is insufficient. The creation of a defense
+strategy goes through the implementation of the analysis, in order to obtain information
+about the behavior, on the one hand, of the boy and, on the other, of the judge. Is the offender black or white?
+
+One of the characteristics of scientific knowledge is the ability to anticipate the future
+states of an object. A scientist describes how something works not only to know it in the
+present, but also to be able to predict its behavior in the future. It is predictability that
+makes science a tool of control over the external environment and thus enables the
+development of technologies capable of improving our living conditions. The possibility of
+creating a social science capable of reducing human action to a set of laws and formulating
+predictions about its future states is the subject of long discussion. Many believe that the
+human will is too complex to model and that freedom would make the study of man
+incompatible with materialistic or mechanical laws. In the case of Law, its object would not
+be to predict how people (be they judges or parties) will act in the future, but rather to
+identify in legal commands the meaning of how they should act. This classic distinction
+between what is and what should be is what led to the classification of Law as a normative
+science, as opposed to the concept of causal science. Law would be the only normative
+social science and its object would not be man, but the legal norm that regulates his
+conduct.
+
+What the lawyer intuitively seeks with these questions is to identify specific
+characteristics both in the behavior of the regulator and in that of the addressee, capable
+of influencing the chances of a conviction and, therefore, adjust his defense strategy to a
+model that increases the probability of acquittal, reduction or conversion of the sentence.
+The judge's decision (individual norm) is therefore not a corollary of a general norm, but
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+SAW. Regulatory and effectiveness jurimetrics
+
+35
+
+36
+
+Analyzed from a concrete perspective, Law is all stitched together by probabilistic
+causality relationships. The lawyer wants to know which strategy has the greatest
+chance of winning, the legislator wants to know which proposed law could be more
+socially beneficial and the judge wants to know the likely effects of his decision.
+The development of models that allow correct predictions to be made is the main
+function of scientific thinking, in its mission to expand our control over the
+environment in which we live. This is the main reason for Jurimetrics' effort to
+reestablish causal relationships in the study of Law, making scientific theory more
+useful and closer to the daily practice of those who work in courts, offices and legislative houses.
+
+An example of effective
+Jurimetrics are studies that seek to verify, for example, the effects of the new
+bankruptcy law on the behavior of banking institutions, especially in reducing
+interest rates and lengthening loan terms.
+
+A central element of regulatory Jurimetry is the legal process. The legal process
+is the process of production of the legal norm. Legal processes can be classified as
+jurisdictional, administrative, legislative or business. What defines the type of
+process is the origin of the power of those who create the norm. Jurisdictional
+processes are those in which someone endowed with jurisdictional power, a judge
+or an arbitrator, for example, produces an individual norm. For example, an ordinary
+action or an arbitration proceeding. Administrative processes are those in which a
+
+Through this explanation, it is clear that the relationship capable of affecting the
+functioning of the legal order is not one of deterministic causality, as in the classical
+natural sciences, nor of imputation, as in Kelsen's normative science, but of
+probabilistic causality. As already explained, probabilistic causality is defined as a
+relationship in which the cause increases the probability of occurrence of the
+corresponding effect, keeping all other conditions constant: if A is, then there is a
+greater probability that B will come into being. It differs from deterministic causality,
+in which the effect necessarily follows from the cause - if A is, then B will be - and
+from imputation, where the occurrence of the antecedent implies the should-be of the consequent: if A
+
+It is important to reiterate that probabilistic causal relationships are present not
+in abstractly considered legal norms, but in the concrete relationships established
+between the human conduct of regulators and recipients of the norms. As a result,
+Jurimetrics does not practice what Kelsen and Vilanova call sociologism, since its
+objective is not to reduce the normative must-be to the being of causality. The duty
+to be is placed on the abstract plane of the norm and can be described by dogmatics
+as a legal proposition, while the causal relationships described by Jurimetrics arise
+on the concrete plane of intersubjective human conduct. They are, therefore,
+approaches that do not collide, but complement each other.
+
+Jurimetry has two dimensions: regulation and effectiveness. Regulatory
+Jurimetrics concerns the analysis of the behavior of those who produce the norm,
+in contrast to effectiveness Jurimetrics, which focuses on the analysis of the
+behavior of the norm's recipient. A classic example of regulatory Jurimetrics are
+studies on "judicial decision-making", which attempt to isolate the cultural,
+educational, religious and evaluative forces involved in the way a judge decides cases.
+
+an effect of a set of probabilistic causes organized in an explanatory model. Having
+mastered this model, the lawyer will be able to go beyond the simple abstract
+statement about what should happen, to make concrete statements about what is
+likely to happen.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+37
+
+authority, endowed with administrative power, produces a norm, which can be
+individual or general. Examples include the administrative sanctioning processes of
+the Securities and Exchange Commission and the issuing of a normative instruction
+by a regulatory agency or autarchy. Legislative processes are those through which
+the bodies of that power produce a general norm. Examples are the ordinary
+legislative process of the National Congress. Negotiation processes are those in
+which any person without public power produces an obligatory legal act. For example,
+the process of negotiating a contract or a unilateral donation.
+
+The legal process is a type of stochastic process, as (i) it is a chain of successive
+random variables indexed in time and (ii) its final result cannot be predetermined.
+The random variables correspond to the stages of evolution of a
+process. For example, a collection action can be contested in several ways: with or
+without preliminaries, using or not a jurisdictional exception, with or without a
+counterclaim. The variation of possible defenses tends to influence the evolution of
+the process and, thus, produce different results. A competency exception may have
+a very low chance of success, but it may delay the judgment of the action by up to two years.
+
+Some processes are faster than others because they are less viscous or because
+they have suffered less institutional attrition. Likewise, groups of analogous
+processes can behave very differently depending on the institutional environment in
+which they are inserted. Thus, measuring these properties helps predict expected
+behavior and the final result of a process.
+
+As for effectiveness Jurimetry, the central element is the study of normative
+impact, that is, the investigation of the effects produced by legal norms on the
+behavior of their recipients. Legal norms aim to influence the behavior of their
+addressees, preventing them from acting in a socially undesirable way or provoking
+them to act in a socially desirable way. However, between the production of the legal
+norm and the reaction of its recipient, there are a series of factors that end up
+interfering with the fulfillment of the norm and that are capable of depriving or
+diverting its effects from the desired objectives. The investigation of the effects of
+the law can be on its degree of indirect effectiveness, that is, how much the law
+impacted on the behavior of magistrates when judging their cases, or of direct
+effectiveness, evaluating to what extent and in what way the law impacted on the
+behavior of its final addressees, the citizens.
+
+The processes of creating legal norms are composed of a succession of preestablished
+procedural phases, each one allowing its participants to make choices.
+As a rule, no participant has control over all choices, the result of each step and also
+the final result of the process are unknown. For example, a judicial collection process
+unfolds in several phases, such as the presentation of an initial petition, defense,
+sanctioning order and sentence. The plaintiff chooses what to ask for, the defendant
+how to answer and the judge grants the evidence, according to the alternatives given
+to the parties. No one, not even the judge, has absolute control over the process.
+Seen in this way, processes in law are stochastic. A stochastic process is a collection
+of random variables, indexed by a set of indices and which presents an evolution in
+time.
+
+The study of the flows of legal processes, or procedural rheology, is a discipline
+of Jurimetry capable of collaborating in the identification of strategies to influence
+the production of norms. Procedural rheology studies the dynamic properties of legal
+processes, such as speed (how many procedural acts are practiced in a certain time
+interval), viscosity (how many procedural acts are practiced per phase) or institutional
+friction (what is the effect of the institutional environment on the speed of the process). process).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+39
+
+41
+
+38
+
+40
+
+VII. Jurimetry as science and technology
+
+According to Tercio Sampaio Ferraz, science and technology are distinguished by their
+purposes and means. Science is concerned with the problem of veracity and is concerned
+with describing objects. Its objective is to create a model of accurate predictions and to
+develop theses that can be verified and falsified. He says that a "scientific investigation is
+always faced with the problem of truth. We admit, therefore, that all science intends to
+obtain statements independent of the situation in which they are made, insofar as they
+aspire to erga omnes validity. (...) Now , scientific statements are basically descriptive, the
+others [prescriptive, resolving and informative] appearing secondarily in the establishment
+of methods, in the choice of themes, etc. Being descriptive, they are statements that
+confirm what existed, exists or will exist, thus having a manifest operational meaning ,
+constituting a system of probable and safe predictions, as well as reproductions and
+interferences in the phenomena it describes. These are, therefore, certain findings whose
+evidence, according to the verification criteria of
+
+Transposed to Law, the ideas of science and technology gain specific meanings.
+
+judges will feel compelled to apply the norms in their decisions, if
+the reaction of the final addressees to the imposition of these norms will be the socially
+desired one.
+
+Jurimetry is a science that aims to describe the factors that interfere in the
+
+functioning of a legal order, notably in the production of norms and in the identification of
+the effects they produce in social behavior. In one sentence, Jurimetry aims to describe in
+detail, preferably measuring, the true Law. And what is true law? It is not the abstract
+article of a code, which obtains its validity through the authorities that promulgated it,
+whose competence to legislate, in turn, comes from other norms, based on other
+competences, in a self-sustaining pyramid of legal rules. True law corresponds to the rules
+actually applied by the courts, which have a minimum level of effectiveness and which,
+excluding other rules from their jurisdictional territory, are obeyed by their addressees.
+
+each epoch of scientific development, tells us to a high degree that they are true.
+
+as well as understand
+
+Technology, on the other hand, is an extension of science, which appropriates scientific
+descriptions and models in order to control reality and develop solutions to practical
+human problems. Technology is therefore concerned with the problem of the technical
+usefulness of scientific knowledge and seeks to employ it to satisfy needs.
+
+Per
+
+The distinction between direct and indirect effectiveness is important insofar as the
+judge is at the same time a producer and recipient of norms. When introducing a new legal
+regime, it is important to assess whether the new norms will have indirect effectiveness, that is, whether the
+
+In Tercio's words: "Technological thinking, characteristic of dogmatics, takes, so to speak,
+the factual possibilities shown by science and transforms them into possibilities of human
+action, on the assumption that, at certain points in the occurrence of phenomena, it is
+possible a practical intervention. Thus, technological thinking is not a normative system,
+although it hides something prescriptive. It does not oppose science, but extends it,
+carrying out transformative operations consistent with the relevance attributed to certain
+conclusions of scientific theories for the future. solution of practical problems. Therefore,
+it does not go beyond the very premises of science". For example, the discovery of
+the relationship between mass and the speed of light by Albert Einstein (E=m.c2) is
+scientific knowledge that, used by the allies during World War II, solved the practical
+problem of building a weapon (the atomic bomb ) powerful enough to end the conflict.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+42
+
+43
+
+Returning to the concept of science, Jurimetry is classified as a human, causal
+and stochastic science. It is science because it works with the problem of veracity,
+formulating statements that are true to the extent of the precision with which they
+manage to describe and predict the behavior of their object. It is human because its
+object of study is the behavior of men in two specific situations: as regulators or as
+recipients of a legal order. It is causal because the relationships investigated by
+Jurimetry connect elements of probabilistic cause and effect with each other. And it
+is stochastic because its explanation models are not deterministic, being, on the
+contrary, based on the purpose of only controlling (and not extirpating) the
+uncertainty, which is inherent to Law.
+
+More than simply describing the functioning of a legal order, Jurimetria provides
+elements so that these operators can make the decision that best meets their needs:
+in the case of the lawyer, to better advise his client on his chances of success; in the
+case of the legislator, to perfect law and society; and in the case of the judge, to
+deliver a sentence with expected consequences.
+
+No doctor worthy of the name prescribes medicines and treatments without knowing
+what the patient is suffering from and why. If our purpose, eg, is to speed up the
+Justice machine, we need to know which parts are performing less, and how the
+sand that wears them down penetrates the mechanism. Without this prior verification,
+we will have no solid criteria for undertaking the work of reform. We run the risk of
+going out to attack windmills, while leaving the real enemies in peace and quiet.
+After reforming the law, it is necessary to closely monitor, with adequate lenses, the
+appropriate impact of the reform on the forensic day-to-day. There is no other way to
+find out what has really changed, in what sense and to what extent. Nor is it possible
+to conceive, without this elementary precaution, a minimally objective assessment,
+in the light of which we can decide whether it is worth continuing in the same direction or whether it is
+Returning to the parallel with medicine: given the medicine, starting the treatment,
+the doctor's mission is not finished: it is up to him to observe how the patient's body
+is reacting and, as the case may be, increase or decrease the dose, when not
+necessary. replace therapy that has proved to be anodic or counterproductive".
+
+From a technological point of view, jurimeria presents relevant applications,
+contributing to the solution of legal decidability problems. As it is an extension of
+science, the technological use of knowledge is directly proportional to the predictive
+power of scientific models. If science has high predictive power, it tends to produce
+technologies of high relevance. In this perspective, Jurimetria can, for example,
+recommend to the legislator a change in the law capable of reducing the time of the
+processes, or the application of a type of penalty that reduces the level of recidivism
+of offenders, or even provide the judge with elements that allow anticipating the
+concrete effects of a sentence. Jurimetria models are still in an early stage of
+development. However, as we accumulate data on the functioning of legal orders
+and refine our analysis tools, it is expected that operators will have a greater
+understanding and, consequently, a greater ability to predict their behavior.
+
+Aware of this relationship between observation, prediction and follow-up, typical
+of rigorous and consistent action, José Carlos Barbosa Moreira compares the activity
+of a lawyer dealing with problems of justice with that of a doctor dealing with an
+illness and explains the importance of empirical diagnosis and follow-up of the
+practical results of any treatment for its success: "Before reforming the procedural
+law (rectius: any law), logic and common sense dictate that a diagnosis be made, as
+accurate as possible, of the evils that one wants to fight and of the causes that generate or feed it.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Pontes de Miranda, in an interview for the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo, on August 5,
+1979, in: DANTAS, Lourenço (coordinator). The lived history [interviews]. São Paulo: O
+Estado de São Paulo, 1981. p. 213-214. I remember that today we have this knowledge thanks
+to the surveys by Justiça Aberta and Justiça em Números by the CNJ. Now we need to learn how to use it.
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+The distinction between science and technology goes back to another distinction,
+between positive science and normative science. Here, however, the concept of
+normative science is used in a different sense than Kelsen's. In this alternative
+meaning, normative science is one that investigates its object in accordance with a
+political or ethical preference, with the investigator acting without axiological neutrality
+towards the object. On the other hand, positive (or descriptive) science is one that
+describes its object independently of a specific purpose, with the investigator
+exempting himself from the purposeful usefulness of his discoveries.
+
+Jurimetrics is, therefore, not a normative science in the Kelsenian sense, because
+its object of interest is not a legal norm in itself (the legal ought-to-be), but the behavior
+adopted by men in function of a legal order (the legal being). .
+But within this alternative Friedmanian meaning, we can think of positive Jurimetry,
+whose main objective is to describe in a neutral, realistic and impartial way which
+norms are actually being applied and what effects they are producing; and a normative
+Jurimetry, which is based on the positive, and which establishes final purposes for
+the reforms to improve the Law, in order to make it faster, more effective and, why not,
+fair. History shows that the discussion around the problems of Law has evolved little
+since Euthyphro's dilemma and the famous conversation between Plato and
+Thrasymachus in the Republic.
+I believe that Jurimetrics is one of the possible ways to overcome these difficulties,
+teaching us a little about how the legal order works and how to develop better policies
+in a global, complex and frantically changing society.
+
+Milton Friedman explains, in a classic essay, the relationship
+between positive and normative economics, in an excerpt that could be directly
+transplanted to the discussion about the object and usefulness of Jurimetrics. For
+him, all "normative art" is based on a positive knowledge about a reality. It is this
+positive knowledge about the practical consequences that makes the choice about
+whether or not to do this something viable: "The art of normative economics, on the
+other hand, cannot be independent of positive economics. Any political initiative
+necessarily rests on a prediction about the consequences of doing one thing rather
+than another, a prediction that needs to be based - implicitly or explicitly - on positive
+economics. There is, obviously, no direct relationship between political initiatives and
+positive economic conclusions; if so If it were, there would be no separate normative
+science. Two individuals may agree on the consequences of legislation. One may view
+them as desirable and be in favor of the legislation; the other as undesirable and
+oppose it."
+
+We are, after two and a half thousand years, more or less in the same place.
+
+44
+
+47
+
+1
+
+45
+
+46
+
+two
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+3
+
+4
+
+5
+
+"What is Econometrics? Strange as it may seem, it does not exist a generally accepted answer
+to this question. Responses vary from the silly 'Econometrics is what econometricians do' to
+the said 'Econometrics is the study of the applications of statistical methods to the analysis of
+economic phenomena', with sufficient disagreements to warrant an entire journal article devoted
+to this question.
+
+KENNEDY, Peter. A guide to econometrics. 6th ed., Cambridge: Wiley-Blackwell. 2008, p 1-2.
+
+This distinction between, on the one hand, the norm and, on the other, behavior, is approached
+by Hans Kelsen in the first topic of Part III of Pure Theory of Law. In a footnote, Kelsen states
+that taking the legal norm as an object is the distinction between pure theory of Law and the socalled
+egological theory of Law, which takes human conduct as the focus of interest. See
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6th ed., Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 109.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6th ed., Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 56-65. In
+Kelsenian theory, the legal order is a system of norms that have in common the same basis of
+validity: the fundamental norm. The fundamental norm, in turn, is the logical legal starting point
+for the creation of positive law, from which the successive dynamic procedures for editing legal
+norms are established, from the constitution to a
+
+This confusion stands from the fact that econometricians wear many different hats. First, and
+foremost, they are economists, capable of using economic theory, to improve their empirical
+analysis for the problems they address. At times they are mathematicians, formulating economic
+theory in ways that make it appropriate for statistical testing. At times they are accountants,
+concerned with the problem of finding and collecting economic data and relating theoretical
+economic variables with observable ones. At times they are applied statistics, spending hours
+with the computer trying to estimate economic relationships and predict economic events. And
+at times they are theoretical statisticians, applying their skills to the development of statistical
+techniques appropriate to the empirical problems characterizing the science of economics".
+
+"The legal norm issued by the competent authority (Constitution, law, etc.) is the main reference
+of the system for resolving conflicts of interest developed in current democratic societies. This
+system is called Law and is very complex. So much so that, due to Due to its complexity,
+knowing it adequately presupposes years of study, professional practice and introjection of
+values.Law, therefore, cannot be defined as a set of norms published by the competent
+authorities in accordance with the political and institutional organization of the State. Law is
+not only law, nor essentially the law. It is more than a set of positive legal norms; it is, once
+again, a complex system for resolving conflicts of interest, in which positive norms serve as
+the main reference". COELHO, Fábio Ulhoa. Civil Law Course. 2nd ed., São Paulo: Saraiva, vol.
+1, 2006, p. 32.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+8
+7
+6
+
+9
+
+10
+
+"The legal order (like any normative system) is a set of norms. This general definition of
+legal order presupposes a single condition: that in the constitution of an order more norms
+(at least two) concur together, and that there is no order composed of a norm only".
+BOBBIO, Norberto. Theory of the legal order. 10. ed., Brasília: Universidade de Brasília,
+1999, p. 31.
+
+"[The fundamental norm] serves to explain the unity of a complex legal order. Its core is
+that the norms of a legal order are not all on the same plane. There are superior norms and
+inferior norms. The inferior ones depend on the superior ones.
+
+For Kelsen, law is a normative science because its object is the legal norm. Human conduct
+is only an object to the extent that it becomes the content of the legal norm: "In the evident
+affirmation that the object of legal science is the Law, there is contained the affirmation -
+less evident - that the legal norms are the object of the science legal, and human conduct is
+only so insofar as it is determined in legal norms as a presupposition or consequence, or -
+in other words - insofar as it constitutes content of legal norms". KELSEN, Hans. Pure
+theory of Law. 6th ed., Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 109.
+
+Ascending from the lower norms to those above, we arrive at a supreme norm, which does
+not depend on any other higher norm, and on which the unity of the order rests. [...] it is the
+fundamental norm. [...] It is what gives unity to the order".
+
+In Hans Kelsen's definition: "An 'order' is a system of norms whose unity is constituted by
+the fact that they all have the same foundation of validity. And the foundation of validity of
+a normative order is - as we will see - a fundamental norm of the which the validity of all
+norms belonging to that order is withdrawn. KELSEN, Hans.
+
+BOBBIO, Norberto. Theory of the legal order. 10. ed., Brasília: Universidade de Brasília,
+1999, p. 49.
+
+Vol. 32 of the Thinking about Law Series : Analysis of the justifications for the production of criminal norms.
+
+verdict.
+
+Pure theory of Law. Almedina. P. 33.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+15
+
+14
+
+13
+
+11
+
+12
+
+16
+
+[http://portal.mj.gov.br/main.asp?View="%7B329D6EB2-8AB0-4606-B054-
+
+"the legal order constitutes a system because incompatible norms cannot coexist in it. (...) the
+
+legal system is not a deductive system, as in the first sense: it is a system in a less incisive sense,
+
+if you like, in a negative sense, that is, an order that excludes the incompatibility of its simple
+
+parts." BOBBIO, Norberto. Theory of the legal order. 10. ed.
+
+There were 800 regulations in 2008, the last year in which the Statistical Yearbook of Legislative
+
+Activities was published. Divided by 260 working days in the year, we arrive at 3.0769 general
+
+standards per working day. See [www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/legislacao/publicacoes/
+
+anuario-estatistico do-processo-legislativo]. Accessed on: 7/30/2013).
+
+"Due to the presence, in a legal order, of lower and higher norms, it has a hierarchical structure.
+The norms of an order are arranged in hierarchical order."
+
+in:
+
+Brasilia: University of Brasilia, 1999, p. 80.
+
+BOBBIO, Norberto. Theory of the legal order. 10. ed., Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1999, p.
+49.
+
+,
+
+There were 24.2 million new cases in 2010. Divided by 260 working days, we arrive at 93,076.92
+
+new cases per working day. See Justice in Numbers 2010 report www.cnj.jus.br/programas-de-aaz/
+
+eficiencia-modernizacao-e-transparencia/pj-justica-em numeros/relatorios (accessed on
+
+July 30, 2013).
+
+Gregory Mitchell explains how observation differentiates empirical research from other approaches
+
+based on guesswork, imagination, or pure logic: "[T]he basic point of separation between empirical
+
+and non-empirical research is the role that observation plays in the research:
+
+VILANOVA, Lourival. Logical structures and the positive law system. São Paulo: Max Limonad,
+1997, p. 185-188.
+
+Available
+4CAD3C53EE73%7D]." Accessed on: 30.07.2013.
+
+[E]mpirical research [is] explicitly founded on direct observations of the world or inferences from
+
+observations; non empirical research does not intend that its claims about the world are
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+18
+
+17
+
+19
+
+21
+
+20
+
+22
+
+Empirical legal scholarship as scientific dialogue. North Carolina Law Review, vol. 83, 2004, p. 197-
+198.
+
+COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p.
+171-215. ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São Paulo: Pioneira Thompson
+Learning, 2006, p. 239-273. COOPER, Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S.
+Methods of research in the field of administration. Porto Alegre: Bookman., 2003, p. 318-333.
+MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6. Ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman,
+2012, p. 173-195.
+
+in:
+
+03/29/2015.
+
+Logical structures and the positive law system. São Paulo: Editora Max Limonad, 1997, p. 62.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6. ed. Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 132.
+
+COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5. Reprint, São Paulo: Atlas, 2011, p.
+123-138. COOPER, Donald R. & SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in administration. Porto
+Alegre: Bookman, 2003, p. 302-317. ZICKMUND, William G. Principles of marketing research. São
+Paulo: Pioneira Thompson Learning, 2006, p. 216 to 238. MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research:
+an applied orientation. 6. Ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012, p. 139-169.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6. ed. Coimbra: Armênio Amado., 1984, p. 118.
+
+See report from the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo: [http://saude.estadao.com.br/noticias/
+
+geral,em 4-anos-numero-de-processos-por-erro-medico-cresce-140-no- stj-imp-,1655442].
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6th ed., Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 7. Lourival Vilanova
+also believes that scientific knowledge of Law has particularities: "Legal, anthropological-social,
+sociological, philosophical knowledge. Each species has its own investigation techniques, and
+other common ones. But there is a type of knowledge that stands out of the others: that of the
+Science-of-Law ( dogmatic knowledge )". VILANOVA, Lourival.
+
+founded on anything other than imagination, supposition, or logic". MITCHELL, Gregory.
+
+Access
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6. ed. Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 135.
+
+"If the domain considered by these sciences is contrasted, as a sphere of values, with the
+sphere of natural reality, it must be taken into account that these are values constituted by
+positive norms, that is, norms that are placed in space and time by human acts, and that,
+therefore, the object of these social sciences is not unreal, that any reality also belongs to
+it or corresponds to it - except that, in this case, it is a reality different from the natural one,
+namely, a social reality. " KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6. ed. Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 132-133.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6. ed. Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 136.
+
+"A natural law says: if a metallic body is heated, it will expand; a legal law says: if an
+individual steals, he will be punished by the court. (...) Against this opinion we must, first
+of all, note- It is clear that the statement that legal laws are, like natural laws, assertions
+about a future to happen cannot refer to norms established by legal authority - either to
+general norms established by the legislator or to general norms set by the courts in its
+decisions - that is, it cannot refer to the Law, but only to the descriptive propositions of the
+Law formulated by legal science. (...) Natural laws are based on our experience and our
+experience resides in the past, not in the future . As a prediction of the future, a natural law
+is only applicable under the problematic assumption that the past is repeated in the future.
+(...) The prophecies of realistic jurisprudence are distinguished from the legal propositions
+of the normative science of Law only by the fact that be statements of being and not of
+ought. But, as assertions of being, they do not translate the specific meaning of Law. To
+the extent that the courts, in their decisions, create new Law, its prediction is as little
+possible as the general prediction to be produced by the legislative body." KELSEN, Hans.
+Pure Theory of Law. 6. Ed., Coimbra : Armênio Amado, 1984, pp. 135-136.
+
+As Lourival Vilanova explains: "From this formal angle, all the criticism that Kelsen makes
+of sociologism (not of the sociology of Law, which is an area of legitimate investigation)
+can be taken as criticism of the reduction of p-deontics to p-descriptives. Holmes or
+Cardoso (sic) consider Law as the prediction of how individuals and, especially judges and
+courts, will behave, dissolving the normative character of Law. Making probability
+judgments about future conduct, based on current conduct , it is important to reduce the
+norm to a proposition that describes: 'under certain conditions, an individual will probably behave in this or that
+
+24
+
+23
+
+25
+
+27
+
+26
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+31
+
+32
+
+33
+
+34
+
+28
+
+29
+
+30
+
+It rests on a presumed (always based on the experience of certain cases) functional
+relationship, that is, here, on a law. Now, the formula of the law of nature is 'if A is, then B is',
+while the legal law 'A is, then B must be'." VILANOVA, Lourival. Logical structures and the system of positive Law .
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6th ed., Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 118-119.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6th ed., Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 81.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6th ed., Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 118.
+
+São Paulo: Editora Max Limonad, 1997, p. 73.
+
+"Like a natural law, a legal proposition also connects two elements together.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6th ed., Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 119.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6th ed., Coimbra: Armênio Amado, 1984, p. 70-80.
+
+However, the connection that is expressed in the legal proposition has a completely different
+meaning from that which natural law describes, that is, that of causality. (...) The fact that the
+meaning of the copula or connection of the elements in the legal proposition is different from
+that of the connection in the elements of natural law results from the fact that the connection
+in the legal proposition is produced through a norm established by the legal authority -
+through a act of will, therefore - while the connection of cause and effect, which in the natural law
+is affirmed, is independent of any intervention of this kind" . p.120.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6. Ed., Coimbra: Almedina, 1984 p. 78.
+
+mode'. The descriptive proposition of facts, to be scientific, rests on the assumption of the
+regularity of phenomena, that is, conduct C is a function of the factors F', F'', F''' or C = f (F', F'' , F''').
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+See HEISE, Michael. The past, present, and future of empirical legal scholarship: judicial decision
+
+making and the new empiricism. University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 4, 2002, p. 832.
+
+in:
+
+DocumentID="%7B68E6736C-4DF7-498B-ABC3-
+
+FERRAZ Jr., Tercio Sampaio. Social function of legal dogmatics, 1998, p. 91. See also FERRAZ JR.,
+
+Tercio Sampaio. Introduction to the study of Law: technique, decision, domination. 4. Ed., São Paulo:
+
+Atlas, 2003, p. 83-91.
+
+A notorious example of deprivation of indirect effectiveness are the rules of disregard of the legal
+
+personality of art. 50 of the CC in the Labor Court.
+
+DBCFE29195F6%7D&ServiceInstUID=%7B0831095E-D6E4-49AB-B405-C0708AAE5DB1%7D]."
+
+Research "Analysis of the new bankruptcy law". Academic coordination Aloisio Pessoa de Araujo.
+
+Fábio Ulhoa Coelho works with different concepts of legal science and technology. Legal science
+
+describes the reasons why a given society decided to produce a certain legal norm. Technology, on
+
+the other hand, deals with the problem of convincing interpretation and persuasion regarding the
+
+meaning to prevail for a given norm. "In close terms, the objective proposed by the knowing subject
+
+who focuses on the legal norm defines the character of the knowledge to be produced. If he intends
+
+to explain the reasons why society, at a given time in its history, created certain legal norms and not
+
+others, his mental work will have a scientific nature. On the other hand, if the objective is to research
+
+the legal decisions that the norm makes possible, his knowledge will have a technological nature. In
+
+the first case, he will have to take into account the alternative between true and false; in the second,
+
+this alternative makes no sense. The question that tends to reveal the reasons for the production of
+
+the legal norm leads to the
+
+Available
+
+[http://portal.mj.gov.br/services/DocumentManagement/FileDownload.EZTSvc.asp?
+
+FERRAZ Jr., Tercio Sampaio. Social function of legal dogmatics, 1998, p. 86.
+
+BASS, Richard F. Stochastic processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
+
+36
+
+41
+
+37
+
+38
+
+39
+
+40
+
+35
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+42
+
+45
+
+43
+
+44
+
+Right and power. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1992, p. 17.
+
+Many law and social science scholars wonder, 'Are we a science yet?. Because of ELS, the answer is
+
+'yes' for L&E. The maturation of L&E into normal science is intoxicating. However, the peripheral of
+
+L&E on law's content is sobering. To make ELS and L&E central to law's content, scholars must show
+
+that correct legal reasoning of requires scientific prediction of law's effects. If judges become
+
+convinced that law's content depends on its effects, then understanding legal science will become
+
+necessary to pass the bar exam. The correct interpretation of law has always depended significantly
+
+on its consequences. People make laws for their own benefit, so the benefits of alternative
+
+interpretations of a law help to determine which interpretation is correct.
+
+The next task of ELS is to make the correct interpretation of law depend significantly on its scientific
+
+consequences, not merely on its intuitive consequences". COOTER, Robert. Maturing into normal
+
+science: the effect of empirical legal studies on Law and economics. University of Illinois Law Review.
+
+vol. 5, 2011, p. 1475.
+
+SABINE, George H. Descriptive and normative sciences. The philosophical review, vol. 21, no. 4, 1912,
+
+p. 438-450.
+
+Commenting on the effects of empirical studies (ELS) on the economic analysis of law, Robert Cooter
+
+explains how advances in statistical research will allow a better understanding of the consequences
+
+of the law and, therefore, the consolidation of normal scientific knowledge, that is, basic knowledge.
+
+empirical and predictive: "Kuhn distinguished between normal and revolutionary science. Normal
+
+science proceeds by incremental improvements. Hypothesis are deduced from current theory and
+
+then tested empirically - a process that is similar to sequencing a gene. Confirmation or disconfirmation
+
+prompts small adjustments in the theory. As normal science proceeds, anomalies accumulate.
+
+Resolving the anomalies requires a new theory at the science's core. Revolutionary science proceeds
+
+by abrupt jumps that rearrange the core's elements into an unfamiliar pattern, as with postulating the
+
+double helix in genetics.
+
+FRIEDMAN, Milton. Essays in positive economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 5.
+
+MOREIRA, José Carlos Barbosa. Civil procedure matters. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2004, p. 10-11.
+
+(...)
+
+knowing subject to a scientific enterprise, while the inquiry about the meaning of just the same norm
+
+leads him to a technological enterprise. Between one and another level there is no hierarchy or
+
+opposition, since there are different objectives to be achieved" COELHO, Fábio Ulhoa.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The dilemma appears in the Platonic dialogue Euthyphro, when Socrates asks the namesake
+of the title: is piety loved by the gods because it is piety, or is it piety because it is loved by
+the gods?
+
+Thrasymachus, Greek philosopher from Chalcedon, states in Plato's Republic that justice
+is just a name given to the will of the strongest.
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+47
+
+46
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It's science, just as a pile of bricks is not a house."
+
+Jurimetry starts from theories about the functioning of the legal order to
+
+formulate its working hypotheses. In the construction of these theories, concepts specific to
+legal dogmatics, general theory of law and legal logic are used, to name a few examples, without
+which there would be no way to delimit the object of study and articulate basic concepts for the
+formulation of a questioning. .
+
+With these premises in mind, we can say that Jurimetry seeks to develop a set of
+generalizations capable of explaining and predicting the behavior of the agents involved in the
+production and fulfillment of legal norms, whose performance will be positive insofar as these
+generalizations are able to predict the states futures of these
+
+In addition to conceptualizing the object and methodology of Jurimetry, it is important to
+provide an additional explanation regarding the objectives of this new discipline, as well as some
+statements about the type of approach that, it is believed, will make its realization possible.
+
+"Science is made of facts like a house is made of bricks. But a pile of facts is not
+
+For this reason, despite being deductive or abductive, the concepts of legal logic and the
+statements of dogmatic doctrine are not dispensable for Jurimetry. Quite the contrary, they
+constitute a reference to practical problems faced by operators, in addition to being a rich and
+abundant work material for the elaboration of hypotheses to be tested.
+
+One of the objectives of Jurimetria is to build a theoretical model regarding the functioning of
+the legal order, which depends on the formulation of working hypotheses able to be measured
+through statistical tests. The creation of the theoretical model of Jurimetry, therefore, must start
+from a set of hypotheses about the factors involved both in the production of legal norms by the
+authorities and in the effects of these norms on the social behavior of people in general, and
+capable of being empirically tested.
+
+Contrary to the more radical strands of American realism, and approaching Scandinavian
+realism, Jurimetry does not rule out law and doctrine as factors that influence the decision of the
+courts (influence of the order on coordination). The abstract meaning built by the doctrine around
+the law is not seen as a myth devoid of any relevance, composing a group of factors that,
+although insufficient to determine, is capable of influencing the behavior of judges. In addition,
+doctrine is an important repository of working hypotheses from which jurimetric research can be
+designed. There is, therefore, no opposition, but a complementarity between dogmatic doctrinal
+work and jurimetric research.
+
+Research projects, also empirical, depend on a theoretical model from which the hypotheses
+to be tested will be formulated. The failure to formulate this model was Lee Loevinger's biggest
+mistake and is, even today, the biggest source of criticism of interdisciplinary empirical
+approaches.
+
+Chapter 6. Characteristics of Jurimetrics
+
+Jurimetry
+CHAPTER 6. CHARACTERISTICS OF JURIMETRY
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+I. Theoretical model
+
+3
+
+1
+
+two
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+abstract
+
+stochastic
+
+Qualitative
+
+concrete
+
+Deterministic
+
+Comparative table
+
+Foresight
+
+Populational
+
+Jurimetry
+
+Perspective
+
+Individual
+
+dogmatic
+
+Quantitative
+
+4
+
+behaviors. Jurimetry will only be successful if it is capable of disseminating knowledge
+that can, for example, identify the factors involved in reducing the time of the judicial
+process and assist in the creation of a set of norms that effectively reduce the period of
+judgment of actions; or that makes it possible to describe the optimal level of a prison
+sentence capable of repressing criminal behavior without making the social reintegration
+of the criminal unfeasible, reducing crime rates and increasing prison recovery rates.
+
+Dogmatics has five characteristics. It is: deterministic, since it makes assertions that
+are supposedly certain; individual, insofar as it takes isolated norms as its object (usually
+general norms); abstract, because its object is not situated in time and space; perspective,
+because it uses methods that only allow the description of present states; and qualitative,
+since it attributes immeasurable qualities to its object.
+
+To better organize this distinction, the comparative table below contrasts the
+characteristics of Jurimetry with those of dogmatic disciplines.
+
+Each of these five defining traits will be discussed separately in the topics below.
+
+For supporters of scientific determinism, knowledge about the initial state of a system
+and its transformation laws makes it possible to predict, with any degree of precision, all
+of its future states. Predictability is based on the existence of relationships of
+
+On the other hand, Jurimetrics differs from dogmatics because it is: stochastic, since it
+admits the presence of uncertainty in legal decision-making processes; populational,
+since it takes as its object not isolated individuals, but groups, samples, subpopulations
+and populations; concrete, as it situates its object in time and space; prospective, as it
+uses methods that allow the formulation of predictions about future states; and
+quantitative, since it proposes to measure its objects, attributing to them characteristics
+endowed with magnitude and multitude.
+
+An enlightening way to define Jurimetrics is to compare it with the dogmatic disciplines
+from which universities organize their curriculum and the Brazilian Bar Association bases
+its professional selection test for lawyers. Traditional disciplines are defined here as
+dogmatic because: (i) they are based on binding premises - legal dogmas (constitution
+of codes and main federal laws); (ii) such dogmas cannot be denied; and (iii) play a role
+of decidability, indicating how concrete conflicts should be resolved according to dogmas.
+
+II. Comparative table
+
+III. Dealing with uncertainty
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+10
+
+9
+7
+8
+to the freedom of
+
+In order for there to be certainty that B is the legal consequence of A, the legal system must
+unequivocally indicate this relationship, and cannot leave doubts as to the existence of other consequences
+for the same conduct A. Hence the statement that the legal system would be organized in the form of a
+consistent system, devoid of antinomies and gaps and capable of assigning, in advance, a single legal
+consequence to each possible social conduct.
+
+Thus, for example, legal science does not state that if someone commits a crime (A), then the criminal will
+necessarily be arrested (B). It only attests that, according to current norms, the criminal must be arrested:
+if A is, then B must be.
+
+5 chance.
+
+decision of the Judiciary which, not coincidentally, constitute the three main sources of law. For this
+reason, the search to minimize this complexity and its consequent uncertainty through the promotion of
+legal certainty becomes a paradox in which the law faces a battle against itself. By trying to predict a
+solution in advance for each possible conduct, the order becomes a jungle of rules that are difficult to
+operate. The jurist stops being an interpreter and becomes a detective involved in a complex tangle of
+rules, which paradoxically end up increasing, not reducing, the predictability of decisions.
+
+It is easy to see that the problem of anticipating the legal consequences of a fact is directly linked to
+the social aspiration for legal security. If there is a determination, there would also be the possibility of
+absolute legal certainty, insofar as the entire normative content of the Law would be previously established
+in the general norm and the application would be an act of mere revelation of this content, immune to
+subjectivism, political disturbances and the
+
+causality - if A is, then B will be
+certain of the occurrence of effect B.
+
+This indeterminacy arises, in part, from the structure of law itself, especially from the plurivocity of
+general norms and the political action of the Judiciary. General norms, in addition to being numerous and
+inevitably plurivocal, are often contradictory and meaningless. Within this space of normative
+indetermination, judges exercise powers to arbitrate and construct solutions that are not entirely
+predetermined in the law.
+
+Even if it were possible, the effort to automate justice by predicting all concrete cases would not make
+sense. Conflicts that are less frequent and have a low social impact (economic or ethical) do not justify
+the effort to move the company in advance.
+
+Jurimetria refutes the "predeterministic" view of law and offers a stochastic view as an alternative. The
+stochastic view understands that, for systems of greater complexity, with numerous factors and complex
+interaction mechanisms, the exact predetermination of future states is unfeasible. This is undoubtedly the
+case of social facts in general and, in particular, of legal facts. The infinity of factors that interact in the
+functioning of the legal order prevents the formulation of models capable of accurately predicting which
+norms will be produced in the future and which legal consequences will be attributed to each behavior.
+
+-,
+
+Humberto Ávila attributes the complexity of the law to the plurality of norms, and the
+vagueness of the doctrine
+
+Juridical dogmatics also operates affirmations equipped with certainty from an initial state. The initial
+state is a consistent system of general and abstract norms whose knowledge allows the deduction of a
+single legal consequence for each fact. With the difference that the relationship between a fact and its
+legal consequence is not causal in nature, but is an imputation between antecedent and consequent
+located in the world of what should be.
+in such a way that, if cause A occurs, the researcher will have
+
+Judging implies creating law and the idea of a consistent set of abstract norms capable of attributing a
+single solution to each and every conflict under jurisdiction is an unrealizable aspiration .
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+11
+
+12
+
+IV. large populations
+
+Due to these difficulties, Jurimetria admits that decision-making processes in law are
+stochastic. The stochastic process is composed of a family of random variables (that is,
+variables whose values cannot be anticipated) indexed in time. While the deterministic
+process evolves in only one direction and has only one possible outcome, the stochastic
+process evolves in different ways and is capable of producing a range of possible outcomes.
+Law is stochastic because, as all operators know, it is not possible to predict with certainty
+how a judicial process will be judged, what will be the final conformation of a contract or
+what will be the final text of a law under discussion in parliament.
+
+To become fully jurimetric, Ávila's explanation would only need to inform that the meaning
+of a rule has the behavior of a random variable and that its possible meanings are equivalent
+to the sample space of this variable. Having made this clarification, Jurimetria can take the
+analysis a step further and, in addition to identifying the possible meanings of the rules,
+assign a probability of occurrence to each one of them (for example, based on the frequency
+distribution of judicial decisions), quantifying and controlling this uncertainty.
+
+Assigning a probability to each possible result of a legal process is the most concrete,
+practical and palpable way to give effect to the principle of legal certainty and, with that,
+accomplish what Jurimetry proposes as a cornerstone: controlling uncertainty in the
+process. right, since it cannot be extirpated.
+
+The jurisprudence of the courts, when it appears, is occasionally referred to
+
+as an allegory of a general position regarding a theoretical issue addressed in the
+
+There is, therefore, an unavoidable randomness in these processes and their results are
+not subject to exact predetermination. It is once again Humberto Ávila who explains how
+legal rules do not produce univocal meanings, but rather ranges of possible meanings to be
+assumed according to the evolution of the decision process, so that the law can only
+produce a "relative certainty", dependent on postulates of interpretation and application, such as
+
+To conclude, it should be clarified that the term stochastic should not be confused with
+irrational or chaotic. Saying that law is stochastic means leaving aside predeterministic
+presumptions to recognize the highly complex functioning of the legal order, motivated by
+causes so numerous that any pretense of exact predetermination of its results is beyond
+reach. It also means recognizing that the production of law contains the imponderable
+element of freedom given to judges, legislators and negotiators to form their judgments, a
+freedom that would ultimately be incompatible with the existence of direct relationships of
+implication between values, facts and norms, on the one hand, and the functioning of order,
+on the other. And it means, finally, admitting with courageous humility that this interaction,
+at least in our current stage of knowledge, can only be the object of a study by approximation
+and of inferential knowledge, in which uncertainty is embedded.
+
+proportionality, coherence and reasonableness.
+
+legislative machine for discussion and approval of a law. Laws should only regulate the
+most relevant conflicts, leaving the decision of cases of reduced incidence to the exclusive
+discretion of judges. The order also provides for this possibility when it states that the
+absence of law does not exempt the magistrate from judging the case based on principles,
+usages and customs and that, therefore, it is the judge's obligation to fill in the gaps and
+hand down sentences for all concrete conflicts that arise. are presented to you.
+
+Dogmatic disciplines study law through the individual interpretation of general norms. In
+dogmatics, each norm represents a solution for a set of concrete cases and understanding
+its meaning, what Vilanova calls the semantic irradiation field of the norm, would be
+sufficient for its application in all conflicts subsumed under its hypothesis.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+13
+
+14
+
+15
+
+Jurimetry, on the contrary, leaves aside the isolated study of general norms and places
+the concrete plan as the central object of interest. If, on the abstract level, each general norm
+refers to a specific factual reality and, therefore, to a very unique conceptual universe,
+capable of supporting an entire theory alone, on the concrete level, large populations of
+facts and individual norms travel, which share collective characteristics among themselves. .
+For this reason, for Jurimetria, the life of law is in the large populations of conflicts,
+processes and norms that are born, migrate and die in the daily life of institutions. It is these
+populations that populate the law and are responsible for its success and failure.
+
+That is, it is not enough to study each individual in isolation to
+
+understand the properties of the population. The set must be taken as an autonomous object
+of interest and studied through a specific methodology capable of describing its
+characteristics and understanding its internal relationships. Using an example from physics,
+the states of matter are properties that are only revealed in aggregates and are qualities that
+cannot be applied individually to each particle. Molecules are not themselves solid, liquid or
+gaseous; Only matter assumes these states.
+
+Transplanting the problem to law, even if a large number of isolated studies accumulate
+regarding articles of law, sentences and processes, the results of these intentionally chosen
+studies cannot be extrapolated to statements regarding the legal order. A general view of
+the functioning of the order will only be achieved through a study of collective behavior and
+the relationships established between parties, judges, mediators, requests, arguments,
+evidence and guarantees, not as isolated individuals (each case is different), but as elements
+of a population. It is from the set of these individual trajectories that the movement vectors
+of the courts will result.
+
+The proposal of Jurimetria is, therefore, to study the legal order not through isolated
+individuals, but by observing the behavior of populations, the general characteristics of
+conflict groups and the movement flows they describe.
+
+For example, the CNJ's 2010 Justice in Numbers program report identified that, of the
+83.4 million cases then underway in Brazil, approximately 27 million were tax foreclosures.
+
+An important aspect, which is also related to the concept of social fact and the foundations
+of the statistical revolution, concerns the discontinuity between the individual level and the
+population level. Despite being made up of individuals, populations behave differently,
+responding to factors different from those that motivate the behavior of each member. In a
+sentence: the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. A collection action, for example,
+may be motivated by the bad faith of a debtor who refuses to pay and hides his assets.
+However, a significant increase in the number of collection actions may result from an
+economic crisis directly related to the movement of other indicators, such as the
+unemployment rate or the slowdown in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
+
+The disclosure of these data alarmed the legal community, especially the
+
+With the help of the Institute of Economic and Applied Research (IPEA),
+
+in a second survey focused on the Federal Justice, the CNJ discovered that tax executions
+had an estimated cost for the judicial machine of R$ 4,368.00 (four thousand three hundred
+and sixty-eight reais) per process and that, contrary to the idea that the Federal Union would
+be by far the biggest litigant, the liberal professions councils accounted for 36.4% of
+executions. These numbers became even more alarming when the research showed that
+council executions were proposed to recover, on average, just R$ 1,540.00 (one thousand,
+five hundred and forty reais) per case.
+
+According to Ilya Prigogine, the distinguishing mark of the statistical revolution is this
+"break in equivalence between the individual description (trajectories, wave functions) and
+the statistical description of sets".
+
+doctrine. With this, the basis of legal education is conceptual and theoretical: the abstract
+concepts of the law and the theories used for its revelation are studied.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+16
+
+V. Everything in its time and place
+
+This preference for studying extraordinary cases leads to the so-called platypus
+problem, which can be defined as follows: individually considered, the platypus is a
+fascinating animal due to several characteristics, among which is that it is a monotreme,
+that is, an oviparous mammal . The platypus so dazzled English naturalists that the first
+stuffed specimen sent to London was considered a forgery. But despite being
+extraordinary in isolation, the platypus is numerically negligible and its endemic
+population only inhabits the eastern coast of Australia. Thus, for those who want to
+understand how the earth's ecosystem works, platypuses are negligible.
+
+What do “cause harm” and “harm” mean? What is done in dogmatics is to operate an
+effort of conceptual taxonomy in which these ideal objects are defined and then classified
+according to other previously established conceptual categories, without any reference
+
+Freely comparing, traditional jurists are like biologists obsessed with legal platypuses.
+Instead of worrying about studying the numerous cases that populate the courts,
+researchers go in search of rare cases that defy traditional taxonomy. Petty crimes,
+special courts and legal gratuity are neglected in favor of eccentric analyzes focused on
+themes that are not very familiar with the daily life of the Brazilian legal order. For
+example, the bank of theses and dissertations at USP.
+
+This example shows how well-designed quantitative studies can diagnose
+
+Hence the insistence of Jurimetria on the study of common cases. The emphasis on
+the study of populations proposes that jurists stop giving so much emphasis to legal
+platypuses and start studying common cases, such as traffic accidents, medical errors,
+moral damage due to denial and many others, which perhaps are even less interesting in
+one sense. individual point of view, but which together make up the large populations
+that explain the functioning and populate the legal order.
+
+real problems faced in the courts.
+
+Law theses are usually dedicated to hermeneutical disputes, not always related to the
+actual problems faced in the courts. These same theses give preference to the isolated
+analysis of peculiar cases and are little concerned with studying large populations of
+cases. A peculiar case may be individually more interesting than another common and
+ordinary one. However, it is the common cases (low-value executions, traffic accidents,
+medical errors, undue protests, indemnities for moral damage) that move the courts, and
+only through the study of the migrations and movements of these populations is it
+possible to that we will be able to understand how the legal order works.
+
+professional councils, and motivated a series of political measures to improve the
+management of processes. A minimum value for proposing executions began to be
+discussed and the councils, fearing the revocation of their benefit, began a movement to
+withdraw and As a consequence, Law 12,514/2011 was enacted, which regulates their
+executions. limited the legal collection by professional councils to a minimum equivalent
+to four times the value of the due annuity.
+
+When studied through traditional dogmatics, law is reduced to deductive or abductive
+formulations located outside any system of spatial and temporal coordinates. Take, for
+example, the concept of subjective civil liability: anyone who by intent or negligence
+causes damage to another is obliged to indemnify the damage. The dogmatic definition
+of civil liability is presented within a theoretical framework in which the meaning of each
+element is decomposed and analyzed separately. Who can be "the one" and "the other"?
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+17
+
+The categories of legal logic are another example of the difference between abstraction
+and concreteness. Logical forms are accessed by merely intellective effort and are
+objects located outside of time and space. In the formulation of the legal norm as
+imputation of a legal relationship to a fact [D {F -> (A Op B)], the variables do not refer to
+a moment or a place and are not located within a system of coordinates. This is because
+they were conceived to represent all the values that, at different times and locations, can
+be assumed by the variable. Only the values that these variables take are temporal and
+spatial.
+
+An additional clarification is important. The fact that a given doctrinal or jurisprudential
+position is associated with a historical moment does not make it concrete. The
+concreteness of a study comes from the use of spatial and temporal coordinate systems
+as part of the analysis method. When a work mentions, for example, that legal realism
+was born in the United States, in 1930, but develops an analysis based only on the
+theoretical value of this current, it is still abstract. The reference to the moment and
+location of this current of thought is a mere exercise in erudition that does not integrate
+the premises and assumptions of the analysis. If we remove the mention of work, its
+rationality remains intact.
+
+For the same reason, the fact that comparative law confronts legal positions in other
+jurisdictions, or that doctrine occasionally refers to changes in jurisprudential
+understanding regarding a given subject, does not make these analyzes concrete. In the
+case of comparative law, the reference to understandings is not an integral part of the
+study, but only an allegorical mention of the conceptual value of each theory. It is usually
+an argument from authority, which seeks to assert the superiority of a position because
+it is adopted by a foreign jurist or by the legislation of a developed country.
+
+Jurimetrics studies the legal order as a concrete object, composed of objects located
+within spatial and temporal coordinate systems. The characteristics of the order are
+therefore accessed through empirical efforts and, furthermore, correspond to concrete
+legal situations, here defined as situations whose moment and position can be identified.
+Locating an object in time corresponds to the possibility of, within a chronological line
+organized in order of precedence, (i) identifying the moment of occurrence of the object
+and (ii) calculating the time interval between the occurrence of the object and other
+points on the line . Locating an object in space corresponds to the possibility of, within
+an area organized in a coordinate system, (i) identifying the position of the object and (ii)
+calculating the distance between the object and other points in the area.
+
+And in the case of jurisprudence, what is seen in traditional doctrine is not a
+discussion about the concrete changes in the understanding of the courts over time, but
+just an illustration of the conceptual evolution of those judged towards a position
+considered superior from the point of view. theoretical. Here, the use of a methodology
+capable of associating time and space with the characteristics of decisions, which are
+intentionally selected to reinforce the author's theoretical proposal, is also not identified.
+
+Contrary to dogmatics, the object of Jurimetry accesses the reality of law by taking
+into account the concrete values assumed by variables in different places and times.
+Thus, for example, while the traditional study of civil liability seeks to explain this concept
+by discussing the theoretical meaning of each particle of the definition, a legal study on
+the same topic verifies the evolution of jurisprudence in Brazilian state courts between
+1997 and 2011. Unlike the generic concept of civil liability, each trial is situated at a time
+and place, which allows observing regional differences between cases or even analyzing
+their evolution over the years.
+
+of time and place.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The more the determinist knows and the closer he is to the truth, the less time and space matter
+to him. For the infinitely wise Laplacian demon, there is no uncertainty and, therefore, there is
+also no time and space, which present themselves simultaneously to his eyes. Omniscience
+implies omnipresence.
+
+SAW. See the future
+
+The first objective of a science is to make accurate predictions. Science tries to understand
+how a system works in order to, aware of its present state and its laws of transformation,
+anticipate what future states will be like. This knowledge will serve as the basis for several
+technological applications, in which future states will be manipulated according to the operators'
+convenience. Likewise, the first objective of any researcher is to develop knowledge that allows
+for greater control over reality. Knowing something under a scientific approach means
+understanding the factors that shape this object with the necessary depth to control its future
+behavior.
+
+When doctrine presents a description of the norm (positive assertion), it is at the same time
+saying what the law should be (normative assertion).
+
+On the other hand, indeterminists do not believe in the possibility of absolute knowledge and
+live with a degree of uncertainty, resulting from the structure of the world itself, which is constantly
+evolving. The universe is stochastic and can evolve in more than one direction. And as the future
+is not predetermined, it is the passage of time that develops situations and defines how things
+will be. Therefore, given this impossibility of witnessing all objects, in all places and at all times,
+the most we can do is observe as many situations as possible and wait for time to reveal other
+experiences. Henri Bergson, quoted by Ilya Prigogine, explains in an almost poetic way this
+relationship between uncertainty, time and reality: "What is the use of time? (omissis) time is
+what prevents everything from being given at once. It delays, or rather, it is the delay. It must,
+therefore, be elaboration. Wouldn't it be, then, the vehicle of creation and choice? Wouldn't the
+existence of time prove that there is a certain indeterminacy in things?".
+
+The dogmatic disciplines of law are perspectives because they do not lend themselves to
+making predictions about the future behavior of the legal order. This legal perspective stems in
+part from the ideality of the objects of the dogmatic approach which, outside of time and space,
+does not include analyzes of evolutions and transformations. Analyzed abstractly, the concept
+of subjective civil liability is timeless and is not subject to transformation processes.
+
+18
+
+It is not by chance that dogmatic studies on this topic, as on all other legal topics, never present
+analyzes regarding trends or projections of future transformation.
+
+In this context, jurimetric research is nothing more than a summary of the past, a way of
+compressing time and space with the aim of enabling the analysis of cases that occurred in
+distant places and times. It is, therefore, an effort to compress observations to optimize our
+accumulated experience and, with that, expand the limits of our learning. With a jurimetric
+research, a newly formed lawyer or judge can observe in a few days the behavior of tens of
+thousands of processes, a set greater than the accumulated experience of dozens of lawyers
+throughout a lifetime.
+
+One last epistemological comment. Within the deterministic perspective, time and space are
+illusions. They are, moreover, illusions proportional to our degree of ignorance.
+
+Furthermore, legal dogmatism merges the positive and normative aspects of Law into a single
+state. When the study of Law is restricted to the abstract plane, the statement of what the general
+norm is simultaneously implies the statement of what it should be. Simultaneity breaks the time
+factor, preventing any type of prospective judgment independent of the descriptive judgment.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+19
+
+21
+
+Humberto Ávila defines the capacity for approximate control over the future effects of
+Law as calculability. Calculability concerns an ideal state in which the citizen has an
+approximate capacity to anticipate today the effects that will be attributed to him by the Law
+tomorrow, reducing and controlling the spectrum of legal consequences that could be 20
+Humberto Ávila's position is impeccable , fitting only one attributed to his conduct. single
+comment. Considering that the expression calculability was used by Karl Popper in the
+opposite sense to that proposed by Humberto Ávila, Jurimetrics chose to reserve its
+Popperian meaning for this expression and refer to the ability to predict and control legal
+uncertainty as the prospectiveness of Law .
+
+We also saw that, because they are stochastic, legal processes do not evolve in a single
+direction. The use of Statistical inference to investigate the relationships between past and
+present states with the possible future states of a process is the essence of prospective
+analyzes in Jurimetrics. Its temporal dynamics always point to two or more possible
+outcomes, corresponding to a probability distribution. Understanding how the behaviors of
+variables affect each other and what possible results will arise from this relationship allows
+us to understand the uncertainty inherent in these processes and, to some extent, control it.
+
+Jurimetry, on the other hand, addresses the legal order as a concrete object, with a past
+and a present, and therefore it is possible to anticipate its future behavior. Still in the
+example of civil liability, when analyzing the results of judgments in state courts handed
+down between 1997 and today, it is possible to carry out analyzes aimed at detecting
+possible trends in future behavior. Is the number of moral damages convictions growing?
+Is this growth associated with any other indicator, such as the HDI or GDP per capita? Based
+on this association, is it possible to predict the number of moral damages convictions that
+will be handed down next year?
+
+Modern society demands greater training and demands results from social managers,
+including legal professionals. These results depend on predictions regarding the effects
+that new laws, legal strategies and judicial decisions will produce in reality. Operators can
+no longer propose legislative reforms based on intuition, they can no longer put into practice
+legal strategies based on idiosyncrasies and they can no longer manage the courts
+responding to merely political incentives. The consequences of legal interventions in society
+need to be known, even if approximate, before decisions are made.
+
+One last point must be clarified. Prospectivity is based on the idea, already discussed, of
+probabilistic causation, distinct from deterministic causation and the implication relation. In
+Law, concrete relationships are of probabilistic causality. Not everyone who commits a
+crime is penalized, but committing criminal conduct increases the likelihood of being
+penalized. Not everyone who adopts a certain strategy wins the process, but its adoption
+increases the probability of success. Likewise, a majority interpretation of the law is not
+capable of determining the meaning of a judicial decision, but its existence increases the
+probability of a decision that accompanies it.
+
+Combating uncertainty in Law through reasonably accurate predictions is the job of an
+operator. The lawyer needs to know how a case will be judged and how the judge will react
+to different types of arguments. The judge needs to foresee which social effects his sentence
+will produce, in order to decide according to the consequences that seem most appropriate
+to him. The politician needs to foresee the consequences of his bills, in order to adapt his
+legislative policy to the demands of his voters. The idea is simple and prosaic, but powerful:
+we have to understand the practical consequences of our decisions. All the decisions of a
+Law operator in the exercise of his office are taken in the present, but are always based on
+an intuition regarding the effects that it will produce in the future.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The concepts of magnitude and multitude refer to the definition of density. Density is an
+indicator that expresses the relationship between two measurements, usually a multitude and a
+magnitude , indicating the concentration of one quantity within another. For example,
+demographic density is the relationship between the number of people within a territory,
+generally expressed in inhabitants per km2, and volumetric density is the relationship
+between a quantity of mass and the volume of a body. In Jurimetry we can speak, for
+example, of inmate density (ratio between the number of inmates by the area of internment)
+and procedural density (ratio between the number of cases and the area of courts).
+
+The dogmatics of Law are based on the definition of the semantic limits of norms and
+the rhetorical persuasion of society regarding their valid, true or useful meanings.
+It is, therefore, an essentially rhetorical approach, in which the values of Law and the
+characteristics of the legal order are presented in a discursive way and are not subject to
+measurement.
+
+and for its methodology.
+The first and most elementary function of a science is to quantify its object, measuring
+its main characteristics. Jurimetrics is quantitative from two angles: due to its objectives. It
+is objectively quantitative because it is capable of attributing to the
+legal order characteristics endowed with magnitude and multitude. Magnitude is the
+measurement of the extension of an object. The length of a ruler, for example, expresses a
+magnitude, because there are infinite points along its length that can divide it without it ever
+being reduced to a fundamental unit. Magnitude is usually linked to continuous variables
+such as weight, height or volume.
+
+On the other hand, Jurimetrics is methodologically quantitative, distinguishing itself
+from other so-called qualitative approaches. The distinction between quantitative and
+qualitative research is an intricate subject, but for didactic purposes we can define
+quantitative research as that based fundamentally on the use of statistical inferences. For
+example, an academic who decides to understand how state court notaries work in Brazil
+has two ways of planning his work. On the one hand, he can intentionally choose a few
+registry offices, say ten, and designate a team of researchers to visit them for a month and
+interview their employees, judges and users. This researcher can also occupy a function in
+the registry office for a few days, hold discussion groups among employees to deepen
+certain issues, including the perception of employees in relation to the main problems
+experienced. On the other hand, the academic can identify the 27 databases of the Brazilian
+state courts and, with the help of a data scientist and a statistician, extract information in
+the last decade on the evolution of the number of employees, the value of salaries, the
+volume of processes, the length of time the records remain in the registry office and other
+quantifiable information available in the database.
+
+Multitude consists of counting the number of occurrences of a unit. The set of appeals
+judged by a court over the course of a year expresses a multitude, because there is a finite
+number of cases that can be counted. The multitude is discontinuous, can be divided up to
+the limit of a fundamental unit and is associated with discrete variables, such as the number
+of people in a city and the number of cars stuck in traffic jams.
+
+The first research is qualitative. Through it, the researcher will be able to delve into
+several issues that are not documented in databases and will build from interviews a very
+in-depth view of the day to day of a registry office. The limitation is that, as the choice of
+registry offices did not respect a sampling plan, the research conclusions cannot be
+expanded to all registry offices in Brazil. The second research is quantitative. It is
+undoubtedly limited in relation to the number of questions that can be answered, since, in
+the example, the works were restricted to the information available in the database. However,
+its conclusions are valid for all registry offices in the country,
+
+22
+
+VII. Right to measure
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+26
+
+28
+
+23
+
+27
+
+32
+
+29
+
+33
+
+24
+
+30
+
+25
+
+31
+
+VIII. The principles and their ends
+
+Third, quantitative research makes it possible to associate magnitudes and thus identify
+association and causality relationships, which allow prediction (and therefore control) over
+the functioning of the legal order.
+
+Second, quantitative research enables statistical inferences about the general
+characteristics of the population, allowing access to a view of the legal order in all its extension.
+
+On the other hand, qualitative research is linked to other techniques, such as focus
+
+groups, capable of exposing the researcher to aspects of cultural experience and
+experimentation not apprehensible by the "quantitative ruler", but which can add knowledge
+about the characteristics of objects devoid of magnitude and multitude.
+
+the ethnography,
+
+on Law based on statistical analysis.
+
+and can serve as a foundation for the development of large-scale public policies.
+
+and conducting in-depth interviews
+
+While ELS is a
+
+grounded approach that tests positive theories about the functioning of law through
+quantitative methods, NLR is defined as an approach based on a methodological eclecticism
+that embraces qualitative and quantitative work, that is, not only statistical analysis, but also
+observation. participant and interviews.
+
+Despite not being aimed at resolving the evaluative issues of law, Jurimetrics
+
+The emphasis on the use of statistical methods, on the one hand, and an empirical
+eclecticism, on the other, is manifested, in the United States, in the differences between,
+respectively, the Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) movement and the New Legal Realism movement ( NLR).
+
+the projective techniques
+
+It is important to be clear that quantitative research is not restricted to available databases
+and that it comprises steps of collecting information in the field. Its distinction lies essentially
+in the use of statistical inference to validate and expand conclusions, which gives it some
+relevant differentials.
+
+While open proposals are presented as spaces of methodological diversity, Jurimetria
+proposes a specialized quantitative methodology, based on statistical hypothesis tests and
+aimed at building a rigorous and coherent set of generalizations
+
+First, the possibility of measurement generates knowledge about the size of the problems,
+the proportionality of investments to solve them and the expected time for resolution.
+Measuring the legal order is essential for the administration of justice.
+
+Following the example, there would also be the possibility of mixed research. The
+academic could carry out an initial qualitative exploration, which would help him understand
+the day-to-day life of the ten initial registry offices. Based on these preliminary results, a main
+questionnaire would be developed and a large quantitative survey would be carried out to
+apply it to a national sample of registry offices generated through rigorous statistical
+planning. As a result, we would have a broad and deep survey at the same time, which would
+account not only for the information available in the databases of the 27 courts, but also for
+new information collected in the field. There is only one restriction on this type of work:
+financial resources. Research at a national level in a heterogeneous country with continental
+dimensions like Brazil is extremely expensive. It is necessary to hire numerous teams of
+researchers, who will incur transportation, food and accommodation expenses to reach the
+most remote registry offices that make up the sample.
+
+In Brazil, this same distinction appears, for example, between open proposals for empirical
+research, such as the Network of Empirical Studies in Law (REED) and Jurimetry.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+35
+
+36
+34
+
+37
+
+The principle of celerity is defined by the doctrine as a guideline for the procedural law to offer
+solutions to simplify and speed up the process and give it a reasonable duration. For example, for
+Ada Pelegrini Grinover, procedural celerity is "making the procedural legislation offer skilful
+solutions to reducing bureaucracy and simplifying the For Cassio Scarpinella Bueno, procedural
+celerity "must be understood as a process". reasonable duration of the process' - and there
+is no harm in enunciating this guideline as the 'principle of the reasonable duration of the process'
+or, to avoid repetition with the text used by the norm under examination, the principle of the
+timeliness of the judicial protection"
+
+speed could be calculated and, what is fundamental, what the magnitude of this measurement would be.
+
+.
+In José Afonso da Silva's classification, procedural celerity would be a special constitutional
+guarantee, given that it confers "the holders of fundamental rights, means, techniques, instruments
+or procedures to impose respect and enforceability of their rights".
+
+Measuring the speed of the process makes it possible to investigate the causes of its
+acceleration or deceleration, among which what we call "institutional friction" and "procedural
+viscosity". Institutional friction corresponds to the set of external factors capable of offering
+resistance to procedural progress, such as, for example, the efficiency of the notary. The use of
+the virtual process is one of the most effective policies for reducing institutional attrition, by
+eliminating steps such as assessment, numbering of sheets, transport and loading of records.
+
+Despite the consideration I have for these authors, we are faced with a series of tautological
+definitions, in which the word celerity is replaced by equivalent expressions such as reducing
+bureaucracy, simplification, reasonable duration of the process or timeliness of the guardianship.
+Although the idea of a speedy process is an understandable aspiration, the formulation worked on
+by legal theory is generic and leaves open the essential question of the problem, which is
+surprising because it has not been faced until today. How can we measure the speed of legal
+action?
+
+The graph below illustrates two physical processes that took place at the Penha Regional
+Forum, in São Paulo. The succession of points that revisit the remittance and receipt movements
+of the MP and Police District in the case of Process 1 (represented in pink) illustrate points of
+institutional friction. This process took around 200 days to reach the sentence.
+
+Starting from the premise that the "speed" attribute is applicable to the process, it is reasonable
+to assume that a lawsuit has a maximum speed (to avoid it being too fast and restricting the
+exercise of the right of defense, for example), a minimum speed (to prevent it from stretching too
+far and causing the right to perish) and an expected speed (calculated based on its complexity and
+the characteristics of the court and the notary where it runs). Surprisingly, there is no news of
+doctrinal studies on how this
+
+has a lot to contribute to the great political controversies of Law. Some examples related to general
+principles are capable of showing how Jurimetry is able to attribute concreteness and give
+practical operability to concepts that were previously restricted to the abstract plane of legal
+theory.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Figure 1: Procedural flow of two processes processed at the Penha Regional Forum, in
+São Paulo, capital.
+
+Another interesting concept is that of viscosity. Procedural viscosity can be defined as
+the set of structural characteristics of a process, capable of affecting its speed. Continuing
+the analogy with fluids, if an observer separates two glasses, one filled with honey and
+the other with water, and turns them simultaneously upside down, the water will fall faster
+than the honey. The greater speed of water does not result from the resistance offered by
+an external obstacle to its displacement, but from differences in the intimate structure of
+each substance: honey is viscous and moves more slowly than water, which is more fluid.
+
+Following the analogy, also some processes are more viscous than others. Cases
+involving complex matters, multiple parties or the production of elaborate technical
+evidence have a more complex intimate structure and tend to proceed more slowly than
+simple, two-part cases involving the production of documentary evidence only. This
+internal complexity is what we call procedural viscosity, and its measurement is
+fundamental to manage the workload and goals of justice officials, such as, for example,
+in the creation of rules to weight the distribution of resources for the reserved chambers.
+
+If we add the time intervals elapsed between the steps related to notary administration
+activities until the write-off, we arrive at an approximate value of the total time wasted in
+the process as a result of institutional attrition. In the case of the first process, this time
+is 207 days (within a total duration of 241), and in the case of the second, it is 118 days
+(within a total duration of 558), which corresponds to a relative loss of 86% and 21%,
+respectively. These are high percentages. The expansion of a study of this type to a
+sufficient number of processes and districts in the three branches of the Judiciary, as well
+as the comparison with groups of virtual processes, will make it possible to calculate the
+expected acceleration of judgments after the implementation of the electronic process.
+
+The first reserved chamber of business law was created by the Special Body of the
+Court of Justice of São Paulo through Resolution 538/2011. It was born as a fractional
+body, specialized in judging issues related to business law, with the declared objective of
+giving the judgment of these appeals greater agility, legal certainty and uniformity.
+According to art. 2 of the Resolution, the chamber is composed of justices and alternates,
+who will act without prejudice to their attributions in the chambers, subsections and
+sections of origin, with compensation in the distribution of facts. In other words, judges
+from the reserved chambers continue to work in the common chambers and are called
+only when a new case of specialized matter comes in. Once the specialized appeal has
+been distributed, the "one to one" rule determines that the judge, on the other hand, no
+longer receives a common appeal.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+For De Plácido e Silva, security "derived
+
+from holding, expresses, grammatically, the action and act of making secure, or of ensuring and
+guaranteeing something. (...) Security, whatever its application, insert the
+
+39
+
+For Canotilho, "the idea
+
+of legal certainty leads back to two material principles that materialize the general principle of security: the
+principle of determinability of laws expressed in the requirement of clear and dense laws and the principle
+of protection of trust, translated in the requirement of laws tends to be stable, or, at least, not harmful to the
+predictability and calculability of citizens in relation to their legal effects".
+42
+
+38
+
+Another interesting example refers to the principle of legal certainty. Legal certainty is defined as the
+principle that guarantees stability and predictability in the legal order. For Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello,
+"the legal order corresponds to a normative framework proposed precisely so that people can guide
+themselves, knowing, therefore, in advance, what they should or what they can do, in view of the further
+consequences attributable to their acts. The Law proposes to give rise to a certain stability, a minimum of
+certainty in the conduct of social life. Hence the so-called principle of 'legal security', which, precisely
+because of this, if not the most important among all the principles of Law, is undoubtedly one of the most
+important among them".
+
+IX. Legal certainty and judicial discrepancy
+
+The creation of the reserved chamber was one of the great successes of the court's management, even
+recognized by the World Bank, but the "one for one" compensation rule created problems. Because they
+involve multiple parties, laws that are foreign to the day-to-day of the judiciary, high amounts and specialized
+lawyers, business law cases tend to be more viscous than common cases. The study of the corporate
+resource implies more extensive research, receiving lawyers in the office for personal dispatch more often,
+the elaboration of entirely new votes, without the use of a base draft, and less space to delegate work to
+lesser advisors. experienced. In the language of procedural rheology, the business resource is a typical
+example of a process with greater viscosity, which takes a lot more work and therefore requires a much
+greater personal effort from the judge.
+
+40 For Paulo de Barros Carvalho, legal
+
+certainty is "a specific value, namely that of coordinating the flow of inter-human interactions, in the sense
+of propagating within the social community the feeling of
+
+In addition, pressured by the excess of work, some of the judges already sworn in have threatened to leave
+the chambers, jeopardizing the continuity of an initiative that is of interest not only to the court, but to the
+economy of its largest commercial center and to Brazil.
+
+predictability regarding the legal effects of the regulation of conduct".
+
+The lesson is clear, and a traffic comparison helps to make it clearer. Judicial traffic management
+requires elaborate engineering and daily monitoring of flows with well-designed metrics and clear goals.
+Just as it is unthinkable to manage traffic in the city of São Paulo, with its 5.5 million vehicles, based on the
+concept of reasonable car speed, we will not be able to manage the traffic of lawsuits based on the idea of
+reasonable duration of the process . The processes need to have a minimum speed, quantifiable according
+to a previously defined magnitude. Excessive slowness must be detected and those responsible, whether
+judges, parties or lawyers, must be fined. Procedural pathways need to be planned according to the flow
+and time expected for judgment. Expressways, like reserved chambers, need to be sized for the type of
+process they will receive.
+
+No wonder, the court realized that, despite the apparent numerical equivalence, the "one to one"
+compensation rule hid a serious disproportion in the allocation of the workload. After some time, the
+workload of the judges of the reserved chambers increased disproportionately, generating discontent and
+a strong incentive to abandon them. The selected judges were worn out, showing signs of stress, fatigue
+and health problems. As a result of this situation, despite the work involving important processes and
+projection in the media, most judges did not express interest in taking up positions in the reserved chambers.
+
+41
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+43
+
+Imbued with the conviction that such a level of discrepancy was bad, the American authorities
+approved, in 1984, a sentencing guideline (judicial guidelines), in which the judge was obliged to respond
+to an objective questionnaire about the characteristics of the case and that at the end indicated the
+penalty to be applied. Research conducted after the reform indicated that the roadmap significantly
+reduced judicial discrepancy. However, a discussion began about the constitutionality of this solution.
+Critics of the script said that it was no longer the court that was judging the case, but rather the commission
+that drafted the script, which would violate the constitutional right to an independent trial.
+
+Twenty years after the screenplay was created, this discussion reached the Supreme Court, in the
+case of United States v. Booker. The story is as follows: Freddie Joe Booker was convicted by a jury, for
+possession of 92.5 grams of cocaine and intent to distribute the drug, to 1 year and 9 months in prison.
+The judge's sentence, however, found that Booker had more cocaine than the jury admitted and, based
+on the script, increased the sentence to three years. Booker appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court,
+claiming that the sentence, by admitting facts not found by the jury, violated the Sixth Amendment. The
+Court, however, found that the script violated the Sixth Amendment and the right to be tried by an
+independent jury and overturned the decision. The US Government appealed to the Supreme Court,
+which also considered the mandatory script unconstitutional. From this precedent, the roadmap became
+a mere non-binding recommendation and the courts were free not to apply its decision parameters.
+
+45
+
+Once again, despite the admiration I have for these authors, we have here another series of circular
+definitions, in which the term legal certainty is replaced by equivalent and equally open expressions, such
+as stability, minimal certainty, determinability, protection of trust, guarantee of rights and waiver of
+damages and losses. Such definitions illustrate what the principle would generally aim for, but they do not
+provide references so that we can, in practice, evaluate how far the real situation of our order is from the
+proposed ideal situation. What does it mean to say that legal certainty is the protection of trust or the
+guarantee of citizens' rights? Not a lot. The truth is that without the ability to articulate practical references,
+any definition is inoperative and therefore useless.
+
+44
+
+The concept of legal security takes on a new aspect when, based on the idea of predictability, it is
+defined as a situation in which citizens who engage in equal conduct find equal treatment in the legal
+system. With this, legal certainty becomes the expression of the variability between different decisions
+handed down by judges for similar cases, manifested through measures of dispersion between precedents.
+It is, therefore, the guarantee of a standard of punishments capable of providing security by accurately
+anticipating the consequences of each conduct and in which, in an ideal limit situation, very similar cases
+would always suffer very similar penalties.
+
+Ten years after the script was made more flexible, new research once again assessed the situation of
+judicial discrepancy by comparing 600,000 interjudicial cases, with interesting results. The disparity in
+decisions doubled after the declaration of unconstitutionality, especially due to the actions of judges
+(female) ideologically linked to the Democratic Party. Judges admitted after the declaration of
+unconstitutionality were also less anchored to the script.
+
+An interesting example of work on judicial discrepancy involved the sentencing script of the American
+Sentencing Reform Act, passed under intense controversy in 1984. In the 1970s, concern arose in the
+US about discrepancies in the adjudication of criminal cases. It was discovered, on that occasion, that
+similar criminal offenses could suffer the application of sentences whose duration could vary by up to
+700%, depending on the judge.
+
+sense of making the thing free from dangers, free from uncertainties, assured of damages or losses,
+removed from all evil".
+
+In other words: the script was associated with a reduction
+
+in the discrepancy between penalties and, therefore, with an increase in legal certainty.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+First, Jurimetrics is not a discipline resulting from the application of information technology to Law.
+Computer science is an accidental tool and Jurimetrics would exist, albeit at the cost of greater effort,
+independently of any computer. The methodology of Jurimetrics is statistical inference and its object is the
+functioning of the legal order, with the computer being just an instrument capable of accumulating data and
+expanding the researchers' calculation power. It is undeniable that advances in computing have allowed a
+growth in legal studies as a result of easier access to data and greater calculation power. However, these
+facilities are not the essence of Jurimetry.
+
+If our intention is to seek a faster and more effective legal order, we must first abandon intuitions,
+idiosyncrasies and erudite hunches to investigate the real factors that affect the performance of the legal order
+in its current configuration. The point is: you don't change what you ignore. complementary to other traditional
+disciplines, which uses statistical methodology to understand the functioning of the legal order, make its
+behavior predictable, evaluate its impact on life in society, inform parties, politicians, judges, prosecutors and
+citizens about how the legal order works and, thus, contribute to bringing its performance closer to the
+objectives desired by society.
+
+with this, make clear what this discipline is not and does not intend to be.
+
+Second, Jurimetrics is not an attempt to automate Law and reduce judicial decisions to an exact
+mathematical calculation. On the contrary, it starts from the premise that the genesis of a concrete legal
+decision is an act of will, the complexity of which prevents its
+
+However, other important issues for the functioning of Law can be the subject of legal research, notably
+those relating to external manifestations of the legal order. Such research, despite not being sufficient to
+resolve all axiological issues, is, without a doubt, necessary to understand reality and the most effective means
+to change it. It seems clear that the debate on reforms of the Judiciary and procedural law, to cite two notable
+examples, involves understanding the flows and the current stock of jurisdictional processes.
+
+46 47
+
+Regardless of whether or not you are in favor of the script, the important thing is that the decision to adopt
+it is made based on the consequences of each option. It is understandable the concern of legislators to reform
+an order that treats differently people who acted in the same way. It hurts our sense of fairness and upsets our
+expectation of safety. But it is also understandable that a society is willing to tolerate a certain degree of legal
+uncertainty to ensure that judicial decisions result from human reflection, and not from a formula or
+mathematical model. In abstract and absolute terms, both positions make sense. The question, therefore, can
+only be resolved from a concrete relativization, which involves the answer to a jurimetric question. What
+degree of legal uncertainty are we willing to tolerate to ensure that judgments are defined by human
+consciences?
+
+48
+
+Jurimetry is a new legal discipline,
+
+It is important to reinforce once again that Law is not entirely measurable.
+
+To conclude, it is important to clear up three misconceptions associated with the expression Jurimetry and,
+
+Measurable are only its concrete manifestations. Ideals, abstractions and values cannot be measured because
+they lack extension and concreteness. Furthermore, all the issues surrounding political transformation
+proposals and social justice ideals are counterfactual and, therefore, cannot be detected by empirical research,
+be it qualitative or quantitative. And the persuasion of society regarding the ideals to be pursued is, without a
+doubt, a problem of absolute relevance, which goes beyond the scope of Jurimetrics and enters the limits of
+the philosophy of Law.
+
+X. What Jurimetry is not
+
+49
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+"Rather than critiquing the role of legal doctrine (contrary the 'rule skepticism' of the original Legal
+Realists), ELS sees doctrine as a source of empirical propositions to be tested. Rather than
+shifting the center from the legal academy to the disciplinary social sciences , ELS sees the
+disciplines as repositories of technical skills that can be imported into established legal endeavors.
+And rather than demanding that legal scholars engage more directly with the social world, ELS
+emphasizes the ease with which statistically skilled law professors can pluck low-hanging empirical
+fruit in the comfort of their campus offices." SCHUMAN, Mark C. Mertz, Elizabeth. Toward a new
+legal empiricism: empirical legal studies and new legal realism. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, vol. 6.,2010.
+
+Attributed to Jules Henri Poincaré. In: FELIX, Isabelle. Informatique, télématique e vie cotidiene.
+Paris: La Documentation Française, 1980. p. 203.
+
+As Theodore Eisenberg explains, there is no way to go in search of data without taking as a
+starting point the theorems of an analytical theory to be tested: "Scholarly rigor can take the form
+of requiring that a theory be clearly articulated before empirical tests are designed or results are
+reported. One sometimes hears descriptive empirical work dismissed with the comment that, 'I
+was taught that one had to have theoretical basis for a study before pursuing data'. The blog
+pundit quoted above seems to be picking up on the same theme by stressing the need for an analytical framework."
+
+In the original: "La science est bâtie de faits de la même fazn qu'une maison est bâtie de briques.
+Mais une accumulation de faits n'est pas plus de la science qu'un tas de briques n'est une maison."
+
+EISENBERG, Theodore. The origins, nature, and promise of empirical legal studies and a response
+to concerns. University of Illinois Law Review, v. 5, 2011. p. 1732.
+
+1
+
+two
+
+3
+
+reduction to a deterministic model and that, therefore, the automation of the decision
+process is not only undesirable, but unfeasible. For Jurimetrics to exist as an application
+of statistical methods in legal research, it is essential that Law is a manifestation of
+human freedom, with its uncertainties and variations.
+
+Third, Jurimetrics does not intend to replace other areas of legal knowledge, such
+as, for example, the philosophy of Law and dogmatics. Jurimetrics is a positive discipline
+that aims to describe the characteristics of a legal order. The assessment of the political
+and axiological convenience of a given legal order is not on the agenda of Jurimetrics
+for the simple fact that such judgments cannot be confirmed through statistical tests.
+
+Like any positive discipline, Jurimetrics can help statesmen, jurists, judges and
+public policy makers to foresee the consequences of their decisions. However, the
+exercise of decision-making is a matter of political preference that is ultimately beyond
+the reach of empirical science.
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Same, p. 58.
+
+168.
+
+9
+
+10
+
+This classificatory concept of legal certainty corresponds to an objectivist conception of interpretation, focused on the result, in the
+
+sense that it is up to the interpreter, through a static and deterministic activity, centered on exclusively semantic aspects, to only
+
+reveal a pre-existing normative content to the process itself. of interpretation. The normative content, which can be assessed in
+
+advance and completely, corresponds to a point with which reality conforms, or not. Law, from this perspective, is seen as a given
+
+object, independent of its subject and its process of application and interpretation. Each rule corresponds to an interpretative
+
+alternative or a normative meaning (R = A)." ÁVILA, Humberto. Legal security. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2011. p.
+
+Kelsen, for example, recognizes the constitutive character of the judicial decision, which is seen as a stage in the process of
+
+implementing the Law. KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 6. ed. Coimbra: Armenio Amado, 1984. p. 328.
+
+6
+
+"The paradox lies in the fact that the more legal security through Law is intended to
+
+4
+
+AVILA, Humberto. Legal security. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2011. p. 40.
+7
+5
+
+Same, p. 51.
+
+Humberto Ávila, for example, states that legal security is a value linked to an ideal state of absolute certainty in which the citizen
+
+would be able to accurately predict the legal consequences that may be attributed to their acts: "In effect, legal security is many
+
+sometimes representative of an ideal state of (absolute) certainty as a possibility for citizens to be able to accurately predict the
+
+content of the rules to which they are and will be subject and the exact consequences that will be attributed to their actions. In this
+
+sense, security is equivalent to the content certainty of the norm and the exact predictability of the consequences to be attributed to
+
+the acts performed, illustrated by the redundant expression 'absolute certainty'. Its concept is, therefore, classificatory, or 'all or
+
+nothing', with no margin for indetermination.
+
+FERRAZ, Tercio Sampaio. Introduction to the study of law. 4. ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2003. p 39 ff.
+
+8
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+13
+
+16
+
+12
+
+11
+
+14
+
+15
+
+same'." ÁVILA, Humberto. Legal security. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2011. p. 47.
+
+reasonableness. Thus, the problem of legal certainty is an argumentative problem.
+
+News
+
+Full text of the research report at: [http://s.conjur.com.br/dl/pesquisa-ipea-cnj-custo-execucao fiscal.pdf].
+
+Accessed on: 08.07. 2012.
+
+PRIGOGINE, Ilya. The end of certainties. São Paulo: Editora da Universidade Estadual Paulista, 1996. p.
+
+involves an attempt to react, through Law, against the insecurity created by the
+
+normative (R = A, B or C), to be determined through argumentative structures provided
+
+professionals:
+
+Law, in this sense, is recognized as an activity dependent on the process of interpretation
+
+P. 201-202.
+
+in:
+
+VILANOVA, Lourival. Logical structures and the positive law system. São Paulo: Max Limonad, 1997.
+
+victim of himself. And the jurist, previously a mere interpreter, becomes a kind of detective,
+
+margin of uncertainty. (...)
+
+[www.cnj.jus.br/images/programas/justica-em
+
+agreements of the
+
+of
+
+predefined." ÁVILA, Humberto. Legal security. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2011. p. 169-170.
+
+guarantee, the less legal certainty of the Law can be achieved. The paradox, put
+
+"In this sense, legal certainty [is] represented by the oxymoron 'relative certainty'. As regards
+
+joint effort
+
+by metanorms of interpretation such as the postulates of proportionality, coherence and
+
+Right. Combating legal uncertainty therefore involves the legal system fighting against itself
+
+159.
+
+and of application. Each rule corresponds to some interpretative alternatives or meanings
+
+like a separate science. This is precisely why the problem of legal certainty has always
+
+advices
+
+Such is the difficulty of identifying which standard is applicable. Just mastering the law constitutes
+
+report
+
+in
+
+normative content, the concept of security has a non-classifying character, with inevitable
+
+In short, it is this: the search for security leads to insecurity. In this respect, the law ends up being
+
+Full
+
+numbers/2010/rel_justica_numeros_2010.pdf]. Accessed on: 08.07.2012.
+
+limited to the predetermination of minimum possible meanings through argumentative structures
+
+of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+19
+
+21
+
+20
+
+17
+
+18
+
+PRIGOGINE, Ilya. The end of certainties. São Paulo: Editora da Universidade Estadual Paulista, 1996. p. 21.
+
+Lourival Vilanova explains the distinction between the formal concept of variable and the material
+values it can assume: "Variables, as we can see, are not symbols that physically vary in a temporal or
+spatial field. They are fixed symbols, identifiable in the occurrences that occur in logical forms. Yes,
+the attributable values vary, and always within an orbit". VILANOVA, Lourival.
+
+" Calculability means the ideal state in which the citizen can know how and when changes can be
+made, preventing him from being surprised. This calculability only exists if the citizen can control,
+today, the effects that will be attributed to him by the Law tomorrow, which only occurs if the citizen
+has, to a large extent, the ability to, approximately, anticipate and reduce the reduced and little varied
+spectrum of criteria and argumentative structures that define consequences attributable,
+heteronomously and coercively or autonomously and spontaneously, to acts, own and unrelated, or
+to facts, occurred or liable to occur, controversial or uncontroversial, and the reasonable spectrum of
+time within which the definitive consequence will be applied." ÁVILA, Humberto. Legal security. São
+Paulo: Malheiros, 2011. p. 684.
+
+Stewart Macaulay's explanation of why new legal realism is really new is based on this effort to
+understand the consequences of Law: On defining New Legal Realism: I would stress the term new in
+New Legal Realism. This effort is Realist because it is not primarily focused on judges, legal rules,
+and elaborate system building after the fashion of Williston or Wigmore. NLR is interested in the
+consequences of law both the intended and the unintended. Itis interested when people turn to
+normative and sanction systems other than theones studied in law schools. It is new because only a
+few of the oldies didit, although many of them talked about it.
+
+Logical structures and the positive law system. São Paulo: Max Limonad, 1997. p. 48.
+
+Certainly, just as with the older movement, there is room for disagreement and differing points of
+view in one's own the word realism. If you ask whether what we are doing fits within the Langdellian
+paradigm, we would clearly be out of bounds for him, law was a science of doctrine and its laboratory
+was the law library. Somewhere there is a nice passage about all of that in Brainerd Curries two
+articles in the 1950s Journal of Legal Education about all of this. In:
+
+The expression calculability is used by the philosopher Karl Popper as one of the properties of
+
+[http://newlegalrealism.wordpress.com/2012/07/]. Accessed on: 08.07. 2012.
+
+[http://www.cnj.jus.br/noticias/cnj/16162:conselhos-profissionais-querem-solucionar-litigios-pormeio
+da-conciliacao]. Accessed on: 08.07. 2012.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+22
+
+23
+
+26
+
+27
+
+25
+
+24
+
+The quantitative approach approximates the proposal of Jurimetrics to the work that has been
+developed in the United States under the name of Empirical Legal Studies - ELS. "ELS
+methodological vision is more quantitative than qualitative, more confirmatory than exploratory,
+and more contemporary than historical. Although several leading ELS scholars have endorsed
+big-tent usages that would include qualitative as well as quantitative methods (eg, Diamond 2002,
+Mitchell 2004) , other ELS proponents seem to take 'empirical' to apply only to statistical analysis
+that hew closely to a formal hypothesis-testing version of the scientific method". SCHUMAN,
+Mark C. Mertz, Elizabeth. Toward a new legal empiricism: empirical legal studies and new legal
+realism. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, vol. 6, 2010, p. 558.
+
+Popper selections. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
+
+MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6. ed. Porto Alegre: Bookman,
+2012. p. 124-129.
+
+MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6. ed. Porto Alegre: Bookman,
+2012. p. 112-120.
+
+For a more detailed explanation of the role of measurement in empirical research: COOPER,
+Donald R.; SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Research methods in management. 7. ed. Porto Alegre:
+Bookman, 2003. p. 178-179; MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6.
+ed. Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012. p. 200-201.
+
+MALHOTRA, Naresh. Marketing research: an applied orientation. 6. ed. Porto Alegre: Bookman,
+2012. p. 121-123.
+
+determinism. For Popper, deterministic calculability is the ability to predetermine the occurrence
+of an event with any degree of precision. Popper, Karl. In: MILLER, David (org.).
+
+Ethnography (from the Greek ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ, meaning writing about a people) is a qualitative
+method of collecting data about the customs and values of a population, based on intersubjective
+contact between the researcher and the social group under study. Participant observation is a
+means of ethnographic production in which the researcher can not only observe, but must find
+an active role to play in the social group, object of study.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In the original: "methodological eclecticism inevitably embracing qualitative and quantitative work [and
+
+as a brand: How do we know what law really does? Can the best knowledge from social science be
+
+Our group of New Legal Realists does not take an exclusionary or singular approach; weincorporate
+
+links
+
+31
+
+Elizabeth. Toward a new legal empiricism: empirical legal studies and new legal realism. annual
+
+[http://newlegalrealism.wordpress.com/].Accessed on: 08.07. 2012.
+
+29
+
+effort to develop translations of law and social science. This requires expertise in the language and
+social science knowledge, New Legal Realists in the US have been working toward a new synthesis of
+
+webpage since 2004. In 2011, we moved the Conversations section of the NLR web project to this blog
+
+In the original: "a model-based approach coupled with a quantitative method [in which the researcher]
+
+our scholarly writings, we have been holding conferences and posting on the New Legal Realism
+
+reprint São Paulo: Atlas, 2011,. P. 123-138; COOPER, Donald R.; SCHINDLER, Pamela S. Methods of
+
+Buildingfrom the law-and-society interdisciplinary tradition, and drawing on the fullrange of current
+
+30
+
+legal .studies and new legal realism. Annual Review of Law and Social Science. v. 6, 2010. p. 662.
+
+32
+
+I'm
+
+really means in our liveswill require examining many kinds of questions, using multiple methods.
+
+28
+
+Interestingly, much of this excellent ongoing research has yet to be discovered and incorporated into
+
+using] not only statistical analysis but also field-intensive methods such as participant observation
+
+Review of Law and Social Science, vol. 6, 2010. p. 558.
+
+categories of law, as well as expertise in interdisciplinary research on law.
+
+The very definition contained in the main New Legal Realism blog reinforces multidisciplinary
+
+whichnow
+
+offers a positive theory of a legal institution and then tests that theory". SCHUMAN, Mark C.; MERTZ,
+
+law, social science, and policy since 1997. Their work bridges disciplines and methods in a systematic
+
+format, the the webpage. In
+
+marketing: an applied orientation. 6. ed., Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2012.p. 109-130.
+management research. Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2003. p. 131-132.; MALHOTRA, Naresh. Search
+
+rest
+
+and interviewing". SCHUMAN, Mark C.; MERTZ, Elizabeth. Toward a new legal empiricism: empirical
+
+mainstream legal scholarship, despite the current interest in empiricism in law.
+
+On qualitative research: COZBY, Paul C. Research methods in behavioral sciences. 5.
+
+Getting people to cooperate and talk across disciplines is often the hardest job of all. In addition to
+
+of
+
+qualitative, experimental, and quantitative methods and study all aspects of law from the ground level of daily
+
+life to the top-level of judges and politicians. We think that understanding what law
+
+used to improve delivery of law on the ground? From the old legal realists to todays generation of law andsocietyresearchers,
+scholars in law and social science have worked to answer these questions.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In:
+
+project in that arena, and that mobility project is bound up with NLR's connections to empirical social
+
+Lenza, Pietro de Jesús Lora Alarcón (coords.). Judiciary Reform. São Paulo: Method, 2005. p. 501.
+
+concept of procedural acts per unit of time (day, month or year), based on the notion that the
+
+Business 91.
+
+37
+
+The following excerpt nicely defines the distinctions between the two approaches. "Like ELS, NLR is firmly
+
+34
+
+sociolegal field". SCHUMAN, Mark C.; MERTZ, Elizabeth. Toward a new legal empiricism: empirical
+
+SILVA, José Afonso da. Course of positive constitutional law. 11. ed. São Paulo: Malheiros Editores,
+
+report
+
+36
+
+[http://www.Direitorp.usp.br/arquivos/noticias/sites_eventos/encontro_pesquisa/links_dos_trabalhos.htm].
+
+question of how these two flavors of empiricism relate to one another and to other players in the
+
+To see
+
+practiced would indicate how quickly it advances in time.
+
+BUENO, Cassio Scarpinella. Systematized course in civil procedural law. v. I. 4th ed. São Paulo:
+
+See REED's purpose statement at: [http://reedpesquisa.org/institucional/]. See also themes
+
+theoretical grounding, and sensitive translation than on quantitative technique, topical immediacy,
+
+2013, P.
+
+GRINOVER, Ada Pellegrini.The necessary infraconstitutional reform. In: André Ramos Tavares, Pedro
+
+embedded in the language and problematics of the legal academy; NLR is actively pursuing mobility
+
+As procedural speed cannot be measured in kilometers per hour, we proposed at ABJ the
+
+Doing
+
+legal studies and new legal realism. Annual Review of Law and Social Science. v. 6, 2010. p. 562-563.
+
+1996. p. 186.
+
+33
+
+Accessed on: 25.07.2012.
+
+38
+
+[www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual Reports/
+
+English/DB13-Chapters/Enforcing-contracts.pdf] Accessed on: 21.01.2016.
+
+and definitive hypothesis testing. NLR is also more concerned about integrating research from cross cultural and global
+
+arenas. This conjunction of overlapping agendas and differing styles raises the
+
+of the debate tables of the 1st Meeting of Empirical Research in Law in:
+
+Saraiva, 2010. p. 176-178.
+
+process follows a procedural trajectory in which the temporal frequency with which acts are
+
+35
+
+science. Compared with ELS, however, NLR relies more heavily on methodological diversity,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+44
+
+42
+
+46
+
+40
+
+45
+
+43
+
+41
+
+39
+
+The name is inspired by mechanical rheology. Areology is the branch of fluid mechanics that
+studies the physical properties that influence the transport of momentum in a fluid.
+
+CARVALHO, Paulo de Barros. Tax Law Course. 18. ed. rev. and current. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2007.
+
+p. 158.
+
+Evidence From Booker. Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper n. 662 (2d
+series).
+
+United States vs. Booker,543 US 220(2005). Votes and oral arguments accessible at: [www.oyez.org/
+cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_104/]. Accessed on: 21.01.2016.
+
+CANOTILHO, JJ Gomes. Constitutional right. 6. ed. rev. Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1995. p. 371-
+372.
+
+MELLO, Celso Antônio Bandeira de. Administrative law course. 14. ed. rev., current. and amp. São
+Paulo: Malheiros, 2004. p. 104-105.
+
+Schuman and Mertz briefly explain the gains resulting from replacing personal intuition and
+conventional wisdom with empirical research: "What unites these nonsense camps [ELS and NLR]
+is an enthusiasm for applying rigorous empirical methods to questions of legal (as opposed to
+primarily disciplinary) import. (...) The ELS mission, then, is the empirical study of all those
+phenomena that have long commanded the attention of legal scholars and practitioners but have
+heretofore been known only through doctrine, personal experience, conventional wisdom, and
+surmise" . SCHUMAN, Mark C.; MERTZ, Elizabeth. Toward a new legal empiricism: empirical legal
+studies and new legal realism. Annual Review of Law and Social Science. v. 6, 2010, p. 559.
+
+YANG, Cristal S. Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime?
+
+SILVA, DePlácido e. Legal Vocabulary, 15th ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1999. p. 739.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+47
+
+48
+
+49
+
+(...)
+
+The origins, nature, and promise of empirical legal studies and a response to concerns. University of Illinois
+
+Law Review. v. 5, 2011. p. 1734-1737.
+
+[the empirical and statistical investigation] can provide a systematic knowledge of an important aspect of
+
+society - the legal system - similar to knowledge about other central characteristics of society, such as the
+
+economy, crime, and healthcare. These other features have highly developed data-gathering systems in
+
+place that dwarf the available information about legal systems". EISENBERG, Theodore.
+
+Theodore Eisenberg, commenting on the work of the National Center for State Courts, a type of CNJ of the
+
+USA, explains the reasons for academics, courts, litigants and public policy agents to invest time and
+
+resources in legal investigation of the Law: "the knowledge shortfall leaves everyone - litigants, policy
+
+makers, the media, and the legal profession - without basic knowledge of how the legal system is actually
+
+functioning. Only through massive efforts by organizations such as the National Center for State Courts
+
+does the United States have elementary unbiased estimates of the outcomes of state court trials. Systematic
+
+knowledge of settlement rate, the modal outcome in civil litigation, exists largely in relatively few studies
+
+isolated by time or locale, and even less information is available about the terms of settlement .
+
+It is pertinent to remember here the recommendation from The American Law Institute on the importance
+
+of judicial statistics in the development of public policies: There has been a tendency on the one hand to
+
+deify and on the other to decry the results of tabulations of court business. It is easy to go to either extreme.
+
+More soundly, however, students of law administration are learning the proper function of such mass
+
+statistics in providing trustworthy facts, so far as they go, of court activities which may be used to verify,
+
+support, disprove, or suggest general hypotheses. The facts must be of such general nature as will lend
+
+themselves to average or mass verification, such as the nature of the general run of business in the courts,
+
+the character of the parties to the suit, the general methods of termination of cases, whether by court, jury
+
+or some other form of trial or by agreement or withdrawal and so on; but withinthese limits the facts may
+
+be definitely ascertained. Moreover, facts inthemselves do not prove what should be the policy of law
+
+administration or thedirection of reform therein. Their function is but to cast light upon the factors which
+
+should shape the rules of policy. The American Law Institute (Wickersham Commission). A Study of the
+
+Business of the Federal Courts. Philadelphia: Executive office, The American Law Institute, 1934.
+
+EISENBERG, Theodore. Why do empirical legal scholarship? San Diego Law Review. v. 41, 200., p. 1741.
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+I. Sociological pre-salt
+
+7. Conclusion: nobody changes what he ignores
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+Jurimetria 7.
+CONCLUSION: NOBODY CHANGES WHAT THEY IGNORE
+
+1
+
+Knowing reality is the first step to transforming it. The lesson that underlies every
+serious empirical research effort is that no one changes what they ignore. There is,
+therefore, no incompatibility between Jurimetrics and the political aspirations of law.
+Empirical research does not want to reduce the axiological dimension of law to a
+handful of numbers, nor does it aim to replace human decisions with mathematical
+models. On the contrary, there is complementarity between these efforts, since the
+results of research into the world as it is provide relevant information about what we
+should do to bring it closer to what we would like it to be.
+
+The diffusion of computers as a daily work tool among professionals in general,
+inside and outside the government, also contributed to the development of another
+unexpected factor in the development of Jurimetrics: the accumulation
+
+The speed of increase in its processing capacity inspired the so-called Moore's Law,
+which states that computers double their performance each year for the same cost,
+which allowed the dissemination of statistical analysis. Originally, due to budget
+constraints resulting from the cost of computers and specialized programmers,
+these analyzes were restricted to large government projects.
+
+This is one of the reasons why empirical studies in law have been growing.
+Lawyers are more aware that there is a lot going on in the courts and that the success
+of future legislative reforms depends on good diagnoses of current problems. If laws
+are the medicine for the ills of social coexistence, we have to be very attentive to the
+courts, which are the hospitals where they manifest themselves. But, in addition to
+responding to practical needs and helping jurists to make decisions, empirical
+research is driven by an important technological factor: the emergence of broad
+legal databases.
+
+Keeping proportions, just as Word popularized word processors and turned every
+user into an amateur editor, programs like "Stata" and "R" popularized database
+processors by making it easier for many users to access statistical analysis.
+Currently, a student of administration, marketing, mathematics or law who is
+interested in exploring a database in his field has at his disposal free of charge (in
+the case of R), or at a reasonable cost, sophisticated programs mounted on machines
+with computational capacity 5000 times greater than that of a laboratory in the early
+1970s.
+
+The first computers that appeared in the 1970s were the size of a living room and
+were not intended for personal use, in addition to being financially inaccessible.
+They had a computing capacity equivalent to 1/5000th (or five thousand times less)
+of a current laptop sold in a common retail store.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+extensive databases.
+
+These difficulties, however, are being overcome. The computerization of public
+administration allowed the spontaneous accumulation of large databases containing
+data on various governmental bodies, such as, for example, the bases of the Federal
+Revenue Service, commercial boards, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
+courts and various government records, such as the register of children in CNJ
+shelters, the register of defaulters at notary offices, the national adoption register,
+on the most diverse aspects of our social life. These databases are a kind of
+"sociological pre-salt", a boulder of raw data waiting to be mined by researchers.
+
+Of course, several studies still depend on data collection in the field, because,
+however broad they are, these bases will not be able to answer all the questions.
+However, there is still a surprising amount of information stored, accessible at a cost
+and time comparatively lower than those involved in field research and data collection
+efforts in a country of continental dimensions like Brazil.
+
+The results are very interesting. At the state level, the study revealed a positive
+association between development and litigation with a correlation coefficient of 0.83,
+which means that each hundredth more in the HDI, at the state level, is associated
+with an increase in the litigation rate, defined as the number of new cases in the state
+per 100,000 inhabitants, from 625 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. The conclusion is
+that the litigiousness rate is one of the potential indicators of the population's level
+of well-being and that the Judiciary can expect a substantial increase in the demand
+for judicial provision, if Brazil moves towards a superior state of socioeconomic
+development.
+
+Conducting statistical research has always been dependent on data collection.
+The data collection procedure is undoubtedly the most expensive part of a survey
+because it depends on hiring, training and supervising the work of several field
+researchers, available to travel to different places and, through interviews or filling
+out forms, obtain the data necessary to carry out the analyses. The costs related to
+data collection were an impediment to a nationwide survey, given the number of
+researchers needed to collect data and the difficulties in accessing corners of the
+country.
+
+An example of what the sociological pre-salt is is found in a recent survey
+prepared by ABJ on litigation in Brazil. This research was planned to dialogue with
+similar research carried out in India and Italy, which had as its motto the following
+question: how does economic and social development affect the litigiousness rate?
+To advance the research, the ABJ searched the bases of the UNDP Atlas for
+information regarding the HDI by federation unit and by municipality in Brazil and
+compared the results with the litigiousness rates measured according to the data
+available in the Open Justice program of the CNJ, unfortunately discontinued in 2015.
+
+two
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Figure 2: Scatter plot between the 2005 state HDI (source) and the number of new cases
+per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010 (source), with the least squares line represented by the
+dashed red line.
+
+Figure 3: Quadratic curve adjusted for the relationship between municipal HDI (IDHM,
+UNDP 2012) and processes distributed per 100,000 inhabitants (source).
+
+These two studies demonstrate the richness of the "sociological pre-salt" and the urgency of its
+
+This study was then deepened and the results became even more interesting. At the
+municipal level, the positive association between development and litigation was
+maintained; however, the adjustment of the model revealed a quadratic function, indicating
+a tendency for the litigiousness rate to stabilize at a natural level.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+exploration. Both were planned and executed using existing bases and, despite this,
+proved to be revealing, unveiling unsuspected aspects of an important issue for the
+administration of the courts from different angles. Thus, before starting any empirical
+research, it is important to check whether there are databases related to the topic
+and whether they have already been exhausted. A premise from which Jurimetria
+starts is that the majority of government and private initiative databases remain
+unexplored. There is, therefore, immense potential to transform the raw data
+accumulated in a disorderly manner by the Government and the private sector in
+their computer systems into useful information.
+
+But that's not the only reason. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that legal
+courses in Brazil have remained restricted to an excessively legalistic stance,
+studying the law as an end in itself and not as a means to achieve objectives desired
+by society. While other social sciences, such as Economics, Political Science and
+
+Throughout Brazil's history, jurists have played a fundamental role in the
+development of public policies and in defining the country's institutional directions.
+Due to their rhetorical skill, their knowledge of the intricacies of the legislative
+process and departments, and their mastery over the interpretation of the law,
+bachelors occupied the position of prominent advisers to heads of state, conceiving
+the great government reforms championed by professional politicians.
+
+This panorama changed, mainly from the second half of the century. XX, when
+jurists were losing space and influence within the Government. Their decline, as
+formulators of public policies, stems, on the one hand, from the emergence of new
+higher education courses that did not exist in the first decades of our republic. At
+that time, the national elites who chose not to follow a military or ecclesiastical
+career had three faculties available: medicine, law and engineering. The emergence
+of alternative degrees such as geography, history, economics, social sciences,
+administration and accounting sciences has diluted the participation of traditional
+professions not only in government, but in the market as a whole.
+
+In addition, this study on litigation shows how the results of empirical research
+vary according to access to so-called microdata. Jurimetry can be compared to
+optical equipment capable of showing the intimate structure of the legal order with
+different degrees of magnification. Observing the relationship between litigation and
+development in the 27 states of the federation was like using a magnifying glass: at
+the state level, this association was linear. When we increased the magnification and
+observed the 5,570 municipalities at a microscopic level, the relationship was shown
+to be quadratic. What's interesting here is how the same question has different
+answers depending on the level of access to the granular data. And as the facts can
+always be deepened, the results of this type of research must always be accepted
+within the limits of the premises of each research. In Jurimetry there are no absolute
+truths, only provisional answers, valid until an equally or deeper and broader study arises.
+
+This when they were not themselves the rulers in charge of legitimizing these
+efforts before the population. It is enough to remember that of the first thirteen
+presidents of the so-called Old Republic, eleven were bachelors in law. Such influence
+still persisted in the Getúlio Vargas period, not only because Getúlio Vargas himself
+was a lawyer, but because of the role that ministers such as Francisco Campos,
+Osvaldo Aranha, Vicente Rao and Gustavo Capanema played in various areas of
+government, such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice , Interior, Farm and Education.
+
+II. The rebirth of jurisprudence
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Psychology, went through a profound process of methodological review of an
+interdisciplinary and empirical nature, Law remained isolated as an area of study of
+legislative texts, contenting itself with passively interpreting the final product of the
+processes of political transformation. Gradually, jurists were removed from command
+positions and became a type of legal dispatchers with the function of ensuring that
+projects proposed by the Government did not run into bureaucratic obstacles such
+as quorums, deadlines or prior authorizations.
+
+As a consequence, Brazil witnessed at the end of the century. XX to a process of
+scrapping the legal professions. At the same time that its elite platoon was losing
+space in the formulation of public policies, a torrent of low-skilled graduates was
+dumped onto the market, without the technical conditions to perform tasks with any
+level of complexity. As a result, while in other countries lawyers have parastatal
+functions, enjoying public faith and acting as notaries, registrars and facilitators of
+the Public Power, in Brazil, this class has few prerogatives, which are not always
+respected, and lives mostly on legal assistance. and provides a mechanical service,
+with low intellectual content and commoditized.
+
+It is no surprise that the position of prominent "consiglieri" held by the jurists of
+the Old Republic was gradually occupied by a new class of social scientists, who
+chose to investigate the real behavior of people in society: economists.
+Economists quickly realized that knowledge about reality was essential for designing
+policies capable of promoting relevant advances, due to the self-evident finding that
+no one can transform what they ignore. As they were among the first humanists to
+recognize the importance of using statistics as a methodology for investigating
+human behavior, economists advanced in the construction of an empirically based
+social science and created more successful tools to explain the result of institutional
+reforms. Such advances, added to the modernization of society, which seeks effective,
+timely and cheap solutions, made Economics stop being a mere accidental discipline
+in law courses to, in just over fifty years, gain curricular autonomy and become the
+most powerful social science of our time.
+
+The loss of influence of jurists in the development of public policies is a direct
+consequence of the erosion of Law's ability to explain reality and offer solutions to
+the challenges faced by modern governments. There are those who say that if Brasília
+were built today, we would have the Praça dos Três Poderes in the pilot plan, with
+the Palácio do Planalto, the National Congress and the Federal Supreme Court, and
+next door, as the home of the main adviser of the three powers, no longer the Palace
+of Justice, but the Palace of Efficiency, where the Ministry of Economy would operate.
+
+Another problem was the scrapping of the profession. From the 1990s onwards, a
+surprising number of Law courses began to proliferate in Brazil, dumping thousands
+of graduates onto the market who were unprepared for the practice of the profession
+and unable to pass the Bar Exam. The numbers are impressive. We have 1,156 law
+schools in Brazil, an increase of 279% compared to the 305 schools that existed in
+1995, with almost 740 thousand enrollments. In contrast, failure rates in the OAB
+exam are very high and reached a record high of 90 in 2012. %. Having worked for a
+year as an examiner for the OABSP legal education commission, I realized that these
+new courses were not intended to train judges, prosecutors or lawyers, but to
+complement the education of their students, making up for deficiencies arising from
+primary and secondary education. , such as writing in Portuguese and logical
+reasoning. These new Law faculties end up becoming a mix of two courses: one
+supplementary and the other professional.
+
+.
+3
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+But should something be done or should the Law settle for a supporting role?
+
+The jurist can no longer be content with describing the sanctions provided for in
+existing norms and working as a taxonomist of legal types. The design of a legal
+order and the construction of successful public policies go far beyond attributing
+sanctions to reprehensible conduct. Rewarding desired behaviors, disseminating
+information to help people make correct choices, creating supplementary norms for
+cases of omission, building well thought out open clauses and establishing general
+principles are some examples of alternative means to influence people's behavior,
+which do not depend on the old concept that the only planning strategy is to monitor
+and punish the population.
+
+Particularly, I understand that it has a relevant contribution to be made to the
+development of society, which is being delayed by the lack of a common
+methodological language with post-revolution statistical science. The law is the
+main tool of government action in democratic states of law, and the study of how it
+impacts people's lives is indispensable. The head of jurists is a machine for
+producing interesting working hypotheses about what is or is not working in the
+interaction between government and society, formulated according to a rich daily
+experience in the experience of human conflicts, typical of those who witness it in
+their daily lives. Every day everything that went wrong: the broken marriages, the
+unpaid debts, the bankrupt companies, the abandoned children. The problem is that
+they have not been trained to test these hypotheses.
+
+Some critics of Jurimetria say that every human decision has an insurmountable
+component of free will and that, therefore, it is impossible to quantify and predict it
+accurately. Causal models would be applicable to physics or chemistry, but not to
+the humanities. The criticism is only partly true. Freedom of conscience and the
+
+Furthermore, Law needs to descend from the high planes of legal theses and
+enter the reality of human conflicts. And why does statistics play a key role in this
+process? Because Law is concerned with social facts - crimes, indemnities and
+payments, marriages, adoptions and separations, contracts, fines and defaults -
+facts that flow in abundance in community life. Anything can be said of a human
+being, unless he is original. Almost everything we do has been done by someone,
+somewhere, at some time, sometimes hundreds or thousands of times. Understanding
+these patterns is the essence of what a human science must do. In the right case,
+we have to investigate the motivations behind the decision to file a lawsuit, or not to
+settle, or to enter into a contract, or to commit a robbery. It is through the
+investigation of the context in which these choices are made that the jurist will be
+able to contribute to the creation of more effective norms, capable of deterring
+people from the practice of socially unwanted acts and encouraging behaviors
+considered healthy and productive.
+
+But then what to do? The first point, the touchstone of this process, is to make
+Law once again a social science, a science concerned with man, and not a branch
+of literature that interprets abstract legal norms. The Law has to dig its hands into
+the mud of jurisprudence, go into the field to interview the parties and judges and
+deeply understand the disease before speculating about possible cures. Your
+interest should not be in isolated norms, but in people's problems and the capacity
+of norms to overcome them. Laws are "quasi-fiction" books, which tell stories about
+what judges should do in certain situations, but which say nothing about what they
+actually did. Restricting the work of jurists to the interpretation of these books
+means condemning them to a state of alienation and reducing Law to a branch of
+literary criticism.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+A decision is never taken in a vacuum, and there is always a social, economic,
+psychological, political, geographic, etc. context that helps to understand why a choice was made.
+
+And finally, there is also a serious question of responsibility towards vulnerable
+parts of society. If the courts are the hospitals of social life and the laws are the
+medicines, jurists and legislators have a moral obligation to guarantee that the
+medicines administered to the population will produce the expected effects. This,
+however, does not happen. The Legislature understands that its role is to legislate
+and that its job ends when a law is enacted. Once the law is made, the legislator
+turns his back and concludes his task, assuming that if there are problems in the
+application of the new law, civil society, through its associations, institutes, OCIPs
+and NGOs, will provoke him to act again.
+
+This passivity is wrong. Most people do not participate in civic organizations and
+do not take part in political events other than periodic elections. Hence the existence
+of countless ills, injustices and social problems that affect groups without the
+capacity for political articulation. These are children abandoned in shelters awaiting
+adoption, low-income elderly people who do not find support from their families and
+suffer violence, small business owners plagued by bureaucracy, drug addicts who
+have become homeless. Precisely because they do not have resources even for their
+own subsistence, let alone to support an association, these groups are unable to
+make their demands reach the National Congress. And the lack of official monitoring
+mechanisms means that serious distortions, which affect vulnerable portions of the
+population, end up ignored by legislators, contributing to the perception, partly true,
+that legislative houses have become hostage to lobbyists and are no longer able to
+represent their constituents.
+
+Not surprisingly, people's freedom is usually exercised within certain known ranges
+and, for no other reason, some choices are firmly associated with certain contexts.
+For this reason, the effort to make predictions, even if approximate, pays its cost.
+We will never predict exactly the time, place and authorship of all homicides.
+However, we can know approximately how many homicides will occur in the city of
+São Paulo next month and which are the most vulnerable areas, which is essential
+information to guide the police's preventive action.
+
+The solution to this situation involves broad political reform, I have no doubt; but
+it also involves the use of Jurimetrics and regulatory impact analysis by legislators.
+The powers of the Republic should exchange information on the situation of
+
+Also, making predictions is unavoidable. Whether we like it or not, we are forced
+to make decisions based on exercises in anticipating the future effects of our present
+choices. Whenever a lawyer chooses a strategy to bring a case, or a legislator
+chooses a wording for a new article of law, or a judge adopts a position in a judicial
+decision, they imagine that the future results of these choices will probably be those
+desired. Every choice presupposes a prediction.
+Therefore, Jurimetrics is not proposing that legislators, judges and lawyers venture
+into guesswork that they previously had no intention of doing. Quite the contrary, it
+is simply offering an additional tool, structured on a reliable methodology and
+available data, capable of helping them refine predictions that would be made in any
+case, based on guesswork and the exercise of mere intuition.
+
+creativity make human behavior ultimately unpredictable and immeasurable. But it
+is also true that the exercise of a certain degree of freedom does not imply irrationality
+or lack of motivation.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Eisenberg, Theodore, Robinson, Nick and Kalantry, Sital, Litigation as a Measure of Well-Being
+
+(2012). Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper no. 12-28. Available at SSRN: [http://ssrn.com/
+
+abstract="2036194" or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2036194].
+
+Data from the 1995 and 2012 higher education censuses from the National Institute of Educational
+Studies and Research - INEP.
+
+Available
+
+typeDocument=Legisla%C3%A7%C3%A3o::Lei;expandGroup=date-2000s].
+
+This number is based on the hertz of a processor. While those from the 70s had around 740KHz,
+
+current ones have an average of 3.6GHz, which, in round numbers, is 5000 times more.
+
+[www.lexml.gov.br/busca/search?f1- in:
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+vulnerable portions of the population and prepare to periodically monitor these bases, organizing
+a positive agenda of discussions with experts, with the aim of developing an active legislative
+agenda and creating regulatory goals aimed at overcoming real problems.
+
+Reducing, simplifying
+
+and rationalizing the legal system should be one of the main goals of the Legislative Branch and
+is, without a doubt, one of the areas in which Jurimetrics can make a relevant contribution.
+
+For the same reasons, permanent regulatory simplification commissions should be created to
+identify useless or dysfunctional standards. Once identified, the need for these standards would
+be assessed for repeal purposes. Courts have a lot of information about which provisions are
+applied in adjudicating disputes and which are not. Structuring judgments on bases that allow for
+a recurring assessment of the applicability and uselessness of current norms is a measure that is
+as elementary as it is necessary. Brazil is a country of high bureaucratic complexity, with 91
+courts, 16,427 judges, 60,000 legislators and 324,000 laws in force.
+
+END
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+3
+
+4
+
+4
+two
+
+1
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Jurimetry
+
+The first international statistics congress, held in 1853 in Belgium, which aimed to study the
+standardization of international comparisons, apparently did not present strong probabilistic
+concerns. When the works of R.
+A. Fisher (1890-1962), an astronomer, presented the pioneering concepts of randomness and
+likelihood, in publications from the second decade of the last century, a new field of research opened
+up. Thus emerged the Science that aims to maximize information at the lowest cost, or the Science
+of the Invisible as Master Prof. would say. Carlos A. de B. Pereira, famous and beloved Senior
+Professor at IME-USP.
+
+Chapter 2, Determinism and the Statistical Revolution, discusses the unfathomable
+
+AFTERWORD
+
+Well, now prefaced by the eminent Prof. Fabio Ulhoa Coelho, the author Marcelo Nunes Guedes,
+a prominent lawyer, believes that the time has come for Law, its actors and its certainties often
+arising from good old hermeneutics, to join our so-called different knowledge, Statistics. I believe
+that the marriage between Law and Statistics has reached its moment, and I don't think it's too late.
+But in fact we notice that these two sciences are old lovers. There is a lot to do to make the most of
+this marriage. We would all like it not to be necessary to waste time on useless bureaucracy,
+although it is believed that some useful ones are necessary. Having unlimited time for an
+epistemological debate is what this book invites, challenges and proposes for everyone to dedicate
+themselves to both areas on their honeymoon.
+
+AFTERWORD
+
+I understand that postfacing is not concluding, much less explaining what has been read. It is
+about criticizing, recommending, interpreting and collaborating. The honorable invitation was
+accepted, and now there is little care. I step on the sands of the "inferiority complex" of the social
+sciences, and, being a Statistician, I invite you to make the marriage of the two knowledges a happy one.
+
+Probability Theory, which heavily depends on deep mathematical knowledge, has a defined
+logical structure, using axioms and theorems that allow us to clarify the different judgments that
+involve uncertainties and a vocation to rationally deal with a huge range of applications. Statistics,
+in turn, relies heavily on probability to build competent models for prediction, estimation and
+hypothesis testing. The logical foundations of statistics are, in fact, built within the formalisms of
+probability, the theory of chance considered by many as the science of randomness.
+
+2018 - 07 - 17
+
+The book begins with the issue of bibliographic weightlifting, a concept introduced and returned
+to later in the last chapter. In short, it's about knowing reality to solve problems. I wonder if this
+question of arguing in a loop, the first chapter being tied to the last, is part of the rhetoric taught in
+good schools. It must be, as it is well argued. The issue of the insufficiency of theoretical efforts to
+understand Law, the legal complexity that embraces us, the myriad of information that can suffocate
+us without us realizing it, the relevance of statistical techniques and methods in a changing world,
+makes us feel sorry for the inability of empirical research in the social sciences in competently facing
+naturally arising challenges.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Chapter 2, Determinism and statistical revolution, discusses everything from the
+unfathomable divine designs, through the aversion to Statistics, to the question of
+rationality in predicting events, where Karl Popper is cited under his famous The Open
+Universe. Girenzer's following sentence seems to predict heated debates from now on.
+The Empire of Chance is attributed the following sentence: "In Determinism, probability
+is a mental state, a measure of our ignorance, and not an objective quality of reality." I
+feel comfortable with this promising, grandstand future when I read about the statistical
+revolution. The issue of the Central Limit Theorem, which helped to consolidate the
+scientific revolution, deserves attention. From now on, humanity can reproduce
+experiences to try to validate other knowledge. Independent reproductions of many
+measurements have approximate probability distributions. In the second decade of the
+last century, in France, this Golden Theorem was rigorously proven.
+
+Chapter 3, Statistical Methods, makes me anxious in the stands because I know the
+rules of the game. The modern meaning of Statistics is not that of a collection of data
+about the population and finances of a State. I think that Marcelo, when stating that this
+definition may be subject to controversy, was polite. Statistics is not just that; and much
+more. When discussing the definition of Probability, Marcelo introduces the issue of
+Expected Risk, which I believe will be relevant in future Jurimetrics work. He writes, in
+an inspired way, that the probability of God existing allows us to predict an infinite
+benefit. I am more modest in exemplifying the same situation. Let's imagine a game in
+which someone bets R$1.50 (one real and fifty cents) and can win R$200 million with a
+chance that is equivalent to flipping 22 coins and all having the same face (a different
+one loses). This is an illusion tax (or Megasena). But, for sure (probability one) those
+who don't play won't win. Or, getting ahead of myself a little in the text, everyone except
+the Australian platypus loses.
+
+Therefore, quoting Ian Hacking, we arrive at the Probabilistic Revolution. Here Marcelo
+Nunes could have emphasized and discussed a necessary restriction to the Theorem: independence!
+
+The lottery paradox, cited and owed to Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, shows that
+much work to correct probabilistic misconceptions remains to be done. It is not a
+paradox and not even constructive criticism. Let's go back to Law, and remember that
+established authority may be able to control - or as Ross says, influence - people's
+behavior. Marcelo transitions the path from this legal statement to Statistics concepts
+with propriety. It clarifies that samples do not represent populations, or explains in a
+footnote the Law of Large Numbers, for example. When quoting Oliver Holmes, he
+relates a rare event to injustice. In an elegant way, it shows that the lottery paradox is
+not pertinent. Furthermore, it discusses the transition from the Era of Formalism to the
+Era of Legal Realism. Let us remember that Megasena distributes the
+
+Probabilistic independence makes the power of Statistics applications unsurpassable.
+Without it, the methods could result in the undesirable "each case is different". Let's say
+I would like to predict, with some measurement of uncertainty, whether or not I will win
+a dispute. Knowing the judge's district, the thesis adopted by my lawyer, the history of
+similar cases, etc., helps to alter my uncertainty. On the other hand, the judge's
+horoscope sign (month in which the judge was born) is information independent of the
+outcome to be predicted! Only astrologers would say yes, that there is an association
+between these facts! Putting the statistical methodology to construct and serve
+Jurimetry, with its conditions for the theorems to be valid, and this Probabilists have
+been demanding in Statistics for more than a century, is one of the challenges exposed
+by Ilya Prigogine, in the widely cited book, The end of certainties, and remember when
+it is described that we live in a privileged moment in the history of sciences. Let us
+escape the blind and illiterate people that the ironic Stigler talks about.
+
+Another necessary restriction is on variances, but the reader will encounter this concept
+later.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+exactly the same!
+
+In Chapter 6, Characteristics of Jurimetrics, the text's bricks are arranged to define the
+cornerstone of Jurimetrics: controlling uncertainty in Law. The probabilistic cause, the
+prognosis, the possibility of even measuring speed or procedural viscosity, rheology - which
+we understand as necessary to measure productivity and set goals - everything is
+conceptualized. The escape from circular definitions, well exemplified in the issue of legal
+certainty, judicial guidelines, the United States against Booker case , even in the absence of
+consecrated doctrinaires, show what this book came for: Jurimetrics is a new discipline, both
+legal and statistical. . I am sure that this book makes a great contribution to Law moving
+forward in its purpose of being a manifestation of human freedom. In the Conclusion, via the
+perception that we now have broad legal databases, the microdata are there, Marcelo places
+himself as one more person to take Law away from an inglorious destiny, where this would
+be just a branch of literary criticism reduced to a state of alienation. This optimism he calls
+the pre-salt state.
+
+In closing, in this afterword I refer to the preface by Eminent Prof. Fábio Coelho, who
+kindly invited me to an epistemological debate, presiding and guiding, and which he
+appropriately called a fertile discussion. Linking the pre and post-easy courses (I'm learning)
+I say yes, Professor Fábio, we all now have a text to invite students and law professionals to
+study and thus make the fundamentals of Jurimetrics accessible. Marcelo Guedes Nunes has
+all the merits. We, Statisticians, with due respect, will gladly collaborate.
+
+Chapter 4, Origins of Jurimetrics, defines standards; They are like chess rules! However,
+realizing that inventing certainty where it does not exist, a swampy terrain that judges live in,
+the use of statistical methods must be recommended, as Jurimetrics brings scientific methods
+of use in the legal field, a field that consists of legislators, witnesses, parties and judges. For
+all that has been said and defended, it is understood that the methodology of Jurimetry is
+Statistics. A fair recognition that the study of uncertainty is useful to Law - habent sua sidera
+lites; a just cause is lost because the stars are unfavorable, said Calamandrei.
+
+Adilson Simonis
+
+Arriving at Chapter 5, Concept of Jurimetrics, the three operational pillars of Jurimetrics
+are presented: Legal, Statistical and Computational. The judge (mouth of the law) is
+characterized and the definition of a miscarriage of justice is defined, which I translate as the
+occurrence of a rare event. A black swan or an Australian platypus: or I hope for the very
+unlikely 22 identical sides when tossing 22 coins. Marcelo Nunes reminds us of the famous
+study that provides evidence that suicide can be a social phenomenon and that the use of
+statistical information can mean that few platypuses appear on random walks around northern
+Australia. When relating Jurimetry to the functioning of a legal order, or the meaning of a law,
+legal uncertainty and people's unpredictable behavior are accepted, defining the field of study
+as stochastic.
+
+Head of the Department of Statistics at the Institute of Mathematics and Statistics of
+
+It couldn't be any different! It convinces us that "if A is, then B is", contrasting with the legal
+law (probabilistic when measuring uncertainty) "A is, then B must be". Without a doubt, an
+extensive territory, especially since we are actually talking about "if A is, then B becomes
+with probability p". The uncertainty, inherent to Law, is then defined and we realize that
+judicial processes are in fact stochastic.
+
+that was sold to a lucky person who matched the six numbers and the car insurance company
+distributes what was sold to the unfortunate person who suffered an accident. The probabilistic paradigm is
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+University of São Paulo - IME USP.
+
+© of this issue [2016]
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+BASS, Richard F. Stochastic processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
+
+BOLFARINE, Heleno & BUSSAB, Wilton O. Sampling elements. São Paulo: Blucher, 2005.
+
+ABUGU, Joseph EO A comparative analysis of the extent of judicial discretion in minority
+protection litigation: the United Kingdom and United States. International Company and
+Commercial Law Review, n.18, 2007.
+
+BERNOULLI, Jacob. The art of conjecturing. Together with letters to a friend on sets in
+court tennis. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006.
+
+BAADE, Hans. Jurimetrics. New York and London: Basic Books, 1963.
+
+BOISTE, Pierre Claude Victor. Dictionnaire universel de la langue française, avec le latin
+et les étymologies, extract comparatif, concordance et critique de tous les dictionnaires. 8th
+ed., Paris: Librarie de Firmin Didot, 1836.
+
+ABRAN, Nelson. Limited companies. 10. ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2012.
+
+ADAM, James. The republic of Plato edited with critical notes and appendices.
+
+BLOCK, Randolph. Book review: Supreme Court Policu Making: Explanation and
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+BUI, Xuan Hai. Transitional adjustment problems in contemporary Vietnam company law.
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\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/Jurimetrics and Its Application in the Courts of Accounts - Analysis of a Study on the Court of Union Accounts (TCU).md b/Jurimetrics and Its Application in the Courts of Accounts - Analysis of a Study on the Court of Union Accounts (TCU).md
new file mode 100644
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+Jurimetrics and its application in the courts of
+accounts: analysis of a study on the Court of
+
+Union Accounts (TCU)
+
+Through the analysis of the application of jurimetry – use of quantitative methods
+
+in law – in the courts of accounts, the aim is to demonstrate that the use of this
+
+methodology can lead the courts of accounts to improve their performance. The
+
+technique used in the work was the bibliographic research. The concept of jurimetry,
+
+its characteristics and advantages are presented, as well as successful cases of its
+
+application in Brazil. The bibliographic research resulted in a single study, which
+
+applies statistical techniques to data from the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of
+
+Accounts (TCU). From the analysis of the result, it is concluded that the application
+
+of jurimetry in the courts of accounts will probably lead to an improvement in its
+
+performance, which demonstrates that the initial hypothesis is true. It is
+
+recommended that the audit courts start using and applying jurimetrics.
+
+Keywords: Jurimetry. Courts of Accounts. Quantitative methods. Federal Audit
+Court. TCU.
+
+46 Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+SUMMARY
+
+Juliana Cristina Luvizotto1
+
+Jurimetrics and its application on the courts of accounts: analysis
+
+Gilson Piqueras Garcia2
+
+of one study of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU)
+
+1
+
+Specialist in Administration from Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). Engineer, External Control Auditor Civil Engineer
+and Technical Coordinator of the School of Management and Accounts of the Court of Auditors of the Municipality of
+São Paulo. E-mail: gilson.garcia@tcm.sp.gov.br
+
+PhD and Master in Administrative Law from the Faculty of Law of the University of São Paulo (USP).
+External Control Advisor at the Court of Auditors of the Municipality of São Paulo. Email: juliana.luvizotto@
+
+2 PhD in Science and Technology from the São Paulo State University (Unesp). Master in Engineering.
+tcm.sp.gov.br
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+MAGAZINE
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Jurimetrics is the use of quantitative methods in law. The main purpose of the
+
+study is to demonstrate that the use of Jurimetrics can lead the Courts of Accounts
+
+to improve their performance. The technique used in the work was bibliographic
+
+research. The concept of Jurimetrics is presented, as well as its characteristics
+
+and advantages. The following are cases of successful application of Jurimetrics
+
+in Brazil. The bibliographic research resulted in a single study, which applies
+
+statistical techniques to data from TCU jurisprudence. From the analysis of the
+
+result it is concluded that the application of Jurimetrics by the Courts of Accounts
+
+will probably lead to an improvement in their performance, which shows that the
+
+initial hypothesis is true. It concludes by recommending that the Courts of
+
+Accounts apply the Jurimetrics.
+
+The object of this work is the application of Jurimetrics on the Courts of Accounts.
+
+Received: 04-12-2019
+
+Approved: 20-01-2020
+
+Keywords: Jurimetrics. Courts of Accounts. Quantitative Methods. Federal Court
+of Accounts. TCU.
+
+ABSTRACT
+
+The growing interest of legal professionals and scholars in the
+
+development of empirical work, as demonstrated by the Journal of Empirical
+
+Studies in Law (REED); the recent creation of lines of university research
+
+focused on the use of this methodology, such as the Applied Legal Research
+
+Center of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo (FGV Direito SP); or, still,
+
+the carrying out of researches by the judiciary courts for the production of data
+
+on their own performance have indicated that, currently, there is a transition to
+
+the modification of the scientific paradigm that has dominated the western legal
+
+tradition since Roman times. Since the aforementioned Roman times, it was
+
+common for the opinions of famous jurists to enjoy authority and mandatory
+
+force of law, which culminates, even today, in a professional strategy of using
+
+what is conventionally called “arguments of authority” (OLIVEIRA , 2004, p. 7). O
+
+47
+
+1. INTRODUCTION
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It is possible to assure that this trend follows a phenomenon observable
+
+everywhere: not only in the United States, where it originated under the influence
+
+of the development of legal realism studies, but also in continental Europe, where
+
+it spread. This is because not only the professional activity of the legal area has
+
+required the performance of pragmatic studies for the application of laws, but also
+
+the academic production in law has increasingly used the method prevalent in
+
+other natural and social sciences, giving greater emphasis to the formulation of
+
+falsifiable theories and the development of empirical and experimental studies able
+
+to test them (PARGENDLER; SALAMA, 2013, p. 97).
+
+More specifically, the object of this study is the application of jurimetry in the
+
+courts of accounts. The hypothesis is that its use improves the performance of
+
+these bodies and contributes to legal certainty and accountability.
+
+The same can be said about the technique for carrying out legal research, which
+
+basically consists of a bibliographical review of classic works, with some illustrative
+
+citation or reinforcement of jurisprudence. However, today, professional and
+
+academic legal activity reflects the aspiration to examine the consequences of
+
+applying the law to the concrete case, the impact of judicial decisions or other
+
+judgmental instances in the context of society.
+
+In the context of the aforementioned empirical analyzes that advance in the
+
+legal area, the object of the present work is presented, jurimetry, which, in short,
+
+can be defined as the application of quantitative methods to law. It is observed that
+
+economics, applied social science, like law, has experienced a huge advance with
+
+the introduction of quantitative methods (econometrics) and, therefore, it is
+
+understood that law can also experience a great advance with the use of jurimetry.
+
+The application of jurimetry in the courts of accounts also fits into the
+
+context of legal research that focuses on the control of the Brazilian public
+
+administration. In recent times, it has been observed that empirical legal research
+
+works aimed at analyzing the performance of the courts of accounts have emerged.
+
+From this perspective, one can mention the Public Administration Control
+
+Observatory, coordinated by professor Floriano de Azevedo Marques Neto and
+
+formed by undergraduate and graduate students from the University of São Paulo,
+
+which investigated aspects of the Federal Court of Accounts on the structure and
+
+functioning of regulatory agencies. Also in this logic is the Observatory of the
+
+Federal Audit Court, formed by researchers from the School of Law of
+
+48 Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+2 WHAT IS JURISDICTION?
+
+São Paulo (FGV Direito SP) and the Brazilian Society of Public Law (SBDP), which
+
+aims, with a broader research focus, to systematize norms, controller decisions and
+
+legal texts relevant to this object of study. The use of jurimetry, in this regard, was a
+
+refined method to improve and contribute to the aforementioned investigation, insofar
+
+as it allows the use of different techniques from research, such as descriptive or
+
+inferential statistics or linear regressions.
+
+The research is justified insofar as society has demanded a better performance from
+
+the judiciary system in general and from the audit courts, in particular, as indicated by
+
+the research groups outlined above.
+
+Legal activity has increasingly focused on mathematics. Knowing the numbers
+
+to discern which is the majority jurisprudence has become a procedural strategy for a
+
+good lawyer, who can no longer be oblivious to the identification of trends to assemble
+
+his plan of action and arguments. Likewise, resorting to mathematics to assess the
+
+impact of certain decisions is of fundamental importance for judges who, currently, in
+
+addition to the legal requirement contained in Article 20 of Decree-Law No. ), need to
+
+identify probable factual consequences arising from the application of normative acts,
+
+even for their decisions to become effective and equitable.
+
+The methodology used in this work is the bibliographical research and the
+
+general objective is to demonstrate that the use of jurimetry improves the performance
+
+of the courts of accounts. The specific objectives of this study are to present the
+
+concept of jurimetrics and investigate its application in Brazil and its use in the courts of accounts.
+
+49
+
+Officially, jurimetrics began in the United States, identifying the use of the term
+
+for the first time in the legal literature in 1949, in the article entitled “Jurimetrics: the
+
+next step forward”, published in the journal Minnesota Law Review, by Lee Loevinger ,
+
+considered the father of jurimetry. The author later published two other articles in which
+
+he developed further reflections on the subject, namely, “Jurimetrics: science and
+
+prediction in the field of law”, written in 1961, and “Jurimetrics: the methodology of legal
+
+inquiry”, of 1963 (LOEVINGER, 1949, 1961, 1963).
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+MAGAZINE
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+His proposal was the first step towards applying the then new technological tool
+
+of electronic computing to the legal field. However, he insisted on a deterministic
+
+form of knowledge, according to which the uncertainty of law would undermine
+
+the foundations for the construction of true knowledge.
+
+Certainly, from a theoretical point of view, without going into the depth of
+
+the conceptual debates on the subject at this point, there is a certain agreement
+
+in the sense that jurimetry consists of the application of quantitative techniques
+
+from statistics to law. For Yeung (2017), who adopts a very comprehensive view
+
+of the subject and presents examples of jurimetric methods applied to judicial
+
+decisions, any legal study that makes use of empirically collected data and whose
+
+analysis is based in some way on statistical concepts, can be considered an
+
+example of jurimetric work.
+
+Its results allow not only the mapping of situations resulting from the application
+
+of legal norms, but also allow the identification of variables that influence the
+
+decision-making aspect, revealing, as applied, the estimated time for decisionmaking,
+in addition to the possible results that will be adopted.
+
+In fact, the method uses probabilistic theories to try to explain the
+
+frequency with which certain events occur in the legal world.
+
+Other researchers subsequently dedicated themselves to the study of
+
+jurisprudence, contributing to refining the definition and spreading the practice. In
+
+this line, studies were developed by De Mulder, Noortwijk and Combrink-Kuiters
+
+(2010), who proposed a concept of jurimetry that implies, in a simpler way, the
+
+use of mathematics for decision analysis to explain and predict the behavior of
+
+judgmental individuals . For the authors, jurimetry can be understood as a form of
+
+empirical study of the form, meaning and pragmatism (and the relationship
+
+between them) of the demands and authorizations of State issues, with the aid of
+mathematical models and with the use of the individualism as a paradigm to
+explain and predict human behavior, especially rationality. In Brazil, the study
+and application of jurimetrics has also become widespread, as will be mentioned
+below.
+His vision pointed to the scientific importance, specifically to statistical
+methods for lawyers, as he thought that knowledge of the law could be better
+understood through observation than speculation.
+
+50 Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+MAGAZINE
+
+Currently, easy access to information through the internet – where you
+
+can search for various citations and judgments – certainly implies rethinking the
+
+way in which agents in the legal field act, as they can no longer be tied to
+
+eloquent rhetoric. or intuitive hunches to formulate your action strategies or to
+
+produce your decisions, with broad knowledge of practical reality being essential.
+
+Jurimetry allows us to look at the law from another angle, that is, not from
+
+the bias related to what the law or doctrine says, hypotheses disciplined by the
+
+norm and examples of jurisprudential pronouncements related to its application.
+
+These are aspects commonly handled in another era of the legal phenomenon,
+
+when erudite tools were enough to convince the judge, such as, for example, the
+
+use of citations and mastery of codes.
+
+According to Nunes (2016), the legal order is the result of the sum of
+
+legal order and coordination. The planning plan is characterized by being
+
+abstract, as its norms do not refer to conduct located in time and space;
+
+systematizing, by operating an internal consistency control mechanism; and
+
+hierarchical, since the norms are organized according to an order of superiority.
+
+Legal coordination is characterized by being concrete, as its norms refer to
+
+situations in time and space; unsystematic, as it does not operate a consistency
+
+control mechanism; and autarchic, because all the norms are on the same level
+
+and are not organized
+
+51
+
+Indeed, according to the president of the Associação Brasileira de
+
+Jurimetria (ABJ), Marcelo Guedes Nunes, this approach aims to understand how
+
+the legal order works in practice, with the purpose of investigating the relationship
+
+between the planning and coordination plans, knowing the realities of the
+
+Judiciary Power and legal practice, studying the results of the application of law
+
+by the courts, analyzing the different degrees of adherence to laws and
+
+understanding the situations in which they are no longer applied (NUNES, 2016).
+
+Its scope makes it possible to understand the legal phenomenon as a
+
+social fact and, by making it possible to make an association between what
+
+happens in the world and the probability of what will happen, it also makes
+
+possible interference and changes by law operators. In fact, jurimetry observes
+
+the legal phenomenon considering its practical effects to then produce the
+
+mapping of the situation in which the Law has been applied, allowing the
+
+intervention of its operators, after all, nobody transforms what they ignore.
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+52
+
+Using jurimetry is not about forming data for use on a personal basis, in
+
+order to profile, for example, the features of judges based on their decisions,
+
+identifying their personal aspects and the way in which they make decisions, even
+
+because the magistrate it is not linked to the profile that was created for you. This
+
+seems to have been the argument used by the French for the enactment of Law
+
+nº 222, of March 23, 2019, which promoted the reform of French justice, weakening
+
+the use of jurimetry in the country (BECKER; BRÍGIDO, 2019).
+
+That is why it is characterized as an important mechanism to guarantee
+
+legal security and accountability of the bodies that use it, insofar as it serves as a
+
+tool for receiving information about the behavior of public agents or the need for
+
+greater decision-making justifications. It can also be considered as an important
+
+legal instrument to guarantee accountability in the Judiciary, whether of a legaldecision-making
+or behavioral nature. In the first aspect, it refers to the possibility
+
+of requesting information or justifications from magistrates for judicial decisions,
+
+while in the second aspect, it can encourage and improve the receipt of indications
+
+or justifications about the behavior of magistrates (honesty, productivity, etc.)
+
+(BECKER; BRÍGIDO, 2019).
+
+ranked in order of superiority. Usually, ordering has a legislative origin and
+
+coordination has a judicial origin.
+
+It consists of a diverse instrument, with a view to encouraging the
+
+transparency and predictability of state activity, through the creation of a database
+
+that provides qualified access to decision-making information by interested
+
+parties, helping in the knowledge of certain deliberative practices and providing
+
+parameters clearer to define whether they continue with their activities in that way
+
+or whether they change their stance. It can also contribute to the performance of
+
+the decision-making bodies themselves, giving them the opportunity to master
+
+and take into account the reflections of their judgments when taking a certain measure.
+
+In addition, jurimetry is now essential in view of the immense mass of
+
+judgments handed down by decision-making bodies, especially in Brazil. Consider,
+
+for example, the Federal Court of Auditors, which comes to deliver, considering
+
+plenary and chambers, approximately 24,000 to 30,000 judgments per year
+
+(BRASIL, 2019). Only a jurimetric study makes it possible to know the majority or
+
+minority jurisprudence or, even, the jurisprudential tendencies of that body.
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Marcia Milena Pivatto Serra (2013), professor and researcher with extensive
+
+training in statistics and quantitative methods, also dedicated herself to the topic and
+
+worked on building a database, exemplifying in a specific essay how descriptive
+
+statistics could be used as a jurimetrics tool.
+
+Jurimetrics has combined several pillars of knowledge, such as statistics,
+
+technology and legal knowledge, in order to enable the adoption of rational strategies
+
+in the legal field, based on plausible evidence of the occurrence of events.
+
+By helping to generate quantitative data, it can be used in different areas of
+
+legal work, both for those who work before the courts and for the managers of these
+
+bodies. Also from an academic point of view, studies involving theoretical conception
+
+and legal practice are being developed in Brazil in a contemporary way.
+
+Cassio Modenesi Barbosa (2016), professor and judge of law, also carried
+
+out current studies on the subject, highlighting the legal application in the
+
+organization of judicial registries to allow the achievement of the quantitative goals
+
+imposed by the National Council of Justice (CNJ).
+
+Marcelo Guedes Nunes, lawyer, professor and founder of ABJ, which
+
+From an academic perspective, it is observed that the topic of jurimetrics
+
+was initially addressed in 1973 by Mario Losano, an Italian professor with great
+
+affection for Brazil. For him (LOSANO, 1973 apud NUNES, 2016), who had a
+
+published work analyzing the relations between information technology and law,
+
+entitled Giusciber netica, it would not be appropriate to use statistics for Law, both
+
+because of rejecting the idea of quantification of Law, as well as the impossibility of
+
+predicting the behavior of the courts, given the voluntarist nature of the judge himself.
+
+53
+
+Other theoretical debates and practical experiences among academics have
+
+been taking place in the country. Professors Felipe Chiarello de Souza Pinto and
+
+Daniel Francisco Nagao Menezes (2014), in addition to articles in which, among
+
+others, they sought to carry out a review of the international and national bibliography
+
+on juri metrics, also discussed and proposed the formalization of their concept .
+
+Furthermore, they promoted and participated in research within the scope of
+
+Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie, in the period from 2014 to 2015, reporting
+
+its application in Brazil (PINTO, 2014).
+
+MAGAZINE
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+3 THE APPLICATION OF JURIMETRY IN BRAZIL
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+It is also worth mentioning the works developed by Zabala and Silveira
+
+(2014), which, in addition to presenting theoretical and applied examples of
+
+quantitative methods in legal matters, teach specific courses in the area at the
+
+Escola Superior da Magistratura Federal, in Rio de Janeiro. Grande do Sul.
+
+This data allows court managers to direct the provision of judicial services
+
+in a less random way, condensing information that is normally either unstructured
+
+or scattered throughout the operational environment, which has facilitated the
+
+adoption of measures to identify solutions to problems.
+
+Luciana Yeung, in turn, illustrates her article with themes in which ju rimetry
+
+was applied in the analysis of judicial decisions (2017). Likewise, there is a recent
+
+article written by lawyer Karina Reis Moacyr (2019) who both discusses the
+
+concept of jurimetrics and exemplifies its use in lawyers' activities.
+
+In the practical aspect, jurimetry was used in several legal segments. In
+
+the Judiciary, it has already served to distinguish what the decision-making trends
+
+are, identifying how legislation has been applied in practice and allowing the
+
+assessment of the impacts of the Judiciary's actions in certain areas.
+
+Interesting and particularly sensitive example in which the
+
+54
+matters.
+
+conducts research that applies jurimetrics in different segments of the legal field,
+and also develops academic work in line with his doctoral thesis, which broadly
+addressed the various aspects surrounding the subject (NU NES, 2016).
+
+It should be noted that, within the courts, the formation of a database and
+
+the processing of information through the use of technology has made it possible
+
+to evaluate the performance of Brazilian judicial courts. Since 2004, the CNJ has
+
+published reports called Justice in Numbers (BRASIL, 2019), which contain
+
+accurate data on the provision of judicial services, considering, for example, the
+
+assessment of the structure of the Judiciary, in relation to its resources, both
+
+financial and human resources, the degree of litigation in the various legal areas
+
+and its growth, the average time for judging cases, productivity, the degree of
+
+appealability of decisions, the impact of computerization on the decision-making
+
+process, the bottlenecks for completing certain actions lawsuits, such as tax
+
+foreclosures, conciliation rates, the time taken to process cases, the most recurrent
+
+demands.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+MAGAZINE
+
+55
+
+This lack of connection of a group of children to a family that could initiate
+
+an adoption process indicated that there was no adequate matching for adoption
+
+carried out by the CNA, not only because, considering age alone, the children
+
+were already at an advanced age in the registration and, therefore, had a low
+
+probability of being adopted, since the suitors preferred children up to 6 years of
+
+age, but also because the adoption process was bureaucratic.
+
+The graph in Figure 1, produced with data from the National Adoption
+
+Registry (CNA), the National Registry of Acolhidas Children (CNCA) and the
+
+courts of law in 2014, demonstrates that there were children available for adoption
+
+in that registry, but that the age profile preferred by suitors was diverse, giving
+
+rise to little connection between children and suitors, as the children's age
+
+progressed.
+
+The legislative, administrative and judicial obstacles related to judicial
+
+adoption processes were then analyzed, including both the process of removal of
+
+family power and the adoption process itself.
+
+jurimetria refers to the contributions of research carried out by ABJ to improve the
+
+adoption system in Brazil, at the request of the CNJ, in 2015.
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Source: Brazilian Association of Jurimetry (2015).
+
+Figure 1: Age of children available at CNA and ages that applicants accept
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+A simulation study indicated that lowering the average age of enrollment
+
+of children into the system by one year significantly increased the chance of
+
+increasing the number of children who could be adopted.
+
+In order to improve the debate about the discussion regarding the
+
+procedural delay that would lead to impunity due to the practice of criminal
+
+offenses, the research analyzed 157,379 judgments issued by the sixteen criminal
+
+and extraordinary chambers of the TJSP and had a disturbing result, because,
+
+when Comparing the results of appeals between these chambers, it remains to be demonstrated
+
+The disclosure of this situation through the collected data, combined with
+
+the opinion of specialists, allowed the formulation of proposals for administrative,
+
+legislative and technological changes in order to guarantee greater speed in the
+
+adoption processes, reducing agents that cause the high number of children with
+
+advanced age. at CNA.
+
+Therefore, there was a chapter of proposals resulting from the
+
+aforementioned research that could help speed up the process, monitor children
+
+at risk and improve the structure of the courts. The research concretely resulted
+
+in Bill 5.860/2016, enacted on November 22, 2017 as Law 13.509/2017, which
+
+streamlined the procedures related to the removal of family power and the
+
+adoption of children and adolescents, changing the Statute of the Child and of
+
+Adolescents (ECA) and the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT)
+
+56
+(BRAZILIAN JURIMETRY ASSOCIATION, 2015).
+
+Among other findings, empirical evidence identified that the obstacles
+
+encountered in the process of destitution of family power slowed down its course,
+
+especially the delay resulting from the attempt to exhaust the means for quoting
+
+parents who, in general, do not have correct addresses, did not work , among
+
+other difficulties. The effectiveness of the guarantee of the right to full defense
+
+and due process of law for parents increased the age of children who were in the
+
+system and, in the end, led to an age group of almost “unadoptability” of these
+
+children.
+
+Another important survey that was also carried out by ABJ and which
+
+demonstrates the importance of using and analyzing statistical data to qualify
+
+the legal debate on certain topics refers to the investigation into the rates of
+
+reform of decisions in criminal matters, focusing on of research the criminal
+
+chambers of the Court of Justice of the State of São Paulo (TJSP) in the year
+2014.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+MAGAZINE
+
+In addition to assisting in the discussion of relevant legal issues, which
+
+are often limited to a theoretical or principled debate of opinions, ju rimetry has
+
+also helped in the specialization of justice and in increasing the quality of judicial
+
+decisions.
+
+There is a very high variation, with denied appeal rates ranging from 16% to 81%,
+
+as shown in the graph in Figure 2:
+
+This variation was not due to differences in procedural types according to
+
+the subject, but to two hypotheses that could be worrying: either the distribution
+
+of resources in the chambers would not be random or there would be a great
+
+discrepancy in the performance of magistrates. In both situations, there would
+
+be enormous legal insecurity, as for similar cases quite discrepant decisions
+
+would be handed down, in which some defendants would remain convicted and
+
+others would not, considering similar crimes (NUNES; TRECENTI, 2015).
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020. 57
+
+Source: Nunes and Trecenti (2015).
+
+Figure 2: Decision reforms in criminal law chambers in São Paulo
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Within the scope of the Legislative Power, carrying out impact analyzes of
+
+normative acts enables not only the realization of a predictability judgment on
+
+certain choices, but can also indicate whether the norms created were effective
+
+and/or applicable, or not. Empirical studies in this
+
+In the area of the Executive Branch, jurimetrics can assist in evaluating
+
+the effects of public policies and in the process of normative elaboration to be
+
+carried out, for example, by sectoral regulatory bodies (regulatory agencies, for
+
+example, since since the enactment of the Law Federal nº 13,848, of June 25,
+
+2019, they must carry out the Regulatory Impact Analysis, which will contain
+
+information and data on the possible effects of the normative act). Marcelo
+
+Guedes Nunes highlights that an entity or working group that carried out an
+
+independent assessment of a regulatory policy could assist in the analysis and
+
+assessment of the results produced by government action in certain areas
+
+(NUNES; RAMOS, 2018).
+
+One of the most recent changes resulting from studies based on statistics
+
+applied to law also resulted in the creation of the First and Second Business and
+
+Arbitration-Related Conflict Courts by the TJSP. Through a study carried out by
+
+ABJ and the São Paulo Lawyers Institute (ASSOCIA AÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE
+
+JURIMETRIA, 2016), it was identified that 30% of business processes distributed
+
+between 2013 and 2016 were underreported due to the misuse of the unified
+
+procedural tables of the CNJ (the CNJ procedural tables, applied to the Judiciary,
+
+aim to standardize and standardize taxonomic and terminological classes,
+
+subjects and procedural movements within the scope of State, Federal and Labor
+
+Justice, as well as the Superior Court of Justice, to be employed in procedural
+
+systems, assisting in the collection of statistical data from the Judiciary), in addition
+
+to having been found that business law processes take twice as long as
+
+magistrates to complete and, in turn, judicial recovery processes take three times
+
+as long judges' time until they are completed.
+
+58
+
+This research led the Court's General Inspectorate of Justice to propose
+
+the creation of specialized courts, which, after a year and a half of operation, led
+
+to a substantial increase in distributed disputes involving, especially, business
+
+issues. The increase, equivalent to 84% in relation to the previous three years,
+
+for logical reasons, became a clear indication of the success of the courts created
+
+and resulted from the recognition of the quality of the judicial service, both by
+
+specialized lawyers and by the market (CALÇAS; NUNES , 2019).
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+MAGAZINE
+
+For companies, the theme is particularly important, since their legal
+
+departments are considered a business unit “like the others”, therefore needing to
+
+generate results, indicators, present values, etc. As Leonardo Barém Leite, a
+
+lawyer specializing in business and corporate law, mentions, numbers can indicate
+
+the chances of success in orders, as well as help to estimate the impact of issues
+
+and risks on balance sheets and projects. The trends indicated by jurimetry, based
+
+on the analysis of precedents and jurisprudence, will facilitate the evaluation, with
+
+less chance of error, of the attitudes to be adopted in each situation, allowing the
+
+definition of better strategies (LEITE, 2018).
+
+Jurimetry has also helped in the management of the procedural portfolio by
+
+the legal controllership bodies existing in law firms or corporate legal departments,
+
+a sector that provides full support to the technical scope, in order to guarantee the
+
+effectiveness, quality, safety and agility in the legal services, creating, supervising
+
+and maintaining standard procedures (MORO, 2019).
+
+59
+
+The Public Ministry has also used jurimetry to analyze data on crimes
+
+related to drug trafficking and crimes against the Public Administration (MPSP…,
+
+2019). Recently, the Public Prosecutor's Office of the State of São Paulo renewed
+
+an agreement maintained with the ABJ to deepen statistical analysis of these
+
+crimes, with a view to identifying when, in what way and who are the people
+
+involved in these practices, as well as the reasons why they occur. in a given
+
+location, allowing the prosecutor to act through another paradigm, together with
+
+non-criminal prosecutors and sectors of the Public Ministry. The study is particularly
+
+interesting because Law nº 11.343/2006, the Drug Law, does not clearly define
+
+what is drug trafficking (article 33) and what is drug possession (article 28),
+
+making it difficult to know when a person may be prosecuted for the heinous crime
+
+of trafficking or not (CARseara
+allow investigating large populations and identifying associations and
+
+causality of events; overcome legislative debates based exclusively on personal
+
+experiences and theoretical concepts of law operators; and diagnose with greater
+
+precision the problems that justify the movement of the legislative machine. They
+
+also demonstrate where there is hyperregulation and where there is hyperregulation,
+
+that is, the fields in which there is already excessive normative intervention by the
+
+State and those in which there is a lack of such intervention, in addition to
+
+indicating other aspects, such as the evaluation of the results of transitions of
+
+regimes or compliance with the goals pre-established by the Legislature (NUNES; PEREIRA, 2013).
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+searches in English with the word “jurimetrics” and the expressions “court of
+
+account” and “courts of accounts”. Searches were carried out in the databases
+
+and open access electronic journals Scientific Electronic Library Online (Scielo)
+
+and Portal de Periódicos Capes/MEC, on August 22, 2019 in Portuguese and
+
+Spanish and on January 6, 2020 in the three languages . Searches were also
+
+carried out in the Brazilian Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations (BDTD), in
+
+Portuguese, and in the Open Access Thesis and Dissertations (OATD), in English,
+
+also on January 6, 2020. All these searches did not return any results. The Google
+
+Scholar database was also searched, which, in addition to articles, contains
+
+books, on August 22, 2019. As this base does not allow the use of Boolean
+
+operators, a search was carried out with the
+
+This study is exploratory in nature and used systematic bibliographical
+
+research as a working method. As the object is to analyze the application of
+
+jurimetry in the courts of accounts, a bibliographical research was carried out with
+
+the word “jurimetria” and the expressions “court of accounts”, “courts of accounts”
+
+and the acronym “TCU”, united by the operator boolean AND, since the objective
+
+was to select the works that contained the word and one of the expressions or
+
+acronym, and not just one of them (“jurimetria AND court of accounts”, “jurimetry
+
+AND courts of accounts” and “jurimetry AND TCU” ). Likewise, searches were
+
+carried out in Spanish using the word “jurimetria” and the expressions “tribunal
+de cuentas” and “tribunales de cuentas”. There were also
+
+VALHO, 2019). The jurimetric analysis of the database of occurrences registered
+
+by the Secretariat of Public Security of the State of São Paulo in the years 2012
+
+to 2017 identified divergences in the classification of crimes made by delegates
+
+and prosecutors of factual situations in which people were apprehended with the
+
+same amount drugs. This finding may support the Federal Supreme Court to
+
+assess the constitutionality or not of article 28 of the aforementioned law, in order
+
+to establish the clarity and normative density of the legal provision or its adequate
+
+form of interpretation, with a view to avoiding excessive discretion. delegates,
+
+prosecutors and magistrates to define who is the user and who is the dealer
+
+(FALCÃO; FREITAS, 2019).
+
+60
+4 METHOD
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+5 RESULT: JURISDICTION AND THE COURTS OF ACCOUNTS
+
+Minitab 19 (2019) defines confidence level:
+
+Oliveira (2016) studied the application of articles 56 to 61 of the aforementioned
+
+law, which deals with fines and sanctions, making use of inferential statistics,
+
+defined by Correa (2003, p. 9) as the “process of obtaining information about a
+
+population from results observed in the sample”.
+
+The Google Scholar database presented four results for the first search and
+
+fifteen for the second. From the reading of the abstracts of the studies of these
+
+results, only one work, present in the two combinations, meets the purposes of
+
+this research (OLIVEIRA, 2016).
+
+61
+
+Oliveira (2016) selected two random samples of 371 names each from a
+
+list of 10,572 convicted by the TCU in the judgment of irregular accounts. The
+
+sample size was calculated to ensure a 95% confidence level in statistical
+inferences.
+
+Only one work was found in the literature that deals with the application of
+
+jurimetry in the courts of accounts. Oliveira (2016) studied the taking of special
+
+accounts (TCE), made by the TCU, which can be instituted when irregularities
+
+occur in the accountability of public resource managers, with the purpose of
+
+clarifying facts, identifying those responsible and quantifying the damage to the
+
+coffers public. The TCU is responsible for judging and applying the sanctions
+
+provided for in the Organic Law of the Federal Court of Accounts (Federal Law No. 8,443/1992).
+
+words “jurimetry” and “courts of accounts” and another with “jurimetry” and “TCU”.
+
+The confidence level represents the percentage of intervals
+that would include the population parameter if you pooled
+samples from the same population over and over again. A
+95% confidence level usually works well. This indicates that
+if you had collected a hundred samples, and you had
+calculated 95% confidence intervals, you would expect
+approximately 95 of the intervals to contain the population
+parameter […].
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+MAGAZINE
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The calculation of the sample size was done according to Equation 1:
+
+62
+
+Figure 3 illustrates the concept of confidence level.
+
+Correa (2003, p. 97) defines a confidence interval:
+
+Figure 3: Confidence level
+
+Source: Minitab 19 (2019).
+
+The horizontal confidence line represents the fixed value of
+the unknown population mean. The vertical confidence
+intervals superimposed on the horizontal line contain the
+population mean value. The confidence interval completely
+below the horizontal line does not contain this value. A 95%
+confidence level indicates that 19 out of 20 samples (95%)
+from the same population produce confidence intervals
+containing the population parameter (MINITAB 19, 2019).
+
+One way to express estimation precision is to establish limits
+that, with a certain probability, include the true value of the
+population parameter. These limits are called “confidence
+limits”: they determine a confidence interval, in which the true
+value of the parameter should be. Therefore, interval
+estimation consists of fixing two values such that (1 – ÿ) is the
+probability that the interval, determined by them, contains the
+true value of the parameter.
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+The point estimation of a parameter does not have a measure
+of the possible error made in the estimation, hence the idea
+of constructing confidence intervals, which are based on the
+sampling distribution of the point estimator.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+n: sample size;
+
+N = 10,572
+
+63
+
+The result obtained by applying the equation from Equation 1 was n = 371.
+
+ÿ = 0.05
+
+p: expected proportion;
+
+Z: normal distribution value for a given confidence level;
+
+According to Agranonik and Hirakata (2011), when there are no expected
+
+proportions found in the literature or pilot studies were not carried out to estimate proportions,
+
+which is the case in the study by Oliveira (2016), the solution to the problem is to assume
+
+that p = 0.5 (50%), which leads to a sample value in favor of safety.
+
+N: population size;
+
+The study was divided into two parts. In the first, inferential statistics was used to
+
+describe the general characteristics of the processes, estimating proportions. In the
+
+second, relationships between variables were also analyzed using statistical inference.
+
+In the descriptive approach, Oliveira (2016) focuses on article 16, item III, of the
+
+ÿ: size of the confidence interval (margin of error).
+
+said law, which refers to the irregularities of the accounts, in verbis:
+
+In the study by Oliveira (2016), the values are as follows:
+
+p = 0.5
+
+Where:
+
+Z = 1.96 (for 95% confidence level)
+
+Equation 1: Calculation of sample size for proportions
+
+Source: Agrononik and Hirakata (2011, p. 383).
+
+Art. 16. The accounts will be judged:
+I – regular, when they express, in a clear and objective way,
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+MAGAZINE
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+II – regular with reservations, when they show impropriety or any other
+
+lack of a formal nature that does not result in damage to the Treasury;
+
+d) embezzlement or diversion of money, goods or public values (BRASIL,
+
+1992).
+
+III – irregular, when any of the following occurrences are proven:
+
+a) omission in the duty to render accounts;
+
+b) practice of an illegal, illegitimate, uneconomic management act, or
+
+violation of legal or regulatory standards of an accounting, financial,
+
+budgetary, operational or patrimonial nature;
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+the accuracy of the accounting statements, the legality, legitimacy and
+
+economics of the management acts of the person responsible;
+
+c) damage to the Treasury resulting from an illegitimate or uneconomic
+management act;
+
+64
+
+Table 1 presents the absolute frequency and percentage by reason for TBI
+
+onset for sample 1 and shows that item “c” is the biggest cause of TBI onset, with
+
+28.6% of cases. Section “b” comes close behind, with 15.6% of cases.
+
+It can be observed that, of the thirteen reasons studied, only two represent
+
+44.2% of the reasons for initiating a TBI, which allows efforts to be focused on
+eliminating causes or concentrating audits.
+
+58
+
+Failure to report and damage to the public treasury (paragraph “a” and “c”)
+
+11.9
+
+15.6
+
+49
+
+Reason for establishing the TCE
+
+Damage to the treasury resulting from an illegitimate or uneconomic management
+act (item “c”)
+
+absolute
+frequency
+
+28.6
+
+Lack of information
+
+106
+
+15
+
+Omission in the duty to report (item “a”)
+
+13.2
+
+Failure to report and embezzlement or embezzlement of money (paragraphs
+“a” and “d”)
+1
+
+8
+
+4.0
+
+44
+
+0.3
+
+Table 1: Absolute frequencies and percentage by reason for TBI initiation, sample 1
+
+Embezzlement or diversion of money, goods or public values (item “d”)
+
+(%)
+
+Practice of an illegal, illegitimate, uneconomic management act, or violation of legal
+or regulatory standards of an accounting, financial, budgetary, operational or
+patrimonial nature (item “b”)
+
+2.2
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+65
+
+Table 2 shows the absolute frequency and percentage of the position or
+
+function of the person responsible for the TCEs in samples 1 and 2. It can be seen
+
+that, of the ten positions or functions analyzed, the mayor is responsible for 44.7%
+
+of the TCEs in sample 1 and 41.2% of TCEs in 2. The legal work allows the TCU to
+
+concentrate audit resources on the mayor, increasing the efficiency of its work.
+
+1.9
+
+Practice of illegal management act, damage to the treasury and embezzlement or
+
+embezzlement of money (item "b", "c" and "d")
+
+absolute
+frequency
+
+Reason for establishing the TCE
+
+51
+
+9.2
+
+Source: Oliveira (2016, p. 80).
+
+Damage to the treasury and embezzlement or embezzlement (item "c" and "d")
+
+Table 2: Absolute frequency and percentage of the position or function of the person responsible for
+
+23
+
+1
+13.2
+
+CNPQ or Capes scholarship holder
+
+3.0
+
+1 Omission of accountability, practice of an illegal management act, damage to the public
+treasury and embezzlement or diversion of money (items “a”, “b”, “c” and “d”)
+
+percentage (%)
+
+6.2
+Employee
+
+0
+
+Practice of illegal management act and embezzlement or embezzlement of money (item
+
+"b" and "d")
+
+371
+
+7
+
+12
+
+1
+
+Position or function of the person in charge
+
+12
+
+3.2
+
+0.3
+
+14.0
+
+TCEs in samples 1 and 2
+
+3.2
+0.3
+
+Manager, boss or coordinator
+
+100
+
+Table 1: Absolute frequencies and percentage by reason for introducing the TBI, sample 1 (continued)
+
+1
+
+49
+Absolute
+frequency
+6
+
+Lack of information
+
+8
+
+(%)
+
+sample 1
+
+0.3
+
+Omission in the duty to render accounts, practice of illegal management act and damage to
+
+the treasury (item "a", "b" and "c")
+
+Practice of illegal management act and damage to the treasury (item "b" and "c")
+
+52
+
+Total
+
+1.9
+
+absolute
+frequency
+
+0.3
+
+Percentage (%)
+
+0
+
+2.2
+
+14.0
+
+11
+
+7
+
+Omission in the duty to render accounts, damage to the treasury and embezzlement or
+
+embezzlement of money (item "a", "c" and "d")
+
+sample 2
+
+1.6
+
+Fraud beneficiary
+
+34
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+MAGAZINE
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+66
+
+The linear regression equation is given by Equation 2:
+
+Correa (2003, p. 107) defines linear correlation:
+
+The work presents several other descriptive analyzes (estimates of
+
+proportions), in order to allow the TCU to use its Audit resources more efficiently.
+
+Statistical inference was also used to study relationships between variables through
+
+linear correlations. All results found have a confidence level of 95%.
+
+4
+Server 6.7
+
+Sample 2
+
+12
+
+1.1
+
+Mayor 44.7
+
+47
+
+371
+
+Source: Correa (2013).
+
+5
+
+Absolute
+frequency
+
+12.7
+
+Table 2: Absolute frequency and percentage of the position or function of the person responsible for
+
+treasurer or accountant 1.9
+
+371
+
+14
+
+3.2
+
+100
+
+16
+
+10.5
+
+5.4
+
+13
+
+Percentage (%)
+
+6 1.6
+president or director
+
+Position or function of the person responsible
+
+25
+2.4
+
+TBIs in Samples 1 and 2 (continued)
+
+Total 100
+
+4.3
+
+166
+
+Absolute
+frequency
+
+state secretary
+
+9
+1.3
+
+Member of the bidding or inspection
+
+committee
+
+7
+
+13 3.5
+
+Sample 1
+
+20
+
+Source: Oliveira (2016, p. 83).
+
+Percentage (%)
+
+Others 3.5
+
+153
+
+municipal secretary 3.8
+
+41.2
+
+39
+
+Equation 2: Linear regression
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Linear correlation is a correlation between two variables, whose
+graph approximates a line. The Cartesian graph that represents this
+line is called a scatter diagram. To be able to better evaluate the
+correlation between the variables, it is interesting to obtain the
+straight line equation; This straight line is called the regression line
+and the equation that represents it is the regression equation. The
+scatter diagram is constructed according to the sample data of n observations.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Equation 3: Multiple linear regression, with an independent quantitative variable
+
+and a nominal categorical qualitative variable (dummy)
+
+Source: Gori (2019).
+
+Y: dependent quantitative variable;
+
+variable X and on which an estimated value is obtained).
+
+X: independent quantitative variable;
+
+or
+
+Y = 11,593.71 + 0.01X (for other positions).
+
+One of the multiple linear regressions carried out by Oliveira (2016) had:
+
+D: nominal categorical independent qualitative variable (dummy: value 0 or 1).
+
+Oliveira (2016) carried out several multiple linear regressions, with continuous quantitative
+
+independent variables and qualitative independent variables (nominal categories, such as position
+
+or reason for initiating the process). To be included in multiple linear regression, these nominal
+
+categorical qualitative variables need to be transformed into dummy variables, which are coded
+
+as 0 or 1, depending on whether the category is present or not. The multiple linear regression
+
+equation, with an independent quantitative variable and a nominal categorical qualitative variable
+
+(dummy) is presented in Equation 3.
+
+67
+
+Y: value of the fine in article 5;
+
+X: debit amount;
+
+D: position (1 if mayor or secretary and 0 if another position).
+
+Y = a + b¹ X + b² D
+
+For sample 2, the fine in article 57 is:
+
+Where:
+
+Where:
+
+Y = 13,184.36 + 0.01X (for mayors and secretaries)
+
+Y: dependent variable (in fact, it is the variable correlated with the
+X: independent variable;
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+MAGAZINE
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+– 1 (perfect negative correlation between variables);
+
+The linear correlation coefficient can be presented as a measure of
+correlation, as it aims to indicate the level of intensity that occurs in
+the correlation between variables. […]
+
+• r = 0 (there is no correlation between the variables or, even, the
+correlation is not linear, if it exists).
+The closer the r value is to the value “1”, the stronger the linear
+correlation.
+
+• r =
+
+The value of the correlation coefficient r varies between +1 and –1,
+
+that is, it is limited between the values of the Interval [-1,+1].
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+The closer the r value is to the “0” value, the weaker the linear
+correlation.
+
+• r = + 1 (positive correlation between variables);
+
+6 DISCUSSION
+
+This allows legal operators and public managers to obtain greater visibility regarding
+
+fines and sanctions applied by the TCU, in addition to encouraging the implementation of a
+
+didactic and preventive scenario, discouraging managers who violate the aforementioned
+
+paragraphs out of bad faith or encouraging a quest to improve the quality of management
+
+by those managers who suffer TCEs due to misinformation.
+
+This regression has a linear correlation coefficient of 0.430.
+
+Although jurimetrics is a relatively new field of knowledge, the literature presents
+
+many success stories resulting from its application. The pragmatic and statistical turn in
+
+law has resulted in precise changes in the management of courts, evaluation of data for the
+
+formulation and modification of normative acts, identification of the way in which norms have
+
+been applied, recognition of decision-making trends in the courts, among others. However,
+
+68
+
+Therefore, using jurimetrics, the value of the fine can be calculated, based on the
+
+amount of the debt and the position of the person responsible, with a confidence level of 95%.
+
+Correa (2013, p. 108) defines linear correlation coefficient:
+
+Oliveira (2016) concludes by arguing that jurimetrics can help the TCU to improve
+
+its efficiency by being able to plan its audits based on risk matrices based on quantitative
+
+data.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+7 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
+
+69
+
+the bibliographical research on jurimetrics applied in the courts of accounts presented
+
+as a result only one study, which showed that the use of quantitative methods, such as
+
+the use of statistics applied to a sample of TCEs from the TCU, in addition to being
+
+possible, allows describing the phenomenon, estimating proportions, for example, of
+
+TCEs per section or combination of sections infringed, as well as TCEs by position or
+
+function of the person responsible, using inferential statistics, with an accuracy of 95%.
+
+The study also proved that it is possible to explain the relationship between the
+
+process variables, since the use of statistical inference indicated that it is feasible to
+
+explain the relationship between dependent and independent variables.
+
+It was analyzed how the value of the fine (dependent variable) is explained in terms of,
+
+for example, the value of the amount of the debt and the position of the person
+
+responsible, with the same 95% precision, using multiple linear regression.
+
+Both the general objective of the study (to demonstrate that the use of jurimetrics
+
+can lead audit courts to improve their performance) and the specific objectives (to
+
+present the concept of jurimetrics, investigate its application in Brazil and its use in audit
+
+courts ) were reached. The limitation of this work is the presentation of a single study
+
+(OLIVEIRA, 2013). This is due to the fact that systematic bibliographical research
+
+resulted in this only study that deals with jurimetrics applied in the courts of accounts.
+
+This limitation points to suggestions arising from it. The fact that the bibliographical
+
+research presents a single study and that this study produced a wealth of quantitative
+
+information, with enormous potential for practical application, in order to improve the
+
+TCU's performance, leads to some considerations. The academic world, professional
+
+associations and audit courts must start producing jurimetric studies based on data from
+
+audit courts.
+
+This study demonstrates, therefore, that the initial hypothesis, that the use of
+
+Considering the large number of successful cases resulting from the application of
+
+jurimetrics in other areas, especially in judicial courts, which have a structure similar to
+
+that of audit courts, it is very likely that these studies will produce a lot of relevant
+
+information from the aforementioned data.
+
+jurimetria improves the performance of the courts of accounts, it is true.
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+MAGAZINE
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+REFERENCES
+
+Available at: https://bit.ly/3aKWR0y. Accessed on: 8 Jan. 2020.
+
+Journal of Judicial Policy, Management and Administration of Justice, Brasília,
+
+DF, v. 2, no. 1, p. 280-295, 2016.
+
+AGRANONIK, M.; HIRAKATA, VN Sample size calculation: proportions. Clinical
+
+and Biomedical Research, Porto Alegre, v. 30, no. 31, p. 382-388, 2011.
+
+BRAZILIAN JURIMETRY ASSOCIATION. Study on business courts in the
+
+District of São Paulo. São Paulo: ABJ, 2016. Available at: ht tps://abj.org.br/cases/
+
+varas-empresariais. Accessed on: 21 Aug. 2019.
+
+BECKER, D.; BRÍGIDO, JP Ne le laissez pas profiler: France and its 'coup de grâce'
+
+in jurimetry. Jota, São Paulo, 16 June. 2019. Available at: https://bit.
+
+ly/2GvioMU. Accessed on: 21 Aug. 2019.
+
+BRAZIL. Law No. 8,443, of July 16, 1992. Provides for the Organic Law of the
+
+Federal Audit Court and provides other provisions. Official Gazette of the Union,
+
+Brasilia, DF, 17 July. 1992. Available at: https://bit.ly/2GylLCY. Accessed on: 21 Aug. 2019.
+
+BRAZILIAN JURIMETRY ASSOCIATION. Time of processes related to adoption
+
+in Brazil: an analysis of the impacts of the actions of the Judiciary. São Paulo: ABJ,
+
+2015. Available at: https://bit.ly/3aKW2ou. Accessed on: 27 Nov. 2019.
+
+70
+
+This relevant information produced by jurimetrics must be used by the audit
+
+courts to improve their processes, in the same way as other bodies mentioned in this
+
+study have done. This will improve their performance and bring them closer to the
+
+role that society expects of them.
+
+BRAZIL. Decree-Law No. 4,657, of September 4, 1941. Law of Introduction to the
+
+norms of Brazilian law. Official Gazette of the Union, Brasília, DF, 9 September. 1942.
+
+BARBOSA, CM; MENEZES, DFN Jurimetry and registry management.
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./Jun. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+GORI, AM Binary variables: econometrics. [S. l.: sn], [2017]. Available at: https://
+
+bit.ly/313ikxn. Accessed on: 26 Nov. 2019.
+
+PANTS, MQP; NUNES, MG A year and a half of business courts in São Paulo: a
+
+successful initiative. Jota, Sao Paulo, 5 Aug. 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/2uLlMjW.
+
+Accessed on: 21 Aug. 2019.
+
+LEITE, LB The legal department and jurimetry. Jota, Sao Paulo, 7 Feb. 2018.
+
+LOEVINGER, L. Jurimetrics: science and prediction in the field of law. Minne sota
+
+Law Review, no. 1799, p. 255-275, 1961.
+
+Available at: https://bit.ly/2RC6oQc. Accessed on: 20 Aug. 2019.
+
+CARVALHO, MA Without law to cite amounts police assign different destinations to
+
+people caught with drugs. O Estado de S. Paulo, São Paulo, 30 March. 2019.
+
+Available at: https://bit.ly/2RCw679. Accessed on: 21 Aug. 2019.
+
+CORREA, SMBB Probability and statistics. 2nd ed. Belo Horizonte: PUC Minas
+
+Virtual, 2003.
+
+71
+
+DE MULDER, R.; NOORTWIJK, K.; COMBRINK-KUILTERS, L. Jurimetrics please!.
+
+European Journal of Law and Technology, [S. l.], v. 1, no. 1, Mar. 2010.
+
+Available at: http://ejlt.org/article/view/13/12. Accessed on: 9 Jan. 2020.
+
+FALCÃO, M.; FREITAS, H. How many grams separate a drug user from a dealer?
+
+Jota, São Paulo, May 30, 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/
+
+BRAZIL. National Council of Justice. Justice in numbers 2018. Brasília, DF: CNJ,
+
+2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/2S2Q8qc. Accessed on: 21 Aug. 2019.
+
+36FHVgR. Accessed on: 23 Aug. 2019.
+
+Brasília, DF: TCU, 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/2O4Rr6U. Accessed on: 27 Nov.
+2019.
+
+BRAZIL. Federal Court of Auditors. 2018 Annual Activity Report.
+
+MAGAZINE
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+bit.ly/2O9wsQj. Accessed on: 23 Aug. 2019.
+
+Available at: https://bit.ly/2uEOpzs. Accessed on: 22 Nov. 2019.
+
+NUNES, MG; RAMOS, ALC Strategies for a more intelligible, cheaper and effective
+
+legal system. Jota, São Paulo, 4 December. 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/38PBtWo.
+
+Accessed on: 21 Aug. 2019.
+
+MOACYR, KR Jurimetry: statistics and the importance of predicting behavior in law.
+
+Magazine of Intellectual Property, Contemporary Law and Constitution, Aracaju,
+
+v. 13, no. 1, p. 110-131, 2019.
+
+NUNES, MG; TREENTI, JAZ Decision reforms in criminal law chambers in São
+
+Paulo. [S. l.: sn], 2015. Available at: https://bit.
+
+ly/2u3yF9h. Accessed on: 27 Nov. 2019.
+
+MORO, M. The application of jurimetry by legal controllership. Jota, Sao Paulo, 19 Aug.
+
+2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/2t6PTC6. Accessed on: 23 Aug. 2019.
+
+72
+MPSP will use jurimetry to guide the fight against trafficking and crimes against
+administration. MPSP: Press Room, São Paulo, 12 July. 2019. Available at: https://
+bit.ly/37OcJgM. Accessed on: 19 Aug. 2019.
+
+LOEVINGER, L. Jurimetrics: The Methodology of Legal Inquiry. Law and Contemporary
+
+Problems. P. 5-35, 1963. Available at: https://scholarship.law.
+
+NUNES, MG Jurimetry: how statistics can reinvent law. São Paulo: Revista dos
+
+Tribunais, 2016.
+
+duke.edu/lcp/vol28/iss1/2. Accessed on January 7, 2020.
+
+NUNES, MG; PEREIRA, GSJ Use of jurimetry can improve the quality of laws.
+
+Legal Counsel, [sl], 13 Jan. 2013. Available at: https://
+
+MINITAB 19. What is a confidence level? State College: Minitab 19, 2019.
+
+LOEVINGER, L. Jurimetrics: the next step forward. Minnesota Law Review,
+
+Minneapolis, v.33, p.455-493, Apr. 1949.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+73
+
+OLIVEIRA, A. Behavior of public resource managers: identification of planned
+
+and current contingencies related to accountability. Thesis (Doctorate in Psychology)
+
+– University of Brasília, Brasília, DF, 2016.
+
+SERRA, MHP How to use elements of descriptive statistics in jurimetry.
+
+OLIVEIRA, L. Don't talk about the Code of Hammurabi!: Socio-legal research in
+
+graduate studies in Law. In: OLIVEIRA, L. His Excellency the Commissioner
+
+and other essays on Legal Sociology. Rio de Janeiro: Letra Legal, 2004. p. 137-167.
+
+PARGENDLER, M.; SALAMA, BM Law and consequences in Brazil: in search of a
+
+discourse on method. Journal of Administrative Law, Rio de Janeiro, v. 262, p.
+
+95-144, Jan./Apr. 2013.
+
+Electronic Journal of the Law Course of OPET Colleges, Curitiba, v. 4, no. 10,
+
+p. 156-168, 2013. Available at: https://bit.ly/2U5bWnV. Accessed on: 8 Jan. 2020.
+
+YEUNG, L. Jurimetry or quantitative analysis of judicial decisions. In: MACHA DO,
+
+Maíra Rocha (org.). Empirically research the law. São Paulo: Network of Empirical
+
+Studies in Law, 2017. p. 249-274.
+
+PINTO, FCS (coordination). The application of jurimetry in Brazil: final research
+
+report. São Paulo, 2014. Available at: https://bit.ly/314YYYT. Accessed on: 9 Jan.
+
+2020.
+
+ZABALA, FJ; SILVEIRA, FF Jurimetry: statistics applied to law. Revista Direito e
+
+Liberdade, Natal, v. 16, no. 1, p. 73-86, Jan./Apr. 2014.
+
+PINTO, FCS; MENEZES, DFN Jurimetry: building the theory. In: FREI TAS, LM;
+
+CATÃO, AL; SILVEIRA, CEM (org.). Decision theories and legal realism.
+
+Florianópolis: Conpedi, 2014. p. 27-42.
+
+MAGAZINE
+
+Rev. Controle, Fortaleza, v. 18, n.1, p. 46-73, Jan./June. 2020.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
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+JURIMETRICS: THE METHODOLOGY OF
+LEGAL INQUIRY
+
+LFE LoEviNGE*
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+The terms "science" and "law" have both been used for so long by so many
+writers with such a variety of meanings, dear and unclear, that one who aspires to
+clarity or rigor of thought or expression might well hesitate to use either one. The
+lawyers are no more agreed on what constitutes "law"' than are the scientists on
+the meaning of "science."' Further, there have been many who claimed that law is
+a science, and it is still asserted by eminent scholars that jurisprudence is "the science
+of law.' 3 Exhaustive reading is not required to establish that there is neither an
+iuthoritative nor a generally agreed definition for any of the terms "jurisprudence,"
+''science" or "law."
+Nevertheless, each of these terms does designate an activity that is being conducted
+by an identifiable group of men. Lawyers and judges are engaged in practicing law
+and adjudicating. There are physicists, chemists, biologists, anthropologists, psychologists,
+and a host of others, engaged in activities that are universally recognized as
+science. And numerous professors, joined by an occasional eccentric lawyer, are
+engaged in writing articles and books that are either labelled or indexed as "jurisprudence."Without
+undertaking either an exhaustive or definitive analysis of the activities
+of these groups, the general nature of their respective activities is fairly evident.
+Lawyers and judges generally are engaged in seeking to apply the principles or
+analogies of cases, statutes, and regulations to new situations. Scientists generally
+are engaged in collecting experimental and statistical data and in analyzing them
+mathematically. Writers on jurisprudence are engaged in the philosophical analysis
+of legal concepts and ideas
+* B.A. 1933, LL.B. 1936, University of Minnesota. Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
+U.S. Department of Justice. Author, THE LAW OF FREE ENTERPRISE (1949); AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
+LoGIC (1952).
+'See Loevinger, Jurimetrics-The Next Step Forward, 33 MINN. L. REV. 455 (i949).
+2 Compare KARL PEARSON, THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE ch. 1 (892), and JAMls B. CONANT, ON UNDERSTANDING
+SCIENCE 4 et seq. (x947); P. V. BPJDGMAN, THE LoGic OF MODERN PHYssCS ch. i (r927), and
+A. S. EDDINGTON, THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WoRLD 323 et seq. (1928); GEORGE A. LUNDBERG, CAN
+SCIENCE SAVE Us?, 66-67 (1947), and JAMEs B. CONANT, MODERN SCIENCE AND MODERN MAN 1x8 et Seq.
+(1952). Also see HANs REiCHENBACH, THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY (x951); JAMES R. NEWMVAN
+(ED.), WHAT IS SCIENCE? (x955). ar ROsCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE ch. x and authorities cited in note I (r959).
+'The following are taken as reasonably representative of modern jurisprudence: WOLFGANG FRAIEDMANN,
+LEGAL THEORY ( 4 th ed. 196o); ROSCOR POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959); MoRis R. COHEN & F. S.
+COHEN (EDs.), READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1951); JULIUS STONE, THE PRoVINcE
+AND FUNCTION OF LAW (1950); P. L. SAYRE (ED.), INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES
+(1947).
+LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+Through the years there have been those who called upon law in the name of
+jurisprudence to become truly scientific. As early as 1895 Justice Holmes asserted that
+"An ideal system of law should draw its postulates and its legislative justification
+from science."' There can be no doubt that this great legal mind thought that at
+least potentially, the techniques of physical science could solve the most basic problems
+of law. For the rational study of law, he declared, "the man of the future is
+the man of statistics";6 and he projected the ideal of "an ultimate dependence upon
+science because it is finally for science to determine, so far as it can, the relative worth
+of our different social ends .... ."7
+Following Holmes, there have been others in the present century, although relatively
+few in relation to the whole profession, who have thought that "scientific
+methods of inquiry" should be applied to the field of values, including ethics, politics
+and law,8 or that we should have an "experimental jurisprudence" in which scientific
+data would be used to determine legal issuesY However, little actual work has been
+done along these lines. The "law-science" symposia that have been published have
+been devoted to the narrow field of utilizing medical evidence to prove damages in
+personal injury cases.10 The resources of science have been used by law enforcement
+agencies, notably the Federal Bureau of Identification, to identify and convict
+criminals. There have been numerous studies of criminality from the viewpoint of
+psychology, psychiatry, and sociology. But nothing that can fairly be called even
+a beginning toward a "scientific jurisprudence" has yet appeared.
+
+I
+
+JuiumEnm cs: A NEw ScmNcE
+It would appear that either the problems of jurisprudence are not susceptible of
+investigation by science, or that there has not been sufficient interest in this possibility
+to produce any results. These are not necessarily the only alternatives, and it may be
+that science will yet fulfill the fondest hopes of those who think it capable of
+' OLIvER W. HOLMES, Learning and Science,'speech delivered at a dinner of the Harvard Law School
+Association, June 25, i895, reprinted in COLLEc FD LEGAL PAPERS 138 (1920).
+'OLivER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, an address delivered in 1897, id. at x67.
+OLvER W. HoLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, an address delivered in 1899, id. at 21o,
+242.8
+Walter Wheeler Cook, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 51, 59 (Julius Rosenthal Foundation, Northwestern
+University, 194); see also Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A.J. 303 (1927); and references
+cited in appendix to first citation.
+" Beutel, An Outline of the Nature and Methods of Experimental Jurisprudence, 5x COLUM. L. REV.
+415 (X951); FREDERICK K. BRUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES OF ExPEmMENTAL JumsPRUDENCE AS A NEW
+BRANCH or SocA. SCIENCE (1957); also see Moore & Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in
+Legal Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943); Hull, Moore & Callahan's "Law and Learning Theory": A
+Psychologist's Impressions, id. at 330; Yntema, "Law and Learning Theory" Through the Looking Glass
+of Legal Theory, id. at 338; Cowan, Legal Pragmatism and Beyond, in F. L. SAYRE (ED.), INTERPRETATIONS
+OF MODERN LEGAL PHnLosoPIVEs 130 (1947); Simpson & Field, Social Engineering Through Law:
+The Need for a School of Applied Jurisprudence, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. 145 (1947); Cowan, The Relation of
+Law to Experimental Social Science, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 484 (1948). 1
+eSymposium.-Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, second series, 30 MINN. L. Rav.
+409-541 (946); Law-Science Symposium, 31 TExAs L. REv. 625-831 (1953).
+THE METHODOLoGY oF LEGAL INQumY 7
+
+producing a blueprint for Utopia. I think this most unlikely. Rather, it seems that
+the activities of those who practice jurisprudence and those who practice science are
+so unlike that there is very little communication and no exchange of work between
+them. Jurisprudence is engaged in asking questions such as: What is the nature of
+law? What is the end or aim of law? What is property? Why should people
+perform promises? Why should we punish criminals? Why should a man be held
+liable for negligence? These are questions that seek ultimate answers, like the
+"Why" of a curious child. 1 These are not questions that can be asked in or answered
+by any scientific discipline. In so far as there are answers to such questions as these,
+the answers are those of philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, or theology. In response to such
+questions man can offer only speculation, preference or faith. The unanswerable
+questions of life belong to the realm of philosophy,' 2 and jurisprudence is the
+philosophy of law.
+On the other hand, in science a question is meaningless unless it is possible to find
+some operation by which an answer may be given to it.' While form is certainly not
+determinative, the questions of science, in contrast to those of philosophy, are likely
+to be of the "How?" variety: How do you know that? How do you do this?'4
+The questions of science do not seek ultimate answers, but only immediate answers,
+subject to further correction and modification as additional questions are formulated'
+One cannot convert philosophy to science merely by adopting the vocabulary or
+imitating the methods of science. To conduct a scientific inquiry, one must first ask
+a scientific question-one that poses a problem that science is capable of investigating.
+A scientific question must be one that can be answered, at least partially, by doing
+something and observing the result.
+These considerations suggest why we do not have and are not likely ever to
+have a jurisprudence that is "experimental" or "scientific." Those who are interested
+in jurisprudence are, naturally enough, interested in the traditional questions and
+problems of jurisprudence. Although the term and the field of jurisprudence could
+be changed or extended to designate a new set of problems and operations, there is
+neither a reason for nor an advantage in doing this. On the contrary, an insistence
+that new problems and procedures are within the field of jurisprudence will inevitably
+be provocative of more futile disputes as to the "proper" scope and method of jurisprudence.
+It seems much more appropriate and profitable to use a different term for
+a different set of activities. Thus the term "jurimetrics" has been suggested, and is
+"
+1See JEAN PrAGET, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THm CmuD ch. 5 (Meridian ed. z955).
+"Edwin W. Patterson, in My PiLOSOPHY OF LAW 231 (1941).
+is BflGmAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 28; R.ICHENBACH, op. dt. supra note 2, ch. x6; VILLIAM S. BEcKc,
+MoDERN SciENcE ANn THE NATURE OF LiFE ch. 3 (1957); KARL PoPPEtR, Tim Looi OF ScIrnN',c DiscoVER?
+40 et seq. (x959); but cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIITrrs 447
+el seq. (1948). " ANATOL RAPOPORT, SCIENCE AND THE GOALS OF MAN 35 et seq. (195o).
+"'HANs REICHENIACH, ATOm AND CosMos 291 (1933); JAMES B. CONANT, ON UNDMSTANDING
+SCIENCE 24-25 (1947); JAMES B. CONANT, MoDENU SCIENCE AND MODERN MAN 106-O7 (952); Bronowski,
+Sdcence at Foresight, in JAMEss R. NEwsAx (ED.), WsT is SciENcE?, at 433 (x955).
+LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+gaining some use, as a designation for the activities involving scientific investigation
+of legal problems. '
+It is unnecessary, and perhaps impossible, to give a precise definition to the field
+of jurimetrics. As in any pragmatic discipline, the definition will be given by the
+activities of its practitioners, and will undoubtedly change and expand as experiment
+and experience give answers to specific questions. The distinction between jurisprudence
+and jurimetrics is already evident. Jurisprudence is concerned with such
+matters as the nature and sources of the law,1 the formal bases of law,'" the province
+and function of law,'9 the ends of law and the analysis of general juristic concepts."
+Jurimetrics is concerned with such matters as the quantitative analysis of judicial
+behavior, the application of communication and information theory to legal expression,
+the use of mathematical logic in law, the retrieval of legal data by electronic
+and mechanical means, and the formulation of a calculus of legal predictability.2 '
+Jurisprudence is primarily an undertaking of rationalism; jurimetrics is an effort to
+utilize the methods of science in the field of law. The conclusions of jurisprudence
+are merely debatable; the conclusions of jurimetrics are testable. Jurisprudence cogitates
+essence and ends and values. Jurimetrics investigates methods of inquiry.
+The validity and importance of this approach has recently received official
+recognition. The Behavioral Sciences Subpanel of the President's Science Advisory
+Committee issued a report on March 21, 1962, with the approval of the White House,
+in which it recommended action to strengthen the behavioral sciences and improve
+their use.2 2 The report stated, inter alia:
+
+The general aims and criteria of evidence of the behavioral sciences are the same as they
+are in other sciences; however, it has so far frequently been necessary to settle for more
+approximate answers--errors of measurement may be large, and often, where experiments
+are not yet possible, correlations still substitute for cause-effect relations. The number of
+variables apparently needed to understand many kinds of human behavior, when combined
+with random or uncontrolled variations familiar in most of the life sciences, account for
+imprecision of results. Nevertheless, behavioral scientists are finding ways to develop
+and test meaningful theories; they have managed to amass a considerable store of tested
+and useful information.
+Loevinger, Jurimetrics-The Next Step Forward, 33 MINN. L. Rav. 455 (x949); Loevinger,
+Jurimetrics: Science and Prediction in the Field of Law, 46 id. 255 (ig6x); Johnson, lurimelrics and
+the Association of American Law Schools, x4 J. LEGAL. ED . 385 (x962); also see 62M MODERN USES OF
+LoGc IN LAw 34, 36 (1962) [hereinafter cited as M.U.L.L.].
+"
+1 JOHN CmHPmAN GRAy, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW (1st ed. igog; rev. ed. 1921). 'a GIORGIO DEL VECCIO, THEa FORMAL BASES OF LAW (ist ed. 1914).
+"9 JuLIUs STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION Or LAW (1950). 5
+oROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (pt. 2 and pt. 7) (1959).
+In view of the present symposium it seems supererogatory to offer a bibliography of recent work
+in the field of 'jurimetrics. However, in addition to the present symposium, attention might be called to
+IAw "rm ELECTRONICS: Ti CHALLENGE oF A NEw ERA (Jones ed. 1962), and to M.U.L.L., the quarterly
+newsletter of the American Bar Association Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval, published
+quarterly in collaboration with Yale Law School. Each issue of M.U.L.L. contains a wealth of material
+within the field of jurimetrics.
+"
+2 Strengthening the Behavioral Sciences, 7 BEmuvioRAL SCIENCE 275 (x962); 136 SCIENCE
+233 (x962); also see comment by John Lear in The Saturday Review, May 5, 1962, p. 35 et seq.
+THE METHODOLOGY OF LEGAL INQUMY 9
+
+The impact of the behavioral sciences on our society is far greater than most people
+realize. At one level they are providing technical solutions for important human
+problems. But at a deeper level they are changing the conception of human nature-our
+fundamental ideas about human desire and human possibilities. When such conceptions
+change, society changes.
+
+Progress in behavioral science has come about by using the scientific processes of observing,
+experimenting, and extensively following up and correcting working hypotheses.
+Indeed, all the general attitudes and strategies of physical and biological science have found
+a place in behavioral science.
+
+Unsolved behavioral-science problems that are clearly solvable, and for which methods of
+attack are already identified, are no longer minor and trivial. Instead, both their scope
+and their scientific importance are substantial and steadily increasing.
+
+As the report points out, recent developments in many areas of the behavioral
+science have been so rapid and diverse that it is difficult for anyone to get a complete
+picture of their scope and depth. This can only be suggested by examining illustrative
+examples of current research. One of the most interesting and seminal areas
+of work now being done in the field of jurimetrics involves the utilization of
+electronic computers for the storage and retrieval of legal data.
+
+II
+
+ELErCroNIc DATA RETIEVAL
+
+The task of data retrieval is one of the most basic, pervasive, and important of all
+the functions performed by lawyers and judges. This includes the activity which
+lawyers commonly refer to as "legal research," but also considerably more. It is
+important to note that when lawyers use the term "legal research" they mean librarysearching,
+whereas scientists use the term "research" to mean laboratory experimentation.
+For the sake of both clarity and generality the term "data retrieval" is more
+useful in the present context.
+One of the principal aspects of data retrieval in the law is that of finding
+applicable, analogous, or relevant precedential authority in the reported cases for
+determination of some current question 3 Indeed, a large part of the formal professional
+education of the lawyer consists of training and exercise in the analysis of
+problems, the use of a legal vocabulary, and the use of legal index systems in order
+to perform this task. But this is by no means the extent of the data retrieval problem
+confronting the lawyer. The problem exists, in varying degrees of difficulty with
+respect to at least these categories:
+i) statutes
+2) court decisions
+3) administrative regulations
+"
+0 On the general considerations applicable to this problem, see Loevinger, An. Introduction to
+Legal Logic, 27 Iuo. L.J. 47, (1952).
+LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+4) administrative decisions and orders
+5) title records
+6) mortgages, liens, and similar recorded instruments
+7) cases and judgments in courts of record
+8) patents
+9) trademarks
+io) legislative history
+ii) legal periodicals and other literature
+12) files, records, and evidence in big cases
+
+Consideration of the growing mass of material in nearly all of these categories
+has pointed to the need for improved techniques of handling the material.24 Indeed
+it is not too much to suggest that unless some more efficient means is found for
+dealing with the constantly increasing volume of case material alone, the common
+law system itself will be in some peril. It is becoming increasingly difficult to search
+for and find the relevant authority in the enlarging bulk of all reported cases; and
+as this difficulty increases, so does impatience and dissatisfaction with the system.
+
+A. The Pittsburgh "Key Words in Combination" Project
+
+In response to the twin stimuli of this need plus the emergent development of
+computers developed for other purposes, a number of experimental projects have been
+undertaken in the field of electronic retrieval of legal data. One of the first projects in
+this field, and probably the most extensive and sophisticated one undertaken to date,
+is that of the Health Law Center at the University of Pittsburgh. Under the direction
+of John F. Horty, a research staff at the University began a study of hospital law in
+1956 and undertook the writing of a manual on the subject. 25 The staff found that
+much of the material from the several states was statutory, but that there was little
+uniformity in indexing from state to state. Therefore research could not proceed
+in reliance on available indexes. As the interest moved into broader areas of "health
+law," the difficulties increased. To meet such practical problems, the staff undertook
+the storage of relevant statutory material on magnetic tapes for use in electronic
+computers.
+In order to avoid problems of abstracting, indexing, or pre-coding, the full text of
+all statutes within the universe selected is recorded on tape. As an indication of the
+order of magnitude involved, the full text of the entire body of Pennsylvania statutes,
+composed of about 31,000 sections and comprising some 6,23o,ooo words, is recorded
+on four reels of tape.2 As each statutory section is recorded it is given a document
+" LAY MAN E. ALLErN, RoseN B. S. BRooxs & PATRmCIA A. Js.s, AuTomA-nc RTmnuvAx op LoAL
+LnERATE: WHY ANI) How (x962). This volume contains a most useful bibliography of the subject.
+2 'Horty, Experience With the Application of Electronic Data Processing Systems in General Law, 6oD
+M.U.L.L. 158 (xg6o). 26 Horty, The "Key Words in Combination" Approach, 62M M.U.L.L. 54, 58 (1962).
+THE METHODOLOGY Op LEGAL INQUIRY 1I
+
+number in serial order. When the statutes have been recorded, a vocabulary of
+the words used in the statutes is prepared by computer. Common words, such as
+"the," "a, .... an," "therefore," "however," "by," and various other pronouns, conjunctions,
+and articles are eliminated as of no significance for retrieval purposes. All
+other words are recorded on separate reels of vocabulary tape which also list the
+document number of each section in which each word appears. The four reels
+containing the full text of the Pennsylvania statutes require five reels of vocabulary
+tape.F
+When material is sought from the recorded statutes in the Pittsburgh system, the
+question is formulated and then phrased in terms that appear in the vocabulary
+of the statutes (the terms appearing in the statutory vocabulary can readily be
+determined as an alphabetical print-out is obtained from the vocabulary reels). This
+question is then "programmed," or arranged in a series of steps each involving an
+operation that the machine can perform. In effect, the machine is instructed to find
+and report all documents containing a certain word, or, preferably, certain words
+appearing in specified combinations. Both the words, the combinations, and the
+relationships (including order and spacing of words) are contained in the instructions
+given the machine. The appropriate words to use in searching for statutes relating
+to a subject of interest are determined either by examination of the vocabulary list
+or by consulting a thesaurus of legally-related (rather than strictly synonymous)
+terms. The search instructions are then formulated to secure all sections containing
+the key words in the specified combinations. These may call for all sections in which
+two words (or any other number) appear regardless of order; they may require the
+words to appear in a certain order (as in the phrase "good faith"); they may require
+the words to appear in the same sentence or within a certain number of words of
+each other.
+For example, suppose the question put is: What are the rights of illegitimate
+children and the duties owed to them by their parents under Pennsylvania statutes?
+The steps that are to be programmed, expressed in ordinary language, will be these.
+
+First, find and store the numbers of all documents which contain one of the following
+words:
+baby
+babies
+child
+children
+foundling
+infant
+minor
+offspring
+Label this list-A
+" Ibid. For a more complete technical description of the KWIC system, see Kehl, Horty, Bacon &
+Mitchell, An Information Retrieval Language for Legal Studies, 4 CosnIuMCA'boNs oF Ta ACM
+(Association for Computing Machinery) 380 (xg6i).
+LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+Second; find and store the numbers of all documents which contain one of the following
+words:
+parent
+parents
+unwed (or) unmarried (in the same sentence and within one word
+of one of the following)
+father
+fathers
+man
+men
+mother
+mothers
+woman
+women
+Label this list-B
+Third, set up and store a list of the numbers of those documents which contain both a
+term on list A and a term on list B. Label this resulting list-C.
+Fourth, find and store the numbers of all documents which contain one of the following
+words:
+bastard
+bastards
+born (in the same sentence and separated by two words from the
+word) wedlock
+illegitimate (where it does not occur with the word "purpose" in
+the same sentence)
+natural (occurring within one word of any of the terms in list
+A)
+Label this list-D
+Fifth, merge the numbers in lists C and D and print the full texts of the documents whose
+numbers appear on the resulting list-E.
+It is possible to give the computer three forms of output commands: "list, "cite,"
+or "print." The command "list" causes the computer to list the document numbers
+of all sections meeting the criteria of the search. The command "cite" causes the
+maehiuie to print the section numbers resulting from the search in the form of
+conventional legal citations. The command "print" produces the full text of all
+sections (or documents) resulting from the search.
+This system of storage and retrieval has been called the "Key Words in Combination"
+approach by the project director, John Horty. 8 . It has certain obvious advantages
+and disadvantages. The full text recording avoids the problem of conventional
+abstracting, which is not only a problem of analyzing the legal significance
+of a document, but also requires foresight as to all possible applications and implications
+of the document that may arise in the future. Of course, such foresight can
+never be complete, and to that extent every abstract is likely to be inadequate.
+
+i Ibid. KWIC is also used to refer .t6 the similar Keyword-In-Context index developed by H. P.
+Luhn of International Business Machines Corporation.
+TE METHODOLOGY OF LEGAL INQUIRY 13
+
+Abstracting involves the further practical problem that it is most difficult to
+employ sufficient first-rate talent to do all such work that needs to be done in the
+law. Thus, every lawyer searching for material that is indexed by conventional
+abstracts, regardless of his own ability or diligence, is limited by the ability and
+performance of the abstracter. The system of full text recording is completely openended
+in the sense that it permits search for novel relationships, and, indeed, imposes
+no limitation or requirements upon the search except that it be in the vocabulary
+of the text. This, of course, may be a substantial limitation but there are available
+techniques to deal with it.
+Probably the principal merit of this system is its efficiency in affording a high
+degree of probability of retrieving relevant data. A test of the comparative efficiency
+of the system was made by running six searches (including one dealing with the
+rights of illegitimate children, used as an example above) both by computer and
+manually (which is the current idiomatic euphemism for mental effort in this field).
+The computer searches produced more than twice as many references (177) deemed
+relevant by the researchers as the manual searches (72), and the manual searches
+produced a minimal number of references missed by the machine (2).
+There are several disadvantages of the system of full text storage. It may very
+well be impractical for handling data that are more voluminous and less structured
+than statutes, since this would require recording an impractical mass of material.
+It is estimated that it would require ioo reels of tape to record the reported decisions
+of Pennsylvania, which is twenty-five times as many reels as those containing the
+statutes of that state. Presumably the vocabulary reels for the cases would be in
+proportion. Further, the mass of case material will increase at a much greater rate
+than the mass of statutes. The cost of recording this mass of material would be high.
+More important, a single search of this number of tapes, using present equipment
+and techniques, would be uneconomic by any standard. Further, full text recording
+of documents of substantial length, such as judicial decisions, vastly increases the
+difficulty of developing sophisticated and discriminating search systems.
+
+B. The Western Reserve "Semantic Coded Abstract" Project
+A system particularly keyed to handling voluminous and complex material has
+been developed at Western Reserve University and has been called the "Semantic
+Coded Abstract" approach.30 Western Reserve University established a Center
+for Documentation and Communication Research in 1955, which has been engaged
+since that time in the investigation of methods of searching literature by electronic
+machines.s' The principal work done by the WRU Center has been in the field
+" Id. at 6o. Also see 'Swanson, Searching Natural Language Text by Computer, 132 SCMENCE 1099
+(xg6o). 10 Melton, The "Semantic Coded Abstract" Approach, 62M M.U.L.L. 48 (1962). "
+1
+Melton & Bensing, Searching Legal Literature Electronically: Results of a Test Program, 45 MINN.
+L, RFv. 299 (s96o); see also Kent, A Machine That Does Research, Harper's Magazine, April x959, -p. 67 et seq.; Kent & Barhydt, Compromise-A Key to Documentation, Datamation, Oct. 1961, p. 26 et seq.
+14 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+of metallurgy, but it has also done substantial work in other fields of science, engineering,
+and medicine. In 1959 and i96o, some work was done in the legal field on
+an experimental and pilot project basis, using the sales provisions of the Uniform
+Commercial Code and cases interpreting this part of the code. The same methods
+of abstracting, indexing, storage, and retrieval were applied to the legal material
+as to the non-legal material.
+In the semantic coded abstract system, the documents to be indexed are first
+abstracted manually in some detail3 2 The abstract is recorded in natural language
+stating the significant index terms, role-indicators assigned by the abstracter to show
+syntactical relations between the terms, and punctuation symbols performing a largely
+conventional function. This abstract is then copied on a key-punch unit and the
+punch card is put through equipment which automatically retrieves semantic-code
+equivalents from the file for the abstract terms, role indicators, and punctuation,
+and transcribes the abstract onto magnetic tape in the semantic code. The semantic
+code is the heart of the WRU system. It consists of a series of four-unit combinations
+of letters and numbers which symbolize the logical elements of the terms to be
+encoded, and of a highly simplified symbolic grammar which consists of three-unit
+combinations of letters called "role indicators" which are used to translate the variety
+of English syntactical expressions into a uniform and consistent coded pattern.
+The four-unit combinations of letters are called "semantic factors" and are constructed
+by using three letters to symbolize a particular concept while varying the
+fourth letter, called an "infix," to indicate variations of that concept. For example,
+the basic concept -information is symbolized by the semantic factor DOCM. The
+infix "A" symbolized the idea a form of. Thus the semantic factor DACM symbolizes
+the logical concept a form of information. A four-digit numerical factor
+added to the four letter semantic factors symbolizing a term serves to distinguish
+synonyms or close approximations from the logical elements of the specific term.
+For example, the concept of swimming is analyzed into the logical elements of
+motion and water. The forms of the term are differentiated by various infixes symbolizing
+different logical correlates, thus:
+
+swim: MATN HVDR 2001 (ie., a form of motion acting upon water)
+swimming: MUTN HVDR 2001 (i.e., used for motion acting upon water)
+swam: NWTN HVDR 2001 (i.e., acted upon by motion acting upon water)
+
+Each of the foregoing terms has essentially the same basic logical concept and therefore
+has the same exterior numerical factor. Examples of related concepts that are
+distinguished by the numerical factor are blueprint and specifications. In encoding
+the term blueprint it is analyzed into the logical elements of (a) a form of information,
+(b) used to regulate, and (c) acting upon construction. These ideas are
+symbolized by the semantic factors of:
+"The description of the semantic coded abstract system and the illustrations given in the text are
+taken from the references cited in notes 30 and 31, supra.
+THE iTHODOLOGY Op LEGAL INQUIRY
+
+DACM-a form of information
+RUGL-used to regulate
+CVNS-acting upon construction
+
+However, the logically similar term specifications analyzes into the same elements
+and is represented by the same semantic factors. Therefore an exterior numerical
+factor is used to distinguish these terms, which are represented in this fashion:
+blueprint: CVNS DACM RUGL 3002
+specifications: CVNS DACM RUGL 3 ooi
+
+It is obvious that the analysis of terms into logical elements may be a difficult
+task. Therefore the system utilizes a code dictionary in which terms and phrases
+are correlated to generic concepts and which also acts as a thesaurus of terms. The
+code dictionary is on punch cards so that abstracts and questions can be quickly and
+automatically checked against the dictionary.
+When a request for search is made in the semantic coded abstract system, the
+question is analyzed in the same manner in which a document is analyzed for
+abstracting. When the logical elements of the question have been determined by
+manual analysis, they are checked against the code dictionary and encoded in the
+semantic code. The coded question is then put on punched paper tape, which is
+run through the computer to secure documents that fit the specifications of the
+question. The output of the machine consists of the serial numbers of relevant
+abstracts, which can then be examined in their uncoded version to determine the
+citations of original documents that are desired.
+The semantic coded abstract system is by no means a complete departure from
+traditional indexing. It depends upon persons skilled in the relevant field to select
+and record significant aspects of the subject matter for future retrieval, and also to
+construct search specifications, leaving only the mechanical process of comparison
+and correlation of search specification with index to the machine operation. Furthermore,
+the use of coded semantic factors to represent conceptual relationships involves
+the creation of indexing "cluster points" which are similar to the "Key Numbers"
+of the West Publishing Company's digest system. The WRU system does avoid
+the rigidity inherent in the hierarchical topical arrangement of the conventional
+digest system and permits coordinate indexing and searching. It certainly has a
+flexibility that exceeds any conventional index; permits searches for specific words,
+generic concepts, or both simultaneously; and provides for specificity or generality
+at almost any level of abstraction.
+The normalizing of language and use of a machine thesaurus permits the retrieval
+of documents that may be relevant although they do not contain any of the terms
+used in the search. This characteristic would be of particular value in problems
+that might involve comparative or foreign law. However, the WRU system not
+only does not avoid the problems and limitations of manual abstracting but imposes
+16 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+some additional functions on the abstracter, thereby exacerbating the difficulties of
+this process. Further, the system imposes its own logic on both the library of
+stored material and on each question. It remains to be demonstrated by further
+work both that this can be done successfully with a large body of legal material and
+that, if done, it will not unduly constrain the use of such material.
+There are also "computer languages" that have been developed and used successfully
+in particular applications, such as COBOLP3 However, the primary purpose
+of these is to facilitate programming and secure compatibility among various computer
+systems, rather than to establish the conceptual or logical framework within
+which data may be manipulated. The law possesses its own conceptual framework,
+and it seems dubious that it will prove useful to attempt to impose an additional
+logical structure on legal material for purposes of an automatic retrieval system.
+
+C. The Oklahoma State "Points of Law" Approach
+
+The existing conceptual framework of the law itself is used for storage and
+retrieval in the "Point of Law" approach used at Oklahoma State University 4 This
+system involves the analysis of each document (case, legal periodical article, or whatever)
+by a lawyer to determine the legal issues decided or covered. Each point of
+law is given a code number, which, of course, represents the particular concept
+involved in that point of law. For example, the legal concept res ipsa loquitur is
+represented by a single code number. When a field of law has been completely
+analyzed, a directory is prepared, listing all points of law in alphabetical order and
+showing the code numbers corresponding to each legal concept. In storing data, legal
+material is recorded in its conventional form on magnetic tape except that it is
+preceded by the appropriate code number or numbers.
+To secure material in this system, the lawyer must analyze his problem to determine
+the point (or points) of law involved and then check against the system
+directory to insure that he has chosen a point that is included in the system. If he
+finds his point of law listed, he ascertains the corresponding code number and
+requests the machine to search for all material indexed under that code number.
+The machine will print out the legal citation of material identified by the code
+number, the citation plus head-notes or the citation, head-notes and complete text.
+A search can be made for a number of points simultaneously.
+This system appears to be essentially a matter of putting the familiar West Key
+Number system, or something very much like it, on computer tape. It has the
+advantage of utilizing concepts and terms that are already well known to lawyers
+and thus working with an idiom that lawyers are willing to accept. However, it
+seems to be limited in both its adaptability to new concepts and its ability to absorb
+:, COBOL-g6i, REVISED SPECIFICATIONS FOR A COMMON BUSINESS ORIENTED LANGUAGE (1961).
+8' Morgan, The "Point of Law" Approach, 62M M.U.L.L. 44 (962). The work at Oklahoma State
+University in this field was being conducted by Professor Robert T. Morgan, whose untimely death may
+handicap full experimentation with this approach.
+THE METHODOLOGY.OF LEGAL INQUIRY 17
+
+large additional quantities of data while still retaining the advantages of fast and
+economical searching. The system obviously has the limitations and disadvantages
+of all systems that rely on manual abstracting, and, in addition, depends upon the
+coincidence of analysis by the asbtracter and the questioner, possibly even to a greater
+extent than present conventional digest systems. This is the kind of a system that
+the lawyer first contemplating automatic data retrieval imagines the future will
+provide 5 However, the scientist in the field says, "Direct mechanization of traditional
+library classification is like building locomotives to run with legs." 6
+
+D. The "Association Factor" Method
+While some have been seeking to use the new technology of electronic data
+machines to perform conventional tasks faster and more easily mechanically, others
+have been developing genuinely new methods of problem solving. One of the
+most interesting techniques in the data retrieval field, of particular significance to
+law, is the development of the "Association Factor" method of retrieval3 This is
+a system in which the terms of a question are automatically expanded to retrieve
+relevant documents that may be indexed under other terms, and the search is so
+processed by computing correlation factors electronically that the documents resulting
+from the search are delivered with a rank order of "weight" indicating probable
+relevance to the inquiry.
+In the association factor system the collection of documents is initially indexed
+by the uniterm coordinate index system. This is indexing by terms drawn from the
+text of the documents themselves without any topical or hierarchical arrangement.
+In coordinate indexing the index terms are independent of each other and data is
+retrieved by manipulation of the index terms, usually (although not necessarily) to
+secure a "match" or "intersection" of two or more terms that will designate an, intersection,
+or other logical function, of the classes represented by the index terms and
+that is likely to contain documents desired? 8 In the coordinate indexing used in
+reported applications of the association factor system the effort was made to eliminate
+all synonyms by cross referencing them to a single term in a thesaurus used as part
+of the system? 9 Two files are prepared, as in usual coordinate term indexing. The
+first is a document-term file showing the index terms assigned to the respective
+documents. This information is recorded on punch cards in this format:
+Document i: Term a, Term c, Term d, Term x, etc.
+Document 2: Term b, Term d, Term e, Term y, etc.
+Document 3: Term a, Term b, Term f, Term z, etc.
+" See, e.g., Loevinger, The Industrial Revolution in Law, 6oJ M.U.L.. 56 (ig6o).
+'o Fairthorne, Automatic Retrieval of Recorded Information, I COMPUT. J. i (1958). 5TStiles, The Association Factor in information Retrieval, 8 J. ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY 271
+(ig96).
+" See JOSEPHINE J. JASTER, BARBARA R. MURRAY & MoRTIMER TA=3, THE STATE OF THE ART" oF COORDINATE INDEXING (prepared for the Office of Science Information of the National Science Foundation
+by Documentation, Inc., z962). This contains an excellent bibliography of the subject.
+" Stiles, supra note 37.
+LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+The cards are then processed by machine to produce an inverted term file on magnetic
+tape in the following format:
+
+Term a: Doc. i, Doc. 3, Doc. 5, etc.
+Term b: Doc. 2, Doc. 4, Doc. 6, etc.
+Term c: Doc. i, Doc. 4, Doc. 8, etc.
+
+This gives a list of all index terms, together with the serial or accession number of
+each document indexed by each term stored on magnetic tape available for subsequent
+computer manipulation. The actual indexing in the applications of this system that
+have been reported to date has been done manually, but it could just as well be
+done automatically when satisfactory methods of automatic indexing have been
+developed.
+In the use of this system, when a search question has been formulated it is fed
+into the computer, which then derives the association factor expressing the numerical
+value of the degree of association between each term of the request and
+each index term by an established formula.40 In essence, this shows the index
+terms that occur in the same document as any of the request terms, and the degree
+of coincidence between them as measured by the number of documents in which
+both occur more frequently than might be expected if there were no logical
+association. Terms are dropped if they have an association factor of less than i.oo,
+or some other specified value, with terms of the request. The remaining terms
+provide a list of index terms associated with each term of the request. This list of
+associated terms is called a "term profile."
+It should be noted that the term profiles contain terms that are statistically, but
+not necessarily semantically, related. The second step, after preparing a term profile
+for each term of the request, is to compare the term profiles of all the request terms
+and then select those index terms which appear in all or a given number of profiles.
+These selected terms are called "first generation" terms. In selecting the first generation
+terms it is possible to select terms that represent the logical product or logical
+sum or other logical function of request term profiles. Synonyms or near synonyms
+are not likely to be found in these first generation terms.
+The third step in this method is to take the list of first generation terms and
+to use these as request terms repeating the process of the first two steps. The new
+terms secured at this stage are called "second generation" terms. These second
+generation terms are likely to include synonyms, various grammatical forms, and
+"o The formula used by Stiles, supra note 37, for computing the association factor is:
+
+log0 o- -B- =ASSOCIATION FACTOR.
+
+where A is the number of documents indexed by one term; B is the number of documents indexed by a
+second term; f is the number of documents indexed by the combination of both terms; and N is the total
+number of documents in the collection. If AB is greater than fN the association is negative.
+Tm METHODOLOGY OF LEGAL INQURY 19
+
+even variations in spelling of the request terms. The fourth step is the preparation
+of an expanded list comprising the original request terms, the first generation terms,
+and the second generation terms. All of the terms on this list will now have an
+association factor greater than the minimum specified as acceptable for the search.
+The association factor of each term in this list to every other term in the list is
+computed and added. The sum of these association factors for each term is then
+divided by the total number of terms on this expanded list. This gives a weight
+which indicates the probable relevance of each term on the expanded list to the
+original request.
+The fifth step in this system is to search the document collection by matching
+terms in the expanded list with the index terms of each document in the collection.
+Whenever any terms match, the weight of the request term on the expanded list is
+assigned to the corresponding document. The sum of these weights for each
+document is the document relevance number. This indicates the degree of fit
+between the request and the contents of the document. The documents thus retrieved
+are then arranged according to these weights and the search thus produces
+a list of documents arranged in order of probable relevance to the initial inquiry, the
+higher numerical value indicating greater probable relevance. It is notable that this
+system will retrieve documents that may be relevant to a request even though the
+document has not been indexed by any terms in the initial request.
+The association factor system is extremely flexible since it develops the interrelationship
+of terms at the time of each search, rather than fixing it in advance
+according to any predetermined system. The system may be used to obtain a response
+in as much or as little depth as is desired by varying the weight of probable relevance
+that is acceptable in retrieving documents. The association factor system has been
+successfully used in experimental application to legal material, including both statutory
+and case material, although the results of this experiment have not yet been
+reported in a publication. 4' The initial use of an automatic thesaurus to expand the
+terms of a request, coupled with association factor manipulation, promises to provide
+one of the most powerful tools for data searching and retrieval that has yet been
+devised.
+
+E. Probabilistic Indexing
+
+The association factor system operates upon the search procedure to provide
+retrieval based upon comparative relevance. There are other systems that secure
+a similar result by modification of the indexing. The basic concept seems to have
+" An experiment in utilization of the association factor system was undertaken with a body of legal
+material relating to antitrust law at the Graduate School of Public Law of George Washington University,
+Washington, D.C., in 1961 and 1962. The project was supported jointly by the school and the Datatrol
+Corporation, and the work was in large part supervised and conducted by John Lyons. A paper giving
+a summary report of the experiment was prepared in August 1962 and distributed at the American Bar
+Association convention in San Francisco; however, the project has not yet been fully reported in any
+publication. Mr. John Lyons has graciously made the summary report available to the author of the
+present article and has assisted the author by providing additional information.
+20 LAW AND CONEMPORARY PROBIEMS
+
+been suggested by Maron and Kuhns in proposing a system of "probabilistic indexing."
+2 They point out that that there is no strict one-to-one correspondence
+between the information content of a document and its set of indexes. All indexing
+is based upon an estimated probability that if a user wants information of the kind
+contained in the document he will formulate a request using the assigned index term.
+However, since there is a degree of uncertainty inherent in the assignment of all
+index tags, it is more reasonable and realistic to make the assignment of index tags
+on the basis of a probabilistic judgment. This is done by weighting index terms
+assigned to documents with relevance numbers which indicate the probable relevance
+of a document for anyone framing a request including that index term. This
+technique is called "probabilistic indexing."
+In the procedure actually adopted for testing this technique, a collection of documents
+was read, and keywords were selected and listed by the readers. The
+keywords were then sorted into categories on the basis of a subjective judgment as
+to their meanings. A keyword could belong to more than one category. The
+categories of keywords were then assigned names or meaningful labels or tags, which
+were thereafter used as index terms. The index terms, or category names, were then
+assigned to documents by giving each document the index term of every category
+containing a keyword that appeared in that document. Each document was then
+re-read and the reader, or indexer, assigned a weight from an eight point scale
+indicating the degree of relevance of the index term to the contents of the document.
+This, of course, is a probabilistic estimate, or an indication of probable relevance to
+a request for information.
+Retrieval in this system is accomplished by presenting a request in terms taken
+from the index vocabulary, together with the value of a relevance number below
+which documents are considered not to be of sufficient importance to be useful.
+The computer will then locate documents indexed by request terms, rejecting those
+that have less than the threshold relevance value, and will produce an ordered list
+of documents which satisfy the request, ranked according to their probable relevance.
+In experimental usage, it was found that the system efficiently retrieved relevant
+documents and required the reading of substantially fewer documents than conventional
+systems. However, the experiments were of limited scope, and it appears
+in any event that the high degree of dependence of this system upon human reviewers
+greatly reduces its efficiency.
+A proposal to secure the advantages of probabilistic indexing while making the
+assignment of relevance values automatically by mathematical formula, rather than
+by subjective estimate, is involved in "latent class" analysis and indexing.4 3 Latent 42 Maron & Kuhns, On Relevance, Probabilistic Indexing and Information Retrieval, 7 J. As'eu roR
+COMPUTING MACHINERY 216 (i960).
+48 Baker, Information Retrieval Based Upon Latent Class Analysis, 9 id. 512 (x962).
+THE METHODOLOGY OF LEGAL INQUIRY
+
+class indexing depends upon the use of keyword index terms, but it eliminates the
+step of reducing the keywords to categories and assigning relevance numbers to
+the connection between the data and the category names. Latent class analysis forms
+large categories (called latent classes) of documents, which deal with a common
+topic, upon the basis of the relationships among the keywords in the total collection
+of documents.
+First, the categories, or latent classes, are formed by determining the degree of
+association among the keywords of the whole document collection in a manner
+roughly similar to the determination of the association factor mentioned above, but
+utilizing different mathematical procedures. Next, a "response pattern" is determined
+for each document. This is simply a pattern of concurrence of index keywords
+found in each document. Then the documents are assigned to the latent classes on
+the basis of correspondence between the response (or keyword) patterns in the
+documents and the keyword organization of the latent classes, and an ordering ratio
+is computed for each document which represents the probability that the keyword
+pattern found in that document will be generated by (or be found in) a document
+from that latent class. In other words, the ordering ratio represents a statistical
+probability relationship between the keyword pattern that might be expected from
+a document that fits the keyword pattern of a latent class perfectly, and the keyword
+pattern actually occurring in each document assigned to the latent class. Thus the
+ordering ratio is a practical indicator of probable relevance of each document to the
+keyword pattern of each latent class.
+Documents are then to be stored by latent classes, with a specified minimum
+level of relevance as indicated by the ordering number of each document for inclusion
+in each class. A single document may be stored in more than one class,
+provided that its ordering number for each class is greater than the minimum
+specified for inclusion in that class. Searching is done by putting a request in terms
+occurring in the keyword vocabulary used for latent class analysis, and by specifying
+a minimum ordering number or degree of relevance desired in retrieved documents.
+The computer uses the pattern of keywords to locate the latent class which has the
+highest probability of containing documents that may yield the pattern of keywords
+in the request. The search will then secure the documents stored in the identified
+latent class and having ordering numbers higher than the minimum specified,
+arranged in rank order according to probable relevance to the request. The latent
+class indexing system has not yet been used in information retrieval, and therefore
+its utility is speculative. It is apparent, however, that it would require recomputation
+and reorganization of the latent classes and of the documents assigned to the latent
+classes as the total collection of documents grows significantly in size. While not
+an insuperable problem, this may be an important practical objection to the use
+of this system.
+LAW AND CoNTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+III
+LEX-Tm ANTITRUST DivisION's SYSTEM
+An attempt to use machines for the storage and retrieval of legal material that
+is more practical than experimental has been undertaken recently in the Antitrust
+Division of the Department of Justice 4 Since this attempt was made for utilitarian
+rather than scientific reasons, the system may be less interesting and original than
+some of those mentioned above that are seeking to develop or test new techniques.
+However, because it is designed and used for practical purposes, the DoJ system
+may have its own particular interest for lawyers.
+In designing and constructing a data retrieval system for the Antitrust Division,
+there were certain requirements that constituted minimum specifications. First, the
+system had to be capable of handling a large body of data of various kinds including
+such material as briefs, judicial opinions, and statutes. Second, the system had to
+be open ended so that material could be added continuously without undue difficulty.
+Third, the system had to be operable with the relatively limited equipment presently
+owned by the Department of Justice. Fourth, the system had to be adaptable to,
+and capable of taking advantage of, more advanced equipment when that becomes
+available. Fifth, the system must be capable of being designed and operated with
+a relatively small staff of specially trained professionals (there are just two lawyers
+with training in computer theory and technology on the staff at the present time),
+although some additional lawyers without technical training in the field and a small
+staff of technicians (machine operators etc.) might be available to assist. Sixth, the
+system must be readily explicable, as well as comprehensible to and usable by a large
+staff of lawyers with a high order of legal skills but no special training or interest
+in the new techniques of data retrieval. Seventh, the system must be compatible
+with existing library and legal methods, which will necessarily continue to be used
+by the staff for all matters not covered by the system. Eighth, the system must
+be more efficient than existing available indexes and methods of indexing. Ninth,
+the system must be economical.
+The system which has been designed and put into partial operation toward the
+end of 1962 appears to meet the requirements specified, although no firm conclusions
+can be hazarded until there has been a substantial period of experience in using it.
+In any event, it is anticipated that there will be significant modifications made as
+experience is gained. The DoJ Antitrust Division system is designed as a legal index
+and accordingly has been named "LEX" by its designers. LEX will be in four parts.
+Part one will index court decisions relating to antitrust law. Part two will index
+"A Legal Reference and Data Retrieval Unit has been established within the Antitrust Division
+to deal with problems of storing and retrieving various kinds of data. This unit has been in charge of
+Mr. John Lyons and Mr. Michael Duggan who have devised and put into operation the system described
+in the text. This system has not previously been described in any publication. The description in the
+text is based upon the author's personal knowledge- of the system. Credit and thanks must be given to Mr.
+Lyons and Mr. Duggan both for their achievement in designing and constructing the system and for their
+assistance to the author in providing information for this article.
+TI MAETHoDoLOGY oF LEGAL INQURY 23
+
+material originating in the Antitrust Division, such as memoranda, briefs, and official
+statements. Part three will index the legislative history of antitrust and related
+statutes. Part four will index legal periodical material related to antitrust law.
+At the time of writing, parts one, three and four are still in preparation and only
+part two has been substantially completed and put in use. However, the system is
+essentially the same for all four parts, so a description of part two will serve adequately
+to characterize the other parts.
+The urgent need for part two of LEX arose out of the fact that the Antitrust
+Division has had several hundred lawyers continuously engaged in practicing antitrust
+law for many years, and that these lawyers have been busily engaged in producing
+briefs, memoranda, and similar material on many facets of antitrust law
+throughout that period. Nevertheless, there has been no systematic indexing of this
+material previously. Consequently there was no way of knowing whether a given
+problem had been exhaustively analyzed and considered in some previous memorandum
+or was being encountered for the first time, other than the memory
+of older staff members and such information as might be obtained by inquiry among
+other staff members. Even these sources were not very readily available to the
+approximately one hundred lawyers stationed in the six field offices of the Division.
+Thus the prompt provision of a workable means of retrieving this material was a
+matter of some importance.
+Like most other present indexing systems, LEX uses a manually created abstract
+of the underlying document. For material generated within the Antitrust Division,
+it is thought that the author can do the best job of abstracting. Accordingly, abstract
+sheets have been mimeographed and distributed to all lawyers-with instructions
+to fill out one abstract sheet and furnish it, together with two copies of the document,
+to the Legal Reference Unit for every memorandum, brief, or similar document
+drafted. Of course, it is not essential that the abstracting be done by the author of
+the original document, and there is a small staff of lawyers available to the Legal
+Reference Unit for abstracting. Each abstract sheet shows the title and date of
+the document abstracted, an abstract in enough length and detail to indicate fully
+the contents of the document, the name of the author of the document, the tide of
+the case to which the document relates, and a few other items that are thought to be
+of possible interest, such as the commodity involved, names of parties, court, and
+various file numbers.
+The abstract is reviewed in the Legal Reference Unit by one and sometimes two
+lawyers with some experience in abstracting. When thought appropriate, reference is
+made to the original document to correct or expand the abstract. The reviewer in
+the Legal Reference Unit then assigns descriptors to the document to serve as index
+terms. The descriptors are simply terms that are thought likely to be associated in
+the mind of a lawyer with the contents of the document. So far we have devised
+no system for selecting descriptors objectively, although we recognize this as desirable.
+LAW AND CoNmMPORRY PROBLEMS
+
+It is hoped that by having descriptors assigned to all documents by a small staff,
+some uniformity may be achieved. However, experience casts some doubt on this,
+as documents that have accidentally been processed twice with an intervening period
+of time have not been assigned identical descriptors. There is no limit to the number
+of descriptors that may be assigned to a single document, and most documents are
+expected to be indexed by ten or more descriptors. Each document is then assigned
+a serial or accession number.45 Punch cards are then prepared for each document,
+containing the document accession number, the descriptors indexing the document,
+the abstract, and the other information contained on the abstract sheet. These
+cards are then processed by machine to produce nine different lists which comprise
+the basic index used. These lists are printed out, reproduced by reduced photo-offset,
+and made available to the staff as a single index volume in nine sections.
+Section one is a thesaurus of terms used. This is to provide cross-references
+among descriptors and from synonyms or near-synonyms to descriptors. This
+section can and will be expanded to afford reference from any word likely to be used
+by a lawyer to some related descriptor.
+Section two is a descriptor index. This is a list of descriptors alphabetically
+arranged, and provides a reference to the number of each document that is indexed
+under each descriptor.
+Section three is a compilation of abstracts arranged in serial order by document
+number. It is intended that anyone using the index will refer from some other
+section to this section in order to determine from the abstract whether the documents
+he has found cited are relevant to his search.
+Section four is a statute and rule index which lists antitrust statutes and federal
+court rules in order by conventional methods of citation. Under each citation is a
+reference to the numbers of all documents containing significant internal references
+to the statute or rule cited. In view of the relatively limited number of statutes and
+rules that are of importance in the antitrust field and the high clustering of references
+to a few statutes, it is doubtful that this section will prove to be of much value. If
+it does not prove useful, it will. be dropped from future editions of the index.
+Section five is a subject matter index. This is an arrangement of topics and
+sub-topics in conventional hierarchical classification with document numbers under
+each entry. The arrangement of this section is similar to a conventional legal digest
+system, except that the LEX system has been constructed for the antitrust field
+and therefore is more detailed with respect to the law in this field than any other
+presently available index. This section offers a conventional alternative to the descriptor
+index as a means of seeking relevant references on the basis of subject matter.
+Whether such an alternative will continue to remain desirable when more advanced
+equipment and techniques are available remains to be determined. For the present,
+" In the first edition of part 2 of LEX all documents were assigned both a serial number and a microfilm
+accession number. However this appeared to be unnecessary, and all documents are now assigned
+a single serial-accession number which serves both to identify and locate the document.
+TRE METHODOLOGY "OF LEGAL INQUIRY
+
+the availability of thdse two differing index approaches offers the opportunity for
+comparison of their efficiency in use.
+Sections six, seven, eight, and nine are more specialized methods of finding
+potentially relevant documents from particular known information. Section six is an
+index based on "Blue Book" numbers. These numbers are assigned in serial order
+chronologically to all antitrust cases brought by the Department of Justice. The
+"Blue Book" numbers are available both from internal and from published sources.
+Section seven is a product classification index. Commodities are listed in numerical
+order according to the Federal Supply Classification system. Section eight is an
+index based upon the names of defendants arranged in alphabetical order. Section
+nine is an index based upon the names of the authors of documents arranged in
+alphabetical order. In each of these last four sections the index shows the numbers
+of all documents generated by the case, product, defendant named (i.e., case) or
+author listed in the respective index section.
+The full text of all documents listed is stored on microfilm. The microfilm is
+contained in magazines identified by letters. The first part of each document
+accession number consists of two ltters that identify the microfilm magazine which
+contains the text of that document. To read a document, the appropriate magazine
+is inserted into the microfilm reading machine.4 6 This automatically illuminates the
+screen and starts the film drive motor. An image appears on the screen which
+identifies the number of the document positioned for reading. A lever on the
+machine causes the film reel to be rotated until the desired document image is reached,
+when the motor is stopped and the document is read. If a copy of a page or of an
+entire document is desired, a button is pushed and a print of the desired page or
+document is made automatically.
+It is self-evident that in its present form LEX is a relatively rudimentary and
+unsophisticated apparatus for retrieval of legal data. Although the assignment of
+descriptors permits coordinate indexing and retrieval, the descriptors will probably
+not be utilized for the discriminating selection of which they may be capable.
+However, there are several important advantages of this system.
+First, it is the only one now in actual use by a group of practicing lawyers who
+have no special training in the use of such. systems. It is thought that whatever
+system is ultimately developed will eventually have to be adapted to use by lawyers
+who are not specially trained in its use. Experimentation with a system that, whatever
+its other shortcomings, is in actual use by lawyers is likely to contribute greatly
+to the development of a better system to meet the needs of lawyers.
+Secondly, it is believed that the basic structure of the LEX system, involving the
+storage of full text of documents on micro records with index terms and abstracts
+recorded on punch cards, tape discs, or similar means for manipulation, is the pattern
+that will ultimately be found most practical and economical.
+"The machines presently in use are Recordak Lodestars.
+LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+Thirdly, LEX provides the opportunity for feedback in use. In actual searching
+for legal reference material, there is a constant interchange of information and instructions
+between the searcher and the body of data. As information is secured,
+the search is modified; finding a particular case, citation, or dictum may wholly
+change the direction of the search. It is thought essential to provide the means of
+maintaining such feedback in any system that is to be found practical by lawyers.
+An elaborate and sophisticated search system that is of such complexity that a
+substantial period of time must elapse between asking one question, securing a
+response, and asking a second question is likely to be less useful than a less complicated
+and less sophisticated system that furnishes a rapid response to questions and
+permits the asking of successive questions quickly.
+Fourth, LEX is flexible and can be easily adapted to more refined techniques and
+more advanced equipment when that becomes available. The index terms used
+by LEX provide coordinate indexing that is adapted to automatic searching, and
+can also be used in a system of association factor searching. Since documents are
+also independently indexed by their own abstracts, LEX can utilize natural language
+questions in automatic full text searching of abstracts. While this is not quite the
+equivalent of full text searching of original documents, it may serve as a practical
+substitute.
+Finally, automatic indexing and abstracting may be utilized when and if the
+techniques and equipment for performing this function satisfactorily become available.
+Since the full texts of all documents are stored on micro records, automatic
+abstracting and indexing may be applied to documents already recorded, as well
+as to new accessions.
+
+IV
+
+MICRO-IMAGE STORAGE OF DocuMErNs
+
+A. From Circulating to Duplicating Libraries
+
+The structure of LEX is dictated in substantial part by an appraisal of the
+potentiality of equipment. No one can predict what may be possible in the future
+in recording, manipulating, and retrieving data by electronic devices. Conceivably,
+it may become possible to record all the decisions in a field of law, or perhaps in the
+entire law, in such fashion that their full text can be searched electronically in
+microseconds. But no device capable of doing this is available now or foreseeable
+in the near future. On the contrary, the mass of material to be stored in even a
+limited field such as antitrust law is so great that putting it all on computer tape
+is not only unduly expensive but is almost prohibitive to search. On the other hand,
+techniques and devices now available will permit full text storage and retrieval by
+micro records of virtually unlimited quantities of material.
+For example, a recently reported technique for the storage and dissemination of
+microdocuments has made high density document storage feasible at a linear reduc-
+TH METHODOLOGY OF LEGAL INQUIRY 27
+
+tion of 200:I, representing an area reduction of 40,000:1. This is known as the photochromic
+micro-image technique, or PCMI.47 Using this technique, it is possible to
+record a 300-page book within one square inch of film. A 3 x 5 inch photochromic
+plate can contain 2,625 micro-images, and by reproduction on a micro-image card,
+the entire contents of eight to ten average size books can be recorded on a 3 x 5 inch
+card. A file of one million document pages can be stored in micro-image form on
+less than 400 3 x 5 inch cards, which are a stack about four inches high. It is
+calculated that the total volume of all reported judicial decisions is slightly less
+than 5,000,000 pages, and that all statutes constitute about another iooo,ooo pages.4s
+Accordingly, by this method all reported judicial decisions and all statutes can be
+recorded in full text on 3 x 5 inch cards in a file approximately 24 inches in depth.
+In this system, any desired document page can be retrieved and read or printed out
+in a hard, full size copy quickly and on demand.
+Another system recently advertised, and presently in commercial production, can
+store 30,000,000 documents in micro-image in the space of an ordinary file cabinet.49
+Within one minute, this system can locate and produce a black and white hard copy
+of any page in the file.
+The storage of documents in micro-image form has many advantages besides
+saving space. The documents are preserved intact and the wear and tear of handling
+and use that is inevitable in an ordinary library is avoided. Perhaps most important,
+the documents are not lost, stolen, or misplaced, but remain constantly available.
+The ability to reproduce desired portions of the documents easily eliminates
+any substantial disadvantage, and .may offer a significant advantage, at least for
+reference material. It seems likely that the duplicating, rather than the circulating,
+library is the library of the future.80 The storage, retrieval, and reproduction techniques
+now available for use with microdocuments indicate that the storage problem
+has been, or can readily be, solved. However, this manner of storage precludes any
+practical method of direct searching of the text and therefore requires retrieval by
+accession number, necessitating an independent indexing system. So it appears that
+indexing or abstracting, or both, will continue to be an integral part of future
+systems for handling large volumes of data.
+
+B. Indexing and Abstracting Problems
+
+The techniques for manipulating index terms and matching request terms to
+index terms are certainly capable of further development and refinement. Nevertheless,
+the work that has already been done suggests that there are known techniques
+which will produce reasonably satisfactory results, and that, in any event, the
+"Photochromic Micro-Images, Reproduction Methods, November 1962, p. 48 et seq.
+" Horty, The "Key Words in Combination" Approach, 62M M.U.L.L. 54, 56 (1962).
+" See Magnavox advertisement for MEDIA system in Wall Street Journal, Nov. 9, x962, p. ii.
+" See Heilprin, Communication Engineering Approach to Microforms, American Documentation, July
+1961, p. 213 et seq.; Heilprin, On the Information Problem Ahead, id., Jan. ig6i, p. 6 et seq.
+LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+capabilities of present equipment permit modification and improvement of these
+
+processes within an established and operating system. The greatest problem now
+apparent in the field is that of establishing adequate clues to document contents by
+indexing or abstracting. These procedures are still done manually in all present
+operating systems, although some provocative experiments have been performed with
+automatic indexing and abstracting.
+On first impression the task of indexing or abstracting may appear to be one
+requiring the exercise of human intelligence and therefore beyond the range of
+automation. However, communication and information have been subject to
+mathematical analysis for more than a decade,"' and there are some techniques for
+mathematical "content analysis" of meaning. 2 All such objective techniques arise
+from the fact that "meaning per se is not negotiable for purposes of communication,
+except by means of arbitrary physical tokens such as the spoken or the written
+word."' It is quite possible, although difficult, to manipulate and analyze objectively
+the objective manifestations of meaning-both the discrete symbols constituting
+words and the complex patterns constituting syntax and even style."4 It has been
+remarked that the semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering
+aspects, but this does not mean that engineering aspects are necessarily irrelevant
+to the semantic aspects06
+To illustrate by a simple example, the meaning of the messages that are to be
+carried is of no significance to the problem of constructing an efficient telephone
+system. On the other hand, the efficiency of the telephone system is indispensable
+to the communication of meaningful messages by telephone, and an inefficient
+system or a "bad" connection can result in a garbled message or wholly prevent
+communication. Similarly, automatic indexing- experiments are based upon the
+thesis that statistics on the kind, frequency, location, order, and arrangement of
+words are adequate to make reasonably good predictions about the subject matter
+(i.e., appropriate classification for library purposes) of documents containing those
+words0 8 It is not necessary to know the significance of an individual word to a
+writer or reader in order to establish its value in conveying information or acting
+as a clue for document retrieval. Thus it may reasonably be assumed that a writer
+will use terms bearing on his special topic with greater frequency than those which
+do not.
+51 See C. E. SHANNON & W. NVEAvER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF CONMIUNICATION (1949).
+'See, e.g., HAROLD D. LASswLL, NATHAN LEiTES & Associates, LANGUAGE OF POLITICS (x949);
+CHAR.S E. OSGooD, GEORGE J. SuCe & PERCY H. TANNENBAUM, Tim MEASUREMENT OF MEANING (1957). "' HANS P. LUHN, AUTOMATED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMs-SoME BASIC PROBLEMS AND PREREQUISITES FOR
+THEIR SOLUTION (IBM, April z, xg6o).
+5' See Yngve, Computer Programs for Translation, Scientific American, June 1962, p. 68.
+SHANNON & W'EAVER, op. cit. supra note 51, at 99-oo.
+Si Maron, Automatic Indexing: An Experimental Inquiry, 8 J. Ass'u FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY
+404 (596r); but cf. Edmundson & W'yllys, Automatic Abstracting and Indexing-Survey and Recommenda.
+tions, 4 COMMUNICATIONS OF= ACM 226 (1961); also cf. Salton, Manipulation of Trees in In!ormation
+Retrieval, 5 COMMUNICATONS OF THE ACM 103 (1962).
+Ti METHODOLOGY OF LEGAL INQUIRY 29
+
+However, mere frequency of use within a document is not a valid indication of
+content, since the most frequently used words are general terms (like "important")
+and logical connectives (like "and," "if," "but," "all," "the," and "an"). In fact,
+a substantial part of any message may be disregarded for purposes of information
+theory analysis. Only about fifty per cent of the words in a message are determined
+by the free choice of the sender, the other fifty per cent being determined by the
+accepted rules governing the use of symbols or the structure of language; so that
+one-half of every ordinary message is redundant in the sense of being unnecessary
+to complete the sense of the message.58 By general information theory, the amount
+of information conveyed by a word should vary inversely, rather than directly, with
+its frequency of usage, since infrequency evidences greater selectivity in its choice59
+It is the rare, special, or technical word that will indicate most strongly the subject
+of an author's discussion. However, the frequency referred to here is frequency in
+general usage, not within a particular document.
+This has led to the formulation of the "relative frequency technique" as a method
+of automatic indexing. 0 This uses the ratio between the frequency of a word's
+occurrence in a particular document and the frequency of its general use to measure
+the significance of the word as an indicator of the contents of the document. The
+matrix for the determination of general frequency may be the literature of the
+language generally, a broad field of interest, such as law, or a special field of interest,
+such as antitrust law. Not enough work has been done to establish the utility of
+the several alternative matrices or ratio measures, but subjective judgment suggests
+that the use of a special field matrix will be both more practical and more informative.
+Refinements of this technique may involve attaching weights to the position of
+occurrence of words; for example, giving more weight to an occurrence in the
+tide, first paragraph, or summary and conclusion than in some other part of an
+article. Further, this technique is capable of establishing a statistically weighted
+connection between a given word and the contents of a document, in order to provide
+the foundation for probabilistic, or comparative relevance, indexing.
+The methods of automatic abstracting are essentially similar to those of automatic
+indexing. Some relatively simple expedients have been suggested, such as extracting
+the first and last paragraphs of a document, or taking the first sentence of each
+paragraph or of every other paragraph. These do not appear to be satisfactory,
+however, and more refined and sophisticated techniques are undoubtedly required.
+When such simple and relatively mechanical techniques are rejected, the problem
+of automatic abstracting becomes essentially the same as the problem of automatic
+indexing. Once it becomes possible to determine statistically the significant words
+in a document, an abstract can be similarly constructed statistically by determining
+" Maron, stpra note 56; Edmundson & Wyllys, supra note 56. 8 SHANNON & WEAVER, op. cit. supra note 51, at 104.
+"'SHANNON & ,VEAvER, op. ct. supra note 51, at 99-io6; Edmundson & Wyllys, supra note 56. " Edmundson & Wyllys, supra note 56.
+30 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+the relative significance of sentences. Sentences may be considered significant if
+they contain single words having a specified significance value or'if they contain a
+plurality of words having a specified aggregate significance value. Then such
+sentences, together with so much of the context as is found. necessary to.make them
+usefully readable (as, perhaps, the sentence preceding and the sentence succeeding
+each significant sentence), may be extracted from the document to form the abstract.
+To those who are concerned about the intellectual .quality of an abstract produced
+automatically, the words of working scientists in the field may be instructive:1
+
+Any technique for automatic abstracting will, ultimately, succeed or fail according as the
+author of the document being abstracted succeeds or fails in expressing his thoughts clearly
+in the document. One cannot put: more into an automatic abstract than the author of
+the document provides. This dependence may actually turn out to be an advantage,
+for automatic abstracts, will rcycal the poverty or richness of a, document .without either
+disguise or embellishment; whereas conventional abstracts sometimes make a document
+appear more valuable than it really is and are liable to subconscious biases and misunderStanding
+ont the part of'flie human abstracter. One may even hope that when, inevitably,
+automatic abstracting-becomes widely used, it will tend to induce authors to set forth
+more -clearly-anpd.explicitly'the main points of their articles.
+
+V
+
+OUTLOOK°
+
+There is mu ch.more that can and.will be said on the subject of legal .data
+retrieval. • In an article such as this it is possible only to. suggest the character and
+scope of the work being done in the field and its possibilities. While major interest
+naturally centers on problems of indexing, abstracting, storing, and retrieving textual
+matter such as court decisions, briefs, memoranda and similar material, this is by
+no means the limit of application. On the contrary, the techniques of automatic
+data processing have been and are being successfully applied to such legal problems
+as the filing of annual corporation reports; 2 the filing and retrieval of chemical
+patents;03 trademark searches;64 the manipulation of large accumulations of evidence
+in a "big case"; 65 storage and retrieval of real estate title records;0 6 record keeping
+by the Internal Revenue Service, including setting up and posting taxpayers'
+accounts, computing taxes and refunds due, searching for failures to file returns and
+" Id. at 232.
+" Russo, Mechanized Processing for Annual Corporation Reports in Connecticut, 6oD M.U.L.L. 133
+(i§6o). 63 Andrews, Experience with Electronic Searching of United States Patents, 6oD M.U.L.L. 168 (196o);
+Newman, Information Retrieval Research in the U.S. Patent Offlce, 6oJ M.U.L.L. 45 (196o). . " Trademark International of Detroit, Mich., a commercial organization, is now offering an automated
+international trademark searching seryice.
+"8 Freed, Machine Data Processing Systems for the Trial Lawyer, The Practical Lawyer, April i 96o,
+p. 73. Individual lawyers in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have also used simple
+punch card systems for handling evidentiary material in an antitrust case. 88 Computer Storage of Title Records Offers Solution to Paperwork Explosion, 47 IoWA L. RuV. 382
+(1962); 12 LAw REv. DIG. 1 (1962).
+TuIE METHODOLOGY OF LEGAL INQUIRY
+
+klecting retiirns for detailed audit;6 7 and the compilation and analysis of identical
+bidding reports by the Department of JtusticeYs These techniques are- more widely
+used, .both in and out of government, for the handling of technical.information not
+directly related to law." Such technical information does, of course,become relevant
+to law when legal investigation or litigation touches technical fields. Accordingly,
+the Department of Justice has established liaison with both ASTIA (the Armed
+Services. Technical Information Agency) and NASA so that abstracts and bibliographies
+on a wide variety of technical subjects can readily be secured by lawyers
+concerned with those subjects 0
+The advantages of automated data retrieval are so great that there is a tendency
+to view these developments principally in terms of convenience, speed, economy, and
+efficiency,7 although thought may also be given to some of the legal problems involved
+in widespread computer employment, such as the effect upon traditional
+notions of negligence and the shopbook rule7 2 Certainly these are important considerations.
+But they should not wholly obscure the broader implications of the new
+technology. There are at least two fundamental differences between the electronic
+computers now available and devices (such as calculating machines) which preceded
+them. First and foremost, the new computers can be internally programmed
+to duplicate or simulate such important psychological functions as remembering,
+forgetting, analyzing, differentiating, deciding and pursuing other goal-directed
+activities.73 Secondly, the new computers have the ability to. manipulate nonhumerical
+information, including words and the abstract symbols of mathematical
+logic 4
+' The computers have just one inescapable theoretical limitation: every term
+and operation must be made explicit and nothing can be presumed, assumed, implied,
+or based on intuitionY' The computers can handle all symbols and programs that
+Smith, Tax Practice Under Automatic Data Processing, 62M M.U.L.L. 7 (1962). 0 8
+The program under which identical bidding reports are received and its genesis are described in
+IDENTICAL BIDDING IN PUBLIC PROCUREM NT, REPORT OF THE AIroRNEY GENERAL UNDER ExECUTIVE
+ORDER 10936 (1962). No sophisticated techniques for analysis of the data have yet been utilized, but
+automatic manipulation has been found indispensable to an orderly arrangement and presentation of the
+mass of data involved with the limited staff available. Page8 112 to 404 of the printed report are simply
+reduced photo copies of the actual print out of the machine from the data cards.
+" See Senate Comm. on Government Operations, Documentation, Indexing, and Retrieval of Scientific
+Inftrmation, A Study of Federal and Non-Federal Science Information Processing and Retrieval Programs,
+S. Doe. No. 113, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (i96o), and Addendum to Senate Document No. 5z3 of the
+Eighty-sixth Congress, S. Doe. No. 15, 87th Cong., ist Sess. (x961).
+" The extensive libraries of ASTIA and NTASA are automated. See references cited in preceding footnote.n
+Freed, Prepare Now for Machine-Assisted Legal Research, 47 A.B.A.J 764 (196x). 7
+. Freed, A Lawyer's Guide Through the Computer Maze, The Practical Lawyer, Nov. 196o, p. 15;
+Brown,- Electronic Brains and the Legal Mind: Computing the Data Computer's Collision with Law', 71
+YALE L.J. 239 (g6i); also ef. Freed, Some Legal Aspects of Computer Use in Business and Industry,
+[g6i] J. INDUilIAL ENGINEERING 289.
+" Lingoes, Information Processing in -Psychological Research, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 412 (1962).
+" Ibid. Also see the pioneer article in the field, Bush, As We May Thin , Atlantic Monthly, July
+1945, P. 0lo.
+" Stone, Bales, Namenwirth & Ogilvie, The General Inquirer: A Computer System for Content
+Analysis and Retrieval Based on -the Sentence as a Unit of Information, 7 BEHeVsoRAL SCIENCE 484
+(rg a). '- ." -• - "
+LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
+
+are completely explicated. In other words, the computers can do anything we tell
+them to do; their only absolute limitation is our ability to provide instructions.
+Even this limitation has uses, for it permits us to test the clarity and consistency
+of our own thought and expression. This can be done for large numbers of similar
+cases by computer programming. It can be done more efficiently for individual cases
+by using the intellectual model or analogue of a computer, symbolic logic. This
+is a far more flexible and powerful intellectual tool than syllogistic logic, and is
+adapted to detecting ambiguities and inconsistencies and determining validity or
+invalidity in complex problems of logic, expression and communication. 0 Any
+operation that can be performed on a computer can be expressed in modern logic;
+and any operation that can be expressed in modern logic can be performed on a
+computer. The basic elements that these procedures have in common are explication,
+model-making (or operational organization or programming), and the production
+of a testable conclusion. These elements carry us beyond the subject matter
+that either computers or symbolic logic ordinarily work with and into the broad field
+of scientific research generally on social problems.
+The yearning for a "scientific" answer to legal problems, as noted at the beginning,
+is an old one. The great Cardozo cried for a "table of logarithms" to produce "the
+formula of justice.""" What we are learning is that the logarithms and other mathematical
+formulae are available-not to produce a "formula of justice," but only more
+modestly to answer specific questions by programmed operations. If questions
+are properly put to science by the law, sensible answers can be secured. The field
+of behavioral -science is far too broad today to review briefly, but examples of particular
+pertinence to law abound.
+Four examples of behavioral science research methods have recently been reported
+from the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School.18 One question
+asked was: What, if any, difference is there between the way a judge and a jury
+decide the same case? The method adopted was to ask the presiding judge in a
+large number of jury cases to answer a questionnaire before the jury verdict was
+returned, stating how he would have decided the case. The judges' answers and
+the jury verdicts were then compared. The results of this inquiry showed that judges
+and juries agreed in eighty per cent of the cases, that in eighteen per cent the jury
+acquitted where the judge would have convicted, and that in only two per cent
+did the jury convict where the judge would have acquitted.70
+7 See Allen, Some Uses of Symbolic Logic in Law Practice, The Practical Lawyer, May x96a, p. 51;
+Allen, "Beyond Document Retrieval Toward Information Retrieval: Federal Estate Tax," a paper presented
+at the Conference on Tax Administrative and Tax Policy Implications of Electronic Data Processing,
+Harvard University, April 13-15, 1961; Stern, Syntactical Ambiguity in the Clayton Act, Section 5(a),
+6oD M.U.L.L. x 9 (ig6o); Vonneuman, But How Do We Apply Modern Logic to Law?, 6oD M.U.L.L.
+138 (xg6o).
+" BENJAMIN N. CaRaozo, Tnx PARADoxEs OF LEGAL.. SCIENCE 1 (x928). T8Zeisel, Social Research on the Law, in WILLIAM M. EVAN (ED.), LAW AND SOCIOLOov 124 et seq.
+(x962). The discussion in the text following this note is taken from the essay of Zeisel.
+"Judge Gustavus Loevinger, who sat on the district court of Ramsey County, Minnesota, from
+THE METHODOLOGY OF LEGAL INQUIRY 33
+
+Another question was whether there was a greater tendency for people to file
+claims in some cities of the United States than in others. The investigation was
+made by a statistical study of claims filed with a cross section group of insurance
+companies arising out of automobile accidents and accidents in department and
+chain stores. The analysis produced a fairly consistent rank order of cities with
+Philadelphia emerging as the most "claim conscious" and Detroit as the least. A
+related question was whether juries in some regions or cities give higher awards in
+comparable tort cases than in other regions or cities. After analyzing a number of
+difficulties in establishing comparability, the experimenters secured detailed written
+descriptions of five personal injury cases. These were then presented to a large
+number of experienced insurance adjusters, each of whom was asked to estimate
+the jury verdict that would be expected from a jury in his locality for that case.
+The results indicated reliable regional variations, with estimated jury awards being
+about eighty per cent of the national average in the rural south and midwest and
+about iao per cent of the national average in the metropolitan east and west coasts.
+Another experiment was designed to determine what effect the formulation-of
+the legal rule as to the defense of insanity in criminal cases actually has on jury
+verdicts. A mock trial based on the real Durham case was tape recorded, with all
+parts of the trial included from the judge's opening statement to the final instructions.
+Three recorded versions were produced that were identical except for the instructions
+to the jury. In one version the instructions were based on the M'Naghten rule, in a
+second version on the Durham rule, and in the third version no instructions on-the
+subject were given. Juries were selected by lot from the actual jury pools of three
+metropolitan areas, and were presented with the recorded trial, followed by the same
+opportunity to deliberate and reach a verdict as in a real trial. The results of this
+experiment are yet to be published. The point of significance here is not that any
+particular investigation was made, or results secured, but rather that the problems
+of law are subject to investigation by the construction and operation of experimental
+models.80
+Computer techniques and applications seem to have attracted more attention,
+both from the technicians and the general public, than scientific theory and investigation
+of other kinds in the behavioral field. One of the reasons obviously is that
+the problem of data retrieval is so pervasive that automated data retrieval systems
+will have very wide utility. However, there are other problems of law that are
+almost, if not quite, as general as that of data retrieval. One of these is that of
+determining the reliability and credibility of testimony. Attention was first called to
+
+1931 until r955, kept a similar record of his own agreement or disagreement with jury verdicts over a
+period of more than ten years. His results were in substantial agreement with those of the Chicago
+experiment. 8 0For another example of interesting model design in the construction of scientific experiments
+for the investigation of forensic problems, see CARL I. HovL-rAr (ED.), THE ORDER op RESENTAMro um
+PERASsTON (1957).
+LAW AND' CONTEMPORARY PROAWEMS.
+
+this problem and to the possibility of its scientific investigation by the classic statement
+of Miinsterberg more than half a century ago.8' Some scientific work has been
+done in the field since that time, principally focused on the detection of deception,82
+but the basic problem still remains and awaits interdisciplinary and scientific investigation.
+3
+Another problem of great generality and deep interest among lawyers is that
+of predicting judicial decisions. Recent work (some of it reported in other articles
+in the present symposium) has made it evident that this problem too, if presented
+in properly posed questions, is amenable to scientific investigation8 4 Two aspects
+certainly seem beyond question. First, as the methods of securing, indexing and
+retrieving legal data improve, it will become more likely that lawyers and judges
+faced with a given case will at least have the same legal precedents and principles
+at hand from which to begin their consideration. This will tend to give the lawyer
+somewhat greater assurance in forecasting the judicial decision than if he must take
+account of the possibility that the judge has discovered a different set of precedents
+than the lawyer was aware of when presenting the case. In the second place, if
+lawyers are to deal intelligently and effectively with scientific data-regarding judicial
+behavior or anything else-they must have at least some understanding of the
+intellectual framework of science, particularly mathematical expression, statistical
+measures and probability8 5 All of this is merely to say that jurimetrics is now
+pr."actical, and that in the near future, its study will probably become essential for
+the individual lawyer.
+Certainly the approach that has been characterized as jurimetrics does not offer
+any social panaceas. Essentially, it involves putting a series of questions that are
+capable of investigation to the test of investigation. It seeks not sudden revelations
+or universal laws but the slow accretion of tested information. It seeks to apply to
+legal problems "the same humble, honest objective approach that has characterized
+the development of science" in other fields!' Jurimetrics does not seek to oust
+" HUGO MBNsTE.RBERG, ON Tm WITNEss STAND (1908).
+"'See Loevinger, Jurimetrics-The Next Step Forward, 33 MINN. L. REy. 455 nn.78 and 79 (x949);
+Rowell, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Scientific Devices and Analysis, 6 ARK. L. REv. 18x
+(1952); Symposium-The Polygraphic Truth Test, 22 TENN. L. REV. 7i et seq. (1953); Skolnick,
+Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961).
+s See Kubie, Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, io8 U. PA. L.
+REV. 59 (x959).
+" See GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); Loevinger, The
+Elements of Predictability in Judicial Decision Making (delivered in ig6o), in LAW AND ELECTRONICS: TiHE
+CHA LLENGE OF A NEW ERa 249 et seq. (Jones ed. 1962); Loevinger, Jurimetrics: Science and Prediction in
+thl! Field of Law, 46 MINN. L. REV. 255 (1961); Kort, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 6oD
+M.U.L.L. 143 (ig6o); Nagel, Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Decisions, The Practical
+Lawyer, March 1961, p. 68; Schubert, Psychometric Research in Judicial Behavior, 62M M.U.L.L. 9 (1962).
+85See Loevinger, The Elements of Predictability in Judicial Decision Making, in LAW AND ELECTRONICS:
+THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW ERA 249 et seq. (Jones ed. 1962); Loevinger, Jurimetrics: Science
+abd Prediction in the Field of Law, 46 MINN. L. REV. 255 (ig6i). . "The quoted phrase is from Szent-Gyorgyi, Science, Man, and Politics, Saturday Review, Oct. 20,
+1962, p. 24.
+THE METHODOLOGY oF LEGAL INQUIRY 35
+
+jurisprudence, philosophy, or faith from men's lives. These, too, have their place.
+There will always be assumptions and choices to be made by the free spirit of a man,
+and no scientific operation or test can ever properly make or constrain such choices.
+Fears for the dangers of a "mechanized jurisprudence" are both quixotic and uncomprehending.
+Jurimetrics is not concerned with a debate as to whether the
+metaphorical life of the law has been logic or experience. Jurimetrics is concerned
+only with investigating the structure and dimensions of all experience that is relevant
+to the law.
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,1939 @@
+Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2458947
+
+RSCAS 2014/72
+Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
+Global Governance Programme-116
+
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions:
+A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2458947
+Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2458947
+
+European University Institute
+Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
+Global Governance Programme
+
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions:
+
+A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/72
+This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other
+purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).
+If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the
+working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher.
+
+ISSN 1028-3625
+
+© Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez, 2014
+
+Printed in Italy, June 2014
+European University Institute
+Badia Fiesolana
+I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
+Italy
+www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/
+www.eui.eu
+cadmus.eui.eu
+Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
+
+The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid
+Laffan since September 2013, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to
+promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society.
+
+The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and
+projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised
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+
+Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:
+http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/
+
+Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and
+books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:
+http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/
+
+The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).
+
+The Global Governance Programme at the EUI
+
+The Global Governance Programme (GGP) is research turned into action. It provides a European
+setting to conduct research at the highest level and promote synergies between the worlds of research
+and policy-making, to generate ideas and identify creative and innovative solutions to global
+challenges.
+
+The GGP comprises three core dimensions: research, policy and training. Diverse global governance
+issues are investigated in research strands and projects coordinated by senior scholars, both from the
+EUI and from other internationally recognized top institutions. The policy dimension is developed
+throughout the programme, but is highlighted in the GGP High-Level Policy Seminars, which bring
+together policy-makers and academics at the highest level to discuss issues of current global
+importance.The Academy of Global Governance (AGG) is a unique executive training programme
+where theory and “real world” experience meet. Young executives, policy makers, diplomats,
+officials, private sector professionals and junior academics, have the opportunity to meet, share views
+and debate with leading academics, top-level officials, heads of international organisations and senior
+executives, on topical issues relating to governance.
+
+For more information:
+http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu
+
+Abstract
+
+This paper considers a large global sample of constitutional texts (i.e. 171 constitutions from 153
+countries) and assesses to what extent and how they refer to the increasingly important phenomenon of
+international regionalism (or regional integration) and how they deal with potential sources of tensions
+and contradictions between the national legal systems and the emerging regional regulatory universes.
+A typology of clauses is therefore proposed. In addition, some evidence is presented on the evolution
+of constitutional references over time, and on the relationship between constitutional referencing and
+the depth of the (de facto and de jure) regionalization processes.
+
+Keywords
+
+Regionalism, regional integration, constitutions, jurimetrics
+
+1
+
+1. Introduction*
+
+International regionalism has gained considerable importance since WWII and there are good reasons
+to think that this tendency of deepening regionalism might well continue in the foreseeable future (de
+Melo and Panagariya 1995; UNCTAD 2007; Kühnhardt 2010).
+1 No doubt there are many cross-border
+policy challenges for which the regional level might well be the most adequate to tackle them,
+especially if the responses to these challenges show features of regional public goods (Sandler 1998).
+Just think of migration (and related social security issues), infectious diseases, large infrastructure
+works, natural resource management, environmental disaster management, consumer protection,
+economic crisis management, monetary stabilization, etc.
+
+Such a process of gradual deepening of regional integration or regionalism implies, however, that
+the institutional and legal nature of the arrangements is also being transformed.2
+From a legal
+perspective, it is recognized that a new form of globalization of the law (called ‘the third
+globalization’) is taking place, characterized by institutional innovations such as structural adjustment,
+economic integration and the generalized protection of human rights. These phenomena have
+influenced the displacement of legal positivism by other normative legal schools such as NeoConstitutionalism
+in Europe and Legal Pragmatism in the US, which seem more compatible with these
+new phenomena (Kennedy 2006:64; Posner 2004:157-9; Bomhoff 2008:4).
+
+From a situation of pure treaty-based intergovernmental cooperation, which can be handled with
+the established instruments and practices of international public law, states may move in the direction
+of deeper forms of integration which imply less policy autonomy and/or the pooling or transfer of
+sovereignty. With deeper integration, the paradigms of the formal international public law and the
+capacity of national constitutions to interact with it, are being tested.
+
+The purpose of this Paper is double. On the one hand, it is related to ontological and typological
+issues, as a first step in theorizing. We aim at describing how and to what extent constitutional texts,
+drawn from a large global sample of constitutions, actually refer to the phenomenon of international
+regionalism (or regional integration). In other words, the questions that will be addressed are about the
+extent to which constituents and legislators worldwide refer in their constitutions to the emerging
+reality of regionalism and deal explicitly with potential sources of tensions and contradictions between
+the national legal systems and the emerging regional regulatory universes. We will thereby propose a
+typology of clauses, which –we claim- will be useful for both legal and political-type analyses, and
+apply a jurimetrics approach. This will already give an initial idea of the extent to which national
+constitutions deal with potential sources of tensions and contradictions between the national legal
+systems and the (existing or emerging) regional regulatory universes. On the other hand, we will
+present exploratory analytical work, showing some evidence on the evolution of constitutional
+references over time, and on the relationship between constitutional referencing and the depth of (de
+jure and de facto) regionalization processes.
+
+The structure of the paper is as follows: we will first present a literature review in section two. This
+includes the connection with the ontological and conceptual discussions in the field (2.1), and the
+connection with the literature on the transformation of international public law in the context of
+
+
+*
+The authors thank Stephen Kingah and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on a previous version of this
+paper.
+1
+In this paper, regionalism, regional governance or regional integration refer to international regions, as distinguished
+from sub-national regions (or cross-border regions). In the literature these regions are also called macro-regions or
+supranational regions. The latter term (supranationality) is reserved here to refer to the nature of arrangements (i.e. not
+regarding membership), as distinguished from intergovernmental arrangements.
+2
+On the transformation of institutions and law in the most emblematic –European- case, see e.g. Weiler (1991).
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+2
+
+regional integration (2.2); Section three deals with various aspects of our empirical methodology
+(research questions, selection of constitutions, selection of relevant clauses, typology, indicators, etc.).
+In section four, we present the results in terms of frequency and typology of constitutional referencing
+to the regional phenomenon. The jurimetric results are contextualized and re-connected to the regional
+and national constitutional and institutional contexts. Section four thus responds to the first purpose of
+this paper (see above). Section five presents some further analysis and interpretation of the data. Using
+a sub-sample of constitutions, some evidence will be presented on the evolution of constitutional
+referencing over time, and on the relationship between constitutional referencing, on the one hand, and
+de jure or de facto depth of the regionalization process, on the other. Section six concludes.
+
+2. Literature review
+
+2.1. International regionalism
+
+The broader political science/IR literature on regionalism is characterized by conceptual variety, if not
+conceptual confusion (see Hurrell 1995; Katzenstein 1996; Mansfield and Milner 1997; WarleighLack
+2008; Sbragia 2008; De Lombaerde et al. 2010; and many others). This variety reflects both the
+heterogeneity of the underlying population of regions (Genna and De Lombaerde 2010), and the fact
+that regions (and regionalization processes) can be looked at through a variety of theoretical lenses.
+We cannot go deeply into this conceptual debate here, but what comes clearly out of it is that
+comparative studies on regionalism require ab initio conceptual pluralism and flexibility. This will
+also be our underlying approach when selecting relevant clauses from a sample of constitutions (see
+below).
+
+Regionalism will therefore be seen here as a phenomenon going beyond regional intergovernmental
+and supranational organizations. Having said this, from institutional and legal perspectives they are
+obviously of essential relevance. From a transaction cost perspective, one could assimilate
+intergovernmentalism with the organization of a market of international relations, whereas
+supranational integration could then be assimilated with the creation of an organization (Trachtman
+1996: 48). They are usually seen as discrete, mutually excluding and opposite extremes but it is closer
+to reality to consider more gradual transformations within a spectrum (Weiler 1991) and -more
+recently- they have been considered as rather complementary options for regional integration (Schout
+and Wolff 2010:1-2). Supranationality is usually understood as a vertical transfer of competences to
+supra-national institutions, i.e. a hierarchical institutional design, while intergovernmental schemes are
+more based on horizontal cooperation. One illustration of the complementarity hypothesis is the
+European Union (EU), considered as the cornerstone of the supranational model, which continues to
+deepen its regional integration process increasingly using intergovernmentalist arrangements for this
+purpose (Fontes 2000:6; Schout and Wolff 2010: 18).
+
+But even from a legal perspective, regionalism is not only a matter of (regional) intergovernmental
+treaties and/or supranational organizations; it is also –more generally- one of the factors that contribute
+to the transformation of international law (see also below) and to the consequential changing nature of
+national sovereignty regarding the regulation of the internal affairs of countries. When looking at these
+developments, the EU is usually taken as the main point of reference, given that its regional
+integration process has created an important corpus of supranational law and institutions and
+simultaneously reduced national sovereign competences of its member states. However, when looking
+at regionalism globally, although one can observe a renewed dynamism since the 1990s (the so-called
+new regionalism) in many regions, one cannot observe a systematic adoption of the ‘European model’,
+understood as the formal model of European supranationalism, elsewhere (Best 2005: 39; De
+Lombaerde and Schulz 2009). ASEAN for instance rejected the creation of regional supranational
+institutions. By contrast, the African Union has taken the European Model more into account but not
+reaching a representative level of supra-nationalism and de facto being more inclined towards
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+3
+
+intergovernmental designs (Best 2005:40-1). This is reflected in our empirical analysis where, behind
+the European countries, the countries of the African region are the ones who have most explicit
+references to belonging to regional organizations in their constitutional texts (e.g. Algeria, Angola,
+Cape Verde and DR Congo) (see section 3). Also in Latin America, there is some formal similarity
+between the regional institutions and the European institutions (the Andean Community being a case
+in point), but despite the intentions, intergovernmentalism is still predominant. There is an extensive
+literature on the ‘European model’ (in its normative and positive understandings) and the
+comparability of regionalization processes in political science/IR.3 This will not be further discussed
+here; in this paper, we will focus on the legal aspects that interact with regional integration policies
+worldwide.
+
+Regional integration can be considered as public international (economic) law whose scope has
+sometimes been interpreted as a new form of governing competition among states with respect to the
+regulation of all issues related with international trade, but more in particular, with public goods. This
+regulation of competition at the international level seeks therefore to achieve local public policy goals
+of national governments (Trachtman1996: 50-1).
+
+But regionalism has also been presented as weakening the unitary sovereignty of the nation state
+and the traditional hierarchy of legal rules (Bernard 2011). According to Trachtman (1996: 57-58), the
+degree of regional integration has a direct relation with the scope of constitutional competences of the
+legislative branch of government. If they are expanded, governments would engage more with
+intergovernmental organizations. The scope of the national constitutional judicial competences may
+also influence the discussion concerning supranational rules. Therefore, constitutional design is
+relevant for the deepening of regional integration processes, when transiting from an
+intergovernmental arrangement towards an institutionalized supranational organization.
+
+2.2. Regional integration, international public law and constitutional law
+
+The discussion on constitutional referencing to regionalism or regional integration should be seen in
+the broader context of a global transformation of international public law and constitutional law.
+Relevant aspects of this transformation include: the constitutionalization of international public law,
+the debate about the enforcement of international treaties by national authorities, and the growing
+relevance of international soft law. These will be briefly presented in the following paragraphs.
+
+The constitutionalization of international public law4
+
+An empirical study of national constitutions and case law concluded that although the influence of
+international law on national constitutional systems is significant, constitutional courts do not
+necessarily uphold the supremacy of international law over national constitutions (Peters 2009:171).
+However, although this appears to be a problem of hierarchy of rules and although it sometimes seems
+that international law and national constitutions are irreconcilable, there is a clear trend towards a
+progressive harmonization of national constitutions worldwide, mainly in the terrain of human rights
+(Peters 2009:197).
+
+Modern constitutions, enacted after 1945, generally protect fundamental rights, based on “a flexible
+and pragmatic style of interpretation and enforcement” which seems closer to the German model
+(Grey 2003:7). This model has been widely adopted in countries with recent democracies and is
+
+
+3
+For an introduction into this literature, see e.g. De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, Van Langenhove and Baert (2010). See also,
+Sbragia (2008), Warleigh-Lack (2008), Acharya (2012), and many others.
+4
+This concept has been widely analyzed, and it is also referred to as world constitutionalism (Ackerman 1997; Peters
+2012). The idea behind these concepts is that some issues regulated by public international law enjoy a sufficient degree
+of ‘objectivity’ that they may limit the sovereignty of the nation–state and even of international organizations (Kleinlein
+2012:703).
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+4
+
+becoming the most influential model outside the US (Ginsburg 2008). In the US, the scope of foreign
+and international law, case law or doctrine has been frequently debated. Some positions argue that
+globalization and the diffusion of the protection of human rights have an incidence on US
+constitutional cases, while other oppose this possibility because it is not in line with the meaning of the
+US constitution (Gray 2007: 5-6, 11-5). That is why world constitutionalism is not considered as
+having a strong influence on US constitutionalism (Ackerman 1997:772).
+
+At the global level, a progressive constitutionalization of international public law has been
+suggested, precisely because of the progressive weakening of national constitutions caused by the
+growing globalization of some issues. This is mainly supported and promoted by courts and the
+academic world (Peters 2012:82). The points of departure for this global constitutionalism are two
+international legal systems in force: the international protection of human rights and the WTO (Peters
+2012). These legal systems are more and more interconnected (Van Hees 2004; De Lombaerde and
+Lizarazo 2013; Lizarazo et al. 2014).
+
+The protection of fundamental rights and their consequent judicial globalization is characterized by
+the mutual citation in human rights matters, named the “new ius gentium of human rights” (Grey
+2003:7; Stone Sweet and Matthews 2008; Bomhoff 2008). This movement is seen as the conclusion of
+a long process of increasing pertinence of rights, in many cases taking the form of rules and in other
+cases as policies, but their relevance cannot be ignored, even if they are not part of the constitution
+(Kennedy 2006:65-6). The growing direct application of International Conventions of Human Rights
+as binding rules by national courts corroborates this trend (ICJ 2008).
+
+The WTO in turn is presented as an example of a strong global institution that aims to fight
+protectionism through the principles of most favored nation (MFN) and national treatment (Peters et
+al. 2011: 71-6). However, the stagnation of the Doha Development Agenda in recent years, similarly
+to what happened during the Uruguay Round, has affected its global influence through the explosion
+of bilateral and regional FTAs. It is argued that the recently approved Bali Package in 2013 (just)
+seeks to recover the role of the WTO as the main regulator of international trade (Ramírez 2013). In
+addition, the constitutionalization of international economic law is also justified by the need to solve
+the conflicting relations between human rights protection and trade liberalization with the
+corresponding creation of a multilevel judiciary (Peters et al. 2011: 76-7, 94; Van Hees 2004; Narula
+2011).
+
+Treaty enforcement by national authorities
+
+Although the debate on the scope of self-executing treaties versus non-self-executing treaties is to a
+large extent associated with the US, its relevance goes beyond this country and extends particularly to
+other federal states in processes of international integration. The concept of self-executing treaties
+refers to the possibility that an international treaty may be directly enforced before courts without the
+implementation of prior legislation (Vázquez 1995: 695). This subject remains highly controversial
+and the US Supreme Court of Justice has not produced a clear precedent that would guide lower courts
+in distinguishing between self-executing treaties and non-self-executing treaties (Vázquez 1995: 722-
+3; García 2013). A non-generalized position in case law supports the presumption of non-selfexecution,
+mainly in the context of multilateral treaties (Bradley 2003:1588-9). Another interpretation,
+seeking to apply a more selective filter to the direct application of international treaties, affirms that if
+a treaty creates a “primary international duty”, it is judicially enforceable but the nature of the duty is
+also relevant. Courts should determine whether this international duty creates a primary national duty
+whose nature and scope is a constitutional issue and whether the national duty is judicially
+enforceable. However, this extreme position limits the enforcement of treaties by the courts when the
+political branches decide not to comply with them (Sloss 2002). In recent years, the US Supreme
+Court has influenced the way of understanding self-executing-treaties after a ruling of 2008 (Medellín
+vs. Texas). Since then, it is accepted that treaties have a double character of political and legal
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+5
+
+agreements whose judicial enforcement may also be considered as a political decision, or as a
+discretionary decision of courts that may be controlled by the political branches (Bradley 2009:41-2).5
+
+In Europe this issue has also been analyzed. Poland, The Netherlands and Germany are quoted as
+countries remarkably inclined towards accepting the character of some treaties as self-executing, in
+particular those that refer to rights enforcement (Sloss 2009:12-3). The existence of the EU legal
+system is one reason that may explain why some national courts in some European countries are more
+familiar with the character of self-executing treaties (Sloss 2009:15).
+
+In some of the more visible countries belonging to the Commonwealth, such as Australia, Canada
+and the UK, the courts are in general open to accept the self-executing character of some treaty
+clauses, also mainly when they relate to rights. In the UK the Human Rights Act (1998) is at the basis
+of this position while Canada accepts the direct enforcement of treaties by the application of “the
+presumption of conformity” and in Australia the “legitimate expectations doctrine” is the basis of this
+acceptance (Sloss 2009:24).
+
+Recent judicial activism of some courts is attracting the attention to emerging markets where the
+international treaties of human rights are not only self-executing, but they are also used as a binding
+principle of constitutional adjudication. This is the case of India and South Africa (Sloss 2009:25) but
+also Colombia (Lizarazo 2011; Lizarazo et al. 2014).
+
+Trade agreements and regional economic integration
+
+Concerning international trade agreements, the US Constitution does not establish their character of
+self-executing treaties approved under the competence of the commerce clause, and case law of the US
+Supreme Court of Justice does not show a clear pattern. Case law of the US Court has not been
+consistent in the interpretation of the scope of the commerce clause although it has ruled that one of its
+purposes is the abolition of the barriers to trade (Goodman and Frost 2000:1,3,5). Therefore, regional
+integration treaties signed by the US, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
+are not clearly self-executing treaties. The Congress has the competence to overrule them. As such,
+regional integration agreements need special constitutional status to warrant more institutional stability
+(Abbot 1993: 184). In some cases, the Court follows policy arguments in favor or against the
+(federated) states, and in some cases it has considered NAFTA as a threat to national sovereignty
+(Goodman and Frost 2000: 1, 3, 5). The US states are concerned that their constitutional competences
+may be compromised by the federal government because it does not have a binding duty to consult
+with the states during the negotiation of trade agreements, although the NAFTA itself includes a duty
+to align state competences with NAFTA regulations (Tangeman 1996: 245-6). Again the issue turns
+around the nature of “constitutional state rights” with a political component. While for some observers
+the constitutional sovereignty of states is an obstacle in the processes of FTA negotiations (Goodman
+and Frost 2000:1), for others the federal government cannot compromise the constitutional sovereignty
+of the states, otherwise the Federal level would widen its competences (Cruz 2014: 102-3, 105). But
+the issue is not exclusive to the US. In Canada, some tensions between NAFTA regulations and
+provincial policies have been observed in the areas of environmental protection and investment
+(Cumming and Froehlich 2007).
+
+In Australia, it has been proposed that the problem of federal states regarding the competences of
+subnational entities in the context of regional agreements be solved by means of the action of the
+constitutional court by balancing (reconciling) (protectionist) sub-national constitutional competences
+with federal constitutional competences on free trade (Villalta 2011:1,18). By contrast, as it will be
+illustrated in the empirical analysis of constitutions, European countries with strong federal states such
+as Germany, Italy and Austria are solving the conflict between levels of government by constitutional
+
+
+5
+For a comparative analysis of the reluctance to accept self-executing treaties in the US and Israel, see Sloss (2009: 32-9).
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+6
+
+regulation of multi-level governance, seeking to avoid regulatory obstacles to the regional integration
+process as in North America or Australia.
+
+At the European level, the development of European integration and the self-executing character of
+most of the hard European Law have been possible because national constitutions have been made
+compatible with (the primacy of) European Law (Declaration 17 annexed to the TEU, quoted by
+Besselink et al 2014:9). The principle of primacy, together with the one of the direct effect of
+European Law have been developed by the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), and
+they have been considered as the point of departure of a progressive constitutionalization of the
+primary Law of the EU (Aguilar 2012:7-8).6
+
+Although in principle the primacy of EU law could be seen as an expression of the Vienna
+Convention of 1969 (27), which does not allow member-states to invoke national rules as a
+justification to breach treaties, the relations between EU law and national constitutions of memberstates
+have been largely analyzed in a very specific way. They have even been considered as a sort of
+composite constitutional framework or an “interwined constitutionalism” (Ziller 2005:480, quoted by
+Diez-Hochleitner 2013: 3-4).
+
+This compatibility has been made possible mainly through constitutional amendments that
+authorize the limitation of national sovereignty and/or the consequent transfer of competences to the
+EU. In many countries, the objective to participate in the EU as a regional integration process was
+made explicit in the corresponding constitutional amendment by means of the enactment of the wellknown
+“Europa Clauses” (Besselink et al. 2014:8-21) or “integration clauses” (Bernard 2011). This
+explains why many EU member states include explicit references to the regional grouping in their
+constitutional texts (see table 3).7
+
+However, ‘good’ European governance in coordination with the national competences of the
+member-states depends not only on constitutional and legal regulators who support regional
+integration mainly by the elimination of constitutional barriers (“constitutional safeguards”) but also
+on the behavior of courts, who can/should also ensure international cooperation by avoiding “the
+protection biases” that may affect regional integration. In other words, regional integration law needs
+to be enforced with the support of a multilevel judicial safeguard who should take into account the
+constitutional diversity of the member-states (Petersmann 2008: 246).8 Therefore, the enforcement of
+EU law depends on a strong coordination between EU Law and national constitutional systems,
+favoring the interpretation pro unione of constitutional rules, in particular the “Europe clauses” (DiezHochleitner
+2013:4), but at the same time, national constitutional values should be a criterion of
+interpretation for the CJEU.9
+
+Thus, as Besselink et al. (2014: 22-27) explain, although from the perspective of the EU
+institutions, national constitutions cannot be used as an argument to refuse the enforcement of EU
+Law, from the perspective of member-states, secondary EU Law is enforceable if it respects
+
+
+6
+The first principle refers to the prevalence of EU Law in case of contradiction with national legal rules of the memberstates,
+and the second one refers to the above defined self-executing treaties (Aguilar 2012:7-8).
+7
+The relevant role of national constitutions for the enlargement of the European integration has been particularly notorious
+in the case of East European countries where deep constitutional reforms were needed in order to make their national
+legal order compatible with EU law (Herdegen 2013:144).
+8
+Although the creation of supranational institutions, including Courts, has been presented as the best way to promote
+regionalism, the “multilevel legal and judicial protection” of regional markets may also occur by means of
+intergovernmental designs as in the case of the Economic European Area (EEA) (Petersmann 2008: 235-236).
+9
+This position has as legal basis the TEU (4.2) which holds that “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States
+before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
+constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including
+ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In
+particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”.
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+7
+
+constitutional rights, the limits of the transferred competences to the EU and the constitutional
+principles (also called “national identity”). These conditions coincide with the TEU (4.2) but they have
+also been identified in case law of national courts (e.g. Germany, Denmark) and in some national
+constitutions (e.g. Germany (23) and Portugal (7(6))).10
+
+The case of Germany is a benchmark case inside the EU and the German Constitutional Court has
+extensively ruled on the scope of delegation of competences to the EU. Initially the discussion was
+mainly about the level of protection of German constitutional rights. The German Court has in general
+upheld EU law if the EU reveals at least the same level of protection of fundamental rights provided
+by the German Constitution (Pernice 1998; Lebeck 2006). However, since the enactment of the Treaty
+of Lisbon, which gave binding force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the tensions
+concerning constitutional rights have diminished (Besselink et al. 2014). Some authors argue that the
+German Constitutional Court is also inclined to be in line with the CJEU because European integration
+is a German constitutional value (Lebeck 2006; Diez-Hochleitner 2013; Paulus 2009: 241; Besselink
+et al 2014: 19). Nevertheless, the respect for fundamental constitutional principles by EU law (which
+in some cases still includes rights concerns) remains a relevant issue in national courts (Besselink et al.
+2014: 22-5).
+
+As far as the respect for the transfer of competences is concerned, the German Constitutional Court
+accepts that the CJEU verifies first whether the EU respects its own competences, and it would only
+rule in cases of notorious detriment of national competences (Besselink et al. 2014: 222).11 This is, the
+conflict becomes real only after a ruling of the CJEU by means of the proceedings for annulment or by
+a preliminary ruling (Diez-Hochleitner 2013:33) .
+
+This issue (known as the ultra vires control) remains the main source of potential conflict between
+EU law and national constitutions, despite the fact that the TEU (4.1 and 5.2) establishes that all
+“competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”. The
+problem is that the Lisbon Treaty does not contain a clear catalogue that would avoid potential
+conflicts (e.g. art. 114) (Diez Hochleitner 2013: 7,9). The main concern of the German Court when
+analyzing the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty (Lisbon Case) referred mainly to the flexibility
+clause (TFEU (352)), which allows that the EU competences may be adjusted to the objectives of the
+Treaty in case it fails in providing the necessary competences to reach them. The German Court held
+that EU law and the competences of the CJEU should respect and protect the democratic principle12
+,
+i.e. each new transfer of competences should be approved by national parliaments and not only by the
+European Parliament. This position has been seen as a rejection of the creation of a European federal
+state (Kiiver 2010:580-3; Diez Hochleitner 2013:14; Wolfahrt 2009:1280).
+
+In Africa, the constitutional rules and case law of African states in general are currently not in a
+state of accommodating supranational rules to support the further deepening of regional integration.
+Some countries reformed their constitutions after independence to favor regional integration.
+However, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) emphasized the national sovereignty of the
+member states and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, which is not necessarily
+compatible with a deepening process of regional integration (Oppong 2008: 2,15). More recently, i.e.
+
+
+10 Cf. infra, the principle of subsidiarity in France, Germany and Portugal.
+11 The Lisbon case has been seen by some as showing a Euro-skeptic position of the German Constitutional Court because
+it keeps the competence of revising ultra vires acts of the EU (Diez Hochleitner 2013: 7). However, the German Court
+upheld the treaty and even made the ultra vires control compatible with the Europe clause (BL 23 (13-4)), seeking not to
+interfere with the normal activity of the EU (Diez Hochleitner 2013:13).
+12 The respect of the democratic principle (i.e. the approval of international agreements by national parliaments) is not an
+exclusive position of the German Court. It is understood as the way to legitimize the international economic order
+(Herdegen 2013:67). Bothe (2009) considers this case law of the German Court not necessarily as an obstacle to regional
+integration but as useful and necessary for Europe because the active participation of Parliaments in daily issues of
+European policy would shorten the distance between EU institutions and EU citizens.
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+8
+
+after the creation of the African Economic Community in 1991, new constitutions do not attach much
+relevance to regional integration, but a clear interaction between national constitutions and regional
+directives with respect to democracy and human rights is notorious (Oppong 2008:2,16,18). However,
+Courts in Africa have not been active in ruling on regional integration treaties and commitments,
+despite the fact that some constitutions may allow such judicial review. In general, regional integration
+treaties are treated like other international treaties, without a special constitutional status (Oppong
+2008: 23-24).
+
+In Latin America, as it will be explained below in the empirical analysis, despite the constitutional
+aims to promote regional integration, in some cases with a supranational character, in practice many
+countries are still more inclined to give primacy to national sovereignty, leaving regional integration
+agreements at the level of the law (e.g. Colombia). Some of them give regional integration agreements
+a higher hierarchy than internal law (e.g. Venezuela and Argentina) but in all the cases, national
+constitutions are at the top of the legal system, which means that regional integration treaties are
+subordinated to national constitutions.
+
+Self-regulating markets and soft law
+
+Although this paper refers to hard law (law and regional integration treaties), some words should be
+said about the growing role of soft law. The process of regional integration has also been influenced
+by the growing privatization of markets and vice versa. Private actors are pushing for more
+regionalism but they are simultaneously and increasingly self-regulating their markets in less explicit
+ways and not only through the institutionalization of their lobbying activities. This transformation of
+the traditional paradigms of the legal system has been producing an explosion of the number of
+regulations applied in countries not necessarily enacted by the national constitutional and democratic
+authorities (Corkin 2013: 636, 648-9). The growing and generalized use of private hard and soft law
+by private and public institutions is considered as the privatization of international law with a clear
+influence on regional integration and the empowerment of private actors in the global markets vis-àvis
+the national states (Peters 2012:78). In other words, besides traditional hard law created by
+constitutional national authorities or by means of international treaties in force under the law of
+treaties, other kinds of hard law enacted by regional institutions are displacing norms adopted by
+national authorities. The latter are also seeing their regulatory competences limited or at least
+influenced by the increasing relevance of soft law produced by regional organisms and by private
+actors (e.g. codes of conduct, standards, certification schemes, etc., which are now part of a complex
+international legal system) (Corkin 2013: 650-651). In some cases, constitutional authorities try to
+interact with the non-traditional lawmakers, making explicit the supremacy of their constitutional
+competences of regulation or judicial adjudication on all issues related with national or institutional
+supranational legal systems (Corkin 2013:659-61). Although there has been reluctance to recognize
+the growing relevance of soft law for international law, it has been used by EU authorities13, alongside
+self-regulation mainly through Codes of Conduct (Peters 2011: 27,31). Despite the increase of soft law
+regulations worldwide, the production of binding hard law does not seem to have been influenced
+(Falkner et al. 2005:350, quoted by Peters 2011: 22). Arguments supporting soft law emphasize that it
+does not need a formal approval procedure in which different institutions are involved. At the EU
+level, it also means a flexible regulation that has marginal effects on national sovereignty of member
+states and which guides the interpretation of hard European Law (Peters 2011: 33,36). However, this
+may create tensions between institutions (European Parliament and the Commission) because soft law
+– in contrast with hard law – does not have a democratic origin and has been associated with the
+bureaucratization of the EU (Peters 2011: 44-45; Corkin 2013).
+
+
+13 Two clear examples of soft law inside the EU have been: the Charter of Fundamental Rights which became hard law with
+its recognition in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, and the Luxemburg Agreement (Peters 2011: 26-7).
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+9
+
+3. Methodological aspects
+
+As mentioned before, the central research questions that will be addressed in this paper refer to the
+extent to which constituents and legislators worldwide refer in their constitutional texts to the
+emerging reality of regionalism and deal explicitly with potential sources of tensions and
+contradictions between the national legal systems and the emerging regional regulatory universes. In
+addition, we will assess whether there is evidence of increasing constitutional referencing over time,
+and of any relationship between constitutional referencing and the depth of the corresponding (de jure
+and de facto) regionalization processes.
+
+At the core of our analysis is a jurimetric analysis of a large sample of constitutions. Inclusion of
+texts in the sample was as wide as possible, and depended basically on the availability of the
+constitutional texts in electronic format. A sample was built from the constitutions accessible through
+Constitution Finder.
+14 Of all the constitutions available, the texts were selected in the original
+language, if the original language was English, French, Spanish, German or Dutch, or –otherwise-- a
+translated version into English was used. Dates of enactment and most recent amendments were
+systematically registered. If various (consecutive) texts were available for a specific country, they
+were all included in the database in order to also make a dynamic analysis possible (see below). Some
+micro-states and territories with special status were excluded from the sample. This led to a final
+sample of 171 post-WWII constitutional texts, corresponding to 153 countries.
+
+As a first step, all relevant articles were identified and uploaded in a database. As suggested before,
+we started from a wide and flexible conceptualization of the regional phenomenon. Any reference to
+international regions, independently of its domestic legal implications was registered. However, the
+numbers of articles as reported in the tables in the following sections, should be interpreted with some
+caution. Not all constitutions are organized in the same way. And therefore the use of ‘articles’ (or
+‘sections’) is not necessarily consistent. We have tried to base our analysis on equivalent articles, but –
+obviously— some margin for interpretation was unavoidable. However, this should not significantly
+influence the main conclusions of our analysis.
+
+In section four, some further analysis of the data is presented. Within the mentioned sample of 171
+constitutions, 16 pairs were identified that covered consecutive constitutions for particular countries
+(i.e. a given constitution and a posterior new, substantially reformed or amended one), in order to
+assess the referencing patterns over time. For another sub-sample of recent constitutions (i.e.
+constitutions enacted or amended after 2000), we contrast referencing statistics with measures of de
+jure and de facto regionalization. The former is an index of institutional integration, similar to the
+integration achievement scores first developed by Hufbauer and Schott (1994), based on Balassa’s
+framework (Balassa 1961), further developed and applied by Feng and Genna (2003), and then refined
+by Dorrucci et al. (2004).
+15 We use the data as reported in De Lombaerde, Dorrucci, Genna and
+Mongelli (2011). The latter index, intra-regional trade shares, reflects the relative importance of intraregional
+trade as a percentage of total trade of the member states of a given regional organization.16
+We use data from the Regional Integration Knowledge System (RIKS).17 This indicator shows the
+degree of regional (economic) interdependence and, thus, de facto regionalization.
+
+
+14 The tool which was used for the identification and collection of constitutional texts was Constitution Finder of Richmond
+University [http://confinder.richmond.edu/index.html]. Constitution Finder is an open access tool, made available by a
+team affiliated with the University of Richmond School of Law.
+15 For a more complete bibliography on indicators of regional integration, see De Lombaerde et al. (2011).
+16 For a methodological discussion of the intra-regional trade share measure, see e.g. Iapadre (2006) and Iapadre and
+Plummer (2011).
+17 See: http://www.cris.unu.edu/riks.
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+10
+
+4. Results: frequency and typology of constitutional referencing
+
+We consider thus a large sample of constitutional texts to assess the degrees and ways in which
+regions and/or regional organizations are referred to and defined in constitutional texts worldwide. The
+analysis of this database is reflected in a number of consecutive tables (tables 1-4). The main results
+are the following: Around 50% of all constitutions in the sample refer to international regionalism in
+one way or another, which is quite significant (table 1). Most of these cases refer to international
+regionalism in one or two articles, although there are outliers of up to nine articles (France). Looking
+at broad geographical regions, Asia, Oceania and North-America tend to refer relatively less to
+international regionalism, whereas Europe, Africa and South-America tend show relatively more
+constitutional references to regionalism (table 2).
+
+Table 1: Distribution of constitutions in sample according to number of articles referring to
+regionalism
+
+Number of relevant
+articles
+0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NonzeroTotalNumber
+of
+constitutions in sample
+85 57 13 7 3 1 2 2 0 1 86 171
+
+Source: Own calculations based on constitutional texts from: http://confinder.richmond.edu/index.html.
+(See table 2 for list of constitutions with relevant references)
+
+Table 2: Distribution of constitutions according to presence of references to regionalism, by
+broad geographical regions
+
+No references References Total
+
+Africa 22 25 47
+Asia 27 17 44
+Europe 16 26 42
+North America 2 0 2
+Central America 4 4 8
+South America 3 10 13
+Caribbean 4 3 7
+Oceania 7 1 8
+Total 85 86 171
+Source: see table 1.
+
+Now, when looking at the constitutional provisions more in detail, one notices that the references to
+international regions come in various forms, and that they are not necessarily concerned with clearly
+defining regional organizations (table 3). They either refer to international regions in rather vague
+terms, leaving it to the national authorities to interpret how this should be reflected in a country’s
+international relations and what the constitutional and legal consequences of these provisions exactly
+are, or they refer to specific regional organizations (e.g. EU, League of Arab States, etc.) rather than to
+the generic category. The latter contrasts clearly with how the constitutional principles of foreign
+policy are usually articulated. In order to see more clearly, we established a typology of how
+constitutions refer to regionalism. The following types were considered: (i) belonging to a wider
+cultural region; (ii) belonging to a wider geo-political region; (iii) belonging to a regional organization
+and/or the commitment to respect its rules; (iv) mandate to engage in further regional cooperation
+and/or formal regional integration in the future; (v) rights for citizens of regional organization comember
+states in national elections; (vi) organization of elections of members of regional parliaments;
+(vii) compatibilization of sub-national autonomy and supra-national rule-making; (viii)
+compatibilization of the constitutional framework and autonomy of national parliament, on the one
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+11
+
+hand, with supra-national rule-making, including the treaty negotiation process, on the other; (ix)
+requirement of a referendum on regional integration treaties/reforms; and (x) (preferential) conditions
+for acquiring citizenship based on belonging to a region or regional organization.
+
+From the distribution of articles in table 3, it can be observed that the four most covered types of
+references are: (ii) belonging to a wider geo-political region, (iii) belonging to a specific regional
+organization, (iv) mandate to engage in further regional cooperation/integration, and (viii)
+compatibilization of national constitutional framework with supra-national rule-making.
+
+In sum, a large number of national constitutions refers to international regions. However, this is
+done in a variety of ways with a variety of legal implications. There is still some way to go in the
+direction of a more homogeneous treatment of international regions in constitutions and thus
+contributing to definitional standardization, but the foundations are laid and through innovation,
+imitation and learning it is to be expected that further steps will follow.
+
+Table 3: Type of references to regionalism, by Constitution
+
+Country
+
+Constitution
+Number of relevant articles
+Belonging to wider cultural region
+Belonging to wider geo-political region
+Belonging to regional organization – respect 
+for its rules
+Mandate to engage in further regional 
+cooperation and/or formal regional 
+integration in the future
+Rights for citizens of regional organization in 
+national elections
+Elections of members of regional parliament
+Compatibilization of sub-national autonomy 
+and supra-national rule-making
+Compatibilization of constitutional 
+framework and autonomy of national 
+parliament with supra-national rule-making, 
+including treaty negotiation process Requirement of referendum on regional 
+integration treaties/reforms
+Conditions for acquiring citizenship based on 
+belonging to a region
+Algeria 1963 1 2 2
+Algeria 1976 4 87 87,
+88
+86,
+88,
+89
+
+87
+
+Angola 1992 1 15
+Argentina 1994 2 25 75.2
+4
+Austria 1929
+(2008)
+6 23c,
+23f
+23a,
+23b
+23d 23e
+
+Bahrain 1973
+(2002)
+2 1 10
+
+Bangladesh 1972
+(2004)
+1 25
+
+Barbados 1966 3 8.1, 8.2,
+8.3
+
+Belgium 1994
+(2007)
+2 8,
+168
+8 168
+
+Belize 1981 1 1
+Bolivia 2009 4 26
+5
+10,
+265
+265 266 257
+
+Brazil 1988
+(2006)
+1 4 4 4
+
+Bulgaria 1991
+(2007)
+1 4 4
+
+Burkina Faso 1991
+(2002)
+2 146 146 147
+
+Burundi 2005 1 291
+Cape Verde 1992 1 11 11 11 11
+Central African
+Republic
+1995 1 67 67 67
+
+Colombia 1991
+(2005)
+2 9 227 9, 227 227 96.2
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+12
+
+Congo
+(Brazzaville)
+1992 1 177
+
+Congo
+(Brazzaville)
+2001 1 182
+
+RD Congo 2003 1 195 195
+RD Congo 2005 1 217 217
+Costa Rica 1949
+(2003)
+1 14 14
+
+Croatia 1990 2 2 2 2, 141 141
+Cuba 1976
+(2002)
+1 12 12
+
+Dominican
+Republic
+2002 1 3
+
+East Timor 2002 2 8.
+3
+8.4
+
+Ecuador 2008 6 41
+6
+416,
+423
+416,
+423
+417,
+418,
+419,
+420,
+421,
+422
+
+420
+
+Egypt 1971
+(2007)
+1 1
+
+Egypt 2011
+(Interi
+m)
+
+1 1
+
+Eritrea 1996 1 13
+Finland 1999 3 93,
+96,
+97
+
+93, 96,
+97
+
+France 1958
+(2011)
+9 87 53-1 88-
+1,
+88-
+2,
+88-
+3,
+88-
+4,
+88-
+5,
+88-6
+
+53-1 88-3 88-2,
+88-4,
+88-5,
+88-6,
+88-7
+
+88-5
+
+Germany 1949
+18
+
+(2010)
+
+3 23 23 23, 24 23, 24 23, 24,
+45
+
+Greece 1975
+(2008)
+1 28 28
+
+Guatemala 1985
+(1993)
+1 150 150
+
+Guinea-Bissau 1984
+(1996)
+1 18 18
+
+Hungary 2011 7 E E,
+XXIII
+,
+XXVI
+II, 8,
+19,
+47
+
+E XXIII XXIII,
+9
+E,
+XXVIII,
+19, 47
+
+8
+
+Ireland 1937
+(2011)
+1 29 29
+
+Italy 1947
+(2007)
+3 117 122 122 117,
+120,
+122
+
+117
+
+Ivory Coast 2000 2 122,
+123
+Jordan 1952 1 1
+Kazakhstan 1995 1 8
+Kenya 2010 1 240
+
+
+18 As amended by the Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990 and Federal Statute of September 23, 1990.
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+13
+
+Kuwait 1962 1 1
+Kyrgyzstan 1993
+(1998)
+1 9
+
+Kyrgyzstan 2007 1 9
+Latvia 1922
+(2005)
+2 68 68, 79 68, 79
+
+Liberia 1986 1 9 9
+Libya 1969 1 1 1
+Liechtenstein 1921
+(2003)
+1 67 67
+
+Lithuania 1992
+(2004)
+1 138
+
+Macedonia 1991 1 120 120
+Madagascar 2010 1 137 137
+Mali 1992 1 117 117
+Malta 1964
+(2003)
+3 23,
+24,
+65
+
+65 23
+
+Marshall Islands 1979
+(1990)
+1 XIII XIII
+
+Monaco 1962
+(2002)
+1 1
+
+Montenegro 2007 1 15 15
+Myanmar 2008 2 96 96,
+209
+Nepal 2007 1 35
+Nicaragua 2007
+(2010)
+3 5, 9 5, 9 9 17
+
+Nigeria 1999 1 19 19
+Oman 1996 1 10
+Pakistan 1999
+(2011)
+1 40 40 40
+
+Paraguay 1992 1 144
+Peru 1993
+(2005)
+1 44 44
+
+Portugal 1976 2 7 7 118 7 118
+Portugal 1976
+(2005)
+5 7 7 7, 8,
+15,
+33
+
+7 15 15 8, 33 295
+
+Qatar 2003 1 1
+Rumania 1991
+(2003)
+3 38,
+148,
+149
+
+38 148,
+149
+
+Saudi Arabia 1992 1 1
+Senegal 2001 1 96 96 96
+Serbia 2006 1 1
+Sierra Leone 1991
+(2002)
+1 10 10
+
+Slovakia 1992 1 7 7 7 7
+Slovenia 1991
+(2006)
+4 5,
+64
+,
+65
+
+3a 3a, 5,
+64, 65
+3a, 64 3a
+
+Spain 1978 1 11
+Sweden 1974 7 1.10,
+2.19,
+10.4,
+10.6,
+10.7
+
+8.2 2.19,
+10.4,
+10.6,
+10.7,
+10.10
+Tunisia 1959
+(2002)
+1 2 2 2 2
+
+United Arab
+Emirates
+1971
+(1996)
+1 123 123
+
+Uruguay 1967 1 6 6
+Venezuela 1947 1 12
+Venezuela 1999
+(2009)
+2 153 153 153 33
+
+Vietnam 1992 1 14
+Yemen 1990
+(1994)
+2 1 6
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+14
+
+Total number of
+constitutions
+containing a
+particular type of
+reference*
+
+25 37 27 49 5 9 3 29 14 8
+
+*independently of number of articles per type of reference.
+
+Notes: Cells contain article numbers. Year of most recent amendments between brackets.
+
+Source: see table 1.
+
+The specific regional organizations to which references are found are shown in table 4. The European
+case is clearly the most developed at this level. Sixteen member states of the EU make reference to
+their belonging to the EU. The countries of other regions do not include this item, with very few
+exceptions.
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+15
+
+Table 4: Explicit references to regional organizations in Constitutions, by regional organization
+
+Country
+
+Constitution
+Articles explicitly referring to 
+regional organization 
+Organization of African 
+Unity/African Union
+Arab League
+European Community/EAEC/EU
+European Economic Area
+Council of Europe
+Conventions France-Monaco
+Andean Community
+Organization of American States
+North Atlantic Treaty 
+Organization
+Algeria 1976 86, 88, 89 X X
+Angola 1992 15 X
+Austria 1929 (2008) 23c, 23f X
+Belgium 1994 (2007) 8, 168 X
+Bulgaria 1991 (2007) 4 X
+Cape Verde 1992 11 X
+Colombia 1991 (2005) 227 X
+RD Congo 2003 195 X
+Finland 1999 93, 96, 97 X
+France 1958 (2011) 88-1, 88-
+2, 88-3,
+88-4, 88-
+5, 88-6
+
+X
+
+Germany 194919
+(2010)
+23, 45 X
+
+Hungary 2011 E, XXIII,
+XXVIII, 8,
+19, 47
+
+X
+
+Ireland 1937 (2011) 29 X
+Italy 1947 (2007) 117 X
+Latvia 1922 (2005) 68 X
+Liechtenstein 1921 (2003) 67 X
+Malta 1964 (2003) 23, 24, 65 X
+Monaco 1962 (2002) 1 X
+Montenegro 2007 15 X
+Paraguay 1992 144 X
+Portugal 1976 118 X
+Portugal 1976 (2005) 7, 8, 15,
+33
+X
+
+Rumania 1991 (2003) 38, 148,
+149
+X X
+
+Slovakia 1992 7 X
+Slovenia 1991 (2006) 3a X
+Sweden 1974 1.10, 2.19,
+10.4, 10.6,
+10.7
+
+X X
+
+Yemen 1990 (1994) 6 X
+
+Note: Year of most recent amendments between brackets.
+
+Source: see table 1.
+
+
+19 As amended by the Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990 and Federal Statute of September 23, 1990.
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+16
+
+Let us now have a more detailed look at the constitutional regulations regarding regional integration in
+the Americas and Europe, and –more concisely- in other world regions. The following patters can be
+identified:
+
+The Americas
+
+In North America, the constitutions of Canada, Mexico and the US do not establish any concrete
+reference to the regional groupings to which they belong. In the US the commerce clause of the
+Constitution (I,8.3.) gives the competence to the Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
+Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The competence to negotiate
+regional integration treaties is based on this clause.
+
+In Latin-America, as elsewhere, the main trend is to strengthen intergovernmental institutions. But
+in this region, this occurs in spite of existing supranational law and institutions. In South America, one
+finds a more-than-average number of relevant constitutional clauses referring to international
+regionalism (table 2). However, only two countries explicitly refer to existing regional organizations
+in their constitutions, and only the Colombian constitution refers to a concrete existing economic
+regional integration grouping (Andean Community –CAN-).20 The latter has shown a noticeable
+development of supranational law and institutions but it has been progressively losing members,
+political relevance and national support. Apart from pursuing a political agenda, the expectation of the
+recently created Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is to succeed in the unification of the
+Common Market of the South –MERCOSUR- and CAN, but this regional grouping has a clear
+intergovernmental character. The emergence of UNASUR (and also of the Pacific Alliance) has
+certainly affected the sustainability of CAN as an institution with supranational characteristics.
+UNASUR is promoting a flexible intergovernmental way of regional association without having the
+intention to follow the ‘European style’ route of deepening regional integration (Escobar 2009; Vilosio
+2010). In any event, some constitutions of South America contain “integration clauses”, but there has
+not been enough interest in the development of a supranational regional integration grouping.
+
+In South America, the types of references that are used mostly follow the general pattern as
+indicated above, i.e. (ii) belonging to a wider geo-political region, (iii) belonging to a specific regional
+organization, (iv) mandate to engage in further regional cooperation/integration, and (viii)
+compatibilization of national constitutional framework with supra-national rule-making.
+
+The Chilean constitution does not have any clause referring to regional integration. It has been the
+most independent country of the region, following unilateral and bilateral trade policies, and only
+being part of the Andean Pact for a very short period of time. It has been active in the promotion
+of interregional relations with the Pacific basin and in the negotiation of bilateral FTAs. More
+recently, it has entered into a regional agreement with Mexico, Colombia and Peru when the Pacific
+Alliance was created.
+
+By contrast, although the constitutions of other countries refer firmly to the respect of national
+sovereignty and to the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, they make explicit reference to
+the promotion of Latin-American regional integration. This is the case of Brazil (1988), Peru (1993
+(2005)), and Bolivia (2009) (which adds the integration with indigenous peoples of the world).
+Colombia (1991) and Venezuela (1999 (2009)), being part of the Caribbean, in addition refers to the
+promotion of regional integration with this region.
+
+Uruguay (1967) mentions as goals of Latin-American integration, the defense of their products and
+raw materials and complementarity of public services. The Paraguayan constitution (1992) refers to
+the Organization of American States (OAS) and mentions the possibility to sign integration treaties in
+general (144).
+
+
+20 On the constitutional aspects of FTAs in Colombia, see: De Lombaerde and Lizarazo (2013).
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+17
+
+The Constitution of Argentina expressly refers to integration treaties with a supranational character,
+although it has also been interpreted in such a way as to place them hierarchically below the
+constitution (Gordillo 2005:II17). It is also remarkable that the Constitution imposes as limits to
+regional integration, the respect of the democratic order and human rights. In Brazil, the necessary
+intervention of the legislative and executive branches to execute international treaties, such as regional
+integration agreements, situates them below the Constitution and therefore they can be subject to
+judicial review by the Supreme Court (Fontes 2000:8). In addition, given that Brazil is the major
+player inside MERCOSUR, it is not particularly pushing for the transfer of sovereignty in favor of
+MERCOSUR (Fontes 2000:15-6).
+
+The constitution of Ecuador (2008) mentions as a strategic objective the regional integration with
+the Andean region, South America and Latin America (and the Caribbean). It is the most detailed in
+this respect and seeks the promotion of a global order with economic and political regional blocs with
+horizontal relations. It refers to the free movement of people worldwide and the end of conditionality
+in north-south relations. It also refers to the respect of human rights, in particular the rights of
+migrants, and rejects colonialism and imperialism and promotes the democratization of international
+institutions. At the institutional level, the Constitution of Ecuador is again the most progressive of
+South America. It promotes Latin-American and Caribbean citizenship and free movement of persons
+in the region, and the creation of supranational institutions of regional integration. Regional
+integration may include a productive, financial and monetary union, the adoption of a common
+international political economy, taking into account the existence of asymmetries. It also includes the
+strengthening of the harmonization of national legislation related with labor, migration, environmental,
+social and educative and health. However, international trade agreements should not affect the right to
+health, the access to medicines, services or technical and scientific progress. It is also forbidden to
+conclude treaties that transfer judicial competences to international arbitration institutions related with
+commercial issues, except for the resolution of disputes among states or citizens within Latin America.
+
+Concerning the creation of supranational organizations and the character and scope of the regional
+integration regime, the constitution of Colombia (1991) promotes the creation of supranational
+organisms, including the creation of a Latin-American Community of Nations, as also mentioned in
+the Brazilian constitution (1988). The Colombian constitution establishes the possibility of elections of
+Regional Parliaments. The constitution of Bolivia stipulates that the approval of treaties of “structural
+economic” regional integration, monetary integration or the transfer of competences to international or
+supranational institutions in the framework of regional integration processes should be approved by
+referendum. The Venezuelan constitution (2009) also accepts the creation of supranational
+organizations and stipulates that the legal rules adopted in integration agreements are part of the
+national legal order and of direct and preferential enforcement vis-à-vis internal law.
+
+The Central American Integration System (SICA) is also based on an intergovernmental logic, but
+not all the member states are bound to the same extent because each of them has concluded
+international agreements with different scopes, instead of entering in a completely reciprocal
+arrangement. The creation of a Court inside the organization has been regarded as an advance in the
+process of supra-nationalization but not all the member states have approved its creation (Carducci and
+Castillo 2012: 24-27).
+
+Europe
+
+Although European constitutions tend to refer relatively more to international regionalism than
+constitutions in most world regions (table 2), not all constitutions do so, not even all EU member
+states. The Czech Republic (1992 (2009)), Denmark (1849 (1953)), Luxembourg (1968 (1998)), the
+Netherlands (1983), Norway (1814), Poland (1997), Estonia (1992) and Lithuania (1992 (2004)) do
+not have any reference to “Europe” or an integration clause. The constitution of Greece (1975 (2008))
+does not refer explicitly to the EU neither, whereas Bulgaria (1991 (2007)) makes a short reference to
+its participation in the building and development of the EU.
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+18
+
+The Constitutions of former imperia (France (1958 (2011)), Portugal 1976 (2005) and Spain (1978
+(2011)) establish the promotion of solidarity and special cooperation with countries with the same
+language, which is an example of the type of reference consisting in belonging to a wider cultural
+region (II). In addition, Portugal includes the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs and
+rejects imperialism and colonialism. Sweden makes reference to its membership in the EU but also to
+its participation in international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations and the
+Council of Europe. Hungary (2011) states that the government shall take into account decisions of the
+EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in security issues.
+
+Rules that may be included in the category ‘compatibilization of national constitutional framework
+with supranational rule-making’ (viii), in casu the EU, can be classified in four groups:
+
+A first group includes references such as in the constitution of Germany (1949 (2010)) which
+highlights that the EU should respect the democratic, social and federal principles, the rule of law, but
+it states in particular that EU law should guarantee a level of protection of basic rights, essentially
+comparable to that afforded by its Basic Law. Along the same lines, Sweden (1974) allows the
+Parliament to transfer decision-making authority without affecting the basic principles and protecting
+rights and freedoms recognized by the Constitution and the European Convention for the Protection of
+Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It forbids the transfer of decision-making authority related
+to the enactment, amendment or abrogation of fundamental law, the Parliament Act and its elections,
+or related to the restriction of any of the recognized rights and freedoms. Slovenia (1991 (2006)) also
+conditions the transfer of rights to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy
+and the principles of the rule of law. The constitution of Greece (1975 (2008)) allows limiting national
+sovereignty, insofar as this does not infringe human rights, the democratic government and the
+principles of equality and reciprocity. The constitution of Bulgaria (1991 (2007)) also makes reference
+to the respect for the rule of law and for human rights.
+
+References in a second group include the constitutions of France and Germany which establish the
+superiority of the principle of subsidiarity with respect to a draft European law. National authorities
+may present an action before the Court of Justice of the EU to challenge a legislative act of the EU for
+infringing the principle of subsidiarity. Portugal also refers to the European identity but under the
+principles of reciprocity, the rule of law, and subsidiarity.
+
+A third group concerns the participation of national parliaments in the decisions of the EU. Austria,
+for example, has a very detailed regulation of the control of the National Council over the position that
+the Government would assume before EU authorities. The government is bound by the opinion of the
+National Council during EU negotiations and voting. The government may deviate only for imperative
+foreign and integrative policy reasons, but if a constitutional amendment is necessary, then the
+deviation is only possible when the National Council does not controvert it. Germany also regulates in
+detail the duty of the Federal Government to consult and take into account the position of the
+Bundestag during the EU negotiations. The consent of the Federal Government is necessary when an
+issue may increase expenditures or reduce revenues for the Federation. Finland (1999) establishes that
+the government should prepare the decisions to be made in the EU, unless the decision requires the
+approval of the Parliament in which case, the Parliament will participate in the decisions of the EU.
+France orders the government to submit to the Parliament the draft European laws. The Parliament
+may oppose reforms on the rules of adoption of European treaties according to the rules of the TFEU.
+Belgium only mentions that treaties reforming the EU treaties in force should be approved by the
+Parliament before their signature. The constitutions of Finland, Hungary, Croatia, Romania 1991
+(2003), Slovenia and Sweden establish the duty of their respective governments to keep the Parliament
+informed on matters related with the EU decisions/law creation and some of them refer to the
+amendments being prepared to the treaties of the EU. The binding force of Parliamentary opinion for
+the governments when negotiating before the EU institutions has different levels of intensity in the
+various constitutions.
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+19
+
+Finally, a fourth group concerns the status of EU Law in the internal legal systems. Croatia 1990
+(2010) retains its sovereign right to decide upon the powers to be delegated and the right to freely
+withdraw therefrom. As a consequence of the transfer of competences to the EU, national authorities
+should apply EU law directly and Croatian courts shall protect subjective rights based on the EU. In
+Hungary, EU law is binding. Romania establishes the prevalence of treaties of the EU and other
+mandatory community regulations over opposite provisions of the national laws and all the national
+authorities should guarantee their implementation. In Slovakia, legally binding acts of the EU also take
+precedence over national laws. The transposition of legally binding acts which require implementation
+should be realized through a law or governmental regulation. The Constitution of Ireland 1937 (2011)
+clarified that it does not invalidate laws enacted before, on or after the entry into force of the Treaty of
+Lisbon, that are necessary for the compliance of obligations of membership of the EU, or prevents
+laws enacted by the EU existing before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. In Portugal, EU
+law is enforced in the internal order taking into account democratic principles. The Constitution
+recognizes the rules of judicial cooperation in the EU. The only explicit reference of the Spanish
+Constitution 1978 (2011) to EU Law is that the volume of public debt held by the public
+administration services may not exceed the reference value established in the TFEU21. Spain also
+refers to its cultural ties with Latin-America and with other countries with which they have had or
+have special links, by facilitating access to Spanish nationality for citizens originating in these regions
+or countries. Slovenia refers in general to the principle that legal acts adopted within international
+organizations shall be applied in accordance with the legal regulation of these organizations. Greece
+stipulates that generally recognized rules of international law ratified by statute shall be an integral
+part of domestic law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law.
+
+With respect to the type of reference referring to the compatibilization between sub-national
+autonomy and supranational rulemaking (vii), the constitutions of Austria (1929 (2008)) and Germany
+establish a very detailed constitutional regulation of the proceedings in case EU law creation or
+modification could affect subnational entities (the Länder), and in this way it assures the concrete
+participation of subnational authorities in the harmonization of their competences with EU law. Along
+the same lines, the constitution of Italy (1947 (2007)) establishes that legislative powers of the State
+and the Regions are constrained by the constitution and by EU-legislation and international
+obligations. Regions may not adopt measures that obstruct the freedom of movement of persons or
+goods between regions, otherwise the Government can act if they fail to comply with international
+rules and treaties or EU legislation. Conversely, regions may take an active part in the preparatory
+decision-making process of EU legislative acts in areas of their competences.
+
+The references related to the rights for citizens of regional organization co-member states in
+national elections (v), i.e. the right to vote in local elections for citizens of the EU with residence in
+their countries, is recognized by Belgium 1994 (2007), Croatia (1990 (2010)), France, Portugal and
+Hungary (2011), which in addition recognizes this right to every person recognized as a refugee,
+immigrant or resident. Some of them refer to the elections for the European Parliament too. Referring
+to people living in EU countries, France creates the possibility of concluding agreements with EU
+members on issues of asylum and Slovenia protects and guarantees the rights of minorities (Italian and
+Hungarian) and stipulates that the rights of the Roma community will be regulated by law.
+
+Concerning the reference to referenda on regional integration issues (ix), the constitution of France
+establishes that all ratifications of treaties referring to membership of the EU should be approved by
+referendum. Latvia 1922 (2005) establishes that membership and substantial changes in the terms
+regarding the membership in the EU shall be decided by a referendum. Portugal establishes the
+possibility to organize referenda to approve treaties related with the construction or deepening of the
+EU. Slovenia offers the possibility to call a referendum before ratifying treaties that transfer sovereign
+
+
+21 This article was not included in the tables because our study took as reference the version of the constitution that is on
+Constitution Finder and which did not yet have the constitutional amendment of 2011.
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+20
+
+rights to supranational organizations. Slovakia establishes that a constitutional law confirmed by
+referendum decides on the entry into a state union. Hungary’s, by contrast, states that no national
+referendum may be held on any obligation arising from an international agreement.
+
+Some general patterns in other regions
+
+Generally speaking, the constitutions of countries in Asia and Oceania refer relatively less to
+international regionalism (table 2). Those who do, refer mostly to a belonging to a wider cultural
+region (category i) and/or to a mandate to engage in further regional cooperation or integration in the
+future (iv) (table 3). In Central Asia, after the disintegration of the USSR, the agreements that seek
+regional integration take into account the European model, considering not only trade but also political
+cooperation and security matters. However, the development of supranational institutions has not been
+pursued. According to some observers, this is related to the lack of democracy and transparency in the
+member states (Kembayev 2006:983).
+
+In Africa, the proliferation of regional integration agreements is prevalent and constitutions tend to
+refer to regionalism relatively more than elsewhere (table 2). Especially references to belonging to a
+wider geo-political region (ii) and to a mandate to engage in further regional cooperation or integration
+(iv) are often found (table 3). We refer to the theoretical part where the evolution of some trends in
+regional integration in this continent is briefly explained.
+
+5. Results: further analysis
+
+In this section we present some further exploratory analysis of the available data. The questions that
+are addressed are the following: “are constitutional references to regionalism increasing over time?”,
+and “is the intensity of constitutional referencing related to the intensity of the regional integration
+processes?” In order to answer our first question, by looking at consecutive (i.e. replaced, reformed or
+amended) constitutional texts, the evolution over time of referencing patterns can be analyzed. Based
+on the, admittedly, small sub-sample of consecutive constitution pairs, it would seem that the increase
+of references is not necessarily spectacular over time (table 5). On the contrary, it would appear to be a
+slow and gradual process. However, the sample size is probably too small here to extract robust
+conclusions.
+
+The second question which can be addressed is whether the intensity of constitutional referencing
+is related to the intensity of the regional integration processes. We therefore selected a sub-set of 31
+constitutions enacted or amended since 2000 (see table 3), and identified the relevant constitutional
+references. This information was then re-organized by regional organizations to which the
+corresponding states belong (table 6). This allows us then to contrast this information with statistics
+reflecting the depth of the integration processes in a cross-section setting. For this purpose, we
+selected indices of institutional integration and intra-regional trade shares (see section 2.3). The former
+is a proxy of de jure integration, the latter a proxy of de facto integration or interdependence.
+
+As expected, the regions with highest and lowest degrees of institutionalized integration (EU and
+NAFTA) are also the ones with the, respectively, highest and lowest referencing intensity (table 6 and
+figure 1). However, the association between both variables within the extreme values (i.e. for the
+remaining cases) is not linear. In addition, as explained before, the average values that are reported
+here, cover quite some variation at individual country level. It is interesting to note that the two cases
+that are generally considered as being characterized by supra-national institutional designs (EU and
+CAN), are the ones that show highest average frequencies of compatibilization references (i.e. clauses
+that seek to make sub-national autonomy compatible with supra-national rule-making (vii); and
+clauses that seek to make the constitutional framework and autonomy of the national parliament
+compatible with supra-national rule-making (viii)).
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+21
+
+Apart from the outlier case (EU), the relationship between constitutional referencing and de facto
+regionalization seems even less straightforward, at least on the basis of the available data (figure 2).
+
+Table 5: Evolution of number of references in consecutive constitution-pairs in sample
+
+Total No references
+over whole
+period
+
+Growing
+number of
+references (+)
+
+No change (=)
+(excluding cases
+without any reference)
+
+Declining
+number of
+references (-)
+Number of
+constitutionpairs
+in sample
+16 5 5 5 1
+
+Note: all consecutive constitution-pairs in database were selected, see table 3.
+
+Source: see table 1.
+
+Table 6: Constitutional references and integration indicators, for selected regional organizations
+
+Number of
+constitutions
+in sample (>
+2000)
+
+Average
+number of
+constitutional
+references
+
+Average
+number of
+compatibilizationprovisionsIndex
+of
+institutional
+integration
+(0-100)
+(2003)
+
+Intraregionaltradeshare
+(%)
+(2010)
+ASEAN 3 0,7 0,7 30 26,1
+EU 16 3,2 1,9 85 (EU-15) 60,8
+NAFTA 1 0 0 15 40,0
+CAN 4 3,8 1,5 40 8,8
+MERCOSUR 2 1,5 0,5 20 11,8
+SICA 4 1 0,3 40 16,3
+CARICOM 1 1 0 50 18,1
+Note: the scores for the index of institutional achievement
+Data: see table 1 (constitutional references); De Lombaerde et al. (2011) (index of institutional
+integration); Regional Integration Knowledge System (RIKS) [http://www.cris.unu.edu/riks/web/data]
+(intra-regional trade shares).
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+22
+
+Figure 1: Correlation between constitutional referencing and de jure integration
+
+Note: ‘Constitutional referencing’ refers to the average number of constitutional references to regionalism
+per integration grouping (horizontal axis); ‘de jure integration’ refers to the index of institutional
+integration per integration grouping (vertical axis).
+Source: Table 6.
+
+Figure 2: Correlation between constitutional referencing and de facto integration
+
+6. Conclusions
+
+With deeper integration, the paradigms of formal international public law (based on intergovernmental
+treaties) and the capacity of national constitutions to interact with it, are tested. This is so for a number
+of reasons. A first reason is that deepening regional integration can lead to the creation of
+supranational authority and –logically- to constrained, conditioned or diluted national sovereignty.
+Although it should be added that, in practice, supra-nationalism and intergovernmentalism are not
+necessarily mutually exclusive. A second reason is that regional governance is not only about hard law
+
+0
+10
+20
+30
+40
+50
+60
+70
+80
+90
+
+0 1 2 3 4
+
+Series1
+
+0
+10
+20
+30
+40
+50
+60
+70
+
+0 1 2 3 4
+
+Series1
+International Regionalism and National Constitutions: A Jurimetric Assessment
+
+23
+
+but it also has an important soft law component. The proliferation of soft law is not very well visible in
+the constitutions but it should not be ignored in the design of regional legal systems. Combining these
+two reasons, one can say that increasingly tensions can be sensed between the functioning of national
+legal systems and the multi-level governance world surrounding them. Outside Europe, a third reason
+is that an evolution can be observed with respect to treaty enforcement by national authorities,
+especially courts (i.e. case law on self-executing versus non-self-executing treaties). Finally, a fourth
+reason is that in federal or quasi-federal states, there are increasing tensions between the outward (i.e.
+international) regional commitments of the federal states, on the one hand, and the constitutional
+autonomy and prerogatives of the federated states, on the other hand.
+
+The observation of these increasing complexities leads to the central question which is addressed in
+this paper: to what extent do constituents and legislators worldwide refer in their constitutions to the
+emerging reality of regionalism and explicitly deal with potential sources of tensions and
+contradictions between the national legal systems, on the one hand, and the emerging regional
+regulatory universes, on the other. For that purpose, a global mapping exercise was presented. It was
+based on an analysis of a sample of 171 constitutional texts, without pretending that the sample
+necessarily and systematically included the most recent amendments. We were basically interested in
+global and longer-term tendencies.
+
+The main results from our analysis are the following: Firstly, about half of our worldwide sample
+of constitutional texts refers to (international) regionalism in one way or another. Secondly,
+constitutional references to regionalism come in a great (formal and substantive) variety. In our
+assessment, we considered ten different ‘types’. However, many of these references are more political
+in nature, with unclear implications for constitutional case law. Our global mapping exercise reveals a
+still very fragmented landscape, with a lot of room for conceptual harmonization and convergence,
+learning and imitation. In the coming years, more activity is to be expected from constitutional
+assemblies and constitutional courts that will re-shape national legal systems to become more
+compatible with the changing reality of (international) regional governance.
+
+We also presented some further preliminary analysis. On the one hand, we looked at the dynamics
+of constitutional referencing over time. Although comparisons over time are not too robust due to lack
+of data, it seems that the number of constitutional references to regionalism over time is increasing
+only very slowly. It is still soon to evaluate whether the current global financial and economic crisis is
+acting as a catalyst in this respect, but there are indications that this is indeed the case, especially in
+Europe (Contiades 2013). On the other hand, we looked at the relationship between constitutional
+referencing and (de jure and de facto) depth of the integration processes. Although deeper de jure
+integration seems to increase the need for the inclusion of ‘integration clauses’ in the constitutional
+texts, this seems to be a loose relationship with a lot of variation. Even in the EU, for example, there
+are still various national constitutions without any reference to the EU at all. The relationship between
+constitutional referencing and de facto integration is even less straightforward.
+
+These empirical results should be read with a lot of caution. They mainly illustrate how data on
+constitutional referencing (to international regionalism) can be related to data on de jure and de facto
+regionalism/regionalization and then statistically tested. Before embarking on the latter, however,
+further work is needed on building more complete databases (i.e. by including more countries and
+more observations per country), more detailed coding, and gathering data on other relevant variables
+reflecting the depth, causes and consequences of regionalism. Only then will it be possible to draw
+firmer conclusions on the complex causalities between (aspirational and reactive) constitutional
+drafting, on the one hand, and de jure and de facto regionalism, on the other.
+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+24
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+Philippe De Lombaerde and Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
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+28
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+
+29
+
+Author contacts:
+
+Philippe De Lombaerde
+
+Associate Director at United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies
+(UNU-CRIS)
+
+Potterierei 72
+
+8000 Brugge
+
+Belgium
+
+Email: pdelombaerde@cris.unu.edu
+
+Liliana Lizarazo Rodríguez
+
+Independent legal advisor (Belgium), registered at College of Lawyers in Madrid (Spain) and Register
+of Lawyers in Colombia
+
+Email: lilianalizarazo@skynet.be
\ No newline at end of file
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+The Narrative of the Number:
+Quantification in Criminal Court
+
+Mona Lynch
+
+Scholars have documented the explosion in quantification of social phenomena
+within organizational settings. A key site of the quantitative turn has been in the penallegal
+field, with purported transformative effects. This article draws from a field research
+project examining the on-the-ground implementation of the federal sentencing guidelines
+to explore how the guidelines’ numbers-based logic is both articulated and reconstituted
+by legal actors in the adversarial process. Complementing macro-level work that
+examines the transformative effects of quantification at the social-structural level, I take
+a micro-level, empirically grounded approach that analytically focuses on day-to-day
+interactions in court to reveal quantification’s possibilities and limits. I identify three
+adversarial strategies that narrate the meaning of the guideline calculation to demonstrate
+how the complex quantitative guidelines system becomes incorporated into narrative form
+to know, assess, and judge legal subjects.
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+The quantification of social phenomena has had transformative effects on
+modern life (Espeland and Stevens 1998, 2008; Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012;
+Lamont 2012). Quantification processes, which can range from “marking”—where
+numbers are used as a form of identification—to commensuration, which transforms
+“difference into quantity” and assigns measures of value or worth to each element
+for the purposes of assessment, comparison, judgment, or action (Espeland and Stevens
+2008, 408), also play an increasingly central role in contemporary governance.
+Numerically based systems are mobilized to achieve an array of institutional
+goals, such as forecasting and measuring organizational outcomes, creating bureaucratic
+accountability, ordering complex inputs, competing for resources, and making
+risk predictions (Silver 2000; Espeland and Sauder 2007; Hansen and Porter 2012).
+Numbers can also have legitimizing effects for institutions, enhancing the appearance
+of accuracy and fairness, which in turn fortifies institutional power and authority
+(Hansen and Porter 2012).
+Criminal justice institutions have not been immune to the quantification
+explosion. In particular, the use of actuarial quantitative tools is pervasive, where
+
+Mona Lynch (lynchm@uci.edu) is a professor of Criminology, Law and Society, and co-director of
+the Center in Law, Society and Culture at the University of California, Irvine. Direct correspondence
+to Mona Lynch, Department of Criminology, Law and Society, University of California, Irvine, Irvine,
+CA 92697-7080, (949) 824-0047. The author thanks Sarah Armstrong, David Greenberg, Lynne
+Haney, Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Joachim Savelsberg, Mariana Valverde, and the anonymous reviewers for
+their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. This research was supported by a grant
+from the National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program, Grant Number 1251700.
+
+VC 2018 American Bar Foundation. 31
+
+Law & Social Inquiry
+Volume 44, Issue 1, 31–57, February 2019
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+calculations of risk are used to categorize, aggregate, and intervene upon subjects.
+Indeed, some have argued that actuarial logic has eclipsed individualized, morally
+infused modes of judgment and intervention in the criminal justice field (Feeley
+and Simon 1992; Kempf-Leonard and Peterson 2000). In this article, I examine the
+on-the-ground implementation of the federal sentencing guidelines, an exemplar of
+quantitatively based systems used in the contemporary US penal-legal field, to
+examine how its numbers-based logic is both articulated and reconstituted by legal
+actors in the adversarial process. Complementing macro-level work that examines
+the transformative effects of quantification at the social-structural level, I take a
+micro-level, empirically grounded approach that analytically focuses on day-to-day
+interactions in court to explore how the quantified sentence calculation shapes the
+adjudication process.
+I draw on data from a large-scale project on federal criminal courts to examine
+the interplay of numbers and narratives as modes for assessing and judging legal subjects.
+Focusing specifically on the quantified criminal history prong of the guidelines,
+I reveal the ways in which quantification provides a vocabulary for making
+assessments, while imposing both constraints and opportunities in the judgment
+process. Quantification provides stakeholders in the adjudication process—prosecutors,
+defense attorneys, and judges—with rhetorical material with which to construct
+a biography about the legal subject to be sanctioned. In the case under study,
+I suggest that quantification obtains its power through narrative, which is how we
+make sense of social phenomena. Specifically, the complex quantitative guidelines
+system becomes incorporated into narrative form to know, assess, and judge legal
+subjects.
+
+QUANTIFICATION, ACTUARIALISM, AND JUSTICE
+
+The rise of quantified modes of governance was presupposed by the “avalanche
+of numbers” (Hacking 1990, 5) that occurred in Western societies as a means to
+know the populace. Numbers first had to constitute humans before they could be
+manipulated to produce effects. The emergence of printed numbers and “the enumeration
+of people and their habits” opened up the possibility for defining and measuring
+normalcy and deviancy, and predicting the likelihoods of each: “Society
+became statistical. A new type of law came into being, analogous to the laws of
+nature, but pertaining to people. These new laws were expressed in terms of probability.
+They carried with them the connotations of normalcy and of deviations from
+the norm” (Hacking 1990, 1).
+Quantification of the social also opened up the possibility for probabilistic prediction
+as a governing strategy, including as a tool of social control. Those who
+measurably deviated from norms—regarding mental and physical health, sexuality,
+educational and vocational attainment, law-abiding behavior, and so on—could be
+identified and intervened upon by state and other actors (Hacking 1990; Rose
+1998; Zuberi 2000; Muhammad 2011).
+While the early manifestation of governance by numbers in the penal-legal
+field was essentially aimed at normalizing deviant individuals through disciplinary
+
+32 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+strategies (Foucault 1977; Harcourt 2007), some scholars have argued that by the
+late twentieth century, those aims had shifted from individual reformation to groupbased,
+actuarial risk management (Cohen 1985; Simon 1988; O’Malley 1992,
+1996). In one of the pioneering papers along these lines, Jonathan Simon (1988)
+made a strong claim that actuarial governance was fundamentally changing social
+and political culture through its retreat from disciplinary logics and techniques of
+power (Foucault 1977). For Simon, subjects are not merely de-moralized, but they
+are essentially de-identified by actuarial practices of social institutions, with transformational
+ideological and material effects:
+
+[I]ndividuals, once understood as moral or rational actors, are increasingly
+understood as locations in actuarial tables of variations. This shift from
+moral agent to actuarial subject marks a change in the way power is exercised
+on individuals by the state and other large organizations. Where
+power once sought to manipulate the choices of rational actors, it now
+seeks to predict behaviors and situate subjects according to the risk they
+pose. (Simon 1988, 772)
+
+Feeley and Simon’s (1992) theorization of a “new penology” epitomizes this
+line of thought in the penal-legal field. In the new penological world, norms favoring
+qualitatively ideographic and individualized moral assessments in addressing the
+problem of lawbreaking were displaced in the late twentieth century by actuarial
+logic. Individual subjects’ motivations, deficiencies, needs, and potential were no
+longer central to the criminal adjudication process; instead, the focus turned to
+measure-based assessments of aggregated offender classes; risk management and prediction;
+and efficiency, internal accountability, and consistency in system administration
+(Feeley and Simon 1992, 1994). This trend has been observed in both adult
+and juvenile criminal justice settings, and it is exemplified by selective incapacitation
+types of schemes that use criminal history as a predictor of future risk, and that
+constrain individualized discretion in determining interventions (Feeley and Simon
+1994; Kempf-Leonard and Peterson 2000; Logan 2000).
+For Feeley and Simon (1992), the federal sentencing guidelines system represents
+a hallmark case of the shift from individualized consideration and assessment
+at sentencing to a quantitative system of aggregated, actuarial categorization. Other
+scholars, as well, have pointed to the guidelines as an important manifestation of
+governance by numbers. For Espeland and Vannebo (2007, 25), they represent “a
+vivid example of efforts to create quantitative accountability” that transformed legal
+practice because of the quantification process. The new system was “intended to
+improve sentencing performance, provide oversight, make sentencing a more visible
+and reviewable process, and create uniformity” (Espeland and Vannebo 2007, 25).
+Indeed, the law authorizing the guidelines’ creation framed their purpose in
+just these terms. The reforms would “provide certainty and fairness in meeting the
+purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants
+with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct” (Public
+Law 98–473 1984). In a major shift from the individualized, highly discretionary
+sentencing practices that had prevailed, the only relevant considerations under the
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 33
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+new system were, essentially, a quantified measure of the past and present criminal
+acts of the defendant (Lynch and Bertenthal 2016).1
+The use of criminal history, in particular, functioned as a rough actuarial measure
+in the new system. Federal parole personnel had been using a quantified version
+of criminal history as an actuarial tool for making release decisions since the
+early 1970s, and this tool migrated, nearly intact, from the back-end of the penal
+process to the sentencing stage in the new regime (Harcourt 2007; Lynch and
+Bertenthal 2016). From the earliest days of the guidelines, research staff at the US
+Sentencing Commission began an evaluation program that assessed how well the
+criminal history score predicted recidivism among sentenced federal defendants (US
+Sentencing Commission 2016). From that agency’s perspective, criminal history has
+been central to the guidelines’ very purpose, as the inaugural commission “chose to
+develop the Guidelines Manual’s criminal history provisions in significant part on
+offenders’ risk of reoffending” (US Sentencing Commission 2016, 3). Emblematic of
+this actuarial commitment, the most recent research report on criminal history is
+titled The Past Predicts the Future: Criminal History and Recidivism of Federal Offenders
+(US Sentencing Commission 2017).
+The promulgated guidelines, contained in the multichapter, annually published
+Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, articulate how past and present
+criminal acts are to be quantified, and lay out the rules for determining and
+summing their values. The manual, which now exceeds 2,200 pages including
+appendices, sets out the complex instructions for transforming elements of the
+criminal acts, on the one hand, and defendants’ prior criminal records, on the
+other, into numbers that are computed into, respectively, an “Offense Level”
+score ranging from one to forty-three and a “Criminal History Category” ranging
+from one to six. The “Sentencing Table,” which prescribes sentence ranges at
+every junction of these two axes, is therefore made up of 258 cells (see Figure
+1).
+To meet the “accountability” goal of the guidelines, the US Sentencing
+Commission built in controls to ensure compliance by decision makers tasked with
+applying them, and to constrain the irrationalities of strategic human actors whose
+judgments may be subject to bias, emotion, self-interest, or other such influences.
+The guidelines especially restricted the discretion and individualized decision making
+of judges by specifying in great detail how both offense level and criminal history
+are to be calculated and what the appropriate sentence range is for each of the
+258 possibilities that exist on the sentencing table. Their application was also mandatory,
+allowing only limited exceptions for judicial deviations from the prescribed
+sentencing ranges. Although this changed in 2005, when the US Supreme Court in
+United States v. Booker rendered the guidelines advisory,2 they must still be
+
+1. The guidelines emerged as a solution to what had surfaced as a broader crisis in sentencing and punishment,
+whereby unfettered discretion of judges came to be identified as producing injustice, and the very
+meaning of punishment was highly contested. For a specific history of the federal guidelines, see Stith and
+Koh (1993). For a more general account of the crisis in confidence about the purposes of punishment, see
+Allen (1981).
+2. First, in United States v. Booker, the US Supreme Court rendered the guidelines “effectively
+advisory” (2005, 245), giving federal judges the discretion to impose a non-guidelines sentence as long as it
+
+34 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+calculated and considered in determining all sentences. They are always the starting
+point of the sentencing process and remain a focal point, in effect anchoring the
+final determination (Bennett 2014).
+The commission also tried to stop-gap prosecutorial circumventions around the
+guidelines by requiring the calculation of all conduct surrounding the underlying
+offense, even if not part of the crime of conviction. This was done to prevent prosecutors
+from plea bargaining away “actual” criminal conduct committed by the
+
+FIGURE 1.
+Sentencing Table
+
+is consistent with the broad purposes of punishment. Two years later, the Court ruled in Kimbrough v. United
+States (2007) that judges are free to sentence outside of the prescribed guidelines’ range on the grounds of
+policy disagreements with the guidelines. In Gall v. United States (2007), decided at the same time as Kimbrough,
+the Court mandated deference to sentencing judges’ decisions and authorized judges to use individualized
+assessments of cases and defendants in deciding whether and how to depart from the guidelines.
+Mandatory minimums are still in force, though, so in cases in which both guidelines and mandatory minimums
+apply, the mandatory minimum trumps.
+Quantification in Criminal Court 35
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+defendant (Schmitt, Reedt, and Blackwell 2013, 257). Finally, under the guidelines’
+regime, appellate courts were given authority, for the first time, to review imposed
+sentences in light of the calculated guidelines, upon appeal by either the prosecution
+or defense. This functioned as an additional constraint on individualized judgment
+that might otherwise stray from the guidelines’ calculation (Stith and
+Cabranes 1998). Through defining and quantifying relevant sentencing criteria,
+coupled with the structural measures to constrain decision makers, the commission
+strove for the perfectly “dehumanized” bureaucracy imagined by Weber ([1956]
+1978, 975) that would “eliminat[e] from official business, love, hatred, and all
+purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation.”
+
+HUMAN CALCULATORS OR MEANING-MAKING AGENTS?
+
+This ideal of the guidelines, of course, was not fully realized in practice. The
+“irrationalities” in outcomes were not so easily tamed, despite the imposing new
+quantitative system. Sentence disparities as a function of defendant demographics,
+geography, and court workforce composition, among other influences, persisted (see,
+e.g., Albonetti 1997; Mustard 2001; Kautt 2002; Ward, Farrell, and Rousseau
+2009). Frontline legal actors quickly figured out ways to circumvent the dictates of
+the guidelines while creating the appearance of formal compliance (Nagel and
+Schulhofer 1992; Schulhofer and Nagel 1996; Lynch 2016).
+As Savelsberg (1992) argues, the guidelines were an attempt to impose a rigid,
+neoclassical, formally rational logic on an organizational field that was infused with
+substantive justice concerns. Judges, among other frontline actors, were active
+agents who would resist being reduced to “automatons” under the new system
+(Savelsberg 1992, 1370; see also Gertner 2007). So, while the formally rational
+guidelines attempted to “redraw the borders that had separated state and society”
+(Savelsberg 1992, 1350) as a way to address perceived injustices, the field itself was
+so defined by broader social justice norms that this effort was bound to fail. Espeland
+and Stevens (2008) also suggest that the guidelines’ legitimacy eroded over
+time due in part to the continued patterns of disparity and injustice in outcomes.
+A long line of neo-institutional scholarship would predict this gap between
+policy ideals and practice (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Powell and DiMaggio 1991;
+Gray and Silbey 2014). In the criminal justice field specifically, the collision of
+actuarial/risk management bureaucratic ideals with often competing forces at the
+point of implementation has been documented within a variety of organizations,
+including in policing agencies (Willis and Mastrofski 2012), criminal courts (Tata
+2007; McNeil et al. 2009), probation and parole offices (Lynch 1998; Fitzgibbon,
+Hamilton, and Richardson 2010), multi-agency criminal justice partnerships
+(Kemshall and Maguire 2001; Goddard 2012), and in prisons (Gartner and
+Kruttschnitt 2004; see also Cheliotis 2006 for a general discussion and critique).
+My intervention here, though, goes further than just identifying and measuring
+the gap between institutional logics and ideals and on-the-ground action. At a
+more fundamental level, there is reason to question the hegemonic powers of quantitative
+schemes to completely reconfigure human social systems. Actuarialism and
+
+36 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+commensuration are doing more than just “making up people” (Hacking 1990, 6).
+The processes are dual-directional, so people, in turn, “make up” and use numbers
+to label and order and categorize their a priori assessments. Given this, the numbers
+themselves can work to maintain and reproduce social processes (like inequality,
+capital accumulation, etc.) that exist both prior to the introduction of new systems
+and outside of those systems (Harcourt 2007; Hannah-Moffat 2013). Therefore,
+they can entrench power relations even while appearing to transform them.
+In that regard, the bifurcation of individualized, qualitative, ideographic modes
+of justice and stripped-down, aggregated, quantitatively driven modes may set up an
+unsustainable dichotomy. Carol Heimer’s (2001) useful schematic distinguishing
+“cases” and “biographies” provides a good launching point for complicating such a
+binary. Heimer (2001, 48) observes that:
+
+Bureaucratic routines act on standard objects; legal systems abstract cases
+from the rest of life; standardized commodities with a single cost and price
+are bought and sold in markets. All of those acts are also done by people
+who are born, grow up, work, form families, sicken, and die. All acts in
+bureaucracies, legal processes, or markets are, then, both instances of general
+categories and pieces of people’s biographies.
+
+In legal settings, “cases” do the work of both boxing out irrelevant information,
+and facilitating a measure of “fairness” in treatment and outcomes. This was an
+express goal of the guidelines—to limit cases to criminal acts only, past and present,
+and to make them comparable and equitable through the quantification process.
+However, as Heimer (2001) implies, cases cannot be fully de-humanized. They
+implicate people who have biographical narratives, whose past, present, and future
+are being adjudicated by other humans.
+Quantification may therefore aim for “the erasure of narratives: the systematic
+removal of the persons, places and trajectories of the people being evaluated by the
+indicator and the people doing the evaluation” (Espeland 2015, 56), but that erasure
+can never be complete. Narratives are fundamental to how we make sense of
+the social world (Bruner 1991; Ewick and Silbey 2003). We understand and make
+sense of our social world “mainly in the form of narrative” (Bruner 1991, 4). So,
+while quantification has effects—it may amplify, mitigate, or reconfigure power
+imbalances, biases, sympathies, and irrationalities—those effects are generally made
+possible through the interpretative meaning-making of narrative.
+Ultimately, the narrative form of meaning-making has consequences for judgment.
+Like numeric commensuration systems, narratives order messy “facts.” But
+unlike the ordinal or ratio formulation underpinning quantitative valuation systems,
+narratives work on a diachronic logic that is “irreducibly durative” (Bruner 1991,
+6). Narratives also require agency and intent in their subjects. Their essence is normative,
+tied to prevailing values and ideals that begin with a “breach” for initial
+propulsion, and end with a resolution. In substance, narratives are concerned with
+the particular (as opposed to the general) and are rooted in specific contexts. However,
+narratives’ “truth” value lies in their hermeneutic qualities—their interpretability
+and resonance. Therefore, narratives are more than just a random collection
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 37
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+of stories; rather, they become categorized within genre-typologies that transcend
+micro contexts and that accrue to “create something variously called a ‘culture’ or a
+‘history’ or, more loosely, a ‘tradition’” (Bruner 1991, 18).
+In the coming analysis, I use the quantified criminal history component of the
+federal sentencing guidelines as a window into the narrative of the number. I focus
+on the criminal history calculation because it represents the best case for the hegemony
+and orthodoxy of quantification in this field. The criminal history score
+should be the most impervious to manipulation, subversion, or subsumption by the
+narrative, given its ideologically well-established role in sentencing across numerous
+Western jurisdictions, and its relatively straightforward translation into quantified
+form (Lynch and Bertenthal 2016). Defendants’ criminal records featured prominently
+in the federal system’s punishment scheme under the old sentencing regime,
+both at sentencing and in parole decision making. And as previously noted, parole’s
+criminal history-based actuarial tool was transported into the guidelines to become
+the basis for the criminal history score in the new sentencing regime (Harcourt
+2007; Lynch and Bertenthal 2016) and has in fact played a similar actuarial role
+(US Sentencing Commission 2016).
+Despite this “best-case” scenario, I demonstrate that rather than displacing existing
+logics and arrangements, the quantified form of criminal history provides additional
+arsenal to power holders who strategically incorporate it into a biographical
+narrative about a moral agent, the defendant. I identify three specific rhetorical strategies
+that illustrate how the numeracy of criminal history is transformed and given life
+in this juridical field. First, I identify an adversarial strategy aimed at delegitimizing
+the calculation, the failure of the formula. Second, I illustrate the adversarial strategy
+whereby legal actors provide contrasting biographies of the number, which entails differential
+meaning making of the defendant’s criminal past by the adversaries, even while
+the criminal history score itself is accepted as correct. Third, I identify the strategy of
+making up numbers whereby legal actors use the criminal history metric as a post-hoc
+label to legitimize a priori moral judgment of the defendant to be sentenced.
+I conclude by returning to the narrative’s power in constructing “reality”
+(Bruner 1991, 1) to ask whether quantitative commensuration of people can ever
+be complete. I suggest that quantitative regimes can open up and facilitate new possibilities
+for understanding and categorizing people, but their potential is made possible
+through their narrative retelling, at least in this field. Narratives play a crucial
+role in social life, including in systems of justice, and cannot be erased no matter
+how sophisticated or tightly built the quantification system. Ultimately, I suggest
+that criminal history, through its elevation as a key, calculable factor in the guidelines,
+functions as both a global orientation by which federal defendants are characterized,
+and as a strategy of action in this adversarial setting. However, instead of
+transforming defendants into a set of criminal history points that help to determine
+sentence assignment from a table, the quantified criminal history provides another
+opening to a qualitative, ideographic narratively based debate about the moral
+makeup of the juridical subject to be punished.
+
+38 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+THE STUDY
+
+Data and Methods
+
+I draw on several sources of data for this analysis that were collected as
+part of a large multiple methods research project on how drug trafficking cases
+are adjudicated in federal court under the guidelines regime. The larger project
+was designed to analyze the interplay between localized norms and imperatives
+in how drug laws are implemented, and the legal structure in which local
+courts are situated (Lynch and Omori 2014; Lynch 2016; Lynch and Bertenthal
+2016). The first component of the project used official federal court data to
+model how local-level legal norms and practices predicted case outcomes as a
+function of both time and place. The second component was a qualitative
+analysis, using sentencing commission, congressional, and other archives to
+examine translation of the sentencing reform law into the particular sentencing
+formula at the inception of the “Guidelines Era.” The third component
+involved comparative field research, where I collected observational, interview,
+and case file documentary data in four purposively selected federal districts
+to tease out how case adjudication and sentencing happens on the
+ground.
+I primarily use data from the field research component here to flesh out how
+the criminal history calculation is used in the adversarial process. I gained initial
+access for the field research through the federal defenders’ offices in the four sites,
+and made multiple visits to each site between December 2012 and July 2014.
+Data collection included making observations of court proceedings involving drug
+cases. I observed a total of over three hundred proceedings across my sites, the
+majority of which were guilty pleas or sentencing hearings. I was also a
+participant-observer in less formal activities in each district, primarily in federal
+defenders’ offices and in the courthouses. In addition, I conducted both informal
+and formal in-depth interviews with legal actors in each locale to assess how plea
+negotiations and sentencing are and have been done in each district. I interviewed
+seventy-five people across the four sites, including federal defenders, panel
+defense attorneys and privately retained counsel, active and former prosecutors,
+judges, and several federal law enforcement agents. I use pseudonyms for all the
+attorneys, judges, defendants, and others I interacted with to protect their
+privacy.
+To illustrate the three adversarial strategies—failure of the formula, biographies
+of the number, and making up numbers—I use detailed examinations of exemplary
+cases for each as empirical support for my arguments (Stablein 1999; see also Small
+2009 on case selection). This kind of close analysis of a smaller number of cases
+allows me to detail the narrative strategies at work to reconstitute the quantified
+sentence recommendation. I triangulate by drawing on interview and other data
+sources to reveal how criminal history is understood and strategically deployed by
+differently situated actors. Before presenting these findings, I outline the general
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 39
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+mechanics of the federal guidelines calculations and sentencing procedure in the
+next section.
+
+Background, Context, and Procedure of Federal Sentencing
+
+Over the several-year period in which the commission developed its inaugural
+version of the guidelines, criminal history was generally acknowledged and
+accepted as having a place at the table.3 Therefore, the primary task was technocratic:
+how to convert qualitatively different “entities”—criminal convictions for
+the full panoply of offenses defined by the myriad jurisdictions that constitute the
+United States—into a common metric that could be deployed by courtroom
+actors.
+After several iterations of how criminal history would be “counted” in the new
+guidelines system, the commission settled on a formula that remains substantially
+intact today. Very briefly, the prior conviction record is first converted into points
+on the basis of imposed sentence lengths (maximum sentenced imposed, not time
+actually served). The points are summed into “scores,” then collapsed into one of
+the six ordinal “criminal history categories” that constitute the x-axis of the sentencing
+grid. Prior convictions are subject to an expiration date that is dependent
+on the severity of the prior sentence, so the look-back period ranges from ten to fifteen
+years.4 The basic criminal history formula is:
+
+(a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and
+one month.
+(b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not
+counted in (a).
+(c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not included in (a) or (b) up to a total of
+4 points for this item. [Includes sentences of probation, and/or short jail sentences
+for misdemeanors and other petty offenses.]
+(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any
+criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release,
+imprisonment, work release, or escape status.
+(e) Add 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of
+violence that did not receive any points under (a), (b), or (c) above because
+such sentence was treated as a single sentence, up to a total of 3 points for this
+subsection. (US Sentencing Commission 2015, 4A1.1)
+
+The criminal history score is calculated, along with the offense level score, by
+a pretrial probation officer after the defendant has been convicted (most often by
+guilty plea) but prior to the sentencing hearing. The offense level scores are much
+
+3. One commissioner, Paul Robinson, did question its place, if the guidelines were to be put in place
+for retributive purposes. Relatively early in the process, he moved on to other fights about the development
+of the guidelines formula and its underlying philosophy.
+4. It will be included if any part of a previous sentence was being served during that period, so if a current
+conviction is in 2016, the prior conviction was in 1996, but the defendant finished serving the sentence
+in 2002, it will count under the rules.
+
+40 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+more likely to be contested as to the technical calculation than is the criminal
+history score. Offense level can be quite complicated because it can involve multiple
+elements and features of the underlying criminal act, some of which are subject
+to considerable interpretation. For instance, a defendant’s relative role (aggravating
+or mitigating) in a multi-defendant case is subject to calculation and is often
+contested.
+On the other hand, the actual calculation of the criminal history score is
+rarely contested or controversial. There is generally no denying the existence of
+prior convictions, which are documented by court records diligently obtained by
+probation. And the formula for calculation leaves little room for multiple interpretations.
+My observational and interview data confirmed that in this narrow sense,
+the criminal history calculation itself faced little resistance. As a defense attorney
+told me, “you can’t do anything about criminal history points. Either you’ve got
+them or you don’t.” Or, in another attorney’s words, “the criminal history [score]
+is what it is.”
+The process by which both criminal history and offense scores are finalized
+is as follows. The probation department works up the guideline calculation as
+part of a presentence report. The attorneys and judge receive probation’s guideline
+determination prior to the scheduled sentencing hearing. Each side can file
+objections about the perceived accuracy of the offense level or criminal history
+scoring. Objections may be alleged errors of fact (i.e., counting a conviction that
+does not exist for the criminal history score), or differences in interpretation (i.e.,
+whether someone is an “organizer or leader” of a drug conspiracy, or not, for the
+offense level score). Any objections are resolved in open court at the beginning
+of the sentencing proceeding, and the judge ultimately makes a determination on
+contested matters. The final offense level, criminal history category, and corresponding
+guideline sentence range are then formally stated and accepted for the
+record.
+Once the guideline calculation terms are established, the meat of the sentencing
+hearing proceeds. It is here that each attorney is given the opportunity to argue
+for a particular outcome and/or for specific values to be given for any departures
+that are being sought or recommended. The defendant is also given an opportunity
+to make a statement prior to sentence imposition and, on occasion, other parties
+(such as family members of the defendant) may briefly speak. Often, the attorneys
+have filed memoranda detailing their respective arguments on sentencing, so their
+in-court oral colloquies usually summarize and expand on those written memos.
+The judge then pronounces sentence. In some cases, the judge has agreed to be
+bound by a plea agreement as to sentence or sentence range; otherwise, the judge
+decides on the sentence terms within any statutory constraints (including mandatory
+minimums).5 The judge is supposed to begin with the guidelines, and make a
+record of reasons for deviations from the guidelines, including for any departures or
+variances.
+
+5. Prior to Booker, this was also bound by the guidelines, except under limited exceptions.
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 41
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+FINDINGS
+
+Failure of the Formula
+
+The first way that the quantified criminal history becomes narratively reconstituted
+in the adversarial process occurs when one or more parties involved in the
+sentencing process disagrees with the underlying rules that have led to the calculation.
+These are instances where, for example, the prosecutor argues that due to the
+time decay rule or some other formal feature of how criminal histories are calculated,
+the resulting criminal history score/category understates the true nature of the
+defendant’s criminality. Alternatively, the defense might object to how a record of
+just very minor misdemeanors, when summed, overstates the seriousness of the
+criminal history. These objections make explicit the perceived limits of the criminal
+history calculus, and directly call into question the process of quantification and
+commensuration, at least in the given case.
+A defense attorney shared how he approached using this strategy: “[W]hat I try
+and do is tie my argument to something in the guidelines. So, even though I really
+think the guidelines are bullshit—pardon my French—I’ll say, ‘Okay, you know,
+this guy has a criminal history, Category IV, but it really should be a II, because
+these three offenses occurred within two days of each other and he was on a drug
+binge. So, if you take away that, you know, and now he’s in rehab.’ So, you just
+have to key it to what you think will make the judge really start doubting the
+guidelines.”
+When they could, defenders also proactively relitigated clients’ prior convictions
+if there was a potential procedural or substantive defect in the original case.
+Getting convictions off the books meant criminal history scores—and potential
+sentencing enhancements—would be mitigated. In this way, defenders directly
+attempted to alter the constitutive elements in the criminal history calculation.
+In one of the courts where I conducted my fieldwork, challenging prior convictions
+was a commonplace strategy in drug cases during my time in the field. This
+was because a scandal in the state lab ended up invalidating a number of convictions
+that, it turned out, constituted a notable share of the criminal history for
+federal drug trafficking defendants. While it was an especially common practice in
+this court during my fieldwork, this kind of strategy was used across all my districts
+if and when there was any possible avenue for challenging the prior
+conviction.
+Due to improprieties in the drug lab testing, a number of prior state court drug
+convictions that made defendants eligible for very lengthy “career offender” sentences
+in federal court were challenged and vacated. This meant that many defendants
+were now facing much shorter guideline sentences than either side anticipated at
+the start of the case. The vacated convictions struck a major blow to a punitive
+strategy in this district whereby law enforcement proactively targeted those with
+the requisite “career offender” criminal history—primarily African American men
+from select “problem” neighborhoods—in small hand-to-hand drug sales to obtain
+long federal sentences (Lynch 2016).
+
+42 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+The federal prosecutors in these cases almost always used a failure of the formula
+strategy to argue that the vacated priors should still be considered in one way or
+another. They often marshaled the delineated guideline departure for “Inadequacy
+of Criminal History Score” to attack the requirement that priors must be legal convictions
+in order to “count.” As such, they made strong claims that the system of
+commensuration had failed in the case, even while using an element of that same
+failed system to legitimize their claim. But they did more than just challenge the
+legitimacy of the rules in these instances. They dismissed the calculation through a
+narrative construction of the criminal subject. In other words, the argument against
+the quantification system was, essentially, its inability to capture the true nature of
+the person to be sentenced.
+Neal Deland’s case is illustrative of this form of contestation. In 2014, Deland
+was convicted and sentenced in federal court for selling 5.5 grams of crack cocaine
+to an undercover officer. Due to prior convictions for selling crack and a prior violence
+conviction, he was to be sentenced under the career offender guideline. The
+state court, however, vacated his two prior crack convictions due to the lab improprieties.
+The prosecutor described the situation in his written sentencing memorandum
+as one that demanded remediation due to the extreme impact that losing the
+prior convictions had on the guidelines calculation:
+
+The effect of [the vacated prior convictions] on Deland’s sentencing could
+not be more dramatic. The Presentence Report ... concluded that Deland
+was a Career Offender with three predicate convictions and was assigned
+a Total Offense Level of 29, a CHC [criminal history category] of VI, and
+an advisory guideline range of 151–188 months. Based on the state court
+orders entered last week, it now appears that Deland’s Total Offense Level
+is down to 15, his Criminal History Category will be only III, and his
+advisory guideline range reduced to 24–30 months. Based on the Sentencing
+Commission’s decision last Friday to lower drug offenses across the
+board by two levels, Deland’s guideline range will be further reduced all
+the way down to 13-III, or 18–24 months. Even the alchemists from the
+Middle Ages would wonder how such a transformation could take place
+when the defendant and his historic offending (i.e., who Deland is and
+what he has done) are unchanged.
+
+The prosecutor tellingly invoked historical, pre-science figures to highlight the
+failures of the late twentieth-century calculative system in this case, but that was
+just the beginning of his complaints. “Wholly apart from the vacated convictions in
+this case, the record shows that the CHC III grossly underrepresents the seriousness
+of Deland’s criminal record and his likelihood of recidivism. The government
+believes that a substantial departure/variance is needed in this case because of
+Deland’s 12 years of continuous, increasingly serious offending, the substantial
+leniency the state court system has wasted on him, and a serious record of prison
+misconduct and violence.”
+This was the prosecutor’s opening to invoke the guidelines’ exceptions that
+authorize upward sentence departures when the criminal history category substantially
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 43
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+underrepresents the seriousness of the criminal history. So, while the prosecutor denigrated
+this system for its failure to capture the essence of Mr. Deland’s criminal being
+(i.e., “who Deland is and what he has done”), he simultaneously marshaled the builtin
+provisions of this system to make the case for the sentence he desired: seventy-two
+months in prison, four times higher than the new guidelines minimum sentence,
+which was a huge, bold departure request.
+In the prosecutor’s twenty-five-page memorandum, defendant Deland was constructed
+as not much more than his past and present criminal acts. But that construction
+was not just points and counts of prior convictions on an x-axis and
+elements of the crime of conviction on the y-axis. Deland’s acts constituted a fully
+agentic criminal being who “has many victims;” who inflicts pain on others, and
+who is driven by greed. So, for example, while acknowledging that Mr. Deland himself
+had grown up in a troubled neighborhood, his criminal acts were evidence that
+he “chose to add to the misery that crack cocaine and other drugs wreak on these
+neighborhoods.” Criminal history, as a window into Mr. Deland’s very being, was
+then expanded well beyond the calculative points to encompass an array of known
+crime-related shortcomings, whether resulting in convictions or not. Eight full pages
+of text were devoted to the memo’s section titled “Criminal History,” opening with
+a schoolyard fistfight (not “countable” as criminal history)6 that the defendant, now
+in his mid-twenties, engaged in at the age of thirteen. The prosecutor stitched
+together the subsequent known criminal justice contact into a narrative of incorrigibility,
+punctuated with repeated displays of “disrespect not only for his community,
+but for the criminal justice system as well.”
+The prosecutor also filed supplemental “exhibits” documenting Mr. Deland’s
+many rule infractions while in custody (again, not countable criminal history) as
+additional support for the above-guidelines sentence he sought in the case. In this
+district, this kind of “where there’s smoke, there’s fire” strategy is relatively common
+among prosecutors. In this and other cases, it provides the narrative glue for the
+argument in support of the recommended sentence, fleshing out the defendant as
+someone who is actively involved in bad behavior even if it does not all end in formal
+convictions that count in the sentencing calculus.
+The defense attorney, conversely, became the spokesperson for the appropriateness
+of a guideline sentence in this case, an unusually conservative position for the
+defense in this district, but one that made sense in light of the prosecutor’s stance.
+He defended the calculative logic of the guidelines, which defense attorneys normally
+argue against in their clients’ defense, and requested a sentence of twentyfour
+months for his client. Although this recommendation was at the top of the
+guidelines range, it was three times lower than the prosecutor’s recommendation. In
+his sentencing memorandum, the defense attorney characterized the prosecutor’s
+request to deviate from the guidelines as “earnest yet fundamentally unreasonable.”
+The memo chided the prosecutor for his claim that Mr. Deland’s “criminal history
+
+6. This was not countable under any scenario. It did not even involve an arrest, much less a conviction,
+it was “stale” since it happened so long ago, and based on the rules pertaining to juvenile convictions,
+it would be uncountable given his age.
+
+44 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+is suddenly substantially under-represented after the inevitable demise of these two
+[lab]-tainted state court convictions.”
+While much of the fifteen-page defense memo made an argument against
+including the vacated priors in consideration of an above-guidelines sentence,
+marshaling case law and policy statements in support of that position, it also provided
+a fleshed out biographical narrative of Mr. Deland that contrasted with the
+prosecutor’s. A section that made the case for Mr. Deland’s “potential to move
+beyond his past” opened with his tragic birth:
+
+Neil Deland could not have a more heart-rending story. He was abandoned
+as an infant by his young mother and has never had any kind of
+meaningful relationship with either of his parents. It is miraculous that he
+even knows the identity of his parents at this time. After apparently being
+dumped in a garbage can as a newborn, he was adopted by his great aunt
+... at a very young age. Although that was certainly a fortunate development
+for Mr. Deland, it came with a price.
+
+The narrative continued through his rejection by his family, becoming homeless
+and alone by the age of fifteen, and his “inevitable” involvement with the juvenile
+justice system and run-ins with the law. It highlighted signs of positive change.
+Before this arrest, Deland had enrolled in college and was doing well. The life story
+was then put back into the language of the guidelines to crystallize the argument in
+favor of a guidelines sentence: “Sadly, his situation is reminiscent of far too many
+cases that come before this Court alleging street-level drug distribution. More
+importantly, all of these factors are captured by the applicable guidelines range.” In
+this sense, Mr. Deland’s narrative represented a genre (the tragic childhood contributing
+to criminality) that could appropriately be served by the “13-III” box offered
+up by the guidelines’ calculation.
+These themes were repeated in the actual sentencing hearing. Stretching
+beyond Mr. Deland’s more serious run-ins with the law, the prosecutor expanded
+his argument to include traffic violations, each worth one point in the criminal history
+calculation, as evidence of danger and incorrigibility. “[T]o be fair, a number
+of [his priors] were for automobile offenses, but even if you look at those, they say
+some important things about Mr. Deland. Just by way of example, your Honor ...
+at least in one, if not more, he created a real hazard as he went through an intersection
+and almost hit a cop car.” The traffic violations, for this prosecutor, were
+more than just points to be summed. They demonstrated Deland’s penchant for
+being around trouble and his utter disregard for the law: “[H]e’s not where he’s supposed
+to be, where he’s not doing what he’s supposed to do, and he’s saying to the
+criminal justice system, ‘Look’—just like ‘I’m going to keep driving a car. I don’t
+care. I don’t care what you say to me. I’m just going to keep doing what I want to
+do.’”
+Before knowing how large an upward departure the prosecutor sought, Deland’s
+attorney shared that he expected the request would be a sentence from thirty to
+forty-eight months since “he would completely lose credibility if he came in at
+seventy-two.” Upward departures, in general, are exceptionally rare in drug cases,
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 45
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+especially in this district. A mere one-half of 1 percent of all drug cases between
+1992 and 2012 received upward departures for any reason in this district. Even in
+the wake of this drug scandal, only 1 percent of the sentenced drug cases resulted
+in upward departures in the district. The judge in this case had not granted any
+upward departures on the drug scandal cases, so Deland’s attorney thought that if
+he granted one at all, it would only be just a few months above the guideline range
+of eighteen to twenty-four months. He was wrong. The prosecutor lost no credibility
+despite asking for seventy-two months. The judge granted the upward departure,
+and imposed a sentence of forty-eight months.
+
+Biographies of the Number
+
+The second, more prevalent strategy to reconstitute the criminal history calculation
+was through the interpretive meaning making that is done by the adversarial
+parties during the sentencing process. In contrast to those cases where the calculation
+rules are explicitly called out for their inadequacy, in these cases, the countable
+criminal record, and its translation into criminal history points, is not
+contested. Nonetheless, the meaning of that quantified record is up for debate. This
+divergent meaning-making was done through biography—making sense of the number
+through telling a tale of a moral agent.
+This strategy also may begin in the written sentencing memoranda that are
+filed with the court prior to the sentencing hearing. In these dueling documents,
+each party, again, offers up a narrative of what the criminal history says about
+the defendant as a person. As such, they are a formal attempt at interpretation,
+moving away from the numbers to give them life and meaning for the sentencing
+task at hand. Criminal history is central to this life narrative because of its punitive
+value in the sentencing formula, but it also opens up the conversation about
+the human actor to be sentenced. And that holistic evaluation, put also in the
+context of the crime of conviction and any other background information
+deemed relevant to the document author, helps form the basis for the recommended
+punishment.
+Dominic Chessman’s case brings to life how the countable record becomes differentially
+interpreted by the opposing sides in support of their respective positions,
+even when the formal calculations are agreed upon as both appropriate and adequately
+representative of the prior record. Mr. Chessman was forty-eight-years-old
+when he pled guilty in 2013 to a drug and money laundering conspiracy involving
+fifteen to fifty kilograms of cocaine. In this case, the prosecution and defense had
+reached a plea agreement where neither side could argue for a sentence outside a
+specified guidelines range of 168–210 months.7 If the judge did not sentence within
+that range, the guilty plea could be voided. This meant that the stakes at sentencing,
+if the judge agreed to be bound to those terms and accepted the plea agreement,
+were over where in that range the sentence should fall.
+
+7. The agreement specified that he was correctly at Offense Level 35 and Criminal History Category
+III, but he would be sentenced at 33-III.
+
+46 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+Early in her sentencing memorandum, the prosecutor assured the court that
+“[a]ll parties agree that the defendant is in criminal history category III.” Yet she
+used the convictions that brought Mr. Chessman to Category III to make a strong
+argument for a sentence at the top of the agreed-upon range, 210 months. She
+began by recounting his distant criminal past that did NOT count in the calculation
+as a way to paint a picture of Mr. Chessman’s criminal essence. Unlike the circumstances
+of Mr. Deland’s case, where the uncountable history was offered as
+evidence of the guideline’s limitations, in this construction, the criminal history is
+offered up as a way of knowing who Mr. Chessman is as a person.
+
+As the [probation report] ably lays out, the defendant has been amassing a
+criminal history for almost his entire adult life. By the age of 28 he had
+received convictions for attempting to commit a crime, possession of burglary
+tools, negligent operation of a motor vehicle (following a high-speed
+pursuit that endangered the lives of others on the road), conspiracy and
+possession of heroin and cocaine with the intent to distribute, and other
+offenses. Notably, because of their ages none of those offenses result in
+criminal history points in the instant case, and also they do not include
+his numerous other arrests that did not result in convictions.
+
+She then narrated his prior countable history, which was one previous conviction
+for heroin distribution and money laundering for which he had been sentenced
+“in this very courthouse.” To preempt the defense argument about Mr. Chessman’s
+positive attributes, she directly counterposed his strengths against his criminal history
+to make clear his agency in choosing to offend. “Unlike so many defendants
+who lack language or work skills, fight debilitating addictions, and/or have no support
+network to fall back on, this defendant has demonstrated the knowledge, dedication,
+and ability not only to obtain gainful employment, but to be a successful
+legitimate businessman. ... He just does not have any excuse for his persistent criminal
+behavior.” She concluded this biography-by-criminal record argument, asserting
+that “the defendant, in a word, is incorrigible.”
+The criminal record also provided the prosecutor’s narrative with a proposed
+resolution. Mr. Chessman’s incorrigibility was predictive of his future, so therefore
+required the incapacitative measure of a long prison term. However, the prosecutor
+did not need an actuarial formula to draw that conclusion; she could divine it just
+through her reading of his criminal biography. “The defendant is going to re-offend.
+That is almost a given. Whatever opinion one may hold about the relative worth
+of mandatory minimum sentencing ... some people simply will not abide by the
+rules of society.”
+Mr. Chessman’s criminal history also signaled his lack of appropriate respect
+for and fear of the law. “Sentences that minimize the significance of habitual criminal
+behavior undermine respect for the law, and encourage younger offenders to
+believe that they can break the law with impunity. Sentencing the defendant to
+any sentence that approximates his previous sentence will accomplish little other
+than confirming his suspicion that the consequences of his behavior will never be
+greater than what he has already decided he is willing to bear.”
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 47
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+In support of his argument for a 168-month sentence, the defense attorney’s
+memorandum, in contrast, made the case that Chessman was more than just his
+criminal past. Needless to say, the attorney only discussed the single conviction
+that constituted Mr. Chessman’s calculable criminal history. That conviction had
+occurred nineteen years earlier, but still counted against the defendant since he had
+been released eight years prior to this conviction (so within the fifteen-year window).
+The defense attorney elaborated Chessman as a psychologically complex, yet
+fragile, man. His psychological problems, including his “histrionic personality disorder
+and anxiety,” were offered up to explain his criminal involvement; his positive
+features, including his successes as a parent, his talents, and his capacity for change,
+were offered as a counternarrative of his life. The defense attorney’s portrait of the
+defendant pivoted away from the “incorrigible criminal” construction offered by the
+prosecutor, pointing out that “Dominic will be 62 years old” when he gets out of
+prison, if the judge gives the lower sentence. He assured the judge that recidivism
+is a low risk for “senior citizen” reentrants.
+At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor hit hard on her point that Chessman’s
+prior record “tells us, more clearly than any argument he can make today,
+that his persistent criminal behavior is not going to change.” She argued that the
+judge who imposed his previous sentence of 151 months had told the defendant:
+“‘This is a serious sentence, you need to take this seriously, the next time you come
+back, the penalty will be even harsher.’” Since this was his “next time,” she
+implied, he had to be punished even more severely. For her, that meant the top of
+the agreed-upon range. The judge cited this exact logic when he pronounced the
+sentence:
+
+What struck me was the comment [the prosecutor] made about ... the
+earlier sentence of 151 months. What I did was take that sentence and I
+thought an appropriate escalation was an additional three years, so the
+sentence I’m going to impose is 187 months.
+
+The 187-month sentence was initially structured by the guidelines’ calculation.
+However, what propelled the judge to come to that number was, at least as he told
+it, the truth value that resonated from the prosecutor’s narrative about Mr. Chessman’s
+fundamental incorrigibility and inability to be deterred. So even if the sentence
+did not stop Chessman from reoffending, it would send a message to the
+public, including would-be criminals, about the normative value of the court’s
+power and will to punish.
+As Mr. Chessman’s sentencing revealed, judges also navigate the score as they
+construct a narrative about the defendant before them as to what an appropriate
+sentence should be. The quantitative metrics end up being absorbed, almost as
+prose, into the biographical narrative. A judge at one of my sites described how he
+dealt with conflicts between the technical calculation by probation and the attorneys’
+arguments about the defendant. Rather than debate the policy-intent minutia
+of the guidelines, he engages in a form of “craft work” (Tata 2007) to reach an
+acceptable judgment: “I just end up kind of stirring that into the soup, so to speak.
+There’s a little bit of oregano from the probation officer, there’s garlic from the
+
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+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+government and then there’s—I don’t know, honey from the defense counsel, and
+the different proportions go into what I end up deciding. Usually everybody has got
+a piece of the truth.” In this forum, truth is not contained in the quantified calculation,
+but emerges through adjudicating competing narratives about whether, for
+instance, the defendant is a “good kid who made a mistake in judgment” or a “rat.”
+
+Making Up Numbers
+
+In one of the districts in my study, judges have maintained considerable allegiance
+to the guidelines even since they became advisory. Therefore, attorneys have
+had a harder time moving sentence lengths through narrative reformulation. Nonetheless,
+the biographical narratives still prevailed; they were just more tightly tied
+to the guidelines’ metrics in the articulations. A defense attorney practicing in this
+district described how she tried to mitigate the criminal history while keeping it in
+the guidelines’ language. “I’ll go and try to find cases where they talk about someone’s
+criminal record and what category they were. And, I’ve done like tables where
+I’ve compared like, ‘Look, my guy’s a Category III, these are his four offenses. But,
+in these ten other cases, look at what has made someone a Category III, and what
+charges, and you see the difference between these charges. And, my guy just isn’t as
+bad as some of these other guys, and so you should give him a reduction.’”
+The sentencing of Franklin Samuels, an elderly African American man who
+had originally been indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin, exemplifies how the
+quantitative metric functioned as a legitimizing label for the qualitative judgment
+made. Mr. Samuels had a history in this court. Fourteen years earlier, he had pled
+guilty to distributing crack cocaine and was sentenced to eighty-four months in
+prison, followed by five years of supervised release. A longtime addict, he violated
+his supervision conditions soon after release by using cocaine and heroin, for which
+he was sent back to prison for two more years.
+After he got out again, Mr. Samuels successfully got off supervision and stayed
+out of trouble. By this point, his health was failing, and he was primarily dealing
+with his life-threatening cardiac and pulmonary problems. Mr. Samuels, however,
+was briefly lured back into the drug trade. Federal agents had decided to target Mr.
+Samuels’s adult son in a “buy-bust” drug sting after his name had come up in
+another case. A confidential informant working with police contacted the son,
+seeking to purchase heroin. The son did not have any heroin so asked his father for
+connections to help out. Mr. Samuels gave the name of a potential supplier. The
+son obtained the drugs from that source, and sold a single gram of heroin to the
+confidential informant. Both Mr. Samuels and his son were arrested and indicted in
+federal court for conspiring to distribute heroin. Mr. Samuels ended up pleading
+guilty to aiding and abetting the one-gram drug sale. His guideline sentencing range
+was calculated to be eight to fourteen months in prison based on his Criminal History
+Category II and Offense Level 10.
+Ten days before the scheduled sentencing proceeding, the defense received a
+copy of the prosecutor’s motion seeking a sentence above the guidelines. The motion
+asserted that Mr. Samuels’s criminal history score substantially underrepresented his
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 49
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+“true” criminal history. The motion recounted his entire criminal record, dating back
+to when he came of age in the early 1970s. He had two felony convictions from his
+late teens and early twenties that no longer counted against him since they were
+nearly forty years old, and some very old misdemeanor convictions that also did not
+count. His previous federal drug conviction did count, which brought him to the
+Criminal History Category II. More bad news came to Mr. Samuels four days before
+his sentencing hearing. His judge, who is usually a “guidelines” judge, issued a notice
+that he was contemplating an “upward variance” in this case “based on the apparent
+inadequacy of previous periods of confinement to promote respect for the law and
+deter criminal conduct.” To the extent that both these legal actors explicitly identified
+the guidelines as inadequate in this case, it fits the failure of the formula typology.
+What distinguishes it, however, is the resolution to that failure, which was to directly
+tinker with the quantitative system to label the judgment with the “correct” metric.
+The prosecutor’s and judge’s filings were dealt with at the sentencing hearing.
+The proceeding began with the judge’s standard confirmation that the guidelines
+had been correctly calculated by the probation officer. After that, the critical part
+of the sentencing proceeding began in earnest when the prosecutor argued her
+motion for a higher sentence. Her telling of Mr. Samuels’s life was—in its
+entirety—his criminal past and his continued failures to be deterred. His criminal
+history also revealed that Mr. Samuels “shows no respect for the law.” These are
+the themes the judge himself often echoes: the need for deterrence and to promote
+respect for law. According to the prosecutor, the consequence of Mr. Samuels’s
+utter failure on both counts results in the “substantial likelihood he will re-offend.”
+Therefore, the prosecutor argued, his criminal history category should instead be V,
+based on all the older, “uncounted” criminal history. If the judge agreed, this would
+increase the sentencing guideline range to twenty-one to twenty-seven months. She
+concluded by requesting Mr. Samuels be sentenced in that range.
+The prosecutor later told me why she was so set on increasing Mr. Samuels’s
+criminal history score. For her, his history of drug use signaled certain recidivism
+for the remainder of his life. “He’s always gonna be involved [in the drug trade]
+because he’s got a lifetime addiction. He’s never going to get over it. ... That’s
+why he did it. Not an excuse, but that’s why. That’s his motivator. It wasn’t greed.
+It was addiction. ... Because of that, when you look at his criminal history, you say,
+‘The likelihood that he’s gonna reoffend is, you know, 98.9 percent.’” Although in
+other districts, the prosecutor may not have taken the step to convert this assessment
+into a higher criminal history score, in this district, the numerical language of
+the guidelines was the formally legitimate form in which the final sentence would
+be couched. Nonetheless, for both the prosecutor and the judge, this was mere form
+and the underlying substance was the narrative biography of the defendant-asrecidivist.The
+defense had a much tougher go of it in front of the judge. In his sentencing
+memorandum, Mr. Samuels’s attorney had asked the judge to sentence his client
+within the calculated guidelines, as a fair and just outcome for an ailing man “in
+his twilight years.” In court, he could not get through his argument without pushback.
+First, he made the point that the worst of the offenses not “counted” in the
+criminal history score happened nearly forty years ago when Mr. Samuels was a
+
+50 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+young man. He tried an empathetic strategy, saying he himself had also made mistakes
+when he was young. The judge interrupted: “But you learned from your mistakes,
+he has not.” The attorney then pivoted to the health issue, and the litany of
+problems his client had dealt with, including while in custody this time around.
+The judge interrupted a second time—“Let’s cut to the chase here”—then he
+detailed each sentence Mr. Samuels had served and concluded, “none has deterred
+him.”
+The attorney tried once again to portray his client sympathetically in terms of
+how minor his crime was this time. He was abruptly cut off, and the floor belonged
+to the judge. Referring to himself in the third person, the judge announced that
+“the court gave notice of a contemplated upward variance. The guidelines in this
+case are inadequate.” He once again narrated Mr. Samuels’s history of convictions
+and punishments that had not deterred him in the past, and stated that his goal in
+sentencing was to promote respect for the law and achieve deterrence. He then
+declared that rather than move Mr. Samuels’s criminal history to a Category V, as
+requested by the prosecutor, he would move the criminal history to the highest category
+available, Category VI.
+Moreover, even though no one suggested that the calculated offense level—
+for helping his son sell a single gram of heroin—was too low, the judge decided
+to tinker with that as well. Based on some internal calculation that was never
+elucidated, he announced that the offense level should really be a “fifteen”
+instead of a “ten.” So even though there was no debate over the seriousness of
+the crime, the judge moved to the offense scale to increase the sentence range
+once the criminal history scale was topped out. The consequence of these adjustments
+was that Mr. Samuels’s new guideline range was forty-one to sixty months
+in prison. The judge settled on forty-eight months—six times longer than the
+low end of Mr. Samuels’s calculated guidelines—plus three years of supervised
+release as the appropriate sentence.
+For the judge in this case, the criminal history metric worked in two ways.
+First, it allowed him to construct a holistic picture of the defendant before him as
+no more than a criminal being who did not have the capacity to learn from his
+past sanctions. In other words, by the construction of the guidelines formula—limited
+to past and present criminal acts—he could dismiss the defense’s broader mitigation
+efforts. And while he declared the score in this case “inadequate,” it gave
+him the language to get to where he wanted to go within the guidelines regime
+that he respected. Mr. Samuels was a 15-VI, not a 10-II. But ultimately, the score
+did not determine the culpability; it was a mere technical category for assignment
+pasted on the more morally infused and intuitive rendering of Mr. Samuels’s
+criminal life.
+Indeed, the judge ended the proceeding with a coda to his version of
+Mr. Samuels’s life narrative about an alternative future that might be rendered
+through this punishment. First, he warned Mr. Samuels to “learn your lesson” and
+not commit any more violations, then he framed the sentence as, essentially, a lifesaving
+intervention for Mr. Samuels’s benefit:
+Quantification in Criminal Court 51
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
+As a fellow human being, I am sensitive to your health care needs and
+will recommend you get sent to a facility where you can get care. You
+may get better care than if you are out. ... I hope you profit from this
+experience and you do not need to spend the rest of your life in prison.
+
+DISCUSSION
+
+In Simon’s (1988) dystopian vision of the contemporary actuarial world, the
+federal sentencing guidelines reduce subjects once thought to be morally problematic
+and in need of intervention to mere numbers on the sentencing table. My
+observations of the contemporary penal-legal field challenge that vision. They
+instead suggest that the manifestation of cases—with living, breathing actors and
+subjects—are neither contained by the quantitative system that was to regulate the
+power to punish, nor reducible to the numerical representations that the system
+imposes. Quantitatively based commensuration systems like the guidelines may provide
+new material for legal actors to ply their craft and may indeed shape the
+parameters of possibility, but they cannot overtake the narrative mode by which
+those actors know and assess those to be punished.
+Across the three strategies I identified, criminal history was probative as to the
+soul of the legal subject. The score itself provides a hook within each narrative. It
+could be the opening to the story, capturing or failing to capture—depending on
+the case and narrator—a particular life history. Or it could be the punctuation
+mark at sentencing pronouncement, a way to summarize and categorize the narrated
+biography that preceded it. It could also be the antagonist, to be challenged as
+inadequate for the purposes of judgment. But even in the most routine cases that I
+observed, for instance, where plea agreements stipulated to all sentencing terms, the
+criminal past (and criminal present) was narrated as a way to help explain the sentence.
+Ultimately, the quantified symbolic representations—offense levels, criminal
+history categories, and sentencing tables—stand in, as needed, for long-established
+norms and mores about criminality, culpability, and justice.
+This suggests the limits of epochal theories that cite dramatic shifts in logics,
+structures, and techniques as evidence of fundamental social transformation, at least
+in the sociolegal field. Such theorizations often seem to be working on a unidirectional
+causal model—that the new logics cause change. Doing so elides the human
+agency that underpins social and technological innovation in the first place. The
+logics and techniques are inventions, born of the power relations that constitute
+the core engine of sociality: they emerge from those relations that constitute social
+life (Foucault 1982). Their articulations are therefore better understood as products
+as much as producers—elements in a feedback loop in which power relations give
+rise to new articulations that then reshape, incrementally, the landscape in which
+those power relations continue.
+Savelsberg (1992) chronicled, at the macro level, the particular power struggles
+that gave rise to the late twentieth-century guidelines movement, and that ultimately
+limited their ability to unseat the substantive modes of justice entrenched in the legal
+
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+
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+system. At the micro-interactional level, my findings illustrate how those substantive
+concerns are articulated, and reinforced, within the guidelines’ formal framework
+through adversarial social relations. The consequence is that the “deductive, logical, and
+gapless system of rules” (Savelsberg 1992, 1350) that structures sentencing procedure
+becomes absorbed into the competing accounts that advocate for particular outcomes.
+The defendant’s biography is initially preempted and presupposed by the guidelines,
+as the legal procedure at sentencing requires the calculation of the two culpability
+scores. She is transformed into a quantified version of a case, an “Offense Level
+34-CHC III,” where both numbers allow for commensuration to other “cases” and
+compute an appropriate sentence range. But as I illustrated, the quantified case logic
+then melds with and becomes absorbed into the biographical narrative. To be sure,
+evaluation efforts, ranking exercises, and “adding up” the value of criminal history
+happen in both the sterile calculation as dictated by the Guidelines Manual and the
+narratives offered by opposing attorneys and contemplated by judges. However, as my
+field observations revealed, the quantitative form functions more to provide an opening
+to the qualitative narrative than as the last word. When it does serve as an endpoint,
+or bookend, as in Mr. Samuels’s case, it is still, functionally, dressing on the
+qualitative, ideographic, morally infused assessment of the defendant to be sentenced.
+Ultimately, criminal courts are social spaces that do more than just process people
+as dehumanized cases, despite the imposition of systems designed to do just that. Even
+in their most mass-processing, assembly-line form, criminal courts are engaged in creative,
+coercive, and individuated social regulation, imbued with moral judgment (Feeley
+1979; Kohler-Hausmann 2013; Van Cleve 2016). Defendants may be reconstituted into
+case types, to be disposed of efficiently through guilty pleas and standardized sentences
+in line with local “going rates” (Church 1985), but even those processes mask behindthe-scenes
+adversarial negotiations about agentic legal subjects possessing biographies
+and psychological complexities (Emmelman 1996; Kohler-Hausmann 2013).
+In other criminal justice agencies, as well, frontline actors may formally comply
+with the numbers-driven actuarial tasks, but those activities mask affectively rich, individualized
+judgment processes that substantially drive intervention (see, e.g., Lynch
+1998). For Cheliotis (2006, 408), the human agency of organizational actors represents
+a formidable counterforce to dehumanized actuarialism in the penal field: “Professionals
+incarnate their agentic capabilities [and] ... actuarial logics have far from supplanted
+traditional goals of punishment like rehabilitation and/or retribution.”
+It may be that the penal-legal field provides an exception to the hegemonic
+power of quantification. It is not only imbued with substantive justice ideals that
+seem to demand moral assessment, but its mode of seeking adjudicatory “truth” via
+adversarialism also lends itself to ongoing contestation. The distinct—indeed oppositional
+roles—that adversarial actors assume in US criminal courts ensure that variations
+in how policy mandates are deployed not only cut across different sites and
+localities, but also occur within individual ones. In the federal criminal justice context,
+the guideline numbers function as rhetorical and material tools for legal adversaries
+to wield in support of their positions for particular outcomes. In this context,
+everything about the guideline calculation is potentially open to questioning and
+cross-examination—the system of valuation itself, the particular calculation made in a
+case, the “fit” of the calculation to the case at hand, to name just a few aspects.
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 53
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+The question remains as to how hegemonic the narrative is in other arenas of
+our increasingly quantified social world. Bruner (1991, 21) argues that narrative
+plays an essential role in how we make sense of the social world: it “organizes the
+structure of human experience,” and so serves as the conduit by which actors make
+sense of those subject to intervention. Narratives also provide “the means through
+which organizations are reflexively constructed,” and help actors to imbue meaning
+and purpose into their roles (Rhodes and Brown 2005, 171). In the face of organizational
+change, narratives can work to reiterate and reinforce organizational values
+and ideals, to help maintain continuity despite the force of reform. In that sense,
+the sterile quantitative system imposed on federal courts changed the manifest form
+of sentencing—judges, lawyers, probation officers, and defendants have to contend
+with the guidelines calculations—but those calculations are narratively reconstituted
+to fit with the visions of justice that those involved seek to impose.
+Yet, as some scholars have amply demonstrated, the quantified logic of metrics
+has become much more hegemonic in some spheres, dominating operations and transforming
+practices (Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012; Espeland and Sauder 2016). For
+instance, to the extent that those governed are dispersed, numerous, and spatially
+removed from governing entities, they are more easily converted into quantified
+abstractions. Social psychological theory would, in fact, predict a continuum of quantification’s
+influence as a function of proximity and individuating opportunities
+(Henderson and Wakslak 2010). The hegemonic powers of the guidelines should be
+expected to be blunted inside the courtroom, where multiple actors are focused on
+assessing and acting upon a single defendant (or a small number of defendants).
+In that regard, I have demonstrated that something happens between the quantitative
+calculation of the appropriate sentence for the “case” and the pronounced sentence
+upon the defendant. What happens is the synergistic making of a criminal being,
+made possible in part by the quantified criminal record, but elaborated by a biographical
+narrative. The adversaries incorporated the criminal history calculations as elements
+of a life story featuring the juridical subject to be punished. Therefore, the determination
+of a subject as a “Criminal History Category III” is imbued with a full panoply of
+meaning—for predicting her future, for judging her morality, for imputing her intention
+and will—through its narrative retelling. In the dueling narratives, those quantifiable
+criminal records “supply the analytic context by fashioning an account of a person’s
+past and hinting at an extended future” (Heimer 2001, 72).
+
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+Stith, Kate, and Steve Y. Koh. “The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
+the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.” Wake Forest Law Review 28, no. 2 (1993): 223–90.
+Tata, Cyrus. “Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the Discretionary
+Decision Process.” Social and Legal Studies 16, no. 3 (2007): 425–47.
+US Sentencing Commission. Guidelines Manual. Washington, DC: US Sentencing Commission,
+2015.
+——. Recidivism Among Federal Offenders: A Comprehensive Overview. Washington, DC: US
+Sentencing Commission, 2016.
+——. The Past Predicts the Future: Criminal History and Recidivism of Federal Offenders.
+Washington, DC: US Sentencing Commission, 2017.
+Van Cleve, Nicole G. Crook County: Racism and Injustice in America’s Largest Criminal Court.
+Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016.
+Ward, Geoff, Amy Farrell, and Danielle Rousseau. “Does Racial Balance in Workforce Representation
+Yield Equal Justice? Race Relations of Sentencing in Federal Court Organizations.”
+Law and Society Review 43 (2009): 757–806.
+Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, [1956] 1978.
+Willis, James J., and Stephen D. Mastrofski. “Compstat and the New Penology: A Paradigm Shift
+in Policing?” British Journal of Criminology 52, no. 1 (2012): 73–92.
+Zuberi, Tufuku. “Deracializing Social Statistics: Problems in the Quantification of Race.” Annals
+of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 568 (2000): 172–85.
+
+CASES CITED
+
+Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
+Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
+United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
+
+STATUTE CITED
+
+Public Law 98–473, 98 Stat. 2018, October 12, 1984.
+
+Quantification in Criminal Court 57
+
+https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12334 Published online by Cambridge University Press
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,1331 @@
+1
+
+ROBERTO LYRA FILHO
+
+O DIREITO
+
+QUE SE ENSINA
+
+ERRADO
+2
+
+CENTRO ACADÊMICO DE DIREITO DA UNB
+ROBERTO LYRA FILHO
+
+PROFESSOR TITULAR DO DEPARTAMENTO DE DIREITO DA UNB
+
+O DIREITO
+
+QUE SE ENSINA
+
+ERRADO
+(Sobre a Reforma do Ensino Jurídico)
+
+Brasília
+3
+
+CENTRO ACADÊMICO DE DIREITO DA UNB
+1980
+
+Pedidos para:
+CENTRO ACADÊMICO DE DIREITO
+4
+
+Departamento de Direito
+Campus Universitário – Universidade de Brasília (UNB)
+Brasília – DF
+
+Aos estudantes de direito da UNB
+Que encomendaram este trabalho.
+
+Feci quod potui, faciant meliora potentes
+5
+
+“Uma vez que a coesão ideológica de uma sociedade de
+classes superpõe-se a inconciliáveis conflitos classistas, criados pelas relações
+de produção, as classes dominadas, ou grupos específicos dentro delas,
+tendem a desenvolver subculturas legais que, em certas circunstâncias,
+podem estar ligadas a uma práxis como legal e esse direito como direito
+paralelo (isto é, caracterizar a situação como pluralismo legal) e adotar uma
+perspectiva teórica julgando esse direito não inferior ao direito do Estado –
+envolve uma opção, tanto científica, quanto política. Ela implica a negação do
+‘monopólio radical’ de produção e circulação de direito pelo Estado moderno”
+(SANTOS, 1977:9).
+
+“A Sociologia do Direito, na medida em que nãos e
+resolve unicamente em pesquisas empíricas, nem tampouco, é claro, em
+teoria sociológica, permite entender que o problema do ensino do direito (e
+também o da ciência jurídica) não estriba simplesmente em lograr uma
+aproximação maior em direção à prática, ao direito vivo. O ensino do direito
+em nossas faculdades necessita, igualmente, e de maneira muito básica,
+duma teoria rigorosa, não dogmática (...); e, na elaboração dessa nova teoria,
+a Sociologia deverá desempenhar uma função relevante” (ATIENZA, 1978:13).
+6
+
+1. Vocês me convidaram para falar, aqui, sobre um tema de minha
+escolha, e, diante disso, resolvi tratar do ensino jurídico.
+Recentemente, quando completei trinta anos de professor, dizia,
+num discurso, que “meu caminho é o do ensino, modelado segundo os reclamos e
+expectativas dos estudantes, e não de acordo com tradições mortas e rotinas de robô.
+A cultura, a experiência, a maturidade do professor de nada valem, se não podem
+sintonizar, nas ansiosas interrogações do aluno, a fonte dum saber que vem das lutas
+sociais e se organiza para servir ao progresso” (LYRA FILHO, 1980:5).
+Esta conferência pretende, agora, desenvolver o posicionamento ali
+delineado, a propósito dum tema que lhes interessa particularmente. É, por assim
+dizer, o confronto entre a insatisfação que vocês todos sentem, como estudantes de
+direito, e o que resultou das pesquisas e reflexões dum professor, que também não
+está satisfeito com a organização e funcionamento do ensino jurídico.
+A meu ver, este ensino ainda não corresponde às exigências da atual
+etapa do processo histórico, em que estamos envolvidos.
+O Direito que se Ensina Errado pode entender-se, é claro, em, pelo
+menos, dois sentidos: como o ensino do direito em forma errada e como errada
+concepção do direito que se ensina. O primeiro se refere a um vício de metodologia; o
+segundo, à visão incorreta dos conteúdos que se pretende ministrar.
+No entanto, as duas coisas permanecem vinculadas, uma vez que não
+se pode ensinar bem o direito errado; e o direito, que se entende mal, determina, com
+essa distorção, os defeitos da pedagogia.
+Vou falar, segundo o meu hábito, com total franqueza; e, portanto,
+vocês me permitirão que, desde logo, faça uma ressalva. A minha crítica não concerne,
+especialmente, à Universidade de Brasília, mas à situação geral dos cursos jurídicos, no
+Brasil e no estrangeiro.
+Por outro lado, a atitude crítica é, aqui, de todo impessoal. Há
+excelentes professores de direito; há muitos Departamentos e Faculdades que
+procuram melhorar o sistema de ensino. Cada qual faz o que pode, nas condições em
+que se encontra. Mas o importante a destacar é outra coisa: parece-me que existe um
+equívoco generalizado e estrutural, na própria concepção do direito que se ensina. Daí
+é que partem os problemas; e, desta maneira, o esforço deste ou daquele não chega a
+remediar uma situação globalmente falsa.
+É preciso chegar à fonte, e não às conseqüências. É preciso tentar
+convencer a todos – vocês mesmos e os meus colegas, professores de que temos de
+repensar o ensino jurídico, a partir de sua base: o que é direito, para que se possa
+ensiná-lo?
+Noutras palavras: não é a reforma de currículos e programas que
+resolveria a questão. As alterações que se limitam aos corolários programáticos ou
+curriculares deixam intocado o núcleo e pressuposto errôneo.
+Se principiamos com a idéia redutora do direito, no chamado
+ordenamento jurídico – único, hermético e estatal - , já teremos estabelecido, neste
+7
+
+primeiro passo, o engano que vai gerar tudo o mais. Nem traria remédio a invocação
+de vagos princípios idealistas ou de fontes suplementares, no uso, costume ou
+jurisprudência, desde que o direito estatal permanece, como estalão que regula, com
+suas normas, a admissão ou rejeição desses acréscimos. Além disso, o costume ou
+coleção de arestos, geralmente invocados, são os provenientes dos mesmos grupos e
+classes que produzem o direito legislado.
+Numa sociedade que assim se divide em classes e grupos, de
+interesses conflitantes, o direito não pode ser captado, em sua inteireza, sob a
+exclusiva ótica da classe dominadora. Nem há, em todo caso, um só conjunto de
+normas sociais, sem contradições. Há, pelo contrário, uma pluralidade de
+ordenamentos que aspiram a definir o que é propriamente jurídico, isto é, o direito
+válido, eficaz e corretamente formalizado. Esses ordenamentos lutam pela hegemonia,
+cujas condições de triunfo ou legitimidade sempre dependem da natureza dos
+posicionamentos e interesses que as normas refletem. “No mesmo espaço geopolítico,
+vigora (oficialmente ou não) mais de uma ordem jurídica” (SANTOS, 1980:109).
+Ademais, considerar que o Estado é o organismo que arbitra,
+mediante seus poderes exclusivos, toda essa disputa social – é esquecer que, antes de
+tudo, ele participa também do processo que deseja controlar; e, de sua posição, neste
+processo, é que emerge a legitimidade, constituída e funcional, daqueles poderes. Em
+todo o caso, a formação mesma de Estado pertence a órbita dos fenômenos jurídicos.
+Se ele não se apresenta jamais, embora às vezes seja, um instrumento de crua
+dominação, apela, até nisto, para aspectos, de avaliação jurídica antecedendo à sua
+estruturação. Dizer, depois, que do Estado organizado, emano todo direito válido é,
+então, de um ilogismo flagrante. Não se pode admitir como fonte de todo direito o que
+se pretende juridicamente formado. Ademais, a referência a Estado, em abstrato,
+mascara diferenças fundamentais entre modelos diversos, fundados em infraestruturas
+diferentes e com quotas, por isso mesmo, variadas, de legitimação. Um
+Estado capitalista e um Estado socialista não se constituem da mesma forma, nem
+servem aos mesmos fins.
+No plano internacional, encontram-se, inclusive, critérios de
+estimativa jurídica supra-estatal. Refiro-me aos direitos humanos, que “longe de
+nascerem duma concessão da sociedade política, hão de ser por esta consagrados e
+garantidos” (TRUYOL, 1974:11).
+Aqui, todavia, é necessário evitar que se concebam tais direitos como
+explicitação de conteúdos perenes, ligados a alguma “essência” metafísica. Os direitos
+humanos representam a conquista, que não poderia dissimular toda luta social e
+histórica para estabelecê-los, seja como princípio e parâmetro de avaliação jurídica,
+seja como elenco de garantias a que se terá de oferecer efetiva substância e eficiência,
+em toda legislação e aplicação de leis, ou até mesmo contra elas, se preciso for.
+No plano interno, a pluralidade dos ordenamentos resulta, já disse,
+da infra-estrutura, geradora de uma divisão em classes e grupos conflitantes, uns
+dominadores, outros dominados. Numa comunidade primitiva, não ocorre tal
+pluralidade, exatamente porque inexiste aquela divisão, e as normas sociais, portanto,
+ganham aspecto maciço, unificado e coerente. Nem aparece o Estado, embora exista
+um tipo de direitos. Este ponto, bastante polêmico, é muitas vezes desfocado, a partir
+duma certa visão do direito, que os vincula a Estado. Mas, indago: o que eram as
+8
+
+instituições reguladoras da vida social, naquelas comunidades, em seu mais intenso
+teor imperativo, senão o direito? “O direito, tal como existe nas organizações políticas
+complexas, ainda que importante, dentro do conjunto de dados etnográficos” (DAVIS,
+1973:10).
+Por outro lado, na sociedade internacional, o processo histórico,
+donde emergem os direitos humanos, também será subordinado, como resultante, à
+infra-estrutura do relacionamento entre as nações, algumas imperialistas, outras
+colonizadas ou semi-colonizadas. Quero dizer, com isto, que os direitos humanos
+propriamente ditos só nascem ou vigem, na medida em que a sua legitimidade
+constitutiva e eficácia funcional se polariza no sentido da evolução histórica, em
+condições propícias das correlações de forças internacionais. E estas só podem ser a
+situação, em cada etapa, do processo de eliminação das dominações minoritárias e
+classistas, internamente, e dos imperialismos de nações ou blocos de nações, no plano
+externo. Daí a constante reformulação daqueles direitos, à medida que novas e mais
+amplas quotas de libertação conscientizam-se, lutam pelo reconhecimento e se
+estabelecem, historicamente. Isto resulta claro, se compararmos, por exemplo, as
+declarações de direitos de ascensão capitalista, como a Revolução Francesa, e as
+declarações do segundo pós-guerra, já incorporando uma tímida, mas característica,
+nota social, senão socialista. No aspecto de diretiva interna, é a superação do
+contratualismo burguês, com a ficta igualdade dos sócio-economicamente desiguais.
+No plano internacional, é a superação da associação de nações, real ou supostamente
+soberanas, ante povos e nações colonizados ou semi-colonizados, numa igualdade
+apenas formal de países imperialistas e, outros mais, independentes (mas não no
+sentido econômico). Hoje, o pólo da legitimidade jurídica é a igualdade real, sócioeconômica,
+dos cidadãos e grupos de cidadãos, nas sociedades políticas, assim como
+das nações, na comunidade dos povos. A liberdade de contratar, de um lado, e o pacta
+sunt servanda (que é o contratualismo internacional), de outro, não poderiam
+funcionar (e, efetivamente, não podem), se os contratantes são o lobo e cordeiro. Daí,
+portanto, as compensações jurídicas, pedindo uma substância maior para aquela
+igualdade ficta, enquanto se desenvolve o processo que as poderá transformar em
+igualdade real.
+Tudo isso exige que se reflita sobre o direito, no que ele é; pois, sem
+tal reflexão, acabaríamos preconizando um ensino jurídico, o tradicional, que só se
+transmite a lei do mais forte e chama de não jurídico o direito dos oprimidos (SANTOS,
+1977: passim), para afinal negar o que já se chamou “direito natural” de combate
+(MIALLE, 1978: 123).
+Nem nos satisfazem determinadas “modernizações” de ensino, cuja
+finalidade é agilizar o currículo, para servir à ideologia tecnocrática ou ao
+desenvolvimento capitalista, dependente e atado à dominação multinacional. Isto
+apenas produz “mão de obra” especializada, para o staff do Estado ou do bi business,
+na mesma estrutura. Quero dizer que esse tipo de ensino aliena o estudante e paralisa
+o esforço de pensar o direito da independência econômica e da liberdade políticosocial
+(LYRA FILHO, 1980 B: 20-21).
+Para maior clareza, ordenarei a minha exposição em tópicos,
+forçosamente abordados num síntese muito apertada. Não há tempo, numa
+9
+
+conferência para tratar, em profundidade, dos assuntos que, só em muitas horas,
+poderia rever, sob todos os aspectos.
+Creio, porém, que isso não inutiliza o meu esforço, por há certa
+utilidade em recortar o campo a ser explorado, num convite a pesquisas, meditações e
+propostas ulteriores.
+Caminharei, dos sub-temas de raio mais dilatado, para o mais
+restrito, com o propósito de fundamentar a minha tese: a questão de ensino jurídico
+não pode ser, já não digo resolvida, mas sequer colocada, sem a percepção de que ela
+está ligada à correta visão do direito. A esterilidade das reformas do ensino, que se
+vêm, processando, deriva-se de que movimentam, em arranjos diversos, o mesmo
+equívoco fundamental.
+Tudo depende do que referimos, quando se trata de direito. Ele
+admite várias abordagens e o erra está em imaginar que o discurso, feito sobre uma
+delas, abrange o fenômeno em sua totalidade. Ainda que se pretenda isolá-las, apenas
+metodologicamente, dá-se a mutilação, pois nisto se perde o vínculo com o devenir e a
+totalidade; isto é, a transformação constante e o conjunto dos fenômenos, históricosociais,
+em cujo seio emergem os aspectos diversos do mesmo processo jurígeno.
+Nesta separação, nem se pode entender o recorte do setor escolhido para análise
+especial (LYRA FILHO, 1980 A: 13-20). Assim, de nada serve acrescentar o estudo da
+Sociologia Jurídica, da Antropologia Jurídica ou da Economia ao currículo, se as
+disciplinas “dogmáticas” permanecem dogmáticas; a Sociologia Jurídica postula a
+concepção restrita, que considera apenas os “fenômenos jurídicos primários” – isto é,
+em substância, as “fontes formais” (CARBONIER, 1979: 166-167); a Antropologia
+Jurídica segue o relativismo cultural (FARACO, 1979: 56-84); e a Economia ministrada
+esconde o jogo estratégico do imperialismo e corporações multinacionais, em sua
+intimidade com o Estado (DOS SANTOS, 1977: 37ss e passim).
+O ponto em foco é que o significante – direito – representa um
+entroncamento de significados, que designam a realidade complexa, dialética e global
+do fenômeno jurídico. Um perspectivismo, à GARCÍA MAYNEZ, por exemplo, perde o
+fio da meada (MAYNEZ, 1977: 36-50), e torna impraticável, não só a correta visão do
+direito, como um todo, mas inclusive a exata colocação de cada um dos aspectos que
+se pretenda considerar isoladamente. Não basta reconhecer que vários aspectos do
+direito existem; é preciso vê-los, no seu entrosamento, sendo esta a única maneira de
+identificar e esclarecer cada um deles, em especial (LYRA FILHO, 1977: 32).
+2. É preciso, portanto, manter em vista o direito, em devir e sob todas
+as suas formas.
+Não se trata, porém, de rever o que, historicamente e no conjunto
+das idéias e instituições jurídicas, formou a série de apresentações concretas, do
+direito existente e da forma de concebê-lo. Trata-se, ao revés, de extrair desse
+material as conclusões, em que o reexame particular fica submerso, numa síntese,
+mostrando o relevo emergente, como o topo do iceberg, no mar das normas,
+aplicações de normas e doutrinas sobre elas desenvolvidas.
+O roteiro, a que me referi, é de natureza sociológica, o que, em si,
+representa uma condensação de dados históricos. Se a Histórica registra fatos sociais,
+a Sociologia estuda os modelos de fatos, que a História exemplifica. Assim, a análise da
+Revolução Francesa, em suas causas e peripécias, propõem-se ao historiador, que
+10
+
+enriquece, com esta amostra, o patrimônio comum das ciências. Mas, por outro lado,
+registrando o fenômeno da revolução em concreto, o historiador há de aplicar os
+modelos que, na análise das revoluções, em geral, a Sociologia lhe ministra: as duas
+abordagens que são complementares e se escoram, reciprocamente. Daí a conhecida
+formulação de DURKHEIM, segundo a qual a Sociologia é uma generalização da
+História. Por isso mesmo, toda História, realmente científica, é História Social e toda
+Sociologia, não formalista, é Sociologia Histórica, isto é, uma sociologia genética, bem
+consciente da origem e desenvolvimento dos fatos sociais em exame. GILBERTO
+FREYRE, muito insupeitadamente, dado o seu talhe conservador e as simpatias
+decorrentes da sua formação americana, já apontava, naquele ponto, uma deficiência
+da Sociologia tradicional, nos Estados Unidos. Isto é, a falta “duma perspectiva
+histórica que nos transmite o estudo das origens, antecedentes e desenvolvimento das
+formas sociais presentes (...)” (FREYRE, 1975: 496).
+Aplicando-se ao direito uma abordagem sociológica, seria talvez
+possível esquematizar os pontos de integração do fenômeno jurídico na vida social
+verificar, então, como transparecem os ângulos de entrosamento dos diferentes
+aspectos.
+Mas, antes convêm assinalar que é imprecisa a menção dum ponto
+de vista sociológico, pois há diferentes orientações, nesta ciência – como em todas as
+outras; e estas orientações corresponde, nas suas linhas gerais, ao posicionamento do
+cientista, no processo histórico-social, em que e, simultaneamente, ator e observador.
+A análise deste vínculo e suas mediações, desde a situação do sociólogo até o reflexo
+desta na teoria sociológica, incumbe à Sociologia do Conhecimento. Ela mostra que a
+participação do sociólogo no processo (o seu implícito ou expresso engajamento) pode
+gerar ideologia, em vez de ciência, ou aproximar-se da objetividade possível, que
+SCHAFF denomina verdade-processo (SCHAFF, 1970: 69). A Sociologia do
+Conhecimento, já o afirmei noutro escrito, é uma espécie de Sociologia ao quadrado
+(LYRA FILHO, 1972: 16).
+Será, fundamentalmente, possível distinguir duas visões sociológicas,
+dois tipos básicos da teoria, a que se prendam os demais subgrupos.
+DAHRENDORF pretendeu delineá-lo como Sociologia “de
+estabilidade, harmonia e consenso” e Sociologia “de mudança, conflito e coação”
+(DAHRENDORF, 1974: 150). Mas está visto que, sendo fundamentalmente um idealista
+(no sentido até de militantemente antidialético), DAHRENDORF constrói os seus
+modelos abstratamente, isto é, desligando-os da infra-estrutura, quer enquanto
+consideração dos fenômenos sociais, quer como elaboração doutrinária (que
+obscurece, inclusive, as determinações relativas, desvendadas pela Sociologia do
+Conhecimento).
+Apesar de tudo, os modelos de DAHRENDORF poderiam constituir
+um ponto de partida, com o cuidado de logo se retificar o que apontam, enquadrandose
+numa perspectiva dialética.
+Os dois modelos talvez pudessem apresentar-se neste esquema:
+11
+
+ (A) + (B)
+
+ Eixo DAHRENDORF
+
+Firme controle social
+ Validado e aceito
+(mudança limitada)
+
+Organização social legítima
+
+ Instituições sociais
+
+Bloco único e consensual de
+ normas sociais válidas
+
+Formação de usos, costumes
+ Folkways e Mores uniformes
+
+Relações estáveis de grupos
+ Tendendo à harmonia
+
+ Processos associativos
+ Predominantes
+
+ Precário controle social
+ Sob constante desafio
+ Anônimo (mudança ilimitada)
+
+Organização social pela
+Coerção ilegítima
+
+Sistema de contra-instituições
+em oposição
+
+Vários blocos de normas sociais
+disputando a validade
+
+Formação de usos, costumes
+Folkways e Mores competitivos
+
+Relações instáveis de grupos
+Tendendo ao conflito
+
+Processos associativos
+Predominantes
+
+Contraculturas irredutíveis
+Cultura (subculturas contidas)
+
+Espaço Social
+12
+
+Assim, os dois modelos principais da teoria sociológica idealista – (A)
+e (B) – com a pretensa solução aditiva (DAHRENDORF), através duma espécie de eixo,
+que polarizaria os elementos centrípetos e centrífugos (tática de remanejamento da
+teoria sociológica de índole conservadora).
+
+Vou explicar, brevemente, o que tentei exibir aí.
+Segundo a perspectiva idealista, haveria dois modelos,
+correspondendo a duas visões da sociedade, com expressão teórica em antítese.
+Num determinado espaço social – isto é, em certa base geográfica,
+onde se estabelecem as relações sociais - , o modelo A enxerga a fixação dos padrões
+de relacionamento estável entre grupos. Esse relacionamento se exprime em bloco
+único e consensual de normas sociais válidas, agrupando usos (práticas reiteradas),
+folkways (costumes tradicionais, definidoras da típica forma de satisfazer, naquela
+sociedade, as necessidades da vida) e mores (o setor mais vigoroso dos costumes,
+acarretando, na hipótese do descumprimento, as sanções mais severas) (PIERSON,
+1979: 292).
+O arcabouço de normas se firma, em travejamento de instituições
+(armação estabilizada e sistemática das práticas normadas). O padrão das instituições
+define o tipo de organização social, revestido pelo controle global que o dinamiza, em
+garantia da estrutura. No ângulo cultural, encontram-se os princípios que visam a
+justificar a praxis de convivência, mediante o amparo dum sistema de crenças,
+consideradas válidas, úteis e eminentemente saudáveis. Nesse contexto, a mudança é
+minimizada, pois, ou cede ao processo de homeostase (recomposição do organismo,
+com respeito às suas variedades funções), ou enfrenta os desvios de comportamento
+e princípios discrepantes (subculturas), como “patologias” e “aberrações” (deviant
+behaviour). A “resolução” desses problemas sociais reclama, é claro, o parâmetro do
+que está instituído. Eis, em síntese, o modelo A, que é fortemente centrípeto.
+A oposição, encontrada no modelo B, desenha uma antítese, em
+perfeita simetria. Aí temos a predominância dos elementos centrífugos, de tal sorte
+que toda aglutinação é, em última análise, uma violência ao constante impulso
+dissociativo, gerado pelo contraste de grupos, cada qual com o seu ordenamento de
+usos, costumes, folkways e mores, em blocos múltiplos e hostis. Nesta ordem de
+apresentação, as instituições são, antes, contra-instituições, enquanto se formam,
+sempre, em pé de guerra e desafiando outras tantas. Por via de conseqüência, uma
+organização social só pode estabelecer-se precariamente e mediante a coerção sem
+consenso, dados os padrões opostos de legitimação, com que se defronta. O controle
+social que exercer permanecerá sob constante ataque anômico, sendo este, porém, à
+guisa de contestação das normas que se impuseram como dominantes, sob coação
+(DUVIGNAUD, 1973: 33-37).
+O modelo A é muito favorecido pelas condições de vitalidade e
+equilíbrio da estrutura. Não à toa ele aparece como o mais antigo, na Sociologia
+burguesa. Esta nasceu, como se sabe, na crista do capitalismo recém-chegado ao
+poder. Foi uma espécie de digestão científica dos princípios sociais que à burguesia
+convêm, e que na sociedade firmara, com pretensões à eterna duração.
+O agravamento das contradições sociais, na estrutura posta, logo
+gerou a crise generalizada, consistente em surtos desorganizadores, que preocupam o
+13
+
+poder e os sociólogos conformistas. Em nosso tempo, os sintomas emergem com a
+clareza que já não cabe negar (BALANDIER, 1970: 13-37). Daí a propagação do modelo
+B.
+Em ambos, todavia, notam-se aspectos que evidenciam a
+escamoteação dos elementos básicos. Em síntese, pode-se dizer que o modelo A é a
+resposta triunfalista da burguesia assente, sob o aspecto de teoria sociológica. O
+modelo B traduz, teoricamente, a inquietação de superfície da pequena-burguesia.
+O que há de comum é a tentativa constante de afastar o modelo
+dialético, seja otimizado o que ele apontara, na ligação com a infra-estrutura, seja
+tentando dissolver os mais agudos instrumentos conceituais que a dialética
+movimenta. Exemplo disto é o esforço para desatar a noção de classe das oposições
+geradas, pelo estabelecimento de um modo de produção: o capitalista
+(SWINGEWOOD, 1975: 121). Em DAHRENDORF e outros a estratégia é a mesma: o
+neo-capitalismo teria desfeito o conflito radical (SWINGEWOOD, 1975: 119 e ss).
+A escaramuça, em certos tópicos, logo se avoluma, à medida,
+também, que as coordenadas da crise social traçam ameaças, cada vez mais
+perigosas, ao contraforte estabelecido.
+A argúcia de DAHRENDORF está a liderar uma predisposição teórica
+geral, cooptando o modelo B, devido à vantagem de absorver o lado-conflito, sem
+reconduzi-lo às determinantes infra-estruturais, que parecem contidas. Trata-se, por
+assim dizer, da teoria do conflito barulhento, mas dispersado e desdentado
+(DAHRENDORF, 1969: 213-226).
+A verdade é que a cooptação tem todas as largas facilidades
+inerentes ao superficialismo do modelo B. Assim, os sociólogos conservadores, na
+aparência de modernidade, não têm receio de cravar mais este prego, na ferradura
+teórica: ele facilita a cavalgada da estrutura dominante. Tudo não passa, entretanto,
+duma operação plástica, na teoria burguesa, em que o capitalismo é, agora,
+apresentando como um selvagem que se “civilizou” e está cedendo alguns dos mais
+luzentes anéis dos seus dedos ávidos. O conceito de classe é, então, levado ao moinho
+caviloso, para que seus grãos incômodos se transformem no fubá da esquerda
+domesticada.
+A operação se consuma no que chamei de “eixo DAHRENDORF” –
+um socorro do centro à direita em apuros, pondo à ilharga uma esquerda que não
+assusta ninguém.
+Todavia, a questão, assim determinada, não poderia, obviamente,
+servir à visão dialética. Esta logo repõe a infra-estrutura, cortada nos dois modelos
+idealistas, e daí resulta um modelo bem mais complexo, para superar todo ardil. Nele,
+incorporam-se os ângulos centrípetos – conservador e centrífugo – anarquista, que
+estão, sem dúvida, presentes, em toda sociedade, sob pena de não se apresentar
+estrutura nenhuma, desde que o esquema A é desmentido pelos fatos e o esquema B,
+ou se dissolve no primeiro, ou dissolve uma ordem social, mais ou menos estável,
+forte e, apesar de tudo existente. Mas o essencial é que se delineia a posição da infraestrutura.
+Num esquema global, a visão dialética poderia surgir, talvez, com esta
+disposição.
+14
+
+MODELO PARA ANÁLISE DIALÉTICA SOCIAL DO DIREITO
+
+Controle social global
+DIREITO IV
+
+Organização Social
+DIREITO III
+
+Instituições Sociais
+Dominantes
+
+Bloco de normas sociais da classe
+(grupos) dominantes (tendendo) ao
+homogêneo apesar das contradições)
+DIREITO II
+
+Usos, costumes, folkways, mores da
+classe (grupos) dominante
+
+ DIREITOVIII
+
+Atividade anômica
+(Espontânea ou organizada)
+ DIREITO VII
+
+Processos de desorganização social
+DIREITO VI
+
+Contra-instituições
+
+Blocos de normas sociais da classe
+(grupos) dominada (pluralidades
+grupais) DIREITO V
+
+Usos, costumes, folkways, mores da
+classe (grupos) dominada
+
+Cultura da classe (grupos) dominados
+Cultura da classe (grupos) dominante
+
+DIREITO
+IX
+
+Superestrutura
+
+Luta de classes (grupos)
+Classes sociais (grupos)
+Relações de produção
+
+Modo de produção
+
+Espaço social delimitado
+
+Sistema aberto: contato -> mudança; comunidade internacional;
+dominações e libertações
+
+Infra-estutura internacional
+
+DIREITO I
+15
+
+Proposto o esquema, vou analisá-lo, brevemente, com a ressalva de
+que este exame sumário não supre outras considerações, mais extensas, profundas e
+matizadas, que não tenho, aqui e agora, o vagar para desenvolver.
+Partirei de um ponto de vista, que toma, inicialmente, o direito, em
+sentido (aliás, pluralidade de sentidos) apenas nominal, na ligação com a substância das
+relações sociais que essa faixa semântica reveste. Quero dizer que aparecerão, assim,
+todos os aspectos que sociólogos, antropólogos, psicólogos, historiadores, juristas e até
+filósofos possam designar com o rótulo direito. Esta primeira abordagem, com a sua
+amplitude, leva, parece-me, a vantagem de não reduzir o fenômeno jurídico a um de
+seus ângulos apenas, de acordo com preconceitos doutrinários e postulações
+arbitrárias.
+Começo observando que um modelo dialético há de ser aberto e com
+a preocupação constante de encarar os fatos, dentro duma perspectiva que enfatiza o
+devir (a transformação constante) e a totalidade (a ligação de todos os segmentos da
+realidade, em função de conjunto).
+Disse modelos aberto, pois, embora focalize, em particular, o que
+ocorreria dentro duma estrutura social, logo fica apontada a coligação com os
+fenômenos inter-societários, da comunidade internacional, que não se limitam a
+tangenciar o sistema; ao revés, penetram nele, seja por via de dominações diretas ou
+indiretas (como na ação imperialista e colonialista ou semi-colonialista), seja no tipo de
+influência mais suave, do contato e assimilação, que gera mudança (assim na
+conscientização de aspectos da luta de libertação dos outros povos, que pode auxiliar a
+dinâmica de classes e grupos, internamente) (LYRA FILHO, 1980 A: 21).
+Advirto logo que o esquema se refere às sociedades de classes, não à
+comunidade primitiva, de organização bem mais simples e homogênea, ou a alguma
+espécie de comunidade final, que seria, por enquanto, projeção futurológica. Nenhuma
+sociedade existente sequer pretende haver atingido essa etapa. O ponto é mencionado,
+en passant, tão-só porque alguns autores, do marxismo ortodoxo, admitem o
+desaparecimento do Estado e do direito, que a ele equivocadamente vinculam, como se
+o direito estatal fosse o único a merecer a qualificação de propriamente jurídico (LYRA
+FILHO, 1980 A:12, 18-20, 25).
+De todas as observações, que passo a fazer, tenha a esperança de que
+resulte claro: a) que o direito é um fenômeno bem mais complexo do que se postula,
+ainda hoje, no debate sobre o seu estudo e ensino; b) que as contrações, baseadas
+nessa camisa de força, desfiguram o direito, não só em termos gerais, mas até na reta
+compreensão de cada uma dos seus aspectos, sempre isolados, como se fossem
+compartimentos estanques (LYRA FILHO, 1977:32).
+A discussão da reforma didática há de assentar, portanto, na revisão
+do conjunto.
+Já expliquei que o elemento, referido como espaço social, diz com a
+base geográfica sobra a qual se estabelecem as relações sociais. Em se tratando de
+esquema aberto, entretanto, fica destacado que a estrutura aí implantada conserva
+aquele tipo de vínculos externos interiorizados, que sublinhei como não apenas
+tangenciais ao sistema. Repito que as dominações interiorizam influxos de poderosa
+organização, que podem chegar, por exemplo, à desestabilização jurídico-política e ao
+16
+
+genocídeo cultural (LYRA FILHO, 1980 A:21). Ademais, a comunidade internacional
+engloba um feixe de relações – estruturas dominantes e estruturas dominadas -,
+gerando exteriormente normas que exprimem essa dominação, tanto quanto normas
+que a contestam. A dinâmica jurídica externa delineia, assim, uma resultante, em que,
+cada momento, se afere, seja o avanço das conquistas libertárias, seja o estado das
+dominações renitentes. Aí é que se propõem “aspirações, necessidades, exigências dos
+oprimidos”, sob o ponto de vista ecumênico, tal como acontece, por exemplo, no
+“direito à independência” (MIALLE, 1978:123). Noutros termos, o direito internacional,
+considerado em toda amplitude e profundidade, e não apenas como descrição de
+instituições, torna-se um campo dialético em que as forças progressistas e
+conservadoras desenvolvem projeções jurídicas de sua oposição. Nesse aspecto é que
+surge o DIREITO I, com todas as suas contradições, o que não é destacado, via de regra,
+pelos internacionalistas, presos a um esquema conservador ou a complexo de
+inferioridade, perante o acabamento “dogmático” do direito estatal.
+As condições de permeabilidade, favorecidas pelo contato, podem
+constituir o rastilho, através do qual se comunica a conscientização e inspiração de
+ações fundadas no direito de libertação. Este passa a atuar, então, no plano interno,
+como sensação do atraso da estrutura, em relação às conquistas emergentes, noutros
+setores da comunidade internacional. Basta pensar, a respeito, na difusão dos
+posicionamentos anticolonialistas, que se propagaram pelo mundo e vão alentando os
+esforços libertários setoriais. Esse anticolonialismo já se organiza, inclusive, em termos
+institucionais, no seio do próprio direito internacional adquirido. Vejam algumas de
+suas repercussões na resenha de GONZÁLEZ CAMPOS (GONZÁLEZ, 1976: 128-146), uma
+importante contribuição que merece destaque especial.
+Consideremos, agora o que ocorre no interior do sistema abstraindo,
+momentaneamente, a correlação de forças internacionais.
+O espaço social recebe, em sua base, a moldagem, cujo substrato é o
+modo de produção, isto é, o tipo de organização das forças de produtivas, gerando
+relações, de acordo com modelos variados (GANDY, 1978: 11ss). Na infra-estrutura é
+que aparecem as classes, definidas pelo papel desempenhado no processo produtivo,
+quando as relações de propriedade estabelecem monopólios dos meios de produção,
+afetos ao controle de alguns, a que os demais apenas servem (GANDY, 1978: 163ss). A
+oposição de interesses, entre dominantes e dominados, deste modo aglutina os pólos
+da cisão, pondo-os na atitude conflitiva.
+Assinalo, desde logo, que, em tal de condicionamento, se abre um
+leque de mediações; e as superestruturas nunca se firmam numa derivação mecânica,
+de efeito e causa com as infra-estruturas. Um dos mais persistentes equívocos, na
+leitura da síntese de MARX, no Prefácio da Crítica à Economia Política, nasce de um erro
+de tradução. A palavra bedingt é geralmente transposta como “determina”, “quando a
+única versão correta é – condiciona –, o que sugere uma idéia mais ampla” (CUVILLIER,
+1975:20).
+Por outro lado, a vinculação do conceito de classe à propriedade e às
+relações nela delineadas, sugere que o arranco do fenômeno jurídico (e a contraposição
+dos direitos opostos, invocados pelas classes) emerge na infra-estrutura mesma, se por
+direito entendemos o que ele mais amplamente designa, e não uma das RESULTANTES
+da cisão classística, isto é, apenas a que vai dar no direito estatal e faz caso e tábua rasa
+17
+
+dos direitos dos dominados. Se estes não são direitos, que são afinal? Insto, sem contar
+que também se formalizam em normas paralelas e antitéticas.
+De toda sorte, cabe sublinhar a contradição, surgida na própria infraestrutura,
+e que forma o núcleo de toda dialética do direito, seja no seu acabamento,
+em sistemas normativos (plurais e conflituais), seja na influência de retorno que as
+resultantes normadas possam ter sobre a infra-estrutura mesma; isto é, a
+wechselwirkung (ação circular, envolvendo o retorno sobre a infra-estrutura, o que não
+pode ser negado, nem foi, sequer pelos marxistas ortodoxos) (MARX, K & ENGELS, F. ,
+1977:44).
+Ademais, o esquema de relações, entre infra-estrutura e
+superestrutura, não será, hoje, exclusivo ponto de vista dos marxistas, com atesta o
+sociológo-antropólogo BALANDIER, notando que “conserva inegável alcance teórico”,
+no próprio campo da antropologia política, e que nela “se inspiram certos
+antropólogos, frequentemente de maneira inconfessada” (BALANDIER, 1969:184). Eu
+mesmo devo declarar lisamente que não sou marxista, embora, segundo anotou o
+pensador católico ARANGUREN, esteja, “como todo homem que realmente pertença ao
+nosso tempo, sob a influência do marxismo” (ARANGUREN, 1968:12-13).
+Para marxistas ou não marxistas, parece-me que a visão correta duma
+uma estrutura social não pode prescindir do reconhecimento de que o modo de
+produção gera relações básicas e a divisão em classes determina um pluralismo
+cultural-contracultural. Nesse contexto é que se propõe em pluralismo jurídico,
+também. E aí radica, por igual, o impulso de toda a dialética social e histórica do direito.
+A militância crítica à doutrina fechada, que tivesse o fenômeno
+jurídico enquanto simples norma de classe dominante, substrairia, por outro lado, a
+dialética mesma, tal como ocorre em muitas direções do marxismo ortodoxo. As
+simples derivações infra-estruturais encurtam a visão, tornando-a simplista e unilinear
+(LYRA FILHO, 1972 A: 98). É, numa palavra, e mecanismo. Além disso, importa assinalar
+que esse vezo despreza uma das mais significativas páginas o próprio ENGELS. Nela vêm
+apontadas, não só as contradições do sistema jurídico estatal, mas também o fato de
+que a “expressão brutal, intransigente e autêntica da supremacia de uma classe” iria
+“por si só contra o ‘conceito’ de direito” (MARX, K. & ENGELS, F., 1977: 37-41,
+especialmente, 38). (o grifo é meu); e aqui pouco importam as aspas do autor, que se
+referem à rejeição dos conceitos “puros” (PRESTIPINO, 1977:221).
+Até alguns autores russos, de nítida posição dogmática e dentro do
+chamado “legalismo socialista”, já acentuaram que “cada classe social, esteja ou não no
+poder, tem a sua própria concepção do direito, concepção que não pode ser, e
+geralmente não é, a que se extrai do direito positivo em vigor” (GOLOUNSKY &
+STROGOVITCH, 1965: 257). Diante disso, cabe perguntar: em que o direito dos
+oprimidos, inspirando uma praxis diferente e real (SANTOS, 1977: passim) é menos
+positivo do que o outro, estatal, que atenderia, embora não sem contradições, à
+consciência jurídica da classe dominante? Positividade é eficácia social (que falta, às
+vezes, ao direito estatal); e a presença de juridicidades contrastantes é um fato que
+vige, no sentido sociológico e histórico da palavra.
+O problema não é a existência, ou não, de ordenamentos, em
+pluralidade, cada um aspirando a definir (formalizar em normas, que efetivamente
+aparecem) o corretamente jurídico. O que cabe indagar é, ao revés, qual o
+18
+
+posicionamento exato, diante desse fenômeno inegável, pois obviamente “a
+consciência jurídica da classe dominante não é igual à da classe dominada; sendo justa
+para uma, é injusta a outra” (GOLOUNSKY & STROGOVITCH, 1965: 257). Por outros
+termos, dado o pluralismo jurídico (dialética social do direito), a questão fundamental é
+de estimativa e opção.
+Parece-me também óbvio que tal opção há de orientar-se pelo critério
+estimativo, que não se prende às pretensões de um certo direito formalizados, por um
+certo poder instituído (o “direito positivo” do jurista tradicional), mas pela legitimidade
+ou ilegitimidade dos ordenamentos contrastantes, tal parâmetro só pode ser achado na
+linha do processo histórico-evolutivo global (não, certamente, linear, mas polarizado,
+em avanços e, às vezes, recuos terríveis, no rumo do progresso democratizador). Uma
+bela intuição desse pólo teve, entre nós, RUI BARBOSA, quando escreveu que estamos
+diante dum “sopro de socialização que agita o mundo” (BARBOSA, 1980: 15).
+A partir da infra-estrutura, as relações que dela emanam e a disputa
+das classes, é que se arma a modelagem social concreta. Daí, como sugiro, no esquema,
+os conjuntos contrapostos de usos, costumes, folkways e mores, como gradações das
+normas sociais emergentes, seja na série ligada à classe dominante, seja, ao contrário
+em séries que promanam da classe e grupos dominados.
+Já sugeri que o direito se prende ao elenco de mores (PIERSON, 1970:
+285-292). Mas logo ressalvo que o direito não é o que, no elenco de mores, aparece em
+forma de peculiar e máxima intensidade: isto, pela simples razão de que as normas
+jurídicas visam a exprimi-lo, com maior ou menor correção, o que nem sempre
+conseguem, seja por vício de apreensão, seja pelo obscurecimento ideológico, seja pela
+condicionante desse obscurecimento, que é a posição classística do órgão produtor das
+normas. O direito mesmo é a mola propulsora de todo o processo normativo especial (a
+produção de normas jurídicas), na mesma linha de toda ética social legítima. Para
+valoração das formulações opostas, é preciso, indeclinavelmente, captar a direção do
+processo histórico, onde reside o parâmetro atual (nunca fixo, não derivado de
+conteúdos perenes, mas aparecendo, por assim dizer, num vetor, que indique o estado
+da consciência jurídica de vanguarda que se torne possível, dentro daquela conjuntura).
+Em síntese, direito é aquilo que, como resultante do processo global (e, não da colheita
+em cavernas platônicas) transparece, como possibilidade da concretização de justiça
+social, em normas de peculiar intensidade coercitiva. Terei algo a dizer, adiante, sobre a
+especificidade do jurídico, enquanto venha a estabelecer-se, em confronto com a
+estimativa ética geral. De qualquer sorte, ele se põe, socialmente, com ligação à
+natureza de estabelecimento do justo. E aí estaria a tentativa de não oposição ao que
+lhe constitui o conceito, segundo a sugestão, já referida, de ENGELS. Por isto sempre
+reivindica a própria legitimidade e autenticidade, ainda quando, de fato, a contraria,
+por desfocalização ideológica ou má-fé. Ninguém, mesmo formalizando o antidireito,
+proclama que o faz. Antes, procura resguardo nalgum apelo à vontade popular, à
+inspiração divina ou que critério lhe ocorra, inclusive o da divindade própria de algum
+potentado, que assim pretende normar, não por si, mas através de si. Nem o mais
+descarado ditador se arroga o simples e próprio voluntarismo, exceto na medida em
+que tal voluntarismo seja por ele identificado como o critério exato de orientação
+jurídica. Acha, então, que He knows Best, isto é, que, melhor do que outrem, sabe que
+é justo. Essa barretada, honesta ou hipócrita, eleva o direito à sua posição enquanto
+19
+
+não confunde o critério de formalização, a dição jurídica, e o que ele é. O direito estará,
+se bem captado, na norma, porém, não é a norma, que apenas o diz.
+Daí a existência de legalidades opostas, desde a non scripta Lex,
+natural, divina ou costumeira, até as leis do Estado ou as normas contratuais que se lhe
+opõem. A pretendida hegemonia do direito estatal é um artifício político, mediante o
+qual o poder instituído aspira a eliminar as próprias contradições jurídicas da sociedade
+em que emerge, dando-se por árbitro da justiça social, numa “expressão coerente em si
+mesma” (MARX & ENGELS, 1977: 38). Mas as contradições subsistem, seja na ordem da
+própria formalização normativa estatal, seja no substrato sócio-econômico, que ela
+deseja moldar. Daí a disputa de ordenamentos. O estado sempre vê frustrada a sua
+pretensão, pois não logra erguer-se acima das contradições de que ele próprio emerge,
+nem pode esgotar o jurídico, em sua produção normativa, sem apelar para um
+sobredireito, que lhe desse tal legitimidade constitutiva e funcional, de órgão único da
+expressão normativa. E ainda existe a considerar, sem dúvida, que o Estado assim se
+apresenta, nos graus duma legitimidade que oscila, desde a mais ampla quota
+democrática até a feroz imposição autoritária. Também isto é um problema jurídico,
+pois o “direito positivo”, naquele sentido restrito do jurista conservador, postula um
+“metajurídico-positivo” que a tal positivação juridicamente legitime. Toda dição, além
+de carregar o ônus da legitimação do órgão jurígeno (que, em si, é jurídica), terá de se
+apresentar como projeto de dição, sujeita a desvios e subordinada ao corretivo, seja
+mediante processos autoregulados, seja por critérios “não positivos” (no sentido de
+não ínsitos num ordenamento). Pois tal regulação e o conteúdo mesmo das normas
+eventualmente ferem o direito, em globo, a que se reportou, fatalmente, o órgão
+normante, dando início ao pretendido monopólio.
+No esquema, acrescentei, sempre, ao termo – classe –, a palavra mais
+ampla – grupo. É que a dialética dos normas sociais, em geral, e, em particular, das
+normas jurídicas não se reduz inteiramente à oposição de classes (SANTOS, 1977:9). Ela
+pode inserir-se na reivindicação de legitimidade, como posicionamento de grupos que
+não representam diretamente o contraste de classes, entendidas estas últimas como o
+posto ocupado no modo de produção. Assim, por exemplo, como nota MIALLE, certas
+minorias étnicas, regionalistas, sexuais, “que exigem o direito à diferença” (MIALLE,
+1978: 123).
+O ângulo mais geral será, todavia, aquele a que estão, em última
+análise, ligados os processos secundários, isto é, a reivindicação das classes dominadas
+para indicarem outro tipo de Estado” (MIALLE, 1978: 124), que realize o modelo mais
+justo, no sentido em que o define a etapa do processo histórico democratizador. Aí,
+sem dúvida, fica revelada, ademais, a ambigüidade do conceito de Estado; pois ele
+pode ser visto, de um lado, como estrutura de dominação e, por outro, emergir como
+veículo para estabelecer a alternativa efetivamente democrática (LYRA FILHO, 1972:
+103). Isto parece claro; pois, de outra forma, que razão haveria para falar num Estado
+socialista? Nenhum Estado, afinal, paira acima das lutas sociais, como árbitro isento. O
+Estado sempre será inserido nelas.
+Quando existe, ele é apenas um sistema diversificado de órgãos, com
+aspiração a monopolizar o poder social; e, portanto, a sua eficácia, tanto quanto a
+legitimação, constitutiva e funcional, depende da maneira por que se ajuste, num
+momento dado, ao processo social. Isto é, depende da sua vinculação ao movimento da
+20
+
+História para frente, ou de seu comprometimento com formas de paralisação ou
+retrocesso.
+Neste perspectiva, a cultura, que imanta com princípios as formas de
+controle social, é apenas um aspecto do mesmo processo. Ela engloba, na sua
+pluralidade efetiva, governada pela pluralidade de grupos e classes, confessos ou
+incontestáveis, quanto a consciência reta e possível, a exata orientação no rumo do
+conhecimento objetivo e dos valores polarizados pelo progresso social, num momento
+dado (CUVILLIER, 1975: 14-30).
+Continuará, decerto, presente uma clivagem, entre cultura como
+projeção das diretrizes que guiam a classe dominante e contraculturas; isto é,
+subculturas, no sentido de que não chegaram ao poder social mais difundido,
+realizando a sua pretensão de generalizar-se. Assim, desafiam o que está posto, no
+stablishment. Nessa acepção é que falo de comportamento anômico, isto é, a posição
+militante que nega uma parte ou todo o conjunto de normas do poder social instituído,
+assim como a série de princípios em que se lastreia e com os quais pretende justificarse.É
+evidente que a presença de contraculturas exprime a existência das
+classes em oposição ou, secularmente, de grupos contrapostos. Aqui, a referência a
+grupos volta ao fenômeno, já assinalado, de contradições não diretamente vinculadas à
+divisão de classes. Deste modo é que se concebe, por exemplo, a pesquisa de
+comportamento anômico em qualquer estrutura social, capitalista ou socialista. Vejamse,
+por exemplo, as investigações de PODGORECKI, sobre coeficientes de anomia na
+sociedade polonesa (PODGORECKI, 1996: 212).
+Dentro desse quadro, o processo jurídico geral vai desvendando seus
+aspectos. O DIREITO II seria a formalização de normas, ainda não instrumentalizadas
+em leis e correspondente ao DIREITO V, enquanto este éa produção correlata, nas
+classes e grupos dominados, e aquele, a formação do elenco, em última análise,
+vinculado a classes ou grupos dominantes (a ressalva – em última análise – tende a
+destacar as contradições de cada série, uma vez que o DIREITO II, como toda produção
+normativa da faixa dominadora, não é, mecanicamente, e tão-só, a tradução de seus
+interesses e posicionamentos). O DIREITO III representa o substrato das normas de préconstituição
+que governam a formação do aparelho estatal. Nenhuma constituição,
+como nenhum poder constituinte, pretende autoregular-se arbitrariamente, mas extrai
+de modelos prévios o que se lhe afigura como assento da própria legitimidade. Ao
+DIREITO III corresponde obviamente o DIREITO IV, na medida em que este compendia
+modelos diferentes de pré-constituição, exprimindo o teor de propostas do “outro
+Estado”, isto é, de substrato diferente.
+O DIREITO IV é o ÚNICO geralmente focalizado, na organização
+tradicional dos cursos jurídicos, inclusive quando se abre espaço para os princípios de
+direito “não positivo” ou costumes (da mesma classe ou grupo); pois, ainda assim,
+igualmente se reconhece ao DIREITO IV, na visão conservadora, o poder de aniquilar
+princípios e costumes, e até legalidades, que contrastem com suas normas expressas.
+ESTA, A GRANDE DETURPAÇÃO. Ela faz de um incidente, sem dúvida relevante, mas
+parcial, a imagem da totalidade do fenômeno jurídico. O reverso é, evidentemente, a
+ação anônima, espontânea ou organizada (DIREITO VII), de classes e grupos que
+desafiam algum aspecto ou, mesmo, a totalidade do sistema instituído; e desemboca
+21
+
+no DIREITO VIII, em que se aperfeiçoa todo um sistema alternativo, para substituição
+global do que está em função.
+O DIREITO IX, que fica no entroncamento dos processos internos e
+externos, isto é, entre o DIREITO I e tudo o que se processa nos demais, seria a
+formulação, perfectível, em progresso, em devenir, da totalidade na dialética externainterna
+do direito, abrangendo o que se possa delinear, para qualquer direito
+emergente, num dos aspectos parciais, setoriais (LYRA FILHO, 1972 A: 111-112). Nesse
+âmbito, aparecem os chamados direitos humanos, com pretensão ecumênica. Note-se
+que não me refiro às declarações de direitos humanos, que desejam exprimir o DIREITO
+IX, porém a este mesmo, que nelas aproximadamente se reflete. Por outro lado, não se
+trata da cristalização de qualquer “essência” metafísica, mas do vetor histórico-social,
+indicando o que se pode ver, a cada instante, como direção do progresso da
+humanidade, na sua caminhada histórica. Essa resultante final (final, não no sentido
+perene, mas no de síntese abrangedora do processo jurídico em sua totalidade e
+devenir) se reinsere, de imediato, no processo, uma vez que a história não pára. O
+DIREITO IX seria, então, a chave de abóbada para todo o ensino jurídico, arrimado em
+uma Antropologia Filosófica de base (GOULIANE, 1968: passim) e na coordenada de
+estudos históricos e sociológicos, inclusive econômicos. Estes, torno a ressaltar,
+também não visariam ao estabelecimento da grande mixórdia de contribuições
+interdisciplinares: a Antropologia Filosófica retoma o esquema antropológico de base
+(LYRA FILHO, 1972 A: 32; 45-68), evitando que a “autonomia” de saberes parcelados
+criem, pela simples adição, a confusão de direções, posicionamentos e doutrinas, que a
+Sociologia do Conhecimento leva à sua raiz e a Filosofia Jurídica se dedica a re-pensar
+em sua totalidade (LYRA FILHO, 1972 A: 44-45), na perspectiva crítica.
+Como não temos, atualmente, senão cursos do DIREITO IV, com raros
+orifícios curriculares onde se possa inserir a visão coerente (quando aparecem, é no rol
+das disciplinas “facultativas”), o DIREITO IX jamais emerge, no desenvolvimento do
+curso jurídico “normal”, seja isoladamente, seja na integração em todo exame de
+conjuntos normativos. O próprio DIREITO I, desdenhado, relegado para a franja
+descritiva de instituições “imperfeitamente jurídicas”, não costuma focalizar a infraestrutura,
+as contradições, a inserção no processo jurídico, em termos globais. Deste
+jeito, o ensino do direito não tem pé (um suporte de reta focalização histórica,
+econômica e sociológica), nem cabeça (uma filosofia jurídica), mas apenas mão, para o
+soco alienante do DIREITO A, que não admite contraste.
+3. Antes de encarar o roteiro que nos vai oferecendo uma visão nova do
+problema do ensino jurídico, resta uma questão, que é talvez a mais delicada e sutil.
+O positivismo, em abordagem que se concentra no DIREITO IV, não
+tem grandes dificuldades para definir a órbita do jurídico, segundo a sua perspectiva.
+Ele a liga, fundamentalmente, ao Estado e vê, portanto, o Direito, entre as normas
+sociais, como algo que se distingue, na medida em que vem assentado,
+fundamentalmente, no sistema de leis e princípios que os órgãos estatais recortam,
+formalizam e impõem. Ou pretenderão impor, já que nem sempre o conseguem.
+O grande erro desta redução está num duplo corte mutilador. Seu
+primeiro aspecto é a confusão entre as normas que enunciam o direito e o direito
+mesmo, que nelas é enunciado. O segundo aspecto do mesmo erro é o que, a pretexto
+de melhor assinalar o que é, afinal, jurídico, nega vários aspectos e setores do direito.
+22
+
+Vamos ver, ligeiramente, em que se concretizam tais deturpações.
+Se dizemos, a propósito do direito, que este é as normas estatais,
+além de contrair-se, arbitrariamente, a dialética do jurídico, fica em aberto o que mais
+normas pretendem veicular. Isto é, o passageiro é definido pelo automóvel e tudo que
+nele transita é o passageiro. Se o motorista põe ali um saco de batatas, este saco passar
+a ser batata jurídica pelo simples fato do depósito. Isto, ainda que batata não seja
+direito e a batata juridicamente, podre e inedível. A escamoteação, assim consumada,
+já se chamou “toque de Midas”, pois, como no caso do rei lendário, tudo o que ele toca
+se transforma em ouro. Mais: como, por outro lado, ao aparelho estatal, e só a ele, é
+deferido o poder seletivo do que se insere na proceituação jurídica, o direito, com
+aquela seleção, passa a ser a vontade do Estado nua e crua. Aí não se atenta para a
+conseqüência fatal: é que a ótica positivista “desjuridiciza” o Estado, de vez que ele
+passa a ser metajurídico, enquanto produtor de todo direito. Mas, se o Estado não é
+jurídico e, sim, jurígeno (pois, em tal caso, até as normas jurídicas reguladoras de sua
+constituição e funcionamento são estatais), em nome de que direito ele se arroga o
+poder jurígeno mesmo? Trata-se, então, dum ato puro e simples de dominação
+ilimitada.
+Essa perspectiva, que não admite um direito supra-estatal, seja qual
+for a modalidade do legalismo, que ali se implante e tenha por jurídica, já foi
+denunciada pelo sociólogo polonês, PODGORECKI, no traçado de um círculo vicioso:
+“advogados e juristas, educados no espírito do legalismo dogmático, nas esferas civil,
+penal ou administrativa, acreditam que o direito é definido por sua validez, ou por sua
+produção pelos órgãos estatais autorizados. Não parecem preocupar-se com a natureza
+obviamente tautológica de tal posição. De fato, se direito é o válido, e o não-válido não
+é direito, surge uma questão: em que princípio se baseia a própria validade? Os que
+dispõem a desprezar a tautologia responderiam que o válido o é, por ser jurídico.
+Alguns advogados dogmáticos mais escrupulosos modificariam ligeiramente essa
+posição, dizendo que o que é válido o é, porque um poder autorizado assim o gerou.
+Mas, autorizado por que princípio? Um princípio legal, é a resposta. Assim reaparece a
+tautologia, embora em círculo maior” (PODGORECKI, 1973: 65).
+A outra face do mesmo erro leva o positivista a negar “positividade”
+ao que não é o direito estatal, que se propõe como dogma. Neste caso, temos o leito de
+Procusto. Se existem, como vimos, direitos não-estatais, na dialética global do jurídico,
+afirma-se que na verdade tais direitos não são um direito direitinho, pois que o são
+impropriamente, insuficientemente, ou de todo não o são. Como no caso do famoso
+bandido, se a cama é curta, deita-se ali a vítima, para esticá-la e, dessa maneira, levá-la
+à morte. Se a vítima é mais comprida do que a cama, nenhum problema: corta-se o
+que sobrar...
+Com isso, desaparece todo e qualquer direito que não seja de fonte
+estatal, como o direito de resistência às suas determinações antijurídicas, até os
+direitos que se estabelecem acima dos Estados como o direito internacional. Este será,
+pelo jurista dogmático, entendido como um “menor desamparado”, a não ser que, um
+dia, apareça o mítico Estado Universal.
+De outra parte, dois fatos óbvios são negados. O primeiro é a
+existência de normação jurídica nas sociedades em que não há Estado – o que qualquer
+antropólogo demonstra ser inexato. O segundo é que fatos jurídicos, tais como o poder
+23
+
+constituinte, para que apela o Estado em sua origem, passam a ser algo não-jurídico.
+Sobretudo, não há falar em direitos humanos, ou coisa que os valha, pois direito não
+são. E aí chegamos à anedota da nave, que era maior por dentro do que por fora, uma
+vez que os princípios de pré-constituição do direito estatal não seriam jurídicos e o
+Estado, como órgão jurídico, então, concebe de si mesmo a dá à luz, ante nós todos, à
+jurisdicidade que se arroga e as derivadas jurídicas por ele mesmo produzidas. Neste
+caso, é no ventre do filho que surgem o pai e a mãe...
+Que visão mais ampla corrigiria esse parto monstruoso?
+Consideremos a realidade, tal como ela é.
+A interação humana de classes, grupos, povos exige que a liberdade
+de atuar, em cada sujeito, individual e coletivo, se limite por algo mais do que o bel
+prazer dos agentes. O controle espontâneo é anárquico e já tive ocasião de satirizá-lo,
+falando na cirandinha social, dançada por uma coletividade de anjos (LYRA FILHO, 1980
+A: 12). Se não há controle espontâneo dos agentes, mas, ao invés, normas coercíveis,
+ou estas descobrem a própria medida e estalão, ou se tornam oposto da anarquia, isto
+é, a opressão arbitrária, enquanto pretenderiam legitimar-se pelo simples fato de
+existirem. A aberração, no caso, gera uma outra dificuldade, pois nem sequer há um só
+conjunto de normas na sociedade, e, sim, conjuntos em oposição, sendo o produzido
+pelo Estado apenas um deles. Nesta obstrução, e admitindo-se que atinássemos com
+qual dos conjuntos teríamos de haver-nos (seria com todos eles?), só restaria o dilema
+de nos submetermos ao que desse e viesse, ou negarmos tudo, sonhando com um
+paraíso em que, de norma, só houvesse a Norma Benguel...
+Ao revés, parece óbvio que é preciso confrontar todos aqueles
+conjuntos com critérios de legitimidade, na medida em que eles se apresentam como
+normas coercíveis e afetam a liberdade de indivíduos, grupos, classes e povos.
+Nesse plano é que o pensamento idealista estabelece a sua tendência
+ao dualismo. A moral se biparte entre o tipo ideal, absoluto, superior e perene e o tipo
+comum, real, variável e inconsistente, de morais contrapostas. Isto deixa cada um
+perante o relativismo, que de novo aceita o que der e vier (contrariando a índole de
+toda norma que é preceituar o que se acha cabível, justificável e conveniente), para
+desembocar no amoralismo, pois tanto vale dizer que valem todas as normas eficazes,
+como dizer que não há mais do que valores sem estalão, que seriam, desta maneira,
+valores que não valem nada. O modelo absoluto, que confortaria os demais, fica lá
+longe, numa caverna platônica; aqui, na planície em que vivemos, só se distinguiriam
+certas imposições convencionais, que nada justifica, a não ser o argumento
+inconveniente e perigoso de que se justificam porque a nós se apresentam.
+Assim, a cisão idealista acaba entregando o que é válido à impotência,
+e o que é coercível, sendo carente de legitimação, termina relegando á violência da
+imposição arbitrária. Isto, quando as duas coisas não se conjugam; pois aquela moral
+absoluta do idealismo é, muito frequentemente, com a aparência de coisa que caiu do
+céu, por graça de Júpiter, ao invés de ter sido gerada na terra, por malícia de Creonte.
+Não vou estender-me nesse tema, senão para lembrar que uma
+concepção dialética do que é moral já enfrentou o dualismo solerte. O parâmetro está,
+de novo, no processo histórico (VAZQUEZ, 1970: 40-47 e passim). Não se trata de duas
+ordens de princípios – uns, absolutos; outros, históricos; uns, sacados a modelos
+eternos; outros safados pela conveniência de grupos, classes padrões de convivência,
+24
+
+de ordenamentos diversos, coexistentes, obedecendo, em última análise, a divisão da
+infra-estrutura em classes e, secundariamente, em grupos, cuja posição social gera
+interesses e propósitos conflitantes. A resultante de legitimidade obviamente
+dependerá, então, do posicionamento das normas oriundas dessas classes e grupos, ou
+até povos, no processo histórico, entre liberdade e opressão, minorias dominadoras,
+minorias oprimidas e maiorias desamparadas.
+Dessa forma, no direito, a oposição entre um direito natural, fixo,
+eterno, e os direitos que classes, grupos e povos geram e opõem. “A deficiência maior
+do iurisnaturalismo clássico é separar os objetivos sociais e os juízos de valor, ou os
+valores mesmos, atribuindo-lhes uma existência como que acima do que ocorre no
+processo histórico-social” (LYRA FILHO, 1980 A: 18). Nesse contexto, o “conflito entre o
+direito eventualmente formalizado e o projeto progressista (desenvolvimento rumo ao
+modelo superador) há de ser deslindado, segundo o parâmetro da continuidade
+histórica e das rupturas (na substituição, também histórica, de modelos). Isto, sem que
+o direito formalizado se ponha de um lado (direito “positivo”) e o direito “justo” de
+outro (direito “natural” idealista). Ao limite, cumpre assinalar que a justiça é
+meramente a concretização das quotas de libertação, na ultrapassagem e dentro do
+processo histórico” (LYRA FILHO, 1980 A: 19). Em síntese, o parâmetro está no DIREITO
+IX, enquanto ele propõe a síntese, em cada momento, do que significa o movimento
+progressista, nas suas projeções jurídicas.
+O que cabe perguntar, entretanto, nesta altura da exposição, é o que
+pode, nos conjuntos de normas sociais, emergir como propriamente jurídico. As séries
+de normas, contraditórias, opostas, em pugna, sejam elas jurídicas ou morais, estão
+imersas no mesmo processo e podem ser avaliados, na medida em que o estalão
+legitimamente, para toda opção, é o apex, designado pela direção daquele processo e
+seu estado, na presente etapa. Nisto, indaga-se, que poderá distinguir as normas
+jurídicas?
+O critério mais difundido, para esse fim, destaca algumas
+características. As normas jurídicas seriam heterônomas, coercíveis, mediante sanções
+organizadas, e bilateralmente atributivas. Eu mesmo já utilizei esses elementos (LYRA
+FILHO, 1972 A: 121 e passim). Mas, em reflexão posterior, eles me pareceram mais
+frágeis do que imaginava.
+Em primeiro lugar, queria repetir que, procurando os elementos do
+direito, nas características da norma jurídica, há uma inversão consistindo em buscar o
+que nelas se vaza, no veículo expressivo e comunicativo que elas são. Advirto que esta
+ênfase nada tem a ver, porém, com a concepção do direito como alguma essência
+extraterrena, metahistórica e metafísica. É apenas a distinção entre o que chamei de
+veículo e passageiro.
+Em segundo lugar, as próprias características formais, assim
+propostas, não se revelam muito precisas e consistentes.
+A heteronomia sugere a índole de coercibilidade externa, com que se
+confunde, pois heteronomia é o oposto de autonomia e significa a sujeição a um querer
+alheio. Assim, o direito, exterior, e como norma coercível, nos afetaria, enquanto
+imposição a que cumpre obedecer, sem que isto dependa de interiorização e de íntimo
+convencimento. A cisão, que é de origem kantiana, desmente, no seu individualismo
+ético (“a lei moral dentro de mim” e a lei jurídica a mim pro-posta e im-posta), a
+25
+
+heteronomia da moral, enquanto comando de origem social, não subjetivamente
+autócne, mas intrasubjetivado (GOLDMANN, 1970: 104 ss). Ademais, o direito,
+enquanto reivindicação jurídica, na conscientização dum posicionamento e projeto,
+igualmente apresenta aquele aspecto interior, por autores marxistas (SZABO, 1973: 13
+e passim).
+A moral, vista como perfeitamente autônoma, esquece que o
+superego admite ou rejeita o que, em grande parte, é apenas a intrasubjetivação do
+que classe social, educação e ideologia inseriram no sujeito. A moral, repito, não é
+subjetivamente autóctone; tampouco, é claro, o direito. Numa perspectiva dialética,
+ambos são, simultaneamente, “heterônomos” e “autônomos”; e a nossa liberdade de
+opção, longe de concretizar-se na negação das intrasubjetivações do social, está na
+conscientização de que elas existem, para a libertação de sua modelagem e a visão
+mais objetiva.
+O direito, assim, como a moral, funciona, exteriormente, como
+resultante do processo social de regulação da conduta, na medida em que o captamos
+(avaliando as diretrizes contrapostas que estabelece, em pluralidade de normas). Nele,
+projeta-se, como opção de indivíduos, grupos, classes, povos a “síntese de
+necessidades e liberdade, coligadas à praxis” (LYRA FILHO, 1972 A: 123). Isto é, na
+descoberta da “posição relativa”, na estrutura, e na reorientação dela decorrente, em
+moral ou em direito, se reinstaura “a dialética do possível subjetivo, diante dos
+imperativos das normas objetivas”, para a determinação dos “rumos do processo
+histórico” (LYRA FILHO, 1972 A: 62). Daí moral (ou direito) “de realização”, que abre
+espaço a novas conquistas, enquanto se opõe à moral (ou direito) dos arranjos
+dominantes (LYRA FILHO, 1972 A: 62; GOULIANE, 1968: 210).
+Há, portanto, na norma jurídica, tanto quanto na moral,
+“heteronomia” e “autonomia”, tanto quanto coercibilidade, pois, ao lado das sanções
+jurídicas, funcionam as que não são apenas o mecanismo interior em que se
+estabelecem “dores de consciência”, porém muito mais do que isto: sanções externas,
+de grande poder e violência, golpeando o comportamento desconforme. Dir-se-á que
+as sanções sociais, acompanhando a norma de tipo moral, são menos precisas –
+sanções difusas, no vocabulário sociológico –, ao passo que as jurídicas são sanções
+organizadas e armam a coercibilidade mais forte. A esse respeito, falarei mais adiante.
+Primeiro, entretanto, desejaria examinar a chamada bilateralidade
+atributiva. Ela importa em dizer que o direito, ao contrário da moral, é uma relação em
+que dois sujeitos se contrapõem, um deles com o poder de reclamar o que ao outro
+cumpre fazer ou deixar de fazer. Isto adviria de que a norma jurídica aparelha o direito
+com uma referibilidade a sujeitos contrapostos: o que tem o dever jurídico e o que tem
+o poder jurídico de exigir o respeito ao padrão de conduta a que o outro está obrigado.
+Bem ponderada essa característica, não vejo como se ausente das
+normas morais, em que o grupo, classe, até, eventualmente, a sociedade inteira se
+investem no “direito” de reclamar o correto procedimento moral e lenta, o
+procedimento tido como aberrante. “O ato moral, como ato de um sujeito real, que
+pertence a uma comunidade humana, historicamente determinada, não pode ser
+qualificado senão em relação a um código moral que nele vigora” (VAZQUEZ, 1970: 65).
+Diria, melhor: um dos códigos morais, conforme a pluralidade de ordenamentos que se
+estabelece na sociedade dividida em classes e grupos, ou até na comunidade
+26
+
+internacional, dividida em nações e povos, como variada posição. De qualquer sorte o
+ato moral é, sempre, “um ato sujeito a sanção dos demais, isto é, passível de aprovação
+ou desaprovação de acordo com as normas comumente aceitas” (VAZQUEZ, 1970: 61).
+Se admite um sancionamento, admite-se uma atribuição bilateral, havendo pessoa,
+grupo, classe, ou que outro órgão coletivo caiba, para aplicar a sanção.
+Dir-se-á que tal sanção é muito menos precisa do que a jurídica; seu
+poder de coerção, menos intenso; o órgão aplicador, menos precisamente indicado; o
+procedimento para infligi-la, de tipo mais fluido. Por outras palavras, aqui emerge a
+questão das sanções morais, enquanto sanções difusas, em oposição às sanções
+jurídicas, enquanto sanções organizadas, com órgão bem estabelecido para a aplicação
+e procedimento mais claramente regulado. Este aspecto é o mais persuasivo dos que se
+apresentam a exame e, por isso mesmo, alguns autores concentram nele a melhor
+maneira de separar a norma jurídica. Assim, para o Eminente ELIAS DÍAZ, autor da mais
+rica e atualizada obra didática da sociologia e filosofia jurídica, “radicaria aqui o critério
+básico diferenciador entre ética e direito” (DÍAZ, 1980: 26).
+Com a devida vênia do ilustre colega espanhol, não posso aceitar sem
+ressalvas, a afirmação, notadamente porque ele ainda a realça, afirmando que só o
+direito é coercível; que a moral, em sentido próprio, exige “condutas não forçadas”
+(DÍAZ, 1980: 26), isto é, livremente aceitas. Parece-me que pesa, contra essa afirmação,
+mais do que uma divergência teórica; pesa, contra ela, toda a força de análises
+psicológicas da intrasubjetivação de padrões alheios à “autonomia” do sujeito; pesa,
+contra ela, a existência externa de coercibilidades morais, com sanções difusas e até,
+acho eu, organizadas; pesam, contra ela, enfim, as investigações da sociologia, da
+antropologia e da história.
+Mais aceitável seria a afirmação de que as sanções jurídicas são
+propriamente organizadas, naquele sentido técnico já referido; sanções especiais.
+Ainda assim, tendo certa dúvida, pois me lembro da organização de formas costumeiras
+do sancionamento moral, como o “gelo”, os procedimentos bem precisos de
+marginalização, que afastam o moralmente infamado, retirando-lhe privilégios
+inerentes às pessoas tidas como “idôneas”, o acesso a locais de recreação ou
+apetecíveis e superiores formas de emprego e trabalho. Sanções difusas? E a “bola
+preta”?
+Essa crítica não tem o propósito de aniquilar totalmente a distinção
+consagrada; visa a pô-la num nível mais modesto, que é o de mera gradação. Eu não
+hesitaria em afirmar que a norma jurídica é mais intensamente heterônoma; sua
+bilateralidade atributiva é mais precisa; a sua coercibilidade mais marcante, sobretudo
+nisto que as sanções organizadas são também mais exatas, na determinação dos órgãos
+e procedimentos. Apenas isto, entretanto, que nega uma separação essencial entre os
+âmbitos moral e jurídico, quanto ao tipo de norma.
+Não quero dizer que, por tal motivo, os ordenamentos jurídicos e
+morais se confundam em tal medida que, num e outro, o conteúdo das preceituações
+seja idêntico. Há, aí, duas coisas que não se deve confundir: a primeira está em que é
+preciso convir em que a diferença do tipo de norma não emerge com a nitidez
+pretendida. A segunda é que essa fluidez do balizamento formal, não importa na
+identidade da preceituação, a cada momento: isto é, podemos ter, simultaneamente,
+até no mesmo nível (de classes, grupo, povo ou nação) sistemas de normas morais e de
+27
+
+normas jurídicas de conteúdo independente e, mesmo, oposto. Essas contradições
+existem e podem ser observadas. A unidade do ordenamento jurídico e moral, em que
+as normas se aglutinam, não apenas formalmente (pela carência de nitidez do tipo de
+normação), mas até substancialmente (pelo sentido maciço, praticamente unívoco, das
+preceituações), é evidentemente, a comunidade primitiva. ROGER PINTO sintetiza isto,
+embora com o emprego de rótulo impreciso – “sociedades arcaicas”. Nestas, diz ele,
+“se verifica que moral e direito não são diferenciados, como também não as normas
+sagradas, estéticas ou técnicas” (PINTO, 1969:73). Isto não quer dizer, entretanto, que
+aí não exista um direito. Quer dizer, sim, que direito e moral são unívocos; mas
+qualquer antropólogo mostraria que direito existe, e até sanções organizadas mais
+intensas.
+Acrescentarei, no fecho desta meditação e na tentativa de captar o
+direito em globo, pretendendo evitar as postulações idealistas ou as reduções do
+positivismo, ela aponta um caminho em três etapas.
+A primeira é a que tentei expor, numa abordagem do fenômeno
+jurídico, em perspectiva sociológica, abrangendo todos os aspectos da manifestação do
+direito, a partir dum conceito nominal.
+Essas duas etapas constituem os dois tipos de estudos básico e
+preliminar. A terceira será, evidentemente, um reencontro global, para que acenei,
+como tarefa da filosofia jurídica. A ontologia que aí se esboça, contrapondo-se ao
+idealismo, também não é uma simples articulação dos dados empíricos e, sim, uma
+reelaboração deles, em busca das “categorias, como formas do ser e determinações da
+existência” (cf. LUKÁCS, 1972: passim), isto é, no salto ontológico em que a realidade do
+ser é deduzida, geneticamente, de suas formas de transição (LUKÁCS, 1972: 12 e
+passim). Seja qual for a crítica feita à realização, aliás fragmentária, de ontologia
+lukácsiana, o seu projeto e intenção parecem-me especialmente fecundos e de índole
+autenticamente dialética.
+A esta altura das minhas reflexões, já sugeri que enxergo o direito, em
+globo, como teoria e praxis das possibilidades de concretização da justiça social, em
+sistemas de normas cuja intensidade coercitiva é particularmente acentuada. Ele está
+obviamente ligado à política, no mais amplo sentido (não sectário, partidário), à praxis
+humana, à história e aos pólos do processo histórico. A abordagem filosófica refocaliza
+o que o material empírico-científico lhe traz ao moinho da razão histórica e dialética.
+Direito, então, assume o aspecto geral de setor da praxis social de maior força
+vinculante, que visa, à justiça, através de normas indicando procedimentos e órgãos
+mais nitidamente demarcados do que em outros tipos de regulamentação da conduta.
+Nesse ângulo, é que o DIREITO IX nos ajudaria a ver que as
+contradições de pluralidade de ordenamentos, alguns dos quais flagrantemente
+injustos, pertencem à dialética do direito mesmo, que não se reduz a nenhum dos seus
+aspectos, seja ele situado na ordem das legalidades estatais ou em quaisquer outras
+legalidades competitivas (SANTOS, 1977:9). Não importa que apareçam vários sistemas
+jurídicos, realizando falsamente o propósito ontológico; a própria existência de
+empanamentos ideológicos e dominações, resguardadas por normas jurídicas,
+notadamente no setor do DIREITO IV, sempre faz, em última análise, uma verdadeira
+homenagem à ontologia jurídica, na medida em que, produzindo injustiça, ainda assim
+reclama, por má-fé ou equívoco, o elemento justiça, no seu procedimento. Nem cabe
+28
+
+argumentar com a existência de artigos de lei que não parecem manter qualquer
+vínculo com a idéia do justo (NOVOA, 1975:74), pois o que está em jogo é o
+delineamento geral dos sistemas, em sua finalidade, e não esta ou aquela disposição
+que constitui pormenor insignificante. Fixar-se nestes equivaleria a dizer que há
+minúcias do processo biológico que não se discerne do vínculo imediato com o que se
+possa chamar vida, trocando as leis teleonômicas, que o regem, pelos acidentes
+puramente químicos ou enlaces matemáticos. Falar em direitos de contestação, por
+exemplo, ainda que se omita a palavra direito, é referir uma parte do processo jurídico
+mesmo; e NOVOA, entre outros, poderá desvincular as duas coisas, porque seu
+pensamento ainda gira, apesar das melhores intenções, em torno da formação
+dogmática, tendendo a registrar, no direito, o simples revestimento do regime
+socioeconômico existente (NOVOA, 1975:190). Essa redução, como pretendi
+demonstrar a vocês, é de todo arbitrária e insustentável, em seus próprios termos. E o
+positivismo de esquerda é apenas o positivismo de direita visto pelo avesso e com
+acréscimo não-dialético da infra-estrutura mecanicamente determinante. A deturpação
+da justiça advém do posicionamento de classes, grupos, povos e nações dominadores,
+segundo um infra-estrutura que os opõe a classes, grupos, povos e nações dominados.
+O outro direito, destes últimos oriundo, não é menos direito, ou ajurídico; é pólo
+oposto da dialética jurídico-social, donde salta uma centelha de superação, permitindo
+a síntese, a cada momento, de que chamei DIREITO IX; isto é, o cadinho em que se
+forma o parâmetro de estimativa e, portanto, o guia da praxis humana progressista.
+Essa práxis, ademais, envolve: a) o aproveitamento das contradições dos sistemas
+normativos estabelecidos (como, por exemplo, voltar as contradições do DIREITO IV
+contra ele mesmo; b) a criação de novos instrumentos jurídicos de intervenção, dentro
+da pluralidade de ordenamentos. E o produto final, como atesta a história, sempre
+emana, enquanto veículo do avanço, das classes, grupos, povos e nações ascendentes
+que representam o futuro, porque neles o progresso está.
+Um ensino em que tal manifestação jurídica se omita, ou seja negada,
+mutila o direito e aliena, repito aqui, o espírito docente e discente, paralisando-o na
+descrição do DIREITO IV, para que não se dedique a repensar o direito da
+independência econômica e da liberdade político-social.
+O que mais urgente necessita ganhar o primeiro plano do direito, em
+sua doutrina, fundada na praxis retamente analisada, é precisamente a discriminação,
+na pluralidade de ordenamentos e legalidades, do que nelas aponta, encaminha e
+dirige a criação duma sociedade nova, sem mais discriminações e privilégios, sem
+minorias favorecidas, minorias oprimidas e classes, ou povos desamparados. Neste
+aspecto, pode haver, inclusive, como já apontei, uma decisiva contribuição das próprias
+normas estatais, dependendo, é claro, de que Estado se cogite, em que direito ele
+funde a sua legitimidade invocada e a que infra-estrutura corresponda, tanto quanto a
+que fins esta obedece: a democratização constante ou a paralisação e retrocesso.
+Não é óbvio que os círculos e programas estão, de forma geral, muito
+longe de ensejar uma abordagem dinâmica, totalizadora e progressista do universo
+jurídico? Neles, o que adquire relevo é, sempre, o DIREITO IV, ainda assim considerando
+como pleno, hermético e sem contradições; isto é, amputando o que, mesmo este,
+possa ter de vitalidade, nas contradições gritantes que se pretende negar.
+29
+
+Talvez seja por isso que se desencanta o jovem estudante de direito.
+Talvez seja por isso que, dizem, o curso jurídico atrai os alunos acomodados, os
+carneirinhos dóceis, os bonecos que falam com a voz do ventríloquo oficial, os sectários
+e Office boys engalanados de um só legislador, que representa a ordem dos interesses
+estabelecidos. O uso do cachimbo dogmático entorta a boca, ensina a recitar, apenas,
+artigos, parágrafos e alíneas de “direito oficial”. Mas, então, é também uma injustiça
+cobrar ao estudante a mentalidade assim formada, como se fosse um destino criado
+por debilidade intrínseca do seu organismo intelectual. Sendo as refeições do curso tão
+carentes de vitaminas, que há de estranhar na resultante anemia generalizada?
+Como professor, peso também as minhas responsabilidades; e digo
+que, como tantos outros colegas, estou desperto – não para fazer da cátedra um
+veículo de proselitismo, porém a fim de nela mostrar, com a possível objetividade
+científica, todos os aspectos da questão essencial, pertinente ao jurídico. O que
+constitui o ensino do direito errado aí está, nos dois sentidos correlatos, que defini no
+início desta conferência. E, diante dele, cumpre defender a reforma duma antiga
+mentalidade, a revisão de todas as mutilações do enfoque do direito, para mudar o que
+se tornou rotineiro e, já no tempo de CASTRO ALVES, fazia com que o acadêmico de
+direito visse os próprios compêndios como um soporífero: “Pego o compêndio
+inspiração sublime pra adormecer inquietações tamanhas. Violei à noite o domicílio – o
+crime! Onde dormia uma nação de aranhas” (CASTRO, 1966: 175)...
+É evidente que numa reforma global do ensino jurídico, nesses
+termos, exigiria condições de viabilidade, que estamos longe de entrever. Porém, ainda
+que atuando em campo mais limitado, é preciso ter, sempre, em vista esse
+delineamento inteiro. Pois com ele é que discernimos o direito apresentado no sistema
+tradicional como verdadeira mutilação, que apresenta as sobras torcidas do que
+realmente o direito é. E, aparelhados por tal visão, podemos nutrir aquela utopia
+realista no sentido de ERNST BLOCH, isto é, a alma de uma praxis destinada a alargar os
+horizontes, dentro das próprias limitações da conjuntura emergente. Com isto,
+inserimo-nos dentro dessas limitações, sem o propósito de enguli-las, mas, ao revés,
+com o instrumental para debatê-las. E esta já é uma contribuição ao processo geral,
+histórico, de superação, que evidentemente transcende a reforma do ensino jurídico,
+em si, ou mesmo a concepção global do direito. Elas são, apenas, dois aspectos de
+outra totalidade, ainda maior: o que se realiza no itinerário histórico para um futuro de
+liberdade, paz, justiça e união fraternal, em vez de dominação do semelhante. O direito
+é substancialmente, na sua onto-teleologia, um instrumento que deve (para preencher
+o seu fim), propiciar a concretização de justiça social, em sistemas de normas com
+particular intensidade coercitiva. No universo jurídico, entretanto, uma dialética se
+forma, entre as invocações de justiça e as manifestações de iniqüidade, para a síntese
+superadora das contradições. Mas a consumação d projeto, como o de um ensino certo
+do direito certo, só pode ocorrer, como direito justo homogeneizado, numa sociedade
+justa e sem oposição de dominantes e dominados. Preconizá-la é também um passo,
+embora minúsculo, para o seu advento. O único, porém, ao alcance das minhas
+deficiências e temperamento; o que realizo, como posso, devolvendo o direito, como
+um todo, aos espíritos jovens e inquietos, que o reclamam, E isto é viável, dentro das
+condições do próprio ensino atual, desde que os professores de índole progressista o
+focalizem, nos seus programas e aulas. Ou assim, no estilo informal deste relatório, em
+30
+
+(perdoem-me: o tema é vasto e empolgante) uma tão longa conferência. De qualquer
+maneira, “o mundo dos juristas, tão calmos, tão bem educados e tão bem-pensantes
+não é mais o mesmo. Nem se cogita de rendição à nostalgia. É preciso ver os sinais do
+mundo diferente, que está em gestação. (MIALLE, 1978:146).
+E, para isso, deixo-lhes, como inspirações e lema, a frase dum jurista
+notável, GUSTAV RADBRUCH: “só é bom jurista quem o é, de consciência pesada”
+(RADBRUCH, 1954:44).
+
+REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS
+
+ARANGÜREN, JOSÉ LUIZ (1968) – El Marxismo como Moral, Madri, Alianza Editorial.
+
+ATIENZA, MANUEL (1965) – in RENATO TREVES, Introdución a La Sociología Del
+Derecho, Madri. Taurus.
+
+BALANDIER, GEORGES (1965) – Anthropologie Politique, Paris, P.U.F.
+
+BALANDIER, GEORGES (1970) – Sociologie des Mutations, Paris, Anthropos.
+
+BARBOSA, RUI (1980) – apud JOSAPHAT MARINHO, Dois Estudos sobre Rui
+Barbosa, Brasília, edição particular.
+
+CARBONNIER, JEAN (1979) – Sociologia Jurídica, Coimbra, Almedina.
+
+CASTRO ALVES, ANTÔNIO (1966) – Obras Completas, Rio, Aguilar.
+
+CUVILLIER, ARMAND (1975) – Sociologia da Cultura, Porto Alegre, Globo.
+
+DAHRENDORF, RALF (1969) – in WALTER L. WALLACE, Sociological Theory,
+London, Helnemann.
+
+DAHRENDORF, RALF (1974) – Ensaios de Teoria da Sociedade, Rio, Zahar.
+
+DAVIS, SHELTON A. (1973) – Antropoligia do Direito, Rio, Zahar.
+
+DÍAZ, ELÍAS (1980) – Sociología y Filosofía Del Derecho, Madri, Taurus.
+
+DOS SANTOS, THEOTÔNIO (1977) – Imperialismo e Corporações Multinacionais, Rio,
+Paz e Terra.
+
+DUVIGNAUD, JEAN (1973) – L’Anomie: Hérésie et Subversion, Paris, Anthropos.
+
+FARACO DE AZEVEDO, PLAUTO (1979) – Limites e Justificação do Poder do Estado,
+Petrópolis, Vozes.
+
+FREYRE, GILBERTO (1957) – Sociologia, Rio, José Olympio.
+
+GANDY, ROSS (1978) – Introducción a la Sociología Histórica, México,
+Ediciones Era.
+31
+
+GOLDMANN, LUCIEN (1970) – Marxisme et Sciences Humaines, Paris, Gallimard.
+
+GOLOUNSKY & STROGOVIETCH (1965) – apud K. STOYANOVITCH, La Philosophie du
+Droit en URSS (1917-1953), Paris L.G.D.J.
+
+GONZÁLEZ CAMPOS, JULIO (1976) – in MANUEL ATIENZA et alii, Política y Derechos
+Humanos, Valencia, Fernando Torres Editor.
+
+GOULIANE, C.I. (1968) – Le Marxisme devant l’Homme, Paris, Payot.
+
+LUKÁCS, GEORG (1972) – Ontologie, Darmstadt und Neuwied, Luchterhand
+Verlag.
+
+LYRA FILHO, ROBERTO (1972) – A Concepção do Mundo na Obra de Castro Alves,
+Rio, Borsoi.
+
+LYRA FILHO, ROBERTO (1972A) – Criminologia Dialética, Rio Borsoi.
+
+LYRA FILHO, ROBERTO (1977) – A Filosofia Jurídica nos Estados Unidos da América,
+Porto Alegre, Fabris Editor.
+
+LYRA FILHO, ROBERTO (1980) – Discurso de Agradecimento à Homenagem pelo 30º
+Aniversário de Docência, Brasília, inédito.
+
+LYRA FILHO, ROBERTO (1980A) – Carta Aberta a Jovem Criminólogo, inédito
+(aparecerá no próximo número da Revista de Direito
+Penal).
+
+LYRA FILHO, ROBERTO (1980B) – Para um Direito sem Dogmas, Porto Alegre, Fabris
+Editor.
+
+MARX, K. & ENGELS, F. (1977) – Cartas Filosóficas e Outros Escritos, São Paulo,
+Grijalbo.
+
+MAYNEZ, EDUARDO GARCÍA (1977) – Introducción AL Estudio Del Derecho, México,
+Porrúa.
+
+MIALLE, MICHEL (1978) – in M. BOURJOL et alii, Pour une Critique du Droit,
+Paris, Maspéro.
+
+NOVOA MONREAL, EDUARDO (1975) – El Derecho como obstáculo al Cambio Social,
+México, Siglo Veintiuno.
+
+PINTO, ROGER (1969) – in ROGER PINTO & MADELEINE GRAWITZ,
+Méthodes des Sciences Sociales, Paris, Dalloz.
+
+PODGORECKI, ADAM (1966) – in RENATO TREVES, La Sociologia del Diritto,
+Milano, Edizioni di Comunità.
+
+PODGORECKI, ADAM (1973) – in DIVERSOS, Knowledge and Opinion about Law,
+London, Martin Robertson.
+
+RADBRUCH, GUSTAV (1954) – Kleines Rechtsbrevier, Guttingen, Vandenhoeck &
+Ruprecht.
+
+SANTOS, BOAVENTURA SOUSA (1977) – The Law of the Oppressed, in Law and Society,
+XII (1): 5-126.
+32
+
+SANTOS, BOAVENTURA SOUSA (1980) – in CLÁUDIO SOUTO & JOAQUIM FALCÃO,
+Sociologia e Direito, São Paulo, Pioneira.
\ No newline at end of file
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+Text 2 - Legal norms and other social norms
+
+48 Later, that is, in the next chapter of the book in which this fragment is found, the author will seek a different proposal,
+which would be “the alternative to the apparently insoluble antinomy, that is, the criterion for overcoming the ideological
+oppositions between 'right positive' and 'natural law'”.
+
+47 LYRA FILHO, Roberto. What is Law? 1st ed. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1982 (First Steps Collection).
+
+Roberto Lyra Filho
+
+141
+
+It is generally accepted that Law is expressed through a certain type of norm – the legal norm.
+We must, however, point out that this is just the packaging: the Law is the content.
+
+The text, reproduced here, was part of a volume commissioned by Editora Brasiliense,
+
+for the collection “Primeiros Passos”47, which was modified to fit the format of the series.
+
+It is formed before being packaged in the legal norm, and not everything that is included in it will be
+Legitimate law, also because there are more than one series of legal norms, in conflictual coexistence,
+at every moment, and all of them belong to the social dialectic of Law48.
+
+Therefore, it is necessary to warn the reader that the fragment, now disclosed, begins the debate,
+so to speak, halfway, and ends abruptly, announcing an examination of the real distinction between Law
+and Morals, which it does not expose. Anyone who wants a complete review can take the book, edited
+by Brasiliense, and insert this small excerpt, between chapters 4 (Sociology and Law) and 5 (Social
+Dialectics of Law): you will see, then, that it fits perfectly where it came from. was removed.
+
+Positivists tend to reduce Law to norms or, even more narrowly, to legal norms, in this case,
+rejecting attempts to see the legal phenomenon in a pre-legislative product, in the mores and customs
+of the dominant class and groups (historicist positivism or sociologist), objectively identifies as “culture”
+and “Volksgeist” – spirit of the people – monopolized by that class and groups; be it, subjectively
+(psychological positivism), in the “free right” of the interpreter; in the “judicial law” (judge-made law), of
+official contentious applicators; or in the “legal phenomenology”, of the researchers of “essences” (who
+remain limited by the guidelines of a single focus, that of the dominant class and groups).
+
+In spite of everything, I believe that the disclosure alone will be useful, because here a point of
+special interest for the jurist is discussed, in a frankly “heretical” perspective; that is, diverging, without
+fuss, from the usual and consecrated criteria, in the distinction between the legal norm and other social
+norms, especially the moral one.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Critical Introduction to Women's Rights
+
+142
+
+But it is obvious that, in the coup d'état carried out in this way, there is no revolution or even reform, however,
+
+there is abrupt conservation. This confession was already found in Kelsen himself.
+
+In any case, positivists do not always give the legal norm the same meaning. Some are limited to
+
+laws, decrees-laws and their resulting decrees, regulations and other details. Others expand the concept of
+
+legal norm and, although without abandoning legalism, admit a process of derivation, which, even if it does
+
+not go beyond those milestones, arrives at “individual norms”, that is, produced in a concrete case – such as
+
+the judgments of the judges. magistrates and contracts, concluded between private individuals or involving
+
+public bodies. This is the case, again, with Kelsen.
+
+In these oscillations, within an arbitrarily contracted range, a certain divergence is established
+
+between positivisms. Some (and it is, even today, the majority, from what has been called the “Modern State”)
+
+circumscribe the laws, although this often causes them embarrassment in the face of “super laws” (which
+
+also aspire to “legal” self-foundation), coming from groups that take power to directly reaffirm the class
+
+domain, even if, for this, they have to pay the price of breaking an entire system of legality, subjecting
+
+themselves to the discussion of the legal problem of legitimation itself. This is where the paradox of denying
+
+the untouchability of a complete state order, including the constitutional summit (which means admitting a
+
+measurement parameter superior to the laws), and, soon after, recomposing another legality, reverse the
+
+idea of that this is untouchable and cannot be changed, not even by peaceful means (as if that parameter
+
+were a monopoly of eventual victors and a closed question of a single system, legitimized by itself). In this
+
+context, there is sometimes talk of revolution, confusing the true revolution, which is a concept of historical
+
+and sociological science, implying the complete restructuring of society, from its bases, and coup d'état,
+
+which is a political movement , in which the government passes from one group to another, without changing
+
+the ruling class, nor fundamentally remodeling the established order. The purpose of coups d'état is, in
+
+general, to avoid this remodeling, including that attempted by legal means (in which case the “defenders of
+
+order” come to act above the law).
+
+The General Theory of Law, as usually practiced, is an anemic field, developed from the tradition
+
+of bourgeois jurists in the 19th century. We do not intend to invite the reader to take a walk in this caatinga.
+
+Like stamp collections, chess games and crossword puzzles, the aforementioned theorization requires a very
+
+particular taste and does not bring much clarification or practical effect to what is, in fact, the life of Law. This
+
+does not mean, of course, that we consider all studies of Legal Logic to be useless, it just states that it
+
+withers and dies in flamboyant constructions, while it exacerbates itself in the mental acrobatics of Formal
+
+Logic. Alienating himself, uncritically, from the real problems of legal and social life, from the origin of norms
+
+and their effects of domination, the formalist dedicates himself to the pastime that seems to give a certain
+
+scientific rigor to conformist exercises, of service rendered to the “will ” from the legislator.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+It is commonly asserted that legal norms are distinguished from other social norms – technical
+norms (correct way of carrying out a task) or moral norms (honest way of proceeding) – because they
+would be, the legal ones, (a) heteronomous, (b) bilateral-attributive and (c) coercive, through organized
+sanctions. This complicated vocabulary covers very simple and – we will try to demonstrate – also very
+inaccurate notions.
+
+Even putting aside the question – which we have already referred to – of free or determined will (only in
+
+(And he ignores it, it is obvious that the norm expresses the wishes of Léch Walesa, and his companions
+or of the tough marshal who arrested the worker leader). But to give an impression of "scientific
+objectivity" to all this, Nowak tries to formulate that "rule, with the help of more precise terminology"...
+What do we have, then? Rule 13 of the formalist is expressed in symbols, which we will spare the
+reader, since all this involves laboriously unfolding the “principle” (we already remember that it is
+cabreiro, in its positivist fervor to postulate the perfection, even formal, of any norm – law) , “decreing”
+that if the norm/law has something superfluous, the interpreter must affirm that it is not superfuous...
+of the “rule” that the norm is never pleonastic, even if... in fact it is. In other words, it is necessary to
+“resolve”, logically, through “interpretation”, the so-called “inconceivable”, but real, pleonasm; and,
+instead of saying that it is a very badly done norm/law, it would be the interpreter's “duty” to consider
+the bad done as well done, because who can commit the “sacrilege” of saying that the norm, even
+formally, is nonsense? Uff! We have already wasted too much time with this intellectual onanism of the
+idolaters of the law! Anyway, the already mentioned Wroblewski, more modest than Nowak, recognizes
+that the logical-legal formalism “can be used to describe some elements of material decisions, provided
+the adequate translation of peculiar legal arguments, in a system of logical calculation”. And? Only a
+non-formalist Logic, admits Wrobleswki, can effectively analyze the decision-making process “taking
+into account all the evaluation conflicts”. This is worth it to us! And it is worth confessing that “the antiformalist
+concept of logic has a wider field of application, at least in legal interpretation, than the
+formalist concert”. Wider or narrower, it is still worth noting that these Polish scholars avoid talking
+about dialectics, which is material logic par excellence, the one that absorbs and reframes “conflicts”,
+as well as any and all contradictions...
+
+Heterônomo is the opposite of autonomous and intends to indicate that legal norms subject us
+to the will of others (the will of those who have the power to regulate our conduct), while moral norms
+(which would be autonomous) subject us only to our own conscience. and will.
+
+Let's look at an example of the formal-logical frenzy of the Polish Leszek Nowak. He takes the
+following proposition from Wroblewsky, “it is necessary to establish the meaning, in such a way that
+none of the expressions included in the norms is considered superfluous, that is, unimportant, nor that
+the interpreted norm is declared useless, in the framework of a certain act legal”, which, according to
+Traditional Legal Logic, is strictly a somewhat stupid banality of positivism
+
+143
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Critical Introduction to Women's Rights
+
+144
+
+we free ourselves to the extent that we become aware of the “determinations” that govern us), it
+remains to be seen whether, in fact, moral norms are autonomous, that is, whether the whole
+moral question arises between us and our own individual conscience. Marx said that
+consciousness (Bewusstsein) is awareness (Bewusstsein) and, with this, he pointed to the fact
+that, in the inner field, of what is called consciousness, external elements act, affecting our will;
+and awareness, instead of consisting of inner “freedom”, demands that we struggle, mentally
+even against what the outside world (class or social group, education, way of life) has placed
+within us, shaping our opinions and attitudes and creating an ideology. This awareness process
+is, in turn, conditioned by other external factors: the breaking of the ideological veneer by the
+contradictions of the social structure, aggravated and in crisis, makes the falsity of those beliefs evident.
+
+Freud showed us that behavior is governed by a scheme of solicitations, of “appetites”,
+under the control of an internal censorship of the superego (that deep element that authorizes
+or represses the search for what we feel like doing). What Freud did not show us – and, yes,
+Marx – was the exact nature of the system that governs the authorizations and prohibitions of
+the super ego. This is not modeled from within, but absorbs and internalizes elements from
+outside, which get inside our heads: they are, as the sociologist Lucien Goldmann said, intrasubjectivated;
+that is, they come from received standards, they come from our social position, in
+class, group, education and way of life. Only to the extent that we can become aware of such a
+powerful influence can we begin a process of “de-ideologization”. But where, then, is the “autonomy” of morality?
+
+On the other hand, Law is not purely external (nor purely internal, of course), but legal
+norms are also subject to that same process, while, for example, we come to realize that legal
+positivism (the notion that Law is only what the State determines, with its laws) is an ideology
+that the State itself has generated (and a certain type of teaching perpetuates), to make us more
+docile to everything that the power in exercise intends to demand of us.
+
+Since we began to critically analyze those directives, apparently autochthonous (that is,
+appearing to be born in our “spirit”), instead of passively adhering to the “voice of conscience”,
+we began to realize that that “voice” is not ours, that there is an alien will there, with which we
+have to settle accounts, expelling much that seemed created by our “free will”. And then many
+“sins” reveal themselves as fables of oppression that impregnated us with very convenient
+prohibitions for those who dominate us.
+
+So only laziness or blindness prevent people especially attached to their class or group living
+from seeing that such beliefs are false, false is the conscience and illegitimate their origin.
+
+We want to say that there is also an internal aspect of legal awareness and, while this reflects
+the vanguard of principles and liberating practice, such awareness is even legitimate and fruitful.
+Law is a social phenomenon that also works internally, as recognized, among others, by the
+Marxist jurist Imre Szabo, returning to speak of a “legal conscience”, which, evidently, like the
+norms themselves, can be reactionary or progressive; that is, you can
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Attributive bilaterality is the pompous name given to the characteristic also attributed to the
+norms of law, according to which there is always a relationship, in this type of norm, in which one of
+the subjects is invested with the subjective right to claim what the norm itself (objective right) )
+guarantees him, imposing on another subject the legal duty to respect both the precepts and the rights
+of others, inscribed therein. Let's change this in kids, with the famous example of Petraziski.
+
+be the liberating awareness or the passive “conscience” of those who surrender to ideologies. How to
+distinguish one from the other is an operation that follows the same criteria for evaluating the legitimacy
+or illegitimacy of the norms in which the Law is expressed (and which are not exclusively those of the
+State). It is a mistake to speak of Law and Morals, as if heteronomous norms appeared in the first
+(imposed, from outside, by someone else's will) and in the second there was an autonomy in which
+the norms and their domain were exclusively an internal process. The legal norm is heteronomous,
+just like the moral one, in the sense that we are not the ones who create them; but they are also both
+relatively “autonomous”, insofar as we position ourselves critically, aware, awake, in the face of what
+either of them imposes on us. We emphasize, again, that there is not a single set of legal norms, but
+several (those of the State, those of dispossessed and oppressed classes and groups), in such a way
+that the exact awareness leads us to options and attitudes of critical examination of those standards
+of conduct that intend to be obligatory and are equipped with repressive means, to try to lead us into
+submission. Purely autonomous moral norm and purely heteronomous legal norm are notions taken
+from Kant's philosophy, according to which the legal norm subjects us without remedy to the will of the
+State and the moral norm "reveals" in us a "categorical imperative" (an indeclinable moral duty ): for
+him “the moral law is within me” (of the subject). However, if we look at what this imperative consists
+of, we will see that all of Kant's “inner” morality is, substantially, the internal reflection of his social
+position and the education he received; in fact, from a very religious mother, who filled her son with
+prohibitions and tricks. This is not the importance of Kant's work. By combating Kantian legal positivism,
+Poulantzas shows that it is worth mentioning another angle, also legal and of better inspiration,
+indicated in Goldmann's Kantian studies. But this, here, is beside the point.
+
+If a citizen rents a vehicle and, arriving at the destination, refuses to pay the cost of transport, also
+denying the alms requested by a beggar who was there, the disgrace towards the beggar has no
+consequences, unless (again!) in the intimate forum of those who practiced it, but the carrier can
+demand payment, as there is a legal rule, which establishes the obligatory bilateral relationship and
+provides means of collection. The reader has certainly noticed that typical bourgeois element of the
+example itself, who immediately thinks of the chargeable debt and credit ratio (between people “of
+means”), leaving to the misery (which society generated) the recourse to charity (even so, if the beggar
+is lucky and the bourgeois, the “open hand”...). Incidentally, the entire General Theory of Law,
+according to tradition, is very bourgeois, and keeps talking about debtor, creditor, performance (that
+is, fulfilling the obligation, paying, even if puffing, or submitting to indemnify “losses” with interest and
+all those other frills about the dollar sign-lord of the world). With this observation, let's return to the example: why it is not “enforceable”
+
+145
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Critical Introduction to Women's Rights
+
+146
+
+moral duty, whatever it may be, even if conceived in those very paltry terms? The answer would be that
+
+there is no (public) body that defines the moral duty, nor any organized sanction (from the State), to which
+the “creditor” resorts. At the most, the thing is resolved between the uncharitable and God, through the
+mediation of a priest, who will “fine” the miser in about ten well-said Our Fathers and a little extra money
+for the Church's charities. This, without any greater sacrifice, as the surplus value is substantial.
+
+It will be said that moral standards are less precisely indicated; that there is a lack of texts to
+
+define them (sometimes they exist, in so-called “codes of ethics”). It will also be said that moral sanctions
+are much less precise than legal ones and, in the latter, coercibility is more intense, the procedure for
+applying them less fluid and the applicator body less vague. But, in this case, the question shifts to the
+third characteristic, attributed to the legal norm, that is, that this, and only this, has organized sanctions.
+In this, after all, lies, for many jurists, the supreme distinguishing criterion. Let us leave aside, for the
+moment, their vice of characterizing the Law by the norm and the norm by the sanction, in a vicious circle,
+which then defines the Law as the set of norms that have that sanction, no matter what, to be “ legal”,
+whatever they take inside.
+
+There is, in this reasoning, a great deal of confusion. Admitting that morality is “unilateral” and
+law “bilateral”, returns, by way of detour, to the question of “autonomy” and “heteronomy”, since it is thus
+said that the moral norm (created in us, because God or “Human Reason” there we are concerned with
+such a free “conscience”) has no master, protector and collector, except on an intimate level. But here
+the same trick appears. The moral act is charged by society (class, group, institutions), which establish
+it and the bad payer (ah, always this vocabulary!) suffers a non-negligible sanction, which grows, from
+the light form of being “disgusted” by “ good people”, even isolation, which prevents the “bad character”
+from enjoying worldly sweets. And there go the outcasts to the underworld, with the label of whore, faggot,
+stoner, crook, irresponsible, shameless and other hypocritical “horrors” for the “morality” of the bourgeoisie,
+the moralist, who incites wars, selling weapons to hostile groups, exploits the worker, has sex in the bush
+in all positions, hands over national riches to foreigners, gets drunk in secret, sponsors whorehouses,
+receives perks, opens a Swiss bank account and emerges rich from bankruptcies or receives credit
+injections for avoid them.
+
+In any case, there is a legal norm without an organized sanction, just as there is a moral norm
+that has such a sanction. If the organized sanction is the one that has an exactly defined organ and
+process for its application, International Law, for example, in many cases, presents mere diffuse sanctions
+(without “organization”); and extracting the idea that it is not really a Law (as some do) is equivalent, as
+Truyol y Serra says, to arbitrarily imposing the model of “Modern State Law” on International Law, as if
+this were the only one – which, logically, is absurd and, historically, it is important to say that many legal
+systems of the past were not Law. In International Law, reprisals, economic pressures, even just war are
+not necessary.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Moreover, there is a mere reinforcement of the established domain (ideological reinforcement), in the
+idea that the State Law is considered as the only “developed”, perfected and “rational”. The word
+“rational” is suggestive, as it suggests the transition from bourgeois irisnaturalism, which thrived
+outside of power, to freezing in State dogmatism and bourgeois laws, which in the end reached social
+command. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Courts, for example, overcame the challenge that they did not
+constitute a pre-established body to apply non-pre-determined sanctions to procedures not predefined
+as a crime. The legalism that intended to save criminals, under International Law, did not
+prevail.
+
+We would remember, for example, the “ice”, in which a group marginalizes the offending individual;
+the “black ball”, which prohibits the access of individuals with bad reputation to certain associations;
+the requirement of “suitability”, required for free movement in certain social positions; and so on.
+
+and previously defined, in its scope, procedure and applying bodies. In this sense, it can be said that
+such sanctions are diffuse, just as many sanctions related to non-compliance with the precepts of the
+Declaration of Human Rights are also diffuse, not for this reason ceasing to be legal. The fact is that
+the argument of the deniers of International Law is distorted by the presentation of a historical model,
+that of the bourgeois state law of the 19th century, as the only legal model, which would mean that,
+before and outside of it, Law did not exist, nor does it exist. . This implies historical nonsense, to
+serve legalist privilege, and contradicts, on the other hand, reality.
+
+Above all, the moral norm is equipped with sanctions, also organized according to customs,
+endowed with a very precise ritual of application, for infractions against honest conduct.
+
+In conclusion, it seems that there would not be a distinguishing criterion between the legal
+norm and the closest type of social norm, which is the moral norm. We didn't get that far, what we
+wanted to emphasize is that there is no absolute formal difference between the legal norm and the
+moral norm. Only the legal norm tends to be more intensely heteronomous; its attributional bilaterality,
+more precise; its coerciveness, more prominent and the sanctions, more clearly organized. It was in
+this process of intensification that the list of legal norms, which coexisted there in a kind of undivided
+condominium, was gradually detached from an original block. The historical lesson and social
+anthropology studies demonstrate this quite clearly. But it is immediately necessary to remember that
+the absence of a radical difference in form (due to absolutely different norms) between Law and
+Morality does not confuse the fields of one and the other, for the simple reason that, as we have
+repeatedly emphasized, even if they were expressed by norms radically different, this would not be
+the reason why Law and Morals would be distinguished, in substance. The same product could
+come in two packs, just as the fact that it comes in very similar packs (standards) does not mean that
+these standards are for the same product, as they effectively are not. Law is one thing, Morality is
+another, but it is not in the norms that such a difference lies. Formally, the vehicles of expression
+(social norms), both for Law and Morals, are very similar; the legal norm is just a form that tends to
+intensify the characteristics of the social norm. If we want to be147Machine
+Translated by Google
+Critical Introduction to Women's Rights
+
+148
+
+To establish the difference between Law and Morals, we will say that, instead of looking for it in the
+norms (in which there is no radical demarcation and, even if there were, it would not resolve the
+issue), we should seek the nature of the contents that are conveyed in standards of such great
+similarity. Even in a primitive community, in which Law and Morality maintain a certain common
+direction (since there is no division and, therefore, no conflict of classes), this does not exclude the
+conflicts of groups and individuals, which Law focuses in a way and the Morals of another. What
+continues to separate Morals and Law, even when (and this is the case of the primitive community)
+both types of norms appear in a block of precepts with a more or less homogeneous direction, is not
+in the precarious formal difference of norms, but in the sense substance that reveals the Law in its
+peculiar “essence”. This must be sought in the social dialectic itself, so as not to dissolve in
+metaphysical nebulae, nor flatten itself in any block of state norms (which are not even remotely a
+guarantee that there, in the laws, is the legitimate Law).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+"I was stiff and cold, I was a bridge, I lay over a ravine. My toes on one side, my fingers
+clutching the other, I had clamped myself fast into the crumbling clay." Franz Kafka, "The
+Bridge", 1922 tr. Edwin and Willa Muir It's a remarkable short story by Franz Kafka called "The
+Bridge". A traveller approaches a bridge high up in the mountains. It's the bridge which tells the
+story. It says how at one end it is anchored firmly in the rock and its feet are anchored firmly at
+the other end, Under it, the void. Far below, one can hear a roaring river and rapids. And the
+bridge summons all the strength it has to bear the traveller as he crosses, but it cannot resist
+the temptation - because this is the first time someone has crossed - of turning round. And so
+the bridge drags the traveller down into the abyss. This image expresses particularly well the
+role and the place of institutions in human affairs. People are faced with this issue of the void of
+meaning. We all need to give our lives meaning, but none can be found scientifically. Institutions
+are there to provide us with shared meaning which everyone must accept, but which allows
+everyone to live, as far as possible, without violence. Chapter 1 - FROM GOVERNMENT TO
+GOVERNANCE Law and the Imaginary Law is something at once familiar and mysterious. Its
+importance is often underestimated, yet it plays, today, an absolutely pivotal role. What we are
+experiencing today is a major crisis of law. Now what does that mean? To understand the
+function of law, we must first understand the anthropology of this strange animal called the
+human being. Human beings, like all animals, inhabit the world through their immediate,
+biological experience, they exist in the here and now of their instinctual life. But through the
+power of speech, the greater use of their brain, and through the whole evolutionary process so
+well described by the anthropologist Leroi-Gourhan in his magnificent work, "Gesture and
+Speech", human beings at a certain point in their evolution become able to represent
+themselves and live in a universe which is not only the here and now of instinctual life: you are
+in a meeting, a room, but you can be elsewhere in thought, in the distant past or in different
+places. Every child makes the intoxicating discovery of this ability to invent a world which is not
+there but into which he can project himself. This is what is meant by the imaginary, the fact that
+we live both an instinctual life, and also a life of images. The human being is therefore faced
+with a difficulty unknown to animals, the difficulty of harmonising the two, so that our mental
+images remain connected to the realities of the world. For example, it is imaginary in this sense
+to say that all men and women are free and equal, it contradicts what we can observe, the
+factual truth. We see inequalities, and today they are enormous or the equality between men
+and women, which is declared in our laws, but does not truly exist in reality. Hence law is the
+site of a tension between a certain representation of the world, which must be realisable, and
+the actual facts on the ground. It straddles both realms, and resembles both art and science. In
+any given period, a single imaginary will subtend a particular civilisation. From the Industrial to
+the Cybernetic Imaginary The dominant imaginary at the beginning of the industrial era - the
+industrial era falls into several periods, it began in the 19th century, then the second industrial
+revolution, associated with the use of electricity, and lastly the First World War and between the
+two Wars, when Taylorism became the general method of organising work. During this period,
+the dominant imaginary was classical physics. The world was represented as a vast system of
+clockwork. God was the Great Clockmaker, the world was a play of forces, and everything was
+a question of energies, laws and forces, including the human being in the workplace, who was
+thought of in the same terms. Artists portray this, great figures like Fritz Lang with "Metropolis"
+or Charlie Chaplin with "Modern Times". They show the imaginary reduction of the human being
+to a mere cog, or a productive herd obeying orders mechanically. This representation of the
+world began to change during the Second World War and immediately afterwards, with the
+invention of the first 'intelligent machines', or computers. They are machines capable of reacting
+to the signals received from their external environment. So we have a machine capable of
+regulating itself: it is fitted with a programme so that it adjusts to variations in its environment.
+This is technically what is called 'regulation', a term drawn from the vocabulary of engineers. For
+example, a coal-fired boiler which adjusts its temperature according to the temperature of the
+air, or a boat on automatic pilot, where the boat will follow the direction set, without human
+intervention. This change also affected the way human work was conceived in the same period.
+The Taylorist vision was replaced by what Peter Drucker called management by objectives, that
+is, we should not prevent people thinking and have them obey like brainless slaves, rather, we
+should develop their mental powers so that they can be programmed to achieve the objectives
+of the organisation. Henceforth, this is how human beings should be made to work. And so that
+they can monitor their own activity, - Drucker advocates "self-monitoring" - the objectives which
+they fix must be quantified so that their performance can be measured. This notion,
+"performance", has swamped our vocabulary ever since. So there is the idea of objectives,
+actions, and feedback, so that one can adjust one's performance. This change also affects how
+one thinks about institutions today. They are likewise conceived in terms of objectives and
+programmes. What interested me was to show how the conception of governing individuals
+shifted from an idea of order and mechanical obedience to an idea dominated by a cybernetic
+imaginary. Cybernetics is these theories which said that one could consider all machines,
+humans and animals to be communication machines, and generalises the idea of the computer
+across the whole universe. This cybernetic imaginary produces a radical transformation in our
+ways of governing, and thinking about institutions. The Origins of our Institutional Crisis Today,
+one talks a lot about the economy, but the root of our crises is institutional. We are living
+through a far-reaching crisis of institutions. What is an "institution"? What is "instituting"? A
+primary school teacher - an "instituteur" in French - institutes children, that is, teaches them to
+act on their own, like an adult. It is different from a tutor, who just gives tuition. So instituting is
+learning to be free, through learning common rules. Clearly, in this sense, instituting children is
+not only a matter for schools, but also concerns other institutions, such as the family, the State,
+the nation, and the business world. These are all places involved in instituting the subject, that
+is, where subjects learn the frameworks within which they can exercise their freedom.
+Historically, in many societies, instituting was achieved through heteronomy, that is, when a
+person imposes a common orientation, and people simply obey. This is true of a monarchy, in a
+patriarchal family, and in an old-style Taylorist firm, where a heteronomous authoritiy fixes a
+course which must be respected by all. Democracy is an ideal in which this common meaning
+respected by all, is also developed by all. Everyone contributes to constructing the frameworks
+which will be valid for everyone. This is what is called the sovereignty of the law. But this
+supposes that everyone has the capacity to consider the common good and not only their
+private interests. Montesquieu said - but he was not the first -, when examining the different
+political systems that democracy presupposes the citizen's virtue, that is, the ability to set aside
+one's petty private interests in order to deliberate collectively on the common good. Today, the
+dogma of globalisation and ultra-liberalism is that all rules must be organised around private
+interests alone. What drives organisations is private interests alone, and if everyone calculates
+his or her private interests, adjusting to others through contracts, we could achieve a world
+where justice reigns. Then we could dispense with trying to define a public interest that is
+binding on everyone. This is what has caused our serious institutional crisis because no human
+community can cohere around juxtaposed private interests. Running Society on Automatic Pilot
+Changes in vocabulary are often revealing, and over the last 30 years the words used to qualify
+the rules which govern us have undergone important changes. We no longer talk of
+government, but of governance; no longer of rules, but of regulation; no longer of morals, but of
+ethics. What is at stake in this shift in vocabulary? When we talk of government, rules, and
+morals, we are talking about rules imposed from the outside. Governance, regulation and ethics,
+however, refer to rules observed spontaneously, as though people had internalised them. So
+this change in vocabulary tends to close the gap between the rule and the subject it applies to.
+Individuals should behave - hence the idea of behaviourism - human beings could be
+programmed, and by examining their behaviour and using the right methods one can control
+their behaviour - people have done research on this, things like neuroeconomics, where one
+imagines piloting people's behaviour just like one programmes a computer. So the imaginary
+here is the idea that subjects, once programmed, will adjust spontaneously to each other.
+People think that one can simply programme men and women, and run society on automatic
+pilot. Chapter 2 - THE DREAM OF HARMONY BY NUMBERS The Belief in a World Ruled by
+Numbers We can identify certain moments in the history of the West - but it would be useful to
+compare with China, where the relation to numbers was also very important - we can identify
+moments in this history when mathematical representations and figures were regarded as the
+ultimate key to social harmony. This was Pythagoras's dream. Pythagoras, the great
+mathematician, also inspired a slightly mystical group, which thought everything was ruled by
+numbers. We see signs in Ancient Greece of this desire for rule through calculation and
+geometry. One aspect of this belief was the discovery of links between geometrical proportions
+and musical harmony. Harmony is a question of making different sounds resonate together, it is
+the concord of what should be discordant. This idea of harmony was common to music, art,
+science, and law. Harmony was thus linked to these spheres of the imaginary. It is clear from
+this how mathematical representation, music and human institutions could all be thought of
+together. We should not forget that numbers, like letters, are symbols, but they have a different
+power because they are not polysemic like words. Every word can be interpreted, whereas in
+principle a number is a symbol which can be shared beyond languages. Today, when we go to
+other countries, even if we do not understand the language, we can read the numbers. It is a
+sort of universal language. The Invention of Bookkeeping Quantified representations of an
+ensemble that we can believe in appeared before official statistics, with the invention of
+bookkeeping techniques by Italian traders in the late Middle Ages. The first bookkeeping treatise
+we have is the work of a Franciscan monk, who is known for importing algebra into Europe.
+What is striking is that this appeared at about the same time as the invention of the modern
+painting in art. I decide that "what I want in this picture is the representation of an ensemble",
+and then "in this chart or quantified table" - with the invention of double-entry bookkeeping - "I
+want what is called in English law a 'fair view' of a firm's financial situation". A faithful image, a
+true likeness, which shows me the truth of what this image portrays. This technique was
+invented as a way of making merchants accountable. This has been admirably explained in a
+study by Samuel Jubé, who shows that initially bookkeeping was about responsibility. The idea
+was to account for oneself, to make visible one's financial situation for all the other merchants,
+so that the market could function correctly. In this respect, recent developments in accounting
+are a clear sign of today's disorders because bookkeeping, from the beginning, was obliged to
+respect the principle of prudence: you can enter a figure in the books, but you must be careful
+about the trust you place in this number. So if I buy something I enter it at its purchase value,
+and I subtract its depreciation, but I don't speculate on its market value until I have sold it. This
+rule, of prudence, was abandoned at the end of the 20th century and replaced by "fair value",
+that is, the immediate market value. This had catastrophic effects during the 2008 financial
+crisis. Now we see an inversion and an abandonment of the principle of prudence. The Allegory
+of Prudence In Nantes Cathedral, the tomb of Francis II of Brittany is surrounded by four
+statues, of the four cardinal virtues: fortitude, temperance, justice and prudence. Prudence is
+represented as a young woman holding an object in her left hand. I overheard some schoolchildren
+saying that it is an iPad, but the statue is from the Renaissance. In fact, it is a mirror.
+She is facing outwards, in one hand she has measuring instruments, and in the other, the
+mirror. On the back of the young girl's head is the face of an old man. What this iconography
+tells us is that Prudence must use measurement, calculation and quantification to plan an
+action, but she must also take the past, and experience, into account. So it is a complex
+message. If you keep only the measuring instruments, you are abandoning prudence. Today,
+bookkeeping has stopped being prudent. The Development of Statistics On this invention of
+statistics, this dynamic of quantification, we have the good fortune to have many excellent works
+by Lorraine Daston in the United States or the late Alain des Rosières in France, who wrote
+"The Politics of Big Numbers", in which he reexamines the history of the invention of statistics,
+with all the problems it posed initially. One of these, in which law is directly involved, was
+deciding whether to make the smallpox vaccine obligatory, although it was known that a certain
+number of the children vaccinated would die from the vaccination. The question was the
+justification of laws based on quantified social data. This only really developed in the 19th
+century, and the Social State was the direct product of this. People discovered in the 19th
+century that society could be regarded as an object placed in front of one - which was not the
+case previously, and the word "society" only gained its modern sense in this period - and as a
+quantifiable object. And people tried, through quantification, to explore the attributes and the
+laws of how society functions. And once these laws of society had been mastered through
+quantification, it would be possible to act on these laws. This was taken in two directions:
+physical causes were attributed to social phenomena, and social causes were attributed to
+physical disorders. The former gave rise to eugenics, and beyond that to racism and Nazism,
+saying that one should forbid ill people to reproduce, or those who where not successful
+socially. We should remember that in the Nordic countries, there was legislation of this sort right
+until 1965, with forced sterilisations. The most atrocious forms were the extermination of those
+considered unfit. All of this was based on the idea of a scientific and quantified representation of
+the world. People reasoned that if you behave badly - they did not say bad genes at the time,
+but the wrong race - the unhealthy elements must be eliminated so that humanity can progress.
+The other current was those who said, on the contrary, if there are ill people, alcoholics, it is
+because they are unemployed, or do not have good conditions, so one must act on the social
+causes to see an improvement in physical conditions. This was the origin of the Social State. So
+the Social State is itself a large-scale expression of this idea of using numbers to justify
+legislation. Chapter 3 - THE UNHOLY UNION OF CAPITALISM AND COMMUNISM The Soviet
+Heritage The unholy union of communism and capitalism was a theme which I treated briefly in
+a previous book, "The Spirit of Philadelphia". I wanted to come back to it because I think it is
+important for understanding what happened after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and ten years before
+that, with the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, which in my view are as important, and they are earlier
+and thus premonitory, as the fall of the Berlin Wall. Generally, these events are seen as the
+victory of capitalism over communism, but if we take a closer look, what happens is rather a
+phenomenon of hybridisation, which gives different results in different countries, but among
+which one can detect common features. To do so, we must return to the Soviet experience and
+Lenin, who actually had no particular economic doctrine - he was influenced by a German writer
+- and who devised economic plans. Soviet planning was the idea of a centralised calculation of
+collective utility, which was carried out by the government of the Soviet Union, and this would
+make the country as a whole progress, and increase the common good. The key institution for
+this planning was the Gosplan (State Planning Committee). The Soviet Union developed a
+gigantic system of statistics, and on the basis of this data a draft quantified plan was dispatched
+starting from the centre and moving down to the periphery, through a myriad of intermediary
+institutions, then there were commentaries on these plans, feedack, and on the basis of these
+replies, the plan itself was drawn up, and this plan was sent out again in the form of legallybinding
+directives. This is where law came in, in the form of these directives, but they were
+simply the transposition of a set of calculations. So this was not governance, but government by
+numbers, since there was still the distinction between governing and governed, leaders - who
+were the avant-garde of the working class, who paraded for all to see on Red Square - and the
+mass of workers who had to achieve by carrying out these directives, the figures and goals. The
+goals were expressed in terms of control figures, which were a kind of macro figures. To give
+one example, the Shanghai Classification, which is behind almost all reforms in French
+universities, - making bigger and bigger units in order to move up in the Shanghai Classification
+- is a direct derivative of Soviet planning and its large control figures. Seeing its influence today
+on the orientation of research should raise a few eyebrows. The Capitulation of European
+Justice In the case of the Court of Justice of the European Union, among others, we see the
+result of applying the idea of governance by numbers to the law, in the form of the "Law and
+Economics" theory. This doctrine was developed first at Chicago, in the wake of Milton
+Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics. A certain number of legal theorists, amongst
+them Richard Posner, argued that every rule can be the object of a calculation of utility. To know
+what the right rule is, we must make this type of calculation. This is how the case-law of the
+European Court of Justice works. So there is no intangible rule, everything must be weighed up,
+which is called the principle of proportionality. One of the most caricatural expressions of this
+method is found in the "Viking ruling", which labour lawyers know well because here the Court
+of Justice submitted the right to strike and the right of assembly to a calculation of their
+economic utility. The "Viking ruling" said that the principle of human dignity must be made
+compatible with the principles of free competition and free entreprise. Whereas in the thinking of
+the great renewal of dogma, at the end of the Second World War, and in its majors texts, the
+principle of dignity was intangible, as it is in the German Constitution where, as a result of
+constitutional reforms, it is forbidden to challenge it. So one can see that this machine of utility
+calculations forces everything into an economic calculation. This is a very good example of how
+the Court of Justice thinks. But one could also take the example of the Constitutional Council's
+case-law in France today. The European Community, when that was still its name, had agreed
+on common social rules, called Social Europe, which was one of the declared goals of the
+Community, and the only ones who did not want them were the British, but the entry of the
+former Communist countries into the EU completely destroyed the balance, particularly in the
+composition of the Court of Justice, because these countries inherited a Soviet-style attitude, in
+which law is there to serve the economy. So there was a conversion to neoliberalism which
+could be done very quickly because there was not much respect for the law. Tzvetan Todorov
+summarises this well: it was a system in which everything was negotiable, ideology was nothing
+but a fiction. So there was a general conversion to the most extreme forms of liberalism in these
+countries, and it is arguable that this is one of the reasons why the Court, which had been very
+prudent - since its legitimacy was very weak - became very hostile to common social rules if
+they laid the groundwork for systems of solidarity. This inversion can also be seen with China
+and Russia. For example in China, in the Constitution under Deng Xiaoping, it is stated that no
+one shall disturb the economic order of society. This applies perfectly to the case-law of the
+European Court of Justice which we just mentioned. You can have social legislation as long as
+it does not affect the economic priorities. So the economic order is in some sense
+constitutionalised. In the case of France, much could be said about how the upper civil service
+embraced the virtues of the market, despite their lack of experience in this area, and this
+produced a number of financial disasters which were paid for by the tax-payer. One could
+compare - but this is sociology rather than law - what happened there and what occurred in the
+Soviet Union, where the oligarchy transformed rapidly from managing huge public enterprises to
+managing huge amounts of private capital. Something comparable occurred in France, where
+the upper civil service previously served the State impartially, what Pierre Legendre, well before
+Pierre Bourdieu, called the "State nobility", but then this ethos of the "State nobility" was
+seduced by the market model, with bankable advantages, because when you move from the
+salary of a high civil servant to the salary of a privatised company, you obviously earn a lot
+more. So one can see in this development, in the way things work today in Bercy (France's
+Finance Ministry), in this permeability between the world of finance and the French upper civil
+service, something comparable to what occurred with the Soviet oligarchy. Chapter 4 - THE
+LIMITS OF GOVERNANCE BY NUMBERS Heteronomy as the Condition of Freedom What the
+long history of law and institutions has shown us is that one cannot have autonomy for each
+human being in the absence of a common, heteronomous framework. The most obvious
+example is the ability to express oneself. It is impossible to express ourselves freely - if only to
+make stirring calls to total revolution against the injustice of the world order - without first
+accepting the law of language, that is, without speaking a particular language. The language we
+learnt as a child was something heteronomous for us. Only if I accept this heteronomy of
+language do I become a subject able to express himself or herself freely. Without this
+heteronomy of language, I remain at the stage of gurglings which no one else can understand.
+And in that case, I cannot claim to act freely. The same is true for the organisation of society: a
+common law must exist, in order that each person may be empowered to act freely. If you
+destroy this common law, and the dominion of the law comes to an end, each person will
+appear to have autonomy but in reality each is abandoned to the whim of someone stronger, or
+will try to dominate someone weaker. What develops in this context is what I call ties of
+allegiance. Thus what looks like generalised autonomy in fact creates the conditions for a return
+of ties of allegiance as the contemporary form of the legal bond. The New Forms of Autonomy
+The notion of "subject", which is very complex, and untranslatable into many Oriental languages
+- it is a big problem in Japanese, that the same word can refer both to a grammatical and to a
+psychological figure - etymologically, it is Subjectum, "thrown under". This idea is present when,
+to affirm myself as an individual subject, I must respect a heteronomous rule. To take a concrete
+example, the new technologies enable all people to express themselves using the social media,
+but this will only produce collective conformity, unless each person has acquired a certain
+culture with which they can act and think freely and independently of the others. So what
+remains of the subject in a cybernetic universe? Nothing but a point, which reacts to signals.
+You receive signals from your environment, and you must adjust to these signals to carry out
+your programme. The ultra-modern subject, in this light, looks sadly like an extinction of
+freedom. Your behaviour can be programmed because we know that you are going to behave in
+accordance with a calculation of your private interests. All is reduced to what I call contracting
+particles motivated by self-interested calculations of utility. This would be one possible figure of
+modernity. The Harm Caused by "New Public Management" The State, as the central figure of
+our political order, represents the heteronomous instance which takes responsibility for what is
+not calculable in human lives. For example, people's identity, since the State guarantees
+personal status, and the honouring of promises. These domains were entrusted to the State.
+And it is because there was this heteronomous, vertical dimension of the incalculable that
+another plane could develop, where individuals are free to act solely by calculation, the plane of
+the market and the contract. So you have, in a sense, the vertical plane of the law and the
+horizontal plane of the contract, but the two are inseparable. Represented like this, the State
+cannot be confused with an economic operator acting in the plane of the contract. It ensures
+that this plane of the market functions correctly. But if you treat the State as itself an economic
+operator, as New Public Management does - New Public Management says that you must apply
+to the State and to the domestic economy the same rules as those applied in a private business
+- this is a way of abolishing the distinction between the two planes. Everything becomes flat.
+This vision of the world as perfectly flat was imagined by an English novelist, Edwin Abbott, in
+the late 19th century, who wrote a clever little tale called "Flat Land", where he imagines a world
+in which only two-dimensional beings exists. Such a world is unsustainable in the long run. This
+means that New Public Management, by undermining the heteronomy of the political order, will
+force private operators to take on what the State has abandoned, that is, the non-calculable.
+One of the expressions of this is corporate responsibility. In a political order which functions as I
+explained just now, where the law reigns and the State functions well, the State sees to longterm
+environmental protection, and businesses can concentrate solely on making profits. In this
+light, when Milton Friedman, one of the founders of the Chicago School, says that a company's
+only corporate responsibility is making money, I am not shocked by this, as long as the business
+pays its taxes and obeys all the social and environmental legislation. However, If the State is
+disempowered, then inevitably the corporate sector is considered to be responsible for the
+social and environmental issues it encounters. So there is a movement of privatisation of the
+public sphere, as well as a movement of "publicisation" of the private sphere. Suffering at Work
+Simone Weil's compelling descriptions of industrial labour show how mind-numbing this type of
+work was, because workers were forbidden to think, and were enslaved to a stultifying,
+mechanical repetition of tasks. This was clearly a form of alienation. With our new types of
+management, the issue is different. The aim is now to control people's mental functioning.
+Robert Castel was one of the first in France to identify this, he called it "therapy for the normal",
+the fact that psychological techniques are used to ensure that workers execute programmes
+well. This gave rise to new management techniques, some of which were qualitative, such as
+appraisal interviews, which have become a standard rite in all organisations, including the public
+sector. Appraisal interviews are those moments of feedback where together you measure the
+performance you have achieved, and then you readjust the objectives accordingly. But at the
+same time, one can say that the appraisal interview is a form of dispossession in the sense that
+it is like confession, where you confess what you did, the difficulties you encountered, and your
+successes, and you must therefore bare your heart to your manager. The difference is that in
+traditional confession you examine your conscience in order to regain self-possession, whereas
+here you have to bare all in order to reset objectives and be reprogrammed. And this can
+amount to a new form of dispossession even if it is not always that. It is always on a knife-edge,
+with these new management methods, which bring possibilities of emancipation but also risks of
+dehumanisation of work. The Denial of Reality Genuinely human work is work where the human
+mind, and the images it invents, can engage with the real. It is an experience in which workers
+both learn about themselves and show what they are capable of doing. This is genuninely
+human work, and in my lectures I tried to show that there are two forms of dehumanisation, not
+just one. There is the form which was incriminated at the end of the industrial era, when you
+reduce human work to the work of an animal or a machine. But there is another form, when you
+enclose the human being in a system of representation entirely divorced from any experience of
+reality. There are some pathological cases, like the Kerviel affair, where financial whizz-kids are
+so immersed in a quantified world of symbols that they lose all contact with reality, but they can
+cause real disasters which have a tremendous impact. This enclosure within systems of
+symbols divorced from reality - and we should recall the meaning of symbol here because
+normally the symbol is precisely what links a sign to a concrete and real object - and when the
+link is broken, people become enclosed within systems of representation devoid of meaning. In
+such cases, there are only too options: fraud, or depression, madness. In Kerviel's case there
+was a bit of both, and in a recent case, the Volkswagen affair, you clearly have engineers faced
+with two incompatible quantified commands: "it must not cost more than x" and "it must not
+pollute more than y", and their solution was to invent a computer programme which could cheat.
+They thus incurred risks for the company, the public, and the environment which were
+enormous. In other words, they entirely separated the map from the territory. Chapter 5 - THE
+DECLINE OF THE STATE The Public / Private Hierarchy Overturned To address the issue of
+the withering-away of the State, we should first recall that it was a theme introduced by the
+founding fathers of Marxism. Friedrich Engels prophesised that the State would disappear of its
+own accord, as soon as society conformed to the laws of scientific socialism. Hence the State
+was destined to disappear as soon as Communism got into its stride. It is striking to see that
+challenges to the role of the State, which started in the 19th century, because the State was
+considered to be a metaphysical entity which had no real function in a positivist vision of the
+world, those challenges have resurfaced today, due to the return, in a new guise, of liberalism.
+To understand this moment, we must also remember that Western democracies were able to
+win out over totalitarian regimes partly because of the invention of the Social State. In this light,
+the famous speech by Franklin Roosevelt, on "the four freedoms", is very striking. There is an
+island in New York which commemorates this speech, in which Roosevelt says that those who
+defend democracy cannot suffer from want. People who suffer from want are the breedingground
+of dictatorships. So you have to have enough to eat to know that you are fighting for
+something. So the State expanded, and it was acclaimed as a protector, and so, on the
+economic front, it was the Keynesians who developed that. The neoliberals - of which one of the
+most remarkable and talented, and the most interesting for jurists, because he trained in law,
+was Friedrich Hayek - their idea was precisely to abolish the preeminent place of the State and
+say that what should be at the top of any normative construction is three things: private
+property, contractual freedom and legal liability. These three had already been mentioned by
+David Hume, as the three fundamental laws which one can derive from observing nature. So the
+idea was that there was a spontaneous order, the order of the market, which is universally valid
+and is grounded universally on respect for the three fundamental laws. And the role of the State
+is to support and respect this universal order of the market. This is what I call the utopia of a
+total market, where there would be universal and almost timeless rules, and where States would
+deal with local problems only. Several legal innovations have reinforced this ideology. One of
+them was the creation of the World Trade Organisation in the 1990s which aimed precisely at
+subjecting all States to a certain number of rules, which are basically rules from private law. This
+overturns the public-private hierarchy, because in the previous order of the Social State,
+freedom of enterprise and of the markets was preserved, but under the supervision of the State,
+which was responsible for social cohesion and systems of solidarity. Today, the overturned
+hierarchy makes economic freedoms into the higher rule. Solidarities are admitted only as
+exceptions to that rule. They are only tolerated, more or less. The other figures which show this
+inversion are European institutions. They too are built on the almost constitutional assertion of
+economic freedoms, while States are in charge of local solidarities only, and then only through
+exemptions, and as long as economic freedoms, with their almost constitutional value, are not
+affected The Rana Plaza Disaster With globalisation, multinationals can escape particular
+national legislations and regard them from the perspective of forum shopping, setting up
+wherever the legislation is most advantageous to them. So they can largely elude the public
+authorities. But they find themselves in a kind of legal void, where they are accountable, but no
+judge is able to hear their case. I shall take a concrete example. Two or three years ago, a
+disaster occurred at Rana Plaza in Bangladesh - I went into greater depth in my lectures -,
+where a textile factory collapsed. It had not respected any security regulations, and 1,000 young
+women working there died crushed in that factory. They had asked not to go back inside
+because there were signs of danger, but they were forced to, with the threat that otherwise they
+would lose their jobs. It transpired that this company worked for many major Western brands,
+both European and American, and people immediately said: these companies must take
+responsibility. They are held responsible for what is one of the largest industrial accidents in
+recent history. I happened to meet one of the top managers of a French firm involved in this
+case, and he said to me "people are just trying to blackmail us, it is not true, it is not us ...". Who
+is right? In this case, we need a judge, but there is no judge at an international level. So the
+company exposes and risks its reputation - which is a very precious thing in today's world -
+without there being a judge to turn to. And in some respects corporate social responsibility is
+successful because it protects a company's moral position without a binding law. But in my view,
+this is not sustainable in the long term. The Reemergence of the Logic of Friend / Enemy The
+reign of the law, in which all people recognise each other as equal before a common law - which
+is how a political community is achieved - when this is destroyed, one of the effects is a situation
+in which people look for an internal enemy. I come back to Carl Schmitt here, who says that
+what is properly political is identifying the enemy, being able to identify the enemy. He thought
+the Friend / Enemy logic had a universal value because the political community only constitutes
+itself by designating an enemy, whether outside its frontiers or within them. And he says this is a
+question of life and death. To my mind, Carl Schmitt does not get to the bottom of the issue of
+law. Law is something other than establishing an order through violence or force. Law is what
+makes subjects believe in a common heteronomous reference. And if this acknowledgment that
+we are all subjects of the same law disappears, the public sphere fragments and the population
+realigns in terms of Friend / Enemy. The Friend / Enemy theory explains moments of
+institutional crisis where precisely there is no shared faith in the same law, and people regroup
+according to affinities, and by naming an enemy. This is revealing because the return of the
+Friend / Enemy logic is a symptom of a crisis in our legal frameworks. This return is visible at
+every level, particularly in the way public debate today abandons argumentation, and
+degenerates into verbal attacks. In public debate in the public sphere, as it appeared in the 18th
+century, and as Jürgen Habermas has theorised it, we all hold the belief that through reasoned
+argument with others we can achieve a better common representation of society. With verbal
+attacks, by contrast, the aim is to find elements which will destroy our opponent. And
+unfortunately what is called public debate is increasingly becoming a free for all, which is a
+symptom of this institutional crisis. Chapter 6 - THE ABUSE OF WORK Total Mobilisation,
+1914-1918 The First World War was an event of the utmost importance in every respect, and it
+can be seen as the beginning of a 30 years' war which ended in 1945. It was also, in itself, the
+very first experiment in what can be called the industrial management of human material. For
+the war effort, and in order to bring supplies to the front, and reinforcements, which were
+consumed in a way comparable to market consumption, as Jünger observed, Taylorist
+techniques were used which until then had only been employed locally. For the requirements of
+the war, these were generalised. As one of the sensitive souls who did not return from the war
+unscathed, and among all those who later wrote about their experience of the War, one of the
+most remarkable witnesses was certainly Ernst Jünger in his attempts to make sense of his
+experience. He was a Prussian aristocrat who saw a world collapse, and he tried to make sense
+of it, and he also diagnosed lucidly the radical novelty of this war in relation to previous wars,
+saying that with these new methods there was not a single seamstress, in her far-flung village,
+who did not participate in some way or other in the war effort. There was total mobilisation,
+"Mobilmachung", which characterised this new way of waging war. From Total War to the Total
+Market In order to confirm the relevance still today of this idea of total mobilisation, - I didn't do
+so in my lecture because I thought about it just recently - one could look at a speech by David
+Cameron who, as British Prime Minister, presented his political programme to the British people
+explaining that we were in a "global race". This implies a deadly race, where we will either sink
+or swim. So this political project is a kind of generalised Darwinism where the only way ahead is
+through combat: you survive, at the expense of your neighbour, or you disappear. But the
+"global race" David Cameron was thinking about was evidently the competitive race on the
+international markets, and the total market here replaces the total war of 1914. With the return
+of this theme of total mobilisation, we have the abandonment of the idea which appeared at the
+end of this 30 years' war, in 1945 - in several founding texts like the Declaration of Philadelphia,
+the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the first plan for an international trade
+organisation - the idea that one should reconstruct an international legal order based on
+collaboration between nations. This model was rejected by Northern countries on several
+occasions, since they did not want to show international solidarity with Southern countries, and
+they pushed for making the competition of all against all into the norm in international relations.
+This was finally enshrined by the WTO. And this led to the idea of a "global race" and the return
+of the idea of total mobilisation: Sunday too, including night work. Women's night work has
+increased by 100% in 15 years in France. We now know that the effects of night work on the
+health of both men and women are particularly alarming. So today we are in this atmosphere,
+that we must mobilise workers, eliminate all limits on working hours, again in this atmosphere of
+total mobilisation, no longer in the framework of a war of weapons, but an economic war.
+Reformism and Transformism: the Lessons of Bruno Trentin I had the good fortune to meet
+Bruno Trentin, and I had a strong friendship with him. His biography is particularly interesting
+because his father was the only law professor to have refused to swear allegiance to Mussolini.
+He was brought up in the South of France, with a double French and Italian culture, and was
+one of the great Italian Trade Union leaders of the 1970s, and one of the agents of the
+destalinisation of the Italian Left. Towards the end of his life - rather despondently, as he told me
+- he was a member of the European Parliament. He wrote a major book called "The 'polis' of
+Work". It is important because in it Trentin retrieved all the debates circulating under Fordism, in
+the aftermath of the First World War. The question confronting the political and trade union Left
+at the time was: "Why do we fight?" It was an important question because without a mobilising
+force and the idea of a better society, no political struggle is possible. This is one of the
+problems in our current crisis. On this issue, Trentin opposed reformism and transformism. A
+reformist politics asks what world one wants to build, and then tries to find the political means to
+this end; whereas transformism is a term taken from Italian politics, but it can be transposed into
+France, it is the politics of changing tack and adjusting in order to keep hold of power. We have
+several examples of this in France - I do not need to specify. So the question posed for the
+political and union Left after the First World War was whether the new forms of organisation of
+work, Taylorist forms, which stultify workers, whose whole life is spent enslaved to a machine,
+monitored by the foreman, with no right to innovate, is that acceptable? He describes the
+debates on this subject. Some said "no", the real goal of social justice is to enable every worker
+to have humane conditions of labour. I take this expression from the Preamble to the
+Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, written in 1919. This position, represented
+in France by Simone Weil, said that this was the greatest injustice, reducing entire human
+masses to the state of mindless herds. More generally people said, including in the Soviet
+Union, that it was the price to pay for technological modernity. It has the blessing of science.
+The scope of social justice was thus reduced simply to quantitative issues, compensation: what
+price can I obtain in return for this life devoid of meaning, which I must surrender to my
+company? At what price and for how long? So I try to reduce the length of time, and that is the
+theme of the working day; and I increase the price, and that is the theme of salaries; and I
+ensure my physical safety. Demands for social justice included these three basic elements of all
+the demands for social justice. This gave rise to the concept of employment. The notion of
+employment is this sort of exchange, where I abandon all forms of freedom in my work, and I
+agree to be alienated, because that is progress, but on the other hand, not for too long and I will
+be well paid, I will receive a pension, etc. This was the pact on which the modern Social State
+was founded. And Bruno Trentin saw clearly that this pact was disintegrating, and this is what
+brought us together, the need to get beyond a defensive attitude and to open up new
+perspectives for mobilisation and seize the opportunities for greater freedom and more humane
+work provided by new ways of organising work Corporate Social Responsibility Concerning
+responsibility, the real problem is that in the ties of allegiance we have described, if we take an
+economic example, international productions chains, where a t-shirt on sale in Paris is the
+product of a manufacturing chain involving workers in Tunisia, Bangladesh, etc. These
+production chains make it possible for those who hold economic power to get advantages from
+this type of organisation without having to be accountable for the damage it can cause. This
+possibility of disconnecting the positions of power from the positions to which responsibility can
+be imputed is a major problem. And it is not simple to resolve because we are used to thinking
+that there is one person responsible. But, on these production chains, if we look at the Rana
+Plaza case again, the bosses were absolute rogues because they knowingly put these women's
+lives at risk through naked greed and criminal attitudes. So there is no good reason why these
+people should get away with it on the pretext that they were working under pressure from the
+big companies, which preferred not to know about the working conditions of these workers. The
+problem is identifying responsibility in networks of allegiance, and linking the degree of
+responsibility to the degree of power held. And also defining a figure with ultimate responsibility.
+Because even if one cannot find the others, there must be someone who is accountable, and in
+general, in the last instance, it is the company director. We have some examples of possible
+solutions, for example in European law, for cases of liability for defective products, where one
+can work back up the chain to find the company which first put the product into circulation. So
+bonds do exist between different agents in the economic chain. The Decline of Solidarity
+Solidarity is perceived as an enemy by neoliberal ideology. Friedrich Hayek states clearly that it
+is an atavistic remainder which should be done away with, because we are heading for a world
+he calls catallaxy, that is, "globalisation" in opposition to "worldisation". "Globalisation" is where
+the globe is peopled by contracting particles which maximise their utilities individually, which
+interact, and in order for this interaction to function well, the three fundamental laws must be
+respected: property, liability and the binding force of contracts. Apart from these, nothing must
+hamper the fluidity of the system. Systems of solidarity are regarded as clots in the blood
+stream, to be destroyed. This is why neoliberalism keeps attacking freedom of association and
+the right to strike, which in its view are particularly vexatious forms of solidarity. Also public
+service agencies, insofar as public services represent monopolies which resist this generalised
+competition. So the dominant trend is to dismantle the established forms of solidarity which had
+been instituted by the Social State. If you dismantle these systems, the need to find protectors
+and to count on people for help does not go away, but it reappears as religious, tribal or ethnic,
+identity-based solidarities. This analysis sheds light on the present situation, in which there is a
+collapse and an indictment of all the systems of solidarity established by the Social State, and
+on the other hand, there reappear particularist, ethnic, identity-based solidarities, which are
+rarely peace-loving because they are mostly solidarities of combat. This is why we should not
+sacralise solidarity as such. We saw, with the '14-'18 War, how Darwinism embraced Solidarity
+by transposing the war of all against all from the individual to the group. So one should not
+sacralise it, but one should not think one can just do away with it either. So once again we are
+faced with the question: how rethink systems of solidarity so that they harmonise with the
+present state of our customs, cultures, and technology, in all their diversity and on the scale of
+the world. This is the agenda for a real "worldisation". Chapter 7 - FROM THE DECLINE OF
+THE LAW TO NEW TIES OF ALLEGIANCE The Return of Ties of Allegiance One of the
+paradoxes of the quest for an impersonal form of power, running human affairs on automatic
+pilot, a quest already present in the order of the law, because the law could represent an
+impersonal figure, and even more so now with governance by numbers - the paradox is that this
+quest made forms of personal dependence reappear. There are two reasons for this. The first is
+that the way of thinking, in the case of work, but as we saw this can be transposed into relations
+between companies, or between more and less powerful States, is to say "I set you objectives, I
+give you a sphere of autonomy, but you are accountable, and you must exercise this autonomy
+for my benefit". This structure of modern management is exactly what in Medieval law was
+called "tenure-service". Tenure-service means "I shall grant you a holding, I who am your
+suzerain, and you will manage it autonomously - a fief for nobles and censive tenure for
+commoners - and you will manage it for my benefit". This structure of tenure-service
+corresponds quite precisely to management by objectives. This is the first reason why one can
+say that allegiance has returned. It is this structure and today's ways of thinking about work that
+bring back allegiance. Another reason is that the weakening of the figure of "the same law for
+everyone", the weakening of the figure of the State, this withering-away of the State, its ability to
+offer protection, especially the Social State which promised everyone security at every moment,
+this weakening obliges those who are most affected by the disappearance of the State as a
+tutelary and protective figure to look elsewhere for guarantees. To survive in these
+environments where a common law no longer prevails, one must pledge allegiance to someone
+stronger than oneself. One must find a protector, whom in return one pledges to serve. These
+ties of allegiance are operative at every level, in relations between companies of different
+strengths, between workers and managers, and also in the relations between countries. During
+the Greek financial crisis, Greece was requested to pledge allegiance to its EU partners. If you
+read the text Greece was obliged to sign in July 2015, it says, "Yes, it's all my fault". The Greeks
+were made to sign that if Greece had an unmanageable level of debt, it was exclusively due to
+the policies introduced since January 2015, which is utterly untrue. But they had to perform this
+act of submission so that later they would be granted a loan. When dealing with the Greek
+deficit, the Troika, that is, the European Commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank
+decided on the fate of the Greeks using methods which far exceeded the normal powers of
+European institutions over a Member State. But this was precisely an effect of what we saw with
+New Public Management, that is, treating a State like a business. When a businessman goes
+bankrupt, he is forbidden to continue trading, and in the case of Greece, one said that the Greek
+people should have no say in the matter. They had been put into receivership. So the Troika
+acted like a sort of receiver. And one can see how this idea of governance by numbers
+flagrantly contradicts the idea of democracy. So these ties of allegiance shape every level of our
+institutions, which is why the concept seemed to me to have a particularly powerful operative
+force. Rule by Men and Rule by Laws We have seen that a Mediaeval structure resurfaces, but
+this does not mean that we are returning to the Middle Ages. It means that, in the history of law,
+there are a limited number of ways of thinking about human government, and when one of them
+is exhausted, another one appears. Some notions are recycled, such as "citizenship", which one
+can see in Ancient Greece, it is reinterpreted differently in Rome, and again in the Italian City
+States at the dawn of modern times, then during the French Revolution, and then in the 1980s
+Auroux Laws, which speak of "citizenship in the work-place". Each time the concept has a
+different meaning. So it is not that we are returning to the Middle Ages, but that a certain
+structure is reappearing. Because there are not that many ways of governing people. Here I
+borrow terms from Chinese political philosophy, where rule founded on laws was distinguished
+from rule by men. For Confucius, the ideal was that people assimilated the rules of good
+conduct to such an extent that they did not need laws. That was government by men, in the
+form of ritualism. Its opposite was government by laws, where a common law applies to
+everyone. Apart from ritualism, feudalism was another form of rule by men. It works through a
+bond of personal allegiance, where I become the vassal of my suzerain, who gives me
+protection. This form had different versions in different societies. There is a magnificent work by
+the great historian Marc Bloch on feudal society which is well worth rereading because it shows
+how this feudal structure was expressed very differently in different parts of Europe. Perry
+Anderson also does this type of comparative work, in "Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism",
+showing how important Japanese feudalism was in Japan's economic successes at the end of
+the last century because they knew how to get the best out of this bond through employment for
+life: I give you life-long employment, but you must serve me faithfully, that was one of the keys
+to Japan's economic success. It did not take the legal form which existed in Europe, where
+feudalism developed in the matrix of Roman law. And within Europe itself, English, French and
+German feudalism were different. An in-depth study would certainly reveal this same type of
+diversity. And in the case of France, there is an old feudal substratum which can resurface at
+any moment in forms which are in keeping with the French tradition. In order not to give the
+impression, which would be false, that this diagnosis of a revival of ties of allegiance reflects a
+certain pessimism, I must stress the fact that unlike the fantasies around the total market, as
+something universal, homogeneous, and a homogenisation of systems, from the perspective of
+"worldisation" as I have tried to define it the issue is rather for every society to get the best out
+of its own tradition. That is to say, to invent its modernity on the basis of its own tradition. In the
+case of France, in the long history of French legal culture, there are certain resources which can
+be mobilised. Instead of this, the tendency today is to use comparative law in much the same
+way that Dr Frankenstein used surgery, that is, thinking one can graft an English head onto
+German muscles, with a Swedish heart... No. The problem is to regain confidence in a certain
+tradition, while not getting enclosed in a fantasised representation of national identity, but also
+not yielding to the idea that now there is only one way of governing and it should be imported
+into France. This is very important, and it links with the issue of reform today: how can one best
+use a legal tradition to tackle the problems of the modern world? An Example from France:
+Reforming the Labour Code It was foreseeable, and already mentioned in the 1999 report,
+"Beyond Employment", that the single currency would reduce the scope of Member States'
+economic action to one adjustment variable, namely labour costs. The rest was not under a
+country's control. There was only this one leverage, to which they clung absolutely frantically,
+thinking that with this alone they could adjust to international competition. "Adjust" here means
+ever lower standards of social protection. So when I saw a politician on television throw a huge
+French Labour Code in a very theatrical gesture onto the table - in fact it was in fact the Code
+with commentaries - saying "This is the origin of all of France's ills", it was entirely foreseeable.
+But I also thought it was irresponsible and showed a lack of political perspective, of
+contextualisation of problems, because the labour law we inherited from the industrial world was
+conceived for employment, and corresponded to a system of production which is no longer ours.
+We must rethink and reformulate the categories of our labour law. It cannot simply be dreamt up
+by academics. One of the problems of the 2016 El Khomri labour reform was that it was based
+on expert analyses and not on negotiation. Labour law has always been based on practice, that
+is, on the experimental knowledge which business leaders and employees via their trade unions
+have of the world of work. That is where reforms can really take root. The Labour Code's first
+article, which derives from the Larcher Law, actually makes it obligatory for every labour law
+reform to be preceded by cross-industry negotiations. But in the case of the El Khomri Law, first
+came the experts and afterwards, to expiate this original error, there was a succession of
+negotiations with different trade unions. So it got off on the wrong foot from the start. In the
+debates on this reform, if I were to make value judgements, with politicians who get the
+advantages of both the public and the private sector, there is an oligarchic tendency. Seeing
+them indict the working class's excessive privileges is something obscene, clearly. When one
+moves from the upper civil service to banking, while keeping the safety of one and the financial
+advantages of the other, attacking the extravagant entitlements of post-office workers or nurses,
+and always blaming what remains of the public services in France, it always means pointing the
+finger, setting immigrants against the others, old against young, pensioners against the working
+population, insiders against outsiders, this is the result of a breakdown, an incapacity to shape
+an agenda for political mobilisation valid for all citizens. It is another symptom of the crisis of the
+political, of our "living together". No Social Harmony without Social Justice How can one, to use
+the terms of the cybernetic imaginary again, reconnect the political to experience? This notion of
+experience is very important. Often one regards issues of social justice as a sort of illusory
+dream, the stuff of boy scouts and pious preachers. actual fact, the principle of social justice
+was formally advocated on two occasions in the course of the 20th century, once in 1919, and
+the other time in 1944, that is, following unimaginable butchery and mass murder. And it was
+asserted twice, first in the Treaty of Versailles, and then in the Declaration of Philadelphia, that
+"universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice". One
+foreseeable consequence of a world in which injustices keep growing is that there will be
+violence. In what form? In wars, it was violence between countries, but now novel forms of
+violence appear before our very eyes, but they are to a certain extent foreseeable. What is very
+striking in the Declaration of Philadelphia and in the Universal Declaration is that they are
+explicit: "Historical experience has shown that if we let injustices flourish, we will have war." So
+reconnecting the political to lived experience seems to me to be an absolute priority, in order to
+avert this possibility. So we have before us a mammoth task, in which, first of all, populations
+must be enabled to reappropriate the political sphere. It should not be confiscated by experts,
+nor by a class of political careerists, which cannot see the map for the territory, which has lost
+touch with people's real experience.
\ No newline at end of file
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+Organização
+Maíra Rocha Machado
+Organização
+Maira Rocha Machado
+Este livro não teria sido concluído sem a contribuição decisiva de
+Riccardo Cappi, o apoio de Felipe Freitas, José Roberto Xavier, Matheus
+Barros e Vitória Oliveira, o belo trabalho de Raquel Klafke, as
+ideias e a presença de Kiko Ferrite.
+
+Capa, projeto gráfico e diagramação:
+Raquel Klafke
+
+Foto da capa:
+Maíra Rocha Machado (detalhe do Memorial Darcy Ribeiro no I Curso
+de Técnicas e Métodos de Pesquisa Empírica em Direito organizado
+pela REED)
+
+Machado, Maíra Rocha (Org.). Pesquisar empiricamente o direito.
+São Paulo: Rede de Estudos Empíricos em Direito, 2017.
+428 p.
+
+ISBN: 978-85-94172-00-6
+
+Impresso no Brasil
+
+O texto desse livro foi composto em
+
+Source Sans Pro Regular, projetada por Paul Hunt, corpo 10pt/15pt.
+
+Os títulos foram compostos em Roboto Slab, desenvolvida pelo Google,
+
+com itálicos de Rockwell, pela Monotype, quando necessário.
+A Rede de Pesquisa Empírica em Direito (REED) é uma organização
+sem fins lucrativos de professores e pesquisadores envolvidos em
+iniciativas de pesquisa empírica em direito, assim como em reflexões
+de natureza metodológica e epistemológica no campo das investigações
+jurídicas. Os objetivos da REED são articular pesquisadores
+no Brasil e no exterior de forma horizontal e acêntrica, divulgar trabalhos
+e informações sobre pesquisas empíricas no campo jurídico,
+bem como promover a difusão e capacitação em métodos e técnicas
+de pesquisa empírica em direito. Para tanto, a REED promove eventos
+e cursos e publica, semestralmente, a Revista de Estudos Empíricos
+em Direito.
+A REED tem especial preocupação com os padrões éticos e o rigor
+metodológico da pesquisa em direito, centrando seu foco na problematização
+e na investigação sobre as manifestações concretas do fenômeno
+jurídico e no permanente diálogo entre diferentes áreas de
+conhecimento, como a sociologia, a ciência política, a antropologia,
+a história, a economia, a estatística, entre outras, com o objetivo de
+melhor compreender o objeto próprio das ciências jurídicas.
+Para mais informações, ver www.reedpesquisa.org
+Apresentação
+
+Esta coletânea é um convite a pesquisadoras e pesquisadores, que se
+dedicam a desvendar e compreender o direito brasileiro, a suspender
+as tarefas rotineiras para escrever sobre questões metodológicas
+suscitadas pelo planejamento e desenvolvimento de projetos de
+pesquisa, mas também pela atividade docente e pela orientação de
+estudantes. Questões com as quais convivemos, sobre as quais pensamos
+e lidamos cotidianamente, mas não paramos para colocá-las em
+texto. As pessoas que aceitaram esse convite o fizeram também movidas
+pelo desejo de ampliar o alcance da discussão sobre como essas
+questões estão sendo percebidas e enfrentadas, nesse momento. Esta
+coletânea foi, portanto, concebida e organizada com um duplo propósito:
+funcionar como um dispositivo de aprendizagem tanto para as
+autoras e autores quanto para as leitoras e leitores desse livro.
+Como parte das atividades do Instituto Rede de Pesquisa Empírica
+em Direito (Instituto Reed), esta coletânea inaugura nosso selo
+editorial que, tal como a Revista de Estudos Empíricos em Direito,
+em seu quarto volume, busca estimular o debate e a produção de
+pesquisas empíricas no campo jurídico. Como a Revista, este livro
+foi produzido em formato digital e disponibilizado livremente (www.
+reedpesquisa.org).
+Esta coletânea reúne contribuições de pessoas que desenvolvem
+e orientam pesquisas empíricas em direito em mais de uma dezena
+de instituições brasileiras: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada
+(IPEA), Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp), Universidade Federal
+do Sergipe (USF), Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), Universidade
+Presbiteriana Mackenzie, Universidade de Brasília (UnB),
+Universidade Federal do Pampa, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
+(UFRJ), Insper, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG),
+FGV Direito SP, Universidade de São Paulo (Ribeirão Preto), Universidade
+Estadual de Feira de Santana (UEFS) e Universidade Estadual
+da Bahia (UNEB). Todas envolvidas nas atividades do Instituto Reed
+e, especialmente, no Curso de Métodos e Técnicas de Pesquisa Empírica
+em Direito, realizado anualmente. Este livro será lançado na
+quarta edição do curso, que coincide com o VII Encontro de Pesquisa
+Empírica em Direito, a ser realizado na Universidade Estadual de Feira
+de Santana, em agosto de 2017.
+Os doze textos reunidos aqui se debruçam sobre o movimento de
+pesquisar – essa combinação muito particular entre um assunto, um
+conjunto de ações, um contexto exterior e, claro, uma pessoa que
+pesquisa. E, assim, oferecem contribuições muito distintas, reveladoras
+dos percursos biográficos e intelectuais, dos tipos de pesquisa
+conduzidas ao longo da vida, e dos modos de observar e se relacionar
+com o mundo jurídico. Há textos que explicitam muito sobre
+quem os escreveu, enquanto outros deixam todos esses aspectos ali
+disponíveis apenas para os olhares mais atentos.
+A partir de diferentes perspectivas, os capítulos abordam desde a
+entrada em campo e as formas de coleta e seleção do material – observação
+participante, entrevista, grupo focal, pesquisa documental
+e historiográfica, pesquisa de fluxo, pesquisa em processos judiciais
+e estudo de caso – até as diferentes possibilidades de tratamento
+qualitativo e quantitativo do material empírico. Ainda que diversas
+as abordagens, coincidem em conjugar uma introdução clara e sistemática
+sobre o método ou técnica de pesquisa com reflexões mais
+amplas sobre as exigências humanas e éticas, os compromissos
+científicos e sociais que a produção de conhecimento suscita.
+Coincidem também em apresentar as estratégias metodológicas
+como resultado de uma construção intelectual que realizamos a partir
+e em função dos objetivos e do contexto mais geral da pesquisa.
+Uma construção que não se faz no vazio, ao contrário, alimenta-se de
+visões de mundo, reflexões teórico-metodológicas e das experiências
+de utilização desses métodos em outras pesquisas, dentro e fora do
+direito. Beneficiam-se, portanto, de interlocução intensa com a antropologia,
+a sociologia, a história e a economia, sem perder de vista
+a especificidade do direito e das instituições jurídicas brasileiras.
+E, em virtude disso, os trabalhos reunidos nessa coletânea não
+reforçam a ruptura, que comumente se vê, entre pesquisa qualitativa
+e quantitativa, entre pesquisa indutiva e dedutiva, entre pesquisa
+teórica e empírica. Em diversos capítulos, ao contrário, quanti e quali
+aparecem como diferentes possibilidades de tratamento de um mesmo
+material empírico. A depender do interesse da pesquisa, é possível
+trabalhar com ‘n’ grande ou pequeno, expressar em texto ou números,
+indicar frequências, narrar fenômenos, acessar percepções e
+discursos, explicitar suas nuances nas diversas maneiras de “contar”.
+E, como revelam os textos sobre observação participante (Bárbara
+Baptista), entrevistas (José Roberto Xavier) e grupo focal (Ana Gabriela
+Braga e Bruna Angotti), o suporte da observação na pesquisa
+empírica em direito vai muito além do texto escrito, convidando a
+nós, juristas, a desenvolver uma série de outras habilidades, de formas
+de escuta e cuidado no decorrer de nossas pesquisas.
+Os capítulos dedicados à pesquisa documental (Andrea Depieri
+Reginato) e historiográfica (Guinter Leipnitz), às pesquisas de fluxo
+(Ludmila Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski) e de processos judiciais (Paulo
+Eduardo da Silva) e, mais amplamente, aos métodos qualitativos
+(Rebecca Igreja) explicitam essas possibilidades, bem como estratégias
+de combinação e complementação entre elas. Os dois textos
+que focalizam o método quantitativo (Alexandre Samy de Castro) e
+a jurimetria (Luciana Yeung) favorecem essa perspectiva ao elucidar
+que, no direito, o suporte empírico da pesquisa, muito frequentemente,
+tem formato textual (acórdãos, decisões, projetos de lei, etc.)
+antes de ser expresso em formato numérico. E que parte fundamental
+dos limites e desafios deste tipo de pesquisa encontra-se justamente
+nessa operação. Compreendida como codificação ou categorização,
+essa operação é, aliás, muito recorrente nas pesquisas que
+utilizam apenas tratamento qualitativo, como mostram os textos de
+Paulo Eduardo da Silva e Riccardo Cappi.
+Igualmente, as ideias de indução e dedução podem tanto expressar,
+de modo global, o modo como uma determinada pesquisa foi concebida
+e desenhada, quanto designar as operações mentais que reali-
+zamos a todo tempo no decorrer de uma pesquisa. Por essa razão, os
+textos sobre a teorização fundamentada nos dados (Riccardo Cappi) e
+sobre os estudos de caso (Maíra Machado) referem-se à possibilidade
+de construir metodologicamente uma pesquisa com vistas a gerar ou
+testar hipóteses. Na primeira situação, estaríamos diante de pesquisas
+prevalentemente indutivas e, na segunda, prevalentemente dedutivas.
+Nas duas situações, contudo, o vai e vem entre a teoria e a empiria é
+constante. Todos os capítulos desta coletânea insistem, de diferentes
+maneiras, sobre este ponto: não há pesquisa empírica sem teoria.
+E me parece que é justamente aqui que temos ainda muito o que
+avançar: em especial, os modos de interação entre as pesquisas empíricas,
+a teoria do direito e a dogmática jurídica. Em alguns dos textos
+reunidos aqui, as reflexões metodológicas estão diretamente relacionadas
+a contextos jurídicos específicos – a prisão, as escrituras
+públicas de contratos, os processos judiciais, os debates parlamentares.
+Outros oferecem um panorama de usos e possibilidades do método
+no campo jurídico a partir da literatura, nacional e estrangeira,
+disponível. Mas falta-nos ainda refletir mais sistematicamente sobre
+o modo como os métodos discutidos neste livro podem beneficiar e
+ser beneficiados pelas questões colocadas pela reconstrução dogmática
+de institutos e decisões, pelo modo de explicitação e raciocínio
+da doutrina, pelas estratégias de fundamentação dos tribunais, pelos
+desafios da formulação e implementação de políticas públicas, pelas
+demandas de juridificação dos movimentos sociais ou, ainda, pelos
+diferentes usos políticos dos instrumentos jurídicos.
+Temas da maior relevância para juristas e cientistas sociais que
+se dedicam à atividade de pesquisa e para os próximos volumes desta
+coleção.
+
+Maira Rocha Machado
+São Paulo, 04 de agosto de 2017
+Índice
+
+11 [CAP. 1] O Direito como objeto de estudo
+empírico: o uso de métodos qualitativos no
+âmbito da pesquisa empírica em Direito //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+
+39 [CAP. 2] O método quantitativo na pesquisa em
+direito //Alexandre Samy de Castro
+
+83 [CAP. 3] O uso da observação participante
+em pesquisas realizadas na área do Direito:
+desafios, limites e possibilidades // Bárbara
+Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+
+119 [CAP. 4] Algumas notas sobre a entrevista
+qualitativa de pesquisa // José Roberto Franco
+Xavier
+
+161 [CAP. 5] Grupo focal na prisão: algumas
+reflexões da experiência da pesquisa Dar à
+Luz na Sombra // Ana Gabriela Braga e Bruna
+Angotti
+
+189 [CAP. 6] Uma introdução à pesquisa
+documental // Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+225 [CAP. 7] Pesquisa historiográfica e
+documental: diálogos entre História e Direito
+a partir de escrituras públicas de contratos //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+
+249 [CAP. 8] Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+
+275 [CAP. 9] Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+
+321 [CAP. 10] Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da
+Justiça Criminal: possibilidades e limites
+de uso no contexto brasileiro // Ludmila M. L.
+Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+
+357 [CAP. 11] O estudo de caso na pesquisa em
+direito // Maira Rocha Machado
+
+391 [CAP. 12] A “teorização fundamentada nos
+dados”: um método possível na pesquisa
+empírica em Direito // Riccardo Cappi
+
+423 Sobre as autoras e os autores
+11
+
+O Direito como objeto de
+
+estudo empírico: o uso de
+
+métodos qualitativos no
+
+âmbito da pesquisa empírica
+
+em Direito // Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+
+Podemos afirmar que a análise do Direito como objeto de uma pesquisa
+empírica é algo recente e ainda muito pouco consolidada na
+formação acadêmica das faculdades de Direito. De fato, o que observamos
+em nossa cotidianidade é a transmissão da ideia de um Direito
+formalista, positivista, dogmático, distante do universo da pesquisa
+empírica. Essa perspectiva tende a desconsiderar os diversos
+estudos empíricos realizados, especialmente pelas Ciências Sociais,
+que buscam demonstrar que o Direito, longe de ser uma entidade
+abstrata, está imerso em um contexto social, cultural e histórico específico,
+que lhe molda e lhe condiciona. Nas mais diferentes abordagens
+desses estudos, o Direito, assim, seria o reflexo de relações
+de poder, de hierarquias e de processos sociais e culturais vigentes
+em um determinado contexto. Longe de refletir uma postura neutra
+
+1
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+12
+
+e universal de aplicação de justiça, o Direito responderia a um campo
+de relações de força presentes na sociedade.
+No entanto, ainda que a afirmação anterior represente uma realidade,
+é importante destacar que o encontro do Direito com a pesquisa
+empírica é antigo e de extrema importância para a consolidação
+de disciplinas como a antropologia jurídica. Há de se recordar que
+juristas, especialmente do século XIX, como Johann Jakob Bachofen1
+,
+Henry Morgan2
+, Henry James Sumner Maine3
+, John Ferguson McLennan4
+são considerados precursores da antropologia por seus estudos
+sobre o direito nas sociedades antigas, fundamentados nas pesquisas
+etnográficas e relatos de viajantes daquele tempo. Como juristas e
+antropólogos evolucionistas, em um período de consolidação da antropologia
+como disciplina, eles contribuíram com seu interesse em
+conhecer o “outro” em sua diversidade e alteridade e, mesmo que de
+forma especulativa e muitas vezes com base em informações produzidas
+por trabalhos etnográficos realizados por terceiros, recolheram
+e analisaram dados sobre autoridades, sistemas de poder e formas
+legais, buscando identificar normas jurídicas e princípios que regulavam
+e orientavam a organização dos povos estudados. A descoberta
+do outro e o conhecimento de suas instituições políticas e normativas
+não se davam somente pelo desejo de dominá-lo (sem dúvida,
+
+1 O livro clássico de Bachofen é Mother Right: an investigation of the religious and juridical
+character of matriarchy in the Ancient World. Edição disponível: Bachofen, J. J..
+(1967). Myth, religion, and mother right: selected writings of J.J. Bachofen Johann Jakob
+Bachofen, Tradução: Ralph Manheim, Princepton University Press.
+2 Morgan, L. H. (1877). Ancient Society or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress
+from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization, Chicago, Charles H. Kerr & Company,
+disponível em https://ia802701.us.archive.org/30/items/ancientsocietyor00morg/ancientsocietyor00morg_bw.pdf3
+O livro clássico de Henry Maine é o Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History
+of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Ideas. London: John Murray, 1861 (disponível em
+https://ia802706.us.archive.org/2/items/ancientlawitsco18maingoog/ancientlawitsco18maingoog.pdf)4
+McLennan, J. F.. (1865). Primitive marriage, Publisher Edinburgh Adam & Charles
+Black, disponível em https://ia600209.us.archive.org/11/items/Mclennan1865gg67O/
+Mclennan1865gg67O.pdf
+13
+
+interesse preeminente), mas também pelo desejo de conhecer a si
+mesmo, de conhecer o próprio Direito ocidental, ainda que fosse para
+situá-lo como formato acabado da evolução das sociedades.
+O fato é que estudos realizados por juristas estiveram na base da
+consolidação da antropologia, especialmente, a antropologia jurídica.
+Contribuíram, assim, para a construção de um campo de estudos
+empíricos no âmbito do Direito, que foi se consolidando no âmbito
+das Ciências Sociais e se afastando do próprio campo jurídico que
+havia contribuído para seu nascimento.
+Novas pesquisas empíricas no âmbito do Direito surgiram nos
+anos subsequentes, buscando focar nas diversas formas de estudar o
+sistema de justiça, incluindo o poder judiciário e demais instâncias de
+outros poderes que dele participam. São pesquisas que focam as instituições,
+as agências administrativas, os operadores do sistema de justiça,
+assim como estudos sobre a lei e suas funções na sociedade (Abel,
+1980). Especificamente, a antropologia jurídica vai se desenvolver a
+partir de paradigmas de análise sobre o fenômeno jurídico em duas diferentes
+perspectivas (Comaroff y Roberts, 1981). Os estudos antropológicos
+dão continuidade às análises de sistemas legais em sociedades
+tradicionais e mais recentemente nas sociedades ocidentais, com foco,
+por um lado, nas normas e nos estudos das instituições ou, por outro
+lado, nos processos sociais e jurídicos, como os processos de resolução
+de disputas, onde as normas se concretizam (Sierra e Chenault, 2006).
+Além disso, especialmente a partir dos anos 80 e na América Latina,
+novos estudos vão focar na análise do encontro de diferentes
+sistemas jurídicos em um mesmo campo social e suas implicações
+sociais e políticas, constituindo assim um pluralismo jurídico fruto
+da permanência de formas jurídicas tradicionais, especialmente dos
+povos originários que sofreram o processo de colonização, ou mesmo
+da existência de múltiplas regulações vigentes nas sociedades
+modernas. (Moore 1986; Sierra e Chenault, 2006; Stavenhagen,1990;
+Souza Santos, 2015; Wolkmer, 2001).
+Constata-se, portanto, que há um histórico importante de estudos
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+14
+
+empíricos no âmbito do Direito, mas que em sua grande maioria, foram
+realizados por cientistas sociais. O que se busca estimular nos últimos
+anos é um maior interesse do próprio Direito pelo estudo empírico
+do fenômeno jurídico. Observa-se, desde já, que embora de forma
+difusa e, especialmente, na América Latina onde as desigualdades de
+acesso à justiça são evidentes, professores e pesquisadores do campo
+do Direito começam a dedicar-se à realização de pesquisas empíricas
+com o objetivo principal de observar a efetividade da lei, a eficácia das
+instituições jurídicas e a garantia de respeito aos direitos de todos os
+cidadãos. É nesse intuito que surge a Rede de Estudos Empíricos em
+Direito – REED no Brasil com objetivo de promover a articulação desses
+pesquisadores e de suas pesquisas em um diálogo com outras áreas
+de conhecimento e com o fim de promover a difusão e capacitação
+em métodos e técnicas de pesquisa empírica em direito.
+Nesse sentido, o texto que aqui apresento busca trazer a contribuição
+do método qualitativo para o estudo empírico do fenômeno
+jurídico, com base no minicurso que tem sido ministrado por mim
+nos encontros anuais da REED. Como antropóloga, o esforço que empreendo
+aqui é pensar técnicas e métodos qualitativos, entre eles a
+etnografia, em um contexto maior, interdisciplinar, que ultrapasse a
+própria antropologia para ir ao encontro das especificidades do estudo
+empírico em Direito e, ao mesmo tempo, responder às conjunturas
+atuais, históricas, sociais e políticas locais e globais, que impactam
+diretamente no campo de análise do fenômeno jurídico.
+
+1. Os métodos qualitativos
+A pesquisa qualitativa se define por uma série de métodos e técnicas
+que podem ser empregados com o objetivo principal de proporcionar
+uma análise mais profunda de processos ou relações sociais. Seu
+uso não objetiva alcançar dados quantificáveis, ao contrário, objetiva
+promover uma maior quantidade de informações que permita
+ver o seu objeto de estudo em sua complexidade, em suas múltiplas
+características e relações.
+15
+
+Charles Ragin (2007, p.73) afirma que devido à ênfase em produzir
+conhecimento em profundidade e em depurar e elaborar imagens e
+conceitos, o método qualitativo é muito adequado para várias finalidades
+da pesquisa social, entre elas, dar voz a muitos grupos sociais,
+em geral, marginalizados; produzir conhecimento e interpretações
+sobre fenômenos históricos e culturais importantes para a compreensão
+da sociedade; e, finalmente, elaborar novos conceitos e novos
+marcos teóricos, contribuindo para o progresso da teoria.
+São vários os métodos e técnicas qualitativos que podem ser empregados.
+Os mais conhecidos são estudos de caso5
+, observação de
+campo6
+ e as entrevistas em profundidade7
+, mas eles se multiplicam e
+outros exemplos podem ser citados como grupos focais, histórias de
+vida, análise de documentos, análise de imagens e de arquivos, pesquisa-ação
+e intervenção sociológica, assim como novos métodos alternativos
+que surgiram nos últimos anos. Apesar de que cada um deles exige
+um desenho de pesquisa especial, podem ser combinados em uma
+mesma pesquisa. Além disso, como parte do arcabouço dos métodos
+qualitativos, apresentam contribuições, desafios e limites em comum.
+O estudo de caso seria o exemplo mais interessante para demonstrar
+essa conjugação de métodos, a partir da análise de um fenômeno
+ou grupo específico. Como explica Becker (1997, p.117), o estudo de
+caso tornou-se uma das principais modalidades de análise das Ciências
+Sociais, com foco em trabalhos de campo sobre organizações ou
+comunidades. Seu uso envolve, normalmente, diferentes métodos
+como pode ser a observação participante e a entrevista, mas não somente
+esses. De forma resumida, possibilita ver os fenômenos sociais
+em seus contextos e pode ser conjugado com métodos quantitativos,
+envolvendo muitas variáveis e fontes de evidência (Yin, 1994).
+
+5 Sobre os estudos de caso, recomendo a leitura do capítulo desse livro da professora
+Maira Machado.
+6 Sobre observação de campo, ver texto da professora Bárbara Lupetti, neste livro.
+7 Sobre entrevistas em profundidade, ler o capítulo desse mesmo livro do prof. José
+Roberto Xavier.
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+16
+
+Mais recentemente, a pesquisa qualitativa sai do âmbito meramente
+acadêmico e desperta o interesse dos que pensam e elaboram
+políticas públicas, daqueles que buscam as pesquisas voltadas
+para o estudo dos problemas sociais e das instituições voltadas para
+a busca de suas soluções. Como explica Lionel-Henri Groulx (2008),
+a sua contribuição para a pesquisa social é geralmente definida em
+oposição à pesquisa quantitativa ou estatística, considerando que
+ela rompe com as categorizações estatísticas homogêneas, ao trazer
+uma pluralidade de vozes e de situações diferentes.
+Os métodos podem se complementar e é isso que vários autores
+que propõe os métodos mistos, uma combinação dos métodos
+qualitativo e quantitativo, buscam demonstrar (Pole, K., 2009 e
+Johnson, R. B. e Onwuegbuzie, A. J., 2004). A escolha de um método
+qualitativo ou quantitativo está diretamente relacionada à pergunta
+que desejamos fazer em nossa pesquisa. Como já mencionado, os
+métodos qualitativos são adequados para trazer informações mais
+detalhadas sobre os contextos e auxiliar na elaboração de categorias
+e novos conceitos. Os métodos quantitativos nos permitem trabalhar
+em contextos mais amplos, através de categorias quantificáveis e generalizáveis.
+O fenômeno social pode ser abarcado por várias estratégias
+de pesquisa.
+O método qualitativo pode ser de fundamental importância para
+auxiliar à pesquisa quantitativa na definição de suas categorias e na
+elaboração de seus questionários e suas variáveis. Muitas vezes, as
+categorias usadas estão distantes da compreensão dos sujeitos do
+estudo (Johnson, R. B. e Onwuegbuzie, A. J., 2004, p.19). Uma pesquisa
+exploratória qualitativa antes da elaboração de uma pesquisa de
+maior amplitude quantitativa pode auxiliar nesse processo de compreensão
+do fenômeno a ser estudado. Além disso, desenvolvida
+de maneira conjunta à pesquisa quantitativa, pode contribuir para
+a explicação de acontecimentos que surgem nas coletas de dados
+quantitativos e que parecem se desviar do previsto e para ilustrar
+com estudos de casos fenômenos que acontecem de maneira global
+17
+
+ou mesmo exceções que podem ser observadas.
+Costuma-se afirmar que os métodos qualitativos trazem como
+desvantagem sua flexibilidade e subjetividade, inclusive do próprio
+pesquisador, além de serem difíceis de ser generalizados. Os quantitativos
+representariam a objetividade e universalidade. Devemos
+recordar, no entanto, que a própria elaboração da pesquisa e sua sistematização
+envolvem escolhas de categorias e variáveis e interpretações
+de dados por parte do pesquisador, sujeitas, portanto, a sua
+subjetividade (Pole, K., 2009, p.39).
+A dificuldade também existe por parte dos pesquisadores que
+trabalham com o método qualitativo que tendem a ignorar as estatísticas
+por sua falta de contextualização e pouca possibilidade de
+auxiliar na compreensão dos fenômenos mais localizados. No entanto,
+as estatísticas podem ser de grande auxílio, pois podem propiciar
+informações importantes sobre o contexto social em que se encontra
+o grupo ou organização estudada.
+
+2. O método qualitativo e o trabalho de campo etnográficoO
+trabalho de campo etnográfico é retomado aqui não somente
+como método privilegiado da Antropologia, mas como parte desse
+arcabouço de métodos qualitativos que têm sido adotados por
+outros campos de conhecimento. Os antropólogos não costumam
+associar esse método ao estudo de caso, mas pensá-lo como um método
+em si, completo. No entanto, cada vez mais, principalmente ao
+ser apropriada por outras disciplinas, a etnografia, especialmente a
+observação participante, tem sido adotada de forma combinada e
+integrada com outros métodos qualitativos (Gimenez Montiel e Heau
+Lambert, 2014).
+A antropologia é uma disciplina que, pode-se dizer, confunde-se
+com o seu próprio método de pesquisa, a etnografia. No entanto,
+essa é uma relação que retrata uma construção da disciplina ao longo
+do tempo que encontrou na etnografia a sua base para poder falar
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+18
+
+da “alteridade”, do “outro” que estava interessada em conhecer. O
+trabalho do antropólogo vai além da pesquisa etnográfica e pressupõe
+uma série de reflexões analíticas sobre a alteridade que deram
+sentido à própria disciplina. Assim, a disciplina não se confunde com
+seu próprio método, ao contrário, explora-o segundo as suas perspectivas
+teóricas e as pesquisas que são realizadas. Essa constatação
+leva à reflexão que os métodos surgem e dialogam com perspectivas
+teóricas e disciplinares que lhes dão fundamento.
+O trabalho de campo etnográfico não está limitado ao uso dos antropólogos.
+Atualmente, são várias as disciplinas que já empregam o
+método em suas análises sobre os fenômenos sociais, como a sociologia,
+a geografia humana, estudos da área de saúde, a psicologia e, é
+claro, o Direito. O método ganhou importância para outras áreas, mas
+como afirma Cristina Ohemichen (2014, p.12), pouco se tem escrito
+sobre ele de forma específica e dirigida ao uso interdisciplinar.
+A etnografia nasce como método estruturado a partir da escola
+estrutural-funcionalista britânica, especialmente pelos estudos de
+Bronislaw Malinowski (1976) e com a sociologia da Escola de Chicago
+a princípios do século XX. O trabalho de campo etnográfico implica
+uma imersão na sociedade ou grupo em que se estuda, com a finalidade
+de registrar com pormenores suas experiências e interpretações
+sobre a problemática que se busca analisar. Especialmente
+desenvolvida no campo da antropologia social em estudos com sociedades
+não ocidentais, a etnografia pressupõe uma convivência diária
+do pesquisador com o universo que estuda, em uma forma de interação
+na qual ele se coloca como observador participante daquela
+realidade. Segundo Becker (1997, p.47) o observador participante é
+aquele que coleta dados através da participação na vida cotidiana do
+grupo ou organização que estuda, observando as pessoas para ver
+as situações com que se deparam e como reagem a ela. Nessa observação,
+conversa com todos e procura descobrir suas interpretações
+sobre os fenômenos.
+Malinowski (1976) ainda é referência pela sistematização do tra-
+19
+
+balho de campo etnográfico e aparentemente muito pouco foi modificado
+em sua forma de aplicação. A partir de sua perspectiva estrutural-funcionalista,
+ele creia na capacidade de se tratar a etnografia
+como fonte de informações concretas e objetivas. Para isso, e como
+em qualquer método de outro ramo de conhecimento, era necessário
+que todos os passos da pesquisa fossem descritos, como as condições
+em que foi realizada e em que os dados foram recolhidos. Isso
+implicaria, igualmente, em um esforço de imersão e de distanciamento
+do pesquisador, pois ao mesmo tempo que deveria promover
+sua total imersão no meio que realiza sua pesquisa, deveria manter
+seu distanciamento enquanto pesquisador, de forma a não interferir
+nesse meio. Uma das premissas da objetividade na pesquisa seria,
+portanto, esse distanciamento do pesquisador, a fim de evitar que
+ele contamine a pesquisa com seus julgamentos e conclusões.
+Como a própria antropologia revelou, muito se pode discutir
+sobre a objetividade dos dados etnográficos e o não envolvimento
+do pesquisador. O diário pessoal de Malinowski, divulgado em 1967
+(edição de 1997), deixou em descoberto as relações muitas vezes de
+dominação e conflito existentes entre o pesquisador e os nativos.
+Novas perspectivas teóricas no campo da antropologia rediscutem
+o trabalho do antropólogo e a forma de se considerar a etnografia. A
+etnografia seria, assim, considerada como um exercício de interpretação
+do antropólogo, uma forma de descrição densa realizada por
+ele (Geertz, 1989) que ocorre em um processo de interação dialógica
+entre o pesquisador e o nativo (Cardoso de Oliveira, 1998). O trabalho
+do antropólogo seria, portanto, um trabalho de interpretação de
+evidências simbólicas e materiais realizado em um processo de fusão
+de horizontes entre o antropólogo e o nativo estudado (Cardoso
+de Oliveira, 2008).
+Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira (1998, p.17-35) chama a atenção
+para três etapas necessárias para a apreensão dos fenômenos sociais
+que os pesquisadores deveriam estar alertas no seu exercício de
+pesquisa e produção de conhecimento como o realizado mediante a
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+20
+
+observação participante. Seriam elas o olhar, o ouvir e o escrever. O
+olhar seria o olhar etnográfico, domesticado e pré-concebido por referências
+da própria disciplina e da preparação do pesquisador. Junto
+com o olhar, o ouvir qualificado ganha importância para auxiliar
+na seleção daquilo que é fundamental para a pesquisa. O ouvir está
+também no centro da pesquisa, quando se considera o trabalho de
+campo como um espaço de diálogo que ocorre entre o pesquisador
+e o nativo, um encontro etnográfico que cria um espaço semântico
+compartilhado por ambos interlocutores. E por fim, o cuidado com o
+escrever, a tradução dessa relação dialética para o discurso, discurso
+que deve se assumir como uma interpretação, no qual o autor não
+deve se ocultar.
+Gilberto Velho (1978) procura ir além dessa discussão sobre a
+neutralidade e imparcialidade do pesquisador e dialogando com
+Roberto Da Matta (1978:04) e sua perspectiva de que o ofício do antropólogo
+é aprender a realizar uma dupla tarefa, a de transformar o
+exótico em familiar e o familiar em exótico, em um processo de interpretação
+e vivência do pesquisador em dois domínios; propõe que o
+importante está no processo de reflexão do pesquisador sobre o seu
+lugar na pesquisa e a capacidade de relativizá-lo para colocar-se no
+lugar do outro. O esforço do pesquisador deve sempre ir no sentindo
+de estranhar o que lhe é familiar, próximo, para que um processo de
+investigação seja possível e que uma interpretação seja realizada.
+A adoção da etnografia por outras disciplinas, portanto, não pode
+ignorar os marcos teóricos antropológicos que transformaram o trabalho
+de campo etnográfico ao longo de sua história. Como explica Eduardo
+Menéndez (2001, p.121) a apropriação da etnografia, assim como
+de outros métodos e técnicas qualitativos e sua ressignificação por outros
+campos dos saberes têm produzido uma série de incongruências,
+especialmente sobre os marcos teóricos e os métodos utilizados. O
+reconhecimento da importância deles não pode desconhecer os usos
+teóricos, metodológicos e éticos questionáveis que determinados trabalhos
+qualitativos estão tendo (Menéndez, 2001, p. 127).
+21
+
+Seja no âmbito da antropologia ou em outros campos de saberes,
+o trabalho etnográfico, assim como as diversas técnicas qualitativas,
+enfrenta desafios em suas possibilidades de generalizações e em sua
+validação. Gilberto Gimenez e Catherine Heau Lambert (2014) explicam,
+usando o exemplo dos estudos de caso, que a generalização
+deve ser compreendida como a possibilidade lógica de transferir as
+conclusões relativas a um caso a outros casos não examinados. Ressalta,
+inclusive, que deve haver uma atenção para as generalizações
+internas, aquelas conclusões que estendemos aos grupos e organizações
+que estudamos e que vai dar conteúdo para a validez do que
+fazemos ou generalizações externas que constituem a possibilidade
+de extrapolar as conclusões obtidas na análise de um caso fora daquele
+que foi examinado (Gimenez e Lambert, 2014, p. 355). Sobre as
+possibilidades de generalizações, os autores apontam três caminhos.
+Primeiro, pode ser que não haja simplesmente o interesse de generalização,
+pois o que se busca é aprofundar em um caso específico.
+Segundo, e referindo-se a Robert Yin, pode se fazer uma generalização
+analítica, onde o que se busca é generalizar teorias e não enumerar
+frequências. Assim, seriam as generalizações a partir de teorias
+e conceitos que surgem no contexto da pesquisa. E finalmente, as
+generalizações podem ser feitas a partir de casos típicos. Citando a
+Denscombre, Gimenez e Heau Lambert (Gimenez e Lambert, 2014, p.
+356) explicam que um caso típico é aquele que é similar em aspectos
+cruciais a outros que podiam ser selecionados igualmente. O que se
+postula é que há um grau de homogeneidade entre os casos de uma
+mesma classe, o que permite generalizar os resultados obtidos.
+ Ainda sobre a etnografia, os antropólogos costumam dizer que
+se aprende a fazê-las lendo outras etnografias. No entanto, devemos
+considerar que muitos relatos de campo antropológicos não costumam
+descrever os passos que o pesquisador seguiu desde a sua inserção
+no campo até o momento de seleção das informações para
+posterior análise, como já afirmava Malinowski, mencionado anteriormente.
+Além disso, poucos falam sobre sua relação cotidiana
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+22
+
+com os sujeitos de seu estudo. Para Jorge Durand (2012) investigar,
+portanto, é um ofício que se aprende e que exige também habilidades
+pessoais para o fazer. A ideia do autor, no entanto, não é promover
+manuais clássicos de metodologia, mas recorrer à experiência de
+pesquisadores conhecidos, para que eles nos digam o que fizeram
+e como fizeram. Menéndez (2001, p. 139) propõe que antropólogos
+e não antropólogos descrevam minuciosamente em suas pesquisas
+em que consiste o trabalho de campo (atenção aos projetos de pesquisa)
+e o trabalho de análise ou de interpretação, para que se possa
+observar a relação entre as propostas de densidade fenomenológica,
+as técnicas utilizadas e a informação produzida.
+Os desafios que enfrentam hoje os pesquisadores por questões
+éticas e por sua relação com os seus sujeitos de estudo ou com instituições
+públicas, exige cada vez mais que a pesquisa qualitativa seja
+avaliada. De uma certa forma, a avaliação sempre ocorreu entre o
+antropólogo e seus pares. A apresentação das pesquisas em bancas
+de exames de pós-graduação e em congressos ou nas publicações do
+meio antropológico sempre as colocaram em discussão. Aprender a
+fazer etnografia não resulta para os antropólogos apenas das leituras
+de etnografias em um curso determinado de metodologia, mas de
+toda uma formação durante os anos de graduação na disciplina. Ainda
+assim, são vários os desafios contemporâneos que colocam em
+discussão as técnicas do campo etnográfico, mesmo no campo da
+Antropologia.
+Como Michel Wieviorka e Greig Calhoun (2013, p. 25) afirmam,
+as ciências sociais estão sendo obrigadas a transformar sua forma
+de realizar pesquisa. Dois fenômenos importantes influenciam no
+fazer pesquisa atualmente: a globalização, por um lado, e o individualismo
+por outro. Em um sentindo amplo, a globalização seria a
+responsável por incluir dimensões econômicas, culturais, religiosas,
+jurídicas que ultrapassam o escopo das Ciências Sociais. Ela obriga
+o cientista a conhecer a história, a política, a geopolítica, os fenômenos
+migratórios, os movimentos sociais, as diferentes identidades;
+23
+
+várias outras perspectivas que impactam diretamente na pesquisa.
+Ela obriga que os fatos sociais locais sejam analisados em suas conexões
+com fenômenos mais globais. Da mesma forma, a globalização
+se articula com o indivíduo e sua subjetividade, esse sujeito múltiplo,
+com identidades diversas, que se movimenta nesse universo global.
+Michel Agier (2013), igualmente, sugere que a individualização
+acelerada, os processos de globalização homogeneizadores, o contato
+constante entre os contextos locais e globais e, por fim, o rompimento
+das fronteiras, das culturas e das identidades provocam
+mudanças importantes na prática antropológica. O autor alerta para
+o cuidado de que em busca de assegurar um campo, não se caia em
+retóricas identitárias, homogeneizadoras ou essencializantes. Pierre
+Beaucage e Pedro Cortes Ocotlán (2014), por sua vez, destacam que
+as etnografias de hoje não são como as pensadas por Malinowski,
+pois os pesquisadores devem atuar de maneira colaborativa com os
+sujeitos de sua pesquisa, desde a planificação do projeto de pesquisa.
+Essa colaboração não se dá somente na criação de um espaço
+dialógico, mas exige a humildade do antropólogo para entender que
+seus sujeitos de estudo são também atores sociais e muitas vezes
+pesquisadores. Reygadas (2014) lembra que não é possível mais o
+autoritarismo científico e é necessário que o cientista social saiba
+atuar e relacionar-se com outras formas de saberes e com as “pessoas”
+com quem estuda. Por fim, Menéndez (2001, p. 07) recorda a
+potencialidade da pesquisa qualitativa para ser usada para a conscientização,
+ação e participação grupal.
+Todas essas críticas se dirigem ao saber das Ciências Sociais, mas
+podemos estendê-las à própria prática da pesquisa qualitativa como
+um todo que nos leva a tratar com pessoas, com atores mais do que
+cenários, como nos impõe o contexto atual. Esse contexto questiona
+não somente a posição do pesquisador, mas o seu próprio engajamento
+junto a aqueles que ele estuda.
+Nós pesquisadores nos encontramos hoje, portanto, em um contexto
+no qual somos interpelados constantemente em nossa pes-
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+24
+
+quisa. Respondemos aos interesses e exigências que a academia e
+as redes de financiamento nos impõem, às demandas e direitos das
+pessoas envolvidas nos nossos projetos e aos critérios de ética profissional.
+Sem esquecer que somos muitas vezes parte do universo
+que estudamos. Muitos de nós nos comprometemos diretamente
+com a elaboração de políticas públicas que impactam diretamente
+nos fenômenos sociais que analisamos ou com posicionamentos políticos
+que defendemos. Não é mais possível nos resguardarmos no
+silêncio das academias, em condições muitas vezes eurocêntricas e
+distantes das sociedades que analisamos, quando somos interpelados
+constantemente por nossas posições. Diante disso e buscando
+resguardar o lugar crítico do cientista social, responsável por promover
+análises mais complexas sobre o fenômeno que estuda e reconhecendo
+o seu próprio lugar de fala, que as pesquisas qualitativas
+podem ser avaliadas8
+.
+Um detalhe importante é que ao mesmo tempo que nos encontramos
+hoje em um momento de cuidado e controle metodológico sobre
+o que fazemos, estamos pressionados por financiamentos, por produtividades
+e por tempos que não condizem com os próprios procedimentos
+da pesquisa qualitativa que exige maior período de permanência
+no campo para a sua boa realização (Menéndez, 2001, p. 157 e Ribeiro,
+2010). Cada vez mais nos vemos pressionados a inovar metodologicamente
+para conseguir nos adaptar a esses tempos e exigências.
+Diante de todos esses desafios metodológicos, de situar-se em
+contextos onde as dinâmicas globais impactam diretamente, onde
+há uma grande mobilidade dos atores e onde tantas variáveis estão
+presentes na pesquisa porque os sujeitos são múltiplos em suas pertenças,
+em suas identidades e, finalmente, onde aqueles que estudamos
+interpelam diretamente o que fazemos, como é possível elaborar
+e realizar uma pesquisa?
+
+8 Sobre avaliação da pesquisa qualitativa recomendo ver Martinez (2006) e Lamont
+(2006)
+25
+
+3. Realizando a pesquisa qualitativa: a criação de
+uma aldeia e a multiplicação das técnicas
+No intuito de seguir os conselhos de Howard Becker (1997, p. 14) de
+que é necessário passar nossas experiências para os outros pesquisadores
+e de criarmos os nossos próprios métodos, ou o conselho de
+Durand (2012) já mencionado, de que devemos contar como fizemos,
+deixo esse item para falar da minha própria experiência de pesquisa,
+especialmente realizada no âmbito do Direito e em um contexto tão
+atual de interdisciplinaridade e de interrelação entre a atividade acadêmica
+e a política pública. O objetivo não é trazer todos os detalhes
+sobre a pesquisa, mas apresentar algumas propostas de delimitação
+de campo que podem ser úteis nesse contexto múltiplo e complexo
+em que realizamos nossas pesquisas.
+Especificamente, gostaria de trazer à discussão alguns elementos
+do desenho de uma pesquisa que pude realizar em colaboração
+com o Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas Aplicadas – IPEA, sobre penas
+e medidas alternativas à prisão (PMAs), especificamente o trabalho
+de campo realizado pela equipe de pesquisa qualitativa coordenada
+por mim nos fóruns criminais escolhidos em várias regiões do
+país. Esclareço que por questões de ética e como o objetivo era obter
+informações da problemática como um todo, os nomes dos fóruns
+foram deixados no anonimato. Escolho esse trabalho de campo específico
+pelos desafios que foram colocados e pela necessidade que
+exigiu de readaptação e de inovação para conseguir realizá-lo.
+De maneira resumida, a pesquisa tinha como objetivo elaborar
+um diagnóstico com a perspectiva de aprimorar a implementação das
+alternativas penais no país e foi pensada em uma cooperação com o
+Departamento Penitenciário Nacional do Ministério da Justiça (Depen/MJ)9.
+A pesquisa foi desenhada com base em duas equipes, uma
+
+9 A Aplicação de Penas e Medidas Alternativas: Relatório de Pesquisa, IPEA, Rio de
+Janeiro, 2015. Disponível em: http://www.ipea.gov.br/agencia/images/stories/PDFs/
+relatoriopesquisa/150325_relatorio_aplicacao_penas.pdf
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+26
+
+de método quantitativo e outra de qualitativo, que trabalharam juntas
+para produzir um relatório conjunto amplo e consistente sobre a problemática.
+Como mencionado anteriormente, trata-se de um grande
+desafio trabalhar com métodos mistos, mas o resultado é bastante enriquecedor,
+tendo em vista a quantidade de informações e reflexões
+que podem ser produzidas. Gostaria de lembrar de Edgar Morin (1977)
+quando nos fala sobre a necessidade de se pensar os problemas, os
+conceitos e os sujeitos de maneira complexa e em todas as suas interrelações.
+O trabalho com os métodos mistos e em uma equipe multidisciplinar
+auxilia nessa visão mais ampla das problemáticas.
+A pesquisa qualitativa buscou concentrar-se em alguns pontos
+centrais: i) a análise dos órgãos judiciais, especificamente varas e
+juizados criminais; ii) o estudo dos procedimentos seguidos no tratamento
+dos casos suscetíveis de aplicação de penas alternativas; iii)
+a estrutura existente para a implantação de penas alternativas; e iv)
+o levantamento das percepções dos atores envolvidos no tratamento
+desses casos. As informações obtidas por meio dessa abordagem
+foram fundamentais para identificar os elementos que interferem
+sobre a aplicação (ou não) das PMAs.
+Esse trabalho conjunto e dirigido às avaliações de políticas públicas
+traz, no entanto, a dificuldade de compreensão dos tempos exigidos
+para uma pesquisa qualitativa. Deve-se destacar desde já que os
+tempos das políticas públicas nem sempre correspondem aos tempos
+acadêmicos. A produção de dados pode ser realizada ainda que
+com dificuldades, mas a sua análise teórica com mais profundidade
+exige ainda maior tempo. Trabalhar com instituições públicas traz, no
+entanto, a possibilidade de ter mais facilidade de entrada nos campos
+de estudo, principalmente quando se trata do universo jurídico, e
+poder contar com maiores recursos financeiros para a elaboração de
+pesquisas nacionais. A pesquisa tende a ganhar com esse cenário, sobretudo
+se há liberdade para que os resultados possam ser utilizados
+para análises e discussões acadêmicas posteriores. A discussão sobre
+essa liberdade de pesquisa e análise é importante para a posição do
+27
+
+acadêmico. Essa foi a contribuição dessa pesquisa para o meu trajeto
+como pesquisadora e minha posição como professora universitária.
+Realizar uma pesquisa é realizar uma investigação em alguns momentos
+similar à investigação policial, como afirma Durand (2012),
+uma investigação sobre algum tema, algum problema, pré-definido
+anteriormente. E em volta desse problema que vamos desenhar nossa
+pesquisa. Com base nele, escolheremos o nosso campo de trabalho
+e os sujeitos com quem vamos estudar e as técnicas e métodos
+que vamos utilizar. Investigar políticas públicas amplia ainda mais
+nosso universo, porque implica diretrizes nacionais, e até mesmo
+internacionais, combinadas com as práticas nos seus mais distintos
+níveis, locais e nacionais inter-relacionados entre si.
+Nesse contexto, costumo utilizar como metáfora em minhas pesquisas
+e nos meus cursos de metodologia que elaborar uma pesquisa
+qualitativa é construir sua aldeia, é delimitar o campo em que se
+pretende trabalhar. Uma aldeia onde vamos observar todos os acontecimentos
+e experiências, onde vamos observar as diversas interrelações
+dos atores presentes, em diferentes esferas. Essa aldeia não
+significa necessariamente um espaço geográfico e um tempo definidos,
+mas se delimita por todas as interrelações que podem ser apreendidas
+nesse espaço criado. Ela pode ser, portanto, a-espacial, pois
+posso a partir da delimitação de um problema, observar os vários
+atores envolvidos em múltiplas dimensões e hierarquias, mas todos
+relacionados diretamente entre si. Pode ser atemporal, pois posso
+fazer uso de material histórico e promover o diálogo entre ele e as
+novas diretrizes e atores que observo. E é dentro dessa aldeia que a
+investigação de campo será realizada.
+Como exemplo, na pesquisa realizada os fóruns eram a nossa aldeia,
+definidos geograficamente, mas tendo em conta todas as dimensões
+e instituições envolvidas na problemática em um âmbito
+mais amplo, nacional. O planejamento da pesquisa envolvia a produção
+de um conhecimento prévio sobre o tema (a domesticação do
+olhar e do ouvir de Roberto Cardoso) que incluía todas as diretrizes
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+28
+
+nacionais e internacionais sobre penas e medidas alternativas. O seguinte
+passo era a inserção dos pesquisadores nessa aldeia. As estratégias
+para essa inserção são múltiplas e implicam uma série de pedidos
+de autorização, facilitadas pelo órgão público. Se por um lado
+isso facilita, por outro lado, foi necessário várias vezes desconstruir a
+ideia de que éramos representantes do governo fazendo fiscalização
+dos fóruns. Coube aos pesquisadores fazer o exercício de se integrar
+ao campo de forma natural, como típico do trabalho do etnográfico.
+O respeito e garantia do anonimato são importantes para assegurar
+que se trata de uma pesquisa. Nesse texto, gostaria, no entanto, de
+manter o foco nessa construção da aldeia de pesquisa e na escolha
+dos métodos qualitativos.
+Como alguns fóruns eram bastante grandes para realizar uma
+observação participante, eram escolhidos duas varas e dois juizados
+criminais, além da vara de execuções e das centrais de penas e medidas
+alternativas. Assim, poderia ver as várias instâncias envolvidas
+no caso, acompanhando o fluxo desses processos. A pesquisa envolveu,
+portanto, os seguintes propósitos:
+
+1. Realizar trabalho de campo nas varas e Juizados criminais (não
+foram incluídos varas e juizados especializados, como as varas de
+violência doméstica e familiar contra a mulher, para não ampliar
+demasiadamente o escopo da pesquisa), Varas de Execução Penal
+e centrais de penas alternativas. O que se pretendeu observar foi
+se aspectos da estrutura, como a existência de uma vara de execução
+penal e de uma central/psicossocial interferiam na aplicação.
+Adicionalmente, mereceu atenção a especificidade dos juizados
+criminais que, em geral, se ocupam da execução dessas sanções.
+2. Localizar os delitos de ameaça, tentativa de homicídio, furto
+simples, tráfico de entorpecentes e porte de arma de fogo, com
+maior atenção aos casos de furto, por constituírem grande parte
+do volume processual das varas não especializadas. Os delitos
+eram importantes como delimitação do tema para as entrevistas
+29
+
+e revisões de processo e a informação sobre eles veio da pesquisa
+quantitativa.
+3. Levantar informações sobre os procedimentos processuais adotados,
+destacando como e quando se insere a possibilidade de
+decidir uma pena ou medida alternativa. De modo geral, pretendeu-se
+investigar os possíveis obstáculos (legais, burocráticos,
+estruturais e culturais, como resistências dos servidores e do juiz,
+entre outros) para a aplicação de PMAs.
+4. Recolher as percepções dos atores envolvidos no processamento
+dos casos, incluindo membros do Judiciário (juízes e servidores),
+do MP, defensores públicos, advogados, acusados e vítimas.
+
+Pode-se constatar que o universo de pesquisa era grande e o tempo
+para cada fórum se resumia em algumas semanas. A pesquisa foi
+realizada nas cinco regiões do país, em fóruns escolhidos no interior e
+na capital (um de cada um). Seria impossível pensar em uma etnografia
+clássica ou mesmo em observação participante, em tão pouco tempo
+e em um universo de pesquisa tão amplo. A equipe qualitativa era
+composta apenas de 4 membros, dois antropólogos e dois juristas que
+eram essenciais para a compreensão das penas no âmbito do Direito.
+Essa amplitude e o pouco tempo em cada fórum implicou um esforço
+de integração de diferentes técnicas para que a análise contivesse uma
+maior quantidade de informações que desse mais segurança.
+Como técnicas escolhidas, foram aplicadas a observação participante,
+entrevistas em profundidade, rodas de conversas coletivas, revisão
+de documentos e de processos e, como uma estratégia geral da
+pesquisa, a realização de audiências públicas com especialistas sobre
+o tema, onde eram discutidos os primeiros resultados da pesquisa.
+A observação participante aconteceu em dias escolhidos para a
+permanência nas secretarias e nas diversas instâncias, assim como
+nas audiências realizadas pelos juizados e varas. Observar o funcionamento
+das secretarias e conversar com os servidores sobre os
+processos e as penas e medidas alternativas forneceram uma quan-
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+30
+
+tidade de informações muito importante. Os servidores lidam com o
+dia-a-dia dos processos e estão em contato direto com as autoridades
+e, ao mesmo tempo, com o público de vítimas e acusados. Estar
+sentados na secretaria era uma tarefa difícil, pois implicava várias
+horas sem o que fazer, sem o que anotar. Ressalta-se, no entanto, que
+era importante ver o movimento de pessoas e dos servidores para a
+compreensão do funcionamento do fórum. Muitas vezes os momentos
+de silêncio e de ausência de acontecimentos têm significados tão
+importantes quanto a movimentação das pessoas.
+Uma das estratégias para auxiliar na relação com os servidores
+foi a revisão de processos e de documentos, em geral. Os processos
+não foram analisados com a intenção de realizar uma pesquisa sobre
+eles (a pesquisa quantitativa estava voltada para a análise dos fluxos
+processuais), mas porque constituíam um elemento importante para
+motivar uma conversa e o questionamento dos procedimentos com os
+servidores e depois com os juízes. Era a forma de ter casos concretos
+para pedir explicações e confrontar os discursos que muitas vezes estão
+muito oficializados. É importante o pesquisador ter em suas mãos
+elementos que facilitem a conversa e que, sobretudo, permitam que
+as pessoas exprimam seu entendimento. Deve se recordar que o pesquisador
+deve chegar ao campo com a mente aberta para o exercício
+de “ouvir” e de “estranhar” aquilo que para ele parece tão evidente.
+As entrevistas em profundidade foram realizadas em dois momentos.
+Na chegada ao Fórum, foram entrevistados servidores e juízes.
+Essas entrevistas, mais curtas, tinham como objetivo recolher
+informações gerais sobre a questão. Em um segundo momento, no
+final do trabalho de campo, as entrevistas foram refeitas com as mesmas
+pessoas, para aprofundar em questões que foram detectadas
+durante a pesquisa de campo. Essa segunda rodada de entrevistas
+ganhou importância fundamental para o tratamento dos dados. É
+muito interessante observar que opiniões e percepções mudam da
+primeira para a segunda entrevista.
+As entrevistas eram muito importantes, também, para fazer a re-
+31
+
+lação dos diferentes níveis e hierarquias em que o tema era tratado.
+Conversar sobre as diretrizes nacionais e internacionais, sobre os
+contextos, sobre a política em geral, para descer em seguida às especificidades
+locais. Alguns juízes se negaram a dar entrevistas, mas a
+permanência no campo trouxe a possibilidade de que algumas conversas
+informais fossem realizadas antes ou depois de audiências.
+Foram muitas as conversas informais com juízes, representantes do
+Ministério Público, defensoria pública, vítimas e acusados, especialmente
+nesses momentos antes ou depois das audiências. Assim, podíamos
+alcançar a percepção desses diferentes atores sobre os casos.
+É interessante recordar o que Durand (2012) afirma quando diz
+que é importante ter, além do conhecimento de como fazer a etnografia,
+a habilidade pessoal para realizá-la. É um exercício permanente
+em compreender como o pesquisador deve se comportar e
+promover o ambiente adequado para que as conversas fluam, ao
+mesmo tempo, desenvolver habilidades pessoais que lhe permitam
+exercer de forma natural essa atividade de diálogo. O trabalho do
+pesquisador é um trabalho de reflexão sobre si mesmo, conduz a
+uma transformação de si mesmo no encontro com esse outro, como
+um processo de autoanálise (Cardoso de Oliveira, 2008). Além disso,
+é importante lembrar que lidamos com pessoas e não somente
+com fontes de dados. Sujeitos múltiplos, como já comentamos. Ao
+mesmo tempo que são juízes, servidores, vítimas e acusados, são
+homens e mulheres, pertencentes às classes sociais distintas, racialmente
+ou etnicamente diferentes, múltiplos em si mesmos10. As
+conversas e entrevistas tinham de deixar espaço para detectar as especificidades
+e múltiplas percepções dessas pessoas desde os mais
+diferentes lugares de fala de onde se posicionavam. E entre especifi10
+Vale a pena recordar o mencionado por Renato Rosaldo (2008), que explica que
+com o tempo as etnografias foram assumindo discursos distanciados, normativos,
+objetivos e muito naturais, retirando a parte de sentimentos, sofrimentos e opiniões
+das pessoas, sem levar em conta que é apenas uma modalidade retórica como outras.
+Nesse sentindo, segundo o autor, a melhor forma de avaliar o que fazemos como
+etnografia é nos colocarmos no lugar daquelas pessoas e pensar se gostaríamos que
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+32
+
+cidades, encontrar elementos comuns possíveis de contribuir com a
+análise da política como um todo.
+Além das entrevistas, sobretudo nas secretarias, foram realizadas
+conversas coletivas com vários servidores ao mesmo tempo. Ao contrário
+do que se imaginou, eram momentos no final do expediente que atraíam
+bastante a atenção de todos. Vários servidores comentaram com a equipe
+como haviam apreciado esse momento de balanço de suas atividades
+e que deveriam continuar a promovê-lo periodicamente.
+A observação das audiências trouxe, igualmente, informações importantes
+sobre os casos e a aplicação das penas e medidas alternativas.
+Nos primeiros dias era evidente a mudança de comportamento por
+conta da nossa presença. Às vezes, juízes paravam a audiência para nos
+explicar o que estavam fazendo. A nossa permanência contínua foi nos
+colocando no anonimato pouco a pouco. É rica essa experiência, mesmo
+quando ela parece não estar funcionando. Uma das audiências em
+que estive presente, a procuradora do Ministério Público solicitou minha
+saída, porque não queria que “gente dos direitos humanos” estivesse ali
+presente. Dado fundamental para a nossa pesquisa.
+O importante dessa construção da aldeia é que delimitamos a
+pesquisa somente a aqueles que aí estavam presentes, sem por isso,
+deixar de questionar sobre os diversos níveis e hierarquias. As percepções
+de atores como representantes do Ministério Público e da
+defensoria pública, que em muitos casos estavam situados fora do
+âmbito do fórum, foram recolhidas somente naquele ambiente de
+inter-relação. Não podíamos fazer uma pesquisa sobre a percepção
+do Ministério Público e da Defensoria enquanto corpo institucional,
+ou mesmo das vítimas e acusados fora daquele ambiente. As percepções
+e ações eram colhidas de todos os atores naquele espaço de
+inter-relação, no contato e no movimento deles naquele ambiente
+de práticas. Atores e mesmo diretrizes que podem ser importantes
+para o tema, mas que não surgiram durante a pesquisa de campo
+não foram incluídos ou foram incluídos para situar essa situação de
+
+fôssemos considerados da mesma forma como estamos fazendo em nosso campo.
+33
+
+ausência. A aldeia delimita o campo.
+No entanto, a construção da nossa aldeia não pode eliminar todo
+o universo maior que impacta diretamente no problema que analisamos.
+Esse diálogo entre as diversas esferas deve ser levado em
+conta, conduzindo a nossa pesquisa a se situar em uma discussão
+mais global e nos retirando de análises excessivamente localizadas.
+A aldeia é o espaço limitado que deve estar aberto para que todas
+essas heterogeneidades estejam presentes.
+O processo de análise e escrita dos dados nos conduziu a muitas
+dúvidas. Primeiro, recordando a Roberto Cardoso, o escrever que implica
+produzir o encontro dos nossos marcos teóricos com os dados
+recolhidos nesse processo dialógico do trabalho de campo. No caso
+dessa pesquisa, promover ainda o encontro com dados macros, tão
+gerais da pesquisa qualitativa. Tantas especificidades, tantos dados e
+percepções recolhidos que não poderiam encontrar espaço na produção
+de um relatório conjunto de pesquisa. O ato de escrever também
+exige escolha e essa escolha põe a responsabilidade sobre o pesquisador.
+Não creio que o objetivo, por tudo o que já mencionamos, deve
+ser a produção de um relatório de pesquisa com objetividades, verdades,
+mas ao contrário, um relatório que traga complexidades, pontos
+de vistas, indicações para que sejam pensadas políticas adequadas.
+Na seleção do que apresentar, escolhemos os dados da pesquisa
+qualitativa que eram fundamentais e que dialogavam melhor com a
+pesquisa quantitativa. Optamos por trazer falas simbólicas, como casos
+típicos que menciona Gimenez, sem deixar de apontar algumas
+exceções e contextos locais e regionais. Os dados qualitativos estavam
+ali para contextualizar e ponderar os dados quantitativos. O material
+é denso e ainda está disponível para que seja explorado em todas as
+suas especificidades em futuros trabalhos teóricos e empíricos.
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+34
+
+4. Bibliografia
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+
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+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
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+y el trabajo de campo en las ciencias sociales. UNAM, México.
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+para combinar metodologías cuantitativas y cualitativas. Renglones,
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+
+México.
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+metodológicas para a pesquisa social. Sociologias, 11(22),
+
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+
+view/9643>.
+
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+Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
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+
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+
+Bookman.
+O Direito como objeto de estudo empírico //
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+38
+39
+
+2
+
+O método quantitativo na
+
+pesquisa em direito //Alexandre
+
+Samy de Castro
+
+As funções básicas do método quantitativo em geral são duas: inferência
+descritiva e inferência causal. Em particular no contexto de estudos
+legais, assim como em outras ciências sociais, o método está
+sujeito à limitações dos estudos observacionais: o objeto da pesquisa
+é incompatível com a realização de experimentos controlados,
+de modo que o desafio de identificar causalidade depende do uso
+adequado de a uma miríade de métodos, a partir dos quais torna-se
+possível a construção de um cenário contrafactual, que possibilite
+testar a presença e aferir a magnitude de mecanismos causais. Este
+capítulo se propõe a discutir um sub-conjunto destes métodos, de
+maior relevância no contexto de estudo empíricos em direito. Para
+tal, a abordagem utilizada é de natureza heurística, reforçada com
+exemplos da literatura pertinente.
+Observa-se no Brasil uma carência, em relação ao resto do mundo,
+de pesquisas quantitativas sobre o funcionamento das instituições
+do sistema de justiça. Constata-se por outro lado, uma excessiva
+judicialização das políticas públicas. Isto em um contexto histórico
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+40
+
+de reformas legais e institucionais baseadas em base empírica frágil
+e influenciadas pela retórica e por interesses específicos de operadores
+do sistema e de grandes litigantes. Interesses esses, vale dizer,
+não necessariamente alinhados com o interesse comum. Parte importante
+das percepções acerca do sistema legal se baseia em evidência
+anedótica e concepções normativas. Por outro lado, verifica-
+-se uma abundância de registros judiciários eletrônicos, que contêm
+informações jurídico-processuais e institucionais. Este conjunto de
+elementos cria uma oportunidade sem precedentes para a produção
+de diagnósticos fundamentados, subsidiando não só debates relativos
+a reformas, mas também a formulação de políticas públicas
+em geral. Nesse contexto, os métodos quanti são imprescindíveis à
+produção de avaliações ex-post do impacto de reformas legais sobre
+desempenho social, econômico e institucional.
+O capítulo se exime de uma discussão acerca dos detalhes metodológicos
+da pesquisa quantitativa, diante da grande quantidade
+de ferramentas estatísticas e matemáticas disponíveis. No entanto,
+sempre que pertinente, o texto introduzirá conceitos básicos e referências
+a métodos específicos, acompanhados de exemplos ilustrativos.
+Devido à limitação de espaço, discute-se a literatura do ponto de
+vista das estratégias empíricas, em detrimento de aspectos substantivos
+e resultados. Discussões e referências teóricas ficam restritas
+da mesma forma, embora uma das mensagens do capítulo é justamente
+a indissociabilidade entre a pesquisa quanti e a teoria.
+
+1. Dados
+A matéria prima fundamental da pesquisa quantitativa são os dados
+em formato numérico. Ocorre, porém, que o conteúdo das decisões
+judiciais e estatutos se apresenta em formato textual . Portanto, parte
+essencial da pesquisa quanti é a transformação de informações
+não-estruturadas em dados numéricos. Nesta seção apresenta-se
+um discussão acerca de bancos de dados estruturados e depois
+discute-se os problemas associados à interpretação de dados não-
+41
+
+-estruturados. A descrição dos bancos de dados não é exaustiva, e o
+critério de inclusão é a relevância no contexto da pesquisa empírica.
+
+1.1. Bancos de dados estruturados
+
+Definem-se como estruturados os bancos produzidos e organizados
+por instituições, como o CNJ e tribunais, que estejam prontos para a
+análise estatística, isto é, devidamente codificados em formato numérico.
+Em geral são dados sobre fluxos e estoques do poder judiciário,
+tais como casos novos ou pendentes de baixa, além de informações
+sobre o perfil da carga de trabalho, a estrutura e os recursos
+disponíveis aos tribunais. O sistema Justiça em Números1
+, do CNJ, é
+um exemplo deste tipo de banco de dados, apresentando indicadores
+clássicos do desempenho de tribunais brasileiros, incluindo taxas
+de atendimento da demanda, taxas de congestionamento, índices de
+recorribilidade, índices de produtividade, etc. Além deste sistema, o
+CNJ publica também relatórios de produtividade de magistrados2
+,
+dados da remuneração de magistrados e servidores e execução financeira
+dos tribunais3
+. As diversas metas de planejamento estratégico
+do CNJ resultam na publicação de diversos relatórios de monitoramento,
+que constituem fontes de informação potencialmente
+úteis para pesquisa quanti. Os bancos de dados estruturados são
+tipicamente já codificados, de modo que a estrutura da informação
+permite o cômputo imediato de indicadores analíticos relativos à
+estrutura e ao desempenho do poder judiciário, tais como os supramencionados.Dados
+estruturados podem ser produzidos também a partir de
+pesquisas de opinião (surveys). De fato, no Brasil, as pesquisas quantitativas
+de maior impacto foram inicialmente desenvolvidas a partir
+
+1http://www.cnj.jus.br/atos-administrativos/atos-da-presidencia/resolucoespresidencia/261-acoes-e-programas/programas-de-a-a-z/eficiencia-modernizacao-e--transparencia/justica-em-numeros2
+Sistema Justiça Aberta: http://www.cnj.jus.br/corregedoria/justica_aberta/
+3 Publicados por força das resoluções nº 102/2009 e nº 215/2015 do CNJ.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+42
+
+de surveys aplicados junto a magistrados e outros atores do sistema
+judicial, voltados para a avaliação do papel de fatores extralegais nas
+decisões judiciais e para aspectos institucionais, ligados à gestão e
+alocação de recursos no poder judiciário4
+. Somente com o advento
+da Emenda Constitucional 45 e com a criação do CNJ é que foi
+possível um incremento importante no grau de transparência dos
+tribunais, do qual resultou uma oferta significativa de bancos de dados
+primários, acessíveis à sociedade. Um ambiente de profusão de
+registros eletrônicos possibilitou, a partir dos anos 2000, a realização
+de pesquisas com bancos de dados relativos a decisões judiciais
+e jurisprudência. Dentre pesquisas que utilizam bancos de dados
+de larga escala, destacam-se Falcão (2011), Oliveira (2011), Chieffi
+(2009), todos na literatura da judicialização da política, além de Vianna
+(1999), Castro (2012) e Castro (2011).
+Outro método importante para a coleta de dados relativos ao sistema
+de justiça é o de pesquisas de campo. Por exemplo, o IPEA têm produzido
+uma série de bancos de dados de processos judiciais a partir da
+coleta de informações in loco em serventias judiciais de todo o país5
+.
+Em relação a sistemática de coleta eletrônica de dados, este método
+possui as seguintes vantagens: pode proporcionar uma maior qualidade
+e profundidade da informação, bem como garante uma maior
+proximidade do pesquisador com o objeto de estudo. Como desvantagens,
+vale ressaltar que os custos são elevados (em todas as fases
+– treinamento, testes e coleta) e a conclusão da coleta pode ser demorada,
+se a cobertura geográfica for muito abrangente. Além disso, a
+atividade depende da anuência expressa do órgão judicial.
+
+4 Destacam-se as pesquisas pioneiras Sadek (1995), Vianna (1997), Pinheiro (2003) e
+Sadek (2005).
+5 O IPEA produziu uma série de bancos de dados utilizando esta tecnologia: Cunha et
+al. (2011), para dados sobre execuções fiscais na esfera federal; IPEA (2015), para dados
+sobre execuções criminais; IPEA (2013b) e CJF (2012) , sobre o perfil das demandas
+de juizados especiais cíveis estaduais e federais, respectivamente; IPEA (2013a), sobre
+o desempenho da justiça itinerante; além de uma pesquisa de campo já concluída
+sobre autos findos trabalhistas, mas ainda não publicada.
+43
+
+O desenvolvimento da ciência de dados e a crescente abertura
+das fontes de informação se combinam para proporcionar uma expansão
+acelerada – em um futuro próximo – das pesquisas que utilizam
+tanto bancos de dados estruturados e públicos (CNJ e tribunais),
+quanto os bancos de dados não-públicos, em geral produzidos
+a partir de uso de robôs e/ou processamento de documentos contendo
+informação semi ou não-estruturada.
+O interesse universal na discussão sobre o papel das instituições e
+sobre o desenvolvimento econômico resultou na produção de diversos
+bancos de dados voltados para a comparação sistemática de múltiplos
+aspectos das instituições judiciais, entre países. Diversas iniciativas
+se propõem a analisar aspectos estruturais dos sistemas judiciais
+e suas inter-relações com o desempenho econômico, político e social.
+Djankov et al (2003) constroem 38 indicadores do grau de formalismo,
+da celeridade e do grau de correção (fairness) do sistema
+judicial em 109 países, com base apenas na análise dos procedimentos
+judiciais associados a ações de despejo por falta de pagamento
+e execução de cheques sem fundo. O banco de dados foi construído
+através do preenchimento de questionário junto a advogados
+de contencioso.6,7 A análise de aspectos institucionais (formalismo)
+a partir de um recorte tão específico de assuntos processuais busca
+viabilizar comparações institucionais entre países, protegendo o
+método contra erros de medida ou a omissão de variáveis relevantes
+
+6 O questionário cobre com detalhes aspectos processuais de cada etapa, associados
+a: grau de profissionalização dos juízes; tipo de procedimento – escrito ou oral; fundamentação
+de decisões; duração; necessidade de peticionamento; procedimentos para
+produção de provas; prazos legais; aspectos dos procedimentos recursais internos e
+externos; quantidade de procedimentos associados a cada etapa do processo; existência
+de prazos processuais; existência de resolução alternativa de conflitos pela via
+administrativa. O survey inclui também perguntas relativas aos incentivos e ao comportamento
+dos operadores do direito. Os questionários são validados duplamente
+dentro de cada escritório de advocacia participante.
+7 Botero et al. (2004) produzem estudo usando método similar de produção de dados,
+para criar um índice que mede o grau de intervencionismo do governo nas relações de
+trabalho, em um conjunto de 85 países.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+44
+
+que possam invalidar inferências causais (ver o problema da endogeneidade
+na seção de métodos). Reforçando o ponto: indicadores institucionais
+de natureza mais geral podem dificultar a identificação
+de efeitos causais, no contexto de um modelo estatístico, por ignorar
+aspectos macro institucionais relevantes, específicos a cada país ou
+sistema legal.
+La Porta (2004) testa a hipótese de que freios e contrapesos judiciais
+– medidos através de indicadores objetivos de independência
+judicial e controle constitucional – estejam associados com liberdades
+política e econômica8
+.
+Feld (2003 e 2004) utilizam indicadores de independência judicial
+de jure (baseado em características legais e institucionais) e de
+facto – a partir de um questionário – para uma amostra de 57 países,
+para testar a hipótese de que independência judicial causa crescimento
+econômico9
+. Staats (2005) compara diversos aspectos do
+desempenho judicial – tais como independência, eficiência, acesso
+a justiça, responsabilização (accountability) e efetividade – entre 17
+países, a partir de um survey. Djankov (2007) utiliza um índice, proposto
+por Porta (1997), que mede o grau de proteção a credores em
+cada país – para testar, em uma amostra de 129 países, se uma maior
+segurança jurídica e uma maior transparência dos registros públicos
+de empresas influenciam positivamente a oferta de crédito na economia
+(medida como % do Produto Interno Bruto – PIB).
+
+8 Independência judicial é computada a partir de três variáveis: extensão dos mandatos
+da suprema corte; extensão dos mandatos de juízes que decidem casos administrativos;
+indicador de common law – isto é, se decisões anteriores são fonte de direito.
+O índice de controle constitucional é dado por duas variáveis: o alcance dos mecanismos
+de controle de constitucionalidade das leis; o grau de dificuldade para aprovação
+de emendas constitucionais, que depende de fatores como: maioria ou super-maioria
+legislativa, aprovação em ambas as câmaras legislativas, opinião do chefe do executivo,
+referendo popular, necessidade de aprovação em duas legislaturas, necessidade
+de maioria em legislativos estaduais.
+9 Os autores aplicam um longo questionário. Para o indicador de jure, abordam-se
+aspectos como a tramitação de emendas constitucionais, forma de acesso à suprema
+corte, mandato dos ministros da suprema corte, possibilidades de eleição/reeleição,
+remuneração, aspectos de accountability, como remoção ou destituição, etc.
+45
+
+Knack (1995) utiliza indicadores institucionais de mais de 97 países,
+compilados por consultorias privadas nos anos 80 e 90, para
+avaliar o impacto da qualidade institucional sobre crescimento econômico
+e taxa de investimento privado. As dimensões dos indicadores
+incluem: direitos de propriedade (riscos de expropriação) e cumprimento
+de contratos (rule of law); quebra de contratos por parte
+do governo; corrupção governamental e qualidade da burocracia10.
+Acemoglu (2000) utiliza a mesma base de dados para avaliar o efeito
+de instituições sobre renda per capita.
+
+1.2. Bancos de dados semi ou não-estruturados
+
+Esta classe de dados inclui basicamente informações no formato de
+linguagem natural – isto é, textos (uma sentença judicial, por exemplo).
+Naturalmente é um formato de dados predominante na pesquisa
+jurídica. Neste contexto, o uso de qualquer método quantitativo
+requer a devida codificação ou classificação dos textos. Por exemplo,
+se a sentença foi procedente ou improcedente, se um embargo foi
+acolhido ou rejeitado, ou se foi decretada a constitucionalidade ou
+inconstitucionalidade de uma norma, etc. Há basicamente dois métodos
+automatizados para a classificação de decisões: 1- expressões
+regulares; 2- aprendizado de máquina.
+Qual método produz melhores resultados depende da estrutura
+exata dos dados, mas a avaliação está sujeita basicamente ao percentual
+de erros de classificação. Vale observar que, no contexto de
+
+10 Qualidade da burocracia: de 0 a 6, considera imunidade a pressões políticas, aspectos
+de continuidade entre administrações e aspectos relativos a recrutamento e treinamento
+do funcionalismo; Corrupção: de 0 a 6, considera pagamentos de propinas relacionadas
+a licenças de comércio exterior, controles cambiais, tributação, políticas públicas
+de favorecimento para grupos específicos, empréstimos; Rule of law: de 0 a 6, considera
+instituições políticas e sistema de justiça robustos, nível de compromisso com políticas
+e contratos de governos anteriores, resolução de disputas políticas dentro da lei e não
+com base na força física; Risco de expropriação: de 0 a 10, associado a nacionalização
+forçada ou confisco sumário de bens e ativos; Quebra de contratos por parte do governo:
+de 0 a 10, associado a anulação ou aditamento de contratos por conta de crises orçamentárias
+ou devido a mudanças bruscas na política econômica ou social.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+46
+
+grandes amostras, a classificação manual torna-se inviável, de modo
+que ficamos sujeitos aos erros inerentes aos métodos automatizados.
+Assim, deve-se buscar, entre estes métodos, aquele que assegure
+uma margem de erro aceitável e que não comprometa a inferência
+estatística. O classificador automático apresenta dois tipos de erros:
+erro do tipo I (falso negativo, por exemplo, não identificar a procedência,
+dado que a sentença foi procedente); erro do tipo II (falso positivo,
+por exemplo, identificar a procedência do pedido quando na
+verdade não ocorreu). Fica a critério do pesquisador julgar os limites
+aceitáveis dos erros de classificação11.
+Os esforços subjacentes à construção de classificadores de andamentos
+processuais podem variar bastante, dependendo da classe
+ou assunto processual. Por exemplo, espera-se ser mais difícil codificar
+aspectos de uma sentença de concessão de recuperação judicial
+do que de uma sentença de condenação por tráfico de drogas.
+Esta por sua vez, deverá ser, em média, mais complexa do que por
+exemplo, uma sentença associada a uma concessão de um benefício
+assistencial, e assim por diante12. Além disso, o grau de detalhamento
+da informação requerido13 é o que vai definir a dificuldade no
+
+11 O dilema entre os dois tipos de erros é intrínseco a qualquer classificador automático
+de textos: no contexto de expressões regulares, por exemplo, quando flexibilizamos
+demais o classificador, aumentamos as chances de falsos positivos (por exemplo,
+apontar uma decretação de falência sem que tenha ocorrido); por outro lado, quando
+restringimos demais o classificador, aumentamos as chances de falso negativos (por
+exemplo, não apontar uma decretação de falência quando ela ocorreu).
+12 Além de variantes decorrentes de especificidades de cada área do direito, a codificação
+de decisões judiciais enfrenta outras dificuldades: por exemplo, uma sentença
+de homologação de acordo não encerra o processo, de modo que seria precipitado
+depreender deste marcador que o resultado do processo foi “acordo” pois o resultado
+final mesmo só ocorre quando o processo é encerrado pelo cumprimento do acordo.
+Afinal, há sempre uma possibilidade de que o acordo não seja cumprido. Outro exemplo
+é o caso de que um recurso venha anular ou reformar um julgamento anterior
+– como pode ocorrer, por exemplo, no caso da revogação de um decreto falimentar
+através de agravo de instrumento. Em ambos os exemplos, a estratégia de codificação
+se torna mais complexa, pois exige a inspeção conjunta de, no mínimo, dois andamentos
+dentro de um mesmo processo.
+13 Requerido para permitir testar – com base nos dados – as hipóteses estabelecidas
+pela pesquisa.
+47
+
+desenvolvimento do classificador: é mais fácil mapear se a sentença
+é procedente ou improcedente do que identificar o fundamento jurídico
+da decisão ou a jurisprudência subjacente. De qualquer forma,
+toda a cautela é necessária nesta etapa da produção de dados, pois
+informações de má qualidade comprometem por completo os resultados
+da pesquisa.
+
+1.3. Robôs
+
+Todos os tribunais brasileiros possuem sítios de internet para a consulta
+e o acompanhamento processual e de jurisprudência, de forma
+pública e aberta. O problema é que a interface de consultas processual
+pública não foi desenhada para fins de pesquisa jurídica, mas
+sim para consultas avulsas por parte de entes diretamente envolvidos
+na lide. Na prática, consulta-se apenas um processo por vez, de
+modo que a única forma de construir um banco de dados é através
+da utilização de uma ferramenta automatizada para busca e consulta
+de processos: o robô. Dentre as dificuldades associadas ao uso de
+robôs destacam-se: a exigência de conhecimentos de programação,
+embora existam muitos softwares “amigáveis ao usuário”; nas consultas
+de primeiro grau, é impossível a busca por classe ou assunto
+processual (justamente os parâmetros essenciais que delimitam as
+pesquisas empíricas); no segundo grau, bancos de jurisprudência
+não necessariamente contêm o universo e pior, o processo de seleção
+(de quais processos serão incluídos) é desconhecido. Dentre as
+facilidades para o uso de robôs, destacam-se os ganhos significativos
+de tempo na compilação de dados. Permite também produzir
+amostras “grandes” do ponto de vista estatístico – o que pode garantir
+representatividade, graus de liberdade e assegurar estimativas
+consistentes; permite recortes “regionais”; permite consultas por
+documento da parte, gerando por construção chave para o pareamento
+com outros registros (bancos de dados). Por fim, um atrativo
+importante de bancos de dados feitos sob medida, é que a estratégia
+empírica pode servir de base para as diretrizes para coleta/extração
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+48
+
+de dados processuais, por exemplo, na definição de estratos ou de
+períodos amostrais14.
+O desenvolvimento de robôs torna-se ainda mais importante em
+um contexto em que a Lei de Acesso a Informação têm baixa efetividade
+e uniformidade junto aos tribunais: muitos pedidos são recusados,
+seja devido a argumentos jurídicos (proteção de dados) ou
+administrativos (custos para extração).
+
+1.4. Registros judiciários e registros administrativos
+
+A possibilidade de cruzamento de bancos de dados judiciais com outros
+bancos15 estende sobremaneira as possibilidades da pesquisa
+quantitativa: permite, por um lado, que se introduzam características
+das partes, como variáveis de controle fundamentais no modelo
+de regressão (como, por exemplo, na literatura de modelos de decisão
+judicial, se a renda ou o nível de escolaridade da parte fossem
+observáveis, teríamos uma boa medida do grau de hipossuficiência,
+potencialmente relevante para explicar o resultado final do processo)
+ou como critério de seleção amostral. Por outro lado, no sentido
+inverso, para estudar impactos do litígio sobre resultados econômicos
+ou sociais no nível do indivíduo (por exemplo, se as listas de históricos
+de reclamações trabalhistas ajuizadas pelo trabalhador impactam
+as perspectivas de obtenção de emprego ou crédito para um
+determinado indivíduo; ou então, em que medida uma concessão de
+recuperação judicial restringe o acesso a crédito para a empresa em
+dificuldades). Em suma, registros administrativos possibilitam a observação
+de variáveis importantes na análise empírica, contribuindo
+assim para mitigar problemas metodológicos importantes, como a
+
+14 O contexto da gestação de pesquisas quantitativas em ciências sociais é tipicamente
+o oposto: quase sempre o desenho de pesquisa, isto é, a estratégia empírica, é que precisa
+se adaptar ao conjunto de dados disponíveis a partir de fontes pré-estabelecidas.
+15 Por exemplo, RAIS, do Ministério do Trabalho e emprego, PIA, PINTEC, do IBGE, SCR,
+do Banco Central, CNIS, do Dataprev, entre outras bases de dados administrativas.
+49
+
+endogeneidade, que veremos adiante16.
+
+1.5. Mensuração e operacionalização dos conceitos
+
+A operacionalização de construtos teóricos consiste na transformação
+de conceitos abstratos, advindos da teoria, em definições concretas
+ou variáveis observáveis. O desafio está presente em todo tipo
+de análise quanti, desde a mensuração de aspectos institucionais
+mais gerais de um país até a mensuração do resultado de uma sentença
+judicial ou do grau de experiência, formação ou ideologia de
+um magistrado. As dificuldades de operacionalização são muitas.
+Por exemplo, como classificar a origem legal de um sistema judicial?
+Como mensurar o grau de formalismo, de (in)segurança jurídica ou
+de qualidade do sistema de justiça? Como mensurar a ideologia de
+um magistrado? Como classificar uma decisão como “liberal” ou
+“conservadora”? Ou ainda, como definir o sucesso em uma ação judicial?
+Frequentemente a ação é sobre o valor do dano e não sobre a
+culpabilidade, portanto, como classificar uma sentença parcialmente
+procedente, que concede ao requerente um valor inferior àquele
+demandado? Isto é, como determinar se o “vencedor” da ação foi o
+demandante ou o demandado? É possível lidar com as dificuldades
+de operacionalização realizando algum tipo de teste de robustez, isto
+é, redefinindo a variável em questão e validando o resultado para as
+definições alternativas17.
+
+16 Embora o valor adicionado oriundo do cruzamento de dados judiciais com dados
+administrativos seja potencialmente elevado, os custos de implementação também
+são: primeiro, este tipo de procedimento pode ser computacionalmente exigente, se
+os bancos de dados forem muito grandes; segundo, todo pareamento de registros requer
+uma chave (por exemplo um documento da parte, como CPF ou CNPJ). Ocorre
+que, frequentemente, os bancos de dados judiciais não contêm esta chave pois muitos
+processos são cadastrados sem o documento da parte ou com o documento errado.
+Diante deste tipo de limitação, o pareamento por vezes precisa ser feito a partir de
+nomes (textos), o que dificulta bastante o procedimento.
+17 Outros exemplos de operacionalização não trivial incluem: definição da experiência
+do magistrado; atributos da formação do magistrado; ideologia política do magistrado,
+hipossuficiência econômica da parte, etc. Em particular a mensuração da ideologia
+política do magistrado produziu extensa literatura na área de law and politics,
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+50
+
+2. O método quantitativo no contexto de estudos
+empíricos em direito
+Adota-se nesta seção um grau de formalismo matemático mínimo,
+apenas com o objetivo de facilitar a exposição dos conceitos. Por
+limitações de espaço, omitem-se conceitos descritivos e diretrizes
+mais gerais do método quanti, para focar nas questões associadas ao
+desenho de pesquisa e inferência, justamente as mais críticas para o
+sucesso da pesquisa.
+Conforme apontado na introdução, a impossibilidade de uma
+discussão metodológica compreensiva obriga-nos a indicar alguns
+manuais ou textos de métodos empíricos, dentre os quais destacam-
+-se Epstein (2014), Leeuw (2016), Cane (2012). Outra fonte importante
+é o trabalho – traduzido para o português – de Epstein (2013), discutido
+de forma concisa por Ribeiro (2010).
+A discussão será feita com base em um modelo linear18, que relaciona
+uma variável dependente, Yi – que mede o fenômeno ou evento
+que queremos explicar, uma variável Ti
+, isto é, tratamento ou intervenção
+cujo efeito sobre Yi gostaríamos de medir, e um conjunto de variáveis
+explicativas ou variáveis de controle19, incluídas no vetor xi
+.
+
+que discute como aferir se um juiz é liberal ou conservador e como isto determina
+padrões decisórios, a partir de um modelo atitudinal. Segal and Cover (1989) criam
+índices de ideologia percebida dos juízes com base em biografias, excluindo do cômputo
+qualquer decisão judicial; Tate (1981) analisa decisões em função do partido que
+nomeou o magistrado (democrata ou republicano). Mais recentemente, Martin and
+Quinn (2002) oferecem um indicador de ideologia que varia ao longo do tempo (para
+cada ministro da suprema corte americana), revelando um maior poder explicativo
+sobre as decisões judiciais. Para maiores detalhes, ver Segal and Spaeth (2002) e Fischman
+and Law (2009). Todas estas definições apresentam problemas. Por exemplo,
+a medida de ideologia baseada no partido do presidente que indica não é robusta a
+variações ideológicas intra-partido ao longo do tempo, nem tampouco ao fato de que
+nomeações de magistrados podem ser determinadas não apenas pelas preferências
+verdadeiras, mas também por decisão estratégica de concessão política.
+18 Este modelo é de fato uma representação abstrata do mundo bastante restritiva,
+porém as ideias discutidas nesta seção são válidas no contexto de outros tipos de modelos,
+como aqueles com varáveis dependentes limitadas, modelos de escolha discreta
+ou sistemas de equações.
+19 Estas são fatores que potencialmente influenciam a trajetória ou o comportamento de Yi
+.
+51
+
+Yi
+=β0
++β1
+ Ti
++γ’xi
++εi
+
+A variável dependente, Yi
+, corresponde a algum tipo de resultado
+ou desempenho, podendo este ser de natureza judicial, social, econômica,
+política ou institucional20. A variável Ti
+é o suposto evento ou
+fato relevante ou mudança, determinante ou condicionante do resultado
+sob investigação. Pode ser uma reforma legal ou processual (reformas
+constitucionais, novas leis, mudanças jurisprudenciais, etc.),
+uma mudança institucional214, uma política pública, inclusive na área
+criminal, um comportamento judicial ou um fenômeno social ou econômico.22
+Pode ser também algum atributo do sistema judicial, como
+celeridade, independência, grau de formalismo, previsibilidade, etc. O
+parâmetro β1
+ captura o grau de associação entre Ti e Yi
+. Naturalmente
+que os parâmetros do modelo são desconhecidos do pesquisador,
+porém, a partir de dados quantitativos, os métodos econométricos
+podem fornecer estimativas. O estimador de β1
+, β ̂1
+, deverá ser interpretado
+como uma correlação ou efeito causal a depender da estratégia
+empírica.
+Este arcabouço quantitativo permite ao pesquisador traçar uma
+descrição das inter-relações observáveis dentro de um sistema de variáveis
+{Yi
+,Ti
+, xi
+}. Esta análise, de cunho descritivo, é, por si só, relevan20
+No contexto de decisões judiciais, pode ser a procedência ou não do pedido, a severidade
+de uma sentença criminal (anos de prisão), etc. No contexto de resultados econômicos,
+medidos no nível regional digamos, pode ser o volume de crédito o crescimento
+ou a taxa de investimento de uma economia ou comarca. Na criminologia, pode ser a
+probabilidade de reincidência criminal ou o risco de vitimização. No contexto do controle
+judicial da administração pública pode ser a porcentagem de decisões de agências
+reguladoras anuladas por tribunais. No contexto de análises institucionais, pode ser alguma
+medida agregada do desempenho do judiciário, como, por exemplo, celeridade
+média, índice de reforma de decisões, taxa de congestionamento, etc.
+21 Por exemplo, criação de juizados tribunais, instalação de uma vara, criação de varas
+especializadas, mudanças no modus operandi do controle externo do judiciário,
+mudanças no orçamento judiciário ou qualquer mudança institucional em outras instituições
+do sistema de justiça.
+22 É comum a formulação de métodos quantitativos para avaliar resultados de políticas
+públicas ou simular impactos de alterações destas políticas, do ponto de vista do
+seu impacto sobre alguma medida de desempenho, Yi
+.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+52
+
+te. Contudo, tipicamente as questões mais valiosas para o pesquisador
+dizem respeito à eventual existência e à magnitude de algum tipo
+de relação causal de Ti sobre Yi
+23. No entanto, a natureza dos dados
+socioeconômicos e judiciais é tipicamente observacional, isto é, os
+dados não foram gerados a partir de um experimento, de modo que
+o tratamento de interesse – Ti – é designado de forma não-aleatória.
+Dito de outra forma, a seleção dos indivíduos tratados (podem ser
+países, tribunais, comarcas, varas, juízes, processos, etc.), ocorreu
+de maneira sistemática. Na prática, isso significa que, digamos para
+analisarmos os efeitos de (mudanças em) instituições judiciais ou
+leis sobre resultados econômicos e sociais, devemos admitir a possibilidade
+de que estas tenham sido determinadas pelo próprio contexto
+socioeconômico ou histórico, o que impede-nos de isolar o efeito
+causal da instituição sobre a economia. No contexto de decisões
+recursais, por exemplo, as características das partes no processo são
+relevantes para determinar o seu desfecho (variável dependente, Yi
+),
+ao mesmo tempo em que influenciam a propensão a recorrer. Esta
+dificuldade do método é conhecida como o problema da endogeneidade
+do tratamento, ou simplesmente quando a variável causal de
+interesse (Ti
+) é dita endógena.
+Sob um ponto de vista mais formal, o problema da endogeneidade
+ocorre quando Ti é correlacionado com εi
+. Este último termo
+da equação consubstancia todos os fatores que contribuem para explicar
+Yi e que não estão considerados no vetor xi
+(em geral por se tratarem
+de fatores não-observáveis, ou seja, fatores para os quais não
+há dados nem proxies disponíveis24). Quando existe uma associação
+entre Ti e εi, então é porque há fatores – não contemplados no modelo
+– que explicam Yi e que são correlacionados com o tratamento, Ti
+
+23 Por exemplo, o impacto de reformas processuais ou da administração judiciária,
+seja sobre o desempenho dos tribunais ou sobre o desempenho econômico e social.
+24 Uma variável proxy é uma variável que não é diretamente do interesse da pesquisa, mas
+que esteja associada com alguma variável de interesse do estudo que não é observável.
+53
+
+.
+25 Esta é origem mais comum do problema da endogeneidade: variável
+omitida. Outra fonte de endogeneidade são os erros de medida na
+variável Ti
+. Por fim, a última fonte de endogeneidade é decorrente
+de simultaneidade e causalidade reversa; neste caso, Ti causa Yi e vice-versa.
+Por exemplo, instituições (Ti
+) são endógenas neste sentido:
+o grau de eficiência dos tribunais pode ser decisivo para determinar o
+nível de desenvolvimento econômico de uma jurisdição. Este, por sua
+vez, pode ser determinante da qualidade institucional (ver por exemplo,
+Djankov (2003)26. Por fim, a endogeneidade pode ocorrer por um
+problema de viés de seleção amostral. Estatísticas de resultados de
+processos judiciais não são representativas, pois os processos não
+são selecionados aleatoriamente Priest (1984), Waldfogel (1995).
+Para reforçar a discussão dos conceitos, a seguir apresentam-se
+exemplos de fontes de endogeneidade no contexto de estudos empíricos
+em direito:
+
+5. Variável omitida: Castro (2012) analisa se uma maior duração
+processual compromete a qualidade da decisão judicial. Isto é,
+se uma maior celeridade (Ti
+) implica em menos qualidade (Yi
+),
+
+25 Por exemplo, considere um modelo de decisão judicial, onde a hipossuficiência é
+medida pelo usufruto de assistência judiciária gratuita (Castro, 2012). Se a assistência
+jurídica gratuita for requisitada de forma oportunística, por exemplo em ações de
+indenização – por conta da ausência de honorários de sucumbência – então possivelmente
+os casos amostrados serão aqueles mais difíceis. Desta forma, o parâmetro
+estimado irá sugerir uma associação entre a gratuidade de justiça e decisões contrárias
+ao hipossuficiente. Em outras palavras, o modelo estaria omitindo uma variável
+importante - “o grau de dificuldade do caso” - que é correlacionada com uma variável
+incluída no modelo - isto é, o indicador de se a parte é beneficiária ou não da assistência
+jurídica gratuita. Este problema remete-nos diretamente à discussão de Priest and
+Klein (1984) na seção 3.
+26 Um contraexemplo do problema da simultaneidade se refere à distribuição aleatória
+dos processos, conforme discutido anteriormente. O princípio do juízo natural
+implica na ausência de simultaneidade, de modo que o desfecho esperado (variável
+dependente) não pode - por construção - ser determinante das características do caso
+(variáveis independentes), notadamente atributos relevantes dos juízes (político-ideológicos,
+por exemplo). Se fosse possível a escolha do juiz, então os defensores de
+direitos civis iriam escolher juízes progressistas, e assim por diante.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+54
+
+definida como a probabilidade de reforma da sentença. Neste
+contexto, uma variável de controle fundamental – a ser incluída
+no vetor xi – seria a complexidade do caso: o grau de dificuldade
+da decisão implica em maior duração, mas também em maiores
+chances de reforma. Portanto uma omissão desta variável enviesaria
+a estimativa do parâmetro β1
+. Outro exemplo, bastante
+comum nas análises quantitativas, diz respeito à interpretação
+do direito ou posicionamentos valorativos (legal reasoning) do
+juiz27. Uma das dificuldades em se testar o papel das preferências
+político-ideológicas nas decisões da suprema corte é a dificuldade
+em isolar tais preferências da variável “direito”: tanto as preferências
+de policy quanto o legal reasoning são influenciados pela
+ideologia, porém este último fator é não-observável. Portanto,
+em termos do modelo, viola-se a independência entre Ti (ideologia)
+e εi (direito)
+28.
+6. Erros de medida: Levitt (1998) apresenta um exemplo clássico deste
+problema, inerente à mensuração da taxa de encarceramento. Enquanto
+esta taxa é definida como o número de prisões divido pelo
+total de crimes ocorridos, sua mensuração é dada pelo número de
+prisões dividido pelo total de crimes reportados29. O autor aponta
+que este tipo de erro enviesará as estimativas do efeito dissuasivo
+
+27 Em decorrência, principalmente, da dificuldade de se codificar este tipo de atributo
+no contexto de uma decisão judicial.
+28 A compreensão desta limitação é essencial para uma avaliação adequada de pesquisas
+quantitativas que buscam medir o papel de fatores extralegais sobre o resultado
+de decisões judiciais. Frequentemente tais fatores não podem ser dissociados
+(disentangled) da hermenêutica. Por vezes, eles sequer podem ser dissociados dos
+textos das normas jurídicas - conforme assinalado por Arguelhes et al. (2006). Ignorar
+tais considerações pode resultar em inferências falsas com relação a um suposto viés
+sistemático subjacente à decisões judiciais. Edwards and Livermore (2009) apresentam
+discussão sobre o tema. Com relação ao paradigma do modelo atitudinal, eles
+afirmam: “As currently structured, empirical research also cannot discern whether judges’
+political views or ideology override the governing law. To make this assessment,
+empiricists would first have to distinguish between forms of moral/political reasoning
+intrinsic to law and those extrinsic to law.”.
+29 Não há como contabilizar crimes que não são reportados, embora seja possível
+propor proxies para a subnotificação de ocorrências.
+55
+
+de law enforcement sobre a propensão à perpetração de crimes.
+7. Simultaneidade: Levitt (2002) e Klick (2005) buscam responder se
+o aumento do policiamento causa redução em crimes. A simultaneidade
+é evidente, pois a racionalidade da política de segurança
+pública prevê uma alocação de efetivo policial condicionada aos
+padrões espaciais de incidência de crimes30. Para resolver este
+problema, os autores buscam documentar choques no efetivo
+policial que sejam exógenos em relação aos padrões espaciais de
+criminalidade, possibilitando com isso, isolar o efeito do policiamento
+sobre crimes. Os dois estudos utilizam choques sobre o
+reforço policial por conta de alerta ou resposta a ataques terroristas.
+Outra discussão importante da criminologia trata da relação
+entre armas e homicídios: mais armas aumentam ou diminuem
+homicídios? Nesse caso, a causalidade reversa ocorre pois um
+aumento de homicídios pode gerar maior procura por armas para
+autodefesa. Assim, para isolar o efeito causal de armas sobre homicídios,
+é necessário considerar algum tipo de choque que afete
+homicídios somente através da prevalência de armas de fogo.
+Para tal, Cerqueira (2012) utiliza o estatuto nacional do desarmamento.
+Na literatura de law and development, Djankov et al
+(2003) utiliza as origens legais (common law versus direito civil)
+para isolar efeitos do formalismo legal sobre o desempenho das
+cortes (em termos de fairness, previsibilidade e celeridade).
+8. Seleção amostral não-aleatória: A amostra de processos judiciais
+não é selecionada aleatoriamente e por isso não deve ser representativa
+da população para a qual deseja-se aplicar a inferência.
+Trata-se do problema de viés de seleção apontado por Priest
+(1984), Eisenberg (1990) e Waldfogel (1995). Kastellec (2008) estuda
+o problema de viés de seleção na suprema corte norte-americana,
+onde a admissão de casos é quase que totalmente discricionária,
+com foco em casos difíceis, controversos e de grande
+
+30 Em outras palavras, aumentar o efetivo policial nas áreas de maior criminalidade.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+56
+
+importância nacional. Desta forma a corte logra a difusão de doutrinas
+e o controle das decisões de cortes inferiores, através da
+jurisprudência. Os autores confirmam a presença deste tipo de
+viés e alerta para a não-representatividade da amostra de casos
+na suprema corte, potencialmente problemática para inferências
+no contexto da literatura da judicialização da política. Siegelman
+(1995) aponta que o índice de sucesso em ações relativas à discriminação
+no trabalho diminuem em períodos de recessão econômica,
+pois, nestes períodos, reclamações com menos chances de
+sucesso tendem a chegar mais facilmente às cortes. Outro exemplo
+de seleção não aleatória diz respeito à questão da mudança de
+competência (Clermont, 1997). A seleção de recursos em instâncias
+superiores via de regra está sujeita a algum critério de seleção.
+O conjunto de recursos admitidos não permite uma aferição
+precisa de qual seria a taxa de reforma de decisão na população,
+que inclui também aqueles casos que não foram recorridos (ver
+Castro, 2012). Bushway (2007) discute soluções técnicas para o
+problema do viés de seleção no contexto da criminologia.
+
+Seja qual for a fonte da endogeneidade, a literatura de estudos
+quantitativos sugere que quanto mais focalizado for o objeto de
+análise, maior a capacidade do pesquisador de lidar com o imponderável,
+ou seja, εi
+. Por exemplo, na análise dos padrões de decisão
+judicial, o mecanismo de seleção de processos é específico a um determinado
+tipo de classe, assunto processual, grau de jurisdição ou
+esfera de justiça, de modo que um tratamento conjunto de assuntos
+distintos dificultaria a cmopreensão com relação ao tipo de viés potencial
+a ser introduzido nos resultados.
+Os exemplos citados acima se tratam de quasi-experimentos, desenhados
+para sanar o problema da endogeneidade, cuja ausência requer
+que Ti seja independente de εi, ou seja, que as variações em Ti
+ocorram
+à revelia de εi
+. Esta situação é típica de experimentos controlados, praticamente
+inexistentes no contexto de dados empíricos relacionados
+57
+
+a resultados (outcomes) políticos, institucionais, econômicos ou sociais31.
+Assim, resta a estratégia da busca por quasi-experimentos, dentre
+os quais se destacam os seguintes métodos: diferenças-em-diferenças,
+regressão com descontinuidade e variáveis instrumentais.32
+O método de variáveis instrumentais é uma das soluções mais
+comuns para o problema da endogeneidade. Na prática, o método
+consiste no desafio de encontrar uma variável, digamos Zi (o instrumento),
+que seja correlacionada com o tratamento, Ti
+, mas que seja
+não-correlacionada com choques em Yi
+, εi
+. Este instrumento deve ter
+bom poder explicativo sobre Ti e, ao mesmo tempo, não impactar a
+variável Yi
+através de qualquer mecanismo.33
+A equação (1) é consistente com o arcabouço-padrão destinado
+à avaliação do impacto de tratamento. Na área do direito, este tratamento
+pode se referir a mudanças legais, processuais, de política criminal,
+jurisprudenciais, etc. O método requer que se faça distinção
+entre um grupo de tratamento e um grupo de controle, isto é, aquelas
+unidades sujeitas ao tratamento (Ti
+) e aquelas que não foram tratadas.
+Uma opção óbvia é comparar os dados antes e depois do tratamento.
+Contudo, esta estratégia impõe o desafio de separar ten31
+A realização de experimentos controlados nas ciências sociais é tema de grande
+controvérsia, esbarrando em questões éticas, políticas e orçamentárias. Por exemplo,
+em 2010, nos Estados Unidos, o governo federal realizou um experimento com a população
+de abrigos para sem-teto, oferecendo “pacotes” de assistência para algumas
+famílias apenas e depois acompanhando sua trajetória de vida. A iniciativa gerou forte
+controvérsia. Nas palavras de um crítico: “Não acho que pessoas sem-teto, na nossa
+época e em nenhuma época, deveriam ser tratadas como ratos de laboratório.” De
+forma análoga, e ainda mais dramática, considere um programa que retirasse policiamento
+de determinadas áreas, escolhidas aleatoriamente, para avaliar o impacto sobre
+crimes. Num país com taxas de homicídios em níveis elevadíssimos como o Brasil, tal
+experimento certamente produziria consequências catastróficas. Por outro lado, o colapso
+das finanças públicas, especialmente em estados e municípios, eleva a responsabilidade
+dos governos em priorizar programas que funcionam. E nesse sentido, os
+experimentos controlados oferecem oportunidades.
+32 Há métodos menos intuitivos e mais complexos tecnicamente, como métodos em
+painel e propensity score matching ou controles sintéticos.
+33 Dito de outra forma, cabe ao pesquisador argumentar, teórica e empiricamente,
+que o instrumento afeta o resultado única e exclusivamente através do tratamento,
+Ti
+. Na prática, este é um ônus considerável para o pesquisador.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+58
+
+dências pré-existentes (variável Yi
+) do resultado do tratamento. A
+solução clássica para este tipo de problema consiste em comparar a
+diferença de outcomes antes e depois do tratamento, para os indivíduos
+afetados por ele, com esta mesma diferença, para os indivíduos
+não impactados pelo tratamento (i.e., grupo de controle).34 O cerne
+da inferência causal consiste em se estabelecer um cenário contrafactual.
+Isto é, qual teria sido a trajetória da variável de interesse, Yi
+,
+na ausência de tratamento?35
+Como veremos na próxima seção, uma estratégia bastante comum
+nos estudos empíricos em direito, para aleatorizar o tratamento
+e contornar o problema da endogeneidade é explorar o princípio
+do juízo natural: a distribuição aleatória (ou segundo regra exógena)
+do processo garante que o “tratamento” seja aleatório. Dito de outra
+forma, as partes não podem (pelo menos dentro de certos limites)
+escolher o juiz da causa, o que causaria viés nas estimativas dos parâmetros
+do modelo.36
+Por fim, diante de uma estratégia empírica bem-sucedida, resta
+ainda ao pesquisador interpretar os resultados à luz de algum marco
+teórico. Para tal, deve-se reconhecer as limitações da estratégia no
+
+34 Método de diferenças-em-diferenças: Meyer (1995) e Campbell (1969)..
+35 Considere, por exemplo, a tarefa de avaliar o impacto da Lei Maria da Penha sobre
+homicídios de mulheres no Brasil. Devido às dificuldades apontadas, uma simples
+comparação da taxa de feminicídios antes e depois da lei resultaria em uma avaliação
+equivocada do seu impacto, pois ignoraria counfounding variables, ou outros fatores
+que pudessem explicar a trajetória dos feminicídios, que não a mudança legal.
+Cerqueira et al. (2015) propõem uma avaliação de impacto adotando o método das
+diferenças-em-diferenças e estabelecendo como grupo de controle os homicídios de
+homens (indivíduos-não tratados, isto é, não afetados pela nova Lei).
+36 São incontáveis as estratégias empíricas que utilizam o juízo natural como uma espécie
+de experimento natural. Roach and Schanzenbach (2015) avaliam o impacto da
+severidade das penas em processos criminais - distribuídos aleatoriamente - sobre
+a probabilidade de reincidência; Abrams and Yoon (2007) avaliam o desempenho de
+advogados em ações criminais; Abrams et al. (2012) avaliam como os padrões de sentenças
+de minorias variam entre juízes; no Brasil, Castro (2012) utiliza a designação
+aleatória de relatorias para avaliar um impacto da experiência profissional dos desembargadores
+(advocacia, ministério público ou carreira) sobre o resultado de apelações
+criminais. Mais recentemente, Kleinberg et al. (2016) adotam o mesmo tipo de estratégia,
+conjugada com algoritmo de aprendizado de máquina.
+59
+
+contexto substantivo. Apenas isolar o efeito causal de uma variável
+ou tratamento não redunda em elucidar o mecanismo causal, isto é,
+identificar canais através dos quais o tratamento Ti deve impactar o
+resultado Yi
+. Isto porque, frequentemente, teorias concorrentes apresentam
+mecanismos alternativos, subjacentes à causalidade aparente,
+de modo que o quasi-experimento não necessariamente terá o
+poder de discernimento37. Ou, ainda, a depender de hipóteses, uma
+única teoria pode resultar em previsões ambíguas. Por exemplo, a
+distribuição aleatória de um processo faz com que as características
+do juiz sejam exógenas em relação ao resultado esperado do caso.
+Este tipo de desenho pode isolar o impacto causal, digamos, do gênero
+ou raça do magistrado sobre a decisão judicial. Contudo, este
+mesmo desenho é incapaz de identificar por que mecanismos (identidade
+cultural, etc.) estariam por trás do aparente viés. Vale dizer, o
+desafio de eleger uma teoria válida dentre muitas está claramente
+presente também no contexto de análises puramente descritivas:
+na medida em que vislumbra-se a endogeneidade, digamos, sob a
+forma de simultaneidade, pode-se dizer que o conjunto de teorias
+potencialmente consistentes com os dados será ainda maior, em relação
+ao caso de um modelo identificado (livre de endogeneidade).38
+
+37 Até mesmo uma mesma teoria pode prever efeitos ambíguos de sobre , de modo que
+o tamanho e magnitude do efeito líquido torna-se uma questão eminentemente empírica.
+38 Por exemplo, Ribeiro and Arguelhes (2013) apontam que o baixo índice de decretação
+de inconstitucionalidade de leis federais (13%) é perfeitamente consistente com
+self-restraint (ideologia), preferências convergentes entre STF e legislativo, e comportamentos
+estratégicos. São teorias distintas a respeito do comportamento judicial,
+porém todas consistentes com o resultado (descritivo) da análise quantitativa. Dentre
+as teorias de comportamento judicial destacam-se os modelos legal, atitudinal,
+de atributos pessoais, estratégico ou institucional. O modelo atitudinal é bastante
+exigente com relação às suas hipóteses: discricionariedade da admissão de casos;
+ausência de responsabilização política ou incentivos de carreira para os magistrados;
+impossibilidade de recurso externo (última instância). Com relação à ambiguidade de
+efeitos, na criminologia - em particular na literatura de reincidência criminal - existem
+mecanismos teóricos que operam em sentidos opostos: Di Tella and Schargrodsky
+(2013) reconhecem que penas mais brandas podem enfraquecer os mecanismos dissuasivos
+e com isso elevar as chances de reincidência. Por outro lado, argumentam
+que o encarceramento pode produzir efeitos de elevar reincidência, por conta de peer
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+60
+
+3. Estratégias empíricas bem-sucedidas
+Esta seção apresenta uma resenha de estudos que adotam estratégias
+empíricas bem-sucedidas na tarefa de emular quase-experimentos
+para isolar efeitos causais e com isso, possibilitar inferências relacionadas
+aos grandes temas da pesquisa empírica em direito e áreas
+afins. Em outras palavras, os estudos mencionados conseguem, com
+algum rigor mínimo, solucionar o problema da endogeneidade,
+apresentando uma estratégia empírica convincente. Organiza-se a
+discussão em subseções, de acordo com áreas temáticas, com ênfase
+em eficiência judicial, direito e economia e criminologia. O tema
+“instituições e desenvolvimento” foi suprimido por dois motivos: primeiro,
+porque os principais artigos foram discutidos na seção sobre
+dados; segundo, porque, do ponto de vista do desenho de pesquisa,
+esta literatura está sujeita a críticas importantes, principalmente no
+tocante a operacionalização de conceitos e endogeneidade em geral.
+A gênese dos estudos quantitativos em direito remete-nos ao
+movimento do realismo jurídico que, desde o início do século XX,
+vêm chamando a atenção de juristas e estudiosos para o papel do
+livre arbítrio do magistrado, condicionado pela “visão individual” e
+por “noções pessoais”39. A visão realista - ou cética - do direito se contrapunha
+à visão formalista, de que o direito, na forma de leis e precedentes,
+seria o determinante fundamental do desfecho de casos
+particulares.40 No limite, esta noção equivale a crença de que o direieffects,
+escola do crime ou más-influências dentro da cadeia. Na literatura de decisões
+colegiadas (em geral apelações), há uma série de teorias alternativas para justificar o
+consenso de um colegiado, seja por conta do processo deliberativo, seja por conta de
+uma aversão ao dissenso por parte do colegiado - fenômeno este documentado por
+Hettinger et al. (2007).
+39 Haines (1922) utiliza dados empíricos para chamar a atenção para disparidades significativas
+entre juízes nas taxas de absolvição em casos de intoxicação pública. Na
+visão de Llewellyn (1931), expoente do movimento realista, “nosso governo não é um
+governo de leis, mas um governo de leis através dos homens”.
+40 De modo que qualquer operador do direito seria capaz de determinar, a partir de
+elementos canônicos do direito, a resposta à uma demanda judicial. Nesse contexto,
+qualquer juiz deveria chegar a exatamente a mesma decisão ou resposta à controvérsia
+em questão.
+61
+
+to seria completo, isto é, capaz de prover todas as soluções para os
+casos concretos. Por outro lado, na visão realista, a solução dos casos
+passa pela ideologia política dos magistrados, pois o direito seria
+excessivamente incompleto, a ponto de que o leque de argumentos
+jurídicos disponíveis seria capaz de justificar qualquer tipo de decisão.
+A dicotomia cético-formal é útil do ponto de vista pedagógico,
+mas a literatura do realismo reconhece que a realidade se encontra
+em um meio-termo, ao incorporar as restrições do direito no modelo
+atitudinal.41 Desde o início do século XX42, a literatura busca compreensão
+dos condicionantes das decisões judiciais com base em hipóteses
+testáveis e grandes bancos de dados. O paradigma formalista
+equivale ao “modelo legal”, enquanto que o paradigma realista equivale
+ao “modelo atitudinal”. A consolidação do movimento realista
+resultou em extensa literatura acerca do papel dos fatores pessoais,
+político-ideológicos, estratégicos e institucionais na decisão do caso
+concreto.
+No entanto, não foi antes da segunda metade do século XX, conforme
+o relato de Miles (2008), que o movimento logrou seus objetivos.
+Parte do impulso inicial do movimento, segundo estes autores, se originou
+na ciência política, em particular no campo de law and politics.43
+O modelo canônico, que deve orientar a aplicação de métodos
+quantitativos à pesquisa jurídica, se deve a Priest (1984), que formula
+uma teoria de que as chances de vitória do requerente em uma
+ação tendem a 50%, independentemente de eventual viés do sistema
+judicial favorável ou contrário ao requerente. A intuição é de
+que, quando há consenso com relação às expectativas de desfecho
+do caso, as partes entrarão em acordo e o caso sequer chegará ao
+tribunal; chegarão apenas aqueles casos limítrofes, onde as chances
+de vitória são meio-a-meio. O impacto inicial do artigo suscitou dú41
+Como por exemplo, em Cross (2003).
+42 Ver, também, Pritchett (1948), Pritchett (1954) e Schubert (1965).
+43 Conforme descrição de Gillman (1997). Mais recentemente, em Epstein and Segal
+(2005) e Segal and Spaeth (2002).
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+62
+
+vidas com relação a capacidade da pesquisa quanti em fazer inferência
+acerca do caráter do sistema legal, por conta da força dos efeitos
+de seleção. Na prática, as estatísticas das taxas de sucesso nas ações
+judiciais estarão sempre suscetíveis, em maior ou menor intensidade,
+a estes efeitos. Por exemplo, o índice de recorribilidade externa
+enquanto medida da qualidade judicial é enviesado, pois ignora o
+que teria acontecido com os casos que não foram a recurso e que por
+isso, não foram amostrados.44
+Extensa literatura empírica busca interpretar resultados divergentes
+da regra, a partir das violações das hipóteses do modelo
+canônico, observáveis nos dados: assimetria no valor econômico da
+ação (stakes) - se uma empresa enfrentasse custos reputacionais
+elevados, digamos, diante de uma demanda consumerista (desgaste
+de ser réu em muitas ações de responsabilidade civil), então estaria
+mais propensa a aceitar acordo, levando a julgamento apenas os
+casos em que tivesse maiores chances. O resultado final seria uma
+taxa de sucesso observada na amostra inferior a 50% para o requerente
+(consumidor); assimetria de informação - se criminosos conhecessem
+melhor suas chances de sucesso então só aceitariam acordo
+quando suas chances de condenação fossem maiores. O resultado
+é que as taxas de condenação observadas em julgamentos seriam
+inferiores a 50%. Na área cível, a mesma lógica se aplica. Considerando-se
+um grau de sofisticação elevado do requerente e “total ignorância”
+do requerido, no limite este requerente entraria em acordo
+em todos os casos “fracos” e ganharia todos os casos que fossem a
+julgamento45; custos de acordo muito elevados - quase todos os casos
+
+44 Para exemplos adicionais, ver a tese de Castro (2012), que discute o problema da
+seleção em diversos contextos da análise empírica de padrões decisórios em tribunais
+brasileiros.
+45 Aqui vale destacar a grande importância de se considerar efeitos de seleção na análise
+quanti. Uma taxa de sucesso de 100% ao requerente sofisticado (em detrimento
+do requerido, digamos, hipossuficiente e/ou desinformado) - tal como acima exemplificado
+- não deve ser interpretada de plano como evidência da existência de um viés
+judicial pró-ricos.
+63
+
+vão a julgamento e nesse caso a taxa de sucesso do requerente na
+amostra é igual a da população; valores extremos e aversão a risco - litigantes
+avessos a risco tendem a ser mais propensos a acordos, fortalecendo
+o efeito de seleção e o resultando da regra dos 50%; custos
+de agência - conflitos de interesse entre advogados e seus constituintes
+podem influenciar a propensão a acordos, dependendo do
+tipo de contrato (por hora ou honorários cotalícios) e de eventuais
+efeitos de reputação. Kessler (1996) demonstra empiricamente que
+as referidas violações às hipóteses do modelo de fato influenciam a
+probabilidade de sucesso do requerente, produzindo portanto desvios
+em relação à regra dos 50%. Ainda que não exista uma solução
+técnica ou formal para o problema da seleção de casos, a discussão
+acima contribui para entender como estes efeitos podem estar distorcendo
+os resultados da pesquisa e comprometendo a inferência.
+Todas as pesquisas quanti baseadas em amostras de processos judiciais
+estão sujeitas às preocupações levantadas por Priest (1984). O
+arcabouço formal do artigo é um modelo de análise econômica do direito
+(AED)46. O problema permanece independentemente do sistema
+legal ou do ambiente institucional, e a rationale da AED é fundamental
+na identificação do problema de seleção específico com o qual o pesquisador
+se defronta no contexto particular da amostra de dados.
+
+3.1. Eficiência e outras medidas do desempenho judicial
+
+A eficiência judicial é objeto de extensa literatura internacional [ver
+survey de Voigt (2016)] e têm se expandido de forma expressiva no
+Brasil, recentemente47. A literatura discute uma ampla gama de determinantes
+da eficiência, tais como a lei, os incentivos advindos do
+desenho organizacional e os mecanismos decisórios. O paradigma
+da literatura é um modelo de produção no qual o volume de senten46
+Ver Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) e Cooter and Ulen (2007).
+47 Ver Schwengber and Sousa (2006) e Schwengber (2006), para métodos do tipo DEA;
+e Castro (2011), para aplicação do método de fronteira estocástica.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+64
+
+ças ou baixas (outputs) dependem de inputs, dados pelo número de
+juízes e da demanda (cuja proxy é, em geral, a carga de trabalho do
+tribunal). Três tópicos se destacam: 1- Comparações entre tribunais
+(benchmarking); 2- Como os membros do órgão judicial respondem
+ao provimento de novas judicaturas?; 3- Como os tribunais respondem
+ao crescimento da demanda (carga de trabalho)?
+Nesse contexto emerge a questão da causalidade reversa: a atividade
+judicial (produção) impacta tanto a demanda quanto o provimento
+de cargos, criando problemas para a implementação de métodos
+quantitativos: a queda na produção pode reduzir a demanda
+do tribunal, por conta de maior morosidade (que é um custo para o
+jurisdicionado)48; ao mesmo tempo, pode elevar o provimento de cargos,
+visando mitigar atrasos49. O resultado final destes efeitos deve
+ser respondido de forma empírica e poucos artigos na literatura oferecem
+tratamento adequado, com destaque para os trabalhos de Dimitrova-Grajzl
+(2012), Hazra (2004), Murrell (2001) e Buscaglia (1997).
+Além da questão da produtividade, a literatura busca analisar de
+forma sistemática outros aspectos do desempenho produtivo dos
+tribunais, tais como a qualidade, por exemplo, medida pelo índice de
+reforma das decisões judiciais. A mensuração de “qualidade” é bastante
+mais subjetiva que a da eficiência50. O ponto a ser ressaltado é
+que, qualquer que seja a medida, o importante para o método quantitativo
+é que as fragilidades da medida proposta sejam explicitadas,
+permitindo qualificação adequada dos resultados. Por exemplo, o
+índice de reforma das decisões, claramente está sujeito a diversas
+
+48 Reconhecido inicialmente por Priest (1989).
+49 Em outras palavras: suponha que uma vara judicial apresenta elevada morosidade,
+que se reflete em taxa de congestionamento elevada e acúmulo de processos. Se
+a administração do tribunal responde aumentando o número de juízes ou escrivães,
+então o input será endógeno e com isso o estimador da produtividade será enviesado.
+50 Até mesmo do ponto de vista conceitual. Juristas são mais propensos a associar
+qualidade judicial apenas a “correção” dos procedimentos ou aderência à lei processual
+e à constituição. Por outro lado, economistas estão mais propensos a associar
+a qualidade ao “acerto” do julgamento, medido, por exemplo, pela confirmação da
+decisão em instâncias superiores.
+65
+
+limitações, entre elas: o fato de que a decisão de instância superior
+possa contar com algum tipo de viés; ou, ainda pior, que a ausência
+de uniformidade da jurisprudência introduza erros de medida51.
+
+3.2. Decisões judiciais
+
+A literatura de decisões judiciais é objeto do próximo capítulo. Conforme
+discutido anteriormente, desenhos de pesquisa utilizam a distribuição
+aleatória de processos para identificar efeitos de atributos
+dos magistrados sobre o padrão decisório. Importante frisar que o
+juízo natural é mais adequado no contexto de primeiro grau, pois em
+tribunais superiores, há diversos outros mecanismos de seleção presentes
+- que podem resultar em endogeneidade. Além disso, mesmo
+sob a hipótese de distribuição aleatória, estudos mais rigorosos buscam
+demonstrar que as características observáveis dos processos
+não diferem sistematicamente entre juízos52.
+Uma literatura relevante, porém inexistente no Brasil, é a que trata
+da possível presença de viés ou discriminação racial ou de gênero,
+por parte de magistrados. Neste tema particular, o desafio de estabelecer
+um desenho de pesquisa convincente é relativamente grande,
+pois é necessário descartar uma potencial correlação entre raça e outras
+características não-observáveis do caso53. Abrams (2012) explora
+a distribuição aleatória de casos para estudar diferenças nas taxas de
+encarceramento entre negros e brancos. Alesina (2014) explora dife51
+Este ponto remete-nos diretamente à discussão sobre a operacionalização de conceitos
+abstratos, introduzida na discussão de dados, no início do capítulo.
+52 Em um dos estudos empíricos mais recentes, Shayo and Zussman (2011), que utilizam
+distribuição aleatória entre juízes, testam a presença de viés de grupos em decisões
+judiciais em Israel. A conclusão é que os autores da ação têm 20% mais chances
+de ganhar se pertencerem ao mesmo grupo étnico que o juiz (judeu ou árabe). Além
+disso, os resultados apontam que o viés é menor em áreas com menos conflito étnico
+(medida pela taxa de mortalidade decorrente de atentados terroristas).
+53 Isto é, viés decorrente de variável omitida. Por exemplo, digamos que raça e renda
+fossem negativamente correlacionados. Então, a omissão da variável renda poderia
+explicar o resultado do caso por conta de um advogado “mais barato” (de qualidade
+inferior) e não por conta de raça per se.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+66
+
+renças entre decisões de primeira e segunda instância no contexto de
+sentenças capitais. Glaeser (2003) sugere que homicídios culposos no
+trânsito, cujas vítimas são negros, resultam em penas mais brandas
+do do que nos casos em que as vítimas são brancas. A identificação
+parte da noção de que a cor da vítima é aleatória.
+
+3.3. Direito e economia
+
+Cepec (2016) encontra que o sucesso de um processo falimentar -
+medido pela taxa de recuperação de créditos - depende das características
+do administrador judicial, levando em consideração as características
+da firma e do processo. Utilizando modelos de regressão, o
+autor identifica o efeito das características do administrador judicial
+por conta da aleatoriedade na escolha do mesmo, introduzida por
+uma nova lei visando ao combate à corrupção.
+Ponticelli (2016) apresenta uma estratégia empírica robusta para
+lidar com o problema da endogeneidade da eficiência judicial. O autor
+demonstra que o impacto da nova lei de falências sobre o desempenho
+das firmas é contingente à eficiência judicial: em jurisdições
+mais “eficientes” a efetividade do novo marco legal foi maior. Os autores
+identificaram o problema da causalidade reversa, segundo o
+qual áreas mais ricas e com maior densidade demográfica apresentam
+maior congestionamento (trata-se de uma manifestação da endogeneidade
+institucional num contexto bastante específico). A solução
+proposta foi considerar como variável instrumental a “jurisdição
+adicional potencial”, produzida por municípios vizinhos aquém de
+parâmetros legais mínimos para constituírem uma sede de comarca.
+Na mesma literatura, destacam-se ainda os estudos de Assunção
+(2014) e Coelho (2012), que avaliam o impacto de reformas legais sobre
+o mercado de crédito: as leis do empréstimo consignado54 e da
+alienação fiduciária de veículos55. Ambos estudos se valem do fato
+
+54 Lei 10.820 de 2003
+55 Lei 10.931 de 2004.
+67
+
+das mudanças legais serem circunscritas a segmentos específicos
+do mercado de crédito, proporcionando a designação de grupos de
+controle, num desenho quase-experimental. Os contrafactuais são
+construídos com base na trajetória dos segmentos não-impactados
+pelas mudanças legais (grupo de tratamento).56
+Visaria (2009) avalia o impacto da instalação de tribunais especializados
+em cobrança de dívidas na Índia, sobre o mercado de crédito
+- encontrando efeitos significativos no sentido da redução de inadimplência
+e de taxas de juros de empréstimos bancários. O autor explora
+as diferenças nas datas de instalação dos tribunais entre regiões do
+país. Shvets (2013) avalia o impacto da qualidade dos tribunais locais,
+medida através de índices de recorribilidade, sobre o volume de empréstimos
+contraídos por firmas na Rússia. Lichand (2014) quantifica
+o impacto da instalação dos juizados especiais cíveis, nos anos 90, sobre
+a taxa de empreendedorismo na economia brasileira, concluindo
+a favor de impactos bastante significativos. Na mesma linha, Garcia-
+-Posada (2015) testa a hipótese de que uma maior eficiência judicial
+impacta positivamente o empreendedorismo, medido pela taxa de
+entrada de firmas na economia espanhola. Chemin (2012) utiliza as
+diferenças de cronogramas, entre regiões da Índia, para a adoção
+de reformas do código de processo civil, com o objetivo de avaliar
+o impacto de atrasos (backlogs) judiciais sobre quebras de contrato
+e acesso a financiamento, por parte das empresas. Outros estudos
+quantitativos apresentam evidências de impactos substantivos do
+desempenho judicial sobre os mercados de crédito, com destaque
+para Jappelli (2005) e Pinheiro (1998), no contexto brasileiro.
+Alguns estudos empíricos exploram as inter-relações entre o
+mercado de trabalho e o comportamento da justiça e legislação
+trabalhista. Nos Estados Unidos, por exemplo, Autor (2003) examina
+o impacto da doutrina da “demissão injusta” e outras alterações
+
+56 Ver menção ao método de diferenças-em-diferenças, na seção de metodologia.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+68
+
+da employment-at-will doctrine57 sobre o aumento do emprego temporário.
+Para identificar o efeito causal, o autor utiliza a adoção de
+jurisprudência relativa à matéria em diferentes estados americanos,
+em momentos distintos do tempo. Em estudo semelhante, Autor
+(2006) avalia os mesmos efeitos sobre taxas de emprego. O mesmo
+tipo de hipótese foi testado na Europa: Kugler (2008) analisa o impacto
+do aumento nos custos de demissão sem justa causa, circunscrito
+a empresas com até 15 empregados, através do método de diferenças-em-diferenças,
+no qual o grupo de controle são as empresas acima
+de 15 empregados.
+
+3.4. Criminologia
+
+O estudo de Costa (2017) utiliza um desenho de quase-experimento
+para avaliar o impacto dissuasivo da maioridade penal sobre a propensão
+dos jovens a cometerem crimes. Para tal, os autores comparam
+a propensão de jovens ao envolvimento em crimes violentos,
+entre jovens um pouco acima e um pouco abaixo dos dezoito anos. A
+conclusão é de que não há efeito dissuasivo: a redução da maioridade
+penal não causa redução de homicídios.
+Cerqueira (2012) estuda se uma redução na prevalência de armas
+de fogo (impulsionada pelo Estatuto do Desarmamento de 2003)
+causa uma redução ou um aumento nos homicídios. Visto que prevalência
+de armas não é observável (pelo menos no Brasil), a pesquisa
+propõe uma variável proxy, dada pela proporção de suicídios
+perpetrados com armas de fogo no total de suicídios. Além disso, a
+pesquisa utiliza variáveis instrumentais para isolar o efeito da prevalência
+de armas de fogo sobre crimes, por conta do problema da
+causalidade reversa.
+Chen (2007) busca aferir o impacto causal de diferentes regimes
+
+57 “Men must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to
+discharge or retain employees-at-will for good cause, or for no cause, or even for bad
+cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act”. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81
+Tenn. 507, 518 (1884).
+69
+
+de prisão sobre as chances de reincidência criminal. O tratamento
+conferido aos prisioneiros é claramente endógeno, pois os mais perigosos
+são alocados em unidades de segurança máxima. Para contornar
+a endogeneidade, os atores exploram um tipo de variação exógena
+no tratamento (presídio de segurança máxima ou não): os presos
+federais são classificados em uma escala de zero a dez, e aqueles
+abaixo de 6 vão para prisões de segurança máxima e aqueles acima
+de 6 vão para prisões comuns. A estratégia reside em comparar presos
+limítrofes, isto é, aqueles logo abaixo e aqueles logo acima do limite.
+Intuitivamente, quando os presos se aproximam do limite estabelecido
+pela lei, as diferenças de score seriam aleatórias. Portanto,
+o tratamento seria aleatório, para os sujeitos próximos ao score fronteiriço.
+Este método, conhecido como regressão com descontinuidade
+[Rubin (1997) e Campbell (2015)] vem sendo largamente utilizado
+nas ciências sociais, conforme documentado por Lee (2010).
+Na mesma literatura, Aizer (2015) utiliza a distribuição aleatória
+de processos entre juízes para avaliar, nos Estados Unidos, o impacto
+do encarceramento de jovens menores de idade sobre a probabilidade
+de conclusão do ensino médio e de encarceramento em idade
+adulta. Di Tella (2013) mensura o impacto da substituição do encarceramento
+pelo monitoramento eletrônico (ME) na Argentina, utilizando
+uma proxy de ideologia dos magistrados para isolar o efeito do
+ME sobre a taxa de reincidência.
+Evans (2007) avalia o impacto do aumento de efetivo policial sobre
+crimes contra o patrimônio nos Estados Unidos, financiado por
+um programa federal de transferência de recursos para tal finalidade.
+Os autores utilizam este programa como fonte de variação exógena
+no efetivo policial, demonstrando que o “tratamento” é independente
+das tendências pré-existentes de criminalidade e efetivo policial.
+MacDonald (2012) avalia o impacto de aumento de efetivo policial
+na vizinhança de universidade privada na Pensilvânia, cujas fronteiras
+de patrulhamento são determinadas historicamente, de forma independente
+do crime. Eles utilizam o método de regressão com descon-
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+70
+
+tinuidade, partindo da noção de que nas áreas próximas aos limites
+da universidade, o tratamento (efetivo policial) é exógeno.
+Yang (2016) encontra que a vacância de judicaturas nos Estados
+Unidos tem impactos sobre o encarceramento, pois as promotorias
+ficam menos propensas a apresentar denúncias e mais propensas a
+realizar acordos. Por conta da endogeneidade das vacâncias, os autores
+utilizam como instrumentos a morte de juízes e a elegibilidade
+para requerer a aposentadoria.
+Nos Estados Unidos, Brinig (2012) encontra impactos significativos
+do fechamento de escolas católicas sobre a criminalidade de bairros
+de Chicago, utilizando como variável instrumental o número de anos
+desde a ordenação do pastor. Em Israel, Gazal-Ayal (2010) estuda o impacto
+da identidade étnica sobre decisões judiciais, analisando o resultado
+de audiências de custódia. O desenho de pesquisa compreende
+a análise de casos distribuídos aleatoriamente entre juízes judeus
+e árabes, cujos infratores podem ser judeus ou árabes. Os resultados
+sugerem a presença de viés étnico na decisão de libertar o preso.
+Mais recentemente, a pesquisa empírica têm utilizado métodos de
+aprendizado de máquina para a análise de big data, que são bancos
+com grande quantidade de observações e variáveis. Kleinberg
+(2016) aplica um destes métodos para predizer o risco de presos
+liberados em audiências de custódia cometer crimes, utilizando
+informações de mais de 750 mil casos, incluindo os dados das respectivas
+folhas de antecedentes criminais. Além de atestar a elevada
+precisão do algoritmo na previsão de riscos, o artigo apresenta cenários
+de policy, nos quais se demonstra ser possível reduzir crimes
+mantendo a taxa de encarceramento ou reduzir o encarceramento,
+mantendo a taxa de crimes. Esta simulação requer, como qualquer
+pesquisa observacional, que se construam decisões contrafactuais
+pra medir o impacto da política. Para tal, utilizam-se a previsão de
+risco do algoritmo e o limite de risco, que é específico a cada magis-
+71
+
+trado, dependendo do seu grau de leniência58.
+
+3.5. Outros estudos relevantes
+
+Cunha (2011) realizou extenso levantamento de campo na justiça federal
+em diversas unidades da federação, para construir um banco
+de dados do fluxo processual de execuções fiscais. Os autores aplicam,
+em cada vara federal, métodos oriundos das ciências administrativas
+(Delphi e ABC), para aferir os custos monetários associados a
+cada etapa do processo. A pesquisa quanti evidenciou a morosidade,
+os custos unitários elevados e a baixa efetividade dos procedimentos.
+Por conta dos resultados contundentes, a Procuradoria Geral da
+Fazenda Nacional elevou, em 2012, o piso mínimo para o ajuizamento
+de execução fiscal de dez mil para vinte mil reais.
+Pesquisa do IPEA [Moura (2013)], de caráter predominantemente
+descritivo, constatou falhas na cobertura da defensoria pública em
+todo o Brasil, que comprometem o acesso pleno à justiça. A pesquisa
+foi decisiva para a aprovação de uma Emenda Constitucional que determina
+a instalação de pelo menos uma defensoria pública em cada
+comarca, num prazo de 8 anos a contar da promulgação59.
+
+4. Os limites do método e considerações finais
+Este capítulo buscou demonstrar que os estudos quantitativos em
+direito são imprescindíveis para a compreensão do direito, inclusive
+o brasileiro, e também para a compreensão dos mecanismos de
+funcionamento das instituições judiciárias e da judicialização das
+
+58 Os autores utilizam a distribuição aleatória de processos para aferir o grau de leniência
+de cada juiz: a porcentagem de solturas será maior para o juiz mais leniente do que para
+o mais rigoroso. As diferenças de rigor significam que juízes rigorosos mantêm presos
+indivíduos de baixo risco e que juízes lenientes libertam presos de alto risco.
+59 Emenda Constitucional Número 80, art. 98: “O número de defensores públicos na
+unidade jurisdicional será proporcional à efetiva demanda pelo serviço da Defensoria
+Pública e à respectiva população. § 1º No prazo de 8 (oito) anos, a União, os Estados
+e o Distrito Federal deverão contar com defensores públicos em todas as unidades
+jurisdicionais, observado o disposto no caput deste artigo».
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+72
+
+políticas públicas, tanto na perspectiva positiva quanto normativa.
+Tais métodos são importantes na análise de temas como: padrões de
+decisões judiciais, mensuração da eficiência judicial; acesso à justiça;
+política criminal; avaliação do impacto de reformas legais sobre o
+judiciário e a economia, etc.
+A experiência internacional atesta que as pesquisas de cunho
+quantitativo têm contribuído de forma decisiva para o desenho institucional
+e de políticas públicas. No Brasil, esta é uma tendência recente,
+mas que parece ser irreversível. A agenda de pesquisas quantitativas
+é surpreendentemente universal. A despeito da discrepância
+das origens legais, a tradição de estudos quantitativos norte-americana
+é útil para guiar muitas das perguntas e iluminar estratégias
+empíricas adequadas para as questões brasileiras.
+O poder da pesquisa de influenciar as instituições, leis e o próprio
+direito pode esbarrar em pelo menos dois tipos de entraves, relativos
+a dados e métodos. Com relação ao primeiro, observa-se ainda no
+Brasil um grau insuficiente de acessibilidade aos dados, que dificulta
+a disseminação do conhecimento, elevando os custos da pesquisa,
+relativos à coleta e organização de dados. Com relação aos métodos,
+a pesquisa quanti de cunho puramente descritivo pode produzir conhecimentos
+importantes, mas os desafios associados ao desenho
+da pesquisa criam uma distância não-desprezível entre o resultado
+descritivo e a inferência causal.
+Uma estratégia empírica adequada é essencial para a identificação
+de efeitos causais. Um modelo teórico deve ser utilizado para se
+estabelecer as hipóteses testáveis. Nem sempre é possível adotar
+uma estratégia de identificação, diante da natureza dos dados, que
+são observacionais e não experimentais. Ainda assim, vale dizer, as
+análises descritivas têm elevado valor intrínseco, especialmente no
+contexto brasileiro, para o qual análises quantitativas são relativamente
+escassas. A lição fundamental de Priest (1984) é que a inferência
+correta requer uma análise cuidadosa dos mecanismos de seleção
+amostral de processos.
+73
+
+Pelo menos três tipos de reflexão emergem da literatura de estudos
+quanti: primeiro, a abordagem se defronta com o inescapável dilema
+de se responder às grandes perguntas versus adotar um desenho
+de pesquisa consistente. Dito de outra forma, quanto mais ambiciosa,
+ou quanto mais ampla e abrangente for a pergunta de pesquisa, mais
+difícil será para o pesquisador emular um quasi-experimento e com
+isso produzir inferência causal que seja convincente. Os “grandes” desenhos
+tipicamente serão factíveis de aplicação à “pequenas” questões.60
+Segundo, grande parte das pesquisas empíricas dependem do
+contexto específico das ações judiciais (competência, classe, assunto
+e partes), de modo que, sem uma contextualização adequada, fica difícil
+controlar para efeitos de seleção de casos e também outras fontes
+de endogeneidade. Terceiro, contrariamente ao que se imagina
+à primeira vista, a pesquisa quanti não é apenas sobre implicações
+positivas, tendo grande alcance do ponto de vista normativo. Ao avaliar
+o impacto de mudanças legais (por exemplo, leis ou regulação
+trabalhista) sobre equilíbrios de mercado, a pesquisa possibilita mensurar
+efeitos de bem-estar social sob regimes jurídico-institucionais
+alternativos. Mais que isso, efeitos de “equilíbrio geral” decorrentes
+de alterações legislativas, podem produzir resultados diametralmente
+opostos àqueles objetivos precípuos à referida mudança61.
+O pesquisador deve sempre exercer cautela com relação à generalização
+de resultados, pois as instituições judiciais são altamente
+
+60 Os desenhos de pesquisa mais robustos em geral são capazes de responder questões
+bem delimitadas, como a avaliação de programas, políticas públicas ou reformas
+legais focalizadas em grupos-alvo específicos ou delimitadas geograficamente. A operacionalização
+de variáveis institucionais de caráter mais abrangente é tarefa complexa.
+Um exemplo de “grande questão” seria o do impacto do formalismo jurídico ou da
+morosidade da justiça sobre o crescimento econômico. Em contraste, um exemplo de
+uma questão mais focalizada seria o do impacto das armas sobre crimes ou do policiamento
+sobre crimes.
+61 Exemplos típicos são: expansão de regulação trabalhista poderia produzir efeitos deletérios
+sobre indicadores do mercado de trabalho (inclusive precarização); legislação
+de proteção ao devedor poderia restringir a oferta de crédito; legislação de proteção
+ao inquilino poderia resultar na redução da oferta de imóveis disponíveis para locação.
+O método quantitativo na pesquisa em direito //
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+74
+
+heterogêneas. Os tribunais não necessariamente se comportam de
+maneira uniforme. Os efeitos institucionais - ou a interface entre as
+decisões de agentes econômicos e as instituições vigentes - não são
+necessariamente os mesmos para diferentes tipos de agentes (por
+exemplo, tamanho de empresa ou faixa de renda do indivíduo).
+A literatura deixa claro que a “frieza dos números” - característica do
+método quanti - é ortogonal à ideologia do pesquisador. Por exemplo,
+uma grande quantidade de pesquisas na criminologia lança dúvidas sobre
+supostos efeitos dissuasivos decorrentes do direito a portar armas ou
+da expansão do direito penal e endurecimento da política criminal, isto
+é, sobre sua capacidade de atingir resultados desejáveis (por exemplo, a
+redução da taxa de homicídios ou da reincidência criminal).
+75
+
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+83
+
+3
+
+O uso da observação
+
+participante em pesquisas
+
+realizadas na área do
+
+Direito: desafios, limites e
+
+possibilidades1
+ // Bárbara Gomes
+
+Lupetti Baptista
+
+A proposta deste capítulo – que trata dos desafios, dos limites e das
+possibilidades de apropriação da observação participante enquanto
+recurso metodológico para a realização de pesquisas na área do
+Direito – se incorpora a um projeto maior, construído no âmbito da
+REED - Rede de Pesquisa Empírica em Direito, que, por sua vez, tem
+o objetivo de articular pesquisadores(as) com o propósito comum de
+refletir sobre o emprego de diferentes dispositivos metodológicos na
+realização de pesquisas na área do Direito, desde uma perspectiva
+
+1 Parte das discussões trabalhadas neste texto foram apresentadas em oficina da qual
+participei no II Curso de Formação em Pesquisa Empírica em Direito da REED, realizado
+no Rio de Janeiro, em 2015.
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+84
+
+que não seja puramente dogmática.
+Este texto articula, especificamente, dois saberes, o Direito e a
+Antropologia, que, nos termos de Geertz (1997, p. 251), “teve como
+resultado mais ambivalência e hesitação, que acomodação e síntese”,
+embora, potencialmente, pudessem estabelecer mais pontes e
+diálogos do que distanciamentos.
+O impulso de escrever este texto se relaciona com a minha própria
+experiência de pesquisa e, hoje, com a minha atividade docente,
+que tem me ensinado muito sobre o quanto é desafiante - e às vezes
+(des)estruturante - se deslocar de uma formação puramente jurídica
+para se permitir “ser afetado” pelas reflexões que um mergulho
+antropológico obriga o(a) pesquisador(a) a fazer. E aqui, utilizo a expressão
+“ser afetado”, nos termos propostos por Fravet-Saada (1990,
+p. 4), que menciona que a afetação pressupõe “que se assuma o risco
+de ver seu projeto de conhecimento se desfazer. Pois se o projeto de
+conhecimento for onipresente, não acontece nada”.
+A minha experimentação tem revelado que, ao mesmo tempo
+em que a proposta de articulação entre o Direito e a Antropologia
+encontra certa resistência entre os juristas mais tradicionais, ela também
+provoca, por parte de pesquisadores mais novos, certo encantamento
+e curiosidade, o que tem permitido a sua ampla difusão e,
+cada vez mais, a adesão de pessoas interessadas em mergulhar em
+métodos diferenciados no campo do Direito, notadamente, em fazer
+trabalho de campo, articulando reflexões teóricas com observações
+empíricas (Kant de Lima;Lupetti Baptista, 2014).
+Certamente, outras disciplinas e saberes também podem subsidiar
+a realização de pesquisas empíricas na área do Direito, tanto em
+perspectiva quantitativa, quanto qualitativa. Porém, no caso concreto,
+coloco o saber antropológico em um lugar privilegiado, por considerar
+que foi por causa da Antropologia Social que o trabalho de
+campo, e notadamente a observação participante, enquanto método
+de pesquisa, se desenvolveu. Ou seja, como menciona Mariza Peirano
+(2014, p. 2), foi exatamente porque antropólogos se motivaram
+85
+
+pela “curiosidade de conhecer mais uma sociedade, mais um grupo
+desconhecido”, é que foram a campo, com um projeto aberto e “sempre
+dispostos a reconfigurar as questões originais e colocar outras,
+de forma criativa e ousada. Era o momento da exploração (no duplo
+sentido)”.
+Propondo-se a conviver e a “ter contato o mais íntimo possível
+com os nativos”; ou, na verdade, a viver “como um nativo entre os
+nativos”, os antropólogos inventaram e elaboraram as “condições
+adequadas” ao trabalho de campo e, mais especificamente, à observação
+participante (Malinowski, 1984, prefácio e p. 25).
+Sendo assim, embora o trabalho de campo não seja um método
+de pesquisa exclusivo da Antropologia Social, certamente é a sua
+forma básica de pesquisa há pelo menos um século, de modo que a
+história da disciplina se confunde com a história do método, tornando
+fundamental, no meu modo de ver, que se estude esse método de
+pesquisa de forma associado à identidade da disciplina que o constituiu,
+vindo daí a minha opção de articulação desses dois saberes: o
+Direito e a Antropologia.
+Nos dizeres de Mariza Peirano (2014, p. 2) “não há antropologia sem
+pesquisa empírica [...] para os antropólogos, a empiria é nosso chão”.
+Como se sabe, foi a experiência de um antropólogo, Bronislaw
+Malinowski, que permitiu a formulação e a reflexão sobre a construção
+de um método de pesquisa próprio da Antropologia, em 1914,
+quando, fazendo o seu doutorado em Antropologia na London School
+of Economics, indo para as ilhas Trobriand, Malinowski ficou mais de
+três anos aprendendo a língua nativa e convivendo com os nativos,
+em absoluta imersão, experiência que ensejou a publicação do livro
+Os Argonautas do Pacífico Ocidental (cuja primeira edição se deu em
+1922, sendo, no Brasil, em 1978), e, com ele, a ignição para a formulação
+e a reflexão do que hoje chamamos de método de pesquisa
+etnográfica e, consequentemente, da observação participante.
+Em função desse contexto histórico, este texto explora, desde
+uma perspectiva antropológica, o dispositivo metodológico da ob-
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+86
+
+servação participante - que se caracteriza, basicamente, pela imersão
+do(a) pesquisador(a) no campo - dando ênfase aos seus possíveis
+usos na área do Direito.
+Em um primeiro momento, procuro destacar os distanciamentos
+e as interseções entre Direito e Antropologia, notadamente quanto
+às questões relacionadas ao trabalho de campo. Depois, trato de definir
+e precisar o que seria a observação participante e quais seriam
+os benefícios de sua utilização na pesquisa jurídica, tratando também
+dos desafios e dos limites desse método no campo da Antropologia
+e do Direito; e, por fim, descrevo de que modo, no meu campo
+de pesquisa, a observação participante me foi valiosa e desafiadora,
+tratando de demonstrar as possibilidades e os limites de seus usos
+na área do Direito.
+
+1. Entre o Direito e a Antropologia: o trabalho de
+campo como vivência e experimentação (e não
+como técnica)
+De fato, articular Direito e Antropologia é uma tarefa exótica e problemática,
+na medida em que, aparentemente, esses dois saberes
+têm muito mais distinções do que associações.
+No Direito, somos ensinados a solucionar (exterminar) os problemas.
+Na Antropologia, quanto mais problemas, melhor. No Direito,
+temos de ter respostas. Na Antropologia, perguntas. No Direito, importam
+os normatizados. Na Antropologia, os “outsiders”. Ao Direito
+interessa a regra. À Antropologia, o desvio.
+Com efeito, depois que tomei contato com a Antropologia e passei
+a conviver com antropólogos e antropólogas tive uma clareza: a
+de que perdemos a inocência e a ingenuidade quando passamos a
+exercitar a reflexividade crítica que a Antropologia impõe. A minha
+sensação é de que nenhum fenômeno social passa ao largo dos
+olhos bem treinados de um(a) antropólogo(a). Nada mais é visto com
+naturalidade. Tudo é problematizado.
+Ao contrário, no Direito, o objetivo é exatamente o oposto, ou
+87
+
+seja, controlar os fenômenos sociais e “pacificá-los”, numa tentativa
+(vã) de evitar conflitos (leia-se: evitar os problemas que são tão caros
+à Antropologia).
+Entretanto, apesar de totalmente distintos em seus propósitos,
+é certo que, no que se refere ao método, a Antropologia tem muitos
+subsídios a oferecer ao Direito.
+Por causa dos objetivos distintos de ambas as disciplinas, a construção
+do saber jurídico também se dá de forma muito diferente daquela
+que ocorre na Antropologia.
+Os discursos produzidos pela dogmática jurídica – baseados essencialmente
+em opiniões, em vez de dados, ou evidências – ainda
+sustentam a produção “teórica” do Direito, embora não encontrem
+qualquer correspondência empírica, fato impensável na construção
+do saber antropológico, que existe a partir dos dados coletados em
+trabalho de campo (Kant de Lima; Lupetti Baptista, 2014).
+Sendo assim, esta virada metodológica na construção do conhecimento
+jurídico, a partir da valorização de pesquisas empíricas, ao
+mesmo tempo em que esvazia a importância dos manuais de direito
+[que, como bem ressaltaram, recentemente, Fragale Filho e Veronese
+(2015), são tijolos que se pretendem exaustivos e completos acerca
+de uma área de saber, mas inúteis para a pesquisa, constituindo, no
+máximo, material didático sobre temas previamente selecionados],
+também exige a capacidade de adesão e de aprendizado de novos
+(e muito distintos) métodos de pesquisa e de produção do conhecimento;
+e aqui temos um dos importantes obstáculos que os(as)
+juristas enfrentam nesse esforço de virar a sua chave metodológica.
+É que, para os antropólogos(as), o trabalho de campo é “uma vivência”
+e “a experiência de trabalho de campo tem uma dimensão
+muito intensa de subjetividade”. (Rodrigues Brandão, 2007, p. 12). Significa
+dizer que, por mais que um(a) antropólogo(a) possa se armar
+de toda uma intenção de objetividade, isso não é possível, porque o
+trabalho de campo está atravessado por uma “relação subjetiva”.
+Nessa medida, é impermeável a qualquer tentativa de “manuali-
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+88
+
+zação”. Enquanto que o Direito, ao contrário, se estrutura justamente
+através dessa forma “manualizada”2
+ de construção do saber (Kant de
+Lima e Lupetti Baptista, 2014, p. 11).
+De minha parte, acho bastante curioso o fato de que, sempre que
+eu estou em sala de aula ou em algum evento, discutindo aspectos
+sobre o trabalho de campo que venho fazendo em Tribunais (Lupetti
+Baptista, 2008 e 2013), sou questionada sobre “como usar a observação
+participante” ou sobre “como fazer trabalho de campo em tribunais”,
+de forma categórica e objetiva, além de ser demandada sobre
+livros didáticos ou manuais de antropologia que ensinem “receitas”
+e “rotinas” do trabalho de campo.
+Estes questionamentos me causam certa perplexidade, na medida
+em que não existe “receita” ou “fórmula” que ensine o passo a
+passo do trabalho de campo.
+Tanto é assim, que cada pesquisador(a) só pode falar do seu próprio
+trabalho de campo e de sua própria experiência de campo, sendo
+certo que, embora a troca de experiências permita a reflexão sobre
+como fazer um trabalho de campo, ela nunca uniformiza ou responde
+com grau de certeza e previsibilidade qual seria A forma correta,
+adequada e objetiva de se fazer a sua própria observação participante.
+Nessa medida, alguns cuidados e alguns “mandamentos” até
+podem ser compartilhados entre pesquisadores(as) que realizam
+pesquisa de campo nos mesmos espaços (e abordarei esse tema no
+
+2 No texto referenciado menciona-se a categoria “manualização” como algo que evidencia
+uma crítica à forma reprodutiva como o Direito se estrutura enquanto campo
+do conhecimento. Oscar Vilhena, em certa ocasião, referindo-se à sua formação mesclada
+entre o Direito e as Ciências Sociais, disse certa vez que, ao ingressar nos referidos
+cursos, viu-se entre “o deserto manualesco dos juristas e a sedutora literatura das
+demais ciências humanas” (Entrevista disponível em: virtualbib.fgv.br. “Os livros que
+fizeram minha cabeça”). Lenio Streck (2005, p.180), em seu texto “A hermenêutica filosófica
+e as possibilidades de superação do positivismo pelo (neo) constitucionalismo”,
+refere-se a “uma cultura positivista e manualesca que continua enraizada nas escolas
+de direito e naquilo que se entende por doutrina e aplicação do direito”. João Maurício
+Adeodato também usa a expressão na orelha de seu livro O Direito Dogmático Periférico
+e sua Retórica, ao mencionar que o livro “procura fugir ao caráter manualesco que
+tem caracterizado boa parte da produção jurídica nacional”.
+89
+
+último tópico do capítulo), mas jamais se poderá ter um “manual”
+que dê previsibilidade e ensine técnicas universais sobre a pesquisa
+de campo, porque essa experiência estará sempre perpassada por
+relações que são construídas em campo e por subjetividades impermeáveis
+a qualquer tentativa de “manualização”.
+Por isso, sempre respondo aos meus ansiosos orientandos e
+orientandas, ávidos por respostas sobre “como se comportar em
+campo” ou “o que devo fazer diante do meu interlocutor(?)”. Digo a
+eles(as) sempre: “Comece logo o trabalho de campo”. E eles(as) retrucam:
+“Mas, como?”. E eu, de novo: “Indo ao campo”.
+A melhor forma de aprender a fazer uma pesquisa de campo é
+fazendo a sua própria e lendo pesquisas de colegas que nos contam
+como fizeram a sua própria pesquisa.
+De fato, não existe “preparo” ou “procedimentos” prévios que
+“aprontam” um(a) pesquisador(a) para a realização de uma pesquisa
+empírica.
+Mesmo que ainda não se saiba exatamente o recorte do trabalho,
+é importante, ainda que em caráter exploratório, dar início ao contato
+com o campo, ou seja, ir aos lugares, observar os espaços, iniciar
+conversas informais com as pessoas.
+É muito importante, como eu costumo dizer, “se jogar no campo”
+para perder a inibição inicial e para perceber que não é necessário ter
+um manual, porque é “em campo” que aprendemos o jeito adequado
+de nos comportarmos, a forma apropriada de falarmos, o modo
+de nos vestirmos, os melhores horários para fazermos a pesquisa, as
+pessoas-chave com quem devemos conversar, as perguntas adequadas
+etc. O próprio Malinowsli ressaltara (1984, p. 22):
+
+[...] muitas e muitas vezes também cometi erros de etiqueta que os nativos,
+já bem acostumados comigo, me apontavam imediatamente. Tive
+
+de aprender a comportar-me como eles e desenvolvi uma certa percepção
+para aquilo que eles consideravam como “boas” ou “más” maneiras.
+
+Dessa forma, com a capacidade de aproveitar sua companhia e partici-
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+90
+
+par de alguns de seus jogos e divertimentos, fui começando a sentir que
+
+entrara realmente em contato com os nativos. Isso constitui, sem dúvida
+
+alguma, um dos requisitos preliminares essenciais à realização e ao bom
+
+êxito da pesquisa de campo.
+
+É justamente nesse contato com o campo e nesse convívio e
+exercício de observação (quase obsessivos), que os pesquisadores
+passam a entender a lógica de funcionamento e as engrenagens do
+campo pesquisado.
+Logicamente, como ensinara Evans-Pritchard (2005, p. 244), “é
+inútil partir para o campo às cegas”. Ou seja, não estou sugerindo
+que, sem ter a menor dimensão do objeto do trabalho e da problemática,
+o(a) pesquisador(a) vá a campo. Estou apenas dizendo que,
+no caso do Direito, considerando que esse método não nos é comum
+e que os pesquisadores perdem muito tempo tentando se preparar
+e cuidar de procedimentos prévios que normalmente boicotam o
+início da pesquisa, é desejável que a pessoa, mesmo em fase exploratória,
+perca o “medo” e se jogue no campo, para iniciar a sua intimidade
+com o espaço e com as pessoas, circunstância que permitirá,
+logo após, uma sofisticação e uma acuidade com a elaboração da
+problemática e com as perguntas da pesquisa.
+Cada pesquisador, em Antropologia, tem de “inventar um sistema
+de trabalho”. Inexistem “receitas” prontas. E cada antropólogo
+“trabalha como acha melhor e mais confortavelmente” nas circunstâncias
+especiais do campo e da vida diária que se lhe apresenta (DaMatta,
+1987, p. 191).
+“Ninguém sabe muito bem como faz o próprio trabalho de campo”,
+disse Evans-Pritchard, citando Paul Radin, em suas reminiscências e
+reflexões sobre o trabalho de campo (2005, p. 243). Até porque, as circunstâncias
+do trabalho de campo podem variar conforme as pessoas,
+o lugar e o objeto da pesquisa. Uma coisa é entrevistar juízes. Outra,
+delegados. Outra, policiais. Outra, traficantes. Outra, crianças. Outra,
+candomblecistas. Outra, padres. Outra, prostitutas. Outra, viciados em
+91
+
+drogas. Outra, moradores de rua. Outra, comerciantes. Outra, políticos.
+Outra, cineastas. Outra, índios. Outra, camponeses.
+Daí uma importante dificuldade de juristas internalizarem a proposta
+metodológica da antropologia: a impossibilidade de “manualizar” (engessar,
+controlar) esse método e de “estar previamente preparado”.
+Claro que, quando eu assumo que o trabalho de campo, numa
+pesquisa antropológica, é subjetivo e impermeável à “manualização”,
+eu não estou querendo dizer com isso que ele é espontâneo,
+meramente intuitivo, ou mesmo acidental. Apenas digo que ele é,
+de certo modo, incontrolável, e que exige readaptações, porque está
+sujeito a surpresas, imprevistos e obstáculos, com os quais pessoas
+acostumadas com o mundo da norma não gostam de deparar.
+Ou seja, o que quero dizer é que a relação interpessoal e a própria
+subjetividade do(a) pesquisador(a) são partes constitutivas desse método
+de trabalho, e que, por isso mesmo, quando vamos falar em observação
+participante, vamos falar em uma pesquisa que presume um
+envolvimento pessoal do(a) pesquisador(a) com as pessoas do campo
+e, mais do que tudo, se faz “de modo artesanal” (DaMatta, 1987, p. 156).
+Além deste, ou talvez articulado com este, destaco um outro embaraço
+que o método do trabalho de campo, notadamente a observação
+participante, normalmente provoca em pessoas habituadas
+com a formação do conhecimento na área do Direito: é que a empiria
+exige que tenhamos a capacidade de nos permitirmos “sermos surpreendidos
+pelo campo”, deixando “em suspenso” certezas prévias e
+verdades pré-concebidas.
+Peirano (2014, p. 12) menciona que os antropólogos são “ávidos
+em conhecer o mundo em que vivemos [...] nunca nos conformamos
+com predefinições, estamos sempre dispostos a nos expor ao imprevisível,
+a questionar certezas e verdades estabelecidas e a nos vulnerar
+por novas surpresas.”.
+Ou seja, quando começamos o trabalho de campo não temos de ter
+um roteiro ou um sumário prévio, porque não há certezas sobre aonde
+a pesquisa vai nos levar. Os percursos, caminhos e atalhos vão sendo
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+92
+
+construídos conforme se caminha no trajeto da pesquisa de campo.
+Sendo assim, considerando que os juristas ficam mais confortáveis
+quando têm certezas, esta é uma dificuldade que se impõe aos
+pesquisadores com formação em Direito que pretendem realizar
+pesquisas utilizando o método da observação participante. É preciso
+desenvolver a habilidade de se adaptar aos possíveis percalços que
+o campo venha a impor e de ficar confortável mesmo quando não se
+tem respostas prontas para perguntas previamente pensadas.
+Para além disso, é preciso ter em conta que o movimento constitutivo
+da Antropologia, nos dizeres de DaMatta (1987, p. 157) está
+situado em uma dupla tarefa: “transformar o exótico em familiar e/
+ou o familiar em exótico”.
+Significar dizer que as viagens empreendidas pelos antropólogos,
+a fim de se familiarizarem com outras culturas, implicava também
+em um movimento reverso, de também estranhar o que lhes
+parecia familiar.
+Nesse sentido, o uso da observação participante em pesquisas realizadas
+na área do Direito implica justamente no movimento (quase exclusivo)
+de “tornar o familiar exótico”, ou seja, de estranhar e de desnaturalizar
+as nossas próprias práticas, rotinas e representações, sendo certo
+que, nessa medida, este é um dos mais importantes desafios dos pesquisadores(as)
+empíricos(as) que pretendem estudar o seu próprio “fazer”
+na área do Direito, exigindo reflexões específicas e habilidades distintas
+daquelas próprias das pesquisas realizadas em sociedades exóticas.
+
+2. A observação participante: quando os nativos
+somos nós (e sobre como nos defendermos de
+nós mesmos?)3
+Evans-Pritchard (2005, p. 246) diz que aquilo que os antropólogos
+
+3 Subtítulo em referência e homenagem a um dos textos antropológicos mais importantes
+e originais sobre as condições de produção intelectual na academia. Trata-se
+do livro de Roberto Kant de Lima, intitulado “A antropologia da academia: quando os
+índios somos nós” (Kant de Lima, 1997).
+93
+
+costumam chamar de observação participante é um “assunto complicado”
+e que implica “na medida do possível e do conveniente, viver
+a vida do povo que se está estudando”.
+O que um observador participante faz? Becker responde (1994, p. 47):
+
+coleta dados através de sua participação na vida cotidiana do grupo que
+
+estuda. Observa as pessoas que está estudando para ver as situações
+
+com que se deparam normalmente e como se comportam diante delas.
+
+Entabula conversação com alguns ou com todos os participante desta
+
+situação. E descobre as interpretações que eles próprios têm sobre os
+
+acontecimentos que observou.
+
+A observação participante é uma maneira específica de se conhecer
+o campo que se quer pesquisar. Consiste em um processo de
+construção de uma relação de intimidade especial entre o pesquisador
+e os seus interlocutores. Trata-se de um método que implica na
+convivência e na imersão do pesquisador no campo, em um prazo
+relativamente longo, com o propósito de desenvolver um entendimento
+científico sobre aquele grupo determinado e escolhido para
+se pesquisar (May, 2001, p. 177).
+Além de Malinowski (1984), que modificou para sempre o “ofício
+do antropólogo”, refutando o que era chamado de “antropologia de
+gabinete” (realizada à distância, através de relatos de terceiros, missionários),
+para se aventurar em um trabalho de campo, realizado
+pessoalmente, mediante a imersão do próprio pesquisador no lugar
+pesquisado, Foote Whyte (2005) também contribuiu de forma particular
+para a construção da observação participante enquanto método
+de pesquisa em ciências sociais. Ao explicitar a sua própria experiência
+na sociedade pesquisada, Foote Whyte (2005) faz uma reflexão
+sobre o convívio com os nativos e sobre os tropeços que praticou durante
+essa aventura. O seu livro constitui um verdadeiro guia de observação
+participante em sociedades complexas e traz como relato
+fundamental, especialmente para pesquisadores não iniciados e não
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+94
+
+treinados na antropologia, a lição de que a pesquisa de campo é experimental
+e, portanto, singular. O observador participante aprende
+com os erros que comete durante o trabalho de campo e deles deve
+tirar proveito, pois seus “passos em falso” fazem parte do aprendizado
+da pesquisa. Sendo assim, a observação participante é altamente
+reflexiva. Ela exige isso do(a) pesquisador(a) (Valladares, 2007).
+Brandão, compartilhando sua própria experiência, assim se posiciona
+(2007, p. 17):
+
+[...] o meu primeiro trabalho se concentra mais numa observação participante.
+Participante num duplo sentido. Em primeiro lugar, porque
+
+se faz estando pessoalmente no lugar e observando e compreendendo
+
+aquilo que está acontecendo, por participar da vida cotidiana das pessoas.
+Eu quero me meter nos bares, dentro da casa, nas manhãs da vida
+
+das pessoas, nos lugares de igreja e principalmente nos lugares de trabalho.
+Quero estar ali vendo o que está acontecendo. E participar em
+
+um segundo sentido também: de que eu me envolvo pessoalmente com
+
+o próprio trabalho quando posso. Há momentos em que eu participo
+
+de um mutirão, trabalho num mutirão com as pessoas. Não para sentir,
+
+não para que as pessoas me sintam como alguém deles, mas para que
+
+esse participar faça com que eu me identifique mais de perto como uma
+
+pessoa não deles, mas mais próxima deles, daqueles lavradores que eu
+
+pesquiso. Esse é o momento em que eu vejo as coisas acontecendo [...].
+
+Diferentemente dos antropólogos que fazem pesquisas em sociedades
+exóticas e precisam de habilidades específicas para operacionalizar
+suas pesquisas, transformando em familiar o que lhes é
+exótico; nós, profissionais do Direito, precisamos desenvolver outras
+habilidades para realizarmos pesquisas em nossos próprios espaços
+de atuação profissional, exercendo o movimento contrário, ou seja,
+exotizando o que nos é familiar.
+É comum em Antropologia a advertência de que o pesquisador
+deve se envolver com os nativos, mas não deve se transformar em
+95
+
+um nativo, mantendo certa distância, sob pena de não ser capaz de
+exercitar o estranhamento necessário à compreensão dos fenômenos
+sociais que se propôs a estudar.
+A questão que se coloca aqui, então, é a seguinte: “mas, e quando
+você é, desde o início da pesquisa, ao mesmo tempo, pesquisador(a)
+e nativo(a)?”.
+A minha trajetória pessoal e profissional me permitiu ter contato,
+desde a época da faculdade, com o dia-a-dia dos tribunais, de modo
+que “exerci” a advocacia antes mesmo de me tornar, oficialmente,
+advogada, porque ir ao fórum todos os dias e ter contato direto com
+as práticas judiciárias fazia parte do meu cotidiano durante o estágio
+no escritório de advocacia, onde, aliás, eu trabalho até hoje.
+Dessa forma, o exercício de me distanciar daquilo que me era tão
+familiar foi o maior desafio metodológico que eu tive de enfrentar (e
+superar) para realizar uma pesquisa de viés antropológico no campo
+do Direito.
+De fato, quando realizei as pesquisas empíricas que ensejaram a
+minha dissertação de mestrado e a minha tese de doutorado, no mesmo
+Tribunal de Justiça onde eu atuava (e atuo) como advogada, vivenciei
+um lugar bastante ambíguo, por ocupar, ao mesmo tempo, os
+papéis de pesquisadora e de nativa (Lupetti Baptista, 2008 e 2013).
+Nessa medida, ser observadora e ser também participante no
+meu campo de pesquisa, me colocava (e ainda me coloca), ao mesmo
+tempo em uma posição privilegiada de intimidade com o campo,
+mas também de desconforto, porque me impõe o desafio e os riscos
+inerentes à essa condição.
+Ser ao mesmo tempo pesquisadora e nativa me permitiu uma
+atuação real na vida do grupo estudado, mas também me colocou o
+problema da dificuldade de estabelecer a necessária distância para
+desnaturalizar e avaliar, com certa objetividade, os dados e as representações
+vivenciadas no campo.
+DaMatta (1987, p. 171) adverte que, na observação participante,
+é “preciso neutralizar os seus sentimentos”, pois o paradoxo da situ-
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+96
+
+ação etnográfica é justamente o seguinte: “para descobrir, é preciso
+relacionar-se e, no momento mesmo da descoberta, o etnólogo é remetido
+para o seu mundo e, deste modo, isola-se novamente.”.
+Esse lugar ambíguo me imputava grande dificuldade de distinguir
+o familiar e o exótico e o desafio de tentar me distanciar do que
+era, na verdade, meu cotidiano, me trouxe angústias metodológicas
+e existenciais bastante importantes (e felizmente superáveis), assim
+como aprendizados que pretendo compartilhar neste texto.
+Tive de empreender, antes de tudo, um importante esforço cognitivo
+para tentar escapar da minha própria posição; e este foi um
+desafio que, depois, eu percebi ser comum a todos os pesquisadores
+que empreendem a observação participante em espaços onde são,
+ao mesmo tempo, nativos e pesquisadores.
+Além disso, relativizar o meu pertencimento no campo para compreendê-lo
+melhor ficou mais fácil na medida em que trabalhei com
+os textos de Geertz (1997), antropólogo que tem uma visão de que a
+pesquisa de campo é sempre interpretativa, de modo que o ponto de
+vista dos interlocutores estará sempre necessariamente atravessado
+pelo ponto de vista do próprio pesquisador.
+Desse modo, a visão antropológica de Geertz (1997, p. 272) me
+permitiu compreender que, na observação participante, conjugamos,
+sempre, o autoconhecimento, a autopercepção e o autoentendimento
+com os processos de conhecimento, percepção e entendimento
+do outro, o meu interlocutor/nativo.
+O distanciamento do objeto, na observação participante, assume
+papel fundamental. DaMatta (1987, p. 158-159) menciona que o
+importante é exercitar o estranhamento, porque “o que sempre vemos
+e encontramos pode ser familiar, mas não é necessariamente
+conhecido”. Ou seja, é sempre possível estudar o que nos é familiar,
+estranhando-o e apreendendo-o desde um outro ponto de vista. O
+familiar deve ser transformado em exótico para que tenhamos uma
+postura antropológica. Segundo DaMatta (1984, p. 162): “não estou
+dizendo que o familiar possa ser estudado porque o conhecemos
+97
+
+bem. Digo apenas que, para que o familiar possa ser percebido antropologicamente,
+ele tem que ser de algum modo transformado em
+exótico.”. E isso é possível mesmo quando se está inserido no contexto
+da pesquisa, porque o distanciamento não implica em apartamento
+físico, mas no desenvolvimento de uma reflexividade capaz
+de permitir a realização do trabalho de campo.
+Inclusive, a própria pesquisa e a busca pelos dados é que nos
+ajuda a adotarmos posturas de neutralidade capazes de permitir o
+distanciamento necessário.
+Conversar com os interlocutores e captar os seus próprios pontos
+de vista e os sentidos e representações que eles próprios atribuem
+aos seus atos é o que nos desloca desse lugar de “nativos”.
+O uso desse método - da observação participante - impõe a todos
+os pesquisadores(as), nos termos mencionados por Gilberto Velho,
+uma exigência muito importante: a reflexão sistemática sobre o seu
+próprio papel (Velho, 1987, p. 74): “[...] o grau de familiaridade pode
+constituir-se em impedimento, se não for relativizado e objeto de reflexão
+sistemática. O processo de descoberta e análise do que é familiar
+pode, sem dúvida, envolver dificuldades diferentes do que em
+relação ao que é exótico”.
+Os dilemas que vivenciei ao me valer do dispositivo metodológico
+da observação participante - e que certamente é compartilhado
+por atores do campo que também pesquisam o seu próprio fazer -
+também foi objeto de reflexão num interessante artigo de Howard
+Becker, intitulado “De que lado estamos?” (1977, p. 122-123), onde
+ele menciona a impossibilidade de ter “inevitáveis simpatias” pelo
+grupo ou pelo tema pesquisado. Mas, ao mesmo tempo, sugere mecanismos
+de defesa dessa inevitável simpatia ao destacar que devemos
+sempre identificar e explicitar as nossas simpatias; dizer de
+onde estamos falando e escutar todos os envolvidos e todos os “lados”
+de grupos que integram o espaço da pesquisa, de forma que
+a utilização dessas defesas nos permita satisfazer os padrões da
+pesquisa sem tornar os seus resultados inválidos. Adotar o que ele
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+98
+
+chama de “medidas de precaução” (Becker, 1977, p. 133) é perceber
+quando as nossas eventuais e inevitáveis simpatias estão nos traindo
+e, com isso, interferir, de forma intelectual e cognitiva, reavaliando e
+reinterpretando os dados.
+A leitura de Becker (1977, p. 122) aliviou bastante as minhas inquietações
+com a escolha do método, na medida em que ele próprio relativiza
+a possibilidade de neutralidade em pesquisas em ciências sociais,
+seja qual for o dispositivo metodológico eleito pelo(a) pesquisador(a).
+
+Ter valores ou não ter valores: a questão está sempre conosco. Quando
+
+os sociólogos realizam estudos de problemas que têm relevância para o
+
+mundo em que vivemos, eles se descobrem no meio de um fogo cruzado.
+Alguns os pressionam para não tomar partido, para serem neutros
+
+e fazerem a pesquisa que seja tecnicamente correta e livre de valores.
+
+Outros lhe dizem que seu trabalho é superficial e inútil se não expressa
+
+um compromisso profundo com uma posição de valor. Esse dilema, que
+
+a muitos parece tão doloroso, na realidade não existe, pois um dos seus
+
+tentáculos é imaginário. Para que ele exista, é necessário que alguém suponha,
+como alguns aparentemente o fazem, que na verdade é possível
+
+fazer uma pesquisa que não seja contaminada por simpatias pessoais e
+
+políticas. Proponho argumentar que isso não é possível e, portanto, que
+
+a questão não é se devemos ou não tomar partido, já que inevitavelmente
+o faremos, mas sim de que lado estamos nós.
+
+Assim como Becker (1977), também Gilberto Velho (1987, p. 123)
+tratou de desmistificar a ideia de que o envolvimento inevitável com
+o objeto de estudo necessariamente constitui defeito ou imperfeição.
+É possível ter experiências de estranhamento, de não reconhecimento
+e até de choque cultural mesmo quando os cenários e situações
+sociais nos são aparentemente familiares. Segundo Velho (1987, p.
+129) é possível observar o familiar e estudá-lo “sem paranoias sobre
+a impossibilidade de resultados imparciais”. Basta, para isso, relativizarmos,
+nós mesmos, os conceitos de distanciamento, relativização
+99
+
+e objetividade.
+Perceber e identificar quando estamos fazendo julgamentos
+“apressados” ou nos valendo de “estereótipos” do senso comum ajuda
+a nos deslocarmos e problematizarmos os dados de forma a escaparmos
+das armadilhas inerentes a uma pesquisa que envolve a observação
+participante. Ou seja, não é impossível ser pesquisador(a)
+e nativo(a). De fato, esta é uma peculiaridade que marca a pesquisa
+e da qual não poderemos escapar, mas que, de modo nenhum, impede
+a realização de um bom trabalho de campo. Faz parte de uma
+pesquisa dessa natureza ter de ser “constantemente testada, revista
+e confrontada” e, nessa medida, o estudo do familiar “oferece vantagens
+em termos de possibilidade de rever e enriquecer os resultados
+da pesquisa” (Velho, 1987, p. 132).
+Magnani (2002) também ressalta a possibilidade da prática da
+observação participante em estudos sobre a nossa própria Cidade,
+na área da antropologia urbana, ao pensar em uma abordagem privilegiada
+do interior da metrópole, do “nativo em carne e osso”, de
+revelar aspectos da cultura urbana invisibilizados pelas abordagens
+“de fora e de longe” (do exótico). Para ele, a familiaridade com o objeto,
+de fato, tende a dificultar o trabalho de pesquisa, já que os atores
+e suas posições já estão previamente situados em nossas próprias
+concepções de pesquisadores (ou seja, eu tenho uma percepção de
+perto da figura de um juiz, de um servidor, ou mesmo das dinâmicas
+de uma audiência ou de um julgamento no Tribunal), mas também é
+nesse processo cognitivo de relativizar o familiar para, então, estranhá-lo,
+que se pode conceber uma prática antropológica específica,
+do “nós”, ou seja, dos pesquisadores(as) que são também nativos(as)
+e que exercitam essa forma singular de treinamento do olhar e de
+exercício da relativização e da desnaturalização.
+É claro que não se pode mais, contemporaneamente, cair na
+crença da suposta neutralidade científica. Weber (2006) já tratara
+da impossibilidade de não envolvimento do pesquisador com o seu
+objeto de pesquisa, destacando a “sinceridade metodológica” como
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+100
+
+mecanismo de defesa, sugerindo ao pesquisador que exponha com
+clareza o seu percurso metodológico, apontando como chegou à
+constituição do objeto e de seus resultados para, com isso, buscar o
+afastamento possível durante a análise dos dados.
+É certo que, mesmo os antropólogos, que são treinados para exercitarem
+a sua neutralidade axiológica, têm preconceitos, no sentido
+gadameriano do termo, ou seja, de ter “opiniões prévias” (Gadamer,
+2002 e 2007). A questão não é, portanto, sustentar ou mesmo pensar
+que a pré-compreensão não existe, mas, a partir de sua explicitação,
+neutralizá-la durante a realização da pesquisa.
+Como salientava o antropólogo Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira
+(1998, p. 18), o nosso “olhar” é “disciplinado” e domesticado teoricamente,
+não só pelo esquema conceitual da “disciplina” em que
+fomos formados - conforme igualmente descrevera Bourdieu (1987)
+- mas também pelas categorias apresentadas pelas teorias disponíveis.
+Por isso que “ouvir” os interlocutores é fundamental para “sofisticar
+a nossa capacidade de observação”. (Cardoso de Oliveira, 1998,
+p. 21) 4.
+No campo do Direito, essa cognição é decisiva, pois, normalmente,
+como os nossos interlocutores são treinados normativamente,
+eles tendem a falar nas entrevistas sobre como as suas práticas deveriam
+ser realizadas e sobre aquilo que acham que fazem em suas
+rotinas, em vez de explicitarem o que, de fato, costumam habitualmente
+fazer.
+No entanto, apesar de termos algumas condicionantes externas
+que atuam na forma de pesquisar, o objetivo é que nos permitamos
+que as significações sejam construídas pelos próprios nativos sem a
+nossa interferência valorativa. Temos de olhar para o campo e enxergar
+o que ele nos mostra, ainda que o que vejamos seja contrário às
+
+4 Radcliffe-Brown, em seu estudo “Religião e Sociedade” já teria alertado para o fato
+de que o pesquisador deve separar “ritos” e “crenças”. (Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. Estrutura
+e função na sociedade primitiva. Col. Antropologia. nº 2. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1973)
+101
+
+nossas hipóteses iniciais e às premissas que direcionaram a construção
+do nosso objeto.
+Malinowski (1984, p. 26) chamava a atenção para o fato de que
+
+conhecer bem a teoria científica [...] não significa estar sobrecarregado
+
+de ideias preconcebidas. Se um homem parte numa expedição decidido
+a provar certas hipóteses e é incapaz de mudar seus pontos de vista
+
+constantemente, abandonando-os sem hesitar ante a pressão da evidência,
+sem dúvida seu trabalho será inútil.
+
+O observador participante deve necessariamente deixar os seus
+valores em suspenso enquanto trabalha na pesquisa, sob pena de inviabilizar
+os seus resultados. “Pôr-em-suspenso” é parte daquilo que
+Bourdieu chama de “ruptura epistemológica” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 49)
+e faz parte do ofício de pesquisador suspender as suas moralidades
+em prol de tentar entender as moralidades dos nativos. De fato, é um
+dilema, mas se as moralidades do pesquisador concorrerem com as
+dos nativos, não haverá estudo possível.
+Além desses riscos, existe também o perigo de o observador participante
+cair em duas armadilhas: (1) ou fazer uma participação (in)
+observante, interiorizando totalmente o ponto de vista dos nativos
+de forma a não conseguir mais se (in)discriminar como pesquisador(a);
+(2) ou o perigo de fazer uma observação tão distante e fria,
+temendo o envolvimento e as simpatias inevitáveis, e, com isso, ficar
+míope e perder a profundidade necessária que a observação exige.
+Nessa medida, certamente a pesquisa, mediante o uso da observação
+participante, é angustiante e sujeita a riscos e limites tanto
+quanto quaisquer outros métodos de investigação.
+O que interessa, no lugar de obstaculizar o método, é identificar
+e pensar sobre os seus limites e, a partir deles, fazer a pesquisa possível,
+adotando medidas de “precaução”, que são também inerentes
+a qualquer pesquisa social.
+Dominar essa técnica de pesquisa antropológica permite trans-
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+102
+
+formar uma simples experiência pessoal (e sempre subjetiva e, portanto,
+também incompleta) em um saber capaz de ser classificado
+como acadêmico.
+E para isso, basta se permitir fazer a pesquisa. Ou seja, é a própria
+pesquisa que nos salva das simpatias e da familiaridade “perigosas”
+à “objetividade”. Ou seja, é pesquisando de modo antropológico,
+adotando uma postura realmente antropológica (de inexistência de
+certezas), que o(a) pesquisador(a) escapa de sua própria eventual
+parcialidade. Porque, conversando com todos os lados do campo, ouvindo
+todos os interlocutores, observando e criando intimidade com
+o campo, estando ali sempre, ouvindo todas as histórias, certamente,
+estabelecemos uma profundidade com o objeto que nos tira de uma
+posição pré-determinada. Os estereótipos muito comumente são
+construídos por força de uma generalização externa que a intimidade
+e a relação de permanência no campo podem impedir de acontecer.
+
+3. Observando e participando e/ou participando
+e observando? A minha experiência individual
+de experimentar o método da observação participante
+em pesquisas realizadas no Tribunal
+de Justiça do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
+Neste tópico pretendo compartilhar algumas experiências pessoais
+de pesquisa de campo e, a partir desses relatos, pensar sobre os percalços,
+os limites e as possibilidades que a observação participante
+impõe a um(a) pesquisador(a) que seja também nativo(a).
+As questões sobre o uso do método da observação participante em
+pesquisas na área do Direito, por atores desse próprio campo, ou seja,
+por nós mesmos, diz respeito a pensar sobre (1) como podemos fundamentar
+uma pesquisa objetiva sobre um grupo do qual nós próprios fazemos
+parte? (2) como validar esses dados? (3) quais são os benefícios e os
+percalços de olhar um campo de dentro? (4) quais as reflexões possíveis
+que esse tipo de pesquisa pode trazer para a própria disciplina?
+Penso que todos esses questionamentos atravessaram a minha ex-
+103
+
+periência e que nem todas essas perplexidades foram, ainda, adequadamente
+trabalhadas. Mas compartilhar a minha própria experiência,
+com honestidade intelectual, e de dentro, talvez possa dar
+pistas de como escapamos de certos “constrangimentos” metodológicos
+e de como damos conta de aproveitar os benefícios que essa
+imersão e essa intimidade permitem a quem é um nativo.
+De minha parte, comecei a fazer pesquisa de campo, através da
+observação participante, na pós-graduação stricto sensu: primeiro,
+durante o mestrado, e, após, no doutorado em Direito (Lupetti Baptista,
+2008 e 2013).
+Pesquisei, desde sempre, as práticas judiciárias realizadas no Tribunal
+de Justiça do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, onde eu também atuo como
+advogada de um escritório de contencioso cível, há cerca de 15 anos.
+Meu foco sempre foi conversar com os servidores, advogados,
+magistrados, defensores públicos, promotores de justiça e partes,
+assim como analisar os autos processuais e observar e assistir às audiências
+e julgamentos. Primeiro, eu estava interessada em entender
+os rituais orais de um processo civil (Lupetti Baptista, 2008). Depois,
+meu enfoque esteve centrado na atuação dos magistrados e no seu
+dever de imparcialidade (Lupetti Baptista, 2013).
+Fiz isso, ininterruptamente, durante cerca de 7 (sete) anos.
+De 2 (duas) a 3 (três) vezes por semana eu me dirigia ao fórum, como
+se fosse antropóloga. Sem as roupas ou as tarefas de uma advogada.
+Frequentando o mesmo lugar que eu frequentava enquanto
+advogada, me dirigia ao Tribunal do Rio de Janeiro como se fosse
+antropóloga e me embrenhava em cartórios e salas de audiências e
+julgamentos, como se estivesse ali pela primeira vez.
+E sempre me imaginava, enquanto estava no campo, mesmo em
+ambientes totalmente conhecidos para mim, como alguém que apenas
+observava, sem contracenar, de modo a permitir que o ambiente fosse
+minimamente afetado pela minha presença de pesquisadora curiosa.
+Por opção, estive em cartórios, varas, gabinetes e salas de audiências
+e julgamentos frequentadas por pessoas que não me conheciam. Mas
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+104
+
+também optei pelos acessos privilegiados que amizades e relações pessoais
+estabelecidas por ocasião da minha advocacia me franqueavam.
+Meu interesse era justamente entender as diferentes percepções
+do campo, sendo uma observadora participante tanto com conhecidos,
+como com desconhecidos.
+Este exercício me permitiu a ambiguidade de realmente exercitar
+um outro olhar sobre os rituais que eu estava interessada em observar.
+Mas, obviamente, eu não era antropóloga e, mal ou bem, aqueles
+espaços eram conhecidos para mim.
+Essa experiência traz distintas possibilidades e, como sempre,
+perdas e ganhos.
+A interação com a Antropologia e a desconstrução que ela enseja
+não são processos fáceis, como parece já ter ficado claro neste relato
+de experimentação.
+Para além disso, fazer pesquisa empírica no mesmo tribunal em
+que se atua como advogada, por um lado, facilita o trabalho, mas,
+por outro, exige redobrada atenção e sensibilidade.
+O juiz que eu entrevistava para a pesquisa era, por exemplo, o
+mesmo com quem, no dia seguinte, eu fazia uma audiência ou ia despachar
+os autos de um processo de interesse do escritório.
+Ou seja, não apenas eu própria me confundia nesses papéis, como
+também os meus interlocutores estranhavam essa ambiguidade.
+Além disso, as autoridades do Judiciário estão acostumadas com
+a lógica bélica, inquisitorial e contraditória do processo e costumeiramente
+se sentem investigadas quando instadas, por alguém do próprio
+campo, a explicitar suas práticas e rotinas cotidianas de trabalho.
+Sendo assim, o receio dos interlocutores em explicitarem as suas
+práticas judiciárias era nítido e decorria, para além de tudo isso, também
+de uma incompreensão acerca desse tipo de pesquisa e de seus
+métodos, incomuns no campo jurídico.
+O tempo me ensinou que esta peculiaridade, de ser advogada
+e pesquisadora ao mesmo tempo, não era nem boa, nem ruim. Era
+simplesmente uma singularidade da minha inserção no campo e que
+105
+
+me traria benefícios e contratempos, como também ocorre com os
+antropólogos - e como aconteceu com o próprio Foote Whyte (2005)
+em sua pesquisa em Corneville, onde ele vivenciou diversos obstáculos
+que lhe ensinaram (e também a nós), que o observador participante
+“nunca sabe de antemão onde está aterrissando, caindo geralmente
+de paraquedas no território a ser pesquisado”; e, portanto,
+equivoca-se se partir do pressuposto de que “dispõe do controle da
+situação”, porque, de fato, ninguém dispõe (Valladares, 2005, p. 3).
+Em uma etnografia, as “verdades” são sempre contextuais e relativas,
+sendo certo que a pesquisa é construída apenas pelos dados
+empíricos regulares, não por exceções generalizáveis. Sendo assim, o
+que importa é a permanência no campo. É estar sempre ali.
+Uma pesquisa de campo é constituída, nos dizeres de Malinowski
+(1984, p. 28), pelas chamadas “regularidades existentes”. E, para
+Geertz (2008, p. 18), a tarefa essencial da observação participante é
+“não generalizar através dos casos, mas generalizar dentro deles”,
+quer dizer, aprofundar nas especificidades em vez de generalizar o
+que é excepcional.
+Ou seja, pode-se dizer que uma pesquisa empírica é significativa
+quando, após lida pelos interlocutores, eles se reconhecem nela e
+se veem espelhados naqueles discursos e naquelas descrições. Desse
+modo, uma das minhas estratégias de pesquisa era sempre dizer
+de onde eu falava, com honestidade, e esclarecer que eu jamais os
+identificaria, seja pelo nome, seja pelo cargo, assim como retornaria
+com o texto escrito para submetê-lo à sua avaliação, a fim de que
+identificássemos se as suas falas representavam, de fato, os sentidos
+atribuídos às práticas que eu estudava.
+Se os interlocutores leem uma pesquisa e legitimam aquelas falas,
+inclusive perdendo-se nos seus discursos, sem saber o que eles
+próprios disseram e o que foi dito por outros nativos, aí sim, pode-se
+dizer que aquele trabalho reproduz uma boa pesquisa de campo. Isto
+é, a ideia não é acusar ou denunciar os interlocutores, mas explicitar
+as suas rotinas, que são, normalmente, invisibilizadas por mecanis-
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+106
+
+mos de abstração próprios do campo do Direito, mas também compartilhadas
+pelos seus atores.
+Um juiz que foi meu interlocutor – e para quem eu levei a minha
+tese publicada – me disse: “Seu texto é um soco no meu estômago!
+Mas, é tudo verdade. Eu nem sei o que eu próprio te disse. Mas, eu
+poderia ter dito qualquer uma dessas coisas, porque penso e faço
+exatamente o que você descreveu aqui.”.
+Isso era outra coisa com que eu sempre me preocupava: jamais
+julgar valorativamente os meus interlocutores.
+Se eles me contavam alguma rotina que me parecesse estranha
+ou até mesmo dissonante de alguma norma jurídica, eu refletia sobre
+os sentidos que eles próprios atribuam àquela prática, sem me
+preocupar com eventual juízo de moralidade.
+Por exemplo, na pesquisa de mestrado, sobre as manifestações
+orais do processo (Lupetti Baptista, 2008), apareciam falas de magistrados
+que, com frequência, mencionavam desprezo em relação às
+audiências, colocando-as em lugar de (des)importância e, muitas vezes,
+dizendo que as partes “não tinham nada a acrescentar no ritual
+da audiência” e, por isso “não precisavam ser ouvidas”. Em vez de
+condená-los ou mesmo questioná-los por não adotarem, na prática,
+o princípio da oralidade, a minha postura era sempre de tentar compreender
+por que motivo os magistrados não gostavam de designar
+as audiências, o que me permitia compreender as lógicas e os valores
+de suas posturas, em vez de julgar se estariam certas ou erradas,
+papel que, se eu adotasse, me restringiria a juízos morais, em vez de
+possibilitar uma compreensão mais aprofundada sobre a lógica do
+campo e sobre as representações de seus atores/nativos.
+Na tese de doutorado, sobre o princípio da imparcialidade judicial,
+também vivenciei problemas decorrentes da escolha do método,
+especialmente na minha entrada no campo, que foi bastante
+conturbada (Lupetti Baptista, 2013).
+Por ser advogada, nativa, e atuante no Tribunal onde realizei a
+pesquisa, eu me confundia, de certo modo, com os meus interlocu-
+107
+
+tores; e, no início da pesquisa, me vi envolvida em suas teias valorativas,
+julgando os dados e os próprios nativos, como se a minha
+pesquisa tivesse de resultar - em vez de uma tese - em uma sentença
+judicial condenatória do nosso sistema judiciário.
+No começo, acostumada ao exercício da advocacia (de produzir
+provas), eu confundi os meus papéis e tentei fazer dos meus dados
+de campo, provas, e da minha tese, um processo judicial, no qual eu
+pretendia condenar todos os magistrados à pecha de parciais.
+Eu parecia querer provar que nem sempre o que os manuais dogmáticos
+dizem que existe, efetivamente existe. E parecia pretender
+demonstrar que a imparcialidade empírica não era a imparcialidade
+dogmática, como se isso, construído dessa forma, tivesse algum valor
+acadêmico.
+Depois de muito refletir, percebi que a tese não é um processo judicial
+e os dados empíricos não são provas para serem levadas ao convencimento
+da banca examinadora nem dos membros da academia.
+Suponho que essa minha confusão simbiótica tenha ocorrido
+por influência da minha socialização no Direito e porque eu estudei
+meus pares, no próprio Tribunal onde atuo: ou seja, eu era uma pesquisadora
+quase tão “nativa” quanto meus interlocutores.
+Exatamente fiquei obstaculizada pelos meus juízos, em vez de
+deixá-los em suspenso (Bourdieu,1989). Talvez porque estivesse
+mais interessada em julgar os nativos e condená-los, do que em
+entendê-los e explicá-los. Quase caí em uma esparrela da qual havia
+conseguido fugir na dissertação de mestrado (Lupetti Baptista,
+2008); e quase esqueci uma importante lição antropológica, que ensina
+que o trabalho de campo exige a suspensão dos nossos valores
+morais, para captar o ponto de vista do outro, o nosso interlocutor,
+mesmo quando estamos estudando o nosso próprio espaço de atuação
+profissional ou a nossa própria sociedade.
+Penso que o meu exercício profissional e a minha atuação como
+advogada de contencioso cível interferiram bastante no meu modo
+de pesquisar o tema, especialmente no início do trabalho de campo
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+108
+
+do doutorado (notadamente por causa do tema, que era polêmico e
+caro tanto à advocacia, quanto à magistratura).
+Eu parecia querer concluir que todos os magistrados são parciais
+e que o princípio da imparcialidade não existe, fato que comprometeria
+completamente a minha capacidade de apreensão da realidade.
+É certo que, depois de identificado o obstáculo epistemológico,
+eu consegui me distanciar do problema e fazer a pesquisa de campo
+e a análise dos dados empíricos como um(a) pesquisador(a) faz, mas
+logo no início da etnografia, foi complicado me distinguir. A tal ponto
+que saí de campo, afastando-me por quase 1 (um) ano, a fim de ler e
+(re)pensar sobre o meu recorte temático (disposta até mesmo a modificá-lo
+ou a abrir mão dele).
+Tive de realizar muitas leituras de antropologia e fazer um esforço
+reflexivo e existencial para conseguir exercitar o meu distanciamento
+e a minha “objetividade”.
+O peso da responsabilidade de não confundir os meus papéis de
+advogada e de pesquisadora e de não julgar os meus interlocutores
+e os seus discursos foi sendo cada vez mais perceptível e controlável.
+Mas, mesmo assim, me inquietava o fato de eu estar estudando
+a “imparcialidade” sem conseguir me afastar dos meus próprios julgamentos
+morais.
+Nas primeiras incursões no campo, tanto após as entrevistas,
+quanto após os julgamentos e audiências que eu assistia, eu saía desconfortável
+com os juízos de valor que eu mesma fazia sobre os dados.
+Pensava em Malinowski (1984) e em seu etnocentrismo declarado
+em seu polêmico e controvertido diário íntimo e pessoal, postumamente
+publicado por autorização de sua viúva, Valetta Malinowska, e
+que demonstrava que a suspensão dos seus valores morais, embora
+desejável, era um exercício difícil, complexo e cotidiano (Malinowski
+1989); e, então, me sentia um pouco menos inadequada, pensando
+que esses dramas e dilemas morais são inerentes à qualquer observação
+participante.
+Valladares (2007), na releitura da obra de Foote Whyte (2005, p.
+109
+
+3), destaca que “a observação participante não é uma prática simples,
+mas repleta de dilemas teóricos e práticos que cabe ao pesquisador
+gerenciar.”
+Afinal, se até aqueles que inventaram a observação participante
+tiveram de administrar seus próprios juízos valorativos, porque eu
+não os haveria de fazê-lo?
+De todo modo, eu comecei a achar que tinha de exercitar o afastamento
+e buscar urgentemente fugir da pergunta implícita que ecoava
+todo o tempo em minha cabeça: “afinal, esses magistrados, são
+ou não são parciais? Existe imparcialidade na administração do processo
+judicial?”
+Com o tempo, a importância dessa resposta se perdeu completamente,
+e hoje eu tenho dúvidas de que a minha tese de doutorado trate,
+realmente, do tema da imparcialidade judicial. Penso que ela se refere
+mais aos dilemas da construção da decisão judicial e aos dramas
+vivenciados pela magistratura na administração dos processos, do
+que, propriamente, sobre eventual dever ou ônus de imparcialidade.
+Mas isso só aconteceu porque eu reconheci a minha dificuldade
+epistemológica e adotei mecanismos de precaução e de defesa.
+Por exemplo, uma postura que adotei na minha observação participante
+foi jamais aplicar questionários durante o trabalho de campo
+e raramente fazer perguntas diretas aos interlocutores.
+Normalmente, apenas dizia o tema da minha dissertação e da minha
+tese e os deixava livres para falar, sempre advertindo-os de que a
+ideia era exatamente buscar os significados e as representações que
+eles próprios tinham a respeito dos meus temas, bem como as conexões
+que eles faziam ao serem instigados a pensar sobre as temáticas
+que eu lhes apresentava de modo bastante amplo.
+Eu deixava as entrevistas ocorrerem de forma tão aberta - pouco
+dirigida - que muitos entrevistados me diziam: “Nossa, esse tema é
+tão amplo...não tem nada que você queira mais específico? Porque o
+tema me remete a tantas coisas...”
+Ou seja, metodologicamente, me defendia do meu próprio (even-
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+110
+
+tual) direcionamento.
+E aqui, abro e fecho parênteses apenas para compartilhar a minha
+experiência pessoal e dizer que, naquela ocasião, ainda com um
+contato bastante incipiente com o método etnográfico - portanto, de
+modo quase intuitivo - eu optei por usar gravadores apenas nas entrevistas
+formais; e tomar nota, em diário de campo, nas entrevistas
+informais. Depois entendi que, dependendo dos interlocutores e do
+campo de pesquisa, o uso do gravador é absolutamente inoportuno,
+podendo, até mesmo, fechar as portas da pesquisa. No meu caso,
+felizmente, não foi. Obviamente, antes de iniciar as gravações, eu
+informava ao interlocutor a minha pretensão e solicitava a sua autorização,
+colocando-me à sua absoluta disposição para fazer apenas
+o que ele próprio desejasse e o que lhe deixasse mais confortável,
+sem questionar os porquês e sem insistir em convencê-lo a aceitar
+a minha proposta de gravar a sua fala. Inclusive, comumente, deixava
+o gravador nas mãos do próprio entrevistado, a fim de que ele/a
+próprio/a conduzisse os “botões” e, com isso, se sentisse confiante
+sobre os ditos, os não-ditos, as falas proibidas etc., pausando e paralisando
+as gravações sempre que considerasse conveniente, ao seu
+bel-prazer, sem a minha interferência.
+Até porque, como eu disse, o meu interesse estava dirigido a ouvir
+o máximo que os meus entrevistados pudessem me dizer, sem
+interferir, sem julgar e sem interromper.
+Aos poucos, fui entendendo que os meus próprios juízos de valor
+não passavam de opiniões pessoais, totalmente desimportantes
+para compreender o meu objeto de pesquisa, que estava situado em
+compreender as práticas e rotinas do Judiciário. O que me interessava
+era realmente identificar as representações que os atores do campo,
+meus interlocutores, nativos (tanto quanto eu, mas falando de
+um outro lugar), conferiam aos institutos que eu estudava; e, mais do
+que isso, me interessava entender as moralidades que orientavam as
+suas práticas, os códigos de emoções, as intenções, assim como as
+motivações que orientavam as suas posturas e que permitiam deslo-
+111
+
+camentos ou interpretações legais que às vezes destoavam da expectativa
+normativa, mas que faziam sentido para eles.
+Conforme conversava com os interlocutores, assistia aos julgamentos
+e as audiências e, mais do que tudo, realizava as entrevistas,
+formais e informais, assim como conversas casuais nos corredores
+do Tribunal, eu ia compreendendo melhor o quanto eu estava interessada
+no ponto de vista deles e, automaticamente, me distanciava
+do meu próprio ponto de vista.
+Com o tempo, o que eu achava e o que eu pensava foi ficando tão
+irrelevante e secundário, que os interlocutores e a observação dos
+rituais se agigantou e foi tomando conta da observação participante,
+circunstância que aconteceu tanto na pesquisa de mestrado, quanto
+na de doutorado.
+Fiz o que Malinowski (1984) sugeriria: não hesitei “ante a pressão
+da evidência” e passei a “ouvir” o ponto de vista dos interlocutores.
+Por vezes, conversar com advogados acionava em mim a visão
+corporativa e me fazia julgar o comportamento dos magistrados.
+Mas, como eu não me restringi apenas aos advogados e entrevistei
+também juízes, desembargadores, defensores públicos, serventuários
+e promotores de justiça, a visão de uma única dessas corporações
+foi totalmente diluída no discurso do campo e os interlocutores
+passaram a sedimentar uma visão diversificada que me impedia de
+estar integrada àquela realidade como nativa. Diluir o discurso acabou
+por diluir a minha própria participação na pesquisa e eu comecei
+a me ver um pouco mais “de fora”, efetivamente como uma pesquisadora.
+Deixei de ser “nativa” e ao final da pesquisa, definitivamente, o
+meu distanciamento estava exercitado.
+Os exercícios de distanciamento narrados por Becker (1977), de
+ouvir “todos os lados”, foram os mecanismos de defesa da própria
+pesquisa. Era como se estar no campo e observar os dados de campo
+fosse o antídoto dos próprios riscos de estar em campo. É como se a
+pesquisa fosse o antídoto dos riscos do método.
+Hoje, sou entusiasta desse método como fundamental para com-
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+112
+
+preender os rituais e as práticas judiciárias.
+Com todos os seus defeitos, limitações e riscos, esse método, da
+observação participante, assim como outros, tem uma vantagem que
+me parece suficiente: ele permite ao(a) pesquisador(a) perceber o que
+está por trás das práticas judiciárias e dos discursos retóricos do campo
+do direito e tentar enxergar para além da realidade dada, tal como
+aparenta, e atingir saberes, sentidos e representações que ficam implícitas
+e invisibilizadas pela idealização do discurso dogmático.
+É verdade que o resultado deste esforço metodológico, de cunho
+empírico, pode ensejar explicitações eventualmente desagradáveis
+para quem acredita nas idealizações discursivas do campo jurídico,
+desafiando o(a) pesquisador(a) empírico(a) que se defronta com esses
+dados a descrevê-los sem medo, com honestidade, arriscando-se à resistência
+e à reação de quem pretende continuar obscurecendo aquilo
+que a etnografia se recusa a esconder. Mas, tudo isso faz parte do método.
+E é assim mesmo. Toda escolha implica em consequências de todas
+as ordens. E um(a) pesquisador(a) deve ter a coragem de assumi-las.
+
+4. Reflexões finais: pensando sobre alguns mandamentos
+da observação participante aplicada
+às pesquisas na área do Direito
+Acho que o relato intimista deste texto já revela bastante sobre o método.
+É impossível, além de indesejável, ensinar alguém a fazer uma
+pesquisa que adote o método da observação participante.
+A contribuição de Foote Whyte (2005) e a releitura de Lícia Valladares
+(2007), por exemplo, dão pistas sobre erros que devem ser
+evitados. Mas, por outro lado, não ensinam modelos ou técnicas a
+serem seguidas. E nem poderiam.
+Não existe receita para etnografia; e muito menos para a observação
+participante, enquanto técnica privilegiada do trabalho de campo
+antropológico.
+É comum, inclusive entre antropólogos, uma brincadeira que diz que
+quando os alunos perguntam aos professores sobre qual é o modelo
+113
+
+para se fazer uma boa etnografia, eles indicarem que se comece pela leitura
+do Manual de Etnografia de Marcel Mauss (1947), que não tem nada
+de manual, tendo diversos ensaios inconclusos, inclusive, mas que dão
+conta de tentar sistematizar algumas experiências que, em sendo compartilhadas,
+contribuem para a formação de um(a) pesquisador(a).
+Rodrigues Brandão (2007, p. 27) faz uma pergunta interessante
+em seu texto sobre reflexões acerca da observação participante: “por
+que não tem muito livro de métodos e técnicas de pesquisa em antropologia?”.
+E ele mesmo responde: “porque, embora haja teoria
+antropológica, método de pesquisa, ou melhor, métodos de pesquisa
+e abordagens diferentes, a prática da pesquisa vai muito de uma
+relação pessoal.”. E finaliza: “o que eu acho que educa e ajuda a gente
+é cada um descobrir o seu estilo.”.
+Assim também, aqui, a minha contribuição ficou difusa, porque,
+até mesmo por força e respeito ao método, eu não poderia sistematizar
+passos indicativos de um padrão, porque não existe padrão.
+Mas, nessas considerações finais, faço algumas reflexões, convoladas
+em pistas, que foram possíveis pela evocação às memórias
+– reminiscências – da minha própria experiência pessoal. Sendo assim,
+penso que o observador participante tem de ter (1) disponibilidade
+para o trabalho de campo (estar sempre lá e voltar sempre que
+combinar); (2) curiosidade intelectual; (3) honestidade intelectual;
+(4) imersão no campo sem pressa; (5) estabelecer uma relação de
+confiança e de respeito recíproco com os interlocutores; (6) levar o
+ponto de vista dos nativos a sério (o que é diferente de acreditar); (7)
+não acreditar (Mauss, 1947); (8) observar com profundidade sempre;
+(9) capacidade reflexiva; (10) disposição para experimentação, porque
+o exercício da observação participante é absolutamente experimental
+e subjetivo; (11) empatia e alteridade; (12) humildade para se
+colocar como aprendiz e não interferir no campo, sendo apenas um
+curioso das práticas e rituais que pretende compreender; (13) não
+fazer qualquer julgamento moral (Mauss, 1947); (14) não se espantar
+com nada e estranhar tudo sempre (ter uma atitude, uma postura de
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+114
+
+estranhamento); (15) problematizar; (16) perguntar por quê; (17) se
+permitir ser surpreendido; (18) não acreditar que já sabe as respostas
+e não ter certezas; (19) escolher bem os interlocutores; (20) falar com
+as pessoas certas e não insistir com aqueles que não querem falar
+com você; (21) escuta atenta; (22) olhar atento; (23) dizer o que se
+sabe, tudo o que se sabe, nada mais do que se sabe (Mauss, 1947);
+(24) não identificar e nem acusar os seus interlocutores; (25) não
+gravar nenhuma conversa sem autorização; (26) submeter os dados
+empíricos aos interlocutores; (27) registrar os dados em um diário de
+campo; (28) falar com todas as pessoas dispostas a conversar (e não
+insistir para falar com quem não quer falar com você); (29) ouvir o
+que as pessoas quiserem dizer para você, mesmo que você não se
+interesse de imediato, estando atento ao que interessa aos seus interlocutores,
+pois se existe algo que interesse a eles, isso também
+deve interessar a você; (30) ser paciente.
+Diversas outras pesquisas empíricas, assim como a minha, abrigadas
+no Instituto Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia – Instituto de Estudos
+Comparados em Administração Institucional de Conflitos (INCT-InEAC/
+UFF), foram realizadas por pesquisadores(as) formados em Direito e
+que se apropriaram da observação participante, estando, muitas delas,
+publicadas e disponíveis para que possamos refletir e repensar sobre
+os métodos possíveis (e impossíveis) na área do Direito5
+.
+Por fim, devo dizer que eu não sou antropóloga e não me arvoraria
+a ser arrogante a ponto de dizer (ou ensinar) como juristas deveriam
+fazer pesquisas valendo-se da observação participante. Apenas
+advirto, como Gilberto Velho (1987), que o processo de estranhamento
+do familiar é difícil e doloroso, uma vez que implica um descentramento
+do olhar, que, por sua vez, traz mudanças irreversíveis à
+forma de ver e de viver do(a) pesquisador(a) naquele espaço onde
+ele é também nativo(a). Mas também ressalto que só esse exercício,
+
+5 Sobre as pesquisas, ver: Moreira Leite, 2003; Ferreira, 2004, 2013; Figueira, 2005,
+2008; Rocha Pinto, 2006; Silva, 2011; Corrêa, 2012; Mendes, 2012; Vidal, 2013; Almeida,
+2014; De Seta, 2015.
+115
+
+altamente subjetivo, reflexivo e problematizador, nos permite enxergar
+para além das certezas absolutas do Direito.
+Minha intenção aqui foi, simplesmente, compartilhar a minha
+experiência e as constatações que pude fazer quando me apropriei
+desse método, que eu considero extremamente rico e valioso, porque
+permite ao(a) pesquisador(a) ver, ouvir e escrever (Cardoso de
+Oliveira, 1998) aspectos do campo jurídico que não são possíveis
+de serem problematizados através do uso de outros métodos. Só a
+experimentação e o contato com a empiria permite explicitar valores,
+ideologias e intenções implícitas e obscurecidas por discursos
+teóricos idealizados. E a observação participante, especificamente,
+pressupõe essa vivência, que torna tanto a pesquisa como o próprio
+método algo a ser construído enquanto se o experimenta na relação
+que se vivencia. E essa possibilidade é absolutamente profícua, além
+de transformadora.
+O uso da observação participante ... //
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+116
+
+5. Referências
+
+Almeida, V. R. de. (2014). Transação penal e penas alternativas: uma pesquisa
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+empírica em juizados especiais criminais do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro:
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+
+Becker, H. (1977). De que lado estamos? In H. Becker (Org.). Uma teoria da
+
+ação coletiva (pp. 122-136). Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
+
+Becker, H. (1994) Problemas de inferência e prova na observação participante.
+In H. Becker (Org.). Métodos de pesquisa em ciências sociais (pp.
+
+47-64). São Paulo: Editora Hucitec.
+
+Bourdieu, P. (1987). Sistemas de Ensino e Sistemas de Pensamento. In P.
+
+Boudieu (Org.). A Economia das Trocas Simbólicas (pp. 203-229). 2. ed.
+
+São Paulo: Perspectiva.
+
+Bourdieu, P. (1989). O Poder Simbólico. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil.
+
+Cardoso de Oliveira, R. (1998). O trabalho do antropólogo. Brasília: Paralelo
+
+15; São Paulo: Editora UNESP.
+
+Corrêa, C. F. (2012). Controvérsias entre o direito de moradia em favelas e o
+
+direito de propriedade imobiliária na cidade do Rio de Janeiro: “O direito
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+de Laje” em questão. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks.
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+DaMatta, R. (1987). Relativizando: uma introdução à antropologia social. Rio
+
+de Janeiro: Editora Rocco.
+
+De Seta, C. G. C. (2015). Consenso nas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal:
+
+um estudo empírico sobre a construção da verdade jurídica. Rio de Janeiro:
+Lumen Juris.
+
+Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (2005). Bruxaria, oráculos e magia entre os Azande. Rio
+
+de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Ed.
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+Favret-Saada, J. (1990). “Être Affecté”. Gradhiva: Revue d’Histoire et d’Archives
+de l’Anthropologie. Musée du quai Branly, 8, p. 3-9.
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+Ferreira, M. A. G. (2008). O Devido Processo Legal: um estudo comparado. Rio
+
+de Janeiro: Lumen Juris.
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+Ferreira, M. A. G. (2013). A Presunção da Inocência e a Construção da verdade.
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+Contrastes e confrontos em perspectiva comparada (Brasil e Canadá).
+
+Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris.
+
+Figueira, L. E. V. (2005). Produção da Verdade nas Práticas Judiciárias Crim-
+117
+
+inais Brasileiras: uma perspectiva antropológica de um processo criminal.
+Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris.
+
+Figueira, L. E. V. (2008). O Ritual Judiciário do Tribunal do Júri. Porto Alegre:
+
+Sergio Antonio Fabris.
+
+Foote Whyte, W. (2005). Sociedade de esquina: a estrutura social de uma área
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+urbana pobre e degradada. Tradução de Maria Lucia de Oliveira. Rio de
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+Janeiro: Jorge Zahar.
+
+Fragale Filho, R.;Veronese, A. K. (2015). A pesquisa em direito: as duas vertentes
+vs. a não pesquisa. In L. T. Silva, J. M. Ximenes (Orgs.). Ensinar direito
+o Direito (pp. 299-336). São Paulo: Saraiva.
+
+Gadamer, H. (2002). Verdade e Método: traços fundamentais de uma hermenêutica
+filosófica. 4. ed. Petrópolis: Vozes.
+
+Gadamer, H. (2007) Verdade e Método II: complementos e índice. 3. ed.
+
+Petrópolis: Vozes; São Paulo: Editora Universitária São Francisco.
+
+Geertz, C. (1997). Fatos e Leis em uma perspectiva comparativa. In C. Geertz
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+(Org.). O Saber Local (pp. 249-356). Petrópolis: Vozes.
+
+Geertz, C (2008). A interpretação das culturas. 1 ed., 13 reimpr.. Rio de Janeiro:
+LTC.
+
+Kant de Lima, R. (1997). A antropologia da academia: quando os índios somos
+nós. Niterói: EdUFF.
+
+Kant de Lima, R.; Lupetti Baptista, B. G. (2014). Como a Antropologia pode
+
+contribuir para a pesquisa jurídica? Um desafio metodológico. Anuário
+
+Antropológico, 39 (1), 9-37.
+
+Lupetti Baptista, B. G. (2008). Os Rituais Judiciários e o Princípio da Oralidade:
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+construção da verdade no processo civil brasileiro. Porto Alegre: Sergio
+
+Antonio Fabris Editor.
+
+Lupetti Baptista, B. G. (2013). Paradoxos e ambiguidades da imparcialidade
+
+judicial: entre “quereres” e “poderes”. Porto Alegre: Sergio Antonio Fabris
+Editor.
+
+Magnani, J. G. C. (2002). De perto e de dentro: notas para uma etnografia
+
+urbana. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais. Associação Nacional de
+
+Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais – ANPOCS, 17, 49 (1), 11-29.
+
+Malinowski, B. (1984). Os Argonautas do Pacífico Ocidental: um relato do
+O uso da observação participante ... //
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+doutrina e interpretação de juízes brasileiros. Rio de Janeiro:
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+Lumen Juris.
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+Moreira Leite, A. (2003). Em Tempo de Conciliação. Niterói: Eduff.
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+Acesso em 30 abr. 2017.
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+
+Rodrigues Brandão, C. (2007). Reflexões sobre como fazer trabalho de campo.
+Sociedade e Cultura, 10 (1), p. 11-27.
+
+Silva, R. R. (2011). Entre a caserna e a rua: o dilema do “Pato”. Uma análise antropológica
+da instituição policial militar a partir da Academia de Polícia
+
+Militar D. João VI. Niterói: Eduff.
+
+Valladares, L. (2007). Os dez mandamentos da observação participante. Revista
+Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 22, 63 (1). Disponível em: <http://dx-
+
+.doi.org/10.1590/S0102-69092007000100012>. Acesso em 30 abr. 2017.
+
+Velho, G. (1987). Individualismo e cultura: Notas para uma Antropologia da
+
+Sociedade Contemporânea. Rio de Janeiro: Ed Zahar.
+
+Vidal, P. C. L. (2013). Os “Donos do Carimbo”: Investigação Policial como Procedimento
+Escrito. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Lumen Juris.
+
+Weber, M. (2006). A “objetividade” do conhecimento nas Ciências Sociais. São
+
+Paulo: Ática.
+119
+
+4
+
+Algumas notas sobre a
+
+entrevista qualitativa de
+
+pesquisa1
+ // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+
+Como proceder numa pesquisa qualitativa em que as entrevistas são
+necessárias para produzirmos dados? Quando o problema de pesquisa
+requer um método que inclui “conversar” com indivíduos, como
+devemos nos portar? Como dar o status de “entrevista de pesquisa”
+para um comportamento que pode ser percebido como semelhante
+a um bate-papo informal? Ou ainda, como lidar com a incerteza de
+um dado cuja produção é contingente à abertura do pesquisado e à
+performance do pesquisador?
+
+1 O conteúdo desenvolvido neste capítulo se relaciona em grande parte com o conteúdo
+desenvolvido nas clínicas de entrevista no quadro da Canadian Research Chair in
+Legal Traditions and Penal Rationality, na University of Ottawa. Faço um agradecimento
+especial ao professor Álvaro Pires, titular dessa cátedra de pesquisa e responsável
+pela formação de muitos entrevistadores no contexto dessas clínicas (o autor deste
+texto inclusive), que gentilmente autorizou as referências ao seu material de sala de
+aula para a confecção deste texto (Pires, 2006). O material dessas clínicas, por sua vez,
+foi confeccionado em grande parte sob inspiração das clínicas de entrevista da professora
+Claude Faugeron, a quem estendemos nossa gratidão (in memoriam). Agradeço
+ainda às colegas Maíra Rocha Machado e Juliana Tonche pelas críticas a uma versão
+preliminar deste texto.
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+120
+Este texto tem a intenção, sem nenhuma pretensão de exaustividade,
+de trabalhar algumas questões estratégicas no desenvolvimento
+de uma entrevista qualitativa de pesquisa. Serão expostas
+nas próximas seções algumas notas fundamentais sobre o uso da entrevista
+na pesquisa social, pensando especificamente num público
+iniciante que faz pesquisa empírica tendo algum aspecto do direito
+como objeto. Como manda a boa comunicação acadêmica, já começamos
+por dizer o que não se pretende aqui.
+Em primeiro lugar, trataremos de um tipo específico de entrevista:
+a entrevista semiestruturada ou semidiretiva. Há várias possibilidades
+de entrevista qualitativa, com estratégias distintas2
+, sobre
+as quais não falaremos. Problemas de pesquisa distintos requerem
+estratégias de pesquisa distintas. Ao pesquisador cabe identificar as
+melhores trilhas na sua caminhada de pesquisa. Os textos metodológicos,
+na sua pluralidade de descrições de técnicas, muitas vezes
+dedicam pouquíssima atenção às estratégias práticas de pesquisa3
+.
+Em segundo lugar, o que se expõe aqui é fruto das leituras, da prática
+de pesquisa e da prática de ensino metodológico (especialmente
+de workshops de entrevista) do autor do texto. A proposta de falar da
+técnica de entrevista certamente contribui para a reflexão metodológica
+dos leitores e leitoras4
+, mas ela seguramente será insuficiente para
+dar de antemão uma segurança do acerto das escolhas de pesquisa de
+cada um. A reflexão constante sobre as escolhas metodológicas e os
+seus limites no âmbito de cada pesquisa é imprescindível. Ao pesquisador
+que mobiliza a entrevista cabe sempre uma análise das virtudes
+e dos inconvenientes do uso da técnica naquele contexto específico.
+Em terceiro lugar, a técnica de que falamos aqui não encerra as pos2
+História oral (Alberti, 2004), entrevistas narrativas (Rosenthal, 2014), entrevistas reflexivas
+(Pires, 2004), entrevistas compreensivas (Kaufmann, 2011).
+3 Alguns no entanto tecem comentários mais precisos sobre estratégias de entrevista.
+É o caso, por exemplo, de Ruquoy (1997) e Magioglou (2008).
+4 Ao longo deste texto será utilizado o masculino universal apenas de forma a facilitar
+a leitura do texto.
+121
+
+sibilidades do mundo real. Método tem de servir à pesquisa, e não
+condicioná-la. Adaptar faz parte do jogo. Não existe técnica acabada,
+pronta, fechada, capaz de garantir as respostas que procuramos. A
+técnica é ao mesmo tempo um guia e uma estrutura da pesquisa,
+mas não é capaz de suprir de antemão todas as dificuldades que
+aparecem em seu horizonte. Improvisações muitas vezes são necessárias.
+O importante é, mais uma vez, que o pesquisador tenha uma
+reflexão sobre as consequências das escolhas tomadas.
+Em quarto lugar, é preciso tomar cuidado com a equivocidade do
+termo “entrevista”. Quando falamos em “entrevista”, há uma série de
+possibilidades de interações sociais que nos vêm em mente. Quem
+fala em “entrevista” pode se referir a um talk show, ou seja, um programa
+de mídia que se propõe a entreter e ou a informar a partir de uma
+relação entre alguém que pergunta e alguém que responde. A entrevista
+pode remeter também à entrevista policial, num estilo de interrogatório
+para a obtenção de informações que levem à elucidação de
+fatos de uma investigação. Pode ainda remeter a uma “entrevista de
+emprego”, na qual um indivíduo se submete a questionamentos sobre
+sua qualificação. Pode também ser uma “entrevista clínica”, ou seja,
+num contexto de tratamento terapêutico. Em outras palavras, quando
+tratamos de “entrevista de pesquisa”, estamos num mundo específico,
+que não se confunde com os acima mencionados. No entanto, dada a
+equivocidade do termo e a familiaridade das pessoas com alguns desses
+tipos de entrevista, pode haver uma errônea impressão de familiaridade
+quando se começa a fazer entrevista de pesquisa.
+Finalmente, este não é um texto que propõe uma reflexão teórico-metodológica
+avançada. Há questões teóricas importantes em
+pesquisa qualitativa que impactam nas estratégias práticas de pesquisa.
+Há discussões sobre amostragem, validade interna e externa,
+viés, dentre outros, das quais não tratamos aqui (ou apenas marginalmente).
+O objetivo é, reforço mais uma vez, discutir questões
+mais pragmáticas e introdutórias de estratégia prática de entrevista.
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+122
+
+1. Os limites e possibilidades de uma entrevista
+que se pretende qualitativa
+Mas o quê de “científico” pode ter numa entrevista qualitativa de pesquisa?
+Como é possível produzir conhecimento “científico” a partir
+de uma interação face a face que muito dificilmente pode ser reproduzida?
+Como garantir a validade interna (a correspondência com o
+pensamento dos entrevistados) e a validade externa (a possibilidade
+de generalização) desses dados? Como garantir sua confiabilidade,
+ou seja, o fato de que reproduzindo a técnica, as perguntas e os entrevistados
+obteríamos os mesmos resultados? Enfim, como garantir
+que esse conhecimento produzido numa pesquisa que se baseia em
+entrevistas possa ser visto como um conhecimento científico?
+Essas questões que no fundo questionam a validade do conhecimento
+produzido pela pesquisa qualitativa já foram tratadas por inúmeros
+autores5
+. Há algumas estratégias para a garantia da validade
+dos dados em entrevistas qualitativas. Quanto à validade interna, há
+formas de intervenção do entrevistador (sobretudo a reformulação,
+da qual falaremos abaixo na seção 4) que permitem uma maior precisão
+na correspondência entre o pensamento do entrevistado e suas
+falas. Quanto à possibilidade de generalização (validade externa),
+muitas vezes ela nem sequer é pertinente para a pesquisa. E quando
+é relevante, há formas de amostragem qualitativa específicas6
+, assim
+como a estratégia da saturação dos dados7
+.
+De toda forma, parece haver por parte de muitos que se debruçam
+sobre uma pesquisa pela primeira vez uma expectativa sobre a pesquisa
+qualitativa (incluindo entrevistas semidiretivas8
+) a qual ela nunca
+poderá corresponder. Nesse sentido, subscrevo as palavras de Ruquoy:
+
+5 Um dos que o faz de maneira bastante didática é Becker (2014).
+6 Sobre amostragem em pesquisa qualitativa, especialmente em entrevistas, ver Pires
+(2010), Becker (2007), Duchesne (2000), Ruquoy (1997) e Michelat (1975).
+7 Sobre saturação dos dados, ver Pires (2010).
+8 Até aqui não utilizamos os termos não-diretivo ou semidiretivo, os quais serão explicados
+na seção a seguir.
+123
+
+“(...) ao utilizarmos a entrevista, nos encontramos longe de uma imagem
+
+de ciência que emprega procedimentos claramente formalizados e identificáveis.
+Ao colocarmos frente a frente dois sujeitos com a sua subjectividade,
+não podemos garantir que as informações obtidas sejam idênticas
+noutra situação de interação. É igualmente impossível garantir uma
+
+comparabilidade perfeita dos dados, uma vez que o dispositivo de interrogação
+não pode ser rigorosamente idêntico. Esses limites nada têm de
+
+surpreendentes: como ocultar as disposições inerentes à natureza humana
+quando é o próprio ser humano que estudamos?” (Ruquoy, 1997, p.85)
+
+Essa é a chave de compreensão da pesquisa qualitativa e, por conseguinte,
+da entrevista qualitativa. Se a confiabilidade dos dados pode
+para alguns parecer prejudicada num tal cenário, certas dimensões da
+natureza humana só podem ser exploradas por instrumentos qualitativos.
+Como capturar determinados aspectos da compreensão humana
+senão por uma inquirição em profundidade junto aos próprios atores
+sociais? Como explorar os sentidos das ações sociais, para falar em termos
+weberianos, sem recorrer à abordagem qualitativa de pesquisa?
+Para aqueles que ainda se sentem inseguros em mobilizar técnicas
+qualitativas de pesquisa, Becker traz argumentos bastante interessantes
+sobre a validade e confiabilidade em pesquisas qualitativas:
+
+Será que acredito mesmo que tudo o que importa em matéria de validade
+é produzir um caso plausível? Será que não há algo a mais envolvido,
+
+especialmente o grau em que alguém observou ou mensurou o fenômeno
+com o qual diz lidar (em oposição àquela preocupação sobre se dois
+
+observadores poderiam chegar ou não ao mesmo resultado [...]? Chegamos
+aqui a uma diferença que é uma questão não de lógica ou de prática
+
+científica, mas de organização profissional, de comunidade e de cultura.
+
+A comunidade profissional na qual o trabalho quantitativo é realizado (e
+
+eu acredito que isso é mais verdade na psicologia do que na sociologia)
+
+insiste em colocar algumas questões sobre confiabilidade e validade, e
+
+transforma as boas respostas a essas questões no critério fundamental
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+124
+(touchstone) da avaliação de um bom trabalho. No entanto, há outras comunidades
+profissionais nas quais estas questões não são fundamentais
+
+para seus operadores. Pesquisadores qualitativos, especialmente em
+
+sociologia e antropologia, estão mais propensos a se preocuparem com
+
+os tipos de questões que eu levantei no corpo deste artigo: se os dados
+
+são precisos, no sentido de serem baseados na observação do que está
+
+sendo discutido ou apenas nos indicativos remotos; se os dados são precisos,
+no sentido de serem próximos daquilo discutido e por isso estão
+
+prontos a lidar com questões não antecipadas na formulação original
+
+do problema; se esta é uma análise completa ou ampla, no sentido de
+
+conhecer um largo número de temas que afetam a questão sendo estudada,
+e não apenas algumas variáveis. (Becker, 2014, p. 195-196).
+
+Em outras palavras, insistir em critérios quantitativos ao aferir
+a qualidade do qualitativo é uma questão despropositada. Mas a
+pesquisa qualitativa, e especialmente a entrevista qualitativa, não
+comporta limites em termos de confiabilidade (no sentido de sua
+reprodução por outros pesquisadores)? Há que se reconhecer que a
+técnica tem limites. O que, certamente, não é de se estranhar, pois
+afinal toda técnica de pesquisa tem os seus. Como bem sabem os
+quantativistas, formulários de entrevistas não estão livres de elementos
+subjetivos em sua confecção, nem tampouco imunes a respostas
+inverídicas dos entrevistados.
+Ao assumirmos que a complexidade humana não pode ser reduzida
+a elementos quantificáveis, é preciso aceitar que a compreensão
+da subjetividade humana não está livre de dificuldades metodológicas
+insuperáveis. Ao pesquisador, no design da sua pesquisa,
+incumbe refletir se a(s) abordagem(ns) e técnica(s) empregada(s)
+permitem trilhar os caminhos pretendidos.
+
+2. O princípio da não-diretividade
+Neste texto, quando falamos em entrevista qualitativa de pesquisa,
+pensamos no princípio da não-diretividade num contexto de pesqui-
+125
+
+sa social em que há um certo grau de estruturação da entrevista. Temos
+em mente um tipo de entrevista que chamamos de semidiretiva
+(ou semi-estruturada)9
+. É de se notar que a nomenclatura não é consensual
+na literatura: há autores que vão falar, referindo-se ao tipo
+de entrevista de que tratamos aqui, em entrevistas não-diretivas, enquanto
+outros se referem ao mesmo tipo de entrevista como “semidiretivas”.
+Usaremos este termo e explicamos as razões nesta seção.
+Em quê consiste esse tipo de entrevista? Temos em mente aqui
+um tipo de interação, estruturada e dirigida pelo pesquisador, que
+permite ao entrevistado explorar suas percepções sobre determinado
+aspecto da realidade social. Nos termos de Duchesne:
+
+A entrevista “semidiretiva” favorece um deslocamento do questionamento,
+voltado para o saber e as questões próprias dos atores sociais. A
+
+principal razão de ser do método é de coletar, junto com as opiniões dos
+
+entrevistados, os elementos de contexto (social e linguístico) necessários
+à compreensão de tais opiniões. Essa entrevista consiste em levar a
+
+pessoa entrevistada a explorar ela própria o campo de indagação aberto
+
+pela “diretriz inicial”10, em vez de ser guiada pelas questões do entrevistador.
+(Duchesne, 2000, p.10).11
+
+Mas a questão a se colocar é como fazer para o próprio entrevistado
+explorar as suas opiniões, percepções, representações? Como
+
+9 Como já mencionado em nota anterior (nota 3), não se trata da única possibilidade
+de entrevista qualitativa.
+10 Tratamos da “diretriz inicial” mais a frente neste texto (item 8).
+11 No original em francês: “L’entretien “non-directif” favorise un déplacement du
+questionnement, tourné vers le savoir et les questions propres des acteurs sociaux.
+La principale raison d’être de la méthode est de recueillir, en même temps que les
+opinions des personnes interrogées, les éléments de contexte, social mais aussi langagier,
+nécessaires à la compréhension des dites opinions. Elle consiste à amener
+la personne interrogée à explorer elle-même le champ d’interrogation ouvert par la
+“consigne”, au lieu d’y être guidée par les questions de l’enquêteur.” Notem que deliberadamente
+traduzi “non-directif” para “semidiretivo”, pois me refiro ao mesmo tipo
+de entrevista que a autora, mas a chamamos de forma distinta. Ao final desta seção
+faremos a distinção entre semidiretivo e não-diretivo.
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+126
+
+funciona na prática uma entrevista em que se espera que o próprio
+entrevistado tenha uma postura pró-ativa e explore em profundidade
+o conteúdo que aos poucos vai se revelando na entrevista?
+Aqui é claro que há a experiência do pesquisador que conta muito,
+e por isso a prática de entrevistas é fundamental. Em alguns aspectos,
+há um componente de “savoir-faire” que vem com uma certa
+prática. Todavia, isso não significa que não haja uma técnica que
+devamos saber e que deva ser praticada. É aí que entra a técnica da
+não-diretividade.
+A entrevista semidiretiva, como frequentemente aplicada em pesquisa
+social, é diretamente tributária da psicologia clínica, especialmente
+dos trabalhos de Carl Rogers com entrevistas não-diretivas.
+Amplamente utilizada na sociologia desde a década de 40, é fartamente
+citada nos manuais. No entanto, são raros os manuais de pesquisa
+social que descrevem de forma mais precisa a técnica dessa entrevista.
+Invariavelmente se comenta sobre o fato de ser uma “entrevista em
+profundidade”, que tenta fazer o entrevistado explorar por si próprio
+suas percepções, opiniões e atitudes sobre determinada questão. Mas
+uma descrição mais prática da técnica é difícil de ser encontrada. Esta
+seção tem exatamente essa pretensão de descer ao detalhe.
+Nada melhor para ilustrar como uma entrevista não-diretiva funciona
+do que o próprio trabalho de Carl Rogers. No trecho abaixo,
+vemos uma sessão de terapia relatada pelo próprio. Trata-se de um
+caso verídico, que é utilizado por Rogers para discutir a questão da
+transferência (no sentido psicológico de trazer sentimentos passados
+e projetá-los no terapeuta). Essa questão não é relevante neste
+texto. No entanto, a técnica de entrevista que Carl Rogers aplica é
+exatamente a não-diretividade. Vejamos o que ele faz (Rogers, 1951
+[1965], p.211-212) para em seguida comentarmos:
+
+Paciente: (….) You feel I want to come, but 1 don’t! I’m not coming any
+
+more. It doesn’t do any good. I don’t like you. 1 hate you! I wish you never
+
+were born.
+127
+
+Terapeuta: You just hate me very bitterly.
+
+P: I think I’ll throw you in the lake. I’ll cut you up! You think people like
+
+you, but they don’t. . . . You think you can attract women, but you can’t.
+
+... I wish you were dead.
+
+T: You detest me and you’d really like to get rid of me.
+
+P: You think my father did bad things with me, but he didn’t! You think he
+
+wasn’t a good man, but he was. You think I want intercourse, but I don’t.
+
+T: You feel I absolutely misrepresent all your thoughts.
+
+P: . . . You think you can get people to come in and tell you everything,
+
+and they’ll think they’re being helped, but they’re not! You just like to
+
+make ‘em suffer. You think you can hypnotize them, but you can’t! You
+
+think you’re good, but you ain’t. I hate you, I hate you, I hate you!
+
+T: You feel I really like to make ‘em suffer, but that I don’t help them.
+
+P: You think I haven’t been straight, but I have. I hate you. All I’ve had is
+
+pain, pain, pain. You think I can’t direct my own life, but I can. You think I
+
+can’t get well, but I can. You think I had hallucinations, but I didn’t. I hate
+
+you. (Long pause. Leans on desk in strained, exhausted pose) You think
+
+I’m crazy, but I’m not.
+
+T: You’re sure I think you’re crazy.
+
+P: (Pause.) I’m tied, and I just can’t get loose! (Despairing tone of voice,
+
+and tears. Pause.) I had a hallucination and I’ve got to get it out! . . . [Goes
+
+on about her own deep conflicts, and tells of the hallucination she has
+
+experienced, with terrific tension in her voice, but with an attitude very
+
+different from that at beginning of interview.]
+
+Como podemos descrever o que o terapeuta faz? Se observarmos
+bem, em todas as suas intervenções não há acréscimo de informações
+novas. Ele nada mais faz do que retomar os termos da exposição
+da paciente. Por vezes os mesmos termos por ela utilizados, por
+vezes com termos próprios com os quais pretende descrever aquela
+passagem. Por vezes o relance é um tanto mais interpretativo, por
+vezes ele é a mera repetição do discurso da paciente.
+No entanto, o que ele faz em todos os momentos é selecionar um
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+128
+
+trecho do discurso da paciente e reapresentá-lo a ela. Ao fazê-lo, tem
+a expectativa que a paciente vai retomar aquela ideia/sentimento e
+aprofundá-la/o. O ato de reapresentar ao paciente um trecho de seu
+discurso, de forma espelhada e sutil, tem com frequência por efeito a
+retomada e o desenvolvimento do raciocínio em questão pelo paciente.
+Em outras palavras, por trás desse relance, há uma pergunta implícita,
+um “me fale um pouco mais sobre isso” que nunca é explicitado.12
+Por trás da aparência de banalidade, a técnica da não-diretividade
+esconde uma grande complexidade em sua aplicação. Ser capaz
+de relançar o raciocínio do entrevistado implica não somente acompanhar
+o seu discurso, mas também ser capaz de ter discernimento
+sob o fogo da ação de quais trechos são relevantes, além de ter a
+sensibilidade de fazê-lo sem parecer um papagaio do entrevistado
+nem lhe causar irritação.
+Deixemos agora o contexto de uma sessão de terapia para retornarmos
+ao contexto de uma pesquisa social. Adaptando o modelo
+da não-diretividade para a pesquisa social, tem-se uma entrevista
+na qual o objetivo é não mais a autoexploração do entrevistado para
+fins terapêuticos, mas sim uma exploração em profundidade de determinadas
+reflexões/representações do entrevistado que são do interesse
+do pesquisador. E aqui passamos da entrevista não-diretiva
+para a entrevista semi-diretiva.
+Qual é a diferença então entre esses dois tipos de entrevista? Tal
+como a concebemos e expomos neste capítulo, a entrevista semidiretiva
+é uma entrevista que é semelhante à entrevista não-diretiva pelo
+uso da técnica da não-diretividade, mas que dela difere pelo grau de
+estruturação da entrevista. Em outras palavras, se a técnica se man12
+Nas palavras do próprio Carl Rogers: “The major feature of this mode of discourse is
+the type of response which we have described as reflection or clarification of feeling.
+The counselor endeavors to hold up to the client a verbal mirror which enables the latter
+to see himself more clearly and which at the same time indicates that the is deeply
+understood by a counselor who is making no evaluation of him or his attitudes. It is
+this technique of reflection of emotionalized attitudes which has proved to have such
+surprising and unexpected value as a tool of social research.” (Rogers, 1945, p.279)
+129
+
+tém, o pesquisador deixa no entanto muito menos espaço livre para
+o entrevistado numa entrevista semi-diretiva, pois o intuito é levar
+este a falar dos temas que aquele lhe apresenta. Nesse sentido, o entrevistado
+não tem uma liberdade quase completa em explorar seus
+pensamentos como teria numa sessão de terapia. Ele tem um espaço
+amplo, mas pré-determinado por uma diretriz inicial (infra – item 8) e
+pelo roteiro de entrevista do pesquisador.
+
+3. Uma atitude não-diretiva
+Para além do domínio de uma técnica de entrevista qualquer, para
+além de uma formação teórico-metodológica, o que possibilita o sucesso
+de uma entrevista é em grande medida o comportamento do entrevistador.
+Esta seção é sem dúvida bastante banal em seu conteúdo.
+As sugestões aqui feitas não vão muito além do senso comum. Entretanto,
+colocar em prática o que se diz logo abaixo não é exatamente
+sempre uma tarefa simples. Como a entrevista qualitativa é uma técnica
+de produção de dados que depende de uma relação interpessoal,
+todas as dificuldades e os estranhamentos do encontro com a alteridade
+podem aparecer numa entrevista. A atitude do entrevistador
+em relação ao entrevistado é determinante para o sucesso ou não da
+entrevista, embora nem a melhor performance do mais experiente entrevistador
+possa garantir de antemão o sucesso da entrevista.
+De toda forma, algumas características são essenciais para o entrevistador
+conseguir uma entrevista relevante para a sua pesquisa. Em
+primeiro lugar, o entrevistador deve ser gentil, cordial. Criar condições
+para o desenvolvimento da autoexploração pelo entrevistado de suas
+concepções implica estabelecer uma relação de empatia na qual este
+se sinta à vontade com o entrevistador. Uma orientação à primeira vista
+tola, mas que nem sempre se mostra simples de ser colocada em
+prática. Estabelecer uma relação amistosa com indivíduos em quem
+identificamos qualidades, que admiramos ou que se mostram receptivos
+e acolhedores é bastante simples. O problema aparece quando
+entrevistamos alguém que nos desgosta ou nos irrita profundamente.
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+130
+Imagine uma jovem entrevistadora pesquisando questões de
+gênero e mercado de trabalho na área do direito. Imagine-a entrevistando
+um advogado sócio de um grande escritório ou um desembargador.
+Imagine que essa pesquisadora é também uma militante
+dos direitos das mulheres nos espaços de trabalho, incluindo igualdade
+de acesso a postos mais altos nas carreiras jurídicas e proteção
+contra assédio. Imagine finalmente que o entrevistado desfila uma
+série de preconceitos: “eu tenho cá para mim que, como a mulher
+tem todas essas obrigações no lar, ela não tem condições de assumir
+as mesmas responsabilidades que um homem no mercado de trabalho”;
+“me parece que essa coisa de assédio sexual não existe; cantadas
+sempre existiram; isso de ficar denunciando assédio é retaliação
+para prejudicar o colega de trabalho”. De repente, o que parecia ser
+evidente – manter uma relação cordial – torna-se muito mais desafiador.
+Manter a calma, o equilíbrio e o profissionalismo em situações
+que nos ofendem é bem menos evidente do que gostaríamos13.
+Além da concepção do entrevistado que pode nos chocar, ele
+pode também se sentir ofendido por alguma razão e passar a destratar
+o entrevistador. Tive experiências de entrevistas com promotores
+que foram terríveis nesse sentido. Já fui ofendido e convidado a me
+retirar da sala do entrevistado quando na minha cabeça estava apenas
+relançando o entrevistado em suas concepções. Num outro sentido,
+a tentativa de ser gentil e estabelecer empatia pode dar errado
+por um “excesso de simpatia” do entrevistado. Algumas colegas pesquisadoras
+já me relataram mais de um caso de entrevistado que tem
+uma atitude condescendente durante a entrevista e termina por fazer
+convites para um “segundo encontro” com ar pouco profissional.
+Nos momentos em que temos dificuldade em manter a compostura
+com um entrevistado que parece se esforçar para nos desestabi13
+Sobre a dificuldade de manter a compostura frente a entrevistados difíceis e sobre
+a dificuldade em geral do pesquisador de lidar com o próprio ego numa relação interpessoal
+de entrevista, ver Lillrank (2012).
+131
+
+lizar, a orientação que sempre utilizo para participantes de workshop
+de entrevistas é que se lembrem que aquela interação é uma situação
+que beneficia fundamentalmente ao pesquisador. O entrevistado pode
+eventualmente tirar um benefício daquela entrevista, mas no mais das
+vezes ele dedica seu tempo em proveito do entrevistador sem nada obter
+em troca. Em outras palavras, quando o sangue subir à cabeça, é
+uma boa estratégia pessoal tomar um recuo da situação e se lembrar
+desse ato de boa vontade do entrevistado. Evidentemente, isso tem limites.
+Nos casos em que o entrevistado vai além daquilo que é possível
+tolerar como provocação, ou em casos em que ele agride verbalmente
+o entrevistador ou até mesmo o assedia, é a situação em que devemos
+realizar que não há muito mais que seja possível fazer para restabelecer
+uma relação de empatia. É hora de encerrar a entrevista.
+Se a tarefa de ser gentil parece óbvia, esta segunda orientação
+segue na mesma linha. Para que seja possível estabelecer uma relação
+de empatia e se criem boas condições para a autoexploração
+do entrevistado, o entrevistador precisa ser claro em suas manifestações.
+Seja numa diretriz inicial, seja num relance, seja em outras
+intervenções, o entrevistador precisa se fazer entender. Isso, que soa
+mais ou menos evidente para o senso comum, também implica alguns
+desafios no momento da realização da entrevista. Em primeiro
+lugar, nunca é demasiado lembrar que a formação em direito (o que
+vale também para outras áreas) nos lega um vocabulário de expressões
+incompreensíveis para pessoas de fora do campo jurídico. O rebuscamento
+da linguagem jurídica pode ser tanto um empecilho à
+compreensão do entrevistado como um elemento de irritação. O entrevistador
+pode ser percebido como arrogante, pernóstico ou algo
+similar, suscitando a má vontade do entrevistado.
+Essa questão da clareza da linguagem vai além do simples problema
+do juridiquês. Há um outro problema aqui mais importante.
+Com muita frequência o pesquisador depara com problemas de pesquisa
+que requerem entrevistas com atores sociais em posições muito
+distintas da sua. Seja para entrevistar elites, seja para entrevistar
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+132
+
+indivíduos em posições sociais pouco valorizadas, ou ainda seja para
+entrevistar pessoas em contextos regionais e culturais muito diferentes
+do seu, o pesquisador é confrontado com a necessidade de ser
+claro em diversos contextos nos quais pode haver importante variação
+do registro da língua falada. Nesses casos, o ajuste da linguagem
+não é tarefa simples.
+Há duas diretrizes que me parecem fundamentais aqui. A primeira
+é: não tente falsear uma posição social por meio da linguagem.
+Vamos, por exemplo, supor uma pesquisa, inspirada em Pasárgada14,
+sobre formas de resolução de conflito numa determinada favela do
+Rio de Janeiro. O pesquisador paulista, pouco afeito às expressões
+do Rio, muito menos às expressões daquela comunidade específica,
+não pode ter a pretensão de querer mimetizar a forma de falar dos
+seus entrevistados. Soaria falso, forçado.
+Num sentido inverso, podemos pensar num cenário no qual um
+pesquisador em início de carreira, pouco familiarizado com a elite
+da burocracia judicial, pretende entrevistar ministros das cortes superiores.
+A falta de traquejo com o funcionamento do tribunal, com
+seus ritos e com a formalidade do linguajar poderá causar dificuldades
+para o entrevistador.15
+
+14 Refiro-me aqui à bastante conhecida pesquisa de Boaventura Santos (2005).
+15 Para ser mais preciso, há muitas dificuldades que emergem no contato com um grupo
+social muito distinto daquele do pesquisador. A questão linguística é apenas uma manifestação
+específica desse estranhamento que faz parte da pesquisa. Particularmente
+com relação a pesquisas com elites, Pinçon e Pinçon-Charlot assim resumem as dificuldades
+do pesquisador: “A pesquisa sociológica em meio burguês ou aristocrático leva o
+sociólogo, quando ele não pertence a esses meios, a experimentar uma posição social
+bastante desconfortável e à qual não foi habituado nos trabalhos de pesquisa. Trata-se
+de uma posição dominada, inversa daquela que se estabelece em meio popular, até pequeno-burguês.
+Essa relação desigual em desfavor do sociólogo quando pesquisa junto
+a famílias da alta sociedade acerca de sua vida cotidiana, da educação dos filhos, das
+alianças matrimoniais (...) pode levar a diferentes tipos de manipulação do pesquisador,
+em função do tema preciso da pesquisa. De um modo geral, ‘os pesquisados possuem,
+além de seus diplomas, um capital cultural certo e sabem utilizá-lo com discernimento.
+Eles querem dominar a representação que dão de si mesmos e buscam então dominar a
+demanda etnográfica, passando, por exemplo, do status de informante ao de interlocutor
+(Le Wita, 1988, p. 23)’”. (Pinçon e Pinçon-Charlot, 2007, p. 26-27)
+133
+
+A segunda diretriz é: por mais que seja impossível falsear uma
+posição social pela linguagem, uma adaptação é preciso ser feita
+pelo pesquisador. Se querer mimetizar a linguagem do entrevistado
+pode soar falso e, consequentemente, inviabilizar o estabelecimento
+de um laço de empatia que possibilite a entrevista, pretender não fazer
+ajustes na linguagem em diferentes ocasiões também é um erro.
+Dessa forma, uma linguagem mais coloquial é necessária para entrevistados
+menos formais; uma linguagem mais simples e sem jargões
+da área é necessária para entrevistados menos escolarizados e sem
+contato com a área; uma linguagem mais formal é necessária para
+entrevistados das elites judiciais, etc.
+Para além do fato de ser gentil e de ser claro, há outras exigências
+para o entrevistador que também são fundamentais para o desenrolar
+de uma boa entrevista. Mais uma vez, são comportamentos que
+parecem banais e autoevidentes, mas que são muito difíceis de serem
+colocados em prática. Refiro-me aqui a três específicos: i) não interromper
+o entrevistado; ii) não falar demais; iii) respeitar os silêncios.
+O entrevistador que já teve oportunidade de ouvir a si próprio
+numa gravação de entrevista sabe bem que interromper o entrevistado
+é um erro muito comum, por mais experiência que se possa ter.
+No afã de relançar determinado tópico, de não perder a oportunidade
+de aprofundar um trecho importante da entrevista, frequentemente
+cortamos a fala do entrevistado sem nem nos darmos conta. Isso só
+vai ser notado quando escutarmos mais tarde a entrevista. É um erro
+comum, que deve ser evitado, mas que dificilmente deixa de ocorrer
+durante as entrevistas. A orientação aqui é para que o entrevistador
+tente se policiar para reduzir a frequência desse erro. Por outro lado,
+em alguns momentos parece inevitável interromper a fala do entrevistado.
+Por mais que isso possa ser percebido como indelicado e colocar
+em risco a relação de empatia que se pretende estabelecer, alguns
+entrevistados fazem digressões longuíssimas de nenhuma pertinência
+para a pesquisa. Alguns entrevistados têm uma tendência a querer estabelecer
+uma relação de bate-papo, contando estórias pessoais, que
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+134
+
+em nada se relacionam com o objetivo da entrevista. É preciso ter um
+grau de tolerância com tais digressões para preservar a boa-vontade
+do entrevistado. Entretanto, se excessivas e não interrompidas, podem
+claramente inviabilizar a entrevista por conta do tempo.
+No mesmo sentido, é um erro para o entrevistador falar em demasia
+e cortar os silêncios do entrevistado. Há certamente tipos de entrevista
+que requerem uma participação maior dos entrevistadores16. No entanto,
+a regra geral de entrevistas semidiretivas é deixar o espaço livre para
+a autoexploração do entrevistado. Nesse sentido, as intervenções devem
+acontecer somente para relançar o entrevistado em determinados
+temas, pedir esclarecimentos sobre trechos que não ficaram claros,
+para fazer reformulações ou introduzir novos elementos do roteiro do
+entrevistador quando o discurso do entrevistado se esgota.17 Eventualmente
+se interrompe para evitar digressões excessivas.
+É certo que descrevemos um cenário ideal que raramente ocorre.
+Com frequência o entrevistador se manifesta mais do que deveria.
+Isso não é necessariamente um enorme problema. Mas quando vamos
+ouvir uma transcrição, muitas vezes nos damos conta de que
+interviemos de forma desastrada em momentos fundamentais, atrapalhando
+a autoexploração do entrevistado. Por vezes, em momentos
+capitais de sua fala, acabamos por inserir conteúdo na entrevista
+que acreditávamos ter vindo do próprio entrevistado. E só nos damos
+conta disso na hora de ouvir a gravação e fazer/ler a transcrição.
+Um outro problema do entrevistador que fala em demasia é
+muitas vezes não respeitar o silêncio do entrevistado. O silêncio na
+entrevista, em minha prática de entrevista, aconteceu sobretudo em
+três situações distintas. A primeira, mais óbvia, acontece quando o
+entrevistado não tem mais o que dizer sobre determinado tópico. É
+
+16 Ver, por exemplo, a discussão feita por Pires (2004) sobre entrevistas reflexivas, nas
+quais o entrevistador pretende estabelecer um diálogo de alto nível intelectual, explorando
+concepções teóricas complexas de entrevistados que possuem um grande
+capital de conhecimento sobre determinado tema.
+17 Sobre tipos de intervenção, ver a próxima seção.
+135
+
+o momento em o entrevistador deve intervir. Uma segunda situação
+de silêncio se dá em casos nos quais a emotividade emerge na fala
+do entrevistado. Há situações em que o silêncio é expressão de uma
+carga emocional, em que o entrevistado não consegue lidar com a
+continuação do discurso e interrompe a fala. Nessas situações, a sensibilidade
+do entrevistador é posta à prova. Com frequência a melhor
+opção para o entrevistador pode ser simplesmente aguardar pacientemente
+que o entrevistado retome o fôlego e consiga lidar com sua
+emoção, sem interferir em seu silêncio. Há ainda um terceiro caso de
+silêncio que é a pausa reflexiva. Por vezes o entrevistado toma um
+certo tempo para organizar suas ideias. Ele interrompe sua fala simplesmente
+para conseguir melhor elaborar o seu discurso. É preciso
+muita atenção nesses casos para não cortar o raciocínio do entrevistado.
+De toda forma, nestes dois últimos casos de silêncio, é exigido
+do entrevistador muito autocontrole para não deixar se levar pela
+ansiedade e atropelar o entrevistado com novas perguntas.18
+Finalmente, é fundamental para o entrevistador ser capaz de não
+demonstrar julgamentos tanto de forma verbal quanto não verbal.
+Uma atitude não-diretiva pressupõe uma escuta atenta, com contato
+visual e com sinais de que acompanha o raciocínio do entrevistado.
+Uma postura muito contida ou muito efusiva (o que muitas vezes só
+vamos perceber ao escutar o áudio da entrevista) pode levar o entrevistado
+a reagir à postura do entrevistador, seja para contrariá-lo,
+seja para mostrar concordância.
+
+18 Duchesne (2010, p.23) também elabora sobre o silêncio do entrevistado: “Há certamente
+silêncios ‘plenos’, durante os quais o entrevistado reflete, em que o pesquisador
+deve respeitar absolutamente, ainda que lhe seja muito difícil fazê-lo nas primeiras
+vezes. Mas há também silêncios tensos, durante os quais o entrevistado manifesta
+uma inquietação, uma consternação, devido talvez a uma dificuldade particular de
+colocar em palavras aquilo que sente ou mesmo em virtude de ideias, pensamentos,
+que ele teme, que ele não quer exprimir. (...) Há enfim os silêncios “vazios”, quando
+o entrevistado tem a sensação que não tem mais nada a dizer, quando espera que o
+entrevistador se manifeste. (...) O entrevistador deve aprender a reconhecer esses diferentes
+silêncios a fim de ser capaz de reagir de forma adequada. E ele só conseguirá
+diferenciá-los se estiver totalmente atento à pessoa entrevistada.” (nossa tradução)
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+136
+
+4. Formas de intervenção do entrevistador19
+Como já exposto, numa entrevista semidiretiva o entrevistador tem
+um papel de estruturação da entrevista. Isso pressupõe uma diretriz
+inicial, um roteiro e intervenções ao longo da entrevista de forma a
+conduzir o entrevistado por esse roteiro. Como não se trata de uma
+sessão de terapia na qual a autoexploração do entrevistado é bem
+mais livre, as entrevistas semidiretivas pressupõem um pequeno
+grau de direcionamento do entrevistado.
+Como fazê-lo? Para além dos relances de conteúdo do qual tratamos
+previamente, há outras formas de intervenção mobilizadas pelo
+entrevistador para a condução da entrevista.20
+
+1. Relance
+O relance pode ser não apenas de conteúdo, como exemplificado
+com extrato da sessão com o Carl Rogers citada acima. Os relances
+podem tratar também do sentimento do entrevistado e do contexto
+da entrevista. Nesse sentido, em momentos nos quais o entrevistador
+se dá conta que a emotividade toma conta do entrevistado e começa
+a dificultar o seu discurso, podem ser feitas intervenções do tipo:
+
+“Essa questão parece ser muito sensível para o senhor...”
+
+“A senhora me pareceu ter ficado muito comovida com esse caso...”
+
+“Isso deve ter sido muito difícil para a sua família...”
+
+A ideia é apenas explicitar o sentimento que parece estar colocando
+dificuldades para que o entrevistado consiga articular o raciocínio.
+Não se tem a pretensão, numa entrevista de pesquisa, de querer discutir
+em profundidade o sentimento do entrevistado, até pelo fato
+
+19 Esta seção é em grande medida originada do material de formação em clínica de
+entrevistas da Canadian Research Chair in Legal Traditions and Penal Rationality. Trata-se
+de uma releitura, com alguns acréscimos e modificações, de Pires, 2006.
+20 Sobre formas de intervenção do entrevistador, ver também Ruquoy (1997) e Magioglou
+(2008).
+137
+
+do entrevistador quase sempre não ter treinamento para tanto. Se o
+relance servir para que o entrevistado consiga se observar e falar um
+pouco sobre o sentimento que parece dificultar o fluxo da entrevista,
+então ele cumpre seu papel. Mas o resultado pode ser também o final
+da entrevista por conta do estado emocional do entrevistado. E o entrevistador
+tem de estar preparado para se colocar numa posição de
+escuta empática e desistir da coleta dos dados num tal cenário.
+Com relação ao relance de contexto da entrevista, ele se refere aos
+elementos que podem colocar problemas para o bom funcionamento
+daquela interação face a face. Os dois mais comuns em minha experiência
+foram o gravador e o barulho de um ambiente pouco propício
+para a realização de entrevistas. Naqueles momentos em que o contexto
+se torna um problema, chamamos a atenção do entrevistado:
+
+“O gravador parece incomodá-lo.”
+
+“O barulho do ambiente parece desconcentrá-lo.”
+
+A ideia aqui é pautar um elemento de contexto que esteja atrapalhando
+a autoexploração do entrevistado. Discute-se o gravador ou
+o barulho do ambiente e se avalia conjuntamente a conveniência de
+mudar o arranjo da entrevista. Por vezes o mero fato de, por exemplo,
+esclarecer sobre a função do gravador e reafirmar a confidencialidade
+dos dados permite a retomada da entrevista de forma mais centrada. 21
+
+21 Como bem nota Barbot, muitas vezes o incômodo com um contexto problemático é
+muito mais do entrevistador do que do entrevistado. Sentimos a necessidade de chamar
+a atenção do entrevistado para o elemento disruptivo, mas no fundo o incômodo
+está no próprio pesquisador: “A introdução de uma material de gravação suscita às
+vezes mais inquietação ao entrevistador que ao entrevistado. O entrevistador se inquieta
+quando dota o material de gravação de uma capacidade de desvelar o caráter
+artificial da situação, de tornar visível a assimetria da relação, de alterar a relação de
+confiança do entrevistado, de comprometer sua capacidade de entrar numa relação
+de confidência.” (Barbot, 2015, 115).
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+138
+
+2. Pedido de esclarecimento direto
+Por vezes a intervenção do entrevistador na fala do entrevistado precisa
+ser simplesmente um pedido de explicação de determinado trecho.
+Quando não se entende o raciocínio do entrevistado, podemos
+fazer um pedido de esclarecimento direto:
+
+“Não estou certo de compreender o que o senhor quis dizer aqui.”
+
+“Poderia me esclarecer um pouco mais sobre essa questão?”
+
+“Não estou certo de acompanhar o seu raciocínio nessa questão...”
+
+Essas e outras frases similares são bastante evidentes em seu propósito.
+Entrando o entrevistado numa zona nebulosa para a compreensão
+do entrevistador, é tempo de considerar se não se trata de um
+momento para um pedido de esclarecimento direto. A única restrição
+é não utilizá-lo a todo momento, pois se a ideia é deixar fluir a autoexploração
+do entrevistado, convém não interrompê-lo em demasia.
+
+3. A reformulação síntese22
+Uma outra forma importante de intervenção do entrevistador é a reformulação
+síntese. De forma simples, ela consiste em resumir, nas
+palavras do pesquisador, determinada seção da entrevista. O princípio
+é o de retomar, uma vez aparentemente esgotada a exploração
+de determinado tema do roteiro do entrevistador, as informações
+expostas pelo entrevistado. Dessa forma, uma vez não havendo mais
+aprofundamentos a serem feitos, o entrevistador intervém da seguinte
+forma:
+
+“Sobre esse ponto que exploramos agora, se eu bem entendi o senhor disse...
+[resumo das informações do trecho nas palavras do entrevistador].
+
+É isso mesmo?”
+
+22 Sobre reformulações sínteses, ver também Ruquoy (1997).
+139
+
+A reformulação síntese tem um duplo propósito. Em primeiro lugar,
+com frequência o entrevistado, após ouvir o relato do entrevistador,
+vai se lembrar de outras informações e assim pedir para complementar
+o que havia dito. Um segundo propósito é o de validação dos
+dados. Podemos ter um reforço de que aquela descrição/reflexão
+corresponde de fato ao pensamento do entrevistado.
+Num cenário ideal, almeja-se fazer reformulações de cada seção
+da entrevista e uma grande reformulação síntese ao final da entrevista.
+Para isso, no entanto, o entrevistador precisa ter uma grande capacidade
+de acompanhar o discurso do entrevistado, de tomar notas
+constantes e de fazer o trabalho de síntese.
+
+4. A avaliação positiva e a provocação
+Se a regra geral de uma entrevista semidiretiva é não intervir de forma
+a direcionar o entrevistado a partir de julgamentos do entrevistador,
+em determinados momentos pode ser necessário introduzir um
+elemento valorativo. Há aqui duas situações opostas que parecem
+requerer uma tal intervenção.
+A primeira delas é a avaliação positiva. Em casos nos quais o
+entrevistador depara com entrevistados que têm muito pouca confiança
+no seu discurso, é interessante por vezes manifestar o quanto
+aquele discurso está sendo importante para a pesquisa. Nesse sentido,
+podemos intervir com frases do tipo:
+
+“Muito interessante o que o senhor me relata...”
+
+“Incrível essa história que a senhora me conta...”
+
+“Não acredito!” (num tom de aprovação)
+
+Dessa forma, em face de um entrevistado, pouco habituado a falar
+mais longamente e menos ainda a ser entrevistado, muitas vezes
+é essencial, para poder chegar ao fim da entrevista, dar demonstrações
+de aprovação do discurso. Se por um lado pode haver uma preocupação
+de que o entrevistado fale aquilo pois pensa que é o que
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+140
+
+queremos ouvir, o fato de não avaliar positivamente algumas falas
+ao longo da entrevista pode ter por efeito simplesmente um vazio
+discursivo. A insegurança com relação às próprias falas pode ser tanta
+que a entrevista se torna breve e por vezes monossilábica. Nesse
+caso, a intervenção com uma avaliação positiva se torna essencial
+para conseguir obter um discurso do entrevistado.
+Um segundo cenário que requer uma intervenção valorativa do
+discurso do entrevistado são as situações em que se fazem provocações.
+Por vezes queremos desestabilizar um pouco o entrevistado
+para tirá-lo de um tipo de discurso que nos pareça não coincidir com
+outras falas ou com o contexto institucional ao qual pertence. Alguns
+exemplos tiro de minha própria pesquisa de doutorado (Xavier, 2012).
+Interessado em entender tudo o que os magistrados ponderavam no
+momento de se determinar uma pena, entrevistei-os perguntando
+sobre que questões jurídicas e não jurídicas lhes ocorriam nessa etapa
+crucial do processo. Com frequência a resposta obtida era de um
+formalismo que parecia longe de dar conta da complexidade do processo
+pelo qual passavam. Diziam simplesmente: “Para se determinar
+uma pena, o artigo 59 do Código Penal diz que...”. E aí não faziam nada
+mais do que repetir o Código. Ao tentar relançar o entrevistado sobre
+suas interpretações desse artigo e sobre os fatores de suas decisões
+que não são explicitados pelo Código, muitas vezes não obtinha nada
+mais do que uma interpretação do referido artigo. Não era uma resposta
+desimportante, mas também não era claramente tudo o que
+ponderavam naquele momento (a se crer na literatura e nas demais
+entrevistas realizadas). Quando as tentativas de relance eram frustradas,
+algumas vezes optava por partir para uma provocação:
+
+“Mas para essa resposta bastava abrir o Código.”
+
+“Mas o que o senhor me diz não é nada diferente de um livro de doutrina.”
+
+“O senhor parece ter um discurso um tanto oficial...”
+
+Ao fazer uma provocação, estamos claramente atentando contra
+141
+
+o estabelecimento de uma relação de empatia com o entrevistado. A
+provocação pode ter por efeito uma grande irritação que pode gerar
+tanto um desbloqueio de outras esferas da reflexão do entrevistado
+quanto um bloqueio total do diálogo. No limite, podem acontecer
+respostas muito pouco educadas antes de se encerrar a entrevista.
+Por essa razão, a provocação é um recurso que deve ser utilizado com
+muita parcimônia. O cenário ideal é dela não precisar. No entanto,
+em face de entrevistados que parecem, do ponto de vista do pesquisador,
+dar muito pouco em termos de exploração em profundidade
+de suas concepções, por qualquer que seja o motivo, a provocação
+pode aparecer como ferramenta de última instância para tentar evitar
+que a entrevista seja praticamente irrelevante.
+
+5. A pergunta
+A forma mais conhecida de intervenção do entrevistador é a pergunta.
+No contexto de uma pesquisa semidiretiva, quando queremos introduzir
+na interação um novo item do nosso roteiro de entrevistas, a
+forma mais elementar de fazê-lo é por intermédio de uma pergunta.
+Também fazemos perguntas para esclarecer determinadas questões
+mais pontuais, nas quais é necessário ser preciso.
+Fazer perguntas é algo percebido como muito simples, pois da experiência
+do cotidiano de todos. No entanto, num contexto de entrevista,
+algumas recomendações sobre as perguntas são importantes de serem
+seguidas. Vejamos algumas noções elementares sobre perguntas.
+
+a. Não fazer mais de uma pergunta em uma intervenção
+Pode parecer evidente, mas no afã de não deixar escapar nada em
+uma entrevista, acabamos fazendo perguntas do tipo:
+
+“Qual a sua experiência com a maconha e você acha que o uso dela deveria
+ser descriminalizado?”
+
+“Como o senhor vê a questão da redução da maioridade penal e o senhor
+
+já foi vítima ou sabe de alguém que já foi vítima de uma ação criminosa
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+142
+de um menor de idade?”
+
+O resultado desse tipo de intervenção é com frequência a resposta
+para apenas uma das perguntas realizadas. Há mais de uma resposta
+pedida e elas não necessariamente podem ser articuladas numa mesma
+manifestação do entrevistado. Este é um cenário a se evitar.
+
+b. Evitar perguntas que convidem respostas “sim” ou “não”
+Numa entrevista semidiretiva em que se quer explorar em profundidade
+a percepção do entrevistado, a orientação geral é para perguntas
+que abram um amplo campo de possibilidades de respostas. As
+perguntas que podem ser respondidas com sim ou não fazem exatamente
+o oposto disso. Elas reduzem drasticamente a possibilidade
+do desenvolvimento da complexidade do pensamento do nosso interlocutor
+em prol de uma simplificação binária. Nesse sentido, são
+a evitar perguntas do tipo:
+
+“A senhora é a favor da redução da maioridade penal?”
+
+“O senhor acredito que o critério ‘garantia da ordem pública’ para a prisão
+preventiva é inconstitucional?” (entrevista com magistrados)
+
+Sugere-se, em vez disso, explorar a percepção do autor com
+questões do tipo:
+
+“Como a senhora vê a questão da redução da maioridade penal?”
+
+“Como o senhor vê o uso do critério ‘garantia da ordem pública’ para a
+
+determinação de uma prisão preventiva?”
+
+Nesses casos se dá margem para o entrevistado expor sua perspectiva.
+Ele não precisa ter uma opinião formada nem um posicionamento
+a respeito. Mas o interessante é explorar as ambiguidades, as
+opiniões incipientes, os posicionamentos políticos que não se reduzem
+a um polo ou outro, etc.
+143
+
+De toda forma, não se trata absolutamente de proscrever a possibilidade
+de perguntas que pedem um sim ou não. Em determinados momentos
+da entrevista podemos querer de fato um esclarecimento muito
+específico sobre determinado ponto de vista, especialmente quando já
+foi realizada uma extensa exploração das representações do entrevistado.
+Nesses casos, cientes de que estamos fechando o campo de respostas
+possíveis e que isso não é um problema naquela circunstância
+específica, é possível fazer uma pergunta que pede um sim ou não.
+
+c. Perguntas que sugerem a resposta
+Uma das inseguranças mais comuns ao fazermos entrevistas é o receio
+de estarmos enviesando as respostas dos entrevistados. Em que
+medida restringi o campo de respostas do entrevistado? Em que medida
+ele responde a perguntas retóricas? Em que medida já adiantei
+minhas impressões de forma que ele parece apenas concordar com o
+que eu expus? Essa preocupação tem de estar sempre presente ao se
+ouvir o áudio da entrevista e analisar a transcrição. Nem sempre conseguimos
+ter um recuo para fazer essa análise e é impossível não influenciar
+em nada as respostas dos entrevistados. A própria ideia de
+“enviesar” a resposta do entrevistado parece menos relevante num
+tipo de entrevista que é dificilmente replicável e depende sempre da
+contingência da performance momentânea do entrevistador.
+No entanto, alguns direcionamentos óbvios das respostas do entrevistado
+são claramente um problema. Alguns tipos de formulação
+de perguntas implicam um tal fechamento do campo de respostas
+que podem suscitar uma resposta artificial que não corresponde ao
+pensamento do entrevistado. O primeiro exemplo, bastante banal,
+é fazer uma pergunta com o “não é?”. Muitas vezes, até de forma inconsciente,
+por ser um vício de linguagem, utilizamos essa expressão
+no contexto da entrevista. Aí aparecem formulações do tipo:
+
+“A senhora tem dificuldades com acordos de delação premiada, não é?”
+
+“O senhor acha que a prisão preventiva viola garantias constitucionais, não é?”
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+144
+O “não é?” é um pedido de confirmação de uma afirmação do
+entrevistador. Se por acaso essa informação já apareceu na entrevista,
+podemos muito bem relançar o entrevistado: “a senhora tem
+dificuldades com acordos de delação premiada...”. Mas trazer o tema
+em forma de afirmação seguida de um “não é?’ é uma imposição do
+entrevistador sobre o entrevistado.
+Vejamos agora os exemplos abaixo:
+
+“O senhor tem dificuldades com os defensores públicos?” (pergunta a um juiz)
+
+“Pode me falar das suas relações com os defensores públicos?”
+
+Ao fazermos a primeira pergunta, já pressupomos que a interação
+do magistrado com os defensores é conflituosa. Ao compararmos com
+a segunda intervenção, fica claro que o campo de possibilidades de
+resposta é muito maior nesta. “Dificuldades” pode ser um dos elementos
+de resposta como pode nem ser mencionado. A primeira formulação
+fecha portanto o campo de possibilidades de resposta ao tema
+“dificuldades”. Se feita como relance na sequência de uma intervenção
+do magistrado mencionando o termo, não seria um problema.
+
+d. Perguntas de difícil compreensão
+O entrevistador só conseguirá ser bem sucedido na sua tentativa de
+produção de dados a partir da interação com o entrevistado se for
+absolutamente claro em suas intervenções e se fizer entender. Esse
+truísmo por vezes pode ser desafiado pelo ímpeto de se mostrar conhecedor
+de um jargão da área. Aos meus alunos, uso sempre um
+exemplo hipotético da pergunta do aprendiz de juridiquês:
+
+“Hodiernamente, como o senhor observa a evocação de uma resposta estatal
+penal usualmente reservada a indivíduos plenamente responsáveis,
+
+tanto legal quanto física e mentalmente, para ilegalidades graves cometidas
+por entes inimputáveis em virtude de uma insuficiência etária?”
+
+Evidentemente, o exemplo é exagerado. Mas estou certo de que
+145
+
+uma pergunta sobre como o entrevistado vê a questão da redução da
+maioridade penal pode tomar formas inacreditáveis.
+A falta de clareza também pode se dar pela vaguidão dos termos
+utilizados. Palavras e expressões imprecisas e ambíguas ou formulações
+negativas23 podem prejudicar a compreensão, e isso muitas
+vezes só é notado quando ouvimos o áudio ou lemos a transcrição.
+
+e. O “como” no lugar dos “porquês”
+Uma outra estratégia que pode ser mobilizada nas perguntas é a substituição
+do “porquê” pelo “como”. Essa estratégia, relatada por Becker
+(2007), sugere substituir os “porquês” das perguntas. Perguntar “por
+quê” pode ser percebido pelo entrevistado como um pedido de se justificar,
+de se explicar. “Por que você fez/pensou isso?” é uma formulação
+que pode deixar o interlocutor na defensiva, procurando se explicar, isto
+é, justificar suas ideias/ações. Substituindo “por quê” por “como” pode
+ter um efeito interessante. O “como” convida para uma reflexão conjunta,
+convida o entrevistado a explicitar as etapas do seu pensamento.24
+
+23 Em sala de aula, uso um exemplo caricato de formulações na negativa: “Como a
+senhora vê esses grupos que não são contra a descriminalização do aborto?”
+24 Becker desenvolve esse argumento de forma mais extensa em seu famoso livro
+de metodologia. Neste trecho há um breve resumo da explicação do autor: “Por que
+‘como?’ funciona tão melhor que ‘por quê?’ como pergunta numa entrevista? Mesmo
+entrevistados cooperativos, não defensivos, davam respostas curtas para ‘por quê?’
+Na compreensão deles, a pergunta pedia uma causa, talvez mesmo algumas causas,
+mas, de todo modo, algo que pudesse ser resumido brevemente em algumas palavras.
+E não apenas qualquer causa antiga, mas a causa contida nas intenções da vítima.
+Se você fez tal coisa, fez por alguma razão. Certo, qual é sua razão? Além disso,
+‘por quê’ pedia uma ‘boa’ resposta, uma resposta que fizesse sentido e que pudesse
+ser defendida. Deveria ser tanto social quanto logicamente defensável; isto é, a resposta
+deveria expressar um dos motivos convencionalmente aceitos como adequados
+naquele mundo. Em outras palavras, perguntar “por quê?” pede ao entrevistado uma
+razão que o absolva de qualquer responsabilidade por qualquer ocorrência de coisa
+negativa que se oculte por trás da pergunta. ‘Por que chegou atrasado ao trabalho?’
+pede claramente uma ‘boa’ razão. ‘Tive vontade de dormir até mais tarde hoje’ não é
+uma resposta, mesmo que seja verdadeira, porque expressa uma intenção ilegítima.
+‘Os trens pararam’ poderia ser uma boa resposta, pois sugere que as intenções eram
+boas e a culpa estava em outro lugar (a menos que ‘Você deveria ter levantado cedo o
+suficiente para contar com essa possibilidade’ esteja à espera como réplica). ‘Estava
+previsto em meu horóscopo’ não funcionará em muitas ocasiões.” (Becker, 2007, p.86).
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+146
+Vejamos o exemplo abaixo:
+
+“Por que o senhor rejeita o critério “garantia da ordem pública?”
+
+“Como a senhora chegou a essa representação negativa da “garantia da
+
+ordem pública?”
+
+O “como” tem a virtude de convidar o entrevistado a uma exploração
+de suas razões, muito mais do que colocá-lo numa posição
+defensiva de quem precisaria “justificar” suas opiniões. Minha
+experiência de pesquisa coincide com a de Becker nessa questão: o
+“como” funciona como um excelente elemento para a construção de
+perguntas que favorecem a autoexploração.
+
+5. Por que as pessoas não mentem?
+Na prática de ministrar workshops de entrevista, algumas perguntas
+sobre a credibilidade do entrevistador e a confiança que ele geraria
+no entrevistado são sempre feitas. “Quem sou eu para que as pessoas
+me falem de suas vidas?” “Por que uma pessoa de um grupo social
+completamente diferente do meu me daria crédito?”
+De forma mais específica, já me perguntaram: “Por que pessoas
+de origem muito humilde ou em situação social muito negativamente
+estigmatizada – um lavrador ou um detento, por exemplo – se disporiam
+a falar para alguém de uma origem social muito diferente da
+deles, como eu, mestrando/doutorando de uma faculdade da elite
+intelectual do país?”. Há também o reverso da moeda dessa pergunta:
+“Por que um magistrado ou um procurador da república, do alto
+de sua posição social, se disporia a falar comigo, um mero estudante
+de pós-graduação?”
+Essa é de fato uma das grandes dificuldades de se empreender
+uma pesquisa com entrevistas semidiretivas. A pergunta se resume a
+como ter acesso aos entrevistados e a como conseguir engajá-los de
+maneira franca nessa interação de forma a que possamos produzir
+os dados para nossas pesquisas. Trata-se frequentemente de pesso-
+147
+
+as de posições sociais muito diferentes da do pesquisador, sem com
+ele nenhuma proximidade, que não pediram para ser pesquisadas e
+ou que não lhe conferem credibilidade.
+Quanto à questão do acesso aos entrevistados, é de uma complexidade
+que cabe muito mal neste curto capítulo que pretende lidar
+apenas com questões pragmáticas da pesquisa. Essa questão depende
+tanto da habilidade do pesquisador para negociar sua entrada no
+campo quanto de algumas questões circunstanciais como o prestígio
+da instituição a que está vinculado, a disponibilidade dos entrevistados
+e suas representações sobre a academia. O acesso que se tem aos
+entrevistados pode se dar por contatos pré-existentes do pesquisador
+com o grupo pesquisado, por indicação de intermediários ou mesmo
+por contato eletrônico/telefônico sem qualquer abordagem anterior
+ao início da pesquisa. Dependendo do contexto da entrevista, o
+acesso pode até mesmo ser fortuito. É preciso que fique claro que o
+tipo de abordagem precisa ser matéria de reflexão do pesquisador.
+Um grupo com o qual nunca teve contato pode ser muito fechado e
+pouco afeito a se expor num contexto de entrevista de pesquisa. Por
+outro lado, um grupo com o qual tem contatos prévios também pode
+colocar problemas. Uma excessiva proximidade do pesquisador com
+o pesquisado pode levar a uma conversa de bate-papo que falha em
+explorar dimensões mais complexas dos temas abordados.
+A outra questão que angustia mais os pesquisadores em início de
+carreira parece ser a dificuldade de fazer o entrevistado “falar” e “levar
+a sério” a entrevista quando se está numa posição social muito diferente
+da dele. Será que o entrevistado vai achar minhas questões tolas?
+Será que vai julgar a pesquisa irrelevante? Será que ele de fato vai se
+engajar em falar coisas relevantes para a minha pesquisa?25 Será que
+ele não vai inventar estórias e me fornecer informações inverídicas?
+
+25 A melhor reflexão que conheço sobre o engajamento do entrevistado e sobre os
+limites da entrevista em face das posições sociais de entrevistado e entrevistador é a
+desenvolvida por Poupart (2010).
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+148
+Não há respostas definitivas para essas angústias. No entanto, há
+formas de se garantir a validade dos dados de entrevista que devem
+ser ponderadas. Há a possibilidade de verificar a coerência interna de
+um discurso. Há a possibilidade de se cotejar uma entrevista com as
+demais. Há a possibilidade de se cotejar os dados da entrevista com
+outros dados (documentos, observações). Há, portanto, formas de tratar
+as respostas de uma entrevista de forma integrada no contexto de
+uma pesquisa de forma a minimizar possíveis informações incorretas26.
+Mas há ainda uma angústia que persiste: “como fazer de fato o
+meu entrevistado se engajar nesta entrevista, sendo ele de um mundo
+tão diverso do meu e a entrevista sendo uma experiência tão estranha
+no seu cotidiano?” Quanto a fazer um lavrador ou um magistrado conversar
+com você, estudante de pós-graduação em início de carreira27,
+de forma ordenada num contexto de entrevista, isso é de fato um desafio.
+Não há nada que possa garantir de antemão essa colaboração,
+ainda que a prática de entrevistas possa ajudar bastante. No entanto,
+há um comportamento que é obrigatório para entrevistadores. A
+única forma de termos uma chance de conseguir uma entrevista que
+de fato explore as dimensões da percepção do nosso entrevistado
+de forma mais elaborada é investirmos na posição de escuta atenta.
+Em outras palavras, se eu, pós-graduando, quero ser levado a sério
+pelo meu entrevistado, a minha única forma de ter uma chance que
+isso aconteça é fazer bem o papel de ouvinte. Seja para deixar claro
+para o entrevistado pouco articulado e numa posição social pouco
+
+26 Mas a própria ideia de “informação incorreta” tem de ser relativizada quando o
+que se pretende é explorar a percepção dos entrevistados sobre determinado tema.
+Em outras palavras, se o que se busca numa entrevista é um conjunto de informações
+sobre determinado fenômeno, instituição ou acontecimento, faz sentido em pensar
+num controle de “correção” dessas informações a partir de uma confrontação com as
+demais entrevistas e outros dados (a chamada “triangulação”); no entanto, se o que se
+busca são as percepções do entrevistado, essa “correção das informações” já parece
+fazer bem menos sentido.
+27 Para intranquilidade dos pós-graduandos, esse é um desafio que permanece também
+para pesquisadores mais experientes. Mas o nosso pós-graduando serve para
+ilustrar bem a questão.
+149
+
+valorizada que aquele discurso dele é interessante e relevante, e que
+é do meu interesse; seja para deixar claro para o entrevistado que
+olha com desdém para a pesquisa (ou para o pesquisador iniciante)
+que aquele é um trabalho sério, que busca resultados socialmente
+relevantes, num contexto de pesquisa acadêmica28.
+Ao pesquisador cumpre lembrar também suas responsabilidades
+para com os entrevistados. Para determinados indivíduos, ser
+entrevistado não representa nada de mais. É uma experiência banal,
+eventualmente até inconveniente. Para outros, no entanto, pode representar
+muita coisa. Representa a possibilidade de ter visibilidade,
+de ser ouvido, de se tornar protagonista. Em ambos os casos, o pesquisador
+precisa ter o compromisso de manter sua atitude de escuta
+atenta, seja para conseguir obter um discurso do entrevistado, seja
+como compromisso ético de quem se engaja em pesquisa com indivíduos
+e grupos que raramente são visibilizados.29
+
+6. A expectativa raramente atendida
+Esta seção tem o intuito de contribuir para ajustar as expectativas do
+entrevistador quanto ao resultado da entrevista. Para quem se lança
+numa primeira experiência de pesquisa com entrevistas qualitativas,
+pode ser bastante frustrante verificar que a maior parte dos entrevistados
+vai com frequência incorrer em dois comportamentos muito
+problemáticos para o entrevistador.
+Por um lado o entrevistado vai falar em demasia sobre questões
+que são absolutamente irrelevantes para a pesquisa. Em muitos momentos
+o entrevistador pode e deve tentar redirecionar o entrevistado
+(ver seção sobre intervenções do entrevistado – item 4 supra),
+
+28 Há grupos que podem ser particularmente difíceis de ser entrevistados, independentemente
+da posição social do entrevistador. Duchesne (2010, p.13), por exemplo,
+vai falar das pessoas que “possuem um alto grau de domínio da palavra”. Aqueles que
+têm por profissão falar em público podem ser muito difíceis de lidar no contexto de
+entrevista, tanto por não saírem do registro da fala para auditórios quanto por terem
+por instinto controlar a ordem do discurso.
+29 Sobre questões éticas envolvendo a pesquisa qualitativa, ver Poupart (2010).
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+150
+
+mas em alguns casos essas tentativas se revelam inúteis. O resultado
+são longos trechos de transcrição de entrevista, que demandaram
+horas do tempo de trabalho do pesquisador, que em nada contribuirão
+para responder à pergunta de pesquisa.
+Por outro, o entrevistado também vai se esquivar de falar sobre
+temas do nosso roteiro, seja por mero esquecimento, seja por desinteresse,
+seja por falta de conhecimento ou seja ainda por uma
+questão de não ter mais tempo para prosseguir na entrevista. Com
+frequência o entrevistador vai terminar uma entrevista sem ter tido
+a possibilidade de explorar tudo aquilo que tinha de expectativa a
+partir do roteiro idealizado.
+Se pudermos descrever graficamente essa situação mais comum
+de entrevista, obteríamos nessa interação algo deste tipo30:
+
+Figura 1. Campo de exploração esperado e atualizado.
+
+Em resumo, o entrevistador tem de estar preparado para um cenário
+no qual muita coisa que planejava ouvir não aparecerá, e muita
+coisa irrelevante se juntará àquilo que pretendia ter visto emergir
+como discurso do entrevistado. O desempenho do entrevistado
+pode ser classificado como “pró-ativo”: com uma ampla margem de
+
+30 Adaptado de Pires, 2006.
+151
+
+liberdade para explorar suas concepções, seu campo de exposição
+dificilmente coincidirá com o campo de exploração esperado pelo
+entrevistador.
+É preciso no entanto olhar com atenção e curiosidade para esse
+cenário de esperado desencontro de expectativa do entrevistador e
+realidade da entrevista. Esse campo de exposição do entrevistado
+guarda muitas vezes “surpresas” interessantes para o entrevistador.
+O pesquisador experiente sabe muito bem que é nessa zona amarela
+da nossa ilustração em que se encontram grandes “descobertas” da
+pesquisa. É ali que achamos elementos que não pudemos antecipar
+no nosso roteiro de pesquisa, mas que acabam se revelando de grande
+interesse para o nosso problema de pesquisa.
+
+7. Que tipo de informação obtemos?
+O que queremos afinal obter com o discurso do entrevistado? Que tipo
+de informação nos interessa como dado de pesquisa? Sua vivência
+num determinado contexto social? Sua experiência familiar ou profissional?
+Seu saber técnico ou científico sobre determinada questão?
+Diferentes tipos de problema de pesquisa demandam diferentes
+tipos de comunicação dos entrevistados. Olivier de Sardan (2008, p.
+55), por exemplo, vai dizer que “as entrevistas oscilam em geral entre
+dois polos, (...) a consulta e a experiência”31. Dessa forma, a informação
+das entrevistas variaria de uma consulta sobre os conhecimentos
+do entrevistado sobre “referenciais culturais ou sociais” a uma
+busca pela vivência do entrevistado, por passagens de sua biografia.
+Como o leitor mais familiarizado com a prática de entrevistas deve
+ter notado, essa divisão só se realiza de forma tão clara num plano
+ideal. O nosso problema de pesquisa pode pedir mais a expertise do
+entrevistado sobre uma determinada atividade profissional ou sobre
+as regras sociais de uma determinada comunidade, mas é impossível
+
+31 No original: “Les entretiens oscillent em general entre deux pôles, que nous appellerons
+la consultation et l’expérience.”
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+152
+
+desvincular completamente dessas informações um certo grau de vivência
+do entrevistado.
+Uma outra classificação relevante sobre o tipo de informação
+que obtemos numa entrevista semidiretiva é a formulada por Pires
+(2006). Nessa classificação, há uma primeira distinção que separa,
+por um lado, as comunicações de opiniões, visões de mundo, ideologias
+e, por outro lado, as comunicações de experiências. Vejamos um
+pouco mais em detalhe essa distinção.
+Nessa primeira face da distinção, o entrevistado pode ser do interesse
+da pesquisa simplesmente por ter uma opinião sobre o tema
+de interesse da pesquisa. Aqui estamos interessados, por exemplo,
+em representações da justiça na população em geral. Não é necessário
+que o entrevistado tenha um saber especializado ou uma vivência
+específica. O mero fato de ser portador de uma opinião32 sobre o tema
+já o qualificaria como entrevistado. No geral, trata-se de um tipo de
+informante que interessa mais frequentemente às pesquisas quantitativas,
+com grandes contingentes de entrevistados. No entanto,
+podemos conceber também numa pesquisa qualitativa, com contingentes
+menores e com pretensões de exploração mais em profundidade,
+o que cidadãos sem nenhuma qualificação ou vivência específicas
+preliminarmente definidas (a não ser, por exemplo, pertencer
+a um grupo amplo: cidadãos brasileiros, contribuintes do Tesouro,
+eleitores etc.).
+Na segunda face da distinção, temos os informantes de experiências.
+Neste caso, não basta ser portador de uma visão ou de uma opinião.
+É preciso ter vivido algo mais específico ou adquirido determinado
+conhecimento para poder ter informações mais precisas sobre
+o nosso objeto de pesquisa. Esse segundo polo pode ser dividido em
+quatro grandes categorias de entrevistados.
+
+32 Nunca é demais relembrar a conhecida crítica de Bourdieu (1984) às sondagens de
+opinião. O mero fato de existir em sociedade não nos dá opinião sobre todo e qualquer
+assunto. É um equívoco comum das pesquisas de opinião trabalharem com essa pressuposição
+de que os entrevistados terão uma opinião sobre o objeto da pesquisa.
+153
+
+Em primeiro lugar, podemos falar numa categoria de entrevistados
+que interessa ao pesquisador por pertencer a um grupo específico.
+Ser músico de jazz, ser poliamorista, ser juiz de direito, ser
+membro de uma gangue... Nesses casos, o entrevistado precisa se
+identificar como membro do grupo de interesse do pesquisador. E
+a entrevista invariavelmente se interessa por entender essa identidade
+e as ações e representações de mundo que daí decorrem. É a
+entrevista que se interessa, por assim dizer, por estilos de vida e identidades
+profissionais.
+Há uma segunda categoria que busca comunicações de experiências
+que se interessem menos pela questão do pertencimento
+do que pelo fato do indivíduo “ter vivido” um determinado evento/
+acontecimento/processo específico. Nesse sentido, o pesquisador
+pode ter interesse, por exemplo, em técnicos e ou parlamentares
+que acompanharam o processo legislativo de determinada lei, ou em
+magistrados e promotores que participaram de um caso criminal de
+repercussão ou ainda em trabalhadores rurais que viveram um episódio
+de conflito. Em outras palavras, neste caso o entrevistador se
+interessa pela reconstituição dos fatos vividos pelo entrevistado. Seu
+testemunho é importante para que se possa não apenas reconstituir
+determinados acontecimentos mas também para se conhecer diferentes
+representações sobre tal acontecimento.
+Uma terceira categoria dessa segunda face da distinção se refere
+ao conhecimento do entrevistado. Neste caso, o que interessa ao entrevistador
+é o “savoir-faire”, o “know-how”. Aqui a entrevista estaria
+interessada em atores que possuem um conhecimento sobre determinado
+tema por ter uma larga experiência de trabalho. É o funcionário
+que cuida há anos de determinado tipo de processo, é o advogado
+especializado em determinados casos que sabe como ninguém como
+funcionam os meandros da burocracia judicial, é o gestor público que
+conhece tudo sobre o trâmite de projetos de lei. Em outras palavras,
+esta categoria se interessa por atores sociais que detêm uma larga experiência
+de trabalho em determinada área e, por essa razão, detêm
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+154
+
+um amplo savoir-faire em suas áreas de especialidade.
+Por fim, uma quarta categoria também se refere ao conhecimento
+do entrevistado, mas neste caso um saber teórico. Alguns entrevistados
+se tornam relevantes para o pesquisador por terem estudado
+determinado tema por um longo tempo e nesse sentido terem constituído
+um saber que poucos detêm. É o grande especialista no tema: o
+acadêmico que conhece em profundidade o direito de família, o pesquisador
+que se debruçou por vários anos sobre conflitos em questões
+de guarda de menores, etc.
+De forma esquemática, o quadro abaixo ilustra essa organização33:
+
+Figura 1. Campo de exploração esperado e atualizado.
+
+Mais uma vez, reforço a ideia de que essa é uma distinção ideal.
+Muitas vezes o tipo de informação que buscamos pode ter tanto a ver
+com a experiência profissional quanto com o pertencimento a uma
+categoria, ou ainda com fatos vividos e o “savoir-faire”. Ou seja, esse
+quadro nos permite melhor organizar o tipo de informação buscada,
+nos permite uma clareza maior sobre que tipo de dado queremos produzir,
+mas ele não deve ser entendido como uma classificação rígida.
+
+33 Adaptado de Pires, 2006.
+155
+
+8. Diretriz inicial34
+Por fim, uma última nota para falar sobre o começo da entrevista.
+Uma vez a cena da entrevistada estabelecida, as explicações sobre
+o que vai se passar fornecidas ao entrevistado, o termo de consentimento
+esclarecido assinado, é hora de lançar o entrevistado na
+estrutura da entrevista. É preciso introduzir o entrevistado no tema
+a partir de uma intervenção inicial do entrevistador. Essa primeira
+intervenção é o que podemos chamar de diretriz inicial.
+Trata-se portanto de uma primeira intervenção que tem por objetivo
+iniciar a exploração da percepção do entrevistado sobre o tema.
+Para tanto, é preciso dar uma direção para a fala do entrevistado,
+sem contudo fechar o campo de possibilidade de respostas.
+Vejamos como é possível fazê-lo a partir de alguns exemplos. O
+primeiro trago de minha pesquisa de doutorado, que pretendia compreender
+algumas questões acerca da determinação da pena. Para
+tanto, usei a seguinte diretriz inicial em entrevistas com magistrados:
+
+Gostaria que o senhor me falasse um pouco dos fatores que são levados
+
+em conta numa decisão penal. Me interessa saber quais são, no momento
+da sentença, os critérios jurídicos e não jurídicos, as considerações
+
+gerais, os raciocínios que são levados em conta para a aplicação de uma
+
+pena. (Xavier, 2012)
+
+Essa foi uma diretriz inicial que permitia ao entrevistado se lançar
+por muitos caminhos diferentes. Havia aqueles que faziam um
+discurso bastante legalista mencionando os artigos do código pertinentes,
+como também havia aqueles que quase transformavam a
+entrevista numa sessão de desabafo sobre as dificuldades pessoais
+de se condenar alguém. Entre um extremo e outro, havia todo tipo de
+resposta. Essa diversidade era esperada e era relevante no contexto
+da pesquisa.
+
+34 Sobre diretriz inicial, ver também Ruquoy (1997).
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+156
+Um segundo exemplo vem da pesquisa de Lachance (1987; nossa
+tradução).
+
+“Tia Emília, a senhora foi a mais velha de uma família de 14 filhos, a senhora
+nunca se casou e a senhora consagrou a sua vida à família. Gostaria
+que a senhora me falasse a respeito.” (entrevistas com pessoas de
+
+mais de 70 anos)
+
+Ao questionar a tia Emília acerca de como foi a sua vida dedicada
+à família, o pesquisador procurava acesso a toda uma série de costumes
+locais de um período determinado. Uma entrevista com uma
+diretriz inicial tão ampla certamente dá margem a elementos de resposta
+que passam ao largo do problema de pesquisa. No entanto,
+ao percorrer suas lembranças de décadas passadas, a entrevistada
+termina por fornecer ao pesquisador dados relevantes sobre o objeto
+de sua pesquisa.
+Por fim, um terceiro exemplo é o mencionado por Blanchet e Gotman
+(2007, p.60).
+
+“Você hospedou por vários meses um refugiado. Poderia me contar
+
+como isso se passou?”
+
+Eis uma diretriz inicial bastante simples e direta. Ao pesquisar sobre
+a integração dos refugiados naquele contexto, o autor se debruça
+sobre como foi para os nacionais daquele local receber em suas residências
+um refugiado. A formulação é bastante genérica: “me conte
+como isso se passou”. A margem de liberdade do entrevistado é aqui
+bastante ampla.
+Em resumo, uma diretriz inicial lança o entrevistado no roteiro do
+entrevistador, mas com uma ampla margem de possibilidade de respostas.
+A ideia é não restringir muito esse campo de respostas, pois
+não é possível de antemão prever os caminhos que o entrevistado
+vai tomar. E, numa entrevista semidiretiva, é fundamental que haja o
+157
+
+espaço para que o entrevistador seja surpreendido por uma resposta
+que ele não poderia antecipar.
+
+9. Considerações finais
+Eduardo Coutinho, o grande documentarista brasileiro cuja fama vinha
+da sua capacidade de fazer filmes fabulosos a partir de entrevistas
+com indivíduos desconhecidos, ao final de sua vida deu uma longa
+entrevista para um documentário sobre sua forma de trabalhar. A
+certa feita, ele diz:
+
+“A necessidade de ser ouvido é uma das mais profundas, senão a mais
+
+profunda, necessidade do ser humano. Ser ouvido é ser legitimado. Mas
+
+quem está preocupado em legitimar o outro?”35
+
+Num mundo de supervalorização do ato de falar, ouvir é um ato
+que causa estranhamento. Falar é ocupar espaços, reivindicar poder.
+As demandas de diversos grupos sociais por reconhecimento no século
+XXI são em grande medida reivindicações para se ter um lugar
+de fala, para se ter voz, para ser ouvido. No entanto, quem reivindica
+o lugar da escuta? O ato de ouvir é percebido como passivo, como
+desprovido de poder, como indesejável.
+Fazer uma entrevista de pesquisa comporta muitos desafios. Talvez
+o maior deles seja se colocar genuinamente numa posição de
+escuta. Afinal, fazê-lo é se colocar numa posição contramajoritária
+numa sociedade que de nós exige falar, não ouvir. Para além da técnica
+e das estratégias expostas neste texto, é fundamental, para que
+haja de fato a possibilidade de uma entrevista relevante, desenvolver
+a capacidade de ouvir o outro.
+Ainda assim, o sucesso da entrevista é apenas uma possibilidade. As
+
+35 O filme a que me refiro é “Coutinho, 7 de Outubro”, de Carlos Nader. O filme está
+disponível online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UOsEWc29vxc (o trecho em
+questão aparece em 1h01min15s).
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+158
+
+contingências dessa interação – performance do entrevistador, do
+entrevistado, questões circunstanciais, interrupções... – ainda podem
+fazer “entornar o caldo” mesmo para os mais experimentados
+dos entrevistadores. Que isso não seja no entanto uma nota de desestímulo
+para aqueles e aquelas que se lançam numa pesquisa com
+entrevistas. Em que pesem as dificuldades, conhecer o mundo a partir
+da escuta da alteridade pode ser uma grande fonte de realização
+profissional e pessoal para o pesquisador.
+159
+
+10. Referências
+
+Alberti, V. (2004). Manual de História Oral. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, p. 29-80.
+
+Barbot, J.. (2015). Conduzir uma entrevista de face a face. In: S.Paugam
+
+(org.), A Pesquisa Sociológica. Petrópolis: Vozes, p.102-123.
+
+Becker, H.. (2014). A Epistemologia da Pesquisa Qualitativa. Revista de Estudos
+Empíricos em Direito, 1(2), p.184-198.
+
+__________. (2007). Segredos e Truques da Pesquisa. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
+
+Blanchet, A.; Gotman, A.. (2007). L’Enquête et ses Méthodes. L’Entretien. Paris:
+
+Armand Colin.
+
+Bourdieu, P.. (1984). L’opinion publique n’éxiste pas. In : Questions de sociologie.
+Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, p. 222-235
+
+Duschene, S.. (2000). Pratique de l’entretien dit ‘non directif’. In:Bachyr, M..
+
+Les méthodes au concret: démarches, formes de l’expérience et terrains
+
+d’investigation en science politique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
+
+France, p.9-30.
+
+Guibentiff, P.. (2002). Questions de méthode em sociologie du droit. A propôs
+
+de l’entretien em profondeur. In: Kellerhals, J. ; Manaï, D. ; Roth, R. (org.).
+
+Pour um droit pluriel. Genebra: Helbing & Liechtenhahn, p.311-337.
+
+Kaufmann, J.. (2013). A Entrevista Compreensiva. Um guia para a pesquisa de
+
+campo. Petrópolis: Vozes.
+
+Kvale, S.; Brinkmann, S. (2009). Interviews. Learning the Craft of Qualitative
+
+Research Interviewing. Los Angeles: SAGE.
+
+Lachance, G.. (1987). Mémoire d’une époque. Un fonds d’archives orales au
+
+Québec. Québec : Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, “Documents
+de recherche” , (12),
+
+Lillrank, A.. (2012). Managing the Interviewer Self. In: J. Gubrium, J.Holstein,
+
+A. Marvasti, K.McKinney (orgs.). The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research.
+The Complexity of the Craft. London: SAGE, p.281-293.
+
+Magioglou, T.. L’entretien non directif comme modèle générique d’interactions.
+In : Les cahiers internationaux de psychologie sociale, (78), p.51-65.
+
+Michelat, G.. Sur l’utilisation de l’entretien non directif en sociologie. Revue
+
+Française de Sociologie, 16(2) , 1975, p.229-247.
+
+Olivier de Sardan, J.. (2008). La rigueur du qualitatif. Les contraintes em-
+Algumas notas sobre a entrevista qualitativa de
+pesquisa // José Roberto Franco Xavier
+160
+piriques de l’interprétation socio-anthropologique. Louvain-la-Neuve:
+
+Bruyllant-Academia.
+
+Pinçon, M.; Pinçon-Charlot, M.. (2007). Sociologia da alta burguesia. Sociologias,
+ano 9, n.18, p.22-37.
+
+Pires, A. (2010). Amostragem e pesquisa qualitativa: ensaio teórico e metodológico.
+In: J.Poupart, J.P.Deslauriers, L.H.Groulx, A.LAperrière, R.
+
+Mayer, A.Pires, A Pesquisa Qualitativa. Petrópolis, Vozes.
+
+_________. (2006). Documentos de trabalho. Clínica de entrevista de pesquisa.
+Ottawa: University of Ottawa.
+
+_________ . (2004). La recherche qualitative et le système penal. Peut-on interroger
+les systèmes sociaux? In: D.Kaminski ; M.Kokoreff (org.). Sociologie
+pénale: système et experience. Pour Claude Faugeron (p. 173-178).
+
+Bruxelas: Les Éditions Érès.
+
+Poupart, J.. (2010). A entrevista de tipo qualitativo. Considerações epistemológicas,
+teóricas e metodológicas. In: J.Poupart, J.P.Deslauriers,
+L.H.Groulx, A.LAperrière, R.Mayer, A.Pires, A Pesquisa Qualitativa.
+
+Petrópolis, Vozes.
+
+Rogers, C. (1951[1965]). Client-Centered Therapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
+
+Company.
+
+__________ . (1945). The Nondirective Method as a Technique for Social Research.
+American Journal of Sociology, 50(4), p.279-283.
+
+Rosenthal, G. (2014). Pesquisa Social Interpretativa. Uma Introdução. Porto
+
+Alegre: EdiPUCRS.
+
+Ruquoy, D. (1997). Situação de entrevista e estratégia do entrevistador. In:
+
+L.Albarello et al. (orgs.). Práticas e Métodos de Investigação em Ciências
+
+Sociais (p. 84-116). Lisboa: Gradiva.
+
+Santos, B. S.. (2005). Notas sobre a história jurídico-social de Pasárgada. In: C.
+
+Souto; J.Falcão (orgs.). Sociologia e Direito (pp. 87-95). São Paulo: Pioneira.
+
+Xavier, J. R.. (2012). La réception de l’opinion publique par le système de
+
+droit criminel. Tese de doutorado. Ottawa: University of Ottawa.
+161
+
+5
+
+Grupo focal na prisão:
+
+algumas reflexões da
+
+experiência da pesquisa Dar
+
+à Luz na Sombra // Ana Gabriela
+
+Braga e Bruna Angotti
+
+Neste capítulo, propomos algumas reflexões advindas do uso do
+grupo focal em uma pesquisa no campo prisional. A presença desta
+discussão neste livro parece-nos interessante em ao menos dois sentidos:
+primeiro, por não ser uma técnica comumente utilizada nos
+estudos empíricos em Direito; e, segundo, por, ao provocar a troca de
+ideias entre interlocutoras, dar acesso a uma perspectiva coletiva do
+problema de pesquisa privilegiada para pensar as questões na esfera
+político social, na qual o sistema de justiça se insere. A partir dos diálogos
+do grupo focal, uma teia de significados é tecida ao alcance dos
+olhos da pesquisadora, acrescentando complexidade e relatividade
+à análise conforme discutiremos adiante.
+Diante do desafio de registrar a vivência de gestantes, lactantes e/ou
+mães com crianças em situação de prisão, realizamos entre os anos de
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+162
+
+2013 e 2014, pelo projeto Pensando o Direito1
+, a pesquisa “Dar à Luz na
+Sombra - condições atuais e possibilidades futuras para o exercício da
+maternidade por mulheres em situação de prisão” (DLNS).2
+ Captamos
+as percepções das personagens do campo da justiça criminal, e analisamos
+as práticas e discursos voltados ao exercício da maternidade no
+espaço prisional com o objetivo final de apresentar propostas concretas,
+de cunho legislativo ou na seara das políticas públicas, visando a
+equacionar os principais problemas encontrados em campo, ou ainda,
+sugerir a replicação de experiências exitosas em nível nacional.
+Enquanto esboçávamos o projeto, pensávamos em estratégias
+metodológicas e logísticas para compreender a problemática da maternidade
+na prisão, considerando o quadro complexo de personagens
+(presas, crianças, agentes, diretoras, gestoras e operadores do
+sistema de justiça) e instituições (judiciário, defensoria, secretaria de
+administração penitenciaria, diretoria da unidade, abrigo etc.) que
+compõe o sistema de justiça criminal feminino. Precisávamos contemplar
+as diversas opiniões e reflexões acerca do tema, garantindo
+voz a diferentes personagens que lidam cotidianamente com a problemática
+trabalhada a partir de diversas perspectivas.
+Frente a essa pluralidade de vozes, tínhamos uma certeza: de que
+precisaríamos desenhar estratégias para conseguir ouvir a experiência
+das mulheres presas, bem como suas propostas para enfrentar os problemas
+concretos que vivenciavam – por isso, tivemos o cuidado de ga1
+O Projeto Pensando o Direito é uma iniciativa da Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos
+do Ministério da Justiça (SAL/MJ), e foi criado em 2007 para promover a democratização
+do processo de elaboração legislativa no Brasil. A partir do lançamento de
+editais para a contratação de equipes de pesquisa, o Projeto mobiliza setores importantes
+da sociedade – Academia, instituições de pesquisa, ONG’s entre outros – para
+a realização de estudos em temas de interesse da Secretaria. Para atingir o propósito
+de conferir maior efetividade às normas perante a realidade social, são privilegiadas
+pesquisas aplicadas, de caráter empírico, com o emprego de estratégias qualitativas e
+quantitativas que informem e fortaleçam o debate no processo de produção de leis e
+demais atos normativos. Fonte: http://pensando.mj.gov.br/o-que-e/, acesso 26/04/17.
+2 Disponível em: http://pensando.mj.gov.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PoD_51_
+Ana-Gabriela_web-1.pdf, acesso 26/04/17.
+163
+
+rantir que suas vozes estivessem presentes a todo o tempo na pesquisa.
+Queríamos que a elaboração e a reflexão acerca da vivência prisional
+partisse daquelas que cotidianamente experimentavam o cárcere.
+Para compreender o contexto e funcionamento das políticas públicas
+envolvendo maternidade e cárcere, além das mulheres presas,
+optamos por entrevistar também especialistas3
+, que compartilharam
+sua produção acadêmica e militante sobre o encarceramento feminino.
+Também procuramos ouvir, quando possível, o posicionamento
+das gestoras prisionais e operadoras do sistema de justiça. Mapeadas
+as personagens com as quais gostaríamos de dialogar para cumprirmos
+alguns dos objetivos da investigação, partimos para o desenho
+do quadro metodológico da pesquisa.
+O uso de entrevistas parecia o método mais adequado para dialogar
+com especialistas e militantes que refletiam sobre o cárcere
+extramuros, e também para contemplar a opinião das gestoras e
+demais funcionárias prisionais. Isso porque tínhamos pouco tempo,
+um recorte espacial vasto4
+, e recursos limitados, o que impossibilitava
+qualquer proposta de reunir em um só espaço essas mulheres
+para uma atividade conjunta, como um workshop5
+.
+Nessa fase de reflexão sobre a pesquisa, não tínhamos ainda a
+certeza de que conseguiríamos entrar nas unidades prisionais que
+
+3 Nesse momento da pesquisa, entrevistamos 13 “especialistas”, as quais dividimos
+nas seguintes categorias – a) militantes pelos direitos das mulheres presas, em especial
+membras do Grupo de Estudos e Trabalho Mulheres Encarceradas (GET); b) integrantes
+do Núcleo de Situação Carcerária da Defensoria Pública do Estado de São Paulo
+(NESC – DPESP); c) estudiosas de temas relacionados ao aprisionamento feminino;
+d) gestoras executivas e membras de comissões em prol da mulher encarcerada e; e)
+uma “especialista na prática”, uma mulher que vivenciou duas gestações e dois partos
+no ambiente prisional.
+4 O campo de pesquisa compreendeu seis estados brasileiros (Bahia, Ceará, Minas Gerais,
+Paraná, Rio de Janeiro e São Paulo) e a província de Buenos Aires na Argentina.
+5 Um exemplo do uso de workshop pode ser visto na pesquisa “Não tinha teto, não
+tinha nada : porque os instrumentos de regularização fundiária (ainda) não efetivaram
+o direito à moradia no Brasil” / Ministério da Justiça, Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos.
+Brasília: Ministério da Justiça, Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos, (SAL): IPEA,
+2016. (Série pensando o direito; 60) coordenada por Arícia Fernandes Correia.
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+164
+
+pretendíamos, uma vez que a entrada de pesquisadores e agentes
+externos necessita de autorizações das secretarias estaduais responsáveis
+pelas prisões, bem como dos comitês de ética em pesquisa,
+dificilmente concedidas em um curto período de tempo - tema que
+trataremos adiante. Nesse momento, a única certeza que tínhamos
+era de nosso acesso à Cadeia Pública de Franca, onde a coordenadora
+da pesquisa realizava atividades de extensão e já tinha negociado
+a entrada diretamente com o delegado responsável6
+.
+ O desafio que se apresentava naquele momento era de como
+escutar as mulheres, reunindo o máximo de experiências sobre um
+tema complexo e delicado em um local de liberdade cerceada. O uso
+de entrevistas seguia como uma opção, porém, a partir das entrevistas
+realizadas até então e da leitura da legislação nacional e internacional
+que trata do aprisionamento feminino7
+, achamos que
+somente a conversa individual poderia limitar a potência do debate
+e da discussão conjunta de temas e propostas, e que gostaríamos de
+testar algumas propostas que vínhamos construindo.
+Foi assim então, pensando na maneira de otimizar as nossas visitas
+à Cadeia Pública, de modo a garantir a presença e participação de todas
+as interessadas, bem como o debate de temas e propostas, que optamos
+pelo uso do método do grupo focal conjugado com algumas entrevistas
+
+6 O fato das cadeias públicas do Estado de São Paulo estarem sob a tutela da Secretaria
+de Segurança Pública (SSP), permitiu-nos a comunicação direta e rápida com o
+diretor da unidade pra realização da pesquisa.
+7 No âmbito internacional temos as Regras de Bangkok das Organização das Nações
+Unidas (ONU) que estabelece regras mínimas para tratamento da mulher presa e medidas
+não privativas de liberdade para as mulheres em conflito com a lei. Já no âmbito
+nacional, além da Constituição Federal, da Lei de Execução Penal (Lei nº 7210/84) e do
+Estatuto da Criança e Adolescente (Lei n° 8.069/90) – que disciplinam a matéria, houve
+na última década quatro importantes modificações legislativas no sentido de garantir
+o exercício de maternidade pela reclusa: a Lei nº 13.257/16 (Estatuto da primeira infância
+que facilita e amplia o acesso ao direito à prisão domiciliar; a Lei nº 12.962/14, que
+regula sobre o convívio entre pais em situação de prisão e suas filhas e filhos, a Lei nº
+12.403/11, que estendeu às gestantes e mães o direito à prisão domiciliar em substituição
+à prisão preventiva, e, por fim, a Lei nº 11.942/09, que assegura às mães reclusas e
+aos recém-nascidos condições mínimas de assistência exercício da maternidade.
+165
+
+em profundidade e observação in loco com inspiração etnográfica.
+Tais opções, feitas ainda na fase inicial da pesquisa, foram reforçadas
+após a participação das coordenadoras da pesquisa no workshop8
+com a professora Laura Beth Nielsen em novembro de 2013. Isso
+porque, de acordo com Nielsen, para se dar conta da multiplicidade
+de um objeto – nesse caso ela refere-se especificamente ao universo
+dos “estudos legais” – é necessário buscar abordá-lo da maneira
+mais ampla possível, valendo-se, para tanto, de pesquisas que utilizam
+a estratégia multimetodológica9
+ (Nielsen, 2010).
+Para Nielsen, pesquisas empíricas com o uso diversificado de métodos
+e técnicas vêm sendo realizadas “(...) para se compreender melhor
+a relação entre a lei e o mundo social”, sendo os achados mais
+duradouros aqueles oriundos de pesquisas que se valem de diferentes
+métodos conjugados entre si (Nielsen, 2010, p. 952). Isso se deve,
+a seu ver, ao fato de o campo jurídico ser composto por organizações,
+indivíduos (e aqui também devem ser considerados elementos como
+classe social, raça, gênero), leis, instituições (e seus atores e atrizes)
+e as diversas interações entre eles, sendo os estudos que conseguem
+abordar todas essas partes mais completos.
+A utilização de diversos métodos combinados permitiu que captássemos
+as vozes a partir de uma multiplicidade de interações (mais
+íntima na entrevista, dialógica no grupo focal, trivial na observação in
+loco), aumentando assim as chances de compreender nosso objeto desde
+uma perspectiva complexa, por diversos ângulos e múltiplas vozes.
+No presente capítulo narramos, especialmente, a experiência do
+
+8 Promovido pela Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos do Ministério da Justiça juntamente
+com o Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea), o Programa das Nações
+Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD) e a Agência Brasileira de Cooperação do Ministério
+das Relações Exteriores (ABC/MRE).
+9 Nielsen utiliza a metáfora do elefante para explicar sua proposta de abordagem multimetodológica:
+com os olhos vendados, pessoas apalpam um elefante de diferentes
+ângulos, o que as permite ter apenas uma perspectiva táctil facetada do objeto total. A
+abordagem de um objeto a partir de um referencial multimetodológico, permite que o
+objeto (no caso do exemplo, o elefante), seja percebido como um todo, ou ao menos de
+forma mais completa que se fosse utilizado apenas um método (2010, pp. 952 e 970).
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+166
+
+uso de um desses métodos, o grupo focal, explorando as possibilidades
+dessa técnica como uma das estratégias de investigação empírica
+em direito. Tecemos ainda algumas considerações específicas
+acerca dos cuidados éticos e metodológicos de pesquisar o campo
+prisional. Mostraremos quais foram nossas negociações, escolhas e
+estratégias em campo para conseguir cumprir o principal objetivo da
+pesquisa, qual seja, de conhecer as perspectivas das mulheres em
+situação de prisão e suas opiniões acerca das políticas penitenciárias
+a elas dirigidas. Procuramos identificar necessidades, detectar entraves
+e elaborar estratégias, juntamente com as presas, para exercício
+de seus direitos maternos-reprodutivos.
+Iniciamos o capítulo com aportes teóricos sobre grupo focal, com
+o intuito de conceituar brevemente a técnica, abordando, também, reflexões
+sobre seu planejamento e execução. Em seguida, tratamos da
+preparação do campo e da entrada em espaços prisionais, e elencamos
+alguns dos resultados da experiência com o uso do grupo focal no âmbito
+da pesquisa Dar à Luz na Sombra. Por fim, fechamos o texto refletindo
+acerca das vantagens, desafios e limites da técnica em questão.
+Na redação do relatório da pesquisa, assim como do presente texto,
+utilizamos as formas gerais e plurais no gênero feminino. Essa, para
+além de uma escolha estilística, marca uma posição política, que vai
+ao encontro do sentido e pressuposto que norteiam a presente pesquisa:
+questionar o feminino como exceção, como segundo plano. A
+pesquisa em questão é uma “pesquisa feminina”. Ela foi realizada por
+uma equipe de sete pesquisadoras, todas mulheres. As entrevistadas
+e participantes são, em sua quase totalidade, mulheres. Nosso campo
+é o sistema prisional feminino. A política pública que se pretende
+formular é direcionada à mulher. E o exercício da maternidade é um
+tema, por excelência do feminino, logo não teria sentido a escolha por
+masculinizar a autoria do texto e nossas personagens.
+Além disso, julgamos que uma obra de metodologia deva contemplar
+a diversidade de gênero e de linguagens. Logo, nada melhor
+do que um texto escrito por duas autoras, em um contexto de uma
+167
+
+pesquisa feminina e feminista, assumir esse lugar de resistência e
+provocar deslocamentos no masculino como regra.
+
+1. Grupo focal: aportes teóricos sobre a técnica
+O grupo focal é uma forma de produzir dados qualitativos a partir do
+envolvimento de um pequeno número de pessoas reunidas em um
+grupo informal de discussão, focado em temas particulares ou em
+um conjunto específico de questões.
+Técnica mencionada pela primeira vez na literatura em 1926, os
+grupos focais foram usados principalmente na área de marketing.
+Nos anos de 1950, o sociólogo Robert Merton, na Agência de Pesquisa
+Social Aplicada da Universidade de Columbia, usou a técnica para
+compreender as reações às propagandas e transmissão de rádio na
+Segunda Guerra Mundial. A percepção de que as pessoas revelavam
+informações delicadas quando se sentiam em segurança, em um lugar
+confortável, ao lado de pessoas como elas (Krueger e Casey, 2000,
+p. 3) se encontra no clássico trabalho The Focused Interview (1956), escrito
+por Merton, em co-autoria com Marjorie Fiske e Patricia Kendall.
+ A partir da década de 1980, sua aplicação se estendeu para a antropologia
+social, estudos culturais e área da saúde, como estratégia
+para dar conta de responder perguntas que as entrevistas em profundidade
+não conseguiam, em especial quando se almejava medir
+reações coletivas e comportamentos relacionais referentes a determinados
+temas (Ressel et al, 2008, p. 780).
+Bernadete Gatti10 – referência do tema no Brasil – o conceitua
+como “técnica que permite fazer emergir uma multiplicidade de
+pontos de vista e processos emocionais, pelo próprio contexto de interação
+criado, permitindo a captação de significados que, com outros
+meios, poderiam ser difíceis de se manifestar” (Gatti, 2005, p. 9).
+Enquanto técnica, o grupo focal encontra-se entre a observação par10
+Gatti nos apresenta um capítulo com sete experiências de grupo focal em diversas
+áreas de pesquisa em Ciências sociais e humanas.
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+168
+
+ticipante e as entrevistas em profundidade. Para propor o grupo focal
+são necessárias, ao menos, duas figuras: a moderadora (ou facilitadora)
+e a observadora (documentadora/ sistematizadora). O papel da primeira
+é guiar a discussão, não a partir de questões específicas aos participantes
+do grupo, mas estimulando que interajam entre si. Já a segunda registra
+as interações do grupo, tanto do ponto de vista discursivo (o que se
+fala), quanto das corporalidades (como, quem e de onde se fala).
+Trata-se de estratégia capaz de abarcar a construção de percepções,
+atitudes e representações sociais de grupos humanos (Gondim,
+2003, p.151). Canales y Peinado (1995, p. 289) conceituam grupo de
+discusión como “a técnica de pesquisa social que (como a entrevista
+aberta ou em profundidade e as histórias de vida) trabalha com a fala
+(...). Em toda fala se articula a ordem social e a subjetividade”.
+O grupo focal abre espaço para a expressão da subjetividade, para
+falas situadas em contextos sociais específicos, e produzidas em diálogo
+com outras subjetividades. É nesse sentido que Callejo Callego (2002,
+p. 418) o identifica como uma técnica que “reintegra o grupo além da
+individualização”, na qual os “participantes reconstroem o grupo social
+a que pertencem.” Logo, a especificidade deste método está na aposta
+na interação do grupo para chegar a lugares, temas e discussões que dificilmente
+seriam fomentados individualmente, fora do grupo.
+As reflexões de Sue Wilkinson (2004) sobre grupo focal foi um dos
+principais alicerces teóricos para pensarmos de que forma utilizaríamos
+tal técnica. Para a autora (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 194), essa técnica funciona
+como uma “janela” na vida das participantes, e a partir dela pode-se
+aproximar dos seus pensamentos, crenças e opiniões, além de possibilitar,
+por meio da observação direta, identificar a forma de constituição
+de determinado contexto social, e produzir insights inesperados.
+De acordo com Wilkinson, o grupo focal pode trazer diferentes
+perspectivas em relação à entrevista individual, porque permite a
+produção de dados com um maior número de participantes. Além
+disso, por ser mais próximo da conversação diária, torna o ambiente
+mais propício para insights inesperados e diminui o clima de des-
+169
+
+confiança. Esse aspecto é especialmente importante em relação às
+pessoas presas, já que, constantemente submetidas a interações nas
+quais são objeto de exame, costumam não ficar “confortáveis” em
+entrevistas individuais.
+Contudo, promover uma interação social ao mesmo tempo espontânea
+e focada não é tarefa simples. Segundo Wilkinson, o sucesso
+do grupo focal depende da preparação da moderadora e da
+sessão. Para tanto, quem modera deve ter habilidade em entrevistas
+e alguma experiência com grupos de trabalho, e deverá estar atenta
+à comunicação não verbal. É importante obter a participação de
+todo o grupo, encorajando participantes quietas e desencorajando
+as muito falantes (WILKINSON, 2004, p. 178). Na dinâmica do grupo,
+as participantes debatem, concordam, discordam, argumentam e
+contra-argumentam. Escutar as discussões do grupo focal permite
+familiaridade com um vocabulário particular e com a forma e conteúdo
+sobre os quais se constrói o debate.
+Para Sonia Gondim, algumas recorrem ao grupo focal como “forma
+de reunir informações necessárias para a tomada de decisão; outras
+o veem como promotores da autorreflexão e da transformação
+social e há aquelas que o interpretam como uma técnica para a exploração
+de um tema pouco conhecido, visando ao delineamento de
+pesquisas futuras” (2003, p. 152). Ao usar o método do grupo focal,
+privilegiando a análise qualitativa e hermenêutica, a pesquisadora
+“assume uma posição crítica, mas não consegue se desvencilhar do
+fato de que está implicado no processo de investigação. Sua maneira
+de olhar e interpretar o fenômeno é contextualizada individual, social,
+cultural e historicamente.” (Gondim, 2003, p. 150). Há uma interação
+entre mediadoras e participantes que não pode ser ignorada.
+
+2. Planejamento e execução do grupo focal: breves
+apontamentos
+Neste texto, não temos o objetivo de detalhar o procedimento de
+preparação e realização do grupo focal. Primeiro, porque foge a
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+170
+
+nossa proposta; segundo, porque há excelentes autoras – algumas
+citadas aqui – que já percorreram esse caminho. No entanto, apresentaremos,
+a seguir, uma brevíssima síntese dos principais passos
+do planejamento de um grupo focal, apenas para situar a leitora. A
+obra da brasileira Bernadete Gatti “Grupo focal na pesquisa em Ciências
+sociais e humanas” (2005) nos parece um ótimo início para
+quem pretende se familiarizar com a técnica. Recomendamos, especialmente,
+o segundo capítulo no qual a autora aborda alguns temas
+para planejamento e execução do grupo focal. Vejamos.
+
+1. Composição do grupo
+Gatti nos lembra que a composição e organização dos grupos que formarão
+o grupo focal devem ser orientadas pelos objetivos da pesquisa,
+e os grupos formados com algumas características homogêneas mas
+com certa variação, de modo que tenham posições diferentes sobre o
+tema. “Por homogeneidade entende-se algumas características comuns
+aos participantes que interessem ao estudo do problema” (Gatti, 2005,
+p. 18), tais como gênero, profissão, idade, condições socioeconômicas
+etc. Já a escolha das variáveis na composição do grupo devem ser pensadas
+a partir do referencial teórico, problema e objetivo da pesquisa.
+Então, por exemplo, se queremos pesquisar a mudança no judiciário
+nas últimas décadas a partir da opinião das magistradas paulistas,
+podemos compor grupos focais compostos por juízas em São
+Paulo (sendo gênero, profissão e estado características homogêneas),
+com variação de tempo de carreira. Poderíamos organizar subgrupos,
+a partir da temática e esfera de atuação (estadual ou federal), agrupando-os
+por similaridades (grupo com magistradas das Varas de Violência
+Doméstica Familiar) ou por contraste (juízas de diversas áreas e
+esferas reunidas), a depender do recorte analítico da pesquisa.
+
+2. Local de sessões e registro das interações
+O local e a organização das sessões são importantes para a interação.
+A autora (Gatti, 2005, p. 24) recomenda sentar em círculo com
+171
+
+contato face-a-face. Essencial, ainda, é preparar a atividade com autorizações,
+material e equipe treinada. Ainda, há de se pensar nas
+diferentes possibilidades de registro das interações, em geral feitas
+por meio audiovisual, bem como por anotações simultâneas.
+
+3. Moderadora e o desenvolvimento do processo grupal
+A pesquisadora pode escolher uma série de caminhos para guiar o
+grupo e organizar as reuniões: número de grupos, sessões, duração,
+composição etc. (Gatti, 2005, p. 28). O contato anterior com a literatura
+possibilitará a emergência das questões que guiarão o debate e
+comporão o roteiro do grupo. O roteiro, assim como todo o processo
+grupal, deve ser flexível para ser modificado pelas exigências que
+surgem da interação (Gatti, 2005, p. 17). Além do roteiro, a moderadora
+poderá lançar mão de dinâmicas que aproximem o grupo, como
+narração de histórias, exercício de role-playing, jogo de perguntas e
+respostas etc. Essas atividades podem iniciar, continuar ou finalizar
+o trabalho de participação do grupo, conforme a pertinência e a necessidade
+para o desenvolvimento do processo grupal.
+
+4. Moderadora e as interações grupais
+Para a autora (Gatti, 2005, p. 40) são as participantes que oferecem
+a chave de significado à pesquisadora, e não ao contrário. Por isso
+é importante prestar atenção ao que as participantes contam umas
+às outras, como histórias, conselhos, experiências pois dão pistas de
+contextos sociais, afetos e representações. Gatti também recomenda
+que se tente captar além das falas11, observar os silêncios, risadas,
+conversas paralelas, posição corporal e o arranjo do espaço.
+
+* * *
+
+11 As pesquisadoras com formação exclusivamente jurídica podem ter especial dificuldade
+na tarefa de observar além do dito – tão cara à etnografia. Recomendamos
+o texto de Kant de Lima e Barbara Lupetti (2010) para aprofundar o debate acerca do
+encontro do direito com a antropologia.
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+172
+
+Depois ou mesmo durante a realização do campo de pesquisa, segue-se
+a análise dos dados12. Devido à profundidade e complexidade
+do tema, deixaremos para outro momento a discussão teórica acerca
+dos métodos de análise. A seguir, damos início à segunda parte do
+capítulo, na qual passamos a refletir sobre aplicação da técnica no
+contexto da pesquisa Dar à luz na sombra, e apresentamos alguns
+dos resultados a partir dos dados obtidos com o grupo focal.
+
+3. A preparação do terreno e o campo
+Pesquisar (n)a prisão traz inúmeros desafios. Narrar os caminhos da
+pesquisa empírica no ambiente prisional é compartilhar as dificuldades
+e estratégias para entrar na prisão, a negociação com o poder
+prisional, além dos caminhos possíveis para aceder às pessoas e espaços
+em um campo que se caracteriza pelo seu hermetismo. Essa
+discussão fundamental escapa ao nosso escopo aqui, e, certamente,
+mereceria um capítulo à parte13.
+Contudo, em um texto de metodologia com base em uma pesquisa
+que tem a prisão como campo principal, não poderíamos deixar
+de narrar – a partir dessa e de outras experiências de pesquisas no
+sistema prisional – algumas peculiaridades e cuidados a serem observados
+para a realização de pesquisa em prisão. Dentre eles, podemos
+citar: a) aprovação do comitê de ética; b) comunicação clara
+e direta com interlocutores de pesquisa; c) relação com o pessoal penitenciário;
+d) expectativas da interação e a “ética do cuidado”.
+
+1. Aprovação pelo comitê de ética
+Os comitês de ética em pesquisa são importantíssimos, sobretudo em
+se tratando de pesquisas envolvendo seres humanos, especialmente
+aqueles em situação de vulnerabilidade física, psíquica e/ou social.
+Contudo, na área de pesquisa em prisão, a aprovação das secretarias
+
+12 Sobre a qual Gatti (2005) trata em outro capítulo de sua obra.
+13 Sobre o tema ver Braga (2014).
+173
+
+de administrações penitenciárias, que muitas vezes tem seus próprios
+do comitê de ética14, funciona como uma barreira –para o acesso
+ao campo de pesquisa. Isso porque, muitas vezes os comitês, para
+além da garantia da ética em pesquisa, acabam funcionando como
+um filtro que define quem entra ou não no sistema prisional – se não
+de forma deliberada pelas profissionais que o compõem, pelo fato de
+a burocracia ser tão grande e os prazos tão extensos que acabam por
+inviabilizar a pesquisa, principalmente as de curto prazo, como trabalhos
+de conclusão, iniciação cientifica, e mesmo mestrado.
+O projeto de pesquisa “Dar à luz na sombra” foi submetido ao
+Comitê de Ética em pesquisa da Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e
+Sociais da UNESP em outubro de 2013, obtendo a aprovação dois
+meses depois. Contudo, a certificação desse comitê universitário
+não fora aceita por todas as secretarias estaduais. As exigências para
+entrar nos sistemas penitenciários estaduais não seguem um padrão.
+Dos seis estados visitados, São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro exigiam
+que submetêssemos o projeto a Comitês próprios.
+No Rio de Janeiro a apreciação ficou a cargo do Centro de Estudos
+e Pesquisa EGP / SEAP, a qual levou por volta de cinco meses e
+ainda tivemos nossa entrada condicionada à autorização formal de
+um juiz das execuções penais. Conhecendo de perto o trâmite para
+entrada no sistema penitenciário paulista e o prazo limitado da pesquisa,
+pensamos, no início, em nem incluí-lo na amostra da pesquisa.
+Porém, a Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos (SAL/ MJ), destinatária
+da pesquisa, ressaltava a importância da inclusão do estado na pesquisa
+(dada a representatividade numérica da população prisional
+de São Paulo no universo nacional) negociou diretamente com a SAP,
+possibilitando nossa entrada no sistema penitenciário paulista em
+tempo hábil para que esse estado compusesse o campo da pesquisa.
+
+14 Como no caso do estado de São Paulo que condiciona a entrada em suas unidades à
+aprovação do projeto pelo Comitê de Ética da SAP (Secretaria de Assuntos Penitenciários)
+criado em 2010. Para mais informações: http://www.sap.sp.gov.br/comite-etica.html.
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+174
+
+2. Relação com o pessoal penitenciário
+Uma semana antes do campo na Cadeia Pública de Franca, visitamos
+o estabelecimento para apresentar a pesquisa ao delegado, pedir a
+autorização para a sua realização, e entrevistá-lo. Ele, que já nos conhecia
+de trabalhos anteriores, nos apresentou ao chefe de segurança
+e autorizou nossa entrada sem qualquer empecilho15.
+Uma boa relação com o pessoal penitenciário é essencial para
+entrarmos e permanecermos no campo de pesquisa, e uma vez lá,
+consigamos alcançar pessoas e espaços significativos. Vale mencionar
+que a privacidade e não interferência do pessoal penitenciário
+é condição ideal para pesquisas com pessoas institucionalizadas e
+somente em Franca tivemos a oportunidade de, em grupo e individualmente,
+interagir com as mulheres presas sem a presença de
+agentes estatais16. Na maioria dos estados17 que visitamos, não nos
+foi permitido entrevistar as presas reservadamente.
+
+3. Comunicação clara com interlocutoras de pesquisa
+Dado que o tempo da equipe de pesquisa no ambiente prisional é geralmente
+curto e que as pessoas presas (não sem razão) recebem com
+desconfiança o olhar externo da pesquisadora, é importante passar uma
+mensagem rápida e direta de quem somos e dos nossos propósitos ali.
+Na etapa preparatória para o campo, além de negociar com o
+delegado, conversamos com a liderança das presas apresentando
+nossa proposta e negociando nossa estadia no pátio da cadeia, bem
+
+15 Aqui cabe salientar e louvar a postura aberta do mencionado Diretor em relação à
+entrada da sociedade civil no espaço da Cadeia Pública de Franca, à qual é liberada o
+acesso de diversos grupos da sociedade, especialmente das universidades locais, pra
+realização de pesquisas e projetos.
+16 Na maioria dos estados nos quais fizemos campo, quais sejam, Minas Gerais, Paraná,
+Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, não pudemos conversar reservadamente com as detentas.
+Em São Paulo foi possível entrevistar somente duas mulheres indicadas pela direção
+e que haviam assinado um termo concordando em participar da pesquisa. No Ceará
+conversamos sozinhas e informalmente com diversas puérperas, e, pela grade, na presença
+da diretora, com outras presas.
+17 Vide nota 15.
+175
+
+como circulamos pela unidade para entregarmos às presas um convite
+para o trabalho na semana seguinte.
+Havíamos planejado “dar uma volta” pela Cadeia entregando um
+convite impresso (composto de um texto claro e uma ilustração) para
+participar da pesquisa, no qual explicávamos quem éramos, os objetivos
+da nossa presença por lá e as datas nas quais voltaríamos.
+Esse instrumento (pensado incialmente somente para mediar um
+primeiro contato com as presas) acabou permitindo que a equipe se
+aproximasse pessoalmente dessas mulheres em conversas individuais
+ou em pequenos grupos, dando início imediato ao debate que
+propúnhamos para a semana seguinte.
+A escolha de utilizarmos a estratégia de levar os convites impressos
+em papel adveio de experiências anteriores, na mesma Cadeia, nas
+quais havíamos percebido a necessidade de lançar mão de alguns cuidados
+para estabelecer relações de confiança naquele espaço e, ainda,
+o cultivo entre elas do que denominamos de um certo “fetiche pelo papel”,
+caracterizado pelo extremo interesse e zelo que têm com qualquer
+papel que entra na cadeia (carta, intimações, desenhos etc.)18.
+No dia em que fomos conversar com o delegado, a liderança e
+distribuir o convite, algumas das mulheres nos pediram para verificar
+sua situação processual, uma vez que sequer sabiam se tinham
+ou não defesa constituída e não tinham a quem pedir essa informação.
+Prometemos voltar na semana seguinte com um levantamento,
+via site do TJSP, feito.
+O uso de uma moeda de troca pelas pesquisadoras com fins de
+facilitar o acesso ao campo é tema recorrente na literatura antropológica.
+Bronislaw Malinowski (1978) narra, em sua clássica monografia
+Argonautas do Pacífico Ocidental, como o tabaco funcionou para que
+ele acessasse os assuntos tribais dos trobriandeses. Já a antropóloga
+Alba Zaluar (2000), ao narrar sua experiência de pesquisa na Cidade
+
+18 A pesquisa de Natália Corraza Padovani (2015) aprofunda a questão das cartas na
+penitenciaria feminina, assim como o livro Cadeia de Debora Diniz (2015).
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+176
+
+de Deus, conta como o empréstimo de um gravador ou ajuda na “festa
+das crianças” foram importantes para responder às expectativas das
+moradoras da comunidade em relação à sua presença ali. Na Cadeia
+de Franca, a consulta da situação processual das presas acompanhada
+de alguns esclarecimentos jurídicos consistiu na nossa moeda de
+troca, servindo de estímulo para a participação na pesquisa.
+
+4. Expectativas da interação e a “ética do cuidado”
+Nas visitas às penitenciárias, pudemos perceber que as presas têm
+poucos espaços para falarem de si e serem ouvidas. Por mais que tenham
+convivência com outras mulheres e conversem entre si, não é
+um espaço de fala íntimo, tampouco para o exterior, com potencial
+de produzir uma interação além muros, abordando outros temas,
+vocabulários e reflexões. Por se tratar de pesquisa que envolve pessoas
+institucionalizadas convidadas a falar sobre um tema tão íntimo
+e complexo como a maternidade no contexto de prisão, os cuidados
+éticos ganharam ainda mais importância.
+Sabíamos que muito provavelmente jamais veríamos novamente
+as mulheres que entrevistamos, e que dificilmente poderíamos ajudá-las
+ali, naquele momento, a não ser com uma breve escuta, com o
+endereço da Defensoria Pública ou algum conselho jurídico. Inclusive,
+tivemos de lidar com a difícil pergunta, que muitas vezes surgiu, de
+qual era a função dessa pesquisa. Mas tínhamos o alívio de uma resposta
+certeira: “esperamos que quando esse relatório terminar, vocês
+já estejam longe daqui, portanto o que estamos fazendo talvez não as
+atingirá diretamente. Mas saibam que vocês estão contribuindo para
+que outras mulheres que vivenciarem a maternidade na prisão sejam
+beneficiadas pela ajuda que vocês nos deram hoje.” A reação delas
+era quase sempre unânime: “se puder ajudar alguém já está bom!”.
+Essa ideia estimulou a reflexão das presas para além da perspectiva
+individual, situando-as em um contexto social e político
+maior que elas, no qual o sentimento de culpa – que a maioria carrega
+– pode ser relativizado frente às condições coletivas que com-
+177
+
+partilhavam. De outra forma, repetir essa ideia possibilitou que nós
+minimizássemos o nosso desconforto de não poder fazer nada que
+modificasse imediatamente a vida das nossas interlocutoras.
+A mesma garantia de retorno da pesquisa nos era cobrada das agentes
+e gestoras, que, na maioria das vezes, nos perguntavam se poderiam
+ter contato com o resultado final do trabalho ali desenvolvido. Assim
+como as detentas, elas ficavam muito curiosas em saber como eram os
+sistemas prisionais de outros estados, o que funcionava em outros lugares,
+o que havia de diferente nos espaços onde estavam. Estabelecemos
+uma dinâmica cuidadosa com as funcionárias e administradoras para
+garantir que receberiam o relatório final da pesquisa, bem como de que
+seriam convidadas para o evento de lançamento da pesquisa19.
+A “ética do cuidado” (Cook & Westervelt, 2007, p. 33) se fez presente
+nas interações entre a equipe de pesquisa, e com as mulheres
+presas, corpo gestor e agentes do sistema20. Julgamos esses pequenos
+cuidados, para além das exigências formais da ética em pesquisa,
+fundamentais no sentido de valorizar e preservar, ética e emocionalmente,
+as participantes da pesquisa.
+
+4. A partir do grupo focal: alguns resultados da
+experiência
+Uma semana após a entrega dos convites, lá estava a nossa equipe21
+para dois dias de vivência do campo. Ao entrar na Cadeia, deixamos,
+
+19 O que foi feito, por meio de uma lista de e-mail, com todas as participantes.
+20 Vale mencionar aqui reflexão semelhante feita por Janaína Penalva. Em suas palavras:
+“o estudo em estabelecimentos prisionais ou de internamento sempre levanta
+dúvidas quanto à capacidade de consentimento, principalmente nos casos de pacientes
+psiquiátricos. Esta não deve ser uma questão ou impeditivo para a pesquisa, na
+medida em que a proteção dos dados e responsabilidade dos mesmos é transferida
+também ao pesquisador. De toda forma, em todos os estabelecimentos pesquisados
+foi necessário – e é importante que seja – o esclarecimento dos objetivos daquela observação,
+o problema de pesquisa, as formas como serão usados os resultados. Esse
+compromisso ético se expressa também no compartilhamento dos resultados com os
+participantes ao final da pesquisa” (Penalva, 2013, p. 78).
+21 Formada pelas autoras desse artigo e as assistentes de pesquisa: Carolina Costa,
+Davílis Maza, Fernanda Ozilak, Naíla Chaves Franklin e Paula Alves.
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+178
+
+com um carcereiro que abriu os portões da prisão, bolsas e objetos
+pessoais, além de um documento de identidade (sem o qual não é
+possível entrar em estabelecimentos prisionais). Na chegada, uma
+das presas nos introduziu ao espaço prisional, gritando para as demais
+que era da “universidade”. Cabe ressaltar que o papel de receber
+as visitantes e apresentá-las às outras detentas, e mesmo de
+receber compras e dar recados, é exercido por uma das presas denominada
+“faxina”, que ocupa, reconhecidamente pela direção e pelas
+outras presas, a posição de liderança naquele espaço, e com a qual
+combinamos nossa entrada.
+Começamos as atividades convidando as presas para se reunirem
+conosco no pátio, com a finalidade de participarem da pesquisa.
+Elas reconheceram o grupo de pesquisadoras e se lembraram do
+convite feito na semana anterior. Algumas rapidamente se sentaram
+próximas a nós, formando um círculo. Outras demoraram mais para
+chegar. A maioria se aproximava e perguntava se “víamos processo”,
+cobrando a promessa, feita na semana anterior, de visualização de
+suas situações processuais.
+Após a explicação dos objetivos do projeto algumas se desinteressaram
+pela atividade e rumaram para suas celas, descontentes.
+Como forma de promover a participação e ajudar as mulheres, a
+equipe se comprometeu, novamente, a verificar a situação jurídica
+daquelas que não haviam pedido na semana anterior e dar uma devolutiva
+no dia seguinte.
+Mesmo assim e ainda que na visita anterior as presas tenham demonstrado
+interesse e vontade de participar dos debates, nos dois
+dias do grupo focal foi muito trabalhoso reuni-las no pátio. Para tanto,
+tivemos que passar de cela em cela, pedir ajuda para as mais participativas,
+e, inclusive (por sugestão das próprias presas), gritar no
+pátio fazendo o convite.
+A dificuldade e resistência foram maiores no segundo dia de trabalho.
+Percebendo o descontentamento e o desânimo da equipe de
+pesquisa, ao chegarmos ao pátio e nos reunirmos em roda, uma de-
+179
+
+las logo disse “eu queria agradecer a vinda de vocês aqui, que estão
+nos ajudando. Se puderem ajudar mais nos ajudarão muito, se não
+puderem está ótimo! Obrigada”. Essa fala foi acolhedora, na medida
+em que algumas delas perceberam a angústia da equipe com a pouca
+adesão inicial à atividade.
+Um dos aprendizados do campo prisional é equilibrar flexibilidade
+e resistência em um espaço ao mesmo tempo volátil e estático.
+Ainda que no planejamento inicial do grupo focal pensássemos em
+nos dividir em pequenos grupos, para que a conversa fluísse com
+mais facilidade e pudéssemos observar as reações das internas com
+relação às propostas, quando nos reunimos na roda grande e explicamos
+os objetivos da pesquisa, o debate se formou espontaneamente.
+Logo a moderadora perguntou a elas se preferiam dividir-se
+em pequenos grupos ou discutir coletivamente. Elas preferiram a
+segunda opção, e foi a que seguimos.
+Uma vez reunidas, outra dificuldade foi estimular a discussão e
+ao mesmo tempo guiar os debates. Algumas se exaltavam durante
+quase todo o tempo, enquanto outras permaneciam indiferentes,
+apesar de estarem integrando a roda. Foi comum também, em certos
+momentos, elas falarem ao mesmo tempo, necessitando a intervenção
+da condutora do grupo para organizar as falas simultâneas e
+exaltadas que clamavam atenção.
+Na primeira atividade que propusemos, 21 mulheres, além da
+nossa equipe, fizeram uma roda. Neste momento pedimos para que
+elencassem as principais problemáticas vivenciadas por elas em situação
+de prisão e que fizessem sugestões de melhoras.
+No segundo dia de campo levamos alguns casos para estimular
+a discussão do grupo. Tratava-se de histórias ficcionais criadas pela
+equipe de pesquisa, mas inspiradas na realidade das mulheres presas
+e seus problemas. Tal estratégia foi utilizada com o objetivo de
+deslocar a problematização da perspectiva individual para a coletiva,
+de forma a atender nossa preocupação ética de não constranger as
+participantes a exporem publicamente seus dramas pessoais. Discu-
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+180
+
+tir a partir dos casos da Maria, Júlia, Joana, Isadora e Rafaela possibilitou
+que elas se identificassem com essas personagens, chegando
+algumas a contar suas histórias a partir dos casos, e, ao mesmo tempo,
+permitiu que o grupo refletisse acerca dos problemas coletivamente,
+se descolando, assim, das histórias individuais.
+Um dos casos tratava de uma mulher que tinha de escolher entre
+ser transferida para a capital (espaço materno-infantil) para poder
+amamentar o bebê ou permanecer no mesmo estabelecimento e entregar,
+após o nascimento, a criança à família. Ao ouvir o caso uma delas
+gritou imediatamente “tem que pensar primeiramente no filho”, e a
+outra emendou “tem que ter direito à licença maternidade – como ela
+vai poder ter neném na cadeia?”. Uma terceira disse preferir ficar com
+o filho seis meses, mesmo sabendo da dor da separação “você pega
+amor, né?”. A outra disse “ai, filha, prefiro assim do que ficar longe do
+meu filho num momento tão importante”. Outra já discordou: “sou contra
+ficar! A criança vai sofrer e a mãe vai sofrer. Todo mundo sofrerá”.
+Outra, que foi mãe na prisão e teve de entregar o filho para a própria
+mãe assim que nasceu, disse: “o Governo deveria fazer assim – deixar
+todo mundo ir pra casa”. Outra disse: “é...podia ter licença maternidade,
+pois assim você fica seis meses em casa, enquanto o advogado briga
+para você sair”. Outra logo discordou: “eu, se sair, vou usar drogas.
+Não adianta achar que não, é a primeira coisa que vou fazer... eu sairia
+e usaria muitas drogas”. Já uma quinta, que é mãe, disse, em represália
+à fala anterior: “taí – por causa das frutas podres as frutas boas sofrem”.
+Nesse momento, tal como aponta o diálogo transcrito acima, mostrou-se
+interessante a dinâmica que se criou entre as participantes do
+grupo focal, sem qualquer intervenção da equipe de pesquisa, de forma
+que elas mesmas avançaram no debate ao contrapor suas opiniões.
+
+5. Balanço da técnica aplicada à pesquisa “Dar à
+Luz na Sombra”
+Um dos trunfos do grupo focal é permitir a interação entre participantes,
+de forma que a fala de uma pessoa impacte a outra, e que
+181
+
+o discurso seja produzido coletivamente. Sob esta perspectiva, o
+grupo focal mostrou-se uma escolha muito acertada, uma vez que
+pudemos notar que funcionou como um espaço de escuta mútua, no
+qual a fala de uma provocava as mais diversas reações nas demais.
+Houve diversas demonstrações de apoio e manifestações de solidariedade
+entre as presas, intercaladas com momentos de embate e
+provocação. Algumas delas, recém-chegadas à Cadeia, nitidamente
+mais caladas e amuadas, tiveram espaço para contar suas histórias e
+perceber que outras compartilhavam de suas angústias e dores. Da
+mesma forma, presas mais antigas se aproximaram de outras, a partir
+dos debates no grupo, e identificaram diversos pontos que aproximavam
+suas trajetórias, criando uma atmosfera de cumplicidade
+entre essas mulheres.
+O mais interessante é que tal cumplicidade não se restringiu às
+mulheres presas, mas se estendeu à própria equipe de pesquisa.
+Esse sentimento se evidenciou no momento da despedida do campo,
+quando nos vimos na mesma roda compartilhando as dores
+daquelas mulheres, e, principalmente, nos unindo na sensação de
+impotência frente às violências do sistema de justiça, as quais são
+vivenciadas por elas “na pele”; e, por nós, ainda que indiretamente,
+na nossa atuação acadêmica e política.
+Os debates ocorridos nos dois dias de grupo focal foram registrados
+por toda equipe de pesquisa por escrito, uma vez que cada uma
+se situou em um lugar da roda, e as conversas paralelas nos possibilitaram
+escutar falas diferentes. Apesar de ter sido possível negociar a
+entrada do gravador, optamos por não fazê-lo primeiro porque o gravador
+por si só é um elemento constrangedor do qual não queríamos
+lançar mão naquele momento. Depois, por uma razão técnica: o alto
+grau de ruído e conversas paralelas durante o grupo. E por fim, mas
+não menos importante, pela especificidade do método, que exige o
+registro das interações e debates, inclusive por diversas perspectivas,
+algo difícil de depurar somente com um registro de áudio.
+Partindo desses relatos, organizamos as falas e propostas das
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+182
+
+presas a partir de alguns eixos temáticos dentro de nove temas centrais
+para a pesquisa, sendo os cinco primeiros relacionados com a
+temática específica da pesquisa (maternidade) e os quatro últimos
+relacionados com questões gerais da prisão, as quais também podem
+ser observadas desde uma perspectiva de gênero. Foram eles:
+visita; amamentação; prisão domiciliar; convivência entre mãe e
+filho; guarda das crianças; assistência médica; assistência jurídica;
+alimentação; condições de higiene.
+Como proposta principal dessa conversa surgiu a sugestão de aumento
+do prazo de amamentação e de alternativas para garantia da
+convivência das mães com seus bebês. Nesse momento também falamos
+sobre as possibilidades legais da prisão domiciliar. As participantes
+concordaram entre si que a melhor opção seria a prisão domiciliar
+— a qual elas denominam de “licença maternidade” — em substituição
+à prisão preventiva ou mesmo à pena privativa de liberdade.
+Identificamos que a maternidade é um tema especialmente delicado
+para as presas, talvez porque, para essas mulheres, ser mãe,
+longe de ser um “momento mágico” (como comumente as mulheres
+o definem), perpassa por sentimentos difíceis, como culpa, tristeza e
+angústia. Percebemos que o debate fluía com mais facilidade nos assuntos
+como visitas, assistência jurídica, alimentação etc. Muitas preferiram
+não falar sobre a maternidade e as filhas e filhos que deixaram
+do lado de fora dos muros, daqueles dos quais não têm notícias ou
+com os quais não exerceram a maternidade de forma presente.
+Foi comum que, conforme a moderadora retomava o debate em relação
+às crianças e gravidez, as presas falassem menos ou mesmo deixassem
+o grupo focal para atividades fora daquelas vinculadas à pesquisa.
+
+6. Notas finais: vantagens, desafios e limites do
+grupo focal
+A escolha do método parece ser uma das principais angústias para a
+pesquisadora que quer se aventurar na pesquisa empírica em direito.
+Essa decisão deve ser tomada pensando em que pergunta quer
+183
+
+responder (objetivo) e aonde quer buscar as respostas (campo),
+para, em seguida, definir as ferramentas de pesquisa. O grupo focal é
+uma técnica eficiente para identificar como certa coletividade constrói
+representações e opiniões acerca de determinado tema. E, por
+isso mesmo, tem a potência de ampliar as perspectivas do problema
+de pesquisa, assim como trazer à tona as ambiguidades e paradoxos
+da questão abordada.
+Outra potência do grupo focal é “trazer um conjunto concentrado
+de informações de diferentes naturezas (conceitos, ideias, opiniões,
+sentimentos, preconceitos, ações, valores) para o foco de interesse
+do pesquisador” (GATTI, 2005, p. 69).
+Contudo Gatti (2005, p. 67) relata que inúmeros trabalhos empregam
+equivocadamente a técnica do grupo focal, realizando algo
+próximo a entrevistas coletivas22 altamente dirigidas. A essência do
+grupo focal está em justamente deixar que as interlocutoras conduzam
+o debate, o qual deve fluir sem interferência direta da mediadora
+(a não ser para reconduzir a discussão ao tema proposto). Logo, um
+dos principais desafios é conduzir um grupo focal sem induzir, encontrar
+o equilíbrio entre a direção e a fluidez. Nesse sentido, é importante
+que a facilitadora tenha alguma familiaridade com dinâmicas de
+grupo, que lhe permitam lançar mão de estratégias de comunicação,
+testadas anteriormente, para lidar com silêncios, conflitos, ausências,
+emoções, e imprevistos que possam surgir durante o processo.
+A facilitadora tem, ao longo do debate, a árdua tarefa de organizar
+as falas – já que muitas vezes as participantes tendem a falar
+ao mesmo tempo – além da função de democratizar a participação,
+evitando que o debate seja monopolizado por uma ou outra figura.
+
+22 Um exemplo de entrevista coletiva pode ser encontrado na pesquisa “Diagnóstico
+dos serviços prisionais no Brasil”, do projeto Pensando o Direito (2017, no prelo). O
+Eixo Nordeste foi realizado pela equipe coordenada por Ana Gabriela Mendes Braga,
+com as pesquisadoras José de Jesus Filho, Vivian Calderoni e Maíra Coutinho Teixeira.
+Na pesquisa, além de questionários distribuídos a agentes penitenciárias de todo o
+Brasil, foram realizadas entrevistas individuais com diretoras de unidade e entrevistas
+coletivas com dirigentes sindicais e terceirizadas.
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+184
+Outro desafio no emprego dessa técnica é a análise dos dados
+coletados, uma vez que são de natureza complexa: “volumosos, refletindo
+ambiguidade e conflitos, para além de consensos” (Gatti,
+2005, p. 67). Esse aspecto ficou evidente na nossa experiência, pois,
+o emprego do grupo focal mais do que nos dar respostas sobre qual
+a política pública deveria ser desenhada de acordo com as mulheres
+presas, nos trouxe muitas dúvidas e uma certeza: de que as propostas
+deveriam contemplar a diversidade das mulheres e contextos,
+sendo impossível desenhar um caminho único sem levar em conta
+as individualidades.
+É preciso lembrar também, que as falas do grupo focal são produzidas
+em um contexto determinado, a partir daquela interação
+especifica, logo as opiniões ali expressas não podem ser tomadas
+como posições definitivas (Gatti, 2005, p. 68). Por mais que essa máxima
+valha para opiniões captadas por qualquer técnica, ela deve ser
+observada especialmente no grupo focal, pois, neste caso, pesquisadoras
+(e participantes) tem menos controle sobre o diálogo que se
+constrói a partir da interação de cada grupo e das falas que emergem
+a partir dele.
+O grupo focal não é recomendado quando se busca um consenso
+sobre determinado assunto, ou, ainda, quando se trata de temas
+delicados, difíceis de serem tratados publicamente. Como narrado
+anteriormente, durante a pesquisa “Dar à luz na sombra” enfrentamos
+dificuldades relacionadas a esses dois pontos. Primeiro, porque,
+ao final, o grupo contribuiu mais para problematizar a questão
+do que para chegarmos a uma conclusão acerca da politica pública
+para a mãe presa (a não ser o não encarceramento dessas mulheres,
+pelo qual advogávamos desde o inicio da pesquisa). E depois, a dificuldade
+que passamos em tratar de um tema tão delicado em um
+ambiente adverso, e a partir de experiências tão doloridas como da
+maternidade das mulheres presas.
+Observados esses cuidados e limites, e desde que faça sentido
+perante o objetivo, os sujeitos e o objeto da pesquisa, o grupo focal
+185
+
+pode ser muito potente nos estudos empíricos em direito para pensar,
+por exemplo, politicas públicas, reformas legislativas, acesso à
+justiça, impactos dos mass media etc.. E, o mais importante, o grupo
+focal é um dos caminhos para que a academia possa lidar com opiniões
+trabalhadas e/ou formadas coletivamente, ampliando não apenas
+o leque de personagens ouvidas, mas, principalmente, a interação
+entre seus pontos de vista. Esse último aspecto é especialmente
+importante nos estudos no direito, como exercício de relativizar as
+certezas e verdades comuns no dizer a justiça.
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+186
+
+7. Referências
+
+Angotti, B. (2012). Entre as Leis da Ciência, do Estado e de Deus: o surgimento
+
+dos presídios femininos no Brasil. São Paulo: IBCCRIM.
+
+Bachman, R and Schutt, R.K. (2003). The Practice of Research in Criminology
+
+and Criminal Justice. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks. California: Sage.
+
+Braga, A.G.M.B. (2014). Criminologia e prisão: caminhos e desafios da
+
+pesquisa empírica no campo prisional. Revista de Estudos Empíricos em
+
+Direito. 1 (1) pp. 46-62.
+
+Callejo Gallego, J. (2002) Observación, Entrevista y Grupo de Discusión: el
+
+Silencio de Tres Prácticas de investigación. Rev. Esp. Salud Publica, Madrid,
+76 (5). Disponível em: < scielo.isciii.es/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1135-57272002000500004&lng=es&nrm=isso>Canales,
+M. y A. Peinado. Grupos de discusión. (1995). In: J. M. Delgado; J.
+
+Gutiérrez [Coords.]. Métodos y técnicas cualitativas de investigación en
+
+ciencias sociales (pp. 288-316). Madrid: Editorial Síntesis.
+
+Cook, K. J.; Westervelt, S. D. (2007) Feminist Research Methods in Theory
+
+and Action: learning from death row exonerees. In: s.Miller (org.). Criminal
+Justice Research and Practice: diverse voices from the Field. Boston:
+
+Northeastern Press.
+
+Dias, M. (2007). A Pesquisa tem “Mironga”. Notas etnográficas sobre o fazer
+
+etnográfico. In: A. Bonetti; S.Fleischer [Org.]. Entre Saias Justas e Jogos
+
+de Cintura. Florianópolis: Editora Mulheres.
+
+Diniz, D. (2015). Cadeia: Relatos sobre mulheres. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização
+
+Brasileira.
+
+Gatti, B. A. (2005). Grupo focal na pesquisa em Ciências sociais e humanas.
+
+Brasília: Líber Livro.
+
+Gondim, S. M. G. (2003). Grupos focais como técnica de investigação qualitativa:
+desafios metodológicos. Paidéia: Cadernos de Psicologia e Educação,
+12 (24), pp. 149-161.
+
+Kant de Lima, R.; Lupetti, B. (2010). O desafio de realizar pesquisa empírica no
+
+Direito: uma contribuição antropológica. Paper apresentado no 7º Encontro
+da ABCP – Associação Brasileira de Ciência Politica, Recife, 4-7 ago.
+
+Krueger, R. A.; Casey, M. A. (2000). Focus groups: A practical guide for applied
+187
+
+research. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.
+
+Malinowski, B. (1978). Argonautas do Pacífico Ocidental: um relato do empreendimento
+e da aventura dos nativos nos arquipélagos da Nova
+
+Guiné Melanésia. São Paulo: Ática.
+
+Nielsen, L. B. (2010). The Need for Multi-method Approaches in Empirical
+
+Legal Research. In: The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research. Oxford
+University Press.
+
+Padovani, N. C. (2015). Sobre casos e casamentos: afetos e “amores” através
+
+de penitenciárias femininas em São Paulo e Barcelona. Tese (Doutorado)
+
+– Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Universidade Estadual de
+
+Campinas, Campinas.
+
+Penalva, J. (2013). Empiria e Argumentação: pesquisa e intervenção social.
+
+In: O Papel da pesquisa na política legislativa. Volume especial Série Pensando
+o Direito, n.º 50. Brasília.
+
+Ressel, L. B. et al. (2008). O uso do grupo focal em pesquisa qualitativa. Texto
+
+contexto - enferm. [online]. 17 (4), pp.779-786. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/
+
+S0104-07072008000400021.
+
+Sá, A. A.. Braga, A.G.M., Bretan, M.E.A.N.; Calderoni, V. (Orgs.). (2013). GDUCC:
+
+grupo de diálogo universidade: cárcere: comunidade: uma experiência de integração
+entre a sociedade e o cárcere. 1. ed. Brasília: Ministério da Justiça.
+
+Zaluar, A. (2000). Máquina e Revolta. São Paulo: Brasiliense.
+
+Wilkinson, S. (2004). Focus Group Research. In: D. Silverman, [Ed.].Qualitative
+Research: theory, method and practice. London: Sage.
+Grupo focal na prisão // Ana Gabriela Braga e
+Bruna Angotti
+188
+
+8. ANEXO CONVITE
+CONVITE
+
+Eu, Ana Gabriela Braga (professora da UNESP e coordenadora do projeto CADEIA)
+e Bruna Angotti (professora do Mackenzie), coordenamos a pesquisa
+
+“Dar à luz na sombra”, que estuda a questão da maternidade e prisão. A ideia
+
+da pesquisa é conversar com as pessoas envolvidas com esse tema para propormos
+mudanças que melhorem a condição da mulher encarcerada. Estamos
+entrevistando juízes, promotores, advogados, professores, e visitando
+
+alguns estabelecimentos para conversar com mulheres presas.
+
+Para a gente, a SUA opinião é muito importante, afinal é VOCÊ que sofre na
+
+pele o dia-a-dia atrás das grades, então ninguém melhor do que a mulher presa
+
+pra falar e dar ideias do que é bom ou não pra sua vida e de seus filhos e filhas.
+
+Nossa equipe de pesquisa estará na Cadeia Pública de Franca na próxima
+
+segunda e terça, 14 e 15 de outubro, de manhã e a tarde, conversando em grupos
+e individualmente com quem quiser falar com a gente e participar das
+
+nossas atividades. Todas estão convidadas a participar, não tem nenhum
+
+requisito, nem mesmo precisa ser mãe.
+
+Sua participação na pesquisa será totalmente anônima, ou seja, ninguém
+saberá seu nome ou que resposta deu. As informações que você compartilhar
+com a gente serão utilizadas unicamente para fins de pesquisa, não
+
+prejudicarão, tampouco contribuirão, para sua situação processual ou penitenciária.
+Sinta-se à vontade para deixar de responder qualquer pergunta
+
+ou atividade, assim como para deixar de participar da pesquisa a qualquer
+
+momento, sem precisar dar qualquer explicação.
+
+Muito obrigada por sua participação, esperamos que com essa pesquisa
+
+possamos contribuir um pouco para levar luz às milhares de mães que tem
+
+as grades entre elas e seus filhos.
+
+Até a próxima semana, abraços.
+189
+
+6
+
+Uma introdução à pesquisa
+
+documental // Andréa Depieri de A.
+
+Reginato1
+
+Os documentos são, sem dúvida alguma, a principal fonte da pesquisa
+empírica em Direito. Uma primeira dificuldade quanto a esta estratégia
+de pesquisa reside no fato de que nós, juristas, somos tão íntimos
+dos documentos, que somos capazes de mobilizá-los sem nem nos
+darmos conta de que o que temos em mãos é um documento e que
+assim deve ser tratado. Acredito que essa invisibilidade não é resultante
+apenas da nossa falta de maturidade enquanto pesquisadores, mas
+que se consolida ainda durante a graduação em Direito, quando temos
+um íntimo contato com documentos que sequer nos são apresentados
+formalmente como tal. Simplesmente lidamos com eles sem nem pensar
+no que são ou de onde vêm. Explico: começamos a graduação e tão
+
+1 Embora professora universitária há anos, apenas despertei para a pesquisa documental
+quando me tornei membro da Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Estado de
+Sergipe - CEV e tive que lidar com a documentação produzida durante os períodos de
+repressão no Brasil, de 1946 a 1988, seus arquivos e seus inúmeros problemas. Minha
+gratidão a Gilson Reis, pesquisador, também membro da CEV, que me apresentou aos
+arquivos e também à chamada Diplomática Arquivística.
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+190
+
+logo somos iniciados nas disciplinas de recorte dogmático, acessamos
+aos códigos e a outras compilações normativas e doutrinárias, que nos
+são apresentados como ferramentas de trabalho, nunca como documentos.
+Atos normativos, todavia, são documentos, assim como as
+decisões judiciais (sentenças ou acórdãos). No caso das últimas, tanto
+pior, posto que vamos aprendendo a pesquisar, coletar e selecionar a
+jurisprudência durante os programas de estágio, com a ajuda de quem
+também aprendeu a fazê-lo na prática. A doutrina tampouco consegue
+ser observada por nós como documento. Talvez tenhamos algum
+grau de consciência quanto aos instrumentos de determinados atos e
+negócios jurídicos, em especial quando o documento é central em um
+litígio e estamos, por exemplo, a procurar uma nulidade. Temos muita
+dificuldade, contudo, para aplicar uma técnica de pesquisa rigorosa,
+ou mesmo um raciocínio jurídico mais preciso, frente a documentos
+como uma lei, uma decisão judicial, os autos de um processo ou uma
+publicação de natureza doutrinária2
+.
+Documentos podem ser mobilizados como fonte de dados tanto
+para pesquisas qualitativas como quantitativas ou ainda como complemento
+em uma pesquisa de natureza biográfica, por exemplo. No
+campo das ciências sociais, em especial na história, na sociologia e
+na educação há uma longa e popular tradição, em permanente evolução,
+no que toca à pesquisa documental, que abrange, hoje, desde
+a coleta física em arquivos até o levantamento de fontes documentais
+virtuais advindas de sítios na internet ou mesmo através de
+e-mail, cuja incerteza quanto à proveniência da informação tem sido
+motivo de preocupação e reflexão constantes. Ao mesmo tempo, importantes
+fundos pertencentes a arquivos públicos começaram a ser
+digitalizados, constituindo incríveis bancos de dados pesquisáveis,
+acessíveis a todos pela internet, o que oportuniza uma série de novas
+possibilidades para o uso de documentos na pesquisa.
+
+2 Para a maior parte dos autores a pesquisa bibliográfica é considerada uma modalidade
+de pesquisa documental, como se vê adiante.
+191
+
+Reconhecer um documento, muito embora fundamental, porque
+nos remete aos registros específicos dessa forma de pesquisa, não
+é a maior dificuldade encontrada quando tratamos uma fonte documental.
+Cellard (2008, p.296) chama a atenção para o fato de que
+“o pesquisador que trabalha com documentos deve superar vários
+obstáculos e desconfiar de inúmeras armadilhas”. Lidar com documentos
+exige, antes mesmo que possamos analisar seu conteúdo,
+que se avalie o próprio documento, sua autenticidade, credibilidade,
+representatividade e sentido (Scott, 1990, p. 2006).
+O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar, de forma introdutória, os
+principais pontos em torno dos quais se desenvolveu uma perspectiva
+teórica para a pesquisa documental nas ciências sociais, pensando
+na aplicação dessa forma de pesquisa ao campo do Direito. As
+obras de referência são os trabalhos de Scott, A Matter of Reccord:
+documentary sources in social research, de 1990 e Documentary Research,
+de 2006, com destaque para o seu volume um, intitulado Theory
+and Methods. Lindsay Prior escreveu Using Documents in Social
+Research, de 2003, um excelente guia para a pesquisa com documentos
+em ciências sociais e é, assim como Scott, citação constante nos
+trabalhos em língua inglesa sobre pesquisa documental. Em comum,
+ambos os autores defendem a tese de que é possível tratar documentos
+de forma científica, visto que, documentos escritos, dos mais
+diferentes tipos, acabam por partilhar características peculiares que
+os diferenciam de outras fontes materiais de pesquisa (Scott, 1990,
+p.2). No marco deste recorte, a pesquisa documental se constitui, ela
+própria, como um campo de pesquisa, que reivindica um tratamento
+teórico específico (Prior, 2003 p. x).
+Outra referência importante para pensar a pesquisa documental
+é o trabalho de Luciana Duranti3
+, considerado como o turning point
+
+3 Diretora do Master on Archival Studies da Universidade de British Columbia, Vancouver,
+Canadá. Diretora do Projeto InterPARES, pesquisa internacional multidisciplinar sobre
+preservação de documentos digitais autênticos.
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+192
+
+tanto para a arquivística como para a chamada ciência Diplomática.
+Duranti publicou, na Archivaria, revista da Associação dos Arquivistas
+Canadenses (ACA) uma série de seis artigos, de 1989 a 1992, intitulados
+Diplomatics: new uses for an old science4
+, defendendo a tese de
+que os mesmos parâmetros desenvolvidos para testar a autenticidade
+de documentos medievais poderiam ser utilizados no estudo de
+documentos administrativos produzidos contemporaneamente. Vale
+destacar que a pesquisa Diplomática, desenvolvida para a análise de
+documentos medievais se disseminou e se desenvolveu, no século
+XVII, nas principais Escolas de Direito de toda a Europa5
+ (Tognolli e
+Guimarães, 2009; Duranti, 1989, P.13-14), propondo um tipo de análise
+documental de grande utilidade para a pesquisa em Direito.
+De uma forma geral, escassa é a literatura que trata da pesquisa documental
+em uma perspectiva teórica. Prior (2003, p.IX-X) levanta por
+hipótese que a falta de estudos científicos que destaquem métodos
+sistemáticos e rigorosos para lidar com documentos decorre do fato de
+que as pesquisas qualitativas e seu sofisticado aparato metodológico
+desenvolveram-se principalmente a partir de culturas orais, em sociedades
+não letradas, fazendo com que os registros escritos fossem relegados
+a um segundo plano, marginal e subsidiário. May (2004) levanta
+outras três hipóteses para essa escassez: (i) uma percepção equivocada,
+herança do positivismo, que considera dados documentais de um
+“empirismo grosseiro”; (ii) a ideia de que a pesquisa documental está
+relacionada especialmente à pesquisa histórica; (iii) a dificuldade de
+pensar metodologicamente o uso dos documentos, vez que, do ponto
+de vista do método, apresentar uma pesquisa como documental nunca
+é suficiente, porque além do rigor com que devem ser tratados os
+
+4 Todas as seis partes do artigo se encontram disponíveis no sítio da revista: http://archivaria.ca/index.php/archivaria/search/authors/view?firstName=Luciana&middleName=&lastName=Duranti&affiliation=&country=5
+É curioso não mais estudarmos, nem haver resquícios da Diplomática em nenhuma
+das cátedras dos nossos cursos de Direito. Esta ciência se desenvolveu justamente a
+partir de controvérsias políticas, religiosas e jurídicas em torno dos documentos e de
+sua autenticidade.
+193
+
+documentos, ainda será preciso definir (metodologicamente) como a
+documentação coletada será utilizada.
+No Brasil não é muito diferente. Encontrei artigos que apresentam
+a pesquisa documental como parte de uma narrativa mais
+genérica sobre tipos e métodos de pesquisa ou ainda textos que
+tratam da pesquisa documental aplicada a áreas específicas como
+história, educação, administração, etc... e não textos que tratam teoricamente
+da pesquisa documental. Os trabalhos de Cellard e May,
+constantes nas indicações bibliográficas abaixo, são exceção, foram
+traduzidos para o português e são excelentes referências para pensar
+teoricamente a pesquisa com documentos escritos. Contudo, a despeito
+das dificuldades apontadas, considerando o papel da escrita e
+da burocracia estatal nas sociedades modernas, pensar e sofisticar
+teoricamente a pesquisa documental é tarefa urgente.
+Por tratar-se de texto introdutório, não pretendo aprofundar aqui
+as diversas possibilidades de tratamento analítico decorrentes de
+uma pesquisa documental, mas antes apresentar formas de reconhecer,
+usar e pensar especificamente os documentos escritos como
+fontes primárias ou secundárias de dados, para que possam ser aplicados
+à pesquisa na área do Direito. Este artigo busca inicialmente
+conceituar o que é documento; discorre sobre os critérios reconhecidamente
+utilizados na análise documental em geral e apresenta,
+em linhas gerais, as contribuições da Diplomática para uma análise
+precisa de documentos administrativos (categoria na qual se encontra
+incluída a documentação jurídica); no tópico final o artigo problematiza
+a autenticidade de documentos obtidos virtualmente.
+Minha intenção é chamar a atenção para o fato de que, cada vez
+que desenvolvemos uma pesquisa que mobiliza algum tipo de instrumento
+jurídico, norma, jurisprudência, autos ou peças processuais
+isoladamente consideradas, estamos no campo da pesquisa
+empírica em direito, especialmente da pesquisa documental (que,
+evidentemente, pode e deve se somar a outras diferentes estratégias
+analíticas de pesquisa). É importante lembrar que documentos cos-
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+194
+
+tumam ser estruturados de forma bem específica e que seu sentido
+se revela para o pesquisador em face do seu grau de iniciação naquele
+campo específico. Quanto mais o pesquisador tenha domínio do
+contexto particular das condições de produção de um determinado
+documento (Cellard, 2008, p.302), mais lhe será possível compreender
+a dinâmica e o sentido do documento sob sua análise. Assim, ao
+conseguir trabalhar conscientemente com um documento produzido
+no contexto jurídico, removendo alguns obstáculos, ganhando
+distância da fonte e melhorando seu padrão de observação, o pesquisador
+que tenha formação na área do Direito terá potencializada
+sua capacidade de desenvolver uma boa pesquisa empírica.
+
+1. Os documentos e algumas de suas possíveis
+classificações
+A pesquisa documental envolve o uso de textos e registros que se
+apresentam a partir de uma fonte material. Cellard (2008, p. 296-297)
+nos conta que inicialmente, a partir da pesquisa histórica, ainda no
+século XIX, eram considerados como documentos exclusivamente
+textos e arquivos oficiais. Só com o desenvolvimento da história social
+é que todo tipo de evidência (May,2004), vestígio, testemunho ou
+registro, passa a ser considerado como documento ou fonte. O meio
+em que é registrado o documento é irrelevante (Scott, 1990, p.5):
+pode ser papel, película fotográfica ou qualquer outro meio de registro
+possível. Documentos são artefatos cuja principal característica é
+o registro intencional de um texto6
+. O desenvolvimento da internet e
+do e-mail oportunizaram o surgimento de documentos virtuais, colocando
+na ordem do dia a necessidade de se pensar as implicações
+desse tipo de fonte na pesquisa documental.
+Atualmente, consideramos como documentos não apenas os
+
+6 Scott (1990, p.05) sugere não ser razoável considerar como documentos alguns objetos
+que contém inscrições como por exemplo um relógio, vez que as inscrições são
+periféricas em razão da própria natureza do objeto.
+195
+
+registros escritos, manuscritos ou impressos em papel, mas toda a
+produção cultural consubstanciada em alguma forma material. Assim,
+são também considerados documentos os registros iconográficos,
+cinematográficos e qualquer outro tipo de registro do cotidiano
+(Cellard, 2008, p. 296), como filmes, vídeos, fotografias, programas de
+rádio, pinturas, plantas arquitetônicas, etc... “The world is crammed
+full of human, personal documents”, nos lembra McCulloch (2004, p.
+1). Além de uma infinidade de documentos pessoais7
+, toda nossa vida
+é perpassada por documentos públicos8
+ de todos os tipos.
+Há diferentes classificações possíveis para pensar documentos.
+Normalmente as classificações giram em torno das seguintes categorias
+básicas: documentos públicos e documentos privados. Documentos
+públicos são tipicamente aqueles que foram publicados, apresentados
+publicamente ou ainda aqueles organizados e classificados em
+arquivos públicos e sobre os quais geralmente recai, observadas regras
+específicas, o dever de publicidade. Incluem-se nessa categoria os documentos
+oficiais, aí compreendidos todos aqueles produzidos pelas
+diferentes instâncias da administração pública e agências estatais variadas,
+a exemplo dos processos judiciais e administrativos, estatísticas,
+relatórios oficiais, balancetes, certidões de nascimento e casamento,
+registros de propriedade, diplomas e muitos outros e os documentos
+não oficiais, normalmente produzidos pela mídia de massa, tais como
+jornais, revistas, livros, obituários, peças publicitárias, etc...
+Os documentos privados, por sua vez, podem estar relacionados
+a uma organização de natureza jurídica privada e por essa razão es7
+“As pessoas mantêm diários, enviam cartas, fazem colchas, tiram fotos, fazem guias,
+compõem autobiografias, constroem sites, grafitam, publicam suas memórias, escrevem
+cartas, compõem currículos, deixam notas de suicídio, gravam diários de vídeo,
+inscrevem epitáfios em lápides, gravam filmes, pintam, fazem fitas e tentam gravar
+seus sonhos pessoais.” (Plummer apud McCulloch, 2004, p.1, minha tradução).
+8 “Em um nível público, também, as nossas identidades são definidas pelos documentos
+que são mantidos sobre nós - documentos como certidões de nascimento, resultados
+de exames, cartas de habilitação, extratos bancários, histórias de jornal, atas de
+reunião, obituários e testamentos.” (McCulloch, 2004, p.1, minha tradução).
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+196
+
+tarem ordenados e classificados também em arquivos. A esses, aqui
+me refiro como documentos privados de natureza organizacional,
+tais como documentos das empresas, igrejas e sindicatos. São também
+documentos privados os chamados documentos pessoais, que
+incluem correspondências, diários, autobiografias, registros de memória,
+dentre tantos outros.
+Para Scott, os documentos administrativos produzidos por organizações
+e agências, governamentais (public records) ou privadas,
+são as mais importantes fontes documentais utilizadas na pesquisa
+social (Scott 1990, p. 59), em oposição aos documentos pessoais. Na
+opinião de McCulloch (2004, p. 4), Scott negligenciou os documentos
+pessoais, que se tornam cada vez mais importantes para a pesquisa
+social, especialmente após o advento da internet.
+Outra classificação importante é aquela que distingue um documento
+como sendo uma “fonte primária” ou uma “fonte secundária”.
+Para explicar esta distinção, McCulloch (2004, p. 25-26) retoma
+um conhecido trabalho de Marwick9
+ no campo da história, onde são
+consideradas fontes primárias as evidências básicas, cruas e imperfeitas,
+produzidas temporalmente dentro do contexto estudado, normalmente
+fragmentadas e de difícil uso, mais significativas para o
+historiador do que para o público em geral. As fontes secundárias, por
+outro lado, seriam produzidas em um momento posterior e corresponderiam
+à produção dos historiadores, como dissertações, artigos
+e livros. As fontes primárias para a história são os testemunhos diretos
+dos fatos, enquanto fontes secundárias reproduzem posteriormente
+fatos não presenciados diretamente. (Cellard, 2008, p. 297).
+É amplamente sabido que essa classificação se revela problemática,
+na medida em que o que é considerado primário em um quadro
+teórico pode ser secundário em outro (Prior, 2003, p.28). Mais que
+isso, o que acontece é que há muitos documentos que não se encai9
+Marwick, A. The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language. London:
+Palgrave, 2001.
+197
+
+xam propriamente nesses recortes pré-estabelecidos. Um exemplo
+é dado pelo relatório confidencial10, apócrifo, produzido e arquivado
+por uma das agências do SNI – Serviço Nacional de Informação,
+que reporta que o então Arcebispo de Aracaju/SE, D. Luciano Duarte,
+havia denunciado, em um documento sigiloso, dirigido ao Núncio
+Apostólico do Brasil, como subversivas as atividades de Dom Hélder
+Câmara, especialmente porque pregara a necessidade de união
+entre “camponeses, operários e estudantes com vistas à derrubada
+do regime”. Pois bem, se quisermos investigar as atividades do clero
+durante a ditadura civil-militar brasileira, a fonte primária passaria
+a ser a referida carta dirigida ao Núncio Apostólico e não o relatório
+do agente do SNI que, ademais, não fornece nenhuma pista sobre
+a origem da informação reportada. Assim, o relatório citado, produzido
+pelo SNI, pode ser visto como fonte primária quando estamos
+a observar o funcionamento dessa agência e seus mecanismos de
+registro e controle da informação. Contudo, quando o documento é
+observado isoladamente e queremos alcançar a própria informação
+ou fato ali narrado, percebemos tratar-se de uma fonte secundária.
+Muito embora a classificação das fontes em primária e secundária
+possa ser ambígua, já que um documento que se constitui como
+fonte primária em um contexto aparece como secundária em outro11
+e, a despeito das dificuldades em se classificar de forma definitiva
+e a priori uma fonte documental escrita, essa classificação não deixa
+de ser importante. Primeiro, porque serve como parâmetro para
+selecionar o grau de importância de um documento no contexto de
+uma pesquisa e, depois, porque ajuda a perceber também o seu grau
+de confiabilidade. As fontes são usualmente classificadas, em textos
+introdutórios à pesquisa acadêmica, da seguinte forma:
+
+10 Arquivo Nacional: BR.AN.RIO.TT.O.MCP.AVU.428 UD 154
+11 Um outro exemplo usual quanto a essa dificuldade de classificação aparece no
+caso das autobiografias, porque normalmente o autor é uma testemunha direta da
+história. Contudo seu registro dos fatos é posterior e por isso não se enquadra exatamente
+como uma fonte primária.
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+198
+
+1. Fontes primárias – são todas aquelas que permitem ao pesquisador
+se aproximar ao máximo do evento pesquisado, de ideias originais
+ou ainda dos resultados de uma pesquisa empírica. Essas
+fontes podem incluir documentos originais, trabalhos criativos,
+relatos produzidos em primeira mão ou mesmo a publicação dos
+resultados diretos de uma pesquisa empírica. As fontes primárias
+resultam da participação ou observação direta dos fatos.
+2. Fontes secundárias – são aquelas que se dedicam à análise, revisão,
+sistematização ou resumo das informações decorrentes de
+uma fonte primária ou mesmo de fontes secundárias. É muito comum
+que fontes secundárias interajam entre si e que mobilizem
+os esforços teóricos típicos de uma área do saber para alcançar
+resultados. As fontes secundárias se constituem como as principais
+fontes de análise e interpretação das fontes primárias.
+3. Fontes terciárias12 – essa categoria se refere especificamente a
+fontes que proporcionam uma visão genérica acerca de tópicos
+específicos, compilando e sistematizando de uma forma bastante
+conveniente informações constantes em outras fontes ou fornecendo
+informações dentro de um contexto que ajuda a interpretá-las,
+a exemplo das enciclopédias e dicionários.
+
+Quanto à sua forma, muito embora, de forma usual, o documento
+seja pensado como um registro escrito, unidimensional, e os textos
+sejam sua principal característica, contemporaneamente os documentos
+podem se apresentar de forma multidimensional (PRIOR,
+2003, p.5) apresentando, por exemplo, pinturas, gráficos, diagramas,
+selos, carimbos, logos, além do próprio texto. Neste mesmo sentido,
+
+12 Essa categoria é bastante questionável, já que, a rigor, as tais fontes terciárias seriam
+aquelas que mobilizam outras fontes, primárias ou secundárias, o que corresponde à
+exata definição de fonte secundária. Não obstante, essa classificação tem sido bastante
+recorrente porquanto propõe uma diferenciação sobretudo qualitativa entre as fontes:
+enquanto as secundárias são mais sofisticadas do ponto de vista da análise porque oferecem
+uma interpretação acerca das fontes primárias e secundárias analisadas, as terciárias
+são bastante genéricas e basicamente organizam a informação.
+199
+
+Fairclough (apud McCulloch, 2004, p. 3) chama a atenção para o fato
+de que os textos produzidos pelas sociedades contemporâneas são
+cada vez mais “multi-semióticos”, o que gera a necessidade de que
+se desenvolvam novos caminhos de análise sobre como as diferentes
+formas semióticas de linguagem interagem com o/no texto. Assim,
+por exemplo, como vemos na peça processual de denúncia13 abaixo:
+
+Quando a promotoria opta por escrever a palavra “denúncia”
+utilizando-se de uma fonte conhecida como Ice Snow (neve gelada),
+lança mão de um recurso iconográfico, que revela ou acrescenta ao
+texto um novo significado. Igualmente quando opta por escrever o
+nome14 do denunciado usando a fonte denominada Blood (sangue).
+É impossível analisar um documento como este sem levar em conta
+a significação da iconografia acrescentada ao texto.
+
+2. Critérios para avaliar a qualidade de um documento:Estamos
+cercados de documentos por todos os lados: quando lemos
+o jornal, examinamos os dados de uma pesquisa eleitoral ou tentamos
+entender os números da previdência, por exemplo, estamos
+lidando com documentos. Também produzimos incessantemente
+documentos, quando gravamos um áudio, tiramos uma foto, ou ain13
+Imagem recortada de cópia escaneada dos autos do processo crime autuado sob nº
+627/98 da Comarca de Cedro de São João, Sergipe.
+14 Apaguei os sobrenomes, que foram originalmente escritos com as mesmas letras,
+para preservar o denunciado.
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+200
+
+da no caso dos juristas, quando produzimos pareceres, despachos,
+petições e outros. Na elaboração de uma pesquisa que mobilize documentos
+é esperado que o pesquisador adote uma postura completamente
+diferente daquela que adota quando lê o seu jornal todos os
+dias. Igualmente, mobilizar um documento para uma pesquisa empírica
+em direito não é a mesma coisa do que selecionar oportunamente
+a jurisprudência mais adequada como argumento de autoridade
+para uma determinada peça processual.
+O que distingue a posição do pesquisador das demais pessoas na
+condução das suas atividades diárias é que o pesquisador sabe que
+os dados são constituídos a partir de objetivos definidos, científica e
+teoricamente. A validade e a confiabilidade dos dados dependem da
+qualidade da evidência disponível para análise. Para Scott (1990, p.6)
+verificar a qualidade da evidência é fundamental em qualquer pesquisa
+social. Partindo dessa constatação ele propõe um conjunto de critérios,
+traduzidos em perguntas, que podem ser utilizados para a avaliação
+de quaisquer evidências, incluindo os documentos. São eles:
+
+a. Autenticidade: a evidência é genuína e sua origem inquestionável?
+b. Credibilidade: a evidência está livre de erros e distorções?
+c. Representatividade: trata-se de uma evidência típica da sua espécie
+e, se não, a extensão da sua atipicidade é conhecida?
+d. Sentido: a evidência é claramente compreensível?
+(Scott,1990, p.6, tradução da autora)
+
+Estas regras básicas estão hoje bem estabelecidas e não podem
+ser ignoradas em uma pesquisa que mobilize documentos em qualquer
+nível. Para McCulloch (2004, p.36)15 a aferição do sentido se
+
+15 MacCullooch (2004, p.35) reforça a ideia de que existem regras básicas para a análise
+documental, que se apresentam geralmente como authenticity, reliability, meaning
+and theorisation. São basicamente os mesmos princípios já apresentados por Scott
+(1990), acrescidos da teorização. A credibilidade e a representatividade de Scott aparecem
+no trabalho de MacCullooch em uma única fase, reliability (confiabilidade).
+201
+
+completa com um quinto critério, a “teorização”, vez que, é impossível
+analisar qualquer documento sem que o pesquisador se socorra
+de um quadro de referência teórico que permita interpretá-lo.
+O primeiro estágio do processo de análise documental é aferir a
+autenticidade do documento, saber se ele é genuíno. Isto significa,
+como observa Scott (1990, p.6), determinar se sua origem é inquestionável.
+Além da aferição quanto à origem é preciso ter em mente
+também os processos de conservação e transmissão daquele documento,
+levando em conta eventos e circunstâncias que possam de
+alguma forma tê-lo afetado. Assim, é preciso checar a autoria, o local
+e a data de escrita, para verificar se a evidência é original e afastar a
+possibilidade de que o documento tenha sido posteriormente alterado.
+É preciso também inspecionar se o documento que se tem em
+mãos se apresenta de forma correta e completa. Documentos públicos,
+especialmente aqueles catalogados junto arquivos respeitáveis
+costumam não ser problemáticos, mas em muitos casos, pode haver
+erros, às mais das vezes decorrentes do processo de cópia ou reprodução.
+Neste processo é preciso procurar eventuais inconsistências,
+tanto no próprio documento, como em relação ao contexto de sua
+produção. Sem que se chegue a uma conclusão sobre a autenticidade
+do documento não há nenhuma possibilidade de se prosseguir com
+um julgamento informado sobre sua qualidade (Scott, 1990, p.7).
+Investigar a autenticidade de um documento reivindica conhecer
+sua origem e os processos de produção, conservação e transmissão
+relacionados ao mesmo. Assim por exemplo, na minha pesquisa atual16,
+um estudo de caso efetuado a partir da análise dos autos de um
+processo-crime produzido durante a ditadura civil-militar no Brasil, a
+
+16 Trata-se do processo-crime autuado sob nº 06/76 e instaurado como consequência
+da chamada Operação Cajueiro, ocorrida no ano de 1976, em Aracaju, Sergipe, para
+apurar o envolvimento dos Denunciados com o PCB – Partido Comunista Brasileiro,
+o que, à época, era considerado crime pela Lei de Segurança Nacional, visto que tal
+partido encontrava-se na ilegalidade. Para saber mais: “Operação Cajueiro: Um Carnaval
+de Torturas”, curta-metragem. Disponível em: https://www.youtube.com/watch?-
+v=pAT_U-IEyZw. Acesso em 24.mar.2017
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+202
+
+autenticidade da documentação foi garantida pela sua origem, neste
+caso o arquivo do Superior Tribunal Militar, onde os autos permaneceram
+desde que a decisão final transitou em julgado, no ano de
+1978. Contudo, conhecer a origem dos autos não basta. Neste caso
+foi preciso investigar também em que condições se deu o arquivamento
+e checar se a documentação que foi escaneada em frente e
+verso, pela própria Corte, correspondia a uma cópia fidedigna do
+original. Com os seis volumes dos autos em mãos, comecei a olhar,
+isoladamente, os documentos que compõem o processo, passando
+a empreender um esforço de verificação quanto à autenticidade de
+cada um, checando a origem do documento e o percurso até sua juntada
+aos autos. Esclareço que, nesse caso, as prisões (sequestros e
+torturas) ocorreram em Aracaju, Sergipe, onde também foi feito o Inquérito
+Policial Militar, enquanto o processo-crime tramitou em Salvador,
+perante a 6ª Circunscrição Militar. A origem da documentação
+é muitas vezes confusa, porque os aparatos de repressão eram variados
+e as atribuições e competências nem sempre claras e estritas.
+Uma vez que a autenticidade do documento tenha sido aferida,
+o documento é considerado válido como evidência, o que não significa,
+automaticamente, que os fatos ali narrados correspondam à
+verdade. É necessário então checar a credibilidade do documento,
+aferir se o que se tem sob exame não contém erros ou distorções, isto
+é, conferir a honestidade e a precisão das informações constantes do
+relato, nas palavras de Scott (1990, p.22) “sincerity and accuracy”. É
+neste estágio que se avalia o quanto um determinado conteúdo pode
+ser levado em conta, o que inclui uma preocupação com a verdade
+da narrativa e seus eventuais desvios (McCulloch, 2004, p.36), que
+podem ser intencionais ou acidentais. O pesquisador que trabalha
+com documentos deve constantemente duvidar, como forma de detectar
+distorções no seu material de pesquisa.
+Voltando ao processo-crime decorrente da Operação Cajueiro17,
+
+17 Ver nota acima.
+203
+
+encontrei várias inconsistências e indícios de que, embora a documentação
+seja genuína, o conteúdo de alguns dos documentos pode
+ter sido forjado, não correspondendo de forma fidedigna à realidade.
+Um exemplo é o documento que segue: trata-se de documento autêntico,
+não obstante não possuir credibilidade. Observe:
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+204
+
+Trata-se de um Laudo de Exame de Corpo de Delito realizado em um
+dos réus do processo sob análise que, acusado de subversão por filiação
+e militância clandestinas junto ao Partido Comunista Brasileiro,
+foi torturado por dias em dependência do Exército Brasileiro (28º
+Batalhão de Caçadores), antes que sua prisão tenha sido oficializada
+e registrada no Inquérito Policial Militar. Esse laudo é absolutamente
+205
+
+autêntico, foi realmente produzido no IML da Bahia, quando a prisão
+já era conhecida e havia sido “regularizada”. Entretanto, o relato
+constante do documento é falso.
+O 4º quesito pede que os peritos indiquem se “ocorreu ou poderá
+ocorrer, perda ou inutilização de membro sentido ou função?” E a resposta,
+constante do item B, na terceira linha, de baixo para cima, indica
+que não: “Respostas aos quesitos: ao primeiro, sim; do segundo ao
+sexto, não;[...]”. Ocorre que, neste caso, o periciado, Milton Coelho de
+Carvalho, ficou cego após as sessões de tortura que se seguiram à sua
+prisão, portanto, houve, sim, perda de sentido e função, ao contrário
+do que consta no documento sob análise. O documento em questão
+não possui credibilidade alguma com relação ao fato que descreve (as
+lesões corporais e sua extensão). Por outro lado, trata-se de um documento
+bastante representativo dessa espécie documental.
+A representatividade do documento resulta de uma análise capaz
+de definir o quão típica a evidência disponível é, para que a partir daí
+sejam atribuídos limites às conclusões extraídas dela (Scott 1990, p.7),
+evitando-se um resultado enviesado. A questão (e a dificuldade aqui) é
+conseguir avaliar o quanto o documento que sobreviveu para estudo é
+“representativo” ou “típico” ou “generalizável” de uma coleção e não um
+elemento idiossincrásico. Para exemplificar, o documento acima (Laudo
+de Exame de Lesões Corporais) pode ser avaliado como absolutamente
+típico e representativo da sua espécie, foi elaborado como um formulário
+a ser completado pelos peritos, apresenta a mesma quesitação padrão
+utilizada até hoje, e serve para que, pelo grau das lesões, se possa aquilatar
+as qualificadoras do crime, de acordo com sua tipificação no direito
+brasileiro. Vale destacar que mesmo quanto à sua narrativa, o documento
+também é representativo18, vez que durante a ditadura civil-militar era
+usual que os Laudos apresentassem informações não confiáveis.
+
+18 VIEIRA,M. e FURTADO, B. Passado em julgamento: legistas acusados de colaboração
+com torturadores podem ter registros cassados. Revista Época. 04. ago.2010. Disponível
+em: http://revistaepoca.globo.com/Revista/Epoca/0,,EMI160772-15518,00.html.
+Acesso em 1.mai.2017
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+206
+Mas como saber se um documento diz a verdade ou se é representativo?
+Cellard (2008, 305) ensina que para avaliar a qualidade de um
+documento “o pesquisador deve tender à saturação das categorias:
+ou seja, coletar depoimentos corroborantes, que permitam produzir
+uma análise coerente do fenômeno pesquisado”. No caso do Laudo
+acima há uma sequência de outros laudos médicos, particulares,
+também do ano de 1976, juntados aos autos, que contradizem a informação
+do Laudo oficial, mas há sobretudo os depoimentos de Milton
+Coelho19, que explicitam os fatos e provam sua cegueira, causada pela
+tortura. Cellard (2008, p. 305) chama a atenção para o fato de que,
+na pesquisa documental, especialmente na pesquisa qualitativa, um
+único documento pode importar muito mais do que inúmeros depoimentos,
+mais pobres. Isso acontece quando o documento é especialmente
+representativo daquela espécie de documento.
+O quarto critério de Scott (1990, p.08), sentido, se refere à análise
+textual do documento, à verificação do quanto o texto do documento
+que se tem sob exame é claro e compreensível ao pesquisador.
+Para analisar o sentido de um documento é preciso examinar também
+elementos intertextuais e semióticos e adequar a narrativa do
+documento ao contexto histórico no qual foi produzido, levando-se
+em conta quem é o emissor e quem seriam os possíveis destinatários
+do documento. Para que se possa compreender por completo o sentido
+de um documento é preciso conhecer, por exemplo, a língua na
+qual fora escrito à época da sua produção. Um outro exemplo: para
+analisar a documentação produzida por um serviço de inteligência,
+será preciso conhecer os códigos e siglas padronizados pelo serviço.
+Em situações extremas, o sentido do documento só será perceptível
+após decodificação criptográfica. O sentido de um documento se
+manifesta na medida em que o pesquisador consegue entender o
+
+19 Milton Coelho prestou depoimento à Comissão Estadual da Verdade “Paulo Barbosa
+de Araújo”, do Estado de Sergipe. Seu depoimento também pode ser visto no curta
+“Operação Cajueiro”, ver nota 15 acima.
+207
+
+que foi registrado originalmente no documento.
+Evidentemente que, quanto maior o acúmulo teórico do pesquisador,
+maior sua capacidade de avaliar a autenticidade, credibilidade,
+representatividade e sentido de um documento. Por essa razão, McCullogh
+(2004, p. 39-41), além desses quatro critérios, destaca um
+quinto, a teorização. No seu entender é fundamental para análise
+documental a existência de alguma base teórica antecipada, um
+quadro de referência teórica que permita ao pesquisador, de antemão,
+interpretar o material. Sem um mínimo de teorização o sentido
+de um documento pode não ser minimamente compreendido, mas
+mais que isso, problemas relativos à sua autenticidade, credibilidade
+e representatividade podem ser invisibilizados.
+Citando Jupp and Norris, McCullogh (2004, p. 39) recupera três
+perspectivas teóricas (consideradas de forma ampla) a partir das
+quais normalmente se situa a análise documental: positivista, interpretativa
+e crítica.
+
+A perspectiva positivista enfatiza a natureza objetiva, racional, sistemática
+
+e quantitativa do estudo. A perspectiva interpretativa destaca a natureza
+
+dos fenômenos sociais e os documentos como sendo socialmente construídos.
+A tradição crítica é fortemente teórica e de natureza abertamente
+
+política, enfatizando conflito social, poder, controle e ideologia, inclui as
+
+teorias Marxista e Feminista e, mais recentemente, os modos críticos de
+
+análise do discurso. (McCullogh, 2004, p. 39, tradução da autora)
+
+Vale lembrar que uma pesquisa baseada em documentos não é
+linear, mas que deve se dar, antes, como processo social, e que essas
+diferentes perspectivas teóricas para a análise de documentos,
+na prática, acabam por se sobrepor e interagir (McCullogh, 2004, p.
+40). Para compreender um documento é preciso ler entre as linhas
+do nosso mundo material, é preciso compreender as palavras e seguir
+o enredo básico, para depois passar entre as linhas, analisar seu
+significado e seu propósito mais profundo (McCullogh, 2004, p. 1).
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+208
+
+3. O uso contemporâneo da Diplomática
+Como o objetivo deste texto é avançar nas discussões acerca dos problemas
+e dificuldades concernentes à utilização de documentos como
+fonte para a pesquisa empírica em Direito, entendo importante apresentar
+também as discussões em torno do uso contemporâneo da
+chamada análise Diplomática, ou simplesmente, Diplomática, que se
+desenvolveu especificamente em torno da questão da autenticidade
+de documentos administrativos e hoje tem status ciência autônoma:
+
+Diplomatics is the study of the Wesen [being] and Werden [becoming] of
+
+documentation, the analysis of genesis, inner constitution and transmission
+of documents, and of their relationship with the facts represented
+
+in them and with their creators. Thus, it has for the archivist, beyond an
+
+unquestionable practical and technical value, a fundamental formative
+
+value, and constitutes a vital prelude to his specific discipline, archival
+
+Science (Cencelli apud Duranti, 1991).
+
+A Diplomática contemporânea é uma adaptação da ciência diplomática
+medieval, que fora desenvolvida justamente como o objetivo
+de permitir a correta identificação, avaliação e controle dos
+documentos produzidos no medievo e se desenvolveu, nos anos 90,
+como ferramenta teórica de suporte à ciência arquivística, a partir da
+percepção de que os princípios, conceitos e métodos utilizados pela
+Diplomática, universalmente válidos, poderiam ser utilizados de forma
+a sofisticar a pesquisa arquivística. Vale destacar, portanto, que a
+análise Diplomática não se aplica a todo o tipo de documento, mas
+exclusivamente aos chamados documentos administrativos, aqueles
+que nesse texto classifiquei como documentos públicos oficiais e
+documentos privados de natureza organizacional.
+A Diplomática, bem como a paleografia20 e a sigilografia21 nasce20
+Estudo de qualquer forma antiga de escrita, tanto em documentos como em inscrições.
+21 Estudo dos selos apostos nos documentos para os autenticar.
+209
+
+ram da necessidade de se distinguir criticamente documentos autênticos
+daqueles suspeitos de falsificação. O problema concernente à
+identificação de documentos originais é bastante antigo, regras para
+o reconhecimento de documentos autênticos foram introduzidas
+pelo Corpus Iuris Civiles de Justiniano e posteriormente em diversos
+Decretos Papais. A Diplomática se torna uma ciência autônoma no
+curso do que foi chamado de guerra diplomática (bella diplomática),
+uma sequência de disputas acerca da autenticidade de determinados
+conjuntos documentais que ocorreu sistematicamente no século XVII
+e que acabou por criar a necessidade de que se articulasse um método
+para aferir a autenticidade documental (Duranti, 1989, p.12-13)
+Dom Jean Mabillion, monge beneditino, ao escrever sobre a vida
+dos santos beneditinos e responder a uma polêmica anterior que
+havia desacreditado todos os documentos Merovíngios guardados
+e preservados pelo Monastério Beneditino de Saint- Denis, publica,
+no ano de 1681, um tratado intitulado De Re Diplomatica Libri VI, que
+é considerado o marco de nascimento tanto da Diplomática como
+da Paleografia. Mabillion examinou mais de duzentos documentos,
+subdividiu-os em grupos, estabeleceu categorias de análise e separou
+os diferentes aspectos que poderiam ser analisados em cada
+documento como: material, tinta, linguagem, escrita, pontuação,
+abreviaturas, fórmulas, assinaturas, selos, sinais especiais, notas da
+chancelaria e assim por diante. (Duranti, 1989, p. 13)
+No século XVIII o ensino da Diplomática foi introduzido nas Faculdades
+de Direito, o que levou à publicação de inúmeros novos estudos
+na Alemanha, França, Inglaterra, Espanha e Itália. De uma maneira
+geral estes estudos tendiam a um excesso de sistematizações. Entre
+1750 e 1765, dois beneditinos, Tassin e Toustain escreveram Nouveau
+Traité de Diplomatique, obra que introduziu aspectos da pesquisa documental
+e princípios metodológicos, que são validos até hoje. No século
+XIX, Ficker percebeu uma importante distinção conceitual, separando
+o momento do ato jurídico do momento do seu registro e von
+Sickel, ao comparar documentos expedidos por uma mesma chance-
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+210
+
+laria, correlacionou a correta avaliação de um documento à análise
+do seu processo de criação (Duranti, 1989, p.12-14).
+A Diplomática se desenvolveu especialmente a partir da análise
+de documentos administrativos e jurídicos, documentos de arquivo,
+resultantes de atividades administrativas práticas, não se aplicando
+adequadamente aos documentos de ordem pessoal, como cartas ou
+diários. Essa identidade entre documentos de arquivo e documentos
+diplomáticos é estabelecida em 1991, por Baltier, que define como
+novo objeto da crítica diplomática todas as peças de arquivo (Tognolli
+e Guimarães, 2009, p. 28).
+Os três requisitos fundamentais para um estudo diplomático são
+“as circunstâncias da escrita, a natureza jurídica do fato comunicado
+e a forma da compilação” (Duranti, 1989, p.16). Esse método se assenta
+na premissa de que não obstante existam diferenças relativas
+ao tipo de documento, sua proveniência ou data, os documentos são
+suficientemente próximos entre si, de tal modo que é possível conceber
+um modelo ideal, típico, regular e completo, que pode servir de
+guia para o exame de todos os demais documentos22. Uma vez analisados
+e identificados cada um dos elementos desse modelo ideal,
+suas variações, sua presença ou ausência no documento sob exame,
+são capazes de revelar a função administrativa desse mesmo documento
+(Duranti, 1991, p. 6).
+Para a Diplomática a forma do documento é definida por um conjunto
+de regras de representação utilizadas na transmissão de uma
+mensagem. A forma de um documento é tanto física quanto intelectual.
+A primeira se refere aos aspectos externos do documento e os
+elementos identificados a partir deste critério são chamados de elementos
+extrínsecos do documento, enquanto a segunda diz respeito
+à articulação interna desse mesmo documento e os elementos dessa
+natureza são chamados de elementos internos ou intrínsecos da for22
+É justamente este o ponto de partida do trabalho de Luciana Duranti (1989, 1991),
+que permitiu estender as categorias de análise da Diplomática medieval para a análise
+da documentação administrativa contemporânea.
+211
+
+ma documental (Duranti, 1991, p. 6).
+Os elementos extrínsecos da forma documental correspondem à
+sua aparência externa, são eles : o meio, a escrita, a linguagem, os
+sinais especiais, os selos e as anotações. O quadro abaixo resume e
+identifica os elementos extrínsecos que devem ser observados em
+uma análise do tipo diplomática:
+
+Elementos
+
+extrínsecos O que observar:
+
+Meio
+
+• material utilizado (papel, DVD, fita magnética
+
+etc...)
+
+• formato e tamanho
+
+• preparação para receber o documento (marca
+
+d’água por exemplo)
+
+Texto
+
+• layout, paginação, formatação
+
+• tipos de escrita
+
+• diferentes caligrafias, fontes ou tintas
+
+• paragrafação
+
+• pontuação
+
+• abreviaturas e iniciais
+
+• emendas e correções
+
+• programa de computador utilizado
+
+• fórmulas
+
+Linguagem
+
+• vocabulário
+
+• composição
+
+• estilo
+
+Sinais Especiais
+
+• sinais dos escritores e subscritores
+
+• sinais dos oficiais de chancelaria, cartórios e
+
+registros oficiais
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+212
+
+Selos
+
+• material
+
+• formato e tamanho
+
+• tipologia
+
+• legendas ou outras inscrições
+
+• método de fixação
+
+Anotações
+
+• incluídas na fase
+
+de preparação (antes
+da compilação
+
+do documento)
+
+• autenticação
+
+• registro
+
+• incluídas durante
+
+a fase de manuseio
+(percurso do
+
+documento e fases
+
+subsequentes do
+
+qual fez parte)
+
+• assinaturas ao lado do
+
+texto
+
+• ações prévias ou posteriores•
+datas de leitura e escuta
+
+• notas de transmissão
+
+• observações
+
+• dúvidas
+
+• locuções como: “urgente”,
+“deixar em suspenso”,
+“aguardar”
+
+• incluídas na fase
+
+de gestão do documento
+(anotações
+
+acrescidas ao
+
+documento como
+
+registro dos serviços
+de arquivo)
+
+• número de registro
+
+• número de classificação
+
+• referências cruzadas
+
+• data e local do recebimento•
+identificadores do
+
+arquivo
+
+Fonte: Duranti, 1991, p. 10, adaptação e tradução da autora
+
+Os elementos intrínsecos da forma documental revelam, em conjunto,
+a articulação intelectual da forma, apresentam uma estrutura típica
+e podem ser observados a partir de uma “subestrutura analítica
+ideal”, segundo os propósitos específicos de cada parte:
+213
+
+Elementos intrínsecos
+
+Protocolo (contém
+o contexto
+
+administrativo da
+
+ação e a fórmula
+
+inicial do documento)•
+titulação (hoje correspondente ao timbre)
+
+• título do documento
+
+• data
+
+• invocação (menção a Deus)
+
+• subscrição (menção ao autor do documento,
+
+atualmente aparece já no timbre)
+
+• inscrição (nome e endereço do destinatário)
+
+• saudação
+
+• assunto (frase que resume do que trata o documento)•
+formula perpetuitatis (sentença típica dos documentos
+medievais que declara que os direitos
+
+instituídos pelo documento valerão para sempre)
+
+• apreciação (curta oração pela realização do teor
+
+do documento, como “Amém”).
+
+Texto (contém a
+
+ação, incluindo
+
+as considerações
+
+e circunstâncias
+
+que a justificam
+
+e as condições
+
+relacionadas à
+
+sua realização)
+
+• preâmbulo (expressa de forma ética ou jurídica a
+
+motivação da ação)
+
+• notificação (fórmula que expressa que o ato consignado
+no documento está sendo comunicado)
+
+• exposição (narração das circunstâncias que
+
+deram origem ao documento)
+
+• disposição (o ato é expressamente enunciado e,
+
+tornando clara a função do documento, há um
+
+conjunto de fórmulas rotineiramente utilizadas
+
+que se adaptam às especificidades de cada
+
+transação)
+
+• cláusulas finais (procuram assegurar a realização
+
+do ato, evitar sua violação, garantir sua validade,
+
+preservar os direitos de terceiros, etc... São espécies
+de cláusulas finais: as cláusulas de injunção,
+
+proibição, derrogação, exceção, obrigação,
+
+renúncia, advertência, promissórias).
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+214
+
+Escatocolo (contém
+o contexto
+
+da ação e as fórmulas
+referentes
+
+à sua autenticação)•
+corroboração (cláusula que atesta a validade e
+
+autenticidade do documento como “lido e achado
+conforme” ou “assinado e selado”
+
+• [data] *
+
+• [apreciação]*
+
+• [saudação]*
+
+• cláusula de cortesia ( “Atenciosamente”, “Cordialmente”)•
+atestação (testemunhas da assinatura, atualmente
+senhas para autenticação virtual do documento)•
+qualificação da assinatura (título e indicação da
+
+capacidade do assinante)
+
+• notas do secretariado (indicação de quem tomou
+
+nota do documento)
+
+*estes itens podem aparecer alternativamente no
+
+Protocolo
+
+Fonte: Duranti, 1991, p. 11-15, adaptação e tradução da autora
+
+É importante esclarecer que os elementos extrínsecos e intrínsecos acima
+não aparecem necessariamente todos ao mesmo tempo em um documento
+e que se apresentam como um modelo ideal, a guiar o pesquisador
+para uma melhor observação e avaliação de um documento.
+Para além da identificação dos elementos extrínsecos e intrínsecos
+de um documento, a chamada crítica diplomática avança para compreender
+o contexto jurídico, administrativo e processual em que os documentos
+foram criados. Para tanto, procurará identificar também:
+
+1. As pessoas que aparecem no documento;
+2. Os títulos e a capacidade civil dos envolvidos;
+3. O nome do ato praticado (procuração, contrato, autorização, etc...);
+4. A relação entre o documento e um procedimento ou fase específica
+de um procedimento;
+215
+
+5. O tipo de documento, identificando-se seu nome, natureza (público
+ou privado), função (probatória, declaratória, dispositiva) e
+status (original, rascunho, cópia simples ou autêntica)
+6. A descrição diplomática, correspondente ao seu contexto (ano,
+mês, dia e local), ação e descrição documental (nome do formulário,
+natureza, função, status, meio e quantidade)
+7. Comentários conclusivos (qualquer comentário, que se refira tanto
+ao documento como um todo, quanto a um elemento específico
+de análise (DURANTI, 1991, p. 7-18, tradução livre da autora).
+
+Os protocolos da crítica diplomática apresentados acima permitem
+observar os documentos administrativos de forma cuidadosa,
+mas mais que isso possibilitam reconstruir a relação entre a ação que
+representam e seu processo de criação, a fim de que se possa identificar,
+avaliar e comunicar sua verdadeira natureza. A análise Diplomática
+permite, sobretudo, entender o funcionamento do próprio Estado.
+Os ensinamentos da Diplomática não são só valiosos para a arquivística
+contemporânea, mas também para a pesquisa empírica em Direito
+e para o próprio Direito, na medida que a questão da autenticidade é
+sempre central quando trabalhamos com documentos jurídicos.
+
+4. Documentos obtidos virtualmente e sua autenticidadeA
+autenticidade da documentação obtida através de meios virtuais
+como a internet ou correio eletrônico é uma grande questão para
+a pesquisa científica, por razões óbvias. Em uma rede alimentada
+por todos é possível criar e falsificar informações e documentos
+com muita facilidade. Por outro lado, cada vez mais, órgãos públicos
+disponibilizam, via web, relatórios, informações e estatísticas;
+e cada vez mais arquivos públicos tornam acessíveis, digitalizados,
+importantes fundos arquivísticos sob sua guarda. Artigos e livros
+disponíveis também através da internet facilitam e democratizam a
+pesquisa, especialmente para quem não está em um grande centro e
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+216
+
+não conta com boas bibliotecas. Jornais e revistas digitalizam não só
+suas edições semanais, como os números anteriores. Se pensarmos
+nos documentos privados, temos uma infinidade de novos documentos,
+muitos deles produzidos direta e exclusivamente em meio
+digital.
+A preocupação relativa à certificação, autenticação e preservação
+dos documentos digitais deu origem à International Research on Permanent
+Autentic Records, conhecida como Projeto InterPARES23, uma
+força tarefa que teve início em 199924 e reuniu pesquisadores do Canadá,
+Estados Unidos, Reino Unido, Irlanda, Suécia, Holanda, França,
+Portugal, Itália, Austrália, China e Hong Kong, com o objetivo de desenvolver,
+teórica e metodologicamente, um conjunto de conhecimentos
+essenciais à preservação de registros digitais autênticos e de formular
+políticas, estratégias e padrões capazes de garantir sua preservação.
+No curso do Projeto ficou claro aos pesquisadores que nem mesmo
+soluções a longo prazo para a preservação de registros administrativos
+e legais serão suficientes para garantir a autenticidade dos registros.
+Governos, universidades e empresas são convidados a considerar
+as implicações políticas, sociais e econômicas de confiar o registro de
+suas informações e conhecimento a sistemas digitais de rápida obsolescência
+sem que antes tenham elaborado um plano para manutenção
+de sua preservação autêntica (Duranti e Blanchette, s/d).
+A questão da autenticidade, confiabilidade e permanência dos
+documentos assentados em meio digital ainda não está pacificada,
+todavia, do ponto de vista acadêmico, os documentos captados
+virtualmente são aceitos como fonte válida de pesquisa. A internet
+disponibiliza, facilmente, fontes documentais de todos os tipos, mas
+reivindica alguns cuidados relativamente à checagem e à idoneidade
+fonte. O protocolo abaixo estabelece uma série de critérios para
+ajudar, especialmente os pesquisadores iniciantes, a separar o “joio
+
+23 Disponível em: http://www.interpares.org/. Acesso em 2.mai.2017.
+24 Atualmente o Projeto InterPARES está em sua quarta etapa de pesquisa, intitulada
+InterPares Trust (I Trust) e continua a explorar questões concernentes à autenticidade
+e confiabilidade de documentos confiados à internet.
+217
+
+do trigo” na coleta de documentos disponibilizados em meio virtual:
+
+Quadro 1. Avaliação da idoneidade de fontes documentais acessadas
+via internet25
+
+Questionamentos possíveis Respostas possíveis
+
+Quem é o responsável
+pelo site ou
+
+por ter lançado
+
+o documento na
+
+internet (pessoa
+
+física ou jurídica)?
+
+Um organismo
+
+oficial?
+
+• governo (.gov)
+
+• judiciário (.jus)
+
+• universidade (.edu.br)
+
+• ONG (.org )
+
+• outros
+
+Uma empresa privada?
+• (.com)26
+
+Um particular?
+
+• Site, blog ou página
+
+hospedada em um servidor
+(Facebook, etc...)
+
+Quanto os objetivos
+
+do site
+
+São claramente
+
+fornecidos?
+
+• Informar
+
+• Defender as ideias, as
+
+opiniões, os valores
+
+• Vender
+
+• Propagar falsas informações•
+Outros
+
+São os objetivos
+
+expostos realmente
+
+mantidos?
+
+• Sim/não
+
+25 VILLAUME, Françoise. Quadro de avaliação da idoneidade de fontes documentais
+acessados via internet. Disponível em: http://scd.docinsa.insa-lyon.fr/sites/docinsa.
+insa-lyon.fr/files/Aidem%C3%A9moire2010.pdf . Acesso em 20 abr 2017.
+26 Os domínios primários dos endereços eletrônicos podem mudar um pouco de país para
+país. No Brasil quem regulamenta a utilização desses domínios é o Comitê Gestor da Internet
+no Brasil CGI/BR. Assim, por exemplo, os domínios das universidades: no Brasil deve-se
+utilizar edu.br, nos Estados Unidos o padrão é .edu, as universidades britânicas apresentam
+domínios como ac.uk, outras universidade europeias usam os prefixos u- ou univ-.
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+218
+
+Quanto os objetivos
+
+do site Os objetivos visados
+estão conforme a lei?
+
+• Há desrespeito aos
+
+direitos humanos
+
+• Violação à dignidade
+
+humana
+
+• Infração aos direitos do
+
+autor
+
+• Outros
+
+Quais são as competências
+do autor
+
+(ou dos autores) da
+
+informação ou documento
+a respeito
+
+do tema?
+
+São claramente
+
+fornecidas?
+
+São reconhecidas?
+
+O autor cita suas
+
+publicações anteriores
+em periódicos
+
+reconhecidos?
+
+• Organismo ou representante
+oficial
+
+• Profissional reconhecido
+(especialista em...)
+
+• Socialmente reconhecidoQuais
+informações
+
+são fornecidas?
+
+Qual a denominação
+
+que o autor usa para
+
+se referir a si mesmo
+
+ou para se expressar?
+
+• Seu nome pessoal
+
+• O nome do organismo
+
+ao qual ele demanda
+
+• O nome do organismo
+
+responsável pelo site
+
+(editor)
+
+O assunto tratado é
+
+claramente apresentado
+na página
+
+inicial?
+
+• Introdução
+
+• Problemática divulgada
+
+• Plano divulgado
+
+• Resumo (tipo de resumo
+do autor)
+
+O assunto apresentado
+é tratado como
+
+um todo ou em uma
+
+parte bem definida?
+
+• No todo
+
+• Em parte, qual?
+
+O autor se refere a
+
+escolas de pensamento,
+a trabalhos
+
+científicos?
+
+• Referências explícitas
+
+• Citações
+
+• Notas
+219
+
+Quais informações
+
+são fornecidas?
+
+O autor situa as controvérsias
+a respeito
+
+do assunto?
+
+• Sim/não
+
+As informações
+
+fornecidas são bem
+
+distintas das opiniões
+
+expressadas?
+
+• Sim/não
+
+Os anúncios são
+
+consideravelmente
+
+separados das informações?•
+Sim/não
+
+O autor fornece suas
+
+próprias fontes de
+
+informação?
+
+• Bibliografia
+
+• Endereços úteis
+
+O autor retorna a
+
+outras fontes de
+
+informação?
+
+• Bibliografia (comentada
+ou não)
+• Sitiografia (comentada
+ou não)
+• Relação com outros
+sites confiáveis
+• Relações operacionais
+
+Podemos entrar em
+
+contato com o autor
+
+para informações
+
+adicionais?
+
+• Endereço postal,
+
+telefone, fax, endereço
+
+eletrônico
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+220
+
+Qual o nível do
+
+público almejado?
+
+Grande público?
+
+Público de especialistas?Público
+de iniciantes?
+
+Público escolar?
+
+Qual(is) a(s) categoria(s)
+sociocultural(is)
+
+vinculadas?
+
+A organização e a
+
+apresentação das
+
+informações facilitam
+seu acesso e
+
+sua apropriação?
+
+A página inicial está
+
+bem preenchida? • Mapa do site
+
+A navegação no site
+
+ou na página é bem
+
+elaborada?
+
+• Caixa de listagem
+
+• Resumo sempre visível
+
+• Vínculos de hipertexto
+• Mecanismo de busca
+interna no site ou da
+página
+
+A contribuição informativa
+das imagens é
+
+relevante?
+
+• Imagens adequadamente
+legendadas,
+
+fontes mencionadas ou
+
+da página
+
+É realizado o processamento
+documental
+
+do site ou da página?
+
+• Sinalizadores de metadados•
+Processamento realizado
+objetivamente
+
+• Processamento realizado
+abusivamente
+221
+
+Quadro 2. Observações complementares27
+
+A concepção do site,
+
+o gráfico
+
+Atrativo, legibilidade, equilíbrio do texto, imagens,
+gráficos
+
+Apresentação harmoniosa
+
+Desenho gráfico respeitado em todo o site
+
+Interatividade:
+
+• Página de ajuda
+
+• Perguntas mais frequentes (FAQ)
+
+• Arquivo do site
+
+• Fórum de discussão
+
+• Chat profissional
+
+A Qualidade da
+
+escrita
+
+• Erros de ortografia
+
+• Erros de sintaxe
+
+• Erros de gramática
+
+• Erros da língua
+
+• Erros de tradução
+
+• Linguagem coloquial
+
+Os aspectos técnicos
+
+• Pedaços de código em certos lugares
+
+• Otimização do site para todos os navegadores,
+para uma certa resolução de monitor
+
+• Abertura intempestiva de janelas, publicidade
+(pop-up)
+
+• Se certos aplicativos são necessários à consulta
+do site: são propostos em download?
+
+5. Conclusão
+Nesse artigo procurei destacar categorias e elementos para a avaliação
+documental tendo em vista sua utilização como fonte para a pesquisa
+empírica em Direito. A grande vantagem de analisar um documento se27
+BASSET, Hervé. L’évaluation de sites web. Disponível em: http://scd.docinsa.insa-
+-lyon.fr/sites/docinsa.insa-lyon.fr/files/Aidem%C3%A9moire2010.pdf . Acesso em 20
+abr 2017.
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+222
+
+gundo os parâmetros aqui apresentados reside na real possibilidade de
+observação de aspectos que com facilidade poderiam permanecer invisibilizados.
+Um outro ponto forte é que o uso de documentos costuma
+conferir à pesquisa uma alta credibilidade. Se bem trabalhados os documentos,
+os resultados da pesquisa costumam ser bastante consistentes.
+Em uma pesquisa documental questões éticas e jurídicas podem se
+constituir em uma dificuldade à parte. As principais questões jurídicas
+gravitam em torno dos direitos autorais, da liberdade de informação
+e da proteção dos dados sensíveis das pessoas. Aqui no Brasil, a lei de
+acesso à informação (Lei 12.527/2011) é um marco na disciplina das
+questões jurídicas afetas ao acesso a informações e documentos públicos.
+Sob a égide dessa lei, várias questões são de pronto resolvidas. Já
+os dilemas éticos na pesquisa documental podem surgir especialmente
+quando o pesquisador é, ele próprio, parte da instituição pesquisada,
+o que pode gerar desconforto com colegas ou perseguições, caso os
+dados apontados na pesquisa não sejam favoráveis. Se por um lado o
+pesquisador pode ser estigmatizado como delator, pode ser problemático
+não registrar ou informar atividades ilegais ou prejudiciais comprovadas
+pela documentação que tem em mãos (McCulloch, 2004, p.42).
+A grande desvantagem da pesquisa documental reside no fato
+de que todo o trabalho de verificação quanto a autenticidade, credibilidade,
+representatividade e sentido do documento, ou ainda a
+análise dos seus elementos extrínsecos e intrínsecos para realização
+da crítica diplomática, podem não ser suficientes diante da complexidade
+de determinados problemas de pesquisa. Nesse sentido a
+coleta e seleção da fonte documental, que inclui checar sua procedência
+e tudo mais, passa a ser uma fase preliminar da pesquisa, que
+se desenvolverá a partir de um outro método de pesquisa escolhido
+para tratamento dos dados obtidos através dos documentos.
+É importante lembrar que o documento é sempre explorado e
+nunca criado pelo pesquisador. Para além da análise básica quanto à
+procedência de um documento, a veracidade quanto aos fatos narrados,
+sua representatividade e sentido, Foucault propõe ainda que o
+223
+
+documento seja decupado, cortado em pedaços e detalhado:
+
+(…) por uma mutação que não data de hoje, mas que, sem dúvida, ainda
+
+não se concluiu, a história mudou sua posição acerca do documento: ela
+
+considera como sua tarefa primordial, não interpretá-lo, não interpretar
+
+se diz a verdade, nem qual é o seu valor expressivo, mas sim trabalhá-lo
+
+no interior e elaborá-lo: ela o organiza, recorta, distribui, ordena e reparte
+em níveis, estabelece séries, distingue o que é pertinente do que não
+
+é, identifica elementos, define unidades, descreve relações. O documento,
+pois, não é mais, para a história, essa matéria inerte através da qual
+
+ela tenta reconstituir o que os homens fizeram ou disseram, o que é passado
+e o que deixa apenas rastros: ela procura definir, no próprio tecido
+
+documental, unidades, conjuntos, séries, relações. (Foucault, 2008, p.7)
+Uma introdução à pesquisa documental //
+Andréa Depieri de A. Reginato
+224
+
+6. Referências
+
+Cellard, A. (2008). A análise documental. In: J. Poupart et al.. A pesquisa qualitativa:
+enfoques epistemológicos e metodológicos (p. 295-316). Trad.
+
+Ana Cristina Nasser. Petrópolis: Vozes.
+
+Duranti, L.. (1989). Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science, Part I. Archivaria.
+Disponível em: <http://archivaria.ca/index.php/archivaria/article/
+
+view/11567/12513>. Acesso: 01.mai. 2017.
+
+Duranti, L. (1991). Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science, Part V. Archivaria.
+Disponível. em: <http://archivaria.ca/index.php/archivaria/article/view/11758/12708>.
+Acesso em: 01.mai.2017.
+
+Duranti, L. ; Blanchette, J-F. The authenticity of eletronic records. [s/d]. Disponível
+em: http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/blanchette/papers/ist2.pdf.
+
+Acesso em 15 mar.2017.
+
+Foucault, M. (2008). A Arqueologia do Saber. 7ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense
+
+Universitária.
+
+May, T. Pesquisa Documental: escavações e evidências. (2004). In:_______
+
+Pesquisa Social: questões, métodos e processos (p. 205-230). Trad. Carlos
+
+Alberto Netto Soares. 3ª ed. Porto Alegre: Artmed.
+
+McCulloch, G. (2004). Documentary Research in Education, History and the
+
+Social Sciences. London: RoutledgeFalmer.
+
+Prior, L. (2003). Using Documents in Social Research. London: Sage.
+
+Scott, J.P. (1990). Matter of Reccord: documentary sources in social research.
+
+Cambridge: Polity Press.
+
+________. (2006). Documentary Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
+
+Tognolli, N.B.; Guimarães, J.A.C. (2009). A Diplomática Contemporânea como
+
+base metodológica para a organização do conhecimento arquivísitico:
+
+perspectivas de renovação a partir das ideias de Luciana Duranti. In:
+
+Anais IX Congress International Society for Knowledge Organization ISKO-Spain,
+Valencia.Disponível em: <http://www.iskoiberico.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/38-47_Bolfarini.pdf>
+. Acesso em 1.abr.2017
+225
+
+7
+
+Pesquisa historiográfica e
+
+documental: diálogos entre
+
+História e Direito a partir
+
+de escrituras públicas de
+
+contratos // Guinter Leipnitz
+
+Neste texto, abordarei possibilidades de investigação de fontes documentais,
+a partir da perspectiva historiográfica. As questões aqui
+levantadas podem ser consideradas para qualquer tipo de material
+documental analisado sob uma dimensão de tempo e espaço, mas
+quando da descrição do método, me concentrarei no trabalho com
+escrituras públicas de contratos de arrendamento, que são as fontes
+utilizadas na oficinas ministradas nos Cursos de Pesquisa Empírica
+em Direito realizados em Brasília (2014) e no Rio de Janeiro (2015).
+Basicamente, esta estratégia consiste no levantamento de um
+corpo documental homogêneo, selecionado a partir de critérios de
+recortes temporal (data inicial e data final) e espacial (dimensão territorial,
+administrativa ou geográfica, abrangida pela documentação).
+Ela demanda uma leitura provisória das fontes, com o propósito de
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+226
+
+familiarizar-se com “fórmulas textuais” que se repetem (por exemplo,
+o cabeçalho, termos jurídicos que apareçam) e, especialmente,
+informações recorrentes, que podemos acompanhar de modo seriado,
+isto é, sua incidência ao longo do tempo.
+No caso de minha pesquisa, situada numa interface de diálogo
+entre História e Direito, eu estava interessado em compreender
+como, no contexto da segunda metade do século XIX, o arrendamento
+poderia tornar-se uma alternativa de acesso à terra em Uruguaiana,
+município situado na fronteira do Brasil com Argentina e Uruguai.
+Naquelas paragens, assim como em outras partes do Brasil, vivia-se
+um contexto de restrição a antigos modos de acesso à terra, regidos
+pelo costume, sendo que nem toda a amplitude da experiência de
+homens e mulheres que ocupavam os terrenos cabia em ordenamentos
+jurídicos delimitados pelo direito de propriedade. Assim, eu
+buscava perceber nos contratos de que modo elementos como os
+prazos, os preços, os modos de pagamento, os tamanhos de terras
+arrendadas, entre outros, poderiam dar indícios das transformações
+no uso da terra. Não menos importante, estava atento a informações
+qualitativas, presentes em alguns contratos, a respeito da efetivação
+dos direitos de propriedade - tanto dos(as) proprietários(as) quanto
+dos(as) arrendatários(as) - implicados pelos contratos, e como poderiam
+ser variadas as formas de realização desses direitos.1
+Antes de tratar os diálogos entre História e Direito, e de aprofundar-me
+nas etapas do método, penso ser necessário abordar, de
+modo bastante breve e esquemático, de que forma a História, como
+um campo de conhecimento, concebe seu objeto de estudo. O nosso
+ofício enquanto historiadores(as) é perseguir os traços de ação humana,
+levando em conta a dimensão temporal: conforme Marc Bloch,
+a História é a “ciência dos homens, [...] no tempo” (Bloch, 2002,
+p. 55). Contudo, o fazer dos(as) historiadores(as) já há muito tempo
+não implica a ilusão positivista de “reconstituir os fatos” tal qual eles
+
+1 Ver Leipnitz, 2010, especialmente os dois primeiros capítulos.
+227
+
+aconteceram e ordená-los cronologicamente, de modo a que as explicações
+e os nexos de causalidade surjam de modo automático, sem a
+intervenção do sujeito do conhecimento. O autor acima citado, juntamente
+com outros historiadores de sua geração, criticaram enfaticamente
+as concepções de uma “história factual” (Febvre, 1989); a
+História, enquanto um campo de produção de conhecimento sobre a
+realidade, somente poderia ser uma “história-problema”. Em outras
+palavras, o estudo da ação humana no tempo movimenta-se a partir
+da problematização do passado, desde perguntas que são dirigidas
+do presente, condicionadas pelas formas de pensar daquele(a) que
+pergunta, pela sua perspectiva em relação à sociedade, pelos seus
+preconceitos, por sua classe social, dentre outros condicionantes.
+Neste sentido, as fontes históricas, que são quaisquer registros –
+fragmentários - da atividade humana (documentais, iconográficos,
+da cultura material, audiovisuais, literários), não falam sozinhas:
+suas respostas dependem das perguntas que a elas são feitas pelo
+sujeito de conhecimento, e estas mediam o acesso às realidades
+pretéritas, cuja reconstituição na totalidade de seus elementos é impossível
+(o que não implica sua falta de verossimilhança). Portanto,
+aos(às) historiadores(as) cabe não apenas a constituição dos fatos,
+mas a sua interpretação (Barros, 2014).
+Logo, devemos encarar quaisquer fontes – especialmente as escritas
+– com um olhar crítico, considerando sempre as condições que
+as produziram, em um determinado locus de tempo e espaço: quem
+as produziu (indivíduos, grupos sociais, esferas de poder), como
+(a partir de que meios), quando (em que contexto temporal), onde
+(qual era o lugar de produção) e por que (qual era a finalidade, a que
+interesses deveriam atender).
+
+1. Diálogos entre História e Direito
+Como alguém que fala de um lugar que não é o do Direito enquanto
+formação, além de situar o campo de conhecimento da qual eu parto
+– a História –, torna-se igualmente importante especificar as interfa-
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+228
+
+ces de diálogo entre este e o Direito. Recuperando a já mencionada
+noção de investigação da atuação humana ao longo do tempo, inserção
+que faço da História no meio do Direito tem a ver especialmente
+com, de que modo, para além das doutrinas jurídicas, concepções de
+justiça e direitos se materializam na realidade histórica através das
+relações internas das sociedades; em outras palavras, como se manifestam
+em “carne e osso”.
+O historiador inglês E. P. Thompson é uma das principais referências
+na abordagem do espaço da lei como arena de conflitos. Ele
+desenvolveu suas ideias a respeito ao longo de toda sua obra, mas
+especialmente no livro Senhores e caçadores (1987), no qual aborda
+a “Lei Negra”, um dispositivo legal produzido no século XVIII que
+transformou em crime capital uma série de delitos na Inglaterra do
+período. Neste estudo, dentro de uma abordagem marxista, Thompson
+insistentemente argumenta que o “domínio da lei” não pode ser
+reduzido meramente à superestrutura que mascara a dominação de
+classe; apesar de também ser isso, a lei não podia ser somente isso,
+pois se assim o fosse, sua própria função de dominação desapareceria.
+Logo, tem de parecer legítima e justa (1987, pp. 348-361). Para o
+autor, a lei é prática e um espaço de conflito de classe:
+
+Assim, chegamos não a uma conclusão simples (lei = poder de classe),
+
+mas a uma conclusão complexa e contraditória. De um lado, é verdade
+
+que a lei realmente mediava relações de classe existentes, para proveito
+
+dos dominantes; não só isso, como também, à medida que avançava o
+
+século, a lei tornou-se um magnífico instrumento pelo qual esses dominantes
+podiam impor novas definições de propriedade, para proveito
+
+próprio ainda maior, como no caso da extinção legal dos vagos direitos
+
+de uso agrários e da ampliação do aumento das terras comunais. Por outro
+lado, a lei mediava essas relações de classe através de formas legais,
+
+que continuamente impunham restrições às ações dos dominantes. Pois
+
+existe uma enorme diferença, que a experiência do século XX deve ter
+
+tornado evidente até para o pensador mais distanciado, entre o poder
+229
+
+extralegal arbitrário e o domínio da lei. E não só os dominantes (na verdade,
+a classe dominante como um todo) estavam restringidos por suas
+
+próprias regras jurídicas contra o exercício da força direta e sem mediações
+(prisão arbitrária, emprego de tropas contra a multidão, tortura e
+
+aqueles outros úteis expedientes do poder com que estamos todos familiarizados),
+como também acreditavam o bastante nessas regras, e na
+
+retórica ideológica que as acompanhava, para permitir, em certas áreas
+
+limitadas, que a própria lei fosse um foro autêntico onde se tratavam
+
+certos tipos de conflito de classe. (Thompson, 1987, p. 356).
+
+Outra referência, com contribuições fundamentais no que tange
+à discussão de elementos do Direito numa perspectiva histórica
+– principalmente as relações de propriedade –, é a espanhola Rosa
+Congost. Ela tem dedicado uma obra inteira ao estudo das relações
+de propriedade, e dos discursos historicamente produzidos a respeito
+dos direitos de propriedade, em especial aqueles que se tornaram
+hegemônicos, a partir da imposição dos interesses dos grupos sociais
+pelos mesmos favorecidos. O fato de o Estado, em determinados momentos
+históricos, ter “encampado” concepções bastante específicas
+dos direitos de propriedade, não implica uma superioridade destes
+sobre aqueles cuja esfera estatal não deu proteção. A esta linha de raciocínio,
+que reduz a legitimidade dos direitos àqueles reconhecidos
+pelo Estado, Congost refere-se como um “juridicismo” ou “estatismo
+analítico” (2007). Para a historiadora, a lei e suas implicações não estão
+à parte da sociedade e nem escapam às suas contradições e conflitos:
+
+Una sociedad [...] se halla en constante movimiento y en la que pueden
+
+producirse rupturas importantes en las formas de disfrute de los derechos
+
+de propiedad, aunque que con anterioridad no se hayan producido cambios
+significativos en el marco político y jurídico. (Congost, 2007, p. 20)
+
+A captura das teias que constituem as relações de propriedade só
+pode ocorrer se percebermos a concretização de direitos de forma
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+230
+
+aberta, plural e mutante:
+
+No nos interesan sólo las condiciones legales, es decir, nominales, de la
+
+propiedad, sino el conjunto de elementos relacionados con las formas
+
+diarias de acceder a los recursos, con las prácticas diarias de la distribución
+social de la renta, que pueden condicionar y ser condicionados por
+
+las diferentes formas de disfrutar de los llamados derechos de propiedad
+
+y también por los derechos y prácticas de uso, es decir, por las diferentes
+
+formas de ser propietarios (Congost, 2007, p. 15).
+
+No Brasil, diálogos similares entre História e Direito passaram a
+se intensificar a partir da década de 1980, com a recepção da obra
+de E. P. Thompson. A documentação produzida por esferas judiciais -
+como processos criminais, processos cíveis, devassas etc. - passava a
+ser examinada de forma exaustiva, focando-se em questões diversas,
+mas principalmente, como um meio de acesso a vozes dos grupos
+sociais mais pobres, de escravos, entre outros (Lara & Mendonça,
+2006).
+Os principais focos de pesquisa giravam em torno de análises sobre
+funcionamento das instituições e agentes das esferas judiciais
+(advogados, juízes, policiais etc.) e de estudos sobre apropriação de
+direitos por parte dos(as) “subalternos(as)” (escravos(as), “homens
+livres pobres”, trabalhadores(as)), enfatizando-se noções alternativas
+de justiça produzidas por estes grupos (Lara & Mendonça, 2006). A partir
+dos resultados de muitas dessas investigações, a interface das relações
+entre História e Direito desliza de um mero diálogo entre os dois
+campos para agendas de pesquisa que tratam de como, em diferentes
+contextos históricos e espaciais, os “direitos” (com ênfase no plural)
+são produzidos na interação de diferentes grupos, muitas vezes em
+conflito, não somente como uma emanação dos discursos jurídicos
+de especialistas ou das esferas oficialmente autorizadas para tal (em
+última análise, que compõem o Estado em todas as suas instâncias):
+231
+
+Assim, também há algum tempo o direito já aparece como um produto
+
+social, e sabe-se que os valores, os textos e as normas jurídicas estão diretamente
+relacionados com os ritmos do processo social. Deixando de ser
+
+entendido como algo decorrente de ideias e filosofias, ou que se configura
+
+como simples instrumento de dominação, o direito passou a ser concebido
+como um campo simbólico, com práticas discursivas ou como dispositivos
+de poder.
+
+[...]
+
+Por isso mesmo, o direito, o justo, o legal e o legítimo não mais podem
+
+ser concebidos como remansos ordenados por uma tradição intelectual
+
+específica (às vezes múltipla, mas sempre concebida a partir de cima).
+
+Também não podem mais ser considerados como simples instrumentos
+
+a serviço da dominação. Ao contrário, formam campos conflituosos, constitutivos
+das próprias relações sociais: campos minados pela luta política,
+
+cujos sentidos e significados dependem das ações dos próprios sujeitos
+
+históricos que os conformam. (Lara e Mendonça, 2006, pp. 9; 13)
+
+Sendo assim, é a partir dos parâmetros teóricos acima elencados que
+eu abordo as questões pertinentes à investigação histórica do Direito.
+
+2. O método da pesquisa histórica e documental
+com as escrituras públicas
+Centrando-se agora na descrição do método, ele deve lidar com uma
+massa documental suficientemente volumosa, a ponto de ser observável,
+no tempo, a trajetória daqueles elementos com os quais estamos
+preocupados, que merecem nossa atenção. Na pesquisa que
+realizei, trabalhei com um total de 901 escrituras de arrendamento,
+que cobriam um período de mais de sessenta anos.
+É difícil encontrarmos pesquisas similares no Brasil, que valeram-
+-se do trato com escrituras públicas, ou mesmo contratos, dentro de
+uma perspectiva histórica seriada e de média duração. Por isso, os
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+232
+
+cuidados com o manejo e as possibilidades de problematização dessas
+fontes foram muito inspirados pelos estudos dos argentinos Raul
+Fradkin e Juan Manuel Palacio (Fradkin, 2004; Palacio, 2002). São notáveis
+as questões comuns que permeiam os dois trabalhos, embora
+devam ser consideradas suas especificidades. O estudo de Fradkin
+centra-se na primeira metade do século XIX, no qual se processa, na
+campanha bonaerense2, uma transformação agrária denominada
+de “la expansión ganadera” (2004, p. 195). O autor busca relacionar
+esse processo com a dinâmica dos contratos rurais, que englobam
+tanto aqueles de arrendamento como os de “companhias” ou “sociedades”.
+A partir da quantificação destas fontes, Fradkin estabelece
+quadros e tipologias concernentes aos tipos de unidades produtivas,
+formas de pagamento, duração dos contratos, distribuição regional
+e, conjuntamente com uma análise qualitativa das relações contratuais,
+ele intenta verificar diferentes variáveis, contidas principalmente
+em uma tensão entre, de um lado, as transformações da propriedade,
+a crescente aplicação de capital na terra e as estratégias de controle
+da mão-de-obra, e de outro, a capacidade de resistência e negociação
+dos produtores diretos (Fradkin, 2004).
+Palacio, por sua vez, considera os arrendamentos dentro do contexto
+da consolidação da “estância mista”3 na região pampiana de Buenos
+Aires, entre 1880 e 1945 (2002). O autor utiliza-se dos contratos e também
+de documentos estatísticos e legislativos, com a intenção de perceber
+as transformações nas condições contratuais, a interação dessas
+com a questão da diversificação produtiva desenvolvida na estância
+mista em diferentes momentos, além do desenvolvimento da legislação
+reguladora dos contratos e a relação com a sua real aplicação.
+
+2 O termo refere-se ao entorno rural que abastecia de gêneros alimentícios o núcleo
+urbano de Buenos Aires e que produzia bens (especialmente advindos da criação de
+gado) a serem exportados para mercados estrangeiros desde o porto da mesma cidade.
+3 A “estância mista” refere-se às unidades produtivas usualmente dedicadas à criação que
+também diversificavam sua produção por meio da exploração agrícola realizada basicamente
+por arrendatários de parcelas de terra da estância, classificados como “chacareiros”.
+233
+
+Salvo essas especificidades, verificamos nesses trabalhos uma
+preocupação dos autores com as formas de problematização e representatividade
+das fontes contratuais.
+Quanto à última, Fradkin lembra que
+
+[…] La visión de mundo de las relaciones sociales agrarias que este tipo
+
+de fuente permite construir es muy limitada. Principalmente porque los
+
+contratos firmados ante escribano son solamente una porción (y probablemente
+muy reducida) del total de acuerdos que se trabaran dado que la
+
+mayor parte de los contratos rurales eran verbales (Fradkin, 2004, p. 196).
+
+Logo, o trato com essas fontes apresenta, ao mesmo tempo, uma
+série de vantagens e limitações, que mencionaremos ao longo das
+páginas seguintes.
+Considerado esses aspectos, aplicando-se ao teor das escrituras
+o conjunto de perguntas básicas referidas anteriormente, têm-se as
+seguintes formulações:
+
+a. Quando? Quais são os prazos combinados no contrato (sua própria
+duração) e as datas que são mencionadas (não apenas a referente
+ao registro do contrato, mas também relativa ao início do
+mesmo, dado que poderiam ser diferentes)?
+b. Quem? Quais são as pessoas envolvidas no contrato (seus nomes)?
+Quais as funções jurídicas que elas desempenham no
+mesmo (proprietário, arrendatário, outorgante, e outorgado, testemunha,
+tabelião, procurador)? Quais profissões ou ocupações
+exercem naquela sociedade (criador, comerciante, lavrador)?
+c. Onde? Quais são os lugares mencionados no contrato (cidade,
+termo, município, aspectos da paisagem e do relevo)?
+d. O quê? Quais são bens envolvidos no contrato (terra, casa, estabelecimento,
+fazenda, animais)? Qual é sua quantidade ou dimensão
+(número de animais, tamanho do terreno)?
+e. Quanto? Qual é o preço do contrato (quantias monetárias)? Qual
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+234
+é a forma de pagamento (dinheiro, espécie, trabalho)? Qual é frequência
+do pagamento (anual, mensal, semestral)?
+f. Por quê? Quais são as possíveis motivações para o contrato?
+g. A partir de quê? Quais leis e termos jurídicos são utilizados para balizar
+o contrato, ou quais são os direitos de propriedade implicados?
+
+Os elementos relativos aos itens de (a) até (e) são muito mais facilmente
+identificáveis, correspondendo a uma camada mais superficial
+de informações que podem ser extraídas dessas fontes. Estas são também,
+não coincidentemente, aquelas melhor observáveis na longa duração.
+Já o item (f) demanda um poder de observação mais acurado,
+dependendo, a não ser em casos muito pontuais, de outras informações,
+que extrapolam a dimensão das escrituras contratuais. Outros
+aspectos da realidade que estão em um nível mais profundo de exame
+da fonte são as que referem-se ao item (g): os direitos de propriedade
+que atravessam os contratos em questão, ou por estes implicados.
+Para melhor ilustrar como pode ser operada esta estratégia metodológica,
+a partir da formulação das perguntas explicitadas acima,
+trago três exemplos de escrituras, que reproduzo em sua íntegra.
+Elas estão registradas em livros de notas, organizados de acordo com
+os tabelionatos, e atualmente acham-se salvaguardados pelo Arquivo
+Público do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (APERS). Segue sua transcrição,
+preservando-se a grafia original.
+
+Escritura 1:
+
+Escriptura pública de arrendamento, entre partes Joaquim Pereira Pinto
+
+e Domingos Luiz de Souza, como abaixo se declara:
+
+Saibão todos quantos este público instrumento de escriptura de arrendamento
+vivem, que no anno do nascimento de Nosso Senhor Jesus
+
+Christo de mil oitocentos setenta e um, aos oito dias do mês de agosto
+
+do dito anno, nesta Villa de Uruguayana da Província de São Pedro do
+235
+
+Rio Grande do Sul, em meo cartório comparecerão as partes havindas,
+
+juntas e contractadas, a saber: de um lado como arrendador Joaquim
+
+Pereira Pinto e d’outro como rendeiro Domingos Luiz de Souza, ambos
+
+moradores deste termo, reconhecidos pelos próprios de que tracto e das
+
+duas testemunhas no fim assignadas, perante as quaes pelo dito Joaquim
+Pereira Pinto foi dito que arrendava a Domingos Luiz de Souza,
+
+uma casa de sua propriedade sita neste termo em Toro passo, com um
+
+cercado, por tempo de seis annos, a preço de duzentos e quarenta mil
+
+reis annualmente, sendo pago o arrendamento, a trimestralmente, ficando
+o rendeiro com direito de criar seos animaes nos campos relativos
+
+a mesma casa, e desfructar os mattos nelle existentes, sem ficar elle arrendador
+prohibido de gosa do campo e mattos; ficando mais obrigado
+
+o rendeiro a entregar a casa e cercado no mesmo estado em que se acha.
+
+Pelo rendeiro me foi dito que acceitava a escriptura na forma por que se
+
+acha estipulada, e obrigava-se ao seo fiel cumprimento. E assim juntos e
+
+contractados me pedirão lhes lavrasse a presença em minha notta, o que
+
+fiz por mim ser isto distribuído, e apresentado o sello relativo, que abaixo
+vai collocado. Depois desta escripta até aqui, por mim Tabellião foi
+
+lida em presença das partes que reciprocamente acceitarão e assinarão
+
+com as testemunhas reconhecidos de mim, as quaes são João Maximo
+
+Pinto da Fonseca e Tristão d’Oliveira Silva. Eu João Nobre d’Almeida, Tabellião
+que a escrevi.4
+
+Escritura 2:
+
+Escriptura publica de arrendamento que fazem Dona Rachel Maria Nunes
+e Martiniano Pinto Cezimbra
+
+Saibão quantos esta publica escriptura de arrendamento vivem, que no Anno
+
+do Nascimento de Nosso Senhor Jesus Christo de mil oitocentos setenta e
+
+4Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (doravante, APERS). Fundo tabelionatos.
+Uruguaiana, 2º Tabelionato, Transmissão e Notas, Livro 1, f. 49-49v.
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+236
+nove, no vinte seis de Abril, nesta cidade de Uruguayana, em casa de residência
+de Dona Rachel Maria Nunes, onde eu Tabellião a rogo vim comparecerão
+
+partes juntas e contractadas, sendo ellas como outorgante proprietária Dona
+
+Rachel Maria Nunes e como outorgado rendeiro Martiniano Pinto Cezimbra,
+
+todos conhecidos de mim Tabellião e reconhecidos das testemunhas no fim
+
+assignadas, do que dou fé, perante as quaes pela mesma Dona Rachel Maria
+
+Nunes foi dito que ela é senhora e possuidora de um campo com estabelecimento
+e mangueiras, sendo estas em parte feitas de nhanduvai e de madeira
+
+branca em mau estado, e a casa ou estabelecimento em bom estado, sendo
+
+que o reboco da parte exterior da casa está em alguns lugares estragados,
+
+havendo próximo a casa arvoredo fructifero cercado com cerca de arame
+
+novo, cujo campo e benfeitorias houve por herança de seu finado marido
+
+Antonio Nunes da Silva e [...] livre e desembaraçada de qualquer obrigação
+
+ou hypotheca, pelo que arrenda tudo, como de facto arrendado tem a Martiniano
+Pinto Cezimbra, por tempo de seis annos, a contar do primeiro de Maio
+
+do corrente anno, mediante o arrendamento annual de um conto e dusentos
+mil reis, pagos no fim de cada anno, obrigando se ella outorgante, por
+
+si e seus herdeiros a faserem o presente contracto bom, firme e valioso até
+
+sua conclusão, ainda mesmo no caso de morte de algum das contractantes;
+
+compremethendo se elle outorgado rendeiro dito Martiniano Pinto Cezimbra
+
+a fazer entrega, no praso estipulado, do campo, casa e benfeitorias, o qual é
+
+situado no lugar denominado “Crus de Pedra”, neste município, no mesmo
+
+estado em que ora recebe. Pelo outorgado rendeiro Martiniano Pinto Cezimbra
+foi dito que aceitava esta escriptura nos termos em que se acha estipulada.
+E assim juntos e contractados me pedirão lhes fisesse esta escriptura que
+
+sendo-lhes lida acharão conforme acceitarão, outorgarão e assignão com as
+
+testemunhas Francisco da Costa Luste e Nicolau Tolentino Dias, perante mim
+
+Manoel Antonio Pereira Botafogo, Tabellião que escrevi e assigno.5
+
+Escritura 3:
+
+5APERS. Fundo tabelionatos. Uruguaiana, 1º Tabelionato, Contratos, Livro 1.
+237
+
+Escriptura publica de subarrendamento de campo e estabelecimento
+
+que fazem Quirino Pereira e Benigno Fernandes Gudin
+
+Saibam quantos esta publica escriptura vivem, que no anno de mil novecentos
+e treze, aos dez dias do mez de Maio nesta cidade de Uruguayana,
+
+Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, em meu cartório compareceram de uma
+
+parte como outorgante Quirino Pereira; e de outra parte como outorgado
+
+Benigno Fernandes Gudin; creadores, residentes neste termo, conhecidos
+de mim Notário, das testemunhas no fim nomeadas e assignadas,
+
+de que dou fé; perante as quaes pelo outorgante Quirino Pereira me foi
+
+dito, que, por escriptura publica de quatro de Agosto de mil novecentos e
+
+onze, lavrada e assignada neste cartório, Antonio de Farias lhe arrendara
+
+pelo preço e condições estipuladas n’aquelle contracto, uma fracção de
+
+campo contendo a area superficial de dois milhões seiscentos e treze mil
+
+e seiscentos metros quadrados, mais ou menos, todo tapado por cercas
+
+de arame e portas de madeira de lei, com estabelecimento composto de
+
+dois ranchos paredes de barro, um coberto de zinco e outro de capim,
+
+uma mangueira de arame, dois piquetes e cercado para plantações, tudo
+
+em regular estado de conservação; confrontando o campo, que é situada
+na sesmaria do Imbahá, da margem esquerda do arroio desse nome,
+
+no primeiro distrito deste município, ao Norte com o arroio Imbahá, ao
+
+Sul e Leste com campo da successão Luzardo, e a Oeste com campos da
+
+successão de Victor Pereira da Silva; que, por esta escriptura e na melhor
+
+forma de direito dá de subarrendamento a predileta fracção de campo e
+
+estabelecimento acima descriptas ao outorgado dito Benigno Fernandes
+
+Gudin, pelo prazo de dois annos e trez mezes a contar do dia primeiro
+
+de Maio do corrente anno, mediante o pagamento da quantia de quatrocentos
+e cincoenta mil reis, em moeda corrente, no fim de cada trimestre
+
+vencido, a ele outorgante ou a seus representantes legaes, nesta cidade;
+
+que o outorgado só poderá utilizar-se dos mattos existentes para consumo
+do estabelecimento, ficando o proprietário do inmovel com direito
+
+de utilizar-se também desses mattos; que, o outorgado fica obrigado a
+
+entregar a elle outorgante ou a quem o representar, ao terminar o prazo
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+238
+estabelecido, o inmovel subarrendado, nas mesmas condições que recebeu;
+que tanto elle outorgante como o outorgado se obrigam por si e seus
+
+sucessores a cumprir fielmente este contracto, sujeitando-se o que faltar,
+
+a pagar ao prejudicado a multa de cinco contos de reis, integralmente,
+
+a titulo de indemnisação. Pelo outorgado Benigno Fernandes Gudin me
+
+foi dito que acceitava esta escriptura tal como acima se declara. Certifico
+
+que me foi apresentada e fica archivada neste cartório certidão da Meza
+
+de Rendas do Estado pela qual se verifica estar pago o imposto territorial,
+
+relativamente ao inmovel acima descripto, dou fé. E assim me pediram
+
+lhes fizesse esta escriptura que lhes li acceitaram, outorgaram, e assignam
+com as testemunhas Anaurelino Garcia Moreira e Raymundo Souza,
+
+perante mim Guilherme Shimidt, Notário que escrevi e assigno.6
+
+Examinemos estes documentos mais exaustivamente, primeiramente
+de modo geral. Há algumas fórmulas textuais que se repetem,
+próprias à linguagem utilizada nos registros públicos (“como abaixo
+se declara...”, “saibam quantos vivem...”). Nas três escrituras, assinadas
+por três tabeliões distintos, a fórmula de ordenamento da estrutura
+do contrato segue um padrão: data do contrato, (ano, dia e mês)
+- lugar do contrato (município e local) – nomes das partes contratantes
+- objeto do contrato - localização do objeto de contrato - duração
+do contrato - preço - forma de pagamento - direitos de propriedade
+implicados - testemunhas. Com a repetição, este padrão torna a leitura
+da fonte muito mais dinâmica, dirigindo o olhar para as informações
+que realmente interessam no meio de rituais terminológicos
+cumpridos no texto contratual.
+
+6APERS. Fundo tabelionatos. Uruguaiana, 1º Tabelionato, Transmissão e Notas, Livro
+1, f. 3v-4.
+239
+
+Figura 1. Exemplo de escritura pública
+
+Vejamos como podemos sistematizar esse padrão de informações
+aplicando-se dos itens de (a) a (e) expressos anteriormente e organizando
+os dados das três escrituras no quadro a seguir:
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+240
+
+Questões Escritura 1 Escritura 2 Escritura 3
+
+a) Quando
+
+Data do contrato: 08
+
+de agosto de 1871;
+
+Duração: seis anos
+
+Data do contrato:
+
+26 de abril de 1879;
+
+Duração: seis anos
+
+(a contar de 1º de
+
+maio)
+
+Data do contrato:
+
+10 de maio de
+
+1913;
+
+Duração: dois
+
+anos e três meses
+
+(a contar de 1º de
+
+maio)
+
+b) Quem
+
+Joaquim Pereira
+
+Pinto (arrendador);
+
+Domingos Luiz de
+
+Souza (rendeiro);
+
+João Maximo Pinto
+
+da Fonseca e Tristão
+
+d’Oliveira Silva
+
+(testemunhas);
+
+João Nobre d’Almeida
+(tabelião)
+
+Dona Rachel Maria
+
+Nunes (outorgante
+
+proprietária);
+
+Martiniano Pinto
+
+Cezimbra (outorgado
+rendeiro);
+
+Antonio Nunes da
+
+Silva (marido da
+
+outorgante);
+
+Francisco da Costa
+
+Luste e Nicolau
+
+Tolentino Dias
+
+(testemunhas);
+
+Manoel Antonio
+
+Pereira Botafogo
+
+(tabelião)
+
+Quirino Pereira
+
+(outorgante,
+
+criador);
+
+Benigno Fernandes
+Gudin (outorgado,
+criador);
+
+Antonio de Farias
+
+(outorgante do
+
+contrato original);
+
+Anaurelino Garcia
+
+Moreira e Raymundo
+Souza (testemunhas);Guilherme
+Shimidt
+(notário)
+
+c) Onde
+
+Contrato: no
+
+cartório, na Vila de
+
+Uruguaiana da Província
+de São Pedro
+
+do Rio Grande do
+
+Sul;
+
+Objeto: em Toro
+
+Passo, termo de
+
+Uruguaiana
+
+Contrato: na casa
+
+da outorgante, na
+
+cidade de Uruguaiana;Objeto:
+em Cruz de
+
+Pedra, município
+
+de Uruguaiana
+
+Contrato: no cartório,
+na cidade de
+
+Uruguaiana;
+
+Objeto: na sesmaria
+do Imbaá,
+
+margem esquerda
+
+do arroio Imbaá,
+
+1º distrito do
+
+município de
+
+Uruguaiana
+241
+
+d) O quê Casa com cercado
+
+Campo com
+
+estabelecimento e
+
+mangueiras, arvoredo
+frutífero com
+
+cercado
+
+Fração de campo
+
+(2.613.000 m²)
+
+cercado de arame,
+
+com estabelecimento
+(dois
+
+ranchos paredes
+
+de barro, um
+
+coberto de zinco
+
+e outro de capim,
+
+uma mangueira de
+
+arame, dois piquetes
+e cercado para
+
+plantações)
+
+e) Quanto
+
+Preço: 40.000 réis
+
+anuais
+
+Forma: dinheiro
+
+Frequência: trimestralPreço:
+1.200.000
+
+réis anuais
+
+Forma: dinheiro
+
+Frequência: anual
+
+Preço: 450.000 réis
+
+anuais
+
+Forma: dinheiro
+
+Frequência: trimestralObservando-se
+em conjunto as três escrituras, no que tange às
+informações extraídas: no item (a) quando, os contratos expressos
+pelas escrituras 1 e 2 firmavam a duração de seis anos, enquanto que
+o mais recente estipulava um pouco mais de dois anos, em que pese
+que tanto neste quanto no segundo contrato as datas da escrituração
+não coincidiam com o início da vigência contratual (em 1879, começaria
+depois da escritura, e em 1913, antes); no item (b) quem, as
+designações dos(as) contratantes são diferentes nas três escrituras,
+começando por “arrendador” e “rendeiro” na primeira escritura, “outorgante
+proprietária” e “outorgante rendeiro” na segunda (além de
+informar de que modo a propriedade foi obtida, através de herança),
+e apenas “outorgante” e “outorgado” no terceiro (embora este seja o
+único em que está explicitada as ocupações socioprofissionais dos
+envolvidos, tendo cada um identificado-se como “criador”); em relação
+ao item (c) onde, a primeira e a terceira escrituras foram elabo-
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+242
+
+radas nos cartórios, enquanto que a segunda foi na casa de uma das
+partes, e no que tange à localização dos objetos arrendados, há uma
+certa homogeneidade de informações, com referências a topônimos;
+já a respeito do item (d) o quê, há uma evidente evolução do nível
+de detalhes dos alvos do contrato, partindo de uma mera “casa com
+cercado” da primeira escritura para chegar numa “fração de campo”
+com dimensões precisas – em metros quadrados - e uma descrição
+pormenorizada do estabelecimento situado naquele terreno; finalmente,
+acerca do item (e) quanto, todos pagamentos deveriam realizar-se
+em moeda corrente, com quantias anuais, embora somente
+no segundo contrato se efetivasse com essa frequência (devendo ser
+pago trimestralmente no primeiro e no segundo).
+Como afirmei anteriormente, o exercício de exame das escrituras,
+a partir do quadro, corresponde a uma camada mais superficial
+de análise, passível de uma comparação seriada, levando-se em conta
+a dimensão temporal (aqui, são apenas três exemplos). Apesar de
+haver algumas diferenças na presença ou ausência de certos dados,
+essas informações são recorrentes em todas as escrituras.
+Agora, podemos partir para um segundo nível de análise, um
+pouco mais refinado, e que exige uma leitura mais aprofundada dessas
+fontes, em conjunto com outras. Fica bastante difícil descobrir,
+partindo-se do teor das escrituras, o porquê do estabelecimento desses
+contratos, ou seja, as motivações dos contratantes para firmarem
+os mesmos. São excepcionais as escrituras que permitem perceber
+esses elementos de modo individual;7
+ o exame exaustivo, confrontado
+com outros documentos pode, no entanto, desvelar um pouco
+das pressões que haviam no mercado de arrendamento de terras.8
+Todavia, pelos menos duas das escrituras aqui trabalhadas podem
+ser exploradas concernindo a partir de quê, isto é, em respeito
+
+7 Ver exemplos em Leipnitz, 2010, pp. 95-97.
+8 Ver Leipnitz, 2012.
+243
+
+a aspectos dos direitos de propriedade implicados pelos contratos.9
+Trato aqui não dos elementos regulares estruturantes dos mesmos
+– concretizados, por exemplo, enquanto fórmulas textuais e/ou jurídicas
+– mas de práticas cotidianas relativas ao exercício dos direitos,
+que nem sempre são explicitadas textualmente. Neste caso, temos,
+tanto na escritura 1 quanto na escritura 3, a formalização textual dos
+direitos de uso dos matos existentes no âmbito das propriedades
+arrendadas. Em ambas está salvaguardado esse direito aos dois polos
+da relação contratual, os que cedem os objetos em arrendamento
+e os que os recebem. Neste sentido, nenhum desfrutaria de um
+exercício individual pleno dos direitos sobre os bens em questão; na
+terceira escritura, inclusive, o uso é condicionado por parte do arrendatário,
+que somente poderia utilizar os matos para consumo do
+estabelecimento. Não gozaria livremente, com bem lhe prouvesse,
+de partes constituintes do todo que arrendava. Esta restrição faz sentido
+no momento em que contextualizamos o uso de terras naquela
+paisagem agrária específica, de campos e pastagens limpas, onde
+era rara a vegetação mais densa, sendo a madeira recolhida das árvores
+necessária para combustível.
+Contudo, veja-se que esse quadro mais amplo não pode ser construído
+a partir do texto da escritura somente; ele depende de confrontarmos
+as informações dessa fonte com outras – neste caso, bibliografia
+a respeito. Igualmente, somente conseguimos afirmar que
+é menos frequente a prática de se registrar nos contratos a regulação
+de direitos de uso do mato e de outros recursos naturais das propriedades
+arrendadas no momento em que somos capazes de enxergar o
+universo mais amplo das escrituras, não sendo com apenas três que
+poderemos sustentar essa afirmação.
+Levando-se em conta os três exemplos aqui utilizados, também
+somos incapazes de dizer se, naqueles contratos que é mencionado
+o uso dos matos, a realidade mais comum é restringir o acesso, se o
+
+9 Ver, a respeito, Leipnitz, 2013.
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+244
+
+uso é compartilhado por ambos os contratantes, etc.. Ressalto este
+argumento para demonstrar a importância de considerar os limites
+do que podemos e o que não podemos afirmar a partir de análises
+qualitativas pontuais e de exames mais amplos seriados. (Isso sem
+falar no próprio subregistro que um contrato escrito pode expressar
+de todas as práticas contratuais – de arrendamento ou de outras –
+que realizavam-se naquela realidade passada, em que as estruturas
+burocráticas do Estado ainda estavam em vias de consolidação.) Por
+isso que os itens (f) por quê e (g) a partir de quê integram um universo
+de análise mais complexo que os demais. A partir deles, podemos
+explorar outras dimensões menos óbvias das escrituras, mas a solidez
+de nossas assertivas a seu respeito dependem de muitos outros
+fatores externos ao escopo textual das mesmas fontes. Isso tudo não
+invalida que prestemos atenção a tais dimensões, apenas permite
+que enxerguemos qual o alcance das respostas que esses documentos
+podem nos dar a seu respeito.
+
+3. Considerações finais
+A utilização de fontes documentais pode trazer ganhos a qualquer
+pesquisa, especialmente no âmbito do Direito. Contudo, uma vez
+que decidimos incorporar tal método em nossas investigações, a primeira
+coisa que temos de ter em mente é que os documentos produzidos
+responderam, no momento de sua produção, a demandas as
+mais variadas (controle fiscal, informações, registros de população,
+materialização escrita da narrativa de um crime etc.), mas todas elas
+estranhas às necessidades do(a) pesquisador(a). Mesmo sua organização
+e salvaguarda em instituições arquivísticas não necessariamente
+atende às suas necessidades, estando sujeita à perda, deterioração
+ou inacessibilidade.
+Portanto, as fontes, em seu conteúdo ou organização dentro de
+um quadro seriado, não expressam automaticamente “a verdade”
+ou “o que realmente aconteceu” a respeito de determinadas ocorrências
+históricas que nos interessam. Se bem problematizadas, elas
+245
+
+podem nos ajudar a reconstituir de modo fragmentário realidades
+passadas. Porém, tudo passa pelos questionamentos que produzimos
+em relação aos documentos. Em outras palavras, à formulação
+de perguntas, das mais básicas às mais complexas, que podem ser
+respondidas de modos distintos, dependendo da natureza da fonte e
+da qualidade de nossas indagações.
+Nesse sentido, as escrituras públicas podem revelar muita coisa
+sobre práticas contratuais, mercado de terras, organização territorial
+e relações de propriedade. Entretanto, não conseguimos apreender
+a totalidade dos contratos firmados entre pessoas a partir delas, especialmente
+quando tratamos de tempos passados, em que o Estado
+ainda estruturava-se na mediação das relações entre seus cidadãos.
+Contratos verbais poderiam reger negócios envolvendo bens
+importantes como terras sem nunca ter sido escrito uma linha a seu
+respeito pelos contratantes. Ainda, elementos práticos cotidianos
+necessários à efetivação dos contratos poderiam estar ausentes de
+sua escrituração (inclusive por serem tão óbvios àqueles que os estabeleciam,
+mas nem tanto a nós que só os acessamos vasculhando
+em arquivos empoeirados).
+Não obstante, para além das informações mais básicas, os meandros
+e as entrelinhas também revelam elementos implícitos, talvez
+menos relevantes para os contratantes e as autoridades que reconheciam
+os acordos, mas importantes para nós. Por exemplo, relações
+e direitos de propriedade implicados, por meio de nominações
+e concepções. Estes são elementos que representam possibilidades
+de investigação nem sempre tão visíveis a partir de um primeiro exame,
+mas que revelam-se pouco a pouco na medida em que dirigimos
+um olhar mais treinado e acurado. Desse modo, as escrituras
+não apenas dizem coisas sobre prazos, preços e quantidades relativos
+aos bens arrendados, mas também podem falar acerca de como
+estabeleciam-se relações entre os contratantes e os recursos naturais
+disponíveis. Isto é, ao examinar as escrituras, podemos afirmar
+coisas relativas não somente aos contratos e as práticas contratuais:
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+246
+
+podemos dizer algo sobre as relações sociais que estruturam o estabelecimento
+desses mesmos contratos.
+Para poder dizer mais sobre essas relações, precisamos cruzar
+as escrituras com fontes de diferentes naturezas (dados estatísticos,
+índices demográficos) e cotejá-las com panorama normativo/legislativo.
+A partir disso, podemos construir um contexto, que seja histórico,
+social, econômico, político, normativo, jurídico... Esta é uma
+boa receita para estabelecermos os limites e os alcances de nossas
+pesquisas, no que concerne a este método.
+247
+
+4. Bibliografia
+
+Bloch, M. (2002). Apologia da história ou o ofício do historiador. Rio de Janeiro:
+Zahar.
+
+Barros, J. D.. (2010). Fontes históricas: olhares sobre um caminho percorrido
+
+e perspectivas sobre os novos tempos. In: Revista Albuquerque, 3(1)
+
+Barros, J. D. A. (2014). Verdade e História: arqueologia de uma relação. Cadernos
+IHU ideias. Ano 12, 12(212).
+
+Chalhoub, S. (2001). Trabalho, lar e botequim: o cotidiano dos trabalhadores
+
+do Rio de Janeiro da belle époque. Campinas: Editora da UNICAMP.
+
+Congost, R. (2007). Tierras, leyes, historia: estudios sobre “la gran obra de la
+
+propiedad”. Barcelona: Crítica.
+
+Febvre, L. (1989). Combates pela História. Lisboa: Editorial Presença.
+
+Fradkin, R. (compilador). (2007). El poder y la vara. Estudios sobre la justicia
+
+y la construcción del Estado en el Buenos Aires rural (1780-1830). Buenos
+
+Aires: Prometeo Libros.
+
+Fradkin, R. (2004). Los contratos rurales y la transformación de la campaña
+
+de Buenos Aires durante la expansión ganadera (1820-1840). In: R. Fradkin,;
+J. C.Garavaglia, (editores). En busca de un tiempo perdido: la economia
+de Buenos Aires en el país de la abundancia: 1750-1865 (pp.195-233).
+
+Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.
+
+Grossi, P. (1992). La propriedad y las propriedades. Un análisis histórico.
+
+Trad. López y López, A. M. . Madrid: Cuadernos Cívitas.
+
+Hespanha, A. M.. (1994). Às vésperas do Leviathan – instituições e poder
+
+político em Portugal – séc. XVII. Lisboa: Aslmedina.
+
+Lara, S. H.; Mendonça, J. M. N. (org.). (2006). Direitos e justiças no Brasil. Ensaios
+de história social. Campinas: Editora Unicamp.
+
+Leipnitz, G. T.. (2013). Contratos e direitos: arrendamentos e formas variadas
+de relações de propriedade. In: Martins-Costa, J.; Varela, L. B. (org.).
+
+Código: dimensão histórica e desafio contemporâneo. Estudos em homenagem
+ao Professor Paolo Grossi. Porto Alegre: Sergio Antonio Fabris
+
+Editor, pp. 161-207.
+
+Leipnitz, G. T.. (2012). Contratos, preços e possibilidades: arrendamentos e
+
+mercantilização da terra na fronteira sul do Brasil, segunda metade do
+Pesquisa historiográfica e documental //
+Guinter Leipnitz
+248
+século XIX. Topoi. Revista de História, Rio de Janeiro, 13(24), pp. 43-59.
+
+Disponível em: http://www.revistatopoi.org/numeros_anteriores/topoi24/TOPOI24_2012_A03.pdf.
+Acesso em 10 de abril de 2016.
+
+Leipnitz, G. T.. (2010). Entre contratos, direitos e conflitos. Arrendamentos e
+
+relações de propriedade na transformação da Campanha rio-grandense:
+
+Uruguaiana (1847-1910). Porto Alegre: Dissertação de Mestrado, Programa
+de Pós-Graduação em História da UFRGS.
+
+Marx, K.. (1983) Los debates sobre la ley acerca del robo de leña. In: En defensa
+de la libertad: los artículos de la Gaceta Renana 1842-1843. Valencia:
+
+Fernando Torres.
+
+Motta, M. M. M.. (2008). Nas fronteiras do poder. Conflito e direito à terra no
+
+Brasil do século XIX. 2ª edição revista e ampliada. Niterói: EDUFF.
+
+Palacio, J. M.. (2002). La estancia mixta y el arrendamiento agrícola: Algunas
+
+hipótesis sobre su evolución histórica en la región pampeana, 1880-1945. Boletín
+del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana “Dr. Emilio Ravignani”.
+
+[online]., no.25, pp.37-87. Disponível em: http://www.scielo.org.ar/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S052497672002000100002&lng=en&nrm=iso>.
+Acesso em 13 de outubro de 2007.
+
+Rodrigues, P. P. (2008). A Lei Hipotecária de 1864 e a propriedade no XIX. XIII
+
+Encontro de História Anpuh–Rio–Identidades. Rio de Janeiro: ANPUH.
+
+Disponível em: http://www.encontro2008.rj.anpuh.org/resources/content/anais/1205339972_ARQUIVO_artigoregistroanpuh.pdf.
+Acesso em
+
+30 de março de 2009.
+
+Silva, L. O.. (1996). Terras devolutas e latifúndio: efeitos da Lei de 1850.
+
+Campinas: Editora da UNICAMP.
+
+Thompson, E. P.. (1997). Senhores e caçadores. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra.
+
+Thompson, E. P.. (2005). Costumes em comum. Estudos sobre a cultura popular
+tradicional. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
+
+Varela, L. B.. (2005). Das sesmarias à propriedade moderna: um estudo de
+
+história do Direito brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar.
+
+Xavier, Â. B.; Hespanha, A. M.. (1998). As redes clientelares. In: A. M. Hespanha
+
+(coord.). História de Portugal: O Antigo Regime (volume 4). Lisboa: Editorial
+Estampa.
+249
+
+8
+
+Jurimetria ou Análise
+
+Quantitativa de Decisões
+
+Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+
+Jurimetria é entendida como um método de pesquisa baseado no
+uso do empirismo, combinado com análises estatísticas, aplicado
+ao estudo do Direito. Por sua vez, o empirismo é a prática filosófica-
+-científica de se chegar a conclusões investigativas por meio da utilização
+de dados obtidos pela observação da realidade. O empirismo
+se contrapõe, por exemplo, ao dogmatismo.
+A Jurimetria como método científico existe, de uma maneira ou de
+outra, desde tempos remotos. Ao que consta, já em 1709, o matemático
+suíço Nicolaus I Bernoulli1 escreveu sua dissertação de doutorado
+(em latim) intitulada “Dissertatio Inauguralis Mathematico-Juridica de
+Usu Artis conjectandi in Jure”, ou “[Dissertação Inaugural de Matemática
+Jurídica do] Uso da Arte da Conjectura em Direito”, que na verdade tratava-se
+de uma aplicação de métodos estatísticos ao Direito. Uma das
+
+1 Nicolau I Bernoulli era filho de Nicolau Bernoulli, pintor na Basileia. Foi aluno de Jacob
+Bernoulli, o famoso estatístico suíço que deu nome à distribuição estatística hoje conhecida
+como “distribuição Bernoulli”. Foi sob a orientação de Jacob que Nicolau I escreveu
+o que se considera ser uma das primeiras obras de Jurimetria na ciência moderna.
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+250
+
+grandes obras do estatístico francês Siméon Denis Poisson, de 1837, foi
+o “Recherches sur la Probabilité des Jugements em Matière Criminelle”
+– ou “Pesquisas sobre a Probabilidade dos Julgamentos em Matéria
+Criminal”. É neste livro que o famoso autor demonstra a fórmula do que
+se convencionou chamar “distribuição (estatística) de Poisson”.
+No entanto, oficialmente como campo de estudo científico, a Jurimetria
+se consolida na década de 60, nos Estados Unidos, com o lançamento
+do periódico Modern Uses of Logic in Law – MULL, em 1959, pela American
+Bar Association (o similar à Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil), liderado
+por Layman Allen. Sete anos mais tarde, em 1966, a MULL passou
+a se chamar Jurimetrics, the Journal of Law, Science and Technology. A
+revista encontra-se ainda em circulação, com periodicidade trimestral.
+Desde então, a Jurimetria tem-se ampliado como método de
+pesquisa nas ciências jurídicas e correlatas, e passou também a ser
+designado como “estudos empíricos (quantitativos) em Direito”. Nos
+Estados Unidos, várias escolas de Direito possuem centros de pesquisa
+empírica/Jurimetria. Há também diversas associações específicas
+para a discussão e a divulgação de trabalhos na área, dentre
+elas a Society for Empirical Legal Studies, que realiza anualmente
+congressos nacionais e internacionais, e tem uma publicação própria,
+a Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. No Brasil, inicia-se um movimento
+similar em diversos centros de ensino e pesquisa. Teremos
+oportunidade para discutir sobre esse tema mais adiante2
+.
+Em seguida, vamos ilustrar alguns exemplos de métodos de Jurimetria
+aplicada a decisões judiciais.
+
+2 O movimento da Jurimetria nos EUA, que de certa maneira confunde-se com o do Empirical
+Legal Studies, foca-se na pesquisa do Direito baseada em análises quantitativas.
+No Brasil, o movimento dos Estudos Empíricos em Direito é mais abrangente, cobrindo
+pesquisas de cunho qualitativo. Este capítulo focará na primeira perspectiva. No entanto,
+isso não quer dizer que as pesquisas aqui abordadas tenham apenas natureza numérica:
+a análise de decisões judiciais é normalmente sobre dados qualitativos. A distinção,
+entretanto, repousa sobre o instrumental ou método da análise, que aqui será baseada
+em modelagem quantitativa. Assim, mesmo se os dados originais sejam de natureza
+qualitativa, serão usadas técnicas para manipulação e análise quantitativa.
+251
+
+1. Como Fazer Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa
+de Decisões Judiciais?
+O primeiro mito a ser destruído no exercício de aplicação da Jurimetria
+é de que ela exige emprego de métodos sofisticadíssimos, com
+matemática e/ou recursos computacionais de última geração, manejáveis
+apenas por doutores das ciências exatas. Qualquer estudo
+cujo objeto faz parte das ciências jurídicas – no caso específico aqui,
+decisões judiciais – que se valha de dados coletados empiricamente,
+e cuja análise se baseie de alguma forma em conceitos estatísticos
+(por mais simples que sejam) é exemplo de trabalho jurimétrico. A
+grande questão é: qual é a inquisição que se está fazendo com tal
+estudo? E talvez mais ainda, quais são as conclusões a que se quer
+chegar com os resultados obtidos? Estudos que tenham ambições
+maiores, que almejem chegar a conclusões generalizáveis a um
+grande número de fenômenos do mundo real, precisam tomar um
+cuidado especial com a escolha do método empírico e com a execução
+da análise. Também é preciso, nesses casos, cuidar da amostra
+a ser usada para o estudo. No caso de decisões judiciais, ela precisa
+conter elementos (casos) que sejam representativos da população
+total, dado o tema específico que se coloca3
+. Assim sendo, a própria
+seleção do conjunto de decisões judiciais a serem coletadas e a análise
+a ser aplicada sobre os dados dependerão do método que será
+empregado. Por sua vez, a escolha do método não é uma opção aleatória,
+havendo modelos mais ou menos adequados para diferentes
+propósitos de pesquisa. Vejamos a seguir:
+
+1. Estudos de Caso: Como o próprio nome diz, os estudos de caso
+
+3 Em particular, o grande problema a ser evitado nesses casos é o viés de seleção na
+amostra, ou seja, por algum motivo, a amostra contenha participações desproporcionais
+de casos com determinadas características em comparação ao que seria na população
+original. Por exemplo, se o tema de estudo é a tendência das decisões judiciais
+com relação a inadimplemento de dívidas contratuais, é importante que a amostra
+selecionada reflita a população original no que se refere à proporção de casos trazidos
+inicialmente aos tribunais pelos credores e pelos devedores.
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+252
+têm como objetivo a análise aprofundada de algum ou alguns
+(não muitos) casos reais que ilustram o tema que se quer investigar.
+Aqui, troca-se o tamanho da amostra observada pelo nível
+de detalhamento da análise. Por exemplo, quer-se estudar julgados
+em matéria de defesa de concorrência que atendam a determinadas
+características: indústria, país, período de tempo, etc.
+Para o propósito desse estudo, é pouco provável que exista uma
+quantidade muito grande de casos. Escolhem-se então, por meios
+não-aleatórios, os casos que atendam àquelas características específicas.
+Estudos de caso normalmente não utilizam técnicas estatísticas
+ou econométricas muito sofisticadas. A sua vantagem,
+no entanto, é a precisão com que podem chegar com a observação
+do fenômeno, principalmente quando há detalhes específicos
+ou quando se almeja obter algum tipo de informação qualitativa.
+Por outro lado, por envolverem quantidades limitadas de observações,
+suas conclusões dificilmente podem ser generalizáveis.
+2. Estatísticas Descritivas (e/ou Correlações): O emprego de estatísticas
+descritivas é a forma mais simples de se aplicar método
+“puramente” quantitativo. Os dados usados na análise descritiva
+podem ser, por exemplo, extraídos de julgados escolhidos de maneira
+mais ou menos aleatória. A contribuição deste tipo de estudo
+é compilar, em um só trabalho, dados que ajudem a mostrar evidências
+de algum fenômeno ou de alguma tendência em decisões
+judiciais. Com base em estatísticas simples, como participações
+percentuais, médias, medianas, etc., é possível chegar-se a conclusões
+preliminares acerca de algum tema, e até mesmo sair de
+evidências anedóticas. Yeung (2016) faz uso de estatísticas descritivas
+aplicadas a julgamentos de ações trabalhistas relacionadas à
+questão da terceirização da mão de obra. Antes da aprovação da
+Lei 13.429/2017, era ilícito para as empresas no país contratar trabalhadores
+terceirizados para o exercício de atividades consideradas
+“fim” das empresas. O que a autora mostra, após a análise de
+500 decisões de diversos Tribunais Regionais do Trabalho (TRT’s),
+253
+
+é que havia uma divergência substancial do que os magistrados
+entendiam por “atividade meio” e “atividade fim”, mesmo para
+funções idênticas. Por exemplo, no âmbito bancário, trabalhadores
+alocados em atividades relacionadas a concessão de crédito,
+compensação, cobranças e financiamentos eram considerados,
+em 66% das decisões judiciais, como exercendo “atividade-fim” do
+banco; mas essas mesmas atividades, em 33% da decisões, foram
+consideradas pelos magistrados como “atividades-meio”. Praticamente
+o mesmo padrão foi observado nos julgados referentes a
+outras atividades. A pesquisa, baseada em estatísticas descritivas
+de julgados, mostrou que, ao contrário do que se afirmava em partes
+do meio jurídico, não era pacífico o entendimento do que se
+considerava como atividade-fim ou atividade-meio, gerando significativa
+insegurança judicial, e incentivando ambos os lados do
+conflito a litigarem. Mesmo assim, cientistas de formação quantitativa
+mais dura normalmente não se limitam às análises das estatísticas
+descritivas.
+3. Regressões de Causalidade: Quando se tem um número “razoável”
+de observações, ou um tamanho “razoável”4
+ de amostra, é
+possível ir além das estatísticas meramente descritivas e tentar
+encontrar relações mais robustas entre as variáveis analisadas,
+normalmente através de modelos de regressões de causalidade.
+De maneira bastante resumida – correndo o risco de simplificar
+uma das áreas mais dinâmicas e de vanguarda da Economia e da
+Estatística de fins do século 20 e início do século 21 – os mode4
+Não existe uma resposta certa para qual seria o tamanho da amostra mínima necessária
+para ser considerada de tamanho “razoável”; isso dependerá do objeto em estudo,
+do total de variáveis que serão incluídas no estudo (quanto mais variáveis, menor é o
+“grau de liberdade” do exercício estatístico, e poderá ser exigido um número maior de
+observações), etc. Normalmente microeconomistas e financistas tendem a trabalhar
+com amostras bastante grandes, com pelo menos milhares de observações. Já os macroeconomistas,
+que muitas vezes têm o número de países do mundo, ou de estados
+de um país, como observações, tendem a ter tamanhos de amostras menores. De toda
+forma, para um razoável exercício de regressão econométrica, é necessário pelo menos
+algumas dezenas de observações (novamente, dependendo do objeto em análise).
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+254
+los de regressão tentam captar a influência de certas variáveis,
+chamadas de variáveis independentes¸ sobre algumas outras, as
+chamadas variáveis dependentes. Mais ainda, o que se pretende
+com estes modelos é explicar supostos efeitos de causalidade de
+variáveis independentes sobre a(s) dependente(s). Por exemplo,
+pode-se perguntar se o tamanho do orçamento municipal para
+a área de saúde afeta o número de pacientes atendidos nos hospitais
+públicos. Importante perceber que se quer chegar a uma
+relação de causalidade: a hipótese é que mais recursos “causam”
+mais (ou menos) atendimentos. E os modelos de regressão colocarão
+a hipótese em teste e darão o resultado positivo ou negativo.
+Entrando para a seara jurídica, onde essas inquisições poderiam
+ser enquadradas na categoria de trabalhos jurimétricos, diversas
+são as possibilidades. Alguns exemplos de regressões possíveis
+(muitas das quais já realizada): se o orçamento do Judiciário e/ou
+a quantidade de magistrados afeta o tempo médio de um processo
+nos tribunais, ou se a qualidade do sistema legal afeta a atividade
+empresarial e o desenvolvimento econômico e social de um
+país. Especificamente em decisões judiciais, pode-se avaliar se
+características do litigante (indivíduo ou empresa, classe social,
+gênero, etc.), ou paralelamente, se características do(s) magistrado(s)
+julgando o caso afetam a decisão judicial. Nesses casos,
+além de variáveis numéricas (tamanho do orçamento, quantidade
+de juízes, renda do litigante, etc.) também é possível incluir
+variáveis discretas, não numéricas nas regressões (qualidade do
+sistema legal, gênero do indivíduo e/ou do magistrado, tipo de litigante,
+estado de origem do processo, etc.) Para tipos diferentes
+de variáveis incluídas no modelo, tipos diferentes de inquisições
+(“quanto”, “como”, ou “qual a probabilidade”, etc.), tipos diferentes
+de variabilidade dos dados (variação em um único momento
+temporal, ou variação ao longo do tempo), etc. existem modelos
+de regressão específicos, mais ou menos adequados à situação
+em questão. Em ponto comum está o objetivo de se evidenciar a
+255
+
+existência ou não de relações de causalidade de algumas variáveis
+sobre outras, mediante a observação de um número grande
+de observações. Sendo essa uma aplicação da Análise Quantitativa
+das Decisões Judiciais fortemente consolidada na literatura
+internacional, discutiremos diversos exemplos de trabalhos nesta
+linha na seção posterior, de ilustração das possibilidades de
+desenvolvimento de pesquisa.
+4. Outros Métodos: Os avanços das pesquisas metodológicas é constante.
+Novas teorias, técnicas e modelos empíricos surgem todos
+os anos. Não existe, portanto, um limite das aplicações possíveis
+de métodos empíricos. Somente para ilustrar uma recente, que
+gradualmente ganha espaço na área de Ciências Políticas e do
+Direito, o QCA, Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Como o nome indica,
+é um método baseado em análise empírica mas qualitativa
+de dados. No entanto, aplicada a decisões judiciais, também tem
+um componente quantitativo forte. A característica do QCA é que
+ele tenta encontrar conjuntos de variáveis que tornam a presença
+de um determinado resultado mais provável de ser observado ou
+não. Os modelos de regressão tradicionais, por sua vez, procuram
+encontrar variáveis independentes que, de maneira isolada, explicariam
+a observância do resultado (a variável dependente). No
+QCA, os conjuntos de variáveis formariam caminhos possíveis que
+levariam a ocorrência do fenômeno observado. Exemplo de QCA
+aplicado a decisões judiciais está em Castillo Ortiz e Medina (2016).
+
+1. 1. Técnicas de coleta e tratamento de dados nos Estudos
+Jurimétricos de Decisões Judiciais
+
+Mas como efetivamente se inicia uma pesquisa empírica quantitativa
+baseada em decisões judiciais? Em primeiro lugar, é preciso ter
+acesso a decisões judiciais que se quer estudar, analisar. Cada pesquisador
+terá suas fontes, podendo ser físicas (obtidas diretamente
+nos tribunais) ou virtuais (via bases eletrônicas), de fonte primária
+(acesso direto na origem) ou fonte secundária/terciária (coletada
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+256
+
+por outrem, e depois, disponibilizada pública ou privadamente a
+outros pesquisadores), etc. Uma vez disponível a base de decisões
+(independentemente do tamanho desta base), começa-se a fazer
+o trabalho de tabulação dos dados: a mão no papel, em planilhas
+eletrônicas, ou mais recentemente, “ensinando” a máquina a fazer
+essa tabulação. Alguns pontos práticos que valem a pena a discussão
+mais detalhada.
+O Judiciário brasileiro tem caminhado cada vez mais na direção
+de disponibilização de processos e de julgados de maneira eletrônica.
+Praticamente todos os tribunais, das 3 Justiças principais (Estadual,
+Federal e Trabalhista) têm publicado de maneira mais ou
+menos adequada a jurisprudência recente. Assim, de maneira geral,
+encontrar a fonte de decisões judiciais não tem sido o problema.
+Os problemas tornam-se significativos à medida que se almeja
+fazer estudos empíricos com grande quantidade de decisões, e
+quando a aleatoriedade absoluta na escolha dos casos é necessária.
+A questão é que há evidências de que nem mesmo os tribunais mais
+avançados na digitalização dos processos disponibilizam integralmente
+seus julgados. A grande dúvida para os pesquisadores é: qual
+é o percentual de julgados não disponibilizados nos sítios abertos?
+Existe alguma característica consistente desses julgados para que
+não sejam disponibilizados publicamente? Se existir, seria um problema
+para as pesquisas científicas, porque levaria a viés de seleção
+dos casos disponibilizados. Veçoso et al (2014) abordam essa questão
+de maneira detalhada e mostram que, mesmo o Supremo Tribunal
+Federal (STF) e o Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ), em suas páginas
+de acesso eletrônico, não disponibilizam a jurisprudência em
+sua totalidade.
+Outra dificuldade para os pesquisadores da Jurimetria aplicada a
+decisões judiciais, dificuldade essa inerente à própria natureza deste
+tipo de pesquisa, é a necessidade de tratamento dos dados – normalmente
+qualitativos – e sua eventual categorização para elementos
+que possam ser tratáveis pelos programas (softwares) estatísticos
+257
+
+computacionais. A transformação de variáveis qualitativas (“decisão
+favorável ou desfavorável?”, “litigante é homem ou mulher?”, “empresa
+é nacional ou estrangeira? De que indústria é?”, etc.) para algo
+que possa ser manipulado e interpretado estatisticamente pode, algumas
+vezes não ser trivial. Os modelos econométricos mais comuns
+para estes casos incluem o probit e o logit, mas eventualmente esses
+modelos podem ser limitados para algumas situações.
+
+2. Temas em Jurimetria de Decisões Judiciais.
+Conforme mostrado anteriormente, a literatura de Jurimetria, ou
+análise quantitativa de decisões judiciais, tem sido bastante vasta.
+Na maioria absoluta dos casos, o método empregado tem sido a análise
+econométrica de regressão de causalidade. No entanto, acompanhando
+o próprio desenvolvimento das pesquisas teóricas em
+econometria, os modelos usados têm se sofisticado cada vez mais.
+Esta seção será subdividida em temas que têm sido exemplos de emprego
+da análise empírica de decisões judiciais. Discutiremos exemplos
+de trabalhos, os modelos utilizados e os resultados alcançados.
+Veremos que tem sido uma área bastante diversificada, não somente
+com relação aos temas específicos de análise, mas também com relação
+os modelos adotados.
+
+2.1. Jurimetria e Efeitos de Ideologia nas Decisões Judiciais
+
+Talvez um dos primeiros objetivos de estudiosos que empregaram a
+análise quantitativa de decisões judiciais tenha sido aferir a existência
+de possíveis efeitos de ideologia dos magistrados.
+Já na primeira metade do século XX, C. Hermann Pritchett focou
+suas análises na Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos. Com base em
+julgamentos que se estendiam por um período superior a 20 anos, o
+autor (1968) encontrou sinais de divergências persistentes na maneira
+de julgar dos Ministros da Suprema Corte, oriundas de diferenças
+ideológicas. Foi uma das primeiras tentativas na literatura de incluir
+características pessoais dos magistrados como determinantes de pa-
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+258
+
+drões de voto que se desviavam da média. A hipótese principal de
+Pritchett era de que os juízes são influenciados por suas ideologias
+pessoais, e de que suas decisões nos tribunais não são meras interpretações
+das “letras da lei”.
+Mais recentemente, Epstein, Landes e Posner (2013), também
+baseados em anos de análises empíricas das decisões da Suprema
+Corte Norte-Americana, argumentam que os impactos da ideologia
+política vem crescendo ao longo do tempo. Para outros tribunais nos
+EUA, por exemplo, os tribunais de apelações e os tribunais distritais,
+os autores indicam que ela também desempenha um papel significativo,
+embora de em magnitudes mais fracas.
+No Brasil, evidências anedóticas no meio empresarial e mesmo
+em referências acadêmicas (vide Arida, Bacha e Lara-Resende 2005)
+apontam para a existência de um suposto viés pró-devedor pelo Judiciário
+brasileiro, o que geraria insegurança jurisdicional e desincentivos
+para a criação de um mercado de crédito de longo prazo. Yeung
+e Azevedo (2015) se valem da análise empírica de decisões judiciais
+para averiguar tal evidência e, para tal, usam uma amostra de aproximadamente
+1.700 decisões do STJ (Superior Tribunal de Justiça)
+com o objetivo de avaliar se esse tribunal tendia a favorecer devedores
+em disputas contratuais envolvendo instituições financeiras. De
+maneira geral, os autores não confirmam tal evidência. No entanto,
+ao analisar variáveis específicas, surgem evidências de determinantes
+ideológicas. Por exemplo, os Ministros do STJ tendem a decidir de
+maneira diferente, dependendo de quem está no polo passivo da relação
+contratual (envolvendo dívida financeira): sendo um indivíduo,
+os Ministros tendem a favorecer o devedor; já nos casos em que o devedor
+é uma pessoa jurídica (empresas e organizações) as decisões
+tenderam a favorecer a instituição financeira credora. Então, ao que
+a evidência empírica aponta, os Ministros têm percepção diferente
+da necessidade de proteção do indivíduo, em comparação com empresas
+e organizações, perante credores financeiros.
+Neste mesmo estudo, outra evidência de ideologia foi averiguada
+259
+
+indiretamente. Os autores avaliaram se havia algum “fator regional”
+impactando nas decisões do STJ. Houve confirmação de apenas um
+caso: Recursos Especiais oriundos do estado do Rio Grande do Sul
+foram consistentemente reformados pelos juízes do STJ, e na direção
+de desfavorecer os devedores. Sendo o STJ um tribunal de instância
+superior (e em muitos casos, a última instância, em não existindo
+matéria constitucional), pode-se constatar que os Ministros do STJ
+usaram a discricionariedade de seu poder de decisão para corrigir as
+“não conformidades” nos julgados dos magistrados gaúchos. Para os
+conhecedores da história recente do Judiciário brasileiro, a lembrança
+do movimento judicial “Associação dos Juízes para a Democracia”
+e de ativismo judicial de maneira mais representativa justamente
+pelos magistrados do Rio Grande do Sul, parece fazer ligação e corroborar
+os achados empíricos de Yeung e Azevedo (2015). Curiosamente,
+neste sentido, o trabalho destes autores evidencia impactos
+de ideologia não somente pelos magistrados gaúchos – no sentido
+de beneficiar os devedores – mas também dos Ministros do STJ – que
+reformaram, de maneira consistente, os recursos vindos do Rio Grande
+do Sul, de maneira a beneficiar os credores.
+Por mais abundantes que sejam teorias e evidências empíricas
+de impactos ideológicos e políticos, este não é o único fenômeno que
+pode ser observado na tomada de decisões judiciais.
+
+2.2. Jurimetria e Efeitos de Gênero nas Decisões Judiciais:
+
+A literatura internacional também tem dedicado espaço para a avaliação
+de impactos do gênero dos magistrados sobre decisões judiciais.
+A literatura da Jurimetria sobre este tema tem sido igualmente
+extensa. Abaixo, fazemos comentários de uma pequena seleção de
+estudos mais recentes.
+Peresie (2005) mostra que o gênero dos juízes é determinante significativo
+nas decisões dos tribunais de apelação nos Estados Unidos, em
+casos de disputas por assédio e discriminação sexuais. O gênero atua
+como fator de impacto direto – ou seja, as juízas tendem a favorecer
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+260
+
+mais frequentemente as vítimas de discriminação – e também como
+fator indireto, através do efeito de pares em colegiados – isto é, as juízas
+influenciam seus colegas homens no julgamento de tais casos. Peresie
+mostra que os colegiados que contam com juízas tendem a favorecer
+as supostas vítimas duas vezes mais frequentemente do que aqueles
+que contam apenas com juízes homens. Neste estudo, o fator gênero foi
+mais impactante do que ideologia sobre as decisões judiciais.
+Na mesma linha, Farhang e Wawro (2004) encontram forte efeito
+de colegiado pelas mulheres, ou seja, as juízas tendem a influenciar
+seus colegas masculinos de maneira significativa. No entanto, os autores
+mostram que uma segunda mulher no painel não tem o mesmo
+efeito que a primeira. Esses autores também tentam encontrar evidências
+de impacto racial, mas – diferentemente do fator de gênero
+– não encontram nenhum, embora sejam cautelosos em interpretar
+esse último resultado.
+Boyd, Epstein e Martin (2010) empregam o método econométrico
+conhecido por propensity score matching e também encontram
+impacto significativo de gênero em litígios de discriminação sexual.
+Aqui, como em Peresie (2005), os impactos ocorrem tanto diretamente
+(via juízes individuais) quanto indiretamente (via efeitos sobre colegiados).
+Embora os autores analisem 13 tipos de matérias de litígios
+judiciais, apenas aqueles relacionados a discriminação sexual
+foram significativamente impactados pelo gênero dos juízes. Apesar
+de a lista incluir outras matérias “sensíveis a gênero” tais como aborto
+e assédio sexual, em nenhuma outra houve impacto significativo
+do gênero dos magistrados.
+Estudos dessa natureza não se restringem a analisar dados dos
+EUA. King e Greening (2007) analisaram as decisões do Tribunal Penal
+Internacional em casos de violência sexual na antiga Iugoslávia. Os autores
+encontram que juízas tendem a punir mais severamente os réus
+que agrediram mulheres – naquilo que constitui uma “solidariedade
+de gênero” entre juízas e vítimas. Esta solidariedade também parece
+estar presente quando os painéis são compostos integralmente por
+261
+
+homens, e esses analisam casos envolvendo vítimas masculinas: as
+sentenças para estes casos eram, em média, 100 meses mais longas
+do que aquelas em que havia pelo menos uma juíza no colegiado.
+Também existem trabalhos brasileiros neste tema. Grezzana e
+Poncezk (2012) analisaram mais de 90 mil conflitos trabalhistas no
+Tribunal Superior do Trabalho (TST). De maneira geral, os autores
+não encontram evidências de impacto de gênero nas decisões daquele
+tribunal. No entanto, quando se controla o objeto de disputa,
+o impacto é evidente. Isso acontece, por exemplo, para casos de
+“equiparação salarial” e “vínculo de emprego e sindicato”. Nestas circunstâncias,
+as mulheres juízas tendem a favorecer as litigantes (trabalhadoras),
+enquanto os juízes masculinos tendem a favorecer os
+trabalhadores do sexo masculino. Novamente, parece haver algum
+tipo de “solidariedade de gênero” entre juízes e litigantes no Tribunal
+Superior do Trabalho.
+Por que o gênero dos juízes teria impacto na forma como eles(as)
+decidem? Com base em literatura anterior, Boyd, Epstein e Martin
+(2010) oferecem quatro explicações de como gênero afeta as decisões
+judiciais, seja por via individual, ou via grupos/painéis. Em primeiro
+lugar, a chamada “voz dissonante”: as decisões divergentes entre
+homens e mulheres seriam manifestações das diferenças de visão de
+mundo e da sociedade por indivíduos do sexo masculino e do sexo
+feminino. Esta seria a perspectiva individual dos impactos do gênero
+nos tribunais. A segunda explicação seria a chamada “narrativa
+representativa”, ou seja, a manifestação de juízas que se veem como
+representantes das pessoas do sexo feminino e, especificamente, de
+litigantes femininas. Nesses casos, as juízas decidirão em favor das
+mulheres nos casos em que há interesses particulares para toda a
+classe feminina na sociedade. Terceiro, o “fator representativo, coloca
+as mulheres juízas como tendo mais informações valiosas para a
+resolução do conflito judicial. Nestas circunstâncias, os seus pares homens
+no painel serão beneficiados desta informação privilegiada, e o
+efeito será canalizado através da votação do painel. Ou seja, a manei-
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+262
+
+ra como a juíza decidir será uma sinalização de informações importantes
+às quais, de outra forma, os juízes homens não teriam acesso.
+Por fim, o “fator organizacional” supervisionará o impacto do gênero
+nas decisões judiciais. A visão aqui é que a formação profissional e
+as regras institucionais no Judiciário são claras e semelhantes o suficiente
+para minimizar quaisquer diferenças significativas entre juízes
+do sexo masculino e feminino. Todos esses fatores foram explorados,
+testados e analisados empiricamente por uma rica literatura empírica
+no tema de impactos de gênero sobre as decisões judiciais.
+Além do gênero, há outros fatores que afetam as decisões judiciais,
+relacionados a grupos minoritários como raça, etnia, grupo religioso
+e formação social, dentre outros. Devido às limitações deste
+capítulo, deixaremos estes tópicos para discussão posterior.
+
+2.3. Jurimetria e Efeitos de Composição e Votação em Painéis,
+e Efeito de Pares:
+
+Vimos acima algumas descrições de como a composição de painéis
+em tribunais afeta os padrões de voto dos juízes. Psicólogos e comportamentalistas
+sociais estudam há tempos os efeitos da pressão
+de pares nas organizações, principalmente nas empresas, e seria de
+se esperar – e de se observar – o mesmo acontecendo em organizações
+públicas e políticas tais como tribunais (Júri, Parlamento, etc.).
+Epstein, Landes e Posner (2013) têm uma explicação teórica para
+a ocorrência do efeito da composição do painel, e o testam. Painéis
+podem decidir por unanimidade – quando não há voto dissidente –
+ou não-unanimidade – quando há dissidência. Os autores explicam
+que há custos e benefícios da dissidência, e muitas vezes os primeiros
+são maiores do que o segundo, ou seja, os custos são maiores do
+que os benefícios da dissidência. Estes incluem escrever a opinião
+dissidente, discordando dos colegas, e também custos de reputação
+para os juízes de quem o voto dissidente discordou. Tudo isso criaria
+aversão à dissidência e, consequentemente, haveria uma minimização
+da vontade de discordar sobre questões menos importantes –
+263
+
+especificamente técnicas – e a divergências seria mais frequente nos
+casos de discordâncias ideológicas, que são mais difíceis de serem
+resolvidos por meio de discussões e acordos.
+Os autores também preveem que a dissidência será inversamente
+proporcional à carga de trabalho do tribunal, isto é, quanto mais
+ocupados forem os juízes, menos discordarão (pois isso gera mais
+trabalho e custo). A evidência histórica da Suprema Corte dos EUA
+e dos Tribunais de Apelações corrobora as previsões dos autores.
+Os autores também mostram impactos do dissenso sobre o tamanho
+do voto escrito: pareceres da maioria são mais longos se houver
+um membro dissidente no painel, e será ainda mais longo se houver
+mais de um voto dissonante. Aparentemente, mais palavras são necessárias
+para justificar o voto quando existe oposição. Finalmente,
+os autores relacionam a frequência de dissidência com a carreira:
+juízes federais nos Estados Unidos tendem a divergir mais durante
+a primeira metade de sua vida ativa, em comparação com a segunda
+metade de suas carreiras como magistrados.
+Os painéis de magistrados também podem potencializar outros
+fatores, por exemplo, a ideologia política (já discutida acima). Como
+observado por Sunstein et al (2006, apud Epstein, Landes e Posner,
+2013), juízes nomeados por Presidentes da República do Partido Republicano
+nos EUA decidem contra casos de ação afirmativa com
+mais frequência do que aqueles nomeados por Presidentes do Partido
+Democrata5
+. Contudo, a frequência é mais elevada para painéis
+integralmente compostos por Ministros Republicanos, e a frequência
+é muito mais baixa para painéis somente com Ministros Democratas.
+Para o fator de gênero, observa-se efeito semelhante: painéis
+integralmente femininos tendem a favorecer litigantes femininas, e
+o oposto para painéis integralmente masculinos, para litigantes do
+
+5 O Partido Democrata é considerado “liberal” em termos de liberdades individuais
+e, portanto, é mais empático a temas de ações afirmativas. Já membros do Partido
+Republicado tenderiam a ser mais “conservadores” sobre esses mesmos temas e tenderiam,
+no geral, a ser contra medidas de ações afirmativas e similares.
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+264
+
+sexo masculino (como mostrado acima). No entanto, às vezes, os
+painéis podem atenuar, ou mesmo reverter, o impacto ideológico.
+Estudos têm encontrado provas de que juízes liberais decidem de
+maneira mais conservadora em painéis com a presença de não-liberais,
+e o contrário para juízes conservadores, na presença de pares
+não-conservadores.
+Fora dos EUA, Smyth (2005) estudou o padrão de dissidência no
+Supremo Tribunal Australiano por quase cem anos. Ele encontra evidências
+de dissidência causada por ideologias políticas divergentes,
+mas nenhuma evidência de relação entre a carga de trabalho e a taxa
+de dissidência (como mostram Epstein, Lande, Posner, 2013). Quanto
+à carreira ativa dos juízes, Smyth encontra evidências de aumento
+da taxa de dissidência ao longo do tempo, um resultado divergente
+para o que Epstein, Lande e Posner (2013) mostraram para os EUA.
+Infelizmente, há ainda um número limitado de estudos sobre
+este tema fora dos Estados Unidos. Pesquisas futuras devem tentar
+reproduzir esses estudos americanos, de modo a corroborar ou rejeitar
+os achados desta literatura. Particularmente na literatura brasileira,
+ainda são raríssimos os estudos de padrões de votação, e efeitos
+de composição dos colegiados, sobre os resultados dos acórdãos.
+
+2.4. Jurimetria e Efeitos de Pressão Externa sobre Decisões
+Judiciais: Mídia e Opinião Popular
+
+Além do efeito exercido por pares nos painéis de votação, conforme
+discutido acima, existem outras fontes de impactos externos influenciando
+as decisões judiciais. A mídia e a opinião popular sempre
+restringiram, de alguma forma, o comportamento dos agentes públicos.
+Contudo, a intensidade deste impacto tem crescido exponencialmente
+com a modernização da tecnologia de telecomunicações.
+Em alguns países, como é o caso do Brasil, as sessões de votação da
+Suprema Corte são transmitidas ao vivo pelos canais de TV. Embora
+os cidadãos comuns raramente compreendam os assuntos discutidos
+nos tribunais – e especialmente nos tribunais superiores – de
+265
+
+tempos em tempos as decisões de Ministros e de juízes estão no
+centro das atenções, destacadas nas primeiras páginas dos jornais e
+discutidas por leigos. Em tempos de escândalos de corrupção envolvendo
+políticos de alto escalão como tem sido os últimos anos, isso
+é sobremaneira verdade. Assim, mesmo os juízes que não são eleitos
+diretamente (e no Brasil eles nunca são) sentem, de alguma forma,
+constrangidos pela opinião pública da sociedade sobre os resultados
+de seu trabalho. Como Epstein e Kobylka (1992) postulam: “A maior
+parte das decisões judiciais reflete a opinião pública ... Por todas as
+provas discutíveis, o Supremo Tribunal [de boa parte das democracias
+modernas] parece refletir a opinião pública com a mesma precisão
+que os outros poderes políticos” (p. 24).
+A literatura empírica sobre os efeitos da mídia e da opinião pública
+é também vasta e crescente. Devido à sua maior exposição e
+ao seu maior impacto sobre o resto da sociedade, estudos deste tipo
+concentram-se principalmente nos tribunais superiores. Casillas et
+al. (2011) encontram influência significativa da opinião pública sobre
+as decisões da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos; curiosamente o
+efeito é mais impactante nos casos relacionados a matérias de pouca
+relevância social (porque em casos de grande relevância social,
+há grande interesse em seguir de perto considerações jurídicas e/ou
+ideológicas pessoais). Os autores medem os custos incorridos pela
+Suprema Corte ao ignorar a opinião pública em casos não salientes
+durante o período de 1970 até 2000. Giles et al (2008) seguem na
+mesma direção e, embora sejam mais cautelosos na afirmação da
+existência de impactos diretos da opinião pública sobre as decisões
+da Suprema Corte, afirmam que há evidências claras de causalidade
+na votação dos Ministros.
+Epstein e Martin (2010) também encontram provas de que as decisões
+da Suprema Corte estão, em certo grau, alinhadas com a opinião
+pública. Além da explicação usual de que os juízes se preocupam com
+sua reputação e com a aprovação da sociedade, eles argumentam
+que a aliança pode ocorrer porque os juízes são, eles próprios, par-
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+266
+
+te da sociedade. Assim, neste caso, eles estão de fato decidindo com
+base em suas ideologias pessoais, e não apenas como um reflexo de
+preferências externas. Não seria fácil separar empiricamente esses
+dois efeitos, e os autores deixam a análise para outros estudos.
+Finalmente, há outro tipo de pressão externa que afeta significativamente
+as decisões judiciais: aquela proveniente de outros Poderes,
+a saber, o Executivo e o Legislativo. A interação entre juízes
+e esses outros atores políticos tem sido discutida há muito tempo
+por juristas, e é um objeto interminável de estudo. Especialmente no
+caso dos Tribunais Superiores, devido à nomeação presidencial de
+seus representantes (no Brasil, em especial no caso do STF), a busca
+por uma melhor compreensão dessa relação é crucial para se entender
+e averiguar a efetiva independência dos poderes, tão cara para o
+pleno funcionamento da democracia moderna.
+Lopes e Azevedo (2017) é um bom exemplo de estudo quantitativo
+sobre este tema no Brasil. Comparando os impactos da pressão
+do Poder Executivo – sobretudo da Presidência da República nas
+decisões do STJ e do STF, os autores encontram um impacto significativamente
+maior sobre o segundo do que sobre o primeiro. Conhecendo
+a maneira como são nomeados os Ministros de um e de outro
+destes dois Tribunais Superiores no Brasil, e lembrando que, de fato
+a indicação política do Presidente da República é muito mais vigorosa
+e efetiva no caso do STF do que no caso do STJ, o resultado destes
+autores não chega a ser surpreendente.
+Quanto às relações entre os tribunais – especialmente Supremas
+Cortes – e o Parlamento, Epstein e Kobylka afirmam que “[elas] não
+são aleatórias. A composição política da Legislatura em relação à da
+Corte desempenha um papel importante na determinação do curso
+dessas relações, sejam elas antagônicas ou amigáveis” (1992, p. 24).
+O fato de que a indicação dos Ministros da Suprema Corte deve ser
+aprovada pelo Senado impõe uma restrição adicional sobre os primeiros.
+No entanto, uma vez que políticas criadas pelo Congresso
+podem ser questionadas judicialmente por indivíduos e grupos e,
+267
+
+eventualmente, ser anuladas pela Suprema Corte, esta relação entre
+o Poder Judiciário e o Poder Legislativo não é, em absoluto, unidirecional.
+Novamente, episódios de conflitos imanentes entre os dois
+poderes no Brasil recente são exemplos claros dessa relação nada
+trivial. Este tema é um campo fértil para trabalhos empíricos futuros
+e que tem sido ainda pouco explorado. Devido às limitações deste
+capítulo, deixaremos as discussões detalhadas à parte.
+
+2.5. Potenciais Temas para a Literatura Brasileira de Análise
+Empírica de Decisões Judiciais:
+
+Está claro que a Jurimetria aplicada a decisões judiciais está apenas
+engatinhando entre os pesquisadores brasileiros. Por diversos motivos
+– de formação acadêmica, estruturais, históricos, tecnológicos,
+etc. – os estudiosos ainda estão se acostumando com a ideia de fazer
+análise empírica e quantitativa sobre o tema. No entanto, os resultados
+alcançados já são bastante promissores. Mais ainda, existe uma grande
+expectativa da aplicação da Jurimetria sobre alguns temas extremamente
+importantes, tanto para atender a objetivos acadêmicos quanto
+a das práticas jurídicas. Ilustraremos apenas 4 exemplos a seguir.
+
+• Relações contratuais, sobretudo envolvendo dívidas e bancos:
+Conforme já mostrado anteriormente, existem evidências anedóticas
+- como “juízes não gostam de bancos” - no Brasil. A perpetuação
+desta percepção não é saudável e nem desejável para
+nenhuma das partes envolvidas: magistrados, instituições financeiras,
+clientes individuais, empresas que necessitam de crédito
+ou outros serviços financeiros. O trabalho de Yeung e Azevedo
+(2015) foi uma das primeiras tentativas científicas e empíricas de
+jogar um pouco de luz sobre o tema. Mas há muito ainda a ser
+feito sobre esse assunto, por si só tão vasto, amplo, complexo e
+multifacetado. Diversas dúvidas ainda sobram, por exemplo: As
+decisões judiciais tratam pequenas e grandes empresas da mesma
+maneira, perante os bancos? Juízes de instâncias diferentes
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+268
+tratam bancos e devedores de maneira similar? Quando os papeis
+se invertem, e são os bancos os devedores (em situações de
+indenizações ou compensações, por exemplo), existem diferenças
+nos padrões dos julgados? Essas e diversas outras questões
+ainda podem e devem ser tratadas com o uso da análise quantitativa
+de decisões judicias.
+• Justiça Trabalhista: Outra área de grandes controvérsias e evidências
+empíricas é a Justiça do Trabalho. É difundida a crença
+– corroborada até com algumas estatísticas descritivas – de que
+as decisões de ações trabalhistas tendem a favorecer o trabalhador.
+Além da cautela que deve ser tomada para não confundir
+viés legislativo (onde a Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas, a CLT,
+é claramente protetora dos trabalhadores hipossuficientes) com
+suposto viés judicial, das decisões proferidas nos tribunais. Arguelhes,
+Falcão e Schuartz (2006) bem nos alertam para a importância
+de tal distinção.
+• Justiça Criminal: Uma área para relevante discussão e reflexão sobre
+as decisões judiciais seria a Justiça Criminal. De maneira geral,
+a percepção disseminada na sociedade é que no Brasil, as chances
+de um criminoso ser punido pelos seus crimes são muito baixas.
+Evidentemente, as decisões judiciais seriam apenas uma das várias
+componentes que tornaria mais ou menos eficazes as sanções previstas,
+dado que deveria contar com o bom funcionamento de outros
+órgãos institucionais como Ministério Público, polícias investigativas,
+Secretarias de Segurança Pública, organizações de presídios, etc. No
+entanto, o trabalho de avaliar quais características dos réus, das vítimas
+e dos magistrados podem ter impactos determinantes nas decisões
+judiciais também seria de valia, mesmo que para fins científicos
+e acadêmicos. Ainda dentro do grande universo de ações penais,
+“fotografias” de temas específicos poderiam ser feitas. Por exemplo,
+usando uma amostra de uma centena de decisões, Jaeger (2016) avalia
+características de réus e dos atos cometidos por estes, em casos
+que se encaixavam na “Lei Maria da Penha” (Lei 11.340/2006), e que
+269
+
+tornavam mais prováveis a condenação judicial.
+• Impactos de Gênero: Finalmente, mas não pretendendo ser exaustiva,
+como já analisado acima, existem nos EUA e em outros países
+europeus, uma tradição de estudos na literatura empírica onde se
+avaliam os impactos de gênero nas decisões judiciais. Acima, discutimos
+impactos do gênero dos magistrados julgadores, tanto em
+situações de decisão individual, quanto seus efeitos em votos em colegiado
+(painéis). Também é possível analisar o impacto do gênero
+das partes litigantes. Por exemplo: em situações de indenizações por
+danos materiais ou morais, de consumidores ou de trabalhadores,
+é diferente quando o autor da ação (a possível vítima) é homem ou
+mulher? O quão similares são as reclamações e as decisões contra
+discriminação sexual voltada a mulheres e voltada a homossexuais,
+por exemplo? Múltiplas questões e possibilidades existem para ricas
+análises quantitativas sobre as decisões judiciais sendo tomadas todos
+os dias nos tribunais no Brasil e no mundo.
+
+3. Limites da Jurimetria ou Análise Empírica
+das Decisões Judiciais.
+Assim como todo método, a Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa apresenta
+limitações. Ao longo do texto acima, apontamos algumas delas,
+por exemplo, dificuldades inerentes à coleta e tratamento dos
+dados. Também, quando existe preocupação em avaliar tendências
+– ou mais seriamente, viés de decisões – é importante distinguir o
+viés legislativo do viés judicial (ou jurisdicional), como advertem Arguelhes,
+Falcão e Schuartz (2006).
+Mas talvez a dificuldade maior seja em mostrar claras relações
+de causalidade. Como mostramos ao longo deste capítulo, as atuais
+pesquisas empíricas de decisões judiciais estão intensamente
+concentradas naquelas que empregam os métodos de regressão (de
+causalidade) econométrica como método de análise. Na verdade,
+economistas e estatísticos resistem fortemente a análises que não
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+270
+
+apontem causalidade6
+. No entanto, a premissa por trás do método
+econométrico é que se conhece, com certo grau de segurança, a função
+de causalidade entre variáveis dependentes e independentes.
+Mais do que isso, assume-se que as variáveis independentes mais
+significativas estejam de fato incluídas no modelo, que elas não sejam
+correlacionadas com outras variáveis, ou que elas não foram omitidas
+da análise. Infelizmente, essas conclusões são muito difíceis de
+se chegar em qualquer exercício empírico. O que fazer então?
+Estudar, estudar, estudar. E discutir, discutir, discutir. É preciso conhecer
+bem as dezenas (centenas?) de modelos econométricos existentes
+para saber qual deles melhor se adequa aos dados que o pesquisador(a)
+tem em mãos e às perguntas postas para teste. Manuais de
+econometria com menos foco na teoria e demonstrações de teoremas e
+mais foco em aplicações começam a avolumar nas livrarias (principalmente
+estrangeiras), alguns deles, inclusive, dedicados especificamente
+à pesquisa em Direito7
+. Além disso, é sempre recomendável discutir
+com outros colegas, inclusive aqueles com conhecimento em Jurimetria
+e análises empíricas. Finalmente, ler trabalhos recentes publicados
+em bons periódicos científicos, nacionais e internacionais. Esses são
+normalmente a fonte de informação mais rápida sobre as técnicas e
+modelos mais recentes, o caminho mais rápido para a fronteira do conhecimento,
+tanto em termos de matérias tratadas, quanto de métodos
+empregados. Assim como em outras áreas do conhecimento, mas sobretudo
+nesta que é, por natureza, interdisciplinar, a pesquisa e o aprendizado
+se fazem gradualmente, com intensa troca de informações.
+
+4. Conclusão: O Futuro da Jurimetria ou Análise
+Quantitativa de Decisões Judiciais.
+O que se pode deduzir desta breve discussão sobre a Jurimetria ou
+
+6 Esta tendência por métodos mais econométricos tem sido acompanhada também por
+cientistas políticos, no Brasil em anos recentes, e no exterior já há algumas décadas.
+7 Excelente exemplo seria Epstein e Martin (2014).
+271
+
+Análise Quantitativa das decisões judiciais? Primeiramente, diversos
+são os métodos possíveis, e ilimitadas são as possibilidades de aplicação.
+Além disso, de uma perspectiva inicial mais positiva, a Jurimetria
+passa a ter um foco também normativo, no sentido de ser capaz
+de apontar soluções e recomendações para os agentes públicos.
+Por exemplo, com ela seria possível avaliar a melhor composição dos
+colegiados nos tribunais.
+Não há dúvidas de que, em um futuro muito próximo, a Jurimetria
+e os estudos empíricos em Direito ganharão importância absoluta
+e com uma velocidade que talvez seja difícil de acompanhar. A
+razão é bastante simples: antes limitada aos estudos de casos em números
+relativamente pequenos, hoje, o gerenciamento e a manipulação
+de dados são quase que integralmente realizados por meio dos
+métodos computacionais. A Tecnologia da Informação tem avançado
+a ritmos cada vez mais acelerados, a capacidade dos softwares
+e das máquinas tem evoluído literalmente de maneira exponencial
+a cada ano que passa. Além disso, os métodos de modelagem e interpretação
+de dados, na maioria das vezes vindos da Estatística e
+da Econometria também têm se tornado cada vez mais avançados,
+permitindo-nos fazer exercícios analíticos antes difíceis de serem
+imaginados (vide seção sobre os limites dos métodos econométricos
+acima). Somado a isso, o avanço das ciências quantitativas aplicadas
+nos anos recentes e, mais ainda, a maior interação entre pesquisadores
+de disciplinas diferentes, têm criado uma enorme gama de novos
+métodos empíricos que podem ser empregados no estudo das ciências
+jurídicas.
+Como mencionado anteriormente, tanto a Tecnologia da Informação
+quanto as ciências aplicadas têm avançado em um ritmo que
+será difícil de acompanhar. A vantagem é que a área da Jurimetria e
+dos estudos empíricos de Direito terão potencial infinito de avançar
+em termos de diversidade e rigor metodológico. Um mínimo de investimento
+no aprendizado sério dos métodos empíricos terá retorno
+certo para os estudiosos do Direito.
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+272
+
+5. Referências
+
+Arguelhes, D. W.; Falcão, J.; Schuartz, L. F. (2006). Jurisdição, Incerteza e Estado
+de Direito. Revista de Direito Administrativo, v. 243, pp. 79-112.
+
+Arida, P., Bacha, E. L.; Lara-Rezende, A. (2005). Credit, Interests, and Jurisdictional
+Uncertainty: Conjectures on the Case of Brazil. In F. Giavazzi;
+
+I. Goldfajn;S. Herrera (ed.). Inflation Targeting, Debt, and the Brazilian
+
+Experience, 1999 to 2003 (pp. 265-293). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
+
+Boyd, C. L.; Epstein, L.; Martin, A.M. (2010). “Untangling the Causal Effects
+
+of Sex on Judging”. American Jounral of Political Science, 54(2), 389-411.
+
+Casillas, C. J.; Enns, P. K.; Wohlfarth, P. C. (2011). “How Public Opinion Constrains
+
+the U.S. Supreme Court”. American Journal of Political Science, 55(1), 74–88.
+
+Castillo Ortiz, P. J.; Medina, I. (2016). “Paths to the recognition of homo-parental
+adoptive rights in the EU-27: a QCA analysis”. Contemporary Politics,
+22(1), 40-56.
+
+Epstein, L.; Martin, A.M. (2010). “Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme
+
+Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why)”. Journal of Constitutional
+
+Law, 12 (2), pp. 263–281.
+
+Epstein, L.; Kobylka, J.F. (1992). The Supreme Court and Legal Change: Abortion
+and the Death Penalty (Thornton H. Brooks Series in American Law &
+
+Society). Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
+
+Epstein, L.; Landes, W.M. & Posner, R.A. (2013). The Behavior of Federal Judges.
+Cambridge : Harvard University Press.
+
+Farhang, S.; Wawro, G. (2004). “Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of
+
+Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making”. Journal
+
+of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20(2), p. 299-330.
+
+Giles, M. W.; Blackstone, B. & Vining, R. L. (2008). The Supreme Court in American
+Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages between Public Opinion and
+
+Judicial Decision Making. The Journal of Politics, 70(2), p. 293–306.
+
+Grezzana, S.; Ponczek, V. (2012). Gender Bias at the Brazilian Superior Labor
+
+Court. Brazilian Review of Econometrics, 32 (1), p. 73–96.
+
+Jaeger, V. (2016). “Se a da Penha é Brava, Imagine a da Vila Matilde - uma
+
+década de Maria da Penha por EvidÊncias do TJSP”. Trabalho Submetido
+
+e Apresentado no IX Congresso Annual da ABDE (Associação Brasileira de
+273
+
+Direito e Economia). São Paulo: Insper.
+
+King, K.L.; Greening, M. (2007). “Gender Justice or Just Gender? The Role of
+
+Gender in Sexual Assault Decisions at the International Criminal Tribunal
+
+for the Former Yugoslavia”, Social Science Quarterly, 88(5), p. 1049-1071.
+
+Lopes, F.; Azevedo, P.F. (2017). Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial
+Independence: preference and opportunistic effects on Brazilian
+
+Courts. Working Paper. São Paulo: Insper.
+
+Peresie, J. L. (2005). Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decision-making
+in the Federal Appellate Courts. The Yale Law Journal, Vol.
+
+114 (7), pp. 1759-1790.
+
+Pritchett, C. H. (1968). Public Law and Judicial Behavior. The Journal of Politics,
+vol. 30, pp. 480-509.
+
+Smyth, R. (2005). The Role of Attitudinal, Institutional and Environmental
+
+Factors in Explaining Variations in the Dissent Rate on the High Court of
+
+Australia”, Australian Journal of Political Science, 40(4), 519-540.
+
+Veçoso, F. F. C.; Pereira, B. R., Perruso, C. A., Marinho, C. M., de Oliveira
+
+Babinski, D. B., Wang, D. W. L., ... & Salinas, N. S. C. (2014). A pesquisa
+
+em Direito e as Bases Eletrônicas de Julgados dos Tribunais: matrizes de
+
+análise e aplicação no Supremo Tribunal Federal e no Superior Tribunal
+
+de Justiça. Revista de Estudos Empíricos em Direito, 1(1).
+
+Yeung, L. (2016). Jurimetria. In M. RIBEIRO; V. H. DOMINGUES; V.KLEIN(org).
+
+Análise Econômica do Direito: justiça e desenvolvimento (volume 1, pp.
+
+133-140). 1. ed. Curitiba: Editora CRV.
+
+Yeung, L. (2016). Terceirização de Mão de Obra no Brasil. Relatório Técnico
+
+Apresentado. Disponível em http://cedes.org.br/images/terceirizacao.
+
+pdf (acesso em 01 de maio de 2017).
+
+Yeung, L.; Azevedo, P.F. (2015). Nem Robin Hood nem King John: testando
+
+o viés anti-credor e anti-devedor dos magistrados brasileiros. Economic
+
+Analysis of Law Review, 6 (1), pp. 1–12.
+
+1. 1. Referência de Manuais para Estudos mais AprofundadosEpstein,
+L. (editor) (1995). Contemplating Courts. Washington, D.C.: Congres-
+Jurimetria ou Análise Quantitativa de
+Decisões Judiciais // Luciana Yeung
+274
+sional Quarterly Inc.
+
+Epstein, L.; Martin, A. D. (2014). An Introduction to Empirical Legal Reserch.
+
+Oxford: Oxford University Press.
+
+Qualquer manual de Econometria Intermediária, entre eles:
+
+Gujarati, D. N.; Porter, D. C. (2011). Econometria Básica, 5ª edição. São Paulo:
+
+McGraw-Hill Bookman.
+275
+
+9
+
+Pesquisas em processos
+
+judiciais1
+ // Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+
+Este capítulo pretende apresentar reflexões metodológicas e relatos
+de experiências de pesquisas feitas com dados de processos judiciais.
+O conteúdo foi estruturado em torno de três perguntas básicas
+sobre o uso dessa fonte em pesquisas em direito: o que é a pesquisa
+empírica em direito baseada em processos judiciais? Quando usá-la?
+E como usá-la? Para respondê-las, o texto explora aspectos que podem
+ser úteis para a definição da estratégia de pesquisa com esse
+tipo de fonte e para o manuseio das técnicas correspondentes.
+A primeira parte do texto divide-se em apontamentos metodológicos,
+epistemológicos e recomendações práticas para o uso dessa
+fonte de informação para a pesquisa em direito. Em seguida, são
+apresentadas experiências concretas de levantamento de dados em
+autos de processos judiciais de natureza quantitativa e qualitativa,
+acompanhados das reflexões metodológicas que elas sugerem2
+. As
+
+1 Agradeço a cuidadosa revisão e pertinentes comentários em versões prévias deste
+texto feitos por Elisa Vanzella Lucena, Rafael Bessa Yamamura e Maíra Rocha Machado,
+e a leitura e revisão do texto final feita por Natalia Batagim de Carvalho.
+2 Adoto neste texto, de modo relativamente semelhante, os termos “autos processuais”,
+“processos judiciais” e “documentos judiciais”. Também trato de modo similar os termos
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+276
+
+experiências narradas compõem, cada uma, um projeto de pesquisa
+específico, com objeto e objetivos próprios, e os respectivos desenhos
+de coleta foram construídos especificamente para cada pesquisa.
+Sua reunião neste texto visa enfatizar a variação dos possíveis
+usos dos processos judiciais como pesquisa em direito e as experiências
+na construção de desenhos específicos de pesquisa conforme
+os objetivos e o objeto em questão. A apresentação das pesquisas é
+acompanhada por apontamentos metodológicos que buscam sistematizar
+algum conhecimento sobre o uso dessa fonte de dados na
+pesquisa em direito e recomendações técnicas para tanto.
+As reflexões feitas neste texto nasceram durante a preparação das
+oficinas de técnicas de pesquisa empírica que conduzi nas três primeiras
+edições do Curso de Métodos e Técnicas de Pesquisa Empírica em
+Direito, organizado pela REED desde 2014, e aprofundadas através de
+levantamento bibliográfico sobre pesquisa documental em geral e,
+especificamente, em fontes judiciais. As pesquisas narradas foram desenvolvidas
+por pesquisadoras e pesquisadores cuja qualidade e trabalho
+de excelência produziram resultados bastante relevantes para o
+conhecimento nas suas áreas e, também, para políticas públicas implementadas
+a partir dos seus achados. Participei das três primeiras como
+coordenador e/ou como pesquisador, inclusive na concepção dos seus
+desenhos metodológicos. As três últimas foram selecionadas na literatura
+especializada3
+. As reflexões trazidas neste texto, e seu eventual
+desacerto, são, porém, de minha inteira responsabilidade e não comprometem
+a excelência dessas pesquisas e dos pesquisadores e pesquisadoras,
+a quem fica desde já o reconhecimento pelo trabalho.
+
+“pesquisa”, “levantamento de dados”, “análises” – embora, em alguns trechos, “análise”
+refira-se apenas à fase seguinte à coleta dos dados em uma pesquisa empírica.
+3 Selecionadas a partir de levantamento em bases de periódicos eletrônicos, feito com
+os argumentos “pesquisa” com “processos judiciais”, “autos processuais” e “arquivos
+judiciais”.
+277
+
+1. O que é a pesquisa em processos judiciais e
+alguns condicionantes metodológicos decorrentes
+da sua natureza
+O levantamento de dados em autos de processos judiciais é uma
+vertente da técnica “pesquisa documental”, utilizada e desenvolvida
+principalmente em pesquisas das áreas de história e ciências sociais4.
+Como tal, ela reproduz o potencial e as limitações inerentes a
+essa técnica, com as peculiaridades tópicas da área do direito e da
+produção de conhecimento jurídico. Por um lado, a fonte é abundante
+e relativamente acessível; por outro, a forma pela qual os dados se
+apresentam e sua função na pesquisa exigem conhecimento e técnicas
+especiais para coleta e análise das informações.
+A pesquisa documental admite ser trabalhada em investigações
+de perfil qualitativo, mais comuns na história e nas ciências sociais, e
+também de natureza quantitativa. Determinados documentos, pelo
+seu valor histórico e riqueza de conteúdo, demandam investigações
+em profundidade que avançam para dados menos evidentes, como
+o contexto de produção, o perfil e comportamento dos seus autores,
+os debates e discursos vigentes à época em que foi produzido, entre
+outros. Por outro lado, alguns documentos, porque menos raros e
+sem tamanho valor histórico, escondem a sua riqueza nas informações
+que aparecem quando lidos e analisados coletivamente. Nesses
+casos, a investigação se concentra nos dados mais evidentes constantes
+dos documentos, cuja análise se constrói a partir do conjunto
+dos dados de grupos similares. Os dados referentes ao primeiro tipo
+são representados textualmente e, por isso, analisados por técnicas
+de análises de conteúdo, de discursos e outras do mesmo gênero.
+Nos documentos do segundo tipo, a informação pode ser represen4
+Integradas à história, as áreas da arquivologia e da diplomática estudam e desenvolvem,
+respectivamente, técnicas de organização de informações em documentos e
+as estruturas formais de documentos oficiais. Os conceitos e técnicas desenvolvidos
+nessas áreas são de diferenciada valia para a pesquisa documental. Sobre pesquisas
+qualitativas baseadas em documentos, v. André Cellard, 2012.
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+278
+
+tada numericamente, o que sugere análises quantitativas nos conjuntos
+de documentos - organizados, para facilitar o manuseio, em
+bases de dados. Em ambos os casos, a fonte é da mesma natureza,
+documental – e as técnicas de coleta e análise valem-se de um ou
+outro formato de linguagem, alfabético ou numérico.
+Os documentos apresentam-se sob diferentes formatos, natureza
+e organização. Os processos judiciais, particularmente, compõem
+a classe dos documentos escritos, públicos e arquivados (Cellard,
+2012) – características que facilitam o seu acesso e análise, mas também
+impõem algumas cautelas metodológicas. No caso dos autos
+processuais, a publicidade e a disposição em arquivos, porque manifestas
+em um contexto de funcionamento burocrático estatal com
+função de investigação e julgamento de conflitos sociais, impõem dificuldades
+especiais ao pesquisador. A dificuldade de acesso, curiosamente,
+decorre do excesso de documentos, não da sua falta, como
+é mais comum em pesquisas históricas. E a análise do documento é
+complexa porque as informações apresentam-se dentro do jogo de
+estratégias e formas que compõe um litígio judicial.
+A descomunal quantidade de processos judiciais que tramita na
+Justiça brasileira guarda um rico manancial de dados para pesquisas,
+mas também gera um grau de complexidade a dificultar a sua
+coleta e sistematização. O Brasil possui mais de 100 milhões de processos
+judiciais (CNJ, 2016). Cada um deles contém inúmeros documentos
+de variados tipos e formatos, todos aptos a fornecer informação
+útil para pesquisas. São exemplos de documentos existentes
+em processos judiciais as petições apresentadas pelas partes, as decisões
+proferidas pelos juízes e tribunais, as certidões emitidas pelos
+cartórios judiciais, além de um outro sem número de tipos de documentos
+apresentados como provas das alegações – alguns oficiais,
+como certidões de propriedade, de nascimento e de óbito, e outros
+particulares, como contratos de todo tipo, declarações de vontade,
+extratos de banco, perícias médicas, balancetes e laudos contábeis.
+Os atos praticados nos processos judiciais, inclusive aqueles apa-
+279
+
+rentemente pouco significativos, são todos registrados e documentados.
+O Poder Judiciário brasileiro, principal ator responsável pela organização
+e arquivo dos processos judiciais em andamento, dedica a
+maior parte de seus recursos humanos às atividades de certificação e
+registro cartorial dos atos processuais e rotinas que os acompanham
+(CNJ, 2016). Seja para fazer funcionar a complexa dinâmica processual,
+seja para aplacar nosso tradicional ímpeto cartorial, o registro dos
+atos processuais faz do assombroso volume de processos um manancial
+de informações para pesquisa. Cada um desses processos contém
+pelo menos um conflito substancial de interesses, cuja complexidade
+se mede pelo simples fato de os envolvidos não terem conseguido resolvê-lo
+sem a intervenção judicial – o que já é, em si, um dado.
+O registro escrito, diferentemente de outros formatos, confere
+aos documentos três características essenciais, que se projetam para
+a pesquisa em processos judiciais: i) uma aptidão incomum para
+acessar acontecimentos temporalmente distantes; ii) um maior isolamento
+a interferências do observador; e iii) a informação se apresenta
+em sentido único, que o pesquisador pouco domina (Cellard,
+2012, p. 295). “[E]mbora tagarela, o documento é surdo” (idem).
+O uso de documentos escritos como fonte de pesquisa depende
+sempre, por isso, de informações complementares. No caso das
+análises qualitativas, costuma-se buscar compreender o contexto
+em que foram produzidos, os autores e seus discursos, a qualidade
+das informações apresentadas (Cellard, 2012), etc. Esta recomendação
+também se aplica a pesquisas com processos judiciais, inclusive
+quando analisados quantitativamente. Diferentemente da frase célebre,
+o que não está nos autos, está sim no mundo.
+O contexto de produção de documentos judiciais também é peculiar
+em relação a outros documentos públicos. Os processos judiciais
+ambientam uma parcela vasta, complexa e diversificada das relações
+e de questões jurídicas socialmente relevantes. Ainda que apenas uma
+parte das disputas de interesses ocorrida na sociedade ganhe espaço
+no sistema jurídico oficial, é através dela que o direito é posto à prova,
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+280
+
+que atores públicos e privados desempenham seus mais relevantes
+papéis e que o funcionamento do sistema de justiça se faz visível.
+A atividade de análise dos documentos constantes de processos
+judiciais condiciona-se a atributos desses documentos, como origem,
+confiabilidade, finalidade, acesso e conteúdo. Embora sejam todos
+registrados e identificados, alguns documentos judiciais foram produzidos
+oficialmente pelo Estado, outros no âmbito privado. Dentre os
+documentos oficiais, nem todos são dotados da chamada “fé pública”,
+pela qual a lei confere a presunção de veracidade do seu conteúdo.
+A função dos documentos constantes em processos judiciais é, geralmente,
+a mesma: registrar e esclarecer atos e fatos para a mais justa
+resolução do conflito que envolve as partes, e que fora por elas submetido
+para arbitramento pelo Poder Judiciário. Mas cada um dos tipos
+de documentos judiciais tem uma finalidade específica: alguns visam
+apresentar argumentos ao juiz, outros a comprovar esses argumentos,
+outros têm fim meramente certificatório e outros ainda servem para
+publicar as decisões tomadas pelo juiz. Esse traço projeta consequências
+de ordem epistemológica para a relação entre a pesquisa e as ‘verdades’
+dos autos judiciais. Discuto esse ponto mais adiante.
+O acesso aos documentos judiciais e, sobretudo, ao seu conteúdo
+também impõe restrições peculiares ao campo. As regras e formas pelas
+quais os litígios são documentados e processados no âmbito do Judiciário
+são de compreensão restrita a profissionais com formação específica.
+A formalização dos conflitos sociais através do processo judicial pressupõe
+a articulação de regras jurídicas aplicáveis a esta situação concreta e
+mobiliza um arsenal de ferramentas processuais para operar o exercício
+dialético que, supostamente, resultará na “descoberta” de uma “verdade”
+que sustentará a imposição de uma solução “justa” ao conflito.
+Não bastasse isso, o exercício do contraditório5
+ e a retórica de
+
+5 O artigo 5o
+., inciso LV da Constituição Federal estabelece que “aos litigantes, em processo
+judicial ou administrativo, e aos acusados em geral são assegurados o contraditório
+e ampla defesa, com os meios e recursos a ela inerentes”. Neste trecho do texto, o
+termo remete ao debate de argumentos pelas partes litigantes num processo judicial.
+281
+
+articulação das normas cabíveis, típicos da atividade praticada no
+processo judicial, acabam por pulverizar o debate sobre o conflito
+em um sem número de questões jurídicas e processuais menores,
+canalizadas através de outros tantos incidentes processuais.
+Este quadro geral de características dos processos judiciais impõe
+dificuldades a qualquer investigação científica que pretenda utilizá-los
+como fonte primária de informação, afugenta pesquisadores
+e pesquisadoras de outras áreas e atormenta por meses o trabalho
+dos poucos que resolvem topar a empreitada. Ainda assim, é crescente
+o uso desta fonte para a pesquisa e o ensino em direito e em
+outras ciências sociais. Os itens abaixo apresentam essas experiências
+e as reflexões e recomendações que elas sugerem.
+
+2. Quando usar a pesquisa em processos judiciais?
+Objetos de pesquisa com processos judiciais
+e algumas experiências concretas
+Os processos judiciais, a despeito das limitações que decorrem de
+suas próprias características, são uma fonte valiosa para a pesquisa
+em direito, inclusive e especialmente a de natureza empírica6
+. Os documentos,
+inclusive as decisões judiciais, podem ser utilizados em
+diferentes tipos de pesquisas, que adotam ou não um olhar empírico.
+Dois fatores principais parecem determinar a escolha de documentos
+judiciais como fonte e objeto de pesquisa. O acesso aos
+processos e documentos é, naturalmente, uma importante limitação
+de ordem prática. Comento-a mais detidamente no item seguinte.
+
+6 Há quem defenda, é preciso dizer, não existir traço empírico na pesquisa documental,
+assim como nas análises de jurisprudência. Parece-me uma posição tanto inútil
+quanto equivocada. Inútil porque a categorização de uma pesquisa como empírica
+ou não empírica diz muito pouco sobre a sua qualidade ou seu valor intrínseco. Uma
+abordagem não é, em si, melhor ou pior do que outra, mas mais ou menos adequada
+ao problema e ao objeto de pesquisa. Equivocada porque, essencialmente, o que caracteriza
+uma abordagem como empírica não é a fonte ou a técnica adotada, mas a natureza
+do objeto e a perspectiva adotada pela investigação. Determinados problemas
+sugerem abordagem empírica e outros sugerem abordagem bibliográfica.
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+282
+
+O outro fator é a pertinência da fonte à pergunta de pesquisa, ou a
+sua capacidade de oferecer informações úteis para o esclarecimento
+do problema posto na bancada de trabalho. Considerando as experiências
+de pesquisas narradas aqui, bem como outros exemplos
+colhidos na literatura especializada, sistematizo abaixo alguns usos
+possíveis de documentos judiciais na pesquisa empírica em direito.
+De um ponto de vista exclusivamente jurídico, evidente que os autos
+processuais são uma fonte mais do que adequada, recomendada
+propriamente, para descrever e analisar a aplicação dos comandos
+normativos e atuação das sanções que os acompanham e caracterizam.
+No plano da eficácia, qualquer norma jurídica, desde que direta
+ou indiretamente judicializada, pode, em princípio, ser analisada através
+de processos judiciais. Mas só recentemente o uso desta fonte ganhou
+espaço e um certo protagonismo para a pesquisa jurídica. A tendência
+observada no direito brasileiro de valorização da jurisprudência,
+inclusive como fonte eventual de direito7
+, ampliou consideravelmente
+o campo para a pesquisa jurídica baseada em análise de processos judiciais,
+sobretudo das peças das partes, votos e acórdãos dos tribunais.
+O sistema de “precedentes judiciais” que se tenta implantar no
+Brasil expande a utilidade da pesquisa com processos judiciais para
+uma outra instância. Além de nutrirem a atividade científica de produção
+de conhecimento jurídico, como seria ordinariamente, as fontes
+judiciárias tornam-se praticamente imprescindíveis, tal qual a lei e a
+chamada “doutrina”, para o próprio exercício diuturno do direito por
+juízes, advogados e os demais atores do sistema de justiça. Evidente
+
+7 Pela atribuição de eficácia persuasiva e, em não poucos casos, vinculante a diversos pronunciamentos
+judiciais. A melhor exemplo é a lista do artigo 927 do novo código de processo
+civil, Lei 13.105/2015: “Art. 927. Os juízes e os tribunais observarão: I - as decisões do
+Supremo Tribunal Federal em controle concentrado de constitucionalidade; II - os enunciados
+de súmula vinculante; III - os acórdãos em incidente de assunção de competência ou de
+resolução de demandas repetitivas e em julgamento de recursos extraordinário e especial
+repetitivos; IV - os enunciados das súmulas do Supremo Tribunal Federal em matéria constitucional
+e do Superior Tribunal de Justiça em matéria infraconstitucional; V - a orientação
+do plenário ou do órgão especial aos quais estiverem vinculados.”
+283
+
+que, diante disso, ainda mais necessário (se é que assim já não era) o
+rigor metodológico na descrição e análise das fontes judiciárias.
+Tal qual implantado no Brasil, a tarefa de identificação do “precedente”
+pelo grau de adesão conferido pelas instâncias de base, que
+seria desempenhada pela pesquisa, é desnecessária porque os próprios
+tribunais decidem que decisão deve ser considerada um “precedente”
+8. Ainda assim, a pesquisa com decisões judiciais continua
+imprescindível para, por exemplo, fazer o controle sobre a escolha
+dos “precedentes” feita artificialmente pelos tribunais, a projeção
+dos efeitos do “precedente” sobre outros casos, a medição de sua
+eficácia como instrumento de regulação normativa via tribunais, etc.
+De modo geral, a efetividade de alterações legislativas – sobretudo,
+mas não somente, as de natureza processual - e a eficácia dos
+instrumentos que elas incorporam ao sistema jurídico brasileiro também
+são suscetíveis de descrição e mensuração através de dados
+disponíveis em processos judiciais - com até mais acurácia, inclusive,
+do que as interpretações oferecidas pelas opiniões doutrinárias.
+De um ponto de vista sociológico, os processos judiciais, como
+adiantei, são uma arena para os mais variados conflitos de interesse
+existentes em uma dada sociedade. É certo que, como também mencionei,
+nem todas disputas chegam a formalizar-se em processos judiciais.
+Mas é justamente pelo seu exame que se pode identificar quais
+disputas, provindas de quais estratos sociais e econômicos, acessam a
+
+8 O estilo do “sistema de precedentes” implantado no Brasil é peculiar em relação a
+outras experiências jurídicas, notadamente as de common law. Por aqui, o “precedente”
+nasce pela declaração formal de um tribunal, não pela adesão da comunidade jurídica.
+Determinados casos são identificados, pelos tribunais, como aptos a produzirem
+um “precedente” vinculante aos demais casos presentes e futuros (o melhor exemplo,
+embora não seja mais o único, é o da declaração de matéria “repercussão geral”). Os
+critérios em geral são a relevância do caso (social, política, econômica ou jurídica,
+seja lá o que isso seja) e o fato dele trazer questão jurídica também presente em uma
+grande quantidade de casos similares (as chamadas “demandas repetitivas”). Nesses
+casos, o julgamento do caso escolhido assume um procedimento especial, com possibilidade
+de participação de terceiros interessados e resulta na redação de uma “tese”
+de aplicação “erga omnes” (ou seja, que tem efeito para todos que se encontram na
+mesma situação, mesmo que não tenham sido parte daquele caso específico).
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+284
+
+Justiça. A natureza e as características desses conflitos, as suas causas,
+as partes envolvidas, as trajetórias prévias e posteriores à judicialização
+e a solução institucional oferecida, entre outros dados, podem ser
+encontrados - não facilmente, é verdade - nos processos judiciais. Ainda
+que correspondam apenas ao cume da “pirâmide das disputas” de
+que fala a literatura sóciojurídica, evidente que o conhecimento sobre
+os litígios judicializados ajuda a entender um pouco mais sobre a vida
+dos conflitos de interesses fora da Justiça, no tecido social9
+.
+De uma perspectiva institucional, o comportamento dos atores
+sociais e estatais que atuam junto ao sistema de justiça também
+pode ser descrito com relativa nitidez através dos dados presentes
+nos processos judiciais. Como pensam e como decidem os juízes?
+Como atuam os advogados? Como litigam e como se articulam os
+órgãos estatais com atuação judicial - como as Procuradorias, Ministério
+Publico e Defensorias? E os demais órgãos estatais e setores
+organizados da sociedade, como se articulam em torno da regulação
+através da judicialização? Como atuam, por exemplo, a Receita Federal,
+os órgãos oficiais de controle de contas, as agências reguladoras,
+as secretarias estaduais e municipais de saúde, os sindicatos, associações
+de defesa do consumidor ou do meio ambiente, etc.?
+A estrutura e o funcionamento dos órgãos do sistema de justiça encontram-se
+refletidos, em parte, nos documentos judiciais. O problema a
+que se convencionou chamar de “morosidade da Justiça”, por exemplo,
+e, na mesma linha, a difusa questão da “gestão da Justiça” parecem bastante
+receptivos a pesquisas baseadas em processos judiciais. Primeiro
+porque os autos processuais registram fielmente datas de todos os atos
+ali praticados, o que os torna ricos para medições de tempos totais de
+tramitação dos feitos, tempos para a prática de atos processuais específicos,
+tempos gastos pelos atores do processo - como juízes e advogados
+
+9 Uma linha influente dos “sociolegal studies” norte-americanos se desenvolveu a partir
+da ideia da “dispute pyramid”, inicialmente concebida no âmbito do Civil Litigation
+Research Project (CLRP) e no referencial artigo de IPEA. Festiner, R. Abel e A. Sarat, em
+1980, “The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming...”.
+285
+
+- e os chamados “tempos mortos” da burocracia judicial, em que o processo
+simplesmente aguarda em fila a sua vez de ser impulsionado administrativamente.
+Os autos processuais, e de modo geral, os documentos
+que se pode encontrar em arquivos judiciários, refletem não apenas a
+organização estática do Poder Judiciário e dos demais atores envolvidos
+(como a advocacia publica e privada, o Ministério Público, as Defensorias,
+etc.), mas também e principalmente a dinâmica do seu funcionamento
+concreto, o que parece um excelente caminho para esclarecer aspectos e
+fazer recomendações no âmbito da gestão do serviço público de justiça.
+A eficácia geral do sistema penal, outro exemplo, pode ser bem representada
+pelas muitas histórias contadas pelos documentos e processos
+das varas de execução. Algo similar pode ser utilizado para descrever o
+funcionamento do sistema dos juizados especiais através das intercorrências
+e do comportamento dos atores envolvidos em seus processos.
+Os litígios judiciais retratam aspectos – formais, é verdade -, do
+complexo jogo institucional de poder entre atores públicos e privados.
+Uma parcela nada desprezível da regulação das relações sociais,
+políticas e econômicas está, sobretudo atualmente, na mão dos tribunais,
+em seus diferentes níveis. Entender como acontece esta regulação
+pelo Judiciário, como se distribui o poder decisório entre
+juízes e tribunais, como as questões formais são estrategicamente
+utilizadas pelos atores envolvidos na busca de uma (não) solução
+dos conflitos, entre outros, são problemas acessáveis por meio de
+pesquisa em autos e decisões de processos judiciais.
+Os autos processuais também podem ser usados para formação
+jurídica, através de uma articulação elementar, mas nem sempre
+comum, entre pesquisa e ensino. A pesquisa é meio de produzir e
+também de sistematizar conhecimento em formatos que viabilizem
+difundir a educação jurídica. Praticamente todas as sugestões de
+uso acima aventadas, assim como as experiências concretas de pesquisa
+apresentadas nos itens seguintes, admitem a formatação de
+produtos para fins didáticos. Os autos processuais, embora profícuo
+instrumento didático, são um material ainda bruto, cujo potencial se
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+286
+
+revelará quando tratado e sistematizado para esta finalidade.
+
+2.1. Experiências de pesquia sobre o sistema de justiça baseadas
+em processos judiciais
+
+As pesquisas apresentadas abaixo enfrentaram diferentes dificuldades
+epistemológicas e metodológicas, cada uma a sua maneira e conforme
+os seus objetivos. Conhecê-las ajudará a compreender melhor
+como montar o plano metodológico de uma investigação baseada
+em autos de processos judiciais. Vale ressalvar que as pesquisas aqui
+apresentadas foram realizadas em cenários um tanto diferentes dos
+que se pode encontrar atualmente. Embora o panorama de obstáculos
+possa ser diferente, porque algumas foram feitas por grandes
+equipes em projetos institucionais, ou porque já contam com alguns
+anos, as questões metodológicas e técnicas que as equipes enfrentaram
+não diferem em natureza das que enfrentará o pesquisador individual
+com objeto menos amplo e que, como aquelas, se embrenhe
+em extrair e sistematizar informações de autos de processos judiciais.
+
+2.1.1. “Gestão e funcionamento dos cartórios judiciais”, MJ/
+SRJ, 200610
+
+Na primeira metade da década de 2000, o discurso de combate à morosidade
+dos processos judiciais já contava com mais de uma década
+na mesa de trabalho das políticas judiciárias e de reforma legislativa
+em matéria processual. A partir de uma nova hipótese para explicar as
+causas desse fenômeno - a gestão da Justiça -, um projeto de pesquisa
+interdisciplinar desenvolvido junto à então recém-criada Secretaria
+de Reforma do Judiciário, do Ministério da Justiça (SRJ/MJ) resolveu
+descrever traços da organização e funcionamento dos tribunais. Como
+objeto de observação imediato, escolheu olhar para os cartórios judiciais
+e identificar fatores que afetavam o funcionamento do Judiciário
+
+10 Brasil, Ministério da Justiça. “Análise da gestão e funcionamento dos cartórios judiciais”.
+Coord.: Alves da Silva, Paulo Eduardo. Brasília, MJ, 2007.
+287
+
+como um todo. Três levantamentos diferentes compuseram o projeto:
+uma descrição etnográfica das dinâmicas internas e relações implícitas
+de poder nos cartórios; um levantamento gerencial dos fluxos das
+principais rotinas de trabalho dos cartórios; e, enfim, a medição dos
+tempos gastos nessas rotinas e seu efeito sobre o tempo total de tramitação
+dos processos. Este último, especialmente, utilizou processos
+judiciais como fonte prioritária de informações11.
+A opção por se fazer esta parte da pesquisa com processos judiciais
+justificou-se na elementar circunstância de que os autos registram,
+com precisão, as datas de todos os eventos acontecidos no processo,
+desde os atos processuais mais relevantes (como pedidos das
+partes e decisões) até as rotinas de andamento burocrático (como as
+juntadas de documentos, certidões e publicações). A hipótese principal
+de trabalho, neste ponto, era a de que essas rotinas burocráticas
+de cartórios consumiam a maior parte do tempo total dos processos.
+O registro das datas dos eventos nos processos era, de certo
+modo, simples. Selecionados os processos, a coleta dependia apenas
+de uma ficha de coleta de dados com duas colunas principais: data
+e respectivo ato. A seleção dos casos procurou compor uma amostra
+variada, com processos de rito ordinário e sumário já julgados em
+primeira instância e que aguardavam distribuição de apelação12. Os
+casos envolviam duas matérias, identificadas nas entrevistas exploratórias
+da pesquisa como frequentes em litígios que envolvam estratos
+intermediários da sociedade: acidentes de veículo, pelo rito
+sumário, e indenização por danos morais, no ordinário.
+
+11 O desenho metodológico desta pesquisa foi elaborado em conjunto com o então jovem
+e já promissor pesquisador, hoje professor reconhecido, Frederico de Almeida, a quem fica
+o reconhecimento pelo trabalho de qualidade. Ainda que, naquela ocasião e em outras
+seguintes, combinamos de publicar o relato da construção deste desenho, a correria das
+atividades que assumimos não nos permitiu. Este item deste capítulo tenta fazer as vezes
+de registrar, não com a mesma qualidade, aquela rica e agradável experiência.
+12 Na época, a distribuição de recursos de apelação no Tribunal de Justiça de São
+Paulo demorava incríveis cinco anos, aproximadamente. A pesquisa soube explorar
+essa patologia organizacional para facilitar o acesso aos processos.
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+288
+A ficha de coleta de dados continha, numa parte geral, os dados
+da vara, do processo (número, tipo de ação, perfil das partes), além
+das datas das ocorrências iniciais (protocolo, distribuição, recebimento
+em cartório, registro em livro). Em seguida, uma segunda parte
+da ficha registrava os atos das partes e do cartório e respectivas
+datas. A figura abaixo ilustra a ficha de coleta.
+
+Figura 1. Instrumento de coleta de dados em autos processuais utilizado na
+pesquisa “Gestão e Funcionamento dos Cartórios Judiciais” (Brasil, 2007)
+
+Fonte: “Gestão e Funcionamento dos Cartórios Judiciais”, relatório parcial
+289
+
+Porque a coleta seria realizada por mais de um pesquisador, era preciso
+padronizar o registro dos nomes dos atos e rotinas processuais. Para tanto,
+os atos mais frequentes, definidos a partir de um levantamento exploratório,
+foram catalogados conforme sua natureza e agente e codificados
+em números. O pesquisador, desta forma, registrava não o ato/rotina,
+mas o seu código – o que diminuía consideravelmente o tempo de coleta
+e, sobretudo, facilitava o controle dos erros de anotação em campo.
+O simples registro do ato processual, contudo, não conduziria automaticamente
+aos esclarecimentos buscados pela pesquisa. O registro de
+uma petição ou de uma certidão, por exemplo, diria pouco sobre qual o
+ator responsável pelo tempo gerado por aquele ato. A fim, portanto, de
+facilitar a análise que viria após a coleta, foram criadas classes de atos e
+rotinas processuais a partir das hipóteses da pesquisa e os códigos de registro
+foram catalogados como: “manifestações do MP e do juiz”, “saídas
+e retornos ao cartório”, “manifestações das partes”, entre outros. A figura
+abaixo apresenta parte da tabela de atos e respectivos códigos. Esta classificação
+visava enfrentar o que se tornou o maior problema do desenho
+para esta coleta de dados, que foi a segmentação dos intervalos de tempo
+de cada rotina ou ato processual, o que explico a seguir (Figura 2).
+A catalogação das classes não seria, contudo, suficiente para permitir
+a medição dos intervalos de tempos que cada uma delas demanda.
+As atividades praticadas em um processo judicial não seguem uma
+sequência absolutamente linear. As rotinas e atos praticados sobrepõem-se
+uns aos outros. Determinadas rotinas são iniciadas e, embora
+não tenham terminado, outras são iniciadas. Antes de completar
+um ciclo de decisão, por exemplo, que começa com a remessa dos autos
+para o juiz e terminaria com a publicação da decisão tomada, uma
+das partes pode atravessar uma petição, que precisaria ser registrada
+e eventualmente apreciada. Isso dificulta enormemente a contagem,
+para os fins da pesquisa, dos tempos de cada um desses ciclos de atividades.
+O registro de atos e respectivas datas, feito pela ficha de coleta
+acima ilustrada, precisaria ser tratado de forma a isolar os ciclos de
+atividades, em que pese a sobreposição de intervalos de datas.
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+290
+
+Figura 2. Tabela de códigos de registro dos atos processuais utilizada na
+pesquisa “Gestão e Funcionamento dos Cartórios Judiciais” (Brasil, 2007)
+
+Fonte: “Gestão e Funcionamento dos Cartórios Judiciais”, relatório
+parcial
+
+Para minimizar o viés da sobreposição de rotinas, o desenho metodológico
+da pesquisa optou por criar intervalos padrão de ciclos de atividades.
+Assim, usando o exemplo acima do ciclo da decisão, as rotinas
+que compõem este ciclo compuseram uma sequência padrão. A cada
+vez que esta sequência aparecia na base de dados, identificava-se e se
+isolava uma decisão, que, então, poderia ter seu tempo medido.
+291
+
+O encadeamento em sequências isoladas ou repetidas permitiu,
+já na fase de análise dos dados colevtados, computar os tempos médios
+das rotinas mais comuns e, então, aferir seu efeito sobre o tempo
+total dos processos. O gráfico abaixo reproduz um dos dados mais
+relevantes revelados pela pesquisa, o de que as rotinas praticadas
+pelos cartórios podem chegar a consumir cerca de 80% do tempo
+total de um processo judicial. Além desse dado, o gráfico também
+permite ilustrar a representatividade das idas do processo para os
+advogados ou para o juiz no tempo total de processamento – que,
+como se vê abaixo pelos nomes de “carga” para advogados e “conclusões”
+para o juiz, são relativamente pequenas.
+
+Figura 3. Somatórias dos tempos consumidos por diferentes atores envolvidos,
+em “Gestão e Funcionamento dos Cartórios Judiciais” (Brasil/2007)
+
+Fonte: “Gestão e Funcionamento dos Cartórios Judiciais”, relatório final
+
+2.1.2. “Custo unitário do processo de execução fiscal da Justiça
+Federal”, IPEA/CNJ, 2010
+
+Cerca de seis anos após a pesquisa sobre os cartórios judiciais, um
+novo projeto aplicou aquele desenho metodológico com um requinte
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+292
+
+suplementar: calcular o custo de um determinado processo judicial.
+Desta vez, o projeto foi desenvolvido junto ao Instituto de Pesquisa
+Econômica Aplicada, o IPEA, no âmbito da sua Diretoria de Estudos
+e Políticas do Estado, das Instituições e da Democracia (Diest/IPEA).
+Através de acordo de cooperação celebrado com o então iniciante
+Departamento de Pesquisas Judiciais do Conselho Nacional de Justiça
+(DPJ/CNJ), este projeto escolheu limitar-se a um determinado
+procedimento, o da ação de execução fiscal federal. Essa escolha baseou-se
+na sua desproporcional representatividade no volume total
+de processos judiciais em trâmite no país, de cerca de 34%, revelação
+então recente do próprio CNJ (Justiça em Números, 2010).
+O desenvolvimento de um método para cálculo do custo de um processo
+judicial, objetivo complementar do projeto, mereceria uma explanação
+própria13. Para este texto, importa ter em conta que, diferente de
+levantamentos gerais até então realizados sobre o custo dos processos
+judiciais, baseados em uma aritmética simples entre o volume das despesas
+do Judiciário e a quantidade de processos, o projeto IPEA/CNJ optou
+por se basear em dados concretos e específicos, coletados junto a
+uma amostra nacional de varas federais e de respectivos procedimentos
+de execuções fiscais. Foram analisados cerca de 1510 processos judiciais,
+selecionados no universo de processos baixados em 2009, localizados
+em 181 varas federais, sediadas em 124 cidades, distribuídas em praticamente
+todo o território nacional14. A representatividade estatística da
+amostra, segundo o relatório, foi cuidadosamente construída para permitir
+generalizar as suas conclusões em nível nacional.
+A coleta dos dados em processos judiciais também foi feita a partir
+de um instrumento de coleta próprio, inspirado no instrumento
+de coleta da pesquisa “Cartórios” acima apresentada. Consideran13
+O relatório oficial da pesquisa traz detalhes esclarecedores acerca da metodologia
+adotada e deste especial desenho criado para calcular o custo do processo judicial.
+(IPEA, 2011, p. 9 e ss).
+14 O relatório traz um ilustrativo mapa da distribuição geográfica das varas cujos processos
+compuseram a amostra. (IPEA, 2011, p. 12)
+293
+
+do-se que o principal elemento para cálculo de custo de um serviço
+é a mão de obra empenhada na atividade (“método ABC”), não tanto
+os insumos materiais para o produto – utilizados para o custeio de
+processos produtivos em geral15 -, o desenho metodológico desse
+projeto visou identificar as rotinas e atividades praticadas nos procedimentos
+executivos fiscais, identificando o respectivo ator responsável.
+Diferentemente do levantamento dos “tempos mortos” da
+burocracia judiciária, calculado em dias, o custeio da execução fiscal
+federal precisava medir os tempos em minutos de cada rotina ou atividade
+– para, então, através do valor-hora do respectivo servidor,
+calcular o custo específico da rotina.
+A coleta de dados em autos processuais foi, então, organizada em
+duas etapas. Em um primeiro momento, foram coletados dados em
+uma amostra reduzida para identificar a sequência de atos praticados
+em uma execução fiscal federal padrão, e os respectivos agentes
+responsáveis. Esses dados compuseram um fluxograma de atos processuais
+deste procedimento, que foi submetido a debate e ratificação
+junto a representantes dos principais atores que operam esses
+procedimentos (juízes federais, procuradores da Fazenda e servidores
+da Justiça Federal). Definido o procedimento padrão, a segunda
+fase da pesquisa se desenvolveu em campo, para medir os tempos
+médios de cada ato. Essa medição também se deu de duas formas:
+pelas datas registradas nos autos processuais (tal qual a pesquisa
+“Cartórios”, acima) e através de entrevistas com os servidores identificados
+como responsáveis pelas respectivas rotinas (aplicando-se a
+chamada “técnica Delphi”16).
+
+15 Como explica o relatório da pesquisa, “[e]m linhas gerais, o método ABC calcula o
+custo com foco na atividade realizada, não no produto final obtido: ‘as atividades, e
+não os produtos, consomem os recursos’ (NUNES, 1998). Como os serviços públicos
+geram resultados de difícil quantificação mercantil, as técnicas clássicas, baseadas no
+custeio pelos produtos, tornam-se imprecisas. O eixo da composição do custo, neste
+método, são as atividades.” (IPEA, 2011, p. 10)
+16 A técnica Delphi se baseia na aferição de um dado pelo resultado construído pelas
+estimativas feitas por um conjunto de entrevistados. (IPEA, 2011, p. 13).
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+294
+A figura ao lado apresenta o instrumento de coleta de dados em processos
+judiciais utilizado nesta pesquisa, resultado de reiteradas revisões
+nas fichas de coleta a partir dos testes realizados antes do início formal
+do levantamento em campo. Perceba-se que é mais complexo do que
+aquele da pesquisa Cartórios. Além das datas das principais ocorrências,
+outras informações foram coletadas - como valor da petição inicial, teor
+do despacho inicial, quantia e modalidades das tentativas de citação,
+entre outros. O instrumento também continha uma coluna intermediária
+para a anotação em formato de rascunho, para minimizar os erros de
+preenchimento e aperfeiçoar o controle dos dados.
+O registro de dados suplementares contribuiu para a interpretação
+do material coletado e conferiu maior acurácia ao cálculo do
+custeio total17. Mas também aumentou o tempo de coleta e tornou
+mais complexas as fases seguintes de limpeza e tratamento dos dados.
+Em geral, é comum a tendência de inserir perguntas no instrumento
+a mais do que o necessário para a pesquisa - no popular estilo
+“já que...”: “já que se vai a campo, por que não incluir uma pergunta
+sobre isso e aquilo?...” Não é uma prática recomenda, nem segura.
+Embora amplie a coleta, torna-a mais difícil e aumenta o risco de
+desviar o foco da investigação. É um risco e um custo que precisam
+ser calculados pelo pesquisador e pesquisadora.
+Como resultado, esse projeto gerou um sem número de dados
+relevantes, que então subsidiaram importantes políticas públicas na
+área de Justiça. Um dos mais significativos dados foi o de que cada
+procedimento de execução fiscal custa, ao Judiciário, cerca de R$
+3,8mil. A partir dele, a atuação de controle e litigância dos órgãos das
+Procuradorias da Fazenda, por exemplo, foram debatidas e revistas
+de modo balancear os benefícios e despesas incorridas pelo uso do
+Poder Judiciário como arena de cobrança administrativa.
+
+17 Um exemplo é o dado sobre quantia de tentativas de citação e a respectiva modalidade.
+O custo de uma tentativa de citação por correio é bastante diferente do de uma
+citação por oficial de justiça.
+295
+
+Figura 4: Instrumento de coleta em autos processuais utilizado na pesquisa
+“Custo Unitário do Processo de Execução Fiscal na Justiça Federal”
+(IPEA, 2010)
+
+Fonte: “Custo Unitário do Processo de Execução Fiscal na Justiça Federal”,
+Relatório parcial
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+296
+
+2.1.3. “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”,
+Conselho Nacional de Justiça/DPJ, 2015
+
+Em 2013 e 2014, um terceiro exemplo de levantamento de dados em
+autos judiciais foi o projeto “Perfil do Acesso à Justiça nos Juizados
+Especiais Cíveis”, desenvolvido junto à série “Justiça Pesquisa”, do
+Departamento de Pesquisas Judiciais do Conselho Nacional de Justiça.
+Diferentemente dos dois anteriores, a pergunta que moveu este
+projeto dizia respeito menos à gestão e funcionamento do Judiciário
+e mais ao perfil e comportamento das partes litigantes. Esta diferença
+se projeta para o plano metodológico e o desenho do instrumento
+de coleta de dados junto aos autos.
+Os processos judiciais registram, por óbvio, dados sobre as partes
+litigantes, como nome, profissão, estado civil, endereço, entre outros
+(CPC, art. 319). Também registram os atos praticados pelas partes no
+processo, como pedidos feitos, argumentos utilizados, tentativas de
+acordo, uso de ferramentas de impugnação de decisão judicial, etc. No
+caso dos Juizados Especiais Cíveis, em que é a facultativa o acompanhamento
+de advogados em causas de até certo limite, os dados dos
+processos também permitiriam aferir se o comportamento processual
+das partes variava conforme o acompanhamento de advogados.
+A pesquisa trabalhou com uma amostra de processos físicos e
+eletrônicos baixados em 2012 em JECs de cinco capitais de cada uma
+das regiões do país. Foram escolhidas varas de Juizados em bairros
+de perfil socioeconômico distinto e estabeleceu-se o limite de 100
+processos por Capital, sendo ao menos 20 processos em cada vara.
+O instrumento de coleta de dados em autos processuais utilizado
+nessa pesquisa foi estruturado, diante disso, para captar dados relativos
+às partes, o comportamento dos advogados e as ferramentas
+processuais utilizadas. Ele foi estruturado em: i) perfil da demanda
+(partes, causas de pedir e pedidos), ii) tratamento processual recebido
+(atos processuais praticados, instrumentos utilizados e resultados
+obtidos), iii) grau de formalização (acompanhamento por advogados,
+quantidade de páginas das peças processuais, etc.).
+297
+
+A ficha continha, aproximadamente, 116 perguntas e, diferentemente
+das pesquisas anteriores, foi disponibilizada para preenchimento
+online através de um formulário eletrônico pelo sistema Google Drive.
+O formato eletrônico agilizou o preenchimento e eliminou uma
+tormentosa etapa das pesquisas anteriores: a transcrição das fichas
+físicas para uma planilha eletrônica Excel. Também permitiu maior
+controle do preenchimento – importante quando a coleta é feita em
+equipe – e a extração imediata de resultados parciais, o que possibilitava
+reorientar as coletas e dar elementos para entrevistas com os
+servidores daquele local feitas em concomitância à coleta nos autos.
+A Figura 5 ilustra a impressão da primeira página do instrumento.
+Diferentemente dos exemplos anteriores de pesquisa, esta não
+precisou dar igual importância aos dados de tempo. Os dados sobre
+datas, ainda que eventualmente coletados, visavam complementar
+ou interpretar o quadro geral de informações. Em compensação, o
+instrumento precisou dedicar atenção especial e espaço suficiente
+para dados localizados dentro de determinadas peças processuais.
+Este tipo de coleta, focada no conteúdo dos documentos judiciais,
+aproxima esta pesquisa do gênero das análises qualitativas de autos
+processuais. Esta opção metodológica altera tanto técnicas de coleta
+quanto, sobretudo, as matrizes de análise do material coletado.
+A principal categoria de dados coletados nesta pesquisa, porque
+seu objeto era o perfil do acesso à justiça, foi a dos elementos da
+ação: partes, causa de pedir e pedido. Sobretudo, a causa de pedir,
+que, em linhas gerais, são os motivos que levaram a pessoa a buscar
+o Judiciário. A figura a seguir ilustra a página impressa do formulário
+eletrônico para registro da causa de pedir da ação judicial. Destaque
+deve ser dado para como foram organizadas as classes de respostas
+possíveis: primeiramente, a identificação das matérias – por exemplo,
+de natureza civil, consumo, previdenciário, etc. (a causa de pedir);
+dentro de cada uma delas, as várias possíveis causas de pedir
+(no caso abaixo, em civil, as hipóteses de posse, propriedade, vizinhança,
+defeito do ato jurídico, contrato de compra e venda, etc.).
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+298
+
+Figura 5: Instrumento de coleta de dados em autos processuais utilizado
+na pesquisa “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”
+(Brasil, 2015)
+
+Fonte: “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”, relatório
+final
+299
+
+Figura 6: Página de instrumento de coleta em autos processuais referente
+ao registro dos fundamentos jurídicos do pedido, utilizado em
+“Acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis” (Brasil, 2015)
+
+Fonte: “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”, relatório
+final
+
+Esta pesquisa produziu, como as anteriores, uma base de dados
+extensa, com muitas colunas de categorias de resposta. Por se tratar
+de coleta via formulário eletrônico, a base estava praticamente mon-
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+300
+
+tada ao término da coleta. Mas isso não quer dizer que estava pronta.
+Também como as anteriores, esta base precisou ser revisada, limpa
+e, eventualmente, retificada – o que, não raro, dependia de retorno a
+campo ou ao processo judicial fonte do dado18. O tratamento da base
+de dados também incluiu a recategorização de colunas de respostas
+muito difusas, que precisaram ser agrupadas em categorias mais gerais
+que permitissem a análise comparativa19.
+Os gráficos abaixo ilustram alguns dados desta pesquisa. O eixo
+X representa cada um dos juizados pesquisados em cada capital que
+compunha a amostra da pesquisa. O primeiro gráfico apresenta os
+tipos de partes que compuseram os processos (se pessoas físicas ou
+jurídicas). Os outros dois gráficos apresentam, respectivamente, os
+valores dos pedidos indenizatórios morais em processos de autores
+com e sem advogados e as faixas de valores das condenações obtidas.
+Mais adiante, o último gráfico ilustra a quantidade média de
+páginas dos processos, em cada juizado – dado coletado para se ter
+uma ideia da intensidade do uso de argumentação jurídica e de prática
+de atos processuais nos processos.
+
+18 Nesta pesquisa, cuja coleta foi feita por equipes de pesquisadores, ao final de cada
+dia de coleta os coordenadores revisavam a base de dados e, já identificando erros
+ou dados faltantes, orientavam o pesquisador respectivo, que ainda estava em campo
+(sim, a planilha permite identificar o pesquisador que coletou cada processo) a
+retornar no dia seguinte para complementar/retificar o dado. Este cuidado, embora
+trabalhoso, reduziu a etapa seguinte, de limpeza dos dados – que, nas pesquisas anteriores
+tomou um tempo extraordinário gerando, inclusive, atraso na entrega do relatório
+final.
+19 A recategorização se faz pela inserção, na planilha da base de dados, de colunas
+suplementares, em que os dados são agrupados em elementos comuns para compor
+uma análise. Do contrário, as respostas dadas variam tanto que fica impossível alguma
+análise e comparação.
+301
+
+Figura 7: Dados de configuração processual (partes), por juizado especial
+da pesquisa “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais
+cíveis” (Brasil, 2015)
+
+Fonte: “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”, relatório
+final
+
+Figura 8: Dados de faixas de valores médios dos pedidos de indenização
+por danos morais do autor pessoa física, com e sem advogado, por
+juizado, da pesquisa “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais
+cíveis” (Brasil, 2015)
+
+Fonte: “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”, relatório
+final
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+302
+
+Figura 9: Faixas de valores médios das condenações em danos morais,
+por juizado, da pesquisa “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais
+cíveis” (Brasil, 2015)
+
+Fonte: “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”, relatório final
+
+Figura 10: Dados de quantidade média do total de páginas dos processos,
+por juizado, da pesquisa “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados
+especiais cíveis” (Brasil, 2015)
+
+Fonte: “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”, relatório
+final
+303
+
+O instrumento de coleta, nesta pesquisa, também previu perguntas
+com campos de respostas abertos, para registrar as narrativas do
+conflito presentes nas petições das partes. Esses dados foram analisados
+tal qual dados qualitativos, por análises de texto. O trecho
+abaixo do relatório ilustra a consolidação de algumas respostas sobre
+as disputas mais comuns nos processos analisados.
+
+Figura 11: Registros das disputas narradas nas petições iniciais após
+tratamento do dado, pesquisa “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados
+especiais cíveis” (Brasil, 2015)
+
+• em relação a serviços bancários, correção monetária de caderneta
+de poupança em razão de plano econômico, cláusulas de
+
+contrato de empréstimo que previam a cobrança de tarifas e juros
+
+abusivos; cobrança ilegal de taxas no leasing, quais sejam: taxas
+
+de serviços de terceiro, taxas de abertura de crédito e taxas de
+
+emissão de boleto;
+
+• “em relação a serviços de telefonia, cobrança indevida em planos
+
+telefônicos, cobrança indevida de ligações, cobrança de valores diferente
+dos termos do plano contratado;
+
+• “em relação a serviços de saúde, negativa de cobertura de procedimento
+cirúrgico, negativa de atendimento de associado ao plano;
+
+• “em serviços de energia, cobrança anormal em conta de energia,
+
+cobrança anormal de conta de energia;
+
+• “em relação a serviços de varejo de massa, cobrança de tarifa
+
+indevida em cartão de compras da loja.”
+
+Fonte: “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”, relatório
+final
+
+O dado tal qual originalmente registrado pelo pesquisador ou
+pesquisadora apareceria em formato narrativo bastante simples e
+direto. As transcrições abaixo permitem ilustrá-las.
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+304
+
+Figura 12: Registros originais das disputas narradas nas petições iniciais,
+da pesquisa “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”
+(Brasil, 2015)
+
+• “a autor foi impedido de entrar no navio por conta de não apresentar
+
+a cédula de RG, afirma o autor que ao contratar o serviço de viagem
+
+não foi informado que precisaria estar com a versão original do RG;
+
+• “chocolates adquiridos com larvas dentro da embalagem;
+
+• “o autor foi preso por conta de acusação de furto no estabelecimento
+da ré;
+
+• “os autores realizaram check in, mas não conseguiram embarcar
+
+por excesso de passageiros no vôo;
+
+• “assalto em frente ao banco logo após o saque agendado de
+
+R$18.000,00; negligência no sistema de segurança da agência;
+
+não disponibilizavam de gravações sobre o assalto.
+
+• “autora levou seu cãozinho para tomar banho na empresa ré,
+
+no entanto, enquanto o cachorro era banhado, caiu e fraturou a
+
+perna; a autora pretende receber indenização por danos materiais
+pelos gastos que teve para recuperar a saúde do cachorro,
+
+bem como pretende indenização por dano moral.
+
+Fonte: “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados especiais cíveis”, relatório
+parcial
+
+Perceba-se que, porque se tratou de uma coleta e registro textual
+do dado, a sua análise não é tão simples como o dado numérico e a
+sua apresentação pode ser feita pela simples transcrição.
+
+3. Como usar os autos processuais? Limitações
+metodológicas e práticas para o uso de processos
+judiciais como fonte de pesquisa
+Abundante, complexo, bruto e de difícil compreensão, o uso de
+305
+
+processos judiciais como fonte de pesquisa não é, portanto, tarefa
+simples nem livre de obstáculos. As diversas possibilidades de uso
+demandam a definição de uma estratégia que considere as questões
+metodológicas, epistemológicas e também as limitações práticas envolvidas.
+Os parágrafos abaixo apresentam algumas dessas considerações.
+Primeiramente, algumas mais gerais, de ordem metodológica
+e/ou epistemológica. Em seguida, outras também metodológicas,
+mas com tom mais prático.
+O caminho que precisa ser construído entre o dado e a análise
+não é linear, nem direto. Ainda que a fonte seja abundante e, em tese,
+de relativo fácil acesso, os processos judiciais são documentos demasiadamente
+formais. Por motivos que não convém discutir aqui,
+a relação entre partes e juiz no processo judicial se dá através de um
+discurso técnico sofisticado e pelo uso e abuso de códigos formais
+que, se por um lado podem convir à solução justa das disputas, por
+outro dificultam o acesso de quem quer que seja às informações
+constante dos autos. Essa característica interfere em enorme medida
+sobre o trabalho de pesquisa com autos processuais. Além de dificultar
+o acesso às informações, afeta o conteúdo de “realidade” que
+a pesquisa busca reconstruir20. A questão do acesso será abordada
+mais adiante. Analiso as interferências da forma processual sobre os
+sentidos de “verdade” nos parágrafos seguintes.
+A comparação entre os papéis desempenhados pelo historiador,
+o juiz e o pesquisador permite ilustrar a relação entre o conteúdo do
+documento e o que se entende por “verdade”. De um certo ponto de
+vista, os três atuam na reconstrução de uma verdade – ou de um sentido
+específico de verdade. Seus métodos são, em alguma medida,
+correspondentes: a investigação dos elementos representativos do
+sentido de verdade almejado21. E, embora nem sempre eles tenham
+
+20 Excelente discussão sobre esta questão, a noção de objetividade e os critérios de
+cientificidade das ciências sociais, em artigo de Álvaro Pires (2008).
+21 Michel Foucault, em uma de suas palestras no Rio de Janeiro na década de 1980,
+publicada com o título de “A verdade e as formas jurídicas”, analisa algo correspon-
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+306
+
+esta percepção, nenhum dos três alcançará êxito absoluto nesta missão.
+O historiador, e também o arqueólogo, empenham-se em uma
+luta paciente para recompor com a maior fidelidade possível eventos
+remotos e interpretá-los à luz do presente. O juiz, para aplicar a lei
+e produzir justiça, geralmente investiga retrospectivamente fatos e
+condutas e os avalia segundo os critérios definidos na lei. E o pesquisador
+procura descrever, analisar e entender o seu objeto de estudo
+através de técnicas de investigação similares, de modo geral, àquelas
+utilizadas pelo juiz e o historiador.
+As informações contidas nos processos judiciais, embora abundantes
+e ricas, não se revelam de maneira evidente nem uniforme
+aos seus diferentes observadores. O processo judicial conta “verdades”
+distintas, geralmente ocultas nos seus registros formais. Tal
+qual, para quem se lembra, o magnífico Dr. Lao, o processo revela-se
+em diferentes faces. Os juízes, por exemplo, enxergam no processo
+judicial as informações que servirão para formar ou fundamentar o
+seu convencimento sobre as alegações do autor e do réu – e, assim,
+compor a interpretação oficial da “verdade”. O advogado consulta,
+no processo judicial, informações sobre o andamento dos litígios
+que envolvem seus clientes e procura compor, nas petições, uma
+versão conveniente do quadro fático sobre o qual o juiz comporá a
+“verdade” oficial22. O escrevente de cartório encara os autos processuais
+como um repertório para a prática de expedientes burocráticos
+que compõem a sua jornada diária de trabalho. De uma perspectiva
+externa ao sistema judicial, outro exemplo, o jornalista encontra no
+processo uma massa de documentos jurídicos que utiliza com finalidade
+totalmente diversa da do juiz, advogado, escrevente ou pesquisador.
+O estudante de direito iniciante decepciona-se ao dar-se conta
+de que sua ideia de justiça se acumula em volumosas encadernações
+
+dente através da história do nascimento dos inquéritos.
+22 A teoria processual possui uma distinção interessante sobre a “verdade real” e a
+“verdade formal”, que é aquela que se apresenta pelos autos. Embora não seja exatamente
+o que eu esteja dizendo acima, é um debate que parte de premissas similares.
+307
+
+de papéis incompreensíveis. E por aí vai.
+Ao pesquisador e à pesquisadora, o processo judicial também
+oferecerá um conjunto profuso, variável e próprio de informações,
+reveladas e evidenciadas conforme a foco de luz que lhes for direcionado
+pelas perguntas de pesquisa respectivamente adotadas. Como
+também acontece na apreciação judicial e na pesquisa histórica, o
+dado presente no documento judicial nem sempre é imediatamente
+visível na pesquisa. Entre o dado “registrado” no processo judicial e o
+dado “revelado” pela pesquisa, há um caminho a ser percorrido pelo
+pesquisador, possível apenas pelo uso refletido de técnicas de coleta
+e análise de documentos judiciais. Tomando por empréstimo uma
+elucidativa ilustração, os autos processuais oferecem, à primeira vista,
+uma simples parede branca, sem detalhes visíveis ou interessantes
+ao pesquisador. Através de uma lente mais apurada, planejada e
+técnica, é possível enxergar várias “ranhuras” na parede, aleatórias,
+disformes e repletas de informações interessantes23.
+A ideia de “neutralidade” científica também se compõe de modo
+peculiar na pesquisa com processos judiciais, sobretudo em comparação
+às fontes pessoais de dados. O documento, como disse André
+Cellard (2012), oferece informações em um único sentido e está menos
+sujeito às interferências do observador (“embora tagarela, o documento
+é surdo”, diz ele). Ele possui registradas as informações de
+interesse da pesquisa e, principalmente em um nível descritivo, pode
+de fato haver boa dose de objetividade na tarefa do pesquisador.
+Contudo, como em qualquer outro método de pesquisa, sempre
+haverá alguma interferência subjetiva no dado. O documento,
+sobretudo o processo judicial, esconde um sujeito por detrás da informação.
+E, na pesquisa, haverá um outro sujeito na sua descrição
+
+23 A imagem da parede com ranhuras é da professora e pesquisadora Vanessa
+Schinke, com quem tive o prazer de conduzir as oficinas de técnicas de pesquisa em
+documentos judiciais junto ao 3o
+ Curso de Métodos e Técnicas de Pesquisa Empírica
+em Direito, da REED, em 2016, em Canoas-RS, e a quem agradeço o empréstimo, reconhecendo-lhe
+a enorme pertinência didática.
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+308
+
+e interpretação. As informações do documento são apreendidas e
+analisadas segundo a perspectiva adotada pelo pesquisador, a partir
+do tipo de investigação e da pergunta de pesquisa que a orienta.
+Não raro, sobretudo em pesquisas de natureza qualitativa, a interferência
+do pesquisador sobre a fonte, embora bem menos intensa do
+que por exemplo nas entrevistas, ainda existirá e afetará o ponto de
+observação e de interpretação do conteúdo dos documentos – em
+outros termos, o seu “ponto de vista” e o “lugar da fala”. Ainda que
+se trate de registros escritos, a potencial interferência deve ser reconhecida
+e considerada no plano metodológico do pesquisador e
+pesquisadora documental. Essa característica também se aplica, naturalmente,
+aos autos de processos judiciais.
+Para além dos desafios metodológicos e epistemológicos, a pesquisa
+com processos judiciais também é condicionada por limitações
+de natureza bastante prática. A primeira delas parece decorrer da
+abundância de fontes, o que exige cuidado especial no recorte e disponibilização
+da amostra de processos objeto da pesquisa. A arquivologia
+não é uma área científica nova e oferece técnicas bastante úteis
+de classificação e gestão de documentos24. No Poder Judiciário, contudo,
+circunstâncias peculiares, quase aleatórias, parecem determinar o
+modo de organização e classificação dos processos nos fóruns. Todos
+os processos estão registrados nos sistemas informatizados dos tribunais,
+mas as categorias utilizadas para organizá-los são específicas da
+atividade forense, sem correspondência em outras ciências. Assim,
+por exemplo, os processos judiciais são organizados pelo que se denomina
+“classe processual”, que é uma mistura de tipo de ação judicial
+com o tipo de procedimento utilizado. Algumas “classes” espelham
+aspectos do conflito material em questão, mas não com suficientemente
+clareza e uniformidade que permitam serem adotadas como
+
+24 Há, na literatura em arquivologia, trabalhos muito interessantes sobre processos
+judiciais. Para indicar alguns, sem prejuízo dos demais, v. os de Gunter Axt (2004), Tassiara
+Kich e Gláucia Vieira Ramos Konrad (2011) e Maria Thetis Nunes (1998).
+309
+
+critério uniforme para definição de amostra para pesquisa25.
+A despeito da massa de processos judiciais no Brasil, sua disponibilização
+para fins de pesquisa também se torna outra enorme dificuldade.
+Processos judiciais ainda em andamento não trazem, por
+óbvio, todas as informações que poderiam interessar a uma pesquisa
+– como, por exemplo, as provas produzidas, os resultados dos recursos
+interpostos e, naturalmente, o resultado final do processo. Além
+disso, esses processos são constantemente acessados pelos servidores
+do fórum e pelos advogados das partes, o que limita, legitimamente,
+a sua disponibilização para fins de pesquisa. Em geral, as pesquisas
+em processos judiciais optam por limitar a amostra a processos finalizados
+(na linguagem forense, “baixados” em arquivo). Ocorre que,
+uma vez “baixados”, os autos processuais podem se tornar menos
+acessíveis. Acaso físicos, eles são arquivados em outros locais, nem
+sempre de acesso fácil ao pesquisador ou com sistemas de localização
+eficazes. Não raro, pesquisadores têm acesso a uma sala com estantes
+lotadas de processos judiciais com poucas identificações; eles
+dispõem somente de algumas pistas de onde pode estar localizado o
+processo específico que procuram e perdem tempo precioso da pesquisa
+apenas na localização dos processos. Esses lugares, porque menos
+visitados pelo público, são menos salubres e estruturados do que
+
+25 Há alguns anos, o Conselho Nacional de Justiça, por meio do Departamento de
+Pesquisas Judiciais, priorizou a padronização de classes processuais. O cenário anterior
+era de um completo caos em termos de classificação de ações e procedimentos
+nos vários tribunais do país. A Tabela de Classes Processuais foi objeto de um estudo
+(<http://IPEA.cnj.jus.br/images/pesquisas-judiciarias/Publicacoes/6-26-2-PB.pdf>,
+acesso em maio de 2017) que culminou na Resolução-CNJ n. 12, de 2006, implantada
+pela Resolução-CNJ n. 46, de 2007 (<http://IPEA.cnj.jus.br/programas-e-acoes/
+tabelas-processuais-unificadas, acesso em maio de 2017). Este trabalho conseguiu
+avanços significativos, que viabilizaram inclusive, a implantação e a comunicação dos
+sistemas eletrônicos de acompanhado dos processos. Mas ainda há algum caminho a
+percorrer até que se consiga organizar e classificar documentos e processos judiciais
+de um modo que facilite tanto a realização de pesquisas, como a própria gestão da
+litigância pelos Tribunais. Para a apresentação deste problema e das ideias que orientaram
+o trabalho do CNJ, v. SORDI, Neide Alves Dias de & MARQUES, Miriam. “Gestão
+documental da Justiça Federal”, 2003., apud AXT, G., 2004.
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+310
+
+os cartórios judiciais nos fóruns. Porque esse arquivamento é fonte de
+despesas, alguns tribunais fixam prazos para a disponibilização desses
+processos, findo o qual eles são incinerados26.
+A terceira limitação diz respeito ao acesso às bases de dados dos
+tribunais. É presumível que o advento dos “processos eletrônicos”,
+em que os atos processuais são realizados eletronicamente, tenha
+eliminado parte dessas dificuldades. Sem dúvida. O processo eletrônico
+facilitou o acesso e a coleta de dados para fins de pesquisa.
+Mas também criou algumas dificuldades. A mais destacável é que o
+processo eletrônico não dispõe de todas as informações dos processos
+físicos. Isso porque - e eis um outro obstáculo da pesquisa com
+processos judiciais, talvez o mais significativo – as informações dispostas
+eletronicamente pelos tribunais visam atender apenas ao andamento
+dos processos judiciais pelos juízos e advogados.
+A política de informatização dos tribunais, implementada há cerca
+de dez anos, praticamente ignorou que as informações dispostas
+nos processos judiciais têm uma outra utilidade pública, de enorme
+funcionalidade, além do acompanhamento processual pelas partes.
+Para ficar nos usos mais ordinários, esses dados podem servir como
+sofisticado instrumento de gestão pelos tribunais, podem subsidiar
+o conhecimento sobre a litigância na sociedade e, inclusive, antever
+eventuais sazonalidades no volume de demandas apresentadas
+ao Judiciário e podem ainda ser utilizados na identificação de tendências
+jurisprudenciais, elaboração de perspectivas econômicas e
+aperfeiçoamento de políticas públicas nos diversos setores representados
+pelos litígios judiciais27. Ainda assim, o enorme investimen26
+O historiador Gunter Axt faz uma esclarecedora reflexão acerca do desafio que se
+impõe à gestão de documentos judiciários, entre a preservação da memória, que sugere
+a retenção do maior volume possível de documentos, e a premência administrativa,
+que exige o descarte de parte deles. Atualmente, técnicas de gestão documental
+têm sido discutidas, inclusive no âmbito dos tribunais, para enfrentar este desafio.
+AXT, G. “Algumas reflexões sobre os critérios para a identificação e guarda dos processos
+judiciais históricos”. Justiça & História, Porto Alegre, v. 4, n. 7, 2004.
+27 Recentemente, órgãos oficiais de gestão da Justiça perceberam a relevância de um
+311
+
+to feito pelos tribunais em informatização soube enxergar apenas o
+seu uso para o andamento dos processos por juízes, escreventes e
+advogados. Sequer às partes o processo eletrônico facilitou o acesso,
+já que a vista dos autos, ainda que públicos, é concedida mediante
+uma senha disponível a advogados apenas.
+Obter as autorizações necessárias para realizar a pesquisa e para
+acessar os dados necessários é outro obstáculo destacável. As limitações
+ao acesso a autos de processos judiciais, em cartório ou virtualmente,
+trazem a questão da necessidade ou da conveniência da autorização
+para a pesquisa. A autorização pode ser necessária para a
+realização da pesquisa ou mesmo para se ter acesso aos autos processuais.
+Atualmente, os tribunais estão muito mais abertos a entender a
+importância de pesquisas do que há alguns anos, quando elas eram
+vistas com desconfiança suficiente para restringir o acesso de pesquisadores
+aos acervos. Além da autorização para a realização da pesquisa,
+geralmente requerida à própria presidência do tribunal respectivo
+e ao juízo responsável pela vara em que está o processo, a intermediação
+institucional pode ajudar no acesso aos dados necessários para
+definição da amostra e o acesso aos autos processuais especificamente
+– em cartório ou através dos sistemas informatizados.
+A definição da amostra de autos processuais objeto da pesquisa
+é outro obstáculo cuja transposição pode ser impossível conforme as
+circunstâncias locais. Se a pesquisa exigir uma amostra estatisticamente
+representativa, é preciso antes de mais nada, dispor de uma
+lista dos processos que compõem o universo da pesquisa. A extensão
+
+desses usos, o monitoramento do volume de processos e das causas da litigância. No
+âmbito federal, a “Estratégia Nacional de Não Judicialização” (ENAJUD), criada em 2014
+no Ministério da Justiça, também se propõe a avaliar o perfil da litigância judicial para
+fins de elaboração de políticas de resolução de conflitos em outras arenas. Em São Paulo,
+o “Núcleo de Monitoramento dos Perfis de Demandas” (Numopede), criado pela Corregedoria
+Geral da Justiça em 2016 tem enfrentado esta questão com o fim de identificar
+o que chamaram de “litigância predatória” (o Relatório Bimestral de Atividades Outubro
+e Novembro de 2016 encontra-se disponível em http://IPEA.tjsp.jus.br/PublicacaoADM/
+Handlers/FileFetch.ashx?id_arquivo=77180, acesso em maio de 2017).
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+312
+
+desta lista varia conforme o recorte do objeto. Por exemplo, a lista de
+processos de execução fiscal em tramite na Justiça Federal baixados
+no ano de 2012 a 2014 será bem mais extensa do que a lista dos processos
+de execução fiscal municipal da cidade de Ribeirão Preto em
+que tenha havido expropriação por leilão, baixados no segundo semestre
+de 2012. Em ambos os casos, é uma lista extensa, cujo acesso
+de regra se dá via tribunal, mediante autorização da presidência e
+disponibilização pelo setor de informática.
+A base de dados dos processos em um tribunal é restrita e operada
+apenas pela gestão do tribunal. Sem esta lista, não é possível dimensionar
+o tamanho e as características do universo de processos, a
+partir do que seria possível extrair uma amostra quantitativa e qualitativamente
+representativa. A autorização do juízo local pode suprir a
+do tribunal, mas será restrito aos processos daquela vara ou comarca,
+limitação que se projetará na pesquisa. Em estudos sem pretensão
+generalizante, em que o acesso a alguns processos especiais é suficiente
+para a investigação e análises, este pode ser um caminho menos
+complexo do que a via do setor de informática dos tribunais28.
+Por fim, conforme o grau técnico da informação que se pretende
+colher nos processos, pode ser necessário alguma habilidade do
+pesquisador e da pesquisadora para manusear e compreender os
+autos processuais. Em geral, essa habilidade se adquire através de
+experiência com esses documentos. Os cursos jurídicos oferecem
+disciplinas que ajudam a desenvolver essas habilidades - como as
+disciplinas em direito processual civil, criminal, trabalhista e administrativo.
+Mas elas não completam esse aprendizado, sobretudo no seu
+aspecto mais prático. Estágios de formação profissional em fóruns e
+tribunais, de advocacia ou de assessoria jurídica em órgãos públicos,
+
+28 Ressalvados, evidentemente, os casos em que será necessária a autorização do
+tribunal para a própria realização da pesquisa, independente do acesso às listas de
+processos. Nenhuma consideração acima atenta a esses casos, específicos da regulamentação
+de cada tribunal e pertinentes à ética em pesquisa, o que não é objeto de
+análise neste momento.
+313
+
+cartórios ou varas, oferecem competente formação para coletar dados
+em processos judicias. Mas não é preciso se tornar um estagiário
+de direito para fazer pesquisas com processos. É plenamente possível
+ao pesquisador sem formação jurídica aprender manusear e colher
+informações em autos de processos judiciais em algumas semanas de
+treinamento em cartórios ou varas judiciais, ou mesmo de treinamento
+interno, desde que com acesso a cópias de autos de processos judiciais
+– sobretudo atualmente, por meio dos “processos eletrônicos”.
+
+3.1. Três pesquisas em processos judiciais na história e na sociologia,
+e as orientações metodológicas que elas sugerem
+
+Diferentes áreas das ciências humanas exploram os arquivos judiciários
+em busca de fontes de dados para suas pesquisas – eventualmente,
+até mais do que a pesquisa jurídica. A história, acostumada à pesquisa
+documental, encontrou uma rica e relativamente fiel fonte de
+reconstrução de tempos distantes nos processos judiciais. A sociologia
+e a ciência política têm complementado suas entrevistas, observações
+e análises com dados coletados em processos judiciais. E a arquivologia
+e a ciência da informação têm oferecido conhecimento técnico para
+ajudar o Poder Judiciário a melhor organizar seu volumoso acervo. Os
+parágrafos abaixo apresentam exemplos de pesquisas com esses objetivos,
+selecionados pela pertinência metodológica. São trabalhos
+de excelente qualidade, que podem inspirar desenhos metodológicos
+para pesquisas empíricas em direito com processos judiciais.
+Como se formaram as relações entre instituições políticas e as estruturas
+do capital no Brasil na transição para o século XX? Qual o papel
+da propriedade da terra na conformação dessas relações? Como
+aconteciam as relações de força e interesse econômico nos poderes
+locais e centrais da época? A professora Ironita Machado, do curso
+de história da Universidade do Passo Fundo/RS, analisou processos
+judiciais da época para esclarecer essas perguntas. A partir de um
+universo de 40,5 mil processos, foi extraída uma amostra de 6,6mil,
+dos quais foram analisados em profundidade 243 processos em trâ-
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+314
+
+mite em comarcas do Rio Grande do Sul entre 1870 e 1930. Os processos
+foram analisados individualmente a partir de um “instrumental
+operacional à leitura”, e sistematizados por décadas em quadro
+comparativos das categorias de tipos, sujeitos, autuação, sentença,
+localização da terra, normas e outros elementos.
+A partir dessa experiência, a professora Ironita faz reflexões metodológicas
+sobre o diálogo entre a história e o direito e o uso de processos
+judiciais pela pesquisa histórica. Segundo ela, “a utilização
+de fontes judiciais sempre fez parte da pesquisa histórica, embora
+tenhamos dado uma nova ênfase nas últimas duas décadas” (2013).
+Ela conta que a sua primeira impressão de “caos das memórias judiciais”
+revelou-se, num segundo momento, “uma experiência histórica
+singular” com “dialética própria”, que, ao final de uma análise
+preliminar, convergia com temáticas clássicas da história – como a
+predominância, também nos processos, de discussões sobre terra,
+violência e escravidão. A análise de processos judiciais, e isso parece
+uma decorrência das conclusões da pesquisa, permitiria:
+
+identificar e analisar as políticas públicas, a legislação, os acórdãos do Judiciário,
+os sujeitos envolvidos nos litígios, as relações sociais no cotidiano,
+que, por sua vez, revelam, explícita e/ou implicitamente, as permanências,
+as mudanças e as iniciativas de intervenção do Estado na economia e
+
+nas relações entre Estado e sociedade. (2013, p. 21)
+
+Ela lembra a peculiar divisão espacial do Poder Judiciário, em
+comarcas não necessariamente correspondentes aos municípios – o
+que afeta a delimitação espacial de pesquisas sobre relações políticas
+com base em processos judiciais.
+Suas reflexões sobre o uso de processos judicias em pesquisas
+resultaram em uma recomendação geral da interdisciplinaridade
+como opção para o “esgotamento teórico” da história e uma lista de
+recomendações práticas, das quais destaco:
+315
+
+“conhecer a origem do documento (estudar o funcionamento da máquina
+
+administrativa para entender o contexto de produção dos documentos);
+
+“descobrir onde se encontram os papéis que podem ser úteis;
+
+“aprender e aprimorar-se em técnicas de levantamento, seleção e anotação
+do que é interessante e de registro das referências das fontes para
+
+futura citação;
+
+“trabalhar com um número adequado de casos, de modo que garantam
+
+a margem aceitável de segurança para fazer afirmações, especialmente
+
+de caráter quantitativo e generalizante;
+
+“contextualizar o documento que se coleta (entender o texto no contexto
+de sua época, inclusive o significado das palavras e das expressões
+
+empregadas; e
+
+“cruzar fontes, cotejar informações, justapor documentos, relacionar
+
+texto e contexto, e estabelecer constantes, identificar mudanças e permanências.
+(2013, pp. 26 e 27).
+
+Guardadas as peculiaridades, todas elas, não é difícil perceber, podem
+ser úteis para a pesquisa empírica em direito com uso de documentos
+judiciais.
+Na sociologia e antropologia, outras duas pesquisas feitas com
+dados de processos judiciais inspiraram reflexões metodológicas sobre
+o uso dessa fonte de dados em pesquisas de natureza qualitativa.
+A primeira analisou votos e acórdãos proferidos em ações diretas
+de inconstitucionalidade entre 1988 e 2003 para analisar se o perfil
+e a trajetória profissional interferem nos julgamentos dos ministros.
+A segunda pesquisa analisou depoimentos de imigrantes italianos e
+negros ex-escravos em inquéritos e processos criminais em que foram
+réus ou vítimas, tramitados no período pós Abolição, para identificar,
+através de uma análise qualitativa dos seus discursos, diferentes representações
+sociais dos grupos, inclusive nas interações entre si.
+Suas autoras, as então doutorandas, hoje professoras e pesquisadoras
+renomadas, Fabiana Luci de Oliveira e Virginia Ferreira da
+Silva, reuniram reflexões sobre este uso e as suas limitações meto-
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+316
+
+dológicas. Segundo elas, trabalhar com processos judiciais, porque
+são documentos escritos, históricos e oficiais, implica, antes de mais
+nada, explorar metodologicamente as questões ligadas à interpretação
+e ao poder. “Interpretação” porque, ao lidar com os processos
+judiciais, trabalha-se com o texto escrito, e não o acontecimento
+em si. “Poder” porque os documentos judiciais são, ainda que indiretamente,
+um produto do Estado (que “encobre a expressão de
+qualquer grupo social que esteja contida no documento”). Os processos
+judiciais utilizam uma linguagem específica, e “esta linguagem
+implica poder”. As manifestações dos juízes representam ora o
+poder do discurso coletivo, ora o poder do discurso individual que se
+contrapõe ao coletivo da lei ou de outras decisões. As manifestações
+das partes e testemunhas são também um exercício de poder, que,
+embora traduzido (“filtrado”, dizem elas) pelo juiz e servidores, ainda
+assim são relevantes para identificar as representações sociais do
+grupo a que pertencem (2005, p. 249)
+O elemento mais relevante de pesquisas qualitativas em processos
+judiciais, segundo essas autoras, é o discurso dos autores dos documentos
+e as várias representações sociais que se podem encontrar
+nele. Os processos judiciais encerram narrativas das pessoas (atores
+institucionais e sociais) envolvidas, que contam muito sobre a identidade
+cultural e a representação social dos emissores – além, na linha
+acima, das articulações de poder que os envolvem. A pesquisa
+em processos judiciais exige, neste sentido, uma procura por esses
+discursos e narrativas, um desvendar da teia de significados que eles
+carregam. Ao ler um processo em busca de dados para pesquisa, escrevem
+as autoras, “quer-se atingir o ato de pensamento que produziu
+o discurso” (2005, p. 256).
+
+4. Considerações finais – um plano para explorar
+a complexidade e riqueza dos processos
+judiciais
+O conjunto das reflexões e experiências de pesquisa narradas nos itens
+317
+
+anteriores permite destacar alguns apontamentos conclusivos sobre
+o uso de fontes judiciais para a pesquisa científica na área do direito.
+Os autos processuais são um manancial de informações de variada
+natureza, o que os torna fonte especialmente rica para a pesquisa em
+direito e em outras áreas das ciências humanas. São documentos escritos,
+oficiais e formais, mas foram elaborados por um sujeito, a partir
+de um contexto e uma situação concreta da vida. Por isso, podem ser
+usados em investigações de natureza empírica, mas exigem alguma
+triangulação com outras fontes e materiais disponíveis para que se
+consiga interpretar corretamente todos os dados de seu registro formal
+ou, se for o caso, captar e compreender o contexto que o envolve.
+No caso de levantamentos qualitativos, a literatura especializada
+já oferece sofisticados caminhos metodológicos para montar o
+mosaico de dados que envolve o documento. Uma das experiências
+narradas acima, por exemplo, sugere que a estratégia de pesquisa
+considere as questões de poder e de interpretação que caracterizam
+o uso do processo judicial, bem como das narrativas e discursos plenos
+de representações sociais que ele carrega.
+No caso de levantamentos quantitativos em processos judiciais,
+a triangulação geralmente se dá com outras técnicas e outros objetos
+de investigação. As experiências narradas acima recorreram,
+por exemplo, a levantamentos etnográficos, relatórios gerenciais e
+entrevistas com diferentes atores envolvidos nos litígios judiciais e/
+ou órgãos do sistema objeto das pesquisas para compor, junto com
+os dados processuais, o mosaico de informações necessárias para o
+mais nítido esclarecimento do objeto pesquisado – no caso, funcionamento
+de cartórios judiciais, custo unitário de um determinado
+procedimento ou o perfil do acesso à justiça em juizados especiais.
+A recomendação metodológica elementar da preservação da
+relação “objeto, método e instrumentos de coleta e de análise”, essencial
+para a pesquisa empírica, é especialmente importante para a
+pesquisa com autos processuais. O documento judicial, como ficou
+subentendido, admite análises quantitativas e qualitativas e a esco-
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+318
+
+lha por uma delas depende menos de seus atributos e mais das características
+do problema e das perguntas de pesquisa – uma regra
+de ouro em pesquisas empíricas em geral, inclusive em processos judiciais.
+Esta opção metodológica preliminar sugerirá como deve ser
+desenhado o plano de coleta, os critérios de seleção da amostra e os
+caminhos para acesso ao documento, como também as estratégias
+de análise do dado coletado.
+Considerando as experiências de pesquisa narradas neste capítulo,
+nas investigações de natureza quantitativa, será preciso montar
+um eficaz instrumento de coleta de dados, reiteradamente testado
+antes de sua aplicação em campo. Se o tamanho da amostra exigir o
+trabalho em equipe, será preciso investir tempo e recursos no treinamento
+e padronização da coleta. Nas pesquisas qualitativas, por sua
+vez, o maior investimento de tempo e recursos foi aplicado na construção
+de uma matriz analítica perspicaz o suficiente para se compreender
+ao máximo o que os dados sugerem, mas que não revelam
+facilmente. Este quadro, contudo, não é absoluto: o estudo de caso,
+de natureza qualitativa, exige um esforço extraordinário e prioritário
+no planejamento e na coleta dos dados, e também na análise do material
+coletado.
+A pesquisa em autos processuais depende sobretudo, como se
+depreende de todas as considerações feitas neste capítulo, de uma
+estratégia de coleta e análise dos dados que contemple a definição
+da perspectiva metodológica adotada, as providências de seleção e
+acesso aos autos, a elaboração e os testes reiterados do instrumento
+de coleta e, por fim, a definição dos marcos orientadores da análise.
+319
+
+5. Referências
+
+Almeida, F.N.R.; Alves da Silva, P.E. (2007). “Efeitos da organização e funcionamento
+dos cartórios judiciais sobre a morosidade do processo”. Relatório final
+do levantamento dos tempos processuais realizado no âmbito do projeto
+
+“Análise da Gestão e Funcionamento dos Cartórios Judiciais”, Ministério da
+
+Justiça, Secretaria de Reforma do Judiciário, 2007. Não publicado.
+
+Axt, G. (2004). “Algumas reflexões sobre os critérios para a identificação e guarda
+
+dos processos judiciais históricos”. Justiça & História, Porto Alegre, v. 4, n. 7,
+
+2004.
+
+Bellato, R. et al. (2012). Mediação do direito à saúde pelo tribunal de justiça:
+
+análise da demanda Texto & Contexto - Enfermagem, 21, 356-62.
+
+Brasil, Conselho Nacional de Justiça (2015). “Perfil do acesso à justiça nos juizados
+especiais cíveis”. Coord.: Alves da Silva, Paulo Eduardo. Brasília: CNJ.
+
+Brasil, Ministério da Justiça (2017). “Análise da gestão e funcionamento dos
+
+cartórios judiciais”. Coord.: Alves da Silva, Paulo Eduardo. Brasília: Ministério
+
+da Justiça.
+
+Brasil, Conselho Nacional de Justiça (2016). Justiça em Números 2016: ano-base
+
+2015. Brasília: CNJ.
+
+Brasil, Conselho Nacional de Justiça. (2010). Justiça em Números 2010: ano-base
+
+2009. Brasília: CNJ.
+
+Brasil, Conselho Nacional de Justiça (2007). Resolução nº 16, de 18 de dezembro
+
+de 2007. Cria as Tabelas Processuais Unificadas do Poder Judiciário e dá outras
+providências.
+
+Cellard, A. (2012). A análise documental. In: Poupart, J. et al. A pesquisa qualitativa:
+enfoques epistemológicos e metodológicos. Petrópolis, Vozes.
+
+Chalhoub, S. (2015). O conhecimento da História, o direito à memória e os arquivos
+judiciais. In: Curso de Formações de Multiplicadores em “Políticas de
+
+resgate, preservação, conservação e restauração do patrimônio histórico da
+
+Justiça do Trabalho no Rio Grande do Sul”. Porto Alegre, 2005
+
+Felstiner, IPEA. L. et al. (1980). The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
+
+Naming, Blaming, Claiming... Law and Society Review, 631-654.
+
+Foucault, M. (1999). A Verdade e as Formas Jurídicas. Rio de Janeiro: Nau, 2a
+. ed.
+
+IPEA. (2011). “Custo unitário do processo de execução fiscal na Justiça Federal”.
+
+Relatório de Pesquisa. Brasília: CNJ.
+Pesquisas em processos judiciais //
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+320
+
+Kich, T. J. F.; Konrad, G. V. R. (2011). Arranjo e descrição arquivística em processos
+
+judiciais Perspectivas em Ciência da Informação, Scielo, 16, 212-27.
+
+Machado, I. A. P. (2012) Algumas considerações sobre a pesquisa histórica com
+
+fontes judiciais Métis: História & Cultura, 12 (23).
+
+Oliveira, F. L.; Silva, V. F. (2005). Processos judiciais como fonte de dados: poder e
+
+interpretação. Sociologias, 7 (23).
+
+Pires, A. (2012). Sobre algumas questões epistemológicas de uma metodologia
+
+geral para as ciências sociais. In J. In J. Poupart et al. (Org.) A pesquisa qualitativa:
+enfoques epistemológicos e metodológicos (p. 43-94). Petrópolis: Editora
+
+Vozes.
+
+Poupart, J. et al. (orgs.) (2012). A pesquisa qualitativa: enfoques epistemológicos e
+
+metodológicos Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.
+
+Rosemberg, A. & Souza, L. A. F. d. (2009) Notas sobre o uso de documentos judiciais
+como fonte de pesquisa histórica. Patrimônio e Memória. São Paulo: Ed.
+
+Unesp.
+
+Zarth, P. A. (2012). A importância dos arquivos do poder judiciário para a pesquisa
+
+histórica. História Social, 2, 13-25.
+321
+
+10
+
+Pesquisas de fluxo e
+
+tempos da Justiça Criminal:
+
+possibilidades e limites de
+
+uso no contexto brasileiro //
+
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+
+Um dos maiores desafios do acesso à justiça no seu sentido mais
+tradicional e restrito, que é o acesso ao Poder Judiciário, é o tempo
+que se há de esperar por uma decisão.1
+ Outro problema, que pode
+ser visto ou não como um desdobramento do primeiro, é o fluxo da
+justiça,ou seja, o encadeamento dos trâmites processuais, com suas
+formas protocolares e dispendiosas, que muitas vezes faz os atores
+do sistema perderem de vista a finalidade do processo, que deveria
+ser a realização da justiça ou a garantia de uma decisão justa para os
+
+1 Sabemos que existem outros desafios, como os altos custos e a desigualdade de recursos
+dos demandantes, e também outras perspectivas, mais atuais e adequadas a um panorama
+de garantia de direitos, que não têm a ver com respostas puramente formais, como as
+sentenças, nem com demandas individuais, e sim com o reconhecimento de atores e formas
+de respostas que estejam inseridas numa perspectiva coletiva e pluralista.
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+322
+
+problemas sociais que ganharam revestimento formal. Em resumo,
+o fluxo não impacta somente no tempo, mas também no tipo de decisão
+que se obtém.
+Na Justiça Criminal temos problemas adicionais. Dela fazem parte
+instituições externas ao Poder Judiciário em dois momentos fundamentais:
+no aporte (chegada) dos casos ao mundo jurídico – que
+é realizado a partir das atividades de policiamento, referidas como
+políticas de segurança pública –, e no momento posterior à decisão
+(definitiva ou provisória) do juiz, que é normalmente referida por
+Execução Penal.
+A chegada de um problema à justiça se dá, normalmente, através
+do Ministério Público, que conecta as instituições policiais ao Judiciário.
+A polícia é a porta de entrada do fluxo começando, em geral, pela
+Polícia Militar e, posteriormente, pela Civil, pois o patrulhamento ostensivo
+é feito pela primeira e o registro da ocorrência pela segunda,
+embora o caso possa chegar já na segunda por algum cidadão, em geral
+a vítima, que vai até a delegacia registrar diretamente a ocorrência.
+É possível ainda que o caso chegue diretamente ao Ministério Público.2
+A saída dos casos da justiça naquelas situações em que alguém
+foi responsabilizado pela prática de um delito ocorre por intermédio
+de instituições que alojam os presos, quais sejam: cadeias públicas
+(para presos provisórios) e penitenciárias (normalmente públicas,3
+administradas por agentes penitenciários ou, às vezes, por policiais,
+para condenados à pena de reclusão em regime fechado4
+).
+Nesses dois momentos rapidamente indicados – polícia e prisão
+
+2 Neste texto procuramos descrever o caminho padrão, mas faremos algumas advertências
+no sentido de que ele pode sofrer alterações, nem sempre fáceis de observar e controlar.
+3 Já existem no Brasil prisões privadas e as chamadas Parcerias Público-Privadas, ainda
+minoritárias em relação às instituições públicas.
+4 Estão previstas na Lei de Execução Penal (Lei n.º 7.210/84) outras instituições, embora
+elas existam no Brasil hoje em quantidade significativamente inferior à das instituições
+citadas no corpo do texto. São elas: as Colônias Agrícolas, Industriais ou Similares
+(para cumprimento de pena em regime semiaberto), as Casas do Albergado (para
+cumprimento de pena em regime aberto), e os Hospitais de Custódia e Tratamento
+Psiquiátrico (para aplicação de medida de segurança).
+323
+
+–, a competência é do Poder Executivo, pois não pode haver coincidência
+entre quem prende, investiga, julga e executa. A integração
+dessas diversas instituições – acrescido aí o Ministério Público e as
+defesas particulares ou públicas (Defensorias) – não é tão fácil de
+operacionalizar. É do conhecimento dos operadores do Direito, estudantes
+ou profissionais, a existência de disputas por fases desse
+processamento formal, como foi o caso do acirrado debate público
+ocorrido em torno da Proposta de Emenda Constitucional n.º
+37/2011, que introduzia limitações às possibilidades investigativas
+do Ministério Público e foi rejeitada em junho de 2013. São comuns
+as acusações de parte a parte dos atores do sistema sobre a incompetência
+dos outros, que atrapalham o seu próprio desempenho, no
+melhor estilo do mecanismo de projeção freudiano.5
+Esse estado de coisas faz com que muitos se perguntem se há
+mesmo um Sistema de Justiça Criminal (SJC), em que as instituições
+comunicam e cumprem, dentro dos prazos estabelecidos na lei processual,
+as tarefas previstas para cada uma delas (Vargas, 2014). Isso
+pode ser dito na forma do seguinte questionamento: há cooperação
+ou competição? O que motiva, por exemplo, operadores do sistema a
+“sentar em cima” de algum processo? O desafio que então se coloca
+é: como ajustar o funcionamento desse sistema, sobre o qual se diz
+atualmente ser “frouxamente articulado”,6
+ para que seus resultados
+
+5 Sigmund Freud desenvolve a ideia de mecanismo de projeção usando a figura do
+bode expiatório, que recebe sobre si toda a negatividade e é enviado para o deserto,
+purificando os habitantes da aldeia. Isso significa que o mal não é propriamente
+reconhecido em cada um, mas é depositado sobre esse símbolo, com o qual não há
+identificação (Baratta, 1999, capítulo 3).
+6 Entender o Sistema de Justiça Criminal como frouxamente articulado significa reconhecer
+que as organizações encarregadas da aplicação da lei nem sempre trabalham
+sob o prisma da cooperação (Lima, 2017), sendo parte do relacionamento entre essas
+agências marcado pela competição por recursos (simbólicos e materiais), ainda que
+formalmente elas sejam organizações que perseguem a mesma finalidade: a responsabilização
+de alguém pela prática de um delito. É uma abordagem que, “ao contrário
+dos modelos macrossociológicos que pressupõem um alto grau de coerência e integração
+de estrutura e função no Sistema de Justiça Criminal”, faz com que esse seja
+melhor descrito como “uma arena de conflitos e negociação de segmentos organi-
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+324
+
+sejam mais próximos de um ideal de justiça?
+Notem que não estamos dizendo simplesmente que os resultados
+devam ser mais rápidos, pois não é exatamente disso que trata. O Poder
+Judiciário não é uma empresa que deve oferecer lucros e produtividade
+e, por isso, precisa se guiar pelo princípio da razoável duração
+do processo. No Brasil, a razoável duração do processo é uma regra
+imposta constitucionalmente ao Poder Judiciário desde a Emenda
+Constitucional n.º 45, de 2004. O inciso LXXVIII do art. 5º da Constituição
+Federal de 1988 possui hoje a seguinte redação: “a todos, no âmbito
+judicial e administrativo, são assegurados a razoável duração do
+processo e os meios que garantam a celeridade de sua tramitação”.
+Entretanto, não há uma duração razoável do processo, como indicam
+as pesquisas sobre o tema,7
+ tanto que já se pode falar no processo
+como pena, o que não é um sofrimento injustificável somente para
+quem está preso provisoriamente, como também para quem está
+sendo processado em liberdade, pois, apesar de os processos não
+acabarem, eles podem acabar com a vida dessas pessoas.
+Na investigação criminológica, três achados de pesquisa de
+meados do século XX marcam as análises sobre o desempenho do
+Sistema de Justiça Criminal. O primeiro foi a descoberta das cifras
+ocultas, que são ocorrências criminais que não chegam a ter registro
+formal (não são conhecidas da polícia) e que, dada a enorme quanzacionais
+pouco articulados” (Paixão, 1988, p. 186), o que seria a explicação para a
+elevada seletividade, morosidade e, por conseguinte, baixa efetividade nas atividades
+de esclarecimento, processamento e punição de crimes.
+7 Na última mensuração de cunho nacional, o tempo médio de duração do processo
+de homicídio doloso era de quase oito anos. O prazo de um processo de homicídio doloso,
+de acordo com as previsões do Código de Processo Penal, deveria ser de 315 dias
+para o réu preso e de 345 dias para o réu solto, desde a data do crime até a sentença
+do júri, sem contar o tempo de recurso entre as decisões judiciais. No entanto, entre os
+786 processos penais de homicídio intencional encerrados em 2012 e analisados por
+Ribeiro et al (2014), referentes a cinco capitais brasileiras, somente 28 casos tiveram
+duração igual ou menor a esse marco, o que, por si só, pode ser um indicador dos atrasos
+da justiça. Em algumas situações, a duração do processo suplantou 40 anos, duas
+vezes o prazo prescricional estipulado para esse crime, denotando como o tempo tem
+impactos no fluxo do Sistema de Justiça Criminal.
+325
+
+tidade de condutas criminalizadas, eram a esmagadora maioria. O
+segundo foi a elaboração de métodos para medir as cifras ocultas –
+pesquisas de vitimização e autoconfissão, diferenciando a conduta
+social, que produz uma unidade de comportamento desviante, da
+atividade organizacional das polícias, que produz taxas de comportamento
+desviante (Kitsuse e Cicourel, 1963). 8 O terceiro foi a criação
+de mecanismos para a identificação da quantidade de casos que se
+perdia entre uma etapa e outra do sistema frouxamente articulado,
+seja por desídia ou por impossibilidades de se investigar, processar,
+julgar e executar. Esse método foi chamado de observação das entradas
+e saídas das etapas do SJC (Aniyar de Castro, 1987, p. 70), ou,
+como se chama hoje, estudo de fluxo de Justiça Criminal.
+Neste capítulo apresentaremos uma descrição dessa técnica de
+pesquisa a partir da literatura internacional e, posteriormente, alguns
+resultados obtidos no Brasil. No decorrer do texto indicaremos alguns
+obstáculos a esse tipo de pesquisa e exemplos a partir dos quais se
+possa compreender casos em que a estratégia não é produtiva.
+
+1. A pesquisa de fluxo de processamento: possibilidades
+e limites
+A pesquisa de fluxo de processamento tem como objetivo reconstituir
+– quantitativa e qualitativamente – a forma como um crime registrado,
+em regra, pela polícia é processado pelas demais agências que
+seguem no fluxo, como o Ministério Público, a Defensoria Pública, o
+Judiciário e o Sistema Penitenciário.
+Em termos quantitativos, o estudo de fluxo de processamento
+visa a mensuração da taxa de atrito, que é a proporção de ofensas
+registradas na polícia que são trazidas ao Sistema de Justiça Criminal
+e responsabilizadas com uma sentença – condenatória ou
+
+8 No Brasil, a pesquisa nacional de vitimização realizada em 2012 indica que menos
+de 30% do total de crimes ocorridos são registrados à polícia. (Disponível em: http://
+www.crisp.ufmg.br/pesquisas/#Vitimização, Acesso em: 01 abr. 2017).
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+326
+
+absolutória. O atrito é uma proporção que permite calcular o percentual
+de crimes comunicados à polícia a partir do total de crimes
+ocorridos em uma sociedade; a proporção dos registros policiais que
+implicou abertura de investigação, desses quantos foram esclarecidos
+com o apontamento de um suspeito e, posteriormente, quantos
+foram transformados em processo e encerrados com uma sentença
+de absolvição ou condenação (Newburn, 2017). Em suma, “o atrito
+refere-se à diferença entre os níveis de criminalidade conhecida e
+a resposta do Sistema de Justiça Criminal em termos de processos,
+sentenças e condenações” (Garside, 2004, p. 7).
+As pesquisas quantitativas de fluxo permitem ainda o cálculo
+do tempo despendido em cada uma das fases de processamento,
+apontando quais são as que implicam maiores retardos e, ainda, as
+que são mais susceptíveis a um rápido desfecho. Permitem também
+comparar o tempo de duração a partir de determinadas características,
+como local da infração e tribunal, identificando as variáveis que
+mais contribuem para os atrasos da justiça.
+Em termos qualitativos, a pesquisa procura desvelar quem são os
+autores e as vítimas de determinados delitos, quais são as distintas
+“verdades” construídas pelos operadores do Direito em cada fase de
+processamento (Foucault, 2001) e em que medida a sentença final
+representa uma construção social acerca de um dado delito, muitas
+vezes distante do que de fato ocorreu. Trata-se da comparação dos
+motivos alegados para a prática do crime por cada um dos operadores
+(policiais, promotores e juízes) como forma de problematizar de
+que maneira a decisão judicial pode ser resultado de narrativas, sem
+qualquer lastro de provas periciais. 9
+Apesar dessas duas vantagens, as pesquisas de fluxo não permitem
+a análise de como ocorrem as negociações dentro do Sistema de
+
+9 A polêmica Súmula 70, do Tribunal de Justiça do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, por exemplo,
+permite a condenação de alguém por tráfico de drogas com base apenas nos depoimentos
+dos policiais que realizaram o flagrante, algo que as pesquisas de fluxo há muito já indicavam
+como realidade da administração da justiça em nosso país (Jesus, 2015).
+327
+
+Justiça Criminal, por exemplo, para registro de um crime (uso em detrimento
+de tráfico de drogas na interpretação que fazem as organizações
+policiais10), para pedido de arquivamento em detrimento da denúncia
+(casos com precários conjuntos probatórios seguem trajetórias
+distintas a partir do pedido do promotor) e, por fim, para priorização
+ou retardo no processamento de certos delitos (casos semelhantes
+com tempos diferenciados de processamento). Essas situações só podem
+ser desveladas a partir de trabalhos eminentemente etnográficos
+nas repartições públicas ou de entrevistas com servidores que relatem
+as rotinas burocráticas para além das normas previstas nos códigos, o
+que significa lançar mão do método de estudos de caso.
+
+2. Os estudos de fluxo no contexto internacional
+Em todo o mundo, de todas as ofensas registradas pela polícia, apenas
+uma proporção muito pequena termina com uma condenação em um
+curto espaço de tempo (Sung, 2006). Para entender esse processamento,
+a melhor opção é a organização de uma base de dados quantitativa
+com informações longitudinais, que tenham como ponto de partida
+as pesquisas de vitimização (que mensuram os crimes ocorridos que
+não foram reportados à polícia), seguindo os Registros de Ocorrência
+e os Processos Penais, chegando aos Prontuários do sistema prisional
+(Bergman, 2006, p. 226). No entanto, o tipo de método empregado para
+a realização desse modelo de estudo está relacionado à disponibilidade
+de informação de cada país, já que alguns contam com sistemas razoavelmente
+interligados (como é o caso do Reino Unido), enquanto
+em outros é preciso consultar os documentos para a organização dos
+dados necessários (como ocorre na América Latina).
+Em locais em que o sistema de registro policial é integrado aos
+sistemas de informação das demais instituições é possível recons10
+Grillo, Policarpo e Veríssimo (2011) problematizam como pode acontecer de a própria
+PM negociar a situação com alguém flagrado com drogas e, com isso, o registro
+daquela ocorrência (de uso ou tráfico) jamais ser iniciado.
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+328
+
+tituir de forma quase imediata o fluxo de processamento. Na Inglaterra,
+o National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) mapeia o processamento
+dos delitos registrados pela polícia e publica relatórios
+regulares sobre esse fenômeno (Garside, 2004). Em 1997, esse relatório
+foi complementado com uma pesquisa de vitimização, o que
+permitiu conhecer o padrão de afunilamento, considerando o não
+registro do caso à polícia. Os números coletados mostraram que para
+os crimes contra a pessoa e a propriedade sem uso de violência, “3
+em 100 ofensas cometidas em 1997 resultaram em condenação criminal
+ou cautela policial; 1 em 300 resultou em uma pena privativa
+de liberdade” (Barclay e Tavares, 1999, p. 29).
+
+Figura 1 – Atrito no Sistema de Justiça Criminal da Inglaterra e do País
+de Gales
+
+Fonte: Barclay e Tavares (1999, p. 29)
+
+O estudo de Barclay e Tavares (1999) é considerado uma pedra
+angular nas pesquisas de fluxo de processamento por incluir a quantidade
+de casos que não é registrada à polícia, ou seja, a cifra oculta
+da criminalidade. Afinal de contas, muitos crimes são cometidos sem
+329
+
+que a polícia jamais seja notificada. Na Inglaterra e no País de Gales,
+nos anos 1999 e 2000, quando o cálculo teve como base a quantidade
+de crimes contra a pessoa e o patrimônio cometidos sem violência e
+registrados à polícia, “a taxa de atrito ficou em torno de 14%, quando
+considerada a sentença; e 9% para os casos de condenação” (Garside,
+2004, p. 19). A diferença é de três vezes dependendo do ponto de
+partida: se as pesquisas de vitimização (Barclay e Tavares, 1999) ou
+se a quantidade de crimes registrados pela polícia (Garside, 2004).
+Uma forma de evitar a diferença decorrente da cifra oculta da criminalidade
+é calculando a taxa de atrito a partir do homicídio consumado,
+delito em que a decisão de comunicar o evento à polícia é substituída
+pela presença do cadáver. Esse é o delito preferencial de várias
+pesquisas realizadas sobre o tema, como é o caso de Restrepo (2001) e
+Lecuona (2004), que estimam que menos de 6% dos homicídios registrados
+na década de 1990 na Colômbia e no México (respectivamente)
+foram encerrados com uma condenação no Poder Judiciário. No entanto,
+como adverte Bergman (2006, p. 220), na América Latina, o número
+de homicídios intencionais computados pelas organizações policiais
+não representa necessariamente todos os corpos com suspeita
+de assassinato intencional, sendo clássico o caso do encontro de cadáver
+que segue sem qualquer tipo de investigação e, por conseguinte,
+responsabilização pelo Sistema de Justiça Criminal (Misse, 2014).
+Outra dimensão importante das pesquisas de fluxo de processamento
+é que os crimes não têm todos o mesmo padrão de seleção e
+filtragem, razão pela qual a taxa de atrito deve ser calculada de forma
+específica para cada modalidade delituosa. Hester (2006) destaca
+que, nos delitos de violência doméstica, em que o perpetrador do
+crime já é conhecido no momento do registro policial, o percentual
+de casos encerrados com uma condenação deveria ser maior do que
+nas situações em que a polícia precisa lançar mão da investigação
+para a identificação do suspeito. Ao escrutinar 869 casos de violência
+doméstica registrados pela polícia de Northumbria (Reino Unido), a
+autora constatou que 13% foram encerrados com uma condenação,
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+330
+
+percentual superior aos 9% encontrados por Garside (2004) para crimes
+em geral. Tomando somente os crimes registrados sob a insígnia
+de violência doméstica, a autora conclui que, “em comparação
+com outras regiões do Reino Unido, as taxas de Northumbria são, no
+entanto, deprimentemente semelhantes” (Hester, 2006, p. 81). Em
+resumo, apesar de a taxa de condenação de casos de violência doméstica
+ser maior do que a taxa de condenação dos crimes em geral,
+o percentual encontrado em Northumbria é o mesmo para o restante
+da Inglaterra, reafirmando a impossibilidade de se comparar o fluxo
+de processamento de delitos diferenciados.
+Nelken (2009, p. 302) argumenta que todos os Sistemas de Justiça
+Penal “são, em certa medida, seletivos – como se vê na famosa
+distinção na literatura anglo-americana entre as exigências do ‘devido
+processo’ e os objetivos do ‘controle do crime’”. No entanto, os
+sistemas diferem entre si (e ao longo do tempo) na maneira como
+constroem e operam suas respectivas seletividades. Por isso, a taxa
+de atrito deve ser vista como um produto dos procedimentos burocráticos
+empregados para o apontamento do suspeito e, depois, para
+a apuração de sua responsabilidade, o que, segundo o autor, seria a
+explicação para o baixo quantitativo de casos criminais que são encerrados
+com uma sentença condenatória em localidades que ainda
+contam com um processo penal inquisitorial.
+Na Itália, as garantias processuais típicas do sistema acusatório
+(centradas na disputa forense do julgamento) foram introduzidas na
+reforma do processo penal em 1989. Com isso, foram acrescentadas
+dimensões do contraditório à tradição inquisitorial, com repercussões
+no tempo que os casos levavam para chegar a uma sentença
+final (Nelken, 2009, p. 305). Afinal, além da investigação inquisitorial,
+era necessário refazer todo o procedimento de coleta de provas desde
+uma perspectiva acusatória na fase judicial, o que atrasava consideravelmente
+o processo. Com isso, a prescrição, período após o
+qual o processo criminal se torna nulo e sem efeito, passou a ocorrer
+em uma quantidade maior de situações. O resultado não poderia
+331
+
+ser diferente: desde a reforma, apenas nos casos que envolviam imigrantes
+o percentual de crimes encerrados com uma condenação foi
+elevado. Nos crimes contra a propriedade e sem violência, a taxa de
+condenação não chegou a um dígito, entre outros motivos, em razão
+do excesso de tempo para processamento (Nelken, 2009, p. 308).
+Reforçando o argumento de que países distintos não podem ser
+comparados em termos de taxas de atrito, Sung (2006, p. 327) constatou
+que os Sistemas de Justiça de países autoritários têm baixas
+taxas de atrito porque “mais suspeitos criminais são presos, mais
+réus acusados são condenados, e mais criminosos condenados são
+presos” sem qualquer respeito ao Rule of Law. Para o autor, “essa alta
+eficiência coordenada entre as agências deve ser considerada como
+um marco do processamento da Justiça Criminal em países autoritários”
+(Idem). Por isso, ele adverte que baixas taxas de atrito não são
+necessariamente sinônimo de eficiência ou justiça.
+Nessa mesma direção encontra-se o estudo de Neubacher et al
+(1999), que encontrou taxas de atrito distintas nos Sistemas de Justiça
+Juvenil em funcionamento nas cidades de Hamburgo (Alemanha),
+Praga (República Checa), Cracóvia (Polônia) e Budapeste (Hungria).
+Analisando o padrão de processamento de agressões, furtos, estupros
+e homicídios intencionais cometidos por jovens entre 1991 e
+1997, os autores constataram que, em Hamburgo, o formato do fluxo
+de processamento era semelhante a um funil, com muitos casos registrados,
+vários esclarecidos e poucos condenados. Já nas cidades
+do Leste Europeu, um número menor de crimes e suspeitos era contabilizado,
+mas, “uma vez no sistema, sempre dentro dele” (p. 533),
+o que fazia com que os casos esclarecidos fossem quase todos punidos,
+dando ao fluxo o formato de um cilindro.11 Essa diferença foi
+
+11 Nas palavras de Neubacher et al (1999, p. 554), “while in the West, the large number of
+suspects is considerably reduced during later stages of selection to a much smaller number
+(those actually sentenced and/or imprisoned) according to what we have called the
+‘funnel’ model, in the East a smaller number of suspected offenders enters this selection
+process, but tends to remain within it and be sentenced – the ‘cylinder’ model”.
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+332
+
+explicada pelos autores a partir dos princípios socialistas que orientam
+o funcionamento da justiça no Leste Europeu, com uma polícia
+mais eficiente no registro e na prisão em flagrante, prazos mais curtos
+para processamento de suspeitos indiciados pela polícia e menos
+recursos para questionamento da decisão final. Para eles, as taxas
+de atrito devem ser consideradas como reflexos dos procedimentos
+específicos de tratamento e controle da criminalidade.
+Considerando a bibliografia internacional, cinco são as lições
+aprendidas: 1) os estudos quantitativos de fluxo de processamento
+dizem respeito ao percentual de crimes que, registrados na polícia,
+alcançam uma sentença no Judiciário; 2) a análise de fluxo deve ser
+realizada a partir do escrutínio de um crime com baixa subnotificação
+ou com a complementação de pesquisas de vitimização para estimativa
+da cifra oculta naquela modalidade delituosa; 3) os bancos
+de dados construídos para o estudo do fluxo de processamento devem
+ser longitudinais, já que o Sistema de Justiça Criminal demora
+certo tempo para processar completamente um crime comunicado
+à polícia e, muitas vezes, esse tempo impedirá que a condenação
+seja efetivada, dada a ocorrência da prescrição; 4) como crimes diferentes
+têm fluxos de processamento distinto, as taxas de atrito
+só podem ser comparadas entre mesmas modalidades delituosas;
+5) países autoritários tendem a ter taxas de atrito mais baixas que
+países democráticos e, por isso, elevados percentuais de sentença e
+condenação não significam necessariamente eficiência do Sistema
+de Justiça Criminal, mas sim mecanismos políticos de controle do
+crime em detrimento de garantias do direito do acusado.
+
+3. Dificuldades das pesquisas de fluxo de Justiça
+Criminal no Brasil
+Ao contrário da literatura internacional, os estudos sobre fluxo de
+processamento no Brasil são tímidos (Vargas, 2014). Uma das principais
+dificuldades das pesquisas de fluxo é a necessidade de um
+acompanhamento manual e o preenchimento artesanal de um ex-
+333
+
+tenso formulário de coleta de dados, que contemple informações sobre
+vítimas, autores, motivações para a prática do delito apontadas
+por cada uma das organizações que compõem o fluxo de processamento,
+datas para cálculo do tempo e, ainda, presença e ausência de
+uma série de detalhes, que incluem desde a realização de perícias na
+fase policial, até a troca de um defensor público por um advogado
+particular na Audiência de Instrução e Julgamento.
+No entanto, é preciso dar um passo para trás para falar sobre isso,
+pois é preciso passar por uma série de etapas até que se chegue a
+folhear um processo, sendo duas as principais:
+
+1. Identificar o universo a ser estudado: dos casos que tramitaram
+na justiça para o tipo de crime pesquisado, por exemplo, quantos
+e quais serão estudados?
+2. Ter acesso ao campo: onde estão os processos referentes àqueles
+casos e como chegar até eles?
+
+O primeiro passo, de identificação do universo a ser estudado, tende
+a ser o mais difícil de todos, porque as agências do Sistema de Justiça
+Criminal ainda carecem de informações qualificadas e concatenadas,
+que permitam conhecer a quantidade de processos iniciados e encerrados
+de um certo delito em um ano específico (Lima, 2017). Nas polícias,
+é possível obter a quantidade de registros de um determinado
+crime naquele ano, o que seria um excelente ponto de partida – ver
+todos os desdobramentos judiciais das ocorrências policiais. Porém,
+como os números de registro da polícia não se comunicam com os
+números de distribuição no Judiciário, o melhor é desenhar o estudo
+a partir da quantidade de processos iniciados ou encerrados em um
+dado momento do tempo. Por exemplo, todos os processos de corrupção
+iniciados em 2017 (desenho prospectivo) ou todos os processos de
+tráfico de drogas encerrados em 2017 (desenho retrospectivo).12
+
+12 Falaremos sobre esses desenhos na próxima seção.
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+334
+Esse primeiro passo deve resultar em uma lista com os números
+dos processos, a partir dos quais é possível negociar com os juízes
+e funcionários de cartório o acesso à documentação. É consultando
+individualmente cada um dos processos que será possível o preenchimento
+do formulário, para posterior digitação dos dados e, por
+fim, análise da base de dados para cálculo dos padrões de seleção e
+filtragem e, especialmente, do tempo entre as diversas etapas.
+Os juízes não costumam colocar óbices ao acesso aos autos, mas
+o mesmo não se pode dizer dos funcionários dos cartórios, principalmente
+quando se trata de processos muito volumosos, como são os
+de corrupção e delitos econômicos. Recomenda-se, portanto, que haja
+um primeiro contato com o juiz da vara em que os processos estão e,
+de preferência, que o pesquisador e seu grupo sejam apresentados
+ao diretor do cartório e aos funcionários, para que esses entendam e
+atendam a demanda pelos processos que compõem a amostra.
+A boa vontade é uma conditio sine qua non dos estudos de fluxo,
+e não se restringe aos atores estranhos ao corpo de pesquisadores,
+pois muitas vezes os integrantes da própria equipe se distraem e cometem
+erros de preenchimento que são extremamente trabalhosos
+para corrigir. Imagine a situação do pesquisador que está há tempos
+num processo de convencimento diário junto aos funcionários de
+um cartório e, depois de ter o preenchimento de um formulário completo,
+devolvido o processo ao cartório, precisa solicitá-lo novamente
+ao funcionário responsável pela sua localização e deslocamento
+para conferir preenchimentos estranhos ou lacunas.
+Todos os dados sobre os crimes, os autores, as vítimas, as defesas,
+as datas de cada procedimento e os resultados devem ser extraídos
+manualmente das páginas dos processos. Algumas informações
+básicas às vezes são difíceis de localizar (especialmente as datas, indispensáveis
+para o cálculo do tempo), o que gera dados cuja leitura
+é prejudicada, visto que um percentual de casos acaba ficando identificado
+em itens como Não se Aplica (N/A) ou Sem Informação (S/I).
+Uma forma de vencer essas dificuldades seria a implantação de
+335
+
+um sistema de fluxo de Justiça Criminal. Em meados dos anos 2000,
+quando o poder público brasileiro iniciou o investimento em processos
+eletrônicos (Lei n.º 11.419/2006) e o Poder Judiciário, por meio do
+Conselho Nacional de Justiça, se empenhou em melhorar a prestação
+jurisdicional com iniciativas como a da padronização da numeração
+dos processos – numeração única13 – e a das tabelas processuais unificadas,14
+houve, no ambiente acadêmico, uma forte expectativa de que
+pudesse ser criado um sistema de fluxo de Justiça Criminal. Com ele
+poderíamos realizar pesquisas de forma mais rápida e precisa, pois haveria
+a integração dos dados produzidos por cada uma das instituições
+polícias, Ministério Público, Judiciário e prisões, facilitando a reconstituição
+do trâmite de documentos entre elas.
+Porém, o grande óbice à criação e implementação de um sistema
+como esse é justamente a integração das bases de dados de cada uma
+das instituições citadas. Dada a frouxa articulação das organizações que
+operam no processamento de um crime, não houve, naquele momento,
+disposição de todos atores em abrir seus dados a instituições que muitas
+vezes não se comportam como parceiras, mas sim como competidoras.
+Com ele, a medição de produtividade e até mesmo o controle de legali13
+“A padronização estabelece unificação da numeração processual, a ser mantida em todos
+os tribunais, facilitando a comunicação entre os órgãos do Judiciário e melhorando o
+acompanhamento dos processos pelo jurisdicionado. As estruturas de composição numérica,
+com vinte dígitos, específicos para identificação de processos por unidade de origem,
+ano do ajuizamento do processo, órgão ou segmento do Poder Judiciário, Tribunal do respectivo
+segmento ou circunscrição judiciária, proporcionam maior segurança e celeridade
+ao jurisdicionado, dispensando memorizações de vários números em processos de uma
+mesma demanda” (Disponível em: <http://www.cnj.jus.br/programas-e-acoes/pj-numeracao-unica>.
+Acesso em: 01 abr. 2017).
+É bem verdade que, passados sete anos da implantação dessa padronização, no momento
+da pesquisa na Justiça Federal, observamos que a numeração não é única, e sim mais uma.
+Além disso, os números dos inquéritos também são diferentes dos números dos processos.
+14 “Implementadas pela Resolução-CNJ n. 46, de 18 de dezembro de 2007, as Tabelas
+Processuais Unificadas do Poder Judiciário visam à uniformização taxonômica e terminológica
+de classes, assuntos e movimentação processuais no âmbito da Justiça
+Estadual, Federal, do Trabalho e do Superior Tribunal de Justiça, a serem empregadas
+nos respectivos sistemas processuais” (Disponível em: <http://www.cnj.jus.br/programas-e-acoes/tabelas-processuais-unificadas>.
+Acesso em: 01 abr. 2017).
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+336
+
+dade seria facilitado, mas até hoje o que se vê é a separação dos sistemas
+de registro e acompanhamento dos casos, cujo acesso de equipes de
+pesquisa é eventual e motivado por algum interesse específico.
+
+4. A pesquisa de fluxo de processamento no contexto
+nacional
+Como vimos, o Brasil carece de um sistema integrado de dados de
+segurança pública e Justiça Criminal que permita entender os padrões
+de seleção e filtragem que têm lugar no processamento de um
+determinado delito. Como cada instituição conta com um banco de
+dados para registro de seus documentos (Quadro 1), é impossível a
+reconstituição imediata do tempo e do padrão de filtragem, cabendo
+ao pesquisador acompanhar a produção dos documentos ou tentar
+recuperá-la a partir da consulta ao processo penal.
+
+Quadro 1. Documentos produzidos pelas instituições do Sistema de
+Justiça Criminal
+
+Instituição Documentos que
+produz O que permite calcular
+
+Polícia Militar Boletim de OcorrênciaQuantidade
+de crimes registradosPolícia
+Civil Inquérito Policial Quantidade de crimes esclarecidosMinistério
+Público
+Denúncia Quantidade de crimes processadosJudiciário
+Sentença Quantidade de crimes responsabilizadosSistema
+Penitenciário
+Prontuário Quantidade de indivíduos que,
+condenados, cumprem pena
+337
+
+Fonte: Adaptado de Vargas (2004)
+
+O nome do suspeito é a única informação que conecta todos os
+documentos elencados no Quadro 1. Como homônimos são muito
+comuns na sociedade brasileira, é difícil reconstituir o fluxo de procedimentos
+utilizando somente essa variável. Nesse cenário, o cálculo
+da taxa de atrito ocorre a partir de três métodos diversos, cada qual
+com ganhos e perdas (Misse e Vargas, 2007).
+O desenho mais recomendável é o longitudinal ortodoxo. Para
+realizá-lo é preciso patrulhar a cidade com a Polícia Militar ou sentar
+em uma delegacia de Polícia Civil e esperar que os crimes sejam
+registrados para, posteriormente, seguir o processamento dos documentos
+nas demais instituições, como o Ministério Público, a Defensoria
+Pública, o Judiciário e o Sistema Penitenciário, calculando o
+tempo despendido entre cada um dos atos processuais. Ocorre que
+esse modelo de pesquisa é bastante caro, pois não se sabe ao certo
+quanto tempo demorará para que a infração registrada como crime
+pelas polícias seja processada definitivamente pelo Judiciário.
+Contamos com quatro pesquisas de destaque que utilizaram
+esse método.15 Edmundo Campos Coelho foi o primeiro a analisar os
+Boletins de Informação disponíveis no Serviço de Estatística, Demografia,
+Moral e Política do Ministério da Justiça para o Estado do Rio
+de Janeiro entre os anos 1942 e 1967 e seus respectivos desdobramentos
+dentro do Sistema de Justiça Criminal, quando esses já estavam
+encerrados (Coelho, 1988). Do total de indiciados por roubo,
+furto, homicídio e estelionato, 16% foram condenados a uma pena
+privativa de liberdade; entre os indiciados por contravenções, esse
+percentual foi um pouco maior: 35%. Para Coelho (1988), esse baixo
+percentual é esperado porque não cabe a promotores e juízes produzir
+“réus e sentenciados no mesmo ritmo em que a polícia produz
+
+15 Essas não são as únicas pesquisas sobre fluxo de processamento que se utilizam do
+método longitudinal ortodoxo, sendo apenas as três mais citadas ou conhecidas. Para
+um levantamento detalhado do tema, ver Vargas (2014).
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+338
+
+indiciados em inquéritos (ou, o que é pior, em ritmo mais acelerado)”
+(Coelho, 1988, p. 333), dado que o Sistema de Justiça Criminal
+contava com muitos policiais e poucos promotores e juízes, o que
+naturalmente reduzia a capacidade de processamento.
+Outra pedra angular nos estudos de fluxo é o trabalho de Vargas
+(2004, p. 15), que acompanhou “444 Boletins de Ocorrência – BOs
+de estupros registrados na Delegacia de Defesa da Mulher – DDM de
+Campinas no período entre 1988 e 1992” e seus respectivos desdobramentos
+até o ano de 2001, constatando que somente 9% dos casos
+se encerravam com uma condenação. Essa taxa é relativamente
+baixa se considerarmos que o estupro é considerado um crime que,
+geralmente, ocorre entre pessoas que se conhecem, o que deveria
+facilitar o esclarecimento e, por conseguinte, a punição do responsável.
+No entanto, esse não foi o padrão encontrado pela autora: já na
+fase policial, 71% dos Boletins de Ocorrência foram arquivados sem
+autoria esclarecida.
+Adorno e Pasinato (2008, p. 1) acompanharam os “344.767 boletins
+de ocorrência policial (BOs) registrados em 16 delegacias que
+compõem a 3ª. Seccional de Polícia, situada na região noroeste do
+município de São Paulo, no período de janeiro de 1991 a dezembro
+de 1997”. Nesse caso, foram escrutinados os crimes violentos (homicídio,
+roubo, roubo seguido de morte, estupro e tráfico de drogas) e
+não violentos (furto, furto qualificado e consumo de drogas). Do total
+de crimes registrados, apenas 5,48% foram convertidos em Inquérito
+Policial após uma década.
+
+Essa proporção é maior (8,14%) para crimes violentos, sendo que as
+
+maiores proporções de registros convertidos em inquéritos correspondem
+ao tráfico de drogas (92,71%), em geral resultado de flagrante; aos
+
+latrocínios, isto é, roubos seguidos de morte (67,20%), e aos homicídios
+
+(60,13%) (Idem, p. 2).
+
+Essa pesquisa ainda está em andamento, dado o longo tempo de
+339
+
+processamento dos casos convertidos em processo, e, por isso, saberemos
+o percentual exato de sentenças em alguns anos.
+Já Arthur Costa (2015) acompanhou os 556 homicídios registrados
+no Distrito Federal em 2004. Desse total, 69% foram esclarecidos,
+uma taxa mais elevada que a revelada por Adorno e Pasinato (2008);
+desses, 9% alcançaram uma sentença e 4% resultaram em uma condenação.
+Essa análise é importante por demonstrar que, mesmo
+quando a filtragem que ocorre na fase policial não é tão elevada,
+poucos são os casos que se encerram no Judiciário uma década após
+o registro policial.
+A desvantagem do desenho longitudinal ortodoxo é que ele demanda
+um longo tempo para sua completa execução, o que significa
+recursos quase ilimitados para a pesquisa. Tem, entretanto, a vantagem
+de permitir o cálculo mais preciso da taxa de atrito e, ainda, uma
+estimativa bastante acurada do tempo de processamento. Porém,
+em uma realidade de recursos escassos, a tendência é a utilização
+de outros métodos, mais baratos. Um deles é o desenho transversal,
+que contabiliza os crimes registrados por cada uma das agências que
+opera no fluxo de processamento em um determinado ano.
+O desenho transversal é o recorte utilizado por quem calcula as
+taxas de atrito a partir das bases de dados do United Nations Survey
+of Crime Trends (UNODC).16 Anualmente, o UNODC coleta, em alguns
+países, informações sobre a quantidade de delitos registrados na polícia,
+de processos iniciados, de sentenças proferidas e de condenações
+encaminhadas ao sistema prisional. De acordo com Shaw, Van
+Dijk e Rhomberg (2003, p. 52), “tais indicadores podem fornecer apenas
+uma medida aproximada da taxa de atrito, uma vez que geralmente
+não medem a mesma série de casos reais”, já que o número de
+registros policiais em um dado ano, assim como o número de proces16
+Bases disponíveis em: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html>.
+Acesso em: 05 mar. 2017.
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+340
+
+sos em andamento ou condenações publicadas nesse ano, não são
+referentes aos mesmos casos de origem. Utilizando os dados survey,
+Shaw, Van Dijk e Rhomberg (2013) puderam calcular a taxa de atrito
+para o homicídio intencional e o roubo em algumas localidades ao
+longo de uma década (1990-2000). Os resultados indicaram que, em
+todos os países participantes da pesquisa, uma condenação foi alcançada
+em cada quatro casos de homicídio e em cada oito casos de
+roubo, média bastante superior à verificada pelos estudos longitudinais
+prospectivos no Brasil.
+O Brasil não participa do survey das Nações Unidas. Em solo nacional,
+um estudo que empregou esse método foi o realizado por
+Misse e Vargas (2007), que escrutinou os registros policiais de homicídios
+(tentados e consumados) do estado do Rio de Janeiro em dois
+períodos: 1953-1957 e 1997-2001. Os autores concluíram que a taxa
+média de esclarecimento de homicídios entre os anos 1953 e 1957
+foi de 28%; já entre 1997 e 2001, a taxa foi de 33%. Esses percentuais
+seriam indicativos da hipótese de Coelho (1988) de que existe uma
+certa constância nas taxas de elucidação policial de homicídios ao
+longo do tempo, o que explicaria a manutenção desses baixos patamares
+várias décadas depois.
+Cano e Duarte (2010) também se utilizaram do método transversal
+para calcular a taxa de atrito dos crimes de roubo e homicídio intencional
+registrados na cidade do Rio de Janeiro entre os anos 2000 e
+2007. Comparando os registros policiais com os processos penais iniciados
+e encerrados no período, os autores concluíram que menos de
+8% dos casos de homicídios intencionais são encerrados com a sanção
+de pelo menos um dos envolvidos na prática do crime (p. 29). Já
+nos casos de roubos, “3% culminam em uma sanção penal” (p. 30).
+O desenho transversal é, sem dúvida, o mais barato e fácil de ser
+realizado, posto que depende apenas dos números totais obtidos a
+partir da contabilidade de registros existentes nas diferentes instituições
+que compõem o Sistema de Justiça Criminal. Porém, apresenta
+a grande desvantagem de não permitir o cálculo do tempo de pro-
+341
+
+cessamento, já que os casos processados em um ano dizem respeito
+a crimes ocorridos em outros períodos.
+O terceiro desenho possível para estudo do fluxo do Sistema de
+Justiça Criminal é o longitudinal retrospectivo. Nesse caso, o ponto
+de partida é o arquivo do Tribunal de Justiça, que possui os Inquéritos
+Policiais (IPs) sem autoria esclarecida, denúncias rejeitadas pelo
+juiz e processos penais encerrados, com ou sem sentença final (por
+exemplo, em razão da morte do acusado). A partir de todo esse material,
+o fluxo de processamento é reconstituído, indicando o que foi
+encerrado em cada uma de suas etapas e, ainda, o tempo de processamento.Esse
+método foi o menos utilizado até agora nos estudos nacionais,
+tendo sido empregado por Ribeiro et al (2014) para estimativa
+dos padrões de seleção e filtragem dos casos de homicídio intencional
+arquivados em 2012 em cinco cidades distintas do país. A análise
+desse material indicou que, em média, do total de casos arquivados
+em um ano, 80% eram IPs sem autoria esclarecida, e 20% eram processos
+penais, o que reforça a constatação de que a maior filtragem
+se dá na fase policial. Do total de processos iniciados, 30% foram
+encerrados com uma condenação válida, dado que a prescrição
+acomete uma quantidade substantiva de procedimentos, tornando
+a decisão final inválida. Em média, foram necessários, aproximadamente,
+oito anos para se processar e julgar um caso de homicídio
+intencional, sendo que em diversas situações esse prazo chegou a
+inacreditáveis quarenta anos.
+Esse desenho tem a desvantagem de impedir a reconstituição
+completa do fluxo de processamento desde o registro inicial do crime,
+já que os inquéritos, denúncias e processos arquivados em um
+determinado ano podem ser referentes a crimes ocorridos em diferentes
+momentos do tempo. Porém, tem a vantagem de permitir
+estimativas bastante acuradas sobre o tempo de processamento, já
+que trabalha com os casos que foram encerrados em definitivo, sem
+qualquer tipo de perda da informação.
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+342
+
+5. O uso de estudos de fluxo para crimes do “colarinho
+branco”17
+Em regra, os estudos de fluxo são usados para se analisar o processamento
+e o tempo de resposta do SJC nos casos de crimes comuns
+– homicídios, estupros, roubos. No entanto, em 2015 foi realizada
+uma pesquisa de fluxo de justiça no Sistema de Justiça Federal (SJF)
+brasileiro envolvendo dispositivos determinados do Código Penal e
+crimes previstos em algumas leis especiais:
+
+• Crimes Contra a Administração Pública (Artigos 312, 313, 314,
+316, 317, 333, 337-A, 337-B, 337-C);
+• Crimes Contra o Sistema Financeiro Nacional (Lei n.º 7.492/1986);
+• Crimes Contra a Ordem Tributária (Lei n.º 8.137/1990);
+• Crimes de Lavagem ou Ocultação de Bens, Direitos ou Valores
+(Lei n.º 9.613/1998);
+• Crimes da Lei de Licitações (Lei n.º 9.666/1993).
+
+A pesquisa, que resultou na publicação “A investigação e a persecução
+penal da corrupção e dos delitos econômicos: uma pesquisa
+empírica no Sistema de Justiça Federal” (Machado, Costa e Zackseski,
+2016), não se restringiu a um estudo de fluxo, tendo sido bem
+mais ampla – com pesquisa bibliográfica e documental (para criação
+da base de dados), além de uma grande parte qualitativa, com entrevistas
+e grupos focais. Porém, em razão do recorte escolhido para
+este texto, será utilizada aqui a etapa específica de fluxo de justiça,
+destacando-se os principais achados e as dificuldades encontradas
+com a finalidade de ilustrar e qualificar o debate sobre esse método
+específico. Em alguns aspectos faremos comparações com fluxos de
+crimes comuns, embora saibamos que versam sobre uma criminali17
+A expressão “colarinho branco” encontra-se entre aspas no subtítulo por causa da
+extensa discussão existente em torno da categoria. A esse respeito conferir o capítulo
+elaborado por Pedro Ivo Velloso Cordeiro para a pesquisa que serviu de fonte para esta
+parte do artigo (In: Machado, Costa, Zackseski, 2016, p. 37-94).
+343
+
+dade distinta; porém, com esse procedimento, estaremos apontando
+justamente para possibilidades e limites no uso de tal método e
+dessas comparações.
+Ao contrário do que sugere a literatura para crimes com maiores
+cifras ocultas, não realizamos pesquisa de vitimização para suprir
+essa lacuna de informação sobre a dimensão real das ocorrências.
+Afinal, as características dos crimes de colarinho branco por si só inviabilizam
+pesquisas de vitimização, pois não há vítimas particularizadas
+– o sujeito passivo normalmente é o Estado e a coletividade
+–, e isso constitui uma limitação para a forma tradicional de medição
+das cifras ocultas, que é a pesquisa de vitimização, embora seja
+possível suprir essa lacuna com surveys de auto-reportagem, menos
+comuns e muito criticados pelo fato de que as pessoas nem sempre
+estão dispostas a admitir os crimes por elas praticados (Aniyar
+de Castro, 1987, p. 70). O que se faz quando é preciso trabalhar com
+dados sobre corrupção, entendida em seu sentido mais geral como
+o “abuso do poder público legítimo visando o ganho privado”,18 é a
+medida da percepção dos cidadãos sobre a sua ocorrência.
+Assim, buscamos trabalhar com as informações obtidas através de
+consulta à base de dados do Sistema Único do Ministério Público Federal,
+que nos permitiu acessar informações sobre denúncias, aditamentos de
+denúncias e arquivamentos de todas as unidades da federação.19 A parte
+quantitativa da pesquisa contém dados de todo o país sobre os processos
+denunciados ou arquivados pelo MPF em 201220 – total de 60.582. Desses,
+
+18 “Transparency International. What is corruption?” Disponível em: <http://www.
+transparency.org/what-is-corruption/>. Acesso em: 01 abr. 2017.
+19 Nosso objetivo inicial era verificar a localização das investigações e ações penais por
+município e os crimes mais investigados por localidade, mas o percentual de preenchimento
+desse campo no sistema ainda estava muito baixo no momento da pesquisa.
+20 Para um levantamento geral de dados tivemos acesso ao Sistema Único do Ministério
+Público Federal, sendo possível identificar nele o quantitativo de casos dos crimes
+de interesse da pesquisa por unidade da federação. Como a existência e alimentação
+desse sistema é recente, trabalhamos com os dados referentes aos inquéritos (IPLs),
+termos circunstanciados (TCs) ou procedimentos investigatórios (PICs) concluídos em
+2012, tendo sido considerados concluídos aqueles que geraram denúncias ou arqui-
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+344
+
+11,7% corresponderam aos tipos penais objeto da pesquisa – 7.108. Uma
+análise quantitativa mais detalhada foi feita para o Distrito Federal e para
+os estados de São Paulo, Paraná e Pernambuco, mas o estudo de fluxo foi
+realizado apenas no Distrito Federal, nas 10ª e 12ª Varas da Justiça Federal,
+competentes na matéria em foco.
+A partir da consulta ao Sistema Único do Ministério Público Federal
+foi possível observar o comportamento dos casos de acordo com
+a categoria descrita anteriormente (crimes contra a administração
+pública, por exemplo) e com o tipo penal (corrupção passiva, por
+exemplo). A consulta ao sistema também possibilitou alguns cálculos
+de tempo, já explorados em outras publicações, cujos principais
+resultados estão sintetizados no parágrafo que segue:
+
+Inferimos pela distribuição das ações penais propostas e arquivamentos
+
+promovidos no transcorrer de 2012, que há um percentual de denúncias
+
+ligeiramente superior. Ao atingir três anos e meio, os percentuais de denúncia
+e arquivamento são equivalentes; após esse patamar, o número
+
+de arquivamentos é mais elevado. Porém, nos casos de corrupção e delitos
+econômicos, a grande diferença ocorre nos três primeiros anos de
+
+investigação, quando os percentuais de denúncia são significativamente
+
+superiores aos arquivamentos. Nesse caso, evidencia-se que a rapidez
+
+da investigação está associada ao maior volume de inquéritos policiais
+
+que geram ações penais, ou seja, a variável tempo indica o perfil da investigação
+com maior probabilidade de que seja objeto de persecução
+
+penal. A pesquisa indicou que Distrito Federal e Pernambuco não apresentam
+diferenças significativas nos tempos de denúncia e arquivamento,
+ao contrário de São Paulo e Paraná, onde os tempos médios de denúncia
+são inferiores aos de arquivamento. Além disso, indicou que São
+
+Paulo e Pernambuco apresentam, de forma geral, médias de tempo de
+
+denúncia e arquivamento superiores aos do Distrito Federal e do Paraná
+
+(Machado, Zackseski, Raupp, 2016, p. 173 - 174).
+
+vamentos naquele ano.
+345
+
+Em resumo, a pesquisa pôde identificar uma grande associação
+entre fluxo de processamento e padrão de seleção e filtragem. Casos
+rápidos, geralmente de solução mais fácil, tendem a ser priorizados
+pela polícia e, assim, crimes que foram denunciados teriam menor
+tempo de processamento do que crimes que foram arquivados, conclusão
+semelhante à encontrada em casos de homicídio intencional
+(Costa, 2015) e estupro (Vargas, 2004).
+Para o estudo de fluxo, a planilha original fornecida a partir da consulta
+ao Sistema Único do Ministério Público indicava o quantitativo
+de 92 processos a serem localizados no Distrito Federal. No entanto,
+na Justiça Federal do DF foram localizados apenas 63 processos – um
+dos processos selecionados na amostra era da Seção Judiciária de
+Luziânia, motivo pelo qual foi excluído, e 28 processos constavam
+como localizados no Departamento de Polícia Federal no Distrito Federal.
+Dos 63 processos da Seção Judiciária do Distrito Federal, 29
+eram da 10ª Vara Federal, 1 da 11ª Vara Federal, 32 da 12ª Vara Federal
+e 1 do 2º Jef Criminal (Adjunto à 12ª Vara).
+Dos 29 processos da 10ª Vara Federal, 20 foram disponibilizados e
+analisados com sucesso. Em razão de segredo de justiça, não obtivemos
+o acesso a 5 processos. Além desses, 1 processo estava em outro
+Juízo – era originalmente da 10ª Vara, mas foi remetido à Seção Judiciária
+de Luziânia –, 2 processos não foram localizados pelo Cartório e 1
+estava concluso para sentença. Sobre esse último, os funcionários do
+gabinete informaram que era volumoso e que, como o juiz estava trabalhando
+com ele naquele momento, não seria acessível para a equipe.
+O processo da 11ª Vara Federal do Distrito Federal não foi localizado
+no sistema. Tentamos por várias vezes a consulta junto ao cartório
+da Vara. A numeração não era compatível com o padrão utilizado
+e, por isso, ele também não pôde ser pesquisado.
+Dos 32 processos da 12ª Vara Federal do Distrito Federal, 30 foram
+disponibilizados e analisados com sucesso. Um estava em carga para
+o MPF e um estava “em procedimento” com a Secretaria da Vara e,
+por isso, não puderam ser analisados.
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+346
+O processo que constava como sendo do 2º Jef Criminal (Adjunto
+à 12ª Vara) também não foi localizado.
+Os 28 “números de feito” pertencentes ao Departamento de Polícia
+Federal no Distrito Federal, datados entre 2004 e 2012, também
+foram difíceis de localizar. Isso porque somente foram disponibilizados
+os números de Inquérito Policial (número com quatro dígitos),
+os quais ainda não haviam sido transformados em números de Processos
+Judiciais. Esses números foram levados ao Protocolo para
+se verificar quais estavam tramitando e quais já haviam tramitado
+como processos, para que pudesse ser feita a análise dos autos correspondentes.
+Todavia, dos 28 “números de feito” solicitados para
+análise, somente 8, que foram transformados em processos judiciais
+distribuídos para a 10ª e a 12ª Varas, foram encontrados. O protocolo
+não pôde informar se a ineficácia em achar a exata localização desses
+inquéritos se deu em razão de uma falha no armazenamento de
+informações anteriores ao ano de 2011 ou se eles realmente não haviam
+sido transformados em processos judiciais. Sendo assim, dos
+28 casos na Polícia Federal, 5, que já eram processos, foram disponibilizados
+e analisados com sucesso, 21 não foram localizados, 1 estava
+em carga com o MPF e 1 em carga com a Defensoria.
+A reconstituição dessa espécie de via sacra para a localização dos
+processos indica que o número total de casos analisados foi de 55. Eles
+geraram 221 preenchimentos do formulário em razão do número de
+réus, pois o método de estudo de fluxo requer um preenchimento por
+réu, e a necessidade disso fica evidente nas análises que seguem. Alguns
+dos dados chamam atenção somente quando comparados aos dados
+obtidos em estudos de fluxo de crimes comuns, por isso, ao destacarmos
+alguns dos achados principais, faremos algumas comparações.
+Em geral (94%), os processos de crimes do colarinho branco são
+iniciados por portaria, sendo que os flagrantes ocorreram em 3,7%
+dos casos, e em 2,3% não se pôde identificar como se deu o início do
+registro. Nos crimes comuns, como o homicídio doloso, há um maior
+registro de flagrantes, embora pesquisa anterior realizada na Área
+347
+
+Metropolitana de Brasília também tenha apontado para um número
+de portarias superior ao esperado.21 Entende-se que essa diferença
+se dá em razão da dinâmica desses tipos de crime e das possibilidades
+disponíveis para sua elucidação, visto que o homicídio tem uma
+materialização e uma prova bastante distinta dos crimes contra o sistema
+financeiro.
+Enquanto nos crimes comuns as ocorrências são registradas nas
+delegacias, muitas vezes pelas próprias vítimas, pelos familiares ou por
+policiais militares, nos crimes de colarinho branco a maior parte das notitia
+criminis foi proveniente de comunicações do Tribunal de Contas da
+União (TCU) (39,91%), sendo a Receita Federal o segundo maior comunicante
+de crimes (16,51%) que levaram à abertura de inquéritos. Essa
+forma de chegada dos casos ao conhecimento do Sistema de Justiça é
+relativamente nova e ainda pouco compreendida. Em 26,61% dos casos
+não houve possibilidade de identificar de onde partiu a informação, sendo
+possível que o problema referente a esse registro esteja relacionado
+às necessidades de sigilo das informações relatadas nos Relatórios de
+Informações Fiscais (RIFs) elaborados pelo Conselho de Controle de Atividades
+Financeiras (COAF) do Ministério da Fazenda.
+Outra característica que se sobressai no crime do colarinho branco
+é a alta frequência de coautores (88,99%), significativamente superior à
+presença de coautores nos crimes comuns, que dificilmente ultrapassa
+a média de 20% (Ribeiro et al, 2014). Essa característica também advém
+da própria dinâmica da criminalidade especificamente analisada.
+Contudo, algumas considerações são importantes: observamos nos
+casos explorados na mídia atualmente que as condenações por crimes
+financeiros são, na verdade, por crimes de associação criminosa (Artigo
+288 do Código Penal), enquanto os crimes de homicídio, quando
+existe mais de um acusado, em geral são agravados pelo concurso de
+agentes. Outra possibilidade seria a condenação desses autores pela
+
+21 Na referida pesquisa houve uma relação de 75% e 25% para portarias e flagrantes
+(Costa, Zackseski, Maciel, 2016, p. 44).
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+348
+
+Lei do Crime Organizado (Lei n.º 12.850/2013), mas como se trata de
+um dispositivo recente na lei brasileira, ainda não houve tempo de se
+observar o comportamento empírico decorrente de tal inserção. Isso
+sem falar na dificuldade de se associar a insígnia “crime organizado”
+em ocorrências que não sejam relativas ao tráfico de drogas.
+Há também uma ocorrência maior da participação de mulheres
+nos crimes de colarinho branco – 12,35%. Somente como exemplo, em
+pesquisa sobre homicídios na Área Metropolitana de Brasília, a presença
+do sexo feminino foi de 6% (Costa, Zackseski e Maciel, 2016).
+As diferenças etárias são ainda mais significativas. Enquanto nos
+crimes comuns os acusados são, em geral, jovens, nos crimes de colarinho
+branco o maior percentual foi registrado para a faixa etária de
+40 a 59 anos (57,4%), havendo uma representatividade significativa
+para maiores de 65 anos (19,8%) e para a faixa etária de 60 a 64 anos
+(13,7%). Portanto, podemos dizer que os jovens estão excluídos da
+prática de tais crimes, tendo sido encontradas pessoas na faixa de 25
+a 39 anos em um percentual bastante reduzido (8,6%), o que indica a
+necessidade de certa especialização para a prática desses delitos, o
+que só se adquire com a maturidade.
+Podemos combinar a esse dado sobre faixa etária dados sobre
+escolaridade e profissão. Dos réus de crimes de colarinho branco,
+60% eram pessoas com curso superior, sendo que o segundo maior
+registro foi para réus com ensino médio (32,59%). A maior parte dos
+réus é composta de empresários/executivos (30,28%), seguidos de
+profissionais liberais (24,77%).22 Encontramos somente 0,92% de
+desempregados e 9,63% de trabalhadores do setor de serviços. No
+tocante aos homicídios, o predomínio é de sujeitos com ensino fundamental,
+completo ou incompleto, e de trabalhadores do setor terciário
+(prestação de serviços), salientando que a profissão é um im22
+Esse perfil é condizente com o tipo de perícia mais comumente solicitada, que foi
+o exame de obra de engenharia (61,33%), seguido da documentoscopia (13,32%) (Machado,
+Costa e Zackseski, 2016, p. 261)
+349
+
+portante preditor dos crimes contra o sistema financeiro, o que não
+ocorre nos delitos de proximidade (Costa, Zackseski e Maciel, 2016).
+A maior parte dos réus (69,27%) nunca havia sido processada anteriormente,
+no que se observa a novidade do processo de construção
+de responsabilidades em nosso país para esse tipo de autor de
+crime, já que o processamento dos homicídios intencionais funciona
+sob a lógica de sujeição criminal: primeiro se identifica o suspeito
+para depois conectá-lo ao delito (Misse, 2014). Outro dado que nos
+permite pensar nessa direção é a escassa presença de prisões na fase
+policial para os réus dos processos estudados: apenas 9 de 218 acusados
+foram presos em tal fase, o que equivale a um percentual de
+4,13%, sendo que desses, 8 foram presos em flagrantes e apenas 1
+preventivamente (Machado, Costa e Zackseski, 2016, p. 258).
+Ao contrário do que se imaginava, foi identificado um número
+muito baixo de quebras de sigilo bancário (2,29%) e um número
+mais consistente de interceptações telefônicas (33,94%). Esse dado
+pode ser lido a partir de uma percepção de que as interceptações
+telefônicas já são procedimentos mais consolidados, enquanto as
+quebras de sigilo são mais recentes. Além disso, percebe-se que os
+tipos penais identificados no Distrito Federal podem ter relação com
+tal dado, visto que predominaram nos inquéritos do Distrito Federal
+os crimes contra a administração pública (59,17%).23
+ Um dos maiores problemas do processo penal num universo tão
+grande de condutas criminalizadas como o de hoje no Brasil são as
+entradas no sistema penal. Quanto mais condutas criminalizadas,
+maiores as estruturas destinadas à repressão e maiores os volumes
+de casos que chegam a essa esfera de controle. Contudo, o sistema
+não tem essa mesma lógica e nunca terá condições de dar prosseguimento
+a todos os casos de acordo com as previsões legais, que
+
+23 Dado interessante a esse respeito: foi constatada uma divergência entre delegados
+e procuradores da República, visto que nas denúncias esse percentual caiu para
+39,30% (Machado, Costa e Zackseski, 2016, p. 266).
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+350
+
+incluem prazos a serem observados, tal como destacado por Coelho
+(1988) há várias décadas atrás. Nesse contexto, de acordo com os
+profissionais entrevistados na parte qualitativa da pesquisa sobre
+corrupção e delitos econômicos, é muito comum o vaivém de papéis,
+que muitas vezes não quer dizer que alguma coisa esteja de fato sendo
+feita para fins de produção de prova. Os dados sobre pedidos de
+dilação de prazo para a conclusão dos inquéritos reforçam essa análise,
+sendo que houve extensão desse prazo em 141 casos (65%).
+Outro dado relacionado às dificuldades da investigação e aos prazos
+diz respeito ao motivo da devolução do inquérito para a polícia (Quadro
+2). Na maior parte das vezes (79,25%), a devolução é para continuar a investigação.
+Em segundo lugar, há o registro da devolução, mas sem motivo
+identificado (7,55%), o que pode significar um pingue-pongue apenas
+simbólico entre polícia – Ministério Público – Judiciário, o que tem apenas
+o efeito de retardar uma decisão final, como verificado nos estudos
+sobre o desfecho do Inquérito Policial (Vargas, 2014).
+
+Quadro 2. Motivo da devolução do Inquérito para a Polícia
+
+Motivo Total Percentual
+
+Continuar investigação 42 79,25
+
+Completar documentação 2 3,77
+
+Diligência adicional 2 3,77
+
+Esclarecer pontos da investigação 2 3,77
+
+Diligências (oitiva de testemunhas) 1 1,89
+
+Não informado 4 7,55
+
+Total geral 53 100,00
+
+Fonte: Machado, Costa e Zackseski (2016, p. 262)
+
+Os dados coletados também permitiram que fosse realizada uma
+série de cruzamentos, como a tipificação penal na denúncia e a fonte
+da informação para abertura de inquérito, o tipo de defesa (particular
+ou dativa), a existência de procedimento administrativo, a idade,
+351
+
+a escolaridade e a ocupação do réu, e assim por diante (Machado,
+Costa e Zackseski, 2016, p. 269-272).
+Dos 218 réus cujos processos foram analisados, somente houve
+sentença para 35 deles até a data de encerramento da coleta dos dados.
+Dessas, 5 foram absolutórias, 29 foram declaratórias da extinção
+da punibilidade (4 por morte, 1 pelo pagamento do débito e 24 pela
+prescrição) e apenas 1 sentença penal foi condenatória, pelo crime
+do parágrafo único do Art. 22 da Lei do Colarinho Branco (Lei n.º
+7492/1986). O dado mais importante da pesquisa é o de que a maioria
+dos casos analisados foi encerrada sem qualquer tipo de punição
+válida em razão do decurso do tempo.
+É possível afirmar que esses dados, comparativamente colocados,
+compõem um conjunto de obstáculos para a compreensão do
+público em geral sobre a dinâmica, a investigação e o processamento
+dos crimes de colarinho branco, o que muitas vezes provoca reações
+negativas no sentido de que há uma gigantesca impunidade e reforça
+demandas punitivas. Os dados também nos permitem pensar no direito
+penal, processual e no sistema penal de uma forma panorâmica,
+pois a maneira com que os casos de corrupção e delitos econômicos
+têm chegado e tramitado na justiça comum e na justiça federal aos
+poucos nos dá uma noção maior das distâncias existentes entre a
+criminalidade comum e a de colarinho branco e dos procedimentos
+usados e requeridos, de modo que fica clara a diferenciação entre as
+diversas formas de controle e suas dificuldades específicas. Essas especificidades
+podem interferir, num futuro próximo, em opções político-criminais
+distintas para cada uma das áreas, pois, ao contrário de
+uma padronização de procedimentos, podemos estar presenciando
+um distanciamento cada vez maior e uma verdadeira separação de
+formas de agir no universo da justiça como um todo.
+
+6. Considerações finais
+Em um artigo de cunho essencialmente metodológico não cabe fazer
+um apanhado dos argumentos apresentados neste trabalho, mas
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+352
+
+apontar algumas dimensões que merecem ser investigadas em pesquisas
+futuras sobre o fluxo do Sistema de Justiça Criminal. De maneira
+imediata, este texto suscita quatro questões principais.
+A primeira é a carência de pesquisas sobre o tema em razão dos
+problemas encontrados. É muito difícil contabilizar a taxa de atrito de
+maneira geral e em cada uma das fases, especialmente os percentuais
+específicos, que dizem respeito à passagem da polícia para o Ministério
+Público, desse para o Judiciário e, depois, para o Sistema Penitenciário.
+Exatamente por isso, os estudos retrospectivos se apresentam
+como uma opção, já que coletar informações em um arquivo que só
+conta com casos encerrados em definitivo nas diversas fases do fluxo
+é menos problemático – do ponto de vista de acesso à documentação
+para pesquisa – do que estudos prospectivos, cujo acesso é limitado
+em razão do andamento processual propriamente dito.
+A segunda diz respeito ao fato de que a maioria das pesquisas de
+fluxo é centrada na análise do padrão de seleção e filtragem dos homicídios
+dolosos que, em razão do cadáver, teriam menor subnotificação.
+Ocorre que esse crime possui uma taxa de atrito bastante elevada,
+dada a baixa capacidade da Polícia Civil em apontar um suspeito para
+crimes que são cometidos em locais impessoais (como ruas e becos
+das grandes cidades) sem uma testemunha ocular. Além disso, o tempo
+de processamento dos homicídios dolosos é muito superior, dada
+a aplicabilidade do procedimento bifásico do júri que, em tese, seria
+naturalmente mais tendente à morosidade do que em outros delitos,
+que contam com um processamento mais simplificado.
+Dessa constatação deriva-se a terceira questão, que diz respeito à
+necessidade de se compreender o formato do fluxo e o tempo de processamento
+de outros delitos, como é o caso dos crimes contra o sistema
+financeiro – que têm ganhado destaque em razão das diversas fases da
+operação Lava Jato – e também do tráfico de drogas, cuja visibilidade
+decorre do elevado número de encarcerados (provisórios e definitivos)
+produzido pela Lei n.º 11.343/2006. No caso desse delito, as pesquisas sobre
+o tema apontam para um fluxo em formato de um cilindro em detri-
+353
+
+mento de um funil: as ocorrências de tráfico são registradas por flagrante
+policial, levando à abertura de Inquérito Policial em quase todas as circunstâncias,
+implicando em desdobramentos rápidos no âmbito judicial
+(menos de seis meses para o processamento completo) com elevados
+índices de condenação, o que explicaria o exponencial crescimento da
+população encarcerada por esse delito (Jesus, 2015; Ribeiro et al, 2016).
+Por fim, uma última questão levantada neste texto é como o estudo
+do fluxo de processamento pode desconstruir visões arraigadas sobre o
+que funciona ou não dentro do sistema frouxamente articulado. Se as
+notícias da mídia apontam para a Lava Jato como o maior mecanismo
+de responsabilização de políticos, burocratas e empresários envolvidos
+em esquemas de corrupção, as pesquisas sobre tempo de processamento
+demonstram o quão falaciosa é essa imagem, dada a possibilidade da
+prescrição. Na competição por recursos simbólicos, as agências parecem
+esquecer qual seria a missão precípua do Sistema de Justiça Criminal,
+por isso, terminam por desperdiçar um tempo precioso em idas e vindas
+da documentação, levando à prescrição dos processos. Perdem-se,
+assim, investimentos altíssimos que têm sido feitos na investigação e no
+processamento dos crimes em geral, pois o alto custo da estrutura disponível
+– verificado na quantidade de funcionários envolvidos e na alta
+qualificação e remuneração desses atores – não é contrabalanceado pela
+performance, já que os resultados estão muito aquém das expectativas.
+Nesse diapasão são estimuladas e fortalecidas linhas de pensamento e
+argumentação genéricas, segundo as quais o problema (do país) é a impunidade,
+gerando cada vez mais insegurança jurídica e fragilidade para
+o próprio sistema de controle. Dá-se, a partir daí, uma transfiguração do
+processo como um sistema de garantias para admitir, em várias de suas
+fases, soluções no mínimo controversas, como as quebras de sigilo, as
+conduções coercitivas e as delações premiadas, que têm se generalizado
+também pela incapacidade de correção dos rumos do sistema de controle
+amplamente considerado.
+Pesquisas de fluxo e tempos da Justiça Criminal //
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro e Cristina Zackseski
+354
+
+7. Referências
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+357
+
+11
+
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa
+
+em direito1
+ // Maira Rocha Machado
+
+Poucas coisas são tão familiares ao mundo jurídico como “um caso”,
+ainda que as acepções e usos possam variar consideravelmente. Um
+caso pode ser utilizado tanto para delimitar e nomear um evento histórico
+quanto para apresentar uma situação fictícia. Para explicitar
+uma área de interesse ou atuação, para ilustrar um argumento, para
+indicar as possibilidades de aplicação de um instituto, para propiciar
+uma experiência didática em sala de aula e para circunscrever um
+objeto de pesquisa.
+Este texto utiliza o “caso” em sentido muito específico. Aqui, um
+caso é uma construção intelectual que busca oferecer uma representação
+de um fenômeno jurídico, em um contexto específico, a partir
+de um leque amplo de dados e informações. Concebido desta forma,
+um caso é revelador tanto do evento representado quanto da pessoa
+que o selecionou, construiu e narrou. Como uma estratégia de pesquisa
+particular, o estudo de caso distingue-se de outros métodos
+em função dos objetivos da investigação e do tipo de pergunta que
+
+1 Agradeço imensamente a leitura, os comentários e as críticas que este texto recebeu
+de Poliana Ferreira, Riccardo Cappi, Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva e José Roberto Xavier.
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+358
+
+permite responder.2
+Na pesquisa em direito, é possível realizar estudos de caso sobre
+a atuação do sistema de justiça (civil, penal, administrativa, internacional)
+diante de um evento em particular – como, por exemplo, o
+Massacre do Carandiru ou a fraude à licitação na construção do prédio
+do TRT-SP – mas também sobre um ou mais autos processuais
+específicos, envolvendo investigações sobre homicídios praticados
+por policiais militares ou sobre corrupção praticada por fiscais do
+ISS. É possível também desenvolver estudos de caso sobre os aspectos
+jurídicos de uma política pública - como a Nota Fiscal Paulista ou
+a Operação Centro Legal – ou de um ato do poder executivo - como a
+redução de velocidade nas marginais de São Paulo – ou de um processo
+de tramitação legislativa3
+.
+Um estudo de caso pode ser desenvolvido como estratégia secundária
+ou complementar em um projeto adotando métodos múltiplos. Mas
+pode também ser concebido como a estratégia metodológica a partir da
+qual se desenvolve uma pesquisa em direito. Esta segunda possibilidade
+permite manter no horizonte o caráter exigente de sua realização e,
+ao mesmo tempo, sinalizar que um estudo de caso pode ser não só adequado
+mas também suficiente para o desenvolvimento de pesquisas no
+campo do direito. Como este texto buscará mostrar, trata-se de uma estratégia
+de pesquisa poderosa que pode ser dosada para diferentes contextos
+de investigação, tanto fora quanto dentro de instituições de ensino
+superior (iniciações científicas, mestrados e doutorados).
+
+2 Yin (2001, p. 24) distingue o estudo de caso do experimento, do levantamento, da
+análise de arquivos e da pesquisa histórica utilizando três critérios: a forma da questão
+de pesquisa, a exigência de controle sobre eventos comportamentais e o foco em
+acontecimentos contemporâneos. George e Bennett (2005, p. 5) constroem a especificidade
+do estudo de caso confrontando-o com os “métodos estatísticos” (“which excel
+at estimating the generalized causal weight or causal effects of variables”) e com os
+“modelos formais” (“in which rigorous deductive logic is used to develop both intuitive
+and counterintuitive hypotheses about the dynamics of causal mechanisms”). Para os
+autores, “[e]studos de caso são geralmente fortes onde os métodos estatísticos e os
+modelos formais são fracos” (George e Bennett, 2005, p. 15).
+3 Todos os estudos de caso citados neste parágrafo serão devidamente indicados no decorrer
+deste texto e utilizados para ilustrar as questões metodológicas debatidas aqui.
+359
+
+Como estratégia de pesquisa, formalizada e desenvolvida de modo
+sistemático, o estudo de caso é considerado um fenômeno recente
+no campo das ciências sociais. George e Bennett (2005, p. 06) localizam
+esses esforços de formalização nas três últimas décadas do
+século XX, ainda que, de modo mais intuitivo, esteja presente desde
+sempre4
+. No campo jurídico e, em particular, no campo da pesquisa
+empírica em direito, a utilização do estudo de caso é ainda mais
+recente e, portanto, dotada de baixo desenvolvimento teórico-metodológico.
+Isto significa que grande parte da elaboração sobre esta
+estratégia de pesquisa vem sendo realizada a partir de casos e interesses
+de pesquisa provenientes de outras áreas do conhecimento.
+Há muito material teórico-metodológico disponível na sociologia,
+antropologia, ciência política, psicologia experimental, administração,
+etc., mas não no direito5
+. O que convida as pesquisas neste campo
+a conhecer e se apropriar deste material, (re)concebê-lo, ajustá-lo
+e colocá-lo em prática em função dos interesses de pesquisa que
+compartilhamos aqui6
+.
+Em face disso, este texto constitui um primeiro esforço de siste4
+George e Bennett (2005, p. 05): “Perhaps because cases study methods are somewhat
+intuitive – they have in some sense been around as long as recorded history
+– the systematic development of case methods for the cumulative building of social
+science theories is a comparatively recent phenomenon (notwithstanding notable
+contributions to these methods by John Stuart Mill)”. No mesmo sentido, Naumes e
+Naumes (2006, p. xvii) identificam o estudo de caso com a prática milenar de contar
+histórias (storytelling). Sobre a força das histórias e, logo, do estudo de caso, os autores
+destacam que seus elementos específicos, seus detalhes, “make the scenes vivid
+and the characters live” (Naumes e Naumes, 2006, p. xviii).
+5 No campo do direito, até o presente momento, encontrei o texto de Ghirardi et al
+(2012, p. 178-190). Há também referências ao estudo de caso, entre outras possibilidades
+de “pesquisa de campo” em Gustin e Dias (2002, p. 104-106) e, muito brevemente,
+entre as “técnicas de pesquisa empírica” em Bittar (2012, p. 213). Na literatura
+internacional, o manual de metodologia de pesquisa em direito publicado pela Oxford
+University Press não dedica um capítulo ao estudo de caso, ainda que apareça em Webley
+(2010, p. 939-40) entre os “métodos de coleta e produção de dados qualitativos”.
+6 Há ainda uma terceira etapa, coletiva e de longo prazo, voltada a revisitar as reflexões
+teórico-metodológicas disponíveis com vistas a expandir tipologias, aprimorar
+qualidades e limites, explicitar desafios e nuances que o estoque de estudos de caso
+no campo do direito permitir identificar e elaborar.
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+360
+
+matização do modo como a autora tem lido, digerido e utilizado os
+aportes da literatura sobre estudo de caso para a realização de pesquisas
+no campo do direito7
+. O texto se contenta, portanto, em propor
+um esquema simples de apropriação dessa estratégia de pesquisa,
+indicando, sempre que possível, as possibilidades de sofisticação
+metodológica indicadas pela literatura e os desafios que apresenta
+ao campo jurídico. Antes de tudo, o objetivo deste texto é colocar o
+estudo de caso em nosso horizonte de possibilidades metodológicas,
+oferecendo algumas ferramentas básicas que podem auxiliar no momento
+de desenhar e desenvolver uma pesquisa empírica em direito.
+Para cumprir esse objetivo, este texto está organizado em quatro
+partes. A primeira discute o significado e as implicações de construir
+uma pesquisa apoiada em estudo de caso, bem como indica algumas
+possibilidades de escolha do caso a ser estudado. A segunda seção
+debruça-se sobre um dos principais desafios para o planejamento e
+desenvolvimento do estudo de caso - a organização do material empírico.
+E apresenta uma estrutura básica em três camadas (o contexto,
+o caso e as unidades de análise), buscando explicitar as implicações
+desse modo de organizar o estudo desde as etapas de coleta do
+material. A terceira seção dedica-se a discutir a especificidade dos
+estudos de caso na pesquisa em direito, em especial no tocante à
+seleção do caso (amostragem) e à identificação dos limites do que se
+pode aprender com ele. Para fechar, a quarta seção discute a contribuição
+dos estudos de caso para a pesquisa em direito, destacando
+o potencial analítico tanto da narrativa quanto das proposições que
+podem ser realizadas a partir dela.
+
+7 Ao lado da experiência como pesquisadora e orientadora, este texto beneficia-se
+também de um conjunto de experiências didáticas, no Programa de Mestrado em
+Direito e Desenvolvimento da FGV Direito SP, no Curso de Formação em Pesquisa
+Empírica em Direito promovido anualmente pela REED e em workshops de pesquisa
+realizados em diversas faculdades. Às parceiras e parceiros de pesquisa, orientandas
+e orientandos, alunas e alunos, registro aqui meu agradecimento pela receptividade
+a uma estratégia de pesquisa ainda em construção no direito, pelos exemplos difíceis,
+pelo ceticismo e pelas dúvidas.
+361
+
+1. Por que um estudo de caso? E por que este caso
+em particular?
+As definições de estudo de caso variam bastante8
+. Nos limites deste
+texto, e neste momento da exposição, é possível caracterizar o “estudo
+de caso” como uma estratégia metodológica de construção de
+um objeto empírico muito bem definido e específico, potencialmente
+revelador de aspectos e características de uma problemática que não
+seriam facilmente acessados por intermédio de outras estratégias.
+Tomado dessa forma, o estudo de caso nos convoca a mergulhar profundamente
+em um fenômeno e a observar a partir de variadas fontes
+e perspectivas. E, justamente por isso, boa parte do trabalho está em
+restringir e recortar o caso, explicitando suas fronteiras. Como indica
+Stake, o principal elemento distintivo do estudo de caso está na “proeminência
+do que é e do que não é ‘o caso’ – as fronteiras são mantidas
+em foco. O que está ocorrendo e é considerado importante dentro
+dessas fronteiras (...) é tido como vital e frequentemente determina
+sobre o que trata o estudo (...)” (Stake, 1978, p. 7).
+Nesse momento de seu texto, Stake define o estudo de caso distinguindo-o
+das estratégias metodológicas nas quais “hipóteses ou
+questões previamente visadas pelo investigador determinam o conteúdo
+do estudo”. Mais a frente o autor insiste no papel, digamos
+assim, secundário das hipóteses nos estudos de caso: “[t]emas e
+
+8 Extrapola aos objetivos deste texto discutir o modo como diferentes autores definem
+o estudo de caso. Apenas como ilustração, indico a seguir as minhas definições preferidas
+que serão em parte retomadas no decorrer deste texto. George e Bennett (2005,
+p. 17) definem um caso “as an instance of a class of events” em que “class of events”
+refere-se a um fenômeno de interesse científico. Para os autores, um estudo de caso
+seria então “a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects
+for analysis, rather than a historical event itself” (2005, p. 18). Para Yin (2001, p. 32),
+“[u]m estudo de caso é uma investigação empírica que investiga um fenômeno contemporâneo
+dentro de seu contexto da vida real, especialmente quando os limites entre
+o fenômeno e o contexto não estão claramente definidos”. A formulação de Stake,
+bem mais antiga, mas muito interessante para os propósitos deste texto refere-se a
+“descriptions that are complex, holistic, and involving a myriad of not isolated variables;
+data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by personalistic observation;
+and a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation,
+illustration, and even allusion and metaphor” (Stake, 1978, p. 7).
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+362
+
+hipóteses podem ser importantes, mas permanecem subordinados à
+compreensão do [próprio] caso” (Stake, 1978, p. 7). Ao invés de discutir
+a compatibilidade da formulação de hipóteses com a estratégia
+de estudo de caso, parece-me que o mais interessante é diferenciar
+– como fez Riccardo Cappi em seu texto neste volume – duas possibilidades
+de construção (global) da pesquisa: prevalentemente dedutivas
+ou indutivas. Na primeira, exige-se a identificação, anterior à
+própria seleção do caso, das afirmações (teóricas ou empíricas) que
+se quer verificar. É esse status de afirmação provisória a ser testada
+em um contexto diferente do que a gerou que caracteriza uma hipótese
+de pesquisa em sentido estrito. As pesquisas prevalentemente
+indutivas, ao contrário, não exigem a elaboração prévia de uma hipótese
+de pesquisa no sentido dado aqui. Nessas situações busca-se
+justamente fazer derivar, do corpus empírico observado, formulações
+– que podem, por sua vez, vir a ser testadas em outras pesquisas9
+.
+Mas isso não significa que nas pesquisas prevalentemente indutivas
+não façamos também um esforço intelectual de antecipar alguns
+elementos, ou afirmar provisoriamente algumas coisas, que podem
+ou não se confirmar depois, algo próximo do que fazemos com as
+hipóteses nas pesquisas prevalentemente dedutivas. De certa forma,
+no processo de seleção do caso a ser estudado lançamo-nos a um
+raciocínio hipotético, do tipo “este caso parece ser apropriado para
+produzir conhecimento sobre este problema”. Se nos lançamos a explorar
+um ou mais casos com vistas a escolher aquele ou aqueles que
+melhor servirão aos propósitos da pesquisa, estamos operando com
+hipóteses de trabalho que podem e devem ser explicitadas na pes9
+Ver, sobre esse ponto, Cappi neste volume e a apresentação. Chamamos atenção
+para o advérbio “prevalentemente” utilizado para anteceder a qualificação indutiva
+ou dedutiva das pesquisas (globalmente consideradas): se tomarmos a indução e a
+dedução como “operações intelectuais”, ambas participam a todo tempo de um percurso
+de pesquisa. A distinção torna-se relevante, sobretudo, ao se desenhar a estratégia
+metodológica de uma pesquisa. Afinal, construir uma pesquisa para verificar a
+pertinência de uma afirmação em dado contexto é bastante distinto de buscar extrair
+deste contexto uma ou mais afirmações pertinentes.
+363
+
+quisa10. Utilizo aqui a expressão “hipótese de trabalho” para marcar a
+diferença em relação às hipóteses em sentido estrito que utilizamos
+nas pesquisas prevalentemente dedutivas.
+Em George e Benett (2005), essas duas possibilidades de percurso
+estão indicadas claramente como objetivos do estudo de caso: testar
+e gerar hipóteses. A depender desse objetivo mais geral, o(s) caso(s)
+serão selecionados conforme a sua aptidão para promover uma determinada
+verificação ou uma determinada elaboração conceitual.
+O que estou chamando amplamente de “elaboração conceitual”, em
+oposição à verificação, pode tomar várias formas. Pode se traduzir
+na construção de categorias e de tipologias, bem aos moldes do que
+apresenta Cappi em seu texto sobre a teorização fundamentada nos
+dados, neste volume. Mas a própria narrativa do caso, como resultado
+de uma análise realizada a partir de um evento histórico muito
+específico, também é uma elaboração conceitual. Nesta última situação,
+o caso em si é o objetivo do estudo, quer o pesquisador tenha
+ou não se dedicado também a extrair categorias ou a gerar hipóteses.
+Tal como caminha esta exposição, os estudos de caso apresentam-se
+como resultado de uma escolha metodológica no decorrer
+do percurso de uma pesquisa – e assim são abordados na literatura
+consultada aqui. Parece-me, contudo, que em diversas situações os
+casos se impõem sobre nós, isto é, o interesse pelo caso precede à
+identificação, com alguma clareza, do interesse de pesquisa. Minha
+experiência como pesquisadora e orientadora leva-me a identificar
+
+10Lembro-me do processo de seleção do Caso TRT e do modo como Kevin Davis, Guillermo
+Jorge e eu nos debruçamos sobre os seis ou sete casos que identificamos inicialmente
+como potencialmente interessantes para a nossa pesquisa. Tínhamos critérios
+substantivos – casos de corrupção que tivessem percorrido as esferas penal, civil,
+administrativa e internacional (em uma estrutura organizacional supranacional ou em
+outra jurisdição que não a brasileira) - e também critérios mais operacionais como o
+acesso aos autos do processo e a possibilidade de realizar buscas amplas e diversificadas
+sobre o caso – algo que se torna bastante complicado quando as pessoas físicas
+envolvidas no caso em que se pensa estudar é também processada e investigada por
+outras condutas. Para a narrativa do Caso TRT, ver Machado e Ferreira (2014), para os
+resultados do estudo de caso múltiplo, envolvendo Brasil e Argentina, ver Davis, Jorge
+e Machado (2015).
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+364
+
+duas possibilidades de percurso metodológico que me parece interessante
+explicitar nesse texto. Dito simplesmente, a primeira caminha
+da pesquisa ao caso e a segunda do caso à pesquisa. O resultado
+será comum aos dois percursos, já que em ambos se estará diante de
+uma pesquisa construída a partir de um estudo de caso. No entanto,
+o percurso poderá ser bastante distinto, sobretudo no que diz respeito
+ao momento de definição da pergunta e das hipóteses de trabalho
+que orientarão a pesquisa.
+A diferenciação entre essas duas possibilidades de percurso permite
+observar que a sequência linear sugerida em manuais de metodologia
+nem sempre corresponde à maneira como construímos nossas
+pesquisas. As sequências “tópico – pergunta – problema - fontes
+de informação”, sugerida por Booth, Colomb e Williams (2005) ou
+“pergunta de partida – exploração – problemática - construção do
+modelo de análise – observação - análise das informações – conclusão”,
+proposta por Quivy e Campenhoudt (1992) muitas vezes transcorrem
+de maneira diferente quando o interesse pelo caso precede a
+definição da pergunta específica que a pesquisa buscará responder.
+Ao explicitar essa possibilidade, do caso preceder a pesquisa,
+este texto busca enfatizar que o desenvolvimento do estudo de caso,
+nessa situação, não pode - ou não precisa - ser tomado como uma
+etapa “meramente exploratória”. Ao contrário, a seleção do material
+a coletar, a organização dos dados e a narrativa do caso são etapas
+constitutivas da pesquisa, podendo e devendo se beneficiar dos procedimentos
+e das estratégias de planejamento disponíveis na literatura
+metodológica. Concebido dessa forma, ampliam-se as chances
+de que a narrativa do caso, em si mesma, possa constituir um resultado
+de pesquisa relevante e apto a oferecer uma contribuição ao
+campo de conhecimento.
+Essas duas possibilidades de percurso – da pesquisa ao caso e
+do caso à pesquisa – apostam nas intuições iniciais, nos interesses
+e na sensibilidade intelectual e humana no momento da escolha do
+objeto de pesquisa. Tendo em mente, sobretudo, o desenvolvimento
+365
+
+de projetos no âmbito das instituições de ensino superior, parece-me
+que esta inquietação inicial constitui o principal pulso da investigação,
+devendo portanto ser vivamente valorizada pelas pessoas envolvidas
+e pela própria instituição11.
+Em algumas situações, o pulso inicial da investigação se apresenta
+como um tema, um tópico, uma questão com a qual tomamos
+contato lendo o jornal, assistindo a uma palestra, percorrendo a cidade,
+conversando com alguém. Pode ainda ter surgido em nossa
+experiência profissional ou em uma pesquisa anterior. Seus contornos
+podem pender mais fortemente para o campo das ideias ou para
+o campo das práticas humanas e institucionais. Esses contornos não
+determinam a estratégia de pesquisa. A inquietação pode surgir conceitual
+e ser desbravada por intermédio de pesquisa empírica. E o
+contrário também pode acontecer: a curiosidade pode estar ligada
+a desvendar como funciona, o que acontece, quem são as pessoas
+envolvidas, como atuam e caminhar para um problema de teor mais
+conceitual ou teórico.
+Vários textos são bastante úteis para auxiliar a gestação dessas
+inquietações iniciais e transformá-las em perguntas de pesquisa12.
+Remetem frequentemente à ideia de um estudo exploratório que se
+realiza por intermédio de leituras e entrevistas mais informais com
+pessoas-chave que contribuam a ampliar nossa compreensão sobre
+um determinado fenômeno teórico ou empírico. Interessará também
+a essa exploração ter alguma clareza sobre o acervo de conhecimento
+disponível sobre o tema, com vistas a elaborar essa pergunta em
+
+11 Extrapola aos objetivos deste texto, mas vale a pena lembrar que este ponto traz
+uma série de implicações para o modo de conceber e estruturar os programas de pós-
+-graduação, no tocante à carga de disciplinas, ao momento de definição da orientação,
+aos prazos para produção e entrega de relatórios, entre outros.
+12 Ver, Booth, Colomb e Williams (2005), Quivy e Campenhoudt (1992), Epstein e King
+(2013). Ainda mais eloquentes que os textos com esquemas gerais são as narrativas
+dos percursos de construção da problemática de pesquisa realizadas pelas próprias
+pesquisadoras e pesquidores. Recomendo, especialmente, a leitura dos capítulos e
+seções metodológicas das dissertações de mestrado citadas ao longo deste texto.
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+366
+
+função do que “falta saber” em determinado campo13. Parece-me
+que na pesquisa empírica em direito esta etapa deve incluir também
+uma boa investigação sobre o material disponível para observação.
+As dificuldades de acesso a documentos – tanto por não serem públicos
+ou, mesmo públicos, serem de acesso restrito ou muito difícil
+– apresenta-se como um desafio importante a ser enfrentado, desde
+as etapas mais iniciais de elaboração da pergunta de pesquisa14.
+Tomemos um exemplo, a partir do percurso de Poliana Ferreira
+na construção de seu projeto de pesquisa de mestrado. A inquietação
+inicial surgiu com o Caso Cabula – uma ação da polícia militar
+baiana que resultou em 12 mortos e 6 pessoas gravemente feridas
+em uma madrugada de 2015. Dali surgiu o interesse em compreender,
+mais amplamente, o modo como o sistema de justiça lida com
+as abordagens policiais que resultam em morte. Por uma série de
+razões, entre as quais a aprovação no programa de mestrado em
+São Paulo, portanto distante do que seria o campo daquele caso, a
+pesquisadora se dedicou a elaborar uma pergunta e um projeto que
+fossem compatíveis com sua mudança de cidade. A possibilidade de
+um amplo levantamento sobre os processos criminais de homicídio
+que tivessem policiais militares, em serviço, na qualidade de réus,
+foi inicialmente descartada em razão da dificuldade de acesso a esse
+conjunto de casos. Em visitas e conversas informais nas varas do
+
+13 Epstein e King (2013, p. 76), por exemplo, indicam que uma pesquisa pode contribuir
+para um determinado campo de ao menos cinco formas: “(1) formulando uma
+pergunta que a comunidade jurídica possa ver como importante, mas que nenhum
+outro acadêmico abordou; (2) tentando resolver uma questão que invocou respostas
+conflitantes; (3) levantando uma “velha” questão, mas tratando-a de uma forma única;
+(4) coletando novos dados sobre as mesmas implicações observáveis ou implicações
+completamente diferentes ou (5) aplicando melhores métodos para reanalisar as
+informações existentes”
+14 Quivy e Campenhoudt (1992, p. 262), por exemplo, indicam a “seleção das unidades
+de observação” como uma etapa a ser realizada ao final da quarta (construção do
+modelo de análise) das sete etapas de sua proposta de procedimento de pesquisa. Parece-me
+que seu livro descreve uma abordagem sobretudo dedutiva de pesquisa, voltada
+mais à ideia de verificação. Isso não impede, é claro, que seu livro seja bastante
+útil mesmo para as pesquisas que pretendem fazer uso de abordagens mais indutivas
+no decorrer do percurso de pesquisa.
+367
+
+júri, foi possível identificar que os processos não são separados ou
+organizados em função dessa característica, o que demandaria um
+esforço de triagem do conjunto de casos levados a júri infactível em
+função do tempo que a pesquisadora dispõe para realizar a pesquisa.
+Uma solicitação foi feita ao Ministério Público do Estado de São
+Paulo, mas até a conclusão deste texto, a pesquisadora não havia obtido
+resposta. Em virtude disso, precisou deslocar seu interesse pela
+produção de conhecimento sobre a frequência das condenações e
+absolvições nesses casos para formular uma pergunta que pudesse
+ser respondida sem o acesso a um universo amplo de processos. Ao
+mesmo tempo, além do obstáculo de acesso, o levantamento dos
+processos criminais traria dificuldades para observar o modo como
+outras esferas de responsabilização, como a civil e administrativa,
+atuavam e interagiam com a criminal nas situações de abordagem
+policial com resultado morte. O levantamento bibliográfico mostrou
+não haver estudos nesse sentido, já que o acervo consultado pela
+pesquisadora referia-se sobretudo a estudos no campo da sociologia
+voltados a compreender as práticas policiais, os autos de resistência,
+entre outros. Diante desses fatores, o estudo de caso mostrou-se a
+opção mais apropriada e condizente com a inquietação inicial, com
+o estoque de conhecimento disponível sobre o tema e com as possibilidades
+de acesso ao campo e ao material.
+O momento inicial de desenho da pesquisa buscará, portanto,
+produzir uma composição entre três elementos: (i) nosso pulso,
+curiosidade, inquietação; (ii) o conhecimento disponível (no direito
+ou fora dele) sobre nosso tópico de interesse; (iii) as possibilidades
+concretas de acesso a um conjunto de documentos ou pessoas - que
+incluem fatores de tempo, recursos humanos e materiais. Será diante
+desses elementos que a escolha por um estudo de caso, por um
+levantamento documental (com tratamento qualitativo ou quantitativo),
+por entrevistas, por observação participante, etc, irá se colocar.
+Não se trata, obviamente, de uma escolha excludente. Muito pelo
+contrário. Estudos de caso frequentemente envolvem entrevistas, le-
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+368
+
+vantamento documental e, até mesmo, diferentes modalidades de
+observação. Mas pode ser realizado também com entrevistas e documentos,
+ou apenas documentos15. Ademais, não é incomum a utilização
+de mais de uma estratégia, em uma mesma pesquisa. Em seu livro
+sobre o ensino jurídico, Fábio Sá e Silva relata a construção, o desenvolvimento
+e os resultados de uma pesquisa empírica que combinou
+levantamento documental e estudo de caso. O levantamento foi realizado
+a partir de consulta à Plataforma Lattes, com vistas a identificar
+experiências inovadoras na área do ensino jurídico-penal. Setenta grupos
+de pesquisa foram localizados e contatados pelo pesquisador, por
+intermédio de um questionário breve, com cinco perguntas. Apenas 3
+responderam o questionário na íntegra. Coube então ao pesquisador
+decidir entre um estudo de caso múltiplo (com os três respondentes) e
+um estudo de caso único. A escolha pelo caso único é justificada pela
+oportunidade de “examinar com detalhamento algumas questões
+sensíveis”, o que poderia ser comprometido com um número maior
+de casos. A escolha então recaiu no grupo mais antigo e com a maior
+gama de atividades em ensino, pesquisa e extensão (Silva, 2007, p.
+186). Para o desenvolvimento do estudo de caso, o pesquisador se
+apoiou tanto em entrevistas quanto em documentos (relatórios, publicações
+científicas e projetos do grupo pesquisado, entre outros). Aqui,
+o levantamento, além de trazer resultados substantivos à pergunta de
+pesquisa, foi o dispositivo para acessar o caso a ser estudado16.
+Mas o interesse por um caso em particular pode também preceder
+todo tipo de elaboração sobre a pergunta de pesquisa e a escolha
+das estratégias metodológicas. É claro que o interesse pelo caso não
+se dá no vazio, ao contrário, é atravessado e até mesmo constrangido
+
+15 A maior parte dos estudos de caso mencionados neste texto baseou-se em entrevistas
+e documentos. O Caso Carandiru contou também com a observação das cinco
+sessões do tribunal do júri que condenaram os policiais militares. A dissertação de
+Ana Beatriz Passos, por utilizar um volume grande de documentos de fontes muito
+diversas (legislativo, judiciário e executivo), não recorreu a entrevistas.
+16 Para outras pesquisas que combinam levantamentos documentais e estudo de
+caso, ver Machado et al (2009).
+369
+
+por nossa visão de mundo, pela área em que atuamos ou realizamos a
+pesquisa, pelo tema do programa de pós-graduação em que estamos
+matriculados, etc. Tratando-se de fenômenos complexos e contemporâneos,
+como indicamos anteriormente, muitas vezes é necessário dedicar
+um longo período de trabalho a desvendar o próprio caso: acessar
+documentos e pessoas, organizar o material e produzir uma narrativa
+que dê conta dos aspectos do caso que nos interessam. Nessas situações,
+a pesquisa é guiada inicialmente por uma pergunta relativamente
+simples: “o que acontece(u) ali?”17. Veja, por exemplo, o modo como
+Bruno Paschoal formula as questões que guiaram seu estudo de caso
+sobre o Programa Nota Fiscal Paulista, a partir do qual desenvolveu sua
+dissertação de mestrado: “(i) como ele funciona? (ii) como ele foi construído?
+(iii) quais foram as diferentes estratégias regulatórias utilizadas
+e como elas podem ser organizadas?” (Paschoal, 2012, p. 21).
+A questão crucial que se coloca será então saber se aquele evento,
+que nos interessa tão fortemente, poderá fornecer ou não subsídios
+suficientes para o desenvolvimento de um estudo. Vale notar que esse
+juízo sobre a “suficiência do caso” está intimamente relacionado ao
+contexto mais geral da pesquisa, tanto no que diz respeito ao seu enquadramento
+institucional – iniciação, mestrado, doutorado – quanto
+ao desenho metodológico proposto – pesquisa multi-métodos, em
+que o estudo de caso é uma entre várias estratégias de tratamento e
+coleta de dados, estudos de caso únicos ou múltiplos18.
+
+17 Desse modo teve início o estudo sobre a atuação do sistema de justiça diante do
+Massacre do Carandiru (a seguir, Caso Carandiru), conduzido por Marta Machado e por
+mim. Às vésperas do caso completar 20 anos, fomos surpreendidas por notícias de jornal
+indicando a nomeação de um dos réus do processo para o posto de chefe da ROTA.
+Mas em que pé estava o processo? Porque não havia sido realizado o júri? O que disse
+a Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos? E as famílias, foram indenizadas? Na
+corregedoria da polícia militar, houve procedimento disciplinar? Com estas questões
+em mente - basicamente “o que aconteceu?” - cinco pesquisadoras dedicaram três
+anos de trabalho a desvendar a atuação do sistema de justiça diante do Massacre, do
+qual resultou um “balanço sobre os processos, as instituições e as narrativas 23 anos
+após o massacre” (Machado e Machado 2015). Para uma aproximação ao Caso Carandiru
+através da estratégia de estudo de caso, ver Machado (2013).
+18 Nos limites deste texto, não será possível explicitar as especificidades do estudo
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+370
+
+2. O evento, o contexto, o caso e as unidade de
+análise
+George e Benett (2005, p. 17) definem “caso” como “um aspecto bem
+definido de um evento histórico selecionado para análise por um
+pesquisador”. Com esta definição buscam distinguir explicitamente
+o “caso” do “evento histórico em si mesmo”. Há bons exemplos
+no campo jurídico de textos e pesquisas nos quais a referência a
+um “caso” designa o próprio evento histórico que, como tal, servirá
+como pretexto ou gatilho para a argumentação e discussão conceitual
+sobre uma determinada questão19. Os ganhos deste tipo de
+abordagem são importantes: permitem a apropriação, pelo debate
+jurídico, de fatos e acontecimentos contemporâneos e o desenvolvimento
+de análises que dialoguem ou se amparem nas experiências
+muito concretas das pessoas e das instituições.
+Mas George e Benett, ao distinguirem o caso do evento histórico,
+ajudam a chamar nossa atenção para um uso particular dos casos
+na atividade de pesquisa: o “caso” é uma estratégia de recorte, uma
+estratégia de delimitação de um “aspecto bem definido” que selecionamos
+para analisar. É claro que quando utilizamos um caso, como
+evento histórico no contexto argumentativo ou de pesquisa, operam
+diversos mecanismos de seleção daquilo que será narrado e omitido,
+valorizado e minimizado. Mas no “caso”, tal como proposto por George
+e Benett e outros autores, esses procedimentos de seleção e definição
+do que constituirá propriamente o caso precisam ser controlados e explicitados.
+Há, ao menos três boas razões para proceder desse modo.
+Em primeiro lugar, os “eventos históricos”, por definição, constide
+caso múltiplo. Remeto as leitoras e leitores ao trabalho de Yin (2001, p. 60-77) e,
+especialmente, às reflexões de Pires (2008, p. 194-202) sobre amostragem por casos
+múltiplos. Para um exemplo de aplicação no âmbito do direito, Machado (2013).
+19 Veja-se, por exemplo, a coletânea Pensar o Brasil: problemas nacionais à luz do
+direito (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2012), organizada por José Rodrigo Rodriguez. Os textos
+sobre Pará, Rondônia, Roraima e Tocantins, partem de “eventos históricos” concretos
+para discutir diversas questões relacionadas à promoção da justiça, ao estado penal,
+à construção de precedentes, etc.
+371
+
+tuem emaranhados de ditos e não-ditos, circunstâncias, imagens que,
+em hipótese alguma, podem ser inteiramente captados em uma pesquisa.
+A teoria da observação nos ajuda, neste ponto, a tranquilamente
+abdicar de qualquer tentativa de captar o todo: o que caracteriza
+uma observação é o ponto cego, minha posição de observador define
+o que é possível observar e o que, necessariamente, está fora do meu
+campo de observação20. Esta formulação não se restringe às situações
+de observação participante, em que presentes, por exemplo, em uma
+sala de audiência, observamos, com nossos pontos cegos, o que se
+passa ali. Mas alcança também as observações que fazemos em qualquer
+tipo de suporte (documentos, entrevistas, imagens, etc.). Nessas
+situações, ao lado dessa característica estrutural de toda e qualquer
+observação, nossa observação tende a responder também a um estoque
+prévio de conhecimentos e sensibilidades. Isto é, há fatores intelectuais
+e humanos que desempenham um papel importante naquilo
+que vamos selecionar enquanto observamos.21
+Em segundo lugar, quando o caso está sendo construído – ou
+sendo considerado para construir uma pesquisa - já sabemos algo
+sobre o que queremos aprender com ele. A escolha do que constituirá
+o caso está frequentemente ligada ao que queremos inferir a
+partir dele. Emprego o termo inferência aqui no sentido específico
+dado por Epstein e King:: “o processo de utilizar os fatos que conhecemos
+para aprender sobre os fatos que desconhecemos” (2013, p.
+36)22. Então, Arthur Prado (2017), em sua dissertação de mestrado,
+
+20 Sobre a teoria da observação, ver Moeller (2006). Para uma discussão sobre as possibilidades
+de utilização desta teoria no ensino do direito, ver Machado (2014).
+21 Sobre o processo de seleção no decorrer da coleta de material e elaboração da
+narrativa do estudo de caso, Naumes e Naumes (2006, p. xxi) destacam que “...real
+situations take place in a world that is so complex and rich in details taht it would not
+be possible to include them all. Thus every storyteller must make choices as to which
+to include and which to leave out.”
+22 No decorrer deste texto, ao mencionar inferências, tenho em mente as inferências
+descritivas e não as inferências causais. Como explicitam os autores, nas inferências
+causais busca-se “saber se um fator ou conjunto de fatores leva a (ou causa) algum
+resultado” (Epstein e King, 2013, p. 43) o que exige a identificação da variável causal
+principal (a “causa”) e da variável dependente (o resultado específico). Trata-se, por-
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+372
+
+observou o “Caso dos Fiscais do ISS” – especificamente o procedimento
+criminal em trâmite na justiça estadual paulista que apura a
+exigência de propinas para a emissão de certificados de quitação do
+ISS – para compreender o modo como são construídas as denúncias
+do Ministério Público – o que corresponde ao “alvo da inferência”,
+no esquema proposto por Epstein e King. Aqui, o estudo de caso foi
+construído para observar um fenômeno concreto contemporâneo
+com o objetivo de, a partir dele, realizar inferências sobre como o
+processo penal concretamente opera de maneira a favorecer a reflexão,
+com base empírica, sobre o modo como a doutrina jurídica descreve
+esse modo de operar. Epstein e King indicam que o principal
+componente para tornar as inferências “mais precisas e menos incertas”
+está em “revelar muito mais sobre o processo pelo qual eles [os
+pesquisadores] geraram e observaram seus dados – todo o processo,
+do momento em que o mundo gerou o fenômeno de interesse até o
+momento em que os dados estavam em sua posse e foram considerados
+definitivos” (Epstein e King, 2013, p. 42). Sem essa explicitação,
+concluem os autores, “os leitores não têm meios de medir a qualidade
+das inferências” (Epstein e King, 2013, p. 42).
+Por fim, uma terceira boa razão para controlarmos e explicitarmos
+nosso processo de seleção e de construção do caso a ser estudado
+está relacionada a um projeto maior que busca desafiar uma
+ideia bastante difundida no campo científico segundo a qual as regras
+técnicas de seleção (amostragem) são relevantes somente para
+as pesquisas que envolvem tratamento quantitativo de dados (Pires,
+2008, p. 156-8). Para Pires, disso decorre “a falsa impressão” de que
+o tratamento quantitativo é mais rigoroso que o tratamento qualitativo.
+Revelar as estratégias de seleção do caso e seu modo de constanto,
+de realizar duas inferências descritivas e observar a diferença que se estabelece
+entre elas. Há várias dificuldades em estabelecer relações causais, como explicitam os
+autores, o que não deve nos impedir de colocar questões deste tipo. Deixo esse ponto
+em aberto, uma vez que não me ocorre uma pesquisa que se utilize de estudo de caso
+e que busque realizar inferências causais.
+373
+
+trução torna-se então uma exigência incontornável à inscrição das
+pesquisas realizadas por intermédio de estudos de caso no campo
+científico. Nas palavras de Pires, “a qualidade científica de uma pesquisa
+não depende do tipo de amostra, e também não mais da natureza
+dos dados (quantitativo ou qualitativo), mas sim do fato de ela
+ser, no conjunto, ‘bem construída’” (Pires, 2008, p. 156)23.
+Estes três fatores contribuem a diferenciar um “estudo de caso” propriamente
+dito de outras estratégias de pesquisa que lançam mão de
+eventos históricos, concretos e contemporâneos. E essas exigências de
+explicitação precisam englobar todo o percurso de recorte e delimitação
+do caso a ser estudado. O desenho de um estudo de caso é frequentemente
+resultado de um procedimento longo que se desenvolve no
+decorrer de todo o período dedicado ao trabalho de campo. O esforço
+de planejá-lo antes, na elaboração do projeto, certamente facilita esse
+percurso, mas não impede que as descobertas ao longo do caminho nos
+convidem a rever e reordenar o desenho inicialmente proposto.
+A literatura propõe várias formas de planejar e estruturar um estudo
+de caso. Para os propósitos deste texto, baseio-me na modelagem
+proposta por Yin que me parece não apenas pedagógica mas também
+facilmente operacionalizável em diferentes situações de pesquisa. O
+principal objetivo dessa modelagem é auxiliar na organização e seleção
+da miríade de aspectos, informações e documentos que nos dá
+acesso aos eventos históricos em função de nossos interesses de pesquisa.
+Com este propósito em mente, é possível distinguir três camadas
+em um estudo de caso: o contexto, o caso propriamente dito e,
+no interior do caso, uma ou mais unidades de análise. De certa forma,
+cada uma dessas camadas corresponde a um nível de exigência na riqueza
+e densidade das informações que serão coletadas. Ao explicitarmos
+o que nossa pesquisa designará como contexto, caso e unidade
+
+23 A expressão “bem construída” é de Bourdieu (Pires, 2008, p. 156, nota 4). Remeto aqui
+as leitoras e leitores para o modo como Pires apresenta as noções de corpus empírico,
+universo geral, população (universo de análise) e amostra, bem como as diferentes estratégias
+de construção de uma pesquisa e suas implicações (Pires, 2008, p. 158-168).
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+374
+
+de análise, calibramos o foco de nossa atenção e, consequentemente,
+estabelecemos critérios de pertinência para o material empírico.
+E com isso vamos limpando o terreno para aguçar nossa observação
+sobre aquilo que nos interessa mais diretamente na pesquisa.
+Comecemos então pela construção do caso e seu contexto, uma tarefa
+bastante exigente nos estudos de caso. Como vimos na seção
+anterior, Stake (1978, p. 07) considera esse esforço de precisar o que
+integra e o que não integra o caso como o elemento distintivo do método.
+Yin, no mesmo sentido, indica a indefinição entre o “fenômeno
+e o contexto” como um dos componentes da definição de estudo de
+caso24. Pois bem, a construção do caso depende então da especificação
+de quais tipos de fatos, por qual período, envolvendo quais atores,
+comporão o caso. Trata-se de indicar onde passaremos a fronteira
+entre o caso e o seu contexto. Neste primeiro movimento de seleção e
+recorte, podemos, ao invés de eliminar completamente de nossa pesquisa,
+atribuir alguns desses componentes ao contexto e não ao caso
+propriamente dito. Se, de acordo com nosso interesse de pesquisa,
+consideramos que tal componente deve pertencer ao caso, consentimos
+em sobre ele exigir diferentes fontes de informação, incluí-los em
+nossos roteiros de entrevista, quando houver, e, sobretudo, justificar
+a pertinência de sua inserção no caso que estamos construindo.
+Tomemos um exemplo. No estudo sobre o Caso TRT, nosso interesse
+de pesquisa estava centrado em observar as interações entre
+as áreas do direito em um processo de corrupção – tratava-se de uma
+pesquisa sobre o tema da coordenação interinstitucional. No decorrer
+da pesquisa, lançamos nosso olhar ao modo como a grande mídia fez
+a cobertura dos procedimentos judiciais. Inicialmente, esse componente
+seria um elemento do nosso contexto, pois o foco estava na observação
+de vários procedimentos (civis, penais, administrativos e internacionais).
+Mas era elemento do nosso contexto porque nos parecia
+
+24 “Um estudo de caso é uma investigação empírica que investiga um fenômeno contemporâneo
+dentro de seu contexto de vida real, especialmente quando os limites entre
+o fenômeno e o contexto não estão claramente definidos” (Yin, 2001, p. 32)
+375
+
+importante, para a compreensão do próprio caso, explicitar também
+o modo como ele foi tornado público pelos meios de comunicação.
+A medida que avançamos sobre este componente – a mídia – percebemos
+que ele revelava uma série de aspectos interessantes sobre a
+obsessão pelo sistema de justiça criminal em detrimento de outras
+formas de responsabilização e, particularmente, pela prisão cautelar
+das pessoas envolvidas. Decidimos então inserir este componente no
+caso e o que seria uma abordagem mais genérica sobre a cobertura –
+inserida no contexto do caso – tornou-se uma sistematização bastante
+precisa, que recorreu inclusive a tratamento quantitativo das notícias,
+de forma a revelar a frequência de reportagens no período em que um
+dos acusados esteve foragido e foi preso provisoriamente. A cobertura
+jornalística tornou-se um componente relevante ao caso, mas este poderia
+ter sido construído sem ela. Mas para que não tivesse apenas um
+papel anedótico ou contextual, foi necessário justificar e articular esse
+componente aos demais que já estavam presentes.
+A construção de um contexto para o nosso caso pode nos auxiliar
+também a estabelecer, com maior clareza, o quadro mais amplo
+de questões que nos interessam. A disputa jurídica ao redor da alteração
+de velocidades nas marginais paulistas pode ser estudada
+no contexto da discussão sobre direito, desenvolvimento e políticas
+públicas, como fez Ana Beatriz Passos (2017) em sua dissertação de
+mestrado. Mas poderia também ter sido estudada no contexto dos limites
+e possibilidades da dogmática jurídica para lidar com questões
+deste tipo. De certa forma, no contexto que construirmos para o caso
+irá reverberar o quadro teórico e o estoque de questões que serão
+consideradas relevantes para circunscrever o caso.
+Conjuntamente a este esforço de estabelecer o que pertencerá ao
+contexto e ao caso, podemos nos beneficiar também de uma terceira
+camada: as unidades de análise. Com esta denominação, Yin (2001,
+p. 44) refere-se aos componentes do caso que receberão ainda maior
+atenção e cuidado no decorrer da coleta e tratamento dos dados. Mesmo
+quando observamos um único caso, a depender do tempo e re-
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+376
+
+curso de que dispomos, mostra-se necessário selecionar dois ou três
+componentes nos quais iremos nos aprofundar ainda mais. No Caso
+TRT, a ação civil pública, os processos criminais e os procedimentos
+administrativos no Tribunal de Contas da União foram selecionados
+como unidades de análise, ainda que o caso propriamente dito incluísse
+também o processo de falência das construtoras, os procedimentos
+internacionais de recuperação de ativos e as ações de indenização por
+danos morais envolvendo um dos réus. Ao indicarmos as unidades de
+análise, fazemos novo movimento de foco, no interior do caso.
+Yin (2001, p. 44) destaca que as unidades de análise relacionam-
+-se às questões inicias de pesquisa e, consequentemente, ao tipo de
+inferência – ou de generalização analítica - que pretendemos realizar
+a partir do estudo de caso25. Não por outra razão, parece-me comum
+que as unidades de análise sejam definidas no decorrer do aprofundamento
+sobre o caso e seu contexto. De certa forma, ao trabalharmos
+sobre a definição dessas três camadas do estudo de caso – com
+idas e vindas, alterações e rearranjos - avançamos sobre a construção
+da pergunta central e da problemática de pesquisa.
+Nesse percurso, a revisão de literatura exerce também um papel
+chave. Refiro-me aqui não apenas ao levantamento bibliográfico sobre
+nosso tópico de pesquisa, mas também à identificação de outras
+pesquisas que, dentro ou fora do direito, tenham utilizado a estratégia
+metodológica que escolhemos. Sim, podemos aprender muito
+com um estudo de caso realizado sobre um tema muito diferente do
+nosso. No campo jurídico, ademais, podemos nos beneficiar de estudos
+de caso sobre processos judiciais relacionados a homicídios praticados
+por policiais militares ainda que nosso tema seja conflito fundiário;
+ou de um estudo de caso sobre a tramitação legislativa da Lei
+Maria da Penha, ainda que estejamos interessados no marco civil da
+
+25 “Cada unidade de análise exigiria um projeto de pesquisa sutilmente diferente e
+uma estratégia de coleta de dados. Especificar corretamente as questões primárias
+da pesquisa traria como consequência a seleção da unidade apropriada de análise”
+(Yin, 2001, p. 44).
+377
+
+internet. Isso, claro, exige que nossos textos dediquem-se a explicitar
+e a elaborar a dimensão metodológica da pesquisa. Neste ponto, Yin
+(2001, p. 46) explicitamente chama nossa atenção para a importância
+de percorrer a literatura para definir o caso e a unidade de análise
+de modo a marcar a semelhança ou a diferença em relação a estudos
+anteriores. O importante é estabelecer claramente essa relação de
+modo a fortalecer nossa análise e a permitir a comparação de nossos
+resultados com outras pesquisas26.
+
+3. A amostra de caso único e a especificidade das
+pesquisas em direito
+Ao discutir mais amplamente o processo de seleção do corpo empírico
+de uma pesquisa, Pires (2008, p. 158 e ss.) apresenta um quadro
+de possibilidades de amostragens, distinguindo-as em função do
+tipo de dado: os dados quantitativos (os números) que convidam a
+amostragens probabilísticas e não probabilísticas e os dados qualitativos
+(as letras) que convidam a amostragens por caso único ou por
+casos múltiplos. O estudo de caso único, foco deste texto, beneficia-
+-se das reflexões do autor sobre a “amostragem por caso único” que
+engloba três tipos de amostra: a amostra de ator, a amostra de meio
+(geográfico ou institucional) e a amostra de acontecimento (ou enredo)27.
+Nos limites da minha experiência no campo da pesquisa em
+direito, tenho observado sobretudo estudos de caso que demandam
+amostras do segundo e do terceiro tipo28.
+
+26 “A maioria dos investigadores vai querer comparar suas descobertas com pesquisas
+anteriores; por essa razão, as definições-chave não devem ser idiossincráticas. Em vez
+disso, cada estudo de caso ou unidade de análise deve ser semelhante àqueles previamente
+estudados por outras pessoas ou devem divergir de forma clara e operacionalmente
+definida” (Yin, 2001, p. 46).
+27 Estas possibilidades estão pensadas para o que o autor denomina “amostragem de microunidades
+sociológicas”, o que exclui macrounidades (uma cidade, por exemplo) e as
+pesquisas históricas que se debruçam sobre longo período de tempo (Pires, 2008, p. 175-6).
+28 Isso não significa que a amostra de ator seja incompatível ou desinteressante para
+a pesquisa em direito. Ao contrário, estudos sobre a biografia de juristas revelam-se
+muito enriquecedores para a compreensão do direito brasileiro e de suas práticas decisórias
+e institucionais. Ver, nesse sentido, a agenda de pesquisa de Rafael Mafei de
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+378
+As amostras de meio institucional constituem recursos ricos e
+bastante difundidos para a construção de objetos de pesquisa no
+campo do direito, mesmo quando a estratégia metodológica utilizada
+não é o estudo de caso: uma central de penas alternativas, uma
+unidade prisional, uma sala de audiências29. Por sua vez, as amostras
+de acontecimento (ou enredo) referem-se, para Pires (2008, p. 178),
+“a um fato institucional (ou cultural) singular, e mesmo único, que se
+produz graças às instituições ou à cultura e que, por esta razão, possibilita-nos
+apreender as mesmas em ação” (grifos no original). Nestas
+situações, diz Pires, “o interesse do pesquisador recai (...) mais sobre
+um acontecimento que ele julga estratégico para o conhecimento do
+que sobre um meio social ou uma história de vida” (Pires, 2008, p.
+178). É neste tipo de amostra que o autor insere exemplos de pesquisas
+que se ocupam de processos judiciais.
+No campo da pesquisa em direito, tem me parecido um tanto difícil
+distinguir entre a amostra de meio institucional e a amostra de acontecimento.
+O desenho jurídico de uma política pública - por exemplo,
+o Programa Nota Fiscal Paulista da Secretaria da Fazenda do Estado
+de São Paulo (Paschoal 2012), a Operação Centro Legal na Cracolândia
+(Carvalhido 2014), o ato da gestão Haddad que reduziu os limites de
+velocidade nas marginais (Passos 2017) – é acessado por intermédio
+
+Queiroz e, muito especialmente Queiroz, Acca e Gama (2017). No entanto, pelo que
+pude verificar até o momento, é incomum que os autores nomeiem esse tipo de pesquisa
+como um “estudo de caso”. Frequentemente são identificadas com a “pesquisa
+biográfica” ou “história de vida” - expressão também utilizada por Pires para descrever
+a amostra de ator (Pires, 2008, p. 176).
+29 Em sua pesquisa de pos-doc, Carmen Fullin realiza uma etnografia da CPMA-Mulher
+- a única experiência brasileira que temos notícia de uma central de penas alternativas
+“só para mulheres” - que inclui a observação das práticas de rotina e entrevistas com os
+profissionais desta instituição. Chloe Guéguen, em sua dissertação de mestrado, realizou
+pesquisa de campo na Unidade 1 do Complexo Prisional de Ribeirão das Neves e
+adotou, como estratégia metodológica prioritária, a realização de grupos focais na modelagem
+proposta pela “abordagem apreciativa” - appreciative inquiry (Gueguen 2017).
+Para uma ampla discussão metodológica e epistemológica sobre pesquisa de campo
+em instituições judiciárias, ver o trabalho de Barbara Lupetti Baptista (2008) que estudou
+as varas e câmaras cíveis do foro central do Rio de Janeiro para refletir sobre a materialização
+do princípio da oralidade no processo civil brasileiro.
+379
+
+de uma amostra de meio institucional ou de acontecimento? A mesma
+dificuldade aparece quando pensamos em processos legislativos ou
+judiciais: a tramitação de um projeto de lei pelo Congresso Nacional
+(Machado et al 2010) ou os processos judiciais que redundaram na
+invasão do Pinheirinho (Ginjo 2016), têm o meio ou o acontecimento
+como protagonista do critério de seleção amostral?
+Neste momento de minha reflexão, parece-me desnecessário, quase
+contraproducente, tentar distinguir entre estes dois tipos com vistas
+a indicar, globalmente, qual das duas possibilidades melhor expressa o
+critério utilizado para selecionar um caso. Mais que isso, parece-me que
+estes dois componentes – o acontecimento e o meio institucional - desempenham
+funções bastante complementares nesse percurso.
+Em algumas situações, um acontecimento pode funcionar como
+o “gatilho” para identificar os arranjos jurídicos e as instituições envolvidas.
+E essa operação pode se dar tanto retrospectivamente – os
+processos judiciais que geraram um dado acontecimento – quanto
+prospectivamente - situação em que o acontecimento de interesse
+é seguido por um conjunto de processos judiciais ou intervenções
+institucionais. A primeira situação, mais incomum e por isso mesmo
+digna de nota, pode ser ilustrada pela dissertação de mestrado de
+Milena Ginjo (2016) que parte da ação da polícia militar para efetuar
+uma reintegração de posse na comunidade do Pinheirinho em São
+José dos Campos para identificar a disputa jurídica que estava sendo
+travada sobre aquele espaço e que gerou, propiciou, permitiu a ação
+desastrosa da polícia. Ainda que a autora não tenha se apoiado na
+estratégia de estudo de caso para desenvolver a pesquisa, oferece
+uma possibilidade muito interessante para desenhar estudos deste
+tipo que se interessem por observar as implicações muito concretas
+do funcionamento do sistema de justiça.
+A segunda situação – do acontecimento para o arranjo jurídico
+institucional - tem suscitado diversas pesquisas no campo do direito.
+Em sua dissertação sobre “direito e políticas públicas”, Ana Beatriz
+Passos (2017) identificou a alteração de velocidade nas marginais de
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+380
+
+São Paulo como um acontecimento rico e estratégico para observar
+o modo como órgãos do executivo, do legislativo e do judiciário responderam,
+juridicamente, a esse acontecimento. No interior de cada
+um dos três poderes, foi necessário operar seleções também, como
+indica a autora em seu capítulo metodológico. É nesse momento que
+a modelagem tripartite proposta por Yin (contexto, caso, unidades
+de análise), apresentada na seção precedente, desempenha um papel
+crucial. Um percurso semelhante pode ser observado nas pesquisas
+voltadas a compreender as interações entre as áreas do direito
+e o modo como se relacionam os procedimentos civis, penais e administrativos.
+Com este interesse de pesquisa em mente, cria-se um
+critério adicional para selecionar o acontecimento (que propiciará os
+processos judiciais e administrativos): a existência de procedimentos
+em curso ou concluídos nas duas ou mais esferas jurídicas de interesse
+para a pesquisa30.
+Mas é possível também que o “acontecimento” que funciona
+como gatilho na seleção dos casos a analisar não seja um episódio
+concreto, mas uma “classe de eventos”. A pesquisa em curso de Poliana
+Ferreira permite ilustrar essa situação. A pesquisadora está interessada
+no modo como diferentes áreas do direito (o tribunal do
+júri, as varas cíveis, a corregedoria da polícia militar) lidam com a
+“abordagem policial com resultado morte” – e não com um episódio
+particular de homicídio praticado pela polícia militar.
+Nestes diferentes percursos em que um “acontecimento”, mais
+ou menos concreto, serviu como gatilho, como porta de acesso, a um
+arranjo jurídico institucional, é fundamental ter em mente que nos30
+Assim se operou a seleção do Caso TRT (Machado e Ferreira 2014) e do Caso Cegonheiros
+(narrativa do caso disponível em Tangerino e Abramovay, 2012, p. 42-55).
+Interessante observar que a pesquisa de Arthur Prado (2017) iniciou com um percurso
+deste tipo e, no decorrer da elaboração do estudo de caso, uma questão específica
+capturou o interesse do autor, convidando-o a operar novos recortes, eliminando os
+procedimentos administrativos e civis em curso e focalizando o material proveniente
+da esfera penal. Com isso, o pesquisador redefiniu a questão e o próprio objeto de sua
+pesquisa - como deve mesmo acontecer.
+381
+
+sa observação do acontecimento “em si mesmo” fica em segundo
+plano, ou melhor, fica constrangida pelo modo como as instituições
+que escolhemos analisar recortam, selecionam e reconstroem esse
+acontecimento. Ou ainda, de forma mais contundente: não é possível
+acessar o próprio acontecimento se nosso suporte de observação
+é circunscrito pelas percepções (obtidas em entrevistas) ou pela documentação
+produzida pelos atores institucionais. Como diz Pires,
+tratando justamente dessa questão, “... a instituição não só recorta o
+enredo primário (...), como o transforma, ao mesmo tempo, no sentido
+pleno do termo, em alguma outra coisa: ela participa do enredo”
+(Pires, 2008, p. 179).
+Nessas situações, Pires chama nossa atenção para um tipo de
+amostra que abrange “dois campos de acontecimentos virtuais superpostos
+e eventualmente unificados e transformados: o campo do
+enredo pré-institucional ou de fora da instituição, e o campo institucional
+do enredo (que é geralmente a criação de um novo enredo)”
+(Pires, 2008, p. 179). Parece-me que essa possibilidade de observar,
+em um estudo de caso, esses dois enredos, pré e pós-institucional,
+exige que a pesquisa contemple outras formas de acesso ao “acontecimento”,
+para além daquilo que foi percebido ou documentado
+pelas próprias instituições. Tenho em mente aqui a observação participante
+ou entrevistas com as pessoas envolvidas que, vale lembrar,
+também estarão constrangidas por outros fatores (que não os institucionais),
+como os pontos cegos e vieses do observador, os “artefatos
+da memória” dos informantes, etc.
+
+4. A narrativa e a análise
+Quivy e Campenhoudt (1992, p. 18), ao apresentarem o objetivo do
+livro, referem-se a “ajudar os seus leitores a efetuarem tanto investigações
+com uma certa envergadura, com ambições teóricas relativamente
+elevadas, como trabalhos mais modestos, desde que estes
+não se reduzam a uma simples descrição de fenômenos sociais, sem
+qualquer intenção compreensiva”. Esta formulação, talvez à revelia
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+382
+
+dos autores, parece estabelecer as qualidades de “envergadura” e
+“modéstia” de uma pesquisa em função de sua ambição teórica e de
+seu distanciamento de pretensões descritivas. Esta formulação me
+parece bem interessante para refletir sobre o tipo de contribuição
+que a estratégia de estudo de caso pode oferecer.
+Em primeiro lugar, por tudo o que foi dito até aqui, o trabalho de descrição
+do caso, contexto e unidades de análise não é uma tarefa simples,
+tampouco sem intenções compreensivas. O registro descritivo é
+altamente valorizado nesta estratégia, especialmente se pensarmos,
+com Blackburn, a descrição como um “juízo de observador” que
+se distingue do “juízo de avaliador” e do “juízo de prescritor” (Blackburn,
+1994, p. 77 e seguintes). De acordo com o autor, os juízos de
+primeiro tipo revelam constatações - e não apreciações (avaliações)
+ou recomendações (prescrições)31. A narrativa que realizamos no estudo
+de caso registra aquilo que observamos do material coletado,
+em função das seleções realizadas e dos objetivos da pesquisa. E não
+há nada simples em fazer uma boa descrição, rica e ao mesmo tempo
+sintética, do amplo material coletado32. No estudo de caso, a envergadura
+da pesquisa pode se dar em função da quantidade brutal de
+material a percorrer, sistematizar, bem como ao enfrentamento de
+enormes desafios na coleta desse material. Ou seja, a ambição pode
+estar também no plano empírico, não apenas no plano teórico.
+A narrativa não é o “caderno de campo”, nem a paráfrase dos
+autos processuais, tampouco a transcrição das entrevistas. De um
+
+31 Em outros termos, Naumes e Naumes (2006, p. 115) chamam atenção para esse
+ponto ao tratar do que denominam “objetividade” no estudo de caso: “[c]ase writers
+(…) need to be careful how they present material. It is inappropriate for case writers
+to lead the readers in the interpretation of data, information, and facts. Adjectives are
+particularly problematic. A reader may form an impression even from a single word as
+“successful” or “friendly”. Instead, the situation should be described as it occurred”. E
+eu acrescentaria, “... a situação deve ser descrita como ocorreu, a partir do ângulo e do
+modo de observação de quem realiza a pesquisa”.
+32 A literatura antropológica oferece riquíssimas reflexões sobre a arte de descrever.
+Para este propósito, gosto especialmente do primeiro capítulo do livro do Clifford Geertz
+(The interpretation of cultures) sobre a descrição densa (Geertz, 1973, p. 3-30).
+383
+
+modo provocativo, parece-me possível dizer que a narrativa é, em si
+mesma, o resultado de um processo analítico, especialmente se compreendermos
+“análise” nos termos propostos por Bernadet (1985, p.
+183). Para o autor, analisar é “descobrir mecanismos de composição,
+de organização, de significação, de ambiguidade, estabelecer a coerência
+ou as contradições entre estes mecanismos”. Esta formulação
+traduz bem o que fazemos diante do material coletado. Diante
+da miríade de informações – algumas mais fortes, apoiadas em mais
+de uma fonte, outras mais fracas, indiciárias, mas relevantes – lançamo-nos
+a encontrar e a propor mecanismos que nos permitam narrar
+o contexto, o caso, as unidades de análise. Nem sempre a ordem
+cronológica é a mais interessante e poderosa para os propósitos da
+pesquisa. As narrativas podem se organizar também a partir dos atores
+intervenientes, dos “nós” de interação institucional, do que nos
+pareça central ou marginal aos propósitos da pesquisa.
+A narrativa que construímos no estudo de caso comporta justamente
+essa intenção compreensiva: os documentos, entrevistas, diários
+de campo tornam-se um texto autoral que oferece um modo
+de organizar, compor, explicitar, um determinado evento do mundo
+jurídico. E, dessa forma, a narrativa, como análise, agrega algo fundamental
+ao material coletado. Nas palavras de Bernadet, a análise
+“faz evoluir a compreensão” pois ela “aumenta os circuitos” pelos
+quais podemos percorrer o material.33
+
+33 Bernadet, neste trecho, está tratando da análise de filmes e, portanto, tem em mente
+situações nas quais as leitoras e leitores de sua análise podem também ter assistido
+aos filmes. Este componente é interessante no campo da pesquisa, pois muitas vezes
+podemos desenvolver estudos de caso sobre fenômenos jurídicos que são, de certa
+forma, conhecidos por nossas leitoras e leitores. Isso não afasta nem diminui o interesse
+pela narrativa, pela análise, proposta pela pesquisadora ou pesquisador. Com
+este esclarecimento sobre a obra de Bernadet, transcrevo a íntegra do trecho citado
+acima: “O que é analisar um filme, tal como o fiz neste livro? É descobrir mecanismos
+de composição, de organização, de significação, de ambiguidade, estabelecer a coerência
+ou as contradições entre estes mecanismos. Não há dúvida de que isto faz
+evoluir a compreensão do filme e pode inclusive enriquecer a emoção que temos ao
+vê-lo, pois a análise aumenta os circuitos pelos quais podemos percorrê-lo” (Bernadet,
+1985: p. 183).
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+384
+Esta forma de compreender a narrativa traz uma série de implicações
+práticas para o percurso da pesquisa. A primeira, e fundamental,
+diz respeito ao cronograma de trabalho. A coleta do material precisa
+ser concluída (ou interrompida...) de modo a deixar bastante tempo
+para a reflexão sobre o modo como se constituirá a narrativa. Pela minha
+experiência, essa tarefa pode tomar até mais tempo que a coleta
+do material. É claro que pequenas seções podem ser redigidas ainda
+no processo de coleta – o que é muito salutar, especialmente se puder
+propiciar leitura e discussão no contexto das relações de orientação,
+em grupos de trabalho em congressos, em disciplinas ou com os
+colegas de turma. Mas elaborar a narrativa em sua forma final, contemplando
+os mecanismos de composição, apresentando de modo
+consistente o material, com suas diferentes fontes, e sendo ao mesmo
+tempo uma narrativa potente para os objetivos da pesquisa e instigante
+para as leitoras e leitores, pode tomar bastante tempo34. Este texto
+autoral, a narrativa do caso, pode ser elaborado em documento único
+ou, como me parece ser mais comum no quadro de programas de pós-
+-graduação, distribuída em diferentes capítulos. Claro que o texto único
+pode facilitar a reutilização do estudo de caso em outras pesquisas,
+bem como seu uso como material didático nos cursos em direito, mas
+pode também dificultar a estruturação de uma tese ou dissertação nos
+moldes com os quais trabalhamos atualmente.
+Insisto que a narrativa do estudo de caso pode, a depender do
+contexto e do tipo de pesquisa, constituir em si mesma uma contribuição
+para o campo jurídico – e em qualquer uma das cinco modalidades
+pensadas por Epstein e King (2013, p. 76) e reproduzidas acima.35
+Mas pode também funcionar como o subsídio, o apoio empírico,
+para um novo momento no percurso da pesquisa: a “generalização
+
+34 Naumes e Naumes (2006, p. 101-21) oferecem uma série de sugestões sobre a redação
+das narrativas, incluindo a organização, extensão, estilo e o tempo verbal. Insistem,
+especialmente, na atenção ao público-alvo da narrativa, na elaboração de uma introdução
+que coloque leitoras e leitores de imediato “dentro” do caso e na utilização de
+citações do material utilizado, com vistas a oferecer boa dose de “realismo” à narrativa.
+35 Ver nota 11, supra.
+385
+
+analítica”36. Este novo momento é incontornável em estudos de caso
+múltiplos e em pesquisas multi-métodos pois, do contrário, deixaríamos
+às leitoras e leitores a tarefa de comparar, cruzar, tecer e produzir
+novas inferências a partir das narrativas e demais dados produzidos,
+sem propormos as nossas em função dos objetivos mais gerais da
+pesquisa37.
+Mas as pesquisas baseadas em estudo de caso único também podem
+se lançar a este segundo momento, em que a narrativa do caso
+é mobilizada para uma nova tarefa analítica, isto é, uma nova rodada
+de buscas por mecanismos de composição. Isto implica que o planejamento
+da pesquisa, globalmente considerada, inclua também a coleta
+e a sistematização de outro tipo de material, com o qual colocaremos a
+narrativa do caso para “dialogar”. Prado (2017), por exemplo, confrontou
+sua narrativa sobre o “Caso dos Fiscais do ISS” com um balanço
+sobre o modo como a doutrina jurídica, nacional e internacional, concebe
+as ideias de obrigatoriedade e oportunidade da ação penal. Isso
+permitiu que o pesquisador retomasse certas passagens da narrativa,
+discutindo-a em função desses conceitos e, sobretudo, formulasse
+proposições - teóricas e, ao mesmo tempo, empiricamente fundamentadas
+- sobre os limites das formulações doutrinárias para observar e
+explicar o que ele descobriu com o estudo de caso.
+Para avançar sobre este ponto, vale a pena ler o capítulo de George
+e Bennett (2005, p. 109 e ss.) sobre como extrair implicações
+teóricas dos estudos de caso. Os autores explicitam vários tipos de
+generalização possíveis, tanto em pesquisas concebidas para favorecer
+a indução (desenvolvimento de teorias) quanto para pesquisas
+de caráter mais dedutivo (verificação de hipóteses teóricas).
+
+* * *
+
+36 Sobre a distinção entre generalização analítica e generalização empírica, ver Pires
+(2008, p. 159). Discuti este ponto em Machado (2013, p. 188-192).
+37 Ver, nesse ponto, as pesquisas mencionadas aqui envolvendo multi-métodos (Machado
+et al 2010; Silva 2007) e estudos de caso múltiplos (Davis et al. 2015; Machado 2013).
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+386
+
+Este capítulo buscou oferecer um primeiro conjunto de reflexões
+sobre as possibilidades de utilização do estudo de caso na pesquisa
+em direito para serem testadas, discutidas, revistas, abandonadas.
+Com o avanço e a difusão do uso desta estratégia, certamente uma
+série de questões metodológicas e epistemológicas surgirá, exigindo
+novos textos de reflexão. Mas para isso precisamos, todas e todos,
+investir no hábito de explicitar e discutir o como de nossas pesquisas.
+387
+
+5. Referências
+
+Baptista, B. L. (2008). Os rituais judiciários e o princípio da oralidade. Construção da
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+Bernardet, J. C. (1985). Cineastas e as Imagens do Povo. São Paulo: Brasiliense.
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+Bittar, E. (2012). Metodologia da pesquisa jurídica. Teoria e prática da monografia
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+Booth, W.; Colomb, G.; Williams, J. (2005). A arte da pesquisa. (trad. Henrique
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+Davis, K.; Jorge, G.; Machado, M. (2015). Transnational anticorruption law in action:
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+Machado, M. R.; Machado, M. R. A. (2015). Carandiru não é coisa do passado:
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+um balanço sobre as narrativas, os processos e as instituições, 23 anos
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+após o massacre. São Paulo: Acadêmica Livre. Disponível em http://bib-
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+no cinema – na sala de aula. Sistema Penal & Violência 6 (1), p. 103-16.
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+Machado, M. R.; Ferreira, L. (2014). Estudos sobre o Caso TRT. São Paulo:
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+Acadêmica Livre. Disponível em http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/
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+handle/10438/12028.
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+Machado, M. (2013). Contra a departamentalização do saber jurídico: a contribuição
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+In V. Silveira, Direito e desenvolvimento no Brasil do Século XXI (p. 177-
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+H.-G. (2006). Luhmann Explained: from souls to systems. Illinois:
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+Open Court.
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+Naumes, W; Naumes, M. (2006). The art and craft of case writing. 2a
+ ed. New
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+York: M. E. Sharpe.
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+Paschoal, B. (2012). Punição, recompensa, persuasão e ajuda: estratégias regulatórias
+a partir do caso Nota Fiscal Paulista. Dissertação. Programa de
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+Mestrado em Direito e Desenvolvimento da FGV Direito SP.
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+Passos, A. B. (2017). Limites de velocidade nas vias marginais de São Paulo:
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+qual o papel do direito na definição de uma política pública? Dissertação.
+
+Programa de Mestrado em Direito e Desenvolvimento da FGV Direito SP.
+
+Pires, A. (2008). Amostragem e pesquisa qualitativa: ensaio teórico e metodológico.
+In J. Poupart et al. (Org.), A pesquisa qualitativa. Enfoques
+
+teóricos e metodológicos (p. 154-211). Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.
+
+Prado, A. (2017). A construção da denúncia: o caso das fiscais do ISS em São
+
+Paulo e as práticas processuais de repressão à corrupção. Dissertação.
+
+Programa de Mestrado em Direito e Desenvolvimento da FGV Direito SP.
+
+Rodriguez, J. R. (2012). Pensar o Brasil: problemas nacionais à luz do direito.
+
+São Paulo: Saraiva.
+389
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+Queiroz, R. M.; Acca, T. S.; Gama, B. P. (2017). De los bancos universitarios a
+
+la toga: la trayectoria académica de los ministros del Supremo Tribunal
+
+Federal brasileño (1988-2013). Precedente 8, p. 67-104.
+
+Quivy, R.; Campenhoudt, L. (1992). Manual de investigação em ciências sociais.
+(trad. João Marques). Lisboa: Gradivas.
+
+Webley, L. (2010). Qualitative approaches to empirical legal research. In P.
+
+Cane et al. (Org.), The Oxford Handbook to empirical legal research (p.
+
+926-951). Oxford.
+
+Silva, F. S. (2007). Ensino jurídico: a descoberta de novos saberes para a democratização
+do direito e da sociedade. Porto Alegre: Sergio Fabris Editor.
+
+Stake, Robert (1978). The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry. Educational
+
+Researcher, 7 (2), p. 5-7.
+
+Tangerino, D.; Abramovay, P. (2012). Crime de cartel e a reparação de danos
+
+no Poder Judiciário. Brasília: Série Pensando o Direito, no 47.
+
+Yin, R. (2001). Estudo de caso: planejamento e métodos. Porto Alegre: Bookman.
+O estudo de caso na pesquisa em direito //
+Maira Rocha Machado
+390
+391
+
+12
+
+A “teorização fundamentada
+
+nos dados”: um método
+
+possível na pesquisa empírica
+
+em Direito1
+ // Riccardo Cappi
+
+Este capítulo pretende apresentar o método conhecido como Grounded
+Theory ou Teorização Fundamentada nos Dados (TFD) que, embora
+ainda pouco utilizado na pesquisa empírica em Direito – e em Ciências
+Sociais em geral – constitui uma ferramenta potente para realizar
+pesquisas empíricas nas quais se pretenda produzir teoricamente
+a partir e através das observações de campo.
+Cabem duas observações preliminares. Primeiramente, ainda
+que possa parecer supérfluo, vale afirmar que fazer pesquisa empírica
+não se restringe simplesmente a coletar dados relacionados a um
+determinado fenômeno. Os dados não existem por si só; eles sempre
+remetem a uma construção teórica do(a) pesquisador(a), mesmo se
+esta permanece implícita ou até inconsciente. Em segundo lugar, no
+
+1 Agradeço muito a leitura, os comentários as discussões e críticas de Maíra Rocha Machado
+e Poliana Ferreira, referentes a este texto e às diversas questões às quais ele se relaciona.
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+392
+
+momento em que a pesquisa pretende colocar em cena uma discussão
+teórica, aparece o problema da relação entre teoria e material empírico.
+Não é raro encontrar trabalhos divididos em duas partes completamente
+disjuntas: em geral, a primeira teórica e a segunda empírica. A disjunção
+aparece de forma nítida quando, na segunda parte, o texto apresenta
+poucas referências, genéricas e pontuais, ao arcabouço teórico desenvolvido
+cuidadosamente na primeira. O que aconteceu? Como lidar com
+esta distância? Como garantir que as categorias – as abstrações teóricas
+– mantenham uma relação estreita e bastante fiel com os fragmentos
+empíricos da realidade coletados no âmbito de uma pesquisa?
+Não existe uma única maneira de responder a estas perguntas.
+Glaser e Strauss propuseram uma forma de lidar com elas quando,
+em 1967, produziram o texto The Discovery of Grounded Theory, justamente
+com a intenção de garantir que as análises, as formulações
+teóricas, mantivessem a possibilidade de diálogo e aderência com
+os materiais empíricos coletados no decorrer das pesquisas. Nosso
+objetivo é apresentar a proposta da TFD, contextualizando-a metodológica
+e epistemologicamente no campo da pesquisa empírica em
+Direito, explicando e ilustrando seus diversos procedimentos, inclusive
+através da exemplificação.
+ Assim, numa primeira seção, trataremos de estabelecer alguns
+marcos da pesquisa empírica em direito que possam dialogar com o
+método da TFD. Em seguida serão apresentadas as grandes linhas do
+método, mostrando sua potencialidades e suas limitações. Na terceira
+seção, teremos como descrever o método, em suas diversas etapas.
+Enfim, será oferecida uma ilustração prática, entre outras possíveis,
+para facilitar a compreensão e mostrar os possíveis resultados
+da mobilização deste método.
+Antes de prosseguir vale propor duas notas: uma de esclarecimento
+e uma de encorajamento. Por um lado, não garantimos que a leitura deste
+texto permita o manejo seguro do método. Como qualquer outro método
+ou técnica de pesquisa, a TFD requer um tempo de exercício e de
+entrosamento pessoal por parte do(a) pesquisador(a) que, ao longo da
+393
+
+experiência vai certamente descobrir novas nuances, inclusive aquelas
+que remetem à forma pessoal de interpretar esta proposta que, por si só,
+se apresenta com o condão da flexibilidade e da adaptabilidade. Por outro
+lado, cabe redimensionar uma possível leitura ambiciosa da palavra
+“teorização”. Se é verdade que o método da TFD permite um movimento
+que vai do dado à abstração, vale perceber que este se encontra ao
+alcance do(a)s pesquisadore(a)s de qualquer nível acadêmico, mesmo
+sob a forma de criação de conceitos isolados, que não constituem ainda
+uma “teoria”, no sentido pleno da palavra . É a partir das ricas lembranças
+e dos ensinamentos adquiridos ao longo de orientações, inclusive e
+sobretudo na graduação, que foi possível redigir as linhas que seguem.
+
+1. A TFD e a pesquisa empírica (em direito)
+Se a metodologia da pesquisa empírica em direito diz respeito à utilização
+de uma série de técnicas, ela nos remete em primeiro lugar – e
+sobretudo – a uma reflexão prévia sobre a pesquisa que pretendemos
+realizar. O que pretendo conhecer? Por quê? Para que? Para quem?
+Como? Não se trata aqui de responder estas perguntas, mas de alertar
+para sua fundamental importância, a ponto de deixar para um segundo
+momento os aspectos técnicos, não menos importantes, que derivam
+logicamente desta reflexão prévia e das respostas fornecidas às
+perguntas evocadas acima. Parece-nos importante insistir sobre estes
+aspectos, uma vez que os manuais de metodologia, com raras exceções,
+não costumam frisar seu caráter indispensável na formulação
+do enredo da pesquisa, de seus rumos gerais, ou ainda de sua função
+específica. Assim antes de nos deter sobre a Teorização Fundamentada
+nos Dados, e seus aspectos técnicos, cabe entender em que tipo de
+pesquisa é útil pensar esta ferramenta metodológica.
+Em primeiro lugar, vale lembrar que a pesquisa empírica em direito2
+não pode ser concebida unicamente a partir da conhecida dis2
+Seguindo uma sugestão de Dan Kaminski, formulada no curso “Abordagens Indutivas
+na Pesquisa em Direito”, ministrado na FGV em 30/9 e 1/10/2016. Ver a integra do
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+394
+
+tinção entre “law in books” e “law in action”, voltada para o estudo
+das variações e descompassos entre as leis – num sentido amplo, incluindo
+doutrina e jurisprudência – e as práticas no universo jurídico.
+Isto porque a vocação da pesquisa empírica em direito não pode ser
+limitada ao estudo deste descompasso e, ainda menos, associada
+à ideia de que este deveria sistematicamente ser reduzido ou anulado.
+Tal perspectiva nos remeteria a uma vocação eminentemente
+normativa da própria pesquisa, isto é, a uma leitura instrumental da
+mesma: a pesquisa só serviria a conhecer e corrigir as lacunas ou defeitos
+na aplicação das leis ou ainda, a modificar as leis para levar em
+conta as aporias e contradições que emergem nas práticas. No limite,
+a pesquisa encontraria nas próprias leis a formulação do marco
+teórico guiando a verificação empírica. Ora, não é disto que se trata.
+A própria lei e as práticas jurídicas são entendidas aqui como o
+produto das ações e interações, de caráter essencialmente conflitivo,
+no âmbito da sociedade, que se trata de descrever, explicar, compreender
+através da pesquisa. Só num segundo momento, e em estrita
+decorrência dos resultados obtidos, torna-se possível – ainda que
+isto não seja um requisito sistemático – encarar a etapa prescritiva
+ou normativa, que inclui as recomendações referentes à temática
+estudada. Em outras palavras, pesquisar nos remete, em primeiro lugar,
+a buscar a descrição, explicação, compreensão dos fenômenos
+estudados para desvendar o “invisível” por trás do visível: “o problema
+é exatamente construir uma ordem ainda invisível de uma desordem
+visível e imediata” (Alves, 1981, p. 22).
+Para oferecer um recorte, ainda que grosseiro, do campo da pesquisa
+empírica em Direito, parece pedagógico propor a distinção,
+inspirada na proposta de Sutherland (1924)3
+, entre as pesquisas volcurso
+em:
+https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_y5G_Co3S0
+https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4TIe_xtBXg
+ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cy0xiLbKv8A
+3 Em sua obra seminal, Principles of Criminology, de 1924, os autores definem a crimi-
+395
+
+tadas para o estudo da produção das normas, aquelas voltadas para o
+estudo das práticas sociais que se relacionam com estas normas, e as
+que estudam as práticas voltadas para operacionalização das normas.
+Cada uma dessas pesquisas poderá, obviamente, selecionar o ângulo
+de observação, assim como os atores e práticas sociais, jurídicas, políticas
+a serem observadas mais especificamente. Assim, por exemplo,
+no âmbito da temática “violência doméstica”, podemos pesquisar os
+aspectos ligados à produção da Lei Maria da Penha, as próprias práticas
+de “violência doméstica” ou, ainda, a atuação de atores específicos
+empenhados em operacionalizar os ditames da lei – por exemplo
+delegada(o)s, promotora(e)s, juíza(e)s. Em todos os casos, trata-se de
+observar o que acontece, na tentativa de oferecer uma boa descrição,
+qualitativa e/ou quantitativa, uma explicação e/ou uma compreensão
+plausível, partindo da ideia de que o descompasso entre normas e práticas
+é algo perfeita e evidentemente esperável, tratando-se sobretudo
+de produzir uma elucidação dos fenômenos observados – inclusive a
+entidade do dito descompasso e as condições de sua produção – que,
+em última análise, poderá (ou não) auxiliar na formulação de proposições
+prescritivas referentes à temática em tela.
+Outro aspecto importante a ser mencionado para contextualizar
+o método da TFD, remete à distinção recorrente no âmbito metodológico,
+entre pesquisas dedutivas e pesquisas indutivas. Dedução e
+indução são operações lógicas realizadas pela pesquisadora e pelo
+pesquisador para chegar à produção de conhecimento. Assim, a dedução
+refere ao método utilizado mais tradicionalmente na ciência
+– e nas ciências sociais – cujo objetivo é, em geral, a verificação de
+hipóteses elaboradas a partir de um marco teórico preestabelecido.
+Já a indução prevê um outro tipo de operação cognitiva: as hipóteses
+são geradas a partir das emergências da observação. Temos, neste
+
+nologia como “o conjunto de conhecimentos sobre o delito como fenômeno social. Inclui
+em seu âmbito os processos de elaboração das leis, de infração das leis e de reação à
+infração das leis”. Acrescentam dizendo que este processo constitui uma “sequência de
+interações mais ou menos constante”.
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+396
+
+caso, inversão da proposta hipotético-dedutiva, na qual o quadro teórico
+é previamente construído ou adotado, antes da aproximação
+aos dados empíricos, para que estes sejam observados a partir daquele,
+isto é, para que a hipótese inicial seja, ou não, confirmada. A
+ilustração a seguir, nos ajuda a entender a distinção, a complementaridade
+e a não dissociabilidade das duas perspectivas.
+
+Quadro 1. Indução e dedução na pesquisa empírica
+
+Vale insistir sobre a seguinte afirmação: se do ponto de vista conceitual,
+dedução e indução correspondem a duas operações distintas,
+elas de fato coexistem na prática da pesquisa – isto é na realização
+de qualquer pesquisa – em maior ou menor medida, podendo-se
+falar em pesquisa prevalentemente dedutiva e pesquisa prevalentemente
+indutiva para designar uma proposta específica de pesquisa,
+globalmente considerada4
+. Isto se deve ao movimento circular que
+caracteriza essencialmente a produção de conhecimento.
+Assim, em uma pesquisa prevalentemente dedutiva, parte-se de
+uma teoria relacionada com o fenômeno estudado, da qual se deduz
+
+4 Valeu a discussão com Maíra Rocha Machado que, neste volume, sugere que “a distinção
+aparece relevante, sobretudo, ao se desenhar a estratégia metodológica de
+uma pesquisa. Afinal, construir uma pesquisa para verificar a pertinência de uma afirmação
+em dado contexto é bastante distinto de buscar extrair deste contexto uma ou
+mais afirmações pertinentes”.
+397
+
+uma (ou mais) hipótese(s), destinadas a ser verificadas através da observação.
+Contudo, é possível – e até esperável – que no decorrer da
+observação apareçam novos elementos, inesperados, que levem a
+modificar as hipóteses iniciais e/ou a gerar novas hipóteses, ensejando
+assim a vertente indutiva da produção de conhecimento.
+De forma análoga, em uma pesquisa prevalentemente indutiva,
+parte-se da observação de um fenômeno, com alguns postulados,
+para que uma (ou mais) hipótese(s) ou afirmações sejam geradas.
+Contudo, estas hipóteses serão imediatamente testadas para conferir-lhes
+certa solidez: reencontramos a vertente dedutiva do movimento.
+Logo, o caráter prevalentemente dedutivo ou prevalentemente
+indutivo da pesquisa se deve à escolha do lugar de partida num
+processo concebido, necessariamente, como circular.
+Embora não seja possível aprofundar aqui tais importantes questões
+epistemológicas, cabe mencioná-las, inclusive para afastar a
+possibilidade de uma leitura ingênua do caráter “indutivo” atribuído
+à TFD. Como se deixou entender pelo uso do advérbio “prevalentemente”,
+não se trata aqui de sustentar que a TFD seja exclusivamente
+indutiva, o que seria de fato impossível, também porque a observação
+sempre é guiada por uma pré-leitura “teórica” da realidade por
+parte do observador-pesquisador, que jamais poderia ser concebido
+como neutro – esta nos parece, aliás, uma discussão superada.
+Mais precisamente, trata-se de afirmar que a TFD renuncia ao intento
+de trabalhar por verificação de uma ou mais hipóteses preestabelecidas
+a partir de um marco teórico dado; ela visa, ao contrário, a
+geração de hipóteses, levando à criação de uma proposta teórica – fundamentadas
+na observação da realidade empírica – que, por sua vez
+se torna objeto de verificação, discussão e comparação, à luz de outras
+formulações teóricas já existentes. Assim, o objetivo é a “elaboração de
+uma teoria, decerto enraizada na realidade empírica, porém não constituindo
+uma simples descrição; os casos empiricamente observados
+não são aí considerados em si mesmos, mas sim, como instâncias do
+fenômeno social observado” (Laperrière, 2008, p. 353, grifo da autora).
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+398
+
+Podemos então afirmar que toda pesquisa empírica requer uma vertente
+de criação e uma vertente de verificação da teoria, ambas propondo
+a formulação de uma relação plausível entre “empiria” e “teoria”–
+sempre difícil de ser encontrada, qualquer que seja seu sentido.
+Assim, a distinção mais importante remete ao ponto de partida de
+uma pesquisa e não à possibilidade de negligenciar a dimensão teórica,
+como poderia sugerir uma compreensão superficial dos métodos
+prevalentemente indutivos. Entendemos, assim, que a distinção entre
+pesquisa dedutiva e indutiva possa ser concebida como secundária.
+Outra distinção, tradicionalmente encontrada nas discussões sobre
+metodologia da pesquisa, é aquela entre métodos quantitativo e
+qualitativo. Se é importante do ponto de vista da operacionalização
+do trabalho de pesquisa, cabe dizer que ela é absolutamente secundária
+do ponto de vista conceitual, uma vez que em toda pesquisa
+haverá elementos qualitativos – na concepção, na análise, por exemplo
+– que, em alguns casos, serão traduzidos em números. A TFD se
+presta para trabalhos essencialmente qualitativos, não podendo ser
+excluída a utilização de métodos quantitativos associados (Strauss;
+Corbin, 2008, p. 39 – 45).
+Para além dessas distinções, a TFD constitui um método que valoriza
+o caráter de descoberta da pesquisa, fomentando a criatividade
+e a sensibilidade do(a) pesquisador(a), sua flexibilidade na observação
+e análise, conjugada com o rigor e a sistematicidade que estas
+requerem. Em outras palavras, a TFD coloca o(a) pesquisador(a) “em
+uma viagem” cujo roteiro inicial será certamente reelaborado em
+função das circunstâncias e das descobertas da pesquisa, sempre segundo
+um procedimento – descritos nas páginas que seguem – que,
+por sua vez, jamais é entendido como estanque em relação a outros
+âmbitos de produção de conhecimentos e ideias, notadamente os da
+política e da ética.
+Entendemos que não existe pesquisa neutra, desde a formulação
+da pergunta de partida até a utilização dos resultados. Assim, no nosso
+caso, valorizamos as pesquisas onde, de maneira geral, estão em pauta
+399
+
+as relações que se estabelecem entre as faces “cis” e “trans” – do lado
+de cá e do lado de lá – do poder, sendo estas comumente associadas a
+características raciais, de gênero, de situação específica dos atores no
+tabuleiro socioeconômico, político e cultural ou, ainda, à interseccionalidade
+desses vetores de opressão, dominação e discriminação.
+Além disto, a TFD nos parece apropriada para observar a maneira
+como observamos no decorrer da pesquisa. Tal opção pela reflexividade,
+além de nos ajudar frente às possibilidades de contradição interna –
+isto é do(a) pesquisador(a) consigo mesmo –, nos obriga a prestar atenção
+a nosso processo de construção de categorias, de diferenciação das
+mesmas com as categorias dos atores observados, considerando que
+nós pesquisadore(a)s nunca estamos em posição completamente externa
+em relação a nosso objeto e que a produção teórica (incipiente)
+consiste na elaboração de um ponto de vista sobre os pontos de vista,
+que será sempre necessário confrontar com as teorias existentes.
+
+2. Aspectos básicos da “Teorização Fundamentada
+nos Dados” (TFD)
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” (Glaser e Strauss, 1967;
+Strauss e Corbin, 2008; Guerra, 2006; Laperrière, 2008) foi apresentada
+pela primeira vez por Glaser e Strauss, em 1967, como um método
+de pesquisa que permite elaborar hipóteses, produzir conhecimentos
+teóricos, a partir da observação dos dados empíricos. Trata-se de um
+método geral, procedendo por análise comparativa, que permite gerar
+proposições teóricas fundamentadas nos dados empíricos. Notemos
+que, a rigor, a palavra “dados” não é adequada, pois ela traduz apenas
+muito imperfeitamente a ideia de uma operação – do(a) pesquisador(a)
+– que consiste sobretudo extrair algo do objeto observado.
+A TFD constitui tanto um modelo de construção da teoria, quanto
+um procedimento de análise de materiais empíricos, rendendo conta
+da relação, sempre complexa, que pode – e deve – existir entre
+a teoria, o método e os dados empíricos. Segundo seus autores, na
+tentativa de construir uma formulação teórica aderente à realida-
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+400
+
+de, a TFD surge como resposta a uma dupla carência encontrada na
+produção científica da época, que encontramos ainda nos trabalhos
+atuais. Por um lado, eles denunciavam o baixo nível de teorização
+alcançado pelas pesquisas, quantitativas em sua maioria, mais interessadas
+na “neutralidade” das coletas e acúmulos de dados. Por
+outro, contestavam a maneira forçosa de as teorias “arredondarem”
+os dados para que correspondessem, a posteriori, aos quadros conceituais
+previamente situados. Neste sentido, a TFD se caracteriza
+por sua diferença em relação aos métodos cujo objetivo é, em geral,
+a verificação ou a corroboração de hipóteses elaboradas a priori, deduzidas
+de um marco teórico preestabelecido. Vale lembrar que um
+método de cunho prevalentemente indutivo, prevendo a produção
+de formulações teóricas fundamentadas na empiria observada, não
+engaja o(a) pesquisador(a) a produzir uma “teoria” no sentido mais
+completo da palavra: o resultado da TFD pode consistir simplesmente
+na criação de hipóteses e/ou de conceitualizações incipientes.
+A TFD se inscreve na tradição sociológica americana da Escola de
+Chicago, conhecida por sua exigência de articulação entre dados e
+teoria, e mantém relações tanto com a fenomenologia – e sua tentativa
+de abstrair das “pré-noções” – quanto com o interacionismo
+simbólico – que atribui importância ao ponto de vista dos atores que
+interagem na construção social da realidade. A TFD explicita as regras
+metodológicas pelas quais se busca construir uma formulação
+teórica enraizada em dados empíricos, essencialmente qualitativos.
+Tratando-se de articular a análise rigorosa e sistemática à possibilidade
+de dar conta da riqueza e da complexidade da realidade, a TFD
+propõe uma construção teórica que seja, por um lado, aderente à
+realidade e que, por outro lado, garanta uma capacidade de compreensão
+ou de explicação teórica da mesma. Isto significa que ocorre
+uma simultaneidade entre a coleta e a analise dos dados (Tarozzi,
+2011, p.23). Trata-se de um método que se propõe como constantemente
+exploratório, onde as hipóteses e as formulações teóricas vêm
+sendo geradas – e consequentemente verificadas – no decorrer da
+401
+
+pesquisa, sempre em busca de “casos negativos” (Pires, 2008, p. 90-
+91) que possam aprimorar essas elaborações.
+Isto significa que a TFD não requer um marco teórico no sentido
+tradicional da expressão, isto é, a mobilização de uma teoria – uma
+sistematização explicativa da realidade estabelecendo relações de
+caráter geral entre suas variáveis – traduzida em hipótese, formuladas
+previamente, a serem verificadas através da pesquisa. Contudo,
+isto não exime o(a) pesquisador(a) em TFD do contato com a teoria,
+muito pelo contrário. Este contato se dará em pelo menos em três
+momentos. Primeiramente, com a adoção de postulados – que não
+demandam verificação – dando conta da ancoragem teórica do(a)
+pesquisador(a), isto é, de seu ponto de partida ou olhar sobre o objeto
+observado. Em seguida, com a prática constante de uma sensibilidade
+teórica amadurecida pel(a) pesquisador(a), através de leituras
+e experiências prévias. Enfim, na necessária confrontação das formulações
+teóricas resultantes da própria pesquisa com outras formulações
+teóricas existentes.
+Antes de prosseguirmos a apresentação do método proposto,
+cabe explicitar, ainda que rapidamente, alguns posicionamentos
+adotados aos quais será feito referência ao longo deste texto. Em
+primeiro lugar, cabe definir uma teoria como uma sistematização
+cognitiva da realidade, que se dá através da explicitação das relações
+que subsistem entre algumas das características (ou variáveis)
+dessa realidade. As características da realidade remetem tanto aos
+elementos “objetivos” da mesma quanto às maneiras de os atores
+sociais de interpretá-los. Nesta apresentação, será dada especial
+atenção às maneiras específicas de os atores produzirem representações
+da realidade, atribuindo-lhe sentido, num contexto específico.
+Em outras palavras, enfatizaremos a possibilidade que a TFD
+oferece para compreender – e formular teoricamente – o ponto de
+vista e as significações construídas pelos atores sociais num “campo”
+específico (Bourdieu, 2001). Isto permite privilegiar uma modalidade
+de pesquisa dita compreensiva (Pires, 2008) que, diferentemente da
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+402
+
+pesquisa explicativa – em busca de relações causais para dar conta
+da explicação de um fenômeno – dedica-se mais especificamente à
+compreensão das maneiras pelas quais os sujeitos observados raciocinam
+e interpretam a realidade. Entende-se, portanto, que a “realidade”
+é uma construção social que se elabora no decorrer das interações
+entre os atores. São essas construções de sentido que a TFD
+nos ajuda a compreender, cabendo inclusive explicitar e questionar
+reflexivamente – até onde for possível – a maneira específica através
+da qual o(a) pesquisador(a) “constrói” a realidade, ao observá-la.
+A TFD é especialmente indicada para estudar as práticas e as maneiras
+de pensar, as maneiras de definir as situações e de conceber
+as ações, por parte dos atores, e pode ser também utilizada para o
+estudo das trajetórias das pessoas (ex.: histórias de vida), de situações
+características (ex.: audiências de custódia) e do funcionamento
+das organizações (ex.: uma delegacia). Conjugando criatividade e
+sistematicidade, sensibilidade e objetividade, a TFD propõe um percurso
+inicialmente aberto à diversidade das interpretações, às múltiplas
+possibilidades, sendo o(a) pesquisador(a) chamado(a) a ser
+paciente, a gerar uma lista de opções antes de escolher, a proceder
+por comparações sucessivas para captar os diversos fragmentos da
+complexidade que se oferece na sua frente. Na TFD, a emergência é
+a base de tudo: trata-se de ficar aberto, de não “entender” rapidamente
+demais, de não começar a pesquisa com conceitos preestabelecidos,
+mas fazer com que eles emerjam da observação e da escuta
+dos atores e das situações. Neste sentido é preciso ter tolerância à
+ambiguidade, fugir dos esquemas, se dispor a avançar e retroceder.
+Vale afirmar que atribuímos um valor específico à interpretação da
+TFD em chave construtivista: “o conhecimento é fruto de uma construção
+recíproca entre o(a) pesquisador(a) e os sujeitos da pesquisa
+e põe, portanto, no centro da investigação como dados da pesquisa,
+mais do que os fatos, a dimensão do significado” (Tarozzi, 2011, p.51).
+Assim, como sugerem Strauss e Corbin (2008), algumas aptidões são
+especialmente indicadas para seguir o caminho da TFD, ainda que não
+403
+
+se exija que sejam plenamente desenvolvidas por quem está iniciando.
+Vejamos quais são algumas delas (Strauss e Corbin, 2008, p.21):
+
+• capacidade de retroceder e analisar criticamente as situações
+• capacidade de pensar abstratamente
+• capacidade de ser flexível e ser aberto a críticas construtivas
+• sentido de absorção e devoção ao processo de trabalho
+
+Estas habilidades remetem, em síntese, à capacidade de produzir
+abstração de forma rigorosamente atenta aos elementos da realidade
+que se apresentam. Radicalizando, em alguns casos, além de
+entrar em campo sem hipótese, o(a) pesquisador(a) em TFD poderá
+entrar em campo sem questão: será o próprio contato com o campo
+que ajudará a definir a questão – nem muito aberta, nem muito estreita
+– que possa orientar o resto da pesquisa.
+Uma formulação, de caráter geral, de uma questão de pesquisa
+que a TFD permite enfrentar, poderia ser “Como os atores x, y, z lidam
+com problema P, no contexto C?”. Centrada em torno do “como”, ela
+pode inaugurar uma pesquisa sobre as maneiras de fazer e de pensar,
+contextualizadas, no âmbito do direito, em uma das modalidades sugeridas
+anteriormente – produção da norma, condutas relacionadas
+à norma, práticas voltadas para colocar em prática a norma.
+Trata-se de um tipo de pesquisa que permite explorar em profundidade
+as práticas, os discursos e/ou as ideias – e as relações entre
+estes elementos – dos atores sociais e jurídicos, em determinado contexto
+e determinada situação. Assim, é possível estudar, só para citar
+alguns exemplos, as ideias dos parlamentares no âmbito da produção
+legislativa, as posições e argumentos dos ministros do STF num
+determinado acórdão, as representações do processo por parte de
+atores envolvidos no mesmo, ou as respostas do sistema de justiça
+– penal, cível e administrativa – frente a situações classificadas como
+ilícitos. Enfim, a TFD permite estudar o que as pessoas fazem, dizem e
+pensam, inclusive sobre o que elas mesmas e os outros fazem. A TFD
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+404
+
+facilita, através da observação e da escuta, o estudo dos processos – o
+“como” –, e de suas variações em contexto, mais do que o estudo das
+causas – o “por que” –, ainda que este não seja excluído.
+Assim pode-se afirmar que a TFD não é indicada para pesquisas
+onde já se tem um conjunto de hipóteses a serem verificadas, dentro
+de um protocolo preestabelecido, ou ainda naquelas pesquisas em
+que o(a) pesquisador(a) elegeu um marco teórico específico que norteará
+o conjunto da observação e da análise. Desta maneira, a TFD
+não é aconselhada para os(as) pesquisadores(as) inteiramente voltados
+para verificação de hipótese e teorias preexistentes, tais como
+aquelas já impostas, a priori, por seus (suas) orientadores(as).
+
+3. O método da TFD
+Cabe agora explicitar as regras metodológicas para construir uma
+formulação teórica aderente à realidade, conforme proposta geral
+da TFD, para dar conta de sua complexidade através de uma análise,
+sempre entendida como o estabelecimento de uma relação entre
+pesquisador(a) e objeto de estudo.
+A TFD constitui um método de análise de matérias essencialmente
+qualitativas, que merece ser descrito aqui nas suas grandes linhas,
+antes que o ilustremos através de exemplos concretos. Cabe ressaltar
+a dificuldade de descrever um método como o da TFD, uma vez
+que ele se baseia num processo onde se faz necessário alternar, de
+maneira repetida e flexível, a observação dos dados empíricos e a
+formulação de enunciados teóricos, tornando-se estes sempre mais
+gerais e abstratos, no decorrer deste processo de mão dupla. Pode-
+-se afirmar, contudo, que se trata de um procedimento de tipo circular,
+em que se passa continuamente dos dados aos conceitos, e
+vice-versa, sem ser possível separar claramente as duas operações
+em constante interação. Isto implica que as etapas previstas, a depender
+da pesquisa, não sejam sempre realizadas na mesma ordem
+cronológica ou que a ordem seja modificada no decorrer da pesquisas
+ou, ainda, que seja necessário repetir algumas sequências – até
+405
+
+por várias vezes – para obter o resultado esperado. Em função de tal
+flexibilidade, a descrição que segue tem, sobretudo, um caráter pedagógico,
+pois a peculiaridade de cada pesquisa levará à adoção de
+procedimentos específicos. Esta dificuldade para explicar o método
+pode ser ilustrada através de uma simples analogia: existe uma diferença,
+e uma necessária defasagem, entre explicar como se nada e o
+fato de nadar. A supor que seja possível identificar e detalhar formalmente
+as operações singulares que constituem o fato de nadar, é fácil
+pensar que cada nadador(a) possa adotá-las seguindo uma ordem
+e um número de repetições diferentes, ditados pelas circunstâncias
+e por sua sensibilidade específica. Vale lembrar que só será possível
+aprender a nadar através da própria experiência em meio aquático:
+uma explicação bem compreendida não garante de forma alguma,
+por si só, que se possa nadar simplesmente em função dela.
+Esta simples constatação pode ser aplicada à sequência de seções
+do presente capítulo. Se as linhas que seguem aparecerem por
+demais abstratas, sugerimos de começar pela leitura do exemplo
+que, uma vez compreendido, permite retornar com maior segurança
+a esta descrição mais conceitualizada.
+Antes de prosseguir, é importante notar que a TFD não privilegia
+um método específico para coleta dos dados que serão analisados.
+Tratando-se de um método de análise de dados qualitativos, diversos
+métodos de coleta poderão ser utilizados de maneira simples ou
+combinada, tais como a entrevista, a observação de caráter etnográfico
+ou, ainda, a utilização de textos e documentos5
+.
+Assim, com a clara compreensão de que a TFD consiste em uma
+prática analítica, podemos nomear suas três etapas fundamentais: a
+codificação aberta, a codificação axial e a codificação seletiva. De maneira
+geral, a codificação é uma operação de análise através da qual
+o(a) pesquisador(a) divide, conceitualiza e categoriza os dados em5
+Não aprofundamos a discussão destas técnicas de coleta, certamente tratadas em
+outras contribuições reunidas nesta obra.
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+406
+
+píricos que ele selecionou anteriormente – o seu corpus empírico –,
+podendo estabelecer, por sua vez, novas relações, de caráter teórico,
+entre os resultados dessas operações analíticas.
+A codificação aberta (Strauss e Corbin, 2008, p. 103-122) é aquela
+que prevê a formulação de códigos, isto é, de conceitos para os elementos
+que compõem a realidade observada: qualquer dado observado,
+neste estágio, é passível de codificação. Ela pode ser comparada
+com uma “análise ao microscópio”. Na frente de um texto (ex. de
+uma entrevista) ou de outro tipo de observação, o(a) pesquisadora
+precisa categorizar os elementos desta observação, isto é, formular
+conceitos, entidades mais abstratas para designar uma unidade de
+sentido (ou incidente) na observação; trata-se, nesta fase, de encontrar
+conceitos que sejam quanto o mais próximos possível aos dados
+empíricos. A princípio, tudo o que aparece merece ser codificado,
+com conceitos associados aos dados, e com um baixo nível de abstração.
+Em alguns casos, pode-se até simplesmente utilizar os mesmos
+termos adotados pelos atores observados para, em seguida,
+elaborar categorias mais abstratas e abrangentes.
+Vale ressaltar que, de um ponto de vista prático, é indispensável
+assumir um sistema rigoroso de anotação das operações de codificação
+– através de memorandos, anotações ao lado do texto ou programas
+informáticos6
+ que facilitam o trabalho – sem presumir por antecipação
+a relevância analítica de qualquer categoria formulada, até
+que ela apareça como relevante ao longo deste minucioso processo
+de “ida e volta” entre a observação e a codificação (Strauss e Corbin,
+2008, p. 65 e seguintes).
+Note-se que as primeiras categorias elaboradas já possuem uma
+dupla natureza: por um lado, elas são abstratas – traduzindo a operação
+analítica do(a) pesquisador(a) –, por outro, elas são enraizadas
+nos dados, isto é traduzem uma relação estreita ao dado empírico.
+
+6 Sugerimos os programas WEFT-QDA – simples e em acesso livre –, útil par quem começa,
+ou os programas mais sofisticados Atlas e NVivo.
+407
+
+Elas são, ao mesmo tempo, analíticas e fundamentadas.
+Na sequência, os diversos conceitos elaborados podem ser reunidos
+em categorias e subcategorias mais abrangentes, quando remetem
+a um mesmo universo de sentido. A codificação aberta prevê também
+a descoberta das propriedades (ou modalidades) das categorias,
+bem como as dimensões das mesmas – por exemplo, a frequência, a
+intensidade e a duração observadas. Para maior clareza, entendemos,
+por exemplo, que “a maneira de conceber a resposta penal” é uma
+categoria, à qual podem corresponder diversas modalidades como
+“castigo”, “ressocialização”, “resolução do conflito” e cada uma dessas
+modalidades pode ser dimensionada, tanto pela sua frequência de
+aparição quanto pela intensidade com a qual é expressada.
+A codificação axial (Strauss e Corbin, 2008, 123-142) consiste na
+comparação das categorias abstraídas dos dados empíricos, bem
+como de suas propriedades e dimensões, para começar a elaborar
+uma articulação teórica entre elas, devendo ser confirmada pelo retorno
+às observações iniciais. Durante esta fase, algumas categorias
+aparecem como centrais na análise. Torna-se então possível o estabelecimento
+de (cor)relações entre categorias, ou entre categorias e
+propriedades. Este procedimento deve levar à elaboração de hipóteses
+que se tornarão sempre mais consistentes, à medida que forem
+testadas novamente com os dados empíricos, rumo à estabilização
+de uma proposta teórica, assim enraizada na observação.
+Enfim, a codificação seletiva (Strauss e Corbin, 2008, 143-160) é
+aquela que permite a integração final de uma proposta teórica, em
+torno de uma categoria ou de uma narrativa central, funcionando
+como pivô ao redor do qual todas as categorias giram. Procede-se,
+portanto por redução, sendo a teoria produzida com um número mais
+restrito de conceitos, porém de um nível teórico mais denso – e de
+maior abstração – aplicável a um maior número de situações. Em outras
+palavras, encontra-se, nesta fase uma linha narrativa que oferece
+uma nova conceitualização do objeto, identificando o “problema
+teórico central” da pesquisa que, obviamente, continua passível de
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+408
+
+complementações ulteriores. Em definitiva, trata-se de desvendar relações
+significativas e recorrentes entre categorias (e suas dimensões)
+válidas para o conjunto de dados empíricos observados.
+As formulações teóricas assim produzidas representam um mapa
+conceitual da realidade estudada: com um número restrito de conceitos,
+gera-se uma leitura mais abstrata, possivelmente aplicável a um
+número maior de situações, passível de complementações ulteriores.
+Este conjunto de operações de codificação é realizado até atingir
+a saturação, isto é, até o momento em que as novas observações oferecem
+apenas novos exemplos que se encaixam nas categorias e propriedades
+já existentes, sem que haja necessidade de remanejá-las,
+pois não aparece nenhum dado novo relevante. Desta forma, a teoria
+emergente encontra-se estabilizada: o pesquisador entende que as
+categorias construídas, bem como as relações que as interligam, têm
+plausivelmente um caráter de generalidade, pelo menos em relação
+aos dados observados. Além de não serem lineares, estes passos são
+intimamente ligados à sensibilidade teórica do pesquisador (Laperrière,
+2008; Strauss e Corbin, 1998; Guillemette e Luckeroff, 2009), isto
+é, seus conhecimentos teóricos prévios, sua cultura e suas experiências
+prévias, que desempenham um papel crucial, para a observação
+da realidade e a elaboração de formulações progressivamente mais
+abstratas da mesma. Enfim, vale ressaltar que o próprio método da
+TFD pode ser combinado, em diversos momentos, com outras técnicas
+de análise, em função dos objetivos da pesquisa.
+
+4. Uma ilustração da utilização da TFD: uma
+análise dos discursos parlamentares
+Como dito antes, a TFD permite explorar em profundidade práticas,
+discursos ou ideias – e as relações entre estes elementos – dos
+atores sociais e jurídicos, em determinado contexto e determinada
+situação. Assim, é possível estudar as representações do processo
+por parte de atores envolvidos no mesmo, as respostas do sistema
+de frente a situações classificadas como ilícitos, as posições e argu-
+409
+
+mentos de juízes ou, ainda, as ideias dos parlamentares no âmbito
+da produção legislativa.
+Apresentamos aqui, a título de ilustração, o procedimento utilizado
+para análise dos discursos parlamentares referentes à redução da maioridade
+penal, tal como foi conduzido em nossa pesquisa (Cappi, 2017).
+Esta privilegia a observação das “maneiras de pensar” as respostas às
+condutas criminalizadas dos jovens, através da análise dos discursos parlamentares,
+deixando em segundo plano o estudo das interações e das
+relações de poder entre os atores específicos que, ao longo do período
+mencionado, deram vida a este processo na esfera legislativa.
+Quais as “maneiras de pensar” o controle social e a justiça penal,
+presentes nos discursos dos parlamentares brasileiros, referentes à
+questão da redução ou da manutenção da maioridade penal? Esta
+é a questão inicial, da pesquisa que fundamenta esta contribuição
+e da qual serão apresentados aqui alguns aspectos metodológicos,
+referentes à utilização da TFD. A intenção era de identificar as diversas
+maneiras de ver e (re)construir a realidade social, bem como os
+modos de conceber as respostas para a delinquência juvenil, a partir
+de diversas « visões de mundo » (Bourdieu, 2001), ou de diversos « referenciais
+cognitivos » (Muller, 2000), as categorias através das quais
+se produz uma leitura do mundo.
+A análise foi conduzida a partir da observação dos textos das 37
+Propostas de Emenda Constitucional (PEC) voltadas para redução
+da maioridade penal e os discursos parlamentares que se referem às
+mesmas, entre 1993 e 20107
+, mobilizando o referencial metodológico
+da TFD. Apresentamos a análise dos conteúdos dos discursos parlamentares
+– favoráveis ou contrários à redução da maioridade penal
+
+7 A análise foi conduzida utilizando as comunicações nos plenários do Senado (85 discursos)
+e da Câmara (479 discursos), durante o período 1993-2010, reportados nas notas taquigrafadas
+nos respectivos sites. Os discursos foram obtidos, utilizando o motor de pesquisa
+dos sites, com a introdução da palavra-chave “maioridade penal”. Dados os limites do capítulo,
+não se encontram apresentados os numerosos passos para seleção da do corpus
+empírico. Para maiores detalhes remetemos à leitura de Cappi (2017).
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+410
+
+– segundo as três etapas que foram apresentadas de maneira mais
+abrangente na seção anterior.
+Tratando-se de apreender, de maneira ampla e aprofundada, as
+maneiras de pensar e as razões que animam a reflexão dos parlamentares,
+iniciou-se a análise a partir da subdivisão de cada discurso em
+sequências, que apresentassem uma unidade de sentido, de acordo
+com o que prevê a codificação aberta. Se tratava de atribuir um código
+a cada uma das sequências recortadas nos discursos. Estas categorizações,
+elaboradas pelo pesquisador, constituem a expressão condensada
+daquelas sequências. Lembramos que a codificação aberta
+“tem por objetivo fazer emergir dos dados o maior número possível
+de conceitos e categorias” (Laperrière, 2008, 361), sem limitar, a priori,
+o número dessas categorias. Vale observar que a “distância”, em
+termos de abstração, entre a sequência do texto selecionada e a categoria
+conceitual correspondente, não é sempre a mesma. Assim,
+algumas categorias aparecem como “já presentes” nos discursos parlamentares,
+emergindo de forma imediata, enquanto outras constituem
+o resultado de um maior trabalho de conceitualização por parte
+do(a) pesquisador(a). Isto não é de surpreender, pois as falas dos parlamentares
+constituem, bem antes da pesquisa em tela, uma reflexão
+sobre a mesma temática. Resumindo, o exercício da codificação aberta
+procede inicialmente com a leitura de cada discurso, dividido em
+sequências, onde se atribui um (ou mais) código(s) a cada sequência.
+Após um certo número de discursos lidos, se torna possível identificar
+a existência de codificações semelhantes. Neste caso é possível
+criar uma categoria única que constitui a síntese de um grupo
+de categorias elaboradas. Por exemplo, quando os parlamentares se
+referem aos jovens infratores, podem utilizar expressões como “adolescentes
+que assolam a vida das famílias” ou “jovens que destroem
+o futuro de uma pessoa” ou ainda “jovens que ameaçam o convívio
+social”. Neste caso escolheu-se uma codificação única para estas diversas
+expressões: “jovem como pessoa perigosa”.
+Continuando desta forma se torna possível elaborar um cer-
+411
+
+to número de códigos, que podem ser ordenados de forma lógica,
+constituindo categorias e propriedades, ou ainda, “categorias de categorias”,
+ou “macro-categorias”. Assim, por exemplo, após um certo
+número de codificações criou-se a macro-categoria “percepção do
+jovem delinquente”, que permite articular as diversas codificações
+referentes à maneira dos parlamentares perceberem os jovens transgressores
+– alvo potencial da redução da maioridade penal –, tais
+como: “pessoa perigosa”, “pessoa em fase de desenvolvimento”,
+“vítima”, “futuro da nação”, etc.. A criação dessas macro-categorias
+materializa a etapa da codificação axial, pela qual se procura estabelecer
+relações entre as categorias inicialmente codificadas. Vale relembrar
+que o método exposto impõe a releitura constante dos materiais
+empíricos, em função da manifestação de novas categorias.
+À medida que o procedimento é repetido, a emergência de novas
+categorias torna-se sempre menos frequente, até parar. Quando isso
+acontece pode-se plausivelmente entender que a saturação teórica
+foi alcançada, isto é, foi obtido um mapeamento conceitual satisfatório
+do material analisado ou, ainda, não encontramos mais trechos
+que não tenham sua categorização correspondente.
+O resultado dessa análise “exaustiva” é a produção de um quadro,
+no qual é possível tanto “ler” os discursos observados em função das
+categorias – construídas indutivamente – ou, ainda, observar transversalmente
+a ocorrência de cada categoria nos diversos discursos.
+Apresenta-se a seguir, a título de ilustração, uma tabela que mostra
+a lista de categorias elaboradas e organizadas, e a maneira como os
+discursos podem ser codificados através dessas categorias, a partir
+da leitura analítica dos mesmos. O quadro a seguir é meramente ilustrativo,
+não cabendo aqui a reprodução da tabela geral, elaborada
+para o conjunto dos discursos. Contudo, através dos exemplos de codificação
+– apresentados na coluna de esquerda – espera-se mostrar
+como este instrumento permite identificar, de maneira detalhada e
+sintética, as múltiplas nuances presentes nos discursos – numerados
+na tabela–, detectadas por este procedimento analítico.
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+412
+
+Quadro 2. Codificação dos discursos parlamentares sobre a maioridade
+penal8
+
+CATEGORIAS
+DISCURSOS
+
+1 2 3 4 Etc.
+
+Posição em relação à redução da maioridade
+penal
+
+Favorável x x
+
+Contrário x x
+
+Representação do problema
+
+Violência x x x x
+
+Violência institucional / estrutural x
+
+Segurança / insegurança x x x
+
+Criminalidade x x x
+
+Medo / perigo x x
+
+Evocação de uma demanda social por
+
+“punição” x x x
+
+Referência à mídia ou a fatos que chocaram
+a “opinião pública” x x x
+
+Contribuição significativa dos jovens à
+
+insegurança do país x x
+
+Consideração da complexidade do problema
+x x x
+
+Consideração da abordagem acadêmica
+
+do problema x x
+
+8 Ver Cappi (2017, p. 182-183)
+413
+
+Degradação moral da sociedade x
+
+Consideração da desigualdade social x x x
+
+Critica ao argumento da desigualdade x
+
+Percepção do jovem como:
+
+Perigoso x x
+
+Racional x
+
+Vítima x x x
+
+Pessoa em fase de desenvolvimento x x
+
+Semelhante x
+
+Futuro do país x
+
+Concepção da intervenção
+
+Crença na punição x x x
+
+Evocação da punição dos adultos x x x
+
+Evocação da ideia de retribuição x x
+
+Evocação da ideia de dissuasão x x x
+
+Evocação da ideia de reabilitação associada
+à ideia de punição x x
+
+Respeito aos direitos dos jovens x x x
+
+Crítica da privação de liberdade x x x
+
+Critica da ideia de retribuição x
+
+Responsabilização inerente ao castigo x x
+
+Responsabilização por meio da intervenção
+sócio-educativa x x
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+414
+Responsabilização pelo respeito à legalidade
+na intervenção x
+
+Neutralização x x
+
+Questionamento das garantias jurídicas x
+
+Evocação condescendente de práticas
+
+punitivas de tipo extralegal x
+
+Educação no decorrer da medida, associada
+à privação de liberdade x x
+
+Educação como alternativa ao castigo x
+
+Impossibilidade de reabilitação para todos x
+
+Autonomia como objetivo do processo
+
+educativo x
+
+Justiça restaurativa como alternativa à
+
+punição x
+
+Outras políticas propostas
+
+Política de assistência x x x
+
+Política social de prevenção x x x
+
+Transformações estruturais da sociedade x
+
+Políticas de segurança de tipo repressivo x x x
+
+Política de segurança integrada x x x
+
+Este resultado intermediário apresenta uma utilidade importante,
+pois constitui um mapa dos discursos contendo todos os aspectos
+selecionados pelo(a) pesquisador(a). Como qualquer mapa, ele
+ilustra de forma sintética e codificada uma determinada realidade,
+no nosso caso, os discursos parlamentares sobre a redução da maioridade
+penal. A precisão do mapa depende obviamente do trabalho
+415
+
+de leitura e codificação, durante o qual serão necessárias diversas
+leituras do material selecionado, até chegar ao ponto em que os aspectos
+julgados salientes neste material se encontram no mapa elaborado,
+desta vez de uma forma mais abstrata e condensada. Assim,
+fica evidente o caráter “enraizado” ou fundamentado nos dados, por
+um lado, e o esboço de uma abstração, por outro lado.
+Esta maneira de expor os resultados torna-se muito útil na análise
+de qualquer material qualitativo e facilita análises ulteriores, inclusive
+aquelas que pretendem “voltar” a uma discussão que pretenda
+observar o material empírico – e o esboço de teorização gerada a
+partir do mesmo – relacionando-o com elaborações teóricas já mais
+amplamente divulgadas na literatura sobre o tema.
+Vejamos a seguir um desdobramento dado a esta categorização,
+que constitui no nosso caso o momento da codificação seletiva. A etapa
+posterior no procedimento da análise proposta consistiu em construir, a
+partir do conjunto dos discursos codificados, uma tipologia desses discursos,
+já que se tratava de descortinar uma linha narrativa a partir de
+um número inferior de categorias, contudo mais densas e significativas.
+Embora cada discurso pronunciado seja único e singular, foi possível
+elaborar quatro discursos-tipo, entendidos como linhas narrativas fortes
+que oferecem uma síntese, com maior consistência teórica, das posições
+expressadas no conjunto do material analisado. Trata-se, de fato,
+de estruturas sintéticas de discursos, purificadas de elementos contingentes.
+De fato, elas oferecem uma resposta à pergunta inicial, dando
+acesso às “maneiras de pensar” ou racionalidades que perpassam os
+discursos sobre a maioridade penal. Relatamos a seguir os quatro discursos-tipo
+que foram construídos a partir da análise dos dados , sendo
+os dois primeiros favoráveis e os dois últimos contrários à redução da
+maioridade penal e os dois outros expondo a posição contrária.
+Apresentamos a seguir os discursos-tipo, tais como aprecem em
+Cappi (2017, p.184-187) ressaltando que esta construção constitui
+um desdobramento possível, e não obrigatório, entre outras opções,
+da utilização da TFD.
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+416
+
+1. O discurso da “punição”
+Este discurso oferece uma leitura que parte de uma percepção dramatizada
+da delinquência juvenil, entendida como contribuição expressiva
+para o panorama de insegurança generalizada e do medo
+que afetam a sociedade como um todo. Há uma referência recorrente
+à mídia e aos fatos que encontram ampla cobertura, com forte impacto
+na opinião pública. Esta é entendida como fonte de expressão
+da demanda “por uma solução”, que assumiria a forma de medidas
+punitivas duras, incluindo a redução da maioridade penal. Ao sentimento
+de insegurança amplamente relatado, faz eco a percepção
+de uma forte degradação moral; a leitura global do fenômeno desconsidera
+a complexidade do problema – a começar da sua inclusão
+num contexto sócio-histórico marcado por desigualdades de variada
+natureza – privilegiando uma análise simplificadora, emocional e
+contingente dos problemas sociais. Aqui, o discurso “acadêmico” é
+geralmente subestimado e pouco mobilizado. Os jovens – os “delinquentes”
+– são entendidos como elementos de uma classe perigosa,
+como “monstros” ou incuráveis, fortemente responsáveis pelo aumento
+da insegurança, do ponto de vista quantitativo e qualitativo,
+frente à qual é essencial reforçar a resposta punitiva, numa perspectiva
+explicitamente retributiva ou dissuasiva. Na mesma linha, aparecem
+argumentos que sugerem a necessidade de adotar medidas destinadas
+à neutralização, como as penas de longa duração ou mesmo
+a pena de morte. Aparece a noção de “responsabilidade” do menor,
+conceitualmente reduzida a uma simples consequência da dureza da
+sentença. Enfim, esse discurso parece afastar-se da perspectiva garantista
+que marcou a ascensão do direito penal moderno – incluindo
+a proteção dos direitos individuais – tanto no que diz respeito às
+modalidades processuais, quanto ao conteúdo da sanção proposta.
+A evocação condescendente de modalidades de punição extralegais,
+sugere que elas existem em grande escala na sociedade brasileira e
+que, no limite, chegam a constituir formas aceitáveis de resposta às
+transgressões dos jovens.
+417
+
+2. O discurso da “punição garantista”
+Este discurso apoia a redução da maioridade penal, numa perspectiva
+de redução gradual, ou condicional, da utilização das “medidas
+socioeducativas” em proveito do Direito Penal. A partir da leitura de
+insegurança que atribui um papel significativo à delinquência juvenil,
+o foco é posto na necessidade de punir os jovens infratores como
+os adultos, dada a ineficácia das medidas previstas pela lei atual. A
+referência à imprensa e aos fatos sujeitos a extensa cobertura da mídia
+é feita com tons menos dramáticos do que no discurso anterior.
+A leitura da realidade social leva em conta a complexidade dos problemas
+e propõe, além da redução da maioridade penal, uma série
+de medidas complementares, como as de políticas de assistência
+aos jovens ou, ainda, políticas de prevenção. São mencionados os
+perigos associados aos jovens infratores, embora reconhecendo que
+existem mecanismos sociais que colaboram para vulnerabilidade
+desta categoria. Dada a contribuição significativa dos jovens – menores
+de idade – para a insegurança da população, torna-se importante
+estender a resposta punitiva a este grupo da população, a partir do
+momento que é possível considerá-los plenamente responsáveis por
+suas ações. A responsabilidade penal, com respectivo aumento das
+penas, deve ser estendida também aos adultos que desempenham
+um papel significativo na determinação das condutas delituosas dos
+menores de idade. As funções retributiva e dissuasiva da pena aparecem
+claramente neste tipo de discurso que, todavia, não desconsidera
+a busca de objetivos educacionais ou terapêuticos, reconhecendo
+inclusive o impacto negativo da privação de liberdade, tal como praticada
+atualmente. Enfim, este discurso se inscreve nitidamente na
+perspectiva garantista do direito penal, que aposta essencialmente
+no teor aflitivo da resposta estatal, sem excluir outras formas de intervenção
+entendidas, contudo, a título complementar.
+
+3. O discurso da “proteção”
+Este terceiro discurso sustenta a manutenção da maioridade penal
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+418
+
+numa perspectiva de conservação do sistema de justiça juvenil estabelecida
+pela Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente. A leitura da delinquência
+atribui um papel importante aos mecanismos de exclusão social
+e à insuficiência das políticas públicas, como fatores significativos
+da vulnerabilidade juvenil. Sustenta-se uma abordagem baseada na
+“proteção integral” que prevê, para os jovens infratores, ações educativas
+e de tratamento, denunciando inclusive o impacto negativo da
+privação de liberdade. Aqui também é feita a referência aos meios de
+comunicação e à opinião pública, mas sem cair em afastando, contudo,
+visões sensacionalistas ou redutoras. A defesa da manutenção da
+maioridade penal fundamenta-se também na adoção de políticas de
+prevenção ou de assistência, frente aos problemas de insegurança.
+Os “jovens (criminosos)” são assim percebidos de forma menos hostil
+e também considerados vítimas de diversos mecanismos sociais que
+determinam sua fragilidade. São enxergados como sujeitos de direitos
+– formalmente estabelecidos pela Constituição e pelo Estatuto da
+Criança e do Adolescente –, que devem ser garantidos concretamente,
+inclusive pelo fato dos adolescentes serem “pessoas em fase de
+desenvolvimento”. A abordagem punitiva não está ausente deste discurso,
+especialmente no que diz respeito a sua função dissuasiva. Por
+um lado, encontra-se a valorização do aspecto aflitivo das medidas
+socioeducativas, considerado semelhante ao das respostas da justiça
+criminal; por outro lado, afirma-se a ideia ideia de maior punição para
+os adultos que têm a custódia dos jovens infratores. Novamente, a
+ideia de responsabilização está presente: da sociedade, pela garantia
+de direitos aos jovens; do adolescente, em relação à sua conduta; da
+família, que é encarregada da educação do jovem. Enfim, podemos
+dizer que este discurso sustenta a visão de “proteção”, seguindo a tradição
+dos sistemas de justiça juvenil tal como se desenvolveram nos
+países ocidentais durante o século XX, o que não exclui a referência, a
+título complementar, a respostas punitivas, de caráter aflitivo, ainda
+que legalmente regulamentadas.
+419
+
+4. O discurso radical
+Este último discurso, além de apoiar a manutenção da maioridade
+penal nos termos atuais, difere significativamente do anterior. Em primeiro
+lugar, quando descreve a violência e a insegurança, faz referência
+à dimensão estrutural do problema. A referência à mídia só aparece
+através de uma leitura crítica: esta oferece ao público ferramentas
+empobrecidas e redutoras para análise dos problemas, notadamente
+o da insegurança. Nesta perspectiva, afirma-se a necessidade de um
+exame aprofundado das diferentes manifestações da violência na sociedade,
+com o intuito de engajar transformações radicais no plano
+político, que possam reduzir as desigualdades e minimizar as dinâmicas
+de exclusão. Como no discurso anterior, os jovens são vistos
+como vítimas da dinâmica social, em sua condição de “pessoas em
+desenvolvimento” e de sujeitos de direitos – os quais não são garantidos
+a contento. Além disso, propõe-se aqui um olhar “não hostil”
+dos adolescentes (infratores): trata-se de apostar nas suas potencialidades
+–- ele é o “futuro da nação” – e vê-lo como um ser semelhante.
+Logo, há uma leitura abertamente crítica da perspectiva punitiva, não
+só em relação às condições concretas da implementação da privação
+de liberdade, mas também no que diz respeito a sua filosofia geral,
+reprovando enfaticamente seus aspectos aflitivo e retributivo. Assim,
+a ideia de educação é entendida como uma alternativa à punição, não
+apenas como abordagem complementar. Além disso, valorizam-se às
+propostas educativas que se afastam nitidamente de posturas autoritárias
+e paternalistas, para priorizar a construção da autonomia do
+jovem, a ser construída gradativamente pela intervenção socioeducativa,
+e a ser conduzida em meio aberto. Enfim, ainda que de forma
+apenas esboçada, esta abordagem mostra-se aberta a métodos de intervenção
+pautados na ideia de “justiça restaurativa” como processo
+de resolução de conflitos.
+
+* * *
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+420
+
+Os quatro discursos-tipo assim construídos ilustram diferentes “maneiras
+de pensar” a resposta estatal frente às condutas delitivas dos
+jovens. Para além da discussão sobre a maioridade penal, essas tipificações
+constituem percursos narrativos que expressam, no campo
+político explorado, visões mais específicas do controle social. As
+narrativas propostas complexificam a leitura dicotômica inicial, que
+só distinguia os discursos favoráveis à redução da maioridade penal
+dos discursos contrários, para propor uma distinção a partir das diversas
+leituras do problema, das visões diferenciadas do jovem infrator
+e das maneiras peculiares de conceber a resposta estatal. Este
+constitui um resultado importante da análise, produzida a partir do
+método da TFD, na medida em que torna visíveis e conceitua distinções
+significativas, não somente entre os discursos que adotam posições
+opostas, mas também no âmbito de discursos que manifestam
+a mesma opção frente a proposta de mudança constitucional.
+
+5. Considerações finais
+Nas páginas que precedem o leitor encontrou uma descrição do
+método da TFD e uma ilustração do mesmo no âmbito da pesquisa
+empírica em direito, onde ele assume uma posição específica, notadamente
+para realização de pesquisas voltadas para estudo em profundidade
+de práticas, discursos ou ideias referidas a atores sociais e
+jurídicos, em determinado contexto da produção jurídica, entendida
+aqui no sentido mais amplo.
+Gostaríamos de frisar aqui, que a TFD requer algumas qualidades
+por parte do(a) pesquisador(a), como a sensibilidade teorética, que
+podem ser adquiridas através do exercício. Aliás, pode-se encarar
+a TFD como a mera descrição de procedimentos mentais que todo(a)
+s adotamos para produzir conhecimentos de cunho mais abstratos a
+partir de nossas observações. Seguindo as indicações de Tarozzi (2011,
+p.168-174), vale conhecer alguns “ingredientes” que compõem a sensibilidade
+teorética ou, ainda, as habilidades as serem mobilizadas.
+Em primeiro lugar, o(a) pesquisador(a) precisa “saber habitar
+421
+
+o caos”, “tolerar a regressão e a confusão, sentir-se estúpido, inexperiente,
+sem o controle e incompetente” (Tarozzi, 2011, p. 168).
+Como dito, a TFD requer capacidade de criatividade para se adaptar
+ao inesperado, tendo a capacidade de “suspender o julgamento”
+em relação à observação, às pessoas, aos enunciados teóricos e às
+próprias expectativas. No fundo, existe como um movimento de tipo
+ambíguo, quase paradoxal: por um lado, existe a intencionalidade de
+construir um sentido; por outro, este não deve aparecer rapidamente
+demais. Trata-se no fundo de uma qualidade eminentemente humana,
+que só se apaga com as tiranias institucionais ou institucionalizadas,
+diante das quais assumimos uma posição de reverência que nos
+impede pensar por nossa própria conta.
+A TFD nos convida a cultivar a escuta, a sensibilidade, a atenção,
+a capacidade de conceituação, a criatividade, a paciência e a intuição.
+Quando tudo parece travar, quando a massa de observações
+parece fazer obstrução à percepção do “invisível” por trás do visível,
+segundo a fórmula de Rubem Alves, vale a pena parar, tomar uma
+água de coco ou uma cerveja, dar um passeio, mergulhar na água...
+Nunca se sabe que, como Arquimedes, possamos, a partir de uma
+observação atenta, de uma sensibilidade teorética e de um bom insight,
+encontrar propostas conceituais plausíveis para dar conta do
+problema que nos interessa.
+A viagem pela TFD é, portanto, paradoxal, por ser “aventurosa e
+prudente ao mesmo tempo” (Tarozzi, 2011 p.174), criativa e metódica,
+repentina e rotineira.
+Alguém lembra de alguma outra aventura humana parecida?
+A “teorização fundamentada nos dados” //
+Riccardo Cappi
+422
+
+6. Referências
+
+Alves, R. (1981). Filosofia da ciência: introdução ao jogo e suas regras. Brasília:
+
+Editora Brasiliense.
+
+Becker, H. S. (2007). Segredos e Truques da Pesquisa. Rio de Janeiro: Zaar.
+
+Bourdieu, P. (2001). Langage et pouvoir symbolique. Paris: Seuil.
+
+Cappi, R. (2014). Pensando as respostas estatais às condutas criminalizadas:
+
+um estudo empírico dos debates parlamentares sobre a redução da maioridade
+penal (1993 - 2010). Revista de Estudos Empíricos em Direito, 1(1).
+
+Cappi, R. (2017). A maioridade penal nos debates parlamentares: motivos do
+
+controle e figuras do perigo. Belo Horizonte: Editora Letramento.
+
+Glaser, B. G.; Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: strategies
+
+for qualitative research. New York: Aldine Pub. Co.
+
+Guerra, I. C. (2006). Pesquisa Qualitativa e Análise de Conteúdo - Sentidos e
+
+Formas de Uso. Estoril : Principia Editora.
+
+HirshhornM. (1999). Type idéal. In A. Akoun ; P. Ansart. Dictionnaire de sociologie
+(p. 550). Paris: Seuil.
+
+Laperrière, A. (2008). A Teorização enraizada (grounded theory): procedimento
+analítico e comparação com outras abordagens similares. In: J.
+
+Poupart et al. (org.) A Pesquisa Qualitativa: enfoques epistemológicos e
+
+metodológicos (pp.353-385). Petrópolis (RJ): Vozes.
+
+Muller, P. (2000). L’analyse cognitive des politiques publiques: vers une sociologie
+politique de l’action publique. Revue française de science politique,
+50e année, n°2, pp. 189-208.
+
+Pires, A. P. (2008). Sobre algumas questões epistemológicas de uma metodologia
+geral para as ciências sociais. In: J.Poupart; J.P.Deslauriers;
+
+L.Groulx (org.). A Pesquisa Qualitativa. Enfoques epistemológicos e metodológicos
+(pp. 43-94). Petrópolis: Vozes.
+
+Strauss, A.; Corbin; J. (2008). Pesquisa Qualitativa: Técnica e procedimentos para
+
+o desenvolvimento da teoria fundamentada. 2ªed. Porto Alegre: Artmed.
+
+Sutherland, E. H. (1924). Principles of Criminology. Chicago: University of Chicago
+Press.
+
+Tarozzi, M. (2011). O que é Grounded Theory, Metodologia de pesquisa e de
+
+teoria fundamentada nos dados. Petrópolis: Vozes.
+423
+424
+
+Sobre as autoras e os autores
+
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+Doutor em Economia pela EPGE – Escola de Pós-Graduação
+em Economia da FGV. Técnico de planejamento e pesquisa do
+IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, desde 1997.
+Recentemente, vem atuando na área de economia institucional
+e reformas legais, com foco na construção e análise de
+grandes bancos de dados relacionados ao sistema de justiça
+no Brasil – a partir da utilização de ferramentas de big data e
+aprendizado de máquina.
+
+Ana Gabriela Mendes Braga
+Professora da Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais da
+UNESP. Doutora em Direito Penal e Criminologia pela USP
+com período sanduiche junto ao Departamento de Antropologia
+da Universitat de Barcelona (UB).
+
+Andrea Depieri de A. Reginato
+É professora efetiva do Departamento de Direito da Universidade
+Federal de Sergipe - UFS. Possui graduação em Direito
+pela Universidade de São Paulo (1992), mestrado em Direito
+pela Universidade Federal do Ceará (2001) e doutorado em
+sociologia pela Universidade Federal de Sergipe (2014).
+
+Bárbara Gomes Lupetti Baptista
+Professora do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da
+Universidade Veiga de Almeida (PPGD-UVA). Professora da Faculdade
+de Direito da Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF).
+Pesquisadora do INCT/InEAC. Advogada de contencioso cível
+no Rio de Janeiro.
+425
+
+Bruna Angotti
+Doutoranda e mestra em Antropologia Social pela Universidade
+de São Paulo e professora da Faculdade de Direito da
+Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie. Autora do livro Entre
+as leis da ciência, do Estado e de Deus: o surgimento dos presídios
+femininos no Brasil (IBCCRIM, 2012) e co-coordenadora
+da pesquisa Dar à luz na sombra: condições atuais e futuras
+para o exercício da maternidade por mulheres em situação de
+prisão (IPEA/MJ).
+
+Cristina Zackseski
+Doutora em Estudos Comparados Sobre As Américas pela
+Universidade de Brasília (2006). Mestre em Direito pela
+Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (1997). Graduada
+em Direito na Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (1993),
+Atualmente é Professora Adjunta da Faculdade de Direito da
+Universidade de Brasília (UnB), credenciada na pós-graduação
+para os cursos de Mestrado e Doutorado (2012).
+
+Guinter Leipnitz
+Doutor em História pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande
+do Sul (UFRGS) e professor do Curso de História - Licenciatura
+da Universidade Federal do Pampa (UNIPAMPA).
+
+José Roberto Xavier
+Professor da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal do
+Rio de Janeiro. Mestre e Doutor em Criminologia pela University
+of Ottawa.
+426
+
+Luciana Yeung
+Professora Adjunta do Insper. Doutora em Economia pela
+Escola de Economia de São Paulo, da Fundação Getúlio
+Vargas (EESP-FGV). Possui graduação em Economia pela
+Universidade de São Paulo (1996), mestrado em Economia
+Aplicada - University of Wisconsin - Madison (2002) e em Relações
+Industriais - University of Wisconsin - Madison (2001). É
+membro-fundadora e ex-Presidente (2016) da ABDE, Associação
+Brasileira de Direito e Economia. Coordenadora do NIAN,
+Núcleo em Instituições e Ambiente de Negócios do Insper.
+
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro
+É professora adjunta do Departamento de Sociologia (DSO)
+e pesquisadora do Centro de Estudos de Criminalidade e
+Segurança Pública (CRISP), ambos da Universidade Federal
+de Minas Gerais (UFMG). Possui doutorado em Sociologia pelo
+Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro - IUPERJ
+(2009), com estágio na University of Florida (2007/2008),
+mestrado em Administração Pública pela Fundação João
+Pinheiro (2003), graduação em Direito pela Universidade
+Federal de Minas Gerais (2002) e graduação em Administração
+Pública pela Fundação João Pinheiro (2001).
+
+Maíra Rocha Machado
+Professora da Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação
+Getúlio Vargas (FGV Direito SP). Doutora em Direito pela Universidade
+de São Paulo. Coordenadora do Núcleo de Estudos
+sobre o Crime e a Pena da FGV.
+
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+Professor da Faculdade de Direito de Ribeirão Preto da USP
+(FDRP/USP). Diretor da Rede de Pesquisa Empírica em Direito
+(REED). Mestre e Doutor em Direito pela USP. Foi Visiting
+Scholar junto ao “Center for Studies of Law and Society” da
+427
+
+Universidade da California/Berkeley, EUA, em 2016, e o “Global
+Legal Studies Institute”, da Universidade de Wisconsin/
+Madison, EUA, em 2010. Foi Co-Editor da Revista de Estudos
+Empíricos em Direito (Qualis B1).
+
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+Antropóloga, professora adjunta e coordenadora da Pós-Graduação
+do Departamento de Estudos Latino-Americanos/
+UnB. É coordenadora do Laboratório de Estudos Interdisciplinares
+sobre Acesso à Justiça e Direitos nas Américas - LEIJUS/UnB
+e coordenadora do Grupo de Estudos Comparados
+México, Caribe, América Central e Brasil (MeCACB). É membro
+da Rede de Pesquisa Empírica em Direito – REED.
+
+Riccardo Cappi
+Doutor em Criminologia e Mestre em Ciências Econômicas
+pela Universidade Católica de Louvain (Bélgica). Professor
+de Criminologia e de Metodologia da Pesquisa, na UEFS e na
+UNEB, professor permanente do Programa de Pós-Graduação
+em Ciências Sociais da UFRB e professor associado do Mestrado
+em Segurança Pública e Cidadania da UFBA. É coordenador
+do Grupo de Pesquisa em Criminologia (GPCRIM) da UEFS
+e da UNEB.
+428
+
+Esta coletânea discute a pesquisa em
+direito, desde a entrada em campo
+e as formas de coleta e seleção do
+material – observação participante,
+entrevista, grupo focal, pesquisa documental
+e historiográfica, pesquisa
+de fluxo, pesquisa em processos judiciais
+e estudo de caso – até as diferentes
+possibilidades de tratamento
+qualitativo e quantitativo do material
+empírico. Participam da publicação:
+
+Rebecca Lemos Igreja
+Alexandre Samy de Castro
+Bárbara Gomes Baptista
+José Roberto Xavier
+Ana Gabriela Braga
+Bruna Angotti
+Andréa Depieri de A.
+Guinter Leipnitz
+Luciana Yeung
+Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva
+Ludmila M. L. Ribeiro
+Cristina Zackseski
+Maira Rocha Machado
+Riccardo Cappi
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/MAIA--Marcos--BEZERRA--Cicero.-Bibliometric-analysis-of-scientific-articles-on-jurimetry-published-in-Brazil..md b/MAIA--Marcos--BEZERRA--Cicero.-Bibliometric-analysis-of-scientific-articles-on-jurimetry-published-in-Brazil..md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/MAIA--Marcos--BEZERRA--Cicero.-Bibliometric-analysis-of-scientific-articles-on-jurimetry-published-in-Brazil..md
@@ -0,0 +1,1409 @@
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 1
+
+ISSN 1678-765X
+DOI 10.20396/rdbci.v18i0.8658889
+
+
+ARTICLE
+
+Bibliometric analysis of scientific articles
+on jurimetry published in Brazil
+
+Marcos Maia ¹ https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3937-5224
+
+Cicero Aparecido Bezerra ² https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5027-9394
+
+¹ Federal University of Paraná, Curitiba, PR, Brazil / e-mail: maia.marcosmaia@gmail.com
+² Federal University of Paraná, Curitiba, PR, Brazil / e-mail: cicero.bezerra@ufpr.br
+
+ABSTRACT
+
+Judicial delays have been the subject of debate in the Brazilian academic community. Among the solutions
+discussed, jurimetrics has gained ground in seeking quantitative standards in court decisions. However, despite the
+relevance of this methodology, in Brazil, few researches have been conducted towards its dissemination.
+Therefore, the present study employs bibliometric techniques on national scientific production, articles, related to
+the term “jurimetry”, from 2002 to 2019, made available on the Google Scholar search tool, presenting an
+information panel on the characteristics found in these publications. The results show that in the period surveyed,
+the number of publications on the subject showed an average annual growth of 18.92%; the collaboration index
+indicates that there are, on average, 2.32 authors per article, some of which stand out for the number of publications,
+including Daniel F. N. Menezes (four) and Filipe J. Zabala (three) and, in turn, the most cited authors are Lee
+Loevinger (eleven citations), Filipe J. Zabala and Fabiano F. Silveira (both with six citations); the magazine that
+has published the most on the subject is the Revista da Faculdade de Direito of the Federal University of Minas
+Gerais, with a single magazine publishing four articles, seven magazines publishing two articles and 66 magazines
+publishing a single article; and finally, as for the keywords associated with the term, the words "adoption", "civil
+procedure", "invalid act", "illegal act", "partial dissolution", and "successive incidence" stand out, suggesting Civil
+Law as an area of law more aligned to the use of jurimetry.
+
+KEYWORDS
+Legal scientific production. Empirical legal studies. Bibliometric Indicators.
+
+Análise bibliométrica dos artigos científicos
+de jurimetria publicados no brasil
+
+RESUMO
+A morosidade judicial tem sido tema de debates na comunidade acadêmica brasileira. Entre as soluções discutidas,
+a jurimetria tem ganhado espaço ao buscar por padrões quantitativos nas decisões judiciais. Porém, em que pese a
+relevância desta metodologia, no Brasil, poucas pesquisas têm sido conduzidas no sentido de sua disseminação.
+Assim sendo, o presente estudo emprega técnicas de bibliometria sobre a produção científica nacional, artigos,
+relacionada ao termo “jurimetria”, de 2002 até 2019, disponibilizada na ferramenta de pesquisa do Google
+Acadêmico, apresentando um painel informativo sobre as características encontradas nestas publicações. Os
+resultados mostram que no período pesquisado, o número de publicações sobre o tema apresentou um crescimento
+médio anual de 18,92%; o índice de colaboração indica que existem, em média, 2,32 autores por artigo, sendo que
+alguns se destacam pelo número de publicações, entre eles, Daniel F. N. Menezes (quatro) e Filipe J. Zabala (três)
+e, por sua vez, os autores mais citados são Lee Loevinger (onze citações), Filipe J. Zabala e Fabiano F. Silveira
+(ambos com seis citações); já a revista que mais tem publicado sobre o tema é a Revista da Faculdade de Direito
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 2
+
+da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, sendo que uma única revista publicou quatro artigos, sete revistas dois
+artigos e 66 revistas um único artigo e, finalmente; quanto às palavras-chaves associadas ao termo, destacam-se as
+palavras: “adoção”, “processo civil”, “ato inválido”, “ato ilícito”, “dissolução parcial”, e, “incidência sucessiva”,
+sugerindo o Direito Civil como uma área do direito mais alinhada ao uso da jurimetria.
+
+PALAVRAS-CHAVE
+Produção científica jurídica. Estudos jurídicos empíricos. Indicadores bibliométricos.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+JITA: BB. Bibliometric methods.
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 3
+
+1 INTRODUCTION
+
+Judicial slowness significantly affects the efficiency of the Brazilian judiciary
+
+(BRITTO, LACERDA e KARNINKE, 2018; GARGANO e NADER, 2018; VENTURINI,
+SOUZA e BIANCHI, 2018). This situation “became part of the daily discussion of the academic
+community, which was forced to seek solutions to this problem that generates great social
+dissatisfaction” (BASSI and SCHUMAK, 2018, p. 720). In this scenario, jurimetry is inserted
+as an approach with real potential to, at least, suggest directions capable of optimizing the
+reasonable time for the solution of legal disputes (COUTO and OLIVEIRA, 2016). This
+approach, according to Menezes and Barros (2017), is capable of verifying the impact of law
+enforcement on society, allowing to evaluate the effectiveness of public policies and judicial
+decisions, showing itself, therefore, innovative in relation to the classic paradigm of scientific
+knowledge.
+Although there is a growing interest in the study of jurimetry in Brazil, there are few
+relevant scientific works (ZABALA and SILVEIRA, 2014). In this same sense, for Menezes
+and Barros (2017, p. 80) “undeniable is the value of jurimetry, a methodology that has not been
+explored yet, to assess the real social impact of the standard when applied to the specific case”.
+Therefore, given the importance of the theme, this study seeks to contribute to mitigate
+the scarcity of studies and contribute to this area by answering the following research problem:
+what are the characteristics of the scientific publications of jurimetry in Portuguese found in
+the research tool of the Google Scholar, until August 2019? It is a bibliometric, exploratory
+study that forms a scenario based on the authors with the largest number of publications
+involving the term "jurimetry", magazines with a higher incidence of the term, more associated
+keywords and the most cited articles.
+This article, in addition to this introduction, is organized in four more sections: the
+theoretical framework presents the concept of jurimetry, the main studies in the area and the
+most used bibliometric laws; the methodological procedures provide the definition of the
+analysis corpus, variables to be analyzed and analytical procedures used; the fourth section is
+the presentation and analysis of the results and, finally; in the final considerations the
+conclusions of the study, its limitations and suggestions for future research are presented.
+
+2 THEORETICAL REFERENCE
+
+This section presents the basic concepts used in the present study, not with the
+
+intention of exhausting such matters, but rather to lead to their understanding.
+
+2.1 Jurimetry: conceptual aspects and applications
+
+Although there is divergence in the literature regarding the origin of the association of
+
+statistical analysis with the study of Law, there is a consensus that this use is very old
+(ANDRADE, 2018; MACHADO, 2017; NUNES, 2016). According to Hald (2003), the term
+was found in the thesis Dissertatio inauguralis mathematico-juridica (BERNOULLI, 2012),
+defended by Nicolou I Bernoulli in 1709. For Rangel (2014), it was with the publication of the
+book The path of the law, by United States Supreme Court judge Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
+who became famous for the use of statistics in law, with the phrase “For the rational study of
+the law the blackletter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man
+of statistics and the master of economics ”(HOLMES JR, 1897, p. 457).
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 4
+
+According to Couto and Oliveira (2016), the term “jurimetry”, a neologism created by
+
+the American lawyer Lee Loevinger, was used for the first time with the publication of the
+article Jurimetrics: the next step forward (LOEVINGER, 1971), in a context in which the
+application of analytical methods can bring progress and legal certainty. In the United States
+there are several law schools and associations that have research centers in jurimetry, having as
+references the Society for Empirical Legal Studies and the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
+(MACHADO, 2017). In Brazil, according to Nunes (2016), this term began to be disseminated
+in 1973, with lectures by Italian professor Mario Losano. Since then, in Brazil, studies have
+emerged that started to address the term “jurimetry”: in 2002, the doctoral thesis of Fernando
+Antônio de Vasconcelos (2002) under the title: “Responsibility of the provider for damages
+done on the Internet” and José Augusto Delgado's (2002) article, “The computer law”; in 2003,
+the doctoral thesis by Alexandre Freire Pimentel (2003), “Principiologia juscibernética.
+Telematic process. A new general theory of process and civil procedural law "and the master's
+dissertation by Ulysses Alves de Levy Machado (2003)," The convergence between the
+privilege of exploring intellectual creation and the elaboration of a right of virtual space with
+its consequences about the public domain. ” In 2006, the master's dissertation by Maria Paula
+Costa Bertran under the title: “Economic analysis as a guiding criterion for judicial decision:
+applications and limits, study based on the case of review of leasing contracts with exchange
+parity” (BERTRAN, 2006). In the United States there are several law schools and associations
+that have research centers in jurimetry, having as references the Society for Empirical Legal
+Studies and the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (MACHADO, 2017).
+For Loevinger (1963), jurimetry involves the use of quantitative analysis, the
+application of communication and information theory to laws, the use of mathematical logic in
+law, the retrieval of legal data by electronic and mechanical means and the formulation of
+calculations aiming at legal predictability . This concept is corroborated by Zabala and Silveira
+(2014, p. 75-76), where for whom, “the definitions of Jurimetry vary from author to author,
+passing through topics such as Statistics, Computing, Linguistics, Human Behavior and
+Science, more generally”.
+Nunes (2016, p. 115-116) describes the term jurimetry as to its object and
+methodology, characterizing it as the “investigation of the functioning of the legal order”,
+whose methodology is to use “statistics to reestablish an element of causality and investigate
+the multiple factors (social, economic, geographical, ethical, etc.) that influence the behavior
+of legal agents ”. For Couto and Oliveira (2016, p. 779), jurimetry,
+seeks to describe the concrete interests of the legal agents, their conflicts and the
+solutions given by the judges, with the aim of helping the Law to better understand
+the citizens' desires and offer subsidies to the authorities for the production of laws
+more in line with social reality, as well as how to function as a fundamental tool for
+the development of more just legal institutions, capable of assimilating the living
+nature of law and providing society with swift and pacifying jurisdictional protection,
+or, alternatively, pointing out the most appropriate non-jurisdictional means of dispute
+settlement for each case (mediation, arbitration, etc.).
+In this sense, for Andrade (2018, p. 687),
+
+Jurimetry provides a systematic perspective of the factors that influence or that play a
+role in decision making by the magistrate, as it helps to define, based on quantitative
+elements, standards of legal behavior.
+For Menezes and Barros (2017, p. 56) “there are countless advantages resulting from
+the application of the proper methodology of jurimetry in all public spheres”. The main
+advantages would be
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 5
+
+the implementation of policies of transparency, inspection, efficiency, cost reduction,
+data collection in real time and, mainly, analysis of social reality, which would allow
+the evaluation of the effectiveness of public policies, judicial decisions and current
+laws when analyzing the corresponding impacts on society.
+Couto and Oliveira (2016) present as a positive aspect of the use of statistical
+techniques, the aid in the identification of problems and the direction of strategies for solving
+the difficulties of knowledge management. The disadvantages include the difficulty in
+obtaining data, conservatism and the plastering of the Judiciary. In addition, according to
+Menezes and Barros (2017, p. 57), the following challenges must be faced:
+
+a) the difficulty in understanding the statistical language by the lawyer (who, as a rule,
+is not familiar with it);
+b) the interdisciplinarity to be observed in order to carry out this study;
+c) the change in habit represented by the replacement of merely bibliographic research
+by empiricism;
+d) the control of uncertainties that is characteristic of statistics is not for the law.
+
+Although the difficulty in understanding statistical language was listed, Machado
+
+(2017) reports the existence of the myth that the use of jurimetry is done through extremely
+sophisticated methods and with the use of cutting-edge mathematics and computational
+resources, limiting its application to only doctors in Exact Sciences. For these authors, a
+jurimetric work is any study with an object belonging to the legal world, which has the presence
+of data collected empirically and whose analysis is based on some statistical concept. In
+addition, it should be noted that the choice of the statistical method to be used does not occur
+randomly, but according to what is intended to be identified with the research, always
+maintaining care to preserve the representativeness of the population in cases of generalization
+of the results. As an example of some methods used, there is the case study, descriptive statistics
+and/or correlations, causality regressions and other infinity of theories, techniques and
+empirical models.
+However, Couto and Oliveira (2016) warn that care should be taken in the direct use
+of mathematical tools, since the incessant search for procedural speed could result in a massive
+and unsatisfactory judicial provision for the judicial system. This is because jurimetry would
+have the function of diagnosing problems and suggesting measures for knowledge
+management.
+Machado (2017) presents some themes studied with the use of jurimetry, being the
+effects of: (a) ideology in judicial decisions; (b) gender in judicial decisions; (c) composition
+and voting on panels and peer effects; (d) external pressure from the media or popular opinion
+on court decisions. “In addition to gender, there are other factors that affect judicial decisions,
+related to minority groups such as race, ethnicity, religious group and social formation, among
+others” (MACHADO, 2017, p. 262). A summary of the authors studying these themes is
+presented in Chart 1:
+
+Chart 1. Studies related to jurimetry
+
+Theme Authors Study object
+
+Ideology
+Pritchett (1968) Analyzes the North American
+Supreme Court trials in order to
+identify patterns arising from
+ideological differences.
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 6
+
+Epstein, Landes and Posner
+(2013)
+Argues that the impacts of political
+ideology have been growing over
+time.
+
+Arida, Bacha and Lara-Resende
+(2005)
+Point to the existence of an alleged
+pro-debtor bias by the Brazilian
+judiciary.
+
+Yeung and Azevedo (2015) Analyzes the studies of Arida,
+Bacha and Lara-Resende (2005) in
+approximately 1,700 decisions of
+the STJ (Supreme Court of
+Justice).
+
+Gender
+
+Peresie (2005) Shows that the gender of judges is
+a significant determinant in the
+decisions of appellate courts in the
+United States, in cases of disputes
+over sexual harassment and
+discrimination.
+
+Farhang and Wawro (2004) According to these authors, judges
+tend to significantly influence their
+male colleagues.
+
+Boyd, Epstein and Martin (2010) Found significant gender impact in
+sex discrimination litigation.
+
+King and Greening (2007) A nalyzed the decisions of the
+International Criminal Court in
+cases of sexual violence in the
+former Yugoslavia.
+
+Poncezk and Grezzana (2012) Analyzed more than 90 thousand
+labor conflicts in the Superior
+Labor Court: in general, they do
+not find evidence of gender impact
+in the decisions of that court.
+
+Composition and voting on
+panels, and peer effect
+
+Epstein, Landes and Posner
+(2013)
+Tested the occurrence of the effect
+of the composition of the panel,
+that is, votes decided unanimously
+or by majority.
+
+Smyth (2005) Dissent pattern in the Australian
+Supreme Court for almost a
+hundred years.
+
+Media and popular opinion
+Epstein and Kobylka (1992) According to these authors, most
+judicial decisions reflect public
+opinion.
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 7
+
+Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth
+(2011)
+They find significant influence of
+public opinion on the decisions of
+the United States Supreme Court.
+
+Giles, Blackstone and Vining Jr
+(2008)
+They say there is clear evidence of
+causality in the vote of the
+ministers.
+
+Epstein and Martin (2010) They find evidence that the
+Supreme Court's decisions are, to
+some degree, in line with public
+opinion.
+
+Lopes and Azevedo (2018) Comparing the impacts of pressure
+from the Executive Branch
+(especially from the Presidency of
+the Republic) on the decisions of
+the Supreme Court of Justice and
+the Supreme Federal Court.
+
+Source: adapted from Machado (2017).
+
+Machado (2017) also suggests some themes that should be studied in Brazil:
+
+contractual relations; labor justice; criminal justice; and, gender impacts.
+It is verified, therefore, that the use of statistical methods applied to Legal Science,
+defined here as jurimetry, can bring benefits, not only to the judiciary and those who use the
+Brazilian justice, but to the whole of society, since it will provide a greater procedural speed,
+as well as contribute to greater assertiveness in judicial decisions.
+
+2.2 Bibliometrics: concepts and laws
+
+According to Silva, Hayashi and Hayashi (2011) the origin of the term bibliometrics
+
+has sometimes been attributed to Paul Otlet in his work Traité de Documentation: Le Livre Sur
+Le Livre, Theorie et Pratique (1934) and, sometimes, to Alan Pritchard, in his book Statistical
+Bibliography or Bibliometrics? (1969). However, a distinction must be made between the
+concepts presented by the authors. Whereas, for Otlet (1934) bibliometrics is inserted in
+bibliology, for Pritchard (1969) bibliometrics has its equivalence to bibliographic statistics,
+defining it as a more appropriate term when making statistics from scientific publications. For
+Santos (2015, p. 5) “the word bibliometrics comes from the fusion of the suffix 'metria' and
+'bibliography', 'information', 'science' and 'library', being respectively analogous or close to their
+nature, objectives and applications”. According to Alvarado (2002, p. 90), it is a “set of research
+methodologies in the field of Information Sciences that takes advantage of quantitative data
+analysis, to explore the framework of a scientific area”. In any case, it is a consolidated concept
+that revolves around the application of statistical methods on bibliographic content (SILVA,
+HAYASHI and HAYASHI, 2011; YOSHIDA, 2010; CHUEKE and AMATUCCI, 2015).
+According to Alvarado (2002), Araújo (2006) and Santos (2015), there are three classic
+laws in bibliometry: Bradford's Law (1934) that studies the productivity of journals; Lotka's
+Law (1926) that works with the authors' scientific productivity; and the laws of Zipf (2012) that
+analyze the frequency of occurrences of words.
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 8
+
+Bradford's Law, also called the Dispersion Law, “allows, by measuring the
+
+productivity of magazines, to establish the nucleus and areas of dispersion on a given subject
+in the same set of magazines” (VANTI, 2002, p. 153), as shown in Figure 1:
+
+Figure 1. Bradford’s Law
+
+Source: adapted from Vanti (2002).
+
+Bradford's Law indicates that there are a small number of journals, which are "closely
+
+related to the subject and a larger core of closely related journals, with the number of journals
+in each zone increasing, while productivity decreasing" (ARAÚJO, 2006, p. 14). Therefore, it
+is suggested that “as new written subjects appear, they will be subject to a small filtering by
+related journals, when accepted. As a result, these journals attract more and more articles, in
+the course of the development of the area” (SILVA, et al., 2012, p. 3).
+Lotka's Law or Inverse Squares Law (LOTKA, 1926) aims to describe the profile of
+the authors' scientific productions, the majority of which few authors produce much and many
+authors produce little. Moretti and Campanario (2009, p. 70) summarize it as follows: “the
+number of authors who make 'n' publications on a given scientific area is approximately 1/n² of
+those who make a single publication, the proportion of which is approximately 60% of the set
+of authors”. Lotka's Law presented some reformulations, among which, the replacement of the
+Inverse Square Method by the Generalized Inverse Power model (PAO, 1985; NICHOLLS,
+1986), as demonstrated by Cândido, et al., (2018), in the Equation (1):
+
+ =
+− (1)
+
+Where:
+γx = probability of an author contributing x publications on a subject;
+x = number of publications on a given subject found in a given period of time;
+c = theoretical percentage of the authors who contributed with only one article, in the
+studied period of time (Lotka coefficient);
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 9
+
+n = slope of Lotka's Law.
+
+In such a way that c is obtained by the Equation (2):
+
+ =
+1
+
+∑
+1
+
+ +
+1
+( − 1)−1 +
+1
+2 +
+
+24( − 1)
++1
+−1
+=1
+(2)
+
+Where:
+x = number of publications by author;
+n = slope of Lotka's Law;
+P = observed number of pairs.
+
+And, in turn, n is calculated according to Equation (3):
+
+ =
+ ∑ log  log  − ∑ log  ∑ log
+ ∑ log
+2 − (∑ log )
+2
+(3)
+
+Where:
+N = number of data pairs (publications by author X authors);
+x = number of publications by author;
+y = number of authors in relation to the number of publications;
+
+The third classic law of bibliometrics is the Zipf Law, which, according to Araújo
+
+(2006, p. 16) “describes the relationship between words in a given text that is large enough and
+the serial order of these words (word count in large samples) ”. According to Booth (1967) it is
+a law originally proposed by Estoup (2018) in 1916 and popularized by Zipf (2012) in 1949,
+whose equation (4) is shown below:
+
+ =  (4)
+
+Where:
+c = constant value for any word in a particular text (Zipf constant);
+r = position of the word in a decreasing list ordered by frequency;
+f = number of occurrences of the word.
+
+This law indicates that “the product of the serial order (r) of a word (given by the
+
+frequency of occurrence in decreasing order) by its frequency of occurrence (f) was [is]
+approximately constant” (GUEDES, 1994, p. 318 ). From there, Zipf (2012) identified that in
+any text, low-frequency words have, basically, the same frequency. Booth (1967) interprets it
+according to Equation (5):
+
+1
+
+=
+( + 1)
+2
+(5)
+
+Where:
+I1 = number of words with frequency 1;
+In = number of words with frequency n;
+n = number of occurrences of a given word.
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 10
+
+At this point William Goffman “concluded that there is a transition point between high
+
+and low frequency words and that the words contained in this space would have a high semantic
+content, that is, words that give meaning to the text” (MELLO, 2017, p. 87 ). This conclusion,
+published by Pao (1978), became known as Point of Transition, indicating the “neighborhood
+where [...] the words with the highest semantic content should be included”, according to
+
+ =
+−1 + √1 + 81
+2
+(6)
+
+Where:
+n = Goffman's Transition Point, known as T;
+I1 = number of words with frequency 1.
+
+From the combination of Zipf's laws and Goffman's Transition Point it is possible to
+
+establish, graphically, where the transition from low to high frequency words occurs,
+highlighting the words that form the trivial, interesting and simply noisy information sets , as
+shown in Figure 2:
+
+Figure 2. Word occurrence zones
+
+Source: adapted from Quoniam, et al. (2001).
+
+Evidently, bibliometrics is not limited to these laws (FONSECA, 1986; CALLON,
+
+COURTIAL and PENAN, 1995; GINGRAS, 2016). That said, considering the importance of
+bibliographic references in scientific works (MORAES, FURTADO and TOMAÉL, 2015), we
+tried to verify how the citations and references of each of the works are related, through analysis
+of citations.
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 11
+
+“The Analysis of Citations is based on the premise that researchers conceive their
+
+work from previous works and demonstrate this by citing previous works in their texts and in
+an ordered and standardized list of references” (MORAES, FURTADO and TOMAÉL, 2015 ,
+p. 186). Its objective is “to measure the impact and visibility of certain authors within a
+scientific community” (VANZ and CAREGNATO, 2003, p. 251). To meet this objective,
+Hirsch (2005) and Garfield (1956) proposed tools to assess the quality of publications and
+measure the researcher's productivity and impact. Eugene Garfield (1956) proposed the Impact
+Factor (FI): a tool for evaluating the quality of publications, efficient in evaluating the quality
+of a journal. For calculating the Impact Factor for a given year “the number of citations received
+in that year by the articles published by the journal in the previous two years is taken into
+account, divided by the number of articles published by the journal in the same period”
+(THOMAZ, ASSAD and MOREIRA, 2011, p. 90).
+Jorge E. Hirsch (2005) proposed the H Index, an indicator responsible for measuring
+the researcher's productivity and impact, relating the number of publications to the number of
+citations. “The H index of a given author will be the number of the numerical sequence of works
+whose number of citations is equal to or greater than the rank of the sequence” (THOMAZ,
+ASSAD and MOREIRA, 2011, p. 92), as shown in the example Figure 3:
+
+Figure 3. Example of calculating the H index
+
+Author “x” articles Number of citations
+
+Order
+➔
+
+Author “x” articles Order Number of
+citations
+
+A 20 A 1 20
+B 3 D 2 10
+C 5 E 3 7
+D 10 C 4 5
+E 7 B 5 3
+Source: the authors (2019)
+
+It is important to stress that the laws presented here are not without criticism: for
+
+authors like M. Carl Drott and Manfred Bonitz, the theoretical support for Bradford's Law is
+lacking (BORGES, 2002); C. Oppenheimer and Paul Travis Nicholls, on the other hand, point
+to weaknesses in the Lotka Law, associated with the estimation parameters (ALVARADO,
+2002); as for Zipf's Law, scholars like Pintadosi (2014), Manin (2008) and Aitchison, Corradi
+and Latham (2016) warn of the synonymic pitfalls that can affect their results. On the other
+hand, there are works using text mining, social network analysis and geoanalysis in bibliometric
+exploration (FAVARETTO and FRANCISCO, 2017); operational research techniques, such as
+linear programming and decision trees (BORGES, 2002); theoretical probability distributions
+and normalization methods applied to the number of citations, percentile-based approaches
+(MINGERS and LEYDESDORFF, 2015) and even; qualitative approaches such as metasynthesis
+(OLIVEIRA, LIMA and MORAIS, 2016).
+
+4 METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
+
+Using the categorization proposed by Silva and Menezes (2005), the present research
+
+is classified as basic as to its nature, considering that it aims to study the characteristics of the
+production of articles referring to jurimetry in Brazil; as quantitative in terms of approaching
+the problem, as it aims to measure publications and their specificities; as exploratory in relation
+to the objectives for explaining how the subject in question has been studied in the country; and
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 12
+
+from the point of view of technical procedures, such as bibliography, since the study is
+developed through published articles and found in the Google Scholar search tool.
+The Google Scholar research tool was defined as a source for the composition of the
+analysis corpus, having as its time frame the period from the date of publication of the first
+article on this basis, until August 12, 2019 (inclusive). The choice of this tool is due to the fact
+that Google Scholar contains all publications present in the Capes Periodicals database. In
+addition, Google Scholar has projected itself as one of the main scientific search tools
+(FALAGAS, et al., 2008), since its results are as good as that of other scientific research bases
+(HARZING and ALAKANGAS, 2016).
+The analyzed records were obtained from the search for the term “jurimetry”, plus the
+filters: (1) search anywhere in the document and, (2) exclusion of patents and citations. The
+search returned 270 publications, of which, from this total, repeated publications were removed,
+as well as texts in English and Spanish. All records that were not scientific articles were also
+excluded. Finally, a total of 84 articles were found. From these articles, the variables to be
+analyzed were extracted, presented in Chart 2:
+
+Chart 2. Analysis variables
+
+Variable Nature What is to be analyzed
+
+Title Categorical Expected values of the number of scientific articles published in
+Brazil, with the term “jurimetry” in the title.
+
+Author Categorical Expected values of authors and co-authorships per article; numbers
+of articles by a single author and more than one author; most
+referenced articles; collaboration index (average number of authors
+present in the publication in relation to the number of publications in
+the analyzed literature,
+
+Journals Categorical Journals that publish more on “jurimetry”.
+
+Publication year Numerical Distribution of the number of publications over the years.
+
+Keywords Categorical Keywords that represent the most frequent information on the theme
+“jurimetry”.
+
+References Categorical Most referenced publications.
+
+Source: the authors (2019).
+
+The variables presented in Chart 2 were submitted to the analysis protocol shown in
+
+Chart 3:
+
+Chart 3. Analysis protocol
+
+Stage Procedures Goals
+
+1 Descriptive statistics: frequencies, averages, standard
+deviations, minimum and maximum.
+Describe the data set.
+
+2 Lotka's law. Find the scientific productivity of the authors.
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 13
+
+3 Bradford's law. Identify the productivity zones of magazines.
+
+4 Zipf Laws and Goffman's Transition Point. Identify the most relevant keywords.
+
+5 Analysis of citations using the H index. Identify the most cited authors.
+
+Fonte: os autores (2019).
+
+Data analysis was performed using software R version 3.5.1, using the bibliometrics
+
+package (ARIA and CUCCURULLO, 2017). The reference data of the 84 articles were saved
+in the BibTex format, exported to the xlxs format and tabulated in the Microsoft Excel 2010
+software.
+
+4 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
+
+In the 84 articles analyzed, it was found that the first work was published in 2002 - it
+
+is the article “The computer law” by José Augusto Delgado. After this registration, there was a
+six-year time lag until the next publication in 2008. From that date on, in all years there were
+publications related to the researched theme, as shown in Figure 4:
+
+Figure 4. Publication numbers from 2002 to 2019
+
+Source: research data (2019).
+It is possible to note, therefore, a clear increase in the number of publications, mainly
+from 2013 onwards. Analyzing the entire period, there was an average annual growth of
+18.92%.
+Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics associated with the numbers of articles and
+authors:
+
+Table 1. Articles and authorship
+Variables Average Standard desviation Minimum Maximum
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 14
+
+Articles by author 0,58 0,59 1 4
+Authors by article 1,70 1,19 1 9
+Co-authorship by article 1,85 1,55 0 8
+
+Source: research data (2019).
+
+It is observed that the majority of articles (75.72%) have more than one author,
+
+increasing the statistics of average co-authorship and average number of authors per article to
+almost two. In general, the collaboration index reached 2.32, which means that there are an
+average of 2.32 authors collaborating per article. It was also registered 36 articles with only one
+author and 109 articles with more than one author.
+In turn, Chart 4 presents the authors who produced more than one article in the studied
+period:
+
+Chart 4. Authors present in more than one article
+Autor Título Ano
+Daniel Francisco
+Nagao Menezes
+Brief analysis on jurimetry, the challenges for its implementation and the corresponding
+advantages 2017
+Effectiveness of the right to education in the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the
+State of São Paulo in the light of Jurimetry 2017
+Metropolitan Region of Campinas: GDP X Labor Proceedings - Jurimetric Analysis. 2014
+Jurimetry: Analysis of the ineffectiveness of the judiciary in consumer protection 2014
+Filipe Jaeger
+Zabala
+Free software applied research in mathematics and statistics learning 2018
+Automatic evaluation and correction in RStudio free software 2016
+Jurimetry: statistics applied to Law 2014
+Grazielly
+Alessandra
+Baggenstoss
+
+Legal hermeneutics in Brazilian higher courts: Sample survey of court decisions 2014
+The judicial decision in guarantor constitutionalism 2013
+Mônica Bonetti
+Couto
+Justice and knowledge management: the contribution of jurimetry to the administration of
+justice 2016
+Utilitarian ethics and qualitative empirical research in law 2015
+Simone Pereira de
+Oliveira
+Justice and knowledge management: the contribution of jurimetry to the administration of
+justice 2016
+Utilitarian ethics and qualitative empirical research in law 2015
+Alexandre Rocha
+Almeida de Moraes
+A new model of criminal activity for the Brazilian Public Ministry: agencies and jurimetry
+laboratory 2018
+New prospects for criminal activity by the Public Ministry in the social control of crime 2017
+Thaisa Jacintho
+Muller
+Free software applied research in mathematics and statistics learning 2018
+Automatic evaluation and correction in RStudio free software 2016
+Márcia Carla
+Pereira Ribeiro
+Legal and economic mechanisms for technology transfer: a case study 2017
+The "Lemons Model" applied to the contract under the legal regime of transfer of business
+establishment: an economic analysis of Law 2015
+Marcelo Guedes
+Nunes
+Judicial recovery in the state of São Paulo - 2nd phase of the insolvency observatory 2019
+Decision reforms in criminal law chambers in São Paulo 2015
+Source: research data (2019).
+
+That is, of the 84 articles analyzed, 63 of them were written by authors who did not
+
+produce other articles available on the studied base. In order to describe the frequency of
+publication of the authors, the Lotka coefficient was calculated, whose result of 3.77 indicates
+that the number of authors who write two articles would be equal to 0.073 (1 / 23.77) of the
+number of authors who wrote only one article.
+Having identified the authors with the highest number of productions under this
+research, the journals with the highest incidence of published articles were investigated. The
+results are shown in Table 2:
+
+Table 2. Journals with more than one article
+Journal name Number of publications
+Journal of Law School of Federal University of Minas Gerais 4
+Brazilian Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 2
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 15
+
+Law UNIFACS – Virtual Debate 2
+Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza 2
+Law and Freedom Journal 2
+Online Courts Review 2
+Legal Journal of the Higher School of the Public Ministry of São Paulo 2
+Legal Opinion Journal 2
+
+Source: research data (2019).
+
+According to Bradford's Law, it appears that one magazine presents four articles, seven
+
+magazines two articles and 56 magazines a single article. Therefore, it is corroborated that many
+journals produce little about the investigated area, as shown in Figure 5:
+
+Figure 5. Number of journals by number of publications
+
+Source: research data (2019).
+
+Regarding the keywords, Table 3 presents a quantitative summary of the occurrences
+
+found:
+
+Table 3. Keywords
+Frequency of
+keywords
+Amount of
+keywords Keywords
+21 1 Jurimetry
+5 3 Law; statistic; artificial intelligence
+3 2 Adoption; civil Procedure
+
+2 16
+Logical analysis; invalid act and illegal act; civil procedure code; Judicial
+decision; human rights; partial dissolution; successive incidence;
+interdisciplinarity; public ministry; slowness; validity plan; judicial power;
+natural language processing; RStudio; safety; Federal Court of Justice
+1 253 ...
+Source: research data (2019).
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 16
+
+Except for the word “jurimetry” (precisely the term used in the search), the terms
+
+“adoption” and “civil process” stand out, showing the areas of law with more applications of
+jurimetry. Soon after, the words "law" and "statistics", present in five articles, show the very
+definition of jurimetry (statistics applied to law). In addition to these, also in the same position
+regarding the number of occurrences, the use of "artificial intelligence" stands out, indicating
+the application of computer systems capable of acting in a similar way to human, in the field of
+Law.
+Excluding the word “jurimetry” and applying the 1st Zipf’s Law to the other
+keywords, ordered in descending order according to the frequency of occurrence, the values
+shown in Table 4 are obtained:
+
+Table 4. 1ª Zipf Law
+Amount of keywords Serial order (r) Frequency (f) Zipf constant
+3 1 5 5
+2 2 3 6
+16 3 2 6
+253 4 1 4
+Source: research data (2019).
+When plotting the Zipf constants in relation to the series orders, found in Table 4,
+Figure 6 is obtained:
+
+Figure 6. Keyword occurrence zones
+
+Source: research data (2019).
+
+It can be observed that the transition point between the high and low frequency words
+
+is the one that has the Zipf constant equal to six, given that the words: jurimetry; law; statistic;
+Artificial intelligence are considered as trivial information (Zone I, as proposed by Zipf) and
+words with Zipf constant equal to four are considered noise (Zone III). Thus, in order to identify
+the word that separates the trivial information zone from the noise zone, the Goffman Transition
+Point (T) was calculated, which, when returning a value of T equal to 22, indicates that the 22nd
+keyword is the one that displays this transition, as shown in Table 5:
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 17
+
+Table 5. Keywords for Goffman's Transition Point
+Word occurrence zones Words Order
+Zone I. Trivial Information Jurimetry -
+Zone II. Interesting
+Information
+Law 1
+Statistics 2
+Artificial Inteligence 3
+Adoption 4
+Civil process 5
+Logical analysis 6
+Invalid and unlawful act 7
+Civil Procedure Code 8
+Judicial decision 9
+Human rights 10
+Partial dissolution 11
+Successive incidence 12
+Interdisciplinarity 13
+Public ministry 14
+Slowness 15
+Validity plan 16
+Judicial power 17
+Natural language processing 18
+Rstudio 19
+Safety 20
+Federal Supreme Court 21
+Brazilian Association of Lawtechs and Legaltechs 22
+Zona III. Ruídos Access justice; Institutional reception; Judgment; Actio nata; Public
+administration; Judicial administrators; Brazilian adoption; Consensual
+adoption; Adoption intuitu personae; Affection; Agency; Infiltrated agent
+Analysis of methods; Economic analysis; Economic analysis of law; Empirical
+analysis of judicial decisions; Jurisprudential analysis; Latent semantic analysis
+Anchoring; Computer application; Active learning; Calculation of assets; Legal
+arguments; Art 1 085 of the civil code; Activism; Intangible commercial identity
+assets; Intangible assets and intellectual property; Criminal performance and
+efficiency; Conciliation hearing; Autonomy; Heritage autonomy; Performance
+evaluation; Judicial evaluation; Bankruptcy Law; Electronic bases of
+judgments; Environmental good; Big data; Biogas; Methodological DIY;
+National CNA adoption register; Adoption campaigns; Carf; Science of law;
+Movie theater; Civil Law; General contractual clauses; E-commerce; Common
+Law; Communication; Contests; Conflict between partners; Positive conflict;
+Mass conflicts; Conflicts between domain name on the internet and trademarks;
+Advisers; Consequentialism; Constitutionality; Constitutionalism;
+Administrative litigation; Mass litigation; Contradictory; Contracts;
+Controversies; Cooperation; Corruption; Child and teenager; Organized crime;
+Watch out; Open data; Moral damage; Repetitive demand; Derivatives;
+Expropriation; Judicial performance; Social differences; Human dignity;
+Alternative law; Civil right; Commercial law; Brazilian commercial law;
+Comparative law; Criminal law; Child and youth law; Family law; Consumer
+law; Education law; Electronic law; International right; Private right; Civil
+procedural law; Social law; Corporate law; Fundamental rights, Economy;
+Behavioral economics; Economic effects; Effectiveness; Effectiveness of
+private law; Judicial efficiency; Procedural efficiency; Empiria; Empirical legal
+research; Legal education; Entity shielding; Barriers and obstacles; Voluntary
+delivery; Epistemology; Democratic state; Regulatory status; State-owned;
+Legal statistics; Empirical legal studies; Extrajudicial exclusion of a minority
+partner; Exercise of citizenship; Liability; Bankruptcy; Family; Biological or
+origin family; Substitute family; Philosophy; Framing; Gamefication; Justice
+management; Ghost in the shell; Open government; State government; Habeas
+corpus; Legal hermeneutics; Heterogeneity of calculations; Homo economicus;
+Impact of the judicial decision; Inertia; Information; Asymmetric information;
+Legal informatics; Insolvency Law; Artificial intelligence and law; Cognitive
+intelligence; Functional interdependence; Public interest; Internationalization;
+Internet; Interoperability; Interpretation; Natural judge; Judge; Brazilian judges;
+Legal; Jurismometry; Lawtechs; Learning with free software; Lee loevinger;
+Legality; Information access law; Freedom of initiative; Usual litigants;
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 18
+
+Repetitive litigation; Inductive logic; Class struggle; Markdown; Basic math;
+Analysis matrices; Mediation; Mercosur; Mcda c methodology; Motivation;
+Virtual world; Bank loan; Business and contracts; Protection level; New civil
+procedure code; Online dispute resolution; Ontologies; Law operators;
+Optimism; Owner shielding; Pan principiologismo; Legal personality; Research
+applied in law; Case law research; Empirical research; Qualitative empirical
+research; Virtual research; Methodological pluralism; General power of caution;
+Criminal and dogmatic criminal policy; Judicial policy; Public policy;
+Positivism; Legal practice; Judicial precedent; Binding precedents; Criminal
+prevention; Principle of efficiency; Principles; Privacy; Private; Collective
+process; Electronic process; Electronic judicial process; Court lawsuits; Labor
+lawsuits; Attorney; Employment protection program; Thinking the Law project;
+Judicial leadership; Protection of private investment; Distinctive protection of
+companies; Legal protection of private investment commercial code;
+Intellectual property protection; Public; R Studio; Strong rationality; Pattern
+Recognition; Business recovery; Reduction of working hours; Wage reduction;
+Decision reform; Family reintegration; Consumer relationship; Relationship
+between genders; Legal relations; General repercussion; Research in education;
+Limited liability; Responsiveness; Scientific methodology; Selection; Adverse
+selection; Public sector; Shiny; Symbolism of codes; Multiport system; System
+R; Systems based on legal knowledge; Information society; Commercial
+companies; Social technologies; Telephony; Theory of legal guarantee; Vital
+testament; Corporate types; Decision making; Topical; Technology transfer
+Source: research data (2019).
+Finally, following the analysis protocol, the behavior of the citations was analyzed, in
+order to identify which works and/or authors are being used when working with the referred
+theme. The publications that were most cited in the analyzed articles are shown in Table 6:
+
+Table 6. Most cited publications
+Autor Título Ano Frequência
+Lee Loevinger Jurimetrics: The Methodology of Legal Inquiry 1963 7
+Filipe Jaeger Zabala e
+Fabiano Feijó Silveira
+Jurimetry: statistics applied to Law 2014 6
+
+Lee Loevinger Jurimetrics – The Next Step Forward 1949 4
+Marcelo Guedes Nunes Jurimetry applied to corporate law - a statistical study
+of the dissolution of society in Brazil
+2012 4
+
+Marcelo Guedes Nunes Jurimetry: how statistics can reinvent Law 2016 4
+Mauro Cappelletti Bryant
+Garth
+Access to justice 1988 3
+
+Fábio Ulhoa Coelho Commercial Law Course: Business Law 2012 3
+Marcos Bernardes de Mello Legal Fact Theory - plan of existence 2003 3
+Márcia Milena Pivatto Serra How to use elements of descriptive statistics in
+jurimetry
+2013 3
+
+Source: research data (2019).
+
+Lee Loevinger's works, found in the research, caused this author to be cited more
+
+frequently, including, also, the fact of being considered the precursor of the term under study
+(GARGANO and NADER, 2018; LUVIZOTTO and GARCIA, 2020).
+Given the most cited publications, the H Index was calculated, an indicator responsible
+for measuring the researcher's productivity and impact, relating the number of publications by
+an author to the number of citations. For the case analyzed, an H index of 4 was reached, that
+is, at least four of the most cited authors have four or more citations. Analyzing the co-citations,
+we can see the relationship shown in Figure 7:
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 19
+
+Figure 7. Co-citations network
+
+Source: research data (2019).
+
+Figure 7 shows the relationship presented by each author to other individuals, with a
+
+predominance of the 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil.
+It is important to analyze the results found in the light of other studies. In this sense,
+corroborating with the laws of Bradford (1934) and Lotka (1926), the findings point to a
+concentration, in terms of authors and magazines, that act on this theme. In other words, even
+though there was an average increase of publications, from 2002 to August 2019, of 18.92%,
+there are few authors and magazines publishing about jurimetry - which corroborates with
+previous studies, which emphasize it is a recent theme and still little explored in Brazil
+(MENEZES and BARROS, 2017; ZABALA and SILVEIRA, 2014; YEUNG, 2017).
+As for what has been published, from the classification of keywords proposed by Zipf
+(2012), it is possible to identify recurrently addressed themes. If, on the one hand, the keywords
+identified as “Interesting information” have broad meanings (for example, “Law”, “Judicial
+decision”, “Slowness”) when, from them, a search is carried out with the so-called “Noises”,
+we obtain a more precise scenario about the published studies:
+
+• The themes associated with Family Law stand out, since from the term
+"Adoption", in the "Interesting information", it is possible to trace "Noises" of
+similar semantic meaning, namely: "right of childhood and youth"; “Family
+law”; “Brazilian adoption”; “Consensual adoption”; “Adoption intuitu
+personae”; "affection"; “National adoption register (CNA)”; “Adoption
+campaigns”; "child and teenager"; “Voluntary delivery”; "family"; “Biological
+or original family”; “Substitute family”; “Family reintegration”.
+
+• Likewise, taking the interesting information “Partial dissolution”, it is possible
+to trace, along with the “Noises”, the terms “commercial law”; “Brazilian
+commercial law”; “Corporate law”; “Partial dissolution”; “Minority partner
+extrajudicial exclusion”; “Conflict between partners”; “Positive conflict”;
+“Mass conflicts”; "bankruptcy"; “Distinctive protection for companies”; “Legal
+protection of private investment”; “Commercial code”; “Business recovery”;
+“Corporate types”; “Transfers from business establishments”; “Bank loan”;
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 20
+
+“Business and contract”.
+
+• It is also possible to notice the presence of studies concerned with the decisions
+themselves (albeit in a smaller number), since from the term “Judicial decision”
+(“Interesting information”), the “Noises” are registered with the keywords
+“empirical analysis of judicial decisions”; “Jurisprudential analysis”; “Judicial
+performance”; “Judicial efficiency”; “Procedural efficiency”; “Impact of the
+judicial decision”.
+
+Yeung (2017) states that, although in Brazil, jurimetry is at an early stage in terms of
+
+scientific communications, this topic could be of great value when associated with issues such
+as contractual relations, especially involving debts and banks; labor justice; criminal justice;
+and, gender impacts on court decisions. In this sense, the placement of Yeung (2017) seems to
+have been considered in a significant part of the published articles.
+The presence of Lee Loevinger as the most frequently cited author is not surprising, as
+he was one of the precursors to the study of jurimetry (COUTO and OLIVEIRA, 2016; BISPO
+and GONÇALVES, 2019; DUARTE and NUNES, 2020).
+Finally, with regard to the analysis of citations and co-citations, the highlight goes to
+the 1988 Constitution itself, given the importance of the Magna Carta in relation to legal studies.
+In addition, there is a high frequency of citation in the works of Lee Loevinger, the first person
+to use the term jurimetry (NUNES, 2016).
+
+5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
+
+At the end of this study, it is important to state the main results found. In this sense,
+
+between 2002 and August 2019, 84 scientific articles published in Brazil can be found under
+the theme of jurimetry, showing an average annual growth of 18.92%. Of the published articles,
+there are almost two authors per work, with 36 published alone out of a total of 143 authors.
+Two authors stood out: Daniel Francisco N. Menezes and Filipe J. Zabala, the first with four
+and the second with three publications. The Journal of the Faculty of Law of the Federal
+University of Minas Gerais was the journal with the most publications on the subject. Words
+related to statistics, judiciary and civil law (Adoption; Civil procedure; Invalid act and illegal
+act; Civil procedure code; Partial dissolution; Successive incidence) were classified as areas of
+interest, according to the Zipf Law, which suggests Civil Law as an area of law more aligned
+to the use of jurimetry. Lee Loevinger was the most cited author in the works, due to being
+considered the precursor of the term under study. Brazilian authors like Filipe J. Zabala,
+Fabiano F. Silveira and Marcelo G. Nunes also stood out.
+As a limitation, this work explored only the Google Scholar search tool, since other
+academic research bases such as Scientific Electronic Library Online and Web of Science, for
+example, did not present scientific articles with the term “jurimetry”, though only in Portuguese.
+It is important to recognize that other sources such as the Virtual Library Network presented
+articles present in the research carried out via Google Scholar. Therefore, studies carried out on
+the basis of theses and dissertations are suggested, which, in a way, present more contemporary
+research. In addition, specific bases dealing with Law, such as the Brazilian Law Bibliography
+(BBD) maintained by the Federal Senate, must be taken into account in future research.
+In addition, the study was limited to an exclusively descriptive aspect. It is necessary
+to deepen in the context of citations, since, according to Thomaz, Assad and Moreira (2011, p.
+90),
+RDBCI: Rev. Dig. Bibliotec e Ci. Info. / RDBCI: Dig. J. of Lib. and Info. Sci.| Campinas, SP | v.18| e020018 | 2020
+
+| 21
+
+The number of publications, citations and the average of citations per published
+work, taken in isolation, are traditional bibliometric indexes that have
+deficiencies, as they do not portray the combined information of published
+works with the respective citations.
+The opportunity for comparative bibliometric studies, mainly associated with the
+analysis of citations, between Brazilian and foreign scientific production is also seen. In this
+sense, methods such as text mining can provide a broader understanding of the studies.
+Anyway, the criticism regarding the exclusive use of bibliometric indicators, coming
+from researchers such as Ioannidis, et al., (2017), Hicks, et al., (2015) and Stephan, Veugelers
+and Wang (2017), do not disqualify applications in a context in which scenarios are established
+that can shed light on a body of knowledge - of relevant utility in the development of new
+studies.
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+Article submitted to the similarity system
+
+Submitted: 26/03/2020 – Accept: 25/06/2020 – Published: 30/06/2020
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/MARICATO--Glaucia--RICHTER--Vitor-Simonis.-What-Numbers-Do--Production--Uses--and-Effects-of-Quantification-in-Everyday-Life..md b/MARICATO--Glaucia--RICHTER--Vitor-Simonis.-What-Numbers-Do--Production--Uses--and-Effects-of-Quantification-in-Everyday-Life..md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7678dd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/MARICATO--Glaucia--RICHTER--Vitor-Simonis.-What-Numbers-Do--Production--Uses--and-Effects-of-Quantification-in-Everyday-Life..md
@@ -0,0 +1,776 @@
+241 Recebido em 02/07/2021; aprovado em 13/07/2021.
+
+DOSSIÊ – O que fazem os números? Produções, Usos e Efeitos da Quantificação E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+DOI: 10.5433/2176-6665.2021v26n2p241
+
+O que Fazem os Números? Produções, Usos e Efeitos da Quantificação
+da Vida Cotidiana
+
+What Numbers Do? Production, Uses, and Effects of Quantification in
+Everyday Life
+
+*Glaucia Maricato1
+*Vitor Simonis Richter2
+
+Resumo
+
+A deflagração da pandemia da Covid-19 casou uma intensa circulação de tabelas,
+gráficos, estatísticas e rankings que buscam narrar o comportamento das infecções
+e mortes pelo novo vírus. Tais ‘dados’ se tornaram o cerne de disputas e
+negociações, evidenciando a centralidade e efeitos políticos das narrativas
+numéricas. Há muito pesquisadores e pesquisadoras têm abordado processos de
+mensuração de populações e de fenômenos sociais como instrumentos de poder e,
+mais recentemente, pesquisas têm avançado a discussão sobre os efeitos políticos
+da redução de processos sociais complexos a números. Nessa apresentação,
+introduzimos alguns dos problemas e subtópicos que povoam os debates
+contemporâneos sobre processos de quantificação no campo das ciências sociais e
+dos estudos sociais da ciência e tecnologia. Em específico, abordamos alguns dos
+problemas que estariam no cerne das discussões sobre os números na produção de
+narrativas oficiais e introduzimos debates em torno do papel das classificações, dos
+efeitos de escala e da linguagem dos números nas tecnologias de governo.
+Palavras-chave: Números. Processos de quantificação. Tecnologias de governo.
+Escalas. Classificações.
+
+Abstract
+
+The Covid-19 pandemic outbreak engendered an intense circulation of tables,
+graphics, statistics and rankings that seek to narrate the infection`s behavior and
+deaths. Such “data” became the object of disputes and negotiations, highlighting
+the centrality and political effects of numerical narratives. For a long time,
+researchers have been approaching processes of measuring populations and social
+phenomena as instruments of power and, more recently, they have advanced in the
+discussion on the political effects of reducing complex social processes to numbers.
+In this introduction, we outline issues that populate contemporary debates on
+quantification processes in the fields of social sciences and science and technology
+studies (STS). More specifically, we address the role of numbers in government and
+
+1 Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Institut für Sozial- und
+Kulturanthropologie (ISK-FUB, Berlim, Alemanha). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4318-3850.
+2 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Departamento
+de Ciência Política, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política (PPGPOL-IFCH-UFRGS, Porto
+Alegre, RS, Brasil). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9475-9277.
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+242 MEDIAÇÕES, Londrina, v. 26, n. 2, p. 241-255, mai-ago. 2021.
+
+State narratives and we introduce debates on the role of classifications, on scalar
+effects, and on the use of numbers on technologies of government.
+Keywords: Numbers. Quantification. Technologies of government. Scales.
+Classifications.
+
+A deflagração da pandemia mundial da Covid-19 no primeiro semestre de 2020
+
+teve como um de seus efeitos a intensa circulação de tabelas, gráficos, estatísticas,
+rankings e outras tecnologias de visualização de dados numéricos sobre as taxas de
+infecções e mortes e o andamento das campanhas de vacinação. A quantificação da
+pandemia em seus diversos aspectos nos informava constantemente sobre o
+alastramento e tentativas de controle do novo vírus, fazendo saltar aos olhos as
+diferenças regionais e nacionais de um mundo marcado por desigualdades. Diariamente
+passamos a ouvir falar sobre a “curva” de casos, sobre subnotificações, sobre as taxas de
+vacinação, sobre as percentagens de casos graves e hospitalizações. Ainda nos primeiros
+meses da pandemia, fomos inundados por variados debates que colocavam as técnicas,
+classificações, normativas e instrumentos de produção de dados epidemiológicos em
+evidência. Em abril de 2020, a mídia brasileira estampava matérias sobre a disparada do
+número de casos de morte por doença respiratória sem causa identificada, trazendo à
+tona o intrínseco enredamento entre diagnóstico, classificações obituárias e controle
+epidemiológico da Covid-19. Ao mesmo tempo, falava-se sobre a discrepância em
+relação aos dados divulgados pelo governo federal e os governos estaduais. Em meados
+de 2021, o número sem precedentes de mortes no país ressoava nas redes e nos debates
+públicos no contexto nacional e internacional, seguidos das alarmantes tentativas do
+governo federal de se desresponsabilizar. Em paralelo a crise sanitária, a crise política no
+Brasil deu contornos dramáticos ao tema da produção de dados estatísticos, tornando
+ainda mais evidente a centralidade dos números como tecnologia de produção de
+narrativas oficiais.
+A questão das tecnologias de quantificação não está, é claro, limitada ao campo
+da saúde; afinal, somos constantemente informados sobre os índices de pobreza nos
+países, sobre as taxas de analfabetismo, escutamos sobre indicadores de violência, sobre
+a subida ou descida das taxas de desemprego, somos convidados a observar gráficos
+sobre a poluição em grandes capitais ou acompanhar o ranking mundial de países com
+maior e menor exposição a notícias falsas e etc. Já há algum tempo cientistas sociais têm
+discorrido sobre a importância do desenvolvimento de pesquisas e debates voltados à
+produção, utilização e efeitos de dados quantitativos e linguagem numérica. Autores
+como Ian Hacking (1990), Michel Foucault (1998, 2008) e Alain Desrosières (1998)
+demonstraram como as estatísticas e quantificações diversas servem como instrumento
+de governo e poder estatal. A própria invenção das estatísticas esteve intimamente
+enredada à constituição de Estados-nações no século XIX (HACKING, 1990; SCOTT,
+1998). Em anos mais recentes, autoras como Marilyn Strathern (2000), Sally Merry (2011),
+Chris Shore e Susan Wright (2015) e Isabelle Bruno (2008, 2010) destacaram como
+números, indicadores e estatísticas têm tornado os rankings um aspecto central da
+ordenação de tecnologias de governo e de auditoria. A principal característica desta
+mudança consistiria em transformar e reduzir processos sociais complexos e diversos a
+números, especialmente transformados em tabelas e gráficos organizados em rankings
+passíveis de comparações e de ordenação de uma hierarquia moral acerca dos “bons
+indicadores” e das ações recomendadas para adequação destes. Conforme apontam, a
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+GLAUCIA MARICATO; VITOR SIMONIS RICHTER I O que Fazem os Números? Produções, Usos e Efeitos da Quantificação da Vida 243
+
+proliferação de indicadores e ranking globais não tem impulsionado apenas a mudança
+de estratégias nacionais e novas formas de (auto)governo, como também a produção de
+novas subjetividades (BRUNO, 2008, 2010; SHORE; WRIGHT, 2015).
+Os números, como aquilo que deve ser lido pelos administradores públicos, se
+tornam mediadores importantes das tecnologias de governo contemporâneas. Nikolas
+Rose (1999) afirma que, além de constituir aquilo a ser lido pelos representantes da
+administração, os números permitem que os planos e diagnósticos da “realidade” sejam
+apresentados como retórica do desinteresse, da objetividade e da imparcialidade,
+características muitas vezes associadas à ciência (HACKING, 1990; HARAWAY, 1995).
+Chamamos atenção, portanto, para a maneira como os números são tomados como
+dados neutros, livres de valores e interferência humana, apolíticos – verdadeiras
+imagens da “realidade real”. Os números, e com eles tabelas, mapas e gráficos, se
+tornam instrumentos pelos quais versões da realidade são performadas.
+As estatísticas não são, todavia, apenas produtos da política institucional oficial
+de agências governamentais, transnacionais e organizações empresariais privadas. Elas
+também fazem parte e são tomadas como formas engajadas de ativismos. Podemos citar
+como exemplos as ONGs e movimentos sociais empenhados na luta pelos direitos das
+mulheres, das populações negras e comunidade LGBTQI+ que atuam produzindo,
+compilando e organizando indicadores e dados estatísticos em relação a violência
+doméstica, urbana e policial. Podemos citar também organizações de pacientes que
+pressionam autoridades locais e nacionais na produção de dados estatísticos afim de
+chamar a atenção para doenças e condições de saúde específicas que tendem a ser
+negligenciadas ou apagadas dos debates públicos. E ainda, grupos de ecologistas que
+acionam linguagem numérica e estatísticas para tentar transmitir a escala e a situação
+dramática que grandes desmatamentos, aquecimento global, queimadas, poluição, secas,
+tempestades têm para a vida no planeta Terra. O uso da linguagem dos números através
+da produção de estatísticas nestes casos pode ser visto como uma importante estratégia
+de visibilização das preocupações e demandas por políticas de proteção e promoção dos
+interesses desses grupos. Trata-se, aqui, daquilo que alguns autores têm chamado de
+estatativismo, “um conceito que descreve um conjunto de práticas estatísticas voltadas a
+emancipação, como de uma palavra de ordem que convoca atores sociais a utilizarem-se
+do poder da quantificação em suas lutas [...].” (DIDIER; BRUNO, 2021, p. 82).
+
+O Papel das Classificações
+
+A análise dos processos de quantificação da vida cotidiana está inelutavelmente
+
+conectada a uma reflexão acerca dos processos de classificação e categorização. Afinal,
+para que seja possível realizar a mensuração dos níveis de poluições em grandes
+metrópoles, por exemplo, é preciso primeiro estabelecer os limites que separam um ar
+poluído de um ar não poluído. Quando uma epidemia é anunciada, isso significa que o
+número de casos registrados num determinado intervalo de tempo cruzou a fronteira
+entre o que seria aceitável e a emergência de saúde pública. Para que os níveis de
+violência doméstica sejam comparados entre regiões, primeiro se estabelece aquilo que
+conta e não conta como violência doméstica. Portanto, chamamos a atenção para uma
+interessante linha de investigação intimamente atrelada aos estudos dos processos de
+quantificação interessada em abordar questões tais como: a) quais são as categorias,
+classificações, diferenciações que informam as quantificações? B) quais são os atores
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+244 MEDIAÇÕES, Londrina, v. 26, n. 2, p. 241-255, mai-ago. 2021.
+
+envolvidos na delimitação dessas categorias? C) quais as negociações e disputas que são
+colocadas? D) quais são os elementos que ganham destaque ou que são invisibilizados
+nesses processos de classificação e quantificação? E) como classificações e categorias
+produzem aquilo que pretendem mensurar?
+Cientistas sociais e historiadores têm analisado classificações locais como forma de
+entender determinadas culturas, relações sociais e processos históricos. Tal como nos
+lembra o importante trabalho de Geoffrey Bowker e Susan Star (1999), “classificar é humano”.
+Todos os dias, abro minha caixa de e-mail e separo aquilo que é lixo daquilo que é importante,
+crio pastas e subpastas para diferentes assuntos e de tempos em tempos reorganizo tudo de
+formas diferentes. Uma vez por semana, verifico meu próprio peso na balança do banheiro,
+coloco o resultado em um aplicativo no celular que, por sua vez, me informa sobre o meu
+IMC corporal, alertando caso tenha cruzado o limite entre o “peso ideal” e o “sobrepeso”.
+Pela tardinha, telefono para meu “meio-irmão” para organizar a celebração de “bodas de
+prata” do nosso pai e juntos fazemos uma lista de compras colocando de um lado aquilo
+que é “essencial” e de outro aquilo que “talvez a gente compre”.
+Se estamos o tempo todo classificando o mundo ao nosso redor, estamos,
+necessariamente, fazendo-o a partir de noções que não estão livres de valores morais e
+relações de hierarquia localmente moldados. Ou seja, processos de classificação e
+quantificação são inevitavelmente perpassados por relações de poder – categorias,
+classificações ou padrões (standards) valorizam determinados pontos de vista e silenciam
+outros (BOWKER; STAR, 1999). Essa questão se torna mais evidente quando analisamos a
+burocratização, ou o congelamento dessas categorias, pelas tecnologias de governo. Por
+exemplo, podemos tomar o simples ato de cadastramento em alguma plataforma
+governamental. Enquanto para alguns sujeitos o preenchimento dos campos necessários
+do formulário poderá ser realizado de forma corriqueira, para outros, esse simples
+procedimento pode se tornar uma experiência de violência institucional. Ao oferecer
+apenas duas opções de resposta para o campo “sexo” – homem ou mulher -, o
+questionário em questão invisibilizaria os sujeitos que se identificam como queer, trans e
+etc. Em meados de 2021, circulava por algumas redes sociais matérias que tratavam do
+censo demográfico prestes a ocorrer na Polônia, país do leste europeu. Conforme
+destacavam, o formulário de preenchimento obrigatório pelos cidadãos poloneses
+questionava o estado civil dos sujeitos, mas não oferecia campos de preenchimento
+adequado para aqueles que eram legalmente casados com pessoas do mesmo sexo no
+exterior (diferente da maioria dos países integrantes da União Europeia, uniões
+homoafetivas não são reconhecidas no país). Ou seja, mesmo que o preenchimento fosse
+obrigatório para os sujeitos vivendo em outros países, o censo proposto pelo governo
+operava um apagamento do número de poloneses em casamentos homoafetivos no
+exterior. Nesses exemplos, portanto, sexo e sexualidade são categorias e classificações
+operadas pela administração pública e que através das burocracias estatais e estatísticas
+oficiais solidifica posicionamentos políticos. Se aqueles campos de preenchimento do
+censo polonês não tivessem sido modificados, fruto da pressão de organizações locais e
+internacionais, o resultado do censo possivelmente divulgaria dados sobre uma população
+casada no exterior cem por cento heterossexual.
+Voltando ao tema da pandemia da Covid-19, podemos nos questionar sobre sua
+temporalidade – sobre o seu começo e (ainda incerto) fim. Quando a Organização
+Mundial da Saúde irá declarar o fim da pandemia? Quando a maioria da população
+mundial estiver vacinada? Qual exatamente será a percentagem (quando a vacinação
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+GLAUCIA MARICATO; VITOR SIMONIS RICHTER I O que Fazem os Números? Produções, Usos e Efeitos da Quantificação da Vida 245
+
+atingir 70%, 80% da população?) Quando o número de mortes diárias tiver caído para
+determinado nível? Qual nível? Quais serão os efeitos dessa declaração para potenciais
+questões ainda em aberto acerca das sequelas da Covid-19? Qual será o investimento em
+pesquisas uma vez que a atenção internacional se dissipar? Pesquisando sobre a
+epidemia do vírus zika e sua relação com a microcefalia no nordeste brasileiro, Debora
+Diniz (2017) apontou que, embora o Ministério da Saúde do Brasil tenha decretado o fim
+da situação de emergência de saúde em 2017, para as mães de crianças com síndrome
+congênita do zika a epidemia jamais terá fim pois elas seguirão vivendo uma
+maternidade cuidadora e solitária. Para além disso, a declaração da OMS do fim da
+emergência de saúde pública devido a epidemia de zika vírus significou o fim do fluxo
+de recursos para desenvolvimento de novas pesquisas e políticas sociais (LAKOFF,
+2019). O que está em jogo aqui, portanto, é o fato de que ao deixar de ser classificada
+como uma emergência, uma questão de saúde pode deixar de figurar na agenda pública
+sem que, contudo, importantes questões científicas e sociais tenham sido resolvidas.
+Portanto, se estamos a todo tempo classificando o mundo ao nosso redor, e essas
+classificações são intrinsicamente moldadas a partir de concepções, hierarquias e relações
+de poder, estamos também produzindo dados numéricos que respondem – ou,
+poderíamos dizer, adicionam uma camada de solidez – a essas classificações. A partir da
+análise de campanhas de eliminação da hanseníase, Glaucia Maricato (2021) demonstrou
+como classificações biomédicas e decisões políticas se enredam na produção de dados
+epidemiológicos que a longo prazo operam uma invisibilização dessa doença na agenda
+da saúde global ao mesmo tempo em que milhares de sujeitos são diagnosticados todos
+os anos e uma série de questões médico-científicas continuam em aberto. Vincanne Adams
+(2016) faz uso da noção de “métricas”, enquanto tecnologias de contagem, para tratar da
+crescente centralidade de abordagens quantitativas na administração da saúde global.
+Por fim, cabe ainda destacar que as classificações têm papel importante não
+apenas na maneira como organizamos o mundo ao nosso redor e como moldamos
+tecnologias de governo, como fazem parte também da nossa forma de viver e experienciar
+o mundo. Um já clássico trabalho sobre a relação entre classificações de pessoas e
+processos de subjetivação pode ser encontrado em Ian Hacking (2002), que sugere o
+conceito de “looping effect” para dar conta daquilo que descreve como uma espécie de
+nominalismo dinâmico. Se estamos o tempo todo classificando, as classificações também
+fazem parte da maneira como identificamos uns aos outros e nos autoidentificamos –
+seja a partir de categorias que podem não ter implicações políticas, tal como, por exemplo,
+signos do zodíaco, seja a partir de classificações que ensejam disputas e carregam
+consigo peso político e social, tal como “negra/o”, “sapatão” ou “travesti”. Embora o
+desenvolvimento dessa discussão específica não faça parte dos objetivos desse dossiê, os
+processos de subjetivação de tipos de pessoa é uma linha importante de pesquisa que
+atravessa debates sobre processos de quantificação – e dois dos artigos publicados aqui
+evidenciam brilhantemente essa questão em contextos de produção de dados
+demográficos nacionais e de classificação de sujeitos em processos criminais.
+
+Números e Indicadores Entre as Tecnologias de Governo
+
+A relação entre classificações e quantificação tem tido um espaço considerável
+
+em certa literatura de orientação foucaultiana (DEAN, 1995, 2009; DESROSIÈRES, 1998;
+FOUCAULT, 1987; HACKING 1990). Nesta tradição, as classificações e suas formas
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+246 MEDIAÇÕES, Londrina, v. 26, n. 2, p. 241-255, mai-ago. 2021.
+
+numéricas, especialmente a estatística, se tornam objeto de estudo para compreender a
+relação entre saber e poder nas práticas de governo e de Estado. Deste conjunto de
+reflexões, alguns autores se voltaram para as tecnologias de governo entendidas como
+um “complexo de programas mundanos, cálculos, técnicas, aparatos, documentos e
+procedimentos através do qual autoridades buscam incorporar ambições
+governamentais” (ROSE; MILLER, 1992, p. 273), que têm como objetivo principal
+organizar as condutas e práticas cotidianas e incidir sobre a subjetividade das pessoas a
+serem governadas (ONG, 2003). Tecnologias de governo frequentemente acionam a
+práticas e técnicas de simplificação de uma realidade extremamente complexa – como,
+por exemplo, “a população”, “os recém-nascidos”, “a área queimada”, “moradores de
+rua” e “imigrantes”. Estas “simplificações” municiam os administradores e planejadores
+de intervenções governamentais com uma visão sinóptica que transforma um arranjo
+infinito de detalhes em um conjunto finito de categorias que, por sua vez, favorecem
+descrições sumárias, comparações e composições diversas a partir dos dados produzidos
+e agregados de formas particulares (DAS, POOLE, 2004; SCHUCH, 2015; SCOTT, 1998).
+Assim, as técnicas de mapeamento, de contabilidade e padronização da
+população que constituem tecnologias de governo acionam a linguagem dos números
+para objetivar e performar os fenômenos e realidades que buscam estabilizar. Os
+números, e com eles tabelas, mapas e gráficos, constituem um instrumento ou uma
+linguagem fundamental para realizar estas descrições, carregando consigo escolhas
+explícitas daquilo que se deseja quantificar, com qual frequência se quantifica bem como
+aquilo que se deseja não explicitar ou estabilizar nesta forma e linguagem particular. Na
+medida em que são estas descrições na maioria das vezes acionadas na elaboração de
+projetos de intervenção e políticas públicas, podemos partir do pressuposto de que não
+apenas os números são politicamente compostos e arranjados, mas também a política é
+numericamente feita e disputada (DESROSIÈRES, 1998; ROSE, 1999).
+Este tipo de reflexão encontra respaldos e inspirações também no campo dos
+estudos sociais da ciência e tecnologia, especialmente se pensarmos nos números como
+uma maneira específica de produzir inscrições, de estabilizar relações e objetos e fazer
+circular realidades até “centrais de cálculos” (LATOUR, 2000). Inscrições, no sentido
+atribuído por Bruno Latour (1986) em suas pesquisas sobre a prática científica e o
+laboratório, são aquelas operações anteriores à escrita de um artefato científico, seja ele
+um relatório, um artigo ou uma comunicação à comunidade científica (LATOUR;
+WOOLGAR, 1997). Tais operações dizem respeito aos traços, números, espectros e
+gráficos usados para compor “explicações poderosas” elaboradas pelos cientistas.
+Inscrições não constituem escrita propriamente dita, mas “transformações que
+materializam uma entidade em um signo, arquivo, documento, pedaço de papel, traço”
+(LATOUR, 2001, p. 350), e podemos incluir, os números. Ao realizarem este trabalho, os
+números enquanto inscrições permitem o aumento da mobilidade e o reforço da
+imutabilidade das entidades materializadas de modo a viajarem pelas redes
+sociotécnicas de forma mais protegida de interferências e desestabilizações até os seus
+destinos: os artigos científicos, os manuais técnicos, os relatórios de pesquisa, os balanços
+administrativos, as tabelas, gráficos e mapas que permitem àqueles que os interpretam e
+planejam realizar intervenções nas vidas de populações. As inscrições às quais Bruno
+Latour se refere, portanto, são dispositivos de mobilização do mundo, do espaço e do
+tempo, para a construção de versões da realidade, explicações poderosas e
+convencimento de adversários.
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+GLAUCIA MARICATO; VITOR SIMONIS RICHTER I O que Fazem os Números? Produções, Usos e Efeitos da Quantificação da Vida 247
+
+Voltando às tecnologias de governo, a conjunção entre números, inscrições e as
+
+políticas que os envolvem pode ser observada de forma particularmente explícita na
+recente polêmica gerada pelo governo federal ao cancelar o censo brasileiro em 2021.
+Como Juan Pablo Estupiñan observa em sua contribuição neste dossiê, os censos são
+tecnologias de governo altamente investidas de interesses, políticas, éticas e moralidades
+importantes tanto para a performance do estado na vida cotidiana das pessoas quanto
+para as identidades compostas em conjunção com resultados e números dos censos
+nacionais. No caso do cancelamento do censo brasileiro, houve reação imediata de
+instituições do Estado, cientistas, sociedade civil e órgãos de imprensa. Durante a
+pandemia, assim como a grande maioria dos países, a realização do censo que deveria
+acontecer em 2020 foi adiada para 2021, na esperança de que a pandemia pudesse ter
+sido controlada e superada. Apesar dos preparativos e providências tomadas para a
+condução do censo sob a pandemia, o governo federal inviabilizou a pesquisa ao
+aprovar o corte de 96% da verba do Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).
+A reação a esta medida ocorreu em meio à desconfiança em relação aos números de
+mortos registrados durante a pandemia (não apenas as vítimas de Covid-19) e dos
+impactos econômicos da inflação e do alto desemprego poderiam se tornar deletérios
+para os projetos de reeleição do presidente.
+Mais recentemente, a literatura voltada para a relação entre quantificação e
+tecnologias de governo tem instigado pesquisas sobre os trabalhos dos números para
+além do Estado-nação (BRUNO, 2008; MERRY, 2011; SHORE; WRIGHT, 2015;
+STRATHERN, 2000). Cris Shore e Susan Wright (2015), por exemplo, argumentam que o
+estilo de “governo pelos números” (governing by numbers) importado do mundo
+empresarial e corporativo se tornou um aspecto definidor dos modos de governo
+contemporâneos, os quais apresentam como principal característica a redução de
+processos complexos a simples indicadores numéricos e rankings para objetivos de
+administração e controle. Esta forma de uso dos números, indicadores e rankings para o
+governo de instituições e sujeitos tem sido observada a partir da crescente presença das
+tecnologias de auditoria como uma forma de vigilância e avaliação remota e de acesso de
+“estrangeiros” (outsiders) à intimidade numérica das empresas, instituições e sujeitos.
+Sally Engle Merry (2011), ao analisar o lugar dos indicadores na governança global dos
+direitos humanos, aponta que ao mesmo tempo que os números, indicadores e rankings
+reforçam um estilo de governo “corporativo” alçado a modelo de “bom governo”, a
+concentração nos indicadores como modo de governo também abre espaço para
+escrutínio público e pressão política aos governos e administrações.
+É neste contexto que demandas por políticas de transparência e desafio aos
+números oficiais se fortalecem (PORTER, 1995). Isabelle Bruno e Emmanuel Didier
+(2013) são autores que se destacam neste tipo de análise. Partindo de seus trabalhos
+sobre benchmarking, uma tecnologia administrativa de comparação de indicadores de
+performance que instaura a dinâmica concorrencial e competitiva em espaços e relações
+orientadas pela cooperação, Didier e Bruno (2021) lançam mão da noção de
+“estatativismo” como uma forma de entender os movimentos sociais e de pressão aos
+governos que amparam suas demandas em números que performam a realidade dos
+problemas denunciados. Assim o fazendo, estes movimentos acabam por deslocar
+também a produção dos números de seus espaços e relações até então privilegiados do
+Estado-nação e do capital (DIDIER; BRUNO, 2021) em direção a novos grupos e
+instituições que passam a disputar a realidade através dos números. Esse tema tem
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+248 MEDIAÇÕES, Londrina, v. 26, n. 2, p. 241-255, mai-ago. 2021.
+
+avançado de forma extremamente interessante e produtiva no Brasil por estudos tais
+quais Daniel Hirata et al. (2019), Bruno Cardoso (2019), Eugênia Motta (2019a, 2019b),
+Fernando Rabossi (2019)3
+.
+Entre os diversos efeitos que a adoção deste tipo de tecnologia de governo
+promove, a literatura tem apontado um comum: a consolidação de formas de
+autogoverno orientadas por rankings que dispensariam órgãos e tecnologias de controle
+e vigilância por parte dos estados-nação. Os rankings como forma de governo se tornam
+formas de ilustrar os bons e maus desempenhos e eventuais correções de cursos sobre
+aquilo que é esperado de cada instituição, empresa, setor e sujeitos. A avaliação, o
+julgamento e a transferência dos riscos recaí sobre os sujeitos que passam a ser ainda
+mais responsabilizados pelo sucesso ou fracasso de suas instituições, empreendimentos
+e administração da vida cotidiana (CAMARGO et al, 2021; SHORE; WRIGHT, 2015). Esta
+“descida” das tecnologias de governo pelos números em direção às empresas e às
+próprias subjetividades autogovernadas pelos rankings e indicadores, mas também sua
+generalização a um “mundo de indicadores” (MERRY, 2011) na governança global, nos
+convida a pensar sobre outro importante trabalho dos números em nossas vidas
+cotidianas: a composição de escalas.
+
+Escalas como efeitos das práticas de quantificação
+
+Como já dito anteriormente, uma das experiências inescapáveis da pandemia de
+
+Covid-19 consiste no acompanhamento diário de um conjunto de números, indicadores e
+gráficos que vieram performar a pandemia na vida cotidiana. Na medida em que os
+números de contaminações, de fatalidades e de países atingidos foram aumentando,
+acompanhamos de perto o trabalho destes números na composição da escala dos
+problemas causados pelo sars-cov-2. Desde sua caracterização enquanto “surto” localizado
+em Wuhan na China, os números de casos e mortes mediaram sua definição como uma
+epidemia e, posteriormente, uma pandemia de doença respiratória altamente letal que
+continua matando milhares de pessoas ao dia. A relação entre os usos de números e a
+experiência da pandemia explicita como as escalas que acionamos para nos relacionarmos
+com os fenômenos da vida social não estão pré-estabelecidos para os/as analistas
+simplesmente explicarem os movimentos entre os “níveis” micro, meso ou macro, local,
+regional, nacional ou global, universal ou particular. Entre as diversas relações,
+infraestruturas, desigualdades e sofrimentos que a pandemia de Covid-19 explicitou,
+podemos elencar a percepção dos processos de produção de escalas (process of scaling)
+como uma das questões evidenciadas pelas políticas dos números ao longo da pandemia.
+Nas ciências sociais as escalas têm sido amplamente acionadas muito mais como
+ferramenta de análise do que um objeto de escrutínio analítico em si mesmo. No entanto,
+elas têm sido cada vez mais frequentemente tomadas como efeitos de práticas e
+linguagens acionadas para que as pessoas e instituições organizem, interpretem e
+orientem suas ações no mundo (CARR; LAMPERT, 2016; LATOUR, 2005; STRATHERN,
+2004; TSING 2005, 2012). Como Marilyn Strathern (2004, p. xvi) já destacou, escalas
+consistem na organização de perspectivas sobre objetos de conhecimento e de
+interrogação, e por isso são feitas, e de forma bastante laboriosa, como Carr e Lempert
+(2016) argumentam. Na medida em que são feitas, elas o são por pessoas, grupos e
+
+3 Para uma revisão recente e detalhada sobre os estudos da quantificação no Brasil, ver Camargo, Lima
+e Hirata (2021).
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+GLAUCIA MARICATO; VITOR SIMONIS RICHTER I O que Fazem os Números? Produções, Usos e Efeitos da Quantificação da Vida 249
+
+tecnologias que estabilizam uma visão situada e particular da relação entre qualidades e
+classificações escaláveis. Escalas se tornam, portanto, uma questão de perspectiva, uma
+maneira de olhar e situar um objeto ou uma relação que enfatizam algumas dimensões e
+características em detrimento de outras, justamente por ser um processo inerentemente
+relacional e comparativo.
+É neste processo de escalar relações ou objetos que as disputas se evidenciam e
+explicitam as suas políticas: qual escala é acionada em cada situação? Quais relações são
+estabilizadas em uma escala? Qual perspectiva é promovida por uma escala particular?
+Como ela chega a ser estabelecida, promovida, estabilizada e institucionalizada? Quais
+as materialidades e significados que a compõe? Estas questões convidam as analistas e
+os analistas a seguirem empiricamente os processos de produção de escalas atentando
+para a habilidade de um grupo ou pessoas em produzir uma escala, aquilo que Anna
+Tsing (2012) denomina de “escalabilidade” (scalability). Esta habilidade carrega e envolve
+relações de poder e possibilidades de estabelecer, desestabilizar ou perpetuar escalas
+hierárquicas de valor e de poder. As escalas passam a ser, assim, um objeto sociológico e
+etnográfico a ser analisado para melhor compreendermos como orientamos e
+significamos nossas ações ordinárias da vida cotidiana, mas também nas situações
+excepcionais. Ao colocar a ênfase em como escalas são feitas e como importam para as
+pessoas e suas relações, os números e as diferentes formas de quantificação emergem
+como uma importante forma de mediação das práticas escalares e da materialização das
+escalas que emergem como efeitos destas práticas.
+Seguindo o convite de Carr e Lampert (2016) de tentar entender como escalas
+são associadas (assembled), tornadas reconhecíveis e estabilizadas através de diversas
+práticas comunicativas, tendemos a entender mais facilmente o caminho percorrido pela
+Covid-19 até sua escala “pandêmica”4
+. No entanto, podemos também tomar como
+exemplo alguns números que moldaram a maneira como os brasileiros experienciam e
+se relacionaram com a dimensão das queimadas no Pantanal no ano de 2019. A
+temperatura foi um número frequentemente utilizado. Elas estavam entre 4 a 6 graus
+celsius acima da média e foi um fator acionado nas explicações para o aumento de 334%
+no registro de focos de incêndio na região em relação a 2018. No entanto, as queimadas
+no pantanal e na região amazônica experimentaram um aumento exponencial de focos
+de incêndio dentro de propriedades privadas registradas no Cadastro Ambiental Rural
+(CAR), segundo um relatório do Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE)
+(QUEIMADAS..., 2021). Ou seja, estes focos de incêndio poderiam ser indícios do
+sucesso das políticas de expansão da fronteira agrícola promovidas pelo governo federal.
+Junto com as imagens de animais queimados e da nuvem de fumaça que escureceu
+cidades no sul e sudeste do país, a extensão de área queimada na casa dos milhares de
+hectares, geralmente convertidos em números de campos de futebol, faz uma outra
+escala do problema. Não mais circunscrito à vegetação e vidas locais, a extensão da área
+queimada (que continua crescendo) mediada pelo número de hectares destruídos,
+transforma o problema em uma preocupação nacional e internacional.
+O processo de composição de escalas não pode ser circunscrito e reduzido ao
+uso de números. Metáforas, metonímias e outras formas de comparação e justaposição
+são também tão acionadas nos projetos escalares. Os números, no entanto, parecem
+constituir um importante caminho para a compreensão etnográfica das escalas que
+povoam e orientam nossas vidas cotidianas.
+
+4 Sobre a pandemia de Covid-19 e seu processo escalar, ver Segata (2020) e Segata et al. (2021).
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+250 MEDIAÇÕES, Londrina, v. 26, n. 2, p. 241-255, mai-ago. 2021.
+
+Os artigos desse dossiê
+
+Abrimos essa coletânea com um instigante artigo de Natalia Romero Marchesini
+
+intitulado Muertes que cuentan: La producción de números sobre femicidios, transfemicidios y
+travesticidios como una política de Estado. Nele, a autora analisa a forma como são
+registrados os números oficiais de mortes violentas de mulheres cis gêneros, transexuais
+e travestis por motivos de gênero no contexto argentino. Conforme aponta Marchesini,
+trata-se de uma política de quantificação oficial recém implantada no país e que está
+atrelada ao combate contra formas de feminicídio, transfeminicídio e travesticídio. Para
+além da análise de documentos oficiais da administração pública, Marchesini realizou
+observação participante e entrevistas com integrantes do Sistema Nacional de
+Informacíon Criminal (SNIC), pertencente a Dirección Nacional de Estadística Criminal
+(DNEC) do Ministério de Seguridad de la Nación Argentina. Com base na análise desses
+dados, a autora demonstra como tem se dado a construção do registro oficial dessas
+mortes, quem são os atores responsáveis pelos registros e quais as categorias que entram
+em jogo. Como pano de fundo, Marchesini oferece uma reflexão sobre as condições de
+possibilidade para o estabelecimento da necessidade de mensurar tais mortes violentas,
+sublinhando como esse processo se deve a pressão vinda de movimentos de mulheres,
+comunidade acadêmica e organizações locais de ativistas LGBTQI+, bem como se atrela
+ao universo mais amplo de legislações e tratados internacionais que nos últimos anos
+vem impulsionando políticas em torno desse tema.
+O ponto auge do artigo, arriscamos sugerir, está na análise que a autora faz
+sobre os debates e disputas em torno da implementação da variável “identidade de
+gênero” nos registros administrativos policiais. Marchesini destaca as problemáticas
+levantadas quando as forças policiais, primeiros agentes a serem chamados para cena de
+um crime, são deparados com formulários que questionam a identidade de gênero da
+pessoa assassinada. Como classificar essas pessoas de acordo com suas identidades de
+gênero? Como os policiais podem distinguir entre pessoas cis, trans e travestis na cena
+do crime? Para quem perguntar? Trazendo as negociações e questionamentos que foram
+levantados entre os agentes que buscavam reformular o sistema de mensuração, a autora
+oferece um vislumbre interessante sobre o processo de decisão que levou a
+implementação da variável “identidade de gênero” no Sistema Nacional de Informacíon
+Criminal (SNIC). Conforme discorreu a autora, tal medida veio acompanhada de uma
+série de dispositivos para identificação e classificação das mortes –como a introdução de
+testemunhos de familiares e membros da comunidade da pessoa assassinada – e a
+implementação de uma política pedagógica voltada para as forças policiais. Trata-se,
+portanto, de um trabalho que traz à tona um debate sobre a efetivação de políticas de
+mensuração, um tema importante no debate dos processos de quantificação; afinal,
+quem e como são realizadas as coletas de dados? Quais são os formulários e como são
+utilizados? Quais são as categorias acionadas? Quais são as disputas e negociações
+colocadas? Quais são os atores envolvidos?
+Se o primeiro artigo nos leva para dentro de uma análise da implementação
+recente de uma política oficial de classificação e quantificação, o segundo artigo que
+compõe esse dossiê propõe uma reflexão histórica sobre processos de inclusão e exclusão
+de categorias censitárias. Em ¿Negro o Afrocolombiano? Disputas por las Clasificaciones
+Raciales/Étnicas en los Censos Colombianos, Juan Pablo Estupiñan analisa as classificações
+de raça/etnia em diferentes censos demográficos levado a cabo na Colômbia a fim de
+refletir sobre como tais categorias contribuíram para criar, legitimar e atualizar
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+GLAUCIA MARICATO; VITOR SIMONIS RICHTER I O que Fazem os Números? Produções, Usos e Efeitos da Quantificação da Vida 251
+
+representações sociais sobre as populações afrocolombianas e o lugar da raça nas
+relações sociais. Na primeira parte do artigo, a partir de uma análise histórica dos censos
+realizadas na Colômbia até meados de 1930, o autor oferece uma reflexão sobre como
+determinados grupos populacionais foram definidos e invisibilizados estatisticamente;
+processo este que estaria atrelado à constituição de narrativas sobre raça e nação. Em
+específico, o autor demonstra a relação entre a emergência da eugenia no final do século
+XIX, o desenvolvimento de projetos de branqueamento nacional pelas elites
+conservadoras do país e a maneira como a categoria de “raça” é retirada do censo
+colombiano a partir de 1928, retornando apenas em 1991. Em seguida, Estupiñan reflete
+sobre as transformações que ocorrem na década de 1990, contexto político de
+reconhecimento oficial da diversidade étnica e cultural na Colômbia, e analisa as
+questões e categorias mais recentes do censo de 2005 e 2018 em relação às demandas e
+ações do movimento afrocolombiano voltadas a fomentar o autoreconhecimento das
+populações negras do país.
+O artigo traz uma potente reflexão sobre a maneira como censos demográficos
+estão profundamente atrelados a projetos de nação que respondem às agendas políticas
+de seu tempo. No caso analisado, o autor sublinha a relação entre a produção de
+estatísticas oficiais e o projeto de constituição de uma nação branca, uma nação mestiça
+e, mais recentemente, de uma nação multicultural. Para além disso, Estupiñan oferece
+um importante debate sobre a maneira como a marginalização histórica das
+comunidades afrocolombianas refletiram, e ainda refletem, na produção de estatísticas
+oficiais tendo em vista que muitos dos sujeitos não se reconhecem como pertencentes a
+essa população. Em relação a isso, o autor descreve uma série de estratégias, campanhas
+e alianças que se formaram entre grupos e organizações afrocolombianas desde final dos
+anos 1990 com o objetivo de promover o autoreconhecimento. Trata-se de um artigo que
+traz uma discussão potente sobre processos de apagamentos e visibilidades operadas
+pelas tecnologias de mensuração do Estado e sobre a organização de atores sociais na
+demanda por visibilidade estatística no marco da consolidação de um projeto
+multicultural. Estupiñan parte da noção de que as classificações raciais/étnicas incluídas
+nos censos colombianos não devem ser tomadas como reflexo das diferenças naturais
+das populações, mas que fazem parte de disputas, negociações e reconfigurações sociais.
+No terceiro artigo que compõe esse dossiê, “A luta de um comando e o uso dos
+dados como instrumento para a elaboração de estratégias de atuação de um batalhão da Polícia
+Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro”, Elisângela Oliveira dos Santos discorre sobre o
+crescimento do uso de estatísticas criminais para o planejamento operacional das polícias
+cariocas. Com base em trabalho de campo, pesquisa documental e entrevista com
+policiais e o comando de um dos batalhões da polícia militar da cidade, a autora discorre
+sobre o cotidiano, planejamento, processo de tomada de decisão e ações realizadas pelo
+“efetivo” da unidade. Em específico, dos Santos chama a atenção para a maneira como o
+“policiamento baseado em evidência” teria se tornado uma das principais metodologias
+para alocação de recursos e planejamento das ações policiais. Ao analisar a dinâmica de
+trabalho no batalhão, a autora descreve a maneira como são tomadas decisões, a
+perspectiva dos policiais em relação a determinados temas e formas de abordagem, bem
+como discorre sobre os chamados indicadores estratégicos de criminalidade da região de
+atuação daqueles policiais. O ponto alto desse artigo, sugerimos, está na maneira como
+ele destaca a forma como as “estatísticas de criminalidade”, que não necessariamente
+indicam a redução ou aumento da violência, fundamenta uma abordagem centrada em
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+252 MEDIAÇÕES, Londrina, v. 26, n. 2, p. 241-255, mai-ago. 2021.
+
+metas e produtividade policial. Ou seja, é através dos números de delitos/crimes
+coletados pelo batalhão que são alocados recursos e é a flutuação dessas estatísticas e o
+alcance ou não de metas estipuladas que determinaria o bom desempenho da unidade.
+Trata-se de uma contribuição importante para a reflexão sobre a circularidade de
+indicadores que são produzidos de determinadas maneiras e a partir de determinadas
+categorias e que, por sua vez, produzem efeitos na maneira como políticas e ações são
+impulsionadas no cotidiano de instituições do Estado.
+Encerramos o dossiê com a contribuição de Alexandre Cardoso, Eugênia Motta e
+Victor Mourão intitulada Números emergentes: temporalidade, métrica e estética da pandemia de
+Covid-19 que aborda os efeitos da “avalanche de números” e indicadores na experiência
+coletiva da pandemia de Covid-19 no Brasil. Partindo da análise de matérias dos portais
+de jornalismo e das discussões públicas que os cercaram, os autores apresentam uma
+interessante correlação entre três dimensões da pandemia (estética, temporalidade e
+controvérsias), e sugerem uma periodização da pandemia no Brasil em três momentos a
+partir dos números que mobilizaram as atenções e preocupações no país.
+Os autores propõem que o primeiro momento desta periodização seria
+caracterizado pela abundante circulação de modelos epidemiológicos de previsão que
+instigaram uma relação com a expansão da Covid-19 através dos números apresentados à
+experiência coletiva em gráficos, curvas e mapas da distribuição de contágios, ocupação
+de leitos hospitalares e mortes. Nesta correlação entre números, apresentação imagética e
+modelos preditivos de ocupação de leitos e contágios, os autores argumentam que este
+primeiro momento foi marcado pelo ceticismo e pela perplexidade diante da urgência do
+“achatamento da curva” que acabaram por informar uma tensão exclusivamente
+dicotômica entre vida e economia. O segundo momento seria caracterizado pela
+compilação, sistematização e circulação dos dados epidemiológicos das crescentes taxas
+de contágio e de mortes e do movimento de interiorização do vírus. Para os autores, estes
+números mediaram as especulações e previsões sobre as possibilidades de ondas e pico
+de contágios e mortes.
+Neste segundo momento, portanto, as noções de “ondas”, “picos”, “platôs”,
+entre outras, transformaram a temporalidade da pandemia: das previsões e modelos
+sobre o futuro da pandemia, passa-se para uma experiência do presente trágico do
+aumento diário e incessante do número de mortes. O terceiro momento caracterizado
+pelos autores seria o momento da vacinação, da explicitação das diferenças geopolíticas
+da esperança trazida pelas vacinas e das controvérsias em torno da dicotomia entre vida e
+economia, sobre os custos das vidas perdidas versus os custos do isolamento necessário
+para contenção do vírus. É neste momento que os autores destacam a emergência de uma
+“modalidade pandêmica de statactivisme” que se concentra em desfiar os números
+estatais, inclusive com novas formas de organização entre órgãos de imprensa,
+instituições médicas e acadêmicas para disputar a confiabilidade dos números que
+passaram a informar os debates sobre a precificação da vida, custos econômicos do
+isolamento e as responsabilizações de governantes.
+O artigo de encerramento deste dossiê, portanto, apresenta importantes
+contribuições para pensarmos o trabalho dos números na performance (enactment) da
+pandemia de sars-cov-2 e na mediação da experiência coletiva desta emergência. O
+argumento final dos autores também é instigante neste sentido. Para eles, a pandemia
+está longe de ser uma ruptura totalmente nova na experiência social, mas, como
+demonstram, ela promove articulações originais que sob a mediação de indicadores,
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+GLAUCIA MARICATO; VITOR SIMONIS RICHTER I O que Fazem os Números? Produções, Usos e Efeitos da Quantificação da Vida 253
+
+números e suas expressões visuais, as quais são acionadas para refazer as tensões da
+oposição entre vida e economia, da produção de dados e dos efeitos dos números
+públicos sobre as vidas cotidianas.
+Nesse dossiê reunimos um conjunto de trabalhos que buscam refletir a partir de
+questões, objetos e campos distintos, sobre aquilo que fazem os números. Trata-se de
+uma coletânea acerca da maneira como processos de quantificação, e suas políticas de
+poder, perpassam os campos mais infinitesimais da vida cotidiana – seja na constituição
+de políticas públicas, nos processos de visibilização e invisibilização estatísticas de
+questões/problemas sociais, seja nos processos de subjetivação de si ou na produção de
+conhecimento. Com esse dossiê buscamos, portanto, contribuir com debates atuais em
+torno da maneira como os números, em suas variadas formas e escalas, são acionados na
+produção de narrativas sobre o mundo ao nosso redor. Nesta expectativa, agradecemos
+a equipe editorial da Revista Mediações e, em especial, a todas e a todos os autores e
+autoras que submeteram suas propostas ao dossiê, assim como aos colegas pareceristas
+que contribuíram para a qualificação dos textos aqui publicados.
+
+Referências
+
+ADAMS, Vincanne. Metrics: what counts in global health. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016.
+
+BOWKER, Geoffrey C.; STAR, Susan Leigh. Sorting things out: classification and its
+consequences. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999.
+BRUNO, Isabelle. La déroute du «benchmarking social: la coordination des luttes nationales contre
+l'exclusion et la pauvreté en Europe. Revue Française de Socio-Économie, Paris, n. 5, p. 41-61, 2010.
+BRUNO, Isabelle. La recherche scientifique au crible du benchmarking. Petite histoire d'une
+technologie de gouvernement. Revue D’histoire Moderne & Contemporaine, Paris, n. 55, p. 28-45, 2008.
+BRUNO, Isabelle; DIDIER, Emmanuel. Benchmarking: L’État sous pression statistique. Paris:
+Zones, 2013.
+CAMARGO, Alexandre de Paiva Rio; LIMA, Renato Sérgio de; HIRATA, Daniel Veloso.
+Quantificação, Estado e participação social: potenciais heurísticos de um campo emergente.
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, v. 23, n. 56, p. 20-40, jan./abr. 2021.
+CAMARGO, Alexandre de Paiva Rio; MOTTA Cardoso, Eugênia de Souza Mello Guimarães;
+MOURÃO, Victor Kuiz Alves. Números emergentes: temporalidade, métrica e estética da
+pandemia de COVID-19. Mediações, vol. 26, n. 2, p. 311-332, mai/ago. 2021.
+CARDOSO, Bruno. Benchmarking et sécurité à Rio de Janeiro. Statistique et Société, v. 7, p. 25-30, 2019.
+CARR, E. Summerson; LEMPERT, Michael (org.). Scale: Discourse and dimensions of social
+life. Oakland: University of California Press, 2016.
+DAS, Veena; POOLE, Deborah (ed.). Anthropology in the margins of the state. Santa Fe: School of
+American Research Press, 2004.
+DEAN, Mitchell. Governing the unemployment self in an active society. International Journal of
+Human Resource Management, London, n. 24, p. 559-583, 1995.
+DEAN, Mitchell. Governmentality: power and rule in modern society. Londres: SAGE
+Publications, 2009.
+DESROSIÈRES, Alain. The politics of large numbers: a history of statistical reasoning. Cambridge:
+Harvard University Press, 1998.
+DIDIER, Emmanuel; BRUNO, Isabelle. O «estativismo» como uso militante da quantificação.
+Sociologias, Porto Alegre, ano 23, n56, jan-abr. 2021, p. 82-109.
+DINIZ, Débora. Zika em Alagoas: a urgência dos direitos. Brasília: Letras Livres, 2017.
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+254 MEDIAÇÕES, Londrina, v. 26, n. 2, p. 241-255, mai-ago. 2021.
+
+ESTUPIÑAN, Juan Pablo. ¿Negro o Afrocolombiano? Disputas por las Clasificaciones
+Raciales/Étnicas en los Censos Colombianos. Mediações, vol. 26, n. 2, p. 272-291, mai/ago. 2021.
+FOUCAULT, Michel. A governamentalidade. In: FOUCAULT, Michel. Microfísica do poder. Rio
+de Janeiro: Edições Graal, 1998.
+FOUCAULT, Michel. Segurança, território e população. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008
+FOUCAULT, Michel. Vigiar e punir: nascimento da prisão. Petrópolis, Vozes, 1987.
+HACKING, Ian. Historical ontology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
+HACKING, Ian. The taming of chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
+HARAWAY, Donna. Saberes localizados: a questão da ciência para o feminismo e o privilégio
+da perspectiva parcial. Cadernos Pagu, Campinas, n. 5, p. 7-41, 1995.
+HIRATA, Daniel; COUTO, Maria Isabel; GRILLO, Carolina; OLLIVEIRA, Cecilia. Échanges de
+tirs. La production de données sur la violence armée dans des opérations de police à Rio de
+Janeiro. Statistique et Société, Paris, v. 7, n. 1, p. 31-39, jun./jul. 2019.
+LAKOFF, Andrew. What is an epidemic emergency? In: KELLY, Ann; KECK, Frédéric;
+LYNTERIS, Christos (ed.). The anthropology of epidemics. London: Routledge, 2019. p. 59-69.
+LATOUR, Bruno. Reassembling the Social. An introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Nova Iorque:
+Oxford University Press, 2005.
+LATOUR, Bruno. A esperança de Pandora: ensaios sobre a realidade dos estudos científicos. Bauru:
+EDUSC, 2001.
+LATOUR, Bruno. Ciência em ação. Como seguir cientistas e engenheiros sociedade afora. São Paulo:
+Editora UNESP, 2000.
+LATOUR, Bruno. Visualisation and Cognition: Thinking with eyes and hands. In: JONES,
+Alun; KUKLICK, Henrika. Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture and
+Present. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986. p. 1-40.
+LATOUR, Bruno; WOOLGAR, Steve. A vida de laboratório: a produção dos fatos científicos. Rio
+de Janeiro: Relume Dumará, 1997.
+MARICATO, Glaucia. Fábulas do fim: classificações e consequências no campo da saúde. In:
+ROHDEN, Fabíola; PUSSETTI, Chiara; ROCA, Alejandra. Biotecnologias, transformações corporais e
+subjetivas: saberes, práticas e desigualdades. Brasília, DF: ABA Publicações, 2021. p. 305-330.
+MARCHESINI, Natalia Romero. Muertes que cuentan: La producción de números sobre
+femicidios, transfemicidios y travesticidios como una política de Estado. Mediações, vol. 26, n.
+2, p. 256-271, mai/ago. 2021.
+MERRY, Sally Engle. Measuring the world: indicators, human rights, and global governance.
+Current Anthropology, Chicago, n. 52, supl. 3, p. 583-595, 2011.
+MOTTA, Eugênia. Les favelas: normalité et subnormalité dans le recensement national
+brésilien. Statistique et Société, Paris, v.7, n. 1, p. 9-15, 2019a.
+MOTTA, Eugênia. Resistência aos números: a favela como realidade (in)quantificável. Mana,
+Rio de Janeiro, v. 25, p. 72-94, 2019b.
+ONG, Aiwa. Buddha is hidding: refugees, citizenship, the new America. Berkley: University of
+California Press, 2003.
+PORTER, Theodore M. Trust in Numbers. The pursuit of objectivity in science and public life.
+Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
+QUEIMADAS atingiram 4,5 milhões de hectares no Pantanal durante 2020 segundo levantamento
+do MP. G1, Rio de Janeiro, 23 abril. 2021. Disponível em: https://g1.globo.com/mt/matogrosso/noticia/2021/04/23/queimadas-atingiram-45-milhoes-de-hectares-no-pantanal-durante2020-segundo-levantamento-do-mp.ghtml.
+Acesso em: 28 jun. 2021.
+RABOSSI, Fernando. La contrebande au Brésil. Statistique et Sociéte, Paris, v. 7, n. 1, p. 17-24, 2019.
+ROSE, Nikolas. Powers of freedom: reframing political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge
+University Press, 1999.
+E-ISSN: 2176-6665
+
+GLAUCIA MARICATO; VITOR SIMONIS RICHTER I O que Fazem os Números? Produções, Usos e Efeitos da Quantificação da Vida 255
+
+ROSE, Nikolas; MILLER, Peter. Political power beyond the State: problematic of government.
+British Journal of Sociology, Oxfordshire, v. 43, n. 2, p. 271-303, jun. 1992.
+SANTOS, Elisângela Oliveira. A luta de um comando e o uso dos dados como instrumento
+para a elaboração de estratégias de atuação de um batalhão da Polícia Militar do Estado do
+Rio de Janeiro. Mediações, vol. 26, n. 2, p. 292-310, mai/ago. 2021.
+SCHUCH, P. A Legibilidade como gestão e inscrição política de populações: notas
+etnográficas sobre a política para pessoas em situação de rua no Brasil. In: FONSECA,
+Claudia; MACHADO, Helena (org.). Ciência, identificação e tecnologias de governo. Porto Alegre:
+CEGOV, 2015, v. 1, p. 121-145.
+SCOTT, James C. Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition
+have failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
+SEGATA, Jean. A pandemia e o digital. Revista Todavia, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 7-15, 2020.
+SEGATA, Jean; SCHUCH, Patrice; DAMO, Arlei Sander; VICTORA, Ceres. A Covid-19 e suas
+múltiplas pandemias. Horizontes Antropológicos, Porto Alegre, ano 27, n. 59, p. 7-25, jan./abr. 2021.
+SHORE, Cris; WRIGHT, Susan. Governing by numbers: audit culture, rankings and the new
+world order. Social Anthropology, Cambridge, n. 23, v. 1, p. 22-28, 2015.
+STRATHERN, Marilyn (org.). Audit cultures: anthropological studies in accountability, ethics
+and the academy. Londres: Routledge, 2000.
+STRATHERN, Marilyn. Partial connections. New York: Altamira Press, 2004.
+TSING, Anna L. Friction: an ethnography of global connection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
+University Press, 2005.
+TSING, Anna L. On nonscalability: the living world is not amenable to precision-nested scales.
+Common Knowledge, Durham, v. 18, n. 3, p. 505-524, 2012.
+
+*Minicurrículo dos Autores:
+
+Glaucia Maricato. Doutora em Antropologia Social pela Universidade Federal do Rio
+Grande do Sul (2019). Pós-doutoranda junto ao Instituto de Antropologia Social e Cultural
+da Universidade Livre de Berlim. Bolsista do Programa Marie Sklodowska-Curie (Processo
+nº 886338). E-mail: glauciamaricato@gmail.com.
+
+Vitor Simonis Richter. Doutor em Antropologia Social pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação
+em Antropologia Social da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (2016). Pósdoutorando
+junto ao Programa de Pós-graduação em Antropologia Social da Universidade
+Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Bolsista PNPD/CAPES (Processo nº 88882.316239/2019-1). Email:
+vsrichter@gmail.com.
+
+Declaração de Co-Autoria: Glaucia Maricato declara ter sido responsável pela
+“redação da parte introdutória da apresentação, do subitem o papel das
+classificações e do resumo dos três primeiros artigos.” Vitor S. Richter declara ter
+redigido “os itens sobre tecnologias de governo e escalas” bem como ter
+contribuído para a “elaboração da introdução e da apresentação do último artigo
+do dossiê.” Ambos enfatizam ainda que revisaram, deram ideias e sugestões de
+redação em relação a todas as partes do texto.
\ No newline at end of file
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+See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356392038
+
+The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
+
+CITATIONS
+
+56 PUBLICATIONS 44 QUOTES
+
+READS
+
+ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW: LEGAL ECONOMICS AND THE PLURALIST INTELLIGENCE OF
+
+LAW IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA (An approach to the Justice of Law, Public Legalism and...
+
+Jacob Massuanganhe
+
+0 18
+DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21979.08488
+
+All content following this page was uploaded by Jacob Massuanganhe on 19 November 2021.
+
+ISPOTEC Higher Polytechnic and Technology Institute
+1 author:
+
+SEE PROFILE
+
+Technical Report · September 2016
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+NOVA UNIVERSITY OF LISBON
+LAW SCHOOL
+
+JURIECONOMICS AND THE PLURALIST INTELLIGENCE OF LAW IN
+PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICA
+
+Advisor:
+
+Prof. Doctor Jorge Bacelar Gouveia
+Faculty of Law New
+University of Lisbon LISBON -
+PORTUGAL
+
+(An approach to the Justice of Law,
+
+SUMMARY
+
+LISBON, SEPTEMBER 2016
+
+Public Legalism and Legal Pluralism)
+
+ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW:
+
+i
+
+Israel Jacob Massuanganhe
+
+Post-Doctoral Research in Law
+
+Student No. 004315
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Index
+
+INTRODUCTION................................................. .................................................................. ........................................1
+
+1.2
+
+2.1.2
+
+3.1.1.2 Normative Adaptability Analysis .............................................. ..................................................................27
+
+1.4 Administration and the Public Service in Africa ............................................ .................................................................. ...7
+
+Objectives: ............................................................. .................................................................. .................................................................. 5
+
+1.5.2 Administrative Reform and the Public Service................................................. ..............................................13
+
+2.2.1.1 Normative Jurimetry (Legal Acts) ..................................... .................................................................. 21
+
+3.1.1
+
+Fundamentals of Public Administration .............................................. .............................................7
+
+Premises of Economic Analysis of Law ............................................................ ...........................................................17
+
+2.2.2.3 Financial Analysis of the Legal Standard.................................................. .................................................................. .25
+
+Law and Justice.................................................. .................................................................. ....................................3
+
+1.3.2
+
+2.1.2.3 Effectiveness of the Legal Standard ............................................ .................................................................. .........20
+
+3.1.2.1 Normative Intelligence ................................................ .................................................... ....................28
+
+3.1.3.1 Normative Diagnostic Analysis................................................. .................................................... .........30
+
+1
+
+1.2.2
+
+2.1.2.1 Effectiveness of the Legal Standard................................................. .................................................... .................19
+
+3.1.1.3 Normative Strategic Excellence................................................. .................................................... .....27
+
+3 JURIECONOMICS AND PLURALIST LEGAL INTELLIGENCE................................................ ..........................26
+
+1.2.1 General Purpose ................................................ .................................................................. ......................................5
+
+Positivist Dogmatics and Normativist Reformism ..........................14
+
+2.2.1.2 Positive Jurimetrics (Legal Facts)................................................... .................................................... ...22
+
+1.4.1
+
+2.2 Methodology of Economic Analysis of Law .............................................. ...............................................21
+
+3.1.2.2 Intelligence of Prediction.................................................. .................................................................. .............29
+
+1.4.2 Normativism and Public Legalism ................................................ .................................................................. .......8
+
+2.1.1.1 Economic Approaches to Law .............................................. .................................................... ....17
+
+1.3.1 Legal Hermeneutics................................................. .................................................................. .........................6
+
+2.1
+
+Normative Impact Analysis .............................................. .................................................... ...........24
+
+ii
+
+Pure Theory of Law.................................................. .................................................... ...........................4
+
+Specific Objectives.................................................. .................................................... .........................5
+
+1.5.3
+
+2.2.1.3 Descriptive Jurimetry (Legal Statistics) ..................................... .............................................23
+
+3.1.3.2 Normative Prognostic Analysis................................................. .................................................... .........31
+
+1.1 Thematic Framework.................................................. .................................................................. ...........................two
+
+1.4.3 The Crisis of Public Intervention............................................... .................................................................. ..................9
+
+2.1.1.2 Contribution of the Economic Analysis of Law................................................... ......................................18
+
+Fundamentals of Jurieconomics.................................................. .................................................... ..........26
+
+1.1.1
+
+1.5 The Administrative Reform ..................................................... .................................................................. ..........................12
+
+Jurimetry - Legal Statistics ..................................................... .................................................................. ..........21
+
+3.1.2.3 Anticipation Intelligence.................................................. .................................................................. ..............29
+
+Interdisciplinarity of Law ................................................................... .................................................................. ...........6
+
+2.1.1
+
+2.2.2
+
+2.2.2.1 Conceptual framework............................................. .................................................... ...............................24
+
+Methodology ..................................................................... .................................................................. ..............................................6
+
+2 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW................................................ .................................................................. ...........16
+
+2.2.1.4 Analytical Jurimetrics (Analytical Logic) ........................................ ..................................................................23
+
+3.1.3.3 Analysis of Normative Implications................................................ .................................................... ...32
+
+2.2.1
+
+3.1.3 Analytical-Decision-Making Foundations .............................................. .................................................... ........30
+
+1.4.4 The Sociological Defense of the Law ..................................................... .................................................................. .......11
+
+Criteria for Economic Analysis of Law................................................................. .............................................19
+
+Fundamentals .................................................................. .................................................................. ...........................................16
+
+2.2.2.2 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis ............................................ .................................................................. ...... 25
+
+3.1.1.1 Adequacy Analysis of normative acts.............................................. .................................27
+
+1.1.2
+
+1.5.1 Reformism and the New Public Management.................................................. ..............................................12
+
+1.3
+
+2.1.2.2 Efficiency of the Legal Standard.................................................. .................................................................. ..............19
+
+3.1.2 Legal Intelligence .............................................. .................................................... ...........................28
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+3.1.4 The New Administrative Legal Order: Contemporary Defenses..................................................... .............32
+3.1.4.1 Legal Norm and the social setting ............................ .................................................................. .............32
+3.1.4.2 Administrative Delegalization.................................. .................................................................. .....................33
+3.1.4.3 Administrative Legality ................................... .................................................................. ................................34
+3.1.4.4 Legal Pluralism and Public Action........ .................................................... ....................................34
+
+4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................... .................................................... ..........................36
+
+iii
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The refoundation of the administrative machine may imply the conception of model forms of administrative
+organization or even a rethinking of the functionality of the administrative machine itself. The administrative reforms
+initiated in the 1980s seem to have had no effect. In their magnitude they had an objective charge (modernism,
+results, etc.), putting aside subjective factors (humanization, moralization, respect for values, etc.). Analytical
+models are a vital instrument for the configuration and reconfiguration of facts resulting from normative measures.
+And as such, it is important to consider new methodological approaches so that Law can have a reference for
+screening and analyzing its postulates and decisions. Economic Analysis of Law in the context of American legal
+thought, its connections with realism and pragmatism, situated, together with Critical Legal Studies, as a reaction to
+formalism and conventionalism. This assumption may be associated with the melodic bases of measuring impact and
+implications leading to decorative norms.
+
+However, the logic of legalism tends to lose its originality, as in the current situation it is imperative to demonstrate
+pluralist principles. As a result of this organization of administrative entities, it can be said that there is no Public
+Administration that acts in a uniform way but a plurality of organizational forms of Public Administration, all of which
+have legal-administrative relationships (Feijó, 2012).
+
+Faced with global changes, society's dissatisfaction with the quality of public service is growing. The installed crisis
+brings with it harmful effects on the social and economic life of the population, and therefore, this begins to demand
+an increasingly active and responsive State. Current Public Administration is characterized by intense and profound
+changes, resulting from the international situation with implications for the social, political and economic structure,
+and raising critical challenges in the sphere of intellectual development in search of new approaches. Public
+Administration is governed by precepts of Law, where legality has become a primary foundation for the effectiveness
+of public action. However, currently there is a growing debate surrounding the efficiency of public intervention. From
+this perspective, Law is seen, in the first analysis, as a normative reality, being certain that not all norms regulating
+human activity are legal norms or rules of law. The law also has duties: to ensure justice, and as such, it must
+prioritize analytical methods that can evaluate and predict legal decisions. It is important to have a reference to the
+applicability of the standard as an evaluative indicator of its relevance. By virtue of its sovereignty, the State, for the
+first time in human history, takes for itself the monopoly of the production of law. Thus, the legal system becomes
+unified and centralized and the justice monopolized by the State becomes official justice.
+
+With legalistic rigidity in public administration, a dogmatic mentality and a static-functional nature of
+
+administration machines and agents can be observed, with negative impacts on the quality of public service at a time
+when global changes require new solutions to face the complexities of problems that affect society. It is in this field
+that jurieconomics emerges, based on the intersection of legal intelligence and economic analysis of law for the study
+of legal acts and facts. This is a framework based on measuring the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness in a short,
+medium and long term dimension of legal norms from their conception, formulation, analysis and implementation,
+monitoring economic increase. Legal intelligence proposes to be a support field for Zetetic conceptions of the legal
+field
+
+1 FEIJÒ, Carlos (2012) The Normative Coexistence Between the State and Traditional Authorities in the Angolan Plural Legal
+Order – Doctoral Thesis. Edições Almedina, SA, Coimbra – Portugal.
+
+Justice is the power to enforce someone's rights. The notion of guarantor validity is perhaps the most decisive point
+as a general theory of Law, as its formulation advocates the predominance of the material link between the legal
+order and fundamental rights. With this it is clear that justice is related to the most diverse forms of manifestation of
+law. The validity of the standard in books is not enough, but its full implementation and effective compliance is worth
+it. Law is not an end in itself and its purpose is to solve the problems of the society in which it operates. Pluralism is
+seen as a field to be explored. Despite legal practices being based on Legistics, questions are growing regarding the
+deficiency and effectiveness of legal norms in public administration.
+
+Professor Feijó (2012)1 considers that the administrative function is performed by Public Administration,
+understood in the organic sense. However, Public Administration is not limited to the State, ie, it is not only made up
+of entities (bodies and services) belonging to the legal entity State. For Professor Teixeira (2014) 2 it constitutes a
+challenge in an interactive way, a syllabus in approaching the foundations of law, with the goal and, in view of the
+basic heterogeneity, the transversality of this approach. As a general principle, it is assumed that not all law is fair.
+
+two TEIXEIRA, Carlos Manuel dos Santos (2014) Administrative Law. Extract from the article published in the book Direito de Angola. UAN
+Faculty of Law under the coordination of Prof. Elisa Rangel and Prof. Bacelar Gouveia. Luanda
+
+1. INTRODUCTION
+
+1
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Boaventura de S. Santos4's statement raises awareness of the importance of understanding legal pluralism in contemporary
+times, pointing, however, to a right that acts at the scale of the State, in order to recommend that, when discussing the term legal
+pluralism, one should necessarily speak of efficacy and validity. Considering that the law is not an end in itself and has the
+purpose of solving the problems of the society in which it operates. Law is just one of the systems in the normative universe,
+which goes beyond it, although there are those who say that others pre-exist it, such as religion, courtesy and morality. The legal
+norm, to achieve the plan
+
+SANTOS, B. de Sousa (1996) A Discourse on Sciences. Harbor. Editions Confrontation. 8th Edition.
+
+The twentieth century represented the crisis of the rationality of the legal system, built from positivism. Legal positivism is
+born out of the historical impulse for legislation, it is realized when the law becomes the exclusive source. Positivist dogmatics is
+based on a monist narrative, statehood and rationality to maintain its premise that Law is the law. In terms of legal pluralism, a
+situation is configured in which more than one legal order prevails in the same geopolitical space. Only information and basic
+concepts of the movement were provided. Despite the merit, the norms are sometimes seen as decorative laws. The duty to
+observe the law, expressed by the dogmatic conception of the existence of the normativity of regulatory texts produced by the
+State, implies the observance of a set of factors regarding their applicability and effectiveness. The law crisis has generated
+profound impacts on the law. The law, by interposing the legal imperative in administrative acts, can create dysfunctionality if all
+elements of guaranteeing the applicability of the law are not addressed – a crisis of legalism, and result in parallel mechanisms
+adopted outside the legal norm, which will lead to vicious practices in the administration.
+
+Carlos Feijó (2016). Elements for State Building in Africa: Between modernity and tradition (Part II).
+
+The excess of legalism is pointed out as one of the factors of inertia. And society's dissatisfaction with the quality of public
+service is growing. The administrative reforms initiated in the 1980s seem to have had no effect. In their magnitude they had an
+objective charge putting aside the subjective factors. The public management model seems out of step with the current context
+and economic and social conjuncture. Humanization and awareness tend to be critical factors. Hospital services register criticism
+regarding the loss of values. Africa's Ranking in “Doing Business” is constantly deteriorating, with indicators such as starting a
+business, Obtaining construction permits and Insolvency Resolution well below the world average. Inertia, bureaucracy, disrespect
+are hallmarks of the current administration in Africa. There are indications that the excess of the legalized creates space for illicit
+practices in the Administration. The levels of dissatisfaction are increasing both on the side of public servants and users of public
+services. The mobility of employees from the general regime to the special regime is increasing, especially at the level of public
+administration. This postulate supports the idea that Public Administration should not, solely, be seen as subject to public legalism.
+
+Published in Jornal Vanguarda Nº 6 of June 21, 2016.
+
+Carlos Feijó (2016)3 considers that it is symptomatic that models of legal construction tend to be inspired by supposed
+models of greater `cultural proximity', i.e., the models adopted – or in some way inherited by the former European colonial powers.
+Feijó argues that, “in addition to the African institutional level, the same has been seen a little at the level of formation, organization
+and functioning of States in Africa. From the Constitutions, through the sources of Law and the bureaucratic organization of
+African States, we witness a formal Westernization of the State model (ie, adoption of Western-inspired models, that is, Western
+European countries and North American countries of culture and traditions of the Judeo-Christian matrix. For Professor Carlos
+Feijó (2016), the preparation of African citizens to deal with new realities presupposes a methodological revolution based on the
+recognition of the need for in-depth knowledge of legal and socially relevant realities, which deserve protection of Law. To deny
+this knowledge is to deny the Law and amputate the jurist from access to instruments that are truly essential to carry out the full
+extent of his functions. Feijó, when citing the case of the relevance of the ideological openness of the law, seeks to show, in his
+words, “renewal of dogmatic formation of law schools.” Legal thought reveals itself as culturally historical entities. It is therefore
+not surprising that Roman, medieval, modern-enlightenment and current legal thoughts are not confused. These thoughts are
+different in their intentionality and methodical modality, in the nature of their rationality and in their specific type of judgment.
+
+based on the improvement of legislative quality to meet the justice and fairness of legal norms within society by regulating cases
+of hypo or hypertension regulation. The analytical-deductive work seeks to contribute to an interdisciplinary and plural vision of
+the study of Public Administration, with a focus on public service.
+
+1.1 Thematic Framework
+
+two
+
+3
+
+4
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Queiroz, Marcelo Brito (2009) Legal-administrative regime. Rio de Janeiro.
+
+Op. Cit Silva. Beclaute Oliveira (2006)
+Barzotto, Luis Fernando. (SD). Social Justice - Genesis, structure and application of a concept. Faculty of Law at UFRGS. Available at
+http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/revista/Rev_48/artigos/ART_LUIS.htm. Accessed on May 11, 2015.
+
+8
+
+3
+
+6
+5 5
+
+7 By justice we can also understand a moral principle by which respect for the law is observed. Justice also expresses the conformity of facts with law. Justice is the power to enforce the rights of someone or
+
+everyone.
+
+However, law is just one of the systems in the normative universe, which goes beyond it, although there are
+those who say that others pre-exist it, such as religion, courtesy and morality. The “fairness” criterion of a legal norm
+is assessed by measuring the objective and subjective values and premises that led the legislator to attribute the
+“legal” condition. Fair norm is the one that “should be” and not “should be” - it corresponds to the problem between
+what is real and what is ideal. Justice transcends the field of law and serves the State's purpose of satisfying the
+common good. It starts from the assumption that justice must be seen from different perspectives: normative, social
+and economic. It is consensual that the norm does not always produce desired effects, and as such, although the
+word Law is connoted with the word Justice, they cannot be considered synonymous. Law does not always produce
+Justice, although this is a doctrinal orientation. The word justice, its meaning is character, or something that is in
+accordance with what is right, with what is fair, appropriate or correct.
+
+Law is the set of norms in force in a country, formed by a set of norms in force in a specific legal order and
+which establishes and governs relationships between individuals in that society. The study of Law is dedicated to the
+attempt to develop and understand general and abstract principles of conduct with a view to finding paths that lead
+such principles to their materialization, in the form of laws, doctrine and jurisprudence. It becomes increasingly
+imperative that the science of Law communicates with other sciences – Interdisciplinarity, as a consecrating premise
+of the pluralism that guides the contemporary legal world. Law is the sense of supposed and expected rationality and
+social conduct. Law strives for justice and justice, among others, for equity and the well-being of society. The central
+issue of this premise is that in the first instance the law must be seen in a progressive compendium; in the background,
+legal operators are invited to reflect on the quality of the decisions they make, taking as a reference the results,
+impact and effects arising therefrom; and third, legal decisions (norms) must be aligned with the natural norms of
+society.
+
+of effectiveness, must also pass through the planes of existence and validity. At first, one can imagine that legal
+pluralism involves all these steps. In order for legal pluralism to be configured, the existence of two or more norms
+applicable to the same situation is necessary. This implies that the law does not always produce the desired effects,
+this resulting from the defects in its effectiveness or even the efficiency in the process of elaboration thereof.
+
+According to Aristotle, the term justice7 denotes, at the same time, legality and equality. Thus, fair is both the
+one who fulfills the norm (justice in the strict sense) and the one who achieves equality (justice in the universal sense).
+State activity now unfolds in two ways: (i) attracting employees to a good level of performance with profitable and
+safe proposals, and (ii) ensuring public activity in an intense and constant manner, with the purpose of preserving
+the undeniable interest public. The thought of this great German jurist, Otto Mayer cited by Queiroz (2009)8, showed,
+since the end of the last century, that the administrative function can be focused on two aspects. The first relative to
+the subject of the function (objective aspect). And the second, related to the legal effects that this function provides.
+Queiroz (2009) argues that the administrative legal regime is a set of principle-norms (distinct from general principles
+of law, as will be seen below), specific to Administrative Law, guaranteeing its scientific autonomy. There is an
+excessive tendency for law to dominate over other sciences - supremacy (exclusive character),
+
+Thomas Aquinas5, takes Aristotle's theory of justice and develops it into three types: legal, distributive and
+commutative justice. Under the impact of the egalitarian tendency that characterizes modernity, the Thomists of the
+19th century, based on legal justice, developed the concept of social justice, which is found in the "Christian social
+ethics" of the 20th century. To designate Aristotelian general justice, Thomas frequently uses the term legal justice,
+since the acts owed to the community so that it can achieve its good, the common good, are, in most cases, set out
+in the norm. To designate Aristotelian general justice, Thomas frequently uses the term legal justice, since the acts
+owed to the community so that it can achieve its good, the common good, are, in most cases, set out in the norm. In
+this way, while the object of particular justice is the good of the individual, the object of legal justice is the common
+good: "Legal justice (...) aims at the common good as its own object", with the common good not the good of the
+whole, but the good of all. The duties of legal justice do not ultimately refer to the social "whole", but to all members
+of society6.
+
+1.1.1 Law and Justice
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+BOBBIO, Norberto. Legal Norm Theory. 3rd ed. magazine. So Paulo: Edipro, 2005.
+
+1.1.2 Pure Theory of Law
+
+According to the philosopher, our life is full of these signposts, many of which are made up of rules of law. What makes societies stable, with their
+institutions and orders, what Norberto Bobbio called “civilization”, the rules of man's conduct in society.
+
+Kelsen9, the object of legal science consists of legal norms, and the task of the jurist (legal scientist) is to describe and systematize this object
+through propositions. According to Kelsen, legal knowledge, to be scientific, must be neutral. For Kelsen, the object of legal science consists of
+legal norms, and the task of the jurist (legal scientist) is to describe and systematize this object through propositions. Kelsen argues that legal
+knowledge, to be scientific, must be neutral10.
+
+When new norms are produced, formal and material limits must be obeyed: (i) - formal: relate to the procedures to be followed for
+normative production; (ii) materials: content that can be regulated by a certain authority. It is clear that the punitive nature of the norm is effective in
+meeting the assumptions based on its validity and validity (the objective side), in
+
+Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law intended to elevate law to the height of a genuine science, bringing its results as close as possible to the
+ideals of all science: objectivity and accuracy. Kelsen conceived law with the eyes of a jurist. For him, law was just a norm, without seeking elements
+from other sciences. In this sense, through his theory he tried to bring to Law the purity necessary for any science. He sought to separate Legal
+Science from any influence coming from Psychology, Sociology, Economics. In this sense, Kelsen saw legal science as supreme, however he
+suffered serious difficulties in explaining the basis of the validity of the law, thus giving a logical organicity to the system. To solve this problem
+Kelsen developed the fundamental norm theory. The Fundamental Norm Theory is based on the idea that Law is formed by hierarchically
+subordinated norms and there is a single authority that directly or indirectly assigns
+
+KELSEN, Hans (1976) Pure theory of law. Coimbra. Beloved Armenian.
+
+indirectly legal character to the whole set of norms. The legal system, therefore, is unitary, organic, closed, complete and self-sufficient, lacking
+nothing for its improvement, as lower norms seek their validity in higher norms.
+
+In this sense, the legal system regulates normative production itself. Respect for hierarchy guarantees the unity of the legal system (the
+lowest norm can be linked to the highest, in a chain of successive commands). Legal System - composed of several norms made by different
+sources of normative power, with hierarchical relationships between them. We then have:-
+
+Assis, Olney Queiroz (2011). Legal anthropology manual— São Paulo : Saraiva, 2011.
+
+rules of conduct; - structure standards: rules to be followed to create new standards. The different sources of normative power are in a hierarchical
+relationship – the inferior is limited by the superior; hence the idea of a staggered construction of the Legal System: The inferior norm “executes”
+the commands of its superior (power), at the same time that it “produces” the inferior norm (power), so that between the most inferior and the most
+superior of all, a continuous line of commands can be drawn....(this is what guarantees unity).
+
+which somewhat limits the inclusivist scientific character that guides the sciences in society. The classic method of studying Law is based on monist
+analysis to assess legal norms.
+
+Norberto Bobbio (2005)11, in his Theory of Legal Norms, starts from the premise that “law is a set of norms”, referring to these as norms
+of conduct that translate into what is “obligatory”, in which what is “allowed” and what is “prohibited”. In a simple analogy, and at the same time
+efficient, he maintains that the individual's life is like the path of a pedestrian in a big city.
+
+There, signposts will indicate that a certain path is prohibited and another is mandatory.
+
+Thus, the study is restricted to a monodisciplinary approach, based on the supremacist idea of Law defended by Kelsen in his dialectical rhetoric of
+positivism, putting aside other sciences for the deepening and knowledge of facts and acts.
+
+Throughout the 20th century, the theoretical model called legal positivism predominated in Law Schools, which is why legal education
+has neglected the contributions of other sciences and other areas of knowledge. Hans Kelsen is the theorist who takes legal positivism to its highest
+level. In 1934, he published the Pure Theory of Law, in which he resumed the theses of legal positivism from the 19th century. In this work, he
+chooses the autonomy of legal science as the fundamental problem of his thesis and gives it its own method and object, capable of guaranteeing
+the jurist scientific knowledge of law. To this end, it establishes a methodological principle, the principle of purity, with which it intends to reduce the
+complexity of the object of law by moving away from other sciences. In Legal Science, intrusive, potentially disturbing, epistemological and
+axiological interferences. For
+
+4
+11
+9
+10
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The study discusses the implications of public legalism in the expected new administrative, economic and social
+situation, seeking to emphasize innovative methodical aspects to assess normative quality and its implications for
+administration using economic analysis of Law. Therefore, we specifically look for:
+
+likely if the civil liability that falls on the father were accepted.
+
+• Analyze the framework of public reformism, with the help of different AED paradigms and postulates with a
+view to delving deeper into the factors associated with poor administration performance, wear and tear
+and discredit in the current context of change.
+
+The legal norm is the source par excellence of Administrative Law, constituting the positive law of the discipline,
+which covers a wide hierarchical range of norms. From the guarantor theoretical matrix, the concepts of validity and
+effectiveness, problematizing them and proposing a different characterization of the traditional categories. In this sense,
+validity and validity were distinguished more precisely, identifying the first with what would traditionally be considered
+'formal validity'. The expression validity would be restricted to identify 'material validity'.
+
+However, with regard to material validity, we sought to show that its conception should not only reflect the consonance
+of directly linked content, but also the consonance of explicit or implicit values in legal norms. In such a way, the entire
+value systematic dimension would be apprehended in the discussion of validity. We sought to re-dimension what is
+traditionally known as legal effectiveness and social effectiveness. Therefore, the use of the word effectiveness is
+restricted to legal effectiveness - normative applicability. Social effectiveness, on the other hand, would be divided into
+two dimensions: effectiveness, referring to real and constant normative application; and efficiency, referring to the fact
+that one or more standards, when applied, mostly achieve their objectives.
+
+1.2.1 General Purpose
+
+The central objective of the study is to contribute, through the method of Economic Analysis of Law, to the New
+ideology of legal knowledge that promotes coexistence of law with other sciences in argumentative-dialectic and logicaldeductive
+support, normative effectiveness oriented to respond to current challenges and futures of Public Administration
+taking into account cyclical and structural changes.
+
+• Study the current administrative framework that guides the principles of Administration.
+
+The establishment of operational systems that evaluate the real conditions of application of standards should
+allow a drastic reduction in the number of instruments that are out of adjustment with reality or context. The objective
+is to evaluate the degree of interdependence of the variation in the contexts of application of standards, which leads to
+the need for standards and assumptions for the effectiveness of the standard. The concept of normative pertinence is
+born as the analytical basis based on a set of material constraints or
+
+This implies the search for considerations that supposedly mean adapting the parameters used to the
+legal reality to the demands of current experience.
+
+However, the relational side that must be safeguarded between the father and the son (the subjective side) is not
+considered, that is, after the conviction of the duty to compensate, the father, as a rule, would no longer have the
+environment to rebuild the relationship or at the same time On the contrary, he would be definitively distanced from his
+son by the barrier erected by the norm. Faced with the situation, the Magistrate can, in the first approach, act according
+to a simple interpretation of the norm (being), as a second option he can resort to there is a multiple interpretation and
+application of the norm, seeking to ascertain the social consequences
+
+1.2.2 Specific Objectives
+
+immaterial elements inherent to the efficiency of norms (justice). The relevance of the norm can be configured as a
+principle of validity of the norm, as it is the main requirement for the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal norm. The
+law may exist but its application does not adjust to the reality of the moment, leading to it contributing to the restriction
+or limitation of progress and prosperity. The law must adapt to changes and be adjusted so that it is relevant to the
+national objectives of promoting justice, peace and development. This implies saying that the law cannot be seen in a
+static prism. They must meet the criterion of adaptability and suitability. Furthermore, the material consonance between
+legal norms should not only be seen as a direct correlation between isolated norms, but also as a correlation of one or
+more norms with the legal system as a whole. With this, the problem of material validity becomes not only a vertical,
+hierarchical one, but also a horizontal evaluative problem.
+
+5
+
+1.2 Objectives:
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Hermeneutics12
+
+Quite the contrary, it requires the originality and diversity of the knowledge that produces and systematizes about a
+given object, a given practice, allowing for a plurality of contributions to more consistent understandings of this same
+object, this same practice." Interdisciplinarity explores the different fields of knowledge seeking to establish in a crosspurpose
+manner, the application of one discipline to analyze the other. There is no absolute truth, which is why scientific
+knowledge cannot be absolutized (conservative).
+
+So that the sociological, historical, anthropological, philosophical or political points of view are not external to it (to
+dogmatics), but rather constitutive moments of dogmatic investigation In short: “the law” is not just a normative
+statement, but the entire system of implementation which results in a real normative sense. The New Rhetoric was in
+the field of legal knowledge, seeking to promote the coexistence between analytical demonstration and dialectical
+argumentation, both originating from ARISTOTLE. Law is the reflection on possible decisions from the perspective of
+rhetorical argumentation
+
+Law has not developed adequate instruments for the analysis of real-world problems.
+
+regarded as the source of Understanding and Interpretation is a branch of philosophy
+that struggles with human understanding and the interpretation of written texts . Legal Hermeneutics brings greater
+security to the legal world with regard to the application of the law, and, at the same time, ensures that the legislator
+has a preview of how the legal text will be applied, even before it comes into force. It is a legal methodology aimed at
+justifying legal decisions that have a normative character. It is a specific tool that aims to understand the applicability
+
+of a legal text and to remedy the interpretative vices. In simpler words: when a law comes into force, as with any and
+all literature, an understanding of its content is required. With regard to the logical process, "what is intended is to
+unveil the meaning and scope of the norm, studying it through logical reasoning, analyzing the periods of the law and
+combining them with each other, with the aim of achieving perfect compatibility" (DINIZ, 2002:156-157). The historical
+interpretative technique is based on the analysis of the norm's antecedents, researching its entire legislative itinerary,
+the factual circumstances that preceded it and gave rise to it, the causes or needs that induced the body to draft it.
+Such research is very useful in order to capture the exact meaning of the rules (ratio legis) and the results they intend
+to achieve.
+
+Video on Hermeneutics: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uR2cts9CWY
+
+In turn, in the systematic process, the interpreter, assuming that the legal system is not made up of a single
+normative system, but of several, which constitute a harmonious and interdependent set, will consider the system in
+which the norm is inserted, relating them to a with other norms concerning the same object. Hermeneutics in its
+interdisciplinary view breaks the fixed line of positivism. They seek explanation and correct interpretation of the various
+institutes and norms, in order to obtain a real understanding of the entire legal world, serving as assistance and subsidy
+for those who venture into this area of human knowledge. In order to develop this study, the jurist must have a free
+nature, that is, he must have a way of thinking that is not compromised by prejudices and assumptions, so that new
+concepts can emerge. The jurist must also have vast knowledge about Law, as only those who know it are capable of
+establishing concepts and criticisms, bearing in mind their responsibility in producing serious work that will contribute
+to the legal world.
+
+• Deepen the legalistic implications in Administration in the current situation markedly plagued by rapid
+changes in the search for new approaches using the AED, both for administration and for the measurement
+of legal standards.
+
+,
+
+• Build analytical methodological legal foundations and normative intelligence oriented towards the decisionmaking
+processes of legal acts and facts, with a view to greater rationality of legality (positivist), thereby
+moving away from monolithic disciplinary considerations.
+
+1.3.2 Interdisciplinary Law
+
+1.3.1 Legal Hermeneutics
+
+Law is not bound by despotic truth, hence the freedom of the interpreter to attribute meaning to Law. Likewise,
+the interpreter's will (will) cannot be eliminated in his hermeneutic task. From this angle, interdisciplinarity does not aim
+at the unity of knowledge but at partnership and mediation of partial knowledge, in the creation of knowledge. It is true
+that this element can be controlled in the legal discussion. The interdisciplinary nature must be reconsidered as more
+than a collaboration, it turns theory into the only relevant knowledge in the study of law. The interdisciplinary perspective
+does not hurt the specificity of the professions nor the specialty.
+
+12
+
+1.3 Methodology
+
+6
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+14 FEIJÒ, Carlos (2012) The Normative Coexistence Between the State and Traditional Authorities in the Angolan Plural Legal Order – Doctoral Thesis. Edições Almedina, SA, Coimbra – Portugal.
+
+15
+
+13
+
+1.4 Administration and the Public Service in Africa
+
+7
+GOUVEIA, Jorge Bacelar (2014) Manual of Constitutional Law - Volume I. Publisher: Almedina. Collection: University Manuals
+
+POULANTZAS, Nicos (1985). The State, Power, Socialism. Rio de Janeiro: Edições Graal, 2nd edition.
+
+Feijó (2012) maintains, following Caparros, that if the only compass available to the legislator is the formalism of the
+norm, if justice is not his guide, if we admit that the law is considered as a mere factor not a value, the content of the
+norm does not reserve for any transcendent principle. Reflection on the history of law allows us to observe that
+systematic thinking was not a universal constant. This isolation of law from other sciences leads to the inadequacy of
+the functional model of administration given the current dynamics. These are critical gaps that the legal world will not
+be able to fill with goodwill alone. In administrative action, rules coexist that some
+
+State intervention has always been a subject of wide discussion when considering the purposes and impact of
+public action and performance. We seek to fulfill the role of the State by taking into account the multiple instruments
+of action aimed at satisfying, regulating, preventing and safeguarding harmony and justice within society. The current
+situation is characterized by intense transformations in social, political and economic relations, by accelerated
+intellectual and technological development. In view of the globalization scenario, it is observed that knowledge has
+occupied a prominent place in public organizations today. The Public Administration is guided by the respect of
+specially enshrined legal principles that govern its action. This subjection substantiates the idea of legalism, that is,
+the Administration needs legal authorization to act, unlike private individuals who are only prevented from doing what
+the norm prohibits, for everything else, freedom of action and private autonomy are valid. Civil service obeys a set of
+guiding principles. In this domain, two main principles aimed at the quality of public service are emphasized: (i) The
+principle of Legality; and (ii) the principle of Efficiency.
+
+1.4.1 Fundamentals of Public Administration
+
+and not from the logical-deductive demonstration. Legal discourse (given several possible meanings of norms) only
+becomes coherent and rational based on a systematizing meta-criterion. Legal rationality is only achieved by
+overcoming the aporetic (of the problem), demonstrating the ability to construct a normative totality taking into account
+factual reason. The view of the isolated norm shifts to a relational view of law with other normative sciences such as
+economics, Administration, etc. The interpreter cannot understand the reality of the present, hence the need to look
+to the past in search of alternatives for the future.
+
+As Poulantzas13 says, “the executive and administration monopolize the role of organization and direction of
+the State vis-à-vis the bloc in power, that of elaborating a long-term general political interest of that bloc and of
+reproducing hegemony”. Public Administration is, in a practical sense, exercised through public services, which are all
+those essential to the community and, as such, declared by the competent powers, whose provision is the responsibility
+of the State. Professor Feijó (2012)14 considers that the administrative function is performed by Public Administration,
+understood in the organic sense. However, Public Administration is not limited to the State, i.e., it is not only made up
+of entities (bodies and services) belonging to the legal entity State. This postulate supports the idea that Public
+Administration15 should not only be seen as bound by State legalism. As a general principle, it is assumed that all
+justice means ensuring the right, but not always the law means ensuring justice. This implies that the standard does
+not always produce the desired effects, this is due to its effectiveness or efficiency in the process of drafting it. The
+discourses of positivism make it clear that Public Administration is subordinated to Law.
+
+Public Administration, seen from a legal perspective, is subordinate to the Law, which implies that all acts and
+actions must be in line with the Standard (Principle of Legality). In effect, the approach highlights the monodisciplinary
+nature of the methodology of legal analysis, which leads to the normative conception of law being strictly oriented
+towards the positivist facet, putting aside a whole set of scientific premises that could support the approach analysis
+of norms emanated by positive law. As a result, there is a crisis within the functionality of the Public Administration.
+Efforts have been made to rationalize public activity, seeking a more active administration in favor of the citizen,
+through different administrative reform initiatives. Despite these efforts, the results are still below what constitutes the
+citizen's expectations.
+
+Thus, despite the merit arising from the postulates of the pure theory of law, we see the distancing of other
+facets of analytics that could serve as criteria for evaluating norms.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+19
+18
+16
+17
+
+8
+
+FARIA, Edimur Ferreira de (2007). Positive Administrative Law Course. Belo Horizonte: Editora Del Rey.
+Marques, Raphael.(2012) Administrative Law and Post-Positivism: The Crisis of Legality and the Empire of Law. AEUDF. Brasilia.
+
+MELLO, Celso Antônio Bandeira (2006). Administrative law course. 20th edition. Sao Paulo: Publisher Malheiros.
+MEDAUAR, Odete. (1999). Modern Administrative Law. 3rd edition. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais.
+
+On the contrary, both in antiquity (Greek and Roman theories) and in the low middle ages, men who think about Law
+did not adopt systematic thinking, the legal system is an order of general principles considered as fundamental values.
+And the introduction of values within the scope of legality does not mean “material fairness”, but the formal adequacy
+of a valuation. Legal propositions valid in a given material scope are deduced from axioms, using a purely axiomaticdeductive
+method.
+
+of superior norm, binding on all the powers of the State”.
+
+1.4.2 Normativism and Public Legalism
+
+The principle of legality expresses the administrative connotation of the rule of law. For the Administration, the
+principle of legality translates into submission to the norm. In the current context, it is necessary to begin a reflection
+on the principle of legality, in its different doctrinal approaches and its connection with Public Administration. According
+to Edimur Ferreira de Faria16, the principle of legality was inspired by article 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man
+and the Citizen, of 1789, and became reality after the adoption of the Rule of Law. The evolution of the concept of
+legality and, more than that, the changes that occurred in the connection of this principle with Public Administration,
+denote the importance of its contextual character. It is forced to think that the principle of legality must, imperatively,
+be worked on in accordance with contemporary reality.
+
+The principle of legality imposes on the Public Administration the duty of obedience to norms and the law; It
+must, therefore, respect constitutional and legal standards, but also international standards and the rights and
+legitimate expectations of citizens. The principle of legality determines that "no one will be obliged to do or not to do
+something except by virtue of a rule". In this sense, it conceptualizes that legality, as a principle of administration,
+means that the public administrator is, in all his functional activity, subject to the commandments of the norm and
+requirements of the common good, and cannot depart from or deviate from them, under penalty of committing invalid
+act and disciplinary, civil and criminal responsibility, according to each case. The principle takes on its own contours,
+as the public administrator is responsible for carrying out everything that arises from the express will of the State,
+expressed in a standard, and it is not permissible for him to exercise the principle of autonomy of will, as his main
+objective is to achieve the ends for which he is proposes the state.
+
+Furthermore, as Odete Medauar18 explains, the Administration's link to the norm increases, following a path
+that goes from a more liberal meaning for administrative practices to a highly restrictive meaning. And it is within this
+variation of interpretative possibilities that the principle of legality must be worked on, and a critical analysis of the
+meaning of the word “norm” is also necessary, in the search for the meaning that best satisfies the institute in our
+system. For Celso de Mello (2006)19 it integrates this doctrinal part, understanding that the expression legality must,
+therefore, be understood as “conformity to the norm and, successively, to the subsequent norms that, based on it, the
+Administration disposes to regulate more strictly the his own discretion", "acquiring then a more extensive sense".
+
+While the Principle of Supremacy of Public Interest over private interests is the central point of any State –
+after all, in any State public interests prevail over private interests – the Principle of Legality is the central point of the
+Rule of Law. Rule of Law is the politically organized State, which obeys its own norms. The demystification of the
+idea of perfection of the norm in the strict sense, the growing protagonism of administrative bodies, the distance
+between the theoretical formulation of the political-philosophical foundations of the principle of legality and its effective
+implementation, demonstrate that the activities of Public Administration must, now, be guided by the norm in a
+material sense. Saying that the administrator can only do what the norm determines does not mean giving him any
+freedom: the administrator has discretionary action, within the limits of the norm. According to Marques (2012)17:
+
+may be considered of merit, but there are also norms that govern public activity.
+
+“The principle of legality is not what it used to be. The standard lost prestige and
+importance. The reasons are several. Norms have sometimes themselves carried
+the burdens of injustice and wrongdoing. In other cases, norms have become
+entangled in the solution of concrete cases, losing the magical dimensions of
+generality and abstraction. Moreover, in view of the drifts of state legalism, modern
+constitutions claim their
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+OTERO, Paul. (2003). Legality and Public Administration. The meaning of the administrative link to legality. Lisbon: Almedina.
+PEREZ, Marcos Augusto. Democratic public administration: institutes of popular participation in public administration. Beautiful
+Horizon: Forum, 2004.
+9
+21
+20
+
+More recent works by some authors, such as Paulo Otero (2003)20, argue that the space of legality is
+
+beginning to suffer the wear and tear caused by the demystification of the perfection of the norm, and that the content
+of the juridical-positive dimension of legality is weakened, and points to a greater protagonism of administrative bodies
+in the application or constitutive realization of Law. Paulo Otero writes in his work “Legalidade e Administração
+Pública” that “the norm proves to be insufficient, obscure and ineffective to face the new collective needs and the very
+content of legal norms loses precision, determination and congruence, finding legality rooted in contradictory interests
+and populated by an intrinsic normative conflict”. Emphasizing the distance between the theoretical formulation of the
+political-philosophical foundations of the principle of legality and its effective implementation, the author states that
+the binding legality of Public Administration does not only include norms originating from sources outside the
+Administration, but also involves considerable normativity elaborated by administrative bodies. The norm must be
+seen from a progressive perspective that promotes the public service, and the postulates must adapt to the pace of
+society's evolution and current demands, and not act as a restrictive factor of progress and innovation in the public
+sector.
+
+For PEREZ21 Public Administration currently assumes the role of harmonizing the behavior of social actors,
+seeking to be more transparent, distancing itself from purely managerial and neoliberal bureaucratic models. It is
+observed that the Public Administration starts to adopt new methods of action aimed at the culture of dialogue, to
+favor the work of society on itself and at this point we can relate the issue of transparency with the role of electronic
+government in the modernization of public administration . It is assumed that, through reducing bureaucracy and
+simplifying procedures, there is a positive effect on improving the provision of services. However, the reform of the
+Public Administration must focus on the reform itself.
+
+The bureaucratic model is accused of being inefficient and too slow to react to the needs of citizens and
+changes in the environment in which it operates. He is also accused of harming the
+
+In fact, the more orthodox bureaucratic model focuses its concerns on “guarantee”
+aspects and, therefore, focuses its attention on legal-formal aspects. However, the
+complex reality of the modern pluralist society dismantled the possibility of success
+of the imposing purely bureaucratic model. The bureaucracy of the Welfare State,
+structured for a uniform and impersonal administrative performance, thought along
+the lines of a “production line”, according to the Fordist model of mass production,
+does not always adapt to the demands of the modern pluralist society, of working
+classes differentiated in multiple facets, with different interests, aspirations and ways
+of life. (Junior BAPTISTA, 2012fi , p. 2, apud Xavier 2012)
+
+1.4.3 The Crisis of Public Intervention
+
+It implies saying that there will be no reform if the postulates that guide the administration remain in rigid normative
+and legal prisms. For effective, fast-acting administration, it is necessary to introduce flexible management
+mechanisms. Thus, it can be said that the collapse of reformist movements in Public Administration is associated
+with their technical and highly administrative form (turned towards its own object and not towards the purposes of the
+administration, which is to serve the citizen). The measures introduced within the framework of the reform, in many
+cases were not accompanied by operational instruments and motivational policies (commitment) of the employee. No
+account was taken of the need to eliminate the boundaries defined by administrative rules and procedures, to the
+detriment of rules aimed at the good performance of the administration.
+
+However, the logic of legalism tends to lose its originality, insofar as, in the current context, it is imperative to
+highlight pluralist principles. According to Celso de Mello's (2006) view, the Administration would be positively linked
+not only to the norm in the strict sense, but also to eventual norms that may exist, produced by the Administration
+itself to regulate its subsequent behavior. However, the initial idea of the principle of legality applied to Public
+Administration has been changing over time, since, from an operational point of view, that total submission to the
+norm made administrative activity unfeasible and paralyzed. The positivist conception and the very sacralization of
+legality led to an exacerbated legalism, resulting in an excessive formalism of normative acts, with the absurd
+predominance of the cold letter of the norm over its spirit or over the dynamic reality of society. In this sense, Baptista
+Júnior understands:
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+0
+
+Cape Green
+
+2 0 6 0
+
+Lesotho
+
+Insolvency Resolution
+
+4 0 8 0
+
+Kenya
+
+namibia
+
+100 120
+
+Seychelles
+
+Mauritius Islands
+
+property registry
+
+Tanzania
+
+Mazza, Alexander. (2012). Administrative law handbook. 2nd. edition. São Paulo Brazil
+
+no 214, Oct/Dec 1998, pp. 69-98, p. 77.
+XAVIER, Gabriela Costa. Society's participation in administrative decisions and the principle of efficiency. Jus Navigandi Magazine, Teresina,
+year 17, no. 3403, 25 Oct. 2012. Available at: <http://jus.com.br/artigos/22885>. Accessed on: May 12, 2015.
+
+BULOS, Uadi Lammego. “Administrative Reform”. Journal of Administrative Law. Rio de Janeiro: Renew,
+
+Source: http://portugues.doingbusiness.org/rankings
+
+22
+
+24
+
+23
+
+opening of companies Obtaining construction permits
+
+Botswana
+
+Business Environment in Africa: 2016
+
+According to Xavier (2012)24, initially, the Public Administration model was developed under the direct
+influence of liberal and positivist doctrines. In this model there are norms that organize,
+
+The bureaucratic model structured in this way, in the vast majority of situations, was efficient in the face of
+routine procedures, moreover, it is equipped with mechanisms to protect against corruption and, above all, it is able
+to conduct the actions of the Public Administration in accordance with the principle of legality. In this way, the
+regulation and elaboration of administrative manuals functioned as a shield against predatory practices, such as, for
+example, clientelism and administrative immorality within the public machine. The exercise of the administrative
+function cannot be guided by the will of the Administration or public agents, but must obligatorily respect the will of
+the norm. In other words, the principle of legality enshrines the subordination of administrative activity to legal dictates.
+This is an important guarantee of the Rule of Law: the Public Administration can only do what the people authorize,
+through enacted norms22.
+
+The graph above reveals the role of administration in rationalizing public activity in favor of the citizen. It is
+noted that the poor performance has contributed negatively to the establishment of conditions of attractiveness of the
+instrument in Africa. The business environment continues to be challenging, which places as a key premise the need
+for greater flexibility in public administration. Excessive generalism may have dictated the law's failure to adapt over
+time. The insertion of the principle of efficiency, alongside the classic vectors of legality, impersonality, morality and
+publicity, was based on the argument that the state apparatus must prove to be able to generate benefits, providing
+services to society and respecting the taxpayer”23. The principle of legality, which is still the foundation of state action
+and the pedestal of Public Administration, often represents a real obstacle to the performance of public agents in the
+quest to meet the aspirations of today's pluralistic society . The installed crisis brings with it harmful effects on the life
+of the population, which is now demanding an increasingly active role in different spheres.
+
+development and economic growth. This model is seen as a means that allows the creation of agents and bureaucratic
+processes that develop their action with a single purpose, the increase of their well-being and their power. This results
+in criticism of the State's inability to meet social demands through public policies. The rhetoric of improving the public
+service invokes that, although decisive and significant steps have been taken in the institutional domain, in the rooting
+of a new awareness of the role and action of the State in the attempt to meet the needs of the citizen, its approach
+still does not fit to current challenges, given its administrative weight.
+
+10
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+25 http://keepcalmandtalkaboutadministrativelaw.blogspot.pt/2012/12/o-dever-de-obediencia-na-administracao.html
+26
+
+to the Law and is subject to its regulatory norms. Prof. Freitas do amaral25 draws attention to the fact that, although
+apparently in an administrative system that is subject to the principle of legality, the question of whether subordinates
+should or should not comply with illegal orders should not even be asked. For Prof. Freitas do Amaral the duty of
+obedience to illegal orders is an exception to the principle of legality, but it is an exception that is admitted by the
+Constitution. Prof.'s opinion Vasco Pereira da Silva is that the duty of obedience ceases whenever fundamental rights
+or human dignity are at stake.
+
+Isolation of Law from other social sciences: the predominant legal-formalist culture associates law with a rational
+construction of norms by an idealized legislator, resulting in a legal science without society alongside social sciences
+without law accompanied by the isolation of law from other social sciences social sciences and the lack of dealing with
+the real world problems that the administration goes through, is a gap in the legal education that is not filled only with
+good will or progressive postures.
+
+1.4.4 The Sociological Defense of Law
+
+In society, man cannot live without observing the rules of conduct that regulate his coexistence with others.
+The effectiveness of law, the object par excellence of Legal Sociology, is a very complex topic. The very term
+effectiveness suggests at least two meanings from which to undertake its examination. First, it is necessary to
+emphasize the adequacy of the legal norm to the reality of the moment in question. Note that, in the quotation above,
+the idea of time plays a fundamental role with regard to the possibility of effectiveness of the norm. But it should not
+be taken in its absolute dimension, it is not just a matter of time. What is on the agenda are the changes that occurred
+in society at a certain time; time, in itself, does not tell us anything without the presence of these changes in the social
+fabric26 In this sense, it is understandable that a norm can be in force without, however, fulfilling its social purposes.
+
+The social consequences of the application of the law, especially the application resulting from a judicial
+process or even the analysis of the implications of the law, is an element of little study in law,
+
+According to Barbato (2003)27 "however, a norm may arise that will never be complied with due to an absolute
+lack of resonance within the community. its dictates, or change its meaning so that it can be partially implemented...
+This means, evidently, observing the compatibility between what the norm says and the configuration of the social
+fabric. Secondly, there is a more objective meaning: the possibility for the norm to achieve the purposes it was
+proposed when it was formulated and subsequently published. These are norms that, because they do not reach the
+moment of effectiveness, cannot be said to be positive". The sociological dimension justifies that the law is only
+realized perfectly when the facts of life are subordinated to the legal norm that predicted and regulated them. If there
+is a defect in this subordination, it is said that there is an imperfection in the legal organization of the society. We are
+faced with a sociological perspective of law. The last criterion for valuing the legal norm, the last dimension in which it
+should be analyzed, concerns its effectiveness, or as it should be better understood, its effectiveness. The fact that a
+legal norm validly exists does not necessarily imply that it is constantly followed. Norberto Bobbio asserts that the
+investigation to ascertain the effectiveness or inefficiency of a norm is of a sociological historical nature, it focuses on
+the study of the behavior of the members of a certain social group and differs, either from the typically philosophical
+investigation around justice, be the typically legal one around validity.
+
+they limit and regulate the actions of everyone, including state power itself. Therefore, the State subordinates itself
+
+Defining the contours of the sociological dimension of the legal norm, Marcos Bernardes de Mello states that:
+If there is a mismatch between the incidence – which takes place in the world of our thoughts, therefore, impossible
+to be modified in its veracity – and the application – which is an act externalized human life, that is, objectified human
+life -, it is demonstrated that either the social reality is different from the prescribed norms, and then they do not
+faithfully represent the values of the group, or the apparatus responsible for realizing the law is unsatisfactory. Of all
+the types of ineffectiveness of the legal norm, Norberto Bobbio says that the most ineffective are those that are
+violated without even applying coercion. As previously discussed, the valuation of the facts of life led the legislator to
+recognize as a value worthy of legal protection the importance of preserving, in favor of the operator, a set of
+guarantees that allow him to explore the good of his activity.
+
+11
+
+XAVIER, Gabriela Costa. Participation of society in administrative decisions and principle of efficiency. Jus Navigandi Magazine, Teresina,
+year 17, no. 3403, 25 Oct. 2012. Available at: <http://jus.c
+om.br/ar
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+1.5 The Administrative Reform
+
+12
+
+Administrative Reform is rooted in the matrix of public management based on the principle of efficiency clearly
+required in the new way of acting in administration. Emphasizes a more active public servant and the time to satisfy
+the wishes of the citizen. However, we cannot talk about the reform without deep reflection on the legalism of the
+administrative machine. There is a growing effort in search of efficiency, innovation and modernization of administrative
+structures and services, however the functionality prevailed by the excessively formalistic precepts and inadequate
+of the current reality prevail the flexibility of the services. Thus, reaching a stage of efficient public management
+implies breaking through the barriers of bureaucracy, the adequacy of
+
+1.5.1 Reformism and New Public Management
+
+Bureaucratic administration, of a procedural nature28, has always been discussed given its legalistic apparatus
+that governs State action. The excess of hierarchy in the decision-making process, as well as the administration's
+inflexibility, draw attention to vices within the administration itself. Managerial Administration, on the other hand, aims
+to give greater flexibility to administrative action in search of greater efficiency, reasonableness and economy. It
+excels in agility and efficiency in administrative action29, emphasizing the achievement of results, to the detriment of
+processes and rites, and encouraging popular participation in public management. The reforms initiated in the 1980s
+lacked government planning and more effective means of implementation. There was a relative distance between
+planning, modernization and human resources, in addition to the lack of integration between the bodies responsible
+for coordinating the reforms.
+
+procedure and an administrative machine adapted to the new requirements. It implies a structural, functional and
+relational change in the state apparatus.
+The notion of guarantor validity is perhaps the most decisive point as a general theory of Law, as its formulation
+advocates the predominance of the material link between the legal order and fundamental rights. It takes into account
+the fact that it is necessary to rethink the normative postulates of law so that the Justice of Law can be ensured. As
+such, it is important to invest in standards analysis methodologies so that the impact and effects of standards can be
+predicted before they are issued.
+
+The results of this experience were relatively disastrous and resulted in the multiplication of entities, the
+marginalization of civil servants, administrative discontinuity and the weakening of the system. For Martins30, State
+reform can be characterized as a paradigm of institutional transformation because it contains peculiar definitions in
+relation to the character and role of the State (content or direction) and also in relation to how to implement it (process).
+
+especially if taken from the bias of the elaboration of statistical data on judicial decisions. That is, the social impact of
+judicial decisions is not – and has never been – analyzed systematically, through appropriate analytical processes
+that allow reaching scientific conclusions on how this Power decides and what are the impacts of such decisions on
+society. Finally, for Weber, sociology must establish a radical distinction between knowing and valuing, between
+fulfilling the scientific duty of seeing the truth of facts and fulfilling the practical duty of defending one's own ideals.
+Weber does not believe that science can guide social action, which is why legal sociology would not be authorized to
+pass value judgments on social inequalities and exclusions that are at the root of various problems related to judicial
+administration.
+
+Briefly, this is a peculiar appropriation of principles and practices of the so-called New Public Management, in
+particular those associated with its initial managerialist phase31, along the lines of the “Washington consensus”32.
+
+30 Humberto Falcão Martins. Administration for development – The relevance in pursuit of the discipline. Advanced program in contemporary
+public management.
+
+unilateral station of will of the public administration whose purpose is to constitute, declare, confirm, alter or deconstruct a legal relationship
+between it and the administered or between its own entities, bodies and agents.
+
+32 The expression was coined by John Williamson (1990) to refer to the set of liberal policies that would illuminate the economic restructuring and
+reform of Latin American states. The ideals conditioned the granting of credit and the condition of credibility to developing countries to the adoption
+of tough fiscal adjustment measures that implied the reduction of the State.
+
+29 According to Mazza, Alexandre. (2012). Administrative law handbook. 2nd. edition. São Paulo: Brasil, pg 138, the central notion of
+managerial administration is the principle of subsidiarity whereby the State should only be attributed activities that are unviable for private initiative.
+
+tigos/22885>. Accessed on: May 12, 2015.
+
+31 This type of focus is illustrated in the pure managerialism and consumerism of the British experience. NGP was born managerialist in the 80s,
+strongly inspired by minimalist reforms and proposing the application of business management technology to the State, based on paradigmatic
+experiences. (Abrucio, 1996; Martins, 1997; Martins 2001).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+33
+
+36
+
+34 JA Oliveira Rocha (2001) The Relations between Political Power and Officials Communication in Colloquiums on the Statute of Municipal Officials. CEDREL. Lisbon
+
+1.5.2 Administrative Reform and the Public Service
+
+This model is based on a normative framework, which must be strictly complied with, as established a priori.
+In this context, the public agent considered efficient is the one who acts strictly in compliance with the manuals and
+regulations, and who, therefore, does not present any deviation in behavior that raises doubts as to his performance.
+In this context, the Public Administration does not have a certain margin of discretion sufficient for decision-making
+in exceptional situations not provided for in the regulations35. However, this Managerial Reform should not be
+understood as the only source of containment of public expenses, especially with the reform power given to public
+administrators for the restructuring of their civil service, which includes the dismissal of civil servants due to excess
+staff when not if the maximum limit established for personnel expenses is reached.
+
+Law strives for justice and justice, among others, for equity and the well-being of society. The central issue of
+this premise is that in the first instance the law must be seen in a progressive compendium; in the background, legal
+operators are invited to reflect on the quality of the decisions they make, taking as a reference the results, impact
+and effects arising therefrom; and third, legal decisions (norms) must be aligned with the natural norms of society.
+There is an excessive tendency for law to dominate over other sciences –
+
+supremacy (exclusive character), which somewhat limits the inclusive scientific character that guides science in
+society. Today, the quality of the public service is discussed, however, the influence of law in the flexibility of Public
+Administration is put aside. The excess of legalism has secularly made the public service static, and the current
+reality demands innovative solutions and with the administration living in a closed and dogmatic world, it cannot cope
+with the dynamism and effects arising from the current national situation and international influences such as
+technological advances , globalization and neodominant geopolitical strategies.
+
+NOGUEIRA36 emphasizes that State reform goes beyond financial and administrative aspects. It implies the
+democratization of the State, the 'renewal of its criteria for action and a reform of the standards of 'relationship
+between State and society, it depends on an intervention that, encompassing the entire public sphere, converts State
+actions into effectively public actions, and control by society occurs through the rescue of democratization and
+politics. It is understood that the Managerial Reform came to break the bureaucratic paradigm of Public Administration,
+generating efficiency, effectiveness, effectiveness and quality in the public service, with a coherent administration of
+its scarce resources, seeking management alternatives that favor the country's growth, as the citizen pays for the
+services of the State and wants the qualitative return of the
+
+The central issue in the context of administrative reform is, firstly, the procedural adequacy of public acts,
+taking into account the nature of the complexity of services.
+
+come into effect. The validity of the standard in books is not enough, but its full implementation and effective
+compliance is worth it. As shown by the author cited by Xavier (2012)33, the excess of formalism and the legal rigidity
+of the bureaucratic model stifle the Administration's action in the face of exceptional situations, arising from the
+multiple interests of society, not foreseen in the norm. Thus, considering the diverse demands of the plural society,
+the action of the public agent based only on the dictates of the norm does not prove to be adequate and sufficient for
+all the cases presented. It is necessary to have a certain margin of decision-making freedom so that the Public
+Administration can act in exceptional situations in observance of the common good, situations in which the provisions
+of the rules and regulations do not lead to efficient decisions.
+
+Second, within the framework of the rationalization of the public service, it is important to carry out a functional
+analysis so that the practicability of the procedures in the framework of the provision of public services can be
+assessed. The slowness, inertia and bureaucracy of the administration are pointed out as being associated with the
+procedural legal rigor, without taking into account the adequacy and scope in the conjuncture. For Rocha34, the new
+public management model insists on the adoption of new control processes for public services (“Performance
+Indicators”). This insistence is predominantly due to the work carried out within the OECD, which has generated a
+culture of evaluation and a fascination with indicators. Since it is not appropriate to subject public organizations to
+market norms, but it is important to evaluate their performance, it is only possible through the construction of
+indicators that allow measuring their efficiency, effectiveness and quality.
+
+13
+
+35See: http://jus.com.br/artigos/22885/novos-rumos-da-administracao-publica-efficient-participacao-administrativa
+procedimentalizacao-consensualismo-e-as-decisoes-colegiadas#ixzz3ZvX3WzX2
+
+year 17, no. 3403, 25 Oct. 2012. Available at: <http://jus.com.br/artigos/22885>. Accessed on: May 12, 2015.
+
+NOGUEIRA, Marco Aurélio. The possibilities of politics: ideas for state reform. Rio de Janeiro, Peace and Land, 1998.
+
+XAVIER, Gabriela Costa. Society's participation in administrative decisions and the principle of efficiency. Jus Navigandi Magazine, Teresina,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+BULOS, Uadi Lammêgo. “Administrative Reform”. Administrative Law Magazine. Rio de Janeiro: Renew,
+no 214, Oct/Dec 1998, pp. 69-98, p. 77.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1987.
+
+14
+
+38
+
+41 FEIJÒ, Carlos (2012) Normative Coexistence Between the State and Traditional Authorities in the Angolan Plural Legal Order – Doctoral Thesis. Edições
+Almedina, SA, Coimbra – Portugal.
+
+39 FEIJÒ, Carlos (2012) Normative Coexistence Between the State and Traditional Authorities in the Angolan Plural Legal Order – Doctoral Thesis. Edições
+Almedina, SA, Coimbra – Portugal.
+
+37 ROSEANE MILANEZ DE FARIAS (2000). ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: IN THE SEARCH FOR QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE. RECIFE
+
+40
+
+Within the framework of the normative reform of administrative procedures, the economic analysis of law
+provides a set of instruments for prior and successive assessment of the impact and implications of the norm. In this
+way, it is imperative to adopt analytical principles based on the predictability and anticipation of the expected results
+(efficacy), the effects and the analysis of the implications of the norm. Hence the importance of the interdisciplinary
+approach. Therefore, it is important to know the real process of “enforcing” standards and the effective result of their
+application. The jurist must also have vast knowledge about the Law, as only those who know it are capable of
+establishing
+
+1.5.3 Positivist Dogmatics and Normativist Reformism
+
+The positivist intention was to give unity to a set of fragmented legal norms,
+
+For Professor Feijó (2012)39, positivist dogmatics are based on a monist narrative, statehood and rationality
+to maintain its premise that the law is the law. Mayra de Sousa Scremin, quoted by Feijó (2012), argues that the
+theory of the legal system was created in the late 18th and early 19th centuries by positivism. Thinking Law, as
+HANNAH ARENDT teaches, is not restricted to despotic truth, hence the freedom of the interpreter to attribute
+meaning to Law.
+Likewise, the interpreter's will (will) cannot be eliminated in his hermeneutic task. It is true that this volitional element
+can be controlled in legal discussion. Administrative obedience to the law is present as a condition for the validity of
+norms. In a formalist theory of Law (Hans Kelsen40 more intensely, Norberto Bobbio), normative validity is confused
+with the fact that the norm belongs to the order, that is, with its formal validity.
+
+removing arbitrariness and uncertainties: to build a single, coherent and complete legal system.
+This thesis supports the conviction of the monodisciplinarity of law by assuming that the reason why we call the
+doctrine of law “pure” stems from the fact that it proposes, as its sole purpose, to obtain a precise knowledge of Law,
+and to be able to exclude from this knowledge everything when, strictly speaking, it does not fit within what, in fact,
+deserves the name of Law (Feijó, 2012). Thus, the law in
+
+For Professor Feijó (2012)41, positivist dogmatics are based on a monist narrative, statehood and rationality
+to maintain its premise that Law is the norm. Bobbio, in a few words, explains Legal Positivism: "... legal positivism is
+born from the historical impulse for legislation, it takes place when the law becomes the exclusive source – or, in any
+case, absolutely prevalent – of law, and its ultimate result is represented by the codification. Kelsen, in the
+development of his theory about the legal system, formulates the idea of nomodynamics, starting from the idea that
+the norms would be staggered in a hierarchical structure.
+
+themselves 37. However, for the Administrative Reform, as Bulos puts it well: “The insertion of the principle of
+efficiency, alongside the classic vectors of legality, impersonality, morality and publicity, was based on the argument
+that the state apparatus should reveal itself able to generate benefits, providing services to society and respecting
+the taxpayer”38. The understanding that we try to express here is not that of being contrary to Administrative Reform,
+as this is necessary in the current scenario of Public Administration, but rather that it should continue without
+transgressing the fundamental rights and guarantees of public servants.
+
+its dogmatic positivist conception does not leave room for other realities outside the normative conception and, as
+such, it does not consider dynamics and mutation as a result of advances in science and the factual reality in which
+Law must be felt. The legal methodology does not address the problems of research or the field of action of law in a
+pluri-analytical matrix. The legal framework elaborated along the lines of the orthodox administrative bureaucratic
+model did not follow the changes in society, nor could it, since it is evident that the norm cannot foresee all the
+situations that are presented in the concrete case. In a pluralistic society, in which the complexity and interests of
+various social segments are so diverse, the mass application of the generic norm does not translate into efficient
+action, nor does it satisfactorily meet all social strata and demands presented.
+
+analyze the influence of the norm in society – its advantages and disadvantages; the driving and disrupting factors in
+the social, economic and political structure. The mandatory character of the norm does not imply that the norm will be
+respected in a specific legal order, it is necessary to attend to and understand the complexity and adapt legal
+rationalization to the normative postulates based on idealistic and interdisciplinary thinking.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+42 Moreira Neto, Diogo de Figueiredo. (2014). Administrative law course: introductory part, general part and special part – 16th ed. rev. and
+current. – Rio de Janeiro: Forense, ISBN: 978-85-309-5371-3
+
+concepts and criticisms, keeping in mind your responsibility in producing serious work that will contribute to the legal
+world. The most recent and robust trends point to the affirmation of the principle of efficiency, transcending the mere
+requirement of effectiveness, as well as, later, its full affirmation in the social environment, as effectiveness, which
+leads to the conclusion that good administration is the duty of the State and law of the administered. The new
+directions point to a renewed democratic Administrative Law, inspired by flexibility, collaboration, competition and,
+above all, reciprocal trust between society and the State42.
+
+15
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+2.1 Fundamentals
+
+16
+
+44
+
+45 OGUISSO, T.: SCHMIDT, MJ On the elaboration of legal norms. Rev.Esc.Enf.USP, v.33, n.2, p. 175-85, Jun. 1999.
+Calsing, Renata de Assis. (2012) THEORY OF LEGAL STANDARDS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF LAW. Magazine of the UFC Postgraduate
+Law Program. v. 2.32, Jul./Dec. 2012
+
+43 BECCARIA, Cesar. On crime and punishment. Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 1986, and BENTHAM, Jeremy. The principles of morality and
+legislation. New York: Prometeu Books, 1988. See CARVALHO, Cristiano. The Economic Analysis of Tax Law. In: “Tax Law –
+Tribute to Paulo de Barros Carvalho. São Paulo: Quartier Latin, 2008.
+
+The study of the interaction relationships between Law and Economy, called economic analysis of Law,
+began with the works of Cesar Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, whose works introduced the notions of behavioral
+disincentives and utilitarianism, respectively43. The economic analysis of law focuses attention on the application of
+theoretical and empirical economic instruments and related sciences to expand the understanding and scope of law,
+improving the development, application and evaluation of legal norms, mainly in relation to their consequences,
+changes in economic policy in order to achieve an optimal or desirable situation. It is from this perspective that, based
+on the premises of the economic analysis of law, the author develops the Economic Theory of Law, aiming to
+analogize the behavior of agents and the State in relation to the normative emanation of the State.
+
+The economic analysis can be seen in different quadrants of this cost and benefit structure; analysis of
+transaction costs, principal-agent relationship, the idea of expectations, externalities, opportunity and waste costs,
+returns on investment, etc. Some traditional institutes and categories of law that are rare today seek new meaning or
+new strength by reestablishing contact with other areas of knowledge, from which they had been moving away since
+the positivist path that began in the 19th century. Having established itself as an autonomous field, endowed with
+“objectivity” and “scientificity” — challenges of legal positivism — is today an objective that has been overcome to
+some extent. This is the reason for the prior examination of legal instruments, taking into account their purpose but
+also considering the economic, social and political costs for both agents and the State. The issue of impact and
+effects resulting from a given standard is also considered.
+
+For Calsing, 201244 life is a constitutionally enshrined right. Legal norms cannot contradict this postulate, but
+rather ensure that it is fully exercised (the right over the right). It is not underestimated that the minimum contents to
+be respected in a given legal order are constitutionally predisposed, and this analysis comprehensively encompasses
+the adequacy of constitutionalized human rights. It translates the materialization, in the world of facts, of legal precepts
+and symbolizes the approximation, as intimate as possible, between the should-be
+
+normative and the being of social reality. Therefore, although formal validity and material validity must be distinguished,
+the two ideas are indispensable and complementary for the exact understanding and dimensioning of Law in terms
+of validity and validity. The conceptual discussion45 of the structure of the legal norm, in some of its aspects, such as
+existence (2), validity (3), validity (4), efficacy (5) and effectiveness, when we will reach our conclusions about the
+theory of the legal norm and its effectiveness.
+
+This paradigm offers several analytical segments for the study of norms to consider strategic analysis, legal
+microeconomics, analysis of implications.
+
+Economic analysis, as a method of analyzing legal norms, emphasizes the use of stylized models of individual
+behavior, recognizing that economic agents react to incentives (a) In describing behaviors, economic analysis places
+great emphasis on the fact that agents they are rational and that their decisions/actions have consequences; and (b)
+From a normative perspective, the measure of social well-being used is explicit. The effectiveness of a standard is its
+acceptance by the community and its continuous and real use. The effectiveness, or as some authors call it, the
+social effectiveness of norms, is the effective compliance with the Law by society, which recognizes the norms and
+complies with them, thus implementing its commands, making its precepts effectively affect life Social. Effectiveness
+refers to the application or execution of the legal rule, with the rule being normative as human conduct. The effective
+norm incorporated into society's way of being, transfiguring itself into action. “The rule of law must, therefore, be
+formally valid and socially effective”. The precedent for the Economic Analysis of Law (AED) is found in Adam Smith,
+who in 1776 published his most relevant work: “The Wealth of Nations”, focusing on the free market. In summary, the
+idea of laissez-fair, defended by Smith, would be socially useful because: i) competition would transform selfinterested
+behavior; ii) the Invisible Hand would ensure that society remains on track, since those who own the means
+of production would only produce exclusively those goods and services that society needs. His work came to be
+challenged along with the theories of Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes, who defended state intervention.
+
+2 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+46
+
+47
+
+17
+
+CALIENDO, Paul. Tax Law and Economic Analysis of Law. Rio de Janeiro:Elsevier, 2009. p. 14.
+CARVALHO, Cristiano de & MATTOS, Ely José de. Economic Analysis of Tax Law and Collision of Principles: a concrete case.
+
+2.1.1.1 Economic Approaches to Law
+
+Excessively protective legislation in private companies encouraged other forms of labor hiring. This change, instead of contributing to
+greater worker security, came to limit the domain and scope of formal long-term contracts (revenue contracts), which ultimately contribute to the
+increase in workers' social and professional instability. Be careful with the fact that the norm can be expansionary (when it meets society's
+purposes) or restrictive, when it harms society's well-being. In these cases, a prior assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency and effectiveness
+of the standards is important, in order to safeguard possible social or economic damages resulting from the application of the standard. As such,
+the analytical process of legal norms must take into account a set of postulates based on guaranteeing their effectiveness, efficiency and
+effectiveness.
+
+The study of law is concerned with the logically correct normative meaning that must correspond to the verbal statement of the norm,
+investigating the meaning of the precepts that present themselves as a determining order of conduct, establishing their logical-formal meaning
+and ordering them in a system logical without contradictions - the legal order, which refers to the plane of what should be. The economic Order
+concerns the world of real events, the distribution of effective power over goods and services and the way in which they are used (Weber,
+1964:251). There are basically two orders of applicability of the economic analysis of law: the positive (or descriptive) and the normative. The
+regulations emanate a set of regulatory aspects and the positive perspective concerns predictions and explanations relating to social behavior
+in relation to a given legal norm. Economic analysis of law assumes that resources should be allocated to those individuals most willing and
+able to pay a certain price for them, under market conditions of perfect competition. When resources are allocated to their most valuable uses,
+it is said that there was an efficient allocation, as the resources were given the purpose that generated the greatest wealth (defined in terms of
+utility).
+
+The measure of efficiency is provided by the Pareto Theorem: an allocation of resources is efficient if no economic agent can be in a
+better position without making other agents worse off. In view of the difficulties in applying the theorem, other concepts were developed, such
+as the Kaldor-Hicks Theorem, according to which the beneficiaries of a given allocation of goods must compensate the losers. We know how
+difficult it is for economists to accept that Law has a complementary and important role in relation to the economic environment, as well as for
+jurists to approve the use of economic tools as a guide for normative production and its application. The discipline of economic analysis of Law
+consists, in general terms, of the analysis of the legal phenomenon and its institutions from an economic perspective, that is, it deals with the
+application of elements of economic theory in understanding the function of Law, as well as the process of formulation of legal norms46 At this
+juncture, three factors must be considered in the economic analysis applied in Law:
+
+Berkeley: Berkeley Program in Law and Economics. Available at: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5sb875z8
+
+Economic Analysis of Law, which in English is known as Law and Economics, is, therefore, the philosophical movement that aims to
+analyze, based on economic rationalism, human behavior resulting from a legal norm (be it general and abstract, be it individual and concrete).
+Through generalization, we seek to identify the possible consequences of a norm, which does not always occur when it is understood
+traditionally, either because it is done seeking the solution of a specific case, or else, because generally, doctrinal texts are concerned with with
+what the norm says, but not with what the recipient of the norm intends to do because of it. The Economic Analysis of Law, therefore, brings to
+the legal world criteria for the identification and consequent prediction of what conduct will be taken by the recipient of the norm, considering,
+therefore, what the implications are in the short, medium and long term in terms rationally economic. It is through the generalization inherent to
+this philosophical movement that it can be seen that norms (both general and abstract, as well as concrete and individual) present externalities.
+In this sense, Cristiano Carvalho and Ely José de Mattos47 teach, stating that:
+
+2.1.1 Premises of Economic Analysis of Law
+
+“as positive law prescribes conduct and (de)limits the radius of these choices, at the same time that this
+normative production itself is also carried out by individuals who choose, and the rights in question are
+scarce, nothing more appropriate than Economic Analysis to describe the legal phenomenon and
+prescribe how it can be more efficient”.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+PACHECO, Pedro Mercado. The Economic Analysis of Law – a theoretical reconstruction. Madrid: Center for Constitutional Studies, 1994.
+p. 27.
+
+CARVALHO, Cristiano de & MATTOS, Ely José de. Economic Analysis of Tax Law and Collision of Principles: a concrete case.
+
+18
+
+48
+
+49
+Berkeley: Berkeley Program in Law and Economics. Available at: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5sb875z8
+
+The Economic Analysis of Law, therefore, brings to the legal world criteria for the identification and consequent prediction of what conduct
+will be taken by the recipient of the norm, considering him, therefore, as a person of flesh and blood, since his actions are rationally economic. It
+is through the generalization inherent to this philosophical movement that it can be seen that norms (both general and abstract, as well as
+concrete and individual) present externalities. In this sense, Cristiano Carvalho and Ely José de Mattos48 teach, stating that:
+
+Economic analysis can be viewed in different quadrants from this cost-benefit structure; transaction cost analysis, principal-agent
+relationship, the idea of expectations, externalities, opportunity and waste costs, returns on investment, etc. Some traditional institutes and
+categories of law now rarefied seek new meaning or new strength by re-establishing contact with other areas of knowledge, from which they had
+been moving away since the positivist journey that began in the 19th century. The study on Public Administration seeks to understand and
+evaluate the law in the normative field and establish relations within a society, in order to assess the impact resulting from its postulates. As such,
+within the framework of the conception, formulation and analysis of the norm, it is necessary to resort to different interdisciplinary paradigms.
+
+“…as positive law prescribes conduct and (de)limits the radius of these choices, at the same time that
+this normative production itself is also carried out by individuals who choose, and the rights in question
+are scarce, nothing more appropriate than Analysis Economic to describe the legal phenomenon and
+prescribe how it can be more efficient”.
+
+The fact that they can be applied means that such standards have applicability, that is, legal effectiveness. With this, it is stated that
+the expression effectiveness is translated as legal effectiveness, as applicability meeting the recommended purposes. It is in this context, too,
+that the Economic Analysis of Law begins to be discussed and considered, whose purpose is precisely to introduce a methodology
+
+The search for the effectiveness of norms, that is, the conformity of the world of duty with the world of being is an essential requirement
+for the legal system as a whole to obtain social validity. The feasibility of normative precepts must be an incessant search for legislators, since
+norms must seek their maximum effectiveness. This point will be structured in order to facilitate the understanding of what is considered the
+effectiveness of the norms. To do so, firstly, some concepts of effectiveness will be presented, followed by a small discussion of their importance
+for the validity of the legal system. In a second moment, one of the faces of the problem of effectiveness, or the lack thereof, for legal norms will
+be presented. Next, the principle of maximum effectiveness will be briefly considered.
+
+that contributes significantly to the understanding of social phenomena and that assists in rational legal decision-making. The economic analysis
+of the legal phenomenon, based on the premise that, when faced with more than one option of action, or more than one possible conduct, man,
+as an economically rational being, will inevitably analyze the cost-benefit relationship between the possible options, to choose what best suits
+your interests. However, the modern economic analysis of Law was inaugurated by the work of Ronald Coase entitled “The Problem of Social
+Cost” which, when dealing with the application of the cost-benefit theory in legal decision-making, as a way of obtaining greater efficiency in the
+solution conflicts, brought to Law the possibility of directly applying the principles of microeconomics49.
+
+2.1.1.2 Contribution of Economic Analysis of Law
+
+In this sense, combating the fragmentation of legal knowledge involves a dogmatic scientific ideological opening towards a pluralist
+analytical character. It means that the normative process must obey a scalar chain of analysis in which the legal precept is seen in a compendium
+in which all the assumptions of prior analysis are ensured: analysis of conditioning factors and analysis of determinants). Formulating standards
+meets a set of assumptions related to the scope of their applicability: the dimension of suitability (Effectiveness), adaptability (Impact) and
+practicality (Effectiveness). In this context, it is essential to methodically consider the prognostic picture. Ultimately, an attempt is made to develop
+a plural analytical base based on the economic analysis of law that can introduce tools for the analysis and evaluation of legal norms in a prior
+and successive premise so that it does not harm social and institutional harmony within public administration .
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+and economists, when using the expression Economic Analysis of Law, commonly refers to the application of economic methods – from
+microeconomics in particular – to legal issues. It follows from this foundation the reason for the prior expertise of legal instruments taking into
+account their object but also considering the economic, social and political costs for both the agents and the State.
+
+The efficiency of the normative choice or decision stems from its quality or impact on society.
+
+2.1.2.1 Effectiveness of the Legal Standard
+
+It is also an object of concern for scholars of the interaction between Law and Economics, as the efficiency of decisions taken within the scope of
+Law is reflected in the better or worse allocation of available resources, given the systemic nature that the legal system creates in the functionality
+of the economy. Economic Analysis of Law seeks to answer two questions: How is the behavior of individuals and institutions affected by legal
+standards and in terms of rigorously defined social welfare measures, what are the best standards and how can different standards be compared?
+legal norms. Science proposes to answer for the mysteries of life, which in the Middle Ages was a "mystery of faith". The power of intellectuals
+and scientists emerges in modernity when science gains a preponderant status in the political life of society, enormously influencing people's
+behavior.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. (2005) General theory of law and the state. 4th ed. Sao Paulo: Martins Fontes,.
+
+Effective is the right capable of being observed and achieving its ends. Efficiency draws attention to the need for legal norms to provide
+positive results in society and as such, the prior and successive analytical component of the norm: the process of conception, formulation,
+screening and the implications of the legal norm for effective public administration. Efficacy refers to the standard's ability to produce effects. The
+concept of effectiveness can have two meanings. The first, studied by the Theory of Law, is effectiveness as applicability and obedience to the
+norm, that is, it analyzes whether legal norms are being effectively applied and obeyed to say that the law is effective. Kelsen (2005)50
+differentiates between effectiveness and validity: the second refers to the obligation of the norm, that is, to a characteristic that makes the legal
+norm something that must be obeyed; the first refers to the fact that the legal norm is effectively obeyed. In short, “validity is a quality of law; the
+so-called effectiveness is a quality of the effective conduct of men and not, as the linguistic usage seems to suggest, of the Law itself”.
+
+KELSEN, Hans. (1998) Pure Theory of Law. MACHADO, João Baptista (trans.). 6. ed. Sao Paulo: Martins Fontes,.
+
+The breadth of applicability and application of a norm is measured by its legal effectiveness and effectiveness: effectiveness in terms of its
+actual compliance and efficiency in terms of achieving its goals. It so happens that a rule in force, legally effective, can be effective and not achieve
+its purposes. Or it can be relatively ineffective - not really applied, yet complied with - and achieve its intended purpose. It is not just a question of
+the validity of the rule, but also, and above all, the "capacity of the report of a norm to give it conditions of action" [ alone or in conjunction with
+other norms. Legal effectiveness is related, for Hans Kelsen (1998)51, to the validity of the norm, because “effectiveness is a condition in the
+sense that a legal order as a whole and a singular legal norm are no longer considered valid when cease to be effective”. Thus, for a norm to be
+effective it must have validity, which is “the answer to the question of why the norms of this legal order must be observed and applied.
+
+Efficacy is related to the production of effects.
+
+The first dimension refers to what would traditionally be called social effectiveness, that is, whether the norm has actually been observed
+by its addressees. This is noticeable when the individuals or legal entities to which the norm is intended generally comply with the normative
+precept.
+
+2.1.2 Criterion of Economic Analysis of Law
+
+By effectiveness it refers to the standard achieving the purposes for which it is intended. A norm is always created as a function of a certain
+purpose to be achieved directly or indirectly. These purposes, with the validity and social application of the norm (the first dimension of
+effectiveness), may or may not be achieved – and, if achieved, this may occur to varying degrees. It is understood that this achievement of
+purposes, of its specific objectives, can also be called normative effectiveness
+
+2.1.2.2 Efficiency of the Legal Standard
+
+Economic analysis, as a method of analyzing legal norms, emphasizes the use of stylized models of individual behavior, recognizing that
+economic agents react to incentives (a) In describing behavior, economic analysis places great emphasis on the fact that agents they are rational
+and that their decisions/actions have consequences; and (b) In the normative perspective, the measure of social well-being used is explicit. Most
+jurists
+
+The issue of the impact and effects resulting from a given standard is also addressed.
+
+19
+51
+50
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+KELSEN, Hans. Pure theory of Law. São Paulo, Martins Fontes, 1999
+
+20
+53 Ob Cit Calsing, Renata de Assis. (2012) page 291
+52
+
+It implies that the law must adapt to changes and be adjusted so that it is considered relevant to the national objectives of promoting justice, peace
+and development.
+
+If the legal effect intended by the rule is unrealizable, there is no possible effectiveness. Effectiveness is the practical and concrete
+action of the norm, making the values determined by the law's duty-to-be prevail in the world of facts. In this way, the values and principles
+contained in the norms are a reality in society, since the objectives of the norms are achieved. A
+
+The OECD (1995) suggests that impact analyzes be carried out using analytical, flexible and consistent methods, that is, supported by
+robust methodologies in order to assist the decision-making process of public policies. The legal world does not matter in a field of factual causality,
+but in an order of validity, which is the plane of what it should be52. However, the legal norms, even being in the ideal plane, refer to a concrete
+fact, generating a consequence in the real plane. In this way, the norm is something abstract as it dictates hypotheses, but it starts to affect
+effectively when its factual support materializes. Law is inseparable from an analysis of values and social facts, which transmits to norms the
+dominant idea of and in the group of people or countries that produce the norm. It happens that, sometimes, these norms do not correspond to
+the values of the entire society, leaving social desires and legal regulations in separate environments. (Calsing, 2012) 53.
+
+2.1.2.3 Effectiveness of the Legal Standard
+
+Effectiveness is the “real activity, the true result”, the coincidence of what is desired by the norms with the events in the world of facts. Effectiveness
+makes feasible what the norms proposed intellectually. The effectiveness of the legal norm implies ensuring full justice, taking into account the
+resulting effects of the norm in society.
+
+The effectiveness of a standard is its acceptance by the community and its continued and actual use. The effectiveness, or as some
+authors call it, the social effectiveness of norms, is the effective compliance with the Law by society, which recognizes the norms and complies
+with them, thus implementing its commands, making its precepts effectively affect life Social. Effectiveness refers to the application or execution
+of the legal norm, the normative rule as human conduct. The effective norm incorporated into society's way of being, transfiguring itself into an
+act. “The rule of law must therefore be formally valid and socially effective”. Effectiveness means, therefore, the realization of Law, the concrete
+performance of its social function.
+
+The establishment of operational systems that evaluate the real conditions of application of standards should allow a drastic reduction in
+the number of instruments that are out of adjustment with reality or context. The objective is to evaluate the degree of interdependence of variation
+in the context of application of standards, which leads to the need for standards and assumptions for the effectiveness of the standard. The
+concept of normative relevance is born as the analytical basis based on a set of material or immaterial constraints inherent to the efficiency of
+norms (justice). The relevance of the norm can be configured as a principle of validity of the norm, as it is embodied as the main requirement for
+the efficiency of the legal norm. The law may exist but its application does not adjust to the reality of the moment, leading to it contributing to the
+restriction or limitation of progress and prosperity.
+
+The search for the effectiveness of norms, that is, the conformity of the world of duty with the world of being, is an essential requirement
+for the legal system as a whole to obtain social validity. The feasibility of normative precepts must be an incessant search by legislators, since
+norms must seek their maximum effectiveness. This point will be structured in order to facilitate the understanding of what is considered the
+effectiveness of the norms. To this end, first, some concepts of effectiveness will be presented, followed by a short discussion of their importance
+for the validity of the legal system. In a second moment, one of the faces of the problem of effectiveness, or the lack thereof, for legal norms will
+be presented. The effectiveness of norms depends, firstly, on their legal effectiveness, on their formal ability to affect and govern life situations,
+operating the effects that are inherent to them.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Aguiar, Márcio (2016). Justice and science: the importance of Jurimetry. http://justificando.com/2016/02/16/justica-e-ciencia-a
+importance-of-jurimetry/
+
+Civil Code is made through a study of its grammatical, historical, systematic or teleological meaning, the study of the universe of judgments
+handed down by the courts based on this standard requires
+
+2.2.1 Jurimetry - Legal Statistics
+
+Legal statistics is a tool to support legal and judicial decisions based on evidence (facts), seeking on the one hand to describe the characteristic
+essence of the facts, with the support of descriptive statistics and on the other hand, to make the inference or generalization of the facts with
+based on a deductive methodology, which ends up being the postulate based on Law. The legal norm by nature is general, abstract, referring to a
+series of undefined cases and not to concrete cases. The law only moves before a concrete fact, through the action of the person applying the law
+who is the intermediary between the norm and the facts of life.
+
+Jurimetry is defined as the application of statistics and probability methods to the study and elucidation of legal phenomena. While the
+classical way of studying Law is concerned with identifying the possible meanings of general and abstract norms (such as those found in norms),
+the purpose of Jurimetrics is to evaluate how Law manifests itself concretely in countless sentences, rulings, contracts, facts and legal acts
+produced daily in society. It seeks to materially demonstrate the dominance of the legal world through statistical data and probabilistic analyzes
+vs. the predictability of phenomena. Decisions about making productive investment depend on forecasts about future profits and how reliable
+these forecasts or expectations are. The level of trust, in turn, depends on the availability of good information and a transparent and stable legal
+system.
+
+Legal research provides data on people's level of satisfaction with justice in terms of the rules and decisions that affect them (eg duration
+of proceedings, amounts paid, reliability of processes and procedures, duration of legal proceedings , and damages arising from the misapplication
+of the law in corporate life, etc.). For Aguiar (2016), as an instrument at the service of law enforcement institutions, Jurimetrics wants to meet
+society's aspirations for justice. Legal models, associated with statistical concepts and techniques in the construction of solid, predictive information,
+help to understand the challenges in terms of legal analysis (whether diagnosis or prognosis). and even for the definition of public policies and the
+participation of society in the conception of legislative proposals (lege ferenda). Jurimetrics proposes to allow a broad and direct approach for
+anyone interested in using quantitative tools in law. A connection is made between the institutes of law and statistics, in order to make the
+application of quantitative methods to legal issues immediate. Statistics began to take on a relevant field in the study of legal phenomena, seeking
+to highlight facts so that the Public Power can identify acts, in cases of hyper-regulation (excessive standards for irrelevant cases) and hyporegulation2.2.1.1
+Normative Jurimetry (Legal Acts)
+
+The study of Law is dedicated to the attempt to develop and understand general and abstract principles of conduct with a view to finding
+paths that lead such principles to their materialization, in the form of laws, doctrine and jurisprudence. It becomes increasingly imperative that the
+science of Law communicates with other sciences – Interdisciplinarity, as a consecrating premise of the pluralism that guides the contemporary
+legal world. Law is the sense of supposed and expected rationality and social conduct. Mathematics is the common sense of the exact rule. The
+classic method of studying Law is based on the analysis of legal norms. However, such a study should not be restricted to this interdisciplinary
+analysis, for the deepening and knowledge of the facts and acts. As important as studying the legal concept is to understand what are the
+characteristics of the facts. The methodology for studying these characteristics is given by Statistics, which allows interpreting and modeling data,
+clarifying how a given population behaves.
+
+(absence of rules for relevant cases).
+
+As exemplified by Nunes (2011)55, the analysis of the norm that regulates the obligation to indemnify the
+
+As maintained by Aguiar (2016)54. The use of statistical methods for the study of Law gave rise to a discipline called Jurimetrics, whose
+main objective is to summarize and understand legal processes through the application of statistical models. Jurimetry is the application of
+quantitative methods, especially Statistics, in Law. From the perspective of the legislator and public manager, Jurimetrics has the role of supporting
+decision-making by formalizing the principles used. Assessments must be replicable, giving preference to public data, in order to make the study
+accessible to all citizens who wish to better understand legal mechanisms.
+
+55
+
+54
+
+Nunes, Marcelo Guedes (2011). Jurimetry. President of the Brazilian Association of Jurimetry (ABJ), lawyer. http://abjur.org.br/o-que-e-jurimetria.php
+
+2.2 Methodology of Economic Analysis of Law
+
+21
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+LOEVINGER, Lee. Jurimetrics: The Next Step Forward. Heidi Online, 1949.
+
+Today, the normative quality is discussed, however, the influence of law in the flexibility of Public Administration
+is put aside. The excess of legalism, for centuries, has made the public service static, and the current reality requires
+innovative solutions and with the administration living in a closed and dogmatic world, it is unable to face the dynamics
+and effects resulting from the current national situation and international influences such as technological advances. ,
+globalization and neodominant geopolitical strategies. The methodology for studying these characteristics is given by
+Statistics, which allows interpreting and modeling data, clarifying how a given population behaves.
+
+As Menezes maintains that jurimetry converges Law and Statistics (as a science), under the umbrella of measuring
+the social facts that gave rise to conflicts and, thus, anticipating hypotheses and projecting behaviors in the elaboration
+of laws, in the establishment of public policies , in the management strategies of the collection in a Judicial Court, in
+the rationalization of decisions in search of their greater effectiveness since the concreteness of the right is given in
+function of the decision that recognizes it.
+
+2.2.1.2 Positive Jurimetry (Legal Facts)
+
+While the classical way of studying Law is concerned with identifying the possible meanings of general and
+abstract norms (such as those found in norms), the purpose of Jurimetrics is to evaluate how Law manifests itself
+concretely in countless sentences, rulings, contracts, facts and legal acts produced daily in society. The eclectic
+profile of legal realism (which appealed to economics, sociology, psychological theory, anthropology, linguistics)
+enabled the emergence of a new profile of the study of law. One of the recent phenomena of law (seen as a science)
+is the break with hermetic disciplinary formalism and the introduction of new perspectives for the analysis of legal
+facts (in a broad sense). The idea is to measure the facts related to conflicts, to anticipate scenarios and plan conduct
+in the practice of law, in the drafting of laws and in Judicial management based on probabilities and regressive
+analyses. Quantitative methods have been used for centuries to solve practical problems in the most diverse areas:
+economics uses such techniques to evaluate its theoretical models in a sub-area known as econometrics; Biology
+found in biostatistics a way to process its immense volumes of data and deal with the uncertainties inherent in the
+study of living beings. The law, despite having uncertainty at the heart of its application, does not use quantitative
+methods in a formal way in its day-to-day activities, even though this association has been around for a long time.
+Holmes Jr. (2009, p. 9)56 states that
+
+Jurimetrics is widespread as the scientific method for analyzing facts and acts arising from decisions in the
+different areas of legal action (legislative), judicial action and executive action. In any of these fields, analysis is
+essential before making a decision, and in the same way, it is important to evaluate decisions taking into account
+their implications for the future. Approving a law may seem easy, even after the Legal procedures have been
+completed, however, this prior diagnostic assessment (ex-ante) must be followed by a successive prognostic
+assessment (ex-post). Jurimetria applies qualitative and quantitative inductive analyzes in the legal context and
+provides the basis for strategic decision-making. Consists of surveying legal documents such as: Judgments and
+Judgments throughout the national territory about a given case to assess jurisprudential trends
+
+MENEZES, Daniel Francisco Nagao (2015). JURISDICTION AS AN AUTONOMOUS RESEARCH METHOD
+
+“the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics”,
+Holmes points out the need to develop quantitative thinking.
+
+models capable of understanding their multiplicity and, at the same time, summarizing their variability and suitability,
+allowing the elaboration of probability calculations regarding the behavior of the courts. By understanding Law "from
+bottom to top", starting from the concrete plan to reach the abstraction of the norm, jurimetrics brings important
+elements to be considered in the elaboration of public policies, which, in democracies, often involve legislative activity
+The application of Statistics to Law, although not very widespread, is important in the field of analysis and evaluation
+of the application of Law in society.
+
+HOLMES JR, Oliver Wendell. The path of the law. [SL]: The Floating Press, 2009
+
+Loevinger (1948)57 coined the term 'jurimetrics', which for the first time united legal theory, computational
+methods and statistics, with the aim of analyzing jurisprudence and making the use of law more predictable. From
+the statistical organization of judicial decisions (qualitative element), and also from the topics covered in the processes
+(quantitative element) it is possible to obtain decision-making parameters (Menezes, 2015))58. Statistics serve as an
+important source of factuality, as they provide evidence about the real conduct of individuals and what decisions
+should be made as a result of data analysis. As such, it should be seen as a source of Legistics.
+
+22
+57
+58
+56
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Based on the normative diagnosis, jurimetry, by describing the concrete interests of legal agents, their
+conflicts and the solutions offered by the judges, can help the law to better understand what citizens expect from the
+authorities and, thus, help the authorities to elaborate laws. more adherent to social reality. By describing the concrete
+life of law, jurimetry becomes a fundamental tool to develop fairer legal institutions capable of realizing the political
+aspirations of society. The quality of decisions handed down in court are and will always be guiding compasses for
+human coexistence, social pacification and cultural, social and economic development. Scholars dedicate themselves
+to theses on the applicability of a norm in judgments and the decision-making profile of a given judge or the probability
+of non-compliance with the nature of the norm. Behind the course is a mathematical-statistical conception of the
+traditional study of law, which theoretically and conceptually discusses abstract laws and principles. After testing the
+decisions, errors of omission or applicability can be detected in some cases.
+
+The legal inference is a tool to help measure the reasonableness of the decision or rule. It follows from this
+foundation the fact that not all legal or judicial decisions are fair and as such it is necessary to assess the reason for
+the decision, with recourse to a specific case. The testability of the decisions is important insofar as the norms are
+generic (deductive), saying reason for the generalist and abstract domain of application. – Normative or decisional
+justice: Involves Hypothesis Testing, Significance, Null Hypothesis/Alternative Hypothesis. Legal inference is a
+laboratory that seeks to measure suitability, risks and uncertainties and identify countermeasures before the decision,
+based on a case or isolated cases to third parties due to the occurrence of commissive or omissive behavior, material
+or legal, legal or illegal, attributable to public agents. Legal inference draws attention to the need to segment a set of
+cases for the testability of the rule before its entry into force. It starts from the principle that the norm is likely to cause
+damage in its practical application and as such, it must be tested before putting it into force.
+
+For Nunes (2011)59, the traditional study of law travels on a theoretical, general and abstract level. Jurimetry
+proposes to serve as a tool for understanding this universe of processes and legal facts. Unlike abstract norms, legal
+processes and facts arise in numerous populations, which are replicated around common elementary structures, with
+each individual, however, displaying its own characteristics. When we study a single general and abstract norm, for
+example an article of law, there are appropriate tools for its description, such as history, grammar or logic. The study
+of populations, on the other hand, demands the use of other areas of knowledge capable of briefly describing their
+central tendencies and variability: statistics and probability.
+
+2.2.1.4 Analytical Jurimetrics (Analytical Logic)
+
+NUNES, Marcelo Guedes (2011). What is Jurimetry?
+
+Based on normative prognosis, analytical jurimetry is an intelligence tool oriented towards the rationality of
+the decision-making process. Analytical jurimetry models are based on the deduction of current factors to admit
+probabilities or possibilities of present or future factors based on one or different scenarios. It is based on the
+coherence of the analysis instruments so that they produce results close to reality. In the legal field, the coherence of
+decisions is important so that similar cases can be judged with the adoption of the same principles as in case law.
+Analytical jurimetry is a posture that defends an argumentative basis based on evidence or even foundations
+substantiated by a support base. An important fact is that logical reasoning is not based only on known factors, but
+also extrapolates from an unknown reality to deduce unknown facts in terms of possibility or probability.
+
+2.2.1.3 Descriptive Jurimetrics (Legal Statistics)
+
+Analytical jurimetry is usual for, based on events, future vectors can be extrapolated. Analytical jurimetry
+serves as a basis for caution and weighting of decisions so that they have a logical, coherent and convincing support
+for a right decision. It is also important to take into account that analytical jurimetry is a tool that helps in the design of
+problems, assuming different combinations of factors (explicit and implicit causation), with which future extrapolations
+are based. Inference is a process by which, through a given sample data, a general conclusion is reached. Other
+synonyms of inference are conclusion, implication, conclusion and consequence. Inference consists of procedures
+for making generalizations about the characteristics of a population from the information contained in the sample. The
+sample contains the elements that can be observed and is where the quantities of interest can be measured.
+
+23
+59
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+In general, it proposes public management with the following characteristics: a) strategic or result-oriented nature of the decision-making
+process; b) decentralization; c) flexibility; d) increasing performance and pay for performance/productivity; e) internal and external
+competitiveness; f) strategic direction; g) transparency and collection of results (accountability); h) differentiated patterns of delegation and
+decision-making discretion; i) separation of policy from its management; j) development of managerial skills; k) outsourcing; l) limitation of the
+stability of servers and temporary employment regimes; in) differentiated structures.
+(Holmes & Shand, 1995; Hood & Jackson, 1991).
+61
+24
+
+60 New Public Management (NGP) is a set of arguments and administrative philosophies accepted in certain contexts and proposed as a
+new paradigm of public management following the emergence of the themes of crisis and State reform in the 1980s (Hood & Jackson, 1991).
+
+2.2.2.1 Conceptual framework
+
+The regulatory impact assessment (Regulatory Impact Assessment) is today an indispensable technical tool for the
+normative process, to support decision-making, and is a factor that promotes the improvement of the quality of legislation,
+transparency and the legitimization of political power. Jacobs (2006) recognizes the important role of the AIN as an instrument
+that assists governments in examining and measuring impacts on the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation (ex ante) or
+an existing regulation (ex post). However, for the author, the AIN is more than an analytical method for measuring impacts, and
+should be understood as an open process that expands the debate and contributes to the choice of public policies by the
+agents involved.
+
+Ensuring the quality of democracy passes, in a decisive way, through ensuring the quality and clarity of the regulations
+emanating from the State. The drafting of legislation is an essential tool of policy instruments that governments can use to
+achieve their objectives, and it is essential to good public management60 that it be implemented as efficiently and effectively
+as possible - as there are limits to the absorption and effectiveness application of legislation by society. All legislation has costs
+and benefits, so its inadequate implementation can cause obstacles to citizens and companies, create the perception of a
+negative environment and even stifle economic growth. It is a tool to aid in the process of designing, monitoring and evaluating
+standards, anticipating the impact of social and economic changes.
+
+The excess of generalism may have dictated the failure of law to adapt itself over time. of the effects that, directly and
+indirectly, they produce on social life and economic relations, imposes on the legislator the duty to guarantee their quality,
+rationality and efficiency. Regulatory impact assessment today constitutes an indispensable technical tool for the regulatory
+process, supporting decisions regarding the relevance and suitability of standards. Normative impact assessment is a
+methodology that aims to support the reasoned choice of legislative policies. There are advantages to preparing an impact
+assessment mainly in the case of propositions that impose relevant benefits or costs for the economic agents involved or that
+promote major changes in the distribution of society's resources. For Meneguin 61 There are several reasons for integrating
+legislative assessment into the process of drafting a rule. One of them is the possibility of framing rational and scientific
+processes to legal production. In the view of KirkPatrick, Parker, 2007, they maintain that:
+
+After defining the objectives, the next phase of preparing the AIN is to establish alternative propositions that can achieve
+the same objectives. Considering a wide range of propositions forces the AIN author to think "outside the box", and also
+provides greater transparency to the process. It makes it possible to demonstrate to Standard Makers and interested parties
+that alternative propositions have been seriously considered, and to explain why they have not been adopted. This makes it
+easier for rule makers and society in general to understand the logic behind choosing the best proposition and avoids
+unnecessary discussions about alternatives that do not contribute to achieving the same objectives. Alternative propositions
+must be closely linked to both the causes of the problem as well as the objectives. An AIN should contain a risk assessment
+when addressing a problem.
+
+Fernando B. Meneguin (2010) Legislative impact assessment in Brazil. Brasilia
+
+The potentially damaging effects on economic growth resulting from
+excessive government regulation have attracted increasing attention from
+policy-makers in recent years. Starting with the Reagan administration in
+the USA and followed by Thatcher government in the UK, a rapidly growing
+number of governments around the world have adopted measures to
+improve the quality of both existing regulations and proposals for new
+regulations.”
+
+2.2.2 Normative Impact Analysis
+
+(KIRKPATRICK and PARKER, 2007, p.1).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Same, page 15
+
+25
+62
+
+2.2.2.2 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
+
+Norms are established in the virtuous practices of society and with care not to repeat what was unsuccessful. Therefore, it is said that
+there is nothing worse than being disrespected. If this occurs, the failure of the corrupting power to exercise becomes clear. On the other hand,
+when it comes to the State, everything is valid, from the violation of norms and customs and everything else that is necessary to achieve the
+intended consequences: the ends justify the means. The expected impact of the norm and its effects/implications on agents must be predicted. A
+standard with high transaction costs, it can be expected that its effectiveness will be reduced. An economic feasibility study is an ex-ante strategy
+that shows the viability of the project before its implementation. It is based on this analysis that the Bank guarantees the credit for the investment.
+
+The cost-effectiveness analysis establishes a comparison of costs between regulations that generate similar benefits, identifying which
+means are less costly to reach certain goals to be achieved. It can be used in cases where the monetization of regulatory benefits cannot be
+obtained (and is therefore complementary to the cost-benefit analysis). Cost-effectiveness analysis (ACE) is defined by OMB (1992, p. 17), as:
+“A systematic quantitative method for comparing the costs of alternative means of achieving the same stream of benefits or a given objective”.
+ACE, therefore, is understood as a systematic method of comparing costs through alternative options to achieve the same flow of benefits or a
+given objective. The OMB points out that ACE constitutes an analysis tool that provides a solid basis for choosing alternatives, with a view to
+identifying policy options that generate greater benefits.
+
+For Jacobs, the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) can be understood as a comparative method of the costs of regulations that have
+similarities in terms of benefits. It is considered a useful and at the same time limited method, as it does not analyze whether the benefits justify
+the costs, but helps governments in comparing possible options. Jacobs (2006, p.33) observes that governments have sought more appropriate
+methods, that is, reliable, transparent and less costly to public coffers. The author points out: “The importance of the policy issues at stake is a
+strong reason to use methods that are robust, flexible and well-proven to work in a wide variety of public policy areas”. The referred author points
+out some main analytical methods: i) cost-benefit; ii) cost-effectiveness; iii) partial analyses; iv) risk analysis; v) uncertainty analyses. (Jacobs,
+2007)
+
+From these data, it is possible to verify if the analyzed norm completely equates the addressed problems, if it needs to be complemented,
+or corrected, identifying the cases of constitutional, legal, legal or regimental, technical, financial or budgetary unfeasibility of the analyzed
+proposition . The Economic and Financial Feasibility Study (EVEF) aims to help evaluate the investment plan to be carried out, demonstrating the
+viability or unfeasibility of the project. One way of calculating the investment is to create a specific account for each project, from which all
+payments and expenses incurred would come out. It is the document through which the forecast structure of costs and income (cost-benefit) is
+made, taking into account opportunities and minimizing risks and uncertainties.
+
+As an alternative tool, and which proves to be the most appropriate until expertise in CBA is acquired, there is the cost-effectiveness
+analysis. This analysis consists of comparing the costs between regulations that generate the same or similar benefits. Unlike the CBA, the tool
+is not applied to determine which goals must be achieved, but, once determined, it is consistent in comparing which means are less costly to
+achieve them (Salgado and Borges, 2010)62. Furthermore, the material consonance between legal norms should not only be seen as a direct
+correlation between isolated norms, but also as a correlation of one or more norms with the legal system as a whole. With this, the problem of
+material validity becomes not only a vertical, hierarchical one, but also a horizontal evaluative problem.
+
+problem where there is a possibility (risk) of serious negative outcomes. If these outcomes may involve irreversible damage or fatalities on an
+unpredictable scale, a formal risk assessment should be carried out by specialized personnel. Standard makers are often faced with the need to
+reduce or eliminate the risk of adverse effects on society and the State itself. When the standard or proposition under analysis is likely to produce
+different results, the AIN must include a risk assessment as a tool to determine the best policy to be adopted.
+
+2.2.2.3 Financial Analysis of the Legal Standard
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+26
+
+3.1.1 Fundamentals of Jurieconomics
+
+Jurieconomics is the science dedicated to the analysis, follow-up, measurements and recording of legal phenomena
+and their impact on the changes that occur in society in general, throughout its period of validity, from the approval
+based on the assumptions of the economy and analytical intelligence.
+
+In today's world, law has great influences in different sectors and dimensions. The apparent supremacy of the
+law has been consecrating the fullness of the law in the different areas of action and performance, however the limits
+and damages of the law are rarely considered in the social or corporate sphere. Jurieconomics is seen as a
+revolutionizer of legal dogmatics towards a state of legal efficiency in the different fields of action and performance,
+aiming at the consecration of normative justice. The limitations of the law result, on the one hand, from the
+methodological limitation of the law to assess its postulates, and on the other hand from the irrelevance given to
+analytical techniques for prior determination of the factuality of the legal world in the consecration of social justice.
+
+There is a growing trend in the legal sphere of emancipation through the legitimation of facts through the norm,
+even if these do not contribute to the justice of law. Jurieconomics invites operators of law and economics to be guided
+by a normative ideology that does not jeopardize the natural rights of a society. On the one hand, there is growing
+recognition of the need to bring law closer to social reality, or the effective application of legal science to satisfy the
+needs of the collective – Justice. However, on the other hand, the limitations of the law in the consecration of justice
+are also recognized, which implies that not all legal acts and facts permeate Justice.
+
+Jurieconomics, by describing the concrete interests of legal agents, their conflicts and the solutions offered by judges,
+can help the law to better understand what citizens expect from the authorities and, thus, help the authorities to
+elaborate laws that are more adhering to social reality. . Every decision requires an analysis of its implications in the
+short, medium and long term, as the decision itself can be meritorious and yet the impact can be disastrous – the
+predictive and probabilistic nature of the actions of law operators. Jurieeconomic research seeks to analyze people's
+level of satisfaction with justice in terms of the norms and decisions that affect them (eg duration of proceedings,
+amounts paid, reliability of processes and procedures, length of time for judicial proceedings, and damages resulting
+from the poor application of law in corporate life, etc.). For Aguiar (2016), as an instrument at the service of law
+enforcement institutions, Jurimetry wants to meet society's aspirations for justice. Jurieeconomic models, associated
+with intelligence in the construction of predictive information, help to understand the challenges in terms of legal
+analysis (whether diagnostic or prognostic) and even for the definition and participation of society in the conception of
+legislative proposals (lege ferenda) .
+
+The contemporary postulates of applied science tend to develop new perspectives around the measurement of
+science of the norms that govern science as well as the interconnection between the different vectors of disciplinary
+knowledge. Scientometrics appears as the science of science, that is, the deductive science to study the progress of
+science in different branches of knowledge. This trend in scientific development has sought to develop theses around
+explanatory models based on the combination of “nomic” postulates that guide scientific doctrine. With interdisciplinarity,
+the combination of different sciences is increasingly common. This is how interdisciplinarity arises to remedy the
+limitations of the analytical domain of law and present new conjugative proposals in the scientific sphere and the
+instrumentalization of legal science using different economic methods and techniques, so that legal and judicial
+decisions are and are increasingly closer to normative optimization – Justice.
+
+3 JURIECONOMICS AND NORMATIVE LEGAL INTELLIGENCE
+
+This is how the combination between Law and economic methodology arises for the study and analysis of legal
+acts and facts. It seeks to enshrine the efficiency of the legal norm, that is, to optimize legal decisions, so that the legal
+field is assertive in terms of its principles and postulates within society. This implies saying that the legal norm should
+contribute to increasingly fair decisions – We are dealing with fairness in the law, that is, the Justice of the Law. In the
+administrative domain, there is a growing need to ensure the approximation of administrative regulation to the context
+and specific reality of each moment. From this purpose, Jurinomy is born as the science that proposes to regulate the
+normativism of law, that is, the scientific field combined between law and economics to study facts and realities where
+the legal norm and economic norm must guarantee social justice. Jurieconomics proposes to be the applied analytical
+field dedicated to measuring the domain of applicability or study efficiency of normative postulates. The foundations of
+Jurieconomics are based on the approach of economic, financial and phonometric models applied to the study of Law.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+27
+
+The intention of strategic excellence in the corporate world is to make organizations market leaders in the
+present and in the future. This trend, with a strategic dimension, draws attention to the facet of suitability (external
+environment) and adaptability (internal environment). A first segment has to do with the combination of strategies
+through separate pieces that are integrated as a block in order to satisfy present and future needs, given its innovative
+nature –
+
+In this way, the possible legal application of fundamental rights would be instrumentalized, in the sense that
+they function as a basic interpretative axis of superior values within the legal system. Adaptive competence reflects
+the quality of self-organization, skills, motives, interests and affections. The foundation is contextual, so prediction
+analytics is guided by the behavioral objectives of intelligent thinking: adaptation to the environment; the modeling of
+the environment according to needs and expectations; the selection of the environment as an adaptive resource. At
+the center, therefore, is adaptation.
+
+Taking into account the dynamics of the external environment such as policies, competition, level of innovation, etc.
+(surrounding environment). Organizations are perfecting their product to satisfy the demand, giving different valences
+and utilities that meet the needs of the user – Adequacy.
+This reconstruction of legal concepts does not represent anything revolutionary, although in itself it presents
+advantages in relation to traditional concepts. This is, rather, a proposal of an instrumental nature, as the objectives
+go beyond mere conceptual reconstruction. Rather, what is sought is to think of the theory of Law in its basic
+categories as a normative set tending to the maximum guarantee of fundamental rights. In this context, it is essential
+to consider the standard taking into account the prognosis: its effectiveness, efficiency and effectiveness. In addition
+to analyzing effectiveness, efficiency and efficiency, the impact assessment should consider other effects produced
+by the legislation, including consequences unexpected by the legislator.
+
+3.1.1.3 Normative Strategic Excellence
+
+Within the framework of normative strategic guidance, it is important that public services are guided by meeting
+their Mission through a Vision and Values. First of all, if we don't know where we are and where we want to go, we
+can hardly have a clear direction, as all paths are useful, but none of them take us anywhere. A critical issue in
+normativism has to do with the devaluation of planning instruments, and as such the makers of standards are not
+aware of what challenges the administration will have to take on in the future. Within the framework of strategic
+guidance, it is important that public services are guided by meeting their Mission through a Vision and Values. First of
+all, if we don't know where we are and where we want to go, we can hardly have a clear direction, as all paths are
+useful, but none of them take us anywhere. Building the future is a visionary process (combines vision and strategies),
+but it is also an intelligent process - a testing instrument (recognition).
+
+3.1.1.2 Normative Adaptability Analysis
+
+3.1.1.1 Adequacy Analysis of normative acts
+
+Necessary the right to observe the law not only formally, but also to observe it substantially, in its directions.
+Hence the claims that reasonableness / proportionality can be seen as an offshoot of legality, called substantive
+legality. In other words, through the principle of proportionality / reasonableness, the due process clause is currently
+conceived, in its substantial sense, as an axiological control mechanism for the actions of the State and its agents.
+That is why it constitutes a typical instrument of the Democratic State of Law, in order to prevent any illegitimate
+restriction of the rights of any man without a previously established process and with the possibility of wide participation.
+Administrative acts will only be complying with the law if they really remain within the standards of reasonableness
+and proportionality. If not maintained, these acts will be illegal, not
+
+With the aim of analyzing the impact of legal norms, the economic analysis of law appears as an analytical
+tool in the field of effectiveness, efficiency and effectiveness of legal norms. It takes into account the fact that legal
+norms should guide the action of agents, however they should not be a limiting factor for their good performance. This
+raises the problem of the applicability and suitability of the legal norm. Having proceeded with the analysis of the
+problems of validity and normative validity from an alternative, guaranteeing point of view, one must move on to a
+related analysis, but situated on a different plane: the difference between efficacy, effectiveness and efficiency. In this
+way, it is possible to formulate effectiveness judgments about standards, stating them as effective or ineffective. A
+norm will be effective if it is effectively complied with and applied and if its purposes - individual and contextual - are
+predominantly achieved. A norm will be ineffective when it is not complied with and applied or when its purposes -
+individual and contextual - are predominantly not achieved.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Massuanganhe, I. Jacob (2015). Applied Scientific Research and Investigation: Structural Analytical Intelligence and the Methodology of Thought
+
+28
+Scientific. Luanda
+63
+
+It is the level of the power structure and the rules of its formation, that of the “material economic infrastructure”.
+It is determined by the functions of the State that ensure capitalist accumulation and the normalization of relations
+between social groups. This is what ultimately explains the conformation of the other two levels, when thought of as
+levels of reality, or the characteristics assumed by the relationships to be investigated, when thought of as levels of
+analysis. This level of analysis deals with the function of state agencies which, in advanced capitalist societies, is,
+in the last analysis, what ensures the process of capital accumulation and its legitimacy before society. This is what
+can be called the essence or structural level.
+
+Intellectual development implies moving from a stage of thinking to more advanced levels with the application
+of a set of instruments, methods and principles. The modern world is constantly changing and new demands arise,
+tending to solve new solutions for the complexity and dynamism with which the problems get worse. Analytical
+intelligence is the ability to solve problems or create products that are meaningful in one or more cultural environments.
+Innate, general and unique ability, which allows individuals to perform, greater or lesser in any area of activity - ability
+to think, conceive, understand; ability to solve new problems and adapt to new situations (Massuanganhe, 2015)63
+And as such, analyzes must be carried out on the domain of the applicability of norms and their implications in society
+using models of predictability and normative intelligence .
+
+It should be noted that questioning whether norms achieve their specific objectives brings to light the teleological
+nature of any set of norms, and the norms themselves in isolation. A civil law norm, which sets criteria to distinguish
+stable union and concubinage, aims to protect marriage and stable union in a similar way, considering this family
+entity and not concubinage. An important aspect of the analysis of a norm is, therefore, the verification of whether
+such norm is reasonably achieving the purpose for which it was created, at least moderately, being, therefore,
+efficient. Such attainment of normative purposes does not mean -
+
+nor could it mean - that the norm fully satisfies what it is intended for, but rather that its positive application -
+application of the norm to a legal situation - or negative - that the norm is respected so that situations that contradict
+it do not occur contributes to bring the law closer to this objective(s).
+
+Normative intelligence is based on the postulates of greater scope and involvement of the population in the
+processes. It is the intelligence area that takes care of aspects inherent in the analysis of interventions, their impact
+and the participation of actors in decision-making as well as in the implementation of decisions. This trend of strategic
+conjugation draws attention to the facet of adaptability and suitability for followers. It has been a common tool during
+election periods, and is evidenced by its conception of engagement and involvement. It is a governance based on
+the masses, the people and the majority. Segments within society the spirit of unity, revolutionary and hope for the
+future. As such, the analysis of the legal norm implies an in-depth study around the predictability and anticipation of
+the adverse effects resulting from the application of the norm – Intelligence. This field of study implies the combination
+of normative theories with positive studies of the legal norm. When looking at normative intelligence, it focuses on the
+practical application of the imaginative capacity associated with the flow of information to analyze the structure,
+behaviors and trends, aiming to extract strategic action in the short, medium or long term. In the intelligence strategy,
+it is in the sense of investing more and more in predictive solutions. It is not interesting to dominate the past as a way
+of equating the present and predicting the future. It is important to combine the past and the future for today, where
+we will have to make decisions based on the problems that afflict us in the present. Tomorrow's problems will be dealt
+with tomorrow, it's just a matter of stratifying short, medium and long term priorities. The functioning of the
+administrative structure (institutional). It is the surface level of intra and inter agency links and networks,
+
+3.1.2 Legal Intelligence
+
+will be realizing the objectives of the law. Even if they formally appear to be legal, they will be illegal if they do not
+adhere to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. There is also in German doctrine the expression
+'prohibition of excess' which for many is synonymous with these principles. In this way, in certain situations it is
+possible to control administrative discretion, as in the case of implementing the norm, as long as they are specific,
+socially necessary and constitutionally required policies.
+
+3.1.2.1 Normative Intelligence
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+64
+
+65 http://www.opiniaoadm.com.br/2011/10/afinal-de-contas-o-que-e-pensamento.html
+Assis, Olney Queiroz (2011). Legal anthropology manual— São Paulo : Saraiva, 2011.
+
+29
+
+This is what can be called the appearance or superficial level. It is the level at which the interests present
+within the scope of the administrative structure are manifested, that is, the political groups present within it and which
+influence the content of the decisions taken. Given that the existing groups within an institution respond to the
+demands of other external groups, located in other public institutions and in private organizations, the characteristics
+and functioning of the same cannot be properly understood unless in terms of the power relations that manifest
+themselves among these groups. This is what can be called the level of interests of the actors. For Boaventura de
+Sousa Santos (1988:73, cited by Assis64, legal pluralism takes place whenever contradictions are condensed into
+the creation of social spaces, more or less segregated, within which litigation or disputes processed on the basis of
+appeals are generated. internal normative and institutional. These social spaces vary according to the dominant
+factor in their constitution (which can be socioeconomic, political or cultural) and according to the composition of the
+social class. Thus, despite the merit arising from the postulates of the pure theory of law, by distancing from the other
+facets of justice that may serve as a criterion for evaluating norms, And the introduction of values within the scope of
+legality does not mean “material fairness”, but the formal adequacy of a valuation Valid legal propositions in a given
+material scope are deduced from axioms, using a purely axiomatic-deductive method.
+
+The problem definition must include a basic scenario for comparing solution options (alternative propositions).
+The purpose of the baseline, or baseline, scenario is to explain how the current situation will evolve without public
+intervention – it is the "no policy action" scenario. The reference scenario should also serve as a basis for comparing
+solution options. The baseline scenario should be solidly supported by facts and, as far as possible, expressed in
+quantitative terms. Also, it should be set for an appropriate time horizon (neither too long nor too short). The baseline
+scenario should establish a clear indication of how serious the problem is, or to what extent it would become more
+serious without public intervention, and whether there are irreversible consequences. When describing the reference
+scenario there is the challenge of uncertainty in the projections made.
+
+3.1.2.2 Intelligence of Prediction
+
+The intelligence of prediction is an exercise oriented towards predicting the future and centered on choosing
+different scenarios (paths) to reach a certain end (vision). The intelligence of prediction is aimed at projecting the
+future (building a long-term vision). Forecasting intelligence is oriented toward the ability to predict the future based
+on forecasting or forecasting models.
+
+3.1.2.3 Anticipation Intelligence
+
+Oriented towards the present based on future facts, it is action aimed at anticipating future phenomena. It is
+oriented towards the ability to bring the future into the present (today) – it implies the
+
+projection. It is based on the equating of strategic thinking aimed at the alternative equating of solutions oriented to
+satisfy the needs of the present and the future. Within the framework of government reform, it is important that public
+leaders are guided by the facet centered on the growing appreciation of strategic action. The foundation is contextual,
+so the prediction analytics is guided by the behavioral objectives of intelligent thinking: adaptation to the environment;
+the modeling of the environment according to needs and expectations; the selection of the environment as an
+adaptive resource.
+
+determined by flows of resources and authority, etc., in which the analysis is centered on the decision-making process
+within organizations and on the relationships between them.
+
+preventive action in order to face possible risks, which means taking measures before the
+
+The intelligence of prediction is oriented towards prediction in the formulation of government action, so that
+adequate ways can be identified to effectively achieve the intended results. Predictive intelligence is now oriented
+towards the long term, however actions can be deployed in the medium and short term. Two moments mark the
+strategic process: (i) strategic thinking, and (ii) strategic analysis. The essence of strategic thinking has been widely
+discussed in debates around public service efficiency and an increasingly active State. For Uberaldo Fernandes65,
+strategic thinking implies the ability to continually look to the future, that is, to know where one wants to be in the
+medium and long term, and define lines of action that guarantee the achievement of the desired results. Strategic
+analysis is associated with choosing the best policy alternatives. The notion of strategic analysis leads to a new
+challenge in the conceptual field and in the realignment of action and ways of acting in public administration:
+maximizing the effects of public choice while maximizing the interest of the State.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+30
+
+It is not enough to have a vision or create strategies, it is also important to be sure of the surrounding environment in which the strategies
+will be inserted. In military science, poor battle preparation implies fatality. Ex-ante and ex -post actions derive from forecasting intelligence . Ex
+ante action is associated with the conditions or environment necessary for the effectiveness of the strategy. The product of ex-ante strategies
+gives ex-ante results. For example, if our strategy chosen from among the
+
+This facet is oriented towards anticipating the future (from tomorrow to today). The visionary facet means knowing the future and
+assuming a set of critical assumptions that could compromise the future. It means identifying the risks, deviations and negative influences and
+taking the measure or action before the phenomenon happens. The visionary facet contributes to the establishment of objective conditions for
+the effectiveness of the strategies, as it induces tactics for contingency situations associated with predictable and unpredictable factors, therefore
+a good strategist must have a good visionary foundation. In anticipation, the visionary foundation seeks to emphasize the preventive role, contrary
+to the strategic facet, which assumes more of a corrective vector. The visionary leader is concerned with “what still comes”, everything that is not
+in the common domain.
+
+1. study of the result of norms (study of legal output), in which analysts try to explain how expenses and services vary in different areas,
+which is why they take norms as dependent variables and try to understand them in terms of social factors, economic, technological
+and others;
+
+3.1.3 Analytical-Decision Fundamentals
+
+Analytical intelligence has a converging field of action insofar as it values the sphere of action based on the assumptions of empirical
+work associated with scientific practices. Intelligence thus gains the primacy of inducing knowledge and knowledge from critical premises
+associated with the combination of scientific methods and techniques. Developing structural analytical intelligence implies the equating of
+analytical models (abstraction) that describe the behavior and interpretation of real phenomena associated with scientific methodologies) to
+understand problems and present scenarios. Intelligence stems from two main foundations: (i) predictability and (ii) anticipation. It is not enough
+to draw up legal norms using a forensic technician, it is imperative to assess their quality. A poorly conceived norm is one that does not have an
+effective domain in terms of suitability and practicability, given the context and dynamics required in a modern administration.
+
+2. evaluation study , which seeks to identify the impact that standards
+have on the population; information for legal making : in this case, government and academic analysts organize data to aid legal
+making and decision-making
+
+It implies the ability to predict and correct future errors before they happen through a set of analytical instruments to measure the level
+of intended results, the impact of the rules, the effects and their implications. Legal analysis is thus characterized by its applied, socially relevant,
+multidisciplinary, integrative and problem-solving orientation, in addition to its descriptive and normative nature. The normative analysis is
+considered a determining factor for a pre-assessment of the impact (implications). It serves as a testing ground or laboratory for testing the
+effects of the standard. This implies that, as soon as the standards are formulated, they pass through a laboratory field for testing. This field of
+testing is called normative analysis. Norms have repercussions on the economy and societies, which is why any theory also needs to explain the
+interrelationships between the State, politics, economy and society.
+
+phenomenon happens. Anticipation is based on the mitigation of risks and uncertainties, that is, it outlines the need to identify effective solutions,
+anticipate events and generate impact from public action (risk and uncertainty balanced) . In this case, it is necessary to anticipate future events
+and try to respond in a timely manner.
+
+3.1.3.1 Normative Diagnostic Analysis
+
+The reviewability of the rules is a fundamental element. Normative analysis seeks to identify possible negative or positive implications
+of norms within society, so that the State can take preventive and corrective measures before the phenomenon occurs. Norm analysis draws on
+contributions from a number of different disciplines in order to interpret the causes and consequences of the norm, in particular by turning its
+attention to the formulation process. He also considers that Normative Analysis is an applied sub-area, whose content cannot be determined by
+disciplinary boundaries, but rather by an approach that seems appropriate to the circumstances of the time and the nature of the problem. The
+norms analyst must be situated outside the everyday world in order to be able to ask about some of the big questions related to the role of the
+state in contemporary society and the distribution of power among different social groups.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+31
+
+• Sensitivity Analysis: In light of this detailed risk assessment, new measures can be adopted to manage the
+risk. When the hazard under consideration may have consequences that are not yet fully scientifically
+established, and which may be irreversible, a full risk assessment by a scientific committee is necessary.
+Sensitivity analysis and risk assessment are tools to address these challenges associated with the description
+of the problem.
+
+An economic feasibility study is an ex-ante strategy that shows the viability of the project before its implementation. It
+is based on this analysis that the Bank guarantees credit for the
+
+The problem definition must include a basic scenario for comparing solution options (alternative propositions).
+The objective of the basic scenario, or reference scenario, is to explain how the current situation will evolve without
+public intervention – it is the "absence of political action" scenario. The reference scenario should also serve as a basis
+for comparing solution options. The baseline scenario should be solidly supported by facts and, as far as possible,
+expressed in quantitative terms. Also, it should be set for an appropriate time horizon (neither too long nor too short).
+The reference scenario must establish a clear indication of the severity of the problem, or to what extent it would
+become more serious, without public intervention, and whether there are irreversible consequences. When describing
+the reference scenario there is the challenge of uncertainty in the projections made.
+
+investment.
+
+As it assumes the nature of predictability, it reduces the level of risk associated with the implementation of the
+decision, given that it is a prognostic instrument that assists the decision-making process.
+
+Sensitivity analysis and risk assessment are tools to address these challenges associated with the description of the
+problem.
+The Prognosis - Ex-post action (efficiency-oriented): They are linked to the implementation of the main
+strategies and oriented towards the efficiency of the strategy. They are also called complementary strategies, which
+support the main strategies. In this case, ex-ante actions serve to reinforce, highlight and support strategies that are
+seen from a tactical perspective. The product of ex-post strategies gives ex-post results. For example, if our chosen
+strategy among the several is to travel by land, throughout the journey we must have fuel (determinant). Prognostic
+analysis can be Predictability or Implications
+
+• Implication Analysis: This is where all elements that may constitute factors in favor (opportunities) or against
+(risks) are taken into account. Implication analysis is a tool that highlights imminent risk factors associated
+with a decision. Therefore, it is essential to screen legal provisions before they come into force to assess the
+implications within society, that is, it is important to invest in methodologies for analyzing legal norms so that
+negative impacts can be predicted and prevented. of the standards, and this must be before they come into
+force.
+
+Here we are facing a cyclical chain. Within the framework of regulatory reform, it is important that those who set
+standards are guided by the aspect centered on the increasing value of intelligence. If employees do not feel involved
+in the reform process, that is, if the reforms do not have an explicit focus on what constitutes employees' concerns
+(progression, promotion, improvement of their working conditions, etc.), it implies that employees reform postulates will
+have no impact. In this case, it is necessary to anticipate future events and try to respond today (anticipability). From
+the perspective of "analysis", official and unofficial speeches are considered, that is, explicit and implicit speeches,
+including the study of the absence of a policy, since silence about a certain issue can be a strategy of action against it
+
+several is to travel by land, before the trip the vehicle is inspected (conditioning). In this case, checking the vehicle is
+an ex-ante strategy that results ex-ante in the good condition of the vehicle.
+
+• Predictability Analysis: In this case, fuel is an ex-ante (complementary) strategy that has the ex-ante result of
+“refueling” the vehicle for the success of the trip. Ex-post strategies follow ex-ante strategies, with the role of
+ensuring the completeness or feasibility of the action.
+
+3.1.3.2 Normative Prognostic Analysis
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Fernandez, Marly (2013). Legal Norms: A Naturalistic Approach to Legal Implications.
+
+32
+
+66
+
+67 The legal system (like any normative system) is a set of norms. Legal systems are complex, that is, their norms come from more than one source. Kelsen's staggered theory of the legal
+order “serves to give an explanation of the unity of a complex legal order. Its core is that the norms of a legal system are not all on the same plane. There are higher norms and lower norms.
+The lower ones depend on the higher ones. When Kelsen says that Law is a coercive order, he means that it is composed of norms that regulate coercion. For Bobbio, the rules for the exercise
+of force are only those linked to the sanction, and not all norms. The objective of every legislator, for him, is not to organize force, but to organize society through force. See Bobbio. N. (2008)
+Theory of the legal system - Portal Jurídica Investidura, Florianópolis/SC, 26 May 2008. Available at: www.investidura.com.br/biblioteca-juridica/resumos/teoria-do-direito/93. Accessed on: 13
+May 2015
+The analysis of implications seeks to substantiate the approach taking into account a set of known and
+unknown future situations. Based on “assumptions”, the cascading consequences, risks or opportunities (domino
+effect) that a decision may entail in the future are studied: cost, medium and long term. The established postulates
+can bring benefits in the long term, however create losses in the medium or long term. In these cases, it is necessary
+to equate all possible situations and assess the degree or magnitude of impact, or effects, in such a way that if the
+rule causes damage in the future, then it may not be approved. The analysis of implications stems from speculative
+foundations of possible phenomena that could result in a chain of effects (positive or negative). Therefore, a
+hypothesis is assumed and an attempt is made to investigate the different scenarios that may arise from a given
+decision or rule. It is important in the analysis of implications to survey different hypothetical postulates associated
+with the norm and its cyclical relationship (chain).
+
+Life in society is marked by a heterogeneity of demands, which from the outset contributes to the acceleration
+of contradictions of interest and conflicting expectations. It is the role of law to ensure harmony, given that it is part of
+human nature rooted in the determination of a set of norms that regulate society. According to Fernandez (2013)66,
+we have well-tuned norms of conduct because they allow us to maximize our ability to predict, control and model
+social behavior regarding the reaction of members of a given community. However, there is no legally valid norm
+without the existence of a corresponding legal system67, although it is possible to discuss whether or not the legal
+norm is fair or effective.
+
+The major concern of Normative analysis is the management of uncertainty (risk environment, impact and
+effects). The norms are oriented to respond to a cause. They must be oriented towards real facts through concrete
+interventions – hence the option for predictability. "Policy analysis" is a study technique that makes it possible to form
+an opinion about the future effects of a given public policy based on the analysis of implications (hypotheses).
+According to the interests and the point from which it is interpreted and analyzed, different judgments can be obtained
+about it, allowing comparisons with others.
+
+The analysis of implications is a tool that reveals the eminent risk factors associated with a decision. It
+translates the multiple effects of a decision, the incidence ratio, its amplitude, the levels of scope of the decision. It
+assumes the predictive principle when raising a set of hypotheses and as such it is important to take into account the
+uncertainty factors associated with predictability. The foundation of analysis of implications is directly associated with
+predictability. It studies possible future scenarios with a positive or negative dimension. It assumes the speculative
+facet and seeks to translate it into possible scenarios to happen in a cyclical chain.
+
+The conception of justice that stems from this approach consists of taking the maximization of society's
+wealth as a criterion for assessing the justice of acts and institutions. This criterion would make it possible to reconcile
+the approaches of utility, freedom and equity. Regarding the social configuration that watches over the Middle Ages,
+where Natural Law and Positive Law coexisted, it is necessary that we pontificate its structure, so that we can then
+deal with its collapse and consequent rise of the Modern Age, where positivist dogmatism prevailed. Medieval times,
+historically speaking, begin with the end of the Roman Empire in the fifth century. In it, at the top of the social pyramid
+we had the first Estate (the nobility), followed by the Second Estate (the clergy) and the Third Estate (the people). ).
+The latter, made up of peasants and craftsmen who assumed the role of servants and were at a clear disadvantage
+compared to their superiors, had no political-legal representation. That is, only the so-called first and second states
+could boast of being holders of power. It is important to note that in medieval times there was no unified legal system,
+but rather a series of normalizing structures that together formed a plurality of rights.
+
+3.1.4 The New Administrative Legal Order: Contemporary Defenses
+
+3.1.3.3 Analysis of Normative Implications
+
+3.1.4.1 Legal Norm and the social setting
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Grande, 2000. Dissertation (Master’s in Sociology) – Humanities Center, Federal University of Paraíba.
+RIBEIRO, Emmanuel Pedro. From legal pluralism to the plurality of rights: a non-essentialist construction of law. Meadow
+
+69
+
+33
+
+68
+
+cell of the legal system (systematized body of rules of conduct, characterized by coerciveness and imperativeness),
+has the imperative force of conduct, which coerces subjects to behave in the way expected and desired.
+
+state legal monism.
+
+In contemporary society, the notion that the positivist norm no longer provides any and all answers to disputes
+is clarified. Even consumerism and unprecedented technological development that lead to globalization are also
+fundamental to demonstrate the senility of the modern system. Undoubtedly, the monist theory decays. In line with
+dogmatism, if we have a glass for water, in terms of positivism, this glass should not be used for other purposes.
+However, the table may be so small that there is no space for other glasses and you may prefer to use the same
+glass for a good wine. In this case, if the glass is actually used for other purposes, this is an infringement.
+
+3.1.4.2 Administrative Delegation
+
+Dogmatism assumes a conservative character, fixed and closed in its postulates. It follows a monodisciplinary
+perspective in its foundations. In Norberto Bobbio's interpretation, the process of normative production by the State's
+centralization effort resulting from the State's intention to gradually suppress the "parallel Powers", which certain
+social groups had to impose valid and generally accepted behaviors on the members of the respective community,
+including using coercive means. Nowadays, with the advancement and greater rapprochement between sciences,
+the paradigm of unity of normative legal no longer has weight. The opening of Law gave rise to several analytical
+conceptions with the aim of studying Law from different perspectives, apart from which Law itself began to assume
+pluralism as a settled way of ensuring the advancement and adequacy of its postulates in the face of today's world.
+Thus, despite the merit arising from the postulates of the pure theory of law, the removal of other facets of justice that
+may serve as a criterion for evaluating the
+
+Delegalization consists of the possibility of the Legislative Power transferring, by means of law, its competence
+so that another body of the Executive or Judiciary can deal with the matter that would be its responsibility, in an
+innovative way, through a normative administrative act. For JUSTEN FILHO, delegalization consists of the possibility
+for Parliament to establish general principles and guidelines on a certain matter that is not an absolute reserve of law,
+but is already set out in formal law. And, in that same (supervening) delegalizing law, assign limited competence to
+the Public Administration to issue regulations, which would end up abrogating the formal law that was in force.
+Delegalization occurs when the Legislature hierarchically demotes a certain matter (which was previously dealt with
+by law) so that it can be dealt with by regulation. The phenomenon of delegalization was developed by Italian doctrine
+and consists of the possibility of the Legislature hierarchically demoting a certain matter so that it can be dealt with by
+regulation. It is, therefore, an institute that aims to give a new reading to the principle of legality, bringing greater
+flexibility to the legislative action, with the alteration of the normative content, without the need to go through the
+lengthy ordinary legislative process69.
+
+standards.
+Law is not bound by despotic truth, hence the freedom of the interpreter to attribute meaning to Law. Likewise,
+the interpreter's will (will) cannot be eliminated in his hermeneutic task. From this angle, interdisciplinarity does not
+aim at the unity of knowledge but at partnership and mediation of partial knowledge, in the creation of knowledge. It
+is true that this element can be controlled in the legal discussion. The view of the isolated norm is shifted to a
+relational view of law with other normative sciences such as economics, administration, etc. standard. Dogmatic
+Questions have an explicit directive function and are finite. The dogmatic approach reveals the act of giving an
+opinion and reserves some of the opinions. When dealing with modern legal dogmatism the “undeniability of the
+starting points”, which says that a norm “can only be rejected on the basis of another legal norm.” According to
+dogmatics, then, since the State holds the monopoly of legal production, it is obliged to make use of its own law when
+deciding disputes between citizens -
+
+http://www.espacojuridico.com/pfn-agu/?p=74
+
+Modernly, the State has sovereign political power within a given territory and valid for its population. The
+normative system frames a set of norms that do not necessarily imply that they are all legal, meaning that the rights
+arising from that normative order as a whole must be safeguarded. By virtue of its sovereignty, the State takes for
+itself the monopoly of the production of law. Thus, the legal system becomes unified and centralized and the justice
+monopolized by the State becomes official justice (RIBEIRO, 2000)68. The legal system is based on an evaluative
+interrelationship between rules and principles.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+72
+
+70
+
+ROULAND, Norbert (2003) In the confines of Law. Sao Paulo, Martins Fontes.
+Assis, Olney Queiroz (2011). Legal anthropology manual— São Paulo : Saraiva, 2011.
+34
+
+Mestre Abelardo, medieval philosopher of the 11th century, is credited with the first written use of the expression Positive Law. BOBBIO, Norberto.
+Legal Positivism: Lessons in the Philosophy of Law. Icon: São Paulo, 1999, p. 19.
+71 Moreira Neto, Diogo de Figueiredo. (2014). Administrative law course: introductory part, general part and special part – 16th ed. rev. and current. – Rio de Janeiro: Forense, ISBN: 978-85-309-5371-3
+
+73
+
+74
+
+In this pluralistic dimension of law, the analysis of public policies investigates the State's intervention in political-social relations. The
+pertinence of the standard can be configured with a principle
+
+The principle of legality expresses the double legal submission of the State: to the norm and to the Law, the classic submission to the norm,
+expressed in the principle of legality, was expanded and overcome with the inclusion of both submission to legitimacy, politically connoted, and
+submission to lawfulness , morally connoted, constitutionally affirmed values of postmodern law, synthesized in the concept of juridicity. Thus,
+according to this most up-to-date nomenclature, the use of the expression legality is reserved when the reference is made to the norm in the strict
+sense, of a positive state norm. The principle of juridicity, thus integrated by legality, legitimacy and lawfulness, is aimed at meeting the most important
+purpose of Administrative Law, which in itself would justify it: the protection of the freedoms and rights of those administered, following in importance ,
+the ordering of the legally relevant activities of the Administration. In this way, it can be seen as a new legal framework, built through the commitment
+of those who need the State's jurisdictional provision, but who are at the mercy of the ineffectiveness of this provision. According to Gomes
+Canotilho70, the principle of legality concerns not the field of material achievements directly, but rather that of administrative procedural-procedural
+functionalization and imposes the performance of the Administration not only in accordance with the law, but also in accordance with the Law, as a
+all. For the State, in the legal-administrative-procedural-procedural environment, the law is its starting point and Law, as a dogmatic science, its
+insurmountable frontier.
+
+validity of the norm, as it is the main requirement for the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal norm. The law may exist but its application does not
+adjust to the reality of the moment, leading to it contributing to the restriction or limitation of progress and prosperity. It implies that the law must adapt
+to changes and be adjusted so that it is considered relevant to the national objectives of promoting justice, peace and development. This implies
+saying that the law cannot be seen in a static prism. They must meet the criterion of adaptability and suitability.
+
+administrative/2#ixzz306yRN1JU
+
+In order to fulfill these missions, the State, in the exercise of the public administrative function entrusted to all entities and bodies that perform
+it in any capacity, has its juspolitically restrained actions by two techniques: that of limitation and that of control. The limitation acts through the legally
+imposed restriction on the State's action, with a view to protecting the freedoms and rights of those administered, thus consisting in its static
+containment. Control acts through reaction, as opposed to the action of the State, whenever it is necessary to make effective the protection of the
+freedoms and rights of threatened or vulnerable administrators, consisting, therefore, in their dynamic containment. In both cases, the constitutional
+primacy of the principle of legality is affirmed with this double expression – the static and the dynamic – which is why the present study should begin:
+how legality control is conceptualized and how it operates71.
+
+According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1988:73, cited by Assis74), legal pluralism takes place whenever contradictions are condensed
+in the creation of social spaces, more or less
+
+3.1.4.4 Legal Pluralism and Public Action
+
+Legal Pluralism, as a new political and legal reference for the achievement of a fairer society, is justified by the reason for the contemporary
+crisis of Legal Positivism. According to Bobbio (1999), Legal Positivism arises from the expression Positive Law, which in its origins was used to
+oppose Natural Law. This notion of distinction and contrast dates back to Greek-Latin thought, but the current use of the phrase only began in the
+Middle Ages72. For Norbert Rouland (2003: 405)73, legal anthropology demonstrates its usefulness when it allows us to discover (and understand)
+the law that is hidden by codes, which sometimes do not adjust to the reality in which they are inserted. This notion is also evident when society, in
+constant transformation, does not find the evolutionary foundation of legal norms in law. All of this can be accepted, but naturally when people
+become aware that public legalism may be behind the inefficiency of the administrative machine, they seek to counter this reality, highlighting new
+ways in which public servants act.
+
+3.1.4.3 Administrative Legality
+
+Read more: http://jus.com.br/artigos/24817/o-surgimento-do-principio-da-juridicidade-no-direito
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Griboggi, Angela Maria (S/D) LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL POSITIVISM IN BRAZIL
+
+35
+76
+75 See Teixeira, Carlos Manuel dos Santos (2014) Administrative Law. Extract from the article published in the book Direito de Angola. UAN
+Faculty of Law under the coordination of Prof. Elisa Rangel and Prof. Bacelar Gouveia. Luanda
+
+77 SILVA FILHO, José Carlos Moreira da (1995). Legal Philosophy of Alterity. 1st ed. Curitiba: uruá, 1995, 280 p.
+
+Silva Filho (1995)77 argues that the crisis in the paradigm of legal dogma affects peripheral reality in a much
+more acute way, as the inadequacy between law and reality, a sign of the crisis, in addition to compromising these
+societies in a more critical way, is already a symptom that dates back to the colonial period itself. Monist conceptions
+admit only one system of Law, whatever it may be, positive state law. When dealing with the subject, in monism only
+the legal system imposed by state bodies must be considered - Positive Law, with no positivity outside the State and
+without the State”. However, it must be reaffirmed that such conceptions are outdated in the current context. Legal
+Pluralism becomes important in this context, as it proves to be contrary to these realities, striving for equality and for
+a true democratic rule of law.
+
+Legal pluralism presupposes the existence of more than one law or normative order in the same geographic
+space. For Professor Teixeira (2014) 75 it constitutes a challenge in an interactive way, a syllabus in approaching the
+foundations of law, with the goal and, in view of the basic heterogeneity, the transversality of this approach. According
+to Griboggi76, the crisis of legalism is a recent phenomenon, starting in the middle of the middle of the 20th century.
+XX, due to the fact that such a model does not correspond to current economic and social interests. Legal Pluralism
+presents itself as a concrete social reality, offering alternative ways of effectively realizing the needs of a multiple
+society, in the face of an Administration that does not meet the needs of the majority.
+
+segregated, within which litigation or disputes are generated based on internal normative and institutional resources.
+These social spaces vary according to the dominant factor in their constitution (which can be socioeconomic, political
+or cultural) and according to the composition of the social class. Santos cites the customary legal space created by
+American merchants, by default
+
+In a particular way, the Administration gradually undresses the trappings of power to present itself as a function,
+which the new trends claim to be performed not only with observance of legality - an effective administration, but with
+attention to legitimacy and integrity. morality-an efficient administration. The criterion for the “effectiveness” of a legal
+norm is assessed based on the adherence of its recipients, the people to whom it is addressed. Even if this norm/
+legal fact is fair and valid, it is still possible that individuals do not comply with it, which appears to be a historicalsociological
+phenomenon of the behavior of those members of the community subject to its incidence.
+
+The pluralist theory does not intend to deny the state structure, but rather to demonstrate that, concomitantly
+with it, there are other parallel forms of production of law, the State not being the only, nor the main legal source, but
+just one more among the many that are capable of establishing legal norms. Pluralism is seen as one of the ways to
+revolutionize Law, and admit greater flexibility of its theoretical postulates that guide Public Administration. And this
+under the following aspects: whether the standards are effectively complied with; if the norms contribute for the legal
+system to reach its objectives, and if the legal norms contribute to the social well-being and especially the implications
+in the functionality of the Public Administration that strives for the common good.
+
+the norms of official law (civil and commercial), with the aim of facilitating transactions and reducing costs. It also
+highlights the spaces where minorities and illegal immigrants are concentrated.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+36
+
+Law is the science whose object is the study of the rules that govern social coexistence.
+
+3. The Administration needs to refresh its guiding postulates. Reformist programs focused on objective postulates,
+putting aside subjective factors such as change of mentality, accountability, moralization, professionalism,
+etc. The deterioration of living conditions resulting, among other factors, from the global crisis and the growing
+pressure on public intervention, in favor of basic services, raise, in Africa, contradictions between classes.
+There is a need for ideological openness in the field of law.
+
+As Prof Feijó (2016) mentions, the preparation of the African citizen to deal with new realities presupposes a
+methodological revolution based on the recognition of the need for in-depth knowledge of legal and socially
+relevant realities, which deserve the protection of Law.
+
+According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1988:73, quoted by Assis, legal pluralism takes place whenever
+contradictions are condensed into the creation of social spaces, more or less segregated, within which
+disputes or disputes are generated based on appeals For Professor Teixeira (2014) it constitutes an
+interactive challenge, a menu in approaching the fundamentals of law, having as a goal and, in view of the
+base heterogeneity, the transversality of this approach.
+
+Law is the set of norms in force in a country, formed by a set of laws in force in a specific legal order and which
+establishes and governs the relations between individuals in that society.
+
+7. With the advancement of theories of scientific methodology, Jurimetrics was born as an instrument to aid legal
+and judicial decisions. The pluralist dimension is seen as an emerging conception in the sense of opening
+the law to other areas and as such different perspectives are drawn in terms of analytical and conceptual
+foundations of the norms that govern Public Administration. The answers to these challenges require an
+analysis of the field
+
+4. Legal thought reveals itself as a culturally historical entity. It is therefore not surprising that Roman, medieval,
+modern-Enlightenment and current legal thought are not confused (Feijó, 2016). These thoughts are different
+in their intentionality and methodical modality, in the nature of their rationality. The legitimization of normative
+power is essential so that the addressees of legal norms perceive that legislative activity is based on solid
+foundations, on reliable facts and analyses, and on important values and interests. It is the proposal of
+jurimetrics to allow a broad and direct approach for anyone interested in using the quantitative tool in law.
+
+This dogmatic view of analysis of real phenomena closes the right to interdisciplinary analyses, leaving the
+reproductive function of what was thought to be the fairest, however at a given moment and in a given reality. The
+validity of the standard in books is not enough, but its full application and effective compliance is worth it. Public
+Administration has already undergone important transformations. As a result of these changes, efforts should be
+made to implement the principle of "good administration", where the public agent needs to be efficient, capable and
+committed to fundamental values such as legality, impersonality and morality. State reform must have as its driving
+force the deepening of democratization. It constitutes an imperative challenge rooted in law, a menu in approaching
+the fundamentals of law, having as a goal and, in view of the base heterogeneity, the transversality of its postulates
+and approaches. The Study focused attention on the analysis of the implications of the structuring principles and
+functionality of the Administration, having as guidelines the applicability and suitability of the legal norm in the public
+administration. Thus, one can consider:
+
+5. It is necessary to open the frontiers of analysis of law through new ideological and analytical approaches,
+especially of a methodological nature for the assessment of legal norms. The economic analysis of law offers
+a set of analytical postulates leading to the analysis of normative quality. The effectiveness of the law is not
+enough, it is important to measure the level of efficiency (impact) as well as the effects and implications that
+may arise. Thus, the Economic Analysis of Law recommends a prior and successive assessment of the rules,
+in order to assess their pertinence and implications in the short, medium and long term, taking into account a
+set of factors.
+
+1. The current Public Administration model is seen as static and out of adjustment to the current context and
+challenges. Today, public administration is seen as discouraging development and discouraging public
+entrepreneurship (creativity, innovation and proactivism). Currently, the public service is faced with two critical
+fundamentals, on the one hand, the dissatisfaction of public servants who call for good remuneration and
+working conditions and, on the other hand, the citizen who calls for a more efficient and responsible service.
+
+4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
+
+6. Legal pluralism has already provided sufficient proof of how important ideological openness is.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+37
+
+interdisciplinary approach to deepen the implications arising from decisions based on the normative role of the
+State.
+
+9. The regulatory impact assessment is today an indispensable technical tool in the regulatory process. The
+displacement of the problematic of the norm from the traditional paradigm of the application to concrete cases
+of neutral legal norms formulated in a general and abstract way, to the field of their creation and the effects
+that, directly and indirectly, they produce in social life and in economic relations , imposes on the legislator the
+duty to guarantee its quality, rationality and efficiency.
+
+10. Jurieconomics proposes to bring prominent elements embodied in analytical intelligence to assess the legal
+norm. Normative intelligence will be the technical ability to analyze norms taking into account a set of postulates
+of the present and the future, objective and subjective, symptomatic and asymptomatic. In this sense, it is
+proposed the adoption of a new approach in the elaboration of normative acts (standard decrees and regulatory
+decrees), in which the attention is not only focused on the analysis of the problem and elaboration of the
+legislation, but also on the implementation, evaluation and revision thereof, with a view to improving efficiency,
+efficiency and effectiveness.
+
+Notwithstanding the limiting factors of legalism, it can be seen that the central point would not be legalism per se,
+but the need for a prior and posterior assessment of the instruments with the application of analytical instruments for
+the normative diagnosis and prognosis. It is necessary to take into account analytical instruments and legal and
+intelligence tools for normative analysis (ex-ante and ex-post) in order to make the public service more flexible. It can
+be inferred that the central question that affects public administration from the point of view of legalism must be
+considered in the objective and subjective aspects. It is necessary to leave the generalist theoretical plan for an applied
+and factual plan. From proceduralism to flexibility and from positivism to pluralism. It is necessary to measure the
+implications of the effectiveness, efficiency and effectiveness of the norms for society as a whole, where the State is
+also an integral part. The normative foundation is seen as a field that must be supported by analytical standards based
+on predictive and anticipatory intelligence.
+
+8. Within the framework of the reform of administrative procedures, analytical intelligence, likewise, offers a set of
+instruments for prior and successive assessment of the impact and implications of the rule. In this way, it is
+imperative to adopt analytical principles based on the predictability and anticipation of the expected results
+(efficacy), the effects and the analysis of the implications of the norm. Various analytical tools can be adopted
+for this purpose, such as public policy analysis methodology, interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary methodology,
+legal economic analysis methodology (legal microeconomics, legal strategy and tactics, etc.).
+
+In short, there are several defenses around the delegalization of public administration, flexibility, legality, but it is
+understood that the central issue is in the monolithic character that guides the legal postulates. Law is just one of the
+systems of the normative universe, which goes beyond it, although there are those who say that others are pre-existing
+to it, such as religion, courtesy and morals. Considering that the law is not an end in itself, its purpose is to solve the
+problems of the society in which it operates. Consequently, normative validity is confused with the efficiency and
+effectiveness of the norm. Within the framework of the reform, it is important to methodically rethink the process of
+designing and drawing up standards.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+ACKERMAN, F; HEINZERLING, L. Priceless: on knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing.
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+Trans. Jefferson Luiz Camargo. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003.
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+depts/comminfo/cambridge/ancients.html>
+
+FERREIRA, Jussara Suzi Assis Borges Nasser. The Ethical Intelligence of Legal Methodologies. In Argumentum __ Law
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+PECI, A. Angolan regulatory reform of the 1990s in the light of Kleber Nascimento's model. Journal of Contemporary
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+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+122
+
+The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis:
+A Tribute to Theodore Eisenberg
+
+by
+
+Marcelo Nunes, Ivan Ribeiro, Pedro Roquim, and Julio Trecenti∗
+
+We consider what we call the Sheriff of Nottingham hypothesis: that the government
+of Brazil, which at the same time is party to litigated cases and the enforcer
+of tax laws, constantly enacts norms that seek to strengthen its side. We test this
+hypothesis and observe that litigants adapt to new proportions of decisions favoring
+tax authorities, with more sophisticated litigants seizing profits beyond those
+of ordinary citizens. Our proposal is that this dynamic adaptation takes considerable
+time; therefore, it is possible to detect the effect of changes in the law, despite
+the selection effect explored by, among others, Theodore Eisenberg. (JEL: C34,
+K34, K41)
+
+1 Introduction
+
+Decisions in judicial cases are examined in a wide range of fields, from law to economics
+to political science. Researchers look for evidence to corroborate hypotheses
+on social phenomena, for example, to underscore claims of racial or gender discrimination
+in the workplace, to examine the judicialization of politics, and to evaluate
+other hypotheses. Judicial decision-making can be also a fertile ground to examine
+the effects of legislative initiatives, so it can be employed to answer the question
+posed by this 32nd Seminar on New Institutional Economics – does the law deliver?
+Our proposal in this empirical article is to test the hypothesis that recent legislative
+initiatives in Brazil favor tax authorities. We call this proposal the Sheriff of
+Nottingham hypothesis. In the following subsections, we delineate this hypothesis
+
+∗ Marcelo Nunes: professor of law at the Pontifical Catholic University of São
+Paulo, president of the Brazilian Jurimetric Association (ABJ); Ivan Ribeiro (corresponding
+author): professor of quantitative methods at the Federal University of
+São Paulo, research coordinator at the ABJ; Pedro Roquim: tax lawyer and senior
+researcher at the Jurimetric Laboratory (J-Lab); Julio Trecenti: Master of Sciences
+(M.Sc.) candidate at the University of São Paulo, Department of Statistics, director of
+the J-Lab at the ABJ. Discussion paper prepared for the 32nd Seminar on the New
+Institutional Economics, Regensburg, June, 2014. The authors thank Christoph Engel,
+Jonah Gelbach (discussant), Daniel Ho, Geoffrey Miller, Peter Moffatt (discussant),
+Maya Sen, Gerhard Wagner, Martin Wells, and all the participants of the 32nd Seminar
+on the New Institutional Economics for their comments and suggestions, as well as
+Daniel Klerman and Alex Lee for sending and commenting on their related papers.
+
+Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 171, 122–140 – ISSN 0932-4569
+DOI: 10.1628/093245615X14188909230253 – © 2015 Mohr Siebeck
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+(2015) 123 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+precisely and examine the feasibility of an empirical test. We propose that the dynamic
+nature of the adjustment in the pool of litigated cases presents an opportunity
+for an empirical strategy, which is a claim that appears new in empirical works
+in the field. Previous versions of this work focused too much on the proportion
+of plaintiff-winning cases, showing how our empirical findings support a fifty–fifty
+proportion favoring each part. Although a relevant empirical finding, this proportion
+is not the most important finding in our paper, which concentrates on the evidence
+showing a dynamic adaptation of this proportion to new legal standards. In that
+matter, the level of this proportion is not so important as its change.1
+
+1.1 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+Brazil is affiliated with the civil-law tradition, where the law, rather than precedent,
+has a major influence on judicial decisions on litigated cases.2 This provides an
+opportunity to test for the effects of law by looking at judicial decisions. Discussions
+about taxes in such a setting are particularly interesting in that one of the litigants,
+the government (represented in these cases by the tax authorities), also has the power
+to enact rules to discipline judicial discussions in tax cases. Indeed, the executive
+branch, in Brazil, has a large ability to enact laws in comparison with other countries.
+It can enact rules relating to its regulatory powers, can start the legislative process
+of initiating a new law, and can even enact decrees that amount to new law under
+the rubric of medidas provisorias ´ . There is, for sure, the need to show urgency and
+relevance in these cases, but such requirements are seldom observed in practice.
+In the past, following the enactment of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, tax laws
+were usually poorly designed. Consequently, the country saw a huge increase in
+administrative and judicial tax litigation. As time passed, tax authorities resorted
+more and more to legislative initiatives to fix holes in tax regulations. Whereas in the
+past these reforms were aimed at mending poorly designed tax laws, today they may
+be looked on as an instrument for the government to have its way in imposing more
+and more taxes without regard for constitutional safeguards and taxpayer rights.
+As in the fable of the wolf and the lamb, the government could be resorting to
+excuses to justify questionable standards in tax laws. We named this explanation
+of the government’s behavior the Sheriff of Nottingham hypothesis (Ribeiro, 2006,
+pp. 23–61, referred to the Robin Hood story in a closely related work, examining the
+selection hypothesis and the possibility of favoring one party in judicial decisions).3
+
+1 We thank especially the discussants for our paper, Jonah Gelbach and Peter Moffatt,
+as well as Christoph Engel, for bringing this point to our attention. 2 There is a long tradition discussing the differences between the civil-law and
+common-law traditions; the most recent spurt of theoretical and empirical works in the
+field started with Djankov et al. (2003). For a recent account of this debate, see La
+Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 3 The name of the article and its main hypothesis were inspired by Glaeser,
+Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003), which first talked of a King John redistribution as
+opposed to a Robin Hood redistribution.
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+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+124 JITE 171 M. Nunes, I. Ribeiro, P. Roquim, and J. Trecenti
+
+The sheriff in several versions of the Robin Hood story is the greedy agent of Prince
+John, acting in questionable ways as his tax collector.
+
+1.2 The Validity of Inferences from Litigated Cases
+
+In this empirical article, we try to find evidence of this bias by examining judicial
+decisions in tax cases. We look for the influence of changes favorable to tax
+authorities in law on the proportion of taxpayers winning in litigated cases.
+However, for some 30 years now, the validity of inferences about the underlying
+population of disputes drawn from a sample of litigated cases has been called into
+question. The main claim, put forward by Priest and Klein (1984),4 is that people
+decide beforehand whether to file a suit when involved in a conflict, and they do so
+taking into account the chances they have to win, so we do not observe a random
+sample when examining cases that have gone to trial.
+The Priest–Klein model has been described countless times (citations of the
+paper are in the thousands)5 and has become a central paradigm in the quantitative
+analysis of law. Some authors even make the claim for a specific field of quantitative
+research in law, called jurimetrics, in the consequences of the selection-of-disputes
+hypothesis.6 Donohue III (1988, p. 911) criticizes law-and-society scholars for
+not accounting for their predictions (“just as theoretical work without empirical
+verification is of little value, empirical work not guided by an intelligent theoretical
+framework can be fruitless”).
+The main hypothesis of the model is that one would observe a proportion of
+decisions favoring each party – plaintiffs and defendants – in litigated cases that
+does not reflect the real proportion for the whole population of potential claims.
+The model also states as a hypothesis that, under reasonable assumptions, one
+would observe a fifty–fifty proportion of decisions favoring each party – plaintiffs
+and defendants – in litigated cases. Partisans of asymmetric-information models of
+litigation called into question the validity of that hypothesis; among those we can
+mention Shavell (1996). Although our empirical findings show a trend towards this
+equilibrium, the fifty–fifty proportion of taxpayers’ winning in litigated cases is not
+central for our empirical strategy. As one can see from the development in the next
+sections, our empirical strategy relies in the change in this proportion, and not in its
+
+4 The paper states the selection hypothesis clearly and gives several examples
+where the rule applies, but there are also some forerunners. Tollison (ed.) (1980) presented
+an intuitive version of the rule, and Danzon and Lillard (1983) also stressed the
+selection effects.
+5 A quick search (done on April 16, 2014) in Google Scholar points to more than
+2,000 citations of the paper. 6 See, for example, Ribeiro (1998), stating that “the analysis of judicial decisions in
+such form wouldn’t be, when taking into account the Priest and Klein hypothesis, an
+easy task in the narrow framework of econometric analysis. This is why there would
+be the need for a specific field for quantitative analysis in law, which I call jurimetrics”
+(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477006).
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+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+(2015) 125 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+level.
+7 To understand this fifty–fifty result, let us look briefly at the model and its
+main assumptions.8
+A party involved in an everyday conflict, and that finds itself in a position to
+seek reparation for some sort of damage, must decide if it will go to court to
+demand what it thinks is appropriate. Before going to court, this party must weigh
+the possible gains and costs of doing so, confronting those with any extrajudicial
+settlement the other party is willing to offer. The chances in a judicial case can be
+assessed by comparing the quality of the case with the standard courts use to grant
+victory in a trial. The quality can be seen as a compound of the evidence, precedents
+or legislation favoring the plaintiff, conditions to support the litigation, and other
+aspects. The underlying quality of filed cases has, as an assumption of the model,
+a standard normal distribution.
+Let us denote by D the decision standard that must be met by the plaintiff for
+the judge to concede whatever is claimed. Every case that meets or exceeds this
+standard D will be awarded a favorable decision, whereas those that find themselves
+below this standard will not. Plaintiffs and defendants, while negotiating on any
+possible settlement before going to court, form unbiased estimates of the quality
+of the case. Let us call this imperfect (although, once more, unbiased) estimate Y
+.
+Therefore, the assessment of the quality of the case formed by each part can be
+expressed as Y + εY
+p for the plaintiff and Y + εY
+d for the defendant. The errors in both
+estimates are drawn from independent normal distributions with equal variances,9,10
+and the subscripts stand for plaintiff (p) and defendant (d).
+The plaintiff will settle and refrain from bringing the case if his or her demand
+is less than the defendant’s offer. In this calculation the plaintiff will consider his
+or her expected profit from the settlement (i.e., the probability Pp of victory times
+the amount J to be awarded in the case he or she wins the case), the cost Cp
+of litigating, and the cost Sp of the settlement, which can be expressed in the form
+Pp J − Cp + Sp. Likewise, the defendant will offer Pd J + Cd − Sd . Suppose the costs,
+both for litigation and settlement, are the same for the plaintiff and the defendant,
+and the stakes at the trial are also the same.11 Priest and Klein then claim that cases
+
+7 We thank Christoph Engel for bringing this argument to our attention. 8 The discussion here follows closely Waldfogel (1993). 9 Waldfogel departs slightly from Priest and Klein’s notation by allowing uncertainty
+to derive both from the variation in the standard decision Y and from the errors
+in estimating the quality of the case by each party. This distinction is not so important
+for the cursory discussion in our paper. See Waldfogel (1993). 10 The requirement of equal variances is relaxed in asymmetric-information
+models, resulting in a different, but stable, proportion of winning rates. In this case
+the proportion would be favorable to the party that has a more accurate evaluation of
+the quality of case. 11 Different stakes in the case, for example flowing for reputation aspects, also
+change the proportion. Parties that lose more from an unfavorable decision would
+bring only stronger cases to trial, and as a result would have a higher proportion of decisions
+in their favor.
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+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
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+126 JITE 171 M. Nunes, I. Ribeiro, P. Roquim, and J. Trecenti
+
+go to trial when the difference between the evaluations of the quality of the case is
+greater than the cost of going to trial, that is, if Pp − Pd > (C − S)/J.
+12
+
+With that structure, one can see that cases will go to trial only if there is a substantial
+disagreement over the probability of plaintiff victory. Cases further away
+of the standard D will be settled, and only cases with quality around the decision
+standard will be tried. This yields a filter resulting in a plaintiff victory rate of 50%,
+regardless of the proportion of possible winning cases among the population of
+conflicts. An increase in the uncertainty about the court standard or the reduction in
+litigation costs will entail an increase in litigated cases, bringing the proportion of
+plaintiff victories close to the value observed in the population.
+The model could explain even a proportion favoring one party when, in reality,
+there is a strong bias against that very same party. Suppose a party is disfavored by
+judges, so there is a bias against him or her. For example, judges could grant more
+decisions against large corporations in tort cases, or they could discriminate against
+gender or race. If they know about this bias beforehand, the disfavored parties will
+settle more often, bringing to court only strong cases. The decision not to bring the
+case would then stem from the violation of some of the assumptions in the model.
+For example, the disfavored party could have a higher stake in the case, perhaps on
+account of reputational effects. At the end, because they bring only strong cases for
+trial, the plaintiffs’ proportion of victory could fall below the predicted fifty–fifty
+value; the odds for the entire population of conflicts would still be in the plaintiff’s
+favor.
+More than the proposed winning proportion of 50%, what this modeling tells
+us is that one cannot draw any inferences about the underlying conflicts from the
+litigated cases, as these are not a random sample of the conflicts. However, a recent
+examination of Priest and Klein’s hypothesis shows that the fifty–fifty proportion is
+still valid under a wide variety of conditions and that one must be very careful in
+explaining departures from this ratio in empirical data.
+
+1.3 The Static Nature of Priest and Klein’s Model
+
+One aspect of the Priest–Klein model that we will address extensively in this paper
+is its static nature. The supposition in most of these studies is that the relationship
+between filed cases and the underlying population of disputes does not change
+over time. For sure, there is a selection effect in these models, and litigated cases
+are not a simple random sample of conflicts. However, this finding does not mean
+that the proportion of litigated cases (whether higher or lower than the observed
+characteristics of the population) in these models would change over time.
+A careful reading of these studies would show that there is an assumption that
+this proportion does not vary over time. Several studies, however, depart from
+
+12 Priest and Klein assume that the proportion of the costs, (C − S)/J, is 0.33 on
+the basis of the lawyers’ contingency fees, in order to close the model. Such assumptions
+are not so important for the discussion here, and we will spare the reader further
+arguments.
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+(2015) 127 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+this assumption, as we see in Henderson and Eisenberg (1990), Donohue III and
+Siegelman (1991), Eisenberg and Henderson (1992), and Siegelman and Donohue
+III (1995). We address the dynamic aspects of case selection in this research, and
+propose a structure for the selection mechanism that allows us to test for the effects
+of law on judicial decision-making.
+Siegelman and Donohue III (1995) show that the selection effect does not dominate
+completely, so we can still observe some effects of the change in the legal
+standard on the results in litigated cases. Klerman and Lee (2014, p. 5), by using
+a model that takes account of information asymmetry between litigants, assure us
+that “plaintiff trial win rates can provide useful information about the law, decisionmakers,
+and legal decisionmaking.” The suggestion in those cases, however, is that
+selection does not operate alone, so one can still see some of the effects of changes in
+law, in the decision-makers, or in the legal decision-making process in litigated cases.
+Our contention is that information about the proportion of winning cases takes
+time to spread. This violates several of the suppositions in those models. As stated
+by Klerman and Lee (2014, p. 5, emphasis added), “changes in legal rules, decisionmakers,
+or case characteristics will produce predictable changes in the percentage
+of plaintiff trial victories only holding other factors equal. If other factors change
+– such as the distribution and characteristics of the underlying disputes, levels of
+uncertainty, the asymmetry of the stakes, and the distribution of information – then
+the effect of shifting the legal standard on the percentage of plaintiff victories may
+well be swamped by the effects of these other factors.”
+
+2 Eisenberg’s Work
+
+Professor Theodore Eisenberg has made several theoretical and empirical contributions
+to the discussions on Priest and Klein’s hypothesis. On the theoretical side, for
+example, he proposed that variation in costs to litigate will entail differences in the
+trial rate (the proportion of filed cases that are tried to a verdict) and in the plaintiff
+win rate (Eisenberg and Farber, 1997). The extent of his contribution, however, is
+magnified by his empirical pieces, amounting to dozens of important and influential
+articles.
+For example, Eisenberg (1989) tests more than 57,000 trials between 1978 and
+1985 and shows that only in 16 out of 72 subject-matter categories are plaintiff
+success rates between 0.45 and 0.55, but he proposes that this may be the result of
+the poor quality of the cases selected for trial.13 Eisenberg (1990) notes how these
+proportions vary among subject classes and geographic areas, suggesting that the
+work of Priest and Klein, although presenting a good baseline analytical tool, must
+be extended to account for these disparities. Eisenberg and Henderson (1992, 1993)
+propose that there was a reversal in the pro-plaintiff bias in tort cases in both state
+courts and federal district court cases on product liability.
+
+13 His contribution on federal civil rights and prisoner cases includes several research
+pieces; see Eisenberg and Schwab (1989, 1987), Schwab and Eisenberg (1988).
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+128 JITE 171 M. Nunes, I. Ribeiro, P. Roquim, and J. Trecenti
+
+All of this empirical experience explains the enthusiasm Professor Eisenberg
+showed for the pioneering massive data collection and quantitative analyses undertaken
+in Brazil by the Brazilian Jurimetric Association. Although one of the authors
+of this work began dealing with the selection effect a long time ago,14 to this day
+legal and economic scholars in the country try to make inferences from litigated
+cases, for example by pointing out the fifty–fifty proportion of cases won by each
+party in several empirical studies (dealing with labor cases, civil litigation, credit
+cases, and others) as definitive proof that the country has a fair and unbiased judicial
+system.
+In addition to its theoretical and empirical findings, this study aims to honor
+Professor Eisenberg’s memory and to draw once more the attention of law academics
+to the selection of case hypotheses, taking into account very recent development in
+the discussion.
+
+3 Tax Laws in Brazil
+
+The selection of disputes for the litigation framework will be employed to test
+the hypothesis of a bias favoring tax authorities in the administrative adjudication
+of tax cases. We proposed that a recent legislative initiative, which resulted in the
+replacement of the previous Tax Payers Council by an Administrative Tax Appellate
+Court, worsened the situation, resulting in an even stronger bias. In this section, we
+present a brief overview of the evolution of tax laws and tax litigation in the country,
+clearly delineating the reasons that underscore the hypothesis of a pro-tax-authority
+bias. In the next sections, we present the empirical strategy we propose to identify
+these unintended effects of the law.
+In Brazil, discussions on tax issues begin within the administrative sphere by
+means of tax assessments, instruments through which tax authorities assess taxes
+that are considered due from the taxpayers. These tax assessments can be administratively
+questioned by taxpayers within administrative courts, which have existed
+in Brazil since the beginning of the 20th century. The importance attributed to these
+courts is related to their power of reviewing acts performed by administrative authorities
+– they can, for instance, discharge the amount initially considered to be
+due.
+As noted above, tax laws in Brazil were, for a long time, poorly designed, so tax
+authorities exerted regulatory powers to amend those flawed laws. We believe that
+this use of regulatory powers degenerated into continual changes in the rules of the
+game to favor the government.15
+
+14 See Ribeiro (1998) for an early acknowledgement of the effects of Priest and
+Klein in quantitative analysis of judicial decisions, also presented in Ribeiro (1998).
+Identification strategies to circumvent the selection effect can be found in Ribeiro
+(2006).
+15 There are several examples of such behavior, as in the case of the enactment of
+Law 10.637/02 and Law 10.883/03 to broaden the incidence of two contributions (PIS
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+(2015) 129 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+One of these changes, the creation of CARF, will be used in the empirical test of
+our Sheriff of Nottingham hypothesis. The purported reason for the replacement of
+the old court was the need to improve the court’s productivity. To this end, as spelled
+out in the justification of the law, there was a new allocation of jurisdiction for trial
+(based on types of taxes). Whereas before there were three taxpayer councils, each
+one in charge of a specific class of cases, these agencies are now combined in the
+CARF, the sole authority responsible for judging and deciding all administrative
+proceedings related to federal taxes.
+In addition to the reform in jurisdiction, tax courts were forbidden to deny the
+application of a given law under the justification of unconstitutionality. This is
+a major change, because former administrative courts had that power. In other
+words, they could declare a tax law unconstitutional even if no such opinion on that
+law had been issued by the Brazilian Supreme Court or any other judicial body.
+While in some countries this change would sound natural, it goes against tradition
+in constitutional control in Brazil. Brazil has a hybrid system, which combines
+centralized judgment of constitutionality by the Supreme Court with the diffused
+judgment exerted by other judicial bodies. The motive for the changes would be, in
+our hypothesis, more related to the desire to increase the odds in favor of the tax
+authorities’ success in tax discussions than to bring more rationality to the system.
+The examination of the intent of the law through litigated cases could be problematic,
+as we observed in the previous discussion of selection effects. We believe,
+however, that there is a simple empirical approach flowing from the dynamic nature
+of the adjustment to the Priest–Klein hypothesis. In the next section, we examine
+traditional approaches to selection problems, and discuss why the approach we
+propose would be an acceptable one.
+
+4 The Empirical Models
+
+Selection models are pervasive in applied social sciences and an intrinsic trait
+of human behavior. In the next subsections, we explore two approaches to the
+problem, the standard sample selection model and a simple treatment-effects model
+(section 4.1). This subsection literally reproduces Winship and Mare (1992), adding
+some few comments linking their modeling to our hypothesis. We move next to
+a dynamic examination of the problem to show how a simpler approach may suffice
+(section 4.2).
+
+4.1 Traditional Approaches
+
+To understand the sample selection bias, we need to look at the structure of selection
+(see Winship and Mare, 1992, pp. 329–332). First, we need to differentiate truncation
+from censoring. The former occurs when observations where the value of the
+
+and COFINS), and the enactment of Law 10.865/04, extending the incidence of two
+contributions (PIS/Pasep and COFINS) to the import of goods and services.
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+130 JITE 171 M. Nunes, I. Ribeiro, P. Roquim, and J. Trecenti
+
+dependent variable is beyond a certain threshold are excluded. Consequently, for any
+value of the independent variable, observations with large positive errors are eliminated
+from the sample, thus causing negative correlation between the independent
+variable and the error term.
+Unlike truncation with explicit selection (that is, the exclusion of all observations
+where the dependent variable exceeds a threshold), censoring occurs when these
+observations are included, but all we know about them is the value of the independent
+variable and that the dependent variable is above a given threshold. If, for example,
+we code the dependent variable in those observations as being equal to the threshold,
+OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent.
+The selection, for both the truncated and the censored sample, could be incidental,
+which means that truncation or censoring is a stochastic function of the dependent
+variable. In the classical example of labor economics, where we are interested in the
+earnings of female workers, the chance that the wage is not observed is a function of
+some covariates and the expected wage itself. If the prospective wage is low enough,
+some female workers may decide not to take a job, so making the observation of
+their wages impossible.
+When we are trying to assess the chances plaintiffs have of winning when filing
+a case, we face a similar problem. We just observe the result for those cases where
+the plaintiff decided to bring a case, which ultimately would be a function of the
+chance of winning itself. Cases with a low chance of winning would not be brought
+to court, because plaintiffs anticipate they will lose in addition to having to bear
+litigation costs. When the chances are high, we would not observe the case either,
+because this time, the defendant would settle to avoid the extra costs of litigating
+the case. This can be represented as a tobit model:16
+
+Y∗ (1) 1i = Xiβ + εi ,
+
+Y1i =
+Y∗1i
+if Y∗
+1i > 0 ,
+0 if Y∗
+1i ≤ 0 , (2)
+
+where Y∗
+1i is an unobserved continuous latent variable (for example, the chance of
+winning a case), Y1i is the observed variable (the actual result, either winning or
+losing the case), Xi is a vector of values of the independent variables, β is a vector
+of coefficients, and εi is the error term. The assumptions of the model are that the
+error term εi is uncorrelated with the independent variables Xi and that they are
+independent and identically distributed (iid). The threshold in (2) can be changed in
+order to accommodate any other real situation, rendering the model quite flexible.
+Estimates of (1) using the OLS approach are subject to selection bias, in that for
+observations where Y1i > 0 the model implies that
+
+Y1i = Xiβ + E[εi|Y∗
+1i > 0] + ηi
+= Xiβ + E[εi (3) |εi > −Xiβ] + ηi ,
+
+16 The discussions in this and the next sections can be found in Winship and Mare
+(1992, pp. 335ff.) and Maddala (1986).
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+(2015) 131 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+where ηi is the difference between εi and E[εi|Y1i > 0] and is uncorrelated with both
+terms. The selection bias occurs because E[εi|εi > −Xiβ] in (3) is a function of
+−Xiβ. The tobit model has been used in a variety of situations, but what we propose
+in this work is that the Priest–Klein model is of a different nature, akin to a standard
+sample selection model.
+We will develop this rationale further ahead, but our proposition is that there is
+a second variable that affects whether the dependent variable is observed. Our claim,
+to be substantiated with empirical evidence, is that it is not only the present chance
+of winning that affects this chance, but also that past patterns of perceived chance
+are influential. For now, just consider that there is a second variable Y∗
+2i that affects
+whether Y1i is observed or not, so the previous model becomes
+
+Y∗
+1i = Xiβ + εi ,
+
+Y1i =
+Y∗1i
+if Y∗
+2i > 0 ,
+0 if Y∗
+2i ≤ 0 .
+
+In the most usual form Y∗
+2i is determined by a binary regression model as
+
+Y∗
+2i = Ziα + νi ,
+
+Y2i =
+1
+if Y∗
+2i > 0 ,
+0 if Y∗
+2i ≤ 0 , (4)
+
+where Y∗
+2i is a latent continuous variable. If, as in our case, Y1i is a dichotomous
+variable, and εi and νi follow a bivariate normal distribution, then we have a bivariate
+probit selection model. Similarly to the previous case, the OLS estimators here are
+subject to selection bias. To see this, note that when Y∗
+2i > 0, it follows that
+
+Y1i = Xiβ + E[εi|Y∗
+2i > 0] + ηi
+= Xiβ + E[εi|νi − Ziα > 0] + ηi ,
+
+and that the OLS regression of Y1i on Xi is biased and inconsistent if εi is correlated
+with νi + Ziα, which will occur if the error term εi is correlated with either νi or Zi.
+An alternative view of the problem would consider the selection as similar to the
+estimation of treatment effects in the case of nonrandom assignment. In this case,
+the trial amounts to the treatment, and plaintiff decides whether or not to submit
+a case to trial, taking into account the chances of winning. We are looking, with
+this approach, for the effect of a dichotomous variable Y2 (if the case was tried)
+on a continuous variable Y1, the chance of winning the case. The equation below
+expresses this case:
+
+(5) Y1i = Xiβ + Y2iγ + εi ,
+
+where the treatment effects are expressed by γ . Were the assignment to the treatment
+to be random, the equation (5) estimated by OLS would be consistent. However,
+when the assignment to the treatment Y2i is a function of the error term εi , there is
+an endogeneity problem, to be solved with instrumental-variable methods if there
+are good instruments for Y2i .
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+132 JITE 171 M. Nunes, I. Ribeiro, P. Roquim, and J. Trecenti
+
+The problem with this estimation in our research is that we do not observe all
+occurrences of Y2i in (4), so we are unable to estimate the selection model properly.
+To contrast our case with a similar study where it is possible to estimate the selection
+model, consider Ichino, Polo, and Rettore (2003). They examine the selection effects
+in labor cases in Italy, looking at the firing of workers for misconduct. Unlike our
+case, they can observe all the steps in the selection, as described below:
+
+(i) Reports of misconduct are brought to the management staff, which must decide
+either to notify the worker or not.
+(ii) After notifying the worker, management decides about the firing, taking into
+account the seriousness of the violation and weighing the chances that the
+worker may appeal to labor courts to reverse the dismissal.
+(iii) After being fired, the worker must decide whether to file a case or not.
+(iv) Conditional on the filing of the case, we can observe a decision either granting
+reversal to plaintiff or maintaining dismissal.
+
+The faithful registering of all reports of misconduct, notifications to the worker,
+cases where the company decided to fire the worker, and, finally, the few cases where
+the fired worker decided to file a case allows the researchers to easily calculate the
+Heckman estimator. As we can see from the description of the data in section 5, we
+are unable to employ the same approach. We also would experience some problems
+in using the instrumental variables (IV) approach suggested before, applying the
+estimation of treatment effects to the case, because there is no observable instrument
+for the first phase of estimation.
+
+4.2 The Dynamic Selection of Cases
+
+The Priest–Klein model has a static nature, expressed in the assumptions the authors
+make. First, the selection of disputes for litigation is framed as a one-shot game,
+where each party decides right away whether to settle or go to court. Moreover,
+to do so each party only evaluates the judicial standard and the quality of the
+case at hand, with a minor role for previous experiences and other sources of
+information. The fifty–fifty rule also implies not only that the decision to litigate is
+endogenous, but also that it is simultaneous; therefore, we always see such cases in
+equilibrium. We suggest that this may not take proper account of the dynamics of
+litigation.
+Parties learn from previous litigations, even if they are not involved in them, and
+adapt to this new information with some delay. The fraction of winning plaintiffs in
+previous litigations influences the decisions and ultimately the volume of litigated
+cases in subsequent periods. If this fraction becomes more favorable to plaintiffs,
+more cases will be brought to the courts, and the expected quality of these new cases
+will be lower than the quality of those already in the pool of litigated cases. The
+result is that in the next period the fraction of winning plaintiffs will drop.
+The reverse also can happen. If the fraction of winning plaintiffs becomes less
+favorable, then in subsequent periods potential plaintiffs with lower-quality cases
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+(2015) 133 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+Figure 1
+Winning Rates of the Taxpayer over Time, when the Plaintiff Is
+the Taxpayer or the Government
+
+Notes: Error bars show 95% confidence interval considering conservative variance of the
+proportion. Numbers on top show the total numbers of cases for each year.
+
+will refrain from bringing their cases. This will increase the quality in the pool
+of litigated cases in the next period, thereby increasing the fraction of winning
+plaintiffs. Once an equilibrium is reached, we will observe the relative stability of
+the plaintiffs’ winning proportion that Priest and Klein suggest.
+Our Sheriff of Nottingham hypothesis fits nicely into the test of our empirical
+suggestion. Because tax authorities overuse their normative powers to increase
+tax collections, we should observe several shifts in the legal standard observed in
+litigated cases. Plaintiffs would respond to these shifts by seeking new adjustments,
+so the expected behavior of this proportion would be a sinusoidal one converging to
+the natural portion of decisions favoring each party.
+What we see in the empirical works mentioned here is that they usually report
+the total number of litigated cases. We suggest that disaggregating these data over
+time would allow us to see a pattern showing the proportion of winning plaintiffs
+evolving around 0.50 (or any other natural fraction of winning cases, given the
+differences in stakes and in variances).
+Figure 1 shows the disaggregated data for litigated cases at the Administrative
+Tax Appellate Court, showing the proportion approaching the equilibrium 0.50. We
+also note that when the government brings an appeal, the proportion of decisions
+favoring taxpayers is greater than when taxpayers do (see the evolution around the
+90th percentile in the graph). This result is most likely due to a rule requiring the
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+134 JITE 171 M. Nunes, I. Ribeiro, P. Roquim, and J. Trecenti
+
+tax authorities to appeal in cases involving amounts above 1 million reais.17 This
+rule violates Priest and Klein’s basic assumption, that both parties should decide
+whether to litigate.18
+If there is a delayed effect of the proportion of plaintiffs’ victories in one period
+on that in the next, any disturbance that changes this proportion should be noticeable
+in the first period, being diluted in subsequent periods until the fifty–fifty (or some
+other) equilibrium is reestablished. For example, a change in the judicial standard
+against which the case is compared or any sort of institutional change that biases
+the judges in favor of one of the parties could be detected in subsequent periods,
+with no need for one of the selection models discussed previously.
+
+5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
+
+5.1 Data Collection
+
+We collected the data directly from the Administrative Tax Appellate Court website,
+using web scraping techniques. We downloaded all the decisions for each year,
+generating a single HTML file for each one. We then parsed those files to obtain
+semistructured data, assembling a file with the following variables:
+
+(i) Case id
+(ii) Name of litigant (taxpayer)
+(iii) Date of the Council session that decided the case
+(iv) Rapporteur name
+(v) Decision id
+(vi) Text of the decision
+(vii) Summary of the decision (usually contains the text of the decision and specifies
+the taxes discussed).
+
+In the next stage, we undertook the data cleaning, eliminating duplicate results
+and those without any information. After that, we obtained all the other variables
+(main taxes, final result, type of decision, etc.) by searching for keywords and regular
+expressions in the decisions’ summary and text. Finally, we filtered the data on the
+population in the study, retaining decisions that were specified without ambiguity,
+and occurred between 1999 and 2011. The final database contains 69,865 decisions.
+
+5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Dynamic Assumptions
+
+The dynamic we suggest in section 4.2 can be observed in descriptive statistics.
+Figure 2, depicting the fraction of winning plaintiffs each year and quarter and
+the volume of new cases in the next period, shows a relation between these two
+
+17 Brazilian currency. This amount is worth around U.S. $430,000. 18 However, as noted previously, part of the literature claims that any proportion is
+possible, and the value 0.50 should be observed only when the variance of the subjective
+evaluations of the quality of cases goes to zero.
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+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+(2015) 135 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+Figure 2
+Number of New Cases for Each Quarter and Fraction of Wins for the Taxpayer
+
+Notes: The points are identified by year and quarter.
+
+variables. The calculated correlation coefficient for these two variables is 43.21%
+(p = 0.025).
+As the number of cases in the study is high, we consider many levels of the
+explanatory variables:
+
+(i) carf : the explanatory variable of interest. It indicates whether the case was
+judged in 2009, i.e., whether it considers CARF changes.
+(ii) main tax: the tax issue under discussion, either referring to only one tax or
+to a frequently litigated group of taxes, among the following options: IRPF;
+PIS; IRF; CSL; ITR; COFINS; FINSOCIAL; IPI; IRPJ; SIMPLES; PIS and
+COFINS; CSL and IRPJ; IPI and IRPF; IPI and ITR; PIS, COFINS, CSL and
+IRPJ; and other combinations that correspond to few observations.
+(iii) year: year of the decision.
+(iv) Original state or region: indicates the state (27 levels) or region (5 levels) of
+the first level instance of the case.
+
+Table 1 shows the proportion of cases favoring taxpayers grouped by the tax under
+discussion.
+We can test whether this equilibrium mechanism operates recurring to some
+conjectures. For example, we expect that if plaintiffs learn from previous decisions,
+a more rational litigant would follow more closely the 50% line, especially when the
+prospects for the case are low. If we could separate these more sophisticated litigants
+from the pool of litigants, we would expect that they would be closer to the 50%
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+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+136 JITE 171 M. Nunes, I. Ribeiro, P. Roquim, and J. Trecenti
+
+Table 1
+Proportion of Cases in Favor of the Taxpayer by Type of Plaintiff and Main Taxes
+
+Taxpayer is plaintiff Main taxes Cases Victories %
+
+COFINS 176 157 89.20
+CSL 169 154 91.12
+CSL IRPJ 164 143 87.20
+FINSOCIAL 35 35 100.00
+IPI 243 219 90.12
+IPI IRPF 5 3 60.00
+IPI ITR 3 3 100.00
+IRF 61 57 93.44
+No IRPF 102 98 96.08
+IRPJ 636 588 92.45
+ITR 75 63 84.00
+NA 1,175 1,063 90.47
+Outros 513 429 83.63
+PIS 130 115 88.46
+PIS COFINS 10 9 90.00
+PIS COFINS CSL IRPJ 55 42 76.36
+SIMPLES 22 21 95.45
+
+COFINS 2,313 619 26.76
+CSL 2,336 1,122 48.03
+CSL IRPJ 1,242 627 50.48
+FINSOCIAL 2,057 1,502 73.02
+IPI 4,413 1,583 35.87
+IPI IRPF 646 319 49.38
+IPI ITR 537 239 44.51
+IRF 814 416 51.11
+Yes IRPF 8,923 4,602 51.57
+IRPJ 4,067 1,914 47.06
+ITR 4,455 1,994 44.76
+NA 17,960 7,600 42.32
+Outros 7,652 4,033 52.71
+PIS 4,077 2,351 57.66
+PIS COFINS 837 331 39.55
+PIS COFINS CSL IRPJ 515 244 47.38
+SIMPLES 3,447 1,560 45.26
+
+Total 69,865 34,255 49.03
+
+line in the years where litigants were disfavored and that they would be well above
+in the years where litigants are favored. A possible guess is that limited-liability
+companies could target these sophisticated litigants (leaving for the other group
+public companies, nonprofit organizations, personal litigants, etc.), so we would
+expect an asymmetric pattern for the winning rate. Figure 3 depicts these ratios for
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+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+(2015) 137 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+Figure 3
+Winning Rates for Taxpayer Plaintiffs over Time, whether the Taxpayer Is
+a Limited Company or Not
+
+Notes: The numbers are the total numbers of cases for each year. This plot does not show
+results when the plaintiff is the government.
+
+limited-liability companies, and we do see such an asymmetric pattern, with the
+ratio closer to the 50% line when it is below 50% and further from the 50% line
+when it is above 50%.
+
+6 Results and Discussion
+
+Table 2 shows that CARF dummy is strongly associated with a reduction in the
+proportion of decisions favoring plaintiffs, a reduction approximately 10% in our
+three preferred specifications. In addition to the dummy variable trying to capture
+the effect of the creation of CARF, the first column has a year trend and controls
+for those situations where the taxpayer decided to appeal (so the taxpayer is the
+plaintiff). In all specifications we control for the main tax under discussion (see
+in Table 1 how the winning proportion varies strongly with this variable), and for
+the sake of brevity we present a χ2 statistic of joint significance for the estimated
+coefficients.
+Figure 1 supports our empirical strategy, as we can see plaintiffs’ winning fraction
+constantly approaching the fifty–fifty proportion equilibrium, evolving around 50%
+in a sinusoidal pattern. The intense regulatory activity of tax authorities, aimed at
+increasing the government’s gains in those discussions, constantly displaces this
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+138 JITE 171 M. Nunes, I. Ribeiro, P. Roquim, and J. Trecenti
+
+Table 2
+Regression Results
+
+Dependent Variable:
+
+Taxpayer wins
+(1) (2) (3)
+
+carf −0.097∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗
+(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
+plaintiff is taxpayer −2.321∗∗∗ −2.303∗∗∗ −2.308∗∗∗
+(0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
+year −0.023∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
+(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
+northeast region −0.007
+(0.034)
+north region 0.048
+(0.047)
+southeast region −0.002
+(0.029)
+south region −0.188∗∗∗
+(0.032)
+
+state# 316.820∗∗∗
+(26)
+main tax# 1,603.992∗∗∗ 1,573.003∗∗∗ 1,551.721∗∗∗
+(16) (16) (16)
+constant 48.370∗∗∗ 49.094∗∗∗ 50.282∗∗∗
+(4.448) (4.458) (4.495)
+
+Observations 69,865 69,865 69,865
+Log likelihood −46,078.650 −46,030.040 −45,920.240
+Akaike inf. crit. 92,197.300 92,108.080 91,932.480
+
+Notes: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. # Individual results on main tax and states
+omitted due to the high number of levels. Deviations and number of degrees of freedom are
+shown for χ2 statistic testing all levels at once.
+
+equilibrium toward a pro-government legal standard. We also note that most of the
+time this ratio stands slightly below 50%, which is compatible with two caveats
+urged by the asymmetric-information literature.
+First, tax authorities have a larger stake in those cases, as precedents could
+undermine their strategy to increase tax revenues. The government here would avoid
+litigation, on the one hand bringing only strong cases to CARF, and on the other
+hand working on legislative changes to strengthen its position. This also explains
+why the time trend is negative and significant in all specifications in Table 2. Our
+suggestion, to be further tested, is that the annual reduction of approximately 2.5%
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+(2015) 139 The Sheriff of Nottingham Hypothesis
+
+in the chances plaintiffs have of winning flow from this legislative strategy employed
+by the tax authorities.
+The second explanation for the slight departure from the 50% rule is the difference
+in variance when parties are assessing the quality of cases. Figure 3 shows how less
+sophisticated parties, which would experience difficulty in attempting to assess this
+quality, have a lower winning fraction (performance of LLC companies compared
+with other litigants). Limited-liability companies are a very popular organizational
+form in the country, usually chosen by small businesses. On the other hand, public
+companies are usually more sophisticated, as are natural persons who decide to
+bring their litigations to the CARF.19 We can see from the graph how the winning
+fraction is far lower for LLCs.
+Finally, while our empirical strategy seems to work as a test of the direction of
+the effects, the degree to which the same strategy could show the magnitude of
+those effects is less certain. To have an estimate of this magnitude we need to have
+a better understanding of the dynamics of the Priest–Klein filter to estimate how
+long it takes the selection to fully operate. We think this subject warrants attention
+and further development in future research.
+
+References
+
+Danzon, P. M., and L. A. Lillard (1983), “Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical
+Malpractice Claims,” The Journal of Legal Studies, 12(2), 345–377.
+Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2003), “Courts,” The Quarterly
+Journal of Economics, 118(2), 453–517.
+Donohue III, J. J. (1988), “Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken,” Law & Society Review,
+22(5), 903–926.
+— and P. Siegelman (1991), “The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation,”
+Stanford Law Review, 43(5), 983–1033.
+Eisenberg, T. (1989), “Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner
+Cases,” The Georgetown Law Journal, 77(4), 1567–1602.
+— (1990), “Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical
+Tests,” The Journal of Legal Studies, 19(2), 337–358.
+— and H. S. Farber (1997), “The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution,”
+The RAND Journal of Economics, 28(0), S92–S112.
+— and J. A. Henderson, Jr. (1992), “Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability,” UCLA
+Law Review, 39(4), 731–810.
+— and — (1993), “Products Liability Cases on Appeal: An Empirical Study,” The Justice
+System Journal, 16(2), 117–138.
+— and S. Schwab (1987), “The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,”Cornell Law Review,
+72(4), 641–695.
+— and S. J. Schwab (1989), “What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System?” The
+University of Chicago Law Review, 56(2), 501–539.
+
+19 A natural person who decides to litigate at CARF is usually a very wealthy person,
+and most of the time is discussing income taxes. Limited-liability companies in
+most cases are facing credit constraints and may resort to such appeals, which may
+be fairly expensive because of the interest charged by tax authorities, just to postpone
+taxes. They are usually very small companies.
+Delivered by Ingenta
+
+Chinese University of Hong Kong 5.8.37.13 Sun, 12 Jun 2016 13:52:08
+Copyright Mohr Siebeck
+
+140 JITE 171 M. Nunes, I. Ribeiro, P. Roquim, and J. Trecenti
+
+Glaeser, E., J. Scheinkman, and A. Shleifer (2003), “The Injustice of Inequality,” Journal of
+Monetary Economics, 50(1), 199–222.
+Henderson, Jr., J. A., and T. Eisenberg (1990), “The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:
+An Empirical Study of Legal Change,” UCLA Law Review, 37(3), 479–553.
+Ichino, A., M. Polo, and E. Rettore (2003), “Are Judges Biased by Labor Market Conditions?”
+European Economic Review, 47(5), 913–944.
+Klerman, D. M., and Y.-H. A. Lee (2014), “Inferences from Litigated Cases,” University of
+Southern California Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-14.
+La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2008), “The Economic Consequences of
+Legal Origins,” Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2), 285–332.
+Maddala, G. S. (1986), Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cambridge
+University Press, Cambridge.
+Priest, G. L., and B. Klein (1984), “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,” The Journal of
+Legal Studies, 13(1), 1–55.
+Ribeiro, I. (1998), “The Forecast for Expenditures in Judicial Claims and the Jurimetric
+Approach,” unpublished Manuscript, University of São Paulo, São Paulo.
+Ribeiro, I. C. (2006), “Robin Hood versus King John: Como os Ju´ızes Locais Decidem
+Casos no Brasil?” (“Robin Hood vs. King John Redistribution: How do
+Local Judges Decide Cases in Brazil?”), IPEA Prize, English version available at
+http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=938174.
+Schwab, S. J., and T. Eisenberg (1988), “Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The
+Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant,” Cornell Law
+Review, 73(4), 719–784.
+Shavell, S. (1996), “Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible,” The Journal of
+Legal Studies, 25(2), 493–501.
+Siegelman, P., and J. J. Donohue III (1995), “The Selection of Employment Discrimination
+Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis,”
+The Journal of Legal Studies, 24(2), 427–462.
+Tollison (ed.), R. D. (1980), The Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal Paper by William
+Baxter, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington (MA).
+Waldfogel, J. (1993), “The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff
+Victory,” Working Paper 4508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge
+(MA).
+Winship, C., and R. D. Mare (1992), “Models for Sample Selection Bias,” Annual Review of
+Sociology, 18, 327–350.
+
+Marcelo Guedes Nunes
+Guedes Nunes, Oliveira e Roquim –
+Sociedade de Advogados
+Rua Leopoldo Couto de Magalhães Jr.
+146, 7o, 11o e 12o andares,
+04542-000 São Paulo - SP
+Brazil
+mnunes@abjur.org.br
+
+Ivan Ribeiro
+Federal University of São Paulo
+Rua Domingos de Morais,
+236, ap. 62, CEP
+04010-000 São Paulo - SP
+Brazil
+iribeiro@abjur.org.br
+
+Pedro Roquim
+São Francisco Law School
+University of São Paulo
+Rua Leopoldo Couto de Magalhães Jr.
+146, 7o, 11o e 12o andares,
+04542-000 São Paulo - SP
+Brazil
+proquim@abjur.org.br
+
+Julio Trecenti
+Institute of Mathematics and Statistics
+University of São Paulo
+Rua Leopoldo Couto de Magalhães Jr.
+146, 11o andar,
+04542-000 São Paulo - SP
+Brazil
+jtrecenti@abjur.org.br
\ No newline at end of file
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+January 13, 2013, 7:35 am
+
+DIAGNOSIS AND SOLUTION
+
+The act of legislating involves a large expenditure of economic and human resources
+by legislative houses, the academic community and civil society. Once enacted, the
+
+new law still requires an additional effort from the Judiciary and law enforcers, in
+its interpretation and application. In order not to be wasted, these efforts must be
+based on investigations of the concrete and current legal reality, in order to guarantee
+
+that new legal regimes meet the desires of the population and the real conflicts
+that are daily referred to our courts.
+
+By Marcelo G. Nunes and Guilherme SJ Pereira
+
+Using jurimetrics can improve the quality of laws
+
+No matter how careful one is when drafting a law, it will always contain a space of
+freedom that must be filled in at the time of its fulfillment. Empirical studies of
+law, therefore, assume a role of great relevance, as they allow us to know how
+
+citizens and judges behave in the face of an existing law and how they are likely to
+behave in the face of a new law. This type of investigation is an important tool that
+allows calculating how a law is likely to be received and whether it will be complied with
+
+— or not — by society.
+
+One of the economic and quick means to investigate this reality is jurimetry, a discipline
+
+that studies the functioning of the legal order through statistics, describing the
+characteristics of the law in operation and inferring associations capable of
+explaining the behavior and reactions of this order. Making use of sampling
+
+and inferential studies, this technique is capable of investigating large populations and
+identifying association and causality relationships that elucidate the reasons for the
+successes and failures of our current practices. The concrete plane of law
+needs to be studied because court decisions, contracts and all acts created daily by
+
+the thousands in the Brazilian legal order are not a mechanical consequence of the
+law, but constitute the result of a complex and rich process of coordination of factors legal, social, economic and
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Brazil is going through a moment of profound economic and social transformation, a fact
+
+recognizable through the numerous bills and codifying reforms pending in the National Congress.
+
+At this historical moment, it is essential that we pay attention to the importance of empirical
+
+studies. Legislating without statistical data is legislating in the dark.
+
+There is yet another aspect that demonstrates the importance of empirical studies in legislation.
+
+They are also important so that we know where there is hyper-regulation and
+
+where there is hypo-regulation, that is, in which fields there is already excessive regulatory
+
+intervention by the State and where, on the other hand, there is a lack of such intervention.
+
+Such studies make it possible to know where legislative reform is and where it is not, as well
+
+as, having concluded that there is a need for reform, what and how it should be changed.
+
+Abstract academic studies are necessary, but equally essential is the study of reality and
+
+reasoning with a logic focused on practice. All this will help us to outline legislative policies with a
+
+greater probability of success.
+
+Jurimetric surveys are a privileged access channel to the concrete level of law, capable of describing
+
+these large populations of conflicts (the Brazilian Judiciary Power faced an unbelievable mass
+
+of 90 million cases in 2011), informing legislators and jurists about the shortcomings of the
+
+legal regimes currently in force and, thus, provide a clearer image of the improvements they entail.
+
+The dissemination of jurimetric research will help the legal community both in the
+
+preparation of diagnoses and in the development of solutions. Jurimetrics is able to provide
+
+support in legislative debates and, mainly, to (i) identify the foci of hyper- and hypo-regulation;
+
+(ii) overcome idiosyncratic legislative debates, based exclusively on personal experiences and
+
+theoretical concepts of law operators; (iii) diagnose with greater precision the problems that justify
+
+the movement of the legislative machine; (iv) to anticipate with reasonable precision the
+
+effects of new legal regimes; and (v) evaluate the results of transitions between regimes, as
+
+well as the fulfillment of goals pre-established by the Legislature. As a result, we will
+
+have a legal order that is more in line with reality, more functional, more effective, faster, more
+
+economical and, therefore, fairer.
+
+No doctor or laboratory puts a drug on the market without first submitting
+
+its active ingredient undergoes rigorous control tests. In the same way, the "social medicines",
+
+which are the laws, also need to be submitted to tests capable of anticipating their adequacy to
+
+overcome the disturbances that they propose to correct.
+
+psychological tests, which contain abundant information about the challenges to be faced
+
+by legislators.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Marcelo G. Nunes is a lawyer and partner at Guedes Nunes, Oliveira e Roquim
+Sociedade de Advogados.
+
+Guilherme SJ Pereira is a lawyer, partner at Yarshell, Mateucci e Camargo Advogados.
+
+Consultor Jurídico Magazine , January 13, 2013, 7:35 am
+
+Machine Translated by Google
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+Suscríbete
+
+www.newleftreview.es
+
+© New Left Review Ltd., 2000
+
+Licencia Creative Commons
+Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
+
+t sd
+
+INSTITUTO
+
+DEMOCRACIA
+
+new Left review 132
+
+enero-febrero 2022
+
+ARTÍCULOS
+
+Rahmane Idrissa El Sahel: un mapa cognitivo 7
+
+Perry Anderson La Gran Bretaña de Edgerton 45
+
+Kheya Bag y Susan Watkins Estructuras de opresión 61
+
+Julian Stallabrass Cálculo sublime 95
+
+Dylan Riley Respuesta a Harvey 103
+
+David Harvey Réplica a Riley 113
+
+Patricia McManus Una nueva crítica literaria 123
+
+Alain Supiot El error de Foucault 143
+
+CRÍTICA
+
+Tom Mertes El modelo de Pittsburgh 161
+
+Tor Krever Las almas enfrentadas del
+liberalismo 170
+
+segunda época
+new left review 132 ene feb 2022 143
+
+La división del derecho en ramas, tal y como se ha desarrollado
+progresivamente desde el siglo xvi, es de naturaleza
+dogmática y posee un valor heurístico débil1
+. Si seguimos, no
+obstante, las ramas del derecho hasta su tronco común, siempre
+llegamos a la cuestión que irriga a todas ellas: la de la preservación
+de la vida humana. La pandemia de la covid-19 nos lo ha recordado,
+puesto que las medidas adoptadas para superarla han afectado a todos
+los países del planeta y han incidido por igual en el derecho nacional
+y el derecho internacional, en el derecho público y el derecho privado
+o el derecho social. Algunos comentaristas consideran que esto ilustra
+la influencia del biopoder, que, de acuerdo con Foucault, caracteriza la
+época moderna2
+. Esta interpretación es apresurada por no decir inexacta.
+Sin preocuparse mucho por la congruencia, estos mismos comentaristas
+han observado a menudo el carácter «medieval» de las medidas de
+confinamiento y cuarentena impuestas contra la pandemia, a las que los
+dirigentes políticos habían recurrido muchos siglos antes del supuesto
+nacimiento del «biopoder».
+
+Para Foucault, el término biopoder hace referencia al tránsito, a partir
+del siglo xix, de un derecho de soberanía –consistente en «hacer morir
+
+1 Jan Schröder, Recht als Wissenschaft. Geschichte der Juristischen Methode vom
+Humanismus bis Historischen Schule, Munich, 2001. 2 Véanse Michel Foucault, La volonté de savoir, París, 1976, cap. 5, «Droit de mort et
+pouvoir sur la vie», pp. 177 y ss.; Il faut défendre la société: Cours au Collège de France
+1976, París, 1997, pp. 213-235; ed. cast.: Historia de la sexualidad, vol. 1, La voluntad
+de saber, Madrid, 2019; Hay que defender la sociedad. Curso del Collège de France
+(1975-1976), Madrid, 2003.
+
+alain supiot
+
+EL ERROR DE FOUCAULT
+
+Biopolítica, cientificismo y Estado de derecho
+144 nlr 132
+
+a la gente» o «dejarla vivir»– a «un poder exactamente opuesto […] de
+“hacer vivir a la gente” y “dejarla morir”»3
+. Pero mucho antes de que en
+el siglo xvi cristalizase la idea de un poder laico y soberano, príncipes y
+ciudades han adoptado disposiciones jurídicas dirigidas a «hacer vivir»
+en lugar de «dejar vivir», no solo para enfrentarse a las pandemias, sino,
+más en general, para conservar la salud de sus poblaciones. Heródoto,
+por ejemplo, se maravilla ante la siguiente norma vigente entre los babilonios
+en el siglo v a. C.:
+
+Al tener en baja estima a los médicos, transportan a los enfermos al mercado;
+entonces, quienes han padecido el mismo mal que el enfermo, o han
+visto a otros en caso similar, se acercan y le asesoran sobre su enfermedad
+y lo confortan, diciéndole por qué medio se han recuperado o han visto a
+otros recuperarse de ella. Nadie puede pasar junto al enfermo sin hablarle
+y preguntarle qué mal lo aqueja4
+.
+
+Resumida en el derecho romano con la fórmula vitam instituere, la preservación
+de una vida propiamente humana a lo largo de generaciones
+sucesivas no es, por consiguiente, el rasgo distintivo de las formas de
+gobierno contemporáneas, sino un hecho constitutivo del fenómeno
+institucional en general y del derecho en particular5
+. Para comprender
+esta función antropológica, es preciso que el derecho y las instituciones
+no se reduzcan a meras técnicas de poder, ni la vida a su sola dimensión
+biológica. Para Louis Dumont dicha reducción es producto de la
+ideología moderna, que contempla la sociedad como una colección de
+individuos que compiten entre sí6. En contra de la creencia popular,
+sostenía Dumont, el nazismo fue el fruto venenoso de este individualismo:
+si las instituciones son de hecho artificios, si solo la fuerza reina
+entre individuos que luchan por la vida, solo la identidad biológica puede
+mantener unidas a las comunidades humanas:
+
+3 M. Foucault, Il faut défendre la société: Cours aux Collège de France 1976, cit., p. 214. 4 Heródoto, Herodotus i, Books i-ii, §197, Londres, 1975, p. 251. 5 Digesto (i,3,2); véanse, respectivamente, Pierre Legendre, Sur la question dogmatique
+en Occident, París, 1999, pp. 106-108; y Alain Supiot, Homo Juridicus, Londres,
+2007; ed. orig: Homo juridicus: essai sur la fonction anthropologique du droit, París,
+2005; ed. cast.: Homo juridicus: ensayo sobre la función antropológica del derecho,
+Buenos Aires, 2012.
+6 Louis Dumont, Essais sur l’individualisme: Une perspective anthropologique sur
+l’idéologie moderne, París, 1983; y del mismo autor, Homo æqualis, vol. i, Génèse et
+épanouissement de l’idéologie économique, París, 1977, p. 19; ed. cast.: Ensayos sobre
+el individualismo: una perspectiva antropológica sobre la ideología moderna, Madrid,
+1987; Homo aequalis: génesis y apogeo de la ideología económica, Madrid, 1999.
+supiot: Ley 145
+
+Hitler no hizo sino llevar hasta sus últimas consecuencias determinadas
+representaciones que son muy comunes en nuestro tiempo, ya sea la
+«lucha de todos contra todos», una especie de lugar común de la incultura,
+o su equivalente más refinado, la reducción de la política al poder. Pero en
+cuanto se aceptan esas premisas, es difícil ver, con ayuda de Hitler, qué
+puede impedir, a quienes tienen los medios para hacerlo, exterminar a
+quienes les plazca, y el horror de la conclusión demuestra la falsedad de las
+premisas. La desaprobación universal demuestra el acuerdo sobre los valores
+y el poder político debe subordinarse a los valores. La esencia de la vida
+humana no es la lucha de todos contra todos y la teoría política no puede ser
+una teoría del poder, sino una teoría de la autoridad legítima7
+.
+
+Esta reducción de la política al poder y de las leyes a puras técnicas de
+dominación es un rasgo común de los autores de posguerra, que han
+perdido la percepción que sus grandes predecesores –Durkheim, Mauss,
+Weber o Bergson– tenían de las instituciones.
+
+La obra de Giorgio Agamben ofrece una de las expresiones más completas
+de esta reductio ad potestam. Agamben ha usado la categoría jurídica
+romana de homo sacer para apartarse de la datación del biopoder efectuada
+por Foucault y afirmar que el poder soberano siempre ha tenido la
+vida como objeto8
+. Esta tesis tiene el mérito de reconocer que los vínculos
+existentes entre la vida humana y las instituciones son estructurales
+y no datan del siglo xix, pero otorga a la idea de soberanía una atemporalidad
+carente de base histórica. El derecho romano hace caso omiso de
+ella y el orden feudal se basa en el señorío, no en la soberanía. Agamben
+define, ante todo, el poder soberano como el poder de decidir sobre el
+estado de excepción en el que la vida puede ser proscrita, es decir, capturada
+y expuesta a la muerte. Basándose en Carl Schmitt, esta definición
+era ciertamente apropiada para el nazismo, cuya práctica jurídica fue
+perfectamente resumida por Göring: «Recht ist das, was uns gefällt» [el
+derecho es lo que a nosotros nos agrada]9. Pero prescinde de la experiencia
+histórica de la soberanía concebida como autolimitación del poder10,
+lo cual dotó de una base duradera al Estado de derecho11, mientras que
+el estado de excepción nazi encontró rápidamente su límite catastrófico.
+
+7 L. Dumont, Essais sur l’individualisme: Une perspective anthropologique sur l’idéologie
+moderne, cit., p. 186. 8 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford, 1998, p.
+93; ed. orig. Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Turín, 1995; ed. cast.: Homo
+sacer: el poder soberano y la nuda vida, Valencia, 2006. 9 Citado en Rush Rhees, «Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Ethics», Philosophical Review,
+vol. 74, núm. 1, enero de 1965, p. 25.
+10 Cf. A. Supiot, «La souveraineté de la limite», en Alain Supiot (ed.), Mondialisation
+ou globalisation ? Les leçons de Simone Weil, París, 2019, pp. 221 y ss. 11 Cf. Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin, 1921, pp. 435-489.
+146 nlr 132
+
+Confundir de este modo la soberanía con la omnipotencia conduce a los
+mismos callejones sin salida con los que tuvo que lidiar el escolasticismo
+medieval. Ante la omnipotencia, nada se sostiene: dos y dos pueden ser
+cinco, el pasado puede no haber existido y el derecho es engullido completamente
+por el agujero negro del «poder». Así, de acuerdo con Agamben,
+solo «al margen de toda ley» sería concebible una vida libre12. Desde este
+punto de vista, las instituciones meramente enmascaran la realidad del
+«poder» del cual el campo de concentración sería hoy en día el paradigma
+secreto; las salas de embarque del aeropuerto de Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle
+serían, por lo tanto, declinaciones de Auschwitz13. Los solicitantes de asilo,
+sin embargo, todavía no son gaseados ni sometidos a experimentos médicos.
+Agamben comienza recordándonos que el gobierno de Hitler tuvo
+cuidado de situar los campos de concentración fuera de la esfera jurídica14.
+La deportación a los campos era una medida de «retención protectora»
+(Schutzhaft), que tenía su fuente directa en la voluntad del Führer. En las
+palabras tajantes de un jefe de la Gestapo citado por Agamben, «los campos
+no se instituyeron, un día estaban ahí» (sie wurden nicht gegründet, sie
+waren eines Tages da). No podría decirse con más claridad que los campos
+pertenecían al puro dominio del hecho. Pero esto no impide a Agamben
+sostener dos páginas después que en los campos «la ley y el hecho se
+fusionan», lo que los dota de una «estructura jurídica particular»15. ¿Los
+campos no tienen una existencia jurídica, pero tienen estructura jurídica?
+
+Legítimamente preocupado por arrojar luz sobre el fenómeno del totalitarismo,
+Agamben cae así en la trampa que el nazismo dejó tras de sí:
+subsumir cualquier tipo de institución bajo la figura del «poder», un
+principio eterno y jamás definido que transpone a la política la noción
+de «fuerza» en términos físicos o de «supervivencia de los más aptos» en
+términos biológicos. Agamben contrasta dos facetas de la vida humana:
+la vida política, o bios, y la «nuda vida», o zôê, cuya captura sería el objetivo
+principal del «poder soberano»16. Pero el conocimiento antropológico
+
+12 Véase G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, cit., p. 69. Dichas
+afirmaciones son síntoma de la descomposición de la democracia, ya detectada por
+Montesquieu en El espíritu de las leyes: «Se era libre bajo las leyes, se quiere ser libre
+contra ellas», en The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge, 1989, p. 23; ed. cast.: El espíritu
+de las leyes, Madrid, 2015. 13 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, cit., p. 188. 14 Ibid., p. 182. Respecto al Schutzhaft, véase Olivier Jouanjan, Justifier l’injustifiable:
+l’ordre du discours juridique nazi, París, 2017, pp. 148 y ss. 15 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, cit., p. 184. 16 La importancia de esta distinción de las fuentes griegas la ha criticado Laurent
+Dubreuil en «De la vie dans la vie: sur une étrange opposition entre zôê et bios», en
+Labyrinthe, vol. 22, núm. 3, 2005, pp. 47-52.
+supiot: Ley 147
+
+sugiere lo contrario, caracterizando al homo sapiens como un «animal
+simbólico» para el que estas dos dimensiones de la vida son inseparables17.
+Hasta el niño lobo, la manifestación más cercana a una «nuda
+vida», manifiesta un sentimiento de justicia. Tratar a los humanos como
+animales ha sido una característica del cientificismo en general y del
+nazismo en particular18, pero constituye una contradicción singular afirmar
+que esta es la verdad oculta de cualquier institución. Como observó
+Simone Weil:
+
+Si la fuerza es absolutamente soberana, la justicia es absolutamente irreal. Pero
+no lo es. Lo sabemos por experiencia. Es real en el corazón de los hombres. La
+estructura de un corazón humano es una realidad más del universo, al igual
+que la trayectoria de una estrella. No está en la mano del hombre excluir por
+completo cualquier tipo de justicia de los fines que dicho hombre asigna a sus
+acciones. Ni siquiera los nazis pudieron. De haber sido posible para los hombres,
+probablemente ellos podrían haberlo hecho19.
+
+La terrible descripción que Agamben hace del asesinato de una joven
+judía en Dachau a efectos de experimentación «médica» atestigua el
+poderoso sentimiento de injusticia que el autor de Homo Sacer comparte
+con sus lectores20. Si hubiera que describir el régimen nazi en los términos
+de quienes confunden soberanía con omnipotencia, habría que
+inclinarse a ver en la política industrial de exterminio aplicada por dicho
+régimen una forma paroxística del poder de «hacer morir a la gente» en
+lugar del «poder exactamente opuesto» de «hacer vivir a la gente» que,
+de acuerdo con Foucault, define el biopoder.
+
+Técnicas de normalización
+
+Sería injusto, sin embargo, reducir el pensamiento de Foucault a la
+noción de biopolítica. Estamos en deuda con él por su sagacidad al
+observar que desde el siglo xix se produjo un retroceso general del derecho
+a favor de las «técnicas de normalización». A diferencia del derecho,
+que sitúa la obediencia a las reglas generales y abstractas bajo el control
+
+17 Véase Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human
+Culture, New Haven (ct), 1944, p. 44. 18 Según Carl Schmitt, las abstracciones del derecho son las mascaras de las que se
+sirven los judíos para disimular su relación parasitaria con el pueblo alemán, Carl
+Schmitt, «Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft in Kampf gegen den jüdischen Geist»,
+Berlín, 1936. 19 Simone Weil, L’enracinement: prélude à une déclaration des devoirs envers l’être
+humain [1949], en Œuvres, París, 1999, p. 179. 20 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, cit., pp. 167 y ss.
+148 nlr 132
+
+de un juez, estas técnicas recurren a la vigilancia y al adiestramiento21.
+En años recientes, han experimentado un crecimiento espectacular posibilitado
+por el progreso de la informática y las ciencias cognitivas22. La
+novedad de la «sociedad de la normalización», cuyo advenimiento percibió
+Foucault, no radica, por lo tanto, como él creyó, en que tenga «la
+vida por objeto y objetivo»23, sino, por el contrario, en que se halle regida
+por una normalidad descubierta por la ciencia y ya no por la legalidad
+referida a un ideal de justicia. La sociedad de la normalización nació con
+el ascenso de las técnicas cuantitativas, que desde finales del siglo xviii
+llevaron a interpretar las sociedades humanas, siguiendo el modelo de
+la física o la biología, como objetos, medibles y manipulables, que era
+posible examinar para entender y controlar su funcionamiento24. Esta
+evolución acaecida en las ciencias sociales ha sido sin lugar a dudas
+fuente de un importante progreso en el conocimiento, pero también ha
+dado lugar a lo que Renan denominó «la audaz pero legítima pretensión
+de organizar la sociedad científicamente»25.
+
+Esta «pretensión legítima» implica que, a medida que la ciencia avanza
+en su interpretación de las «leyes verdaderas» de la sociedad humana,
+la legalidad jurídica debería ser sustituida por una normalización de
+los comportamientos. La tarea de los dirigentes sería similar a la de los
+ingenieros, que aplican las leyes de la física para hacer funcionar las
+máquinas, o a la de los médicos, que restauran la salud gracias a los
+descubrimientos de la biología. Las figuras del ingeniero y el médico
+fueron presentadas explícitamente como modelos por promotores del
+«socialismo científico» como Pashukanis para ilustrar la normatividad
+puramente técnica que regiría en una sociedad comunista en cuanto se
+completase la desaparición progresiva del Estado26.
+
+Este desplazamiento de la norma jurídica a favor de una normatividad
+técnica fue un factor común de los regímenes totalitarios. La noción de
+
+21 M. Foucault, La volonté de savoir, cit., pp. 116-118. 22 Véase Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human
+Future and the New Frontier of Power, Londres, 2019; ed. cast.: La era del capitalismo
+de la vigilancia, Barcelona, 2020. 23 M. Foucault, Il faut défendre la société, cit., pp. 225-226. 24 Véase Alain Desrosières, La politique des grands nombres: histoire de la raison statistique,
+París, 1993; Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment,
+Princeton (nj), 1988. 25 Ernest Renan, L’avenir de la science: Pensées de 1848 [1890], París, 1995, p. 104. 26 Evgeny Pashukanis, La théorie générale du droit et le marxisme [1924], París, 1970,
+p. 71; ed. cast.: La teoría general del derecho y el marxixmo, Barcelona, 1976.
+supiot: Ley 149
+
+Estado nazi es efectivamente un oxímoron, dado que concierne a un régimen
+que no conocía otro Estado que el de excepción27. Sometido al tutelaje
+de un solo partido, el Estado nazi era una herramienta de dominación de
+la raza superior y no ocupaba ya el lugar de «tercera parte» garante que
+caracteriza el fenómeno jurídico28. Esta posición no tendría sentido en el
+universo totalitario y tampoco la ocupó Hitler. La estructura del régimen
+nazi no era jurídica, sino gerencial29. El Führer no era la fuente del derecho
+que debería aplicarse, sino el modelo al cual adecuarse actuando en
+función de cómo él actuara en cada situación concreta30.
+
+La situación era formalmente diferente en la Unión Soviética, que sí
+tenía una constitución; pero tampoco allí era el Estado la piedra de
+toque institucional. Como en Alemania, se convirtió en una máquina
+administrativa bajo el control de un partido único, que era responsable,
+entre otras cosas, de aplicar los planes basándose en cálculos de
+utilidad económica. El hecho de que no se caracterizase por un «régimen
+de derecho» en el sentido indicado por la Declaración Universal de
+los Derechos Humanos, no significa que la Unión Soviética estuviera
+desprovista de normas; pero no eran normas jurídicas, es decir, reglas
+generales y abstractas aplicadas por organismos judiciales independientes31.
+El rule of law cedió allí el lugar al rule by law32.
+
+Este cambio en el tipo de normatividad caracterizó el punto de inflexión
+percibido por Foucault y no la aparición de un poder que aspirase
+a «hacer vivir» en lugar de limitarse a «dejar vivir». Para entender la
+«sociedad de la normalización», cuya aparición diagnosticó, necesitamos
+recordar que no todos los órdenes normativos son jurídicos. El ritual o la
+moral pueden constituir fuentes de reglas no jurídicas. De igual modo,
+el orden sadiano, en el que Dany-Robert Dufour ha visto acertadamente
+
+27 Proclamado por la Ley de 24 de marzo de 1933 (Gesetz zur behebung der Not von
+Volk und Reich), el estado de excepción solo acabó con la caída del Reich en mayo
+de 1945.
+28 Alexandre Kojève, Esquisse d’une phénoménologie du droit [1943], París, 1982, pp.
+73 y ss.
+29 Johann Chapoutot, Libres d’obéir: Le management, du nazisme à aujourd’hui, París,
+2020.
+30 Lion Murard y Patrick Zylberman (eds.), Le soldat du travail: guerre, fascisme et
+taylorisme, Recherches, núm. 32/33, 1978, p. 518; O. Jouanjan, Justifier l’injustifiable:
+l’ordre du discours juridique nazi, cit., pp. 285 y ss. 31 Alexandre Zinoviev, Le communisme comme réalité, París, 1981, pp. 170-171. 32 Harold Berman, Law and Revolution, 2 vols., vol. 1, The Formation of the Western
+Legal Tradition, Cambridge (ma), 1985; vol. 2: The Impact of the Protestant Reformation
+on the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge (ma), 2003, p. 19.
+150 nlr 132
+
+el punto de fuga de la ideología económica33, tal vez esté saturado de
+normas, pero difícilmente puede considerarse un orden jurídico. Por
+otro lado, el orden sadiano, en cuanto ámbito del poder soberano en el
+sentido dado a este término por Foucault o Agamben, prefigura a la perfección
+los universos concentracionarios del siglo xx, formas extremas
+de la «sociedad de la normalización».
+
+Esta ambición normalizadora no desapareció junto con los totalitarismos
+del siglo xx. Hoy adopta la forma de la gobernanza por los números,
+extendiéndose a todos los aspectos de la vida humana y a todas las escalas
+de organización de la misma34. Inspira la ideología del «mercado
+total», que constituye el ámbito de un «orden espontáneo» que animaría
+la acción de todos y cada uno de nosotros, si fuera necesario por medio
+de la inteligencia artificial y de técnicas de entrenamiento tales como los
+«nudges» [empujones] de la economía conductista o la compliance [norma
+de cumplimiento]35. Las personas se ven obligadas de hecho a asimilar
+este orden inmanente, purgado de toda referencia heterónoma, del que
+ellas son los agentes y no las dueñas. La paz perpetua debería reinar
+pronto en un mundo plano, libre de la figura de una «tercera parte»
+imparcial y desinteresada, que estará poblado por seres humanos programados
+como ordenadores o adiestrados como mascotas, gracias al
+progreso de las técnicas conductuales y, parece, de la tecnología del blockchain36.
+La promesa de este futuro radiante haría obsoleto el derecho, como
+atestiguan los cambios semánticos registrados en los desplazamientos de
+ley a programa, de reglamentación a regulación, de gobierno a gobernanza, o
+de moral a ética. En todos estos casos, el objetivo es eliminar la distancia
+entre la norma y el sujeto al que de ese modo no se le exige que la
+observe, sino que la incorpore.
+
+Al igual que anteriores avatares del cientificismo, la gobernanza por los
+números está condenada a encontrar su límite catastrófico. La regulación
+de la sociedad, como ha demostrado Canguilhem, no es un hecho
+de la misma naturaleza que la regulación biológica. En el caso de un
+organismo vivo, «la norma o la regla de su existencia viene dada por
+
+33 Dany-Robert Dufour, La cité perverse: libéralisme et pornographie, París, 2009. 34 Alain Supiot, Governance by Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance,
+Oxford, 2017; ed. orig.: La gouvernance par les nombres, París, 2015. 35 Pablo Jensen, Deep Earnings: le néolibéralisme au cœur des réseaux de neurones,
+Caen, 2021.
+36 Katrin Becker, «La technologie blockchain et la promesse crypto-divine d’en finir
+avec les tiers», en Religiosité technologique, Études digitales, núm. 6, 2018.
+supiot: Ley 151
+
+su existencia misma», pero la sociedad humana «no es un fin en sí
+misma»; «no hay justicia social espontánea, es decir, no hay autorregulación
+social». Como Canguilhem observa a continuación, «la justicia
+debe proceder de algún otro lugar»37. Una sociedad no puede perdurar
+sin una referencia que le sea heterónoma y tampoco puede deducirse de la
+observación de los hechos, sino que es, por el contrario, resultado de lo que
+Bergson denominó la «función fabuladora»38 y Leroi-Gourhan el «aparato
+simbólico»39, que son lo propio de la especie humana. Nuestra vida
+no solo se despliega en el mundo tal cual es, sino también en un mundo
+que podría o debería ser.
+
+El ser humano es un animal dénaturé40, una criatura en dos partes, que no
+puede reducirse de manera inteligible a la vida orgánica o a la vida mental.
+Bípedo cuya cabeza se mueve en el cielo de las ideas, no puede tener ni
+conservar la razón si no estando instituido, esto es, si no se halla inscrito
+en un orden que relacione la infinitud de su universo mental con la forma
+finita de su experiencia física para ejercitar su razón, dando a su vida
+mortal un lugar y un sentido. Este avance siempre frágil de la razón está
+amenazado por dos formas contemporáneas de desinstitucionalización.
+Por un lado, el biologismo, que reteniendo solo los pies y prescindiendo
+de la cabeza, lo asimila por completo a la parte animal; y por otro, el posmodernismo,
+que conserva solo la cabeza, perdiendo su punto de apoyo
+en la realidad. Basándose en estas dos formas, lo que Vico denominó la
+«barbarie de la reflexión» amenaza los mecanismos jurídicos dirigidos a
+preservar una vida propiamente humana41. Valéry observaba que la conquista
+de las cosas por parte de la ciencia positiva conduciría a «una forma
+elaborada y rigurosa de barbarie, mucho más formidable que las barbaries
+antiguas por ser más exacta, más uniforme e infinitamente más poderosa.
+Volveríamos a la era del hecho, pero del hecho científico»42.
+
+37 Georges Canguilhem, Writings on Medicine, Nueva York, 2012, pp. 67-78.
+38 Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion [1932], París, 1988, pp.
+111 y ss.; ed. cast.: Las dos fuentes de la moral y la religión, Madrid, 2020. 39 André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, Cambridge (ma), 1993, pp. 313 y ss.;
+ed. orig.: Le geste et la parole, vol. 2, La mémoire et les rythmes, París, 1964, p. 107. 40 Vercors, Les animaux dénaturés [1952], traducido al inglés con el título de You
+Shall Know Them, Boston, 1953; ed. cast.: Animales desnaturalizados, Buenos Aires,
+1953 (trad. Rosa Chacel).
+41 Cf. sobre la «barbarie de la reflexión», Giambattista Vico, Principes d’une science
+nouvelle relative à la nature commune des nations [1744], París, 2001, pp. 536-537;
+véase, Alain Pons, Vie et mort des nations: lecture de la Science nouvelle de Giambattista
+Vico, París, 2015, pp. 315 y ss. 42 Paul Valéry, «Préface aux Lettres persanes» [1930], en Montesquieu, Lettres persanes:
+édition du tricentenaire, París, 2021, pp. 373-374; ed. cast.: Cartas persas, Madrid, 1997.
+152 nlr 132
+Un salto adelante
+
+La experiencia de la barbarie nazi dio lugar a un salto jurídico e institucional
+sin precedentes en la historia humana. Ante las masacres sin
+sentido de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, se constató la insostenibilidad
+de un mundo sometido por completo a las relaciones de fuerza. Dado
+que «the disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous
+acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind» [el desconocimiento
+y el menosprecio de los derechos humanos han originado actos de barbarie
+ultrajantes para la conciencia de la humanidad], la Organización
+de Naciones Unidas consideró «essential, if man is not to be compelled
+to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression,
+that human rights should be protected by the rule of law» [esencial
+que los derechos humanos sean protegidos por un Estado de derecho,
+a fin de que el ser humano no se vea compelido al supremo recurso
+de la rebelión contra la tiranía y la opresión]43. Ya en 1944 los Estados
+miembros de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo habían acordado
+que «experience has fully demonstrated the truth of the statement in the
+Constitution of the International Labour Organisation that lasting peace can
+be established only if it is based on social justice» [la experiencia ha demostrado
+plenamente cuán verídica es la declaración contenida en su carta
+de constitución, según la cual la paz permanente solo puede basarse en
+la justicia social]44. Es imposible sobrevalorar la importancia de la experiencia
+de las dos guerras mundiales. La justicia social no solo se afirma
+como un ideal, un deber moral que debería pesar sobre las naciones y
+contrarrestar el realismo político y económico, sino que constituía en
+sí misma una muestra de realismo o, más precisamente, supondría la
+toma de conciencia de la experiencia histórica que había visto como la
+humillación y la pobreza habían dado lugar al odio, la violencia y la guerra
+«which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind» [que
+dos veces durante nuestra vida ha infligido a la humanidad sufrimientos
+indecibles]45. Una novedad en este aluvión de declaraciones de principios
+fue la de afirmar que la justicia y la paz solo podían basarse en «the
+faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
+person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small»
+[la fe en los derechos humanos fundamentales, en la dignidad de la persona
+humana y en la igualdad de derechos de hombres y mujeres y de
+
+43 Preámbulo a la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (1948). 44 Preámbulo a la Declaración de Filadelfia (1944).
+45 Preámbulo a la Carta de las Naciones Unidas (junio de 1945).
+supiot: Ley 153
+
+las naciones grandes y pequeñas]46. Partiendo de la experiencia –esto
+es, de los hechos– estos textos fundamentales afirman de ese modo el
+carácter fiduciario de un orden jurídico que, de acuerdo con las palabras
+de Valéry, no podía fundamentarse en «la seule contrainte des corps par les
+corps» [la exclusiva coerción de los cuerpos por los cuerpos]47.
+
+La novedad de estas declaraciones, sin embargo, no radicaba en que afirmasen
+la primacía de las relaciones jurídicas sobre las relaciones de poder.
+Consistía en que daban cabida a la dimensión física de la vida humana
+al proclamar que «the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
+and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
+freedom, justice and peace in the world» [el reconocimiento de la dignidad
+inherente y de los derechos iguales e inalienables de todos los miembros
+de la familia humana constituye el fundamento de la libertad, la justicia y
+la paz en el mundo]48. Este nuevo principio de dignidad, solemnemente
+afirmado en el Preámbulo y en el Artículo 1 de la Declaración Universal de
+los Derechos Humanos, solo aparece, significativamente, en relación con
+los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, empezando por el derecho
+a la seguridad social (Artículo 22). Reconocer la dignidad significa atribuir
+un valor inconmensurable a la vida de cada persona. Este valor no mercantilizable
+–al margen del precio, por usar el término de Kant– abarca
+el cuerpo y la mente y exige, por lo tanto, cubrir las necesidades físicas.
+Estas habían quedado en gran medida dejadas a un lado en las declaraciones
+de la Ilustración, que tenían por objeto un «hombre» completamente
+desmaterializado; por eso se decía que los derechos económicos y sociales
+eran derechos de «segunda generación». Esta cronología es, sin embargo,
+equívoca, porque el derecho de los hambrientos a recibir ayuda de los ricos
+fue en la Edad Media el objeto primigenio de la doctrina de los derechos
+naturales49. El principio de dignidad se expresó por primera vez de hecho
+respecto de los deberes con los hombres y mujeres más expuestos al infortunio
+físico, los pobres50. Es comprensible, por lo tanto, que la dignidad,
+principio fundador de la justicia social y de los derechos económicos y
+sociales, haya sido atacada por los defensores del neoliberalismo desde
+comienzos de la década de 1980.
+
+46 Ibid.; véase también el preámbulo a la Declaración Universal de los Derechos
+Humanos.
+47 P. Valéry, «Préface aux Lettres persanes», cit.
+48 Preámbulo a la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos.
+49 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Natural Law and Church Law, 1150-1625
+[1997], segunda edición, Grand Rapids (mi), 2001, pp. 70 y ss. 50 Por eso Bossuet reconoció su «dignidad eminente»: Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, De
+l’éminente dignité des pauvres [1659], París, 2015.
+154 nlr 132
+El reinado del cientificismo
+
+El sello distintivo de la «sociedad de la normalización» no es –como
+erróneamente afirmaba Foucault– el biopoder, sino el cientificismo, que
+erige la ciencia fetichizada en la «nueva iglesia universal»51. Como sus
+predecesoras, esta iglesia aspira a someter a todos los seres humanos a
+leyes idénticas que escapan a su deliberación. Estas leyes inmanentes,
+inscritas en la naturaleza humana, ocupan el lugar otorgado previamente
+a las leyes transcendentes reveladas por Dios. Como observó Alexander
+Grothendieck, el cientificismo «es igual de irracional y emocional en
+sus motivaciones, e igual de intolerante en su práctica cotidiana, que
+cualquiera de las religiones tradicionales a las que ha suplantado». Los
+gobiernos no deben boicotear las leyes de dicho cientificismo, sino, por
+el contrario, facilitar su acción como un relojero «engrasa un reloj o
+de cualquier otro modo asegura el estado de un mecanismo para que
+funcione permanente y correctamente»52. El perímetro de la democracia
+se reduce así a medida que avanza el progreso del conocimiento de
+estas leyes, que se imponen sin discusión a modo de normas técnicas
+mediante la pedagogía o la constricción, de manera que «el gobierno de
+las personas cede el paso a la administración de las cosas»53. Las leyes
+y el Estado no tienen más función que la de engrasar las ruedas del
+mercado autorregulado. Como observó Polanyi: «El mecanismo puesto
+en marcha por el principio del beneficio tuvo una eficacia solo comparable
+al arrebato de fervor religioso más violento de la historia»54. Pero
+este mecanismo afirma ser una ciencia experimental, cuyos enunciados,
+como los de la religión, están por su naturaleza apartados de toda deliberación
+democrática. De nuevo, esta vez mediante la razón neoliberal, se
+trata de sustituir el rule of law por el rule by law y de reducir el derecho y el
+Estado a la función de un «aceite colocado en los engranjes» de las leyes
+inmanentes descubiertas por la ciencia económica, cuya imposición se
+efectua al margen de la conciencia de los seres humanos e independientemente
+de la racionalidad o irracionalidad de sus comportamientos
+(principio de maximización, autorregulación del mercado, estabilidad
+
+51 Alexander Grothendieck, «La nouvelle église universelle», Survivre… et vivre,
+núm. 9, agosto-septiembre de 1971, pp. 3-7.
+52 Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal
+Principles of Justice and Political Economy, vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice, Abingdon
+y Nueva York, 1982, p. 128; ed. cast.: Derecho, legislación y libertad, Madrid, 2018. 53 Fredric Engels, Anti-Dühring [1878], París, 1971, p. 317; ed cast.: Anti-Dühring,
+Madrid, 2014.
+54 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our
+Times [1944], Boston, 2001, p. 31; ed. cast.: La gran transformación, Barcelona, 2016.
+supiot: Ley 155
+
+de las inclinaciones humanas, etcétera)55, lo cual acota el campo de la
+democracia asimilada ahora a un «mercado de ideas»56.
+
+Esta búsqueda del reconocimiento científico fue coronada en 1969 con
+la creación del Premio del Banco de Suecia en Ciencias Económicas en
+memoria de Alfred Nobel. Logrado plagio de los otros premios Nobel,
+esta consagración sitúa los estudios económicos al mismo nivel que la
+física y la biología, cuyos enunciados están por naturaleza exentos de
+toda deliberación democrática57. De acuerdo con uno de sus premiados,
+Gary Becker, las leyes de la economía derivan de hecho de las de la genética
+y la selección natural, las únicas capaces de explicar la dialéctica de
+egoísmo y altruismo observada en la conducta humana58. Hayek, uno
+de los más famosos «economistas merecedores del Nobel», dedicó sus
+primeras investigaciones a las condiciones biofísicas de emergencia de
+la conciencia y concibió el «orden espontáneo del mercado» a partir
+del modelo darwiniano de la selección natural59. Esta búsqueda de un
+anclaje en la biología continúa hoy en la economía conductual, que toma
+prestada de la medicina la técnica de los estudios aleatorios con el objetivo
+de conseguir que los pobres se comporten bien en el mundo tal y
+como es en vez de interrogarse sobre su justicia60.
+
+En virtud del «Consenso de Washington», el sometimiento del derecho y
+los Estados a este «orden espontáneo» del mercado fue confiado a organizaciones
+internacionales o regionales (omc, fmi, ue), que trabajaron
+metódicamente para desmantelar el derecho laboral, los sistemas de
+seguridad social y los servicios públicos, los tres pilares del Estado social
+
+55 Cf. Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Chicago, 1976. 56 Ronald Coase, «The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods
+and the Market for Ideas», American Economic Review, vol. 64, núm. 2, 1974, p.
+384. Véase Alain Supiot, «Democracy Laid Low by the Market», Jurisprudence, vol.
+9, núm. 3, 2018, pp. 449-460.
+57 Patrick Moynot, «Nobel d’économie: coup de maître», Le Monde, 15 de octubre
+de 2008.
+58 G. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour, cit., p. 282. 59 Friedrich Hayek, The Sensory Order, Chicago, 1952 [ed. cast.: El orden sensorial,
+Madrid, 2011]; Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 3, The Political Order of a Free People,
+Londres, 1982, p. 154.
+60 Respecto a estas promesas, véase Banco Mundial, Informe de desarrollo mundial
+2015: Mente, sociedad, conducta; Richard Thaler y Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving
+Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, New Haven (ct) y Londres, 2008.
+Para un análisis crítico de estos planteamientos, veánse Jean-Michel Servet,
+L’économie comportementale en question, París, 2018; y Arthur Jatteau, Faire preuve
+par le chiffre: le cas des expérimentations aléatoires en économie, París, 2020.
+156 nlr 132
+
+construido para aplicar los principios de justicia social proclamados en
+las grandes Declaraciones internacionales y en las constituciones adoptadas
+después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Durante las últimas décadas,
+se ha convertido en algo de buen tono burlarse del énfasis humanista o
+denunciar la perversidad de estas Declaraciones, que no serían sino la
+máscara de la imposición de lo político sobre la vida61. Foucault nunca
+optó por este sinsentido. Por el contrario, denunció la «crítica inflacionaria
+al Estado» y declaró que «todos los que participan en la gran fobia al
+Estado» se estaban «dejando llevar por la corriente»62. No fue únicamente
+uno de los raros filósofos en percibir la importancia crucial de la seguridad
+social, sino que también la defendió frente «al liberalismo salvaje, que
+conduciría a la cobertura individual de quienes dispusieran de los recursos
+necesarios y a la ausencia de cobertura para el resto»63.
+
+La fe cientificista en el orden espontáneo del mercado choca con los
+mecanismos jurídicos del Estado social, pero más aún con las realidades
+de las crisis que genera. La pandemia de la covid-19 ha reafirmado
+por un tiempo la importancia fundamental de la conservación de la vida
+humana, núcleo de las instituciones jurídicas y sociales, y los Estados
+han recuperado brevemente su función de garantes de último recurso de
+la seguridad física en su territorio. El vector jurídico de esta resurgencia
+es el «derecho a la salud»64, cuya prioridad nos exige cuestionar algunas
+de las «reformas estructurales» impuestas en nombre del mercado. La
+pandemia ha revelado, en consecuencia, la degradación del sistema sanitario
+debido a la gobernanza por los números, así como la incapacidad
+de los seguros privados para asumir la carga económica que suponen la
+vacunación y las interrupciones del trabajo.
+
+La lucha por las patentes
+
+Vivimos hoy en un orden normativo esquizofrénico en el que los principios
+y valores jurídicos surgidos de la crisis provocada por la Segunda
+Guerra Mundial no han sido derogadados, pero se encuentran contradichos
+por la reglas impuestas por «el orden espontáneo» de un mercado
+
+61 Véanse, por ejemplo, G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life,
+cit., pp. 138 y ss.; y F. A. Hayek, The mirage of Social Justice, cit., pp. 104-105. 62 M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, cit., pp. 196-197. El tema del derecho se
+halla omnipresente en los escritos de Foucault, quien, sin embargo, no abordó su
+teorización (cf. Márcio Alves da Fonseca, Michel Foucault e o direito, São Paulo, 2002).
+63 Entrevista con Robert Bono en Sécurité sociale: L’enjeu, París, 1983, p. 60.
+64 «El goce del grado máximo de salud que se pueda lograr es uno de los derechos
+fundamentales de todo ser humano sin distinción de raza, religión, ideología política
+o condición económica o social», «Preámbulo» a la Constitución de la oms.
+supiot: Ley 157
+
+con pretensiones de totalidad. La «lucha por el derecho», que el jurista
+alemán Rudolf von Ihering consideraba una tarea que debía ser recomenzada
+sin cesar, adquiere hoy más actualidad que nunca65. Prueba
+de ello es la cuestión acuciante del derecho a la salud en tiempos de
+pandemia global.
+
+Los creadores de la Organización Mundial de la Salud, percibiendo la
+solidaridad objetiva que une a los habitantes del planeta ante los riesgos
+relacionados con la salud, pretendieron en 1946 movilizarla con la
+intención de evitar dichas amenazas. Uno de los impulsos primarios
+de esta solidaridad activa ante la enfermedad es –como lo era entre los
+babilonios– la puesta en común de los conocimientos relacionados con
+la misma. Esta puesta en común, sin embargo, se enfrenta en la actualidad
+al orden imperante sobre los derechos de propiedad intelectual, que
+asume formas que ilustran la naturaleza esquizofrénica del orden jurídico
+internacional, desgarrado como indicábamos entre los principios de
+justicia social característicos del periodo de posguerra y el libre mercado.
+Por un lado, el «Preámbulo» de la Constitución de la oms establece que:
+«La extensión a todos los pueblos de los beneficios de los conocimientos
+médicos, psicológicos y afines es esencial para alcanzar el más alto grado
+de salud». Pero, por otro, desde la creación de la Organización Mundial
+del Comercio en 1994, estos conocimientos se han convertido en objeto
+de propiedad privada, lo cual se opone precisamente a su «extensión a
+todos los pueblos», a tenor del Acuerdo sobre los Aspectos de los Derechos
+de Propiedad Intelectual relacionados con el Comercio (adpic)
+66. Hasta
+entonces en el derecho internacional se aceptaba que la protección de los
+intereses de salud pública se imponía a los intereses de los propietarios
+de las patentes. El Acuerdo sobre los adpic invirtió esta jerarquía y dio
+primacía a la protección de la propiedad industrial.
+
+El principio de protección de la salud pública había llevado a muchos
+países, entre ellos Brasil, Sudáfrica, Turquía y la India, a excluir los
+medicamentos del ámbito patentable. El caso de la India es particularmente
+instructivo67. Tras la consecución de la independencia, sus
+
+65 Rudolf von Ihering, Der Kampf ums Recht, 1872. 66 Véase Clotilde Jourdain-Fortier, Santé et commerce international: contribution à
+l’étude de la protection des valeurs non marchandes par le droit du commerce international,
+París, 2006.
+67 Samira Guennif y Julien Chaisse, «L’économie politique du brevet au sud:
+variations Indiennes sur le brevet pharmaceutique», Revue internationale de droit
+économique, vol. 21, núm. 2, 2007, pp. 185-210; Maurice Cassier y Marilena Correa,
+«Brevets de médicament, luttes pur l’accès et intérêt public au Brésil et en Inde»,
+Innovations, núm. 32, 2012, pp. 109-127.
+158 nlr 132
+
+líderes concluyeron que el régimen de propiedad intelectual heredado
+del colonialismo británico no había garantizado la innovación y la protección
+de la salud de su población y que había conferido un monopolio
+de facto a las empresas occidentales, que cobraban precios prohibitivos.
+La Indian Patent Act aprobada en 1911 se reformó en 1970 para excluir
+de su ámbito de aplicación los productos de salud pública y los agrícolas
+«por los intereses de salud, nutrición y existencia de los ciudadanos
+indios»68. De ahí emergió una potente industria farmacéutica india, que
+proporcionó fármacos genéricos a bajo coste para cubrir las necesidades
+del país y posibilitar la exportación a otros países del Sur. A comienzos
+de la década de 1990, el precio del tratamiento contra el sida rondaba
+los 700 dólares mensuales; en 1993, tras hacer uso de los derechos contemplados
+en la Patent Act de 1970, la empresa india Cipla empezó a
+fabricar medicamentos genéricos a un precio de 300 dólares mensuales,
+lo que redujo significativamente el coste del mismo. La India, que
+fue importador neto de medicamentos hasta comienzos de la década
+de 1980, se ha convertido en un gran exportador69. Esta estrategia ha
+provocado fuertes reacciones en Occidente. La American Academy of
+Sciences, estrechamente relacionada con la industria farmacéutica estadounidense,
+se alarmó ante el riesgo de perder su predominio en los
+mercados emergentes. En 1997 pidió al gobierno de Clinton que hiciera
+cumplir los derechos de propiedad intelectual de la industria farmacéutica
+estadounidense en todo el mundo en virtud del Acuerdo sobre los
+adpic firmado poco antes70.
+
+A comienzos del nuevo milenio, este hincapié en la propiedad intelectual
+provocó una gran disputa entre Estados Unidos y Sudáfrica respecto
+a la concesión de «licencias obligatorias» para combatir la pandemia de
+sida, es decir, el gobierno sudafricano concedía licencias sin el consentimiento
+del propietario de la patente71. Estas demandas judiciales
+estadounidenses desencadenaron una ola de solidaridad internacional
+a gran escala con Sudáfrica, obligando a la omc a suavizar su posición
+
+68 Vandana Shiva, «Democracy Wins Patents Laws Debate in Indian Parliament»,
+twr, núm. 57, mayo de 1995, p. 12.
+69 Manish Panchal, Charu Kapoor y Mansi Mahajan, «Success strategies for Indian
+pharma industry in an uncertain world», Business Standard, Bombay, 17 de febrero
+de 2014.
+70 Institute of Medicine, «America’s Vital Interest in Global Health: Protecting
+Our People, Enhancing Our Economy and Advancing Our International Interest»,
+Washington dc, 1997. 71 La posibilidad de dicha concesión de licencias obligatoria se introdujo en 1925 en
+la Convención de París para la Protección de la Propiedad Industrial.
+supiot: Ley 159
+
+en la Declaración de Doha (2001) y a admitir que los imperativos de
+salud pública entraban en el ámbito de las derogaciones establecidas en
+el Acuerdo sobre los adpic72. El episodio demostró que la acción colectiva
+internacional puede frenar el proceso de extensión de la lógica de
+mercado a todos los aspectos de la vida humana. Al mismo tiempo, sin
+embargo, la Declaración de Doha aceptó el cambio del principio que rige
+el derecho sanitario internacional, que ahora se basa en la patentabilidad
+de los medicamentos73.
+
+El argumento principal a favor de la patentabilidad de los medicamentos
+fue que esta es esencial para la innovación. Remachado por la Comisión
+Europea en su Comunicación 351 de 2009 sobre el sector farmacéutico74,
+este argumento lo usan también algunos economistas, que basan
+su cuantificación de la innovación tecnológica en el número de patentes
+solicitadas75. En vista del enorme progreso terapéutico efectuado antes
+de la adopción de los Acuerdos sobre los adpic, no resulta muy convincente.
+Ha sido duramente criticado por otros economistas, como Joseph
+Stiglitz, que sostienen que, por el contrario, limitar la propiedad intelectual
+reabriría este terreno a la competencia76. La pandemia de la covid-19
+ha situado en el primer plano este conflicto entre normas. La seguridad
+sanitaria mundial significa que todos los habitantes del mundo deberían
+tener acceso a las vacunas, de acuerdo con la Constitución de la oms.
+Las multinacionales que las desarrollaron con ayuda de masivos fondos
+públicos intentan, sin embargo, obtener el mayor beneficio posible
+de ellas. En octubre de 2020, Sudáfrica y la India pidieron a la omc la
+derogación de las normas de propiedad intelectual sobre estas vacunas
+de modo que ello permita su producción masiva77. Respaldada por la
+oms y aproximadamente sesenta países, esta solicitud fue bien recibida
+
+72 C. Jourdain-Fortier, Santé et commerce international: Contribution à l’étude de la
+protection des valeurs non marchandes par le droit du commerce international, cit., pp.
+541-547.
+73 oms-omc, Los acuerdos de la omc y la salud pública, Ginebra, 2002. 74 com (2009) 351 final. Esta posición se modificó levemente en una nueva
+Comunicación de la Comisión adoptada en medio de la pandemia, que hace referencia
+a los «valores europeos comunes» ausentes en la Comunicación de 2009:
+«acceso universal al cuidado de calidad, a la equidad y a la solidaridad»: com (2020)
+761 final, 25 de noviembre de 2020.
+75 Philippe Aghion et al., «Innovation and Top Income Inequality», Bank of France,
+junio de 2015.
+76 Joseph Stiglitz y Adam Hersch, «The Transpacific Free-Trade Charade», Project
+Syndicate, 2 de octubre de 2015. 77 «South Africa and India push for covid-19 patents ban», The Lancet, 5 de diciembre
+de 2020.
+160 nlr 132
+
+por el director general de la omc e incluso por Biden, en ese momento
+recientemente elegido presidente de Estados Unidos78. Sin atreverse a
+contradecirle frontalmente, los políticos europeos se han mostrado muy
+reacios ante la propuesta y han defendido una política de donaciones
+benéficas de los países ricos a los pobres, sosteniendo ahora que los países
+«en vías de desarrollo» son incapaces de producir estas vacunas79.
+Pero países como la India y Sudáfrica están demandando la liberación
+de las patentes, precisamente porque ya poseen grandes industrias farmacéuticas80.
+En cuanto actor del orden de mercado, la Unión Europea
+presiona constantemente para que se establezcan «reformas estructurales»
+que reduzcan las obligaciones de los empresarios con la seguridad
+social y los servicios públicos, aunque ambos sirvan para «hacer vivir
+a las personas». Al mismo tiempo, defiende el alto nivel de las tasas
+obligatorias que favorecen a las multinacionales farmacéuticas, a pesar
+de que dichas tasas conducen a «dejar morir a las personas». La fe en
+el mercado total, el avatar más reciente del cientificismo, considera la
+vida humana como un medio y no como un fin. Observamos aquí el
+conflicto existente entre una lógica jurídica basada en los imperativos de
+la justicia social y la solidaridad y una lógica normalizadora destinada a
+engrasar los mecanismos del «orden espontáneo del mercado». Como
+indicábamos precedentemente, la «lucha por el derecho», reinvindicada
+por von Ihering, se ha vuelto más urgente que nunca81.
+
+78 «Waive Covid vaccine patents to put world on war footing», who/oms, 7 de
+marzo de 2021.
+79 Esta es notablemente la posición de los gobiernos suizo y alemán: Agence France
+Presse, 6 de mayo de 2021.
+80 Cf. Carlos Lopes y Dirk Willem te Velde, «Structural Transformation, Economic
+Development and Industrialization in Post-Covid-19 Africa», Institute for New
+Economic Thinking, 14 de enero de 2021; Dinesh Abrol y Thomas Franco, «How
+Can India Expand covid Vaccine Production Quickly?», The Wire, 26 de mayo de
+2021.
+81 Cf. Emilios Christodoulidis, The Redress of Law: Globalisation, Constitutionalism
+and Market Capture, Cambridge, 2021.
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,1790 @@
+Pedro Lucas de Moura Palotti
+
+Year
+
+chapter title
+
+http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/978-65-5635-032-5
+
+Maurício Mota Saboya Pinheiro
+
+João Paulo Dias
+
+ISBN
+
+http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/978-65-5635-032-5/capitulo13
+
+Organizers
+
+-
+
+BRAZILIAN INSTANCE
+
+PUBLIC POLICIES AND USES OF EVIDENCE IN BRAZIL:
+
+CHAPTER 13 - INSTITUTIONAL STATATIVISM AND THE EPISODES
+
+Series
+
+Brasilia
+
+Maricilene Isaira Baia do Nascimento
+
+Janine Mello
+
+2022
+
+Natália Massaco Koga
+
+Publishing company
+
+IT HURTS
+
+Authors
+
+Book's title
+
+Edition
+
+978-65-5635-032-5
+
+'
+
+IT HURTS
+
+Volume
+
+-
+
+City
+
+AROUND THE CAUSES OF FIRST MAGISTRACY
+
+CONCEPTS, METHODS, CONTEXTS AND PRACTICES
+
+Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea)
+
+1a
+
+Ipea publications are available for free download in PDF (all) and EPUB (books and periodicals)
+formats. Visit: http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/publicacoes
+
+Reproduction of this text and the data contained therein is permitted, provided the source is cited. Reproductions for
+commercial purposes are prohibited.
+
+© Institute of Applied Economic Research – Ipea 2022
+
+The opinions expressed in this publication are the exclusive and entire responsibility of the authors, not necessarily
+expressing the point of view of the Institute of Applied Economic Research or the Ministry of Economy.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+INSTITUTIONAL STATATIVISM AND THE EPISODES AROUND THE
+
+CAUSES OF BRAZILIAN JUDGEMENT OF FIRST INSTANCE1
+
+“[We] at the CNJ, President Gilmar Mendes, the councilors, we all know that
+we are living in a country of extreme, profound, unjust and hateful social
+inequality. And inequalities are also included in the scope of the Judiciary!”
+(CNJ, 2008a), exclaimed the then minister Gilson Dipp, national inspector of
+the CNJ, at the II National Meeting of the Judiciary, in February 2009. But the
+minister's speech, as it might seem, did not refer to the inequalities in accessing
+the Justice. He referred to structural inequalities within the judiciary, to
+“inequalities between instances”, to inequalities between “inflated courts” and
+“abandoned first-degree justice”: “Brazilian justice is as unequal as inequality
+between people” ( op. cit.), in a tone of denunciation, concluded the minister.
+The body that would centralize the coordination of the administrative and
+financial organization of the Brazilian Judiciary (the CNJ) had already been in
+existence for a little over four years, and, as if in a discursive coalition, it seems
+that the theses about the causes of the slowness of Justice, in the speeches
+given at the event: “Although they differ in terms of competences, the Brazilian
+judicial bodies form a single Judiciary, hence it is commonly said that the
+Judiciary is a national power, whose image is immediately affected if the shortest of the rods weakens” (CNJ,
+
+The first degree of jurisdiction is the gateway to
+Justice. It is the front line, the vanguard of the
+Judiciary. It is, in most cases, the only point of contact
+between the citizen and the Judiciary. It is where the
+service of Justice is visualized, felt, dreamed and
+achieved. It is the face of Justice that is perpetuated
+in the imagination of the thousands of men and
+women who seek help every year. (...). There is a
+pressing need to give a new perspective to the first
+degree. It is necessary to direct our eyes and attention to the gateway to Justice4
+
+João Paulo Dias3
+
+1. INTRODUCTION
+
+Maricilene Isaira Baia do Nascimento2
+
+CHAPTER 13
+
+3. Assistant researcher at the Center for Social Studies (CES) at the University of Coimbra, in Portugal.
+
+1. We are grateful for the debates, concerns and suggestions of Rebecca Neaera Abers, professor at the Institute of Political
+Science at the University of Brasília (Ipol/UnB), regarding the concepts proposed in this chapter, a partnership that made us
+reflect a lot on the inequalities of bureaucracy Brazilian judicial system.
+
+4. Speech by then Minister Joaquim Barbosa, at the time President of the Federal Supreme Court (STF) and CNJ, in an
+opening speech at the VII National Meeting of the Judiciary Power, in Belém do Pará, in November 2013. Available at CNJ (2013c ).
+
+2. Researcher at the Board of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy (Diest) at Ipea. E-mail:
+<maricilene.nascimento@ipea.gov.br>.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+428 | Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in
+Brazil: concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+
+2008b), declared the then president of the CNJ, Minister Gilmar Mendes. It was
+also a denunciation discourse: “just as in a well-organized machine, if a part does
+not work, no matter how small, it is the whole that is harmed” (op. cit.).
+
+Six days before the aforementioned Second National Meeting of the Judiciary
+Power, where the first Strategic Planning of the Judiciary Power would be approved,
+President Gilmar Mendes arrived, to add to the statistical evidence of the Justice in
+Numbers report, the recent statistical results of the 1st Survey on the Working
+Conditions of Judges, carried out by the Association of Brazilian Magistrates (AMB),
+in the pioneer presidency of a magistrate of first instance of the Northeast region,
+Judge Airton Mozart Valadares Pires, of the Court of Justice of the State of
+Pernambuco ( TJPE). In the report, the conclusion was that “the working conditions
+of magistrates reveal[ed] a worrying situation and help[ed] to understand the delay
+demanded by the citizen when resorting to Justice” (AMB, 2009, p. 4-5): the
+“number of judges in Brazil is insufficient for the number of cases”; “only 15% of the
+units process up to a thousand processes – a number considered acceptable”. “In
+addition to the insufficient number of judges, the survey reveals that the number of
+technical personnel is practically half of what would be needed to meet the demands
+of the Judiciary”; we have “lack of transparency in the way the resources of the
+Judiciary are managed”; “almost [the] totality of magistrates are unaware of the
+percentage of the Court's budget that is transferred to their unit”; and “more than
+two thirds of the judges say that the allocated resources are insufficient” (op. cit.).
+
+Highlighting one of the most impressive statistics from the latest Justice in Numbers
+report , created by statisticians from the Department of Judicial Research (DPJ),
+the president also highlights:
+
+This investigation proposes to highlight how statistical ecology was central to
+support a wave of intra-bureaucratic protests against structural inequalities between
+instances of the Brazilian judiciary. The work carried out here explores how the
+actors and defenders of the magistracy of first instance in Brazil mobilized statistics
+to try to reach historical claims of this class, located in different episodes, since the
+installation of the CNJ, in 2005, such as, among others: i) the search for the
+standardization of objective criteria in the career movement of the judiciary; ii) the
+right to vote in choosing the
+
+it matters little whether the congestion charge of a certain court is regular, or
+appears to be regular, if cases accumulate in the districts. (...) Many times,
+exactly this can happen: a given court may be giving the adequate answer in
+the second degree, precisely because the first degree has a high rate of
+congestion. [Therefore, there has to be] balance in the working conditions
+offered to the instances in order to prove adequate to the demands that pass
+through them, there needs to be an adequate distribution of resources between
+the second and first grades (CNJ, 2008b).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the
+Brazilian Magistracy of First Instance
+| 429
+
+As follows, after this introduction, section 2 brings the theoretical inspirations
+and proposed arguments; section 3 centralizes the proposed episodes; and, finally,
+section 4 presents the final considerations.
+
+direction of the courts; and iii) the construction of a distributive policy to subsidize
+
+improvements in the working conditions of the basic judiciary.
+
+“Statistical institutions [treat] people as members of abstract groups rather than
+individuals with unique identities, histories and motivations”, situates Haggerty
+(2001, p. 100) as this statement being one of the most central criticisms made of
+the State when using of quantification. After all, agrees Bourdieu (2014, p. 38), “it
+is not [only] an instrument that allows measuring, that allows those who govern to
+know the governed”, it is an instrument of symbolic construction of the State,
+especially in the construction principles of division, of production of legitimate social
+identities. “It is not by chance that there is a link between the State and statistics”,
+refers Bourdieu (2014, p. 38).
+
+To help with this research proposal, we dialogue with the conceptual proposal
+of Bruno, Didier and Vitale (2014), who argue that activism with statistics, which
+they call stativism, is a repertoire of action of social movements in contentious
+episodes for the search for representation and affirmation of the reality they
+experience, as well as to support criticism and denunciations of this reality. With
+inspiration from Abers' (2017) concept of institutional activism, we propose to
+characterize the episodes surrounding the causes of first-degree judiciary as
+institutional stativism, an activist movement with statistics by actors from the
+institutions themselves. From this, we seek to identify what we call statistics
+mobilization practices, a term referring to the construction of meanings with
+statistical principles, techniques and results to support and justify political causes.
+The methodology followed privileges the consultation of official and institutional
+sources, produced by social, professional and institutional actors, involved in the
+episodes surrounding the claims of the first instance judiciary in Brazil, whose data
+and analyzes were processed in the Atlas.ti software .
+
+In this role of categorical production, what we discuss is that “statistics are
+frequently contested” and that “certain movements denounce them, accusing
+quantification of freezing human relations; of transmitting a cold image of society;
+of constantly evaluating human beings, citizens, workers”, as identified by Bruno,
+Didier and Vitale (2014, p. 199).
+
+INSTITUTIONAL
+2 INSTITUTIONAL STATATIVISM: ACTIVISM, STATISTICS AND MOVEMENTS
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+5. Body created by Constitutional Amendment (EC) 45/2004 , with the mission of coordinating the administrative and financial
+management of the Brazilian courts.
+
+However, in the context of expectations leading to the creation of the
+CNJ,5 a statistics mobilization movement was born with a different approach
+from traditional denunciation movements and which has been institutionalized
+over the years, coming from internal and external voices of/in support of first
+instance judiciary in Brazil. The former general secretary and then advisor to
+the CNJ, judge Rubens Curado Silveira, representative of the first instance
+judiciary of the Labor Court, in an opinion published on the famous website
+Consultor Jurídica (ConJur), in August 2015, came to warn of the serious
+situations of inequalities experienced within the Judiciary. Specifically, he described:
+
+These denouncing excerpts from judge Rubens Curado accompanied his
+defense of the National Policy for Priority Attention to the First Degree of
+Jurisdiction, which had recently been launched by the CNJ (in 2014). The
+magistrate's protest was based on statistics published by the Justice in Numbers
+report, which were mobilized in several episodes of contestation over the
+working conditions under which the first instance judiciary in Brazil is historically
+subjected, and is a demonstration that shows that “ there are also emerging
+forms of collective action that use numbers, measures and indicators as means
+of denunciation and criticism. In certain cases, activists use statistics as a tool
+for struggle and as a means of emancipation” (Bruno, Didier and Vitale, 2014,
+p. 199). After all, this is a “form of statistical politics that involves (...) trying
+rhetorically to 'do things' with numbers, with statistics being used as a persuasive
+device to advance political causes” (Haggerty,
+
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in
+
+Brazil: concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+430 |
+
+The burden on the shoulders of servers in the first instance is equally greater:
+488 cases against 227 in the second instance. (...) by itself, it reveals the
+imbalance in the distribution of the workforce. That is to say: there are many
+servers where there are few processes and, proportionally, few servers where
+almost all processes are concentrated. This accumulation of collection can be
+explained, to a large extent, by the poor historical structure of the first instance,
+represented by counties and jurisdictional units lacking the minimum resources
+to meet the procedural demand. In contrast, the concentration of investments at
+the top of the courts is visible. As a result of a cultural inversion of priorities,
+sumptuous headquarters crowded with public servants share the scene with
+hovels crammed with processes (Silveira, 2015).
+
+Data from the Judiciary show an alarming workload on the first instance, which
+translates into society in the form of procedural delays. Suffice it to say that 95%
+of pending cases (stock) are in the first grade, responsible for a congestion rate
+of 77%, 30 percentage points higher than the second grade (47%). The workload
+of first-degree magistrates is, astonishingly, 6,383 cases per judge, double that
+imposed on second-degree judges.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+2001, p. 95). “Statistics are situated in broader discourses where they can be
+invoked to advance an agenda” (op. cit., p. 95). And that is a form of activism.
+More specifically, it is stativism.
+
+(Bruno, Didier and Vitale, 2014, p. 199). Traditionally used by the workers'
+movement, as stated by Bruno, Didier and Vitale (2014), stativism is moving to
+many fields of action and by many types of actors, and is present, mainly, in terms
+of state restructuring. In this action repertoire, there are two roles that the actors
+grant to statistics: representation of reality and criticism of reality. Therefore,
+Bruno, Didier and Vitale (2014) propose that, in the production of a shared reading
+of reality, we can find two dimensions of stativism: denunciation and affirmation.
+“In other words, we will see the role of stativists in denouncing a certain state of
+reality and, also, in efforts to use statistics in creating equivalence between
+disparate conditions and in cementing emerging social categories” (op. cit., p .
+198 ).
+
+In the case of the episodes that will be narrated here, a coalition in defense of
+the claims of the magistracy of first instance in Brazil mobilized official statistics,
+in particular to try to advance causes in denunciation of budgetary and personnel
+distributive practices, criteria and practices in the movement of careers and the
+election system for the administrative tops of the courts in the country.
+
+But, unlike what Bruno, Didier and Vitale (2014) propose to focus on,
+situating the mobilization of statistics in contentious causes as part of a broad
+repertoire of action by social movements, we propose to show that this tativism
+is also a repertoire of action by social movements . intrabureaucracy, a kind of
+action repertoire that we suggest conceptualizing as institutional stativism.
+
+Bruno, Didier and Vitale (2014) draw attention to the urgency of “recognizing
+how much social movements use statistics and quantification as part of
+
+This last term is inspired by the conceptual proposal of institutional activism6
+
+Bruno, Didier and Vitale (2014) propose that stativism, a term formed by the
+contraction of statistics and activism, is a particular form of action in a wide
+repertoire used by contemporary social movements (the mobilization of statistics);
+“it should be understood perhaps as a slogan to be brandished in battle, but also
+a term to be used in the description of those experiments aimed at reappropriating
+the power of statistics of denunciation and emancipation”
+
+by Abers (2017) – a proactive action that involves the search for opportunities by
+the state bureaucracy, the object of this action being the defense of a contentious
+cause, “even when it is opposed to the demands of its superiors” (op. cit. , p . 26).
+
+| 431
+
+6. We recognize that we were inspired in an ultra-adapted way by the concept of institutional activism proposed by Abers
+(2017), which situates activism in the relations of bureaucracy with social causes. However, we dare to propose that the
+concept helps us to think about repertoires of action in causes that we deem contentious within intra-bureaucratic relations,
+a conceptual journey that, we agree, requires refinements and justifications to the debate proposed in this chapter.
+
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the
+Brazilian Magistracy of First Instance
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Additionally, we also propose to show that, sometimes, statistics are
+mobilized to simultaneously criticize and represent, to denounce and
+
+their repertoires of action, in the criticism of certain statistics, as well as in the
+use of others as powerful instruments in political struggles” (op. cit., p. 202).
+Stativism, the authors suggest, “designates those statistical practices that are
+used to criticize and free from any authority”, but they also agree that
+quantification, sometimes, plays a crucial role in the construction of authority, of
+domination: “we could also to say that today there is hardly a better example of
+authority capable of disarming any criticism than a number or nexuses of
+numbers” (op. cit., p. 200). An important distinction that these authors bring is
+that statistics is about representing – synthetically – reality and stativism is about
+challenging the representation of reality with statistics themselves. Thus, in order
+to advance in this instrumental recognition that make statistics these movements,
+and that also applies to the nature of the movement with which we propose to
+analyze in this chapter, we agree that an important aspect to be investigated
+concerns the practices of mobilization of statistics that , as well as the purposes
+for which they are mobilized, can help in understanding how this form of activism
+develops.
+
+The examples of contentious episodes, around the causes of the magistracy
+of first instance in Brazil, which we will report in section 3, allow us to situate the
+practices of mobilization of statistics referring to the construction of systems of
+meanings with the elements of statistical ecology, such as principles, techniques,
+formulas and results, among other dimensions, to support, justify and represent
+political causes. On the battlefield, sometimes the mobilization of statistics occurs
+in reaction to criteria that have been established; “in other cases, stativism is not
+against indicators, but consists of quantifying data to make an issue visible and
+relevant” (Bruno, Didier and Vitale, 2014, p. 200). On this aspect, Nas cimento
+and Abers (2020) also show that, depending on where the actors are located in
+the intra-bureaucratic political dispute, different statistics mobilization strategies
+can be observed: actors producing statistics can mobilize statistical techniques
+whose resulting indicators are constituted in order to induce organizational
+changes, by classifying better and worse. Otherwise, the actors affected by such
+classification techniques – in particular, those who reach low positions in indices
+and indicators –, to mitigate socio-institutional losses, create and disseminate
+new interpretations, “sometimes abandoning, sometimes recombining some (...)
+elements [constituting the statistics], to propose positive interpretative trails of
+themselves” (op. cit., p. 138), which is the case they bring from the creation of
+the controversial Comparative Productivity Index of Justice (IPC-Jus), by the
+DPJ /CNJ, to assess the comparative productive efficiency of Brazilian courts.
+
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in
+
+Brazil: concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+432 |
+Machine Translated by Google
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the
+Brazilian Magistracy of First Instance
+
+3.1 Episode 1: “Deserving is not falling to those who work the hardest” (AMB,
+2010): questioning the criteria for career movement in the judiciary
+
+3 THE STATISTICAL ECOLOGY OF THE CAUSES OF FIRST MAGISTRATURE
+BRAZILIAN INSTANCE
+
+| 433
+
+claim. In the episodes that will be discussed around the causes of first instance
+
+judiciary in Brazil, this simultaneous practice will be explained.
+
+“This is a historic date for the Brazilian judiciary”, highlights the commemoration of
+
+the president of the AMB, judge Rodrigo Collaço, on the Migalhas website (CNJ
+
+welcome..., 2005). The commemoration was related to the reception of the request
+
+for measures submitted by the AMB to the CNJ, which claimed that the vote in the
+
+promotions by merit of judges from the first degree to the second degree should be
+open and reasoned. “It is the recognition of the importance of merit, the introduction
+of constitutional principles, such as transparency, impersonality and publicity in
+promotion based on merit. This will contribute to the appreciation of the judge before
+society” (op.cit .), stated the judge, situating the meaning of his commemoration.
+
+Another claim that accompanied the open and reasoned practice of voting for
+
+ascension to the second degree was the observance of the courts to what the
+
+Organic Law of the National Judiciary (Loman) already provided for in terms of
+
+promotion: the regulation by the courts of the verification and assessment of the promotion criteria.
+
+In the application submitted to the CNJ, the AMB argued that Constitutional
+
+Amendment 45/20047 – which brought changes known as the reform of the Judiciary,
+
+among which it created the CNJ – established “four objective criteria for the purpose
+
+of assessing the merit of judges, aiming at the promotion in the career”,8 and the
+
+demand was that “the immediate observance of these parameters was necessary,
+
+through an open and reasoned vote, by all national courts, in the acts of promotion
+
+of magistrates”. The open and reasoned practice of voting was so important for
+
+compliance with the adoption of objective criteria in the promotion process because
+
+“until the moment that preceded EC 45/2004 , promotions based on merit were
+
+made, in the national courts, through secret ballot, in which the magistrates on the
+
+list did not have access to the motivation for promotion”; therefore, “the subjective
+
+criterion prevailed over the objective”, denounces the AMB.
+
+7. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3Dgt4dH>.
+8. The quotations that follow were taken from the documentary files of the CNJ's procedural follow-up page.
+On this page, there are different images referring to the submission of the AMB action request. Available
+at: <https://bit.ly/3nygDDG>.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+9. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2YnCZ1I>.
+10. This defense of the quantification of criteria must be read in the historical context of the demands of the
+Brazilian judiciary, led by judiciary associations, such as the AMB. For several decades now, the excessive
+quantification and production of statistical indicators has been questioned, especially when its promoters forget
+to answer the question: what are data for? Gauléjac (2005) even calls it “quantyphrenia”. For more details of
+this discussion in other scientific areas, see, among other authors, Desrosières (2010), de Gauléjac (2005),
+Koga (2003) or Roy and Offredi (2011).
+
+434 | Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in
+Brazil: concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+
+Citing excerpts from Loman,9 the request for measures highlighted that, for the purpose
+
+of composing a triple list,
+
+The complaint was about the validity of objective investigations, when available,
+
+without due regulation by the court. According to AMB's claim and complaint, in relation to
+
+Loman's enrollment: “As can be seen, such criteria could only be considered effectively
+
+objective in the face of any 'regulation issued by the court', because, if they were
+
+considered as such in law, would not meet the legal requirement”.
+
+This is a case in which the mobilization of statistics can be observed to defend that
+
+the objectification of criteria is the only practice that represents the fair structuring of the
+
+rationale for moving the career of the judiciary.
+
+of the criteria teaches us that actors can direct statistical elements and quantification as
+
+the only valid means of representing reality, including to dilute the autonomy of more
+
+powerful actors that, otherwise, under another type of industriousness, would not be
+
+possible. In this episode, statistics represent and guarantee more rights than any other
+
+type of operationalization.10
+
+The AMB further adds that: It
+
+is necessary for each court to discipline, at least, (a) what the judge's conduct is
+(...), (b) what are the parameters in order to be able to quantify the industriousness
+in the exercise of the position, and (d) the valuation to be attributed to each
+improvement course. (...) [The] courts have never observed these criteria (...)
+promotions always take place by means of a mere secret ballot (...). A given judge
+received fewer votes than another without knowing which objective requirements
+the winner would have fulfilled to the detriment of his requirements.
+
+The claim for parameterization, for valuation, for quantified industriousness
+
+EC no. 45/2004 also legislated on the matter, specifying that promotion should take
+
+place by “measuring merit according to performance and objective criteria of productivity
+
+and promptness in the exercise of jurisdiction and
+
+merit will be determined at the entrance and assessed with the prevalence of
+objective criteria, in the form of the regulations issued by the Court of Justice,
+taking into account the conduct of the judge, his industriousness in carrying out
+his position, the number of times he has appeared in the list, (...) as well as the
+use in improvement courses.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the
+Brazilian Magistracy of First Instance
+| 435
+
+But it was also not enough to resort to the CNJ to remind the courts about the
+
+constitutional observance of openness and the objective justification of the vote; the
+
+experience was still not ideal, especially in terms of grounds. The denunciations
+
+continued, such as those of the then president of the AMB, Judge Mozart Valadares, in
+
+defense of the draft of the new resolution proposed by the Commission on Prerogatives
+
+in the Career of Magistracy, created during the administration of Minister Gilmar Mendes:
+
+“The vast majority of judges treat the public space as if it were private”: “To be promoted
+
+to the TJPE, the candidate must make a pilgrimage through the judges’ office, assuming
+
+commitments that this collegiate does not waive”. “So you get there without
+
+independence” (Magalhães, 2008), “deserving is not falling to the one who works the
+
+hardest. If the magistrate knows that the work is not enough to get the promotion, the
+
+result is discouragement” (AMB, 2010). The new resolution, which was open for public
+
+consultation, and which would replace Resolution 6/2005 , regulated more specifically on
+
+the parameterization and operationalization of the objectivity of the criteria for
+
+for the attendance and success in official or recognized improvement courses”, he adds
+
+in his request for measures to AMB. The petition motivated the proposal of one of the
+
+CNJ's first resolutions, Resolution no. 6, of September 2005, which resolved on the
+
+“measurement of merit for the promotion of magistrates and access to second-degree
+
+courts”, guaranteeing, in art. 1st
+
+In the words of the author of the original proposal, minister Ives Gandra, on the
+
+Miga lhas website , “the idea is to provide more objectivity to the promotion of magistrates,
+
+avoiding political criteria and standardizing the rules in the courts” (CNJ analyses..., 2010) .
+
+, that
+
+“promotions based on merit of magistrates will be carried out in a public session, in a
+
+nominal, open and reasoned vote” (CNJ, 2005). Furthermore, it resolved that the courts
+
+should issue normative acts regulating the objective assessment of the criteria provided
+
+for by EC no. 45/2004.
+
+the voting members (...) declare the foundations of their conviction (...) in the
+choice, which are: I - performance (qualitative aspect of the jurisdictional
+provision); II - productivity (quantitative aspect of jurisdictional provision); III -
+promptness in the exercise of functions; IV - technical improvement; V - adequacy
+of conduct to the Code of Ethics of the National Judiciary (2008) (CNJ, 2010).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in Brazil:
+
+concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+
+The parameterization structure and quantified workmanship for measuring merit in
+career movement from first to second degree
+
+436 |
+
+It is
+
+Evaluation of technical improvement
+
+V – adequacy of conduct to CEMN: 15 points.
+
+III – Teaching classes in lectures and courses promoted
+by courts or councils of the Judiciary, by judicial schools or
+by educational institutions affiliated with the Judiciary
+
+e) effective participation in joint efforts, in itinerant justice and other institutional
+initiatives;
+
+II – Production volume
+
+a) compliance with procedural deadlines, computing the number of cases with
+expired deadlines and unjustifiable delays;
+
+Assessment of the quality of decisions
+
+c) the average duration of the process in the court, from the distribution to the sentence;
+
+f) the average time of the process in court.
+
+g) inspection of judicial and extrajudicial facilities and prison and internment facilities
+for the protection of minors under its jurisdiction;
+
+I – performance: 20 points.
+
+b) clarity.
+
+IV – technical improvement: 10 points.
+
+a) attendance at forensic work;
+Productivity assessment
+
+j) publications, projects, studies and procedures that have contributed to the organization
+and improvement of the public services of the Judiciary;
+
+Assessment of the adequacy of conduct to the Code of Ethics of the National Judiciary
+(CEMN)
+
+e) respect for the precedents of the Federal Supreme Court and superior
+courts.
+
+I – Attendance and performance in official courses or
+courses recognized by the respective national schools,
+considering courses and events offered equally to all
+magistrates by the courts and councils of the Judiciary, by
+the court schools, directly or through an agreement;
+
+c) administrative management;
+
+I – Work structure a) sharing
+
+of activities in the jurisdictional unit with another
+magistrate (incumbent, substitute or auxiliary); b) collection
+and procedural
+flow existing in the jurisdictional unit; c) accumulation of
+activities; d)
+jurisdiction and type of court; It
+is
+
+k) alignment with the goals of the Judiciary, outlined under the coordination of the
+National Council of Justice.
+
+a) independence, impartiality, transparency, personal and professional integrity,
+diligence and dedication, courtesy, prudence, professional secrecy, knowledge and
+training, dignity, honor and decorum;
+
+the essay.
+
+f) residence and permanence in the district;
+
+b) the average time for the performance of acts;
+
+a) number of hearings held; b) number of
+reconciliations carried out; c) number of
+interlocutory decisions issued; d) number of sentences
+handed down, by procedural class and prioritizing the oldest
+cases; e) number of judgments and decisions handed down
+in substitution or assistance in the second degree, as
+well as in appellate classes of special civil and criminal
+courts; It is
+
+Evaluation of merit (maximum score of the criteria)
+
+b) administrative disciplinary proceedings opened against the magistrate and sanctions
+applied during the evaluation period.
+
+II – productivity: 30 points.
+
+h) effective measures to encourage conciliation at any stage of the process;
+
+Operationalization of the productivity assessment: the
+average number of sentences and hearings compared to
+the average productivity of judges from similar units, using,
+for this purpose, the median and standard deviation institutes
+from the science of statistics, privileging in all cases, judges
+whose conciliation rate is proportionally higher than the rate
+of sentences handed down within the same average.
+
+d) the average duration of the process in the court, from the sentence to the definitive
+archiving, disregarding, in this case, the time that the process was in the appeal
+stage or suspended; It is
+
+c) objectivity.
+
+readiness assessment
+
+b) punctuality in hearings and sessions;
+
+d) relevance of doctrine and jurisprudence.
+
+e) the number of net sentences handed down in cases submitted to the summary and
+very summary procedure and hearings handed down in hearings.
+
+I - Dedication
+
+II - Speed in the provision of jurisdiction
+
+e) the branch's operating structure (human resources,
+
+technology, physical installations and material resources).
+
+d) acting in a jurisdictional unit previously defined by the court that is difficult to serve;
+
+i) procedural and technological innovations to increase judicial provision;
+
+II – Diplomas, titles or certificates of completion of legal
+courses or related areas and related to the professional
+skills of the judiciary, completed after entering the career; It
+is
+
+III – promptness: 25 points.
+
+Source: CNJ (2010).
+
+TABLE 1
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the
+Brazilian Magistracy of First Instance
+| 437
+
+Instead of drawing attention to the only valid way of constructing the basis of
+
+the vote for career advancement, it was time to point out the specificities of the
+
+elements of objectification, parameterization and quantification of the laboriousness
+
+of the measurement. The movement of representation of the judiciary was still
+
+around the quantitative assessment of those who work the most. The new resolution
+valued the criteria, in addition to specifying the operationalization of some variables,
+such as the variables belonging to the evaluation of productivity and the evaluation
+of promptness. Measures such as mean, median, standard deviation and indices
+were suggested for normalization. However, as can be seen in Table 1, the norm
+brought a hybrid operationalization of the criteria, which was the reason for the
+controversies that arose around the new resolution proposal. Despite the new
+standardization establishing the maximum quantitative score of the criteria that
+compose the assessment by merit, even the criteria for evaluating productivity and
+evaluating readiness, it was not specifically established in part of its variables how
+much and how to quantify. In addition, the new norm added new criteria that were
+difficult to measure quantitatively, such as the assessment of the quality of decisions
+and the assessment of the adequacy of conduct to the Code of Ethics of the
+National Judiciary. The hybridity and plasticity of some criteria leave room for
+different approaches, particularly by the evaluator, but it also interferes with the way
+in which the evaluated person defines the course of his professional performance,
+as can be seen in studies on the issue (Dias, 2004) .
+
+The new norm generated many contrary repercussions by associations of the
+
+judiciary; in particular, the AMB, the Association of Federal Judges of Brazil (Ajufe)
+
+and the National Association of Labor Justice Magistrates (Anamatra), claiming that,
+with Resolution 106/2010, in fact, the proponents “ended up establishing subjective
+criteria and still violate the principles of independence of judges, isonomy and
+proportionality” (STF, 2010), argued the associations in the Direct Action of
+Unconstitutionality (ADI) No. 4,510, filed at the STF . Previously, the associations
+had submitted a request for measures to the CNJ, denouncing that many provisions
+of Resolution 106/2010 lacked constitutional support, such as the new criteria for
+measurement, in addition to the risk of subjectivity they entailed in the evaluation.
+However, this is the resolution that still applies today.
+
+The date of March 31, 2014 marked the apex of what became known as the Direct
+
+Elections Movement in the Brazilian Courts. On that day, male and female judges
+
+from all over the country, coordinated by the national and local professional
+
+associations of the judiciary, filed requests asking for changes in the internal regulations of their
+
+3.2 Episode 2: “Putting these more than 80% of members of the
+Judiciary as protagonists in the management of the Justice
+system” (CNJ, 2016a): the Direct Elections Movement in Brazilian Courts
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+FIGURE 1
+
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in Brazil:
+
+concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+
+Campaign image of the Diretas Já movement in Brazilian courts
+
+438 |
+
+Continuing the defense for democratization in the Brazilian courts, the
+then president of the AMB, the judge of the first degree of the Court of Justice
+of the State of Rio Grande do Sul (TJRGS), João Ricardo dos Santos Costa,
+explained that the date of March 31, 2014 was not random to proclaim the
+movement: “The choice of date by the Association of Brazilian Magistrates was (...) a way
+
+respective courts, so that all lifelong judges of the first degree also had the right
+to vote to choose the presidency and vice-presidency of the courts (Diretas
+Já..., 2014). It was also an old claim that came from more remote times and
+that gained strength with the arrival of members of the first degree judiciary in
+the presidency of associations (Magalhães, 2008): “There is no internal
+democracy in the Judiciary (...)” , “(...) first degree judges are members of the
+Judiciary and have to participate in the administration of this power”, “We want
+a more accessible Judiciary, made to serve the population and not judges,
+judges and ministers”, “ We want good working conditions, functional buildings
+and not luxury” (op.cit .), denounced and claimed, at the time of his presidency
+of the AMB, the judge of the first degree from Pernambuco, Mozart Valadares.
+
+Source: Cardoso (2014).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the
+Brazilian Magistracy of First Instance
+
+[Therefore] from the moment the choice process also has to pass
+through the expression of will of the judges of first instance, there will
+be, in principle, a tendency to make an administration also focused on
+the first instance (AMB , 2014, p. 2).
+
+| 439
+
+to show that, 50 years after the military coup of 1964, 'the Judiciary has not yet reached
+
+democracy in its fullness',(...) only judges, who represent 17% of magistrates throughout
+
+the country, can vote” (Diretas Already..., 2014).
+
+In fact, the opening of elections for the entire Judiciary "will enable a better
+
+qualification of the Judiciary and the improvement of our jurisdictional performance"
+
+The point is that
+
+it is not just a matter of democratizing the administrative structure of the Judiciary,
+but mainly of allowing the choice of that magistrate who, for the majority of
+members of the judiciary, presents himself as the best manager, the best
+administrator of public affairs. , (...) while the process of choosing management
+positions is restricted to the electoral college formed by magistrates who are part
+of the second instance, the administration of the first instance will be relegated to
+the particular will of the elected magistrate (...) by the members exclusively of the second instance.
+
+“After all, it is not credible that only 17% of the judiciary is allowed to define the
+
+destinations of the Judiciary” (AMB, 2014, p. 9), claimed the president of the AMB, in
+
+the request for measures to the CNJ, filed on April 8 of 2014, as a national symbol of
+
+the coalition for Diretas Já in the Brazilian courts, requesting that the council issue a
+
+“recommendation to all courts of Justice for them to change their internal regulations,
+
+aiming to expand the college of voters in order to reach all magistrates linked to the
+
+courts, in the process of choosing presidents and vice presidents” (op. cit., p. 10).
+
+(Santos and Romão, 2014), published on the website of the Order of Lawyers of Brazil
+
+(OAB), regional of Ceará, a second degree magistrate of the Court of Justice of the
+
+State of Ceará (TJCE) in favor of the cause. According to Santos and Romão (2014):
+
+“several Brazilian courts abandon the first instance, granting good working conditions
+
+only to the second level; and this is nothing more than a reflection of the electoral
+
+process for the administration of the court”, therefore, “through a direct election, the
+
+monocratic judges will be able to charge the elected judges, demanding a management
+
+focused on the first degree” (op. cit . .). It is not just a cause of the judiciary, “the direct
+
+election reveals a way of inserting democratic management within the scope of the
+
+Judiciary, because democracy enables a leadership committed to the aspirations of
+
+those under jurisdiction and to the results desired by the institution” (op . cit .). Thus,
+
+the magistrate makes the following statement: “No one is better than the first degree
+
+judge to diagnose the needs of the district where his work is to be carried out, due to
+
+his approach to the parties and lawyers” (op. cit. ) .
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in
+
+Brazil: concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+440 |
+
+The struggle comes from the country's pre-democratization period, and it turned out
+that the Constitution of [19]88 did not include a full democratization of the three
+powers of the Republic and the Judiciary was left pending. We made this request
+based on the possibility of the National Council of Justice, as manager of national
+policies for the Judiciary, issuing a recommendation, (...) it is a recommendation that
+we are proposing, in order for the courts to make progress on this issue of full
+participation of the judiciary in the choice of boards of directors (...). I would like to
+address this topic here from the perspective of the management of the Brazilian
+Justice system: one of the biggest difficulties we have today, perhaps the biggest
+problem, maybe not, the biggest problem of the Brazilian Justice system, is
+congestion, there are the lengthy services that the Judiciary has provided to Brazilian
+society. [In] these ten years of CNJ, we have not yet managed to advance in this
+aspect, and we understand that an important step for us to move forward would be to
+place these more than 80% of the members of the Judiciary as protagonists in the management of the Justice system (CNJ, 2016a) .
+
+The difficulties we have to face are very visible, in conceiving a national policy on the
+basis of the Justice system, where all the demand for justice in the country is received
+(...) these difficulties (...) notably occur due to of the verticalized policies that are
+conceived by the courts. And this is due to the way in which the representation of the
+Brazilian Justice is constituted (CNJ, 2016a).
+
+The movement for direct elections in the courts invokes the old relationship
+
+between statistical principles and democratization. More than 80% of members of
+the Judiciary Power without the right to vote for the choice of the direction of the
+courts, which is the percentage of members of the national magistracy of first
+instance, justifies the criticism that there is no democracy in the Judiciary, that there
+is no a system of majority representation, of which the current proportion does not
+mean democracy. Only 17% of the members of the judiciary and belonging to
+another level of jurisdiction with voting rights was the proportional representation
+used by the actors to characterize the organizational government system of the
+courts as dictatorships, as indicated by the symbolism of the campaign I want to
+vote for president . Direct now in Brazilian courts.
+
+And the day of voting arrived for granting or not the request for measures
+submitted by the AMB, specifically at the 238th Ordinary Session of the CNJ, which
+took place on September 28, 2016. Although, in the documented request, submitted
+in 2014, there was no mobilization of statistics to support the arguments for the
+democratization of the state courts, it was left to the crucial moment of the plenary
+sessions of the council, which is the oral support of the interested party. In defense
+of the claim, the presiding judge of the AMB, Ricardo Costa, reminds the plenary that this
+
+The correlation between the non-election participation of almost 80% of
+members of the Brazilian Judiciary and the problems of the Judiciary was close, in
+the view of the claimants.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the
+Brazilian Magistracy of First Instance
+
+Judiciary (...) cannot remain immune, insensitive, to democratic activity; and
+democratic activity, it involves precisely the participation of first degree
+judges in court decisions (CNJ, 2016a).
+
+The subject addressed today is of extreme importance for the judiciary. It is
+extremely important for the judiciary because we, first class magistrates,
+are, for the most part, so I don't generalize, excluded from the decisions of
+the courts to which we belong. (...) There is, in fact, in Brazil, a mismatch
+between the first-degree judiciary and the second-degree judiciary. While
+the offices of first degree judges have a maximum of two advisors, the
+offices of judges have at least eighteen advisors (...). There are situations of
+courts in Brazil that, despite having only 4% of the cases being processed
+in the state, have 26% of the employees allocated to the state Judiciary.
+This is a situation that we know is directly reflected in the issue of democratization, [and the]
+
+| 441
+
+In comparison to the way in which the system of participation in other powers
+
+is developed, emphasizes the magistrate, president of Ajufe, Roberto Carvalho
+
+This correlation built by the actors exposes the administrative management
+
+representation crisis that exists in the Brazilian courts. Still in the view of the judge
+
+president of the AMB, “we have made a lot of progress in relation to this, but in many
+
+courts we still practice the seniority criterion. So, today, the manager waits his turn,
+
+he does not commit to a project, (...) and he is not accountable after he leaves” (CNJ,
+2016a). In this excerpt, there is another denunciation of the system for establishing
+administrative leadership – and representation – in the courts, which is the existence
+of the seniority rule for candidates running for president. For reasons of this electoral
+structure, the president of the AMB denounces, “the members of Power do not know
+what will be carried out, the commitments they have, (...) there is already a problem
+of legitimation and a serious problem in representation, which is something expensive
+in democracy. This, in the scope of management, has quite evident consequences” (op.
+cit.). It is “about valuing that sector [in] which all demands for justice are involved
+and [in] which almost, much more than half, almost 90% of disputes are at the basis
+of the Justice system, and this basis is found become precarious in view of the way
+the courts have been managed” (op. cit.), he sustains.
+
+There is another dimension of representation constructed by the actors when
+
+they demand appreciation via the right to vote in that sector in which all the demand
+for justice comes into play: not representing the base judiciary means not also
+representing those under jurisdiction, society. This non-representation is supported,
+in the actors' view, by the proportion of structural working conditions between the
+instances, a dimension centrally brought up in oral arguments by the president of
+Ajufe, judge Roberto Carvalho Veloso, in support of the AMB:
+
+Veloso, in his oral argument,
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Another aspect that draws attention is the strategy of the actors in invoking
+a system of terms that help to frame the meaning of the proportionality of
+disputes and the number of judges in the composition of the instances, in order
+to give rhetorical force to the claim for voting. Mobilized terms, such as the basis
+of the system, gateway, population, Diretas Já, representation, participation and
+manifestation of the [popular] will, approached the first degree judiciary as being
+compared to the people, society, the voter – a statist movement which proposed
+the meaning of the first instance as not being the lowest, but the most crucial for
+the Justice system, a meaning that had great repercussions in the construction
+of the National Policy of Priority Attention to the First Degree of Jurisdiction of
+the CNJ.
+
+The fight continued even though the CNJ plenary rejected the request of the
+AMB for the issuance of a recommendation to the courts for the inclusion of the
+magistracy of first instance in the electoral process. In times of projection of what
+would become known as the apex of the movement of associations for the
+democratization of the administrative structures of the Judiciary, another
+mobilization around the cause was also born from within the CNJ, in the
+construction of a judicial institutional public policy that would try to change the
+course of the meaning of first instance justice in the organizational structure of the justice system:
+
+This was an enthusiastic announcement, at the Preparatory Meeting for the
+7th National Meeting of the Judiciary, by the counselor representing the first
+degree magistracy of Labor Justice, Judge Rubens Curado Silveira, one of the
+central actors in the idealization of this policy and coordinator of the group of
+work instituted by CNJ Ordinance No. 155, of September 6, 2013 (CNJ, 2013a).
+“And what made the National Council, especially the president, propose this
+working group, as a sign of a permanent national policy aimed at
+
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in
+
+Brazil: concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+442 |
+
+Even the Executive, the executives, mainly the municipal executives, who are
+elected by direct vote of the people, today, adopted the measure of the
+participatory budget, in which the population is heard in advance (...). Why
+can't we do this in the Judiciary too? And the path is the participation of first
+degree magistrates in the election of the board of directors (CNJ, 2016a).
+
+Yesterday we also received, with great joy, the constitution of this working
+group, (...) something innovative on the part of Minister Joaquim Barbosa, of a
+group to present to him, to the National Council of Justice, (...) proposals that
+will consolidate and implement a future, but already launched, policy of
+prioritizing the first level of jurisdiction (CNJ, 2013b).
+
+3.3 Episode 3: “Suffice it to say, I will not dwell on numbers, that
+90% of cases in Brazil are at the first level of jurisdiction” (CNJ,
+2013b): The National Policy of Priority Attention to the First Level of Jurisdiction
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the
+Brazilian Magistracy of First Instance
+
+According to data from the Justice in Numbers report, 90% of the cases being
+processed by the Judiciary are in the first level units, giving rise to an average
+congestion rate of 73%, 23 percentage points above the existing rate in the
+second level, and the main cause of current systemic slowness; [in addition,] the
+data from that same report point, as a rule, to an inadequate distribution of public
+servants between the first and second levels of jurisdiction, disproportionate to
+the demand for cases (CNJ, 2013a).
+
+Suffice it to say, I won't go into numbers, that 90% of cases in Brazil are in the
+first level of jurisdiction (...). A diagnosis that underlies all of our work, and that
+jumps to our eyes, in fact, and that is known to all of us, [is that the] (...) great
+bottleneck of the Judiciary is in the first degree of jurisdiction (. ..). Of the 89
+million lawsuits that were processed in 2011, according to the latest official data
+from the [report] Justiça em Números, almost 80.79 million are at the first level
+of jurisdiction. (...) And we know, we all know the first degree of jurisdiction, and
+we know the difficulties faced (...), which are also portrayed in the congestion
+rate, which is more than 50%, on a national average, [ than second degree
+(CNJ, 2013b).
+
+| 443
+
+In 2013, in the ordinance that established the working group, the presidency of
+
+the CNJ, in the exercise of its attributions, already set the statistical tone that
+
+legitimized the interpretation of this kind of statistical causal chain of the slowness of
+
+Justice to justify the need to create this group , in order to think about the prioritization policy
+
+prioritization of the first level of jurisdiction, were the data extracted from all this
+
+strategic management work” (CNJ, 2013b), the counselor also justified.
+
+The extracted data referred to those published in the Justice in Numbers report,
+
+whose statistics systematize the comparative results of procedural, budgetary and
+
+personnel demands between the first and second levels of jurisdiction of each
+
+segment of Justice by the CNJ. The report ’s indices and indicators
+
+Under such statistical justifications, the group created had the responsibility of
+
+“developing studies and presenting proposals (...) with a view to the implementation
+
+of a national policy aimed at prioritizing the first level of jurisdiction in the Brazilian
+
+courts”, in particular “with a view to identify the main problems faced by Brazilian
+
+courts” (CNJ, 2013a).
+
+they were the central source of institutional evidence to support the entire argument in
+favor of the need to centralize the issue of the structural conditions of the Court of First
+Instance, as being a priority in the modernization policies of the Judiciary; in particular,
+an indicator that, in the view of the claimants, statistically translated the delay in the
+jurisdictional provision and the proportion of the procedural demand to the instances,
+at the same time that it represented the structural difficulties faced by the Justice of
+first instance (the congestion charge) :
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+444 | Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in
+Brazil: concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+
+According to the Justice in Numbers 2013 report, of the 92.2 million cases
+that were processed in the Brazilian Judiciary in 2012, 82.9 million were
+in the first degree (...). The data also reveal that the first degree lowered 23.1
+million processes, demonstrating that its annual production capacity is only
+28% of the demand (new cases plus collection) imposed on its appreciation (...).
+Therefore, the first degree congestion rate is 72%, 26 percentage points
+above the second degree rate of 46% (CNJ, 2013c, p. 5).
+
+In the report, one conclusion: the productivity of the first instance was
+compromised. The solution proposals translated into draft resolutions in the
+aforementioned report were named by the working group as being proposals of
+the National Policy for Priority Attention to the First Degree of Jurisdiction. In
+politics, lines of action were proposed, they were those that represented old
+yearnings and claims of the first degree magistracy almost in formulas, among
+which: i) equalization of the workforce between the first and second degrees,
+proportionally to the demand for Law Suit; ii) budgetary adequacy for the
+development of first instance judicial activities; iii) infrastructure and technology;
+iv) collaborative governance, favoring internal democracy; and v) social and
+institutional dialogue (CNJ, 2013c).
+
+In this more mature episode of the claim of the first degree magistracy, in
+which a specific national policy of prioritization was already brought to the
+actions of the CNJ, the rate of procedural congestion linked to other statistics
+that showed the unequal proportion of structural conditions between instances,
+as the proportion of civil servants among them, was central to the mobilization
+of evidence by claiming actors to reaffirm, in diagnoses recorded in official
+documents, such as technical reports, that, in the view of the institution
+responsible for coordinating the modernization policies of the Judiciary, there
+was something wrong with the management of resources in the courts: “[The]
+first level of jurisdiction is the most overloaded segment of the Judiciary and,
+therefore, the one that provides judicial services that fall short of the desired
+quality” (CNJ, 2013c, p. 5 ), concluded the report published in December 2013,
+containing the studies and proposals carried out by the working group, which
+relied, among other institutional actors, on the technical support of the DPJ. But
+it wasn't a criticism of the first degree, it was the defense of old causes:
+
+Among the proposed resolutions contained in the report, it was envisaged
+to empower the country's judiciary and first-instance officials to manage the
+policy, in the institution of the First Degree Prioritization Network: "the courts will
+indicate to the presidency of the CNJ, in the within thirty days, two first-degree
+magistrates to act as regional policy managers within the scope of their
+activities” (CNJ, 2013c, p. 22). It was the proposal for a system of representation
+and participation that attempted to dilute the majority system of second-class judiciary.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+| 445
+
+instance in decision-making on court resources and the unequal allocative
+parameters of these resources. In order to seek to guarantee new ways of
+allocating resources, two other directives were specifically at the center of another
+draft resolution proposed by the working group within the scope of the policy: “The
+poor distribution of resources available in the courts, notably among the units of
+first and second degrees, is one of the main causes of insufficient performance in
+the first instance” (op. cit., p. 25), diagnosed the working group. It was a great
+opportunity for the base judiciary to institutionalize the search for equality in
+working conditions between instances: “In effect, the working group presents a
+proposal to issue a normative act to regulate the equitable distribution of budget,
+employees, positions in commission and commissioned functions between the first
+and second levels of jurisdiction, respecting the principles of efficiency and
+proportionality” (op. cit., p. 25); and to, furthermore, “strengthen the independence
+and autonomy of first-degree magistrates” (op. cit., p. 25).
+
+The statistical parameterization project of the actors was aimed at the
+democratization of administrative structures. This proposed resolution, to regulate
+the matter, also mobilized other statistics used in the Justice in Numbers report,
+for the purpose of parameterization and distribution, including:
+
+•
+
+the IPS, “obtained by dividing the total number of processes downloaded
+in the previous year by the number
+
+of servers”; the Productivity Index Applied to Warrant Execution Activity
+
+•
+
+(Ipex), “obtained by dividing the total number of warrants executed in
+the previous year by the number of employees in the warrant execution
+
+area”; the congestion rate, “an indicator that [measures] the percentage
+of cases that were processed during a given base period (new cases
+plus pending cases), but that were not downloaded”; It is
+
+The desires for the democratization of the administrative structures of the
+courts were embodied by the actors in statistical formulas, which operationalized
+the equalization between the instances. The proposed resolution discussed
+“identification and proportional distribution of the budget between the first and
+second degrees, (...) effective participation of magistrates and civil servants in the
+planning and execution of the budget, [and] improvement of the quality of budget
+execution” (CNJ, 2013c, p. 26). Specifically, the proposal established the
+application of “objective parameters [in] the distribution [and movement] of the
+workforce, linked to the demand for processes, with a guarantee of a minimum
+structure of the units in the end area” (op. cit. , p . 28); that is, the construction of
+distributive parameters was a function of the workload, a function that would favor the most overloaded instance.
+
+•
+
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the
+Brazilian Magistracy of First Instance
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+SaJud - total servers in the areas of direct support to the judging activity: indicates the total number of servers allocated in the areas of
+direct support to the judging activity in effective activity at the end of the base year, covering effective servers - except requested
+assignments and commissioners with no bond . The sum of the first and second degrees is also considered.
+
+446 |
+
+Applying the percentages obtained in the previous formulation to the total number of civil servants in the
+
+Average number of new second-degree cases in the last three years.
+
+Formula: proportion to the second degree
+
+The statistical representations that proposed the formulation of the operationalization of distributive equity of the workforce
+
+were around the proportion of new cases entering the instances (table 2).
+
+Source: CNJ (2013c).
+
+the quartile, “statistical measure that divides the ordered set of data into four equal parts, with each part representing
+
+25%” (CNJ, 2013c, p. 30).
+
+Formula: total number of employees in the areas of direct
+support for judicial activity in the first degree
+areas of direct support for judicial activity, there are:
+
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in Brazil: concepts, methods,
+
+contexts and practices
+
+Formulas for operationalizing the equitable distribution of the workforce proportional to the procedural size between first and
+
+second degree
+
+CN1o – new cases in the first instance: indicates the total number
+of new cases in the first instance during the base year. It is considered
+the sum of the knowledge and execution processes.
+
+–,
+
+Glossary
+
+TABLE 2
+
+Formula: total number of employees in the areas of direct
+support for judicial activity in the second degree
+
+This episode around the construction of an institutional policy that seeks to prioritize the demands of the first degree shows
+
+that stativism as a repertoire of action of institutional movements is not limited to the action of mobilizing statistics as instruments of
+
+claim or affirmation, the claiming actors they also create institutional fields to give voice to a discursive coalition, with the purpose of
+
+legitimizing the argument that the parameters of the proposed statistical activity represent a chain of actors. This practice was proposed
+
+and carried out by the working group, and, at its request, the CNJ presidency convened the first public hearing of the council, which took
+
+place in February 2014, with a view to hearing the actors interested in the subject in order to formulate opinions on the proposals.
+
+regulations, in addition to collecting contributions around the efficiency of the first degree of jurisdiction and legislative improvement
+
+aimed at the Judiciary,
+
+Formula: proportion to the first degree
+
+CN2o – new cases in secondary education: indicates the total number of
+new cases in secondary education during the base year.
+
+Average number of new first instance cases in the last three years.
+
+•
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the Brazilian
+Magistracy of First Instance
+
+The public hearing that now begins carries important symbolism. It is symbolic because it is
+
+the first public hearing in the history of the National Council of Justice, the first opportunity in
+
+which the CNJ, for two days, suspends part of its activities to listen to society to be represented
+
+by the main actors of the Justice system, in the certainty that social and inter-institutional
+
+dialogue oxygenates institutions and nurtures democracy. It is also symbolic because it raises
+
+issues of the greatest relevance to Justice and Brazilian society. During these two days of
+
+hearing, we will hear from representatives of prominent public and private institutions that
+
+responded to the CNJ's call to comment on the topics under debate: (...) magistrates, members
+
+of the Public Ministry, public defenders, public and private lawyers, servers and representatives
+
+of the academy (...). First-class efficiency is not a wish, it is not a dream, it is an obligation
+
+(CNJ, 2014b).
+
+It is (...) a moment of great opportunity, a great opportunity to inaugurate a different discourse,
+
+to adapt our Judiciary to the demand for justice of our time. (...) [As already mentioned here,
+
+every demand for It is there that the judge is seen by society. justice that exists in the country
+
+inside forum. It is the forum of the capital. It is the enters through the first degree. It's the
+Judiciary that is most frequented by the population (CNJ, 2014b).
+
+Giving voice to the guests, voices supported by yearnings and technical studies, the parametric
+
+proposals gave identity to the speeches. As the then president of the AMB, judge Ricardo Costa,
+
+spoke, centralizing the demand for adequacy of court resources according to the procedural demand
+
+received by the bodies:
+
+theme of the hearing (CNJ, 2014a). The creation of this institutional field motivated around the
+
+proposal of a priority policy brought together many causes around one (that of the first instance
+
+judiciary). The statistical formulations around equity were situated in broader discourses, those
+
+represented by society, convened to give strength to the proposed agenda: the democratization of
+
+court structures, as stated by Minister Joaquim Barbosa, beginning the work:
+
+| 447
+
+The president of the Association of Judiciary Servants of Bahia, in support of the policy,
+
+highlights the lack of participation in the courts: “(...) I am delighted with this hearing, as justice
+
+servants will have the right to talk about their problems in their states” (CNJ, 2014b). The general
+
+secretary of the National Federation of Judicial Servants in the States, Volnei Rosalem, in support,
+
+speaks and recalls that the “first degree” is much broader than a body of magistrates; it is “a counter”,
+
+it is the “real world of the Judiciary”, made up of many civil servants, who also give a voice to the
+
+users of Justice: “It is in the first degree that the population approaches the counter and comes into
+
+contact with the Judiciary as a service public. Also [it is] in the first degree [that] the process is still
+
+linked to the real world and real needs” (CNJ, 2014b).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+[Here] I am tempted to invoke the poet and playwright Bertolt Brecht, who says the following:
+
+“what times are these when we need to defend the obvious?”. Every time I talk about this
+
+subject, I invoke Brecht (...): it seems so natural that there should be prioritization of the first
+
+degree of jurisdiction, that it even seems counter-intuitive that we are treating this as an
+
+institutional public policy and terms, mainly, to explain what it means! (STM, 2016).
+
+After collecting the contributions and protests, Resolution No. 194, of May 26, 2014, regulates
+
+the institution of the National Policy of Priority Attention to the First Degree of Jurisdiction. But only
+
+in 2016 was the controversial Resolution No. 219, of April 26, which deals with the distribution and
+
+proportional movement of the workforce, approved by the CNJ (CNJ, 2016b). Since then, such are
+
+these resolutions that have been supporting struggles and institutional strategies for greater equality
+
+between instances of the justice system.
+
+In the first episode presented (subsection 3.1), the search for merit for those who work the
+
+most – that is, for new evaluation criteria for the purpose of moving up the career ladder from the
+
+first degree to the second degree –, the
+
+This was the speech of the then CNJ counselor and judge of the first instance of the Labor
+
+Court, Carlos Eduardo Oliveira Dias, in his first moments of a lecture at the Military Justice Training
+
+School, entitled Effective Meaning and Sense of Prioritization of the First Degree of Jurisdiction , in
+
+November 2016.
+
+448 |
+
+It was obvious because the statistics showed it, according to Carlos Eduardo Oliveira Dias, during
+
+his lecture. But the advisory magistrate’s statement was also the temporal resonance of a
+
+bureaucratic movement of the meaning constructed for those statistics – the new look at the first
+
+instance: “improving the judiciary = improving the first degree” (CNJ, 2015), already disseminated
+
+the advisor Rubens Curado in his presentation at the 1st Meeting of the First Degree Prioritization
+
+Network, in 2014.
+
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in Brazil:
+
+concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+
+4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
+
+Inspired by the existence of a peculiar action in the battle repertoire in the field of social
+
+movements, which is the mobilization of statistics, and by the fact that the state bureaucracy also
+
+mobilizes to defend internal causes that are dear to them, the objective of this investigation was to
+
+show how statistics were central to support a wave of intramagistracy movements against the
+
+historically existing inequalities between instances. Especially, statistical mobilization practices
+
+(construction of systems of meanings with elements of statistical ecology, such as principles,
+
+techniques, formulas, among other dimensions, to base, justify and represent political causes)
+
+helped us to understand this centrality in different episodes , which marked the movements for the
+
+democratization of the administrative structures of the courts.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+claim was around the demand for open voting and based on merit-based promotion processes. In
+
+that episode, statistics were central to preventing, according to claimants, subjective criteria from
+
+prevailing over objective ones and helping to make promotion processes more transparent.
+
+Under a different manifestation, statistical principles were equally central to the construction
+
+of meanings around what became known as the Direct Elections Movement in Brazilian Courts. The
+
+second episode (subsection 3.2) dealt with the causes of the magistracy of first instance for the
+
+democratization of the structures of the courts, a movement that marked the national institutional
+
+struggle of associations of the judiciary for the right to vote for the basic magistracy in the choice of
+
+presidents and vice-presidents. court presidents. In this second episode analyzed, the quantitative
+
+proportionality of magistrates entitled to vote was the statistical practice mobilized to criticize the
+
+fact that only 17% of eligible voters chose the direction of the courts, characterizing the judicial
+
+system as a dictatorship that did not represent the majority of the components of the judiciary. ,
+
+which are more than 80%. In this movement for Diretas Já, the old relationship between statistical
+
+principles and democratization was invoked. In addition, based on this proportion, the actors built
+
+the justification that there is an intimate relationship between the non-electoral participation of the
+
+majority of the judiciary and the existence of problems in the Judiciary, especially since, likewise,
+
+the highest proportion of disputes is in the first instance, the true representatives of society's
+
+aspirations, as they define themselves. Here, there is an example where, at the same time, statistics
+
+are mobilized to criticize and represent the reality experienced by the actors.
+
+Finally, the third episode (subsection 3.3) brought to this debate is marked by the construction
+
+of an institutional policy of prioritizing the first instance around the equitable distribution of budgetary
+
+and personnel resources.
+
+| 449
+
+In that episode, statistics were central in the search for improvements in primary school working
+
+conditions, mobilized to make the movement of workforce and budget proportional to the litigation
+
+between instances.
+
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the Brazilian
+Magistracy of First Instance
+
+The objectification of criteria under claims through the practice of parameterization, valuation and
+
+quantified activity was the only valid means of representing reality, including for the purpose of
+
+diluting the autonomy of more powerful actors, establishing the foundations of their conviction,
+
+which, under another type of industriousness would not be possible.
+
+The construction of statistical formulas that made the base magistrates divide resources according
+
+to new cases that enter the first and second levels was the central practice of mobilizing statistics in
+
+this case. In addition, to reaffirm the importance of the statistical project of distributive allocation of
+
+resources of the courts according to the proportion of litigiousness, the creation of an institutional
+
+field to summon the vision and contribution of different actors to make the project representative
+
+and legitimate through a chain of actors, who
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+it was the occurrence of a pioneering audience on the subject, it sought to institutionalize the new
+
+perspectives and meanings in the first instance.
+
+Finally, in this chapter, we dare to identify that the central recurrence to principles, instruments
+
+and statistical representations and quantification in episodes of containment in themes of intrabureaucratic
+inequalities can be thought of as a form of institutional stativism – that is, a creative
+
+action of institutional actors denouncing the very organizational structure in which they operate with
+
+statistics. A concept that shares with – and invites to – an agenda of debates on the heterogeneity
+
+of the state bureaucracy, as well as on its struggles, causes and inequalities.
+
+PowerPoint presentation. 55 slides. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2ZsQJsY>.
+
+______.
+
+REFERENCES
+
+at: <https://bit.ly/317CBpF>.
+
+450 |
+
+______. CNJ approves Resolution no. 106 and establishes objective criteria for the promotion of
+
+judges. Brasília: AMB, apr. 2010.
+
+BOURDIEU, P. On the State, courses at the Collège de France (1989-92). 1st ed. Translated by
+
+Rosa Freire d'Aguiar. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014.
+
+ABERS, RN Bureaucratic activism: pursuing environmentalism inside the Brazilian state. Latin
+
+American Politics and Society, vol. 61, no. 2, p. 21-44, 2017.
+
+Request for Provisions No. 1386908. Brasília, 18 Apr. 2014. Available
+
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in Brazil:
+
+concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+
+The reflection presented and the cases exemplified question us about the power of statistics
+
+in the interpretation of reality, in which quantification is far from exercising only the controversial role
+
+of freezing and coldly representing individuals and social relations. Statistics are instruments for
+
+interpreting and reading reality, for battles and fights for the arguments they support, for criticism
+
+and questioning for the results obtained, for reaffirming and building new perspectives on actors
+
+who are disadvantaged in the political game. And not just instruments for the action repertoires of
+
+social movements. In the episodes of intramagistracy struggle in Brazil, it was possible to identify
+
+which principles, techniques and statistical and quantification representations are central to the
+
+construction of meanings that symbolize and base the justification of intrabureaucratic protests
+
+against the inequalities that structure them. Likewise, it was observed that statistics are central to
+
+change and the creation of institutional policies that, in a way, help to dilute such inequalities.
+
+AMB – ASSOCIATION OF BRAZILIAN JUDGES. 1st Survey on the Working Conditions of Judges.
+
+Brasilia: MCI Strategy, Jan. 2009.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+1st Public Hearing on Efficiency of the First Degree of Jurisdiction.
+
+2013b. Video file.
+
+| 451
+
+YouTube, 16 Feb. 2008b.
+
+______.
+
+Lecture by Minister Gilmar Mendes. Strategic planning in the judiciary. In:
+NATIONAL MEETING OF THE JUDICIARY, 2. Part 1 of 2.
+
+CARDOSO, R. Amapar requests admission as an interested party in a request for
+
+measures at the CNJ that deals with direct elections in the courts. Amapar Notícias, Jul.
+
+Available at: <https://bit.ly/3iyHDRV>.
+
+BRUNO, I.; DIDIER, E.; VITALE, T. Statactivism: forms of action between disclosure
+
+and affirmation. Partecipazione and Conflicto, v. 7, no. 2, p. 198-2020, 2014.
+
+2010. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3uIOn4H>.
+
+______. Resolution No. 106, of April 6, 2010. Provides for the objective criteria for
+
+assessing the merits of promoting magistrates and access to the second degree
+
+courts. Electronic Justice Gazette (DJe), Brasília, 6 Apr.
+
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the Brazilian
+Magistracy of First Instance
+
+CNJ – NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE. Resolution no. 6, of September 13, 2005.
+
+Provides for the assessment of merit for promotion of judges and access to the
+
+second degree courts. Electronic Justice Gazette (DJe), Brasília, 16 September.
+
+2005. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3D7uWFs>.
+
+______.
+
+______. Working Group (Ordinance 155/2013). National Policy of Prioritization of the
+First Degree of Jurisdiction. Final report. Brasilia: CNJ, Dec. 2013c.
+
+______.
+
+2014. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3a5xWpn>.
+
+Electronic Justice Gazette (DJe), Brasilia, 26 May 2014a. Available at: <https://bit.ly/
+
+3uIvpuN>.
+Ordinance No. 155, of September 6, 2013. Designates a working group to
+
+prepare studies and formulate proposals for the implementation of a National Policy
+
+aimed at prioritizing the first level of jurisdiction of the Brazilian courts. Electronic
+
+Justice Gazette (DJe), Brasilia, September 6, 2013a. Available at: <https://bit.ly/
+
+2Yjj30E>.
+
+______. Resolution No. 194, of May 26, 2014. Establishes the National Policy of
+
+Priority Attention to the First Degree of Jurisdiction and other measures.
+
+Part 2 of 3. YouTube, 16 Feb. 2008a.
+
+1st Presentation by the Opening Panel of the Meeting. Brasília: CNJ, 27 September.
+
+First full day. Brasilia: CNJ, 17 Feb. 2014b. Video file.
+
+______.
+
+Lecture by Minister Gilson Dipp to the National Justice Department in
+
+Strategic Management. In: NATIONAL MEETING OF THE JUDICIARY, 2.
+
+______.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+MAGALHÃES, A. Justice for the citizen. Algomais Magazine, n. 22, Jan. 2008.
+
+Legal Consultant Magazine (ConJur), 1st April. 2014. Available at: <https://bit.
+
+452 |
+
+ly/3mstMO6>.
+
+,
+
+DIRECT NOW: association of judges from all over the country call for direct elections in the courts.
+
+______. Resolution No. 219, of April 26, 2016. Provides for the distribution of civil servants,
+
+commission positions and positions of trust in the bodies of the Judicial Power of the first
+
+and second degrees and other measures. Electronic Justice Gazette (DJe), Brasília, 26
+
+Apr. 2016b. Available at: <https://bit.
+
+n. 24, p. 135-145, 2020.
+
+PowerPoint presentation. 66 slides. Brasilia: CNJ, May 5, 2015. Available at: <https://bit.ly/
+
+3mgNiOI>.
+
+GAULÉJAC, V. La société malade de la management. Paris: Seuil, 2005.
+
+The First Degree Attention Policy: prioritizing the first degree of justice, our goal
+
+is you. 1st Meeting of the First Degree Prioritization Network.
+
+CNJ ANALYZES criteria for promoting judges today. Migalhas, 23 Mar. 2010.
+
+CNJ WELCOMES AMB's request on the promotion of judges. Migalhas, 31 Aug. 2005.
+
+Available at: <https://bit.ly/2ZZlKVx>.
+
+Public Policies and Uses of Evidence in Brazil:
+
+concepts, methods, contexts and practices
+
+238th Ordinary Session of the CNJ: oral support from Judge Ricardo Costa, 28
+
+Sep.2016a. YouTube. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3nujtcV>. Accessed in: 2
+
+Paris Innovation Review, 30th October 2010. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3uGJz
+
+ly/2YiMX5b>.
+
+DESROSIÈRES, A. Economic crises and statistics: from 1880 to 2010.
+
+______.
+
+KOGA, D. Measures of cities: between territories of life and territories lived. São Paulo:
+
+Cortez, 2003.
+
+Available at: <https://bit.ly/3ixEC4r>.
+
+HAGGERTY, KD The politics of statistics: variations on a theme. The Canadian Journal of
+
+Sociology, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 89-105, 2001.
+
+oct. 2020.
+
+DIAS, JP The world of magistrates: the evolution of organization and judicial selfgovernment.
+Coimbra: Almedina, 2004.
+
+Political-Institutional Analysis Bulletin
+
+wH>. Accessed on: 20 Mar. 2021.
+
+______.
+
+NASCIMENTO, MI B; ABERS, RN There will always be the best and the worst:
+
+controversies, creativity and interpretative frameworks around comparative productivity
+
+statistics of actors and judicial organizations in Brazil.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+SILVEIRA, RC Valuing primary education is a challenge for the CNJ. Consultant
+
+ROY, AL; OFFREDI, C. Quantification au service de l'observation socialelocale: à
+
+quelles conditions? Revue Française de Socio-Économie, n. 7, p. 191-220, 2011.
+
+prioritization of the first degree of jurisdiction. 17 nov. 2016.YouTube. Available
+
+AMB DELIVERS research on judges' working conditions to the CNJ.
+
+Legal News, 21 Aug. 2015. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2ZXudIO>.
+
+CNJ News Agency, Brasilia, 10 Feb. 2009. Available at: <https://bit.
+
+| 453
+
+at: <https://bit.ly/3GBi2SS>.
+
+ly/3Aaj5EL>.
+
+STF – SUPERIOR FEDERAL COURT. Associations of judges challenge the CNJ
+rule that establishes criteria for promotion based on merit. JusBrasil Notícias, Dec.
+2010. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3BdbSVQ>.
+
+COMPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+Institutional Stativism and the Episodes around the Causes of the Brazilian
+Magistracy of First Instance
+
+SANTOS, RNS; ROMÃO, PF Diretas Já, in the Judiciary: the democratization of
+
+Justice. OAB Ceará, 30 April. 2014. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3Fjarrm>.
+
+STM – SUPERIOR MILITARY COURT. Effective meaning and sense of
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
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+This article was downloaded by: [University of Chicago Library]
+On: 11 December 2014, At: 04:21
+Publisher: Routledge
+Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
+Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
+
+Justice Quarterly
+Publication details, including instructions for authors and
+subscription information:
+http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjqy20
+
+Estimating wrongful convictions
+Tony G. Poveda a
+a
+ State University of New York at Plattsburgh
+Published online: 20 Aug 2006.
+
+To cite this article: Tony G. Poveda (2001) Estimating wrongful convictions, Justice Quarterly,
+18:3, 689-708, DOI: 10.1080/07418820100095061
+
+To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07418820100095061
+
+PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
+
+Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information
+(the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor
+& Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties
+whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
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+This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
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+systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
+Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/
+page/terms-and-conditions
+RESEARCH NOTE
+
+ESTIMATING WRONGFUL
+CONVICTIONS*
+
+TONY G. POVEDA**
+State University of New York at Plattsburgh
+
+Although numerous cases of wrongful convictions have been documented in
+the literature and in the media, criminologists have yet to devise a methodology
+for estimating the extent of such errors in the criminal justice system.
+I explore several methodologies with this purpose in mind, including the use
+of official data, inmates' self-reports, and case study approaches. Specifically,
+I use court-ordered discharges from imprisonment as a basis for measuring
+official error. In addition, I employ data from the RAND inmate
+surveys to estimate the extent of convicted offenders who deny their commitment
+offenses. Studies that attempt to catalogue individual wrongful
+convictions also serve as a basis for estimating false positive errors. Each
+methodology has its own limitations, but by employing multiple measures
+and approaches, I make possible an estimate of the "dark figure" of wrongful
+convictions.
+
+The extent of wrongful convictions has been a topic of much
+speculation and remains a "dark figure" in the study of criminal
+justice. One of the few attempts to estimate the prevalence of
+wrongful convictions was a 1986 study by C. Ronald Huff and associates.
+In that research a variety of justice system officials (mostly
+in Ohio) were surveyed for their perceptions of this type of miscarriage
+of justice in felony cases (Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin 1986,
+
+* An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meetings of the
+American Society of Criminology, held in San Francisco on November 16, 2000. I am
+indebted to Paul H. Korotkin, assistant director, and to William Chapman of the
+DOCS office for Program Planning, Evaluation and Research for providing me with
+data on court-ordered discharges from imprisonment in New York State. I am also
+grateful to my colleague, Dr. Tie-ting Su, for writing a computer program to transform
+the data from the RAND Inmate Survey into a more manageable data set and
+for producing the resulting cross-tabulated tables.
+** Tony G. Poveda is professor of sociology and criminal justice at the State
+University of New York at Plattsburgh. He received his doctorate in criminology in
+1970 from the University of California at Berkeley. His research interests include
+white-collar crime (especially organizational crime), the FBI, and, most recently,
+wrongful convictions. His book publications are Lawlessness and Reform: The FBI in
+Transition (1990), Rethinking White-Collar Crime (1994), and a co-authored work,
+The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (1999). In addition, Professor Poveda
+has published numerous papers on these topics in scholarly journals.
+
+JUSTICE QUARTERLY, Vol. 18 No. 3, September 2001
+© 2001 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
+
+Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 04:21 11 December 2014
+690 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
+1996). 1 More recently, a statistical study of errors in capital cases
+
+conducted by James Liebman and colleagues has highlighted the
+
+extent of reversible error in capital cases, some of which involve the
+
+erroneous conviction of the innocent (Liebman, Fagan, and West
+
+2000). 2 Research on the scope of the wrongful-conviction problem is
+
+still in its infancy; it is plagued by methodological problems and by
+
+the absence of any central entity for tracking official errors in the
+
+justice system.
+
+A 1998 scholarly exchange between Richard Leo, Richard Ofshe,
+and Paul Cassell underscores the difficulty of quantifying the
+
+wrongful-conviction problem but also highlights its importance for
+public policy 3 (Cassell 1998; Leo and Ofshe 1998a, 1998b). 4 The
+present article is a preliminary effort at exploring several methodologies
+for estimating wrongful convictions. I emphasize two approaches
+to the problem: the use of official records on court-ordered
+discharges from imprisonment, and data from inmates' self-reports.
+
+DEFINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
+Wrongful convictions can be understood along a continuum of
+
+justice-system errors ranging from persons who are falsely accused
+
+(arrested, prosecuted, and tried), to those who are wrongly convicted
+and imprisoned, to death row inmates who are erroneously
+
+executed. In this article I focus on errors that result in the conviction
+and imprisonment of innocent persons. These are wrongperson
+errors, as distinct from procedural errors in the conviction of
+
+a defendant. Although this distinction is sometimes difficult to
+
+maintain in practice, wrong-person convictions are cases in which
+
+1 The great majority of respondents (71.8%) in the Huff study estimated that
+fewer than 1 percent of felony convictions involved innocent persons (Huff et al.
+1986:523).
+2 In the Liebman study of capital cases, 7 percent of persons whose death
+sentences were overturned were found not guilty upon retrial, or charges against
+them were dismissed (Liebman et al. 2000:132).
+This is most evident in the movement for a moratorium on the death penalty.
+The. release of 95 innocent death row inmates nationwide since 1973 (as of
+May 7, 2001) has raised serious doubts about the administration of capital punishment
+in the United States (Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) 2001; Dieter
+1997). On January 31, 2000 Illinois became the first death-penalty state to issue
+such a moratorium. In that state, for each death row inmate executed over the last
+20 years, another has been released because of innocence (Johnson 2000).
+4 The exchange between Leo/Ofshe and Cassell centered on the role of policeinduced
+false confessions in producing wrongful convictions, the magnitude of the
+problem, and the relevance of the Miranda warning to this issue. Cassell (1998)
+maintained that the false-confession problem is minor compared with the problem of
+lost confessions from guilty persons (and therefore lost convictions); this problem, he
+argued, is due to restrictions on police interrogation. Leo and Ofshe (1998b) challenged
+Cassell's attempt to quantify the false-confession problem and rejected his
+claim that quantification is even necessary for public policy decisions. In addition,
+they reaffirmed the importance of Miranda and the need to develop other procedural
+safeguards to minimize false confessions and other sources of wrongihl convictions.
+
+Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 04:21 11 December 2014
+POVEDA 691
+
+individuals are exonerated because they are factually (not merely
+legally) innocent of the crime for which they were convicted--and
+are not released solely on the grounds that their due process rights
+were violated (e.g., by illegal search, Miranda warningnot given,
+trial-court error). This definition is in the tradition of Edwin
+Borchard's ([1932] 1970) classic study of wrongful convictions, the
+landmark work of Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet (1987; Radelet,
+Bedau, and Putnam 1992) on erroneous convictions in capital cases,
+and the research of Huff and associates (1986, 1996) on convicted
+innocents.
+
+On a conceptual level, wrongful convictions denote a distinct
+type of justice-system error: when a wrong person has been convicted
+and incarcerated. Operationally, however, it is difficult to
+determine when someone is factually innocent, The fact that an offender's
+conviction is overturned on appeal and that the offender is
+acquitted in a subsequent trial does not in itself establish innocence.
+It simply means that the state was not able to establish guilt
+beyond a reasonable doubt. Clearly, "not guilty" and "innocent" are
+not synonymous. For example, according to New York State's
+Court of Claims Act (Article II, Sec.8-b), if innocent persons wish to
+seek compensatory damages for unjust conviction and imprisonment,
+they must "demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence"
+that they did not commit the crime for which they were convicted
+and incarcerated (New York State Court of Claims 1998). More is
+required than merely showing that the conviction was vacated or
+that the indictment against them was dismissed.
+
+The problem is illustrated further by the April 2000 verdict in
+the Sam Sheppard civil trial. The Sheppard jury had to determine
+"by the greater weight of the evidence" whether Sheppard was innocent
+and therefore wrongfully imprisoned by the State of Ohio for
+the 1954 murder of his wife. The civil jury ruled that Sheppard's
+family ~ had not met the burden of proof for innocence, even though
+a 1966 jury, in Sheppard's second criminal trial, had found him not
+guilty (Ewinger and Hagan 2000; Hagan and Ewinger 2000).
+
+Thus, the operational definition of wrongful conviction for research
+is problematic. What constitutes evidence and criteria for
+innocence? How compelling should that evidence be? The tradition
+of studying wrongful convictions, beginning with Borchard in 1932,
+has erred on the side of a restrictive definition of wrongful conviction:
+evidence is required showing that someone else committed the
+offense or that the convicted person was uninvolved in the crime
+
+5 Dr. Sam Sheppard died of liver failure in 1970 at age 46 ("History of Sheppard
+Case" 2000).
+
+Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 04:21 11 December 2014
+692 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
+(Gross 1998:129; Radelet and Bedau 1998:106). 6 Bedau and
+Radelet (1987:47) maintained that "there is no quantity or quality
+of evidence that could be produced that would definitively prove innocence."
+At best, they argued, a "majority of neutral observers,
+given the evidence at our disposal, would judge the defendant in
+question to be innocent. ''7 Huff and his colleagues similarly included
+only cases in which there was evidence of innocence "beyond
+a reasonable doubt" (Huff et al. 1986:519) or when convicted persons
+had been "clearly exonerated" (Huff et al. 1996:10).
+
+An additional issue is whether such wrong-person errors must
+be acknowledged by officials in the criminal justice system, particularly
+by the courts. Surely the more restrictive definition would
+consider only officially acknowledged errors. This criterion is followed
+in Huffs database of felony cases (Huff et al. 1986:519).
+Bedau and Radelet also relied on official judgment of error (e.g.,
+appellate court decisions, executive pardons, indemnity claims) in
+90 percent of their 416 capital cases. In the other 10 percent, however,
+their decision to include the case was based on unofficial judgments.
+These latter cases included research by scholars or
+journalists who had reexamined evidence in a particular case (and
+often had discovered new evidence), and had concluded that the defendant
+was not guilty, even though no court had determined this
+(Radelet et al. 1992:17-18). Insofar as we allow unofficial judgments
+of error, we are shifting toward a more expansive definition
+of wrongful conviction.
+
+ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES
+
+A critical methodological problem in the study of wrongful convictions
+is how to determine the extent of such convictions and imprisonment
+in the criminal justice system. The dominant approach
+in the literature has been to catalogue individual cases of wrongful
+conviction. This approach has been pursued by legal scholars, journalists,
+sociologists, and other researchers (Borchard [1932] 1970;
+Connors et al. 1996; Dieter 1997; Huff et al. 1996; Radelet et al.
+1992; Radin 1964; Rosenbaum 1990-1991; U.S. House 1994; Yant
+1991); none claim to have identified all such cases. Indeed, many of
+
+6 Radelet and Bedau (1998:106-07) also note that the concept of innocence can
+be broadened in a variety of ways including the counting of accidental killings, selfdefense,
+and killings by a mentally ill offender.
+
+7 The most one can hope to obtain is a consensus of investigators after the
+case reaches its final disposition, Consensus can be measured in degrees, and the
+cases that we have included in our catalogue are those in which we believe a majority
+of neutral observers...would judge the defendant in question to be innocent"
+(Bedau and Radelet 1987:47).
+
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+POVEDA 693
+
+these researchers point to the role of tuck and chance in the discovery
+of wrongful-conviction cases (U.S. House 1994:12). Bedau and
+Radelet (1987:29) emphasized "how accidental and unsystematic
+the discovery of relevant cases actually is." Gross (1998:150) concluded
+that "most miscarriages of justice in capital cases never
+come to light"; when they do so, it is typically because of heightened
+judicial attention to the case, because the real criminal confesses, or
+simply because of luck.
+
+The fundamental flaw of the case study approach is that there
+is no way to determine how many cases go undiscovered--the "dark
+figure" of wrongful convictions--and whether these cases differ systematically
+from those which are identified. The documenting of
+individual cases has helped to sensitize the public and policy makers
+to the existence of erroneous convictions, but it falls short as a
+method for determining the prevalence of such convictions.
+Another approach, taken especially since the late 1970s, has
+been to employ laboratory or experimental methods in studying
+mistaken eyewitness identification, a significant factor in many
+wrongful convictions (Cutler and Penrod 1995; Loftus 1993, 1996;
+Wells 1993). This research has attempted to discover error rates of
+eyewitness identification under different experimental conditions,
+with emphasis on police identification procedures in lineups, event
+factors, and postevent information. Factors such as whether the
+culprit is present or absent in the lineup, police instructions given
+to the witness, the trauma of the crime, the use of a deadly weapon,
+and information obtained by the witness after the crime are all relevant
+to shaping the memory of an event and to eyewitnesses' accuracy
+(Devine 1995; Loftus and Ketcham 1991; Wells 1993).
+One problem with this line of research is that it is often based
+on simulated events (staged crimes and lineups) rather than on actual
+crimes; thus it raises questions of generalizability from experimental
+to forensic ("real") contexts (Yuille 1993). Moreover, the
+purpose of eyewitness identification experiments is to isolate the
+role of particular factors in producing error, not to estimate the
+overall accuracy of eyewitness identifications in actual cases (Cutler
+and Penrod 1995). Thus, again, this methodology is limited in
+providing an empirical basis for estimating the prevalence of
+wrongful convictions. In 1999, however, when the Innocence Project
+examined the 62 DNA exonerations to date in the United
+States, it found that mistaken eyewitness testimony was a factor in
+84 percent of those wrongful convictions (Scheck, Neufeld, and
+Dwyer 2000:246).
+Another possible line of inquiry is the use of field research to
+determine the extent of error produced by a particular investigative
+
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+694 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
+practice. Leo and Ofshe's research on police interrogations reflects
+this approach (Leo 1996). Their fieldwork in a limited number of
+police departments has led to observations on how standard police
+interrogation practices can cause suspects to make false confessions
+(Leo and Ofshe 1998a; Ofshe and Leo 1997). These authors, however,
+make no claim that their methodology can be used to identify
+the universe of false confessions. On the contrary, they maintain
+that the "methodological problems inherent in arriving at a sound
+estimate [of the frequency of false confessions] are formidable and
+unsolved, and we have concluded that no welt-founded estimate has
+yet been published" (Leo and Ofshe 1998b:560). Thus they are
+quite skeptical about the possibility of quantification, given the absence
+of official records on the number of police interrogations and
+the frequency of false confessions resulting from those
+interrogations.
+
+Finally, another approach to discovering errors in the criminal
+criminal justice system is the use of appellate court decisions in
+which convictions or sentences have been overturned. This methodology
+has been adopted by Liebman and associates in their research
+on errors in capital cases. Liebman relied on published judicial decisions
+at three levels of the capital review process: state direct appeal,
+state postconviction appeal, and federal habeas corpus review.
+This is a monumental task, as noted by Liebman, Fagan, and West
+(2000:24): it requires a "painstaking search" for cases relying on various
+sources of information. To complicate this task, there is no
+central repository for these judicial decisions.
+
+Liebman's study of capital errors between 1973 and 1995 began
+in 1991 and continues today. Although appellate courts (at the
+three review levels) found reversible error in 68 percent of capital
+cases during the study period, Liebman's findings on the outcomes
+of these reversals are limited to the 301 cases in the state postconviction
+appeals. Upon retrial, 247 of the plaintiffs in the state
+postconviction cases were sentenced to less than death, 22 (7%)
+were found not guilty, and 54 were resentenced to death (Liebman
+et al. 2000:132). As Liebman et al. (2000:27) pointed out, state
+postconviction decisions, unlike state direct appeal and federal
+habeas corpus reviews, often are not published and therefore are
+difficult to locate. At the present, the list of such cases is incomplete.
+The Liebman study has provided substantial evidence demonstrating
+a high rate of error in capital judgments. So far,
+however (except for the state postconviction results), it has provided
+only limited information on the outcome of these reversals,
+notably in regard to the prevalence of wrongful convictions.
+
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+POVEDA 695
+
+As noted, criminal justice agencies do not keep statistics on errors
+made by officials at various stages of the justice process, including
+the number of persons wrongfully convicted and
+imprisoned. In the remainder of this paper, I consider two different
+approaches to this quantification problem. One approach employs
+official agency records or statistics as a basis for constructing a
+measure of wrongful convictions and imprisonment; the other relies
+on inmates' self-reports of their own criminal activity, including denial
+of committing the offense for which they were incarcerated.
+The development of multiple methods for estimating wrongful convictions
+has certain advantages. Insofar as each method has its
+own limitations, the use of multiple and independent measures to
+estimate the prevalence of wrongful convictions will increase our
+confidence in the findings of each approach, if we assume a consistency
+in results (Webb et al. 1966:3-5).
+
+USE OF OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON
+COURT-ORDERED DISCHARGES
+
+This approach develops an estimate of wrong~l convictions
+based on actions taken by justice officials, namely court-ordered
+discharge of inmates from imprisonment. "Court-ordered discharge,"
+however, is a broader category than "wrongful conviction":
+it encompasses not only substantive errors (wrong-person convictions)
+but also procedural errors in the conviction and sentencing of
+the offender. Ultimately it is necessary to distinguish these two
+types of errors if our use of these official data is to have merit.
+
+Data From the New York State Department of Correctional
+Services
+
+A series of research reports and the availability of data from
+the New York State (NYS) Department of Correctional Services
+(DOCS) make New York a convenient jurisdiction for examining the
+value of court-ordered discharges, s Every year the DOCS publishes
+reports on inmates under its jurisdiction, but its annual report,
+Characteristics of Inmates Discharged, is most relevant to this
+study. The DOCS recognizes 10 categories of inmate release, including
+parole, maximum expiration of sentence, escape, death,
+court-ordered discharges, and others.
+A court-ordered discharge is defined by the DOCS as a case
+%vhere the individual is discharged from custody while further
+
+s The DOCS disseminates official statistics through its Office of Program
+Planning, Evaluation, and Research.
+
+Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 04:21 11 December 2014
+696 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
+court proceedings take place (i.e., an appeal, new trial), or is discharged
+as a result of court proceedings in which the individual is
+found guilty of a lesser charge for which he may already have
+served the length of time legally required, or discharged because
+the original charge was dismissed" (DOCS 1997a:3). Over the 22-
+year period from 1976 through 1997, the DOCS has averaged 155
+court-ordered discharges per year. There were 199 such discharges
+in 1995, the year that we examine here. Because of the relatively
+small number of inmates discharged under court order in any single
+year, the DOCS annual reports do not provide cross-tabulated data
+on inmate characteristics for those who are released in this manner.
+(Such data are available only for parole release.) The DOCS
+Office of Program Planning, Evaluation, and Research, however,
+provided me with more highly detailed information on the characteristics
+of court-ordered discharges for 1995.
+
+Measures of Wrongful Conviction
+
+Unfortunately, the data mentioned above need further elaboration
+and interpretation before we can make any inferences about
+the extent of wrongful convictions. As stated earlier, official data
+on court-ordered discharges do not distinguish between substantive
+and procedural errors, and we are concerned with the former
+(wrong-person convictions and imprisonment). Nothing in the official
+data makes this distinction, except a 1989 DOCS report on vacated
+murder sentences in New York. That study, conducted by the
+New York State Department of Correctional Services, identified 33
+offenders who had been convicted of murder and released from
+DOCS custody between 1980 and 1987 for new trials. Those cases
+"represent current instances where appellate courts found error so
+substantial as to warrant the vacation of the conviction for murder"
+(DOCS 1989:1).
+In the DOCS follow-up analysis on those 33 cases, it was found
+that on retrial the great majority (26, or 78.8%) were reconvicted of
+a lesser offense (17 for first-degree manslaughter). The remaining
+seven (21.2%) were acquitted after a new trial or after local prosecutors
+dismissed the original indictment. 9 If we regard these seven
+cases as wrong-person convictions, using acquittal after a new trial
+or dismissal of indictment (following a court-ordered discharge) as
+measures of wrongful conviction, this internal DOCS study offers
+some empirical basis for estimating the proportion of court-ordered
+
+9 Five of the seven cases involved acquittals; the other two, dismissals. It is
+possible that the indictment dismissals were made on procedural grounds, but it is
+more likely that the conviction reversal in appellate court undermined the evidentiary
+basis for pursuing the case (e.g., recanted witness testimony, discovery of police
+report exonerating defendant).
+
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+POVEDA 697
+
+discharges that represents substantive error (21.2%), at least in regard
+to murder convictions and commitm, ents.
+Samuel Gross (1996, 1998) argues persuasively that homicide
+cases in general, and capital cases in particular, are handled differently
+by officials in the criminal justice system, and for a variety of
+reasons are more likely to involve erroneous convictions. Therefore,
+in line with Gross's thesis (and the limits of DOCS data), we must
+limit our objective here to estimating the prevalence of wrongful
+murder convictions rather than wrongful felony convictions.
+
+Findings
+
+An examination of 1995 DOCS data on court-ordered discharges
+reveals that of the 199 inmates released from custody by
+the courts, 24 (12.1%) had been convicted of murder (DOCS
+1997a). 1° If we assume that only 21.2 percent 11 of these court-ordered
+discharges represent substantive errors, then only five discharges
+represent wrongful murder convictions. However, the
+relevant population base for calculating prevalence of wrongful convictions
+is the number of murder commitments to the Department
+of Correctional Services. A study conducted by the New York State
+Defenders Association (NYSDA) 12 found that the median time
+from conviction to reversal (acquittal/dismissal) in wrongful homicide
+convictions in New York is approximately three years (NYSDA
+1989; Rosenbaum 1990-1991). 13 Accordingly, murder inmates released
+by court-ordered discharge in 1995 were probably committed
+to the Department of Correctional Services in 1992, when 357 murder
+commitments were made to the DOCS (DOCS 1997b:10). If five
+of these were wrongful convictions, this translates to an error rate
+of 1.4 percent in murder convictions/commitments. 14
+
+lo Data on the specific characteristics, including the commitment crime, of
+1995 court-ordered discharges were provided by Paul Korotkin, assistant director of
+program planning, evaluation, and research of the DOCS.
+11 The 21.2 percent figure is based on the findings of the 1989 DOCS study on
+vacated murder sentences.
+12 The New York State Defenders Association is a nonprofit organization of
+public defenders and legal aid atton]eys who provide services to criminal defense
+lawyers throughout the state.
+13 On the basis of the wrongful conviction cases cited in the NYSDA study, the
+median time between conviction and inmate's release was 38.5 months. The DOCS
+(1989:3) study placed the median at 29 months (from prison reception to reversal).
+Even if we allow for some variation in the reversal period (from one to four years),
+the average number of annual murder commitments in NYS between 1991 and 1994
+was 370, only a slight departure from the 1992 figure of 357 that t used.
+14 If we use the 7.3 percent figure (instead of the 21.2 percent from the DOCS
+study), derived from the Liebman study of state postconviction reversals, as the basis
+for estimating the proportion of errors involving wrong-person convictions in vacated
+murder cases, the error rate ~br murder convictions/commitments is only .5
+percent. The Liebman study, however, is based on an incomplete sample of capital
+cases reviewed in state postconviction appeals (1973-1995) in 26 states (Liebman et
+al. 2000:53), not including New York (which did not restore the death penalty until
+
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+698 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
+The NYSDA study, described above, also attempted to catalogue
+wrongful homicide convictions in New York State from 1965
+to 1988. As part of its Wrongful Conviction Study Project, the study
+identified 59 wrongful homicide convictions during this period, 45 of
+which involved murder convictions (Rosenbaum 1990-1991:807-08).
+The NYSDA's definition of wrongful homicide conviction, however,
+was broader than that employed in the present study. It included
+not only cases in which the defendant, whose conviction had been
+overturned, was acquitted on retrial or the charges were dismissed,
+but also cases in which the defendant was reconvicted of a
+nonhomicide crime. If the NYSDA study cases are limited to murder
+sentences reversed between 1980 and 1987 and to cases in
+which the defendant was subsequently acquitted on retrial or the
+indictment was dismissed (and omits cases in which the defendant
+was reconvicted of a lesser offense), 15 we were left with 23 wrongful
+murder convictions in New York State between 1980 and 1987.
+During the period 1977 to 1984,16 2,276 murder commitments were
+made to the Department of Correctional Services (Chapman and
+Zausner 1985); this translates to a 1.0 percent error rate in murder
+convictions/commitments.
+The estimated prevalence of wrongful murder convictions
+reached by using the NYSDA study (1.0%) is comparable to the estimate
+of 1.4 percent calculated from DOCS data on court-ordered
+discharges. This is the case even though very different methodologies,
+each with its own assumptions and limitations, are used in
+each approach. Both, however, are based on officially acknowledged
+errors in which the convicted murder defendant has been released
+from custody and subsequently is acquitted on retrial, or in
+which the original indictment is dismissed.
+
+USE OF INMATES' SELF-REPORTS
+
+The use of inmates' self-reports is another methodological approach
+to estimating the prevalence of wrongful convictions. Unlike
+court-ordered discharges, which rely on the reliability and
+validity of agency records, inmates' self-reports depend on the reliability
+and validity of inmates' accounts of their own criminality.
+The use of these self-reports provides another approach, with a different
+set of assumptions and limitations, to the quantification
+problem.
+
+September 1995). The 21.2 percent figure is based on New York vacated murder
+cases during the 1980-1987 period.
+15 These parameters then correspond to those of the 1989 DOCS study.
+16 This allows for a three-year lag period from conviction to reversal.
+
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+POVEDA 699
+
+The RAND Inmate Survey
+
+In late 1978 and early 1979, the RAND Corporation of Santa
+Monica, California conducted surveys of convicted male offenders
+(in 14 jails and 12 prisons) in California, Michigan, and Texas (Peterson
+et al. 1982). The surveys were administered in small groups
+(10 to 30 inmates) by temporary RAND employees who were hired
+because of their experience in working with incarcerated inmates;
+prison officials did not participate in these sessions.
+The sample was representative of adult male inmates admitted
+to prisons and jails in the above jurisdictions at the time of the survey.
+Participation was voluntary and required informed consentF
+Altogether self-report data were obtained from 1,380 prison inmates
+and 810 jail inmates.
+
+The questionnaire, which took about 50 minutes to complete,
+asked for detailed information about crimes the inmates had committed
+in a one- to two-year period preceding their incarceration,
+including questions about arrests and convictions. The survey also
+questioned inmates about their current conviction offense, demographic
+characteristics, and other personal details. In addition, official
+criminal records were collected on 85 percent of the prison
+inmates who responded to the questionnaire (Peterson et al. 1982).
+
+Measure of Wrongful Conviction
+
+Although the purpose of the RAND Inmate Survey was to collect
+data on criminal careers and to develop policy implications
+from those data, two questionnaire items in the "1978 Jail/Prison
+Survey Booklet" (Chaiken and Chaiken 1982:App. E) are relevant
+to our research. These questions (Numbers 6 and 7 on p. 39 of the
+booklet) pertain to the inmate's current offense: "What charge(s)
+were you convicted of that you are serving time for now? (Check all
+that apply)," and "For these convictions, what crimes, if any, do you
+think you really did? (Check all that apply)." Each of these questions
+is followed by a list of 15 different offenses, plus an "other"
+category. In addition, the last response choice for the second question
+is "Did no crime." Inmates' denials of the conviction offense
+(i.e., self-reports that they "did no crime") provide another basis for
+measuring wrongful conviction. Clearly, inmates who claim that
+
+17 The response rate for jail inmates was 70 percent; for prison inmates in California
+and Michigan, 50 percent; for prison inmates in Texas, 82 percent (Peterson et
+al. 1982:viii). The RAND researchers attempted to correct the problem of
+nonrespondents with a replacement procedure. Moreover, although the survey was
+confidential, it was not anonymous. The questionnaires were coded to make future
+identification of respondents possible for subsequent research (Peterson et al.
+1982:x).
+
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+700 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
+they are innocent of the offense for which they have been incarcerated
+meet the operational definition of wrongful conviction.
+
+Certainly, inmates' self-reports raise serious questions of reliability
+and validity that must be addressed before we can take them
+at face value. Built into the RAND research design were several
+ways of checking on the internal consistency (reliability) as well as
+the validity of responses. These included asking respondents for essentially
+the same information in different parts of the questionnaire,
+retesting some of the respondents a week later, and
+comparing inmates' responses with official records. Overall, "83
+percent of respondents tracked the questionnaire with a high degree
+of accuracy and completeness, and were very consistent in
+their answers" (Chaiken and Chaiken 1982:224-25).
+
+When researchers compared questionnaire data with the
+prison inmates' official records, is they found a close correspondence.
+In fact, in California and Texas, respondents reported 6 percent
+more convictions than the records show; in Michigan,
+convictions were underreported by 6 percent (Marquis and Ebener
+1981:34). Inmates were reluctant, however, to provide information
+on sex offenses, including rape; these are more likely than other
+offenses to be understated in self-reports (Peterson et al. 1982:21).
+There was also evidence that some errors in inmate-reported crimes
+were due to confusion about offense categories; thus the problem
+was one of misclassification rather than omission. For example,
+"robbery" and "theft" were sometimes confused (Marquis and
+Ebener 1981:38).
+In assessing the quality of prisoners' self-reports, RAND researchers
+began with the conventional wisdom that respondents
+are likely to conceal undesirable information about themselves. After
+reviewing the methods literature as well as results from the
+RAND Inmate Survey, however, they concluded just the opposite:
+"We found evidence that respondents usually reveal more arrests
+and convictions in questionnaires or interviews than can be found
+in official records" (Marquis and Ebener 1981:2). Moreover, the
+RAND evaluation of inmates' self-reports specifically examined the
+quality of reports on questionnaire items pertaining to the current
+offense. The investigators concluded that "on a general level, the
+data are close to unbiased" (Marquis and Ebener 1981:32). Although
+the RAND researchers observed item-by-item variation,
+
+is This portion of the assessment of the quality of responses was limited to
+prisoner respondents because official records were available only for prisoners, not
+for jail inmates. RAND researchers used official records to check the correspondence
+between prisoners' self-reports and official arrests and convictions.
+
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+POVEDA 701
+
+they found in general that reliability was "moderately high" (Marquis
+and Ebener 1981:32). Overall the RAND findings refute the
+widely held belief that inmates are likely to underreport their criminal
+activity: "In general, the prisoner respondents do not appear to
+be systematically denying their conviction offenses in the questionnaire"
+(Marquis and Ebener 1981:47).
+
+Method
+
+The RAND Inmate Survey (National Archive of Criminal Justice
+Data 2000; Peterson et al. 1982) is available to the public at the
+National Archive of Criminal Justice Data website. 19 Because I
+was interested in only a few of the variables contained in the survey,
+I extracted those variables from the RAND data set to create a
+smaller data set for analysis. Any cases with missing data were
+eliminated. The specific variables in the newer, smaller data set
+included current conviction offense, crimes actually committed,
+state, and type of institution. In addition, because in the present
+study I am interested in wrongful convictions and imprisonment at
+the felony level, I examined only data on prison inmates: 1,282
+cases in Michigan, California, and Texas.
+
+Findings
+
+The basic finding is that 197 of the 1,282 prison inmates questioned
+in the RAND Survey, or 15.4 percent, claimed that they did
+not commit the crime for which they had been convicted and imprisoned.
+(See Table 1) Those inmates also denied committing any of
+the other 15 crimes included on the "current conviction offense"
+checklist, including "other." This finding did not vary widely by
+state: 14.1 percent of Michigan prisoners denied having committed
+any crime, as did 14.6 percent in California and 16.7 percent in
+Texas.
+Denials varied more widely, however, by current conviction offense.
+Rapists and other sex offenders denied their conviction offense
+at the highest rates by far: 37.7 and 26.9 percent
+respectively. Those convicted of murder, weapons violations, assault,
+and robbery fell into the middle range: 17.5, 13.4, 12.8, and
+11.5 percent respectively denied their offense. Drug and nonviolent
+property offenders were least likely to deny their conviction offense.
+It is possible that in this rather lengthy, complex questionnaire
+the inmate respondents misunderstood the two key questions that
+are of concern to us. Specifically, in marking "Did no crime," they
+
+19 The NACJD is sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (U.S. Dept. of
+Justice), operated by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research,
+and headquartered at the University of Michigan.
+
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+702 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
+Table 1. Current Conviction Crime by Self-Reported
+Denial
+
+Current Conviction Offense Did Not Commit
+n %
+
+Rape 23 37.7
+Sex Offense (not rape) 14 26.9
+Murder 18 17.5
+Weapons 20 13.4
+Assault 22 12.8
+Robbery 44 11.5
+Forgery 8 9.9
+Burglary 33 9.0
+Drug Sate 7 8.1
+Drug Possession 6 5.2
+
+All Offenses 197 15.4
+
+Source: National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (2000).
+NOTE: N = 1,272 (missing values in 10 of the 1,282 cases)
+
+may not have understood their response. As a check on respondents'
+confusion, I examined whether inmates who reported that
+they "did no crime" (in response to question 7 in the booklet) also
+indicated, nonetheless, that they really had committed another
+crime. Such a response, of course, would be contradictory to the
+question "What crimes, if any, did you really commit?" This did not
+seem to be a problem, however: only 19 (1.5%) of the inmate respondents
+indicated that they had committed no crime and yet
+checked one of the other crime categories on the list.
+
+Overall, inmates' reports of their conviction crime corresponded
+to crime they actually committed. For example, 103 inmate respondents
+reported that they had been convicted of murder, and 70 of
+those respondents admitted that they had committed murder.
+Many of the remaining 33 respondents admitted to crimes less than
+murder (e.g., manslaughter, robbery) and therefore questioned the
+state's classification of the crime they had committed, but only 18
+claimed that they had committed no crime at all. Similarly, 382
+inmate respondents reported a conviction of robbery, and 287 admitted
+that they had committed that crime. Only 44 of the remaining
+95 respondents convicted of robbery claimed that they had
+committed no crime. This pattern holds for the great majority of
+crimes; the exceptions are rape and other sex offenses, for which the
+rate of denial was much higher. In the case of rape, 61 inmate respondents
+reported a conviction of rape, only 17 conceded that they
+had committed that crime, and 23 claimed to have committed no
+crime at all.
+
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+POVEDA 703
+
+DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
+
+The prevalence of wrongful convictions as measured by inmates'
+self-reports is significantly greater than the estimate derived
+from using official data based on court-ordered discharges
+(15% versus 1%). 20 This finding perhaps is not surprising, but it
+does not support the idea that alternative methodologies might produce
+similar results.
+Although the RAND assessment of prisoners' self-reports challenged
+the conventional wisdom that inmates in general deny their
+criminal activities, some prisoners nonetheless have a variety of
+self-serving motives for underreporting their crimes. Even though
+they have been convicted and imprisoned, some inmates still may
+have forthcoming appeals, and therefore, in spite of the anonymity
+or confidentiality of a survey, a personal stake in minimizing their
+involvement in the conviction crime. It is also possible, as Loftus
+(1996) argued so persuasively with eyewitness testimony, that postevent
+information may reshape inmates' memories of their criminal
+conduct, including their current conviction offenses. 21 Perhaps defense
+arguments and accounts of the crime presented at trial or on
+appeal, by minimizing or denying defendants' involvement, may
+subtly influence memories of the actual crime. 22
+It may also be that inmates' perceptions of their criminal conduct
+are at variance with the legal definition. For example, Koss,
+Gidycz, and Wisniewski (1987), who researched the prevalence of
+rape on college campuses, observed that male offenders tended not
+to recognize their conduct as rape; yet they admitted to having sex
+with a female against her will. 23 This disparity in definitions of
+
+20 Technically, the comparison here should be between 17.5 percent (the proportion
+of convicted murderers denying the charges in the RAND survey) and the 1.4
+percent error rate for murder convictions/commitments based on court-ordered
+discharges.
+21 This is evident in the growing number of cases where postconviction DNA
+testing provides incriminating evidence rather than exonerating the inmate. A case
+in point is that of Texas death row inmate Ricky McGinn. In June 2000 Governor
+George Bush gave McGinn a 30-day reprieve to allow time for DNA testing before his
+execution. All of the DNA results subsequently showed a match between McGinn
+and evidence recovered from the victim. Even so, McGinn maintained his innocence
+(Texas Man" 2000). This also occurred in the Scott William Davi case in South
+Dakota: Davis's DNA results provided a match confirming the rape and murder of
+his ex-wife. Davi, too, maintained his innocence. The results of DNA testing at two
+major forensic laboratories (Forensic Science Associates and Cellmark) have confirmed
+prisoners' guilt in 60 percent of the cases (Cohen 2000:A1).
+~2 Penningten and Hastie (1993) have written about the "story model" of juror's
+decision making, arguing that prosecutors and defense attorneys construct stories of
+the crime to make it more understandable to the jury. The story then is a way to
+organize the facts of the case in a manner consistent with the prosecution or the
+defense version of events. These "stories" might later influence the defendants'
+recollections of their crimes.
+23 In particular, respondents disagree about what constitutes coercive or consensual
+sexual relations.
+
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+704 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
+rape (legal versus offender's definition) perhaps accounts for much
+of the underreporting of rape (and other sex offenses) in the RAND
+Inmate Survey. Another possibility, as noted by the RAND researchers,
+is that inmates misclassify their offense, perhaps confusing
+robbery with theft or murder with manslaughter. It is more
+difficult, however, to understand the complete denial of an inmate's
+conviction offense, short of lying or wrongful conviction.
+
+An earlier RAND survey of 624 California male prisoners also
+concluded that "inmates did not deny committing crimes" (Peterson,
+Braiker, and Polich 1981:xxi), but found that 81 (13%) of those
+inmates denied committing any of the 11 crimes on the survey list.
+Peterson and his colleagues (1981:20) maintained that about half of
+the 81 had committed a crime not on their list; about 6 percent denied
+committing any crime, including the crime for which they had
+been imprisoned. Although this figure is less than the approximately
+15 percent denial rate found in the 1978 RAND Inmate Survey,
+it is larger than the i percent estimate of wrongful convictions
+based on court-ordered discharges.
+
+The two approaches employed in this study to estimate the
+prevalence of wrongful convictions not only resulted in different
+outcomes, but also are based on different methodologies. One
+draws on officially acknowledged error (court-ordered discharges);
+the other, on the uncorroborated claims of prisoners (inmates' selfreports),
+and thus on a more expansive definition of wrongful conviction.
+Because court-ordered discharges are the result of inmates
+who pursue their claims of justice-system error (whether substantive
+or procedural), it is not surprising that the outcome of that process
+will yield a smaller estimate, given the attrition of cases.
+Moreover, future research on court-ordered discharges must continue
+to distinguish between persons released for procedural and
+for substantive reasons, and must reexamine the proportion of
+cases involving wrong-person convictions. 24 Although the extent of
+wrongful convictions remains a "dark figure," the divergent fmdings
+of the two approaches used here may delineate the parameters
+of the problem: prevalence ranges from 1 to 15 percent, depending
+on assumptions and operational definitions.
+Future research also must take into account variation in
+wrongful convictions over time. Drawing on Packer's (1968) distinction
+between "crime control" and "due process," Huff and his colleagues
+(1996:143-44) note a possible link between wrongful
+
+24 The 21.2 percent estimate used in this study is based on one study, the 1989
+DOCS research on vacated murder convictions, which needs to be explored more
+fully.
+
+Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 04:21 11 December 2014
+POVEDA 705
+
+convictions and a crime-control model of the criminal justice process.
+This suggests that in historical periods which emphasize
+crime control over due process (as in "get tough" crime policies), errors
+of justice are also more likely, including wrongful convictions.
+Until now, the absence of a methodology for measuring justice-system
+error has made this proposition untestable.
+
+Estimating the prevalence of wrongful convictions is not
+merely a matter of academic interest. IZ~owing the magnitude and
+scope of the problem has important public policy implications. Although
+we may never know exactly how many innocent persons
+have been convicted and imprisoned, the extent of this problem indicates
+how well (or how poorly) our criminal justice system is sorting
+the guilty from the not guilty; certainly this is a major goal of
+the system. The extent of error provides a quality control mechanism
+and alerts us to systemic flaws, whether they pertain to mistaken
+eyewitness identification, police interrogation practices,
+ineffective counsel, or the use ofjailhouse informers.
+
+In a 1999 report by the Institute of Medicine of the National
+Academy of Sciences (NAS), it was estimated that medical mistakes
+annually kill from 44,000 to 98,000 hospital patients (Corrigan,
+Kohn, and Donaldson 1999). The report emphasized the systemic
+basis for most errors in the health care system, rather than individual
+recklessness, and identified some of the organizational measures
+that can be taken to prevent death and injury from medical
+mistakes (NAS 1999). Although officials and providers in the
+health care system have been slow 25 to recognize the extent of
+medical mistakes and their implications for public safety, this report
+represents a reversal.
+
+Officials in the criminal justice system can learn from the
+experience of other institutions by publicly acknowledging justicesystem
+errors, conducting inquiries when they occur, and beginning
+to quantify the extent of the problem. 26 Only then can the problem
+of wrongful convictions be addressed in terms of systemic flaws, not
+merely as individual wrongdoing nor as honest mistakes that are
+quickly forgotten.
+
+25 Action has been slow in relation to some other sectors of the economy in
+which public safety issues are well established, such as the airline and automobile
+industries and workplace safety in general. Medical malpractice suits, of course,
+have contributed to the health care system's reluctance to publicly acknowledge
+medical mistakes.
+26 In May 2000, New York Governor George Pataki proposed legislation to cre~
+ate a DNA Review Committee. This committee would have the authority to review
+cases in which DNA has exonerated offenders, and to recommend legal or procedural
+changes to prevent future recurrences ("Gov. Pataki" 2000).
+
+Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 04:21 11 December 2014
+706 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
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+1978: California, Michigan, and Texas." ICPSR Study 8169. Ann Arbor,
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+New York State Defenders Association (NYSDA). 1989. Convicting the Innocent:
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+Problems 61:105-24.
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+Convictions in Capital Cases. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
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+"Texas Man Gets New Execution Date." 2000. New York Times, August 15. Retrieved
+August 15, 2000 (http://www.nytimes.com).
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+Danger of Mistaken Executions. Staff Report by Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutianal
+Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session.
+Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
+Webb, E.J., D.T. Campbell, R.D. Schwartz, and L. Sechrest. 1966. Unobtrusive Measures:
+Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
+Wells, G.L. 1993. "What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?" American
+Psychologist 48:553-71.
+Yant, M. 1991. Presumed Guilty: When Innocent People Are Wrongly Convicted. Buffalo,
+NY: Prometheus.
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+708 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
+
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+American Psychologist 48:572-73.
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\ No newline at end of file
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+Process Mining-Enabled Jurimetrics
+
+Analysis of a Brazilian Court’s Judicial Performance in the Business Law Processing
+
+Adriana Jacoto Unger
+José Francisco dos Santos Neto
+Marcelo Fantinato
+Sarajane Marques Peres
+{ajacoto,jose.francisco.neto,m.fantinato,sarajane}@usp.br
+University of Sao Paulo
+Sao Paulo, Brazil
+
+Julio Trecenti
+Renata Hirota
+{jtrecenti,rhirota}@abj.org.br
+Brazilian Jurimetrics Association
+Sao Paulo, Brazil
+
+ABSTRACT
+Improving judicial performance has become increasingly relevant
+to guarantee access to justice for all, worldwide. In this context,
+technology-enabled tools to support lawsuit processing emerge as
+powerful allies to enhance the justice efficiency. Using electronic
+lawsuit management systems within the courts of justice is a widespread
+practice, which also leverages production of big data within
+judicial operation. Some jurimetrics techniques have arisen to evaluate
+efficiency based on statistical analysis and data mining of data
+produced by judicial information systems. In this sense, the process
+mining area offers an innovative approach to analyze judicial
+data from a process-oriented perspective. This paper presents the
+application of process mining in a event log derived from a dataset
+containing business lawsuits from the Court of Justice of the State
+of Sao Paulo, Brazil – the largest court in the world – in order to
+analyze judicial performance. Although the results show these lawsuits
+have an ad hoc sequence flow, process mining analysis have
+allowed to identify most frequent activities and process bottlenecks,
+providing insights into the root causes of inefficiencies.
+
+CCS CONCEPTS
+• Applied computing → Law; Business process management; Business
+intelligence; • Information systems → Data mining.
+
+KEYWORDS
+Process mining, jurimetrics, judicial performance, administration of
+justice, legal informatics, business process management, procedural
+law, business law.
+ACM Reference Format:
+Adriana Jacoto Unger, José Francisco dos Santos Neto, Marcelo Fantinato,
+Sarajane Marques Peres, Julio Trecenti, and Renata Hirota. 2021. Process
+Mining-Enabled Jurimetrics: Analysis of a Brazilian Court’s Judicial Performance
+in the Business Law Processing. In Eighteenth International Conference
+for Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL’21), June 21–25, 2021, São
+
+Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
+classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
+for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
+on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
+author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
+republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
+and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
+ICAIL’21, June 21–25, 2021, São Paulo, Brazil
+© 2021 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
+ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-8526-8/21/06. . .$15.00
+https://doi.org/10.1145/3462757.3466137
+
+Paulo, Brazil. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 5 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/
+3462757.3466137
+
+1 INTRODUCTION
+Within the administration of justice, electronic lawsuits and management
+information systems emerged to control lawsuit processing
+in the courts of justice. These systems allow the practice of
+procedural acts by magistrates and other participants in lawsuits in
+a fully digital environment. Since 2015, the Court of Justice of the
+State of Sao Paulo (TJSP1
+), Brazil, is 100% digital, i.e., all new lawsuits
+born digital. TJSP is considered the largest court in the world in
+terms of volume of lawsuits2
+, with over 19 million ongoing lawsuits,
+managed by the Justice Automation System (e-SAJ3
+). Data-centric
+analysis techniques, such as jurimetrics [11] and machine learning
+[14], take advantage of the increasing availability of judicial data.
+Jurimetrics supports statistics-based analysis on justice big data. In
+this sense, process mining [20] emerges as an approach to bridge
+data mining to Business Process Management (BPM), providing a
+process-oriented perspective which turns out to be more valuable
+when analyzing phenomena distinguished by procedural behaviour,
+such as in lawsuit processing ruled by procedural law.
+This paper presents an innovative application of process mining
+to analyze judicial performance based on a lawsuit dataset, as a
+proof of concept for process mining-enabled jurimetrics. The experiment
+was restricted to business law, as it is an area of law that
+commonly presents poor judicial performance and difficulties in
+diagnosis due to its high heterogeneity. This study raises and highlights
+contributions of process mining showing the benefits of a
+process-oriented approach to analyzing legal data for performance
+diagnostics. The paper is divided as follows: background, presenting
+the theoretical framework of this work; related work, pointing
+out prior research related to this topic; research method, describing
+the stages of this research study; results, showing results of the
+process mining application; analysis of the results, presenting process
+mining-enabled analysis of lawsuit processing; and conclusion,
+which highlights the research findings.
+
+2 BACKGROUND
+This section introduces the main theoretical concepts related to
+this work, contextualized in the Brazilian setting.
+
+1Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo (in Portuguese)
+2http://www.tjsp.jus.br/QuemSomos
+3
+Sistema de Automação da Justiça (in Portuguese)
+
+240
+ICAIL’21, June 21–25, 2021, São Paulo, Brazil Unger et al.
+
+2.1 Judicial Performance
+Judicial performance is a field of study dedicated to evaluate performance
+of judicial systems and courts of justice [8]. Some international
+organizations conducted studies to measure and compare
+judicial performance worldwide [10, 17]. In Brazil, the National
+Council of Justice provides the Justice in Numbers annual report
+[5], offering an overview of the judiciary productivity.
+Current models for judicial performance evaluation contributed
+substantially to the continuous measurement, monitoring and comparison
+of judicial performance. However, such evaluation models
+have done little to guide improvement actions. Identifying the root
+causes of inefficiencies is often limited due to the asymmetry of
+information among the courts’ information systems, as well as the
+lack of detailed data on the activities of lawsuit processing [1].
+
+2.2 Jurimetrics
+Jurimetrics [11] is defined as ‘statistics applied to the law’. Although
+it emerged decades ago, recent advances in computing and data
+storage capabilities have enabled alternative ways of observing
+patterns in data-based and hence statistics-based court decisions.
+In the USA, the application of statistics to law has been developed
+under alternative nomenclature, such as Empirical Legal Studies
+[7] and, more recently, Judicial Analytics [4]. In Brazil, jurimetrics
+has received growing interest [12].
+When analyzing alternative ways of managing the lawsuit processing,
+the analysis of the lawsuit throughput time using jurimetrics
+techniques may present quality issues, as it eventually considers
+inadequate time intervals for the object of analysis [3]. Procedural
+viscosity [16], defined as “a set of structural characteristics of a
+lawsuit that is able to affect the speed of its processing”, may apply.
+Specifically in business law, processing of lawsuits may require
+about twice as much effort as a common lawsuit [2]. The same
+authors suggest “future research focused on process flow analysis,
+i.e., the study of the stochastic process that generates all events and
+timestamps of lawsuit processing”.
+
+2.3 Process Mining
+Process mining [20] emerged as a set of techniques for mining
+business process-related information from event data logged by
+information systems. A business process is a chain of activities that
+produces an outcome that adds value to an organization and its
+customers [6]. Business process models play a dominant role during
+BPM life cycle, leading in achieving organizational improvement
+goals, including reducing costs, lead times, and error rates. By using
+real event data to discover process models, process mining leverages
+data mining to understand operational processes in organizations.
+Table 1 shows the mapping of the basic elements of event logs
+from the process mining perspective to their counterparts in the
+procedural law domain.
+
+3 RELATED WORK
+Process mining should be seen as an analytical tool naturally suitable
+for lawsuits due to their inherently procedural nature. It is
+cited as a promising approach to suggest improvements for lawsuit
+processing [15]. Lawsuit digitization is presented as not being an
+
+Table 1: Process mining in procedural law
+
+Process mining Procedural law
+
+Activity Name of the lawsuit procedural movement.
+Event Occurrence of a procedural movement, i.e., occurrence
+of a lawsuit’s procedural progress.
+Timestamp Date of occurrence of the lawsuit’s procedural
+movement.
+Case Lawsuit.
+Case ID Lawsuit identifier.
+Event attributes General attributes related to the movement.
+Case attributes General attributes related to the lawsuit.
+
+end in itself, so that process mining can enhance the way the judiciary
+treats its digital data through the application of algorithms for
+process discovery, compliance and predictive analysis [9]. A technical
+report with suggested actions to improve judicial efficiency
+highlights the use of process mining as one of these actions [3].
+Nevertheless, few studies on this topic were found in the literature.
+Empirical studies were performed using lawsuit data from
+Brazilian courts[19, 22] though focused on comparison of lawsuit
+throughput times. Attempts to apply data mining to extract information
+from lawsuit data were made [13, 18], but these studies do
+not directly address process mining on that data.
+
+4 RESEARCH METHOD
+This study applied the Process Mining Project Methodology [21] to
+guide the application of process mining to analyze judicial performance
+in a specific context. Only the first five stages of the method
+were carried out: planning, extraction, data processing, mining and
+analysis, and evaluation. The project was finished with the insights
+generated by the evaluation stage. Besides restricting the scope to
+business law, a period of analysis was defined to consider only the
+TJSP’s lawsuits distributed between January 1, 2018 and July 21,
+2020. All lawsuits with a procedural movement published in that
+time interval were considered. Full progress data for each lawsuit
+was retrieved until July 31, 2020, including lawsuits opened before
+and lawsuits not yet closed.
+The data were extracted in two steps. First, the identifiers of
+lawsuits of interest were obtained. For this, all issues of the TJSP’s
+Electronic Journals of Justice (DJE4
+) were downloaded from the DJE
+website5
+, considering the defined analysis period. DJE publishes information
+on provisional or final decisions for all ongoing lawsuits
+at TJSP, daily. An automated scraping of these files was carried out
+using keywords associated with business law litigation. Second,
+the lawsuit identifiers obtained were used to retrieve data from
+the e-SAJ website6
+, where information on lawsuits is published. A
+web scraping was carried out to retrieve information on lawsuits
+attributes and progress events including their respective dates. In
+TJSP, there are four filing court departments dedicated to business
+
+4Diário da Justiça Eletrônico (in Portuguese)
+5http://www.dje.tjsp.jus.br
+6http://esaj.tjsp.jus.br
+
+241
+Process Mining-Enabled Jurimetrics ICAIL’21, June 21–25, 2021, São Paulo, Brazil
+
+law; as a result, the lawsuits not filed at these four court departments
+were discarded. Data from both DJE and e-SAJ websites are
+publicly available7
+.
+The process knowledge transfer with domain experts was carried
+out, resulting in a mapping between the elements of the dataset
+and the concepts of event log used by process mining, presented
+in Table 2. Event data from lawsuits were used to create the event
+log to be used in process mining. The lawsuit dataset was filtered
+to remove columns with missing values or data not relevant to the
+scope of this study. The judge column was made anonymous for
+protecting personal data. The additional column order was added
+to the movement database, and hence to the event log, to allow the
+process mining discovery algorithm to identify the correct order of
+activities within a case occurring on the same date.
+
+5 RESULTS
+The resulting event log contains data on lawsuits referring to 4,795
+cases and 266,834 events, with procedural movements dating back
+to 2008, and 10 case attributes, as described in Table 2. The event log
+file8 was imported using the EverFlow9 process mining tool, which
+produced the business process maps and the main process metrics,
+such as number of cases, number of events, and average duration,
+as presented in Figure 1 and Figure 3. Process map views are userinteractive,
+so that activities, transitions, and the time interval can
+be selected and filtered for drill-down analysis. Detailed views on
+specific metrics are presented on dedicated dashboards and panels,
+as shown in Figure 2, Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6.
+
+Figure 1: Process map of the lawsuit processing
+
+6 ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
+As a proof of concept for process mining-enabled jurimetrics, the
+results were analyzed considering each of the following process
+mining perspectives: control-flow, time, resource, and case [20].
+
+6.1 Control-flow Perspective
+The control flow is the main perspective considered in process
+mining discovery, adding process-oriented value to the data mining
+7The right of access to judicial data in Brazil is guaranteed by the constitutional
+principle of judicial publicity, except in lawsuits protected by the secrecy of justice.
+8The event log file is available in the repository: https://doi.org/10.4121/14593857
+9http://everflow.ai
+
+Figure 2: Histogram of procedural movements by lawsuit
+
+Figure 3: Process map based on average duration metrics
+
+Figure 4: Slow transition analysis panel
+
+analysis of the event log, as shown in Figure 1. The complexity
+and procedural viscosity of lawsuits in business law can be verified
+by the process metrics, i.e., average rate of 55.6 events per case
+and average case duration of 334 days. As shown in Figure 2, over
+10% of lawsuits have over 100 events per case, which corresponds
+to procedural movements during lawsuit processing. In addition,
+one can verify that lawsuit processing in business law has an ad
+
+242
+ICAIL’21, June 21–25, 2021, São Paulo, Brazil Unger et al.
+
+Table 2: Judicial data mapped to process mining event log
+
+Dataset column Data description Event log role
+
+lawsuit_id Lawsuit identifier. Case ID.
+movement Name of the lawsuit procedural movement. Event activity.
+date Date of occurrence of the lawsuit’s procedural movement. Event timestamp.
+order Sequential order of occurrence of the lawsuit’s procedural movement. Event attribute.
+area Law area to which the lawsuit refers. Case attribute.
+claim_amount Lawsuit claim amount. Case attribute.
+class Procedural class (refers to specific law or claim reason). Case attribute.
+control Internal control number. Case attribute.
+court_department Filing court department. Case attribute.
+digital It shows whether the process is digital (born digital or scanned) or on paper. Case attribute.
+distribution_date Date and time when the lawsuit was distributed. Case attribute.
+judge Name of the ruling judge for the lawsuit. Case attribute.
+status Lawsuit status. Case attribute.
+subject_matter Main topic of the lawsuit. Case attribute.
+
+Figure 5: Lawsuits by judge dashboard
+
+Figure 6: Comparative analysis between on-paper and digital
+lawsuits
+
+hoc sequence flow, characterized by the large number of process
+variants. The most frequent control-flow is shared among 155 cases,
+which represents only 3% of all lawsuits. The extended process map
+in Figure 1 shows the process control-flow considering only 4.19%
+of cases. Figure 1 also highlights the most frequent activities and
+event counting for each transition.
+
+6.2 Time Perspective
+The analysis of the lawsuit throughput time using process mining
+techniques is favored by the easy handling of incomplete cases,
+considering the activities carried out in the sequence flow. Since
+the full progress data for each lawsuit was retrieved, there is no
+issue related to the beginning of the process (i.e., lawsuit opening).
+However, the lawsuit processing time evaluation can be affected by
+cases that did not ended (i.e., lawsuits not yet closed). The Definitely
+Archived activity is the most frequent final activity, which confirms
+the natural behaviour of lawsuit processing within the court. It is
+the final activity in 20% of the cases, which represents the number of
+closed lawsuits in the dataset. By filtering all cases that go through
+this activity, the lawsuit throughput time for closed lawsuits can
+be calculated as 312 days.
+Furthermore, based on the process map in Figure 3, one can
+identify highlighted slow transitions and activity bottlenecks. These
+transitions are also listed in the slow transition analysis panel
+in Figure 4, which offers a detailed diagnostics on each of them.
+Comments on some slow transitions of the lawsuit processingrelated
+business process are presented in the following:
+
+• Transition between Issued Publication Certificate and Issued
+Judicial Office Certificate activities, with duration of 18 days
+and effort of 121 years and 209 days, affecting 38% of cases:
+this is a clear bottleneck within the court department. After
+the publication certificate is issued, the judicial office publication
+certificate must be issued. However, there is a long
+waiting time due to the lack of human resources on the court.
+This bottleneck has a high impact on lawsuit processing time
+and the use of court resource, suggesting that this activity is
+a good candidate for automation solutions.
+• Transition between Issued Publication Certificate and Suspension
+of the Term activities, with duration of 21 days and effort
+of 164 years and 258 days, affecting 42% of cases: bottleneck
+possibly due to litigant issues, such as lack of required documentation.
+Figure 4 shows that this transition causes the
+average duration of the case to increase by 77%.
+
+243
+Process Mining-Enabled Jurimetrics ICAIL’21, June 21–25, 2021, São Paulo, Brazil
+
+• Transition between Suspension of the Term and Conclusions
+for Decision activities, with duration of 13 days and effort of
+19 years and 298 days, affecting 10% of cases: this bottleneck
+is related to the previous one, possibly due to the judge being
+unable to evaluate the case for proper decision making.
+
+6.3 Resource Perspective
+The resource perspective analysis allows process maps and metrics
+to be evaluated considering the resources (people or devices) that
+execute the process activities. In addition, the values of the process
+execution effort can be evaluated based on the average duration
+and event counting for each activity. Performance and comparative
+analysis of lawsuit processing from the resource perspective were
+carried out based on the judge attribute, as shown in Figure 5.
+
+6.4 Case Perspective
+The case perspective allows performance diagnostics to be carried
+out considering specific case attributes. Considering the digital case
+attribute, a side-by-side comparison was carried out to analyze how
+this attribute impacts process flow and metrics. Surprisingly, Figure
+6 shows that digital lawsuits are 6% slower than the on-paper ones.
+Some considerations on these findings are as follows:
+
+• The definition of the digital attribute includes both the born
+digital lawsuits and the scanned ones, although the scanned
+ones usually require more time and effort to be processed.
+It is not possible to distinguish them by the value of this
+attribute, but further investigation on procedural movements
+may confirm this assumption, if scan activities are logged.
+• Procedural viscosity in business law might hide inefficiencies
+usually associated with on-paper lawsuits, which means
+that the main process bottlenecks in business law might
+be related to internal activities that are independent of the
+digital nature of lawsuits. However, this statement requires
+further investigation, since digital lawsuit management is
+often associated with performance gains.
+• A data selection bias may have occurred due to the analysis
+period, as it is not uncommon for dedicated task forces to
+occur within court departments to reduce the backlog of
+on-paper lawsuits.
+
+7 CONCLUSION
+The analysis of the results revealed a comprehensive set of diagnostic
+metrics, insights into the root causes of inefficiencies, and
+ideas for improvement, which would hardly be discovered without
+a process-oriented analysis approach. The prospects for using process
+mining in the Brazilian judiciary include the use of process
+mining tools to provide online dashboards for judicial performance
+monitoring by the State Internal Affairs Divisions of Justice, which
+monitors the performance on the provision of jurisdictional services.
+These dashboards can be used to identify inefficiencies in
+near real time and define targets for resolving them.
+
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
+The authors thank the EverFlow company for kindly supporting
+this research.
+
+REFERENCES
+[1] Bruna Armonas Colombo, Pedro Buck, and Vinicius Miana Bezerra. 2017. Challenges
+When Using Jurimetrics in Brazil—A Survey of Courts. Future Internet 9,
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+76122013000200005 (in Portuguese).
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+direito processual (2 ed.), Dierle Nunes, Paulo Henrique dos Santos Lucon, and
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+com/resources/global-measures
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+[12] Marcos Maia and Cicero Aparecido Bezerra. 2020. Bibliometric analysis of scientific
+articles on jurimetry published in Brazil. Revista Digital de Biblioteconomia e
+Ciência da Informação 18 (2020). https://doi.org/10.20396/RDBCI.V18I0.8658889
+[13] Oleg Metsker, Egor Trofimov, Sergey Sikorsky, and Sergey Kovalchuk. 2019. Text
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+practice control. In Communications in Computer and Information Science, Vol. 947.
+Springer, Cham, 169–180. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13283-5_13
+[14] Tom M. Mitchell. 1997. Machine Learning. McGraw-Hill Science/Engineering/Math.
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+direito processual (2 ed.), Dierle Nunes, Paulo Henrique dos Santos Lucon, and
+Erik Navarro Workart (Eds.). JusPodivm, Salvador, 55–78.
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+Direito (2 ed.). Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo. 192 pages. (in Portuguese).
+[17] Giuliana Palumbo, Giulia Giupponi, Luca Nunziata, and Juan Mora-Sanguinetti.
+2013. Judicial performance and its determinants: a cross-country perspective.
+OECD Economic Policy Papers 5 (2013), 1–38. https://doi.org/10.1787/
+5k44x00md5g8-en
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+smart legal systems. Computers and Electrical Engineering 78 (9 2019), 328–342.
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2019.07.017
+[19] Universidade de São Paulo. 2019. Justiça Pesquisa - Mediações e Conciliações
+Avaliadas Empiricamente: jurimetria para proposição de ações eficientes. Technical
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+jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/e1d2138e482686bc5b66d18f0b0f4b16.pdf (in
+Portuguese).
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+Springer, Berlin. 467 pages. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49851-4
+[21] Maikel L. van Eck, Xixi Lu, Sander J. J. Leemans, and Wil M. P. van der Aalst.
+2015. PM2: A process mining project methodology. In Lecture Notes in Computer
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+19069-3_19
+[22] Caio Castelliano de Vasconcelos, Eduardo Watanabe de Oliveira, Henrique Pais da
+Costa, and Tomas de Aquino Guimaraes. 2018. Tempo de Processos Judiciais
+na Justiça Federal do Brasil. In XLII Encontro da ANPAD. Curitiba, 1–16. http:
+//www.anpad.org.br/abrir_pdf.php?e=MjQ1NzA= (in Portuguese).
+
+244
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+Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477006
+
+In the normal course of business, companies are involved in various disputes that must be
+resolved by the courts. The administration of these legal actions involves assessing the risk
+to which these companies are exposed. This text proposes that such actions can be
+grouped and treated as a portfolio. Legal techniques can be used to assess and manage
+the risk in these actions.
+
+This differentiation between risk and uncertainty is made by Frank Knight in Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Boston New
+York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921. According to the author "But Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically
+distinct from the familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly separated. The term "risk," as loosely used
+in everyday speech and in economic discussion, really covers two things which, functionally at least, in their causal
+relations to the phenomena of economic organization, are categorically different. The nature of this confusion will be
+addressed with at length in chapter VII, but the essence of it may be stated in a few words at this point. The essential
+
+Text presented at the VII Congress of Legal Administration, Legal Informatics and Jurimetry, São Paulo, Othon Hotel,
+October 7, 1998.
+
+Summary
+
+Consultant and business administrator from the University of São Paulo. Email ivan_ribeiro@dialdata.com.br.
+
+According to Eduardo Leopoldino de Andrade, Introduction to Operations Research, Technical and Scientific Books,
+São Paulo, 1990, page 261.
+3
+
+1
+
+two
+
+4
+
+A Jurimetric Approach1
+
+Lawsuit Portfolio Risk Assessment
+
+Ivan César Ribeiro2
+
+A company, in the normal exercise of its activities, becomes involved in conflicts that eventually
+flow into the Judiciary. These are labor actions filed by former employees, customer actions
+supported by the recently enacted Consumer Protection Code (Law 8,078 of 1990), debt
+enforcement charging defaulting customers and several other possibilities. Sometimes,
+companies create internal legal departments, or hire law firms to monitor and defend these
+actions.
+
+Risk is normally defined as an estimated degree of uncertainty with respect to the achievement
+of desired future outcomes. The wider the range of predictable values for the return on an
+investment (or, in our case, for the outcome of a lawsuit), the greater the degree of risk of the
+investment3. .
+
+The result of each of these actions, sometimes occurring at a very distant point in the future, can
+have important impacts on the company's revenues, expenses and results. Condemnations in
+amounts higher than expected in those actions in which the company is the defendant, or an
+unfavorable decision frustrating the receipt of amounts in an action in which the company acts
+as the plaintiff, therefore imposes a risk for the company.
+
+In the case of legal actions, a portion of the possible values for their result may not be easy to
+assess, that is, it would not be possible to assign probabilities to all values in the spectrum of
+possible results. We are, in this case, dealing with the difference between risk and uncertainty4 .
+
+1. Introduction
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477006
+
+5
+
+6
+In order to correctly assess the risks and returns of this said portfolio of lawsuits, therefore, we
+need to find ways to assess the risk involved in each lawsuit, as well as the possible amounts
+involved.
+
+Due to its uncertain nature, a lawsuit that has not yet been closed can be classified as a
+contingency. According to the FASB (1975)6 , a contingency involves a condition, situation or set
+of circumstances involving uncertainty in relation to a gain (assets) or loss (liabilities) whose
+resolution depends on future events. These regulations have been in constant evolution, with
+contingent liabilities, specifically, first disciplined by IAS-10 (International Accounting Standards),
+from 1978, with the most recent amendment in 1994.
+
+A company's lawsuits can be viewed and managed as a whole, in the form of a portfolio. Thus,
+more than the risk in a specific lawsuit, the company is interested in performance in all lawsuits.
+While the company may face adverse results in some of these actions, in others the result may
+be positive – what is expected is that there is not a perfect correlation between all the issues that
+the company discusses in the Judiciary. Portfolio Theory has been examined for a long time in
+the area of finance, and this property, of different correlations between legal actions, ends up
+mitigating the total risk to which the company is subjected, making results more predictable5 .
+
+A contingent liability, still according to the FASB, must be classified according to the probability
+of occurrence, being classified as probable, possible or remote. In the case of lawsuits, we
+observe in the balance sheets of publicly-held companies a reserve in the income statement
+accounts for these expenses (provisions), in the case of those classified as probable. Lawsuits
+classified as only possible or even remote are informed in the notes
+
+Assessing the likely outcome of legal actions in companies is normally the responsibility of
+lawyers and, occasionally, accountants. The so-called due diligence procedures, through a
+detailed examination of the documents of each legal action, seek to determine the values involved
+in the legal discussions and the chances of victory. It should be noted that legal actions are
+evaluated in at least two dimensions – first in relation to the chance of gain or loss, and, once
+this stage has been completed, in relation to the possible value of conviction (or value recovered,
+in the case of actions promoted by the company ).
+
+2. Provisions and Contingencies
+
+“A contingency is defined as an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving as uncertainty to
+possible gain (hereinafter a "gain contingency") or loss 1 (hereinafter a "loss contingency") to an enterprise that will
+ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to occur. Resolution of the uncertainty may
+confirm the acquisition of an asset or the reduction of a liability or the loss or impairment of an asset or the incurrence
+of a liability”.
+
+See, for an approach to portfolio theory, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinley, 1997, Chapter 5.
+
+fact is that "risk" means in some cases a susceptible quantity of measurement, while at other times it is something
+distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomenon
+depending on which of the two is really present and operating. There are other ambiguities in the term "risk" as well,
+which will be pointed out; but this is the most important. It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or "risk" proper,
+as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We
+shall accordingly restrict the term "uncertainty" to cases of the non-quantitive type. It is this "true" uncertainty, and
+not risk, as has been argued, which forms the basis of a valid theory of profit and accounts for the divergence
+between actual and theoretical competition."
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+9
+
+7
+
+8
+
+3. The Econometric Approach
+
+closed in three large companies, with the dual objective of i) providing better forecasts for these
+
+contingencies and ii) guiding legal strategies or amicable composition, in order to better manage
+
+what we call a portfolio of lawsuits. These models were initially developed with an econometric
+
+approach, described in the next section. After facing problems with what we call the phenomenon
+
+of case selection, we began to develop a jurimetric approach to creating such models.
+
+The practice in most companies has been to request these assessments as to the likelihood of
+
+gain or loss (whether probable, possible or remote) and estimates of the amounts involved from
+
+the attorneys in these actions, whether these are company lawyers or external offices. More often
+
+than not, these predictions are made in a non-systematic way, with little adherence between the
+
+final outcome and the predictions offered by the lawyers.
+
+The development of predictive models began with data collection and preparation of a database
+
+with lawsuits both from the company and from other litigants. This information is available in the
+
+various services for querying information from the judiciary, through services supported by
+
+RENPAC (National Package Network), Videotext (Telesp) and proprietary projects.
+
+the development of process-based forecasting models has already
+
+explanations of the financial statements, although not all companies bring this information in their
+balance sheets7 .
+
+The creation of these databases proved to be challenging, as each judiciary body uses different
+
+standards in its computers. Accessing information requires the access program to emulate different
+
+terminals, such as the IBM 3270, Digital terminals (especially the VT 100) and others. Since 1993,
+
+we have developed technology for these consultations, through our Telejuris® software, a terminal
+
+emulator capable of automatically collecting this data.
+
+,
+
+In a second step, with these data in hand, econometric models were developed that sought to
+
+determine the chance of gain or loss in these actions9 , as well as estimators of the amounts
+
+involved in court decisions. In addition to basic information such as the order value,
+
+This is the discipline required by Ibracon (1994, p. 151), which provides that a condition that may
+
+generate a contingent loss “shall be provisioned, through a debit to income for the year when it is
+
+considered probable and its amount can be estimated” .
+
+We started, from 19918
+
+Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477006
+
+Companies inform, above all, the so-called passive contingencies in the labor, tax and civil areas.
+
+These are projects that involve contractual secrecy, and for such reasons the names and details of the lawsuits will not
+be declined in this article.
+See Berndt (1991, especially Chapter 11) for win-loss prediction models, called dichotomous models. Regarding the use
+of econometric techniques for predicting results in legal actions in a more general way, see Nagel (1965) – “[t] his article
+illustrates and systematically compares three methods for quatitatively predicting case outcomes. The three methods are
+correlation, regression, and discriminant analysis, all of which involve standard social science research techniques.”
+
+Companies with activities that produce high environmental impact, such as mining companies, have also reported
+information on actions in the environmental area, especially when these are consequences of Public Civil Actions.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+10
+
+4. The Selection of Disputes for Litigation
+
+In the case of labor actions, it was detected that a policy of agreements, aiming to eliminate the labor
+
+liabilities of a subsidiary of one of the companies, was apparently leading to the filing of an increasing
+
+number of actions.
+
+The action will only be filed if there is a margin of doubt that justifies this proposition.
+
+It is noted, from the content of the previous sections, that the management of legal actions in the form
+
+of a portfolio requires the determination of the risk and values involved in each action. Similar to what
+
+is done with other assets, this assessment could be made using the historical values of these shares.
+
+However, unlike financial assets, legal actions have a more dynamic characteristic, which makes their
+
+prediction a little more difficult.
+
+area of litigation, lawyer, place of action and others, variables were included that sought to provide
+
+guidance for defense strategies or for proposing agreements. The estimators of the parameters of
+
+these models were obtained through OLS and probit regressions made using the EViews 2.010
+software.
+
+If the plaintiff assesses that the chances of winning are minimal, he will not propose the action,
+
+accepting a possible agreement, with the situation being similar for the defendant. Priest and Klein's
+
+proposal is that the proportion of decisions favoring each side tends to 50%, regardless of any bias
+
+on the part of the court in favor of either party.
+
+For the management of a portfolio of legal actions, not only the actions currently litigated are important,
+
+but also those that could potentially go to court. What works such as Priest and Klein (1984),
+
+Siegelman and Donohue (1995) and Steven Shavell (1996) show is that the actions that actually go
+
+to trial are not representative of all potential conflicts. Put another way, the litigated actions are not a
+
+random sample of the underlying conflicts, and the majority of these conflicts are resolved by
+
+agreement.
+
+The models did not seek to determine litigation or settlement strategies, but rather to provide support
+
+for legal teams, with these strategies being chosen exclusively by lawyers with mandate in legal
+
+actions. Each chosen strategy was then monitored and validated, especially in the labor and consumer
+
+rights areas.
+
+What these projects seem to show so far is that it is not enough to just observe the actions already
+
+proposed, but also to take into account disputes with the potential to reach the judiciary. This possibility
+
+has been the subject of research in the United States since the end of the seventies.
+
+What these authors propose is that potential litigants take into account the chances of success before
+
+deciding whether or not to propose an action (and, consequently, whether to refuse an eventual
+
+agreement). Judges will grant a favorable decision to the author if the total evidence of the proposed
+
+action reaches or exceeds what the court understands as necessary evidence to justify it. Each party,
+
+plaintiff and defendant, makes an assessment of the merits of the case, weighing their assessment
+
+against the evidence considered to be the standard required by the court.
+
+Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477006
+
+It is a software released by QMS in March 1994, replacing MicroTSP. The version used, 2.0, is the first for
+the Windows environment, an operating system developed by Microsoft for compatible PC environments.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+5. Jurimetry and Selection Bias
+
+Source: Adapted from Santos et al (1995).
+
+The phenomenon can be better understood through an example. Suppose that the Consumer
+
+Defense Code, edited in 1990, generated a bias against large companies. For this reason judges in
+
+90% of cases would tend to favor the consumer. Companies, aware of this bias, will take to the
+
+judiciary only those actions in which they are absolutely certain they will win, where the evidence in
+
+their favor is strongest. As a result, although the bias against companies disadvantages them in
+
+90% of cases, we could, in the end, observe that companies win, say, 80% of cases. What happens
+
+is that these companies end up making agreements in the actions in which they would be harmed,
+
+and thus the examination, even econometric, of the results of the actions proposed in the judiciary
+
+would be useless to determine the risk and values involved.
+
+At the base of this pyramid we have social relations with the possibility of injury and, at the top, the
+
+result of the trial with the possibility of a previous agreement. At each stage the parties decide
+
+whether to move to the next stage. Figure 1 below presents a variation that we propose for this
+
+pyramid, showing that the next stage does not “fit” perfectly into the previous one. What this
+
+representation seeks to show is that there is a selection at each stage. At the base, for example,
+
+humble litigants or those with little access to justice can resign themselves to the injury. At the upper
+
+reaches of the pyramid, a party that fears being biased may prefer settlement to litigation.
+
+What the selection bias hypothesis shows is that, as the cases litigated are not a representative
+
+sample of the total number of disputes in society, it would not be possible to carry out any
+
+assessment of the chances of winning in an action based on these cases. What researchers
+
+suggest is that this bias be taken into account when analyzing the results of these cases – for example, Heisenberg and
+
+Santos et al (1995), examining litigation in Portugal, suggest a pyramid for litigation.
+
+Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477006
+
+Figure 1
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+11
+
+6. The Jurimetric Approach
+
+Farber (1996) suggest that the heterogeneity of litigants can explain differences in success
+rates, when selection bias is taken into account.
+
+In fact, there is no impediment for econometrics to face specific issues such as self-selection
+– see, for example, the work of James Heckman in this regard (1974, 1976, 1979). We
+believe, however, that just as the creation of sociometry11, psychometrics, biometrics and
+others helped to boost the use of quantitative approaches in specific fields, the same is true
+of jurimetrics.
+
+In the end, what we found is that the analysis of judicial decisions in such a way is not, when
+taking into account Priest and Klein's hypothesis, an easy task within the narrow framework
+of econometric analysis. That is why there is a need for a specific field for quantitative
+analysis in law, which we call jurimetry.
+
+Positive Jurimetry is the branch of knowledge that carries out the scientific investigation of
+legal phenomena through the proposition of hypotheses and their empirical test. The
+hypotheses formulated by positive jurimetry seek to explain and establish the causal links of
+these phenomena, but do not intend to explain a specific course of action for law practitioners.
+This last approach would be more typical of traditional jurimetry, as defined by Loevinger
+(1949, 1963) and his followers, and which could be more properly called Normative Jurimetry.
+
+Positive Jurimetry proposes hypotheses about the regularities observed in the legal
+phenomenon and also about variations around these regularities. These hypotheses will be,
+as far as necessary to define the empirical tests, defined in mathematical formulations or at
+least formulations that can be quantified. Empirical tests will seek to test the validity of these
+propositions through the use of statistics, especially statistical inference and probability
+theory, dealing with problems of identification, causality, significance and robustness of
+results.
+
+An additional challenge is to accurately quantify the extent of this bias. Zatz and Hagan
+(1985) show in an empirical exercise how much the coefficients in a regression analysis of
+this nature can vary as a function of selection bias. In fact, Priest and Klein's proposition is
+theoretical, and does not provide econometric or other methods for estimating the bias. An
+extensive literature, also mentioned by Zatz and Hagan, suggests strategies for these
+estimations, all of which are challenging to implement.
+
+As a field specifically focused on law, jurimetrics would be particularly capable of dealing with
+specific problems in Law and the administration of Justice. The existence of a field of its own
+does not exclude interdisciplinary action, especially dialogue with disciplines such as
+mathematics, statistics and econometrics. The existence of a field of its own would allow
+even better dealing with problems such as self-selection of cases and its impact on the inference from
+
+Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477006
+
+In the case of Social Sciences, Berk (1983) is one of the pioneering works to show the impact of selection bias
+based on the econometric literature mentioned. His proposition gave rise to an extensive literature applying selection
+models to the area of criminology, including the examination of judicial decisions.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+12
+
+7. Conclusions
+
+8. Bibliography
+
+Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477006
+
+Since the end of the 1980s, there has been some research, especially in the area of Political Science, which
+
+focuses on judicial decisions. These analyses, however, are only descriptive, consisting of frequency tables
+and the use of questionnaires. Inference analysis, especially that using regression models, still seems far from
+our scientists' research agenda. Facing problems such as self-selection of cases and other challenges such as
+calculating risk and determining agent behavior models, essential for effectively understanding the nature of
+litigation in our country, is even further away.
+
+This risk assessment can benefit from the tools and techniques provided by the expansion of
+access to information technology resources, especially from the popularization of personal
+computers in the 90s and access to information networks such as RENPAC and others. In
+addition to the possibility of setting up databases with information on lawsuits by the company
+itself and others, econometric models and software such as Micro TSP and EViews allow for
+a better assessment of this risk.
+
+The confluence of these techniques and, above all, the action of private agents, consultants
+and developers in conjunction with the university and public authorities should advance the
+research and production of new technologies and products aimed at managing legal actions,
+especially through the development of a new field of research, Jurimetrics.
+
+litigated cases, or the development of specific decision models, aimed at analyzing agents
+such as judges, lawyers, parties to legal actions, legislators and others
+
+The management of lawsuits in companies can benefit from a more technical treatment, with
+the development of predictive models and a better assessment of risks and amounts involved
+in conflicts, whether they reach the judiciary or are resolved extrajudicially. This better
+assessment and control of lawsuits would allow for portfolio treatment of the set of disputes
+faced by each company, allowing for better risk diversification and better financial management.
+
+The use of these techniques and tools occurs, in Brazil, exclusively in companies and the
+private sector, and there is no news, to date, of research and development activities led by
+public bodies, universities or research centers12. Outside the country, especially in the United
+States, there is a large amount of academic production examining the conditions for judicial
+decisions, with the development of important theories such as the case selection hypothesis
+for litigation and others.
+
+CAMPBELL, John Y.; L.O., Andrew W.; MACKINLAY, A. Craig; The Econometrics of Financial Markets,
+Princeton University Press, 1997.
+
+ANDRADE, Eduardo L.; Introduction to Operational Research, Technical and Scientific Books, São Paulo, 1990.
+
+BERNDT, Ernst R.; The Practice of Econometrics: Classic and Contemporary, New York: Addison-Wesley
+Publishing, 1991.
+
+EISENBERG, Theodore, and Henry S. FARBER. The litigious plaintiff hypothesis: Case selection and resolution,
+mimeo, WP 5649, National Bureau of Economic Research - NBER, July 1996, 34 pages.
+
+BERK, Richard A. "An introduction to sample selection bias in sociological data." American sociological review
+(1983): 386-398.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2477006
+
+SIEGELMAN, P.; DONOHUE, JJ; The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using
+Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis; Journal of Legal Studies, 24(2), 427-
+
+IBRACON – Brazilian Institute of Accountants. Accounting Principles. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 1994.
+
+SHAVELL, S.; Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible, Journal of Legal Studies, 25(2), 1996,
+pp. 493-501.
+
+462.
+
+HECKMAN, James J. "Sample selection bias as a specification error." Econometrica: Journal of the
+econometric society (1979): 153-161.
+
+LOEVINGER, L.; Jurimetrics - The Next Step Forward. Minnesota Law Review, 33, 1949, 455.
+KNIGHT, Frank; Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Boston New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921.
+
+ZATZ, Marjorie S., and John HAGAN. Crime, time, and punishment: An exploration of selection bias in
+sentencing research, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 1.1, 1985, pp. 103-126.
+
+EViews, User Guide. "Version 2.0." QMS Quantitative Micro Software, Irvine, California (1995).
+
+NAGEL, Stuart. Predicting court cases quantitatively, Michigan Law Review, 63.8 (1965): 1411-1422.
+
+LOEVINGER, L.; Jurimetrics: The methodology of legal inquiry; Law and contemporary problems. 28(1),
+1963, pp. 5-35.
+
+HECKMAN, James. "Shadow prices, market wages, and labor supply." Econometrica: journal of the
+econometric society (1974): 679-694.
+
+SANTOS, Boaventura S.; MARQUES, Maria ML; PEDROSO, John; FERREIRA, Pedro L.; Courts in
+Contemporary Societies: The Portuguese Case. Porto: Afrontamento, 2nd edition, 1996.
+
+HECKMAN, James J. "The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection and limited
+dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models." Annals of economic and social measurement,
+volume 5, number 4. NBER, 1976. 475-492.
+
+Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 -
+Accounting For Contingencies, Norwalk (CT), March 1975.
+
+PRIEST, GL; KLEIN, B.; The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, Journal of Legal Studies, 13(1), 1984, pp.
+1-55.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,3674 @@
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords: A Jurimetric Analysis
+Author(s): David Robertson
+Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Jan., 1982), pp. 1-25
+Published by: Cambridge University Press
+Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/193719 .
+Accessed: 09/05/2014 10:06
+
+Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
+http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
+
+ .
+JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
+content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
+of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
+
+ .
+
+Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to British
+Journal of Political Science.
+
+http://www.jstor.org
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+B.J.Pol.S. 12, 1-25 I
+Printed in Great Britain
+
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords:
+A Jurimetric Analysis
+
+DAVID ROBERTSON*
+
+For a variety of reasons political science in Britain has made no serious
+attempt to study courts and judges as political institutions and actors. Or at
+least this was true until recently. Several works in the last few years,
+especially Griffith's,1 Stevens's2 and a forthcoming book on the law lords by
+Alan Paterson,3 have pointed to a much needed change in this attitude.
+However, none of them have been works of political science, even though
+they have considered politics. By this I mean two things: they have not
+principally considered the judges' thoughts as political ideology; and they
+have not used the techniques and assumptions of rigorous, analytic political
+science. Indeed one of the few slightly earlier studies of the political role of
+the courts in Britain, by Morrison,4 specifically denies that such approaches,
+especially the statistical approach of jurimetrics, is possible in Britain. This
+article is an attempt to do the impossible, not so much because the author
+believes that Morrison's point is necessarily wrong, but because it is never
+sound methodology to abandon techniques that have been useful elsewhere
+without trying to make them work on different data sets. But first we must
+attempt to characterize the judicial role, before we try any study of the
+politics that may be attendant on judicial ideology.
+For political science there are perhaps three broad characterizations of the
+judicial role. I will identify these, for convenience, as the realist model, the
+class model, and the orthodox model. The realist model comes from the
+American tradition in the early decades of this century, best exemplified in
+works like Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind and Llewellyn's The
+Bramble Bush.6 These assume, broadly, that legal decisions are never
+determined in any firm way by the rules, precedents and arguments in the
+court. Rather a judge does, and must, come to his decision intuitively, and
+then only rationalizes it by the legal material. In itself this says nothing about
+the types of decision a judge makes, and not much about how he comes to his
+intuitions. It was left to a school of political scientists in the I950S and I96os,
+associated with Glendon Schubert,7 to fill in these details.
+* St Hugh's College, Oxford.
+J John A. G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (London: Fontana, 1977). 2 Robert Stevens, Law and Politics. the House of Lords as a Judicial Body, I80oo-976
+(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979). 3 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (forthcoming, I98I).
+4 Fred L. Morrison, Courts and the Political Process in England (London: Sage, I973).
+5 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Tudor, 1936).
+6 Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York: Columbia University Press, I930).
+7 Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, I965).
+P.p.
+
+B.J.Pol.S. 12, 1-25 I
+Printed in Great Britain
+
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords:
+A Jurimetric Analysis
+
+DAVID ROBERTSON*
+
+For a variety of reasons political science in Britain has made no serious
+attempt to study courts and judges as political institutions and actors. Or at
+least this was true until recently. Several works in the last few years,
+especially Griffith's,1 Stevens's2 and a forthcoming book on the law lords by
+Alan Paterson,3 have pointed to a much needed change in this attitude.
+However, none of them have been works of political science, even though
+they have considered politics. By this I mean two things: they have not
+principally considered the judges' thoughts as political ideology; and they
+have not used the techniques and assumptions of rigorous, analytic political
+science. Indeed one of the few slightly earlier studies of the political role of
+the courts in Britain, by Morrison,4 specifically denies that such approaches,
+especially the statistical approach of jurimetrics, is possible in Britain. This
+article is an attempt to do the impossible, not so much because the author
+believes that Morrison's point is necessarily wrong, but because it is never
+sound methodology to abandon techniques that have been useful elsewhere
+without trying to make them work on different data sets. But first we must
+attempt to characterize the judicial role, before we try any study of the
+politics that may be attendant on judicial ideology.
+For political science there are perhaps three broad characterizations of the
+judicial role. I will identify these, for convenience, as the realist model, the
+class model, and the orthodox model. The realist model comes from the
+American tradition in the early decades of this century, best exemplified in
+works like Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind and Llewellyn's The
+Bramble Bush.6 These assume, broadly, that legal decisions are never
+determined in any firm way by the rules, precedents and arguments in the
+court. Rather a judge does, and must, come to his decision intuitively, and
+then only rationalizes it by the legal material. In itself this says nothing about
+the types of decision a judge makes, and not much about how he comes to his
+intuitions. It was left to a school of political scientists in the I950S and I96os,
+associated with Glendon Schubert,7 to fill in these details.
+* St Hugh's College, Oxford.
+J John A. G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (London: Fontana, 1977). 2 Robert Stevens, Law and Politics. the House of Lords as a Judicial Body, I80oo-976
+(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979). 3 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (forthcoming, I98I).
+4 Fred L. Morrison, Courts and the Political Process in England (London: Sage, I973).
+5 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Tudor, 1936).
+6 Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York: Columbia University Press, I930).
+7 Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, I965).
+P.p.
+
+B.J.Pol.S. 12, 1-25 I
+Printed in Great Britain
+
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords:
+A Jurimetric Analysis
+
+DAVID ROBERTSON*
+
+For a variety of reasons political science in Britain has made no serious
+attempt to study courts and judges as political institutions and actors. Or at
+least this was true until recently. Several works in the last few years,
+especially Griffith's,1 Stevens's2 and a forthcoming book on the law lords by
+Alan Paterson,3 have pointed to a much needed change in this attitude.
+However, none of them have been works of political science, even though
+they have considered politics. By this I mean two things: they have not
+principally considered the judges' thoughts as political ideology; and they
+have not used the techniques and assumptions of rigorous, analytic political
+science. Indeed one of the few slightly earlier studies of the political role of
+the courts in Britain, by Morrison,4 specifically denies that such approaches,
+especially the statistical approach of jurimetrics, is possible in Britain. This
+article is an attempt to do the impossible, not so much because the author
+believes that Morrison's point is necessarily wrong, but because it is never
+sound methodology to abandon techniques that have been useful elsewhere
+without trying to make them work on different data sets. But first we must
+attempt to characterize the judicial role, before we try any study of the
+politics that may be attendant on judicial ideology.
+For political science there are perhaps three broad characterizations of the
+judicial role. I will identify these, for convenience, as the realist model, the
+class model, and the orthodox model. The realist model comes from the
+American tradition in the early decades of this century, best exemplified in
+works like Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind and Llewellyn's The
+Bramble Bush.6 These assume, broadly, that legal decisions are never
+determined in any firm way by the rules, precedents and arguments in the
+court. Rather a judge does, and must, come to his decision intuitively, and
+then only rationalizes it by the legal material. In itself this says nothing about
+the types of decision a judge makes, and not much about how he comes to his
+intuitions. It was left to a school of political scientists in the I950S and I96os,
+associated with Glendon Schubert,7 to fill in these details.
+* St Hugh's College, Oxford.
+J John A. G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (London: Fontana, 1977). 2 Robert Stevens, Law and Politics. the House of Lords as a Judicial Body, I80oo-976
+(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979). 3 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (forthcoming, I98I).
+4 Fred L. Morrison, Courts and the Political Process in England (London: Sage, I973).
+5 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Tudor, 1936).
+6 Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York: Columbia University Press, I930).
+7 Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, I965).
+P.p.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+2 ROBERTSON
+
+The class model is broader still as a label, but refers mainly to Marxist
+attacks on the law and the courts of 'bourgeois' states. The best recent
+example is J. A. G. Griffith's The Politics of the Judiciary.8 He makes two
+characteristic claims in this book, although he seldom disentangles them
+himself. Primarily he argues that discretionary problems in law are solved by
+judges consulting their own notion of 'public interest', which is made up of a
+belief that the State must be protected from danger, including 'moral' danger,
+that legislation should be limited in its effects on property and other
+'bourgeois' freedoms, and that a general political philosophy associated with
+the Conservative party should prevail.9 The second assumption that he seems
+to make is that judges, in so acting, are acting out of a class-conditioned
+perspective, as agents of a dominant socio-economic group. Thus it is not so
+much the private and perhaps idiosyncratic intuitions of judges unprovided
+with determinate law, but the deliberate and systematic protection of a
+particular class that characterizes discretionary judgments.10
+One of the class model's major drawbacks is that, by treating judges as
+largely interchangeable, it does not enable us to differentiate various profiles
+of judicial ideology. If judges are taken as ideologically homogenous, we can
+learn nothing in detail about how they do operate, and nothing about the
+predisposing - I am hesitant to say causal - elements.
+The third, orthodox, model is hard to describe but approximates to the
+public lawyer's interpretation of a broadly Austinian theory. It has little of a
+systematic nature to say about the uses of discretion. I mean by it the working
+assumptions of lawyers and political scientists interested in public law. It
+contains perhaps the three following assumptions:
+
+(i) Discretion does exist, because statutes are sometimes vague, or precedents
+missing or conflicting.
+(2) Most judges most of the time will try very hard to stick within the clear
+meaning of the statute or the guidance of precedent. Some will from time
+to time try to develop the law to fit modern needs, but this 'public policy
+horse' is dangerous, to be ridden seldom and cautiously.
+(3) Where 'difficult cases' do crop up, some judges will act from personal
+idiosyncrasy, but these are mainly self-cancelling unsystematic quirks, not
+representing an intrusion of class ideology, and too limited to fit the
+realist model of permanent intuition.
+It is difficult, if not impossible, to test any of these models. Not only are
+their predictions entirely unclear, but, as a philosopher of science would say,
+they use different observation languages. However, they are basically empirical
+propositions, and raise questions that need to be answered empirically.
+The empirical work on judicial decision making known to political science
+
+8 See fn.i.
+9 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. I95.
+10 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. 2o8f.
+
+The class model is broader still as a label, but refers mainly to Marxist
+attacks on the law and the courts of 'bourgeois' states. The best recent
+example is J. A. G. Griffith's The Politics of the Judiciary.8 He makes two
+characteristic claims in this book, although he seldom disentangles them
+himself. Primarily he argues that discretionary problems in law are solved by
+judges consulting their own notion of 'public interest', which is made up of a
+belief that the State must be protected from danger, including 'moral' danger,
+that legislation should be limited in its effects on property and other
+'bourgeois' freedoms, and that a general political philosophy associated with
+the Conservative party should prevail.9 The second assumption that he seems
+to make is that judges, in so acting, are acting out of a class-conditioned
+perspective, as agents of a dominant socio-economic group. Thus it is not so
+much the private and perhaps idiosyncratic intuitions of judges unprovided
+with determinate law, but the deliberate and systematic protection of a
+particular class that characterizes discretionary judgments.10
+One of the class model's major drawbacks is that, by treating judges as
+largely interchangeable, it does not enable us to differentiate various profiles
+of judicial ideology. If judges are taken as ideologically homogenous, we can
+learn nothing in detail about how they do operate, and nothing about the
+predisposing - I am hesitant to say causal - elements.
+The third, orthodox, model is hard to describe but approximates to the
+public lawyer's interpretation of a broadly Austinian theory. It has little of a
+systematic nature to say about the uses of discretion. I mean by it the working
+assumptions of lawyers and political scientists interested in public law. It
+contains perhaps the three following assumptions:
+
+(i) Discretion does exist, because statutes are sometimes vague, or precedents
+missing or conflicting.
+(2) Most judges most of the time will try very hard to stick within the clear
+meaning of the statute or the guidance of precedent. Some will from time
+to time try to develop the law to fit modern needs, but this 'public policy
+horse' is dangerous, to be ridden seldom and cautiously.
+(3) Where 'difficult cases' do crop up, some judges will act from personal
+idiosyncrasy, but these are mainly self-cancelling unsystematic quirks, not
+representing an intrusion of class ideology, and too limited to fit the
+realist model of permanent intuition.
+It is difficult, if not impossible, to test any of these models. Not only are
+their predictions entirely unclear, but, as a philosopher of science would say,
+they use different observation languages. However, they are basically empirical
+propositions, and raise questions that need to be answered empirically.
+The empirical work on judicial decision making known to political science
+
+8 See fn.i.
+9 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. I95.
+10 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. 2o8f.
+
+The class model is broader still as a label, but refers mainly to Marxist
+attacks on the law and the courts of 'bourgeois' states. The best recent
+example is J. A. G. Griffith's The Politics of the Judiciary.8 He makes two
+characteristic claims in this book, although he seldom disentangles them
+himself. Primarily he argues that discretionary problems in law are solved by
+judges consulting their own notion of 'public interest', which is made up of a
+belief that the State must be protected from danger, including 'moral' danger,
+that legislation should be limited in its effects on property and other
+'bourgeois' freedoms, and that a general political philosophy associated with
+the Conservative party should prevail.9 The second assumption that he seems
+to make is that judges, in so acting, are acting out of a class-conditioned
+perspective, as agents of a dominant socio-economic group. Thus it is not so
+much the private and perhaps idiosyncratic intuitions of judges unprovided
+with determinate law, but the deliberate and systematic protection of a
+particular class that characterizes discretionary judgments.10
+One of the class model's major drawbacks is that, by treating judges as
+largely interchangeable, it does not enable us to differentiate various profiles
+of judicial ideology. If judges are taken as ideologically homogenous, we can
+learn nothing in detail about how they do operate, and nothing about the
+predisposing - I am hesitant to say causal - elements.
+The third, orthodox, model is hard to describe but approximates to the
+public lawyer's interpretation of a broadly Austinian theory. It has little of a
+systematic nature to say about the uses of discretion. I mean by it the working
+assumptions of lawyers and political scientists interested in public law. It
+contains perhaps the three following assumptions:
+
+(i) Discretion does exist, because statutes are sometimes vague, or precedents
+missing or conflicting.
+(2) Most judges most of the time will try very hard to stick within the clear
+meaning of the statute or the guidance of precedent. Some will from time
+to time try to develop the law to fit modern needs, but this 'public policy
+horse' is dangerous, to be ridden seldom and cautiously.
+(3) Where 'difficult cases' do crop up, some judges will act from personal
+idiosyncrasy, but these are mainly self-cancelling unsystematic quirks, not
+representing an intrusion of class ideology, and too limited to fit the
+realist model of permanent intuition.
+It is difficult, if not impossible, to test any of these models. Not only are
+their predictions entirely unclear, but, as a philosopher of science would say,
+they use different observation languages. However, they are basically empirical
+propositions, and raise questions that need to be answered empirically.
+The empirical work on judicial decision making known to political science
+
+8 See fn.i.
+9 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. I95.
+10 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. 2o8f.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial Judicial Ideology Ideology in the House of Lords
+
+comes from the American realist tradition, under the name of 'judicial
+behaviour', and has been carried out principally on the Supreme Courts of the
+United States, Canada and Australia.11 Its celebrated paradigm is Schubert's
+The Judicial Mind,12 a classic of what has been called 'jurimetrics'. This
+involves complex statistical analysis of the voting by Supreme Court judges in
+'political' cases during the I950s and I96os. Its principal conclusion, that these
+judges can be seen as arrayed on two intercorrelated dimensions, 'political
+liberalism' and 'economic liberalism', with several minor dimensions, is well
+known. It is often overlooked that Schubert's work is not just descriptive
+data-analysis. The data-analysis is informed by, and partially intended as a
+test of, a highly specified, if obscure, psychological model of stimulus
+perception and choice-making that is influenced by the 'cognitive psychology'
+of Coombs.13
+The most important criticism of Schubert and his associates is Karl Becker's
+Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence.14 This stresses the
+central importance of the judge's own notion of his role, and especially of the
+degree of his commitment to principles like that of stare decisis.15 Becker
+argues that although judges may have, or be forced to consult, a private
+ideology, and may be influenced by emotional reactions to the facts and
+personalities of the case, they are highly trained, and therefore highly
+socialized, professionals.16 Come what may, the ideology and the emotions
+consulted are those of judges. Although research like Schubert's is very
+useful, the dimensions that emerge as characterizing judicial ideology ought,
+at least partially, to represent judicial differences on essentially 'professional
+judicial' questions.17
+However, Schubert's approach is markedly superior to most class analysis,
+and certainly to that of Griffith, because it fixes firmly on the judicial
+decision. We therefore need to offer, with due caution, an individuating
+descriptive account of judicial ideology, on the basis of unambiguous and
+standardizable data.
+Even the orthodox view invites research of Schubert's type, although not
+with his theoretical presuppositions. It accepts that there is discretion on the
+margin, and that sometimes it is influenced by judicial prejudice. But it is
+silent on how much and how salient and systematic such 'prejudicial' decision
+
+ll For example, the case studies contained in Glendon Schubert and David Danelski, eds,
+Comparative Judicial Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, I969). 12 Schubert, The Judicial Mind, and also Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind Revisited (New
+York: Oxford University Press, I974). 13 Clyde H. Coombs, A Theory of Data (New York: Wiley, i964). 14 Karl Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence (Chicago: Rand McNally,
+I965).
+15 Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence, p. 105. 16 Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence, p. 243. 17 This position has become common now in American political science, where survey
+examinations of judges' role expectations have often been carried out. Some comparative work
+of this type has also been done.
+
+comes from the American realist tradition, under the name of 'judicial
+behaviour', and has been carried out principally on the Supreme Courts of the
+United States, Canada and Australia.11 Its celebrated paradigm is Schubert's
+The Judicial Mind,12 a classic of what has been called 'jurimetrics'. This
+involves complex statistical analysis of the voting by Supreme Court judges in
+'political' cases during the I950s and I96os. Its principal conclusion, that these
+judges can be seen as arrayed on two intercorrelated dimensions, 'political
+liberalism' and 'economic liberalism', with several minor dimensions, is well
+known. It is often overlooked that Schubert's work is not just descriptive
+data-analysis. The data-analysis is informed by, and partially intended as a
+test of, a highly specified, if obscure, psychological model of stimulus
+perception and choice-making that is influenced by the 'cognitive psychology'
+of Coombs.13
+The most important criticism of Schubert and his associates is Karl Becker's
+Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence.14 This stresses the
+central importance of the judge's own notion of his role, and especially of the
+degree of his commitment to principles like that of stare decisis.15 Becker
+argues that although judges may have, or be forced to consult, a private
+ideology, and may be influenced by emotional reactions to the facts and
+personalities of the case, they are highly trained, and therefore highly
+socialized, professionals.16 Come what may, the ideology and the emotions
+consulted are those of judges. Although research like Schubert's is very
+useful, the dimensions that emerge as characterizing judicial ideology ought,
+at least partially, to represent judicial differences on essentially 'professional
+judicial' questions.17
+However, Schubert's approach is markedly superior to most class analysis,
+and certainly to that of Griffith, because it fixes firmly on the judicial
+decision. We therefore need to offer, with due caution, an individuating
+descriptive account of judicial ideology, on the basis of unambiguous and
+standardizable data.
+Even the orthodox view invites research of Schubert's type, although not
+with his theoretical presuppositions. It accepts that there is discretion on the
+margin, and that sometimes it is influenced by judicial prejudice. But it is
+silent on how much and how salient and systematic such 'prejudicial' decision
+
+ll For example, the case studies contained in Glendon Schubert and David Danelski, eds,
+Comparative Judicial Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, I969). 12 Schubert, The Judicial Mind, and also Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind Revisited (New
+York: Oxford University Press, I974). 13 Clyde H. Coombs, A Theory of Data (New York: Wiley, i964). 14 Karl Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence (Chicago: Rand McNally,
+I965).
+15 Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence, p. 105. 16 Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence, p. 243. 17 This position has become common now in American political science, where survey
+examinations of judges' role expectations have often been carried out. Some comparative work
+of this type has also been done.
+
+comes from the American realist tradition, under the name of 'judicial
+behaviour', and has been carried out principally on the Supreme Courts of the
+United States, Canada and Australia.11 Its celebrated paradigm is Schubert's
+The Judicial Mind,12 a classic of what has been called 'jurimetrics'. This
+involves complex statistical analysis of the voting by Supreme Court judges in
+'political' cases during the I950s and I96os. Its principal conclusion, that these
+judges can be seen as arrayed on two intercorrelated dimensions, 'political
+liberalism' and 'economic liberalism', with several minor dimensions, is well
+known. It is often overlooked that Schubert's work is not just descriptive
+data-analysis. The data-analysis is informed by, and partially intended as a
+test of, a highly specified, if obscure, psychological model of stimulus
+perception and choice-making that is influenced by the 'cognitive psychology'
+of Coombs.13
+The most important criticism of Schubert and his associates is Karl Becker's
+Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence.14 This stresses the
+central importance of the judge's own notion of his role, and especially of the
+degree of his commitment to principles like that of stare decisis.15 Becker
+argues that although judges may have, or be forced to consult, a private
+ideology, and may be influenced by emotional reactions to the facts and
+personalities of the case, they are highly trained, and therefore highly
+socialized, professionals.16 Come what may, the ideology and the emotions
+consulted are those of judges. Although research like Schubert's is very
+useful, the dimensions that emerge as characterizing judicial ideology ought,
+at least partially, to represent judicial differences on essentially 'professional
+judicial' questions.17
+However, Schubert's approach is markedly superior to most class analysis,
+and certainly to that of Griffith, because it fixes firmly on the judicial
+decision. We therefore need to offer, with due caution, an individuating
+descriptive account of judicial ideology, on the basis of unambiguous and
+standardizable data.
+Even the orthodox view invites research of Schubert's type, although not
+with his theoretical presuppositions. It accepts that there is discretion on the
+margin, and that sometimes it is influenced by judicial prejudice. But it is
+silent on how much and how salient and systematic such 'prejudicial' decision
+
+ll For example, the case studies contained in Glendon Schubert and David Danelski, eds,
+Comparative Judicial Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, I969). 12 Schubert, The Judicial Mind, and also Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind Revisited (New
+York: Oxford University Press, I974). 13 Clyde H. Coombs, A Theory of Data (New York: Wiley, i964). 14 Karl Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence (Chicago: Rand McNally,
+I965).
+15 Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence, p. 105. 16 Becker, Political Behaviouralism and Modern Jurisprudence, p. 243. 17 This position has become common now in American political science, where survey
+examinations of judges' role expectations have often been carried out. Some comparative work
+of this type has also been done.
+
+3
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+4 ROBERTSON
+
+making is. If one can demonstrate that there are fairly fixed and specifiable
+dimensions of judicial ideology, operating over a fairly wide field, the
+orthodox model may have a certain amount of explaining, and explaining
+away, to do.
+The data analysis in this article is only exploratory. The whole exercise
+is an attempt to see if such an approach may be useful and justified in
+general. I give rather more attention therefore to the methodology and its
+potential weaknesses than is usual. Indeed, while I hope that the analysis
+itself is interesting, the methodology is in some ways the core of this
+discussion.
+Very broadly, the article attempts to create a statistical model of the
+similarities and differences between judicial styles. The model expresses these
+similarities in terms of abstract numerical dimensions. These dimensions
+have, in themselves, no substantive meaning. Meaning can only be given by a
+second stage in the analysis - interpreting these dimensions - which I attempt
+by looking at how groups of judges at different ends of these dimensions react
+to particular sorts of cases. The third stage is to show how changing
+membership of the court has affected the salience of the two primary
+dimensions I analyse. At this stage I also look at the relationship between a
+judge's position on each of the separate dimensions.
+The final part of the article attempts to sketch a more general theory of the
+intellectual orientations that might lead judges to occupy varied 'ideological'
+positions. I offer some evidence to support the idea that these are orientations
+to the very business of being an appellate judge. It should be borne in
+mind throughout that my attitude is one of great respect to the judiciary, and
+that I end by making the notion of judicial ideology a matter of intellectual
+and professional preference, not a psychological drive.
+
+RESEARCH OUTLINE AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
+
+Basic Premises
+
+Judicial decision making in English Appellate Courts is partly discretionary.
+My basic premise is that, where discretion exists, an individual judge's voting
+will be influenced by his beliefs and attitudes inside a specifically legal and
+'professional' ideology. This 'ideology' will vary from judge to judge, and
+whether it is conservative or not, will be complicated both by individual
+variation with respect to any one aspect of the ideology, and also by the
+ideology having several aspects. There is no reason to believe that judges'
+views on the separate aspects will be correlated, although they may be. These
+ideological variances should in part account for fairly stable groupings of
+judges, and should be discoverable, at least in crude form, by analysis of
+voting.
+
+making is. If one can demonstrate that there are fairly fixed and specifiable
+dimensions of judicial ideology, operating over a fairly wide field, the
+orthodox model may have a certain amount of explaining, and explaining
+away, to do.
+The data analysis in this article is only exploratory. The whole exercise
+is an attempt to see if such an approach may be useful and justified in
+general. I give rather more attention therefore to the methodology and its
+potential weaknesses than is usual. Indeed, while I hope that the analysis
+itself is interesting, the methodology is in some ways the core of this
+discussion.
+Very broadly, the article attempts to create a statistical model of the
+similarities and differences between judicial styles. The model expresses these
+similarities in terms of abstract numerical dimensions. These dimensions
+have, in themselves, no substantive meaning. Meaning can only be given by a
+second stage in the analysis - interpreting these dimensions - which I attempt
+by looking at how groups of judges at different ends of these dimensions react
+to particular sorts of cases. The third stage is to show how changing
+membership of the court has affected the salience of the two primary
+dimensions I analyse. At this stage I also look at the relationship between a
+judge's position on each of the separate dimensions.
+The final part of the article attempts to sketch a more general theory of the
+intellectual orientations that might lead judges to occupy varied 'ideological'
+positions. I offer some evidence to support the idea that these are orientations
+to the very business of being an appellate judge. It should be borne in
+mind throughout that my attitude is one of great respect to the judiciary, and
+that I end by making the notion of judicial ideology a matter of intellectual
+and professional preference, not a psychological drive.
+
+RESEARCH OUTLINE AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
+
+Basic Premises
+
+Judicial decision making in English Appellate Courts is partly discretionary.
+My basic premise is that, where discretion exists, an individual judge's voting
+will be influenced by his beliefs and attitudes inside a specifically legal and
+'professional' ideology. This 'ideology' will vary from judge to judge, and
+whether it is conservative or not, will be complicated both by individual
+variation with respect to any one aspect of the ideology, and also by the
+ideology having several aspects. There is no reason to believe that judges'
+views on the separate aspects will be correlated, although they may be. These
+ideological variances should in part account for fairly stable groupings of
+judges, and should be discoverable, at least in crude form, by analysis of
+voting.
+
+making is. If one can demonstrate that there are fairly fixed and specifiable
+dimensions of judicial ideology, operating over a fairly wide field, the
+orthodox model may have a certain amount of explaining, and explaining
+away, to do.
+The data analysis in this article is only exploratory. The whole exercise
+is an attempt to see if such an approach may be useful and justified in
+general. I give rather more attention therefore to the methodology and its
+potential weaknesses than is usual. Indeed, while I hope that the analysis
+itself is interesting, the methodology is in some ways the core of this
+discussion.
+Very broadly, the article attempts to create a statistical model of the
+similarities and differences between judicial styles. The model expresses these
+similarities in terms of abstract numerical dimensions. These dimensions
+have, in themselves, no substantive meaning. Meaning can only be given by a
+second stage in the analysis - interpreting these dimensions - which I attempt
+by looking at how groups of judges at different ends of these dimensions react
+to particular sorts of cases. The third stage is to show how changing
+membership of the court has affected the salience of the two primary
+dimensions I analyse. At this stage I also look at the relationship between a
+judge's position on each of the separate dimensions.
+The final part of the article attempts to sketch a more general theory of the
+intellectual orientations that might lead judges to occupy varied 'ideological'
+positions. I offer some evidence to support the idea that these are orientations
+to the very business of being an appellate judge. It should be borne in
+mind throughout that my attitude is one of great respect to the judiciary, and
+that I end by making the notion of judicial ideology a matter of intellectual
+and professional preference, not a psychological drive.
+
+RESEARCH OUTLINE AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
+
+Basic Premises
+
+Judicial decision making in English Appellate Courts is partly discretionary.
+My basic premise is that, where discretion exists, an individual judge's voting
+will be influenced by his beliefs and attitudes inside a specifically legal and
+'professional' ideology. This 'ideology' will vary from judge to judge, and
+whether it is conservative or not, will be complicated both by individual
+variation with respect to any one aspect of the ideology, and also by the
+ideology having several aspects. There is no reason to believe that judges'
+views on the separate aspects will be correlated, although they may be. These
+ideological variances should in part account for fairly stable groupings of
+judges, and should be discoverable, at least in crude form, by analysis of
+voting.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords 5
+
+Selection of Data
+
+Decisions on cases decided by the House of Lords over a twelve-year period
+were studied, mainly through statistical analysis. The House of Lords
+Appellate Committee was chosen because it is the only English court not
+absolutely bound by precedent, and thus the possibility of discretion in
+judgment is at its highest. As it is also the final court of appeal this possibility
+is increased, both because it only gets difficult cases, and because it need not
+fear being overruled. In addition, the incidence of dissent, vital for this type
+of analysis, is higher than in any other multi-member court in the United
+Kingdom. The principal analysis is carried out only on cases where decisions
+were not unanimous.
+
+The Basic Method and its Justification
+
+It is assumed that a judicial ideology of the type hypothesized will show itself
+in two ways - by causing some pairs of judges to think more alike than others,
+and by causing judges to vary in the preponderance of their votes for
+particular sides in cases characterized by certain issues. Both of these
+assumptions are also made by judicial behaviouralists in the United States,
+although they conceptualize the problem differently, and use different
+techniques. Thus the basic method has two stages. The first extracts from data
+on judicial voting some description of the degree of affinity between judges.
+The second explores whether or not these affinity relationships are correlated
+with differences in support for certain types of litigant.
+In the first stage we take the cases for the period and construct a measure
+of agreement for each pair of judges where this is possible. The 'agreement
+index' is simply the proportion of all cases the pair of judges heard together
+on which they voted the same way. This matrix says nothing about the
+direction of influence in agreement, or the depth of agreement in detail, but
+reflects only the fact of concurring or dissenting judgments. The 'agreement
+index' matrix is decomposed by multi-dimensional analysis into a two
+dimensional representation of judicial agreement. This represents the agreement/disagreement
+ratios of judges in what is hoped is an intuitively
+comprehensible way. The more judges agree, the closer their positions are in
+the underlying assumed 'ideological space'. The idea of 'ideological space' is,
+of course, only a metaphor, but a useful one.
+The second stage tries to identify the as yet meaningless dimensions of this
+space. This is done by taking several basic categories of cases where different
+'sides' can be unambiguously and meaningfully identified. The tendency of a
+judge to vote for a particular side is measured by the proportion of all cases in
+a particular category in which he gave judgment for that side. These
+'category scores' are correlated in various ways with the positions of the
+judges on each dimension. The resulting pattern, in which the dimensions of
+the spatial representation are shown to be correlated with category voting, is
+
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords 5
+
+Selection of Data
+
+Decisions on cases decided by the House of Lords over a twelve-year period
+were studied, mainly through statistical analysis. The House of Lords
+Appellate Committee was chosen because it is the only English court not
+absolutely bound by precedent, and thus the possibility of discretion in
+judgment is at its highest. As it is also the final court of appeal this possibility
+is increased, both because it only gets difficult cases, and because it need not
+fear being overruled. In addition, the incidence of dissent, vital for this type
+of analysis, is higher than in any other multi-member court in the United
+Kingdom. The principal analysis is carried out only on cases where decisions
+were not unanimous.
+
+The Basic Method and its Justification
+
+It is assumed that a judicial ideology of the type hypothesized will show itself
+in two ways - by causing some pairs of judges to think more alike than others,
+and by causing judges to vary in the preponderance of their votes for
+particular sides in cases characterized by certain issues. Both of these
+assumptions are also made by judicial behaviouralists in the United States,
+although they conceptualize the problem differently, and use different
+techniques. Thus the basic method has two stages. The first extracts from data
+on judicial voting some description of the degree of affinity between judges.
+The second explores whether or not these affinity relationships are correlated
+with differences in support for certain types of litigant.
+In the first stage we take the cases for the period and construct a measure
+of agreement for each pair of judges where this is possible. The 'agreement
+index' is simply the proportion of all cases the pair of judges heard together
+on which they voted the same way. This matrix says nothing about the
+direction of influence in agreement, or the depth of agreement in detail, but
+reflects only the fact of concurring or dissenting judgments. The 'agreement
+index' matrix is decomposed by multi-dimensional analysis into a two
+dimensional representation of judicial agreement. This represents the agreement/disagreement
+ratios of judges in what is hoped is an intuitively
+comprehensible way. The more judges agree, the closer their positions are in
+the underlying assumed 'ideological space'. The idea of 'ideological space' is,
+of course, only a metaphor, but a useful one.
+The second stage tries to identify the as yet meaningless dimensions of this
+space. This is done by taking several basic categories of cases where different
+'sides' can be unambiguously and meaningfully identified. The tendency of a
+judge to vote for a particular side is measured by the proportion of all cases in
+a particular category in which he gave judgment for that side. These
+'category scores' are correlated in various ways with the positions of the
+judges on each dimension. The resulting pattern, in which the dimensions of
+the spatial representation are shown to be correlated with category voting, is
+
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords 5
+
+Selection of Data
+
+Decisions on cases decided by the House of Lords over a twelve-year period
+were studied, mainly through statistical analysis. The House of Lords
+Appellate Committee was chosen because it is the only English court not
+absolutely bound by precedent, and thus the possibility of discretion in
+judgment is at its highest. As it is also the final court of appeal this possibility
+is increased, both because it only gets difficult cases, and because it need not
+fear being overruled. In addition, the incidence of dissent, vital for this type
+of analysis, is higher than in any other multi-member court in the United
+Kingdom. The principal analysis is carried out only on cases where decisions
+were not unanimous.
+
+The Basic Method and its Justification
+
+It is assumed that a judicial ideology of the type hypothesized will show itself
+in two ways - by causing some pairs of judges to think more alike than others,
+and by causing judges to vary in the preponderance of their votes for
+particular sides in cases characterized by certain issues. Both of these
+assumptions are also made by judicial behaviouralists in the United States,
+although they conceptualize the problem differently, and use different
+techniques. Thus the basic method has two stages. The first extracts from data
+on judicial voting some description of the degree of affinity between judges.
+The second explores whether or not these affinity relationships are correlated
+with differences in support for certain types of litigant.
+In the first stage we take the cases for the period and construct a measure
+of agreement for each pair of judges where this is possible. The 'agreement
+index' is simply the proportion of all cases the pair of judges heard together
+on which they voted the same way. This matrix says nothing about the
+direction of influence in agreement, or the depth of agreement in detail, but
+reflects only the fact of concurring or dissenting judgments. The 'agreement
+index' matrix is decomposed by multi-dimensional analysis into a two
+dimensional representation of judicial agreement. This represents the agreement/disagreement
+ratios of judges in what is hoped is an intuitively
+comprehensible way. The more judges agree, the closer their positions are in
+the underlying assumed 'ideological space'. The idea of 'ideological space' is,
+of course, only a metaphor, but a useful one.
+The second stage tries to identify the as yet meaningless dimensions of this
+space. This is done by taking several basic categories of cases where different
+'sides' can be unambiguously and meaningfully identified. The tendency of a
+judge to vote for a particular side is measured by the proportion of all cases in
+a particular category in which he gave judgment for that side. These
+'category scores' are correlated in various ways with the positions of the
+judges on each dimension. The resulting pattern, in which the dimensions of
+the spatial representation are shown to be correlated with category voting, is
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+6 ROBERTSON
+
+held to be a rough description of certain aspects of the hypothesized judicial
+ideology.
+In a third and final stage a different question is asked. Can these
+'substantive' patterns be seen as representing a more fundamental single
+difference that makes general theoretical sense of English judges' behaviour?
+By examining the voting patterns of two active and intellectually dominant
+Law Lords of the period it is argued that this may be the case
+
+Research Problems, Solutions, and Some Working Assumptions
+
+Why has no jurimetrics been done on the English House of Lords, when so
+much has been done on the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada
+and on the High Court of Australia?18 Because it is very much harder,
+technically, to do such research in Britain. As mentioned above, one
+American political scientist has argued that jurimetrics simply cannot be
+applied in Britain.19 No other example is known to me.
+The most obvious problems relate to the structures and practice of our
+Higher Appellate Courts. Compared with the United States Supreme Court,
+the House of Lords (a) hears far fewer cases in a year (perhaps forty to fifty
+compared with well over a hundred); (b) decides far more of them unanimously
+(70-80 per cent in Britain, rarely even 50 per cent in the United
+States, according to Schubert's research); (c) has more judges but hears cases
+with less. (In the House, a bench of five Law Lords, drawn from eleven or
+twelve more or less at random, hears each case, while in the United States the
+norm is for all nine Justices to vote on each case.) The immediate result is the
+paucity of data. Because of these differences, Schubert could analyse each
+year's voting separately, and still have plenty of cases to determine the
+agreement for each pair of judges as well as having a large number of cases for
+both his 'political liberalism' and 'economic liberalism' dimensions.
+There is another difference of practice that raises for my research a
+problem Schubert did not have to face. On the United States Bench majority
+and dissenting judges usually group together, offering joint opinions,
+although there may be more than one opinion for both majority and minority.
+In Britain it is quite usual to issue five separate, and often radically different,
+opinions even when all the judges vote the same way! This involves the
+following very strong assumption: when two judges vote the same way in a
+case, they can be taken to be substantially in agreement in preferring that one
+side win the case rather than the other.20 Although this may not seem an
+
+18 See Schubert and Danelski, eds, Comparative Judicial Behavior.
+19 Morrison, Courts and the Political Process in England. Others have felt, however, that it
+was both possible and desirable. See, for example, Burton Atkin, 'Judicial Behaviour
+Approaches in America and Britain', paper presented to the Law and Politics panel, Conference
+of the Political Studies Association, Hull, April I981.
+20 I am here ignoring the potentially important difference between giving a formal concurrence
+with another judge's reasoned opinion, and issuing one's own opinion. In the latter case two
+
+held to be a rough description of certain aspects of the hypothesized judicial
+ideology.
+In a third and final stage a different question is asked. Can these
+'substantive' patterns be seen as representing a more fundamental single
+difference that makes general theoretical sense of English judges' behaviour?
+By examining the voting patterns of two active and intellectually dominant
+Law Lords of the period it is argued that this may be the case
+
+Research Problems, Solutions, and Some Working Assumptions
+
+Why has no jurimetrics been done on the English House of Lords, when so
+much has been done on the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada
+and on the High Court of Australia?18 Because it is very much harder,
+technically, to do such research in Britain. As mentioned above, one
+American political scientist has argued that jurimetrics simply cannot be
+applied in Britain.19 No other example is known to me.
+The most obvious problems relate to the structures and practice of our
+Higher Appellate Courts. Compared with the United States Supreme Court,
+the House of Lords (a) hears far fewer cases in a year (perhaps forty to fifty
+compared with well over a hundred); (b) decides far more of them unanimously
+(70-80 per cent in Britain, rarely even 50 per cent in the United
+States, according to Schubert's research); (c) has more judges but hears cases
+with less. (In the House, a bench of five Law Lords, drawn from eleven or
+twelve more or less at random, hears each case, while in the United States the
+norm is for all nine Justices to vote on each case.) The immediate result is the
+paucity of data. Because of these differences, Schubert could analyse each
+year's voting separately, and still have plenty of cases to determine the
+agreement for each pair of judges as well as having a large number of cases for
+both his 'political liberalism' and 'economic liberalism' dimensions.
+There is another difference of practice that raises for my research a
+problem Schubert did not have to face. On the United States Bench majority
+and dissenting judges usually group together, offering joint opinions,
+although there may be more than one opinion for both majority and minority.
+In Britain it is quite usual to issue five separate, and often radically different,
+opinions even when all the judges vote the same way! This involves the
+following very strong assumption: when two judges vote the same way in a
+case, they can be taken to be substantially in agreement in preferring that one
+side win the case rather than the other.20 Although this may not seem an
+
+18 See Schubert and Danelski, eds, Comparative Judicial Behavior.
+19 Morrison, Courts and the Political Process in England. Others have felt, however, that it
+was both possible and desirable. See, for example, Burton Atkin, 'Judicial Behaviour
+Approaches in America and Britain', paper presented to the Law and Politics panel, Conference
+of the Political Studies Association, Hull, April I981.
+20 I am here ignoring the potentially important difference between giving a formal concurrence
+with another judge's reasoned opinion, and issuing one's own opinion. In the latter case two
+
+held to be a rough description of certain aspects of the hypothesized judicial
+ideology.
+In a third and final stage a different question is asked. Can these
+'substantive' patterns be seen as representing a more fundamental single
+difference that makes general theoretical sense of English judges' behaviour?
+By examining the voting patterns of two active and intellectually dominant
+Law Lords of the period it is argued that this may be the case
+
+Research Problems, Solutions, and Some Working Assumptions
+
+Why has no jurimetrics been done on the English House of Lords, when so
+much has been done on the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada
+and on the High Court of Australia?18 Because it is very much harder,
+technically, to do such research in Britain. As mentioned above, one
+American political scientist has argued that jurimetrics simply cannot be
+applied in Britain.19 No other example is known to me.
+The most obvious problems relate to the structures and practice of our
+Higher Appellate Courts. Compared with the United States Supreme Court,
+the House of Lords (a) hears far fewer cases in a year (perhaps forty to fifty
+compared with well over a hundred); (b) decides far more of them unanimously
+(70-80 per cent in Britain, rarely even 50 per cent in the United
+States, according to Schubert's research); (c) has more judges but hears cases
+with less. (In the House, a bench of five Law Lords, drawn from eleven or
+twelve more or less at random, hears each case, while in the United States the
+norm is for all nine Justices to vote on each case.) The immediate result is the
+paucity of data. Because of these differences, Schubert could analyse each
+year's voting separately, and still have plenty of cases to determine the
+agreement for each pair of judges as well as having a large number of cases for
+both his 'political liberalism' and 'economic liberalism' dimensions.
+There is another difference of practice that raises for my research a
+problem Schubert did not have to face. On the United States Bench majority
+and dissenting judges usually group together, offering joint opinions,
+although there may be more than one opinion for both majority and minority.
+In Britain it is quite usual to issue five separate, and often radically different,
+opinions even when all the judges vote the same way! This involves the
+following very strong assumption: when two judges vote the same way in a
+case, they can be taken to be substantially in agreement in preferring that one
+side win the case rather than the other.20 Although this may not seem an
+
+18 See Schubert and Danelski, eds, Comparative Judicial Behavior.
+19 Morrison, Courts and the Political Process in England. Others have felt, however, that it
+was both possible and desirable. See, for example, Burton Atkin, 'Judicial Behaviour
+Approaches in America and Britain', paper presented to the Law and Politics panel, Conference
+of the Political Studies Association, Hull, April I981.
+20 I am here ignoring the potentially important difference between giving a formal concurrence
+with another judge's reasoned opinion, and issuing one's own opinion. In the latter case two
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology in the House of Lords
+
+over-demanding assumption, it could make certain conclusions false if drawn
+from data heavily characterized by a special sort of case. This is a case, quite
+frequent in English law, where one or more judges who think X ought to win
+in fact vote for Y because they feel bound by a precedent they dislike, and
+where some vote for Y feeling the precedent is itself desirable. Because the
+American court is much freer to overturn precedents than the House of
+Lords, Schubert and his associates have less need to justify this assumption.
+The justification is that we are not only interested in the inner meaning of a
+judge's decision. To a major extent the statement that judge X has a
+particular type of judicial ideology is an external judgement based on the
+consequence of his vote. For example, in the IT Case Lord Reid's decision
+was just as much a vote against individual freedom of expression, and had just
+as much effect on the freedom of press enjoyed by International Tribune as
+Lord Morris's, even though Reid felt the binding precedent to be wrong and
+had voted against it in the original case while Morris had supported the
+prosecution willingly on both occasions.21
+There is a final difference between the American and the English experience
+that makes Schubert's kind of analysis much harder to perform on
+English data. It does not affect this article, because I take a totally different
+approach to the characterization (the 'coding') of decisions from Schubert's.
+The difference is that, because the United States has a written constitution
+and a Bill of Rights, the clauses and principles of which enter into real
+political conflict and political language, it is much easier to assert that case N
+is an example of category Z. For example, in the United States an obscene
+publications case will be fought expressly in terms of a constitutional 'positive
+law' prohibition on censorship in the first amendment. So for Schubert to
+'code' a case as belonging to the 'political liberalism' category is fairly safe.
+Here a similar case will be fought in terms of varying interpretations of one or
+more statutes, using legal categories that may not translate at all into the
+language of political ideology. To claim that a case involving contractual
+infringement on freedom of trade fits into a category of economic conservatism
+would be much more subjective and difficult to defend than an equivalent
+in the United States. There it would probably arise under the Inter-State
+Commerce clause where decades of Congressional debate make clear what
+political lines are drawn up.
+An analyst must, in the end, impose his own categories. I have attempted
+to stick fairly close to legally existing categories, because I wish to interpret
+the resulting dimensions of judicial ideology as far as possible in terms of legal
+ideologies rather than, as with Schubert, asserting ideologies that have
+nothing directly to do with what judges may think they are doing. Yet again it
+
+judges agreeing on how to dispose of a case may in fact have very different views. From my point
+of view this difference is irrelevant here, although it might have been preferable to take the
+distinction so as to record degrees of agreement. Unfortunately the available data are too sparse
+for this.
+21 Knuller v. DPP (1973) A.C.435.
+
+over-demanding assumption, it could make certain conclusions false if drawn
+from data heavily characterized by a special sort of case. This is a case, quite
+frequent in English law, where one or more judges who think X ought to win
+in fact vote for Y because they feel bound by a precedent they dislike, and
+where some vote for Y feeling the precedent is itself desirable. Because the
+American court is much freer to overturn precedents than the House of
+Lords, Schubert and his associates have less need to justify this assumption.
+The justification is that we are not only interested in the inner meaning of a
+judge's decision. To a major extent the statement that judge X has a
+particular type of judicial ideology is an external judgement based on the
+consequence of his vote. For example, in the IT Case Lord Reid's decision
+was just as much a vote against individual freedom of expression, and had just
+as much effect on the freedom of press enjoyed by International Tribune as
+Lord Morris's, even though Reid felt the binding precedent to be wrong and
+had voted against it in the original case while Morris had supported the
+prosecution willingly on both occasions.21
+There is a final difference between the American and the English experience
+that makes Schubert's kind of analysis much harder to perform on
+English data. It does not affect this article, because I take a totally different
+approach to the characterization (the 'coding') of decisions from Schubert's.
+The difference is that, because the United States has a written constitution
+and a Bill of Rights, the clauses and principles of which enter into real
+political conflict and political language, it is much easier to assert that case N
+is an example of category Z. For example, in the United States an obscene
+publications case will be fought expressly in terms of a constitutional 'positive
+law' prohibition on censorship in the first amendment. So for Schubert to
+'code' a case as belonging to the 'political liberalism' category is fairly safe.
+Here a similar case will be fought in terms of varying interpretations of one or
+more statutes, using legal categories that may not translate at all into the
+language of political ideology. To claim that a case involving contractual
+infringement on freedom of trade fits into a category of economic conservatism
+would be much more subjective and difficult to defend than an equivalent
+in the United States. There it would probably arise under the Inter-State
+Commerce clause where decades of Congressional debate make clear what
+political lines are drawn up.
+An analyst must, in the end, impose his own categories. I have attempted
+to stick fairly close to legally existing categories, because I wish to interpret
+the resulting dimensions of judicial ideology as far as possible in terms of legal
+ideologies rather than, as with Schubert, asserting ideologies that have
+nothing directly to do with what judges may think they are doing. Yet again it
+
+judges agreeing on how to dispose of a case may in fact have very different views. From my point
+of view this difference is irrelevant here, although it might have been preferable to take the
+distinction so as to record degrees of agreement. Unfortunately the available data are too sparse
+for this.
+21 Knuller v. DPP (1973) A.C.435.
+
+over-demanding assumption, it could make certain conclusions false if drawn
+from data heavily characterized by a special sort of case. This is a case, quite
+frequent in English law, where one or more judges who think X ought to win
+in fact vote for Y because they feel bound by a precedent they dislike, and
+where some vote for Y feeling the precedent is itself desirable. Because the
+American court is much freer to overturn precedents than the House of
+Lords, Schubert and his associates have less need to justify this assumption.
+The justification is that we are not only interested in the inner meaning of a
+judge's decision. To a major extent the statement that judge X has a
+particular type of judicial ideology is an external judgement based on the
+consequence of his vote. For example, in the IT Case Lord Reid's decision
+was just as much a vote against individual freedom of expression, and had just
+as much effect on the freedom of press enjoyed by International Tribune as
+Lord Morris's, even though Reid felt the binding precedent to be wrong and
+had voted against it in the original case while Morris had supported the
+prosecution willingly on both occasions.21
+There is a final difference between the American and the English experience
+that makes Schubert's kind of analysis much harder to perform on
+English data. It does not affect this article, because I take a totally different
+approach to the characterization (the 'coding') of decisions from Schubert's.
+The difference is that, because the United States has a written constitution
+and a Bill of Rights, the clauses and principles of which enter into real
+political conflict and political language, it is much easier to assert that case N
+is an example of category Z. For example, in the United States an obscene
+publications case will be fought expressly in terms of a constitutional 'positive
+law' prohibition on censorship in the first amendment. So for Schubert to
+'code' a case as belonging to the 'political liberalism' category is fairly safe.
+Here a similar case will be fought in terms of varying interpretations of one or
+more statutes, using legal categories that may not translate at all into the
+language of political ideology. To claim that a case involving contractual
+infringement on freedom of trade fits into a category of economic conservatism
+would be much more subjective and difficult to defend than an equivalent
+in the United States. There it would probably arise under the Inter-State
+Commerce clause where decades of Congressional debate make clear what
+political lines are drawn up.
+An analyst must, in the end, impose his own categories. I have attempted
+to stick fairly close to legally existing categories, because I wish to interpret
+the resulting dimensions of judicial ideology as far as possible in terms of legal
+ideologies rather than, as with Schubert, asserting ideologies that have
+nothing directly to do with what judges may think they are doing. Yet again it
+
+judges agreeing on how to dispose of a case may in fact have very different views. From my point
+of view this difference is irrelevant here, although it might have been preferable to take the
+distinction so as to record degrees of agreement. Unfortunately the available data are too sparse
+for this.
+21 Knuller v. DPP (1973) A.C.435.
+
+7
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Unanimous and Split Cases Heard by Members of the House of
+Lords Appellate Committee, I948-76
+Unanimous and Split Cases Heard by Members of the House of
+Lords Appellate Committee, I948-76
+Unanimous and Split Cases Heard by Members of the House of
+Lords Appellate Committee, I948-76
+
+Dates of No. of cases heard by this
+Name membership judge in the data set
+Unanimous Split
+
+For both 'courts'
+Reid I948-75 Io8 56
+Morris 1960-75 102 44
+Diplock I968-77 92 37
+Dilhorne* 1969-77 I 2 31
+Wilberforce 1964-77 92 50
+
+Plus, for 'early court'
+Hodson I960-71 60 28
+Guest 1961-71 51 32
+Pearce I962-69 38 20
+Donovan 1963-71 24 14
+Upjohn I963-71 42 25
+Pearson 1965-73 62 26
+
+Plus, for 'late court'
+Simon 1971-77 50 29
+Kilbrandon I971-77 40 20
+Salmon 1972-77 80 20
+Edmund-Davies 1974-77 39 27
+Russell 1974-77 43 I6
+Cross 1971-76 48 17
+
+Dates of No. of cases heard by this
+Name membership judge in the data set
+Unanimous Split
+
+For both 'courts'
+Reid I948-75 Io8 56
+Morris 1960-75 102 44
+Diplock I968-77 92 37
+Dilhorne* 1969-77 I 2 31
+Wilberforce 1964-77 92 50
+
+Plus, for 'early court'
+Hodson I960-71 60 28
+Guest 1961-71 51 32
+Pearce I962-69 38 20
+Donovan 1963-71 24 14
+Upjohn I963-71 42 25
+Pearson 1965-73 62 26
+
+Plus, for 'late court'
+Simon 1971-77 50 29
+Kilbrandon I971-77 40 20
+Salmon 1972-77 80 20
+Edmund-Davies 1974-77 39 27
+Russell 1974-77 43 I6
+Cross 1971-76 48 17
+
+Dates of No. of cases heard by this
+Name membership judge in the data set
+Unanimous Split
+
+For both 'courts'
+Reid I948-75 Io8 56
+Morris 1960-75 102 44
+Diplock I968-77 92 37
+Dilhorne* 1969-77 I 2 31
+Wilberforce 1964-77 92 50
+
+Plus, for 'early court'
+Hodson I960-71 60 28
+Guest 1961-71 51 32
+Pearce I962-69 38 20
+Donovan 1963-71 24 14
+Upjohn I963-71 42 25
+Pearson 1965-73 62 26
+
+Plus, for 'late court'
+Simon 1971-77 50 29
+Kilbrandon I971-77 40 20
+Salmon 1972-77 80 20
+Edmund-Davies 1974-77 39 27
+Russell 1974-77 43 I6
+Cross 1971-76 48 17
+
+* Some cases earlier than I969
+before 1964.
+* Some cases earlier than I969
+before 1964.
+* Some cases earlier than I969
+before 1964.
+are included; included; included; he presided presided presided occasionally occasionally occasionally as Lord Chancellor Chancellor Chancellor
+
+does impose a positivistic assumption, that externally given categories
+suitably represent realities of judicial thinking even when they are not the
+categories of actual legal practice.
+
+Results: Similarities Between Judges
+
+Because a Law Lord's membership of the House overlaps with others arriving
+and retiring at different dates, we cannot treat the seventeen Law Lords who
+held office during I965-78 as forming one court. Instead they have been
+treated as falling into three groups, an early, late, and continuing section.
+Those five who were present for most of the period, Lords Reid, Morris,
+Diplock, Dilhorne and Wilberforce, are analysed twice, once when put with
+the early court, and once when put with the late court. So in carrying out the
+data analysis as described above, I normally report two results. The membership
+of the two 'courts' thus studied, with dates of membership and the
+number of cases used in the main part of the analysis, is given in Table I.
+The first step is to form 'similarity' matrices for each of these courts. These
+
+does impose a positivistic assumption, that externally given categories
+suitably represent realities of judicial thinking even when they are not the
+categories of actual legal practice.
+
+Results: Similarities Between Judges
+
+Because a Law Lord's membership of the House overlaps with others arriving
+and retiring at different dates, we cannot treat the seventeen Law Lords who
+held office during I965-78 as forming one court. Instead they have been
+treated as falling into three groups, an early, late, and continuing section.
+Those five who were present for most of the period, Lords Reid, Morris,
+Diplock, Dilhorne and Wilberforce, are analysed twice, once when put with
+the early court, and once when put with the late court. So in carrying out the
+data analysis as described above, I normally report two results. The membership
+of the two 'courts' thus studied, with dates of membership and the
+number of cases used in the main part of the analysis, is given in Table I.
+The first step is to form 'similarity' matrices for each of these courts. These
+
+does impose a positivistic assumption, that externally given categories
+suitably represent realities of judicial thinking even when they are not the
+categories of actual legal practice.
+
+Results: Similarities Between Judges
+
+Because a Law Lord's membership of the House overlaps with others arriving
+and retiring at different dates, we cannot treat the seventeen Law Lords who
+held office during I965-78 as forming one court. Instead they have been
+treated as falling into three groups, an early, late, and continuing section.
+Those five who were present for most of the period, Lords Reid, Morris,
+Diplock, Dilhorne and Wilberforce, are analysed twice, once when put with
+the early court, and once when put with the late court. So in carrying out the
+data analysis as described above, I normally report two results. The membership
+of the two 'courts' thus studied, with dates of membership and the
+number of cases used in the main part of the analysis, is given in Table I.
+The first step is to form 'similarity' matrices for each of these courts. These
+
+8 ROBERTSON
+
+TABLE I
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology in the House of Lords
+
+TABLE 2 Similarity Matrix for First Set of Law Lords
+
+oDo C - o
+
+Morris 0-82
+Diplock 0-70 0o77
+Dilhorne 0o85 0o87 0o85
+Wilberforce 0-76 0-77 0-70 0o88
+Hodson 0-86 0o86 0o83 0-74 0-75
+Guest 0-73 0-82 0o63 0-82 0-72 0o84
+Pearce 0o83 0-73 0-74 0-76 0o99 0o83 o-80
+Donovan 0o83 0-91 0-73 o-8I 0-75 o-8I 0o69 o-60
+Upjohn 0-88 0-78 o071 o080 0-78 0o86 0o82 0o85 0o67
+Pearson 0o82 0-92 0-70 0o84 0o88 0-90 0-78 0-73 0o85 0-77
+
+Note: The cell entries are agreement scores. That is, they are the proportion of cases each pair
+of judges heard together which they voted to resolve in the same way. The average level of
+agreement is high because 70 per cent of the cases involved were decided unanimously.
+
+are given in Tables 2 and 3. An entry represents the amount of agreement.
+Thus, the entry in Table 2 for Lords Pearson and Morris at 0-92 represents a
+very high tendency to vote together, whilst that of o060 for Lords Pearce and
+Donovan shows an unusual dissensus. The average figure is very high at 0-75
+because 70 per cent of the cases studied were decided unanimously.
+
+TABLE 3 Similarity Matrix for Second Set of Law Lords
+
+o C
+
+2 a A, -? - E:
+
+Morris 0-82
+Diplock 0-70 0o77
+Dilhorne o-85 0-87 o-85
+Wilberforce 0-76 0-77 0-70 o088
+Simon 0o83 0o82 0o87 0go90 067
+Kilbrandon 0o87 o-8o o091 0-79 0-77 0-82
+Salmon 0-74 o-8o 0-78 o086 0-76 0-73 0-92
+EdmundDavies
+o060 0-73 o085 0-75 0o63 0-78 o082 0-70
+Russell 0-62 0-77 0-89 0-71 0-73 o-8o 0-78 0-84 o-86
+Cross o-6i 0-73 o088 0o84 o-8i 0o67 0-75 o088 0o64 0-76
+
+Note: see footnote to Table 2.
+
+TABLE 2 Similarity Matrix for First Set of Law Lords
+
+oDo C - o
+
+Morris 0-82
+Diplock 0-70 0o77
+Dilhorne 0o85 0o87 0o85
+Wilberforce 0-76 0-77 0-70 0o88
+Hodson 0-86 0o86 0o83 0-74 0-75
+Guest 0-73 0-82 0o63 0-82 0-72 0o84
+Pearce 0o83 0-73 0-74 0-76 0o99 0o83 o-80
+Donovan 0o83 0-91 0-73 o-8I 0-75 o-8I 0o69 o-60
+Upjohn 0-88 0-78 o071 o080 0-78 0o86 0o82 0o85 0o67
+Pearson 0o82 0-92 0-70 0o84 0o88 0-90 0-78 0-73 0o85 0-77
+
+Note: The cell entries are agreement scores. That is, they are the proportion of cases each pair
+of judges heard together which they voted to resolve in the same way. The average level of
+agreement is high because 70 per cent of the cases involved were decided unanimously.
+
+are given in Tables 2 and 3. An entry represents the amount of agreement.
+Thus, the entry in Table 2 for Lords Pearson and Morris at 0-92 represents a
+very high tendency to vote together, whilst that of o060 for Lords Pearce and
+Donovan shows an unusual dissensus. The average figure is very high at 0-75
+because 70 per cent of the cases studied were decided unanimously.
+
+TABLE 3 Similarity Matrix for Second Set of Law Lords
+
+o C
+
+2 a A, -? - E:
+
+Morris 0-82
+Diplock 0-70 0o77
+Dilhorne o-85 0-87 o-85
+Wilberforce 0-76 0-77 0-70 o088
+Simon 0o83 0o82 0o87 0go90 067
+Kilbrandon 0o87 o-8o o091 0-79 0-77 0-82
+Salmon 0-74 o-8o 0-78 o086 0-76 0-73 0-92
+EdmundDavies
+o060 0-73 o085 0-75 0o63 0-78 o082 0-70
+Russell 0-62 0-77 0-89 0-71 0-73 o-8o 0-78 0-84 o-86
+Cross o-6i 0-73 o088 0o84 o-8i 0o67 0-75 o088 0o64 0-76
+
+Note: see footnote to Table 2.
+
+TABLE 2 Similarity Matrix for First Set of Law Lords
+
+oDo C - o
+
+Morris 0-82
+Diplock 0-70 0o77
+Dilhorne 0o85 0o87 0o85
+Wilberforce 0-76 0-77 0-70 0o88
+Hodson 0-86 0o86 0o83 0-74 0-75
+Guest 0-73 0-82 0o63 0-82 0-72 0o84
+Pearce 0o83 0-73 0-74 0-76 0o99 0o83 o-80
+Donovan 0o83 0-91 0-73 o-8I 0-75 o-8I 0o69 o-60
+Upjohn 0-88 0-78 o071 o080 0-78 0o86 0o82 0o85 0o67
+Pearson 0o82 0-92 0-70 0o84 0o88 0-90 0-78 0-73 0o85 0-77
+
+Note: The cell entries are agreement scores. That is, they are the proportion of cases each pair
+of judges heard together which they voted to resolve in the same way. The average level of
+agreement is high because 70 per cent of the cases involved were decided unanimously.
+
+are given in Tables 2 and 3. An entry represents the amount of agreement.
+Thus, the entry in Table 2 for Lords Pearson and Morris at 0-92 represents a
+very high tendency to vote together, whilst that of o060 for Lords Pearce and
+Donovan shows an unusual dissensus. The average figure is very high at 0-75
+because 70 per cent of the cases studied were decided unanimously.
+
+TABLE 3 Similarity Matrix for Second Set of Law Lords
+
+o C
+
+2 a A, -? - E:
+
+Morris 0-82
+Diplock 0-70 0o77
+Dilhorne o-85 0-87 o-85
+Wilberforce 0-76 0-77 0-70 o088
+Simon 0o83 0o82 0o87 0go90 067
+Kilbrandon 0o87 o-8o o091 0-79 0-77 0-82
+Salmon 0-74 o-8o 0-78 o086 0-76 0-73 0-92
+EdmundDavies
+o060 0-73 o085 0-75 0o63 0-78 o082 0-70
+Russell 0-62 0-77 0-89 0-71 0-73 o-8o 0-78 0-84 o-86
+Cross o-6i 0-73 o088 0o84 o-8i 0o67 0-75 o088 0o64 0-76
+
+Note: see footnote to Table 2.
+
+9
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+IO ROBERTSON
+
+Little can be obtained directly from these tables, although they may be
+used to test various hypotheses. One hypothesis worth testing, if only to
+reject it, is the effect of previous political affiliations on judicial relationships.
+Although the old tendency for senior judges to have had political careers is
+almost over, several of the men studied here have either been MPs or stood as
+parliamentary candidates when they were barristers. Lord Donovan was once
+a Labour MP, Lord Dilhorne (as Manningham-Buller) was a Conservative
+Attorney-General and Lord Chancellor, Lords Guest and Wilberforce were
+Conservative candidates, and Lord Reid a Scottish Unionist MP and Lord
+Advocate. The obvious test is to consider the average 'distance' or similarity
+between one Labour MP, Lord Donovan, and both the known Conservative
+group and those not known to be Conservative. These latter are Lords
+Pearce, Upjohn, Diplock and Morris (who is an ex-Liberal candidate). If this
+is a fair test of the relevance of past party affiliation, then partisanship is
+shown to be irrelevant. The average distance between Donovan and the two
+groups is not significantly different. Indeed, his average agreement with the
+known Conservatives, 0-74, is slightly greater that that with the non-political
+group, at 0-72. The agreement between Donovan and Dilhorne, presumably
+the pair most likely to be affected by their past roles, is, at o08i, above
+average for the whole table. It might be remembered, should this result seem
+unimportant, that such a result would most certainly not arise from a similar
+table on American judges.22
+The real use of these agreement/similarity matrices is to decompose them,
+using multi-dimensional analysis. This technique, extensively used in cognitive
+sociology and psychology, is able to represent a complicated pattern of
+such similarity measures in a much simpler way, using the minimum necessary
+set of scales or dimensions, without doing serious damage to the original
+relationships.23 It is akin to the more familiar factor analysis in assuming that
+a set of correlations between variables or people is explained by the several
+data 'representing' or 'measuring' an underlying set of basic factors.
+In order to discover such 'explainable' judicial affinities, both similarity
+matrices were submitted to an MDSCAL analysis.24 The results, in terms of
+positions on each of three necessary 'underlying' dimensions, are given in
+Tables 4 and 5.
+These solutions are not technically very good, because the stress coefficients
+(which give a measure of how much the original relationships have had
+to be altered in order to be displayed in a small set of dimensions) are rather
+high. However, no serious problem arises because the configurations are only
+
+22 But not all appointments to the Supreme Court have always worked like this. Eisenhower's
+disappointment with the Republican, Earl Warren, is a notable case in point. However, most
+studies of the judiciary at the state level show a fairly strong connection between judicial voting
+and partisanship.
+23 See, for example, Coombs, A Theory of Data.
+24 The programme used was MINISSA in a package of programmes devised by A. P. M.
+Coxon, University College, Cardiff.
+
+Little can be obtained directly from these tables, although they may be
+used to test various hypotheses. One hypothesis worth testing, if only to
+reject it, is the effect of previous political affiliations on judicial relationships.
+Although the old tendency for senior judges to have had political careers is
+almost over, several of the men studied here have either been MPs or stood as
+parliamentary candidates when they were barristers. Lord Donovan was once
+a Labour MP, Lord Dilhorne (as Manningham-Buller) was a Conservative
+Attorney-General and Lord Chancellor, Lords Guest and Wilberforce were
+Conservative candidates, and Lord Reid a Scottish Unionist MP and Lord
+Advocate. The obvious test is to consider the average 'distance' or similarity
+between one Labour MP, Lord Donovan, and both the known Conservative
+group and those not known to be Conservative. These latter are Lords
+Pearce, Upjohn, Diplock and Morris (who is an ex-Liberal candidate). If this
+is a fair test of the relevance of past party affiliation, then partisanship is
+shown to be irrelevant. The average distance between Donovan and the two
+groups is not significantly different. Indeed, his average agreement with the
+known Conservatives, 0-74, is slightly greater that that with the non-political
+group, at 0-72. The agreement between Donovan and Dilhorne, presumably
+the pair most likely to be affected by their past roles, is, at o08i, above
+average for the whole table. It might be remembered, should this result seem
+unimportant, that such a result would most certainly not arise from a similar
+table on American judges.22
+The real use of these agreement/similarity matrices is to decompose them,
+using multi-dimensional analysis. This technique, extensively used in cognitive
+sociology and psychology, is able to represent a complicated pattern of
+such similarity measures in a much simpler way, using the minimum necessary
+set of scales or dimensions, without doing serious damage to the original
+relationships.23 It is akin to the more familiar factor analysis in assuming that
+a set of correlations between variables or people is explained by the several
+data 'representing' or 'measuring' an underlying set of basic factors.
+In order to discover such 'explainable' judicial affinities, both similarity
+matrices were submitted to an MDSCAL analysis.24 The results, in terms of
+positions on each of three necessary 'underlying' dimensions, are given in
+Tables 4 and 5.
+These solutions are not technically very good, because the stress coefficients
+(which give a measure of how much the original relationships have had
+to be altered in order to be displayed in a small set of dimensions) are rather
+high. However, no serious problem arises because the configurations are only
+
+22 But not all appointments to the Supreme Court have always worked like this. Eisenhower's
+disappointment with the Republican, Earl Warren, is a notable case in point. However, most
+studies of the judiciary at the state level show a fairly strong connection between judicial voting
+and partisanship.
+23 See, for example, Coombs, A Theory of Data.
+24 The programme used was MINISSA in a package of programmes devised by A. P. M.
+Coxon, University College, Cardiff.
+
+Little can be obtained directly from these tables, although they may be
+used to test various hypotheses. One hypothesis worth testing, if only to
+reject it, is the effect of previous political affiliations on judicial relationships.
+Although the old tendency for senior judges to have had political careers is
+almost over, several of the men studied here have either been MPs or stood as
+parliamentary candidates when they were barristers. Lord Donovan was once
+a Labour MP, Lord Dilhorne (as Manningham-Buller) was a Conservative
+Attorney-General and Lord Chancellor, Lords Guest and Wilberforce were
+Conservative candidates, and Lord Reid a Scottish Unionist MP and Lord
+Advocate. The obvious test is to consider the average 'distance' or similarity
+between one Labour MP, Lord Donovan, and both the known Conservative
+group and those not known to be Conservative. These latter are Lords
+Pearce, Upjohn, Diplock and Morris (who is an ex-Liberal candidate). If this
+is a fair test of the relevance of past party affiliation, then partisanship is
+shown to be irrelevant. The average distance between Donovan and the two
+groups is not significantly different. Indeed, his average agreement with the
+known Conservatives, 0-74, is slightly greater that that with the non-political
+group, at 0-72. The agreement between Donovan and Dilhorne, presumably
+the pair most likely to be affected by their past roles, is, at o08i, above
+average for the whole table. It might be remembered, should this result seem
+unimportant, that such a result would most certainly not arise from a similar
+table on American judges.22
+The real use of these agreement/similarity matrices is to decompose them,
+using multi-dimensional analysis. This technique, extensively used in cognitive
+sociology and psychology, is able to represent a complicated pattern of
+such similarity measures in a much simpler way, using the minimum necessary
+set of scales or dimensions, without doing serious damage to the original
+relationships.23 It is akin to the more familiar factor analysis in assuming that
+a set of correlations between variables or people is explained by the several
+data 'representing' or 'measuring' an underlying set of basic factors.
+In order to discover such 'explainable' judicial affinities, both similarity
+matrices were submitted to an MDSCAL analysis.24 The results, in terms of
+positions on each of three necessary 'underlying' dimensions, are given in
+Tables 4 and 5.
+These solutions are not technically very good, because the stress coefficients
+(which give a measure of how much the original relationships have had
+to be altered in order to be displayed in a small set of dimensions) are rather
+high. However, no serious problem arises because the configurations are only
+
+22 But not all appointments to the Supreme Court have always worked like this. Eisenhower's
+disappointment with the Republican, Earl Warren, is a notable case in point. However, most
+studies of the judiciary at the state level show a fairly strong connection between judicial voting
+and partisanship.
+23 See, for example, Coombs, A Theory of Data.
+24 The programme used was MINISSA in a package of programmes devised by A. P. M.
+Coxon, University College, Cardiff.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology in the House of Lords
+
+TABLE 4 MDSC
+Lords
+
+Lord
+
+Solution in Three Dimensions Solution in Three Dimensions for First Set of Law Solution in Three Dimensions for First Set of Law for First Set of Law
+
+Final configuration co-ordinates
+Ist Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+Final configuration co-ordinates
+Ist Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+Final configuration co-ordinates
+Ist Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Reid -0-223 -0o864 -0o083
+Morris 0-586 0-078 0o473
+Diplock 0o064 I 378 o I63
+Dilhorne 0-248 0o604 -0o233
+Wilberforce ogg99 0-037 -0o984
+Hodson -01 38 -0-269 0-429
+Guest -0o645 0.022 I1042
+Pearce -0-922 0-205 -0o603
+Donovan 1-231 -0o395 0-097
+Upjohn -0o892 -0-42I -0-056
+Pearson o059I -0o347 -0o247
+
+Note: This solution, which has the rather high stress value of I-405, is not intended to be taken
+as a very definite configuration. It is, however, a useful crude dimensional 'map' of how the
+judges fit together. The analysis was carried out by the Edinburgh version of the programme
+MINISSA, originally writen by Roskam and Lingoes.
+
+TABLE 5 MDSC Solution in Three Dimensions for Second Set of Law
+Lords
+
+Reid -0-223 -0o864 -0o083
+Morris 0-586 0-078 0o473
+Diplock 0o064 I 378 o I63
+Dilhorne 0-248 0o604 -0o233
+Wilberforce ogg99 0-037 -0o984
+Hodson -01 38 -0-269 0-429
+Guest -0o645 0.022 I1042
+Pearce -0-922 0-205 -0o603
+Donovan 1-231 -0o395 0-097
+Upjohn -0o892 -0-42I -0-056
+Pearson o059I -0o347 -0o247
+
+Note: This solution, which has the rather high stress value of I-405, is not intended to be taken
+as a very definite configuration. It is, however, a useful crude dimensional 'map' of how the
+judges fit together. The analysis was carried out by the Edinburgh version of the programme
+MINISSA, originally writen by Roskam and Lingoes.
+
+TABLE 5 MDSC Solution in Three Dimensions for Second Set of Law
+Lords
+
+Reid -0-223 -0o864 -0o083
+Morris 0-586 0-078 0o473
+Diplock 0o064 I 378 o I63
+Dilhorne 0-248 0o604 -0o233
+Wilberforce ogg99 0-037 -0o984
+Hodson -01 38 -0-269 0-429
+Guest -0o645 0.022 I1042
+Pearce -0-922 0-205 -0o603
+Donovan 1-231 -0o395 0-097
+Upjohn -0o892 -0-42I -0-056
+Pearson o059I -0o347 -0o247
+
+Note: This solution, which has the rather high stress value of I-405, is not intended to be taken
+as a very definite configuration. It is, however, a useful crude dimensional 'map' of how the
+judges fit together. The analysis was carried out by the Edinburgh version of the programme
+MINISSA, originally writen by Roskam and Lingoes.
+
+TABLE 5 MDSC Solution in Three Dimensions for Second Set of Law
+Lords
+
+Final configuration co-ordinates
+Lord ISt Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Reid - Io60 -0-784 -0-358
+Morris -0-234 -0-2I8 0-78I
+Diplock o-618 0-I57 -01 76
+Dilhorne -0'575 -o0i51 0-216
+Wilberforce -0-972 0'535 0-270
+Simon 0-117 -0-94I 0. II
+Kilbrandon 0-015 -0o064 -0o632
+Salmon -o-182 0o670 -0-480
+Edmund-Davies 1-22I -o-608 -0-14I
+Russell o088i 0-264 o0435
+Cross 0-172 1-141 -o-oi6
+
+Note: See note to Table 4; the stress coefficient for this configuration is also high at 1-012.
+
+intended as a rough representation of the judicial groupings underlying the
+original data. The high stress coefficients indicate that more than three
+dimensions are required to account fully for the original agreement scores.
+But it is hardly surprising that many extra dimensions must exist to explain so
+complex a phenomenon as the rate at which such skilled and trained legal
+practitioners agree with each other. Some, at least, of these dimensions will
+be inexplicable, picking up the subtlest gradations of highly personal judicial
+
+Final configuration co-ordinates
+Lord ISt Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Reid - Io60 -0-784 -0-358
+Morris -0-234 -0-2I8 0-78I
+Diplock o-618 0-I57 -01 76
+Dilhorne -0'575 -o0i51 0-216
+Wilberforce -0-972 0'535 0-270
+Simon 0-117 -0-94I 0. II
+Kilbrandon 0-015 -0o064 -0o632
+Salmon -o-182 0o670 -0-480
+Edmund-Davies 1-22I -o-608 -0-14I
+Russell o088i 0-264 o0435
+Cross 0-172 1-141 -o-oi6
+
+Note: See note to Table 4; the stress coefficient for this configuration is also high at 1-012.
+
+intended as a rough representation of the judicial groupings underlying the
+original data. The high stress coefficients indicate that more than three
+dimensions are required to account fully for the original agreement scores.
+But it is hardly surprising that many extra dimensions must exist to explain so
+complex a phenomenon as the rate at which such skilled and trained legal
+practitioners agree with each other. Some, at least, of these dimensions will
+be inexplicable, picking up the subtlest gradations of highly personal judicial
+
+Final configuration co-ordinates
+Lord ISt Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Reid - Io60 -0-784 -0-358
+Morris -0-234 -0-2I8 0-78I
+Diplock o-618 0-I57 -01 76
+Dilhorne -0'575 -o0i51 0-216
+Wilberforce -0-972 0'535 0-270
+Simon 0-117 -0-94I 0. II
+Kilbrandon 0-015 -0o064 -0o632
+Salmon -o-182 0o670 -0-480
+Edmund-Davies 1-22I -o-608 -0-14I
+Russell o088i 0-264 o0435
+Cross 0-172 1-141 -o-oi6
+
+Note: See note to Table 4; the stress coefficient for this configuration is also high at 1-012.
+
+intended as a rough representation of the judicial groupings underlying the
+original data. The high stress coefficients indicate that more than three
+dimensions are required to account fully for the original agreement scores.
+But it is hardly surprising that many extra dimensions must exist to explain so
+complex a phenomenon as the rate at which such skilled and trained legal
+practitioners agree with each other. Some, at least, of these dimensions will
+be inexplicable, picking up the subtlest gradations of highly personal judicial
+
+II
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+12 ROBERTSON
+
+reaction to the facts and law of cases. Our intention here is not to give a
+putative total 'explanation' of judicial decision making, which would be to
+take positivism to an arrogant extreme. It is rather to see whether one can
+identify and characterize just some of these aspects. It is sufficient to say that
+the agreements between judges can be displayed, very crudely, as concerning
+some two or three dimensions, and to try to identify these.
+The results in Tables 4 and 5 do suggest more clearly than the original
+similarity matrices some of the contrasts between Law Lords that could be
+explained in terms of a judicial ideology. A sharp contrast exists between
+Lords Reid and Diplock, who are at opposite ends of the second, as yet
+unidentified, dimension. Lords Pearce and Guest have something in common
+(they are close on both dimensions) which makes them opposed to Lords
+Pearson and Donovan. Whatever this 'something' is, it operates in a different
+field from whatever it is that separates Reid and Diplock. This latter distance
+is on the first, not the second, dimension.
+What are these differences? The interpretation of a multi-dimensional
+scaling analysis is not a statistical and objective exercise, although statistical
+measures can help. It is a substantive judgement, a fitting of substantively
+meaningful patterns to an objective and numerically derived pattern. Essentially
+one forms hypotheses about what might underlie the observed patterns,
+and one tests them. An example that might appeal to exponents of the
+'orthodox' model is that differences in judicial experience or training are the
+real 'causes' of such spatial configurations. But in fact comparing judges from
+Scottish, Common Law or Chancery backgrounds throws no light on the
+three-dimensional array here. Of course further dimensions, if extracted,
+might well show up such a 'training' pattern.25
+
+INTERPRETING THE DIMENSIONS
+
+The explanations we are seeking are couched in terms of a 'judicial' ideology
+- reflexive positions on issues of a politico-legal nature - echoing or leading to
+a (perhaps only marginal) preference for supporting a particular type of cause
+or litigant. There are many such potential candidates, as many as there are
+issues. We pick two major ones, because they have been much discussed both
+in academic and popular circles. Both can be characterized in the language of
+politics as exemplifying degrees of 'conservatism' and, more academically,
+both relate to the power and nature of the state in modern liberal democracies.
+The first, more obvious candidate, is that of attitudes to criminal law. It
+is a matter of speculation at all levels of the press whether Mr Justice X is
+harder or tougher on criminals than Mr Justice Y. Whilst this might be studied
+
+25 For example, judges promoted from Queen's Bench Division, with considerable experience
+as criminal trial judges, might see due process differently from those who have a different legal
+experience. Judges from the Family Division could well behave in a systematically different way
+on adoption from those whose experience of family legal problems is restricted to interpreting
+wills and trusts.
+
+reaction to the facts and law of cases. Our intention here is not to give a
+putative total 'explanation' of judicial decision making, which would be to
+take positivism to an arrogant extreme. It is rather to see whether one can
+identify and characterize just some of these aspects. It is sufficient to say that
+the agreements between judges can be displayed, very crudely, as concerning
+some two or three dimensions, and to try to identify these.
+The results in Tables 4 and 5 do suggest more clearly than the original
+similarity matrices some of the contrasts between Law Lords that could be
+explained in terms of a judicial ideology. A sharp contrast exists between
+Lords Reid and Diplock, who are at opposite ends of the second, as yet
+unidentified, dimension. Lords Pearce and Guest have something in common
+(they are close on both dimensions) which makes them opposed to Lords
+Pearson and Donovan. Whatever this 'something' is, it operates in a different
+field from whatever it is that separates Reid and Diplock. This latter distance
+is on the first, not the second, dimension.
+What are these differences? The interpretation of a multi-dimensional
+scaling analysis is not a statistical and objective exercise, although statistical
+measures can help. It is a substantive judgement, a fitting of substantively
+meaningful patterns to an objective and numerically derived pattern. Essentially
+one forms hypotheses about what might underlie the observed patterns,
+and one tests them. An example that might appeal to exponents of the
+'orthodox' model is that differences in judicial experience or training are the
+real 'causes' of such spatial configurations. But in fact comparing judges from
+Scottish, Common Law or Chancery backgrounds throws no light on the
+three-dimensional array here. Of course further dimensions, if extracted,
+might well show up such a 'training' pattern.25
+
+INTERPRETING THE DIMENSIONS
+
+The explanations we are seeking are couched in terms of a 'judicial' ideology
+- reflexive positions on issues of a politico-legal nature - echoing or leading to
+a (perhaps only marginal) preference for supporting a particular type of cause
+or litigant. There are many such potential candidates, as many as there are
+issues. We pick two major ones, because they have been much discussed both
+in academic and popular circles. Both can be characterized in the language of
+politics as exemplifying degrees of 'conservatism' and, more academically,
+both relate to the power and nature of the state in modern liberal democracies.
+The first, more obvious candidate, is that of attitudes to criminal law. It
+is a matter of speculation at all levels of the press whether Mr Justice X is
+harder or tougher on criminals than Mr Justice Y. Whilst this might be studied
+
+25 For example, judges promoted from Queen's Bench Division, with considerable experience
+as criminal trial judges, might see due process differently from those who have a different legal
+experience. Judges from the Family Division could well behave in a systematically different way
+on adoption from those whose experience of family legal problems is restricted to interpreting
+wills and trusts.
+
+reaction to the facts and law of cases. Our intention here is not to give a
+putative total 'explanation' of judicial decision making, which would be to
+take positivism to an arrogant extreme. It is rather to see whether one can
+identify and characterize just some of these aspects. It is sufficient to say that
+the agreements between judges can be displayed, very crudely, as concerning
+some two or three dimensions, and to try to identify these.
+The results in Tables 4 and 5 do suggest more clearly than the original
+similarity matrices some of the contrasts between Law Lords that could be
+explained in terms of a judicial ideology. A sharp contrast exists between
+Lords Reid and Diplock, who are at opposite ends of the second, as yet
+unidentified, dimension. Lords Pearce and Guest have something in common
+(they are close on both dimensions) which makes them opposed to Lords
+Pearson and Donovan. Whatever this 'something' is, it operates in a different
+field from whatever it is that separates Reid and Diplock. This latter distance
+is on the first, not the second, dimension.
+What are these differences? The interpretation of a multi-dimensional
+scaling analysis is not a statistical and objective exercise, although statistical
+measures can help. It is a substantive judgement, a fitting of substantively
+meaningful patterns to an objective and numerically derived pattern. Essentially
+one forms hypotheses about what might underlie the observed patterns,
+and one tests them. An example that might appeal to exponents of the
+'orthodox' model is that differences in judicial experience or training are the
+real 'causes' of such spatial configurations. But in fact comparing judges from
+Scottish, Common Law or Chancery backgrounds throws no light on the
+three-dimensional array here. Of course further dimensions, if extracted,
+might well show up such a 'training' pattern.25
+
+INTERPRETING THE DIMENSIONS
+
+The explanations we are seeking are couched in terms of a 'judicial' ideology
+- reflexive positions on issues of a politico-legal nature - echoing or leading to
+a (perhaps only marginal) preference for supporting a particular type of cause
+or litigant. There are many such potential candidates, as many as there are
+issues. We pick two major ones, because they have been much discussed both
+in academic and popular circles. Both can be characterized in the language of
+politics as exemplifying degrees of 'conservatism' and, more academically,
+both relate to the power and nature of the state in modern liberal democracies.
+The first, more obvious candidate, is that of attitudes to criminal law. It
+is a matter of speculation at all levels of the press whether Mr Justice X is
+harder or tougher on criminals than Mr Justice Y. Whilst this might be studied
+
+25 For example, judges promoted from Queen's Bench Division, with considerable experience
+as criminal trial judges, might see due process differently from those who have a different legal
+experience. Judges from the Family Division could well behave in a systematically different way
+on adoption from those whose experience of family legal problems is restricted to interpreting
+wills and trusts.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology in the House of Lords
+
+at the level of the criminal courts of first instance, there are good reasons for
+taking it more seriously as a question about appeal judges.
+When asked about trial judges, who do not decide guilt, it is a question
+about sentencing practice, and probably reflects psychological differences, or
+differences about theories of criminal deterrence. Asked of Law Lords, it is a
+question about legal beliefs, for the issues in criminal appeals to the Lords
+are, for example, about the acceptability of evidence. They are about whether
+an alleged crime is, in fact, forbidden by the law; the fairness of summings up;
+police investigatory behaviour; or definitions in statutes, all informed by, and
+relevant to, the general area of criminal civil liberties.
+To be a hard-line 'pro-prosecution' judge in the House of Lords is to take a
+robust attitude to claims that it would be unfair actually to punish someone
+whom a jury had convicted of doing what the police said he did. This is clearly
+a political, but also a legal, attitude, and it is one that can fairly be judged
+'conservative' in one of the many senses of that word.26
+A second dimension worth investigating relates to the non-criminal coercion
+of the state. I call this, for want of a better phrase, the 'public law'
+aspect. By public law I include all non-criminal cases where one of the
+litigants is the state in some form or other, and the other is an individual
+(although he may be an artificial individual, as in the legal sense, a
+corporation, local government, trade union or Church). I exclude all 'revenue'
+cases of whatever form from this category, for they raise special problems. So
+we may be talking about the right of a Town Council to withdraw a market
+trader's licence because he was seen urinating against a wall,27 about a habeas
+corpus plea by an alleged fugitive from a foreign government sentenced to
+deportation,28 about an industry claiming the right to a subsidy the Ministry of
+Technology does not want to grant,29 or about the owner of a Caravan Park
+refused planning permission.30
+Of course this is a broad category, imposed on what professional lawyers
+would see as separate areas of the law. But any decision in favour of the state
+means supporting the central coercive power against a weaker individual
+attempting to assert a right, privilege, or immunity. Like the criminal law
+category discussed earlier, it is immediately cashable into a dimension of real
+politics, is expressable in ordinary and academic political language, and
+represents a version of conservatism. That the 'conservatism' inherent in
+supporting the state in criminal prosecutions does not necessarily go with
+26 I have no desire to apply contentious labels. Whatever the philosophy of conservatism says,
+however, hard line 'law and order' attitudes are associated with the politico-psychological
+syndrome of conservatism. See Hans J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge,
+1954).
+27 This particular case actually never got beyond the Queen's Bench Division, but there are
+many roughly similar cases. Take, for example, the long line of cases dealing with the regulation
+of Bingo Halls, which raise similar problems of natural justice. 28 Armah v. Government of Ghana (1968) A.C.192. 29 British Oxygen Ltd. v. Minister of Technology (1971), A.C.6io.
+30 Chertsey UDC v. Mixnam's Properties (I965) A.C.735.
+
+at the level of the criminal courts of first instance, there are good reasons for
+taking it more seriously as a question about appeal judges.
+When asked about trial judges, who do not decide guilt, it is a question
+about sentencing practice, and probably reflects psychological differences, or
+differences about theories of criminal deterrence. Asked of Law Lords, it is a
+question about legal beliefs, for the issues in criminal appeals to the Lords
+are, for example, about the acceptability of evidence. They are about whether
+an alleged crime is, in fact, forbidden by the law; the fairness of summings up;
+police investigatory behaviour; or definitions in statutes, all informed by, and
+relevant to, the general area of criminal civil liberties.
+To be a hard-line 'pro-prosecution' judge in the House of Lords is to take a
+robust attitude to claims that it would be unfair actually to punish someone
+whom a jury had convicted of doing what the police said he did. This is clearly
+a political, but also a legal, attitude, and it is one that can fairly be judged
+'conservative' in one of the many senses of that word.26
+A second dimension worth investigating relates to the non-criminal coercion
+of the state. I call this, for want of a better phrase, the 'public law'
+aspect. By public law I include all non-criminal cases where one of the
+litigants is the state in some form or other, and the other is an individual
+(although he may be an artificial individual, as in the legal sense, a
+corporation, local government, trade union or Church). I exclude all 'revenue'
+cases of whatever form from this category, for they raise special problems. So
+we may be talking about the right of a Town Council to withdraw a market
+trader's licence because he was seen urinating against a wall,27 about a habeas
+corpus plea by an alleged fugitive from a foreign government sentenced to
+deportation,28 about an industry claiming the right to a subsidy the Ministry of
+Technology does not want to grant,29 or about the owner of a Caravan Park
+refused planning permission.30
+Of course this is a broad category, imposed on what professional lawyers
+would see as separate areas of the law. But any decision in favour of the state
+means supporting the central coercive power against a weaker individual
+attempting to assert a right, privilege, or immunity. Like the criminal law
+category discussed earlier, it is immediately cashable into a dimension of real
+politics, is expressable in ordinary and academic political language, and
+represents a version of conservatism. That the 'conservatism' inherent in
+supporting the state in criminal prosecutions does not necessarily go with
+26 I have no desire to apply contentious labels. Whatever the philosophy of conservatism says,
+however, hard line 'law and order' attitudes are associated with the politico-psychological
+syndrome of conservatism. See Hans J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge,
+1954).
+27 This particular case actually never got beyond the Queen's Bench Division, but there are
+many roughly similar cases. Take, for example, the long line of cases dealing with the regulation
+of Bingo Halls, which raise similar problems of natural justice. 28 Armah v. Government of Ghana (1968) A.C.192. 29 British Oxygen Ltd. v. Minister of Technology (1971), A.C.6io.
+30 Chertsey UDC v. Mixnam's Properties (I965) A.C.735.
+
+at the level of the criminal courts of first instance, there are good reasons for
+taking it more seriously as a question about appeal judges.
+When asked about trial judges, who do not decide guilt, it is a question
+about sentencing practice, and probably reflects psychological differences, or
+differences about theories of criminal deterrence. Asked of Law Lords, it is a
+question about legal beliefs, for the issues in criminal appeals to the Lords
+are, for example, about the acceptability of evidence. They are about whether
+an alleged crime is, in fact, forbidden by the law; the fairness of summings up;
+police investigatory behaviour; or definitions in statutes, all informed by, and
+relevant to, the general area of criminal civil liberties.
+To be a hard-line 'pro-prosecution' judge in the House of Lords is to take a
+robust attitude to claims that it would be unfair actually to punish someone
+whom a jury had convicted of doing what the police said he did. This is clearly
+a political, but also a legal, attitude, and it is one that can fairly be judged
+'conservative' in one of the many senses of that word.26
+A second dimension worth investigating relates to the non-criminal coercion
+of the state. I call this, for want of a better phrase, the 'public law'
+aspect. By public law I include all non-criminal cases where one of the
+litigants is the state in some form or other, and the other is an individual
+(although he may be an artificial individual, as in the legal sense, a
+corporation, local government, trade union or Church). I exclude all 'revenue'
+cases of whatever form from this category, for they raise special problems. So
+we may be talking about the right of a Town Council to withdraw a market
+trader's licence because he was seen urinating against a wall,27 about a habeas
+corpus plea by an alleged fugitive from a foreign government sentenced to
+deportation,28 about an industry claiming the right to a subsidy the Ministry of
+Technology does not want to grant,29 or about the owner of a Caravan Park
+refused planning permission.30
+Of course this is a broad category, imposed on what professional lawyers
+would see as separate areas of the law. But any decision in favour of the state
+means supporting the central coercive power against a weaker individual
+attempting to assert a right, privilege, or immunity. Like the criminal law
+category discussed earlier, it is immediately cashable into a dimension of real
+politics, is expressable in ordinary and academic political language, and
+represents a version of conservatism. That the 'conservatism' inherent in
+supporting the state in criminal prosecutions does not necessarily go with
+26 I have no desire to apply contentious labels. Whatever the philosophy of conservatism says,
+however, hard line 'law and order' attitudes are associated with the politico-psychological
+syndrome of conservatism. See Hans J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge,
+1954).
+27 This particular case actually never got beyond the Queen's Bench Division, but there are
+many roughly similar cases. Take, for example, the long line of cases dealing with the regulation
+of Bingo Halls, which raise similar problems of natural justice. 28 Armah v. Government of Ghana (1968) A.C.192. 29 British Oxygen Ltd. v. Minister of Technology (1971), A.C.6io.
+30 Chertsey UDC v. Mixnam's Properties (I965) A.C.735.
+
+I3
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+14 ROBERTSON
+
+the 'conservatism' of supporting state infringements in civil liberties and
+privileges is clear. Whether they go together in judicial ideology is an
+empirical question.
+
+TABLE 6 Judicial Scores on Two Basic Dimensions
+
+% of criminal cases % of public law cases
+
+Lord pro prosecution pro State
+
+Reid 51 (4I) 66 (29)
+Morris 63 (41) 58 (24)
+Hodson 63 (24) 50 (12)
+Guest 78 (i8) 50 (Io)
+Pearce 65 (20) IOO (7)
+Donovan 80 (io) 33 (6)
+Upjohn 47 (15) 88 (8)
+Wilberforce 62 (26) 50 (30)
+Pearson 8i (2I) 58 (I2)
+Diplock 77 (34) 33 (21)
+Dilhorne 78 (32) 38 (21)
+Simon 78 (18) 56 (i6)
+Kilbrandon 82 (I7) 57 (14)
+Salmon 80 (25) 63 (i6)
+Edmund-Davies 88 (i6) 38 (8)
+Russell 80 (5) 39 (13)
+Cross 83 (12) 42 (12)
+
+Note: The figures in brackets are the number of cases in each category a judge heard. They are
+frequently very small, which is why most of our analysis is undertaken on groups of judges rather
+than individuals.
+
+According to our basic research design, separate scores are calculated for
+each Law Lord on these categories. It is simply a matter of calculating what
+proportion of criminal appeals a judge decided in favour of the state. The full
+data for these two variables are reported in Table 6. In many cases, as can be
+seen, the number of cases of a particular type decided by a judge are so few as
+to make the resulting proportions highly unreliable. None the less a rough
+picture emerges, even from a casual inspection, that begins to identify the two
+first dimensions of the ideological map, at least for the 'early' court.
+Tables 7 and 8 give more exact support, reporting correlation coefficients
+that measure the relationship between each variable and each dimension. It is
+clear that for both courts the first dimension is significantly correlated with
+tendencies to support the prosecution in criminal law cases. For the 'early'
+court, it is also clear that the second dimension of the judicial affinity map is
+significantly correlated with the state/individual distinction suggested for
+cases of public law.
+As Table 6 shows, the proportions used in calculating these correlations are
+probably suspect (being often based on small numbers of cases). A different
+
+the 'conservatism' of supporting state infringements in civil liberties and
+privileges is clear. Whether they go together in judicial ideology is an
+empirical question.
+
+TABLE 6 Judicial Scores on Two Basic Dimensions
+
+% of criminal cases % of public law cases
+
+Lord pro prosecution pro State
+
+Reid 51 (4I) 66 (29)
+Morris 63 (41) 58 (24)
+Hodson 63 (24) 50 (12)
+Guest 78 (i8) 50 (Io)
+Pearce 65 (20) IOO (7)
+Donovan 80 (io) 33 (6)
+Upjohn 47 (15) 88 (8)
+Wilberforce 62 (26) 50 (30)
+Pearson 8i (2I) 58 (I2)
+Diplock 77 (34) 33 (21)
+Dilhorne 78 (32) 38 (21)
+Simon 78 (18) 56 (i6)
+Kilbrandon 82 (I7) 57 (14)
+Salmon 80 (25) 63 (i6)
+Edmund-Davies 88 (i6) 38 (8)
+Russell 80 (5) 39 (13)
+Cross 83 (12) 42 (12)
+
+Note: The figures in brackets are the number of cases in each category a judge heard. They are
+frequently very small, which is why most of our analysis is undertaken on groups of judges rather
+than individuals.
+
+According to our basic research design, separate scores are calculated for
+each Law Lord on these categories. It is simply a matter of calculating what
+proportion of criminal appeals a judge decided in favour of the state. The full
+data for these two variables are reported in Table 6. In many cases, as can be
+seen, the number of cases of a particular type decided by a judge are so few as
+to make the resulting proportions highly unreliable. None the less a rough
+picture emerges, even from a casual inspection, that begins to identify the two
+first dimensions of the ideological map, at least for the 'early' court.
+Tables 7 and 8 give more exact support, reporting correlation coefficients
+that measure the relationship between each variable and each dimension. It is
+clear that for both courts the first dimension is significantly correlated with
+tendencies to support the prosecution in criminal law cases. For the 'early'
+court, it is also clear that the second dimension of the judicial affinity map is
+significantly correlated with the state/individual distinction suggested for
+cases of public law.
+As Table 6 shows, the proportions used in calculating these correlations are
+probably suspect (being often based on small numbers of cases). A different
+
+the 'conservatism' of supporting state infringements in civil liberties and
+privileges is clear. Whether they go together in judicial ideology is an
+empirical question.
+
+TABLE 6 Judicial Scores on Two Basic Dimensions
+
+% of criminal cases % of public law cases
+
+Lord pro prosecution pro State
+
+Reid 51 (4I) 66 (29)
+Morris 63 (41) 58 (24)
+Hodson 63 (24) 50 (12)
+Guest 78 (i8) 50 (Io)
+Pearce 65 (20) IOO (7)
+Donovan 80 (io) 33 (6)
+Upjohn 47 (15) 88 (8)
+Wilberforce 62 (26) 50 (30)
+Pearson 8i (2I) 58 (I2)
+Diplock 77 (34) 33 (21)
+Dilhorne 78 (32) 38 (21)
+Simon 78 (18) 56 (i6)
+Kilbrandon 82 (I7) 57 (14)
+Salmon 80 (25) 63 (i6)
+Edmund-Davies 88 (i6) 38 (8)
+Russell 80 (5) 39 (13)
+Cross 83 (12) 42 (12)
+
+Note: The figures in brackets are the number of cases in each category a judge heard. They are
+frequently very small, which is why most of our analysis is undertaken on groups of judges rather
+than individuals.
+
+According to our basic research design, separate scores are calculated for
+each Law Lord on these categories. It is simply a matter of calculating what
+proportion of criminal appeals a judge decided in favour of the state. The full
+data for these two variables are reported in Table 6. In many cases, as can be
+seen, the number of cases of a particular type decided by a judge are so few as
+to make the resulting proportions highly unreliable. None the less a rough
+picture emerges, even from a casual inspection, that begins to identify the two
+first dimensions of the ideological map, at least for the 'early' court.
+Tables 7 and 8 give more exact support, reporting correlation coefficients
+that measure the relationship between each variable and each dimension. It is
+clear that for both courts the first dimension is significantly correlated with
+tendencies to support the prosecution in criminal law cases. For the 'early'
+court, it is also clear that the second dimension of the judicial affinity map is
+significantly correlated with the state/individual distinction suggested for
+cases of public law.
+As Table 6 shows, the proportions used in calculating these correlations are
+probably suspect (being often based on small numbers of cases). A different
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords 15 Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords 15 in the House of Lords 15
+
+TABLE 7 Correlations Between Judicial Scores on MDSC Dimensions
+and Judicial Voting Record on Two Types of Cases: First Set of
+Law Lords
+
+Variable ISt Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Proportion of criminal law
+cases decided for prosecution
+0-52* 0-46 0-20
+Proportion of public law cases
+decided for the State -o046t -0'70* 0-13
+
+* Significant at at least 5 per cent level.
+t Significant only at the io per cent level.
+
+TABLE 8 Correlations Between Individual Scores on MDSC Dimensions
+and Judicial Voting Record on Two Types of Cases: Second Set
+of Law Lords
+
+Variable ist Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Criminal cases 0.78* -0-22 -0-30
+Public law cases -0-49t -0-26 -0-28
+
+* Significant at at least 5 per cent level.
+t Significant only at the io per cent level.
+
+strategy has therefore been adopted to substantiate and develop these
+patterns, and to investigate certain further aspects of 'judicial' ideology and
+its change over time.
+Because it is unreliable to count judges separately, it seemed sensible to
+group judges together according to the clusterings shown in the tables. Thus,
+although one might be uneasy about comparing Lords X and Y, who heard
+only thirty public law cases between them, one can feel happier comparing
+group X and group Y, natural clusterings of judges on the map, who may have
+heard a hundred cases between them. Such groupings allow one to retain a
+disaggregating emphasis on the differences between judicial ideologies,
+something the class model so completely ignores. This grouping also allows
+one to offer certain explanations for a change over time in the dimensions of
+judicial ideology that will shortly appear.
+Rather than group the judges together intuitively by inspecting a map, a
+process that leaves the analyst open to charges of arranging the data to suit his
+purposes, an objective grouping was achieved by using a single cluster
+analysis programme. The input data for this programme (Johnson's Hierarchical
+Clustering programme HICLUS)31 were the original similarity matrices
+used for the MDSCAL analysis. The groupings of judges, representing
+31 I am grateful to Eric Tanenbaum, SSRC Survey Archive, Essex University, for providing
+me with this programme and for help in running it.
+
+TABLE 7 Correlations Between Judicial Scores on MDSC Dimensions
+and Judicial Voting Record on Two Types of Cases: First Set of
+Law Lords
+
+Variable ISt Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Proportion of criminal law
+cases decided for prosecution
+0-52* 0-46 0-20
+Proportion of public law cases
+decided for the State -o046t -0'70* 0-13
+
+* Significant at at least 5 per cent level.
+t Significant only at the io per cent level.
+
+TABLE 8 Correlations Between Individual Scores on MDSC Dimensions
+and Judicial Voting Record on Two Types of Cases: Second Set
+of Law Lords
+
+Variable ist Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Criminal cases 0.78* -0-22 -0-30
+Public law cases -0-49t -0-26 -0-28
+
+* Significant at at least 5 per cent level.
+t Significant only at the io per cent level.
+
+strategy has therefore been adopted to substantiate and develop these
+patterns, and to investigate certain further aspects of 'judicial' ideology and
+its change over time.
+Because it is unreliable to count judges separately, it seemed sensible to
+group judges together according to the clusterings shown in the tables. Thus,
+although one might be uneasy about comparing Lords X and Y, who heard
+only thirty public law cases between them, one can feel happier comparing
+group X and group Y, natural clusterings of judges on the map, who may have
+heard a hundred cases between them. Such groupings allow one to retain a
+disaggregating emphasis on the differences between judicial ideologies,
+something the class model so completely ignores. This grouping also allows
+one to offer certain explanations for a change over time in the dimensions of
+judicial ideology that will shortly appear.
+Rather than group the judges together intuitively by inspecting a map, a
+process that leaves the analyst open to charges of arranging the data to suit his
+purposes, an objective grouping was achieved by using a single cluster
+analysis programme. The input data for this programme (Johnson's Hierarchical
+Clustering programme HICLUS)31 were the original similarity matrices
+used for the MDSCAL analysis. The groupings of judges, representing
+31 I am grateful to Eric Tanenbaum, SSRC Survey Archive, Essex University, for providing
+me with this programme and for help in running it.
+
+TABLE 7 Correlations Between Judicial Scores on MDSC Dimensions
+and Judicial Voting Record on Two Types of Cases: First Set of
+Law Lords
+
+Variable ISt Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Proportion of criminal law
+cases decided for prosecution
+0-52* 0-46 0-20
+Proportion of public law cases
+decided for the State -o046t -0'70* 0-13
+
+* Significant at at least 5 per cent level.
+t Significant only at the io per cent level.
+
+TABLE 8 Correlations Between Individual Scores on MDSC Dimensions
+and Judicial Voting Record on Two Types of Cases: Second Set
+of Law Lords
+
+Variable ist Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension
+
+Criminal cases 0.78* -0-22 -0-30
+Public law cases -0-49t -0-26 -0-28
+
+* Significant at at least 5 per cent level.
+t Significant only at the io per cent level.
+
+strategy has therefore been adopted to substantiate and develop these
+patterns, and to investigate certain further aspects of 'judicial' ideology and
+its change over time.
+Because it is unreliable to count judges separately, it seemed sensible to
+group judges together according to the clusterings shown in the tables. Thus,
+although one might be uneasy about comparing Lords X and Y, who heard
+only thirty public law cases between them, one can feel happier comparing
+group X and group Y, natural clusterings of judges on the map, who may have
+heard a hundred cases between them. Such groupings allow one to retain a
+disaggregating emphasis on the differences between judicial ideologies,
+something the class model so completely ignores. This grouping also allows
+one to offer certain explanations for a change over time in the dimensions of
+judicial ideology that will shortly appear.
+Rather than group the judges together intuitively by inspecting a map, a
+process that leaves the analyst open to charges of arranging the data to suit his
+purposes, an objective grouping was achieved by using a single cluster
+analysis programme. The input data for this programme (Johnson's Hierarchical
+Clustering programme HICLUS)31 were the original similarity matrices
+used for the MDSCAL analysis. The groupings of judges, representing
+31 I am grateful to Eric Tanenbaum, SSRC Survey Archive, Essex University, for providing
+me with this programme and for help in running it.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+I6 ROBERTSON
+
+TABLE 9 Cluster Analysis Grouping Information
+
+Because of the unreliability of the individual judge data, cluster analysis was used on
+each set of Law Lords to produce, for each set, two groups of judges. The input matrix
+for each analysis was that used for the MDSC solution. The clustering that produced
+only two groups and included all judges from the set was chosen for simplicity. The
+clustering is instrumental only, and was not intended to support any hypothesis. In
+each case Johnson's Hierarchical Clustering Program HICLUS was used, and the
+solutions obtained used the Diameter method.
+
+I ist Set of Law Lords
+The two-group solution yields the following groups:
+A
+Lords Guest, Wilberforce, Pearce, Reid and Upjohn.
+B
+Lords Diplock, Dilhorne, Donovan, Hodson, Morris and Pearson.
+
+II 2nd Set of Law Lords
+The two-group solution yields:
+A1
+Lords Morris, Reid, Dilhorne and Simon.
+B1
+Lords Edmund-Davies, Diplock, Kilbrandon, Salmon, Wilberforce and Cross.
+
+'natural' clusterings from this original proximity data are reported in Table 9.
+They do not entirely correspond with the 'eyeball' groupings one might
+construct for the map. This is because the maps would be one- or twodimensional
+representations of what should have been a multi-dimensional
+solution. They are more reliable groupings, therefore, and the fact that such
+groupings replicate the ideological distinctions reported makes one more
+confident in the conclusions, not only because sample sizes of cases in
+categories are now much greater, but because all available information on
+judicial similarities has been utilized.
+With these groups we can repeat the identification of the main dimensions
+in a more easily interpretable fashion, by looking directly at tables of
+decisions. Instead of talking about the relationship between dimensions and
+categories, we can address ourselves directly to the performance of groups of
+judges; the connection between these groups and the dimensional locations is
+still fairly strong.
+First let us note, in Table Io, the strength and permanence, during both
+early and late courts, of a criminal law dimension. Groups A and B in the
+early court, and A1 and B1 in the later, are significantly different in their
+probability of supporting the prosecution in such cases. The distinction is
+much the same in both courts. There is a 12 percentage point difference for
+the first court: Group B (Lords Diplock, Dilhorne, Donovan, Hodson, Morris
+and Pearson) are significantly less likely to find for the criminal accused in
+such cases. In the second court Group B1 is I i percentage points more likely
+
+TABLE 9 Cluster Analysis Grouping Information
+
+Because of the unreliability of the individual judge data, cluster analysis was used on
+each set of Law Lords to produce, for each set, two groups of judges. The input matrix
+for each analysis was that used for the MDSC solution. The clustering that produced
+only two groups and included all judges from the set was chosen for simplicity. The
+clustering is instrumental only, and was not intended to support any hypothesis. In
+each case Johnson's Hierarchical Clustering Program HICLUS was used, and the
+solutions obtained used the Diameter method.
+
+I ist Set of Law Lords
+The two-group solution yields the following groups:
+A
+Lords Guest, Wilberforce, Pearce, Reid and Upjohn.
+B
+Lords Diplock, Dilhorne, Donovan, Hodson, Morris and Pearson.
+
+II 2nd Set of Law Lords
+The two-group solution yields:
+A1
+Lords Morris, Reid, Dilhorne and Simon.
+B1
+Lords Edmund-Davies, Diplock, Kilbrandon, Salmon, Wilberforce and Cross.
+
+'natural' clusterings from this original proximity data are reported in Table 9.
+They do not entirely correspond with the 'eyeball' groupings one might
+construct for the map. This is because the maps would be one- or twodimensional
+representations of what should have been a multi-dimensional
+solution. They are more reliable groupings, therefore, and the fact that such
+groupings replicate the ideological distinctions reported makes one more
+confident in the conclusions, not only because sample sizes of cases in
+categories are now much greater, but because all available information on
+judicial similarities has been utilized.
+With these groups we can repeat the identification of the main dimensions
+in a more easily interpretable fashion, by looking directly at tables of
+decisions. Instead of talking about the relationship between dimensions and
+categories, we can address ourselves directly to the performance of groups of
+judges; the connection between these groups and the dimensional locations is
+still fairly strong.
+First let us note, in Table Io, the strength and permanence, during both
+early and late courts, of a criminal law dimension. Groups A and B in the
+early court, and A1 and B1 in the later, are significantly different in their
+probability of supporting the prosecution in such cases. The distinction is
+much the same in both courts. There is a 12 percentage point difference for
+the first court: Group B (Lords Diplock, Dilhorne, Donovan, Hodson, Morris
+and Pearson) are significantly less likely to find for the criminal accused in
+such cases. In the second court Group B1 is I i percentage points more likely
+
+TABLE 9 Cluster Analysis Grouping Information
+
+Because of the unreliability of the individual judge data, cluster analysis was used on
+each set of Law Lords to produce, for each set, two groups of judges. The input matrix
+for each analysis was that used for the MDSC solution. The clustering that produced
+only two groups and included all judges from the set was chosen for simplicity. The
+clustering is instrumental only, and was not intended to support any hypothesis. In
+each case Johnson's Hierarchical Clustering Program HICLUS was used, and the
+solutions obtained used the Diameter method.
+
+I ist Set of Law Lords
+The two-group solution yields the following groups:
+A
+Lords Guest, Wilberforce, Pearce, Reid and Upjohn.
+B
+Lords Diplock, Dilhorne, Donovan, Hodson, Morris and Pearson.
+
+II 2nd Set of Law Lords
+The two-group solution yields:
+A1
+Lords Morris, Reid, Dilhorne and Simon.
+B1
+Lords Edmund-Davies, Diplock, Kilbrandon, Salmon, Wilberforce and Cross.
+
+'natural' clusterings from this original proximity data are reported in Table 9.
+They do not entirely correspond with the 'eyeball' groupings one might
+construct for the map. This is because the maps would be one- or twodimensional
+representations of what should have been a multi-dimensional
+solution. They are more reliable groupings, therefore, and the fact that such
+groupings replicate the ideological distinctions reported makes one more
+confident in the conclusions, not only because sample sizes of cases in
+categories are now much greater, but because all available information on
+judicial similarities has been utilized.
+With these groups we can repeat the identification of the main dimensions
+in a more easily interpretable fashion, by looking directly at tables of
+decisions. Instead of talking about the relationship between dimensions and
+categories, we can address ourselves directly to the performance of groups of
+judges; the connection between these groups and the dimensional locations is
+still fairly strong.
+First let us note, in Table Io, the strength and permanence, during both
+early and late courts, of a criminal law dimension. Groups A and B in the
+early court, and A1 and B1 in the later, are significantly different in their
+probability of supporting the prosecution in such cases. The distinction is
+much the same in both courts. There is a 12 percentage point difference for
+the first court: Group B (Lords Diplock, Dilhorne, Donovan, Hodson, Morris
+and Pearson) are significantly less likely to find for the criminal accused in
+such cases. In the second court Group B1 is I i percentage points more likely
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial Judicial Ideology Ideology in the House of Lords
+
+TABLE 0 Voting of Groups of Judges in Criminal Cases
+
+First set of Law Lords
+
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for prosecution 71 117
+(60%) (72%)
+No. of votes against prosecution 47 45
+(40%) (28%)
+Total I 8 162
+(ioo%) (Ioo%)
+Chi Square 4-496, Probability 0-034*
+
+Second set of Law Lords
+
+Group A1 Group B1
+No. of votes for prosecution 86 104
+(66%) (77%)
+No. of votes against prosecution 44 31
+(34%) (23%)
+Total 120 135
+(Ioo%) (ioo%)
+Chi Square 3'87, Probability 0049*
+
+* i.e., the chance of getting the result by accident.
+
+to find for the prosecution, although two of the 'tougher' judges from the first
+court's Group B are now in the 'softer' Group A1 compared with others in the
+later court.
+This suggests, and the suggestion is borne out by Table 15, that there has
+been a general shift to the 'pro prosecution' end of this distinction as a result
+of new members. If, following Table 12, we use the time groupings 'early',
+'continuing' and 'late' instead of proximity groupings, we find no difference
+between those present only in the 'early' court and those present in both
+courts, but a 15-16 percentage point difference in pro-prosecution tendencies
+between either and those present only in the late court.
+This is slightly premature. Returning to Table I I, we see the change in the
+'public law' dimension. Between the two proximity groups for the early court
+there is a dramatic difference in preparedness to uphold the state over the
+individual. While Group B (those most prosecution minded in criminal
+appeals) has only a 46 per cent probability of supporting the state in civil
+cases, Group A, the ones most 'liberal' in criminal cases, are much more
+likely (63 per cent) to support the state against the 'non-criminal' individual.
+This is a fascinating result, and one that makes theoretical sense; but it is a
+warning to those prone to an over-facile belief in the 'conservatism' of the
+judges. Evidently the 'conservatism' of men like Diplock and Morris, which is
+
+TABLE 0 Voting of Groups of Judges in Criminal Cases
+
+First set of Law Lords
+
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for prosecution 71 117
+(60%) (72%)
+No. of votes against prosecution 47 45
+(40%) (28%)
+Total I 8 162
+(ioo%) (Ioo%)
+Chi Square 4-496, Probability 0-034*
+
+Second set of Law Lords
+
+Group A1 Group B1
+No. of votes for prosecution 86 104
+(66%) (77%)
+No. of votes against prosecution 44 31
+(34%) (23%)
+Total 120 135
+(Ioo%) (ioo%)
+Chi Square 3'87, Probability 0049*
+
+* i.e., the chance of getting the result by accident.
+
+to find for the prosecution, although two of the 'tougher' judges from the first
+court's Group B are now in the 'softer' Group A1 compared with others in the
+later court.
+This suggests, and the suggestion is borne out by Table 15, that there has
+been a general shift to the 'pro prosecution' end of this distinction as a result
+of new members. If, following Table 12, we use the time groupings 'early',
+'continuing' and 'late' instead of proximity groupings, we find no difference
+between those present only in the 'early' court and those present in both
+courts, but a 15-16 percentage point difference in pro-prosecution tendencies
+between either and those present only in the late court.
+This is slightly premature. Returning to Table I I, we see the change in the
+'public law' dimension. Between the two proximity groups for the early court
+there is a dramatic difference in preparedness to uphold the state over the
+individual. While Group B (those most prosecution minded in criminal
+appeals) has only a 46 per cent probability of supporting the state in civil
+cases, Group A, the ones most 'liberal' in criminal cases, are much more
+likely (63 per cent) to support the state against the 'non-criminal' individual.
+This is a fascinating result, and one that makes theoretical sense; but it is a
+warning to those prone to an over-facile belief in the 'conservatism' of the
+judges. Evidently the 'conservatism' of men like Diplock and Morris, which is
+
+TABLE 0 Voting of Groups of Judges in Criminal Cases
+
+First set of Law Lords
+
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for prosecution 71 117
+(60%) (72%)
+No. of votes against prosecution 47 45
+(40%) (28%)
+Total I 8 162
+(ioo%) (Ioo%)
+Chi Square 4-496, Probability 0-034*
+
+Second set of Law Lords
+
+Group A1 Group B1
+No. of votes for prosecution 86 104
+(66%) (77%)
+No. of votes against prosecution 44 31
+(34%) (23%)
+Total 120 135
+(Ioo%) (ioo%)
+Chi Square 3'87, Probability 0049*
+
+* i.e., the chance of getting the result by accident.
+
+to find for the prosecution, although two of the 'tougher' judges from the first
+court's Group B are now in the 'softer' Group A1 compared with others in the
+later court.
+This suggests, and the suggestion is borne out by Table 15, that there has
+been a general shift to the 'pro prosecution' end of this distinction as a result
+of new members. If, following Table 12, we use the time groupings 'early',
+'continuing' and 'late' instead of proximity groupings, we find no difference
+between those present only in the 'early' court and those present in both
+courts, but a 15-16 percentage point difference in pro-prosecution tendencies
+between either and those present only in the late court.
+This is slightly premature. Returning to Table I I, we see the change in the
+'public law' dimension. Between the two proximity groups for the early court
+there is a dramatic difference in preparedness to uphold the state over the
+individual. While Group B (those most prosecution minded in criminal
+appeals) has only a 46 per cent probability of supporting the state in civil
+cases, Group A, the ones most 'liberal' in criminal cases, are much more
+likely (63 per cent) to support the state against the 'non-criminal' individual.
+This is a fascinating result, and one that makes theoretical sense; but it is a
+warning to those prone to an over-facile belief in the 'conservatism' of the
+judges. Evidently the 'conservatism' of men like Diplock and Morris, which is
+
+I7
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+I8 ROBERTSON
+
+TABLE I I Voting of Groups of Judges in Public Law Cases
+
+First set of Law Lords
+
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for the State 53 44
+(63%) (46%)
+No. of votes against the State 31 52
+(37%) (54%)
+Total 84 96
+(Ioo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 5-37, Probability 0-021
+Second set of Law Lords
+
+Group A1 Group B1
+
+No. of votes for the State 50 53
+(55%) (47%)
+No. of votes against the State 41 6I
+(45%) (53%)
+Total 91 114
+(Ioo%) (Ioo%)
+Chi Square I 447, Probability 0-23
+
+TABLE I I Voting of Groups of Judges in Public Law Cases
+
+First set of Law Lords
+
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for the State 53 44
+(63%) (46%)
+No. of votes against the State 31 52
+(37%) (54%)
+Total 84 96
+(Ioo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 5-37, Probability 0-021
+Second set of Law Lords
+
+Group A1 Group B1
+
+No. of votes for the State 50 53
+(55%) (47%)
+No. of votes against the State 41 6I
+(45%) (53%)
+Total 91 114
+(Ioo%) (Ioo%)
+Chi Square I 447, Probability 0-23
+
+TABLE I I Voting of Groups of Judges in Public Law Cases
+
+First set of Law Lords
+
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for the State 53 44
+(63%) (46%)
+No. of votes against the State 31 52
+(37%) (54%)
+Total 84 96
+(Ioo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 5-37, Probability 0-021
+Second set of Law Lords
+
+Group A1 Group B1
+
+No. of votes for the State 50 53
+(55%) (47%)
+No. of votes against the State 41 6I
+(45%) (53%)
+Total 91 114
+(Ioo%) (Ioo%)
+Chi Square I 447, Probability 0-23
+
+protective of the interests of non-criminals in conflict with the state, is notably
+different from that of judges like Guest and Wilberforce, who are much more
+sensitive to injustice in criminal cases than in those where the interest of the
+state is more general.
+Comparing this result with Tables 10 and i , however, one sees that a
+change has effectively removed this public law dimension. The new groups A1
+and B1 are not significantly different in their reactions to public law cases
+(although A1 is still marginally more 'statist'). Again, Table 12 shows this to
+be a result of judicial replacement: the group who served through the early
+part of our period, Lords Hodson, Guest, Pearce, Donovan, Upjohn and
+Pearson, were the ones prone to support the state, and there is no difference
+between the 'continually present' judges and the newcomers, both being
+more alive, as groups, to the interests of the individual.
+Anyone with a passing knowledge of recent developments in public law will
+know that since the middle I96os, in cases like Conway v. Rimmer,32 the
+House has been making some inroads into the power of the executive,
+especially through the ultra vires doctrine. These tables are revealing of how
+much this change has been occasioned by new minds in the House, rather
+than by the judicial conversion of those long in it. At the same time they
+suggest that there has been, and, as the 'continually present' group retire, will
+32 Conway v. Rimmer (I968), A.C.9Io.
+
+protective of the interests of non-criminals in conflict with the state, is notably
+different from that of judges like Guest and Wilberforce, who are much more
+sensitive to injustice in criminal cases than in those where the interest of the
+state is more general.
+Comparing this result with Tables 10 and i , however, one sees that a
+change has effectively removed this public law dimension. The new groups A1
+and B1 are not significantly different in their reactions to public law cases
+(although A1 is still marginally more 'statist'). Again, Table 12 shows this to
+be a result of judicial replacement: the group who served through the early
+part of our period, Lords Hodson, Guest, Pearce, Donovan, Upjohn and
+Pearson, were the ones prone to support the state, and there is no difference
+between the 'continually present' judges and the newcomers, both being
+more alive, as groups, to the interests of the individual.
+Anyone with a passing knowledge of recent developments in public law will
+know that since the middle I96os, in cases like Conway v. Rimmer,32 the
+House has been making some inroads into the power of the executive,
+especially through the ultra vires doctrine. These tables are revealing of how
+much this change has been occasioned by new minds in the House, rather
+than by the judicial conversion of those long in it. At the same time they
+suggest that there has been, and, as the 'continually present' group retire, will
+32 Conway v. Rimmer (I968), A.C.9Io.
+
+protective of the interests of non-criminals in conflict with the state, is notably
+different from that of judges like Guest and Wilberforce, who are much more
+sensitive to injustice in criminal cases than in those where the interest of the
+state is more general.
+Comparing this result with Tables 10 and i , however, one sees that a
+change has effectively removed this public law dimension. The new groups A1
+and B1 are not significantly different in their reactions to public law cases
+(although A1 is still marginally more 'statist'). Again, Table 12 shows this to
+be a result of judicial replacement: the group who served through the early
+part of our period, Lords Hodson, Guest, Pearce, Donovan, Upjohn and
+Pearson, were the ones prone to support the state, and there is no difference
+between the 'continually present' judges and the newcomers, both being
+more alive, as groups, to the interests of the individual.
+Anyone with a passing knowledge of recent developments in public law will
+know that since the middle I96os, in cases like Conway v. Rimmer,32 the
+House has been making some inroads into the power of the executive,
+especially through the ultra vires doctrine. These tables are revealing of how
+much this change has been occasioned by new minds in the House, rather
+than by the judicial conversion of those long in it. At the same time they
+suggest that there has been, and, as the 'continually present' group retire, will
+32 Conway v. Rimmer (I968), A.C.9Io.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial Judicial Ideology Ideology in the House of Lords
+
+TABLE I2 Comparison of Voting of Judges According to 'Time Groups'
+
+Early group Continuing group Late group
+(Simon, Cross,
+(Hodson, Guest, (Reid, Morris, Edmund-Davies,
+Criminal Law Pearce, Donovan, Diplock, Dilhorne, Kilbrandon,
+Cases Upjohn, Pearson) Wilberforce) Salmon, Russell)
+
+No. of votes for 74 114 76
+prosecution (67%) (66%) (82%)
+No. of votes against 34 60 17
+prosecution (33%) (34%) (I8%)
+Total io8 174 93
+(Ioo%) (IOO%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 7-89, Probability o0o09
+
+Public Law Cases Early group Continuing group Late group
+
+No. of votes for 34 63 40
+the State (62%) (50%) (50%)
+No. of votes against 21 62 40
+the State (38%) (50%) (50%)
+Total 55 125 80
+(IOO%) (Ioo%) (00o%)
+Chi Square 2-33, Probability 0-3I
+
+TABLE I2 Comparison of Voting of Judges According to 'Time Groups'
+
+Early group Continuing group Late group
+(Simon, Cross,
+(Hodson, Guest, (Reid, Morris, Edmund-Davies,
+Criminal Law Pearce, Donovan, Diplock, Dilhorne, Kilbrandon,
+Cases Upjohn, Pearson) Wilberforce) Salmon, Russell)
+
+No. of votes for 74 114 76
+prosecution (67%) (66%) (82%)
+No. of votes against 34 60 17
+prosecution (33%) (34%) (I8%)
+Total io8 174 93
+(Ioo%) (IOO%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 7-89, Probability o0o09
+
+Public Law Cases Early group Continuing group Late group
+
+No. of votes for 34 63 40
+the State (62%) (50%) (50%)
+No. of votes against 21 62 40
+the State (38%) (50%) (50%)
+Total 55 125 80
+(IOO%) (Ioo%) (00o%)
+Chi Square 2-33, Probability 0-3I
+
+TABLE I2 Comparison of Voting of Judges According to 'Time Groups'
+
+Early group Continuing group Late group
+(Simon, Cross,
+(Hodson, Guest, (Reid, Morris, Edmund-Davies,
+Criminal Law Pearce, Donovan, Diplock, Dilhorne, Kilbrandon,
+Cases Upjohn, Pearson) Wilberforce) Salmon, Russell)
+
+No. of votes for 74 114 76
+prosecution (67%) (66%) (82%)
+No. of votes against 34 60 17
+prosecution (33%) (34%) (I8%)
+Total io8 174 93
+(Ioo%) (IOO%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 7-89, Probability o0o09
+
+Public Law Cases Early group Continuing group Late group
+
+No. of votes for 34 63 40
+the State (62%) (50%) (50%)
+No. of votes against 21 62 40
+the State (38%) (50%) (50%)
+Total 55 125 80
+(IOO%) (Ioo%) (00o%)
+Chi Square 2-33, Probability 0-3I
+
+probably increasingly be, a shift from sympathy with those whose conflict
+with the state is over criminal justice, to those who escape such categorization.
+For note that the 'continual group' were the same as the 'early group' in
+being sympathetic to criminals, and the same as the 'late group' in having
+sympathy for individuals 'oppressed' by the state.
+The 'early' court in many ways is more interesting than the 'late', because
+the pattern of group differences in the former can be shown to extend widely
+into the fields of law. It is a necessary deduction from my notion that
+prevailing judicial ideologies will be 'legal' or 'professional' that they should
+enter not only into cases of criminal and public law that are obviously
+'politically relevant', but into the less obviously 'political' cases of day-to-day
+civil law. A serious criticism of both class models and of jurimetrics is that
+they restrict so considerably the scope of 'political' cases. For surely anything
+which has as much impact on ordinary life as that of a leading decision of a
+tort case covering manufacturers' liability for dangerous products is at least as
+important as a ruling on fugitive offenders that is never likely to affect the
+majority of us.33 Griffith seems to me to give away half his case when he says,
+of judicial neutrality,
+
+33 Anyone reading the argument in the most famous of these cases, Donoghue v. Stevenson
+(1932), A.C.562, will see that the judges themselves were aware of the enormous consequences
+of what they were doing.
+
+probably increasingly be, a shift from sympathy with those whose conflict
+with the state is over criminal justice, to those who escape such categorization.
+For note that the 'continual group' were the same as the 'early group' in
+being sympathetic to criminals, and the same as the 'late group' in having
+sympathy for individuals 'oppressed' by the state.
+The 'early' court in many ways is more interesting than the 'late', because
+the pattern of group differences in the former can be shown to extend widely
+into the fields of law. It is a necessary deduction from my notion that
+prevailing judicial ideologies will be 'legal' or 'professional' that they should
+enter not only into cases of criminal and public law that are obviously
+'politically relevant', but into the less obviously 'political' cases of day-to-day
+civil law. A serious criticism of both class models and of jurimetrics is that
+they restrict so considerably the scope of 'political' cases. For surely anything
+which has as much impact on ordinary life as that of a leading decision of a
+tort case covering manufacturers' liability for dangerous products is at least as
+important as a ruling on fugitive offenders that is never likely to affect the
+majority of us.33 Griffith seems to me to give away half his case when he says,
+of judicial neutrality,
+
+33 Anyone reading the argument in the most famous of these cases, Donoghue v. Stevenson
+(1932), A.C.562, will see that the judges themselves were aware of the enormous consequences
+of what they were doing.
+
+probably increasingly be, a shift from sympathy with those whose conflict
+with the state is over criminal justice, to those who escape such categorization.
+For note that the 'continual group' were the same as the 'early group' in
+being sympathetic to criminals, and the same as the 'late group' in having
+sympathy for individuals 'oppressed' by the state.
+The 'early' court in many ways is more interesting than the 'late', because
+the pattern of group differences in the former can be shown to extend widely
+into the fields of law. It is a necessary deduction from my notion that
+prevailing judicial ideologies will be 'legal' or 'professional' that they should
+enter not only into cases of criminal and public law that are obviously
+'politically relevant', but into the less obviously 'political' cases of day-to-day
+civil law. A serious criticism of both class models and of jurimetrics is that
+they restrict so considerably the scope of 'political' cases. For surely anything
+which has as much impact on ordinary life as that of a leading decision of a
+tort case covering manufacturers' liability for dangerous products is at least as
+important as a ruling on fugitive offenders that is never likely to affect the
+majority of us.33 Griffith seems to me to give away half his case when he says,
+of judicial neutrality,
+
+33 Anyone reading the argument in the most famous of these cases, Donoghue v. Stevenson
+(1932), A.C.562, will see that the judges themselves were aware of the enormous consequences
+of what they were doing.
+
+I9
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+20 ROBERTSON
+
+Where the issues are simple and the dispute limited to the interests of the two parties
+the judge may fulfil his traditional function. Divorce, the meaning of a contract
+between businessmen, a personal claim for injury sustained in a road accident, the
+buying and selling of a house - for these the traditional view often suffices. But less
+simple issues can easily emerge . . Then other persons and even the state itself may
+be involved.34
+
+TABLE I3 Voting in Clearly 'Unequal' Cases
+
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for 'more powerful' 50 50
+side (59%) (48%)
+No. of votes for 'weaker' 34 54
+side (41%) (52%)
+Total 84 104
+(ioo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 2-45, Probability o012
+
+Where the issues are simple and the dispute limited to the interests of the two parties
+the judge may fulfil his traditional function. Divorce, the meaning of a contract
+between businessmen, a personal claim for injury sustained in a road accident, the
+buying and selling of a house - for these the traditional view often suffices. But less
+simple issues can easily emerge . . Then other persons and even the state itself may
+be involved.34
+
+TABLE I3 Voting in Clearly 'Unequal' Cases
+
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for 'more powerful' 50 50
+side (59%) (48%)
+No. of votes for 'weaker' 34 54
+side (41%) (52%)
+Total 84 104
+(ioo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 2-45, Probability o012
+
+Where the issues are simple and the dispute limited to the interests of the two parties
+the judge may fulfil his traditional function. Divorce, the meaning of a contract
+between businessmen, a personal claim for injury sustained in a road accident, the
+buying and selling of a house - for these the traditional view often suffices. But less
+simple issues can easily emerge . . Then other persons and even the state itself may
+be involved.34
+
+TABLE I3 Voting in Clearly 'Unequal' Cases
+
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for 'more powerful' 50 50
+side (59%) (48%)
+No. of votes for 'weaker' 34 54
+side (41%) (52%)
+Total 84 104
+(ioo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 2-45, Probability o012
+
+It is much harder, especially in this sort of aggregative statistical analysis, to
+investigate judicial ideology in ordinary civil law, for one cannot easily rule on
+what 'sides' of a case 'ought' to be voted for by which ideological affinity
+group. But at least one fairly simple extension can be made. Many civil cases
+can be seen as involving litigants of clearly unequal 'power', 'resources', or
+'status'. A victim of a road accident who sues a road haulage firm is clearly the
+weaker, more vulnerable, 'side'.35 So is a policeman trying to appeal against a
+court which reduced the damages (paid in any case by an insurance firm) he
+was entitled to from an accident in no way his fault because he would get a
+small pension.36 More typically, workers trying to sue for industrial injuries
+against large firms can hardly be seen as equal participants.37 As many as
+possible of our cases were therefore coded according to whether both sides
+were effectively equal, or one or other clearly more powerful than the other.
+Table 13 shows how the groups A and B who were clearly different in their
+attitudes to public law carried this difference over into civil cases where an
+analogous inequality existed. As it shows, the pattern is maintained, although
+not as sharply. Although there is no statistically significant difference
+between groups A and B, Group B none the less has less than a fifty-fifty
+chance of voting for the more 'powerful' side, while Group A has nearly a
+60 per cent probability of supporting, in civil as well as public law, the bigger
+side. Table 14 may well reflect this difference too, for it takes only cases in
+contract law (widely interpreted to include many Admiralty cases). Here the
+pattern gives us a I6 percentage point difference, with Group B much less
+
+34 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. 187.
+35 Henderson v. Henry E. Jenkins and Sons (1970), A.C.282.
+36 Parry v. Cleaver (1970), A.C.I.
+37 ICI Ltd. v. Shotwell (I965), A.C.656.
+
+It is much harder, especially in this sort of aggregative statistical analysis, to
+investigate judicial ideology in ordinary civil law, for one cannot easily rule on
+what 'sides' of a case 'ought' to be voted for by which ideological affinity
+group. But at least one fairly simple extension can be made. Many civil cases
+can be seen as involving litigants of clearly unequal 'power', 'resources', or
+'status'. A victim of a road accident who sues a road haulage firm is clearly the
+weaker, more vulnerable, 'side'.35 So is a policeman trying to appeal against a
+court which reduced the damages (paid in any case by an insurance firm) he
+was entitled to from an accident in no way his fault because he would get a
+small pension.36 More typically, workers trying to sue for industrial injuries
+against large firms can hardly be seen as equal participants.37 As many as
+possible of our cases were therefore coded according to whether both sides
+were effectively equal, or one or other clearly more powerful than the other.
+Table 13 shows how the groups A and B who were clearly different in their
+attitudes to public law carried this difference over into civil cases where an
+analogous inequality existed. As it shows, the pattern is maintained, although
+not as sharply. Although there is no statistically significant difference
+between groups A and B, Group B none the less has less than a fifty-fifty
+chance of voting for the more 'powerful' side, while Group A has nearly a
+60 per cent probability of supporting, in civil as well as public law, the bigger
+side. Table 14 may well reflect this difference too, for it takes only cases in
+contract law (widely interpreted to include many Admiralty cases). Here the
+pattern gives us a I6 percentage point difference, with Group B much less
+
+34 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. 187.
+35 Henderson v. Henry E. Jenkins and Sons (1970), A.C.282.
+36 Parry v. Cleaver (1970), A.C.I.
+37 ICI Ltd. v. Shotwell (I965), A.C.656.
+
+It is much harder, especially in this sort of aggregative statistical analysis, to
+investigate judicial ideology in ordinary civil law, for one cannot easily rule on
+what 'sides' of a case 'ought' to be voted for by which ideological affinity
+group. But at least one fairly simple extension can be made. Many civil cases
+can be seen as involving litigants of clearly unequal 'power', 'resources', or
+'status'. A victim of a road accident who sues a road haulage firm is clearly the
+weaker, more vulnerable, 'side'.35 So is a policeman trying to appeal against a
+court which reduced the damages (paid in any case by an insurance firm) he
+was entitled to from an accident in no way his fault because he would get a
+small pension.36 More typically, workers trying to sue for industrial injuries
+against large firms can hardly be seen as equal participants.37 As many as
+possible of our cases were therefore coded according to whether both sides
+were effectively equal, or one or other clearly more powerful than the other.
+Table 13 shows how the groups A and B who were clearly different in their
+attitudes to public law carried this difference over into civil cases where an
+analogous inequality existed. As it shows, the pattern is maintained, although
+not as sharply. Although there is no statistically significant difference
+between groups A and B, Group B none the less has less than a fifty-fifty
+chance of voting for the more 'powerful' side, while Group A has nearly a
+60 per cent probability of supporting, in civil as well as public law, the bigger
+side. Table 14 may well reflect this difference too, for it takes only cases in
+contract law (widely interpreted to include many Admiralty cases). Here the
+pattern gives us a I6 percentage point difference, with Group B much less
+
+34 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. 187.
+35 Henderson v. Henry E. Jenkins and Sons (1970), A.C.282.
+36 Parry v. Cleaver (1970), A.C.I.
+37 ICI Ltd. v. Shotwell (I965), A.C.656.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology Judicial in the House of Lords Ideology in the House of Lords
+
+TABLE 14 Voting in Contract Law Cases
+
+Group A Group B
+No. of votes for plaintiff 54 44
+(72%) (56%)
+No. of votes for defendant 2I 35
+(28%) (44%)
+Total 75 79
+(IOO%) (100%)
+Chi Square 4'419, Probability 0-036
+
+TABLE 14 Voting in Contract Law Cases
+
+Group A Group B
+No. of votes for plaintiff 54 44
+(72%) (56%)
+No. of votes for defendant 2I 35
+(28%) (44%)
+Total 75 79
+(IOO%) (100%)
+Chi Square 4'419, Probability 0-036
+
+TABLE 14 Voting in Contract Law Cases
+
+Group A Group B
+No. of votes for plaintiff 54 44
+(72%) (56%)
+No. of votes for defendant 2I 35
+(28%) (44%)
+Total 75 79
+(IOO%) (100%)
+Chi Square 4'419, Probability 0-036
+
+likely to find for the plaintiff. The data are harder to interpret without a
+time-consuming study of each case, but the logic of contract law tells us that
+the plaintiff is someone trying to enforce an obligation on one who, a priori,
+has failed to satisfy it. It seems quite plausible that this difference reflects a
+greater preparedness to 'accept excuses' (as it were), to mitigate the
+fierceness of demands that, in strict law, should be enforced. There may not
+be a logical connection between these three phenomena - supporting
+individuals against the state, the weak against the strong, and those who fail
+to live up to strict contractual obligations - but tests of logical entailment
+seldom work when applied to ideologies. Certainly there is an
+emotional appeal common to the three situations, and although a future,
+more detailed, investigation of the cases might make the point better,38 I
+would suggest we see here a strong ideological 'fit' that engages both political
+and 'legal' traditions that, if conservative, is so in a rather populist way.
+To sum up this more objective part of the analysis, we have good reason to
+believe that judges vary systematically in their use of discretion in at least two
+politically relevant areas, public and criminal law. Both a strictly individual
+analysis, and, more reliably, an affinity-group analysis distributed judges on
+dimensions registering Statism versus Individualism and Criminal Toughness
+versus Libertarianism. These distinctions are partially dependent on the
+judges' period of service: in the 'later' court there is near unanimity in being
+more 'individualistic' than 'statist', such that this dimension fails to distinguish
+groups as it did in the 'early' court. There still remains a serious cleavage on
+'Criminal Toughness' because the newer appointees are markedly more
+'prosecution oriented' that those who remain from the earlier court, although
+some of these were, in the previous court, themselves on the 'tougher' side.
+These 'obviously' political dimensions of judicial ideology penetrate into
+'ordinary' legal cases, reflecting an extended concern for the weak, and
+possibly for those seeking to escape harsh obligations in contract law. The
+general shape of part of a judicial ideology operating through discretionary
+
+38 The theoretical problems of deciding when a judgment is evidence of ideological bias, and
+what bias it might be evidence for, are very complex. Some discussion of this is contained in my
+forthcoming book: David Robertson, Judicial Ideology (Oxford: Clarendon, forthcoming 1982).
+
+likely to find for the plaintiff. The data are harder to interpret without a
+time-consuming study of each case, but the logic of contract law tells us that
+the plaintiff is someone trying to enforce an obligation on one who, a priori,
+has failed to satisfy it. It seems quite plausible that this difference reflects a
+greater preparedness to 'accept excuses' (as it were), to mitigate the
+fierceness of demands that, in strict law, should be enforced. There may not
+be a logical connection between these three phenomena - supporting
+individuals against the state, the weak against the strong, and those who fail
+to live up to strict contractual obligations - but tests of logical entailment
+seldom work when applied to ideologies. Certainly there is an
+emotional appeal common to the three situations, and although a future,
+more detailed, investigation of the cases might make the point better,38 I
+would suggest we see here a strong ideological 'fit' that engages both political
+and 'legal' traditions that, if conservative, is so in a rather populist way.
+To sum up this more objective part of the analysis, we have good reason to
+believe that judges vary systematically in their use of discretion in at least two
+politically relevant areas, public and criminal law. Both a strictly individual
+analysis, and, more reliably, an affinity-group analysis distributed judges on
+dimensions registering Statism versus Individualism and Criminal Toughness
+versus Libertarianism. These distinctions are partially dependent on the
+judges' period of service: in the 'later' court there is near unanimity in being
+more 'individualistic' than 'statist', such that this dimension fails to distinguish
+groups as it did in the 'early' court. There still remains a serious cleavage on
+'Criminal Toughness' because the newer appointees are markedly more
+'prosecution oriented' that those who remain from the earlier court, although
+some of these were, in the previous court, themselves on the 'tougher' side.
+These 'obviously' political dimensions of judicial ideology penetrate into
+'ordinary' legal cases, reflecting an extended concern for the weak, and
+possibly for those seeking to escape harsh obligations in contract law. The
+general shape of part of a judicial ideology operating through discretionary
+
+38 The theoretical problems of deciding when a judgment is evidence of ideological bias, and
+what bias it might be evidence for, are very complex. Some discussion of this is contained in my
+forthcoming book: David Robertson, Judicial Ideology (Oxford: Clarendon, forthcoming 1982).
+
+likely to find for the plaintiff. The data are harder to interpret without a
+time-consuming study of each case, but the logic of contract law tells us that
+the plaintiff is someone trying to enforce an obligation on one who, a priori,
+has failed to satisfy it. It seems quite plausible that this difference reflects a
+greater preparedness to 'accept excuses' (as it were), to mitigate the
+fierceness of demands that, in strict law, should be enforced. There may not
+be a logical connection between these three phenomena - supporting
+individuals against the state, the weak against the strong, and those who fail
+to live up to strict contractual obligations - but tests of logical entailment
+seldom work when applied to ideologies. Certainly there is an
+emotional appeal common to the three situations, and although a future,
+more detailed, investigation of the cases might make the point better,38 I
+would suggest we see here a strong ideological 'fit' that engages both political
+and 'legal' traditions that, if conservative, is so in a rather populist way.
+To sum up this more objective part of the analysis, we have good reason to
+believe that judges vary systematically in their use of discretion in at least two
+politically relevant areas, public and criminal law. Both a strictly individual
+analysis, and, more reliably, an affinity-group analysis distributed judges on
+dimensions registering Statism versus Individualism and Criminal Toughness
+versus Libertarianism. These distinctions are partially dependent on the
+judges' period of service: in the 'later' court there is near unanimity in being
+more 'individualistic' than 'statist', such that this dimension fails to distinguish
+groups as it did in the 'early' court. There still remains a serious cleavage on
+'Criminal Toughness' because the newer appointees are markedly more
+'prosecution oriented' that those who remain from the earlier court, although
+some of these were, in the previous court, themselves on the 'tougher' side.
+These 'obviously' political dimensions of judicial ideology penetrate into
+'ordinary' legal cases, reflecting an extended concern for the weak, and
+possibly for those seeking to escape harsh obligations in contract law. The
+general shape of part of a judicial ideology operating through discretionary
+
+38 The theoretical problems of deciding when a judgment is evidence of ideological bias, and
+what bias it might be evidence for, are very complex. Some discussion of this is contained in my
+forthcoming book: David Robertson, Judicial Ideology (Oxford: Clarendon, forthcoming 1982).
+
+21
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+22 ROBERTSON
+
+judgments is therefore demonstrated in a way not entirely compatible with
+either class or orthodox models. Our interpretation is also different from
+American research into judicial behaviour.
+
+JUDICIAL METHODOLOGY AS AN UNDERLYING DIMENSION
+
+One is still a little hesitant in regarding this as more than surface evidence, or
+as an approximation. Might there not be a 'deeper structure' to judicial
+ideology, a yet further, less substantive, ideological distinction, one more
+directly related to judges' role perceptions than the distinction so far
+demonstrated? The discovery of such a deeper structure would not invalidate
+the results above; rather it would offer an answer to a troubling question.
+Why should some judges be more 'prosecution minded' or more 'statist' than
+others? Of course, some answers to this may be highly personal, lacking the
+generalizable nature of an ideological, professionally ratiocinative, categorization.
+Still it seems worthwhile asking whether there exist some very basic
+distinctions of judicial technique, judicial craftsmanship, and ultimate reactions
+to the nature of the law. One is asking, in effect, whether the tendency
+of Lord Z to find for the prosecution might depend not so much on his
+wanting to incarcerate the accused as on the interaction between the structure
+of criminal law and a belief he holds about how to apply law in general. Are
+there basic, purely 'methodological' or role beliefs that might generate the
+results shown above, or at least combine with the basic predispositions they
+demonstrate?
+Several known questions about the judicial role might serve as a test, apart
+from the argument from precedent that I dismiss. One might consider judges'
+views on the well-known rules of interpretation. Lord Simon has shown how a
+commitment to apply these systematically can lead a judge to a view without
+the nature of the litigants' interests being important. But all judges have
+roughly the same knowledge and understanding of these.39 One might take,
+from the Americans, a methodological distinction between 'strict' and 'wide'
+constructionism as the prevailing determinant of actual decisions.
+There may well be something in this. Table 15 demonstrates the effect of
+taking this variable into account in analysing the previously documented
+difference in the 'early' court on criminal justice. I have coded a group of
+criminal cases according to the nature of the interpretation of law used by the
+prosecution case. A 'narrow' interpretation is one where terms or words are
+considerably restricted in their scope, rather than being given a 'purposive' or
+
+39 One of the best discussions of differences in interpretation strategies available refers not to
+UK Courts but to the European Court of Justice, in the papers given at the Judicial and Academic
+Conference of the Court 27/8 September 1976. These are available from the Office for Official
+Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. In particular the paper by H.
+Kutscher, a senior member of the bench, is valuable. Lord Denning's recent semiautobiographical
+The Discipline of Law (London: Butterworth, 1979) is the frankest account by a
+British judge of such matters.
+
+judgments is therefore demonstrated in a way not entirely compatible with
+either class or orthodox models. Our interpretation is also different from
+American research into judicial behaviour.
+
+JUDICIAL METHODOLOGY AS AN UNDERLYING DIMENSION
+
+One is still a little hesitant in regarding this as more than surface evidence, or
+as an approximation. Might there not be a 'deeper structure' to judicial
+ideology, a yet further, less substantive, ideological distinction, one more
+directly related to judges' role perceptions than the distinction so far
+demonstrated? The discovery of such a deeper structure would not invalidate
+the results above; rather it would offer an answer to a troubling question.
+Why should some judges be more 'prosecution minded' or more 'statist' than
+others? Of course, some answers to this may be highly personal, lacking the
+generalizable nature of an ideological, professionally ratiocinative, categorization.
+Still it seems worthwhile asking whether there exist some very basic
+distinctions of judicial technique, judicial craftsmanship, and ultimate reactions
+to the nature of the law. One is asking, in effect, whether the tendency
+of Lord Z to find for the prosecution might depend not so much on his
+wanting to incarcerate the accused as on the interaction between the structure
+of criminal law and a belief he holds about how to apply law in general. Are
+there basic, purely 'methodological' or role beliefs that might generate the
+results shown above, or at least combine with the basic predispositions they
+demonstrate?
+Several known questions about the judicial role might serve as a test, apart
+from the argument from precedent that I dismiss. One might consider judges'
+views on the well-known rules of interpretation. Lord Simon has shown how a
+commitment to apply these systematically can lead a judge to a view without
+the nature of the litigants' interests being important. But all judges have
+roughly the same knowledge and understanding of these.39 One might take,
+from the Americans, a methodological distinction between 'strict' and 'wide'
+constructionism as the prevailing determinant of actual decisions.
+There may well be something in this. Table 15 demonstrates the effect of
+taking this variable into account in analysing the previously documented
+difference in the 'early' court on criminal justice. I have coded a group of
+criminal cases according to the nature of the interpretation of law used by the
+prosecution case. A 'narrow' interpretation is one where terms or words are
+considerably restricted in their scope, rather than being given a 'purposive' or
+
+39 One of the best discussions of differences in interpretation strategies available refers not to
+UK Courts but to the European Court of Justice, in the papers given at the Judicial and Academic
+Conference of the Court 27/8 September 1976. These are available from the Office for Official
+Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. In particular the paper by H.
+Kutscher, a senior member of the bench, is valuable. Lord Denning's recent semiautobiographical
+The Discipline of Law (London: Butterworth, 1979) is the frankest account by a
+British judge of such matters.
+
+judgments is therefore demonstrated in a way not entirely compatible with
+either class or orthodox models. Our interpretation is also different from
+American research into judicial behaviour.
+
+JUDICIAL METHODOLOGY AS AN UNDERLYING DIMENSION
+
+One is still a little hesitant in regarding this as more than surface evidence, or
+as an approximation. Might there not be a 'deeper structure' to judicial
+ideology, a yet further, less substantive, ideological distinction, one more
+directly related to judges' role perceptions than the distinction so far
+demonstrated? The discovery of such a deeper structure would not invalidate
+the results above; rather it would offer an answer to a troubling question.
+Why should some judges be more 'prosecution minded' or more 'statist' than
+others? Of course, some answers to this may be highly personal, lacking the
+generalizable nature of an ideological, professionally ratiocinative, categorization.
+Still it seems worthwhile asking whether there exist some very basic
+distinctions of judicial technique, judicial craftsmanship, and ultimate reactions
+to the nature of the law. One is asking, in effect, whether the tendency
+of Lord Z to find for the prosecution might depend not so much on his
+wanting to incarcerate the accused as on the interaction between the structure
+of criminal law and a belief he holds about how to apply law in general. Are
+there basic, purely 'methodological' or role beliefs that might generate the
+results shown above, or at least combine with the basic predispositions they
+demonstrate?
+Several known questions about the judicial role might serve as a test, apart
+from the argument from precedent that I dismiss. One might consider judges'
+views on the well-known rules of interpretation. Lord Simon has shown how a
+commitment to apply these systematically can lead a judge to a view without
+the nature of the litigants' interests being important. But all judges have
+roughly the same knowledge and understanding of these.39 One might take,
+from the Americans, a methodological distinction between 'strict' and 'wide'
+constructionism as the prevailing determinant of actual decisions.
+There may well be something in this. Table 15 demonstrates the effect of
+taking this variable into account in analysing the previously documented
+difference in the 'early' court on criminal justice. I have coded a group of
+criminal cases according to the nature of the interpretation of law used by the
+prosecution case. A 'narrow' interpretation is one where terms or words are
+considerably restricted in their scope, rather than being given a 'purposive' or
+
+39 One of the best discussions of differences in interpretation strategies available refers not to
+UK Courts but to the European Court of Justice, in the papers given at the Judicial and Academic
+Conference of the Court 27/8 September 1976. These are available from the Office for Official
+Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. In particular the paper by H.
+Kutscher, a senior member of the bench, is valuable. Lord Denning's recent semiautobiographical
+The Discipline of Law (London: Butterworth, 1979) is the frankest account by a
+British judge of such matters.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology Judicial Judicial Ideology Ideology in the House of Lords
+
+TABLE 1 5 Interaction Between 'Literal Interpretation' and Voting in Criminal
+Law Cases
+
+(i) Prosecution relies on a 'wide' interpretation
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for prosecution I6 29
+(64%) (69%)
+No. of votes for defence 9 13
+(36%) (31%)
+Total 25 42
+(Ioo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square o-i8I, Probability 55-3
+
+(2) Prosecution relies on a 'narrow' interpretation
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for prosecution 17 23
+(46%) (79%)
+No. of votes for defence 20 6
+(5 4) (21%)
+Total 37 29
+(ioo%) (ioo%)
+Chi Square 7'6, Probability oo006
+
+Note: Despite the very small numbers involved, the second table does reach a high level of
+statistical significance (probability oo006). It is however the difference in pattern between the
+tables to which attention is drawn.
+
+'teleological' meaning from the scope of the Act. It is notable that, although
+Group B is in both cases more likely to vote for the prosecution, the extent of
+this difference varies greatly. Where the prosecution uses a 'wide' or
+purposive (might one say 'sensible'?) interpretation there is only a 5 per
+centage point difference between the groups. But in the second part of the
+table, where the prosecution case requires a very restrictive, or 'narrow',
+interpretation of clauses in statutes, sticking very literally to strict meanings,
+there is a huge difference, Group B being 33 percentage points more likely to
+uphold a conviction.
+Far various reasons, however, this distinction between 'strict' and 'broad'
+construction is not generally satisfactory. Unlike American judges, English
+judges tend to switch back and forth between these interpretative positions
+depending on their more basic reactions to the merits of the case. One can
+find pairs of cases where the same judges take different 'interpretation'
+approaches in order to arrive at results which are consistent on other values.
+A good example is given by Wilberforce and Dilhorne in two cases in 1976.40
+4( Daymond v. South West Water Authority (1976), I All ER 39; Southendran v. Immigration
+Appeal Tribunal (1976), 3 All ER 6I I. See Robertson, Judicial Ideology, Chap. 2 for a discussion
+of these.
+
+TABLE 1 5 Interaction Between 'Literal Interpretation' and Voting in Criminal
+Law Cases
+
+(i) Prosecution relies on a 'wide' interpretation
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for prosecution I6 29
+(64%) (69%)
+No. of votes for defence 9 13
+(36%) (31%)
+Total 25 42
+(Ioo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square o-i8I, Probability 55-3
+
+(2) Prosecution relies on a 'narrow' interpretation
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for prosecution 17 23
+(46%) (79%)
+No. of votes for defence 20 6
+(5 4) (21%)
+Total 37 29
+(ioo%) (ioo%)
+Chi Square 7'6, Probability oo006
+
+Note: Despite the very small numbers involved, the second table does reach a high level of
+statistical significance (probability oo006). It is however the difference in pattern between the
+tables to which attention is drawn.
+
+'teleological' meaning from the scope of the Act. It is notable that, although
+Group B is in both cases more likely to vote for the prosecution, the extent of
+this difference varies greatly. Where the prosecution uses a 'wide' or
+purposive (might one say 'sensible'?) interpretation there is only a 5 per
+centage point difference between the groups. But in the second part of the
+table, where the prosecution case requires a very restrictive, or 'narrow',
+interpretation of clauses in statutes, sticking very literally to strict meanings,
+there is a huge difference, Group B being 33 percentage points more likely to
+uphold a conviction.
+Far various reasons, however, this distinction between 'strict' and 'broad'
+construction is not generally satisfactory. Unlike American judges, English
+judges tend to switch back and forth between these interpretative positions
+depending on their more basic reactions to the merits of the case. One can
+find pairs of cases where the same judges take different 'interpretation'
+approaches in order to arrive at results which are consistent on other values.
+A good example is given by Wilberforce and Dilhorne in two cases in 1976.40
+4( Daymond v. South West Water Authority (1976), I All ER 39; Southendran v. Immigration
+Appeal Tribunal (1976), 3 All ER 6I I. See Robertson, Judicial Ideology, Chap. 2 for a discussion
+of these.
+
+TABLE 1 5 Interaction Between 'Literal Interpretation' and Voting in Criminal
+Law Cases
+
+(i) Prosecution relies on a 'wide' interpretation
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for prosecution I6 29
+(64%) (69%)
+No. of votes for defence 9 13
+(36%) (31%)
+Total 25 42
+(Ioo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square o-i8I, Probability 55-3
+
+(2) Prosecution relies on a 'narrow' interpretation
+Group A Group B
+
+No. of votes for prosecution 17 23
+(46%) (79%)
+No. of votes for defence 20 6
+(5 4) (21%)
+Total 37 29
+(ioo%) (ioo%)
+Chi Square 7'6, Probability oo006
+
+Note: Despite the very small numbers involved, the second table does reach a high level of
+statistical significance (probability oo006). It is however the difference in pattern between the
+tables to which attention is drawn.
+
+'teleological' meaning from the scope of the Act. It is notable that, although
+Group B is in both cases more likely to vote for the prosecution, the extent of
+this difference varies greatly. Where the prosecution uses a 'wide' or
+purposive (might one say 'sensible'?) interpretation there is only a 5 per
+centage point difference between the groups. But in the second part of the
+table, where the prosecution case requires a very restrictive, or 'narrow',
+interpretation of clauses in statutes, sticking very literally to strict meanings,
+there is a huge difference, Group B being 33 percentage points more likely to
+uphold a conviction.
+Far various reasons, however, this distinction between 'strict' and 'broad'
+construction is not generally satisfactory. Unlike American judges, English
+judges tend to switch back and forth between these interpretative positions
+depending on their more basic reactions to the merits of the case. One can
+find pairs of cases where the same judges take different 'interpretation'
+approaches in order to arrive at results which are consistent on other values.
+A good example is given by Wilberforce and Dilhorne in two cases in 1976.40
+4( Daymond v. South West Water Authority (1976), I All ER 39; Southendran v. Immigration
+Appeal Tribunal (1976), 3 All ER 6I I. See Robertson, Judicial Ideology, Chap. 2 for a discussion
+of these.
+
+23
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+24 ROBERTSON
+
+In one Wilberforce took a 'strict construction' approach in order to uphold
+the intention of Parliament to allow a Water Authority to levy rates, in the
+other he took a 'liberal' line to protect an immigrant from deportation.
+Dilhorne reversed his 'methodology' in the other direction, in order to relieve
+the rate payer and to support the Home Office against the immigrant.
+Griffith helps make this point. In commenting on the Race Relations cases,
+he attacks the minimizing interpretation of the Act,
+the alternative view does not found itself on this individualistic position, does not think
+primarily of private rights. It makes other assumptions. It seeks to interpret the Race
+Relations Act in a way which will extend its operation and not restict it ... It regards
+racial discrimination not as an individual right but as a social wrong41
+
+although I doubt whether he means the point to be taken in quite this fashion.
+He argues that the Lords should have chosen to interpret the meaning of 'the
+public or a section of the public' in such a way as to extend, rather than
+restrict, the scope of the Act.
+One can see that a very general distinction might exist between those who
+believe that statutes and precedents should, in general, be pushed to their
+logical conclusions, that law should continually extend the scope of its rights,
+obligations, duties and privileges, and a more cautious school. The more
+cautious would not necessarily, as Griffith believes, be protecting traditional
+privileges against reform, but much more generally be restricting legal
+intervention in life to the clearly intended minimum of legislators, both
+parliamentary and judicial. The 'extensionists' might be likened to social
+engineers, eager to solve as many problems and disputes as possible by
+extension of legal machinery, largely irrespective of the particular sides they
+favoured. The 'restrictionists', however, would be more conservative, being
+dubious of human potential to legislate solutions in general, and keen to keep
+tricky cases and problems out of the law.
+
+TABLE 16 Voting of Lords Reid and Morris According to 'Restrictive v.
+Extensive' Interpretation
+
+Lord Reid Lord Morris
+
+No. of votes for the 'restrictive' 13 3
+interpretation of a legal problem (68%) (I6%)
+No. of votes for the 'extensive' 6 i6
+interpretation of a legal problem (32%) (84%)
+Total i9 I9
+(I00oo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 10-795, Probability o-ooI
+
+In one Wilberforce took a 'strict construction' approach in order to uphold
+the intention of Parliament to allow a Water Authority to levy rates, in the
+other he took a 'liberal' line to protect an immigrant from deportation.
+Dilhorne reversed his 'methodology' in the other direction, in order to relieve
+the rate payer and to support the Home Office against the immigrant.
+Griffith helps make this point. In commenting on the Race Relations cases,
+he attacks the minimizing interpretation of the Act,
+the alternative view does not found itself on this individualistic position, does not think
+primarily of private rights. It makes other assumptions. It seeks to interpret the Race
+Relations Act in a way which will extend its operation and not restict it ... It regards
+racial discrimination not as an individual right but as a social wrong41
+
+although I doubt whether he means the point to be taken in quite this fashion.
+He argues that the Lords should have chosen to interpret the meaning of 'the
+public or a section of the public' in such a way as to extend, rather than
+restrict, the scope of the Act.
+One can see that a very general distinction might exist between those who
+believe that statutes and precedents should, in general, be pushed to their
+logical conclusions, that law should continually extend the scope of its rights,
+obligations, duties and privileges, and a more cautious school. The more
+cautious would not necessarily, as Griffith believes, be protecting traditional
+privileges against reform, but much more generally be restricting legal
+intervention in life to the clearly intended minimum of legislators, both
+parliamentary and judicial. The 'extensionists' might be likened to social
+engineers, eager to solve as many problems and disputes as possible by
+extension of legal machinery, largely irrespective of the particular sides they
+favoured. The 'restrictionists', however, would be more conservative, being
+dubious of human potential to legislate solutions in general, and keen to keep
+tricky cases and problems out of the law.
+
+TABLE 16 Voting of Lords Reid and Morris According to 'Restrictive v.
+Extensive' Interpretation
+
+Lord Reid Lord Morris
+
+No. of votes for the 'restrictive' 13 3
+interpretation of a legal problem (68%) (I6%)
+No. of votes for the 'extensive' 6 i6
+interpretation of a legal problem (32%) (84%)
+Total i9 I9
+(I00oo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 10-795, Probability o-ooI
+
+In one Wilberforce took a 'strict construction' approach in order to uphold
+the intention of Parliament to allow a Water Authority to levy rates, in the
+other he took a 'liberal' line to protect an immigrant from deportation.
+Dilhorne reversed his 'methodology' in the other direction, in order to relieve
+the rate payer and to support the Home Office against the immigrant.
+Griffith helps make this point. In commenting on the Race Relations cases,
+he attacks the minimizing interpretation of the Act,
+the alternative view does not found itself on this individualistic position, does not think
+primarily of private rights. It makes other assumptions. It seeks to interpret the Race
+Relations Act in a way which will extend its operation and not restict it ... It regards
+racial discrimination not as an individual right but as a social wrong41
+
+although I doubt whether he means the point to be taken in quite this fashion.
+He argues that the Lords should have chosen to interpret the meaning of 'the
+public or a section of the public' in such a way as to extend, rather than
+restrict, the scope of the Act.
+One can see that a very general distinction might exist between those who
+believe that statutes and precedents should, in general, be pushed to their
+logical conclusions, that law should continually extend the scope of its rights,
+obligations, duties and privileges, and a more cautious school. The more
+cautious would not necessarily, as Griffith believes, be protecting traditional
+privileges against reform, but much more generally be restricting legal
+intervention in life to the clearly intended minimum of legislators, both
+parliamentary and judicial. The 'extensionists' might be likened to social
+engineers, eager to solve as many problems and disputes as possible by
+extension of legal machinery, largely irrespective of the particular sides they
+favoured. The 'restrictionists', however, would be more conservative, being
+dubious of human potential to legislate solutions in general, and keen to keep
+tricky cases and problems out of the law.
+
+TABLE 16 Voting of Lords Reid and Morris According to 'Restrictive v.
+Extensive' Interpretation
+
+Lord Reid Lord Morris
+
+No. of votes for the 'restrictive' 13 3
+interpretation of a legal problem (68%) (I6%)
+No. of votes for the 'extensive' 6 i6
+interpretation of a legal problem (32%) (84%)
+Total i9 I9
+(I00oo%) (IOO%)
+Chi Square 10-795, Probability o-ooI
+
+I wish to claim that such a distinction may well underlie, although not
+totally explain, the results in the previous analysis. It can only be proved by
+41 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. 90.
+
+I wish to claim that such a distinction may well underlie, although not
+totally explain, the results in the previous analysis. It can only be proved by
+41 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. 90.
+
+I wish to claim that such a distinction may well underlie, although not
+totally explain, the results in the previous analysis. It can only be proved by
+41 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, p. 90.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords 25
+
+research of some subtlety, involving a complex coding of many cases that has
+as yet not been undertaken. However, I can not only argue that it would
+make sense of the previous findings, but also indicate its plausibility in Table
+I6. So delicate a categorization as between 'extensive' and 'restrictive' coding
+of the central intent of cases cannot easily be done for many judges, so I
+discuss only one pair of judges, amongst the most active for the period
+covered here, Lords Reid and Morris. More narrowly still, I consider only
+nineteen randomly chosen non-unanimous cases that they both heard, which I
+could categorize in terms of which side was pushing an 'extensive' interpretation
+and which a 'restrictive' interpretation of the law. Reid was the leading
+member of Group A during the 'early' court, i.e., those less prosecutionminded
+but also more statist and more 'power prone' in the ordinary civil
+cases. Morris was the longest serving member of Group B, hearing more
+cases than any Law Lord after Reid. Table I6 shows that a restrictive/
+extensive distinction accounts very well indeed for this group difference. Of
+the nineteen cases, Reid voted for the 'restrictive' interpretation thirteen
+times, while Morris voted for the 'extensive' argument sixteen times; Reid fits
+the pattern 68 per cent of the time, Morris 84 per cent. Alternatively, only
+nine out of thirty-eight (24 per cent) of their decisions do not fit.
+A suggestion as pregnant for the understanding of discretionary judgement
+as this, largely because it is uncontroversial and orthodox, will not be
+accepted without much more sophisticated, probably non-statistical, evidence.
+Nor should it be. I would argue, however, that a serious case has been
+made out for the existence, in Britain, of a specifically judicial ideology, in
+part characterized by the Criminal Justice and Public Law dimensions
+demonstrated above, and in part explained by a deeper distinction, a
+systematically maintained choice between extending and restricting the
+general scope of law.
+Naturally there is very much more to do before this style of analysis has
+proved itself. It needs to be extended to other courts, to more areas of law,
+and to other possible restrictions on decisions. Two overwhelming questions
+stand out, each capable of solution by jurimetrics of this type. The first is
+about discretion. Just how much do judges think there is? Where and why
+does it appear? Much has been written in general terms about this, but we
+have little systematic evidence, without which we cannot properly estimate
+the relevance of the research presented here. The second question is more
+properly one for political science. We can hardly believe that the views of all
+judges are equally important in influencing their brethren; but who are the
+more influential, and why, we cannot yet say, although once again a
+jurimetric approach could say quite a lot. For the moment one dares to say
+that there does appear to exist the sort of ideology, with the sort of
+consequences, that our basic premises outline.
+
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords 25
+
+research of some subtlety, involving a complex coding of many cases that has
+as yet not been undertaken. However, I can not only argue that it would
+make sense of the previous findings, but also indicate its plausibility in Table
+I6. So delicate a categorization as between 'extensive' and 'restrictive' coding
+of the central intent of cases cannot easily be done for many judges, so I
+discuss only one pair of judges, amongst the most active for the period
+covered here, Lords Reid and Morris. More narrowly still, I consider only
+nineteen randomly chosen non-unanimous cases that they both heard, which I
+could categorize in terms of which side was pushing an 'extensive' interpretation
+and which a 'restrictive' interpretation of the law. Reid was the leading
+member of Group A during the 'early' court, i.e., those less prosecutionminded
+but also more statist and more 'power prone' in the ordinary civil
+cases. Morris was the longest serving member of Group B, hearing more
+cases than any Law Lord after Reid. Table I6 shows that a restrictive/
+extensive distinction accounts very well indeed for this group difference. Of
+the nineteen cases, Reid voted for the 'restrictive' interpretation thirteen
+times, while Morris voted for the 'extensive' argument sixteen times; Reid fits
+the pattern 68 per cent of the time, Morris 84 per cent. Alternatively, only
+nine out of thirty-eight (24 per cent) of their decisions do not fit.
+A suggestion as pregnant for the understanding of discretionary judgement
+as this, largely because it is uncontroversial and orthodox, will not be
+accepted without much more sophisticated, probably non-statistical, evidence.
+Nor should it be. I would argue, however, that a serious case has been
+made out for the existence, in Britain, of a specifically judicial ideology, in
+part characterized by the Criminal Justice and Public Law dimensions
+demonstrated above, and in part explained by a deeper distinction, a
+systematically maintained choice between extending and restricting the
+general scope of law.
+Naturally there is very much more to do before this style of analysis has
+proved itself. It needs to be extended to other courts, to more areas of law,
+and to other possible restrictions on decisions. Two overwhelming questions
+stand out, each capable of solution by jurimetrics of this type. The first is
+about discretion. Just how much do judges think there is? Where and why
+does it appear? Much has been written in general terms about this, but we
+have little systematic evidence, without which we cannot properly estimate
+the relevance of the research presented here. The second question is more
+properly one for political science. We can hardly believe that the views of all
+judges are equally important in influencing their brethren; but who are the
+more influential, and why, we cannot yet say, although once again a
+jurimetric approach could say quite a lot. For the moment one dares to say
+that there does appear to exist the sort of ideology, with the sort of
+consequences, that our basic premises outline.
+
+Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords 25
+
+research of some subtlety, involving a complex coding of many cases that has
+as yet not been undertaken. However, I can not only argue that it would
+make sense of the previous findings, but also indicate its plausibility in Table
+I6. So delicate a categorization as between 'extensive' and 'restrictive' coding
+of the central intent of cases cannot easily be done for many judges, so I
+discuss only one pair of judges, amongst the most active for the period
+covered here, Lords Reid and Morris. More narrowly still, I consider only
+nineteen randomly chosen non-unanimous cases that they both heard, which I
+could categorize in terms of which side was pushing an 'extensive' interpretation
+and which a 'restrictive' interpretation of the law. Reid was the leading
+member of Group A during the 'early' court, i.e., those less prosecutionminded
+but also more statist and more 'power prone' in the ordinary civil
+cases. Morris was the longest serving member of Group B, hearing more
+cases than any Law Lord after Reid. Table I6 shows that a restrictive/
+extensive distinction accounts very well indeed for this group difference. Of
+the nineteen cases, Reid voted for the 'restrictive' interpretation thirteen
+times, while Morris voted for the 'extensive' argument sixteen times; Reid fits
+the pattern 68 per cent of the time, Morris 84 per cent. Alternatively, only
+nine out of thirty-eight (24 per cent) of their decisions do not fit.
+A suggestion as pregnant for the understanding of discretionary judgement
+as this, largely because it is uncontroversial and orthodox, will not be
+accepted without much more sophisticated, probably non-statistical, evidence.
+Nor should it be. I would argue, however, that a serious case has been
+made out for the existence, in Britain, of a specifically judicial ideology, in
+part characterized by the Criminal Justice and Public Law dimensions
+demonstrated above, and in part explained by a deeper distinction, a
+systematically maintained choice between extending and restricting the
+general scope of law.
+Naturally there is very much more to do before this style of analysis has
+proved itself. It needs to be extended to other courts, to more areas of law,
+and to other possible restrictions on decisions. Two overwhelming questions
+stand out, each capable of solution by jurimetrics of this type. The first is
+about discretion. Just how much do judges think there is? Where and why
+does it appear? Much has been written in general terms about this, but we
+have little systematic evidence, without which we cannot properly estimate
+the relevance of the research presented here. The second question is more
+properly one for political science. We can hardly believe that the views of all
+judges are equally important in influencing their brethren; but who are the
+more influential, and why, we cannot yet say, although once again a
+jurimetric approach could say quite a lot. For the moment one dares to say
+that there does appear to exist the sort of ideology, with the sort of
+consequences, that our basic premises outline.
+
+This content downloaded from 194.29.185.42 on Fri, 9 May 2014 10:06:58 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
\ No newline at end of file
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+www.ssoar.info
+
+Quantification and objectivity: from statistical
+conventions to social conventions
+Salais, Robert
+
+Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
+Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
+
+Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
+GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
+
+Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
+Salais, R. (2016). Quantification and objectivity: from statistical conventions to social conventions. Historical Social
+Research, 41(2), 118-134. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.41.2016.2.118-134
+
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+Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
+https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-468702
+Historical Social Research 41 (2016) 2, 118-134 │© GESIS
+DOI: 10.12759/hsr.41.2016.2.118-134
+
+Quantification and Objectivity. From Statistical
+Conventions to Social Conventions
+
+Robert Salais∗
+
+Abstract: »Quantifizierung und Objektivität. Von statistischen Konventionen zu
+sozialen Konventionen«. Standard quantification processes and most often their
+analysis are derived from statistics’ technique and approach. Social conventions
+are at the core of daily life, practical knowledge and coordination between people;
+statistical conventions are at the heart of cognitive activities developed by
+statisticians. What does quantification mean when addressed from the wider
+point of view of social conventions? This article analyzes the differences between
+social and statistical conventions. It enlarges the concept of objectivity in having
+recourse to the lenses of the plurality of worlds as defined by the economics of
+convention (EC), and to the concept of the informational basis of judgement in
+justice introduced by Amartya Sen. A wider conception of quantification processes
+in the social world can thus be elaborated, which opens fresh views on what
+become, in these processes, the concepts of facts and democracy.
+Keywords: Quantification, conventions, statistics, worlds, plurality, informational
+basis, judgment in justice, facts, democracy.
+
+1. Introduction
+
+In his article in Historical Social Research 37 (1), Alain Desrosières (2011) has
+shown how deeply the economics of convention (in short EC) is historically
+rooted in research on the history of statistical conventions and categories. Are
+statistical conventions of measurement nonetheless of the same nature as the
+social conventions people have recourse to coordinate in daily situations of life
+and work? Or do they delineate two separate universes that intersect only fortuitously?
+Such questions are all the more important as standard quantification
+processes, and most often their analysis, are both derived from statistics’ technique
+and approach. Social conventions are at the core of daily life, practical
+knowledge and coordination between people; statistical conventions are at the
+heart of cognitive activities developed by statisticians. Hence, what does quantification
+mean when addressed from the wider point of view of social conventions?∗
+Robert Salais, IDHES ENS-Cachan, 61 avenue du Président Wilson, 94235 Cachan Cedex,
+France; rsalais@wanadoo.fr.
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 119
+
+In this article, I try to develop that wider view on quantification processes in
+taking inspiration from the EC. In Section 2, I review the status of objectivity
+in a few of the canonical works of sociology of quantification. In Section 3, I
+more in-depth analyze the differences between social and statistical conventions.
+Then, in Section 4, I enlarge the concept of objectivity in having recourse
+to the lenses of the plurality of worlds as defined by the EC, and to the concept
+of the informational basis of judgement in justice introduced by Amartya Sen.
+In Section 5, I list the main characteristics of quantification processes on which
+to look from such a combined point of view, mixing the economics of convention
+and Sen’s developments.
+So let me begin by briefly presenting the two universes of social versus statistical
+conventions. I will come back to them in Section 3. Social conventions
+allow us to coordinate with others, to form mutual expectations, to understand
+each other without even having to think about it beforehand, and explain to
+others the purport of what we are going to do, without ex ante negotiating a
+contract, without external rules embedded into institutions and dictating our
+behavior. Systems of conventions shared by people create worlds in which
+people mutually consider they live and act together. These worlds are not “real”
+in the positivist sense. They are real in the sense that coordinating people
+give the elements of these worlds compatible meanings and verify the likelihood
+of these meanings by the fact they successfully achieve their undertakings
+and projects. There is a plurality of such worlds of variable scope based on
+different principles. As social beings in our daily life, we are moving from one
+world to another, depending of the activity, the people, the situation at stake.
+They are not at all immutable worlds forever. They arise and re-arise again in
+situations by being generated via mutual expectations and coordination between
+people. They are for people more or less implicit or reflexively explicit
+depending of events and hazards. Though they are not – properly speaking –
+substantial, these worlds left interpretable traces, either material, cognitive, or
+symbolic in the situations. To what extent can all these very diverse common
+worlds we just spoke about be relevantly subject to standard quantification
+processes, applying statistical techniques?
+To have a preliminary view of what statistical conventions are, open any
+publication by a statistician. You will always find, at the beginning or in a byside
+insert, a series of methodological precautions. These tell the reader the
+detailed procedures and categories that have been employed, what they allow to
+say and not to say when interpreting them. The fact that the right procedures
+are followed serves as proof that data is correct. Publishing the methodology is
+supposed to guarantee the reproducibility: anybody who would try to reproduce
+the methodology would arrive at the same outcome. Doing so, statisticians are
+applying the procedural objectivity as employed in scientific research. Is this
+type of objectivity valuable for quantifying processes of social life? Do “ordinary”
+people have recourse on this type of objectivity when deploying social
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 120
+
+conventions? Or do they put into action other objectivities? These are the issues
+I will first consider.
+
+2. Scientific Objectivity and Social Conventions
+
+Approaches of quantification processes have begun in the Anglo-Saxon world
+in the more general field of sociology of sciences. The Anglo-Saxon world, its
+social actors, and researchers, are characterized by its focusing on a specific
+conception of objectivity, that of scientific objectivity as first developed in
+Britain by the very influential scientist Francis Bacon.
+I have immersed myself in a series of articles on objectivity that I had collected,
+promising myself to read them one day. These articles come from special
+issues from Annals of Scholarship published in 1992 that included work by
+noted researchers in the field of sociology of quantification, such as Lorraine
+Daston, Theodore Porter, and Peter Miller.1
+ I find that the predominant notions
+and practices in the Anglo-Saxon world can be summarized by their strong
+historical reliance on a specific concept of “facts.” Any knowledge is not
+“fact.” To become fact, knowledge should be detached both from the context of
+observation in which facts were generated and from contemporary theoretical
+controversies (that are relegated to the rank of ideologies). If so, such facts
+could be said as objective, which means that such facts become entirely selfsufficient
+as incontrovertible truths. They owe nothing to the turbulence of
+ideological debates or the specificities of the field of observation. So they must
+prevail in the discussion.
+
+2.1 From Baconian Objectivity to Modern “Evidence”
+
+The above posture, very influential over time, is that adopted by Francis Bacon in
+the 17th century, in opposition to Aristotle and the scholastics. Lorraine Daston
+has followed the posterity of this position through the debates it raised over time
+within the scientific community (Daston 1992). It is worth briefly recalling in
+what system of beliefs Bacon has embedded his conception of objectivity.
+Frank and Fritzie Manuel (1976) remind us that, among many writings, Bacon
+was the author of a utopia, The New Atlantis (Bacon 1951). The major
+institution of Atlantis was a college of 36 scientists-priests called the Elders.
+Their mission – an action program obeying to a very centralized organization –
+was to monitor in Atlantis the development of science toward innovation and
+the accumulation of scientific knowledge. This so-called Solomon’s House was
+independent both from the state and from the people. Elders decided what
+inventions and experiments should be made public and which should not, and
+
+1
+ See Allan Megill, ed. (1992, 1994).
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 121
+
+also when to impart secret inventions to the state. “The end of our foundation is
+the knowledge of the causes, and secret motion of things; and the enlarging of
+the human Empire, to the effecting of all possible things” (Bacon 1951, 288).
+The methodology was based on the repetition of the same experiments under
+different conditions (what are called today experimental designs). Outcomes
+were discussed by the college and new experiments decided. Some Elders,
+called the “Interpreters,” were in charge to “distill from all the experiments
+general observations and axioms” (Manuel and Manuel 1979, 258). One recognizes
+the experimental, science-based objectivity of the concept of “facts” as
+above defined.
+The other dimension of the objectivity of “facts,” independence from ideology,
+has been today amputated from its Baconian religious connotation. Bacon
+was concerned not to sully science by human emotions and, above all, that
+scientists “do not presume by the contemplation of nature to attain to the mysteries
+of God” (Bacon 1951, 6). Indeed, the scientist had a religious duty to
+inquire into God’s creation and to force nature to yield up in works all the
+potentialities inherent in creation (in other terms all that had ever been there,
+waiting for its discovery). But the objective of science for Bacon was accumulation
+of knowledge through the contemplation of nature, not accumulation of
+capital through the exploitation of nature. This (fragile) preservation of nature
+proceeds for Bacon from its God creation.
+In the long run, this concept of “fact” has been refurbished without losing its
+key foundations. Today, minus religion-based ethics, plus quantitative efficiency
+(the search of what works),2
+ the same ideal of objectivity is called “evidence.”
+Evidence remains something on which everybody should agree without
+discussion whatever his political, social, or theoretical position, and that can be
+extracted without cognitive damage from the singularities of the empirical
+observation. Evidence is not pre-given; it should be built through procedures
+that possess the property of objectivity.
+In matters of scientific knowledge, the possibility of relying on this type of
+objectivity is dependent on the experimental protocol that must be as rigorous,
+verifiable, and reproducible by a third party as is possible. As emphasized by
+Allan Megill in his introduction, the underlying objectivity is procedural (Megill
+1992). As long as the procedure is followed, the result obtained belongs to
+a sphere that is neither that which is true or just, but the unfalsifiable. It will
+remain valid until another researcher posits another theory and shows, using a
+methodology of the same nature, that in fact there should have been a different
+understanding of the same reality, that there are other properties and forces at
+work. And even then, the figures will be established along similar types of
+procedures.
+
+2
+ Search of what works is now the matter of a myriad of books in the Anglo-Saxon literature,
+both scientific and popular.
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 122
+
+In such a methodological posture, quantification is sought, not merely for the
+additional information it provides, but mostly to bring the incontrovertible procedural
+proof that one is right. Could what is valid in scientific matters be transferred
+as such to social life (not to speak of the controversies on such issue in
+hard sciences also)? If so, “facts,” even those related to human and social affairs,
+should thus be abstracted from the social conventions of their time and population.
+This pretention is highly contestable, as we will see below.
+
+2.2 The Use of Evidence in Quantification in Bureaucratic and
+Managerial Circles
+Observing Anglo-Saxon bureaucratic and managerial circles, Theodore Porter
+(1992) and Peter Miller (1992) conclude that, in these circles, the force of
+quantification lies in its reliance on the objectivity of figures and the intangibility
+of the bureaucratic and managerial rules that underlie their constitution. The
+objectivity of figures is based on arithmetic, and therefore cannot be contested:
+4 is larger than 3; a drop from 100 to 80 is a 20% reduction. The intangibility
+of the rules is due to the fact that they are rationally grounded and have been
+rigorously established to achieve a certain sort of optimum balance, both social
+and economic.3
+Procedural objectivity has another property, “politically” interesting to
+transport into the social domain. It is impartial. The subject of this type of
+quantification cannot complain of partiality, and conversely can argue that s/he
+has not profited from any special treatment. Neither injustice nor favoritism,
+this type of quantification instruments a particular conception of justice, the
+justice based on objective equality of treatment. These two authors suggest the
+ways in which – in this social context of objectivity – figures can be appropriately
+manipulated and have the power to transform practices, behavior, and
+thinking. As Miller puts it, the proponents of corporate accounting (in this case
+analytical accounting) are driven by the utopian desire to “form” a new man, in
+the strongest sense, of giving shape and – almost – life. Such a new man would
+think and act according to the dictates of performance prescribed by accounting.
+He could not imagine any other way of being. For he has been convinced
+that the world created for him is efficient (privileging performance) and just
+(treating individuals equally). This world espouses values that this individual
+recognizes: talent, merit, and responsibility.
+Procedural objectivity of that type is based on standardization, on the belief
+that, whatever the complexity, diversity, and singularities of circumstances, it is
+always possible to put somebody in a given case of a statistical table at the
+crossing of some general nomenclatures without losing any relevant piece of
+information.
+
+3
+ This conception of “rule” can be found in John Rawls (1955).
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 123
+
+2.3 The Impossible Transposition in Social Life
+
+However, things are not so simple, for the transposition in social life of procedural
+objectivity is precisely a utopia. It does not work for every case or all
+circumstances. When is it relevant and when is it not are questions that cannot
+be eliminated without the risk of social or cognitive damage. To take this example,
+the film “Welfare” by Frederick Wiseman, devoted to a welfare office
+in the United States, illustrates the conflict, very painful for both parties, that
+arises when a request for aid that would be justified in terms of social justice
+based on the welfare of persons does not fit into the framework defined by the
+system of rules. The employee is caught between the desire to do the right
+thing, and the impossibility of satisfying the demand. And the applicant cannot
+achieve a just resolution of his case.
+Does such a situation, apparently unsolvable, mean the impossibility to
+overcome the conflict or does it simply signal that there could exist other ways to
+define the problem, other worlds of quantification, and types of objectivity than
+those based on standardized impartiality? In such a situation, debating and convincing
+other participants that one is right is inconceivable for individuals because
+their claims are facing a complex, standardized, and powerful machinery, a
+multilevel system of rules which produce the data and the final yes or no judgment.
+Are there nevertheless worlds, in the sense recalled in the introduction, in
+which social justice could be achieved in being founded on other principles?
+The way to overcome the blockade and to understand what is at work is to decode
+the entire chain that has produced the data. Only professionals of statistics
+have the capability to do so, if not the will. If it is done – and Alain Desrosières
+and Laurent Thévenot were pioneers of such an undertaking (Desrosières 2008;
+Thévenot 1984) –, it would publicly appear a series of rules of classification and
+measurement that, taken one by one, are in no way scientific axioms. They are
+socially determined in the sense that other choices would have been possible
+that would have led to another frame and judgment. In the illustrations from
+Wiseman, it could have appeared for instance that both the applicant and the
+employee had another principle of justice in mind, hence other ways of classifying
+and quantifying that would have achieved an agreement. One of the reasons
+could be that they know by their experience of life that, in this instance,
+using a minimum income threshold to decide whether to help or not was not
+relevant. For the specific case, the right issue was to provide the claimant with
+a decent housing that he cannot obtain on the market. The market was functioning
+on the basis of conventions, i.e. mutual expectations, like exhibiting individual
+responsibility, having a secure job, inspiring trust, etc. But, as these
+conventions are not taken on board by the rules of the welfare system, no adequate
+solution could be found.
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 124
+
+3. When and Where Could Statistical and Social
+Conventions Meet?
+
+We will pass here in review the specificities of statistical versus social conventions,
+and then consider how they could meet. The main difference between
+statistical and social conventions is basically that the former are rules, not
+conventions; only the latter can be labelled as conventions.
+
+3.1 Statistical Conventions
+
+Statistical conventions are not conventions in the sense of expectations mutually
+agreed among people, but rules. These rules have been pondered at length in
+keeping with forms borrowed from science, and aim for objectivity and incontrovertibility.
+They create standard categories (which then allow general statements
+detached from elementary observation) by treating as equivalent all
+people, or answers to questionnaires that possess the same general property. As
+they are built for the long run, they have also their own temporalities that do
+not correspond to social temporalities.
+Statistical conventions are built with reference to a founding scene: the configuration
+as defined by Norbert Elias (1973) in which the person is subject to
+questioning and is called upon to answer. These conventions are meant to construct
+and equip this scene adequately to reach the expected ends. We can
+speak of injunction because the person who is questioned faces (just like in a
+company) a vast institutional system embedded in the mechanisms, rules, and
+components of the scene, and hence enters a power relationship. This is clear in
+administrative statistics, for example the production of data that goes along
+with the daily operation of the welfare office, but is also more subtly present
+for the person being questioned for a population census or a survey.
+Likewise, the general categories that underlie equivalence, according to
+Alain Desrosières (Desrosières 1998) (or commensurability, in the words of
+Wendy Espeland; see Espeland and Stevens 1998), and the observation methods
+deployed to implement them are elaborated, criticized, and revised in the
+professional spheres of statistics, accounting, or law. In these spheres, the discussion
+about which rules to choose and the choices to be made cannot totally
+escape from some observation on what is going on in society and the conventions
+at work. But the aim is that – once established – these rules can go their
+own way. So, the dynamic relationship between statistical and social conventions
+in a given society is complex and even unpredictable. Both systems borrow
+to each other, but at the same time they differ and sometimes even can take
+distance from each other.
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 125
+
+3.2 Social Conventions
+
+Social conventions also partake of cognition. That cognition, however, is the
+one of ordinary people, focusing on common situations, not of professionals of
+cognition. It arises not in a statistical scene centered on responding, but in daily
+life where action must be coordinated with others. At the difference of scientific
+or rational cognition which aims at producing explicit formal knowledge,
+the finalities of “daily” cognition are practical, even better, pragmatic. It is
+consequently centered on acting, precisely on the relevant acting that will produce
+the expected outcomes for people.
+For EC, it follows from these characteristics that ordinary action always has
+three interrelated moments: a cognitive moment, a normative moment and a
+pragmatic one.
+These moments, most of the time, are never considered as such either in statistics
+or in quantification processes. These moments are, however, essential to
+understand. In practice, they emerge in the instant and locus of the action (in
+other terms in the situation) and are indexed to these instant and locus. They
+are also dynamically articulated. The cognitive moment brings forth what “suffices”
+to know in the pragmatic moment (whose aim is the successful completion
+of the coordination). What to pragmatically know in the situation is linked
+to the normative moment. Conventions are also practical norms other people
+expect you will refer to in your action. So, they are not purely pragmatic in the
+usual sense, but they convey a notion of justice. It follows, for the EC, that the
+normative moment mobilizes individual conceptions about the fair treatment
+people expect from others during the coordination. Expectations on fair treatment
+allow people to select in their environment the relevant information, to
+interpret the behaviors and intentions of other people, and to guide his own
+action. The coupling of the three moments leads to success or to failure of the
+engaged coordination.
+
+3.3 When and Where Could Statistical and Social Conventions
+Converge?
+We have already noticed that the establishment of statistical conventions needs
+to be somewhat connected to social reality. If not, if they are too far away from
+daily understandings of that reality by people; the data processed from people’s
+answers would produce an information, mostly irrelevant for political purposes.
+In case of unemployment for instance, at least in France at the turn of the 20th
+century, women at work in homework (5 or 6 million), or peasants having at
+the same time an industrial job did not understand a situation of no work as
+unemployment in the modern sense (Salais, Baverez and Reynaud 1999). This
+situation was understood as part of normal life. Homework, for instance, had its
+off seasons with no orders. So, when questioned in a census, homeworkers did
+not produce answers leading to be classified as unemployed.
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 126
+
+But it also can work in the other way. The diffusion in public policies of
+general categories may in the long run induce a shifting of “indigenous” understandings
+of social situation and lead not to identity, but to convergence towards
+statistical conceptions. It depends of other economic, social, or political transformations.
+In France, again for unemployment, from the 1970s onwards, women
+looking for a job began to register at public employment offices. In so doing, they
+adhered in practice to the official statistical definition of unemployment and were
+included in official statistics. It led to an increase of the number of unemployed
+people that was somewhat artificial because it was not linked to any fall of the
+level of employment.
+Such reciprocal moves are unpredictable. It could or could not occur. As
+Bénédicte Zimmermann (2001, 2006) demonstrates, the move toward a general
+and generally admitted category of unemployment proved impossible in Germany.
+The plurality of social worlds (see the next section) was so resilient that
+still today several regimes of employment, hence several understanding of what
+means to be unemployed cohabitate in Germany.
+
+4. Worlds and their Informational Bases of Judgment in
+Justice
+
+The problems with the articles on quantification mentioned above are, firstly,
+their tendency to limit the person to the rational individual, and secondly, the
+failure to take plurality into due consideration. They rightly described the conceptions
+of quantification in Anglo-American administrations and enterprises,
+but cannot ground any relevant critics. These limitations must be surpassed in
+order for research to fully grasp social processes of quantification. That is what
+EC can take on board by focusing on social conventions.
+As individuals are social beings embedded into networks of affiliations and
+activities, they are able to differentiate different worlds in the meaning we
+provided in the introduction and to which we will come below. They are able to
+think and act within them by practicing the system of conventions relevant in
+the world in which – in the situation under progress – they consider to be.
+Hence, they have the capability to take distance from and to be critical against
+quantification processes they believe inadequate to their conception of the
+evaluated domain of activity or to their values. Any scientific approach of
+quantification processes should fully integrate these facts. It is no more possible
+to view the diversity of practices by the unique lens of objectivity as evidence,
+impartial objective justice and standardization of data. One should be
+open to other elaborations that obey to the above principles.
+To succeed requires working at the crossing of two fields of research, that of
+the plurality of worlds already labored by EC and that of the informational
+bases of judgement on justice (IBJJ) as developed by Amartya Sen in his capa-
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 127
+
+bility approach. We first remind the plurality of worlds as conceived by EC,
+and then, make the bridge with the Sen’s IBJJ.4
+
+4.1 The Plurality of Worlds and their Conception of Objectivity
+and Justice
+The “plurality of worlds” hypothesis and its empirical description are running
+all along EC’s research process, especially in Eymard-Duvernay (1989),
+Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), and Salais and Storper (1993, 1997).5
+ Through
+various elaborations, all these works converge towards the same basic axioms
+and outcomes.
+As stated in the introduction, systems of conventions give access to a plurality
+of worlds. In Salais and Storper (1997) we distinguished four of these
+worlds: the industrial world, the interpersonal world, the market world, and the
+intellectual world – plus combinations between them. Let us here only focus of
+their conception of objectivity and justice.6
+The industrial world is congruent with objectivity as evidence, for its organization
+and functioning are based on systematic standardization of products, of
+industrial processes, of work and individual identification, of measurement, of
+performance reduced to quantitative variables. The industrial world takes the
+evidence exhibited by numbers as a general principle to direct evaluation. No
+aspect of the reality at stake can escape to such processes of rising into generality.
+No singularity is capable of resisting such generalization and equivalence
+or to serve to support for criticism. In the industrial world, the particular is
+expressed only as an example, an application of the general model. It does not
+signal the presence of another world in the situation, though this might appear
+beneath the surface during the coding of elementary operations (Thévenot
+1983). This is the price to pay in order to establish the impersonal impartiality
+of a quantitative observation of the situation, which is the sole conception of
+justice making social and economic coordination possible in that world. But
+there are other worlds, such as the interpersonal world and the market world. In
+the interpersonal world, coordination is based upon durable personal relationships.
+People have an in-depth knowledge of the others coming from familiarity
+acquired through proximities. To coordinate in a given situation does not
+have to rely on quantification. It mostly requires spontaneous forms of understanding
+of the situation based on familiarity and experience. In the market
+world, quantification is of interest only because it reveals the degree of competition
+between individuals and, more generally, between participants in the
+market. It helps to make ratings and scorings along price and cost comparisons,
+
+4
+ See also Salais (2015).
+5
+ See, for an in-depth presentation in German, Diaz-Bone (2015). 6
+ For a detailed presentation see Salais and Storper (1993), Storper and Salais (1997).
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 128
+
+to discover the best offer or the best demand, to build anticipations on the futures.
+Basically, the ideal-type of quantification for all markets in the market
+world is made of the series of indicators that enable stock markets to make
+conjectures about the shares of all sorts that are bought and sold.
+More generally, in the compromises that prevail between these worlds and
+the industrial world, quantification can be useful at certain levels of aggregation,
+but not at more “local” levels. And the question of what not to quantify
+becomes a key issue for achieving such compromises. There is no need to
+quantify everything; as Sen said, “description is choice” (Sen 1980). In other
+terms: quantifying is at the same time submitting people to evaluation, hence to
+control, and trying to guide their actions. Not to quantify implies to decide,
+whatever the way to do so, what type and scope of freedom, and into what
+domain have to be left to people, especially as markers of trust.
+
+4.2 Sen and the Informational Basis for Judgment in Justice
+
+So, we must look beyond the sociology of science-based quantification to elaborate
+the theoretical foundations of the plurality of modes of quantification,
+based on the plurality of worlds, and thereby the plurality of social forms of
+knowledge. Amartya Sen’s works on capability and the informational basis of
+judgement in justice (IBJJ) are offering the basis for a wider and more relevant
+theoretical framework on which to build. Sen – in an entirely different intellectual
+domain: the theories of justice – broaches the dimension of justice in its
+double dimension of “correctness” and of “fairness.” The originality of Sen,
+compared to Arrow or Rawls, is his insistence on the informational basis of
+judgement in justice, which, in a democracy, defines the content and mechanisms
+of collective choice. In his theoretical treatment of collective choices,
+Sen maintains the need for objective evaluation of the individuals and their
+social positions, as opposed to the dominant procedural current of ordinal ranking.
+The knowledge of social reality, of its substance, should be the object of a
+collective building of knowledge, not only the ranking between situations or
+individuals.
+Such introduction of fairness issues radically transforms theoretical and
+practical approaches to quantification in the social world. Firstly, it renders
+explicit the normative dimension of any quantification process, which legitimates
+the need of public discussion and democratic deliberation on choices initially
+considered as purely technical and to be left to technicians and experts. Secondly,
+it enriches the concept of “facts,” making factuality and knowledge a collective
+elaboration where all stakeholders interested in the domain under review have to
+participate. Suddenly, John Dewey and his concerns about inquiry, the constitutions
+of publics, and people’s participation become parts of the fields of research
+and of collective action. Far from to be isolated against social conventions and
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 129
+
+against the singularity of situations, facts, to be rightly and correctly elaborated,
+require taking into account social conventions and singularities.
+Sen introduces, in effect, a fascinating concept for research on and practices
+of quantification, that of factual territory. Let us first quote Sen:
+The informational basis of a judgment identifies the information on which the
+judgment is directly dependent and – no less important – asserts that the truth
+or falsehood of any other type of information cannot directly influence the
+correctness of the judgment. The informational basis of judgments of justice
+thus determines the factual territory over which considerations of justice
+would directly apply (Sen 1990, 111).7
+A factual territory for a given issue at whatever level is composed of all the
+information which is, no more no less, necessary and sufficient to achieve the
+two criteria of correctness and fairness for the decision to build and the choice
+to make. For the same situation, depending of the world to which people consider
+belonging (or of the compromises between), several factual territories can
+be built for the same issue and a choice so offered to the democratic debate.
+The last – but not least – advantage to the concept of IBJJ is that the relevant
+information is not limited to quantities. This helps to have a wider look at
+quantification processes, notably at the selection of facts to be quantified and
+how, of those which are not. It helps to be aware of the normativity embedded
+into technical choices and to reveal it.
+Without harking back to the canons of Arrow or Rawls, let us say that in
+theories of justice, the problem of democratic choice is to achieve an optimal
+outcome, according to two criteria to fulfil:
+1) All individuals feel that they occupy the right place and have their claims
+taken into account, because they find the necessary resources and, according
+to Sen, the capabilities to conduct the life that they value.
+2) This optimal outcome is attained through democratic deliberation between
+individuals in which each and all have been able to participate, express their
+claims and have them heard by others. Collective agreement is possibly only
+under these twin conditions. So, it is a matter of collectively reaching a state
+of common knowledge that is just, i.e. both correct and fair.
+
+5. Implications for Research on Quantification Processes
+
+Of course, few effective processes of quantification obey the whole guidelines
+leading to an IBJJ. But starting from this theoretical framework helps to discover,
+for a given process, which it takes on board and which is missing. So
+doing, one can found both: a relevant critique and a search for alternatives. To
+
+7
+ The two emphases on the word “directly” are from Sen, the one on “factual territory” is
+made by us.
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 130
+
+conclude, we will focus on three issues that make the difference for the analysis
+of quantification between the standard evidence approach and the approach of
+EC: facts, objectivity, and democracy.
+
+5.1 Which Facts?
+
+Coming back to our discussion in Section 2, one should emphasize that the
+facts so engendered – their “factuality,” if one could say – are not at all the
+evidence, so praised in Anglo-Saxon methodologies. The difference concerns
+several points:
+- there are collective judgments on the situation at stake, its issues, and participants,
+not positivist or what-works statements reflecting some pre-existing
+reality, purged from its conventional elements;
+- these judgments constitute cognitive representations in which normative
+concerns are embedded into the choice of cognitive categories and inquiry
+methods;
+- there is a plurality of possible relevant judgments for the same situation and
+issue, depending on the agreement between participants on the relevant
+world (or compromise between worlds).
+
+5.2 Which Objectivity?
+
+The status of objectivity is not, and cannot be, the same for statistical and social
+conventions. The difference comes from the treatment of social justice. At best,
+as we have seen, statistical objectivity can support an instrumental conception
+of justice, equal treatment of quantifying between people, and impersonality.
+But it has not been explicitly searched for.
+Expectations of fair treatment by people in their daily life and work are far
+from being restrained to equal treatment of quantifying. For instance, in a
+world built around personal and durable relations (one can find in neighborhood,
+in family, in small firms, or personal networks), people expect more than
+only impersonal treatment. As they know that others have a true knowledge of
+them, they expect (mutually) to be treated at their value. Not a standard number,
+but a value whose expression is, for the essential, qualitative, unique, and
+even singular as it is closely linked to the situation and to the persons present in
+it. In the market world, people expect as fair treatment to buy and exchange
+goods that satisfy their individual utility, hence the key role they attribute to the
+signals sent by the participants to the market and to their correctness. Only in the
+industrial world built on systematic standardization in all domains could people
+be ready to accept their instrumental reduction to numbers (though not so easily
+because there are here and there always traces of other worlds in any coordination
+built along industrial world’s principles, for instance in wage determination,
+or in tacit expectations from managers that workers compensate by their
+initiatives the failures and hazards that occur in any rational organization).
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 131
+
+So if one endorses the theoretical approach of EC, objectivity should be understood
+as “conventional,” that is an objectivity which is not only correct in
+terms of scientific procedures, but is by the same way based on common expectations
+between the participants with regard to the right principle of justice (or
+the compromise) to refer to. The plurality of objectivities has to be acknowledged,
+each of one being viewed as socially valid, and of equal theoretical and
+practical value. Objectivity should be considered, above all, as a social construct
+at the crossing of correctness (in its usual scientific acceptation) and
+fairness (applying a principle of justice recognized as legitimate in the community
+at stake).
+
+5.3 Which Democracy?
+
+In an EC approach, enriched with Sen’s IBJJ, the theoretical and empirical grid to
+analyze quantification processes should start from the following assumptions:
+- As a social construct, any objective judgment evaluating situations or people
+should be produced, neither from outside, nor from rules chosen by some authority
+or power considering it has some natural a priori legitimacy to do so.
+- Choice has to be “democratic,” with the participation of the evaluated.
+- Even so, these assumptions can be transcribed in several ways, depending of
+the way the leading authority conceives its action and coordination with the
+evaluated and find an agreement with them.
+Following these guidelines to build observations helps to have access to segments
+of reality that are most the time inaccessible to standard approaches. One
+will only develop the last point about the diverse conceptions of authority, for it
+largely remains terra incognita. We had our attention attracted to this issue
+thanks to our approach to the state, developed with Michael Storper (Salais and
+Storper 1993, 326-46). Looking at the diversity of states’ conceptions in Europe
+and in process of the invention of the European Union, it is easy to discover
+traces of different historically-rooted conceptions of central authority and
+its relationship with democratic practices (Salais 2015). There are parallels and
+homologies to establish at a higher level with the worlds we presented in this
+contribution, especially the industrial world, the interpersonal world and the
+market world.
+Remember that a world in our sense is not real in the standard meaning, but
+is a pragmatic world that holds on by the belief, shared by the participants, that
+they belong to that world. So doing, people develop mutual expectations that
+allow them to successfully coordinate. The same could be said of the relationship
+between a central authority and the people under it. Such a relation holds
+and leads to expected outcomes, only and only if both sides share the belief
+they belong to the same world. If not, quantification processes are characterized
+by a lack of consistency, which leads to rational manipulation, cheats, and
+other similar manifestations from both sides. Using a grid based on types of
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 132
+
+authority and of legitimacy so conceived again helps to shed lights on such
+phenomena and to decrypt discourses and attitudes.
+What are the key issues for defining such types of authority and legitimacy?
+is a largely open question. In Salais (2015), with regards to the state, I oppose
+two global conceptions of the relationship expected by both sides.
+1) In the first conception, each side agrees to devolve to the central authority
+the whole task of building the quantification process (modalities, what and
+how to measure). Evaluated people, through their representatives, are asked
+to indicate if they agree the choices made by the central authority. The applied
+procedure is similar to the one which is used in standard representative
+democracy. The question that remains and to be observed is to what extent –
+as they have no true say in it (and are satisfied by such a position) – the
+evaluated people are committed to take the evaluation procedure as their
+practical benchmark.
+2) In the second conception, the authority and the future evaluated people, by
+common agreement, decide to build part or all of the modalities of the procedure,
+including what and how to measure issues. In practice, it requires
+that both sides commit themselves into deliberative procedures which try to
+achieve deliberate decisions. At the difference from strategic decisions, deliberate
+decisions are decisions that both sides have the effective intention to
+apply. One will not go further, except to note the proximities with the concepts
+of subsidiarity and of deliberative democracy. One cannot expect that the central
+authority or the people spontaneously enter in such a demanding cooperative
+process. In his works, John Dewey (1927) has in-depth explored the political
+conditions making such frames of coordination possible. Dewey
+understands democracy as a collective practice led by collective movements
+that struggle for creating what Dewey calls publics, that is people gathering
+together able to defend a cause (common goods for instance) and to build the
+relevant knowledge for implementing this cause. When built along Dewey’s
+lines, democratic quantification processes would bond the authority to implement
+principles of social justice as well as criteria and procedures that would
+have been collectively agreed and tested. Here we have the right format both
+to implement and to make relevant research on quantification.
+
+6. Conclusion
+
+Quantification is plural. One can build several processes of quantification for a
+given social activity. These processes will differ depending of the agreed principle
+of justice among the participants. Such a plurality means that any quantification
+process has to be situated, for the choices of what and how to quantify
+depend of the situation, the activity, the people, and their principles of justice,
+in other terms, the world (or the compromise between different possible
+HSR 41 (2016) 2 │ 133
+
+worlds) they agree they are living together. So, any quantification is at the
+same time an evaluation based on explicit or implicit values. Another consequence
+is that to be not only democratic, but basically correct in terms of representation
+of the reality and fair in terms of justice values, quantification processes
+cannot be built from above and from the external. They should involve,
+from the beginning to the outcome, the people whose activity is the object of
+quantification. Last but not least, one of the key questions often neglected on
+quantification issues is what is worth to quantify and what is worth not to quantify.
+For the sake of efficiency, for instance, it could be better for all to let
+spaces of freedom for people in which what is going on is neither observed, nor
+evaluated.
+What precedes has to be taken both as a grid about what to observe and
+how, and as general guidelines to build what should be in our view a satisfying
+process of quantification; even if, until now processes of quantification in the
+social world have not yet, except rare examples, followed such guidelines.
+
+References
+
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+Sen, Amartya. 1980. Description as choice. Oxford Economic Papers 32 (3): 353-69.
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\ No newline at end of file
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+ARTICLE
+
+From sociology of quantification to ethics
+of quantification
+
+Andrea Saltelli 1✉ & Monica Di Fiore 2✉
+
+Quantifications are produced by several disciplinary houses in a myriad of different styles.
+The concerns about unethical use of algorithms, unintended consequences of metrics, as well
+as the warning about statistical and mathematical malpractices are all part of a general
+malaise, symptoms of our tight addiction to quantification. What problems are shared by all
+these instances of quantification? After reviewing existing concerns about different domains,
+the present perspective article illustrates the need and the urgency for an encompassing
+ethics of quantification. The difficulties to discipline the existing regime of numerification are
+addressed; obstacles and lock-ins are identified. Finally, indications for policies for different
+actors are suggested.
+
+https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00557-0 OPEN
+
+1 Open Evidence Research, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), Barcelona, Spain. 2 Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Roma, Italy. ✉email: andrea.saltelli@gmail.com; monica.difiore@cnr.it
+
+HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:69 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00557-0 1
+
+1234567890():,;
+Give me a number!
+
+Numbers, visible and invisible, pervade our life, dominate
+the language of our communication, and accelerate all our
+transactions. What price is being paid?
+
+At the time of writing the present work, uncertainty, precaution,
+and governance are the keywords describing how
+COVID-19 emergency is challenging political questions of
+security and health in the era of big data. In this context, numbers
+are very much in demand, and expected from science.
+According to The New York Times (Landler and Castle, 2020)
+the report which purportedly “jarred the U.S. and the U.K. to
+Action”, from the Imperial College in London (Ferguson et al.,
+2020), warned about the possibility of 510,000 deaths in Britain
+and 2.2 million in the US. How could such a two-digit precision
+be obtained? Known uncertainties include the prevalence of the
+virus in the population; the number of asymptomatic cases and
+their infectiveness; the behaviour and resilience of acquired
+immunity; the way the flue will react to the oncoming summer
+and to the next winter; the time needed to make a vaccine globally
+available; how the emergency will affect non-COVID patients,
+and how individuals will adapt their behaviour to the new
+situation and containment measures.
+The report from the Imperial College explains that the calculation
+corresponds to the do-nothing scenario, and comes from a
+model described in a Nature paper (Ferguson et al., 2006b) and
+associated online supplementary information (Ferguson et al.,
+2006a). The uncertainty in the prediction was assessed moving
+just one uncertain factor, a strategy bound to grossly underestimate
+the uncertainty when the model is nonlinear and nonadditive
+(Saltelli and Annoni, 2010; Saltelli et al., 2019), as is likely
+the case for epidemiological models, due to the exponential term
+(s) in the equation.
+An intense debate in the media (Steerpike, 2020; Fund, 2020)
+and social media1 ensued about the scarce transparency of the
+Imperial College model, and its previous performance in the case
+of the BSE and foot and mouth disease documented in Mansley
+et al. (2011) and Kitching et al. (2006).
+As noted, more realistically, by Anthony Fauci—a member of
+the White House Coronavirus Task Force at the time of this
+work, in his reply to a politician insisting for a number of deaths,
+“There is no ‘number-answer’ to your question” (Fauci, 2020).
+Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Yaneer Bar-Yam go further in their
+indictment of poor use of mathematical modelling in the context
+of the UK pandemic experience, suggesting that modelling and
+policy making are two sources of error in the UK action. They
+note that “[I]f we base our pandemic response plans on flawed
+academic models, people die” (Taleb and Bar-Yam, 2020). The
+subject of modelling work for COVID-19 was the subject of
+several commentaries (Rhodes and Lancaster, 2020; Pielke, 2020),
+including one involving the authors of this work in the journal
+Nature (Saltelli et al., 2020a). Here we stressed that modelling is a
+social activity and that more inclusive societal negotiations are
+needed in the framing of these mathematical objects.
+The pandemic shows how numbers and their uncertainty—if
+not properly mastered—may play a dysfunctional role at the
+science policy interface (Saltelli et al., 2020a; Bradshaw and
+Borchers, 2000).
+The pandemic has also shown that the act of quantifying, either
+by a model or by an algorithm, increasingly nourishes the
+science–policy interface with the opportunity to outsource
+decision-making authority to number-based decision-making
+(Danaher et al., 2017), when momentous political decisions are
+delegated to the purported neutrality of model generated numbers
+(Saltelli et al., 2020a).
+
+There is, therefore, a circularity between numbers, models,
+algorithms and the interface between science and politics. In this
+perspective, the last decade has seen a growing critical thinking
+about a crisis in the workings of science—the so-called reproducibility
+crisis (Saltelli and Funtowicz, 2017; Saltelli, 2018). One
+of the many dimensions of this crisis is related to its ethical
+dimension, in the relationship between poor reproducibility and a
+perverse system of incentives (Smaldino and McElreath, 2016;
+Edwards and Roy, 2017). A sectors hit by the reproducibility
+crisis, and the first where the alarm was sounded (Begley and
+Ellis, 2012), is that of biomedical research (Harris, 2017; Ioannidis,
+2005, 2016), already affected by a collapse in trust (Goldacre,
+2012). This should be borne in mind now that the world
+waits for a COVID-19 vaccine.
+Connecting this growing critical thought about scientific problems
+to ethics of quantification shows that a multitude of
+unintended effects, lock-ins and path dependencies, are worth
+paying attention to.
+If one reads the present context with the lenses of social system
+theory, then one can take the mediatisation of science (Scheufele,
+2014), its commodification (Mirowski, 2011) and politicisation
+(Pielke Jr, 2007)—as a consequence of the structural coupling of
+different systems—economy, science, media, policy. As per this
+theory, due to the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (Moeller,
+2006; Luhmann, 1995), each system communicates using its own
+code, true/false for science, profit/loss for the economy, new/nonews
+for the media and so on. For the authors in (Saltelli and
+Boulanger, 2019), society is confronted with a situation where
+science’s code true/false is corrupted by those of the other systems,
+such as profit/loss, news/no-news, and finally by that of
+technology: functions/does not-function. In this scenario media’s
+appetite for quantified information accelerates a process of pervasive
+quantification, intended both as the production of more
+numbers, and the use of more algorithms in the social media.
+As noted in Saltelli (2020), finding commonalities in the
+undesired aspects of different forms of quantification can help
+chart the problem, and bring some perspective to scholars
+involved in different aspects of this discussion.
+
+Numbers, models, algorithms, how different, how similar
+
+What qualities are specific to rankings, or indicators, or
+models, or algorithms? What does quantification share with
+related concepts like commensuration or categorization?
+(Popp Berman and Hirschman, 2018)
+As algorithms and Big Data populate ever more deeply our life,
+following the evolution of what has been variously called platform
+capitalism (Lanier, 2006) or surveillance capitalism (Zuboff,
+2019), decisions arrived at by computation may come to pose
+important societal threats (O’Neil, 2016).
+Quantifications seem to be the leading language used to deal
+with and solve different aspect of social and political life, even
+when this dissolves the meaningfulness of the number themselves,
+as when the news about the pandemic reports number of deaths,
+or worse of infected people, with the unbelievable precision of
+three, four, even five significant digits.
+It becomes hence urgent for society to develop a better
+understanding of, adaptation to and defence from, a pervasive
+datafication. The exigency of policy to achieve efficiency and
+certainty through the instrument of quantification should be kept
+under societal control, lest the complexity of models, algorithms
+or rankings becomes an end to itself, used instrumentally to
+transform political problems into technical ones. It might be that
+the new, post-pandemic normal, will have to include a new
+maturity in the relationship between numbers and society.
+
+ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00557-0
+
+2 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:69 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00557-0
+It must be stressed here that there are different quantification
+tools and methods with distinguished social, political and economic
+impact: an algorithm embedding prejudices is different
+from a poorly designed statistical analysis, from a mathematical
+model predicting the unpredictable, or from the pervasive ranking
+of countries, cities or universities. Inequality embedded in
+algorithm may affect members of minority groups (ethnic, racial,
+sexual, disability-related, etc.) (Danaher et al., 2017), with a long
+chain of impacts. A biased algorithm can inflict longer sentences
+to coloured people or simply to people living in a poor neighbourhood
+(O’Neil, 2016; Muller, 2018). A poorly designed statistical
+analysis for medical treatments could squander billions
+and kill thousands (Harris, 2017). Poor modelling may lead to
+wrong, or simply unjustified, political choices (Saltelli, 2019;
+Saltelli et al., 2020a, 2020b). The proliferation of rankings of
+universities has profoundly altered higher education, making it
+into a global market and dramatically increasing prices for students
+and their families (O’Neil, 2016; Muller, 2018). The list of
+examples could continue (Saltelli, 2020). Still, as argued in this
+work, the diversity in the various families of quantification hides
+important commonalities.
+It should also be stressed that a list of perverse quantification
+can be contrasted with a list of virtuous ones. These come most
+often from the field of physics than from the more complex fields
+of medicine or social sciences. Thanks to clever modelling NASA
+scientists could position around Mercury the probe MESSENGER,
+launched in 2004, after five billions miles and six ½ years
+(Kay and King, 2020).
+Models for weather forecast are an example where a mutual
+process of domestication has taken place between models and
+society. By producing useful short-term predictions constantly
+updated by new information, and by communicating uncertainty
+carefully, these models make it normal for us to read on our
+mobile that tomorrow will be mostly sunny with a 20 per cent
+chance of rain (Lazo et al., 2009). From agriculture to transport to
+energy, virtually all sectors of the economy benefit from these
+models (Sarewitz et al., 2000). Weather forecasts become controversial
+only under condition of extreme political interference,
+as shown by the recent story of hurricane Dorian in the US (Law
+and Martinez, 2020), or when high-stakes events, such as storms
+or flooding, complexify the transmission from the technical
+knowledge of meteorologists to the takers of momentous political
+decisions, such as e.g., evacuation for coastlines or cities (Sarewitz
+et al., 2000; Pielke et al., 2002). Hurricanes and pandemics are
+situations “when facts are uncertain, stakes high, values in dispute
+and decisions urgent”, according to the mantra of post-normal
+science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). COVID-19 illustrates
+perfectly the mutated conditions of operation of science when
+moved from the normal to the post-normal regime (WaltnerToews
+et al., 2020); under these circumstances, when models
+impact directly societal decisions, their use needs better political
+and societal coping strategies (Saltelli et al., 2020a).
+Sheila Jasanoff, identifies two opposing classes of modelling:
+‘technologies of hubris’ and ‘technologies of humility’ (Jasanoff,
+2003). Developed to reassure the public, and “to keep the wheels
+of science and industry turning”, the technologies of hubris
+include quantifications such as risk assessment and cost benefit
+analysis whose purpose is to promise a chance of management
+and control, even in areas of great uncertainty such as climate
+change. The promise is reinforced by claims of neutrality, rigour
+and objectivity, but these come, for Jasanoff, with important
+limitations, i.e., in generating overconfidence thanks to the
+appearance of exhaustivity, pre-empting political discussion of
+what remain outside these quantifications, and remaining limited
+in the capacity of these technologies to internalise challenges that
+arise outside their framing assumptions. All these remarks have
+
+been vindicated—in the opinion of the authors of this work—by
+the numbers populating the present pandemic (Saltelli et al.,
+2020a). Calls for humility in relation to using mathematical
+model (Sridhar and Majumder, 2020) come with disputes where
+models become the target of political attack (Pielke, 2020). Some
+authors (Rhodes and Lancaster, 2020) speak of “mathematical
+models as public troubles”.
+Adopting “technologies of humility” (Jasanoff, 2007) would
+entail to reflect on the sources of ambiguity, indeterminacy and
+complexity, to bring out the ethical dimensions of problems, and
+to identify winners and losers in the distributions of costs and
+benefits—focusing on the most vulnerable. Most importantly, for
+Jasanoff (Jasanoff, 2003), society should identify those factors
+which either deter or encourage learning.
+It is perhaps useful to note that the aspects of quantification
+which might be called hubristic enjoy in our society an privileged
+status and popularity, suffice to consider the role of intellectuals
+such as Cass Sunstein (Matthews, 2018), and Steven Pinker
+(Pinker, 2018). The Panglossian numbers of the latter reassure us
+that all is well (Gray, 2018), while the cost benefit analyses and
+nudging of the former ensure that—once society is given the right
+facts, in numerical form, disagreement will dematerialise, as “the
+issues that most divide us are fundamentally about facts rather
+than values” (Matthews, 2018). For example, in relation to
+COVID-19, the Washington Post notes (Frankel, 2020) that if we
+adopt a cost-benefit analysis using as a yardstick concepts such as
+the value of a statistical life (VSL, see later in the present work),
+this would force society to confront reality in a more precise way;
+the alternative to using these tools, admonish the Washington
+Post, is to be left to gut feelings, educated guesses or political
+arguments (Frankel, 2020).
+
+A fragmented landscape
+
+Quantifications are produced by several disciplinary houses
+in a myriad of different styles. What problems are shared by
+all these?
+How, where and what is quantified? From education to finance,
+from criminal justice to global governance, from the economy to
+the environment, all fields are colonised by numbers. Mathematical
+and statistical models, indicators, metrics and algorithms of
+various nature and complexity are used to maximise efficiency, to
+measure profit, sustainability, decarbonisation, the achievement
+of objectives, the ratings of cities or restaurants. They can give a
+price to financial products which only initiates can understand
+(Porter, 2012), and which have the power to collapse the economy
+(Wilmott and Orrell, 2017; Salmon, 2009).
+For some scholars, humanity is now “entering an era of
+widespread algorithmic governance” (Kitchin, 2017). Speed, efficiency,
+comprehensiveness and fairness are some positive properties
+invoked in favour of algorithmic governance. At the same
+time, this increasing complexity of algorithms comes in the form
+of black boxes (Danaher et al., 2017), where clarity is sacrificed,
+because although algorithms have the power to act upon data and
+make decisions, they are largely beyond query or question
+(Kitchin, 2017; O’Neil, 2016), thus foregoing the properties of
+comprehensiveness and fairness.
+What kind of ethical reflection is going on these topics? Indeed,
+a lot, though in a fragmented landscape.
+● Ethics of AI has become a field of its own, with both a rich
+literature, institutional initiatives (High-Level Expert Group
+on Artificial Intelligence, 2019), including from the Holy See
+(Copestake, 2019). ● In the discipline of statistics the community is moored in an
+internal ‘statistics war’ about the fundamental concepts to be
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+used or taught (Gelman, 2019). ● Abuse and misuse of metrics—from the Goodhart’s law to our
+days, is also a field with a long tradition of investigation
+(Muller, 2018). ● In mathematical modelling the situation is at the same richer
+and more confused, owing to mathematical modelling not
+being a discipline (Saltelli, 2019; Saltelli et al., 2020a). ● Rankings, inferences, decisions, are all different output of
+these activities, which in some cases do not even bring to the
+surface a number. Yet these are all instances of quantification.
+Wendy Espeland and Mitchell Stevens (Espeland and Stevens,
+2008) draw attention to the spread of quantification and the
+significance of new regimes of measurement, where democracy,
+merit, participation, accountability and even “fairness” are to be
+discovered and appreciated via numbers. These authors investigate
+five key dimensions of quantification
+
+● the work it requires, e.g., in relation to the need for “wellfunded
+bureaucracies with highly trained administrators”; ● its reactivity, in that “turning qualities into quantities creates
+new things and new relations among things”; ● its tendency to discipline human behaviour, e.g., by practices
+which define what is appropriate, normal; ● its polyvalent authority, in that quantitative authority confer
+epistemic authority, and ultimately power (Porter, 1995); ● its aesthetics, in relation to the craft skills and evolving
+fashions related to making numbers compelling, and in a
+sense, beautiful.
+The authors conclude with the pressing recommendation to
+move from a sociology of quantification to an ethics of numbers.
+This descends from the realisation that quantification is fundamentally
+a social activity, and for this its ethical implications
+should be considered explicitly and transparently.
+While sociology of quantification has received a considerable
+boost in the last decade – see the review in Popp Berman and
+Hirschman (2018), ethics of quantification is still fragmented in
+different realms of quantification.
+The COVID-19 pandemic offers perhaps the appropriate
+moment for this discussion, now that the discussion about
+COVID-19 is formulated in the jargon of mathematics and
+models (Rhodes et al., 2020), with expression such as ‘flatten the
+curve’ entering into everyday language.
+Said otherwise, the present moment of intense reciprocal
+domestication between society and the numbers of the pandemic
+may bring us closer to the mature use of quantification exemplified
+above for the case of weather predictions.
+
+Concerned readings: who is alarmed?
+
+Voices of concern about different aspects of quantification
+
+As noted by Cathy O’Neil (O’Neil, 2016), one deplorable use of
+algorithms/mathematics in the guise of operational research, is
+making labour conditions harder, by a scheduling which optimises
+the employer benefits. She mentions ‘clopening’, the
+practice whereby the same worker is responsible for closing a
+public exercise in the night and open it in the morning, and how
+these practices make it impossible for an employee to plan care
+for children and elderly, for studying, for having a life.
+Similar, and possibly more drastic conclusions are reached by
+Alain Supiot (Supiot, 2007), a jurist, for whom the numerification
+of society has created a system where algorithms replace laws, and
+the labour market has transformed from Taylorian—where the
+labourers sold to the employers hours of labour—to cybernetic,
+whereby thanks to the governing by objective, the mobilisation of
+the workers is total, in a homoeostatic system where their
+
+performance is constantly measured. In this system, argues
+Supiot, any possibility of appeal and negotiation is lost, the law
+loses its heteronomy, human solidarity is eroded, as the fellow
+worker becomes a competitor, and the individual is left to seek
+the protection of the more powerful in order to survive; in other
+words, a re-feudalisation of society.
+A complementary reading of the situation is offered by the
+French movement of ‘statactivistes’ (Bruno et al., 2014), which
+reconnects to a rich tradition of sociology of numbers (Pierre
+Bourdieu, Alain Desrosieres) to fight numbers with numbers
+under the slogan ‘another number is possible’. As shown by the
+many compelling examples in the book and articles of the statactivistes
+(Bruno et al., 2014; Bruno et al., 2014) the fight against
+a dystopian use of quantification is not the end of quantification,
+but its correct use disciplined by just laws. The rich repertoire of
+strategies deployed by the statactivistes includes ‘statistical judo’, a
+technique of self-defence against invasive measures of performance.
+Statactivistes also demonstrate examples of how unjust
+metrics can be deconstructed and replaced with a fairer one—e.g.,
+in the measurement of poverty (Concialdi, 2014), and how hidden
+pathologies of society can be detected by statisticians—dramatic
+the example of suicides at France Telecom as a result of a
+drastic restructuring of the company, see also the discussion in
+Saltelli (2020).
+At Cardiff University in the UK, a Data Justice Lab examines
+the relationship between datafication and social justice, investigating
+the politics and the consequences of big data and datadriven
+processes (Cardiff University, 2020). An International
+Research Network named “Society for the Social Studies of
+Quantification (SSSQ)” has been recently created, gathering
+scholars from disciplines such as history, philosophy, sociology,
+anthropology and political science (Didier, 2020b).
+Other virtuous examples of data activism are described by O’Neil
+(O’Neil, 2016), pp. 91–92, where ‘Hackathons’ are the occasion for
+the opening of the black box of algorithms, to detect embedded
+racial prejudice, e.g., in the software used by the police. Other
+relevant example of activism are models to combat gerrymandering
+in the US, and to defend in the wider world the integrity of the
+voting process in elections (Lindeman and Stark, 2012).
+A form of societal activism on the relation between models and
+society is offered by Tomas Pueyo, not an epidemiologist, who
+maintains a blog for COVID-19 epidemiological models and
+explains in plain-language the implications of model uncertainties
+for policy options (Pueyo, 2020), along the lines of ‘modelling as a
+social activity’ discussed in (Saltelli et al., 2020b).
+
+Reasons for an ethics of quantification
+
+Why does society need an encompassing ethics of
+quantification? Why it is urgent now?
+As noted above, for Espeland and Stevens (Espeland and Stevens,
+2008) a sociology and an ethics of numbers is needed due to
+the spread of quantification and the significance of new regimes
+of measurement. In a previous work from one of the authors
+(Saltelli, 2020) the case for an ethics of quantification (EoQ) is
+made as follows:
+● An ethics of quantification is needed because of the symbiotic
+relationship between quantification and trust (Porter, 1995). ● It is a defence against statistical abuses perpetrated by public
+or private actors (Bruno et al., 2014). ● It can oppose consequentialism in scientific quantification—
+meaning by this the instrumental production of numbers just
+because there is a cause or an audience to serve, irrespective of
+the numbers’ quality. Consequentialism is typically associated
+with an optimistic view of how the ‘good’ can be neatly
+
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+computed (Saltelli, 2020), and with the ‘modelling hubris’
+often met in quantitative studies (Saltelli, 2019; Saltelli et al.,
+2020a). ● It helps to apportion responsibilities and to act on them when
+metrics produce unintended or otherwise undesirable effects
+(O’Neil, 2016; Muller, 2018). ● An ethics of quantification can assist in realising that “The
+technique is never neutral” (Saltelli et al., 2020), meaning by
+this that the outcome of a policy study can be decided in
+advance just by the choice of the experts and disciplines called
+to adjudicate it (Beck, 1992). An important instance of this is
+when a political issue is presented/transformed into a
+technical one (Ravetz, 1971). Thus, an ethics of quantification
+can help to make the relationship between a quantification
+and the associated context and purpose more stringent
+(Zyphur and Pierides, 2017). ● The fragmented nature of ethics efforts in different disciplines
+discussed above calls for an encompassing ethical effort.
+To this list, a more general concern can be added for the way
+numerification may change the nature of a discipline. The point
+has been made repeatedly for the mathematization of economics
+(Reinert, 2000; Mirowski, 1991) and for sociology falling prey of
+statistical rituals (Gigerenzer and Marewski, 2014).
+For the authors in Sareen et al. (2020) the main reason to call
+for an ethics of quantification is related to the two faces of
+quantification: one of illumination and one of obfuscation. Social
+actors producing quantification may strategically illuminate those
+aspects that can be socially legitimated, while obfuscating those
+that cannot. An example is the use of an AI assisted census to
+purportedly increase the legitimacy of a biometricising governance
+regime, while at the same time some citizens are not allowed
+to register, becoming invisible. This is the case of the Aadhaar
+system in India (Sareen et al., 2020).
+This debate has become all the more urgent at the moment of
+the pandemic. When a set of numbers – deaths and infections in
+the present case, establish itself at the centre-stage, other possible
+numbers and stories may be neglected, including the losses for the
+more vulnerable economic subjects, the loss of rights such as that
+to education, to health (for other than COVID-19 issues) and to
+civil liberties (Didier, 2020a; Foucault et al., 2020).
+
+Obstacles
+
+Why the battle to discipline a pervasive datafication of the
+world will be hard
+A program such as one of increased attention to the ethics of
+quantification is made arduous by a variety of factors. One is the
+prevailing techno-optimistic paradigm, whereby normative bias
+and controversy dissipate against the light of well-crafted quantification,
+as argued by Cass Sunstein (Matthews, 2018), while for
+Aaron Bastani (Bastani, 2019) the new era of big data and artificial
+intelligence will present us with an era of abundance, a
+“Fully Automated Luxury Capitalism”.
+Related to the pandemic, while concepts such as value of a
+statistical life are considered by many authors controversial even
+within their ‘home’ in actuarial sciences, when applied in the
+setting compensatory damages (Viscusi, 2008), e.g., in case of
+airplane crashes (Linshi, 2015), they still have currency in global
+socio-economic and health contexts. VSL are used in (Thunstrom
+et al., 2020) to assert that social distancing in the US will lead to
+net benefit of about $5.2 trillion. In spite of the apparent objectivity
+of VSL, even within the administration of the United States,
+different regulatory agencies use different values of VSL (Viscusi,
+2008).
+
+As an example of resistance to datafication, the addictive nature
+of algorithms and AI in the new social media is denounced by
+Jaron Lanier, who suggests to his readers that they should close all
+their social accounts immediately (Danaher et al., 2017).
+According to Rob Kitchin (Kitchin, 2017), algorithms create
+capital, steer behaviour, identify people, and multiply themselves
+in a growing web of applications. They hence represent nonneutral
+practices corresponding to specific political economies
+and cultures. The working of algorithms is thus not ‘apolitical’.
+For Lucas Introna (Introna, 2016) the new regimes of quantification
+allows a group of state and private actors to increase their
+interconnectivity at the expenses of their subjects—be these
+customers, consumers, citizens, migrants, tourists, suspects, students,
+friends, colleagues, and many others. These considerations
+suggest the existence and reinforcement of lock in and path
+dependence processes.
+Lock-in are also evident in many strands of occupation. As
+researchers, the authors are well aware of the damage brought
+about by the system of evaluation of research quality based on
+metrics such as the impact factor or the Hirsh factor (Wilsdon,
+2016); yet researchers can no more easily stop using these measures
+than deans can stop checking the position of their departments
+and universities in international rankings.
+Whatever course society takes it will have to contend with the
+pessimism of the Collingridge dilemma (Collingridge, 1980): it is
+arduous to control a technology, as it is impossible to know in
+advance its negative effects, and when the consequences become
+evident, it might be too late to intervene.
+
+Some emerging Implications for policy
+
+What should be done?
+
+Since the gist of this work is in the commonality of the issues
+met in the different families of quantification, the authors do not
+repeat in this section all the policy initiatives which are already
+ongoing in existing fields where the discussion is more advanced,
+as for example in the ethics of artificial intelligence and algorithms,
+see a recent reviews in (Cath et al., 2018), (Lo Piano,
+2020) or in the domain of official statistics, where codes of good
+practices have existed for a long time.
+The focus here is on the more general initiatives which could
+be taken on numbers in general. Referring to AI the authors in
+(Cath et al., 2018) note that “We are creating the digital world in
+which future generations will spend most of their time”, and the
+same can be said of the present pattern of datafication of
+everyday life.
+In this respect holistic approaches are needed. For Shoshana
+Zuboff “If the digital future is to be our home, then it is we who
+must make it so” (Zuboff, 2019), p. 21. Among our most urgent
+tasks, for this author, is the “naming of the unprecedented”, i.e.,
+to describe and draw attention of the singularity of the present
+transition in the battle against what she calls surveillance capitalism.
+There are surprising analogies between these sentiments
+and those expressed by scholars of different orientation, from the
+jurists (Supiot, 2007) to the data scientists (O’Neil, 2016) to the
+Statactivistes (I. Bruno et al., 2014), to the historians (Muller,
+2018; Porter, 2012), and many others.
+Hence, the next sections describe a few suggestions for specific
+actors.
+
+Role of organised labour. If this will be a collective fight of ‘us
+the people’, the role of unions and other social actors will be of
+paramount importance. The example of the fight of the statactivistes
+with the official French statistical institute INSEE to change
+the way of measuring poverty is instructive (Concialdi, 2014); the
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+fight would not have been possible without the help from the
+unions which put the problem on the table and assisted the statactivistes
+in their battle. The COVID-19 pandemic offers to
+organised labour a natural experiment about which workers fall
+through the net of welfare systems, how to measure and compensate
+the performance of all those workers who have made
+social distancing possible (ILO, 2020), as well as to measure the
+many ways in which the pandemic increase existing inequalities
+(Macfarlane, 2020).
+
+Role of institutions. For Zuboff, the need to fight the “unprecedented”
+totalitarian ambitions of surveillance capitalism and its
+attempt to dominate human nature implies the capacity for
+society to discover that all is not well (Zuboff, 2019). While
+Zuboff is quite accurate in the diagnosis of the challenge, she is in
+general vague in her conclusions as to what actions this new
+indignation should lead to (di Bella, 2019). In our opinion an
+important ingredient in the battle of ideas she advocates is to give
+civil society and institutions the means to source their evidence
+independently to contrast the important devices of persuasion
+and lobbing of surveillance capitalists. According to David
+Michaels (Spencer, 2020), discussing how to contrast the power of
+lobbies, “we need independent science paid for by the producers”,
+meaning by this that part of the cost of this increased surveillance
+(or anti-surveillance?) should be brought by those who needs to
+be regulated—in this case the producers of opaque algorithms
+and ratings. It is important to avoid the trap whereby “actors with
+the deepest pockets can buy the science they need, frame issues
+according to specific agendas and enforce these on the rest of
+society” (Saltelli, 2018).
+In order to tackle this important challenge to the future of our
+societies the recipe of Lee Drutman (Drutman, 2015) is that of an
+‘Office for Public Lobbying’. The idea would be to offer citizens
+the same protection afforded to indigent defendants by the courts.
+In this respect—in a US perspective, the US Office for
+Technological Assessment (OTA) can be remembered. Eliminated
+in 1995 by a conservative legislature (Chubin, 2001), it
+offers a cautionary tale. “A moment’s thought brings to mind a
+dozen or more subjects where an analytical agency like OTA
+could be of use today”, notes Adam Keiper (Keiper, 2004) in
+2004. In 2020, an OTA-like agency would not be without work.
+
+Europe and the agenda for responsible research and innovation
+(RRI). In Europe the movement of Responsible Research and
+Innovation (RRI), part of the European Commission Horizon
+2020 research strategy, has contributed to a reflection on the
+‘right impacts’ of research, as well as on research’s governance,
+responsiveness, integration and anticipation of the often unpredictable
+consequences of science and technology (Owen et al.,
+2012). RRI lists six policy keys that RRI should advance: ethics,
+gender equality, governance, open access, public engagement, and
+science education (European Commission, 2014). Perhaps a
+seventh, responsible quantification, should be added to the list.
+
+Ethics of quantification, in principles
+If one were to explain, after the illustration above, what an ethics
+of quantification consists of, one would be at loss to draw a
+synthesis in the present multiverse of numbers. In the field of
+statistics, in that of mathematical modelling, in those of algorithms
+and ratings, a multitude of aspirations, agendas, and
+interests are simultaneously at play. What can perhaps be suggested
+here are a few principles which could be usefully followed
+to move toward a more mature form of coexistence between
+number and society.
+
+● The multidimensionality of the “algorithms of public
+relevance” (a definition due to (Gillespie, 2014)) points a
+space of socio-political influence and public relevance of the
+quantification, requiring a balancing movement that the
+authors associate with an ethics of quantification. An ethics of
+quantification as a framework to investigate the societal
+relevance of quantification. ● Our analysis of the literature has focused on the cognitive
+dissonance between possibly adverse impact of quantification,
+and their purported function of universal certainty, neutrality,
+and control. An ethics of quantification as vigilance about the
+spoken and unspoken framing and assumptions. ● Quantification can belong to a culture of hubris or to one of
+humility (Jasanoff, 2003). An ethics of quantification as
+providing a compass to look at numbers along the humilityhubris
+axis. ● The certainty of numbers and the neglect of ambiguity and
+‘not-knowing’ (Gupta, 2001) may limit the space of the
+possible policy solutions, or worse, it may offer to politics the
+chance to abdicate decision by transforming a political
+decision into a technical one, imposed by the certainty of
+the quantitative prediction. An ethics of quantification for
+systematically probing for missing numbers and blind spots. ● As mentioned in our perspective, both society and the
+collective of quantifiers have a useful role to play in a context
+of participation and activism. An ethics of quantification as
+normative framework and intellectual home for various forms
+of data-activism, model-activism and stat-activism. ● Quality of knowledge should be the primary tool helping to
+map main dimensions of social, political and economic
+phenomenon, overcoming knowledge asymmetries. Quality of
+knowledge can be assisted by a process of socially mediated
+quantification, with a role for forms of participative quality
+(van der Sluijs et al., 2005; Saltelli et al., 2013). An ethics of
+quantification for fostering quality as fitness for societal
+purpose.
+These principles are not new, and can be found in different
+forms in different works concerned with e.g., mathematical
+modelling (Saltelli, 2019) (Saltelli et al., 2020a), indicators (Engle
+Merry, 2016), or algorithms (O’Neil, 2016).
+
+Conclusions
+This work has tried to emphasise commonalities among different
+families of quantification, to stress that these commonalities were
+not lost in the thought of the sociologists of numbers (Porter,
+1995), and that the call these scholars made yesterday for an
+ethics of quantification (Espeland and Stevens, 2008) become all
+the more urgent today that societies live immersed in numbers,
+including those of COVIDS-19, which are both visible (number of
+deaths and infections) or invisible (social monitoring algorithms).
+The magic power seduction of numbers (Engle Merry, 2016)
+has increased enormously, including under the direction of
+platform and surveillance capitalism. As a result, forms of societal
+learning and coping have become at the same time more needed
+and more difficult.
+The present perspective article tried to capture the common
+perspective that emerges from the authors’ reading of signals of
+concern from existing literature, and to derive from these readings
+the good reasons why we as citizens and scholars should act
+now. An attempt has been made to show how asymmetries and
+lock-ins stand in the way of a solution, especially since it is the
+model of political decision itself which has been subtracted from
+human agency and entrusted to the often-opaque logic of algorithms.
+Finally, a few reflections for policy have been offered,
+
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+emphasising the collective need and responsibility for actions,
+involving institutions, social actors, scholars and citizens.
+
+Received: 6 April 2020; Accepted: 16 July 2020;
+
+Note
+1 Most of the discussion is hosted on GitHub, and the relevant links are available at
+https://bit.ly/2TknWR7.
+
+References
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+Beck PU (1992) Risk society: towards a new modernity. Published in Association
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+Begley CG, Ellis LM (2012) Drug development: raise standards for preclinical
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+
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+The University of Chicago
+
+The University of Chicago Law School
+
+Cognition and Cost‐Benefit Analysis
+Author(s): By Cass R. Sunstein
+Source: The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. S2 (June 2000), pp. 1059-1103
+Published by: The University of Chicago Press for The University of Chicago Law School
+Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/468105 .
+Accessed: 12/05/2013 06:27
+
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+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
+
+CASS R. SUNSTEIN*
+
+Abstract
+
+Cost-benefit analysis is often justified on conventional economic grounds, as a
+way of preventing inefficiency. But it is most plausibly justified on cognitive
+grounds—as a way of counteracting predictable problems in individual and social
+cognition. Poor judgments, by individuals and societies, can result from certain heuristics,
+from informational and reputational cascades, from thinking processes in
+which benefits are ‘‘on screen’’ but costs are not, from ignoring systemic effects of
+one-shot interventions, from seeing cases in isolation, and from intense emotional
+reactions. Cost-benefit analysis serves as a corrective to these cognitive problems.
+In addition, it is possible to arrive at an incompletely theorized agreement on costbenefit
+analysis—an agreement that does not depend on controversial arguments
+(for example, the view that willingness to pay should be the basis for all social
+outcomes) and that can attract support from a variety of reasonable views. There is
+discussion as well of the role of distributional weights and other equitable factors
+in cost-benefit analysis. The conclusion is that the best argument for cost-benefit
+analysis is rooted in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics.
+
+The American people have no doubt that more people die from
+coal dust than from nuclear reactions, but they fear the prospect
+of a nuclear reactor more than they do the empirical data that
+would suggest that more people die from coal dust, having coalfired
+burners. They also know that more lives would be saved if
+we took that 25 percent we spend in the intensive care units in
+the last few months of the elderly’s lives, more children would
+be saved. But part of our culture is that we have concluded as a
+culture that we are going to rightly, or wrongly, we are going to
+spend the money, costing more lives, on the elderly. . . . I think
+it’s incredibly presumptuous and elitist for political scientists to
+conclude that the American people’s cultural values in fact are
+not ones that lend themselves to a cost-benefit analysis and pre-
+
+* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago
+Law School. I am grateful to Jill Hasday, Eric Posner, and Richard Posner for helpful
+comments on a previous draft; special thanks to Eric Posner for many helpful discussions.
+Brian Lehman and Brooke May provided excellent research assistance and valuable comments
+and criticisms.
+
+[ Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXIX (June 2000)]
+ 2000 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/2000/2902-0020$01.50
+
+1059
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+1060 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+sume that they would change their cultural values if in fact they
+were aware of the cost-benefit analysis.1
+Many people have argued for cost-benefit analysis on economic
+grounds.2 On their view, a primary goal of regulation is to promote economic
+efficiency, and cost-benefit analysis is admirably well suited to that
+goal. Arguments of this kind have met with sharp criticism from those who
+reject the efficiency criterion3 or who believe that, in practice, cost-benefit
+analysis is likely to produce a kind of regulatory paralysis.4
+In this essay I offer support for cost-benefit analysis, not from the standpoint
+of conventional economics, but on grounds associated with cognitive
+psychology and behavioral economics. My basic suggestion is that costbenefit
+analysis is best defended as a means of overcoming predictable
+problems in individual and social cognition. Most of these problems might
+be collected under the general heading of selective attention. Cost-benefit
+analysis should be understood as a method for putting ‘‘on screen’’ important
+social facts that might otherwise escape private and public attention.
+Thus understood, cost-benefit analysis is a way of ensuring better priority
+setting and of overcoming predictable obstacles to desirable regulation,
+whatever may be our criteria for deciding the hardest questions about that
+topic.
+Of course, much of the controversy over cost-benefit analysis stems from
+the difficulty of specifying, with particularity, what that form of analysis
+entails. None of the cognitive points made here supports any particular understanding
+of cost-benefit analysis. Certainly I do not mean to embrace the
+controversial and indeed implausible proposition that all regulatory decisions
+should be made by aggregating private willingness to pay, as if economic
+efficiency is or should be the goal of all regulation.5 I will attempt
+
+1 Joseph Biden, Confirmation Hearings for Stephen G. Breyer, to be an associate justice
+of the United States Supreme Court, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d
+Sess. 42 (July 14, 1994) (Miller Reporting transcript). 2 See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public & Private Responsibilities for
+Risk (1992); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, in this issue, at 843. 3 See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993).
+4 See, for example, Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory
+Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy (1991). 5 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale
+L. J. 165 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice ch. 9 (1997); Amartya
+Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in this issue, at 931; Matthew D. Adler & Eric
+A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, in this issue,
+at 1105. See, in particular, Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 Am. Econ.
+Rev. 1, 17 (1995) (‘‘There are plenty of social choice problems in all this, but in analyzing
+them, we have to go beyond looking only for the best reflection of given individual preferences,
+or the most acceptable procedures for choices based on those preferences’’).
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1061
+
+instead to provide an understanding of cost-benefit analysis that is agnostic
+on large issues of the right and the good and that can attract support from
+people with diverse theoretical commitments or with uncertainty about the
+appropriate theoretical commitments.6 In this sense I attempt to produce an
+incompletely theorized agreement on a certain form of cost-benefit analysis—an
+agreement on a form of cost-benefit analysis to which many different
+people, with diverse and competing views, should be willing to subscribe.
+This is partly an attempt to respond to the most natural objection to
+my principal claim here, an objection that would stress the possibility that
+cognitive problems would reappear in the values that end up being associated
+with various states of affairs.
+The paper is organized as follows. In Sections I, II, and III, I seek to
+defend the general idea of cost-benefit analysis, not as embodying any sectarian
+conception of value, but as a way of overcoming predictable problems
+in understanding risks to life and health at both the individual and social
+levels. In Section IV, I briefly attempt to specify what cost-benefit
+analysis might be understood to entail. My goal is to show how this
+method, conceived in a particular way, might attract support from people
+with varying conceptions of the good and the right, including, for example,
+neoclassical economists and those who are quite skeptical about some normative
+claims in neoclassical economics, involving those who do and who
+do not take private preferences, and willingness to pay, as the proper foundation
+for regulatory policy. In other words, I try to show how a certain
+understanding of cost-benefit analysis might contain considerable appeal
+precisely because it overcomes problems in individual cognition, and I do
+so without taking a stand on controversial issues about the ultimate goals
+of regulation and law.
+
+I. A Tale of Two Tables
+
+Let us begin with two simple tables. It is well known that there is a
+great deal of variability in national expenditures per life saved. Consider
+Table 1, which has come to define many discussions of these problems.7
+This table should be taken with many grains of salt.8 It does not contain
+nearly all of the benefits from regulation, including those that fall short of
+mortalities averted (including illnesses averted, benefits for animals, and
+
+6 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 5, which is in the
+same general spirit as this essay, and from which I have learned a great deal. 7 Based on data from Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government
+Fiscal Year 1992 pt. 2, at 370 tab. C-2 (1991). 8 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L. J. 1981
+(1998).
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+TABLE 1
+
+Cost Effectiveness of Selected Regulations: Cost per Life Saved
+
+Cost per
+Premature
+Death Averted
+Regulation Agency (1990 $Millions)
+Unvented space heater ban CPSC .1
+Aircraft cabin fire protection standard FAA .1
+Auto passive restraint/seat belt standards NHTSA .1
+Steering column protection standard NHTSA .1
+Underground construction standards OSHA-S .1
+Trihalomethane drinking water standards EPA .2
+Aircraft seat cushion flammability standard FAA .4
+Alcohol and drug control standards FRA .4
+Auto fuel system integrity standard NHTSA .4
+Standards for servicing auto wheel rims OSHA-S .4
+Aircraft floor emergency lighting standard FAA .6
+Concrete and masonry construction standards OSHA-S .6
+Crane-suspended personnel platform standard OSHA-S .7
+Passive restraints for trucks and buses (proposed) NHTSA .7
+Side-impact standards for autos (dynamic) NHTSA .8
+Children’s sleepwear flammability ban CPSC .8
+Auto side door support standards NHTSA .8
+Low-altitude windshear equipment and training standards FAA 1.3
+Electrical equipment standards (metal mines) MSHA 1.4
+Trenching and excavation standards OSHA-S 1.5
+Traffic alert and collision avoidance (TCAS) systems FAA 1.5
+Hazard communication standard OSHA-S 1.6
+Side-impact standards for trucks, buses, and MPVs (proposed) NHTSA 2.2
+Grain dust explosion prevention standards OSHA-S 2.8
+Rear lap/shoulder belts for autos NHTSA 3.2
+Standards for radionuclides in uranium mines EPA 3.4
+Benzene NESHAP (original: fugitive emissions) EPA 3.4
+Ethylene dibromide drinking water standard EPA 5.7
+Benzene NESHAP (revised: coke byproducts) EPA 6.1
+Asbestos occupational exposure limit OSHA-H 8.3
+Benzene occupational exposure limit OSHA-H 8.9
+Electrical equipment standards (coal mines) MSHA 9.2
+Arsenic emission standards for glass plants EPA 13.5
+Ethylene oxide occupational exposure limit OSHA-H 20.5
+Arsenic/copper NESHAP EPA 23.0
+Hazardous waste listing for petroleum refining sludge EPA 27.6
+Cover/move uranium mill tailings (inactive sites) EPA 31.7
+Benzene NESHAP (revised: transfer operations) EPA 32.9
+Cover/move uranium mill tailings (active sites) EPA 45.0
+Acrylonitrile occupational exposure limit OSHA-H 51.5
+Coke ovens occupational exposure limit OSHA-H 63.5
+Lockout/tagout OSHA-S 70.9
+Asbestos occupational exposure limit OSHA-H 74.0
+Arsenic occupational exposure limit OSHA-H 106.9
+Asbestos ban EPA 110.7
+Diethylstilbestrol (DES) cattlefeed ban FDA 124.8
+Benzene NESHAP (revised: waste operations) EPA 168.2
+1,2 dichloropropane drinking water standard EPA 653.0
+Hazardous waste land disposal ban (first, third) EPA 4,190.4
+Municipal solid waste landfill standards (proposed) EPA 19,107.0
+Formaldehyde occupational exposure limit OSHA-H 86,201.8
+Atrazine/alachlor drinking water standard EPA 92,069.7
+Hazardous waste listing for wood-preserving chemicals EPA 5,700,000
+
+Note.—CPSC: Consumer Protection Safety Commission; FAA: Federal Aviation Administration; NHTSA:
+National Highway Transportation Safety Administration; OSHA-S: Occupational Safety and Health Administration-Safety;
+EPA: Environmental Protection Agency; FRA: Federal Railroad Administration; MSHA: Mine Safety
+and Health Administration; OSHA-H: Occupational Safety and Health Administration-Health; FDA: Food and
+Drug Administration.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1063
+
+aesthetic and recreational gains). An adequate cost-benefit analysis would
+certainly take those benefits into account. (See the Appendix.) We will
+shortly see that the table depends on many contentious assumptions, above
+all involving the appropriate discount rate; modest changes in the discount
+rate can greatly reduce the expenditures and the disparities. But at the very
+least, the table creates a presumption that the current system of regulation
+suffers from serious misallocation of resources. It also suggests that with
+better allocations, we could obtain large gains. Indeed, a recent study finds
+that it would be possible to save the same number of lives that we now save
+with tens of billions of dollars left over—and that better priority setting
+could save 60,000 lives, and 636,000 life-years, annually at the same price.9
+What is the source of the misallocations? Interest-group power undoubtedly
+plays a substantial role, because well-organized groups are able to obtain
+measures in their interest or to fend off measures that would harm
+them, and because poorly organized ones typically fail. Indeed, cost-benefit
+analysis might be defended partly as a corrective to interest-group power,
+operating as a kind of technocratic check on measures that would do little
+good or even produce net harm (and also on measures that do much less
+good than they should).10 But officials are of course responsive not only to
+interest groups but also to general public pressures, and thus part of the answer
+must lie in the distinctive judgments of ordinary people, who do not
+assess risks through a well-informed cost-benefit lens. Indeed, divergences
+between expert and lay assessments of risks have been demonstrated in
+many places. Consider the comparison in Table 2.11
+The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) itself has found that EPA
+policies are responsive not to expert judgments but to lay assessments of
+risks.12 Indeed, EPA policies track ordinary judgments extremely well.
+If we put together these two tables, we can suggest a general hypothesis.
+The government currently allocates its limited resources poorly, and it does
+so partly because it is responsive to ordinary judgments about the magnitude
+of risks. A government that could insulate itself from misinformed
+judgments could save tens of thousands of lives and tens of billions of dollars
+annually. Let us attempt to be more specific about the cognitive problems
+that help account for current problems.
+
+9 See Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social
+Investments in Life-Saving, in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from
+Regulation 167, 172–74 (Robert W. Hahn ed. 1996). 10 Of course it is possible that the content of the cost-benefit test will reflect interest-group
+power. 11 Reprinted by permission from Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward
+Effective Risk Regulation 21 (1993). 12 See id.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+1064 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+TABLE 2
+
+Rating Health Risks
+
+Rank by EPA Experts’
+Public Risk Rank
+1 Hazardous waste sites Medium to low
+2 Exposure to worksite chemicals High
+3 Industrial pollution of waterways Low
+4 Nuclear accident radiation Not ranked
+5 Radioactive waste Not ranked
+6 Chemical leaks from underground storage tanks Medium to low
+7 Pesticides High
+8 Pollution from industrial accidents Medium to low
+9 Water pollution from farm runoff Medium
+10 Tap water contamination High
+11 Industrial air pollution High
+12 Ozone layer destruction High
+13 Coastal water contamination Low
+14 Sewage plant water pollution Medium to low
+15 Vehicle exhaust High
+16 Oil spills Medium to low
+17 Acid rain High
+18 Water pollution from urban runoff Medium
+19 Damaged wetlands Low
+20 Genetic alteration Low
+21 Nonhazardous waste sites Medium to low
+22 Greenhouse effect Low
+23 Indoor air pollution High
+24 X-ray radiation Not ranked
+25 Indoor radon High
+26 Microwave oven radiation Not ranked
+
+II. Six Problems in the Public Demand for Regulation
+
+For the moment, I attempt no controversial specification of cost-benefit
+analysis and understand the term broadly to refer to a regulatory method
+that calls for regulators to identify, and make relevant for purposes of decision,
+the good effects and the bad effects of regulation and to quantify those
+as much as possible in terms of both dollar equivalents and life-years saved,
+hospital admissions prevented, workdays gained, and so forth. (See the Appendix
+for examples from the EPA’s regulation for ozone and particulates.)
+Let us also assume that cost-benefit analysis, thus understood, can accommodate
+distributional factors, by, for example, giving distributional weights
+to certain adverse effects, or by assuming uniform numbers for various
+goods (such as increased longevity) so as to ensure that they do not vary in
+accordance with wealth.
+It is obvious that people, including government officials, often lack riskrelated
+information; they may not know the nature of the health risks at
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1065
+
+issue or the adverse consequences of risk reduction. By itself this point argues
+for cost-benefit analysis, simply as a means of producing the relevant
+information. The public demand for regulation is often based on misunderstandings
+of facts.13 But put this obvious point to one side. Why, exactly,
+might people’s judgments about risk and risk regulation go badly wrong?14
+There are six points here.
+
+A. The Availability Heuristic
+
+The first problem is purely cognitive: the use of the availability heuristic
+in thinking about risks.15 It is well established that people tend to think that
+events are more probable if they can recall an incident of its occurrence.16
+Consider, for example, the fact that people typically think that more words,
+on any given page, will end with the letters ‘‘ing’’ than have ‘‘n’’ as the
+second-to-last letter (though a moment’s reflection shows that this is not
+possible).17 With respect to risks, judgments are typically affected by the
+availability heuristic, so that people overestimate the number of deaths from
+highly publicized events (motor vehicle accidents, tornados, floods, botulism)
+but underestimate the number from less publicized sources (stroke,
+heart disease, stomach cancer).18 Similarly, much of the concern with nuclear
+power undoubtedly stems from its association with memorable events,
+including Hiroshima, Chernobyl, and Three-Mile Island.
+To the extent that people lack information, or base their judgments on
+mental shortcuts that produce errors,19 a highly responsive government is
+likely to blunder. Cost-benefit analysis is a natural corrective, above all because
+it focuses attention on the actual effects of regulation, including, in
+
+13 A colorful discussion is Barry R. Glassner, The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are
+Afraid of the Wrong Things (1999). 14 Some of these problems may infect market behavior as well, and when this is so there
+is a problem with using private willingness to pay as the basis for regulation, since private
+willingness to pay will (by hypothesis) be based on a misunderstanding of the facts. But
+markets contain some safeguards against these errors, through the budget constraint and opportunities
+for learning, and in any case the form of cost-benefit analysis that I support would
+not rest on mistaken factual judgments, as discussed in more detail below. 15 See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
+Risk Regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747, 749–60 (1990). 16 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
+Biases, in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
+Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds. 1982) (describing the availability heuristic). 17 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction
+Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 Psychol. Rev. 293, 295 (1983). 18 Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 218 (2d ed. 1994). 19 Other heuristics are likely to be at work, such as the representativeness heuristic, but
+availability is the most important source of distorted public judgments.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+1066 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+some cases, the existence of surprisingly small benefits from regulatory
+controls. To this extent cost-benefit analysis should be taken not as undemocratic
+but, on the contrary, as a means of fortifying (properly specified)
+democratic goals, by ensuring that government decisions are responsive to
+well-informed public judgments.
+
+B. Aggravating Social Influences: Informational
+and Reputational Cascades
+
+The availability heuristic does not, of course, operate in a social vacuum.
+It interacts with emphatically social processes and, in particular, with
+informational and reputational forces.20 When one person says, through
+words or deeds, that something is or is not dangerous, he creates an informational
+externality.21 A signal by some person A will provide relevant
+data to others. When there is little private information, such a signal may
+initiate an informational cascade, with significant consequences for private
+and public behavior, and with possibly distorting effects on regulatory
+policy.22
+Imagine, for example, that A says that abandoned hazardous waste sites
+are dangerous or that A initiates protest activity because such a site is located
+nearby. B, otherwise skeptical or in equipoise, may go along with A;
+C, otherwise an agnostic, may be convinced that if A and B share the relevant
+belief, the belief must be true; and it will take a confident D to resist
+the shared judgments of A, B, and C. The result of this set of influences
+can be social cascades, as hundreds, thousands, or millions of people come
+to accept a certain belief simply because of what they think other people
+believe.23 There is nothing fanciful to the idea. Cascade effects help account
+for the existence of widespread public concern about abandoned hazardous
+waste dumps (a relatively trivial environmental hazard), and in more recent
+years, they spurred grossly excessive public fears of the pesticide Alar, of
+risks from plane crashes, and of dangers of shootings in schools in the aftermath
+of the murders in Littleton, Colorado. Such effects recently helped
+produce massive dislocations in beef production in Europe in connection
+
+20 I draw in this section on Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and
+Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1999). 21 See Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities
+and Search, 108 Econ. J. 60 (1998). 22 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 720. 23 See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational
+Cascades, in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188 (Mariano Tommasi &
+Kathyrn Ierulli eds. 1995).
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1067
+
+with ‘‘mad cow disease’’; they are currently giving rise to growing and apparently
+unfounded fears of genetic engineering of food.
+On the reputational side, cognitive effects may be amplified as well.24 If
+many people are alarmed about some risk, you may not voice your doubts
+about whether the alarm is merited, simply in order not to seem obtuse,
+cruel, or indifferent. And if many people believe that a certain risk is trivial,
+you may not disagree through words or deeds, lest you appear cowardly or
+confused. The result of these forces can be cascade effects, mediated by the
+availability heuristic. Such effects can produce a public demand for regulation
+even though the relevant risks are trivial. At the same time, there may
+be little or no demand for regulation of risks that are, in fact, quite large in
+magnitude. Self-interested private groups exploit these forces, often by using
+the availability heuristic. Consider the fact that European companies
+have tried to play up fears of genetically engineered food as a way of fending
+off American competition.
+Cost-benefit analysis has a natural role here. If it is made relevant to decision,
+it can counteract cascade effects induced by informational and reputational
+forces, especially when the availability heuristic is at work. The effect
+of cost-benefit analysis is to subject a public demand for regulation to
+a kind of technocratic scrutiny, to ensure that the demand is not rooted in
+myth, and to ensure as well that government is regulating risks even when
+the public demand (because insufficiently informed) is low. And here too
+there is no democratic problem with the inquiry into consequences. If people’s
+concern is fueled by informational forces having little reliability, and
+if people express concern even though they are not fearful, a governmental
+effort to cool popular reactions is hardly inconsistent with democratic ideals.
+Similarly, there is nothing undemocratic about a governmental effort to
+divert resources to serious problems that have not been beneficiaries of cascade
+effects.
+
+C. Dangers On-Screen, Benefits Off-Screen
+
+Why are people so concerned about the risks of nuclear power, when experts
+tend to believe that the risks are quite low—lower, in fact, than the
+risks from competing energy sources, such as coal-fired power plants,
+which produce relatively little public objection? Why do people believe that
+small risks from pesticides should be regulated, even if comparatively small
+risks from X-rays are quite tolerable?
+Suggestive answers come from research suggesting that for many activities
+that pose small risks but that nonetheless receive public concern, people
+
+24 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 727.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+1068 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+perceive low benefits as well as high risks.25 For example, nuclear power
+itself is seen as a low-benefit, high-risk activity. Similar findings appear for
+some activities that are in fact relatively high risk: a judgment of low risk
+accompanies a judgment of high benefits. The very fact that activities are
+known to have high benefits skews judgment in their favor and hence
+makes people understate the costs as well.
+The obvious conclusion is that sometimes people favor regulation of
+some risks because the underlying activities are not seen to have compensating
+benefits.26 Thus for some activities, trade-offs are not perceived at all.
+Dangers are effectively on-screen, but benefits are off-screen. Note that this
+is not because such activities do not, in fact, have compensating benefits. It
+is because of a kind of perceptual illusion, a cognitive bias.
+An important factor here is loss aversion. People tend to be loss averse,
+in the sense that a loss from the status quo is seen as more undesirable than
+a gain is seen as desirable.27 In the context of risk regulation, the consequence
+is that any newly introduced risk, or any aggravation of existing
+risks, is seen as a serious problem, even if the accompanying benefits (a
+gain from the status quo and hence perceived as less salient and less important)
+are considerable.28 Thus when a new risk adds danger, people may focus
+on the danger itself and not on the benefits that accompany the danger.
+And an important problem here is that in many cases where dangers are onscreen
+and benefits off-screen, the magnitude of the danger is actually quite
+low. Cost-benefit analysis can be a corrective here, by placing the various
+effects on-screen.
+
+D. Systemic Effects and Health-Health Trade-Offs
+
+Often people focus on small pieces of complex problems, and causal
+changes are hard to trace. They ‘‘bracket’’ resulting issues. Consider an
+
+25 The fact that nuclear power and application of pesticides produce benefits as well as
+risks may not register on the lay viewscreen, and this may help produce a high-risk judgment.
+See Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship
+between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085, 1088 (1994). 26 See Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk (1996), for a detailed discussion of how this
+point bears on the different risk judgments of experts and lay people. 27 See Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Economics,
+in Quasi Rational Economics 137, 143 (Richard H. Thaler ed. 1991) (arguing that ‘‘losses
+loom larger than gains’’); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental
+Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325, 1328
+(1990); Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics
+665–70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds. 1995). 28 For some policy implications of loss aversion, see Jack L. Knetsch, Reference States,
+Fairness, and Choice of Measure to Value Environmental Changes, in Environment, Ethics,
+and Behavior: The Psychology of Environmental Valuation and Degradation 52, 64–65 (Max
+H. Bazerman et al. eds. 1997).
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1069
+
+analogy. The German psychologist Dietrich Do¨rner has done some illuminating
+computer experiments designed to see whether people can engage in
+successful social engineering.29 Participants are asked to solve problems
+faced by the inhabitants of some region of the world. Through the magic
+of the computer, many policy initiatives are available to solve the relevant
+problems (improved care of cattle, childhood immunization, drilling more
+wells). But most of the participants produce eventual calamities, because
+they do not see the complex, systemwide effects of particular interventions.
+Only the rare participant can see a number of steps down the road—to understand
+the multiple effects of one-shot interventions on the system.
+Often regulation has similar systemic effects. A decision to regulate nuclear
+power may, for example, increase the demand for coal-fired power
+plants, with harmful environmental consequences.30 A decision to impose
+fuel economy standards on new cars may cause a downsizing of the fleet,
+and in that way increase risks to life. A decision to ban asbestos may cause
+manufacturers to use less safe substitutes. Regulation of tropospheric ozone
+may control the health dangers of ozone, but ozone has various benefits as
+well, including protection against cataracts and skin cancer; hence regulation
+of ozone may cause health problems equal to those that it reduces.31
+Indeed, regulation of ozone will increase electricity prices, and because
+higher electricity prices will deprive poor people of air conditioning or lead
+them to use it less, such regulation may literally kill people.32
+These are simply a few examples of situations in which a government
+agency is making health-health trade-offs in light of the systemic effects of
+one-shot interventions. Indeed, any regulation that imposes high costs will,
+by virtue of that fact, produce some risks to life and health, since ‘‘richer
+is safer.’’33 A virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that it tends to overcome peo29
+See Dietrich Do¨rner, The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can
+Do to Make Them Right (1996). 30 See Stephen G. Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court’s Role in the Nuclear Energy
+Controversy, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1833, 1835–90 (1978). See generally Peter Huber, Electricity
+and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1002 (1987). 31 See Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screening by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications
+for the NAAQS, 31 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 142A, 144A (1997) (estimating that the
+EPA’s new ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) could cause 25–50
+more melanoma skin cancer deaths and increase the number of cataract cases by 13,000–
+28,000 each year). See also Ralph L. Keeney & Kenneth Green, Estimating Fatalities Induced
+by Economic Impacts of EPA’s Ozone and Particulate Standards 8 (Policy Study No. 225,
+Reason Public Policy Institute, June 1997) (calculating that if attainment of the new standards
+costs $10 billion annually, a number well within EPA’s estimated cost range, it will contribute
+to 2,200 premature deaths annually). On the general phenomenon, see John D. Graham &
+Jonathan Baert Wiener, Risk versus Risk (1995). 32 See C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act under Regulatory Reform, 11 Tulane Envtl. L.
+J. 235 (1998). 33 John D. Graham, Bei-Hung Chang, & John S. Evans, Poorer Is Riskier, 12 Risk Analysis
+333, 333–35 (1992); Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+1070 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+ple’s tendency to focus on parts of problems, by requiring them to look
+globally at the consequences of apparently isolated actions.
+
+E. Emotions and Alarmist Bias
+
+A set of data now suggests that people are subject to alarmist bias.34 The
+mere existence of discussions of new risks can aggravate concern, even
+when the discussions take the form of assurances that the risk level is relatively
+low. And when presented with information suggesting that a risk may
+range from A (low) to Z (high), the high risk number is especially salient,
+and it appears to have a disproportionate effect on behavior.
+A recent paper by George Loewenstein et al. suggests that risk-related
+concerns are often based on feelings rather than judgments.35 Thus riskrelated
+objections can be a product not so much of thinking as of intense
+emotions, often produced by extremely vivid images of what might go
+wrong. This point is supported by evidence that reported feelings of worry
+are sometimes sensitive not to the probability of the bad outcome but only
+to its severity.36 Vivid mental pictures of widespread death or catastrophe
+can drive a demand for risk regulation. Consider, for example, the motivations
+of those who press for regulation of airplane safety in the aftermath
+of an airplane crash, even though such regulation may increase travel risks
+on balance (by driving up the price of flying and causing a shift to driving,
+a more dangerous form of transportation).37
+It is important to be careful with the relevant categories here. There is
+no sharp distinction between cognition and emotion.38 Emotions are generally
+the products of beliefs, and hence an emotional reaction to risk—terror,
+for example—is generally mediated by judgments.39 But this is not always
+true; sometimes the operation of the brain allows intense emotional reacHealth-Health
+Analysis, 22 Ecology L. Q. 729 (1995); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks
+Induced by the Costs of Regulations, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 95 (1994); Aaron Wildavsky,
+Richer Is Safer, 60 Pub. Interest 23 (1980); Aaron Wildavsky, Searching for Safety 59–75
+(1988). 34 See W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 Econ. J.
+1657, 1657–58 (1997) (studying situations under which ‘‘[n]ew information about risks may
+generate alarmist actions that are not commensurate with the magnitude of the risks’’). 35 See G. F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings (unpublished manuscript, Carnegie Mellon
+Univ., May 4, 1999). 36 Id. at 12. 37 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security: An Analysis of
+the White House Commission’s Recommendations, 20 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 791 (1997). 38 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in the Criminal
+Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev 269 (1996); Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and
+the Emotions (1999). 39 Elster, supra note 38.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+COGNITION AND CBA 1071
+
+tions with minimal cognitive activity.40 In any case the judgments that fuel
+emotions may be unreliable. We need not venture into controversial territory
+in order to urge not that emotions are free of cognition but that some
+risks produce extremely sharp, largely visceral reactions. These reactions
+can be impervious to argument. Experience with mass panics has shown
+exactly this structure, as assurances based on statistical evidence have little
+effect in the face of vivid images of what might go wrong.41 Some fears
+even appear to have a genetic foundation; consider, as a possible example,
+fear of snakes, found in people who have no reason to think that snakes are
+dangerous.
+The role of cost-benefit analysis is straightforward here. Just as the Senate
+was designed to have a cooling effect on the passions of the House of
+Representatives, so cost-benefit analysis might ensure that policy is driven
+not by hysteria or unfounded alarm but by a full appreciation of the effects
+of relevant risks and their control. If the hysteria survives an investigation
+of consequences, then the hysteria is fully rational, and an immediate and
+intensive regulatory response is entirely appropriate.
+Nor is cost-benefit analysis, in this setting, only a check on unwarranted
+regulation. It can and should serve as a spur to regulation as well. If risks
+do not produce visceral reactions, partly because the underlying activities
+do not yield vivid mental images, cost-benefit analysis can show that they
+nonetheless warrant regulatory control. The elimination of lead in gasoline
+is a case in point.42
+
+F. Separate Evaluation and Incoherence
+
+Suppose that you are asked to say, without reference to any other problem,
+how much you would be willing to pay to protect certain threats to
+coral reefs. Now suppose that you are asked to say, without reference to
+any other problem, how much you would pay to protect against skin cancer
+among the elderly. Suppose, finally, that you are asked to say how much
+you would be willing to pay to protect certain threats to coral reefs and how
+much you would be willing to pay to protect against skin cancer among the
+elderly. Empirical evidence suggests that people’s answers to questions
+taken in isolation are very different from their answer to questions when
+they are asked to engage in cross-category comparisons.43 It appears that
+
+40 See Loewenstein et al., supra note 35. 41 See the discussion of Love Canal in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 691–98. 42 See Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Richard D. Morgenstern
+ed. 1997). 43 See Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov, & David Schkade, Economic Preferences or Attitude
+Expressions? An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, 19 J. Risk & Uncertainty
+203 (1999); Daniel Kahneman et al., Reversals of Judgment: The Effect of CrossThis
+content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+1072 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+when people assess problems in isolation, they do so by reference to other
+problems in the same basic category—and that this intuitive process is dramatically
+altered when people are explicitly told to assess problems from
+other categories as well. The result of assessing individual problems, taken
+in isolation, is to produce what people would themselves consider a form
+of incoherence.
+The forms of regulatory spending shown in Table 1 undoubtedly reflect,
+in part, the kinds of irrationality that follow from judgments that are made
+without close reference to other problems from different categories. Incoherence
+is the natural result of the relevant cognitive processes. The argument
+for a form of cost-benefit analysis is straightforward: it operates as a
+built-in corrective to some of the distortions that come from taking problems
+in isolation. The point applies to contingent valuation assessments, but
+it operates more broadly with respect to expenditure decisions that otherwise
+risk incoherence, simply by virtue of the fact that they operate without
+looking at other problems, including those from other categories.
+
+G. General Implications
+
+The cognitive argument for cost-benefit analysis is now in place. It is
+important but obvious to say that people lack information and that their lack
+of information can lead to an inadequate or excessive demand for regulation
+or a form of ‘‘paranoia and neglect.’’44 What is less obvious is that predictable
+features of cognition will lead to a demand for regulation that is unlikely
+to be based on the facts. When people ask for regulation because of
+fears fueled by availability cascades, and when the benefits from the riskproducing
+activity are not registering, it would be highly desirable to create
+cost-benefit filters on their requests. When interest groups exploit cognitive
+mechanisms to create unwarranted fear or diminish concern with serious
+problems, it is desirable to have institutional safeguards. When people fail
+to ask for regulation for related reasons, it would be desirable to create a
+mechanism by which government might nonetheless act if the consequences
+of action would be good. Here too cost-benefit balancing might be desirable,
+as in fact it has proved to be in connection not only with the phaseout
+of lead but also with the Reagan administration’s decision to phase out
+
+Category Comparisons on Intendedly Absolute Responses (unpublished manuscript,
+Princeton Univ. 1999). See also Daniel Read, George Loewenstein, & Matthew Rabin,
+Choice Bracketing, 19 J. Risk & Uncertainty 171 (1999). 44 See John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in Hahn ed.,
+supra note 9.
+
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+COGNITION AND CBA 1073
+
+chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), motivated by a cost-benefit analysis suggesting
+that the phaseout would do far more good than harm.45
+A caveat: It is entirely possible that the public demand for regulation will
+result from something other than cognitive errors, even if the relevant risk
+seems low as a statistical matter. People may think, for example, that it is
+especially important to protect poor children from a certain risk in a geographically
+isolated area, and they may be willing to devote an unusually
+large amount to ensure that protection. What seems to be a cognitive error
+may turn out, on reflection, to be a judgment of value, and a judgment that
+can survive reflection. I will return to this point. For the moment note two
+simple points. Whether an error is involved is an empirical question, subject,
+at least in principle, to empirical testing. And nothing in cost-benefit
+analysis would prevent people from devoting resources to projects that they
+consider worthy, even if the risk is relatively low as a statistical matter.
+I have not yet discussed what cost-benefit analysis specifically entails,
+and there are potentially serious controversies here. But it will be best to
+discuss that question after dealing with some direct objections.
+
+III. Objections: Populism, Quantification,
+and Rival Rationalities
+
+The argument made thus far runs into three obvious objections. The first
+involves democratic considerations; the second points to the limitations of
+quantification; the third raises the possibility that ordinary people’s judgments
+are based not on cognitive limitations but on a kind of ‘‘rival rationality.’’A.
+Populism
+
+The first objection, populist in character, is captured by the opening quotation
+from Senator Biden. The objection would be that in a democracy,
+government properly responds to the social demand for law. Government
+does not legitimately reject that demand on the ground that cost-benefit
+analysis suggests that it should not act. Any approach that uses efficiency,
+or technocratically driven judgments, as a brake on accountability is fatally
+undemocratic.
+
+45 See Morgenstern ed., supra note 42. See also Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy:
+New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 63 (1991) (Reagan administration supported
+aggressive regulation largely because cost-benefit analysis from the Council of Economic
+Advisers demonstrated that ‘‘despite the scientific and economic uncertainties, the
+monetary benefits of preventing future deaths from skin cancer far outweighed costs of CFC
+controls as estimated either by industry or by EPA’’).
+
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+1074 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+The problem with this objection is that it rests on a controversial and
+even unacceptable conception of democracy, one that sees responsiveness
+to citizens’ demands, whatever their factual basis, as the foundation of political
+legitimacy. If those demands are uninformed, it is perfectly appropriate
+for government to resist them. Indeed, it is far from clear that reasonable
+citizens want, or would want, their government to respond to their
+uninformed demands.
+The analysis thus far suggests that the relevant demands are, in fact, uninformed
+or unreflective. If this is so, they should be subject to deliberative
+constraints of the sort exemplified by cost-benefit analysis. After that analysis
+has been generated, and public officials have taken it into account, democratic
+safeguards continue to be available, and electoral sanctions can be
+imposed on those who have violated the public will. The simple point is
+that if, once informed if the cost-benefit trade-off, people continue to seek
+some particular regulation, then democratic considerations require government
+to respect their choice.46 At the very least, cost-benefit analysis should
+be an ingredient in the analysis, showing people that the consequences of
+various approaches might be different from what they seem.
+
+B. Quantification and Expressive Rationality
+
+I have noted that the cost-benefit chart (Table 1) described above raised
+many questions. Those questions might be made into a thoroughgoing challenge
+to cost-benefit analysis. In an extensive discussion, Lisa Heinzerling
+has attempted to do precisely that.47 Heinzerling argues that many of the
+values depend on controversial judgments of value and that the table itself
+masks those judgments. Her first point is that the table includes many regulations
+that were in fact rejected. Some of them were not issued on the
+ground that their costs would exceed their benefits. The table is also underinclusive,
+for many regulations have been issued that impose dramatically
+lower costs than many of those included on the table. But by itself this is
+no indictment of cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, it provides support for costbenefit
+analysis insofar as it suggests that the tool has resulted in a rejection
+of undesirable regulations.
+But Heinzerling goes further. She contends that many of these numbers
+depend on controversial judgments about how to discount future benefits.
+Above all, the charts depend on a 10 percent discount rate, whereas the
+agencies tended to use a lower discount rate or not to discount at all. Heinz46
+At least assuming the decisions involve nothing peculiar or invidious, such as racial
+animus. 47 See Heinzerling, supra note 8. Heinzerling’s alternative table appears in id. at 2040 n.397.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+COGNITION AND CBA 1075
+
+TABLE 3
+
+Corrected (?) Table on Cost Effectiveness of Regulations
+
+Adjusted
+Agency Cost Estimate
+Regulation and Year (1995 $Thousands)
+Asbestos OSHA 1972 700
+Benzene OSHA 1985 2,570
+Arsenic/glass plant EPA 1986 6,610
+Ethylene oxide OSHA 1984 3,020–5,780
+Uranium mill tailings/inactive EPA 1983 2,410
+Acrylonitrile OSHA 1978 8,570
+Uranium mill tailings/active EPA 1983 3,840
+Coke ovens OSHA 1976 12,420
+Asbestos OSHA 1986 3,860
+Arsenic OSHA 1978 24,490
+Arsenic/low-arsenic copper EPA 1986 5,740
+Land disposal EPA 1986 3,280
+Formaldehyde OSHA 1985 31,100
+
+Note.—OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration; EPA: Environmental
+Protection Agency.
+
+erling also suggests that the charts depend on downward adjustment of the
+agency’s estimates of risk. Her own estimates result in Table 3, adjusted
+for inflation.
+This table may be more accurate than Table 1; certainly there are problems
+with any approach that assumes a 10 percent discount rate. But even
+if Heinzerling’s table is better, it offers an ironic lesson, serving largely to
+confirm the point that current regulatory policy suffers from poor priority
+setting. The disparities here are not as dramatic, and they certainly do not
+establish pervasive overregulation; but they do support the view that resources
+are being misallocated.
+Heinzerling does not, however, conclude that this revised table is the appropriate
+basis for evaluating regulatory policy. Her aim is not to come up
+with a better table from which to reassess government behavior. On the
+contrary, she takes her argument to be a basis for rejecting cost-benefit analysis
+altogether. This, then, is a lesson about ‘‘the perils of precision.’’48
+Heinzerling also suggests that it ‘‘would be better if we left the picture
+blurry, and declined to connect the dots between all the confusing and
+sometimes conflicting intuitions and evidence.’’49 She is concerned that
+‘‘some, probably many, people will be fooled into believing that numerical
+
+48 Id. at 2042. 49 Id. at 2069.
+
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+1076 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+estimates of risks, costs, and benefits are impartial reflections of factual reality,
+in which case the likely result of increased reliance on quantification
+in setting regulatory policy will be that the side that best obscures the value
+choices implicit in its numbers will prevail.’’50
+There is considerable truth here; but I think that Heinzerling’s lesson is
+greatly overdrawn. Truth first: If an agency says that the cost of regulation
+is $100 million, and the benefit $70 million, we still know much less than
+we should. It is important to know who bears these costs and, if possible,
+with what consequences. Will wages be lower? Whose wages? Will prices
+be higher? Of what products? A disaggregated picture of the benefits would
+also be important; what does the $70 million figure represent? Consider, for
+example, a recent table explaining that the costs of skin cancer, from health
+effects of reducing tropospheric ozone, are between $290 million and $1.1
+billion, with dollar subtotals for skin cancers and cataracts.51 By itself, this
+table is insufficiently informative to tell people what they need to know.
+Heinzerling is therefore on firm ground if she means to suggest that the
+dollar numbers cannot substitute for a fuller inquiry into what is at stake.
+Any cost-benefit analysis should include more than the monetary values by,
+for example, showing what the values are about, such as life-years saved
+and illnesses averted (see the Appendix for illustrations). But her own table
+suggests that the general conclusion—that cost-benefit analysis can illuminate
+inquiry—remains unassailable. If regulation ranges from tens of thousands
+of dollars to tens of millions of dollars per life saved, at least there
+is a presumptive problem. One of the functions of cost-benefit balancing is
+to help show where limited resources should go. A regulation of particulates
+is hard to evaluate without knowing, for example, the number of
+deaths averted and the range of consequences for morbidity: How many
+workdays will be saved that would otherwise be lost? How many hospitalizations
+will be avoided? How many asthma attacks will be prevented?
+It could even be useful to attempt to describe these effects in terms of
+‘‘quality-adjusted life-years,’’52 knowing that here, too, a good analyst will
+go back and forth between bottom lines and the judgments that go into their
+creation.
+I suspect that there may be theoretical claims behind Heinzerling’s skepticism
+about quantification. She may believe that many of the goods at stake
+
+50 Id. at 2068. 51 See Lutter & Wolz, supra note 31, at 145. In fairness to the authors, it should be noted
+that a previous table in their essay describes adverse health effects in quantitative terms by
+listing the numbers of cases averted. 52 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi.
+L. Rev. 1 (1995); American Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 1999 WL 300618 (D.C. Cir. May 14,
+1999).
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+COGNITION AND CBA 1077
+
+in regulation (human and animal life and health, recreational and aesthetic
+opportunities) are not merely commodities, that people do not value these
+goods in the same way that they value cash, and that cost-benefit analysis,
+with its reductionism, is inconsistent with people’s reflective judgments
+about the issues at stake. Arguments of this sort have been developed in
+some philosophical challenges to cost-benefit analysis.53
+Such arguments are convincing if cost-benefit analysis is taken to suggest
+a controversial position in favor of the commensurability of all goods—
+if cost-benefit analysts are seen to insist that people value environmental
+amenities, or their own lives, in the same way that they value a bank account,
+or if cost-benefit analysis is taken as a metaphysical claim to the effect
+that all goods can be aligned along a single metric, or as if five lives
+saved is seen as the same, in some deep sense, as $20–$30 million saved.
+Part of what people express, in their daily lives, is a resistance to this form
+of commensurability; some goods are believed to have intrinsic as well as
+instrumental value.54
+The existence of qualitative differences among goods fortifies the claim
+that any bottom line about costs and benefits should be supplemented with
+a more qualitative description of the variables involved. But cost-benefit
+analysis should not be seen as embodying a reductionist account of the
+good, and much less as a suggestion that everything is simply a commodity
+for human use. It is best taken as pragmatic instrument, agnostic on the
+deep issues and designed to assist people in making complex judgments
+where multiple goods are involved. To put it another way, cost-benefit analysis
+might be assessed pragmatically, or even politically, rather than metaphysically.We
+should conclude that the final number may provide less information
+than the ingredients that went into it and that officials should present costbenefit
+analysis in sufficiently full terms to enable people to have a concrete
+sense of the effects of regulation. This is an argument against some overambitious
+understandings of what cost-benefit balancing entails. But it is not
+an argument against cost-benefit balancing.
+
+C. Rival Rationalities
+
+The final objection to the discussion thus far is the most fundamental. On
+this view, cost-benefit analysis is not desirable as a check on ordinary intuitions,
+because those intuitions reflect a kind of rival rationality. Ordinary
+people have a complex understanding of what it is that they want to max53
+See Anderson, supra note 3. 54 See id.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+1078 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+TABLE 4
+
+Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in Risk Judgments
+
+Risk Traits Aggravating Mitigating
+
+Familiarity New Old
+Personal control Uncontrollable Controllable
+Voluntariness Involuntary Voluntary
+Media attention Heavy media coverage Ignored by media
+Equity Unfairly distributed Equitably distributed
+Children At special risk Not at risk
+Future generations At risk Not at risk
+Reversibility Irreversible Reversible
+Identifiability of victims Known Identifiable
+Accompanying benefits Clear Invisible
+Source Human origin Created by nature
+Trust in relevant institutions Low High
+Timing of adverse effects Delayed Immediate
+
+imize. They do not simply tabulate lives saved; they ask questions as well
+about whether the relevant risk is controllable, voluntary, dreaded, equitably
+distributed, and potentially catastrophic. Consider Table 4.
+Some people suggest that to the extent that ordinary people disagree with
+experts, they have a ‘‘thicker’’ or ‘‘richer’’ rationality and that democracy
+should respect their judgments.55 On a more moderate view, government’s
+task is to distinguish between lay judgments that are products of factual
+mistakes (produced, for example, by the availability heuristic) and lay judgments
+that are products of judgments of value (as in the view that voluntarily
+incurred risks deserve less attention than involuntarily incurred
+ones).56 In any case the ‘‘psychometric paradigm’’ is designed show how
+ordinary people’s judgments are responsive to an array of factors other than
+lives saved.57
+One problem with this view is that it may not be a criticism of costbenefit
+analysis at all; it may suggest only that any judgment about benefits
+and costs (whether or not based on willingness to pay) will have to take
+account of people’s divergent assessments of divergent risks. In principle,
+there is no problem with doing exactly that. There is, however, reason to
+question the now-conventional view that qualitative factors of this kind in
+
+55 See Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, & Sarah Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk: A Psychological
+Perspective, in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 241 (Roger G. Noll ed.
+1985). 56 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi.
+L. Rev. 1 (1995). 57 See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment
+Battlefield, 44 U. Chi. Legal F. 59 (1997).
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1079
+
+fact explain people’s disagreement with experts about certain risks of death.
+In fact, I do not believe that the psychometric paradigm can defend its own
+central claims. The first point is technical. In the relevant studies, the key
+factors—voluntariness, controllability, potentially catastrophic nature—
+have usually not been generated spontaneously or independently by subjects.
+Instead, those who conduct the relevant research ask people to rank
+risks along these dimensions. From this information it cannot be said that
+ordinary people think that these qualitative differences justify departing
+from the lives-saved criterion. The evidence is simply too indirect.
+Now this does not mean that the rival rationalities view is wrong. There
+is independent evidence to suggest that people consider some deaths to be
+worse than others.58 They are apparently willing to pay more, for example,
+to prevent a cancer death than to prevent an unforeseen instant death, and
+there is some evidence that voluntarily incurred risks receive less social
+concern than risks that are involuntarily incurred. Distributional judgments
+also appear to play some role in assessments about how to allocate scarce
+resources. But these points raise further questions.59
+No doubt it is possible that people’s judgments about risk severity are a
+product of some of the more qualitative considerations listed above; this
+idea leads to the widespread view that ordinary people have a richer rationality
+than do experts, since ordinary people look at the nature and causes
+of death, not simply at aggregate deaths at issue. But it is also possible that
+an apparently rich judgment that a certain risk is severe, or not severe, depends
+not on well-considered judgments of value, but instead on an absence
+of ordinary contextual cues, on a failure to see that trade-offs are inevitably
+being made, on heuristic devices that are not well adapted to the particular
+context, or instead on a range of confusing or confused ideas that people
+cannot fully articulate. When people say, for example, that the risk of nuclear
+power is very serious, they may be responding to their intense visceral
+concern, possibly based on (uninformed) statistical judgments about likely
+lives at risk and on their failure to see (as they do in other contexts) that
+the risk is accompanied by a range of social benefits. Thus it is possible
+that a judgment that a certain risk of death is unusually bad is not a rich
+qualitative assessment but an (unreliable) intuition based on a rapid balancing
+that prominently includes perceived lives at stake and the perceived
+presence of small or no benefits associated with the risk-producing activity.
+Thus the question becomes whether citizen judgments that certain deaths
+
+58 Some of the data are collected in Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. Risk & Uncertainty
+259 (1997). 59 I draw in the next several paragraphs from id.; Margolis, supra note 26, contains an
+excellent discussion of this point, from which I have learned a great deal.
+
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+1080 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+are especially bad can survive a process of reflection. My conclusion is that
+understood in a certain way, the notions of dreaded deaths and unfairly distributed
+deaths are fully reasonable and deserve a role in policy. But the
+special concerns about deaths stemming from involuntarily run and uncontrollable
+risks raise serious doubts; as frequently invoked, they do not justify
+according additional concern to deaths that ‘‘code’’ as a product of involuntary
+or uncontrollable risks. At most, they suggest that government
+might spend more resources on deaths where the cost of risk avoidance is
+especially high and devote less attention to deaths where the cost of risk
+avoidance is especially low.60
+
+1. Dread
+
+It is often said, on the basis of evidence like that outlined above, that
+especially dreaded deaths deserve special attention. Deaths from cancer and
+AIDS fall in this category. The underlying point is probably that the relevant
+deaths are especially grueling and hence there is a kind of ‘‘pain and
+suffering premium’’—not merely a life lost, but an antecedent period of
+intense emotional and physical difficulty as well. This period of intense difficulty
+might impose costs on those with the illness and on friends and family
+members as well. Sudden, unanticipated deaths can be dreaded too—
+consider the extremely unpleasant idea of dying in an airplane crash. But
+the dread here stems from some factor (perhaps terror) different from and
+much shorter than the extended period of suffering that precedes some
+deaths. Thus it might be concluded that dreaded deaths deserve special attention
+in accordance with the degree of suffering that precedes them. A
+special problem with cancer deaths is that at least some of the time, people
+like to have upward-sloping utility. It is particularly bad to be in a situation
+in which things will constantly get worse.61 With cancer deaths, the slope
+goes downward fairly consistently until the point of death.
+
+2. Voluntariness
+
+People seem to perceive voluntarily incurred risks as less troublesome
+than involuntarily incurred risks. Consider diverse public reactions to airplane
+crashes and automobile crashes. Or consider the fact that tobacco is
+by far the largest source of preventable deaths in the United States. Why
+have we until recently not devoted much more of our regulatory effort to
+
+60 I borrow the next few pages from Sunstein, supra note 58. 61 See George Loewenstein & Nachom Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage
+Profiles? 9 J. Lab. Econ. 67, 71–75 (1991); George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Negative–
+Time Preference, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 347, 347 (1991).
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+COGNITION AND CBA 1081
+
+reducing smoking? The reason seems to lie in a judgment that smoking is
+a voluntary activity, and hence the resulting deaths are less troublesome
+than other sorts of deaths. Here—it might be said—people have voluntarily
+assumed the relevant risks.
+Puzzles: High Cost of Avoidance Rather than Involuntariness? A simple
+reference to voluntariness, if taken to suggest something special about
+‘‘lay rationality,’’ raises many puzzles. The most important problem is that
+it is not simple to know when a risk is voluntarily incurred. Voluntariness
+may be entirely absent in the case of an unforeseeable collision with an
+asteroid; but voluntariness is not, in the cases under consideration, an allor-nothing
+matter. Instead, it is a matter of degree. Return to the conventional
+thought that airplane crashes are involuntary and automobile crashes
+more voluntary. Certainly it would be possible to see the risks from air
+travel as voluntarily run; people have a choice about whether to fly, and
+when they do fly, they pay a certain amount for a certain package, including
+risks of various sorts. The same is true of automobile safety—and it is not
+in any way less true, however disparate the two kinds of risks may seem.
+Perhaps people are responding to the perceived fact that they have no control
+over the pilot’s behavior, whereas they have considerable control over
+automobile safety if they are themselves drivers. But airlines respond to
+market forces, including the market for safety, and many people injured in
+automobile accidents are not at fault. The difference between the two risks
+is hardly so categorical as to justify an assessment that they fall on poles
+of some voluntariness-involuntariness divide. Indeed, it is not clear even
+what is meant by the suggestion that one is voluntary and the other is not.
+Something else appears to underlie that suggestion.
+Three Cases. To shed some light on the issue, let us consider three
+classes of cases. First, consider the question whether workers exposed to
+cancer risks are voluntarily or involuntarily so exposed. If workers do not
+know about such risks—if they lack relevant information—we seem to
+have an easy case of involuntariness. Thus it makes sense to say that risks
+are run involuntarily when the people running them do not know about
+them. Lack of adequate information provides a legitimate basis for a judgment
+of involuntary exposure to risk. But of course information itself can
+be obtained at some cost, pecuniary or otherwise. We are thus dealing, in
+cases of this kind, with high costs of risk avoidance, in the distinctive form
+of high costs of acquiring relevant information.
+Second, suppose that people who are exposed to a certain risk are aware
+of the risk but are not in an actual or potential contractual relation with the
+risk producer. Many victims of pollution are in this position; recall that in
+surveys air pollution is a particular source of public concern. People in Los
+Angeles may well know that they face high levels of smog. Are they exThis
+content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+1082 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+posed involuntarily? If we conclude that they are, we may mean that a risk
+is incurred involuntarily in the sense that it is typically very expensive for
+people to avoid it—and when someone else can reduce the risks more
+cheaply. Here a claim that the risk is faced ‘‘involuntarily’’ may mean that
+those who run the risk can reduce it only at very high cost, at least compared
+to those who produce the risk. (The quotation marks are necessary
+for obvious Coasean reasons.) Or it is possible that we mean that on nonutilitarian
+grounds, the people exposed to the risk have a moral entitlement
+to be free from it, at least if they have not explicitly sold it.
+But turn now to a third class of cases, involving a wage package or contract
+that does include compensation for the relevant risks. Assuming that
+point, we might want to distinguish between two different possibilities. In
+a case of a high-level scientist, knowledgeable about relevant risks and involved
+in work that he finds rewarding, people may well conclude that we
+have an instance of voluntariness. (In the same category can be found the
+case of an astronaut.) But people might not say the same about a low-level
+worker who does not like his work at all.62 What distinguishes the two
+cases? If knowledge is present, or if the compensation package includes
+payment for the relevant risk, it is not clear how the two differ. The underlying
+judgment must be that the compensation is inadequate, perhaps because
+background inequality has produced a wage package that seems unfair
+even if voluntarily chosen by the parties.
+From this discussion it seems reasonable to speculate that any judgment
+that a risk is run ‘‘involuntarily’’ is probably based on (1) a lack of knowledge
+of the risk or, more accurately, high costs of obtaining information
+about the risk; (2) a belief that, information to one side, it would be very
+costly for people to avoid the risk; or (3) a belief that the risk is unaccompanied
+by compensating benefits, notwithstanding their belief that the contract
+is in some sense worth signing. It may seem hard to make sense of point
+3; what might be at work is a judgment that background inequalities are
+producing the relevant bargain (not by itself a good reason to disrupt the
+deal), or perhaps a belief that workers are competing to their collective detriment,
+and an agreement not to compete would be in their best interests.
+On this view, the question whether a risk is run voluntarily or not is often
+not a categorical one but instead a question of degree, associated with information
+cost, risk-reduction cost, and the existence or not of accompanying
+benefits. Of course there are interesting background questions about why
+and when a risk codes as voluntary or involuntary; undoubtedly the answer
+depends a great deal on heuristic devices and selective attention.
+
+62 Compare Anderson, supra note 3.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+COGNITION AND CBA 1083
+
+The Purpose for Which the Risk Is Incurred and Problems of Responsibility
+and Blame. Death risks may seem voluntarily run when people do
+not approve of the purpose for which people run the relevant risks, and involuntarily
+run when people think that the purpose for which the risk is run
+is laudable. It is predictable that people will not want to pour enormous
+taxpayer resources into lowering the risks associated with skydiving, even
+if the dollars/life-years saved ratio is quite good. By contrast, it is doubtful
+that people think that it is wrong to spend enormous resources on the prevention
+of death from childbirth or being a police officer, even though the
+decision to have a child is (with appropriate qualifications) voluntary, and
+so too with the decision to become a police officer. People may think that
+when the appeal or purpose of the activity is associated with its very riskiness,
+resources should not be devoted to risk reduction. At least this is plausible
+when the risk is an independent good or part of the benefit of the activity.
+And it is easy to imagine a belief that some activities—unsafe sex,
+cigarette smoking—are like the skydiving case, perhaps because the risk is
+sometimes part of the benefit, perhaps because the risks are not incurred for
+a purpose that observers find worthy or valuable.
+It might seem that this consideration—the purpose for which the risk is
+incurred—overlaps with or is even identical to the question whether there
+are high costs of risk avoidance. When the costs are low, as in skydiving,
+the purpose might seem inadequate. But on reflection the two ideas are
+hardly the same. It may well be that failing to sky dive, or skydiving with
+some safety-increasing technology, imposes high costs on sky divers. There
+seems to be an objective judgment, not necessarily connected with subjective
+costs, in the claim that some risks are voluntary, or deserve less attention,
+because they are run for inadequate purposes.
+Relatedly, airplane accidents may seem different from automobile accidents
+not because the former are less voluntary, and not because of diverse
+costs of risk avoidance, but because the victims of airplane accidents are
+less blameworthy than the victims of automobile accidents, in the sense that
+the death is not a product of their own negligence or misconduct. In the
+case of an airplane disaster, weather conditions, mechanical failure, or pilot
+error are likely causes; in the case of an automobile accident, it is more
+likely (though not of course certain) that the victim could have avoided
+death through more careful driving. The point is crude, since many victims
+of automobile accidents are not drivers and many drivers in accidents do
+not behave negligently. But the perceived difference, in a significant number
+of cases, may underlie an apparent judgment of voluntariness that is
+really a judgment about responsibility and blameworthiness. In any case
+judgments are likely to be affected, and distorted, by the fact that drivers
+seem to be risk optimists—with 90 percent ranking themselves as safer than
+
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+1084 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+the average driver and less likely to be involved in an accident.63 This is
+another place—illusions of control and risk optimism—where cognitive
+psychology argues in favor of cost-benefit analysis.
+Underlying Questions and Assumption of Risk. We might therefore
+conclude that whether a risk qualifies as involuntary raises many of the
+questions raised by the question whether government should regulate the
+market at all. A risk might be characterized as involuntarily run because
+affected people lack relevant information, because the transactions costs of
+bargaining are high, because the risks should be seen to amount to externalities,
+because collective action problems make market outcomes unsatisfactory
+since (for example) workers are in a Prisoner’s Dilemma best solved
+through law, or because some motivational or cognitive defect makes successful
+solutions through markets unlikely. These of course are among the
+conventional grounds for regulation in the first instance. When a risk seems
+voluntary, and not worthy of substantial regulatory resources, the term
+‘‘voluntary’’ is serving as a placeholder for an argument that there is no
+sufficient ground for government action, because the accompanying benefits
+are high or the risk-reduction costs are low, and because market arrangements
+take adequate account of these facts.
+Should voluntarily run risks of death receive no public attention, on the
+ground that the relevant people have already received compensation? We
+might imagine a death risk to be incurred voluntarily when an informed person
+decides to incur it in light of its costs and benefits. Suppose, for example,
+that someone purchases a small car with fewer safety features, or decides
+to become a boxer, an astronaut, or a police officer in a dangerous
+neighborhood. If a death results from such a choice, it might seem that the
+chooser has no legitimate ground for complaint; there has been ex ante
+compensation for the risk. But even in such cases, it is not clear that government
+lacks a role. If government can reduce a serious risk at low cost,
+and thus eliminate deaths, it should do so even if there was ex ante compensation
+for the relevant risk. There is a general point here. Sometimes observers
+confuse two quite different questions: (1) Should people be banned
+from running a certain risk, when they have run that risk voluntarily? (2)
+Should government attempt to reduce a certain risk, when people have run
+that risk voluntarily? A negative answer to question 1 does not answer
+question 2.
+From this point we should conclude that a lay judgment that a risk is
+‘‘voluntary’’ should not be decisive. A better understanding of what factors
+underlie and support that judgment should be used in regulatory policy.
+
+63 See Shelley E. Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind
+10 (1994).
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1085
+
+3. Ripple Effects
+
+The psychological evidence suggests, though it does not fully elaborate,
+an important and relevant fact: Some deaths produce unusually high externalities,
+in the sense that they generate widespread losses, including those
+stemming from empathy and fear, in a way that leads to predictable pecuniary
+and nonpecuniary costs. Consider, for example, the death of the president
+of the United States, a death that imposes a wide range of costs and
+that taxpayers invest significant resources to prevent. Part of the reason for
+allocating those resources is undoubtedly the greater risk that the president
+will be murdered; but the external costs associated with his death are undoubtedly
+important too. A parallel can be found in the relatively large level
+of resources devoted to prevent the assassination of many important public
+officials. But the point is hardly limited to the highest public officials. An
+airplane hijacking or crash, partly because it is likely to be well publicized,
+may produce large externalities in the form of empathy and fear. It may
+even deter air travel by making people unusually frightened of airplanes,
+simply because of heuristic devices (availability) and other predictable factors
+that make people’s probability assessments go awry. This fear may be
+damaging because it is itself a utility loss and because it may lead people
+to use less safe methods of transportation, such as automobiles. Or an airplane
+crash might be especially disturbing because the sudden loss of dozens
+or hundreds of people seems so unusually and senselessly tragic, in a
+way that produces large empathetic reactions, or because it signals the further
+possibility of random, apparently inexplicable events in which large
+numbers of people die.
+Special public concern about catastrophic events may reflect a judgment
+that certain kinds of deaths have ancillary effects, well beyond the deaths
+themselves. Consider in this regard the ‘‘Buffalo Creek Syndrome,’’ documented
+several times in the aftermath of major disasters. Nearly 2 years
+after the collapse of a dam that left 120 dead and 4,000 homeless, psychiatric
+researchers continued to find significant psychological and sociological
+changes; survivors were characterized by a loss of direction and energy,
+other disabling character changes, and a loss of communality.64 One evaluator
+attributed this loss of direction specifically to ‘‘the loss of traditional
+bonds of kinship and neighborliness.’’65
+These various points raise a number of questions. We do not yet have a
+
+64 Daniel J. Fiorino, Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis, 9 Risk Analysis
+293 (1989). 65 Id. at 295. See also J. D. Robinson, M. D. Higgins, & P. K. Bolyard, Assessing Environmental
+Impacts on Health: A Role for Behavioral Science, 4 Envtl. Impact Assessment Rev.
+41 (1983).
+
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+1086 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+full understanding of the basis for special public concern with catastrophes.
+Moreover, the argument for devoting special resources to deaths with externalities
+is strongest when the externalities do not reflect irrationality or cannot
+be reduced through other means. For example, some of the fear that
+follows certain widely reported deaths is based on confusion or ignorance
+about actual probabilities; if it is possible to dispel the confusion, the fear
+should dissipate as well. Here the question is whether government can legitimately
+spend extra resources to avert the harms associated with irrational
+public attitudes. Perhaps information-based strategies would be preferable
+to allocating additional resources to deaths whose occurrence produces
+widespread panic. On the other hand, there are undoubtedly instances in
+which information is ineffective, and there are also cases in which high externalities,
+in the form of special fear, are not a product of factual ignorance.
+In such cases government is justified in giving additional resources
+to death prevention.
+
+4. Inequitable Distribution
+
+Some risks might be, or be thought to be, inequitably distributed, above
+all because the victims are disproportionately members of socially disadvantaged
+groups. Certain deaths might, for example, be concentrated among
+poor people, African-Americans, or homosexuals. Consider the risk of lead
+paint poisoning suffered by inner-city children, or the risk of AIDS, faced
+disproportionately by African-Americans as well as homosexuals. Citizens
+or elected representatives may think that inequitably distributed risks of
+death deserve special attention from government.
+When such social concern exists, and when it is not objectionable on
+constitutional or other grounds, it is entirely legitimate for officials to respond.66
+Thus regulators should be permitted to use a uniform number per
+life or life-years saved; this is itself a (modest) redistributive strategy, because
+wealthy people (simply because they are wealthy) are willing to pay
+more to reduce risks than nonwealthy people. Regulators might also be permitted
+to give distributional weights to risks whose distributional incidence
+is especially troublesome.67 These weights might take a technical form
+(through adding numbers to the ones that would otherwise be used) or appear
+via the official judgment about how to proceed after the cost-benefit
+
+66 It is inadequate to respond that potential compensation could be made to losers in the
+context of efficient programs; if the compensation is only potential, the concern remains. 67 See the critical comments about willingness to pay in Sen, The Discipline of CostBenefit
+Analysis, supra note 5, and in Adler & Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis,
+supra note 5.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+COGNITION AND CBA 1087
+
+analysis has been supplied (through deciding in favor of a strategy not
+strictly suggested by the numbers). The distributional concern supports special
+efforts to control AIDS; environmental risks like asthma, which are
+concentrated among inner-city children; and perhaps the spread of diseases
+whose incidence is concentrated among women. My minimal claim is that
+if there is a public judgment in favor of according a distributional weight
+to a certain death-reduction policy, and if that judgment is not unconstitutional
+or otherwise illegitimate, policy makers should not be barred from
+respecting that judgment.
+
+5. No Rival Rationality
+
+I conclude that there is no rival rationality and that people are willing to
+depart from the lives-saved criterion for reasons that cast a clearer light on
+what it is that they are attempting to maximize. More particularly, I suggest
+the following:
+People Are Willing to Pay a Premium to Avoid Deaths That Involve a
+High Degree of Pain and Suffering. At least presumptively, this desire, or
+judgment, should be respected by government regulators; the presumption
+might be rebutted if, for example, the premium seems so high as to suggest
+that some kind of irrationality is at work.
+People Are Willing to Devote More Resources to Protect Children.
+This judgment may depend on a belief that children are typically
+more vulnerable to risk, in the sense that they cannot protect themselves,
+or on a belief that more life-years are at stake when children are in jeopardy.
+In either case, this judgment too deserves respect.
+People Are Willing to Pay a Premium to Avert Catastrophes. This may
+depend on a belief that catastrophes have ripple effects that outrun lives
+actually lost. A plane crash killing 100 people may be worse than 100
+deaths from poor diet, if the consequence of the former is to create pervasive
+fear and anxiety. A shooting in a high school may warrant special attention,
+keeping lives saved constant, if only in order to ensure that students
+and parents are not constantly fearful about the safety of schools. These
+ripple effects qualify as social costs and at first glance seem to deserve special
+attention. The major qualification is that it may be possible to address
+them directly, rather than to cater (pander?) to them. Suppose, for example,
+that education can assure the public that flying is generally quite safe. If
+information can accomplish this end, it is better to provide it than to engage
+in regulation that is costly and that has no purpose other than to reassure.
+People Are Willing to Devote More Resources to Protect against Dangers
+When the Costs of Risk Avoidance Are High. Perhaps people do not
+have information about certain risks, and perhaps information is costly to
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+1088 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+obtain. Perhaps third parties are in danger, and perhaps it is costly for them
+to avoid the danger. This point may involve fairness; it may involve efficiency.
+It involves fairness if people believe that those who bear high costs
+from risk avoidance should not, in principle, have to bear those costs. If
+this is the underlying belief, then it may follow that those who can easily
+avoid the cost of some risk should, in principle, do exactly that. The point
+involves efficiency if the judgment is that the best means of reducing aggregate
+costs (public as well as private) is to regulate the entity that is imposing
+the relevant risk.
+People May Believe That It Is Especially Important to Protect Vulnerable
+or Traditionally Disadvantaged Groups against Certain Risks. If, for example,
+AIDS is concentrated among African-Americans and homosexuals,
+there may be a special reason to devote resources to its prevention, even if
+quantitatively identical risks receive less attention.
+These various points suggest that there is no rival rationality. The question
+is whether people believe that some dangers deserve more attention
+than (quantitatively identical) others and, if so, whether that belief can survive
+critical scrutiny. But these points also suggest that it is wrong to think
+that policy should follow the judgments of experts focused on the single
+question of ‘‘lives at stake.’’68 This is not the social maximand for reflective
+citizens. Such citizens have a different view about what their government
+ought to be doing. That different view does not embody any exotic conception
+of rationality.
+
+IV. An Incompletely Theorized Agreement
+on Cost-Benefit Analysis?
+
+A. Problems with Aggregated Willingness to Pay
+
+Thus far I have suggested that cost-benefit analysis is a sensible approach
+to cognitive problems faced by ordinary people in the assessment of risk.
+I have also suggested that there is no democratic objection to using costbenefit
+analysis as an ingredient in decisions, even a crucial ingredient, and
+that cost-benefit analysis can be understood in a way that responds to reasonable
+concerns about quantification and about the idea that the only thing
+to be maximized is total lives saved (or, somewhat better, life-years saved).
+But none of this deals with the general question how cost-benefit analysis
+should be understood. In the least contentious formulation—the formula68
+This is the apparent recommendation in Margolis, supra note 26.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1089
+
+tion that I have used here—cost-benefit analysis is simply a form of openended
+consequentialism, an invitation to identify the advantages and disadvantages
+of regulation,69 without saying anything about appropriate weights.
+The virtue of this formulation is that it is uncontentious; the vice is that it
+is vacuous. People can agree with it, but it does not mean anything. In its
+most contentious formulation, cost-benefit analysis depends on asking people
+how much they are willing to pay for various goods and making decisions
+depend on the resulting numbers.70 Problems with this approach lie in
+a possible lack of private information, possible distributional unfairness
+(since willingness to pay depends on ability to pay), potential differences
+between private willingness to pay and public aspirations,71 and collective
+action problems of various sorts that might draw into doubt the privately
+expressed amounts.72 It will be worthwhile to spell out these points in a bit
+more detail.
+Willingness to pay is a simple way to capture people’s valuations, and
+for this reason it has practical advantages. Indeed, it is a good place to start,
+especially in the absence of anything better. But it also suffers from several
+problems. First, willingness to pay may be a product of cognitive and motivational
+distortions of various kinds. Willingness-to-pay judgments may be
+insufficiently informed or reflective with respect to both facts and values.
+For example, people may overstate the risks that receive disproportionate
+media attention. If this is so, it seems odd to base government policy on
+those judgments. It is also possible that people will be willing to pay little
+to avoid some bad X simply because they are used to it and their preferences
+have adapted accordingly.73 Preferences based on lack of information
+or adaptation to deprivation are hardly a good basis for regulatory policy.
+They need not be taken as given and translated into law. In any case, private
+preferences may be a product of social norms over which individuals have
+little control, by which they live, but which they would like to change if
+they could. If people are willing to pay little to avoid some risk (for example,
+of smoking) because of prevailing norms that they would wish
+
+69 See Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 5; compare the notion of
+cost-benefit analysis as a decision procedure in Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit
+Analysis, supra note 5. 70 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. 1998). 71 See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision
+of Public Goods, 108 Yale L. J. 377 (1999); Sunstein, supra note 5, ch. 2. 72 See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 71; Amartya Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social
+Choice: Contingent Valuation and the Market Analogy, 46 Japanese Econ. Rev. 23, 29
+(1995). 73 See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (1983).
+
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+1090 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+changed, willingness to pay is unjustified as a basis for policy, since the
+norm could be changed through collective action.74
+Second, willingness to pay is imperfectly correlated with utility; at best
+the first is a proxy for the second, and the two should not be confused in
+principle. Poor people are willing to pay less than wealthy people simply
+by virtue of being poor, and their willingness to pay for something (for example,
+a reduced mortality risk) is crudely connected with the utility that
+they would gain from it. In the face of disparities in wealth, willingness to
+pay should not be identified with expected utility or with the value actually
+placed on the good in question.75
+Third, there is a purely distributive concern.76 Because poor people have
+less money than wealthy people, they are willing to pay less for equivalent
+goods (such as reduced risks to life). The result of the use of willingness
+to pay would be to produce greater expenditures to protect wealthy people
+than poor people, a controversial result to say the least.77
+Fourth, the willingness-to-pay criterion will produce losers as well as
+winners, and many of the losers will go uncompensated; it is scant comfort
+to say that they could be compensated with side payments or a system of
+optimal taxation. Hence an attempt to defend cost-benefit analysis by reference
+to the efficiency criterion, as measured by private willingness to pay,
+runs into great difficulties, at least unless steps are taken to ensure against
+distributional bias.78
+Fifth, and finally, there may be differences between the choices people
+make as consumers and the choices that they make as citizens, and it is not
+clear that the former should be preferred. The context of citizenship may
+evoke other-regarding or altruistic values that are not reflected in private
+choices. This is partly because aggregating private willingness to pay can
+
+74 See Sunstein, supra note 5, ch. 2. 75 This seems to me a mistake in Viscusi’s illuminating discussion: Viscusi, Risk Equity,
+supra note 2. 76 This is a standard point in economic discussions of cost-benefit analysis, though it is
+ignored in many discussions by economic analysts of law. See, for example, Richard W.
+Tresch, Public Finance: A Normative Theory 541 (1981): ‘‘In our opinion the distributive
+question is the single most important issue in all of cost-benefit analysis.’’ Tresch discusses
+how distributional considerations might be incorporated. See also A. Allan Schmid, BenefitCost
+Analysis 157–90 (1989), with a discussion of distributive weights at 170–72. 77 At least unless poor people are compensated for any losses via side payments. 78 There are some complexities here. Of course markets are ordinarily based on willingness
+to pay, and poor people are willing to pay less for safety, simply because they have
+less. Poor people are willing to pay less, as a class and other things equal, for safer cars,
+safer neighborhoods, and so forth. The aggregated willingness-to-pay approach simply generalizes
+this phenomenon; there is nothing unusual about it. Thus a system that assigns uniform
+values to life embeds a kind of subsidy to people with relatively less resources or, more
+precisely, to people with less willingness to pay.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1091
+
+replicate various collective action problems faced in the private domain;
+people may be willing to pay more simply because they know that other
+people are contributing as well.79 If this is so, it makes no sense to base
+policy on private willingness to pay, where the collective action problem
+arises.
+In any case we might think that government policy should be based on
+the reasons given for one or another outcome, and the fact that people are
+willing to pay a lot or a little for some outcome tells us too little about
+whether good reasons exist. Before discussion, for example, people may be
+willing to pay a fair bit to discriminate on the basis of sex, and they may
+be willing to pay little to protect large populations of animals that are at
+risk. These judgments may change as a result of reason giving in the public
+domain. In other words, government is a place for exchanging reasons for
+one or another course or action. It is not simply a maximizing machine,
+taking private willingness to pay as the foundation, whatever the source or
+the grounds of prediscussion preferences.
+A particular problem here is that people may not want to spend a great
+deal to protect (for example) environmental amenities because they seek to
+protect their (relative) financial position.80 A regulatory program supported
+by all might maintain relative position, which may be what people care
+about. Current willingness-to-pay numbers do not take account of this possibility.
+We have an empirical speculation here, one that suggests that current
+numbers are far too low. Much further work remains to be done to test
+whether people would in fact be willing to spend more for safety, or for
+environmental amenities, if the result would be significant decreases in absolute
+income but the same relative income.
+Nor would it be sensible to disregard the presence of tragic choices, as
+when cost-benefit analysis leads to a choice of course A over course B, but
+course A leads to uncompensated losers (a group whose members may suffer
+from serious illnesses and even death).81 Perhaps it is possible, in such
+cases, to restructure social arrangements so as to reduce or eliminate the
+tragedy. But even if this is so, a cost-benefit analysis, of the sort to be described,
+can help inform a decision about what tragedy-reducing course to
+take and whether such a course is worthwhile at all.
+
+79 See Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for
+Status (1985); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 71; Sunstein, supra note 5. 80 See Frank, supra note 79; Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis
+and Relative Position, U. Chi. L. Rev. (in press, 2001). 81 See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy
+and Philosophy (1983); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits
+of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in this issue, at 1005.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
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+1092 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+B. Incomplete Theorization: Cost-Benefit Analysis
+as Political, Not Metaphysical
+
+Often it is possible to resolve hard questions of law and policy without
+resolving deeply contested issues about justice, democracy, or the appropriate
+aims of the state.82 Often it is possible to obtain an incompletely theorized
+agreement on a social practice. In many areas of law and public policy,
+people can reach closure about what to do despite their disagreement
+or uncertainty about why, exactly, they ought to do it. Thus people who
+disagree about the purposes of the criminal law can agree that rape and
+murder should be punished, and punished more severely than theft and trespass.
+Thus people can support an Endangered Species Act amidst disagreement
+about whether the protection of endangered species is desirable for
+theological reasons, or because of the rights of animals, plants, and species,
+or because of the value of animals, plants, and species for human beings.
+A great advantage of incompletely theorized agreements is that they allow
+people of diverse views to live together on mutually advantageous terms.
+An even greater advantage is that they allow people of diverse views to
+show one another a high degree of both humility and mutual respect.
+I believe that an incompletely theorized agreement is possible here. For
+reasons just discussed, it would be difficult to obtain agreement on the view
+(which seems to me implausible) that all questions of regulatory policy
+should be resolved by asking how much people are willing to pay for various
+social goods.83 But it should be possible for diverse people to agree on
+presumptive floors and ceilings for regulatory expenditures. A great deal
+can be done without confronting the hardest theoretical questions raised by
+contentious specifications of cost-benefit analysis.
+An obvious question here is, Who could join this incompletely theorized
+agreement? Who would reject it? My principal claim is that the agreement
+could be joined by a wide range of reasonable people, including utilitarians
+and Kantians, perfectionist and political liberals, and those who accept and
+those who doubt the idea that private willingness to pay is the appropriate
+foundation for regulatory policy. There is room here for deliberative democrats
+who emphasize the need for government to reflect on private preferences,
+rather than simply to translate them into law.84 A prime purpose of
+
+82 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996); Cass R. Sunstein,
+One Case at a Time (1999). 83 See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 5. 84 Absolutists of various kinds might refuse to join an agreement on these principles. Perhaps
+their refusal would be most reasonable in the case of the Endangered Species Act, where
+nothing said below explains why millions of dollars should be spent (at least in opportunity
+costs) to save members of ecologically unimportant species. It would be possible, however,
+to imagine a kind of ‘‘meta’’ cost-benefit analysis that would point in this direction, perhaps
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1093
+
+the approach is to ensure more in the way of reflection; cost-benefit analysis,
+as understood here, is a guarantee of greater deliberation, not an obstacle
+to it. Nor is the approach rigid. Under the proposed approach, agencies
+have the authority to abandon the floors and ceilings if there is reason for
+them to do so. If, for example, agencies want to spend a great deal to protect
+African-American children from a risk disproportionately faced by
+them, they are entitled to do so, as long as they explain that this is what
+they are doing, and so long as what they are doing is reasonable.
+
+C. Eight Propositions
+
+Here, then, are eight propositions, offered in the hope that they might
+attract support from diverse theoretical standpoints. I do not attempt to defend
+them in detail here. The goal is to provide a starting point for the effort
+to anchor cost-benefit analysis in an incompletely theorized agreement
+about regulatory policies.
+1. Identify and Quantify. Agencies should identify the advantages and
+disadvantages of proposed courses of action and also attempt to quantify
+the relevant effects to the extent that this is possible. When quantification
+is not possible, agencies should discuss the relevant effects in qualitative
+terms and also specify a range of plausible outcomes—for example, annual
+savings of between 150 and 300 lives, or savings of between $100 million
+and $300 million, depending on the rate of technological change. The statement
+should include the full range of beneficial effects. The Regulatory Impact
+Statement involving the EPA’s particulates and ozone regulation provides
+considerable help in this regard. (See the Appendix.) The problem of
+particulates and ozone regulation poses some serious difficulties to challengers
+to cost-benefit analysis (CBA); if the EPA is not to do a form of
+CBA, what is it to do, concretely?
+2. Provide Quantitative and Qualitative Descriptions. The quantitative
+description should supplement rather than displace a qualitative description
+of relevant effects. Both qualitative and quantitative descriptions should be
+provided. It is important to know the nature of the relevant effects—for
+example, lost workdays, cancers averted, respiratory problems averted. To
+the extent possible, the qualitative description should give a concrete sense
+of who is helped and who is hurt—for example, whether the beneficiaries
+are mostly or partly children, whether the regulation will lead to lost jobs,
+higher prices, more poverty, and so forth. Where the only possible informaon
+the ground that it greatly simplifies decision without imposing high costs overall. For the
+regulatory issues dealt with here, an absolutist approach seems hard to justify, not least because
+there are dangers to life and health on both sides of the equation.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+1094 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+tion is speculative, this should be noted, along with the most reasonable
+speculations.
+3. Convert Nonmonetary Values. Agencies should attempt to convert
+nonmonetary values (involving, for example, lives saved, health gains, and
+aesthetic values) into dollar equivalents. This is not because a statistical life
+and (say) $5 million are the same thing, but to promote coherence and uniformity
+and to ensure sensible priority setting. There is nothing magical or
+rigid about the dollar equivalents; the conversion is simply a pragmatic tool
+to guide analysis and to allow informed comparisons.
+4. Establish Presumptive Floors and Ceilings. Agencies entrusted with
+valuing life and health should be controlled, by statute or executive order,
+via presumptive floors and ceilings. For example, a statute might say that a
+statistical life will ordinarily be valued at no less than $2 million and no
+more than $10 million. Evidence of worker and consumer behavior, suggesting
+a valuation of between $5 million and $7 million per statistical life
+saved, is at least relevant here. The fact that the willingness-to-pay numbers
+are in this range is hardly decisive, but it is supplemented by the fact that
+similar numbers appear to represent the midpoint of agency practice. Thus
+both market and governmental measures point in the same basic direction.85
+The Office of Management and Budget should establish presumptive floors
+and ceilings for various regulatory benefits. If an agency is going to spend
+(say) no more than $500,000 per life saved, or more than $20 million, it
+should have to explain itself. Actual agency practice reveals a mixed record.
+The EPA now values a life at $4.8 million; some agencies go as high as
+$5.6 million or as low as $1 million; and some agencies do not provide
+specific numbers at all.
+5. Adjust Ceilings and Floors. Agencies should be permitted to adjust
+the ceilings and floors, or to choose a low or high end of the range, on the
+basis of a publicly articulated and reasonable judgment that such an adjustment
+or such a choice is desirable. Perhaps adjustments could be made if,
+for example, poor people are especially at risk. There should be no adjustments
+downward for poor people; in other words, the fact that poor people
+are willing to spend less to protect their own lives (because they are poor)
+should not call for correspondingly lower expenditures by government. The
+principal danger here is that well-organized groups will be able to use equitable
+arguments on behalf of their preferred adjustments. It is important to
+ensure a degree of discipline here, and perhaps the dangers of interest-group
+manipulation are serious enough to suggest that uniform numbers or ranges
+
+85 Note, however, that if relative position is what matters, these numbers may be too low,
+for reasons stated above. See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 80.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1095
+
+might be used or that the presumptions are strong and rebuttable only in the
+most compelling cases.86
+6. Adjust According to Qualitative Factors. Agencies should be permitted
+to make adjustments on the basis of the various qualitative factors
+discussed above. For example, they might add a pain and suffering premium
+or increase the level of expenditure because children are disproportionately
+affected or because the victims are members of a disadvantaged
+group. It would be reasonable to conclude that because AIDS has disproportionate
+adverse effects on homosexuals and poor people, special efforts
+should be made to ensure against AIDS-related deaths. To the extent possible,
+agencies should be precise about the nature of, and grounds for, the
+relevant adjustments, especially in light of the risk that interest-group pressures
+will convert allegedly qualitative adjustments in illegitimate directions.877.
+Respond to Social Fear. The appropriate response to social fear not
+based on evidence, and to related ripple effects, is education and reassurance
+rather than increased regulation. Sometimes public concern about certain
+risks is general and intense, even though the concern is not merited by
+the facts.88 The best response is educational; the government should not expend
+significant resources merely because an uninformed public believes
+that it should. But if education and reassurance fail, increased regulation
+may be defensible as a way of providing a kind of reassurance in the face
+of intense fears, which can themselves impose high costs of various kinds.
+Consider, for example, the possibility that people afraid of risks of plane
+crashes will shift to driving, a more risky method of transportation; consider
+also the fact that the fear is itself a cost.
+8. The Role of Courts. Unless the statute requires otherwise, judicial
+review of risk regulation should require a general showing that regulation
+has produced more good than harm, on a reasonable view about valuation
+of both benefits and costs.89 On this view, courts should generally require
+agencies to generate and to adhere to ceilings and floors. But they should
+also allow agencies to depart from conventional numbers (by, for example,
+valuing a life at less than $1 million or more than $10 million) if and only
+if the agency has given a reasonable explanation of why it has done so. The
+
+86 See Viscusi, Risk Equity, supra note 2. 87 See id.; see also James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks? The Spatial
+and Political Dimensions of Hazardous Waste Policy (1999) (showing that allegedly equitable
+shifts are driven by political pressures not mapping onto any sensible conception of equity).
+88 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 20. 89 See Margolis, supra note 26.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+1096 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
+
+ultimate task would be develop a kind of common law of cost-benefit analysis,
+authorizing agencies to be law-making institutions in the first instance.90
+
+V. Conclusion
+
+I have suggested that cost-benefit analysis, often defended on economic
+grounds, can be urged less contentiously on cognitive grounds. Cost-benefit
+analysis, taken as an inquiry into the consequences of varying approaches
+to regulation,91 is a sensible response not only to interest-group power but
+also to limited information and to predictable problems in the public demand
+for regulation. These problems include the use of the availability heuristic;
+social amplification of that heuristic via cascade effects; a failure to
+see the benefits that accompany certain risks; a misunderstanding of systemic
+effects, which can lead to unanticipated bad (and good) consequences;
+and certain emotional reactions to risks. In all of these areas, an
+effort to identify costs and benefits can properly inform analysis.
+These points do not show how cost-benefit analysis should be specified.
+Here I have raised questions about the willingness-to-pay criterion and suggested
+that, at least in principle, it would be obtuse to attempt to assess
+regulatory proposals via a uniform number for lives saved; but I have also
+suggested that presumptive ranges, for life as well as other beneficial effects
+on health and other values, would be an excellent way to clarify and order
+regulatory policy, in a way that should lead to both greater consistency and
+more overall protection. If ordinary market behavior and ordinary government
+behavior point to a similar basic range (for example, $3 million to $7
+million per life saved), that is an excellent place to start.
+My ultimate hope is for a form of cost-benefit analysis that is a pragmatic
+instrument that ought not to be terribly contentious—a form of cost-benefit
+analysis that does not take a stand on highly controversial questions about
+what government ought to do and that promises to attract support from people
+with diverse conceptions of the right and the good. I have suggested
+here that the most promising source of such an agreement is not only or
+even mostly neoclassical economics, but also behavioral economics and
+cognitive psychology.
+
+90 This has started to happen in various areas. See the development of a common law of
+risk significance under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, discussed in Cass
+R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303, 352–53 n.243
+(1999). 91 There is no alternative to regulation. What is sometimes described as deregulation, or a
+failure to regulate, is actually regulation via the common law.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+COGNITION AND CBA 1097
+
+APPENDIX
+
+All tables are taken from Environmental Protection Agency, Innovative Strategies
+and Economics Group, Regulatory Impact Statement for Particulates and
+Ozone Regulation (1997).
+
+TABLE A1
+
+Proposed PM10 Standard (50/150 g/m3
+) 99th Percentile:
+National Annual Health Incidence Reductions
+
+Partial Attainment
+Endpointa Scenario
+PM2.5(g/cm3
+):
+Annual 50
+Daily 150
+*1. Mortality:b
+Short-term exposure 360
+Long-term exposure 340
+*2. Chronic bronchitis 6,800
+Hospital admissions:
+*3. All respiratory (all ages) 190
+All respiratory (ages 651) 470
+Pneumonia (ages 651) 170
+COPD (ages 651) 140
+*4. Congestive heart failure 130
+*5. Ischemic heart disease 140
+*6. Acute bronchitis 1,100
+*7. Lower respiratory symptoms 10,400
+*8. Upper respiratory symptoms 5,300
+Shortness of breath 18,300
+Asthma attacks 8,800
+*9. Work loss days 106,000
+*10. Minor restricted activity days 879,000
+
+Note.—Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and particulate
+matter (PM) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (year 5
+2010). Numbers may not completely agree because of rounding.
+COPD 5 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. a Only endpoints denoted with an asterisk are aggregated into total
+benefits estimates. b Mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term
+exposure or long-term exposure but not both because of double-counting
+issues.
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+TABLE A2
+
+Ozone: National Annual Health Incidence
+
+Partial Attainment Scenario
+
+.08 5th .08 4th .08 3rd
+Maximum Maximum Maximum
+High-End Low- to High- High-End
+Endpointa Estimate End Estimates Estimate
+Ozone health:
+*1. Mortality 80 0–80 120
+Hospital admissions:
+*2. All respiratory (all ages) 280 300–300 420
+All respiratory (ages 651) 2,300 2,330–2,330 1,570
+Pneumonia (ages 651) 860 870–870 600
+COPD (ages 651) 260 260–260 200
+Emergency department visits
+for asthma 120 130–130 180
+*3. Acute respiratory symptoms
+(any of 19) 28,510 29,840–29,840 42,070
+Asthma attacks 60 60–60 90
+Minor restricted activity days 620 650–650 920
+*4. Mortality from air toxics 1 1–1 2
+Ancillary PM health:
+*1. Mortality:b
+Short-term exposure 60 0–80 110
+Long-term exposure 180 0–250 340
+*2. Chronic bronchitis 400 0–530 690
+Hospital admissions:
+*3. All respiratory (all ages) 70 0–90 120
+All respiratory (ages 651) 50 0–60 80
+Pneumonia (ages 651) 20 0–20 30
+COPD (ages 651) 10 0–20 20
+*4. Congestive heart failure 10 0–20 20
+*5. Ischemic heart disease 10 0–20 20
+*6. Acute bronchitis 290 0–400 530
+*7. Lower respiratory symptoms 3,510 0–4,670 6,190
+*8. Upper respiratory symptoms 320 0–430 570
+Shortness of breath 800 0–1,220 1,660
+Asthma attacks 4,210 0–5,510 7,200
+*9. Work loss days 38,700 0–50,440 66,160
+*10. Minor restricted activity days 322,460 0–420,300 551,300
+
+Note.—Estimates are incremental to the current ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards
+(year 5 2010). COPD 5 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. a Only endpoints denoted with an asterisk are aggregated into total benefits estimates. b Particulate matter (PM) mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or
+long-term exposure but not both because of double-counting issues.
+
+1098
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+TABLE A3
+
+Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) Estimates (Mean Values)
+
+Mean WTP Value per Incident
+Health Endpoint (1990 $)
+Mortality:
+Life saved $4.8 million
+Life-year extended $120,000
+Hospital admissions:
+All respiratory illnesses, all ages $12,700
+Pneumonia, age 651 $13,400
+COPD, age 651 $15,900
+Ischemic heart disease, age 651 $20,600
+Congestive heart failure, age 651 $16,600
+Emergency visits for asthma $9,000
+Chronic bronchitis $260,000
+Upper respiratory symptoms $19
+Lower respiratory symptoms $12
+Acute bronchitis $45
+Acute respiratory symptoms (any of 19) $18
+Asthma $32
+Shortness of breath $5.30
+Sinusitis and hay fever Not monetized
+Work loss days $83
+Restricted activity days:
+Minor $38
+Respiratory Not monetized
+Worker productivity $1 per worker per 10% change in
+ozone
+Visibility:
+Residential $14 per unit decrease in deciview per
+household
+Recreational Range of $7.30–$11 per unit decrease
+in deciview per household
+Household soiling damage $2.50 per household per g/m3
+
+1099
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+TABLE A4
+
+Proposed PM10 Standard (50/150 g/m3
+) 99th Percentile:
+National Annual Monetized Health Benefits
+Incidence Reductions
+
+Partial Attainment
+Scenario
+Endpointa High-End Estimate
+PM2.5(g/cm3):
+Annual 50
+Daily 150
+*1. Mortality ($):b
+Short-term exposure 1.7
+Long-term exposure 1.6
+*2. Chronic bronchitis ($) 1.8
+Hospital admissions ($)
+*3. All respiratory (all ages) .002
+All respiratory (ages 651) .006
+Pneumonia (ages 651) .003
+COPD (ages 651) .002
+*4. Congestive heart failure .002
+*5. Ischemic heart disease .003
+*6. Acute bronchitis ($) 0
+*7. Lower respiratory symptoms ($) 0
+*8. Upper respiratory symptoms ($) 0
+Shortness of breath 0
+Asthma attacks 0
+*9. Work loss days ($) .009
+*10. Minor restricted activity days ($) .034
+Total monetized benefits ($)
+Using long-term mortality 3.4
+Using short-term mortality 3.5
+
+Note.—Estimates are incremental to the current ozone (.12 ppm,
+1 hour) (1990 $billions; year 5 2010). Numbers may not completely agree
+because of rounding. COPD 5 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. a Only endpoints denoted with an asterisk are aggregated into total benefits
+estimates. b Mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure
+or long-term exposure but not both because of double-counting issues.1100This
+content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+TABLE A5
+
+Ozone: National Annual Monetized Health Benefits
+
+Partial Attainment Scenario
+
+.08 5th .08 4th .08 3rd
+Maximum Maximum Maximum
+High-End Low- to High- High-End
+Endpointa Estimate End Estimates Estimate
+Ozone health:
+*1. Mortality .370 .000–380 .570
+Hospital admissions:
+*2. All respiratory (all ages) .004 .004–.004 .006
+All respiratory (ages 651) .029 .029–.029 0
+Pneumonia (ages 651) .014 .014–.014 .010
+COPD (ages 651) .004 .004–.004 .003
+Emergency department visits for asthma .001 .001–.001 .002
+*3. Acute respiratory symptoms (any of 19) .001 .001–.001 .001
+Asthma attacks 0 0–0 0
+Minor restricted activity days 0 0–0 0
+*4. Mortality from air toxics .003 .006–.006 .011
+Ancillary PM health:
+*1. Mortality:b
+Short-term exposure .300 0–.400 .520
+Long-term exposure .870 0–1.210 1.640
+*2. Chronic bronchitis .110 0–.140 .180
+Hospital admissions:
+*3. All respiratory (all ages) .001 0–.001 .001
+All respiratory (ages 651) .001 0–.001 .001
+Pneumonia (ages 651) 0 0–0 0
+COPD (ages 651) 0 0–0 0
+*4. Congestive heart failure 0 0–0 0
+*5. Ischemic heart disease 0 0–0 0
+*6. Acute bronchitis 0 0–0 0
+*7. Lower respiratory symptoms 0 0–0 0
+*8. Upper respiratory symptoms 0 0–0 0
+Shortness of breath 0 0–0 0
+Asthma attacks 0 0–0 0
+*9. Work loss days .003 0–.004 .005
+*10. Minor restricted activity days .012 0–.016 .020
+Total monetized benefits:
+Using short-term PM mortality .790 .056 1.300
+Using long-term PM mortality 1.400 1.785 2.400
+
+Note.—Estimates are incremental to the current ozone NAAQS (.12 ppm, 1 hour) (1990 $billions;
+year 5 2010). a Only endpoints denoted with an asterisk are aggregated into total benefits estimates. b Particulate matter (PM) mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or
+long-term exposure but not both because of double-counting issues.
+
+1101
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+TABLE A6
+
+Ozone: Summary of National Annual Monetized Health and Welfare Benefits
+
+Partial Attainment Scenario
+
+.08 5th .08 4th .08 3rd
+Maximum Maximum Maximum
+High-End Low- to High- High-End
+Category Estimate End Estimates Estimate
+Health benefits 1.4 .06–1.76 2.4
+Welfare benefits .25 .32–.32 .5
+Total monetized benefits 1.6 .4–2.1 2.9
+
+Note.—Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and particulate matter National Ambient Air
+Quality Standards (1990 $billions; year 5 2010).
+
+TABLE A7
+
+Comparison of Annual Benefits and Costs of PM Alternatives in 2010
+
+Annual Annual
+Benefits of Costs of Net Benefits
+Partial Partial of Partial
+Attainmenta Attainment Attainment Number of
+(1990 (1990 (1990 Residual Non-
+$Billions) $Billions) $Billions) attainment
+PM2.5 Alternative (g/m3) (A) (B) (A 2 B) Counties
+16/65 (high-end estimate) 90 5.5 85 19
+16/65 (low-end estimate
+to high-end estimate) 19–104 8.6 10–95 30
+15/50 (high-end estimate) 108 9.4 98 41
+
+Note.—All estimates are measured incremental to partial attainment of the current PM10 standard
+(PM10 50/150, 1 expected exceedance per year). The results for 16/65 and 15/50 are only for the highend
+assumptions range. The low-end estimates were not calculated for these alternatives. a Partial attainment benefits based on postcontrol air quality as defined in the control cost analysis.
+
+1102
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+TABLE A8
+
+Comparison of Annual Benefits and Costs of Ozone Alternatives in 2010
+
+Annual Annual
+Benefits of Costs of Net Benefits
+Partial Partial of Partial
+Attainment Attainment Attainment Number of
+(1990 (1990 (1990 Residual Non-
+$Billions)a $Billions) $Billions) attainment
+Ozone Alternative (ppm) (A) (B) (A 2 B) Areas
+.08 5th Maximum (highend
+estimate) 1.6 .9 .7 12
+.08 4th Maximum (lowend
+estimate to high-end
+estimate) .4–2.1 1.1 (.7)–1.0 17
+.08 3rd Maximum (highend
+estimate) 2.9 1.4 1.5 27
+
+Note.—All estimates are measured incremental to partial attainment of the baseline current ozone
+standard (.12 ppm, 1 expected exceedance per year). The results for .08, 5th maximum and .08, 3rd maximum
+are only for the high-end assumptions. The low-end estimates were not calculated for these alternatives.
+a Partial attainment benefits based on postcontrol air quality estimates as defined in the control cost
+analysis.
+
+1103
+
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
+This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Sun, 12 May 2013 06:27:46 AM
+All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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+International Labour Review, Vol. 149 (2010), No. 2
+
+Copyright © The author 2010
+Journal compilation and translation © International Labour Organization 2010
+
+A legal perspective
+on the economic crisis of 2008
+
+Alain SUPIOT*
+
+Abstract. The 2008 global financial meltdown was the symptom of an underlying crisis
+in law and institutions caused by the neoliberal utopia of Total Market –“scientific”
+depoliticization of the economy, full commodification of labour, land and money,
+and all-out competition, with even legal systems subject to “law shopping”. Financial
+markets were so successfully deregulated, they were the first to collapse: taxpayers are
+now paying the bills. But the markets for natural and “human resources” are also at
+risk. In the spirit of the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, Supiot argues, the rule of
+law must be reinstated to end human subordination to economic efficiency.
+
+he global financial meltdown in the autumn of 2008 was but a symptom of T deeper underlying trouble, ultimately a crisis in law and institutions. In
+order to function properly, markets require a three-dimensional institutional
+framework within which relations between economic agents can be conducted
+under the auspices of a third party that guarantees the fairness of their transactions
+over the long term of human existence. By way of illustration, a medieval
+marketplace makes a useful metaphor, as does the Marktplatz in Brussels, for
+example: its architectural magnificence is imbued with institutional meaning.
+This ancient marketplace is bounded by the headquarters of the institutions
+which ensured the smooth operation of the market. The Town Hall housed the
+municipal authority that saw to the fairness of trade through inspection of
+weights and measures, while the buildings of various trades (e.g. butchers,
+bakers, brewers) housed the guilds that upheld the status and quality of labour,
+without which there would have been nothing valuable to trade. These various
+buildings also marked out the boundaries of the commercial sphere. If one left
+the marketplace, say, to go to the courthouse or to the royal palace, a different
+set of rules applied. Indeed, if the law of the market had extended to judges or
+
+* Permanent Fellow and Director, Nantes Institute for Advanced Studies (http://www.ieanantes.fr).
+This article draws on some of the ideas discussed at greater length in Supiot (2010). A
+review of this recent book on “the spirit of Philadelphia” will appear in the next issue of the International
+Labour Review.
+Responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles rests solely with their authors and
+publication does not constitute an endorsement by the ILO.
+152 International Labour Review
+
+political leaders, their decisions would have been up for sale, the city would have
+been corrupt, and honest traders would have been unable to carry on their
+business there freely. Yet such removal of the market’s institutional framework
+is precisely the aim of the neoliberal project that has been pursued for the past
+three decades. Chasing the utopian fantasy of a marketplace without boundaries,
+it is bent on engineering a “flattened world” in which relations between
+people and even the law can be treated as goods (Friedman, 2005).1 The unprecedented
+crisis that broke in 2008 was a foretaste of the disastrous consequences
+of that utopia – a wake-up call to stop promoting “law shopping” and
+reinstate the rule of law.
+
+The institutional foundations of markets
+Today’s markets no longer feature the spatial and architectural unity of medieval
+marketplaces, yet their smooth operation still depends on the selfsame
+institutional framework. A contract only makes sense if the parties it binds have
+concluded it under the auspices of some higher authority that can guarantee
+they will keep their word (e.g. the gods, the king or the State). In the absence of
+such a guarantor, the contract will be no more than an expression of the will
+of the strongest party. Similarly, the right to own private property involves more
+than just a binary relationship between a person and the thing that he or she
+owns, because the effective exercise of that right depends on the existence of a
+third party that guarantees each person’s property is respected by everyone else
+(Macfarlane, 1998). Where this precondition is not met – say, if the State is dysfunctional
+or corrupt – the fiction of a connection between a thing and a single
+individual owner becomes untenable. Relationships would then predominantly
+revert to dependency, with the weak having to do allegiance to the strong so as
+not to be dispossessed of what little they own.
+Yet, the institutional foundations of markets have been under systematic
+neoliberal attack for three decades, through financial deregulation and the promotion
+of competition between different systems of labour and environmental
+law. From the legal standpoint, it was predictable that the financial markets
+would be the first to collapse because this is where deregulation has made its
+deepest inroads. But the meltdown was also predictable in economic terms. It
+had in fact long been foreseen by some economists. Such economists, however,
+do not get published in peer-review journals, nor are they ever nominated for
+the prize awarded each year “in memory of Alfred Nobel”.2
+The market economy long predates capitalism,3 whose main characteristic
+is to embrace the market as a general principle for regulating the economy. This,
+however, presupposes that land, labour and money should be treated as if they
+were commodities, which is clearly not the case (Polanyi, 1944, pp. 71–80). The
+
+1 This utopia was foreshadowed in Edwin A. Abbott’s 1884 novel, Flatland: A romance of
+many dimensions, whose striking relevance today is aptly highlighted by Ota De Leonardis (2008).
+2 Examples from France include Jean-Luc Gréau (1998) and, more recently, François Morin
+(2006).
+3 On the need to distinguish between the two, see Amato and Fantacci (2009, p. 329).
+A legal perspective on the economic crisis of 2008 153
+
+capitalist market economy is thus grounded in legal fiction. But legal fiction is
+not like literary fiction: it is sustainable only to the extent that it is humanly
+viable. For example, without a system of environmental law that effectively protects
+natural resources, nature cannot be treated as a commodity for very long.
+Similarly, without a system of labour law that effectively protects “human
+resources”, labour markets too are unsustainable. The 1944 Declaration of
+Philadelphia reaffirmed that “labour is not a commodity” and called for “the
+extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in need of
+such protection and comprehensive medical care”. The Declaration thus committed
+States to the adoption of a system of labour and social security law that
+would ensure the physical and economic security of workers and their families,
+i.e. the regulatory frameworks needed to sustain the long-term operation of
+labour markets over successive generations (see Supiot, 2000).
+But the regulatory frameworks were constructed at national level, and
+they are now gradually being dismantled in the context of globalization. The
+same goes for financial markets, whose deregulation has been pursued systematically
+– and to devastating effect, as recent events have begun to show. Without
+such frameworks, the rules of free trade lose their connection to the
+diversity of people, territories and goods. For a while, it may still be possible to
+pretend that labour, land and money are unconnected to workers, the natural
+environment and the real economy, but such fiction is bound to break down
+eventually as reality closes in. Contrary to what Market worshippers naively
+believe, the dismantling of national regulatory frameworks will not procure the
+“spontaneous order of the Market”. It will simply undermine the institutional
+foundations of markets. There is indeed no such thing as the Market Economy,
+but rather a variety of legal systems framing different types of market, with
+variations depending not only on the nature of the goods and services traded but
+also on historical backgrounds and legal cultures.
+
+The advent of Total Market
+In order to understand the implications of the dismantling of markets’ institutional
+foundations, a distinction needs to be drawn between two types of process
+which, though clearly distinct, have become conflated into the catchy term
+“globalization”. The abolition of physical distance in the transmission of signs
+between people is a structural process which derives from the introduction of
+new information and communication technology. The free movement of capital
+and goods, by contrast, is a conjunctural process which derives from reversible
+political decisions (on liberalization of trade and capital markets) and the temporary
+over-exploitation of non-renewable physical resources (i.e. artificially
+low transport costs). The conjunction of these two distinct processes has led to
+the utopia of “Total Market”, in which people, signs and things can all be rendered
+commensurable and be mobilized in the cause of globalized competition
+– i.e. they can all be “liquidated” in the legal sense of this term.4
+
+4 Liquidation consists in making something fungible by converting it into cash. For example,
+a debt is said to be liquid when it can be converted into a specified amount of money.
+154 International Labour Review
+
+The Market then becomes total in the sense that Ernst Jünger gave to that
+adjective in the aftermath of the First World War when he used it to describe a
+form of organization based on the total mobilization of human, technological and
+natural resources to produce armies that were “sent to the battlefield both day
+and night, where an equally mechanical bloody maw took over the role of consumer”
+(Jünger, 1930, as translated in Wolin, 1993, p. 129).5 The First World War
+marked the founding moment of this conversion of people into fuel with which to
+drive the monotonous functioning of a war machine that worked like “a turbine
+fueled with blood” (ibid., p. 129). Post-war forms of work organization conformed
+to this model and were aimed at converting everyone and every thing
+into usable energy. This approach evolved into the management vision that is still
+prevalent today. As early as 1932, Jünger described it in the following terms:
+Our situation is peculiar in that our every movement is governed by pressure to
+set a record, while the minimum standard of performance we are required
+to meet is constantly broadening the scope of its expectations. This completely
+precludes the possibility that any sphere of life might ever stabilize on the basis
+of some secure and undisputed order. The resulting way of life is more like a
+deadly race in which all of one’s energy is stretched to the limit lest one should
+fall by the wayside (Jünger, 1932).
+That economic competitiveness has become the ultimate purpose of the
+legal order boils down to acceptance of a dogma that sees the growth of output
+and trade as an end in itself – an end that can only be pursued through all-out
+competition, by pitting all people in all countries against one another. This
+dogma is actually spelt out in the first preambular paragraph of the Marrakech
+Agreement which established the World Trade Organization: international
+“relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted
+with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large
+and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding
+the production of and trade in goods and services” (WTO, 1994). This statement
+stands in stark contrast to the Declaration of Philadelphia. Quantifiable
+economic outcomes – employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
+real income and effective demand – and “expanding the production of and trade
+in goods and services” are considered as ends in themselves. Human beings have
+been dropped from the list of objectives that the economy and trade are supposed
+to serve, as have all references to human freedom and dignity, economic
+security and emotional well-being.
+Just as King Midas changed all he touched into gold, Total Market converts
+everything into economic resources. People are thus considered merely as
+means to an end, and no longer as the ultimate beneficiaries of economic activity.
+They are subsumed into the indistinct pool of “resources” that Market needs
+in order to function.6 Such commodification of human beings was long confined
+to workers, but it has now been extended to all types of creditor or debtor by
+
+5 It was from this seminal article that Carl Schmitt later derived the concept of the “total
+State”.
+6 On this process of “resourcification”, see Doria (2010).
+A legal perspective on the economic crisis of 2008 155
+
+means of innovative financial instruments. Not only can these new instruments
+convert an interpersonal relationship into a tradeable product, but they also do
+away with any connection to the people engaged in the relationship. Influenced
+by their economic perspective on law, business lawyers have spent the past two
+decades actively pleading for such dissolution of people into the category of
+“things”. In particular, they have argued that relationships between creditors
+and debtors should be considered “in objective terms”,
+as if they were just commodities, i.e. relationships between one balance sheet and
+another rather than between one person and another. The rules governing trade
+in debt thus derive from those governing the sale of goods with guaranty construed
+as an accessory of the object of the sale. Such commodification of obligations
+effectively makes it possible to organize their tradeability as if they were
+goods, which, in turn, allows for optimization of their value; and all of this takes
+place within a regulatory framework that is secure because it owes more to the
+laws of mechanics than to uncertain considerations of psychology (Aynès and
+Stoffel-Munck, 2005, p. 99).
+Such brilliant analyses sowed the seeds of the disasters wrought by financial
+derivatives like collateralized debt bonds or credit-default swaps. Capitalism
+would obviously be better off in a world inhabited solely by electronic calculators,
+but wishful thinking and the pretence that people do not exist can only lead
+to dead ends – all the more dead because a commodified world is a world in
+which no one has to answer for anything. Indeed, one of the most devastating
+effects of those new financial “products” has been to spare lenders the need to
+answer for the financial risk inherent in any credit transaction. As a matter of
+fact, even the term credit is a misnomer here because lending can now proceed
+regardless of whether the borrower’s solvency is credible or not. The process
+might be better described in terms of issuing counterfeit currency. But this is not
+entirely accurate either because a counterfeiter is at least liable to prosecution
+under criminal law. And responsibility for such counterfeiting on a massive
+scale has now actually been taken over by States themselves.
+
+“Law shopping” versus the rule of law
+The notions of “person” and accountability are not the only ones that Total
+Market has deprived of meaningful content. The law itself – along with religion,
+ideas and art7 – has come to be seen as just another product competing on the
+global market. Legal systems better suited to the pursuit of financial profitability
+outcompete the rest. So instead of competition being subject to the law, the
+trend is towards making the law subject to competition. Friedrich Hayek was
+among the first to have theorized such regulatory Darwinism. Having no faith in
+the “rational agent” of economics, he believed in natural selection among normative
+systems as a result of international competition between legal systems
+and cultures. In his view, the proponents of social Darwinism were wrong to
+
+7 See Coase (1974, pp. 384–391). On the extension of the concept of “the market for ideas” to
+religions by the Supreme Court of the United States, see Legendre and Mayali (2002).
+156 International Labour Review
+
+look no further than the selection of individuals who were congenitally the fittest
+– a process too slow to be internalized – “and at the same time neglecting the
+decisively important selective evolution of rules and practices” (Hayek, 1979a,
+p. 154).
+In the economic sphere, the freedoms associated with free trade – i.e. freedom
+of establishment, freedom to provide services, and the free movement of
+capital and goods – are invoked as grounds for allowing investors and firms to
+evade the laws of the countries where they operate and to opt for some other
+jurisdiction more congenial to their business interests. Flags of convenience used
+to be confined to the law of the sea, but this practice is now spreading on dry land
+as a result of “law shopping”, whereby national legal systems are treated as products
+competing on an international market for standards.8 In Europe, this trend
+is actively promoted by the European Court of Justice which has upheld the right
+of firms to circumvent the law of the State where they carry on their business by
+registering in another State whose law is less constraining.9 In one of its most
+recent judgements along these lines, the Court held that “the objectives of protecting
+the purchasing power of workers and good labour relations” did not in
+themselves constitute sufficient public policy grounds to justify impairment of
+“freedom to provide services”.10 One would be hard pressed to find a more vivid
+expression of the current reversal of the spirit of the Declaration of Philadelphia
+which, as recalled by the International Labour Conference in 2008, stressed the
+ILO’s responsibility “to examine and consider all international economic and
+financial policies in the light of the fundamental objective of social justice”.11
+Recent developments, by contrast, reflect a legal view of the world centred on a
+“market for legislative products” open to the discretionary choice of individuals
+who are free to avail themselves of whichever legal system is the most profitable.
+In order to help “law shoppers” choose the best products on the “market
+for standards”, the World Bank has since 2004 published an annual report that
+assesses the economic efficiency of national legal systems within the framework
+of its “Doing Business” programme.12 The accompanying database provides
+“objective measures” of the law of 178 countries (referred to as “economies”). In
+particular, it contains numerical indicators of the “rigidity” of labour law in each
+country. Doing Business in 2005, for example, includes a chapter on “hiring and
+
+8 For a richly referenced overview, see Muir Watt (2005).
+9 See Case C-212/97, 9 March 1999, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, ECR 1999,
+p.I-1459; Case C-438/05, 6 December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish
+Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, ECR 2007, p.I-10779 (legitimizing
+flags of convenience for the sake of freedom of establishment); and Case C-341/05, 18 December
+2007, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets
+avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, ECR 2007, p.I-11767.
+10 Case C-319/06, 19 June 2008, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand Duchy
+of Luxembourg, para. 53.
+11 Quoted from the preamble to the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization
+(ILO, 2008, p. 6).
+12 See http://www.doingbusiness.org, which includes a map showing the world as an arena for
+legislative competition (Business planet: Mapping the business environment).
+A legal perspective on the economic crisis of 2008 157
+
+firing workers” that assesses the degree to which labour law acts as a constraint
+on investment across countries (World Bank, 2005, pp. 25–32). A table also compares
+labour law systems worldwide on the basis of indices that are designed to
+measure: difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours, difficulty of firing, rigidity of
+employment, and hiring and firing costs.13 From this perspective, of course, “difficulty”
+or “rigidity” refers to regulation, while “cost” refers to rights designed to
+protect workers. The “rigidity of employment” index thus assigns negative scores
+to States that give workers too many rights, such as social protection for part-time
+workers, minimum wages the Bank deems too high (US$20 per month being considered
+too much for African countries), a working-time limit below 66 hours per
+week, prior notice of dismissal, or programmes to combat discrimination based
+on race or sex.14 The formalization of this “market for legislative products” is
+designed gradually to eliminate those regulatory systems that fail to meet
+investors’ financial expectations. In other words, inter-firm competition for the
+favours of the financial markets is unlikely to remain confined to the economic
+sphere; it is set to become the organizing principle of the legal sphere as well.
+Such “law shopping”, however, is ultimately incompatible with the rule of
+law. Indeed, freedom to choose the most convenient legal system goes against
+the notion that everyone should be equally subject to the rule of law. It also goes
+against democracy itself because the scope of democracy automatically shrinks in
+countries whose labour, tax and environmental legislation is subject to global
+competition. Hayek argued that this restriction of democracy was necessary to
+allow for “the spontaneous order of the market”. A fierce critic of the standardsetting
+initiatives taken in the aftermath of the Second World War,15 Hayek’s
+main complaint was that those endeavours had established “unlimited democracy”,
+whose rule extended to economic matters: “once we give licence to the
+politicians to interfere in the spontaneous order of the market […] They thus
+initiate that cumulative process which by inner necessity leads […] to an evergrowing
+domination over the economic process by politics” (Hayek, 1979a,
+p. 151). This argument eventually morphed into the primary objective of the neoliberal
+revolution, namely, to protect the “spontaneous order” of the market
+against the power of democratically elected government. What this meant was
+that the distribution of work and wealth, together with control over money,
+should be entirely excluded from the political sphere. Democracy had to be
+restricted in this way in order to prevent the ignorant masses from interfering
+
+13 The World Bank’s methodology is based on the work of economists from Harvard and
+Yale (see Botero et al., 2004).
+14 In response to criticism by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the
+ILO (ILO, 2007; Berg and Cazes, 2007), a joint working group was set up by the ILO and the Bank
+in 2009 to review these indicators (see http://doingbusiness.org/Documents/Press_Releases_10/
+EWI_Advisory.doc).
+15 Referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, he wrote: “The whole
+document is indeed couched in that jargon of organization thinking which one has learnt to expect
+in the pronouncement of trade union officials or the International Labour Organization […], but
+which is altogether inconsistent with the principles on which the order of a Great Society rests”
+(Hayek, 1979b, p. 105).
+158 International Labour Review
+
+with the laws of economics, which were beyond their understanding. “To them
+the market economy is largely incomprehensible; they have never practised the
+rules on which it rests, and its results seem to them irrational and immoral. […]
+Their demand for a just distribution in which organized power is to be used to
+allocate to each what he deserves, is thus strictly an atavism, based on primordial
+emotions” (Hayek, 1979a, p. 165).
+This drive for depoliticization led most economists to abandon the learned
+tradition of “political economy” in favour of “economic science”. By aping the
+natural sciences, this discipline even succeeded in awarding itself its own prizes
+for excellence in the name of Alfred Nobel.16 This quest for scientific legitimacy
+was contemporaneous with the neoliberal revolution, of which it was a key component.
+Indeed, since science and religion are the only domains not open to
+political debate in a democratic society, the point was to believe and make
+believe that the economy fell within the domain of science, in order to depoliticize
+it. In the process, however, the neoliberal revolution unwittingly linked up
+with the other major scientistic ideologies, particularly “scientific socialism”,
+through its faith in the existence of immanent laws of economics that political
+leadership has a duty to implement, rather than question.
+
+Concluding remarks
+The most fundamental tenet of neoliberal doctrine is that the Market is the
+supreme regulatory authority for worldly affairs and that it must ultimately be
+allowed to dictate the conduct of firms and the economic policy of States around
+the globe. Since this doctrine continues to hold sway among the business and
+political leadership of the western world, it is hardly surprising that the economic
+recovery packages designed to cope with the recent collapse of financial
+markets consisted in throwing staggering amounts of public money at them
+without so much as wondering about the structural reasons for their collapse. It
+is as though arsonist firefighters had sprayed petrol onto an engine which they
+had set alight in the hope of restarting it.
+Unlike the dogmatic of law, which is inherently possessed of conscience
+and open to the resources of interpretation, the dogmatic of scientism does not
+recognize itself for what it is and is thus perfectly hermetic to any challenge from
+without. This is what makes scientism so powerful, but it is also a weakness when
+the principle of reality intrudes upon the system, as it has done with neoliberal
+doctrine today. The system’s political and economic proponents are then incapable
+of comprehending why their world falls apart. A couple of decades ago,
+this is what happened to socialists and communists: lacking the capacity to think
+through the breakdown or collapse of “scientific socialism”, they converted
+within a few years from unconditional defence of the latter to equally uncondi16
+A successful forgery of the genuine Nobel prizes, the “Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic
+Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel” was established in 1968 and first awarded in 1969 (see Moynot,
+2008).
+A legal perspective on the economic crisis of 2008 159
+
+tional support for the neoliberal faith. Something similar is now happening to
+those (often the same characters) who embraced that faith and owe it the
+authority they enjoy.
+The latest report from the OECD, Economic policy reforms 2010: Going
+for growth, is a good example of such introversion, mired in dogmatic certainties
+that no amount of counterfactual evidence will ever shake. Published some
+18 months after the crisis broke, the report argues in its editorial (entitled “Shifting
+gears”) that the collapse of the financial markets does not call into question
+the Organization’s “longstanding policy prescriptions” (OECD, 2010, p. 5). On
+the contrary, it recommends intensifying policies aimed at flexibilizing labour
+markets and “reaping efficiency gains on spending, especially in the areas of education
+and health, and avoiding large increases in harmful labour and capital
+taxes” (ibid., p. 4). From atop its towering expertise, the OECD hands down
+good grades to Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa for “major
+improvements in human capital”. Subject to “some differences” across these
+countries, however, it urges them to rise to the challenges of “moving towards
+more competition-friendly product market regulation, strengthening property
+rights and contract enforcement, deepening financial markets” (ibid., p. 5). This
+last recommendation is a particularly shocking example of inability to reconnect
+with the principle of reality: it was indeed precisely because they refrained from
+submitting to the rule of the financial markets that the major emerging markets
+were so little affected by their collapse.
+At best, there has been reluctant admission that better financial market
+regulation might help, but without any hint that rules which ought to be binding
+should no longer be treated like competing products on some international market
+for standards. Hence again the circularity of the self-referential logic which
+stubbornly sustains the belief that the market can be regulated by the Market.
+Besides, unlike other European languages, English – the language of globalization
+– lacks specific terminology to distinguish between “regulation” and the
+enforcement of genuinely binding rules in the same way as it distinguishes
+between, say, “governance” and “government” (see Supiot, 2003).17 The notions
+of regulation and governance derive from physics and biology where they refer
+to rules inherent in some technological device or living organism. Their usage
+was extended to human affairs through cybernetics as this science endeavoured
+to erase the boundaries between people, animals and things. Erasure of those
+boundaries, however, leads to obliteration of the characteristically human distinction
+between biological or technical standards, on the one hand, and legal
+rules, on the other – and therefore between the domains of being and having to
+be. Indeed, a biological organism embodies a state of being in which its existence
+and the rule by which it lives are undifferentiated. The order of human affairs
+does not fit this model, however, because in this case the rule is not immanent but
+
+17 French, for example, makes a clear distinction between réglementation, which is about
+imposing rules, and régulation, which is about getting people to respect rules. German and Italian
+also make this distinction (Supiot, 2003, pp. 1–2).
+160 International Labour Review
+
+necessarily external to the “social corpus”. This is why medicine looks upon evil
+(i.e. sickness) rather than good (i.e. health) as a problem, whereas for society the
+challenge lies in determining exactly what the right order is (see Canguilhem,
+1955). Indeed, in this case, the rule cannot be found embedded in society itself; it
+obviously has to come from elsewhere, somewhere beyond the reach of both
+scientific research and individual whim, albeit in the guise of “ethics”.
+The issue is thus not about “regulating markets” as one might casually
+adjust the settings of the central heating. It is about bringing them under effective
+control with hard-and-fast rules to serve the interests of society. This, in turn,
+means going back to the political and legal drawing board in order to restore the
+order of ends and means as between human needs and economic and financial
+organization. In other words, it means reconnecting with the spirit of the Declaration
+of Philadelphia which, towards the end of the Second World War, aimed
+to harness the economy and finance in furtherance of the principles of human
+dignity and social justice. What this implies for the International Labour Organization
+today is not to give up on its “core business”, but to promote labour standards
+suited to the state of the world today (for some suggestions, see Supiot,
+2006). Francis Maupain, one of the ILO’s sharpest legal minds, once disingenuously
+pointed out that the question to be pondered would then not be about the
+social dimension of globalization but about the economic and financial dimension
+of social justice. This was not meant as a plea for restoring the institutional
+arrangements of the three decades of prosperity that followed the Second World
+War. Admittedly, in the industrialized countries at least, those years certainly did
+produce much better social and economic outcomes than the three decades of
+neoliberalism that followed, but those arrangements belong to a world that is no
+longer. The fact remains, however, that the definition of social justice adopted at
+Philadelphia in 1944 has lost nothing of its cogency. The ILO Declaration on
+Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, adopted in 2008, stresses that the Declaration
+of Philadelphia “continues to be fully relevant in the twenty-first century
+and should inspire the policies of [the ILO’s] Members” (ILO, 2008, p. 6). Keeping
+faith with the spirit of Philadelphia means charting courses for the future in
+the light of the present. This presupposes escape from the flattened, boundless
+world of neoliberal dogmatics and recovering the use of five senses that have
+been brutally blunted by some three decades of policy designed to harness
+people to the interests of finance. They are the senses of limits, moderation,
+action, responsibility and solidarity (for further elaboration, see Supiot, 2010).
+Lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice: this
+statement, reiterated in the Declaration of Philadelphia, was first made at the
+time of the ILO’s post-war establishment in 1919. Yet it is more relevant than
+ever in today’s world. Indeed, to present the middle and working classes with
+the bill for the bankruptcy of neoliberal policy will only exacerbate the sense of
+social injustice that is felt so acutely already across the world of work. The temptation
+will then be to generalize the approach currently followed in regard to
+immigration, which consists in organizing global competition among workers,
+on the one hand, while holding “aliens” responsible for social insecurity, on the
+A legal perspective on the economic crisis of 2008 161
+
+other. Xenophobia has historically served as a convenient safety valve for
+regimes that have plunged entire populations into insecurity and destitution.
+The risk of a resurgence of identity-driven extremism has been heightened by
+the wholesale conversion of a bottomless abyss of private debt into a towering
+mountain of public debt.
+
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+Friedman, Thomas L. 2005. The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. New
+York, NY, Farrar Straus and Giroux.
+Gréau, Jean-Luc. 1998. Le capitalisme malade de sa finance. Paris, Gallimard.
+Hayek, Friedrich A. 1979a. Law, legislation and liberty. Vol. 3: The political order of a free
+people. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press.
+—. 1979b. Law, legislation and liberty. Vol. 2: The mirage of social justice. Chicago, IL, University
+of Chicago Press.
+ILO. 2008. ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization. Geneva.
+—. 2007. The United Nations and reform: Developments in the multilateral system. World
+Bank Doing Business report: The employing workers indicator. Governing Body,
+300th Session, Nov., GB.300/4/1. Geneva.
+Jünger, Ernst. 1932. Der Arbeiter (The Worker). [French translation: Le Travailleur, Paris,
+Bourgois, 1989].
+—. 1930: Die totale Mobilmachung [English translation “Total mobilization”‚ translated by
+Joel Golb and Richard Wolin, in Richard Wolin (ed.): The Heidegger controversy: A
+critical reader. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1993, pp. 122–139].
+Legendre, Pierre; Mayali, Laurent (eds). 2002. Le façonnage juridique du marché des religions
+aux Etats-Unis. Paris, Editions Mille et une nuits.
+Macfarlane, A. 1998. “The mystery of property: Inheritance and industrialization in England
+and Japan”‚ in C.M. Hann (ed.): Property relations. Renewing the anthropological
+tradition. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 104–123.
+162 International Labour Review
+
+Morin, François. 2006. Le nouveau mur de l’argent: Essai sur la finance globalisée. Paris, Seuil.
+Moynot, Patrick. 2008. “Nobel d’économie: Coup de maître”‚ in Le Monde, 16 Oct.
+Muir Watt, Horatia. 2005. Aspects économiques du droit international privé (Réflexions sur
+l’impact de la globalisation économique sur les fondements des conflits de lois et de
+juridictions). Académie de droit international de La Haye, Recueil des cours, Vol. 307
+(2004). Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff.
+OECD. 2010. Economic policy reforms 2010: Going for growth. Paris.
+Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time.
+New York, NY, Farrar and Rinehart [page numbers cited refer to the Beacon Press
+paperback edition, Boston, MA, 2001].
+Supiot, Alain. 2010. L’esprit de Philadelphie: La justice sociale face au marché total. Paris,
+Seuil.
+—. 2006. “The position of social security in the system of international labor standards”‚ in
+Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 113–121.
+—. 2003. “Governing work and welfare in a global economy”‚ in Jonathan Zeitlin and David
+Trubek (eds): Governing work and welfare in a new economy. European and American
+experiments. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 376–406.
+—. 2000. “The dogmatic foundations of the market (Comments illustrated by some examples
+from labour law and social security law)”‚ in Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 4
+(Dec.), pp. 321–345.
+World Bank. 2005. Doing Business in 2005: Removing obstacles to growth. Washington, DC.
+Available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/DoingBusiness2005.pdf [accessed
+12 May 2010].
+WTO. 1994. Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. Available at: http://www.
+wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf [accessed 19 Apr. 2010].
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+CHAPTER 1
+
+What International Social Justice in the
+Twenty-First Century?*
+
+Alain Supiot
+
+The concept of social justice appeared in international law a century ago, in the
+aftermath of the bloodbath of the First World War, in the form of a solemn declaration
+in 1919 included in the Treaty of Versailles, which continues to be enshrined in the
+Preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization (ILO):
+
+Universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice.
+
+There was little follow-up in the interwar period to the appeal for a peace with
+social justice. The creation of the ILO was insufficient to avoid the economic and
+political disasters engendered by capitalism’s social incompetence, of which the
+highlights were the crash of 1929 and the turning of many countries into dictatorial and
+warmongering regimes. As we know, the American response to this crisis was
+different, with the experience of the New Deal – which strongly inspired the main
+directions adopted in the aftermath of the Second World War. Thus it is that the link
+established in 1919 between social justice and peace between nations was reaffirmed
+by the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), according to which:
+
+Experience has fully demonstrated the truth of the statement in the Constitution of
+the International Labour Organisation that lasting peace can be established only if
+it is based on social justice.
+
+This reference to experience cannot be too strongly emphasized. Social justice has
+not only been asserted in international law as an ideal – a moral obligation borne by the
+countries, one that should counterbalance political and economic realism. It itself also
+makes a claim to realism, more precisely the historical experience that has always seen
+
+* Keynote address to the XXI World Congress of the International Society for Labour and Social
+Security Law, Cape Town, 15-18 September 2015.
+
+1
+humiliation and poverty engender hate and violence – violence that on many occasions
+in the course of the twentieth century went beyond the imaginable.
+From January 1941, in his famous four freedoms speech, President Roosevelt
+established a close link between the achievement of social justice and the defence of
+democracy. He returned to it in January 1944, in his speech on the ‘Second Bill
+of Rights’, which announced what would become the 1948 Universal Declaration of
+Human Rights:
+
+We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot
+exist without economic security and independence. People who are hungry and out
+of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.
+
+The assertion that men in need are not free men is taken from the Vernon v.
+Bethell judgment dating from 1762. Roosevelt was thus able to anchor in the long
+history of the common law the idea that social justice is not a luxury that democracy
+might or might not avail itself of, but rather a precondition for its very existence and its
+ability to stand up to all kinds of dictatorships. Far from leading Western democracies
+onto the road of servitude – as the neoliberal rewriting of history1 would have us
+believe – the ideal of social justice has allowed them to not go down that road.
+This ideal is neither that of a transcendent justice imposed from on high by a
+putative benevolent dictator, nor that of an immanent justice arising spontaneously
+from the free play of supposedly scientific laws, be they based on race, history or the
+market. Social justice avoids these two pitfalls, as it combines a values dimension with
+a procedural dimension. Its values dimension is that of human dignity and of the
+economic, social and cultural rights that flow from it. Its procedural dimension comes
+simultaneously from free enterprise and from freedom of association; the tension
+between the two, regulated by the right to strike and collective bargaining, allows the
+conversion of power relations into legal relations.
+It is in this spirit that the Declaration of Philadelphia was adopted, soon after
+Roosevelt’s speech. It did not simply reassert the need for social justice internationally.
+It sought to subordinate ‘all national and international policies and measures, in
+particular those of an economic and financial character’ to achievement of this
+objective. With this end in mind, the Havana Charter – adopted in 1948 but never
+ratified – envisaged the creation of an International Trade Organization (ITO), one of
+the missions of which would have been the achievement of the objectives of full
+employment and raising of the standard of living, as set by the Charter of the United
+Nations. Its statutes enjoin it in particular to combat balance of payments surpluses and
+deficits; to contribute to economic cooperation and non-competition between states; to
+promote compliance with international labour standards; to control capital movements
+and to pursue stability in commodity prices … . In a nutshell, its role would have been
+nearly the opposite of that assigned to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its
+creation in 1994.
+The failure of this project did not condemn social justice to remaining as a legal
+dead letter. But it is in domestic law that its offspring saw the light of day. Inscribed in
+
+1. See F.A. Hayek: The Road to Serfdom (Routledge, Abingdon,1944), 266 pp.
+
+Alain Supiot
+
+2
+the forefront of numerous constitutions, in most industrialized countries it has led to a
+reinvention of States. Having become ‘social’ states, each one of them has interpreted
+and implemented it in its own way, by endowing itself with labour law, a social
+security system and public services corresponding to its history and legal tradition
+(which explains their extreme variety from country to country). This splintering into
+national models is an essential feature of social justice in the twentieth century. Its
+international dimension remained limited and subsidiary. Ratification of the ILO
+Conventions in fact exposes the States to a ‘double penalty’: on the one hand, they
+must submit to the ILO’s supervision and monitoring system; on the other hand, they
+deprive themselves of a comparative advantage in relation to their competitors.2 As
+well, they scarcely ratified them except inasmuch as the level of the social demands in
+these Conventions remained below that of their domestic law. Internationally, the
+greatest social injustice was in practice that resulting from colonization. To rectify it
+would have required a form of international economic solidarity that the failure of the
+Havana Charter suffocated at birth.
+As a consequence, a gap opened up between international social and business
+standards, one that has steadily expanded for the past forty years. Promoting social
+justice certainly still appears as one of the duties assigned to the States by the ‘Charter
+of Economic Rights and Duties of States’, adopted by the United Nations General
+Assembly on 14 December 1974, so as to ‘establish and maintain’ between industrialized
+countries and developing countries ‘a just and equitable economic and social
+order’.3 But lacking the agreement of the rich countries on the whole of its provisions,
+this charter has never had binding legal effect. With this setback, this charter
+constitutes something of a swan song for the projects of international social justice
+coming out of the war. In the same decade the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate
+in favour of floating currencies, the coming into office of Mr Reagan and Mrs Thatcher,
+and the beginning of the merger of communism and capitalism in China all opened up
+a different era, one that is still with us: that of neoliberalism and the disowning of what
+Friedrich Hayek called the ‘mirage of social justice’.4
+Having taken note of the refusal of the rich countries to agree on a just
+international social order founded on solidarity with the poor countries, the latter
+embarked on the route opened up by the creation in 1994 of the WTO: that of global
+competition, where in accordance with the liberal theses of David Ricardo, each should
+cultivate its ‘comparative advantage’.5 This comparative advantage might lie in natural
+
+2. See F. Maupain: The Future of the International Labour Organization in the Global Economy
+(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013), 320 pp.
+3. Preamble to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, ratified by the UN in 1974. On
+this Charter, see M. Virally: ‘La charte des droits et des devoirs économiques des états. Note de
+lecture’, in Annuaire français de droit international, Vol. 20, 1974, pp. 57-77.
+4. See F.A. Hayek: Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice (London,
+Routledge, 1976).
+5. D. Ricardo: On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London, 1817). Significantly, the
+concept of comparative advantage appears in black and white only once in this work, to caution
+against tax rises likely to lead to losing it: ‘A new tax may destroy the comparative advantage
+which a country before possessed in the manufacture of a particular commodity’ (supra.,
+Chapter 19).
+
+Chapter 1: What International Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century?
+
+3
+resources, or in a ‘human resource’, that they were thus encouraged to super-exploit in
+order to maintain their ‘competitiveness’ globally. Competing to be the lowest bidder
+in social and environmental terms is thus the path that has been followed by the most
+populous countries of the South – first and foremost China – with the economic
+successes and environmental disasters that are well known. This kind of competition
+obviously undermines the foundations of the social state in the countries of the North,
+engaged whether they like it or not in what the British Prime Minister has recently
+called a ‘global race’,6 a deadly sprint the iron law of which is to lower labour costs,
+which has become the be-all and end-all of the economic policies followed by all
+governing parties in Europe.7 As for the countries whose states were too weak to go
+down this path – notably many African countries – they have been left defenceless at
+the mercy of international competition, the looting of their natural resources and the
+IMF’s structural adjustment plans. A significant proportion of their ‘human resource’ –
+in particular their youth – thus seeks security in mass emigration, which is as perilous
+for them as it is destabilizing for the countries of immigration.
+With the same reasons producing the same effects, the attempt through the Kyoto
+Protocol (2005) to found an international legal order able to safeguard the climatic
+future of the planet has to date been a bitter failure, with the largest countries of the
+South refusing to lose the ‘comparative advantage’ integral to what standard economic
+theory calls their ‘right to pollute’.8 From which follows a schizophrenic international
+legal order whose economic hemisphere encourages non-ratification or nonenforcement
+of standards, the necessity and universality of which are proclaimed by its
+social or ecological hemisphere.
+What conclusions to draw from this historical and legal contextualizing of social
+justice? Should one consider – as we have been pushed for thirty years to do by the
+neoliberal doctrines and reforms – that this centenarian lady was in fact a freedomkilling
+vampire, that we must drive a stake through her heart and bury her once and for
+all in order to allow the emergence of the only justice that is worthwhile, the justice
+immanent in market forces? The future would thus be one of the drastic reduction of
+
+6. ‘The truth is this. We are in a global race today. And that means an hour of reckoning for countries
+like ours. Sink or swim. Do or decline. (…) These are difficult times. We’re being tested. How will
+we come through it? Again, it’s not complicated. Hard work.’ D. Cameron: Speech to the
+Conservative Party Conference, The Telegraph, 9 October 2012.
+7. Often attributed to Karl Marx, the ‘iron law of wages’ was first formulated by Ferdinand Lassalle,
+who himself drew inspiration (in order to criticize them) from the ideas of David Ricardo and
+Thomas Malthus: ‘Die beschränkung des durchschnittlichen arbeitslohnes auf die in einem volke
+gewohnheitsmäßig zur fristung der existenz und zur fortpflanzung erforderliche lebensnotdurft —
+das ist also (…) das eherne und grausame gesetz, welches den arbeitslohn unter den heutigen
+verhältnissen beherrscht’. (‘The iron and inexorable law, according to which, under the domination
+of supply and demand, the average wages of labour remain always reduced to the bare
+subsistence which, according to the standard of living of a nation, is necessary for the maintenance
+of life and the reproduction of the species’) Ferdinand Lassalle: ‘Open Letter in Response
+to the Central Committee for the Calling of a General German Workers’ Congress in Leipzig,
+March 1, 1863’, in Gesammelte Reden und Schriften (Collected Speeches and Writings), ed.
+Edward Bernstein. Berlin: Paul Cassirer, 1919-1920, Vol. 3, pp. 41-107.
+8. Disseminated among jurists by the Law and Economics doctrine; this concept comes from the
+‘Nobel Prize’ winner in Economics, Ronald H. Coase: ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law
+and Economics, III (October 1960), pp. 1-44.
+
+Alain Supiot
+
+4
+the scope of social justice to a few fundamental rights, and to the consequent capture
+of the potentially lucrative segments of social security by the insurance industry. Social
+justice would thus meet the same fate as that promised to the state by anarchocapitalism,
+which deems that it should ‘reduce it to the size where it can be drowned
+in the bathtub’.9
+This call to have done with ‘the mirage of social justice’ disregards the fact that
+without it, in the future as in the past, there will be no lasting peace. The overlooking
+of this lesson of history is presently one of the causes of hitherto unknown violence
+marking the breakdown of the weakest states. The tensions and inequalities engendered
+by globalization certainly lead to the resurgence of solidarity in action, as one can
+see in such different situations as the strikes in China10 and the uprisings in the Arab
+world – but also, and in particular, to solidarity based on exclusion, founded on new
+religious, ethnic or identities, which are the soil in which terrorism thrives.11
+In this context, social justice comes again to be a political priority, in particular in
+the large emerging countries, which do not perceive it as an obstacle to development,
+but on the contrary as one of its most pressing preconditions. From this remarkable
+institutional innovations follow – like the ‘family allowance’ programme in Brazil or
+the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India. Even in the United States,
+homeland of anarcho-capitalism (but also of the New Deal), the Obamacare reform
+provides evidence of this renewal. This is a necessary renewal since, while the basis of
+social justice in values is intangible (as is the dignity of human beings proclaimed
+coming out of the Second World War), its implementation is diverse and evolving, and
+needs to respond to the present age. This age is marked by the growing interdependence
+of all of the people of the earth, and it is thus at international level that we must
+envisage social justice in the twenty-first century. At this level it has new dimensions
+that we will take stock of (section §1.01) prior to exploring the paths for its achievement
+(section §1.02).
+
+§1.01 THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
+
+The signs are there of a reconfiguration of social justice, one that yields neither to awe
+nor to despondency in the face of the steamroller of globalization, but that rather
+advances toward a ‘world-forming’ (mondialization) that respects the diversity of
+humans and their life-supporting environments.12 This implies not reducing social
+
+9. See the famous declaration of G. Norquist: ‘My goal is to cut government in half in 25 years,
+to get it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub.’ DLC: Blueprint Magazine, 30
+June 2003 (‘Starving the beast’).
+10. See Feng Xiang: Chine: la solidarité en chanson. Les révélations d’une grève., in A. Supiot
+[ed.] La solidarité. Enquête sur un principe juridique, Paris, O. Jacob, 2015, pp. 221-237.
+11. See The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising. Translated by
+G.M. Goshgarian (London, Saqi Books, 2013).
+12. According to the primary meaning of the Latin word mundus (where monde is opposed to
+immonde, just as cosmos is opposed to chaos), the ‘mondialization’ consists in making a
+physical realm inhabitable by humans: in making our planet a place that can be inhabited. In
+other words, it consists in mastering the different dimensions of the globalization process.
+Unlike globalization (globalization), which has as its perspective the homogenization of the
+
+Chapter 1: What International Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century? §1.01
+
+5
+justice to a minimum set of fundamental rights – which would be more or less the right
+not to freeze to death or die of hunger – but on the contrary to enrich it with three
+dimensions ignored or neglected by the social state: that of justice in international
+trade, justice in relationships of economic allegiance, and lastly justice in the division
+of labour.
+
+[A] Justice in International Trade
+
+The generalized conversion to the neoliberal credo has everywhere been the source of
+a dizzying inequality gulf and of a rapid enrichment of the ruling classes, which are its
+main beneficiaries in all countries. It is not surprising in such a context that in 1996 the
+low-wage countries vigorously opposed any idea of a social clause in trade treaties, on
+the ground that ‘the comparative advantage of the countries, in particular of the
+low-wage developing countries, should in no way be called into question’.13 The ILO
+itself pledged allegiance to the WTO on this point, in underlining two years later in its
+Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work that ‘the comparative
+advantage of any country should in no way be called into question by this Declaration
+and its follow-up’.14 The ILO could hardly go further in its self-denial. A repentance for
+this denial of its founding principles emerged ten years later in its 2008 Declaration, the
+terms of which are more balanced: ‘the violation of fundamental principles and rights
+at work cannot be invoked or otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage
+and labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes.’15
+Since the failure of the Havana Charter, the States have deemed themselves the
+sole entities responsible for social justice, with the role of the ILO being to encourage
+and assist them in the exercise of this responsibility. This essentially national path was
+practicable within an international legal order resting on sovereign states that were
+masters of their trade and monetary policies. But this order has changed since the free
+movement of goods and capital has become the rule. In combination with the IT
+revolution, the wiping out of trade boundaries has led to a radical transformation in the
+large firms, which is to say to a transformation of the arrangements for the organization
+
+world under the aegis of a now all-encompassing market, world-forming ‘mondialization’ has
+as its perspective a world made liveable by humans through understanding of the diversity of
+civilizations and of their growing interdependence. On this distinction see A. Supiot:
+Grandeur et misère de l’État social: Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France (Paris, Fayard,
+2013). In English: ‘Grandeur and Misery of the Social State’, New Left Review, No. 82, (August
+2013) pp. 99-113 (abridged version. A full version is available at http://books.openedition.
+org/cdf/3093).
+13. Singapore Ministerial Declaration adopted on 13 December 1996, paragraph 4 (‘The comparative
+advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be
+put into question’). Available in English, French and Spanish on the WTO website.
+14. ILO: Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998, Article 5. (‘The
+comparative advantage of any country should in no way be called into question by this
+declaration and its follow-up.’)
+15. ILO: Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008, Articles I to IV (‘The violation
+of fundamental principles and rights at work cannot be invoked or otherwise used as a
+legitimate comparative advantage and (…) labour standards should not be used for protectionist
+trade purposes.’).
+
+§1.01[A] Alain Supiot
+
+6
+of work worldwide. The large Fordist enterprises – organizations that were highly
+integrated and hierarchical, working under the aegis of a state and of its tax, social and
+environmental laws – have given way to international production networks and chains
+that practice ‘optimization’ in these areas, which is to say that elude the empire of the
+rule of law so as to reap the full benefits of the opportunities for law shopping. For them
+the world no longer looks like a patchwork of sovereign states, but rather as an
+immense gaming table where it is possible to play one set of laws off against another.
+Such a system undermines the financial foundations of the social state where it
+was the most developed, and halts its construction in the emerging countries, which
+continue to be threatened with losing their ‘comparative advantage’ if they get it into
+their heads to bid up labour costs, increase the amount of taxes or protect nature. It also
+undermines the enterprises themselves. Their networked organization leaves them
+exposed to new risks, inasmuch as they exert only indirect control over the chain of
+manufacture of their products. And they are subject to ever higher demands for
+short-term profitability, putting at risk the security of their activities and their needs for
+investment over the long term.
+The wiping out of trade boundaries also affects the balance of power on which
+social justice rests. Whereas enterprises may deploy freely anywhere on the world
+stage, the collective freedoms of workers remain locked up in the cage of domestic
+laws. And at country level the pressure exerted by ‘the industrial reserve army’16 –
+whether that of the unemployed and workers in precarious employment, or that of the
+countries with low labour costs – undermines the economic and sociological foundations
+of trade unionism. A legal offensive is undertaken every day on behalf of this
+rupture in the equality of arms, against the right to strike. Labour law sets up a balance
+between the freedom of enterprise and the freedom of association. In order that this
+tension may constitute a factor for achievement of social justice, collective freedoms
+must not be subordinated to economic freedoms, and trade unions should be able to
+pressure the enterprises through collective actions, including strikes. In systems like
+those of the European Union or communist China, where the broad economic policy
+options are beyond electoral reach, the strike is the last arm citizens have available to
+contest the most unjust effects of these policies. It is this weapon that since 2007 the
+European Court of Justice seeks to render inoperative, in prohibiting on principle
+strikes directed against offshoring or international posting of labour. This challenge is
+not the doing of the authoritarian economic regimes alone. It has won the heart of the
+ILO itself since the International Organisation of Employers clashed with the Committee
+of Experts in 2012, with the aim of excluding the right to strike from the scope of
+application of Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of Association.
+
+16. This concept comes from Marx, as is well known (see Capital, Book I, Chapter XXV, section III
+(Penguin Classics, 1992). Among the various methods used to ‘manufacture supernumeraries’,
+he mentions the fact of replacing ‘a Yankee by three Chinese’ or as well the intensification of
+work: ‘The overwork of the employed part of the working class swells the ranks of the reserve,
+whilst conversely the greater pressure that the latter by its competition exerts on the former,
+forces these to submit to overwork and to subjugation under the dictates of capital (see Capital,
+supra).
+
+Chapter 1: What International Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century? §1.01[A]
+
+7
+From the viewpoint of international social justice, we would do well to rather
+pose the question the other way round: how to restabilize collective bargaining, which
+at present pits enterprises that are free to practice law shopping worldwide, against
+trade unions whose action remains confined to a national scope? However necessary it
+may be, defence of the right to strike is an inadequate response to this question. It
+would be necessary to open up more widely the range of international solidarity in the
+face of injustice, by using as a basis other forms of collective action than strikes, such
+as labelling or boycotts, concurrently with precise legal conditions.
+
+[B] Justice in Relationships of Economic Allegiance
+
+Globalization (globalization) profoundly questions the very notion of the rule of law.
+The utopia of an all-encompassing market governing all human activity on the face of
+the earth leads to putting the law at the service of economic calculation. That is the
+whole object of the ‘law and economics’ doctrine, whose considerable influence on
+the theory and practice of contemporary law is well known. Governance by numbers
+thus replaces the rule of law, henceforth subservient to calculations of utility. But this
+overturning of the rule of law leads in practice to a generalization of the bonds of
+allegiance. Failing their placement under the aegis of a common law that is obligatory
+for all, people forge networks of loyalties among themselves, within which each seeks
+the protection of those stronger than oneself or the support of those weaker than
+oneself. The bonds of allegiance that make up the weft of these networks are oriented
+to the subjugation of one subject to the objectives of another, who simultaneously
+controls it and grants it a certain autonomy and protection. This new paradigm reflects
+both new forms of individual employment relationships (waged or not), as well as new
+forms of business organization (in supply chains and networks), or new forms of
+subjugation of certain states through their voluntary enrolment in unequal treaties or
+structural adjustment plans that take away part of their sovereignty.17
+With regard to the employment contract, this change puts a new face on
+subordination. In the post-Fordist realm that today is that of the large firms, subordination
+is understood less as submission to orders than as behavioural programming,
+with each one being granted a sphere of autonomy to reach the quantified objectives
+that have been allocated to it. But unlike in legal subordination, this programming of
+the work is not limited to wage earners. It gives structure to the international supply
+chains and explains the boom in relational contracts.18 It obviously leads to a
+dispersion of responsibilities within dependency networks, which rest not on obedience
+but on the achieving of measurable objectives set out within the cascade of
+subsidiaries, subcontractors and suppliers – with the risk of allowing those who forge
+these networks and take advantage of them to shrug off their responsibilities and pass
+them on to underlings. In the event for example of an accident at work, of pollution or
+
+17. For an account of this legal paradigm shift, see A. Supiot: La gouvernance par les nombres (Paris,
+Fayard, 2015).
+18. The idea has been put forward by Ian R. Macneil: The Relational Theory of Contracts, Selected
+Works of Ian Macneil (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001).
+
+§1.01[B] Alain Supiot
+
+8
+of the bankruptcy of the subcontractor, only the latter’s liability will be sought,
+whereas the one who gives the order – who has devised and controls the production
+system generating these damages – will escape the jurisdiction of the states on whose
+territory they take place.
+The States themselves will often be inclined to not take on their public responsibilities
+in social, environmental or tax matters, for fear that hard laws may dissuade
+investors from setting up or continuing on their territory. All the more so since these
+States are as well more often than not themselves caught in bonds of allegiance that
+deprive them of all or part of their sovereignty. The Guinean state or the Greek state will
+thus be held accountable for the degradation of the health status of their population –
+even though this degradation results in fact from the instructions they have received
+from the IMF or the Troika. Globalization thus authorizes the most irresponsible
+actions in the management of human, natural and financial resources: the most
+irresponsible and also the most dangerous, as the networked organization of the global
+economy embodies systemic risks.
+But the structure of the bond of allegiance also clarifies the means of avoiding this
+pernicious effect. The power of control that it bestows on the dominant party is
+simultaneously a right of oversight and a duty to take care of the long-term interests of
+the one made dependent on it. Thus what German law called Sorgenpflicht reappears.
+This is a duty of care that blends oversight and protection, control and support – one
+that modern law rediscovers under the name of ‘due diligence’. The evolution of the
+employment contract is as always revealing of this resurgence. The ‘flexibility’
+henceforth demanded from the employee in return calls forth the duty of the employer
+to watch over the maintenance of their occupational capacities, as well as a liability.
+The logic of a personal bond in the medium to long term thus goes beyond that of a
+simple exchange of services. Due diligence takes various forms, depending on whether
+the work constitutes employment or not, but it responds in both cases to the same
+social justice imperative.
+The broadening of social justice beyond waged employment is thus necessary. It
+is already underway in the concept of Decent Work. This concept – promoted by the
+ILO since the turn of the century19 – refers to ‘work that is productive and delivers a fair
+income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects
+for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their
+concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of
+opportunity and treatment for all women and men’.20 Enshrined in the 2008 Declaration
+on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, the Decent Work Agenda is addressed not
+
+19. See ILO: Decent Work, Report of the Director-General, International Labour Conference, 87th
+Session, (ILO, Geneva, 1999).
+20. ‘A work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social
+protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration,
+freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect
+their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men’ http://www.ilo.
+org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm.
+
+Chapter 1: What International Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century? §1.01[B]
+
+9
+only to wage earners, but to ‘all workers’, as well as to ‘the entirety of enterprises’, the
+sustainability of which needs to be ensured.21
+
+[C] Justice in the Division of Labour
+
+In the twentieth century the scope of social justice was limited to earnings and working
+time, as well as to work being physically safe. Excluded from this scope, however, was
+the division of labour – which is to say, all matters affecting its organization, meaning
+and content. As long as it did not jeopardize the physical safety of the wage earner,
+work as such was thought to come under a ‘scientific organization’ that alone assured
+its efficiency. In both communist as well as capitalist territories, Taylorist dehumanization
+of work could never be unjust for those who deemed it necessary.22 The result
+of this restriction was to reduce the issue of social justice to that of an exchange of
+quantities: the quantity of work against the quantity of the wage – and on the contrary
+to disregard all that which has to do with quality: quality of the people and quality of
+the work. In other words, social justice in the twentieth century had as its essential
+purpose the distribution of wealth.
+For some twenty years this purely asset-related and redistributive conception has
+been criticized, in particular in North America, by various authors who have accused
+it of ignoring inequalities based on sex, origin, ethnicity, sexual orientation or religious
+beliefs. A new conception of social justice has thus been developed, a recognitive
+justice, to address ‘struggles for recognition’ conducted by these minorities.23 It has
+manifested itself in substantive law in a significant expansion of the number of
+prohibited grounds of discrimination.
+The essential novelty of the contemporary debates on social justice is thus to no
+longer – or no longer only – define it in terms of the equitable distribution of resources,
+but rather in terms of the just recognition of persons. Focused in this way on the
+dichotomy between having and being, these debates however left invisible a third
+dimension of social justice – that of acting, which is to say of the work as such.24 This
+dimension was nevertheless in embryo in the Preamble to the Constitution of the ILO,
+which calls for ‘humane conditions of labour’ (un régime de travail réellement
+humain).25 It is found more clearly in the Declaration of Philadelphia, which places
+among workers’ fundamental rights that of having ‘the satisfaction of giving the fullest
+
+21. ILO: Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, adopted by the International Labour
+Conference (2008), Article I.A (Geneva, ILO, 2008), p. 11.
+22. See Bruno Trentin: La città del lavoro. Sinistra e crisi del fordismo (Milan, Feltrinelli, 1997);
+French translation. La Cité du travail: La gauche et la crise du fordisme (Paris, Fayard, 2012),
+448 p.
+23. C. Taylor: Multiculturalism and ‘the Politics of Recognition’ (Princeton, Princeton University
+Press, 1992); A. Honneth: Kampf um anerkennung: zur moralischen grammatik sozialer
+konflikte, Suhrkamp, 1st edition, 1992, 2nd edition 2003 (The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral
+Grammar of Social Conflicts (Polity Press, 1995)); N. Fraser: Redistribution or Recognition?: A
+Political-Philosophical Exchange (London and New York, Verso, 2004).
+24. See A. Supiot: ‘L’idée de justice sociale’, in L. Burgorgue-Larsen (ed.): La justice sociale saisie par
+les juges en Europe, Collection cahiers européens No. 4 (Paris, Pedone, 2013), pp. 5-30.
+25. On the interpretation of this concept see La gouvernance par les nombres, supra., Chapter 12.
+
+§1.01[C] Alain Supiot
+
+10
+measure of their skill and attainments and make their greatest contribution to the
+common well-being’ (Article III(b)). It has reappeared recently in the Decent Work
+Agenda, which is aimed at providing to individuals the possibility of ‘personal
+development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns,
+organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives’.26 This long neglected
+dimension of social justice is today essential, for reasons both of security of persons as
+well as of environmental protection.
+As Taylorism gives way to management by objectives, subordination takes on a
+new look: that of a programming of the worker. They are not asked to unplug their
+brains and act in a mechanical fashion, but on the contrary to plug them in to the
+information flow, and react to it to achieve the objectives that have been allocated to
+them. Amplified by information technology, this hold over the brain exerted by the
+organization of work led to the appearance at the end of the twentieth century of new
+hazards that were unknown in the industrial era: hazards damaging one’s mental
+health. Unlike the industrial hazards of the Fordist era, this kind of hazards is faced as
+much (if not more) by managers as by those who perform the work.27 And they cannot
+be prevented without questioning the choices in the organization of production, which
+up until now were excluded from the realm of collective bargaining – in other words,
+without bringing back into the scope of social justice the issue of the meaning and
+content of the tasks assigned to each person, such that all workers have ‘the
+satisfaction of giving the fullest measure of their skill and attainments and make their
+greatest contribution to the common well-being’.
+This search for a just division of labour is also required for environmental
+reasons, since work is not only the object of relations between people – it is also the
+locus of the relationship between humans and nature. The way in which it is designed
+and organized thus has a significant impact on our ecumene. In the modern age, with
+the beginnings of technoscience, the earth is no longer envisaged as humans’ lifesupporting
+environment, the equilibria of which need to be respected by work, but as
+an object at its disposal. It would be its ‘master and possessor’ and could exploit its
+resources indefinitely. Of course this involves a fiction, since humanity depends more
+on the earth than the earth depends on humanity. Like that of labour as a commodity
+to which it is closely linked, this fiction is sustainable only so long as the States remain
+the guarantors over the inter-generational time frame, and submit the use of labour and
+of nature to rules that protect them from overexploitation. With globalization these
+frameworks disintegrate. The world is imagined as a ‘global village’, with each of its
+inhabitants needing to specialize in the activity that is most profitable for them, trading
+freely with the others. This vision of the world as ‘global village’ is carried along by the
+IT revolution, which abolishes distances in the circulation of signs.28 But it is deceptive
+
+26. See http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--fr/index.htm.
+27. See on the case of Amazon, the investigation by Jean-Baptiste Malet with regard to the workers
+(En amazonie: Infiltré dans le ‘meilleur des mondes’ (Paris, Fayard, 2013) and that of Jodi Kantor
+and David Streitfeld with regard to the managers (‘Inside Amazon: Wrestling Big Ideas in a
+Bruising Workplace’, New York Times, 15 August 2015).
+28. The idea of global village comes from Marshall McLuhan, the theorist of information and
+communication technology (see The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto, University of Toronto Press,
+
+Chapter 1: What International Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century? §1.01[C]
+
+11
+when involving the production and circulation of things, which remain anchored in the
+diversity of natural environments.
+Thus it is for example that it is assumed that raising chickens or pigs could be
+subject to international specialization, governed by ‘comparative advantage’ of ‘rootless’
+industrial organization and cheap labour, the products of which would be
+exported worldwide by road or maritime transport that itself is ‘governed’ by competition
+and the seeking of ever lower prices. This type of organization of work has an
+exorbitant human and environmental cost that is not taken into account in market
+prices. To put it in economic terms: it engenders enormous negative externalities. The
+factory farming developed on a massive scale in Europe rests on the super-exploitation
+of the breeders integrated into the food industry or of underpaid posted workers. It is
+the cause of massive pollution of the soils and water resources. Export of this frozen
+meat requires road or maritime transport the carbon footprint of which has seen a
+massive increase,29 and precludes any possibility of the importing country undertaking
+its own endogenous development of livestock raising on a human scale.30
+A just division of labour thus cannot ignore this environmental dimension. The
+organization of work not only has to have meaning for those who perform it, but must
+also respect the environment in order to ‘contribute to the common well-being’. These
+two dimensions of work are two sides of the same coin, since what the Constitution of
+the ILO calls ‘humane conditions of labour’ is a system that preserves the ecosystem of
+which humanity is a part.
+
+§1.02 THE WAYS FORWARD FOR INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE
+
+These new dimensions of social justice remain largely disregarded by the States, which
+continue to be prisoners of the neoliberal agenda of the 1970s. But they are, on the
+other hand very well captured by the major transnational companies, which are
+directly confronted with the hazards of globalization. Awareness of these hazards leads
+most of them to lay claim to their ‘social and environmental responsibility’ (SER).
+Motivated by morality – or by understanding of their long-term interests – they claim
+to take on a commitment, on a purely voluntary basis, in the service of safety or of the
+well-being of all stakeholders. These latter are their employees and customers, but also
+
+1962)); see also by the same author The Medium Is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects. (New
+York, Bantam, 1967). McLuhan said he was inspired by the concept of noosphere developed
+some years earlier by Teilhard de Chardin, according to whom ‘thanks to the prodigious
+biological event represented by the discovery of electro-magnetic waves, each individual finds
+himself henceforth (actively and passively) simultaneously present, over land and sea, in every
+corner of the earth’ (Phenomenon of Man (New York, Harper, 1959), p. 240).
+29. In Europe transport is the second-largest contributor to human-induced greenhouse gas
+emissions, after energy production. See Marie Cugny Seguin: ‘Les transports et leur impact sur
+le environnement: Comparaisons européennes’, in Commissariat Général au Développement
+Durable, Observations et statistiques, No. 8, March 2009, figure 5, p. 3.
+30. On the case of the poultry industry, see the documentation published by the collective of NGOs
+entitled Exportations de poulets: Le Europe plume l’Afrique. (Campaign for the right to protect
+agricultural markets. CCFD and Agir Ici, 2004). http://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/img/pdf/dossier
+_vola0f1b.pdf.
+
+§1.02 Alain Supiot
+
+12
+their agents (subsidiaries, subcontractors and suppliers). Allowing for exceptions,
+these commitments form part of what is called soft law. Their normative force depends
+on the sincerity of those that undertake them. Thus the practice of paternalism
+resurfaces at international level, just as it had developed at country level prior to the
+construction of the social state. However, numerous signs show that – on the model of
+the historical evolution of the paternalism of yesteryear – this soft law is destined to
+harden. SER cannot in fact be taken seriously until such time as it is secured by a
+neutral third party, in reference to common rules that are binding on all.
+
+[A] What Guarantor?
+
+There is first of all no true legal obligation without a neutral third party ensuring
+enforcement, be this third party a judge or trustee (administrateur). In international
+trade law – and this is what makes it ‘hard’ – the place of this third party is occupied
+by the dispute settlement body of the WTO and the deterrent sanction mechanisms it
+has available to it.31 In social and environmental matters, on the contrary, the third
+party is absent and the law is ‘soft’. As a consequence, their social or environmental
+responsibility is seriously called into question, with all of the resulting economic risks,
+and the large firms find themselves looking for this neutral third party. Thus the Rana
+Plaza drama gave rise to the signing under the auspices of the ILO of an agreement
+between large distribution companies and international trade union federations.32
+But the ILO lacks both a tribunal as well as a system of sanctions comparable to
+that of the WTO that would allow the States to be compelled to take their social
+responsibilities seriously. Even worse, its international labour standards supervision
+system is going through an unprecedented crisis. Since 2012 the International Organisation
+of Employers has denied to the Committee of Experts all power of interpretation
+of those Conventions whose application it controls.33 It is true that despite the quality
+of its members and of the rigour of its procedures, this Committee is not a court of law.
+It is not subject to the adversarial principle, and its opinions lack the force of res
+judicata. Thus it is not without reason that the Employers’ group denies it true
+interpretive authority over the international labour standards. But neither is this
+without hypocrisy, since as a party to the dispute on the interpretation of Convention
+No. 87 that set off the crisis, this group has opposed the two solutions offered by the
+Constitution of the ILO for its settlement: referral to the International Court of Justice
+or the creation of the tribunal provided for in Article 37, paragraph 2. This refusal
+
+31. See the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Appendix 2: Understanding on
+Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. As the WTO very rightly explains on
+its website: ‘Dispute settlement is the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and the
+WTO’s unique contribution to the stability of the global economy. Without a means of settling
+disputes, the rules-based system would be less effective because the rules could not be enforced.
+The WTO’s procedure underscores the rule of law, and it makes the trading system more secure
+and predictable.’ https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm.
+32. Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 13 May 2013.
+33. See the Employers’ statement at the Committee on the Application of Standards of the
+International Labour Conference of 4 June 2012.
+
+Chapter 1: What International Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century? §1.02[A]
+
+13
+demonstrates a wish to be at one and the same time judge and party to the dispute.
+Since – contrary to the expectations in the Constitution of the ILO – interpretation of
+contentious Conventions would be within the sole discretion of those that have
+adopted them – i.e., of the Governing Body or of the International Labour Conference
+– the principle of the separation of powers was no longer guaranteed, and these
+Conventions would no longer entail hard law – but once again soft law, which is to say
+a law the interpretation of which is at the mercy of those that decree it.
+As a consequence, one cannot exclude the possibility that the locus of the
+international guarantor of fundamental social rights ends up attaching to the standing
+appellate body of the WTO. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
+includes a few legal loopholes34 of a nature that could authorize a country to close its
+market to products manufactured in violation of these rights. But it would of course be
+entirely illusory to think that this still hypothetical route could go beyond sanctioning
+the crudest violations of the most basic rights, since nothing in its constitution gives the
+WTO the mission of ensuring international social justice.
+Failing an internationally recognized guarantor, questioning of the SER of the
+enterprises, like that of the States, falls within domestic or regional jurisdictions. The
+latter are confronted directly with the schizophrenia of the international legal order,
+whose rules (both social as well as commercial) they must apply. The European Union
+offers an excellent example of this clash of legal logics. On the one hand the Court of
+Justice of the Union has as much as possible seen fit since 2007 to subordinate social
+rights to economic freedoms, supported to this end by the action of the Troika in the
+indebted countries. On the other, the European Court of Human Rights – as well as a
+certain number of constitutional courts (notably in Germany, Portugal or Italy), and
+international bodies such as the European Committee of Social Rights or the Committee
+of Experts of the International Labour Office – oppose this approach as much as they
+can, and remind the States of their social obligations.35 The domestic judge is today still
+the best equipped to give a certain extraterritorial scope to social justice. But this is not
+without regrets nor contradictions, as is shown by the Kiobel judgment, in which the
+Supreme Court almost entirely shut the door of the Alien Tort Claims Act in relation to
+gross infringement of fundamental rights committed outside the territory of the United
+States.36 This prudence on the part of the Supreme Court breaks with the legal
+imperialism toward enterprises shown for its part by the American Department of
+Justice, as regards embargoes or in fighting corruption.37
+
+34. See G. Marceau and A. Doussin: ‘Le droit du commerce international, les droits fondamentaux
+et les considérations sociales’, in L’observateur des Nations Unies 2009, No. 2, Vol. 27, pp. 1-16.
+With regard to environmental standards, see G. Marceau and J. Wyatt: ‘The WTO’s Efforts to
+Balance Economic Development and Environmental Protection: A Short Review of Appellate
+Body Jurisprudence’, Latin American Journal of International Trade Law, 1, Issue 1, Year 2013,
+pp. 291-314.
+35. See the forthcoming special report on the subject in the European Journal of Human Rights.
+36. Supreme Court of the United States. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10/1491. (17 April
+2013).
+37. See Antoine Garapon and Pierre Servan-Schreiber, (eds.): Deals de justice. Le marché européen
+de l’obéissance mondialisée (Paris, PUF, 2013).
+
+§1.02[A] Alain Supiot
+
+14
+The ability of domestic judges to impose respect for a certain international social
+or environmental order is thus real. This is one of the reasons why one seeks to
+eliminate their jurisdiction in international investment agreements by stipulating
+arbitration clauses in them. These clauses privatize the job of judging, by entrusting it
+to arbitrators, with the power to impose sanctions on those States that might dare to
+harden their legislation in these areas.38 One might seriously question the ability and
+impartiality of these arbitrators. Their narrow specialization in corporate law is not
+such as to nourish their understanding of social and environmental issues.39 And since
+the large firms are their main clients on the arbitration and legal consultation market,
+the arbitrators are economically dependent on their orders.40 Already begun in
+the bilateral investment agreements, this placing of the States under supervision by
+private justice would spread considerably if the transatlantic41 and transpacific42 free
+trade treaties now being negotiated with the United States managed to be imposed on
+hostile public opinion. Since it is unable to ignore this hostility, the European
+Parliament has requested that the negotiators of the transatlantic treaty remove any
+arbitration clause, in favour of ‘independent professional judges appointed by the
+public authorities’, with the aim of avoiding ‘private interests undermining public
+policy objectives’.43 The growing awareness of the risks that these treaties pose is not
+limited to the issue of arbitration. It also concerns respect for social standards.
+
+[B] What Standards?
+
+For forty years the international watchword has been deregulation of labour law and of
+social security. The rise in unemployment and lack of employment security, the
+dizzying inequality gulf and the environmental disasters and mass migrations caused
+by this deregulation will sooner or later oblige the States to call into question the
+
+38. U. Kriebaum: ‘Privatizing Human Rights: The Interface between International Investment
+Protection and Human Rights’, Transnational Dispute Management, 2006, pp. 165-189.
+39. See Marc Jacob: International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, INEF Research Paper
+Series on Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development, 03/2010.
+(Essen, University of Duisburg, 2010), 51 pp.
+40. On the arbitration market see the very well documented investigation by P. Eberhardt and
+C. Olivet: Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fuelling an
+Investment Arbitration Boom. (Brussels and Amsterdam, Corporate Europe Observatory and the
+Transnational Institute, 2012).
+41. Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA).
+42. Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP).
+43. Resolution of the European Parliament of 8 July 2015 containing the recommendations to the
+European Commission with regard to the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
+Partnership (TTIP) (2014/2228 (INI)), point S-2-a- d-xv (‘to ensure that foreign investors
+are treated in a non-discriminatory fashion, while benefiting from no greater rights than
+domestic investors, and to replace the ISDS system with a new system for resolving disputes
+between investors and states which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny, where
+potential cases are treated in a transparent manner by publicly appointed, independent
+professional judges in public hearings and which includes an appellate mechanism, where
+consistency of judicial decisions is ensured, the jurisdiction of courts of the EU and of the
+Member States is respected, and where private interests cannot undermine public policy
+objectives’).
+
+Chapter 1: What International Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century? §1.02[B]
+
+15
+dogmas of neoliberalism and to pull out of the race to be the lowest social bidder. Three
+legal avenues are emerging to create the social and environmental competition police
+the world so clearly needs.
+The first is that of the bilateral trade agreements. Chased out of the multilateral
+trade organization by the Declaration of Singapore, the social clause has made a
+remarkable comeback in these bilateral agreements, as well as in the generalized
+systems of preferences instituted by the United States and the European Union.44 A
+comprehensive study conducted recently under the auspices of the International
+Labour Office gives us an idea of the scale of this movement, whose dynamism has to
+do both with the number of agreements as well as with the social issues addressed.45
+It likewise shows the promotional nature of a majority of these clauses, which commit
+the countries that are signatories to compliance programmes that are supported by aid
+from the stronger party to the agreement. It is an irony of history that refusal of the
+social clause by the ‘developing’ countries within a multilateral framework leads them
+to place themselves under allegiance to the ‘developed’ countries for the definition of
+their social priorities.
+Wherever it is not entirely muzzled, democracy has obliged the political leaders
+to subordinate the opening up of their markets to respecting social and environmental
+disciplines. The resolution of the European Parliament mentioned above regarding the
+draft transatlantic free trade treaty already provides evidence of this pressure. Its
+preamble underlines that ‘trade and investment flows are not an end in themselves
+(…); that a strong and ambitious trade agreement should not only focus on reducing
+tariffs and NTBs but should also be a tool to protect workers, consumers and the
+environment’.46 By virtue of this, instructions are given to the European negotiators to
+‘ensure that the sustainable development chapter is binding and enforceable and aims
+at the full and effective ratification, implementation and enforcement of the eight
+fundamental International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions and their content,
+the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda and the core international environmental agreements’.
+They are also mandated to ‘ensure that the implementation of and compliance with
+labour provisions is subjected to an effective monitoring process, involving social
+partners and civil society representatives and to the general dispute settlement which
+applies to the whole agreement’.
+Of course these are only recommendations. But coming from the sole democratic
+authority of the European Union, they demonstrate a loss of faith in the spontaneously
+beneficial properties of free trade, and a rather novel political will to subordinate the
+latter not only to respect for fundamental rights, but more broadly to the overall
+
+44. W. Clatanoff: ‘Labor Standards in Recent U.S. Trade Agreements’, Richmond Journal of Global
+Law and Business, 5, 2005, No. 2, pp. 109-117; and for some examples: M.A. Cabin: ‘Labor
+Rights in the Peru Agreement: Can Vague Principles Yield Concrete Change?’, Columbia Law
+Review, 109, 2009. pp. 1047-1093; L. Compa: ‘Labour Rights in the FTAA’, in: John D. R. Craig
+and S. Michael Lynk: Globalization and the Future of Labour Law. Cambridge University Press,
+2006, pp. 245-273; S.E. Martin: ‘Labor Obligations in the US–Chile Free Trade Agreement’,
+Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 25, 2004, No. 2, pp. 201-226.
+45. See C. E. Franz and A. Posthuma: Labour Provisions in Trade Arrangements: Current Trends and
+Perspectives (Geneva, International Labour Office, 2011).
+46. Resolution of the European Parliament of 8 July 2015, supra.
+
+§1.02[B] Alain Supiot
+
+16
+improvement in labour and environmental protection. The route thus sketched out is
+promising. Only integrated intercontinental agreements are at present liable to lay the
+foundations for ‘fair trade’, by subordinating trade liberalization to the greater welfare
+of humanity and conservation of its environment.
+A second route would consist in providing a legal foundation for corporate social
+responsibility, all the while leaving companies with a margin of autonomy in its
+implementation. Mentioned in the resolution of the European Parliament, such an
+increased legal stringency for SER has recently been put into effect in India, whose
+Companies Act requires since 2013 that all large firms dedicate at least 2% of their
+average net profits to pursuit of SER.47 Much more timidly, to date the European Union
+has merely imposed on listed companies with more than 500 employees the inclusion
+in their financial reports of environmental and social information.48
+‘Last but not least’, as regards the international social standards, one must
+wonder how to give the ILO standards a legal effect commensurate with their
+unquestionable legitimacy. The difficulty here is well known, and dates from 1919,
+when the United States objected to the European proposals looking to make Conventions
+adopted by a two-thirds majority of the International Labour Conference directly
+enforceable in all Member States.49 The result of this opposition is that the international
+labour standards drawn up by the ILO are subject to a kind of regulatory ‘self-service’,
+with each State remaining free to choose those to which it will submit, and to ratify
+only a handful of them.50
+The ebbing of the international social justice objectives that took place from the
+1970s has brought to light the gap that exists between the universal mission of the ILO,
+and its legal impotence in fulfilling it. In its 1998 Declaration it tried to re-establish its
+authority by reminding its Member States of the obligations that are incumbent upon
+them by the mere fact of their membership. Thus in one go it sought in its Constitution
+the universal legal foundation that was lacking in its Conventions, and to get eight of
+these Conventions – designated as ‘fundamental’ – to be ratified by the largest possible
+number of States.
+One understands the intellectual reasoning, but one also sees its drawback,
+which is that of giving up the social justice objectives of the Declaration of Philadelphia
+
+47. Companies Act of 2013, section 135. All companies with a net worth of at least five hundred
+crore rupees (about 80 millions dollars), or business turnover of at least one thousand crore
+rupees (about 160 millions dollars), or net earnings of at least five crore rupees (about 800,000
+dollars) over the course of one financial year are required to fulfil this obligation (see Supryia
+Routh: ‘La responsabilité solidaire dans les réseaux de entreprises en inde’, in A. Supiot and
+M. Delmas-Marty (eds.), Prendre la responsabilité au sérieux (Paris, PUF, 2015), Chapter 13.).
+48. Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 (the so-called Barnier Directive) modifying Directive
+2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large
+undertakings and groups.
+49. The compromise solution suggested by the British consisted in instituting a right of veto for the
+national parliaments, with the Conventions becoming enforceable in the absence of such veto in
+the year following their adoption by the Conference (see Nicolas Valticos: ‘Droit international du
+travail’, in G.H. Camerlynck (ed.): Traité de droit du travail, Vol. 8, 2nd edition, No. 63 (Paris,
+Dalloz, 1983), p. 48).
+50. This is the case for instance of the United States, which along with Bahrain at 14 ratifications is
+the country that has ratified the fewest.
+
+Chapter 1: What International Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century? §1.02[B]
+
+17
+in order to fall back to the defence of a minimum number of fundamental rights.
+Linking the constitutional obligations of the Member States to a handful of Conventions
+that are supposed to express them undermines the legitimacy of all of the other
+international labour Conventions, the purely optional and voluntary nature of which
+thus stands underlined. Doubtless conscious of this drawback, the ILO changed tack in
+its 2008 Declaration, which promotes the Decent Work Agenda by making reference to
+the constitutional foundations of the ILO, but without selecting a limited number of
+Conventions to correspond to it. But the ILO therefore finds itself caught once again in
+the trap of soft law and of declarations of intent that weigh lightly in the face of the
+power of the interests at play in international trade.
+There is a way to get out of this trap. It would consist in imparting opposability
+erga omnes on ratification by a State of the ILO Conventions. Adoption of these
+Conventions by the International Labour Conference indeed gives them an unquestionable
+legitimacy, not least due to the qualified two-thirds majority that it needs to
+obtain.51 Each Member State of the ILO is certainly free to ratify an adopted Convention
+or not, but its membership in the ILO requires it to provide a reasoned justification for
+this decision, and to report on its legislation and practice with regard to the issue that
+is the subject of this Convention.52 One should even more so consider that its
+membership in the ILO prohibits it from compromising implementation of this
+Convention by the States that have ratified it. To put it in the terms of the Preamble of
+the ILO Constitution, no Member State should put obstacles ‘in the way of other nations
+which desire to improve the conditions [of workers] in their own countries’. A State
+that does not ratify a Convention is certainly not obligated to implement it on its own
+territory, but it must respect its implementation on the territory of the others. There
+should be a right – corresponding to this obligation to respect ratification by other
+States – for these other States to only open their markets to those members of the ILO
+that have ratified the same Conventions as they have. Such a reading would allow one
+to bring to an end the system of ‘double penalty’ that hits the States ratifying
+Conventions. An opposability erga omnes of ratified Conventions would certainly be a
+preferable system to the imposition of social clauses in the bilateral trade agreements,
+the content and implementation of which depend on the often unequal balance of
+power between the parties to these agreements. In order to be practicable, such a route
+would imply however that the ILO would be able to fully play its role of guarantor of
+the effective enforcement of the Conventions in the countries that have ratified them.
+Failing which, the States could lightly ratify Conventions that they would not implement.
+The issue of the guarantor and that of the standards are indissociable: international
+social justice can no more dispense with the judge than with the laws.
+It is futile to expect that all the countries in the world come to agree on ambitious
+international rules respected by all. But it is realistic to think that some States that are
+determined to enforce rigorous social and environmental rules on their territories,
+subordinate access to their markets to compliance with rules of a comparable level,
+thus putting in motion a movement for positive emulation.
+
+51. Constitution of the ILO, Article 19, section 2.
+52. Constitution of the ILO, Article 19, section 5(e).
+
+§1.02[B] Alain Supiot
+
+18
\ No newline at end of file
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+when numbers rule
+
+Alain SUPIOT, Governance by Numbers: The Making
+of a Legal Model of Allegiance (Oxford/Portland OR,
+Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017)
+
+The president of Rutgers University, a large public American
+university recently wrote a column in its alumni magazine titled,
+“For Good, Measure.” In it he described how the university was
+“using metrics to ensure it stays on mission” by collecting data
+measuring 50 aspects of the university’s mission. These include
+one-year retention rates, graduation rates, academic satisfaction,
+fundraising goals, research grants received, endowments, and debt.
+One can imagine the incentives that went along with reaching or
+failing to reach targets for these indicators. The result of all this data
+tracking is “more efficiency,” staff and faculty “working smarter”,
+greater accountability, and helping the university stay “on mission.”1
+Alain Supiot’s engaging, ambitious and sweeping book helps us
+understand how we arrived at a place where we valorize numbers
+and treat universities (and most organizations) like businesses.
+In a wonderful book that merits careful scrutiny, Supiot argues that
+we have lived through a profound transformation in work, law, the
+state and economic life. He characterizes this shift as one from
+governing by law to governance by numbers. Supiot sees this as
+a global institutional crisis, one that leaves workers profoundly
+alienated from work, politics, and each other. Just what does this
+shift entail? One major change is that the notion of government is
+replaced by “the terminology of management” [29]. Workers become
+human capital. Justice is supplanted by efficiency. Rules give way to
+objectives. Unions become social partners. Under the liberal regime,
+law was a prerequisite for the market but retained some autonomy
+from it; it was not purely an instrument of the market, as it is now.
+And, globally, firms are now free to pit nations against each another in
+their search for the most lenient fiscal, labor and environmental laws.
+Where government is the subordination of individuals to the rule of
+law, governance by numbers relies on the programming of individuals
+to continually respond to information and quantified objectives. This
+
+1 Rutgers, Spring (2019), page 1.
+
+523
+
+Wendy Espeland, Sociology Department, Northwestern University [wne741@
+northwestern.edu]
+European Journal of Sociology, 60, 3 (2019), pp. 523–527—0003-9756/19/0000-900$07.50per art + $0.10 per page
+ªEuropean Journal of Sociology 2020. doi: 10.1017/S0003975619000432
+
+available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975619000432
+Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Rochester, on 04 Mar 2020 at 13:24:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
+shift to a cybernetic view of work entails “mutually adjusting
+calculations of individual utility.”
+Central to Supiot’s method is “treating the law as a cultural fact.” By
+this he means situating law in its historical and material context, and
+making judicious use of comparison. He characterizes law according to
+its aesthetic and poetic dimensions. These are the imaginary metaphors
+that we use to capture the predominant normativity of an era, to
+conceptualize law and society, and determine how it is we recognize
+ourselves in relation to it. We have variously understood rulers and
+subjects as helmsmen of ships, as shepherds of flocks. However, the most
+dominant metaphor, at least since the Enlightenment, has been the image
+of society as a machine in which individuals are interdependent cogs.
+The first part of Supiot’s book traces the development of various
+aesthetic imaginaries. Under the Greeks, law was first conceived of as being
+man-made rather than divine. Nomos was the Greek term for laws made by
+and for citizens, where man is subordinate to impersonal law. The Roman
+conception of lex which eventually came to mean text, and ius, which
+originally referred to specialized secret knowledge but came to mean law as
+both a set of rules to follow and a right to act, was combined in Roman law
+with nomos to create a system of law that was separate from the
+philosophical and political associations it had in Greece. During the Middle
+Ages, the Gregorian Revolution combined Roman law with canon which
+gave rise to an understanding of government in which law is not simply an
+instrument of sovereign power but also a force that helps to create it where
+the sovereign is subordinate to impersonal law. This conception shaped the
+early sovereign states and the development of both civil law and common
+law. Rule by law became the dominant aesthetic imaginary.
+The image of society as a machine is associated most famously with
+Hobbes. This image of machinery that is guided by elites that are
+informed by science remained the dominant aesthetic until well into
+the 20th century. As Supiot notes, Taylorism was the culmination of
+this normative order, where a few were paid to think and many simply
+followed orders. But the mechanics of work are now being driven by
+images of dispassionate science and technology.
+Under the neoliberal order, workers are no longer cogs in a machine
+but are part of “programmable systems of interacting unity adjusting
+automatically to signal inputs and feedback” [25]. As Supiot puts it,
+the “physico-mechanical model of the clock, linked to the idea of the
+reign of law, has been supplanted by the model of the computer. The
+organization of work is no longer conceived of as a machine controlled
+by the lay of weights and forces but as a programmable system of
+
+524
+
+wendy espeland
+
+available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975619000432
+Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Rochester, on 04 Mar 2020 at 13:24:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
+interacting units adjusting automatically to signal inputs and feedback”
+[25]. These inputs are typically the metrics and indicators that
+are now routinely used to control and organize work. Quantification
+has long been fundamental to the control of labor, be it piece work,
+wages, or legislation about the length of the work day. What is new, for
+Supiot, is that it is no longer just the body which is subordinated.
+Now the mind is dominated, too.
+The second part of Supiot’s book examines the consequences of
+governance by numbers with an emphasis on law and employment,
+considering the effects for individuals, corporations, states and global
+relations. Rather than being sovereign subjects, workers are constructed
+into “objective subjects” who react to signals rather than act
+freely [179]. Corporations become single-minded entities, focusing
+exclusively on shareholder value. Where, formerly, corporate sectors
+were integrated according to a Fordist model, they are now organized
+as networks of subcontractors subordinate to the contractor. Supiot’s
+compelling insight is to suggest that the legal relations among these
+entities are similar to a feudal system in which the prime contractor
+controls considerable capital of the subcontractor who controls the
+sub-subcontractors in a complex structure of obligation and
+deference.
+A book of such scope cannot spend much time close to the
+empirical ground. Nonetheless, it would have been useful to have at
+least one or two concrete examples of how metrics affect behaviour in
+practical terms. One of the consequences of governance by numbers is
+the instability that is generated from more fluid labor markets and
+from the “autonomy” to determine the means to meet objectives. One
+form of flexible work is the gig or “click” economy, where workers rely
+on platforms to locate temporary jobs in transportation, housekeeping,
+home repair, or programming. It is estimated that some 70 million
+people have registered with on-line labor applications2
+. Gig workers
+are often treated as independent contractors and may not receive the
+benefits (health care, health insurance, training, paid vacations) and
+protections (the right to be organized) offered to employees. Supiot
+rightly emphasizes that one of the consequences of flexibility is the
+stress that workers experience in this form of governance, and its
+
+2 R. Heeks, 2017. “Decent work and the
+digital gig economy: a developing country
+perspective on employment impacts and
+standards in online outsourcing, crowdwork,
+etc.” Development Informatics Working Paper
+
+no 7 (Manchester: global development institute
+SEED, University of Manchester)
+[http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/institutes/gdi/publications/workingpapers/di/di_wp71.pdf].525when
+numbers rule
+
+available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975619000432
+Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Rochester, on 04 Mar 2020 at 13:24:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
+implications for their mental health. He does not provide much detail
+of what this feels like but others have done so. Part of this stress comes
+from the “on demand” economy and the precariousness of work—the
+uncertainty over wages and not knowing how many hours one can or
+must work. For Valenduc and Vendramin [2016: 34]
+3 gig work is
+a “continuous employment relationship without continuous work”. In
+some cases, the market is global and competition is fierce. As one
+Nigerian working in social media advertising reported4
+, “immediately
+[as] you see an offer being posted. you will see 50 proposals have
+been submitted.” Needless to say, this drives wages down.
+Another aspect of the stress associated with governance by numbers
+is the type of surveillance they achieve. Even if governance is not
+the stated goal, our fascination with performance metrics of all kinds
+has penetrated deeply into many spheres. Take educational rankings.
+First intended as useful consumer information, in an already marketdriven
+conceptualization of students, they became such visible markets
+of quality that they came to penetrate higher education. As
+a result, extraordinary efforts are made to manipulate the statistics and
+data that comprise them. At the global level this means that
+universities across the globe are constructed in a relative hierarchy.
+Some countries have reorganized their universities and their missions
+in order to climb the rankings. At the organizational level, rankings
+are “engines of anxiety,” where efforts to improve the numbers are
+relentless and backed by powerful incentives5
+. Administrators feel
+intensive competition with former colleagues; they are suspicious of
+the numbers their peers compile; and they fear for their bonuses and
+their jobs each year as the rankings are released.
+Supiot’s depiction of the “withering of the state” is, I think,
+overblown. If part of the neoliberal contract has been to “liquefy”
+labor markets, the state has certainly reasserted itself in the policing of
+its borders. As I write this, the children of refugees are separated from
+their deported parents, many of whom were fleeing for their lives, and
+housed in facilities that often seem like prisons. And it is exceedingly
+difficult to obtain a visa to work in the US. In Great Britain, of course,
+not just migrant labor but the entire economy is threatened by Brexit.
+
+3 G. Valenduc and P. Vendramin, 2016.
+“Work in the digital economy: sorting the old
+from the new”, Working Paper (Google
+Scholar). 4 Alex J. Mark Graham Wood, Vili Lehdonvirta
+and Isis Hjorth, 2019. “Good Gig,
+Bad Gig: autonomy and algorithmic control
+
+in the global gig economy”, Work, Employment
+and Society, 33 (1): 56-75. 5 Wendy Espeland and Michael Sauder,
+2016. Engines of Anxiety: academic rankings,
+reputations and accountability (New York,
+Russell Sage Press).
+
+526
+
+wendy espeland
+
+available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975619000432
+Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Rochester, on 04 Mar 2020 at 13:24:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
+And the current trade war between the US and China, with the
+imposition of thousands of tariffs, will put a damper on trade. Clearly
+the state retains the muscle to disrupt the free movement of labor and
+goods.
+Who should read Governance by Numbers? Quantification scholars,
+of course. Economists. If only. Legal scholars, political theorists, social
+theorists, scholars of work and globalization, Marxists, management
+scholars, and anyone concerned with the state of contemporary
+politics. Supiot has written a book that should animate scholars for
+many years. One of the most stirring features of his work is his
+commitment to making work meaningful and workers dignified.
+Saskia Brown deserves praise for a fine translation, as does The
+College de France  and the Institut d’Etudes Advancees de Nantes  for
+providing the support that made it possible.
+
+wendy espeland
+
+527
+
+when numbers rule
+
+available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975619000432
+Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Rochester, on 04 Mar 2020 at 13:24:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/SUPIOT--Alain.-The-Governance-by-Numbers--Legal-Sociology-and-Quantification..md b/SUPIOT--Alain.-The-Governance-by-Numbers--Legal-Sociology-and-Quantification..md
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@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+Review
+
+SUPIOT Alain. La Gouvernance par les nombres. Cours au colège de France (2012-2014). 2015. Paris. Fayard. 520ppp.
+
+Supiot
+Legal sociology and quantification in Alain
+
+Receipt: 08 February 2019
+Approval: 11 June 2019
+DOI: https://doi.org/10.4013/csu.2019.55.2.11
+
+For Alain Supiot, the institutional crisis in which Europe is plunged precedes a way of thinking about
+population governance that appeared at the beginning of modern times and continues to dominate the
+normative imagination. This imaginary consists of representing governance as a technique of power, as a
+machine whose functioning must be indexed in the form of human scientific knowledge. The forms of work
+organization occupy a central space in these transformations and it is for this reason that Alain Supiot
+dedicates a large space to new forms of management whose watchword is total mobilization at work
+(Supiot, 2015).
+In the same line of reasoning, Alain Supiot criticizes the legal positivism of the philosopher Hans Kelsen
+and opts for an epistemological approach to the legal system, taking into account social sciences as a
+relevant instrument for analyzing the legal system, which is inserted within social systems and forms of
+governance. The book is structured in two parts: in the first the author analyzes the emergence of an
+impersonal power where the dominant model is that of a machine that governs and leads to a new form of
+governance based on numbers; in the second part, he returns to personal allégeance as a response to
+the impasse of this governance (Supiot, 2015).
+
+Unisinos Social Sciences, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 260-264, 2019
+
+Alain Supiot's book, the result of classes at the Collège de France, starts from a definition of law as a
+cultural fact that is part of the same logic as technique and the arts. Therefore, law is located between
+technique and the arts whose epistemological reference is neither truth nor aesthetics, but justice. In a
+previous book, the author analyzes the anthropological function of law, which was denied by the totalitarian
+conception that reduced man to a unit of account manipulable by the mathematical rationality of capitalism
+(Supiot, 2005). Thus, the legal order is inscribed within the imaginary institutions of society and, for this
+reason, an analysis of this nature cannot be disarticulated from the material conditions of existence. This
+materialist conception of the legal system implies that the law is always a possible response to the material
+conditions imposed on the human species and the implication of this is that the analysis of the legal system
+presupposes a socio-historical approach and, for this reason, the law cannot be found on transcendental
+bases, nor can it be analyzed only as a technical object emptied of its social meanings (Supiot, 2015).
+
+University of Vale do Rio dos Sinos Center for Human Sciences Graduate Program in
+Social Sciences
+
+Law, moreover, also has an aesthetic dimension that extends to legal statements as a “complex field of
+discourse” (Foucault, 1969, p.34). The authority and permanence of a rule depend on its literary quality
+and the strength of the rule depends on the quality of the style (Supiot, 2015). The aesthetic and political
+dimension of governance were left aside by those who see law as just an instrument of domination by the
+popular classes. This aesthetic and political dimension has no place in the rationalist and mechanistic
+vision that dominates political philosophy from modern times to the present day. From the moment that
+institutions are represented under the model of a machine, it becomes difficult to understand the central
+space that aesthetics must occupy in the art of governing.
+
+Antônio Paulino de Souza antonio.paulino@terra.com.br
+Federal University of Maranhão, Brazil
+
+Thus, the distinction is between legal qualification that passes through language (criticism of
+nomenclature) and interpretation and statistical qualification that operates in secret and based on
+conventions that are subject to rules that do not compare with legal qualification (Supiot, 2015). Statistical
+quantification escapes the principle of contradiction and remains a privileged field for technicians in
+statistics and economics. The author's criticism is directed, in particular, at the statisticians who produce
+the indicators that are used by the government, above all to support public and economic policies.
+
+Legal sociology and quantification in Alain Supiot
+
+The legal sociology of quantification in Alain Supiot
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+For the author, the central principle is that the legal text should not be isolated from its historical,
+anthropological and socioeconomic context, as this is the condition for understanding recent social phenomena
+based on a legal analysis. The rule of law does not precede exclusively the observation of facts, and these
+do not help to see society as it is, but as a society should be thought and organized, therefore this legal
+representation is one of the drivers of society's transformation ( Supiot, 2015).
+
+In this way, work becomes the object of a scientific organization and is reduced to a succession of simple
+and measurable gestures. The “scientific” organization of work aimed to extort from the worker as much
+income as possible, enclosing him “in a system of obligations that took away any margin of initiative” (Gorz,
+2004, P. 38). To the physical model of the clock, which leads to seeing man as a machine, is added the
+biological model of natural selection inspired by social Darwinism, which is useful for liberalism and the
+limitless competition of all against all.
+
+In this sense, legal analysis poses a real methodological problem, since the complex relationships between
+the text of the law and the social context cannot be understood without the contribution of research in other
+areas of knowledge, such as the sciences. human and social issues that feed comparative research. Now,
+this same methodological problem is expanded with the theme of quantification, which is accelerating in the
+contemporary period and this leads to increasingly specialized work by practical jurists, but also in other
+areas of knowledge (Supiot, 2015).
+The author makes a historical retrospective based on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and states that,
+since modern times, the old Greek ideal of a city founded on laws and not on men takes on a new form which
+is governance conceived under the model of a machine. It is precisely with industrial society that industries
+and power plants emerge, as well as labor law, whose history is intertwined with the history of capitalism
+(Supiot, 2004).
+
+The ideal of impersonal power takes on a new dimension after the Second World War, where number
+progressively becomes the basis of obligations between men and this imaginary of governance is that of a
+society without heteronomy where the law gives way to programming and , once programmed, the individual
+does not act freely, that is, he starts to behave according to the expected reactions. This movement was
+engaged by Soviet planning in which, for the first time, the law was reduced to an instrument for applying the
+pragmatic utility of calculation (Supiot, 2015). This new representation corresponds to the transition from
+economic liberalism, which placed economic calculation under the control of the law, to neoliberalism, which
+places the law under the aegis of calculation and economic and financial interests (Supiot, 2015).
+
+The analysis of communist regimes made by Alain Supiot is, in the conception of statistician Jacky Fayole,
+of paramount importance for thinking about the Soviet statistical system and the transition to a market
+economy. For Ejov, in Lenin's conception, statisticians should be assistants to the party and government and
+Lenin placed the entire statistical apparatus at the service of building communism (Ejov, apud Fayolle, 1987).
+Thus, the ideology of the market is increasingly strengthened with the instrumentalization of statistical
+engineering that not only quantifies, but decides on the units to be observed and the nomenclature that
+classifies and analyzes certain dimensions of the quantified phenomena making, at the same time, an
+economy of conventions (Desrosières, 2014).
+
+It turns out that the dominant representation of this society is marked by classical physics that conceived
+the world as a big clock with its implacable weights and shapes. To better understand the nature of the
+problem, the author's epistemological starting point is the notion of governance and not that of governability,
+by Michel Foucault (2001). Alain Supiot reminds us that we cannot forget that the mechanistic and rationalist
+paradigm are techniques of manipulation and communication.
+
+Supiot analyzes the transformation of a society based on the rule of law and the emergence of a society
+based on the rule of numbers. According to him, the latter forms part of a long history of the illusion of
+harmonization through calculation in which the last innovation occurred with the numerical revolution, passing
+through statistical reason, as Alain Desrosières would say ( Desrosières, 1993). Such a transformation has
+effects that increase social inequalities that may be similar to what happened in the 19th century, when
+traditional solidarity was destroyed by capitalism. Solidarity that was based on family, religious and
+professional relationships and was questioned, with great brutality, by the first industrialization, as is well
+exemplified in the case of colonization and slavery. Today, it is the state forms of solidarity, established within
+the framework of the welfare state, to minimize the absence of traditional solidarities, which are being
+progressively deregulated. The globalization project conceives the world as a total market composed of
+opposing particles based on relationships based on interested calculation. The question is to know, Supiot
+tells us, to what extent legal analysis can contribute to clarify these transformations. In this sense, he does
+not skimp on epistemological and methodological reflection.
+
+The paradigm of quantification, present in all parts of the world, occupies the central place of a fundamental
+norm on a global scale. This paradigm destroys the Social State (which in turn is represented as a machine)
+whose objective is not to eradicate new forms of dehumanization of work, but rather to compensate for its
+effects and make work humanly bearable. For André Gorz, “social benefits and considerations do not
+reconcile populations with capitalist society, nor do permanent negotiation and arbitration procedures
+dismantle social antagonisms.” (Gorz, 2004,18-19). The subjection of the individual who conducts governance
+through numbers does not only concern the people, but individuals and companies (Supiot, 2015).
+
+This paradigm of objectivity represents men as objects and, in this perspective, the art of governing
+presents itself as an immense machine that statistical engineers dominate with mastery. It is in the way of
+thinking about the European legal system that we can find this way of thinking about governance under the
+model of the machine and this is what Alain Supiot observes in Hobbes' physical anthropology in which the
+body must bend to the model of the clock (Supiot, 2015).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Alain Supiot analyzes at length the effects that governance through numbers has on labor relations that
+have constituted, since the industrial era, the basis of all forms of governance and the main indicator of
+economic policies. In this conception of management, the mobilization of a person at the service of
+
+The author's fundamental criticism is directed at statistics as a science of the State. To do this, Alain
+Supiot is explicitly based on the sociology of quantification by statistician and sociologist Alain Desrosières,
+who elaborates a typology of five forms of State, which equally correspond to different ways of using
+statistics. The hypothesis of the sociology of quantification is that, as a set of socially accepted conventions
+and measurement operations, a new way of thinking, representing the world and acting on it is created.
+When quantification procedures are codified and enter everyday life, the initial conventions are forgotten
+and the quantified object is naturalized (Desrosières, 2014).
+
+Alain Supiot highlights that large transnational companies occupy a space in the neoliberal world
+comparable to that occupied by the State. The game of influence between large companies and the State
+is strong and tends to limit social rights in general and labor law in particular when considering, above all,
+the effects of outsourcing on labor relations. The effects of the paradigm of governance based on numbers
+appear at the moment when the subjection of workers imposes “the imperative of competitiveness, making
+them elevate the interests of the company above even their health and their lives” (Gorz, 2004 p. 41).
+Legal notions are products of Western history and for this reason they must also be problematized and
+regarding this, the author makes a reflective analysis of the legal categories of thought.
+
+Statistical quantification has this dual nature as it is an instrument of coordination, administration and
+management that is more political and is at the same time an instrument of proof that constitutes more of
+a more prestigious scientific dimension.
+The conception of the scientific administration of the State became banal with the frequent references
+to Max Weber's notions of rationalization and bureaucracy and Foucault's governability. But Max Weber
+was a pioneer in the analysis of the forms of exercise of power “underlining the importance of devices
+embodying a legal, formal rationality, in the development of capitalist societies, he made the place of
+material technologies of government autonomous in relation to the classic theories centered mainly on
+sovereignty and legitimacy of rulers” (Lascoumes and Galès, 2012, p.23). Desrosières' interest is to
+analyze this rationalization taking into account the technical instruments of statistics in their political
+dimension, their structure and content that is congruent with ways of thinking about society and acting on
+it. The sociology of quantification questions the different ways of thinking about the State and the role of
+statistics in the different possible forms of the State.
+
+The uncritical notion of globalization, for Alain Supiot, expresses a slogan followed by an ideological
+belief in the inevitable expansion of Western culture across the planet (Supiot, 2015). This is not the case
+with the notion of globalization, which makes us think about the diversity of cultures that are configured as
+distinct forms of habitus. This critical notion opposes the conception of uniformity of the world under the
+Western model. According to the author, it is necessary to avoid the illusion of the essentialist and positivist
+conception of legal culture as invariant structures that persist in being, as well as that of the end of history
+and the triumph of Western culture over other cultures.
+
+Governance through numbers is based on the encrypted representation of the world disconnected from
+experience (Supiot, 2015). This submission has a price which is the elimination of consideration for people
+and the good use of quantification presupposes respect for the human person who should not be confused
+with a machine, which presupposes a sense of the extent to which the law can help maintain or restore ,
+imposing respect for the principle of contradiction in the elaboration and interpretation of numbers linked
+to a normative force. Restore the legal system in the sense that the measure cannot be made without a
+political questioning of the power acquired today, in most countries, by the plutocratic ruling classes,
+where the norm has nothing mystical and the limitless cupidity as well as the power devastating made the
+critique of capitalism instituted by Marx current (Supiot, 2015).
+
+From this same perspective of domination, the programmable man is born, whose emergence is due to
+cybernetics and the numerical revolution. The computer obeys a program and not legal rules. Thus, a
+reified conception of work is established. The ideology is that it is necessary to program to optimize
+performance according to economic and financial interests. It is in this way that political democracy is
+denied in the name of numerical management and administration (Supiot, 2015).
+
+The conception of the Social State no longer corresponds to the reality of Europe, since it has been
+replaced by a cybernetic representation that dominates today's programmed society whose ideal is
+governance through numbers. The author's central hypothesis is that the welfare state crisis reveals a
+much deeper institutional rupture that affects the Western way of conceiving administration, the
+management of society and governance, as it is from numbers that became the dominant model. The idea
+of the welfare state leads the author to conclude that the Law or bureaucracy are considered, in his
+analysis, not only as a framework for legal analysis, but as categories that must be problematized in the
+interest of better understanding the major institutional transformations in process under the umbrella of
+globalization (Supiot, 2015).
+
+In this sense, Eric Hobsbawm's reflection on the current nature of Marx's thought is part of the same
+line of epistemological reasoning as Alain Supiot (Hobsbawmn, 2014). When analyzing the level of
+dogmatism of neoliberal economic doctrine, even in the legal sphere, Alain Supiot considers that criticism
+of this belief system has the chance of engendering, in the market of ideas that is today a public space,
+possible alternatives to the dominant system governance based on numbers.
+
+In this sense, for Alain Supiot, what characterizes governance is that it is not based on the legitimacy of
+a law that must be obeyed, but on the capacity that all human beings have to adapt their behaviors to new
+material and social conditions, more specifically this notion designates the internalization of norms and
+the elimination of heterogeneity. Governance through numbers and autonomy is not intended to limit the
+individual's action, but rather to program the set of activities in the field of work. And, based on Bourdieu,
+the author defines this type of state as a metaphysical state (Supiot, 2015).
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This analysis would allow us to better see the uncertainties present in the job market and the insecurity
+in the field of work where numerical governance is the dominant logic. On the other hand, young workers
+find in the company an identity that is denied to them in global society and this creates the ideal
+conditions for the subjection of worker domination. Quantification is something so naturalized that the
+individual does not realize the effects of this mode of governance. In this sense, the book by Alain Supiot
+is of paramount importance for understanding the legal nature of quantification and its harmful effects on
+personal life and society as a whole. At the current juncture, Alain Supiot's conception is central to the
+legal understanding of labor reforms in both France and Brazil.
+
+This theory of harmony based on calculation is justified, ideologically, by mathematics as a central
+element for the intelligibility of the world and this legitimizes management methods based on quantification
+and accounting, as a way of rationally accounting for the results of production.
+
+Discover, 1993.
+
+This happens when the State no longer ensures its regulatory role in the economy, in defending the
+identity and physical and economic security of the population. The change from a society based on
+subordination to one based on programming is a central point in the contemporary representation of
+human action and modes of governance based on numbers. The machine to govern is no longer
+conceived under the clock model, but under the computer model and in this way the governance of
+numbers supplants the governance of laws, without forgetting that these are the result of conventions (Supiot, 2015).
+
+Probability calculus itself is both prescriptive and normative. Well, but the author does not fail to consider
+that mathematics is a powerful instrument and is also a space for mystical and aesthetic experience that
+must be placed at the service of man.
+The aesthetic dimension of mathematics clearly demonstrates the fascination it has exerted since
+Pythagoras, but it also points to the dangers of subjecting the legal system and society to the order of
+calculation. In this sense, the problem of quantification is an object of law insofar as it is not only objects
+that are quantifiable, but people are also classified according to the quantity produced, the worker is
+reclassified according to productivity and this has legal implications in work relationships. Quantification
+becomes a norm for judgment and numbers emerge as modes of social control of individuals (Supiot,
+2015).
+
+Considering what Alain Supiot states in this book, we conclude that despite the methodological
+difficulties, legal analysis can help to understand the multiple crises that are spreading with globalization,
+with the constant growth of inequalities, the end of credit, etc. The social foundations on which the world
+order was based deregulated both national states and international organizations. The perspective
+adopted by the author is indispensable to legally understand how impersonal governance was already
+present in the realm of law and takes on new forms in governance through numbers.
+
+For Alain Supiot, the ideology of law can be as harmful as that of numbers. In this context, the law
+becomes an object of calculation, a mere legislative product competing in the global market for standards.
+The chances for the return of the kingdom of laws are non-existent due to the durable establishment of
+the governance of numbers. The problem, for the author, is that markets must be reinserted into society
+and stop reducing human life and economic life to a market economy. And also restore the principle of
+economic and legal democracy, as the social state constitutes a first attempt at such an ordering of the
+economy within society (Supiot, 2015).
+
+Bibliographic references
+
+Capitalism, for Alain Supiot, has transformed into anarcho-capitalism that erases borders, subjects
+States to capital and dismantles the rules for protecting fictitious markets such as nature, work and
+currency as identified by Karl Polanyi. The need for this dismantling is ideologically justified on a daily
+basis by the modern equivalent of religious preaching that is the media. Like every ideology that loses its
+sense of limit, anarcho-capitalism is condemned to find its catastrophic limit and this happens when
+mental representation ignores the principle of reality.
+
+DESROSIÈRES, Alain, La politique des grands nombres. Histoire de la raison statistic. Paris: La
+
+The company must be total in the sense that it targets both the spirit and the body; mechanical obedience
+to orders gives way to programming as a way of managing work. In this sense, a sphere of autonomy
+granted to the worker must be used to achieve established objectives and, thus, visible power is replaced
+by invisible and decentralized power. This autonomy in subordination means that the worker becomes
+transparent in relation to the employer who, at any time, can measure and evaluate his productivity. The
+objectives are inseparable from the coded indicators that are decided arbitrarily and that measure the
+worker's performance. In this sense, the worker is reified from his experience of the world in which he
+closes himself in speculative frameworks and cannot extract from this situation anything other than fraud
+or psychic illness.
+
+Right at the beginning of the book, Alain Supiot states that to fully understand the legal dimension of
+governance through numbers it is necessary not to limit ourselves to the organization of the city and the
+company, but to consider the state of people and their private lives. Now, following this reasoning, the
+book would make a greater contribution if the author had developed ways of evaluating higher education
+institutions and researchers who are subjected to the logic of productivity. From the moment society is
+represented as a system of elementary particles linked by the calculation of individual interest, this
+imaginary is expressed in all fields of human life and produces its effects.
+
+The economic crisis of 2008 offers us a bitter taste of this catastrophic limit that found arguments to
+dismantle the social state. It is predictable that this dismantling will lead to the imposition of high levels
+of inequalities to the detriment of the democratic principle, which will lead to unprecedented violence that
+combines with ecological disasters engendered by the overexploitation of natural resources.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+HMTL generated from JATS4R XML by
+
+SUPIOT, Alain, Le droit du travail, Paris: Puf, 2004.
+
+____________________.
+
+_____________,
+
+HOBSBAWM, Eric, Et le monde Changea. Réflexions sur Marx et le marxisme, de 1840 à nos jours, Paris:
+Actes Sud, 2014.
+
+La découverte, 2014.
+
+LASCOUMES, Pierre and GALÈS, Patrick, Public action addressed by its instruments, Revista Pós
+
+FAYOLLE, J. Pratique contemporaine de l'analyse conjonturelle, Paris, Economca/INSEE, 1987.
+
+FOUCAULT, Michel, L'archéologie du savoir, Paris: Gallimard, 1969.
+
+SUPIOT Alain, Homo juridicus: Essai sur la fonction anthropologique du Droit, Paris: Seuil, 2005.
+
+in Social Sciences, v.9 n.18 Jul/Dec. 2012.
+
+Le droit du travail, Paris: Puf, 2004.
+
+Pouvoir et gouverner. Une political analysis of public statistics. Paris:
+
+FOUCAULT, Michel, Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988. Paris: Gallimard, 2001.
+
+GORZ, ANDRÉ, Miseries of the present, richness of the possible, São Paulo: Annablume, 2004.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
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+Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
+https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjpn20
+
+Jurisprudence
+
+An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought
+
+ISSN: 2040-3313 (Print) 2040-3321 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpn20
+
+Democracy laid low by the market
+
+Alain Supiot
+
+To cite this article: Alain Supiot (2018) Democracy laid low by the market, Jurisprudence, 9:3,
+449-460, DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2018.1545734
+
+To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2018.1545734
+
+Published online: 22 Nov 2018.
+
+Submit your article to this journal
+
+Article views: 22
+
+View Crossmark data
+ANNUAL LECTURE
+
+Democracy laid low by the market
+
+Alain Supiota,b
+
+a
+Collège de France, Paris, France; b
+Nantes Institute for Advanced Study, Nantes, France
+
+ABSTRACT
+From its origins in antiquity to the emergence of neoliberalism,
+democracy had always been thought of as a fragile institutional
+construct, comprising two complementary dimensions: an
+objective dimension (its formal institutions), and a subjective one
+(instituting its citizens). Appeared in the 1970s, the Law and
+economic doctrine has undermined this bases of democracy by
+assimilating the enactment of laws to negotiation on a market,
+and reducing democracy to a ‘market of ideas’. The specific status
+of speech in the democratic area fades out, paving the way for
+‘post-truth politics’ and ‘democratic dictatorships’.
+
+KEYWORDS
+Democracy; inter-diction;
+reference; law and
+economics; inequalities;
+market of ideas; post truth
+politics
+
+Democracy is one of the solutions invented by human beings to the problem of having to
+impose on members of a given society the rules by which they must live. It is a vital issue
+for the human species, and for the human species alone.
+In order to understand this, we must return briefly to physical anthropology, and LeroiGourhan’s
+admirable depiction of the process whereby the great apes were cast into a
+world of signs and objects which could embody their mental images.1 Human beings,
+like all other animals, inhabit the world first through their senses, but unlike all other
+animals, they have access to a symbolic universe which transcends the here and now of
+instinctual life, by means of language and technology. The finitude of organic, instinctual
+life is complemented by a limitless world of mental representation. However, as the poet
+Jacques Prévert says, ‘le monde mental ment, monumentalement’.
+2
+
+With his two dimensions – his feet on the ground and his head in the stars – man is
+always liable to lose his footing in reality, and to be swept off his feet by his giddying
+mental representations. Entering the intoxicating world of symbols comes at a price
+which other animals never experience: the risk of delusion, and above all the illusion of
+omnipotence. This is why human beings must be ‘instituted’, that is, subjected to a representation
+of the world which is shared by all. A society that does not institute its children
+will see them turn into murderers. Instituting reason means enabling the human being to
+harmonise the finitude of his physical existence with the infinity of his mental universe. In
+other words, since our mental images both link us to, and separate us from, the physical
+
+© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
+
+CONTACT Alain Supiot alain.supiot@college-de-france.fr 1
+André Leroi-Gourhan, Le geste et la parole (Albin Michel, 1964); Gesture and Speech (Anna Bostock Berger tr, MIT Press,
+1993). 2
+‘The mental world lies, monumentally’. Prévert, ‘Il ne faut pas’ in Œuvres complètes (Gallimard-La Pléiade, 1992) 139.
+
+JURISPRUDENCE
+2018, VOL. 9, NO. 3, 449–460
+https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2018.1545734
+world, instituting reason enables us to distinguish between what in our images belongs to
+reality, what to possibility, and what to pure fantasy.
+This education of reason, which each of us had to go through as a child, and which in
+reality is never completed, is essential for drawing us out of the solipsism of our subjective
+lives so that we can have the same representation of the world as others, and so communicate
+with them. But communication is conditional upon accepting the law of language,
+that is, having as common reference symbols that are outside of us and that are binding on
+us all. Only then will we be able to participate in the type of ‘speech assembly’ which we
+know of as ‘democracy’. To address the question of democracy again at this elementary
+level of ‘speech assemblies’ can shed light on the factors determining its emergence and
+survival.
+
+I – Democracy as a type of speech assembly
+
+A brief foray into linguistics is required here in order to understand how linguistic
+exchange differs from the signals exchanged by animals. If we take the typology drawn
+up by Charles Peirce (1839–1914), we find three types of representation of the world, to
+which correspond three types of reference.3
+The first is iconic, the icon being the physical image of the represented object, whether
+this object exists in reality or not; images are icons, as are diagrams, algebraic equations,
+and metaphors.4
+The second is indexical: the index is the physical or temporal mark of the presence
+of the object; it does not resemble the object, but signals its presence. ‘Everything whichattracts
+our attention is an index’, Peirce writes, ‘insofar as it marks the juncture between two
+states of experience.’
+5 Examples include a knock at the door, a clap of thunder, the visitor’s
+soaked clothes, the swaying gait of the sailor, the calloused hands of the labourer, the president’s
+flashy watch, or the movements of a wind vane.
+The third type of reference is symbolic: symbols refer to the object via a mediating
+system of signs, independently of any resemblance, or physical or temporal link to the
+object. Peirce refers to symbols as ‘legisigns’: ‘a symbol is a law’,
+6 he says, ‘a sign which
+acts as a law for all its singular uses. Every ordinary word is thus a symbol, applicable
+to everything which can realise the idea attached to this word.’
+7 Unlike the index, the
+symbol is not physically linked to an object. It relates to objects via the system of signs
+of which it is a part.
+Towards the end of his life, Peirce declared that ‘man is a sign’, in other words, he
+is a symbolic animal, which precisely differentiates him from animals. Animals
+exchange many different signals, which respond to different circumstances.
+But these are indexical, that is, a certain cry or whistle corresponds to a certain
+object.8
+
+3
+Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce, Volume 1 and 2, Selected Philosophical Writings (1867–1893) (Nathan Houser and
+Christian J. W. Kloesel eds, Indiana University Press, 1992). 4
+Ibid.
+5
+Ibid.
+6
+Ibid.
+7
+Ibid.
+8
+Cf. Terence Deacon, The Symbolic Species. The Co-evolution of Language and the Human Brain (WW. Norton, 1997, reed.
+Penguin) 69f.
+
+450 A. SUPIOT
+A rat or a monkey can therefore learn to make a correlation between the sound ‘food’
+and the food itself. A direct link is made between a sign and an object, each sign being the
+index of the presence of an object or a particular situation – a certain danger, for example.
+It is a stimulus which functions separately from all the others, as long as it is proved by the
+here and now of sense experience (the stimulus disappears if recurrently the rat sees no
+food appear when it hears the word ‘food’, just as we stop paying attention to a fire
+alarm that goes of unexpectedly several times a week).
+By contrast, the meaning of a word in a language persists independently of its actualisation.
+I would even go so far as to say that it persists even more forcefully when this actualisation
+is impossible: conjuring up a swim in the sea or a walk in the hills has much more
+power for the prisoner locked in his cell, or the hospitalised patient on a drip. This quality
+of language was highlighted by Leroi-Gourhan, its ability to transport us far from the here
+and now of our physical existence. It can do this because the words of a language, unlike
+the cries of animals, are not indices separated from each other, but quite the reverse: they
+refer to each other as parts of the same linguistic structure. Their sense depends on how
+they are associated with one another, as we can test by opening a dictionary and taking the
+word ‘fast’, for example, which has various meanings, relating to going without food, fixity,
+and speed.9 It is this symbolic structure which allows us to depict both real and imaginary
+things.
+‘Reference’, in linguistics, is thus different from a simple indexing of things, from a collection
+of signals, each of which points to something. It is above all a reference to a symbolic
+structure, and this reference is necessarily shared by the language’s speakers. As the
+great linguist Émile Benveniste wrote:
+
+In an utterance, language [la langue] is used to express certain relations to the world. The precondition
+for this mobilisation and appropriation of a language is, for the speaker, the need to
+refer by means of discourse, and, for the interlocutor, the possibility of co-referring identically,
+in conformity with the pragmatic consensus which makes of each speaker a co-speaker. Reference
+is an integral part of utterance.10
+
+An index refers to a natural object; language refers to a system of signs.
+Reference, in the linguistic sense used here by Benveniste, does not mean the direct
+reference of a word to a thing, but a shared reference to a symbolic system capable of
+expressing all sorts of experience, both real and imaginary.
+Reference, capital ‘R’, the precondition for linguistic exchange, is not something we can
+just get a feel for: that which guarantees sense eludes the senses. Linguistic communication
+is therefore never binary, but always ternary, because it supposes speakers who already
+refer to the same symbolic system. This structure involves human beings in what can
+be called, literally, a logic of inter-diction.11 Reference, a necessary passage via the third,
+both inter-poses itself between, and links together speakers. In the strict sense, it is the
+source of inter-diction.
+
+9
+Peirce, The Essential Peirce (n 3) 122. 10Émile Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale, t.2 (Gallimard, 1974) 82; Problems in General Linguistics (Mary Elisabeth
+Meek tr, University of Miami Press, 1973). Also, on this point, Dany-Robert Dufour, Les mystères de la trinité (Gallimard,
+1990), especially Part 2, ‘La trinité et la langue’ 73ff. 11This significant way of writing the term was first formulated by Jacques Lacan, Encore. Séminaire, t.XX (Jacques-Alain Miller
+ed, Seuil, 1975) 151; On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge. 1972-1973. Encore, The Seminar of Jacques
+Lacan Book XX (Bruce Fink tr, WW. Norton, 1998) 119.
+
+JURISPRUDENCE 451
+That is why human societies cannot be assimilated to animal herds, nor political
+communities to a form of ‘living together’. Human beings do not have access to rationality
+without society, and they cannot form a society without accepting a common
+Reference, that is, without complying with the logic of inter-diction thanks to which
+they can exchange words rather than blows. By taking up the question of democracy
+at this elementary level we can gain insight into how it resembles, and how it differs
+from other forms of political organisation. It resembles other forms in the need for
+a common Reference, and the logic of inter-diction. It differs from these in how the
+inter-dictions are laid down.
+In the long history of us poor humans, these interdictions have for the most part been
+imposed on the many by the few, whose power is rooted in religion, tradition or, more
+rarely, in force alone. The corresponding regimes have been exhaustively classified by political
+scientists from Aristotle to Montesquieu – aristocratic, monarchic, and despotic
+regimes, among others. In all of these, the rules imposed are heteronomous, that is,
+their source is located in the gods, or in men accorded higher status.
+Democracy emerged from a rather marginal practice, in Ancient Greece, but not only
+there, whereby free men in a given society came together as equals to decide on common
+affairs. Each member of the assembly had the right to contribute to the enactment of the
+norm, and could, on occasion, contradict the opinion of his peers. This has given us the
+agonistic dimension of democracy,12 which, from a jurist’s perspective, is expressed
+nowhere better than in labour law.
+Comparative research coordinated by Marcel Détienne13 has shown that the democratic
+practice of speech assemblies has been present at times and in places as varied
+as the Ochollo in Ethiopia,14 monastic communities in Japan15 and in Medieval
+Europe,16 assemblies of the clergy in fifteenth-century France, of Cossack warriors
+in sixteenth- to seventeenth-century Ukraine, and of the inhabitants of Pacific atolls,
+as described by the first anthropologists to land there in the nineteenth century.17
+What these widely varying cases have in common is their institution of a place for
+politics where people gather in accordance with certain rule-bound procedures to
+debate as equals on questions of common interest, and to take decisions which will
+be binding on all.
+The spatial dimension of democratic debate has been superbly described by Jean-Pierre
+Vernant from this perspective.18 Once the people are assembled, each person has an equal
+right to speak (isègoria). A sceptre, symbolising power, is ‘placed in the centre’ (en méso,
+which also means mediate and measure) of the circle formed by his fellow men (homoïoï).
+The person who wishes to speak advances to the centre and takes up the sceptre, to signify
+the public status of the words he is about to speak. When he has finished, he puts the
+
+12Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Verso, 2009). 13Cf. Marcel Détienne (ed) Comparer l’incomparable (Seuil, 2000) ch. V.; Comparative Anthropology of Ancient Greece
+(Harvard University Press, 2009) and, also coordinated by Détienne, Qui veut prendre la parole? (Seuil, 2003). 14Cf. Marc Abelès, ‘Pouvoir et société chez les Ochollo d’Ethiopie méridionale. à Demeke Dejasse et Salanon Wenjela’ (1978)
+18(71) Cahiers d’études africaines 293; ‘Revenir chez les Ochollos’, in Détienne, Qui veut prendre la parole? (n 13) 393 sq. 15Cf. Pierre-François Souyri, in Détienne, Qui veut prendre la parole? (n 13) 85 sq. 16Cf. Hélène Millet, ibid 95 sq. 17Cf. Jean-Paul Latouche, ibid 303 sq. 18Jean-Pierre Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs (Maspéro, 1965) vol. 1, 179–80; Myth and Thought Among the Greeks
+(MIT Press, 2006) 450. See also Pierre Lévêque and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Clisthène l’Athénien (Les Belles Lettres, 1964).
+
+452 A. SUPIOT
+sceptre down, and returns to his place. Thereupon, his speech ceases to be public and
+becomes private again. Like every speech assembly, democracy must presuppose that its
+members share the same normative reference. In the case of democracy, this reference
+is not only linguistic, it is also moral and economic.
+
+II – The institution of democracy
+
+From its origins in antiquity to the emergence of neoliberalism, democracy had always
+been thought of as a fragile institutional construct, comprising two complementary
+dimensions: an objective dimension (its formal institutions), and a subjective one (instituting
+its citizens).
+Democratic regimes, in their objective dimension, both separate and carefully articulate
+three institutions, each of which has its particular place and rules:
+
+(a) a political assembly, where debate on the public interest takes place;
+(b) a market, where private interests are negotiated;
+(c) a space for the sacred (religio in its original legal sense), or sphere of dogmatic Reference,
+which is both the source of meaning and the guarantee of the trustworthiness of
+the pledged word, whether in a commercial or political context.
+
+This necessary religious dimension in the institution of the State (which is clearly visible
+in the layout of Greek Cities and Medieval free towns) should make us sceptical of the idea
+that democracy is synonymous with a secularisation of the political sphere, or rather, concomitantly,
+that collective autonomy can be achieved without any heteronomous
+instance.19 Political freedom, like freedom of speech, requires a heteronomous Reference
+respected by all. Democracy’s watchword is indeed isonomy, the equal right to take part in
+enacting legislation. However, in the public sphere, this isonomy is subordinated to what
+The Digest calls – speaking of public law – ‘sacred affairs’.
+20
+
+Tocqueville dwelt on this link between a shared faith and civil liberties when observing
+the early days of American democracy. ‘If man’, he writes, ‘does not have faith, he must
+serve, and if he is free, he must believe.’
+21 And indeed, the American Declaration of Independence
+opens with the assertion that there exist ‘self-evident truths’, that is, an axiological
+basis and orientation to the political community, which all its members must respect.
+From this perspective, democracy requires the institution of a demos, a people of citizens,
+in order to survive. Members of the demos must fulfil three requirements, each of
+which corresponds to one of the constitutive facets of democracy:
+
+(a) a training and an education which makes them capable of distinguishing between the
+public interest and their private interests;
+(b) an economic independence through work, so that citizens are not divided by too great
+inequalities of wealth, nor enslaved to each other;
+
+19Radical collective autonomy is an idea put forward by Cornelius Castoriadis, for example in Le monde morcelé. Carrefours
+du labyrinthe 3 (Seuil, 1990) 137–71. 20Sunt enim quædam publice utilia, quædam privatim. Publicum jus in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit,
+(Digeste, 1, 1. §.2). 21Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, II (Gallimard, 1966) 29.
+
+JURISPRUDENCE 453
+(c) an ethic of truth, that is, the courage to say what one thinks and be challenged by what
+others think, in speech assemblies which aim to come to an agreement on what is and
+what should be.
+
+Although these three conditions are structurally linked, we shall briefly summarise each
+one separately. They are the backbone of what a long tradition has called civic virtues,
+which can also be called the subjective dimension of democracy.
+(a) Starting with education, which the Greeks called paideia (παιδεία), this is education
+not in the sense of accumulating knowledge, but in the sense of a formative process for the
+individual. The practice of democratic debate constitutes a training in rational argumentation
+during which reasonings based on received authority must give way to the authority
+of rational argument. Democratic debate both fosters, and relies on, the participants’
+ability to distinguish private from public utility, and to make sure that the latter prevails
+over the former. The ideal of this education is to serve the public interest, not to amass
+personal wealth. (The Greeks would have been appalled by the idea of having billionaires
+as a model for their youth).
+Montesquieu highlights this same point many centuries later, in his well-known typology
+of governments. He distinguishes three forms – monarchy, despotism and republicanism
+– each of which is based on a principle, respectively honour, fear and virtue. A mode of
+government can only perpetuate itself if its associated guiding principle is instilled into the
+population from their earliest years. This requirement is particularly vital for Republican
+government.
+
+It is in a republican government that the whole power of education is required. The fear of despotic
+governments naturally arises of itself amidst threats and punishments; the honour of
+monarchies is favoured by the passions, and favours them in its turn; but virtue is a self-renunciation,
+which is ever arduous and painful.
+
+This virtue may be defined as the love of the laws and of our country. As such love requires a
+constant preference of public to private interest, it is the source of all private virtues; for they are
+nothing more than this very preference itself. (…)
+
+Everything therefore depends on establishing this love in a republic; and to inspire it ought to be
+the principal business of education22
+
+(b) Second, a democracy requires its citizens to achieve economic autonomy through
+work. Following Solon’s reforms in 594–593 B.C.E., the idea that work is necessary for
+the citizenship of the less wealthy began to take shape. It has been reaffirmed throughout
+the history of democratic institutions until the twentieth century.
+The need to shelter democracy from the domination of the richest members of society
+was a constant concern in the conception of French and American democracy. The founding
+fathers did not have in mind capitalism, but a population of small-scale independent
+workers, and the French revolutionaries, faithful to Rousseau, did not aspire to the invisible
+hand of the market, nor to an appetite for riches, but to the sovereignty of the general
+will, and the cult of virtue:
+
+22Montesquieu, L’esprit des lois, L. IV, Ch. V, in Œuvres complètes (Gallimard-La Pléiade, 1951) vol. 2, 266–67, translated by
+Thomas Nugens (1752).
+
+454 A. SUPIOT
+It is most important not to allow any professional financiers in the Republic, not so much
+because of their dishonest profits as because of the fatal example they set; an example which,
+all too promptly diffused throughout the nation, destroys all worthy feelings by making illicit
+wealth and its advantages respectable, and by covering unselfishness, simplicity, morality
+and all the virtues with a cloud of scorn and opprobrium.23
+Rousseau was not the only French philosopher to hold this opinion. Montesquieu is
+always quoted for his defense of the civilising virtues of ‘gentle commerce’. The economist
+Albert Hirschman quotes him at length in his excellent book on the political justifications
+of capitalism before its prime.24 Curiously, however, Hirschman does not mention Montesquieu’s
+distinction between the beneficial effects of trade on relations between nations
+and the harm it causes in relations between individuals.
+
+If the spirit of commerce unites nations, it does not in the same manner unite individuals. We
+see that in countries where the people move only by the spirit of commerce, they make a traffic
+of all the humane, all the moral virtues; the most trifling things, those which humanity would
+demand, are there done, or there given, only for money.25
+
+In order to avoid such excesses, laws should ‘divide up wealth as trade grows’, so that the
+poor can – and the rich must – live from their labour.
+
+In order to support the spirit of commerce (…) these very laws, by dividing the estates of individuals
+in proportion to the increase of commerce, should set every poor citizen so far at his ease
+as to be able to work like the rest, and every wealthy citizen in such a mediocrity as to be obliged
+to take some pains either in preserving or acquiring a fortune.
+26
+
+From Jefferson to Eisenhower via Brandeis and F.D. Roosevelt, work was always conceived
+as the best training for self-government. But democracy was in mortal danger if ever economic
+power held sway over political power. Roosevelt mentions this in his last speech, in
+favour of the adoption of a Second Bill of Rights, in January 1944:
+
+We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist
+without economic security and independence. “Necessitous men are not free men.” People
+who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.27
+
+(c) The third condition for a democratic society is that its members observe an ethic of
+truth. This is the ethic which Foucault, discussing Greek classical theatre,28 calls ‘parrêsia’,
+or truth-telling:
+
+The place of parrêsia is defined and guaranteed by the politeia; but parrêsia, the truth-telling of
+the political man, is what assures the appropriate game of politics. The importance of parrêsia,
+it seems to me, is found in this meeting point. At any rate, it seems to me that we find here the
+
+23Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Projet de constitution pour la Corse (1765), in Œuvres complètes (Gallimard/La Pléiade, 1970) t. 3,
+933; Constitutional Project for Corsica (Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1953), http://www.constitution.org/jjr/corsica.htm. 24Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests – Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton UP,
+1980, revised edition 2013). 25Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois [1748], livre XX ‘Des lois dans le rapport qu’elles ont avec le commerce considéré dans sa
+nature et ses distinctions’, chapitre 2 ‘De l’esprit du commerce’. 26Montesquieu, L’esprit des lois, L. V, Ch. VI, in Œuvres complètes (n 22) 280. 27The declaration that ‘necessitous men are not truly free men’ comes from common law, namely the judgement on the
+Vernon v Bethell case of 1762 (Vernon v Bethell [1762] 28 ER 838). 28Cf. Michel Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, Cours au Collège de France, 1982–83 (Gallimard/Le Seuil, 2008);
+Government of self and others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–83 (Graham Burchell tr, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
+See Maria Andrea Rojas, Michel Foucault : la « parrêsia », une éthique de la vérité (DPhil thesis, Univ. Paris-Est, 2012).
+
+JURISPRUDENCE 455
+root of a problematic of a society’s immanent power relations which, unlike the juridical-institutional
+system of that society, ensure that it is actually governed. The problems of governmentality
+in their specificity, in their complex relation to but also independence from politeia,
+appear and are formulated for the first time round this notion of parrêsia and the exercise
+of power through true discourse.29
+
+This good parrêsia is opposed to a bad parrêsia, which resembles it in order to deceive the
+citizens more effectively. Bad parrêsia is the demagogue’s ‘saying it straight’, but above all
+the abuse of speech, that is, the ‘false speech’ of the sophists, who are not interested in the
+truth, but only in seducing the masses with rousing speeches. It is a rhetoric which can be
+summed up in the expression selected as ‘Word of the Year 2016’ by Oxford Dictionaries,
+‘“post-truth” politics’.
+Foucault was not the first thinker to foreground the importance of the subjective internalisation
+of the conditions of democracy, that is, the dependence of democratic institutions
+on people with the courage to make them thrive. He was rediscovering the crucial role of
+what a whole lineage of jurists, from Cicero to Vico and Montesquieu, called ‘civic virtues’.
+This is the list Cicero gives30:
+
+Religio est, quæ superioris cujusdam naturæ, quam divinam
+vocant, curam caerimoniamque affert;
+Religion is that which causes men to pay attention to, and to
+respect with fixed ceremonies, a certain superior nature
+which men call divine nature.
+pietas, per quam sanguine conjunctis patriæque benivolis
+officium et diligens tribuitur cultus;
+Affection (Piety) is that feeling under the influence of which
+kindness and careful attention is paid to those who are
+united to us by ties of blood, or who are devoted to the
+service of their country.
+gratia, in qua amicitiarum et officiorum alterius memoria et
+remunerandi voluntas continetur;
+Gratitude is that feeling in which the recollection of friendship,
+and of the services which we have received from another,
+and the inclination to requite those services, is contained.
+vindicatio, per quam vis aut iniuria et omnino omne, quod
+obfuturum est, defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsatur;
+Avenging is that disposition by which violence and injury, and
+altogether everything which can be any injury to us, is
+repelled by defending oneself from it, or by avenging it..
+observantia, per quam homines aliqua dignitate
+antecedentes cultu quodam et honore dignantur;
+Respect is that feeling by which men obey when they think
+those who are eminent for worth or dignity, worthy of some
+special respect and honour.
+veritas, per quam immutata ea, quæ sunt, aut ante fuerunt,
+aut futura sunt, dicuntur.
+Truth is that by which those things which are, or which have
+been previously, or which are about to happen, are spoken
+of without any alteration.
+
+Foucault’s good parrêsia is in fact the Latin veritas, a virtue which is vital for the functioning
+of speech assemblies based on an equal right to speak (isègoria), that is, for democratic
+institutions in their most essential aspect. Using the term ‘virtue’ has the advantage
+of highlighting the fact that, for a democracy to function adequately, its citizens must be
+individually and collectively committed to telling the truth. In other words, they must be
+educated, they must be inculcated with a respect for the truth, and they must have
+sufficient economic power to participate in expressing it.
+So, contrary to what Foucault maintains, parrêsia is not ‘independent of the politeia’,
+understood as democracy’s legal and institutional framework. Foucault himself – always
+somewhat uneasy with the question of the law – contradicts this idea of independence
+
+29Foucault, Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres (n 28) 147. Underlying is mine (A.S.). 30Cicero, De inuentione, II, LIII, in Œuvres complètes de Cicéron, English translation by C. D. Yonge (the translation of vindicatio,
+which is misleadingly translated as ‘vengeance’ (Fr) and ‘revenge’ (Eng) in these editions, has been modified by the
+author.
+
+456 A. SUPIOT
+when he notes at the outset, quite rightly, that ‘the place of parrêsia is defined and guaranteed
+by the politeia’. Although it does indeed take courage to speak out in a democratic
+assembly, it is not the same courage for the Prince’s counsellor, the Resistance fighter in
+Nazi-occupied France, and the Soviet dissident or prisoner in the Gulag, as immortalised
+by Varlan Shalamov in his Kolyma Tales.31 In the latter case, the risk is death, and the
+virtue required is not only veritas, but also vindicatio: the courage not only to speak the
+truth, but also to act in defence of others, and denounce injustice.
+In one of these ‘tales’, Shalamov recounts how he was forced to stand in line in the
+camp’s training ground for an unbearably long roll call in the depth of a Siberian
+winter. A prisoner near him collapsed from exhaustion. His face was covered in blood.
+The soldiers were kicking him to make him stand up:
+
+Suddenly, I felt a wave of warmth come over me. I understood that everything, all my life, was
+at stake at this moment. If I did not do something - I didn’t really know what - there would
+have been no point my coming with this convoy, no point to my twenty years of life. My
+shame at my own cowardice, which had been burning my cheeks, suddenly vanished: I felt
+them go cold again, and my body felt strangely light.
+
+I stepped out of line, and said in a halting voice:
+
+- I forbid you to strike this man.
+
+Shalamov’s artistry, and his experience of the Gulag, succeed in conveying to us what is
+meant by the institution of the subject, by the subject’s incorporation of a virtue which,
+by dint of being practised, takes on an existential value. He also helps us understand
+the process of dispossession at work in the universe of the camps, where the human
+being is methodically stripped of the attribute of legal subject, and driven to abandon
+any sort of virtue.
+We do not need to be reminded of such extreme situations to realise that the courage
+required to speak out is different under non-democratic regimes, which willingly grant
+legal status to their populations, but keep them in such subordination that their
+freedom of expression is curtailed or abolished. This is particularly evident in business
+enterprises. The neglect of this institutional context of truth-telling has generated the
+confusions we see today between collective bargaining and democracy in the
+company. It must be stressed that a relation of dependence or subordination rules out
+the possibility of isègoria, or equal right to speech. If we focus on the individual as
+the sole agent of speaking the truth, we shall erroneously think that business enterprises
+are a democratic politeia. In so doing, we risk making collective bargaining into an
+instrument of collective submission.
+
+III – The dislocation of democracy
+
+Insofar as democratic regimes are dependent on the virtue of their members, they are particularly
+fragile. They run specific risks, described by Giambattista Vico in the closing
+pages of his New Science. Vico admires the grandeur of what he calls ‘popular commonwealths’
+in which ‘entire peoples, who have in common the desire for justice, command
+
+31Varlan Shalamov, Kolyma Tales (John Glad tr, Penguin Classics, 1994).
+
+JURISPRUDENCE 457
+laws that are just because they are good for all’.
+32 The democratic practice of debating proposed
+legislation educates the rational faculty, and this leads people to ground the social
+order in philosophical rather than religious principles.33 But although such commonwealths
+or republics may be admirable, they are also precarious, because their capacity
+to survive depends upon the virtue of their citizens.
+And indeed, just when such commonwealths achieve their greatest political and
+material successes, they become vulnerable to the ‘barbarism of reflection’. This involves,
+Vico continues, a misuse of abstraction. Abstraction no longer serves to hold our passions
+in check and work towards a common, objective view of the world, but to ‘calumniate the
+truth’ and support any cause at all, as long as it serves private interests. ‘Learned fools’ cast
+off all common reason, and set about dismissing the very idea of the general interest, or
+else they subordinate it to the pursuit of private utilities.34 Such diseased commonwealths,
+in Vico’s view, witness their citizens lose interest in the common good, and so ‘the strength
+which had led the people to leave their primary solitude disappears’.
+35 Thereafter, the
+society falls apart, and each individual sinks into civic apathy and social isolation. Vico
+gives a striking description of this state:
+
+Such peoples, like so many beasts, have fallen into the custom of each man thinking only of his
+own private interests, and having reached the extreme of delicacy, or better of pride, like wild
+animals they bristle and lash out at the slightest displeasure. Thus in the midst of their greatest
+wealth and festivities, though physically thronging together, they live like wild beasts in a deep
+solitude of spirit and will, scarcely any two being able to agree since each follows his own pleasure
+or caprice.
+36
+
+In this state of decomposition, political power becomes the instrument of wealth, which
+paves the way for demagogy and civil war. Thus, Vico states, ‘do commonwealths fall
+from a perfect liberty into perfect tyranny’.
+37 Only this experience of the return to the barbarousness
+of the senses can drive them to rediscover a sense of civic virtue, namely ‘the
+piety, faith and truth which are the natural foundations of justice.’
+This diagnosis is remarkably relevant today. Appeared in the 1970s, the economic
+analysis of law has effectively destroyed the three bases of democracy we outlined
+above. In 1975, Richard Posner, the founder of the ‘Law and Economics’ doctrine,
+assimilated the enactment of laws to negotiation on a market, and reduced democracy
+to a ‘market of ideas’.
+38 He was simply extrapolating a thesis formulated by Ronald
+Coase in the previous year, in a seminal article entitled ‘The Economics of the First
+Amendment. The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas’.
+39 Coase argues that
+there is no fundamental difference between these two types of ‘markets’, and so
+public policy decisions on ‘Goods’ and on ‘Ideas’ should both conform to economic
+
+32Giambattista Vico, The New Science (Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch tr, from the third edition (1744) Cornell
+University Press, 1948) §. 1101. 33Ibid §. 1040. Add. Alain Pons, Vie et mort des nations. Lecture de la Science nouvelle de Giambattista Vico (Gallimard, 2015)
+307ff. 34Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico (n 32) §. 1102. 35Cf. Pons, Vie et mort des nations (n 33) 315. 36Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico (n 32) §. 1106. 37ibid §. 1102. 38William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, ‘The independant Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective’ (1975) 18(3)
+Journal of Law and Economics 875, quoted 877. 39Ronald Coase, ‘The Economics of the First Amendment. The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas’ (1974) 64(2)
+American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 384.
+
+458 A. SUPIOT
+rules.40 The United States Supreme Court subsequently confirmed this vision of
+democracy as a market of ideas in two well-known rulings: Buckley41 and Belotti.
+42
+
+These had limited effect until the notorious Citizens United43 ruling of 2010, which
+demonstrated the full logical implications of this conflation.
+The case concerned an organisation, called Citizens Union, that despite being nonprofit
+was massively financed by private funds (its annual budget was roughly 12
+million dollars). To coincide with the Democratic primaries of 2008, it wanted to broadcast
+a free-access documentary called Hillary, which was in fact an attack on the candidate
+Hillary Clinton. In the terms of the McCain–Feingold law, business enterprises had the
+right to support certain political opinions, but they could not intervene, in the period preceding
+elections, for or against a particular candidate. If they did want to do so, their action
+had to take the form of ad hoc committees, using limited funds, and closely monitored by
+the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Within this set-up, Citizens Union challenged
+only the limits placed on the budget. But the 5 conservative judges of the Supreme
+Court – Justices Roberts, Alito, Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy – seized on this case to
+forbid any intervention at all on the ‘market of ideas’ other than the minimum required
+for transparency. In so doing, the Court’s judgement endorsed the two principles which
+underpin this vision of democracy as a ‘market in ideas’.
+44
+
+The first principle is the equivalence between a quantity of money and a quantity of
+ideas. Consequently, any reduction in the quantity of money spent on political propaganda
+is equally a reduction in the quantity of political expression, and is presumed to
+limit the number of subjects discussed, the thoroughness of the discussion, and the size
+of the audience reached.
+The second principle is that of the equal treatment of legal persons and physical persons
+regarding freedom of expression. Ignoring the functionalist vision of legal personality
+defended previously, the Citizens United ruling sees legal persons as ‘speakers’ like any
+other:
+
+Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content (…), the Government may commit
+a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the right
+to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person
+or class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s
+voice. The Government may not by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege
+to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration. The First Amendment
+protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.
+
+As such, any restriction on their contribution to the public debate constitutes a form of
+censorship incompatible with the First Amendment of the Constitution. This judgment
+overturned the precedent set by Austin,
+45 which had confirmed the restriction:
+
+Austin interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment. It
+permits the Government to ban the political speech of millions of associations of citizens.
+
+40ibid 389. 41Buckley v. Valeo [1976] 424 U.S. 1. 42First National Bank v. Bellotti [1978] 435 U.S. 765. 43Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n [2010] 558 U.S. 310. 44Cf. Timothy K. Kuhner, Capitalism v. Democracy. Money in Politics and the Free Market Constitution (Stanford Law Books,
+2014). 45Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm. [1990] 494 U.S. 652.
+
+JURISPRUDENCE 459
+The censorship we now confront is vast in its reach. The Government has ‘muffle[d] the voices
+that best represent the most significant segments of the economy.’ (…)
+
+When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a
+person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses
+censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to
+think for ourselves.46
+
+Without batting an eyelid, the Supreme Court thus decided that the voice of big business is
+the voice which best represents the nation’s economic interests. And it invoked the principle
+of equality to give big business the same rights of expression as ordinary citizens.
+Although consequently there should be no distinction made between the voice of a
+simple citizen and that of a business enterprise, one still has to admit that the voice of
+business is better, it is the maior et sanior pars of the electorate, to use (and travesty)
+the vocabulary of the canonists.47 Or, to put it another way, in the words of Orwell’s
+Animal Farm: ‘All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others.’
+48
+
+Historically, democracy was assimilated to a marketplace for the first time in 1919, with
+jurists such as Justice Holmes,49 and the idea flourished, paradoxically, thanks to the New
+Deal. The New Deal was inspired by a belief in unlimited growth, a sort of economic motor
+of history, which the Social State could use to reconcile the concentration of capital and
+social justice. Economic dogma thus acquired the commanding position, which it still
+occupies for the legal realm. It conferred a ‘scientific legitimacy’ on the assimilation of
+ideas and beliefs to products in competition on a market, and it also ‘legitimated’ the
+definition of democracy as a regime which should protect the invention and circulation
+of such ‘intellectual products’ from any form of legal constraint. The sphere of the
+market thus absorbed the political realm (the electoral market), as well as the space of
+the sacred (the market of religions),50 and the figure of the citizen gave way to that of
+the consumer. In this context, the ethics of citizenship – education, financial independence
+in and through work, and respect for the truth – lost any meaning.
+The specific status which political speech had gained in all the experiences of democracy,
+that is, as a speech designed to express a certain representation of the public good,
+and not to defend private interests, could no longer be justified. Moreover, in the marketplace
+of ideas, since all discourses are in principle worth the same, reducing the amount of
+money invested in one discourse is deemed to directly reduce its freedom to express itself.
+This situation embodies the replacement of democracy by what Colin Crouch has called
+‘post-democracy’,
+51 a regime in which the freedom and equality of citizens are subordinated
+to the free play of economic rules, rather than ensuring that economic activities
+are subordinated to the requirements of the political sphere.
+Today, the best example of this ‘post-democratic’ regime can be found in the Chinese
+Constitution. Its first Article defines the People’s Republic of China as ‘a State of democratic
+dictatorship’.
+
+46Citizens United (n 43). Underlying is mine (A.S.). 47See Léo Moulin, ‘Les origines religieuses des techniques électorales et délibératives modernes’ (1998) 11(43) Politix 117;
+Brian Tierney, ‘A Conciliar Theory of the Thirteenth Century’ (1951) 36(4) The Catholic Historical Review 415. 48George Orwell, Animal Farm (Secker and Warburg, 1945). 49Abrams v. United States, [1919] 250 U.S. 616. 50On this extension of the concept of Market, see Alain Supiot, The Spirit of Philadelphia. Social Justice vs. the Total Market
+(Verso, 2012). 51Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Polity Press, 2004).
+
+460 A. SUPIOT
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+DEMOCRACY
+
+95
+61
+
+Julian Stallabrass
+
+Response to Harvey 103
+
+170
+
+Reply to Riley 113
+
+sublime calculation
+
+The Pittsburgh model 161
+
+Dylan Riley
+
+123
+
+Tom Mertes
+
+Tor Krever
+
+143
+
+The Sahel: a cognitive map
+
+David Harvey
+
+Rahmane Idrissa 7
+
+Perry Anderson
+
+Patricia McManus
+
+Alain Supiot
+
+Kheya Bag and Susan Watkins Structures of Oppression
+Edgerton's Great Britain 45
+
+A new literary criticism
+
+The warring souls of liberalism
+
+Foucault's error
+
+INSTITUTE
+
+second period
+
+www.newleftreview.es
+
+January-February 2022
+
+© New Left Review Ltd., 2000
+
+Creative Commons license
+Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivative Work 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
+
+CRITICISM
+
+ARTICLES
+
+Subscribe
+
+new Left review 132
+
+t sd
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+1 Jan Schröder, Recht als Wissenschaft. Geschichte der Juristischen Methode vom
+Humanismus bis Historischen Schule, Munich, 2001.
+2 See Michel Foucault, La volonté de savoir, Paris, 1976, chap. 5, "Droit de mort et
+pouvoir sur la vie", pp. 177 et seq.; Il faut défendre la société: Cours au Collège de
+France 1976, Paris, 1997, pp. 213-235; ed. cast.: History of sexuality, vol. 1, The will
+to know, Madrid, 2019; Society must be defended. Course at the College of France
+(1975-1976), Madrid, 2003.
+
+The
+
+The division of law into branches, as it has
+progressively developed since the 16th century, is
+dogmatic in nature and has a weak heuristic value1 . If
+we follow, however, the branches of law to their common
+trunk, we always arrive at the question that irrigates all of them:
+that of the preservation of human life. The covid-19 pandemic
+has reminded us of this, since the measures adopted to overcome
+it have affected all countries on the planet and have equally
+affected national law and international law, public law and private
+law. social law. Some commentators consider this to illustrate the
+influence of biopower, which, according to Foucault, characterizes
+the modern age2 . This interpretation is hasty if not inaccurate.
+
+new left review 132 Jan Feb 2022 143
+
+Without worrying much about consistency, these same
+commentators have often noted the "medieval" character of the
+confinement and quarantine measures imposed against the
+pandemic, which political leaders had resorted to many centuries
+before the supposed birth of "biopower." .
+
+For Foucault, the term biopower refers to the transit, from the
+19th century, of a right of sovereignty –consisting of «making death
+
+alain supiot
+
+Biopolitics, scientism and the rule of law
+
+FOUCAULT'S ERROR
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+144 nlr 132
+
+Summarized in Roman law with the formula vitam instituere, the
+preservation of a properly human life throughout successive
+generations is, therefore, not the distinctive feature of contemporary
+forms of government, but rather a constitutive fact of the institutional
+phenomenon in general. and of law in particular5 . To understand
+this anthropological function, it is necessary that law and institutions
+are not reduced to mere techniques of power, nor life to its only
+biological dimension. For Louis Dumont, this reduction is a product
+of modern ideology, which views society as a collection of individuals
+who compete with each other6. Contrary to popular belief, Dumont
+maintained, Nazism was the poisonous fruit of this individualism: if
+institutions are in fact artifices, if only force reigns among individuals
+fighting for life, only biological identity can hold people together.
+human communities:
+
+people” or “let them live” – to “an exact opposite power […] of “making
+people live” and “letting them die”»3 . But long before the idea of a
+secular and sovereign power crystallized in the sixteenth century,
+princes and cities have adopted legal provisions aimed at "make live"
+instead of "let live", not only to deal with pandemics, but also, more
+generally, to preserve the health of their populations. Herodotus, for
+example, marvels at the following rule in force among the Babylonians
+in the fifth century B.C. C.:
+
+4 Herodotus, Herodotus i, Books i-ii, §197, London, 1975, p. 251.
+
+6 Louis Dumont, Essais sur l'individualisme: Une perspective anthropologique sur
+l'ideologie moderne, Paris, 1983; and by the same author, Homo æqualis, vol. i, Génèse
+et épanouissement de l'ideologie économique, Paris, 1977, p. 19; ed. cast.: Essays on
+individualism: an anthropological perspective on modern ideology, Madrid, 1987; Homo
+aequalis: genesis and apogee of economic ideology, Madrid, 1999.
+
+Holding doctors in low esteem, they transport the sick to market; then those
+who have suffered the same illness as the patient, or have seen others in a
+similar case, come and advise him of his illness and comfort him, telling him by
+what means they have recovered or have seen others recover from it. No one
+can pass by the patient without talking to him and asking him what ails him4 .
+
+3 M. Foucault, Il faut défendre la société: Cours aux Collège de France 1976, cit., p. 214.
+
+5 Digest (i,3,2); see, respectively, Pierre Legendre, Sur la question dogmati que en
+Occident, Paris, 1999, pp. 106-108; and Alain Supiot, Homo Juridicus, London, 2007;
+ed. orig: Homo juridicus: essai sur la fonction anthropologique du droit, Paris, 2005; ed.
+cast.: Homo juridicus: essay on the anthropological function of law, Buenos Aires, 2012.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+supiot: Law 145
+
+Giorgio Agamben's work offers one of the most complete expressions
+of this reductio ad potestam. Agamben has used the Roman legal
+category of homo sacer to depart from Foucault's dating of biopower
+and affirm that sovereign power has always had life as its object8 .
+This thesis has the merit of recognizing that the links between
+human life and institutions are structural and do not date from the
+19th century, but it gives the idea of sovereignty a timelessness
+lacking in historical basis. Roman law ignores it and the feudal order
+
+is based on lordship, not sovereignty. Agamben defines, above all,
+sovereign power as the power to decide on the state of exception in
+which life can be outlawed, that is, captured and exposed to death.
+Based on Carl Schmitt, this definition was certainly appropriate for
+Nazism, whose legal practice was perfectly summarized by Göring:
+«Recht ist das, was uns gefällt» [law is what pleases us]9. But it
+dispenses with the historical experience of sovereignty conceived
+as self-limitation of power10, which provided a lasting base for the
+rule of law11, while the Nazi state of exception quickly found its
+catastrophic limit.
+
+This reduction of politics to power and laws to mere techniques of
+domination is a common feature of postwar authors, who have lost
+the perception that their great predecessors –Durkheim, Mauss,
+Weber or Bergson– had of institutions.
+
+Hitler only carried out to their ultimate consequences certain representations
+
+that are very common in our time, whether the "fight of all against all", a kind of
+commonplace of lack of culture, or its more refined equivalent, the reduction of
+politics to power. But once these premises are accepted, it is difficult to see, with
+the help of Hitler, what can prevent those who have the means to do so from
+exterminating whomever they please, and the horror of the conclusion
+demonstrates the falsity of the premises. Universal disapproval demonstrates
+agreement on values and political power must be subordinated to values. The
+essence of human life is not the struggle of all against all and political theory
+cannot be a theory of power, but rather a theory of legitimate authority7 .
+
+9 Quoted in Rush Rhees, "Wittgenstein's Lectures on Ethics," Philosophical Review, vol.
+74, no. 1, January 1965, p. 25.
+
+11 Cf. Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin, 1921, pp. 435-489.
+
+7 L. Dumont, Essais sur l'individualisme: Une perspective anthropologique sur l'ideologie
+moderne, cit., p. 186.
+Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford, 1998, p. 93;
+ed. orig. Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Turin, 1995; ed. cast.: Homo
+sacer: sovereign power and bare life, Valencia, 2006.
+
+10 Cf. A. Supiot, «La souveraineté de la limite», in Alain Supiot (ed.), Mondialisation ou
+globalisation ? Les leçons de Simone Weil, Paris, 2019, pp. 221 et seq.
+
+8
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Confusing sovereignty with omnipotence in this way leads to the
+same dead ends that medieval scholasticism had to deal with. In the
+face of omnipotence, nothing stands: two and two can be five, the
+past may not have existed and the law is completely swallowed up
+by the black hole of "power." Thus, according to Agamben, only
+"outside all law" would a free life be conceivable12. From this point
+of view, institutions merely mask the reality of "power" of which the
+concentration camp would today be the secret paradigm; the
+departure lounges of the Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle airport would
+therefore be declinations of Auschwitz13. Asylum seekers, however,
+are not yet gassed or subjected to medical experiments. Agamben
+begins by reminding us that the Hitler government was careful to
+place the concentration camps outside the legal sphere14.
+
+(Schutzhaft), which had its direct source in the will of the Führer. In
+the blunt words of a Gestapo chief quoted by Agamben, "the camps
+were not instituted, one day they were there" (sie wurden nicht
+gegründet, sie waren eines Tages da). It could not be said more
+clearly that the fields belonged to the pure domain of fact. But this
+does not prevent Agamben from holding two pages after in the fields
+"law and fact merge", which endows them with a "particular legal
+structure"15. The fields do not have a legal existence, but do they have a legal structure?
+
+146 nlr 132
+
+The deportation to the camps was a measure of "protective retention"
+
+Legitimately concerned with shedding light on the phenomenon of
+totalitarianism, Agamben thus falls into the trap that Nazism left
+behind: subsuming any type of institution under the figure of "power",
+an eternal and never-defined principle that he transposes into politics.
+the notion of "strength" in physical terms or "survival of the fittest" in
+biological terms. Agamben contrasts two facets of human life: political
+life, or bios, and «naked life», or zôê, whose capture would be the
+main objective of «sovereign power»16. But anthropological knowledge
+
+16
+
+12 See G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, cit., p. 69. These
+affirmations are a symptom of the decomposition of democracy, already detected by
+Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws: "One was free under the laws, one wants to be
+free against them", in The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge, 1989. , p. 23; ed. cast.: The
+spirit of the laws, Madrid, 2015.
+
+14 Ibid., p. 182. Regarding the Schutzhaft, see Olivier Jouanjan, Justifier l'injustifiable:
+l'ordre du discours juridique nazi, Paris, 2017, pp. 148 et seq.
+
+The importance of this distinction from the Greek sources has been criticized by
+Laurent Dubreuil in "De la vie dans la vie: sur une étrange opposition entre zôê et bios",
+in Labyrinthe, vol. 22, no. 3, 2005, p. 47-52.
+
+13 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, cit., p. 188.
+
+15 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, cit., p. 184.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+18
+
+Simone Weill:
+
+supiot: Law 147
+
+It would be unfair, however, to reduce Foucault's thought to the notion of
+biopolitics. We are indebted to him for his astuteness in noting that since
+the nineteenth century there has been a general retreat in law in favor
+of 'standardization techniques'. Unlike law, which places obedience to
+general and abstract rules under the control
+
+Agamben's terrifying description of the murder of a young Jewish woman
+in Dachau for the purpose of "medical" experimentation testifies to the
+powerful sense of injustice that the author of Homo Sacer shares with
+his readers. If one were to describe the Nazi regime in the terms of
+those who confuse sovereignty with omnipotence, one would be inclined
+to see in the industrial policy of extermination pursued by that regime a
+paroxysmal form of power to "make people die" rather than "kill people."
+exactly opposite power” of “making people live” which, according to
+Foucault, defines biopower.
+
+suggests otherwise, characterizing homo sapiens as a "symbolic animal"
+for whom these two dimensions of life are inseparable17. Even the wolf
+child, the closest manifestation to a "bare life," manifests a feeling of
+justice. Treating humans like animals has been a feature of scientism in
+general and of Nazism in particular,18 but it is a singular contradiction to
+claim that this is the hidden truth of any institution. as he observed
+
+17 See Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human
+Culture, New Haven (ct), 1944, p. 44.
+
+If force is absolutely sovereign, justice is absolutely unreal. But is not. We know it
+from experience. It is real in the hearts of men. The structure of a human heart is
+one more reality of the universe, just like the trajectory of a star. It is not in man's
+power to exclude entirely any kind of justice from the ends that man assigns to his
+actions. Not even the Nazis could. If it had been possible for men, they probably
+could have done it19.
+
+19 Simone Weil, L'enracinement: prélude à une declaration des devoirs envers l'être
+humain [1949], in Œuvres, Paris, 1999, p. 179.
+
+According to Carl Schmitt, the abstractions of law are the masks used by the Jews to
+hide their parasitic relationship with the German people, Carl Schmitt, "Die deutsche
+Rechtswissenschaft in Kampf gegen den jüdischen Geist", Berlin, 1936 .
+
+20 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, cit., pp. 167 et seq.
+
+Normalization techniques
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This displacement of the legal norm in favor of technical regulations
+was a common factor in totalitarian regimes. The notion of
+
+of a judge, these techniques resort to surveillance and training21.
+
+This "legitimate claim" implies that, as science advances in its
+interpretation of the "true laws" of human society, legal legality should
+be replaced by a normalization of behaviors. The task of leaders
+would be similar to that of engineers, who apply the laws of physics to
+make machines work, or of doctors, who restore health thanks to the
+discoveries of biology. The figures of the engineer and the doctor
+were explicitly presented as models by promoters of «scientific
+socialism» such as Pashukanis to illustrate the purely technical
+regulations that would govern in a communist society as soon as the
+progressive disappearance of the State was completed26.
+
+148 nlr 132
+
+In recent years, they have experienced spectacular growth made
+possible by the progress of computing and cognitive sciences22. The
+novelty of the «normalization society», whose advent Foucault
+perceived, does not lie, therefore, as he believed, in its having «life as
+its object and objective»23, but, on the contrary, in its find it governed
+by a normality discovered by science and no longer by the legality
+referred to an ideal of justice. The standardization society was born
+with the rise of quantitative techniques, which since the end of the eighteenth century
+They led to interpret human societies, following the model of physics
+or biology, as measurable and manipulable objects that could be
+examined to understand and control their functioning24. This evolution
+in the social sciences has undoubtedly been the source of important
+progress in knowledge, but it has also given rise to what Renan called
+"the bold but legitimate claim to organize society scientifically"25.
+
+22 See Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human
+Future and the New Frontier of Power, London, 2019; ed. eng.: The era of surveillance
+capitalism, Barcelona, 2020.
+23 M. Foucault, Il faut defendre la société, cit., pp. 225-226.
+
+25 Ernest Renan, L'avenir de la science: Pensees de 1848 [1890], Paris, 1995, p. 104.
+
+24 See Alain Desrosières, La politique des grands nombres: histoire de la raison sta
+tistique, Paris, 1993; Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, Princeton
+(NJ), 1988.
+
+21 M. Foucault, La volonté de savoir, cit., pp. 116-118.
+
+p. 71; ed. cast.: The general theory of law and Marxism, Barcelona, 1976.
+Evgeny Pashukanis, La théorie générale du droit et le marxisme [1924], Paris, 1970, 26
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+supiot: Law 149
+
+The situation was formally different in the Soviet Union, which did have a
+
+constitution; but neither was the State the institutional touchstone there. As
+
+in Germany, it became an administrative machine under the control of a
+
+single party, which was responsible, among other things, for implementing
+plans based on calculations of economic utility. The fact that it was not
+characterized by a "regime of law" in the sense indicated by the Universal
+Declaration of Human Rights, does not mean that the Soviet Union was
+devoid of norms; but they were not legal norms, that is, general and abstract
+rules applied by independent judicial bodies31 . The rule of law gave way
+there to the rule by law32.
+
+This change in the type of normativity characterized the turning point
+
+perceived by Foucault and not the appearance of a power that aspired to
+
+"make live" instead of limiting itself to "let live". To understand the
+
+"normalization society" whose emergence he diagnosed, we need to
+
+remember that not all normative orders are legal. Ritual or morality can be
+
+sources of non-legal rules. Similarly, the Sadian order, in which DanyRobert
+Dufour has rightly seen
+
+The Nazi State is effectively an oxymoron, since it concerns a regime that
+
+knew no other State than that of exception27. Subjected to the tutelage of
+a single party, the Nazi State was a tool for the domination of the superior
+race and no longer occupied the place of "third party" guarantor that
+characterizes the legal phenomenon28. This position would make no sense
+in the totalitarian universe, and it was not held by Hitler either. The structure
+of the Nazi regime was not legal, but managerial29. The Führer was not
+the source of the law that should be applied, but rather the model to which
+to adapt, acting based on how he acted in each specific situation30.
+
+2020.
+
+28 Alexandre Kojève, Esquisse d'une phénoménologie du droit [1943], Paris, 1982, pp.
+73 et seq.
+
+30 Lion Murard and Patrick Zylberman (eds.), Le soldat du travail: guerre, fascisme et
+taylorisme, Recherches, no. 32/33, 1978, p. 518; O. Jouanjan, Justifier l'unjustifiable:
+l'ordre du discours juridique nazi, cit., pp. 285 et seq.
+31 Alexandre Zinoviev, Le commune comme realité, Paris, 1981, pp. 170-171.
+
+29 Johann Chapoutot, Libres d'obéir: Le management, du Nazisme à aujourd'hui, Paris,
+
+27 Proclaimed by the Law of March 24, 1933 (Gesetz zur behebung der Not von Volk und
+Reich), the state of emergency only ended with the fall of the Reich in May 1945.
+
+32 Harold Berman, Law and Revolution, 2 vols., vol. 1, The Formation of the Western
+Legal Tradition, Cambridge (ma), 1985; vol. 2: The Impact of the Protestant Reformation
+on the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge (ma), 2003, p. 19.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+This normalizing ambition did not disappear along with the
+totalitarianisms of the 20th century. Today it takes the form of
+governance by numbers, extending to all aspects of human life
+and all scales of its organization34. It inspires the ideology of the
+"total market", which constitutes the realm of a "spontaneous order"
+that would animate the action of each and every one of us, if
+necessary through artificial intelligence and training techniques
+such as "nudges" . » [pushes] from behavioral economics or
+compliance [compliance norm]35. In fact, people are forced to
+assimilate this immanent order, purged of all heteronomous
+references, of which they are the agents and not the owners.
+Perpetual peace should soon reign in a flat world, free from the
+figure of an impartial and disinterested "third party," populated by
+human beings programmed like computers or trained like pets,
+thanks to progress in behavioral techniques and, it seems, , of the
+block chain technology36. The promise of this radiant future would
+make the law obsolete, as witnessed by the semantic changes
+registered in the shifts from law to program, from regulation to
+regulation, from government to governance, or from morality to
+ethics. In all these cases, the objective is to eliminate the distance
+between the norm and the subject who in this way is not required to observe it, but to incorporate it.
+
+150 nlr 132
+
+Like previous vicissitudes of scientism, governance by numbers is
+doomed to find its catastrophic limit. The regulation of society, as
+Canguilhem has shown, is not a fact of the same nature as
+biological regulation. In the case of a living organism, "the norm or
+rule of its existence is given by
+
+the vanishing point of economic ideology,33 it may be saturated
+with norms, but it can hardly be considered a legal order. On the
+other hand, the Sadian order, as a sphere of sovereign power in
+the sense given to this term by Foucault or Agamben, perfectly
+prefigures the concentrationary universes of the 20th century,
+extreme forms of the «normalization society » .
+
+36 Katrin Becker, “Blockchain technology et la promise crypto-divine d'en finir avec les
+tiers”, in Religiosité technologique, Études digitales, no. 6, 2018.
+
+34 Alain Supiot, Governance by Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance,
+Oxford, 2017; ed. orig.: Gouvernance by names, Paris, 2015.
+35 Pablo Jensen, Deep Earnings: le neoliberalism au coeur des réseaux de neurones,
+Caen, 2021.
+
+33 Dany-Robert Dufour, La cité perverse: libéralisme et pornographie, Paris, 2009.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Biped whose head moves in the sky of ideas, cannot have or preserve
+reason if it is not instituted, that is, if it is not inscribed in an order that
+relates the infinity of its mental universe with the finite form of its
+experience. physics to exercise his reason, giving his mortal life a place
+and meaning. This always fragile advance of reason is threatened by two
+contemporary forms of deinstitutionalization.
+
+The human being is a denatured animal,40 a two-part creature that cannot
+
+be intelligibly reduced to organic life or mental life.
+supiot: Law 151
+
+We would return to the era of fact, but of scientific fact»42.
+
+On the one hand, biologism, which by retaining only the feet and
+dispensing with the head, completely assimilates it to the animal part;
+and on the other, post-modernism, which only retains its head, losing its
+foothold in reality. Based on these two forms, what Vico called the
+"barbarism of reflection" threatens the legal mechanisms aimed at
+preserving a properly human life41. Valéry observed that the conquest of
+things by positive science would lead to “an elaborate and rigorous form
+of barbarism, much more formidable than the ancient barbarities because
+it was more exact, more uniform and infinitely more powerful.
+
+its very existence”, but human society “is not an end in itself”; "There is no
+
+spontaneous social justice, that is, there is no social self-regulation." As
+Canguilhem next observes, "justice must come from somewhere else"37.
+A society cannot last without a reference that is heteronomous to it and
+neither can it be deduced from the observation of the facts, but rather is,
+on the contrary, the result of what Bergson called the «fabulous
+function»38 and Leroi-Gourhan the «apparent function» . symbolic
+moment»39, which are typical of the human species. Our life unfolds not
+only in the world as it is, but also in a world that could or should be.
+
+38 Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion [1932], Paris, 1988, pp.
+111 et seq.; ed. cast.: The two sources of morality and religion, Madrid, 2020.
+39 André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, Cambridge (MA), 1993, pp. 313 et seq.;
+ed. orig.: Le gesture et la parole, vol. 2, La mémoire et les rythmes, Paris, 1964, p. 107.
+
+41 Cf. on the «barbarism of reflection», Giambattista Vico, Principes d'une science nouvelle
+relative à la nature commune des nations [1744], Paris, 2001, pp. 536-537; see, Alain
+Pons, Vie et mort des nations: lecture de la Science nouvelle de Giambattista Vico, Paris,
+2015, pp. 315 et seq.
+
+40 Vercors, Les animaux dénaturés [1952], translated into English as You Shall Know
+Them, Boston, 1953; ed. cast.: Denatured Animals, Buenos Aires, 1953 (trans. Rosa
+Chacel).
+
+37 Georges Canguilhem, Writings on Medicine, New York, 2012, pp. 67-78.
+
+42 Paul Valéry, «Préface aux Lettres persanes» [1930], in Montesquieu, Lettres persanes:
+édition du tricentenaire, Paris, 2021, pp. 373-374; ed. cast.: Persian letters, Madrid, 1997.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The experience of Nazi barbarism gave rise to a legal and
+institutional leap without precedent in human history. In the face
+of the senseless massacres of World War II, the unsustainability
+of a world completely subjected to power relations was confirmed.
+Given that "the disregard and contempt for human rights have
+resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of
+mankind" , the Organization of the United Nations considered
+"essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a
+last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human
+rights should be protected by the rule of law" [essential that
+human rights be protected by a rule of law, so that the human
+being is not compelled to the supreme recourse of rebellion
+against tyranny and oppression]43. Already in 1944 the member
+States of the International Labor Organization had agreed that
+«experience has fully demonstrated the truth of the statement in
+the Constitution of the International Labor Organization that lasting
+peace can be established only if it is based on social
+justice» [ experience has fully demonstrated how true is the
+statement contained in its charter, according to which permanent
+peace can only be based on social justice]44. It is impossible to
+overestimate the importance of the experience of the two world
+wars. Social justice is not only affirmed as an ideal, a moral duty
+that should weigh on nations and counteract political and economic
+realism, but it constituted in itself a sample of realism or, more
+precisely, it would mean the awareness of the historical experience
+that had seen humiliation and poverty give rise to hatred, violence
+and war "which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
+mankind" [which twice during our lifetime has inflicted untold
+suffering on humanity ]Four. Five. A novelty in this flurry of
+declarations of principle was the affirmation that justice and peace
+could only be based on "the faith in fundamental human rights, in
+the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of
+men and women." and of nations large and small»
+
+152 nlr 132
+
+[ faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity of the human
+person and in the equal rights of men and women and of
+
+43 Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).
+44 Preamble to the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944).
+45 Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (June 1945).
+
+A leap forward
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+nations large and small]46. Starting from experience – that is, from
+facts – these fundamental texts thus affirm the fiduciary character of
+a legal order that, according to Valéry's words, could not be based
+on "la seule contrainte des corps par les corps". [the exclusive
+coercion of bodies by bodies]47.
+
+It was that they accommodated the physical dimension of human life
+by proclaiming that “the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
+equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
+foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” [the recognition
+of the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members
+of the human family constitutes the foundation of freedom, justice
+and peace in the world]48. This new principle of dignity, solemnly
+affirmed in the Preamble and in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration
+of Human Rights, only appears, significantly, in relation to economic,
+social and cultural rights, beginning with the right to social security
+( Article 22). Recognizing dignity means attributing immeasurable
+value to the life of each person. This non-mer cantizable value –
+regardless of price, to use Kant's term – encompasses the body and
+the mind and therefore requires covering physical needs.
+
+supiot: Law 153
+
+The novelty of these declarations, however, did not lie in the fact
+that they affirmed the primacy of legal relations over power relations.
+
+These had been largely brushed aside in the statements of the
+Enlightenment, which aimed at a completely dematerialized "man";
+This is why economic and social rights were said to be "second
+generation" rights. This chronology is, however, misleading, because
+the right of the hungry to receive help from the rich was in the Middle
+Ages the original object of the doctrine of natural rights49. The
+principle of dignity was expressed for the first time in fact regarding
+the duties towards the men and women most exposed to physical
+misfortune, the poor50. It is therefore understandable that dignity,
+the founding principle of social justice and of economic and social
+rights, has been attacked by defenders of neoliberalism since the
+early 1980s.
+
+50 That is why Bossuet recognized his “eminent dignity”: Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, De
+l'éminente dignité des pauvres [1659], Paris, 2015.
+
+49 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Natural Law and Church Law, 1150-1625
+47 P. Valéry, «Preface aux Lettres persanes», cit.
+46 Ibid.; see also the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
+
+[1997], second edition, Grand Rapids (mi), 2001, pp. 70 et seq.
+
+Humans.
+
+48 Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+154 nlr 132
+
+The hallmark of the “society of normalization” is not – as Foucault
+erroneously claimed – biopower, but scientism, which erects
+fetishized science in the “new universal church”51. Like its
+predecessors, this church aspires to subject all human beings to
+identical laws that are beyond its deliberation. These immanent
+laws, inscribed in human nature, occupy the place previously
+granted to the transcendent laws revealed by God. As Alexander
+Grothendieck observed, scientism "is just as irrational and
+emotional in its motivations, and just as intolerant in its daily
+practice, as any of the traditional religions it has supplanted."
+Governments should not boycott the laws of such scientism, but,
+on the contrary, facilitate its action like a watchmaker "oils a watch
+or in any other way ensures the condition of a mechanism so that
+it functions permanently and correctly"52. The perimeter of
+democracy is thus reduced as the progress of knowledge of these
+laws advances, which are imposed without discussion as technical
+norms through pedagogy or constriction, so that "the government
+of the people gives way to the administration of things»53. The
+laws and the State have no other function than to grease the
+wheels of the self-regulated market. As Polanyi observed: "The
+mechanism set in motion by the principle of profit had an
+effectiveness comparable only to the most violent outburst of
+religious fervor in history"54. But this mechanism claims to be an
+experimental science, whose statements, like those of religion,
+are by their nature removed from all democratic deliberation.
+Again, this time through neoliberal reason, it is about replacing
+the rule of law with the rule by law and reducing law and the State
+to the function of an "oil placed in the gears" of the immanent laws
+discovered by the economic science, whose imposition is carried
+out outside the conscience of human beings and independently of
+the rationality or irrationality of their behaviors (principle of maximization, self-regulation of the market, stability
+
+52 Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal
+Principles of Justice and Political Economy, vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice,
+Abingdon and New York, 1982, p. 128; ed. cast.: Law, legislation and freedom, Madrid, 2018.
+
+54 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our
+Times [1944], Boston, 2001, p. 31; ed. cast.: The great transformation, Barcelona, 2016.
+
+53 Fredric Engels, Anti-Dühring [1878], Paris, 1971, p. 317; cast ed.: Anti-Dühring,
+
+51 Alexander Grothendieck, “La nouvelle église universelle”, Survivre… et vivre, no. 9,
+August-September 1971, pp. 3-7.
+
+Madrid, 2014.
+
+The reign of scientism
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Under the "Washington Consensus", the submission of law and
+states to this "spontaneous order" of the market was entrusted to
+international or regional organizations (wto, imf, eu), which worked
+methodically to dismantle labor law, social security systems and
+public services, the three pillars of the social state
+
+This search for scientific recognition was crowned in 1969 with the
+creation of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in
+
+memory of Alfred Nobel. Achieved plagiarism of the other Nobel
+prize winners, this consecration places economic studies at the
+same level as physics and biology, whose statements are by nature
+exempt from any democratic deliberation57. According to one of its
+winners, Gary Becker, the laws of economics derive in fact from
+those of genetics and natural selection, the only ones capable of
+explaining the dialectic of egoism and altruism observed in human
+behavior58. Hayek, one of the most famous "Nobel-winning
+economists", devoted his early research to the biophysical conditions
+of emergence of consciousness and conceived the "spontaneous
+order of the market" from the Darwinian model of natural selection59.
+This search for an anchorage in biology continues today in behavioral
+economics, which borrows the technique of randomized studies
+from medicine with the aim of getting the poor to behave well in the
+world as it is instead of questioning themselves. about his justice60.
+
+supiot: Law 155
+
+of human inclinations, etc.)55, which delimits the field of democracy
+now assimilated to a «market of ideas»56.
+
+59 Friedrich Hayek, The Sensory Order, Chicago, 1952 [ed. cast.: The sensory order,
+Madrid, 2011]; Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 3, The Political Order of a Free People,
+London, 1982, p. 154.
+
+384. See Alain Supiot, "Democracy Laid Low by the Market," Jurisprudence, vol. 9, no.
+3, 2018, pp. 449-460.
+
+56 Ronald Coase, "The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods and
+the Market for Ideas," American Economic Review, vol. 64, no. 2, 1974, p.
+
+58 G. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour, cit., p. 282.
+
+For a critical analysis of these approaches, see Jean-Michel Servet, L'économie
+comportementale en question, Paris, 2018; and Arthur Jatteau, Faire preuve par le
+chiffre: le cas des expérimentations aléatoires en économie, Paris, 2020.
+
+55 Cf. Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Chicago, 1976.
+
+On these promises, see World Bank, World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society,
+Behavior; Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about
+Health, Wealth and Happiness, New Haven (CT) and London, 2008.
+
+57 Patrick Moynot, "Nobel d'économie: coup de maître", Le Monde, October 15, 2008.
+
+60
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+The fight for patents
+
+cit., pp. 138 et seq.; and FA Hayek, The miracle of Social Justice, cit., pp. 104-105.
+
+63 Interview with Robert Bono in Sécurité sociale: L'enjeu, Paris, 1983, p. 60.
+
+See, for example, G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life,
+
+62 M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, cit., pp. 196-197. The theme of law is
+omnipresent in Foucault's writings, who, however, did not address his theorization (cf.
+Márcio Alves da Fonseca, Michel Foucault eo direito, São Paulo, 2002).
+
+World War have not been repealed, but they are contradicted by the
+rules imposed by "the spontaneous order" of a market
+
+The scientific faith in the spontaneous order of the market clashes with
+the legal mechanisms of the social State, but even more so with the
+realities of the crises it generates. The covid-19 pandemic has
+reaffirmed for a time the fundamental importance of the preservation
+of human life, the core of legal and social institutions, and States have
+briefly recovered their role as guarantors of last resort for physical
+security in their territory. The legal vector of this resurgence is the
+«right to health»64, whose priority requires us to question some of the
+«structural reforms» imposed in the name of the market. The pandemic
+has consequently revealed the degradation of the healthcare system
+due to governance by numbers, as well as the inability of private
+insurance companies to shoulder the financial burden of vaccination
+and work interruptions.
+
+156 nlr 132
+
+We live today in a schizophrenic regulatory order in which the legal
+principles and values that emerged from the crisis caused by the Second
+
+built to apply the principles of social justice proclaimed in the great
+international Declarations and in the constitutions adopted after the
+Second World War. During the last decades, it has become somewhat
+of a good tone to mock the humanist emphasis or denounce the
+perversity of these Declarations, which would be nothing more than
+the mask of the imposition of the political on life61. Foucault never
+opted for this nonsense. Instead, he denounced the "inflationary
+critique of the state" and declared that "everyone participating in the
+great statephobia" was "going with the flow." He was not only one of
+the rare philosophers to perceive the crucial importance of social
+security, but also defended it against "the savage liberalism, which
+would lead to individual coverage for those with the necessary
+resources and to the absence of coverage for the rest»63.
+
+61
+
+64 «The enjoyment of the highest level of health that can be achieved is one of the fundamental rights of
+every human being without distinction of race, religion, political ideology or economic or social condition»,
+«Preamble» to the Constitution of the WHO .
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+65 Rudolf von Ihering, Der Kampf ums Recht, 1872.
+66 See Clotilde Jourdain-Fortier, Santé et commerce international: contribution à
+l'étude de la protection des valeurs non marchandes par le droit du commerce
+international, Paris, 2006.
+67 Samira Guennif and Julien Chaisse, “L'économie politique du brevet au sud:
+variations Indiennes sur le brevet pharmaceutique”, Revue internationale de droit
+économique, vol. 21, no. 2, 2007, pp. 185-210; Maurice Cassier and Marilena Correa,
+“Brevets de médicament, luttes pur l'accès et intérêt public au Brésil et en Inde”,
+Innovations, no. 32, 2012, p. 109-127.
+
+The creators of the World Health Organization, perceiving the
+objective solidarity that unites the planet's inhabitants in the face of
+health-related risks, sought to mobilize it in 1946 with the intention of
+avoiding such threats. One of the primary impulses of this active
+solidarity in the face of illness is – as it was among the
+
+On the one hand, the "Preamble" of the Constitution of the WHO
+establishes that: "The extension to all peoples of the benefits of
+medical, psychological and related knowledge is essential to achieve
+the highest degree of health." But, on the other, since the creation of
+the World Trade Organization in 1994, this knowledge has become
+the object of private property, which is precisely opposed to its
+"extension to all peoples", according to the Agreement on the
+Aspects of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 66.
+Until then, international law accepted that the protection of public
+health interests prevailed over the interests of patent owners. The
+TRIPS Agreement reversed this hierarchy and gave primacy to the
+protection of industrial property.
+
+with claims of totality. The "struggle for the right", which the German
+jurist Rudolf von Ihering considered a task that had to be endlessly
+recommenced, is today more topical than ever65. Proof of this is the
+pressing issue of the right to health in times of global pandemic.
+
+Babylonians – the sharing of knowledge related to it. This pooling,
+however, currently confronts the prevailing order on intellectual
+property rights, which assumes forms that illustrate the schizophrenic
+nature of the international legal order, torn as we indicated between
+the principles of social justice characteristic of the period. postwar
+and the free market.
+
+The principle of protecting public health had led many countries,
+including Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and India, to exclude medicines
+from the patentable scope. The case of India is particularly
+instructive67. After the achievement of independence, its
+
+supiot: Law 157
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+69 Manish Panchal, Charu Kapoor and Mansi Mahajan, “Success strategies for
+Indian pharma industry in an uncertain world”, Business Standard, Mumbai,
+February 17, 2014.
+70 Institute of Medicine, "America's Vital Interest in Global Health: Protecting Our
+People, Enhancing Our Economy and Advancing Our International Interest",
+Washington dc, 1997.
+
+68 Vandana Shiva, "Democracy Wins Patents Laws Debate in Indian Parliament,"
+twr, no. 57, May 1995, p. 12.
+
+71 The possibility of such compulsory licensing was introduced in 1925 in
+the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.
+
+The Indian Patent Act passed in 1911 was amended in 1970 to exclude from
+
+its scope of application public health products and agricultural products "in the
+
+interests of health, nutrition and existence of Indian citizens"68. From there, a
+
+powerful Indian pharmaceutical industry emerged, which provided low-cost
+
+generic drugs to meet the country's needs and enable exports to other countries
+
+in the South. In the early 1990s, the price of AIDS treatment was around $700
+
+a month; In 1993, after making use of the rights provided for in the Patent Act
+
+of 1970, the Indian company Cipla began to manufacture generic medicines at
+
+a price of $300 per month, which significantly reduced its cost. India, which was
+
+a net importer of medicines until the early 1980s, has become a major
+
+exporter69. This strategy has provoked strong reactions in the West. The
+
+American Academy of Sciences, closely related to the American pharmaceutical
+
+industry, was alarmed at the risk of losing its dominance in emerging markets.
+
+In 1997 he asked the Clinton administration to enforce the intellectual property
+rights of the US pharmaceutical industry around the world under the Agreement
+
+on
+
+At the beginning of the new millennium, this emphasis on intellectual property
+
+caused a major dispute between the United States and South Africa over the
+
+granting of "compulsory licenses" to combat the AIDS pandemic, that is, the
+
+South African government granted licenses without consent. of the patent
+
+owner. These US lawsuits triggered a wave of international solidarity
+
+Leaders concluded that the intellectual property regime inherited from British
+
+colonialism had failed to ensure innovation and health protection for its
+
+population and had given a de facto monopoly to Western companies, which
+
+charged prohibitive prices.
+
+TRIPS signed shortly before70.
+
+on a large scale with South Africa, forcing the WTO to soften its position
+
+158 nlr 132
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+73 WHO-WTO, The WTO agreements and public health, Geneva, 2002.
+74 com (2009) 351 final. This position was slightly modified in a new Commission
+Communication adopted in the middle of the pandemic, which refers to the "common
+European values" absent in the 2009 Communication: "universal access to quality
+care, equity and solidarity»: com (2020) 761 final, November 25, 2020.
+
+76 Joseph Stiglitz and Adam Hersch, "The Transpacific Free-Trade Charade," Project
+Syndicate, October 2, 2015.
+
+72 C. Jourdain-Fortier, Santé et commerce international: Contribution à l'étude de la
+protection des valeurs non marchandes par le droit du commerce international, cit.,
+pp. 541-547.
+
+75 Philippe Aghion et al., “Innovation and Top Income Inequality”, Bank of France,
+June 2015.
+
+77 “South Africa and India push for covid-19 patents ban”, The Lancet, December 5,
+2020.
+
+The main argument in favor of patenting medicines was that it is
+essential for innovation. Reinforced by the European Commission in
+its Communication 351 of 2009 on the pharmaceutical sector74,
+this argument is also used by some economists, who base their
+quantification of technological innovation on the number of patents
+applied for75. In view of the enormous therapeutic progress made before
+
+supiot: Law 159
+
+The multinationals that developed them with the help of massive
+public funds try, however, to obtain the greatest possible benefit
+from them. In October 2020, South Africa and India asked the WTO
+to repeal intellectual property rules on these vaccines to allow their
+mass production77. Endorsed by the who and approximately 60
+countries, this request was well received
+
+of the adoption of the TRIPS Agreements , is not very convincing. It
+has been harshly criticized by other economists, such as Joseph
+Stiglitz, who maintain that, on the contrary, limiting intellectual
+property would reopen this field to competition76. The covid-19
+pandemic has brought this conflict between rules to the fore. Global
+health security means that everyone in the world should have access
+to vaccines, according to the WHO Constitution .
+
+in the Doha Declaration (2001) and to admit that public health
+imperatives fell within the scope of the derogations established in
+the TRIPS Agreement72 . The episode demonstrated that
+international collective action can stop the process of extending
+market logic to all aspects of human life. At the same time, however,
+the Doha Declaration accepted the change in the principle governing
+international health law, which is now based on the patentability of
+medicines73.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
+Cf. Emilios Christodoulidis, The Redress of Law: Globalisation, Constitutionalism
+2021.
+
+78 “Waive Covid vaccine patents to put world on war jogging”, who/oms, March 7,
+2021.
+
+and Market Capture, Cambridge, 2021.
+
+Cf. Carlos Lopes and Dirk Willem te Velde, “Structural Transformation, Economic
+Development and Industrialization in Post-Covid-19 Africa”, Institute for New
+Economic Thinking, January 14, 2021; Dinesh Abrol and Thomas Franco, “How Can
+India Expand covid Vaccine Production Quickly?”, The Wire, May 26,
+
+80
+
+81
+
+79 This is notably the position of the Swiss and German governments: Agence France Presse, May 6, 2021.
+
+160 nlr 132
+
+by the director general of the WTO and even by Biden, at that time
+recently elected president of the United States78. Without daring
+to contradict him head-on, European politicians have been very
+reluctant towards the proposal and have defended a policy of
+charitable donations from rich countries to poor ones, now
+maintaining that "developing" countries are incapable of producing these vaccines79.
+But countries like India and South Africa are demanding the release
+of patents, precisely because they already have large
+pharmaceutical industries80. As an actor in the market order, the
+European Union constantly presses for the establishment of
+"structural reforms" that reduce the obligations of employers with
+social security and public services, although both serve to "make
+people live." At the same time, he defends the high level of
+mandatory fees that favor multinational pharmaceutical companies,
+despite the fact that such fees lead to "letting people die." Faith in
+the total market, the most recent avatar of scientism, considers
+human life as a means and not an end. We observe here the
+conflict between a legal logic based on the imperatives of social
+justice and solidarity and a normalizing logic intended to grease
+the mechanisms of the "spontaneous market order." As we
+indicated previously, the "fight for rights", claimed by von Ihering,
+has become more urgent than ever81.
+
+Machine Translated by Google
\ No newline at end of file
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+‘That which is lacking cannot be counted.’
+
+(Ecclesiastes I:15)
+
+1 J-P Vernant , Myth and Thought among the Greeks, tr J Lloydwith J Fort( New York City,
+Zone Books , 2006 ) . 2 C Castoriadis , The Imaginary Institution of Society, tr K Blamey( Cambridge , Massachusetts,
+MIT Press , 1987 ) . 3 ibid.
+Introduction
+
+LIKE EVERY WORK of human hand, our institutions bear the imprint
+of the ideas which helped bring them into being. Law is an institution
+in this sense, a cultural fact like technology, religion or the arts,
+which contain and preserve an era ’ s dominant representations of the world.
+Of course, every body of representations — technology, law, the arts, and so
+forth — has its own internal system of reference. Although an airplane may
+be the incarnation of the human being ’ s dream of soaring into the sky, as
+a technological object it depends on the truth of the scientifi c knowledge
+which enabled its construction. This necessary reliance on the value of scientifi
+c truth is what distinguishes modern from older technological objects,
+the latter being simply ‘ traps set at the points where nature can be grasped ’ ,
+1
+as Jean-Pierre Vernant puts it, that is, recipes deduced from what works or
+fails to work. Art, by contrast, has no such obligation towards truth, and
+can free itself entirely from the weightiness of the world as it is. However, a
+work of art needs to have an aesthetic value, at least in principle, and this is
+the yardstick by which it will be judged.
+Law occupies a position halfway between art and technology. Its referent
+is neither truth, nor the aesthetic, but justice. However, just as a zeppelin
+may be dangerous, and a painting, botched, so a legal rule can be unjust.
+Yet even saying this implies a reference to what a legal rule should be. In
+common with art, law inhabits a world of fi ction — for example a republic
+in which freedom, equality and fraternity reign. But in common with technology,
+law aims to act on the real world and must consequently take it
+into account. These two aspects interact, each being part of what Cornelius
+Castoriadis has called the imaginary institution of society. 2 ‘ Imaginary ’does
+not imply that our institutions are creations of pure fantasy, born out of
+the magma of representations inhabiting us from cradle to grave. On the
+contrary: instituting individuals in society means removing them from that
+magma so that they may ‘ gain access to society and the world of signifi cation
+as a world belonging to all and to no one ’ .
+3 This world of shared meaning,
+which is imposed through the instituting of the psyche, is itself produced by
+2 Introduction
+
+4 cf J-L Gardies , L ’ erreur de Hume ( Paris , PUF , 1987 ) . 5 cf A Berque , É coum è ne. Introduction àl ’ é tude des milieux humains ( Paris , Belin , 2000 ) . 6 cf S Weil , The Need for Roots. Prelude to a Declaration of Duties towards Mankind [ 1943 ],
+tr A Wills , pref TS Eliot(London, Routledge &Kegan Paul , 1952 ) . From a similar perspective,
+M Horkheimerand T Adorno , Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments [ 1947 ],
+tr E Jephcott , ed G Schmid Noerr( Redwood City , Stanford University Press , 2002 ) . 7 For this concept, see P Musso , L ’ Imaginaire industriel ( Paris , Manucius , 2014 ) . 8 cf H Berman , Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
+( Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press , 1983 ) .
+
+a social imaginary which, for society to survive, must be compatible with
+the prevailing physical and biological conditions of existence.
+The legal order is also part of this imaginary institution of society. It cannot
+be divorced from a society ’ s material conditions, but neither can it be
+deduced from these. The law is always one of the possible responses to the
+challenges which material conditions pose to humankind. 4 This is why it is
+as futile to seek to ground law transcendentally as it is to explain it away
+in terms of its material base, or analyse it as a technological object devoid
+of meaning. What natural law theory, materialist theory of law (based on
+biologism, sociologism, and economism) and Kelsenian positivism have in
+common is that they are all based on a subject – object dichotomy, which is
+a specifi cally Western way of conceiving relations to the world. Although
+we owe much to this way of thinking — on which, for instance, the natural
+sciences have thrived — it can blind us to the irreducible singularity of the
+human being. Our denatured animal may well project onto the world the
+images which inhabit him, using words and tools, but he can only survive
+if he is also aware of the realities of his ecumene, 5 his living environment. 6
+The industrial imaginary, 7 dominated by the laws of classical physics,
+gave us electrifi cation, the fi lm Metropolis, and labour law. The world was
+conceived as a huge clock advancing through the implacable interaction
+of weights and forces, which could be harnessed by human beings, but to
+which they were also subjected. The social state itself was designed as a
+machine, to correct the imbalances caused by industrial progress. It never
+aimed to eradicate the new forms of dehumanisation which appeared in
+the workplace, but instead to compensate for their effects and make them
+humanly bearable. It is at odds with today ’ s cybernetic imaginary which
+champions governance by numbers. This new, and dominant, representation
+of how people and societies should function not only saps the social
+state but, more critically, it undermines our very conception of the state as
+it has been handed down to us from the Gregorian Reform of the eleventh
+to twelfth century, as a transcendent and immortal being. 8 The hypothesis
+on which this book rests is that the ‘ crisis of the welfare state ’is a sign of a
+much deeper institutional break, which affects the specifi cally Western way
+in which the ‘ government of men ’has been conceived. This is why we will
+not be treating the state, the law or democracy as parameters for a legal
+Introduction 3
+
+9 M Foucault , Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the College De France, Vol 4,
+1977 – 78, tr Graham Burchell( London/ New York City , Palgrave Macmillan , 2009 )and Birth
+of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Coll è ge de France, 1978 – 1979, tr Graham Burchel, (London /
+New York City, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
+
+analysis, but as categories which must themselves be re-examined in order
+to understand the far-reaching institutional changes taking place under the
+name of ‘ globalisation ’ .
+In order to approach this crisis of institutions, a much broader concept
+will be introduced: that of ‘ government ’ , and its contemporary form,
+‘ governance ’ . There is nothing new about broaching issues of law and institutions
+in terms of the ‘ government of men ’ . In Locke ’ s Two Treatises of
+Government (1st edn, 1690), the notion of state appears only in ‘ State of
+Nature ’and ‘ State of War ’ , which are forms of power outside the realm
+of the law. To designate a system under the authority of the law, Locke
+uses the term ‘ Commonwealth ’(Republic) and not ‘ State ’ . He thus marks
+his difference from Hobbes, who equates ‘ State ’with ‘ Res Publica ’or
+‘ Commonwealth ’ . So we have only to cross the Channel for the general
+validity and self-evidence of the concept of state to evaporate. Much more
+recently, Michel Foucault has used the notion of government, or more precisely,
+‘ governmentality ’ , to designate all forms of exercise of power. 9 In
+addition to the authority of these authors, there is a further, and much more
+decisive argument for our focus on ‘ government ’ : today, within the institutional
+confi gurations taking shape, it is transnational companies that occupy
+a role comparable to that of states. The methods of government employed
+by states and by businesses for governing people have always interacted, as
+from the industrial age. By employing the concept of ‘ government ’it will be
+possible to track these mutual infl uences and address today ’ s institutional
+transformations as a coherent whole.
+The critical distance taken from the concept of the state is necessary but
+not suffi cient for analysing the legal dimension of ‘ globalisation ’ . Other
+associated legal notions must also be re-examined because they too are
+products of the West, as is the notion of ‘ State ’ — and that of ‘ government ’ .
+We take for granted, for example, that governing and exercising power
+are one and the same thing. But this assimilation — even in the form of
+Foucault ’ s ‘ biopower ’ — is by no means self-evident. It is symptomatic of
+a culture and an epoch (Western culture and our present times), which it
+would be childish to try and escape, since this is our world, but which we
+must try to situate in relation to other ways of conceiving the legal organisation
+of human societies.
+The purpose of critically examining our categories of thought is not to
+dismiss them, but rather to circumscribe them, and understand how deeply
+they are embedded in the history of Western legal thought. In other words,
+4 Introduction
+
+10 cf G Dagron , Emperor and Priest. The Imperial Offi ce in Byzantium, tr J Birrell
+( Cambridge , Cambridge University Press , 2003 ) . 11 cf below, ch 3, p 52ff. 12 cf A Berque , ‘ La mondialisation a-t-elle une base ? ’in G Mercier , Les territoires et la
+mondialisation ( Quebec , Presses universitaires de Laval , 2004 ) 73 – 92 .
+
+these notions should be used knowingly, rather than letting them do the
+thinking for us. The reference to ‘ the West ’here is to be understood in a
+particular sense, connected with the long history of our institutions and
+more specifi cally with our culture ’ s grounding in Roman law. When Rome
+split into Western and Eastern Empires, this was not only a political and
+religious schism, it was also a crucial moment in the history of law. The
+fall of the Western Empire in 476 produced an institutional void which the
+Catholic Church was called upon to fi ll, leading to the medieval period ’ s
+solutions of Roman and Canon law, from which our modern concept of the
+state emerged. Meanwhile, the Eastern Roman Empire survived until 1453,
+roughly 1,000 years later. There, a symbiosis developed between the priesthood
+( hi é r ô sin è ) and the Empire ( basileia), from which emerged the fi gure
+of a monarch who is also a priest. 10 Western leaders ’staggering ignorance
+of the specifi c heritage of the post-Byzantine world has caused centuries of
+incomprehension; for example, the vision of Greece as the direct descendant
+of Athenian democracy (which affected the conditions placed on Greece ’ s
+entry into the EU) or the diffi culties encountered by Europe in establishing
+pacifi ed relations with Russia.
+Within Western legal culture, two branches have developed — continental
+law and common law. They harbour a common, if rivalrous, wish to
+westernise the world, but in our post-colonial era, it is their confl icting
+institutional forms which take centre stage. 11 The acritical catchword
+‘ globalisation ’refers to the expansion of a certain Western culture over the
+whole globe. The French language enables us to analyse this process more
+precisely, and to envisage another perspective, through the crucial distinction
+between la globalisation, and la mondialisation. La mondialisation—
+‘ worldisation ’ — is derived from the Latin ‘ mundus ’ , which is the opposite of
+‘ immundus ’in much the same way that the Greek ‘ cosmos ’is the opposite
+of ‘ chaos ’ . La mondialisation evokes the diversity of civilisations; that is,
+the different ways of inhabiting the planet and of making it humanly viable.
+An uninhabitable world resembles, precisely, a reversion of the cosmos to
+chaos. 12 La mondialisation does not imply the advent of a standardised
+world based on Western ways, but instead, the West ’ s encounter with other
+ways of conceiving how society may be instituted; ways which are, in turn,
+challenged by Western modernity. This dynamic should force us to abandon
+both the illusions produced by an essentialist reading of legal cultures qua
+invariants persisting in their being, and the idea that history is coming to an
+end, with the victory of Western civilisation over all others.
+Introduction 5
+
+13 See below, ch 11, p 295ff.
+
+The interaction of these reciprocal challenges can be felt with particular
+force in the history of social legislation. In nineteenth-century Europe, the
+forces of capitalism crushed traditional systems of solidarity. These were
+based on family, religious, geographical and occupational bonds, which
+were destroyed to varying degrees by Europe ’ s fi rst industrial revolution,
+and then no less brutally with colonisation and the slave trade. Today, it is
+state systems of solidarity, designed for nationwide coverage, and invented
+precisely to palliate the weakening of traditional solidarities, which are
+under threat. From the perspective of the total market, which globalisation
+aspires to, society is simply a swarm of contracting particles whose relations
+to each other are based purely on calculated self-interest. Calculation — and
+hence the contract — thus comes to occupy the place previously assigned to
+the law as the normative reference.
+This new utopia is no more likely to succeed than those which preceded
+it in the twentieth century, when the founding reference for the political
+order was the laws of biology or of history. As soon as Nazism and Real
+Communism were obliged to confront the limits imposed by reality, this
+proved catastrophic for their unbounded ambitions. Today, the pressure of
+globalisation on all cultures has triggered a powerful backlash of religious,
+ethnic, regionalist and nationalist identifi cations. Their common hallmark
+is to look for new solidarities grounded neither in tradition nor in the state,
+but rather in solidarities of combat based on the binary opposition — dear
+to Carl Schmitt 13— of friend and enemy, which try to fi nd justifi cation in
+fundamentalist re-readings of dogmatic corpuses.
+So how, and under what conditions, can a legal analysis help shed light
+on these transformations ?Law occupies a strange position as a fi eld of
+knowledge. Due to the medieval origins of modern law, Western jurists tend
+to see it as a self-enclosed system which can have no fruitful interactions
+with other domains.
+However, law can best be understood as the secular equivalent of the
+systems of mandatory rules which, in other times and cultures, originated —
+or still originate — in shared belief and religious ritual. Every legal system
+rests on what the American Declaration of Independence calls ‘ self-evident
+truths ’ , that is, on a dogmatic basis which makes the system meaningful and
+authorises interpretation:
+
+We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
+are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
+are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights,
+Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
+of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive
+of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to
+6 Introduction
+
+institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing
+its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety
+and Happiness.
+
+This founding text presents a series of logical deductions. It starts by supposing
+the existence of individual rights, in a clearly dogmatic gesture: just
+like the creator, rights are ‘ self-evident ’ , a truth which thus requires no demonstration,
+but should instead be proclaimed and celebrated. This dogmatic
+core grounds the power of government, while simultaneously limiting it in
+two ways: the government must have the consent of those governed; and
+its power should be used to defend the people ’ s rights. If the government
+fails in this, the people have the right — a collective right this time — to put
+power into the hands of another group which can better guarantee security
+and happiness. The word ‘ happiness ’appears twice in the Declaration: fi rst,
+as the object of an individual quest which each citizen must be allowed to
+pursue freely; and again as the happiness of the people as a whole when it is
+ruled by a good government.
+So law has a dogmatic basis, but it is also a technique of government,
+which people may use as they see fi t. This duality explains the abyss existing
+between the supporters of legal positivism, who exclude any axiological
+considerations from their approach to the ‘ science of law ’ ; and those who
+swear by a natural foundation to legal systems, an immanent or transcendant
+order considered universally valid, against which positive law can be
+measured, and which it should simply serve.
+However, in reality, no serious legal analysis can opt for either the technical
+or the axiological dimension of law. A legal analysis should certainly not
+dissolve the text in its context, as sociologising and economistic approaches
+do. But neither should it divorce the text entirely from its historical, anthropological
+and socio-economic contexts. If these two conditions are not
+met, a legal analysis will be unable to contribute to our understanding of
+phenomena which anyway no single knowledge area can explain. Unlike
+biological or economic norms, legal rules are not derived from the observation
+of fact. They are not the imprint of the world as it is, but rather what
+a society thinks the world should be. It is thus a representation which can
+help bring about change.
+The specifi c task of a legal analysis is thus to apprehend what ought to be,
+not directly what is. This defi nition is not intended to exclude the dynamic
+relation between is and ought (and additionally the realm of the purely
+imaginary), which exists in every human action. But we would insist that
+it cannot be grasped unless the systems of representation which leave their
+imprint on the law in a given society are fi rst identifi ed. There is much at
+stake in the gap between these formal representations and the real state of
+the world. If the gap is too large, or if it widens, then the legal order will be
+disqualifi ed by reality, and its credibility will be undermined. This is what
+Introduction 7
+
+14 cf F Brunet , La normativit éen droit ( Paris , Mare &Martin , 2012 ) .
+
+happens when the law — which should be equally binding on all — simply
+masks a system ruled by privilege and personal allegiances. On the collapse
+of Real Communism, for example, the state lost all credibility, and what
+replaced it were negotiated ‘ arrangements ’based on calculations of individual
+interest alone. But a system of law can also implement, at least partially,
+the vision of the world it advocates. Tocqueville ’ s analyses, for example,
+testify to the strength of the principle of equality once it had gained constitutional
+value. And although it is clear that, for example, there are still today
+many inequalities between men and women, and thus a gap between the law
+and the facts on the ground, the normative force of the principle of equality
+has just as clearly narrowed that gap.
+For a legal analysis to be productive, it must thus take into account the
+historical and geographical relativity of the law, which is not a universal and
+atemporal feature of human societies. But it must also take into account the
+centrality of legal rules, which are the only form of normativity to be the
+object of deliberation, and conscious of its own status, as well as binding
+on everyone. 14 With this relativity and centrality in mind, legal analysis can
+help detect the normativity at work in scientifi c disciplines, which often
+unknowingly mobilise legal categories while attributing to them a universal
+heuristic value. These categories, which frequently originate in Roman
+law — ‘ civilisation ’ , ‘ contract ’ , ‘ law ’and ‘ religion ’ , for instance — are extensively
+used in economics and sociology. Many others — such as ‘ heritage ’
+and ‘ heredity ’ — have infl uenced biology.
+This treatment of law as a cultural fact attracts two types of criticism.
+The fi rst, voiced by social scientists, accuses this type of analysis of relying
+on ideological constructs rather than confi ning itself to the facts. The second,
+from legal positivists, at the other extreme, accuses it of betraying the integrity
+of the law by attending to the law ’ s contexts. On this basis, neither
+Montesquieu, nor Portalis and Carbonnier can have contributed anything
+at all to the science of law! But it is precisely when the study of law draws
+on this intellectual tradition that it can help us understand the upheavals of
+today ’ s world.
+A legal analysis as we defi ne it here poses major methodological problems.
+The complex links between text and context cannot be identifi ed and
+understood without studying historical and comparative works. As a result,
+the quality of a legal analysis begins to depend on readings from other fi elds,
+which in turn exposes jurists, despite themselves, to getting drawn into the
+controversies of other disciplines.
+In addition to this fi rst set of methodological diffi culties, which relate to
+setting the text in context, there is a second group, which is internal to law.
+The extraordinary infl ation of the law since the beginning of modern times,
+8 Introduction
+
+15 See on this subject, H Berman, Law and Revolution Vol II: The Impact of the Protestant
+Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition, which gives a historical account of this
+systematisation within Protestant lands; or, from a German perspective, J Schr ö der , Recht als
+Wissenschaft. Geschichte der Juristischen Methode vom Humanismus bis Historischen Schule
+(Geneva, Beck , 2001 ) ; A Wijffels , ‘ Qu ’ est-ce que le ius commune? ’in A Supiot(ed), Tisser le
+lien social ( Paris , MSH , 2004 ) 131ff .
+
+and even more so today, has led to increasing specialisation on the part of
+jurists, both practitioners and researchers. At the same time, one cannot
+address fundamental questions affecting the development of law as a whole
+without leaving behind the comforts of a particular branch of law. What
+is required is a kind of ‘ intra-disciplinarity ’ , despite the obstacles posed by
+the exponential increase in legal sources and the fragmentation of research
+across increasingly narrow specialisations.
+The division of law into branches is a relatively recent product of the
+analytical study of law, or legal dogmatics, and dates from the jurists of
+Renaissance humanism and the legal theorists of the Reform. So it was only in
+the sixteenth century that law began to be conceived as having branches and
+sub-branches corresponding to the subjects treated. This approach, called
+usus modernus, was part of a larger movement affecting both theology
+and philosophy. 15 Today, certain signs, and the return of certain techniques
+employed by medieval jurists, suggest that the usus modernus no longer
+holds. In medieval times, the legal order was not compartmentalised, and
+operations of qualifi cation did not consist of slotting a case into a category
+of subject matter. Jurists could solve a case by appealing to general principles
+or to rules borrowed from different subject areas.
+Over the last century, the branches of law have multiplied, for practical
+(the increased number of sources) rather than epistemological reasons.
+This ramifi cation is of importance for the profession, but its heuristic power
+is weak and perhaps getting weaker. It is particularly weak in the case of
+labour and social security law, a historically recent branch, which straddles
+private and public law, and has greater or lesser scope depending on the particular
+country and its judicial and administrative systems. Any advanced
+research will almost inevitably transgress the fi eld ’ s constituted boundaries,
+and oblige the jurist to venture onto terrain less familiar than his or her
+original specialism, with all the risks this involves.
+Despite all these diffi culties, a legal analysis can help one get one ’ s bearings
+within the many calamities, of varying intensity, precipitated by globalisation
+throughout the world: increasing ecological threats, a massive
+rise in inequalities, mass pauperisation and migration, the return of religious
+wars and cultural isolationism, the collapse of political credibility and of
+fi nancial systems, and so forth. We are a far cry from the radiant future
+announced by the prophets of the end of history and of a harmoniously globalised
+world. All these upheavals interact and amplify each other like dif-
+Introduction 9
+
+16 cf T Todorov , Hope and memory: refl ections on the twentieth century, tr D Bellow
+( Princeton , Princeton University Press , 2003 )(translation of Le si è cle des totalitarismes (Paris,
+Laffont, 2010), 31.). 17 This idea, which I fi rst elaborated in The Spirit of Philadelphia [2010], tr S Brown
+(London, Verso, 2012), was inspired by the title of the second volume of Alain Desrosi è res ’ s
+collected articles, L ’ argument statistique, Vol 2: Gouverner par les nombres (Paris, Presses de
+l ’ É cole des mines, 2008). My debt to this author goes beyond this title, since his whole work
+shows a particularly fi ne understanding of institutions.
+
+ferent centres of the same fi re. They have one factor in common: the decay
+of national and international institutions. The institutional bases on which
+a new world order was set up at the end of the Second World War have been
+profoundly dislocated, affecting countries and international organisations
+alike. People today cast around for a fi gure capable of protecting the planet,
+the value of the currency or justice in the world. They settle on God and the
+market, sometimes together, since monotheism and faith in a total market
+are well matched in the minds of fundamentalists, whatever their religion.
+After all, is not the ‘ invisible hand ’of the market simply a secular version of
+Divine Providence ? 16
+Whether it is God or the market which is called to the rescue in the
+various upheavals we are undergoing, the result always seems to be that
+collective deliberation is muzzled. In other words, the ideal of a res publica
+governed by the laws a people gives itself seems to end up abandoned or
+betrayed. This ideal, which has come down to us from the Greeks, rests on
+fragile foundations, and its history has not been smooth. It was utterly discredited
+by the twentieth century ’ s totalitarian regimes based on scientistic
+norms, but it was solemnly reaffi rmed in 1948 by the Universal Declaration
+of Human Rights, whose Preamble states that ‘ it is essential, if man is not to
+be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny
+and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law ’ .
+This ideal is offi cially still our own, and so in the fi rst part of this book we
+shall give an historical account of the many forms it has taken, in order
+better to grasp the critical challenges it has faced over the last century. This
+chronological contextualisation is vital for understanding how the promise
+of an impersonal government, which was already part of this ideal, came to
+take the form today of a governance by numbers. 17
+Since the reign of the law is intimately bound up with state sovereignty,
+this regime has suffered from the latter ’ s decline. Today, the state seems to
+be relegated once again to the instrumental role it had under totalitarian
+regimes, and criticised as an archaic and oppressive fi gure. Where previously
+it was the plaything of a single party supposedly embodying the movement
+of history, the state has become the instrument of a total market which
+enlists all individuals into a world of unending competition, in which all
+aspects of human life are measured in economic terms. In this context, laws
+themselves become the object of a calculation, treated as legislative products
+10 Introduction
+
+18 On the cybernetic imaginary, see L Sfez , Critique de la communication ( Paris , Seuil ,
+1988 ) ; P Thuillier , La grande implosion. Rapport sur l’effondrement de l’Occident 1999 – 2002
+( Paris , Fayard , 1995 ) 363f ; C Lafontaine , L’empire cybern é tique. Des machines àpenser àla
+pens é e machine ( Paris , Seuil , 2004 ) ; P Breton , L’utopie de la communication. Le mythe du
+‘ village plan é taire’( Paris , La D é couverte, 2006 ) .
+
+competing on a global market of norms. This gearing of the law to calculations
+of utility already operated in Soviet central planning. Thereafter,
+thanks to the unholy union of communism and capitalism — as from 1979,
+when the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping launched his economic reforms —
+this subjection took the form of a governance by numbers which penetrates
+every level of society, from the individual employment relationship to the
+structural adjustment plans promoted at European and international level.
+The overthrow of the reign of the law by governance by numbers
+enacts the dream of an arithmetically attainable social harmony. The latest
+incarnation of this dream in its long history are the ICT and digital revolutions,
+to which we all seem enthralled. The latter are based on a cybernetic
+imaginary, which produces to an idea of normativity not as legislation but
+as programming. 18 People are no longer expected to act freely within the
+limits laid down by the law, but to react in real time to the multiple signals
+they receive, in order to meet the targets they are assigned. Ways of thinking
+about work have been particularly affected by this development, which is
+why the second half of this book is devoted to the new forms taken today
+by the imperative of ‘ total mobilisation ’ , which fi rst appeared as Taylorism
+at the time of the First World War. The fate of Taylorism, and of ‘ total
+mobilisation[ ’ s] ’new avatar, governance by numbers, demonstrates the
+failure awaiting all normative systems founded on denying the specifi cally
+human capacities of thinking and acting independently. Today, with the
+withering-away of the state and the new forms of alienation this brings, a
+typically feudal legal structure is re-emerging, consisting of networks of allegiance
+within which each person seeks the protection of someone stronger
+than he is, or the support of someone weaker.
+This book therefore follows a double movement. First, the quest for an
+impersonal model of power, epitomised by the ‘ machine of government ’ ,
+which has led to governance by numbers. Secondly, the return of personal
+allegiance as a reaction to the failures of governance.
+1 A Haudricourt , La technologie, science humaine. Recherches d ’ histoire et d ’ ethnologie des
+techniques ( Paris , Maison des sciences de l ’ homme , 1987 ) 277ff .
+
+1
+
+In Search of a Machine
+of Government
+
+‘ To treat a person as a thing or as a purely mechanical system is not less but more
+imaginary than claiming to see him as an owl. ’
+
+EUROPE ’ S PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL disarray can be attributed
+to a certain way of conceiving government, which emerged with the
+modern age and continues to dominate our normative representations.
+The premise is that governing, as simply a technique of power, operates
+likes a machine, in this case a machine based on scientifi c knowledge of
+the human being. Yet there is nothing self-evident about equating rule with
+power. Or rather, one could say that this reduction is fairly symptomatic of a
+civilisation and an epoch which it would be childish to think one could simply
+leave behind, since it is still ours, but which we should attempt to situate
+in relation to other ways of conceiving human government. By exploring the
+aesthetic and poetic dimensions of government, we shall be able to relativise
+our own imaginary of the machine of government, and understand today ’ s
+shift from government to governance.
+
+I. THE POETICS OF GOVERNMENT
+
+‘ Government ’draws etymologically on a nautical terminology (the Greek
+kybernan ( κυβερναω), via the Latin gubernō). To govern is to be at the helm,
+directing both the movements of the boat and its crew. But not all civilisations
+have conceived the organisation of human communities on this model
+of commands and constraints imposed on both men and things. The ethnobotanist
+Andr éHaudricourt considers this model to be typical of predominantly
+pastoral societies. 1 By contrast, in societies where agriculture is more
+important, the image of the shepherd or the helmsman, who leads men with
+a stick, acting on them directly, is replaced by that of the gardener, who acts
+indirectly by creating the conditions which will enable each plant to thrive.
+14 In Search of a Machine of Government
+
+2 The Chinese Classics: Analects of Confucius, Book XIII: Tsze-Lu, 6, tr and notes James
+Legge, online Gutenberg Project, 2001. 3 E Kantorowicz , ‘ Kingship under the Impact of Scientifi c Jurisprudence ’ fi rst published
+in M Clagett , G Postand R Reynolds(eds), Twelfth-century Europe and the Foundations of
+Modern Society ( Madison , University of Wisconsin Press , 1961 ) . 4 Cicero, On the Commonwealth, Book 2, 57 in J Zetzel(ed) On the Commonwealth and
+On the Laws ( London , New York City , Cambridge University Press , 1999 ) 52 . See also the
+description of the three powers which, for Polybius, are unique to the Roman Constitution:
+Polybius, The Histories, Book VI, Ch 5, Loeb Classical Library edition, 1922 – 1927. 5 Q Skinner , ‘ Ambrogio Lorenzetti: the artist as political philosopher ’( 1986 ) Proceedings of
+the British Academy, 72, 1 – 56 . For a different interpretation of these frescoes, see P Boucheron
+Conjurer la peur. Sienne 1338. Essai sur la force politique des images ( Paris , Seuil , 2013 ) .
+
+In the Confucian tradition, for example, the government guarantees the
+harmony which enables subjects to fulfi l their functions as best they can.
+The person who deserves to govern is one whose virtue shines forth: ‘ When
+a prince ’ s personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without
+the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue
+orders, but they will not be followed. ’ 2
+So, reducing governing to the exercise of power is a typically Western
+idea. It has its origin in what Kantorowicz, in his research into the medieval
+origins of modern institutions, calls the disintegration of the ideal of
+liturgical royalty, when the fi gure of power split off from that of authority. 3
+We tend to forget that this combination was precisely what made a government
+stable, as Cicero insists much earlier, in his dialogue De re publica:
+
+If there is not an equitable balance in the State of rights and duties and responsibilities,
+so that there is enough power in the hands of the magistrates and enough
+authority in the judgment of the aristocrats and enough freedom in the people,
+then the condition of the commonwealth cannot be preserved unchanged. 4
+
+Quentin Skinner has shown, in a magnifi cent short text, 5 that this tradition
+was still active in the political thought of the medieval pre-Humanists, as
+expressed in the famous allegorical frescoes of Buon Governo and Tyranny
+painted by Ambrogio Lorenzetti around 1338 on the walls of the Council
+Room of the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena. These paintings show two opposing
+scenes within a single political theatre: the allegory of bad government
+is dominated by a single fi gure — the Tyrant — whereas good government
+shows a balance between the masculine fi gure of political Power and the
+feminine fi gure of Justice. The honest citizens, when guided by power and
+authority together, are united in Concord (symbolised by the rope which
+links them to the two fi gures), and can thus contribute to the City ’ s prosperity,
+as shown on another wall of the room.
+These frescoes are a particularly striking example of the moment of selfrepresentation
+essential to every government, whether the entity is a city, a
+state, a political party or a company. Pierre Legendre has explored the crucial
+The Poetics of Government 15
+
+6 See particularly P Legendre , La 901 e
+ conclusion. É tude sur le th é â tre de la Raison ( Paris ,
+Fayard , 1998 ) 291f . 7 cf J-P Vernant , ‘ La trag é die grecque selon Louis Gernet ’in Hommage àLouis Gernet
+( Paris , Coll è ge de France , 1966 ) 31 – 35 . 8 cf G Borenfreund , La repr é sentation des salari é s et l ’ id é e de representation( 1991 ) Droit
+social 685 – 95 .
+
+role of this aesthetic dimension in all institutional constructs. 6 A representative
+government implies that those governed can recognise themselves in it.
+The same goes for the sphere of collective representation which labour law
+has built up between private and public law. If the governed can no longer
+recognise themselves in their government, they will be unable to trust it and
+identify with its decisions. Politics will appear to be nothing but a ridiculous
+posturing, which can at best elicit derision, while one bides one ’ s time. The
+blistering humour which thrives under authoritarian regimes is a sign of
+this, as the population ’ s way of expressing their defi ance of those who govern,
+and as a way of creating invisible networks of solidarity. When a people
+has been denied the right to form a political community freely, their poets
+and musicians often represent a more powerful and long-standing focus
+of collective identifi cation than do their political leaders (Liszt ’ s music, for
+example, or Mahmoud Darwich ’ s poetry).
+One of the most remarkable features of collective representation, understood
+in this double legal and aesthetic sense, is that it institutes, or gives
+legal existence to, a community of those governed. This is why ancient
+Greek theatre was not a form of entertainment reserved for the wealthy, but
+a civic ceremony which was integral to the development of democracy and
+the primacy of the law. Louis Gernet has shown, in Jean-Pierre Vernant ’ s
+words, that ‘ the true material of tragedy is the socio-political thought peculiar
+to the City-state, in particular the legal thought that was being elaborated
+at the time. ’ 7 Theatre, music and poetry reinforced the laws governing
+the polis, and brought the public together through their experience of the
+same imaginary representations. A similar process of bonding is achieved
+by the various forms of collective representation. Every representative body
+of employees creates a particular community, whether at the level of the
+company or the business unit, and whether it is a group of managers or of
+metallurgists. Unlike a mandate or power of attorney, by which those who
+are represented institute their representatives, in collective representation it
+is always the representatives who institute the represented body. 8 In other
+words, this type of representation provides a form and a collective identity
+for what was until then only an aggregate of individuals.
+What knits together such communities are legal ties, that is, texts which
+at once defi ne and organise the groupings. However, the ties take shape only
+16 In Search of a Machine of Government
+
+9 French Labour Code, L.4451-1 and R.4451-1f. 10 French Labour Code, art L.5134–54. 11 cf P Domingo and M Pucci, ‘ Le non-recours au RSA et ses motifs ’in Rapport du Comit é
+d ’ é valuation du RSA, Annex 1, December 2011, 25 – 26. 12 cf Archives de philosophie du droit (1995) Droit et esth é tique, 40, 534.
+
+through other forms of social imaginary, which we can class as aesthetic.
+This point should not be overlooked in examining the specifi c role of the
+law in instituting solidarity between people. In general, the links between
+law and technoscience are easy to grasp, for example when social law gives
+legal force to groups ‘ objectively ’constituted by technological factors (for
+instance, a group of employees exposed to ionising radiation), 9 or else
+groups defi ned ‘ objectively ’by social scientists (for instance, ‘ young people
+aged between 16 and 26 who live in deprived urban areas ’ ). 10 But the law
+also plays a role in constituting ‘ subjective ’solidarity between, say, those
+attending a rock concert or a concert of baroque music. When a young
+graduate joins a fast-track stream of the civil service, this is not simply an
+administrative act determined by an organisational rationale; it is also a
+moment of initiation into a certain ethos, a certain type of ‘ confraternity ’
+which, although symbolic, can have powerful effects in the way the State
+functions in practice. Similarly, the legal qualifi cation of a ‘ young person
+who lives in a deprived urban area ’is not simply a neutral label which
+translates a supposed understanding of the causes of unemployment. It is
+also the sign of a certain social group, which is a form of stigmatisation
+and relegation to a sub-culture. ‘ Rational ’administrative bodies register
+the symbolic effects of certain legal categories only unconsciously, and veil
+their subjective dimension behind a fa ç ade of purely instrumental goals:
+take, for example, some French acronyms for university courses and posts
+at the bottom of the scale — ATER ( Attach éTemporaire d ’ Enseignement et
+de Recherche), which sounds like àterre: fl oored, on the ground); or equally
+the incomprehension which has greeted the poor take-up of the State benefi t
+‘ Income from Active Solidarity ’( Revenu de Solidarit éActive), where those
+eligible explain that they are ‘ capable of coping alone ’and do not want to
+‘ be dependent on assitance from others ’ .
+11
+The aesthetic dimension of the law extends to how legal statements themselves
+are formulated. The authority and stability of a rule will often depend
+on its literary elegance. The articles of the French Civil Code are a case in point,
+but the same goes for any work of legal doctrine, 12 since their force derives
+in part from their stylistic qualities. French jurists still deploy their arguments
+in two parts and sub-parts — a distant hangover from Scholasticism —
+which is deemed to refl ect the balance and hence the fairness of their reasoning.
+We may hardly be aware nowadays of the normative force of
+The Poetics of Government 17
+
+13 Kantorowicz, ‘ Kingship ’(n 3). See the same author ’ s study of praise of the sovereign in
+the medieval liturgy , Laudes Regi æ . A Study in Liturgical Acclamations and Medieaval Ruler
+[ 1946 ] ( Berkeley , University of California Press , 1958 ) . 14 G Vico , ‘ The Origin of Heroic Language or Poetry ’(Ch 12 § .2)in Opere Di Giambattista
+Vico. De Constantia Jurisprudentis Liber Alter, Volume 1 ( reprint of 1841 translation ,
+Saraswati Press , 2012 ) . 15 P Chantraine , Dictionnaire é tymologique de la langue grecque ( Paris , Klincksieck , 1999 ) ;
+see poiesis, 922. 16 Most of the following exposition draws on Professor Kado Kazumaza ’ s detailed analysis
+of these foreign legal and linguistic imports into Japan. See particularly his article in French,
+‘ Revisiter la notion de souverainet é ’(2011) Droits 53, 215 – 39.
+
+aesthetic properties, but the reader of the famous opening sentence of the
+Prooemium of Justinian ’ s Institutes senses this clearly: ‘ The imperial majesty
+should be armed with laws as well as glorifi ed with arms, that there
+may be good government in times both of war and of peace ’ . Kantorowicz
+studied the singular fate of this couple armis decorata-legibus armata in the
+sixteenth century, when in some of its restatements Letters replaced Laws
+in order to stress that good government should be based on the arts as
+much as on force. 13 In the eighteenth century, despite the rationalism of the
+period, Vico methodically explored the links between laws and poetry. In
+his words, ‘ [Scholars] agree that the fi rst poets were also the fi rst writers,
+but they have failed to recognise the related fact that poetic language was
+the fi rst language of nations and that it founded their fi rst religions and
+their fi rst laws. ’ 14 To a modern mind, the affi nity between law and poetry
+may seem incongruous, but it becomes clearer if we recall that the Ancient
+Greek term ποίησις ( po í ê sis) meant creative activity, bringing forth something
+new, and only secondarily poetry and poetics. 15 Through its aesthetic
+force, poetry reconciles contraries and is both creative and organisatory.
+It can therefore contribute to establishing or re-establishing harmony
+between human beings.
+This mode of thought was familiar to Japan, the fi rst country to assimilate
+Western legal culture without abandoning its own traditions, and thus a
+particularly interesting case. With the Meiji era a vast linguistic project was
+launched to incorporate Western legal concepts while also reviving strictly
+Japanese ones, which belonged to the imperial tradition. One of these concepts
+was ‘ government ’ .
+16
+Under the shogunate, government by warriors ( bushis) was referred to
+metonymically as bakufu 幕府. Originally, ‘ baku’ , 幕, referred to a piece
+of material which surrounded the place ( ‘ fu’ , 府) where the ‘ shogun ’(the
+general-in-chief) resided in the camp of campaigning armies, and so the fi rst
+meaning of ‘ bakufu’was the headquarters of the military command. But
+in the twelfth century it came to mean the power exercised by the Shogun
+over his vassals, the great feudal lords. Different terms were used to refer
+18 In Search of a Machine of Government
+
+to the power of the Tenno 天 皇 (the king of the heavens, the most high),
+whose function was different. By metonymy, again, rather than metaphor,
+the terms Gosho or Chotei designated the imperial headquarters, the seat
+of the Tenno. One could compare this with the papal government, called
+the Holy See or the Apostiolic See. According to Canon 361 of the Code of
+Canon Law in force today, ‘ the term Apostolic See or Holy See refers not
+only to the Roman Pontiff but also to the State Secretariat, the Council for
+the Public Affairs of the Church, and other institutes of the Roman Curia,
+unless it is otherwise apparent from the nature of the matter or the context
+of the words. ’The Roman pontiff himself is the ultimate seat of government
+of the Church. This comparison should help us understand the terminology
+adopted by Japanese jurists after the Meiji Restoration. Until the 1870s,
+there was no consecrated translation of the word ‘ government ’ : the Tenno,
+like the Pope, was infallible. His omnipotence did not rely on what the West,
+following Weber, calls the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, but on
+the infl uence he exercised over his subjects ’minds. Like the Pope, he did not
+reign through soldiers but through souls, and while the Shogun dealt with
+the reality of power, the Emperor organised poetry competitions.
+The instigators of the Meiji Revolution attempted to reactivate this political
+fi gure of the Tenno, while ensuring that the Emperor held real power.
+This was, understandably, no easy task, and the concepts they mobilised to
+achieve it can seem impenetrable to Western jurists. According to Article 1
+of the Meiji Constitution, ‘ The Empire of Japan is reigned over by T ô chi
+power, from a line of Emperors unbroken since eternity. ’One of the leading
+drafters of this Constitution, Inoue Kowashi (1844 – 1895), explained that
+the Chinese character ‘ T ô chi ’ originally meant the capacity to refl ect truth
+like a mirror. Due to his celestial position, the Tenno can know and ordain
+everything, bringing order to the world without violence despite his omnipotence.
+Another drafter of the Constitution criticised the Western idea of
+government in its original nautical sense, which in his view dehumanised
+the population by treating it like an inanimate object. Choosing the concept
+of ‘ t ô chi’to describe the role of the Emperor was also a response to this
+criticism.
+Translations of the term for ‘ government ’only stabilised in the 1880s,
+with the notions of ‘ sei-ji ’and ‘ sei-fu ’ . ‘ Sei-ji ’ , 政 治, a term taken from
+ancient Chinese texts, refers to the action of governing, and means ‘ politics ’
+in China and Japan. But in the pre-Meiji era in Japan, it also meant being in
+charge of the rites. ‘ Sei-fu ’ , 政 府, also a Chinese term, was used to translate
+the organisation of government, and was hardly used in Japan before modernisation.
+As we saw with Baku-fu, the word ‘ fu ’was often used to refer
+both to the place of residence of the leader and his function. In the 1870s the
+word ‘ sei-fu ’was adopted to translate ‘ government ’ , in order to stress the
+fact that the emperor and his ‘ fu ’were leaders of the ‘ sei ’ ; that is, not only
+of the political realm, but also of state rites.
+The Man-Machine 19
+
+17 On the post-colonial political practices of Central Africa, see J Tonda , Le Souverain moderne.
+Le corps du pouvoir en Afrique centrale (Congo, Gabon) ( Paris , Karthala , 2005 ) . On
+Western countries and multinationals, see P Legendre , La Fabrique de l ’ homme occidental
+( Paris , Mille et une nuits , 1996 ) , and, by the same author , Dominium Mundi. L ’ Empire du
+Management ( Paris , Fayard , 2007 ) , texts complemented by two eponymous documentary fi lms
+by Pierre Legendre and G é rald Caillat, produced by Pierre-Olivier Bardet. 18 P Bourdieu , R é ponses ( Paris , Le Seuil , 1992 ) . 19 T Hobbes , N Malcolm(ed), Leviathan, 3 vols, English and Latin( Oxford, Oxford
+University Press , 2012 ) .
+
+II. THE MAN-MACHINE
+
+With some rare exceptions, 17 those who regard government as solely an
+instrument of domination of some groups over others tend not to perceive
+its aesthetic and poetic dimension. The latter seems to have no place in
+the rationalistic and mechanistic imaginary which has dominated political
+philosophy from the advent of modernity until today. When political institutions
+are regarded as machines, it is indeed diffi cult to understand the
+pivotal role of aesthetics in the art of governing, but since government ’ s
+spectacular aspect cannot be denied either, it is reduced to techniques of
+manipulation and communication, and thus forced back into a mechanistic
+paradigm. This paradigm, which is supposedly ‘ objective ’ , makes us
+view people as though they were things, ‘ like “ particles ”which are under
+the sway of forces of attraction, repulsion, etc, as in a magnetic fi eld ’ , in
+Bourdieu ’ s words. 18 From this perspective, government is one huge machine
+controlled by a play of forces, cogs, weights and counter-weights.
+Hobbes in the mid-seventeenth century is certainly the thinker who
+expressed this idea of government as a machine in its purest form, as from
+the opening of his classic work of European legal thought, Leviathan.
+19 In
+the section which precedes and justifi es the contents of the book, and indeed
+its very fi rst word, we fi nd the term ‘ nature ’ : ‘ Nature (the art whereby God
+hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other
+things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artifi cial animal. ’Hobbes
+is neither the fi rst nor the last thinker to ground the law in nature, where
+nature is the expression of a technique which God has devised and which
+He oversees. Man, made in God ’ s image, can and should copy this technique,
+and, in turn, use the mechanical arts to create artifi cial beings, more
+precisely ‘ artifi cial animals ’or automata, which imitate a living being and
+are endowed with movement. From the late Middle Ages to the industrial
+era, automata were objects of such fascination that they attracted the best
+watchmakers of Europe and involved remarkable technical prowess, as in
+the group of three fi gures — the writer, the draughtsman and the woman
+playing an instrument — created by Pierre and Henri Jaquet-Droz in 1775
+(today displayed in the Neuch â tel museum).
+20 In Search of a Machine of Government
+
+Figure 1.1: The Draughtsman, by Henri
+Louis Jaquet-Droz, 1774 (inv AA3).
+He draws by moving his hand over the
+paper, which is immobile. He blows on
+his drawing a few times to get rid of any
+dust left by the pencil © Musée d’art
+et d’histoire, Neuchâtel
+
+Figure 1.2: The Writer, by Henri
+Louis Jaquet-Droz, 1774 (inv AA2).
+This automaton has the most complex
+mechanism. It is programmable, and can
+write any text of 40 signs covering three lines
+© Musée d’art et d’histoire, Neuchâtel
+The Man-Machine 21
+
+20 cf L Mumford , Technics and Civilization ( New York City , Harcourt , Brace &Co , 1934 ) . 21 JO de La Mettrie , A Thomson(ed and tr), Machine Man and Other Writings ( Cambridge ,
+Cambridge University Press 1996 ) .
+
+Hobbes states:
+
+For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal
+part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves
+by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artifi cial life ?
+
+‘ As doth a watch ’ : this object — the automaton par excellence— captured
+the imagination of the West from the late Middle Ages to the industrial
+era because it reproduced on a human scale what God the watchmaker
+created. 20 Astronomical clocks could even be found hanging in cathedrals,
+for example in Strasbourg. The whole of creation was represented as a vast
+clockwork mechanism driven by a play of weights and energetics which
+classical physics would attempt to explain.
+Hobbes ’ s argument at this point takes a new direction. Man imitates God
+by creating automata, but that is because he is himself an automaton, created
+by the Great Watchmaker: ‘ For what is the heart, but a spring; and
+the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving
+motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artifi cer ? ’This
+reversal of agency resembles the logic of those who argue today that the
+human brain works like a computer because the computer is modelled on
+certain faculties of the brain. What underlies the famous Treatise on the
+Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil
+(the subtitle of Leviathan) is thus not simply a metaphor, but a real physical
+anthropology of the man-machine. This fi gure had precedents in the
+sixteenth century, for example in Ambroise Par é ’ s medical works, and in the
+eighteenth century a more radical version emerged with de la Mettrie, who
+declared that ‘ we are like a watch which says, “ What! Was I made by that
+stupid workman, I who can divide up time, who can indicate so precisely
+the sun ’ s course, who can say out loud the hours which I indicate! No, that
+is impossible ” . ’ 21
+After establishing a continuum between man, animal and machine,
+Hobbes takes one last step, to arrive at his conception of the state as an
+automaton made by man in his own image:
+
+Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of Nature,
+man.
+
+For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State
+(in Latin, Civitas), which is but an artifi cial man, though of greater stature and
+strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and
+in which
+22 In Search of a Machine of Government
+
+— the sovereignty is an artifi cial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole
+body;
+— the magistrates and other offi cers of judicature and execution, artifi cial joints;
+— reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty,
+every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do
+the same in the body natural;
+— the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength;
+— salus populi (the people ’ s safety) its business;
+— counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it,
+are the memory;
+— equity and laws, an artifi cial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness;
+and civil war, death.
+
+Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at
+fi rst made, set together, and united, resemble that fi at, or the Let us make man,
+pronounced by God in the Creation.
+
+In this seminal text, religion, law, science and technology are all summoned
+to give form to a normative imaginary which is still largely ours today,
+namely that of government as a machine.
+However, European societies went further than placing astronomical
+clocks in cathedrals, as images of God ’ s creation. In the medieval period,
+they also put them on the outside, on belfries and church towers, introducing
+a new organisation of working time, which followed the clock ’ s
+
+Figure 1.3: Astronomical Clock,
+Strasbourg Cathedral. The original
+fourteenth-century clock was replaced
+in the sixteenth century, and renovated
+in the fi rst half of the nineteenth
+century © David Iliff / WikiCommons
+The Man-Machine 23
+
+22 cf J Le Goff , Pour un autre Moyen  ge. Temps, travail et culture en Occident ( Paris ,
+Gallimard , 1977 ) 66ff . 23 Modern Times by Charlie Chaplin [1936] is an inspired and cruel criticism of the theory
+of the man-machine. On the perception by artists of the mechanisation of the human being
+more generally, see V Adam , A Caiozzo(ed) La Fabrique du corps humain: la machine mod è le
+du vivant ( Grenoble , CNRS MSH-Alpes , 2010 ) . 24 de La Mettrie, Machine Man (n 21). 25 S Weil , ‘ The experience of factory life ’( 1941 )in D Tuck McFarlandand W Van Ness(eds)
+Formative Writings, 1929 – 1941 ( Cambridge , Mass , Massachusetts University Press , 1987 ) .
+On the distinction between cadence and rhythm in Simone Weil ’ s thought, see A Supiot ‘ La
+pens é e juridique de Simone Weil ’in M é langes àla m é moire de Yota Kravaritou: a trilingual
+tribute (Brussels, ETUI, 2010).
+
+mechanical movements and gradually diverged from natural rhythms. 22
+The culmination of this new way of governing human beings is represented
+by Taylorism. The industrial worker of Chaplin ’ s Modern Times is nothing
+but a set of physical forces enslaved to the cadence of the production line. 23
+His body is utterly dominated by the model of the clock, dear to Hobbes
+and de La Mettrie. 24 ‘ Machine operators, ’Simone Weil observed,
+
+do not reach the required cadence unless even their smallest gestures succeed one
+another in an uninterrupted sequence and almost like the tick-tock of a clock,
+without anything marking that one thing is fi nished and something else is beginning.
+Workers are obliged to reproduce with their bodies this tick-tock, which is
+so dreary and monotonous that one cannot bear to listen to it for long. 25
+
+Figure 1.4: A detail of the
+mechanism for the perpetual
+calendar (or Gregorian computus),
+at the bottom left of the clock
+© Fryderyk / WikiCommons
+24 In Search of a Machine of Government
+
+26 cf the etymology of the French m é tiers (trades), which were called myst è res (mysteries)
+up to the eighteenth century, as Marx reminds us in Capital, Book I, Ch XV, para 9. 27 See below, ch 12 , p 229ff. 28 cf P Breton , Une histoire de l ’ informatique ( Paris , La D é couverte , 1987 ; republished by
+Le Seuil , 1990 ) . 29 C Castoriadis , The Imaginary Institution of Society, tr K Blamey , ( Cambridge , Mass, MIT
+Press , 1998 ) 99 – 100 . 30 cf S Weil( 1937 ) ‘ La rationalisation ’in La Condition ouvri è re ( Paris , Gallimard , 1964 )
+289ff ; B Trentin , La citt àdel lavoro. Sinistra e crisi del fordismo ( Milan, Feltrinelli , 1997 ) .
+
+As an object of ‘ scientifi c organisation ’ , work is reduced to a succession
+of simple and measurable gestures. Occupational qualifi cations and their
+mysteries must dissolve into the transparent functioning of the factory. 26
+Work is here reduced to its most basic expression, not; that of a beast of
+burden. In the industrial-era factory, the worker was deprived of a truly
+human experience of work, which consists of realising something one has
+oneself conceived. 27
+After this physical model of the clock, which encouraged a vision of
+human beings as themselves machines, there appeared in the nineteenth
+century the biological model of natural selection, which inspired Social
+Darwinism and continues to take its toll in the form of neoliberalism and
+the competition of all against all. To these fi gures, which are cumulative
+rather than cancelling each other out, we can add ‘ programmable man ’ ,
+produced by cybernetics and the information revolution. Its model is not the
+clock, with its interplay of forces and cogs, but rather the computer, with
+its digital processing of signals. The computer responds to programmes, not
+laws. It embodies the externalisation of some of the faculties of the human
+brain, and represents a new era in our relation to machines, as well as in the
+content and organisation of work. 28
+This reifi ed concept of work expresses a social imaginary typical of
+modern times. Its potentially delusional dimension has been magnifi cently
+described by Castoriadis:
+
+To treat a person as a thing or as a purely mechanical system is not less but
+more imaginary than claiming to see him as an owl; it represents an even deeper
+dive into the imaginary. For not only is the real kinship between a man and
+an owl incomparably greater than it is with a machine, but also no primitive
+society ever applied the consequences of its assimilations of people with other
+things as radically as modern industry does with its metaphor of the human
+automaton. Primitive societies always seem to preserve a certain duplicity in
+these assimilations, but modern society in its practice takes them literally, in
+the most brutal ways. 29
+
+Although this fascination for the technical rationalisation of work was
+criticised by the most clear-sighted thinkers, 30 it was the Left ’ s ideological
+backbone for over a century, and had this in common with the neoliberal
+Right. Not only did the majority of the Left adhere to the imaginary
+representation of the man-automaton, and the supposed techno-scientifi c
+From Government to Governance 25
+
+31 Cited by J Querzola ‘ Le chef d ’ orchestre àla main de fer. L é ninisme et taylorisme ’in
+(1978) Recherches, Le Soldat du travail, 32/33, 58. 32 Lenin (1902) What is to be done ? , cited by Querzola, ‘ Le chef d ’ orchestre ’(n 31) 70. 33 Trentin, La citt àdel lavoro (n 30) 246. 34 E J ü nger (1932) Der Arbeiter. See, similarly, Marcel Gauchet ’ s summary of the heritage
+of the First World War:
+‘ an individual who consummates his existence by being unattached, fi nding all grounds
+within himself, shouldering the law which binds the whole, to the point of self-sacrifi ce [ … ].
+This is why the fi gure of sacrifi ce is a legacy made by war to peace which is much more dangerous,
+in reality, than is the issue of “ brutalization ” , which has dominated recent research ’ .
+( M Gauchet( 2000 ) ‘ L ’ Av è nement de la d é mocratie ’in Àl ’ é preuve des totalitarismes
+(1914 – 1974) ( Paris , Gallimard , 2010 )vol 3, 47.
+35 On this point, see L Mumford , Technics and Civilization ( New York City , Harcourt ,
+Brace &Co , 1934 ) .
+
+rationality of the organisation of work, but it also applauded the idea of
+extending this model of corporate governance to the whole of society.
+Lenin regarded Taylorism as ‘ an immense scientifi c progress ’ ,
+31 and in his
+view one could consider the Bolshevik Revolution to have achieved its ends
+when ‘ the whole society [would] be nothing but a single offi ce, a single
+workshop. ’ 32 Bruno Trentin describes the human being produced by this
+ideology shared by the Left and the Right as ‘ a new subject, conscious of
+the limits “ technology ”and the organisation of labour impose, and capable
+of assuming them voluntarily; capable also, for that very reason, of being
+in some sense more conscious and freer. ’ 33 One cannot help thinking here
+of Ernst J ü nger ’ s depiction of the worker after the First World War, who
+was heir to the industrial management of man tested out in the trenches,
+and whose only freedom was total self-sacrifi ce on the altar of the party
+or the market. 34 This shared imaginary helps explain the unholy union of
+communism and capitalism which we have witnessed in China and in postenlargement
+Europe, and it can also make sense of the general approval
+given the idea of importing into the public sphere the management techniques
+used in the business world.
+
+III. FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE
+
+The desire to apply the supposedly scientifi c methods of the organisation
+of work beyond the factory to the whole of society has by no means disappeared
+today, but the reference has changed. The physico-mechanical model
+of the clock, 35 linked to the idea of the reign of the law, has been supplanted
+by the cybernetic model of the computer. The organisation of work is no
+longer conceived as a machine controlled by the play of weights and forces,
+in which workers are no more than cogs, but as a programmable system
+of interacting units adjusting automatically to signal inputs and feedback.
+This model was welcomed across the political spectrum, and imported into
+26 In Search of a Machine of Government
+
+36 See below, ch 8 , p 153ff. 37 N Wiener , Cybernetics and society. The human use of human beings [ 1950 ] ( London , Free
+Association Books , 1989 ) 26 – 27 . 38 cf G Hermet , ‘ Un r é gime àpluralisme limit é ? Àpropos de la gouvernance d é mocratique ’
+( 2004 ) 54 Revue fran ç aise de science politique, 1 159 – 78 .
+
+state institutions at all levels under the name of New Public Management, 36
+a doctrine which would certainly have been applauded by the brains behind
+the Gosplan.
+It was one of the founding fathers of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, who
+fi rst had the idea of projecting this mode of functioning onto society as a
+whole. He described this in a work published in 1950 called Cybernetics
+and Society, whose sub-title, ‘ The human use of human beings’ , already
+spoke volumes:
+
+It is my thesis that the physical functioning of the living individual and the operation
+of some of the newer communication machines are precisely parallel in their
+analogous attempts to control entropy through feedback. Both of them have sensory
+receptors as one stage in their cycle of operation: that is, in both of them
+there exists a special apparatus for collecting information from the outer world at
+low energy levels, and for making it available in the operation of the individual
+or of the machine. In both cases these external messages are not taken neat, but
+through the internal transforming powers of the apparatus, whether it be alive or
+dead. The information is then turned into a new form available for the further
+stages of performance.
+
+In both the animal and the machine this performance is made to be effective on the
+outer world. In both of them, their performed action on the outer world, and not
+merely their intended action, is reported back to the central regulatory apparatus.
+
+This complex of behavior is ignored by the average man, and in particular does
+not play the role that it should in our habitual analysis of society; for just as individual
+physical responses may be seen from this point of view, so may the organic
+responses of society itself.37 (emphasis added)
+
+This text is particularly useful for understanding the transition from government
+to governance (or rules to regulation) in the institutional vocabulary of
+the last 30 years. Contrary to ‘ government ’ , which implies a law which must
+be obeyed, ‘ governance ’rests on the capacity of human beings to adapt their
+behaviour to changes in their environment, in order to survive.
+
+***
+
+Historically, the French term gouvernance appeared in the thirteenth century
+to refer to the art of governing. It was subsequently transplanted into
+English, and then taken back into French charged with a new meaning. 38
+In its modern sense, it was fi rst used to challenge the power of senior managers,
+through what would become the doctrine of corporate governance.
+The famous economist Ronald Coase had already laid the theoretical bases
+From Government to Governance 27
+
+39 R Coase , ‘ The nature of the fi rm ’( 1937 ) 4 , Economica, 16, 386 – 405 . 40 The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London, Professional Publishing Ltd,
+1992) www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf . 41 See the updated version published by the OCDE , Principles of Corporate Governance
+( Paris , OECD , 2004 ) 66 . 42 ‘ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,
+Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union — A
+Plan to Move Forward ’COM(2003) 284 fi nal. 43 cf P Bissara , ‘ Les v é ritables enjeux du d é bat sur le gouvernement d ’ entreprise ’( 1998 )
+Revue des soci é t é s 5 ; B Bruhnes , ‘ R é fl exions sur la gouvernance ’( 2001 ) Droit social, 115 – 19 ;
+P Charl é ty , ‘ Le gouvernement d ’ entreprise: é volution en France depuis le rapport Vi é not de
+1995 ’( 2001 ) Revue d ’ é conomie fi nanci è re, 63, 25 – 34 . 44 The increasing power of this technostructure in industry was identifi ed by J K Galbraith ,
+The New Industrial State ( Boston , Houghton Miffl in Company Boston , 1967 ) . 45 On this new conception and its impact on labour law, see E Peskine , R é seaux d ’ entreprises
+et droit du travail ( Paris , LGDJ , 2008 ) . 46 On the place which these stakeholders ought to occupy in corporate ‘ governance ’ ,
+see S Deakinand A Hughes(eds) Enterprise and Community: New Directions in Corporate
+Governance ( Oxford, Blackwell , 1997 ) . 47 A Berque , Histoire de l ’ habitat id é al. De l ’ Orient vers l ’ Occident ( Paris , É ditions du F é lin ,
+2010 ) 347ff .
+
+of this doctrine in a famous article of 1937 on the nature of the fi rm, 39 and
+its principles were expounded in the Cadbury Report of 1992, 40 by the
+OECD in 1998, 41 and then by the European Commission. 42 In France it
+was imported via the Rapport Vi é not (1995), which was behind the French
+reforms of company law adopted at the end of the 1990s. 43 Corporate governance
+in practice made the fi rm ’ s fi nancial performance into the criterion
+for management decisions, and adjusted the forms of organisation of
+work to ‘ value creation ’for shareholders, with the result that calculations
+of fi nancial interest overrode all other rationales.
+By linking top managers ’pay to the company ’ s fi nancial performance,
+corporate governance called a halt to the autonomisation of the power of
+the ‘ techno-structure ’ , as John Galbraith called it. 44 The Fordist organisation
+was a hierarchical, integrated structure, which obeyed a logic of technical
+rationality. It prevailed during the post-war boom years, and provided
+factory workers with economic security. Corporate governance, by contrast,
+thinks in terms of networked units of value creation, 45 which obey the logics
+of the information and communication technologies, and where a worker ’ s
+motivation is supposed to spring from the maximisation of his or her fi nancial
+interest.
+Work has no place in this new conception of the company, for which
+only shareholders and stakeholders exist. Employees are stakeholders, not
+because they work or as workers (such terms are banished from the language
+of governance), 46 but because they possess a ‘ human resource ’or a
+‘ human capital ’ . To borrow an expression used by Augustin Berque in a
+different context, the ‘ foreclusion of work ’ 47 has replaced the industrial
+era ’ s ‘ reifi cation of work ’ . Under Taylorism, work was divided between a
+small number of people paid to think and the vast mass of workers who
+28 In Search of a Machine of Government
+
+48 cf Wiener, Cybernetics and Society (n 37). See, for a similar argument, Amartya Sen ’ s use
+of this notion in Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1992). 49 World Bank , ‘ From crisis to sustainable growth — sub-Saharan Africa: a long-term perspective
+study ’( Washington , 1989 ) ; ‘ Governance and Development ’(Washington, 1992). 50 International Monetary Fund , ‘ Good Governance : The IMF ’ s Role ’( Washington , IMF
+Publications , 1997 ) . 51 JE Stiglitz , Globalization and its Discontents (New York City, Norton , 2002 ) . Similarly,
+M Mahmoud Mohamed Salah , L ’ Irruption des droits de l ’ homme dans l ’ ordre é conomique
+international. Mythe ou r é alit é ? ( Paris , LGDJ , 2012 ) 21ff . 52 The Eurolex database turns up 205 texts with ‘ governance ’in the title, of which 27 are
+regulatory texts (consulted on 10 April 2013).
+
+were forbidden to do so, who were simply machines for obeying orders.
+This division of labour disappears in the cybernetic universe of governance,
+where all work is ‘ functioning ’ ,
+48 more specifi cally the functioning of
+a communication machine programmed to always optimise performance.
+It is these real performances, measured quantitatively in terms of fi nancial
+results, which have become the criterion of good governance, rather than
+respect for the law.
+
+***
+
+The notion of governance in this sense was adopted at the end of the last
+century by international economic organisations (the World Bank 49 and the
+IMF), 50 who imposed this business model on ‘ developing ’countries fi rst
+through structural adjustment plans, and later through poverty reduction
+strategies. The ‘ good governance ’championed by these organisations works
+out in practice as a drastic shrinkage of the state, particularly in the areas of
+culture and welfare, and the burgeoning of the private sector and ‘ civil society
+’ . As Joseph Stiglitz, the former Vice-President and Chief Economist of
+the World Bank from 1997 to 2000 confessed, structural adjustment plans
+were never anything other than forcing developing countries to serve the
+fi nancial interests of the industrialised countries. 51
+The notion of ‘ governance ’also overrun the vocabulary of the EU at about
+the same time. 52 It cropped up in all sorts of contexts: the EU ’ s legal system
+as a whole; its economic and taxation policies; its statistics; international
+institutions; relations with developing counties; aviation; new technologies;
+the environment; and more. The notion ’ s crowning triumph, whereby it
+jumped to the top of the hierarchy of European legal instruments, was represented
+by the coming into force of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination
+and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, on 1 January 2013.
+This was the Treaty which the then candidate for the French Presidency,
+Fran ç ois Hollande, vowed never to ratify as it stood — which did not prevent
+him doing just that as soon as he came to power. But this makes perfect
+sense, because governance, implemented as programmes of self-adjustment
+to received signals in real time, is incompatible with keeping one ’ s word.
+From Government to Governance 29
+
+More generally, the terms of ‘governance’ tend to replace those of
+‘government’, 53 as Table 1below shows:
+
+Table 1:The political vocabulary of government replaced by the terminology of
+management
+
+Government Governance
+
+people civil society
+
+sovereignty subsidiarity
+
+territory space
+
+law programme
+
+freedom fl exibility
+
+morals ethics
+
+justice effi ciency
+
+judgment evaluation
+
+rule objective
+
+rulings regulation
+
+representation transparency
+
+worker human capital
+
+qualifi cation employability
+
+trade unions social partners
+
+collective bargaining social dialogue
+
+Where ‘ government ’relies on subordinating individuals, ‘ governance ’ , in
+line with its cybernetic vision, relies on programming them. This shift was
+already visible in the text by Norbert Wiener cited above, in the opposition
+he drew between performed action and intended action. The subordinated
+worker obeys the rules he is given, whereas the programmed worker reacts
+to the information reaching him from his environment. This move from subordination
+to programme is absolutely central to our contemporary representation
+of human action. Unlike plans, which suppose the heteronomous
+intervention of a planner, programmes are homeostatic and auto-referential
+systems. This explains their success in biology, where genetic programmes
+have put a salutary end to divine plans, and in management, as a way of getting
+around the question of who governs. Today, the media do not explain
+a politician ’ s or a political party ’ s policies in terms of their ideology or their
+principles, but instead they talk about them being ‘ hard-wired ’to do something,
+having it ‘ in their DNA ’ .
+
+53 cf C Gobin , ‘ Le discours programmatique de l ’ Union europ é enne. D ’ une privatisation de
+l ’ é conomie àune privatisation du politique ’( 2002 ) Sciences de la soci é t é , 55, 157 – 69 ; Hermet,
+‘ Un r é gime àpluralisme limit é ? ’(n 58) 167 – 68.
+30 In Search of a Machine of Government
+
+The myth of a being created by man in his own image to satisfy his needs
+and desires is nothing new. But it is only in the West and in modern times
+that this imaginary has inspired technology, from the construction of the
+fi rst automata to the industrial universe represented by Fritz Lang or Charlie
+Chaplin, and more recently the world of information technology. In an illuminating
+book on these creatures made in the image of man, the historian
+of technology Philippe Breton has sketched the fi liation from Pygmalion and
+Galatea in Greek mythology, or the Golem in the Talmudic tradition, through
+to contemporary computers and robots. 54 Leviathan is not mentioned, but
+it would rightfully have a place in this lineage alongside the fi rst automata
+and androids of the Renaissance. With it, everything is already in place:
+legal rules are assimilated to the biological regulation of a ‘ political body ’ ,
+and this ‘ body ’is itself reducible to a machine. The many offspring of this
+machine of government could also be added to the list: the Jacobin Republic,
+the monstrous machine of the totalitarian state, which massacres innocents,
+like Frankenstein ’ s creature, and the nurturing fi gure of the welfare state,
+which should satisfy all man ’ s needs. The youngest offspring would be the
+decidedly contemporary fi gure of the pre-programmed homeostatic machine,
+capable of self-regulation through feedback (in response to the ‘ nerves ’of this
+machine-body, which are punishment and reward). The machine of government
+has abandoned the model of the clock and adopted that of the computer,
+an acephalous machine in which the locus of power is unidentifi able,
+in which regulation replaces rules, and governance replaces government. The
+digital revolution thus accompanies the revolution in law, in which an ideal of
+governance by numbers tends increasingly to supplant government by laws.
+Hobbes ’ s machine of government, modelled on the automaton, was ruled
+by infl exible laws similar to Galileo ’ s laws of physics. Today, its cybernetic
+equivalent is ruled not by laws but by programmes which ensure homeostasis 55
+according to a self-regulatory mechanism similar to that of a biological
+organism or a computer. The replacement of government by governance is
+an expression of this new, cybernetic imaginary, and marks both a break
+with the ideal of the law ’ s supremacy, and a continuity. A break, because law
+loses its sovereign status and becomes simply an instrument for the realisation
+of programmes; but also a continuity, because governance comes closest to
+the ideal of a res publica protected from the arbitrariness of human will —
+including the will of the majority, that is, democracy. As such, the consecration
+of governance in the form of programming and programmes resonates
+with another dream pursued by the West, that of socio-political harmony as a
+calculable outcome. By focusing fi rst on these two elements of continuity, we
+shall gain a better understanding of the dynamics and scope of governance by
+numbers, as well as the inevitable failure of its proposed solutions.
+
+54 P Breton , Àl ’ image de l ’ homme. Du Golem aux cr é atures virtuelles ( Paris , Le Seuil , 1998 ) . 55 On this concept, see G Simondon , On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects [ 1958 ],
+tr C Malaspina( Minnesota UP , Univocal Publishing , 2016 ) .
+1 J-J Rousseau , ‘ Eighth Letter ’in Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written from the Mountain,
+and Related Writings, eds C Kellyand E Grace , tr C Kellyand JR Bush , Collected Writings of
+Rousseau Series, Volume 9 ( Lebanon, NH, University Press of New England , 2013 ) .
+
+2
+
+The Fortunes of an Ideal:
+Ruling by Law
+
+‘ For wherever in a State the law is subservient and impotent, over that State
+I see ruin impending; but wherever the law is lord over the rulers, and the rulers
+are servants to the law, there I see salvation and all the blessings that the
+gods bestow on States. ’
+
+Plato, The Laws
+
+I
+T HAS OFTEN been argued that we need to consent to general and
+abstract laws in order to be freed from bonds of personal dependence.
+The most eloquent defendant of this ideal of rule by laws was
+Rousseau, who, on the eve of the French and American Revolutions,
+declared that: ‘ A free people obeys, but it does not serve, it has leaders, but
+no masters; it obeys the laws, but it obeys only the laws, and it is due to the
+strength of the laws that it is not forced to obey men. All the boundaries set
+on the power of Magistrates in a Republic are fi xed only to protect from
+their attacks the sacred precinct of the law. A people is free, whatever form
+its government takes, when it sees in him who governs not a man but the
+organ of the law. In a word, liberty always follows the fate of the laws, it
+reigns or perishes with them. I know of nothing more certain. ’ 1 Scarcely
+two decades later, this desire to be governed not by men but by laws was a
+cornerstone of the fi rst modern Constitutions. In the pioneering example of
+the State of Massachusetts (1780), the principle of the separation of powers
+was introduced ‘ to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men ’ .
+This end also inspired the Constitution of the French Republic, as informed
+by Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
+(1789): ‘ Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right
+to participate personally, or through his representative, in its foundation.
+It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. ’
+32 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+2 Plato , Laws, 715d – e, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols 10 &11 , tr RG Bury( Cambridge ,
+Mass, Harvard University Press ; London, William Heinemann Ltd , 1967 &1968 )[ tr mod]. 3 cf M D é tienne , Comment ê tre autochtone. Du pur Ath é nien au Fran ç ais racin é ( Paris ,
+Le Seuil , 2003 ) . 4 On the conditions in which law in this modern sense was ‘ discovered ’in Ancient Greece,
+and on some of its faltering fi rst steps, see J de Romilly , La Loi dans la pens é e grecque ( Paris ,
+Les Belles Lettres , 1971 ) . 5 C Moss é , ‘ Comment s ’ é labore un mythe politique : Solon, “ p è re fondateur ”de la d é mocratie
+ath é nienne ’( 1979 ) Annales ESC 3, 425 – 37 .
+
+The goal of ruling by laws was nothing new, and went back to the Greek
+ideal of a state in which, as Plato wrote some 2,000 years before Rousseau,
+those who govern are servants to the law:
+
+And those who are termed ‘ magistrates ’I have now called ‘ ministers ’of the laws,
+not for the sake of coining a new phrase, but in the belief that salvation, or ruin,
+for a State hangs upon nothing so much as this. For wherever in a State the law is
+subservient and impotent, over that State I see ruin impending; but wherever the
+law is lord over the rulers, and the rulers are servants to the law, there I see salvation
+and all the blessings that the gods bestow on States. ’ 2
+
+The machine of government is the outcome, over many centuries, of the
+sedimented interpretations of this Greek ideal. In order to understand our
+current situation, in which law no longer rules because it is once again a
+servant, this time serving the calculations of a machine, we must briefl y
+review the main stages which have led us to this pass.
+
+I. THE GREEK NOMOS
+
+Some years ago, Marcel D é tienne rightly drew attention to our tendency
+to mythologise our Greek roots, 3 but despite this justifi ed criticism, Greece
+remains the place where a state fi rst realised the ideal of freely endowing
+itself with laws. 4
+Writing brought with it the possibility of making laws out of the rules of
+coexistence which until then had circulated orally and were relatively unenforceable.
+The founding laws of the Greek city states, which the great lawgivers
+like Lycurgus and Solon had drawn up, were called Rhetra ( ῥήτρα) in
+Sparta and Thesmos (θεσµ ός) in Athens. Rhetra is related to the verb for ‘ to
+say ’ , and Thesmos to the verb ‘ to lay down ’ , ‘ to institute ’ . Nomos ( νόµ ος)
+replaced Thesmos in the fi fth and sixth century BC, when Athens became
+a democracy, and the laws imposed externally were replaced by laws with
+which the citizens endowed themselves. Nomos was therefore associated
+with the idea of the rule of law, which for the Greeks was synonymous with
+democracy. 5 This was the ideal later upheld by Plato, that of a government
+where ‘ Law became …supreme king over men instead of men being despots
+The Greek Nomos 33
+
+6 Plato Letters, Letter 8 [354c]. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol 7, tr RG Bury (Cambridge,
+Mass, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1966). 7 C Meier , ‘ Essais et conf é rences du Coll è ge de France ’in Introduction àl ’ anthropologie
+politique de l ’ Antiquit éclassique ( Paris , PUF , 1984 ) 28ff . 8 Meier ‘ Essais et conf é rences du Coll è ge de France ’(n 7) 30.
+
+over the laws ’ .
+6 Nomos, from the verb nem ô , ‘ to share ’ , had previously
+
+referred to a wide range of ritual and aesthetic rules. In its new guise, it
+contained a tension between what is prescribed (an ideal order) and what is
+described (customs observed in practice). This tension would appear to be
+inherent in the very idea of human law. It is found in every historical period,
+down to this very day.
+Unlike the modern era, which ended up conceiving the political realm
+exclusively in terms of power, the Greeks fi rst conceived it in terms of a just
+order. In the sixth century BC, Greek political thought centred on the concept
+of nomos, and the opposition between Eunomia ( Εὐνοµ ία), the ideal
+of a well-ordered state, and Dysnomia ( Δυσνοµ ία), the rule of injustice and
+excess. Each of these poles was embodied by a goddess, who presided over
+the state. Equality between citizens gradually became integral to the idea
+of a just order, and gave rise to the concept of Isonomia ( ἰσονοµ ία). 7 There
+emerged in the ensuing century the idea that a state ’ s organisation is decided
+by whoever governs it, and with that the goddess Eunomia developed gradually
+into a concept. This was when ‘ cratistic ’constitutional terms emerged,
+to differentiate states according to their form of power ( cratos): monarchy;
+oligarchy; aristocracy; and democracy. In Christian Meier ’ s analysis, this
+change in vocabulary implied a change in awareness: citizens discovered
+that a just order is not something preordained on which one has no purchase,
+but that they themselves can decide under what sort of rule they wish
+to live. 8 From then onwards, Nomos took on the meaning of law in the
+modern sense, that is, a law made by and for the citizens.
+Since this was an entirely human law, the question of the source of its
+binding effect — that is, the authority on which it drew, which secured it
+obligatory character — was quick to emerge. Obviously, the question had
+not arisen as long as laws were deemed to have a supernatural origin, but as
+soon as they were recognised as a human invention, they lost their ultimate
+surety and became open to change and relativity. Legal thought soon seized
+upon the possibility — which was to haunt it throughout its history — that
+higher, unwritten laws might exist, to which everyone must bow even if they
+were contradicted by a human law-giver. This was the theme played out by
+Antigone in her struggle against Creon, when she claimed that every human
+being should receive due burial rites in the name of the ‘ unwritten, unwavering
+laws of the gods ’ .
+Today we no longer invoke the gods, but instead the sacred rights of the
+human being, which underpin the right to resist oppression, and which,
+34 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+9 Herodotus , The Histories, tr AD Godley( Cambridge , Mass, Harvard University Press ,
+1920 ) , Bk III, Ch 38, ss 3 – 4; H é rodote , L ’ Enqu ê te, III, 38 , in Œ uvres compl è tes ( Paris ,
+Gallimard , coll ‘ Biblioth è que de la Pl é iade ’ , 1964 ) 235 – 36 . 10 The French term ‘ l’ interdit’has the primary sense of a ‘ prohibition ’or ‘ interdiction ’ , and
+carries the additional meaning of something ‘ said-between ’( inter-dit from the verb ‘ dire’ , to
+say). Law as ‘ inter-diction ’thus both separates and mediates, making possible the space of
+shared meaning necessary for the creation of the social bond. See my Homo Juridicus. On the
+Anthropological Function of the Law, tr. S Brown( London , Verso Books , 2007 ) . 11 Aristotle , Ethics, tr JAK Thomson , revised by H Tredennick( London , Penguin , 1976 )
+[ tr mod].
+
+since they are without statutory limitations, can prevent someone hiding
+behind the laws in force in order to escape prosecution. This right was contained
+in the American Declaration of Independence (1776), and reappeared
+in Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789),
+thus forming part of today ’ s Constitutional laws in France.
+We cannot help noticing, however, that the authors of the American Declaration
+had no qualms about racial legislation, and had no intention of
+conferring on their slaves the same rights of resistance as they did on themselves.
+In other words, they gave legitimacy to legal rules which Article 7 of
+the Rome Statute, which instituted the International Criminal Court, qualifi
+es today as crimes against humanity. The regime of ‘ indig é nat’which the
+French Republic applied in its colonies, and the eugenicist legislation which
+remained in force in northern countries well after the Second World War,
+encounter the same problem: that however eternal and sacred the human
+laws laid down claim to be, they have no absolute authority. They may
+contradict each other, and change, and their legitimacy is thus only relative.
+It is well known that Montesquieu devoted a large part of his work to the
+relativity of laws. But long before him, Herodotus, who can indisputably be
+called the founding father of comparative law, made similar observations.
+Throughout his wanderings, which provided him with the subject matter
+of his Enquiry (his Histories), he noted down and passed judgement on the
+different laws he encountered in the countries he travelled through. He came
+to a ground-breaking conclusion: the very same people who habitually eat
+their fathers ’dead bodies are repelled by the idea of burning them. And vice
+versa. 9 Universally, the relativity of laws goes hand in hand, in human societies,
+with the law ’ s anthropological function of inter-diction. 10
+The idea of the relativity of laws was taken up by the Sophists in their
+claim that the real laws, unlike these artifi cial ones, were the laws of nature.
+In their wake, generations of philosophers and jurists attempted to measure
+the legal order ’ s legitimacy against the order of nature. Nature, indeed — but
+which nature ?Aristotle wrote that natural justice, in contradistinction to
+justice in law, ‘ has the same validity in all places, and does not depend on
+whether public opinion favours or rejects this value ’ .
+11 But what has the
+same validity everywhere, and does not depend on this or that opinion ?An
+order of the world, that is, a cosmic order which is beyond human will and
+The Greek Nomos 35
+
+12 Plato , Gorgias, Plato in Twelve Volumes, tr WRM Lamb( Cambridge , Mass, Harvard
+University Press ; London, William Heinemann Ltd 1967 )Vol 3, 483 c [ tr mod]. 13 Plato, Gorgias (n 12) 483 d. 14 cf F Ost , Sade et la Loi ( Paris , Odile Jacob , 2005 ) ; D-R Dufour , La Cit éperverse. Lib é ralisme
+et pornographie ( Paris , Deno ë l , 2009 ) . 15 DAF Marquis de Sade , L ’ Histoire de Juliette ou les prosp é rit é s du vice, Ve Partie , in
+Œ uvres compl è tes ( Paris , T ê te de feuille , 1973 ) vol 9 , 291 . 16 A Hitler , Libres propos sur la guerre et sur la paix, recueillis sur l ’ ordre de Martin
+Bormann( Paris , Flammarion , 1952 ) 51 and 69 .
+
+controls it ?Or the nature of man, driving him to impose his views and to
+seek to dominate his fellow men ?Are cosmic and human nature simply one
+and the same, with the only really universal law being the law of the jungle ?
+All these questions, which preoccupied the Greeks, are still with us today.
+Those who believe in the existence of a ‘ spontaneous order of the market ’ ,
+and who condemn in its name the ‘ mirage of social justice ’ , could repeat
+Callicles ’ s criticism of laws in Plato ’ s Gorgias without changing a word:
+‘ The pity is that the makers of the laws are the weaker sort of men, and the
+more numerous. ’ 12 Human law, which is founded on equality, is thus the
+weapon of the weak and the least capable, a weapon by means of which
+they avoid being subjected to the stronger and more capable, and even manage
+to subjugate these. Against such artifi ce, Callicles appeals to nature,
+in a Darwinistic claim which was to have a notable legacy: ‘ but nature,
+in my opinion, herself proclaims the fact that this is what justice has been
+decided to be: that the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share
+than they ’ .
+13
+We should be careful not to lump together the many later advocates of
+this idea that the law of the strongest is true to the order of nature: Sade,
+Nietzsche and Hitler cannot be confl ated, no more so than Adam Smith,
+Darwin and Milton Friedman or Friedrich Hayek. However, this very range
+shows how powerfully seductive it has been to project onto the legal order
+what we think of as a ‘ natural ’order.
+Sade, whose relation to the law has been the subject of several recent
+books, 14 in a certain way took this projection to its limits in showing its
+deadly potential. Sade wrote:
+
+‘ If it is true that we resemble all the other productions of nature, if we have no
+greater worth than they, why should we continue believing that we are driven by
+different laws ?Are plants and animals acquainted with pity, social duties, brotherly
+love ?And can we fi nd in nature any supreme law other than that of egoism ? ’ 15
+
+There is no simple transition from philosophising in the boudoir to mass
+butchery, yet this was a step the twentieth century took. Notably Hitler,
+for whom ‘ natural resources, by virtue of an imminent law, belong to he
+who conquers them [ … ] This is in accordance with the laws of nature [ … ]
+The law of selection justifi es this unceasing struggle to enable the best to
+survive. ’ 16 What Hitler added to Sade was the reference to Darwin, that
+36 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+17 L Dumont , Homo æ qualis, vol I, Gen è se et é panouissement de l ’ id é ologie é conomique
+( Paris , Gallimard , 1977 ) . See Ch 5, ‘ La Fable des abeilles de Mandeville: l ’ é conomique et la
+moralit é ’83ff. 18 Dufour, La Cit éperverse (n 14).
+
+is, to a biological understanding of history. But Sade was not the fi rst to
+describe the ‘ supreme law ’of nature as egoism, and to have proclaimed
+that vices prosper and virtues suffer. This idea had already appeared in
+Bernard Mandeville ’ s Fable of the Bees, a short philosophical tale published
+in 1714 with the candid sub-title of ‘ Private vices, public benefi ts ’ . Louis
+Dumont has stressed the importance of this text in the emergence and success
+of contemporary economic ideology, 17 and more recently, Dany-Robert
+Dufour has shown convincingly that Sade did no more than expose the
+normative truth behind the idea that Kant ’ s categorical imperative could
+simply be put aside, and self-love and the instrumentalisation of others
+celebrated as the supreme law of a just order. 18
+
+***
+
+How did the Greeks attempt to resolve this crisis of legitimacy affecting
+democratic law ?Now that the law was no longer ultimately guaranteed by
+the gods, how could it avoid being enslaved to human passions and appetites,
+and ultimately treated as a simple tool wielded by the strongest ?The
+answers to this question varied from Socrates to Aristotle, but their common
+ground was that they appealed to human reason as a substitute for
+divine reason.
+For Socrates, human reason understands law as a kind of pact. Not an
+arbitrary, but a necessary pact, guaranteeing the survival of the state. Contrary
+to Enlightenment philosophers and Rawls, Socrates did not postulate
+an originary social contract, a sort of normative Big Bang from which
+the law must have issued. He regarded respect for the law (even if it was
+unjust) to be an obligation to be shouldered daily, a debt contracted simply
+by virtue of living in a law-governed state. Without this respect, the state
+would go to rack and ruin. And since Socrates formulates this principle
+in the Crito, when he is deciding whether to submit to or fl ee the death
+sentence which had been passed upon him, one can suggest that Socrates
+valued this respect for the law above his own life. Having witnessed this
+injustice, Plato can no longer adhere unreservedly to the ideal of government
+by laws. For him, what reason dictates is that law is a necessary evil;
+an imperfect, but indispensable instrument. There would be no need for
+laws in an ideal world because it would be governed by a perfect science, a
+royal science which along can reconcile the world of facts and that of ideas.
+This ideal order is the subject matter of Plato ’ s The Statesman, which is also
+The Greek Nomos 37
+
+19 See Leo Strauss ’ s extremely detailed gloss on The Laws in his The Argument and the
+Action of Plato ’ s Laws ( Chicago , University of Chicago Press , 1975 ) . 20 Aristotle . Politics. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol 21, 1269 a , tr H Rackham( Cambridge ,
+Mass, Harvard University Press ; London, William Heinemann Ltd , 1944 ) . 21 J-É -M Portalis , Preliminary Address on the First Draft of the [French] Civil Code ( 1801 ),
+tr R Singh , Montesquieu Law Review, University of Bordeaux , November 2016 . 22 See below, ch 5 , p 89ff . 23 The Enactments of Justinian. The Digest or Pandects, Book I, 1, ‘ Cujus merito quis
+nos sacerdotes appelet … ’ : ‘ Anyone may properly call us [jurists] the priests of this art, for
+
+a thorough-going critique of the imperfections of the law, in its inability to
+grasp the diversity of individual cases and changing situations. Yet Plato ’ s
+last treatise, the Laws, defends the sovereignty of the law. 19 For laws to
+constitute a bridge between the world of ideas and the human world, he
+argues, they must pursue the public interest, and be informed by the divine
+model which is revealed to humans through the exercise of reason. The law
+in this sense is what must reign in the city, whose leaders are no more than
+its guardians, or even its slaves.
+For Aristotle, by contrast, the authority of laws is based on the length of
+time they have been in use by the state, which is a sign of their soundness.
+Aristotle therefore refuses to assimilate the art of legislation to a technique
+of government. Whereas technical rules may change for greater effi ciency,
+the effi ciency of laws is measured by their stability. Aristotle wrote:
+
+The example from the case of the [mechanical] arts is a mistake as to change the
+practice of an art is a different thing from altering a law; for the law has no power
+to compel obedience beside the force of custom, and custom only grows up over
+a long lapse of time, so that lightly to change from the existing laws to other new
+laws is to weaken the power of the law. 20
+
+Aristotle would therefore condemn the idea of a ‘ machine of government ’ ,
+insofar as the law cannot be equated with a technique.
+The idea that the authority of laws depends on their stability still has its
+advocates today; for example in a famous passage from the Preliminary
+Address on the First Draft of the French Civil Code, Jean-Marie-Etienne
+Portalis claimed (although at the time he was himself involved in recasting
+the whole of French law) that one must
+
+be abstemious in terms of novelty in matters of legislation because, while it is possible,
+in a new institution, to calculate the advantages which theory may offer us,
+it is not possible to know all the disadvantages that practice alone can uncover;
+[ … ] that instead of changing laws, it is almost always more useful to present citizens
+with new reasons for liking them. 21 (emphasis added)
+
+This warning against enslaving laws to calculations of interest shows
+a premonition of governance by numbers, at a time when, just after the
+French Revolution, calculations of probability were fi rst being applied to
+social issues. 22 Like Plato, and also Ulpian, 23 Portalis regarded the art of
+38 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+we cultivate justice and profess to know what is good and equitable, dividing right from
+wrong, and distinguishing what is lawful from what is unlawful ’ , ed and tr SP Scott , The Civil
+Law, II( Cincinnati , The Central Trust Company, 1932 ) .
+24 Montesquieu uses this famous formula in Letter LXXIX of his Persian Letters, English
+translation, The Persian Letters ( London , Athenaeum Publishing Company , 1897 )[ tr mod]. Its
+fi rst sentence is also worth noting: ‘ Most legislators have been men of limited intellect, owing
+their elevated position to accident, and, in almost every case, guided by their prejudices and
+fancies. ’ 25 Demosthenes , Against Timocrates, with an English translation by AT Murray
+( Cambridge , Mass, Harvard University Press ; London, William Heinemann Ltd 1939 ) , s 24,
+139. 26 In France, this was the position held by Michel Villey , Philosophie du droit, vol 1, D é fi nitions
+et fi ns du droit, 3rd edn( Paris , Dalloz , 1982 ) 55f .
+
+law-making as a kind of sacred task mediating between the world of ideas
+and pure knowledge, on the one hand, and knowledge of the diversity
+of temperaments and the strength of habit on the other. The fi rst realm
+prompts us to ‘ calculate the advantages which theory may offer us ’ , whereas
+the second consideration prompts us to ‘ to touch laws only with trembling
+hands ’ .
+24 The fear which should grip the legislator in the exercise of his
+function was a theme already in Greek times. Demosthenes held up as an
+example to the Athenians the Locrian custom in which ‘ if a man wishes to
+propose a new law, he legislates with a halter round his neck. If the law is
+accepted as good and benefi cial, the proposer departs with his life, but, if
+not, the halter is drawn tight, and he is a dead man. ’ 25 What we see today is
+quite the inverse, with legislative hyperactivity and the imperative of ‘ publish
+or perish ’dictated to leaders and scholars alike.
+
+***
+
+Contemporary legal scholars tend to neglect what Greek thought contributes
+to our conception of the law. At best they note the few pages on ‘ particular
+justice ’in Aristotle ’ s Nicomachean Ethics, while abandoning all the
+rest as political philosophy, and thus as anathema to legal inquiry. 26 Yet
+even this extreme position cannot mask the extraordinary legal infl uence
+of the Greek ideal of the rule of law in the history of Western institutions.
+It is an ideal embodied in the very fi rst Constitutions and Declarations of
+Rights drawn up in the late eighteenth century, which laid the basis for
+legal orders which are still essentially ours today. So we cannot exclude the
+heritage of Greek philosophy from the ‘ science of law ’because, as Harold
+Berman rightly notes, legal positivism, natural law theory, the historical and
+sociological schools (and, one should add, the ‘ Law and Economics ’doctrine)
+cannot themselves explain the legal order, since they are all part of it.
+‘ The history of the Western legal tradition, ’Berman writes, ‘ is in part the
+tale of the emergence of, and the friction between, these different schools of
+Lex in Roman Law 39
+
+27 HJ Berman , Law and Revolution, the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
+( Cambridge , Mass , Harvard University Press , 2009 ) . 28 A Magdelain , La Loi àRome. Histoire d ’ un concept ( Paris , Les Belles Lettres , 1978 ) . 29 cf E Benveniste , Vocabulaire des institutions indo-europ é ennes [1969] vol 2, 111ff, translated
+as Dictionary of Indo-European Concepts and Society ( Chicago , Chicago University
+Press , 2016 ) ; A Magdelain , ‘ Le ius archa ï que ’in Ius, Imperium, Auctoritas. É tudes de droit
+romain ( Rome , É cole fran ç aise de Rome , 1990 ) 3ff . 30 T Mommsen , The History of Rome, 5vols, tr W Purdie Dickson( Cambridge , Cambridge
+University Press , 2010 )vol 1 [1861], Bk I, Ch12.
+
+philosophy of Law. They do not explain history because it is history which
+explains them, why they appeared and why certain schools predominated in
+such-and-such a place and in such-and-such a time. ’ 27 Projecting back onto
+our Greek heritage a ‘ pure ’conception of law, emptied of any political or
+philosophical dimension, is in fact a legacy of Roman Law.
+
+II. LEX IN ROMAN LAW
+
+Although the word lex has certainly come down to us from Rome, or through
+Latin, its etymology is the subject of much debate, and it has no equivalent
+in other Indo-European languages. We can suppose that lex comes from
+legere, which originally meant to pluck or gather, and later had the sense of
+reading (harvesting the writing ’ s meaning). The great Roman Law specialist,
+Andr éMagdelain, adopted this etymology, which has the additional advantage
+of clarifying the difference between lex and ius.
+28 The primary meaning
+of the word ius in Latin is an authoritative formula. Ius comes from the verb
+iurar meaning to swear, and ius dicere was the formula used to declare what
+the law is, what one must comply with. 29 In Archaic Rome, ius was a body
+of secret knowledge which circulated only between the pontiffs, because
+they alone were guardians of mos, the customs of the ancestors. The Roman
+civitas originally had two colleges of priests (sacred experts), the six augurs
+responsible for interpreting the signs sent via birds by the gods to humans,
+and the fi ve pontiffs ( pontifi ces). The pontiffs were responsible for assembling
+and dismantling the bridges over the Tiber, and were thus in the fi rst
+instance engineers, privy to the secrets of measurements and numbers. They
+had the associated duty of announcing the public calendar, and their legal
+expertise derived from their ability to tell dies fasti from dies nefasti. A third
+college, of the twenty fetiales, emerged later. Its members were the living
+memory of the treaties passed with neighbouring States, and they played a
+similar role regarding the ius gentium (international law) as did the pontiffs
+for the ius civilis. Despite their prestige (in their particular areas), the pontiffs,
+augurs and fetials were simply consultants, who only pronounced on
+what was asked of them, and had no potestas.
+30 The pontiffs prescribed rites
+(particularly sacrifi cial rites) to be performed in order to keep peace with
+40 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+31 P Noailles , Fas et Jus. É tudes de droit romain ( Paris , Les Belles Lettres , 1948 ) . 32 A Schiavone , Ius. L ’ invenzione del diritto in Occidente ( Turin , Einaudi , 2005 ) ; The Invention
+of Law in the West, tr J Cardenand A Shugaar( Cambridge , Mass, Harvard University
+Press , 2012 ) . 33 This famous episode is described by Marie Theres F ö genin R ö mische Rechtgeschichten.
+Ü ber Ursprung und Evolution eines sozialen Systems ( Göttingen, Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht ,
+2002 ) .
+
+the gods and between men. The precepts delivered consequently covered
+both the sacred ( fas) and the legal ( ius) domains, which were intertwined. 31
+The pater familias who wished to know what ius to follow in a particular
+circumstance, for example, what attitude and ritual words to observe in
+carrying out a particular act (claiming or disposing of a good, making a formal
+commitment, for instance), turned to the pontiffs, whose responsa took
+oracular form, were never justifi ed by reasons, and were always formulated
+in the imperative. The responsa were only valid for the case under consideration,
+but the pontiffs kept a record, and in their case-based reasoning,
+certain precedents, which they alone knew of, were endowed with authority.
+Like the responsa, the leges were formulated in the imperative and likewise
+belonged to the wider category of ius. But this ius was made public, promulgated
+or displayed, or both at once. The ritual of reading the lex was a
+condition of its validity, for royal edicts ( lex dicta), the consecration of temples
+( lex templi), the publication of treaties (the lex of foedus), or other legal
+acts. Only gradually did lex come to take on the meaning not of reading a
+text, but of the text itself. And only after the founding of the Republic was
+lex used to import the Greek nomos into Rome, together with its model of
+a state ruled by laws and by the principle of isonomia. This legal and democratic
+turning point was marked by the Law of the Twelve Tables, which
+was composed in 450 BC, inscribed in bronze, and erected on the Forum
+Romanum.
+However, as Aldo Schiavone has shown, 32 grafting the Greek model
+onto the Roman system never really worked because the rule of law had
+to contend with the legal expertise of the pontiffs. The pontiffs became
+the guardians of laws which they had not themselves proposed, but which
+they scrutinised closely with their acknowledged hermeneutic powers. This
+power passed into the hands of the (non-priestly) jurisconsults, after a freed
+scribe, Gnaeus Flavius, divulged the pontiffs ’secret knowledge in the midfi
+fth century BC, consisting of the law to be applied (statute law and case
+law), the formulae to be used and the calendar to be respected to bring an
+action before the judge. 33
+This is how ius incorporated lex, and could emerge as a technique stripped
+of its religious origins, and capable of being used in the most varied political
+organisations. One could suggest that this technique had a digestive function.
+It enabled the corpus iuris to digest a law ’ s content, whatever it was.
+It was a technique wielded by experts who claimed to be neutral regarding
+Lex in Roman Law 41
+
+34 On the development of procedure, see PF Girard , Manuel de droit romain, 5th edn( Paris ,
+Rousseau , 1911 ) 971ff . 35 Girard, Manuel de droit romain (n 34) 44. 36 Quoted by F ö gen (who takes this example from the Digest) (n 33) 175.
+
+its content and to apply it under rigorously codifi ed conditions. The law
+could give rise to an individual right only if the plaintiff was granted an
+action, and this was done by complying with certain formulae approved by
+the judge. 34
+The formulae, which originated in a typology of cases abstracted from
+their factual contexts, were a kind of social algebra, and the real keys to
+the law. Girard observed that your average Roman would have felt just as
+much at a loss attempting to apply the Twelve Tables to a concrete situation
+as we feel today when faced with a set of log tables. 35 However, despite its
+relevance, we should not be tempted to project back onto the past our contemporary
+distinction between form and content. Not only did the Romans
+have no algebra, but above all Roman law did not make the same clear-cut
+distinction which modern legal systems make between substantive law and
+procedural rules. Ius still confl ated them: it endowed the subject with a right
+to bring an action in a particular case. Respecting the forms accompanying
+each type of case was necessary for the performance of this ritual, even if
+this process also laid the groundwork for a technical conception of law as a
+pure form capable of adapting to any content whatsoever.
+The formulae obeyed strict compositional principles. Their structure
+could be divided into essential parts (which were specifi c to the type of
+action) and ancillary parts (dependent on the concrete characteristics of
+each case). The principle elements were the judge ’ s nominatio, the demonstratio
+(a clause stating the facts from which the claim arose), the intentio
+(the plaintiff ’ s statement of the claim or cause of action), the adjudicatio
+(which gave the judge the power to transfer property, in actions for division
+of common property) and the condemnatio (the instruction to the judge to
+make a decision). A very simple example of a formula, comprising only the
+three essential clauses of an action, looked like this: 36
+
+[NOMINATIO] So-and-so must be judge. [INTENTIO] If it is proven that
+A (the plaintiff) entrusted for safekeeping a silver table to B, and through the
+perfi dy of B the table was not returned, [CONDEMNATIO] you, judge, must
+condemn B to pay to A the sum which the object is worth. If it is not proven, you
+must acquit him.
+
+Litigants were obliged to use the set formulae, but the praetor could change
+these to extend their scope and include situations which had not been foreseen
+originally. This he did by adding a parameter which separated the precedents
+from the case under consideration. For example, he could invoke the
+notion of good faith ( bona fi des) if the custodian had a good reason for not
+42 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+37 L Dumont , Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective
+[ 1983 ] ( Chicago , University of Chicago Press , 1986 ) 227 . 38 E Kantorowicz, ‘ La royaut ém é di é vale sous l ’ impact d ’ une conception scientifi que
+du droit ’(ch 2, n 3). See also his Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite ( Berlin , Georg Bondi , 1927 ) ;
+tr ang. Frederick the Second, 1194 – 1250, tr EO Lorimer (New York City, Frederick Ungar
+Publishing Company, 1931).
+
+returning the table. Or he could change the person, in order to grant the
+ususfructuary (U) the actio civilis legis Aquili æ which was initially granted
+the owner (O) of something damaged by a third party. Thus U became
+admissible instead of O, giving rise to a new formula. Another method was
+to introduce a fi ctional element by behaving as though one of the formula ’ s
+conditions had been fulfi lled. This gave rise to an actio fi ctiti æ of the following
+sort:
+
+So and so should be appointed judge. The theme of the trial is that A (the plaintiff)
+entrusted a silver table to S, the slave of B. You, judge, must say what S — were he
+free — must give to A or perform for him on the basis of good faith, and sentence
+B in favour of A.
+
+In this type of system, an individual right was a right to an action in the
+procedural sense of the term: without a formula corresponding to the matter
+under dispute, no right could be claimed. To use a concept coined in a
+completely different context by Louis Dumont, 37 that of ‘ the encompassing
+of the contrary ’ , Roman law came into being when ius encompassed lex,
+and produced an extraordinarily successful paradigm, namely a legal order
+which was at once binding on those who governed and a tool in their hands.
+It was binding because it gave autonomy to the legal form and endowed
+those governed with enforceable individual rights; and it was a tool the powerful
+could wield because, unlike religious or scientifi c law, human law gives
+normative force to the human will and can be shaped and transformed by it.
+This paradigm certainly belongs to rule by laws, but unlike the Greek
+original, it cannot be identifi ed with any particular political regime. Once
+the law becomes a technique of government, it can function indifferently
+in a monarchy, an oligarchy or a democracy. Thus Pope Gregory VII, in
+the late eleventh century, could seize on this technique drawn from historical
+Roman Law when — as vicarius Christi (and not simply vicar of Saint
+Peter) — he claimed to be the living source of laws which were binding
+throughout Christendom.
+
+III. THE GREGORIAN REVOLUTION
+
+Contrary to received ideas, modern law did not emerge in the Renaissance,
+but at the height of the Middle Ages. Ernst Kantorowicz, 38
+The Gregorian Revolution 43
+
+39 P Legendre , La P é n é tration du droit romain dans le droit canonique classique, de Gratien
+àInnocent IV (1140 – 1254) ( Paris , Jouve , 1964 ) 144 ; and, by the same author, Les Enfants du
+Texte. Essai sur la fonction parentale des É tats (Paris, Fayard, 1992) 237ff. 40 Berman, Law and Revolution (n 27). 41 Berman, Law and Revolution (n 27). 42 E Faure , D é couverte de l ’ archipel [ 1932 ] ( Paris , Seuil , 1995 ) 217 . 43 P Anderson , Passages from Antiquity to feudalism ( London , NLB , 1974 ) . 44 cf T Berns , Souverainet é , droit et gouvernementalit é . Lectures du politique àpartir de
+Bodin ( Brussels , L é o Scheer , 2005 ) . On the particular importance of justice for medieval monarchies
+see R Colson , La Fonction de juger. É tude historique et positive ( C-F, Presses universitaires
+de Clermont-Ferrand , 2006 ) . 45 Bracton ( c 1210 – 68) De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae.
+
+Pierre Legendre 39 and Harold Berman 40 have all highlighted its medieval origins
+and its debt to the rediscovery of Roman law hybridised with canon law.
+What Berman has called the Gregorian Revolution occurred in the twelfth
+to thirteenth centuries, with its fi rst moment in 1075, when Pope Gregory
+VII proclaimed in his Dictatus papae: a) the divine source of the authority of
+the Church and the Pope; b) Papal supremacy over the whole Church; c) the
+Pope ’ s power to make new laws; d) the Pope ’ s supreme judicial authority;
+e) his independence from all temporal power; and f) his superior authority. 41
+The papacy had been ‘ the abstract continuation of Roman government
+in the West ’since the fall of the Empire, as Elie Faure puts it. 42 Since the
+Western Church was the bridge between Roman imperial institutions and
+feudal ones, 43 it could assert itself as an autonomous transnational entity
+with a separate legal personality, independent of any imperial, royal or
+feudal power.
+A new conception of legal systems emerged with this revolution, infl uenced
+by the distinction between temporal power and spiritual authority.
+Gregory VII ’ s claim to sovereignty over the government of the Church and
+the spiritual life of Christians uncoupled the previous intertwining of spiritual
+and temporal, and paved the way for recognition of temporal power,
+and for the rise of the modern state. Yet it would be inexact to think of the
+Holy See as itself the fi rst modern state. Unlike state power, its authority had
+no territorial limits, and was restricted to the salvation of the children of
+God (and hence, originally at least, to the personal status of individuals). In
+other words, it reigned over only a certain part of human life, the rest being
+in the hands of secular powers. These powers themselves adopted the model
+of government forged by Pope Gregory: a sovereign judge and legislator
+whom all must obey, and whose power transcends the generations.
+In this new model of government, the law was not simply an instrument
+of sovereign power, but actually its constitutive element. 44 Bracton, in the
+thirteenth century, was already claiming that ‘ The king must not be under
+man but under God and under the law, because the law makes the king,
+for there is no rex wherever will rules rather than lex’ .
+45 This means that it
+44 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+46 cf C Pornschlegel , ‘ La question du pouvoir dans les op é ras de Mozart ’in A Supiot(ed)
+Tisser le lien social ( Paris , FMSH , 2005 ) 149 – 62 . 47 cf F Oakley , The Mortgage of the Past. Reshaping the Ancient Political Inheritance
+(1050 – 1300) ( New Haven, Yale University Press , 2012 ), esp 161ff .
+
+is not because the will of the ruler is sovereign that it is the source of law.
+On the contrary, it is because it is the source of the law that this will is sovereign.
+The ruler cannot break the law without disqualifying his own sovereignty.
+Mozart put this theme to music in his opera Il Seraglio: although the
+Pasha Selim Bassa desires the beautiful Konstanze and has her at his mercy,
+he cannot use force against her without thereby destroying his own position
+as sovereign. 46
+The articulation between laws ( la loi) and the objective order of the law
+( le Droit), which was already present in the Roman lex, was reworked
+after the Gregorian Revolution and gave rise to what since the nineteenth
+century has been called the Rule of Law ( l ’ É tat de droit). Over the last
+200 years, this institutional construct has spearheaded the West ’ s ‘ civilising
+mission ’abroad, in its successive guises of colonisation, development policies
+and globalisation. However, it was fi rst exported much earlier, in the
+twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when jurists serving the temporal power of
+princes adopted the model of government invented for the spiritual order by
+Gregory VII. That is how the fi rst modern states emerged, beginning (in
+chronological order) with England and France. This history is well known,
+but one should not forget that the two major legal cultures of the West —
+common law (in England and then America), and continental law, or
+Romano-canonic law on Continental Europe — have this origin in common.
+
+IV. COMMON LAW AND CONTINENTAL LAW
+
+Again, contrary to certain received ideas, the legal culture of common law
+comes closest to that of Ancient Rome. It took shape following the Norman
+invasion of 1066, when William the Conqueror preserved the customary
+law of the Anglo-Saxon inhabitants (using a legal strategy shared by many
+colonising forces), but also imported the Norman laws in force at the time
+for use by the new masters of the kingdom. The Curia regis used the original
+language of this legislation ( ‘ Law French ’ ). William ’ s successors, and
+particularly Henry II (1133 – 89), set up legal institutions in England which
+were heavily infl uenced by Gregorian innovations. For example, in the work
+of the great jurist Bracton ( c 1210 – 68), the King of England is explicitly
+assimilated to the Pope, subject to no one but God, and called ‘ vicarius
+Christi.’ ‘ For as long as he metes out justice ’ , said Bracton, ‘ he is the vicar
+of the eternal King ’ .
+47 Unlike what occurred in France, the monarch ’ s
+Common Law and Continental Law 45
+
+48 For an overview of this legal history, see SFC Milson , Historical Foundations of the common
+law, 2nd edn( Oxford , Oxford University Press , 1981 ) ; JH Baker , An Introduction to
+English Legal History, 4th edn( Oxford , Oxford University Press , 2007 ) . 49 A de Tocqueville , Democracy in America, ed JP Mayer , tr G Lawrence( New York City ,
+Harper &Row , 1969 )Vol I, Ch 8, ‘ What Tempers the Tyranny of the Majority in the United States.
+
+normative power was thus initially rooted in his role as a judge. 48 The much
+sought-after access to the royal court was limited by a system of specifi c
+actions comparable in all respects to the Roman actiones. One ’ s case could
+be heard there only if one obtained an ordinance from the King ’ s Chancellor
+(the Royal writ or bref, a short written order, from the Latin breve), or — in
+a later version — if one obtained an authorisation from the judge himself
+(actions on the case or super casum). Each type of action corresponded
+to a particular type of case and had to comply with forms — the ‘ forms of
+action ’ — which determined the procedure to be followed (the words to be
+used; the modes of proof and of court appearance; the modes of judgment,
+etc). As the adage ‘ Remedies precede rights ’shows, a right was only recognised
+if there existed a specifi c action (a remedy) which corresponded to the
+case in hand. The progress of law thus depended, as it did in the Roman
+period, on the recognition of new cases which could give rise to an action,
+like new shoots grafted onto the old stock of cases accepted in the past. The
+rule that there is only one ‘ form of action ’for each cause of action remained
+in force until 1854.
+The law was thus identifi ed with the authority of precedents. The grounds
+for judgement — the ratio decidendi— were binding on judges when confronted
+with similar cases in the future (but any other considerations, or
+obiter dictum, which were not essential to the decision, were not binding).
+The judge, just like the Roman praetor, could innovate by admitting new distinctions,
+from which a new case and a new rule could emerge. The law was
+thus fi rst and foremost case law (in French, la juris-prudence), expressing
+the prudence and the immemorial wisdom of the judge. But the sovereign —
+the monarch, or equally the people represented by Parliament — could also
+make the law. This statute law was binding on judges, but since in their
+decision-making they fi ltered it through the common law, or rather incorporated
+and absorbed it into the latter, Parliament had to practise a certain
+casuistry in order to foresee how its intentions might be distorted or
+bypassed. This is why common law jurists have such diffi culty accepting
+that the succinctly polished statements of principle which constitute the very
+backbone of continental law have legal force. Tocqueville summarised the
+difference in mentality between the common law and the Continental jurist
+in a few incisive traits ‘ The English and American lawmen [ l é gistes] investigate
+what has been done; the French lawmen inquire into what one must
+have intended to do; the former looks for rulings, the latter, for reasons. ’ 49
+46 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+The Temper of the American Legal Profession and How It Serves to Counterbalance Democracy ’ .
+On the persistence of this attitude, which dictates that the judge may not go beyond the text of
+the law to inquire into what the lawmakers may have had in mind, see RA Katzmann , Judging
+Statutes ( Oxford , Oxford University Press , 2014 ) .
+50 See the Oxford English Dictionary ( Oxford , OUP , 2016 ) ‘ Law n.1 Etymology: Late
+Old English (c1000) lagu strong feminine (plural laga), <prehistoric Old Nor se * lagu
+
+The common law ’ s embedding in casuistry explains why it resembles
+a network rather than a pyramid. Its structural traits emerge inductively,
+through the actions of individuals, and not deductively, from the general
+interest incarnated by the State. There is thus not really any place in common
+law systems for what continental law calls the Law [ le Droit], in the
+sense of a national legal system identifi ed with a state and a territory. In
+Continental languages, the distinction between ius and lex in Roman law is
+still operative in the difference between Droit and loi in French, and Recht
+and Gesetz in German, but with certain shifts in meaning. French Droit
+was coined in the medieval period from the Latin directum. It differs in two
+respects from Roman ius: fi rst, there is the additional idea of rectitude and
+direction, of that which orientates human life in time, and prescribes a path
+to be followed. Secondly, this path is not simply the procedural route by
+which one gains access to the law — that is, to recognition of an individual
+subjective right ( un droit) — but it is also the direction which a whole society
+decides to take ( le Droit, capital ‘ D ’ ). These two sides of the notion of
+droit— le droit and le Droit— are, of course, intimately linked. It is because
+the individual is within a shared normative framework that he or she can be
+a legal subject ( un sujet de droit) and have recourse to the law. This particular
+interconnection between the individual and society is not only lexicalised
+in French but in all Continental European languages: Recht, diritto, derecho,
+etc. It implies that the individual cannot be considered independently
+of the society in which he or she is a subject, in the sense both of sub-jected,
+‘ thrown under ’( sub-jectum), and of a speaking subject, a bearer of rights
+and freedoms. This sub-jection of individual identity in a shared whole is
+also implied in the French term é tat. An individual ’ s é tat civil— which could
+be translated as ‘ personal status ’ — communicates with the notion of É tat
+(capital ‘ É ’ ), the state, which guarantees this status; and also with the Etat
+social, the social state, which extends guarantees to the individual ’ s
+working life.
+These interconnected meanings (around ‘ droit and ‘ é tat’ ) do not exist in
+the English language. Admittedly, ‘ right ’comes from Ius, from the same root
+as Recht or droit, but it has the meaning of an individual subjective right;
+there is no equivalent of Droit with a capital ‘ D ’ , the order which underpins
+and on which depend les droits with a small ‘ d ’( ‘ rights ’ ). The term ‘ law ’ ,
+which is derived from the Old Norse lag meaning what is placed, fi xed 50—
+similar in this to the German Gesetz and Latin lex— combines the senses
+Common Law and Continental Law 47
+
+(<Old Icelandic l ǫg), plural of lag neuter; in singular the word meant in Old Icelandic ‘ something
+laid or fi xed ’(specifi c senses being, eg ‘ layer, stratum ’ , ‘ share in an undertaking ’ , ‘ partnership
+’ , ‘ fi xed or market price ’ , ‘ set tune ’ , etc); the plural had the collective sense ‘ law ’ , and in Old
+Norwegian its form became (as in Old English) a feminine singular ’ .
+51 cf P Raynaud, see Law/Right in B Cassin(ed) Vocabulaire europ é en des philosophies
+( Paris , Seuil — Le Robert , 2004 ) 695 ; Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon,
+ed B Cassin, translation eds E Apter, J Lezra and M Wood (Princeton, Princeton University
+Press, 2014). 52 cf S Kakaralaand A Supiot(eds), La Loi de la langue ( Zurich , Schulthess , 2017 ) . 53 cf O Jouanjan(ed) Figures de l ’ É tat de droit. Le Rechtsstaat dans l ’ histoire intellectuelle
+de l ’ Allemagne ( Strasbourg , Presses univ Strasbourg , 2001 ) ; L Heuschling , Etat de droit —
+Rechtsstaat — Rule of Law ( Paris , LGDJ , 2002 ) .
+
+of the French la loi and le Droit, which are thus inadequately rendered in
+English by ‘ law ’(although this is its standard translation). If we take Hegel ’ s
+Rechtsphilosophie, for example, the English translations show the extent of
+this dilemma: variously, the Philosophy of Law or, most obscurely for an
+English reader, the Philosophy of Right.51
+Beyond these translation problems lies the issue of the law of language. 52
+The system of common law has been adopted by many countries, and it is
+not attached to any particular one because it retains something of the universalising
+ambition and the imperial pretensions of ius civilis, from which
+our term civilisation comes. By contrast, in the system of continental law,
+the law as Droit (capital ‘ D ’ ) is linked to the idea of the state and of territorial
+limits: one expects the term to be accompanied by an adjective such as
+‘ German ’ , ‘ Belgian ’ , ‘ Italian ’ , etc. ‘ The Rule of Law ’stands alone, requiring
+no further qualifi cation, whereas its German equivalent, Rechtsstaat, supposes
+the fi gure of the state. 53
+The aspiration to universality which is contained in the very expression
+‘ rule of law ’determined its translation into French in the Preamble to
+the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as r é gime de droit (an
+expression otherwise unfamiliar to the French ear): ‘ it is essential, if man is
+not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against
+tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule
+of law [ par un r é gime de droit]. ’Where the English has a defi nite article, the
+rule of law, implying the dream of a law embracing all the peoples of the
+earth, the French has the indefi nite article, un r é gime de droit, and hence
+the suggestion of a multiplicity of legal orders. This example alone shows
+the weighty political stakes involved in the issue of working languages in
+university research and in the drafting of laws at international level. Working
+in a single language inevitably means thinking along the lines of the legal
+culture it transports. This is particularly true of European law, where the
+gradual adoption of English as the only working language has gone together
+with abandoning the idea of a territorially defi ned political entity.
+However real these differences may be, they should not be over-emphasised.
+Were comparative law to broaden its scope, these two sides of the same
+48 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+54 cf Schiavone, The Invention of Law in the West (n 32). 55 Mentioned by Cicero , De offi ciis, I, 10, 33 , tr W Miller( Cambridge , Mass, Harvard
+University Press , 1913 ) . 56 HJ Berman , Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
+( Cambridge , Mass , Harvard University Press , 1983 ) .
+
+Western legal tradition might in fact prove closer and more unifi ed than
+they appear today, in comparison with the normative systems of other
+cultures. And indeed, a closer look shows us that although the architecture
+of common law may be very different from that of continental law,
+functionally they are very close. The difference between common law
+(in the narrow sense) and equity — one of the pillars of this architecture — is
+of about the same importance for English jurists as that between private
+and public law for Continental ones. Equity echoes aequum, which was
+used by Roman praetors to temper the infl exibility of the formulae of ius,
+and to prevent their mechanical observance from generating injustice, 54 as
+embodied in the proverb summum ius, summa iniuria.55 Equity had a similar
+function in countering the rigidity of the Westminster Courts, and the
+injustices this gave rise to. The victims of these injustices appealed to the
+sense of equity of the King, who delegated the investigation of their claims
+to his Chancellor, who was also his confessor and the ‘ guardian of the King ’ s
+conscience ’ . The development of this new branch of law within the Court
+of Chancery as from the fi fteenth century could have led the British legal
+system towards the Continental model, with sovereignty vested in the king
+rather than in the authority of parliament. But history did not take that
+path, and indeed equity fi nally absorbed common law in the seventeenth
+century, as an antidote to its own defi ciencies. The Introduction to Hobbes ’ s
+Leviathan states that ‘ Equity and laws are an artifi cial reason and will, ’thus
+establishing both their difference and their complementarity. Equity played
+a similar role in the common law system as general legal principles do in
+continental law, allowing a judge to interpret a technical rule, which may be
+a source of injustice, in the light of a principle which transcends and corrects
+its unjust effects. This complementarity between common law and equity, as
+between the articles of Continental Codes and the principles by which one
+can interpret them, shows that in neither system can the law be lastingly
+divorced from considerations of justice. One could even claim that law ’ s
+effectiveness as a technique depends on its fulfi lling the criteria of justice
+of a particular society at a particular time. Those who claim the contrary
+revert to a dogmatic defi nition of the law, which may well correspond to the
+mechanistic imaginary of the West, but has never secured itself historically
+for any length of time.
+Continental law and common law are thus two branches of a single Western
+legal tradition, as Harold Berman has described. 56 Its principal characteristic
+is to have established law as an autonomous sphere, separate both
+The Western Legal Tradition 49
+
+57 Quoted by Legendre, La 901e
+ Conclusion (Ch 1 fn 6) 409. 58 P Legendre , De la soci é t écomme Texte. Lin é aments d ’ une anthropologie dogmatique
+( Paris , Fayard , 2001 ) 230 . 59 See below, ch 5, p 90ff. 60 See below, ch 7, p 121ff.
+
+from politics and from religion. In the other civilisations of the book, legal
+interpretation necessarily defers to Revealed Scripture, that is, to a text
+which is the foundation of the legal order and of its legitimacy. By contrast,
+the Gregorian Revolution separated law from theology, and the secular
+states which were founded in its wake reaffi rmed this autonomy of the legal
+sphere. Thereafter, the law developed as a technique, and was entrusted to
+experts who had no need to inquire into the reason of the law.
+
+V. THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
+
+Accursius ( c 1182 – 1260), who pioneered the teaching of law at university,
+was already defending what is today the widely held purely technicist and
+self-referential conception of the law when he dismissed the question of
+whether the jurist should study theology with the reply ‘ Everything can be
+found in the corpus of the Law ’ .
+57 Today, jurists still tend to dismiss the
+question of the ratio legis, and to see themselves as plain and simple technicians
+who supervise the complicated system of conduits in which claims and
+counter-claims circulate. The rationale and legitimacy of the laws they study
+can be left to others.
+But the issue would not go away. In the modern period, before the natural
+sciences became the paradigm for the science of law, it was theologians
+and philosophers who examined this question spurned by jurists. In Catholic
+lands, the key actors were the School of Salamanca and the work of
+Francisco Suarez. In the wake of the Counter-Reformation, Suarez developed
+a general theory of laws in his Treatise On Laws and God the Lawgiver.
+In Protestant lands, Hobbes ’ s Leviathan attempted to ‘ establish the art of
+government as knowledge of nature ’ .
+58 This direction was pursued further
+by the Enlightenment philosophers, especially Locke in England, and
+Montesquieu and Rousseau in France. As from the nineteenth century,
+biology and the nascent social sciences became the fi elds in which scholars
+hoped to fi nd the natural foundations of government. 59 Today it is economics,
+and so pervasively that the Law and Economics doctrine has become the
+standard paradigm for the science of law in the United States. 60
+By separating law from theology, the Gregorian Revolution created a
+space for political theologies, or secular religions, to develop. Their common
+feature was that they subjected the legal order to the normative force
+of certain ideas. They thus laid the groundwork for modernity in the West,
+50 The Fortunes of an Ideal: Ruling by Law
+
+61 The two words have the same etymology, from the Indo-European weird (to see, to
+perceive by vision). On the passage from idol to idea, see M Horkheimerand T Adorno ,
+Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments [1947], tr E Jephcott , ed G Schmid Noerr
+( Redwood City , Stanford University Press , 2002 ) . 62 R Lenoble , Histoire de l ’ id é e de nature ( Paris , Albin Michel , 1969 ) 227 . 63 This is what Augustin Berque calls ‘ TOM ’(as in ‘ lobo tomy ’ ), an acronym for ‘ Modern
+Western Topos ’( Topos Occidental Moderne). See Po é tique de la Terre. Histoire naturelle et
+histoire humaine, essai de m é sologie ( Paris , Belin , 2014 ) 35ff . The critique of the subject – object
+dichotomy has been a minor, but longstanding and tenacious, theme in the human sciences,
+from Vico to Dilthey and Gadamer. It is essential for understanding the symbolism specifi c to
+human beings. 64 J-P Vernant , ‘ Remarques sur les formes et les limites de la pens é e technique chez les Grecs ’
+in Revue d ’ histoire des sciences ( Paris, PUF, 1957 ) 205 – 25 , reprinted in Mythe et pens é e chez
+les Grecs, vol II( Paris , Maspero , 1971 ) 44ff .
+
+with its idolisation of ideas, 61 and attempts to fashion society in their image.
+One might think of tracing this omnipotence of ideas back to Plato, and it
+is true that Platonism has always haunted the sciences, not least mathematics.
+But whereas Plato ’ s refl ections on the cosmic order aimed at fi nding a
+place for the human being within it, modernity aimed at quite the reverse, at
+fashioning a human order in the image of its own theories. Robert Lenoble
+has described the break between the Greek representation of Nature and
+our own in the following terms:
+
+For a Christian, Nature is not eternal: God cast it into being when He wanted to,
+and He will spirit it away at the Last Judgment as though it were simply a huge
+stage-set. It is not all there is, but simply something in the hands of God. When
+humankind thus thinks of itself not as in Nature, but as facing nature, it will
+apprehend its destiny as independent of the history of the world. And a day will
+come when humankind will dare to declare that Nature, a machine in the hands of
+God, is itself only a machine, whose levers may be handled also by man. 62
+
+So it is our belief in the Biblical narrative of the Creation — secularised as
+the ‘ Big Bang theory ’ — that separates our vision of nature from that of the
+Greeks. In common with many non-Western cultures, the Greeks viewed
+nature as eternal, subject to a cyclical and not a linear time. It was the object
+of religious contemplation, not of active exploitation. For the Moderns, by
+contrast, knowledge of nature was primarily a means to access its resources.
+The Judeo-Christian belief that nature, or the physical world, was an emanation
+of God ’ s mind and corresponded to His designs, brought with it
+the subject/object dichotomy which has so powerfully shaped our scientifi c
+representation of the world. 63 It led to the Cartesian ambition of becoming
+‘ master and possessor of nature ’ , and fashioning the world in our image, by
+appropriating for our own use the God-given laws inscribed there.
+This shift in the role of knowledge of the world, from contemplation
+to transformation, brought with it a change in the status of technology.
+In Ancient Greece, technology never got further than ‘ a system of traditional
+recipes and practical skills ’ ,
+64 whereas from the seventeenth century
+The Western Legal Tradition 51
+
+onwards it became both the means of putting knowledge into practice, and
+the primary justifi cation for pursuit of knowledge. A similar change took
+place at the same time in the realm of law, as in Hobbes ’ s conception of
+the law as a vast machine in which jurists are one of the ‘ artifi cial joints ’
+(or rather, in today ’ s vocabulary, the technicians or maintenance team).
+Legal technique embodied, and also challenged, the ideas which supposedly
+governed the world at the time. These ideas were treated as idols, images
+to which were attributed powers similar to the gods they represented. The
+King, the nation, the fatherland, race, class, genes, the market and globalisation
+are some such fetish words, and are meant to disclose a natural order
+and allow us to press it into our service. According to this logic, the laws in
+force should be the refl ection of the revealed truth of these ideas.
+But we should not ourselves succumb to the idolatry of ideas, by treating
+them as equivalent and interchangeable expressions of an ‘ idea of ideas ’
+which would be called ‘ political theology ’or ‘ dogmatics ’ . All these notions
+serve to link the human order to the natural order, but they are so wideranging
+that ‘ nature ’seems to cover almost anything. The laws of nature
+according to Aristotle, Cicero, or Rousseau are not the same as those for
+Callicles or Sade.
+When examining how these different ideas situate law, we shall be asking
+whether or not they allow for an autonomous legal order. One of the
+characteristics of twentieth-century totalitarianisms is precisely that they
+obliterated an autonomous realm for the law, under the sway of scientism.
+The conviction that science can answer the question of the meaning and
+orientation of human life reduces the law to the role of a simple technique of
+power, which can thus lay no claim to an independent realm. Our twentiethcentury
+historical experience should remind us that the autonomy of the
+legal form, and government by laws, cannot be taken for granted as timeless
+and universal achievements, and that they have already come under heavy
+fi re within the Western world itself.
+1 Wen-Tzu (Wenzi): Understanding the Mysteries. Further teachings of Lao-Tzu, tr T Cleary
+(Boston/London, Shambhala Publications, 1991). (French-Chinese bilingual edition, Les É crits
+de Maî tre Wen. Livre de la pé né tration du mystè re, tr and annotated by J Lé vi, Paris, Les Belles
+Lettres, 2012). 2 See P Legendre(ed), Tour du monde des concepts ( Paris , Fayard-Institut d ’ É tudes avancé es
+de Nantes , coll ‘ Poids et mesure du monde ’ , 2014 ) .
+
+3
+
+Other Perspectives on Law
+
+A wise sovereign changes the laws according to the demands of the times, and
+adapts the rites to the development of morals. Clothes and utensils must
+be adapted to the use to which they are put, just as legislation must be
+appropriate to the society. 1
+
+EVERY CIVILISATION UNTHINKINGLY endows its own categories
+of thought with a universality they never have. Westerners are particularly
+prone to this tendency because they have enjoyed three centuries
+of dominating others thanks to their techno-scientifi c prowess. This
+period is coming to a close, and they must now contend with other ways of
+conceiving how human societies should be organised. This is no easy task
+for some, as the return of the most primitive biologism attests and, relatedly,
+the eclipse of comparative cultural studies among the research priorities of
+the human sciences. As though exploring the ‘ neurological bases of religious
+belief’ could substitute for an understanding of other systems of thought
+(if only with a view to understanding the specifi city of our own)! This kind
+of escapism, which is intimately entwined with the founding dogmas of the
+West, makes any real universalism unattainable. Universalism does not mean
+fi ltering the whole world through our own concepts, but rather fi ltering our
+concepts through those of other civilisations. 2 It would be judicious, to say
+the least, to pay some attention to how the emerging continents, which have
+assimilated Western culture without abandoning their own, view the world
+and conceive its organisation. We could learn from this how to identify the
+real bonds and discrepancies between the different legal traditions facing
+globalisation today.
+For there is nothing universal about conceiving a natural or social order
+in terms of laws. To show this, rather than undertaking a world tour of different
+civilisations, this chapter will simply consider two very different but
+complementary cases: sub-Saharan Africa and China. The example from
+Ritualism 53
+
+3 On the place of rites in Confucian thought and its tradition, see A Cheng , Histoire de la
+pensé e chinoise ( Paris , Le Seuil , 1997 ) . 4 See L Vandermeersch ‘ Ritualisme et juridisme ’in É tudes sinologiques ( Paris , PUF , 1994 )
+209 – 20 . 5 The Book of Rites (Li Ji): English-Chinese Version, tr J Legge (CreateSpace Independent
+Publishing Platform, 2013).
+
+Africa is particularly revealing, because laws arrived there only with colonisation,
+and remained alien to African thought systems. We shall spend
+longer, however, on the case of China because the idea of governing through
+laws actually emerged there at roughly the same time as it did in Ancient
+Rome, but in a different form. In both cases, governing by laws interrupted a
+social order regulated by rites. We shall therefore start with a brief reminder
+of what a ritual order is, and how it differs from a legal one.
+
+I. RITUALISM
+
+Ritualism is undoubtedly the oldest way of organising social relations, and
+it was for a long time the most widespread. The role of rites in African
+societies has been extensively studied by anthropologists, who have shown
+how they enable the visible world to be harmonised with invisible forces.
+However, these thought systems are diffi cult to characterise in general terms
+because of their variety (also linguistically) and their oral mode of transmission.
+Since Chinese ritualism is more unifi ed, and has been codifi ed in
+writing, 3 it is an easier corpus to summarise, especially since it shares some
+common ground with European-style legal systems. 4
+Ritualism prescribes the ways of behaving appropriate to the full range
+of inter-personal relations in a society, starting with the essential ones —
+father – son, sovereign – subject, husband – wife, older – younger, colleague –
+companion. From these are derived the rites to be observed in all other types
+of relation, from the most local bonds (neighbourhood, school) to the most
+distant (the nation, humanity as a whole). According to The Book of Rites:
+
+He who sets great store by rites and who observes them is called an orderly person;
+he who, on the contrary, ignores them and does not observe them is called
+a man without rules. [Rites] are the consequence of respect and modesty; when
+observed in the temple of one ’ s ancestors, it is respect; when observed at court,
+the higher-ranking people and those who are more lowly have their respective
+places; if observed in the home, there is love between father and son, and harmony
+between older and younger; if observed in one ’ s village, there is a distinction
+between the elders and those who are younger. 5
+
+As the life of this ‘ orderly person ‘shows, rules do not have the same sense
+in a ritual and in a legal order. In a society governed by laws, rules have
+an objective, external existence with respect to the individual. In ritualism,
+54 Other Perspectives on Law
+
+6 cf Cheng, Histoire de la pens é e chinoise (n 3) 73. 7 Cheng (n 3) 224 – 25. 8 Vandermeersch ‘ Ritualisme et juridisme ’ art. cit. (n 4) 213. 9 The Book of Rites (Li Ji) (n 5) Ch 21. 10 Conseil constitutionnel (the French Constitutional Council), Decision no 99–419 DC of
+9 November 1999, Loi relative au pacte civil de solidarit é . Prior to this, Conseil constitutionnel,
+Decision no 82–144 DC of 22 October 1982, Loi relative au d é veloppement des institutions
+repr é sentatives du personnel. On this approval, see P Deumierand O Gout( 2011 )
+‘ La constitutionnalisation de la responsabilit écivile ’ , Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel 31 ;
+B Girard , Responsabilit écivile extracontractuelle et droits fondamentaux ( Paris , LGDJ , 2015 ) . 11 According to Confucius, ‘ when the people live in harmony through rites, it is the feeling
+of face ( chi) which makes the rule prevail ’(Lunyu, Ch 2, Weizheng, quoted by Vandermeersch
+‘ Ritualisme et juridisme ’(n 4) 218).
+
+they are internalised ways of behaving. The Confucian tradition on which
+ritualism is based depends on individuals ’work of ascesis in ‘ overcoming
+their ego’. 6 Each person must internalise the primacy of society over the
+individual in his handling of human relations; and harmony results from
+the principle of allotted positions, to which the individual ’ s behaviour must
+correspond. 7 This primacy of form over content and of society over individuals
+explains why ritualism is based on duties and not on individual
+rights. On this issue, L é on Vandermeersch notes that the single French term
+‘ droit’refers both to ‘ subjective ’rights and to the ‘ objective ’system of laws
+( le Droit), and its equivalent Chinese term, ‘ yi’ , refers both to the duty to
+show respect and to the ritual form. 8 He quotes the Book of Rites, which
+states that ‘ What results from disciplining attitudes by applying rites
+is respect. It is from respect that prestige results. ’ 9 In other words, being
+respectful is motivated by a duty and expressed in the form of rituals, and
+only he who conducts himself respectfully will in turn elicit respect. What
+the different rituals have in common is this imperative of respect for the
+other, which plays the same role as what we call dignity.
+In the case of both China and Europe, the issue is imposing rules on social
+relations. However, the nature of the rules is quite different: in a law-bound
+order, violation of the rule is sanctioned by cancelling the act or, where this
+is impracticable, by repairing the damage caused. This principle of liability
+gained constitutional status in France, on the basis of article 4 of the Declaration
+of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen: ‘ Liberty consists of doing
+anything which does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights
+of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the
+society the enjoyment of these same rights. These borders can be determined
+only by the law. ’ 10 In a ritual order, however, liability cannot be defi ned
+in this way. Rituals are not concerned with the outcome of actions, but
+the way they are carried out. Someone who has behaved badly can neither
+annul his or her bad conduct nor compensate for any losses, because this
+behaviour cannot be calculated in fi nancial terms. The punishment is of a
+different order: it is shame, or what in the East is called ‘ losing face ’ .
+11
+Africa, the Otherness of the Law 55
+
+12 On the importance of this type of consultation in the practice of African rituals, see
+M Cartry( 2011 ) ‘ Le chemin du rite ’ , Incidence 6, 37 – 44 . 13 See above, ch 2 , pp 39–40. See also P Legendre , ‘ L é galit édu rite ’in Sur la question dogmatique
+en Occident ( Paris , Fayard , 1999 ) 259 – 72 . 14 A Honneth , Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konfl ikte,
+2nd edn[ 1992 ] ( Suhrkamp , 2003 ) ; translated as The struggle for recognition. The moral grammar
+of social confl icts, tr J Anderson (Cambridge Mass, MIT, 1996). 15 D Liberski-Bagnoud, ‘ “ Langues du Burkina Faso ” , v “ Loi ” , in Legendre (ed), Tour du
+monde des concepts (n 2) 92 – 97.
+
+But before we make the culturalist move of saying that we have found a
+properly Eastern characteristic, unknown in the West, we should recall that
+infringements of codifi ed good behaviour are punished in exactly this way in
+the West. If a dinner guest gets abusive after drinking too much, offering to
+pay compensation the next day will not rectify the situation, and since good
+behaviour is constitutive of a person ’ s place in society, disrespect for such
+rules will lead to the person ’ s downfall. And even if we look only at legal
+rules, we fi nd that there is no unbridgeable gap between them and ritual
+ones. Even Roman law stems from consultations given by experts in ritual
+forms, 12 and legal formalism still retains something of that origin. 13 As for
+rights and duties, they are inseparable: ‘ subjective ’rights imply the duty
+to be respected by others, just as the duty to respect others is paired with
+the right to be respected. These are two inseparable sides of the relations
+between human beings. But it is symptomatic that in our societies the ‘ struggle
+for recognition ’ , by which some authors characterise the second period
+of social justice, 14 takes the form of claimed rights. Respect is then claimed
+as an individual right rather than as a duty inherent to life in society. Similar
+tendencies can be found in societies in which ritualism is dominant: it is not
+that the law is ignored, but that it is coloured by other factors.
+
+II. AFRICA, THE OTHERNESS OF THE LAW
+
+African cultures do not conceive of society in terms of law. This is why
+the colonising powers had such diffi culty translating the notion into the
+vernaculars. A recent study by Danouta Liberski-Bagnoud has shown
+how these diffi culties were overcome, in the case of the Gur (or Voltaic)
+languages. 15 This family of languages includes the most widely spoken of the
+61 languages of Burkina Faso, Mossi (six million speakers), a language which
+distinguishes three types of norms: prohibitions linked to ritual observances,
+which are beyond human will (Mossi: kigsu); edicts (Mossi: noor è , whose
+primary meaning is ‘ mouth ’ ), which are issued by human authorities such as
+the king or the elder of a lineage; and the intermediate category of prescriptions
+attributed to recent ancestors whose alteration of a ritual later became
+authoritative. The colonising powers, wishing to leave intact the rules governing
+marriage, inheritance and land transfers, grouped these together under the
+56 Other Perspectives on Law
+
+16 Liberski-Bagnoud, ‘ “ Langues du Burkina Faso ” , v “ Loi ” ’(n 15) 95. 17 On land ownership, A Supiot, ‘ L ’ inscription territoriale des lois ’(2008) Esprit, November,
+151 – 70. 18 cf M D é tienne , Comparing the Incomparable, tr J Lloyd( Stanford , Stanford University
+Press , 2008 ) ; J-G Bidima , La Palabre. Une juridiction de la parole ( Paris , Michalon , 1997 ) . 19 cf P-O de Sardan, ‘ Gouvernance despotique, gouvernance chefferiale et gouvernance
+postcoloniale ’in Entre tradition et modernit é : quelle gouvernance pour l ’ Afrique ? , Actes du
+Colloque de Bamako, 23 – 25 January 2007, IRG 2007, 109 – 31, www.institut-gouvernance.
+org/fr/analyse/fi che-analyse-263.html .
+
+name of ‘ customary law ’ . Other terms were therefore needed to translate the
+European idea of statutory law. The solution was to take two terms used by the
+Mossi themselves in their subjection of the local populations before they were
+colonised: tila ï (obligation) and panga (force / strength), both of which imply
+illegitimate coercion using force. This was why, after Independence, it proved
+diffi cult to convey the idea of a law to be observed by the whole population
+because it was formulated by those to whom it applied. As for the notion of a
+constitution, the Mossi term tengkugri was used by journalists keen to protect
+this structure from their leaders ’ongoing habit of amending it as they pleased
+in order to hang on to power indefi nitely. Tengkugri refers to a much-feared
+fi gure of the Earth, sacred (inviolable), and fenced off by prohibitions. 16
+The choice of this term was criticised as anti-democratic insofar as it placed
+the number of presidential terms of offi ce beyond human will.
+Thus sub-Saharan Africa had such a different vision of an orderly society
+from the Western ideal of government by laws that even today few people
+appreciate how much Africa has to offer Western legal thought under
+globalisation. 17 For instance, ‘ speech assemblies ’[ assembl é es de parole], that
+is, open deliberative practices leading to the adoption of shared norms —
+which are, after all, what we call ‘ law ’in democracies — were already used
+long before colonisation. 18 Yet the message addressed to African states over
+the last 30 years has insistently been that they should import the European
+democratic model, despite their own traditions, and despite the utter discredit
+it suffered under colonisation. What most African elites retained from
+colonialism was that this legal system (an import frequently also written by
+Western jurists) was basically no different from the law of the jungle (Mossi:
+panga), and likewise for the concept of the state. Given that the ‘ civilising
+mission ’of the colonial state seemed primarily concerned with exploiting
+local populations and resources, this arrogant and predatory state could
+hardly be regarded as serving the local populations ’interests and meeting
+their needs. After Independence, the new leaders simply stepped into the
+shoes of the former colonial administrators, and the state continued its
+predations. 19 In a note on colonisation written in 1943 for the French government
+in exile in London, Simone Weil observed that
+
+‘ the poison of scepticism is much more virulent where previously there was none.
+Unfortunately we do not believe in much. And when we come into contact with
+Africa, the Otherness of the Law 57
+
+20 S Weil , ‘ Àpropos de la question coloniale dans ses rapports avec le destin du peuple
+fran ç ais ’[ 1943 ]in Œ uvres ( ch 2 , fn 9) 429. From a similar perspective, see Tzvetan Todorov ’ s
+remarks on the ‘ sombre victory of colonialism and its ideology over their enemies ’ , whenever
+the latter simply invert racism and oppression rather than eradicate it ( T Todorov , The Morals
+of History, tr. Alyson Waters( Minneapolis , Minnesota University Press , 1995 ) . 21 Tonda, Le Souverain modern ( ch 1 , fn 17) 297. 22 A Nandy , The Intimate Enemy. Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism ( Oxford ,
+Oxford University Press , 1984 ) . 23 cf OO Sidib é , ‘ La d é liquescence de l ’ É tat: un acc é l é rateur de la crise malienne ? ’in
+D Konat é(ed), Le Mali entre doutes et espoirs (Bamako, Editions Tombouctou, 2013.) 171 – 91 . 24 On the harmful effects of these oppositions, see A Cheng(ed), La Pens é e en Chine
+aujourd ’ hui ( Paris , Le Seuil , 1997 ) 7ff .
+
+others, we seem to manufacture a species of man who believes in nothing at all.
+If that continues, one day we will experience the backlash with a brutality of
+which Japan (in 1943) gives us a foretaste. ’ 20
+
+We will continue to be fl ummoxed by the diffi culties many African countries
+have in constructing a workable state unless we recall that the model
+inherited from colonialism is a predatory state. Many of the ruling elites
+after Independence simply adopted this model, producing the fi gure of what
+Joseph Tonda has called the ‘ modern Sovereign ’ .
+21 And what is true of institutions
+is also true of colonised individuals, who internalised something of
+the identity of the coloniser, their ‘ intimate enemy ’ .
+22
+So there is nothing essential to Black Africa which makes it incapable
+of achieving the rule of law. The state, far from being bloated, is sorely
+lacking in its role of ensuring peace internally and guaranteeing people ’ s
+fundamental rights. 23 This lack cannot be remedied by imposing ‘ models
+of governance ’from the outside, dreamt up in Europe or the US. On the
+contrary, these countries must be enabled to draw on what is best in their
+own traditions, so that they may invent their own models of government. In
+Africa as elsewhere, the choice is not between being dissolved into a ‘ global ’
+culture and adopting the position of a victim, in an ossifi ed and essentialised
+‘ local ’one. Tradition is everywhere a resource for renewal, and not an
+obstacle to be overcome, nor a place to retreat into.
+On this issue, we should remember that law and ritual are not binary
+opposites, and that in practice they operate together in every culture. 24
+We tend to overlook this because we understand ritualism as an archaic
+and outdated form, and thus unthinkingly place the relations between law
+and ritual within a linear history in which the former replaces the latter.
+The narrative of this historical ‘ progress ’corresponds, in legal terms, to
+a reduction in formalism and an increase in consensualism, which many
+regard as supremely embodied by the history of Roman law: the pontiffs
+prescribed, in oracular fashion, the rituals to be observed, and only later did
+they become the guardians of laws. Although the idea of the law ’ s inviolability,
+which marks the beginnings of government by laws in the West, still
+58 Other Perspectives on Law
+
+25 See above, ch 2 , p 37–38. 26 MT F ö gen, Histoires du droit romain ( ch 2 , fn 33) 86. 27 cf J-N Robert, ‘ Les religions du Japon ’in Orientalisme (1982) Courrier du CNRS,
+48, supp. 28 This scene is fi lmed in the documentary with Pierre Legendre , Dominium Mundi.
+L ’ Empire du Management ( dir G Caillat , 2007 ) .
+
+represents an ideal for all lawgivers, 25 it is also a way of preserving something
+of the stability of rituals. For, once written down, the law unleashes
+what Marie Theres F ö gen rightly calls an ‘ explosive force ’ ,
+26 like a kind of
+atomic core generating mushrooming glosses by chain reaction. When the
+free play of interpretations is no longer controlled by the strict limits of the
+text, the reaction spirals out of control. So when laws and constitutions
+are reduced to the status of ‘ legislative products ’ , and tools for governance,
+the very idea of law is under threat. Instead of constituting a stable framework
+within which human activities can take on sense for everyone, this
+debasement of the law draws everything towards senselessness, a bit like a
+house whose foundations become rubbery and whose walls keep moving.
+All the great law-givers, from Solon (who, after drawing up the Athenian
+laws, left the city for 10 years to avoid the temptation of changing them)
+to Portalis, were acutely aware of the danger of a legislative hybris, which
+ultimately destroys the very purpose of the law. It was in order to counter
+precisely such a hybris that the Burkinab édecided to use the term tengkugri
+to refer to their constitution, since it implies a prohibition which transcends
+human will.
+It is unlikely that a society can survive for long without stable rules and
+without rituals. In twentieth-century totalitarian states, the contempt for
+the law went hand in hand with an exaggerated use of rituals, invented for
+the occasion to glorify a mythical past or a radiant future. Big business is
+also fond of rituals, some of which are drawn from tradition, such as the
+rites performed by Japanese fi rms when they inaugurate a new site, 27 but
+most are standardised packages produced by event management specialists.
+You want to see Bill Gates dance on stage ?Just come along to Microsoft ’ s
+annual celebration of its fi nancial results. 28 And even societies as devoid of
+rituals as our own have not yet abandoned funeral rites, however basic they
+may have become.
+
+III. CHINA, THE LEGALIST SCHOOL
+
+No one would dream of suggesting to the Chinese government today
+that it should divest itself of its ancient culture and embrace the modern
+world. Like Japan half a century before it, China had adopted Westernstyle
+laws in its First Chinese Republic (1911), which it harmonised with
+China, the Legalist School 59
+
+29 J Escarra , Le Droit chinois. Conception et é volution. Institutions l é gislatives et judiciaires.
+Science et enseignement ( Paris, Sirey , 1936 ) XII-562 . 30 M Delmas-Martyand P- É Will(ed), La Chine et la D é mocratie ( Paris , Fayard , 2007 ) ;
+X-Y. Li-Kotovtchikine(ed), Les Sources du droit et la r é forme juridique en Chine ( Paris , Litec ,
+2003 ) , bilingual, French and English, 271 and 257; PB Potter(ed) Domestic Law Reforms in
+Post-Mao China ( London , East Gate Book , 1994 ) ; SB Lubman(ed), China ’ s Legal Reforms
+( Oxford , Oxford University Press , 1994 ) ; and by the same author, Bird in a Cage. Legal
+Reform in China after Mao (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999). 31 cf Cheng, Histoire de la pens é e chinoise (n 3) 614ff. 32 Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, tr B Watson( New York City , Columbia University Press ,
+1964 ) . 33 H Maspero , La Chine antique [ 1927 ] ( Paris , PUF , 1965 ) 426ff ; Escarra, Le Droit chinois
+(n 29) 3 – 84; J Bourgon, ‘ Principes de l é galit éet r è gle de droit dans la tradition juridique chinoise
+’in Delmas-Marty and Will, La Chine et la D é mocratie (n 30) 157 – 74; X Li, ‘ L ’ esprit du
+droit chinois. Perspectives comparatives ’(1997) Revue internationale de droit compar é , 49,
+1, 7 – 35; and by the same author, ‘ La civilisation chinoise et son droit ’(1999) Revue internationale
+de droit compar é , 51, 3, 505 – 41; Cheng, Histoire de la pens é e chinoise, (n 3) 235 – 49. 34 L Vandermeersch , La Formation du l é gisme. Recherche sur la constitution d ’ une philosophie
+politique caract é ristique de la Chine ancienne ( Paris , É cole fran ç aise d ’ Extr ê me-Orient ,
+1987 ) . 35 K Schipper, ‘ “ Chinois ” , v “ Loi ” ’in Legendre (ed), Tour du monde des concepts (n 15)
+166 – 71. On Taoism, see the classic work by H Maspero, Le Tao ï sme et les religions chinoises
+
+its own traditions. 29 This process was interrupted under Mao, who dissolved
+the legal form, but was resumed after 1978, 30 connecting back to the
+synthesis of legalism and ritualism which had characterised its beginnings. 31
+It is erroneous to believe that the art of government in China can be reduced
+to Confucianism, with its particular model of ‘ government by men ’ . For
+there is another tradition in China, that of ‘ government by laws ’ , which
+played a major role in the foundation of the country ’ s imperial institutions,
+and continues to shed light on issues today. The singular position of China
+within the globalised world is arguably incomprehensible without an understanding
+of what has been called the Legalist School (Fa-jia: 法家), which
+still informs Chinese practices in government and big business.
+The Legalist School developed in China during the Warring States period
+(sixth to third centuries BC), a time of unrest and feudal struggles. Legalist
+doctrine underpinned the fi rst empire, founded by Qin Shi Huang (221 – 10)
+(the dynasty of Qin). This emperor did not leave fond memories among the
+Confucian learned elite, whom he apparently burnt at the stake in large
+numbers along with their books. But he was the fi rst emperor to set up a
+centralised bureaucracy ruled by stable laws, which provided a more or less
+exemplary model of government right up to the contemporary period. The
+principal theoreticians of Legalism — Shang Yang, Shen Dao and above all
+Han Fei 32— are as famous in China as Confucius or Lao Tseu. Their works
+became known in France thanks to scholarly research, 33 fi rst and foremost
+L é on Vandermeersch ’ s research into the formation of the Legalist School. 34
+The conception of law current in that school derived from Taoism, for
+which nature, the Tao, 35 is the only law. In Taoism, the universe is perceived
+60 Other Perspectives on Law
+
+(Paris, Gallimard, 1971), preface by M Kaltenmark. (a collection of articles authored by this
+great specialist on China who was deported and died at Buchenwald).
+36 cf A Cheng , É tude sur le confucianisme han: l ’ é laboration d ’ une tradition ex é g é tique
+sur les Classiques ( Paris , Coll è ge de France and Institut des Hautes É tudes chinoises , 1985 ) ;
+and, by the same author, Histoire de la pens é e chinois (n 3). 37 See especially Wen-Tzu (Wenzi), Understanding the Mysteries. Further teachings of
+Lao-Tzu (n 1). 38 Vandermeersch, La Formation du l é gisme (n 34) 219.
+
+as a self-regulating system governed by interacting forces of creation and
+destruction; neither rites nor royal ordinances have any moral basis. The
+doctrine of the Legalists was developed in opposition to Confucianism and
+its ideal of government by men, for which ritualism and the cultivation of
+virtue were central. 36 However, the exceptionally long-lived institutions of
+the Chinese Empire — from the second century BC to the beginning of the
+twentieth century — were based on a mixture of this legalism and Confucian
+ritualism. Many Chinese classics on the art of government refl ect this
+synthesis, in their attempt to temper the totalitarian dimension of legalism
+with ritualism. 37 Even today, legalism continues to show beneath the veneer
+of Confucianism applied by the People ’ s Republic of China to the Socialist
+market economy.
+The Legalists thought it was useless to bank on human virtue because
+only egoism exists. In their view, the Confucians were simply wrong to
+believe that social harmony could be produced by instilling the Prince ’ s virtue
+into the hearts of his subjects through the practice of rites. In opposition
+to Mencius, who considered that ‘ human nature, like water, fl ows from high
+to low ’ , the Legalists claimed that ‘ the people pursues its interest like water
+fl ows down a slope ’ .
+38 The question of government was therefore, rather,
+how to make egoism work for the Prince. A good example of this problem
+can be found on the battlefi eld. The individual soldier ’ s personal interest is
+to take to his heels as soon as he can. To prevent this, the soldier must be
+made to displace his fear onto something other than the enemy, which can
+be done by punishing desertion with spectacular cruelty; and at the same
+time he must be roused to battle by having his exploits in the fi eld rewarded,
+which also inspires courage in the cowardly. Hence, for the Legalists, laws
+were regarded as a technique for infl uencing people ’ s self-interest. Rejecting
+rites as the means of ensuring order and unity, the Legalists highlighted
+what was only a secondary measure for the Confucians, and considered
+worthy only of those incapable of governing themselves, namely the criminal
+law, and punishment, xing 形. The word xing in Chinese means both
+‘ punishment ’and ‘ form ’ . Punishment is understood as re-form, which could
+be physical (physical marks: castration, amputation, cutting off the nose,
+etc), or symbolic (wearing red clothing, etc). The word f à 法, by contrast,
+from which the Legalists ’name derived, meant ‘ Law of the Heavens ’in
+China, the Legalist School 61
+
+39 ‘ The two handles ’in Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu (n 2) s VII, 30 – 34. There is nothing
+specifi cally ‘ oriental ’about singling out these two tools: along similar lines, see Richelieu ,
+The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu [ 1688 ]: the Signifi cant Chapters and Supporting
+Selections, tr HB Hill( Madison, Wisconsin University Press , 1961 ) . 40 ‘ The two handles ’in Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu (n 2), s XIV. 41 J Levi, Introduction to Han-Fei-tse ou le Tao du Prince, Han-Fei-tse ou le Tao du Prince,
+presented and translated from the Chinese by J L é vi (Paris, Le Seuil, 1999).
+
+ancient texts, and was the model which the sacred king was supposed to
+imitate, that is, the universal law. In its archaic written form, the character
+f à was composed of three elements, which represented:
+
+— water (perfectly fl at, symbolising the idea of rectitude and justice)
+— an element meaning ‘ to expel ’(everything crooked)
+— a pictogramme representing a unicorn, reputedly able to detect those
+who have not behaved with rectitude.
+
+The Legalist doctrine was the result of bringing together xing and f à , and of
+adding to the regime of punishments that of rewards. The art of government
+consisted of using these ‘ two handles ’ — punishments and rewards. In Han
+Fei Tzu ’ s words:
+
+The Prince controls his ministers by means of two handles alone. The two handles
+are punishment and favor. What do I mean by punishment and favor ?To infl ict
+mutilation and death on men is called punishment; to bestow honor and reward
+is called favor. Those who act as ministers fear the penalties and hope to profi t by
+the rewards. Hence, if the ruler wields his punishments and favors, the ministers
+will fear his sternness and fl ock to receive his benefi ts. 39
+
+For the Legalists, law was thus a machine which the sovereign could use
+to ensure social order, by manipulating the two sole motives for human
+behaviour: greed and fear. To achieve this, the sovereign does not need to be
+crafty or intelligent, nor to make a show of his power; on the contrary, he
+should conceal it in order to become one with this impersonal and abstract
+law. He must be able to count on the eyes and ears of his subjects, who
+are made transparent to him because they all spy on each other, while he
+himself remains invisible. 40 The Sovereign-Legalist is less a prince than a
+principle: the principle of a law which transforms egoism into a force for
+order. The comparison which inevitably springs to mind here is today ’ s
+faith in the invisible hand of the market. In both cases, the order derived
+from the manipulation of self-interest is linked to concealment of the loci of
+power, or more precisely the immersion of power into a general system for
+conditioning behaviour. One could say of our self-regulating market what
+Jean Levi says of the Sovereign-Legalist: what the other sees is only ever
+the polished mirror of nothingness. 41 But the Legalists did not believe that
+order could emerge spontaneously from unbridled self-interest. The Prince
+quelled his subjects only by implacably applying the criminal law, which
+62 Other Perspectives on Law
+
+42 Wen-Tzu (Wenzi), Understanding the Mysteries. Further teachings of Lao-Tzu (n 1). 43 See below, ch 7 , p 121ff.
+
+itself was successful in conditioning people ’ s self-interested behaviour only
+if it was both objective and general.
+This objectivity was predicated on publication of the laws. The fi rst
+Chinese legal codes, carved onto tripod vessels, date from the sixth century
+BC, and replaced the Annals, which only legal offi cials could consult.
+Publication was meant to prevent purely subjective interpretations of the
+law. A comparable shift towards codifi cation took place a century later in
+Rome, when the Law of the Twelve Tables was promulgated. There was one
+essential difference, however. The Legalists published laws not to satisfy the
+demands of the people, but to restore the state ’ s authority. Concomitantly,
+codifi cation did not lead to a legal system in the Western sense; that is, one
+which also guarantees the rights of individual subjects. Classical Chinese
+has no term for these rights. It was translated by qu á n 权, which refers to
+the power — the ‘ two handles ’described by Han Fei Tzu — exercised by the
+Prince through the law, namely to punish and to reward. The Legalists confi
+scated these instruments from the learned bureaucratic class, and handed
+them over to the sovereign.
+Another important difference was that promulgating laws did not go
+hand in hand with the idea of the law ’ s inviolability. Since laws were simply
+an instrument of power at the sovereign ’ s disposal, they had to be effi cient,
+not just. Also, their value was not in their relation to moral principles —
+which are simply masks for the private interests of those who profess
+them — nor of course in their refl ection of the will of the people. Rather,
+laws conveyed an understanding of things. As such, they needed to evolve
+with time, in order to respond to the changing context and to the lessons
+learnt from their application. A famous treatise on government advises the
+sovereign to change the laws according to the demands of the moment:
+‘ Clothing and utensils must be adapted to the use which is made of them,
+just as legislation must be appropriate to the society. This is why it is not
+always a bad thing to change ancient rules, nor always judicious to preserve
+them. ’ 42 In the West, not until very recently has the law been so totally
+assimilated to an instrument of power, to a tool no different from a saw
+or a hammer. And since the law was founded on effi ciency, there was no
+place for contradiction: a more effi cient law naturally excludes one that is
+less effi cient (a notion which resurfaced with Condorcet, and with the contemporary
+Law and Economics school). 43 The law ’ s effi cacy depends not
+only on being known, but also on being understood by everyone, which is
+why the Legalists designed their system for the least educated, and did not
+assume any perspicacity on the part of the people: ‘ The people are easy to
+China, the Legalist School 63
+
+44 S Jun shu, Ch 26, 43, cited by Vandermeersch, La Formation du l é gisme, (n 34) 195 and
+200. 45 The Book of Rites (n 5) Ch 1. 46 Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu (n 2) Ch VI. 47 cf J Levi, Introduction to the É crits de Ma î tre Wen (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2012), CXIII. 48 ibid.
+
+govern because they are stupid. The law can do this. If it is clear and easy to
+understand, it will work necessarily. ’ 44
+As a technique for conditioning subjects through punishments and
+rewards, the law was applied to every individual and every area of life
+in society. In opposition to the Confucian tradition, which exempted the
+nobility from punishments involving physical mutilation because the performance
+of rites was what disciplined them and, just as ‘ rites do not extend
+down to the common people ’ , so the criminal law ‘ does not rise as far as
+the nobles ’ ,
+45 Legalist doctrine made the law absolutely universal. As Han
+Fei Tzu states, ‘ When faults are to be punished, the highest minister cannot
+escape; when good is to be rewarded, the lowest peasant must not be passed
+over. To suppress disorder, muzzle lies, check excess, expose error and unify
+the conduct of the people, nothing can compare with the law. ’ 46
+The Legalists additionally subjected all aspects of life in society to the
+law, including areas which in the West would be classed under a different
+type of normativity, such as moral principles or technical standards.
+As the etymology of the Chinese character f à shows, the law is related to
+the sign for water. Like water, with its level surface symbolising equality,
+the law indicates the right path with impartiality, and marks out the dividing
+line between the true and the false, the just and the unjust. But it is
+also placed under the sign of water as that which fl ows through the whole
+social body. The Legalists borrowed from Taoism, which regards water in
+its formlessness as a primordial element close to Tao, the idea that Tao produces
+the law, dao sheng f à , or ‘ the Way engenders the Law ’ .
+47 The law is
+not based on a contract between free and equal subjects, but is created by
+the interacting forces of Tao at work throughout the society. Jean L é vi comments
+that ‘ what makes it possible for the law to impregnate and irrigate the
+social whole is a political organisation in which the population is divided
+up into interlocking territorial units, where behaviour is fashioned through
+collective responsibility and mutual surveillance from the lowest level — the
+brigade — upwards. ’ 48
+As such, when laws are diffused throughout the social body and supplemented
+by a system of generalised surveillance, they produce order and
+effi ciency. These two aspects are combined in the organisation of work,
+which is entirely governed by criminal law, and where no separation may
+exist between moral, disciplinary and technical norms and standards. L é on
+Vandermeersch gives a particularly striking example of this, dating from the
+64 Other Perspectives on Law
+
+49 H Tan, Xinl ù n, cited in Vandermeersch, La Formation du l é gisme (n 34) 103.
+
+fi rst century BC, concerning the introduction of new agricultural techniques
+for increasing the yields of the land in the Kingdom of Wei:
+
+In Wei, in the 3rd month, during celebration of the rites, the agricultural offi cials
+read out the law to the peasants. The law said ‘ If you plough without driving
+the ploughshare deep into the earth, your labour will not break up the soil. In
+the fi elds in Spring, fl atten the earth like a sheet before planting. In the fi elds in
+Summer, fl ock together to work, in as large numbers as the ducks. In the fi elds
+in Autumn, keep a constant watchful eye, for the unforeseen arrives like a thief.
+In the fi elds in Winter, spy on one another, as the people of Wu and of Yu observe
+each other [ that is, as enemies]: if your harvest is of the last of the lowest quality
+on fi elds of the highest fi rst quality, you will be punished; if your harvest is of the
+highest fi rst quality on fi elds of the last lowest quality, you will be rewarded. ’ 49
+
+One can hazard a guess that something of this tradition persists today in
+the way China ’ s large industrial companies are governed, and in the total
+control which they seek to exercise over their workers. More generally, this
+rapid incursion into the writings of the Chinese Legalists already gives us
+some idea of how their conception of the law resembles, and also differs
+from, the dominant paradigm in the West. Both models aspire to objectivity,
+equality and generality, but the Chinese version has three distinguishing
+features: enforceable individual rights are inexistent (the lex is not combined
+here with a ius which is a source of individual prerogatives); what in the
+West would pertain to theology, morals or technology is here encompassed
+within the sphere of law; and, lastly, the law is judged by its effi ciency and
+not by its justice. These three markers can help us measure the extent to
+which globalisation has brought these Western and the Chinese ideas of law
+closer together.
+The Legalist doctrine was supported by merchants and tradesmen exasperated
+by the arrogance and hypocrisy of the nobles, and by the anarchic
+political situation which undermined economic prosperity. So it is hardly
+surprising that their idea of the human being had much in common with
+the West ’ s characterisation of the homo economicus and with utilitarian
+philosophy. Some twenty centuries after the Legalists, the utilitarians
+likewise regarded the pursuit of individual interests as the only real motivating
+force behind human behaviour. But in utilitarianism, this pursuit
+was understood as the best way to produce social harmony. It is private
+vices that engender public benefi ts, Bernard Mandeville remarked at the
+very beginning of the eighteenth century. This founding credo of the liberal
+economic order is illustrated in a famous passage from Adam Smith ’ s
+The Wealth of Nations: ‘ It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
+brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
+China, the Legalist School 65
+
+50 A Smith , An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed E Cannan
+( London , Methuen &Co , 1904 ) , Book I, Ch II, 1.2.2: ‘ Of the Principle which gives Occasion
+to the Division of Labour ’50. 51 D-R Dufour, La Cit éperversem ( ch 2 , fn 14) 51ff. 52 Constitution of the People ’ s Republic of China [1982], Arts 1 and 15.
+
+their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their
+self-love. ’ 50 Dany-Robert Dufour has shown in a recent book that this idea
+of the automatic conversion of private vices into public benefi ts has religious
+origins. 51 It derives from a belief in the capacity of divine providence
+to redeem human imperfections in order to lead humankind to salvation.
+In its secular form of the invisible hand of the market, this faith in divine
+providence has made individual economic freedoms into the cornerstone of
+the legal order. By contrast, such a faith in the miraculous virtues of egoism
+was completely foreign to Chinese Legalism, whose purely rationalistic
+conception of the world stemmed from Taoism. Although the Legalists ’
+disenchanted view of humankind as motivated exclusively by greed and
+fear has a certain resonance with liberal ideology, they never envisaged that
+unleashing desires and passions could produce anything other than chaos.
+Giving free reign to individual egoism cannot produce harmony because
+egoism imprisons people in a short-term vision of calculated personal interests,
+and blinds them to any long-term interests, be it their own or those of
+the group. As the Legalists put it, egoism encourages people to behave like
+the child who refuses to let his head be shaved, although it is to prevent him
+getting lice. The legal system can in consequence be based only on seeking
+rewards and fearing punishments. It is a unifi ed and impersonal system,
+which aspires to produce a self-regulated society in which the laws apply
+equally to everyone, and where there is no distinction between what we
+would call legal, moral and technical norms.
+Further research into Legalism by specialists on Ancient China would
+not only enrich comparative law, but it would also give depth to our understanding
+of the specifi city of the modes of government demonstrated by the
+Chinese state and Chinese businesses in the international arena today. This
+project is itself predicated on building strong bridges between research on
+ancient civilisations and research on the contemporary world, in order to
+avoid clich é s and hasty judgements (instead of which there is a tendency to
+draw fi ercely defended frontiers between the two). It is a risky venture, since
+the appropriation of scholarly work can always lead to approximations and
+simplifi cations, but such work is vital for any well-grounded legal analysis
+of globalisation, for which the Western tradition, whether in the form of
+economic liberalism or of Marxism, is too limiting a framework. Contemporary
+China, with its constitutional ‘ democratic dictatorship ’and its ‘ socialist
+market economy ’ ,
+52 does not fi t neatly into either of these forms, and
+requires us to refl ect differently upon its mode of government and its relation
+66 Other Perspectives on Law
+
+53 Kristofer Schipper, ‘ “ Chinois ” , v. “ Loi ” ’in Legendre (ed), Tour du monde des concepts
+(n 35) 170 – 71. 54 See below, ch 6 , p 112ff.
+
+to the rule of law. Kristofer Schipper has argued that Legalism remains a
+dominant infl uence in China to this day, with a veneer of Confucianism to
+give an appearance of humanity to what is overwhelmingly state control
+and bureaucratic power. 53 If we accept Schipper ’ s analysis, we can make
+two further claims to end this chapter.
+The fi rst point is that a more profound comparative analysis of Western
+and Chinese traditions of government by laws can help us understand their
+different perceptions of globalisation. For Western governments — and especially
+for Europeans — globalisation means that the spontaneous order of the
+market henceforth rules the whole world, and that far from impeding this
+dominion, states should be its willing vehicle, ensuring only the universal
+recognition of economic freedoms and respect for fi rst-generation (civil and
+political) human rights. For the Chinese government, on the other hand, an
+order founded purely on the pursuit of individual interest is another name
+for chaos. This might be tolerated abroad, but not in China, where this
+pursuit must be harnessed to the national interest by a strong state which
+encourages wealth creation while strictly policing its population and meting
+out harsh punishment for any infringement of the political order as it
+stands.
+Our second claim, which we expand on below, 54 is that the new world
+order which emerged after the collapse of real communism should not be
+interpreted as a victory of the West over the East, or the rule of law over
+totalitarianism, but rather as a hybrid form of communism and liberalism;
+in other words a form of what the Chinese Constitution precisely calls a
+‘ socialist market economy ’ , partaking of both systems.
+1 For Islam, see I Khald û n , La Voie et la Loi, ou le Ma î tre et le Juriste ( Paris , Sindbad , 1995 ) ,
+presentation and notes by Ren éP é rez, 308. Christianity also addressed this dichotomy, for
+example in the controversy over Quietism in the seventeenth century. 2 The notion of calculated harmony comes from Pierre Legendre( La fabrique de l ’ homme
+occidental ( Paris , Mille et une nuits , 1996 ) 26 ), who was himself inspired by the work of the
+liberal economist Fr é d é ric Bastiat( Harmonies é conomiques ( Paris , Guillaumin, 1851 , reprint
+BookSurge Publishing , 2001 ) 582 , online: http://bastiat.org/fr/harmonies.html ).
+
+4
+
+The Dream of Social Harmony
+by Numbers
+
+‘ Everything is ordered according to number. ’
+
+Pythagoras
+
+THE SPECTACULAR SUCCESS of the model of governance by
+numbers is no historical accident. Nature ’ s ultimate principles had
+long been represented by a mixture of numbers and rules (through
+physics and mathematics), and the social order, by a mixture of quantitative
+economics and law. The religious sphere likewise admitted a composite
+of submission to divinely given laws and mystical contemplation of absolute
+truths, as two different ways of attaining the godhead. 1 Governance
+by numbers does not in fact abolish laws, but it submits their contents to
+a calculation of utility designed to serve the ‘ economic harmonies ’which
+reputedly ensure the smooth functioning of human societies. 2 But can the
+law be reduced to numbers ?Does law do something other than express the
+perfect harmonies formulated by mathematics ?Does it not have a purpose
+of its own, to overcome the strife inherent in life in society ?Our leaders
+confront these questions daily, torn between quantitative representations of
+the economy and society, and whatever remains of democratic representations
+of the social body. In order to understand both the ancient origins of
+governance by numbers and its foreseeable failures in the future, we shall
+again adopt a historical perspective.
+
+I. THE PERFECT HARMONIES OF NUMBERS
+
+The fascination with numbers and their systematising powers is age-old,
+and not confi ned to the Western world. Chinese thought is pervaded by the
+68 The Dream of Social Harmony by Numbers
+
+3 cf Marcel Granet, who devotes a chapter to numbers in his La Pens é e chinoise [1934]
+(Paris, Albin Michel, 1968) 127ff. 4 Nicomachus of Gerasa, Theology of Arithmetic, quoted by M Ghyka , Philosophie et
+mystique du nombre ( Paris , Payot , 1952 ) 11 . 5 cf E Cassirer , The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy [ 1963 ],
+tr M Domandi( Chicago , Chicago University Press , 2010 ) , F Patras , La Possibilit édes nombres
+( Paris , PUF , 2014 ) 13 – 42 . 6 N de Cues , On Learned Ignorance [ 1514 ], tr J Hopkins( Minneapolis , MN , Banning ,
+1985 ) .
+
+symbolic value of numbers, 3 and the Indian, Arab and Persian worlds have
+contributed enormously to mathematics. But the West was where numbers
+were vested with the most potential: as objects of contemplation, then as
+tools of knowledge and prognostication, and today as tools of governance,
+after being endowed with legal force. One might be tempted to fi nd an origin
+in a Biblical source, the Book of Wisdom, in which it is stated that God
+has ‘ arranged all things by measure and number and weight ’(Wis 11:20).
+But we would have to add that this book was (apparently) written directly
+in Greek in the second century BC by a Hellenistic Jew who was probably
+infl uenced by the Pythagorean revival. And it is apparently Pythagoras
+(-580/-500 BC) who claimed that ‘ Everything is ordered according to
+number ’ , an idea developed further by the philosopher and mathematician
+Nicomachus of Gerasa (fi rst century AD) in the following terms:
+
+Everything that has been arranged systematically by nature in the Universe appears
+in its parts as in the whole to have been determined by and harmonised with
+Numbers, through the foresight and thought of he who created all things; for its
+model was fi xed, like a preliminary sketch, by the preeminence of numbers preexisting
+in the mind of God the creator of the world, number-ideas which are purely
+immaterial in every respect, but at the same time the true and eternal essence,
+such that in harmony with numbers, as though following an artistic design, were
+created all these things, and Time, movement, the heavens, the stars and all the
+cycles of all things. 4
+
+The idea that numbers were thus the key to the divine order has had an
+extraordinary legacy, from Pythagoras to this day, in particular through the
+works of Plato and the Renaissance Neo-Platonists. 5 Nicolas de Cues, for
+instance, maintained that ‘ since no path gives access to godly matters except
+through symbols, we can use mathematical signs because their indisputable
+certainty makes them best suited to this ’ .
+6 And in Galileo ’ s words, ‘ this vast
+book which is constantly open before us, by which I mean the Universe [ … ],
+is written in mathematical language, and its letters are triangles, circles
+and other geometrical fi gures, without which it is humanly impossible to
+The Perfect Harmonies of Numbers 69
+
+7 Galileo, The Assayer [ Il Saggiatore, 1623], selections translated by S Drake , Discoveries
+and Opinions of Galileo ( New York City , Doubleday &Co , 1957 ) . On this ‘ mathematical
+alphabet of the world ’ , see O Rey , Itin é raire de l ’ é garement ( Paris , Le Seuil , 2004 ) 46ff . 8 For the mystical infl uence, see, for example, S Weil ‘ The Pythagorean Doctrine ’[ 1941 ],
+in Intimations of Christianity Among the Ancient Greeks, ed and tr GE Chase( London :
+Routledge , 1957 ) . 9 cf D-R Dufour , Les Myst è res de la trinit é ( Paris , Gallimard , 1990 ) 354ff .
+
+understand a single word. ’ 7 This belief in a world entirely ruled by numbers
+continues to fuel our imagination today. ‘ The world is mathematical ’was
+the title of a book series headed by C é dric Villani, a 2010 Fields Medalist
+and the Director of the Institut Henri-Poincar é , for the newspaper
+Le Monde, in 2013. Mathematics — today as in the past — is deemed to be the
+key to understanding — and hence mastering — the world, a claim echoed not
+only in numerous philosophical, scientifi c and mystical works, but also in
+the conviction that a numerical ‘ legality ’exists, as expressed in cosmology,
+theology, music, ethics and law. 8
+Within this numerical symbolism, the scholarly and mystical Confraternity
+of Pythagoreans placed particular emphasis on the number 10. The group ’ s
+emblem was the esoteric symbol of the Tetractys, a triangle of 10 points,
+on which its members swore an oath never to divulge their secrets, especially
+not those pertaining to mathematics. It was the geometrical fi gure of
+the number 10, represented as an equilateral triangle whose tip is one, and
+whose sides are three times four.
+
+Figure 4.1: The esoteric symbol of the Tetractys
+
+Michael Stolleis ’ s research on the metaphor of ‘ the eye of the Law ’has
+shown that the Tetractys is present throughout Western history. Masons and
+kabbalists used it, and although it was rejected by Christianity as a pagan
+element, it was recycled as a fi gure of the Trinity, 9 and then of the eye of
+70 The Dream of Social Harmony by Numbers
+
+10 M Stolleis , Das Auge des Gesetzes. Geschichte einer Metapher ( Munich , Beck , 2004 ) ;
+Eng tr The Eye of the Law: Two Essays on Legal History (London, Birkbeck Law Press, 2008). 11 Ghyka, Philosophie et mystique du nombre (n 4) 50 – 51.
+
+God. Thereafter it continued its course, and was secularised as the eye
+of the Law. 10 This is the symbol we fi nd, still laden with its religious, legal
+and mathematical symbolism, when we look at the reverse side of a one
+dollar note today. Represented are the two sides of the Great Seal of the United
+States of America, including a pyramid, dated 1776 at its base, and at its tip,
+the eye of divine Providence, which watches over the newly formed State.
+
+Figure 4.2: At the pyramid’s
+tip: the eye of God and
+the mention Annuit
+Cœptis (‘He has favoured
+our undertakings’). On
+the ribbon: Novus Ordo
+Seclorum (‘A new order
+of the ages [which is
+beginning]’)
+
+The Tetractys was a symbol of the cosmos (of a universe saved from chaos),
+and also represented harmony. 11 Harmony, the daughter of Ares, the god
+of war, and of Aphrodite, the goddess of love, has represented the uniting
+of opposites and the resolving of discord and disagreement ever since
+the Ancient Greeks. In European Union law, ‘ harmonisation ’means either
+materialising in law the economic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty on the
+Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), or a spontaneously produced
+outcome of using these freedoms. In the terms of the Treaty ’ s Article 151,
+the ‘ functioning of the internal market ’ — the freedom given economic operators
+to act on the basis of their calculated interest alone — should result
+in the ‘ harmonisation of social systems ’ . The convergence of national
+legislations has only a subsidiary role, to accompany this spontaneous
+operation. Somewhat like the Decretum Gratiani eight centuries earlier, the
+The Perfect Harmonies of Numbers 71
+
+12 TFEU, Art 136. 13 This way of defi ning sounds in terms of harmonic proportions was highly infl uential right
+up to the nineteenth century, when the physicist and acoustician Hermann von Helmholtz
+‘ objectively ’defi ned the frequency of each sound in absolute terms. cf M Rieger , Helmholtz
+Musicus. Die Objektivierung der Musik im 19 Jahrhundert durch Helmholtz ’Lehre von den
+Tonempfi ndungen ( Darmstadt , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft , 2006 ) esp 49ff .
+
+European Treaty thus hoped to establish a ‘ reconciliation of contradictory
+canons ’( Concordia discordantium canonum), and a ‘ harmonisation while
+[the] improvement is being maintained ’ ,
+12 by overcoming the diversity of
+national legislations and the imperative of competition. Unlike in Gratian,
+however, this reconciliation was not to be achieved by the law (since the
+alignment of national legislations is conceived simply as a facilitator), but
+rather was to emerge as the by-product of the economic calculations of an
+‘ internal market ’ . The redactors of the Treaty of Rome instituted and delimited
+this market under EU law, but they certainly did not have in mind a
+global market where all obstacles to the free circulation of goods and capital
+would be abolished. This utopia of a total market engendering social harmony
+spontaneously across the whole planet only emerged a few decades
+later, with the triumph of neoliberalism.
+The Pythagorean mysticism of numbers understood harmony to be
+conceived either as a result of an immediately achieved perfect eurythmy,
+or from the consonance of opposing principles, on the model of musical
+harmonies which transcend dissonance. The Greeks measured musical frequencies
+in terms of the ratios between string lengths (length and frequency
+are inversely proportional: the longer the string, the lower the frequency).
+The ideal order of numbers contained in the Pythagorean Tetractys was
+immediately linked with the laws of musical harmony because the Tetractys
+contained the main ratios of the diatonic scale:
+
+— the ratio 4:2 or 2:1, the octave
+— 3:2, a fi fth
+— 4:3, a fourth.
+
+However, to accommodate further ratios, another number was required,
+the number 12, which is divisible by all the numbers of the Tetractys: 1,
+2, 3 and 4. For example, the consonance of two strings of length 12 and 6
+corresponds to the interval of an octave (12:6), that of two strings of length
+12 and 8 to a fi fth (3:2), and that of two strings of length 12 and 9 to a fourth
+(12:9). These consonances of an octave (12:6), a fi fth (3:2) and a fourth
+(12:9) correspond to the arithmetical ratios 2/1, 3/2, and 4/3. These are not
+only arithmetical but also geometrical ratios because 9 is a square number
+(3 squared), 6 is the number of faces of a cube, 8 the number of points
+of a cube, and 12 the number of its edges. 13 This perfect correspondence
+72 The Dream of Social Harmony by Numbers
+
+14 On the role of quantifi cation in the mediaeval invention of polyphony, see AW Crosby ,
+The Measure of Reality. Quantifi cation and Western Society 1250 – 1600 ( Cambridge ,
+Cambridge University Press , 1997 ) 139ff . And more generally, on the ‘ Golden Number ’or
+‘ divine proportion ’ , see M Neveuxand HE Huntley , Le Nombre d ’ or. Radiographie d ’ un
+mythe followed by La Divine Proportion ( Paris , Le Seuil , 1995 ) 328 . 15 ‘ Concord ’and its cognates stem from the Latin concordia ( ‘ agreement, union ’ ) derived
+from cor, cordis (the heart), and concors ( ‘ of the same mind ’ ), literally ‘ hearts together ’ . 16 cf H Hesse , The Glass Bead Game. A tentative sketch of the life of Magister Ludi Joseph
+Knecht together with Knecht ’ s posthumous writings [ 1943 ], tr R Winstonand C Winston ,
+Foreword by T Ziolkowski( London , Picador , 2002 ) . 17 Cicero, De re publica, para 13, ed OJ Thatcher , The Library of Original Sources, Vol III:
+The Roman World ( Milwaukee , University Research Extension Co , 1907 ) 216 – 41 . 18 ibid, para 18.
+
+between mathematical proportions and musical harmonies was interpreted
+as the sign of a cosmic harmony to which one may have access through
+the contemplation of numbers. 14 One of the most powerful motives behind
+scientifi c endeavours in the West was the desire to penetrate the secrets of
+this universal harmony.
+Not only should this harmony resonate in all works of human hand —
+from the most modest manufactured object to the work of art — but it
+should also operate between people, by establishing ‘ concord ’ , a perfect harmony
+which transcends differences. As shown by these terms ’etymology,
+harmony and concord (and their antonyms of dis-harmony and dis-cord)
+have at once an auditory sense (the consonance of sounds) and an emotional
+one, with the union, or dis-union, of affections. 15 Bringing humans
+together in harmony requires both that hearts should beat in unison and
+that strong bonds should be forged between them. Harmony in this sense
+achieves a universal dimension through its mathematical expression. This
+is abundantly conveyed by its representations, for instance, on the walls of
+Chartres Cathedral, in Renaissance painting, and even in certain twentiethcentury
+literary works depicting an ideal world of erudition. 16
+One of the treatises on the art of government to have profoundly infl uenced
+the Renaissance Neo-Platonists was Cicero ’ s De re publica, in which
+the law is central. It ends on the account of a fi ctional dream in which Scipio
+is visited by his ancestor Africanus, who reveals to him that ‘ nothing on earth
+is more agreeable to the foremost of the gods, the governor of the universe,
+than the assemblies and societies of men united together by laws, which are
+called States ’ .
+17 Africanus then transports him to the nine heavenly spheres
+which compose the universe, and asks him to listen to the music they produce,
+while explaining that what he hears is the result of ‘ their motion and
+impulse; and being formed by unequal intervals, but such as are divided
+according to the most just proportion, it produces, by duly tempering acute
+with grave sounds, various concerts of harmony ’ .
+18 Mathematics, physics
+and music are here as one, and together they create the celestial harmony
+which the law must materialise in the state. It is somewhat disconcerting,
+The Foundational Function of Discord 73
+
+19 MT F ö gen , R ö mische Rechtsgeschichte. Ü ber Ursprung und Funktion eines sozialen
+Systems ( G ö ttingen , Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht Verlag , 2002 ) . 20 Livy , History of Rome, tr and notes D Spillan( Covent Garden , London , Henry G Bohn ,
+1857 ) III, 33 . 21 ibid, III, 34.
+
+given today ’ s legal positivism, to fi nd in a treatise on the institutions of
+the res publica this kind of dream story, with its aesthetic and mathematical
+considerations. But the contemporary doctrine of Law and Economics
+does something very similar in its claim to found social harmony on mathematical
+operations — although it should be noted that Scipio ’ s humanity is
+missing from today ’ s homo economicus, who could neither dream nor even
+imagine that the Invisible Hand could be that of a musician.
+This ongoing mathematical infl uence on legal thought, from the Renaissance
+to the present, is shown particularly well in an incisive commentary
+by Marie Theres F ö gen on Raphael ’ s famous fresco The School of Athens
+(although I have some reservations about her conclusion). 19 She uses this
+fresco (situated in the Room of the Signatura in the Vatican) as an illustration
+of Livy ’ s narrative of the establishment of the Law of the Twelve Tables.
+The question she is trying to answer is why, at the origin of Roman Law,
+should there be 12 and not 10 tables (the number sacred to Pythagoreans,
+and also the number of the Commandments).
+
+II. THE FOUNDATIONAL FUNCTION OF DISCORD
+
+In Livy ’ s account, the Tables were created by an appointed assembly of
+10 sages, the decemvirate, in 457 BC. Its membership was identical to that
+of the Tetractys: one consul from the preceding year; two consuls from the
+current year; three envoys who had returned from Greece; and four elders
+appointed, in Livy ’ s words, ‘ to make up the number ’ ; 20 in other words, the
+sacred number 10. The laws drawn up by these 10 sages were transcribed
+onto ten tables, which were presented to the Roman citizens for discussion,
+and then adopted by the comitia, or citizens ’legislative assembly. A rumour
+then spread that there were two tables missing ‘ which, if added to the others
+[ … ], would have formed a complete corpus of Roman law ’ .
+21 Another
+decemvirate was therefore appointed, among them Appius Claudius, who
+had already worked on drawing up the fi rst set. But this new assembly
+behaved tyrannically. Appius Claudius infringed the laws he himself had
+drafted, and he also abused his role of judge in a case in which he gave
+a young and beautiful plebeian, called Virginia, to be the slave of one of
+his henchmen. In order to spare her the enslavement and dishonour awaiting
+her, Virginia ’ s father had no choice but to stab her to death. Appalled
+by such injustice, the people rebelled, and Claudius ended up committing
+74 The Dream of Social Harmony by Numbers
+
+22 H Zimmer , Maya. Der indische Mythos [ 1936 ] ( Insel Verlag , 1988 ) ; French tr, Maya
+ou le R ê ve cosmique dans la mythologie hindoue, Preface by M Biardeau (Paris, Fayard, 1987). 23 ibid. This remark applies to a very concrete problem which the courts are confronted with
+today: young delinquents who have not integrated a sense of limits, that is, with whom instituting
+has failed, are impervious to the sense of guilt.
+
+suicide in captivity. When peace returned to a city governed thereafter by
+the Twelve Tables of the Law, these were displayed in the Roman Forum,
+in 449 BC.
+This narrative of the origins of Roman law is worth dwelling on, because
+it concerns at once numbers (10, then 12), and law. In Marie Theres F ö gen ’ s
+interpretation, the Romans had to experience a lack of law before a legal
+system, and the resulting society harmony, could prevail. We take issue
+with this interpretation, however, because it is both anachronistic and misleading:
+where there is no law, it cannot be broken, and Claudius Appius ’ s
+crime was precisely to have broken the laws in place, which he himself had
+drafted. The conclusion we can draw from this narrative of the origins of
+the law is, rather, that no legal system can hold if founded on a calculating
+rationality alone.
+Yet if this ideal of a calculated social harmony has so tenaciously haunted
+Western legal thought, it is perhaps because of the West ’ s inability to grasp
+the unity, at a deeper level, of law and its violation, of order and disorder.
+We shall address this possibility by looking briefl y to how other civilisations
+view the relation between order and disorder. Heinrich Zimmer has noted
+an interesting detail in Hindu cosmogony. 22 At the very moment when the
+god Vishnu conceives the advent of a perfect world, and despite his beauty,
+he has dirt in his ears! It is out of this dirt that Madhu and Kaitabha, the
+demons of passion and stupidity, are born, and it is they who will sow
+the fi rst seeds of disorder in the cosmos. In the Western tradition, by contrast,
+the godhead is purely positive, with no demonic dimension. Zimmer
+reminds us that human beings achieve selfhood only by confronting the
+shadowy, negative side of their being: ‘ How else, ’he writes, ‘ could men
+enter into contact with external and internal reality, except through guilt ?
+How could one be rooted in reality without some failing ?It is only through
+failings that one learns who one is; before that, one is simply fl oating in the
+realm of appearances. ’ 23 Returning to our analysis, rather than postulate an
+improbable passage via ‘ lawlessness ’ , we would suggest thinking together at
+once the democratic process of deliberation (which led to the fi rst ten tables
+being adopted) and the collective revolt against injustice (which led to the
+adoption of the last two tables). The rule of law cannot be established by
+mathematical calculation, but only through the experience of injustice and
+the passions. The narrative of the foundation of Roman Law thus shows
+not only the hubris of human passions which trample the law underfoot,
+but also the hubris of a perfect law determined by numbers. It enables us
+The Foundational Function of Discord 75
+
+24 N Machiavelli , Discourses upon the First Ten (Books) of Titus Livy [ 1517 ], tr N Hill
+Thomson( London , Kegan Paul, Trench &Co , 1883 ) I, 4 . 25 C Lefort , Le Travail de l ’ œ uvre: Machiavel [1972]( Paris , Galli-mard, coll ‘ Tel ’ , 1986 )
+472ff . 26 See, for example, M Villey , Philosophie du droit, t. 1 D é fi nitions et fi ns du droit ( Paris ,
+Dalloz , 1982 ), 43, 76ff . 27 See above, ch 1 , p 14. 28 Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics, tr J. Thompson , rev H Tredennick( London , Penguin
+Books , 1976 )V, 2, 176 – 77.
+
+to understand the logic of the passage from 10, the perfect number, to 12,
+the key to harmony. The Twelve Tables are the result both of rational
+deliberation and of a revolt or struggle inspired by a sense of injustice.
+And even of two struggles: fi rst the plebeians, who fought for Rome to
+adopt a law which was equal for everyone, on the model of Greece; and then
+all the citizens of Rome, to oblige the leaders themselves to submit to the
+law. The primal scene of Roman law thus exposes at once the fruitlessness
+of pursuing an ideal order founded on numbers, and the need for a system,
+however imperfect it may be, founded on experience.
+Machiavelli referred to this founding Roman narrative to prove that good
+laws are those which are born of the experience of confl ict:
+
+In every republic there are two confl icting factions, that of the people and that of
+the nobles; it is in this confl ict that all laws favourable to freedom have their origin
+[ … ]. We cannot truly declare …the republic [the Roman Republic] to have been
+disorderly …wherein we fi nd so many instances of virtue; for virtuous actions
+have their origin in right training, right training in wise laws, and wise laws in
+these very tumults which many would thoughtlessly condemn. 24
+
+Machiavelli ’ s discovery is nothing short of scandalous, as Claude Lefort has
+pointed out: in a free republic, the law is not the outcome of level-headed
+reasoning but of the clash of two equally limitless desires, that of the nobles
+to possess ever more; and that of the people not to be oppressed. This is also
+why the law is never laid down once and for all, but is always open to the
+confl icts through which it is reformed. 25
+The Greeks themselves were aware, in their refl ections on law, of the
+impossibility of giving justice a purely mathematical basis. In Nicomachean
+Ethics, Aristotle attempted to express in mathematical terms the different
+types of justice he identifi ed. But contrary to what all the textbooks on the
+philosophy of law say, 26 he discovered three, not two, forms of justice. The
+fi rst two are represented in the allegory of Buon Governo, in the Palazzo
+Pubblico in Siena. 27 We can identify distributive justice, which distributes
+‘ honour or money or such other assets as are divisible among the members
+of the community, 28 and which is proportional to the person ’ s merit, as
+Aristotle describes: ‘ This kind of proportion is called geometrical by mathematicians
+[ … ]. For justice that is distributive is always in accordance with
+the proportion [to merit] because if the distribution is made from common
+76 The Dream of Social Harmony by Numbers
+
+29 ibid, V, 3 – 4, 178 – 79. 30 ibid, V, 4, 181. 31 cf F Ewald , L ’ É tat providence ( Paris , Grasset , 1986 ) 552ff ; C Herrenschmidt , Les Trois
+É critures. Langue, nombre, code ( Paris, Gallimard , 2007 ) 289ff . 32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, (n 31) V, 5, 182 – 83 [ tr mod]. 33 ibid, V, 5, 183 – 84.
+
+funds it will be in the same ratio as the corresponding contributions [to the
+community] bear to one another ’ .
+29 And there is also rectifi catory justice,
+which consists of repairing the harm unjustly infl icted on one person by
+another. This second type of justice obeys an arithmetical, and not a geometrical,
+principle of equality: ‘ What the judge does is restore equality. It is
+as if a line were divided into two unequal parts; the judge takes away that
+by which the greater segment exceeds the half of the line, and adds it to the
+lesser segment ’ .
+30
+However, the typology does not end there. As Fran ç ois Ewald, and later
+Clarisse Herrenschmidt, have noted, 31 Aristotle completes the picture
+with a third type of justice: a justice of proportional reciprocity, which he
+introduces as follows:
+
+The idea of reciprocity does not square with either distributive or rectifi catory
+justice [ … ]. Nevertheless, in associations for exchange, what sustains the community
+is this type of justice, but it is reciprocity based on proportion, not on strict
+equality. [ … ] It is because one returns the equivalent of what one has received that
+the state holds together. 32
+
+This type of justice — which prefi gures our social justice — is, according to
+Aristotle, indispensable to exchange, which alone holds humans together.
+And it requires agreement on a standard which all citizens will respect when
+they exchange the fruits of their labour.
+
+Proportional exchange or requital involves an equation between diametrically
+opposed terms: for example, a builder [A], a shoemaker [B], a house [C], and
+a shoe [D]: the builder receives from the shoemaker part of what he produces,
+and the shoemaker part of the builder ’ s production. There can be no exchange
+or association between them if the transaction is not in some way equal: there
+must, therefore, be one standard by which all commodities are measured.
+This standard is in fact demand, which holds everthing together. …Demand has
+come by convention to be represented by money. It is called money [ nomisma],
+Aristotle continues, because it does not exist naturally but by law [ nomos], and it
+is hence in our power to change it or withdraw it from circulation. 33
+
+This passage is vital for understanding how Aristotle links law and numbers
+in his refl ections on justice. Unlike Plato, he does not regard law as simply
+a stand-in required because of our inability to grasp the mathematical
+truths which govern the universe. Figures and numbers are indeed useful —
+they can illustrate the defi nitions of distributive and rectifi catory justice,
+as Aristotle shows — but they cannot determine social bonds. The need to
+The Foundational Function of Discord 77
+
+34 Herrenschmidt, Les Trois É critures (n 34) 299.
+
+bring together similar needs but different activities is what produces the
+social bond, and Aristotle provides no mathematical formulation for this
+third type of justice. Likewise, money is not conceived as the spontaneous
+expression of the fair price of the products of human labour, but as a
+‘ substitute for demand ’ , which serves as a common measure for the goods
+to be exchanged; it is based on law and not number, as the derivation of
+numisma from nomos illustrates. The justice of transactions is therefore
+neither a question of mathematics nor of morals: if I wish to measure the
+value of the work of a trader on the fi nancial markets or a nurse in a hospital,
+I require neither calculations, nor ethics, but law. And more specifi cally,
+today, social law.
+Clarisse Herrenschmidt has shown, in her Les Trois É critures, that the
+awareness of the limits of mathematical rationality for the organisation of
+human affairs was infl uenced by the discovery of irrational numbers such
+as √2 — the length of the hypotenuse of the simplest right-angled triangle —
+which cannot be represented as a ratio of integers. In her view, this sort of
+incommensurable length led, during the fourth century BC, to the replacement
+of geometrical fi gures on coins by political symbols: ‘ If there exist
+magnitudes without a common measure, then everything is not proportional
+to everything else. Consequently, the arithmetical-geometric quality
+of monetary writing had no basis other than human beings and their squabbles
+’ .
+34 With these discoveries, the dream of having human communities
+governed by a mathematically deducible harmony, in tune with the music of
+the spheres, disappeared. Yet it is a dream which has continued to haunt the
+West in different guises up to our own times — and sometimes in the form
+of a nightmare.
+1 A de Tocqueville , The Old Regime and the Revolution, Vol II , Notes on the French
+Revolution and Napoleon [ 1856 ], tr AS Kahan , ed and intr F Furetand F M é lonio( Chicago ,
+University of Chicago Press , 1998 )Ch 5, 57 [ tr mod]. 2 cf F B é darida , J Bouvier, F Caron, I Cloulas, Marec, Briand, Desrosières, et al , Pour une
+histoire de la statistique, Vol 1 ( Paris , INSEE/Economica , 1987 ) ; P Cline Cohen , A Calculating
+People: The Spread of Numeracy in Early America [ 1982 ] (London, Routledge , 1999 ) ;
+L Daston , Classical Probability in the Enlightenment, 2nd edn [1988] ( Princeton , Princeton
+University Press , 1995 ) ; A Desrosi è res , La Politique des grands nombres. Histoire de la raison
+statistique ( Paris , La D é couverte , 1993 , 2000 (2nd ed)) ; TM Porter , Trust in Numbers. The
+Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life ( Princeton , Princeton University Press , 1995 ) . 3 On these differences, cf A Desrosi è res, La Politique des grands nombres (ibid) 28ff.
+
+5
+
+The Development of Normative Uses
+of Quantifi cation
+
+The notion of government has been simplifi ed: numbers alone make laws and the
+law. Politics has been reduced to a question of arithmetic.
+
+Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution1
+
+S
+OME REMARKABLE HISTORICAL scholarship has been carried
+out over the last 30 years on the quantifi cation of economic and social
+facts in the modern era, 2 showing the state’s concern with perfecting
+instruments to measure its wealth and population. The most important of
+these instruments is statistics, a term derived from the German Staatistik, a
+‘ science of the state ’( Staatswissenschaft), but whose contents actually corresponded
+more to what in England was called ‘ political arithmetic ’ . The
+difference was that Staatistik sought to give an overall picture of the state
+without using quantifi cation, whereas ‘ political arithmetic ’ , or statistics,
+was entirely based on quantitative surveys. 3 Although, in both cases, the
+normative uses of quantifi cation seem to have the state as their central protagonist,
+in fact they were fi rst developed in the private sphere, to assist in
+business management. We shall therefore start with this corporate sphere,
+before examining the much better known history of the rise of public statistics
+and calculations of probability. From the different uses of quantifi cation,
+both private and public, we shall be able to tease out its four normative
+functions, as they developed historically: accounting; managing; judging;
+and legislating.
+Accounting 79
+
+I. ACCOUNTING
+
+Accounting ledgers are doubtless the fi rst modern expression of the link
+made between numbers and law, quantifi cation and legal obligation. In its
+Commercial Code, French law defi nes the ‘ fi nancial obligations applicable
+to all traders ’in the following terms:
+
+Article L 123-12— All natural or legal persons with the status of trader shall
+enter in their accounts the movements affecting the value of their company. These
+movements shall be recorded chronologically.
+
+These persons must check the existence and value of the assets and liabilities of the
+company by means of an inventory at least once every twelve months.
+
+They must prepare annual accounts at the end of the fi nancial year in view of the
+entries made in the accounts and the inventory. These annual accounts shall consist
+of the balance sheet, 4 the profi t and loss account 5 and an annex, all of which
+shall form an inseparable whole.
+
+Article L 123-14— The annual accounts shall be honest and truthful and shall
+ensure a fair representation of the assets, fi nancial situation and results of the
+company.
+
+Where the application of an accounting requirement is not suffi cient to ensure
+the fair representation indicated in this article, additional information must be
+provided in the annex.
+
+If, in an exceptional case, the application of an accounting requirement proves
+to be unsuitable in order to ensure a fair representation of the assets, fi nancial
+situation or results, an exception must be made to this. This exception shall be
+indicated in the annex and duly reasoned, with an indication of its effect on the
+assets, fi nancial situation and results of the company.
+
+In this defi nition, accounting operates within four legal parameters. First, the
+obligation to prepare accounts. Merchants must be able to account for their
+activities before third parties, and preparing accounts is part of this commercial
+liability, which is not solely to contracting parties but beyond this
+to the state and the public in general. 6 The term ‘ accountability ’precisely
+contains an idea of fi nancial liability, requiring an accountor (who must render
+account), an accountee (to whom the accounts are submitted) and an
+accountant (who prepares the accounts). Today, accounting obligations are
+enshrined in law, but in the medieval period, when modern accounting was
+
+4 The balance sheet shows the company ’ s assets at a particular moment, namely at the end
+of the accounting year. 5 This account shows the profi t and losses for the accounting period, and justifi es the overall
+result. 6 The concept of ‘ commercial liability ’does not seem to have been studied for itself in
+recent doctrine. See the nomenclature of the tradesman ’ s responsibilities in Jacques Mestre ,
+Isabelle Arnaud-Grossi, Laure Merland, Marie-Eve Pancrazi, Nancy Tagliarimo- Vignal , Droit
+commercial, 29th edn( Paris , LGDJ , 2012 ) 249ff, 236ff .
+80 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+fi rst invented, they were stipulated by the guilds, or what Berthold Goldman
+has called the lex mercatoria.7 Later, the Italian city states made book-keeping
+obligatory for merchants, as a system of proof and a way of preventing
+bankruptcy. Etymologically, ‘ bankruptcy ’is the destruction of the bench; that
+is, the counter the bankrupt merchant had occupied in the marketplace. From
+the outset, then, keeping accounts was one of the merchant’s responsibilities.
+Secondly, accounting is a way of accrediting a truth through an image.
+The notion of ‘ fair view ’(in French, ‘ image fi d è le’ ; a faithful image), which
+recurs in Article L 123-14 of the French Commercial Code (introduced via
+the European Directive no 78/660/CEE of 25 July 1978) is an abbreviation
+of the English formula, ‘ true and fair view ’ . The accounting image thus
+has the status of an icon: religious icons unite a community of the faithful
+around a religious truth, just as accounting images federate a community of
+merchants around a legally backed truth. With this shared faith in a divine
+guarantor for pledges made, merchants could obtain credit from one end of
+Europe to the other. 8 As late as the nineteenth century, many industrialists
+placed their accounting books under the protection of God. And inversely,
+when the accounting image proves deceptive, such that it can no longer
+inspire collective belief, the whole community falls apart. This is what happened
+with the American company Enron. Having risen to stratospheric
+heights on the stock exchange, it crashed over a couple of weeks at the end
+of 2001, when the accounting ploys on which its apparent wealth had been
+based became known. 9 The Sarbanes-Oxley Law passed by the American
+Congress in 2002 showed the lessons learnt: the law strengthened accounting
+regulations and attempted to break the collusion between companies and
+audit fi rms, but more importantly it reactivated the old religious principle on
+which the veracity of accounts is based, by obliging the heads and fi nancial
+directors of quoted companies to certify their books under oath. Foreign
+companies trading on the US markets were under the same obligation, with
+stiff penalties for non-compliance. 10 The accounts must be a true and a fair
+image because they are a vital pillar of the market system, a point of articulation
+of the true and the just. As such, accounting standards necessarily
+
+7 B Goldman , ‘ Fronti è res du droit et lex mercatoria ’in Archives de philosophie du droit,
+( Paris, Dalloz, 1964 ) 177 ; and, by the same author: ‘ La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et
+l ’ arbitrage internationaux: r é alit é s et perspectives ’ , Clunet, 1979, 475. P Lagarde , ‘ Approche
+critique de la lex mercato-ria ‘in Le Droit des relations é conomiques internationales. É tudes
+offertes àBertold Goldman ( Paris , Litec , 1987 ) 125 – 50 . 8 cf A Supiot , Homo juridicus. On the Anthropological Function of the Law, tr S Brown
+( London , Verso , 2007 ) 153ff . (With this shared faith in a divine guarantor for pledges made,
+merchants could obtain credit from one end of Europe to the other.) 9 See M-A Frison-Roche(ed), Les Le ç ons d ’ Enron. Capitalisme, la d é chirure ( Paris , Autrement
+, 2002 ) . 10 See P Lanois , L ’ Effet extraterritorial de la loi Sarbanes-Oxley (Paris, É ditions Revue
+Banque , 2008 ) .
+Accounting 81
+
+refer to a certain representation of justice, and are not simply politically
+neutral technical norms. Only ignorance, or the wish to mask this political
+dimension, can have led the EU to entrust accounting standardisation to a
+private agency, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 11
+Thirdly, accounting is also the fi rst modern system to have conferred on
+numbers the value of a legally backed truth. As the French Commercial
+Code states, the fi gures acquire probative force: ‘ Article L 123-23 — Duly
+kept accounts may be accepted by the courts in order to act as proof between
+traders in respect of commercial instruments ’ .
+12 The way these fi gures were
+arrived at, and the many qualitative decisions taken to get there, simply
+fall away, unlike what occurs when a law has been passed or a contract
+has been signed. For whereas laws or contracts are expressed in a natural
+language and so remain open to interpretation, numbers are not accessible
+in this way. The dogmatic value assigned to numbers in certifi ed accounts is
+not absolute, however. An Annex which ‘ shall supplement and comment on
+the information given in the balance sheet and the profi t and loss account ’
+confi rms that the accounting presentation is true and fair, when this cannot
+be perceived from the fi gures alone.
+Lastly, accounting is the fi rst technique to have made money into a
+universal standard of value. Money makes different things commensurable.
+13 Its function as a unit of measurement is different from its function
+as a means of payment, and there is no reason why the two should
+be confl ated, as we do today. 14 In a barter economy, one should be able
+to exchange a consultation with a doctor for a certain number of bottles
+of wine, by referring each to the same unit of account. This unit
+would simply serve as a reference for both parties, and not as a means
+to dissolve the obligation, which is only done by handing over the bottles.
+The idea of separating these two functions of money recurs periodically.
+Keynes, for instance, tried to do this after the Second World War
+when he proposed an accounting currency which he called the ‘ bancor ’
+as an international monetary reference, to protect the economy from
+national currency manipulation (and from the hegemony of the dollar —
+which is why Keynes ’ s proposal failed). More recently, the French statesman
+Jean-Pierre Chev è nement proposed a similar uncoupling, in order to
+compensate for the evident design faults of the single European currency. 15
+
+11 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002. 12 French Commercial Code, Art L 123-23. 13 cf above, ch 4 , pp 76–77. 14 Money has yet another distinct function, as a reserve currency, which raises other problems.
+On the legal analysis of these different functions, see R Libchaber , Recherches sur la
+monnaie en droit priv é ( Paris , LGDJ , 1992 ) . 15 J-P Chev è nement , 1914 – 2014. L ’ Europe sortie de l ’ histoire ? ( Paris , Fayard , 2013 ) 295ff .
+And on this defect, F Lordon , La Malfa ç on. Monnaie europ é enne et souverainet éd é mocratique
+( Paris , Les Liens qui lib è rent , 2014 ) .
+82 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+The euro could indeed cease to be the means of payment in France, without
+even having to change the provisions of the Commercial Code, which states
+that ‘ The accounting documents shall be expressed in Euros and drafted in
+the French language ’ (Article L 123-22 )’ .
+16 Ever since the Bretton Woods
+agreement was abandoned in 1971, money has been treated as a commodity
+like any other, but this can only be sustained if its function as a measure
+of value is concealed. On any market worthy of the name, the weights
+and measures which are the common reference enabling exchange to take
+place cannot themselves be treated as things to be exchanged. The refusal
+to consider this foundational function of money inevitably ruins any market
+economy. 17 Be that as it may, accounting exploits money ’ s function as
+a standard of value, to measure not only the value of existing goods of all
+sorts, but also credit-worthiness, or, more generally, future values. In other
+words, the word ‘ accounting ’is deceptive: it precisely does not count (in the
+sense of enumerating things of the same nature); rather it evaluates; and it
+evaluates not only what is, but also what may be, using money as a way of
+taming the future.
+This fi rst form of government by numbers was not introduced by states,
+but by businesses. Although accounting techniques already existed in antiquity,
+especially in Ancient Rome, 18 it was in the medieval era that modern
+accountancy emerged, with the keeping of personal accounts and later
+the invention of the partita doppia, the double-entry system, by the merchants
+of large Italian towns. 19 This system solved the problems raised by
+the expansion of credit. Books in which the infl ow and outfl ow of goods
+and money were entered as they arose were not suitable for credit arrangements
+with suppliers or clients. If I have granted a credit of 1,000 fl orins
+to a client, I can never be absolutely certain that I will recover the sum, so
+I cannot enter it as an available asset. By the same token, if I have a debt
+of 1,000 fl orins with a supplier, it must fi gure on the books, even if these
+1,000 fl orins are still in my account. To give a faithful representation of
+these operations, merchants therefore opened specifi c accounts: ‘ client ’and
+‘ supplier ’accounts for the operations of credit; and ‘ sales ’and ‘ purchases ’
+for the corresponding transfers of goods. They then opened more specifi c
+
+16 French Commercial Code, Art L 123-22. 17 cf L Fantacci , La moneta. Storia di un ’istituzione mancata ( Venice , Marsilio , 2005 ) 276 ;
+S Jub é , Droit social et normalisation comptable ( Paris , LGDJ , 2011 ) 63ff . 18 For the case of Rome, see G Minaud , La Comptabilit é àRome. Essai d ’ histoire é conomique
+sur la pens é e comptable commerciale et priv é e dans le monde antique romain ( Lausanne ,
+Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes , 2005 ) . 19 On this history, see J-H Vlaemminck , Histoires et doctrines de la comptabilit é ( Bruxelles ,
+Treurenberg , 1956 ) ; (Brussels, Treurenberg Press, 1956; rpt. Vesoul, Pragnos Press, 1979);
+Y Lemarchand , Du d é p é rissement àl ’ amortissement. Enqu ê te sur l ’ histoire d ’ un concept et de
+sa traduction comptable ( Rennes , Ouest É ditions 1993 ) 719 ; S Jub é , Droit social et normalisation
+comptable ( Paris , LGDJ , 2011 ) 673 .
+Accounting 83
+
+accounts corresponding to the elements of their wealth which could be identifi
+ed as a source of expenditure or income. All these books were kept in the
+same accounting currency, which could be different from the currency used
+for payment. When a sale occurred on credit, the same sum was entered in
+the ‘ sales ’and in the ‘ clients ’account. When this debt was settled, the sum
+was entered in the ‘ clients ’and the ‘ cash ’accounts. Thus any economic
+operation gave rise to at least two accounting entries. This is why historians
+regard keeping separate accounts for credit operations as the origin of
+double-entry book-keeping.
+In the words of the great German historian and sociologist Werner Sombart
+— to whom we owe the word ‘ capitalism ’ — ‘ capitalism and doubleentry
+book-keeping are absolutely inseparable; their relation to one another
+is as form to content ’ .
+20 The invention of the double-entry system went hand
+in hand with other legal techniques which were also highly successful — bills
+of exchange, discounts, endorsements and trusts. When analysed closely, all
+of these credit transactions reveal the dogmatic basis on which the market
+economy rests: they are all implicitly backed up by a third, who acts as a
+guarantor. The normative force invested in numbers through these key innovations
+was closely linked to the introduction of algebra in Europe. 21 The
+arithmetical and geometric fi gures of equality used by Aristotle to illustrate
+his theory of justice only allowed known magnitudes to be compared. With
+algebraic equations, equality became a question, and algebra could help
+arrive at the numerical value of a certain number of unknowns. 22 Doubleentry
+book-keeping exploited these new techniques. It brought within the
+sphere of calculation elements which had previously been excluded: not
+only the money one has, but all the resources mobilised for one ’ s trade;
+not only the value of one ’ s present goods, but also an estimation of future
+values. Additionally, double-entry book-keeping gave the legal principle of
+equality a new systematising power, since charts of numbers were organised
+according to a rigorous principle of equal rights and obligations.
+
+20 W Sombart , Der moderne Kapitalismus. Historisch-systematische Darstellung des gesamteurop
+ä ischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anf ä ngen bis zur Gegenwart [ fi nal edition , 1928 ]
+( Berlin, Duncker &Humblot , 1986 ) ; passage translated into French by M Nikitin in Cahiers
+de l ’ histoire de la comptabilit é , 2, 19ff., quoted by B Colasse , Les Fondements de la comptabilit
+é ( Paris , La D é couverte , 2007 ) 10 . See also W Sombart , Der Bourgeois. Zur Geistesgeschichte
+des modernen Wirtschaftsmenschen [1913], English tr as The Quintessence of Capitalism:
+A Study of the History and Psychology of the Modern Business Man, tr and ed M Epstein
+( New York City , EP Dutton , 1915 ) . 21 The fi rst systematic exposition of double-entry book-keeping was in the work of a mathematician
+and monk, Luca Pacioli , entitled Summa de arithmetica, geometria, proporzioni et
+proporzionalita ( Venice , 1494 ) . But it makes up only one chapter of this work, which remained
+famous for introducing algebra into the West, from Arab scholars. Pacioli also elaborated the
+notion of ‘ divine proportion ’(see above, ch 4 , p 72), which he took as the title of a later work
+illustrated by Leonardo da Vinci ( De Divina Proportione [1509], French tr G Duschesne and
+M Giraud (Librairie du Compagnonnage, 1980)). 22 I owe this insight to Pierre-Yves Narvor, philosopher-scholar and mathematician.
+84 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+This new form can be discussed alongside the contemporary invention
+of the laws of perspective, which conferred a comparable objectivity on
+depictions of reality. 23 Tables of fi gures (or, later, statistical tables) can be
+regarded as a sort of portrait, an objective fi guration of reality. The French
+language already points to this meaning, through its designation of the chart
+of accounts as a tableau chiffr é (literally, a fi gured table or fi gured painting).
+Michel Foucault famously gives a foundational role to painting in his
+‘ archaeology of the human sciences ’ .
+24 However, painting is only one way
+of projecting an image onto a fl at surface. It should be relativised by two
+others: the map and the mirror. 25 ‘ The merchant ’ s mirror, ’a metaphor often
+used to describe accounting, and found in the title of Richard Dafforne ’ s
+1636 treatise on book-keeping, published in London, The Merchant ’ s
+Mirrour, or Directions for the Perfect Ordering and Keeping of his
+Accounts,
+26 can be regarded as a precursor of our legal concept of ‘ faithful
+image ’or fair view. What gives double-entry book-keeping its originality
+and power is that fundamentally heterogeneous things, people and operations
+are presented as a coherent and homogeneous whole, by the use of a
+unit of account which ‘ views ’them all from the same perspective, showing
+the relative importance of each one ’ s place in the fi nancial life of the company.
+The laws of perspective result in exactly the same ordering effect, since
+the size of each object in a painting will be exactly proportional to its distance
+from the spectator ’ s viewpoint, irrespective of any qualitative criteria.
+Of course, this objectivity is as fabricated in the case of book-keeping as
+it is in painting, where the composition will vary according to the spectator
+being addressed, and the desired effect. Today ’ s dominant accounting regulations,
+which are Anglo-American, have always privileged the viewpoint of
+investors; the fi nancial reports accordingly seek to gain their trust, and to
+enable them to form an opinion on the accounts. In mainland Europe, by
+contrast, the accounting tradition has always addressed the state, particularly
+the tax authorities: it is for them that a company ’ s accounts should
+appear transparent. And the books would look different again if the privileged
+viewpoint were that of the people whose work keeps the company
+going. At present, employees are regarded as a liability and an expense. 27
+This is one of the reasons for share-price-induced redundancies, which
+
+23 cf S Jub é , ‘ De quelle entreprise les normes comptables internationales permettent-elles de
+rendre compte ? ’in A Supiot(ed), L ’ Entreprise dans un monde sans fronti è res ( Paris , Dalloz ,
+2015 ) 147 – 63 . 24 M Foucault , The Order of Things. An Archeology of the Human Sciences, ( London ,
+Tavistock Publications , 1970 ) . 25 VI Stoichita , L ’ Instauration du tableau ( Gen è ve , Droz , 1999 ) 207ff . 26 Quoted by Y Lemarchand, ‘ Le Miroir du marchand. Norme et construction de l ’ image
+comptable ’ , in A Supiot (ed), Tisser le lien social ( ch 2fn 47) 213. 27 cf on this point Jub é , Droit social et normalisation comptable (n 19).
+Managing 85
+
+automatically show up as ‘ value creation ’ , whereas in reality they drain the
+lifeblood of a company, sometimes bleeding it to death like an over-greedy
+vampire. So, there is nothing mechanical about the recording of numerical
+data, not even according to the same accounting standards. The information
+is fi ltered through a range of possible presentations, highlighting or playing
+down this or that aspect, in a process of window dressing or, at the other
+extreme, of ‘ creative accounting ’close to cooking the books. However, none
+of this will be visible in the fi nal fi nancial statements and, if well executed,
+they will have the persuasive self-evidence of a truth. Unlike scientifi c truths,
+which are always a modifi able approximation of the state of the world, legal
+truths fi x a certain representation of the world and continue to produce
+their normative effects as long as people continue to believe in them. Their
+veracity does not depend on fl uctuating empirical data but on the trust they
+are able to elicit, in this case, trust in the accounting image presented by a
+company regarding its economic situation. If that trust falters, either for
+good reasons (too wide a gap between the accounting image and reality) or
+for bad ones (a rumour, stock-market panic), then the company ’ s credit will
+plummet, as occurred in the Enron scandal.
+Double-entry book-keeping has a further crucial characteristic, which
+is its application of an unbending principle of balance to the represented
+system of rights and obligations. The term ‘ balance ’comes via the Italian
+bilancio from the Latin bilanx, used to designate a pair of scales in which
+two ( bis) pans ( lancis) are in equilibrium. Everything on the balance sheet
+must, precisely, be balanced. The merchant can see at once the state of his
+company and the entries he can act on to ensure it does not go under. In
+other words, the books present the company as a homeostatic whole whose
+internal equilibrium must be respected. The company director must react to
+the numerical information given by the accounts, in order to avoid spiralling
+imbalances becoming so critical that the company collapses in entropy.
+Profi t and loss, from this perspective, are simply indicators which need to
+be interpreted in the light of other fi gures. This is why the pressure from
+the fi nancial markets to get fi xated on ‘ the bottom line ’ — the company ’ s net
+balance — can lead to suicidal strategies, if to increase profi ts one loses the
+skills (which themselves are excluded from the company ’ s accounts) which
+ensured the company ’ s market position in the fi rst place. This is the slippery
+slope on which ‘ fabless ’companies navigate, in their belief that they will be
+able to keep on amassing golden eggs while outsourcing the goose which
+lays them.
+
+II. MANAGING
+
+In the Roman Republic, the population census which was carried out
+every fi ve years ended on a ritual of purifi cation, the lustrum, to mark the
+86 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+city ’ s rebirth. The two specialist legal experts, or censors, who were entrusted
+with this task through a non-renewable mandate counted the citizens
+and the goods they possessed, appointed senators, and supervised public
+morality. ‘ Census ’and ‘ censorship ’in modern English retain a reference to
+this dual function, just as ‘ lustre ’denotes a period of time (fi ve years) as well as
+a literal and metaphorical radiance (the Latin l ūstr āre means to purify ceremonially,
+to expiate or redeem). Thomas Berns has shown in a recent book
+how a long line of early modern jurists sought to have the Roman institution
+of the censor restored, among them Jean Bodin, Lipsius, and Montchrestien,
+and, on the Protestant side, Althusius. 28 Censors, like judges, were
+legal offi cers, but unlike judges, they did not apply the law. Instead, their
+task resembled what could be called — without fear of anachronism — public
+management, a knowledge-based activity.
+The Roman censor ’ s primary function was to provide the sovereign with
+knowledge of human and material resources, and thus to contribute to
+the country ’ s political economy, dissolving the limit Aristotle had drawn
+between the oikos and the polis, and treating state administration on the
+one hand, and the management of a company or a family on the other in
+the same terms. The most important knowledge provided by the censors
+was that of the distribution of wealth within the population, this being,
+ever since the Middle Ages, construed as a ‘ mirror of the Prince ’in the same
+way as accounting was a ‘ mirror of the merchant ’ . It allowed the monarch
+to gauge his own importance and that of his kingdom. The metaphor of the
+mirror was also used to refer to the fi rst codifi cations of laws; for example,
+the famous Sachsenspiegel, the mirror of the Saxons, a code of laws in
+Middle Low German. Whereas the mirror of the laws composed the image
+of an ideal order for the sovereign and his subjects to contemplate, the
+mirror held up by the censors was supposed to present the kingdom as it
+really was. This ‘ mirror of the prince ’became the ‘ mirror of the nation ’a
+few centuries later, and continues today in the form of ONS in the UK or
+Eurostat at the European level.
+Equipped with this knowledge, the sovereign could act on two fronts.
+First, he could correct over-large disparities in wealth. Political and legal
+thought at the time was particularly sensitive to the fact that such inequalities
+were a source of unrest and sedition, and thus a threat to law and order.
+Francis Bacon spared no one on this point, comparing money to muck that
+must not be allowed to accumulate if one wants it to fertilise the land and
+
+28 T Berns , Gouverner sans gouverner. Une arch é ologie politique de la statistique ( Paris ,
+PUF , 2009 ) 163 . This book expands an analysis already present in Berns’s Souverainet é , droit
+et gouvernementalit é . Lectures du politique moderne àpartir de Bodin (Brussels, Léo Scheer,
+2005) 183ff. On this history, see Jean-Claude Perrot ’ s earlier Une histoire intellectuelle de
+l ’ é conomie politique ( Paris , EHESS , 1992 ) 143ff .
+Managing 87
+
+not pollute the atmosphere. 29 Secondly, the sovereign ’ s knowledge was to
+allow the deserving poor to be distinguished from those whom Montchr étien
+called ‘ importunate beggars ’ 30 and, more generally enable ‘ banishment
+of the vagabonds, the idle, the thieves, the tricksters and the ruffi ans ’ ,
+31 in
+Bodin ’ s words. To banish is also to make public — one publishes marriage
+banns — a publicity which in this case is both a punishment and a way of
+making society transparent to itself. In Bodin ’ s time, only individuals were
+targeted, but today whole nations are demoted by rating agencies and made
+to toe the line by the IMF or the European troika. And information technology
+helps realise the vision of a society laid bare for its leaders to observe,
+in a way Bodin and the Chinese Legalists could not have hoped for in their
+wildest dreams. But might this transparency, Bodin nonetheless asked, lead
+to tyranny ?Certainly not, he replied, and for at least two reasons: the honest
+citizen has nothing to hide; 32 and besides, this transparency does not
+constrain people from the outside, as would a sentence handed down by
+a judge, but from within, by encouraging everyone to behave well. Unlike
+Justice, who is armed with a sword but who is also blindfold so as not to see
+particularities, the budding discipline of statistics has no power to coerce,
+but it wants to see absolutely everything. 33
+So once again we come upon the fi gure of the government of souls, dear
+to both the Pope and the Tenn ô of imperial Japan. The population censuses
+in the Bible likewise have a religious dimension, and are to be performed
+only under God ’ s instructions, and within the limits He poses. 34 God alone
+keeps the register of souls, and King David even regrets that he complied
+with God ’ s order 35— but maybe it was Satan ’ s 36— to conduct a census of the
+populations of Israel and Juda. The institution of the censor, in encouraging
+spontaneous compliance with the rules of a society which had been made
+self-transparent, contains in embryonic form all the ingredients of participatory
+management. The only elements lacking were the ‘ objective ’images
+which today statistics and indicators, after two centuries ’development, can
+provide of everyone ’ s activities.
+Since the census ’ s primary function was to assess the wealth of the kingdom,
+it is hardly surprising that the legislative fi eld in which statistics developed
+most spectacularly was taxation. As the historian Jean-Claude Perrot
+
+29 F Bacon ‘ Of Seditions and Troubles ’in The Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral [ 3rd ed ,
+1625 ] . 30 A de Montchr é tien , Trait éd ’ é conomie politique [ 1615 ] ( Gen è ve , Droz , 1999 ) 237 . 31 J Bodin, Six Books Of The Commonwealth, tr MJ Tooley (Oxford, Blackwell, 1955),
+VI, 1 (quoted by T Berns, Souverainet é , droit et gouvernementalit é (n 28) 194). 32 Bodin, ibid. 33 cf Berns, Gouverner sans gouverner (n 28) 134 – 35. 34 Numbers, I, 49. 35 The Book of Samuel, II, 24:10. 36 Chronicles, Book One, 21:1 – 17.
+88 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+has remarked, ‘ the overlap of the census and taxation was for many years
+the best and the worst motivations for book-keeping ’ .
+37 The example he
+takes is from the early eighteenth century, and Vauban ’ s research into the
+possibility of introducing a royal levy. To assess the potential yield of this
+policy, Vauban used two different methods. He isolated a ‘ proportional
+mean ’of several measurements of the same object (for example, the surface
+area of the kingdom), and he calculated a ‘ mean value ’arrived at by
+aggregating heterogeneous data into ‘ a sort of whole ’ .
+38 For example, he
+calculated average agricultural yields using data from different parishes or
+years. Whereas quantities had previously been estimated purely pragmatically
+(with the idea of ‘ grosso modo ’ , ‘ taking the good years and the bad ’ ,
+‘ all things told ’ ), taxation gave rise to new techniques of quantifi cation, and
+new entities such as ‘ sorts of wholes, ’which then became operative categories
+in law.
+The normative force of these new categories increased considerably when
+the state acquired powerful tools for carrying out censuses, and for calculating
+and comparing quantifi ed data on the country ’ s population. The
+two types of mean identifi ed by Vauban — an objective average, calculated
+from many imperfect observations of the same object, and a subjective average,
+derived from the aggregation of heterogeneous objects — could then be
+combined. Adolphe Qu é telet who, despite his profession as an astronomer,
+is regarded as one of the founding fathers of statistics and sociology, used
+these methods. When the exhaustive data he had gathered on the number of
+births, deaths, marriages, crimes, etc, was plotted on a graph, there appeared
+regularities which, for example for statistics of fertility, had the form of a
+bell (the ‘ Gaussian function ’ ): the pinnacle of the bell corresponded to the
+age of greatest fertility. One hundred years earlier, Johann Peter S ü ß milch,
+a Prussian pastor and almoner in the army of Frederick II, had seen in this
+type of regularity the expression of a ‘ divine order ’ , which he described as
+follows:
+
+The most wise Creator and Governor of the world brings forth from the nothingness
+the hosts of humans by creating those He has commanded to live. The Lord
+has us all pass in the same way before his eyes, until such a time as each of us,
+having attained the goal decreed, deserts the world ’ s stage. Our emergence, our
+passage before the Lord of Hosts, and our departure all occur in admirable order.
+Our appearance in the land of the living occurs progressively, without precipitation
+and according to certain numbers, which are always in a precise relation to
+the army of the living and the numbers of the departing. Just before we enter the
+land of the living, some of us are struck off the tally, these are the stillborn. But
+even this operation occurs in accordance with fi xed proportions. Two facts are
+
+37 Perrot, Une histoire intellectuelle de l ’ é conomie politique (n 28) 147. 38 ibid, 28 – 29.
+Managing 89
+
+particularly worthy of our attention concerning our emergence from the void:
+20 girls are always born for 21 boys, and the newly born are always a little more
+numerous than those who return to dust. This is how the human army continues
+to increase slightly, but always in a set proportion. 39
+
+Like all nineteenth-century scientists, Qu é telet abandoned the idea of a
+divine order, and used the numerical regularities discovered to construct the
+image of the ‘ average man ’whose role in statistics is the same as that of ‘ the
+normally prudent and diligent man ’ , or the ‘ reasonable person ’in issues of
+civil liability, that is, a standard of normality by which the deviations of individual
+cases may be measured. Qu é telet called the regular effects revealed
+by numbers ‘ binomial law ’ , but Pearson later renamed it ‘ normal law ’[ ‘ loi
+normale’ ]. 40 This shift signalled the emergence of a normality induced from
+the observation of facts, which displaced the legality of the legal system, and
+hence replaced the subject of law with an object of care, through the institution
+of what Foucault has called ‘ biopolitics ’ .
+41
+The ‘ objective laws ’brought to light by quantifi cation inevitably had an
+impact on law. They were based on the supposition of constant causes which
+could explain the observed regularities. The inductive method used did not
+measure the effects of an identifi able cause, but inferred from the unchanging
+nature of certain measurements that constant causes existed. In biology, this
+idea of explaining phenomena through quantifi cation was extraordinarily
+successful because it held out the promise of discovering laws which would
+be as rigorous and unquestionable as the laws of physics. Since legal systems
+attach normative effects to the laws of science, 42 they could certainly not
+ignore these ‘ normal laws ’ , all the more so as Qu é telet and his successors did
+not restrict their quantifi cations to physical features alone, but also calculated
+what was called ‘ moral behaviour ’ , and today would be called socio-cultural
+phenomena such as marriage, suicide or homicide. It becomes clear that no
+simple limit can be drawn between physical and socio-economic features.
+Studying the statistics of mortality, for example, shows differentials linked to
+wealth or working conditions, such that one must impute social causes to physical
+effects. Research of this kind, as carried out, for example, by the doctor
+Louis Ren éVillerm éin the fi rst half of the nineteenth century, encouraged the
+
+39 JP S ü ß milch, Die g ö ttliche Ordnung in den Ver ä nderungen des menschlichen Geschlechts
+aus der Geburt, dem Tode und der Fortpfl anzung desselben, 2 Teile [1st ed 1741, 2nd ed
+1761 – 1762], vol II, ch I, § 14, 468. On these origins, see also H Le Bras , Naissance de la
+mortalit é . L ’ origine politique de la statistique et de la d é mographie ( Paris , Gallimard-Le Seuil ,
+2000 ) . 40 In 1897. cf TM Porter , The Rise of Statistical Thinking ( Princeton , Princeton University
+Press , 1986 ) . 41 cf M Foucault , ‘ Society must be defended ’ , Lectures at the Coll è ge de France, 1975 – 1976,
+tr D Macey( New York City , Picador , 2003 ) . 42 This point is developed in A Supiot , ‘ L ’ autorit éde la science. V é rit éscientifi que et v é rit é
+l é gale ’in P Rosanvallon(ed), Science et D é mocratie. Colloque de rentr é e du Coll è ge de France
+( Paris , Odile Jacob , 2014 ) 81 – 109 .
+90 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+adoption of the fi rst social laws, which were introduced to tackle the relative
+over-representation of death and disease among the working class. 43 The statistical
+measurement of the specifi c physical risks run by certain categories of
+the population was thus pivotal in the birth of social legislation, which was
+the fi rst area to respond to the social differences revealed by quantifi cation.
+The use of the term ‘ social ’here, to qualify a new branch of law, implied
+a new legal representation of society. ‘ Society ’ , as conceived in the French
+1789 Declaration, was an ideal homogeneous body composed of free and
+equal persons (even if this ideal was already compromised by the exclusion
+of women from universal suffrage and, later, when voting was linked to a tax
+threshold, the exclusion of the poor). The only political arithmetic to have
+legal validity was therefore elections — one person, one vote: in Tocqueville ’ s
+words, ‘ the notion of government has been simplifi ed. Numbers alone make
+laws and the law. Politics has been reduced to a question of arithmetic ’ .
+44
+The ‘ society ’sketched by social law is quite different. It is not a homogeneous
+political body, but a ‘ sort of whole ’ , to borrow Vauban ’ s words,
+composed of heterogenous and also dysfunctional elements, as revealed by
+statistical studies and the new discipline of sociology. This ‘ whole ’cannot
+survive without legal measures to support the most vulnerable, above all
+working-class women and children. This is why the jurist Louis Josserand
+gave the name of class law to what was otherwise known as ‘ workers ’law ’
+or ‘ industrial legislation ’ ,
+45 implying that the physical and spiritual hardships
+of this new class were not regarded as facts of nature, but as the consequences
+of the industrial revolution. Social legislation was thus built on
+the conviction that material inequalities such as illness, accidents, or life
+expectancy, but also inequalities in ways of life, had socio-economic causes.
+At the same time, but inversely, socio-biology and racial biology attributed
+physical causes to social phenomena. This was the direction taken by
+Francis Galton (1822 – 1911), a cousin and admirer of Darwin, and one of
+the inventors of biometrics and eugenics, who sought to relate the distribution
+of physical, intellectual and spiritual qualities revealed by statistics to
+natural selection. He advocated eugenicist legislation, to improve the human
+species by encouraging the reproduction of the fi ttest and the most capable,
+and the progressive elimination (through sterilisation) of those whom the
+‘ normal law ’categorised as deviants. 46 Nazi Germany was certainly not the
+only country to pass laws designed to eliminate the ‘ unfi t ’ ; this occurred
+
+43 L-R Villerm é , Tableau de l ’ é tat physique et moral des ouvriers employ é s dans les manufactures
+de coton, de laine et de soie ( Paris , Renouard , 1840 ) ; rpt, É ditions d ’ histoire sociale
+(1979), 2 vols, 458 and 451. 44 de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, Vol II (n 1). 45 L Josserand , ‘ Sur la reconstitution d ’ un droit de classe ’( Dalloz , Recueil hebdomadaire ,
+1937 ) 1 – 4 . 46 cf A Pichot , La Soci é t épure. De Darwin àHitler ( Paris , Flammarion , 2000 ) ; and, by
+the same author, Aux origines des th é ories raciales. De la Bible àDarwin ( Paris , Flammarion ,
+2008 ) .
+Managing 91
+
+in the United States and in almost all the Protestant countries of Northern
+Europe, with the remarkable exception of the United Kingdom. Many progressive
+thinkers viewed the successful opposition to these laws mounted in
+the Catholic countries of Southern Europe as a sign of a reactionary attitude
+going against the movement of history. In some Western countries this
+eugenicist and racial legislation remained in place long after the end of the
+Second World War. In the US, racial laws were abolished only in 1964,
+and the eugenicist legislation in Sweden remained in force until 1976. An
+estimated 63,000 mentally ill and ‘ socially maladjusted ’people (90 %of
+whom were women) were sterilised against their will in application of these
+eugenicist laws in Sweden as from 1934. 47
+Both these ways of articulating physical and socio-economic data, as
+revealed by statistics, supposed that society was a whole, a social body,
+whose laws of functioning can be elucidated by quantifi cation, and whose
+malfunctions can be corrected through legal measures. The social sciences,
+beyond their diversity and their divisions, all defi ned themselves in relation
+to this new object called ‘ Society ’with a capital S, a totality which could be
+contemplated from the outside using the same methods of quantifi cation as
+the natural sciences. The social sciences also sought to found a legal order
+on the ‘ normal laws ’which Society had been shown scientifi cally to obey.
+Legal qualifi cation and statistical qualifi cation were thus interwoven, since
+the law was grounded in ‘ truths ’revealed by the quantifi cation of economic
+and social facts. ‘ Qualifi cation ’ , in both cases, means relating facts to categories
+of thought, but there are important differences between this operation
+in law and in statistics.
+All judicial decisions are based on prior operations of legal qualifi cation.
+The judge who is called upon to decide, for example, whether the suicide
+of an employee in his home can be qualifi ed as a work accident has to
+examine — and possibly broaden — the notion of ‘ industrial accident ’ . This is
+what the French Cour de cassation did when it ruled that ‘ an accident occurring
+at a moment when the employee is no longer in subordination to the
+employer constitutes a work accident if the employee proves that it occurred
+due to the work ’ .
+48 The fact that the employer did not take the necessary
+steps to ensure that the working relationship responsible for the suicide
+did not deteriorate was qualifi ed in the same decision as ‘ gross negligence ’ ,
+with the result that the widow and orphans gained rights to ‘ full redress ’ .
+The judge decides on the qualifi cations — here, ‘ work accident ’ , ‘ gross
+negligence ’ — only after hearing an adversarial debate between the two parties
+[ audi alteram partem]. This debate can be re-opened on appeal or in the
+Supreme Court. Only at the end of this process will a legal truth be fi xed, as
+
+47 cf A Drouard , ‘ Àpropos de l ’ eug é nisme scandinave. Bilan des recherches et travaux
+r é cents ’( 1998 ) Population, 53, 3, 633 – 42 . 48 Civ 2, 22 February 2007, No 05-13771, Bull civ (Bulletin des arr ê ts de la Cour de cassation:
+Chambres civiles) II, No 54.
+92 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+case law. And even then, this truth can be challenged if a judge goes against
+precedent or if Parliament intervenes. In other words, legal qualifi cation
+operates in the refl exive medium of language, and thus remains indefi nitely
+open to reinterpretation.
+Statistical qualifi cation is less easy to grasp because it works behind the
+scenes and does not follow procedural rules in the way legal qualifi cation
+does. Despite this, qualifi cation is a necessary stage in the production of a
+statistical image of social facts because one cannot quantify what has not
+been qualifi ed. Statisticians talk of ‘ conventions of equivalence ’to refer to
+the aggregation of heterogeneous elements into a single whole. 49 This procedure
+is necessary because every enumeration must begin by defi ning what
+is being counted. To count apples, I must begin by distinguishing them from
+pears and plums. And if they are for immediate consumption, I shall have
+to separate the ripe from the unripe and the rotten apples. Since, not unlike
+us humans, apples do not change overnight from immaturity to maturity,
+and on to the disorders of old age, I shall have to decide like a judge how
+to qualify each of my apples in order to single out the edible ones. If I am
+an apple-seller, I will be tempted to qualify as edible an apple which a more
+demanding client would qualify as rotten. In other words, the qualifi cation
+of the objects of a calculation implies a standard of judgment which is not
+itself an object of calculation, but which makes the calculation possible.
+In some cases, statistics simply adopts pre-existing legal qualifi cations, as
+when it counts work accidents or the national population. In other cases,
+however, it uses its own categories, which may then carry over into law.
+This is precisely what happened with the category ‘ unemployed ’ , which
+was a category invented by labour statisticians in the late nineteenth
+century. 50 However, the constant is always the construction of equivalences,
+so that heterogeneous elements may nonetheless be counted. Although
+these conventions of equivalence may be as hotly debated as any issue in the
+court room or before parliament, statistical qualifi cation still differs in two
+essential respects from the work of a judge. Since statistics are supposedly
+the preserve of technical experts, the decisions are not the object of revisable
+open debate, and there is no standard procedure by which qualifi cations
+may be contested. Secondly, once the element has been qualifi ed, it is used
+not to judge but to count, to fi x the facts of the case in fi gures not letters.
+In other words, the pronouncements of statistics lie outside the refl exive
+medium of language, and this gives them a very particular dogmatic power.
+This symbolic power of numbers was reinforced by the use of what are
+called Arabic numerals, transmitted by the Arab Enlightenment, although
+actually of Indian origin. Unlike Roman or Greek numerals, which retained
+
+49 A Derosi è res , ‘ Entre r é alisme m é trologique et conventions d ’ é quivalence: les ambigu ï t é s
+de la sociologie quantitative ’( 2001/2 ) Gen è ses 43, 112 – 127 . 50 cf R Salais , N Baverezand B Reynaud-Cressent , L ’ Invention du ch ô mage, 1st edn( Paris ,
+PUF , 1986 ) ; 2nd edn (PUF, coll ‘ Quadrige ’ , 1999) 288.
+Judging 93
+
+semantic traces of a particular alphabet, Hindu-Arabic numerals had the
+advantage of being potentially universal (as well as abolishing the distance
+between writing and calculation). They can be compared to sinogrammes,
+which are understood by Chinese people even if they speak different languages:
+they simply have to trace the strokes of the character on a slip of
+paper or on the palm of their hand. But the person they address still has
+to be able to read sinogrammes, whereas the hegemony of Hindu-Arabic
+numerals has universalised the normative force of numbers and realised the
+Babelian dream of a language shared by all humanity. 51
+
+III. JUDGING
+
+Another dilemma central to law, which modern methods of quantifying
+social facts sought to address from the outset, was how to choose rationally
+when in a situation of uncertainty. Legal procedure deals with this, and if
+one were to teach only one area of law in all law faculties it should unquestionably
+be procedure. The aim of every trial is to prevent a confl ict from
+degenerating into fi sticuffs. Legal procedure converts confl ict into litigation,
+that is, into a regulated exchange of arguments under the supervision of a
+third party who will hand down a judgement binding on all parties. The role
+of the judge is to weigh up the arguments in the scales of justice, establish
+the truth or falsehood of the facts produced, and take a decision which shall
+have the force of law.
+The role of the judge is similar to that of a gambler, who also takes decisions
+in situations of uncertainty. Rabelais merged the two in his colourful
+Judge Bridlegoose, who explains to Pantagruel how he decides on cases by
+throwing the dice, ‘ as the custom of the judicatory requires, …and by the
+rule thereof to direct and regulate our actions and procedures ’ .
+52 Throwing
+the dice is entrusting oneself to God ’ s judgement, as Saint Augustine
+observed regarding drawing lots. 53 But ever since Canon law forbade
+bringing God into settling cases in this way, the search for rational proof
+took over. 54 Similarly, the experienced gambler does not simply rely on chance,
+but instead tries to calculate the chances of winning or losing before placing
+his bets. Pascal ’ s famous wager was directed precisely at this calculating gambler.
+If he has not received faith through divine grace, then only he can decide
+
+51 European merchants banned the use of Hindu-Arabic numerals in bookkeeping until the
+end of the fi fteenth century, when its use became standard, long after it had started to be used
+in mathematics ( cf Vlaemminck, Histoires et doctrines de la comptabilit é (n 19) 54). 52 Rabelais, Le Tiers Livre, Édition de Pierre Michel. Préface de Lucien Febvre, (Paris,
+Gallimard, 1973) Ch 39. 53 Saint Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, L I, Ch XXVIII, 29, quoted by E Coumet ,
+‘ La th é orie du hasard est-elle n é e par hasard ? ’( 1970 ) Annales ESC, 3, 578 . 54 cf J-P L é vy , La Hi é rarchie des preuves dans le Droit savant du Moyen  ge depuis la
+renaissance du droit romain jusqu ’ àla fi n du XVIe
+ si è cle ( Paris , Sirey , 1939 ) 174 ; H L é vyBruhl
+, La Preuve judiciaire. É tude de sociologie juridique ( Paris , Marcel Rivi è re et Cie , 1964 ) .
+94 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+whether or not he should believe in the existence of God. Since he has already
+‘ embarked ’on life ’ s journey, he cannot escape this question, but his decision
+will be taken in a situation of uncertainty. Pascal shows that he can decide
+rationally to believe or not, using the same calculations as at the gaming table.
+The mathematical rigour of Pascal ’ s demonstration and its sheer daring (basing
+faith on a calculation) is a precious resource for our understanding of the
+religious dimension of governance by numbers to this very day. Pascal begins
+by showing that certainty and uncertainty are not separated by an unbridgeable
+gulf, but are linked by the ‘ proportion of the chances ’ 55 of gain and loss.
+In the case of the existence of God, the chance is set at a one in two chance.
+All that remains after this step is to apply the amount of the stakes to this
+probability: a libertine but fi nite life on the one hand, and on the other, eternal
+salvation. The maths holds no secrets, and must lead to rational belief, a truth
+of which ‘ all men are capable ’ . One could argue that Pascal does not calculate
+everything rationally because he decides arbitrarily that there is a 1:2 chance
+of winning or losing. However, any other proportion would have given much
+the same result, given that the trump card of infi nity has been introduced
+into the equation. At all events, this is a good example of the impossibility of
+an entirely self-enclosed calculation divorced from any reference to a value
+judgement, a qualitative moment underpinning the demonstration. Calculations
+of probability are at once descriptive and normative.
+The problem Pascal was trying to solve in this exploration of probability
+was in fact a question of law: how should losses and gains be allotted
+in the case of breach of an aleatory contract ? 56 As Alain Desrosi è res has
+shown, this question cannot be answered without appealing to an arbiter
+who stands outside the game and is able to construct ‘ spaces of equivalence
+between incompatible, heterogeneous future events which have not yet
+taken place ’ .
+57 Although calculations of probability can replace the qualitative
+operations which a judge carries out in order to arrive at a position
+‘ beyond reasonable doubt ’(the judge ’ s ‘ intime conviction’ ), and although
+these calculations can thus replace legal procedure, the fi gure of the impartial
+third party does not disappear for all that. In making incommensurable
+facts commensurable, the third carries out exactly the same type of operations
+as those undertaken by jurists when they subsume different factual
+situations under the same legal qualifi cation.
+Like the judge, this third must fi rst decide on the truth or falsehood of the
+facts alleged. In the courtroom, this question is ultimately a matter for ‘ the
+prudence of the judge ’ , in the words of Domat, the most brilliant jurist of his
+time (and friend of Pascal). 58 Prudence, one of the four cardinal Christian
+
+55 B Pascal, Les Pensées in Oeuvres Complètes (Paris, Gallimard, 1954), pp 1214–1215. 56 cf E Courmet, ‘La thé orie du hasard est-elle né e par hasard?’ in Annales. Économies,
+Sociétés, Civilisations, no. 3, 1970, pp 574–98. 57 Desrosi è res, La Politique des grands nombres, (n 2) 65. 58 J Domat , Les Loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel [ 1689 – 94 ] ( Paris , M de H é ricourt
+é diteur , 1777 ) 285 .
+Judging 95
+
+virtues — the others being justice, fortitude and temperance — is the faculty
+of discernment thanks to which actions may be guided by an exact representation
+of the truth. The famous sculptures of the tomb of Francis II
+of Brittany portray Prudence as a twin-facing fi gure, representing from the
+front a young woman holding in her right hand a compass, the symbol of
+the measure appropriate to every action, and in her left hand, a mirror. 59
+Due to this mirror, she does not simply face the future, but also looks into
+herself, for self-knowledge, and behind her to the past. No prudent action
+is indeed possible without self-knowledge and the benefi ts of experience,
+as this sculpture also shows, on its reverse side, through the depiction of a
+pensive old man facing away from us and towards the past.
+
+59 On this tomb, cf Fulcanelli , ‘ Les gardes du corps de Fran ç ois II de Bretagne ’ , in Les
+Demeures philosophales et le symbolisme herm é tique dans ses rapports avec l ’ art sacr éet
+l ’ é sot é risme du grand œ uvre, 3rd edn( Paris , Jean-Jacques Pauvert , 1965 ) Vol 2 , 181 – 238 .
+
+Figure 5.1: The Allegory
+of Prudence, one of the
+four cardinal virtues
+which stand at the
+corners of the tomb
+of Francis II, Duke of
+Brittany, and his wife
+Marguerite de Foix,
+sculpted by Michel
+Colombe, Nantes
+Cathedral ©Florian /
+WikiCommons
+96 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+The good judge (whose jurisprudence is authoritative) is thus one who takes
+into account past experience, through self-examination, who is able to
+assess the reliability of the evidence presented concerning the alleged facts,
+and who can anticipate the effects of his decision. A key facilitator of these
+essentially qualitative evaluations is what in French procedure is called the
+principe du contradictoire, which means that the judge decides only on the
+basis of evidence which all the parties to the trial have been able to discuss.
+This is the rule laid down in Article 427 of the French Code of Criminal
+Procedure: ‘ The judge may only base his decision on evidence which was
+submitted in the course of the hearing and adversarially discussed before
+him ’ . The value attributed to a piece of evidence presented to the judge will
+depend on several factors: the conditions surrounding it (a testimony under
+oath carries greater weight than a simple declaration before a police offi cer),
+on the character of the person testifying (the words of an honest citizen
+are more trustworthy than those of a ruffi an) and on the credibility of the
+facts attested (seeing the Virgin Mary appear is less credible than seeing a
+shepherdess).
+The founding fathers of calculations of probability — Leibniz, Bernoulli,
+and Condorcet — attempted to quantify these types of factors, in order to
+give a numerical value to the possible truth of a reported fact. In her Classical
+Probability in the Enlightenment, Lorraine Daston cites many examples
+of these calculations, as applied in the fi eld of law. 60 Condorcet, in one
+of his M é moires àl ’ Acad é mie royale des sciences, arrived at the following
+formula to calculate the probability of an extraordinary event reported by
+a witness: 61
+
+Let us suppose that u and e represent the probability of the truth of an extraordinary
+event and of the falsity of the same event, and that at the same time u1 and e1
+express that the probability of a testimony will or will not conform to the truth,
+and that a witness has testifi ed to the truth of this event [ … ], the probability that
+the extraordinary event declared true really did occur will be:
+
+uu
+uu ee
+1
+1 1 +
+
+and that it is false:
+ee
+uu ee
+1
+1 1 +
+
+Some years later, Laplace arrived at a signifi cantly more complicated formula
+in his calculations of the probability (P i) of the truthfulness of a
+
+60 Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (n 2) 306 – 69. 61 M-J-A de Condorcet, M é moire sur le calcul des probabilit é s [1786], in Arithm é tique politique:
+textes rares ou in é dits (1767–1789), critical edition with commentaries by Bernard Bru
+and Pierre Cr é pel (Paris, INED- PUF, 1985) 432.
+Judging 97
+
+testimony which claims that a number i was drawn from an urn containing
+n numbers. 62 There are four possibilities, he maintains: the witness
+does not lie and is right (P1 = pr/n); the witness does not lie but is wrong
+(P2 = p[1 − n]/r); the witness lies and is not wrong (P3 = [1 − p][r]/n); and
+the witness lies and is wrong (P4 = [1 − p][1 − r]/n: L). This gives the following
+mathematical formula:
+
+Pi
+
+r
+
+=
+
++ - -
+-
+
++ - + - + - -
+
+pr
+n
+p
+n n
+
+pr
+n
+p r
+n
+p r
+n
+p r
+n
+
+1 1
+
+1
+
+1 1 11
+
+( )( )
+
+( )
+
+( ) ( ) ( )( )
+
+or:
+
+Pi pr p = - -
+- + ( )( ) 1 1
+1
+r
+n
+
+Formulas of this sort already give substance to the dream of replacing
+the judge, who decides impartially on the truth of an alleged fact, with a
+calculating machine. 63 They prefi gure the role of computers in regulating
+the fi nancial markets through governance by numbers. Calculations of
+probability also embody a change in the hierarchy of values by privileging
+considerations of utility over knowledge in the face of uncertainty.
+Pascal ’ s wager already demonstrates this inversion, insofar as his libertine
+has no interest in fathoming the mysteries of existence, all he wants is to
+maximise his winnings. Through calculation, he can evade both the abyss
+of a world devoid of sense, and the absoluteness of a world over-saturated
+with sense. Thus purged of any metaphysical qualms, he can live his life
+in the dimension of the gambling table, which knows neither heights nor
+depths. This shift in values separates Greek investigations — centred on the
+contemplation of the world — from our own, which have to prove their
+usefulness. Usefulness is indeed what gave statistics its momentum: society
+is constructed as an object of knowledge only in order to make it easier
+to manage. Ren éThom has argued that at the turn of the eighteenth and
+nineteenth centuries, the mathematics of control supplanted the mathematics
+of intelligibility, due to the professionalisation of the activity of the
+scholar or scientist: ‘ Armed with the certainties of science, the enlightened
+man gradually transformed into what today we would call a technocrat ’ .
+64
+
+62 P-S de Laplace , Th é orie analytique des probabilit é s [ 1812 ], 3rd edn( Paris , Coursier ,
+1820 ) 457 , quoted by Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (n 2) 335ff. 63 Laplace even applied calculations of probability to judges ’decisions in court, in Essai
+philosophique sur les probabilit é s, 5th edn [1825], preface by Ren éThom (Paris, Christian
+Bourgois, 1986) 136 – 42. 64 Thom, Preface to Laplace, Essai philosophique sur les probabilit é s (n 2) 6 – 7.
+98 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+65 On this debate, see Laplace (n 63 above) 145ff; J-P Benz é cri , L ’ Analyse des donn é es
+( Paris , Dunod , 1973 ) ; Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (n 2) 83ff; Le Bras,
+Naissance de la mortalit é (n 3). 66 A Rowbotham , ‘ The Philosophes and the propaganda for inoculation of smallpox in
+eitheenth-century France ’( 1935 ) University of California Publications in Modern Philology,
+18, 265 – 90 ; AA Rusnock , Quantifying Health and Population in Eigteenth-Century England
+and France ( Cambridge , Cambridge University Press , 2002 ) 249 esp 43 – 91 . 67 cf Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (n 2) 84ff. 68 cf Desrosi è res, La Politique des grands nombres (n 2) 104ff.
+
+IV. LEGISLATING
+
+The fi rst calculations of probability bear this tendency out, in that they did
+not confi ne themselves to establishing certains facts, but additionally sought
+to formulate the rules governing these facts. Calculations of probability thus
+overstepped the limits of stating what is, and concerned themselves with
+what should be. They did not simply describe, they prescribed.
+The legitimacy of probability calculations as a basis for a legal decisions
+was fi rst debated in the context of a public health issue: the question of
+whether inoculation against smallpox should be made obligatory, as a preventive
+measure. 65 It was clear that this would reduce the incidence of the
+illness as a whole, but the inoculation had also caused the death of a number
+of people vaccinated. On the basis of the patchy statistics existing at the
+time, the risk was evaluated at 1/300. When Daniel Bernouilli presented a
+paper to the Academy of Sciences on the subject in 1760, he recommended
+applying a formula similar to the one used for calculating one ’ s chances of
+winning at the lottery. Since the results gave an increased life expectancy of
+about three years for those inoculated, he implicitly recommended inoculation
+for everyone. The case was hotly debated. Bernouilli ’ s argument for
+inoculation was echoed by most of the enlightened minds of the time, especially
+Voltaire, and the issue was framed as a confl ict between the forces of
+progress and of reaction, where progress meant adapting the government of
+men to the facts of science. 66 Among the philosophes, only d ’ Alembert came
+out against, arguing that one could not apply to a problem where human
+lives were at stake a calculation based on incomplete data. 67
+Since then, the questions raised by this famous controversy have not gone
+away. Public health policy is still obliged to take into account the two facets
+of illness, as a quantifi able social fact and as a singular event in a person ’ s
+private life. In the nineteenth century, hygenicist doctors advocating a
+‘ numerical method ’which standardised care on the basis of medical statistics
+fought it out with doctors who set store by clinical experience and
+individualised discussion with the patient. Claude Bernard, who was critical
+of the numerical method, accused it of treating conditions ‘ on average, ’
+instead of using in-depth knowledge of the particular determinations of the
+illness. 68 The fact that the primary factors of illness appeared to be physical
+Legislating 99
+
+69 cf Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (n 2) 175ff. 70 This was the main lesson drawn by European law from the fi nancial crash of 2008.
+See the ‘ Solvency II ’Directive 2009/138/EC of 25 November 2009, on access to the business of
+Insurance and Reinsurance, and their practice. 71 Ewald, L ’ É tat providence, (ch 4 n 31) 143ff.
+
+doubtless helped justify the use of calculations of probability to decide on
+preventive or other treatments, since it seemed legitimate to accept statistical
+regularities which derived from the unchanging and universal laws of
+the physical world. This is why the fi rst applications of probability calculations
+to legal issues all concerned physical phenomena, particularly mortality,
+which the development of statistics could represent in the form of
+quantifi ed tables. The ‘ Galilean sciences ’ , which are also based on measuring
+regularities observed in nature, are not so different. Techniques such as
+life insurance and life annuities, which were still assimilated to games of
+chance in the seventeenth century — and particularly blameworthy ones at
+that, because they played with an individual ’ s life — tended to be considered,
+by the nineteenth century, as a sign of forethought, which the authorities
+would do well to foster in the venerable minds of the pater familias.
+The legitimation of probability calculations started with a Gambling Act
+in the UK, passed in 1774, which made the interests of the person insured
+into the criterion by which to distinguish between insurance (legitimate)
+and a bet (legally void). 69 John Law, and the crash of his system insuring
+lottery losses, was fresh in people ’ s minds. And in order to decide whether
+the insurance contract was ‘ in the interests of the person insured ’ , the question
+posed was: does it imply the long time of foresight, or the short time
+of speculation ?This same question could helpfully be applied today, if only
+there existed some genuine determination to regulate the fi nancial markets.
+For everything points to the fact that insurance on the fi nancial markets has
+become speculative in the way that led to its being banned until the eighteenth
+century. The lifting of this ban — a change which enabled the construction
+of the modern Social State — was not unconditional. The generalisation
+of social statistics seemed to transform uncertain events into calculable
+risks, but these calculations were still screened by a principle of prudence.
+This principle cannot itself be an object of calculation because it applies
+to the essential function of insurance and not just the extent of particular
+fi nancial reserves. In other words, the principle of prudence should oblige
+one to set solvency ratios 70 and limit the activities of insurance to exclude
+speculative operations.
+The importance of insurance in the construction of the social state is
+unquestionable, but its precise role merits closer analysis. Fran ç ois Ewald,
+in his book on the birth of the welfare state, examines the debates which
+led to the inclusion of insurable risk within legal liability. 71 This marked a
+legal turning-point, the beginning, he argues, of a society which had become
+100 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+72 ibid, 390. 73 Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) , 15 July 2010 , Commission v/
+Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-271/08 , Droit social 2010 , 1233 , observations Francis
+Kessler. 74 cf Written Question No 02501 by Mme Marie-No ë lle Lienemann (S é nat, Journal offi ciel,
+18 October 2012, 2262). 75 cf Porter, Trust in Numbers (n 2). 76 cf Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (n 2) 182ff.
+
+totally objectifi able and transparent to itself, regulated by norms rather
+than governed by law. He calls it a ‘ society of insurance techniques ’[ une
+soci é t éassurantielle]. This reading leads him to deny any essential difference
+between social insurance and private insurance. There is no good reason,
+he argues, to oppose them ‘ because both use the same techniques of risk,
+and both proceed by pooling and sharing out the burden of these risks’.
+Thus one could say that within the vast fi eld of ‘ social ’security, that is, of
+security which is mutualised through insurance, what we usually call ‘ Social
+Security ’is but one part. 72 The concept of a society of insurance techniques
+thus leads to the conclusion that social insurance and private insurance are
+functionally equivalent. Both types ‘ pool ’risks and use the same actuarial
+techniques, such that private insurance would be perfectly capable of covering
+those risks today covered by social security. From there, it is a small step
+to maintaining that the choice between the two should depend ultimately
+on their relative cost, set by the market. This step was taken recently by
+the Court of Justice of the European Union, when it stated, in a decision of
+15 July 2010, that ‘ preservation of [those] elements of solidarity is not inherently
+irreconcilable with the application of a procurement procedure ’since
+‘ the pooling of risks, upon which any insurance activity is based [ … ] can be
+ensured by a body or [a] undertaking ’ .
+73 The case involved the requirement
+that the social partners turn to the insurance market for the management
+of a pension fund established by a collective agreement. A draft European
+directive of 2012 on public procurement similarly included this requirement,
+regarding ‘ obligatory social security ’ . The political uproar this caused
+obliged the Commission to withdraw the provision. 74
+The notion of a society of insurance techniques cannot, however, do justice
+to the scope and complexity of the legal changes brought about by
+the quantifi cation of social facts. As regards the scope: insurance is only
+one aspect of the shift from faith in persons, operative at the very heart
+of institutions, to faith in numbers. 75 It is a shift clearly visible today in
+insurance contracts, for which statistical risk assessments have progressively
+supplanted prudent examination of the situation of each candidate. 76
+But already in the nineteenth century this movement was emerging in fi elds
+as diverse as medical practice and public administration. Quantifying social
+facts lends them an appearance of objectivity, and makes them commensurable
+on the scale of the planet. Belief in numbers can thus foster the hope
+Legislating 101
+
+77 Condorcet , ‘ Observations sur le vingt-neuvi è me livre de l ’ Esprit des lois ’in ALC Destutt
+de Tracy , Commentaire sur l ’ Esprit des lois de Montesquieu ( Li è ge , Desoert , 1817 ) 458 . 78 ibid, 461 – 62. 79 PR de Montmort , Essai d ’ analyse sur les jeux de hazard, 2nd edn( Paris , Jacques Quillau,
+1713 )quoted by Daston, (n 2) 317. 80 A Comte , ‘ Relation of Sociology to the other departments of positive philosophy ’in The
+Positive Philosophy, tr H Martineau , intro F Harrison( London , George Bell and Son , 1896 ) ,
+Vol 2, Ch IV, 223.
+
+that another type of rule of law may exist, founded not on dogma but on
+observed regularities valid for all humankind.
+Advances in quantifi cation thus went hand in hand with the idea of a
+uniform and universal law, such as Condorcet had advocated, in his sharp
+criticism of Montesquieu ’ s legal relativism. His model for this law was that
+of weights and measures, a model ‘ which can only displease men of law who
+fear to see the number of trials diminish ’ . He justifi es his ideas as follows:
+
+Since truth, reason, justice, the rights of men, and the interests of property, liberty
+and safety are the same everywhere, there is no good reason why all the provinces
+of a State, or even all States, should not have the same criminal laws, the same civil
+laws, the same laws on trade, etc. A good law should be good for all men, just as a
+true proposition is true for all. Where in different countries the laws would appear
+to need to be different, or have objects which should not be ruled by laws, like
+most of the rules of trade, or are based on prejudices and customs which should
+be eradicated; one of the best ways of destroying these is to cease to support them
+through laws. 77
+
+Condorcet goes on to say that Montesquieu is wrong to evoke the legal
+function of Tartar or Chinese ceremonies because just as mathematicians
+accustomed to calculations of probability are capable of explaining the rules
+of a particular game, so it should be possible to calculate the rules applicable
+to all humanity. 78 The vision of law sketched here prefi gures the situation
+under globalisation: the deregulation of trade, and the eradication of
+regional and national legal cultures in the name of a uniform law. The only
+element missing is the natural selection of the fi ttest ‘ legislative products ’
+through competition between national legal systems.
+Applying probability calculations to social facts has, however, always
+met with opposition. The early eighteenth-century mathematician Pierre de
+Montmort identifi ed the two reasons why one should beware of these calculations.
+The fi rst was that human action does not obey the unchanging
+laws of nature (and one is fooling oneself if one thinks self-interest can be
+equated with this type of law). The second was the human mind ’ s inability
+to grasp all the factors determining any given action. 79 In the following
+century, Comte added scathing criticism of ‘ the pretension of some geometers
+to render social investigations positive by subjecting them to a fanciful
+mathematical theory of chances ’ ,
+80 in this explicitly targeting Condorcet
+102 The Development of Normative Uses of Quantifi cation
+
+81 ibid, 224 [ tr mod]. 82 K Polanyi , ‘ The Machine and the Discovery of Society ’[1957] lecture: http://kpolanyi.
+scoolaid.net , 4 . 83 cf the excellent biography of Le Play by F Arnault , Fr é d é ric Le Play. De la m é tallurgie à
+la science sociale ( Nancy , Presses universitaires de Nancy , 1993 ) . 84 F Le Play , Les Ouvriers europ é ens ( Paris , Imprimerie imp é riale , 1855 ) 301 . 85 See, for example, A Cottereauand MM Mazok , Une famille andalouse. Ethnocomptabilit
+éd ’ une é conomie invisible ( Paris , Bouch ê ne , 2012 ) .
+
+and Laplace. He considered that the high degree of abstraction of mathematics
+disqualifi ed it from being used at all rigorously for the close study
+of nature.
+
+Can one possibly imagine a more radically irrational conception than that which
+takes for its philosophical basis, or its principal method of conclusive explanation,
+for all the social sciences, a supposed mathematical theory, in which, as is normal
+for purely mathematical speculations, signs being taken for ideas, we attempt to
+subject to calculation the necessarily sophistical notion of numerical probability,
+which amounts to offering our own ignorance as the natural measure of the
+degree of probability of our various opinions ? ’ 81
+
+More recently, this criticism was echoed by Karl Polanyi who attacked
+the ‘ immature dogmatism [which] stood guard at the gates of moral statistics,
+through which the reality of society had announced its entrance in
+the guise of mathematical precision ’ .
+82 Quantifi cation is legitimate in the
+social sciences only if it is limited to what can be precisely counted, and
+does not construct simulations which extrapolate general laws from incomplete
+measurements of sets of heterogeneous facts. Fr é d é ric Le Play, an engineer
+by training, and his successors, observed this method scrupulously in
+their minutely detailed surveys of the living conditions of the peasantry and
+working-class populations in different European countries. 83 Le Play had
+been struck by the lack of scientifi c rigour in the existing statistical tables
+which, he said, ‘ take into account neither the specifi c nature of the individuals,
+nor the particular character of their living environments; the offi cial
+data thus neglects the principal facts which science must consider in order
+to reach conclusions which concern individual existences or different social
+categories ’ .
+84
+This ethno-accounting continues to be practised today by some researchers,
+despite the overwhelming dominance of standard econometrics. Instead
+of replacing the real with prefabricated statistical categories, this type of
+research attempts to understand in all their complexity the systems of values
+operative in a human group. 85 For instance, instead of projecting an a
+priori notion of value onto poor populations in the context of quantifi ed
+anti-poverty programmes, these researchers regard the attribution of value
+as a social process which must be understood before one can really improve
+these people ’ s lot.
+6
+
+The Law Geared to Numbers: From
+the Gosplan to the Total Market
+
+‘ The State forbids by law any organisation or individual from disturbing
+the socio-economic order. ’
+
+The Constitution of the People ’ s Republic of China, art. 15
+
+ONE OF THE many convictions capitalism and communism have in
+common is that social harmony can be the outcome of a calculation.
+Where they differ is that, unlike the Soviet planned economy, ‘ classical
+’or ‘ old-style ’economic liberalism considered the law and the state to
+be the condition, and not the means, for achieving social harmony through
+calculation. Communist regimes used the normative instrument of planned
+economic development in their attempts to produce harmony out of quantifi
+cation, whereas the fathers of liberalism believed that an essential condition
+for a system of spontaneously self-adjusting calculations of individual
+interest was the rule of law ( un r é gime de droit), under which the identity
+and freedom of persons were guaranteed, property rights were protected
+and contracts were enforced. Even as provocative a thinker as Mandeville
+never lost sight of the fact that the conversion of private vices into public
+wealth required the reign of the law because, as he concluded in his fable of
+the bees, ‘ So Vice is benefi cial found, When it ’ s by Justice lopt, and bound ’ .
+In other words, classical liberalism still placed itself under the authority of
+the law. In order to understand how greatly neoliberalism departed from
+this vision, and how greatly it resembles communist utopias, we must take
+another look at how the authority of the law was undermined by Soviet
+planning.
+
+I. THE LAW DETHRONED
+
+The founders of liberal thought knew full well that the rule of law is a
+condition for economic activity. They certainly did not think that a market
+was possible without a law to fi x its limits and its rules, and they would
+never have dreamt of laws as ‘ products ’competing on a market of norms.
+The two parties to a contract may calculate their interests only because a
+104 The Law Geared to Numbers
+
+1 I take the liberty of referring the reader to my Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological
+Function of the Law, tr S Brown( London/ New York City , Verso , 2007 ) Ch 3, 86ff . 2 See above, pp 16–17.
+
+third is there to guarantee fair exchange, and to settle everything which lies
+beyond calculation — not least the identity of the contracting parties. From
+this perspective, law is not an instrument serving the cause of calculation,
+but rather a prerequisite for its existence. In other words, classical liberalism
+still inhabited a three-dimensional universe, in which the dimension of
+market exchange had its reference point in the vertical dimension of the
+state. This third dimension is necessary not only for contract law, but also
+for property law and personhood.
+After all, what would a contract look like if it were reduced to a bilateral
+bond between Primus and Secundus?It would be nothing but the expression
+of the power relation between the two. For there to be a contract, Primus
+and Secundus must at least both be equally subject to a heteronomous rule
+which they cannot modify, namely the value of the pledged word ( Pacta sunt
+servanda). In other words, there is no contract without a law. This in itself
+tells us nothing about the nature of that law, which may have a religious or
+a customary or a codifi ed basis, but at all events it represents a guarantor
+of the pledged word, whether this is called the gods, the community or the
+state. And the guarantor is not on the same plane as the contracting parties. 1
+So much for the contract. But what would a property right be if it were
+reduced to a bilateral relation between an individual and a thing ?It would
+be nothing but a simple fact, the fact of possessing a thing, with the risk of
+being dispossessed of it at any moment at knifepoint, or by someone just a
+bit stronger. This is something we can easily forget if we have the good fortune
+to live in a country where we do not risk being mugged at every corner.
+In other words, in a country where the law prevails. But one has only to
+venture into ‘ no-go areas ’[ ‘ zones de non-droit’ ] for the fi ction of a bilateral
+and exclusive relation between myself and my property to be exploded, as
+we leave behind the rule of law and enter zones of lawlessness, a ‘ state of
+nature ’in which people must be armed and live in gated enclosures if they
+are to come out of it alive and with all their possessions. The praemium of
+Justinian ’ s Institutes expressed this as follows: one must be armed with laws
+for arms to be decorative objects or replaced by the arts and letters. 2
+And who would we be, after all, if our identity were not secured by a
+heteronomous order which assigns us personhood before the law, and
+ensures it is respected ?Whole swathes of humanity had to be reduced to
+pack animals, numbered and led to the slaughter before their legal personhood
+was at last enshrined as a right, in Article 6 of the Universal Declaration
+of Human Rights: ‘ Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere
+as a person before the law ’ . This article implies a ternary structure: if I am
+The Law Dethroned 105
+
+3 E Durkheim , The Rules of Sociological Method, 2nd edn, tr WD Halls( New York City ,
+The Free Press , 1982 )preface, 47. 4 See my The Spirit of Philadelphia, ( op. cit. Introduction), n 17, Ch 1, 17ff. 5 On the practice of high-frequency trading, see the Report of the French Financial Markets
+Regulator, the Autorit édes march é s fi nanciers: A Oseredczuck , Le trading haute fr é quence vu
+de l ’ AMF ( Paris , AMF , 2010 ) . On how it can be manipulated, see M Lewis , Flash Boys. A Wall
+Street Revolt ( New York City, Norton &Cie , 2014 ) ; J-F Gayraud , Le nouveau capitalisme
+criminel ( Paris , O Jacob , 2014 ) . The European Union did not want to forbid these practices,
+but introduced stricter regulation: see Directive 2014/65/UE of 12 June 2014 concerning the
+market in fi nancial instruments, and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014.
+
+to be ‘ recognised everywhere ’by others, then my identity must be warranted
+by a third, whose authority is respected. The immediate refl ex, on
+losing one ’ s passport abroad, is to contact one ’ s country ’ s embassy, the sate
+which vouches for who one is, in order to prove one ’ s identity to the foreign
+authorities, and thus regain one ’ s freedom of movement and the protection
+of a legal personhood. One does not need to be schooled in law to have this
+refl ex, because institutions are not simply things outside of us; as Durkheim
+states, ‘ Institutions bear down upon us, yet we nevertheless cling to them;
+they impose obligations upon us, and yet we love them; they place constraints
+upon us, and yet we fi nd satisfaction in the way they function, and
+in that very constraint. ’ 3
+So, from a legal perspective, classical economic liberalism and communism
+had one essential difference: liberalism recognised that the rule of law
+was necessary for economic harmony, whereas communism used the law
+as a tool for implementing a harmony based on quantitative computations.
+The unholy union of capitalism and communism which Europe and China
+celebrated towards the end of the twentieth century 4 accelerated the process
+of gearing the law to numbers. Classical liberals were in no doubt that the
+unrestricted pursuit of individual interests could never lead to general prosperity
+unless the law set limits on individual greed. But neoliberals took the
+legal fi ctions which ground the market to be facts of nature. They mistook a
+construct for a given, and extended the paradigm of the market to all areas
+of human life, including the law, which is considered to be just another
+product competing on a market of diverse norms.
+Neoliberalism is thus a utopia predicated on erasing the fi ctional nature
+of the legal constructs on which the market economy is based: identity is
+treated as though it were solely a solipsistic, self-defi ning individuality;
+property as the omnipotent hold of a subject over an object; and contracts
+as two-way communication between two subjects. Neoliberalism ’ s world is
+composed of contracting particles calculating in real time their individual
+interests and exchanging the objects they have in their possession in the
+light of this calculation. This is indeed how the fi nancial markets, which are
+at the epicentre of globalisation, operate today. They are largely controlled
+by computers performing high-frequency trading, which is itself the latest
+incarnation of the governing machine. 5
+106 The Law Geared to Numbers
+
+6 EA Abbott , Flatland, A Romance of Many Dimensions, with Illustrations by the Author,
+A SQUARE ( London , Seeley and Co , 1884 ) . https://archive.org/details/fl atlandromanceo00abbouoft
+(accessed 20 July 2017). 7 ‘ Nuovi confl itti a Flatlandia ’in G Grossi[ a cura di ] Confl itti contemporanei ( Turin , Utet ,
+2008 ) 5 ff . 8 Unlike Cartesian space and the representations of classical physics, the universe described
+by Einstein is not without limits: it has a ‘ border ’ , a horizon. See on this point the remarks of
+A Berque , É coum è ne. Introduction àl ’ é tude des milieux humains ( Paris , Belin , 2000 ) . 9 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. ( ch 2fn 62). 10 TL Friedman The World is Flat. A Brief History of the Twenty-fi rst Century, 1st ed
+( New York City , Farrar , Straus &Giroux , 2005 ) .
+
+As often happens — with human imagination prefi guring human action —
+this ‘ fl at world ’divested of the vertical fi gure of the third which secures relations
+between individuals, was fi rst represented in a novel, a philosophical
+tale called Flatland, published in 1884 by the mathematician Edwin Abbott. 6
+Ota de Leonardis unearthed this forgotten work some years ago and showed
+its striking relevance for today, and its prophetic power. 7 As the title indicates,
+Flatland is a world reduced to two dimensions, characterised by a sort
+of caste system in which the Brahmin are polygons aspiring to the perfection
+of circles, the lower cast are represented by triangles, and the intermediary
+cast, by squares. Those outside the caste system, and obliged to serve
+all the others, are irregular geometrical fi gures. If we try to imagine living
+in this two-dimensional universe, in Flatland, we can begin to understand
+how tricky social relations must be. Since by defi nition fi gures in the same
+plane cannot meet face to face, the most insignifi cant encounter becomes
+an extremely complicated and perilous affair, in which mutual recognition
+requires prior measurement and calculation of angles in order to identify
+the other ’ s caste. This world without verticality — without heteronomy — this
+Flatland without a horizon, has no visible limits. In a three-dimensional universe,
+the horizon (from the Greek horizein: to set a limit) is precisely a line
+which circumscribes our fi eld of vision and in so doing also designates the
+existence of something beyond it. 8 Abolishing any such beyond has been
+the work of positivism, with its purely immanent approach. It attempts to
+free humankind from the fear of the unknown by ‘ identifying the animate
+with the inanimate, just as myth identifi es the inanimate with the animate
+’ , leading to a new ‘ universal taboo ’ , which Horkheimer and Adorno
+described: ‘ Nothing should remain outside because the very idea of an ‘ outside
+’is itself the source of terror ’ .
+9
+The metaphor of a fl at world reappeared around the year 2000, but used
+this time without any critical intent. It even became a best-seller, by the
+economist Thomas Friedman: The World is Flat. A Brief History of the
+Twenty-fi rst Century (published in 2005). 10 In it Friedman rejoiced in
+the advent of a world fl attened by globalisation and market forces, in which
+all the operators have the same chance of succeeding in a competitive environment
+unencumbered by any heteronomous rules. The neoliberal utopia
+The Instrumentalisation of Law in the Planned Economy 107
+
+11 H Berman , Law and Revolution II. The impact of the Protestant Reformation on the
+Western Legal Tradition ( Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press , 2003 )Vol II, 19. 12 On this Constitution, see C Jianfu , ‘ La derniè re ré vision de la Constitution chinoise.
+Grand bond en avant ou simple geste symbolique ? ’( 2004 ) Perspectives chinoises, 82, 15 – 32 . 13 See the comparison between these two historical experiences by P Andersonand
+W Chaohua , Deux r é volutions. La Chine au miroir de la Russie ( Marseille , Agone , 2014 ) . 14 On the application of this idea to property rights, cf the thesis of Aurore Chaigneau ,
+Le droit de propri é t éen mutation. Essai àla lumi è re du droit russe ( Paris , Dalloz , 2008 ) , preface
+by A Lyon-Caen.
+
+is precisely this fl at world wholly driven by the immanent laws of the market,
+and in this respect it is much closer to communist utopias than to ‘ classical
+’liberalism.
+
+II. THE INSTRUMENTALISATION OF LAW IN THE
+PLANNED ECONOMY
+
+The construction of a communist society was entrusted not to the law, but
+to plans; in other words to a two-dimensional universe in which law was
+reduced to an instrument for implementing a computed collective utility.
+Harold Berman has aptly described such a totalitarian regime in terms of
+a distinction between rule by law and rule of law: 11 Soviet-style planning
+illustrates rule by law, and a normative order in which economic life is
+ruled by numbers rather than law. This early historical experiment is largely
+neglected by researchers today, but its lessons are more than ever relevant
+to us. It sheds light on the contemporary hybridisation of communism and
+capitalism, for instance in the People ’ s Republic of China and the Russian
+Federation, but also in Western countries, whose dependence on the fi nancial
+markets has transformed them, in the felicitous terms of the First Article
+of the Chinese Constitution, into ‘ democratic dictatorship[s] ’ .
+12
+So we should re-examine, if only in its broad outlines, the episode of the
+Soviet planned economy, which preceded — and in many respects paved the
+way for — China ’ s conversion to capitalism under the presidency of Deng
+Xiaoping (1904 – 1997). 13 Article 15 of the Chinese Constitution assigns
+the state a threefold task: ‘ The State practises a socialist market economy.
+The State strengthens economic legislation, improves macro-regulation and
+control. The State prohibits by law any organisation or individual which
+disturbs the socio-economic order ’ . The exercise of rights is thus protected
+by the Constitution only to the extent that this does not disturb the ‘ socioeconomic
+order ’ . We fi nd this idea (which has some similarity with the rulings
+of the European Court of Justice) already in the Soviet Civil Code of 1922,
+whose fi rst article provided that ‘ Civil rights are protected by law except
+when they are exercised in violation of their socio-economic destination ’ .
+14
+In order to know whether this destination is indeed violated, one has to
+108 The Law Geared to Numbers
+
+15 See above, ch 3 , p 52 and p 62. 16 T Kondratieva , Gouverner et nourrir. Du pouvoir en Russie ( Paris, Les Belles Lettres ,
+2002 ) . 17 The Nazi Party (the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or NSDAP) was
+called the ‘ movement ’( cf M Stolleis , ‘ Que signifi ait la querelle autour de l ’ É tat de droit sous
+le Troisi è me Reich ? ’in O Jouanjan(ed) Figures de l ’ É tat de droit ( Strasbourg, Presses univ
+Strasbourg , 2001 ) 374 ). 18 SA Golunskyand MS Trogovitch Theory of State and Law ( Moscow , 1940 )quoted by
+P Lavigne ‘ La l é galit ésocialiste et le d é veloppement de la pr é occupation juridique en Union
+sovi é tique ’( 1980 ) 11 Revue d ’ Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest 1980, 3, 11 . 19 One of the most spectacular incarnations of this ideal, and the highlight of the Soviet
+pavilion at the Universal Exhibition of 1937 in Paris, was the sculpture The Worker and
+Kolkhoz Woman by Vera Moukhina: 25m high and 80 tonnes of steel.
+
+calculate how useful exercising a particular right is to the Soviet people.
+A right ’ s enforceability thus depends on a calculation of its utility which is
+external to, and imposed upon, the legal apparatus. If this calculation suggests
+a lack of ‘ utility ’ , legal guarantees simply evaporate.
+As a result, laws were simply tools — Chinese legalists would have said
+‘ utensils ’ 15— with which to construct socialism. ‘ Construction ’was the
+USSR ’ s preferred term for designating its political system, rather than
+political or constitutional ‘ regime ’ .
+16 The word suggests a dynamic onward
+march, as illustrated by the Soviet art invented to glorify it. In the USSR,
+as in Nazi Germany, the single party was the driving force behind a society
+which was to be in perpetual motion. 17 Soviet jurists defi ned socialist legality
+not as a stable framework for society, but as a method: ‘ The method
+for actualising the dictatorship of the proletariat and the construction of
+socialism [ … ] it is always the Socialist State ’ s means of action, and cannot
+become an obstacle to the fulfi lment of its historical tasks ’ .
+18 The notion of
+‘ construction ’conveys at once a process, the extension of a system whose
+limits are not yet fi xed, and a technical conception of normativity, pegged
+to effi ciency and not to the law ’ s authority. ‘ Construction ’thus defi es the
+legal order ’ s aspiration to stability, as represented in the emblems of justice,
+which are always motionless Single Party if only to keep the scales straight!
+This new ideal of movement was embodied above all in Soviet and Fascist
+art, and particularly sculpture. 19 We should note that the term ‘ construction
+’has also been used Single Party and still is used Single Party to describe
+the European Community, and later the European Union. The ‘ construction
+of Europe ’will, in similar fashion, be achieved through an institutional
+momentum inseparable from an economic programme. The images on
+euro banknotes show this clearly, with schematic doors (symbols of openness)
+and bridges (symbols of union) following a line of historical progress
+which is refl ected in the value of the note (from fi ve-euro notes in Roman
+style to 500-euro notes in contemporary style, via the Middle Ages, the
+Renaissance and industrial architecture). ‘ The construction of Europe ’thus
+inscribes itself within an imaginary historical movement, but one in which
+The Instrumentalisation of Law in the Planned Economy 109
+
+20 ‘ Le patronat ’refers to employers as a group (or, in the context of labour negotiations, to
+‘ management ’in contrast to ‘ labour ’ ). The notion comes from Roman law, and designates the
+reciprocal obligations between a freedman and his former master. The latter gives birth to the
+freedman ’ s social existence, and transmits him his name, just like a father ( pater). The former
+master, now a patron (in French, an employer), owes help and assistance to the freedman, who
+owes respect ( obsequium) and certain services ( operae) in return. 21 K Ballod , Der Zukunftsstaat ( Stuttgart , J.H.W. Dietz, 1920 ) . I thank Martine Mespoulet
+for pointing out this fi liation. 22 On the economic debates in the early days of the Gosplan, see N Jasny , Soviet Economists
+of the Twenties. Names to be remembered ( Cambridge , Cambridge University Press , 1972 ) . 23 cf H Bh é rer , Management sovi é tique ( Paris , Presses de la Fondation des sciences politiques
+, 1982 ) ; EH Carr , An History of Soviet Russia. Socialism in one Country. 1924 – 1926
+( New York City, MacMillan , 1958 ), esp 315f ; F Seurot , Le syst è me é conomique de l ’ URSS,
+1st edn( Paris , PUF , 1989 ) .
+
+Single Party—unlike the society of plenty promised by Communism —
+seems to have no other goal than itself. In a similar development, with the
+increasing fi nancialisation of the economy, the body representing French
+businesses, the MEDEF, decided to change its name from the familial and
+far too reassuring Conseil national du patronat fran ç ais to one evoking the
+dynamic force of a Movement ( Le Mouvement des entreprises de France). 20
+So we can see how the extremes of Soviet planning on the one hand,
+and neoliberalism on the other, converge in gearing laws to calculations
+of utility. Where they differ is in the means they employ to do so. Communism
+used the central plan, whereas neoliberalism uses the contract.
+The body responsible for central planning was called the State Planning
+Committee, better known by its Russian acronym Gosplan. The idea behind
+it was actually developed much earlier, well before the Bolshevik Revolution,
+by a German economist — of socialist and not communist sympathies —
+Karl Ballod. In 1898 he published a book called Der Zukunftsstaat ( The
+State of the Future), with a preface by Karl Kautsky, which defi ned the role
+of state planning in a future socialist Germany. 21 The book went through
+many editions and translations, and it infl uenced Lenin, who lacked a clear
+idea of how a socialist economy should be organised concretely. At fi rst the
+Gosplan, which was created in February 1921, brought together economists
+of different schools of thought. 22 As from 1925, it produced annual ‘ control
+fi gures ’ , to monitor the activities of state enterprises. 23 It was only in 1927
+that the fi rst fi ve-year plan was worked out (1928 – 1932). Unlike the Goelro
+plan, which had been adopted in 1921 to set up the USSR ’ s electricity system,
+and which defi ned the broad lines of longer-term development (10 – 15
+years), the fi ve-year plan fi xed precise targets for businesses, and assessed
+their attainment annually through ‘ control fi gures ’ . The Gosplan, the body
+responsible for economic planning, was considered to be one of ‘ the USSR ’ s
+scientifi c and technical structures ’ . This is another point of convergence
+between communism and neoliberalism: the assertion that economic policy
+is not the outcome of political debate, but of scientifi c calculation. It led
+110 The Law Geared to Numbers
+
+24 On the history of the creation in 1969 of this ‘ Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences
+in Memory of Alfred Nobel ’ , see P Moynot, ‘ Nobel d ’ é conomie: coup de ma î tre ’ , Le Monde,
+15 October 2008. 25 The idea of limited democracy sketched here was vigorously defended by Friedrich
+Hayek, one of the fi rst Laureates of this so-called ‘ Nobel Prize ’ . 26 For China, see BM Richman Industrial Society in Communist China ( New York City ,
+Random House , 1969 ) ; MA Hong(ed) Modern China ’ s Economy and Management ( Beijing ,
+Foreign Language Press , 1990 ) ; C Eyraud , L ’ entreprise d ’ É tat chinoise. De l ’ institution totale
+vers l ’ entit é é conomique ( Paris , L ’ Harmattan , 1999 ) 215ff . 27 M Mespoulet , Construire le socialisme par les chiffres: enqu ê tes et recensements en URSS
+de 1917 à1991 ( Paris , INED , 2008 ) 240 . 28 cf H Chambre , Espace é conomique et Union sovi é tique( 1959 ) 1 Cahiers du monde russe
+et sovi é tique 1(May 1959) 25 – 48. 29 cf Carr (n 23) 315f.
+
+to the creation by the Bank of Sweden of the so-called ‘ Nobel Prize ’for
+Economics, in 1969, a (successful) counterfeit of the Nobel Prizes in physics,
+chemistry and physiology. 24 Once the management of economic affairs is
+legitimated by science, it need no longer be exposed to the will of the people
+and the decisions of the ballot box. 25
+The Gosplan was a model for similar structures in other communist countries,
+including China. 26 Underpinned by an impressive data-collection and
+statistical system, 27 its task was to collect and analyse all the information
+from all the economic regions and enterprises, from which it drew up three
+types of plan: long-term prospective plans; fi ve-year plans; and annual plans.
+The plans gave greater weight to geographical or to industry sector factors in
+different periods. The organisational diagram of the Gosplan refl ected this
+complexity. Its central bodies were organised both by industry sector, working
+with the economic planning departments of the corresponding ministry;
+and also by specialised departments (investment, territorial planning, etc).
+The central, federal, apparatus had regional and local equivalents, with
+a whole hierarchy of different bodies at Soviet republic and local level.
+The plans were supposed to refl ect the Gosplan ’ s overall goals while taking
+into account territorial specifi cities, in order to achieve balanced development
+in all economic regions of the USSR. The procedures evolved over
+time, but in the last decades of the USSR, greater weight was given to data
+fed up from the local level. 28 ‘ Control fi gures ’ , which were the backbone of
+the plan, were produced, comprising relative and absolute magnitudes. 29
+These were then fed down through the different industry sectors, republics
+and economic regions. Once they had been further broken down and
+defi ned by the regional authorities, these fi gures were passed down to company
+level, where the businesses prepared their own plans on the basis of
+these fi gures and in accordance with the terms of the contracts they had
+already signed with their clients and suppliers. All these plans were then fed
+back up to the republic-level Gosplan bodies, which synthesised them and
+The Instrumentalisation of Law in the Planned Economy 111
+
+30 cf R David , Les grands syst è mes de droit contemporain, 7th edn( Paris , Dalloz , 1978 ) ,
+n 254f and p 305ff. 31 cf Conseil d ’ É tat [French Council of State], Le contrat, mode d ’ action publique et de
+production de normes, Rapport public 2008 (Paris, La Documentation fran ç aise, 2008)
+Vol 2, 398; J Caillosse , La constitution imaginaire de l ’ administration. ( Paris , PUF , 2008 ) 145f .
+
+arbitrated between the initial fi gures and those proposed by the lowest
+levels. The republic-level plans went back to the central Gosplan, which in
+turn synthesised them, and passed them on for approval to the government of
+the USSR. This fi nal plan became legally binding, and was fed down, a second
+time, in the form of directives affecting the various occupations and regions,
+and right down to enterprise level. Each level had to follow the annual plan
+prepared for it, with the Gosplan piloting the whole exercise and ensuring
+co-ordination with the central planning bodies of the other socialist countries
+and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).
+The accounting system used was the ‘ method of material balancing ’ , which
+calculated resources and needs in kind, in order to measure the real fl ow of
+products and not their equivalent in money.
+In legal terms, all these plans governing the production of goods and services
+took the form of unilateral administrative acts binding on the economic
+operators, who were all public operators. Contracts were simply the
+tools used to implement the quantifi able objectives fi xed by the plans. 30
+However, Soviet legal doctrine distinguished two types of contract, depending
+on whether it had been imposed on the economic operator or not.
+The fi rst were called planned contracts, and they were imposed by the plan;
+they prescribed, for example, that enterprise A should be supplied by enterprise
+B. The planned contract contained all the obligations that could not
+be fi xed at the level of the overall plan. It also constituted a legal commitment
+by the parties, a voluntary pledge to carry out the plan. The second
+type of contract, called non-planned contracts, was not the result of any
+legal obligation to contract, but of the fact that it was economically necessary
+or benefi cial to do so in order to fulfi l the plan ’ s objectives. In certain
+circumstances, enterprise A could take the initiative to enter into contract
+with enterprise B or C. This freedom to contract was very limited, because
+the obligations undertaken by the contracting parties had to correspond to
+the assignments given in the plan. This sort of contract prefi gures what we
+have seen spreading through Western Europe over the last 20 years, and
+which goes by the name of the contractualisation of public action and public
+services. 31
+The shift from liberalism to neoliberalism was precipitated by the implosion
+of real communism. The rivalry between Eastern and Western blocks
+disappeared, and with it the pressure on Western leaders to introduce welfare
+reforms. This is clearly visible in the plummeting number of new international
+Conventions adopted since the mid-1990s by the International
+112 The Law Geared to Numbers
+
+32 Between 1995 and 2012, eight conventions were signed concerning non-maritime labour
+and six concerning maritime labour, compared with the 108 conventions adopted between
+1946 and 1994. 33 T Todorov , Le si è cle des totalitarismes ( Paris , Laffont , 2010 ) 18 – 19 . 34 The Constitution of the USSR (1936) Arts 4 and 5.
+
+Labour Organisation (with the exception of the maritime transport
+sector). 32 And former Eastern bloc countries were already familiar with a
+system in which, in Tzvetan Todorov ’ s words, ‘ the Constitution and the
+laws are held in low esteem by the Security Forces and the other powerful
+fi gures of the regime [ … ] for whom the individual can always get round
+the law applicable to all [ … ]. Here everything can be arranged, negotiated,
+bought: the exception replaces the rule ’ .
+33 Real communism had primed its
+populations to treat the law not as the inviolable framework within which
+individual interests may mutually adjust, but as one of those very interests
+themselves.
+
+III. THE HYBRIDISATION OF COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM
+
+In order to grasp the process of hybridisation at work here, we must understand
+how very different Soviet-style planning was from the legal universe of
+Western liberalism. First, the planned economy was predicated on the abolition
+of the private ownership of the means of production, and the introduction
+of Socialist property ‘ either in the form of State property (owned
+by the people as a whole), or in the form of cooperative and collectivefarm
+property (property of a collective farm or property of a cooperative
+association) ’ .
+34 Secondly, the whole society was mobilised to achieve quantifi
+ed objectives imposed from above by a government which operated as
+a dictatorship. By contrast, the liberal system is based on the privatisation
+of the means of production. All individuals are mobilised, as under communism,
+but in a generalised competition for the maximisation of their
+individual interests. From this the greatest social utility should spontaneously
+emerge. Another major difference is that under liberalism, although
+governments are regularly exposed to the sanction of the ballot box, the
+management of the economy is removed from any political or democratic
+scrutiny. The state ’ s role is simply to guarantee the security of the economic
+calculations on which the market is based, to protect private property and
+to ensure that contracts are honoured. To this was later added the role of
+the social state, which was responsible for the longer timeframe of human
+life and the succession of generations.
+These differences are considerable, and they should not be minimised.
+But if we look no further, we shall never understand what the two regimes
+had in common from the very start. As products of the same civilisation,
+The Hybridisation of Communism and Capitalism 113
+
+35 cf A Zinoviev , L ’ Occidentisme. Essai sur le triomphe d ’ une id é ologie ( Paris , Plon , 1995 ) . 36 The Constitution of the USSR (1936), Art 11. 37 K L ö with , Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der
+Geschichtsphilosophie ( Stuttgart , Kohlhammer , 1953 ) ; English tr Meaning in History: The
+Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History ( Chicago , University of Chicago Press ,
+1957 ) . 38 Lenin, Report On The Work Of The Council Of People ’ s Commissars, Eighth All-Russia
+Congress of Soviets in Collected Works, 4th edn (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1965) Vol 31,
+461 – 534.
+
+communism and capitalism had the same faith in gaining mastery over, and
+possessing, nature. Both saw themselves as bearers of a messianic promise
+expressed in terms so similar that it caught the attention of the more lucid
+Soviet dissidents once they had settled in the West. 35 The 1936 Constitution
+of the USSR defi ned the goals of central planning as ‘ increasing the public
+wealth, [of] steadily improving the material conditions of the working
+people and raising their cultural level, [of] consolidating the independence
+of the USSR and strengthening its defensive capacity ’ .
+36 We could compare
+these goals with the EU ’ s Lisbon Strategy of 2000, which promised to bring
+about, by 2010, ‘ the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
+in the world capable of sustainable economic growth, with more and
+better jobs and greater social cohesion ’ . The very same philosophy of history,
+whose genealogy Karl L ö with has traced, lies behind these grandiose
+pronouncements: history as an indomitable march forward towards a radiant
+future. 37
+The shared economistic vision of communism and liberalism was supplemented,
+with the advent of neoliberalism, by a shared belief that the
+law was merely an instrument in what the Chinese Constitution called ‘ the
+economic order of society ’ . This instrumental conception of rule by law
+had led the Communist regimes to reject the idea of the rule of law. Lenin
+dreamt aloud of the ‘ very happy time ’when the power of politicians and
+administrators would give way to that of engineers and agronomists, that is,
+to an order founded on science and technology, and no longer on the law:
+
+We are witnessing a momentous change, one which in any case marks the beginning
+of important successes for the Soviets. Henceforth the rostrum at All-Russia
+Congresses will be mounted, not only by politicians and administrators but also
+by engineers and agronomists. This marks the beginning of that very happy time
+when politics will recede into the background, when it will be discussed less often
+and at shorter length, and when engineers and agronomists will do most of the
+talking. 38
+
+The founding fathers of Marxism already entertained this vision of a world
+purged of politics in favour of technology. For Engels, once the Proletarian
+revolution had been achieved, ‘ the government of persons is replaced by the
+administration of things, and by conducting the processes of production, ’
+114 The Law Geared to Numbers
+
+39 F Engels , Anti-D ü hring. Herr Eugen D ü hring ’ s Revolution in Science, tr E Burns
+( Moscow, Progress Publishers , 1947 ), III ‘ Socialism ’ , II ‘ Theoretical ’ . 40 I thank Pierre Musso for bringing to my attention this phrase of Enfantin ’ s, which fi rst
+appeared in Le Globe in July 1831 (and was later published in Religion saint-simonienne.
+Enseignement central (Paris, Imprimerie D ’ É verat, 1831)). 41 cf Trichet ’ s statements quoted by A Dumini and F Ruffi n, ‘ La Banque centrale, actrice
+et arbitre de la d é b â cle fi nanci è re. Enqu ê te dans le temple de l ’ euro ’ Le Monde diplomatique,
+November 2011. 42 See below, ch 10 , p 197ff. 43 On this distinction, see M Foucault , Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Coll è ge de
+France, 1978 – 1979 ( Paris , Gallimard-Le Seuil , 2004 ) . On the infl uence of ordoliberalism on
+the construction of Europe, see P Anderson, The New Old World (London, Verso, 2009).
+
+which should lead to the gradual extinction of the state. 39 And Saint-Simon
+is often read as promising to replace the government of persons with the
+administration of things — whereas Saint-Simonian religion taught, on the
+contrary, and in accordance with liberal doctrine, that ‘ it is not simply a
+question of administering things, but of governing persons, a diffi cult task,
+an immense, a saintly task ’ .
+40 What characterises neoliberalism, and defi nes
+its radical distinction from classical liberalism and its affi nity with Marxism,
+is that it likewise envisages laws and the legal order not as stable frameworks
+securing life in society, but as pure instruments and products. Hence
+the utopia of a fl at world, where the law no longer occupies a dominant
+position, as ‘ queen ’ , but is simply a utensil judged by its effi cacy. And if law
+is a product, then legislation is a technical issue, not an object of political
+debate. This was the spirit in which M Trichet, towards the end of his mandate
+as the President of the European Central Bank, described at length and
+in detail to an interviewer how urgent it was to privatise public services and
+deregulate labour markets, while insisting all the while that these reforms
+were in no way a political programme, but simply technical measures for the
+good of the ‘ 17 governments and 332 million citizens, of all leanings ’whose
+best interests he felt he spoke for. 41 Once one accepts that law is a technical
+tool, it must, like any other product, be exposed to competition on a global
+market of norms in order for those products best suited to the needs of the
+economy to be selected. 42 This is how forum shopping comes to replace the
+rule of law, especially in those areas crucial to the social state, such as labour
+law, tax law and social security law.
+Of course, we should not confuse neoliberalism in the strict sense — as it
+was broadcast across the Anglo-American world by Ronald Reagan and
+Margaret Thatcher — with German-style ordoliberalism, which stresses
+the institutional conditions underpinning the ‘ spontaneous order ’of the
+market. 43 The differences between these two contemporary forms of economic
+liberalism are signifi cant, and should not be played down. Germany ’ s
+legal and economic resistance to the neoliberal tendencies of the EU is
+partly due to ordoliberalism ’ s infl uence. Cases in point are the tensions
+The Hybridisation of Communism and Capitalism 115
+
+44 See Decision No 2 BvR 2728/13 of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 14 January 2014
+on the European Central Bank ’ s programme of ‘ Outright Monetary Transactions ’(OMT);
+S Dahan , O Fuchsand M-L Layus , Whatever it takes ?A propos de la d é cision OMT de la Cour
+constitutionnelle f é d é rale allemande( 2014 ) Actualit éjuridique de droit administrative 1311 . 45 cf R Hornung-Draus ‘ Le mod è le allemand d ’ entreprise ’in A Supiot(ed) L ’ entreprise dans
+un monde sans fronti è res ( Paris , Dalloz , 2015 ) . 46 See ch 8, p 157ff.
+
+which have emerged around how the European Central Bank ’ s mandate is
+interpreted, 44 and around the Anglo-American versus Rhineland models of
+the company. 45 Ordoliberalism ’ s infl uence has also spotlighted the particular
+type of governance by numbers which the eurozone has adopted,
+with its ‘ control fi gures ’set in stone in the treaties on the single currency. 46
+But on the world stage, Germany does not carry the same weight as the
+United States. And above all, since ordoliberalism is a contemporary form
+of German nationalism, it does not have the same imperialist and universalist
+pretentions outside of the eurozone as does neoliberal ideology. The
+latter claims to be the expression of universal economic laws which transcend
+the diversity of legal cultures. This is why it could so easily replace a
+communist eschatology whose telos was to see an identical economic order
+reign across the whole world.
+So neoliberalism has in common with communism its desire to see the
+law geared to calculations of utility. The theoretical difference between
+these two utopian visions is that Soviet-style planning believed in a centralised
+calculation of social utility as a way of governing the behaviour
+of individual economic operators, whereas neoliberalism believes in these
+economic operators ’calculations of individual utility as a way of maximising
+social utility. Neoliberal governance expunges all trace of heteronomy.
+In substituting governance for government, technical regulation ( la r é gulation)
+for regulations ( la r é glementation), ethics for morals and norms for
+rules, it closes the gap between being and ought-to-be. This gap still existed
+in communist planning, which conceived itself as a government by numbers.
+The Soviet leaders saw themselves as the engineers of a new society, whose
+construction depended on the commitment of the working class labouring
+under their orders. The construction of socialism required unquestioning
+obedience, and permanent surveillance by the party hierarchy, similar to
+the managerial control of workers in a Taylorist factory. Soviet planning,
+understood as a tool for the construction of communism, can thus be situated
+somewhere between government by laws and governance by numbers.
+Although the plan ’ s directives were legitimated by mathematical formulae
+rather than by the sovereignty of the law, they resembled laws and regulations
+in that they still addressed the citizen from a heteronomic position.
+Governance by numbers goes one step further in its dethroning of the law.
+As in economic planning, calculation replaces law as the basis of the norm ’ s
+116 The Law Geared to Numbers
+
+47 The ambiguity of ‘ post-modern ’critique in this respect was pin-pointed by Luc Boltansky
+and È ve Chiapello already in 1999 in their The New Spirit of Capitalism, tr Gregory Elliott
+( London / New York City , Verso Books , 2006 ) . 48 EM Cioran , Histoire et utopie ( Paris , Gallimard , 1960 ) 21 . 49 M Foucault , ‘ Society Must Be Defended ’ , Lectures at the Coll è ge de France, 1975 – 1976,
+14 January 1976 , tr D Macey( New York City , Picador , 2003 ) 26 – 27[ tr mod].
+
+legitimacy. But the norm is now akin to a biological norm or a computer
+programme, it results from the interaction of individual calculations and it
+operates from within. This interiorisation, or eradication of heteronomy,
+is precisely what governance means: whereas government implies a commanding
+position above those governed, and the obligation for individual
+freedoms to observe certain limits, governance starts out from individual
+freedoms, not to limit but rather to programme them.
+Economists were not the only ones to seek to topple the law by gearing it
+to calculations of individual utility. Much of the sociological and philosophical
+critique we have seen over the last half century has branded the state and
+the legal apparatus — and more generally any form of heteronomy — as ruses
+of power and assaults on individual sovereignty. This position is shared by
+much of what has been called post-modern thought, and it can be found in
+authors of very different leanings, disciplines and specialisms. 47 Their common
+ground is that they all confi rm Cioran ’ s remark on the post-war French
+intelligentsia: ‘ They all claim to speak in the name of freedom yet none of
+them respect the form of government which defends and embodies it ’ .
+48
+Foucault, for example, discusses law as follows, in his lecture ‘ Society must
+be defended ’ :
+
+The essential function of the technique and discourse of law is to dissolve domination
+in power and to replace that domination, which has to be reduced or masked,
+with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign on the one hand, and the
+legal obligation to obey, on the other. [ … ]
+
+My general project has been, basically, to reverse the general direction of this
+analysis, which has, I think, been the entire discourse of law since the Middle
+Ages. I have been trying to do the opposite, in other words to stress the fact of
+domination in all its brutality and its secrecy, and then to show not only that law
+is an instrument of that domination — that is self-evident — but also how, to what
+extent, and in what form the law (and when I say the law [ le droit], I am not thinking
+just of legislation [ la loi], but of all the apparatuses, institutions, and rules that
+apply it) serves as a vehicle for and implements relations that are not relations of
+sovereignty, but relations of domination. [ … ]
+
+The legal system and the judiciary are permanent vehicles for relations of domination,
+and for polymorphous techniques of subjugation. The law must, I think, be
+viewed not in terms of a legitimacy that has to be established, but in terms of the
+procedures of subjugation it implements. 49
+The Hybridisation of Communism and Capitalism 117
+
+50 P Bourdieu , ‘ Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field ’ , tr R Terdiman
+( 1987 ) Hastings Law Journal 38, 805 . 51 In Naissance de la biopolitique (n 43) 196 – 97. This ambiguity did not escape M á rcio
+Alves da Fonseca, who noted that although the theme of law is omnipresent in Foucault ’ s
+writings, it is never clearly defi ned as a concept, nor elucidated theoretically. ( cf M Alves da
+Fonseca , M Foucault et al in A Supiot(ed) Tisser le lien social ( Paris , FMSH , 2005 ) 164 ; Michel
+Foucault e o direito (S ã o Paulo, Max Limonad, 2002), trad fr Michel Foucault et le droit (Paris,
+L ’ Harmattan, 2014)).
+52 In R é ponses, Paris, Seuil, 1992, p 86 [English translation: An Invitation to Refl exive
+Sociology, 1992]. 53 In Contrefeux. Propos pour servir àla r é sistance contre l ’ invasion neo-lib é rale (Paris,
+Raisons d’agir, 1998) 46.
+
+Equating law with a machine which subjects individuals to power can also
+be found in Bourdieu, for whom even legal controversies, and the divide
+between legal academics and legal practitioners, should not mask the fact
+that they are all ‘ objectively complicit ’in the same enterprise of symbolic
+domination:
+
+The hostility between the holders of different types of juridical capital, who are
+committed to very divergent interests and world-views in their particular work of
+interpretation, does not preclude the complementarity of their functions. In fact,
+such hostility serves as the basis for a subtle form of the division of the labor of
+symbolic domination in which adversaries, who are objectively complicit, fulfi ll
+mutual needs. The juridical canon is like a reserve of authority providing the
+guarantee for individual juridical acts in the same way a central bank guarantees
+currency. 50
+
+Clearly the assimilation of law to a fi nancial product ( ‘ legal capital ’ ) found
+a welcome home in sociology long before any theory of ‘ forum shopping ’ .
+But we would not wish to reduce the important body of works produced by
+these authors to what they wrote on law. Nor should we forget that despite
+this general trend in their thinking, they nonetheless defended the state and
+individual rights from time to time. For example, in the name of a ‘ critical
+morality ’ , Foucault condemned ‘ the infl ationary criticism of the state ’by
+those who tar with the same brush the totalitarian state and the welfare
+state, and he reminded ‘ all those who share in the great phobia of the state ’
+that they are ‘ swimming with the tide ’ .
+51 And Bourdieu, who had declared
+that ‘ the state is a quasi-metaphysical notion which must be blown to bits ’ ,
+52
+took a stance, towards the end of his life, in favour of the social state and
+the public services, going so far as to write that ‘ the struggle of intellectuals
+must be directed fi rst and foremost against the shrinking of the state ’ .
+53
+But the respect owed to their works and their thought also obliges us to
+point out the extraordinarily impoverished vision they have of law, when
+we compare it with the profound and subtle understanding which their
+great predecessors — Durkheim, Mauss or Gurvitch — had. After all, who
+would deny that law is part of the machinery of power and an instrument
+118 The Law Geared to Numbers
+
+54 L Dumont , Homo æ qualis, t I Gen è se et é panouissement de l ’ id é ologie é conomique
+( Paris , Gallimard , 1977 ) 19 , English translation : From Mandeville To Marx: The Genesis And
+Triumph Of Economic Ideology ( Chicago , Chicago University Press , 1977 ) . 55 M Foucault , The History of Sexuality, 3vols, tr R Hurley( New York City , Pantheon ,
+1978 – 86 )Vol 2, The Use of Pleasure (Pantheon, 1985). 56 G Deleuzeand F Guattari , A thousand plateaus. Capitalism and schizophrenia,
+tr B Massumi( Minneapolis , University of Minnesota Press , 1987 ) . 57 ibid, 17.
+
+of domination ?This affi rmation can hardly be considered to add to our sum
+of knowledge. But reducing law to this function most certainly represents a
+regression, and shows a lack of understanding of the law as a nodal point
+in the domestication of power. Law is most certainly a technique of power,
+but it is a technique which binds and limits power, making it a particularly
+diffi cult object to think adequately.
+As Louis Dumont has shown on a broader canvas, this reduction of political
+theory to a theory of power can be traced back to modern economic
+ideology. ‘ As soon as hierarchies are abolished, subordination must be
+explained as the mechanical result of an interaction between individuals,
+and so authority deteriorates into ‘ power ’[ … ]. We forget that this occurs
+only on the basis of a particular ideology, namely individualism: thus political
+speculation has unknowingly walled itself up within the confi nes of a
+modern ideology. Yet recent history has powerfully shown how worthless
+this approach is, with the disastrous attempt by the Nazis to found power
+only on itself ’ .
+54 Beyond the reduction of law to power or domination, it is
+every form of social heteronomy which is under attack. Signifi cantly, the last
+writings of Foucault were devoted to the self-government of the individual,
+what he called ‘ the perfect sovereignty of self over self ’ ,
+55 freed not only
+from any legal system but also from any moral code.
+The dethroning of heteronomy in all its forms is expressed during the
+same period in a new normative ideal theorised by Deleuze and Guattari in
+A Thousand Plateaus56 as an ideal of networks and mutual adjustment, of
+free-fl oating identities and evanescent frontiers. Centred systems, embodied
+in territorial states, are set against
+
+acentered systems, fi nite networks of automata in which communication runs
+from any neighbor to any other, the stems or channels do not preexist, and all
+individuals are interchangeable, defi ned only by their state at a given moment,
+such that the local operations are coordinated and the fi nal, global result synchronized
+without a central agency. 57
+
+Since the Internet did not yet exist in 1980, this cybernetic utopia employs a
+botanical metaphor, the rhizome, which is acclaimed in the following terms:
+
+Unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point,
+and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into
+The Hybridisation of Communism and Capitalism 119
+
+58 ibid, 21. 59 ibid, 23. 60 Deleuze et Guattari , Capitalisme et schizophr é nie 2: Mille plateaux ( Paris , Minuit , 1980 )
+484 .
+61 ibid, 486. 62 For a similar analysis, see D-R Dufour , L ’ individu qui vient …apr è s le lib é ralisme ( Paris ,
+Deno ë l , 2011 ) 128f .
+
+play very different regimes of signs, and even non-sign states. The rhizome is
+reducible neither to the One nor the multiple. It is not the One that becomes Two
+or even directly three, four, fi ve, etc. It is not a multiple derived from the One, or
+to which One is added (n +1). It is composed not of units but of dimensions, or
+rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle
+[ milieu] from which it grows and which it overspills. It constitutes linear multiplicities
+with n dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out
+on a plane of consistency, and from which the One is always subtracted (n–1). 58
+
+A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things,
+interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is fi liation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely
+alliance. The tree imposes the verb ‘ to be ’but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction,
+‘ and …and …and … ’This conjunction carries enough force to shake
+and uproot the verb ‘ to be ’ .
+59
+
+This really is a fl at world ( ‘ laid out on a plane ’ ), and not even a planned
+one, as in the Soviet era. It is a world without limits (it has no beginning
+and no end), it has no central agency or stable identities (neither individual,
+the One, nor collective, the multiple); it is a world in which ‘ numbers
+become the subject ’ ,
+60 bonds are binary (the rhizome is alliance: and …
+and …and), and its only law is movement (it grows out and overspills).
+Mafi a networks have long been organised along these lines, yet Deleuze and
+Guattari believed that with this reticular model they had discovered something
+radically new and subversive of the established order, an order symbolised,
+in their view, by the verticality of the tree plunging its roots into the
+ground. This much-decried emblem was easily comparable with the worst
+forms of nazism, they maintained. We had been ‘ too eager ’to criticise the
+reduction of human beings to deterritorialised numbers in the universe of
+the concentration camps because, ‘ horror for horror, the numerical organisation
+of men is certainly not more cruel than their organisation by lineages
+or States ’ .
+61 They thought they were one step ahead of capitalism when in
+fact they were paving the way for its transformation into neoliberalism. 62
+Championed by them as a model of radicality, the rhizome could in fact
+serve as the logo of globalised capital today. It has no territorial boundaries,
+and its economic networks are so powerful that they can indeed uproot the
+authority of states, reduce identities to interchangeable numbers, and make
+laws useless in the face of the contract — all laws, except that of permanent
+change.
+120 The Law Geared to Numbers
+
+63 S Weil , The Need for Roots. Prelude to a Declaration of Duties towards Mankind [ 1943 ],
+tr A Wills , pref TS Eliot( London, Routledge &Kegan Paul , 1952 ) 44 . 64 ibid, 41. In this respect, Weil is a successor to Charles P é guy: on 1 August 1914 he wrote
+that ‘ for the fi rst time in the history of the world, money is the master, without limit or measure.
+For the fi rst time in the history of the world, money stands alone opposite spirit ’(C P é guy,
+‘Note conjointe sur M Descartes et la philosophie cart é sienne’ in Œuvres complètes, tome IX:
+Œuvres posthumes (Paris, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue française, 1924) p 57–331. 65 cf J-M Goulemot . Pour l ’ amour de Staline. La face oubli é e du communisme fran ç ais
+( Paris, ECRS , 2009 ) .
+
+Such zealous uprooting of whatever is still standing was diagnosed by
+Simone Weil as ‘ the most dangerous malady to which human societies are
+exposed ’ ,
+63 because it gradually extends the proletarianisation which had
+fi rst been the lot of workers and colonised peoples to everyone. Weil was
+in no doubt that there was no revolutionary potential in destroying roots,
+because she understood, much earlier and much more profoundly than
+Deleuze and Guattari, that this process was in fact driven by capitalism.
+As she noted:
+
+Money destroys human roots wherever it is able to penetrate, by turning desire for
+gain into the sole motive. It easily manages to outweigh all other motives, because
+the effort it demands of the mind is so very much less. Nothing is so clear and so
+simple as a row of fi gures. 64
+
+One cannot metabolise what comes from the outside unless one is rooted
+somewhere. And one of the effects of the mass destruction of roots is to
+impair this capacity to metabolise situations, with the result that all that
+remains is a choice between two forms of stultifi cation: bowing to the victory
+of the commodity, or accrediting fantastical identities, which are the
+breeding ground of fundamentalisms of all sorts.
+So we can understand better, with hindsight, what this post-modern
+thought, which was welcomed into American universities under the name of
+French Theory, was really about. It operated as a theoretical hinge enabling
+part of the intelligentsia to switch from communism to neoliberalism. This
+turning-point — from one blind alley to another — was a period of great intellectual
+vitality for the greatest of these thinkers. However, when the dust
+settled, their disciples lapsed back into Stalinist sectarianism, rallying to the
+total market with the same fervour as they had previously expressed for the
+‘ Great Helmsman ’Chairman Mao or, earlier still, for the magnifi cent ‘ little
+father of the peoples ’and the ‘ great mechanic of the engine of history ’ .
+65
+But let ’ s not get things out of proportion: the French intellectual scene
+in all its greater or lesser brilliance should not receive all the glory — or
+opprobium — for providing neoliberalism with its theoretical basis. Some
+years earlier, the economists and jurists of the Chicago School had already
+got down to it, with infi nitely more powerful effects globally on the making
+of law than this so-called French Theory.
+1 ‘ If the stakes are high enough, torture is permissible ’ RA Posner , The Best Offense ,
+The New Republic, 2 September 2002 . 2 This is Michel Miaille ’ s formulation, in Une introduction critique au droit ( Paris , Masp é ro ,
+1976 ) 388 . 3 R Gu é non , Le R è gne de la Quantit éet les signes des temps ( Paris , Gallimard , 1945 ) 272 .
+
+7
+
+Calculating the Incalculable:
+The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+‘ If the stakes are high enough, torture is permissible ’ 1
+
+WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK of neoliberalism, laws fi gure
+merely as legislative products which compete on a global market
+of norms. Their isonomic function disappears; that is, their role
+as a shared reference valid for everyone. As a result, neoliberalism faces a
+dilemma previously confronted by communist states when they abandoned
+‘ the fetishism of the legal form ’ 2 (as Marxists put it): with law transformed
+into simply a tool to implement calculations, what can serve as a common
+reference by which to harmonise human activity, defi ne each person ’ s
+place and judge his or her actions ?Soviet central planning had provided an
+answer by enlisting the whole of society, through administrative directives
+supplemented by ‘ planned contracts ’ , into the process of achieving quantifi
+ed objectives. ‘ Control fi gures ’ , defi ned at the very top and fed down to
+individual level, served to assign each person a task and to judge how well it
+was carried out. In short, Soviet planning was the fi rst attempt to introduce
+what Ren éGu é non has called ‘ the reign of quantity ’ .
+3
+No analogous problem arose for classical liberalism, because the contractual
+order was subordinated to the sphere of the law. But neoliberalism,
+with its aim of creating a society ruled by economics, simply cannot
+dodge the issue. The calculation of private interests cannot be referred to
+the incalculable value of a categorical imperative, as represented by the law.
+Nor can these calculations be measured against ‘ control fi gures ’handed down
+from above. This is why neoliberalism has set up a self-referential system
+in which calculations of utility ultimately determine how the law is applied.
+The Law and Economics doctrine sought to provide a theoretical basis for
+122 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+these self-referential mechanisms. 4 Over the last 30 years it has acquired
+paradigmatic status for Western law, infl uencing not only research but also
+case law and legislation.
+Before analysing this doctrine from a legal perspective, we should make
+an important preliminary point. Fortunately, the contribution economics
+can make to law is not exhausted by the Law and Economics approach. 5
+One could even say that this particular branch of economics provides us
+with the least insight into legal thought, because it does not understand law
+in all its anthropological, historical and cultural depth, but only as a means
+to implement an economic calculation. The Law and Economics doctrine
+should thus not be confused with the tradition of political economy, which
+aims at describing and understanding the institutional frameworks delimiting
+economic activity and not at subordinating these to a model of computational
+rationality. The approach of political economy, which is already
+present in Veblen ’ s 6 work, was pursued in the United States by what has
+been called institutionalist economics. It was a highly dynamic fi eld before
+the Second World War, 7 and still has a certain following, albeit very small. 8
+It gave rise to a ‘ neo-institutionalist ’school, whose best-known representative
+is Olivier E Williamson. 9 Unlike marginalist or utilitarian currents which
+are dominant today, institutionalist theory is not predicated on the harmonisation
+of private interests, but instead seeks to explore the frameworks
+and possibilities of collective action. It is worth mentioning that in France
+this theory was taken up predominantly by scholars with a background in
+engineering, who sought to anchor economic thinking in the realities of
+the productive process. It has given rise to the regulation school, 10 which
+
+4 These legal constructs should not be confused with those of Niklas Luhmann and Gunther
+Teubner, who were infl uenced by the biological theories of Francisco Varela. See in particular,
+N Luhmann , Legitimation durch Verfahren ( Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp , 1969 ) ; G Teubner ,
+Recht als autopoietisches System ( Frankfurt/Main , Surhkamp , 1989 ) ; by the same author,
+Droit et r é fl exivit é . L ’ auto-r é f é rence en droit et dans l ’ organisation ( Paris , LGDJ , 1994 ) . On
+the concept of reference, see P Legendre , Le D é sir politique de Dieu. Essai sur les montages de
+l ’ É tat et du Droit, 2nd edn( Paris , Fayard , 2005 ) 350ff . 5 This is why we shall use the original American name here rather than the broader category
+of ‘ the economic analysis of law ’ . For an excellent overview of the different economic
+approaches to law, see T Kirat , É conomie du droit ( Paris , La D é couverte, 2002) . 6 T Veblen , ‘ Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science ’( 1898 ) The Quarterly Journal
+of Economics 12 ; (1899) Theory of the Leisure Class. 7 JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924); With a new introduction by
+JE Biddle and WJ Samuels (New York City, Transaction Publisher, 1995). 8 WJ Samuels , Economics, Governance, and Law: Essays on Theory and Policy. Cheltenham
+( UK , Edward Elgar , 2002 ) ; GM Hodgson , Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a
+Modern Institutional Economics (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988 ) ; GM Hodgson , WJ Samuels
+and MR Tool , The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics ( London ,
+Edward Elgar , 1994 ) . 9 OE Williamson , Economic Institutions of Capitalism ( New York City , Free Press , 1985 ) . 10 R Boyer , Th é orie de la r é gulation: L’Etat des savoirs ( Paris , La D é couverte , 2002 ) ;
+M Aglietta(ed), Ecole de la r é gulation et critique de la raison é conomique ( Paris , L ’ Harmattan ,
+1994 ) .
+Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine 123
+
+11 J-P Dupuy , L’Avenir de l ’ é conomie: Sortir de l ’ é comystifi cation ( Paris , Flammarion ,
+2012 ) ; O Favereau , ‘ Note critique sur le droit, l ’ é conomie et le “ march é ” ’( 2012 ) Revue de
+droit du travail 9, 479 – 87 . A Orl é an , L’empire de la valeur. Refonder l ’ é conomie ( Paris , Seuil ,
+2011 ) ; R Salaisand M Storper , Les mondes de productions ( Paris , EHESS , 1995 ) . 12 For France, see R Guesnerie , L ’ é conomie de march é ( Paris , Le Pommier , 2006 ) ; A Masson ,
+Des liens et des transferts entre g é n é rations ( Paris , EHESS , 2009 ) ; T Piketty , Capital in the
+Twenty-First Century, tr A Goldhammer( Cambridge , Mass, Harvard University Press , 2014 ) . 13 See www.montpelerin.org .
+
+emphasises macroeconomic institutional frameworks, and to the economics
+of conventions, 11 which is more interested in the strategies of coordination
+used by actors of supposed limited rationality in situations of uncertainty.
+More generally, many economists are attentive to the non-economic determinants
+at work in the creation and distribution of wealth. 12 Beyond their
+differences, all these authors agree that, fi rst, an economy has no existence
+outside of the societies or institutions of which it forms a part; and secondly,
+that we can understand the economy only by looking at the real behaviour
+of economic agents and at the law as it stands. These fi elds of research are
+essential for a better understanding of the law because their work of contextualisation
+is a prerequisite for an insightful legal analysis.
+The doctrine of Law and Economics is quite different. It was developed
+by Henry Simons and Friedrich Hayek at the Law School of the University
+of Chicago in the late 1940s, in close collaboration with economists at
+the same university, amongst them Milton Friedman. Its explicit ideological
+aim was to combat Keynesianism and state interventionism by defi ning
+the legal and institutional frameworks best suited to fostering a competitive
+environment. The economic analyses produced there were thus from
+the outset conceived as the theoretical basis for a political programme with
+global ambitions. The core of this programme was elaborated within the
+Mont Pelerin Society, the fi rst international and economically liberal think
+tank, which was founded by Hayek in 1947 with funds provided by Swiss
+businesses. It is still going strong today. The Society ’ s website describes its
+members — top economists, politicians and business leaders — as those who
+
+see danger in the expansion of government, not least in state welfare, in the power
+of trade unions and business monopolies, and in the continuing threat and reality
+of infl ation. Without agreeing on everything, the members see the [Mont Pelerin]
+Society as an effort to interpret in modern terms the fundamental principles of
+economic society as expressed by those classical economists, political scientists,
+and philosophers who have inspired many in Europe, America and throughout
+the Western World. 13
+
+An important link is made here between a neoliberal political position and
+belief in the scientifi city of economic analysis. In order to get public opinion
+and academic circles to accept this link, the economists in question
+managed to have a new Nobel Prize for the Economic Sciences created,
+124 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+14 ‘ The Swedish Riksbank has put an egg in another very decent bird ’ s nest and thereby
+infringed on the trademarked name of Nobel. Two thirds of the Bank ’ s prizes in economics
+have gone to US economists of the Chicago School who create mathematical models to
+speculate in stock markets and options — the very opposite of the purposes of Alfred Nobel to
+improve the human condition. ’Peter Nobel, quoted by H Henderson , ‘ The “ Nobel prize ”that
+isn ’ t ’ , Le Monde diplomatique, English edn , February 2005 . 15 George Orwell, Animal Farm [1945]. 16 We gained some insight into the morals and mores of this ruling class from the US Congress
+’ s auditions of the bankers and traders involved in precipitating the fi nancial crisis of
+2008. See also the documentary Inside Job (2010) by Charles Ferguson, with Matt Damon, in
+which one can see and hear many of the protagonists of the crash. 17 Declaration to Reuters News Agency, Brussels, 26 February 2013.
+
+in 1969, whose winners have included many Mont Pelerin Society members
+such as Milton Friedman, Ronald Coase and Gary Becker. Alfred Nobel ’ s
+great-nephew condemned this sleight of hand in 2001, maintaining that in
+legitimating the positions held by the Chicago School economists, the Royal
+Bank of Sweden ‘ had laid its egg in another bird ’ s nest ’ .
+14 When we examine
+the Law and Economics doctrine from a legal perspective, we understand
+that it is underpinned by a dogma structurally no different from that of scientifi
+c socialism: in both cases, law is merely a tool for implementing underlying
+scientifi c laws, which occupy the position of a Grundnorm, a founding
+norm valid for all humanity. Those who fi rst attacked the Social State in the
+name of ‘ the fundamental principles of economic society ’were undoubtedly
+just as sincere as the founding fathers of communism. The latter genuinely
+believed that economics was a science equal to the natural sciences, and so
+they sought to adapt law and institutions to it. But the same cannot be said
+for the ensuing generations. As in Orwell ’ s ‘ animal farm ’ ,
+15 one can always
+fi nd ‘ useful idiots ’who continue to believe in neoliberalism (as previously
+in communism). But they do this out of class interests, not zealous faith.
+In reality, communism ’ s utopianism produced a thuggish and unscrupulous
+Nomenklatura, and neoliberalism has put power into the hands of a no less
+cynical, grasping and corrupt plutocracy. 16 This is why the ruling classes —
+particularly in post-communist countries — have so effortlessly passed from
+one regime to the other. Soviet planning and neoliberal programming also
+share the belief that since the economy is based on rational calculation,
+it should not be exposed to the vagaries of democratic elections. Recently
+the outgoing President of the European Commission, Jos éManuel Barroso
+(himself a former Maoist activist), expressed the need for a restricted
+democracy, when one of his former colleagues, Mario Monti, was defeated
+in Italy ’ s general elections. He refl ected out loud that:
+
+The question we have to ask ourselves is the following: should we determine our
+policy, our economic policy, by short-term electoral considerations or by what
+has to be done to put Europe back on the path to sustainable growth ?For me the
+answer is clear. We should be serious, and not give in to immediate political or
+party considerations. 17
+Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine 125
+
+18 c f W Streeck , Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism ( London ,
+Verso , 2014 ) ; W Brown , Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy( 2003 ) 7 Theory
+&Event 1 . 19 cf JG Vald é s , Pinochet ’ s Economists: The Chicago School of Economics in Chile
+( Cambridge , Cambridge University Press , 1995 ) . 20 GS Becker , The Economic Approach to Human Behavior ( Chicago , University of Chicago
+Press , 1976 ) . 21 See above, ch 5 , pp 90–91. 22 R Coase ‘ The Economics of the First Amendment. The Market for Goods and the Market
+for Ideas ’( 1974 ) 64 , American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 2, 384 – 91 . 23 cf L Mayali(ed) Le fa ç onnage juridique du march édes religions aux Etats-Unis ( Paris ,
+Mille et une nuits , 2002 ) . 24 cf T Porter ‘ US Army Engineers and the Rise of Cost-Benefi t Analysis ’in Trust in
+Numbers ( ch 5 , fn 2) 148 – 89.
+
+The alliance between capitalism and democracy was sealed by the social
+state and also by Western competition with communism. But capitalism in
+fact has no need of democracy. It has never had a problem with dictatorships,
+as long as they respect the market economy. On the contrary, neoliberal
+doctrine has always singled out democracy as a source of disturbance
+for the spontaneous order of the market. 18 We should not forget that the
+place where the Chicago School fi rst tested its theories was in Chile under
+Pinochet ’ s dictatorship. 19
+Unlike the fi rst economic analyses of law, the Law and Economics doctrine
+claims to encompass the whole legal order, and not simply the legal
+rules governing trade and industry. This extended scope corresponds to the
+tendency of economists to defi ne their discipline not by its object (the production
+and distribution of wealth), but by its method, which can supposedly
+reveal the profound motivations of human behaviour in every area of
+life, and produce a system of rules to account for this behaviour. A book
+by Gary Becker, who was awarded this so-called Nobel Prize for Economic
+Sciences in 1992, bore the unambiguous title of The economic approach to
+human behaviour,
+20 and theorised this shift from object to method. The call
+on which it ended, to link economics to biology, was heard loud and clear,
+to judge by the success of neuro-economics, today ’ s version of the recurrent
+attempts since Francis Galton to ground human behaviour ultimately in
+biology. 21 Economics thus defi ned itself as a total science, capable of analysing
+in terms of the market all aspects of human life, whether family life (the
+marriage market), politics (the electoral market), intellectual endeavour (the
+market for ideas) 22 or religious life (the market of religions). 23
+The Law and Economics doctrine is just one corner of this vast project.
+In its descriptive aspects it relies on some very old legal practices,
+which are nothing but plain common sense. Cost – benefi t analysis, for
+instance, was introduced in the nineteenth century by the state corps of
+engineers, in the US as well as in France. 24 As for how judicial decisions
+may encourage diligence or discourage negligence, the idea is probably as
+126 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+25 R Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, 8th edn( Aspen , Wolters Kluwer , Aspen , 2010 ) . 26 E Mackaayand S Rousseau , Analyse é conomique du droit ( Paris , Dalloz-Th é mis , 2008 ) . 27 cf B Deffainsand É Langlais(eds) Analyse é conomique du droit: Principes, m é thodes,
+r é sultats ( Paris , De Baeck , 2009 ) 407 ; and for a historical overview: B Deffainsand S Ferey ,
+Agir et juger: Comment les é conomistes pensent le droit ( Paris , Universit éPanth é on-Assas ,
+2010 . 28 Among the most recent, see particularly R Cooterand T Ulen , Law and Economics,
+6th edn( Harlow, UK, Prentice Hall , 2011 ) . Also the excellent bibliographical appendices in the
+books by Thierry Kirat and Ejan Mackaay. 29 See above, ch 5 , p 93ff. 30 A Comte, ‘Relation of Sociology to the other departments of positive philosophy’ in The
+Positive Philosophy, tr H Martineau, intro F Harrison (London, George Bell and Son, 1896),
+Vol 2, Ch IV, 223.
+
+old as the judgement of Solomon. But what really characterises this doctrine
+is its aim to derive from such particular practices generally valid norms to
+which all legal systems must conform. These normative ambitions are perfectly
+explicit, and the doctrine ’ s infl uence, initially relayed by international
+economic bodies, was and still is considerable at all levels of law-making.
+There one can fi nd, intact, the faith in a numerically computed social harmony,
+and in the possibility of realising the Platonic dream of a city state
+ruled not by human laws in their inevitable arbitrariness and imperfection,
+but by a royal science capable of securing the government of men through
+knowledge of numbers.
+From its origins in the United States, with the publication of Richard
+Posner ’ s pioneering work, Economic Analysis of Law, in 1972, 25 this doctrine
+spread to France via the Canadian legal scholars Ejan Mackaay and
+St é phane Rousseau. 26 It has met with extraordinary success, 27 generating
+such mountains of secondary literature that no exhaustive account of it is
+possible. 28 Its different advocates share a belief in a certain number of theories
+and principles, which we explicate below, all of which justify a normative
+order based entirely on calculation.
+
+I. GAME THEORY
+
+The idea that calculation can replace judgement has a long history, at least
+since Pascal ’ s wager and probability theory. 29 Its popularity peaked in the
+late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and then declined, under fi re
+from the positivists who criticised it as, in Comte ’ s words, ‘ offering our
+own ignorance as the natural measure of the degree of probability of our
+various opinions ’ .
+30 Yet even enthusiasts such as Condorcet and Laplace
+applied it only to situations resembling games of chance, where players calculate
+their chances of winning or losing without any ethical stakes being
+involved. In other words, they certainly never considered that society as a
+whole, and the economy, could be a vast gaming hall or casino. Only when
+economics decided that game theory could be applied to every situation of
+Game Theory 127
+
+31 Game theory was systematised by Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann in
+1944 (in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton University Press, 1944)). The
+so-called ‘ Nobel Prize ’in economics is regularly awarded to authors who work within this
+theoretical framework, which has become something of a paradigm in the economic sciences
+today. For an overview, cf G Giraud , La th é orie des jeux, 2nd edn( Paris , Flammarion , 2009 ) .
+And for a legal approach, see M van de Kerchoveand F Ost , Le droit ou les paradoxes du jeu
+( Paris , PUF , 1992 ) .
+
+uncertainty was the idea of the limited legitimacy of probability calculations
+overturned. 31
+Game theory, and one of its best-known examples, the Prisoner ’ s Dilemma,
+is familiar even to beginners in economics. In this dilemma, invented in 1950
+by Tucker, two prisoners, charged with the same crime, are each encouraged
+separately to betray the other in return for the promise of the accuser ’ s
+acquittal (sentence = 0) and a heavy sentence (= 20 years in jail) for the
+one accused. If both refuse to collaborate, each will receive a light sentence
+(= 1 year). If each betrays the other, each will receive a moderate sentence
+(= 5 years). This situation can be compared to a ‘ game ’in which each prisoner
+must optimise his situation, but this optimisation depends on the decision
+taken by the other party. If each relies on calculation, each will betray
+the other, whereas the optimal solution would have been that each refuses
+to collaborate. This is meant to demonstrate that strategies of cooperation
+grounded in a contract are more effi cient at producing collective utility than
+is non-cooperation between agents acting under a common law.
+
+The Prisoner’s
+Dilemma
+
+Prisoner A
+
+Prisoner B
+
+Denounce Stay silent
+
+Stay silent
+
+5 years 5 years 0 year
+
+0 year
+
+20 years
+
+20 years 1 year 1 year
+
+Denounce
+
+Figure 7.1: The Prisoner ’ s Dilemma
+
+We should note that this argument has eliminated any Kantian-style
+perspective, in which an incommensurable value is attached to actions
+128 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+32 See R Hamayon Jouer , Etude anthropologique àpartir d’exemples sib é riens ( Paris ,
+La D é couverte , 2012 ) . 33 cf above, ch 3 , p 60f. 34 M Jensenand W Meckling , Theory of the fi rm: managerial behavior, agency cost, and
+ownership structure( 1976 ) Journal of Financial Economic, Volume 3, Issue 4, October 1976,
+305–360 .
+
+performed out of a sense of justice, duty or honour. There is no place in this
+game theory for Jean Moulin ’ s heroism, nor for all those who, for better
+or for worse, hold certain values in greater esteem than their own life. The
+marginalist or utilitarian economics on which this theory rests must pretend
+these values do not exist, and work with an incredibly impoverished notion
+of ‘ game-playing ’ , understood as quantifi cation of the stakes involved, and
+stripped of any anthropological depth. 32 From a legal standpoint, the extension
+of game theory to every situation of uncertainty implies a universe
+entirely governed by contract, in which individuals are driven by two forces
+dear to the Chinese legalists: fear and greed. 33
+In the terms of game theory, optimal outcomes, understood as the sum of
+individual utilities, are achieved only by the use of contracts, whereas noncooperation
+between agents gives negative results; had the two prisoners
+made a pact of mutual non-denunciation, each would have come out of it
+better. This theory not only justifi es off-the-record dealings, but more generally
+provides the basis for ‘ the contractualisation of society ’ . Since appealing
+to the law results in non-cooperation between individuals, one would
+do better to generalise use of the contract, which enables individuals to
+optimise their utility on a case by case basis, and thus to optimise collective
+utility.
+
+II. AGENCY THEORY
+
+One extension of game theory which directly affects the realm of law is
+agency theory. It focuses on situations in which the optimal result, which
+is supposed to be produced spontaneously by the contractual relation, is
+compromised by an asymmetrical distribution of information between the
+contracting parties. This occurs whenever a contract creates an ‘ agency relationship
+’ , that is, whenever there is ‘ a contract under which one person (the
+principal) engages another person (the agent) to perform some service on
+their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to
+the agent ’ .
+34 An ‘ agency relationship ’is a broad notion applicable indifferently
+to the employment contract, the relation between shareholders and
+company directors, or to situations of delegation. It goes without saying
+that each party in these relationships is presumed to be motivated exclusively
+by egotistical concerns. The risk is that agents may exploit the leeway
+they have in carrying out their tasks to serve their own rather than the
+principal ’ s ends. Agency theory claims that such problems can be solved,
+Agency Theory 129
+
+35 See the example of contracts with real estate agents, examined in EA Posner , Agency
+Models in Law and Economics, John M Olin Law &Economics Working Paper No 92( 2000 )
+The Chicago Working Paper Series, 12 , www.law.uchicago.edu/fi les/fi les/92.EAP_.Agency_0.
+pdf .
+36 See below, ch 8, p 148ff. 37 cf J-P Rob é , ‘ Àqui appartiennent les entreprises ? ’( 2009 ) Le D é bat, 155, 32 – 36 . 38 See the collective volume edited by A Supiot , L ’ entreprise dans un monde sans fronti è res
+( Paris , Dalloz , 2015 ) .
+
+once again, by contractualisation, and notably by giving the agent a fi nancial
+incentive to produce the most profi table results for the principal. 35 This
+theory provided the doctrinal basis for the trend in offering stock options
+to top business managers, and in fi xing salaries individually. As is often the
+case with the economic analysis of law, it is tempting to see this doctrine
+simply as a slightly naive formalisation of what has long been common
+knowledge and practice. However, it also isolates the solutions proposed
+from their contexts and gives them a generalisable normative force. In other
+words, the theoretical innovations introduced by agency theory are as meager
+as their normative impact is huge.
+For example, agency theory was central to the doctrine of corporate governance,
+understood as the generalisation throughout commercial law of a
+reductive idea of the business enterprise as the property of its shareholders. 36
+Of course this idea has no serious legal grounding, because shareholders
+have never owned anything except their shares. 37 But it was used to contest
+the idea that a business enterprise is an economic entity whose freedom of
+action should be secured against shareholders and employees alike, while
+both should have the right to monitor together the directors ’decisions.
+The application of agency theory has resulted in subjecting companies to the
+snapshot time of the fi nancial markets, thus ruining precisely their entrepreneurial
+ability, which is predicated on the longer timescale of a collective
+project. 38
+Applying agency theory to the employment contract also has deleterious
+effects because it inverts the founding perspective of labour law. The law ’ s
+function becomes the protection of employers from the power of employees
+rather than the protection of employees from the power of employers.
+We have seen a panoply of mechanisms developed over the last 30 years to
+destroy the individual and collective autonomy of employees. They have
+been applied up and down the salary scale, but obviously in different forms.
+At the top, salaried company directors are dissuaded from pursuing the
+business ’ s long-term interests — which might confl ict with short-term profitability
+— by pegging their fi nal pay to shareholder profi ts through devices
+such as stock options. To keep employees lower down the scale from protesting,
+the national and industry-level safeguards provided by the Fordist
+compromise have been reduced. So-called ‘ atypical ’[ atypique] and insecure
+130 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+39 R Coase , ‘ The Problem of Social Cost ’( 1960 ) 3 The Journal of Law &Economics, 1 – 44
+(available online at www.econ.ucsb.edu/∼tedb/Courses/UCSBpf/readings/coase.pdf ). 40 ibid, 44.
+
+[ pr é caire] contracts, outsourcing, individualised pay, and variable working
+time [ les accords emploi-comp é titivit é ] are all examples of this inversion
+of labour law ’ s primary function, since they ultimately shift economic risk
+from employer to employee.
+
+III. THE ‘ COASE THEOREM ’AND THE THEORY
+OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+The American economist Ronald Coase wrote an important book published
+in 1937, The Nature of the Firm, on the economics of businesses.
+He demonstrated persuasively that fi rms will decide to carry out an
+economic operation within the fi rm, or else through the market, on the basis
+of the transaction costs — fi nding partners, invitations to tender, negotiation,
+and so forth — involved in the latter. Building on this work, he published
+an article in 1960 called ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, which is often considered
+to be the founding text of the new economic analysis of law. 39 It
+concerns the legal mechanisms required to mitigate what are called businesses
+’ ‘ negative externalities ’ , that is, the harm they cause their environment.
+Coase claims to show that if transaction costs are reduced to zero, it is
+always more effi cient to settle this problem of externalities through private
+arrangements than by appealing to the law or regulations. To prove this, all
+one need do is frame the problem in terms of competing rights-bearers and
+not liability for damage.
+
+The failure to develop a theory adequate to handle the problem of harmful effects
+stems from a faulty concept of a factor of production. This is usually thought of as
+a physical entity which the businessman acquires and uses (an acre of land, a ton
+of fertiliser) instead of as a right to perform certain (physical) actions.
+
+If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to understand
+that the right to do something which has a harmful effect (such as the creation of
+smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of production. Just as we may use a piece
+of land in such a way as to prevent someone else from crossing it, or parking his
+car,or building his house upon it, so we may use it in such a way as to deny him a
+view or quiet or unpolluted air. The cost of exercising a right (of using a factor of
+production) is always the loss which is suffered elsewhere in consequence of the
+exercise of that right — the inability to cross land, to park a car, to build a house,
+to enjoy aview, to have peace and quiet or to breathe clean air.
+
+It would clearly be desirable if the only actions performed were those in which
+what was gained was worth more than what was lost. 40
+The ‘Coase Theorem’ and the Theory of Property Rights 131
+
+41 ‘ It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage caused
+since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no market
+transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which maximises the
+value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to
+work without cost ’(R Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Coast’, (n 39) 8). 42 In US law, a ‘ circuit ’is the area, covering several states, over which an appellate court
+has jurisdiction. 43 Kirat, É conomie du droit (n 5) 73.
+
+If, for example, a company pollutes a river, the legal issue would not be
+regulating its activity but rather how to settle competing rights: the right to
+produce and the right of others to fi sh. The optimal solution proves to be
+a private arrangement between polluters and fi shermen. If the gain for the
+business from its polluting activity is 1,000 and the loss for the fi shermen is
+200, this arrangement would take the form of the fi shermen selling the business
+a ‘ right to pollute ’in return for a sum set somewhere between these two
+fi gures. Failing an agreement, the case goes to court where the judge, after
+a ‘ cost – benefi t ’calculation, redistributes the rights between the two parties.
+Adjusting private utilities should thus result in a maximisation of public
+utility, independently of how the rights are distributed between the parties,
+which fi nally proves insignifi cant. In Coase ’ s words:
+
+It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage
+caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there
+can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate
+result (which maximises the value of production) is independent of the legal position
+if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost. 41
+
+This idea was developed further by Richard Posner, who is generally
+acknowledged as the founder of the Law and Economics doctrine. Posner
+was a professor at the Chicago Law School as well as occupying a highranking
+position in the American legal system (he was a judge of the appeal
+court for the seventh circuit). 42 In his view, the judge ’ s function is not to
+distribute goods justly but to allocate rights to their most productive use.
+Posner ’ s view is that justice is the same as what is economically effi cient.
+As Thierry Kirat summarises, ‘ the judicial process operates as a machine for
+allocating costs and profi ts, and for producing cost – benefi t calculations ’ .
+43
+Unsurprisingly, when France imported this doctrine, it also imported this
+function of the judge. For example, in the presentation of the Economics of
+Law Research Unit of the University of Paris 2 (which describes itself on its
+English home page as having ‘ the top faculty of law in France ’ ), the idea of
+‘ justice ’is distanced through quote marks, the judge is called a ‘ producer of
+rules ’and the law, a product.
+
+The research carried out at the Economics of Law Research Unit of Paris 2 seeks
+to provide new ideas in legal reasoning, but also economic impact studies. Producers
+of rules must be made aware of the economic consequences of their decisions.
+132 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+44 Homepage of the Economics of Law Research Unit of the University of Paris 2 at www.uparis2.fr/1284364950996/0/fi
+che___laboratoire , consulted on 19 March 2013. 45 159 F 2d 169 (2d Cir 1947). See M Fabre-Magnan , Droit des obligations, 3rd edn , Vol 2 ,
+Responsabilit écivile et quasi-contrats ( Paris , PUF , Th é mis , 2013 ) 58 – 59 . 46 The logical aporia of this reduction of the judge to a homo oeconomicus was already
+mentioned by Alexandre Koj è ve in 1943 in his Outline of a Phenomenology of Right, ed and
+tr B-P Frost (London, Rowman &Littlefi eld, 2000).
+
+It is often assumed that the role of the courts is to identify ‘ just ’solutions, and that
+the cases have no impact on individuals other than the parties in litigation. But in
+reality judgments produce effects for a whole category of similar cases. 44
+
+Rather than dwell on the dreadful platitude of this last sentence — as though
+the author were discovering the existence of case law (‘juris-prudence’) — we
+shall simply note that this necessary exercise of prudence by the judge is
+reduced to the consultation of ‘ economic impact studies ’ . This focus implies
+a method of reasoning which has long characterised American tort liability
+case law. It was formalised in 1947 by the judge Learned Hand in the United
+States v Caroll Towing Co case. 45 Judge Hand had to decide whether the
+owner of a barge left unattended was responsible for the damage caused
+when it struck another vessel after its moorings had come loose. He based
+his decision on a calculation with three parameters: the probability P that
+damage would occur; the expected sum L ( ‘ loss ’ ) corresponding to this damage;
+and the cost B (for ‘ burden ’ ) of preventing the damage. If the cost B
+was less than the amount of probable damage PL, then the person who
+could have prevented the damage occurring was guilty of negligence ( N)
+and should be sentenced to indemnify the victim. This gave the following
+formula, known as the ‘ Hand Formula ’ :
+
+B ≺ PL ⊃ N
+
+The Coase Theorem generalises this extension of individual rights, and
+the corresponding restriction of the scope of legal prohibition. The overall
+result is supposedly to maximise wealth. It refl ects a legal universe without
+a categorical imperative, peopled by contracting particles armed with rights
+by which to achieve maximum individual satisfaction. The judge is not
+the guardian of the law, but an accountant expected to tot up maximised
+individual utilities, case by case, the total being unquestioningly identifi ed
+with social utility. As such, the judge is no longer a point of heteronomy,
+the expression of an authority placed at n + 1 above the particular interests
+of the parties in dispute, but is simply there to ensure that maximum collective
+utility results from the parties ’calculations of individual utility. 46
+Instead of arriving at a judgment by applying the law, the judge fi ne-tunes
+fi gures on the basis of cost – benefi t assessments. This explains today ’ s trend
+for using alternative dispute resolution methods, and the generalisation of
+The ‘Coase Theorem’ and the Theory of Property Rights 133
+
+47 For this arbitration market and its practices, see P Eberhardt & C Olivet , Profi ting from
+injustice. How law fi rms, arbitrators and fi nanciers are fuelling an investment arbitration boom
+( Brussels/Amsterdam , Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute , 2012 )
+73(available online at www.corporateeurope.org ). 48 See particularly SW Schill(ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public
+Law ( Oxford , Oxford University Press , 2010 ) ; F Gisel , L ’ arbitrage international ou le droit
+contre l ’ ordre juridique: Application et cr é ation du droit en arbitrage international ( Fondation
+Varenne , thesis , 2011 ) ; M Audit , Contrats publics et arbitrage international ( Brussels ,
+Bruylant , 2011 ) ; AE Gildemeister , L ’ arbitrage des diff é rends fi scaux en droit international
+des investissements ( Paris , LDGJ , 2013 ) ; E Loquinand S Manciaux(eds) L ’ ordre public et
+l ’ arbitrage ( Paris, Lexis Nexis , 2014 ) ; JE Viñ uales , L ’ Etat face a la protection internationale de
+l ’ entreprise, in A Supiot(ed) L ’ entreprise dans un monde sans fronti è res, ( Paris , Dalloz , 2015 )
+103 – 14 . 49 cf H Demsetz , ‘ Towards a Theory of Property Rights ’( 1967 ) American Economic Review
+2, 347 – 59 ; Eirik G Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich ‘ Property Rights and Economic Theory: a
+Survey of Recent Literature ’( 1972 ) X Journal of Economic Literature 4, 1137 – 62 ; S Pejovich ,
+Economic Analysis of Institutions and Systems ( Dordrecht-Boston , London , Kluwer , 1995 ) .
+
+arbitration clauses in commercial agreements. When the law is thus atomised
+into a cloud of individual rights, disputes call for arbitration not judgment,
+guided by the arbiter ’ s own desire to maximise his profi ts on the arbitration
+market. 47 And when the arbitration market gets a foothold in investment
+agreements between transnational corporations and countries, whole states
+are forced to obey the rationale of economic calculation. The inclusion of
+arbitration clauses, called Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses,
+in international investment agreements gives businesses the right to go to
+arbitration for any employment, environmental or tax legislation liable to
+reduce the profi tability of their investment. 48 If these sorts of clauses were
+inserted into the investment treaties currently being negotiated between the
+EU, and the USA and Canada, they would deal a death blow to national
+sovereignty in these areas and to the struggle against the total subjection of
+the law to economic calculation. This is why the negotiations have mobilised
+so many people, and also why they have been conducted with such
+stealth and speed.
+In the Law and Economics doctrine, the replacement of mandatory rules
+by individual rights goes by the name of the ‘ theory of property rights ’ .
+49
+Based on Coase ’ s ideas, this theory extends the reach of the market to
+encompass not only the exchange of goods and services but also the right
+to use these. The market thus conditions individual behaviour through the
+play of profi t and loss resulting from exercising, or not exercising, these
+rights. The concept of property right is thus not simply about ownership,
+but it includes all the prerogatives, the ‘ bundle of rights ’ , attached to the
+possession of a good. For example, if I take over a company I do not strictly
+have a property right in the skill and experience of its staff, but these are
+part of the ‘ bundle of rights ’attached to the thing and transferable with it.
+What is really at stake here is the destruction of the separation between laws
+and products. On the one hand, legal rules are viewed as ‘ products ’and the
+134 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+50 R Posner Economic Analysis of Law, 8th edn( Aspen , Wolter Kluwer , Casebook series ,
+2010 ) ; and by the same author, ‘ Let us never blame a contract breaker ’(2008 – 09) 107
+Michigan Law Review, 1349 – 43. For a general overview and a detailed bibliography, see
+M Fabre-Magnan , Droit des obligations I Contrats et engagement unilateral, 3rd edn( Paris ,
+PUF, Th é mis , 2012 ) 720f . 51 O Holmes, Jr , The Common Law ( Boston , Little, Brown, &Co 1881 ) 107 – 10, 299 – 301 ;
+‘ The Path of the Law ’(1897) Harvard Law Review, Vol 10, No 8 (25 March 1897) 457–478.
+
+judge or legislator as a ‘ producer of rules ’ ; but, on the other hand, every
+product is conceived as a bearer of a bundle of rights. Everything is calculated
+in terms of individual rights, and more precisely of property rights,
+that is, they are exclusive and transferable.
+The legal subject of the Law and Economics doctrine is thus a monad
+which cares only about (and for) itself, and which accepts no laws except the
+self-imposed bonds of its contractual relations with other similar monads.
+It fi ts neatly into our cybernetic imaginary, in which rhizomal networks,
+networks of nerves and networks of computers are all part of the same
+representation of the world. Law likewise becomes a network, with no vertical
+axis or identifi able frontiers. What gives stability and consistency to
+the whole is that all individuals are actively seeking to extend their territory.
+Legal bonds are just so many contractual threads joining legal subjects
+together, who would ideally be undifferentiated beings, without sex, age,
+forbears or interiority, and who would all be preprogrammed to maximise
+their individual utilities. The incalculable — because in-valuable — principles
+which ground the reign of the law have no place here. The values they represent
+have all been converted into quantities. We saw this above, in Coase ’ s
+vision of environmental protection, where the judge balances the right to
+breathe pure air against a ‘ right to pollute ’ . The same logic can be applied
+regarding the value of the pledged word and of human dignity.
+A cost – benefi t analysis can be used to measure the value of keeping one ’ s
+word. The theory of the effi cient breach of contract does just that: on the
+basis of a calculation of utility, one of the parties can be authorised not to
+honour his or her word when it is more advantageous to pay damages to the
+other party than to perform the agreement. The effi cient non-performance
+of a contract was fi rst theorised by Richard Posner, 50 who attributes its origin,
+most probably wrongly, to Judge OW Holmes, in whose words
+
+the only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes
+the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every
+case, it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfi llment has gone by,
+and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses. 51
+
+The promisor ’ s behaviour is to be judged not in terms of his obligation
+to honour his promise, but in terms of a calculation of the greatest social
+utility. When the dogmatic, and therefore priceless, value of a promise
+is replaced by a monetary value, and the rule of Pacta sunt servanda
+The ‘Coase Theorem’ and the Theory of Property Rights 135
+
+52 Y-M Laithier , É tude comparative des sanctions de l ’ inex é cution du contrat ( Paris , LGDJ ,
+2004 ) , pref Muir-Watt. Also C Fluet , ‘ La rupture effi cace du contrat ’ , in C Jamin(ed) Droit
+et é conomie des contrats ( Paris , LGDJ , 2008 ) 155 – 67and J Rochfeld, ‘ La rupture effi cace ’ ,
+in ibid, 169 – 92. Arguing the case against this theory, see D Friedmann , ‘ The Effi cient Breach
+Fallacy ’( 1989 ) 18, The Journal of Legal Studies 1, 1 – 24 . 53 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Ch 2, in Practical Philosophy, translated
+by Mary Gregor (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996). 54 C Castoriadis , The Imaginary Institution of Society, tr K Blamey( Cambridge , Massachusetts,
+MIT Press , 1987 ) . 55 See above, ch 6 , p 118. 56 O Cayla, in O Caylaand Y Thomas , Du droit de ne pas na î tre ( Paris , Gallimard ,
+2002 ) 47 . 57 S H é nette-Vauchez , ‘ Droits de l ’ homme et tyrannie: de l ’ importance de la distinction entre
+esprit critique et esprit de critique ’( 2009 ) Recueil Dalloz 238 . Also, an earlier work along the
+same lines by C Girardand S H é nette-Vauchez , La dignit éde la personne humaine. Recherche
+sur un processus de juridicisation ( Paris , PUF , 2005 ) 215ff .
+
+( ‘ contracts must be honoured ’ ) by the maximisation of utility, then heteronomy
+has been fi nally expunged from the contractual order and reduced
+to something quantifi able. The effi cient breach theory was enthusiastically
+received, and is now widely applied in the US, as well as having some supporters
+among French legal scholars. 52
+As for the equal dignity of human beings, it represents the incalculable
+par excellence. Kant famously defi nes dignity as follows: ‘ In the realm of
+ends everything has either a price or dignity. Anything with a price can be
+replaced by something else as its equivalent, whereas anything that is above
+all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has dignity ’ .
+53 Since dignity
+is ‘ above all price ’ , it by defi nition cannot be subjected to calculation.
+Dignity has a further drawback: as a categorical imperative, it is a duty, and
+not only an individual right. Dignity thus places heteronomy at the heart of
+subjectivity. It is the equivalent in law of the fact, noted by Castoriadis, that
+‘ the institution of the social individual means the imposition on the psyche
+of an organisation which remains essentially heterogeneous to it ’ .
+54 Such
+heteronomy remains incompatible with the ‘ perfect sovereignty of self over
+self ’by which postmodernity characterises the subject. 55
+This dual drawback may be overcome in two ways: either abolish the
+principle of dignity, or convert it into something quantifi able so that it
+can be fi tted into a cost – benefi t analysis. Unsurprisingly, the fi rst path was
+chosen by postmodern legal scholars, the second by upholders of the Law
+and Economics doctrine. The postmodern camp vilifi ed the principle of dignity
+for its ‘ anti-modern ’refusal of ‘ the subjectivism inherent in human rights ’
+modernity ’ .
+56 To this argument, based on a value judgment, they added
+the — somewhat contradictory — one that with dignity ’ s axiomatic value one
+‘ left the arena of science ’ 57 and thus forfeited any de jure discussion of legal
+axiomatics, law ’ s anthropological function or the value choices underlying
+legislation and case law. Yet in the founding texts drafted in the wake
+of the Second World War ’ s atrocities, dignity is and remains a fi rst and
+136 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+58 cf M Fabre-Magnan , ‘ La dignit éen Droit: un axiome ’( 2007 ) 58 Revue interdisciplinaire
+d ’ é tudes juridiques 1, 1 – 30 . 59 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), Art 1. 60 Posner, The Best Offense (n 1). This position was supported by many other American
+jurists. For general surveys, see KJ Greenbergand JL Datel , The Torture Paper. The Road to
+Abu Ghraib ( Cambridge , Cambridge University Press , 2005 ) 1284 ; M Terestchenko , Du bon
+usage de la torture ou comment les d é mocraties justifi ent l ’ injustifi able ( Paris , La D é couverte ,
+2008 ) , esp Ch 2 ‘ Des juristes au service de la torture ’ , 27ff.
+
+inviolable principle. 58 Why, then, should legal analysis not refer to it, and be
+charged with lacking scientifi city if it does so ?Does the science of law not
+extend to the principles which positive law declares to be the ‘ the basis of
+every human community, of peace and of justice in the world ’ ? 59 Unless the
+new fundamental axiom organising legal thinking were this very prohibition
+of the concept of dignity, branded as ‘ anti-modern ’and ‘ liberticidal ’ ?This
+prohibition would become the emancipatory axiom of a legal order without
+axioms, reduced to a juxtaposition of sovereign monads. But this move
+comes at the cost of brushing aside the texts which precisely constitute the
+‘ science of law ’ , and hence of abandoning what in legal thought precisely
+corresponds to the ‘ arena of science ’ .
+The second solution, which is just as dogmatic but less convoluted,
+involves submitting dignity to a cost – benefi t analysis. This was the method
+used by the Law and Economics school to settle the issue of the use of torture
+in the context of the ‘ War on Terror ’ . The prohibition of torture is a primary
+corollary of the principle of dignity and as such is enshrined both in the Universal
+Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5) and in the EU Fundamental
+Charter (Article 5). From the perspective of the economic analysis of law,
+however, it should be weighed up against other values. Richard Posner was
+the fi rst of a long list of American legal scholars to claim that ‘ If the stakes
+are high enough, torture is permissible ’ .
+60 Here, the resultant social utility is
+calculated by balancing the dignity of the supposed terrorist — which would
+be an argument for not torturing him — against the anticipated harm done
+to his countless potential victims. The Hand Formula can be applied here: if
+the cost B of violating the prisoner ’ s dignity is set at 100, the probability of
+a terrorist attack at 0.1 and the expected damage at one million then it is an
+open-and-shut case: the prisoner should be tortured in the name of overall
+social utility. As with the hero of Sartre ’ s Huis Clos ( No Exit), the only question
+is ‘ Where are the stakes, the racks, the leather funnels ? ’ .
+This method, in which dignity, reduced to a quantifi able value, must be
+balanced against other interests, has been adopted by the Court of Justice of
+the European Union. Unlike our postmodern experts, the Court ’ s judges are
+not entitled to assert their sovereign right to exclude the principle of dignity
+from the arena of law; they have no choice but to admit its pre-eminent
+value in positive law. However, this value is balanced as Richard Posner
+New Comparative Analysis and the Market in Law 137
+
+61 M Horkheimer and T Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, op. cit. Introduction, n 6. 62 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers ’Federation v Viking Line ABP [ 2008 ]
+IRLR 143, 46 . 63 cf E Christodoulidis , The European Court of Justice and ‘ Total Market ’Thinking( 2013 )
+14 German Law Journal 10, 171 – 86 . 64 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 30 June 2009 — 2 BvE 2/08 (Lisbon Treaty) § §
+211 and 216 (accessible at www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de ). 65 cf particularly P d ’ Iribarne , La logique de l’honneur. Gestion des entreprises et traditions
+nationales ( Paris , Seuil , 1989 ) ; R Salaisand M Storper , Les mondes de production.
+
+advocated: everything depends on the sums involved; in other words, everything
+is processed according to the principle of proportionality. This clearly
+illustrates Horkheimer and Adorno ’ s diagnosis that ‘ eqivalence becomes the
+new fetish ’ .
+61 For example, in the Viking case, the European Court of Justice
+ruled that human dignity has to be ‘ reconciled ’with freedom of competition,
+the free circulation of goods and capital, and the freedom to provide
+services, in the name of the principle of proportionality:
+
+the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue, that is, freedom of expression and
+freedom of assembly and respect for human dignity, respectively, does not fall
+outside the scope of the provisions of the Treaty. Such exercise must be reconciled
+with the requirements relating to rights protected under the Treaty and in accordance
+with the principle of proportionality. 62
+
+Evoking the principle of proportionality makes it possible to reduce every
+sort of rule to its calculated utility, and hence to expel from legal reasoning
+any idea of an inviolable law. In Germany ’ s Basic Law, however, human
+dignity is precisely qualifi ed as inviolable. 63 So it should come as no surprise
+that one of the rare courts to resist this trend of relativisation is the
+German Constitutional Court, which declared that ‘ The right to free and
+equal participation in public authority is enshrined in human dignity …The
+principle of democracy may not be balanced against other legal interests; it
+is inviolable. ’ 64
+This brief foray into the legal debates surrounding the concept of dignity
+aimed to show that when faced with something which is ‘ beyond price ’ , the
+Law and Economics doctrine obliterates it by setting a price on it nonetheless.
+In the total market, nothing which is price-less can have existence.
+
+IV. NEW COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND THE MARKET IN LAW
+
+Political economy, in its emphasis on understanding economic phenomena
+which really exist, and studying them scientifi cally, has always been particularly
+attentive to the diversity of legal and institutional systems. This
+is also central in the economic theory of regulation and the economics of
+conventions, 65 which treat diversity as a constitutive feature of economic
+138 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+Enqu ê te sur l ’ identit é é conomique de la France ( Paris , EHESS , 1993 ) ; R Boyer , ‘ Vari é t édu
+capitalisme et th é orie de la r é gulation ’( 2002 – 03 ) L ’ ann é e de la r é gulation 6, 125 – 94 ; R Boyer
+Une th é orie du capitalisme est-elle possible ? ( Paris , O Jacob , 2004 ) .
+66 FA Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol 3: The Political Order of a Free People,
+(London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). 67 cf I Cadet , ‘ La norme ISO 26000 relative àla responsabilit ésoci é tale: une nouvelle source
+d ’ usages internationaux ’( 2010 ) XXIV Revue internationale de droit é conomique 4, 401 – 39 .
+This extension was criticised by certain employers ’associations (for example, the BDA in Germany
+and the International Organisation of Employers at the ILO), who complained that a)
+despite declarations to the contrary, these standards would encroach upon the ILO ’ s areas of
+
+life, in which different systems cannot be evaluated and hierarchised by reference
+to any ideal order.
+The Law and Economics doctrine, by contrast, presupposes that the
+spontaneously generated market order can be helped to function well, or
+hindered from doing so, by a particular legal system. The doctrine is by
+defi nition prescriptive and normative, because it is forever seeking the rules
+which may optimise mutual adjustments of calculated individual utilities.
+One of the tasks of the economic analysis of law would thus be to assess
+the performances of national legal systems against this normative optimum.
+Once this assessment has been made public in all transparency, it will trigger
+a mechanism whereby the best legal systems in terms of economic effi -
+ciency will prevail by natural selection. Instead of free competition within
+the framework of the law, the law itself shall be generated as a by-product
+of free competition. Applying Darwinism to the normative sphere had
+already been theorised by Hayek, who trained in law. Unconvinced by the
+concept of the ‘ rational actor ’in economic theory, he had turned to the natural
+selection of normative systems through competition between laws and
+cultures on an international scale. In his view, Social Darwinism was wrong
+to focus on the selection of congenitally fi tter individuals, because the timescales
+involved were too long. It should, rather, have attended to ‘ the selective
+evolution of rules and practices ’ .
+66 This type of Darwinism today goes
+by the name of benchmarking in management (both private and public).
+The ‘ selection of best practices’consists of using the practice which has
+obtained the best results as a standard, or benchmark, against which other
+practices are measured. Since the best practice is itself perfectible, benchmarking
+creates an upward spiral of emulation. This thinking informed the
+International Organisation for Standardisation in its production of the ISO
+9000 norms (which are currently being updated in order to ‘ respond to the
+latest trends ’ ). They benchmark the good practices required by quality management
+systems to obtain certifi cation. In the management audits of large
+companies, ISO 9000 standards play a central role, and many people are
+employed to ensure that the company conforms to them. Currently they are
+being extended to include human resources management, in the framework
+of the draft standard ISO 26000 on corporate ‘ social responsibility ’ .
+67
+New Comparative Analysis and the Market in Law 139
+
+responsibility; b) that such standards would curb the freedom of business managers; and c) that
+they would be detrimental to the diversity of national legal cultures, as expressed in each body
+of labour legislation. cf M Maupain , L ’ OIT àl ’ é preuve de la mondialisation fi nanci è re. Peut-on
+r é guler sans contraindre ? ( Geneva , BIT , 2012 ) ).
+68 R La Porta , F Lopez-de-Silane , A Shleiferand R Vishny , ‘ Law and Finance ’( 1998 ) 106
+Journal of Political Economy, 1998 , 6, 113 – 15 . 69 J Botero , S Djankov , R La Porta , F Lopez-de-Silanes , and A Shleifer , ‘ The regulation of
+Labor ’( 2004 ) Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1339 – 382 . 70 ibid, 1346.
+
+The new type of normativity which is thus emerging in the world of work
+is characterised by a) universality: these standards are applicable in every
+country and every industry; b) voluntary participation: businesses may
+choose to comply or not; c) the privatisation of standards, in two senses:
+the ISO standards absorb elements from the public domain into the private
+sector (ISO 26000 includes certain ILO standards as ‘ best practice ’ ), and the
+standards are marketed (they are bought and sold).
+In order to enlist national legal systems into this virtuous striving for
+ever-better practice, it seemed expedient to put together some methodological
+principles. This was the role of New Comparative Analysis. A group
+of researchers from Yale, Harvard and the World Bank began developing
+instruments for measuring investment risk, by coding and benchmarking
+the rules of company law and of fi nancial market regulation. 68 They then
+extended this method to labour law in an article entitled ‘ The Regulation of
+Labor ’ , published in 2004. 69 This article described how the economic effi -
+ciency of social and employment legislation in 82 countries was measured:
+
+We constructed a new data set that captures different aspects of the regulation of
+labor markets in 85 countries. Our measures of labor regulation deal with three
+broad areas: (i) employment laws, (ii) collective relations laws, and (iii) social
+security laws. [ … ]
+
+For each of the three areas of law, we examine a range of formal legal statutes governing
+labor markets. We then construct subindices summarizing different dimensions
+of such protection, and fi nally aggregate these subindices into indices. We
+construct all measures so that higher values correspond to more extensive legal
+protection of workers. 70
+
+For employment legislation, these subindices concerned the cost of using
+atypical employment contracts, the cost of overtime, and the cost of severance
+pay and dismissal procedures. Systems of equivalence were devised
+to enable the different provisions in a law to be quantifi ed, from zero (the
+lowest level of social protection) to 1 (the highest level of social protection).
+For example, where a temporary contract can be signed only if there is a
+corresponding temporary task to be performed, the score is 1, whereas if
+this condition is absent, the score is 0. Where there is no provision for severance
+pay, the legislation gets a higher ranking, etc. The aggregate data is
+140 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+71 ibid, 1354. 72 cf www.doingbusiness.org , where one can fi nd a globe representing the earth as a collection
+of legislative areas in competition ( ‘ Business planet mapping the business environment ’ ).
+
+then classifi ed by legal culture, and correlated with governments ’attitude to
+trade unions (more, or less, positive). This results in the following table: 71
+
+Chief
+executive
+and
+largest
+party in
+congress
+have left
+or centre
+political
+orientation
+(1928–1995)
+
+log
+GNP
+per
+capita
+1997
+Social
+security
+laws
+index
+Collective
+relations
+laws
+index
+Panel D: Data by legal origin
+Employment
+laws index
+
+English legal
+ origin:
+Socialist legal
+ origin
+French legal
+ origin:
+German legal
+ origin:
+Scandinavian legal
+ origin:
+
+Mean
+Median
+Mean
+Median
+Mean
+Median
+Mean
+Median
+Mean
+Median
+
+0,2997
+0,2886
+0,5944
+0,6233
+0,5470
+0,5161
+0,4529
+0,4527
+0,6838
+0,7110
+
+0,3313
+0,3170
+0,4925
+0,4970
+0,4914
+0,4792
+0,4787
+0,4807
+0,4814
+0,4792
+
+0,4236
+0,4311
+0,6923
+0,7337
+0,5454
+0,5855
+0,7110
+0,6957
+0,8324
+0,8354
+
+7,8045
+7,7266
+7,3650
+7,2442
+7,9034
+7,9202
+10,0557
+10,2545
+10,3310
+10,3356
+
+0,5204
+0,4779
+0,8646
+0,9118
+0,4484
+0,3750
+0,2725
+0,2647
+0,7721
+0,7647
+
+Figure 7.2: New Comparative Analysis: quantifying labour law and social
+legislation
+
+The World Bank developed its Doing Business programme with explicit
+reference to this research. The programme evaluates national legal systems
+in terms of their economic and fi nancial effi ciency. 72 Its regularly updated
+database of fi gures gives ‘ objective measurements ’of the legal systems of
+183 countries (renamed ‘ economies ’ ). It comes with an illustration: a globe
+representing the earth as a space of competing legislations, and with a timetrend
+cursor showing the proud onward march of economic rationality. The
+database is meant to help investors choose the most hospitable countries for
+their purposes. It is also designed to enlist countries to reform their legislation
+in order to make it more ‘ business-friendly ’ . The resultant ‘ market in
+legislative products ’is designed to eliminate in the long term the systems of
+rules least able to satisfy the fi nancial expectations of investors. Competition
+for the favour of the fi nancial markets should thus not be confi ned to businesses
+and the economic fi eld alone, but should include whole states and
+thus become a general principle organising the sphere of law. This is how
+New Comparative Analysis and the Market in Law 141
+
+73 See above, ch 5 , p 101. 74 See above, ch 2 , p 44ff. 75 For a critical analysis, see J Bergand S Cazes , Les Indicateurs Doing Business: Limites
+mé thodologiques et consé quences politiques ( Geneva , ILO , 2007 ) 23 .
+
+we could leave behind the dark ages of the relativity of laws and gradually
+arrive at the universal laws based on calculation which Condorcet was
+already dreaming of. 73
+In theory, this quantifi cation is axiologically neutral and does not favour
+any particular type of law. Yet all these studies come to the same conclusion:
+the culture of common law is better than all others. We should not necessarily
+see in this some unacknowledged chauvinism. It is, rather, the logical
+consequence of the close links between the Law and Economics doctrine
+and the culture of common law. Common law conceives the law not as the
+expression of a sovereign will, but as a spontaneously created order, requiring
+for its ongoing development only a judge and the free play of individual
+rights. 74 In many respects, the Law and Economics doctrine is a fundamentalist
+variant of this legal culture. Besides, ‘ fundamentalism ’is originally a
+Protestant notion, a late-nineteenth-century doctrine developed in traditionalist
+American circles, advocating a literal interpretation of the Scriptures
+in opposition to theological liberalism and the Social Gospel movement.
+But confi ning thought within the letter of a text also characterises what
+we today call Islamic fundamentalism. It too seeks to subject national legal
+systems to a literal interpretation of Sharia and to attack the diversity of
+traditions, customs and schools which have always also informed Muslim
+legal doctrine. What these many different fundamentalisms have in common
+is their reference to a universal norm which human laws are meant to relay
+and implement, but never antagonise. This is why fundamentalist doctrines
+are so implacable and ruthless.
+The World Bank ’ s 2005 ‘ Doing Business ’report contained a chapter on
+labour law entitled ‘ Hiring and Firing Workers ’ , explicitly using the research
+done by the Botera / La Porta team at Yale and Harvard. The chapter measures,
+country by country, how labour legislation deters investment — since
+the whole process of quantifi cation is ultimately designed to demonstrate
+that social protection for employees is economically ineffi cient. 75 Labour
+legislation not only causes costly ‘ rigidities ’ — so the argument goes — which
+in turn generate high unemployment rates, a larger ‘ informal sector ’and
+a relative decrease in the proportion of income reaching the poorest, but
+more generally it compromises the maximisation of social utility, which
+labour market deregulation precisely optimises. We are familiar with this
+kind of argument and its unmistakable political message, tirelessly relayed
+by the OECD, the IMF and the European Commission. Yet one might have
+thought that after the collapse of the fi nancial markets in 2008, the most
+urgent task would be to regulate them. But no: the principal lesson drawn by
+142 Calculating the Incalculable: The Law and Economics Doctrine
+
+76 On the responsibility of this investment bank in the fi nancial crisis and in fi xing the books
+in the case of Greece, see M Roche , La Banque. Comment Goldman Sachs dirige le monde
+( Paris , Albin Michel , 2010 ) . Also, see the account ‘ Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs ’ , by one
+of the bank ’ s former managers (Greg Smith), published in the New York Times of 14 March
+2012. 77 ‘ Europe ’ s Banker Talks Tough. Draghi Says Continent ’ s Social Model Is “ Gone ” , Won ’ t
+Backtrack on Austerity ’ , an interview published in the Wall Street Journal of 24 February
+2012. On the abandonment of the project of a Social Europe and how to remedy this, see
+N Countourisand Mark Freedland(eds) Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis ( Cambridge
+University Press , 2013 ) 525 . 78 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen ECLI:EU:C:1999:126 . 79 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers ’Federation v Viking Line ABP [ 2008 ]
+IRLR 143and Case C-341-05 , Laval v Svenska ECLI:EU:C:2007:809 . See A Supiot , ‘ Europe ’ s
+Awakening ’ , in M-A. Moreau(ed), Before and after the Economic Crisis, What Implications for
+the European Social Model ? ( Cheltenham (UK) / Northampton (USA) , Edward Edgar Publishing
+, 2011 ) 292 – 309 . 80 For the infl uence of the ‘ Law and Economics ’doctrine on labour law, see T Sachs , La
+raison é conomique en droit du travail. Contribution àl ’ é tude des rapports entre le droit et
+l ’ é conomie ( Paris , LGDJ , 2013 ) 448 ; G Bargain , Normativit é é conomique et droit du travail
+( Paris , LGDJ , 2014 ) 535 . 81 cf above, Ch 2, p 51.
+
+international economic organisations from this fi nancial disaster was that
+countries should urgently deregulate their labour markets and dismantle
+their institutions of solidarity. According to Mario Draghi, the President of
+the European Central Bank (ECB) and former International Vice-President
+of Goldman Sachs in charge of European Affairs, 76 Europe ’ s social model is
+of the past, and the duty of member states is now to introduce fl exibility into
+labour markets wherever this has not already been done. 77
+But already before the bankruptcies of 2008 the European Court of
+Justice had supported the idea of making national legal systems compete
+against each other, when it ruled, in the 1999 Centros case, that a business
+could dodge the rules of the country in which it was operating by registering
+in a country with less restrictive legislation. 78 It thus legalised the practice of
+fl ags of convenience, but on dry land, allowing businesses to play member
+states off against each other in favour of the legislation which could provide
+the highest business profi ts. Extending this decision to labour law in the
+famous Laval and Viking cases, the Court ruled that businesses with headquarters
+in countries with scanty employee protection should be allowed to
+fully exploit this comparative advantage when operating in countries still
+resisting the injunction to deregulate their labour markets. 79 In no time at
+all, the quantitative criteria advocated by the Law and Economics doctrine
+have become a cornerstone of European case law. 80
+We should not be surprised that case law has embraced the Law and
+Economics doctrine in this way. Ever since its origins in Rome, the law has
+been instrumentalised by all sorts of ideologies, limited only by the legal
+order ’ s autonomy. 81 When this autonomy is not respected, and the ‘ fetishism
+New Comparative Analysis and the Market in Law 143
+
+of the legal form ’is broken, one can no longer talk of legal norms, whatever
+the pretence. For those in power, the law has always been both a tool and
+an obstacle; its use as a tool will always be challenged by its dimension
+of resistance. Tocqueville understood this well, describing the ‘ spirit of the
+jurist ’as the only counterweight to the tyranny of the majority in a democratic
+regime. 82 This dual feature of law leads us to examine the incursions
+of governance by numbers into the law, in order to identify this doctrine ’ s
+inevitable failures and the legal form ’ s resistance.
+
+82 Tocqueville , Democracy in America, I, II, viii , ed E Nolla , tr JT Schleifer( Indianapolis :
+Liberty Fund , 2010 ) .
+1 D Migaudand G Carrez , La Performance dans le budget de l ’ É tat, Information Report
+presented to the French National Assembly, No 1780 , 24 June 2009 , 7 . 2 On this point, see my earlier Homo juridicus ( ch 2 , fn 10) x–xi and 193–94. 3 N Wiener, Cybernetics and Society. The human use of human beings ( ch 1fn 37), Ch 1.
+
+8
+
+The Encroachment of Governance
+on Law
+
+‘ The battle of performance will only really be won after several years,
+because it fi rst has to be won in people ’ s minds. ’ 1
+
+THE IMAGINARY REPRESENTATION of society as a set of
+‘ elementary particles ’driven only by individual interest has a systematic
+force whose effects permeate every area of human life. For
+instance, the way the principle of equality has been interpreted to support
+the rejection of sexual difference stems from exactly the same type of selfreferential
+calculation as that championed by neoliberal economics. 2 We
+should therefore look further than the strictly political or corporate realm
+to gauge the full extent of how governance by numbers has penetrated the
+sphere of law, and also consider issues of personal status and private life.
+Eros and Anank é — the need for the other sex and the need to work — are
+the basis of every human civilisation, in that they oblige each individual to
+enter into relation with the others under a common law, or a set of shared
+representations characteristic of a given culture. Insofar as governance by
+numbers seeks to programme human behaviour, it cannot fail to leave its
+mark on issues of personal status and identity. Instead of making the human
+being mechanically obey rules, as was the case historically with the ‘ Administrative
+State ’[ l ’ É tat administratif] and the Fordist factory, governance by
+numbers thrives on the human being ’ s capacity — as highlighted by Norbert
+Wiener — to give any information received ‘ a new form in order that it may
+be used with a view to later stages in the functioning ’of the system. 3
+Industrial-era capitalism and communism both sought to impose a supposedly
+scientifi c form of organisation of work on the whole of society.
+Far from disappearing, this desire has simply updated its model: from
+a machine of weights and forces obeying the laws of classical physics,
+The Encroachment of Governance on Law 145
+
+4 Luc Boltanski and È ve Chiapello analyse this managerial revolution in their New Spirit of
+Capitalism ( ch 6fn 47). 5 P Legendre , L ’ Empire de la v é rit é . Introduction aux espaces dogmatiques industriels ( Paris ,
+Fayard , 1983 ) 152 . 6 cf R Laufer , ‘ Proposition for a Comparative History of Education in Law and Management :
+About the Notion of Jurisprudence ’in S Dameron , R Durand(ed), Redesigning Management
+Education and Research: Challenging Proposals from European Scholars ( Cheltenham, Edward
+Elgar Publishing , 2012 ) 30 – 55 . See also P Napoli ‘ Pour une histoire juridique de la gestion ’in
+P Bezès, F Descamps, S Kott and L Tallineau (eds), La mise en place du syst è me fi nancier public
+1815 – 1914 ( Minist è re de l ’ É conomie , coll ‘ Histoire é conomique et fi nanci è re de la France ’ ,
+2010 ) 271 – 97 . The citations from Drucker and others never use the term ‘ leadership ’ , but
+always ‘ management ’ . It so happens that ‘ management ’was initially a French term taken up
+into English, which returned to France with its modern sense: Bossuet mentions Francis of
+Assisi ’ s inability to become a good m é nager of his father ’ s business affairs ( cf Pan é gyrique de
+saint Fran ç ois d ’ Assise, in Œ uvres (Paris, Gallimard, coll ‘ Biblioth è que de la Pl é iade ’ , 1961).
+
+where the worker was simply a cog which obeyed orders, the vision of
+the organisation of work has shifted to a system of self-adjusting interacting
+units automatically responding to signal inputs and feedback, as
+programmed by computer algorithms. What we see occurring in the legal
+sphere, where governance by numbers tends to supplant government by
+laws, has its counterpart in the triumphs of the ICT revolution at all levels
+of the organisation of work. The individual, the company and the nation
+are uniformly expected to fulfi l objectives, and their success in this is rated
+by numerical indicators.
+Governance by numbers thus has an immediate impact on the division
+of labour, which it understands in the most restrictive and illusory sense
+of salaried employment, and which it is anyway unable to address because
+it is by nature blind to the difference between human labour and machine
+work. In the comprehensive, Durkheimian sense, the division of labour
+affects every level of human cooperation, whether between individuals, in
+the company, in the public sphere or in international relations. At all these
+levels, the purchase of governance by numbers on the law is palpable in
+the way concepts and methods originally developed for managing companies,
+namely ‘ management by objectives ’ , have been transposed into law. 4
+This operation was facilitated by the fact that management is based on a
+casuistry similar to that of law (at least before it broke up into more or
+less impermeable disciplinary compartments). The bond between law and
+management methods has been stressed time and again by Pierre Legendre, 5
+and has also been analysed by Romain Laufer, who has shown what the
+consecration of management science as a university subject owed, over the
+last century, to the rational systematisation of cases, that is, to a notion of
+‘ case law ’common to management and law. 6 This explains the permeability
+between the two disciplines, as illustrated by the spectacular impact in law
+of management by objectives, which has become, as Peter Drucker describes
+146 The Encroachment of Governance on Law
+
+7 P Drucker , Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices, rev ed of The Practice of
+Management [ 1954 ] ( Harper-Collins , 1973 ) , Ch 25, ‘ Management by Objectives and SelfControl
+’ , 258 – 69. See also J Humble , Management by objectives in action [ 1970 ] ; O G é linier ,
+Direction participative par objectifs ( Paris , Homme et techniques , 1968 ) 63 . 8 Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices (n 7) 267. 9 N Wiener, Cybernetics and Society. The human use of human beings ( ch 1fn 37). See
+above, ch 1 , p 26. Peter Drucker does not cite Norbert Wiener and it is not certain that he had
+read him. 10 Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices (n 7) 266. 11 ibid.
+
+in a chapter devoted to the subject in his book of 1954, ‘ a new philosophy
+of management ’for businesses: 7
+
+What the business enterprise needs is a principle of management that will give
+full scope to individual strength and responsibility, as well as common direction
+to vision and effort, one that will establish teamwork and harmonize the goals of
+the individual with the common good. Management by objectives and self-control
+makes the interest of the enterprise the aim of every manager. In place of
+control from outside, it substitutes the stricter, more exacting, and more effective
+control from inside. It motivates managers to action, not because somebody tells
+them to do something or talks them into doing it, but because the objective task
+demands it. They act not because somebody wants them to but because they themselves
+decide that they have to — they act, in other words, as free men and women. 8
+
+After repudiating Taylorism, this new philosophy of how to govern human
+beings had incredible success, in the business world and beyond. It is strikingly
+similar to Norbert Wiener ’ s refl ections in his Cybernetics and society. The
+human use of human beings, published four years earlier. 9 For both authors,
+self-control is the key to how human organisations should function. This new
+key to the organisation of work was thus theorised in disciplines as far apart
+as cybernetics and management, and half a century before the generalised
+use of computers in the real economy. This alone demonstrates the power of
+a particular period ’ s ‘ imaginary institution of society ’ , in this case management
+by objectives which is today ’ s paradigm of the scientifi c organisation of
+work, in the public and private sector alike. Staff are no longer subjected to
+rules defi ning their tasks in advance, but rather are involved in the elaboration
+of the task ’ s objectives, which should be quantifi able, and which refl ect,
+at each level, the common goals of the organisation. Each worker is thus
+‘ objectifi ed ’ , measuring (and reducing) the gap between the objectives set and
+his or her actual performance. This is achieved through ‘ self-control ’ , which
+in Drucker ’ s terms is identical with ‘ freedom ’ , since it satisfi es ‘ a desire to do
+the best rather than do just enough to get by. ’ 10 Drucker ’ s prescience, in his
+chapter ‘ Management by Objectives and Self-Control ’ , is striking: he warns
+against misinterpretation and abuse of his method, stressing that the objectives
+requiring self-monitoring ‘ must never become the grounds for “ management
+by domination ”because this would destroy their very purpose ’ .
+11
+Individual Governance 147
+
+12 ibid, 104 ( tr mod). 13 cf B Faure(ed), Les Objectifs dans le droit ( Paris , Dalloz , 2010 ) . 14 cf P Waquet , ‘ Les objectifs ’( 2001 ) Droit social 120 – 25 ; T Pasquier , ‘ R é viser les objectifs
+salariaux ’( 2013 ) Revue de droit du travail 82 – 89 . 15 See above, ch 7 , p 128ff.
+
+Moreover, he was convinced that not all objectives can be quantifi ed, and
+he criticised the irrational tendency to pursue one single goal: ‘ to manage a
+business, ’Drucker writes, ‘ is to balance a variety of needs and goals, and this
+requires judgment. The search for ‘ one right objective ’is essentially an unproductive
+quest for the philosopher ’ s stone. It is irrational to seek to replace
+judgment with a formula ’ .
+12
+Yet despite these warnings, management by objectives in practice has
+taken precisely these aberrant paths: management for domination; generalised
+quantifi cation; and the focus on a single objective — bibliometrics for the
+researcher; value-creation for the shareholder; or reducing the public defi cit
+to under three per cent of the GDP, for a country. And ‘ fi xing objectives ’has
+burgeoned in all branches of law over the last twenty years. 13 To examine
+this invasion of the legal sphere by governance by numbers, we shall not,
+however, start from law ’ s different branches, if only because governance
+by numbers precisely ignores such divisions, and subjects the whole of law,
+indifferently, to the same pre-programming of human action. Additionally,
+since the legal corpus affected is already too large for any exhaustive analysis,
+we shall confi ne ourselves to spotlighting different levels in the division
+of labour. Through this focus, we shall show how the dynamics of governance
+by numbers affects the legal frameworks of the individual worker, the
+company, the state, the European Union, and international relations.
+
+I. INDIVIDUAL GOVERNANCE
+
+It is now common practice in the workplace for objectives to be fi xed for
+individuals. This is sometimes done unilaterally by the employer, by virtue
+of his or her management prerogatives, but they may also be the object of
+a contract, 14 serving as parameters for pay, or actually mentioned in the
+contract, when someone is recruited specifi cally to achieve them. Employees
+invariably enjoy a certain autonomy in the way they choose to attain
+objectives. At all events, the legal force behind objectives can have the effect
+of transferring a certain amount of economic risk to the worker, in line
+with the theory of agency. 15 Fixing objectives always brings with it procedures
+for evaluating performance, which can take two complementary
+forms: a quantifi ed form, which measures performance; and a discursive
+form, through individual interviews, during which the employee and his
+manager analyse the employee ’ s performance, and may revise the objectives
+in the light of this. There is an abundant, and most instructive, literature in
+148 The Encroachment of Governance on Law
+
+16 See C Dejours , L ’ É valuation du travail àl ’ é preuve du r é el. Critique des fondements de
+l ’ é valuation ( Paris , INRA , 2003 ) 82 . 17 (2002) Droit ouvrier, 535, note V Wauquier. See S Vernac , ‘ L ’ é valuation des salari é s ’
+( 2005 ) Recueil Dalloz. Chron 924, A Lyon-Caen, ‘ L ’ é valuation des salari é s ’(2009) Recueil
+Dalloz, 1124. 18 French Labour Code, Art L.1222-1. 19 French Labour Code, Art L.1222-2 to L.1222-4. 20 D é cret No 2003-1284 of 26 December 2003. 21 D é cret No 2004-731 of 21 July 2004. 22 D é cret No 2006-1019 of 11 August 2006. 23 Law of 5 July 2010 on the Renewal of collective bargaining in the public sector, Arts
+40 and 41. 24 J Tapie , ‘ Les recommandations de bonne pratique et les r é f é rences m é dicales, des outils
+àg é n é raliser ’( 1987 ) Droit social, 828 ; D Tabuteau , ‘ Assurance maladie: les “ standards ”
+de la r é forme, Droit social, 2004 , pp 872-876 ; B é atrice Espesson-Vergeat , ‘ La force des avis
+et recommandations des autorit é s de sant é ’( 2009 ) Revue g é n é rale de droit m é dical, 15 – 31 ;
+M Chassang , ‘ Br è ves r é fl exions sur l ’ avenir de la m é decine lib é rale ’( 2011 ) Revue de droit
+sanitaire et social, 7 – 14 ; I Vacarie , ‘ Raison statistique et cat é gories du droit de la sant é ’in
+Statistique et normes ( Aix-en-Provence, Presses universitaires d ’ Aix-Marseille , 2014 ) 57 – 73 .
+
+management and workplace psychology on the theory and practice of these
+evaluations in companies. 16 From the legal perspective, in the terms of the
+French Cour de cassation, ‘ the employer ’ s management role, as derived from
+the work contract, authorises him to evaluate the work of his employees ’ .
+17
+In a certain number of cases (for example, skills assessment) evaluation is
+even prescribed by law. In French law, certain obligations such as transparency
+(advance notifi cation) and the suitability of evaluation methods and
+techniques are included under the general duty to perform the work contract
+in good faith, 18 thus giving legal force to the ideals of management
+by objectives. 19 The counterpart of this management method in the public
+sector was the — at fi rst piecemeal — introduction of performance-related
+bonuses, which civil servants received if they met the objectives assigned to
+them: after the judiciary, 20 the police, 21 certain levels of central government
+administration, 22 and other branches, the practice of performance-related
+bonuses was generalised, in 2010. 23 Governance by numbers has also spread
+into the management of certain self-employed groups in France, if they are
+fi nanced, at least in part, by compulsory contributions. This applies to certain
+medical practitioners, 24 who are subject to enforceable principles of
+good practice in, for example, prescription expenses (in accordance with the
+r é f é rences m é dicales opposables, or RMO); and to another self-employed
+sector, farmers, whose outputs are regulated by objectives imposed by the
+EU, if the farms are in receipt of European funds.
+
+II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
+
+In the corporate sector, the penetration of governance by numbers into
+the legal sphere is evident in the laws passed to oblige companies trading
+on the stock markets to respect the imperative of ‘ value creation ’for
+Corporate Governance 149
+
+25 A Pietrancosta , Le Droit des soci é t é s sous l ’ effet des imp é ratifs fi nan- ciers et boursiers
+( thesis , Universit éParis-I , 1999 ) ; Lulu Entreprises Inc (2007) 2 vols, 486 and 748. 26 For an overview, see R Vatinet , ‘ Clair-obscur des stock-options àla fran ç aise ’( 1997 )
+Revue des soci é t é s, 31 – 66 ; ‘ Quelques incertitudes du r é gime juridique des stocks-options ’
+(2002) Droit social, 690 – 94. 27 cf J-P Bertreland M Jeantin , Acquisitions et fusions des soci é t é s commerciales ( Paris,
+Lexis-Nexis , 2001 ) No 382, 160 ; see M Bertrel , L ’ Incidence du LBO sur la notion de soci é t é
+( thesis , Universit éParis-Est , Presses acad é miques francophones , 2012 ) ; and by the same author ,
+‘ L ’ impact social du LBO sur la soci é t é “ cible ”ou la n é cessit éde r é former l ’ abus de majorit é ’
+( 2013 ) Revue des soci é t é s, 75 . 28 See below, ch 14, p 269ff.
+
+their shareholders. 25 Many legislative techniques were invented to facilitate
+these reforms, two of which are particularly signifi cant. The fi rst was the
+highly successful phenomenon of stock options, or free shares. 26 Agency
+theory advocated this mechanism as a way of ensuring that company managers
+fulfi lled the objective of improving the company ’ s short-term performance
+on the stock market. The second example is the leveraged buy-out, a
+legal and fi nancial arrangement which obliges the company which is bought
+(the ‘ target ’company) to pay the costs of its own buy-out, by ‘ squeezing it
+like a lemon ’ , so that it produces a maximum number of dividends. 27 The
+expansion of governance by numbers in the corporate sector also results
+from having abandoned the industrial era ’ s integrated model in favour of
+today ’ s networked organisation. This type of organisation, aided by digital
+technologies, which make the subcontractor transparent to the contracting
+customer, enables the latter to maintain technical and economic control over
+a section of the production process, without having to assume any legal
+responsibility for it. The generalisation of this model internationally has
+created countless dependent entrepreneurs, all over the world, who work
+under the more or less stringent monitoring of one or several clients, meeting
+the objectives fi xed by them. Although the networked structure is generally
+justifi ed by the declared wish of companies to refocus their activities on
+their core business, this trend is also guided by the fi nancial markets, which
+hope to draw the maximum fi nancial gains from the different ‘ profi t units ’
+of the production chain, through stimulating competition. Recent scandals
+in the food business and textile industry 28 have shown the large-scale effects
+on health of the irresponsibility of those in positions of economic power, an
+irresponsibility authorised by this mode of organisation of work.
+Another, rarer, aspect of companies ’enslavement to meeting objectives is
+evident not in company or in fi nancial law, but in labour law. It takes the
+form of an obligation to negotiate, a process initially restricted to issues
+of pay, hours of work and the organisation of working time. Later, these
+obligations were extended to the implementation of public policies such
+as equality between men and women in the workplace, the inclusion of a
+disabled or an older workforce, and the provision of collective insurance
+150 The Encroachment of Governance on Law
+
+29 French Labour Code, Art L.2323-57, al 3 and 4 (Law of 26 October 2012). 30 See below, ch 9 , pp 169–70. 31 Law No 2007-130 of 31 January 2007, on the modernisation of the social dialogue. This
+law gives the social partners the right to negotiate the terms of proposed legislative or regulatory
+labour law reforms falling within the limits defi ned for cross-sector or national collective
+bargaining. See N Maggi-Germain , ‘ Sur le dialogue social ’( 2007 ) Droit social 798 ; J-F Cesaro ,
+‘ Commentaire de la loi du 31 janvier 2007 de modernisation du dialogue social ’ , Semaine
+juridique, 20 Feburary 2007 , 174 ; A Supiot , ‘ La loi Larcher ou les avatars de la d é mocratie
+repr é sentative ’( 2010 ) Droit Social, 525 – 32 . 32 See below, ch 10 , p 193ff. 33 French Commercial Code, Art L.123-14. See above, ch 5 , p 79ff.
+
+or profi t-sharing schemes. Regarding sexual equality in the workplace in
+France, heads of companies of more than 300 employees are now obliged
+by law to draw up, unilaterally, ‘ an action plan designed to ensure equality
+in the workplace between women and men ’ . This plan must be based
+on ‘ relevant indicators, particularly quantifi able data, defi ned by ordinance,
+which may be supplemented by indicators which take into account the company
+’ s particular situation ’ . Having evaluated the objectives fi xed and the
+measures taken in the course of the preceding year, this action plan
+
+‘ determines the progress on objectives to be achieved in the following year, the
+qualitative and quantitative description of the actions by which these may be
+achieved, and an estimation of their cost. [ … ] A synthesis of this action plan,
+comprising at least the progress on indicators and objectives defi ned by ordinance,
+shall be made known to the employees by the employer. ’ 29
+
+We should note in passing the confusion, which is characteristic of governance
+by numbers, between the objectives assigned and the indicators
+measuring performance. 30 Governance here devolves a regulatory role previously
+held by the State onto private individuals. The use of ‘ negotiated
+law ’ — applied overwhelmingly today in labour issues 31— is the clearest
+proof of how the social partners are enlisted to defi ne the legal measures for
+implementing objectives fi xed by the public authorities. As we shall see, the
+heart of the matter is the erosion of the border between private and public
+spheres 32 because governance obliges unions and companies to carry out
+roles previously reserved for the State alone, and inversely, the State applies
+to itself the principles of corporate governance.
+In the corporate world, governance by numbers is most clearly expressed
+in the profi t margins fi xed by share-holders. In evaluating whether a company
+is suffi ciently profi table, two methods are used, both of which have
+a legal dimension. One is stock market fi gures, which are meant to refl ect
+the value of the company in the eyes of the fi nancial markets; and the other
+is the company ’ s accounts, which are meant to give ‘ a fair representation
+of the assets, the fi nancial situation and results ’of the company. 33 The
+impact of governance by numbers on fi nancial legislation has been considerable
+since the neoliberal turn of the 1980s, with the abolition of state
+Corporate Governance 151
+
+34 Law No 2007-544 of 12 April 2007. cf B Jacquillat , ‘ La gouvernance des entreprises de
+march é ’( 2006 ) Revue d ’ é conomie fi nanci è re, 169 – 88 ; S Neuville , ‘ Les prestataires (entreprises
+d ’ investissement et entreprises de march é ) et les services d ’ investissement ’( 2007 ) Bulletin Joly
+Bourse et produits fi nanciers, 559 – 85 . 35 On this issue more broadly, see A Couretet , H Le Nabasque(ed), Droit fi nancier, 2nd edn
+( Paris, Dalloz , 2012 ) 6 . 36 The algorithms of the computers conducting high-frequency trading enable dozens of
+orders to be placed per millisecond. Today, 90 %of the orders placed on the stock markets in
+Europe have been issued by these ‘ high-frequency traders ’ . The fi gure is even greater in the US,
+where several ‘ fl ash crashes ’on Wall Street have been attributed to these operations, including
+that of 6 May 2010 ( cf ‘ High-Frequency Trading ’ , New York Times, 10 October 2011). 37 Couret and Nabasque, Droit fi nancier (n 5) 16. 38 A Gaudemet , Les D é riv é s ( Paris , Economica , 2010 ) , preface H Synvet, 328. 39 cf Couret and Nabasque, Droit fi nancier (n 5) 814. For comparison, the net state budget
+expenditure in France came to a total of roughly 300 billion euros in 2014 (about 374 billion
+US dollars).
+
+regulation and the reliance on market regulators. The result has been the
+normative self-enclosure of the world ’ s fi nancial systems. 34 In the context
+of this drive to self-regulation, the fi nancial markets themselves have been
+transformed into ‘ market undertakings ’ , valued on their own market, such
+as to become entirely self-referential fi nancial products. Moreover, the international
+association of market regulators — the International Organisation
+of Securities Commission (IOSCO-OICV) — itself recommends using selfregulatory
+organisations (SROs), which in its view are the only bodies capable
+of responding to the technical demands of the fi nancial markets. 35 But
+when one knows that the majority of orders on these markets are passed by
+computers programmed to carry out high-speed trading, in which profi ts
+may be derived from differences in trading prices as little as a millisecond
+apart, 36 one can see how extensively the cybernetic dream of having human
+affairs run themselves on automatic pilot is becoming a reality. One of the
+best-known consequences of this shift from heteronomy to autonomy has
+been the exponential development of new fi nancial products and the correlative
+boom in two highly unstable techniques: securitisation and credit
+derivatives.
+Securitisation brings about what the most knowledgeable authors have
+called a ‘ quite extraordinary alchemy ’ , whereby ‘ debts which are nonderivative
+and can only circulate with diffi culty, may be transformed into
+securities, that is, into identical fungible assets circulating without diffi -
+culty on a market ’ .
+37 We should take this term ‘ alchemy ’in its literal sense:
+the transformation of lead into gold. The problem is then to prevent gold
+becoming lead again, and this is why credit derivatives were invented. 38
+These derivatives are futures, meaning that a risk inherent in a debt or a
+group of debts may be transferred, by virtue of a contract with consideration,
+without having to transfer the debt itself. The best known of these
+derivatives are credit default swaps (CDS), which were phenomenally successful,
+reaching a monetary volume of 30,000 billion dollars in 2006. 39
+152 The Encroachment of Governance on Law
+
+40 Named after John Law who, with the support of the Regent, converted the public debt
+into paper money backed against future income from the colonies. This fi rst speculative bubble
+founded on banknotes burst in 1720 (see E Faure , La Banqueroute de Law ( Paris , Gallimard ,
+1977 ) ). 41 See above, ch 5 , p 99. 42 F Morin , Le Nouveau Mur de l ’ argent. Essai sur la fi nance globalis é e ( Paris , Le Seuil ,
+2006 ) 277 . 43 Andr é Orl é an , L ’ Empire de la valeur. Refonder l ’ é conomie, Paris , Le Seuil , 2011 , p 307 . 44 See above, ch 5 , pp 94–96. 45 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
+19 July 2002. The American counterpart, or rather twin, of the IASC is the Financial Accounting
+Standards Board (FASB), and between them they carve up accounting standardisation for
+the whole world.
+
+Although their function was to insure against fi nancial risks, they and other
+similar instruments increased these risks considerably, and themselves became
+the object of large-scale speculation. So there is nothing new since Law’s
+fi nancial system 40— except that we seem to have lost sight of the reasons
+why, in the eighteenth century, insurance mechanisms too close to games
+of chance were prohibited. 41 But it is hardly surprising that economic policies
+based on game theory should generate a casino economy. Such fi nancial
+instruments have created a monstrous speculative bubble, estimated today
+at 90 per cent of all fi nancial transactions. Some economists, among them
+Fran ç ois Morin, warned early on against the risk of this ‘ wall of money ’ ,
+42
+detached from any real economic basis. Like a tsunami, it is capable of
+sweeping away real human lives. And as another economist, Andr éOrl é an,
+has shown, the fi nancial markets do not obey the law of supply and demand.
+This is because every operator is by turns a buyer and a seller, and because
+the operator does not speculate on the value of goods, but on the value that
+others will assign to them in the future. As a result, ‘ price, on the fi nancial
+markets, does not express a magnitude defi ned prior to the market interaction,
+but is a pure creation of the fi nancial community as it goes looking for
+liquidity ’ .
+43
+Alongside stock market fi gures, the second tool used to measure the
+value of companies is their fi nancial accounts. Accounting standards were
+reformed at roughly the same time as these fi nancial instruments were
+developed, and there too the impact of governance by numbers and the
+ideal of self-referential calculations are palpable. Accounting logic has been
+inverted. Ever since the invention in medieval times of double-entry bookkeeping,
+the principle of prudence 44 had prevailed to ensure that one could
+record as assets only the historical cost of goods owned, that is, their purchase
+value minus depreciation. When in 2002 the European Union farmed
+out the development of new accounting standards to a private body, the
+International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), 45 it simultaneously
+did away with the principle of prudence, replacing it with the concept of
+‘ fair value ’ , which is the estimated value of the good if sold on the market
+Public Sector Governance 153
+
+46 S Jub é , Droit social et normalisation comptable ( ch 5fn 17). 47 cf S Jub é , ‘ R é gulation bancaire et r é gulation comptable ’in ‘ D é bats autour de la r é gulation
+bancaire et de ses impacts ’( 2012 ) The Journal of Regulation, May. 48 For an overview, see OE Hughes , Public Management and Administration. An Introduction
+( London, Palgrave Macmillan , 1994 ) ; 4th edn (2012) 373; for a sociological approach, see
+B Hibou , La Bureaucratisation du monde àl ’ è re n é olib é rale ( Paris , La D é couverte , 2012 ) 223 . 49 French Social Security Code, Art L.O.111-3 and L.O.111-4. cf R Pellet, ‘ Les lois de
+fi nancement de la s é curit ésociale depuis la loi organique du 2 ao û t 2005 ’ , Revue de droit
+sanitaire et social (2006, p 136; Anne-Sophie Ginonand Maurice Trepeau , ‘ L ’ ONDAM peut-il
+s ’ imposer comme outil de r é gulation des d é penses d ’ assurance maladie ? ’( 2008 ) Revue de droit
+sanitaire et social 1096 ; P Hassenteufeland B Palier , ‘ Les trompe-l ’ œ il de la “ gouvernance ”
+de l ’ Assurance-maladie. Contrastes franco-allemands ’( 2005 ) Revue fran ç aise d ’ administration
+publique 113, 13 .
+
+on the date the accounts are drawn up. As Samuel Jub éhas shown, these
+reforms have utterly transformed the role of accounting and the meaning
+of accountability. 46 Accounts are no longer the quantifi ed reminder of an
+entrepreneur ’ s legal responsibilities towards third parties, but are now an
+instrument for measuring a company ’ s market value in comparison with
+its competitors. The stock market value of companies is largely based on
+this sort of benchmarking, and since company directors are obliged to
+espouse the immediate interests of their share-holders, improving a company
+’ s accounting image has become an end in itself, independently of its
+real performance and long-term interests. This has produced the phenomenon
+of redundancies based on stock-market performance, which improve
+the company ’ s present value, but harm its future, represented by its human
+potential. This mode of valuation can be termed procyclical, because it
+infl ates stock market values in boom times, and wipes them out when the
+markets plunge. After the stock market crash of 2008, the European banks
+argued successfully for calculating their loans not at their (immediate) ‘ fair
+value ’ , but at their historical cost 47— thus returning to the principle of prudence
+when it was to their advantage. One could summarise this by saying
+that when a mafi a-style system holds sway, the fi gure of the guarantor does
+not disappear, but it abandons overseeing equitable exchange in favour of
+protecting the ongoing opportunities for predation.
+
+III. PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
+
+In the public sector, governance by numbers was introduced in the name
+of the burgeoning science of organisations through a programme called
+New Public Management, which applied the rules and methods developed
+for private sector management to the public sphere. 48 In France, social
+security law was the fi rst area to be affected by this new methodology, when
+a national objective of health insurance expenditure (ONDAM) was introduced
+in 1996, to be fi xed annually by a law on funding the social security. 49
+154 The Encroachment of Governance on Law
+
+50 É Douat , ‘ La valeur juridique de l ’ ONDAM. Apparence et r é alit é ’in Finances publiques
+et sant é ( Paris , Dalloz , 2011 ) 493 . 51 Constitutional Bylaw on Budget Acts No 2001-692 of 1 August 2001 (the LOLF).
+See the summary, ‘ Les objectifs et les indicateurs de performance des projets et rapports annuels
+de performance annex é s aux projets de lois de fi nances ’ , published by the French Department
+of Budgetary Reform of the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry, 12 December
+2003; and the Guide to the Constitutional Bylaw on Budget Acts (2008 English edition),
+available at www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr . See also J-P Camby(ed), La Ré forme
+du budget de l’É tat. La LOLF, 2nd edn (Paris, LGDJ, coll ‘Systè mes’, 2004) ; P Pariniand
+M Bouvier , La Nouvelle Administration fi nanci è re et fi scale ( Paris, LGDJ , 2011 ) ; H Crucis , ‘ La
+gestion publique en mode LOLF: quel genre ? ’( 2008 ) Actualit éjuridique Droit administratif
+(AJDA) 1017 ; and by the same author , ‘ Les objectifs en droit fi nancier public. La fi n en soi ? ’ ,
+in B Faure(ed), Les Objectifs dans le droit ( Paris , Dalloz , 2010 ) 115 – 33 . 52 D Migaud and G Carrez, La Performance dans le budget de l ’ É tat (n 1) 7. On this idea
+and its concrete realisation, see F Jany-Catrice , La Performance totale: nouvel esprit du capitalisme
+? ( Lille , Presses universitaires du Septentrion , 2012 ) 175 .
+
+However, despite the efforts of Parliament, this innovation did not have
+a very signifi cant normative impact, 50 unlike the Constitutional Bylaw, or
+Organic Law, on Budget Acts (the LOLF, or Loi organique relative aux
+lois de fi nances), which was passed by all parties in 2001. 51 The main issue
+behind this reform was the ‘ performance ’of public policy. As Didier Migaud
+and Gilles Carrez, two members of the Finance Committee, stated in their
+Report to Parliament, ‘ the battle of performance will only really be won
+after several years, because it fi rst has to be won in people ’ s minds ’ .
+52 This
+military vocabulary — the ‘ battle ’ , and psychological warfare — is characteristic
+of the rhetoric of total mobilisation in all its forms. In this case, mobilising
+people ’ s minds involves a revolution in the language of governmental
+action, in order to make it meet quantifi ed objectives, as illustrated by the
+following extract from the LOLF:
+
+— the budget acts are ‘ in keeping with a defi ned economic equilibrium as
+well as the objectives and performances of the programmes that they
+determine ’ ;
+— a mission ‘ covers a set of programmes designed to contribute to a
+defi ned public policy ’ ;
+— a programme ‘ covers appropriations for implementing an action or a
+consistent set of actions coming under the same ministry and involving
+both specifi c objectives, defi ned in the public interest, and expected
+results subject to evaluation. ’
+— An action is ‘ a component of a programme. [ … ] If an action has an
+identifi able fi nality, it may be tied to objectives and indicators which
+are specifi c to it, among those associated with the programme ’ ;
+— a programme ’ s operational budget (BOP): ‘ the totality of the means
+associated with the objectives measured by results indicators. The
+objectives of the programme ’ s operational budget are defi ned in the
+detailed objectives of the programme ’ ;
+Public Sector Governance 155
+
+53 Sources: the LOLF, Arts 7-I, 51 and 54; Guide to the Constitutional Bylaw (n 51) 51 – 52. 54 Guide to the Constitutional Bylaw (n 51) 51 – 52. 55 cf C Eyraud , Le Capitalisme au c œ ur de l ’ É tat. Comptabilit épriv é e et action publique
+( Broissieux , É ditions du Croquant , 2013 ) 320 . 56 The LOLF, Art 30. 57 Certifying French universities alone requires budget increases of some 50 million euros
+annually ( cf Eyraud, Le Capitalisme au c œ ur de l ’ É tat (n 55) 231). 58 M Bouvier , ‘ La constitutionnalisation de la programmation pluriannuelle des fi nances
+publiques ’( 2008 ) Les Petites Affi ches 245, 50 ; and, by the same author , ‘ Programmation pluriannuelle,
+é quilibre des fi nances publiques et nouvelle gouvernance fi nan- ci è re publique ’( 2009 )
+Les Petites Affi ches 16, 52.9.
+
+— indicators: ‘ a quantifi ed indicator gives a numerical indication of the performance
+progress expected and obtained. Each indicator sets a quantifi
+ed projection for the year of the budget act and for the medium term ’ ;
+— the annual performance plans (PAP) for each programme contain ‘ the
+presentation of its actions, associated costs, objectives, and results
+obtained and expected for the coming years measured by a justifi ed
+choice of accurate indicators ’ ;
+— The annual performance reports (RAP) show, by programme, ‘ the
+objectives and results, expected and obtained, the indicators and associated
+costs ’ , highlighting ‘ the deviations from the budget act projections
+for the year considered as well as from the actual sums reported
+in the latest budget review act ’ .
+53
+
+The number of objectives contained in the PAPs and the RAPs can be estimated
+at around 500, each of which comes with its indicators, to give a
+‘ numerical indication of the performance progress expected and obtained ’ .
+54
+To these should be added the avalanche of objectives set internally, from the
+highest to the lowest level, in each public institution. The introduction of
+this new type of governance went hand in hand with applying in the public
+sector the accounting standards used in the corporate sector. 55 Since that
+date, ‘ the rules applicable to government accrual-based accounting only
+differ from those applicable to companies on the grounds of the specifi c
+nature of government action ’ .
+56 This has given rise to a lucrative market in
+the certifi cation of public accounts by private audit fi rms. 57 Applying these
+accounting standards means that public institutions are henceforth valued
+at their estimated market sale price.
+To complement these reforms, the programming of public funding and
+the subordination of governmental action to the accounting imperative of
+balanced books was constitutionalised in France in 2008. The equivalent
+of the private sector ’ s ‘ bottom line ’ , that is, the fi gure which can be treated as
+the ‘ objective indicator ’of public action, has become, for the public sector,
+the budget defi cit or surplus. In the terms of article 34 of the French Constitution,
+‘ The multi-annual guidelines for public fi nances shall be established
+by Programming Acts. They shall contribute to achieving the objective of
+balanced accounts for public administrations. ’ 58 In order to avoid laxism,
+156 The Encroachment of Governance on Law
+
+59 See B Jean-Antoine , ‘ La r è gle d ’ é quilibre ou “ r è gle d ’ or ”en droit compar é ’( 2012 ) Revue
+fran ç aise de fi nances publiques 117, 55 . 60 Le contrat, mode d ’ action publique et de production des normes. Rapport annuel du
+Conseil d ' É tat, 2008 (Paris, La Documentation fran ç aise, 2008); S Chassagnard-Pinet ,
+D Hiez(ed), La Contractualisation de la production normative ( Paris , Dalloz , 2008 ) ; L Richer ,
+‘ La contractualisation comme technique de gestion des affaires publiques ’( 2003 ) Actualit é
+juridique de droit administratif (AJDA) 19, 973 . 61 Laws No 83-8 of 7 January 1983 (on the allocation of powers between the commune, the
+d é partement, the region and the state), No 87-572 of 23 July 1987 and No 92-675 of 17 July
+1992 (on apprenticeship); Education Code, Art D, 214-5ff. 62 Programmatic Law No 2005-781 of 13 July 2005 setting energy policy guidelines; Environment
+Code, Art L.226-26; A Fourmon , ‘ L ’ essor des plans Climat- É nergie territoriaux ’
+( 2009 ) Gazette du Palais 185, 24 . 63 Public Health Code, Art 1435-3 and 16114-1; L Cocquebert , ‘ Le contrat pluriannuel
+d ’ objectifs et de moyens est-il un contrat ’( 2012 ) Revue de droit sanitaire et social, 2012, 34 . 64 Law No 2002-1138 of 9 September 2002 on organising and programming the justice system.
+See R Denoix de Saint Marc , ‘ Les contrats d ’ objectifs des cours administratives d ’ appel ’
+( 2008 ) AJDA, 1246 . 65 Education Code, Art. L 712-9.
+
+which always threatens democratic regimes, some countries have constitutionalised
+a ‘ budgetary golden rule ’ , which results in automatic budget cuts
+(in American law, ‘ sequestrations ’ ) if the authorised defi cit is exceeded. 59
+The relations between central and regional and local government, or
+equally public agencies, are likewise specifi ed by numerical objectives. 60
+‘ Contracts of agreed objectives ’have mushroomed beyond any possible
+overview, but to give a taste of their range of application, there are: government-region
+strategic plan contracts; contracts of objectives and means for
+continuing professional development; 61 territorial climate energy plans; 62
+multi-annual contracts of objectives and means in healthcare; 63 contracts
+of objectives for administrative courts; 64 multi-annual contracts between
+the state and university establishments, 65 etc. All of these contracts are of
+course accompanied by performance and procedures indicators, in order to
+monitor their execution.
+France is by no means unique in this development, which seems to have
+become the norm for public policy implementation throughout the world.
+The educational reform brought about in the US by the law ‘ No Child Left
+Behind ’(2002) is a good example. Like the LOLF in France, this law was
+passed with support from both the majority and the opposition. It fi xed
+‘ knowledge stages for different levels of public schooling ’ , and ‘ a general
+system for monitoring pupils ’results ’ , thanks to yearly performance tests.
+Both the school and the district are considered responsible for their pupils ’
+results. When schools do not meet the objectives fi xed, they are declared as
+‘ fail[ing] to make Adequate Yearly Progress ’(AYP). Corrective measures are
+then taken, sometimes accompanied by a two-year ‘ turnaround plan ’ . The
+school can thereafter be called a ‘ School in Need of Improvement (SINI),
+if the objectives set are not met within these two years, or a School Under
+Registration Review’(SURR). If the ‘ failure ’continues, the district informs
+European Governance 157
+
+66 cf M Montagutelli , ‘ L ’ é cole am é ricaine dans la tourmente de “ No Child Left Behind ” ’
+( 2009 ) 1 Revue fran ç aise d ’ é tudes am é ricaines 119, 94 – 105 ; see also A Gamoran , ‘ Bilan et
+devenir de la loi “ No Child Left Behind ”aux É tats-Unis ’( 2012 ) Revue fran ç aise de p é dagogie,
+178, 13 – 26 . 67 See above, ch 7 , p 138.
+
+the parents that they can change school. In the long run, the school can be
+managed as a ‘ charter school ’(under contract with the state), in which case
+it has reduced administrative obligations, but it absolutely must meet its
+objectives if it wants to see its contract renewed. The school can also have
+its teaching or administrative staff replaced. The public authorities can also
+request that ‘ an entity such as a private management company which has
+proved its effi cacy ’manage the school. On the other hand, when the school
+meets or catches up on its objectives, it can receive bonuses ( State Academic
+Achievement Awards). 66
+
+IV. EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE
+
+At the European level, Member States ’obligations to attain certain quantifi
+ed objectives were fi rst enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992),
+with the decision to create a single European currency. Four convergence
+criteria, or objectives common to all Member States, were adopted at the
+time, namely the control of infl ation, the control of the budget defi cit and
+the public debt, a stable exchange rate mechanism and the convergence of
+interest rates. From the start, this subordination of economic policies to
+objectives was assessed by ‘ objective indicators ’ , which were both the goal
+and the measure of countries ’performances. For example, the indicator of
+price stability is that a country ’ s rate of infl ation does not exceed by more
+than 1.5 points the rate of infl ation in the three Member States with the best
+results. The indicator for the control of public spending is that the defi cit
+of general government and social security does not exceed three per cent of
+the GDP, and the level of the public debt, not more than 60 per cent of the
+GDP. As for long-term interest rates, they must not be more than two per
+cent higher than the rates of the three Member States with the best results
+in terms of price stability (a technique called ‘ benchmarking ’ , where performance
+is measured not by an absolute standard but by reference to the
+performance of others). 67
+Since this mechanism never worked, rather than examine its workability,
+the screws were simply tightened over 20 long years. Thus, in 1997,
+the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) signed in Amsterdam obliged Member
+States to submit a yearly ‘ stability programme ’for the ensuing three years to
+the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN). This council adopts
+a host of objectives every year — the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
+158 The Encroachment of Governance on Law
+
+68 G Abeille , ‘ Àl ’ origine du d é fi cit à3 %du PIB, une invention 100 % …fran ç aise ’ ,
+La Tribune, 1 October 2010 . 69 One of the promises on which the French President was elected in 2012 was that he
+would not ratify this text as it stood; no sooner elected, than he did just that. The Constitutional
+Council handed down a particularly tortuous decision to the effect that this ratifi cation
+did not require prior revision of the Constitution ( Conseil constitutionnel, No 2012-653 DC,
+9 August 2012).
+
+(BEPG) — which are implemented by Member States under mutual monitoring.
+The Pact has introduced fi nancial penalties for Member States with a
+defi cit in excess of the objective indicator of three per cent of their GDP.
+Why this fi gure ?One of the brains behind it, who was a member of the
+Budget Directorate at the time, described the process in terms which reveal
+our leaders ’fetishistic worship of numbers, and the attendant loss of contact
+with the realities of the economy:
+
+Focusing on the defi cit of a particular year doesn ’ t have much sense and relating
+it to the GDP of the same year has even less. The defi cit to GDP ratio [ … ] can in
+any case never be used to indicate a trend; it does not measure anything: it is not
+a criterion. The only valid tool is an analysis of the country ’ s capacity to repay
+its debts, that is, an analysis of their fi nancial health [ … ]. Be that as it may, the
+political — not economic, but political — question does not go away: how transmute
+the lead of a reasoned analysis of creditworthiness into the visible gold of an
+arresting and punchy rallying cry ? 68
+
+The last step in the enslavement of Member States to the imperative of
+attaining numerical objectives was taken on 1 January 2013, when the
+Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
+Monetary Union (the Fiscal Stability Treaty) came into force. Article III of
+this Treaty is a perfect example of governance by numbers: it fi xes an objective,
+immediately translated into numerical indicators, of a balanced budget
+or a budgetary surplus, lays down a timeline for achieving this objective,
+and the evaluation procedures to be employed. Going against an electoral
+promise, 69 this text was ratifi ed by France. Its most important sections contain
+the following:
+
+Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
+Union, Article III:
+
+1. The Contracting Parties shall apply the rules set out in this paragraph in addition
+and without prejudice to their obligations under European Union law:
+
+(a) the budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting Party
+shall be balanced or in surplus;
+(b) the rule under point (a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural
+balance of the general government is at its country-specifi c mediumterm
+objective, as defi ned in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with
+a lower limit of a structural defi cit of 0.5 %of the gross domestic product
+European Governance 159
+
+70 Constitutional Bylaw No 2012-1403 of 17 December 2012 on the Programming and
+Governance of Public Finances. 71 See A Taillefait , ‘ Les “ automatismes budg é taires ” àl ’ é preuve du politique. Àpropos des
+dettes publiques ’( 2012 ) Revue fran ç aise des fi nances publiques, 118, 133 ; D Wilsher , ‘ Law
+and the Financial Crisis : Searching for Europe ’ s New Gold Standard ’( 2013 ) 19 European Law
+Journal 3, 241 – 83 . 72 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Art 105, §1. 73 TFEU, Art 101; Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of
+the European Central Bank, Art 21.
+
+at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence
+towards their respective medium-term objective. The time-frame for such
+convergence will be proposed by the European Commission taking into consideration
+country-specifi c sustainability risks. Progress towards, and respect
+of, the medium-term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall
+assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis
+of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the revised
+Stability and Growth Pact;
+(c) the Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their respective
+medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional
+circumstances, as defi ned in point (b) of paragraph 3;
+(d) where the ratio of the general government debt to gross domestic product at
+market prices is signifi cantly below 60 %and where risks in terms of longterm
+sustainability of public fi nances are low, the lower limit of the mediumterm
+objective specifi ed under point (b) can reach a structural defi cit of at
+most 1.0 %of the gross domestic product at market prices.
+
+Where this Treaty is really new, catapulting us into the era of legal cybernetics,
+is in its introduction of a corrective mechanism which ‘ is triggered automatically
+in the event of signifi cant observed deviations from the medium-term
+objective or the adjustment path towards it. The mechanism shall include
+the obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement measures
+to correct the deviations over a defi ned period of time ’(Art 3e). In France,
+this mechanism has taken the form of the Haut Conseil des fi nances publiques
+(Higher Council on Public Finances), an independent body headed
+by Didier Migaud, one of the fathers of the LOLF, and Chair of the Cour
+des comptes (France ’ s highest institution for auditing public fi nances). If a
+signifi cant gap is observed between the path for re-establishing a balanced
+budget and the objective assigned, the government must respond to this in
+its public expenditure or social security proposals during that year. 70
+But how solid is this legal armature through which economic policy
+choices are funnelled ?Not one of the quantifi ed objectives fi xed by
+European law since the Maastricht Treaty has ever really been fulfi lled, and
+the ‘ golden rule ’imposed on all the Eurozone countries by the Stability and
+Growth Pact probably has the same fate awaiting it. 71 Iron discipline was
+imposed not there but elsewhere, in the Maastricht Treaty ’ s obligation on
+the European Central Bank to follow one single objective only, that of price
+stability, 72 and in its prohibition on lending to Member States. 73 These are
+160 The Encroachment of Governance on Law
+
+74 For a similar argument see F Lordon , La Malfa ç on. Monnaie europ é enne et souverainet é
+d é mocratique ( Paris, Les liens qui lib è rent , 2014 ) 23ff . 75 cf J-M Sorel , ‘ Sur quelques aspects juridiques de la conditionnalit édu FMI et leurs cons
+é quences ’( 1996 ) 7 European Journal of International Law, 1 . 76 The IMF adopted new conditionality regulations in 2009. The monitoring of compliance
+is now contained in ‘ programme reviews ’ , rather than being assessed through structural
+criteria.
+
+two major differences from the US Federal Reserve, which is allowed to buy
+government bonds, and whose primary role is to ensure full employment.
+Since Eurozone countries cannot get fi nancing from the Central Bank, they
+are at the mercy of the whims of the fi nancial markets. The numbers really
+endowed with normative force are not the ones mentioned in the Treaties,
+but rather the interest rates on the bond markets. 74
+
+V. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
+
+Governance by numbers on an international level has two facets: public and
+private. Its public aspect is clearest in the conditions imposed by international
+institutions on the assistance they give to countries in fi nancial diffi culty. Aid
+is provided either within the framework of global plans — structural adjustment
+plans — or within narrower programmes. All aid programmes come
+complete with their quantifi ed indicators, by which the country ’ s success in
+attaining the assigned objectives is measured. These numerical indicators
+have given the IMF a lot of power, ever since the dollar left the gold standard
+in 1971, under Richard Nixon, with the resulting fl oating of currencies.
+Currencies were then themselves treated as though they were products, with
+the price being determined by the fi nancial markets, such that the IMF ’ s mission
+as guardian of the international monetary order became meaningless.
+Since then, the IMF ’ s main aim has been to force countries to obey the three
+commandments of neoliberalism: abolishing trade barriers; deregulating the
+labour markets; and privatising public services. The fi nancial assistance proposed
+by the IMF is at that cost. 75 The payment of the fi nancial aid is staggered,
+and is conditional upon attaining the agreed objectives, as evaluated
+by quantitative criteria, 76 which invariably include macro-economic variables
+such as certain monetary and credit aggregates, international reserves,
+budgetary balances and foreign borrowing. Failure to meet one of the quantitative
+targets may be tolerated by the IMF when the deviation in question is
+insignifi cant or temporary, or if national authorities have taken, or will take,
+corrective measures — this principle has also been adopted for monetary discipline
+in the Eurozone. Structural adjustment plans, which were fi rst tested in
+Latin America, particularly Argentina (leading to its bankruptcy), were later
+applied to many Southern countries, particularly in Africa, and were later
+prescribed to Eurozone countries under the aegis of the Troika (the European
+Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF).
+Global Governance 161
+
+77 World Bank , World Development Report 2000 ⁄ 2001: Attacking Poverty ( Oxford , OUP ,
+2001 ) ; J-P Cling , M Razafi ndrakotoand F Roubaud(ed), Les Nouvelles Strat é gies internationales
+de lutte contre la pauvret é ( Paris , Economica , 2003 ) 463 . 78 cf The Millennium Declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly (Resolution 55/2
+of 13 September 2000). Social and environmental objectives have pride of place in this Resolution
+(which also enshrines the principle of solidarity), including: development, and eradicating
+poverty; protecting the environment; promoting democracy and good governance; protecting
+the vulnerable; and meeting the specifi c needs of Africa. 79 S Knackand N Manning , Towards Consensus on Governance Indicators, World
+Bank , March 2000 , 28 ; M Besan ç on , Good Governance Ranking: The Art of Measurement
+( Cambridge Mass , World Peace Foundation-Harvard University , 2003 ) 40 ; S Van de Walle ,
+‘ Peut-on mesurer la qualit édes administrations publiques gr â ce aux indicateurs de gouvernance
+? ’( 2005 ) 3 Revue fran ç aise d ’ administration publique 115, 435 – 61 . 80 J Gadreyand F Jany-Catrice , Les Nouveaux Indicateurs de richesse, 2nd edn( Paris ,
+La D é couverte , 2007 ) ; J Stiglitz , A Senand J-P Fitoussi , Richesse des nations et bien- ê tre des
+individus. Rapport au Pr é sident de la R é publique, preface by N Sarkozy( Paris , Odile Jacob ,
+2009 ) 351 .
+
+The mechanism of ‘ conditionality ’ , with its numerical indicators, is not
+the preserve of the IMF. The EU and the World Bank also apply such conditions
+in their aid programmes to poor countries. The social and economic
+disasters they have generated led to the introduction of another type of programme,
+using other quantifi ed objectives: the fi ght against poverty; good
+governance; and human development. 77 These have been the objectives
+of the UN ’ s Development Programme (the UNDP) since 1990, and, since
+2000, of the ‘ UN Millennium Development Goals ’ .
+78 It was from within the
+UNDP that Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq came up with their ‘ human
+development index ’ . After several changes, it stabilised in 2011 into the
+following formula:
+
+IDH I I I Life Education I I × ncome ILif
+
+where ILife, IEducation and IIncome are the indicators for longevity, level of education
+and standard of living respectively.
+This index is constructed by aggregating sub-indices designed to measure
+health, lifespan, level of education and standard of living. For example, the
+level of education is measured by the average length of formal education
+for 25-year-old adults, and the expected length of education for school-age
+children. Similar indices were developed to measure ‘ good governance ’ .
+79
+These indicators of ‘ well-being ’have been all the rage recently, 80 particularly
+in anti-poverty plans, which invariably replaced structural adjustment
+plans. The question is whether they can provide useful remedies or whether
+they simply push these countries further down the blind alley of generalised
+quantifi cation.
+The fi rst non-fi nancial objective to be quantifi ed as an internationally
+binding target was the reduction in CO 2 emissions set out by the Kyoto
+162 The Encroachment of Governance on Law
+
+81 A-S Tabau , La Mise en œ uvre du Protocole de Kyoto en Europe ( Brussels , Bruylant ,
+2011 ) 527 ; A Bordeand H Joumni , ‘ Le recours au march édans les politiques de lutte contre le
+changement climatique ’( 2007 ) Revue internationale et strat é gique, 67, 53 . 82 See above, ch 7 , p 130ff. 83 cf R Guesnerieand H Tulkens(eds), The Design of Climate Policy ( MIT Press , CESifo
+Seminar Series , 2008 ) ; R Guesnerie , Pour une politique climatique globale ( Paris , É ditions Rue
+d ’ Ulm/Presses de l ’ É cole normale sup é rieure , 2010 ) 96 . 84 See, concerning the InternationalCountryRiskGuide (ICRG), A Linderand C Santiso ,
+‘ Not Everything that Counts Can be Counted : A Critical Look at Risk Ratings and Governance
+Indicators ’( 2003 ) 29 Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 105 – 32 . 85 Regulation EU No 1060/2009 of 16 September 2009, amended by Regulation (EU)
+No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 and completed
+by fi ve delegated acts of 31 March and 12 July 2012. On this question, see Les Agences de
+notation (Paris, la D é couverte, coll ‘ Rep è res ’ , 2010); T Bonneau , ‘ Coup de projecteur sur les
+agences de notation ’( 2011 ) La Semaine juridique é dition G é n é rale (JCP G) 45, 1184 ; ‘ R è glements
+d é l é gu é s ’(2012) Revue de droit bancaire et fi nancier, 5, fn 173.
+
+Protocol. This normative instrument emanating from the United Nations
+Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Rio in
+1992, was signed in 1997 and came into force in 2005. By 2010, it had been
+ratifi ed by 168 countries, but not by China, nor by the United States. 81 Its
+objective was to reduce over the period 2008 – 12 the emissions measured in
+1990, by at least fi ve per cent. The method used here is a good illustration of
+what is called the theory of property rights, 82 which works neither through
+rules or levies, but by setting up a market in tradeable pollution rights. An
+amendment adopted in Doha in December 2012 extended the period of
+measurement to 2013 – 20, using this mechanism. However, the failure of
+the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, and the desertion
+of several countries which had initially signed the Protocol (Canada, Japan,
+New-Zealand and Russia), have resulted in a mere 15 per cent of world CO 2
+emissions being covered today by the agreement, and its very conception has
+been discredited by the most reliable economists. 83
+
+***
+
+Assessing countries ’performance quantitatively also has a private sector
+dimension, in the form of rating agencies which produce fi gures to describe
+a country ’ s actual and projected fi nancial performance, and the trustworthiness
+of its debt securities. The ratings in turn generate risk indicators
+of variable sophistication. 84 Internationally, these agencies are only regulated
+by a non-legally binding Code of Conduct, the Statement of Principles
+Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies, adopted in 2003
+by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOCV).
+The EU favoured the principle of self-regulation for rating agencies up to
+2006, but after the fi nancial markets crashed in 2008 it adopted a series
+of regulations 85 designed to defi ne the activities of credit rating agencies,
+Global Governance 163
+
+in order to prevent confl icts of interest, 86 to guarantee the soundness of the
+rating methods used and to have the agencies monitored by a European
+Securities and Markets Authority, established in 2010. One of the lessons
+of the fi nancial collapse of 2008 — the same lesson which should already
+have been learnt from the Enron scandal (2001) regarding accounting practices
+— was that governance by numbers gives immense power to those who
+construct the fi gures, because this is conceived as a technical exercise which
+need not be exposed to open debate. 87 The disasters we have seen recurring
+are never ascribed to a design fault in the very mechanism used, but always
+to human failings. Yet governance by numbers is itself a dead end, unsustainable
+in the long run. It generates the return of new forms of allegiance
+between people, as we shall see in the second part of this book.
+
+86 J-M Moulin , ‘ Confl its d ’ int é r ê ts chez les agences de notation ’( 2008 ) Bulletin Joly Bourse,
+special issue, December, 580 . 87 The Libor case clearly illustrated this error. The Libor is a grouping of rates supposed to
+represent the market price of inter-bank loans and to serve as a benchmark in a large number
+of credit operations. The Libor rate is fi xed daily on the basis of the declarations made
+by London banks on the borrowing costs practised between them. It came to light that several
+of them had agreed a price between themselves, which led to Barclays Bank being fi ned
+365 million euros in the British courts.
+
+1 M Tribus , Quality First. Selected papers on quality and productivity Improvement,
+4th edn ( Washington DC , National Society of Professional Engineers , 1992) 1459 ) . 2 Plato Letter VIII, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol 12 , 334c – 337e , tr HN Fowler
+( Cambridge , Mass, Harvard University Press ; London, William Heinemann Ltd , 1921 ) . 3 cf D Hofstadter , Gö del, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid (London, Penguin, 1979) .
+
+9
+
+The Limits of Governance
+by Numbers
+
+If you try to improve the performance of a system of people, machines,
+and procedures by setting numerical goals for the improvement of its
+individual elements, the system will defeat your efforts and you
+will be picking up the pieces where you least expect it. 1
+
+BOTH GOVERNANCE BY numbers and government by laws pursue
+the ideal of a society whose rules derive from an impersonal source
+and not from the will of the powerful. However, governance by numbers
+parts company with government by laws in its desire to liquidate all
+heteronomy, including that of the law. When the law is the sovereign ruler, 2
+its heteronomous authority, to which all are subject, is the primary condition
+for the autonomy of the individuals it governs. The institution of language
+has the same normative structure: language-speakers can express themselves
+freely only if they have fi rst accepted the law of the language they speak;
+we must obey the impersonal rules which refer certain signifi ers to certain
+signifi eds in order to achieve the autonomy of thought and expression which
+the mastery of a language gives us. Without this, we have no access to the
+refl exive universe of (natural) language, in which we can observe ourselves
+and speak, for example, about the rules which govern us. However, in natural
+languages, there is no univocal link between signifi er and signifi ed, so a
+statement is open to a multitude of possible interpretations.
+Logico-mathematical language, by contrast, is univocal and non-refl exive.
+The symbols used have one meaning, and one only, even if they can only
+be discussed in the natural languages on which they are based. One of the
+breakthroughs of modern mathematics was the coding of some of its own
+formulas, in a movement of refl exivity which G ö del explored further in his
+demonstrations that undecidable propositions exist — undecidable because
+open to several possible interpretations. 3 Computing language rests on this
+168 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+4 A Nicolle , ‘ Comparaison entre les comportements r é fl exifs du langage humain et la
+r é fl exivit édes langages informatiques ’ , in S Stinckwich(ed), R é fl exivit éet auto-r é f é rence
+dans les syst è mes complexes ( Paris , É cole nationale sup é rieure des t é l é communications , 2005 )
+137 – 48 ; and, by the same author, ‘ La question du symbolique en informatique ’ , in H PaugamMoissy
+, V Nyckees , J Caron-Pargue(ed), La Cognition entre individu et soci é t é ( Paris , Herm è s ,
+2001 ) 370 . 5 See above, ch 1 , p 19ff. 6 K Polanyi , The Livelihood of Man, ed H Pearson( New York City, Academic Press , 1977 ) . 7 cf E Nagel , JR Newman , K G ö del , J-Y Girard , Le Th é or è me de G ö de l ( Paris , Le Seuil ,
+1997 ) ; P Cassou-Nogu è s , Les D é mons de G ö del. Logique et folie ( Paris , Le Seuil, coll ‘ Points ’ ,
+2007 ) esp 173ff . 8 J-Y Girard , ‘ Le th é or è me d ’ incompl é tude de G ö del ’in N Bouleau , J-Y Girard , A Louveau ,
+Cinq conf é rences sur l ’ ind é cidabilit é ( Paris, É cole nationale des Ponts et Chauss é es , 1982 ) 23 . 9 ibid, 20. 10 ibid, 23 – 24.
+
+discovery, and the refl exivity of one program taking another as an item
+of data. 4 Computers are thus self-governing machines, within the limits of
+the programs they are running. Their invention made it possible to envisage
+a society which functions according to immanent and impersonal rules,
+that is, an inherently self-programming society purged of any heteronomy.
+However, this notion of society as a machine had fi red the imagination of
+Western legal thought for a long time, at least since Hobbes. 5 Governance
+by numbers simply replaced the clock with a new fetishised object, the computer,
+coupled to its vision of a self-regulating order in which subjection to
+any over-arching laws is superfl uous. The radiant future promised by neoliberalism
+conceives society as governed solely by the calculated utilities of
+a host of contracting particles. Its basis is thus, as Karl Polanyi has called it,
+pure ‘ economic solipsism ’ .
+6
+There are, however, solid reasons for doubting that this kind of future
+will ever materialise. In its pursuit of the utopian dream of entirely calculable
+norms, governance by numbers undermines the foundations of any
+rational, scientifi c calculation. G ö del demonstrated that a formal system
+built out of an indefi nite series of logically linked axioms will nevertheless
+have an irreducible element of incalculability to it. And, as one of the people
+whose discoveries led to the invention of computing, he was also one of
+the fi rst to point out that the human mind is not reducible to a machine. 7
+The mathematician Jean-Yves Girard characterised this position as follows:
+‘ if we had to summarise in a single sentence the signifi cance of G ö del ’ s refutation
+of Hilbert ’ s programme, it would be: ‘ there are things which cannot
+be explained in terms of machines ’ .
+8 Many scientists turn a deaf ear to the
+implications of such discoveries, continuing to adhere to a mathematical
+formalism, and a mechanistic and totalising vision, whose only advantage
+is giving a simple and reductive access to the world. 9 Moreover, outside the
+realm of mathematics, G ö del or Turing are the victims of the most fantastical
+extrapolations. 10 This is only to be expected, since the scientifi c discoveries
+The Eclipse of the Object 169
+
+11 On the genetic imaginary, see B Duden , Die Gene im Kopf — der F ö tus im Bauch.
+Historisches zum Frauenk ö rper ( Hannover , Offi zin Verlag , 2002 ) 266 . 12 PJ Proudhon, Literary Property, p 14, para 2, at http://wiki.proudhonlibrary.org .
+(tr mod). This is a partial bilingual translation of P-J Proudhon , Les Majorats litt é raires.
+Examen d ’ un projet de loi ayant pour but de cr é er, au profi t des auteurs, inventeurs et artistes,
+un monopole perp é tuel ( 1862 ) .
+
+of a particular period inevitably inform that period ’ s imaginary, including
+ideas about how society should be governed. 11
+To give some idea of the unsustainability of governance by numbers, we
+shall fi rst look at its structural effects on the legal order, and then at the
+latter ’ s inevitable resistance.
+
+I. THE STRUCTURAL EFFECTS OF GOVERNANCE BY NUMBERS
+
+Insofar as the legal order helps anchor in reality the image we have of the
+world in which we live, and of what it could or should be, legal normativity
+contributes to the institution of reason. This anthropological function
+of the law can be achieved only if one respects at once the realities of the
+world and human beings ’specifi c capacity to transform them. This is done,
+in Proudhon ’ s words, by having ideas ‘ in the palm of one ’ s hand ’ .
+12 Under a
+Taylorist system, the capacity to refl ect on one ’ s actions was the privilege of
+a minority of leaders (the bourgeoisie or the ‘ vanguard of the proletariat ’ ),
+while the majority of workers were reduced to the status of cogs obeying
+mechanically the rules of the workshop and the rhythms of the machines.
+The dichotomy generated — between those whose role was to think and lead,
+and those whose role was to obey without thinking — tends to disappear
+under governance by numbers. This would be good news indeed, if only the
+effect was to anchor managers ’thinking in real experience and to enable the
+workers, who live this experience, to communicate what they think and put
+it into action. However, governance by numbers produces quite the opposite
+effect. Rather than release us from the fantasy of the governing machine, it
+intensifi es this fantasy and ensnares managers and workers alike in feedback
+loops governed by numerical representations of the world increasingly disconnected
+from experience. Far from reconciling objectivity and subjectivity
+in the conduct of human affairs, it impairs both by replacing the territory
+with the map, and action with reaction.
+
+II. THE ECLIPSE OF THE OBJECT: THE MAP REPLACES
+THE TERRITORY
+
+In theory, management by objectives claims to make a sharp distinction
+between the time of action and the time of evaluation. The ‘ structure of
+170 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+13 See above, ch 8 , p 146. 14 Cour des comptes, Rapport public annuel 2012, 605.
+
+self-control ’which it champions thus in principle has three stages, comprising:
+a) the setting of objectives; b) the actions carried out to meet these; and
+c) the assessment of the performance, which itself, through feedback, serves
+to redefi ne the future objectives or actions. However, the numerical indicators
+used in c) to assess the performance are endowed with a normative
+function, which results in a ‘ management of domination ’(rather than
+self-management) which Peter Drucker ’ s governance by numbers expressly
+warned against. 13 A confl ation between satisfying indicators and realising
+objectives gives rise to what can be called an ‘ objective indicator’ , in which
+two different meanings of ‘ objective ’are fused: as a noun it is a goal assigned
+to an action, and as an adjective, it qualifi es the objectivity of a judgment
+on reality. In any purely quantitative evaluation, this fusion of objectives
+and indicators is inevitable, because the numbers are already informed by a
+qualitative value which the assessor cannot modify.
+A good example of this fusion occurs when research assessment methodologies
+ignore the issue of how a piece of research contributes to furthering
+knowledge, and instead assign value through bibliometric indicators,
+according to the ranking of the journals in which the research is published.
+The academic world, which was left unscathed by Taylorism, has become
+the chosen playground of governance by numbers. Researchers in economics
+are at the cutting edge of this replacement of judgement by calculation
+in evaluation procedures. They are like the hero of Kafka ’ s Penal Colony,
+applying management methods to themselves with the greatest rigour, and
+advocating that they be applied to all domains of human existence. Thus,
+in a report by the Cour des comptes, France ’ s highest budget auditor, the
+Toulouse School of Economics is reported as having ‘ introduced a system of
+payment “ on merit ” ’ , in order to ‘ reward excellence ’and the individual performances
+of its researchers, ‘ based on awarding bonuses to the researchers
+who publish in the 100 best economics journals’ (none of which are French).
+A complex formula, based on the status of the article, the number of
+co-authors, its volume and the journal ’ s ranking, gives an objective fi gure
+for the bonus. The maximum bonus is awarded for articles published in one
+of the top fi ve journals in the world. 14 With this kind of procedure, no one
+actually needs to read the academic articles, and even less ask themselves
+whether the real economy in the real world is any more intelligible or could
+be better managed as a result, because a value judgement is already present
+in the numerical ranking of the journals. All one has to do is calculate.
+And that can be entrusted to a machine, to ensure the ‘ objectivity ’of the process.
+The assessment as a whole thus exemplifi es something G ü nther Anders
+noted half a century ago: the desire to ‘ transfer decision-making power to an
+instrument (since the “ last word ”must be objective, and only the judgements
+The Eclipse of the Object 171
+
+15 G Anders , Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen ( Munich , Beck , 1956 ) . 16 See W Blockmans , Bibliometrics: Use and Abuse in the Review of Research Performance
+( London, Portland Press , 2014 ) 178(fi ndings of the conference of the Academia Europ æ ). 17 cf R Adler , J Ewingand P Taylor (Joint Committee on Quantitative Assessment of
+Research) , Citation Statistics, A report from the International Mathematical Union (IMU) in
+cooperation with the International Council of Industrial and Applied Mathematics (ICIAM)
+and the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (IMS) , December 2008 , at www.mathunion.org/
+fi leadmin/IMU/Report/CitationStatistics.pdf . See also the Editorial of the review Mathematical
+Structures in Computer Science, ‘ Bibliometrics and the curators of orthodoxy ’( 2009 ) 19
+Mathematical Structures in Computer Science 1 – 4 . 18 NC Liuand Y Cheng , ‘ Academic Ranking of World Universities — Methodologies and
+Problems ’ ( 2005 ) 30 Higher Education in Europe 2, 127 – 36 . 19 See above, ch 6 , p 109ff.
+
+declared by objects are today considered to be “ objective ” ) ’ .
+15 Despite harsh
+
+criticism from some researchers, 16 not least mathematicians, 17 these procedures
+are increasingly applied, and are used to decide on funding allocations
+and the nature of the research to be undertaken. For example, in
+the top Chinese universities, promotion for legal scholars is dependent on
+their publications in a limited number of journals, all of which are in English.
+In practice, they are thus encouraged to abandon any in-depth research
+into legal systems other than common law ones (because any serious legal
+research needs to work in the language of the legal system it is studying).
+A university can thus improve its overall score only at the cost of considerably
+impoverishing its real research capacities in comparative law.
+On a much larger scale, the famous ‘ Shanghai Ranking ’has become
+the standard by which all the universities in the world are assessed. This
+Academic Ranking of World Universities, devised by researchers at the
+Shanghai Jiao Tong University, respects the following weightings for calculating
+a university ’ s rank: the number of Fields Medals and Nobel Prizes
+among its members (20 per cent) and ex-students (10 per cent); the number
+of researchers most quoted in their discipline (20 per cent); the number of
+articles published in the journal Nature or Science (20 per cent), or which
+have been indexed in the Science Citation Index or the Arts &Humanities
+Citation Index (20 per cent); and the relation of these performances to the
+size of the institution (10 per cent). 18 This ranking exerts an enormous
+infl uence on higher education policy-makers, and drives the tendency to
+ever-larger units: if all universities in France were fused into a single institution
+called ‘ University of France ’ , this entity would — at least provisionally —
+come top of the tables in any such global benchmarking operation. Arguably,
+this system is the exact remake of the ‘ control fi gures ’which China inherited
+from its socialist economic planning past. 19 The same causes continue to
+produce the same (devastating) effects: through governance by numbers,
+and the priority of calculation over judgment, decision-makers lose touch
+with the real performances of institutions, and with the complexity of the
+real. The map replaces the territory.
+172 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+20 See above, ch 8 , p 153ff. On these measurements of the state ’ s performance, see Jany-Catrice,
+La Performance totale (ch 8 fn 52) 91ff. 21 D No 2011-1038, 29 August 2011, establishing incentive awards for collective performance
+in civil service departments, quoted Art 2, para 3. See L Cluzel-M é tayer , ‘ La prime de
+fonctions et de r é sultats dans la fonction publique ’( 2010 ) Droit administratif 1 ; D Jean-Pierre ,
+‘ La prime d ’ int é ressement àla performance collective: entre dits et non-dits ’ ( 2011 ) La Semaine
+juridique A , 2305 ; M Pochard , ‘ La prime d ’ int é ressement dans la fonction publique. Risques
+et chance ’( 2011 ) AJDA, 1705 . 22 Circular of 29 August 2011 on the establishment of incentive awards for collective
+performance in civil service departments and in public agencies, Art 3.1.1. 23 See above, ch 8 , pp 156–57. 24 Montagutelli, ‘ L ’ é cole am é ricaine dans la tourmente de “ No Child Left Behind ” ’( ch 8
+fn 66) 99 – 100; from the same perspective, see A Gamoran, ‘ Bilan et devenir de la loi “ No Child
+Left Behind ”aux É tats-Unis ’( ch 8fn 66) 13 – 26. 25 For the notion of statistical qualifi cation, see above, ch 5 , p 92.
+
+This divorce from the real is evident in all the legal mechanisms employed
+to implement governance by numbers. The Constitutional Bylaw LOLF
+by which ‘ New Public Management ’was instituted in France created an
+ocean of performance indicators divided into main groups (effi ciency indicators,
+quality indicators and effectiveness indicators), whose common
+denominator was that they were quantifi ed. 20 Thus, the text of the Decree of
+29 August 2011, which generalised performance-related bonuses for civil
+servants, states that ‘ defi ning a mechanism for collective performancerelated
+bonuses involves fi xing 1. Objectives, indicators, and the results to
+be achieved over 12 consecutive months. This period can form part of a
+multi-annual programme of objectives ’ .
+21 The sequence ‘ objectives, indicators,
+and the results to be achieved ’is an indivisible whole. The circular
+concerning the Decree ’ s application takes these different terms to be synonymous,
+and the examples it gives of indicators for the ‘ quality of service
+provided ’show that this quality must always be reduced to quantities:
+‘ the proportion of sites or bodies inspected; the rate of implementation
+of the rules applied to a policy; the rate of development of e-governance;
+the level of user satisfaction; the processing times for requests; the average
+time-frame for processing cases; the level of user information ’ .
+22
+As such, those involved will seek to achieve the targets, independently
+of any real improvement in the services provided. This is one of the lessons
+learnt from the American initiative we mentioned above, No Child Left
+Behind.23 To improve their scores, the schools became less demanding in
+their evaluations, and to improve their bonuses the teachers lowered their
+teaching standards by ‘ cramming ’and teaching to the test, sometimes even
+giving the pupils the answers in order to ensure good results. 24 There were
+so many nefarious effects of the reform that, after the election of Barack
+Obama to the presidency, there was a debate as to whether the legislation
+was too profoundly fl awed, or whether it could still be reformed.
+This disconnection from reality is also produced by the statistical qualifi
+cation on which macro-economic indicators are built. 25 For example,
+The Eclipse of the Object 173
+
+26 On this indicator, see above, p 157ff . 27 See below, pp 263–64. 28 On the nefarious impact of the politics of numbers on democracy, see A Ogien , D é sacraliser
+le chiffre dans l ’ é valuation du secteur public ( Versailles , Ed. Qae , 2013 ) 117 . 29 Eyraud, Le Capitalisme au c œ ur de l ’ É tat ( ch 8fn 55) 197 – 207.
+
+in order to comply with the ‘ objective indicator ’of three per cent of the
+GDP as the maximum public defi cit, 26 all one need do is transfer to the
+private sector the defi cit accrued for services provided by the public sector.
+For example, by consistently reducing the coverage of ‘minor risks’, French
+public health insurance both shaves fi gures off its defi cit and automatically
+boosts the private health insurance market. 27 The problem is that private
+health insurance is not comprehensive — those who cannot afford it are not
+covered — but it has the advantage of not showing up in the public accounts.
+In other words, improving one ’ s score does not result in any real reduction
+in expenditure — and it can have the opposite effect, as soaring opticians
+’costs illustrate — and moreover it brings with it a decline of the level
+of health protection in the population as a whole.
+A similar logic, but on an international scale, informs the ‘ fi ghting poverty
+’programmes, which in many countries have superseded years of
+‘ structural adjustment ’ . ‘ Poverty ’is treated in this context as a numerical
+indicator expressed in dollars, a piece of statistical information which can
+be applied all over the world, like the occurrence of an epidemic or a natural
+disaster. The defi nition of ‘ extreme poverty ’adopted by the United Nations
+Millennium Goals, as living with less than 1 US $per day, excluded everything
+which in a person ’ s standard of living and quality of life depends
+on their social and cultural context, and cannot be assessed in fi nancial
+terms. Although within a national framework it is possible for parliament or
+trade unions to challenge this statistical representation of society, and thus
+for its normative purchase to be monitored democratically, these checks do
+not exist wherever numerical representations of society are endowed with
+superior value and universality. The risk which emerges is that of becoming
+enclosed in the self-referential loops of a technocratic discourse which irons
+out the realities of human life rather than re-presenting them.
+Despite the fact that these indicators are supposed to be the product of a
+rational technical process, their construction involves power struggles which
+are never the subject of democratic deliberation. 28 The sociologist Corine
+Eyraud has described the negotiations between the French Treasury and
+the Higher Education Ministry, as their civil servants fought it out to defi ne
+higher education performance indicators. 29 For the academics, the indicators
+proposed were those most likely to protect their budget allocations (for
+example, the number of students registering); for the Treasury inspectors,
+the indicators proposed were those most likely to be diffi cult to attain (for
+example, pass rates at the end of the fi rst two university years), which could
+174 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+30 See above, ch 8, p 155. 31 PLR 2011. See ‘ Mission interminist é rielle. Projets annuels de performance. Annexe au
+projet de loi de fi nances pour 2012 ’ , Recherche et enseignement sup é rieur, 64. This calculation
+takes into account the number of research centres which sign each publication.
+
+show up some ‘ ineffi ciency ’on the part of the ‘ operators ’ . This is the type of
+alchemy which transmutes university courses and research into fi gures, and
+decides upon budget allocations accordingly. As for research, the indicators
+constructed for use in the Annual Performance Reports (RAP) 30 are a good
+illustration of how reality is expelled in favour of the imaginary products
+of benchmarking. Programme No 150 of the Constitutional Bylaw LOLF,
+concerning ‘ Higher Education training, and academic research ’ , has as its
+Objective No 7 ‘ the Production of academic knowledge to the highest international
+standard ’ , which is measured by indicator 7.1, ‘ Programme operators ’
+academic production ’ . This indicator is arrived at by dividing the ‘ number of
+internationally recognised publications by the programme operator ’ , by the
+‘ EU-27 leading publications ’or the ‘ number of world-leading international
+publications (global proportion) ’ .
+31 This gives the following table:
+
+Share of international reference
+publications by programme
+operators in the academic
+production of the EU
+
+2009
+Achievement
+2010
+Achievement
+2011
+Forecast
+APP* 2011
+2011
+Forecast
+mid 2011
+2011
+Achievement
+2013
+Target
+APP* 2011
+
+*APP: Annual Project Performance
+
+Unit
+
+% 8,59 8,68 >8,2 >8,2 8,66p >=8,5
+
+% 2,75 2,75 >2,2 >2,2 2,72p >=2
+
+% 18,2 18,5 >17,9 >17,9 18,7 >=17,7
+
+Share of international reference
+publications by programme
+operators in the academic
+production worldwide
+Share of international reference
+publications by programme
+operators in the academic
+production of France, Germany
+and the UK
+
+Indicator 7.1: Progamme Operators’ Academic Production
+
+(from the citizen’s point of view)
+Mission Indicator
+
+Figure 9.1: Quantifi ed representation of French research performance
+
+This indicator therefore equates the progress of knowledge with a supposedly
+measurable relative share of each programme operator ’ s ‘ output ’on an
+international market of research ‘ products ’ . This type of ‘ objective indicator
+’ , apart from being divorced from the real development of knowledge
+areas, obliges research bodies to focus primarily on improving their rank
+in this international benchmarking competition. Researchers are expected
+to replace the activity of research with reactions to numerical signals: this
+cannot but choke the wellspring feeding an individual ’ s research motivation,
+which is not to increase one ’ s score but, in Thomas Kuhn ’ s words, to
+The Eclipse of the Subject 175
+
+32 T Kuhn , The Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions ( Chicago , Chicago University Press ,
+1962 )ch 2. 33 cf F Patras , La Possibilit édes nombres ( Paris , PUF , 2014 ) 36 – 39 . 34 These points are developed in my Critique du droit du travail (Paris, PUF, 1994; coll
+‘ Quadrige ’ , 2002) 280.
+
+solve enigmas. 32 There is a certain irony in the fact that the very fetishism
+of quantifi cation and mathematical symbols once promoted by researchers
+now comes back to haunt them. This ‘ non-ontological ’use of quantifi
+cation not only prevents the world of research from refl ecting on the
+real in all its complexity, it also — particularly in economics — leads to sterile
+simulations which from the start expel the real in favour of mathematical
+representations. 33
+
+III. THE ECLIPSE OF THE SUBJECT: ACTION
+BOWS TO REACTION
+
+Embracing the fi ction that people have property rights in their own bodies,
+the law provided that a person ’ s ‘ labour force ’could be rented out just like a
+cart-horse or a mill. Taylorism transposed this reifi cation into management,
+by founding the ‘ scientifi c organisation ’of labour on the neutralisation of
+the mental capacities of the worker. The employment contract gave legal
+form to this divorce between the thinking subject (reduced to the fi gure of
+the contracting party) and the work, emptied of subjective input (reduced
+to a pure quantity of time in subordination). It was labour law which made
+this fi ction bearable and sustainable, through the minimum physical and
+economic security it afforded employees, so that they could maintain their
+capacity to work over the longer period of a human life. Understood in
+this light, the employment contract made it possible to institute a ‘ labour
+market ’ , and thus brought to an end the two legal forms which had organised
+the economy until then: the status of slave (which consigns work to the
+realm of things, in qualifying the worker as himself a thing); and guild membership
+status (which does the opposite, making work one of the elements
+of a person ’ s identity). 34
+Governance by numbers swept all this away by treating the human being
+as an intelligent machine. Work ceased to be an energy source one owned
+and could hire out to someone in return for subordination; it was no longer
+an object or a thing separable from the contracting subject. Rather, governance
+decrees a new type of subject, the programmed subject, capable of
+self-objectifi cation. The programmed worker is an ‘ objective subject ’ , motivated
+entirely by calculated interest, and capable of adapting in real time
+to variations in the environment in order to meet the objectives assigned to
+him or her. In legal terms, this new fi gure of the worker impacts upon the
+176 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+35 See below, ch 13 , p 251–53. 36 L Lerouge , La Reconnaissance d ’ un droit àla sant émentale au travail ( Paris , LGDJ ,
+2005 ) ; N Maggi-Germain , ‘ Le stress au travail ’( 2003 ) Revue de jurisprudence sociale 3, 191 ;
+P Adam , ‘ La prise en compte des risques psychosociaux par le droit du travail fran ç ais ’( 2008 )
+Droit ouvrier, 313 . 37 These risks have not disappeared; far from it. They take on new forms — asbestos, exposure
+to new chemical products, radiation, etc. See A Thébaud-Mony, V Daubas-Letourneux,
+N Frigul and P Jobin (eds), Sant éau travail. Approches critiques ( Paris , La D é couverte , 2012 )
+357 .
+38 cf an overview of the situation at the time, in the joint report by the WHO and the
+ILO, Gaston Harnoisand Phyllis Gabriel , Mental Health at Work: Impact, Issues and Good
+Practices ( Geneva , WHO/ILO , 2000 ) 66 . Predictably, these reports were concerned above all
+to produce quantifi ed indicators on these new risks (see P Nasseand P L é geron , Rapport sur
+
+binding force of the contract. The employment contract made it possible to
+treat work as a negotiable object, of which the counterpart was the employee
+’ s qualifi cation as a contracting party. This role provided a minimum of
+legal protection: for example, employers cannot reduce employees ’salary
+or increase their working hours without their consent. This ‘ rigidity ’of the
+work contract — not to be confused with the ‘ rigidity ’of the law, the target
+of neoliberalism ’ s obsessive attacks — puts a brake on the logics of governance,
+which require ‘ a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour
+markets responsive to economic change, with a view to achieving the objectives
+defi ned ’(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 145).
+In other words, governance requires what today we would call ‘ fl exibility ’
+(a term borrowed from materials science). ‘ Flexible ’arrangements were previously
+confi ned to legal provisions and collective agreements, but recent
+reforms in France have extended such arrangements to individual employment
+contracts through the possibility of company-wide agreements on lowering
+salaries or on enforced geographical mobility. 35 A new type of legal
+tie emerges here, which, unlike the contract, does not bear on a given quantity
+of work, measured in time and money, but on the very person of the
+worker. Since the worker ’ s ‘ reactivity ’and ‘ fl exibility ’are incompatible with
+the binding force of the contract, governance will necessarily strip workers
+of some of the attributes of a contracting party.
+This programmed working subject runs a risk unknown to the previous
+industrial revolutions: that of harm to mental health. 36 Under Fordism,
+workers might lose their physical health and sometimes their lives, 37 their
+work was back-breaking and dull, but they did not risk losing their minds.
+A legal analysis can outline quite precisely the emergence and spread of this
+new risk. Its fi rst appearance in the French Labour Code was in 1991, and
+mental and behavioural disturbances were fi rst added to the ILO ’ s list of
+occupational diseases in 2010. Reports by occupational health doctors of
+cases of suicide in the workplace began trickling in towards the end of the
+1990s. 38 The numbers have increased in recent years, not only in Europe
+The Eclipse of the Subject 177
+
+la d é termination, la mesure et le suivi des risques psychosociaux au travail ( Paris, Ministry
+of Labour , 2008 ), 42 ; M Gollacand M Bodier(ed), Mesurer les facteurs psycho-sociaux de
+risque au travail pour les ma î triser, Report to the Minister of Labour( Paris , La Documentation
+fran ç aise , 2011 ) .
+39 An episode which received widespread media coverage — but which is by no means an
+isolated case — was the suicide of 11 young employees, in the fi rst quarter of 2010 alone, on
+the production site of the largest manufacturer of electronic components, Foxconn Technology
+(which is under contract from fi rms like Apple, Dell and Nokia). 40 Y Clot , Le Travail àc œ ur. Pour en fi nir avec les risques psychosociaux ( Paris ,
+La D é couverte , 2010 ) 190 . 41 On the fi rst uses of these psycho-technical methods, see S Weil , ‘ La rationalisation ’[1937]
+in La Condition ouvri è re ( Paris , Gallimard , 1964 ) 314 – 15 .
+
+(especially France), but also in emerging countries which have imported
+the same methods of work organisation (especially China). 39 As well as suicide,
+increased stress and nervous breakdowns attributable to working conditions
+have been observed. 40 But these new forms of dehumanisation of work
+are not inevitable, nor are they the price to pay for technological progress.
+On the contrary, the new information technologies can be an amazing liberatory
+force, when they allow people to concentrate on the most creative part
+of their work, that is, the most poietic part, in the original sense of the term.
+Our new computing tools could be the chance to wrest work from the stultifying
+activity it was under Taylorism. But this will be impossible as long as
+one conceives of the worker as a kind of computer rather than conceiving of
+the computer as a way of humanising work. The worker under governance
+by numbers is enclosed in a form of virtual reality, obliged to react in ‘ real
+time ’ , and assessed by performance indicators divorced from the conditions
+under which the work is actually carried out. Work then ceases to be the
+most signifi cant way in which human beings realise their involvement with
+the world ’ s realities, one which allows them to exercise — and not lose —
+their minds. Instead, workers are trapped into a system of signifi ers without
+signifi eds, in which performance requirements keep rising, while at the same
+time any real capacity to act is confi scated, that is, the capacity to act freely
+on the basis of one ’ s own professional experience and within a work community
+united around the task to be carried out. Taylorism was based on
+the total subordination of workers to a rationalised system imposed from
+outside, whereas today the organisation of work is predicated on programming.
+Through massive use of psycho-technical methods, the disciplinary
+practices previously applied to the body are now applied to the worker ’ s
+mind. 41 Work outcomes are mostly measured by numerical indicators, but
+subjects need to be implicated in the process in order to react positively to
+the discrepancies revealed between their own performance and the assigned
+objectives. This is why in large organisations a particular management technique
+quickly became standard practice: the individual performance review.
+Robert Castel was the fi rst to point out that this extension of corporal disciplinary
+techniques to the mind was something new. He called it ‘ therapy for
+178 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+42 R Castel , La Gestion des risques. De l ’ anti-psychiatrie àl ’ apr è s- psychanalyse ( Paris ,
+Minuit , 1981 ) 169 . 43 cf M Th é venet , Maurice, C Dejoux and E Marbot (eds), Fonctions RH. Politiques, m é tiers
+et outils des ressources humaines ( Paris , Pearson Education , 2009 ) 107 and 110 . On the role of
+this performance appraisal in the history of management theories, see L Cadin , F Gu é rinand
+F Pigeyre , Gestion des ressources humaines, 3rd ed ( Paris , Dunod , 2007 ) , ch 7: ‘ L ’ appr é ciation ’ .
+And on the origins of the idea of ‘ maximum mobilisation ’ , see below, ch 13, p 248. 44 cf M Gauchetand G Swain , La Pratique de l ’ esprit humain. L ’ institution asiliaire et la
+r é volution d é mocratique ( Paris , Gallimard , 1980 ) 406 . 45 cf C Dejours , L ’ É valuation du travail àl ’ é preuve du r é el. Critique des fondements de
+l ’ é valuation ( Paris , INRA , 2003 ) 82 . 46 From a similar perspective, see the research carried out under the aegis of the charity
+ATD-Quart-Monde , Le Croisement des savoirs et des pratiques ( Paris , É ditions de l ’ Atelier ,
+2009 ) 703 . 47 Jub é , Droit social et normalisation comptable ( ch 5fn 17), 558ff.
+
+normal people ’ .
+42 The idea, in management theory, is to enable employees
+
+‘ to give meaning to their work and understand their place in the company ’ ,
+and to enable the company ‘ to mobilise people ’ s maximum commitment,
+as the source of their performance ’ .
+43 This is simply the good old judicial
+and religious technique of confession, repackaged for economic ends. But
+whereas confession instated the subject as capable of assuming his or her
+conduct, today ’ s psycho-therapeutic interview does the opposite, generating
+dependence and disempowerment, as Gladys Swain and Marcel Gauchet
+have shown, 44 as well as a number of medically recognised pathogenic
+effects. 45
+The conversion of the subject into a reactive object characterises
+governance by numbers more generally. In the fi ght against poverty, which
+we mentioned above, local knowledge and skills are never mobilised to
+conceive, but only to implement plans. Local researchers are not involved
+in formulating the issues raised by the everyday living conditions of their
+fellow citizens, but to fi ll out questionnaires conceived in advance by
+international organisations. Yet the situation is not so different in France.
+‘ The poor ’ — unlike the rich — are endlessly profi led as objects of the social
+sciences, and as objective — but also, it is hoped, reactive — subjects of ‘ Back
+to work ’programmes. It is only quite exceptionally that they are genuinely
+treated as subjects, and consulted on their own experience of poverty. 46
+Moreover, the changes occurring in the legal subject do not only affect
+natural persons, but also companies. They too are treated as ‘ objective subjects
+’ , and are enslaved to the programmed signals they receive to achieve
+certain results. Today, every company over a certain size is both a subject
+operating on the markets and an object of market speculation. The company
+yoked to short-term fi nancial goals experiences the entropic time of
+the disorganisation of organisations. 47 Its visions for the future collapse,
+as does the quality of its products. Although still an economic subject, it is
+pre-programmed, vulnerable to becoming a dispossessed object, in the most
+The Eclipse of the Subject 179
+
+48 Law No 98-546 of 2 July 1998. Commercial Code, Art L. 225 – 07ff. See, in favour of this
+reform, R Mortier , Le Rachat par la soci é t éde ses droits sociaux ( Paris , Dalloz-Sirey , 2003 )
+708 .
+49 cf J-L Gr é au , L ’ Avenir du capitalisme ( Paris , Gallimard , 2005 ) 174ff . 50 On the buyback by EADS (Airbus) of 15 %of its capital for its shareholders,
+see M Orange , ‘ EADS: le grand pillage par les actionnaires ’ , Mediapart, 23 March 2013 . 51 ‘ The proportion of cashfl ow used for repurchases has almost doubled over the last decade
+while it ’ s slipped for capital investments [ … ]. Buybacks have helped fuel one of the strongest
+rallies of the past 50 years as stocks with the most repurchases gained more than 300 percent
+since March 2009. Now, with returns slowing, investors say executives risk snuffi ng out the
+bull market unless they start plowing money into their businesses. ’ L Wangand C Bost , ‘ S & P
+500 Companies Spend 95 %of Profi ts on Buybacks ’ , Payouts, Bloomberg , 6 October 2014 . 52 Eurozone countries in receipt of EU bailouts were obliged to agree to the Troika ’ s conditions
+(the ‘ Troika ’comprises the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central
+Bank). The Troika ’ s operations were unreservedly criticised by the European Parliament in two
+resolutions voted on 13 March 2014: one, the Inquiry into the role and activities of the Troika
+(P7_TA-PROV(2014)0239), and the other, the Inquiry into the social aspects of the role and
+operations of the Troika (P7_TA-PROV(2014)0240) in the Eurozone countries (Reports available
+at www.europarl.europa.eu ).
+
+technical sense of the term. This possibility of dispossession was enacted
+in France by the Loi Strauss-Kahn of 2 July 1998, 48 which destroyed a
+centuries-old mainstay of commercial law, that a company is forbidden to
+buy back its own shares. The justifi cation for shareholders ’receipt of dividends
+was that they helped fi nance the joint stock company ’ s operations.
+But when companies are allowed to buy their own shares to increase their
+value artifi cially for their shareholders, the bond of obligation is inverted,
+with shareholders getting richer at the expense of the company. 49 The 1998
+reform was a gift from heaven for a certain category of shareholders who
+are indifferent to a company ’ s entrepreneurial capacity (its long-term economic
+viability) and who want only to rake in the maximum amount of
+money in the shortest possible time. 50 In other words, this change in legislation
+privileged speculation over investment. And after the fi nancial crisis
+of 2008, when central banks fl ooded the fi nancial markets with liquidity in
+the hope of restarting the economy, a large part of these sums was used by
+multinationals to repurchase their own stock in order to enrich their shareholders,
+making even Bloomberg raise an eyebrow. 51
+Lastly, governance by numbers transforms states themselves — those sovereign
+subjects par excellence— into ‘ objective subjects ’which no longer
+act freely, but react to numerical signals. The imposition on countries of
+structural adjustment programmes, supposedly to bring their budgets back
+into balance, embodies this loss of sovereignty. In the Eurozone countries
+in particular, these programmes have subjected the work of nations to
+the same sort of ‘ scientifi c rationality ’as work in a business, according to
+principles which are never open to political debate. The activities of the
+Troika 52 in Europe have shown that if one thinks that managing a country
+and managing a company are one and the same thing, then it is not only
+conceivable but even essential, if a fi nancial crisis strikes, to put the country
+180 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+53 Including some of its territory, after some German Members of Parliament called on
+Greece to sell off a number of its islands ( cf Le Figaro É conomie, 5 March 2010). 54 When in 2011 the Prime Minister of Greece, Georges Papandreou, envisaged holding
+a referendum on the austerity plan imposed on Greece until 2020 by the other Eurozone
+countries, he was forced to resign under pressure from Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel
+( cf S Halimi , ‘ Juntes civiles ’ , Le Monde diplomatique, December 2011 ). 55 P Valé ry , ‘ Le bilan de l ’ intelligence ’[1935] in Œ uvres, Vol 1( Paris , Gallimard, coll
+‘ Bibliothè que de la Plé iade ’ , 1957 ) 1076 . 56 cf A Gourevitch , É conomie sovié tique. Autopsie d ’ un systè me ( Paris , Hatier , 1992 ) 13ff . 57 On the increase in these frauds, see FC Fang , RG Steenand A Casadevall , ‘ Misconduct
+accounts for the majority of retracted scientifi c publications ’( 2013 ) 109 Proceedings of the
+National Academy of Science 42, 17028 – 33 www.pnas . org/content/109/42/17028.full;
+JPA Ioannidis , ‘ Why Most Published Research Findings Are False ’ , PLOS Medicine, 30 August
+2005(DOI: 10.1371/journal. pmed.0020124).
+
+into receivership and liquidate its assets, 53 since one cannot sack its inhabitants.
+Within that logic, turning to the electorate will naturally be deemed as
+‘ irresponsible ’as letting a bankrupt entrepreneur continue to run his or her
+business. 54 Governance by numbers thus dispossesses not only companies
+and individuals, but entire populations.
+And since human beings are not computers, and can never be entirely
+programmed or objectifi ed, they are either driven to mental illness and suicide,
+or they start playing the numbers game themselves, with their own
+ends in view. Unlike machines, they are quick to understand that satisfying
+indicators is an irrebuttable presumption with respect to meeting objectives.
+Val é ry remarked that ‘ Monitoring an action anyway corrupts and perverts
+it [ … ], for whenever an action is monitored, the subject ’ s deeper motivation
+ceases to be the performance of the action itself, but rather the control,
+and how to get round it ’ .
+55 Soviet planning provides an endless supply
+of examples in which, in order to meet the objective of, say, doubling the
+length of material produced annually by a particular factory, exactly the
+same length was produced — but at half the width. Or, in order to meet
+the quotas for the production of boots, but without an adequate supply
+of leather, factories simply produced boots in cardboard or only in small
+sizes. 56 Or again, in order to boost the bibliometric scores used to measure
+performance, researchers can make four articles out of what they would
+otherwise have published as a single article, or even cheat with their sources
+and falsify the results. 57 Receptionists who know that their performance is
+measured by the number of inquirers whose calls are not answered before
+the fi fth ring, will programme their phones to pick up automatically after
+the third ring, thus improving their scores under ‘ quality of service provided
+’ . And, regarding the implementation of structural adjustment programmes
+in Africa, Ousmane O Sidib é , with his excellent knowledge of
+facts on the ground in Mali, recounts how the international funders fi rst
+had a large number of teachers fi red, as dictated by the programme, but
+then conditioned their aid upon improving schooling rates (as a component
+The Law’s Resistance 181
+
+58 OO Sidibé , ‘ Les indicateurs de performance amé liorent-ils l ’ effi cacitéde l ’ aide au
+dé veloppement ? ’( Nantes , IEA , 2012 ) , available online in French and English on the site of
+the Institute of Advanced Studies, Nantes: www.iea-nantes.fr/fr/actus/nouvelles/actualite_69 . 59 A Zinoviev , The yawning heights, tr G Clough( New York City , Random House, c 1979 ) .
+
+of the human development indicator). 58 In order to successfully square this
+circle, the African countries in question hastily recruited a mass of unqualifi
+ed and underpaid stand-in teachers, who dispensed their classes without
+pedagogical aids in warehouses fi lled to bursting. ‘ Progress ’ , in the terms of
+the indicator, was thus achieved at the cost of impoverished education for
+generations of children and adolescents. Deprived of their traditional modes
+of transmission of knowledge and culture, these groups had no access to a
+school system worthy of the name either. When meeting targets becomes the
+goal of a piece of work, not only does this defl ect from productive activity
+(more and more time is spent entering the required performance information),
+but it also disconnects the work from the realities of the world, and
+replaces these with a numerical image constructed dogmatically.
+
+IV. THE LAW ’ S RESISTANCE
+
+While the law is overrun by governance by numbers, and lends it normative
+force, it also resists this invasion, and has developed what can be called
+immune defences against it. These defences are structural, because the legal
+form, a tripartite arrangement, cannot be totally absorbed into the universe of
+governance by numbers, which has a binary structure. As long as the law
+resists, it carves out areas of freedom, however reduced these may be.
+Alexander Zinoviev has shown how this works, in terms which refl ect his
+thinking as a mathematician and a logician. In his work The Yawning Heights,
+he imagines a conversation in a text, A, which can be characterised as hostile
+to the status quo (an ‘ anti- ’text) when a system of legal rules, B, is applied to it.
+The author N of text A is liable for prosecution. But, Zinoviev asks,
+
+How characterise a text ‘ N affi rms that A ’ , from the viewpoint of B ?Might it
+itself be ‘ anti- ’ ?Alright, but then how about the prosecutor when he accuses me
+in court of maintaining that ‘ N affi rms that A ’ ?Will he be accused in turn of
+expressing a text which is ‘ anti- ’ ?Why not ?What formal criterion can distinguish
+between us ?True, I used the term ‘ affi rm ’once, and the prosecutor will use it
+twice. If this were made into law, all I would have to do is declare in advance the
+following text: ‘ M affi rms that N affi rms that A ’[ … ] Draw up a code B which
+contains laws by which texts may be qualifi ed as ‘ anti- ’ , and I bet you that, using
+any ‘ anti- ’text, I will be able to write a text which cannot be judged ‘ anti- ’by B,
+but which will anyway be understood as the text of an opponent. All legality is a
+priori the possibility of its infringement. 59
+
+Communist society obeyed its own normative system which was not, according
+to Zinoviev, a system of law: ‘ the norms governing people ’ s conduct do
+182 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+60 A Zinoviev , The reality of communism ( University of Michigan , Schocken Books , 1984 ) . 61 cf N Rose , ‘ Governing by Numbers : Figuring out Democracy ’( 1991 ) 16 Accounting
+Organizations and Society, 1991 7 , 673 – 92 . For another interpretation, and a much more
+critical stance, see K Prewitt , ‘ Public Statistics and Democratic Politics ’ , in W Alonsoand
+P Starr(eds), The Politics of Numbers ( New York City , Russel Sage Foundation , 1987 ) 261 – 74 . 62 FA Hayek , The Political Order of a Free People [1979] in Law, Legislation and Liberty
+( London , Routledge , 1998 (1982)) 128ff . 63 ibid, Epilogue, ‘ The three sources of human values ’ , 165. 64 ibid, Ch 18. 65 C Gini , ‘ The scientifi c basis of fascism ’( 1927 ) 42 Political Science Quarterly 1, 99 – 115 ;
+see also J-G Pr é vost , ‘ Une pathologie politique. Corrado Gini et la critique de la d é mocratie
+lib é rale ’ ( 2001 ) Revue fran ç aise d ’ histoire des id é es politiques 13, 105 – 28 .
+
+not correspond to legal principles, but rather to reason of State, the interests
+of particular groups or of the whole country. Power is the only judge ’ .
+60
+The law ’ s formalism resisted the fundamental principles and the very nature
+of power in a Communist society. When the regime of governance by numbers
+contradicts too starkly democratic principles and fundamental rights,
+not least the right to physical and mental integrity, a legal analysis can precisely
+lay bare this form of resistance.
+
+V. THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE
+
+Despite the optimistic claims of those who identify democracy with quantifi
+cation, 61 when governance by numbers takes hold it limits democracy.
+This is an essential part of Hayek ’ s thought, when — in the footsteps of
+Lenin — he calls for a ‘ dethroning of politics ’ .
+62 In the eyes of neoliberals,
+citizens should not meddle with the organisation of the economy because:
+
+To them [an ever-increasing part of the population of the Western World] the
+market economy is largely incomprehensible; they have never practised the
+rules on which it rests, and its results seem to them irrational and immoral. [ … ]
+Their demand for a just distribution in which organized power is to be used to
+allocate to each what he deserves, is thus strictly an atavism, based on primordial
+emotions. 63
+
+This is why Hayek ’ s battle-cry was ‘ The last struggle against arbitrary
+power is still ahead of us — the fi ght against socialism and for the abolition
+of all coercive power to direct individual efforts and deliberately to distribute
+its results ’ .
+64 This idea that economic calculations must be removed
+from democratic inspection was also advocated by the great Italian statistician
+active under Mussolini, Corrado Gini, the inventor of the coeffi cient
+which bears his name. The title of an article of his leaves no room for doubt:
+‘ The Scientifi c Basis of Fascism ’ .
+65 And one could also mention General
+Pinochet ’ s Chile, where Hayek ’ s neoliberal theses were fi rst tried out on a
+large scale, eliciting his remark that ‘ Personally, I prefer a liberal dictatorship
+The Democratic Principle 183
+
+66 Cited by C Laval, ‘ D é mocratie et n é olib é ralisme ’ , FSU Research Institute http://institut.
+fsu.fr/Democratie-et-neoliberalisme-par.html ; see also P Dardotand C Laval , La Nouvelle
+Raison du monde. Essai sur la soci é t én é olib é rale, ( Paris , La D é couverte , 2009 ) . 67 German Constitutional Court ( Bundesverfassungsgericht), 2 BvE 2/08, Judgement of the
+Second Senate of 30 June 2009. D é cision 2 BvE 2/08 du 30 juin 2009. 68 ibid, §213. 69 ibid, §270.
+
+to a democratic government from which all liberalism is absent ’ .
+66 And
+
+indeed, a shining example of the thriving association between the market
+economy and dictatorship is today ’ s China, which — in a particularly apt
+formulation — calls itself a ‘ democratic dictatorship ’ . The First Article of
+its Constitution states that ‘ The People ’ s Republic of China is a Socialist
+State of popular democratic dictatorship governed by the working class and
+founded on the alliance between workers and peasants ’ .
+As for the EU, although it restricts democracy in a much less brutal way,
+it nevertheless shields its economic policies from electoral scrutiny by putting
+power into the hands of non-elected bodies. And for the last 20 years
+or so, it has become something of a habit for EU leaders to respect electoral
+results only if they correspond to what they hoped for: the rejection of the
+Maastricht Treaty by Danish voters, of the Treaty of Nice by the Irish, of the
+Constitutional Treaty by French, Dutch and Irish voters, and of the Treaty
+of Lisbon by the Irish (twice) was simply passed over. In addition, when the
+Greek Prime Minister declared he would call a referendum, in 2011, on the
+structural adjustment programme designed by the Troika to reduce Greece ’ s
+public defi cit in accordance with certain numerical objectives, he was forbidden
+to do so.
+These infringements of national sovereignty come on top of the restrictions
+already required of Member States by the construction of the
+European Union. In themselves, these restrictions of national sovereignty
+pose no threat to democracy as long as European institutions can guarantee
+the same democratic process as national ones. But this is far from being
+the case. The ‘ democratic defi cit ’of the EU has become so fl agrant that it
+even drove the German Constitutional Court to issue a word of warning
+in its decision concerning the ratifi cation of the Treaty of Lisbon. 67 Its
+decision — largely ignored or caricatured in France — is in fact a legal turning
+point in the history of the construction of the EU, and is worth dwelling on.
+The Court began by recalling what is meant by a democracy. It is a regime in
+which ‘ the exercise of public authority is subject to the majority principle of
+regularly forming accountable governments and an unhindered opposition,
+which has an opportunity to come into power ’ .
+68 In a democracy,
+
+the people must be able to determine government and legislation in free and equal
+elections. This core content may be complemented by plebiscitary voting on factual
+issues [ … ]. In a democracy, the decision of the people is the focal point of the
+formation and retention of political power: Every democratic government knows
+the fear of losing power by being voted out of offi ce. 69
+184 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+70 ibid, §288. 71 ibid, §289.
+
+Having spelt out its understanding of democracy, the Court compares it
+with the workings of the European Union. There are two points in its lapidary
+conclusion. First, that in the current state of European Treaties the
+European Parliament is unable to guarantee democratic representation of
+European citizens:
+
+Measured against the requirements of a Constitutional State, even after the entry
+into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union lacks a political decisionmaking
+body based on equal elections by all citizens of the Union and able to uniformly
+represent the will of the people. In addition, connected with this fi rst failing
+is the lack of a system of organisation of political rule in which the expression of a
+European majority leads to the formation of the government sustained by free and
+equal electoral decisions and thus enabling genuine competition, transparent for citizens,
+between government and opposition. Even in the new wording of Article 14.2
+of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (TEU), and contrary to the claim that
+Article 10.1 seems to make through its wording, the European Parliament is not a
+representative body of a sovereign European people.
+
+Representation of citizens in the European Parliament is not linked to the equality
+of citizens of the Union (Article 9 Lisbon TEU), but to nationality, a criterion that
+is actually an absolutely prohibited distinction for the European Union.
+
+(2 BvE 2/08, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009, § §280, 287)
+
+As though to add salt to the wound, the German Constitutional Court also
+dwells upon the fact that the Lisbon Treaty itself violates the grand principles
+it proclaims at the outset, such as equality between European citizens (TEU,
+Article 9) or the claim that ‘ the functioning of the Union shall be founded
+on representative democracy ’(TEU, Article 10.1). So if one introduced the
+principle of ‘ one man one vote ’into elections for the European Parliament,
+would that wipe out the democratic defi cit ?No, says the German Constitutional
+Court, because — and this is the Court ’ s second point — the European
+Parliament ’ s legislative power would still be shared with bodies which have
+no democratic legitimacy, namely the Council, the Commission and the
+Court of Justice of the European Union. The latter, says the German Court
+in passing, obeys the principle of ‘ one state, one judge ’ , and is thus ‘ under
+the determining infl uence of Member States ’ .
+70 In other words, it neither
+represents European citizens, nor is it independent of governments. Which is
+why the Constitutional Court concludes that the democratic defi cit can neither
+be offset, nor justifi ed, by other provisions in the Treaty: ‘ The defi cit of
+European public authority that exists when measured against requirements
+of democracy in states cannot be compensated for by other provisions of the
+Treaty of Lisbon and, to that extent, it cannot be justifi ed ’ .
+71
+The Employer’s Liability for Health and Safety 185
+
+72 316th Session of the Governing Body, 1 – 16 November 2012, §784-1003. 73 European Framework Agreement on stress at work, transposed into French law by the
+National Cross-Industry Agreement of 2 July 2008. See C Sachs-Durand , ‘ La transposition
+dans les É tats membres de l ’ accord conclu par les partenaires sociaux au sein de l ’ Union europ
+é enne sur le stress au travail ’( 2009 ) Revue de droit de travait ( RDT) , 243 . 74 French Labour Code, Art 1152-1ff. 75 Soc 28 February 2002, No 99-17201; see M Babin , Sant éet s é curit éau travail ( Paris ,
+Lamy , 2011 ) 324 ; see also the special section ‘ Protection de la sant éet charge de travail ’published
+in Droit social in July – August 2011, with the contributions of M Blatman, E Lafuma,
+M Gr é vy, P Lokiec, L Gamet and J-D Combrexelle. 76 Soc 28 Nov. 2007 (Groupe Mornay) No 06-21964, Bull civ V, No 201 (the implementation
+of annual appraisal interviews, which, in their methods and signifi cance, ‘ were clearly liable
+to generate psychological pressure which would have repercussions on working conditions ’ ). 77 A qualifi cation recognised by the law of 9 November 2010, French Labour Code, Art
+L.4121-1 and D.4121-25. On this notion of ‘ arduousness ’ , see ‘ Les n é gociations professionnelles
+relatives àla p é nibilit éau travail ’( 2006 ) Droit social, 834 ; see also B Lardy-P é lissier ,
+‘ La p é nibilit é : au-del àde l ’ imm é diat et du quantifi able ’( 2011 ) Revue de droit du travail, 160 . 78 French Labour Code, Art L 3221-4. See E Lafuma , ‘ Charge de travail et repr é sentants du
+personnel ’( 2012 ) Droit social, 758 . 79 H Bouchet, La Cybersurveillance sur les lieux de travail, Report by the CNIL, March
+2004, available on the website of the Documentation fran ç aise; J-E Ray , Le Droit du travail à
+l ’ é preuve des NTIC ( Paris , Liaisons , 2001 ) 247 ; and, by the same author, ‘ Droit du travail et
+TIC ’(2007) Droit social, 140 and 275; L Flament , ‘ La biom é trie dans l ’ entreprise ’ , Semaine
+juridique, é dition S( 2006 ) 1468 ; A de Senga , ‘ Autorisations uniques de la CNIL de mise en
+œ uvre de dispositifs biom é triques ’( 2007 ) Droit ouvrier, 31 ; E Supiot , Les Tests g é n é tiques.
+Contribution àune é tude juridique ( thesis , Paris-I , 2012 ) 298ff(Marseille, Presses universitaires
+d ’ Aix-Marseille, 2015).
+
+The democratic principle ’ s resistance through law is also evident at an
+international level, on social-democratic issues. For example, the ILO Committee
+on Freedom of Association condemned the fact that Trade Unions
+were excluded from consultations when the European Troika imposed a
+programmed reduction of social rights on the Greek government. 72
+
+VI. THE EMPLOYER ’ S LIABILITY FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY
+
+The new risks to mental health which governance by numbers generates
+in the workplace have been addressed — without much effect to date — in
+negotiations between the social partners, under the title of ‘ stress at work ’ ,
+73
+and through legislative action around ‘ psychological harassment ’ .
+74 But, in
+France, case law is what has really entrenched the employer ’ s responsibility
+for achieving results ( l ’ obligation de s é curit éde r é sultat) in the domain of
+health and safety, 75 and has led to restrictions on the use of new management
+techniques in companies. 76 New notions, implying a qualitative approach
+to work, have emerged in this context: the ‘ hardhip ’( la p é nibilit é ) 77 and
+the ‘ physical or mental burden ’( la charge physique ou nerveuse) of work. 78
+More generally, the use of new digital and biological technologies to check
+up on and observe employees has been contained by legislation and case
+law. 79 The Cour de Cassation has also set limits on the proliferating use
+186 The Limits of Governance by Numbers
+
+80 P Waquet , ‘ Les objectifs ’( 2001 ) Droit social, 120 ; S Vernac , ‘ L ’ é valuation des salari é s en
+droit du travail ’( 2005 ) Recueil Dalloz, Chronique, 924. 81 Soc 10 November 2009, Association Salon Vacances Loisirs, No 07-45321 (2001) Droit
+social, 109, obs C Rad é . 82 Soc 5 March 2008, Snecma, No 06-45888, Droit social 2008, 605, note P Chaumette. 83 Soc 27 March 2013, No 11-26539 P, Hewlett-Packard, France. 84 Tribunal de Grande Instance, Lyon, 4 September 2012, No 11/05300, Semaine sociale
+Lamy, 10 September 2012, 1550, 15.
+
+of new objectives-based management and evaluation techniques in companies.
+80 It validated, for example, the idea that psychological harassment
+could be inherent to certain management methods, independently of any
+intention to harm. 81 And it gave the judge the right to suspend ways of
+organising work which were likely to compromise the mental health of
+employees. 82 More recently, it criticised a certain practice of ranking, in
+which assessors divide the staff into graded groups, each group containing
+a predetermined percentage of employees. 83 Some employees are thus
+inevitably downgraded, whatever the quality of their work. In the words
+of the Court, ‘ A system of assessment based on pre-set quotas, even if they
+are meant to be only indicative, in order to divide employees into different
+groups, necessarily implies using criteria which are unrelated to the evaluation
+of the employee ’ s professional skills ’ .
+A ruling by the Tribunal de grande instance in Lyon in 2012 84 illustrates
+how the notion of the employer ’ s obligations regarding employees ’health
+and safety can be invoked to resist new managerial techniques. The ruling
+prevented a bank from introducing a staff performance management system
+based on benchmarks. The constant assessment of employees was to have
+been organised as follows:
+
+Every branch [ … ] has its performances analysed by comparison, and hence in
+competition, with the performances of other branches; within, and independently
+of, each branch, the performance of each employee is examined in relation to
+the performance of the other employees; no objective is imposed offi cially on the
+branches or the employees, except that of doing better than the others; no one
+can know at the end of any given day whether he or she has worked well or not,
+because the assessed quality of his work will depend primarily on the results of
+the others; in such a system, one starts from zero again every day, which creates
+a permanent state of stress, especially since computers allow everyone to follow,
+from any terminal, the live performance of every member of the sales team for the
+whole bank.
+
+The health and safety inspector ’ s report was ratifi ed by the Court, which
+concluded that this sort of system was likely to have the following effects:
+
+— the infringement of dignity, since employees are permanently devalued
+in order to generate ongoing competition between them.
+— a feeling of instability because employees cannot situate themselves in
+relation to annual targets since one ’ s personal results are conditioned
+by those of all the others.
+The Employer’s Liability for Health and Safety 187
+
+85 European Committee of Social Rights, GENOP-DEI and ADEDY v Greece, Collective
+Complaints Nos 65/2011 and 66/2011.
+
+— a constant sense of guilt because of the individual ’ s responsibility in the
+results of the group.
+— a feeling of shame because one has privileged selling a product over
+advising the client.
+— a pernicious encouragement to break the rules in order to boost the
+fi gures.
+— increased occurrences of physical and mental disturbances among
+employees.
+
+The bank ’ s defence was that it had intended to set up a ‘ pscyho-social risks
+observatory ’ , a free helpline, and a ‘ work quality ’action plan. This argument
+was dismissed by the Court, which observed that such measures, aimed
+at dealing after the fact with foreseeable hazards which had already materialised,
+did not meet the employer ’ s obligations to achieve results regarding
+employees ’health and safety. It accordingly forbade the company from
+introducing this way of organising work. This judgment now forms part
+of the Cour de Cassation ’ s case law, and it enables judges to ban modes of
+organisation or assessment of work which it considers dangerous.
+Since health protection has always been the backbone of social legislation,
+it is hardly surprising that the resistance of the law to the penetration of governance
+by numbers should express itself most forcefully in this area. This
+resistance has a particularly powerful purchase because it obliges the issue of
+the organisation of work to be situated once again as an issue of social justice,
+whereas the Fordist compromise had precisely excluded it. Historically,
+social legislation developed in concentric circles around measures to protect
+the bodies of women and children — the core physical resources of the nation.
+Today, a similar movement could be generated to take measures to protect
+the nation ’ s core intellectual resources. Already the resistance of the law to
+governance by numbers has surfaced in fi elds other than physical protection.
+For example, in October 2012, certain measures taken by the Greek government,
+under pressure from the European Troika, were condemned by the
+European Committee of Social Rights (the body which monitors compliance
+with the Council of Europe ’ s Social Charter). The Committee stated that
+
+a greater employment fl exibility in order to combat unemployment and encourage
+employers to take on staff, should not result in depriving broad categories
+of employees, particularly those who have not had a stable job for long, of their
+fundamental rights under labour law, which protect them from arbitrary decisions
+by their employers and from fl uctuating economic circumstances. 85
+
+But the immune defences mobilised by the law in order to resist governance
+by numbers lead to a profound transformation of the legal order itself.
+As we shall see in the following chapter, the law is forced to adapt in order
+to survive.
+1 Engels, Anti-D ü hring (1878), part III, Ch 5. 2 ‘ Hujus studii du æsunt positiones, publicum et privatum. Publicum ius est quod ad statum
+rei roman æspectat. Privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem ’ , A Watson (ed), Latin text eds
+T Mommsenand P Kr ü ger , The Digest of Justinian ( Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania
+Press , 1985 ) 1, 1, § 2 . 3 See on this point Pierre Legendre ’ s remarks in Le d é sir politique de Dieu. Essai sur les
+montages de l ’ É tat et du Droit, 2nd edn (Paris, Fayard [1988], 2005) 237f. For the gradual
+
+10
+
+The Withering-Away of the State
+
+The State is not ‘ abolished ’ ; it dies out. 1
+
+THE REGIME OF governance by numbers dismantles the legal order
+most effectively through its subordination of the public sphere to
+private interests. Since calculations of individual utility are the lynchpin
+of this type of governance, the only heteronomous rules admitted as
+legitimate are, at best — in the case of ordoliberalism — those which ensure
+that calculations are dependable: the rules of private law. Any intrusion by
+the state into the sphere of these computations in the name of the ‘ general
+interest ’is immediately considered suspect. This inversion of the hierarchy
+between public and private is the outcome of a long history which started
+with expelling the res publica from the sphere of the sacred and replacing it
+with a purely technicist conception of norms.
+
+I. THE SACRED NATURE OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE
+
+Contrary to what one might imagine, the public – private distinction does
+not originate with the Enlightenment, but comes down to us from the very
+matrix of both continental law and common law traditions, the Code of
+Justinian ( Corpus iuris civilis). In the Code ’ s best-known formulation,
+penned by Ulpian, ‘ there are two branches [ positiones] of legal study: public
+and private law. Public law is that which respects the establishment [ statum]
+of the Roman commonwealth, private law that which respects individuals ’
+interests ’ .
+2 Today this distinction is understood as an opposition between
+two bodies of rules (as the translation by ‘ branches ’suggests), whereas at
+stake are actually different positions of the same corpus of rules. 3 The body
+The Sacred Nature of the Public Sphere 189
+
+abandonment of the notion of ‘ position ’in favour of ‘ opposition ’between public and private,
+see G Chevrier , ‘ Remarques sur l ’ introduction et les vicissitudes de la distinction du “ jus privatum
+”et du “ jus publicum ”dans les œ uvres des anciens juristes fran ç ais ’( 1952 ) Archives de
+philosophie du droit, 5 – 77 .
+4 See Legendre, ibid. 5 ‘ some matters being of public, others of private interest. Public law covers sacred things,
+the priesthood, and offi ces of the state ’ . ( ‘ Sunt enim qu æ dam publice utilia, qu æ dam privatim.
+Publicum jus in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit ’ ), Digest, op. cit. ch 2, n 23. 6 We should therefore attribute the criticisms made by certain French politicians of Art 6
+of the new Tunisian constitution to ignorance of their own constitutional roots. Article 6 guarantees
+at once religion, the protection of the sacred, freedom of conscience and belief, and
+freedom of worship.
+
+of law ( corpus iuris) can link two different positions because the mutual
+adjustment of private interests in the horizontal plane and the stability
+( status) of public institutions in the vertical one are interdependent: the
+former depends on the latter. In other words, the res publica must stand tall
+if relations between individuals are to be governed by the rule of law and
+not by the ‘ law ’of the strongest. The subordination of the private to the
+public realm is what makes legal systems intelligible and dependable.
+This institutional confi guration is the West ’ s response to an anthropological
+dilemma confronted by all human civilisations. In their vital need
+to metabolise society ’ s potential for violence, they refer power to an origin
+which both legitimates and limits it. 4 The containment of individual interests
+necessarily depends on the establishment of a res publica, which is the
+bearer of what Ulpian calls ‘ sacred things ’ .
+5 Today we would call the latter
+the ‘ founding prohibitions ’in which each legal system expresses its own
+particular axiological principles. The reference to the sacred, understood in
+these terms, has in no way disappeared from our own founding texts. It is
+present in the 1789 Declaration in its proclamation of the ‘ natural, sacred
+and inalienable rights of man ’ , and the ‘ inviolable and sacred ’right to property.
+And it was solemnly reaffi rmed at the end of the Second World War in
+the Preamble to the French Constitution of 1946, which provides that ‘ each
+human being, without distinction of race, religion or creed, possesses sacred
+and inalienable rights ’ . This same sacred character is also implicitly affi rmed
+by the declared intangibility of certain constitutional principles. For example,
+in Germany ’ s Basic Law, Article 79 places the principle of dignity, and
+the federal, democratic and social nature of the state, beyond the reach of the
+constituants. 6 This articulation of the sphere of the general interest with
+that of individual interests has underpinned legal systems as varied as those
+of Classical Rome, the monarchies of the Ancien R é gime, nation states and
+colonial empires. Over the last 200 years, it has expanded spectacularly
+successful across the whole world, in step with Western domination, and has
+190 The Withering-Away of the State
+
+7 See L Vandermeersch , ‘ Ritualisme et juridisme ’in É tudes sinologiques ( Paris , PUF , 1994 )
+209f .
+8 See Le Chemin du rite. Autour de l ’ œ uvre de Michel Cartry (Paris, F é lin, 2010) (esp the
+contribution of A Adler: ‘ Logique sacrifi cielle et ordre politique: le statut de la personne du chef
+en relation avec son statut de sacrifi ant ’149 – 68). 9 For the former, see J-M Modrzejewski , ‘ Tora et Nomos ’ ,in Un peuple de philosophes.
+Aux origines de la condition juive ( Paris, Fayard , 2011 ) 193f . 10 See A Pichot Pure Society: From Darwin to Hitle ( London/New York City , Verso , 2009 )
+and his Aux origines des th é ories raciales. De la Bible àDarwin (Paris, Flammarion, 2008). 11 Nazi Primer, quoted by H Arendt , The Origins of Totalitarianism ( London , Allen &
+Unwin , 1967 ) 350 . 12 Quoted by Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (ibid) 357.
+
+forced onto the defensive other ways of civilising power, such as Asian 7 and
+African 8 ritualism, or Jewish 9 and Muslim religious legalism.
+The modern state is thus heir to ‘ the establishment [ statum] of the Roman
+res publica’ , which it fi gures as an immortal being capable of ensuring
+respect for ‘ self-evident ’truths and ‘ unalienable and sacred rights, ’and of
+giving lasting continuity to a people over the generations. However, a whole
+swathe of Western thought since the Enlightenment has sought to eradicate
+the dogmatic dimension of this institutional confi guration, and to found the
+legal order on ‘ laws of nature ’ . Consideration of ‘ sacred things ’has been
+relegated to the private sphere of ‘ religious feeling ’ , leaving a purely instrumental
+conception of the law.
+
+II. THE ‘ SCIENTIFIC ’GOVERNMENT OF HUMAN BEINGS
+
+The totalitarian regimes which fl ourished in the twentieth century were
+the fi rst to claim that they had freed the law, and state institutions, from
+any trace of metaphysics. They claimed to anchor them in the ‘ true laws ’
+discovered by racial biology or scientifi c socialism. From this scientistic perspective,
+relations between individuals are not subordinated to a public law
+which is itself grounded in ‘ sacred things ’ , but are dictated by a truth inherent
+in the power relations between races or classes.
+Nazism, for example, in its pursuit of the advent of a ‘ master race ’destined
+to dominate all others, referred to laws derived from the biology of its
+time. 10 ‘ We shape the life of our people and our legislation in accordance
+with the verdicts of genetics ’ , the Hitler Youth Manual proclaimed. 11 For
+Hitler, ‘ The State is only the means to an end. The end is: conservation of
+the race ’ .
+12 Law is here entirely confl ated with the will of the strongest or,
+in Goering ’ s hedonist version, ‘ Recht ist das, was uns gef ä llt’( ‘ Law is what
+it pleases us to dispose ’ ). Instead of simply obeying laws as laid down, the
+‘ healthy ’citizen ’ s duty was to examine and even anticipate the will of the
+F ü hrer, who set the goals to be attained rather than the rules to be observed.
+The ‘Scientifi c’ Government of Human Beings 191
+
+13 According to the views Hitler expounded in a speech held in Weimar in July 1936, the
+Party ’ s task was to govern and to legislate, while that of the state was to administer. But this
+formal distinction had no real practical purchase, because the Party controlled everything at all
+levels ( cf E Fraenkel , The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship ( Oxford,
+Oxford University Press 1941, reprint Clark, New-Jersey, Lawbook Exchange , 2006 ) XV . 14 Decree of 28 February 1933, suspending the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
+Weimar Constitution. 15 Schmitt, who had no time for the concept of ‘ rule of law ’( Etat de droit), attempted to
+accommodate the Nazi regime ’ s concern for respectability by forging the concept of German
+Rule of Law of Adolf Hitler ( cf M Stolleis , ‘ Que signifi ait la querelle autour de l ’ É tat de droit
+sous le Troisi è me Reich ? ’in O Jouanjan(ed) Figures de l ’ É tat de droit ( Strasbourg, Presses
+universitaires Strasbourg , 2001 ) 378 ). 16 cf E Fraenkel (n 13) 9 – 56; W Ebenstein , The Nazi State ( New York City , Farrare &
+Rinehart , 1943 ) 3f ; M Stolleis , The Law under the Swastika. Studies on Legal history in Nazi
+Germany ( Chicago , University of Chicago Press , 1998 ) 263 ; O Jouanjan , ‘ Prendre le discours
+juridique nazi au s é rieux ? ’( 2003 ) 1 Revue interdisciplinaire d ’ é tudes juridiques, 70, 1 – 23 ;
+‘ Qu ’ est-ce qu ’ un discours ‘ juridique ’nazi ? ’(2014) 1 Le D é bat 178, 160 – 77. 17 F Engels , Herr Eugen D ü hring ’ s revolution in science (anti-D ü hring), tr E Burns , ed CP
+Dutt( New York City , International Publishers, c 1939 ) .
+
+The Single Party made sure that no one could ignore the F ü hrer ’ s will, and
+the state was simply a tool at his disposal. 13 Loyalty to a person thus supplanted
+obedience to the law. From this perspective, it was logical that the
+National Socialist regime ’ s only constitution should be martial law. 14 This
+transformation of a state of exception into the very foundation of the legal
+order corresponded to Carl Schmitt ’ s theories, 15 which disregard whether
+political power is bound by a founding legal rule or not, and thus refuse to
+distinguish between a totalitarian state and a state governed by the rule of
+law. 16 This stance is of the same order as the refusal to distinguish between
+reason and madness, and the totalitarian state is indeed a state of madness,
+as writers as divergent as Orwell and Ionesco have shown.
+For the Marxist-Leninist totalitarian regime, the true laws of history
+would bring about a society without class and without law, as a result of
+the transformation of the society ’ s economic base. Since ‘ bourgeois ’laws
+were simply there to serve class domination, it was imperative, in order to
+hasten this historical change, to make the legal form itself wither away, and
+to eliminate all legal guarantees that might hinder the advent of the scientifi c
+government of human beings. This vision of a world purged of the political
+in favour of the technical was dear to the fathers of Marxism. Already for
+Engels, once the proletarian revolution was achieved,
+
+State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfl
+uous. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things,
+and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not ‘ abolished ’ .
+It dies out. 17
+
+The Maoist regime took this further than most, especially during the Cultural
+Revolution. And many of its former followers have now quite naturally
+turned up among the theorists of anarcho-capitalist ‘ deregulation ’ , in China
+and the West alike.
+192 The Withering-Away of the State
+
+18 On the post-war rehabilitation of dogma, see my Spirit of Philadelphia. Social Justice vs
+the Total Market, tr S Brown( London/ New York City , Verso , 2012 ) . 19 D Hume , Treatise on Human Nature, Section VI, ‘ Some Farther Refl ections Concerning
+Justice and Injustice ’in Philosphical Works ( Edinburgh , 1826 ) II, 302 . 20 See FA Hayek , Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles
+of Justice and Political Economy, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice ( Chicago , University
+of Chicago Press , 1973 ) .
+
+However, seeking to base a political regime on science is perfectly illusory.
+The system of law underlies scientifi c research, and not the other way
+round. Without a legal basis, which endows science with value, and protects
+it, it cannot develop freely. Indeed, nowhere is it more threatened than in a
+system founded on an offi cial ‘ scientifi c ’truth. The regimes which, over the
+last 100 years, have claimed to rest on scientifi c foundations (racial biology
+or scientifi c socialism, for instance) are also those which have muzzled
+scientifi c endeavour by forbidding any research which might contradict
+them. This is an interesting lesson because it proves that science cannot
+ground itself. Moreover, human laws always end up getting the better of the
+pseudo-scientifi c ones to which these political regimes refer. Western nations
+were obliged to accept the categorical imperative of respect for human dignity,
+after the Second World War, as the basis on which they would agree
+to collaborate in the establishment of a new worldwide legal order which
+could further social justice. 18 This entailed the proclamation of a ‘ new generation
+’of human rights — economic, social and cultural. Since these needed
+state intervention for their implementation, the Western European social
+state underwent a period of unprecedented growth.
+However, this imperative that economic transactions should work
+towards social justice did not survive the upheavals of the last three decades.
+The neo-conservative revolution brought back a belief in the existence
+of super-human forces — market forces this time — capable of generating a
+self-regulating ‘ spontaneous order ’ . Centuries previously, Hume likewise
+thought he had discovered the ultimate grounds on which law and morals
+could be based. In his Treatise Of Human Nature (1740) — whose sub-title
+clearly conveys its scientifi c pretentions: ‘ Being An Attempt to introduce
+the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects ’ — he identifi ed
+‘ three fundamental laws of nature ’on which the government of human societies
+should be based: ‘ We have now run over the three fundamental laws
+of nature, that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent,
+and of the performance of promises. It is on the strict observance of those
+three laws, that the peace and security of human society entirely depend;
+nor is there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among
+men, where these are neglected ’ .
+19 Unsurprisingly, Hayek referred to these
+laws two centuries later, in his affi rmation of the existence of a spontaneous
+order of the market, and in order to combat the ‘ mirage of social justice ’ .
+20
+The Public–Private Hierarchy Overturned 193
+
+21 FA Hayek , Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of
+Justice and Political Economy, Volume 1: Rules and Order ( Chicago , University of Chicago
+Press , 1973 ) . 22 Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice (n 20), p 112.
+
+The three laws in question belong to private law: property rights; the freedom
+to contract; and contractual liability. If the market order is to be extended
+over the whole globe, then private law, which is the expression of these ‘ fundamental
+laws of nature ’ , will take precedence over public law. As previously
+in the relation between human law and divine law, public law becomes
+simply an ‘ organisational law ’ , a necessary evil whose role is to ‘ reinforce ’ ,
+and certainly not obstruct, the action of the Invisible Hand of the Market. 21
+That is the fate reserved for the law in the global market order.
+
+III. THE PUBLIC – PRIVATE HIERARCHY OVERTURNED
+
+This is the ideology which has carried the day since the 1980s. Economic
+and social rights are decried as false rights, and the privatisation of the
+institutions of the welfare state tops national and international political
+agendas. The utopia of a worldwide legal order which would no longer be
+a patchwork of states but rather a great ‘ Open Society ’peopled by clouds
+of contracting particles pursuing their private interests, has given rise to a
+fi nancial, technological and economic space which disregards national frontiers.
+The abolition of barriers to the free circulation of goods and capital,
+along with the new information and communication technologies, has
+struck hard at the sovereignty of states and crippled their legislative power.
+According to Hayek, ‘ the only ties which hold the whole of a Great Society
+together are purely economic [ … ] it is the … “ cash-nexus ”which holds the
+Great Society together, [and] the great ideal of the unity of mankind in the
+last resort depends on the relations between the parts being governed by
+the striving for the better satisfaction of their material needs ’ .
+22 No longer,
+then, should individual interests be subordinated to the general good, but
+on the contrary, the state should be transformed into a means of maximising
+one ’ s individual utilities. As regards the law, this inversion of the public –
+private hierarchy brings with it a movement of privatisation of the power
+to make binding legal rules. This movement is a consequence of the way
+the public sphere has been squeezed out in favour of the private sector, as a
+direct result of awarding contracts for public initiative to private operators.
+This trend affects not only the services provided by the social state, but also
+sovereign prerogatives such as justice (with the rise in arbitration) or prison
+management. In the United States, the most radical proponents of this
+approach seek to ‘ starve the beast ’ , a strategy which Grover Norquist, the
+fi gurehead of the fi ght against tax, has described in his particularly colourful
+194 The Withering-Away of the State
+
+23 E Kilgore , ‘ Starving the Beast ’ Blueprint Magazine, 30 June 2003 . 24 cf D Friedman , The Machinery of Freedom (Chicago, Open Court, 1973) . And Robert
+Nozick ’ s most moderate version , Anarchy, State and Utopia ( New York City , Basic Books ,
+1974 ) . Compare Pierre Clastres ’ s arguments, using ethnographic data from Amazonian societies,
+in La soci é t écontre l ’ É tat (Paris, Minuit, 1974). 25 F Fukuyama , The End of History and the Last Man ( New York City, Harper Perennial ,
+1993 ) . 26 See above, ch 8 , p 157. 27 Case C-41/90 H ö fner and Elser ECR [1991] I-01979, 21 . Case C-244/94 F é d é ration franç
+aise des soci é t é s d’assurance ECR [1995] I-4013, 14 ; Case C-67/96 Albany, [ 1999 ] I-05751,
+77 . VS Hennion-Moreau , ‘ La notion d ’ entreprise en droit social communautaire ’( 2001 ) Droit
+Social 957 . 28 H ö fner and Elser (ibid), 21 – 24. 29 For example, the employment relationship is indissociably an economic and a social relation,
+in which the employee is both its subject and its object.
+
+style as the goal of ‘ cutting government in half in 25 years, to get it down to
+the size where we can drown it in the bathtub ’ .
+23 Prior to the emergence of
+this powerful political movement, theoretical writings from the most diverse
+quarters had already defended the idea of a society in which the unwieldy
+and oppressive fi gure of the state had been done away with. 24 The current
+neoliberal avatar of the prophecy of the ‘ withering-away of the state ’is true
+to the West ’ s eschatological vision of history, of which Marxism is just one
+competing version. That is why the collapse of the Soviet Union, while it
+clearly demonstrated the inanity of believing in ‘ laws of history ’ , was nevertheless
+interpreted as the sign of the universal and lasting triumph of market
+forces, that is, again, as an expression of the enduring laws of history, and
+even, for the most enthusiastic, as the ‘ end of History ’ .
+25
+These grandiose visions are of course absent from positive law, which
+refl ects, rather, the way governance by numbers has come to pilot whole
+countries. Structural adjustment plans or European monetary governance
+are the most visible agents of this subjugation. 26 Insofar as EU law identifi es
+the general interest of the EU with defence of economic freedoms, it plays a
+key role in inverting the public – private hierarchy. Member States of course
+have a structural role, but it is a subordinate one. EU law is not founded
+on the distinction between public and private, but rather on the distinction
+between the economic (the exclusive domain of EU law) and the social (the
+concern of Member States only). By defi ning an undertaking as ‘ every entity
+engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way
+in which it is fi nanced, ’ 27 the Court of Justice transformed the notion of
+‘ economic activity ’into a dogmatic category embracing any activity which
+can be performed by a private entity, regardless of whether it is operating in
+the private or public sector. 28 The opposition which it established between
+economic rights (universalisable) and social rights (by nature particular) is
+thus entirely ideological. There is no legal bond which is not at once social and
+economic. 29 We must therefore take this opposition for what it really is: not
+a scientifi c fact but a dogmatic construction which implies marginalising the
+The Public–Private Hierarchy Overturned 195
+
+30 Case C-159 and 160/91 Poucet et Pistre ( 1993 ) Droit Social, 488, note P Laigre and obs
+J-J Dupeyroux; Case C-244/94 Coreva ( 1996 ) Droit Social, 82, note P Laigre; Case C-238/94
+Garcia, Droit Social 1996, 707. J-J Dupeyroux ‘ Les exigences de la solidarit é ’( 1990 ) Droit
+social, 741 ; P Rodi è re Trait éde droit social de l’Union europ é enne, 2nd edn( Paris , LGDJ ,
+2014 ) , No 354 – 55, 394 f. 31 Case C-67/96 Albany (n 27) §60f. 32 Case C-438/05, Viking ( ch 7fn 62). 33 P Rodi è re , ‘ Actualit édes solidarit é s sociales en droit europ é en ’in A Supiot(ed).
+La solidarit é . Enqu ê te sur un principe juridique (Paris, Odile Jacob, coll des travaux du Collè ge
+de France, 2015) . 34 C-320/91 Corbeau ECLI:EU:C:1993:198, 865 , note F H amon, quoted §17. The same
+reasoning can be found in the provisions of the TFEU concerning economic services of general
+interest (Art 14; ex-Art 16 TEC). 35 cf É Loquinand S Manciaux , L ’ ordre public et l’arbitrage ( Paris , Lexis Nexis , 2014 ) 258 . 36 cf F Canutand F Gaudu(ed), L ’ ordre public en droit du travail ( Paris , LGDJ , 2007 ) 513 . 37 French Conseil d ’ É tat, Opinion of 22 March 1973 (1973) Droit social 514. 38 French Conseil d ’ É tat, 8 July 1994, CGT, Case No 105471, published in the Rec.
+
+role of the state. For instance, the Court of Justice ruled that the solidarity
+between the different branches of social security was a permissible exception
+to the principles of free competition, but gave the applicability of this exception
+a very restrictive interpretation. 30 Similarly, collective agreements were
+interpreted as restricting competition between the companies which sign
+them, and it is only because they pursue a social policy objective that they
+have escaped being branded as a form of illegal economic collusion. 31 The
+aptly named Viking ruling is particularly instructive in this respect because
+in it the use of fl ags of convenience is analysed as an issue of freedom of
+establishment. The application of the law would thus appear to be a function
+of calculations of individual utility. 32 As Pierre Rodi è re has noted, ‘ For
+the Court, the question is always one of checking whether a restriction of
+economic freedoms may be admitted exceptionally. The baseline is always
+economic freedoms, as enshrined in EU law, from which one may, if it is
+really necessary, grant an exception or an exemption ’ .
+33 The same argument
+turns up in relation to monopolies by public-service enterprises. This sort of
+monopoly is tolerated only insofar as it it necessary to ‘ balance profi table
+sectors with less profi table ones, and hence limit the competition between
+individual enterprises which operate in economically profi table sectors ’ .
+34
+Domestic law is similarly affected by this undermining of the public sphere
+to the benefi t of the private sector. In fi elds as diverse as arbitration 35 and
+collective bargaining, 36 the scope of mandatory rules is increasingly narrow.
+It is worth looking closer at the case of collective bargaining because it
+directly affects the foundations of the social state. Whereas a contract in
+private law cannot prevail over public policy rules, things are less clear-cut
+in labour law, where in France there are two sorts of public policy: there are
+absolutely overriding public policy rules; and there is ‘ social ’public policy,
+which may admit variation by agreement if the conditions agreed are more
+favourable to the employee. 37 In the eyes of the highest French administrative
+court, the Conseil d ’ Etat, this ‘ social ’public policy is a ‘ general principle
+of labour law ’ .
+38 Parliament, in thus empowering trade unions and
+196 The Withering-Away of the State
+
+39 cf A Supiot ‘ Actualit éde Durkheim. Notes sur le n é o-corporatisme en France ’( 1987 )
+Droit et Soci é t é 6, 177 – 99 , which shows that the neo-corporatist tendencies identifi able in
+political science in the 1970s were present also in France (see P Schmitterand G Lehmbuch
+(eds) Trends towards Corporatist Intermediation ( Beverly Hills/London , Sage Publications ,
+1979 ) 328 ). 40 J Barth é l é myand G Cette , Refondation du droit social: concilier protection des travailleurs
+et effi cacitéé conomique, Rapport du Conseil d ’ analyse é conomique( Paris , La Documentation
+fran ç aise , 2010 ) 199 . 41 See above ch 8 .
+
+employers ’associations to impose on employers provisions not already
+contained in laws or regulations, was reintroducing neo-corporatist practices
+in a new guise, whereby intermediate groups could gain a quasilegislative
+power. 39 From the start, then, this ‘ social ’public policy was a
+means of privatising the prerogatives of Parliament. But, initially at least,
+it operated exclusively to improve the welfare conditions of the weaker
+party to the employment contract. It simply completed the public policy
+of France ’ s R é publique sociale, and did not challenge the authority of its
+laws. However, increasingly, labour and management have been authorised
+to waive measures which protect employees in favour of their own
+rules for employment relations. This legal technique has become ever more
+widespread since 1981 (when the fi rst exemptions concerning working
+time were agreed) up to the law of 14 June 2013 (concerning job security),
+which gave substance to a programme drawn up by employers ’organisations
+already in the late 1970s. This programme was called the ‘ contrat
+collectif d ’ entreprise’( ‘ collective company contract ’ ) and involved
+the company ’ s right to abandon its legal obligations — except for a few
+esssential public policy rules — and set itself up as an autonomous legal
+order governed only by the rules of private law. The Barth é l é my-Cette
+Report produced by the French Council for Economic Analysis recently
+unearthed this idea in its recommendations for ‘ refounding labour law ’
+through collective bargaining, which, it maintained, should no longer be
+subordinated to the law or the individual employment contract. 40
+The domination of the private over the public is also an indirect result of
+New Public Management, which aims to apply private-sector management
+methods to the public sector. 41 The idea of subjecting the whole of society
+to a single science of organisations, based on criteria of effi ciency alone, is
+nothing new, if we recall the tenets of the Bolshevik Revolution. This idea
+reappears with the contemporary universe of governance by numbers in
+which the law is no longer conceived as a norm transcending the individual ’ s
+interests, but as an instrument at the latter ’ s disposal. Once individual will
+has been elevated into the necessary and suffi cient condition of the legal
+bond, it follows logically that every person should be able to choose the law
+which suits him or her best (having the law for oneself) and be able to lay it
+down (having oneself as law).
+A Law for Oneself and Oneself as Law 197
+
+42 In law, the for, from the Latin forum, refers to the court competent to judge cases, within
+a particular territory. 43 See HM Watt ‘ Aspects é conomiques du droit international priv é(R é fl exions sur l ’ impact
+de la globalisation é conomique sur les fondements des confl its de lois et de juridictions) ’( 2004 )
+307 Acad é mie de droit international de La Haye, Recueil des cours (Leiden/Boston, Martinus
+Nijhoff, 20050, 383; A Supiot , ‘ Le droit du travail brad ésur le march édes normes ’( 2005 )
+Droit Social 12, 1087f . 44 Case C-212/97 Centros [ 1999 ] ECR I-01459 , concl La Pergola; see above, p 142. 45 See above, p 137. 46 For this opposition, see H Berman , Law and Revolution ( Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
+University Press , 2003 ) Vol II, 19 .
+
+IV. A LAW FOR ONESELF AND ONESELF AS LAW
+
+There are many examples of these two tendencies in law today. The formula
+‘ A law for oneself ’aptly describes the increasing number of cases in
+which people have the right to choose the law to be applied to them, and
+can thus elude the common rule which applies equally to all. Private international
+law has proved to be more than hospitable to this development.
+With the lifting of trade barriers in the free market economy, the freedom
+of contracting parties to choose the law to be applied to them has gained a
+new lease of life. The objective criteria for determining the relevant jurisdiction
+governing a particular legal operation, and the principle that there are
+mandatory rules in force and inexorably applicable in that jurisdiction, have
+limited purchase in a world in which economic operators are free to move
+their products, production sites and profi ts wheresoever they please. The
+old principle of the autonomy of the will, which international private law
+elaborated some 150 years ago, has been resurrected in order to justify an
+international market of legal rules on which different national legislations
+compete like commercial products for the favour of the punter out to get
+the best value for his money. Such legal forum 42 shopping, facilitated by
+the removal of trade barriers, allows private persons to choose the public
+framework most likely to maximise their individual utilities. 43 The Centros
+ruling 44 confi rmed this interpretation of ‘ freedom of establishment ’ , and in
+the social fi eld, the Viking45 and Laval rulings confi rmed a company ’ s right
+to choose the law deemed best to serve its interests, regardless of where its
+operations are located. Flags of convenience have now taken up residence
+on dry land, and the pursuit of private interests clearly overrides respect for
+public policy rules. Such legal forum shopping is of course incompatible
+with a system based on the rule of law, but it has its place in one based on
+rule by laws.
+46 The maxim ‘ no contract without law ’has been turned on its
+head: there is no law without contract, that is, without contracting parties
+who agree to apply whatever law they have chosen. Ultimately, the only
+law which holds is that of the pursuit of individual interest. In the light of
+this trend, one can understand the importance of the theory of the effi cient
+198 The Withering-Away of the State
+
+47 See above, ch 7 , p 134ff. 48 ‘ The German people has splintered into as many mini-States [ … ] as there are individuals ’
+(inner monologue of a driver in Der Himmel ü ber Berlin ( Wings of Desire), a fi lm by Wim
+Wenders, 1987). 49 Laskey v UK,[ 1997 ] 24 EHRR 39 , [1997] ECHR 4 § .43. 50 KA and AD v Belgium (Application Nos 42758/98 45558/99) ECHR, § .84 .
+VM Fabre-Magnan , ‘ Le sadisme n ’ est pas un droit de l’homme ’( 2005 ) Recueil Dalloz, 2973 – 81 ;
+B Edelman , ‘ La Cour europ é enne des droits de l’homme: une juridiction tyrannique ? ’( 2008 )
+Recueil Dalloz, 1946 . 51 cf J de Romilly , La loi dans la pens é e grecque ( Paris , Les Belles Lettres , 2001 ) 146 . 52 Quoted by R Rhees ‘ Wittgenstein ’ s Lectures on Ethics ’( 1965 ) 74 The Philosophical
+Review 1, 25 .
+
+breach of contract, promoted by the economic analysis of law: 47 a promise
+is binding on the person who makes it only if it is in his interests to keep it,
+otherwise he should be free to break it, as long as he compensates the other
+contracting party, who had placed his trust in it. This is the logical conclusion
+of today ’ s rejection of heteronomy, which strips even the spoken word
+of its value as a pledge between people.
+The other tendency may be summarised by the maxim: ‘ Oneself as law ’ .
+It applies to the cases where a private person obtains the right to act as legislator.
+It defi nes a universe in which legal rules fi nd their ultimate source
+in the individual will and every individual is deemed — in the words of the
+fi lmaker Wim Wenders — to be a ‘ mini-state ’ .
+48 Under its infl uence, rules
+which appeared beyond question, such as the fact that violating another person
+’ s physical integrity is unlawful, have been challenged, as the European
+Court of Human Rights ’recent judgments on torture show. In 1997, it had
+ruled that ‘ one of the roles which the State is unquestionably entitled to
+undertake is to seek to regulate, through the operation of the criminal law,
+activities which involve the infl iction of physical harm. This is so whether
+the activities in question occur in the course of sexual conduct or otherwise
+’ .
+49 By 2005, however, it had dismissed this ‘ unquestionable ’principle
+in the case of a woman savagely tortured by her husband and by third parties,
+to whom the husband had offered the spectacle of his wife ’ s torment
+in return for a fee. The ECHR overturned its 1997 ruling in deciding that
+‘ the criminal law could not in principle be applied in the case of consensual
+sexual practices, which are a matter of individual free will ’ .
+50 This conception
+of freedom is poles apart from the Greek ideal handed down to us, in
+which ‘ Freedom is obedience to the law ’ .
+51 To make enjoyment of someone
+else ’ s suffering into the source of a right, and moreover a human right which
+no national law can override, is a perversion of the anthropological function
+of the law. It exalts the omnipotence of the individual will as in Goering ’ s
+defi nition of the law as ‘ what it pleases us to dispose ’( was uns gef ä llt). 52
+Fran ç ois Ost rightly notes that the Sadeian hero ’ s pleasure stems in part
+from the fact that ‘ he substitutes for the common law a law of exception, of
+which he alone is the author, thus depriving his victims of the right to seek
+‘Fearing Neither God Nor Man’: The Unsustainable Society 199
+
+53 F Ost , Sade et la loi ( Paris , O Jacob , 2005 ) 194 . 54 T Sachs(ed) La volont édu salari é ( Paris , Dalloz , 2012 ) 272 ; P Adam , L ’ individualisation du
+droit du travail. Essai sur la r é habilitation juridique du salari é -individu ( Paris , LGDJ , 2005 ) 553 . 55 K L ö with , Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen. Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der
+Geschichtsphilosophie ( 1953 ), in his Sämtliche Schriften 2 (Stuttgart, Metzler Verlag, 1983)
+pp 7–239 .
+
+society ’ s protection ’ .
+53 Instead of channelling human passions and keeping
+
+at bay the darker side of our nature, which lurks within each of us, the law
+here serves to give them free rein. The consent of the workers was used in
+the nineteenth century to justify inhuman working conditions. And social
+law in its entirety was conceived in opposition to the idea that the consent
+of the weak could serve as a justifi cation for the domination of the strong.
+This position is still fi rmly anchored in our labour law, but it is increasingly
+challenged in the name of individual freedoms. 54 Today, it is easier for the
+individual employee ’ s consent to be determinant, even if it deprives him or
+her of the protection of a law or a collective agreement.
+It is noteworthy that none of these perverted uses of the law have lasted
+very long. They led to deadly stalemates and the need for new solutions.
+This is why dogma was reinvested after the Second World War. Pre-war
+scientisms were rejected, and the need to ensure the survival of humankind
+once again prevailed through the recognition that the law is not there to
+pander to the egoism, violence, greed and madness of human beings, but on
+the contrary to channel these and keep their lethal power at bay. We thus
+also have historical reasons for doubting that relations between individuals
+may be ‘ regulated ’without reference to a heteronomous instance able
+to defend the public interest over private ones. The increasing number of
+countries in which the state is non-existent, particularly in Africa and the
+Middle East, are not exactly models of well-ordered societies: one should be
+living in a libertarian paradise, but it can often look like hell on earth. It is
+necessary, time and again, to submit the whims of the strong to something
+which is binding on everyone and which is even stronger than they are, so
+that human society does not degenerate into the law of the jungle.
+
+V. ‘ FEARING NEITHER GOD NOR MAN ’ : THE UNSUSTAINABLE SOCIETY
+
+Any society lacking a heteronomic instance will inevitably collapse into civil
+war. One might dream then of a world held together exclusively by love or
+by calculations of individual interest. But neither of these produces the solidarity
+needed for people to live together in the same society. To mistake this
+dream for a possible reality is a recipe for violence. The promise of just such
+a world, purged of the heteronomy of the law, originates with Christianity,
+and is not found in the other monotheisms. It typifi es a certain philosophy
+of history which has taken many different forms and, as Karl L ö with has
+shown, has theological roots. 55 As so often with Christianity, the seminal
+200 The Withering-Away of the State
+
+56 Epistle to the Galatians, 3:23 – 28 (King James Version). 57 Epistle to the Romans, 7:1. 58 Epistle to the Romans, 13:1.
+
+author here is St Paul. In two famous Epistles, he proclaims the end of the
+epoch of the law and the advent of a time of grace, when all people will
+commune in the same shared faith. The most radical of these writings is the
+Epistle to the Galatians, which was addressed to pious Jews who adhered to
+observance of the Law with a capital ‘ L ’ , the Law of Moses which gives the
+Jewish people its identity and endurance:
+
+But before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which
+should afterwards be revealed.
+
+24 Wherefore the law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we
+might be justifi ed by faith.
+
+25 But after that faith is come, we are no longer under a schoolmaster.
+
+26 For ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus.
+
+27 For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ.
+
+28 There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither
+male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus. 56
+
+Apart from its evident anachronism, this rousing text anticipates both
+globalisation and Simone de Beauvoir. Globalisation: since Christ ’ s message
+is addressed to all human beings without distinction, the differentials
+of nationality ( ‘ There is neither Jew nor Greek ’ ), and of socio-legal status
+( ‘ there is neither bond nor free ’ ) have become irrelevant. And Simone de
+Beauvoir ( ‘ One is not born a woman; one becomes one ’ ): since the difference
+between man and woman, in the same way as the differences between
+nationalities and social ranks, are a legal construction, they are destined to
+disappear and make way for the communion of all humankind. Christian
+communities are meant to embody this ecumenical idea on earth, although
+it will only be realised at the end of time. Until then, the question is: what
+relation should Christians have to the law ?Paul replies in a serener tone,
+in the Epistle to the Romans. He knows — as he explicitly states — that he is
+‘ speak[ing] to them that know the law ’ .
+57 He distinguishes between the contingent
+law imposed by the authorities of the moment — whom one should
+obey, ‘ For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of
+God ’ 58— and the highest law, which is binding on Christians. But this law
+for Christians is not really a law because Paul mentions it only in order to
+announce its dissolution in mutual love:
+
+Owe no man any thing, but to love one another: for he that loveth another hath
+fulfi lled the law.
+
+9 For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not
+steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any
+‘Fearing Neither God Nor Man’: The Unsustainable Society 201
+
+59 Epistle to the Romans, 13:8 – 10. 60 J Taubes , Die Politische Theologie des Paulus (Paderborn, Wilhelm Fink, 1993),
+tr J Taubes ; The Political Theology of Paul, eds A Assmann , Jan A , H Folkers , W Hartwich ,
+and C Schulte , tr D Hollander( Stanford , Stanford University Press , 2004 ) . 61 L Feuerbach , Das Wesen des Christentums (Leipzig, Otto Wiegand, 1841), English tr;
+The essence of Christianity, tr G Eliot , intro W Vondey( New York City , Barnes and Noble
+Books , 2004 ) . 62 P Legendre , L ’ Autre Bible de l’Occident: le Monument romano-canonique. É tude sur
+l ’ architecture dogmatique des soci é t é s’( Paris, Fayard , 2009 ) 582 . 63 cf J Carbonnier , Essais sur les lois ( Paris, Defr é nois , 1979 ) 281ff . 64 Carbonnier (ibid) 295.
+
+other commandment, it is briefl y comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt
+love thy neighbour as thyself.
+
+10 Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore love is the fulfi lling of the law. 59
+
+Of the tomes of glosses this Epistle has generated, we shall only mention
+Jacob Taubes ’ s trenchant observation: Paul never mentions God ’ s love. His
+only commandment is to love one ’ s neighbour.
+60 The Epistle to the Romans
+thus already adumbrates Christianity ’ s secularisation, its transformation
+into a religion of man, as Feuerbach depicted it. 61 Or, to put it more simply:
+from the very start, Christianity prophesises the abolition of law in a society
+exclusively governed by mutual love; that is, it prophesises an end of
+history which will also be the end of the law. This prophecy has had an
+immense infl uence on the history of institutions throughout the Christian
+world, although it took different forms in the West and the East. While
+waiting for the end of days — the eschaton— which was thought to be imminent
+but whose arrival was always deferred, Medieval Europe adopted the
+Code of Justinian, which, as Pierre Legendre has shown, thus became the
+second book, after the Bible. 62 In the sedimentary history of institutions,
+the writings of St Paul re-emerged with new interpretations at the beginning
+of the Early Modern period, giving rise to Protestantism and its doctrine
+of salvation by faith alone. This was the standpoint of the great Protestant
+jurist Carbonnier, who ended his Essays on Laws with a postface entitled ‘ Is
+every law in itself an evil ? ’ .
+63 In it, he says exactly the same thing as St Paul:
+‘ For a people of Saints, the law would have no use ’ .
+64 Since the law is bound
+up with the existence of evil, and laws themselves are a necessary evil, they
+will vanish when evil vanishes.
+This promise of a world purged of the heteronomy of laws took secular
+forms as from the nineteenth century. Fraternity and abundance were no
+longer reserved for another world, but were thought to be imminent for this
+world, where mastery of the laws of nature would lead to the witheringaway
+of the state and of the law. Marx described in the following terms the
+‘ higher phase of communist society ’in which work would no longer be a
+livelihood but a principal vital need:
+
+after the productive forces have increased with the all-round development of the
+individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth fl ow more abundantly — only
+202 The Withering-Away of the State
+
+65 Marx , Critique of the Gotha Programme ( 1875 )Marx/Engels Selected Works (Moscow,
+Progress Publishers, 1970) Vol 3, 13 – 30. 66 Lenin , The State and Revolution. The Marxist Theory of the State &the Tasks of the
+Proletariat in the Revolution ( 1917 )Collected Works, Vol 25, 381 – 492. 67 cf P d ’ Iribarne, Vous serez tous des ma î tres. La grande illusion des temps modernes (Paris,
+Seuil, 1996) 209. 68 On these two schools and on the spread of Buddhism in Asia, see R de Berval (ed),
+Pr é sence du Bouddhisme (Paris, Gallimard, 1987) Part 2, 419 – 702. For a synthetic overview,
+cf J-N Robert, Petite histoire du bouddhisme (Paris, Librio, 2008) 38ff.
+
+then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois law be left behind in its entirety and
+society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according
+to his needs! 65
+
+In order to hasten the realisation of this prophecy, Lenin set about providing
+the ‘ economic basis of the withering-away of the state ’ :
+
+So long as the state exists there is no freedom. When there is freedom, there will be
+no state [ … ] The state will be able to wither away completely when society adopts
+the rule: ‘ From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs ’ , i.e.,
+when people have become so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of
+social intercourse and when their labor has become so productive that they will
+voluntarily work according to their ability. [ … ] Each will take freely ‘ according
+to his needs. 66
+
+The aim of providing the ‘ economic basis of the withering-away of the state ’
+in no way disappeared with the collapse of real communism. The credo
+of an arithmetically produced social harmony re-emerged with neoliberal
+globalisation and libertarian demands, which are two sides — economic and
+cultural — of the same coin. The new prophets again announced the advent
+of a world of abundance in which no one will have to suffer a constraint
+that is not self-imposed, since all will be self-governing. The difference is
+that the Communist prophecy announced the salvation of the wretched of
+the earth, whereas neoliberal eschatology rejects any idea of social justice.
+As Philippe d ’ Iribarne has shown, the modern promise of emancipation is
+not for the weak. On the contrary, it casts into poverty and isolation the
+vast numbers of people who do not manage to assert themselves as masters
+in this universe of generalised competition. 67 Yet despite the considerable
+media resources available to preach the new faith, it is far from certain
+that the majority of people will be lastingly converted to this credo. To
+have any chance of cementing a human community, the message must be
+addressed to all its members, regardless of whether the salvation promised
+is for this world or the next. At any rate, that is the lesson we learn from
+the history of religions. Buddhism could never have taken root as it did in
+the Far East had it not proclaimed the doctrine of mah āy āna, the ‘ Great
+Vehicle ’ , which promises awakening to all beings, unlike h īnay āna, the
+‘ Smaller Vehicle ’ , which is for a small elite only. 68 On a much smaller scale,
+‘Fearing Neither God Nor Man’: The Unsustainable Society 203
+
+69 See C Prudhomme(ed), Les religions dans les soci é t é s coloniales (1850– 1950) in Histoire,
+Monde et Cultures religieuses, March 2013 . 70 cf S Mardin , ‘ The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey ’in ME Marty(ed) Fundamentalism and
+Society ( Chicago, University of Chicago Press , 1993 ) 204 – 33 . 71 cf P Lachaier , C Cl é mentin-Ojha , Divines richesses. Religion et é conomie en monde
+marchand indien ( Paris , É cole Fran ç aise d ’ Extr ê me-Orient , 2008 ) 238 . For the case of P â rs î s,
+see E Kulke , The Parsees in India: A minority as agent of social change ( Munich , Weltforum ,
+1974 ) 300 .
+
+the economic achievements of the Islamic brotherhoods such as the Mourides
+in Africa 69 or the Naqshbandi in Turkey, 70 or of the various minority
+religions in India, 71 are linked to the strong feeling of solidarity between
+their members. Even Protestantism, which Weber considered to be at the
+origin of modern capitalism, does not deny anyone the possibility of salvation,
+and no one can claim to be excluded from it. By contrast, neoliberalism
+inherently excludes any kind of solidarity, in the name of competition
+and selection of the fi ttest. And this, not within small communities, but on
+a global scale. Unlike the prophecies of St Paul, neoliberalism ’ s message
+cannot hope to establish a lasting and shared faith to compensate for the
+abolition of the law. It gives us no future, because no society can survive in
+lawlessness and without shared dogma. In attacking the heteronomy of the
+law, while failing to generate a common conviction that generalised competition
+is for the best and that the resulting inequalities are just, neoliberal
+and libertarian politics cannot but destroy what we call civil society. This
+assertion is based on the concrete historical experience of countries whose
+state system has fallen apart or ceased to fulfi l its function of a third party
+which safeguards individuals ’identity and the binding force of the pledged
+word.
+1 GW Bush, Press conference with Vaclav Havel, Prague, 20 November 2002. Consulted at
+http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato/index.html . 2 C Schmitt , The Concept of the Political, tr G Schwab( Chicago, London , University of
+Chicago Press , 1996 ) . 3 cf his interpretation of the notion of ‘ enemy of the gospel ’ , used by St Paul to refer to the
+unconverted Jews (Romans, 11:28); see J Taubes, La Th é ologie politique de Paul. Schmitt,
+Benjamin, Nietzsche et Freud (ch 10 fn 60) 81. 4 For the political background to Schmitt ’ s constitutional theories, see O Beaud , ‘ Carl
+Schmitt ou le juriste engag é ’ , preface to the French edition of Verfassungslehre, in C Schmitt ,
+Th é orie de la Constitution ( Paris , PUF , 1993 ) 5 – 113 .
+
+11
+
+The Return of ‘ Rule by Men ’
+
+Should Iraqi President Saddam Hussein choose not to disarm,
+the United States will lead a coalition of the willing to disarm him. 1
+
+I
+N THE ABSENCE of a shared, but heteronomous, point of reference,
+human relations will inevitably collapse into the binary logic of ‘ friend ’
+and ‘ enemy ’ , which Carl Schmitt regarded as the essence of the political. 2
+This — unsustainable — situation is precisely what the shrinking of the state
+has generated, and with it the re-emergence of other ways of instituting society
+from the rubble of the reign of the law. In Europe, what has reappeared
+is a particular from of rule by men, namely networks of allegiance.
+
+I. THE BINARY LOGIC OF FRIEND V ENEMY
+
+The works of Carl Schmitt give us some insight into the structural effects
+of ‘ exiting from the law ’ . For Schmitt, it is not the law which, in the last
+instance, binds together human groups, but the capacity to distinguish
+between friend and enemy. In this respect, he is yet another disciple of Saint
+Paul, whose Epistles he pored over at length. However, in his secularisation
+of St Paul ’ s message, he was ahead of his time, and produced an almost structuralist
+defi nition of friendship: political friendship only takes on meaning
+and consistency in the face of an enemy who incarnates and actualises an
+existential threat. 3 Carl Schmitt was here attacking the pacifi st illusions on
+which, in his view, the Weimar Republic and the Society of Nations rested
+(and his anti-Semitism, as well as his support for the National Socialists in
+his theoretical writings, are beyond doubt). 4 In order to survive, a political
+The Binary Logic of Friend v Enemy 205
+
+5 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (n 2) 27. 6 ibid, 28. 7 ibid, 33. 8 ibid, 45. 9 On this point, see C Schmitt , Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der
+Souver ä nit ä t ( Berlin , 1922 , 2nd edn 1934 ) ; tr Political Theology. Four Chapters on the
+Concept of Sovereignty, ed and tr G Schwab (Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1985, 2nd
+edn, 2005).
+
+society must therefore be able to name a common enemy. Schmitt defi nes
+the enemy as the other, the stranger:
+
+But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is suffi cient for his nature
+that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien,
+so that in the extreme case confl icts with him are possible. These confl icts can be
+resolved neither by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgement of
+a disinterested and therefore neutral third party. 5
+
+More often than not, the other and the stranger are one and the same. In
+a normal situation, in which a state ensures social harmony within its own
+frontiers, the enemy is situated beyond its borders, and the recognition of
+a common enemy is what brings into being the community of friends. This
+does not necessarily lead to open confl ict, but supposes its ever-present
+possibility. 6 Human beings therefore come together as a political society
+only under threat of death, since the hostility between friend and enemy is a
+concretely existential question, not one of sympathy or antipathy:
+
+The concepts of friend, enemy and combat thus gain their objective meaning from
+their permanent relation to the real possibility of causing the physical death of
+another person. War derives from enmity, which is the existential negation of
+another being. War is simply the ultimate actualisation of enmity. 7
+
+When the friend / enemy dichotomy is not concentrated at the frontier, but
+becomes active within the state, it is no longer the stranger who is the object
+of this existential negation, but a group of fellow citizens, identifi ed through
+their class, race, religion or opinions. This is when the destabilising threat
+of civil war hangs over the society. The outcome will depend on whether the
+country ’ s leaders are able to impose their will at this decisive point, either by
+reuniting the society in the face of a named external enemy or by offi cially
+designating an internal enemy and managing to eliminate it. 8 For Schmitt,
+the imposition of the leader ’ s will by force is the foundation of every political
+and legal order. 9 This is why Carl Schmitt ’ s thought had such success,
+not only with the Nazis, but more generally and more recently, with all those
+who think law is nothing but an instrument of power. It is in such ‘ exceptional
+circumstances ’ , when the legal order is collapsing or about to collapse
+that its true nature is revealed. At that moment all depends, says Schmitt,
+on the decisions taken by the person who reaffi rms the state ’ s sovereignty
+by placing himself at the limits of the legal order to judge ‘ when it is truly a
+206 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+10 Schmitt, Political Theology (n 9) 6 – 7. 11 ibid. 12 ibid. 13 See particularly his analysis of liberal thought and its tendency to annihilate the political
+in favour of ethics and economics, in Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (n 2) 71. 14 ibid, 27. 15 On these bio-sociological theories, see A Pichot, ‘ Biologie et solidarit é ’ , in A Supiot (ed),
+La Solidarit é (ch 11 fn 33). 16 C Darwin , The Descent of Man, and selection in relation to sex [1871], revised edn
+( New York City , D Appleton and co , 1889 )Part I, 130.
+
+case of an extreme emergency, and [of] how it should be eliminated ’ .
+10 The
+
+law is therefore not founded on some hypothetical basic norm, but on the
+decision taken by someone who manages to impose his will from outside the
+body of laws in force. For Schmitt, this is the only realistic theory possible.
+It parts company both with the legal positivists, who refuse to acknowledge
+this brutal primal scene of the law, and with natural law theorists, who
+attempt to occupy this scene in order to impose their idea of a ‘ higher order ’
+transcending positive law. 11 When they succeed, says Schmitt, their rule is
+absolutely merciless because it claims to speak for all humanity. 12
+These critiques of legal positivism and natural law theory are not unconvincing
+or irrelevant. 13 But the problem is elsewhere and more serious, in
+the fact that Schmitt ’ s legal theory is basically yet another version of social
+darwinism. When Schmitt attributes a determinant role to ‘ the capacity to
+distinguish friend from enemy, ’ 14 and to the ‘ existential negation ’of the
+latter, he is simply positioning himself within a current of thought which
+applies the ideas of natural selection to groups rather than individuals. 15
+Alfred Wallace introduced this approach in 1864 and, in his footsteps,
+Darwin argued that mutual assistance between members of the same group
+(sometimes called ‘ biological altruism ’ ), is an advantage in the competition
+between groups. Darwin explains that:
+
+when two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into competition,
+if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included a great number of
+courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were always ready to warn
+each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would succeed better
+and conquer the other. [ … ] Selfi sh and contentious people will not cohere,
+and without coherence nothing can be effected. A tribe rich in the above qualities
+would spread and be victorious over other tribes: but in the course of time it
+would, judging from all past history, be in its turn overcome by some other tribe
+still more highly endowed. Thus the social and moral qualities would tend slowly
+to advance and be diffused throughout the world. 16
+
+Wallace ’ s and Darwin ’ s theory sought to bring together biology, law and morals.
+But in shifting from the selection of the individual to this bio-sociologism,
+they gave a decisive role to war in the selection of the fi ttest groups.
+The Binary Logic of Friend v Enemy 207
+
+17 In a speech of 30 January 1942, Hitler declared that: ‘ Wir sind uns dabei im klaren
+dar ü ber, da ßder Krieg nur damit enden kann, da ßentweder die arischen V ö lker ausgerottet
+werden, oder da ßdas Judentum aus Europa verschwindet. ’(We should be quite clear about the
+fact that the war can end only in two ways, either the Aryan peoples will be annihilated or the
+Jews of Europe will disappear ’ ). M Domarus , Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen, 1932 – 1945,
+Vol 2, 2( Munich, S ü ddeutscher Verlag , 1965 ) 1828 . 18 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (n 2) 35. 19 ibid, 45ff.
+
+The effects of this move were soon apparent in the First World War,
+which was also the fi rst total war aimed at eradicating the enemy ’ s
+biological resources, and then in the Second World War, which was conceived
+by Hitler as a decisive struggle between the Aryan and the Jewish
+races. 17 Like all the intellectuals of his generation, Carl Schmitt was immersed
+in this scientistic vision of humanity, and profoundly affected by the First
+World War. The cornerstone of his legal theory was the distinction friend /
+enemy, and armed struggle, which he described as the ‘ decisive moment par
+excellence’ .
+18 That is why, among the legal qualifi cations of sovereignty, he
+chose jus belli, the right to declare war, rather than, for example, the role of
+judge or legislator. 19
+The re-emergence of this binary logic of friend / enemy is in fact a symptom
+of an of an institutional crisis which rocks the legal fi eld in much the
+same way as an earthquake shakes a whole building to its foundations: it
+is an acid test of the structure ’ s solidity. We are probably living through a
+crisis of this sort due to globalisation and loss of sovereignty in Europe in
+the face of ‘ market forces ’and competition from emerging countries. No
+sudden collapse, but strong tremors whose recurrence is enough to weaken
+our societies ’legal frameworks. With the inversion of the hierarchy between
+the common good and particular interests, the free circulation of goods
+and capital becomes a means whereby the more powerful can fl out the law
+binding on all. The result is a fracturing of the political community. The
+distinction between friend and enemy begins to take shape within nations,
+and across the political spectrum, with political leaders frantically looking
+round for an internal enemy against whom they can mobilise the maximum
+number of people, in order to preserve or take power. This internal
+enemy is always an ‘ other ’ , whether this is a Muslim (confl ated with an
+Islamist), an immigrant (fi guring as a welfare scrounger), or a member of the
+‘ Cathosphere ’(a blinkered obscurantist). And as the awareness of a common
+law recedes, so public discussion is replaced by a slanging match, and
+reasoned debate is replaced by tactics of disqualifi cation of the opponent.
+The crisis we are living through today is thus, arguably, as much institutional
+as it is economic.
+The criterion friend / enemy has an undeniable heuristic value, since
+it helps us identify and interpret the symptoms of the crisis of legitimacy
+affecting the law. However, it tells us nothing about how this legitimacy
+208 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+20 Schmitt, Political Theology (n 9). 21 P Dac , Pens é es ( Paris, Presses de la Cit é , coll ‘ Pocket ’ , 1972 ) 18 . 22 J-J Rousseau , The Social Contract, tr HJ Tozer( Ware , Wordsworth Editions , 1998 ) , Book 1,
+Ch 3, 8. 23 cf Introduction, p 6–7 and ch 5, p 80–81. 24 cf A Tocqueville, ‘ Of the principal source of belief among democratic nations ’in Democracy
+in America, 7th edn, II, I, Ch 2, tr H Reeves (New York City, Edward Walker, 18470 517. 25 This point is developed in my Homo Juridicus: On the anthropological function of the
+law ( ch 2 , fn 10).
+
+was constructed. Schmitt ’ s phrase, ‘ there must be an established order for
+the legal order to have meaning ’ ,
+20 dodges the issue, which is perhaps best
+summarised in the humourist Pierre Dac ’ s remark that ‘ Order established
+by force is often of the lowest order ’ .
+21 For the problem is not whether
+decisiveness and the use of force can help establish a legal system: no doubt
+about it! Rather, what needs to be understood are the conditions under
+which ‘ strength transforms into right and obedience into duty ’ .
+22 Neither
+willpower, nor decisiveness nor force nor friendship nor love can alone set
+up a sustainable legal order. The permanent state of exception of the Nazi
+regime lasted 12 and not 1,000 years, despite the promises of the F ü hrer.
+A legal order requires more than restoring order, in the military or policing
+sense. Setting up a legal order — in the strong sense of establishing a lasting
+state— implies instituting a society, and one which can endure from generation
+to generation. This process has a subjective dimension, because every
+government needs its citizens to accredit it with serving their best interests. 23
+It is a question of belief, of dogma, of accepting a legal truth as valid for all.
+But this belief is not a private affair; it is a claim enforceable by each and
+every citizen, and guaranteed by a third. The stronger the population ’ s belief
+in the justice of the order established, the less the regime needs to use force
+to keep power.
+This subjective dimension of instituting society is nothing new. Tocqueville
+observed that ‘ without such common belief no society can prosper;
+say, rather, no society can exist ’ .
+24 Nearer to us, Cornelius Castoriadis and
+Pierre Legendre drew attention to this aspect, bringing to it the additional
+insights of psychoanalysis. Peace can only reign in society if interdiction is
+internalised, fi rst and foremost the foundational interdiction of murder. In
+secular societies, it is the role of the law to embody concretely the logic of
+interdiction, so that human beings can together form societies. The anthropological
+function, and structural necessity, of interdiction for the survival
+of the species gives no indication as to the actual prohibitions which any
+given society should observe. 25 This approach is thus entirely different from
+that of natural law, which believes that the laws of nature can be discovered
+rationally and that they should be imposed universally, for example Hume ’ s
+‘ three fundamental laws ’of nature. Grasping the anthropological function
+The Binary Logic of Friend v Enemy 209
+
+26 cf A Supiot , ‘ Le sommeil dogmatique europ é en ’( 2012 ) Revue fran ç aise des affaires
+sociales 1, 185 – 98 , tr ‘ Europe ’ s awakening ’ , in M-A Moreau(ed), B efore and after the
+Economic Crisis, What Implications for the European Social Model ? ( Cheltenham (UK)/
+Northampton (USA) , Edward Edgar Publishing , 2011 ) 292 – 309 . 27 J Somavia , Director-General of the ILO, Preface to the World of Work Report 2008,
+Income Inequalities in the Age of Financial Globalization ( Geneva , ILO , 2008 ) .
+
+of law can help us understand periods of legal crisis, in which there is a loss
+of faith in institutions.
+In the aftermath of the two World Wars, a number of attempts were made
+to establish a new international order based on the rule of law. Organisations
+were commissioned to develop common rules for cultural, economic,
+monetary and welfare issues, in order to lay the legal foundations for a
+just and lasting peace. These projects were gradually abandoned, however,
+after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, and the
+shift to freely fl oating exchange rates. This is when governance by numbers
+took hold, making the market into the sole arbiter of the value of money, of
+nature and of work, on a global scale. This ‘ liquidation ’of monetary, natural
+and human resources has led not only to fi nancial, ecological and social
+catastrophes, but it has also fanned the fl ames of fundamentalisms and of
+violence. Only fervent neoliberals are blind to the scale of these disasters
+and their causes. Neither the collapse of the fi nancial markets in 2008, nor
+the failed goals of ‘ tradeable pollution rights ’ , nor the increase in ecological
+hazards, nor mass pauperisation, nor the multiplication of civil wars seem
+capable of waking them from their dogmatic slumber. 26
+Yet the effects of breaking up the legal frameworks of social justice are
+so well known that we hardly need to dwell on them again: a giddying rise
+in inequalities; widespread casualisation of labour; mass unemployment,
+affecting particularly the young in many countries; new threats to mental
+health at work — and the list goes on. In 2008, the ILO summarised the
+effects of globalisation on working conditions, as part of its annual World
+of Work Report. In its preface, the then Director-General, Juan Somavia,
+outlined the conclusions of the study, which is one of the few precise and
+well-documented analyses of the taboo subject of the social effects of freemarket
+policies:
+
+A comprehensive overview of key factors underlying income inequalities shows
+that these have risen more than can be justifi ed by economic analysis and that
+they entail major social and economic costs. What emerges is an evidence-based
+critique of the way fi nancial globalization has occurred so far.
+
+The fi ndings assembled here provide analytical support to the ILO ’ s view that the
+growth model that led to the fi nancial crisis is not sustainable. It confi rms that a
+rebalancing between economic, social and environmental goals is vital both to
+recovery and also to shaping a fair globalization. 27
+210 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+28 Oxfam International , Even it Up: Time to End Extreme Inequality ( Oxford , January
+2014 ) . On the evolution of inequalities in the long term, see Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First
+Century (ch 7 fn 12). 29 Source: ILO, ‘ Measuring informality: A statistical manual on the informal sector and
+informal employment ’(2013). See, for the case of India, S Routh , Enhancing Capabilities
+through Labour Law: Informal Workers in India ( Abingdon, Routledge , 2014 ) 288 . 30 JD Ostry , A Berg , CG Tsangarides , Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth, International
+Monetary Fund — Research Department , February 2014 , 30 . 31 G Achcar , The People Want. A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising, tr GM
+Goshgarian( Berkeley , LA , University of California Press , 2013 ) .
+
+Since the fi nancial crisis of 2008, the effects of globalisation have not diminished,
+but intensifi ed. Almost half of the world ’ s wealth is now held by only
+one per cent of its population; seven out of 10 people live in countries where
+economic inequality has increased in the last 30 years; the one per cent of
+richest people have seen their income increase between 1980 and 2012, in
+24 out of the 26 countries surveyed; the one per cent of richest people in
+the USA captured 95 per cent of the growth following the fi nancial crisis
+of 2008, that is, since 2009, whereas the 90 per cent of poorest people got
+poorer. 28 These soaring income inequalities go together with the disintegration
+of employment protection. At the top of the scale, a small number of
+high-level managers obtain both job security and a share of the profi ts, while
+at the bottom of the scale casualised labour, and what is called the ‘ informal ’
+sector, represent 51 per cent of the workforce in Brazil, and 85 per cent in
+India. 29 In France, the last ‘ Working Conditions ’survey (2005) showed that
+27 per cent of the working population were in unstable employment, and of
+these, 17 per cent were in precarious work, and 10 per cent in employment
+which was likely to disappear.
+To this astronomical rise in inequalities, and increasingly precarious living
+conditions, should be added the multiplication of wars and violence.
+The media invariably attribute these to religious or particularist factors,
+whereas the deeper causes can be found in the fact that, as the ILO Constitution
+states, ‘ lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social
+justice ’ . Even the IMF ’ s economists have acknowledged, in a recent report,
+that increased inequality has negative effects on economic prosperity. 30 The
+correlation between lack of social justice and violence applies to the Arab
+uprisings, as Gilbert Achcar has shown, 31 but equally to the disintegration
+of the social bond in the poorest districts of Western cities. Throughout the
+world, mass unemployment and poverty are the seedbed of dislocated family
+structures, delinquency and religious or identity-based ‘ struggles for
+recognition ’ .
+The loss of trust in the fi gure of the third, its discredit, is what has caused
+the binary confrontation of friend and enemy to reappear. With no common
+referent to ensure a place for each recognised by all, society risks breaking
+up into antagonistic groups. However, contrary to what Carl Schmitt
+Ties of Allegiance 211
+
+32 This notion of ‘ coalition of the willing ’ , coined by the then United States Defence Secretary
+Colin Powell in 2001, was described by the US President George W Bush in the preamble
+to the Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002 ( http://www.state.
+gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf ). It later became the rallying cry of the 49 countries
+which supported the American invasion of Iraq. 33 M Bloch , Feudal Society [1939], 2 vols ( Chicago , Chicago University Press , 1961 ) .
+
+argues, this sort of crisis does not necessarily issue in the declaration of a
+state of exception. The collapse of one legal structure can lead to the reactivation
+of another, which had existed before it and returns in new forms.
+
+II. TIES OF ALLEGIANCE
+
+A striking change took place around the beginning of the twenty-fi rst
+century in the way the United States sought to refashion the world order.
+As the only imperial power for a time, it chose to neglect international
+organisations in favour of ad hoc groupings, which assembled as many
+countries as were willing to rally round a particular enterprise. In 2003, for
+instance, the invasion of Iraq, in contempt of international law, took the
+form of a ‘ coalition of the willing ’ .
+32 The countries of the ‘ New Europe ’ ,
+which in the meantime had aligned themselves with the US in becoming
+die-hard neoliberals, were eager to join its ranks. This war, then, effectively
+resuscitated the feudal stipulation that vassals come to the monarch ’ s aid
+to assist him in his military campaigns, bringing all their equipment, and a
+number of men proportional to their rank and quality. 33 President Bush ’ s
+coalition was thus swelled by 7,100 British, 700 Poles, 97 Czechs and 29
+Ukrainians. This type of coalition would shortly become the standard way
+of treating international crises, in fl agrant violation of United Nations rules.
+A similar turning point occurred in the fi eld of international trade rules.
+The World Trade Organisation, the last major post-war global organisation
+to be set up, was commissioned in 1994 to come up with a multilateral
+framework for the application of its general rules on tarifs and trade. It was
+already equipped with a dispute settlement mechanism. Although it achieved
+a lot, it failed to extend free trade regulation agreements multilaterally, particularly
+in the service sector and in agriculture. Concurrently, bilateral free
+trade agreements were fl ourishing. These favour larger trading blocks such
+as the US or the EU, which can dictate their conditions to smaller countries
+and demand their allegiance, in return for opening up their large markets to
+them. The two sides are obviously much more equally matched in the case
+of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (the TIPP), which is
+under negotiation at present between the European Commission and the
+United States. But the fears are the same: that the Treaty will legally seal
+Europe ’ s infeudalisation to American norms in the fi elds of work and welfare,
+tax and the environment.
+212 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+34 See above, ch 3 , p 58ff. 35 See above, ch 6 , p 103ff. 36 cf on this point, Chevrier, ‘ Remarques ’( ch 10fn 3) 16ff. 37 See above, ch 3 , p 53ff.
+
+This abandonment of international organisations in favour of coalitions,
+and concomitantly the decline in international rules in favour of unequal
+treaties are the symptom of a more general transformation of modes of
+government. There are not an infi nite variety of types of legal structure,
+even if each one has hundreds of different versions. Schematically, following
+a distinction found in Chinese political philosophy, one can distinguish
+‘ government by laws ’from ‘ government by men ’ .
+34 In a system of
+government by laws, the condition of freedom for each member of the society
+is that all should be subject to general and abstract laws. This is a structure
+which rests on the institution of a third which secures the legal order
+and transcends the will and interests of individuals. The third enables the
+two legal planes which the opening of the Digest so carefully distinguishes
+to be articulated: the rules which cannot be the object of a calculation of
+individual interest, which belong to the realm of deliberation and the law;
+and the rules which fall within the realm of calculations of individual interest
+and therefore within that of negotiation and the contract. 35 Their articulation
+is what allows men and things to be treated as abstract, exchangeable,
+entities in a contract, whose value can be determined by a shared monetary
+standard. Their qualitative differences, meanwhile, are protected by the law,
+as the domain of the incalculable. In a system of government by men, by
+contrast, each person is placed within a network of relations of dependence.
+The key idea is not that all should be subject to the same abstract law, but
+that each person should behave according to his or her place in the network.
+Each must serve the interests of those on whom he depends, and be able to
+count on the loyalty of those who depend on him. Legal subjects, in their
+mutual relations as well as in their relations to things, are consequently
+defi ned in terms of ties of allegiance, not in terms of subjection to the same
+impersonal law. The fi gure of the third does not disappear altogether in
+these forms of government, but functions as a guarantor of personal ties,
+not of impersonal law. This mode of government can do without the fi gure
+of the sovereign state. No third instance lays claim to the domain of the
+incalculable, necessarily merges with that of the calculable, breaking down
+the distinctions between public and private. 36
+Several forms of government by men have existed historically. There
+is ritualism, which we mentioned briefl y earlier, 37 and also feudalism,
+which played a much greater role in European history. Few political systems
+have really managed to fuse government by laws and government by
+men in the way Imperial China did (which perhaps explains in part the
+Empire ’ s exceptional longevity). More frequently, one of the models has
+Ties of Allegiance 213
+
+38 On this revival, see the summaries of the lectures of Anne Cheng in the Annuaire du
+Coll è ge de France, 2010 to 2013. See also J Zhe , ‘ Confucius, les lib é raux et le Parti. Le renouveau
+du confucianisme politique ’ , La Vie des id é es, May 2005 , 9 – 20 ; and by the same author,
+‘ L ’ é thique confuc é enne du travail et l ’ esprit du capitalisme àla chinoise ’ , Revue du MAUSS
+permanente, 30 March 2012. 39 cf C Le Bartand F Rangeon , ‘ Le n é o-f é odalisme politique: l ’ é ternel retour des fi efs ’ , in
+J Lefebvre(ed), L ’ Hypoth è se du n é o-f é odalisme. Le droit àune nouvelle crois é e des chemins
+( Paris , PUF , 2006 ) 115 – 36 . 40 See C Chavapneuxand T Philipponnat , Lacapture ( Paris , La D é couverte , 2014 ) . 41 See in particular Supiot, ‘ Actualit éde Durkheim ’( ch 10fn 39) 177 – 99; ‘ La contractualisation
+de la soci é t é ’in Y Michaux(ed), Universit éde tous les savoirs, Vol 2 , Qu ’ est-ce que
+l ’ humain ? (Paris, O Jacob, 2000) 156 – 67 ; P Legendre , ‘ Remarques sur la re-f é odalisation de
+la France ’in É tudes en l ’ honneur de Georges Dupuis ( Paris , LGDJ , 1997 ) 201 – 11(reprinted
+in Nomenclator. Sur la question dogmatique en Occident, II (Paris, Fayard, 2006) 271ff);
+J Lefebvre (ed), L ’ Hypoth è se du n é o-f é odalisme. Le droit àune nouvelle crois é e des Chemins
+(n 39).
+
+predominated, but elements of the other are always also present. When the
+power of one falters, the other makes a comeback, since it has never completely
+disappeared from institutional memory. We can see this in twelfth to
+thirteenth-century Europe, when the decline of feudalism and its mode of
+government by men was contemporaneous with the rise of sovereign states
+founded on the reign of the law. We have reason to believe that the period
+introduced by this change is now coming to an end. With today ’ s crisis in
+the legal order, and the blind alley of governance by numbers, government
+by men has resurfaced in novel forms. Thus contemporary China attempts
+to circumvent the need for a genuine rule of law by reactivating Confucian
+ideals of social harmony. 38 In Europe, as government by law recedes, so
+feudal legal structures resurface. This is because, where security is no longer
+assured by a law which applies equally to all, people take refuge in ties of
+allegiance which they forge with others. Ties of allegiance give access to
+protection from those more powerful than oneself, and to the support of
+those weaker than oneself, whom in turn one protects. These bonds emerge
+in real life before they appear in law. They have taken root in the most disparate
+areas, for example, in drug-dealing networks, civil war zones, but
+also political parties; 39 in the relations between the political world and the
+world of fi nance, 40 and between subisdiaries or sub-contracted companies
+and their principals. In its sabotage of the heteronomy of the law, governance
+by numbers does not bring about the reign of unfettered individual
+autonomy, but rather promotes networks of allegiance which erode the distinction
+between private and public interests. This outcome is nothing if
+not ironic, in the light of the goal sought: the quest for the most impersonal
+guarantees of power (numbers) has ultimately caused a mode of government
+to reappear and take centre stage that is based on ties of allegiance.
+When these networks of allegiance permeate the whole of society, we can
+say, as several authors have argued, that the legal structures of feudalism
+have made a comeback. 41 Rather than signalling a return to the Middle Ages,
+214 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+42 cf A Al Azmeh , ‘ Chronophagous Discourse : A Study of Clerico-Legal Appropriation of
+the World in an Islamic Tradition ’in FE Reynoldsand D Tracy(eds), Religion and Practical
+Reason ( Albany , State University of New York Press , 1994 ) 163ff . 43 cf P Anderson , Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism ( London , New Left Books , 1975 ) ;
+and, by the same author, Lineages of the Absolutist State ( London , Verso , 1979 ) ; J-P Polyand
+É Bournazel , La Mutation f é odale X e
+– XII e
+ si è cles, 2nd ed( Paris , PUF , 1991 ) 535 . 44 cf Vandermeersch, ‘ Nature de la f é odalit échinoise ’( ch 10fn 7) 63 – 104. And, for a similar
+position, Bloch, Feudal Society (n 3). 45 cf Bloch, Feudal Society (n 3). 46 For an overview, see J-F Lemarignier , La France m é di é vale. Institutions et soci é t é ( Paris ,
+A Colin , 1970 , 416 ; Poly and Bournazel, La Mutation f é odale (n 43). 47 See M Castells , TheRise of the Network Society ( Oxford , Blackwell , 1996 ) ; F Ostand
+M van de Kerchove , De la pyramide au r é seau ?Pour une th é orie dialectique du droit
+( Brussels , Publications des Facult é s universitaires Saint-Louis , 2002 ) 587 ; L Amiel-Cosme , ‘ La
+th é orie institutionnelle du r é seau ’ , in Aspects actuels du droit des affaires. M é langes Y Guyon
+( Paris , Dalloz , 2003 ) 1 – 40 ; E Peskine , R é seaux d ’ entreprises et droit du travail ( Paris , LGDJ ,
+2008 ) 363 .
+
+however, this phenomenon suggests that the structures against which, and
+on the rubble of which, the nation state was fi rst erected, have re-emerged.
+For bygone dogmatic categories do not fi t neatly into a linear history, but
+fl ow into a subterranean reserve from which they can always resurface and
+produce new normative effects. 42
+Feudal structures have tended to be revived whenever central authority
+loses its grip. Each time the form they take is different. 43 For example,
+Chinese and Japanese feudalism have little in common with the feudalism
+of the Medieval West. 44 Yet common ground exists between feudalism and
+ritualism, namely the importance of the personal tie. After the fall of the
+Roman Empire, one of the unique features of the Western feudalism which
+rose from its ruins was the legal character given to these ties of dependence.
+45 The most fundamental bond, and the backbone of the social order,
+was vassalage, that is, a contract of a very particular sort, combining a personal
+element with a real element. 46 The personal element consisted in one
+person being made dependent on another. The form this took varied with
+the status of the parties concerned, and could be homage or serfdom. The
+real element resided in granting a possession to the dependent party, who
+in return fulfi lled certain obligations towards the grantor. Again, the conditions
+varied with the status of the parties, and land could be held in noble
+(fi ef) or non-noble tenure. This type of relation provides a useful approach
+to changes in contemporary law, where we see emerging new techniques of
+infeudalisation of people and tenure of things.
+
+III. FEUDAL RIGHTS IN PEOPLE
+
+The techniques whereby people are infeudalised today go by the name of
+‘ networks ’ .
+47 The representation of the world as a network of communicating
+Feudal Rights in People 215
+
+48 See above, ch 8 , p 144ff. 49 See particularly G Teubner , ‘ The Many-Headed Hydra : Networks as Higher-Order
+Collective Actors ’in J McCahery , S Picciottoand C Scott , Corporate Control and Accountability
+( Oxford , Oxford University Press , 1993 ) 41ff ; and by the same author, Netzwerk als
+Vertragsverbund Virtuelle Unternehmen (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2004) 286. 50 TFEU, Art 5. On this principle and its history, see the convincing critical analysis of Julien
+Barroche, for whom ‘ subsidiarity ’ ‘ names Europe ’ s aporia, and has joined the new arsenal of
+ultra-liberal governance ’ , in É tat, lib é ralisme et christianisme. Critique de la subsidiairit éeurop
+é enne (Paris, Dalloz, 2012) 748, cited 563. 51 Speech by the European President Delors at the fi rst intergovernmental conference
+(Luxembourg, 9 September 1985), Bulletin des Communaut é s europ é ennes, September 1985,
+9, 8.
+
+particles was fi rst championed by cybernetics in the post-war years, and
+later by postmodern philosophy and the Law and Economics doctrine.
+Today, participatory management puts these techniques into practice, in the
+way it subjects people to fulfi ling objectives rather than observing rules. 48
+Governance by numbers thrives on the structure of the network, for which
+authors have proposed biological or computing models. 49 However, its legal
+character becomes clear when we recall that feudalism was essentially a
+world of networks, and when we examine the feudal legal categories handed
+down to us. The feudal relationship, as it reappears today, is signalled by
+a double displacement: from sovereign to suzerain and from law to bond.
+The shift from sovereign to suzerain power is the most visible sign of
+the extension of vassalage in Europe today. The suzerain has immediate
+authority over his vassals, but not over his vassals ’vassals, whereas the
+sovereign ’ s power is supreme, self-positing and bears its cause within itself.
+This power can be exercised directly over all the sovereign ’ s subjects, which
+is why, as from the end of the Middle Ages, sovereignty became the cornerstone
+of the modern theory of the state. However, it can no longer account
+for the changes occurring today, since the state increasingly appears as a
+suzerain rather than a sovereign power. The European Union provides the
+best illustration of this revival of relations of suzerainty today. European
+political institutions are clearly not sovereign, a fact offi cially clarifi ed by
+the Maastricht Treaty ’ s ‘ principle of subsidiarity ’ .
+50 The EU has no army,
+no real government, and a tiny number of civil servants compared to the
+populations under its rule. It does not raise taxes and most of the rules it
+issues (through Directives) are applied in the national legislation of Member
+States only after being fi ltered through the transposition procedures.
+When Jacques Delors was President of the European Commission, he even
+called the EU ‘ an unidentifi ed political object ’ .
+51 But if one starts thinking
+of European institutions in terms of suzerainty rather than sovereignty,
+everything becomes clear. The EU ’ s power over the populations it governs
+is only indirect, and requires the mediation of the states which agree to be
+its vassals. Member States are consequently beholden to a legal entity which
+does not itself have the full panoply of attributes of sovereignty over its
+216 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+52 See above, ch 1 , p 28. 53 www.imf.org/external/index.htm . 54 www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2013/mli/fra/120213f.pdf(accessed on 4 September 2014). 55 cf FA Hayek , Law, Legislation and Liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of
+justice and political economy, Vol 3 The Political Order of a Free People ( Chicago , University
+of Chicago Press , 1978 ) .
+
+citizens. In other words, Member States are vassals of an entity which has
+only the diminished power of a suzerain.
+The EU’s structure of suzerainty can be found in certain international
+economic organisations like the IMF, which can only wield effective power
+over states if the latter agree to lose a portion of their sovereignty by pledging
+to carry out the reforms they are prescribed. 52 The acceptance of these
+programmes is not strictly contractual, but involves precisely an act of allegiance,
+confi rmed by a letter addressed by the country concerned to the IMF.
+These letters, and the associated documents, are published on the IMF ’ s
+web site. They all look more or less the same. 53 For example, the letter from
+the government of Mali to the IMF dated 2 December 2013 certifi es that
+the country has made progress in implementing the policies recommended,
+and has ‘ achieved the [applicable] indicators ’ . It presents the economic and
+fi nancial policies it intends to introduce in the ensuing three years, with a
+view to maintaining macroeconomic balance, improving budget management
+and encouraging the private sector, particularly the fi nancial sector.
+Lastly, it requests a sum of 46 million dollars as extended credit facility.
+54 Whereas these international organisations appear to be dealing with
+‘ economic governance ’alone, they are clearly using techniques of vassalage
+which are ultimately incompatible with the sovereignty of the countries
+concerned.
+This trend grew rapidly after the collapse of the fi nancial markets in
+2008. Central banks and countries threw untold sums at the banks to bail
+them out and to limit the social and economic effects of their greed and
+ineptitude, thus managing to convert a mountain of private debt into a bottomless
+pit of public debts. And no sooner had they done this and footed the
+bill for the fi nancial sector ’ s meltdown, then they were enjoined, precisely in
+the name of the debts thus contracted, to privatise whatever was left of their
+public services and to entirely deregulate their labour markets. And — why
+do things by halves ? — the political leaders initially chosen to carry out these
+policies often came from the banking world which had sparked the crisis in
+the fi rst place. As the ‘ Greek crisis ’perfectly illustrates, there is much more
+at stake here than the familiar practice of privatising profi ts and having
+taxpayers bear the losses. What we are witnessing, rather, is an undisguised
+challenge to a people ’ s right to govern themselves. Friedrich Hayek ’ s battle
+cry of ‘ dethroning politics ’ 55 and introducing a ‘ limited democracy ’ , which
+Feudal Rights in People 217
+
+56 IR MacNeil , ‘ Contracts : Adjustments of long-term economic relations under classical,
+neoclassical and relational contract law ’( 1978 ) Northwestern Law Revue, 854 ; ‘ Relational
+contract: What we do and do not know ’( 1985 ) Wisconsin Law Revue, 483 ; ‘ Refl ections
+on relational contract ’( 1985 ) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 541 ;
+C Boismain , Les Contrats relationnels ( Marseille , Presses universitaires d ’ Aix-Marseille , 2005 )
+526 ; Y-M Laithier , ‘ Àpropos de la r é ception du contrat relationnel en droit fran ç ais ’( 2006 )
+Recueil Dalloz, 1003 . 57 L Nodlerand U Reifner(eds), Life Time Contracts. Social Long-term Contracts in Labour,
+Tenancy and Consumer Credit Law ( The Hague , Eleven International Publishing , 2014 ) 666 . 58 cf M-A Frison-Roche(ed), Droit et é conomie de la r é gulation( Paris , Dalloz , 2004 ) , esp
+Vol 1, ‘ Les R é gulateurs é conomiques: l é gitimit éet effi cacit é ’ , 205. 59 cf Conseil d ’ É tat , Le Contrat, mode d ’ action publique et de production de normes,
+Rapport public 2008( Paris , La Documentation fran ç aise , 2008 ) 398 ; and above, ch 8 , p 153ff. 60 M Laroque , ‘ La contractualisation comme technique de tutelle: l ’ exemple du secteur
+social ’( 2003 ) AJDA 976 .
+
+puts the question of the distribution of wealth beyond the reach of the ballot
+box, is close to becoming a reality in Europe today.
+The shift from law to tie would be an apt defi nition of the plethora of
+recent contracts which not only oblige someone to give, do, or refrain from
+doing something specifi c, but which additionally create between the parties
+a bond obliging one party to behave according to the expectations of
+the other. This is the type of contract generally used to establish a bond of
+economic dependence between one (natural or legal) person and another.
+These contracts, which integrate one person into another ’ s economic activity,
+affect the status of the two parties after the fact, and oblige them to create
+relatively stable ties. Examples are relational contracts, studied by Ian
+R MacNeil for the United States, where they are used increasingly. 56 Life
+time contracts also belong to this category, for instance employment contracts,
+tenancy agreements and real-estate loans, on which a group of
+researchers headed by Luca Nodler and Udo Reifner have recently carried
+out important research. 57
+Similar techniques are also used in public contracts. The state allows private
+and public bodies to defi ne how they will meet the objectives it sets
+and, rather than regulate their activities, it delegates the task of monitoring
+whether these objectives are attained to ad hoc authorities. The state simply
+reserves the right to intervene after the fact if failings are observed. 58
+We have already mentioned these techniques, which go by the name of the
+‘ contractualisation of public policy initiatives ’in domestic law, and which
+are used extensively in the relations between central and regional or local
+government, and between central government and executive agencies. 59 The
+ideal of governance by numbers is implanted here by the use of an abundance
+of indicators and quantitative performance assessment procedures. In
+legal terms, these are what Michel Laroque has called ‘ techniques of administrative
+accountability ’ ,
+60 such that public agencies, for example, no longer
+218 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+61 Law No 2009-879 of 21 July 2009 on the reform of the hospital and on patients, health
+and geographical areas. 62 Code of Education, Art L.718–7ff. 63 See above, ch 8 , p 157ff. 64 FH Lawsonand B Rudden , The Law of Property, 2nd edn( Oxford , Oxford University
+Press , 1995 ) 80 ; K Greyand S Grey , Elements of Land Law, 5th edn( Oxford , Oxford University
+Press , 2009 ), 67 . On the historical origins of the eminent domain of the King of England,
+see Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (n 43).
+
+act solely in view of the law, but also of the contractual bonds they have
+made. The battery of fi gures produced by this mode of governance conceals
+a web of relations of vassalage between the state and intermediary bodies
+such as regional health agencies 61 or university groupings. 62 These distance
+the state from the public and even from the service providers themselves.
+These types of contracts are extensively used in EU law for the Union ’ s
+economic governance, that is, its fi nality of permanently monitoring states ’
+budgetary balance through control mechanisms, themselves inspired
+by governance by numbers. 63 However, this cybernetic dream of putting
+human affairs on automatic pilot works out quite differently in the real.
+The Maastricht criteria have in actual fact almost never been respected by
+Eurozone countries, so it is unlikely that the corrective mechanisms foreseen
+by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic
+and Monetary Union will be ‘ automatically ’triggered. The net result of these
+mechanisms is thus essentially to place countries in a relation of dependence
+with respect to the Commission and the European Central Bank, and to
+create ties of allegiance to these two non-elected bodies. These ties end up
+having more infl uence on the determination of economic and social policy
+than the law itself.
+
+IV. FEUDAL RIGHTS IN THINGS
+
+The proliferation of techniques for granting rights in things is the other
+symptom of this revival of government by men. In the feudal system, where
+wealth was essentially vested in land, men were considered simply as custodians
+of worldly goods, which ultimately belonged to God. This idea
+still persists in English law, where no subject can technically ‘ own ’land,
+even if he or she has exclusive enjoyment of it, because the land belongs to
+the sovereign. 64 Thus land was always granted by someone else, and only
+exceptionally (the exception being allodial land) were one ’ s rights not tied to
+a relation of dependence on another person. Hence the medieval distinction
+between the dominium utile of the vassal or tenant, and the lord ’ s dominium
+eminens over the land granted in fi ef or on the basis of the peasant ’ s dues or
+his serfdom. The granting of land was indissociable from certain personal
+Feudal Rights in Things 219
+
+65 cf A Esmein , Cours é l é mentaire d ’ histoire du droit fran ç ais ( Paris , Larose , 1898 ) 139ff,
+271ff and 411ff . 66 For a clear and concise overview, see P Ourliacand J de Malafosse Histoire du droit priv é ,
+t 2, Les Biens, 2nd edn( Paris , PUF , 1971 ), 148ff . 67 L Dumont , Homo æ qualis I. Gen è se et é panouissement de l ’ id é ologie é conomique, 2nd
+edn( Paris , Gallimard , 1985 ) 13 . English tr, From Mandeville To Marx: The Genesis And
+Triumph Of Economic Ideology ( Chicago , Chicago University Press , 1977 ) . 68 M Mauss , Essay on the Gift, The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies
+[1950], tr WD Walls , foreword by M Douglas ( London and New York City , Routledge , 1990 ) . 69 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, signed in Marrakesh,
+15 April 1994.
+
+bonds between grantor and grantee, which could take the form of acts of
+loyalty (owed by the vassal to his suzerain), or of economic contributions
+(owed by peasants or villeins to their lord). The same system of concessions
+can be found in feudal law for the allocation of public and ecclesiastical
+offi ce. The holder received remuneration (or ‘ benefi ce ’ ), in the form of the
+revenue from the goods attached to that offi ce. This link between offi cium
+and benefi cium was the basis of the venality of offi ces and charges which
+lasted until the end of the ancien r é gime, 65 and is still current in some regulated
+professions in France such as notaries or taxis. The relations between
+people and things thus always preserved the imprint of relations between
+people. 66 But, as Louis Dumont has shown, economic ideologies seek to
+make relations between people secondary to relations between people and
+things because, in the market economy, the goods to be exchanged must be
+stripped of any trace of personal bonds. 67 Once again, an analysis of law
+can show how feudal structures have re-emerged, in the form of the fragmentation
+of ownership and the delegation of public functions.
+The dismemberment of ownership is clearly a consequence of the extension
+and consecration of intellectual property rights. Intellectual property
+implies that one person can have rights over something which is the physical
+property of another. The bearer of these rights has prerogatives which vary
+from case to case, but they always restrict the otherwise absolute rights of
+material ownership.
+This is because intellectual property rights are attached to the thing,
+regardless of its physical owner. As Mauss noted, intellectual property
+brings back into the modern world something we thought was confi ned to
+‘ archaic ’societies, namely the ‘ spirit of the thing ’ , which follows it wherever
+it goes, and must always return to whoever put it into circulation. 68 This is
+precisely what the TRIPS agreement signed in the framework of the WTO
+enshrines: freedom of circulation, and the obligation on every custodian
+of the thing throughout the world to honour his or her debt to the owner
+of the spirit of the thing. 69 What is this structure, if not the revival of the
+feudal distinction between dominium utile and dominium eminens?When
+rights in the physical object are overlaid by intellectual property rights, the
+220 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+70 Supreme Court of the United States, 13 May 2013, Bowman v Monsanto ( 569 US 2013 ) . 71 On these neo-feudal and neo-colonialist effects of intellectual property, cf A Rahmatian ,
+Copyright and Creativity. The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works ( Cheltenham,
+Edward Elgar Publishing , 2011 ) 247ff . 72 cf K Polanyi , ‘ The Self-regulating Market and the Fictitious Commodities : Labor, Land,
+and Money ’in The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
+[ 1944 ] , foreword by J Stiglitz, Ch 6 (Boston, Beacon Press, 2001). 73 The notion of a shared heritage of humanity fi rst appeared in the law of the sea (see the
+Montego Bay Convention of 10 December 1982), and later encompassed outer space and heritage
+on land. On the revival of the notion of ‘ commons ’ , see B Paranceand J de Saint Victor
+(ed), Repenser les biens communs ( Paris , CNRS É ditions , 2014 ) 314 ; D Bollier , La Renaissance
+des communs ( Paris , É ditions Charles L é opold Meyer , 2014 ) 192 .
+
+latter inevitably end up dominating the former. Thus the US Supreme Court
+decided that since intellectual property rights can extend to living organisms,
+they encompass the organisms ’reproductive capacities, which automatically
+become objects of the patents as well. 70 Farmers who purchase
+their seed from Monsanto will thus be infringing this company ’ s intellectual
+property rights if, in the following seasons, they plant the seed produced.
+Nor do they have the right to buy grain meant for consumption
+from another producer, if the producer has signed a similar contract. This
+has enslaved crop-growers in unprecedented ways to the power of the seedsupplying
+companies. Instead of being independent producers, they have
+been transformed into tenant farmers responsible for crops which they do
+not fully own, and this for the entire life of the patent — 20 years in this case.
+More generally, intellectual property is the basis of an economy founded on
+unearned income which extends its dominion not only over individuals but
+also over whole states. 71
+However, intellectual property is not the only factor in the fragmentation
+of ownership. The legal concept of ownership is today incapable of covering
+how economic control over certain goods is really held, because the
+rights may be spread across several bearers, from private persons to public
+authorities. This insuffi ciency comes as no surprise regarding ‘ things ’such
+as labour, natural resources and money, which anyway can only be traded
+thanks to a fi ction. 72 Since the preservation and renewal of human and natural
+resources affect the common good, these fi ctitious commodities can only
+enter the market if we limit the rights of those who appropriate them. It is
+only because labour law and environmental legislation have set reasonable
+limits on the exploitation of these ‘ resources ’that labour and nature may
+be treated as though they were commodities. These legal constraints, which
+work towards what is now called ‘ sustainable development ’ , show the limited
+power of private property rights over these types of resources, which
+belong to the dominium eminens of transcendent beings such as the common
+heritage of the Nation or of Humanity. 73 The French term patrimoine
+(heritage and patrimony) successfully articulates, in the longer term, the
+Feudal Rights in Things 221
+
+74 cf A S é riaux , ‘ La notion juridique de patrimoine. Br è ves notations civilistes sur le verbe
+avoir ’( 1994 ) Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 801 ; F Terr é , ‘ L ’ humanit é , un patrimoine sans
+personne ’( Paris , M é langes Phillipe Ardant, LGDJ , 1999 ) 339 ; D Hiez , É tude critique de la
+notion de patrimoine en droit priv éactuel ( Paris , LGDJ , 2003 ) 459 . 75 See the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of 11 November
+1997, Art 1. cf GB Kutukdjian , ‘ Le g é nome humain: patrimoine commun de l ’ humanit é ’ , in
+H é ctor Gros Espiell Amicorum Liber ( Brussels , Bruylant , 1997 ) 601 – 10 ; M Bedjaoui , ‘ Le g é nome
+humain comme patrimoine commun de l ’ humanit éou la g é n é tique de la peur àl ’ esp é rance ’in
+Federico Mayor Amicorum Liber ( Paris , Unesco and Brussels, Bruylant, 1995 ) Vol II , 905 – 15 ;
+B-M Knoppers , Le G é nome humain: commun de l ’ humanit é ? ( Qu é bec , Fides , 1999 ) 41 . 76 European Directive 85/374/EEC of the Council of the European Union, 25 July 1985. See
+Y Markovits , La Directive CEE du 25 juillet 1985 sur la responsabilit édu fait des produits
+d é fectueux ( Paris , LGDJ , 1990 ) , preface J Ghestin ; S Taylor , L ’ Harmonisation communautaire
+de la responsabilit édu fait des produits d é fectueux. É tude comparative du droit anglais et du
+droit fran ç ais ( Paris , LGDJ , 1999 ) , preface G Viney. 77 cf P Pedrot , Tra ç abilit éet responsabilit é ( Paris , Economica , 2003 ) 323 .
+
+legal categories of persons and things. 74 It now even includes the human
+genome, with a view to limiting its exploitation and commercialisation. 75
+Developments in tort law have also contributed to this superposition
+of different legal relations in the same object. The regime of strict liability
+devised in the late nineteenth century to oblige the custodian of a thing to
+answer for the damage it caused had the effect of resuscitating the idea of a
+thing ’ s guardian who might be distinct from its owner. This transformation
+of the exclusive relation between someone and his property is even clearer in
+the rules concerning liability for defective products. 76 It is the producer of the
+thing — whoever manufactures the product or puts it into circulation — who
+is liable for the harm caused by the product ’ s defects, whether or not the producer
+is bound by a contract with the injured party. As in the case of intellectual
+property, the producer ’ s liability follows the product, thus requiring
+procedures of ‘ traceability ’to be set up. 77
+However, unlike in the case of intellectual property rights, here it is the
+producer ’ s debt and not the author ’ s claim that circulates with the product.
+The producer continues to be answerable for the safety of the product, whoever
+its temporary owner may be, such that the liability for damage caused
+by things splits up into two forms: utile (the guardian ’ s) and eminens (the
+producer ’ s, a liability which cannot be eluded).
+The formal delegation of functions occurs in both the public and the
+private sector, and blurs the distinction between the two. It fi rst came to
+prominence in the management of private companies. Under pressure from
+the fi nancialisation of the economy, companies divided up their business
+into cost and profi t centres, and set them ever more stringent performance
+targets. This move towards more autonomous units went hand in hand with
+outsourcing the least profi table processes and focusing on what was called a
+company ’ s ‘ core business ’ , that is, whatever operation appeared at the time
+to be the most competitive in the eyes of the fi nancial markets. The structure
+222 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+78 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 6 May 2009 on the
+establishment of a European Works Council, Art 3; French Labour Code, Art L.2331-1 and
+L.2341-2; see, similarly, the defi nition given by the French Commercial Code (Art L.233-3); see
+P Didierand P Didier , Droit commercial, Vol 2 Les Soci é t é s commerciales ( Paris , Economica ,
+2011 ) 960f ; G Teubner , ‘ Unitas Multiplex : Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises ’in
+D Sugarmanand G Teubner(eds), Regulating Corporate Groups in Europe ( Nomos , BadenBaden
+, 1990 ) 67 – 104 ; I Daugareilh(ed), Le Dialogue social dans les instances transnationales
+d ’ entreprises europ é ennes ( Bordeaux , Presses universitaires de Bordeaux , 2014 ) 171 . 79 P Le Tourneau , Les Contrats de franchisage, 2nd edn( Paris , LexisNexis , 2007 ) 323 ;
+M Behar-Touchaisand G Virassamy , Les Contrats de la distribution ( Paris , LGDJ , 1999 ) 938 . 80 Law No 75-1334 of 31 December 1975 on sub-contracting, which defi nes it as ‘ the operation
+by which an entrepreneur entrusts by means of a sub-contract, and under his responsibility,
+to another person called the sub-contractor, the execution of all or part of a business
+contract or of part of a public sector contract signed with the contracting authority ’ . 81 L Lorvellec , É crits de droit rural et agroalimentaire ( Paris , Dalloz , 2002 ) 292ff . 82 Protected by Article L 446-2 of the French Commercial Code, which sanctions sudden
+termination of established business relations: see R Libchaber , ‘ Relation commerciale é tablie et
+quasi-contrat ’( 2010 ) R é pertoire du notariat Defr é nois 1, 114 . 83 cf Lemarignier, La France m é di é vale (n 46) 143ff; Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to
+Feudalism (n 43).
+
+of businesses changed accordingly, in ways familiar to us today: the Fordist
+model of an integrated and highly hierarchical organisation gave way to
+the model of a network in which the company contracts out an increasing
+proportion of the operations needed to manufacture its products. Various
+legal techniques accompanied this process. Those used by business groups
+involve a company (called the parent company) holding a suffi ciently large
+share of the capital of a subsidiary to exert a ‘ dominant infl uence ’ 78 over it.
+New contractual techniques are also used, such as concessions or franchises
+in distribution networks, 79 sub-contracting contracts in industry, 80 ‘ integration
+contracts ’in agriculture, 81 listed suppliers for supermarkets, 82 and so
+forth. All these techniques have a similar structure, that of ‘ tenure-service ’
+in which a dominant company grants to a tenant (subcontractor, distributor,
+supplier, etc) a profi table economic activity, in return for a pledge to
+respect certain rules and inspections defi ned by the company. The ‘ tenant ’
+can in turn use the services of other companies, for example in a two-tier
+sub-contract, which is the equivalent of the feudal vavasour (the vassal ’ s
+vassal). 83 The vavasour can in turn engage a third-level sub-contractor. In
+order to gain some autonomy with respect to the dominant company, the
+sub-contractor can also serve several lords at once. A sub-contractor for car
+elements — air-conditioning or electronic components, say — can thus work
+for several competing makes. So, as in feudal networks, these commercial
+networks are not necessarily pyramidal, or rather the pyramid can sometimes
+be standing on its tip. The same vassal can be bound to several lords,
+thus creating potential competition, or a confl ict of loyalties, between them.
+This was why, in feudal times, the notion of ‘ liege lord ’was introduced,
+to avoid confl icts of interest by ensuring that a vassal gives priority to one
+Feudal Rights in Things 223
+
+lord in particular in the acquittal of his obligations. 84 An almost identical
+mechanism today ensures exclusivity in business dealings, 85 as do noncompetition
+clauses in labour law. 86 We can thus, without overstatement,
+
+Business Relationship of the Prime
+Contractor Within the Textile-Clothing Supply Chain
+
+MANUFACTURERS OF 1ST RANK: CLOTHING FACTORIES
+
+STORAGE and DISTRIBUTION
+
+TRANSPORT
+
+Audit?
+
+Audit?
+
+Audit?
+
+Audit?
+
+Audit? SUPPLY OF RAW MATERIAL
+Cotton, synthetic fibres, zips, buttons, etc.
+
+DYEING MESHING SPINNING
+
+Social and environmental risks: child labour, forced labour, working conditions (safety,
+fire, health), rights of workers (freedom of association, etc.), pollution of sites, toxicity
+of products, corruption
+
+FINSIHING
+
+FACTORIES FACTORIES
+
+FACTORIES FACTORIES FACTORIES FACTORIES FACTORIES
+
+FACTORIES
+
+Subcontracting
+declared /
+authorised
+
+STEPS PRIOR TO MANUFACTURE
+
++ Risk of subcontracting in cascade
+Subcontracting
+concealed
+
+FACTORIES
+
+R R
+
+R
+
+R
+
+R
+
+R
+
+R R R
+
+R R R R
+
+PURCHASING OFFICE -
+ INTERMEDIARIES — 1st RANK
+
+Transparency on the
+supply conditions of the
+intermediary
+Opacity on the supply
+conditions of the
+intermediary
+
+Figure 11.1: The principal’s relations in the textile and garment supply chain
+© D.R. / OCDE
+
+84 M Bloch, Feudal Society (n 3); Lemarignier, La France m é di é vale (n 46) 144 – 47. 85 G Parl é ani , ‘ Les clauses d ’ exclusivit é ’in Les Principales Clauses des contrats conclus
+entre professionnels ( Marseille , Presses universitaire d ’ Aix-Marseille , 1990 ) 55 ; N É r é s é o ,
+L ’ Exclusivit écontractuelle ( Paris , Litec , 2008 ) 410 . 86 M Gomy , ‘ L ’ autonomie de la clause de non-concurrence post-contractuelle en droit du
+travail ’in M é langes en l ’ honneur d ’ Yves Serra ( Paris , Dalloz , 2006 ) 199 – 216 .
+224 The Return of ‘Rule by Men’
+
+reasonably compare any textbook depiction of the relations under feudalism
+(see Fig. 11.2) with those defi ning today ’ s networks of suppliers in, for
+example, the textiles industry (see Fig. 11.1). 87
+Another area in which a legal analysis can reveal the socio-economic
+dynamics at work is that of the contractualisation of public policy. In imitation
+of private sector management, the state has, on the one hand, divided up
+
+King
+
+Higher nobility
+(dukes, counts)
+
+Lower gentry,
+lords/ladies
+
+Knights,
+owners of small
+fiefdoms
+
+Figure 11.2: Feudal relations of interdependence
+
+87 Report on the implementation of the OECD Guidelines in the textile and garment supply
+chain, 2 December 2013, 16.
+Feudal Rights in Things 225
+
+its different operations, and, on the other, outsourced those not considered
+integral to its ‘ core business ’ . In the fi rst case, its activities are made into selfcontained
+units, on the condition that certain objectives are pursued, and
+their attainment measured by quantitative indicators. In the second case,
+its activities are privatised on condition that companies accept regulation
+by the regulatory authorities designated to ensure the general interest for a
+product or a particular service (electricity, highways, telecommunications,
+the stock exchange, the railroads, prisons, and so forth). 88 A panoply of feudal
+legal mechanisms resurface here in a new guise. The venality of offi ces and
+charges, which a century ago Adh é mar Esmein deemed a ‘ monstrous organisation
+’ ,
+89 has returned with a vengeance, in the name of dismantling the
+monopolies enjoyed by public companies. For ‘ services of general economic
+interest ’(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 14 and
+Protocol No 26), relations of ‘ tenure-service ’have once again become the
+norm. And what the principle of the separation between economic operators
+and regulators conceals is the much older distinction between power
+( potestas) and authority ( auctoritas) by which the feudal system attempted
+to stem absolutist tendencies.
+Once again, this does not imply that the world is returning to the Middle
+Ages, but only that the legal concepts of feudalism provide excellent tools
+for analysing the vast institutional upheavals occurring under the acritical
+notion of ‘ globalisation ’today. We are not making a value judgement on
+these revolutions, nor defending the thesis of an ‘ eternal return ’ , as though
+history never produced any new legal confi gurations. It is as inadequate to
+regard the globalised world as a fl attened tabula rasa on which governance
+by numbers is rolled out everywhere in the same way, as it is to imagine the
+world as a patchwork of unchanging cultures which persist in their being
+and do not infl uence each other. After two and a half centuries of colonial
+domination and economic and cultural imperialism, there is no civilisation
+in the world, be it on Pacifi c Islands or in the Amazon Basin, that has
+escaped the infl uence of Western ways of governing human societies. Every
+single one of them is today affected by the destruction of the reign of the
+law and the instatement of governance by numbers, and all see the increasing
+power of networks of allegiance in their institutions. So the return of a
+structure does not mean a repetition of the past, but rather the emergence
+of new structures which recycle elements of the systems they replace. But we
+have not yet depicted this world in the making. And no better vantage point
+exists for understanding the government of men than the way they are put
+to work.
+
+88 N Decoopman, ‘ Les autorit é s administratives ind é pendantes et l ’ hypoth è se du n é of
+é odalisme ’in J Lefebvre, L ’ Hypoth è se du n é o-f é odalisme (n 39)137 – 50. 89 A Esmein, Cours é l é mentaire d ’ histoire du droit fran ç ais (n 65) 403.
+1 See A Smith , An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776]
+( London , Methuen , 1904 ) . The fi rst chapter is entitled ‘ Of the Division of Labour ’ . 2 cf E Durkheim , The Division of Labor in Society ( 1893 ), tr WD Halls( New York City ,
+Free Press , 1997 ) .
+
+12
+
+‘ Genuinely Human Work in Humane
+Conditions ’I
+
+From Total Mobilisation to the Crisis
+of Fordism
+
+The failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour [ ‘ un r é gime de
+travail r é ellement humain’ ] is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire
+to improve the conditions in their own countries.
+
+GOVERNANCE BY NUMBERS was introduced above all as a way
+of solving the problems raised by work. The founding fathers of
+political economy 1 and sociology 2 were quick to realise that the
+division of labour is a nodal point for society as a whole. If we talk of a ‘ slaveowning
+’ , ‘ agrarian ’ , ‘ nomadic ’ , ‘ feudal ’or ‘ industrial ’society, we acknowledge
+that slavery, agriculture, pastoralism, serfdom and the wage system are
+all central to a given society ’ s mode of functioning. It is signifi cant that when
+we try to talk about our own times, we tend to talk of ‘ post-industrial ’society:
+this is another way of saying how diffi cult we fi nd it to defi ne exactly
+what our present regime of work is. Industry has not disappeared, not even
+in its most Taylorist incarnations, but it has shifted massively away from
+the West. As for the ‘ post- ’ , here as elsewhere (as in ‘ postmodern ’or ‘ posthuman
+’ ) the term is a way of placing a question mark over a world still in
+its infancy. ‘ Post-industrial ’therefore means that the transformations of the
+industrial era pushed our institutions to their critical limits, and we are still
+unable to understand and conceptualise the consequences. This is why we
+have reason to believe that a legal analysis of the transformations of work
+over the last century can shed some light on the nature of the crisis of work
+we are experiencing, and possible ways out of it. We shall start with an overview
+of how attitudes to work and its organisation have changed, from the
+The Fordist Compromise 227
+
+3 E J ü nger , ‘ Total Mobilization ’[ 1930 ]in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed
+R Wolin , tr J Golband R Wolin( Cambridge , Mass, MIT Press , 1993 ) 119 – 39 . 4 ibid. 5 ibid. 6 ibid. 7 G Babcock, Conference at the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration,
+3 – 4 Oct. 1919, quoted by J Querzola , ‘ Le chef d ’ orchestre àla main de fer. L é ninisme
+et taylorisme ’( 1978 ) Recherches, 32/33( Le soldat du travail) 63.
+
+Treaty of Versailles (1919) to the crisis of Fordism. In the following chapter,
+we shall examine the structure of the relations of allegiance which have
+accompanied the implanting of governance by numbers.
+
+I. THE FORDIST COMPROMISE
+
+In order to understand the employment protection provisions resulting
+from what has been called the ‘ Fordist compromise ’ , we must fi rst cast a
+look back at the founding event of industrial society: the First World War.
+This war contributed two at fi rst sight contradictory things to the history of
+labour, but which are actually interdependent: the industrial management
+of ‘ human material ’ ; and, as we examine in greater detail below, the appeal
+for humane working conditions.
+For the purposes of this war, Ernst J ü nger wrote, ‘ States transformed
+themselves into gigantic factories, producing armies on the assembly line
+that they sent to the battlefi eld both day and night, where an equally
+mechanical bloody maw took over the role of consumer. ’ 3 The Taylorist
+organisation of industrial labour spilled over from the ultra-modern factory
+to take over society as a whole. J ü nger uses the expression ‘ total mobilisation
+’to describe this shift. The epoch of ‘ old-style ’wars between European
+monarchs, which ended in the nineteenth century, had used only a portion
+of the human and material resources of the warring states. The First World
+War was the fi rst full-scale experience of ‘ total mobilisation ’ , a process in
+which ‘ every life is converted into energy ’ .
+4 The image of war as armed
+combat, J ü nger continues, ‘ withers away into the much more comprehensive
+image of war as a gigantic labour process ’ .
+5 In the fi nal phase of this
+development, which began with the First World War, ‘ there is no longer
+any movement whatsoever — be it that of the homeworker at her sewingmachine
+— without at least indirect use for the battlefi eld ’ .
+6 The forms of
+social organisation introduced during the Great War continued to make
+themselves felt on the return to peacetime. ‘ The most important lesson to
+be drawn from the War ’ , the American engineer George Babcock declared
+to the Society to Promote the Science of Management, ‘ is that the expansion
+and elaboration of the principles of industrial organisation, in the form
+of Taylor ’ s principles of scientifi c organisation, have proved themselves in
+practice under the heaviest burden they have ever had to bear ’ .
+7 J ü nger
+228 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ I
+
+8 J ü nger (n 3). 9 cf The Spirit of Philadelphia. Social justice vs the Total Market, tr S Brown( London /
+New York City , Verso , 2012 ) . 10 cf L Doria , Calculating the Human: Universal Calculability in the Age of Quality
+Assurance ( London/New York City, Palgrave Macmillan , 2013 ) 210 . 11 Part XIII, Section, Art 387f.
+
+applied this remark, which was made for the benefi t of managers, to the
+organisation of entire countries:
+
+Despite the spectacle, both grandiose and frightful, of the later ‘ battles of material
+’ , in which the human talent for organization celebrated its bloody triumph,
+its fullest possibilities have not yet been reached. Even limiting our scope to the
+technical side of the process, this can only occur when the image of martial operations
+is prescribed for conditions of peace. We can see that in the postwar period,
+many countries have tailored new methods of organization to the pattern of total
+mobilization. 8
+
+The concept of total mobilisation infl uenced Carl Schmitt ’ s concept of the
+Total State and Hannah Arendt ’ s concept of totalitarianism. Its heuristic
+value remains powerful, because it exists today in the new form of the Total
+Market, 9 in which every existence is converted into a quantifi able resource 10
+and the inhabitants of every nation of the world are precipitated into an
+unceasing, and pitiless, economic war.
+But the First World War had an impact on the regime of work in another,
+more frequently cited and acclaimed, way, in that the Treaty of Versailles
+provided for the creation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). 11
+The Preamble to the ILO Constitution sets out why this organisation was set
+up, adopting for this the terms of the Versailles Treaty:
+
+Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon
+social justice;
+
+And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and
+privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace
+and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions
+is urgently required; [ … ]
+
+Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour [ ‘ un
+r é gime de travail r é ellement humain ’ ] is an obstacle in the way of other nations
+which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries;
+
+The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as
+well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, [ … ] agree to the
+following: [ … ] A permanent organization is hereby established for the promotion
+of the objects set forth in the Preamble.
+
+Without social justice we will have war; social justice implies ‘ humane conditions
+of labour ’(a ‘ r é gime de travail r é ellement humain’ , in the French);
+The Fordist Compromise 229
+
+12 S Weil , On Science, Necessity, &The Love of God, tr R Rees( London , Oxford University
+Press , 1968 ) .
+
+these conditions will not exist without a policing of competition worldwide
+with a view to safeguarding social justice; an international organisation is
+necessary to defi ne and apply labour standards which shall be common to
+all nations. This was, in brief, the other lesson drawn from the experience of
+the First World War as regards the organisation of work. It proved to be a
+lasting one, because the ILO was the only international organisation to survive
+the disappearance of the Society of Nations. Its mandate was reaffi rmed
+and further defi ned at the end of the Second World War, in the Declaration
+of Philadelphia, and it is now preparing to celebrate a meritorious 100 years
+of faithful service, in 2019.
+So how were these two legacies of the Great War linked ?Is the pursuit of
+‘ humane conditions of labour ’compatible with ‘ the scientifi c organisation
+of work ’and the total mobilisation of human capital for a global competitive
+market ?The answer will depend on the interpretation one gives to these
+passages from the Treaty of Versailles, as included in the Preamble to the
+ILO Constitution. Both French and English were offi cial languages of the
+Treaty, yet they say slightly different things. The French ‘ r é gime de travail
+r é ellement humain’means at one and the same time ‘ a genuinely human (or
+humane) regime of work ’ , and ‘ a regime of genuinely human (or humane)
+work ’ . In English, where this double emphasis is absent, there is simply the
+call for ‘ humane conditions of labour ’ . If we follow up what is suggested by
+the French wording — expressing the goals of a renewed vision of the organisation
+of work (the ‘ regime of work ’ ), and of work itself ( ‘ human work ’ ), in
+the aftermath of the First World War — we shall see that the two directions
+sketched are the condensed expression of confl ictual and even contradictory
+priorities in the thinking about work, which labour law was called upon to
+resolve, and which are still with us today.
+A ‘ r é gime de travail r é ellement humain’ , understood as a ‘ regime of genuinely
+human work ’ , states that the work itself must have a genuinely human
+quality to it. We could understand this broadly as meaning that the work
+must be such as to enable whoever carries it out to invest in it a part of
+him- or herself: that is what makes it human labour, rather than the work
+of animals or machines. In human work, the worker seeks to inscribe his or
+her mental representations in the universe of things or of symbols. In this
+respect, work also educates reason. It confronts our mental images with
+the realities of the outside world and thus forces us to get the measure of
+both the world and of our representations. Simone Weil expressed this in
+one of those striking phrases which light up her writing: ‘ It is through work
+that reason grasps the world itself, and gets a grip on imagination ’ s folly ’ .
+12
+But this interaction exists fully only in what is improperly called ‘ manual
+230 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ I
+
+13 This is why Simone Weil chooses to end her work on the ‘ duties towards the human
+being ’with the assertion that physical work should be the spiritual centre of an orderly society.
+See The Need For Roots. Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind, tr AF Wills
+( London , Routledge and Kegan Paul , 1952 ) . cf the place occupied by manual labour in Gandhi ’ s
+conception of sovereignty: MK Gandhi , Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule [ 1908 ], bilingual
+English / Gujarati, critical edn by S Sharmaand T Shurud( New Delhi , Orient Blackswan ,
+2010 ) XXIV + 102 +83 pages . 14 PJ Proudhon , Les majorats litt é raires. Examen d ’ un projet de loi ayant pour but de cr é er,
+au profi t des auteurs, inventeurs et artistes, un monopole perp é tuel ( Bruxelles , Offi ce de publicit
+é , 1862 ) 16 . ( ‘ Literary Entailments: Examination of a bill whose purpose it is to create,
+for the benefi t of authors, inventors and artists, a perpetual monopoly. ’ ) See also the historical
+inquiry by R Sennet , The Craftsman ( New Haven, Yale University Press 2008 ) . 15 R Reich , The Work of Nations. Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism
+( New York City , Alfred A Knopf , 1992 ) . 16 EM Cioran , Essai sur la pens é e r é actionnaire [1957]( Fontfroide le Haut, Fata Morgana ,
+2005 ) 14 . 17 J Kerviel, an employee of the Soci é t ég é n é rale bank, had made unauthorised trades on
+stock exchange futures, which ended up costing the bank (and to a certain extent the taxpayer)
+a total of 4.82 billion euros, in 2008. For comparison, this sum is the equivalent of two thirds
+of France ’ s annual research budget (excluding military research).
+
+labour ’ , which mobilises both body and mind in performing ‘ doing-skills ’ ,
+a savoir-faire.
+13 Intellectual work also has a physical dimension since it
+requires one to be minimally healthy. But it does not pit the body against
+the world as does the work of the farmer, the labourer, the sculptor or the
+dancer. Proudhon said that ‘ he who has his idea in the hollow of his hand
+is often a man of more intelligence, in any case more comprehensive, than
+the one who carries it in his head, incapable of expressing it other than by
+a formula ’ .
+14 The work of those whom Robert Reich calls ‘ manipulators
+of symbols ’ 15 mobilises ‘ saying skills ’( un savoir-dire), ‘ writing skills ’( un
+savoir- é crire) and ‘ counting skills ’( un savoir-compter) but not ‘ doing skills ’
+( un savoir-faire). Intellectual workers are not faced with the realities of their
+immediate environment, but this can precisely expose them to losing their
+sanity. Cioran has described the work of intellectuals in the following terms:
+
+To be intimate with an idea drives one mad, obliterates one ’ s judgment, and produces
+the illusion of omnipotence. In truth, grappling with an idea leaves one
+senseless, knocks the spirit off balance; one ’ s pride loses its calm self-assurance
+[ … ] The thinker who covers with ink a blank page addressed to noone imagines
+that he sits in judgment over the whole world. 16
+
+But the pull of insanity is not reserved for thinkers and ideologues alone.
+It also affects fi nancial engineers, whose work places them at the radioactive
+core of governance by numbers. As several recent scandals have shown —
+in France, the Kerviel affair 17— this type of work ‘ totally impairs people ’ s
+judgement and gives them the illusion of omnipotence ’ . It draws them — and
+us with them — into speculative loops which can only end in disaster, as the
+reality principle reasserts itself. In the Kerviel affair, the Cour de cassation
+ruled that the failure of the bank, the Soci é t ég é n é rale, to keep a sharp
+The Fordist Compromise 231
+
+18 Cour de cassation, Criminal division, 19 March 2014, No R 12-87.416. 19 See above, ch 9 , p 169ff.
+
+enough eye on this securities trader ‘ had contributed to the fraud [committed
+by him] and its fi nancial consequences ’ , and it concluded that the trader
+had no civil liability for the consequences (despite his being convicted of
+criminal offences). 18
+So there are two situations in which work loses its humanity: when
+thought is banished and when reality is banished. Thought is banished
+when human labour is modeled on the machine, however sophisticated it
+may be. Taylorism was the fullest expression of this form of dehumanised
+labour. It explicitly forbade thought, and work was reduced to a sequence
+of timed gestures (others are paid to think, Taylor said). The banishment
+of reality is less readily observed. It occurs when the work of manipulating
+symbols is severed from any of the experiences which underly them. Metaphorically
+speaking, this type of work replaces the territory with the map. 19
+It expels the facts in favour of their fantasised representation which, dominated
+by scientism and a numbers fetishism, sets reality at one remove, with
+the attendant risk of individual and collective madness. This fate does not
+only befall fi nancial engineers, but more generally political and economic
+leaders, whenever they see the world only through its quantifi ed representations.
+These two forms of dehumanised labour are not alternatives. On the
+contrary, the twentieth century ’ s insane massacres have shown that the two
+are perfectly compatible, when brainwashed masses are marshalled into the
+service of delirious leaders. The madness of scientism has the same deadly
+potential as religious fanaticism, and today we see them working hand in
+hand.
+Work can thus be described as inhuman when it reduces the worker to
+the condition of an animal or a machine, simply a tool for implementing
+the thoughts of others. And it is also inhuman when it cuts the worker off
+from any experience of the realities which he or she is dealing with. Between
+these two extremes, ‘ genuinely human ’work is irreducibly two-sided. It is
+both mastery over the world and submission to the world, creation and
+toil. Had the ILO Constitution ’ s ‘ r é gime de travail r é ellement humain’been
+interpreted in this strong sense, in the sense of a regime of ‘ genuinely human
+work ’ , the nature of the work performed would have had to be addressed.
+But it was the weaker interpretation which won out, from the First World
+War onwards. Admittedly not without discussion and protest, but, as Bruno
+Trentin has shown in his magnifi cent work on the crisis of Fordism, the discordant
+voices fell on deaf ears in the political and trade union Left because
+the Left was already convinced of the idea of the scientifi c organisation
+of labour, and even sought to extend this organisational model to society
+232 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ I
+
+20 B Trentin , La citt àdel lavoro. Sinistra e crisi del fordismo ( Milan, Feltrinelli , 1997 ) ,
+French tr La Cit édu travail: La gauche et la crise du fordisme ( Paris , Fayard , 2012 ) 448 . 21 Quoted by J Querzola, ‘ Le chef d ’ orchestre àla main de fer. L é ninisme et taylorisme ’in
+Le soldat du travail (1978) Recherches 32/33, 58. 22 Lenin, fi rst version of the article ‘ The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government ’ ,
+Collected Works, 4th English edn (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972) Vol 27, 235 – 77, quoted
+Querzola (n 7) 66. 23 Gramsci, La settimana politica. L ’ operiao di fabbrica (February 1920), in L ’ Ordine
+nuovo, 433, quoted in Trentin (n 6) 244. 24 N Wiener , Cybernetics and Society. The Human Use of Human Beings ( London ,
+Houghton Miffl in , 1950 ) . 25 S Weil, ‘ La rationalisation ’(1937), in La condition ouvri è re (Paris, Gallimard, 1951) 289.
+
+as a whole. 20 Lenin thought Taylorism constituted ‘ an immense scientifi c
+progress ’ .
+21 In his words, ‘ if the masses of working people, in introducing
+socialism, prove incapable of adapting their institutions to the way that
+large-scale industry should work, then there can be no question of introducing
+socialism ’ .
+22 Trentin quotes Gramsci, for whom the industrial division
+of labour makes the worker feel ‘ the need for the whole world to be like
+a single vast factory, organised with the same precision, method and order
+that he sees as vital in the factory where he works ’ .
+23
+In its weaker interpretation, then, it is the ‘ regime of work ’ , its conditions,
+which must be humane, not the work itself. Understood in this sense,
+the ILO ’ s goal would be to make work humanly bearable, when it is not
+intrinsically so. In Norbert Wiener ’ s words, from the subtitle of his book
+Cybernetics and society, only ‘ the human use of human beings ’is to be
+taken into account. 24 And it is this weak sense which the Treaty of Versailles
+must have had in mind when it was drawn up, because, as we have seen,
+the English version of ‘ un r é gime de travail r é ellement humain’abandons
+the ambiguity of the French and settles for ‘ humane conditions of labour ’ .
+Here the human qualities do not apply to the work itself but only to the
+conditions under which it is carried out. This more restrictive interpretation
+is confi rmed in paragraph 2 of the Preamble, which gives examples of these
+conditions. None of them concerns the work as such, but only its price, its
+duration, its safety, freedom of association and the right to training. In other
+words, at issue are the quantitative terms of salaried employment but not
+the qualitative dimension of the work itself.
+In Simone Weil ’ s view, this general fascination with the scientifi c organisation
+of labour was due to the powerful hold of classical science over
+society. From the time of Galileo to the nineteenth century, classical physics
+in particular had been accredited with explaining how the world functions,
+in terms of mass and energy. The notion of energy was derived from
+that of work, understood in its most basic sense of physical force. Work
+as dehumanised mechanical energy was precisely the reductive defi nition
+Taylorism adopted. 25 The Taylorist factory is but one of the many expressions,
+to be found in every fi eld of culture, of this enthrallment to science,
+The Fordist Compromise 233
+
+26 S Weil , On Science, Necessity, &The Love of God, tr R Rees( London , Oxford University
+Press , 1968 ) .
+
+which encourages one to treat the human being as a machine. The industrial
+boom was accompanied in the second half of the nineteenth century
+by the development of the social sciences, which fl ourished on claiming to
+study human beings in the same way as things. The physical and biological
+sciences, industrial techniques, the social sciences and the scientifi c organisation
+of labour were all linked, and everything pointed to the idea that
+humans themselves could be observed and treated in the same way as things,
+and put to use without any thought for the good or the just. Simone Weil
+observed that ‘ nothing is more foreign to the good than classical science,
+since it takes the most basic work, the work of the slave, as the principle on
+which it reconstructs the world; the good is not even mentioned as a contrast,
+an opposite term ’ .
+26
+And so a consensus emerged, in the name of scientifi c progress, concerning
+the most effi cient method of working. Discussions could take place on
+working hours and on how the rewards for one ’ s labours were to be allocated,
+but not on the work itself, which was supposed to obey scientifi c and
+technical imperatives. This is what was called the ‘ Fordist compromise ’ ,
+after Henry Ford, who decided to share with the factory workers a portion
+of the productivity gains achieved through the Taylorist organisation of
+their labour. In 1914, Ford introduced a kind of ‘ welfare capitalism ’ — which
+proved to be extremely profi table and spread rapidly as a model — when he
+doubled the hourly wage to gain the loyalty of his workforce and transform
+them into clients for his cars. The overall result was to confi ne the issue of
+social justice to the three fi elds mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitution
+of the International Labour Organisation, namely the quantitative
+terms of the employment contract (salary, working time, social protection);
+physical safety at work; and collective freedoms (freedom of association and
+collective bargaining). The work ’ s organisation was treated as an entirely
+technical issue, a question of effi ciency and not of social justice, beyond the
+concerns of a political or a social democracy. The encroachment of technology
+on the sphere of justice is a constant in the contemporary history of law.
+But once technology has justifi ed the division of labour between those forbidden
+to think and those paid to do so, the nature of this division changes.
+It is no longer a fundamental injustice which the law must redress, but a
+necessary evil which the law must indemnify. As such, the aim of labour law
+ceases to be to introduce a just division of labour and ensure that each of
+us may experience ‘ genuinely human work ’( un ‘ travail r é ellement humain’ )
+but rather to provide compensation for an alienation at work which is
+henceforth deemed inevitable for most of us. This is why a ‘ caring ’Left
+has sprung up ( ‘ une gauche d ’ accompagnement’ ), making humanly more
+234 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ I
+
+27 French Code of Public Health, Art 1110-9: ‘ Every person in ill-health has the right
+to receive palliative care and support, if their state requires it ’ . (Code de la Sant épublique,
+Art.1110-9: ‘ Toute personne malade dont l ’ é tat le requiert a le droit d’acc é der àdes soins palliatifs
+et àun accompagnement’ ). 28 French Labour Code, Art L.5131-3 and R.5131f. cf F Petit , Le droit àl ’ accompagnement
+( 2008 ) Droit Social 413 – 23 . As Franck Petit points out, the French term ‘ accompagnement’ ,
+which was initially used only in the context of medical or social care, especially end-of-life
+care, is now used in French labour law to designate ‘ help ’of all sorts: ‘ Help to Work ’for young
+people; assistance for business start-ups; help for accreditation of prior learning, etc. 29 cf T Revet , La force de travail ( É tude juridique) ( Paris , Litec , 1992 ) 727 . 30 cf A Supiot , Critique du droit du travail ( Paris , PUF , 1994 ) .
+
+bearable the sacrifi ces considered unavoidable in the name of technological
+and economic progress. Ever since mass unemployment set in, the right to
+‘ care and support ’( ‘ le droit àl ’ accompagnement’ ), initially granted to the
+terminally ill (as palliative care), 27 has positively invaded labour law. 28
+The basic concepts of modern labour law refl ect this restrictive interpretation
+of the scope of social justice. The key concept of subordination makes
+obedience to orders the essential criterion of the legal defi nition of the
+employment contract, and the concept of employment encompasses all the
+securities which the law guarantees for this state of subordination: limits on
+working hours, minimum wage, hygiene and safety, job security, and social
+insurance. To employ someone is etymologically to make them bow to one ’ s
+will ( in-plicare), to im-plicate them, and employment denotes the conditions
+and limits under which a worker may be made to do this in the execution of
+his work. ‘ The right to [obtain] employment ’inscribed in the French Constitution
+is the right to receive the means to live decently from working in
+subordination to someone else. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
+(1948) gives a more comprehensive version in its Article 23, ‘ The right to
+work ’ . This article is particularly striking because it is the only one, along
+with Article 22 on social security, to link explicitly the rights it proclaims to
+the notion of human dignity. But this link is construed exclusively in terms
+of a ‘ right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his
+family an existence worthy of human dignity ’ . In other words, human dignity
+is linked to fi nancial remuneration, but the contents of the work itself
+seem to fall outside the scope of human rights.
+Labour law thus served to reconcile the two in principle irreconcilable
+legacies of the First World War: the reifi cation of labour, transformed into
+‘ labour power ’which can be bought and sold like units of electricity, 29 and
+on the other hand, the obligation for every employment contract to contain
+measures shielding the worker from the physical and economic effects of
+this reifi cation. 30 In this light, labour law has made the fi ction of labour
+as a commodity into something both tolerable and sustainable, and, along
+with social security legislation and the public services, it has become one of
+the institutional pillars of the labour market. The changing vocabulary in
+The Deconstruction of Labour Law 235
+
+31 See above, ch 1, p 25ff.
+
+this domain is instructive. With the consolidation of employment protection
+during the post-war boom years, the initial expression ‘ labour market ’gave
+way to ‘ employment market ’ . But with the neoliberal turn of the 1980s,
+the expression ‘ labour market ’won back fi rst place in political and economic
+discourse. The European Commission and international economic
+organisations kept harping on about those ‘ vitally necessary labour market
+reforms ’ — reforms which would have to be ‘ brave ’ , understandably, since
+picking on the weak takes some guts — but this refrain was in fact the code
+name for dismantling the labour law inherited from the Fordist era. Its goal
+was to inject liquidity into ‘ human capital ’in order to bring about the ‘ total
+mobilisation ’of labour power on international competitive markets.
+
+II. THE DECONSTRUCTION OF LABOUR LAW
+
+This attack on the Fordist compromise had two principle causes, as summarised
+above. 31 The fi rst was technological. The digital revolution and
+the attendant changes in our collective representations transformed our
+model of work from mechanical (the clock) to cybernetic (the computer).
+Theories of management shifted accordingly from Taylorism to management
+by objectives. The second cause was political. The collapse of communism
+and the liberalisation of trade in goods and capital resulted in global
+competition not only between companies and between workers, but also
+between different welfare and tax regimes. These changes undermined the
+country-specifi c compromises which had been achieved through welfare and
+employment legislation, between the reifi cation of work and the protection
+of the worker. And this is why we have ended up with exactly what the
+International Labour Organisation sought to avoid: today, the failure of
+certain countries to adopt humane conditions of labour has indeed become
+a real ‘ obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the
+conditions in their own countries’ . The ILO has been unable to prevent or
+even temper this regression, which is encouraged by international economic
+and fi nancial institutions and by the European Commission in the name of
+these countries ’comparative advantage in maintaining a cheap labour force.
+Politically weakened by the disappearance of East – West rivalry, the ILO has
+neither carrots nor sticks with which to urge states to ratify its Conventions
+and apply its Standards.
+The digital revolution and the new governance by numbers which has
+accompanied it have totally transformed how work is organised. It is no
+longer enough to be obedient, one must be competitive and meet everhigher
+targets as well. These are the terms of today ’ s ‘ total mobilisation ’ .
+236 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ I
+
+32 L Murard and P Zylberman (eds), Le soldat du travail, Revue Recherches. Guerre,
+fascisme et taylorisme, n°32/33 (Paris, Editions Recherche, 1978), p 518.
+
+However, this way of governing human beings already existed in a similar
+form in totalitarian regimes, as Murard and Zylberman describe in the
+case of Nazism: ‘ The only thing which matters is the constant movement
+forwards towards objectives which are constantly redefi ned [ … ]. In a State
+without laws, obeying to the letter is nothing; the healthy citizen takes his
+cue not from orders but from the supposed wishes of the leader ’ .
+32 Today,
+governance by numbers, with the supposed objectivity of its fi gures, has
+simply replaced the supposed wishes of the leader. Contemporary forms of
+human resources management no longer require workers to obey mechanically,
+like a piston or gears, but to react to signals, in order to meet preprogrammed
+objectives.
+As a result, work is no longer structured by the division of labour between
+managers and subordinates, with the subordinate ’ s work being broken down
+into sets of simple and measurable operations. Today, the capacities of all
+workers, including managers, must be mobilised. Subordinate and manager
+alike must be quick to react and to fulfi l the quantifi ed objectives assigned
+to them. The opposition between autonomy and subordination is no longer
+decisive in this new conception of work. Whereas the organisation of industrial
+labour was predicated on the distinction between independent and
+salaried work, and the subordination of those managed to those managing,
+post-industrial labour rests on programming everyone. The only differences
+are legal and fi nancial: managers get the carrot (bonuses, stock options,
+golden handshakes, etc), and the managed get the stick (lack of security in
+the job, and of job security per se). Neoliberals had their hearts set on engineering
+this break with the Fordist compromise and destroying employment
+protection, considered to be an obstacle to the spontaneous order of the
+market, and a source of extra costs and rigidities. Their way of achieving
+this was principally to introduce competition internationally between workers.
+This was made possible by keeping energy and transport costs artifi -
+cially low, such as to make relocation to countries with a cheaper workforce
+an attractive proposition. Additionally, digital technologies have enabled
+the deterritorialisation of any work dealing with signs (not with things).
+Trade union reaction has generally been to protect the status quo against
+this systematic deconstruction of labour law, a defensive position which can
+be explained by the drop in union membership and by management ’ s position
+of strength at a time of mass unemployment and the free circulation of
+goods and capital. This strategy has led the unions to withdraw into defending
+the positions least affected by the rise in unemployment and in insecure
+work, namely the public sector or, within the private sector, those in stable
+jobs. Although this reaction is understandable, unions thus cut themselves
+The Deconstruction of Labour Law 237
+
+33 See above, ch 9, p 183–84. 34 C-176/12 Association de m é diation sociale ECLI:EU:C:2014:2 . See P Rodi è re, Un droit,
+un principe, fi nalement rien ?Sur l ’ arr ê t de la CJUE du 15 janvier 2014, Semaine sociale Lamy,
+17 Feb. 2014, no. 1618, pp 11–14. 35 CJEU, 22 November 2005, Mangold, Case C-144/04.
+
+off from the world of insecure work, particularly from the younger generations,
+thereby reinforcing the dualisation of the labour market, and the
+social divide, and so intensifying the effects of the attacks on the Fordist
+compromise.
+Over the last 30 years, employment has thus seen a slow and inexorable
+erosion of the protections provided by labour law. This development is particularly
+clear within Europe. From the end of the 1970s to the enlargement
+of the European Community to ex-communist countries in 2004, the deregulation
+of the labour markets championed by Great Britain under Margaret
+Thatcher remained a marginal position. Up to the Treaty of Maastricht, her
+government managed to block almost all the draft directives in labour law;
+and in the Treaty itself, Britain managed to obtain an opt-out from the social
+clauses in the Annex. However, as soon as the European Union opened its
+doors to the ex-communist countries, Britain ’ s isolation came to an end.
+Unlike with the preceding enlargements, this one substantially changed the
+existing balances within the Union, and particularly within the Court of
+Justice of the European Union (CJEU). As the Bundesverfassungsgericht
+noted, the CJEU, which has considerable normative power, does not obey
+the democratic principle on which the Union claims to be founded. 33 Its
+composition and rules of deliberation discount Member States ’demographic
+weight in favour of a one-country-one-seat system. Its earlier case
+law had been very cautious around social issues, but after 2007 – 08 it displayed
+what were clearly neoliberal sympathies in its famous Laval and
+Viking judgement. This jurisprudential turn — the neoliberal deconstruction
+of labour law — has proved irreversible, as shown by a judgement delivered
+on 15 January 2014 in the Association de m é diation sociale case. 34 At issue
+was whether a domestic court can disapply a national provision when it is
+contrary to a principle recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights
+(today an integral part of the Treaty) and implemented by a Directive.
+In the Mangold35 and K ü c ü kdeveci cases relating to the principle of nondiscrimination
+on grounds of age, as established by Article 21 of the Charter,
+the European Court had ruled that a national court can disapply such a provision.
+The question was the same in the Association de m é diation sociale
+case, but with one difference: it concerned workers ’rights to information
+and consultation, already recognised in Article 27 of the Charter, and implemented
+through Directive 2002/14 establishing a general framework for
+informing and consulting employees in the Union. However, in this case, the
+Court refused to give any normative effect to the provisions of the Charter.
+238 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ I
+
+36 CJEU, 15 January 2014, § . 47. 37 This notion is developed in Supiot, Critique du droit du travail (n 30) 140 – 49. 38 G Bargain , Normativit é é conomique et droit du travail ( Paris, LGDJ-Lextenso, coll Droit
+&Economie , 2014 ) §541 . 39 Case C-345/89, Stoeckel ECLI:EU:C:1991:324 ; see A Supiot , Principe d ’ é galit éet limites
+du droit du travail (en marge de l ’ arr ê t Stoeckel)( 1992 ) Droit social 4, 382 – 85 .
+
+What were the Court ’ s arguments for refusing to give horizontal effect to
+workers ’rights to information and consultation, while admitting it for the
+principle of non-discrimination ?The Court held that the principle of nondiscrimination
+‘ is suffi cient in itself to confer on individuals an individual
+right which they may invoke as such ’ .
+36 And why should the right to be
+informed and consulted in the cases specifi ed by a legal instrument of secondary
+law (such as the Directive 2002/14) not also be ‘ an individual right
+which they [individuals] may invoke as such ’ ?From a legal standpoint there
+is no reason whatsoever for this exclusion, and one could even go further
+and say that the right to information and consultation is easier to implement
+than the principle of non-discrimination. There is no need to compare
+employees in order to know whether any of them have been left out of the
+bodies set up to represent them (which was the specifi c issue in this case).
+A worker ’ s right to information and consultation, just like the right to form
+trade unions, the right to strike and to collective bargaining are not unenforceable
+or simply normative claims. They are individual rights exercised
+collectively,
+37 overriding rights which must be concretised by employers and
+which the State must simply protect, as it protects all civil and political rights.
+So the Court ’ s decision, just like the Viking and Laval judgements and all
+those delivered since then in the same vein, was in no way prescribed by the
+texts. It expressed a certain conscious orientation of the Court. What it was
+doing was applying the Law and Economics doctrine, according to which
+every legal rule must be judged in terms of its economic effects. This is why
+the Court squeezes out collective freedoms, while at the same time, and just
+as energetically, it enlarges the scope of the principle of non-discrimination.
+Collective freedoms being a market force, the Court sees them as potential
+obstacles to the exercise of economic freedoms. Fighting discriminations, by
+contrast, corresponds to the search for greater liquidity of ‘ human capital ’ .
+This is naturally considered positive, since it responds to what Gwenola
+Bargain has called ‘ economic actors ’search for anonymity, the freedom to
+contract at lower rates ’ .
+38 The rights to which the Court gives the greatest
+effect are thus those which, like the principle of non-discrimination, facilitate
+the liquidity of human capital on the labour markets by obliging individuals to
+consider themselves and others as identical and interchangeable contracting
+particles, regardless of their sex, age or nationality. An example would be
+the prohibition of women ’ s night work, a prohibition considered discriminatory
+and therefore made illegal by European legislation, 39 resulting in an
+Towards a New Compromise 239
+
+40 French Ministry for Labour, ‘ Le travail de nuit en 2012 ’(2014) Dares Analyses, 62. 41 K Marx, Capital, Book One, Ch XV, § .9.
+
+increase across the board of the proportion of workers having to do night
+work — increases of 100 per cent for women and 25 per cent for men over
+the last 20 years. 40 This type of development is absolutely in line with a logic
+of total mobilisation of the labour force, and is diametrically opposed to a
+logic of work of human quality in humane conditions, which would seek to
+reduce night work for both sexes. And while the CJEU extends such rights
+with one hand, with the other it tries to stifl e the exercise of rights which
+might hamper the ‘ spontaneous order ’of the labour market, not least the
+right to contest this order, a right which can be broken down into elements
+such as, precisely, workers ’rights to information and consultation, and the
+rights to representation, collective bargaining and strike action.
+However, neither defending the status quo nor pulling apart the protections
+inherited from the Fordist era are viable long-term solutions. Those for
+whom the Fordist compromise signalled a kind of end of history of labour
+law forget Marx ’ s account of the inherent instability of modern industry ’ s
+modes of organisation. Modern industry ’ s revolutionary character is such
+that it ‘ is continually causing changes not only in the technical basis of production,
+but also in the functions of the labourer, and in the social combinations
+of the labour-process. At the same time, it thereby also revolutionises
+the division of labour within the society, and incessantly launches masses
+of capital and of workpeople from one branch of production to another ’ .
+This process fi nally ‘ destroys all the labourer ’ s guarantees of existence, and
+constantly threatens, by taking away the instruments of labour, to snatch
+from his hands his means of subsistence ’ .
+41 This is why, at the other extreme,
+asserting that a labour market has a viable future when it simply discounts
+the longer timeframe of human life is to take the fi ction of labour-as-acommodity
+as a reality, and to sow the seeds of violence, as the ILO makes
+clear in its Constitution. It doesn ’ t take genius to see that the European
+Union ’ s abandonment of the goal of social justice and its policy of methodically
+dismantling the social state inevitably undermine its political legitimacy
+and will ultimately threaten its very existence.
+
+III. TOWARDS A NEW COMPROMISE
+
+In response to the crisis of the social state, we should not be debating whether
+to protect or destroy the Fordist legacy, but rather what new compromise
+can be reached between entrepreneurial freedoms and worker protection.
+This issue has received much attention since the end of the last century, and
+the ideas emerging can be put broadly into two camps.
+240 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ I
+
+42 European Commission, ‘ Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better
+jobs through fl exibility and security ’COM [2007] 359 fi nal, 27 June 2007. 43 A Lefebvreand D M é da , Faut-il br û ler le mod è le social fran ç ais ? ( Paris , Seuil , 2006 ) 153 . 44 On these two reports, both of which are published by the Documentation fran ç aise, see
+SSL Nos 1153 and 1154. See also the Besson Report , ‘ Flexis é curit éen Europe ’( February
+2008 ) . 45 ‘ De la pr é carit é àla mobilit é : vers une s é curit ésociale professionnelle ’Report of
+2 December 2004, Liaisons soc V No 10/2005 of 11 February 2005.
+46 Those who dreamt up these new contracts apparently had no knowledge of ILO Convention
+No 158, despite its ratifi cation by France. 47 M Camdessus , Le sursaut. Vers une nouvelle croissance pour la France, Report to the
+Ministry of Finance( La Documentation Fran ç aise , 2004 ) . 48 The Attali Commission ‘ for unleashing France ’ s growth ’ , 300 propositions pour changer
+la France (2008), sharply criticised by A Lyon-Caen , ‘ Le songe d ’ Attali ’( 2008 ) RDT, 65 . 49 OECD Employment Protection Regulation and Labour Market Performance ( Paris,
+OECD, 2004 ) . 50 P Aghion , G Cetteand É Cohen , Changer de mod è le, de nouvelles id é es pour une nouvelle
+croissance ( Paris , Odile Jacob , 2014 ) 269 . 51 J-J Dupeyroux , ‘ Le rapport Minc, une nouvelle trahison des clercs ’ , Lib é ration, 17
+January 1995 , available online.
+
+The fi rst goes by the name of fl exicurity, a notion which the European
+Commission elaborated in 2007. 42 Inspired by the ‘ Nordic Model ’ ,
+43 it has
+been endorsed in France by a myriad of reports and expert opinions, all of
+which share the same vision of labour law as a variable to be adjusted in the
+light of economic policies. The report of the de Virville Commission in 2004,
+with its 50-odd proposals for ‘ a more effi cient labour code ’ 44 is an instance
+of this. The Cahuc-Kramarz Report 45 was behind the creation in 2005 of
+the contrats nouvelle embauche (CNE) and the contrats premi è re embauche
+(CPE), which came under such intense political and legal fi re (for their
+attacks on labour law) that they brought the Villepin government to its
+knees. 46 The Camdessus 47 and Attali 48 reports were effectively echo chambers
+for the demands of ‘ international economic organisations ’for a ‘ fl uidifi
+cation ’of the labour market that could ‘ dynamise ’growth. 49 And more
+recently, three eminent economists decided to endow France with a new
+social model, beginning with dismantling the minimum wage. 50 One must
+have a very short memory indeed to think that these ideas are anything new.
+They were already in circulation in the nineteenth century, to oppose the
+prohibition of child labour, and they have been constantly preached over the
+last 40 years by the neoliberal zealots who led the world into bankruptcy
+in 2008. As Jean-Jacques Dupeyroux remarked, already 20 years back, on
+reading one of the countless reports of this sort — Mr Minc ’ s, as it happens,
+for whom the culprit already then was the insane generosity of the minimum
+wage — ‘ for the last two centuries, the same neurotic obsession of the
+well-off: the workers are raking it in ’ .
+51 Who can seriously believe that in
+order to extricate France from its economic doldrums, all one has to do is
+to get rid of the seuils sociaux— whereby the employer ’ s obligations are correlated
+to the number of employees in the company — make Sunday a work
+Towards a New Compromise 241
+
+52 J Boissonnat (rapporteur), Le travail dans vingt ans (Paris, Odile Jacob, 1995) 373. 53 A Supiot(ed), Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in
+Europe ( Oxford , Oxford University Press , 2001 ) . 54 On these ideas, see the contributions in honour of Professor Jean-Pierre Chauchard by
+J-C Le Duigou , P-Y Verkindtand J-P Le Crom( 2011 ) Droit Social, 1292 – 1305 .
+
+day, do away with the minimum wage, ban legal challenges to redundancy,
+and other such wonder-working recipes invented to deconstruct labour law ?
+And this, without ever evaluating the reforms to introduce corporate governance,
+trade liberalisation and the deregulation of the fi nancial markets ?
+And without a word on the evident design faults of the Euro system ?Nor on
+the responsibility of the French economic elites themselves, who seem — to
+put it mildly — to lack something of the industrial culture of their German
+counterparts ?Would it not be a more courageous move for political and
+economic leaders to reconsider their own responsibilities before abolishing
+what meagre protections the weakest in society still have ?
+The second approach is to let work, rather than the market, take centre
+stage, and to reopen the debate on ‘ genuinely human work in humane
+conditions ’(un ‘ r é gime de travail r é ellement humain’ ). This was what the
+Boissonnat report, entitled ‘ Work in 20 years ’time ’ , did in 1995. It recommended
+laying new foundations for labour law, to include all forms of work
+and not only salaried work. 52 This idea found its way into the expert group ’ s
+Report for the European Commission, ‘ Au-del àde l ’ emploi’ , published in
+France in 1999. 53 The Report ’ s key ideas included the notion of ‘ membership
+of the workforce ’ , a status designed to allow people real freedom of
+choice throughout their working lives, enabling them to move from one job
+situation to another while also achieving work – life balance. The Report
+recommended introducing ‘ social drawing rights ’to realise this, modelled
+on special leave (training leave, parental leave, etc), so that workers would
+have the concrete means to exercise their freedom of choice. This thinking
+also helped redefi ne trade union goals in France, which were reformulated
+in terms of ‘ social security for working life ’and ‘ securing career tracks ’(the
+French trade union confederations CGT and CFDT respectively). 54
+One has only to compare, term-for-term, what is implied in these two
+approaches to understand how far apart they are. The notion of ‘ fl exicurity
+’refers to concepts of fl exibility, economic effi ciency, the market, human
+capital and employability. ‘ Membership of the workforce ’rests on those of
+freedom, social justice, law, work and capacity.
+
+Flexicurity Workforce membership
+
+Flexibility
+Economic effi ciency
+The market
+Human capital
+Employability
+
+Freedom
+Social justice
+Law and rights
+Work
+Capacity
+242 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ I
+
+55 cf F Gaudu , La S é curit ésociale professionnelle, un seul lit pour deux r ê ves( 2007 ) Droit
+Social 4, 393 . 56 R Barthes , Mythologies, tr A Lavers( London , Jonathan Cape , 1972 ) 158 . 57 See above, ch 11 , p 209ff.
+
+The fi rst approach is in line with Article 145 of the TFEU (ex-Article 125
+TEC), which prompts Member States to work towards ‘ promoting a skilled,
+trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to economic
+change ’ . The markets ’supposed needs are primary, and these must be
+met by supplying human ‘ resources ’to businesses in real time. The second
+approach is in harmony with the Declaration of Philadelphia, which enjoins
+states to promote ‘ the employment of workers in the occupations in which
+they can have the satisfaction of giving the fullest measure of their skill
+and attainments and make their greatest contribution to the common wellbeing
+’ ; and with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states
+that ‘ Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen
+or accepted occupation ’ . In the fi rst case, the starting point is the supposed
+needs of the market, to which the workforce must be made to adapt; in
+the second, the starting point is human creativity, with the goal of constructing
+a legal system and an economy through which this may best fi nd
+expression. 55
+According to Roland Barthes, ‘ History never ensures the pure and simple
+triumph of something over its opposite: it unveils, in its making, unimaginable
+solutions and unforeseeable syntheses ’ .
+56 The history of law confi rms
+this idea. The development of labour law since the millennium is the result
+of the tension between these two approaches to work. It certainly refl ects
+the new state of relations between political and economic forces, which are
+highly detrimental to workers due to the distortion between collective freedoms
+(which are recognised — where they still exist — only within national
+borders) and the freedom of capital and goods to circulate internationally.
+Among mainstream political parties, belief in the benefi ts of worldwide
+competition has achieved the status of dogma, and a broad consensus has
+emerged that the freedom of capital should have an absolute priority over
+the freedoms of work. At the opposite extreme from the Declaration of
+Philadelphia ’ s recommendations, people are at pains today not to measure
+the new international economic order in terms of its effects on social justice.
+There is a sort of taboo against doing so, with some rare exceptions
+(for example, the Report produced by the International Labour Bureau in
+2008). 57 This is why any genuinely reformist commitment has collapsed,
+with both Right and Left apparently abandoning any idea of rethinking
+social justice. They practise what Bruno Trentin, following Gramsci, calls
+‘ transformism ’ , which ‘ identifi es politics with the art of adapting to circumstances
+and with the precedence given to the governability of evolving mores
+Towards a New Compromise 243
+
+58 B Trentin , La libert àviene prima ( Rome , Editori Reuniti, 2004 ) 128 . 59 cf P Rodi è re , Droit social de l ’ Union europ é enne, 2nd edn( Paris , LGDJ-Lextenso ,
+2014 ) 33 . 60 Case C-126/86 Gim é nez Zaera ECLI:EU:C:1987:395, §17 .
+
+and of society ’ .
+58 As such, it is hardly surprising that the present climate
+
+favours taking apart rather than reinforcing what only recently was still
+called the European Social Model. The President of the European Central
+Bank announced this model ’ s fi nal demise in 2012 without anyone batting
+an eyelid. Clearly, the dominant trend is to make national legal systems
+compete against each other and to ‘ reform the labour markets ’to increase
+their reactivity and their adaptability to the expectations of investors. It
+must be said that our politicians have performed quite some feat in making
+us forget that the 2008 crisis was caused by the fi nancial markets and not
+by the labour markets combined with our countries ’deliriously excessive
+welfare provision for employees and the unemployed.
+But certain labour law reforms, however embryonic they may be at present,
+show that new defi nitions of ‘ human work in humane conditions ’are
+being explored, however tentatively. Europe already has the legal bases for
+further progress in this direction. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is
+one such instrument — if only the Court of Justice would stop spending its
+time taking the teeth out of its social clauses. And there are also the Treaties,
+and secondary law. The social objectives assigned to the European Community
+and to Member States by Article 117 of the Treaty of Rome have
+not been removed from the TFEU, despite some attempts to do so. 59 Article
+151 provides that:
+
+The Union and the Member States …shall have as their objectives the promotion
+of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible
+their harmonisation while improvement is being maintained, proper social protection,
+dialogue between management and labour, the development of human
+resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion.
+
+In the Gim é nez case of 1987, the Court judged that these provisions were
+purely programmatic, and that ‘ the general guidelines of social policy
+defi ned by each Member State [cannot] be subject to review by the Court to
+determine whether they are compatible with the social objectives laid down
+in article 117 of the Treaty (i.e. art 151 TFEU) ’ .
+60 But at the time it still
+endorsed the idea that ‘ the fact that the objectives of social policy laid down
+in Article 117 are in the nature of a programme does not mean that they
+are deprived of any legal effect. They constitute an important aid for the
+interpretation of other provisions of the treaty and of secondary community
+legislation in the social fi eld. The attainment of those objectives must
+nevertheless be the result of a social policy which must be defi ned by the
+244 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ I
+
+61 ibid §14. 62 Bundesverfassungsgericht ( ch 7fn 64), §258.
+
+competent authorities ’ .
+61 The attainment of social objectives thus depends
+
+on political will, which seems precisely to have deserted the European institutions,
+not least the Court of Justice, after 2007. But ignoring these objectives
+could well end up antagonising certain Member States. The Bundesverfassungsgericht
+’ s ruling on the Lisbon Treaty laid the foundations for a constitutional
+review of EU infringements of the basic principles of a social state.
+The judgement stated that ‘ the Basic Law not only defensively safeguards
+social tasks for the German state against supranational demands, but aims
+at committing the European public authority to social responsibility in the
+spectrum of tasks transferred to it ’ .
+62 Even in France, it seems unlikely that
+our higher courts would be able to muster such purposiveness. However,
+the French Government cannot entirely ignore the French Republic ’ s vocation
+of social justice, which is why the ‘ labour market reforms ’of 2013,
+which were undertaken to increase fl exibility, actually focused on reducing
+job insecurity. So we should be wary of any too one-sided interpretation of
+the transformations occurring in labour law, since some changes also point
+to new defi nitions of what genuinely human work and humane conditions
+could be.
+1 Bamileke proverb mentioned by J Nguebou Toukamand M Fabre-Magnan , ‘ La tontine:
+une le ç on africaine de solidarit é ’in Du droit du travail aux droits de l ’ humanit é . É tudes offertes
+àPhilippe-Jean Hesse ( Rennes , Presses universitaires de Rennes , 2003 ) 299 . 2 French Labour Code, Art L.3121-1.
+13
+
+‘ Genuinely Human Work
+in Humane Conditions ’II
+
+From Quantifi ed Exchange
+to Ties of Allegiance
+
+‘ People not purse are a man ’ s wealth ’ 1
+
+Bamileke proverb
+
+WORK CONTRACTS UNDER the Fordist system represented a
+quantifi ed exchange: for a certain quantity of work the employee
+received a certain quantity of money. The terms of this exchange —
+the number of hours worked and the level of the salary — were negotiated
+by collective bargaining. In a country like France, there were statutory
+limits set to this negotiation, namely a minimum salary, a maximum working
+time, and overtime payments for hours worked in excess of the legally
+set limit. Social law — labour law and social security legislation — has made
+this fi ction of work as a measurable quantity of time (hence a negotiable
+commodity) tolerable and sustainable because it introduces into the work
+contract protective measures which make it viable over the worker ’ s whole
+life. This covers both the worker ’ s physical and economic security, and his
+contractual freedom (via guaranteed collective freedoms). The work itself is
+not part of this construct because the employer is the only person to have
+the right to organise the time he has bought. This explains the crucial role of
+legal subordination in the qualifi cation of the work contract. Work is simply
+a quantifi able length of time during which the employee suspends his own
+volition and is at the ready to obey the orders he receives from his employer,
+or the employer ’ s representative (the worker ’ s manager). This defi nition of
+work time is statutory: ‘ Effective working time is the time during which the
+employee is at the employer ’ s disposal and complies with his or her orders,
+without being able to go freely about his or her own personal business ’ .
+2
+246 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+3 I borrow this concept from A Berque , Histoire de l ’ habitat id é al. De l ’ Orient vers l ’ Occident
+( Paris , É ditions du F é lin , 2010 ) 347ff . Berque attributes this foreclosure to the ‘ ontological
+topos of modernity ’ . 4 Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale (Soc) 3 June 2009, No 08-481. Similarly, but rejecting
+the qualifi cation of the employees as ‘ artiste interpr è tes’ : Civ 1, 24 April 2013, No 11-19091. 5 They Shoot Horses, Don ’ t They ? Film by Sydney Pollack (1969) from the eponymous
+novel by Horace McCoy. 6 See above, ch 7 , p 127ff.
+
+This ‘ foreclosure of work ’ 3 became particularly prominent through a
+well-known ruling by the French Cour de cassation in 2009, in which one
+of the stars in a TV reality show had his participation requalifi ed as a work
+contract. 4 The show, ‘ Temptation Island ’ , sought to ‘ put the feelings of nonmarried
+couples to the test ’ , when invited to spend 12 days together on an
+exotic island practising leisure activities — diving, horse-riding, water skiing
+and sailing — alongside members of the opposite sex, all of them single,
+under the watchful eye of a large number of TV cameras. In return for
+the sum of 1,500 euros, each participant agreed to ‘ let the public in on his
+private life ’ , by allowing the cameras to fi lm ‘ the interpersonal relations
+generated naturally when couples and singles live their daily lives together ’ .
+There is nothing new about exploiting human misery for entertainment; one
+need only think of Sydney Pollack ’ s fi lm They Shoot Horses, Don ’ t They ? 5
+in which victims of the 1929 Wall Street crash are recruited into a dance
+marathon, lured by the promise of prize money. Television exploits the same
+market when it promises fame to young people invited to perform before
+millions of people, in games whose rules are always the same — variations
+of the Prisoner ’ s Dilemma 6— and basically involve being prepared to do just
+about anything to outstrip the others. When some of the contestants wanted
+their commitment to the show to be requalifi ed as work contract, the company
+replied that participating for free in leisure activities is not work. The
+Cour de cassation dismissed this argument on the grounds that the participants
+‘ were obliged to obey the rules of the programme, which had been
+defi ned unilaterally by the producer, that they were given guidelines on how
+to analyse their behaviour, that some of the scenes were rehearsed in order
+to bring out their key moments, that the producers set the times at which
+they would go to bed and get up, that they were obliged to be permanently
+available, and were forbidden to leave the site or communicate with the
+external world, and that any infringement of these contractual obligations
+could be punished by dismissal from the show ’ . Since the service they provided
+consisted in ‘ taking part in obligatory activities and expressing predictable
+reactions ’ , the contract between them and the production company
+was fi nally qualifi ed as a work contract.
+Although the Cour de cassation received fi erce criticism for this ruling, it
+is perfectly sound from a legal standpoint. The notion of work, as it appears
+in the work contract is ‘ abstract work ’in Marx ’ s sense, that is, work defi ned
+‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II 247
+
+7 Marx, Capital [1887], Book 1, Vol 1, para 4, ed F Engels, tr S Moore and E Aveling
+(Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1887). 8 Civ 1, 24 April 2013 (n 4). 9 A Supiot , ‘ Les nouveaux visages de la subordination ’( 2000 ) Droit social, 131 .
+
+not by its use value, but by its exchange value. 7 The essential function of
+the work contract — and hence of the labour market — is to convert the
+infi nite diversity of human activities, and the particular meaning we give
+to each, into commensurable (and hence exchangeable) quantities of time
+and money. It was this notion of abstract work that the Cour de cassation
+invoked in the ‘ Temptation Island ’case, stating that ‘ what the participants
+contributed to the show was due to produce a commodity with an economic
+value ’ .
+8 If the employees are not at any physical or mental risk from their
+activity, it is not for the judge to comment upon its content, its meaning
+or its usefulness. These are issues only for the manager, as the relay of the
+employer ’ s prerogatives, according to the contract.
+What is most interesting about this case is not the court ’ s application of
+the criteria qualifying a work contract — on which, as it happens, it cannot
+be faulted — but the shift of meaning which management by objectives and
+participatory management have brought to the notion of subordination. TV
+reality shows are a perfect example of management by objectives and the
+fi ction it relies on: not the worker-commodity, but programmed freedom. By
+substituting programmes for commands, these new forms of work organisation
+give workers a certain amount of autonomy in how they carry out their
+tasks. TV reality shows make psychological experimentation on human
+beings into a lucrative spectacle, in which the guinea pigs obey the aptly
+named ‘ programme rules ’(rather than a manager ’ s orders). They are programmed,
+do not act freely, and express, accordingly, ‘ predictable reactions ’ .
+This limit case shows that labour law has no diffi culty integrating programmed
+activities of this sort, if their performance can be shown to involve
+a relation of subordination. However, the work contract is thereafter
+modifi ed from within: programming is now included in the notion of ‘ subordination
+’(and not simply obedience). Over the last 30 years, we have seen
+‘ new forms of subordination ’ ,
+9 which blur the limits between freelance and
+subordinated work. The evolution of labour law shows a certain autonomy
+in subordination, resulting particularly from the employee ’ s right to interrupt
+the relation of subordination for reasons of security (the right to leave,
+or to refuse to return), and from the right to pursue other activities, whether
+remunerated or not (special leave). And, symmetrically, workers who are
+freelance encounter situations of dependence in autonomy, resulting particularly
+from contracts which integrate their activity into production or
+distribution networks. These two movements complement each other, and
+transform working relations — whether salaried or freelance — into relations
+of allegiance.
+248 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+10 See above, ch 1, p 26 and ch 8, p 147ff. 11 Belgian law pioneered the ‘ activation ’of the unemployed. See D Dumont , La Responsabilisation
+des personnes sans emploi en question ( Brussels , La Charte , 2012 ) 613 . 12 Offi ce for National Statistics, ‘ Analysis of Employee Contracts that do not Guarantee a
+Minimum Number of Hours ’ , 30 April 2014, 21.
+
+These trends have amplifi ed in recent years, and so they can be analysed
+more fi nely. We shall restrict ourselves to looking at changes in the economy
+of the work contract, which has been the foundation of the labour system
+since the industrial era. Our legal analysis shows that, as the strictly quantifi
+ed exchange which previously characterised the contract declines, so ties
+of allegiance between the employer and the employee have become more
+visible. This allegiance combines two elements: a personal element whereby
+the employee is obliged to be available and responsive to the employer ’ s
+expectations at every moment; and a real element, consisting of the rights
+attached to the worker to make him or her more autonomous and less
+dependent on his present employment.
+
+I. TOTAL MOBILISATION AT WORK
+
+In a work system organised through management by objectives, total mobilisation
+requires qualities other than obedience, namely the ability to react
+in real time to signals received, in order to meet objectives assigned by a
+programme. 10 Under this new regime of work produced by governance by
+numbers, workers do not carry out orders in a timeframe agreed in advance,
+but must be prepared to respond to the needs of the market as judged by
+the employer or, if they are unemployed, by the back-to-work agencies. 11 In
+other words, they must be ready to be mobilised at any moment, and must
+spring into action when the time comes, in order to realise the objectives
+they are assigned.
+Availability and response time are the two aspects — passive and active —
+of this total mobilisation, which in legal terms takes the form of a certain
+indeterminacy in the terms of the contractual exchange.
+
+A. Availability: The Indeterminacy of Working Conditions
+
+One of the most explicit signs of the requirement of constant availability
+in this legal regime of allegiance is the ‘ zero-hours contract ’(ZHC). It
+has had immense success in the UK recently, totalling 1.4 million contracts
+at the beginning of 2014, of which 583,000 were for the person ’ s main
+employment. 12 This new type of contract reveals the ambitions of the system
+of allegiance: to make the worker totally available, and correlatively
+Total Mobilisation at Work 249
+
+13 See D Pyper and F McGuiness, Zero-hours contract, Report to Parliament, No SN/
+BT/6553, 20 December 2013, House of Commons Library, 16; I Brinkley , Flexibility or Insecurity
+?Exploring the rise in zero hours contracts, The Work Foundation, University of Lancaster ,
+August 2013 , 29 ; V Alakeson , G Cory , M Pennycook , A Matter of Time: The rise of zero-hours
+contracts, Resolution Foundation , June 2013 , 21 . 14 cf S Deakinand G Morris , Labour Law, 6th edn( Oxford , Hart Publishing , 2012 ) 3, 78ff,
+145ff . 15 Pulse Healthcare v Carewatch Care Services Ltd UKEAT/0123/12/BA .
+
+to remain totally vague as to the contents of the work. ZHC is a generic
+term for agreements where a worker is at the employer ’ s disposal, with the
+employer specifying the number of hours of paid work, and when they are
+to be carried out. 13 These contracts derived from new practices, in the context
+of drastic reductions in unemployment benefi ts, and they were initially
+confi ned to a few industries, primarily the hotel and catering trade, services
+to individuals, retailing, and the building trade. The worker ’ s availability
+in ZHC should not be confused with being ‘ on call ’ , when the worker must
+also be ready to react to the employer ’ s mobilisation orders, because in the
+latter case the length of time worked and the amount of pay received will be
+known in advance. ZHC should also be distinguished from employment ‘ at
+will ’ , which is the rule in American law, and refers to the employer ’ s discretionary
+right to terminate a contract whenever he or she wishes.
+The boom in ZHCs raises a problem of legal qualifi cation, which can
+best be addressed comparatively. Should the workers involved be regarded
+as ‘ workers ’or as ‘ employees ’ ?The closest equivalent of this distinction in
+French law is that between freelance and salaried workers. This is a rough
+equivalent only, however, because the UK does not have codifi ed labour
+law; that is, a systematic set of rules applicable to all employees. Every UK
+statute has a different scope. Some statutes cover both workers and employees,
+others apply only to certain categories of employees. However, the differences
+between the two categories of worker are discernable in case law,
+where salaried work can be summarised as work carried out: a) personally;
+b) under the supervision of the employer or his or her representatives;
+and c) within a relationship of mutual obligation. 14 This third parameter is
+the vaguest, and it is what caused the problems with the ZHC. The courts
+accordingly dealt with litigation on a case-by-case basis. In 2012, the UK
+Employment Appeal Tribunal requalifi ed a ZHC into an employment contract
+because the regularity of the hours worked in practice testifi ed to the
+mutual character of the obligations in the context of a ‘ framework contract ’
+(which the judge called a ‘ global or ‘ umbrella ’contract of employment ’ ). 15
+The fundamental issue here is whether a ‘ pure ’ZHC — that is, one
+which has no minimum guaranteed hours of work — is a contract at all. In
+French law, such a contract would be considered void. As the French Civil
+Code states, ‘ An obligation is void when it has been contracted subject
+250 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+16 French Civil Code, Art 1174 (Art 1304-2 since 2016). 17 French Civil Code, former Art 1131: ‘ An obligation without cause, or founded on a false
+cause, or an illicit cause, can have no effect ’ . The idea of ‘ balance ’replaced that of ‘ cause ’in
+2016, as the wording of the new article 1169 suggests: ‘ An onerous contract is a nullity where,
+at the moment of its formation, what is agreed in return for the benefi t of the person undertaking
+an obligation is illusory or derisory ’[my emphasis]. 18 cf H Collins , The Law of Contracts, 4th edn(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
+2003) 58ff . 19 Soc 8 October 1987, No 84-41902 and 84-41903, Bull civ V, No 541, 344 ( Raquin and
+Trappiez).
+
+to a potestative condition on the part of the party who binds himself ’ .
+16
+
+The employer does not commit himself to anything because he will only
+provide work for the employee ‘ if he wants to ’ . The employee ’ s obligations,
+on the other hand, are real enough (being at the employer ’ s disposal), but
+since there is no counterpart, the contract has no ‘ cause ’in the legal sense,
+and hence may have no effect. 17 In common law, this sort of contract should
+also be void: the contract in common law is defi ned not as a relation of free
+wills, but as a bargain which requires an offer, an acceptance and also a consideration,
+that is, something in return which has economic value. 18 So the
+ZHC is not a real contract; it is a pure bond of allegiance, which transforms
+the worker into a resource which can be mobilised at any moment.
+In French law, the requirement of availability has not given rise to such
+extreme indeterminacy concerning what each party brings to the work relation.
+But indeterminacy has nevertheless gained ground in recent years,
+partly due to changes, since 1996, in how contracts may be varied. In principle,
+for the contracting parties, contracts substitute for the law, and can
+only be modifi ed by mutual consent. In the case of the employment contract,
+however, this principle must be reconciled with the power which one of
+the parties has to control the activities of the other. The contract underlies,
+but also restricts this power. So where should the limit pass ?Until 1996,
+the guiding thread was the interpretation of the intentions of the parties. If
+the employer changed an ‘ essential ’provision, that is, one which had been
+decisive in the employee ’ s consent to contract, then this was a ‘ substantial
+variation ’to the contract, and required the other party ’ s consent. Already
+in 1987, in case law, the employee ’ s consent could not be presumed simply
+because the contract continued, and it was the employer ’ s responsibility to
+solicit the employee ’ s consent, even at the risk of having to begin dismissal
+procedures if the modifi cation was refused. 19 This change refl ected a move
+towards greater autonomy for the employee not only when entering into
+contract, but also throughout the contract ’ s execution. It implied, essentially,
+autonomy in subordination. A further step in the transformation of
+subordination was taken in 1996. The Cour de cassation, in order to decide
+if a change constituted a variation to the employment contract, replaced
+the subjective interpretation of the parties ’intentions with an objective
+Total Mobilisation at Work 251
+
+20 Soc 10 July 1996, No 93-41137 and No 40-966, Bull civ V, No 278, 196 ( Gan vie and
+St éSocorem). 21 ‘ Citoyens dans la Cit é , les salari é s doivent l ’ ê tre aussi dans leur entreprise’( ‘ Employees
+in the company should be like citizens in the State ’ ), J Auroux , Les Droits des travailleurs.
+Rapport au Pr é sident de la R é publique et au Premier ministre( Paris , La Documentation
+fran ç aise , 1981 ) 4 . 22 French Labour Code, Art L.1121-1. 23 Soc 10 July 1996, No 93-41137 (GAN vie).
+
+defi nition of the employer ’ s management prerogatives. 20 The employer
+may not vary the contract unilaterally, but he or she can impose changes
+in the employee ’ s working conditions, since this is one of his management
+prerogatives.
+The change involved here is not simply terminological, but affects how
+the employment relationship itself is conceived. It has generally been interpreted
+as strengthening the individual contract, whose binding force cannot
+henceforth be overridden by the employer, even on minor (non-substantial)
+points. There is a great deal of truth in this. In 1982, the French
+Auroux labour law reforms advanced the idea that employees do not cease
+to be citizens on entering the workplace. 21 The reforms sought to ensure
+that employees did not lose their status as legal subjects due to the employer
+’ s management prerogatives. This was why new rights were admitted,
+such as the right to leave dangerous situations or the right to have a direct
+voice; and also functional limitations were set on management ’ s powers, as
+laid down in the Law of 4 August 1982: ‘ No one may put restrictions on
+the rights of persons, and individual and collective freedoms, which are not
+justifi ed by the nature of the task to be carried out nor proportionate to
+the end pursued ’ .
+22 This fi ne principle already suggested that the notion of
+subordination was changing. Employees are not simply tools for use by the
+employer, but are acknowledged as active subjects, bearers of individual and
+collective rights, which should be preserved as far as is possible. But there
+was the other side of the coin: the law explicitly recognised the employer ’ s
+right to restrict the rights and freedoms of employees to the extent that this
+was necessary for the work to be performed effectively.
+The new rules for varying a contract pointed in the same direction. They
+‘ introduced citizenship into the company ’by preserving the attributes
+which the employee had as a contracting party, but they also strengthened
+the employer ’ s right to change the employee ’ s working conditions, by giving
+it an objective basis, whether or not the clauses were important to the
+employee. In the case at the origin of this change, the employee had not
+managed to meet the fi nancial objectives prescribed by his employer, so
+he was downgraded to his previous post, on a lower salary. The Cour de
+cassation decided that the employee ’ s refusal to accept the changes in his
+working conditions decided by the employer justifi ed dismissal for gross
+misconduct, that is, without advance notice or severance pay. 23 This ruling,
+252 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+24 See, for similar cases, the notion of ‘ blanket consent ’formulated by M Fabre-Magnan , in
+‘ Le for ç age du consentement du salari é ’( 2012 ) Droit ouvrier 459 – 70 . 25 Soc 3 June 2003, No 01-43573, Bull V, No 185, 181. 26 ibid. 27 Soc 2 February 2011, No 09-43022. See F Canut , ‘ Le secteur g é ographique ’( 2011 ) Droit
+social, 929 . 28 Soc 15 June 2004, No 01-44707, Chaussures Bailly, Bulletin civil des arr ê ts de la Cour
+de cassation ( Bull).
+
+handed down in this context of management by objectives, transformed —
+and did not simply weaken — the notion of subordination. Clearly, as soon
+as the employee regains all his attributes as a contracting party, he must at
+once be mobilised to meet all the objectives defi ned by his employer. And
+mobilisation here means accepting in advance all changes in working conditions,
+whatever the subjective importance they might have for him. The
+employment contract here implies advance acceptance by the employee of
+any changes in working conditions decided by the employer. 24
+The indeterminacy which results from this is in principle limited by the
+intangibility of the obligations which the employer has himself assumed. But
+case law brought about changes on this point also, in defi ning ‘ objectively ’
+the employer ’ s management prerogatives. This undermines the binding
+force of the contract itself, through the introduction of clauses presented as
+‘ purely informative ’into the employment contract, which are consequently
+not binding on the employer. The case at the origin of these changes concerned
+an accountant in a company. 25 Since her contract stated clearly that
+her place of work was in a Parisian suburb called Anthony, she refused
+to go and work in the company ’ s new premises some 10 miles away, but
+more than one hour away by public transport. After being dismissed for
+gross misconduct, she appealed, invoking the binding force of her employment
+contract. But in vain, because the Cour de cassation decided that ‘ the
+mention of the place of work is for information only, unless a clause states
+clearly and precisely that the employee will perform his or her work exclusively
+in this place ’ .
+26 Since then, this case law from 2003 has been confi
+rmed through the ‘ objective ’notion of ‘ geographical sector ’of activity, 27
+which overrides the indications in the contract. Despite its supposed objectivity,
+it appears extremely vague, accommodating — perhaps — the availability
+of public transport, 28 but not the distance from the employee ’ s home to
+the new place of work, which, although considered ‘ subjective ’ , was taken
+into account before the case law changes of 1996. The Cour de cassation
+subsequently took a further step towards objectifying the employer ’ s prerogatives
+when it stated that
+
+if an employee is occasionally required to work outside the geographical sector
+in which he or she usually works, or outside the limits stipulated in a contractual
+clause concerning geographical mobility, this may not constitute a variation to
+Total Mobilisation at Work 253
+
+29 Soc 3 February 2010, No 08-41412, Bull civ V, No 31. 30 On this reform, see the Law on Securing Employment, the Loi relative àla s é curisation
+de l ’ emploi (2013) Droit social, dossier, 772 – 849; A Lyon-Caenand T Sachs , ‘ L ’ ADN d ’ une
+r é forme ’( 2012 ) Revue de droit du travail, 162 . 31 French Labour Code, Art L.2242-21ff. See G Auzero , ‘ De quelques effets de l ’ ANI du
+11 janvier 2013 sur le droit du contrat de travail ’( 2013 ) Revue de droit du travail, 179 ; P-H
+Antonmatt é i , ‘ L ’ accord de mobilit éinterne: il faut l ’ essayer! ’( 2013 ) Droit social, 794 . 32 French Labour Code, Art L.5125-1. See G Couturier , ‘ Accords de maintien dans l ’ emploi ’
+( 2013 ) Droit social, 805 ; E Peskine , ‘ Les accords de maintien dans l ’ emploi ’( 2012 ) Revue de
+droit du travail, 168 . 33 See French Labour Code, Art. L 2242-22.
+
+the employment contract [ … ] if this posting is in the interests of the company,
+is justifi ed by exceptional circumstances, and if the employee is informed of the
+temporary nature of this posting, and its anticipated length, a reasonable amount
+of time in advance. 29
+
+Hence the contract must give way before the requirement of mobility or,
+more precisely, the solidity of the contractual bond is inversely proportional
+to the binding force of its content.
+
+***
+
+This erosion of the binding force of the employment contract is also evident
+in the French law of 14 June 2013 ‘ relating to job security ’ .
+30 Proposed by
+a left-wing government, it was the result of a cross-industry national agreement,
+and was meant to arrive at new compromises between fl exibility for
+the company and employment security. With this in view, two new types
+of company-wide collective agreement were invented, in order to suspend
+certain clauses in individual employment contracts. One concerned agreements
+on mobility within a company, for companies with no redundancy
+plans, but which wanted to be able to count on greater mobility from their
+workforce, between posts and geographically. 31 The second type concerned
+agreements to maintain employment, and applied to companies suffering
+from ‘ serious circumstantial economic diffi culties ’ , which were allowed,
+under certain conditions, to envisage lowering salaries. 32 In both cases, any
+employees who refused the suspension of the related contractual clauses
+would be fi red, a dismissal qualifi ed in the legislation in such a way that it
+could not lead to judicial proceedings.
+These new agreements not only relativise the binding force of the contract,
+they also impose new obligations on the employer, which would previously
+have been termed ‘ paternalistic ’ . The employer must henceforth take into
+account employees ’family situations, and see to it that they maintain and
+improve their skills. 33 Instead of a predictable quantity of time and money,
+these contracts promise a lasting personal bond. Of course, the promise
+of secure ties is often hollow, whereas the insecurity concerning the hours
+254 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+34 cf ‘ Accords de comp é titivit é : quels engagements sur l ’ emploi ?Controverse entre M.-A.
+Souriac et M. Morand ’(2012) Revue de droit du travail, 194. 35 French Labour Code, Art L.3122-6, Law No 2012-387 of 22 March 2012 on the simplifi
+cation of the law and the reduction of administrative procedures.
+36 French Constitutional Council, Decision No 2012-649 DC of 15 March, 2012. 37 Explanatory memorandum on the Directive 2003/88/EC of 4 November 2003, concerning
+certain aspects of the organisation of working time.
+
+worked and the place of work, and even concerning pay, is absolutely real.
+Yet a legal analysis shows that this shift from exchanging specifi c services to
+infeudalising persons is a deep-seated trend. The agreements on mobility and
+on maintaining employment were based largely on older plans called ‘ competitiveness-employment
+agreements ’ ,
+34 invented under a previous French
+government of the opposite political colour, suggesting that these changes to
+the work contract are subtended by an implicit political (and not trade union)
+consensus, and are not the product of a moment of political hyper-activity.
+This is but one sign of a much broader phenomenon, which is the erosion
+of the binding force of individual employment contracts with respect to collective
+agreements and habitual practice in the company. The French Constitutional
+Council decided, without batting an eyelid, that the establishment
+of a collective agreement concerning annualising the working hours, ‘ does
+not constitute a variation to the employment contract ’ . This measure had
+been introduced under a right-wing government and was not repealed when
+the Left came to power. 35 Yet it potentially imposed major constraints on
+employees, since they can no longer anticipate when they will be working,
+and it may also contradict clauses in their employment contracts, and thus
+curb contractual freedom, which is recognised as a constitutional freedom.
+The Constitutional Council decided that
+
+the law-maker intended to enable employees ’working time to be adapted to the
+company ’ s rhythms of production; [ … ] this possibility of organising working time
+without having to gain the consent of each individual employee is conditional
+upon the prior existence of a collective agreement in the company, which permits
+this sort of modifi cation [ … ]; it follows that these provisions, since they are based
+on suffi cient grounds of general interest, do not infringe contractual freedom in a
+manner contrary to the Constitution. 36
+
+Making employees adaptable to the rhythms of production is thus presented
+as justifi able despite infringement of contractual freedom. A similar spirit
+imbues Article 145 of the TFEU, which calls for a labour force that can
+adapt and react rapidly to the needs of the economy. This position implicitly
+derives from the economic analysis of law, and its balancing of law
+and effi ciency. The constitutional blessing given to employees ’adaptation
+to the rhythms of production rides roughshod over ‘ the general principle
+of adapting work to the worker ’ , as a European directive concerning health
+and safety at work, and the organisation of working time, clearly states. 37
+Total Mobilisation at Work 255
+
+38 French Constitutional Council, Decision No 2013-672 DC of 13 June, 2013. 39 cf P Waquet , ‘ Les objectifs ’( 2001 ) Droit social, 120 . 40 Soc 29 June 2011, No 09-65710, St éPrompt, Bull No 173; Soc 24 October 2012,
+No 11–23843. 41 Soc 2 March 2011, No 08-44977; 30 March 2011, No 09-42737. 42 Soc 30 March 1999 No 97-41028, St éSamsung; see also Soc 19 April 2000, No 98-40124,
+St éMoulinex; Soc 13 January 2009, No 06-46208, St éCap Gemini et Ernst Young, D 2009,
+1931, note Pasquier. 43 Soc 11 July 2000, No 98-41132, Axa Conseil; Soc 10 February 2004, No 01-45216, St é
+KPMG Fiduciaire de France, Bull No 44.
+
+The French Constitutional Council, in admitting the opposite principle — the
+employee ’ s obligation to adapt to the company ’ s rhythms of production —
+also demonstrated how little it respects the employee ’ s contractual freedom.
+We shall see that its attitude is quite different when it is the employer ’ s contractual
+freedom which is at stake. 38
+
+B. Readiness: The Indeterminacy of Work Operations
+
+New management methods seek to mobilise the intellectual capacities of
+workers. Instead of having their work broken down into a set of simple
+operations which must be performed in the shortest possible time, workers
+are driven by the results to be attained. For employees this change is doubleedged.
+On the one hand, they regain a certain mastery over the performance
+of their tasks, which can mean a certain freedom in the work, for which they
+are answerable. On the other hand, the fi xing of objectives by management
+means the obligation to produce set results while being prevented from participating
+in the meaning of the work, which can increase workers ’alienation.
+On the legal plane, this change in the forms of organisation of work
+raises the question of the place of objectives in the work contract: can the
+employer decide them unilaterally ?By what method will their achievement
+be assessed ?And if they are not met, what conclusions can be drawn ?If
+we can answer these three questions, we will be able to shed light on the
+nature of the new ties of allegiance which are forming today in the economic
+sphere.
+Fixing objectives is one of the manager ’ s prerogatives 39— or even a duty,
+if the employment contract stipulates that all or part of the worker ’ s pay
+will be dependent on achieving these. 40 For the objectives to be enforceable,
+they must fulfi l three conditions defi ned in case law: the employee must have
+been informed of them; 41 they must be realistic ( ‘ reasonable and compatible
+with the market ’ ); 42 and the worker must have the personal and material
+means to achieve them (they must have received the required training and
+have the required qualifi cations to carry out the tasks). 43
+Assessing the attainment of objectives is the corollary of the autonomy
+granted the worker to meet them. This is why issues of assessment are
+256 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+44 M Power , The Audit Society. Rituals of Verifi cation ( Oxford , Oxford University Press ,
+1999 ) 208 . 45 See above, ch 9 , p 176ff. 46 French Labour Code, Art L.1222-3. See ‘ L ’ É valuation en d é bat ’(2010) La Semaine sociale
+Lamy 1471; S Vernac , ‘ L ’ é valuation des salari é s en droit du travail ’( 2005 ) Recueil Dalloz, 924 ;
+A Lyon- Caen , ‘ L ’ é valuation des salari é s ’( 2009 ) Recueil Dalloz, 1124 . 47 Law and case law tried to set limits on the multiplication of these instruments: see above,
+ch 9, p 185ff. 48 Soc 30 March 1999, No 97-41028, Samsung , Bull No 143; Soc 13 January 2004,
+No 01-45931 01-45932, St éFollet Boyauderie Blesoise , Bull No 3. 49 Reductions in salary are justifi able if the contract states that all or a part of the salary will
+be pegged to the results obtained. This clause of variation is valid in civil law and also in labour
+law, as long as the sum can be determined, and it is not lower than the statutory minimum, or
+the amount set by collective agreement. 50 French Labour Code, Art. L 1331-2. 51 Soc 2 March 2011, Neopost. This case law establishes that potestative conditions, already
+admitted in other types of contract, can be used in contracts under labour law. cf J Rochfeld ,
+‘ Les droits potestatifs accord é s par le contrat ’ , in Le Contrat au d é but du XXI e
+ si è cle. É tudes
+offertes àJacques Ghestin ( Paris , LGDJ , 2001 ) 747ff .
+
+inseparable from systems of governance by numbers. Michael Power has
+shown in a seminal work that evaluation is the new, and far from neutral,
+core ritual of what he calls the Audit Society, and one which produces many
+nefarious effects in the way organisations function. 44 One such effect is to
+introduce new risks to mental health. 45 ‘ Employee evaluation methods and
+techniques ’ 46 cover a vast range of tools which the management sciences
+have attempted to inventory. 47 The majority are for quantitative assessment,
+but some are also qualitative, the most emblematic of these being the
+Appraisal Interview, for which the employee is expected to go back over the
+tasks he was assigned and refl ect on how he performed them.
+The legal force of objectives is limited because in the employment contract
+the employee ’ s obligations consist in using certain means and not
+obtaining certain outcomes. A decision of the Cour de cassation states
+that in general ‘ insuffi cient results cannot in themselves constitute a cause
+for dismissal ’ .
+48 But this does not mean that the setting of objectives has
+no effect on the performance of the contract. Not meeting objectives can,
+for example, justify a reduction in salary. 49 If we recall that the amount of
+salary paid is the very core of the employer ’ s obligations, and that the sum
+cannot be modifi ed even with good disciplinary justifi cations, then we will get
+a sense of how deeply management by objectives has affected the economy
+of the employment contract. 50 Henceforth, the employer can also lower pay
+after unilaterally revising the objectives assigned to the employee. The Cour
+de cassation has accepted that this is the employer ’ s right, since ‘ the employment
+contract provides that the defi nition of the objectives which condition
+the variability of the employee ’ s pay is one of the employer ’ s management
+prerogatives. ’ 51 This position goes against the rule that a reduction in salary
+cannot be imposed on employees without their consent, a rule which for
+some commentators was the pre-eminent sign of the renewed weight given
+Total Mobilisation at Work 257
+
+52 See P Waquet, ‘ Les objectifs ’(n 39) 121 – 22. 53 On this notion from case law of the ‘ personal life of the employee ’see P Waquet , ‘ La vie
+personnelle du salari é ’in Droit syndical et droits de l ’ homme àl ’ aube du XXI e
+ si è cle, M é langes
+en l ’ honneur de Jean-Maurice Verdier ( Paris , Dalloz , 2001 ) 513 . 54 The French President Sarkozy did much in this direction, but destroying the weekly rest
+day was also a priority in President Hollande ’ s economic thinking, infl uenced by the Tourism
+Minister Laurent Fabius, and the Minister for the Economy, Emmanuel Macron. 55 Beginning in 2011, the Volkswagen Group blocked its mail servers from 6.15 pm to
+7 am. The Daimler Group installed an ‘ Absence Assistant ’which removed the mail addressed
+to employees during their holidays, and suggested to the sender either that they contact another
+person, or that they resend the mail on the person ’ s return. ( Le Figaro, 4 September 2014).
+
+to the binding nature of the individual contract. 52 With this new clause,
+however, the employer can lower the pay without having to renegotiate the
+contract or start disciplinary proceedings, where using reduction of pay as
+a penalty is forbidden.
+What conclusions can be drawn from this rather technical overview of
+today ’ s total mobilisation of employees, as expressed in law ?First, it shows
+that the vocabulary imposed by the Cour de cassation, when it states that
+‘ the personal life of the employee ’falls outside the employer ’ s management
+prerogatives, is in fact misleading. 53 What falls outside are the choices
+made by employees in their private lives, which employers could previously
+monitor: employees ’ways of life, family status, religion or way of dressing.
+The power over the employee ’ s person has, by contrast, been considerably
+reinforced by management by objectives. Salaried employment had always
+involved a certain reifi cation of the person, who is both subject and object
+of the employment contract. In return for the performance of the work, the
+worker received employment protection, which constructed the worker ’ s
+professional identity, that is, a relatively stable objective form of recognition.
+But today, with management by objectives, there is, paradoxically, a
+much greater subjective investment required of the worker. The worker ’ s
+(programmed) autonomy, and the destabilisation in time and space of the
+performance of the work are major factors here. This trend is reinforced
+by the more general demand that the workforce be always at the ready.
+This obsession, which in France is shared by both left- and right-wing governments,
+is expressed most crudely in their determination to destroy the
+Sunday rest. 54 One would think that the very idea of a period of collectively
+shared time escaping the grip of the market is anathema to them, while at
+the same time the most successful German fi rms are doing just the opposite,
+reconstituting ‘ humane conditions of labour ’by deactivating employees ’
+work mailboxes during their rest periods. 55 Yet the destructive effects of
+Sunday opening or night work — which is also on the increase — on family
+life are no secret; simply, the economic indicators used under the regime of
+governance by numbers do not take these effects into account. Other signs
+of the increasing grip of governance by numbers are the new notions arising
+258 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+56 cf P-F Girard , Manuel é l é mentaire de droit romain ( Paris , Rousseau , 1911 ) 189ff .
+
+in the area of health and safety, such as work intensity and stress at work,
+harsh conditions and psycho-social risks. These risks are not only imposed
+through orders from above but also from within, through the internalisation
+of constraints and risks which, under the Fordist regime, the employer had
+shouldered alone.
+The legal limits placed on acts of allegiance show that workers are treated
+as free and rational beings: they cannot be subjected to restrictions or inspections
+without being informed in advance, and they have the right to challenge
+those which appear unjustifi ed or disproportionate in the light of the
+task to be performed. They are like free men who, having pledged allegiance
+to someone, are obliged to do their utmost to be of service to them. As for
+employers, they no longer have the right to intrude upon the employee ’ s
+private life, but they are obliged to take it into account, for example when
+they wish to impose new constraints which may be diffi cult to reconcile with
+family life.
+Additionally, employers can legitimately set objectives, but only if employees
+receive the training and material means necessary to meet these. They
+have the right to dismiss staff for economic reasons, but only if they have
+done everything possible to keep them on, including changing their conditions
+of employment or even reducing their salary. Of course, this picture
+of the legal rules applied to employment does not faithfully refl ect actual
+practice, but it does enable us to foreground the structure of allegiance, in
+which a certain number of new rights are linked to increasing demands for
+availability and responsiveness.
+
+II. THE ‘ NEW RIGHTS ’ATTACHED TO THE PERSON
+
+The fi ction of work as a commodity has thus been progressively replaced,
+in the employment contract ’ s new economy, with the fi ction of the free
+worker. This fi ction is sustained by granting employees new rights, which
+are supposed to help them assume their responsibilities throughout their
+working lives. Workers ’relative emancipation exposes them to dangers
+from which they were previously shielded. To explain this, we must return
+to the originary meaning of ‘ emancipation ’in law. In Roman law, emancipation
+fi rst appeared as the pater familias’ s punishment of his son, who
+was thus deprived of his protection 56— and of his inheritance. This punishment
+was less severe than being put to death or sold abroad, but it was
+worse than simple disinheritance. Emancipation made the child sui iuris,
+that is, it invested him with legal capacity, only if he simultaneously ceased
+to exist for his former family, and suffered a series of capitis deminutiones
+(reductions in rights). Over time, this regime of emancipation became less
+The ‘New Rights’ Attached to the Person 259
+
+57 ibid, 191 – 92. 58 On this change in the concept of capacity, see S Godelain , La Capacit édans les contrats
+( Paris , LGDJ , 2007 ), 591 ; S Deakinand A Supiot(ed), Capacitas: Contract Law and the Institutional
+Preconditions of a Market Economy ( Oxford/Portland , Hart , 2009 ) 184 . 59 Soc 25 February 1992, Bull civ V, No 122 Expovit.
+
+harsh. For example, the emancipated son could later retain ownership of
+his peculium profecticium that is, the goods he had managed to acquire
+with the money his father had given him before his emancipation. A frequent
+form of emancipation, with remancipatio patri, equated the emancipated
+son with a freedman, over whom the father had the prerogatives of
+an employer. 57
+The status of the emancipated son sheds light on the ambiguous status
+of post-Fordist workers. They are, of course, spared the Taylorist straightjacket:
+the work is not broken down into a prescribed sequence of gestures,
+and there is more autonomy in the way it is carried out. But it is
+an autonomy in subordination, which implies less contractual protection
+and more responsibility. Freed from Taylorist constraints and with greater
+scope of action, workers are also more directly exposed to the constraints
+of the market, to which they must try to adapt. In order to accommodate
+these new risks, and to ensure that workers are fully mobilisable and reactive,
+they obtain protection which is not linked to a particular profession
+or company, but rather to their person, throughout their working lives. The
+counterpart of the demand for permanent availability is thus the personalisation
+of certain rights, which, like the peculium profecticium, are attached
+to the person and enforceable against the employer. And indeed, the number
+of these employee rights has soared since the beginning of the 2000s. But,
+contrary to what one would expect from an increase in effective freedoms,
+these rights seem designed to encourage the worker to adapt to the expectations
+of the labour market, and to compensate for the loss in employment
+and welfare protection. To these new rights correspond new duties for
+the employer. The employment contract no longer obliges employers solely
+to pay a sum of money, but additionally they must ensure that employees
+maintain their work skills. Not simply their physical abilities, but also their
+mental capacities and their employability. The duty of care for the person
+of the worker, and not only for his physical well-being, had been gradually
+excluded from the employment relationship as paternalism waned, and as
+social security took over responsibility for the longer period of the employee
+’ s life. This duty is making a comeback today, but in new forms. Broadly,
+among the new obligations incumbent upon the employer, there are those
+he must discharge himself, and those he can pay an organisation outside the
+company to fulfi l.
+Supporting employees ’capacities belongs to the fi rst category. 58 This
+duty was invented by the French Cour de cassation in 1992, 59 and later
+260 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+60 French Labour Code, Art L.6321-1: ‘ Employers must ensure that employees are adapted
+to their job positions. They must ensure that employees maintain the capacity to perform their
+tasks, particularly in the light of the evolution of their jobs, of technology and of work organisation.
+They may suggest training to help boost skills or combat illiteracy ’ . 61 See below, ch 14 , and above, ch 11 , p 211ff. 62 For this notion, see G Lyon-Caen , La Pr é voyance ( Paris , Dalloz , 1994 ), 126 .
+
+became law, containing provisions on the employer ’ s obligation to achieve
+certain results (to ensure employees ’adaptation to their jobs), an obligation
+of means (ensure that their occupational skills are maintained) and a simple
+moral obligation (encourage skills development). 60 The second of these
+obligations — monitoring employee skill levels — is particularly important
+here because it is emblematic of ties of allegiance. Typically, emphasis shifts
+from law to contract to embody the master ’ s duty to attend to the longterm
+interests of those who serve him. This is the type of relation pertaining
+between contracting companies and their interlocking chain of service
+companies. 61
+
+A. Developments in Collective Social Insurance
+
+The other category of duties incumbent upon the employer covers those
+he meets through fi nancial contributions to collective funds, managed by
+a third party. The funds are private social insurance schemes ( la pr é voyance).
+62 It is worth looking at these more closely because they are the site of
+an obstinate struggle between two approaches. For one school of thought,
+these funds constitute a form of property rights guaranteed by the insurance
+market. For the other, these are social rights based on social solidarity. In
+order to grasp the importance of this divergence, we must take a brief step
+back in time.
+In France, from the abolition of the corporations to the creation of the
+social security system, social protection was in the hands of private actors.
+The initiatives came from the employees themselves, who built up precautionary
+savings, or from employers who considered they had a moral debt
+to their employees when they were old, ill, incapacitated through a work
+accident, or heads of household. These individual initiatives took on a
+collective dimension when employers turned to insurance companies to
+spread the fi nancial burden between them, and when employees founded
+mutual benefi t associations, which played the same role, as regards collective
+assistance, as trade confraternities had played under the Ancien r é gime.
+These mutual benefi t societies, which were legalised in 1852 and are today
+covered by a specifi c legal code, are non-profi t-making bodies managed by
+representatives of their members. So already at that time there were two
+types of collective protection funds, both of which were private initiatives.
+The ‘New Rights’ Attached to the Person 261
+
+63 French Social Security Code, Art L 111-1. 64 cf P Durand , ‘ Des conventions collectives de travail aux conventions collectives de s é curit
+ésociale ’( 1960 ) Droit social, 42 . These joint representative bodies ( institutions paritaires)
+were called ‘ L4 ’ , referring to the article of the Social Security Code which regulated them at
+the time.
+
+One was linked to the insurance market and the other to occupational solidarity
+schemes.
+When French social security was created in1945, it inherited this tradition
+to a certain extent. Unlike its British counterpart, which was a public service
+run by the state, French social security involved a mixture of public and
+private law. The originality of the French system was its social-democratic
+principle, according to which representatives of the interested parties themselves
+managed a system which covered the whole population. But this new
+scheme also represented a qualitative break with earlier collective endeavours.
+It was based on ‘ national solidarity ’ ; 63 it was obligatory (no longer
+voluntary); and the rights which it generated were attached to individuals
+and accompanied them ‘ from the cradle to the grave ’ . Social security is the
+primary agent in protecting career paths, and it is also the main way in
+which employers can externalise their social responsibilities. It has become
+a required third party to any employment contract, endowing employees
+with personal rights which replace their dependence on an employer ’ s paternalism.
+Since these rights are necessarily limited, the creation of the social
+security system did not do away with the need for what thereafter was called
+‘ complementary social protection ’ . The social partners were subsequently
+authorised by law to set up non-profi t-making joint representative bodies
+by collective agreement, to ensure fair distribution between the contributors
+to the fund of the burden of the sums to be paid out to employees or
+their benefi ciaries. 64 These institutions operated alongside the mutual benefi
+t societies. Profi t-making insurance companies were, however, excluded
+from schemes for complementary risk cover. At the time, it was considered
+that these complementary schemes should be based entirely on principles of
+voluntary solidarity and social democracy. This was the normative matrix
+in which complementary retirement pension schemes were set up, in 1947,
+then unemployment insurance in 1958, which was again the result of a collective
+agreement, and was managed jointly by the social partners. When
+these different regimes became obligatory, they began to resemble the social
+security system. European law treats them as all the same, even if they are
+still managed separately. For the other risks covered by complementary protection
+schemes, voluntary solidarity remains the norm.
+The ultra-liberal turn and the pressure exerted by European law as from
+the 1980s had the effect of integrating private insurance into the complementary
+social protection system, and of gradually forcing all the operators
+on this gigantic and lucrative ‘ market ’to follow the same rules. Between
+262 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+65 J-J Dupeyroux , M Borgetto , R Lafore , Droit de la s é curit ésociale, 7th edn( Dalloz , coll
+‘ Pr é cis ’ 2011 ), 1030ff . 66 cf J Barth é l é my , ‘ Les fondamentaux du droit de la “ PSC ” ’( 2013 ) Droit social, 873ff . 67 This advantage was considerably reduced in 2011 under the presidency of Nicolas
+Sarkozy. Today, these contracts are taxed at 7 % , compared to 9 %for normal contracts. They
+were criticised in the same year by the European Commission, which regards this provision as
+state aid contravening the rules of the European market. 68 French Labour Code, Art 2221-1, which states that the book of the Labour Code devoted
+to collective bargaining and collective agreements ‘ defi nes the rules for the exercise, by collective
+bargaining, of employees ’rights concerning all their conditions of employment, their
+professional training, and their social guarantees’ . 69 French Social Security Code, Art L.911-1ff. 70 Art L 911-2 of the Social Security Code gives an indicative list of these risks.
+
+1985 and 2003, no less than eight laws and ordonnances were passed. 65
+The most important of these was the Evin Law of 31 December 1989. Its primary
+aim was to bring into force, in the sector of collective protection plans,
+the European directives relating to the free provision of services regarding
+personal insurance. In the name of ‘ reinforcing the guarantees offered to
+people insured ’(the law ’ s title), the joint representative bodies ( institutions
+paritaires) and the mutual benefi t societies ( mutuelles) were obliged to have
+a certain level of capital corresponding to their commitments. This implied
+abandoning the principle of redistribution in order to fl uidify the market
+and make the three types of operators — the joint representative bodies, the
+insurance companies and the mutuelles— compete. 66 The link established in
+1945 between the various dimensions of complementary social protection —
+based on collective agreements, non-profi t-making and democratically managed
+— was thus broken. As a trade-off, the insurance companies which were
+accepted into this market had to obey certain rules inspired by the principle
+of solidarity — life-long cover, uniform fees, no individual surcharges — with
+a tax break for contracts deemed ‘ in a spirit of solidarity and social responsibility
+’ , for healthcare without any selection on medical grounds. 67
+Today, collective social protection takes the form of ‘ social guarantees ’ 68
+or of ‘ collective guarantees for employees ’ .
+69 They are fi nanced by the
+company, and attract tax incentives and favourable rates for the employers
+’contributions. In principle, they are the result of collective agreements,
+and are designed to include risks not covered by the social security, or only
+incompletely. 70 They are at the intersection of labour law, social security
+law and insurance law, and have two features in common. The fi rst is that
+their fi nancial management is externalised; collecting social contributions
+from companies and paying benefi ts to employees are tasks devolved upon
+specialised agencies. Employees thus hold a debt claim against these bodies,
+distinct from the salary claim, although it too stems from the employment
+contract. As in social security law, the involvement of a third party, who
+owes the welfare benefi ts, is a mechanism enabling the short time of the
+contract to be harmonised with the long time of the worker ’ s life, without
+The ‘New Rights’ Attached to the Person 263
+
+71 Code de la mutualit é , Art L.111-1. 72 Cross-industry national agreement of 11 January 2013 and Law No 2013-504 of 14 June
+2013. On this reform, see above, ch 13, p 253ff. 73 D Tabuteau , D é mocratie sanitaire. Les nouveaux d é fi s de la politique de sant é ( Paris ,
+Odile Jacob , 2013 ) 141ff, 146 – 47 .
+
+the latter being dependent on an employer ’ s paternalism. The other feature
+these guarantees have in common is that they spread the fi nancial burden
+across the contributing members. But the way this equalisation is organised
+is the cause of irreconcilable tensions between two different visions of the
+system. For some, this is fi rst of all a market, and as such should be open
+to competition between service providers. For others, it is the expression
+of occupational solidarity, which should be encouraged. From the perspective
+of free competition, the equalisation is achieved exclusively through
+actuarial techniques applied to aggregate risks; that is, it involves simply a
+calculation of probability, true to its vision inspired by governance by numbers.
+Consequently, it is hostile to social bonds, viewing them as nothing but
+a risk factor. From the perspective of solidarity, the role of equalisation is to
+ensure that everyone enjoys certain protections, and also to compensate for
+inequalities in wealth and in exposure to these risks. In other words, it obeys
+the rule of ‘ to each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs ’ .
+This is still the crowning principle of the mutuelles today, whose mission
+is, through ‘ securing against risk, through solidarity and mutual aid [ … ],
+to contribute to the cultural, moral, intellectual and physical development
+of their members, and the improvement of their living conditions ’ .
+71 These
+goals are of course entirely alien to the insurance market.
+When a scheme for ‘ employment security ’became law in 2013, it created
+a head-on clash between these two visions. In return for ‘ negotiation
+over anticipated economic changes ’ , that is, the weakening of the binding
+force of employment contracts, ‘ new individual rights for securing
+career pathways ’were introduced. 72 However, this resounding announcement
+proved hollow, as the very fi rst article shows: the provision simply
+extended the right to complementary cover for illness, maternity
+and accident to all employees. How are we to understand this abuse of
+language by which one of the oldest rights granted to employees — the right
+to health cover — is presented as a ‘ new right ’ ?The solution to this enigma
+can be found not in labour law but in social security legislation, which
+increasingly refuses to cover what are called ‘ minor health risks ’ . Over the
+last 20 years, as Didier Tabuteau has shown, French social security has
+operated a ‘ salami policy ’whereby it ‘ cuts up obligatory health cover into
+fi ne slices so that it is gradually absorbed, and not rejected, by the bodies
+handling complementary social protection ’ .
+73 In the context of drastic
+reductions in ‘ public spending ’ , this underhand process which privatises the
+most profi table sectors of the gigantic market in health, seems by now to
+264 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+74 For a recent overview, see the Annual Report of the Higher Council for the Future of
+Health Insurance ( Haut conseil pour l ’ avenir de l ’ assurance maladie) Paris, 2013, 273, which
+focuses on this issue. 75 M-A Le Garrecand M Bouvet , Comptes nationaux de la sant é2012, Drees, Working
+Document, s é rie Statistiques, No 185 , September 2013 . Public accounts on health 2012. 76 Source: Autorit éde la concurrence (Competition watchdog), Opinion No 13-A-11 of
+29 March 2013. 77 J Barth é l é my , ‘ Clauses de d é signation et de migration au regard du droit communautaire
+de la concurrence ’( 2011 ) Jurisprudence sociale Lamy 296 . 78 J-P Chauchard , ‘ La pr é voyance sociale compl é mentaire selon le Conseil constitutionnel ’
+( 2014 ) Revue de droit sanitaire et social ( RDSS) 4 . J Barth é l é my , ‘ Le concept de garantie sociale
+confront é àl ’ article L.1 du code du travail et la d é cision des sages du 13 juin 2013 ’( 2013 )
+Droit social 673 – 79 ; and by the same author, ‘ Protection sociale compl é mentaire. La survie des
+clauses de d é signation ’ ( 2014 ) Droit social, 10 .
+
+be irreversible. 74 The total expenditure on health in 2012 was 243 billion
+euros, the equivalent of 12 per cent of the GDP. 75 But — through the magic
+of governance by numbers — one has only to privatise the service for the
+fi gure to disappear from the expenditure column and transform miraculously
+into an economic growth factor for the nation. This is what occurred
+with the market in health protection, which represented 31.1 billion euros in
+2011, 76 a fi gure which automatically increases every time the social security
+reduces the number of situations it covers. It is much clearer, in this light,
+why complementary health cover was given such a high profi le in the law on
+employment security. Far from giving employees ‘ new rights ’to help them
+face the increased insecurity of the job market, these rights simply tempered
+the effects of the reduced health cover provided by the state ’ s social security,
+while at the same time the methodical privatisation of health cover continued,
+under the label of reducing ‘ public expenditure ’ .
+
+B. The Market versus Solidarity
+
+There remained, then, the issue of the type of privatisation to choose:
+should there be free competition and the insurance market, or national
+solidarity systems and non-profi t-making bodies ?The generalisation of
+complementary health insurance, introduced with the law of 2013 on
+employment security, gave the insurance lobby the chance to table this
+vexed issue, which had been coming back and back ever since 1945. The
+2013 law authorised the social partners to develop ‘ a high degree of solidarity
+’within occupational sectors, by providing that a single body should
+handle this protection. In 2011, the lawfulness of designating this one body
+was recognised by the Court of Justice of the European Union, despite
+its penchant for economic liberalisation. 77 But the French Constitutional
+Council handed down a decision of infringement of the right to free enterprise
+and freedom of contract, and achieved the near-impossible in not even
+mentioning solidarity. 78 Whereas this decision satisfi ed a long-standing
+The ‘New Rights’ Attached to the Person 265
+
+79 Quoted by S Chabas , ‘ Compl é mentaire sant é : le Conseil consti tutionnel rejette les
+“ clauses de d é signation ” ’ , Batiactu.com , 14 June 2013 www.batiactu.com/edito/complementaire-sante---le-conseil-constitutionnel--35457.php(accessed
+2 August 2014). 80 Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, para 13.
+
+demand on the part of the insurance sector, small and medium-sized businesses
+regarded it as a disaster, and stressed the vulnerability of small businesses,
+henceforth exposed to the ‘ soliciting and pressures of all sorts which
+the insurance sector will not hesitate to exert ’ , as the representative of the
+Union of Artisans stated. 79
+The generalisation of complementary health insurance highlighted two
+very different conceptions of the rights designed to protect the worker ’ s
+employment over time. The version chosen by Parliament was that of collective
+guarantees which are realised individually. They are collective not only
+because of the nature of the act which creates them (a collective agreement),
+but also because the agreement ’ s signatories are authorised to ground these
+rights in a regime of solidarity managed by the representatives of those who
+fi nance it. When these individual rights, which are meant to secure employees
+against risk throughout their working lives, are backed up by this sort of
+regime of solidarity, these rights are social rights. The conception imposed
+by the French Constitutional Council was, by contrast, that of purely individual
+rights, which are not rooted in a regime of solidarity between members
+of the same profession, but in a debt claim against a fi nancial body or
+insurance company. In other words, these are not strictly speaking social
+rights but patrimonial rights, based not on solidarity but on capitalisation.
+This second, purely fi nancial, vision supports an expansionist market forever
+in search of greater liquidity of ‘ human capital ’ . It ousts the principle
+of solidarity, increases inequalities between employees, and endorses the
+‘ Matthew effect ’ , whereby those who have will receive even more, and those
+who have not will receive even less. As the latest developments in other areas
+of social protection have shown, one of the determinant conditions of the
+system ’ s effi ciency is protection of the principle of solidarity. A particularly
+striking example of this is professional training. The French Constitution
+states that ‘ the Nation guarantees equal access of the child and the adult to
+instruction, professional training and culture ’ .
+80 The ‘ Delors ’Law of 16 July
+1971 realised this social guarantee, and laid the foundations for the French
+system of continuing professional development (CPD). At the time, it was
+decided to set up a market in training services, rather than making CPD into
+a public service (like education), or linked to a non-profi t-making regime of
+solidarity. So on this particular market, a demand for training from companies
+meets a supply from training providers. The system is fi nanced not
+by welfare contributions but by taxes. Companies must spend at least a
+minimum sum on training, which may be partially spent by the training
+activities they organise for their own staff; the rest is handed over to certifi ed
+bodies, whose structure is repeatedly rethought. Since 2009, these bodies
+266 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+81 French Senate, Report No 359 (2013 – 2014) by M Claude Jeannerot representing the
+Commission for Social Affairs, submitted on 12 Feburary 2014. 82 Cross-industry national agreement (ANI) of 18 December 2013 and Law No 2014-288 of
+5 March 2014. This reform increased the fi nancing and the role of the Fund set up by the social
+partners for safeguarding career paths. 20 %of the Fund will be pooled across industry sectors
+to benefi t the employees of small businesses, who lost out heavily in the previous system, which
+was entirely founded on the idea of regulating a market in professional training. 83 French Labour Code, Art L.6323-1, modifi ed by Law No 2014-288 of 5 March 2014. 84 French Labour Code, Art L.6323-3.
+
+must jointly represent the social partners, and cannot themselves be training
+providers. This market in training is regulated by industry-level collective
+negotiation and by central government and regional administrations.
+Despite the many attempts since 1971 to reform this market, it has continued
+to generate considerable inequalities in access to training. Those
+who lose out the most are small- and medium-sized enterprises, women,
+and job-seekers — the sign that the ‘ Matthew effect ’is indeed taking its toll.
+As a recent report to Parliament states: ‘ The system is so unsuccessful in
+redistribution that SMEs of 10 to 49 employees fi nance the training policies
+of larger-sized businesses to the tune of 50 million euros. Less than 3 %of
+the sums collected for training provision are disparity-adjusted to the benefi
+t of SMEs. ’ 81 This report illustrates the ongoing inequalities generated by
+dismissing the principle of solidarity when establishing rights attached to
+the employee ’ s person. In the case of professional training, these inequalities
+were so glaring that in 2014 a cross-industry agreement between the social
+partners became law, in order to include an element of solidarity in favour
+of small business employees, and not simply follow the rules of the market
+in professional training. 82 Another effect of this relative retreat of market
+logic in favour of the principle of solidarity was the law ’ s provision for the
+creation of a personal training account open to all individuals, and valid
+from leaving school right up to retirement. 83 The account is available not
+only for employees in work. It can be used by account-holders as they wish;
+for example, they do not have to obtain their employer ’ s consent to the
+training — which is partly fi nanced by the company — if it takes place outside
+of working hours. Lastly, ‘ the account-holder ’ s accumulated training hours
+are not lost when changing jobs or in the event of loss of employment ’ .
+84
+This is called the ‘ portability ’of professional training rights, which, like a
+savings account, can be drawn on throughout the individual ’ s life in the
+case of career diffi culties or, at the other extreme, to achieve new career
+goals.
+Although many of these ‘ new rights ’attached to the individual — working
+time accounts, skills ’assessments (or skills’ ‘balance sheets’ — bilans de
+compétence), personal training accounts, etc — use a vocabulary drawn from
+banking, this does not necessarily mean that they are backed on capitalisation.
+As part of the individual ’ s labour force status, they are inalienable
+The ‘New Rights’ Attached to the Person 267
+
+85 cf P Catala( 1966 ) ‘ La transformation du patrimoine dans le droit civil moderne ’ , Revue
+trimestrielle de droit civil 185, 185 ; J Audier , Les Droits patrimoniaux àcaract è re personnel
+( thesis , LGDJ , 1979 ) ; J Ghestin , G Goubeauxand M Fabre-Magnan , Trait éde droit civil:
+Introduction g é n é rale, 4th ed( Paris , LGDJ , 1994 ) 217f, 170ff . 86 Nguebou Toukam and Fabre-Magnan (n 1) 299. 87 cf A Supiot , ‘ Du bon usage des lois en mati è re d ’ emploi ’( 1997 ) Droit social, 229 – 42 ;
+A Supiot (ed), Beyond Employment. Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in
+Europe ( ch 12fn 53) 90ff.
+
+and non-distrainable. They are a grey area between patrimonial and nonpatrimonial
+rights. 85 And above all, they are mostly backed by the solidarity
+of the members of an occupational group, and not by an amount of capital.
+As such, these rights are a modern version of a type of wealth well known
+in some traditional societies, in which a person is rich not because they have
+accumulated a pile of gold but because they have forged links with a suffi
+cient number of other people to be able to rely on their help. ‘ People not
+purse are a man ’ s wealth ’ , as a Bamileke proverb puts it. 86 The rich man is
+one who has ‘ lots of people ’he can rely upon. This does not dispense with
+the need for contingency planning, but, as in the case of African tontines,
+the safest savings prove to be those backed up by solidarity between people,
+who are, by turns, creditors and debtors in the same system.
+Yet the idea of economic security underpinned by solidarity between people
+rather than by an individual ’ s capital is anathema to ultra-liberal dogma.
+It regards society as a collection of subjects surrounded by objects, in which
+the alpha and omega of the subject ’ s relation to the object is individual ownership.
+That is why ultra-liberals have such immense diffi culty envisaging
+human beings as interconnected with their lived environments, both social
+and natural.
+The concept of ‘ social drawing rights ’is useful for understanding these
+new rights attached to the person, as well as their similarities and differences
+from social security, which also embodied a return to rights founded
+on solidarity. 87 These rights are attached to the person of the worker and
+not to their employment, which is why they can ensure the person ’ s continuing
+status within the workforce whatever the disparities and discontinuities
+in their working lives. They allow employees to step outside the relation
+of subordination and devote themselves for a time to another socially useful
+activity. They are drawing rights, because they can only be ‘ drawn ’ , or
+exercised, under two conditions: attaining a certain level of ‘ reserves ’ , and
+the decision to use these. And they are social rights, not only in the way
+they are constituted (different sources of matching funds, mobilising different
+circles of solidarity), but also in their objectives (exercising these rights
+gives access to socially useful activities). Social security protects against the
+risks of everyday life, while social drawing rights enable people to have real
+freedom of choice in how they conduct their professional lives. Recent legislation
+on ‘ securing career paths ’seems to adopt the perspective of these new
+268 ‘Genuinely Human Work in Humane Conditions’ II
+
+rights, particularly with respect to professional training and development,
+and health and safety at work. However, the overwhelming tendency is still
+for work to be conceived in a reifi ed way, as ‘ human capital ’held hostage
+to the total market. We can see, therefore, that ties of allegiance are indeed
+advancing inexorably, but the form they take is not set in stone. All depends
+on the strength of collective action and the political responses to it.
+The employment relationship has always been at the heart of how people
+are governed in the modern age. This somewhat austere legal analysis of its
+contemporary metamorphoses was the prerequisite for proceeding to identify,
+in more general terms, the structure of the ties of allegiance developing
+at all levels of our societies.
+1 ‘ Whosoever benefi ts bears the burden ’ , Liber Sextus Decretalium, De regulis juris, LV.
+On this adage, see H Rolandand L Boyer , Adages du droit fran ç ais, 4th edn( Paris , Litec , 1999 )
+913 – 20 . 2 OECD Report by the NCP of France, ‘ Implementation of the OECD Guidelines in the
+textile and garment supply chain ’ , 2 December 2013.
+
+14
+
+The Structure of Ties of Allegiance
+
+Ubi emolumentum, ibi onus. 1
+
+THE TIES BETWEEN controlling companies and subsidiaries, and
+imperial states and controlling companies, have a similar structure
+to the ties of allegiance examined above, which are operative in the
+individual employment relationship.
+
+I. ALLEGIANCE IN BUSINESS NETWORKS
+
+A vivid image of the ties of allegiance operating in business networks
+is provided by a particularly monstrous case, that of the Rana Plaza disaster
+and its aftermath. The facts were widely reported in the Press: a Bangladeshi
+garment factory situated on the outskirts of Dhaka supplied cheap clothing
+to many Western retailers. On 24 April 2013, the company ’ s premises in the
+building called Rana Plaza collapsed, causing 1,133 deaths, most of them
+women workers, and 2,000 injured, many of them handicapped for life. The
+images of this industrial catastrophe, the largest since the Bhopal disaster in
+1984, were seen the world over, turning the spotlight — for a brief moment —
+on the realities of work in poor countries in the age of globalisation.
+The day before the accident, cracks had been observed in the building,
+which was in imminent danger of collapsing. 2 The building was then evacuated.
+The following day, the female garment workers, under the threat
+of fi nes and wage deductions, were forced to return to their workstations.
+Designed as residential accommodation, the building was built on marshy
+ground and its use violated the most basic safety regulations. Without permission,
+four extra fl oors had been built on top of the initial fi ve. A generator
+had been place on the roof, and its vibrations, coupled with those of the
+machines, caused the building to collapse. The garments found in the rubble
+270 The Structure of Ties of Allegiance
+
+3 L Joffrin , Le Nouvel Observateur, 24 April 2014 . 4 Cited by H Wesseling , Le Partage de l ’ Afrique ( Paris , Deno ë l, 1996; Gallimard, coll
+‘ Folio ’ , 2002 ) 169 ; Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880 – 1914 (Westport, CT,
+Praeger Publishers Inc, 1996).
+
+had labels from many big Western brands, especially French (Auchan, Tex
+(Carrefour), Cama ï eu, Casino and Leclerc), Italian (Benetton), English
+(Primex) and American (Walmart, among others).
+
+Figure 14.1: Rana Plaza, 24 April 2013 ©Abir Abdullah
+
+This accident gave the lie to the fable that globalisation provides workers
+in emerging economies with a fulfi lling and prosperous life. For a while, it
+drew the Press ’ s attention to the social impact of the new forms of organisation
+of work in the globalised economy. And since it risked casting doubt
+on the civilising virtues of economic globalisation, the latter ’ s devotees
+were quick to stress the proper message. In the words of the Editor of a
+major French Left-wing weekly, ‘ We would be quite wrong to embark on
+an angelic condemnation of globalisation or declare that its days are numbered
+[ … ] For these young women, the workshop is preferable to the family
+and the economic oppression they experience in rural areas. Paradoxically,
+their job at Rana Plaza gave them a form of freedom. ’ 3 This colonial discourse
+in a new guise claims, as it did previously, that one can decide from
+Paris what is good for these ‘ natives ’in southern countries, while bracketing
+out the fact that some died crushed by the steamroller of all-out trade.
+The President of the Chamber of Commerce in Lyon had already — at the end
+of the nineteenth century — summed it up: ‘ civilising people means teaching
+them to work in order to buy, trade, and spend ’ .
+4 Conscious of their
+Allegiance in Business Networks 271
+
+5 See above, ch 6 , pp 103–195. 6 M Friedman , ‘ The Social Responsability of Business is to Increase Its Profi ts ’ , The New
+York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970 . 7 cf O Favereau , ‘ La “ fi n ”de l ’ entreprise priv é e ’in A Supiot(ed), L ’ Entreprise dans un mode
+sans fronti è re ( Paris , Dalloz , 2015 ) .
+
+image, most of the Western fi rms involved in the tragedy made much of
+their ‘ social responsibility ’ , but when the Press — whose role regarding the
+deregulation of international trade is similar to that played by the major
+industrial-era strikes — voiced its indignation, these companies were forced
+to confront their real responsibilities. Faced with pressure from the media,
+and from two international organisations which had developed good practice
+guidelines in the area of corporate social responsibility — the ILO and
+the OECD — these companies, which in 2013, the year of the accident, raked
+in 24.5 billion dollars from Bangladesh, were obliged to take action to prevent
+such accidents in the future.
+This event shows that removing barriers to trade also has negative effects
+for transnational companies. On the one hand, they have thrown off
+state control and can thus freely relocate, and practise fi scal, employment
+and environmental forum shopping. The larger companies create networks
+across the globe, in which they enslave smaller companies. On the
+other hand, they enter a sort of legal vacuum which exposes them to new
+risks, which they attempt to contain by brandishing their capacity for selfregulation
+and their ‘ social responsibility ’ .
+As long as the international legal order was made up of juxtaposed sovereign
+states who controlled their own frontiers, business activities were
+situated at the intersection of private and public law. The state dealt with
+what the Digest calls ‘ sacred things ’ , that is, the domain of things which are
+beyond calculation, such as personal status and the survival of the political
+community. 5 Relieved of this responsibility, exchanges between individuals
+could then be pursued purely according to a logic of calculated utility.
+Milton Friedman ’ s famous line that ‘ the one and only social responsibility
+of business is to increase its profi ts ’ ,
+6 can be seen as displaying a very
+primitive conception of business, 7 but it is not in itself scandalous: as long
+as entrepreneurs obey the law and pay their taxes, there is indeed no reason
+why they should be required to envisage occupational and environmental
+issues over the longer period of human life. Small businesses operate within
+these limits, but today transnational companies escape state control because
+of trade deregulation, and are allowed to choose the laws most profi table
+to them from the whole planet. In other words, the present context enables
+them to elude what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
+calls the rule of law.
+The Rana Plaza disaster is a tragic illustration of the opportunities
+and risks for transnational fi rms of stepping outside the law. They can
+272 The Structure of Ties of Allegiance
+
+8 cf Le Figaro, 1 May 2013. 9 Source: Fairwear Foundation, cited in the OECD Report, Annex 7, 107. 10 See above, ch 11 , p 221ff.
+
+ignore workplace and environmental rules, and drive their profi ts to giddying
+heights by using what Pope Francis has rightly called ‘ slave labour ’ ,
+8
+through the intermediary of subcontractors. The collapse of the relative cost
+of labour in the price of a T-shirt sold on Western markets is painful proof of
+this. It stands at 0.6 per cent; that is, at 1/100th of the distributor ’ s margin: 9
+
+BREAKDOWN OF THE PRICE OF A T-SHIRT
+
+Margin
+of the store*
+Margin
+of the brand
+
+Intermediaries
+
+Source: Fairwear Foundation
+
+Margin of the factory in
+Bangladesh
+General
+expenses
+Worker's
+salary
+
+Cost of
+material
+Cost of
+transport
+
+Price
+OF THE
+
+T-SHIRT
+
+*All costs related to the sale in store are included: personnel, rent,
+margin of the shop, VAT, etc.
+
+Figure 14.2: ©Collectif É thique sur l ’ é tiquette. (The author thanks the Collectif
+for its kind permission to reproduce this fi gure.)
+
+But on the other hand, these multinationals run the risk of having to answer
+for violations of fundamental human rights, when the over-exploitation of
+human beings and natural resources becomes known to the public. Unlike
+the integrated production chain of the Fordist manufacturing system, transnational
+businesses create networks of autonomous legal and economic entities,
+in a typically feudal structure. 10 Legally speaking, these companies are
+not liable for any wrongdoings committed, or risks incurred, by their subsidiaries,
+their sub-contractors or their suppliers. Legal personality protects
+them from prosecution if there is an accident. To a certain extent, therefore,
+this mode of work organisation enables the sites of economic power to be
+separated off from the sites of imputation of liability, as the last 20 years of
+sub-standard food product scandals have shown on numerous occasions.
+The other side of this coin, however, is that the transnationals no longer
+Allegiance in Business Networks 273
+
+11 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 13 May 2013. 12 The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, 13 July 2013. These Agreements can be
+found in full in the OECD Report, ‘ Implementation of the OECD Guidelines in the textile and
+garment supply chain ’ , Annexes 5 and 6.
+
+have direct control over manufacturing conditions, and the indirect control
+they try to keep is diluted along the chain of sub-contractors and suppliers.
+This has two negative consequences for them: they lose their technical skills,
+such that their vassal companies can one day become their competitors —
+one of the bitter truths to emerge from European and American fi rms ’conquest
+of the Chinese market; and they also risk fi nding themselves at the
+centre of a humanitarian and ecological scandal, their brand name dragged
+through the mud in the media, spattered with the blood of the female garment
+workers of Rana Plaza. In such cases, the fa ç ade of legal personality is
+no longer much help to them because public opinion, that is, their customers,
+will hold them responsible.
+As a result, major businesses have chosen to restructure their relationships
+with suppliers and sub-contractors to avoid being held directly responsible
+for work-related or environmental damage. They want to be able to monitor
+their activities and provide them with the means to operate in a responsible
+fashion. Although technically the ties of allegiance forged between
+companies are not the same for a relation between parent company and
+subsidiary, contracting company and contractors, or clients and suppliers,
+these relations are all modes of vassalage, and can consequently be treated
+together. The relation of vassalage becomes clearer if we compare it with the
+relation of salaried employment and its recent transformations, as discussed
+in the last chapter. Allegiance in employment is perceptible in the employee ’ s
+autonomy-in-subordination with respect to the employer; as we have seen,
+where the bond of allegiance requires greater commitment from the employee
+’ s person. Employees can no longer simply obey orders mechanically for a
+certain length of time in a certain place prescribed in advance, but they have
+to be totally mobilised to achieve the objectives assigned, and they must
+also accept the related performance evaluation procedures. In exchange, the
+employer must be mindful of employees ’mental and physical health, and
+their professional capacities, in order to maintain their ‘ employability ’on
+the labour market.
+Similar ties of allegiance are formalised in the two agreements signed after
+the Rana Plaza disaster, one between mostly European companies, 11 the
+other between North American ones. 12 The ‘ American ’agreement was less
+restrictive, and made sure the unions had no hand in supervising its application.
+The ‘ European ’agreement was more ambitious and provided more
+food for thought. It was signed, on 15 May 2013, by a number of multinationals
+and the international unions of the relevant industry sector, Industri
+ALL and Uni Global Union, under the auspices of the ILO. It was applicable
+274 The Structure of Ties of Allegiance
+
+13 Le Monde, 14 October 2014.
+
+for a fi ve-year period, during which security and fi re risk inspections in the
+textile industry would be stepped up, and workers ’health and occupational
+safety conditions would be improved. To date, the agreement applies to 103
+brands of purchasers, with planned inspections of 1566 factories. Its implementation
+is supervised by a steering committee chaired by a representative
+of the ILO and comprising equal numbers of customer companies and trade
+unions. A binding dispute settlement mechanism has also been devised.
+The Agreement has fi ve goals: to set up credible inspections; to work on
+prevention, ensuring that factories comply with safety standards; to provide
+training on safety issues; to introduce a bottom-up communications system;
+and to guarantee transparency on the audited sites (access to data). The signatory
+companies have pledged funds corresponding to the pro rata value
+of their orders, to train the inspectors, carry out the inspections, and to get
+factories up to standard. The fi rst inspection report was delivered in autumn
+2014: it revealed 80,000 infringements of safety rules, and prescribed work
+estimated at more than one billion dollars. 13
+Three features of ties of allegiance become apparent in this collective
+formalisation of relations of production. The agreement confi rms suppliers
+’dependence because they are obliged to accept the inspections commissioned
+by the consortium of signatory companies, and they must apply the
+corrective measures prescribed by the inspectors, and implement the training
+programmes on staff safety. The economic penalty for non-compliance
+is extremely harsh: they will not be allowed to trade with any of the companies
+which are parties to the agreement, a situation which amounts to
+economic banishment. This dependence means that suppliers must bare all
+for the signatory companies, just like employees in their appraisal interviews.
+Secondly, the customer companies must support their suppliers so that they
+can assume their new responsibilities. This requires the economic relationship
+to be viewed in a long-term perspective, a dimension usually ignored
+by ‘ value-creating ’cost-killers. The customer companies vow to ‘ maintain
+long-term sourcing relationships with Bangladesh ’and to negotiate terms
+such that the supplier factories are fi nancially able to ‘ respect the security
+requirements stipulated in the Agreement ’ . This support can also take the
+form of fi nancial aid provided by the main company to the supplier. The
+agreement also sets up a system of fi nancial solidarity between the signatories,
+whereby the amount contributed by each company for inspection and
+training is proportional to its turnover in Bangladesh. Together with the
+adoption of shared safety standards, this mutualised auditing framework
+functions as a genuine working conditions watchdog, so that the costs of
+safety at work are never the object of a competitive race to the bottom.
+Lastly, the agreement establishes that customer – supplier relations are jointly
+Allegiance in Business Networks 275
+
+14 The scope of this right includes: a guarantee of employment during the works to implement
+security standards; the right to withdraw from dangerous situations; the right to collective
+representation (50 %on health and safety committees, which are to be created by the
+Agreement); a complaints procedure. 15 French Labour Code, Art L.8222-1, which obliges customer companies to ensure their
+sub-contractors are not employing illegal workers. 16 Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 25 September 2012, No 10-82938 ( Erika case),
+Revue de droit des transports, October 2012, No 4, comm, Martin Ndend é . See P Delebecque ,
+‘ L ’ arr ê t “ Erika” : un grand arr ê t de droit p é nal, de droit matitime ou de droit civil ? ’( 2012 )
+Recueil Dalloz, 2711 .
+
+and severally liable with respect to certain third parties. The supplier ’ s
+employees can thus get behind their employer ’ s fa ç ade of legal personality,
+and submit their case directly to the customer company to which their
+employer is answerable. The customer company consequently has a right
+to intervene in the management of the supplier ’ s staff on issues concerning
+the application of the agreement. 14 This Agreement, considered exemplary
+not only by the unions, but also by the ILO and the OECD, is indeed a
+model of its kind, due to its international dimension and its standard-setting
+character. Although its geographical focus is limited (the textile industry in
+Bangladesh), as is its material range (the safety of buildings, fi re prevention),
+its normative structure is much the same as many mandatory provisions
+already present in domestic and European law.
+Transnational companies are not, however, the only ones to develop a
+legal defi nition of allegiance. The relations of dependence between companies
+have long been the object of legislation and case law in domestic
+law, where the same three characteristics are evident: the supervision of the
+vassal by the suzerain; the support of the suzerain by the vassal; and the
+responsibility of the suzerain for the doings of the vassal.
+As customers, multinationals have thus been given the power and the duty
+to supervise the supply chain, and to combat illegal work by checking their
+subcontractors ’registration and employee declarations. 15 A similar legal
+obligation emerged from the Erika case, concerning the chartering of shipping
+vessels. The Erika ecological disaster in the Atlantic was caused by the
+break-up in heavy seas of a 25-year-old oil tanker unfi t to sail. The company
+Total denied civil and criminal liability, on the grounds that it was neither
+the owner nor the charterer of the vessel, since the transport contract had
+been drawn up by one of its subsidiaries. However, Total was found guilty
+of not exercising ‘ the due diligence incumbent upon it ’ , insofar as it had not
+carried out the technical checks which it had itself envisaged, in accordance
+with which it ‘ had the right to board the tanker Erika, to observe operations
+of loading and unloading, to inspect the cisterns and to have access to
+the ship ’ s documents, all of which gave it the power to supervise the cargo
+and also the ship ’ s functioning ’ .
+16 Here, French law mirrored the solutions
+found by the USA after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, since in American law
+276 The Structure of Ties of Allegiance
+
+17 According to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, ‘ any person owning, operating, or demise
+chartering a vessel ’is liable for the pollution it causes. 18 French Commercial Code, Art L.442-6-I. See R Libchaber , ‘ Relation commerciale é tablie
+et quasi-contrat ’( 2010 ) R é pertoire du notariat Defr é nois 1, 114 . 19 Crim 11 March 1997, No 95-82009, SCA La Moutonnade. 20 French Labour Code, Art L.2323-16. 21 This conclusion can be deduced from the decision of the Labour Division ( Chambre
+sociale) of the Cour de cassation, Goodyear Dunlop of 1 February 2011, F-P + B, No 10-30.045,
+10-30.046, 10-30.047, 10-30.048. The Commercial Division is much less bold, and tends to
+keep the iron curtain of legal personality down, for example, in order to protect a parent company
+from liability for its subsidiary ’ s bankruptcy, even when its actions were contributory factors.
+(Chambre commerciale, 3 July 2012, Sodim é dical, No 11-18026 (2012) Recueil Dalloz,
+2212, obs R Dammann and Sl Fran ç ois). 22 Case C-97/08 P Akzo Nobel v Commission 2009 I-08237 .
+
+all those directly or indirectly involved in a transport are considered liable,
+a rule which prompts charterers to check the conditions under which their
+contracted transporters operate. 17
+Concretely, the duty to support means that the suzerain company must
+make sure that its vassals are economically viable. This duty is enshrined in
+the French Commercial Code for the relations between large retailers and
+their suppliers, in the form of a prohibition on
+
+subjecting or seeking to subject a trading partner to obligations that create a
+signifi cant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties; obtaining, or
+seeking to obtain clearly abusive terms concerning prices, payment times, terms
+of sale or services that do not come under the purchase or sale obligations, under
+the threat of an abrupt total or partial termination of business relations; abruptly
+breaking off an established business relationship, even partially, without prior
+written notice commensurate with the duration of the business relationship and
+consistent with the minimum notice period determined by the multi-sector agreements
+in line with standard commercial practices. 18
+
+The obligation to make sure that the vassal company is economically viable
+has also been confi rmed in case law, regarding clandestine labour. 19 More
+generally, a duty to be mindful of sub-contractors explains why companies
+are obliged to keep them informed. 20 This could make a company liable for
+the consequences of closing down its subsidiary, when there are no grounds
+for this other than increasing its own profi ts to the detriment of jobs in the
+subsidiary. 21
+Joint and several liability is a technique increasingly used for the legal
+control of company networks, in both domestic and European law. The
+suzerain company is accordingly responsible for the doings of it vassal.
+Unsurprisingly, the EU Court of Justice admitted this ‘ lifting of the veil ’on
+companies ’legal personality whenever it was a question of enforcing EU
+competition rules. 22 After recalling that in European law, an undertaking
+‘ encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of
+the legal status of the entity or the way in which it is fi nanced ’ , the Court
+Allegiance in Business Networks 277
+
+23 French Labour Code, Art L.8222-5. 24 Soc 18 January 2011, FS-P + B + R, No 09-69.199, St éJungheinrich fi nances holding
+v Delimoges. See C Hannounand S Schiller , ‘ Quel devoir de vigilance des soci é t é s m è res et des
+soci é t é s donneuses d ’ ordre ? ’( 2014 ) Revue de droit du travail, 44 ; F G é a, ‘ Pouvoir et responsabilit
+éen droit du travail ’in A Supiot (ed), L ’ Entreprise (n 7) 219 – 32. 25 Court of Appeal (Civil Division)[ 2012 ] EWCA CIV 525(2013) Revue critique de droit
+international priv é , 632, obs H Muir-Watt.
+
+stated that ‘ the concept of an undertaking, in the same context, must be
+understood as designating an economic unit even if in law that economic
+unit consists of several persons, natural or legal ’ . When an economic unit of
+this sort infringes competition rules, the Court continued, ‘ according to the
+principle of personal responsibility, that entity must answer for the infringement
+’ . But who should be personally liable for the infringement when the
+undertaking is an ‘ economic unit ’which transcends the legal personality of
+the companies comprising it ?The Court had no doubt about it: ‘ the conduct
+of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company in particular
+where, although having a separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not
+decide independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out,
+in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company …
+having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links
+between those two legal entities ’ . In such a situation, the Court went on, ‘ the
+parent company and its subsidiary form a single economic unit and therefore
+form a single undertaking ’ . The parent company may therefore be fi ned
+‘ without having to establish [its] personal involvement in the infringement ’ .
+This case law is particularly interesting because it allows the courts to get
+round the different legal personalities and impute responsibility to where
+the power really lies.
+In French labour law, a similar solution was adopted to combat clandestine
+work: any person who indirectly uses clandestine workers is jointly
+and severally responsible for paying the corresponding taxes and employer ’ s
+contributions, and for settling their wages. In the case of sub-contractors,
+the company and the sub-contractor are jointly and severally responsible. 23
+More generally, joint and several responsibility results from the concept of
+‘ co-employers ’in French labour law, a concept which the courts can use to
+enable employees of a subsidiary to identify the controlling company, and
+to bring proceedings accordingly. 24
+In English law, a parent company ’ s joint and several liability has recently
+been upheld in case law concerning the health and safety of a subsidiary ’ s
+employee. Following a particularly interesting reasoning, the parent company
+was judged responsible for this employee ’ s health and safety. 25 Here,
+the company ’ s responsibility was not deduced from the effective supervisory
+power of the parent company over the subsidiary, but was due to the
+278 The Structure of Ties of Allegiance
+
+26 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996
+concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. 27 cf the Savary Report on the government bill to increase the liability of contracting authorities
+and companies regarding sub-contractors, in the fi ght against social dumping and unfair
+competition, Travaux Assembl é e nationale (2014) Report No 1785, 22. 28 See É Pataut , ‘ D é tachement et fraude àla loi. Retour sur le d é tachement de travailleurs
+salari é s en Europe ’( 2014 ) Revue de droit du travail, 23 . 29 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014,
+Art 12.
+
+superior knowledge it had, or should have had, of the dangerous nature of
+the working conditions managed by its subsidiary.
+The judge considered that, consequently, ‘ the parent company knew, or
+ought to have known that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its
+using that superior knowledge for the employees ’protection ’ . The duty of
+care incumbent upon the suzerain extends over both the vassal and the vassal ’ s
+employees. This duty is therefore not the consequence but the cause of the
+parent company ’ s involvement in the affairs of its subsidiary, an involvement
+which is necessary in order to protect the subsidiary and its employees.
+European law recently introduced the joint and several liability of customer
+companies, with a view to increasing protection for posted workers
+providing services. Ever since the Bolkestein proposal, European authorities
+had attempted to introduce competition between national legislations,
+using the international posting of employees as a key weapon. This was a
+way for companies to practise forum shopping for social legislation without
+even having to relocate their activities — a recipe taken straight out of the
+book of governance by numbers. For example, a 1996 Directive authorised,
+under not very stringent conditions, employees to work under the
+foreign legislation of countries where there were lower levels of protection,
+using a foreign company of service providers. 26 Thus European law,
+in a gesture which takes us back to the personality of laws, encourages
+competitive practices between employees in the same country but working
+under different legislations. The number of posted workers employed
+in France, as a way of dodging employer ’ s contributions, has soared to an
+offi cial fi gure 20 times higher than 12 years ago, a hike from 7,495 in 2000
+to 169,613 in 2012. 27 In 2014, a complementary Directive attempted to
+remedy the most fl agrant abuses arising from these practices, yet without
+challenging the ‘ competitive advantage ’which some Member States gain
+through exporting low-cost employees. 28 Labour-exporting companies thus
+continue to evade payment of the social contributions which their competitors
+in the same country are obliged make. The 2014 Directive principally
+sought to protect the employees concerned from not being paid by the traders
+in people who hire them to work abroad for the destination company.
+It provided that the destination company has joint and several liability for
+the payment of the salaries of these posted workers. 29 This applies only
+Multinationals’ Allegiance to Imperial States 279
+
+30 Directive 2014/67/EU, art. 12.5. 31 French Environment Code, Art L.512-17. 32 Catala draft reform of the law of obligations (Arts 1101 to 1386 of the French Civil
+Code), Report to the Minister of Justice, 22 September 2005 (draft Art 1360). 33 cf on the threats of relocation by companies operating out of France, the Rapport
+d ’ information No 558 by M Anzianiand M B é teille , Travaux parlementaires ( French Senate ,
+2008 – 09 ) 64ff . 34 French Law No 2017-399 of 27 March 2017 regarding the duty of care of parent and customer
+companies. See A Supiot(ed) La dynamique de la solidarit éen droit de la responsabilit é
+( Paris , Coll è ge de France , coll Conf é rences , 2017 ) .
+
+to the building trade, but Member States can tighten the provisions and
+include other sectors. They can also authorise companies to guard against
+this risk by fulfi lling due diligence obligations.
+30 This internalisation of rules
+is a technique on the rise, as we shall see regarding compliance programmes.
+Joint and several liability also fi gures in environmental law, when a parent
+company wrongfully contributes to the bankruptcy of a subsidiary, which
+is therefore unable to fi nance the rehabilitation of the site(s) it occupied.
+Today, liability extends not only to the parent company, but, where applicable,
+to the companies of which this parent company is itself a subsidiary
+or a sub-subsidiary. 31
+The ‘ Catala ’draft bill for the reform of French contract law suggested
+that this type of liability be given broader scope, and that ‘ one who manages
+or organises the work of another person and gains an economic advantage
+from this is liable for the harm caused by the latter in carrying out this
+activity ’ . A similar rule was planned, namely that ‘ one who controls the
+economic or patrimonial activity of a dependent professional, although acting
+in his own interests, when the victim establishes that the harmful event
+is related to this control ’will be considered liable. 32 The adoption of this
+bold proposal would have provided a legal basis for the adage ubi emolumentum,
+ibi onus ( ‘ Whoever benefi ts bears the burden ’ ), extending liability
+for the harmful consequences of an economic activity to whoever controls it
+and profi ts from it. It could have prevented the involvement of French companies
+in the Rana Plaza disaster, for instance. But the Medef, the French
+employers ’union, wheeled out the heavy artillery and effectively blasted
+the proposal off the legislative map, 33 such that the draft bill presented in
+October 2012 by the Ministry of Justice for reforming the law of contract
+bore no trace of it. In 2013, in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza tragedy, the
+idea re-emerged in the form of a bill introducing a duty of vigilance on the
+part of parent and customer companies. 34
+
+II. MULTINATIONALS’ ALLEGIANCE TO IMPERIAL STATES
+
+The case of the out-of-court settlement of 10 billion dollars which the French
+bank BNP Paribas paid the US in 2014 to avoid judicial proceedings has
+280 The Structure of Ties of Allegiance
+
+35 Morrison v National Australia Bank 130 S Ct 2869 (2010). 36 FPCA, §78dd – 1, which extends the scope of the law to ‘ any issuer which has a class of
+securities registered pursuant to section 78l of this title or which is required to fi le reports under
+section 78o (d) of this title, or for any offi cer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any
+stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer ’ . 37 Piercing the veil of legal personality is also the goal of the British equivalent of the FPCA,
+the UK Bribery Act 2010. 38 cf S Manacorda, ‘ La dynamique des programmes de conformit édes entreprises ’in
+A Supiot (ed), L ’ Entreprise (n 7) Ch 12; A Fiorella(ed), Corporate Criminal Liability and
+Compliance Programs, Vol 1, Liability ‘ ex crimine ’of legal entities in Member States ( Naples ,
+Jovene , 2012 ) 638 . 39 A Garaponand P Servan-Schreiber(eds), Deals de justice. Le march éeurop é en de
+l ’ ob é issance mondialis é e ( Paris , PUF , 2013 ) .
+
+drawn attention in the French media to a practice developing over the last
+20 years in the United States: multinationals suspected of having infringed
+American legislation on corruption or tax fraud, or who breached the embargos
+decided by the American government against certain countries, were
+obliged to submit to ‘ compliance programmes ’ . The accusations were based
+on texts which provide for the application of US law abroad. Examples
+include the Helms-Berton (1996) and Amato-Kennedy (1996) Acts, concerning
+the embargos against Cuba and Iran. Or the Dodd-Franck Act of
+2010, which ignored the Supreme Court ’ s Morrison ruling, 35 and endowed
+the Security Exchange Commission (SEC), the stock exchange watchdog,
+with the power to crack down on ‘ any conduct in the United States which
+contributes signifi cantly to an infringement, even if the fi nancial transaction
+was agreed outside the US and involves only foreign investors. ’Or equally,
+the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in its 1998 revised version, which
+applies to all people connected in some way to the American territory. This
+can include a company trading on the American markets, 36 or even one
+which has signed agreements whose currency is in dollars. These provisions
+also make it possible to get behind the corporate veil of the different companies
+which make up a business. 37
+Compliance procedures can be implemented by companies voluntarily in
+the countries in which they operate, to avoid legal proceedings, but they can
+also be imposed, and not solely by the United States. The World Bank uses
+them to exclude companies suspected of corruption from bidding for the
+projects it helps fi nance. 38 But the US is the only country powerful enough
+to oblige multinationals to accept some of its laws, in the form of compliance
+programmes. A remarkable joint research project, headed by Antoine
+Garapon and Pierre Servan-Schreiber, has recently shown the extraordinary
+growth in these programmes over the last decade. 39 This new form of negotiated
+justice should not be confused with the practice of the ‘ guilty plea ’ .
+The latter takes place before a judge, whereas these procedures to bring
+companies into line are precisely aimed at keeping the courts out of any
+bilateral negotiations between the Department of Justice and the company
+Multinationals’ Allegiance to Imperial States 281
+
+40 On this schizophrenic position, see P Servan-Schreiber, ‘ L ’ avocat, serviteur de deux
+ma î tres ? ’in Garapon and Servan-Scheiber, Deals de justice (ibid) 101ff. 41 O Boulon, ‘ Une justice n é goci é e ’in Garapon and Servan- Scheiber, Deals de justice
+(n 39) 74. 42 They have ranged from 137 million dollars (payable by Alcatel Lucent in 2010) to nine
+billion dollars (payable by BNP Paribas in 2014).
+
+under suspicion. Bilateral negotiation of this sort is what the Speedy Trial
+Act of 1974 enabled, because it ensures that defendants have suffi cient time
+to prove that their conduct has been blameless. In practice, however, the
+suspected company is required to confess its wrongdoing during this time
+period, and without any of the normal guarantees of an adversarial process.
+The procedure is as follows: the US Department of Justice (DoJ) receives
+information suggesting that a certain company has infringed American law,
+for example by trading with Cuba, corrupting a foreign civil servant in
+order to obtain a market opening, or helping to commit tax fraud against
+the US. The indicting information can come from any source — and the DoJ
+is not obliged to reveal its provenance — including from informers enticed
+by the prospect of receiving a reward proportional to the penalty infl icted
+on the company: the traditions of the Far West die hard. There are sound
+reasons to believe that the information can also be supplied by the National
+Security Agency (NSA), whose immense ears pick up information which it
+can see no good reason not to divulge, at times, to the DoJ. Armed with
+these suspicions, the DoJ announces to the company that it will be taken to
+court, unless it fulfi lls the following three conditions.
+The fi rst condition is that the company should confess its wrongdoing
+in greater detail, in a statement of facts which confi rms the DoJ ’ s version,
+and which the company pledges never to contest subsequently (a ‘ muzzled
+clause ’ ). This confi rmation of the facts, as presented by the DoJ, is not an
+acknowledgment of guilt in the legal sense because it is produced under
+threat of legal proceedings, not as part of them. The consent simply confi
+rms a certain state of the facts, which the company is thereafter obliged
+to investigate (at its own cost) by means of an internal inquiry carried out
+by a lawyers ’offi ce approved by the public prosecutor. The company thus
+pledges to be entirely open with the investigators, who behave like directors
+of conscience — inquisitorial but also protective of those who confi de
+in them. 40 The cost of this inquiry, which involves combing through all
+the documents and correspondence connected with the alleged facts, can
+reach astronomical fi gures — one billion dollars, in the case of Siemens 41— to
+which should be added the settlement fi ne negotiated between the parties.
+The second condition is precisely the payment of a settlement fi ne.
+The fi gures for these attain millions, even billions, of dollars, and they
+are a particularly profi table source of revenue for the US Treasury because
+they are mainly levied against foreign fi rms. 42 The American authorities
+282 The Structure of Ties of Allegiance
+
+43 See the provisions of the Anti-bribery and Books &Records Provisions of the Foreign
+Corrupt Practices Act, Title 15, Ch 2B, §e.
+
+can also demand punitive measures against natural persons who abetted
+the violations. The idea here is to prevent corporate liability from replacing
+the responsibilities of those who benefi tted from the wrongdoing: the persons
+involved are liable to disciplinary sanctions (losing their job) and criminal
+proceedings.
+The third condition is to bring the company into line with American law
+by setting up a compliance procedure, based on programmes supplied by
+the DoJ, and supervised by an independent monitor ratifi ed by the DoJ. 43
+Unlike the idea of conformity, which implies the state of corresponding to
+a norm, the term compliance implies a procedure of standardisation, and
+hence the programming of how a company should operate: any deviation
+from the norm by the company must be abolished, so that the latter ’ s normal
+state of functioning conforms to the demands of the American authorities.
+Additionally, unlike voluntary monitoring of conformity, the programming
+involved in compliance is supervised by an independent inspectorate for
+the entire duration of the agreement (from one to four years). Its role is to
+supervise the application of the agreement, report any shortcomings, and
+certify at the end of the process that the company has now adopted a suffi
+ciently robust compliance programme for the attested violations not to
+recur. Another particularity of this system is that it requires compliance with
+American law alone, despite its possible confl ict with the legislation of other
+countries in which the company also operates. For example, on issues of
+transparency, American law may force a French company to disclose to
+the American authorities information which under French law is expressly
+classifi ed.
+The commitments emerging from the compliance programme are set out
+in a ‘ deferred prosecution agreement ’ , which guarantees that there will be
+no legal proceedings for as long as the company respects the agreement.
+The threat of prosecution is extremely effective because were prosecution
+to be triggered, the multinationals concerned would be banished from the
+American markets until the end of the trial. The post-Rana Plaza agreements
+also brandished this threat of banishment, but whereas the market power
+of multinationals is within particular industries and within the countries in
+which they operate, the USA ’ s power market is infi nitely greater, effectively
+sovereign, and it cannot be challenged without economic death. To date,
+no multinational has taken the risk of banishment, and all have complied
+with the DoJ ’ s desiderata. They have thus sworn allegiance to the American
+authorities, entering into a legal structure similar to the one identifi ed in the
+employment relationship and in the relations between customer companies
+and their sub-contractors or suppliers.
+1 ‘ The Concept of Enlightenment ’in Horkheimerand Adorno , Dialectic of Enlightenment.
+Philosophical Fragments [ 1944 ](ch 2 fn 62) 20. 2 ‘ Men have now come so far in dominating the forces of nature that with the help of the latter
+it is easy for them to exterminate each other down to the last human. They know it, and that
+is a large part of their present disquiet, unhappiness and their underlying anxiety ’(Sigmund
+Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents [1930]). 3 On this confusion, cf J-P Dupuy , ‘ La croissance vaut-elle d ’ ê tre v é cue ? ’ Le Monde Eco et
+Entreprises, 4 February 2014 , 12. 4 ‘ When Mr. Hollande became leader of the second-ranked euro economy, some of us hoped
+that he might take a stand [on neoliberalism]. Instead, he fell into the usual cringe — a cringe
+
+Conclusion
+
+Ways Forward
+
+Mathematical formalism, whose medium, number, is the most abstract form of the
+immediate, arrests thought at mere immediacy. The actual is validated, knowledge
+confi nes itself to repeating it, thought makes itself mere tautology. The more
+completely the machinery of thought subjugates existence, the more blindly it is
+satisfi ed with reproducing it.
+
+Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, ‘ The concept of Enlightenment ’ 1
+
+ALTHOUGH A FEELING of civilisational disquiet is nothing new —
+it was diagnosed by Freud in 1929, in the aftermath of the Wall
+Street crash 2— it certainly seems to have gripped Europe today with
+an intensity unknown since the Second World War. Legal analysis may not
+probe to the depths of psychoanalysis, but it can certainly help identify the
+underlying forces at work in a given society, and diagnose the ills affecting
+it. Our contemporary economistic credo simply explains away this disquiet
+by means of formulas, indicators and charts. Thus we are shown graphs
+of variations in unemployment rates, with the promise that the curve will
+shortly ‘ show an upturn ’ , according to a logic which blithely confuses how
+a situation develops with its geometrical representation. 3 These sorts of confusion
+refl ect more generally how the regime of governance by numbers
+loses all contact with reality, and substitutes the map for the territory in
+its organisation and running of public affairs. The dismissal of the real in
+favour of its quantifi ed representation leads to what the American economist
+Paul Krugman has called ‘ an intellectual breakdown ’(applied here to
+the French leadership), 4 the result not of mental, but of institutional deterioration.
+This phenomenon has various causes, and has taken various forms
+over its long history, as we have attempted to show.
+284 Conclusion
+
+that has now turned into intellectual collapse. And Europe ’ s second depression goes on and on ’
+(P Krugman, ‘Scandal in France’ The New York Times (16 January 2014)).
+
+With the advent of modernity, the age-old Greek ideal of government by
+laws rather than by men developed a new fi gure: government as a machine.
+An identical collective imaginary thereafter subtended the development of
+science and technology, and of law and institutions. It was the dream of a
+world entirely mastered and transparent to itself, in which each person may
+act as a sovereign subject, freed from the power of men as from material
+needs. Classical physics, the second industrial revolution and the rule of law
+contributed, each differently, to giving this imaginary its fi rst modern form,
+that of a world ruled by general, abstract laws which can ensure that actions
+are performed effi ciently. After the Second World War, a new mode of this
+impersonal power developed, with numbers progressively superseding laws
+as the basis of obligations between people. Governance by numbers, sustained
+by the ICT revolution, attempted to bring about a society in which
+there would be no heteronomy, in which legislation would be replaced by
+programming and rules by technical regulation. Soviet central planning was
+the fi rst system to reduce the function of the law to an instrument for implementing
+calculations of usefulness. The cybernetic imaginary amplifi ed this
+tendency by imposing its vision of a networked natural and human world
+in which the difference between humans, animals and machines tends to
+zero, since each can be conceived as a homeostatic system communicating
+with the others. This new stage corresponded to the passage from economic
+liberalism, in which economic calculations were subject to the law, to
+neoliberalism, in which the law was piloted by economic calculations. The
+market paradigm is today applied to all human activities; it has replaced the
+Basic Norm on a global scale. Capitalism has thus mutated into an anarcho-capitalism
+which destroys frontiers, subjugates states and dismantles
+the rules designed to protect the three fi ctional commodities identifi ed by
+Karl Polanyi: nature; work; and money. And not a day passes without the
+media — that modern equivalent of religious zealotry — banging on about
+how necessary this subjugation is. Yet it cannot but result in the collapse
+of the whole system: it was only within the framework of national legal
+systems which can ensure some damage-limitation that the fi ction of nature,
+work and money as commodities was sustainable.
+Whenever an ideology loses a sense of limits, these will inevitably return
+in catastrophic ways, as soon as its limitless pretentions come up against
+the reality principle. So it is with our anarcho-capitalism, which gave us a
+foretaste of its destructive potential in the 2008 fi nancial crisis, despite the
+amazing sleight of hand of arguing in its aftermath for a rapid dismemberment
+of the social state. We can predict that this dismemberment and the
+establishment of calculations of individual utility as the sole norm — fl ying
+in the face of democratic principles — will generate new forms of violence,
+Conclusion 285
+
+5 S Kowalevski, quoted by A Barine, ‘ La ran ç on de la gloire. Sophie Kovalesky ’in Revue des
+Deux Mondes, 1 May 1894, Vol 123, 379.
+
+combined with the ecological disasters generated by the over-exploitation
+of the planet ’ s natural resources. When the state no longer assumes its role
+as guardian of people ’ s identity, and of their physical and economic security,
+then people will inevitably pledge allegiance to any group claiming to
+provide such guarantees — be it clans, religious factions, ethnic identities or
+mafi a networks. Such networks of allegiance, both legal and illegal, have
+already penetrated every level of human activity. Within them, each person
+depends on the protection of those stronger than he and on the dedication
+of those weaker. Governance by numbers, as a radical form of impersonal
+power (an impersonality to which the law already aspired), has thus paradoxically
+spawned a world of bonds of dependence. In it there can be no
+difference marked between countries and businesses, or public and private.
+The realm of the law had been structured around the vertical axis of a public
+sphere (the sphere of the incalculable), and the horizontal plane of private
+interests (which can be conceived as the sphere of mutually adjusting calculations
+of individual utility). The suppression of the Law ’ s heteronomy — legal
+rules treated as just another product competing on a market of norms — has
+generated a double movement of privatisation of public responsibilities and
+‘ publicisation ’of private ones. This is not a value judgment on our state of
+affairs, but simply a snapshot of the laws in force today. It can show us why
+governance by numbers is an unsustainable system, and why our representation
+of the future is no longer one of revolution but of catastrophe.
+One of the defi ning characteristics of the West is that it idolises ideas,
+a tendency as dangerous when its object is law as when it is numbers.
+The role of a legal system, in the epoch of ruling by law, was precisely to
+temper this idolatrous tendency by fi ltering laws through systems of interpretation
+which the law-makers themselves were obliged to respect. Arguably,
+the same critical fi lters should be applied to numbers. Mathematics
+are a potent tool, but they may also generate a sort of mysticism, as the
+great Polish late-nineteenth-century mathematician Sophie Kowalevski
+described, in a letter to a friend: ‘ Everything in life seems to me so drab, so
+uninteresting. In such moments, there is nothing better than mathematics.
+No words can describe the balm of feeling that a world exists from which
+the Self is entirely absent. If only one could always speak only of impersonal
+subjects! ’ 5 Kowalevski ’ s experience shows us the fascination exerted
+by numbers, ever since Pythagoras, but also the exorbitant price paid for
+letting calculation dominate the legal sphere: it eliminates any thought for
+people of fl esh and blood. In order to avoid this, a sense of measure must
+be preserved in every practice of quantifi cation. Law can help maintain or
+286 Conclusion
+
+6 cf on this point A Supiot, The Spirit of Philadelphia, op. cit. Ch 6; as well as above ch 9,
+p 181ff. 7 On this expression coined by Ronald Coase, see above, ch 7, p 125.
+
+restore this measure, by making it obligatory to observe the adversarial
+principle in the way numbers are treated and interpreted, whenever the
+results are to have normative force. 6 However, restoring this sense of measure
+cannot be achieved without challenging politically the power which the
+plutocratic ruling classes have won in most countries today. Their motivation
+is anything but mystical, and their unbridled greed and destructive
+power make Marx ’ s critique of capitalism from 150 years ago once again
+acutely topical.
+In view of the dogmatic position acquired by neoliberal economic doctrine,
+including in the sphere of law, there is little chance that criticism of
+this system of belief will be heard on the ‘ market for ideas ’ 7 which seems
+to have replaced the public forum today. Criticism can nonetheless help us
+refl ect on the future, and make the transition from diagnosis to antidotes.
+And the fi rst thing to do is to dismantle the systems of allegiance being
+woven before our very eyes as defensive reactions to the unsustainability of
+the regime of governance by numbers.
+This is why the employment relation, which has been the matrix of many
+forms of government since the industrial era, has been a major focus here.
+In tracking its transformations, we identifi ed the emergence of the tie of allegiance,
+which in its modern form has two essential features. First, the total
+mobilisation of one person in the service of another. Unlike its Taylorist
+version, however, this mobilisation manages the mind as much as the body,
+organising work not through mechanical obedience to orders but through
+the programming of feedback. The corollary of the sphere of autonomy
+granted to workers for carrying out their prescribed objectives is the right of
+employers to have their workers ’ ‘ functioning ’measured and evaluated at
+any time. The work objectives are thus made inseparable from quantitative
+performance indicators which the worker has no part in defi ning. Workers
+subjected to these ‘ objective indicators ’are divorced from the reality of the
+world on which they act, and bound into a speculative spiral from which
+they may not escape other than mentally deranged or criminally indicted.
+The second feature of the tie of allegiance is the employer ’ s responsibility
+to ensure that employees continue to be economically productive, to adapt
+in ‘ real time ’to the needs of the market, whether they are in work or have
+been made redundant. The degree of commitment required of the employer
+depends on the occupational status of the employee, ranging from a maximum
+for highly qualifi ed staff on permanent contracts, and hardly any at
+all for the unqualifi ed casual worker. A similar situation obtains in relations
+between dominant and less dominant businesses, and between the American
+Conclusion 287
+
+8 See above, ch 13, pp 254–255. 9 cf A Supiot(ed), La solidarit é . Enqu ê te sur un principe juridique ( Paris , Odile Jacob , coll
+des travaux du Coll è ge de France , 2015 ) . 10 Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice (ch 10 fn 20). 11 ibid.
+
+Empire and multinationals: vassal businesses swear to stand always at the
+ready, constantly scrutinised and called to account by suzerain businesses
+or the sovereign authority, which in return promise to see to their economic
+survival.
+The disappointing ruling of the French Constitutional Council on the
+French Law on employment protection of 2013, discussed above, 8 is a
+good example of how the total market can capture new protective measures
+while stripping them of their dimension of solidarity. Employee protections,
+which the employer must contribute to, were to be attached to
+the employee in person, and not to his or her job. There are two ways of
+conceiving this protection beyond the particular employment contract: in
+terms of insurance, using actuarial risk assessments; or in terms of pooling
+risks, based on solidarity within each industry sector. The Constitutional
+Council ’ s decision in favour of the insurance lobby points to what
+will doubtless be the most important institutional challenge of the years to
+come: how much space will be given, in the legal order, to the market and
+how much to solidarity. If the ideas I have developed in this book are correct,
+then we are no more likely to return to the reign of the law than we
+are to see governance by numbers become a permanent fi xture. As we have
+seen, contemporary social relations of production have revived the tie of
+allegiance, and this is probably an irreversible trend in the new historical
+era opening before us. Like every legal bond, the tie of allegiance implies
+the existence of a third which guarantees its binding force. For example, in
+the agreement made between European companies in the aftermath of the
+Rana Plaza disaster, the ILO guarantees the fund these companies set up for
+legal and fi nancial solidarity with their Bangladeshi providers. By contrast,
+in the French Constitutional Council ’ s ruling on complementary employee
+health cover, solidarity between companies was destroyed, and the protection
+owing to employees was left to the insurance market.
+The principle of solidarity is today the legal order ’ s last bastion against
+the market. 9 Hayek, a remarkable, if remarkably limited, thinker understood
+this, and declared it bluntly: ‘ Solidarity ’ , he said, ‘ is an instinctual
+hangover from the days of tribal society ’ .
+10 It must be eradicated in order
+for catallaxis to rule on a global scale, that is, ‘ the order generated by the
+mutual adjustment of many individual economies on a market ’ .
+11 ‘ A Great
+Society ’ , he declared, ‘ has no place for “ solidarity ”in the strict sense of the
+term, that is, for people coming together around known goals. The two
+288 Conclusion
+
+12 ibid. 13 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation (ch 11 fn 21). 14 cf A Supiot(ed) L ’ é tat de l ’ entreprise dans un monde sans fronti è res ( Paris , Dalloz , 2015 ) . 15 cf A Berque , Po é tique de la Terre. Histoire naturelle et histoire humaine, essai de m é sologie
+( Paris , Belin , 2014 ), 238 . For a similar position, see the concept of ‘ anthropo-cosmic
+solidarity ’outlined by A Cheng, ‘ Solidarit é s horizontales et verticales en Chine ancienne ’in
+La solidarit é : enqu ê te sur un principe juridique, Ch 7, p 139–50 (ch 10, note 33).
+
+are even incompatible ’ .
+12 Since the total market requires the liquidity of
+
+‘ human capital ’in order to establish itself globally, it thereby also requires
+the liquidation of all the forms of human ‘ alliance ’implied by solidarity. If,
+however, in the footsteps of Karl Polanyi, one says that the markets are ‘ a
+useful, but secondary, element in a free society ’ ,
+13 things look quite different.
+The problem is then to ‘ re-embed ’markets in society, and not to reduce
+human life to economic life, nor economic life to the market economy.
+A break with capitalism ’ s present form is vital for restoring a balance
+between competition and cooperation, which in turn is essential for making
+work humane, for the spirit of enterprise, 14 the successful functioning of the
+markets in products and services, and the protection of the planet.
+The social state was a fi rst attempt to do this, re-embedding the economy
+in society. Despite its real successes, it had two weaknesses. The fi rst and
+most obvious weakness was that it rested on national legal frameworks.
+These have been drastically affected by the elimination of trade barriers and
+by the introduction of competition between social, tax and environmental
+legislation internationally, as well as by the digital revolution, which has
+made it possible to deterritorialise all tasks focusing on signs not things.
+The second weakness, which is more rarely noted, is that the social state,
+in this similar to Communist regimes, excluded fair organisation of work
+from the fi eld of social justice. There was a consensus to the effect that the
+organisation of work at its different levels (the individual, the company, the
+nation and international trade) was a purely scientifi c and technical issue,
+illustrated by Taylorism in the past, and today incarnated in management
+by objectives and governance by numbers. What is overlooked here is the
+anthropological dimension of work, understood in its broadest and most
+concrete sense of human beings ’need to inscribe into their everyday living
+environment the mental images which guide their action and collaboration.
+Excluding this dimension has had devastating effects not only on the
+institution of reason, but also on creativity and respect for the ecumene.
+Restoring sustainable institutional frameworks requires regaining a sense of
+limits — not only territorial limits, but also limits on the hubris of accumulation
+and on humankind ’ s omnipotent treatment of nature — and also a sense
+of solidarity: solidarity within and between human communities, and also
+ecological solidarity between the human species and its lived environment. 15
+This is the broad context within which today ’ s revival of ties of allegiance
+and their reshaping of the legal order should be placed. This revival
+Conclusion 289
+
+catalyses the decline of the state, and brings back the law of the jungle, as
+many regions of the world demonstrate. But this change can also encourage
+us to examine the functions of the state afresh. Now that it has lost its
+monopoly on organising solidarity, the state ’ s role should be to guarantee
+the articulation between national solidarity and solidarity organisations
+within civil society and internationally, which are woven through these
+networks of allegiance. In the face of private interests, and fi nancial or
+religious powers, however, the state must remain the ultimate guarantor,
+capable of making the general interest and democracy prevail for everyone.
+A fi rst step in this direction would be to restore the principle of democracy,
+not only in the political sphere (where it has been discredited by the EU),
+but also in the economic sphere, by empowering those who work to have a
+say in the goals and meaning of what they do.
+
+Index of Names
+
+A
+Abbott, Edwin
+Flatland 106
+Accursius 49
+Achcar, Gilbert 210
+Adorno, Theodor W. 106, 283
+Alembert, Jean le Rond d ’ 98
+Althusius 86
+Anders, G ü nther 170 – 171
+Arendt, Hannah 228
+Aristotle 36, 37 , 86
+natural law theory 34 – 35, 51
+Nicomachean Ethics 38, 75 – 77 , 83
+Augustine, Saint 93
+
+B
+Babcock, George 227
+Bacon, Francis 86 – 87
+Ballod, Karl 109
+Bargain, Gwenola 238
+Barroso, Jos éManuel 124
+Barthes, Roland 242
+Beauvoir, Simone de 200
+Becker, Gary 124, 125
+Berman, Harold 38 – 39, 43 , 48 , 107
+Bernard, Claude 98 – 99
+Bernoulli, Daniel 96, 98
+Berns, Thomas 86
+Berque, Augustin 27
+Bodin, Jean 86, 87
+Botera 141
+Bourdieu, Pierre 19, 117
+Bracton, Henry de 43 – 44
+Breton, Philippe 30
+Bush, George W 204, 211
+
+C
+Callicles 35, 51
+Carbonnier, Jean 7, 201
+Carrez, Gilles 154
+Castel, Robert 177 – 178
+Castoriadis, Cornelius 1 – 2, 24 , 135 , 208
+Chaplin, Charlie
+Modern Times 23, 30
+Chev è nement, Jean-Pierre 81 – 82
+Cicero 51
+De re publica 14, 72 – 73
+Cioran, EM 116, 230
+Coase, Ronald 26 – 27, 124 , 130 – 131 ,
+133 , 134
+
+The Nature of the Firm 130
+‘ The Problem of Social Cost ’ 130
+Comte, Auguste 101 – 102, 126
+Condorcet, Marie-Jean-Antoine de 62, 96 ,
+101 – 102 , 126
+M é moires àl ’ Acad é mie royale des
+sciences 96
+universal law 101
+
+D
+Dac, Pierre 208
+Dafforne, Richard
+The Merchant ’ s Mirrour 84
+Darwich, Mahmoud 15
+Darwin, Charles 24, 35 , 90 , 206
+Daston, Lorraine 96
+Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, F é lix
+A Thousand Plateaus 118 – 120
+Delors, Jacques 215
+Demosthenes 38
+Deng Xiaoping 10, 107
+Desrosi è res, Alain 94
+D é tienne, Marcel 32
+Domat, Jean 94
+Draghi, Mario 142
+Drucker, Peter 145 – 147, 170
+Dufour, Dany-Robert 36, 65
+Dumont, Louis 36, 42 , 118 , 219
+Dupeyroux, Jean-Jacques 240
+Durkheim, É mile 117, 145
+
+E
+Engels, Friedrich 113, 188 , 191
+Esmein, Adh é mar 225
+Ewald, Fran ç ois 76, 99 – 100
+Eyraud, Corine 173
+
+F
+Faure, Elie 43
+Feuerbach, L 201
+F ö gen, Marie Theres 40, 58 , 73 – 74
+Foucault, Michel 116, 117 , 118
+biopolitics 3, 89
+governmentality 3
+The Order of Things 84
+Francis, Pope 272
+Freud, Sigmund 283
+Friedman, Milton 35, 123 , 124 , 271
+Friedman, Thomas
+The World is Flat 106 – 107
+292 Index of Names
+
+G
+Galbraith, John 27
+Galileo Galilei 68 – 69
+Galton, Francis 90, 125
+Garapon, Antoine 280
+Gaucher, Marcel 178
+Gernet, Louis 15
+Gini, Corrado 182
+Girard, Jean-Yves 168
+Girard, Paul-Fr é d é ric 41
+G ö del, Kurt 167, 168
+Goering, Hermann 190, 198
+Goldman, Berthold 80
+Gramsci, Antonio 232, 242
+Gregory VII 42 – 44
+Gu é non, Ren é 121
+Gurvitch, Georges 117
+
+H
+Hand, Learned 132
+Han Fei Tzu 59, 61 , 62 , 63
+Haq, Mahbub ul 161
+Haudricourt, Andr é 13
+Hayek, Friedrich 35, 123 , 138 , 192 – 193 ,
+216 – 217 , 287 – 288
+Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 47
+Herodotus 34
+Herrenschmidt, Clarisse 76, 77
+Hitler, Adolf 190 – 191, 207
+natural law theory 35 – 36
+Hobbes, Thomas 3, 19 , 30 , 168
+equity 48
+law grounded in nature 19, 49
+law as a machine 51
+Leviathan 19, 21 – 22 , 23 , 30 ,
+48 , 49
+man-machine 19, 21 – 22 , 30
+res publica 3
+Hollande, Fran ç ois 28
+Holmes, OW 134
+Horkheimer, Max 106, 283
+Hume, David 192 – 193, 208
+
+I
+Inoue Kowashi 18
+Ionesco, Eug è ne 191
+Iribarne, Philippe d ’ 202
+
+J
+Jaquet-Droz, Pierre and Henri 19 – 20
+Josserand, Louis 90
+Jub é , Samuel 153
+J ü nger, Ernst 25, 227 – 228
+Justinian
+Code of Justinian 188, 201
+Digest 212, 271
+Institutes 17, 104
+
+K
+Kafka, Franz 170
+Kant, Immanuel 36, 135
+Kantorowicz, Ernst 14, 17 , 42
+Kautsky, Karl 109
+Kelsenian, Hans 2
+Keynes, John Maynard 81
+Kirat, Thierry 131
+Kowalevski, Sophie 285
+Krugman, Paul 283
+Kuhn, Thomas 174 – 175
+
+L
+Lang, Fritz
+Metropolis 2, 30
+Laplace, Pierre-Simon 96 – 97, 102 , 126
+La Porta 141
+Laroque, Michel 217
+Laufer, Romain 145
+Law, John 99, 152
+Lefort, Claude 75
+Legendre, Pierre 14 – 15, 43 , 145 , 201
+Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 96
+Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 25, 109 , 113 , 182 ,
+202 , 232
+Lenoble, Robert 50
+Leonardi, Ota de 106
+Le Play, Fr é d é ric 102
+Levi, Jean 61, 63
+Liberski-Bagnoud, Danouta 55
+Lipsius 86
+Liszt, Franz 15
+Livy 73 – 74
+Locke, John 3, 49
+Lorenzetti, Ambrogio
+allegory of Buon Governo 14, 75 – 76
+L ö with, Karl 113, 200
+Lycurgus 32
+
+M
+Machiavelli, Niccol ò 75
+Mackaay, Ejan 126
+MacNeil, Ian R 217
+Mandeville, Bernard 64, 103
+Fable of the Bees 36
+Mao Zedong 59, 191
+Marx, Karl 191, 201 – 202 , 239 , 246 – 247 ,
+286
+Mauss, Marcel 117, 219
+Meier, Christian 33
+Mencius 60
+Mettrie, Julien Offray de la 21, 23
+Migaud, Didier 154, 159
+Montchrestien 86
+Montesquieu 7, 34 , 49 , 101
+Monti, Mario 124
+Montmort, Pierre de 101
+Index of Names 293
+
+Morin, Fran ç ois 152
+Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus
+Il Seraglio 44
+Murard, L 236
+
+N
+Nicolas de Cues 68
+Nicomachus of Gerasa 68
+Nietzsche, Friedrich 35
+Nixon, Richard 160
+Nodler, Luca 217
+
+O
+Orl é an, Andr é 152
+Orwell, George 191
+Animal Farm 124
+Ost, Fran ç ois 198 – 199
+
+P
+Par é , Ambroise 21
+Pascal, Blaise
+wager 93 – 94, 97 , 126
+Paul, Saint 200 – 201, 204
+Perrot, Jean-Claude 87 – 88
+Pinochet, Augusto 182
+Plato 32 – 33, 37 , 50 , 68 , 76
+Gorgias 35
+The Laws 31, 32 , 37
+The Statesman 36 – 37
+Polanyi, Karl 102, 168 , 284 , 288
+Pollack, Sydney
+They Shoot Horses, Don ’ t
+They ? 246
+Portalis, Jean- É tienne-Marie 7,
+37 – 38 , 58
+Posner, Richard 121, 131 , 136 – 137
+Economic Analysis of Law 126
+effi cient breach of contract 134
+Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph 169, 230
+Pythagoras 67, 68 , 71 – 72 , 285
+Tetractys 69 – 70, 71 – 72 , 73
+
+Q
+Qin Shi Huang 59
+Qu é telet, Adolphe 88
+
+R
+Rabelais, Fran ç ois 93
+Raphael
+The School of Athens 73
+Rawls, John 36
+Reagan, Ronald 114
+Reich, Robert 230
+Reifner, Udo 217
+Rodi è re, Pierre 195
+Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 31, 49 , 51
+Rousseau, St é phane 126
+
+S
+Sade, Marquis de 35, 36 , 51
+Saint-Simon, Comte de 114
+Sartre, Jean-Paul
+No Exit 136
+Schiavone, Aldo 40
+Schipper, Kristofer 66
+Schmitt, Carl 5, 191 , 204 – 208 , 210 – 211 ,
+228
+Sen, Amartya 161
+Servan-Schreiber, Pierre 280
+Shang Yang 59
+Shen Dao 59
+Sidib é , Ousmane O 180 – 181
+Simons, Henry 123
+Skinner, Quentin 14
+Smith, Adam 35, 64 – 65 , 226
+Socrates 36
+Solon 32, 58
+Somavie, Juan 209
+Sombart, Werner 83
+Stiglitz, Joseph 28
+Stolleis, Michael 70
+Suarez, Francisco 49
+S ü βmilch, Johann Peter 88 – 89
+Swain, Gladys 178
+
+T
+Tabuteau, Didier 263
+Taube, Jacob 201
+Thatcher, Margaret 114, 237
+Thom, Ren é 97
+Tocqueville, Alexis de 7, 45 , 90 ,
+143 , 208
+Todorov, Tzvetan 112
+Tonda, Joseph 57
+Trentin, Bruno 25, 231 – 232 , 242
+Tricher, M 114
+Tucker, Albert W. 127
+
+U
+Ulpian 37, 188 , 189
+
+V
+Val é ry, Paul 180
+Vandermeersch, L é on 54, 59 , 63 – 64
+Vaubin 88, 90
+Veblen, Thorstein 122
+Vernant, Jean-Pierre 1, 15
+Vico, Giambattista 17
+Villani, C é dric 69
+Villerm é , Louis Ren é 89 – 90
+Voltaire 98
+
+W
+Wallace, Alfred 206
+Weber, Max 18, 203
+294 Index of Names
+
+Weil, Simone 229, 232
+on colonisation 56 – 57
+‘ The experience of factory life ’ 23 – 24
+The Need for Roots 120
+Wenders, Wim 198
+Wen-Tzu (Wenzi) 52
+Wiener, Norbert 26, 29 , 144 ,
+146 , 232
+
+William the Conqueror 44
+Williamson, Olivier E 122
+
+Z
+Zimmer, Heinrich 74
+Zinoviev, Alexander
+The Yawning Heights 181 – 182
+Zylberman, P 236
+General Index
+
+A
+accounting
+accounting standards 81, 152 – 153
+Anglo-American regulations 84
+balance, principle of 85
+benchmarking 153, 157 , 174
+capitalism and 83
+creative 80, 85
+development and use 78, 79 – 85
+double-entry system 82 – 85, 152
+equality and 83
+ethno-accounting 102
+European tradition 84
+EU standards 81
+fi guration of reality 80, 84 – 85
+governance by numbers 163
+importance to market system 80 – 81
+money as universal standard of value 81
+objectivity 84 – 85
+political dimension 80 – 81
+probative force of accounts 81
+administrative state 144
+Africa see sub-Saharan Africa
+agency theory 128 – 130, 149
+aid programmes
+management by objectives 160 – 163,
+180 – 181
+algebra 83
+allegiance see feudal structure
+alternative dispute resolution 132
+anarcho-capitalism 191, 284
+appraisal interviews 147, 185n, 256
+Arab uprisings 210
+arbitration clauses 133
+Argentina
+structural adjustment plan 160
+Attali Report 240
+automata
+Hobbes 19, 21 – 23 , 30
+in Western culture 30
+
+B
+back-to-work programmes 178, 248
+Barth é l é my-Cette Report 196
+benchmarking 138, 153 , 157 , 174
+bills of exchange 83
+biological altruism 206
+biometrics 90
+biopolitics 3, 89
+BNP Paribas settlement 279
+
+Boissonnat Report 241
+Bretton Woods agreement 82, 209
+Buddhism 202
+
+C
+Cadbury Report 27
+Cahuc-Kramarz Report 240
+Camdessus Report 240
+canon law
+Roman law and 43
+capitalism
+accounting and 83
+anarcho-capitalism 191, 284
+communism compared 103, 144
+Marx ’ s critique 286
+social effect 5
+Cartesianism 50
+case law and precedent
+common law 45
+governance by numbers 145 – 146
+Law and Economics doctrine 122,
+142 – 143
+legal qualifi cation 92
+Roman law 40 – 42
+casino economy 152
+census
+function 86 – 88
+Roman Republic 85 – 86
+taxation and 87 – 88
+Chartres Cathedral 72
+Chicago School 120, 123 – 124 , 131
+Chile
+neoliberalism 182 – 183
+China
+Annals 62
+assimilation of Western legal
+culture 58 – 59
+Book of Rites 53, 54
+communist/capitalist hybridisation 10,
+25 , 105 , 107 , 112 – 120 , 183 , 191
+Confucian tradition 14, 54 , 59 ,
+60 , 66
+Constitution 103, 107 , 113 , 183
+Cultural Revolution 191
+governance by numbers 10, 171
+legal codes 62
+Legalist School 58 – 66, 108
+perception of globalisation 66
+planned economy 110, 171
+ritualism 53 – 55, 59 , 60
+296 General Index
+
+socialist market economy 65 – 66, 107 ,
+183
+symbolic value of numbers 68
+Taoism 59 – 60, 63 , 65
+Christianity 203
+abolition of law in ideal society 199 – 201
+civil law see continental law
+classic liberalism see liberalism
+clock
+God the Watchmaker 21 – 23
+industrial imaginary 2, 23 – 24
+rule of law and 25
+Coase theorem 130 – 137
+colonialism
+colonial discourse of globalisation 270
+generally 5, 44
+language and translation issues 55 – 56
+racial legislation 34
+sub-Saharan Africa 55 – 57
+Comecon 111
+common law
+actions 45
+case law and precedents 45
+continental law compared 44 – 49
+equity 48
+forms of action 45
+justice 48
+Law and Economics doctrine 141
+national legal systems 46, 47
+obiter dictum 45
+origin 44
+ratio decidendi 45
+remedies precede rights 45
+rights 45, 46
+Roman law and 44 – 45, 48
+rule of law 47
+statute law and 45
+Western legal culture 4
+Commonwealth
+use of term 3
+communism
+see also China; Soviet Union;
+totalitarianism
+calculation of utility 107 – 109, 115
+capitalism compared 103, 144
+classic liberalism compared 105,
+112 – 113
+collapse of real communism 5, 7 ,
+111 – 112 , 202
+communist/capitalist hybridisation 10,
+25 , 105 , 107 , 112 – 120
+generally 181 – 182
+governance by numbers compared 172
+law under 191
+neoliberalism compared 103 – 104, 107 ,
+110 , 113 , 115 , 121 , 124 , 202
+planned economy 10, 103 – 104 , 105 ,
+107 – 112 , 113 , 115 , 121 , 171 , 180 , 284
+
+rule by law 103 – 104, 105 , 107 – 112 ,
+113 – 114
+shrinking of the state 201 – 202
+Taylorism 24 – 25, 232
+comparative law 34
+competition
+benchmarking 174
+biological altruism 206
+Bolkestein proposal 278
+classic liberalism 112
+European Union 137, 195 , 278
+forum shopping 103, 114 , 117 ,
+197 – 198 , 271
+global 9, 114 , 202 – 203 , 207 , 228 , 235 ,
+236 , 242
+governance by numbers 235 – 236
+international relocation 236
+law, competition of global market 114
+Law and Economics doctrine 137
+natural selection and Social
+Darwinism 24
+neoliberalism 24, 114 , 202 – 203 , 235 ,
+236
+non-competition clauses 223
+social insurance 263, 264 – 268
+total market 9
+Confucian tradition 14, 59 , 60 , 66
+ritualism 54, 60
+constitutions 31
+debasement 58
+People ’ s Republic of China 103, 107 ,
+113 , 183
+Soviet Union 113
+sub-Saharan Africa 56
+continental law
+common law compared 44 – 49
+le Droit 46 – 47, 54
+individual and society 46
+justice 48
+legal principles 48
+national legal systems 46, 47
+origin 44
+Western legal culture 4
+contracts
+agency theory 128 – 130, 149
+classic liberalism 103 – 104, 121
+effi cient breach theory 134 – 135,
+197 – 198
+employment ‘ at will ’ 249
+employment contracts 175 – 176, 234 ,
+245 – 255
+fl exibility 253 – 255
+‘ framework ’contracts 249
+French ‘ Catala ’draft bill 279
+indeterminacy of working
+conditions 248 – 255
+indeterminacy of work
+operations 255 – 257
+General Index 297
+
+Law and Economics doctrine 134 – 135
+neoliberalism 105, 109 , 121 , 193
+‘ new rights ’attached to the
+person 258 – 268
+as normative reference 5
+Soviet Union 111
+variation 250 – 255, 256 , 258
+zero-hours contracts 248 – 250
+contractualisation
+of public policy 217 – 218, 224 – 225
+of society 128, 129
+corporate governance doctrine
+agency theory 129, 149
+criterion of good governance 28
+governance by numbers 148 – 153
+law and 28
+leveraged buy-outs 149
+management by objectives 149
+networked structures 149
+subcontractors 149, 222 – 223
+value-creation for shareholders 27,
+84 – 85 , 147 – 148 , 150 – 151 , 153 , 274
+cost-benefi t analysis 125 – 126, 131 – 137
+see also utility, calculation of
+human dignity 135 – 137
+use of torture 136
+credit default swaps 151 – 152
+credit rating agencies 87, 162 – 163
+cybernetic imaginary 2, 284
+New Public Management 26
+programmable man 24, 25 – 26 ,
+29 – 30
+social state 2
+
+D
+Declaration of Philadelphia 229, 242
+Decretum Gratiani 70 – 71
+democracy
+concept of generally 2 – 3
+economic sphere 289
+European Union 183 – 185, 289
+German Basic Law 137
+governance and 30, 90
+governance by numbers 182 – 185
+Greek civilization 15, 32 – 33
+law as counterweight 143
+neoliberalism 182 – 183, 216 – 217
+rule of law 32 – 33
+digital revolution 10, 235 – 236 , 284
+programmable man 24, 25 – 26 , 29 – 30 ,
+236
+le Droit
+continental law 46 – 47, 54
+duties
+as basis of ritualism 54
+‘ new rights ’attached to the
+person 259 – 268
+rights and 54 – 55
+
+E
+employees see work/workers
+employment see work/workers
+English law
+see also United Kingdom
+common law 44 – 45
+equity 48
+joint and several liability 277 – 278
+labour law 249
+monarch 44 – 45
+statute law 45
+Enlightenment 49
+Enron scandal 80, 85 , 163
+environmental issues
+commodifi cation of nature 220,
+284 – 285 , 288
+cost-benefi t analysis 131, 134 , 162
+Erika disaster 275
+Exxon Valdez disaster 275 – 276
+forum shopping 271
+globalisation 8, 209
+international agreements 161 – 162
+joint and several liability 279
+tradeable pollution rights 131, 134 ,
+162 , 209
+transnational companies 275 – 276
+equality
+algebraic equations 83
+Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
+the Citizen 31
+double-entry book-keeping 83
+economic prosperity and 210
+and globalisation 8
+Greek civilization 33
+inequality and neoliberalism 8,
+209 – 210
+labour law 149 – 150
+Matthew effect 265, 266
+natural law theory 35
+principle of 7
+rectifi catory justice 76
+equity 48
+Erika disaster 275
+ethno-accounting 102
+eugenics 34, 90 – 91
+Euro/Eurozone 81 – 82, 157 – 160 , 241
+governance by numbers 115, 160 ,
+179 – 180
+Maastricht Treaty 157
+structural adjustment plans 160,
+179 – 180 , 183 , 185 , 187 , 194
+European Central Bank (ECB)
+labour market deregulation 142
+neoliberal mandate 114 – 115
+objective 159 – 160
+European Union
+accounting standards 81, 152 – 153
+aid programmes 161
+298 General Index
+
+Association de m é diation sociale
+case 237 – 238
+benchmarking 157
+Bolkestein proposal 278
+Centros case 142, 197
+Charter of Fundamental Rights 136,
+242 , 243
+competition 278
+‘ construction of Europe ’ 108 – 109
+convergence criteria 157
+corporate governance doctrine 27
+Courts 100, 107 , 136 – 137 , 142 , 195 ,
+198 , 237 – 239 , 243 , 244
+democratic defi cit 183 – 185, 237 , 289
+economic domain 194 – 195
+Economic and Financial Affairs
+Council 157 – 158
+economic freedoms 195
+economic policies subordinated to
+objectives 157
+employment contracts 254 – 255
+Eurozone see Euro/Eurozone
+exchange rate mechanism 157
+fair value, principle of 152 – 153
+feudal power structure 215 – 216, 225
+Fiscal Stability Treaty 28, 158 – 159
+former communist countries 25, 105 ,
+211 , 237
+freedom of competition 137, 195
+freedom of establishment 195
+Gim é nez case 243
+‘ governance ’ , notion of 28
+Greece ’ s entry 4
+Greek crisis 216
+harmonisation 70 – 71
+internal market 70 – 71
+joint and several liability 276 – 277,
+278 – 279
+K ü c ü kdeveci case 237
+labour law deconstruction 237 – 238
+labour market deregulation 141 – 142
+labour market ‘ total
+mobilisation ’ 254 – 255
+language and translation issues 47
+Laval case 142, 197 , 237 , 238
+Law and Economics doctrine 136 – 137,
+141 – 143 , 238 – 239
+Lisbon Strategy 113
+Lisbon Treaty 183 – 184, 244
+Maastricht Treaty 157, 159 , 183 , 215 ,
+237
+management by objectives 157 – 160,
+254 – 255
+Mangold case 237
+monetary governance 194
+national legislations 71
+neoliberalism 237 – 238, 261 – 262
+Nice Treaty 183
+
+posted workers 278 – 279
+proportionality principle 137
+public-private hierarchy 194 – 196,
+207 , 285
+rating agencies 162 – 163
+Rome Treaty 243
+social domain 194 – 195
+social insurance 100, 261 – 262
+Social Model, demise 243
+social policy 239, 243 – 244
+Stability and Growth Pact 157 – 158, 159
+suzerain power 215 – 216
+TFEU 70 – 71, 176 , 225 , 242 , 243 ,
+254 – 255
+torture, ECHR judgment 198
+Transatlantic Trade and Investment
+Partnership (TIPP) 211
+Treaty of Rome 71
+Troika 87, 160 , 179 , 183 , 185 , 187
+Viking case 137, 142 , 195 , 197 , 237 ,
+238
+Eurostat 86
+exchange rates, fl oating 160, 209
+Exxon Valdez disaster 275 – 276
+
+F
+fair value, principle of 152 – 153
+feudal structure
+company organisation 221 – 223
+economic banishment 274
+European Union 215 – 216, 225
+generally 212 – 213
+globalisation 225
+international economic
+organisations 216
+international trade 211 – 212
+joint and several liability 276 – 279
+liability law 221
+management by objectives 221 – 222
+market economies 219
+networks of allegiance 10, 213 – 218 ,
+222 , 269 – 282 , 285 , 286 – 287 , 288 – 289
+property rights 219 – 222
+re-emergence 10, 211 – 225
+rights in people 214 – 218
+rights in things 218 – 225
+shift from law to bond 215, 217 – 218
+subsidiaries 269 – 279
+suppliers ’dependence 274 – 275
+suzerain power 215 – 217, 275 – 276 , 287
+ties of allegiance 10, 214 , 268 , 269 – 282 ,
+286 – 287 , 288 – 289
+transnational companies 272 – 273
+vassalage 214, 222 – 225 , 273 , 275 – 276 ,
+287
+fi nancial collapse (2008) 141 – 142,
+162 – 163 , 179 , 209 , 210 , 216 , 240 ,
+243 , 284
+General Index 299
+
+Fordism 27, 129 , 144 , 176 , 222 , 231 – 232 ,
+245 , 258
+Fordist compromise 227 – 235, 236 ,
+237 , 239
+forum shopping 103, 114 , 117 , 197 – 198 ,
+271
+France
+1946 Constitution 189
+‘ Catala ’draft bill 279
+Civil Code 16, 37 – 38
+‘ co-employees ’ 277
+collective social insurance 260 – 264
+Commercial Code 79, 80 , 81 , 82 , 276
+Constitution of the French Republic 31
+contract law 279
+contrat collectif d ’ entreprise 196
+contrat nouvelle embauche 240
+contrat premi è re embauche 240
+Criminal Procedure 96
+Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
+the Citizen 31, 34 , 54 , 90 , 189
+Delors Law 265
+le Droit 46 – 47, 54
+employment contracts 249 – 255
+Evin Law 262
+Jacobin Republic 30
+job security 210
+joint and several liability 277
+labour law 195 – 196, 240 – 241 ,
+250 – 255 , 259 – 268 , 277 , 287
+liability, principle of 54
+Loi Strauss-Kahn 179
+market versus solidarity 264 – 268
+New Public Management 153 – 156, 196
+posted workers 278 – 279
+‘ Temptation Island ’case 246 – 247
+freedom
+Greek ideal 198
+neoliberal globalisation 202 – 203
+right to 198 – 199
+free shares 149
+French Theory 120
+fundamentalism 5, 9 , 209 , 285
+Law and Economics doctrine 141
+
+G
+game theory 126 – 128
+casino economy 152
+Germany
+founding prohibitions 189
+human dignity inviolable 137, 189
+ordoliberalism 114 – 115, 188
+Treaty of Lisbon 183 – 184
+globalisation
+backlash against 5
+business model imposed by 28, 160 – 163
+‘ cash-nexus ’ 193
+Chinese perception of 66
+
+colonial discourse 270
+competition 9, 114 , 202 – 203 , 207 , 228 ,
+235 , 236 , 242
+contract as normative reference 5
+crisis of welfare state 2 – 3
+decline of state sovereignty 9 – 10, 207
+ecological threat 8
+effects 8 – 9
+feudal structures 225
+generally 3, 106 – 107 , 200
+inequality, increasing 8, 209 – 210
+law, competition of global market 114,
+197 – 198
+mass migration 8
+mass unemployment 210, 234
+neoliberalism 193, 202 – 203
+non-Western legal traditions 65 – 66
+and political credibility 8
+Rana Plaza disaster 269 – 270, 271 – 272 ,
+273 , 279 , 282 , 287
+rule of law and 44, 114 , 213 – 214
+shrinking of the state 200 – 203, 204
+social effect 5
+total market 5, 9 – 10
+trade union reaction 236 – 237
+transnational companies 3, 269 – 282
+universalism 52, 101
+use of term 4
+Western perception of 66
+West ’ s development policies 28, 44
+workers and 269 – 282
+governance
+corporate governance doctrine 26 – 28
+criterion of good governance 28
+democracy and 30
+generally 3, 116
+government compared 26, 116
+management terminology 29
+neoliberalism 115 – 116
+New Public Management 26, 153 – 157 ,
+196
+numbers as tools of 68
+programmable man 25 – 26, 29 – 30 , 286
+res publica 30
+transition to 26 – 30
+governance by numbers
+allegiance under 268, 269 – 282 , 285 ,
+286 – 287
+benchmarking 138, 153 , 157 , 174
+calculation of utility 67, 109 , 284 – 285
+China 10
+communist planned economy
+compared 172
+competition 235 – 236
+computer regulation 97
+contractualisation of public policy
+217 – 218, 224 – 225
+democratic principle 182 – 185
+300 General Index
+
+encroachment on the law 10, 144 – 163
+fl oating exchange rates 160, 209
+health risks 176 – 178, 180 , 185 – 187 ,
+258
+indeterminacy of working
+conditions 248 – 255
+indeterminacy of work
+operations 255 – 257
+performance indicators 150, 170 – 175 ,
+180 – 181 , 286
+programming 284, 286
+rule by law compared 167
+structural adjustment plans 160,
+179 – 180 , 183 , 185 , 187 , 194
+structural effects 169
+total mobilisation 248 – 258
+unsustainability 285 – 286
+Western culture 68
+government
+Confucian tradition 14, 54
+etymological root 13
+generally 3
+governance compared 26, 116
+law as technique of 6, 51
+as machine 19, 22 – 23 , 30 , 37 , 105 , 169
+poetics of 13 – 18, 19
+and power 3, 13 – 14 , 33
+representative 15
+self-representation 14 – 15
+transition to governance 26 – 30
+Greece
+EU membership 4
+structural adjustment plan 183, 185 ,
+187 , 216
+Greek civilization
+Aristotle 36, 37 , 38 , 51 , 75 – 77 , 83
+democracy 15
+equality 33
+harmony of numbers 67, 68 – 70 ,
+71 – 72
+infl uence 38
+justice 36
+just order 33
+natural law theory 34 – 35
+nomos 32 – 39, 40
+Plato 37, 76
+representation of nature 50
+rule by law 32 – 39, 284
+Socrates 36
+theatre 15
+Grundnorm 124
+
+H
+Hand Formula 133, 136
+health protection
+collective social insurance 264
+public health policy and 98 – 99
+homo economicus 64, 73
+
+‘ human capital ’ 27, 29 , 229 , 235 – 241 ,
+265 , 268 , 288
+human development index 161, 181
+human genome
+property rights 221
+human rights see rights
+
+I
+industrial imaginary 2
+industrial revolution 5
+institutionalist economics 122
+insurance techniques
+fi nancial markets 99
+probability calculation 99 – 101
+social state 99 – 100
+International Accounting Standards Board
+(IASB) 81
+international institutions
+decay 9
+International Labour Organisation
+(ILO) 111 – 112, 271 , 273 – 274 , 287
+creation and objectives 228 – 230, 231 ,
+235 , 239
+inequality and globalisation 209
+political weakness 235
+international law
+language and translation issues 47
+International Monetary Fund (IMF)
+abolition of trade barriers 160
+business model imposed by 28, 87 , 160
+feudal power structure 216
+inequality and economic prosperity 210
+labour market deregulation 141 – 142,
+160
+privatisation of public services 160
+International Organisation of Securities
+Commission (IOSCO-OICV) 151
+International Organisation for
+Standardisation (ISO) 138 – 139
+Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS)
+clauses 133
+isonomia 33, 40
+ius
+continental law 46
+Roman law 39 – 41
+
+J
+Japan
+assimilation of Western legal
+culture 17 – 18
+judging
+legal qualifi cation 91 – 92
+principe du contradictoire 96
+probability and 93 – 97
+quantifi cation and 78, 93 – 97
+role of judge 93 – 94
+justice
+see also social justice
+General Index 301
+
+common law 48
+continental law 48
+distributive 75 – 76
+equity 48
+generally 1, 14
+Legalist School 62
+natural law theory 35
+proportional reciprocity 76 – 77
+rectifi catory 76
+rule of law 36
+
+K
+Kerviel affair 230 – 231
+Keynesianism 123
+Kyoto Protocol 161 – 162
+
+L
+labour law
+autonomy in subordination 247 – 248,
+250 – 253
+basic concepts 234 – 235
+collective representation 15
+commodifi cation of labour 220,
+234 – 235 , 239 , 245 – 247 , 258 , 268 , 284
+deconstruction 210, 235 – 239
+employer ’ s liability 185 – 187,
+259 – 260
+employment contracts 175 – 176
+equality 149 – 150
+fl exible arrangements 176, 187
+fl exicurity 240 – 241
+Fordist compromise 227 – 235, 236 ,
+237 , 239
+forum shopping 271
+France 195 – 196, 240 – 241 , 250 – 255 ,
+259 – 268 , 277 , 287
+management by objectives 149 – 150
+market deregulation 114, 141 – 142 , 160 ,
+216
+neoliberalism 236
+New Comparative Analysis 139 – 143
+non-competition clauses 223
+‘ Nordic Model ’ 240
+proposed reforms 239 – 244
+public and private law 15
+straddles private and public law 8
+transnational companies 271
+language and translation issues 47
+colonialism 55 – 56
+ILO Constitution 229 – 230
+legal qualifi cation 92
+law
+aesthetic dimension 16 – 18
+anthropological function 208 – 209
+autonomous legal order 48 – 50, 51
+benchmarking 138
+case law see case law and precedent
+Christianity 199 – 201
+
+commodifi cation 117 – 118, 121 ,
+133 – 134
+communist states 107 – 108, 181 – 182
+competition of global market 114
+concept of generally 2 – 3
+contract replacing as normative
+reference 5
+corporate governance doctrine and 28
+cost-benefi t analysis 131 – 137
+debasement 58
+division into branches 7 – 8
+dogmatic basis 5 – 6
+effi ciency 62 – 63
+encroachment of governance by
+numbers 67, 144 – 163 , 285
+feudal structures 217
+forum shopping 103, 114 , 117 , 197 – 198
+founding prohibitions 189 – 190, 208
+freedom and 198 – 199
+historical and geographical relativity 6, 7
+imaginary institution of society 1 – 2
+inviolability 57 – 58
+and justice 1
+labour see labour law
+language and translation issues 47
+Law and Economics doctrine see Law and
+Economic doctrine
+legal procedure 93
+legal qualifi cation 91 – 92
+loss of credibility 7, 8 , 15
+materialist theory of 2
+mathematical infl uence on legal
+thought 67 – 77
+natural law see natural law theory
+neoliberalism 114, 117 – 118 , 121 , 284
+New Comparative Analysis 139 – 143
+nomos 32 – 39
+power and 6, 43 – 44 , 49 , 50 – 51 , 118 ,
+205 – 206
+precedent see case law and precedent
+public-private distinction 8, 188 – 196
+ratio legis 49
+relative legitimacy 33 – 34
+replacement by programming 284
+resistance to governance by
+numbers 181 – 182
+rights and 33 – 34
+ritualism and 57, 58
+rule by see rule by law
+rule of see rule of law
+and social solidarity 15 – 16
+subordination of public sphere 188 – 196
+totalitarian states 107 – 108, 190 – 192
+treatment as cultural fact 7
+usus modernus 8
+Western culture 3 – 4, 5 – 6 , 48 – 49
+Law and Economics doctrine
+agency theory 128 – 130
+302 General Index
+
+benchmarking 138, 153 , 157 , 174
+calculation of utility 121 – 122
+case law 122
+Coase theorem 130 – 137
+common law 141
+competition 137
+cost-benefi t analysis 125 – 126, 131 – 137
+effi ciency of the law 62
+effi cient breach of contract 134 – 135,
+197 – 198
+environmental issues 131, 134
+European Union 136 – 137, 141 – 143 ,
+238 – 239
+game theory 126 – 128, 152
+generally 38, 49 , 121 , 123 – 126 , 131 ,
+215
+Hand Formula 133, 136
+human dignity 135 – 137
+ISO standards 138 – 139
+law as product 133 – 134
+legislation 122
+natural selection 138
+New Comparative Analysis 139 – 143
+political economy compared 122
+privatisation of standards 139
+property rights 130 – 137, 162
+social harmony founded on
+mathematics 73
+use of torture 136
+voluntary participation 139
+legal analysis
+centrality of legal rules 7
+historical and geographical relativity 6, 7
+increasing specialisation 7 – 8
+legal positivism 6
+methodological problems 7 – 8
+natural law theory 6
+purpose 6 – 7
+Legalist School
+effi ciency of the law 62 – 63
+generally 58 – 66, 108
+justice 62
+present-day infl uence 66
+punishment and rewards 60 – 61, 62 , 65
+and Taoism 59 – 60, 63 , 65
+legal positivism
+generally 6, 38 , 73 , 206
+subject-object dichotomy 2
+legislating
+Law and Economics doctrine 122
+probability and 98 – 99
+quantifi cation and 78, 98 – 102
+leveraged buy-outs 149
+lex
+continental law 46
+Roman law 39 – 42, 44
+liability
+joint and several 276 – 279
+
+principle of 54, 221
+liberalism
+communism compared 105, 112 – 113
+competition 112
+contracts 103 – 104, 121
+neoliberalism compared 114, 284
+personal identity under 104 – 105
+privatisation 112
+rule of law 103 – 105, 284
+shift to neoliberalism 111 – 112
+Smith 64 – 65
+
+M
+Mafi a organisations 119, 285
+management see management by objectives;
+public management
+management by objectives
+aid programmes 160 – 163, 180 – 181
+appraisal interviews 147, 185n, 256
+assessing attainment 150, 170 – 175 ,
+180 – 181 , 255 – 256
+corporate governance 148 – 153
+employment contracts 245 – 255
+European Union 157 – 160, 254 – 255
+feudal structures 221 – 222
+fi xing objectives 255, 258
+generally 145 – 147, 148 , 169 – 170 , 215 ,
+235 , 247 , 248 – 258 , 288
+health risks 176 – 178, 185 – 187 , 258
+indeterminacy of working
+conditions 248 – 255
+indeterminacy of work
+operations 255 – 257
+labour law 149 – 150
+legal force of objectives 256 – 257
+‘ No Child Left Behind ’reforms
+156 – 157, 172
+objective indicators 170 – 175, 286
+outsourcing 221 – 222
+participatory management 87,
+215 , 247
+performance indicators 150, 170 – 175 ,
+180 – 181 , 286
+performance-related bonuses 148, 170
+power over employee ’ s person 257
+public sector 148, 153 – 157
+quantifi cation 147, 185 – 187
+rating agencies 87, 162 – 163
+self-regulation 146, 151 , 170
+Soviet planning 180
+subordination 236, 247 – 248 , 250 – 253
+totalitarian regimes 236
+total mobilisation 248 – 258
+zero-hours contracts 248 – 250
+man-machine
+automata 19 – 22
+governance by numbers 175 – 178
+Hobbes 19, 21 – 22
+General Index 303
+
+programmable man 24 – 26, 176 – 178 ,
+236 , 286
+Taylorism 23 – 24
+market
+abandonment of gold standard 160, 209
+accounting, importance 80 – 81
+classic liberalism 103 – 104
+computer control 97, 105
+deregulation 101, 114 , 141 – 142 , 160
+fi nancial market and supply and
+demand 152
+free circulation of goods and capital 193
+‘ human capital ’ 27, 29 , 229 , 235 – 241 ,
+265 , 268 , 288
+insurance techniques and the fi nancial
+markets 99
+labour market, function 247
+market forces and loss of
+sovereignty 207
+neoliberalism 193 – 194
+self-regulation 151
+speculation 178
+spontaneous order of 35, 61 , 66 , 71 ,
+103 , 114 , 125 , 138 , 192 , 236 , 239
+total see total market
+versus solidarity 264 – 268, 287 – 288
+market economy
+and dictatorships 182 – 183
+dismembership of ownership 219 – 220
+Marxism see communism
+Matthew effect 265, 266
+migration and globalisation 8
+monarchy
+Eastern Empire 4
+England 44 – 45
+Japanese shogunate 17 – 18
+liturgical royalty 14
+mondialisation 4
+money
+commodifi cation 82, 220 , 284
+functions 81 – 82
+as universal standard of value 81
+Monsanto 220
+Mont Pelerin Society 123 – 124
+Mourides 203
+multinational companies 3, 269 – 282
+allegiance to states 279 – 282
+compliance programmes 279 – 282
+environmental responsibility 275 – 276
+feudal structure 272 – 273
+forum shopping 271
+human rights 272 – 273
+joint and several liability 276 – 279
+loss of technical skills 273
+market power 282
+posted workers 278 – 279
+post-Rana Plaza agreements 273 – 275,
+282 , 287
+
+supervision of supply chain 275 – 276
+suppliers ’dependence 274 – 275
+
+N
+Naqshbandi 203
+nationalism 5
+natural law theory
+Callicles 35, 51
+Enlightenment 49
+equality and 35
+generally 6, 38 , 206 – 207
+globalisation and 101
+Hayek 192 – 193
+Hobbes 19, 49
+Hume 192 – 193, 208
+justice and 35
+neoliberalism 192 – 194
+rights 54
+Sophists 34 – 35
+subject-object dichotomy 2
+totalitarian regimes 190 – 192
+natural selection
+equality and 35
+eugenics 90 – 91
+Law and Economics doctrine 138
+neoliberalism 24, 203
+Social Darwinism 24, 35 – 36 , 206 – 207
+nature
+see also environmental issues
+commodifi cation 220, 284 – 285 , 288
+representations of 50
+Nazism 5, 108 , 118 , 119 , 190 – 191 , 198 ,
+204 , 205 , 208 , 236
+eugenics 90
+neo-institutionalist school 122
+neoliberalism
+abolition of trade barriers 160
+calculation of utility 109, 115 – 116 ,
+121 – 122 , 271 , 284 – 285
+‘ cash-nexus ’ 193
+casualisation of labour 209, 210
+classic liberalism compared 114, 284
+communism compared 103 – 104, 107 ,
+110 , 113 , 115 , 121 , 124 , 202
+competition 24, 114 , 202 – 203 , 235 , 236
+contracts 105, 109 , 121 , 193
+democracy and 182 – 183, 216 – 217
+destabilisation of society 209 – 211
+ecological catastrophes 209, 275
+European Union 237 – 238, 261 – 262
+generally 106 – 107, 176
+globalisation 193, 202 – 203
+governance 115 – 116
+inequality, increasing 8, 209 – 210
+labour law 236
+labour market 114, 141 – 142 ,
+160 , 235
+law, commodifi cation 117 – 118, 121
+304 General Index
+
+law piloted by economic
+calculations 284
+law as technical tool 114
+market forces 193 – 194, 236
+mass unemployment 210, 234
+natural law theory 192 – 194
+natural selection 24, 203
+personal identity under 105
+privatisation 114, 160 , 193 – 196 , 225 ,
+285
+property rights 193
+rule of law 105, 109 , 114
+shift to 111 – 112
+social justice 192 – 193, 209 – 211 , 242
+social state 114, 160 , 192 – 193
+society and 209 – 211, 267
+Taylorism 24 – 25
+total market 71
+trade union reaction 236 – 237
+Neo-Platonists 68, 72 – 73
+networked structures
+company organisation 221 – 223,
+272 – 273
+corporate governance doctrine 149
+feudalism 10, 213 – 218 , 222
+neuro-economics 125
+New Comparative Analysis 139 – 143
+New Public Management 26, 153 – 157 ,
+196
+Nobel Prize for Economics 110, 123 – 124 ,
+125
+‘ No Child Left Behind ’reforms 156 – 157,
+172
+nomos 32 – 39, 40
+numbers
+Arabic numerals 92 – 93
+divine proportion 72
+harmony and 67 – 73, 74 – 77
+representation of nature by 67 – 68
+statistics 78
+symbolic value 68, 92
+
+O
+obiter dictum 45
+ordoliberalism 114 – 115, 188
+Organisation for Economic Co-operation
+and Development (OECD) 271
+corporate governance doctrine 27
+labour market deregulation 141 – 142
+outsourcing 221 – 222
+ownership see property rights
+
+P
+People ’ s Republic of China see China
+personal allegiance see feudal structure
+personal identity
+classic liberalism 104 – 105
+governance by numbers 144
+
+neoliberalism 105
+perspective, laws of 84
+political economy
+Law and Economics doctrine
+compared 122
+posted workers 278 – 279
+post-industrial society 226 – 227
+postmodernism 116 – 120, 135 ,
+215 , 226
+power
+containment of individual
+interests 189 – 190
+and government 3, 13 – 14 , 33
+law and 6, 43 – 44 , 51 , 118 , 205 – 206
+Legalist School 62
+political theory as theory of 118
+separation of powers 31, 48 – 49
+spiritual and temporal, Gregorian
+Revolution 42 – 44
+US power market 282
+precedent see case law and precedent
+Prisoner ’ s Dilemma 127 – 128, 246
+privatisation
+classic liberalism 112
+neoliberalism 114, 160 , 193 – 196 , 225
+post 2008 fi nancial crisis 216, 284 – 285
+social insurance 263, 264 – 268
+probability
+game theory and 126 – 127
+insurance techniques 99 – 101
+judging and 93 – 97
+legislating 98 – 99
+public health policy and 98 – 99
+programmable man 24, 25 – 26 , 29 – 30 ,
+176 – 178 , 236 , 286
+property rights
+dismembership of ownership 219 – 220
+economic control 220 – 222
+feudal structure 219 – 221
+human genome 221
+intellectual property 219 – 221
+neoliberalism 193
+sustainable development and 220
+property rights theory 133 – 137, 162
+prudence, principle of 94 – 95, 99 , 100 ,
+152 – 153
+public management
+censuses 85 – 87
+management by objectives 153 – 157
+mathematics of intelligibility 97
+New Public Management 26, 153 – 157 ,
+196
+‘ No Child Left Behind ’reforms
+156 – 157, 172
+quantifi cation and 78, 85 – 93
+public policy
+contractualisation 217 – 218, 224 – 225
+probability and 98 – 99
+General Index 305
+
+public and private law
+branches straddling 8
+hierarchy overturned 193 – 196, 207 ,
+213 , 285
+subordination of public sphere 188 – 196
+punishment
+Legalist School 60 – 61, 62 , 65
+ritualism 54 – 55
+Pythagoreans 67, 68 , 69 , 71 – 72
+
+Q
+quantifi cation
+see also probability; statistics; utility,
+calculation of
+accounting 78, 79 – 85
+communist planned economies 103, 105 ,
+107 – 108
+cost-benefi t analysis 125 – 126, 131 – 137
+ethno-accounting 102
+human development index 161, 181
+judging and 78, 93 – 97
+legislating and 78, 98 – 102
+management by objectives 147 – 148,
+150 , 170 – 175 , 180 – 181 , 185 – 187
+New Comparative Analysis 139 – 143
+‘ normality ’ 89, 91
+probability 93 – 97, 98 – 99
+public management and 78, 85 – 93
+rating agencies 87, 162 – 163
+social sciences 88 – 91, 102
+
+R
+Rana Plaza disaster 269 – 270, 271 – 272 ,
+273 , 279
+agreements signed after 273 – 275, 282 ,
+287
+rating agencies 87, 162 – 163
+ratio decidendi 45
+regionalism 5
+regulation school 122 – 123
+religious fundamentalism 5, 9
+religious legalism 190
+Renaissance humanism 8
+res publica
+Cicero 72 – 73
+Code of Justinian 188, 201
+concept generally 9
+containment of individual
+interests 189 – 190
+Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
+the Citizen 31
+decline of ideal 9
+governance and 30
+Hobbes 3
+rights
+common law 45, 46
+cost-benefi t analysis 107 – 109, 135 – 137
+duties and 54 – 55
+
+European Charter of Fundamental
+Rights 136, 242 , 243
+freedom 198 – 199
+human dignity 135 – 137, 189 , 192 , 234
+Law and Economics doctrine 133 – 137,
+238 – 239
+natural law theory 54
+‘ new generation ’human rights 192
+‘ new rights ’attached to the
+person 258 – 268
+property see property rights
+property rights theory 133 – 137, 162
+proportionality principle 137
+protection by rule of law 47
+Roman law 41 – 42
+‘ social drawing rights ’ 267 – 268
+transnational companies 272 – 273
+Western culture 6, 33 – 34 , 54 – 55 ,
+189 – 190
+ritualism
+China 53 – 55, 59 , 60
+Confucian tradition 54, 60
+duties as basis of 54
+generally 190, 212 , 214
+law and 57, 58
+Roman law 55, 57
+sub-Saharan Africa 53, 57 , 190
+totalitarian states 58
+Western culture 55, 58
+Roman law
+actions 41 – 42
+aequum 48
+canon law and 43
+case law and precedents 40 – 42
+Code of Justinian 188, 201
+common law and 44 – 45
+decemvirate 73
+East/West split 4
+founding narrative 73 – 75
+infl uence 42
+ius 39 – 41, 48
+lex 39 – 42, 44
+res publica 72 – 73, 188 – 189
+rights 41 – 42
+ritualism 55, 57
+statute law 40
+Twelve Tables of the Law 40 – 41, 62 ,
+73 – 75
+and Western culture 4
+Roman Republic
+census 85 – 86
+rule by law
+see also law; rule of law
+clocks and 25
+communist regimes 103 – 104, 105 ,
+107 – 112 , 113 – 114
+constitutions 31, 58
+current situation 32
+306 General Index
+
+democracy 32 – 33
+forum shopping 197
+generally 107, 212
+governance by numbers 10, 30
+governance by numbers compared 167
+Greek ideal 32 – 39, 284
+Gregorian Revolution 42 – 44
+inviolability of the law 57 – 58
+justice 36
+just order 33
+Plato 31, 32 – 33 , 36 – 37
+power 33
+Roman law 39 – 42
+Rousseau 31
+sovereignty of the law 36 – 37
+Western culture generally 30, 31 , 44 ,
+213 , 285
+rule of law
+see also law; rule by law
+classic liberalism 103 – 105, 284
+common law 47
+contract law 103 – 104, 109
+forum shopping 271
+generally 44, 107
+globalisation 44, 114 , 213 – 214
+human rights protection 47
+neoliberalism 105, 109 , 114
+origin 44
+Schmitt 191
+society and 204, 207 – 209
+threat to 58, 213 – 214
+transnational companies 271
+Western culture 30, 31 , 44 , 213
+Russian Federation
+communist/capitalist hybridisation 107,
+112 – 120
+Eastern Empire tradition 4
+USSR see Soviet Union
+and Western cultures 4
+
+S
+Sachsenspiegel 86
+Salamanca, School of 49
+Sarbanes-Oxley Law 80
+Scholasticism 16
+scientifi c socialism 124, 190 , 192
+securitisation 151
+self-regulation
+management by objectives 146, 151 ,
+162 , 170
+self-regulatory organisations
+(SROs) 151
+separation of powers
+Western culture 31, 48 – 49
+shareholders
+interests of, paramountcy 27
+profi t margins fi xed by 150 – 151
+share-price-induced redundancies 84 – 85
+
+value-creation for 27, 84 – 85 , 147 – 148 ,
+150 – 151 , 153 , 179 , 274
+shares
+company buy-backs 179
+social contract 36
+Social Darwinism 24, 35 – 36 , 138 ,
+206 – 207
+‘ social drawing rights ’ 267 – 268
+social insurance
+collective 260 – 264
+competition 263, 264 – 268
+European Union 261 – 262
+social justice
+humane working conditions 228 – 229,
+239 , 241
+modern labour law 234
+neoliberalism 192 – 193, 209 – 211 , 242
+peace secured by 210
+proportional reciprocity 76 – 77
+social legislation 90 – 91, 245
+and capitalism 5
+and globalisation 5
+probability and 98 – 99
+public health policy 98 – 99
+social order
+natural law see natural law doctrine
+ritualism see ritualism
+social sciences 226
+law as fi nancial product 117 – 118
+‘ normality ’ 89, 91
+statistics 88 – 91, 102
+social state
+cybernetic imaginary 2
+dismemberment 284 – 285
+European Union 239
+and globalisation 5, 101
+insurance techniques 99 – 100
+Law and Economics doctrine 124 – 125
+neoliberalism 114, 160 , 192 – 193
+social security legislation 245
+weaknesses 288
+Western European 192
+society
+civil war 199, 205 , 209
+contractualisation 128, 129
+decay of national institutions 9
+destabilisation 199 – 203, 204 – 211
+enemy as unifying factor 5, 204 – 211
+exiting from the law 204 – 208
+legal ties 15 – 16
+as machine 168
+natural law theory 206 – 207
+neoliberalism and 209 – 211, 267
+rule of law 204, 207 – 209
+shared point of reference 204
+social imaginary 1 – 2
+social order see natural law doctrine;
+ritualism
+General Index 307
+
+subject-object dichotomy 2, 50
+Western see Western culture
+Society of Nations 204, 229
+Sophists
+natural law theory 34 – 35
+sovereignty
+decline 9 – 10, 207
+European Union countries 183
+feudal structures 215
+Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS)
+clauses 133
+of the law 36 – 37
+law as element of sovereign power 43 – 44
+market forces and 207
+Soviet Union
+Civil Code 107
+collapse 194
+Constitution 113
+contracts 111
+Gosplan 26, 109 – 111
+management by objectives 180
+planned economy 10, 103 – 104 , 107 – 108 ,
+112 , 113 , 115 , 121 , 180 , 196 , 284
+rule by law 103 – 104, 107 – 112 , 113
+speech assemblies 56
+‘ starve the beast ’strategy 193 – 194
+state
+collapsed states 199 – 203, 204 – 208
+governance by numbers 179 – 181,
+285 – 286
+Hobbes 3
+Locke 3
+loss of credibility 7, 8 , 15
+multinational companies and 279 – 282
+shared point of reference 204
+shrinking 200 – 203, 204
+social see social state; welfare state
+sovereignty see sovereignty
+totalitarian 9, 10
+use of term 3
+in Western culture 2 – 3, 4
+statistics
+accounting 78, 79 – 85
+censuses 85 – 87
+development 78
+ethno-accounting 102
+fi guration of reality 80, 84
+judging 78
+legislating 78
+moral 89, 102
+‘ normality ’ 89, 91
+public health policy and 98 – 99
+public management 78
+social sciences 88 – 91, 102
+statistical qualifi cation 91, 92
+taxation 87 – 88
+statute law
+Roman law 40
+
+sub-Saharan Africa 56
+stock options 149
+Strasbourg Cathedral Astronomical
+Clock 21, 22 , 23
+structural adjustment plans 160, 179 – 180 ,
+183 , 185 , 187 , 194
+subcontractors 149, 222 – 223 , 272 – 273 ,
+275
+subject-object dichotomy 2, 50
+sub-Saharan Africa
+colonialism 55 – 57
+constitutions 56
+otherness of the law 53, 55 – 58
+post-colonial societies 57
+ritualism 53, 57 , 190
+speech assemblies 56
+statute law 56
+structural adjustment plans 160
+suppliers ’dependence 274 – 275
+sustainable development
+private property rights 220
+
+T
+Taoism 59 – 60, 63 , 65
+taxation
+competition between regimes 235
+statistics 87 – 88
+Taylorism 10, 23 – 25 , 27 – 28 , 115 ,
+146 , 169 , 175 , 177 , 226 , 227 ,
+231 – 233 , 235
+communism 24 – 25, 232
+neoliberalism 24 – 25
+Tetractys 69 – 70, 71 – 72 , 73
+totalitarianism
+see also communism; Nazism
+central planning 10, 236
+generally 9, 228
+law as technique of power 51
+law under 107 – 108, 190 – 192
+management by objectives 236
+market economy 182
+neoliberalism 182 – 183
+rights under 107 – 108
+ritualism 58
+state as machine 30
+total market
+competition 9
+concept of 71, 228 , 287 – 289
+contract as normative reference 5
+globalisation 5, 9 – 10
+neoliberalism 71
+total mobilisation 10, 25 , 227 – 228 ,
+235 – 236 , 239 , 248 – 258 , 286
+fl exibility 253 – 255
+indeterminacy of working
+conditions 248 – 255
+indeterminacy of work
+operations 255 – 257
+308 General Index
+
+‘ new rights ’attached to the
+person 258 – 268
+zero-hours contracts 248 – 250
+Total State 228
+trade
+bilateral agreements 211 – 212
+deregulation 101, 271
+neoliberalism 160
+World Trade Organisation 211
+Transatlantic Trade and Investment
+Partnership (TIPP) 211
+transformism 242 – 243
+transnational companies see multinational
+companies
+Trinity 69
+TRIPS agreement 219
+trusts 83
+
+U
+United Kingdom
+see also English law
+Gambling Act (1774) 99
+Offi ce of National Statistics 86
+social insurance 261
+zero-hours contracts 248 – 250
+United Nations
+Development Programme 161
+Framework Convention on Climate
+Change 162
+Millennium Development Goals 161,
+173
+rules of violated 211
+United States
+abandonment of gold standard 160, 209
+Amato-Kennedy Act 280
+application of US law abroad 279 – 282
+BNP Paribas settlement 279 – 280
+compliance programmes 279 – 282
+Declaration of Independence 5 – 6, 34
+Dodd-Franck Act 280
+dollar note 70
+employment ‘ at will ’ 249
+Federal Reserve 160
+Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 280
+Helms-Berton Act 280
+institutionalist economics 122
+invasion of Iraq 211
+Law and Economics doctrine 49
+Morrison ruling 280
+new world order post-Cold War 211
+‘ No Child Left Behind ’reforms
+156 – 157, 172
+racial laws 91
+Sarbanes-Oxley Law 80
+Security Exchange Commission
+powers 280
+Speedy Trial Act 281 – 282
+‘ starve the beast ’strategy 193 – 194
+
+Transatlantic Trade and Investment
+Partnership (TIPP) 211
+United States v Caroll Towing Co 133
+Universal Declaration of Human
+Rights 47, 104 – 105 , 136 , 271
+right to work 234
+USSR see Soviet Union
+usus modernus 8
+utilitarianism 64
+utility, calculation of
+see also cost-benefi t analysis;
+quantifi cation
+communism 107 – 109, 115
+forum shopping 271
+governance by numbers 67, 109 , 284
+Law and Economics doctrine 121 – 122
+law piloted by 284
+neoliberalism 109, 115 – 116 , 121 – 122 ,
+271 , 284 – 285
+rights 107 – 108
+use of torture 136
+
+V
+value-creation for shareholders 27, 84 – 85 ,
+147 – 148 , 150 – 151 , 153 , 179 , 274
+Versailles Treaty 227, 228 , 232
+Vi é not Report (1995) 27
+de Virville Commission Report 240
+
+W
+war
+civil war in destabilised societies 205,
+209 , 210
+natural selection theory 206 – 207
+social justice and 210
+US invasion of Iraq 211
+World Wars 10, 25 , 207 , 209 , 227 – 228 ,
+234
+Weimer Republic 204
+welfare state
+competition between regimes 235
+privatisation 193, 285
+state as machine 30
+Western culture
+automata 19 – 23, 30
+autonomous legal order 48 – 50, 51
+colonialism 5, 34 , 44
+common law see common law
+continental law see continental law
+corporate governance doctrine 28
+crisis 2 – 3
+cybernetic imaginary 2
+dependence on fi nancial markets 107
+development policies 28, 44
+enthrallment to science 232 – 233
+founding prohibitions 189 – 190
+globalisation, perception of 4, 66
+governance by numbers 68
+General Index 309
+
+government and power 14
+Greek infl uence 38
+Gregorian Revolution 42 – 44
+harmony of numbers 67 – 73, 74 – 77
+homo economicus 64, 73
+inviolability of the law 57 – 58
+legal tradition 3 – 4, 5 – 6 , 48 – 51
+liability, principle of 54
+liberalism 64 – 65
+mathematical infl uence 68, 73 – 77
+perspective generally 52
+representation of nature 50
+rights 6, 33 – 34 , 54 – 55
+ritualism 55, 58
+Roman law 4, 42
+ruling by law 30, 31 , 44 , 213 , 285
+and Russia 4
+separation of powers 31, 48 – 49
+social state 192, 288
+subject-object dichotomy 2, 50
+utilitarianism 64
+work/workers
+see also labour law
+agency theory 129 – 130, 149
+ambiguous status 259 – 268
+appraisal interviews 147, 185n, 256
+autonomy in subordination 247 – 248,
+250 – 253 , 259 , 273
+casualisation of labour 209, 210
+‘ co-employees ’ 277
+collective social insurance 260 – 264
+commodifi cation of labour 220,
+234 – 235 , 239 , 245 – 247 , 258 , 268 , 284
+contracts 175 – 176, 234 , 245 – 255
+corporate governance doctrine 27 – 28
+Declaration of Philadelphia 229
+dependence in autonomy 247 – 248
+deterritorialisation 236
+digital revolution 235 – 236
+employer ’ s liability 185 – 187, 258 ,
+259 – 260
+employment ‘ at will ’ 249
+feudal structure see feudal structure
+fi nancial sector 230 – 231
+fl exible arrangements 176, 187 ,
+253 – 255
+fl exicurity 241 – 242
+Fordism 27, 129 , 144 , 176 , 222 ,
+231 – 232 , 245 , 258
+Fordist compromise 227 – 235, 236 , 237 ,
+239
+‘ foreclosure of work ’ 246 – 247
+forum shopping 271
+‘ framework ’contracts 249
+function of labour market 247
+globalisation and 269 – 282
+governance by numbers 144 – 146,
+175 – 181 , 226 , 235 – 236 , 286
+
+health risks 176 – 178, 180 , 185 – 187 ,
+230 , 258
+‘ human capital ’ 27, 29 , 229 , 235 – 241 ,
+265 , 268 , 288
+humane working conditions 227,
+228 – 235 , 239 , 241
+indeterminacy of working
+conditions 248 – 255
+indeterminacy of work
+operations 255 – 257
+individual performance reviews 177 – 178
+‘ informal sector ’ 210
+international relocation 236
+job security 210
+labour market deregulation 114,
+141 – 142 , 160 , 216
+Legalist tradition 64
+management by objectives 145 – 147,
+148 – 150 , 169 – 170 , 235 , 247 ,
+248 – 258 , 288
+management power over employee ’ s
+person 257
+man-machine 23 – 25
+mass unemployment 210, 234
+multinational companies 269 – 282
+neoliberalism 235 – 236
+New Comparative Analysis 139 – 143
+‘ new rights ’attached to the
+person 258 – 268
+performance assessment 147, 150 ,
+170 – 175 , 180 – 181 , 185n, 255 – 256
+performance indicators 150, 170 – 175 ,
+180 – 181 , 286
+performance-related bonuses
+148, 170
+posted workers 278 – 279
+post-industrial society 226 – 227
+privatisation of standards 139
+programmable man 24, 25 – 26 , 29 – 30 ,
+176 – 178 , 236 , 286
+public sector 148, 153 – 157
+reifi cation of labour 234, 246 – 247
+scientifi c organisation 227 – 228, 229 ,
+232 – 233
+subcontractors 149, 222 – 223 ,
+272 – 273
+subordination 234, 236 , 247 – 248 ,
+250 – 253
+Taylorism 10, 23 – 25 , 115 , 146 , 169 ,
+175 , 177 , 226 , 227 , 231 – 233 , 235,
+259, 286, 288
+technical rationalisation 23 – 25
+total mobilisation 10, 25 , 227 – 228 ,
+235 – 236 , 239 , 248 – 258 , 286
+trade unions 236 – 237
+workforce membership 241 – 242
+working time 245 – 246
+zero-hours contracts 248 – 250
+310 General Index
+
+World Bank
+business model imposed by 28, 161
+compliance procedures 280
+‘ Doing Business ’programme 140, 141
+World Trade Organisation (WTO) 211
+TRIPS agreement 219
+World War I 207, 209
+
+legacy 227 – 229, 234
+total mobilisation 10, 25 ,
+227 – 228
+World War II 207, 209 , 229
+
+Z
+zero-hours contracts 248 – 250
\ No newline at end of file
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+Turnbull, P. J. (2022). Slow, slow, quick, quick, slow: The ‘thick and
+thin’ of comparative (statactivist) research with a European trade
+union federation. European Journal of Industrial Relations.
+https://doi.org/10.1177%2F09596801221075807
+
+Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
+
+License (if available):
+CC BY
+Link to published version (if available):
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+
+Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
+PDF-document
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+This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via SAGE Publications
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+published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
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+Original Article
+
+European Journal of
+Industrial Relations
+2022, Vol. 0(0) 1–23
+© The Author(s) 2022
+
+Article reuse guidelines:
+sagepub.com/journals-permissions
+DOI: 10.1177/09596801221075807
+journals.sagepub.com/home/ejd
+
+Slow, slow, quick, quick, slow:
+The ‘thick and thin’ of
+comparative (statactivist)
+research with a European trade
+union federation
+
+Peter Turnbull
+University of Bristol, UK
+
+Abstract
+The greater insight and deeper understanding generated by slow comparative international
+research is beyond doubt. However, there are times when researchers need to ‘quicken
+up’, most notably when engaged in ‘real-time’ social science that is directly responsive to
+policy initiatives by the (supranational) state and/or new business strategies and employment
+practices developed by (multi-national) employers. This is a particular challenge
+for scholars working with European trade union federations, especially when they are
+drawn into political campaigns and/or European policy debates. Such engagement often calls
+for a (quick) step from slow (typically qualitative) to fast (predominantly quantitative)
+research, using statistics for activism in order to build evidence for representation that can
+pass the test of science as well as the test of action. The evidence is necessarily ‘thin’ but
+nonetheless sufficient, on occasion, to warrant collective action.
+
+Keywords
+Comparative industrial relations, statactivism, evidence for representation, European
+trade union federations
+
+Introduction
+
+The manifesto for ‘slow’ comparative research on work and employment (Almond and
+Connolly, 2020) is a public declaration that will no doubt resonate with industrial relations
+researchers as both activist-scholars and university employees. Comparative international
+
+Corresponding author:
+Peter Turnbull, School of Management, University of Bristol, Howard House, Bristol BS8 1SD, UK.
+Email: peter.turnbull@bristol.ac.uk
+research that is little more than a series of flying overseas visits – or what Bate (1997:
+1150) derides as ‘jet-plane ethnography’ that produces ‘quick description’ rather than
+‘thick description’ – is surely anathema to the activist-scholar who is concerned with ‘not
+only what trade unions are, but what they might become, and how’ (Hyman, 2001: 225,
+original emphasis). The slow process of access to the ‘common sense’ of relevant actors
+demands immersion in the societies, industrial sectors and organizations subject to
+theoretical and empirical scrutiny, which clearly favours emancipatory and participatory
+action research approaches (Almond and Connolly, 2020: 69–70). In fact, the very act of
+incorporating participatory social action into one’s research slows down the research
+process (Cancian, 1993: 96). Unfortunately, in the modern-day (neoliberal) university,
+going slow runs counter to ‘the current drama of get-rich-quick research activity’ (Stewart
+and Mart´ınez Lucio, 2017: 552, original emphasis). As a university employee, regardless
+of whether or not one is involved in activism beyond the academy, the pressure to ‘publish
+or perish’, and only in ‘high ranking’ journals, has created a highly competitive, often
+toxic environment (Smyth, 2017) where the majority of academic staff now claim they
+have insufficient time to undertake the research they need to ‘get ahead’ (Times Higher
+Education, 04/02/2016 and 08/02/2018). Nonetheless, being a ‘slow professor’ (Berg and
+Seeber, 2016) is surely more appealing than a ‘fast food professor’ (Marinetto, 2018:
+1015).
+The proficiency of slow professors is the culmination of an ‘intimate knowledge of
+several thousand concrete cases in their area of expertise’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 222), where
+the cases in question are not simply countries, sectors and organizations, but everything
+from the ‘politics of everyday’ and people’s experiences at work (Courpasson, 2017) to
+the ‘politics of opportunity’ and the ability of social movements to transform social
+relationships (McAdam et al., 2001). Slow comparativism ‘supports the organic engagement
+of researchers within different national contexts’ (Almond and Connolly, 2020:
+70) and this context-dependent knowledge and experience, typically accumulated over
+many years of idiographic research, is ‘at the very heart of expert activity’ (Flyvbjerg,
+2006: 222). That said, there are often times when even slow research has to ‘quicken up’.
+In particular, when activist-scholars are engaged in ‘real-time’ social science that is
+directly responsive to public issues, they must:
+
+accommodate the schedules of policy-making not the ideal working conditions of scholarship.
+This usually means deploying in new contexts knowledge that academics have
+already developed, or quickly preparing new analyses of existing data … This sort of real
+time social science depends on longer-term research projects already underway and on the
+development of social science expertise through careers of scholars who learn about issues
+even when they are not immediately the focus of public attention (Calhoun, 2009: 300).
+
+For academics working with European Trade Union Federations (ETUFs), the timing
+
+of when to quicken up is largely determined by the policy-making process, when opportunities
+arise to respond to policy proposals at the national and especially the international
+level (i.e. the agenda defined by the institutions of the European Union)
+(Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2020: 262). Such opportunities are not simply given
+
+2 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+and must always be created, but the formal status of ETUFs as social partners in the
+European social dialogue presents both on-going opportunities and transformative
+moments for activist scholarship. The more challenging question is how to quicken up.
+How do we build expert (slow comparative) knowledge and respond to the (real-time)
+opportunities for activism that present themselves from time to time? If close contact can
+be maintained with our trade union partner(s), founded on trust and a shared commitment
+to social transformation, then it is much easier to execute the very tight turns that animate
+the rhythm of ‘slow, slow, quick, quick, slow research’ when dancing with our research
+partners to the tune of policy makers. With solid (slow) foundations in place, built not only
+on trust and commitment but also social scientific expertise, it is possible to generate
+evidence that can be used to bolster the representation of workers’ interests in relatively
+short (quick) order.
+Proponents of participatory action research and other slow qualitative research designs
+often downplay the utility of fast(er) quantitative data (e.g. Brook and Darlington, 2013:
+240). Such data is typically equated with a positivist (nomothetic) research strategy of
+‘thin comparativism’ whereby standardized questions are posed to as many respondents
+as possible (e.g. via a questionnaire survey) in order to maximize the comparability of
+respondents and establish relationships (correlation) between variables. To be sure, ‘in
+divorcing variables from the socio-cultural-political contexts in which their concrete
+meaning is interpreted and realized by actors, cross-sectional research often fails to
+understand how phenomena or issues are socially constructed’ (Almond and Connolly,
+2020: 64). Nonetheless, ‘the use of statistics is part of the repertoire of contention and a
+major resource for contemporary mobilizations … to be strong one must ally oneself, and
+statistics is a primary cement of such alliances’ (Bruno et al., 2014: 200 and 213).
+Statactivism – a portmanteau word used to denote the mobilization of statistics – involves
+a denunciation of certain representations of reality (e.g. official data on the violation of
+workers’ rights), seizes on elements not often taken into account (e.g. undeclared work)
+and creates equivalency among disparate conditions in order to bond together emerging
+social categories (e.g. false or bogusly ‘self-employed’ workers). As such, these social
+(statistical) categories ‘form the basis for individual and collective identity’ (Porter, 1995:
+42).
+The generic use of statistics as a tool for struggle, especially for ETUFs when representing
+the collective interests of member organizations vis-a-vis the supranational `
+state, international employer associations and multi-national employers (MNCs), is
+discussed in the following section. The specific use of statistics to ‘quicken up’ slow
+research is then demonstrated in relation to policy debates in the European transport
+sector, based on more than 20 years of slow comparative research with different transport
+sectors of the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF). The deep foundations of
+slow research provide a springboard for much quicker, real-time research when the
+occasion arises. Moreover, contrary to the assumption that, in theory, ‘one could use
+evidence-based principles to promote workers’ interests against those of the management,
+but “in theory” is where this idea is likely to be destined to remain’ (Morrell and
+Learmonth, 2015: 525), quick research with the ETF has utilized a framework that draws
+on such principles to generate ‘evidence for representation’ (EfR) in double-quick time.
+
+Turnbull 3
+Using the authority of ‘facts’ without forgetting their statistical construction, the
+
+statactivist can ‘uncover the lies that [management and the state] proffer’ (Bruno et al.,
+2014: 208). In a subsequent section, two particular examples of such mendacity are
+addressed by way of illustration: first, an assurance by the European Community
+Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA) that there was no intention on the part of its members
+to increase the number of non-EU nationals on intra-EU regular passenger and ferry
+services (CEC, 1999: 17) after the ECSA ‘sank’ a proposed manning Directive (CEC,
+1998) designed to protect seafarers’ terms and conditions of employment; and secondly,
+claims made by the European Commission that, despite the ‘mis-application of the social
+rules in road transport’ (e.g. driving, working and resting time requirements), in the bus
+and coach sector at least, existing regulations ‘ensure both fair working conditions for
+drivers and fair competition between operators’, such that ‘there does not appear to be a
+requirement for any further labour market policies to address these problems’
+(Commission Staff Working Document, 2017: 56–7 and 87). Quick research can
+promptly dispel such duplicity, although disclosure (denouncing a certain state of reality)
+and affirmation (creating equivalency among disparate conditions to cement emerging
+social categories) (Bruno et al., 2014: 200) does not necessarily provoke collective action.
+
+Statactivism and evidence for representation with European
+trade union federations
+
+The (mis)use of statistics is widely associated with the exercise of power, especially by the
+state (Porter, 1995: 43) and in particular the neoliberal state in its quest to foster market
+competition (Bruno et al., 2014: 201). Conversely, statistics have long been used to not
+only describe the lives of working people, but to demonstrate the relationship between
+employment and social conditions with a view to their improvement (e.g. Booth, 1892).
+Actors gain power from the data that supports their policy agenda, at the same time as
+these data give power to their policy agenda. Power in any social context is not just about
+position but also purpose. With the necessary savoir-faire, the statactivist can mobilize
+data as a tool for struggle during political fights and, in certain cases, ‘as a means of
+emancipation’ (Bruno et al., 2014: 199).
+The dual role of statistics is to represent and criticize reality, albeit a synthetic representation
+of reality but nonetheless one that can create a shared reading of social and
+economic conditions. This is especially important for ETUFs as ‘meta-organizations’ (i.e.
+an association of associations) as their members are not individuals (e.g. transport
+workers) but collective organizations (e.g. national transport unions) (Hyman and
+Gumbrell-McCormick, 2020: 225). If it can be demonstrated that workers in different
+European countries share common interests, express shared grievances and experience
+similar forms of exploitation, possibly at the hands of the same MNC, then quantifying
+these outcomes of a Single European Market ‘necessarily implicates statistical categories
+and statactivism, helping to define the subject that serves as receptacle for the desire for
+and praxis of emancipation’ (Bruno et al., 2014: 210). Social categories need to be defined
+in order to be defended, exploitation needs to be exposed before it can be ended. To be
+sure, evidence is not answers – data must always be interpreted in context and there is no
+
+4 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+guarantee that research evidence will yield a warrant for action – but the simple fact that
+‘another number is possible’ creates a shared reading of reality that, at a minimum, will
+strengthen the ETUF’s ‘force of argument’ and, on occasion, the ‘argument of force’.
+Organizations that have other organizations as members typically lack hierarchical
+authority or the power to sanction members. For ETUFs, consensus is therefore sought
+through a process of ‘deliberative democracy’ (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2020),
+because: ‘When policies are adopted deliberately – after sufficient discussion, debate, and
+the sifting of reasons and evidence, including from experts – they are more likely to be
+policies that people are prepared to live with’ (Keohane et al., 2009: 8, emphasis added).
+Collective reasoned reflection is essential to ensure that policies are understood internally
+at all levels – from rank-and-file members to national union officials to the permanent
+secretariat of the ETUF – and sufficiently robust to withstand the critique of external
+interlocutors such as MNCs, European employer associations and the European institutions
+(e.g. Commission, Council and Parliament). As recognized social partners, when
+ETUFs participate in sector social dialogue committees and the European policy-making
+process, they are expected to present robust evidence that can withstand the scrutiny of
+peer review and benchmarking against other studies (Smismans, 2015: 22). Indeed, it is
+axiomatic that any data that challenges capital(ism) will always be questioned in terms of
+rigour and objectivity (Porter, 1995: 5–6; and Stewart and Mart´ınez Lucio, 2017: 540).
+Statactivism delivers on both rigour and relevance, generating statistical and other forms
+of evidence for representation that challenges EU policies and the business and employment
+strategies of employers, in real time, in order to protect and promote the interests
+of workers.
+The ETF, in common with other ETUFs, has long been embedded in the European
+social dialogue and oriented towards the ‘logic of influence’ (Dølvik, 1997) whereby
+union organizations adapt their aims and methods to the decision-making processes
+through which they seek to represent their members. Transport unions in Europe were
+divided on whether the Comite syndicales des transports dans la Communaut ´ e euro- ´
+peenne ´ (CSTCE), established in 1958 and commonly known (or derided) as the ‘Brussels
+Committee’, should simply service the various Joint Committees established by the
+European Commission for joint consultation or whether it should function as an international
+trade union federation for transport workers that could organize political
+campaigns, support members embroiled in conflict with employers and/or the nation state,
+and possibly even coordinate industrial action across member states. Movement in the
+latter direction was signalled by the creation of the Fed´ eration Syndicale des Travailleurs ´
+des Transports Europeens ´ (FST) in 1996, and most notably by incorporation into the
+regional structure of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) in 1999 as the
+ETF. For example, with the support of the ITF, the ETF was able to organize an effective
+campaign of political and industrial action by dockworkers against employer and
+Commission proposals to liberalize the port services market (Turnbull, 2006b, 2010b). In
+hindsight, however, it is evident that mobilization on this scale is rare and might best be
+described as a sporadic interruption of the more normal technocratic character of international
+and specifically European trade unionism (Gentile, 2016: 122). For other ETF
+transport sectors, a more diplomatic approach has prevailed, characterized by social
+
+Turnbull 5
+dialogue with European employer associations and lobbying the European institutions (cf.
+Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2020: 268).1
+With labour diplomacy comes a more bureaucratic meta-organization, running the risk
+that ‘internationalism from above’ might ‘marry efficiency to impotence’, leading to a
+suppression of both political alternatives and mobilization capacity (Hyman, 2005: 145).
+That said, domination is manifest in control over the means of knowledge production as
+well as material production, and evidence (the force of argument) invariably comes before
+action (the argument of force). Through statactivism, evidence can establish the foundations
+if not the focus for action. Mobilizations take place around social indicators (e.g.
+real wage levels, the prevalence of zero hours contracts, accident and injury rates, etc.),
+which requires both an ‘authority of facts’ and the utilization of politically accountable
+forms of knowledge. Such knowledge, as depicted in Figure 1, might be used to make
+public and legitimate (or illegitimate) a common practice not yet brought to light, to
+deconstruct and de-legitimize existing statistical indicators, or to institutionalize new
+social categories. For example, the extensive hiring of pilots on ‘self-employment’
+contracts by several low-cost airlines, most notably Ryanair (Harvey and Turnbull,
+2015, 2020), was not widely appreciated prior to the publication of a report commissioned
+by the European Cockpit Association that involved national case studies and a survey of
+more than 6600 European pilots (Jorens et al., 2015).2 Initially, the Commission referred
+to this practice as a new ‘business model’ but eventually acknowledged that such hiring
+practices constitute a form of ‘bogus’ or ‘false self-employment’ (Turnbull, 2020).
+The four different types of knowledge depicted in Figure 1 are interdependent and
+thereby equally important for effective representation. While the mantra of evidenceFigure
+1. Evidence for representation.
+
+6 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+based policy-making is ‘what works’, the normative foundation of EfR is ‘what’s right’
+(i.e. socially just). Armed with knowledge for understanding, the statactivist can ‘do the
+research right’ (i.e. according to the rigours of social scientific methods) as ‘it requires
+institutional or personal credibility even to produce impersonal numbers’ (Porter, 1995:
+214). More importantly, the power of social scientific evidence resides not only in more
+‘objective’ empirical data but ‘knowledge for understanding’. Theoretical interventions –
+‘deploying in new contexts knowledge that academics have already developed’ (Calhoun,
+2009: 300) – can function as a form of political practice precisely because problems are
+always in need of a theoretical explanation as well as a practical solution. Hence, the
+importance of combining social scientific evidence with sector-specific (contextdependent)
+evidence in order to translate this knowledge into action.
+Crucially, this is not a unidirectional diffusion of ‘expert knowledge’ – or what
+Burawoy (2005: 10–11) labels ‘professional sociology’ – rather a dialectic interaction of
+mutual education. EfR involves a critical engagement between the researcher and the
+research partner, the co-production of research with as opposed to research on or for. EfR
+is critical in the sense of avoiding the subordination of academic work to the immediate
+interests and demands of political organizations such as ETUFs – a danger inherent to
+what Burawoy (2005: 9–11) has classified as ‘policy sociology’. By retaining the independence
+needed for the proper development of scholarly reflection, the statactivist can
+proactively engage in support of workers’struggles for democracy, equality, decent work,
+fair pay, etc. Critical engagement ‘expands the role of the sociologist into the furnace of
+action itself and the grounding of ideas within the movement itself’ (Lambert, 2008: 98,
+original emphasis). Doing things right (the test of science) is the foundation for doing the
+right thing (the test of action).
+Working with ETUFs, the statactivist is engaged with an expert community that
+understands the significance of statistical significance, given that the typical professional
+international trade union official today is a graduate with language skills who, having
+spent some time as a researcher in a national labour movement, has progressed to an
+international federation (Hyman, 2005: 147). Equally important, as diplomats engaged in
+political lobbying and social dialogue with European employer associations, the modernday
+secretariats of ETUFs are well-versed in dealing with a variety of different stakeholders.
+They appreciate the importance of understanding the interests of employers and
+policymakers if they are to generate legitimate knowledge in the eyes of external interlocutors,
+especially as these stakeholders have the power to make certain ideas (appear)
+universal (e.g. ‘freedom of access’ to a single market or what constitutes‘fair competition’
+and a ‘level playing field’) (ETF, 2019: 15). The appeal of numbers is especially
+compelling for bureaucratic officials of the European Commission, who lack the mandate
+of a popular election: ‘A decision made by the numbers … has at least the appearance of
+being fair and impersonal’ (Porter, 1995: 8). EfR thereby generates both statistical and
+practical confidence in a ‘shared reading’ of the research evidence, making public issues
+out of private problems in accordance with the precepts of ‘organic public sociology’
+(Burawoy, 2005: 7–9). At a minimum, stakeholders must acknowledge that workers have
+a case and there is a case to answer.
+
+Turnbull 7
+Knowledge for framing is also central to EfR, as international solidarity ultimately
+
+rests on ‘an active strategy by union leaders and activists to enhance knowledge, understanding
+and identification of common interests cross-nationally’ (Hyman, 2005: 149).
+Variously described as ‘organic intellectuals’ or ‘political entrepreneurs’ who possess ‘the
+vision to explore transnational strategies and the leadership skills to convince their
+constituency’ (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2008: 80), this is the group of collaborators ‘who
+can take the lead in co-analysis, who are motivated to appropriate the project, and who
+engage in some sort of critical reflexivity and conceptual production upon their own
+practices’ (Arribas Lozano, 2018: 106). Meta-organizations need to connect the secretariat
+of the federation to the rank-and-file members of affiliated unions, via union officials
+and activists who not only draw on shared trade union identities and familiar ideas about
+union action, but who move cognitively and physically outside their spatial origins and
+are open to new repertoires of contention. They continue to be linked to national and local
+place and the social networks that inhabit that space, but they frame knowledge (research
+evidence) as not simply a threat but an opportunity to externalize conflict and forge new
+and/or stronger alliances with their counterparts in other countries (Tarrow, 2005). As
+‘practical theorists’, union officials engage with activist-scholars in a form of ‘critical
+sociology’ (Burawoy, 2005: 10–11) that reflects on the normative as well as the descriptive
+foundations of the research, on political as well as academic accountability (i.e.
+the ‘test of action’ as well as the ‘test of science’), on ‘what matters’ (to the workers) as
+well as ‘what’s interesting’ (to the researcher).
+EfR offers a way for comparative industrial relations researchers to reconcile the longstanding
+dilemma of how to combine idiographic and nomothetic research methods (cf.
+Hyman, 2001). The co-production of knowledge and the combination of different forms
+of knowledge depicted in Figure 1 is clearly attuned to slow (idiographic) research,
+building long-term relationships with the ETUF and its members, engaging with and
+understanding the interests of different stakeholders, and learning about relevant issues
+even when they are not at the top of the policy agenda. In this way, researchers come to
+appreciate that interrelationships between different societal elements renders the experience
+of every national trade union movement (more or less) unique. But without
+common variables, there is only difference. Thus, as Hyman (2001: 210) notes, ‘Formulating
+and “testing” explanatory generalizations are necessary, and reciprocally
+conditioning, elements in comparative research. In the process, we may attain a deeper
+and more sensitive understanding of difference in similarity and similarity in difference’.
+In this regard, EfR is equally well-suited to faster (nomothetic) approaches. For
+example, questionnaires can be readily and rapidly developed and distributed with the
+assistance of both the ETUF’s secretariat and national union officials/activists. More
+importantly, through co-production of the questionnaire, survey questions will ‘speak to’
+respondents and enable the ETUF and its affiliates to ‘speak for’ their respective
+members: questionnaires can encourage respondents to express their interests, articulate
+personal claims and reflect on shared grievances, which in turn can be presented as a
+collective and coherent political claim. Even if fast questionnaire survey research does
+nothing more than record empirical events and establish correlation between variables,
+this might be sufficient to put workers’ interests (the case to answer) on the policy agenda.
+
+8 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+With EfR, the statactivist can go much further, drawing on different forms of knowledge
+to look beyond the observable and investigate the causal mechanisms behind the empirical
+world of quantifiable events. In the world of international transport, where both
+capital and labour are highly mobile, these mechanisms are played out in a Single
+European Market that allows capital to exploit labour via regulatory ‘spaces of exception’
+(Lillie, 2010) and digital platforms that not only give firms access to more data but also a
+dominant market position and potential control over the rules of what is supposed to be a
+‘level playing field’ for competition (Srnicek, 2017: 47).
+
+Lies, damned lies and statactivism
+
+Slow, slow comparativism – ports, civil aviation and … maritime
+
+Slow research on the CSTCE began in 1995, prior to the creation of the FST, as part of a 3-
+year project on the comparative economic performance of European ports (Barton and
+Turnbull, 2002). At the time, the CSTCE/FST was a rather peripheral player on the
+waterfront as there was no European sector social dialogue committee for port transport
+and many dockworker trade unions objected to making financial contributions to what
+they regarded as an ineffective European Comite´, especially when they were active in the
+ITF. However, the policy context changed dramatically in 2000 when the ETF received a
+document from the European Commission with a series of questions that were clearly
+designed to ‘test the water’ for plans to liberalize the port services market. The author was
+asked to write a response for the Dockers’ Section of the ETF, to be submitted to the
+Commission following a review of the document by affiliated dockworker trade unions.
+Research with the ETF continued throughout the ensuing ‘war on Europe’s waterfront’
+(Turnbull, 2006b), including subsequent participation as an official delegate of the ETF at
+a series of six workshops organized by the Commission to determine future EU ports
+policy (Turnbull, 2010b). The latter involved quickly drafting responsesin the name of the
+ETF to Commission position papers issued less than 10 days before each workshop.
+Around this time, attention turned to a participatory action research project with the
+Civil Aviation Section of the ETF as part of a long-term study of the Single European
+Aviation Market (SEAM) and ‘social dumping’ by low-cost airlines (Turnbull, 2010a).
+This research involved a combination of case studies and questionnaire surveys of
+aviation workers (Harvey and Turnbull, 2012, 2014), culminating in a 2-day workshop for
+all stakeholders3 and a joint declaration by the social partners on the threats posed by
+‘flags of convenience’ (FoCs). Registering a ship in a more ‘convenient’ country in order
+to avoid taxes and labour standards in the owner’s country is a long-standing and
+widespread practice in the maritime industry (Lillie, 2010) and was now a feature of the
+SEAM. For the ETF and the Association of European Airlines, at issue was a low-cost
+business model that distorted social conditions and competition, posing a threat to
+‘comparatively decent employment’ in European civil aviation: the social partners feared
+a similar fate to shipping, where ‘the past permissive attitude towards the use of flags of
+convenience has been devastating to industry and employment alike’.
+4 For example, at the
+turn of the millennium, non-EU nationals constituted only 2–3 per cent of the crew onTurnbull
+9
+board regular short-sea services between EU member states and most services were
+carried out by ships under member states’ flags; a decade later, around 1-in-5 crew were
+hired from third countries (ECORYS, 2009: v).
+Although the maritime industry was not the immediate focus of research with the ETF,
+it was still possible, if not inevitable, to learn indirectly about shipping as a result of the
+emergence of FoCs in civil aviation and directly as a consequence of the close cooperation
+between maritime and dockworker trade unions within the ITF and ETF. In 2010, the ETF
+launched a campaign for ‘Fair and Safe Ferries for All’ (Umney, 2012) combining portbased
+vessel inspection (supported by national dockworker trade unions) and political
+lobbying for a Directive that would make the ITF’s ‘Athens Policy’ a reality. With similar
+wording to the Commission’s proposed Common Policy on Manning of Regular Passenger
+and Ferry Services (CEC, 1998), which was vehemently opposed and ultimately
+scuppered by the ECSA in 2004, the ITF’s Athens Policy states that: ‘the crews of vessels
+engaged in European ferry trades, including non-European vessels, shall be covered by
+European conditions of employment which are regulated through national collective
+bargaining agreements held by the appropriate ITF European affiliates’.
+5 When the
+Political Secretary of the ETF Dockers’ Section transferred to the Maritime Section, we
+entered into correspondence on how to bring new (statistical) evidence to bear on FoCs
+and social dumping, in particular with respect to: ‘the terms and conditions applied to
+crew members on-board ships trading between European countries and then prolonging
+their trade to non-European Southern Mediterranean countries’ (email from the ETF, 18
+September 2012).
+
+Quick statactivism – short-sea shipping
+
+Accurate and comparable data on seafarers is scarce (EC, 2020: 11), especially when
+shipping lines operate under a FoC in the ‘spaces of exception’ (Lillie, 2010) on routes
+between EU and non-EU countries, where seafarers ‘fall between the cracks’ (EC, 2020:
+18) or ‘loopholes’ in existing EU regulations (ETF, 2019: 3) and policy makers and other
+stakeholders are ‘deprived of key information that would normally be used to identify
+problems’ (EC, 2020: 11). Shipping lines are of course in full possession of the necessary
+evidence, but they use their considerable financial, technical and other resources to ‘set an
+agenda that corresponds to their needs’ (EC, 2020: 17), which includes with-holding
+information on crewing and labour costs (EC, 2020: 14). For its part, the ETF has limited
+internal research capacity6 and is therefore reliant on national unions and the commitment
+of activist-scholars who can generate the necessary (statistical) evidence for representation.
+To this end, as part of its work programme for 2013–17, it was agreed with the
+ETF’s Maritime Transport Section (MTS) to undertake a 5-month (quick) research project
+in order to:
+
+1. identify all ferry routes and vessels in the western Mediterranean;
+2. determine whether terms and conditions of the crew differ depending on the
+nationalities of seafarers; and
+
+10 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+3. analyse the recurrent practice of reflagging to cheaper flags with less stringent
+conditions.
+
+Data on shipping is available from a variety of sources, creating the potential for new
+
+analysis of existing data. The annual market report published by Shippax provides a
+comprehensive list of all cruise, ferry, ro-ro and high-speed vessel trading worldwide.7
+From this database it was possible to identify all short-sea services in the western
+Mediterranean and for each vessel record the operator(s), flag and flag changes from 2003
+onwards. These data were combined with and cross-checked against Sea-web, an online
+database of currently more than 200,000 vessels that is continuously updated.8 Access to
+the Sea-web database was secured via the Dockers’ Secretary of the ITF and involved
+initial training to use the database at the Federation’s HQ in London. Although our main
+concern was to extract data on vessels trading between EU member states and then
+extending their services to the Maghreb countries, we also included island cabotage as a
+‘control group’ as these vessels are known to be flagged and operated by EU member
+states and crewed predominantly by EU seafarers. This yielded a total population of 116
+vessels sailing from either France, Italy or Spain to non-EU countries and 227 vessels on
+island cabotage (Thomas and Turnbull, 2021).
+As expected, on island cabotage almost all the vessels (96%) sailed under their national
+flag. In contrast, on ferry routes to non-EU countries there were 33 different operators
+under 59 registered owners, with almost 30% sailing under a FoC. There was clear
+evidence of flagging out, as less than a third of the vessels flew the flag of France, Italy or
+Spain and yet more than 40% of vessels were under French, Italian or Spanish ownership.
+Moreover, between 2003 and 2012, almost 1-in-5 vessels had re-registered under a more
+convenient flag, allowing the operator to employ seafarers on inferior terms and conditions
+of employment. These data exposed the fallacy of the ECSA’s earlier claim that its
+members had no intention of flagging out. Amongst the group of vessels flying a FoC, an
+average of six vessels per annum changed flag, just one of several indicators of ‘regime
+shopping’ in an open market.
+In order to demonstrate that conditions on-board FoC vessels are inferior when
+compared to EU-flagged vessels, the data from Shippax and Sea-web was married to
+information collated by Equasis9 on the detention and deficiencies of vessels recorded by
+the Paris MoU on Port State Control.10 The detention of a vessel is clearly an objective
+measure: a vessel has either been allowed to sail following an inspection or detained
+because of technical deficiencies (e.g. structural integrity of the vessel, equipment,
+maintenance, etc.) and/or human element deficiencies, whether in relation to the crew (e.g.
+competency and training standards) or conditions on-board (e.g. hygiene, living accommodation,
+medical equipment, etc.). While there was no statistically significant
+difference in the average number of detentions per vessel between FoCs and other flags, as
+documented in Table 1, the average number of deficiencies was significantly higher on
+FoC vessels. Moreover, recorded deficiencies are known to be just the ‘tip of the iceberg’
+as vessel inspectors often lack the time, resources and sometimes the competencies
+needed to detect human element deficiencies (Bloor and Sampson, 2009: 715).
+
+Turnbull 11
+When these initial results were presented to the MTS Steering Committee established
+
+to co-produce the research, attention focused on incomplete crew data, both in terms of the
+nationality of seafarers and whether they were covered either by an EU collective
+agreement, the ITF-IMEC (International Maritime Employers’ Council) collective
+agreement that sets out seafarers’ wages and working conditions on board FoC vessels in
+international trade, or no legally binding collective agreement. It was therefore agreed to
+design a questionnaire that national union officials, activists and vessel inspectors would
+complete, covering every vessel on EU to non-EU routes and a representative sample of
+vessels on island cabotage. For each vessel, data was requested on crew composition and
+nationalities, compliance with the ITF’s standard manning policy and other international
+regulations, deficiencies (as per the Paris MoU) and the (in)effectiveness of recording/
+reporting procedures, coverage of collective bargaining agreements (if any), and terms
+and conditions on-board benchmarked against the ITF-IMEC collective agreement. The
+statistical results were once again significant – FoC vessels fell well short of the standards
+on EU-flagged vessels – but far from complete. While questionnaire data was returned for
+almost every vessel on island cabotage, for trades to non-EU countries questionnaires
+were returned for 79% of vessels calling at Italian ports, 73% of vessels calling at Spanish
+ports, and only 17% of vessels calling at French ports. Moreover, returned questionnaires
+were often incomplete, with missing responses to specific questions.
+The absence of statistical data highlighted the need for further action, not simply the
+collection of more systematic evidence for representation to ensure a shared reading of
+reality based on the authority of comprehensive facts, but targeted vessel inspection and
+union organizing. To this end, the next stage of statactivism involved importing the data
+into a live Excel file that could be regularly updated when vessels changed flag, hired a
+different crew of convenience, called at different ports, etc. Variables were colour coded to
+enable union officials, activists and vessel inspectors to readily identify the shipping lines
+and/or vessels with non-EU crews, those with a preponderance of previous detentions and
+deficiencies, or no collective agreement. By also colour coding the ports where these
+vessels called most often, inspection/union organizing could then be targeted at the ‘worst
+offenders’, albeit only in those ports where dockworkers are both willing and able to
+refuse to un/load a vessel until deficiencies are rectified and demands are satisfied.
+
+Table 1. Deficiencies and detentions per vessel, EU (European union) to non-EU routes (2003–
+2012).
+
+Flag
+Average detentions
+per vessela
+Average deficiencies
+per vesselb
+Average human element
+deficiencies per vesselc
+
+Flags of convenience 0.48 (0.795) 60.27 (60.743) 5.94 (7.850)
+Other flag 0.29 (0.615) 35.07 (37.177) 3.24 (4.642)
+
+Notes: standard deviation in parenthesis.
+a
+No statistically significant difference. b
+Statistically significant difference: t (114) = 2.718, p = .008. c
+Statistically significant difference: t (114) = 2.290, p = .024.
+
+12 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+Although the data was used to support political action at the supranational level –
+
+specifically the removal of various exemptions in EU secondary legislation that excluded
+certain seafarers from their scope11 – industrial action at the national level was muted. The
+ETF had previously called for ‘industrial actions with a view to support our legitimate
+political demands’ (Philippe Alfonso, Political Secretary, MTS News Online, 20 September
+2010), but the MTS Steering Committee made it clear that it would be left to ‘individual
+unions to look at industrial actions’ (MTS Minutes, June 2012). As a result, the metaorganizational
+politics of the ETF and ITF, specifically long-standing differences between
+national dockworker unions (Gentile, 2016), effectively curtailed the option of port-based
+inspection backed by dockworkers. The main dockworker trade unions in France
+(Fed´ eration nationale des ports et docks ´ ) and Spain (Coordinadora) are not affiliated to the
+ETF. Dockworkers in Italy are affiliated to the ETF, but the dockworkers’ cooperatives
+(compagnie portuale) are now private companies, and their workforce is consequently more
+vulnerable to dismissal in the event of (secondary) industrial action. Union organization in
+the Maghreb ports is much weaker, but more importantly any coordinated union action
+targeting vessels sailing between EU and non-EU countries falls under the remit of the ITF’s
+Fair Practices Committee, a joint committee of seafarers’ and dockers’ unions that runs the
+ITF campaign against FoCs. The ITF had already made it clear that, at the height of the Arab
+Spring, it was ‘not appropriate’ to involve ITF Inspectors and union representatives from
+the Maghreb countries in the questionnaire survey of vessels sailing between EU and nonEU
+countries (email from ITF Maritime Section, 31 January 2013). It may be axiomatic that
+when we describe we prescribe, but prescription is not permission – making an issue more
+visible does not necessarily make industrial action any more viable.
+
+Quick statactivism – long-distance bus and coaches
+
+Ports are places where land and sea transport intersect. As with shipping, knowledge of
+the road transport sector was accumulated over the years by osmosis. Then, in 2009, a
+project to promote social dialogue in the ports of Bulgaria and Romania (Turnbull,
+2006a), jointly funded by the International Labour Organization and European Commission,
+was extended to include road haulage. Research with road transport unions
+continued with a project to promote the employment of women in the transport sector
+(Turnbull, 2013) and participation in the ETF’s Education for Valuable Employment
+(EVE) project, led by the Political Secretary of the Road Transport Section (RTS).12 When
+policymakers proposed changes to existing EU driving and rest time regulations as part of
+the first Mobility Package (MP1)13 in May 2017, the ETF was already in the process of
+collecting evidence for road haulage (ETF, 2018). It was agreed to gather comparable
+evidence for drivers engaged in international bus and coach services, a sub-sector that the
+Commission characterised as under-performing, with a ‘patchwork of rules’ that creates‘a
+high administrative burden’ and restrictions on market access that ‘limit competition
+between operators and against other modes’ (EC, 2017: 3). The ETF’s starting point, in
+contrast, was not the regulatory burden or ‘red tape’ (reglementation ´ ) that Jean-Claude
+Junker’s Commission was committed to reducing (EC, 2014: 2), rather poor enforcement
+of existing rules (regulation ´ ). Statistics were required to demonstrate this point.
+
+Turnbull 13
+Member states are required to organize a system of appropriate and regular vehicle checks
+
+for all categories of road transport (Directive 2006/22/EC, Art.2). States provide detailed
+statistics on controls of compliance (e.g. number of vehicles checked at the roadside and at
+company premises) but information on the implementation of the Road Transport Working
+Time Directive (2002/15/EC), which lays down the rules on the organization of the working
+time of mobile workers, is patchy at best. For the review period 2015–16, for example, seven
+member states failed to submit a report and only seven member states provided detailed
+statistics on controls and their outcomes. Member states are also obliged to undertake not less
+than six one-week concerted roadside checks per year with at least one other member state.
+Again, not all member states provide information on coordinated checks and only 15 states
+met the required number of checks during the relevant review period for the ETF project
+(Commission Staff Working Document, 2018: 13).
+Although cross-border coordination and cooperation is the sine qua non for enforcement
+in international transport, there is no pan-European road transport agency to
+promote uniform standards and enforcement (unlike, for example, the European Union
+Aviation Safety Agency). However, coordinated checks are organized by EuroControle ˆ
+Route (ECR), a voluntary cooperation of European transport inspection services working
+together to improve road safety, sustainability, fair competition and labour conditions in
+road transport through activities related to compliance with existing regulations.14 ECR
+targets particular offences (e.g. tachograph fraud/manipulation) or type of vehicles (e.g.
+holiday buses) during coordinated inspection weeks. Analysis of these data revealed that
+it is only when inspectors target drivers’ hours that the difference between a ‘regular’ and
+‘target’ week is statistically significant, as documented in Table 2. Further calculations
+based on ECR data established that, across the EU, around 15–20% of controlled longdistance
+buses, on average, record an offence each year. Analysis of all bus and coach
+
+Table 2. Total offences for bus and truck inspections, 2016.
+
+Category of offence
+
+Control
+Week
+Tachograph
+fraud/manipulation Technical
+Over-weight
+<12 tons
+Over-weight
+>12 tons
+Insecure
+loads
+Drivers’
+hoursb
+
+Week 6 319 3217 796 599 240 6308
+Week 10a 152 370 21 43 15 770
+Week 19 220 2036 347 516 312 4458
+Week 30 150 2078 327 174 90 2688
+Week 37 211 3356 634 324 288 4394
+Week 41 141 3492 466 320 167 4338
+Week 47 350 3032 501 391 160 5960
+
+Source: Calculations based on data from EuroControle Route. ˆ
+Notes: Figures in bold indicate the theme for that particular week. a
+Holiday Bus theme in Week 10 (hence, lower volumes compared to both truck and bus figures for other
+weeks).
+b
+The difference between weeks when drivers’ hours were a theme (Weeks 6 and 47) and other weeks in 2016 is
+statistically significant.
+
+14 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+offences between 2012 and 2016 revealed that drivers’ hours constituted the largest
+number of offences each year (around 25%), with the exception of 2015 when tachograph
+offences were most frequently recorded.
+As the tachograph is the most effective way to enforce drivers’ hours, these two
+concerns are closely related. However, proposals for the utilization of advanced vehicle
+technology would have to wait for Mobility Package 3 (MP3), to be published in May
+2018. The ETF wanted (quick) data before the publication of MP3 in order to demonstrate
+the routine violation of driving and rest time regulations and to highlight the structural
+problems created by opening the market. Mobility Package 2 (MP2), published in
+November 2017, proposed further measures to open access to the bus and coach market, a
+sector already dominated by just a handful of ‘lean platforms’ (Srnicek, 2017: 49–50)
+such as FlixBus. These companies rely not only on market access (e.g. liberalization of the
+German bus market in 2013 that opened the roads to FlixBus) but also network effects:
+‘the more numerous the users who use the platform, the more valuable that platform
+becomes for everyone else … [resulting in] … a natural tendency towards monopolisation’
+(Srnicek, 2017: 45). Witness the merger of FlixBus and MeinFernbus, which
+created a company with a domestic market share of over 70%. Further consolidation –
+with megabus, Postbus and Eurolines – resulted in a company not only with a dominant
+position in Germany (over 90% of the market) but by far the largest route network across
+Europe and, most recently, expansion into the US market. The driver of market domination
+is low prices (e.g. FlixBus offered EUR€1 tickets for its new international services
+announced in December 2015), made possible by sub-contracting all services to ‘partner’
+bus companies. FlixBus controls the platform, providing the administration and permissions
+required to operate long-distance and international services, but the company
+neither owns any coaches nor employs any drivers.
+During initial meetings of the RTS Steering Committee established to oversee the project,
+as well as focus group meetings with activist-drivers from Belgium and the Netherlands, it
+was clear that sub-contracting was associated with sub-standard terms and conditions of
+employment and routine violation of driving and rest time regulations. Notwithstanding the
+veracity of insights proffered by union officials and activists on this new social category of
+drivers, it is important to recognize that when stakeholders represent their members’ interests
+to the Commission, they are advised that ‘it is important to distinguish evidence from
+opinions’ (EC, 2009: 20). An online questionnaire survey was therefore developed, focussing
+on objective (time-based) measures for driving, breaks and daily/weekly rest, in accordance
+with Directive 2002/15/EC, as well as any work activities performed during designated rest
+periods. As drivers experience very different levels of remuneration, working time and work
+intensity during high (summer) and low (winter) seasons, which tends to be exacerbated for
+sub-contractors, data was sought for different times of the year and different categories of
+drivers. Non-probability (purposive) sampling was used to target unionized drivers via
+national transport unions and non-union drivers via online forums where participants log-on
+to ‘compare notes’ on different operators. The survey returned 696 responses (630 men and
+66 women), from 17 EU member states.15 More than a third of the total sample were nonunion
+members. Most respondents were directly employed by either operators or‘partner’ bus
+
+Turnbull 15
+companies (sub-contractors), and 1-in-7 respondents were hired via an agency or on a shortterm
+contract (typically 6–12 months).16
+There was clear evidence of both low pay and variable pay. Drivers were paid as little as
+EUR€11 per hour and the average (mode) monthly salary during the low season was
+EUR€1500–1999 compared to EUR€2000–2500 in the high season. The proportion of
+drivers earning less than EUR€1500 per month more than doubled during the low season
+(from 1-in-8 drivers to more than 1-in-4). More than 60% of drivers received an irregular
+monthly salary, principally as a result of pay per hours driving (over 28% of the sample) or per
+hours worked (over 47%). One indication of the absence of ‘red tape’ was the finding that
+more than 1-in-10 drivers (over 12%) did not receive a detailed pay slip each month. These
+drivers were more likely to be hired via an agency and were less likely to receive a range of
+benefits such as health care insurance, sick pay and training, as documented in Table 3.
+Questions on driving and rest times were designed to support the ETF’s campaign to
+prevent any changes that might further intensify work and to strengthen the Federation’s
+call for the more rapid introduction of smart (tamper-proof) digital tachographs. Respondents
+were asked how often their daily resting time was reduced to less than 11 hours
+(almost 44% replied ‘frequently’ and a further 48% said ‘occasionally’) and how often
+they were unable to take their full weekly rest entitlement (1-in-4 replied ‘frequently’ and
+a further 39% said ‘occasionally’). Table 4 lists the activities that drivers are expected to
+perform during what should be their rest time. Agency/temporary drivers were
+
+Table 3. Employers’ provision of benefits: full-time versus agency/temporary drivers (%).
+
+Health
+care/insurance*
+Sick
+pay*
+Holiday
+pay Training*
+Meal
+allowance
+Emergency
+accommodation
+
+Full-time/permanent 55.5 74.2 89.2 81.3 73.2 62.4
+Agency/temporary 23.5 50.6 84.0 67.9 76.5 60.5
+
+Notes: * Significant difference between full-time/permanent and agency/temporary drivers at the 1% level.
+
+Table 4. Working during rest time.
+
+For a typical trip, how often do you perform these
+tasks during what should be your rest time? Always % Sometimes % Never %
+
+Cleaning the bus/coach 57.8 26.0 16.2
+Studying the route (e.g. tolls, one-way roads, parking) 55.7 27.0 17.3
+Un/loading luggage 45.8 34.1 20.1
+Parking the bus/coach 45.5 24.2 30.3
+Pick-up/drop-off at hotel/station 31.0 31.8 37.2
+Assisting passengers with problems 28.0 52.7 19.3
+Advice for passengers (e.g. connecting transport) 26.0 49.1 24.9
+Selling drinks/snacks 18.8 52.2 29.0
+Selling tickets 13.2 26.0 60.8
+
+16 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+significantly more likely to have their rest times disrupted by selling drinks/snacks (p <
+.1), un/loading luggage (p < .01), picking up/dropping off passengers (p < .05), finding a
+parking space for the bus/coach (p < .05), and cleaning the bus/coach (p < .05).
+The evidence co-produced with the ETF demonstrated that, in clear violation of
+European driving and rest time regulations, international bus and coach drivers routinely
+work excessive hours, much of this time is unrecorded and certainly unremunerated, and
+their work is intensified as a result of additional (typically unpaid) activities that systematically
+eat into their daily and weekly rest time. The report based on the project
+(Turnbull, 2018) was published by the ETF in April 2018 and officially launched at a
+meeting of the European Parliament the following month to coincide with the final
+Mobility Package (MP3). Under the ordinary legislative (co-decision) procedure, the ETF
+relies on national transport unions to lobby European Council members, whereas the
+Federation can address MEPs both directly and indirectly (via national unions) to build a
+network of support across different political groups in the European Parliament that crosscut
+national party lines. The success of this political (legislative) campaign was signalled
+by the ‘road not travelled’ (i.e. stalling many of the proposals most likely to have a
+particularly adverse impact on drivers’ terms and conditions of employment), and by
+expediting the more widespread introduction of the latest generation of tachographs. The
+smart tacho automatically registers the vehicle every 3 hours of accumulated driving time
+as well as the location of passenger pick-up/drop-off. The latter is considered by law to be
+working time, but our data clearly demonstrated that these and other activities are often
+not remunerated. The ETF expects the latest EU Regulation (2020/1054) on maximum
+daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and weekly rest periods to curb the
+practice of paying drivers only for their driving time rather than their entire working
+activity.
+
+Conclusion
+
+Comparative industrial relations research is an iterative process driven not only by the
+confrontation between idiographic and nomothetic methods (Hyman, 2001) but also the
+(temporal) interaction between slow and fast research. In the neoliberal university, all
+academic staff are now expected to ‘quicken up’, but for activist-scholars working with
+the labour movement a ‘quickstep’ (fast research) that passes the test of action as well as
+the test of science is only possible when founded on many years of slow research. The
+latter ensures a deep understanding of industrial relations in different countries, sectors
+and workplaces, access to key informants, and the ability to act quickly by mobilizing
+the necessary intellectual, human and data resources when opportunities arise.
+No doubt cynics might still ask what fast research adds to our existing knowledge of
+industrial relations in Europe? After all, neither project reported here revealed anything
+about the working lives of seafarers and drivers that the ETF and national transport unions
+were not already aware of. Except that this was no longer a matter of ‘opinion’ but rather
+statistically significant evidence – ‘facts that stick’ – and the evidence pointed to systemic
+features (or more accurately failures) of the market that drive down workers’ terms and
+conditions of employment. The playing field was not level, competition was not fair.
+
+Turnbull 17
+Shipping lines exploited spaces of exception in order to exploit seafarers. Lean platforms
+exploited their monopoly power in order to exploit drivers. Slower ethnographic research
+with individual seafarers and drivers would no doubt generate ‘thicker’ and more
+compelling stories of the hardships of their daily working lives, based on their own
+personal experiences. Except that now they know their experience is shared by many
+others, and sharing that knowledge makes them part of a much larger community of
+knowing. To be sure, the comparison might be necessarily ‘thin’, but it can still prove
+sufficient to cement new social categories with a different interpretation of the present and
+vision for the future.
+Statactivism involves the (re)interpretation of existing data as well as the collection of
+new evidence for representation, which is all the more telling when variables are based on
+widely recognized measures such as technical or human element deficiencies in shipping or
+driving and rest times in road passenger transport. Clearly, it is not sufficient simply to
+establish a statistically significant relationship between the flag of a vessel sailing in
+European waters and seafarers’ terms and conditions of employment, or the systematic
+under-recording of driving time on European roads and undeclared work during the official
+rest periods of bus and coach drivers. Nonetheless, correlation – the case to answer – cannot
+simply be discounted. This is especially important for ETUFs in terms of political engagement
+with supranational institutions, as demonstrated by legislative (in)action when
+research data is used to bolster the force of argument. In contrast, it is far more problematic
+for ETUFs, as meta-organizations, to use aggregate data to persuade member unions to
+engage in a particular course of national political and/or industrial action.
+Fast(er) research is evidently more attuned to generalization across countries and
+social categories, whereas slow(er) research is more attuned to the variegated impact of
+global neoliberalism and a holistic understanding of a particular time and place
+(Almond and Connolly, 2020: 65–6). EfR is a way to resolve this temporal and
+methodological dilemma: by drawing on a variety of knowledge (Figure 1), it is equally
+well-suited to fast(er) or slow(er) research. Consequently, EfR offers recourse in those
+‘moments of confrontation between a general research problematic on one hand, and
+what occurs at a local level on the other’, especially in the moments of real-time social
+science when researchers need to ‘find a means of dancing between the requirement for
+some degree of meta-comparability (a thematic unity across countries) and societal
+specifics at a more granular level’ (Almond and Connolly, 2020: 67). As comparative
+international scholars, maybe we should all learn to dance slow, slow, quick, quick,
+slow.
+
+Acknowledgements
+
+I am indebted to the Secretariat of the ETF and all the national transport union officials and activist
+with whom I have danced over the years.
+
+Funding
+
+The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
+article.
+
+18 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+Notes
+
+1. Under its Constitution, the ETF is bound to the logic of influence, most notably in relation
+to the European institutions (Rule XIII.4), with any ‘practical international cooperation and
+joint action’ (Rule I.5) limited to moral support, financial assistance and support for the
+affiliate in its approach to national governments and inter-governmental organizations
+(Rule XIV.2). https://www.etf-europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Constitution-amendedMay-2017-EN-1.pdf2.
+The author contributed case studies of Ireland/Ryanair and the UK/easyJet to this project.
+3. https://www.etf-europe.org/europe-must-stop-social-dumping-and-flags-of-convenience-in-civilaviation/4.
+https://www.etf-europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/110714_Social-Dialogue-JD-briefinghandout.pdf5.
+https://www.itfglobal.org/sites/default/files/node/resources/files/mexico_city_edition_2.pdf
+6. At the time, the ETF’s secretariat consisted of only 14 full-time staff covering nine different
+transport sectors.
+7. www.shippax.com
+8. https://ihsmarkit.com/products/sea-web-vessel-search.html
+9. www.equasis.org
+10. https://www.parismou.org/
+11. Directive (EU) 2015/1794 amending Directives 98/59/EC, 2001/23/EC, 2002/14/EC, 2008/94/
+EC and 2009/38/EC.
+12. https://www.etf-europe.org/fttub-and-etf-successfully-complete-the-eve-project/
+13. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/news/europe-move-commission-launches-new-transportpackage_en14.
+https://www.euro-controle-route.eu/
+15. There were no statistically significant differences between drivers from different countries.
+16. Almost 44% worked for a company with fewer than 50 employees and these companies were
+more likely to employ drivers on temporary contracts.
+
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+Jorens Y, Gillis D, Valcke L, et al. (2015) Atypical Forms of Employment in the Aviation Sector.
+Brussels, Belgium: European Cockpit Association. Available at: https://www.eurocockpit.be/
+sites/default/files/201901/report_atypical_employment_in_aviation_15_0212_f.pdf.(accessed
+3 January 2019)
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+reconfiguration of sovereignty. International Studies Quarterly 54(3): 683–704.
+
+Turnbull 21
+Marinetto M (2018) Fast food research in the era of unplanned obsolescence. Journal of Management
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+University Press.
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+learning. Academy of Management Learning & Education 14(4): 520–533.
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+Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
+Smismans S (2015) Policy evaluation in the EU: the challenges of linking ex ante and ex post
+appraisal. European Journal of Risk Regulation 6(1): 6–26.
+Smyth J (2017) The Toxic University: Zombie Leadership, Academic Rock Stars and Neoliberal
+Ideology. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
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+challenges of emergent participatory and emancipatory research approaches. Ephemera 17(3):
+533–556.
+Tarrow S (2005) Cosmopoliti radicati e attivisti transnazionali. Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia 2:
+221–248.
+Thomas H and Turnbull P (2021) Navigating the perilous waters of partisan scholarship: participatory
+action research (PAR) with the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF). Work,
+Employment and Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/09500170211038531
+Turnbull P (2006a) Social Dialogue in the Process of Structural Adjustments and Private Sector
+Participation in Ports: A Practical Guidance Manual, Geneva: International Labour Office,
+ISBN 92-2-117721-1, go to: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/
+maritime/ports-socdialguidelines.pdf
+Turnbull P (2006b) The war on Europe’s waterfront – repertoires of power in the port transport
+industry. British Journal of Industrial Relations 44(2): 305–26.
+Turnbull P (2010a) Creating markets, contesting markets: labour internationalism and the European
+Common Transport Policy. In: McGrath-Champ S, Herod A and Rainnie A (eds). Handbook
+of Employment and Society: Working Space. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 35–52.
+Turnbull P (2010b) From social conflict to social dialogue: counter-mobilisation on the European
+waterfront. European Journal of Industrial Relations 16(4): 333–49.
+Turnbull P (2013) Promoting the Employment of Women in the Transport Sector – Obstacles
+and Policy Options, Working Paper No.298, Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 2013,
+go to: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_dialogue/—sector/documents/
+publication/wcms_234880.pdf
+Turnbull P (2018) Driven to Distraction? International Coach and Bus Drivers in the EU. Brussels:
+ETF, go to: https://www.etf-europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ETF-report-on-wokingconditions-of-bus-and-coach-1.pdfTurnbull
+P (2020) Tackling Undeclared Work in the Air Transport Sector, with a Special Focus on
+Bogus Self-Employment of Aircrews: A Learning Resource. Brussels: European Platform
+
+22 European Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
+Tacking Undeclared Work, go to: https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=23097&
+langId=en
+Umney C (2012) Managerial and mobilizing internationalism in the British docks and seafaring
+sectors. European Journal of Industrial Relations 18(1): 71–87.
+
+Author biography
+
+Peter Turnbull is Professor of Management & Industrial Relations at the University of
+Bristol. His research on the transport sector dates from the mid-1980s and includes studies
+of ports and maritime, inland waterways, civil aviation, and road transport.
+
+Turnbull 23
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+
+THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT
+PRINCETON STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
+HISTORICAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
+
+Series Editors
+Ira Katznelson, Martin Shefter, Theda Skocpol
+
+A list of titles in this series appears at the back of the book
+THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT
+
+THE BATTLE FOR
+
+CONTROL OF THE LAW
+
+Steven M. Teles
+
+PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD
+Copyright © 2008 by Princeton University Press
+Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
+In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock,
+Oxfordshire OX20 1TW
+
+All Rights Reserved
+
+Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
+
+Teles, Steven Michael.
+The rise of the conservative legal movement : the battle for control of the law /
+Steven M. Teles.
+p. cm. — (Princeton studies in American politics : historical, international, and
+comparative perspectives)
+Includes bibliographical references and index.
+ISBN 978-0-691-12208-3 (cloth : alk. paper)
+1. Law—Political aspects—United States. 2. Law—Economic aspects—United States.
+3. Justice, Administration of—United States. 4. Conservatism—United States.
+5. Liberalism—United States. I. Title.
+KF385.T45 2008
+340′.11—dc22 2007040836
+
+British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
+
+This book has been composed in Sabon
+
+Printed on acid-free paper. ∞
+
+press.princeton.edu
+
+Printed in the United States of America
+
+10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
+For FSA, whose faith and patience, never wavering, sustained me.
+This page intentionally left blank
+Contents
+
+Acknowledgments ix
+
+Introduction 1
+
+1. Political Competition, Legal Change,
+and the New American State 6
+
+2. The Rise of the Liberal Legal Network 22
+
+3. Conservative Public Interest Law I: Mistakes Made 58
+
+4. Law and Economics I: Out of the Wilderness 90
+
+5. The Federalist Society: Counter-Networking 135
+
+6. Law and Economics II: Institutionalization 181
+
+7. Conservative Public Interest Law II: Lessons Learned 220
+
+Conclusion 265
+
+Appendix
+Interviews 283
+
+Notes 287
+
+Index 331
+This page intentionally left blank
+Acknowledgments
+
+IN WRITING THIS BOOK, I have acquired more than the usual authorial
+debts. My parents were this book’s earliest and most important patrons.
+They lavishly invested in my human capital and provided a vital in-kind
+subsidy to the research process—if they lived outside the Washington Beltway,
+I could not have afforded my many research trips to D.C.
+I drafted chapters 3 and 7 while a fellow at Princeton University’s
+James Madison Program, and I owe a special debt to Professor Robert
+George, an organizational entrepreneur of unusual skill as well as a true
+intellectual. Yale University provided me a wonderful home for the last
+year and a half of writing this book. I would like to thank Yale’s Alan
+Gerber, whose Center for the Study of American Politics provided me a
+fellowship in 2005–6 (which was partially devoted to this project), and
+Dan Kahan, who as Associate Dean helped arrange for me to teach at the
+Law School in the fall of 2006. The Achiles and Bodman Foundation
+provided a very generous—and timely—grant for the 2003–4 academic
+year that helped fund my nonsabbatical leave, and the Earhart Foundation
+provided summer and research support for the project. I would never
+have completed this book without this support.
+I also owe a debt to my many sources within the conservative movement.
+Pride of place goes to Eugene Meyer of the Federalist Society, who
+provided my first real breakthrough in obtaining internal organizational
+documents. Gene was under no obligation whatsoever to provide me the
+remarkable access that he did—I still recall being pointed to the file cabinet,
+in a cramped closet in the Society’s offices, and being told that it was
+mine to rummage through. Thanks are also due to Steven Calabresi,
+David McIntosh, Lee Liberman Otis, and Gary Lawson, who subjected
+themselves to interviews, follow-ups, and reading an early draft of chapter
+5. Their willingness to trust someone who was clearly not “on the team”
+is to be commended.
+In the area of public interest law, my debts are even wider. Clint Bolick,
+Chip Mellor, Terry Pell, Michael Greve, Jim Moody, David Kennedy, and
+Michael McDonald, among others, shared their time, and, in most cases,
+were willing to talk to me multiple times and read draft chapters, in order
+to help me get the complicated stories of the organizations straight. I was
+repeatedly struck by their candor, even to the point that, more than once,
+I penned e-mails reminding them that they were on the record. Special
+recognition must be given to Michael Greve, who replied to dozens of
+e-mails, and read drafts of the chapters on public interest law and the
+x A C K N O W L E D G M E N TS
+
+Federalist Society. In addition, in one especially important case, his encouragement
+to look beyond the public record helped me to avoid a particularly
+spectacular case of historical oversight.
+My chapters on law and economics would have been much poorer
+without the help of numerous scholars in the field. Robert Cooter, Christine
+Jolls, Robert Ellickson, Steven Shavell, Mitch Polinsky, Roberta Romano,
+Jerry Mashaw, Todd Zywicki, Michael Graetz, and others read
+chapters 4 and 6, providing terribly useful suggestions as well as, in some
+cases, their firsthand recollections. My greatest debt is to Henry Manne,
+who dug out, from numerous sources, much of the documentary material
+that chapters 4 and 6 are based upon. Henry also interrupted his otherwise
+idyllic life in Naples, Florida, for a number of very long interviews,
+and was willing to respond to dozens of e-mail requests for information.
+Henry truly went above and beyond the call of duty.
+At the Olin Foundation, Jim Piereson and Cary Hemphill were much
+more cooperative than they had any obligation to be. They provided me
+uncensored access—at a time when they were busy putting the foundation
+out of business—to the grant officer reports, grant proposals, and the
+minutes of the Olin Foundation, a gold mine on the history of the Foundation
+and the conservative movement overall. The account of the movement’s
+history in these pages would be much the poorer without their
+willingness to trust a nosy political scientist.
+Much of chapter 2 would have been impossible were it not for the Ford
+Foundation’s remarkably open archives, and the help of two wonderful
+archivists, Idelle Nissila and Jonathan Green. Special thanks go to
+Thomas Hilbink, who generously gave me access to his remarkable interview
+with Sanford Jaffe. The story in chapter 2 would not have been the
+same without it. I was also blessed with Sandy’s firsthand recollections
+during a visit to New Haven.
+I am especially indebted to the many scholars who read parts or all of
+the manuscript. Mike McCann, Robert Gordon, Jacob Hacker, Jack Balkin,
+Peter Skerry, Reva Siegel, Mark Blyth, Adam Sheingate, Stuart Chinn,
+Robert Mickey, Chuck Epp, Keith Whittington, Art Ward, Sandy Levinson,
+Stephen Skowronek, Shep Melnick, Bart Sparrow, David Fontana,
+Dan Ernst, Ilya Somin, Jack Goldstone, David Bernstein, Mark Tushnet,
+Brian Glenn, and Ken Kersch all provided incisive comments on the
+manuscript at various stages. Martha Derthick and Larry Mead are owed
+special notice. Throughout my career they have read everything I sent
+them, providing a combination of sharp commentary and credible support.
+Oliver Houck of Tulane University Law School saved me when I
+had all but given up on ever finding a copy of the Horowitz Report. Special
+thanks are due to Paul Pierson, who read a great deal of this book,
+but even more valuably reminded me constantly that it had to be finished.
+ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi
+
+One final, largely silent, debt must be acknowledged. This book began
+as a comparative study of Social Security privatization. Although I eventually
+switched cases, my original question remained the same: what explained
+conservative strategies for undermining the modern liberal activist
+state? Much of my emphasis on organizational entrepreneurship and
+long-term strategy came out of a series of interviews with the Heritage
+Foundation’s Stuart Butler. I doubt this book would have been possible
+were it not for Stuart, who taught me so much.
+A deep debt of gratitude is owed to the research assistants who did
+work on the book. At Brandeis, Sam Dewey, Dan Kenney, Melissa Bass,
+and Sarah Staszak did excellent work for me. I am especially indebted to
+Melissa, now a professor at the University of Puget Sound, who helped
+get my writing in shape on criminally short notice. At Yale, my research
+needs increased considerably, and I was very lucky to have the assistance
+of the university’s remarkable students. Grace Leslie did heroic work on
+chapter 2, Judy Coleman gets credit for much of the book’s readability,
+Jonathan Dach did a magnificent job with the final copyediting, Sophie
+Lee scrutinized all the historical chapters and saved me from innumerable
+errors, and Sarah Egan introduced me to a great deal of work on social
+movements. The excruciating final revisions of the book were supervised
+by Judith Miller. It would be impossible to say enough about Judith’s
+intelligence, organization, and sharp editorial skills, but it must suffice to
+record for posterity that (despite her distaste for sporting metaphors) she
+dragged me across the finish line.
+Finally, Chuck Myers at Princeton University Press was an exceptional
+editor. In an age in which so many presses simply produce books rather
+than edit them, Chuck actually read, with great care, the entire manuscript
+and provided simple, elegant solutions for problems that otherwise
+would have made this a much less readable and coherent book. I would
+also like to state my appreciation for the generous and helpful comments
+of the three reviewers that PUP solicited for the book.
+What is good in this volume is due to the candor of those willing
+to share their memories, their files, and their wisdom. The failures are
+mine alone.
+This page intentionally left blank
+THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT
+This page intentionally left blank
+Introduction
+
+REFLECTING ON RICHARD NIXON'S sweeping victory over George
+McGovern in the 1972 presidential election, the young White House aide
+Patrick Buchanan told the president that, even though liberalism was still
+dominant in institutions such as the media, “the Supreme Court is another
+story. The president has all but recaptured the institution from the Left;
+his four appointments have halted much of its social experimentation;
+and the next four years should see this second branch of government become
+an ally and defender of the values and principles in which the President
+and his constituency believe.”1 Buchanan’s hopes, and those of the
+conservative movement, would soon be proven sorely misplaced, as the
+Burger Court revealed itself to be the “counter-revolution that wasn’t.”2
+Flash forward to 2005. President Bush has nominated one of his closest
+advisers, Harriet Miers, to replace Sandra Day O’Connor on the Supreme
+Court. The reaction from the conservative legal establishment is immediate,
+harsh, and pointed. William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard,
+groaned that the nomination left him “disappointed, depressed and demoralized.”3
+Todd Zywicki, professor of law at George Mason University
+Law School, summed up the mood of many in the conservative legal
+movement when he opined in the Legal Times that
+
+inspired by thinkers such as Scalia, Thomas, Robert Bork, and Richard Posner,
+and nurtured by groups such as the Federalist Society and the Institute for Justice,
+the conservative legal movement in America has grown in confidence and
+competence, building a deep farm team of superbly qualified and talented circuit
+court judges primed for this moment. The prevailing liberalism of the contemporary
+legal culture was on the ropes and primed for a knockout—only to
+have the president let it get off the canvas and survive this round.4
+
+Within weeks of Kristol’s and Zywicki’s laments, Miers’s nomination was
+withdrawn and replaced with that of Samuel Alito, whose connections to
+the conservative legal movement were so strong that they became a central
+topic in his confirmation hearings.
+The contrast between these two vignettes is telling. The inability of
+Nixon’s four appointees to transform the Supreme Court taught conservatives
+that electoral success was not enough, in and of itself, to produce
+legal change: conservatives’ failure in the Court reflected a deep imbalance
+between their forces at the elite level and those of their liberal counterparts.
+A generation later, the conservative legal elite—a group that did
+not, in any meaningful sense, exist in the early 1970s—led the charge
+2 INTRODUCTION
+
+against the president’s nominee and pushed the president to appoint one
+of their own. This book will explain how the conservative legal movement,
+outsmarted and undermanned in the 1970s, became the sophisticated
+and deeply organized network of today.
+By the time of Buchanan’s memo, conservatives were well on their way
+to capturing the Republican Party and turning it into a powerful, movement-based
+vote-getting machine, capable of prevailing in mobilizationheavy
+contests like the battle over the Equal Rights Amendment.5 Grassroots
+liberalism, by contrast, was shrinking, while its forces at the elite
+level—in the professions, universities, the media, and Washington-based
+public interest organizations—were surging.6 These new liberal elites, and
+the Democratic Party of which they were an increasingly central part,
+were of little use at election time. Yet conservatives like Buchanan would
+find themselves repeatedly frustrated by the liberals’ success at limiting
+the impact of conservative electoral power on the law.
+Although conventional wisdom holds that the Republican coalition
+was held together by anticommunism and opposition to taxes, just as
+important were the specter of “activist judges” and the liberal organizational
+network that supported them. Businesses hated the courts for legitimizing
+and accelerating the expansion of the federal regulatory state.
+Western farmers, ranchers, and extractive industries detested them for
+limiting their use of federal lands. Southerners continued to resent their
+part in dismantling segregation. Northern ethnic refugees from the Democratic
+Party seethed at the “forced busing” mandated by judges like Massachusetts’s
+Arthur Garrity. Religious conservatives were enraged by the
+Supreme Court’s constitutional sanctioning of abortion and its restrictions
+on school prayer. While their particular grievances differed, the conservative
+coalition was drawn together by a shared opposition to liberal
+judges, professors, and public interest lawyers and by a unified call for
+“strict constructionism” and “judicial restraint.”
+What conservatives in the early 1970s only dimly recognized was that
+reversing liberal accomplishments in the law was more strategically problematic
+than other conservative goals, such as reducing taxes and stiffening
+the American response to the Soviet Union. While relatively little elite
+mobilization was necessary to translate electoral victories into policy outcomes
+in these areas, in the law conservatives faced liberal opponents
+with a much more impressive set of resources: elite law schools, a large
+chunk of the organized bar, a vast network of public interest lawyers, and
+the still-powerful liberal understanding of rights. If they were to have any
+chance of influencing the development of the law, conservatives would
+have to compete directly with liberals at the level of organizational, and
+not simply electoral, mobilization.
+I N T R O D U C TI O N 3
+
+Spurred by their overlapping grievances, informed by an increasingly
+sophisticated knowledge of how to produce legal change, and coordinated
+by a strategically shrewd group of patrons, conservatives began
+investing in a broad range of activities designed to reverse their elite-level
+organizational weaknesses. While similar kinds of organizational development
+were happening in other domains where conservatives faced liberal
+entrenchment, in no other area was the process of strategic investment
+as prolonged, ambitious, complicated, and successful as in the law.7
+This book is an effort to explain the legal regime that conservatives faced,
+how they responded to it, and what accounts for the timing and relative
+success of their response.
+My explanation for the character of conservative countermobilization
+in the law combines multiple traditions in the social sciences. From historical
+institutionalism, I draw a focus on how the choices of social and
+political movements are decisively influenced by the nature of the regime
+they seek to dislodge. I borrow insights from organizational theory to
+explain the internal challenges that insurgents face and how these can
+decisively shape their ability to devise optimal competitive responses to
+entrenchment. Finally, from the sociology of knowledge and the professions
+and the political science study of the policy process, I draw lessons
+on how the status quo is protected by constructions of expertise, conventional
+wisdom, and prestige.
+My choice of these tools does not mean that I ignore the importance
+of electoral power or the intrinsic merits of ideas. Against the trend in
+political science studies of law, however, I argue in chapter 1 that changes
+in the form of political competition over the past half-century, especially
+the increasing importance of ideas and professional power, have led to
+a decline in the power of elections to cause comprehensive change, especially
+in highly entrenched political domains. As a consequence of this
+shift, the rhythm of large-scale political transformations in highly insulated
+policy and institutional domains, such as the law, is increasingly
+determined by nonelectoral mobilization. Change in these domains is
+generated by the ability of insurgents to develop strategies appropriate
+to specific forms of entrenchment, and to generate organizations capable
+of effectively implementing those strategies. The “problem solving”
+character of countermobilization, therefore, requires combining a structural
+focus on inherited constraints with close attention to the problemsolving
+efforts of political agents.
+I take seriously the argument that conservatives have found greater success
+in the law because their ideas—such as the negative side-effects of
+state planning and regulation—were shown over time to be superior to
+those of their liberal counterparts. My reconstruction of the history of the
+conservative legal movement shows, however, that ideas do not develop
+4 INTRODUCTION
+
+in a vacuum. Ideas need networks through which they can be shared and
+nurtured, organizations to connect them to problems and to diffuse them
+to political actors, and patrons to provide resources for these supporting
+conditions. Of even greater significance, the market for ideas is one in
+which incumbents have substantial resources with which to frustrate the
+challenges of competitors, regardless of how compelling their ideas are.
+In short, while there is a “market” for ideas, it is one that is institutionally
+sticky and requires entrepreneurial activity to give it life. For this reason,
+intellectual history is necessary but not sufficient.
+Given my focus on the structural constraints facing countermobilizers,
+it is essential to place the mobilization of legal conservatives in the context
+of the regime they opposed. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the examination
+of conservative mobilization that is to come by tracing out the development
+of the liberal legal regime, identifying the sources of its strength and
+durability, and thus the strategic challenges that it presented to conservative
+countermobilizers. This framing also reveals that legal liberals faced
+some of the same challenges that their conservative successors confronted
+a generation later.
+Chapters 3 through 7 shift the analysis to the primary subject of the
+book, the conservative legal movement.8 Chapters 3 and 4 examine the
+earliest organizational response to the rise of legal liberalism. The “first
+generation” of conservative public interest law firms, driven primarily by
+locally rooted, business-supported firms, was largely unsuccessful, and
+led the conservative movement to reconsider its approach to legal change.
+By contrast, the intellectual school known as “law and economics,” both
+at the University of Chicago and in the programs of Henry Manne’s Law
+and Economics Center, was remarkably successful. The differing outcomes
+of these two efforts at organizational countermobilization demonstrate
+that the movement’s success was not simply determined by the
+availability of financial resources, the perception of threat, or the opportunities
+provided by electoral victories, but was critically shaped by the decision-making
+of organizational entrepreneurs.
+Chapters 5 through 7 take the story into the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter
+5 examines the Federalist Society, showing how a group of network entrepreneurs
+built a formidable organization to establish a conservative
+presence in the nation’s law schools and created the social capital upon
+which the movement’s intellectual and political entrepreneurs would
+draw. In chapter 6, I pick up the story begun in chapter 4, focusing on
+the Olin Foundation’s efforts to institutionalize law and economics in
+America’s elite law schools and Henry Manne’s ambitious project to
+create an entire law school around the field. In chapter 7, we return to
+the subject of conservative public interest law, with a comparison of the
+Center for Individual Rights and the Institute for Justice, the quintessen-
+I N T R O D U C TI O N 5
+
+tial “second generation” conservative public interest law firms. I show
+how they responded to the organizational design and strategy failures of
+the first generation, and how they drew upon the conservative support
+structure’s new intellectual and network resources to challenge legal liberalism
+in the courts.
+The core of this book, chapters 3 through 7, is based almost exclusively
+on interviews and internal organizational papers. Unfortunately, very little
+of the documentary history of the conservative legal movement has
+been archived. Almost every document referred to in this book, therefore,
+was given to me directly by the organizations involved. To acquire these
+documents, I agreed that, while I would be free to quote from them in
+any way I thought appropriate, they would be for my exclusive use. I
+offered this arrangement to my sources because I believed that it was the
+only way that this material would ever get into the public domain. Because
+other scholars will not be able to check my arguments against the
+original documents or interviews, I have erred on the side of longer quotations,
+and have not strictly limited my presentation of the cases to material
+with direct bearing on my theoretical arguments. This should allow other
+scholars to draw different conclusions, and provide a foundation for future
+scholarship on these subjects.
+I have found repeatedly through the writing of this book that the combination
+of interviews and contemporaneous documents was essential.
+While interviews are quite important, memory, on its own, is fallible, as
+most people tend to remember events in such a way that they form a
+coherent narrative. Memory, however, is often tidier than history. Contemporaneous
+documents, especially grant proposals—a wonderful and
+woefully underused source—help to fill in the holes of memory. What is
+more, they help to correct for the very real problem of survivor bias in
+the study of organizations, the tendency to focus on projects that worked
+(and thus were continued) and to ignore the equally interesting ideas that
+were tried and failed, or were considered and shelved.
+Even these sources do not completely convince me that the story told
+in these pages is definitive. The history of the conservative legal movement
+is still in its infancy, and, in almost all my cases, I was working more or
+less from scratch. As a result, this book is only as good as the papers that
+organizations kept and the candor of my informants. Events on which
+there was a large documentary base, for example, may loom larger than
+those that were equally important, but less thoroughly documented and
+preserved. My hope is that this will be the first of many books on the
+subject. I look forward to having my errors corrected by those who come
+after me.
+1
+
+Political Competition, Legal Change, and the New
+American State
+
+Whether a given state changes or fails to change,
+the form and timing of the change, and the
+governing potential in the change—all of these
+turn on a struggle for political power and
+institutional position, a struggle defined and
+mediated by the organization of the
+preestablished state.
+—Steven Skowronek, Building a New
+American State
+
+A Polity Transformed: The Rise of Nonelectoral Party Mobilization
+
+Political competition, as the epigraph of this chapter asserts, is mediated
+by the structure of the state. Challengers to a dominant regime do not
+operate in an empty playing field, but are forced to challenge inherited
+norms and institutions, or to adapt their insurgency to the structure of
+the regime they seek to dislodge. To understand why the conservative
+legal movement took the form it did, therefore, we need to begin with an
+account of the regime created by its opponents and the form of political
+competition that it produced.
+In the process of creating a vast new set of policy commitments—from
+social insurance and economic regulation to civil rights and environmental
+protection—liberal reformers also transformed the American political
+system. This new policy process put a premium on knowledge, expertise,
+and professional credentials, and developed in tandem with the “legalization”
+of society, marked by an increasingly dense maze of laws, regulatory
+agencies, courts, and litigants.1 In some cases, the national government
+actively encouraged professionalization in order to generate linkages between
+levels of government and between the state and society and encourage
+policy changes that could not be produced directly.2 As universities
+expanded, graduate programs increased to sate the demand for professors,
+credentialed teachers, social workers, public administration professionals,
+and policy analysts. The higher education sector grew in tandem
+with the expansion of this new political system, generally accepting its
+POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMPETITION 7
+
+assumptions and supplying cadres of trained individuals sympathetic to
+its preservation and expansion.
+The fraying of separation of powers, federalism, and limits on governmental
+authority produced a policymaking system with multiple, overlapping
+programs, paid for and administered by different levels of government
+and nongovernmental organizations. Responsibility for policy
+outcomes was hard to affix in this complex system, making mass mobilization
+difficult and diverting participation into particularistic, piecemeal
+forms.3 The diffuse character of government meant that coordination and
+control of the policymaking system were produced by networks that cut
+across agencies, levels of government, and the state-society divide, rather
+than by political parties.4 Even as the Democratic Party’s electoral power
+waned in the late 1960s, its strength in these policy networks waxed.
+These networks, built largely through subsidy by third-party funders such
+as charitable foundations,5 facilitated policy change by encouraging
+courts, congressional subcommittees, and bureaucrats to collaborate in a
+process of low-visibility, incremental policy expansion.6 These changes
+in the structure of the policymaking process made elections decreasingly
+important as sources of large-scale policy change.7
+The flip side of this institutional transformation was a political system
+increasingly sensitive to expert opinion, issue framing, and professional
+networks.8 Many of liberalism’s achievements derived from the skillful
+use of power by a transformed federal bureaucracy, staffed by actors sympathetic
+to (or previously involved in) social movements. This system’s
+advent gave liberal Democrats the ability to push their policy agenda even
+when the presidency was in the hands of Republicans.9 Shifts in attention,
+driven by interest groups, the media, intellectual entrepreneurs, and litigators,
+became important drivers of cycles of policy change, independent of
+the electoral fortunes of the political parties.10
+By the 1970s, political scientists became convinced that these changes
+had permanently displaced parties as significant political actors. We now
+know that this claim was wrong—or at least incomplete. Rather than
+destroying parties, this transformed state produced a new form of party
+competition. Social movements and interest groups that had been organized
+in opposition to political parties eventually became institutionalized,
+cemented to the state, and coordinated in a network increasingly
+connected to the Democratic Party.11 This activist network, primarily concerned
+with policy rather than electoral outcomes, became the dominant
+faction in the Democratic Party. The rise of this faction led to George
+McGovern’s nomination in 1972, as the head of a strange new coalition
+unlike any the Democrats had ever seen. In short, the new Democratic
+Party that emerged by the mid-1970s was “new” not just in the sense
+8 CHAPTER 1
+
+that new groups were incorporated, but also in how those groups were
+organized, coordinated, and centered.12
+The Democrats created this new party system as it incorporated interest
+groups and social movements that had once defined themselves in opposition
+to the party. A loosely coordinated network that bridged state and
+society—what some observers called a “new class”—came into being as
+these activists moved into the professions, foundations, educational organizations,
+and the media.13 At the same time, older American elites who
+had once thought of themselves as part of a cross-party establishment
+linked themselves to these new actors, giving them access to institutions
+with substantial resources, connections, and prestige.14 While this network
+of activists, organizations, and elites cut across the two political
+parties through the 1960s, it became firmly incorporated into the Democratic
+Party in the early 1970s as the Republicans began to identify themselves
+with resistance to liberalism.
+In contrast to European political systems, which feature a broad array
+of these kinds of activities and movements formally linked to the parties,
+the nature of American law (especially the tax code) and the strategic
+advantages that could be had from avoiding an open partisan coloration
+forced the relationship between the Democrats and their nonelectoral
+wing to remain informal. Despite this formal delicacy, an activity is partisan
+in a behavioral sense because of what it does, not what it is called.
+Political activity can be said to be “partisan” to the degree that participants
+operate as a “team” (their behavior is “coordinated”) and integrate
+their activities with a corresponding team of ambitious officeholders
+(their behavior is “coupled”). Understood this way, “party” is a
+continuous, rather than a bimodal, variable: organizations are more partisan
+to the degree that their behavior is coordinated with the party’s
+office-holding side. It is not necessary that every individual in a particular
+institution, such as a profession or a university, actively conceive of his
+or her activity as partisan for it to function as a support for a partisan
+coalition. What matters is whether there is general sympathy with the
+policy goals of a party, and whether the institution in question helps to
+coordinate action consistent with those goals and provide services to
+support them. Understood this way, the broad liberal network that
+worked closely with the Democrats to develop ideas, coordinate strategies,
+recruit personnel, and implement policies was now a part of the
+party system, in effect if not in name.
+For a time, Republicans responded to this newly configured Democratic
+Party only in the electoral dimension, avoiding direct competition at the
+level of elite organizational mobilization. As a result, they were frustrated
+in their effort to create change except where a policy venue had a strong
+electoral lever (as in tax and defense policy), or where their objectives
+POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMPETITION 9
+
+could be achieved by preventing action from occurring.15 In the new
+American political system of the 1970s and 1980s, access to specialized
+knowledge, networks across government and society to diffuse information
+and strategies, and allies in institutions that trained and recruited
+future policymakers were increasingly important, and conservative Republicans
+were at a severe disadvantage in all of these areas. This elite
+organizational imbalance explains the otherwise puzzling fact that many
+of the issues that the Republican Party now defines itself in opposition to
+were passed with almost no organized conservative response or critique.16
+It was only when Republicans developed a parallel set of elite organizations
+that they could avoid being overwhelmed by the Democrats’ advantages
+in information, organization, networks, and professional power.
+Political parties have always reached beyond the small core of officeseekers
+who carry their label in elections, but in the transformed party
+system that came into being in the 1970s, these nonelectoral dimensions
+of party activity have become increasingly important.17 As the parties became
+more polarized on ideological lines, the distinction between partisan
+and ideological activity became blurred.18 Increasingly enmeshed with political
+parties, these activists and their institutions have become the subject
+of fierce ideological competition, testament to which can be found in contemporary
+arguments over the composition of universities, the media, and
+even the medical profession.19
+Parties have gone where the action is in American politics, seeking to
+control government not just through electoral warrants from the voters
+but also by coordinating the behavior of actors across society and among
+the different branches and levels of government. Explaining political
+competition in the era of electoral displacement does not require that
+we abandon assumptions of rational, optimizing, competitive behavior.
+Rather, it demands a recognition of the evolution in the locus of policy
+change and the effect that this has had on the collective pursuit of American
+political power. Much of the action in American politics currently
+resides in the realm of elite organizational mobilization, where the great
+battles of modern politics are being fought and where the alignment of
+the political system is increasingly determined. Far from disappearing,
+parties (rightly understood) are now competing over a much wider terrain
+than in the past.
+
+The New Political Competition: The Case of the Law
+
+Complex, technical, and professionalized, the politics of American law
+and courts has proven acutely sensitive to the increasing significance of
+ideas, information, networks, issue framing, and agenda control in Ameri-
+10 CHAPTER 1
+
+can politics. Despite these changes, political scientists have, if anything,
+become even more likely to identify shifts in electoral power and public
+opinion as the motor of large-scale legal change. Electoral stimuli obviously
+influence legal change through the mechanism of judicial appointment.
+Purely electoral accounts of legal change are too quick to see continuity
+in the legal politics of the period up through the New Deal and that
+of the last fifty years. If the argument up to this point is correct, then
+explaining conservative countermobilization in the law demands a more
+capacious tool-belt than electoral theories can provide.
+Theories that look to electoral stimuli as the key to understanding legal
+change are hardly new. Fifty years ago, Robert Dahl gave this argument
+its classical formulation: “Except for short-lived transitional periods
+when the old alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to
+take control of political institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a
+part of the dominant national alliance. As an element in the political leadership
+of the dominant alliance, the Court of course supports the major
+policies of the alliance.”20 Subsequent authors have followed Dahl’s lead,
+claiming that the judiciary is too weak to avoid supporting the “dominant
+alliance,”21 actively advances the goals of the dominant party,22 or changes
+its behavior only in “constitutional moments” produced by realigning
+elections.23 Other authors less interested in general theories of constitutional
+change have argued that the Supreme Court, independent of the
+composition of its members, appears sensitive to shifts in popular preferences,
+although this effect is typically somewhat small, and—significantly
+for our purposes—possibly in decline.24
+Students of the courts have devoted increasing attention to the conflict
+between the courts and the other branches of government that Dahl
+thought limited to “short-lived transitional periods.” Because of the long
+(and growing) length of justices’ terms, these periods may be more sustained
+than scholars in the Dahlian tradition recognized, and therefore of
+substantial constitutional significance.25 The nonsimultaneous response
+of political institutions to external stimuli sets the stage for conflict between
+the judiciary and the other branches of government. As J. Mitchell
+Pickerill and Cornell Clayton argue, the Court’s attempts to disrupt the
+agenda of the dominant political alliance “will provoke an institutional
+response—such as a constitutional amendment, legislation to strip the
+Court of jurisdiction, or Court packing—to realign the Court’s jurisprudence
+with the priorities of the governing regime.”26 Despite their useful
+addition of durable interbranch conflict, these arguments are not fundamentally
+different from others in the Dahlian tradition: it simply takes
+longer for the legal market to clear (that is, to align with the “dominant
+political alliance”) than earlier supporters of the “political court” theory
+believed. Entrenchment happens in this theory, but both its source and its
+POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMPETITION 11
+
+remedy are electoral. Courts eventually change when, and only when, the
+dominant political alliance has sufficient time and power to reshape the
+composition of the court.
+Dahl’s successors are clearly right to understand legal change as tightly
+coupled to larger processes of political competition. However, if the argument
+of the previous section is correct, neither partisan entrenchment nor
+disentrenchment can be understood predominantly by reference to electoral
+stimuli, as partisan conflict ranges well beyond the electorally rooted
+institutions that analysts of a “political court” usually assume drive longterm
+judicial change. What is more, theorists in this tradition give relatively
+short shrift to the declining prevalence or efficacy of institutional
+devices to align the courts with the dominant political alliance. Finally,
+modern Dahlians ignore the “thickening” of the American political system
+produced by the growth of the modern state, which has been shown
+in other contexts to have weakened the mechanisms of disruptive, electorally
+inspired change.27 In short, “partisan entrenchment” occurs not only
+in courts, but also in the social institutions that feed the courts with ideas,
+personnel, and cases. In particular, professional associations, the politically
+motivated parts of the bar, and law schools are all sites for attempting
+to temporally extend a partisan coalition. Jack Balkin and Sanford
+Levinson recognize this when they note “one important feature of
+intellectual paradigm shifts and constitutional revolutions: the takeover
+of those institutions charged with teaching the young by newcomers imbued
+with the new learning and inclined to dismiss, often quite rudely,
+the purported verities of their predecessors.”28 But Balkin and Levinson
+say nothing about how, if at all, “entrenchment” in law schools occurs,
+and give us no reason to expect that the process by which law students
+(and ultimately law faculties) change should resemble that of the courts,
+for which the political mechanism is at least reasonably clear.
+The work of Charles Epp provides a useful frame for understanding the
+nonelectoral sources of judicial entrenchment. Epp argues that for major
+legal changes to occur, a shift in the judiciary’s character is insufficient.
+
+Many discussions of the relationship between the Supreme Court and litigants
+assume that the resources necessary to support litigation are easily generated
+and that, as a result, litigants of all kinds have always stood ready to bring
+forward any kind of case that the Court might indicate a willingness to hear or
+decide. But that presumes a pluralism of litigating interests and an evenness of
+the litigation playing field that is wholly unjustified. Not every issue is now, nor
+has been in the past, the subject of extensive litigation in lower courts, due in
+part to limitations in the availability of resources for legal mobilization.29
+
+Hence, in explaining why legal change occurs, we must focus on the supply
+side (litigants), rather than simply the demand side (courts) that the
+12 CHAPTER 1
+
+Dahlians focus on. Epp’s supply side, which he refers to as the “support
+structure” for legal change, includes not just those bringing cases, but
+also those who create legal ideas and strategies, such as law professors,
+litigants, and their patrons.30 Where the composition of the judiciary is
+reshuffled without a corresponding shift in the support structure, legal
+change may fail to occur or, at the least, be substantially limited and
+poorly coordinated or implemented.
+What is it about the law that makes this support structure so important?
+First and foremost, courts have substantially less agenda control
+than other political institutions. Because of this, social actors who are
+mobilized and skilled at organizing litigation campaigns are likely to prevail
+over their unmobilized and unskilled counterparts.31 Whether the
+Court hears a case at all depends upon the ability of litigants to produce
+enough cases to create a conflict between circuits, and whether the cases
+produce the outcomes they want depends upon those litigants’ ability to
+effectively shape the fact pattern presented to the courts.32 This feature of
+strategic litigation substantially advantages those who control the supply
+of cases, and disadvantages those who are forced to respond.
+Furthermore, for legal ideas to be taken seriously by the courts they
+cannot be seen as wholly novel or outside the realm of legitimate professional
+opinion. This is work that first must be done outside the courts.
+Balkin, for example, has convincingly argued that
+
+the question of what is “off the wall” and what is “on the wall” in law is tied
+to a series of social conventions that include which persons in the legal profession
+are willing to stand up for a particular legal argument. In law, if not in
+other disciplines of human thought, authority, and particularly institutional authority,
+counts for a lot. The more powerful and influential the people who are
+willing to make a legal argument, the more quickly it moves from the positively
+loony to the positively thinkable, and ultimately to something entirely consistent
+with “good legal craft.”33
+
+As a consequence, groups with disproportionate control of the institutions
+that produce and legitimate legal ideas, groups who have legal “authority,”
+will enjoy a significant advantage in persuading judges and other
+significant legal actors that their demands are reasonable and appropriate.
+If, as Owen Fiss has argued, the “disciplining norms” within a legal community
+constrain the range of legitimate interpretation, then the ideological
+bias of that community should strongly influence the kinds of arguments
+that are successful in the courts.34 Control of the institutions that
+embody this interpretive community, in particular law schools and the
+organized bar, is only weakly coupled with the cycles of electoral politics.
+These institutions not only produce legal ideas, but are also the dominant
+force in training successive generations of lawyers, influencing their no-
+POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMPETITION 13
+
+tions of the proper function of law in society, of which legal claims are
+“off the wall,” and of how a career in law might be pursued. In short, as
+gatekeepers to the profession, control of legal education shapes, over time
+and not without substantial room for error, patterns of recruitment to the
+profession, and ultimately determines who will be soliciting cases and
+arguing before the courts.
+This support structure is also important because the courts, and the
+Supreme Court in particular, typically look for cues from other elite institutions.
+For instance, students of the Supreme Court have found that prolife
+advocates in the 1970s were significantly disadvantaged because of
+the overwhelming support pro-choice activists had from professional organizations,35
+while justices were, in the area of civil rights, especially
+attentive to the perceived attitudes of national elites.36 Because Supreme
+Court judges are, first and foremost, lawyers, they are unusually sensitive
+to the dominant opinion in the legal community. In addition, judges can
+reasonably be understood as an “enterprise” that includes their clerks,
+who are drawn overwhelming from a very small group of elite law
+schools: in the Rehnquist years, for example, 77 percent of clerks came
+from just seven law schools.37 The ideological team best able to influence
+the conventional wisdom among these professional elites is likely, all other
+things being equal, to have a substantial advantage in court.
+Control of the legal support structure also matters because it has the
+potential to shape not only the supply side, represented by cases and legal
+norms and ideas, but also the demand side, represented by the composition
+of the courts themselves. If both parties were equally possessed of a
+cadre of talented, trained, experienced, and ideologically motivated potential
+judges and justices and had a network that allowed those promising
+individuals to be identified by those in charge of nominations, then
+the men and women placed on the courts might simply reflect the balance
+of forces at the time of their nomination. But there is no reason to believe
+that the nominees in the pool or the network that brings them to the fore
+are always in rough ideological balance.38 The side that has the deeper,
+more readily identifiable, and better-networked supply of potential justices
+will be able to maximize its influence on the courts by reducing the
+chance of miscalculating a potential judge’s views and by offering presidents
+enough options that they can act on their narrowly political motivations
+for judicial selection (which are often quite significant) while also
+satisfying their longer-term ideological objectives. Legal networks influence
+both the supply and demand sides of law, determining the scope of
+electoral opportunity that a political coalition can actually exploit.
+While this support structure is critical when groups are on the outside,
+it is equally important when they are no longer pressing their noses up
+against the legal glass. Once their major victories are won, the support
+14 CHAPTER 1
+
+structure can then insulate these accomplishments from unsympathetic
+successors. What is insurgent in one generation becomes entrenched in
+the next. While achieving a legal revolution may require a heroic development
+of organizational resources, once this support structure is developed,
+it may be relatively easy to maintain and very difficult to dislodge.
+One simple example makes the point. While judicial entrenchment may
+seem quite impressive, given that the average term on the bench is approximately
+twenty years, that is just over half of the career of the average law
+professor. But even this analogy will tend to underestimate the depth of
+entrenchment in the law schools, since, unlike the courts, law school faculties
+are almost totally self-reproducing. While Supreme Court justices
+are chosen by presidents and confirmed by senators who represent contemporary
+political majorities, law school faculties are chosen by committees
+staffed by a previous generation of professors. It is a commonplace
+in the sociology of knowledge that disciplines tend to reproduce themselves,
+and ideological and disciplinary projects are tightly interwoven in
+legal academia. As a result, we would expect law faculties to reproduce
+themselves ideologically, even in the absence of an explicit individual desire
+to discriminate, by defining alternative ideological research projects
+as marginal or unimportant.39 While there may be some important linkages
+between electoral change and shifts in the character of the institutions
+that shape legal culture, they are far from direct and probably not
+first in importance.
+If this is true, then we would expect that for a new political coalition
+to fully translate its electoral power into legal change, it must either substantially
+weaken the support structure of its older rivals or create a competing
+support structure of its own. In the terms of the previous section,
+it must become competitive in the sphere of nonelectoral mobilization.
+But as that section suggested, control in this sphere is likely to be very
+sticky and substantially disconnected from electoral change. In short,
+nonelectoral mobilization follows a logic of its own. To understand the
+challenges that conservatives faced in developing their own legal support
+structure, therefore, we must recognize countermobilization as a peculiarly
+organizational problem. It is to the challenges of creating such organizations
+that we now turn.
+
+The Challenge of Countermobilization
+
+Scholars in the social movement tradition have been especially active in
+trying to understand the organizational challenge of mobilization, explaining
+patterns of success and failure by focusing on either “political
+opportunity” or “resource mobilization.” The political process tradition
+POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMPETITION 15
+
+explains the existence and effectiveness of social movements by reference
+to the “political opportunity structure,” which incorporates such factors
+as the openness of the political system, the tolerance of protest, and the
+existence of elite allies.40 Resource mobilization theorists take the opposite
+tack, beginning with social movement’s internal resources, such as
+money, labor, networks, coalitions, organizations, and ideas.41 Both of
+these theories, like the arguments in political science and law discussed
+in the two previous sections, assume that organization is an automatic,
+agentless response either to opportunity or to resources.
+A useful theory of social movement organization needs to pry open
+this black box of organizational development, to explain where effective
+organizations come from and how their leaders use them. After accounting
+for the effects of opportunities and resources, Marshall Ganz has argued,
+significant variation still remains: “Some leaders see political opportunities
+where others do not, mobilize resources in ways others do not,
+and interpret their causes in ways others do not. To the extent that strategy
+influences the emergence, development and outcomes of social movements,
+we must ask not only why different leaders devise different strategies,
+but why some leaders devise more effective strategy than others.”42
+My argument places Ganz’s insight in historical context, situating political
+agents in an inherited regime that sets the conditions under which
+strategic decisions are made. Within those conditions, however, agents
+have the capacity to make better or worse decisions, decisions that subsequently
+become part of the context in which future choices are made.43
+Political outcomes are, therefore, the product of this interaction between
+inheritance and agency. I begin with the challenges of entrenchment, and
+then move on to describe the actors who make up the support structure
+that seeks to overcome them.
+
+The Challenges of Entrenchment
+
+The challenges of countermobilization are more severe when the governance
+structure of a field is well defended. This is especially the case in
+professional domains such as the law, where there are clearly defined
+barriers to entry. For example, as described earlier, leadership selection
+in professional institutions (such as faculty hiring in law schools) is typically
+controlled by incumbents. This puts members of a countermovement
+at a substantial disadvantage, either because of active discrimination,
+through an allocation of positions favoring incumbents’ interests
+and skills, or simply because outsiders lack access to the information
+that flows through personal and professional networks. A similar phenomenon
+is often present in the control of federal agencies. Accounts of
+16 CHAPTER 1
+
+agencies as diverse as the Social Security Administration, the Environmental
+Protection Agency, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
+Commission have shown how they were staffed by personnel sympathetic
+to, or in some cases drawn from, the social movements that were
+pressuring them.44 This tight relationship between agency personnel and
+outside interests left those who were unsympathetic to their objectives,
+such as conservatives, out in the cold. Barriers to entry can also come in
+the form of “rules of the game.” Outsider groups that mobilize against,
+and eventually take effective control over, institutions may also change
+political processes in a way that durably advantages their resources and
+tactics. The form of legal politics that legal liberals developed, for example,
+put a political premium on Washington, D.C.—based organizational
+presence and connections to legal academia, while disadvantaging the
+sort of grassroots mass mobilization that conservatives were in the process
+of perfecting.45
+Outsiders must respond to normative and cultural, as well as institutional,
+entrenchment.46 A regime is most likely to endure when it can make
+its ideas seem natural, appropriate, and commonsensical, consigning its
+opponents to the extremes. Gramsci described this phenomenon as hegemony:
+control through direction and consent, instead of dominance
+and coercion.47 Given the increasingly fractured character of advanced
+societies, it is more useful to conceptualize modern societies as characterized
+by differing spheres, or, in Pierre Bourdieu’s term, fields.
+48 Each
+field—legal, economic, educational—is governed by its own logic and sensitive
+to different, incompletely transferable, forms of social, cultural, financial,
+and human capital. Understood in this way, the concept of hegemony
+comes close to the role of culture and ideas used by scholars of
+the public policy process. So, for example, Peter Bachrach and Morton
+Baratz claimed that the most important form of political power was the
+ability to mobilize “the dominant values and the political myths, rituals,
+and institutions which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more
+groups” in order to keep substantive challenges to the existing regime off
+the political agenda.49 A regime that has achieved hegemony makes its
+principles seem like “good professional practice,” “standard operating
+procedure,” “the public interest,” or “conventional wisdom.” Those who
+fail to affirm these principles are stigmatized, and their arguments are
+dismissed. This ideational entrenchment is likely to be especially powerful
+in professional settings like the law, where opportunities for concealing
+normative choice in technical garb are widely available.
+Operating in a hostile and unfamiliar environment and without clearly
+analogous precedents upon which to base decision-making, a movement
+faced with institutional and ideational entrenchment will find it difficult
+to identify a rational response to its predicament. Put another way, coun-
+POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMPETITION 17
+
+termobilizers face a condition of profound uncertainty.
+50 Uncertainty may
+be compounded by insurgents’ inability to recognize their opponents’ vulnerabilities,51
+or by their limited repertoire of possible responses.52 Faced
+with such challenges, countermobilizers may fall back on existing tools
+and strategies that require less adaptation of the movement’s infrastructure
+and strategic repertoire but may be highly unsuited to the challenges
+of political entrenchment.
+
+The Components of an Alternative Governing Coalition
+
+To respond to the challenges of elite entrenchment, countermobilizers
+must develop what Stephen Skowronek called an “alternative governing
+coalition,” a concept roughly equivalent to Epp’s “support structure”
+for legal change. An alternative governing coalition is composed of intellectual,
+network, and political entrepreneurs, and the patrons that support
+them. This section describes the role that each part of this alternative
+governing coalition plays in responding to the challenges of
+entrenchment, and in the process points to the limits of countermobilization
+when this coalition is immature or incomplete. As argued earlier,
+changes in the form of governance have made elite higher education,
+through its credentialing of expertise and control of the production and
+legitimation of ideas, an important source of political power. Because
+cultural capital—the habits, skills, and bearing that allow one to be
+taken seriously in elite circles53—is transmitted through these institutions,
+an effective challenge to the dominant regime must sink roots in
+those institutions or produce alternative institutions also capable of producing
+not only knowledge but also reputations, prestige, and distinction.54
+This points to the importance of intellectual entrepreneurs as a
+part of an alternative governing coalition.
+The first function of intellectual entrepreneurs is to “denaturalize” the
+existing regime, by exposing the hidden normative assumptions embedded
+in seemingly neutral professional, scientific, or procedural standards
+and practices, forcing those assumptions to be justified and alternatives
+to them entertained. The activity of intellectual entrepreneurs signals that
+a domain is vulnerable to challenge and provides the legitimacy for others
+to follow up their arguments with action. Intellectual entrepreneurs also
+provide insurgents with rhetorical formulations, or frames, that give intellectual
+substance to otherwise silent grievances.55 These frames, as Erik
+Bleich has argued, “help actors identify problems and specify and prioritize
+their interests and goals; they point actors toward causal and normative
+judgments about effective and appropriate policies in ways that tend
+to propel policy down a particular path and to reinforce it on that path;
+18 CHAPTER 1
+
+and they can endow actors deemed to have moral authority or expert
+status with added power in a policy field.”56 These alternative frames support
+“oppositional consciousness,” which “requires ideational resources—ideas
+available in the culture that can be built upon to create
+legitimacy, a perception of injustice, righteous anger, solidarity, and the
+belief in the group’s power.”57
+Intellectual entrepreneurs provide countermobilizers with an alternative
+vision of social order, drawing upon examples from private orderings,
+foreign examples, logical argument, or the polity’s past experiences.58
+Given that, in its early stages, the alternative governing coalition is likely
+to be composed of widely scattered members, themselves isolated in hostile
+institutions and lacking substantial organization, these ideas can generate
+“coordination without a coordinator,” providing guidance for action,
+confidence that risks are worth taking, and reassurance that others
+will be acting as well.59 Finally, intellectual entrepreneurs help to create
+durable relationships between groups with disparate interests, forms of
+organization, and animating ideas. The idea of the “general strike,” for
+example, helped to fuse previously uncoordinated French socialists, republicans,
+anarchists, and corporatists in the late nineteenth century into
+a coherent political Left.60 The National Review played a similar function
+on the American Right in the 1950s and 1960s, where Frank Meyer’s idea
+of “fusionism” transformed libertarians, business, social conservatives,
+Cold Warriors, and Southern segregationists into the modern conservative
+movement.61 Intellectual entrepreneurs help make coalition partners
+attentive to areas of overlapping interests and provide the emotional glue
+that helps coalitions maintain relationships in times of stress.
+Given my argument in the first section that party activity is increasingly
+found in diffuse policy domains characterized by networked forms
+of organization, intellectual entrepreneurs must be accompanied in an
+alternative governing coalition by a second category of actor, network
+entrepreneurs. For my purposes, political networks are a form of social
+capital, a series of connections between persons that reduce the transaction
+costs of political activity. However, as James Coleman has pointed
+out, “Because the benefits of actions that bring social capital into being
+are largely experienced by persons other than the actor, it is often not in
+his interest to bring it into being.”62 Consequently, an alternative governing
+coalition needs entrepreneurs willing to invest their time and energy
+to facilitate these networks.63 Network entrepreneurs help to build
+“strong ties” by circulating stories, complaints, and symbols that knit
+people together, identify a common enemy, and encourage intense bonds
+to a particular group. They create “weak ties” through the opportunity
+for repeated interactions and the provision of a ready source of contacts
+across a wide range of social fields.64 The association with the network
+POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMPETITION 19
+
+allows individuals to trust one another because membership demonstrates
+common opinions or prejudices and allows for the development
+of reputations.65 Network entrepreneurs facilitate the diffusion of ideas
+by nurturing linkages among intellectuals, political entrepreneurs, and
+the rank and file; the rapid transmission of information and lessons
+across space;66 and the intense emotional connections and repeated interactions
+that facilitate intellectual development.67 These networks are
+most likely to be dense and effective when their development is the principal
+concern of specialized actors capable of generating trust across the
+divides within a political coalition.
+Translating the work of intellectual and network entrepreneurs into
+concrete change is the task of political entrepreneurs. The most important
+functions of political entrepreneurs are to identify and take maximal advantage
+of political opportunities in the present and make investments
+that will produce additional opportunities down the line.68 The need to
+effectively recognize opportunities means that political entrepreneurs
+who can effectively serve as a component of an alternative governing coalition
+are likely to be “insider-outsiders,” persons who are products of
+the regime they seek to dislodge.69 Experience in and credentials from the
+existing regime give organizational entrepreneurs the cultural capital to
+be taken seriously in fields with deeply embedded expectations of participants’
+experience, knowledge, and cultural competence. Finally, political
+entrepreneurs need to embed their strategy in organizations capable of
+maintaining their focus on the long term, given that regime change is
+likely to unfold slowly, requires actions in multiple stages, and depends
+on effects that are difficult to trace and thus to claim credit for.70 They
+must be effective in persuading actors whose time horizons and ultimate
+political objectives are different from their own, while simultaneously
+aligning their sources of organizational maintenance with their strategic
+goals. This latter factor is likely to be especially important, given the tendency
+for organizations to become focused primarily on short-term organizational
+maintenance, rather than long-term strategy.71
+The extent and quality of organizational infrastructure described above
+does not emerge spontaneously: to solve the collective action problem
+inherent in supporting these actors, a final component of the alternative
+governing coalition is necessary—the patron.
+72 All of the functions of patrons
+depend upon their role in providing subsidies for organization, especially
+during periods of organizational genesis. In this start-up period,
+information about organizational outcomes may be limited or nonexistent,
+the costs of determining probable organizational quality high, organizational
+entrepreneurs’ time scarce, and thus the opportunity costs associated
+with fund-raising significant.73 Without patrons willing to invest
+large amounts of money in speculative ventures in their early stages, the
+20 CHAPTER 1
+
+scope of organizations able to take advantage of political opportunities
+will be greatly limited. In order to limit the pressure on entrepreneurs to
+water down or obfuscate the content and aims of their programming,
+effective patrons need to share with the groups they fund an underlying
+strategic vision.74 In order to obtain otherwise inaccessible information
+on the quality of agents whose quality may be hard to evaluate from
+public sources, they must also be embedded in a common network with
+their objects of support.
+Patrons also need a significant degree of strategic sophistication, a coherent
+overall vision, and the intellectual self-confidence to make investment
+decisions whose success is uncertain. Spurring the creation of organizations
+capable of exploiting existing opportunities and creating new
+ones requires patrons with certain specific characteristics and strategies:
+
+A. Spread betting. Given the uncertainty associated with countermobilization,
+effective patrons will spread their bets over a wide range of alternative strategies
+and entrepreneurs rather than focusing their resources on a single
+approach or individual.
+B. Feedback mechanisms. The effectiveness of spread betting depends upon
+the existence of patron mechanisms for evaluation, learning, and lessondrawing,
+so that resources can be withdrawn from low-return investments
+and diverted to those that have shown more promise.
+C. Long time horizons. In addition to spreading their bets, the challenge of
+countermobilization under conditions of entrenchment demands that patrons
+extend the time horizon within which they expect results.75
+D. Willingness to accept and the ability to measure diffuse outcomes. Many
+of the social and political outcomes in organizational countermobilization
+are more diffuse than electoral returns. What is more, even those outcomes
+that can be easily measured may be difficult to trace back to the actors that
+produced them.
+
+The effectiveness of patrons in pursuing these strategies depends upon a
+combination of their skill, the absence of internal organizational conflict,
+and the richness of the networks in which they are embedded. Effective
+feedback mechanisms, for example, depend on both the ability of patrons
+to determine the appropriate metric for evaluation, and the reliability of
+the networks that transmit information about a venture’s success.
+The most effective patrons are also important coalition actors in their
+own right, not just sources of funding. When patrons develop permanent,
+professional staff with substantial continuity over time, their position
+in the ecology of organizational development can provide an alternative
+governing coalition with strategic coordination and institutionalized
+“memory.” The information they receive in the feedback process may
+give patrons a sense of where the movement is weak, allowing them to
+POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMPETITION 21
+
+actively encourage additional programming to fill holes or provide linkages
+between existing efforts, thereby accelerating the process by which
+opportunities are recognized and exploited. The institutional memory of
+patron staff will increase the probability that resources will be funneled
+away from projects with a low probability of success, while increasing
+the “hit rate” of new investments. These are critical parts of the strategy
+of learning-by-doing intrinsic to building an alternative governing coalition
+under conditions of uncertainty. Patrons are therefore critical coordinating
+structures, the site in an alternative governing coalition where
+information is gathered, lessons drawn and disseminated, and slack resources
+directed.
+Developing an alternative governing coalition with the qualities described
+above is an extraordinarily difficult process, and one that is likely
+to be characterized by significant mistakes, long periods of learning and
+lesson-drawing, and significant lags between the emergence of opportunities
+and their effective exploitation. If the theoretical account presented
+here is correct, we should expect large-scale political change—especially
+legal change—to be determined as much or more by the idiosyncratic
+rhythms of organizational development as by the more visible tides of
+electoral success and failure. As a result, it should not be surprising to
+find that the policy and institutional impact of a rising partisan regime
+should vary dramatically, in relation to the depth of entrenchment and
+the sophistication of the field’s alternative governing coalition.
+2
+
+The Rise of the Liberal Legal Network
+
+TO UNDERSTAND THE PROCESS of conservative organizational development
+examined in chapters 3 through 7, we must begin with what I will
+refer to as the liberal legal network (LLN), the collection of individuals
+and organizations in the legal profession, law schools, and public interest
+law groups that formed what Epp called the “support structure” for the
+rights revolution.1 The LLN was at least as important, however, in the
+entrenchment and extension of the rights revolution as it was in their
+original achievement. The LLN protected and extended liberal accomplishments
+in the law, even when the electoral coalition that had originally
+supported them began to wither. It was the LLN’s power and its seeming
+immunity to direct attack that sparked conservative organizational countermobilization.
+To understand the character of this response, therefore,
+we need a clear sense of where the LLN came from and why it was such
+a potent and resilient force for entrenching legal liberalism.
+Conservatives studied the liberal legal network to understand what
+they were up against, and to draw lessons for their own activism. As later
+chapters will show, they learned that successful legal change requires a
+beachhead in the legal academy, ideas capable of generating passionate
+commitment, channels for recruiting lawyers into public interest law, and
+professional networks to build the movement’s social capital. The professional
+entrenchment of legal liberalism meant however, that there were
+limits to the lessons conservatives could learn from their liberal counterparts.
+Chapter 3, in particular, shows why this process of lesson-drawing
+was so hard, and why there was such serious resistance to it.
+This story of the growth of the LLN starts with the New Deal, whose
+revised constitutional orthodoxy paved the way for an expansion and
+centralization of government. The New Deal created both the demand for
+and the supply of new kinds of lawyers, and, in the process, changed the
+character of the legal profession’s elites and ultimately the legal academy.
+The chapter then traces the development of the proto-support structure
+of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the American Civil Liberties
+Union, and how they were able to produce legal liberalism’s early victories.
+One of these decisions, Gideon v. Wainwright, led to the creation of
+a network of legal aid organizations under the sponsorship of the Office
+of Economic Opportunity. The rise of legal aid, along with the maturation
+of an earlier generation of lawyers raised under the New Deal, led to a
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 23
+
+dramatic shift in the character of the organized bar, from being a
+staunchly conservative force to one that actively assisted the LLN. In this
+same period, law schools began to change as the elite legal professoriate
+grew steadily more liberal, eventually incorporating a small but growing
+contingent further to the left. These law professors, in conjunction with
+an increasingly liberal judiciary, devoted their scholarship to legitimating
+an assertive role for courts in advancing egalitarian social goals.
+Law schools also changed institutionally. While they had once
+staunchly opposed clinical education, law schools began to create clinics
+at a rapid pace. This change was propelled by a confluence of factors: a
+long-standing concern in the profession that legal education was insufficiently
+practice-oriented, pressure from radical students to make education
+“relevant” to the pursuit of social justice, an increasingly sympathetic
+pool of professors, and funding from the Ford Foundation.
+These changes created the necessary preconditions for the final element
+of the LLN, a network of public interest law organizations with interests
+far beyond those of the ACLU and NAACP LDF. With a ready pool of
+ideas from a more liberal professoriate, a generation of law students looking
+for a new way to practice law, the experience of legal aid, and a judiciary
+willing to remove legal impediments to bringing cases, liberal public
+interest law exploded in the early 1970s. Despite these permissive environmental
+conditions, the growth of liberal public interest law depended on
+a number of highly contingent factors, especially the staff of the Ford
+Foundation’s success in convincing their board of the field’s philanthropic
+propriety and the defeat of the Nixon administration’s effort to deny their
+tax exemptions. Having overcome these obstacles, legal liberals were able
+to use their superior legal sophistication, the cultural halo of rights, and
+support in the media and Congress to advance the legal agenda far more
+effectively than conservatives could further theirs. This success genuinely
+shocked conservatives, especially those in business, and led them to explore
+developing a legal infrastructure of their own.
+Two themes clearly emerge from the story told in this chapter. The first
+is the critical role played by the nation’s legal and philanthropic establishment
+in the development of the LLN. From the perspective of the early
+twenty-first century, it is perplexing why these wealthy, well-positioned,
+white men—presidents of the American Bar Association, leaders of the
+nation’s largest foundations—put their support behind a project to liberalize
+the legal profession. Part of the explanation has to do with the times.
+By the 1960s, liberalism had become the philosophy of the middle ground.
+Civil rights, criminal procedure reforms, prison reform, women’s rights,
+and environmentalism all came to be associated with progress, modernity,
+and “good professional practice.” It was, for a brief period of time,
+strangely uncontroversial—a bulwark against something much worse,
+24 CHAPTER 2
+
+holding out the promise of order and stability in a world that seemed to be
+spiraling toward radicalism and polarization. While many of the changes
+described in this chapter have become controversial over time, only a few
+were at their inception. My story thus tracks that of John Skrentny, who
+found that the “minority rights revolution” was made at least as much
+by elite white men in positions of power as it was by masses of ordinary
+men and women protesting on the streets.2
+The second theme of this chapter is that legal liberalism is impossible
+to understand without appreciating that its most important practitioners
+saw it as legal, as well as liberal. This was not a movement populated, for
+the most part, by people who were cynical about the law, who believed
+that it was simply “politics by other means.” If anything, legal liberals
+had a more exalted vision of the law than their realist forebears. Older
+liberals were made uncomfortable by their faith in the federal courts, and
+future generations of legal realists, the “crits,” would claim that legal
+liberals failed to see that law was always an instrument of power. Legal
+liberals, however, quite consciously operated under the “spell of the law.”
+The patrons, intellectuals, and political entrepreneurs of this movement
+believed deeply in law’s possibilities, and sought to remake the law to
+facilitate what they saw as its highest purposes. They were, in that sense,
+temperamental conservatives, who believed that deep reforms in the profession
+were necessary in order to keep law “relevant” to rapidly changing
+times. It was this idea of progress and relevance that underlay a new professional
+ethos and provided legal liberalism with its most powerful
+source of legitimacy.
+To understand the peculiar character of the regime that conservatives
+faced in later years, it is critical to appreciate the deep ambiguity built
+into legal liberalism. While it was encoded with ideological content, this
+content was subterranean, complicated by the need to reconcile a project
+of social transformation with the management of institutions that, precisely
+because they were professional in character, limited how openly and
+directly it could be pursued. This ambiguity was, in part, legal liberalism’s
+strength, since it forced conservatives to spend time and resources uncovering
+the ideological character of the modern legal profession. The simultaneously
+professional and ideological character of legal liberalism forced
+conservatives to adapt to this changed understanding of professionalism.
+It would take them decades to do so effectively.
+
+The Birth of the Liberal Legal Network
+
+From the late 1930s to the early 1960s, the liberal legal network passed
+through its germinal stage. A generation of New Deal lawyers, informed
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 25
+
+by legal realism and experienced in government, created new kinds of law
+and new kinds of lawyering, and became in the process an integral part
+of America’s legal elite. At the same time, further from the centers of
+elite power, the ACLU and NAACP developed a new, politically engaged
+approach to the law. With it came new linkages between the law, legal
+education, and legal intellectuals. Law schools began their long march to
+academic respectability and institutional prosperity in the late 1940s, and,
+as they grew, their faculties absorbed a large number of ex—New Dealers,
+Jews, and young lawyers more connected to the New Deal than to the
+traditional conservatism of the bar. The professional bar, by contrast, was
+staunchly conservative through much of this period, but some of its leaders
+began to make hesitant steps in the direction of reform in the middle
+to late 1950s—steps that would rapidly accelerate in the 1960s.
+The New Deal was a watershed moment for the legal profession. FDR’s
+administration brought into positions of power lawyers cut from a very
+different cloth than the conservative, Republican WASPs who controlled
+the legal profession. Their service in government, and the experience and
+contacts that it produced, gave these New Deal lawyers a market value
+to corporate America that they lacked before the depression, and hence
+the ability to create their own firms. Perhaps the most important of these
+new firms, Arnold, Fortas and Porter, included New Dealers with experience
+in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, the Departments
+of Agriculture and Interior, and the Federal Communications Commission.3
+Even as the Republicans recovered some of their lost political power
+at the war’s end, the New Dealers’ networks, understanding of the modern
+administrative state, and prestige derived from their government service
+made them indispensable to corporate clients. Peter Irons found that,
+of the New Deal lawyers he surveyed, “two thirds moved into private
+practice, most often in large, big-city firms. A substantial number established
+their own firms in Washington and New York, guiding clients
+through the maze of federal statutes and regulations they helped to draft,
+administer, and interpret.”4 Doing well also meant the firm had the wherewithal
+to do good, as they understood it. For example, when their former
+friends and colleagues in government were targets of the loyalty campaigns
+of the 1950s, Arnold, Fortas and Porter put its resources and prestige
+behind their defense; at times in the 1950s “loyalty cases were consuming
+between 20 and 50 percent of Arnold, Fortas and Porter’s
+working hours.” The firm was able to charge only expenses for these cases
+because the corporate side of the business was so fantastically lucrative.5
+The resources, orientation, and ideology of America’s law schools
+changed markedly after World War II. Soon after the war the Association
+of American Law Schools (AALS) and ABA began to increase their standards
+for accreditation, requiring the appointment of a full-time dean
+26 CHAPTER 2
+
+in 1948, a minimum student-faculty ratio and faculty size in 1952, and
+gradually restricting admission to students with college degrees.6 Many
+law schools went well beyond these minimum requirements by increasing
+the number of law school professors and ratcheting down their labors,
+thereby increasing the attractiveness of law teaching to those of intellectual
+ambitions. The growing quality of state university law schools was
+especially notable: by the 1950s, Berkeley, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan,
+Virginia, UCLA, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Texas had become national
+institutions, with growing resources and faculty.7 At Michigan,
+there were twenty-five professorial appointments in the law school between
+1946 and 1956, as compared to nine between 1927 and 1946,
+combined with “an increase in research and writing.”8 In the fifteen years
+after the end of World War II, Berkeley’s law faculty increased 47 percent,
+the school moved to a new building five times the size of the old one, and
+its “strong California orientation was diluted by faculty members who
+were new to the state, brought perspectives from other parts of the country,
+attended a wider variety of educational institutions, and had different
+preteaching experiences.”9 Increasing in size, resources, and ambition,
+these rising law schools were vastly more valuable to social movements
+than they would have been just a few years earlier.
+Encouraging the liberalization of the legal academy was the decline of
+anti-Semitism. Before the war, the elite law schools accepted a small handful
+of Jews; in the years after the war, hiring of law professors increased
+sharply, quotas capping the number of Jewish law faculty gradually fell
+(lowering constraints on hiring), and the number of Jewish law students
+exploded (increasing the number of Jews with the credentials to successfully
+enter the law-teaching market). Meanwhile, constraints on practice
+in the top law firms remained, so law teaching was an attractive opportunity
+for many of the best (and overwhelmingly liberal) Jewish lawyers.
+At the same time, a sizable portion of the New Deal lawyers who chose
+not to join the burgeoning government-relations bar in Washington went
+into law teaching. At the start of the New Deal only Yale had decisively
+embraced liberalism, supplying Jerome Frank, Thurman Arnold, William
+O. Douglas, and Walter Hale Hamilton to FDR’s administration.10 At
+Columbia and Harvard, by contrast, leftward movement was limited to
+a handful of the faculty, such as Harvard’s Felix Frankfurter and James
+Landis and Columbia’s Karl Llewellyn and Adolph Berle. Beyond these
+elite institutions, most law schools focused primarily on getting their students
+past bar exams, and for the rest “money was generally short, the
+faculties miniscule and generally undistinguished, and libraries in most
+cases modest.”11 By 1948 Yale Law had hired New Deal veterans Boris
+Bittker (Lend-Lease Administration, law clerk to Jerome Frank), Fleming
+James (Office of Price Administration), Thomas Emerson (National
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 27
+
+Labor Relations Board, National Recovery Administration, Social Security
+Board, OPA), and Eugene Rostow (Lend-Lease Administration and
+Department of State).12 If anything, the hiring of veterans of the New Deal
+or war service at Harvard Law was even more impressive: nine were hired
+in quick succession at the end of the war.13 Of the eighty-two lawyers
+surveyed in Irons’s The New Deal Lawyers, a dozen went into law school
+teaching, and the impact on Harvard was especially striking: two became
+deans of the school (Landis and Erwin Griswold) and another five became
+tenured professors (Paul Freund, Stanley Surrey, Louis Jaffe, Henry Hart,
+and Milton Katz).14 Two more of Irons’s subjects joined the law faculty
+at Columbia (Milton Handler and Telford Taylor).
+At the other end of American legal education’s class system, Charles
+Hamilton Houston was laying the foundations at Howard University for
+a new group-focused and politically engaged vision of law. Houston believed
+that the “Negro lawyer must be trained as a social engineer and
+group interpreter. Due to the Negro’s social and political condition . . .
+the Negro lawyer must be prepared to anticipate, guide and interpret his
+group advancement.”15 This conviction drove Houston to transform
+Howard Law from a night school that could barely meet the ABA and
+AALS’s newly stringent rules to “perhaps the first public interest law
+school, with an institutional focus on the effects of the legal system on
+the black community.”16 A graduate of Harvard Law, Houston parlayed
+his connections, especially with Felix Frankfurter, to convince Michigan,
+Yale, and Columbia to support fellowships designed to build up the quality
+and prestige of Howard’s professors. The faculty and graduates of
+Howard’s law school would play a critical role in the support structure
+of the civil rights movement.
+Houston was put in charge of the NAACP’s legal program, and
+promptly hired his former Howard Law student Thurgood Marshall.
+Many observers (including many conservatives) have attributed great
+strategic acuity to the NAACP’s focus on education, and its decision to
+move from equalization suits (which demanded equality within segregation)
+to a direct attack on the constitutionality of segregation. In truth,
+while the NAACP’s litigation strategy did have a strategic component, its
+decisions were driven as much by organizational maintenance imperatives
+(such as the lower cost of directly attacking the constitutionality of segregation,
+and the availability of foundation patronage) as they were by the
+disciplined, long-term design that contemporary observers have read back
+into the past.17 The NAACP LDF under Houston and Marshall was
+loosely organized, scattershot, opportunistic, and improvisational, its history
+littered with “proposals made by planners who were removed from
+implementation of the plans, the abandonment of those plans in favor
+of others that reflected the NAACP’s internal organizational constraints,
+28 CHAPTER 2
+
+decisions altered because of the preferences of the staff, and negotiations
+over plans with constituencies having diverse interests.”18 Its genuinely
+critical strategic decision was “to create a central staff concerned with
+litigation, not any of the particular decisions the staff made.”19 A permanent
+organization, staffed by very talented lawyers who could leverage
+and organize the resources of the black community, did not need a clear,
+multistep strategy because its continuity over time facilitated learning and
+adaptation, which would not have been possible in a more ad hoc form of
+organization.20 By creating a durable organization Houston and Marshall
+could pass on a legacy to the future development of the liberal legal network:
+a series of pathbreaking precedents, a template for public interest
+lawyering, infrastructure that could be adapted to future struggles, and a
+vision of the role of the lawyer in progressive struggles that was to have
+a powerful cultural impact on the profession.
+Complementing the emergent NAACP LDF was the ACLU, which had
+initiated an aggressive plan of expansion as early as 1929, when it decided
+that “the time has come to decentralize our work; to build up local organizations
+all over the country.”21 By the mid-1940s, an organization that
+had once been led by labor radicals and socialists had become wholly
+mainstream: the ACLU’s twenty-fifth anniversary was marked by supportive
+messages from President Truman and New York governor
+Thomas Dewey.22 Starting in 1951, the ACLU started to ramp up its membership
+considerably, growing from 30,000 in 1955 to over 60,000 by
+1960 and finally reaching an impressive 275,000 in 1974.23 The ACLU
+expanded its staffed affiliates, growing from only four cities with full-time
+staffed offices at the beginning of the 1950s to chapters throughout the
+country, including the South, by the end of the decade. By 1964, the ACLU
+reinforced the ranks of the civil rights movement by adding a very expensive,
+but necessary, Southern Regional Office in Atlanta, built on the funds
+that surged into its coffers as the civil rights struggle heated up.24
+Changes in the mainstream bar in this period were considerably more
+limited. Until well into the 1950s, the American Bar Association was a
+rigidly conservative organization. The ABA’s president from 1935 to
+1936, William Ransom, accused the New Deal of being built from “blue
+prints borrowed from old world dictatorship.”25 The American Liberty
+League, the most determined and best-funded enemy of the New Deal,
+drew substantial support from the ABA’s leaders.26 Through the 1950s,
+the ABA continued to warn darkly of creeping socialism, which it connected
+to the destruction of older constitutional norms, and projected
+itself as a bulwark against government activism. In 1950, the ABA pointed
+to the need to “reexamine generally all legislation now in effect which
+has a tendency to involve or promote the socialization of business and to
+hamper individual initiative and the continued development of the free
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 29
+
+enterprise system.”27 In the following year the ABA president could not
+“escape the conviction held by so many of my fellow lawyers that the
+‘Supreme Law of the Land’ has been distorted out of its original pattern.”28
+In 1955, the ABA published a report drafted by Fred and Phyllis
+Schlafly that criticized the Supreme Court for its excessively liberal approach
+to domestic Communism. “Anticommunist groups across the
+country distributed copies to the grassroots by the hundreds of thousands.”29
+The ABA in the 1950s was, by any measure, an organization of
+the Right.
+This conservative posture alienated many members of the bar, and in
+1937, the National Lawyers Guild was founded to provide a forum for
+dissenting voices. The Guild brought together a number of prominent
+New Deal lawyers, such as Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn, who were
+connected by “disparate motives and hopes: some were dismayed by the
+corporate law identity of the ABA; others were distressed by its active
+involvement in conservative politics; some wanted to rally lawyers to the
+New Deal; still others (Llewellyn especially) desired an organization committed
+to the provision of low-cost legal services. They were united only
+by the conviction that the ABA should no longer be permitted to speak
+for the legal profession.”30 The Guild would later become the object of
+furious ABA attacks in the 1950s, explicitly on the basis of its ties to
+Communists, but implicitly “to undercut guild proposals for public funding
+of legal services for low-income groups” and to embarrass prominent
+liberals who had once been members of the organization.31
+The perceived threat of socialism cut two ways, however. It also pushed
+the ABA toward a greater concern for the social obligation of lawyers, in
+order to defend the profession against the attacks from the left and to
+prevent the “socialization” of the legal profession. The ABA was deeply
+disturbed by the evidence of government-funded legal aid in the United
+Kingdom and by “contemporary developments in the medical profession,”
+which together “raised the specter of eventual socialization of the
+practice of law—a possibility that American lawyers cannot view with
+complacency.”32 The ABA’s fear of socialism was a powerful resource for
+more liberal members of the bar who wished to push the organization
+into a more supportive role in the provision of private legal aid. In 1951,
+ABA president Cody Fowler opined that “legal aid is the shield of our
+profession. It protects the integrity and independence of the bar by blunting
+the attacks of those who would make us servants of the State. The
+establishment of legal aid offices through the land will dissolve the only
+tenable argument advanced by those who argue for socialistic measures
+to correct present conditions.”33 Despite this rhetorical support, the commitment
+of the profession to legal aid in this period, compared to what
+was to come in the 1960s, was shallow.34 What was important was that
+30 CHAPTER 2
+
+the bar had publicly accepted that adequate legal defense was not simply
+a matter for the market, but was a social and professional obligation. This
+would have significant consequences in the years to come.
+At the same time that the ABA expanded its interest in legal aid, legal
+liberalism gained a significant patron in the recently reconstituted Ford
+Foundation. In 1953, the foundation gave $120,000 to the National Legal
+Aid Association (NLAA), founded just four years earlier by figures close
+to the ABA, and $50,000 to support its Committee on Administration of
+Criminal Justice.35 These donations would be the first of a steady flow of
+funds supporting legal reform, including support to the NLAA for civil
+legal aid as well as criminal legal defense.36 The Ford Foundation also
+showed considerable interest in law schools in this period, giving grants
+to the AALS in 1957 to examine “the problems of lawyer education for
+public affairs” and for a “study of resources for legal education.”37 These
+were followed by a quarter-million dollars in 1958 to support fellowships
+for young law teachers, a million dollars to Notre Dame, Penn, Vanderbilt,
+and Wisconsin to “help strengthen the research and teaching programs
+of their law schools in law and contemporary affairs,” and large
+grants to Northwestern, Wisconsin, and Illinois for research into criminal
+law and corrections.38 The Ford Foundation’s support for the bar’s liberalizing
+trends was, however, just beginning.
+By the early 1960s, American law schools were attracting more liberal
+professors and increasing their resources, the bar was becoming more
+diverse and supportive of liberal understandings of its social obligations,
+and the ambitions and capacities of liberal public interest law were increasing.
+Over the next decade, the LLN would expand much further.
+Along with the increasingly ambitious Warren Court, a powerful apparatus
+for legal and social change was taking shape.
+
+Breakthrough: Gideon, the ABA, and the Rise of Legal Aid
+
+Starting in 1963, the prospects for public legal aid changed dramatically
+with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright and the federal
+government’s commitment to free legal services as part of the War on
+Poverty. In the process, the concept of legal aid changed from representing
+individual indigents to encouraging broad-based political and social
+change. Remarkably, given its furious opposition to the idea in the 1950s,
+the bar ceased seeing legal aid simply as a “shield” to defend itself from
+state interference and became a key supporter of this critical part of the
+expanding LLN. As the bar signaled its movement away from the conservatism
+of the past, it attracted into its fold a generation of more liberal
+lawyers who would have previously shunned it.
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 31
+
+Two events in March 1963, one prominent and the other obscure,
+dramatically altered the fortunes of legal aid. In that month the Supreme
+Court, having appointed Abe Fortas to represent the petitioner, handed
+down Gideon v. Wainwright, declaring that “in our adversary system of
+criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
+lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
+him.”39 The Court’s decision that access to attorneys in criminal trials
+was a fundamental constitutional right had a powerful impact on the
+ABA, which immediately set up a committee, headed by Whitney North
+Seymour (ABA president from 1960 to 1961), to survey the legal aid
+situation in all fifty states.40 Gideon had an impact beyond its immediate
+application to criminal defense, elevating the status of access to legal
+services—both criminal and civil—on the agendas of policymakers and
+the legal profession.
+In a more obscure corner of the world, the Mobilization for Youth, a
+Ford Foundation—funded program connected to the president’s antidelinquency
+program, made a decision to create a legal program that would
+provide “1. direct service and referral; 2. legal orientation for MFY staff
+members who were not lawyers, clients and community leaders; and 3.
+the achievement of social change primarily through legal research and the
+persuasion of governmental administrators to change their policies.”41 By
+September of that year, MFY decided to jointly operate the new legal
+program with Columbia University, and that it should be headed by a
+young labor lawyer, Edward Sparer. With funds from the Ford Foundation,
+and later with assistance from the OEO Legal Services Program,
+Sparer began to implement an ambitious strategy to use the law to transform
+the operation of the welfare system, stripping it of what he saw as
+illegitimate discretion and intrusion into the private lives of the poor.42
+These two events influenced the creation and the character of the government’s
+Legal Services Program. The LSP was something of an afterthought
+in the planning for the Great Society. It might not have been
+included in the president’s proposals at all were it not for the internal
+government lobbying of Jean and Edgar Cahn, who had led an abortive
+legal services effort in New Haven and whose “The War on Poverty: A
+Civilian Perspective,” became the blueprint for the LSP. The LSP produced
+a massive expansion in the size and scope of legal aid. “In 1965
+the combined budgets of all legal aid societies in the United States totaled
+$5,375,890 and their combined staffs comprised some 400 full-time lawyers.
+By 1968 OEO Legal Service had an annual budget of $40 million
+and had added 2,000 lawyers.”43 The impact of the LSP went far beyond
+increasing the legal access of the poor, as it rapidly developed into a remarkably
+effective strategic litigant. Between 1966 and 1974, the LSP
+submitted 169 cases to the Supreme Court, 73 percent of which were
+32 CHAPTER 2
+
+accepted for review (a rate that exceeded that of the Solicitor General).44
+The LSP was especially successful in the area of welfare rights, where
+(largely under the direction of Edward Sparer) cases like Shapiro v.
+Thompson and Goldberg v. Kelly helped transform the administration,
+and ultimately the politics, of public aid.45
+The ABA, which had red-baited the National Lawyers Guild only a
+decade earlier for its support of legal services, suddenly reversed course,
+and with each succeeding year the ABA’s support for the LSP intensified.
+In 1961, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid Work observed
+that “we have been forced into placing greater emphasis on defender systems
+by recent Supreme Court decisions pointing out that in federal courts
+every defendant must have counsel unless such is intelligently waived, and
+that in the state courts the right to have counsel provided for the poor is
+unquestioned in capital cases.”46 In the wake of Gideon, this support became
+even more intense, and spread into civil as well as criminal legal aid.
+In 1964, the ABA House of Delegates declared that the legal profession’s
+most important task was to ensure that “adequate provision is made everywhere
+to insure that competent counsel are provided for indigent defendants
+in serious criminal cases,” and insisted that training lawyers for
+indigent defense should be a priority for state and local bar associations.
+OEO-supported legal services was still in its germinal stages at this point,
+however, and, during the early planning of the Legal Services Program,
+the ABA was wary and suspicious. Working within OEO, the Cahns recognized
+the need to get the ABA on board, believing that “the ABA could
+provide just the muscle needed to persuade OEO to affirmatively promote
+legal assistance for the poor.”47
+By the following year, the LSP was a reality, and the ABA became its
+most important supporter. In 1965, ABA president (and future Republican
+nominee to the Supreme Court) Lewis Powell stated that his first priority
+had been “an acceleration and broadening of efforts to assure the
+availability of legal services,” and that applying Gideon had produced
+greater demand for such services than expected.48 Tellingly, Powell observed
+that
+
+the resulting expansion of legal services should not affect lawyers adversely.
+Indeed, to the extent that the poverty program succeeds, the base of potential
+clients should expand significantly. . . . It is true that most lawyers would have
+preferred local rather than federal solutions. Certainly this would have been my
+own choice. But the complexities and demands of modern society, with burdens
+beyond the will or capacity of states and localities to meet, have resulted in
+federal assistance in almost every area of social and economic life. [There] is no
+reason to think that legal services might be excluded from this fundamental
+trend of the mid-twentieth century.49
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 33
+
+By 1966, ABA president Edward Kuhn evidenced even greater enthusiasm,
+declaring that “render[ing] legal services to the indigent within the
+framework of the plan announced by the Legal Services Division of the
+Office of Economic Opportunity and in accordance with the high ethical
+standards of our honored profession” is “the greatest project ever undertaken
+by the legal profession.”50 Kuhn dismissed the “portent of socialization
+of the law,” stating that the profession was no nearer socialization
+than it had been a year before, and that the ABA’s support for legal services
+(evidenced by its support before congressional committees for a generous
+LSP appropriation) “should tend to prove that we have not neglected
+the interest of the poor or the principle of equal justice.”51 In 1967
+Orison Marsden was elected president of the ABA. Marsden had been the
+most energetic supporter of legal aid in the mainstream bar since the
+1950s, and during his presidency the ABA pushed the administration to
+support the LSP more generously, rather than simply taking the government’s
+lead.52 By 1970, the ABA’s Special Committee on Availability of
+Legal Services admitted that the association’s attitude toward legal aid a
+decade earlier had been misplaced and that “the experience of the last
+five years has demonstrated beyond the possibility of serious dispute that
+maintenance of even a limited Legal Aid program is no longer within the
+capacity of the legal profession and those civic and governmental agencies
+who provided the financial support before the advent of OEO.”53 Reflecting
+an attitude that had become the conventional wisdom of the
+ABA’s leadership, the 1970 president, Bernard Segal, called the bar to
+“assist in the critical process of curing those afflictions that the gathering
+of time, population, technology and social movement have visited upon
+American society” by “combining the principle of preservation with the
+principle of reform so that American society may move forward again
+within the confines of its basic institutions.”54 Support for a liberalized
+legal system had been reframed as an instrument of modernization and
+as the responsible, establishment alternative to anarchy.
+The ABA’s commitment to legal aid in the 1960s and 1970s went well
+beyond rhetoric. Having developed a standing committee on Legal Aid
+and Indigent Defendants, the ABA went on to add other committees that
+reinforced the aims of legal liberalism. A Special Committee on Housing
+and Urban Development Law was created in 1969 with support from
+foundations (including Ford) and the government, followed the next year
+by special committees on the environment and correctional facilities and
+services and a new Division on Individual Rights and Responsibilities,
+with committees on civil rights and responsibilities, hunger, overpopulation,
+alcohol and drugs, and the protection of the rights of women and
+the American Indian.55 The ABA also developed an increasingly dense
+network of committees to research, plan, and coordinate the project of
+34 CHAPTER 2
+
+legal aid in tandem with the government and lawyers on the ground. The
+support of the bar gave legal services allies at the highest levels of the legal
+profession, as well as, through its chapters, presence on the ground in
+every congressional district in the country.
+Especially against the backdrop of the 1950s, the ABA’s vigorous support
+of government-funded legal services seems, at the very least, peculiar.
+What can explain this shift? First, the ABA was moving in this period
+from an exclusive to a universal model of membership, and in the process
+the class basis of its members changed.56 Second, even though most lawyers
+continued to work for and sympathize with business, the balance of
+the profession shifted as the generation of lawyers who were socialized
+into the profession prior to the depression gradually gave way to those
+whose attitudes toward government were shaped by the New Deal and
+World War II. Third, as government grew in the postwar period, increasing
+numbers of lawyers (and their clients) developed a stance of accommodation
+with the state, while others went further, seeing legal liberalism as
+a philosophy of modernization and progress.57 Finally, important figures
+in the profession concluded that, in the words of ABA president Kuhn,
+“if you don’t serve the public as it needs to be served the public will
+force some kind of change in the profession.”58 Government-funded legal
+services, while not the first choice of many elite lawyers, at least seemed
+less intrusive on the profession’s autonomy than the alternatives.
+Throughout this process, the Ford Foundation played a critical role. Its
+“Gray Areas” project, initiated in 1960 to provide intensely focused services
+for poor urban areas, provided the early support for the work of
+Jean and Edward Cahn.59 In December 1962, three months before Gideon,
+the Ford Foundation approved a five-year, $2.4 million grant to the
+National Legal Aid and Defender Association to create model defender
+services, establish new defenders offices in major cities, and provide fellowships
+and internships “to attract outstanding law graduates” into
+legal aid work.60 A year after Gideon, the foundation invested an additional
+$2 million to “take full advantage of the tide of interest in defender
+services resulting from the Gideon case,”61 and a year later it provided
+substantial funding for Sparer’s work at Columbia. Reinforcing the increasing
+ambition of the LSP, in 1966 the Ford Foundation appropriated
+$1 million “to assist in selecting, coordinating, and financing significant
+test cases likely to establish fundamental precedents in remedying injustice
+and advancing the rights and opportunities of the poor.”62 Throughout
+the 1960s, Ford reinforced the movement for legal aid by providing
+grants to law schools to increase their curriculum in poverty law and
+related areas, and provided direct assistance to the ABA as it deepened its
+support for the movement. At each stage in the growth of legal services,
+the Ford Foundation’s support appeared both before that of the govern-
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 35
+
+ment and the organized bar and rapidly thereafter, increasing the speed
+and depth of the legal aid movement. While foundation patronage was
+not, in and of itself, a sufficient condition for the institutionalization of
+the LSP, it, along with the active support of the national bar, does appear
+to have been a necessary one.63
+
+The Transformation of American Law Schools
+
+On the evening of August 2, 1966, just months into his leadership of
+the Ford Foundation and against the background of riots in numerous
+American cities, McGeorge Bundy spoke to the Urban League about his
+plans for the nation’s largest foundation. Bundy’s declared, “We believe
+that full equality for all American Negroes is now the most urgent domestic
+concern of this country.”64 Pointing to the brave leaders of the civil
+rights movement, Bundy insisted that “these men and women need to be
+multiplied. They need reinforcement. We hope that we can help in that
+objective.”65 The example of the civil rights movement had implications
+well beyond the rights of black Americans. “Finally, and yet really first of
+all in the list of things we take for our concern, I put the idea—and the
+practice—of justice. The legal rights of the Negro are a part of it and so
+are the legal rights of all who are poor . . . and we see a real chance here
+that what has been learned in the struggle for Negro rights can be put to
+the service of other Americans as well.”66 With the fires of Los Angeles
+and other major cities as a backdrop, Bundy pointed to a future day of
+reckoning and warned that “if that day ever comes, history will mark it
+as the white man’s fault, and the white man’s companies will have to take
+the losses.”67 Civil rights, including the reform of the law, had become a
+necessity for the white establishment, represented by the men who made
+up the Ford Foundation’s board.68
+As Bundy hinted, the reform of the law would be at the core of the
+foundation’s work in the coming years, and that project would reach beyond
+civil rights. The Ford Foundation had been involved in legal reform
+for more than a decade, but with Bundy’s rise to the foundation’s leadership,
+its work in the area became much more ambitious and far-reaching.69
+For our purposes, the most important examples of this expanded ambition
+were the foundation’s work in legal education and its patronage of the
+public interest law movement, which will be discussed below (see “The
+Explosion of Liberal Public Interest Law”). Without its patronage these
+critical pieces of the liberal legal network would have developed slowly
+and lacked the strategic coordination that the foundation provided.
+36 CHAPTER 2
+
+Changing Curriculum, Changing Students
+
+No demand of 1960s law students was as prominent as making their
+education more “relevant” to the cause of social justice, and the clearest
+example of what relevance looked like was clinical legal education. These
+clinics have been among the most persistently irritating parts of the LLN
+for conservatives. In the 1980s, the conservative Washington Legal Foundation
+published a report attacking legal clinics, and the drumbeat of
+conservative opposition has continued up to the present day.70 Conservative
+author Heather McDonald, for example, has attacked clinics for “engaging
+in left-wing litigation and political advocacy for 30 years,” claiming
+that they “offer the legal professoriate a way to engage in political
+activism—almost never of a conservative cast.”71 Most clinics engage in
+“left wing litigation and political advocacy” only in a strained sense of
+the term, but there is little question that their caseloads over the past
+thirty-five years have included little to please modern conservatives, and
+provided a significant source of free labor, training, and recruitment for
+the public interest law movement. Like most of the liberal legal network,
+however, clinics never would have emerged had they simply been, in McDonald’s
+words, the “perfect embodiment of a radical new conception of
+lawyers and litigation that emerged in the 1960s—the lawyer as socialchange
+agent.”72 Legal clinics emerged out of a peculiar confluence of
+factors: a long-standing and apolitical movement within the profession
+to better prepare law students for the real world of legal practice; pressure
+for law schools to do their part to live up to post-Gideon expectations of
+legal access for the poor; the demands of an increasingly radicalized law
+student body; and the willingness of the Ford Foundation to invest a remarkable
+sum of money into overcoming the legal academy’s suspicions
+of clinical education. Clinical legal education never displaced the old law
+school curriculum, but it did succeed in finding a home for itself in the
+nation’s law schools, becoming in the process one of the most controversial
+parts of the LLN.
+The roots of clinical legal education were far from radical. The earliest
+foundation support for clinical legal education began in 1959, when the
+Ford Foundation gave a seven-year grant of $800,000 to the National
+Legal Aid and Defender Association to support the creation of the Council
+on Legal Clinics (CLC), chaired by Orison Marsden, then-head of the
+New York City Bar, with a board composed of ABA, AALS, and NLADA
+representatives. “The organization’s purpose was to improve legal education
+by getting law students involved in practical experience, including
+legal services; accordingly, CLC offered grants to finance the introduction
+of clinical programs into law school curricula.”73 In a sign of the increasing
+legitimacy of clinical legal education, in 1965 the CLC was taken
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 37
+
+over by the AALS and became the Council on Education in Professional
+Responsibility. In 1967, COEPR’s leader, Howard Sacks, left to become
+the dean of the University of Connecticut Law School, and its board (including
+the future Republican attorney general Edward Levi) sought to
+accelerate the organization’s work and make it independent. The Ford
+Foundation stepped in to lead the project, renamed the Council on Legal
+Education for Professional Responsibility, putting up $6 million over the
+project’s first five years ($26.25 million in 2004 dollars), followed by an
+additional grant of $5 million for its last five years ($17.28 million in
+2004 dollars).
+Just as important, Ford gave to the project its chief program officer in
+the area of law and the administration of justice, William Pincus, who
+believed that America’s law schools, and by extension the legal profession,
+were fundamentally flawed. An official Ford Foundation report recalls
+that he wondered whether “a professional school which prides itself
+on the selection of brains and on the excellence of its technical training,
+whose diploma is bound to be worth large fees or prestigious jobs in
+combination, [should] also concern itself with other matters—such as the
+legal and social problems of the poor, the availability of legal services, the
+economic structure of the profession and criminal justice?”74 CLEPR had
+the ambitious mission of injecting clinical education into every law school
+in the country, and making the idea an institutionalized part of legal education.
+To do so, CLEPR gave grants to law schools to set up clinical
+programs, which had to be partially, and increasingly over time, matched
+by the institutions themselves. This funding was critical to overcoming
+faculty opposition, as “the programs are expensive, and many older faculty
+members are skeptical. It is easy for a dean to sell his faculty on a
+program that is funded from the outside, much harder for him to get
+approval if the school’s own money is required. Similarly, the needed appointments—whether
+of tenure-ladder teachers or of clinicians brought
+in outside the usual ladder—were much easier to arrange because they
+were backed by New York money.”75 This support was essential in helping
+spread the idea of legal clinics: while only a dozen law schools gave credit
+for clinical work in 1968, four years later 125 of 147 law schools did.76
+The structure, and not just the extent, of clinical legal education was influenced
+by CLEPR, since its substantial funding gave it power over law
+schools lacking in other substantial external funding sources. The foundation
+concluded that “if there had been no CLEPR, or if CLEPR’s requirements
+had been less strict, the pattern now visible across the country—
+for-credit programs attached to weak seminar components, with placements
+in criminal or civil legal aid offices—might be less consistent.”77 By
+1972, the foundation had concluded that clinical legal education had been
+fully institutionalized. “Partly because CLEPR has been administered so
+38 CHAPTER 2
+
+well and has been so careful to demand rising contributions from the law
+schools that have been its grantees, clinical legal education of the sort that
+CLEPR has supported is almost certainly here to stay, to be carried on
+with the schools’ own money.”78
+The motivations for this extraordinary injection of foundation funds,
+and law schools’ acceptance of them, were complex. The oldest and least
+controversial motivation was a sense that legal education had become too
+distant from the actual practice of law, leaving lawyers, in Chief Justice
+Burger’s words, “to learn their craft in the courtroom.”79 A modest injection
+of clinical education was a way for law schools to deal with these
+criticisms, without changing the Langdellian core of classroom education.
+Clinical education was also seen as part of the bar’s support for legal aid.
+At the annual meeting of the ABA in 1960, its Standing Committee on
+Legal Aid Work noted that the CLC would “advance the cause of legal
+aid by encouraging law schools to expand their existing clinical programs,
+including legal aid.”80 Clinical education was seen by the ABA’s leaders
+as a way to train the army of lawyers necessary to make their commitment
+to greater legal access a reality.81 Clinical education was law schools’ contribution
+to the War on Poverty and the Court’s decisions on access to
+counsel, as a 1965 report to the Ford Foundation by Professor Ralph
+Brown of Yale Law School observed.
+
+We believe that the timing of the program has been especially auspicious. The
+higher standards which the United States Supreme Court is exacting for the
+defense of the indigent and for the safeguarding of the rights of individuals have
+compelled widespread attention to these matters in the bar and in government
+just as the Administration’s War on Poverty has begun the mobilization of resources
+to meet a wide range of social needs. These developments will call for
+the services of more lawyers, and it is plain this call must be answered chiefly
+by recent graduates of the law schools. Those graduates who have participated
+in the projects sponsored by the program should be among the best qualified
+for the new professional roles that are emerging.82
+
+In order to vindicate these national commitments, the character of law
+students had to change. This desire to use clinical education for transformative
+ends existed as early as 1965, when Brown observed that
+
+the need for direct confrontation [with the legal needs of the poor] is especially
+important for many students because their professional work will insulate them
+from these community problems and from the human distress with which most
+of the projects we have been observing have been concerned. For these lawyers
+the law school might provide the only occasion in their careers to deal with such
+matters or to observe them at first hand. We, therefore, believe it a reasonable
+hypothesis that the lawyer who, as a student, has had the experience that these
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 39
+
+projects provide will be more likely to take an active role in civic or professional
+efforts to minister to the community’s social ills.83
+
+The staff report to the Ford Foundation Trustees that accompanied
+CLEPR’s initial grant request carried forward this transformational mission,
+stating that, in addition to improving students’ skills, clinical education
+would “reinforce the social consciousness of certain law students and
+professors through confrontation with injustice and misery; and to expose
+others, perhaps less socially motivated, in such a way that they take with
+them a sensitivity which may be aroused in the course of their later life
+and professional career.”84 It would be easy, in retrospect, to interpret
+this as a desire to liberalize the law school curriculum, but at the time
+encouraging “sensitivity” among young lawyers was seen as a way of
+keeping the legal profession relevant to a rapidly changing world, in
+which concern for economic and racial inequality looked like anything
+but a passing fad.
+While the financial support of the Ford Foundation, the moral support
+of the bar, and pressure for law schools to do their part to increase access
+to legal services contributed to changes in the law school curriculum, these
+changes were also driven by intense pressure from law students themselves.
+In the decade between the early 1960s and the early 1970s, the
+political attitudes of law students and their reasons for attending law
+school changed markedly, and at elite schools dramatically. Robert Stevens
+found that “the ‘desire to serve the underprivileged’ ”
+
+shows a steady, and, in some cases, dramatic increase over time. At Yale the
+percentage of those attributing “great” importance to this motive more than
+quintupled between 1960 and 1970. By 1972 almost half the class indicated
+that this factor was of “great” importance. Indeed, with the exception of U.S.C.,
+the large majority of entering students in 1960 had regarded service to the underprivileged
+as being of “no” importance dwindled to a minority by 1970 and
+almost disappeared by 1972. . . . With respect to working in a legal aid office,
+the percentages rose between 1960 and 1970 from 11 to 28 at Iowa, 15 to 23
+percent at Pennsylvania, zero to 18 percent at U.S.C., and seven to 26 percent
+at Yale. Most dramatic however, was the increased anticipation of performing
+“civil rights or civil liberties” work. During the decade, the percentages rose
+from four to 28 percent at Iowa, from 11 to 27 percent at Pennsylvania; from
+four to 27 percent at U.S.C; and from 17 to 48 percent at Yale.85
+
+Driving these changed goals was the shifting ideological contour of the
+law student body. Stevens found that law students were more liberal
+upon entering law school and moved to the left in school as well.86 The
+ideological shift was especially rapid at the very top of the law school
+world: an October 1967 straw poll at Harvard Law showed that 31
+40 CHAPTER 2
+
+percent of the student body identified as Republicans, but a year later
+the percentage supporting Richard Nixon stood at just 21 percent, and
+by 1972 those planning on voting for Nixon dropped to a mere 11 percent.87
+Changing demographics as well as the tenor of the times also
+played their part in this shift. Women and ethnic minorities, whose representation
+in law schools shot up in this period, reported even greater
+aversion to traditional corporate law careers and had ideological preferences
+further to the left. By the early 1970s, the ideological makeup of
+elite law school students had changed enormously from where it had
+been just a few years earlier.
+The changed ideological character and professional expectations of law
+students was to have a durable effect on law schools. The persistent demand
+for “relevance” and the expansion of government led to changes in
+the curriculum that complemented clinical education. In the view of the
+Ford Foundation, “The clinical movement has been inseparable from the
+growth in courses in poverty law (including welfare law, consumer credit
+law, landlord-tenant law), family law, criminal law, and prison law. Lawyers
+and students have been more concerned with these fields because of
+general trends in the society, and because of heavy federal funding for
+legal services programs that inevitably encouraged activity in these
+areas.”88 These curricular changes would only accelerate over time.89
+While these forces could generate more elective courses in the law schools,
+it took the increasingly strident demands of the students, combined with
+the financial wherewithal of CLEPR, to produce the major institutional
+shift toward recognizing clinical education. Laura Holland’s history of
+clinical education at Yale found that
+
+at Yale Law School student discontent with the American legal system and the
+legal education system manifested itself in symptoms ranging from general malaise
+and boredom with the traditional law school curriculum, to building a
+counterculture tent village in the law school courtyard, to a mass demonstration
+on the New Haven Green. Clinical education was but one battle in a war against
+the academic law school as an institution. . . . The struggle to reform the curriculum
+centered on the students’ demand that their legal studies bear some relevance
+to the pressing legal and social issues of poverty and racial equality.90
+
+In sharp contrast to students’ demands for a role in school governance,
+support for clinical education was one demand that the faculty was not
+implacably opposed to, so long as the resources were available.
+Had the massive growth of clinics occurred ten, or even five years, earlier,
+their ideological character might have been different. It was not inevitable
+that legal clinics would develop caseloads more comforting to liberals
+than conservatives. The fact that clinics were such a persistent demand
+of students meant, however, that it was their priorities that were stamped
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 41
+
+on the caseloads.91 Also important in shaping the character of clinics was
+the proliferation of legal services, especially those supported by the OEO.
+Many of the clinical professors hired by law schools in this period were
+veterans of legal services, and brought their legal networks and mission
+of serving the poor with them. In addition, public interest law firms had
+proliferated by the late 1960s. Clinics and public interest law firms complemented
+each other, clinics giving public interest law firms substantial
+free, skilled labor, and the public interest law firms helping to identify and
+organize cases of interest to students and professors. As a result, much
+of the caseload in legal clinics came to reflect the political attitudes and
+preferences of the students who demanded them, the character of contemporary
+legal services, and the mission of liberal public interest law firms.
+This set a template for the future development of clinical education that
+became self-reinforcing, to the point that the more liberal character of the
+clinical caseload is now seen by many in the academy as part of the definition
+of clinical education.92
+Student protesters left their footprint in other ways. They demanded,
+and with few exceptions received, more aggressive affirmative action in
+admissions and faculty recruitment. Flowing out of their previous demands
+for clinical education, when this generation of law students graduated and
+went into practice, corporate law firms substantially increased their pro
+bono programs in order to convince graduates that work in a law firm
+was not inconsistent with the pursuit of social justice.93 This allowed the
+fledgling public interest law movement to leverage the substantial resources
+of private firms, at a time when its budgets were quite modest.
+Student protesters did not get, in all but a few cases, meaningful participation
+in law school governance. By pushing for affirmative action and
+curricular change, students did help to create the conditions for a change
+in the demand for professors, a demand that many of these same students,
+seeking an alternative to corporate law, helped to fill.
+
+A Changing Legal Professoriate
+
+In this period, the law professoriate continued its earlier leftward drift.
+Even more consequential, however, was that the legal liberalism of law
+professors changed dramatically in this period. Liberal law professors
+became much less committed to their New Deal predecessors’ deference
+to the administrative state and the political branches. Inspired by the
+jurisprudence of the Warren Court and the example of the civil rights
+movement, they also developed a vision of legal scholarship that eschewed
+the older realists’ insistence on debunking the moral status of
+law, replacing it with a conviction that law could be grounded on something
+more than politics.
+42 CHAPTER 2
+
+The period of political ferment on college campuses, and in law schools,
+coincided with a massive increase in the size of the professoriate. Between
+1962 and 1977, the number of full-time professors of law in the United
+States increased from 1,628 to 3,875, the great bulk of which growth
+occurred in the five years between 1967 and 1972.94 The legal professoriate
+swelled because new law schools were created in response to increasingly
+strict rules for entering the profession (the number of ABA-accredited
+schools went from 111 in 1947 to 163 in 1977) while standards for
+accreditation of law schools, including pressure to hire more full-time
+faculty, were stiffened.95 As a consequence, hiring among law schools was
+especially intense at precisely the time that the law students who would
+fill those positions were moving decisively to the left. Law teaching was
+especially attractive for the substantial portion of recent JD’s with an
+ideological aversion to traditional law practice, as well as for aspiring
+social scientists or historians who noticed the dire shape of the job market
+in those fields.96 These two trends also helped pull the ideological attitudes
+of law professors to the left, and given that academic political attitudes
+tend to skew to the left as one climbs the ladder of prestige, these general
+trends were felt especially intensely at the elite schools that disproportionately
+supplied their graduates to law teaching.97
+In a 1972 survey of academic attitudes, the Carnegie Commission on
+Higher Education found that law professors, while substantially to the
+left of both academic and American public opinion, were still to the right
+of social sciences and humanities professors. Law professors reported voting
+for Nixon in 1972 at a much higher rate than social scientists (35
+percent compared to 20 percent) and fewer law professors reported being
+“very liberal” than social scientists.98 By the 1990s the political attitudes
+of law professors had converged with their colleagues in arts and sciences,
+probably the result of generational replacement, as law students from the
+late 1960s and 1970s moved into the academy and their predecessors
+retired. John McGinnis found that elite law faculties are now almost exclusively
+Democratic: at the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford, Yale,
+Georgetown, Columbia, and Duke, 89 percent or more of law professors
+who made political donations gave exclusively or predominantly to Democrats,
+primarily to those on the left side of the party. By contrast, there
+was not a single elite law school with a majority of Republican donors.99
+Among the elite law faculties that have a disproportionate influence on
+the character of scholarship, establish the legal conventional wisdom, and
+help determine professional norms, liberalism and the legal professoriate
+have become synonymous.
+Equally important as changes in law professors’ attitudes were transformations
+in their roles and functions. Two stand out. The first is the growth
+of the “activist law professor,” connected to social movements and liberal
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 43
+
+litigants and skeptical of bureaucracy. The earliest example of this trend
+at the elite level was Yale Law School professor Charles Reich, who in
+the mid-1960s produced a stream of major articles that marked a decisive
+break with the New Deal legal tradition.100 These provided “the scholarly
+foundation” for welfare rights in the courts.101 Where the New Deal tradition
+had emphasized bureaucratic discretion, legal informality, and deference
+to the elected branches, Reich was gripped by fear of the state New
+Dealers sought to empower. In language that anticipated (and influenced)
+the arguments of the public interest law movement, he drew attention to
+the fact that “Congress and the executive have developed institutional
+characteristics which . . . disable them from being satisfactory custodians
+of the constitution” and that bureaucracy had proved itself to be “characterized
+by its need steadily to increase its own powers; it seems intrinsically
+incapable of imposing limits, constitutional or otherwise, on itself.”102
+The threat of a growing state, empowered by the New Deal’s
+deference to Congress and the executive branch was, for Reich, terribly
+real. Reich’s study of “midnight welfare searches,” developed as part of
+a project for the Field Foundation, drew on meetings with the nascent
+welfare rights network (including Sparer) and argued that the modern
+welfare state had become a threat to fundamental constitutional liberties.103
+In his famous article “The New Property,” Reich pointed to the
+reinvigoration of constitutional formalism as a solution to this threat.
+Reich reached back to the pre—New Deal court in his suspicion of delegated
+power,104 and called on the courts to resuscitate the “unconstitutional
+conditions” doctrine105 and to insist on a much higher standard
+of review of administrative decision-making.106 Reich’s work provided a
+powerful example of how legal academics could be integrated with the
+mission of progressive social change, offering “a vision of progressive
+‘law reform’ to be promoted through constitutional and statutory rulings
+favorable to the poor.”107 Reich also helped legitimate the idea that, while
+a welfare state under Congress and executive branch control was a danger
+to liberty, expansions of state power directed by or under the supervision
+of the courts were not.
+The role of legal scholar-activist became increasingly well institutionalized
+in the years after Reich’s work. Of special interest in this regard were
+the LSP’s “backup centers,” which helped to coordinate appellate strategy
+for cases emerging from the LSP’s ground-level work. The first backup
+center, for welfare rights work, was Columbia University’s Center on Social
+Welfare Policy and Law (which had received support from the Mobilization
+for Youth), and once the LSP was established it replicated the Columbia
+program at UC-Berkeley (housing law), Boston University
+(consumer law), St. Louis University (juvenile law), Harvard (education
+law), UCLA (health law), and USC (geriatric law).108 As new areas of the
+44 CHAPTER 2
+
+law, such as women’s rights and the environment, came to the fore, law
+schools (drawing on government and foundation funding, as well as their
+increasingly flush budgets) developed new centers to provide public goods
+for the public interest law movement: training new generations of public
+interest lawyers, developing the intellectual foundations for future cases,
+and coordinating legal strategy through meetings and conferences.109
+Law professors in this era contributed to the liberal legal network by
+helping to entrench the work of the Warren Court, culturally and intellectually.
+Law professors such as Alexander Bickel and Philip Kurland, who
+came of age between the mid-1930s and the mid-1950s, cut their teeth
+on legal realism and judicial restraint and consequently found the Warren
+Court’s decisions starting with Brown and accelerating with Baker v. Carr
+difficult to square with these inherited commitments. The generation of
+liberal law professors who succeeded them, by contrast, rejected their
+predecessors’ obsession with the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”110
+Whereas their forebears had rationalized Brown as a necessary but limited
+aberration, “Members of a new generation who went to law school during
+the Warren Court years and entered law teaching at Harvard and
+elsewhere during the 1960s—a group that included Jesse Choper, Bruce
+Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, Owen Fiss, Frank Michelman,
+and Lawrence Tribe—were not haunted by memories of the old
+Court and viewed judicial activism even more tolerantly than did their
+teachers.”111 Legal liberals’ realist predecessors were skeptical of lofty
+conceptions of rights, but this new generation sought to legitimate the
+expanded role of the judiciary ushered in by the Warren Court. While the
+faculty of Harvard Law were generally skeptical of the Court’s activism,
+Fiss recalled that “even in those days it was understood that Harvard did
+not speak for the profession as a whole, and even less so for the young,
+who looked to the Court as an inspiration, the very reason to enter the
+profession.”112 This generation of law professors saw it as their duty to
+demonstrate the legal, and not simply political, character of the Warren
+Court’s decisions.
+
+In the decades following the Second World War, particularly in the sixties, at
+the height of the Warren Court era, a new judicial doctrine arose to replace the
+doctrine that was associated with laissez faire capitalism and that was ultimately
+repudiated by the glorious revolution of 1937 and the constitutional
+victory of the New Deal. It embraced the role of the activist state and saw
+equality rather than liberty as the central constitutional value. Scholars turned
+to defending this new doctrine and in so doing sought to rehabilitate the idea
+of law in the face of the realist legacy. They sought to show that Brown v. Board
+of Education was law, not just politics. So were Reynolds v. Sims, New York
+Times v. Sullivan, and Gideon v. Wainwright.
+113
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 45
+
+Armed with a revived understanding of law, this generation produced a
+series of major works that lacked the defensiveness of their elders, arguing
+that Brown demonstrated that a muscular role for the judiciary was indispensable
+to the cause of equality and justice, while also being above normal
+politics. Propelled by a progressive vision of history,114 Dworkin,
+Tribe, Fiss, and others pointed forward to the completion of the Warren
+Court’s vision as well as backward in legitimating its deeds.115 The nearabsence
+of conservative voices in law schools meant that this interpretation
+of constitutional law was nearly hegemonic. This was “a dominance
+so complete that every casebook, treatise, and handbook used to teach
+constitutional law in American law schools is the product of Democrats
+writing from Democratic perspectives.”116
+These legal scholars sought to ennoble the legal profession, making it
+a tool for the pursuit of justice rather than a mere lubricator of commerce.
+As Laura Kalman argues, this new conception of the law sunk deep roots
+in elite law schools.
+
+Law schools capitalized on the Warren Court. “Glossy admissions brochures
+entice some students into law school with promises that lawyers of the future,
+riding white chargers, will crusade against social problems,” one student wrote.
+As a law student working with prisoners at Leavenworth, another future academic
+learned “that the federal courts are special. They are the most splendid
+institutions for the maintenance of governmental order and individual liberty
+that humankind has ever conceived.” To the children of the Warren Court, “the
+law seemed like a romance.” The editors of the Yale Law Journal said Earl
+Warren “made us all proud to be lawyers.”117
+
+A heroic conception of the law went hand in hand with a heroic role for
+the courts, and not incidentally an elevated status for law professors. This
+generation of liberal law professors, which Mark Tushnet caricatured as
+accepting the vision of the “lawyer as astrophysicist,”118 meshed interdisciplinarity
+with the moral role of conserving and extending the Warren
+Court’s accomplishments. An egalitarian understanding of the Constitution,
+with civil rights at its core, was for them part and parcel of a new
+legal professionalism. Brown, Baker v. Carr, and Roe v. Wade thus provided
+the text of a new civil religion, one in which elite law professors
+were the keepers of the true church. This role aimed left as well as right,
+against conservatives who attacked the Warren Court as lawless and the
+leftist legal skeptics in the critical legal studies movement, whom legal
+liberals attacked as preaching “nihilism” in their insistence that law was
+politics “all the way down.”119
+Sanctifying legal liberals’ aspirations for the law was the powerful
+moral status of “rights” produced by the civil rights struggle and the
+image of a Warren Court that was simultaneously legally orthodox and
+46 CHAPTER 2
+
+substantively humane, whose actions rested on genuine authority as well
+as decent and civilized instincts. At the same time, the reputation of the
+institutions that they sought to reform, such as southern state governments,
+urban machines, and big business, was at a low ebb, and the ability
+of those institutions to compete in the cultural and ideological marketplace
+acutely limited. The place of legal liberals at the pinnacle of an
+increasingly well-resourced and influential legal academy gave their framing
+of legal politics real legitimating power, helping to preserve the role
+of legal liberalism in the legal profession even as its electoral grip was
+slipping away. The power of these ideas, which claimed to be above normal
+politics, would infuriate, frustrate, and ultimately mobilize conservatives
+in the years to come.
+
+The Explosion of Liberal Public Interest Law
+
+By the time that the Democrats’ electoral dominance began to crumble in
+1968, many of the pieces of the LLN were already well developed. This
+previous organizational development and network-building laid the
+groundwork for the final, and in policy terms most powerful, piece of
+the LLN: public interest law firms. Public interest law did not emerge
+spontaneously; the breadth, sophistication, and internal structure of these
+firms can be directly traced to the Ford Foundation’s extraordinary strategic
+patronage. The LLN provided a supportive network and ideas, a more
+liberal judiciary swept away formal impediments to public interest law,
+and the Ford Foundation helped to tie these together by providing a major
+subsidy and strategic direction at the organizational generation stage.120
+The impact of public interest law was explosive, and it set the stage for
+the early countermobilization by conservatives.
+The Ford Foundation’s support for public interest law was anything
+but inevitable. The foundation was far from a monolith, divided
+between a staff closely tied to the liberal legal network and an establishment
+board intensely concerned with propriety and responsibility. The
+foundation’s staff focused on persuading the board that public interest
+law was a sensible enterprise for the foundation. They argued that the
+foundation was already supporting the NAACP LDF and programming
+in indigent defense and legal education, and was generally pushing the
+bar to be more progressive and oriented to social reform. In addition,
+McGeorge Bundy had established civil rights and poverty as the foundation’s
+overarching goals, and this provided an obvious justification for
+replicating the civil rights movement’s legal approach with other groups
+(hence the foundation’s support for the Mexican American Legal Defense
+and Educational Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, and the
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 47
+
+Native American Rights Fund). Finally, the foundation had active programming
+in areas such as communications and the environment, and
+this justified moving the focus of public interest law beyond ethnic and
+racial minorities to these new areas as well.
+“Public interest” law, as distinct from civil rights or poverty law, presented
+some unique and very tricky issues for the foundation’s leadership.
+The constituencies targeted by public interest law were not, on the whole,
+poor or disadvantaged, and thus not obvious targets of philanthropic support.
+It was here that increasingly popular critiques of interest group pluralism
+helped the foundation’s leaders justify their support of what might
+otherwise look like direct political activity.121 Bundy recalled that this new
+thinking first took hold in energy policy, but soon grew much broader.
+
+That grew out of a growing feeling [that] the public interest in analyzing it was
+not adequately represented . . . whereas the various or special interests were
+busy as can be, primarily but not exclusively, the commercial interests. . . . It’s
+the old shoe-pinching argument of the democratic theorists that those whose
+interests are most closely affected are those who will pay the most attention . . .
+those . . . most attentive to their interests get there faster with more arguments
+than those who may in the end be just as much affected either as consumers or
+as workers or as students. . . . We encountered that problem when we moved
+into the policy aspects of public broadcasting; we encountered it again here in
+the energy case and its exists also in defense studies; in arms control studies; and
+I myself believe, it exists in the public interest law field. I think the Foundation is
+right to be ready to take a lively interest in those kinds of problems where
+there are plenty of people and forces and money to represent existing organized
+interests and not so much... that is unaffected by either personal or commercial
+or corporate or institutional interests. Broadly speaking, the Foundation
+doesn’t have that kind of interest.122
+
+This argument helped Bundy and the board reconcile the nonpartisan
+traditions of foundation philanthropy with the creation of a network of
+public interest law firms connected to liberal social movements. Instead
+of actively supporting one side in a political dispute, the Ford Foundation’s
+role was simply a means of ensuring “balance” and an opportunity
+for arguments to be heard on both sides. It was well understood at the
+time, however, that public interest law would be in considerable tension
+with the Nixon administration. The program’s original planning document
+noted that “whatever its other virtues may be, the prevailing attitude
+and view of the present Administration with respect to the meaning of
+the Constitution and the purpose of the nation has effectively shut off
+service in the Executive Branch of the national government as a viable
+outlet for large numbers of young people trained in the law who have
+public service motivations.”123 This illustrates one of the peculiar qualities
+48 CHAPTER 2
+
+of much of the LLN and the prevailing liberal consensus in elite circles
+and institutions. While in substance it often operated to support ideological
+and partisan causes, it was understood by many of its patrons and key
+participants in objective, neutral, nonpartisan, and nonideological terms.
+This framing of the legal liberal cause facilitated support from elite institutions
+and protected its tax status, and in later years it forced conservatives
+to devote resources to “exposing” the LLN’s veiled ideological character.
+The staff of the Ford Foundation had a second challenge in selling public
+interest law to their board: defusing potential concerns that the project
+was too politically hot for the foundation to handle. While the board was
+increasingly sympathetic to liberal causes, its members were by no means
+radical and in their professional life directed the most established institutions
+in American life. As a consequence, much of the structure of the
+public interest law firms supported by the Ford Foundation was put in
+place simply to neutralize possible opposition from its board. Sanford
+Jaffe, the Ford Foundation program officer in charge of the Government
+and Law Program from 1968 to 1983, recalls that the program’s greatest
+challenge was the question of
+
+how do we [insulate] ourselves from . . . criticism both from some people on
+the Ford board and a lot of people from the outside? And that’s really where
+we come across . . . an extraordinarily great idea. . . . I would go to a group
+called the Public Interest Law Advisory Committee and I would get their judgment
+as to whether or not this grant was a good grant . . . whether the people
+on the boards were really competent and they would be responsible people. So
+that way we would be able to tell the Ford board that, “Look, we have got
+these four very eminent people who have helped Sandy to make these grants.”
+And then when we got attacked from the outside—which we did . . . I would
+be able to say, “Look, I got the advice of these four people.” And who did we
+pick? We picked four ex-presidents of the American Bar Association. . . . [For
+example,] William Gossett . . . represented Henry Ford. . . . We had a sense that
+Henry Ford would be one of the difficult guys on the Ford board. The automobile
+industry might be a target of these law firms, who knew? . . . That became
+a key element to be able to say to Henry Ford if he had a problem, “Well, Bill
+Gossett—your lawyer—thinks that this is a worthwhile enterprise, he’s joining
+us in looking at it.”. . . I think without the structure I don’t think we would
+have had a public interest law program. The Ford board, in my judgment,
+would have been very, very reluctant to approve the program.124
+
+Jaffe also directly influenced the internal structure of the public interest
+law firms in order to assuage the foundation’s board. The firms would
+have a litigation committee that would have to approve each case, and
+the committee would be made up of the same sorts of white-shoe lawyers
+as the Ford Foundation advisory committee.
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 49
+
+And the theory behind that was, if somebody said, “Hey, these bunch of kids
+just out of Yale, or out of Harvard, or Columbia were suing, you know, the big
+auto companies or were suing the big chemical companies. Why’d these crazy
+Ford people give these kids a lot of money to do that? What do they know
+about this?” We’d say, “Now, wait a minute, they have a distinguished board
+and beside that they have a litigation committee and they cannot file a lawsuit
+unless the litigation committee’s approved it.” Now look who’s on the litigation
+committee. Arthur Goldberg, you know was a former Supreme Court Justice,
+this person and that person and these are all senior partners at law firms.125
+
+The foundation’s program officers did all they could to give this potentially
+explosive program a smooth, establishment veneer. Beyond the elite
+lawyers on the boards of foundation and the public interest law firms, the
+program officers were able to point to previous victories against attacks
+on legal services (in the form of the “Murphy amendment,” which would
+have given state governors a veto over legal services programs) as evidence
+that the establishment would, in fact, come to public interest law’s aid
+when attacked:
+
+A well organized lobbying effort to knock the Murphy amendment out of the
+OEO bill was mounted in the House. This unanticipated effort was powered
+by the fully mobilized, nationwide engines of the American Bar Association,
+supported by the staffs of the nation’s law schools, and skillfully orchestrated
+by OEO Director Donald Rumsfeld and his deputies for Legal Services. . . . The
+ABA has been given total credit by the bill’s managers for persuading a dozen
+or more congressmen of impeccable conservative hue and traditional antipathy
+to “poverty give-aways” to stand up for the Legal Services program before the
+outcome was clear.126
+
+The transformation of the legal establishment gave public interest law a
+critical ally, assuring the Ford Foundation board that it would not be
+alone when the inevitable backlash came. Without this reassurance, the
+program would never have gotten past the foundation’s board.
+The second and closest-run episode in the development of public interest
+law concerned the firms’ tax status. When the Ford Foundation was
+in the early planning process for its public interest law initiative, it was
+unclear whether these firms would be eligible under Section 501(c)(3) of
+the federal tax code, which grants tax deductibility to nonprofit, charitable
+organizations. Jaffe recalls that
+
+Bundy said, “What if somebody hassles us about the charitable nature of this?”
+And you gotta remember, this was in a period of time in which . . . the only
+civil rights legal organization that existed, in my recollection, was the NAACP
+Legal Defense Fund. I mean, the Native American Rights Fund hadn’t been
+created yet, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund hadn’t been created yet, wom-
+50 CHAPTER 2
+
+en’s rights law hadn’t been accepted, there were no environmental public interest
+law firms at this point, so the notion of a group of lawyers having a pot of
+money and then using that pot of money to litigate on behalf of the public
+interest, some people thought might be a violation of the charitable tax code
+that sets up charitable giving and all that business.127
+
+The early foundation planning documents took this consideration very
+seriously, and Jaffe reports that Bundy specifically directed him that “even
+before we go to the Board . . we need an opinion from a very elegant,
+first-class lawyer that says we can do this as a charitable thing.”128 Even
+getting the opinion was difficult: the first lawyer the foundation approached
+declined, citing potential conflicts with the firm’s clients.129 The
+early planning documents for public interest law make clear how uncertain
+the tax deductibility issue was. On the one hand, a report noted,
+“At least at present, the term ‘legislation’ does not embrace the quasilegislative
+actions of regulatory and other administrative agencies,”130 and
+thus the actions of public interest law firms did not directly and explicitly
+fall under the requirement that 501(c)(3) organizations not “attempt to
+influence legislation.” The tax code also permitted “public advocacy” by
+tax exempt organizations, so long as it did not cross “partisan” or “legislative”
+lines. On the other hand, the same report noted that “Treasury
+regulations do not explicitly authorize litigation in the courts by tax-exempt
+organizations, and thus contain no overt authorization for litigation
+as the prime rationale for a tax-exempt organization.”131 The foundation
+thought that the exemptions provided to the Center for Law and Social
+Policy, the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, and the NAACP suggested
+that the IRS was on its side, concluding that “while clearly volatile
+and unpredictable, the climate in Washington with respect to this particular
+activity appears, at present, to be improving.”132
+The climate was not, in fact, “improving.” In March 1970, the IRS
+gave the Natural Resources Defense Council tax deductible status, but
+only on the condition that “the NRDC . . gain prior clearance on each
+lawsuit it planned. The IRS would then be able to rule in each separate
+case whether the NRDC was doing anything to jeopardize its tax deductibility.”133
+Jaffe recalls that “it became a real hullabaloo and it would have
+stopped our program right in the middle,” as these restrictions would
+have required that the firms surrender their 501(c)(3) status, damaging
+their ability to raise funds from foundations and individuals.134
+While the Nixon administration had a strong interest in preventing the
+growth of tax-deductible public interest law firms, and communicated
+this clearly to the IRS, this early effort at “defunding the Left” was no
+match for the increasingly well-coordinated LLN. Two of the most important
+environmental officials in the Nixon administration, William
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 51
+
+Ruckleshaus (then-nominee to head the EPA) and Russell Train, of the
+Council for Environmental Quality, came out against the IRS’s ruling.135
+They were not alone in rising to public interest law’s defense. Jaffe recalls,
+
+One of the things that was very helpful were our four advisors who, having
+been: a) ex-Presidents of the American Bar Association; b) all from extraordinarily
+well-positioned, prestigious law firms and all men of integrity and substance
+and so-forth began to make the calls that they felt it was necessary to
+make and to talk to people, point out the rightness of the law and the wrongness
+of their interpretation. . . I think it showed that there were forces aligned out
+there who felt that this was not something they wanted to see. I think it also
+showed that there was a lot of support from the bar.136
+
+Such “men of integrity” did not exist just a few years earlier. Now, core
+members of the legal establishment had deep connections to the liberal
+legal network and were willing to put the force of the ABA and their own
+reputations behind public interest law. Just as was the case with defeating
+the Murphy amendment, this support made all the difference in swaying
+an elected Republican administration.
+It is highly unlikely that public interest law would have gotten off the
+ground were it not for the support of the Ford Foundation. While some
+of these firms now have large budgets and thousands of members, in the
+late 1960s and early 1970s groups representing large, diffuse interests
+were still quite novel and the mechanisms of generating support unclear.
+Patron support allowed these groups to get past the difficult early stages
+of organizational formation, while allowing them to become active players
+in the policy process before building a mass membership base.137
+Would other patrons have emerged to support public interest law? It
+seems highly unlikely. Jaffe recalls that the large financial and reputational
+investment of the project led Bundy to seek partners in other large foundations,
+such as Rockefeller, Mellon, and Carnegie, but the controversial
+nature of the project led them to reject his entreaties.138 This strongly
+suggests that, had the program officers not been able to effectively manage
+the difficult diplomatic work within the Ford Foundation, public interest
+law would have lacked a single major supporter. The foundation went
+beyond funding to provide coordination and advice. It sought to create a
+broad swathe of firms, distributed across the country and covering a range
+of policy areas, and identified organizational entrepreneurs willing to fill
+the holes in the public interest law network. It put budding public interest
+lawyers in touch with the legal establishment, recommended lawyers for
+their boards, and shaped their internal structure (going so far as to reject
+NRDC’s original desire to have a communal leadership structure). The
+existence of a dense network of liberal public interest law firms was, in
+short, a highly contingent outcome. While changes in the opportunity
+52 CHAPTER 2
+
+structure, as discussed in the next section, were necessary to the success
+of the enterprise, without the patronage of the Ford Foundation those
+opportunities would have lacked organizations capable of effectively
+exploiting them.
+
+The Liberal Legal Network and the New Politics
+
+Before the public interest law project got off the ground, the Ford Foundation
+staff could identify signs of support for public interest law in the
+courts, Congress, and administrative agencies, but for the project to have
+its full impact this support would have to increase substantially. Law “in
+the public interest” required changes in traditional legal concepts, such
+as standing, the definition of a class, and the allocation of legal fees, without
+which the firms would be stopped at the courthouse door. This was
+a matter of the greatest concern for the foundation’s leadership because,
+as Jaffe recalls, if “the only guy who’s got standing is the guy whose house
+is going to be impacted, then you can’t do this kind of stuff . . . it would
+have been conceivable, had standing gone the other way, that it would
+have killed the movement then—or at least circumscribed it so much that
+it would have been very hard to bring a lot those kinds of class action
+cases.”139 Congress and the courts did, in fact, respond, making possible
+the impressive legal achievements of the era. The Center for Law in the
+Public Interest, Public Advocates, Natural Resources Defense Council,
+Environmental Defense Fund, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Citizens
+Communications Center, Georgetown Institute for Public Interest Representation,
+League of Women Voters Education Fund, Education Law Center,
+International Project, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
+Fund, Native American Rights Fund, and the ACLU Women’s
+Rights Project all started with Ford Foundation funding.
+Shifts in the American political system in the late 1960s and into the
+1970s made it much more accessible to the public interest law movement,
+helping solve problems of financing and providing protection
+when it was attacked. The public interest law movement was both beneficiary
+and contributor to what political scientists soon identified as “the
+New American political system” or the “new politics of public policy.”140
+This new form of politics was tailor-made for the strengths of public
+interest advocates, while simultaneously disadvantaging those of their
+adversaries. What Daniel Patrick Moynihan had, in the early 1960s,
+called the “professionalization of reform” had become, by the end of
+that decade and in the decade following, the “legalization of reform.”141
+The professionalization of reform that Moynihan noted in 1965 reflected
+a peculiar feature of the politics of politics in the 1960s and 1970s, which
+was the diminishing role of popular mobilization in setting the govern-
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 53
+
+ment’s agenda and the increasing role of ideas generated in the academy,
+professions, and government itself. Those who controlled the production
+of ideas and intellectuals, therefore, had a substantial competitive advantage.Connected
+to this was the transformation of the American elite media.
+In the 1960s and 1970s a new generation of reporters appeared in America’s
+newsrooms, and with them a changed conception of journalism. Journalists
+became eager to set their own agenda, and became open to those
+outside government who wished to use the news to introduce new issues
+into public debate or to challenge existing government policy. Stories of
+Americans demanding their rights, and challenging the discretion of government
+officials, fit nicely into this changed conception of the role of
+journalism, and actors within the LLN were well placed to take advantage
+of this openness. These new journalists shared the public interest lawyers’
+suspicions of corporations, regulatory agencies, and local government,
+making the media a substantial resource in using litigation to shape public
+perceptions and the government’s agenda.
+Congress, which was undergoing sweeping reform in this period, expanded
+public interest groups’ access to government. A twenty-year
+movement to “open up” Congress came to fruition in the early 1970s, as
+the power of conservative committee barons was broken and a new Congress
+emerged in its stead, dominated by its subcommittees.142 The subcommittees
+whose work was most important to the public interest law
+movement were typically led by those members with the most sympathy
+for the LLN, who used their position in Congress to protect and nurture
+it. These subcommittees were often staffed by young liberal lawyers with
+strong linkages (through the Nader and civil rights networks, for example)
+to allies across the government. Starting in the late 1960s, when liberals
+could no longer count on a sympathetic administration, Congress
+began to pass a number of low-profile legal provisions allowing for “citizen
+suits,” loosening rules of standing, and facilitating public comment
+in regulatory proceedings, leading to more stringent agency regulation.143
+Few of these changes attracted much attention at the time, but the public
+interest law movement and its allies in Congress understood their importance,
+since they indirectly subsidized the practice of public interest law
+in regulatory and court settings and encouraged regulators to err toward
+stringency.144 These shifts were possible because the decentralization of
+Congress had diminished the importance of “the floor” in Congress,
+transferring it to legislative “high demanders” in subcommittees. While
+regulated industries were high demanders on the specific implementation
+of regulations, they were unmotivated on broader issues since the impact
+of these procedural decisions on the corporate bottom line was distant
+and often difficult to trace.145
+54 CHAPTER 2
+
+These changes in courts, bureaucracies, and Congress were all tied to
+the increasing centralization of policymaking in Washington.146 Federal
+bureaucracies and courts came to supervise large swaths of policy, even
+in areas that remained under the nominal control of state or local governments.
+This centralization of policymaking diminished the value of
+broad-based, federated organizations and mass movements, but advantaged
+groups that were organized in Washington and networked into
+its web of agencies, courts, media, congressional subcommittees, and
+research organizations.147 The centralization of government matched the
+centralization of the public interest law movement, whose lawyers “located
+themselves in Washington, D.C.—and, more specifically, in the
+once low-rent areas around Dupont Circle—[which] facilitated the opportunity
+for frequent interaction.”148 The Washington-based structure
+of the movement allowed for strategies and information to be quickly
+disseminated, networks to form, and ideas to be shared across the
+boundaries of Washington’s formally separated powers. Information,
+networks, and proximity were central to this new centralized politics,
+and were, in the new politics of the 1970s, just as important as masses
+of active members or economic power.
+The consequences of the emergence of the LLN for the outcomes of
+public policy were substantial and far-reaching. Lawyers associated with
+the welfare rights movement (most of whom worked for the LSP) convinced
+federal courts to oversee a revolution in welfare policy, which
+caused the percentage of eligible persons actually receiving welfare to
+more than double in a matter of a few years.149 Lawyers for the NAACP
+LDF and the ACLU succeeded, for a time, in abolishing the death penalty.150
+Building on an initially judge-sponsored movement to reform prisons,
+the NAACP LDF, ACLU, and a growing network of law clinics and
+pro bono lawyers remade the American prison system.151 Starting with
+Griswold v. Connecticut and concluding with Roe v. Wade, advocates
+were able to push abortion law from a trajectory of moderate, limited
+liberalization rapidly running out of steam to legalized abortion as the
+law of the land.152 The ACLU Women’s Rights Project achieved through
+the courts what it could not obtain through the constitutional amendment
+process: constitutional equality for women.153 In a broad range of regulatory
+issues, from the environment to land use and the treatment of the
+disabled, public interest lawyers were able to maximize the impact of
+congressional enactments, despite the substantial costs these imposed on
+business and local governments.154 Lawyers who spoke for a wide range
+of minority groups, especially Hispanics, were able to use a combination
+of regulation and litigation to incorporate themselves into the civil rights
+regime originally established for black Americans, despite an absence of
+mass mobilization.155 American public schooling, especially in the areas
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 55
+
+of discipline and student free speech, was transformed from a regime of
+almost total administrator discretion to one of pervasive legalization.156
+In perhaps the most emotional case of court-led policy change, judges
+mandated busing for racial balance in urban public schools, a policy that
+led to broad popular disapproval, and, in some cases, violence.157 While
+a few of these policy changes were eaten away at the edges, what is remarkable
+is their original accomplishment and subsequent resilience.
+Litigators were far from alone in these cases, drawing on a network of
+supporters in the legal academy, the bar, and the other professions. This
+network helped them fund, identify, and develop cases, establish their
+intellectual rationale, and provide the legitimacy that courts often assume
+from broad elite support. The power of this network came in large part
+because of the weakness of its opposition. In case after case identified
+before, defenders of the status quo were marked by their intellectual
+superficiality, their almost total lack of agenda control, an absence of information,
+and a vacuum in support from professional elites. Whereas
+liberals had specialized repeat-players defending their side in court, conservatives
+were often represented by relatively unsophisticated state government
+lawyers,158 or representatives of business who were more interested
+in minimizing their costs than in long-term legal strategy.159
+Finally, the combination of court action and the LLN served to insulate
+these reforms from reversal, even when they were unpopular or imposed
+large costs on concentrated, wealthy, organized groups. The LLN was
+well equipped for rapid mobilization when conservatives attempted to
+use their power in the elected branches of government to reverse liberal
+victories in the courts or the bureaucracy. The legal and intellectual resources
+available to conservatives at the time, by contrast, paled in comparison.
+The LLN’s victories in court were also protected by the constitution’s
+separation of powers. As Shep Melnick astutely explained, “By
+establishing a new policy status quo, the court shifted what might be
+called the political burden of proof within Congress. No longer was the
+burden on those favoring national uniformity and program expansion to
+build a coalition broad enough to pass new legislation. Now the burden
+was on their opponents to pass legislation to overturn the courts. Given
+the obstacles to constructing winning coalitions in Congress, this shift
+often proved decisive.”160 So long as liberals had disproportionate power
+over the agenda of courts and the institutions that supported them, conservative
+power elsewhere was a very limited countervailing force. As a
+result, liberals could achieve durable policy outcomes far from the center
+of public opinion (as in the case of busing and affirmative action) or that
+squeezed implementation of popular policies past where they would have
+gone otherwise (as was the case with disability and the environment).161
+56 CHAPTER 2
+
+Conclusion
+
+The development of the LLN into a formidable support structure for legal
+and policy change was not foreordained. Up through the 1950s liberals
+were largely outsiders in the professional bar. While the character of legal
+academia was changing in the 1950s, its liberalism was suspicious of
+courts, and few law schools had the resources to contribute to progressive
+social change. Legal aid was scarce, and public interest law did not reach
+beyond the ACLU and NAACP LDF. The Ford Foundation was becoming
+more interested in funding legal reform, but its interest was still in its
+nascent stages.
+The development of the liberal legal network from these meager roots
+depended on a confluence of factors. First, the fear of state involvement
+in the legal profession, the incorporation of a new generation of more
+liberal lawyers, and the seismic impact of Gideon v. Wainwright caused
+the legal profession to alter its relationship to legal liberalism. Second,
+the social disruptions of the 1960s caused many American elites to see
+legal liberalism as the civilized response to challenges that would otherwise
+spill into the streets. Third, the courts and the federal government
+became substantially more sympathetic to legal liberalism, providing
+elite sanction for its goals (in the form of Supreme Court decisions) and
+subsidy for its organizational development. Fourth, in the wake of the
+civil rights movement, the idea of rights attained a powerful cultural
+status, making the political claims of legal liberals seem identical to morality,
+progress, and common decency, a part of elite common sense.
+Fifth, the rules of the game in American politics changed, in a way that
+durably advantaged the resources of legal liberalism. Sixth, elite foundations
+threw themselves behind the creation of the liberal legal support
+structure, providing critical funding and strategic coordination for its
+emerging infrastructure. By the early 1970s, these interacting factors
+produced an imposing structure for the production of liberal legal goals,
+one capable of sustaining legal liberalism’s momentum even as the electoral
+status of its allies began to be challenged.
+For much of its growth phase, legal liberalism was not a partisan project,
+drawing support as it did from elite actors in both parties. By the
+early 1970s, however, the party system was changing, as the issue context
+and coalitional dynamics of American politics started to change. Starting
+with Richard Nixon, Republicans began to recognize the value of assaulting
+legal liberalism as a strategy for realigning the party system. Small
+businessmen could be mobilized by resistance to the courts’ aggressive
+decisions on environmental and health and safety regulation. Attacks on
+judges for their decisions on abortion, busing, and affirmative action decisions
+could be used to drive a wedge between urban ethnic Catholics and
+RISE OF THE LIBERAL LEGAL NETWORK 57
+
+more affluent, socially liberal Democrats. Southern Democrats who just
+a few years earlier considered voting Republican a sin were attracted to
+the party’s ranks by the Supreme Court’s decisions on prayer in schools,
+desegregation, pornography, and abortion. At the same time, the Democratic
+Party began to change, as the liberal legal support structure became
+an ever-more important part of its elite stratum and its central commitments,
+such as women’s, civil, consumer, and welfare rights and the environment,
+came to rival the party’s older commitments to economic stabilization
+and unions. In the new party system that emerged in the 1970s,
+the liberal legal network became closely linked to the Democratic Party,
+while the Republicans attracted Democrats repelled by legal liberalism.
+In a telling example of this shift, Lewis Powell—who as president of the
+ABA had helped advance the cause of legal liberalism—became the author
+of a seminal report to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce calling for countermobilization
+against public interest lawyers, and eventually a Nixon appointee
+to the Supreme Court.162
+While conservatives successfully used resistance to the courts to attract
+converts to their cause, they quickly discovered that disentrenching legal
+liberalism was an altogether more difficult matter. For example, in response
+to a lawsuit by the Center for Law in the Public Interest that
+stopped oil drilling by Armand Hammer’s Occidental Petroleum, Hammer
+directly lobbied McGeorge Bundy to cut CLIPI’s funding, had his
+lawyers contact CLIPI’s trustees, and campaigned to cut its tax exemption.
+Despite being one of America’s richest men, he was wholly unsuccessful.163
+The Nixon administration unsuccessfully sought to strip public
+interest law of its tax exemption, and both Nixon and Reagan made efforts
+to “defund the Left,” but were able to do so only at the margins.164
+Conservatives slowly recognized that they needed to develop their own
+apparatus for legal change, one that could challenge legal liberalism in
+the courts, in classrooms, and in legal culture. How they did so, and the
+difficulties that legal liberalism placed in their way, is the story to which
+we now turn.
+3
+
+Conservative Public Interest Law I: Mistakes Made
+
+OF ALL THE CASES of conservative legal mobilization examined in this
+book, none was more difficult or characterized by greater trial-and-error
+than public interest law.1 While each step in the development of the Federalist
+Society and law and economics could build relatively smoothly on
+earlier ones, in public interest law conservatives had to overcome the legacy
+of their strategically inadequate initial response to legal liberalism.
+This chapter traces out the early—failed—conservative response to legal
+liberalism, the sources of its ineffectiveness, and the long process of strategic
+reevaluation its failings engendered.
+Faced with a deluge of lawsuits from Naderite and Ford Foundation–
+supported public interest law firms it was far from obvious what response
+might be effective, and the founders of conservative PILFs lacked the experience
+and strategic sophistication to discover it. The conservative public
+interest law structure they did devise, with firms cartelized geographically,
+reactive to the agenda of legal liberalism, focused on amicus participation,
+and compromised by close ties to regionally powerful businessmen, produced
+meager results and was an obstacle to the emergence of more successful
+organizations. The first-generation firms’ geographic focus and
+close ties to business limited their ability to specialize, develop a “public
+interest” reputation, and organize their litigation around a coherent set
+of ideological principles. Ultimately, as I will argue in chapter 7, power
+and decision-making in conservative public interest law passed from the
+businessmen who were dominant in the first-generation firms to a second
+generation of foundations, activist intellectuals, and conservative lawyers.
+This new alignment of patrons and organizational-intellectual entrepreneurs
+proved substantially more potent than their predecessors. This
+chapter examines the period of organizational trial-and-error that began
+in the early 1970s and continued well into the late 1980s. It sheds light on
+three elements of conservative elite organizational countermobilization:
+strategic errors driven by dominant movement interests and inappropriate
+models for action, lags in response to failure, and organizational learning
+through generational succession.
+First, the conservative movement’s responses in the law were poorly
+matched to available opportunities because of the interests, attitudes, and
+experiences of its core constituencies. The most mobilized interest of con-
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 59
+
+servatives in the early 1970s was business, a problematic ally for the cause
+because of its unreliable opposition—and frequent support—for state activism.2
+While businessmen often sincerely believed in the ideology of antistatism,
+they commonly detached this belief from their day-to-day behavior.3
+American businessmen also lacked the knowledge to effectively direct
+countermobilization in professionalized and intellectually dense fields.
+This close relationship with business put a taint on the movement, especially
+in a period dominated by the idea of the “public interest.” Conservatives
+were further hampered by strategies that seemed natural or appropriate
+to its organizational entrepreneurs. Repertoires of action that the
+movement had used with success in other areas (such as electoral politics)
+were deployed in response to new problems, often without careful consideration
+of their effectiveness in new domains, while those with a higher
+probability of success were avoided because they violated strong collective
+normative commitments. Responses that drew on existing movement
+resources and organizational forms were preferred over those that required
+innovation and the empowerment of new kinds of leaders. These
+constraints help to explain why conservatives chose a geographically
+based, business-led strategy poorly suited to the task of legal change.
+Second, the same forces that caused the conservative legal movement
+to devise a flawed organizational response to legal liberalism made rapid
+readjustment difficult, rendering flawed strategies durable despite their
+limited efficacy. While the market in interest group organization may
+“clear” over time, in the sense that ineffective approaches will lose support
+and more promising approaches will gain, the relationship between
+organizational entrepreneurs and their supporters means that initial responses
+may be very sticky. This relationship is likely to be characterized
+by asymmetric information, as supporters may have a difficult time monitoring
+organizational entrepreneurs and may not have a clear sense of
+what constitutes “success” or how to measure it.4 As a result, inexpert
+patrons may be vulnerable to the existing organizations’ self-interested
+assessment of their effectiveness. Conservatives overcame this problem
+over time, with the emergence of specialized patrons embedded in a network
+with multiple information streams, but it took more than a decade
+to do so.
+Third, conservative movement leadership became more effective,
+adaptable, and legitimate when there was a shift in power from the movement’s
+material base to those with primarily cultural and intellectual motivations.
+Organizational maintenance imperatives made it hard for incumbents
+to learn from failure, so learning happened through the creation
+of new organizations by “refugees” from the old. It is no accident that all
+of the senior leaders of the second generation of conservative public interest
+law worked at one time in first-generation firms.
+60 CHAPTER 3
+
+The Origins of Conservative Public Interest Law
+
+The rise of liberal public interest law in the late 1960s and early 1970s
+was seen by conservatives as deeply threatening. Liberal public interest
+lawyers established critical precedents in high-profile areas of constitutional
+law, threw obstacles in the way of conservatives’ governing agenda,
+and used their superior organization, networks, and information to influence
+policy outcomes through litigation and intervention in the regulatory
+process (especially in the area of the environment). Conservatives’ initial
+responses to the liberal legal network were direct reactions to all three of
+these dimensions of the rise of public interest law.
+The first causes of conservative countermobilization were changes in constitutional
+law in civil rights, criminal procedure, and sexual and religious
+freedom. Liberal public interest law organizations pushed the Court to use
+constitutional provisions to liberalize policies and procedures, primarily at
+the state level.5 These decisions threatened core conservative constituencies,
+such as religious conservatives or defenders of racial segregation. Even
+more ominously, they produced a shift in federalism, centralizing policymaking
+in a system where conservatives had seen their interests served
+by decentralization and separation of powers. Power was transferred from
+Congress, where conservatives could count on considerable support, to the
+Court, where they could not. Against these changes, conservatives initially
+mobilized almost exclusively in the electoral arena. Richard Nixon ran for
+president in 1968 promising to brake the Warren Court’s activism by nominating
+“law and order” Supreme Court justices,6 and by 1972, as the quote
+from Patrick Buchanan that graces this book’s introduction makes abundantly
+clear, many conservatives believed he had succeeded.
+Conservatives in government, especially Ronald Reagan during his stint
+as governor of California from 1967 to 1975, found their agenda obstructed
+by liberal PILFs, including those funded by the Legal Services Program.
+Reagan ran for office on a program of welfare reform, but soon
+found his changes challenged in the courts. Ronald Zumbrun, Reagan’s
+deputy director for legal affairs in California’s Department of Social Welfare,
+found that in defending Reagan’s welfare reforms in court, “we were
+all by ourselves, with nobody to defend the program other than ourselves.
+We felt we were on the side of the public interest.”7 The wave of environmental
+public interest litigation provided an additional impetus to conservative
+legal mobilization. Unlike their predecessors in the NAACP Legal
+Defense Fund and the ACLU, these newer firms imposed large costs on
+businesses, ranchers, and other conservative interests, both directly
+(through regulation) and indirectly (by publicizing corporate wrongdoing,
+damaging corporations’ reputations, and forcing defensive compliance).
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 61
+
+Conservatives’ inability to protect their victories in the polling booth or
+the profitability of corporate America without substantial representation
+in the courts led to the creation in 1973 of the first conservative public
+interest law firm, the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF).
+PLF drew support from the California Chamber of Commerce, whose
+members had become sensitized to the danger the public interest law
+movement could pose to business by the success of the Wilderness Society,
+Environmental Defense Fund, and Friends of the Earth in temporarily
+halting the development of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline in the early 1970s.8
+One of those businessmen, J. Simon Fluor, brought his complaint to Los
+Angeles lawyer (and future Reagan administration attorney general) William
+French Smith, who put Fluor in contact with Zumbrun.9 The chamber
+of commerce recognized that corporations were at a substantial disadvantage
+in their battle with the liberal PILFs, as their in-house lawyers
+could never devote themselves full-time to business’s collective interests.
+Legal liberals could also organize, at a time when tax rates were very
+high, through 501(c)(3) organizations funded by tax-exempt charitable
+donations, while individual corporate lawyers were paid by taxable
+funds. Drawing on his experience in government, Zumbrun hoped that
+PLF could obtain support from consulting contracts with state governments
+as well as financing from business.10 Mimicking the rhetoric of its
+counterparts on the left, the Zumbrun-led PLF sought to represent the
+“other side” of the public interest. Unlike its liberal predecessors, PLF
+was created “not because they [conservatives] were disadvantaged in the
+legislative or executive arenas, but because they viewed conservatives as
+disadvantaged in the courts, where they believed that liberal firms had a
+‘moral monopoly’ on the public interest.”11 PLF and its successors would
+be a shield, not a sword.
+The most notorious indication of business’s early strategic response to
+legal liberalism is a memorandum solicited by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
+written by soon-to-be Supreme Court justice and former ABA president
+Lewis Powell. Powell argued that business faced a challenge to its
+very survival, but that businessmen had “responded—if at all—by appeasement,
+ineptitude and ignoring the problem.”12 Powell recommended
+that the chamber of commerce hire a “highly competent staff of lawyers.
+In special situations it should be authorized to engage, to appear as counsel
+amicus in the Supreme Court, lawyers of national standing and reputation.”13
+Powell assumed that business’s problem was representative disequilibrium
+in the courts: when liberals were able to press their claims
+without effective probusiness rebuttal, courts inevitably sided with them.
+Powell did not propose that business use the law to create limits on government
+activism, but sought a return to the New Deal–era tradition of
+62 CHAPTER 3
+
+judicial restraint that business found it could work with. It would be over
+a decade before conservatives fully recognized that this tradition was beyond
+resuscitation and business would have to work within the new legal
+regime created by its adversaries.
+The network of regional conservative PILFs that built off the experience
+of PLF shared Powell’s strategic approach. PLF had expanded rapidly,
+taking on a number of high-profile cases and raising money quite successfully.
+PLF’s staff wanted to take the organization national by creating
+branch offices across the country, a move that its board was afraid would
+stretch it too thin.14 Leonard Theberge, a corporate lawyer who had been
+active in the ABA and conservative causes,15 was asked by PLF’s supporters
+to study the possibility of expanding the group’s work nationally. This
+led to the founding, under Theberge’s leadership, of the National Legal
+Center for the Public Interest, with the mandate of creating versions of
+PLF in the other regions of the country.16 NLCPI originally operated out
+of PLF’s offices in California, but soon moved to Washington, D.C.
+NLCPI’s most fateful strategic choice was to organize PLF’s successors
+geographically rather than functionally, a decision that flowed from PLF’s
+previous plan to open branch offices. NLCPI’s founders also believed that
+regional firms could draw on local pride and business networks and establish
+their reputations through litigating issues of local importance. By
+granting a local monopoly in fund-raising, these firms would have a
+chance to grow without competing with their regional counterparts.17
+This cartel system would be maintained by a system of interlocking directorships,
+in which the president of NLCPI would serve on the firms’ board
+and the presidents of the firms would serve on NLCPI’s board. This structure
+was designed to prevent NLCPI from competing with its members
+(in particular by starting to litigate cases) and the regional firms from
+competing with each other (by allowing the president of NLCPI access to
+information about fund-raising and case strategy only available to board
+members). NLCPI would ensure that its members did not end up on opposite
+sides and adjudicate “border disputes” between the firms. In short,
+the network of first-generation public interest law was designed to stifle
+interorganizational competition.
+NLCPI experienced organizational turmoil almost as soon as its member
+firms were created, with one faction of its board arguing it should go
+out of business and another interested in giving it an ongoing purpose.
+In 1979, former Ford administration assistant attorney general Michael
+Uhlmann was asked by Theberge to take over the presidency of NLCPI,
+a request that “had great appeal, especially in contrast to the commercial
+‘dry as dust’ of private practice.”18 Uhlmann’s vision for NLCPI put him
+into substantial conflict with the organization’s members:
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 63
+
+I had not thought through a programmatic agenda for NLCPI when I took over
+. . . it was enough for me then to be involved in trying to make a philosophical
+and rhetorical case for “conservative” public-interest law. . . . By the time I
+figured out what ought to be done, I could see that the NLCPI structure was
+not particularly well suited to its accomplishment. NLCPI had all the structural
+flaws of the Articles of Confederation—the regional entities wanted a weak
+central organization. . . . What they wanted from “central” was a national
+megaphone that would, from time to time, draw attention to their efforts, perhaps
+testifying before Congress occasionally, holding “national” conferences,
+etc. Above all, they wanted “central” to help them raise money, which would
+in be turn be redistributed to the regionals. The unworkability of this formula
+was compounded by the fact that most of the regionals were pretty thin entities
+to begin with. In fact, they were little more than tiny law offices whose principal
+function (as I later learned) consisted in filing amicus briefs within their bailiwicks.
+. . . The only one of the regionals that had a serious agenda, or that could
+make any serious claim to being a law firm, was Jim Watt’s Mountain States
+operation, which tore a page from PLF and made itself into a force to be reckoned
+with. The others were feeble operations, big on rhetorical enthusiasm
+(which they would put forth before local business gatherings) but otherwise
+lacking anything resembling strategic vision or a way to achieve it.
+
+Uhlmann and NLCPI parted ways when it became clear that he wanted
+it to abandon “coordinating” the behavior of regional firms and to go
+into business as a full-time, national public interest law firm. There was
+a powerful logic to Uhlmann’s plan, but it was precisely what NLCPI’s
+was designed—effectively—to prevent.
+Uhlmann was replaced by in 1980 by Ernest Hueter, the former CEO
+of Kansas City’s Interstate Brands. Hueter was actively involved in the
+Gulf and Great Plains Legal Foundation in Kansas City, later renamed the
+Landmark Legal Foundation. Hueter was approached by Joseph Coors, a
+fellow member of the National Association of Manufacturers’ board, to
+replace Michael Uhlmann as NLCPI’s leader. Coors made clear that he
+wanted NLCPI’s president to be a respected businessman, who could reestablish
+businessmen’s support of conservative public interest law.19 The
+replacement of Uhlmann, an experienced and ideologically motivated
+conservative lawyer, with Hueter, a Midwestern businessman, was telling:
+the organization took a step in the direction of Washington-based, intellectual-driven
+leadership under Uhlmann and quickly jumped backwards.
+This leadership role for business, along with the movement’s geographical
+structure, would set the template for the conservative public interest law
+movement’s first two decades.
+64 CHAPTER 3
+
+The Troubled First Generation
+
+The experience for Chip Mellor and David Kennedy (who would go on
+to found the Institute for Justice) at the Mountain States Legal Foundation
+(MSLF) provides a useful case with which to examine the problems of the
+first-generation conservative firms because the organization had substantial
+advantages that its regional brethren lacked. MSLF was founded and
+financially supported by Joseph Coors, the conservative beer magnate
+who was also actively involved in building other parts of the movement’s
+organizational apparatus in the 1970s. Unlike most of the other conservative
+firms, MSLF had a happy coincidence of geographical and functional
+differentiation: the states where it operated were those where public lands
+and related environmental issues were most hotly contested, and where
+the conservative legal movement’s position on them had the strongest
+political support.20 David Kennedy, the chairman of MSLF’s Board of
+Litigation,21 recalls that in the West there “was an enormous sense of
+political disenfranchisement. Therefore, with the lessons taught by the
+leftist activists of the sixties and early seventies in their use of the courts
+to obtain results which they were unable to obtain politically, there developed
+a movement to use the same tactics on behalf of more traditional,
+more conservative, more libertarian causes.” Chip Mellor, a staff attorney
+for MSLF and for a brief period its acting president,22 believes that this
+geographically focused grievance strongly differentiated MSLF: “One of
+the things that gave Mountain States an advantage that allowed it to be
+set apart from and more successful than its sister organizations was that
+it had a niche that it could successfully occupy and create an identity, a
+funding source, and some jurisprudence around. The other entities, to a
+greater or lesser extent, had a harder time developing a distinct identity.
+That led to problems in funding and focus of mission.”
+In its early years, MSLF had something else its sister organizations
+lacked: a powerful, dynamic leader, the soon-to-become-notorious James
+Watt. Watt drew attention to MSLF’s cases, giving the organization a
+clear public presence, helping to attract talented lawyers to its staff, and
+building the trust and support of its board. After Watt left in 1981 to
+become Ronald Reagan’s secretary of the interior, however, the flaws in
+the firm’s organizational structure and legal strategy, which had been hidden
+under Watt’s charisma, were exposed. David Kennedy comments,
+“When I compare . . . the quite carefully thought through and clearly
+articulate mission of IJ [Institute for Justice] with the more rudimentary
+thrust of MSLF, it’s pretty clear that MSLF was starting from a basic
+complaint which was not carefully delineated or articulated.” MSLF
+under Watt drew attention to its cause, but it was distinctly unsuccessful
+in directly using litigation to influence public policy.
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 65
+
+The root of MSLF’s difficulty in developing a coherent and effective
+legal strategy was in the tensions between individual business interests
+and conservative ideology—tensions that plagued all of the first-generation
+conservative PILFs. MSLF’s board of directors was made up of three
+CEOs from each state, “either CEOs of their self-made companies, or
+mid- to upper-level executives with a larger corporation.”23 This leadership
+structure was largely driven by financial considerations, as all members
+of the board were expected to be either “financial contributors or at
+least to be active in fund-raising.” Jefferson Decker has found that “in
+correspondence, foundation employees often thanked contributors for
+their ‘investment,’ not their ‘donation’ or ‘contribution’; fundraisers targeted
+executives in specific industries and explained how Mountain
+States’ legal work would ‘directly affect’ their cause.”24 In numerous cases
+MSLF took the logic of “investment” literally, preparing amicus briefs in
+support of its financial contributors.
+The interests of local businessmen and the libertarian principles of
+MSLF’s staff soon came into conflict with MSLF’s challenge to Denver’s
+grant of an exclusive cable television franchise to William Daniels.25 Mellor
+recalls, “It was a great lawsuit. It was right at the time that cable
+television was in its infancy, and Denver was the cable capital of the
+world, and this was going to be the showcase system to demonstrate the
+potential of cable television to the world . . . [but] everybody was bought
+off on this thing. The business establishment, the political establishment,
+was very much behind it. But it was a violation of the First Amendment,
+so we filed suit.” Mellor was answerable to a two-stage process within
+the organization: a Board of Litigation made up of practicing lawyers
+(who supported the suit) and the business-dominated board of directors.
+
+Some of them loved it, but there was a contingent from Colorado who said,
+“This is the wrong suit, you don’t want to do this suit.”. . . I was all for it,
+Clint [Bolick] was all for it, my wife—she wasn’t my wife at the time—and our
+chairman [at the Institute for Justice], David Kennedy, was on the Board of
+Litigation, [future] Senator John Kyl, who was on the board. So we were all
+fired up about it. But it gored the wrong ox, it gored very powerful interests
+there, well connected to the Republican Party. The day we filed the lawsuit Joe
+Coors resigned from our board. Joe . . . thought this was not a good thing. It
+was not a cynical move on his part, and while he didn’t like the idea that it was
+going to gore the people it was going to gore, he had much more of a feeling
+that “this is not what I founded MSLF to do. I founded it to take on the Sierra
+Club, not to do this sort of thing.”
+
+The Denver cable case exposed the division between the orientation of
+the businessmen on MSLF’s board of directors and its staff and Board of
+Litigation. Reflecting the disconnect identified earlier between American
+66 CHAPTER 3
+
+businessmen’s beliefs and behavior,26 Daniels, a friend of Coors and the
+potential head of the Denver cable monopoly
+
+conceded that he understood and even sympathized with the principle which
+the staff was asserting, but argued that we had to “live in the real world” and,
+in the real world, municipal monopolies were the way it was going to be, so he
+was there to try to take advantage of the opportunity. . . . They failed to persuade
+this idealistic young organization that the real world had to be that way
+and . . . couldn’t be changed. After all, we felt, that’s what the entire purpose
+of this organization was, to change things from . . . the “unfair” status quo, to
+an order more consistent with . . . individual liberty and freedom from improper
+constraint, which we perceived as being all around us.27
+
+Today, Mellor sees the Denver cable case as a “quintessential [Institute
+for Justice] case ten years before we formed IJ,” but it didn’t turn out to
+be an acceptable case for MSLF. “As the controversy and media coverage
+increased, contributions to the legal foundation dropped, especially from
+corporations. We persevered in court, but we were increasingly constrained
+by the Foundation from making our case aggressively in the
+media. Meanwhile, the screws continued to tighten on the funding front.
+In the face of this, the Foundation decided to abandon the fight.”28
+The MSLF experience taught Mellor lessons that he would spend the
+next decade trying to apply. The most important lesson was that, first,
+
+any organization worth its salt has to be dedicated to principle and not to expediency
+and political forces. Second, that the board of directors has to fundamentally
+understand the mission and be dedicated to that long-term mission, recognizing
+that there are going to be setbacks and difficult decisions along the way.
+Third, that fund-raising must never drive case selection, and you should never
+be beholden to anyone and that you have to be able to call your own shots.
+You have to gather around idealistic people who recognize the importance of
+the fight you are engaged in and who will pursue it with a passion that will
+allow you to have fun and overcome the obstacles.
+
+The Denver cable case made it clear that free markets and business’s interests
+were necessarily in tension. Conservative PILFs could not expect their
+business base to stand up for libertarian causes when they damaged the
+interests of specific firms. The key assumption of the first generation of
+firms, that the welfare-regulatory state could be turned back by mobilizing
+businessmen to defend their interests, failed under the stresses of reallife
+litigation. It would take Mellor a decade before he could create a new
+organization in which lawyers driven by ideology, rather than investors
+motivated by profits, would be in the driver’s seat.
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 67
+
+The Horowitz Report and the Problem of Business Influence
+
+Mellor and Kennedy were not the only conservatives in the late 1970s
+who realized that something was seriously amiss in conservative public
+interest law. The most influential internal criticism came in a report to the
+Scaife Foundation by Michael Horowitz29 that was subsequently distributed
+informally to conservative donors and activists.30 The Horowitz Report
+had a powerful effect on conservative foundations and legal activists.
+Michael Greve, then a program officer at the Smith Richardson Foundation
+and later a founder of the second-generation Center for Individual
+Rights, recalls that
+
+there had for some time been a lot of dissatisfaction among conservative foundations
+about [conservative] nonprofit public interest law. . . . That didn’t mean
+that all these places were losers. Some of them weren’t, some of them were quite
+good. In general, there was a sense that the foundations had not gotten their
+money’s worth.... There were reports that they had commissioned from outside
+people who had looked at this stuff, which had pretty much [agreed on the
+need for] specialization [and] more hardball litigation rather than amicus briefs.
+The [most important] document is the Horowitz Report.
+
+The wide distribution of the Horowitz Report primed conservative foundations
+for new approaches and made them more skeptical of the projects
+they were already supporting. As a study of conservative organizational
+development in law prior to the 1980s and as an influence on it in later
+years, the Horowitz Report is worth examining in detail.
+Horowitz’s criticisms were direct and damning. “When visiting law
+schools” Horowitz found that “young men and women are tired, as is
+everybody, of the old answers. Yet, nobody has sufficiently offered young
+lawyers the sense that one can be caring, moral, intellectual, appropriately
+ideological, while at the same time being radically opposed to the stale
+views of the left.”31 While opposed to the liberal public interest law movement’s
+goals, he was impressed by how it placed “its efforts on a higher
+moral plane than those of its adversaries and has thus engaged the loyalties
+of young attorneys and the national media.”32 This insight suggested
+the need to avoid a narrowly legalistic focus, instead attacking the “moral
+monopoly enjoyed by traditional public interest lawyers and their allies,”
+thereby convincing young lawyers that conservatism and the public interest
+were not contradictions in terms. While the existing firms assumed
+that equalizing the contest over the public interest was simply a matter of
+who appeared in court, Horowitz recognized that the battle over the public
+interest was an intellectual contest over meaning and the moral reputations
+of ideological movements. Unable to compete at this higher plane,
+68 CHAPTER 3
+
+“The conservative public interest law movement will at best achieve episodic
+tactical victories which will be dwarfed by social change in the
+infinite number of areas beyond the reach of its case agendas.”33 The
+conservative legal movement needed to stretch beyond the courts to the
+institutions that supported legal activism and generated movement reputations
+and intellectual distinction. Horowitz’s report thus pointed beyond
+public interest law to the Federalist Society, of which he was an
+early supporter.
+In the battle to transform legal culture, Horowitz discovered that conservatives
+were the victims of their greatest strengths, grassroots mobilization
+and the support of local businessmen, which encouraged the conservative
+public interest law movement’s geographic division of labor. He
+observed, “The success of PLF led to the NLCPI model, which sought to
+replicate the least significant (and somewhat accidental) aspect of PLF—
+its regionally based character.”34 PLF’s geographical orientation was not
+a secret to its success, but an obstacle, and certainly not a characteristic
+to be replicated.
+
+Washington is “where the action is” insofar as issues of public policy are concerned.
+A conservative public interest law movement should of course have, as
+one of its prime objectives, a radical alteration of that fact. Still, in maintaining
+its regional orientation, the conservative public interest law movement has essentially
+confused wish with reality, for it is in being more effective in Washington
+that the conservative public interest law movement can more effectively
+erode the power of its agencies . . . decision-making in Washington is, as is true
+with all human institutions, dramatically effected [sic] by personal relationships
+and ease of immediate access to decision makers.35
+
+Conservatives had to adapt to the regime they sought to dismantle. That
+regime, centered in Washington, with policymaking conducted in the
+low-visibility, low-mobilization contexts of congressional committee
+hearings, agency regulatory operations, and informal relationships with
+interest groups and policy research organizations, foreclosed access to
+power by those based elsewhere. The national media, with its influence
+on the conventional wisdom of policymakers, was also based in Washington,
+and so firms interested in shaping the media’s agenda and framing
+of the issues needed to have ongoing relationships with the Washington-based
+press. Situated far outside the Beltway, conservative PILFs
+lacked the ability to nimbly respond to opportunities, access information,
+and develop networks.
+Even more important than this misdirected decentralization was the
+privileged role of business in the movement, which hampered its ability
+to seize the moral high ground and wage the battle of legal ideas. The
+firms’ business-heavy caseload lent credence to their adversaries’ argu-
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 69
+
+ment that, far from being defenders of the public interest, they were nothing
+more than shills for conservative business interests. In fact, Horowitz
+agreed with the factual basis of this criticism, noting that “all too often,
+conservative public interest law firms serve as mere conduits by which
+monies contributed by businessmen and foundations are given to private
+law firms to assist it in the prosecution of ‘its’ cases. No practice presently
+engaged in by conservative public interest law firms is more inappropriate.”36
+The source of this problem was the businessmen on the firms’
+boards, who saw their interests and that of conservatism as identical, and
+thus saw no conflict in having conservative public interest firms do their
+work for them.37
+While this exposed the movement to claims of corruption and tax evasion,
+Horowitz was more concerned that it led conservatives to miss opportunities
+to influence the character of legal and policy debate. Those
+opportunities went well beyond those of interest to business, including
+social issues, poverty, and civil rights. Horowitz observed that there were
+“an increasing number of situations where businesses will seek federal
+support and subsidies to insure survival and to maximize their short-run
+interests. In such situations, ‘conservative’ positions will often be adverse
+to those of the businesses in question.”38 Businesses were highly riskaverse,
+hesitant to alienate their stakeholders by taking strong, ideologically
+charged stands, thereby producing “an adversarial confrontation
+between one party seeking principled, ideological gain, while the other,
+from the outset, seeks to limit losses, [a confrontation that] is inherently
+one-sided insofar as issues of precedent are concerned.”39 Conservative
+PILFs tended to reinforce this framing of the public debate, rather than
+challenging it. Business’s leadership of the conservative legal movement,
+Horowitz concluded, harmed broader conservative interests in the law
+and was an obstacle even to its own long-term interests, and, as a result,
+business should limit itself to a purely financial role in the movement.
+Freeing the movement from business would allow it to reach out to
+clients that fit the inherited framing of public interest law’s mission. “It
+is clear,” Horowitz wrote, “that only law-action centers which speak for
+such unrepresented parties as taxpayers, ultimate consumers and small
+businessmen, and which take positions (which may or may not be joined
+in by large corporations) against the growth of federal power and expenditures,
+can sufficiently articulate principled ‘conservative’ positions with
+a requisite measure of staying power and consistency.”40 To plausibly
+speak for these unrepresented interests, control of the movement needed
+to shift to lawyers with ideological and philosophical, rather than material,
+motivations. “The very decline in power of the American business
+community over the past decade, and the corresponding growth of a government-growth
+oriented, anti-business, traditional public interest move-
+70 CHAPTER 3
+
+ment is perhaps the best evidence that the skills in the business community
+are not well correlated with the skills involved in generating idealism and
+enlisting the intellectual loyalties of bright young men and women.”41
+Horowitz identified the university, rather than the corporation, as the
+key site of competition in the law. Universities, especially their law
+schools, Horowitz found, were the breeding ground of the liberal public
+interest law movement, where ideas were produced, strategies hatched,
+idealism shaped, and networks nurtured. Activists were motivated by
+their professors, the judges they clerked for, and the heads of public interest
+organizations, all of whom were motivated primarily by fundamental
+ideas of justice. If conservatives wished to compete in the public interest
+law arena, they needed to move their own intellectuals and entrepreneurs
+to the fore, since the primary battle was in the market for talented law
+school graduates. Links to law schools, rather than to business, were, as
+a consequence, vital in constructing the leadership of conservative PILFs.
+Once they hired talented young lawyers, conservative PILFs needed to
+be able to stimulate them intellectually, which meant that “directors of
+conservative public interest law firms must only be those people capable
+of marshalling the enthusiasms of meaningful staffs.”42 These new leaders
+would be quite unlike practical businessmen, comfortable in organizations
+conducive to “an often impractical intelligence, a speculativeness of
+mind, often unfocused thinking, exceedingly unstructured organizations
+and the relative absence of hierarchy . . . the need for change in the above
+direction in the style and character of many conservative public interest
+law firms is not likely to be seen by many business leaders, but would be
+insisted upon by academics and others more regularly in contact with
+young men and women.”43 Even as conservatives were experiencing what
+Horowitz saw as an intellectual renaissance, the conservative academic
+community was nowhere to be seen in conservative public interest law.
+An inability to appeal to law students’ idealism and organizational style
+led to the recruitment of lawyers who were “appallingly mediocre,”44
+graduates of lesser-known, regional law schools, with virtually no representation
+from the top-tier schools that fed liberal PILFs. To solve this
+problem, Horowitz wrote, “A dramatic change in the board and leadership
+profiles of conservative public interest law firms is a necessary first
+step, even at most successful conservative public interest law firms.”45
+This was a repudiation of the dominant organizational model of the conservative
+movement in the 1970s and a shift in priorities that would accelerate
+in the 1980s as financial leadership of the movement shifted from
+businessmen to conservative foundations.
+Conservative firms faced yet another set of structural obstacles to effective
+legal strategy, and these were the organizational maintenance impera-
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 71
+
+tives that led to an unreasonable devotion of time and effort to activities,
+especially amicus curiae participation, that had little or no impact on
+legal or political outcomes. For Horowitz, business’s emphasis on “measurable
+outputs” was a weakness where legal and intellectual combat
+was concerned, as it produced incentives for furious but strategically
+ineffective demonstrations of activity. Amicus briefs had the advantage
+of being cheap and quick to prepare, thereby allowing firms to show
+“participation” in a large number of cases, even when they were marginal
+to the outcome of the case. While admitting that there were instances
+where amicus participation made sense, Horowitz observed that
+“a high ratio of amicus participations on the part of a conservative public
+interest law firm raises a fair presumption that the firm is engaging in
+pufferies intended for naı¨ve audiences of donors, and not truly doing
+meaningful work.”46 That “naı¨ve audience” included businessmen and
+the diffuse audience targeted by direct mail, which has an even more
+limited ability to scrutinize the impact of groups they are asked to fund.
+Once firms got into this organizational maintenance cycle, little time or
+effort was left over for activities that might have had a significant impact
+on law and politics. Later critics of the first generation, like Chip Mellor,
+would trace even more serious consequences to the first generation’s
+amicus addiction.47
+Horowitz saw a target-rich environment for a conservative public interest
+law movement freed from structural impediments, especially in institutions
+controlled by liberals. Horowitz claimed that liberalism had become
+“a powerful establishment in American society which, in the name of
+speaking for the poor, has actually become the means of perpetuating the
+power and well-being of a middle-class group of well-paid and highly
+placed professionals, often through collusive and at times literally corrupt
+involvements with sympathetic government agencies.”48 This populist
+stance would allow conservatives to turn Naderite cultural resources—
+antiestablishmentarianism, suspicion of concentrations of power, claims
+of institutional self-interest, and temperamental populism—against liberal
+institutions.49 This strategy would create opportunities for conservative
+firms to destabilize their opponents’ material base and challenge their
+claim to monopolize the representation of the public interest.
+In addition to attacking large, unaccountable institutions, conservatives
+could also draw on inherited understandings of public interest lawyering
+by defending large, diffuse, unrepresented interests. Among the
+issues Horowitz identified that would meet this criterion were the impact
+of regulation on small business and consumers, pornography, gerrymandering,
+deficit spending, and racial quotas. The specific issues were of
+considerably less interest to Horowitz than their long-term political po-
+72 CHAPTER 3
+
+tential. Horowitz applied five basic tests of the attractiveness of an issue
+for the movement, which were whether it would
+
+1. produce desirable political effects, in the sense of attracting potential constituencies
+for conservatism;
+2. undermine the claim that liberals represented a trans-political public
+interest;
+3. have plausibility as a matter of the public interest rather than wealthy
+private interests;50
+4. exhibit idealism and provide an opportunity for conservatives to be seen
+on the side of the “good guys,” which would also be useful for attracting
+idealistic young lawyers;
+5. foster desirable policy outcomes, in the sense of limiting government
+power and empowering civil society.
+
+While the business supporters of the first generation of public interest law
+thought in terms of discrete cases, Horowitz thought in terms of longterm
+political conflict, and judged cases by whether they weakened the
+institutional entrenchment of liberalism, and strengthened conservative
+organizations and causes.
+Horowitz thought it especially vital for conservatives to represent clients
+who would associate conservatives with the underdog, individuals
+unjustly treated by large institutions, while simultaneously associating the
+Left with malevolent, unresponsive concentrations of power. In particular,
+conservatives needed to target “poor clients such as ghetto school children
+affirmatively interested in the maintenance of internal school discipline”
+and “ghetto public housing residents,” who wished to “reestablish order
+in their neighborhoods.” These cases “would sharply engage a traditional
+[liberal] movement which has essentially ignored the victims of ghetto
+disorder in its defense of the intended subjects of public sanction.”51 It
+would also help conservatives erase the stigma of racism and connect
+conservative legal activism to the increasingly sophisticated scholarship
+on race, poverty, and crime being produced by critics of the Great Society.52
+This scholarship, which would soon come under the heading of “empowerment,”53
+gave conservatives a plausible alternative on traditionally
+liberal issues, allowing them to claim that their legal activism genuinely
+represented the public interest better than did that of the Left.
+The Horowitz Report’s short-term effect on foundation support for
+conservative public interest law was primarily negative. In 1980, before
+the Horowitz Report was released, the staff of the Olin Foundation believed
+that the Southeastern Legal Foundation was “one of the better
+conservative public interest law groups, and one that the Steering Committee
+may want to support before the Scaife study [the Horowitz Report]
+is out.”54 By the beginning of 1982, the Olin staff was considerably
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 73
+
+less impressed, observing, “As the Horowitz report indicates, this is not
+one of the more effective public interest law firms . . . staff recommends
+rejection of this general support proposal.”55 In 1982 the Olin Foundation
+responded to a grant request from the New England Legal Foundation
+by observing that “its staff is small and its director . . . is forced to
+spend most of his time fund-raising. Because of this, most of NELF’s
+activity is limited to the filing of amicus briefs. A large number of amicus
+briefs are impressive to potential supporters, but these generally have
+little bearing on the outcome of litigation.”56 The Washington Legal
+Foundation (WLF) also felt the sting of the Horowitz Report. While not
+rejecting WLF’s 1982 proposal completely, the Olin Foundation staff
+noted “WLF is more markedly a political organization than the other
+public interest law firms . . . and has not as yet had much influence on
+the legal profession itself. Horowitz also criticized WLF for using too
+many amicus briefs . . . and spending a sizeable proportion of its budget
+(about 15%) on direct mail.”57
+The Olin Foundation staff had clearly absorbed the core of Horowitz’s
+critique, both its more obvious points (such as the use of amicus briefs)
+and its more subtle observations (such as the need for a more intellectual,
+idealistic approach to law). As a result, funding for other first-generation
+firms stagnated; it would be years before conservative foundations recovered
+their enthusiasm for the field. In fact, conservative patrons’ skepticism
+of the field persisted as late as 1992:
+
+Staff is well aware of the Board’s reluctance to make new grants for conservative
+public interest law organizations, and well aware of the good reasons for
+this reluctance. The bright hopes of ten years ago that conservatives could create
+effective counterparts to the liberal groups that have taken their policy agendas
+to the courtroom, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Sierra
+Club, have produced more disappointments than successes. The loose network
+of law firms has not been conspicuously effective, well-organized or stable.58
+
+This experience was not wholly negative, since it primed the movement’s
+patrons for new approaches to legal change. When a new generation of
+organizational entrepreneurs, such as the Federalist Society and secondgeneration
+PILFs, showed that they had learned Horowitz’s lessons, foundations
+were ready and willing to fund them.
+
+The Capital Legal Paradox
+
+While Horowitz was unsparing in his attack on the conservative public
+interest law movement, he made an exception for one firm: the Capital
+Legal Foundation (CLF). CLF anticipated almost all the strategic and
+74 CHAPTER 3
+
+organizational innovations that were put into practice at the Center for
+Individual Rights and the Institute for Justice a decade later, but collapsed
+in on itself, despite its strategic foresight, just a few years after Horowitz’s
+praise. This makes CLF a very valuable case, for two reasons. First, it
+demonstrates that the failure of first-generation firms was due less to the
+absence of an effective strategic template for conservative public interest
+law and more to the unwillingness or inability of CLF’s counterparts to
+recognize the superiority of its model and adapt their organizations accordingly.
+Second, CLF’s eventual collapse demonstrates the substantial
+constraints that the immature conservative infrastructure imposed on
+even a firm with a strong and innovative strategy.
+CLF was established at the same time as the other regional firms, and
+was undistinguished until Dan Burt, a successful Massachusetts lawyer,
+took the helm in 1979. As Jim Moody, his colleague at CLF, puts it, “It
+was Dan with the vision, now best embodied at IJ, that government and
+especially unwise regulation was there to basically help the established
+and entrenched aristocracy with collateral damage to the ‘little’ people,
+or the economically or politically unpowerful.” Burt brought a coherent
+strategic vision to CLF, combined with a critique of the administrative
+state that echoed the liberal public interest law movement that he had
+once been a part of. CLF under Burt was more libertarian than its traditionally
+conservative counterparts, giving it a framework that detached it
+from business—a framework that, in fact, led it to take cases in which
+business was being protected or subsidized at the cost of consumers.
+CLF anticipated (and may have influenced) many of the critiques made
+in the Horowitz Report. First, CLF was based in Washington, locating it
+close to the national bureaucracy, media, opinion leaders, and lawmakers.
+Second, CLF shared Horowitz’s conviction that conservative PILFs
+needed to establish a principled image as the populist enemies of large
+concentrations of power. This required a very different relationship between
+case selection and fund-raising than that of other first-generation
+firms. “Dan ran interference,” Moody said, “and made it very clear that
+our positions and actions were to be guided by the merits and not by any
+money-related concerns; he’d gladly sacrifice money for taking the right
+position.”59 Third, through litigation, Burt’s book on the Nader network,60
+and attacks on the nomination of Nader ally Reuben Anderson
+to head the Administrative Conference of the United States, CLF argued
+that liberal firms were compromised by their cozy and dependent relationships
+with government, just as liberals had claimed that conservative firms
+were illegitimate because of their ties to business. Fourth, CLF focused
+on direct litigation as the route to long-term legal and policy change since,
+as Moody recalls, “Dan’s vision [was] to directly represent clients as this
+. . . leads to better control of issues, record, etc. [although it] is much
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 75
+
+harder and more expensive.”61 For example, CLF defended a group of
+homeworkers (the “Vermont Knitters”) against Department of Labor regulations
+that threatened to put them out of business, attacked federal
+agricultural marketing orders, and effectively challenged FCC content
+and balancing rules in broadcast license renewal decisions.
+This approach made CLF extremely popular with foundations and protected
+it from the reconsideration of investment in first-generation firms
+that occurred in the aftermath of the Horowitz Report. From the beginning,
+the Olin Foundation was impressed with Burt, whom it saw in 1980
+as a “very bright, aggressive, former Naderite who understands how the
+Nader organizations work and uses the same tactics for conservative
+causes,”62 and in 1982 as the head of “probably the most effective of
+the conservative firms operating at the national level,” noting Horowitz’s
+praise of the organization.63 CLF was regularly given the Olin Foundation’s
+highest rating—a record no other public interest law firm could
+match—and its budget increased steadily in the early 1980s even as other
+conservative firms faced financial instability.
+In 1982, CLF was presented with what seemed like a golden opportunity
+to establish conservative public interest law as a force to be reckoned
+with. General William Westmoreland was the subject of a 1981 CBS 60
+Minutes segment that claimed he knowingly falsified reports of enemy
+troop strength. Westmoreland believed the claim was libelous and
+shopped his case to several high-profile lawyers, all in vain.64 At the same
+time, Leslie Lenkowsky of the Smith Richardson Foundation (SRF) was
+contacted by a friend at CBS News, who was “appalled” by what he read
+in an article in TV Guide65 attacking the 60 Minutes report. According to
+Lenkowsky, SRF “had been working with Burt, had paid for his Nader
+book. And I passed the tip to him. He in turn spoke to Dick Larry at
+Scaife, who contacted a D.C. PR man . . . who knew Westmoreland.” The
+case was attractive because it promised to humble the “liberal media”
+and present an opportunity for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision
+in New York Times v. Sullivan, which set a very high bar for libel claims.66
+In addition, there was a genuine moral offense at CBS’s reporting, shared
+widely on the right at the time. Jim Moody “recall[s] vividly the sense of
+outrage we all felt at the depth of the CBS lies, a truly calculated and
+deliberate effort to rewrite history to a different agenda. Sure we knew it
+would be [very difficult] but we just couldn’t in all conscience not take
+the case,” even though they were aware that the case was a stretch for an
+organization like CLF.
+Before the case was tried Burt’s gamble looked like it would pay off.
+Because of the damage inflicted by the TV Guide article, CBS was in the
+uncomfortable position of needing to prove, in the words of its general
+counsel, “that in fact your broadcast was well founded. And therefore
+76 CHAPTER 3
+
+you had to defend the journalism as well as the law. We were in a public
+battle as well as a legal battle.”67 Although even CBS realized the case was
+dangerous, Westmoreland did not play to CLF’s organizational strengths.
+CLF had to raise money for Westmoreland as it tried the case, a distraction
+even for an experienced libel lawyer, which Burt was not.68 Exacerbating
+CLF’s competitive disadvantage was CBS’s extremely talented
+and well-funded legal team headed by David Boies of Cravath, Swaine.
+Despite these disadvantages Burt embarrassed CBS in the court of public
+opinion prior to the trial, using the discovery process to pry embarrassing
+documents out of CBS, including an internal investigation (the “Benjamin
+Report”) critical of the program.69 Burt’s aggressive handling of pretrial
+publicity and his promise that “we are about to see the dismantling of
+a major news network”70 made him a cause ce´le`bre in the conservative
+movement.71
+Partially due to Burt’s less-than-stellar performance in court, the case
+concluded with a disappointing settlement in which CBS granted Westmoreland
+neither money nor a retraction or admission of guilt. Despite
+this, Moody believes the case was a success, as “the discovery and scholarship
+associated with the case proved CBS lied and did so deliberately in
+a very agenda-driven and deceptive way, violated many of its own internal
+news guidelines. Westy’s reputation was vindicated, even without the payment
+of damages.” On the other hand, after investing the largest sum of
+money ever put into a conservative public interest law case, CLF obtained
+a meaningless settlement that made it difficult for the firm to argue that
+the case had been a success.
+CLF’s failure at the trial stage points beyond the firm to problems with
+the entire conservative legal movement at the time. First, CBS was a prestigious
+institution with extremely deep pockets and the finest legal defense
+money could buy. CLF, on the other hand, had to raise enormous sums
+of money for the case, since it lacked the pro bono assistance of a large
+private law firm, while also conducting the litigation and directing the
+public relations that went along with it. A more experienced and betterfunded
+firm would have used the Westmoreland case to embarrass CBS
+through the discovery process and then moved it into the less resourceheavy
+appeals process, where it could focus narrowly on enticing the Supreme
+Court to revisit New York Times v. Sullivan. CLF, despite very
+heavy fund-raising, could not even fully cover the cost of the trial itself.
+While many observers at the time accused Burt of being outlawyered by
+Boies into accepting a vacuous statement by CBS, by the time the trial
+concluded it was clear that Westmoreland was going to lose. Therefore,
+going to the jury and getting an unfavorable verdict only made sense if
+CLF was prepared to invest the next few years in the appeals process. It
+would have been nearly impossible for CLF to survive long enough to do
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 77
+
+so. By the time the case concluded, without even going to appeal, CLF
+was $400,000 in debt and had suffered reputational damage from the
+popular (if not wholly accurate) sense that Burt had mishandled the case.
+Michael Greve concludes that “Dan Burt bet a terrific outfit on Westmoreland—and
+lost.” The fact that CLF’s very existence was at stake in a single
+case underlines the difficulty PILFs faced in litigating highly fact-intensive
+cases against large, well-defended institutions without the ability to draw
+on the free resources from lawyers in private practice.
+The failure of CLF in the Westmoreland case also points to two strategic
+problems that conservatives would confront over the next few years.
+First, the case was based on the theory that the dominant media could
+be shamed or litigated into what conservatives thought was more dispassionate,
+less ideological reporting. The Westmoreland case showed that
+CBS would stand up against attempts to alter its reporting through libel
+actions, and the public relations from the case did not seem to put a dent
+in the popularity of 60 Minutes. As a consequence of the seeming futility
+of this strategy, conservatives began to focus on developing their own
+alternative media, supporting campus newspapers, the Washington
+Times, and, a decade later, the Weekly Standard and Fox News. This
+strategy would pay substantial dividends by the 1990s, in a way that the
+strategy of critique never did. Second, the Westmoreland case points to
+the lack of depth within the conservative movement at the time and the
+difficulty in maintaining a legal movement without the support of an
+effective professional insurgency. While Dan Burt may have been one of
+the best conservative legal minds at the time, he was wholly inexperienced
+in libel law. Today, as a result of the networks created by the Federalist
+Society, a high-profile personality such as Westmoreland with an
+exciting case could attract at least a handful of talented lawyers with
+experience in libel law, ready and willing to provide their skills and the
+resources of their firm.72 In the early 1980s, when the Federalist Society
+was in its infancy, no such network existed, which explains why CLF
+got the case in the first place.
+While the fallout from the Westmoreland case and Burt’s desire to return
+to private practice killed CLF, it would be too easy to write it off
+with the rest of the first-generation firms. In fact, as argued earlier, CLF
+had a strategic design and litigation strategy that resembles the best of the
+second-generation conservative firms. Beyond its own achievements, CLF
+also recognized many of the legal opportunities that the Institute for Justice
+and the Center for Individual Rights took advantage of half a decade
+later. Still reeling from the failure of Westmoreland, Burt in 1985 presented
+an ambitious plan for the future of CLF to the Olin Foundation
+that proposed a new initiative to attack “self-help barriers” created by
+government, drawing on the then au courant idea of “empowerment.”
+78 CHAPTER 3
+
+While CLF could not get this initiative off the ground, the general approach
+and justification for the project were identical to those proposed by CIR
+and IJ years later. CLF argued that the issue of poverty could provide conservatives
+with legal traction, positive public relations, and the potential to
+embarrass liberals. “In short,” wrote Burt, “many of the regulations aimed
+at ‘helping’ or ‘protecting’ the poor in fact perpetuate a culture of dependency
+that deprives them of the skills they need to enter the mainstream of
+our society.”73 CLF would use the law to win tangible victories for the poor
+and demonstrate the idea that government action itself was responsible for
+persistent poverty. Reflecting Horowitz’s insights, CLF claimed that legal
+activism could influence popular ideas and reshape the conventional wisdom.
+In its last years, CLF also proposed other initiatives that would be
+fully developed by later law firms. It proposed to defend “the right to practice
+your profession,” which, along with the Vermont Knitters case described
+earlier, has remarkable similarities to the “Ego Brown” case (defending
+a black Washingtonian’s right to shine shoes) that made Clint
+Bolick’s name at the Landmark Legal Foundation and the Institute for Justice.74
+This suggests that conservative public interest law in the early and
+middle 1980s did not lack strategically sound legal opportunities, but was
+faced with insurmountable organizational problems in establishing the resources,
+networks, and tactics to match its ideas.
+Not long before CLF closed its doors, Burt, at the prompting of Richard
+Larry of the Scaife Foundation, addressed the question, “Is There a Future
+For Conservative Public Policy Litigation?” Not surprisingly, Burt’s answer
+was a qualified yes. He admitted that even the best of the first generation
+of conservative litigation was not designed primarily to change the
+law. “Although we won most of our court and administrative litigation
+. . . many of these cases were brought to change attitudes, and raise
+money. Indeed almost all conservative public policy litigation to date has
+been brought to change public and judicial attitudes, since this is a prerequisite
+to changing the law, and with an eye to their fund raising appeal.
+. . . What we need to do now is convert these changes in attitude into
+changes in law.”75 Burt observed that five years of Reagan appointments
+to the bench meant that the opportunity to change the law existed in a
+way that it did not a few years earlier. Anticipating Charles Epp’s arguments,
+Burt argued that changes in the composition of the courts would
+lead to only limited legal consequences without corresponding shifts
+among conservative litigators.
+
+Judges don’t legislate, they must have specific cases before them to rule on. The
+new attitudes toward welfare, entry barriers and so on cannot become part of
+our law, cannot be institutionalized, if the disputes that arise when these attitudes
+clash with the laws of the last 50 years are not brought before the new
+judiciary. The policy litigators must turn from the high visibility, big press cases
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 79
+
+of the last eight years and bring repeated cases in their area of special concentration,
+which they are prepared to litigate and relitigate until they change the
+law. . . . CLF has done this in a number of areas—most notably in the field of
+agricultural marketing orders. But as you know from that fight, it is long, arduous,
+and often undramatic labor. . . . In the process we have also raised marketing
+orders as an issue in the press and with the public. At the same time we hurt
+our fund raising in two ways. First Sunkist, our chief opponent in the marketing
+order fight, urged our corporate contributors to stop supporting us. I reckon
+they cost us $75,000 or so a year. Secondly, the issue wasn’t “sexy,” and did
+not attract individual or “gut” conservative money.76
+
+Finally, Burt concluded that business could not be mobilized to defend
+free markets. In fact, as seen by CLF’s efforts to eliminate agricultural
+marketing orders (a New Deal–era policy establishing production quotas)
+business could be the conservative movement’s most determined foe.
+
+Corporate America never had a long term view of public policy litigation. It
+sought relief from an immediate problem, and that happened. The Reagan years
+have taken the immediate public pressure off the business world, and hence
+eliminated the pressure to support policy litigation. Thus the policy litigators
+have seen a substantial part of their funding disappear. This has been especially
+serious to CLF, since its program never included litigation aimed at pleasing
+business, as opposed to supporting free markets. For example, a long-time CLF
+corporate contributor cut its contribution from $20,000 to $5,000 in the last
+two years. Its public policy executive told one of our directors before the last
+cut: “You’ll have to take more cases that appeal directly to the business community
+if you want our support.” . . . The general public [through direct mail] will
+fund highly visible attacks on liberal “sacred cows,” but it will not sustain a
+large, careful slog through the courts that results in fundamental, long range
+legal change. It will not do so because this sort of fight is undramatic, subtle,
+and not easily understood.77
+
+CLF clearly understood the organizational bind that faced conservative
+public interest law, but had no answer to it beyond a request that conservative
+foundations substantially increase their support. CLF recognized
+the solution to the problems of conservative public interest law, but it
+would take a new generation of firms, and the deepening of the conservative
+support structure, to take advantage of this strategic breakthrough.
+
+Charting a New Course
+
+Chip Mellor moved on from the Mountain States Legal Foundation to
+the Department of Energy, a thankless task for a libertarian, while his
+colleague Clint Bolick went to work in the Reagan administration in
+80 CHAPTER 3
+
+Clarence Thomas’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Government
+service was a part of neither’s long-range plans, but developing
+an invigorated form of conservative public interest law was. Starting
+in the mid-1980s, and drawing on Horowitz’s critique and their own
+experience, Bolick and Mellor began to devise a strategy and an organizational
+design to guide a new generation of conservative PILFs. This
+process would produce many of the insights that Bolick and Mellor drew
+on in founding IJ, influence the future leadership of CIR, and convince
+conservative patrons that public interest law was not an intrinsically
+futile project.
+Before they left the Reagan administration, Mellor and Bolick began
+planning a law firm, the “Center for Constitutional Litigation.” Their
+original planning documents are striking in their scant emphasis on “judicial
+restraint,” which was still dominant in conservative jurisprudence,
+and their insistence that courts should energetically protect a libertarian
+understanding of constitutional liberties.
+
+In the American system of government, the courts are designed to safeguard
+basic liberties against the passions of the other branches of government. Unfortunately,
+the judiciary has abandoned this vital responsibility while assuming
+the role of a super-legislature, imperiling those very individual rights with
+whose protection it was entrusted. Leading this effort is a highly sophisticated
+advocacy movement with a well-defined legal and social agenda. The philosophy
+of this movement now permeates legal academia and much of the judiciary,
+and no effective, principled alternative has yet been developed to challenge its
+agenda. Thus, any comprehensive movement to advance liberty must include
+as a vital component an organization designed to restore and expand judicial
+protection of these principles.78
+
+Bolick and Mellor recognized that their opposition was a well-organized
+liberal legal network rather than a disconnected set of cases. Countering
+that network required a serious intellectual critique, principled constitutional
+philosophy, and organizations capable of acting across the entire
+range of venues that feed into legal change. With the MSLF experience
+clearly on their minds, Mellor and Bolick declared that “the Center’s efficacy
+in achieving this goal is directly dependent upon its steadfast commitment
+to principle and rejection of simple expediency. This requires methodical
+effort with a long-range strategy to be implemented through
+carefully developed litigation. The Center and its supporters must be prepared
+to make a long-term commitment.”79 Making that long-range strategy
+a reality required that the proposed firm’s patrons eschew using public
+interest law to achieve their short-term economic or political interests in
+order to facilitate their long-term interests in a constitutional order of
+limited government. The keys to stretching out the firm’s time horizon
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 81
+
+were severing fund-raising from case selection and identifying patrons
+who would accept outcomes from litigation campaigns years or even decades
+out.
+Bolick and Mellor identified a range of areas ripe for litigation, such
+as civil rights, free enterprise, property rights, contracts, torts, education,
+and telecommunications. They had no doubt that the opportunity structure
+for conservative litigation was permissive, but it could not be exploited
+without significant strategic and organizational innovation.
+Their first innovation was to be strategic rather than reactive, selecting
+issues “in concert with movement think-tanks, academicians, and legal
+experts,” focusing on concerns that had the greatest potential for creating
+useful precedent, rather than those of interest to their donors. This
+strategy would bring conservative intellectuals closer to the center of
+legal activism than they had been in the past, and require that the firm’s
+lawyers be informed by and contribute to scholarship. A close relationship
+between intellectuals and lawyers was essential since “in some mission
+areas, it will be necessary to lay extensive scholarly groundwork
+before litigation is commenced. . . . One of the Center’s most important
+functions will be to produce law review articles, to sponsor and provide
+speakers for law-related seminars, to work in concert with other legal
+scholars, and to coordinate with think tanks within the movement. Such
+an approach will ensure the intellectual integrity of the Center’s program
+and of the precedents it successfully establishes.”80 This intellectual orientation
+reflected the lessons of the Horowitz Report (which they knew
+potential grant-makers would have read) and the insight that a clearly
+defined, intellectually informed strategy was an organizational maintenance
+device: the clearer the principle upon which litigation was based,
+the less risk of being pushed and pulled by short-term considerations or
+pressured by patrons.
+Bolick and Mellor’s second innovation was to organize the proposed
+firm functionally by issue instead of geographically by region. This change
+reflected a crucial lesson they had learned from the Left, which was the
+need for careful, strategic client selection. Despite the fact that conservatives
+had previously criticized the Left’s “venue shopping,” Bolick and
+Mellor recognized that this was essential in using law strategically to produce
+large-scale change. “After a strategy is devised, the Center will typically
+initiate litigation in multiple jurisdictions. This approach will increase
+the likelihood that favorable fact-situations and forums can be
+found, and that a conflict may emerge among the circuit courts leading
+to possible resolution by the Supreme Court.”81 The more functionally
+specialized the organization, the more regionally opportunistic it could
+be. The first generation of firms made the opposite calculation, being functionally
+promiscuous but regionally focused.
+82 CHAPTER 3
+
+The 1985 proposal never made its way to any potential funder, but it
+was a critical step in the development of the second generation of conservative
+public interest law. Mellor presented the proposal to David Kennedy,
+who, “in his gentle but firm way . . . convinced us that we weren’t
+there yet in having really thought it through enough or in having the
+management and fund-raising experience to pull it off.”82 At the same
+time, Mellor was recruited from the Reagan administration by Anthony
+Fisher, the patron of a far-flung network of think tanks in the United
+States and abroad, to head the Pacific Research Institute (PRI). Mellor’s
+move to PRI, soon after the 1985 proposal was written, gave him an
+opportunity to “try to develop and focus the concept further while learning
+how to manage and fund a nonprofit,” and a home for a new project,
+the Center for Applied Jurisprudence (CAJ), that became the principal
+planning tool for the Institute for Justice.
+The original grant proposal for CAJ, sent to all of the major foundations
+on the right, began with a forceful call for change in the conservative
+legal community. The proposal made clear that “the courtroom is and
+will continue to be a policy arena, regardless of President Reagan’s success
+in transforming the judiciary.”83 Success in elections and the consequent
+appointment of judges would not transform the courts, because the legal
+liberal movement, “unlike the conservative movement[,] has developed
+a cohesive and pragmatic ideological program with support from legal
+academia, supplemented through a sophisticated public interest law network.”
+Liberals compensated for their declining electoral power through
+a powerful network of legal organizations, while the absence of a similar
+network on the right meant conservatives failed to capitalize on their increasing
+power over judicial appointments. As Horowitz had also observed,
+the conservative firms that did exist were notably ineffective.
+
+Conservative public interest law organizations were, and in some important
+cases continue to be, a significant first step in advocating concepts of free enterprise,
+private property rights, and individual freedom in the courtroom. But the
+effectiveness of conservative public interest law has been impaired by at least
+three factors: 1) the need to learn on the job since it was a new approach to
+advocacy; 2) an ad hoc, uncoordinated approach to case and tactics selection,
+guided generally by conservative principles, but rarely as part of a comprehensive,
+philosophically consistent long range strategy; and 3) a “discomfort factor”
+toward such litigation in the general legal community and among judges.84
+
+Mellor told conservative patrons that the firms they supported were insufficiently
+intellectual and principled and that their meager long-term impact
+was a function of their reactive posture, defined as they were by their
+opposition to the Left rather than their own vision of social justice. A
+clearer set of principles would allow conservatives to set the legal and
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 83
+
+political agenda and define the terms of public debate. In what amounted
+to movement heresy at the time, the proposal embraced a proactive stance
+for conservative litigators and an assertive role for federal courts. This
+was bitter medicine for a movement raised on “judicial restraint” and
+“strict construction,” but it was necessary if conservatives were to cease
+the futile exercise of playing defense in the federal courts. Consequently,
+the CAJ proposal recognized the necessity of convincing conservative
+judges and executive branch officials, who had grown up under these
+older ideas, to accept the unfamiliar and seemingly exotic sources of doctrine
+that this new generation of litigators would present in court. Without
+establishing the intellectual weight and coherence of these ideas outside
+of court, in the institutions where legal norms are legitimated, they
+would produce limited results on the inside, even from judges with a conservative
+temperament.
+The CAJ proposal emphasized the project’s intellectual dimensions, in
+particular the prominent legal scholars who would participate.85 This was
+a sign of the conservative legal movement’s maturation. Assembling a
+group of prominent conservative legal theorists and lawyers with government
+experience would have been almost impossible a decade earlier, but
+by the mid-1980s the conservative movement had developed a cadre of
+activists and thinkers whose primary commitment was to a set of ideas
+rather than the defense of particular interests or constituencies. Their
+common belief was that advancing the conservative legal movement required
+the elaboration of conservative ideas rather than the further mobilization
+of conservative interests. Idealism was strategy.
+The CAJ proposal assembled three task forces of intellectuals and lawyers:
+on the First Amendment, on economic liberty and civil rights, and
+on property rights. Papers written by the chair of the task force laid out
+the issues at stake in the area, which were then critiqued by the task force
+and its collective judgment assimilated into a book. While the books
+would be the responsibility of the authors alone, the process was designed
+to build consensus within the movement. As Mellor recalls, the purpose
+of organizing the task forces was
+
+to create a buzz, to get people excited about what we were up to, then to enlist
+the involvement of these scholars and recognized authorities in their respective
+areas. I wanted to grow our own talent; I didn’t want to bring in someone who
+was already recognized as having this scholarship or this point of view, so all
+we were doing is giving an old dog a new platform. I wanted to get something
+new and dynamic going that would shake up the tradition a little bit and draw
+upon the good ideas from a variety of different people. So bringing those authorities
+in got us their expertise, but it also got them invested in our success.
+They . . . became . . . very excited about this. Many of them . . . have continued
+to play important roles in the Institute for Justice.
+84 CHAPTER 3
+
+These books would combine substantive legal and policy arguments with
+strategic judgments about how to organize a legal campaign. In particular,
+the books would emphasize:
+
+1. Model case development including possible timing, forum, ideal parties,
+
+and appellate considerations
+2. Timing and placement of significant law review articles and related
+publications
+3. Exposure and debate in the legal community, academia, and the general
+public
+4. Cooperation with other groups or endeavors, e.g. law and economics, the
+Federalist Society, Institute for Humane Studies, and conservative litigation
+groups86
+
+CAJ’s proposed legal strategy integrated the transformation of legal culture
+and ideas with strategic public relations and coalition building. Cases
+and legal strategy would be chosen for maximum public impact in areas
+that held the potential to attract new groups to the conservative fold.
+Michael Greve, at the time the program officer at the Smith Richardson
+Foundation in charge of the CAJ grant, recalls that “the SRF grant unquestionably
+demonstrated that Chip is a very good fundraiser. What’s
+more, he made good on the grant. . . . That undoubtedly helped him to
+establish IJ.” CAJ not only helped Mellor think through the organizational
+and strategic questions in public interest law, it also demonstrated
+to the foundation community that he was capable of organizing and delivering
+on a major project—thereby helping to alleviate suspicions inherited
+from the Horowitz Report among conservative patrons of public interest
+law entrepreneurs. The CAJ had a broader impact than laying the foundation
+for IJ, as it influenced the thinking of the larger conservative network.
+Greve recalls, “The sessions I attended were on First Amendment and
+Equal Protection. Former mostly on commercial speech; dominated, intellectually,
+by Mike McConnell and Lillian BeVier. Latter dominated by
+Clint Bolick, then still on a racial neutrality riff. [There was] lots of advice
+(from Jeremy Rabkin, Nathan Glazer, yours truly) to get off it and to push
+‘black entrepreneurship’ instead.” While Bolick would continue to push
+race neutrality in his publications, IJ followed the advice of the CAJ task
+force in its actual litigation. The CAJ networking was important for Greve
+as well. The early CIR grant proposals stressed his participation in the
+CAJ’s task forces, and noted that “CIR’s Directors have spoken with William
+(‘Chip’) Mellor, PRI’s President, and he has agreed to make the PRI’s
+Task Force strategies available to the CIR.”87 This sent a signal to conservative
+patrons that money invested in CIR would not lead to a reprise of
+the errors made by earlier firms.
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 85
+
+Just as important were CAJ’s more diffuse impacts. “What I really got
+out of it was a confidence builder,” says Mellor. “It’s not that I knew all
+the legal issues, I didn’t by a long shot, but I expected to learn those. What
+I was really in need of at that time was the reassurance that there was
+fertile ground there. . . . I needed confirmation, but they told me it was
+even more fertile than I realized.” Speaking of CAJ, Greve argues that
+
+the original project [didn’t] dictate any particular result, position, or even emphasis.
+For example, Clint [Bolick] later wrote a screed against local “Grassroots
+Tyranny,” which is light years from my own and CIR’s perspective on
+federalism and local government. More significantly, perhaps, IJ would never
+represent the people CIR represents, but behind that product differentiation
+lays the judgment that you’ve got to get back to the constitutional norms. So
+in that sense, the project really was a marker.
+
+The search for a new strategy of conservative public interest law that
+began with the Horowitz Report culminated with the CAJ project, giving
+the movement’s organizational entrepreneurs the confidence to set up new
+firms, and its patrons the confidence to fund them.
+
+Idealism as Strategy: The Strategic Vision behind the Institute for Justice
+
+The most important book to emerge from this project was Clint Bolick’s
+Unfinished Business: A Civil Rights Strategy for America’s Third
+Century.
+88 At Clarence Thomas’s EEOC, Bolick had been deeply involved
+with the development of conservative thinking on civil rights.
+After leaving government he moved to the Landmark Legal Foundation,
+where he put the CCL and CAJ framework into action, pursuing libertarian
+goals with clients, including African-Americans, who were not
+typically associated with conservatives. Drawing on this experience,
+Bolick developed an argument that prefigured the strategy behind all of
+IJ’s most prominent cases.
+Unfinished Business was relentlessly optimistic in tone, highly sanguine
+about the role of the judiciary, and characterized by a total lack of defensiveness
+that was both temperamental and strategic. Bolick argued that
+“a strategy that consists mainly of resisting the civil rights establishment’s
+agenda is by nature a losing strategy . . . a reactive posture allows the
+other side to define civil rights in terms of its own agenda and to claim
+the moral high ground.”89 Bolick embraced the empowerment fad popular
+among a handful of younger Beltway conservatives while also distancing
+himself from the mainstream of the conservative movement, evidence
+for which was Bolick’s quoting of Stuart Butler that “confidence is not
+engendered [among black Americans] by conservative attorneys chasing
+86 CHAPTER 3
+
+firetrucks to see if any members of the Teamsters Union are upset about
+affirmative action.”90 Bolick understood that in civil rights, perhaps more
+than in any other area, an image of goodwill was a precondition for having
+conservatives’ intellectual argument taken seriously.
+
+Those who have resisted the civil rights policies of the past quarter-century have
+been accused, often justly, of offering no alternative. The lack of a coherent,
+credible, and comprehensive alternative leaves us in the untenable position of
+arguing either that all of our nation’s civil rights problems have been solved or
+that the major civil rights issue of our time is the plight of white firefighters
+victimized by reverse discrimination. If that is our response, our detractors may
+be excused for calling into question our commitment to civil rights.91
+
+The repetition of the “white firefighter” trope is illuminating. Bolick
+took as axiomatic the modern activist state’s assumption that policies
+need to be justified in terms of their impact on less privileged groups.
+Sixty years of government activism had shifted the ground of politics,
+and so, for conservatives’ argument for limited government to be heard,
+they would have to justify their policies against the standards of their
+liberal opponents.
+While Bolick did not argue against opposing affirmative action (he
+would later become famous for calling Lani Guinier the “quota queen”),92
+he claimed that the conservative cause on civil rights was better served by
+identifying blacks, not whites, as its beneficiaries. Even if this strategy did
+not advance Republican electoral fortunes, it would produce clients with
+“stories” more compelling to the courts and the media. While a client’s
+racial identity should be irrelevant from a conservative point of view, Bolick
+argued that “given limited resources, public interest litigators should
+represent the most disadvantaged individuals and should try whenever
+possible to find a plaintiff whose plight outrages people.”93 He claimed
+the authority of the civil rights movement as justification for his emphasis
+on an affirmative role for federal courts. Against the conservative consensus
+in favor of judicial restraint, Bolick asserted that
+
+as our nation’s founders recognized, the legislative and executive branches are
+especially susceptible to majoritarian and special interest influences. Since civil
+rights are by definition individual rights . . . the ultimate guardian of those
+rights, when the other branches of government have failed adequately to protect
+them, is the judiciary. I recognize how imperfectly the judiciary has provided
+that protection to date . . . but those considerations, it seems to me, speak in
+favor of increasing our activities in the courts rather than diminishing them.94
+
+Bolick called, without apology, for judicial activism, on the grounds that
+liberals could not be defeated by putting the activist court genie back in
+the bottle. In sharp contrast to the visionaries who inspired the first-
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 87
+
+generation conservative PILFs such as the Pacific Legal Foundation, Bolick
+claimed that success would come only through judicially enforced
+constitutional rights, which could act as a counterweight against the
+“majoritarian and special interest influences” that preserved liberal policy
+preferences.
+Bolick extended the CAJ proposal’s argument that public interest lawyers
+needed to establish clear long-range goals, and to judge “every individual
+case . . . against those principles and goals to keep the program on
+course. Otherwise, the public interest law firm becomes just another law
+firm.”95 Bolick had learned from the Left that victories in court that established
+no clear precedent for future cases could set the movement back,
+while “defeats can advance the strategy by creating splits among jurisdictions
+(thus increasing the odds of Supreme Court review), by providing
+guidance in fine-tuning strategy, and by creating public support that may
+translate into future triumphs.”96 For conservatives to counter the Left in
+court, they needed to establish “counterrights” of their own, with precedential
+value that could push back the scope of governmental intervention.97
+An amicus strategy, even if successful, could only stop assertions
+of liberal rights in particular cases. A more powerful strategy was to use
+the law as a sword rather than a shield, expanding the judicially recognized
+meaning of the First Amendment and the takings clause, for example,
+to put liberals on the defensive. Conservatives of the second generation
+had a few examples of this approach, none more powerful than the
+Pacific Legal Foundation’s successful litigation in Nollan v. California
+Coastal Commission, which applied the takings clause of the Constitution
+to government conditions on the use of property.98 Nollan signaled that
+conservatives could do more than play defense, that the newly reshaped
+federal courts would allow them to create counterrights of their own.
+The final, and, for organizational purposes, most important insight that
+Bolick (drawing heavily on Mellor’s experience and judgment) presented
+in Unfinished Business was the centrality of organizational design. Opportunities
+were not enough if they were squandered by short-term organizational
+maintenance imperatives.
+
+It is absolutely essential that groups dedicated to such goals understand the
+respective roles of fundraising and case selection. Funds are raised to support
+the cases—not vice versa. This rule is critical not only for the organization’s
+integrity, but also for the mission’s success. While no public interest group can
+afford to overlook funding realities, allowing such concerns to dictate or heavily
+influence case selection confused ends with means. . . . Too often, public interest
+law firms have lost sight of their original goals, ultimately viewing the perpetuation
+of their particular programs as ends in themselves and engaging in mercenary
+tactics to advance their programs even at the costs of the very principles
+88 CHAPTER 3
+
+that are their reason for existence. Such organizations are not only worthless,
+they detract from those who are sincerely committed to principles by diverting
+scarce resources and by fostering cynicism about the entire movement.99
+
+By learning from the Left and from their own experience of the dynamics
+of legal strategy, and combining these lessons with an organizational form
+capable of supporting those lessons, conservatives could make the courts
+into a powerful instrument for political change.
+
+Conclusion
+
+The sources of the first generation’s ineffective reaction to the rise of
+legal liberalism can be found in the character of the conservative movement
+in the 1970s. Conservatism’s strengths were its activists at the state
+level, especially its network of small to medium-sized businessmen.
+These assets were electorally potent, since the federal character of Congress
+and the Electoral College mirrored the movement’s resources. The
+changes in American politics described in chapters 1 and 2, however,
+devalued those resources when it came to legal and policy change. In
+this new regime, conservatives had few resources appropriate to the system
+they sought to influence, which privileged ideas, legal tactics, access
+to Washington networks, and the ability to influence the mass media. In
+this regard, conservatives compared poorly to the Left, whose assets
+were precisely those rewarded by this new political system. The new
+American political system was well adapted to influence by the “new
+class” of intellectuals and professionals, a class in which conservatives
+were all but entirely unrepresented.
+Conservatives were also hampered by their alliance with the business
+community. Conservatives had counted on business, whose bottom lines
+were being attacked by liberal public interest law, to be the natural constituency
+for countermobilization. What they had not anticipated was the
+way that American business had adapted to the structure of the activist
+state. America’s business leadership had learned to make the expansion
+of government activity work for them, or at least to minimize its impact
+on their bottom line. Both Mellor and Kennedy at MSLF and Burt at CLF
+recognized that business’s interest in keeping its access to anticompetitive
+arrangements could make it the enemy of free markets. Those businessmen
+sufficiently motivated to support the movement were insufficiently
+sophisticated in the new mode of legal politics to effectively guide it, and
+they lacked interest in the broader range of conservative legal opportunities.
+Reorienting the relationship between conservative public interest law
+and business would, therefore, be a necessary precondition for organizational
+success.
+CON SE RVAT IV E PUB L I C INT ER E S T L AW I 89
+
+The problems with first-generation public interest law went beyond the
+predominant role of business. The larger challenge was that change in
+professionally dense areas like the law requires context-appropriate networks
+to provide personnel that can develop legal ideas and strategy, identify
+and bring cases, take maximal advantage of legal precedents in bureaucratic
+rule-making, and raise money from foundation and
+governmental sources. It was here that conservatives were weakest. Even
+if the businessmen who supported the first-generation firms had been
+more sophisticated than they were, they would have lacked the foot soldiers
+to devise an alternative as effective as their liberal opponents. It
+would take the development of a conservative legal network, of the sort
+that the Federalist Society would create in the early 1980s, for conservatives
+to have the public goods to support an effective legal movement.
+Finally, the experience of the first generation of public interest law suggests
+the importance of agenda control in the new American political system.
+Liberal public interest law organizations were designed to control
+the legal agenda and to use even marginal precedents to keep their adversaries
+on the defensive. Conservatives fell into a trap by presenting the
+“other side” in an institutional context—the courts—where power comes
+from defining the terms of debate and choosing the terrain on which the
+battles will be fought. By organizing reactively, conservatives guaranteed
+that they could only slow down the advance of legal liberalism, but not
+stop or reverse it. Only when they reoriented their activity to support
+“counterrights” of their own could conservatives take advantage of the
+opportunities of the new American political system.
+Seizing those opportunities required new ideas and new organizations.
+To gain control of the legal agenda, conservatives needed to escape the
+bounds of judicial restraint, which stated what courts should not do
+rather guiding where they could legitimately act. Judicial restraint was
+the natural ideological match to the strategy of providing the “other
+side,” since both aimed to resuscitate the legal status quo ante. Legitimating
+an active role for the courts in defending individual rights would require
+a much greater role for intellectuals in the conservative legal movement,
+since transforming what judges considered reasonable and
+appropriate was as important as the design of specific cases. Conservatives
+would have to change the ideas of legal elites before they could effectively
+change the behavior of courts.100 As subsequent chapters will show,
+this is why conservatives of the second generation sought to rebuild their
+legal movement around intellectuals and academics, and significantly diminish
+the role played by businessmen and Republican politicians.
+4
+
+Law and Economics I: Out of the Wilderness
+
+DOES THE FIELD OF LAW AND ECONOMICS even belong in a book on the
+conservative legal movement? Many of the field’s most prestigious practitioners
+are quite liberal and motivated primarily by a desire to make
+law an empirical discipline, rather than an instrument of conservative or
+libertarian ideology. That said, there can be no doubt that many conservatives,
+especially foundation patrons, saw in law and economics a powerful
+critique of state intervention in the economy, and a device for gaining a
+foothold in the world of elite law schools.
+To understand the place of law and economics in the larger conservative
+legal movement, it is necessary to begin at the University of Chicago Law
+School, the home of scholars such as Richard Posner and Richard Epstein
+and the training ground of many of the movement’s most important early
+practitioners and entrepreneurs. From there, our story moves on to the
+myriad projects of Henry Manne, who scored the first real entrepreneurial
+success for the movement through his economics programs for judges and
+law professors, and his Liberty Fund conferences on law and economics.
+Manne’s programs at Rochester, Miami, and Emory emerged at roughly
+the same time as conservative public interest law, but were rooted in a
+very different model of legal change. Businessmen dominated conservative
+public interest law, but in law and economics they provided money
+without taking a significant leadership role, a role that was tightly
+guarded by the movement’s intellectuals. Whereas conservative public interest
+law assumed that the way to counter legal liberals was by providing
+the “other side” in court, the law and economics movement sought to
+undermine the intellectual foundations on which its arguments, and its
+claim to represent the public interest, were based.
+Throughout this chapter, there are false starts and failed efforts at
+institution building, to go along with some impressive organizational
+successes. Even more interesting, this period shows that the conservative
+movement was far from internally homogenous—internal conflict and
+suspicion between movement patrons and entrepreneurs helped to sink
+one of the movement’s most ambitious efforts at institution building,
+Manne’s project of building “Hoover East” in the suburbs of Atlanta.
+A close study of the early organizational history of law and economics
+shows that conservative countermobilization was not governed by a
+“grand plan” hatched all at once. Instead, movement patrons opportu-
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 91
+
+nistically supported organizational entrepreneurs who seemed to have
+found a crack in the edifice of legal liberalism. Only later did these opportunistic
+decisions gel into a coherent strategy that could then be applied
+in other cases.
+
+Building the Mother Ship: The Creation of Law and Economics
+at Chicago
+
+The organizational history of law and economics, like so much of the
+modern conservative movement, begins with the University of Chicago.
+While it has since found other homes, Chicago has always been the spiritual
+center of the movement, especially for those who see it as a critique
+of government activism as well as a method for studying law. Chicago
+provided a home for law and economics to develop even when its ideas
+were regarded with intense skepticism and hostility in the larger academic
+and legal world.1 As a result, the field was ready when the law schools
+and policymakers became more open in the 1970s.
+Law and economics began at Chicago by accident, rather than as part
+of a larger ideological plan. The first economist in the University of Chicago
+Law School was Henry Simons, who “published little and was not
+a popular teacher”2 but “had a few good friends in the law school like
+Wilber [Katz] and [Malcolm] Sharp” who managed to move Simons from
+the economics department to the Law School in 1933.3 The irony of Simons’s
+appointment was that what passed for law and economics in most
+law schools at the time was part of the progressive project to question
+the theoretical foundations of classical economics and the legal doctrines
+informed by it.4 It would have been hard to find a character less sympathetic
+to this approach than Simons, who was a representative of the “Old
+Chicago” economics of Frank Knight and Jacob Viner. By the late 1930s
+Simons had become, like many others of libertarian instincts, genuinely
+spooked at what he saw as threats not just to the free market, but the free
+society. Simons, who helped arrange for the publication in the United
+States of The Road to Serfdom, agreed with Hayek that economic planning
+posed a danger to personal and political liberty; in the words of
+Aaron Director, he “thought that doomsday was upon us.”5 Simon’s
+“doomsday” was set in motion by a growing state that pulled academics
+into its maw, a trend that threatened both the quality of public policy and
+the freedom of universities.
+
+The prevailing drift toward increasing participation of professors as bureaucrats,
+as governmental or business consultants, and as Round-Table exhibitionists
+is, I think, tragically mistaken and wholly ominous for democracy....
+It means not only bad government—democracy of cheap debate and mere
+92 CHAPTER 4
+
+technical maneuver, instead of government by intelligent, truth-seeking discussion—but
+bad Universities as well. The alternation of professors between action
+and inquiry, as occasional, temporary bureaucrats or part-time consultants, involves
+accretions of power and prestige and often large additions to full-time
+academic remuneration. . . . The consequent perversion and distortion of academic
+standards and University functions thus becomes pervasive.6
+
+The increasing reach of the state meant that universities no longer set their
+own priorities, but became corrupted, albeit softly and subtly, by a state
+that had outstripped its proper bounds.
+While Simons was not appointed to the Law School because of his ideology,
+he was a Chicago economist through and through, committed to
+helping to save capitalism—if it could be saved. While his book on taxation
+was considered a serious contribution at the time, he devoted a substantial
+percentage of his time to less academic pursuits aimed at preserving
+free enterprise.7 On the one hand, Simons published A Positive Plan
+for Laissez-Faire, which by the standards of the time was highly marketoriented
+but which is markedly lacking in orthodoxy by contemporary
+standards.8 George Stigler quipped in this regard, “It’s true that he was
+the man that said the Federal Trade Commission should be the most important
+agency in government, a phrase that surely should be on no one’s
+tombstone. . . . Yet, relative to the hectic, excited days of the thirties he
+was leaning the other way.”9 Simons represented what is best understood
+as the evangelical element of Chicago economics, embodying the same
+spirit that inspired Milton Friedman in his public intellectual work and
+the Chicago economics department’s famous (and in some quarters notorious)
+collaboration with the Catholic University of Chile.10 By 1945, Simons’s
+concern for the future of free societies had become acute, as had
+his anxiety about the fortunes of classical liberal thought.
+
+With the scattering of the “Austrians” and the vastly changed complexion of
+economics at Cambridge and Harvard, this intellectual tradition . . . is now
+almost unrepresented among the great universities, save for Chicago; and it may
+not long be well represented at Chicago. It still has its firm adherents, to be
+sure; but its competent representatives are widely dispersed and isolated from
+one another, in academic departments or governmental bureaus where they are
+largely denied opportunity for cooperation with like-minded scholars, or for
+recruiting and training their successors.11
+
+Acutely aware of their isolation, classical liberal thinkers initiated projects
+aimed at identifying allies and networking domestically and internationally,
+the most important of which was the Hayek-founded Mont Pelerin
+Society. The overriding object of the Society was to cement a network of
+classically liberal thinkers of all countries; “the contacts which the meetings
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 93
+
+provide and the exchange of opinions between members which the mere
+existence of a list provides should remain the main function of the
+group.”12 Hayek’s proposal assumed that the “scattering” was a more or
+less permanent state of affairs, and proposed to correct for it by networking
+those advocates for classical liberalism that still remained.13
+Simons’s plans at the University of Chicago were driven by a vision different
+from Hayek’s libertarian internationale, looking instead to what we
+might call “remnantism,” the idea that in a fallen world a “saving remnant”
+of those still committed to right thinking should be preserved until
+the folly of corrupt ideas was definitively revealed.14 Driven by this more
+pessimistic sense of the prospects for classical liberalism, Simons proposed,
+in a document sent to Hayek and intended for eventual consideration by
+the Volker Fund,15 “There should, I submit, be at least one university in
+the United States where this political-intellectual tradition is substantially
+and competently represented—and represented not merely by individual
+professors but also by a small group really functioning as a social-intellectual
+group.”16 An institute, staffed by libertarian professors and with funding
+for research support, visiting lecturers, seminars, and visiting fellows,
+would bring together “the best economists and political philosophers of
+its ‘school’ from all over the world.”17 With the concern about capture
+by central administration that would later characterize the administrative
+entrepreneurship of Henry Manne, Simons insisted that his institute
+“should be set up, not as part of the University of Chicago but independently,
+with its own governing body and its own funds. It should be located
+at Chicago, however, only after reasonable assurances of close and friendly
+relations with the University; and it should be free to move elsewhere if
+effective or fruitful cooperation later proves unattainable.”18
+For the future of law and economics at Chicago—and beyond—the
+most important part of Simons’s proposal was its proposed leader:
+“Aaron Director is not only the ideal person to head the Institute; he is
+available and would be willing to undertake the task even at financial
+sacrifice.”19 In a letter to Hayek, Simons confided that the project was
+“contrived . . . largely for what one might call ulterior purposes . . . to
+get Aaron Director back here and into a kind of work for which he has,
+as you know, real enthusiasm and superlative talents.”20 While Simons’s
+institute never materialized, the discussions surrounding it did succeed in
+bringing Director to Chicago, through the beneficence of the Volker Fund.
+Director recalls that
+
+Hayek . . . met a person called Luhnow, who was then responsible for a lot of
+money in the Volker Fund. He persuaded Luhnow to give a certain sum of
+money to establish a center that would promote private enterprise. It was earlier
+decided that Chicago was the only place that was likely to accept such a project,
+94 CHAPTER 4
+
+and it was also decided that the law school was the only part of the University
+of Chicago that would accept such a project. Henry Simons was the one that
+suggested to Hayek that I should be the person in charge of the project. Apparently
+the dean of the law school, Wilber Katz, then wrote in one condition. It
+was that I should be permitted to teach one course in the law school. The course,
+of course, was economic analysis. Henry Simons had tired of teaching it by then
+and had been trying to get the law school to get me to teach it. There I was with
+this project, which never amounted to much, teaching this course on Economic
+Analysis and Public Policy.21
+
+Despite the failure of his institute, by obtaining a position for Director in
+the Law School, Simons planted the seed for a quite unintended growth,
+Chicago-style law and economics.
+When Aaron Director came to the Chicago law school, the newly invigorated
+field of antitrust was being taught by Edward Levi, an alumnus
+of Thurman Arnold’s “brain trust” at the Justice Department. One of
+Director’s duties at the Law School was coteaching the then-mandatory
+antitrust course with Levi. In a story that became a Chicago legend, while
+Levi taught the cases four days a week, Director would spend the fifth
+day telling “us that everything that Levi had told us the preceding four
+days was nonsense. He used economic analysis to show us that the legal
+analysis would not stand up.”22 Robert Bork recalls that this course had
+the effect of recruiting a significant number of students to discipleship in
+the nascent movement: “A lot of us who took the antitrust course or the
+economics course underwent what can only be called a religious conversion.
+It changed our view of the entire world. . . . We became Janissaries
+as a result of this experience.”23 Bork’s comment, while somewhat obscure,
+is telling: the Janissaries were Christian prisoners of war who converted
+to Islam and formed the elite corps of the Ottoman Empire. While
+only a handful of Director’s students were as motivated as Bork, there
+was something in the power of these ideas that impelled those who had
+learned them to a life of evangelism—both intellectual and organizational—on
+their behalf.24 A set of ideas that lacked the intrinsic potency
+and breadth of Chicago-style price theory would have been unlikely to
+produce such voluntary efforts on behalf of the cause.
+Director’s influence reached beyond his own classroom, and in those
+early days began to wind its way, through his impact on students and the
+faculty, into the rest of the Law School as well. Henry Manne recalls that
+
+at this very moment, a strange thing happened. . . . In classes we began talking
+more about economics. Aaron Director began having a clear, direct influence
+on certain members of the faculty. Every afternoon there was a tea well attended
+by students and faculty. . . . Most of us stood around talking to Aaron
+Director. A lot of the discussion of how you might talk about law and econom-
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 95
+
+ics started at those teas. . . . It began showing up in classes. In my last semester,
+I thought I was very lucky to have a seminar with the most famous law professor
+in the country at that time, Karl Llewelyn, who gave a seminar in jurisprudence.
+He thought he knew everything about everything. He thought the TVA
+was one of the greatest things that ever happened. Well, those of us who knew
+something about economics started raising some questions about it, and he
+became apoplectic. He turned beet red, he slammed his book shut, stormed
+out the door, and turned around and said, “Just wait until my first-year elements
+class gets here, then we’ll have a real jurisprudence seminar!” That was
+a revealing moment.25
+
+Director’s influence was such that he continued to recruit converts for
+law and economics, even after he retired from teaching. Posner, who met
+Director at Stanford in 1968, recalls that “he was...a Socrates-like figure
+in the sense that he wrote very little . . . [but had] a very penetrating
+style of discussion. He wouldn’t let you get away with anything. Most of
+what people say in conversation [is] casual nonsense, and he didn’t tolerate
+any of that. He was polite but he was very firm and a real teacher.”
+Director’s influence deepened with the creation of the Journal of Law
+and Economics, and the establishment of a research program in antitrust.
+The Anti-Trust Project was the first great entrepreneurial success for the
+movement, allowing Director’s ideas, which would have been locked up
+in his writer’s-blocked brain, to be disseminated to the larger world
+through the project’s fellows.26 In addition to laying the intellectual foundations
+for law and economics, it is also gave the field a solid organizational
+base. “The economic analysis of law was no longer an idea but a
+fact. The Journal of Law and Economics existed. There were law and
+economics fellowships with the whole program financed by the Volker
+Fund. Furthermore, and this was extremely important, there were now
+law professors who took an active part in the program, at first Ken Dam
+and Edmund Kitch, later to be joined by Richard Posner.”27 Law and
+economics’ origins in antitrust are also an important explanation for the
+movement’s success. Law and economics “was viewed as a very narrow
+hole in the dam geared mainly to antitrust where it was perfectly appropriate.
+At that time there was probably less resistance than might have
+emerged later when the whole operation burst forth in ways that weren’t
+forecast by the people involved.”28 Law and economics was able to find
+a place in legal education because “this was an activity involving the appointment
+of maybe one economist. It might be interesting. It did not
+have clear implications for someone who was, say, teaching property.”29
+The combination of an academic entrepreneur (Director), a group of disciples
+(the Anti-Trust Project fellows), a willing patron (the Volker Fund),
+96 CHAPTER 4
+
+and a “hole” in the edifice of legal education (antitrust) prevented law
+and economics from dying in the crib.
+Ronald Coase would build an even more impressive base for law and
+economics on Director’s foundation. It was the combination of the chance
+to extend Director’s ideas and the opportunities available in Chicago that
+led Coase to the Law School.
+
+When I came to the University of Chicago, I regarded my role as that of Saint
+Paul to Aaron Director’s Christ. He got the doctrine going, and what I had to
+do was bring it to the gentiles. And I don’t think I would have ever come to the
+University of Chicago had it not been for the existence of the Journal of Law
+and Economics. That’s what I wanted to do. I wanted to get what Aaron started
+going so that the whole profession [would be influenced by these ideas]—and
+when I say profession, I mean the economics profession; I have no interest in
+lawyers or legal education.30
+
+Coase’s ideas showed how economic reasoning could apply to the entire
+legal system, and his editorship of the JLE demonstrated these broad applications.
+At the time, it was extremely difficult to place economically
+informed articles in major law reviews,31 but Coase could run the JLE
+proactively, soliciting articles that extended economic analysis of law to
+social regulation, intellectual property, education, minimum wage policy,
+unionization, property rights, broadcasting, and industry structure. In the
+1960s, the JLE provided coordination and coherence to the movement
+that would have been absent if its adherents had to publish in pure economics
+or law journals. Coase’s work with the JLE also meant that, when
+an intellectual entrepreneur par excellence arrived in Chicago, he could
+draw on a deep foundation of preexisting scholarship.
+
+The Externalities of Richard Posner and the Takeoff of
+Law and Economics
+
+While the work of Director and Coase helped to establish law and economics
+as a respectable field, it was the emergence of Richard Posner that
+made it an academic phenomenon of the first rank.32 First and foremost,
+the breadth of the ambition of Posner’s major work, Economic Analysis
+of Law, signaled to the legal academy that law and economics could identify
+major defects in traditional approaches across the entirety of legal
+scholarship, thereby inducing others, especially prospective law professors,
+to follow his lead. Second, Posner legitimated law and economics as
+a mainstream field by setting off so many arguments with legal academia’s
+incumbent scholars. Third, because he was publishing in so many different
+fields, Posner created a strong incentive for even the unsympathetic
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 97
+
+to become competent in law and economics, if only to argue with or understand
+what he was saying. Fourth, Posner helped to create a small
+industry by cofounding the economic consulting firm Lexecon, thereby
+creating a demand for persons trained in law and economics, as well as
+educating lawyers in the usefulness of the field. Posner’s work, in short,
+produced a positive externality for the movement, by increasing the demand
+for its scholarship and removing blockages to its supply.
+After graduating from Harvard Law and clerking for Supreme Court
+Justice William Brennan, Posner went on to a series of important posts in
+the federal government, concluding at the Solicitor General’s office, where
+he handled antitrust matters. Up to that point, Posner’s career trajectory
+pointed to a bright, if conventional, future in the liberal academic establishment.
+At the Solicitor General’s office, Posner began to be exposed to
+the possibilities of law and economics, when as the head of a Telecommunications
+Task Force he worked with the economists Leland Johnson and
+William Baumol, and the law and economics pioneer William Baxter. As
+a consequence, he says, “By the time I went on the teaching market and
+I was hired by Stanford I knew I wanted to do economic analysis of law.”
+What was not clear to Posner was what a career in economic analysis
+of law looked like. Reflecting on his arrival at Stanford in 1986, Posner
+recalls,
+
+I noticed the name Aaron Director on the door of an office, and I knew the
+name because I read a little book that . . . mentioned [him] . . . disapprovingly,
+but indicating that he had an interesting point of view. I thought that since I
+was going to do antitrust I would meet this fellow so I went and introduced
+myself, and soon realized that this is a very smart person. I mean, Lee Johnson
+was a good economist, but Aaron was a really exceptional person.
+
+In addition to influencing him intellectually, Director also brought Posner
+into contact with his Chicago network. After Nixon was elected president
+in the fall of 1968, George Stigler was asked to set up a task force on
+antitrust, to which he appointed Coase and Dam of Chicago, and, on
+Director’s recommendation, Posner. Posner’s connection to the network
+deepened even further when Stigler taught at Stanford that same fall. Bill
+Baxter was also teaching law at Stanford, and introduced him to the work
+of Guido Calabresi, which “was a real eye-opener, this idea that you could
+use economics to talk about tort law.”33 This was also the year that Gary
+Becker published his famous article on the economics of crime.34 Taken
+together, these simultaneous influences suggested to Posner that if economics
+could be applied beyond antitrust, to torts and criminal law, then
+there was no area of law immune from its scrutiny. While his year at
+Stanford opened his eyes to the potential of law and economics, its equally
+98 CHAPTER 4
+
+durable impact was to pull him into the network that would land him an
+appointment at Chicago in the fall of 1969.
+Becoming the Richard Posner who would go on to apply economic
+calculation to all areas of social life involved more than a new methodology.
+Given his background as a Brennan clerk and Johnson administration
+lawyer, he embraced a new ideology as well.
+
+I would say I was looking for an academic niche, but it is of course the case
+that people like George and Aaron and Milton, Gary Becker, Harold Demsetz,
+they’re extremely conservative. . . . I’d been very liberal up until then, but I
+didn’t like the student unrest of the late sixties and the general leftism. . . . I
+didn’t have any particular belief in the Vietnamese, all this left-wing stuff and
+riots and all that, so I was unsympathetic, but as late as ’68 I did vote for
+Humphrey. I didn’t vote for Nixon, but gradually I swung around [so that] in
+the seventies I was very conservative, and so certainly part of my interest in
+economics analysis of law . . . by the seventies was an effort to reform the law
+and make antitrust more economic and less political, which would narrow it
+necessarily. . . . So I think the conservative and the normative side of it was a
+factor, but I think the most important was just that these people seemed very
+smart, analytically. This is different from . . . their political views . . . this reflex
+hostility [to government]. It was a reaction of course to overregulation. . . .
+They seemed smarter than lawyers . . . and in particular they were smarter in
+the sense they had much better sharper analytical tools for dealing with law
+rather then the standard legal vocabulary, so that was really the decisive thing,
+and that was more important than the normative [side].
+
+Looking back at Posner’s epochal Economic Analysis of Law, it is hard
+to miss this weaving together of the ideological and methodological sides
+of law and economics. Posner’s tone was brutal, implying that traditional
+approaches to law were based on little more than muddle-headed liberal
+benevolence. Economic liberalism had become a sedative to serious discussion
+of first principles, and the legal profession and the law itself
+needed to be administered a dose of shock therapy to awaken itself.35 The
+conservatives that Posner began to associate himself with seemed willing
+to confront reality directly, and they had a methodology that allowed
+them to do so.
+Economic Analysis of Law helped to move law and economics from its
+relatively low profile in the 1960s to its ubiquity in the 1970s and 1980s.
+While leading liberal legal scholars largely ignored the previous generation
+of law and economics scholarship, they felt compelled to respond to
+Posner. George Priest observes that, despite its weaknesses,
+
+Posner’s efficiency-of-the-law project . . . had great intellectual influence—defined
+even in market terms—because it electrified the academy by compelling
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 99
+
+them to learn something about law and economics. Here, Calabresi had an
+important role as well. Calabresi and Posner both had substantial influence over
+the market for law and economics through their decade-long debate over the
+importance of efficiency as a value. Note, however, that this influence derives
+not so much from the originality of any idea or from its attempted refutation,
+but from the debate itself. It was the debate between the Chicagoan and the
+Yalie, the conservative and the ultraliberal, which had the influence. . . . Both
+parties embraced the core of economic analysis as a mechanism for thinking
+about legal problems; they simply differed in that embrace in many respects. At
+heart, what was important in the Posner-Calabresi debate was the economic
+analysis that they agreed upon. Observers could side with one or the other combatant
+regarding their differences. To do so convincingly, however, each observer
+had to learn the common areas of agreement.36
+
+The Posner-Calabresi debate convinced legal scholars that, if they did not
+update their analytical toolkit, they might be left behind. Michael Graetz
+of Yale Law School recalls that Posner played a critical role in the diffusion
+of law and economics “because he was saying, ‘You may think you
+can ignore it in procedure, but you can’t ignore it in procedure. You may
+think that family law doesn’t apply here, but you can’t ignore it there. In
+criminal law you can’t ignore it.’ By the mid-1970s young scholars at least
+thought it was something that you had to read and understand.” Finally,
+the fact that one of the participants in the debate was at Yale Law School
+helped to strip law and economics of the perception that it was an entirely
+conservative, University of Chicago project. “In the academic world generally,
+certainly in the law school part of it, anything out of Chicago economics
+at that time was ideological. It wasn’t really scholarship. But here
+was someone who never set foot in Chicago at that time writing the same
+kind of thing. . . . Well that gave a kind of respectability [to the field].”37
+Economic Analysis of Law signaled that traditional legal approaches
+were vulnerable and that substantial reputations could be made in challenging
+them. As Roberta Romano has convincingly argued, the legal
+academy’s approach to corporate law, for example, was intellectually vulnerable
+in the late 1960s, but the efforts of Henry Manne and Ralph
+Winter to apply economic concepts to the field were ignored at best and
+ridiculed at worst.38 Because of his sheer visibility, Posner could not be
+ignored. Douglas Baird, a student at Stanford Law in the mid-1970s and
+later dean of the University of Chicago Law School, recalls that Posner
+reshaped the structure of legal scholarship.
+
+In the early seventies, people like Posner would come in and spend six weeks
+studying family law, and they’d write a couple of articles explaining why everything
+everyone was saying in family law was 100 percent wrong. And then the
+replies would be, “No, we were only 80 percent wrong.” And Posner never got
+100 CHAPTER 4
+
+things exactly right, but he always turned everything upside down, and people
+talked about law differently. . . . By the time I came along, and I wasn’t trained
+as economist, it was clear that . . . doing great work was easy. . . . I used to say
+that this was just like knocking over Coke bottles with a baseball bat. You had
+the article du jour club. You could just go in and write something revolutionary
+and go in tomorrow and write another article. I remember writing articles
+where the time between getting the idea and getting it accepted from a major
+law review was four days. I’m not Richard Posner, and few of us are. I got out
+of law school, and I was interested in bankruptcy law, which was inhabited by
+intellectual midgets. . . . It was a complete intellectual wasteland. I got tenure
+by saying, “Jeez, a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.” You
+got tenure for that! The reality is that there was just an open field begging for
+people to do great work.
+
+Economic Analysis of Law suggested to young scholars that the future
+belonged to law and economics, and that traditional doctrinal scholarship
+was no longer the unquestioned route to success in the legal academy.
+On top of this, expectations for scholarly production among law professors
+began to increase considerably in the 1970s, and Posner’s remarkable
+productivity showed that law and economics was an approach that
+fit these increasingly strict tenure standards. No group was more effected
+by this than the editors of elite law reviews. “If you were a student who
+was interested in going into law teaching, in the mid- to late 1970s your
+education would include editing law review articles of Posner and Easterbrook.
+. . . If you look at the articles that were published in the field in
+this period, people like Posner were just crushing people and leading the
+pack. That’s the cutting edge that people like me were exposed to.”39
+Finally, Posner influenced the legal academic pipeline because, in comparison
+to the first generation of law and economics scholars, he had sterling
+establishment credentials, and his success destabilized the model of what
+constituted the career of an elite legal scholar. Posner recalls, “I was someone
+who had very conventional legal credentials. . . . I was a great student,
+I clerked for the Supreme Court, I worked for the Solicitor General, so I
+was a sort of model law professor type, but instead of writing conventional
+law professor stuff I was writing economics, so if I was doing that
+. . . then people began to wonder what exactly is the standard law professor’s
+career?” Posner’s example suggested that there was no risk, and
+potentially great reward, in a career in law and economics.
+Posner was also instrumental in exploiting the business potential of law
+and economics, by cofounding (with Richard Landes and their student
+Andrew Rosenfield) the economic consulting firm Lexecon in 1977.40 The
+firm, which now has a staff of over one hundred, offices in five cities, and
+clients that include many of the nation’s major corporations and top law
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 101
+
+firms, provides expert witnesses and economic analysis on litigation and
+regulatory matters. The increasing comfort of judges with economic analysis,
+in large part a function of the surging legitimacy of law and economics
+scholarship, has made economic consultants almost mandatory for
+large companies involved in complex litigation. Michael Mandel has identified
+three forces leading to increasing demand for economic consulting:
+the boom in litigation, economic deregulation, and mergers and acquisitions.
+Romano adds to Mandel’s list the increase in complex financial
+deals beginning in the 1980s, which stimulated market demand for law
+and economics practitioners and provided natural experiments with
+which to test its claims.41 Writing as the economic stakes involved with
+the law were increasing, Mandel argues that “lawyers and judges have
+become much more comfortable with economic reasoning,” a phenomenon
+he attributes to the spread of law and economics in law schools, and
+the Law and Economics Center’s seminars for federal judges (for the LEC
+see below).42 Given the stakes involved, firms have been willing to spend
+enormous amounts for economic expert witnesses: Mandel provided a
+low estimate of the market in 1997 (just at the largest firms) of $300
+million, “almost certainly larger than the payroll for the full-time faculty
+at the top 25 economics departments.”43 In 1994, consulting fees for top
+economists at Lexecon were $300 an hour, and some estimates suggest
+they have doubled in the years since then.44 The lucrative nature of the
+field created a substantial demand for both lawyers and economists
+trained in the area, putting pressure on law schools to produce students
+familiar with the subject.
+Posner influenced the legal scholarship market on the supply (of scholarship)
+and demand (by law schools and firms) sides, and in the process
+helped lead law and economics from the margins to the academic mainstream.
+It would take skillful organizational entrepreneurship, however,
+to make the most of the opening that Posner and others had created.
+
+The Birth of an Intellectual Entrepreneur: Manne at Rochester
+
+While Coase claims the mantle of the St. Paul of law and economics,
+Henry Manne, along with Posner, has an equally strong claim to having
+evangelized the gentiles.45 As the movement’s first organizational entrepreneur,
+Manne increased the audience for law and economics scholarship
+in the academy and on the bench. While there were larger forces
+encouraging law and economics, Manne’s activities are essential in explaining
+the rapidity and depth of its diffusion in the 1970s and 1980s.
+Manne made his reputation as a legal scholar at George Washington
+University, producing work on corporate law that was (and continues to
+102 CHAPTER 4
+
+be) controversial. In the mid-1960s, Manne argued that hostile takeovers
+are the most effective device for the control of management46 and that
+insider trading is an efficient mechanism for extracting information from
+inside the firm.47 On the basis of these publications, Manne was offered
+an endowed chair in the University of Rochester’s political science department,
+then under the leadership of the legendary William Riker, who had
+made it the “mother ship” of rational choice theory, the application of
+microeconomic theory to political institutions and processes.48 In addition
+to being a member of the political science department, Manne was asked
+by then-president W. Allen Wallis to take over the planning of a new, fully
+interdisciplinary law school with a strong emphasis on law and economics.
+The planning documents Manne generated show the two sides of law
+and economics, its nonideological critique of legal education and legal
+scholarship and an ideologically charged attack on government interference
+in the economy. While the law school was never built, its failure led
+Manne to direct his entrepreneurial energies into wholesale reform of the
+legal academy, and his plans for Rochester provided the template for his
+deanship of the George Mason University Law School fifteen years later.
+Manne’s formal proposal for the law school emphasized the nonideological
+component of law and economics. He noted that criticism of the
+standard law school curriculum was not of recent vintage, but could be
+traced back to the rise of legal realism, which led naturally to interdisciplinarity;
+as there was no uniquely “legal” discipline, the law was best
+approached through the methods of the social sciences. This intellectual
+critique, Manne argued, had now become a professional necessity. The
+specialization of law and the complexity, differentiation, and regulation
+of the economy made law schools’ focus on appellate advocacy skills unsuited
+to the world of working lawyers.49 While this was a compelling
+critique, it had not yet influenced the core of legal education.
+
+In spite of the consistent responsible criticism of both the form and the substance
+of modern American legal education, the traditional mode continues to
+prevail. . . . This process produces a graduate with a somewhat mechanical approach
+to legal problems and little comprehension of the social, political and
+economic realities of his subject matter. The modern American political system
+has placed responsibilities on lawyers for which this traditional program has
+not adequately equipped them.50
+
+No one would create new law schools that resembled the current model,
+but it was impossible to unwind existing institutions and substitute
+something new in their place. “Introducing a program of this sort with
+a completely new law school is quite different from attempting to introduce
+such a program into an existing law school . . . it is almost impossible
+to change the institutionalized patterns of a traditionally-oriented
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 103
+
+law school. . . . This would not be the case with a program adopted
+from the beginning with a faculty who were sympathetic to it.”51 While
+newness in a highly reputation-sensitive field like education could be a
+liability, Manne proposed to make it his chief asset. “There is no vested
+bureaucracy, no tradition-bound alumni, and no contented administrators
+without strong motivation for change. It is, happily, relatively simple
+to institute vastly improved educational programs in a new law
+school, whereas it might be impossible to get leadership on such matters
+from existing schools.”52
+The core of Manne’s alternative was law and economics. In Manne’s
+view, while other disciplines had become attractive to law professors,
+
+no other social science discipline can begin to match the relevance and importance
+of economics for the training of modern lawyers. . . . The idea should be
+to infuse the entire curriculum with economic sophistication. Law graduates
+who plan on careers in government, in business or with business law firms
+should be equipped to analyze the problems they confront with rigorous analytic
+techniques of both law and economics. If this training can be successfully
+accomplished, it would be safe to predict a heavy demand for these graduates.53
+
+The attractiveness of the law school to future graduates was only a part
+of the story, however. Equally important was the potential that the approach
+had for attracting the support of American business.
+
+On very few occasions have law schools sought direct support from industry.
+The law school at the University of Chicago has done successful fund raising
+from corporations, as has Yale. . . . But these two, and undoubtedly other
+cases not know to the writer, are the exceptions rather than the rule. Almost
+every corporation today has considerable in-house legal work; the general
+counsel has become an increasingly important figure; and the promotion of
+general counsels into higher executive offices is quite common in American
+industry. Thus a law school especially designed to serve the needs with which
+these men are familiar could strike a responsive chord that many other law
+schools do not.54
+
+By taking advantage of this untapped resource and leveraging the resources
+of Rochester’s well-developed business school and economics department,
+Manne proposed to create a new law school that could compete
+with the elites of legal education. “If the University of Rochester established
+a law school along the lines proposed here, it should be possible in
+a few years to achieve an academic status which would otherwise take
+many years and considerably more money.”55
+Building such a school would require a great deal of money, and not
+just clever ideas. Manne’s plan assumed the attractiveness of the school’s
+law and economics focus to American business. It was here that the other
+104 CHAPTER 4
+
+side of Manne’s project, and law and economics itself, revealed itself most
+clearly. Especially instructive in this regard was Manne’s correspondence
+with Pierre Goodrich, the wealthy Indianapolis founder of the Liberty
+Fund. The two men’s shared assessment of the state of American education,
+and legal education in particular, is vividly expressed by Manne’s
+observation that
+
+the Augean stables were cleansed by diverting a stream of water through them.
+. . . The educational world is such a mess today from the libertarian point of
+view that a cleansing is certainly long overdue, but one strong stream of attractive
+conservative philosophy might just be able to sweep things clean. One law
+school dedicated to propositions like those you propound . . . would do more
+to discipline all the other law schools (and conceivably other segments of the
+university) than anything I can think of.56
+
+Manne clearly saw himself, as Simons did, as part of a true-believing remnant,
+comparing the potential for his law school to that of the Chicago
+economics department.
+
+I frequently recall my own experience at the University of Chicago from 1949
+to 1952. I received my first serious introduction to libertarian views there. The
+man most responsible for my education in libertarian values was Aaron Director,
+the economist in the Law School. But consider the state of economics education
+in the United States at that time. With the exception of perhaps six to eight
+people at the University of Chicago and four or five more scattered around the
+country, there was literally no remnant of libertarian philosophy in academic
+economics in America. Had that Chicago group not existed, I think that today’s
+growing popularity and respect for so-called “Chicago economics” would not
+exist. That is not to say that libertarian values would have disappeared from
+the face of the earth, or that Chicago economics perfectly embodies those values.
+But it is to suggest that from a small tough nut, like that group at Chicago,
+vastly larger and more important things can grow. Actually I believe that the
+law school world is even more ripe for this than economics was twenty years
+ago. A single generation of lawyers from one school dedicated to true liberal
+values could turn the American legal system back into a productive and desirable
+channel. At least it would be a start, and that is more than is happening
+elsewhere at present.57
+
+This letter makes clear what Manne’s proposal did not, that the Rochester
+Law School would provide a home for those who believed in “true liberal
+values,” and, like Chicago, would send out missionaries to the unchurched.
+It would do what Yale Law School had done for modern liberalism:
+provide an intense environment for the development of ideas, and a
+training ground for the lawyers who would disseminate them. “Hopefully
+all our students will become educated in the true implications of law for
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 105
+
+free men in a free society. If we do succeed in that goal, we shall certainly
+be the only major law school in the United States even addressing itself
+to the problems of law in the free society.”58 Manne was clear that if this
+project was not undertaken at Rochester, it was exceptionally unlikely
+that it could be put into place anywhere else, as Rochester was “one of the
+few major universities in the United States that has a significant number of
+professors who are strongly oriented toward the free market philosophy
+and the free society.”59
+A sympathetic faculty only dealt with the internal problem. More
+daunting was attracting external support for a law school with a distinctly
+libertarian edge.
+
+We have a tremendous fund raising problem ahead of us, since so many foundations
+and individuals will not support what they consider a “conservative” law
+school, and I will not dishonestly propose something to them while I plan to
+establish something else. I have no interest in founding “just another law
+school,” and certainly no interest in furthering the statist characteristics of our
+leading schools. . . . Nothing would make me more proud than to be able to
+name our law school the Pierre F. Goodrich School of Freedom Under Law.60
+
+The traditional reliance on alumni makes raising money for a new law
+school a risky proposition, but Manne believed that law and economics
+would allow Rochester to raise money from conservative donors, like
+Goodrich and the (then still conservative) Pew Foundation. Raising that
+kind of money was a full-time, presidential-level job, but despite Allen
+Wallis’s strong commitment to the project—he donated half a million dollars
+to the project—his time was increasingly absorbed in conflict with
+the university’s faculty.61 While fund-raising problems and the opposition
+of the local bar62 killed Manne’s plans at Rochester, his failure redirected
+his entrepreneurial activities to the larger world of legal academia. Henceforth,
+he would operate within existing law schools while mounting an
+ideological and pedagogical critique of them.
+Manne’s greatest entrepreneurial success at Rochester were his Economics
+Institutes for Law Professors. The seminars brought law professors
+together for three and one-half weeks (later reduced to two) of intensive
+training in microeconomics: “No effort was made in the early
+versions of this course to relate economics directly to the law: that was to
+be left entirely to the law professors, each armed with a copy of Posner’s
+Economic Analysis of Law.”63 Manne’s motivations for starting the program
+were complex. On the one hand, the ideas themselves were so powerful
+that they produced a powerful motivation for spreading them to
+others: “I was all excited by the power of the economics that I had
+learned. It was totally new. It wasn’t the economics I learned in college,
+it wasn’t even the economics I had learned from Aaron Director. This was
+106 CHAPTER 4
+
+. . . the economics of property rights. . . . I thought that if law professors
+learned this, it would really change things.” Manne’s alienation in the
+legal academy meant that he also had more self-interested motivations for
+spreading these ideas to law professors. Having failed to receive an offer
+from an elite law school and unable to start his own, Manne focused on
+making himself part of the mainstream by exercising influence from the
+outside: “Over time I educated over 650 law professors, and I dare say I
+became friendly with a great number of them. So slowly, this idea that
+Henry Manne was some kind of a kook—and it was strong—[declined].
+. . . This was wholesaling it. I thought that then, and I used it to sell it
+[that way] too.” Unable to supply legal education himself (retailing), he
+could supply the suppliers, law professors themselves (wholesaling). In
+the process, Manne gradually evolved into a network entrepreneur, focusing
+on the dissemination of ideas and the creation of a coherent community
+of law and economics scholars.
+The seminars worked on both the supply and demand sides of law and
+economics. On the supply side, the seminars provided law professors with
+the skills to introduce economic concepts into their scholarship. As a later
+section will make clear (see “Early Adopters: UVA and USC”), the Manne
+programs substantially helped certain law schools, such as the University
+of Virginia, develop a core of law and economics scholars. The scholarship
+of Ralph Winter, then a professor of law at Yale and later a judge on
+the Second Circuit, and Douglas Ginsburg, then a professor of law at
+Harvard and now chief judge of the D.C. Circuit, took on a strong law
+and economics coloration soon after they attended Manne’s seminars.64
+Warren Schwartz of UVA Law attended the first Manne seminar and recalls,
+“As an intellectual matter, I had a very serious itch that I did not
+have the theoretical foundation for. . . . In particular, I was teaching regulated
+industries from the typical casebook which simply disclosed what
+the regulatory law was. It simply didn’t make any sense to me. I was very
+much in the market if you will for some theoretical coherence. I went to
+the [first seminar] at Rochester, and it was for me a just a very exciting
+awakening.” Perhaps the most direct impact was at the University of Toronto.
+Manne recalls, “I got a call from... Michael Trebilcock. He was
+from New Zealand, and had been teaching at University of Toronto Law
+School, and the province of Ontario just put up a quarter of a million
+dollars for a program in law and economics, and he’d been selected to
+head it. He said, ‘But I’ve never studied economics. Could I come to your
+program?’ He did, and went on to head what was one of the strongest
+law and economics programs in the world.”
+Just as important were the effects on the demand side. At the simplest
+level, the seminars helped law professors understand economics and integrate
+it into their teaching, even if they did not produce it themselves. In
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 107
+
+addition, the tenured professors who made the law school hiring decisions
+were wholly untutored in economics, and because of ideology or incomprehension
+were resistant to hiring law and economics scholars. Eroding
+this blockage in the academic hiring market was a key objective of the
+seminars for law professors. In order to have maximum impact, Manne
+“would not take a single professor from any law school. They had to
+come in a minimum of pairs, and the more the merrier, because I knew
+exactly what would happen, they would go back and get laughed at, as I
+had been at GW. . . . If there were two or more, they could support each
+other. In the first program there were six from UVA, four from Yale, two
+from Harvard, Indiana had three or four.” Steve Eagle, who was one of
+Manne’s earliest hires at the George Mason Law School, also believes that
+the seminars had this effect, saying, “Even those who went to the program
+and went back to their home schools, and did pretty much what they had
+done before, had an exposure to law and economics, and it made it easier
+for them to accept hiring people in the law and economics field, made
+them more comfortable and conversant in law and economics scholarship.
+. . . It spread the idea that law and economics was an important part
+of the law professors’ world, even if the individual didn’t participate.”
+Michael Graetz, then at UVA Law and one of the program’s earliest graduates,
+recalls,
+
+I remember even now a handful of people from around the country who you
+met who became important people in their fields. I think they created lots of
+networks, lots of people stayed in touch. . . . It created a group of true believers.
+. . . If you look at key first-generation people of a certain age cohort of that
+time, you’d find that they had been through the Manne school at some point,
+because he did it for a long time. . . . It made them more sophisticated consumers.
+. . . It created lots of networks. . . . Henry certainly reduced the transaction
+costs to people becoming competent at least as readers if not as producers. And
+he got enough people interested to be producers. So he played a catalyst role.
+
+The Economics Institute for Law Professors spurred the creation of more
+scholarship, increased the audience that was receptive to it, and reduced
+the hostility to its practitioners. By demonstrating organizational success,
+Manne’s first program also made it much easier for Manne to raise money
+for later, even more ambitious programs.
+What gave the program for law professors even greater momentum was
+the ease with which Manne was able to raise funds, a pleasant surprise
+after his experience at Rochester. Manne had tried and failed to launch a
+similar program at GWU, but between 1968 (when Manne left GWU)
+and the early 1970s business had become much more open to supporting
+law and economics.
+108 CHAPTER 4
+
+This time when I went for fund-raising, I wanted $100,000, and I thought I
+could handle a fund-raising job of raising $10,000 from ten of them [major
+corporations]. I wrote to eleven, and I related it heavily to antitrust. At this
+point, the world knew that Chicago economics was the only thing that could
+possibly save them from an antitrust debacle, and I related it strongly to that.
+I said it was a way to get these ideas across to a large number of law professors
+who create the lawyers and government officials. Well, of the eleven I wrote to,
+within a few weeks I had $10,000 from ten of them, and the last $10,000 came
+in a few weeks later. It was the U.S. Steel company. I called the guy and said, “I
+can’t use your money,” and he said, “No, don’t do that.” I gave the extra to
+the university.
+
+Manne was riding the same wave as conservative public interest law’s
+early entrepreneurs, but, in sharp contrast, Manne was raising money
+from corporations for long-range, free-market-oriented activity. This
+fund-raising success would be even more important in subsequent years,
+as Manne’s programmatic ambitions increased.
+
+Spreading the Gospel: The Creation of the Law and Economics Center
+
+By 1973, Manne had definitively concluded that he could be “far more
+effective in some activity other than waiting around here indefinitely to
+open and administer a law school.”65 Manne’s opportunity for greater
+effectiveness arose at the relatively undistinguished law school of the University
+of Miami, under the deanship of former University of Chicago law
+professor Soia Mentschikoff. The new dean was eager to put the school
+on the map, and despite her ideological reservations about Manne’s intellectual
+approach, she agreed to give him “the necessary autonomy to run
+a free-market oriented research, teaching and conference center,” which
+would “do scholarly research in free market alternatives to the regulatory
+approach so pervasive in our legal system today.”66 Manne’s experience
+at Miami shows the opportunities and constraints that existed for conservatives
+in the legal academy of the 1970s and early 1980s.
+While Manne had been considered a marginal, even eccentric, character
+in the legal academy of the 1960s, by the mid-1970s his star was rising.
+Manne credits the shift to the increasing credibility of free-market economics:
+“I had become respectable at this point. . . . You know who I
+credited for that? Milton Friedman. At an AALS meeting in about 1969
+or 70, two young professors that I didn’t even know were walking ahead
+of me, and they were talking about me. And I heard one of them say, he’s
+not a conservative kook, he’s like Milton Friedman! Milton made the
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 109
+
+world safe for people to talk about free market [ideas]. . . . Now I was
+respectable—she [Soia Mentschikoff] wouldn’t have touched me two
+years before—and it wasn’t accidental that she called me the same year
+that Yale did.” The rising tide of Chicago was raising all boats, Manne’s
+included, by removing the stigma associated with libertarian ideas. In his
+last year at Rochester, the offer from Yale Law School that Manne had
+waited so long for finally came through.
+
+At that point, I finally had an offer from Yale. I got a call from Ralph Winter.
+He said . . . we want you to come visit as a prelude to a faculty appointment.
+. . . I said Ralph, you’re two weeks and five years too late. . . . Two weeks ago
+I agreed with Soia Mentschikoff that I was going to start this new center at
+Miami . . . [and] you’re five years too late for me to give a damn. That was one
+of the truest things I’ve ever said. Because for the first fifteen years I was dying
+to get to Columbia or Yale Law School.
+
+Why did Manne turn down a visiting appointment at Yale, then as now
+the pinnacle of legal education? Resentment at the elite legal institutions
+that had refused to make room for him played an important part, but
+Miami’s relative backwardness offered opportunities that even a law
+school as strong as Yale could not match.
+
+The relative weakness of the University academically is paradoxically an advantage
+in that same regard. At a stronger University or law school, where I would
+not be the most prominent professor, it is very unlikely that I could promote a
+program of this sort without considerable resistance and interference from
+other members of the law faculty, the economics department, and from the
+University administration. It is unlikely that an opportunity like this one would
+ever be presented at any other major university in the United States.67
+
+Miami, unlike Yale, was not in a position in the legal academic market
+to allow its ideological scruples to interfere with an opportunity for
+national attention.
+The Law and Economics Center (LEC) that Manne created at Miami
+was remarkably ambitious. In addition to the economics program for law
+professors, the LEC hosted an economics program for federal judges, a
+fellowship program for students with economics training to obtain a law
+degree, and topical conferences supported by the Liberty Fund. These
+programs transformed law and economics from an idea to a movement
+with real organizational breadth.
+The Olin Fellows program brought recent PhD’s in economics to
+Miami to receive a fully funded law degree, supplemented with a specialized
+curriculum in law and economics. The objective was to produce economists
+that law schools could hire, at a time when JD/PhD’s were very
+110 CHAPTER 4
+
+rare in legal academia. The alumni of the Olin program remember the
+Law and Economics Center as a heady intellectual environment. Fred
+McChesney, professor of law at Northwestern University and certainly
+the most distinguished alumnus of the Olin Fellows, recalls, “It was fabulous.
+People coming in, going out, giving short courses, giving long
+courses, giving papers, conferences, it was electric, just electric. . . . Buchanan
+came in, Coase came in. . . . Guido [Calabresi] came in. . . . You’d
+be walking down the hall, and there’d be Gary Becker, there’d be Armen
+Alchian, there’d be Harold Demsetz. . . . You want to talk to them? Go
+in and talk to them. Anybody who was somebody was down there at
+some point.” None of the other LEC Olin Fellows ascended as far as
+McChesney, but the program had other successes, the most important of
+which was producing the core of the faculty that Manne recruited in his
+first few years as dean of GMU Law School. In Manne’s view, the success
+of the program has to be judged relative to its location at Miami and later
+at Emory.
+
+I always thought that the Olin Fellowship program was central to the whole
+
+idea of the Law and Economics Center. . . . Indeed, I think I might go so far as
+
+to say that I do not think the Center could ever have had the success it did
+without the galvanizing and energizing influence of the Fellows. . . . I was confident
+that the uniqueness of the program and the growing reputation of the
+Center, as well as a lot of money in a fairly bad market, would get us decent
+students. It worked; the Olin Fellows were regularly in the top 10 percent of
+their law school classes. . . . After all the dust settled, sixteen of the thirty-three
+Fellows at Miami and Emory ended up in academia, some in business schools
+but mostly in law. One [Fred McChesney] is today a very distinguished chair
+professor at Northwestern; one is a mainstay of law and economics at George
+Mason. . . . One had a chair at Kansas Law School before he took (and then
+dropped) the deanship at Chapman’s business school (he now runs a very successful
+program in economics for state judges for the Brookings-AEI Joint Center);
+one was a very prolific and successful economist at Clemson until he died
+a few years ago; one was my associate dean and a very successful professor at
+GMUSL. . . . One (who finished his law degree at Chicago) is a professor at U
+Penn Law School; and one became the academic VP at the University of Texas—
+Arlington after a successful teaching career. . . . Consider, if you will, the rather
+amazing list that I just presented. These were law graduates of Miami and
+Emory law schools (though to be sure some had very prestigious PhD degrees),
+and I suspect that this is more academics than those two schools have produced
+in total during their entire existence.
+
+Stated in these terms, there is no question that the Olin Fellows program
+was a success. Soon enough, however, conservative movement patrons,
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 111
+
+the Olin Foundation especially, asked themselves whether success relative
+to weak institutions was enough.
+More unambiguously successful were the Liberty Fund conferences and
+the economics programs for federal judges. The Liberty Fund conferences,
+which ran from 1975 to 1985, brought law and economics practitioners
+and others together for intense conferences on a single subject. As a letter
+from Manne to the Earhart Foundation explained, part of the motivation
+for the conferences was LEC public relations: “The great advantage to us
+of these programs is that they rapidly acquaint both the economics and
+law school worlds with our existence, and they generate an excellent book
+of papers and proceedings with the Center’s imprimatur.”68 More important
+were the networks the conferences created between scholars in
+economics and law who rarely ran in the same professional circles. The
+Liberty Fund conferences were of critical importance to younger scholars,
+integrating them into the budding law and economics network. George
+Priest, now at Yale but then at the University of Puget Sound Law School,
+recalls that the conferences
+
+gave younger people an opportunity to interact with senior people, and it created
+a cadre of law and economics types that proved to be very helpful. I met
+Bob Bork at the “Fire of Truth” Conference,69 and spent a lot of time with him
+there; Ed Kitch took me to a conference once when I was a research fellow [at
+Chicago] and I met people from UCLA, USC, and other schools. And after I
+did very well in some of these conferences, Henry Manne started soliciting articles
+from me for the conferences. That gives you even more prominence, and
+encourages you to work harder. Getting a thousand-dollar honorarium to write
+a paper then was a lot. I drooled over it. It was very helpful.
+
+Attendance at the Liberty Fund conferences also increased the perceived
+market value of law and economics practitioners, increasing their status
+in their own institutions and the likelihood that they would be recruited
+by other, more prestigious institutions.
+
+These conferences both enhanced existing markets and created markets of their
+own. Within a law school, again because of the rarity of academic conferences,
+it was a distinction to be invited to an academic conference of this nature; to
+be asked to deliver a paper was a special distinction. Thus, attendance at one
+or more of Henry Manne’s conferences greatly enhanced the positions of law
+and economics scholars within existing schools and with other schools to which
+they might be recruited. . . . They created markets that vastly enhanced the
+position of many of us in the field (including myself).70
+
+Charles Goetz, who became a major figure in law and economics at Virginia,
+is especially impressed with the networking functions of the Liberty
+Fund conferences.
+112 CHAPTER 4
+
+They were very important to me, because I very quickly got to know the other
+people who were interested in this stuff spread out across the United States of
+America. I met the people who were players at that time, and who you might
+want to have exchanged a paper [with] and so forth. I met people whose stuff I
+then knew enough to read. One example that strikes close to home is that I met
+George Priest at those conferences. He was a young guy out in Siberia, at the
+University of Puget Sound. I remember being very excited by George, and recommending
+him to the appointments committee at the University of Virginia.71
+
+The Liberty Fund programs were also important for purely intellectual
+reasons. They provided detailed feedback to scholars working in law and
+economics, identified areas for new research in a field still in its infancy,
+and provided opportunities for ideas to germinate. In the absence of a
+geographic center other than Chicago, the Liberty Fund programs provided
+otherwise isolated scholars with the intense, face-to-face interactions
+necessary for intellectual ferment and creativity.72
+Manne’s most famous programmatic achievement was, without a
+doubt, his Economics Institute for Federal Judges. Started in 1976, soon
+after Manne arrived in Miami, these were a direct spin-off of the institutes
+for law professors, which Manne concluded were successful and worthy
+of extension to other audiences (before the first seminar for law professors,
+in fact, he conducted programs for congressional staff and was considering
+programs for law review editors, journalists, and even clergy).73
+The draw of the program, especially before it developed a reputation
+among federal judges, were its price (free), luxury accommodations (the
+first was held at the Ocean Reef Club in Key Largo, and later seminars
+were held at equally attractive locations), and high-quality instructors,
+including Milton Friedman, Paul Samuelson, Armen Alchian, Harold
+Demsetz, Paul McAvoy, and Martin Feldstein.74 The inclusion of Samuelson
+was especially important, since it gave the seminars cover from
+charges of ideological imbalance.75 Manne was careful to limit the course
+to microeconomics, and to avoid any direct applications to legal issues.
+Charles Goetz, a professor in later programs, recalls that this limitation
+was not designed to avoid accusations of influencing judges’ decisionmaking,
+but for pedagogical reasons.
+
+The economics program for judges was pretty much straight economics. The
+competitive model, capital values, discounting to present value, that sort of
+thing. Henry Manne was concerned that judges were uncabinable if you tried
+to bring any kind of express legal applications into the picture. Classes would
+wind up being discussion of law rather than economics. Putting it bluntly . . .
+judges are pretty hard to control. They’re petty monarchs in their own courtroom.
+They’re not like ordinary students.
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 113
+
+For two and a half weeks (reduced to two weeks a few years later), federal
+judges would be marched through a tightly compressed course in microeconomics.
+In addition to the formal teaching sessions, Manne encouraged
+his faculty to mix informally with the judges in order to encourage
+intellectual interchange and engagement with the material.76 At its height,
+in 1990, the Economics Institute for Federal Judges had hosted 40 percent
+of the federal judiciary, including Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Clarence
+Thomas, and sixty-seven members of the federal courts of appeals.77
+The LEC’s seminars for federal judges have not been without controversy.
+First, the seminars for judges, like those for law professors, were held
+in first-class locations with opportunities for recreation in the afternoon.
+This led to accusations that the seminars were junkets intended to influence
+the decision-making of judges. Second, critics argued that the seminars
+violated codes of judicial ethics, because they were funded by corporations
+that judges could face as litigants. This was the charge of a challenge to
+the programs brought to the Advisory Committee on Codes of Judicial
+Conduct in 1980 by Charles Halpern, the cofounder of the Center for Law
+and Social Policy at the Georgetown University Institute for Public Interest
+Representation. Henry Butler, a close associate of Manne’s over the years,
+recalls that this challenge did lead to a change in the financing of the
+program. “In the process of discussing the LEC’s finances, Manne committed
+to the Judicial Conference that the LEC would not use corporate contributions
+to pay the direct expenses of the judicial education programs sponsored
+by the LEC. All direct expenses for the judges programs would be
+paid for with contributions from private foundations not affiliated with
+corporations. Corporate contributions would be used to cover LEC overhead
+and other activities, such as the Economics Institute for Law Professors
+and Law for Economics Professors.”78 Ending direct corporate contributions
+to the seminars has not satisfied the LEC’s critics, especially those
+in the liberal legal network, who have continued to publish widely publicized
+reports purporting to expose them as a form of judicial corruption.79
+In recent years, this controversy has heated up, although it has focused
+primarily on the seminars run by the Foundation for Research on Economics
+and the Environment, which has successfully rebuffed accusations
+that participation in its programs is ethically improper for federal judges.80
+In fact, Manne made a point of avoiding telling his supporters that there
+were any direct impacts on judges’ decision-making from the programs.
+He recalls “a family foundation out in San Francisco that gave us a lot
+of money, and finally withdrew it. They said that ‘you’ve taught us that
+foundations oughtn’t give money if you can’t show results. Well, we want
+you to show that you’re getting some impact from your judges’ program,’
+and I said, ‘You’re going to take that one on faith, because one thing I can’t
+do is claim to be having any impact on how judges decide cases.’ ”
+114 CHAPTER 4
+
+Manne always recognized that the effects of the judges programs were
+diffuse—rather than trying to change judges’ decision-making on particular
+cases, he was hoping to make them, at the margin, more open to economic
+reasoning across the board.
+Despite all the controversy that has swirled around them, Manne is
+convinced that his program for judges has had less impact in spreading
+law and economics than the Liberty Fund conferences or seminars for
+law professors, noting that “the ultimate intellectual payoff [of teaching
+judges], while perhaps more immediate, could never be as great as would
+teaching the teachers.”81 That said, Manne is convinced that the judges
+program was important, but as much for the attention it brought to the
+LEC and the legitimacy it gave to the larger enterprise of law and economics
+as for the actual impact on judges’ decision-making: “Law professors
+and lawyers have almost a mystical regard for judges, so if they were
+taking economics, it had to be okay.”
+Manne’s programs required enormous funding, well beyond what a
+university like Miami could raise on its own, and he was concerned that
+the LEC might raise money that would be diverted to purposes other than
+those of free market programming. In response, Manne chose the risky
+strategy of relying on annual funding, rather than building up an endowment.82
+In a letter to his supporters, Manne explained that
+
+there should be no permanent endowment funding for the Center. Grants can
+be conditioned on my continuing as the Director of the Center, and funds for
+individual professorships can be conditioned on the chair’s being occupied by
+a specific individual. This approach, however, leaves the Center somewhat vulnerable,
+since its long term future is always in doubt, and this can be debilitating.
+. . . In effect, what is required is good faith on the part of supporting foundations
+and agencies that they will not unexpectedly withdraw financial support
+from ongoing Center programs.83
+
+Manne’s success at Miami, and to a degree at Emory as well, was in part
+due to his impressive ability to extract resources from foundations and,
+to a degree that has not been replicated in other cases examined in this
+book, from corporations, without compromising his vision of the LEC’s
+programming. The LEC’s fund-raising success was partially owed to
+being founded before the explosion of conservative groups in the late
+1970s and early 1980s.
+
+There wasn’t much competition for that money—the competition came with
+
+these think tanks that were beginning to start up. . . . [At Scaife] Dick Larry
+
+always understood in some way what we were about, [but] what he really did
+was he liked Dick Ware, the program officer from Earhart, who pioneered a
+way of philanthropic giving that made more sense than anything. Find people
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 115
+
+they trusted and give them money when they could use it. . . . Dick Larry often
+used to say that I was always welcome to come in and make applications, because
+I had always done well with them in the past. He never was able to articulate
+why he liked what I had done, but it had always worked.84
+
+At least in this early period, and to some degree even today, conservative
+and libertarian foundations operated on the basis of “feel” and trust.
+They identified people they agreed with and in whose competence they
+had reasonable confidence, and did not ask a lot of questions or require
+extraordinary documentation. These patrons recognized that in the law,
+outcomes were long-term and difficult to reliably trace, and thus relied
+on informal evaluations and reputations developed within the small network
+of conservative founders and organizational entrepreneurs, rather
+than more formal, bureaucratic methods.
+Equally important as foundation support was Manne’s success in corporate
+fund-raising. In the early years of the LEC approximately threequarters
+of its support came from foundations and one-quarter from corporations,
+but Manne was so successful in raising corporate money that
+by the end of the decade the balance of support had been reversed (despite
+level funding from foundations). As chapter 3 showed, business in the
+early 1970s had become frightened by widespread challenges to corporate
+capitalism, a fear that Manne successfully exploited. Manne’s initial insight
+into corporate fund-raising was that the modern firm’s intellectual
+capital was concentrated in its general counsels, who had advanced degrees
+and were required to think about the corporation’s social, political,
+and legal context. While these general counsels could not give very large
+gifts, they “had their power of donation. . . . It was usually a small pot;
+they had twenty-five, fifty thousand. A lot of our gifts were five to ten
+thousand dollars. If you got one hundred donations, that’s pretty good.”85
+Working with corporate counsels allowed Manne to sidestep corporate
+philanthropy offices that tended to be more sensitive to the firm’s public
+relations. Establishing this broad donor base also meant that Manne did
+not have to worry about offending any particular firm. Diversity thus
+provided an effective defense against capture by its corporate donors.
+Manne’s fund-raising needs at Miami were considerably larger than
+they were at Rochester, and his strategy had to adapt accordingly. Fortuitously,
+soon after arriving in Miami, Manne met Bill Weston, who had
+worked for J. Howard Pew (the benefactor of the Pew Family Foundation)
+at the Sun Oil Company. Manne recalls that
+
+I met him once at a conference some years earlier. . . . I’d say a month or so
+after we got to Miami, he walked in the front door, said he wasn’t doing anything,
+but he knew what I was doing and he’d like to help. . . . We were going
+lickety-split trying to raise money, and at that point the mechanics of getting
+116 CHAPTER 4
+
+money out of corporations wasn’t clear. Fund-raising isn’t a one-person job;
+you needed someone to do all the advance work, and that’s what he was willing
+to do. Plus, he knew government affairs people—that’s another office that often
+had money to give. Bill Weston was so good, the line I gave to general counsels
+he gave to government affairs people, and he would get them to take a longerrange
+view than they had. He really beefed up our fund-raising.
+
+Manne’s connection to Weston gave him a staff member with networks
+that allowed him to see possibilities for raising corporate money that were
+invisible to most academics. Manne and Weston’s networks allowed them
+to set up a fund-raising apparatus separate from, and thus not easily cannibalized
+by, the University.
+Manne made a direct appeal to corporation’s long-term self-interest,
+but—in sharp contrast with the first generation of public interest law—
+in the service of programming that he had designed for his own purposes.
+Law and economics was attractive to corporations who recognized that
+the growth of federal regulation was not a fad. Whether the appeal was
+to antitrust, which hit at the core interests of large corporations, or the
+new “social regulation” of the early 1970s, regulation was inescapable,
+growing, and connected to a powerful support structure in universities.
+Manne remembers that both he and Weston agreed that
+
+we were not asking for charity. We didn’t even believe in corporations making
+charitable contributions. Corporations had a long-range interest in what went
+on in universities, and if they didn’t begin tending to it, it was going to jump
+up and bite them. This was an easy line for the lawyers, because I could talk
+about antitrust, the work that was done in product liability. . . . There were
+other areas that the solid academic work academic guys were doing would be
+useful to these guys, but they didn’t know anything about it. . . . To learn that
+this could go on, and that this thing could be introduced in court was very
+impressive to them. They had seen it already at this time in antitrust, you could
+always use the antitrust example. . . . Weston did very much the same thing.
+He’d talk to the government affairs people about getting materials they could
+use in their work that they weren’t getting out of the university world at the
+time. Law and economics . . . would be on their side, to put it very simply. Not
+that we were tailoring things for their needs, but we were doing something that
+they ought to buy.
+
+Manne recognized that corporations could also be motivated to contribute,
+despite the incentives to free ride, by leveraging their desire to “keep
+up with the Joneses.”
+
+Believe me, we always made them feel guilty about being free riders. We’d tell
+them that others were supporting this, it was going to benefit them whether or
+not they contributed, but others would look down on them. They were very
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 117
+
+sensitive about that. There was a community among those people. They all
+wanted to know, “What did so and so give you?” It would sometimes be a
+company in their industry, but more likely it would be a company whose size
+and importance they thought was like theirs. Like Sears might want to know
+what did Exxon give. . . . If we could get an existing contributor to write letters
+to people he knew at other companies, that was like social charity. . . . You give
+to my pet charity, and I’ll give to yours.
+
+Law and economics gave Manne and Weston a language through which
+they could communicate with businessmen in terms they understood and
+that made the long-term, relatively untraceable outputs of the LEC seem
+like a good investment. “We were in business. Here we were producing
+this stuff, trying to market it to you. Often we talked about it in those
+terms, and this was something they understood. A few of them articulated
+it as if they were entering into an informal contract to buy something. It
+was an inchoate product, it wouldn’t be measured very easily, but the
+thing came to be understood.”86 This common language was the cement
+that got corporate donors into the door, and kept them there in the LEC’s
+early years. Finally, Manne had a taste for fund-raising, an exceedingly
+rare trait among academics of any ideological stripe. “What you were
+doing was really like sales work, calling on people face to face, offering
+your product and seeing if you could interest them. I grew up in sales, so
+I did like it.”
+Manne’s successful fund-raising allowed the LEC to expand rapidly. By
+early 1975 he reported to Richard Ware of the Earhart Foundation, “I
+can only preface the details by stating that we have been successful in this
+organizational year beyond even my usually optimistic expectations. I
+believe that we are already at the point I initially anticipated for our third
+year. We have enough money pledged, assured, or on hand to begin every
+specific program and project mentioned in the Prospectus sent to you last
+fall.”87 Unfortunately, the LEC could not completely insulate itself from
+the Law School, or the University as a whole. As Manne recalls, “In more
+general terms, we weren’t a good fit. We were too good an operation, too
+intellectually high-powered to be at the University of Miami.” The dean
+of the Law School, Soia Mentschikoff, appeared to have been threatened
+by the growth of the LEC, and attempted to limit its operations in a number
+of ways. Manne wrote to the president of the University in early 1980
+that his relationship with the dean had totally broken down. “Singlehandedly—unless
+you want to take part of the credit through inaction—Soia
+has destroyed my ability to manage personnel by raising tensions and
+lowering morale to the breaking point. Every important member of the
+LEC faculty and staff has actively sought other employment in the last
+six months because of their fear of Soia and their realization that the
+118 CHAPTER 4
+
+university administration is either unwilling or unable to provide security
+for them. . . . I give up.”88 Manne maintained much of the LEC’s momentum
+by going over the dean’s head to the university president, but by 1980
+his relationship with Miami was damaged beyond the possibility of repair.
+Manne was looking for a way out, and was receiving offers to move the
+LEC to other schools.89
+In early 1980, Manne began negotiations with Emory University, and
+by August of that year they were complete. The LEC’s exit was far from
+amicable: a timeline in Manne’s files of the LEC’s transition to Emory
+reports that, on November 12, the president of the University fired Manne
+as head of the LEC, and that, on the following day, “Tensions became
+very high at the Center as armed guards were posted, locks were changed
+on various doors. Dr. Manne’s Secretaries were told to leave the building,
+file cabinets were taped up, and Drs. Moore and Aranson were ordered
+by Dean Walton to vacate their offices.”90 Conflict was especially severe
+over fund-raising. Manne began to raise funds for the LEC at Emory while
+still at Miami, while the University of Miami used the LEC’s mailing list
+to solicit contributions from its donors. This suggests the importance of
+Manne’s decision to avoid raising an endowment. Had he done so, he
+would have been faced with years of conflict with Miami over its status,
+rather than less than a year of severe but limited acrimony.
+Despite the controversy that swirled around the LEC and Manne’s battles
+with administrators at Miami, a very powerful organizational foundation
+was laid for the law and economics movement in these years. When
+the Manne programs were combined with the intellectual breakthroughs
+being made by Richard Posner and Ronald Coase, among others, law
+and economics had both a set of ideas whose power was increasingly
+recognized and an elaborate network of programming to diffuse those
+ideas throughout legal academia and the judiciary. It would turn out to
+be a potent combination.
+
+Early Adopters: UVA and USC
+
+While law and economics made only small strides at elite schools beyond
+Chicago in the 1970s, it became a major force in the law schools at the
+University of Virgina and the University of Southern California. This
+breakthrough was due to four factors: the move toward interdisciplinarity
+in legal scholarship; the presence of creative, entrepreneurial deans looking
+to increase their law schools’ status; at USC, and to a lesser degree
+UVA, an institutional connection with nonlawyers working in the public
+choice tradition; and the impact of the Manne programs in equipping law
+professors with the basic skills to conduct law and economics scholarship.
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 119
+
+The combination of these factors allowed UVA and USC to attract unusually
+strong faculties at a rapid rate.91 Of particular importance for moving
+the field into the mainstream, only a few of the scholars who were influenced
+by law and economics at UVA and USC shared the strongly libertarian
+instincts of its Chicago progenitors.
+By the early 1970s, criticism of law schools as intellectually vacuous
+and unsuited to the research expectations of the modern university began
+to reach a critical mass. This same period was the high point of faith in
+the social sciences, and these disciplines were obvious candidates for filling
+the hole in legal scholarship that critics had identified. Combined with
+these factors, the transformation of gender equality expectations put pressure
+on the informal approaches to hiring in elite institutions. Richard
+Posner recalls, “Certainly the way I was hired, it was a network . . . people
+knew each other and so the people hired were all white males. When that
+was challenged, the question was, ‘Well, if you’re not going to hire the
+white males that you know, what are you going to use as your criteria?’
+So they moved to criteria which seem more objective, having to do with
+productivity and so on—using that for hiring or for promotion gives the
+law school some insulation from complaints about discrimination.” The
+rise of interdisciplinary scholarship and an emphasis on scholarly production
+created an opportunity for lower-ranked institutions to dramatically
+improve their national reputation. Robert Scott recalls that “this is a time
+when there was a big transformation in American legal academics . . . the
+integration of the law school with the rest of the university. With that
+integration of interdisciplinary work came the integration of university
+standards for productivity. All of a sudden writing original scholarship
+became the sine qua non of a successful academic. I’m not sure it was
+happening everywhere. I visited at Columbia in 1987, and it was just
+beginning to happen [there].” Law schools more focused on their institutional
+aspirations than their existing constituents could dramatically improve
+their reputation by responding to this shift, because many top
+schools continued to believe that the preeminent responsibility of the law
+school was to the profession, not to the academy.
+Taking advantage of this opportunity required leaders with the instincts
+and authority to put interdisciplinary law scholarship at the center of their
+school’s mission. At UVA, that leader was Monrad Paulsen, the author of
+the best-selling casebook in America.92 Paulsen believed “it was supremely
+important that the law school be engaged not merely in vocational training,
+but in serving as an integral part of the university.”93 Michael Graetz
+recalls that “Monrad was really transformative in pushing people on
+scholarship. Monrad would go around asking, ‘What are you working
+on?’ What he was doing was trying to hire younger faculty, a faculty much
+more engaged in scholarship.” But while “Monrad was really supportive
+120 CHAPTER 4
+
+of the law and economics group . . . he was not a law and economics
+person. Monrad was a real intellectual, he was interested in ideas.”
+Paulsen’s strategy for transforming the law school at UVA was to “create
+an appointments structure that gave a lot of power to the appointments
+committee, and then stacked it with the younger people who he thought
+were the more ambitious people in the law school. . . . He was willing to
+take risks that many deans might not, in those days, have been willing
+to take.”94 By the standards of legal academia, Paulsen was a genuine
+entrepreneur, willing to disrupt existing organizational forms and practices
+in order to take advantage of opportunities that other market actors,
+especially schools above him in the law school status hierarchy, could not.
+At roughly the same time, USC hired Dorothy Nelson as dean. Like
+Paulsen, Nelson was not a law and economics scholar, but she was committed
+to building the law school, and willing to take risks to do so. “By
+1967, attrition had reduced the number of tradition-minded senior faculty
+[at USC], and the appointments process had come under the control
+of a diverse group of younger and more senior faculty united in the view
+that law was about ordering social processes. . . . The understanding
+could be theoretical or practical, philosophical or economic, but it should
+not be merely doctrinal.”95 Michael Graetz recalls that Dorothy Nelson
+“basically turned the appointments process over to the faculty. This was
+a point where you had a group of faculty who were basically into the
+‘Let’s build USC’ mode. So they were looking for interesting scholars.
+They were also looking for something that looked cutting edge, and law
+and economics at the time was pretty cutting edge.” USC could compete
+by playing what George Mason University Law School later called “moneyball,”
+hiring scholars who were undervalued by the market and ignoring
+the credentials by which faculty at the time were typically judged.96
+
+They weren’t as interested in the superficial credentials that would mark a good
+appointment in the old system. They probably couldn’t have competed for Supreme
+Court clerks or guys who finished first in their class at the Harvard Law
+School. So they were looking for people who were really smart and intellectually
+interested, but for whatever reason whose academic career was a little more
+academically checkered, who chose not to clerk or who went to a lesser law
+school. They were willing to make their decisions based on the quality of the
+mind and the ambition of the individual, and were willing to trust that instinct,
+rather than what was at one time the sine qua non, which was being a very
+good law student.97
+
+A willingness to seek out the unorthodox made USC a magnet for those
+committed to the intellectual transformation of legal scholarship. Graetz
+recalls that “when I went back to USC in 1979, I had an offer from Chicago,
+and I decided that USC was every bit as interesting a faculty as
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 121
+
+Chicago.” Douglas Baird similarly recalls that when he graduated from
+Stanford in the mid-1970s, “I desperately wanted a job at USC because I
+didn’t think I could get a job at Chicago. I wanted to be where the action
+was, and if it wasn’t Chicago, a close second was USC.” USC took an
+approach that some law schools were willing to accept at the margins,
+and by making it the dominant theme of the school USC created a huge
+competitive advantage. While the story was not simply one of law and
+economics—the school was open to other disciplines as well—no field
+was as mobilized to take advantage of the opportunity.
+USC, and to a lesser degree UVA, became early adopters of law and
+economics in part due to their connection to the rising centers of public
+choice scholarship. Public choice in economics and rational choice in political
+science apply rational, hedonistic, behavioral assumptions to the
+decision-making of government. While law and economics scholars devoted
+much of their attention to demonstrating the inadequacy of existing
+legal frameworks, public choice purported to explain that inadequacy by
+focusing on the motivations of political actors.98 The public choice connection
+at USC came through its close relationship with Caltech, where a
+number of law faculty (including Graetz, Schwartz, and Levine) had joint
+appointments.99 Levine recalls that “the Caltech group profoundly influenced
+and greatly broadened my notion of what interdisciplinary work
+entailed. They gave me a perspective and analytical tools with which to
+address the obstacles that prevented adoption of regulatory policies that
+would produce efficiency gains. . . . It helped explain the seeming paradox
+that a careful economic analysis of law and policy, however eloquently
+and persistently put forth, did not seem to carry the day politically and
+influence real-world outcomes.”100
+UVA Law was in the same university that gave birth to the “Virginia
+School” of public choice, including economists James Buchanan, Gordon
+Tullock, and Ronald Coase. Former UVA faculty members Michael
+Graetz, Jerry Mashaw, and Warren Schwartz recall that there was a significant
+influence of the Virginia School on the economically minded professors
+in the UVA law school, through the meetings of a reading group
+called Pegasus that connected them with the public choice scholars at
+Virginia Tech and UVA.101 Charles Goetz, however, recalls that, by the
+time he arrived in 1975, the connection with the economics department
+was much less substantial than it would have been just a few years before,
+given the exodus of the Virginia School that began with Ronald Coase in
+the early 1960s and was largely complete by the early 1970s.
+
+At that point Tullock was at Rice, Coase was at the University of Chicago,
+
+Buchanan went off to UCLA. . . . The reason why there wasn’t much interaction
+with the Department of Economics was, there were still some people like Bill
+122 CHAPTER 4
+
+Bright and Leland Yeager, but there was a big falling out in the Department of
+Economics itself, so by the time I arrived in 1975, if you spoke to the people
+who were on one side of the wall, the other people became your enemies. It was
+that bad. I basically was unable to have any interaction with the economics
+department at all, in those years, nor do I recall anyone who did.
+
+Therefore, while there was some cross-fertilization with the Virginia
+School, it does not appear to have been the main conduit for economic
+thinking in the UVA Law School.
+The most important connection between the Virginia School and UVA
+Law was Goetz himself, who had been a professor of economics at Virginia
+Tech, the home of Buchanan and Tullock’s Center for the Study of
+Public Choice. Goetz got on Virginia’s radar screen when he met Warren
+Schwartz at a talk in Blacksburg, where Schwartz recalls that “he just
+knocked my socks off, and I thought, ‘This guy would just be perfect for a
+law school,’ which I got right. I don’t remember exactly how, but Virginia
+decided they would like to hire an economist, and I was assigned the task
+of finding one. . . . The first person who visited was Isaac Ehrlich.102 ...
+We offered him a job, which he declined. Then I thought of Goetz.” Goetz
+was a student of Coase, Buchanan, and Tullock at Virginia in the early
+1960s, but when he moved to the Law School, he quickly committed to
+being more than the economist on the law faculty.
+
+The one difference between me and the other early people in law and economics
+is that I . . . decided that I would give myself at most four or five years to learn
+enough law that the people on the faculty, my colleagues, would regard me as
+a legal scholar, as opposed to just an economics guy grafted in there. I made a
+very concerted effort to learn the closest equivalent of microeconomic theory
+in the substratum of law school discussion, the fields like contracts, tort law,
+civil procedure. . . . That meant that I could then talk to people in different
+areas who often came to me for some kind of advice or insight. . . . Just to give
+you one example: This seems incredible now, but back in 1975, the whole notion
+of the applicability of the prisoners’ dilemma and game theory . . . to legal
+problems was new. . . . Even people who had been to Henry Manne camp had
+no knowledge of elementary game theory, and that turns out, as the years go
+by, to be an important tool in legal analysis.103
+
+In addition to spreading economic concepts in the law school, Goetz became
+part of one of law and economics’ most fertile collaborations, with
+Robert Scott. Goetz recalls,
+
+I had an office on the third floor . . . and I could hear an argument between Bob
+Scott and Warren Schwartz over liquidated damages. . . . Economists had been
+hostile to liquidated damages, thinking, wrongly in my view, that liquidated
+damages would impede efficient breaches. Scott and Schwartz were arguing
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 123
+
+over this, Scott arguing in favor of liquidated damages, at least under certain
+circumstances. I remember once jumping up and walking down the hall and
+saying to Warren, “Bob is right, and I can prove it.” By the next day I had an
+economic model; several of them became incorporated into the article. . . . That
+argument in the hallway wouldn’t have taken place in a lot of places.
+
+While the Manne seminars created a common language for the UVA faculty,
+the presence of a skilled economist on the faculty meant that economic
+theory could constantly feed into the intellectual life. Schwartz recalls
+that “Charlie [Goetz] was very much the tutor for all the rest of us.”
+Robert Scott believes that these “arguments in the hallways” were very
+important in his own development as a law and economics scholar.
+
+Warren Schwartz had an important role because he . . . spent most of the day
+chatting with colleagues. I remember several lunches with Warren and [others]
+. . . in which my first memory was someone talking about Coase, and I had
+no idea who Coase was, so if I was going to be with these guys I’d better know
+a little bit about what they were talking about. So I did take that occasion to
+get . . . the first edition of Economic Analysis of Law. I read Ronald Coase’s
+“Problem of Social Cost.” . . . So I was knowledgeable about the nascent law
+and economics movement, but I hadn’t integrated it significantly into my own
+scholarship. . . . I started writing an article on the constitutional regulation of
+procedural due process that was subsequently published in the Virginia Law
+Review. In the course of conversations with a number of colleagues, Mashaw
+certainly was an important one. . . . I read more and that article was my first
+law and economics article. . . . That article was written in the academic year
+1974–75, and that spring Graetz and Jeffries and I signed up to go to Florida
+for Henry’s program.
+
+Proximity breeds creativity by facilitating unplanned interactions and arguments
+and increasing the emotional intensity of scholarly interaction.
+At UVA, adding additional people with common interests (especially
+those who combined complementary intellectuals skills with broad interests)
+produced increasing intellectual returns.104
+The other explanation for the rapid spread of law and economics in
+Virginia’s faculty was the disproportionate impact of Manne’s Economics
+Institute for Law Professors. According to Manne, “In the first three
+years the program, we had half of the UVA faculty, and that’s because
+Monrad pushed it. I would take anyone Monrad nominated.” Dean
+Paulsen was a close friend of Henry Manne’s, a drinking buddy at AALS
+meetings and a former summer roommate at UCLA in the late 1950s,
+so it was natural that he would turn to Paulsen to help drum up interest
+in the economics institutes. Goetz recalls that the impact on the Virginia
+Law School “was enormous, because Manne managed to attract to these
+124 CHAPTER 4
+
+summer programs some of the really big names in the law, not just big
+names of those who were already established, but those who were up
+and coming, like Jerry Mashaw and Graetz, and they became quite excited
+about economics. The Manne summer camps were important in
+the sense that they gave some of these people who were early attendees
+a common language, and they were able to find linkages that cut across
+the substantive fields.” It was that common language that structured the
+intense intellectual environment that produced some of the most important
+figures in law and economics over the next few decades: Graetz,
+Scott, Mashaw, and Warren Schwartz were among the UVA attendees in
+the early years of the program.105
+Of the two programs, UVA seems to have been able to hold onto its
+position as a leader in law and economics, while USC has declined somewhat.
+Both schools developed Olin Law and Economics Programs, but
+UVA retained many of its core faculty for decades, while USC lost most
+of its faculty and was not able to match UVA in recruiting new law and
+economics scholars. In 2001, as the Olin Foundation began to wind down
+operations, it reported that, at UVA, “the Law School’s dean, John Jeffries,
+is an enthusiastic supporter of the Program and has made the financial
+commitment necessary to sustain the Program at a level of funding at
+least half of the current budget.”106 UVA Law built its impressive reputation
+with the assistance of law and economics, and it appears that it has
+become an institutionalized commitment of the school.
+
+A Beautiful Dream: Trying (and Failing) to Create Hoover East at Emory
+
+His relationship with the University of Miami having become acutely
+unpleasant, Manne began looking for a new location for his Law and
+Economics Center. The opportunity to move the Center to Emory University
+came with the appointment of Tom Morgan (an alumnus of the
+professors’ institute) to the deanship of the law school. Morgan knew
+that Manne was eager to move and, upon becoming dean, “the first thing
+he did was approach me about coming to Emory.” When Manne made
+his move to Emory, the University had just begun its rapid move up the
+ranks of American higher education, driven by the Woodruff family’s
+(the owners of the Coca-Cola Company) extraordinary donation of
+$100 million in 1979. Manne arrived a year later and, in 1981, President
+Jimmy Carter took a position at the University, dramatically increasing
+its visibility.
+Emory seemed in 1980 to be the ideal location for the Law and Economics
+Center: a university rapidly growing in prestige and wealth in the
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 125
+
+most important city in the Southeast. Manne’s programming increased
+substantially in his first few years at Emory, and he had a strong ally in
+Morgan, who put the LEC at the core of the Law School’s research
+agenda. Morgan’s 1981 Status Report on Emory Law argued that
+
+with the coming of the Law and Economics Center to Emory, the Law School
+has an unparalleled opportunity to become what few law schools even aspire
+to and fewer even come close to being: a school with sufficient breadth of view
+to be called a school of jurisprudence. Emory will have a natural advantage in
+bringing together a group of first rate scholars interested in applying the rigorous
+logic of economics to the study of law, and should exploit that advantage
+to the extent possible.107
+
+The Olin Foundation, Manne’s most important patron, was also encouraged
+by Manne’s move to Emory, noting that “the Center at Emory will
+enjoy a much better faculty, the stature of a much finer University, and
+the close cooperation of the Emory administration.”108 Manne had at
+Emory what he lacked at Miami—a sympathetic dean and a university
+rapidly increasing in prestige—to accompany his patron support. What
+he lacked was the most basic, but essential resource in academia—space.
+As banal as this may seem, it was a fight over space that eventually led
+Manne to fall out with Emory’s administration, and more critically, with
+the Olin Foundation.
+At the start, Manne’s relations with the Emory administration were
+very warm. “[President James T. Laney] welcomed the center, agreed to
+put up a million dollars. . . . My error [was that] I didn’t really know
+before I got there how inadequate the facilities were. We had eight or ten
+people, and there were some in the law school, in that little tiny house. It
+was inadequate.” Just as it became clear that the LEC needed more space,
+Manne learned that an architecturally remarkable facility, the Simmons
+Building (also known as the Gulf&Western or Jones Bridge building),
+twenty miles away from the Emory campus, had come onto the market.109
+Along with housing all of Manne’s staff, the building had space for the
+LEC’s seminars and room for other activities.
+
+At that time, the Simmons company, an Atlanta bedding company, sold out to
+ITT, a very generous supporter of the Law and Economics Center—they were
+very interested in antitrust. . . . Simmons had built the most glamorous building
+I had ever seen. . . . It was all redwood, copper, and glass, sitting on 125 acres
+of virgin forest, on the Chatahoochie River, which was a trout stream at that
+point, twenty miles out from Emory, in Gwinnett County, which was just starting
+not to be an outlier. You could tell the real estate was going to go up there.
+ITT acquired this building, and decided it was too glamorous for any of their
+subsidiary companies. . . . One of the guys told me about it, maybe we could
+126 CHAPTER 4
+
+make a deal. There was something in the tax laws called a bargain sale, in which
+by manipulating numbers, a piece of property is sold at a discount price, and
+the difference is allowed as a charitable contribution for the corporation. The
+arithmetic worked out. . . . It was almost ready-made for my more ambitious
+plans for it.110
+
+Manne quickly approached John M. Olin about supporting the purchase
+of the building, a request that he received sympathetically, based on his
+previous support with Manne and his friendship with Robert Woodruff.
+He directed Manne to submit a formal request to the Olin Foundation.111
+Manne approached President Laney with the idea, and “Jim approved it.
+He said, ‘If you raise the $3 million, I’ll get you the $1 million and we’ll
+buy it.’ ”112 Laney wrote in May 1982, “I can’t tell you how pleased I
+am with the work you have done to date to develop Emory’s Law and
+Economics Center and particularly to find a more adequate physical facility
+. . . We all join with you in your enthusiasm for the Simmons Building
+on Jones Bridge Road in Gwinnett County and believe this would make
+an excellent addition to both the Center and the University.”113 With both
+the Olin Foundation and Emory’s leadership on board, Manne believed
+the way was clear to buy the building.
+Manne believed that the purchase of the Simmons Building would turn
+the LEC into a major component of the free market organizational infrastructure.
+In May 1982, Manne made clear to John M. Olin that the
+building represented a rare opportunity for the conservative movement.
+
+What I have reference to is the whole cause of free market and conservative
+ideology in American universities. There is literally only one academic building
+in the country housing a number of respected and influential conservative scholars.
+That is the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. And successful as the
+Hoover Institution has been, it has always lacked a certain influence because of
+its location on the West Coast and because, as a one-of-a-kind institution, many
+intellectuals do not take it seriously. The building we want for the John M. Olin
+Law and Economics Center would be an East Coast anchor of conservative
+intellectual thought comparable to the Hoover Institution on the West Coast.
+Indeed two such activities, geographically separated, would lend more credibility
+to the work of each. Because of our special emphasis on economics for lawyers,
+law professors and judges a properly housed John M. Olin Center would
+likely become one of the most influential academic operations of its kind in the
+world, one to which the most distinguished thinkers would repair on visits or
+research leaves. Further, the Center would become a world focal point for conferences
+and other programs concerned with the free enterprise system. I believe
+that this kind of presence would be a more significant association for your name
+than merely a building or the Center as it presently operates.114
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 127
+
+Manne believed that the ideological instincts of American university administrators
+made this opportunity very unusual, one that if squandered
+could not be easily replicated.
+
+I am not sure that many people understand how completely left-leaning American
+universities are today. Emory in that regard is no better nor worse that the
+rest of them. It is simply understood and accepted by most administrators,
+professors and trustees that American universities will be dominated by people
+with extremely liberal views. . . . Our president, Jim Laney, is thoroughly confused
+by the appearance of a successful and intellectually respected conservative
+activity like the Law and Economics Center. Nonetheless, the people running
+our universities are trapped to some extent by their finer, older traditions;
+they must tolerate dissent, even when it is most distasteful to them, as with
+anyone proclaiming the virtues of individualism and free enterprise. But toleration
+is not support, and it is rare for a university to make things easy for a
+group with our point of view. The Hoover Institution has been a festering sore
+for a number of left-wing academics at Stanford for years, as in a smaller way
+has the Law and Economics Center, both at Miami and at Emory. But if we
+can fund our own way and maintain high standards of work, there is literally
+nothing they can do except brood about our expansion and our influence. But
+a lot of people here are unhappy with the prospect of the Law and Economics
+Center having such a handsome facility; they understand very well that we will
+be a much more potent intellectual force if we make that move. Unfortunately,
+without the move, we may disappear altogether. In other words, we hang precariously
+between an enormous increase in our importance and a possible slide
+into obscurity.115
+
+Some discount probably should be applied both to Manne’s hopes for the
+Simmons Building and his fears if its purchase fell through: he was, after
+all, trying to convince John M. Olin to increase his financial contribution
+to its purchase. That said, Manne seemed to sincerely believe that conservatives
+were strangers in American higher education. What opportunities
+they had came from institutional norms of “fair play” that provided small
+openings for conservative mobilization, but only if those cracks were skillfully
+and expediently taken advantage of.
+It is difficult to say whether this perception of Emory’s administrators
+(and to some degree those of other institutions as well) was accurate.
+Laney had every reason to be unsympathetic to a major conservative project
+at Emory, especially one connected to law and economics. Laney was
+a political liberal and close to President Jimmy Carter—the Carter Center
+was located next to Emory and was envisioned to come under its management
+after Carter’s retirement.116 Laney was also a believing Christian of
+the liberal, social-justice-oriented variety, having studied under Niebuhr
+at the Yale Divinity School in the 1950s. One indication of Laney’s beliefs
+128 CHAPTER 4
+
+can be seen in a speech he gave to the United Methodists (the denomination
+that sponsored Emory) in 1992: “Our dominant philosophy also has
+a down side—a kind of unrestrained individualism that ignores the social
+fabric. It tends to spawn an ethos of disregard. Individuals pursue their
+own interests, but those interests are sometimes terribly self-centered. The
+last few years have revealed what the excesses of laissez-faire individualism
+lead to when there is not a concomitant concern for larger responsibility.”117
+Laney imagined the university as a corrective to individualism, a
+community dedicated to moral improvement and growth.
+The program of the LEC, by contrast, was devoted to the “laissez-faire
+individualism” that Laney found so distasteful. Worse, with private funding
+and a building off campus, it would have been difficult for Laney to
+exercise meaningful control over Manne’s empire-building. Manne concedes,
+“I’m sure he saw that this would be Henry Manne’s empire, trading
+on Emory’s name, and he wouldn’t be able to control it. And he was a
+control guy. If I’d been president, I’d have been a control guy. . . . Given
+my proclivities, if, say, Ralph Nader had wanted to do the same thing, I
+think I would have put stumbling blocks in the way.” Manne and his
+staff, in fact, believed that the Simmons Building would insulate them
+from the University’s control. Lewis Rockwell, an LEC staff member at
+the time, wrote to Manne in March 1982,
+
+I vote for Jones Bridge. . . . It would be far easier to raise money, because of
+Jones Bridge, than because of an ordinary building here. At Jones Bridge, we
+would have the premier meeting facility in the conservative world. No one—
+not Hoover, not AEI, not Heritage—could compete with us. The building itself
+would raise money for us. . . . We would not be putting our trust in modern
+universities and the kind of people who administer them. We would have all
+the advantages of the university connection, and very little of the disadvantages.
+Here on campus, we would be having continuous troubles with the administration,
+just because of the nature of the people in it.118
+
+Roger Miller, who had been with Manne since the founding of the LEC,
+concurred in this latter judgment, stating that “the reliance on the good
+will of a few individuals is a weak basis for locating on campus.”119
+Manne told Michael Joyce early on in the negotiations that
+
+an activity like the L&EC requires very careful and delicate tending in any respectable
+American university. The instincts and the politics of most people who
+manage universities run contrary to everything we stand for. We have certainly
+not escaped their attention at Emory, nor do I think we would at any university
+of this quality. To some extent we are and will always be strangers on a campus:
+actually we are “free riders” on an edifice that is run by our ideological enemies.
+All of this is by way of saying that my decision to go for the Simmons Building
+was designed to give us a degree of security here that we certainly do not have
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 129
+
+at present, could not likely secure elsewhere, and could not have with President
+Laney’s alternative proposal for a small office building on campus.120
+
+Manne’s deep suspicion of his own university and his conception of
+academic politics as a battle with his “ideological enemies” explains his
+high-wire efforts to salvage the Jones Bridge location and the conflicts
+they engendered.
+With the purchase of the building reasonably far advanced, Emory’s
+administration withdrew its support for LEC’s off-campus location. The
+Olin Foundation’s account of these events claims that, in July 1982, “the
+Board of Trustees of the University rejected the Simmons Building as a
+location for the Law and Economics Program. They apparently thought
+the building was too far from the campus. . . . Laney, we gather, concurred
+in this judgment.”121 Following on this rejection by the board, Laney proposed
+that the foundation put up $1.5 million to match the university’s
+$1 million, which would be used to build an on-campus facility for the
+LEC, a building that would also house the economics department. This
+new offer may have been driven by predictable administration desires
+to use outside money to cover ordinary university functions. The Olin
+Foundation was unsympathetic to paying to house the economics department,
+and the university revised its proposal, with the foundation paying
+$1.5 million to build the facility and the university donating $1 million
+to endow the LEC. While this was going on, the purchase price for the
+Simmons Building dropped to $2.5 million—the exact amount that Olin
+and Emory had on the table—and Manne tried to convince Laney of the
+merits of shifting back to the Simmons Building option.122
+Confused by the “mixed signals” coming from Emory, the staff of the
+Olin Foundation invited President Laney in October 1982 to speak with
+the foundation’s steering committee. “Laney was advised by the Steering
+Committee that it was up to the University to decide once and for all
+which of the alternatives it preferred. . . . At the meeting, Laney made a
+strong pitch for the Simmons Building.”123 However, in this meeting,
+Laney was informed by Olin Foundation president William Simon that
+the foundation would support the university’s preferred location,124 thus
+contradicting his understanding that the foundation’s support was contingent
+on the off-campus location, and in the process undercutting Manne’s
+position and credibility. Laney reversed course and, in November, the University
+officially requested support for the on-campus location. “Manne
+objected immediately to this decision, stating his strong preference for the
+Simmons Building. He told Laney that he would not cooperate with the
+proposal, and would inform the Foundation of his objections.”125 In fact,
+Manne proposed to the foundation that he be allowed to purchase the
+building independent of the university, a proposal the foundation rejected.126
+Laney took Manne’s actions as a personal affront. “By your
+130 CHAPTER 4
+
+action in recent days, you have failed to acknowledge and abide by my
+decision and have subverted Emory’s efforts to raise money for an on
+campus location. It is a matter of record that you informed the John M.
+Olin Foundation that you opposed the proposal which you originally
+drafted on the University’s behalf for the on campus solution. Your conduct
+in this instance is unacceptable and clearly would not be tolerated
+from any other member of the University community.”127 Convinced that
+the University and Manne were not on the same page, the Olin Foundation
+Steering Committee withdrew its support from the project. It was at
+this meeting that the foundation also decided to pull its funding from the
+LEC’s Olin Fellows program and to pursue the possibility of creating law
+and economics programs at elite law schools, which will be discussed in
+detail in chapter 6.128
+His relations with Emory’s administration in tatters, Manne made a
+last, desperate gambit to establish the Center as an independent operation.
+Separation from Emory only increased the scope of Manne’s ambitions,
+and he entered into a partnership with his old friend from the University
+of Rochester, Richard Rosett, dean of the University of Chicago
+business school from 1974 to 1983, to form the “Chattahoochee Institute.”
+Rosett’s stature in the academic community (he was later appointed
+dean of arts and sciences at Washington University), combined with his
+friendship with Manne, made him a natural choice for helping to resuscitate
+the project.
+Relieved of the connection to a university, Manne proposed to move
+the LEC’s programming beyond training judges and professors, to include
+virtually all senior-level decision-makers in America. Manne observed
+that, traditionally, knowledge diffused to decision-makers in one of two
+ways: publication in scholarly journals or through traditional classroom
+teaching. To these Manne proposed to add a third:
+
+Courses tailored for senior level executives, attorneys, and government officials,
+taught by scholars selected for the importance and influence of their scholarship
+and for their skill in teaching. Examples are courses in economics for corporate
+counsel, finance theory for executives with an engineering background, regulatory
+law and theory for chief executive officers who must take positions on
+pending government proposals, or accounting and marketing for trustees of
+not-for-profit organizations. The Institute will provide a communications shortcut,
+enabling business and government leaders to become sophisticated consumers
+of new ideas that ordinarily reach them along conventional routes.129
+
+The objective of these programs was to counteract what Manne saw as
+the liberal bias in the information that executives received, in the process
+reshaping the perspectives of American decision-makers.
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 131
+
+Expanding the LEC’s training programs was only the beginning of
+Manne’s plan for “Hoover East.” The institute would play host to other
+sympathetic organizations (such as the Mont Pelerin and Philadelphia
+Societies, the Atlanta Lexecon office, and smaller conservative foundations)
+as well as providing a home for new organizations, such as an
+international law and economics association and an association for economic
+expert witnesses. The new institute would also use its expertise
+in economic consulting, providing assistance in the selection of expert
+witnesses, and helping “translate” between economists and lawyers. On
+top of these initiatives would be an aggressive research program with
+visiting scholars, sabbatical programs, postdoctoral fellowships, and
+an expanded research staff.130 Manne proposed to push the combination
+of entrepreneurship and free market research much further than he
+had before.
+By May 1983, Manne and Rosett believed that their Hoover East plan
+would reach fruition. Rosett wrote Manne at the time that “the excitement
+still is not fading. I have examined the idea from every angle I can
+think of and its appeal grows steadily. I have tried to work out a plan that
+will allow us to move ahead with some confidence that the Chattahoochee
+Institute will come into existence and that it will have the importance it
+deserves.” The risk of the institute’s plan, given its detachment from an
+academic institution, clearly weighed on Rosett. “You will see that I am
+giving myself more than one option and as much safety as I can manage.
+I expect that you will want to do the same.”131
+What finally killed the efforts of Rosett and Manne to bring the Hoover
+East project back to life was the implacable opposition of William
+Simon. Manne asked Rosett to go to New York to make a final pitch for
+the newly redesigned project, but Simon turned him down flat. Rosett
+recalls, “I went to the Olin Foundation and talked to Mike Joyce and
+told him what I wanted, and he said, ‘You ought to talk to Bill Simon.’
+He ushered me into a room where I met Bill Simon for the first time. . . .
+He told me there were no circumstances where he would support any
+activity of Henry’s.” Despite John M. Olin’s personal support for the
+project, Simon had lost trust in Manne due to the crossed signals coming
+from Emory, and, given Simon’s dominant position in the foundation,
+that meant the Simmons Building project was finished. As many involved
+with the foundation agree, Simon was a man of strong opinions, who
+relied on his gut instincts, and he had decided (perhaps on the basis of
+imperfect information) that the foundation should burn its bridges with
+Manne.132 It was only due to the support of other members of the board
+(including George Gillespie, Olin’s private lawyer) and some of the staff,
+that the foundation continued to support the seminars for federal judges
+despite Simon’s hostility.
+132 CHAPTER 4
+
+Manne aimed high and he fell hard. He lost any chance of acquiring
+the Simmons Building, the funding for his Olin Fellows program was eliminated,
+and the finances of the LEC were withering. The distraction of the
+Simmons Building negotiations had taken an especially heavy toll on the
+LEC’s previously careful nurturing of its financial supporters. The LEC
+depended on Manne’s personal connections, reputation, and attention,
+and once these became frayed, the momentum of the LEC began to stall.
+By 1984, Manne was forced to plead with foundations to maintain his
+core programs, the economics seminars for law professors and judges.
+The Olin Foundation grudgingly agreed that
+
+Manne is not without his weaknesses as an administrator, and has probably
+brought the bulk of his economic woes upon himself. Still, staff is sympathetic
+to this particular request [for the judges institutes]. . . . While the precise impact
+this economic training has had on legal decision-making is difficult to
+gauge, many recent decisions reflect a sound understanding of economic principles,
+and indicate how important it is that judges have a background in economics.
+One such case in point is the recent decision by the Ninth Circuit
+Court of Appeals to reverse the District Judge in the State of Washington on
+a comparable worth ruling. The decision explicitly reinforced the supremacy
+of market forces in determining wage and price values. . . . Staff thinks the
+cancellation of the Economics Institute would represent a significant loss to
+the legal community.133
+
+While the “sexiest” programs from the point of view of the foundation
+were maintained, much of the rest of the LEC, especially its training of
+students, had unraveled.
+
+The main thing we lost was the fellowships, and the fellowships just gave a
+spark to the whole thing. . . . We lost a lot, and [had we stayed at Emory] I’m
+not sure it [the LEC] would have survived. I sure didn’t like the idea of staying
+on as a full-time law professor at Emory. Tom Morgan by that time had left; in
+my last year there was another dean there. He had moved on to be the dean at
+George Washington. The new dean didn’t have a clue what it was all about.134
+
+By 1983, Manne had lost his opportunity to create Hoover East, and the
+Law and Economics Center, which just a few years earlier was one of
+the conservative movement’s most impressive assets, seemed to be coming
+unraveled.
+
+Conclusion
+
+By the early 1980s, law and economics was becoming part of the mainstream
+of academic law. The meteoric rise of Richard Posner gave the
+L AW AND E CONOM I C S I 133
+
+movement a bona fide intellectual superstar, whose notoriety forced the
+rest of legal academia to take law and economics seriously and sent powerful
+signals to young scholars that prestigious careers could be forged in
+this once-exotic field. Posner’s work built on the foundation laid by Director
+and Coase, which points to the importance of the Chicago Law
+School’s role in nurturing law and economics in its early years, despite
+the fact that it was still out of fashion in the larger world of legal academia.
+Had Chicago not performed this function, it is unlikely that law
+and economics would have experienced the explosive entry into the legal
+mainstream made possible by Posner’s emergence. At the same time that
+the Posner phenomenon burst on the legal academic scene, the movement
+developed important outposts at Virginia and USC, where budding law
+and economics practitioners could learn from, compete, and collaborate
+with each other. Just as important, the law and economics professors at
+UVA and USC were not Chicago-style libertarians, and as they moved on
+to more prestigious law schools, they helped eat away at the perception
+that the approach was simply thinly veiled ideology. This legitimated law
+and economics in the legal academic mainstream, and opened the way to
+its institutional advances in the 1980s and 1990s.
+Of equal importance was the entrepreneurial work of Henry Manne,
+who successfully operated on both the demand and supply sides of the
+movement. Manne’s institutes for law professors equipped a remarkable
+number of legal academics with the techniques necessary to apply law and
+economics to new fields, and increased the receptivity of the profession to
+those scholars’ insights. At the same time, Manne’s programs for federal
+judges ensured that many members of the federal bar could understand
+the concepts that these professors were developing, which meant that the
+courts would not have to wait on a wholly new generation of judges to
+absorb these new theories. Of even greater long-term significance,
+Manne’s programs helped to build networks of law and economics scholars
+across the country in a period when most of the movement’s personnel
+were widely scattered across the country and isolated in their home institutions.
+When this intellectual and network entrepreneurship was combined
+with the increasing scope of law and economics’ ambitions, the
+stage was set for entry into the legal mainstream in earnest in the 1980s
+and 1990s.
+The 1970s and early 1980s were a period of remarkable organizational
+success and significant setbacks for law and economics. Given how scarce
+entrepreneurial skills are in the academy, had Manne invested his talents
+in pure scholarship (as he might have, if he had been appointed to an elite
+law school in the late 1960s), it is far from certain that anyone else would
+have built the movement’s organizational infrastructure. It was only because
+of the still-powerful barriers to entry to the legal academy that
+134 CHAPTER 4
+
+Manne’s efforts were deflected in this direction. In his organizational entrepreneurship,
+much of Manne’s success came from trial and error, and
+not from a grand plan. In the area of fund-raising, Manne only slowly
+discovered how to draw large sums of money from corporations without
+compromising the intellectual focus of his programming, something that
+the leaders of the conservative public interest law movement were not
+able to do. Despite his success in raising money and building enthusiasm
+for the movement, Manne’s path was not without obstacles. At both
+Miami and Emory he operated under administrators who were not enthusiasts
+for the project of law and economics, and his conflicts with them
+limited his entrepreneurial reach. In a series of events that show that the
+movement was far from a well-oiled “giant right-wing conspiracy,”
+Manne had an almost complete falling out with the Olin Foundation by
+the early 1980s. In short, the organizational successes of law and economics
+in this period were far from inevitable, might not have occurred without
+Manne’s specific skills and commitment, and were limited by internal
+conflict within the conservative movement itself.
+Ironically enough, however, it was this very conflict that set the stage for
+the next steps in the movement’s organizational evolution: the creation of
+the Olin programs in America’s elite institutions and the resurrection of
+Manne’s plan to build a law and economics law school. We will return
+to these programs in chapter 6.
+5
+
+The Federalist Society: Counter-Networking
+
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY IS ACKNOWLEDGED, by friend and foe, to be
+an organization of extraordinary consequence. Liberals, fearing a “giant
+right-wing conspiracy” in the law with the Federalist Society at its head,
+have been alarmed by its role in judicial selection and have devoted significant
+time and resources to producing detailed studies of the organization.1
+On the right, conservatives have lavished praise on the Society for
+helping to “turn the tide” against liberal control of the legal profession,
+the law schools, and the courts.2 Others are impressed simply by the federal
+judges and Supreme Court justices, top conservative legal professors,
+and prestigious private lawyers who attend its annual meeting. All of this
+focus on the Society’s members—the articles they have written, decisions
+they have handed down, presidents they have hunted—leaves the Society
+as an actual, working organization somewhat in the shadows.
+This chapter, by contrast, focuses primarily on the Federalist Society itself,
+asking three fundamental questions about its development and place
+in the larger conservative legal movement. First, what explains the rapid
+growth of the Society, given the dismal fortunes of the conservative public
+interest law organizations described in chapter 3? How did it avoid falling
+into their “organizational maintenance” trap? Second, why did the Society’s
+leaders choose to act as intellectual and network entrepreneurs rather
+than orient the organization more directly at legal change? Third, what
+explains the growth over time in the Society’s functions and ambition?
+The key to answering these questions and correcting misconceptions
+about the Society is the concept of “boundary maintenance.” There is a
+strong tendency in most of the popular writing on the Society to conflate
+the activities of the organization itself with those of its members. For
+example, during the Clinton impeachment saga it was common to read
+that the president was being hunted by “Federalist Society lawyers.” This
+was true in the sense that many of the president’s pursuers were Federalist
+Society members, but false in the specific sense that the Society as an
+organization was not involved.3 Nevertheless, it is probably the case that
+the networks produced by the Society made such activities easier than
+they would otherwise have been. I suggest as much below, describing these
+as the “indirect outputs” of formal Society activities. The Society has been
+faced with opportunities to expand into the activities its detractors claims
+136 CHAPTER 5
+
+it engages in, and has refrained from doing so because of concerns over
+organizational maintenance. An organization that did what many people
+think the Federalist Society does would not, and could not, look like the
+Society that exists today.
+What is it, then, that the Society does? It is best understood as a provider
+of public goods (in the welfare economic sense) to the conservative
+legal movement. First, it engages in recruitment of law students and practicing
+attorneys who can identify with and participate in the movement.
+Second, it invests in the human capital of members through frequent debates,
+which acquaint them with conservative legal ideas and heighten
+their intellectual self-confidence, and through their participation in its student,
+lawyer, and practice groups, which provide leadership experience.
+Third, the Society produces cultural capital, in that its activities facilitate
+the orderly development of conservative legal ideas and their injection
+into the legal mainstream, reducing the stigma associated with those ideas
+in institutions that produce and transmit professional distinction. Fourth,
+and perhaps most importantly, the Society is a producer of social capital
+in the form of networks that develop as by-products of Society activities.
+In the absence of an organization like the Federalist Society, these movement
+public goods would be produced in a haphazard, uncoordinated,
+and redundant fashion, if produced at all. Organizational entrepreneurs
+would have seen their transaction costs escalate significantly, to the point
+where some activities would not have been worth pursuing.
+Why did the Society’s activities cohere around these functions and not
+others? To explain this, I pay particular attention to the choices its leaders
+made in shaping the Society’s organizational structure. While it is probably
+true that, given the context of the early 1980s, some organization of
+conservative lawyers would inevitably have formed, it was not predetermined
+that it would look like the Federalist Society or that it would effectively
+manage the organizational maintenance problems that face all such
+projects in contemporary American politics. It matters a great deal that
+the opportunity to build a network of conservative lawyers was seized by
+the particular individuals who formed the Federalist Society. Had others
+been the first movers, it is highly unlikely that the organization would
+perform the functions it does. The importance of leadership in the conservative
+legal movement is even clearer when the Federalist Society is compared
+to the first generation of conservative public interest law firms (as
+discussed in chapter 3), which had a very different sort of leadership, and
+very different outcomes.
+The key decision this entrepreneurial cadre made was to narrow its
+mission to facilitating the activism of its members and influencing the
+character of intellectual debate rather than directly influencing the actions
+of government itself. The Society has aimed to deepen the character of
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 137
+
+legal thought in conservative circles, rather than proposing doctrines of
+its own. It has tried, through its activities, to make conservative lawyers
+aware of each other, thereby activating latent resources for the conservative
+legal movement, rather than plan overall movement strategy and organizational
+development. It has sought to make conservative lawyers
+aware of opportunities for political and legal participation but has not
+itself engaged in litigation or lobbying. The Federalist Society, in sum, has
+pursued an indirect approach to legal change, one that operates as a focal
+point for discussion and as a safe harbor for individuals who feel isolated
+from the mainstream of American legal culture. This strategy of indirection
+was dictated by its initial organizational commitments to intellectual
+debate and a desire to serve as a hospitable environment for the entirety
+of the conservative legal movement. Indirection has served the organization
+well. The leadership of the Society has been happy to see the fruits
+of its labors harvested by other organizations, which have been able to
+take advantage of the networks and resources the Society has produced.
+The key to understanding the Society’s ability to attract resources despite
+their diffuse outputs has been their close relationship to patrons willing
+to invest for the long term.
+To understand the role of the Federalist Society in the conservative legal
+movement, it is necessary to focus on how it solved some basic problems
+of organizational design, in particular the establishment and maintenance
+of organizational boundaries. As I argued in chapter 1, the modern activist
+state created a change in the character of modern parties. With more of the
+governing apparatus outside of direct electoral control, partisan mobilization
+has shifted to new sites of contestation, such as the professions and
+the universities, where many of the key resources for elite political change
+are rooted. Understanding the Federalist Society requires that we situate
+its rise and development as part of a larger effort to mobilize against the
+entrenchment of the liberal legal network. The critical factor in explaining
+why opportunities are seized or lost in this sphere of political competition
+is the decision-making of organizational entrepreneurs, and here the movement
+was lucky in the character and continuity of the individuals who
+founded the Federalist Society. Had people with other interests and abilities
+filled the organizational space taken by the Society, the history of conservatives
+in American legal institutions could have been very different.
+
+Founding the Federalist Society
+
+The Federalist Society was founded by a small minority of law students
+embedded in what they saw as a hostile institution, America’s law
+schools. For both strategic and personal reasons, the Society’s founders
+138 CHAPTER 5
+
+responded to this hostility by creating an organization with a central commitment
+to intellectual debate. This founding organizational mission has
+been sustained by a leadership cadre that has, with only small adjustments,
+controlled the Society for its first quarter-century and will, in all
+likelihood, do so for another two decades.
+The first Federalist Society activity was a symposium on federalism at
+Yale Law School held in April 1982. At the time, active conservative law
+student organizations existed at Yale, Chicago, Harvard, and Stanford,
+although not all of the chapters were formally known as the Federalist
+Society. The inspiration for the symposium was the organizers’ belief
+that “law schools and the legal profession are currently strongly dominated
+by a form of orthodox liberal ideology which advocates a centralized
+and uniform society. While some members of the legal community
+have dissented from these views, no comprehensive conservative critique
+or agenda has been formulated in this field. This Conference will furnish
+an occasion for such a response to begin to be articulated.”4 The conference
+was intellectually ambitious but organizationally modest: none of
+the organizers anticipated that the symposium would lead to anything
+like the modern nationally organized and funded Federalist Society. As
+Lee Liberman Otis recalls, “We did not know [we were] starting a national
+organization when we started this. Basically what . . . we at Yale
+and we at Chicago thought about this [was that] we were starting organizations
+at our schools.” The original proposal showed the modest expectations
+that accompanied the first conference: “If it is successful, we
+would hope to make such a conference annual or periodic occasions for
+reflection on the ways in which the law and the development of legal
+principles affect society.”5 While the earliest ambitions of the Society’s
+founders were intellectual rather than organizational, hints of its eventual
+function as a network of conservative lawyers were in evidence even
+at this time. The organization provided financial support for students to
+come to the symposium from law schools across the country, and its
+organizers announced their hope that they would “participate in the discussion
+following each address, and would also have the opportunity to
+exchange ideas with the speakers between meetings, during the informal
+reception and over meals.”6 Networking was built into the organization
+from the beginning.
+The founding symposium of the Federalist Society attracted enormous
+attention in the national press, in the conservative movement, and among
+conservative law students. Gary Lawson, at the time a law student at Yale,
+recalls that
+
+once the stuff all dropped in our laps, of course we’re going to do something.
+. . . We had student groups in 1981 writing to us and saying, “How do
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 139
+
+we start an organization?” What are we going to do, say, “We’re going to have
+this conference at Yale and then disappear”? It all really started with conferences.
+The major event was the conference in 1982, but we started that with the
+idea of having one panel. We had Bork and Winter at Yale, Scalia and [Professor
+Edmund] Kitch at Chicago and we thought, “Wouldn’t that make a fun panel
+on federalism?” That just steamrolled into a whole conference. We had people
+from other schools calling us up, wanting to be part of the conference. We had
+people who wanted to come in from a thousand miles away and start their own
+chapters. That was the first sign that there was something there. There’s a void
+in that market waiting to be filled.
+
+Steven Calabresi also uses a market metaphor to explain the emergence
+of the Federalist Society, to some degree underplaying his role as an entrepreneur
+and emphasizing instead the existence of an enormous untapped
+demand for an organization.
+
+My original objective—I started the Yale Chapter when I was a second-year
+
+student at Yale Law School—was to have some good debates, to bring some
+conservative speakers to Yale, where I don’t think any conservative voices were
+being heard, force faculty members there to confront the ideas by debating who
+we were bringing in. . . . We held a conference in 1982; it was held by the folks
+at Chicago and by the folks at Yale. The folks at Chicago were friends of mine
+from my undergraduate days at Yale—Lee Liberman Otis and David McIntosh.
+Our conference was covered by National Review and suddenly conservatives
+at fifteen other law schools began calling us and telling us they wanted to attend
+the conference and they wanted to form chapters too. That was a process of
+almost spontaneous generation. It turned out there was an enormous demand
+at other law schools for the kind of thing we felt a demand for at Yale.
+
+Conservative law students alienated in their home institutions, desperate
+for a collective identity, and eager for collective activity provided a ripe
+opportunity for organizational entrepreneurship. What was undetermined
+at the time, however, was how this opportunity would be directed,
+and by whom.
+By the end of the summer of 1982 the Society’s founders were well on
+the way to tapping into this unmet demand by attracting funding from
+conservative foundations. In a letter to Richard Larry of the Scaife Foundation
+in August 1982, Lee Liberman Otis noted, “While there now exist
+a number of organizations which are beginning to provide a counterweight
+to the liberal public interest law groups, no comparable effort has
+been made at the law school level.”7 Echoing Michael Horowitz’s broadside
+from two years earlier, the Society’s founders pointed to the intellectual
+vacuum at the core of the conservative legal counterestablishment,
+and argued that changing legal culture through the education, recruit-
+140 CHAPTER 5
+
+ment, and development of young conservative lawyers was an essential
+counterpart to investments in litigation. Changing legal culture required
+shaking the self-confidence of liberal lawyers by challenging their perception
+that they had a monopoly on serious legal thought. An October 1982
+proposal observes that by “encouraging conservatives to present their
+ideas more articulately and more vocally, it [an organization of conservative
+law students] could cause others to listen to these views more attentively,
+and, perhaps ultimately, to question some of the liberal positions
+which are being presented as the law.”8 Conservatives were insufficiently
+“articulate” and their ideas poorly developed, and the budding Society
+claimed that they could build an organization that could help make conservative
+ideas both convincing and respectable.
+Early on in its development, the Society looked to create a membership
+larger than law students. In its original 1982 proposal, the Society proposed
+a tripartite organizational structure, composed of student, law
+faculty, and lawyer divisions. While speakers, symposia, and publications
+were at the core of the Society’s mission, these purely intellectual
+activities did not exhaust its ambitions. Number 5 in the proposal’s list
+of activities was placement, which it claimed was dominated by the liberal
+legal network: “Conservatives have long bemoaned the fact that
+clerkships to prominent conservative jurists have often gone to people
+with liberal views. Similarly, it has been contended that far too many
+legal posts in governmental offices (even those not controlled by civil
+service regulations) have been held by liberals under Republican administrations.
+Finally, it is generally acknowledged that there is an insufficient
+number of conservative law school faculty.”9 A placement service
+run by Professor James McClellan of the University of Virginia was proposed,
+along with a “job exchange section” in the Society’s newsletter.
+The proposal was prescient in its prediction that “simply through its
+existence, the Society can be expected to create an informal network of
+people with shared views who are interested in helping each other out
+in the placement sphere. It will in fact be one of the national organization’s
+goals to develop key relationships with judges, legislators, governmental
+counsels and practitioners. To some extent, through the Yale
+symposium, this has already begun to take place.”10 From its founding,
+the Society’s leaders hoped that “simply through its existence” conservatives
+might gain sway over jobs in conservative administrations and in
+the courts. Early in the Society’s development it crowed to patrons about
+members’ success in obtaining prestigious clerkships and other positions,11
+but it looked for its greatest impact in placement to come as a
+by-product of the Society’s other activities, rather than as an explicit,
+formalized function of the organization.
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 141
+
+While they did not direct the Society’s development, the support of
+senior members of the conservative legal movement was essential in this
+period. By the fall of 1983, the Society had a permanent office and a fulltime
+director, Eugene Meyer.12 Perhaps the most important elite sponsor
+of the Society in its early years was then-professor Antonin Scalia, who
+first helped connect the Yale and Chicago contingents with the conservative
+law group at Stanford,13 helped them with fund-raising, spoke at their
+first conference,14 hosted visiting Harvard Law Federalist Society members
+at his home when the Society had its conference at the University of
+Chicago Law School, and facilitated the Society’s early move into an office
+at the American Enterprise Institute. Michael Horowitz also played a critical
+role in getting the Society off the ground, no doubt recognizing that
+it was doing what he had called for in his report to the Scaife Foundation.15
+As Lee Liberman Otis recalls, Horowitz
+
+found us after we started. . . . He was really excited to find out that this thing
+existed. And he was full of ideas, people he knew. . . . He did help us a little
+with foundations, but also I think he helped us with just meeting other conservative
+lawyer types in Washington. For example, I clerked with a fellow named
+John Schmidt who became deputy counsel to Vice President Bush. Mike Horowitz
+came up with the idea that John should meet Boyden Gray who was then
+counsel to Vice President Bush. He just knew everybody, basically, and so if we
+were looking for speakers or things like that he would be able to help us with
+stuff like that.
+
+Finally, Kenneth Cribb, first as an advisor to the attorney general and
+then as assistant to the president for domestic policy, was an early an
+important ally in the Reagan administration. Cribb recalls,
+
+I was always looking for people who would come and work on the president’s
+agenda without self-calculation, and that describes these Federalists. They’re
+loyal to a philosophical principle that Reagan was trying to accomplish, and
+they weren’t trying to [ideologically] position themselves for personal gain, so
+they were very valuable. . . . In any event, after Meese had been appointed attorney
+general . . . Judge Bork said there’s one person you must hire when you’re
+setting up the Justice Department, and that’s Steve Calabresi. . . .So he was the
+first one brought in, and he became a special assistant to the attorney general,
+then David McIntosh, who was practicing law in Los Angeles. . . . So I hired
+David second; he was also a special assistant to the attorney general.16 Lee [Liberman
+Otis] had been hired independently by William French Smith at Justice,
+so she was there when we came over in 1985. . . . In terms of the signal it sent,
+[hiring the Federalist Society founders showed that] the Reagan administration
+thinks what they’ve accomplished in terms of founding the Federalist Society is
+important, and worthy, and we’re going to give them good jobs. I think a third
+142 CHAPTER 5
+
+sense is that young, idealist-oriented students saw that you could win that way,
+you could succeed if you acted honestly on the basis of your ideals, as opposed
+to maneuvering and telling people what they want to hear and playing both
+sides of the street. It was a signal that if you do the right thing you’ll go further
+than if you manipulate. It’s a good moral example.17
+
+Society membership was a valuable signal for an administration eager
+to hire true-believers for bureaucratic hand-to-hand combat.18 In addition,
+by hiring the Society’s entire founding cadre the Reagan administration
+and its judicial appointees sent a very powerful message that the
+terms of advancement associated with political ambition were being set
+on their head: clear ideological positioning, not cautiousness, was now
+an affirmative qualification for appointed office. In its early years Federalist
+Society membership carried a stigma within legal academia, but
+it was precisely the willingness to bear this stigma that made Society
+membership a valuable signal of true-believership for conservatives
+in government.19
+The nascent Federalist Society was beginning to connect conservative
+law students from across the country, and the involvement of Scalia, Horowitz,
+Cribb, and Gray connected the Society to the conservative legal
+establishment. In recognition of how far the organization had come, just
+four years after its modest founding journalists were already describing
+the Society as part of the “Conservative Elite.”20
+
+Building Chapters
+
+The Federalist Society moved rapidly to open chapters in as many significant
+law schools as possible. This could be done spontaneously, up to a
+point, by building on the outpouring of interest produced by the Yale
+symposium. The Society’s founders sought to guide this budding movement
+even before they developed a national office, by distributing “How
+To Form a Conservative Law Student Group,” a document that provides
+a window on the Society’s early goals and methods.
+David McIntosh recalls writing the document with Otis “literally a few
+weeks before the first conference, because people were asking and we
+realized, ‘This is an opportunity, we’re bringing fifty people together, let’s
+have at least something they can take home with them to think about how
+to do it.’ ” The document emphasized the Society’s intellectual mission to
+“stimulate thought and discussion about the applications of conservative
+principles to the law.”21 Cognizant of the wide range of conservative
+thought, the proposal noted that the Yale Federalist Society “provides a
+sense of community for its members who span a broad ideological spec-
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 143
+
+trum which includes traditionalists, fusionist conservatives, libertarians,
+objectivists, classical liberals and Straussians.” Aware that these ideological
+divisions posed significant dangers to the movement, the proposal recommended
+that student chapters
+
+should not use the adjective “conservative.” This is for several reasons. There
+is no need to become involved in disputes among conservatives, libertarians
+and other factions about what they call themselves. A number of people may
+be hesitant about identifying themselves as conservatives, although they may
+share most of your views. Additionally, although it is important to have some
+ideological identification among members of the groups, a number of nonconservatives
+may want to come to your events and participate in the group,
+and there is no need to make them feel uncomfortable. . . . Finally, if the group
+wishes to issue statements on national or law school policies, or even if it does
+not, it will have greater credibility if the name does not make the group appear
+too unobjective.22
+
+This passage points to two fundamental dynamics in the Society’s early
+development. First, the founders had a strong desire to avoid factionalism.
+Previous conservative student groups, like Young Americans for Freedom,
+were rife with such conflict, to the point that their energies were squandered
+in internecine conflict. “One of the easiest ways for groups of students
+interested in politics to fail to accomplish as much as they would
+like,” the paper observed, “is for them to become bogged down in internal
+politics.”23 The Society was obviously aware of such a danger, and from
+the beginning consciously tried to avoid it.24 As McIntosh recalls, “I noticed
+that there was often a tendency for conservatives to be critical of
+each other, and . . . some of that was product differentiation, but some of
+it was [that] culturally it is a lot easier to get into a fight with a fellow
+conservative because you’re both outliers to the mainstream of American
+culture. It’s a lot harder to get into a debate or a fight with the law school
+or legal establishment.” Second, the Society sought to make its ideas attractive
+to those not previously affiliated with conservatism. Factional
+infighting ran the risk of turning off outsiders, a serious danger since the
+personal experiences of Society leaders convinced them that “conversion”
+was possible. Steve Calabresi recalls that
+
+there was definitely a feeling of conversion, that . . . there were people who
+could be turned around. Most law students had grown up in liberal families,
+had gone to good schools where the viewpoints being heard were mainly liberal
+and . . . they were essentially liberal out of lack of awareness of conservative
+ideas. Some of that was fueled by our lack of personal pasts in conservatism....
+I was originally a moderate Democrat, and I was persuaded by Reagan that
+conservative ideas were right, but I was definitively a liberal who became a
+144 CHAPTER 5
+
+conservative. Lee Liberman was definitively in the same position, David McIntosh
+was in the same position. We tended to assume that if we could make
+the transition, other people could also, so long as we made a good persuasive
+argument for the things we believed in.
+
+The Society’s leaders thought there was a constituency for their ideas beyond
+the hard core of self-identified conservatives. Convincing them, not
+simply providing succor for the hard core, was the principal objective of
+the Society.
+The Society’s emphasis on debate, rather than just sponsoring conservative
+speakers, was evident from the beginning. The original “how to”
+document makes the motivation clear: “You are more likely to convince
+people of your viewpoint if they feel the other side has been given a fair
+hearing.”25 As Calabresi recalls, “If you just bring a famous conservative
+and the audience hears that but thinks, ‘Well, sounds good to me, but I
+think one of my professors probably could have critiqued it and then I
+would have understood where they were wrong.’ By having the professor
+there on stage with them they get to see it and evaluate the ideas.”26 Otis,
+Calabresi, Lawson, and McIntosh had all been active members of an undergraduate
+debating society, the Yale Political Union, an experience that
+each of them identified as important in shaping their ideas for how to
+organize the Society. McIntosh remembers that “Lee, Steve, and I as undergraduates
+and Gary when he was at Yale [were] very involved in a
+debating society [which] meant that we embraced the classical liberal notion
+that a debate about ideas is a healthy thing because the truth will
+emerge from that. And that strong belief . . . led us to instill it as an organizing
+principle for the organization. We’re all very politically oriented
+people, so [without that experience] you could have seen a different ethic.
+There was also a genuine intellectual commitment to debate.” Gary Lawson
+notes that “you don’t have an interesting discussion if you don’t have
+people disagreeing, [if you have] pep rallies.” Eugene Meyer argues that
+the debate orientation came about because “we think in a fair debate
+these ideas are really strong and we’ll win. Two, if it’s a really fair debate
+and you keep losing, you sure better figure out why if you’re intellectually
+honest. [One example is] original intent and original meaning. To some
+degree some of these discussions and debates led not all but most conservatives
+to abandon original intent and adopt original meaning.”27 An orientation
+to debate also had the consequence of moderating factional conflict.
+Despite their differences, in debates conservatives and libertarians
+would find themselves agreeing with one another more than with the liberals
+on the other side. The original, foundational commitment to debate
+made the organization open and attractive to outsiders, moderated fac-
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 145
+
+tional conflict and insularity, and had a tendency to prevent the members’
+ideas from becoming stale from a lack of challenge.
+After having established a strong foundation of student chapters, the
+Society moved on to develop its lawyers division, beginning with its first
+and most important chapter, in Washington, D.C. The D.C. chapter was
+founded by Stephen Markman, a young conservative lawyer serving as a
+staff member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Markman was approached
+by active members of the Society in early 1985, Michael Horowitz
+in particular, because his position on the Judiciary Committee gave
+him strong connections to legal conservatives in the administration and
+on the Hill. As Markman recalls,
+
+I thought it would be a way in which we could provide a greater focus for those
+individuals who shared . . . conservative judicial and constitutional values, and
+of course I knew there were a great many people in Washington who did in fact
+share those values, but it was all far more amorphous back in those days—there
+was no regular meeting group. There’d been a couple of aborted efforts by the
+Heritage Foundation and some other groups to have that kind of meeting, [and
+while] they did serve their own purpose, there really was no principal focus for
+people who shared those views.
+
+In its early years, the D.C. chapter helped conservatives across government
+shape the movement’s still fairly underdeveloped legal ideas by facilitating
+freer debate than is typically possible within the day-to-day routines
+of the executive branch and Congress. Markman believes that the
+intense interactions facilitated by the D.C. chapter played a key role in
+the evolution of “originalist” jurisprudence.
+
+Ed Meese at this time had originated not the idea, but the nomenclature of
+
+original intent jurisprudence. This was later refined, refined I believe in a very
+useful way to original meaning jurisprudence, but remember at this time the
+stuff of debate was still kind of the old Nixonian terminology of strict contructionism
+and law and order jurisprudence, and this was a very clumsy way of
+referring to the ideas I think united people who congregated around the Federalist
+Society. I think that one of the interests in getting together was trying to try
+to refine our debate, to try to render more sophisticated what it is we were
+talking about, and many of our speakers contributed to that. I think the language
+of interpretivism or textualism or original meaning jurisprudence—these
+things were all aired and the subject of a great deal of discussion at Federalist
+Society meetings.
+
+Steven Calabresi believes that the Society has had a continuing impact in
+shaping the evolution of conservative thought, and speeding the transition
+from the older tradition of judicial restraint.
+146 CHAPTER 5
+
+Before we existed there were a handful of conservative scholars, but they
+weren’t in contact with each other. By bringing them together, putting them on
+debates and things, I think we’ve to some extent helped to bring together a
+homogenous, mature set of conclusions on things that people on the right agree
+on, about how particular legal problems should be addressed. One example
+might be the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. I think at the time that we
+started there were some members of the Federalist Society, some of our leading
+scholars, who were very skeptical of expanding the takings clause. They
+thought it violated judicial restraint, they thought it might hark back to a return
+to Lochner v. New York. I’d say in particular Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia,
+who were very involved in this from the beginning, were very hesitant about
+expanding the takings clause. Then there were people like Richard Epstein who
+thought everything was a taking.... Both of those positions have gradually
+been rejected by most members of the Federalist Society, so today most members
+of the Federalist Society believe there are some things that are regulatory takings,
+and in that sense the takings clause has been expanded beyond where it
+was in 1981. Even Scalia now on the Supreme Court goes along with that view
+and has written cases like Nollan.
+28 That reflects to some degree the interest in
+the takings clause among Federalist Society members.... That may be a case
+where having conservatives and libertarians . . . debating this issue and fleshing
+it out, and having members listen to it, has led to the emergence of a position
+that was not the original position of either of the advocates of that matter.
+
+By encouraging intense and sustained interactions among its members,
+the Society—in particular, its D.C. chapter—has created the deliberative
+conditions necessary for convergence in the ideas of the conservative legal
+movement’s various factions.
+While it is easy to emphasize the networking function of the Society,
+the most significant fact about the Society is what its networks center
+around. The sense that something is at stake in the speakers and debate
+that the Society sponsors gives the Society an emotional and intellectual
+edge. Especially for those members of the Society who had participated
+in it during their law school years, the D.C. chapter provided sustenance
+in what could easily be an intellectually stultifying environment. McIntosh
+recalls, “I was a young lawyer in government and [the D.C. chapter
+meeting] was a great opportunity to see friends who were spread around
+the Reagan administration and hear a debate similar to what we had done
+at the Society meetings or the national conferences, when your daily activities
+didn’t let you do that as much. So I think there was a sense of people
+missing that academic debate, and this was an opportunity to keep being
+involved in that.”
+The most important by-products of the D.C. chapter’s intellectual debates
+were the networks it created across the federal government. The
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 147
+
+D.C. chapter helped overcome the atomization and lack of coordination
+that is an unavoidable danger in our “government of strangers.”29 Markman
+recalls that networking “was obviously one of [our] interests—it was
+also . . . to try to identify more individuals who shared those values with
+whom one could seek assistance . . . knowing somebody in the Commerce
+Department who shared your perspectives [was very valuable].” Based
+on his experience as head of President George H. W. Bush’s Council on
+Competitiveness, David McIntosh found the D.C. chapter’s networks especially
+valuable in overcoming the intrinsic informational challenges of
+coordinating action across the executive branch.
+
+Our formal role [was] to ensure that the president’s policy preferences were
+taken into account in the agency rule-making, and yet we had no staff, half a
+dozen people by the end and some staff support from technical people at OMB
+who monitor these regulations. Being able to attend the Federalist Society lunch
+and hear from people who were either at an agency or at a law firm working
+on some of this issues meant that I had a much better sense of what was happening
+on issues that were taking place. . . . One of the folks at OMB told me, . . .
+“David, you’ve been getting the mushroom treatment.” And I said, “What do
+you mean?” and he said, “You’re kept in the dark and fed shit.” And by that
+he meant the information flow was being controlled by the agency and we were
+expected to at the last minute ride herd on this for policy reasons. So having a
+group of people who were friends and talked freely with each other opened up
+an alternative information source.
+
+The D.C. chapter reduced the transaction costs of governing as a conservative.
+It allowed Society members to identify allies in other agencies,
+thereby facilitating the flow of information, helping ideas to germinate
+and spread, and allowing members to escape from the “agency view.” As
+we will see later in this chapter, this network function of reducing transaction
+costs (especially those connected to the search for information) has
+also been vital where judicial appointments are concerned.
+
+The Growth and Funding of the Federalist Society
+
+Whether one focuses on its budget, members, or programs, the Federalist
+Society has grown dramatically over its first two decades. How did the
+Society manage to finance this growth given its diffuse and hard-to-measure
+goals? The secret to the Society’s success is the diversity in its sources
+of support, in particular the (financial and in-kind) contributions of its
+members and the long-term support of conservative foundations.
+The Federalist Society budget has gone through four basic phases,
+which can be identified (as in figure 5.1) by funding plateaus. The first,
+148 CHAPTER 5
+
+$8,000,000
+
+$7,000,000
+
+$6,000,000
+
+$5,000,000
+
+$4,000,000
+
+$3,000,000
+
+$2,000,000
+
+$1,000,000
+
+$0
+
+Revenues
+
+Expenses
+
+1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
+
+Figure 5.1. Federalist Society Budget (in 2006 dollars), 1983–2006
+
+from 1982 to 1986, saw the organization’s budget go from around
+$120,000 (measured by revenues in 2006 dollars) to a little over $1 million
+by 1986, where it stayed for the next few years.30 The next big jump
+was between 1989 and 1993, when the budget rose to $1.6 million.
+Fund-raising steadily increased from 1993 to 1997, as the budget exceeded
+$2.5 million, and the growth since then was gradual before
+sharply accelerating in 2001. The Federalist Society’s activities, with the
+exception of its two national meetings, are conducted primarily through
+its student chapters (in law schools), lawyer chapters (by city), and practice
+groups (organized by functional interest). The growth in the student
+and lawyer chapters can be seen in figure 5.2.31 In a shift from the evolutionary
+pattern of the lawyers and student chapters, the Society’s fifteen
+practice groups were created at the same time, in late 1995, funded by a
+$100,000 grant from the Wiegand Foundation.32 Since then, the practice
+groups have created subcommittees, but the basic structure has remained
+the same.
+The Society’s membership tracks the expansion of its budget and chapters
+(see figure 5.3).33 It evened off somewhat in the mid-1980s, increased
+dramatically in the wake of the Bork nomination, and went up enormously
+during the Clinton administration.34 The latter finding may be
+somewhat surprising. The Society’s skeptics typically argue that it is a
+“job network” for conservatives, but some of its strongest growth occurred
+during a period when the Democrats controlled executive branch
+appointments and the power to nominate federal judges. Thus, it is rea-
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 149
+
+Student Chapters
+Lawyer Chapters
+
+250
+
+200
+
+150
+
+100
+
+50
+
+0
+1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
+
+Figure 5.2. Federalist Society Chapters, 1983–2001
+
+sonable to hypothesize that the Society is most effective when Republicans
+are out of office. Conservatives may be drawn to the organization more
+when it is least powerful, as a forum in which challenges to existing government
+policy can be developed, relationships formerly established in
+government can be maintained, and networks can be preserved when governmental
+office is no longer there to provide ongoing contact and esprit
+de corps.
+Discovering a way to fund the growth the Society has experienced over
+the last two decades, without distorting the goals of the organization, has
+been one of its most fundamental challenges. The Federalist Society has
+flourished in part because of its increasingly wide base of support. The
+Society is less dependent on third-party support than almost any similar
+organization, because of its members’ substantial in-kind contributions
+and membership dues. The leaders of the student, lawyer, and practice
+groups are, for the most part, not compensated,35 even though they put
+in tens of thousands of hours a year performing Society-related tasks.36
+Lee Liberman Otis notes that “if you try to cost out the in-kind contributions
+of members, it is enormous, because they are all lawyers, so their
+time is very valuable.” The Society recognized early on that building its
+membership base was essential to its success. In a letter to Michael Joyce
+in 1984, Eugene Meyer observed that “in the long term, we intend to
+obtain a significant percentage of our funding from members of the legal
+community. This is why we feel developing some activities involving lawyers
+is essential.”37 While the Society created its Lawyers Division for
+150 CHAPTER 5
+
+1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
+
+35,000
+
+30,000
+
+25,000
+
+20,000
+
+15,000
+
+10,000
+
+5,000
+
+0
+
+Lawyers
+Students
+Faculty
+
+Figure 5.3. Federalist Society Membership, 1986–2003
+
+other purposes, the desire to identify a pool of donors who had a personal
+connection to the Society played a significant role. Today, over two-thirds
+of the Society’s high-dollar ($1,000 or more) individual contributors are
+Society members.38
+Despite the substantial resources represented by Society volunteers, the
+organization has always needed to raise money. Like most of the institutions
+of the conservative legal movement, this funding came from a handful
+of relatively small conservative foundations, while support from business
+or law firms only came much later, after the Society’s basic
+organizational norms and structure had congealed. Through October
+1983, the Society spent a grand total of $103,000, 95 percent of which
+came from six conservative organizations, and 5 percent from dues and
+fees.39 Meyer believes that the key to the Society’s fund-raising success has
+been the distinctiveness of conservative foundations.
+
+[Foundations usually ask] What have you done? Well, we’ve helped change
+some of the debate on the Constitution. But what have you done? I can’t answer
+that in the type of compelling way . . . [such as] Senator So-and-So wouldn’t be
+a senator but for this, or even such and such a bill wouldn’t have passed....
+That’s true of policy organizations generally unless they are lobbying organizations....
+There’s definitely in the philanthropic community a big emphasis on
+measurable results. I understand that. The only problem I have is that you have
+to have the judgment to know what sort of measurement you can reasonably
+expect for certain kinds of goals. The leading conservative foundations have
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 151
+
+had more of a long-term outlook.... That is what foundations should be
+for. . . . You can understand that if you’re doing a new group, a certain percentage
+of your grants will fail, the group won’t work, and you have the same costs
+that any other entrepreneur in the business world has—that’s the way business
+works. If you can choose intelligently you’ll start some really good businesses
+or really good organizations.
+
+Conservative foundations were especially vital in the Society’s early years,
+when funds from corporations were scarce, and they have stayed with the
+Society ever since. Foundation leaders had been exposed to the Horowitz
+Report’s message that conservatives needed to focus on legal ideas and the
+recruitment of law students, priming them for the pitch that the Society’s
+leaders brought to them. James Piereson at the Olin Foundation, Michael
+Joyce at Olin and then later at the Bradley Foundation, and Richard Larry
+at the Scaife Foundation established personal relationships with the Society’s
+leaders, creating bonds of trust that permitted a more aggressive and
+long-term style of grant-making than would have been possible without
+them.40 With less need to focus on fund-raising in its early years, the Society
+was able to eschew direct mail and corporate support and focus its
+energies on its members and the programming and services of interest to
+them.
+As soon as it established itself as a permanent organization, the Society
+sough to increase its organizational reach by using elite supporters such
+as Bork and Senator Orrin Hatch to expand its donor base beyond foundations.
+A 1985 letter from Otis to Abraham suggests that Hatch supported
+aggressively expanding Society fund-raising from an early point.
+
+Brent Hatch (son of the Senator) says his father was very impressed . . . [with]
+the caliber of the people in the Society, and wanted to know what he could do
+to help. In particular, he thought we could do a lot with “real money.” Brent
+unfortunately told him that he thought we had already raised $300,000, and
+didn’t think we needed help; but I’m sure that misimpression can be corrected.
+David [McIntosh] thinks we should make a blueprint for a $1 million organization
+and present it to Hatch. . . . In any case, I think we should meet with Hatch
+sometime next week, while he still remembers his enthusiasm.41
+
+A 1988 memo shows that the follow-up with Hatch must have been successful;
+he was one of the first two successful prospects for a Federalist
+Society Development Board.42 A central goal of this project was to create
+a board of trustees that could contribute or commit to raising $50,000,
+as well as a National Legal Advisory Council, whose members would
+commit to $10,000.43 Both of these new committees were intended to
+broaden the reach and networking of the Society, as well as provide intelligence
+on “the organization’s perceived reputation within various sectors
+of the legal community.”44
+152 CHAPTER 5
+
+Boundary Maintenance
+
+All organizations have to determine the boundaries of their membership
+and mission. While some scholars have argued that political organizations
+have a natural tendency toward growth, rooted in the self-interest of organizational
+leaders, the development of the Federalist Society suggests that
+this is far from an iron law.45 The key to the Society’s boundaries has
+been its self-imposed prohibition on “position taking,” a constraint that
+distinguishes the Society from ordinary interest groups and explains why
+it has repeatedly turned down opportunities to grow. This section will
+identify two of these foregone opportunities—a proposed litigation center
+and rating of nominees for the federal bench—and show how the Society
+has regulated its members’ behavior and limited the use of the Society for
+the personal interests of its leaders.
+At the beginning of the George W. Bush administration, a number of
+Federalist Society members who were nominated for positions in the Justice
+Department were quizzed about the organization. For example, Viet
+Dinh, who was being considered for the position of assistant attorney
+general, was asked by Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), “So is your belief
+that the Federalist Society does not have a philosophy, a stated philosophy,
+when it comes to, for example, the future course of the Supreme
+Court?” Dinh responded, “No, I do not think it does have a stated philosophy,
+to my knowledge. It may very well have. I just simply do not know.
+I know that the Society has a very diverse membership of people who
+think very critically about these issues, and I know that I’ve gotten into
+many, many disagreements with members of the Federalist Society on
+these kinds of issues. So I do not think that an official policy would be
+possible, even if desirable.”46 In a similar exchange, Edith Brown Clement
+was asked, “Do you share a judicial philosophy with the Federalist Society?”
+to which she replied, “I am unaware of any judicial philosophy
+articulated by the Federalist Society.”47
+Any number of reporters and columnists found these denials to be unconvincing,
+and depending upon what one means by a “judicial philosophy,”
+they were. There is no question that the Federalist Society is held
+together by some very broad, overarching principles, the generality of
+which is suggested by Sen. Orrin Hatch’s (R-Utah) description of the Society’s
+philosophy: “The Federalist Society espouses no official dogma. Its
+members share acceptance of three universal ideas: One, that government’s
+essential purpose is the preservation of freedom; Two, that our
+Constitution embraces and requires separation of governmental powers;
+and, three that judges should interpret the law, not write it.”48 Meyer
+notes that the distinction between these “principles” and “policy positions”
+is far from obvious.
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 153
+
+The statement, “We don’t take positions” is more accurately, “We don’t take
+policy positions.” In other words, when we say in our statement of purpose
+that we are interested in the current state of the legal order and separation of
+powers, the rule of law, individual freedom, and [that] certainly the role of the
+judge is to say what the law is, not what it ought to be—obviously those are
+positions. Those are the positions we take. Beyond that, the fact that something
+promotes individual freedom doesn’t mean we’re going to support it.... Does
+that broad set of principles affect what our programming is? Of course it does.
+It’s designed to bring those things to the fore. We make sure in our program
+. . . that those general principles are strongly advocated in addition to other
+principles. That’s where we stop. But once again, where we stop and someone
+else picks up can make the line seem fuzzy.
+
+This denial of position-taking could easily be seen as a ruse, but this would
+be a critical mistake, since stopping short of drawing out the policy or
+legal consequences of its principles serves vital organizational maintenance,
+enhancing the Society’s role in the larger conservative movement.
+Michael Oakeshott’s distinction between enterprise and civil association
+is useful for clarifying this point. Enterprise associations are defined
+by their goal: members join because they agree with its goals. Civil associations,
+on the other hand, provide a common venue, resolve disputes, and
+establish rules for interaction. Oakeshott observed that the mode of civil
+association is very difficult to maintain in a pure state, since at some point
+people need some general notion of why the forum that the procedures
+make possible is desirable, some assurance that it is oriented toward a
+morally defensible end. On the other hand, a pure enterprise association
+has a tendency toward collapsing in on itself, becoming insulated and
+antiparticipatory. All organizations that seek some form of membership,
+therefore, usually end up between these poles.49
+The Federalist Society has positioned itself primarily as a civil association,
+focusing almost exclusively on fostering debate and providing services
+to its members. While its critics have often interpreted its role
+through the frame of other Washington-based organizations, the Federalist
+Society is not an interest group, and it does not engage in many
+of the activities its opponents attribute to it. This is not because the
+organization finds anything intrinsically wrong with such activities—it
+works closely with organizations that involve themselves in litigation
+and judicial confirmation battles, and these activities are made easier
+because of the networks the Society has fostered. The Society could not
+involve itself directly in these activities, however, and preserve its organizational
+structure and distinct mission. The vital distinction here is activities
+the Society actually engages and those that we might call “externalities”
+of its core function.
+154 CHAPTER 5
+
+A useful example of how the Federalist Society has consciously limited
+its mission is its consideration in the mid-1980s of a litigation center. This
+would seem to be a natural extension of the organization’s mission, given
+that Michael Horowitz’s criticism of conservative law firms was still fresh
+in the movement’s mind and that the Center for Individual Rights and the
+Institute for Justice would not be founded for years. In addition, as Meyer
+notes, “If you get a group of lawyers with a broad set of principles, what
+do lawyers do? They sue someone. We had litigators involved with us;
+they wanted to use their talent. A lot of our lawyers were involved in pro
+bono work.” However, the litigation center never got off the ground, and
+other organizations stepped in to fill the void. Why didn’t the organization
+take advantage of this opportunity to expand its reach?
+The litigation center was seriously considered, and hints of interest in
+the idea even appeared in the Society’s original proposal. That proposal,
+written when the Society’s organizational form was still inchoate, stated,
+“As its statement of purpose indicates, the Federalist Society is being
+founded in no small measure to advance such concepts as judicial restraint
+and the rule of law. In order to effectively achieve that goal it may be
+helpful for the Federalist Society to submit amicus curiae briefs in appropriate
+cases.”50 Interest in the idea increased in 1985, an indication of
+which is a letter from Irving Kristol to Eugene Meyer observing, “I am
+not a lawyer and really have no opinion about a pro bono litigation center
+or lawyers groups—but, in the abstract, the prospect pleases.”51 This letter
+appears to have been in response to a memo written that year suggesting
+projects for the litigation center, including “locating appropriate
+cases,” “conducting litigation projects,” and “participating in think-tank
+seminars.” It notes that “we expect to be able to raise initial grants from
+foundations who have given money to the Federalist Society. Senator
+Hatch has indicated enthusiasm for the project and will assist in fundraising
+for the Center.” It proposed that the center incorporate in November
+1986, hire a staffer by April 1986, and begin selecting cases soon thereafter.52
+Finally, there is a 1986 “Status Report”53 that notes, “The Federalist
+Society has available today a $75,000 grant from the Scaife Foundation,
+the terms of which would permit expenditures toward initial funding of
+the Litigation Center.” In addition, the Society’s files include plans for a
+conference designed to produce a “compendium of ideas for use by Federalist
+Society Litigation Center.”54 Pointing to the findings of the Horowitz
+Report—another sign of the report’s importance to the conservative
+movement—the memo noted the disappointing results of existing conservative
+firms. “Although the movement’s success has received mixed reviews,
+it has clearly not achieved the widespread conservative shift in legal
+policy that was originally intended.” Society members have somewhat
+different recollections of how seriously the litigation center was consid-
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 155
+
+ered. Gary Lawson, a longtime member of the Federalist Society’s board
+of directors, recalls, “We pretty quickly put the kibosh on it on the theory
+that it would compromise the mission too much. . . . My recollection is
+that . . . there was some foundation that expressed interest in six-figure
+funding of a litigation group. So we had to consider it.” On the other
+hand, both Otis and McIntosh believe that the proposal was considered
+quite seriously. Otis states,
+
+I think we did think about it reasonably seriously, and I remember what happened
+in my mind was at a certain point I realized [that] if we do this we are
+going to be filing briefs, and there [will] have to be the Federalist Society’s name
+on it, and people are going to want us to take a position. . . . You have different
+schools of thought. [We have members who] would really like the takings clause
+to reach certain kinds of government regulation . . . and then we have other
+people in the organization who feel strongly that it’s not the case. And so officially
+the brief is going to have to say one thing or the other, and [as a result]
+there were going to [be] people who are going to be really mad, and then what?
+I remember fairly clearly going through that thought process and thinking . . .
+we’re going to have to kill this thing.
+
+David McIntosh adds that the opportunity costs of starting a litigation
+center were a significant factor, given that the Society was just getting off
+the ground.
+
+The energy to make something like that work was a lot more than we had
+anticipated and therefore we’d have to make some explicit choices. Do we
+want to now spend a lot of our time and effort and resources in developing a
+litigation project at a point when there existed other conservative litigation
+entities? And it would take away and diminish our abilities in the programming
+we were doing on campuses, starting the lawyers chapters. . . . It forced
+a choice of where you put your resources in an organization, and we went to
+the core strengths.
+
+A litigation center could have also jeopardized the participation of many
+of the Society’s members, especially those in government. Suggestive in
+this regard is a 1985 letter from a senior Reagan administration official
+noting that he would have to resign from the organization if it pursued
+such an initiative.55
+As a partial substitute for a litigation center, the Society created, in the
+mid-1990s, a pro bono law clearinghouse to connect conservative and
+libertarian lawyers with ideologically sympathetic pro bono opportunities.
+The initiative was initially modest and poorly funded, but the Society
+has recently increased its ambitions in the area considerably through the
+creation of the Federalist Society Pro Bono Populi Center, funded largely
+by a grant from the Brady Foundation. The Society’s increased focus on
+156 CHAPTER 5
+
+pro bono law was driven by interest from its members, who “complained
+a lot about the kind of pro bono activities that are available. If you’re
+going to do pro bono work you want to do something you feel strongly
+about, and they didn’t feel they were getting as much of that as they’d
+like.”56 The question was whether it was possible to reconcile the Society’s
+desire to be responsive to its members with its mission to facilitate debate.
+The creation of the passive matching system has allowed them to do so.
+Using a computer matching system, the Society connects members with
+organizations who have submitted cases without taking any role in case
+selection, a point strongly emphasized in the project’s grant proposal.
+“Because the Society will not screen participants, it makes no representations
+regarding the qualifications or legal experience of particular lawyers
+involved. All we do is encourage the initial contact.” Furthermore, the
+proposal noted that “furnishing information to public interest groups
+should not be construed as the Society’s endorsement of either the group
+or the specific project involved.”57 While this project is somewhat at odds
+with the Society’s primary mission of fostering debate, it fits well with its
+increasing role of countering what it sees as the influence of the liberal
+legal network on the organized bar (discussed in greater detail below in
+the section “A Counter-ABA?”).
+The Society saw the project as an opportunity to correct a significant
+imbalance between liberal and conservative public interest law. Just as
+the Federalist Society has accused the ABA of being ideologically biased,
+it has recently claimed that pro bono law in major firms is systematically
+diverting valuable resources to legal liberals, while providing almost nothing
+to lawyers on the right.58 Chapter 2 provides some support for this
+argument, since it shows that the liberal legal network has thousands of
+lawyers willing and able to handle public interest law cases, fed through
+the pro bono system and trained in law school clinics. Despite all their
+other strengths, conservatives continue to have little of this sort of infrastructure,
+and as a result conservative law firms only have the manpower
+to take cases likely to set a significant precedent. The need to correct this
+“disparity between these two philosophical sides in the number of lawyers
+who follow up on victories made by the public interest groups with whom
+they agree”59 was the most important motivation for the Society’s expansion
+of its involvement in pro bono law. By matching lawyers in its network
+with interesting but non-precedent-setting cases, the Society told its
+patrons that “lawyers will work thousands of extra pro bono hours in
+these cases, thereby dramatically expanding the ability of our public interest
+groups to defend the Constitution and promote free enterprise by connecting
+them with a new generation of volunteers.”60 This project is probably
+the farthest the Society has strayed from its mission of fostering
+debate to actively organizing conservatives for political and legal activ-
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 157
+
+ism. The Society has gambled that it has created a means by which it can
+support conservative pro bono law while respecting its carefully policed
+organizational boundaries.
+No conviction about the Federalist Society is as tenacious as the belief
+that it plays a key role in Republican administrations’ selection of federal
+judges, especially since the Bush administration limited the role of the
+ABA. This is another area where the distinction between the Society as
+an organization and as a network is essential. The Society has considered
+issuing its own ratings of judges, in response to pressure from members.
+An early memo61 describes a proposal for “Recommendation and Evaluation
+of Judges,” in which the Society would “develop recommendations
+for appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for all circuits.... Each
+recommendation will be accompanied with a short statement about the
+candidate, his record, and his strengths and weaknesses.”62 The memo
+also suggested that the Society “make every effort to contribute to the
+examination of potential judicial appointments whom we hear about before
+their actual appointments.” The memo makes it very clear why the
+Society considered such a project:
+
+Judicial candidates are perhaps less thoroughly examined than most candidates
+for public office. This is true both with regard to their judicial philosophy and
+the intellectual caliber of their thought and writing. Their integrity usually receives
+exemplary review; but integrity alone is not enough. The Reagan administration
+provides an example of the importance of such review. While most of
+its judicial appointments have been excellent, a few have shared the philosophy
+and judicially activist orientation of many of the Carter appointees. There are
+many reasons for these appointments, but we hope that our evaluation of judges
+will contribute usefully to the store of knowledge from which judicial appointments
+are made.
+
+In the absence of a mechanism to systematically determine the judicial
+philosophy of nominees to the bench, the memo assumes that Republican
+administrations would fail to nominate reliably conservative judges. Outside
+government, but with a formidable network of “its own advisory
+board, its recent graduates, and law professors, lawyers and law students
+with whom the society has had contact and who share the society’s basic
+purposes,” the Society would have access to information on the judicial
+philosophy of potential nominees inaccessible to government officials.
+Meyer recalls that Society volunteers “keep saying, ‘We think the ABA
+is biased in the way it does judges; we need something to counter, to show
+that there is an alternative.’ And they say that the Federalist Society is the
+natural thing to do that.” The proposal was never acted upon, because
+of doubts about the effectiveness of such ratings: “How seriously would
+such ratings be taken? What’s our qualification for doing it? It’s a large
+158 CHAPTER 5
+
+logistical [project]. The fact of the matter is how it would be perceived.”
+Despite the ambition of some members that the Society act as counter
+to the ABA, it lacks the dispassionate, neutral professional reputation
+necessary for effectively rating federal judges. The Society has the power
+to vigorously challenge the reputation of the ABA—which it has done
+successfully enough that the Bush administration ceased cooperating with
+ABA review of judicial nominees—but it has not been able to reform the
+ABA or provide a viable alternative to it.
+While the proposal to rate federal judges was rejected, formal involvement
+in judicial selection may have been rendered unnecessary by the
+growth of the Society’s network. First, Society members have assumed
+important positions in the judicial nomination process. Steven Markman,
+who as assistant attorney general in Reagan’s second term was
+responsible for judicial nominations, suggests that the Society network
+helped to identify and expand the pool of potential conservative nominees
+for the bench.
+
+When you look early in the Reagan administration in the first term, sure, everybody
+knows that Professor Scalia at the University of Chicago or Professor Bork
+at Yale shared this approach to the judicial role, but it was not a deep team at
+that point, and . . . the Federalist Society really did help to not only identify
+additional [candidates], but . . . it also helped to create more individuals who
+found these views attractive. Once you get past people like Professor Easterbrook,
+and Professor Bork, and Professor Scalia, there was a lot of confusion
+as to the other appellate court nominees, and District Court nominees as well,
+and I think the Federalist Society helped to identify, to track, people who proved
+to be . . . capable of filling those positions.
+
+Lee Liberman Otis, who in the first Bush administration directed the
+White House Counsel’s work on judicial nominations, argues that the
+Society dramatically improved the quantity and reliability of information
+in the hands of conservatives involved in judicial nominations. The Society
+had “[a] lot of people who were sympathetic to what we were trying
+to do on the courts whom one could call and ask for thoughts about
+various candidates, or for thoughts on candidates that would make good
+judges. . . . It was a source of information in both directions, both positive
+and negative.”
+Republicans also have used Society membership as a criterion in making
+executive branch appointments. A former official in the George W.
+Bush administration recalls that
+
+Precisely because the law schools and legal establishment are so liberal, membership
+and especially leadership in the Federalist Society is a costly signal of
+commitment to legal conservatism, and so as a result it is also a valuable signal.
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 159
+
+So, if someone is willing to stick their neck out to be a member of the Federalist
+Society, then they can be counted on to have some commitment to conservative
+legal ideas and the conservative movement that someone else does not, say a
+local Republican Party hack. When I was hiring at [an executive agency], we
+would not only look for whether someone was in the Federalist Society but
+whether he or she actually attended monthly Federalist Society lunches or were
+at Ted Olson’s annual barbecue, signs that they were willing to bear a cost for
+the signal.63
+
+Like the D.C. chapter’s role in the diffusion of information within the
+federal government, the Federalist Society’s network reduces the transaction
+costs of acquiring information about the quality and ideological preferences
+of potential nominees to the federal bench and executive branch.
+This networking effect, combined with the presence of active Society
+members in senior positions in Republican administrations, is much more
+important in the selection of personnel than any active role the organization
+plays as an organization. Meyer concludes, “If we have succeeded in
+the ideas part . . . and people have come to share ideas, and . . . get to
+know each other, we’re not irrelevant to what they end up doing. I
+wouldn’t go farther than that, but I would go that far.”
+While the informal role of Society members and networks is surely its
+most important role in judicial selection, the Society has increased its
+formal role over the last few years, and this has required careful attention
+to boundary maintenance. Starting with the Roberts nomination,
+the Society did become more involved in the debate over judicial confirmations,
+but in a way that maintained its short-term institutional neutrality.
+Meyer describes the new role for the Society as primarily about
+enabling public education:
+
+[In the Society] there a bunch of people who are... experts in [the role of the
+courts] and clerked on the Court and have constitutional law expertise, [and]
+they really would be people who should be out there talking to the media. [So],
+one, we were making them available, and number two, we’ve gotten some PR
+help to make them available. Our feeling is that the role of the Court is one of
+the central things that we talk about, and it will facilitate the public discussion
+a lot to get some of these people out there. So we are doing [this] as an organization
+not in the sense that these people are representative of our organization,
+but in the sense that we’re very much trying to get these people out into the
+media so [the most eloquent views on the subject] get heard. But beyond that,
+we as an organization don’t do anything.
+
+This strategy is reminiscent of how the Society has managed its role in
+pro bono law. In pro bono law, it wanted to increase the contribution of
+Society members to conservative public interest law firms, while in judi-
+160 CHAPTER 5
+
+cial selection it sought to shape the debate over Republican nominees
+to the bench by increasing the availability and quality of conservative
+commentators available to the news media. In neither case was the Society
+“neutral”: it wanted to increase the effectiveness of conservative public
+interest law and the success rate of conservative nominees to the federal
+bench. In both cases, however, the Society sought to avoid involving itself
+in a way that would lead to conflict with its members, who might disagree
+with any particular case brought by a public interest law firm, or with
+specific judicial nominees. As a result, the Society has fallen back on its
+role as a network entrepreneur, facilitating the participation of its members
+and in the process increasing the impact of the rest of the conservative
+legal movement.
+While the Society has limited its formal role in judicial confirmations,
+its task of projecting its organizational neutrality has been complicated
+by the increasing involvement of Leonard Leo, the Society’s executive
+vice president and director of its Lawyers Division. Along with Ed Meese
+and Jay Sekulow,64 Leo closely advised the White House in the choice of
+John Roberts, Samuel Alito, and, more controversially, Harriet Miers.65
+Leo had previously been involved in partisan politics as the head of Catholic
+Outreach for the Republican National Committee, but his deepening
+involvement in judicial confirmations in Bush’s second term led him to
+take a leave of absence from the Society, since that deeper role has made
+it “hard[er] to separate him from the organization.”66 While the Society
+was eager to distinguish its formal involvement in the Roberts nomination
+from that of Leo’s more direct role, the nearly unanimous support
+Roberts received from Society members meant that tension or confusion
+was unlikely. The Miers nomination was entirely different, as her strongest
+opponents were Society members such as Robert Bork, Randy Barnett,
+and John Yoo. The tension between Leo’s role in the Society and
+his support for the Miers nomination came to a boil with the publication
+of a long Wall Street Journal article. The article reported that “Roger
+Pilon, vice president for legal affairs at the Cato Institute, a libertarian
+think tank, was fuming in his Washington office when the Miers nomination
+was announced. When he saw Mr. Leo on television, defending the
+nominee and identified as a Federalist Society officer, Mr. Pilon picked
+up the telephone and complained to the society’s president, Eugene
+Meyer. Mr. Meyer had already called the television network to complain,
+both men recall.”67 Meyer is quick to point out that all of his members
+understood, when it was explained to them, that Leo’s role was in his
+own personal capacity and that he took a leave of absence precisely to
+avoid making it seem as if the Society was actively supporting the administration’s
+judicial choices.
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 161
+
+The very complications that Leo’s role in judicial confirmations has
+created for the Society is a sign of the importance of its boundaries and
+the consequences of an apparent breach. As McIntosh observes, “My
+view—and I am the most politically oriented in the board—is [that] once
+you cross that Rubicon [of active involvement in judicial confirmation],
+the nature of the organization changes, and so we have to remain disciplined
+and say, ‘No, we’re going to participate, but we have a larger function
+of making sure these ideas are debated in the legal culture.’ ” David
+McIntosh recalls that deciding precisely where the activities of the Society
+in judicial nominations should end and where that of its members should
+begin was a major subject of debate within the Society’s leadership.
+
+Now a step over the line which we . . . consciously have decided not to do in
+the organization would be having a group . . . geared to support a particular
+nomination, a particular process for that nomination. And again it came down
+to wanting to be faithful to not taking positions. It requires discipline—let’s put
+it that way—because you’ve got members who are interested in engaging more
+fully in the political process of a confirmation. You’ve got political entities that
+look to the Federalist Society favorably who say, “Can you guys participate?”
+And we say, “No, our mission is limited to this.”
+
+The Society clearly is “political” and partisan in one sense, in that it seeks
+to advance legal goals with strong support in the Republican Party and
+little support among Democrats and to increase the effectiveness of conservative
+organizational entrepreneurs whose activities are largely consistent
+with those of the Republican Party. As the Miers nomination shows,
+however, the Society’s network is also capable of disciplining party leaders
+when they are seen as going soft on conservative legal principles for shortterm
+or personal political reasons. This disciplining function does not
+mean that the Society is set apart from the party system; in a system in
+which parties have become defined by ideology, this is a critical mechanism
+through which elected officials are held responsible to the party’s
+elite strata.
+How did the Society maintain such a clear, consistent, and limited mission
+over time? Much of the explanation has to do with its remarkably
+stable leadership cadre. Of the six members of the Society’s board of directors,
+Steven Calabresi, David McIntosh, Gary Lawson, and Eugene Meyer
+have led the Society from its inception, while Brent Hatch and Kenneth
+Cribb became active in the leadership of the Society soon thereafter. The
+Society has had only one full-time president, Eugene Meyer, and the cochairmen
+of the Society’s Board of Visitors, Robert Bork and Orrin
+Hatch, have had some relationship with the Society from its inception.
+This consistency of leadership is no accident, as vacancies on the board
+of directors are filled by the board itself, a decision that emerged early
+162 CHAPTER 5
+
+in the Society’s development. The July 31, 1982, organizational meeting
+minutes indicate a decision that “the Board of Directors will be self-perpetuating
+and will be comprised of students and lawyers. . . .” Interestingly,
+that sentence originally was concluded with “each serving a one or
+two year term.”68 Had this become official Society policy, it would have
+eliminated the continuity of leadership that has allowed the Society to
+manage its organizational boundaries and protected the Society against
+short-term pressures for expansion. As Gary Lawson explains,
+
+The reason we’ve succeeded . . . is that the same people who ran it twenty
+years ago, and the same people who will run it twenty years from now . . . all
+have a very clear vision of what this organization should do, which is promote
+ideas. Bring debates into the law schools, bring debates into the legal community,
+and everything else that happens, we’ll take it. . . . If you ever view this
+as a device for organizing and galvanizing or anything else, it will blow up,
+and we all know that, and we’re not going to let that happen. . . . If anybody
+wants to try to move the focus of this organization . . . they’re going to run
+into a brick wall immediately.
+
+This stability of mission and personnel would not be surprising for
+most contemporary political organizations, but the Federalist Society is
+not a nonparticipatory “association without members.”69 Quite to the
+contrary, the Society’s strength comes from the direct participation of its
+members. In this sort of participatory organization, leadership elections
+might be thought essential, as they encourage member mobilization and
+ensure leadership legitimacy.70 In the case of the Society, however, ideological
+competition with legal liberalism substitutes for internal competition
+among conservatives and weakens the virulence of intragroup ideological
+conflict. In addition, the norm against “position taking” and the
+focus on intellectual debate reduces the need for ideological factions to
+mobilize to protect their position. That said, it might have been expected
+that as the Society grew from a small group of friends to a large, less
+intensely connected group, the legitimacy of its tight leadership cadre
+would come under suspicion, as was the pattern for many participatory
+groups of the Left.71 Conservatives, however, may be more willing to
+judge the legitimacy of leadership by the fruits of their labor; so long as
+the Society seems to be working, they see no reason to challenge its authority
+structure. Finally, while the Society’s national office prepares lists
+of funded speakers, the chapters themselves choose whom to invite, who
+their leaders will be, and what activities they will engage in. These factors,
+taken together, explain how the Society has been able to maintain
+the high level of participation that is necessary to its core networking
+mission, while simultaneously preserving a stable leadership cadre that
+can maintain the organization’s boundaries.
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 163
+
+Organizational Outputs: Direct and Indirect
+
+As was hinted at before, to understand the Federalist Society requires
+close attention to the distinction between its direct and indirect outputs.
+The most significant direct output is debate: over half of the organization’s
+funding goes to sponsoring speakers and its national meetings.72
+The indirect outputs of the Society network are best understood as the
+conservative movement’s return on the social capital produced by the Society’s
+debating activities.73 None of the Society’s effects on the politics of
+judicial nominations, networking, placement of members, or facilitating
+connections across government is denied or foresworn by its leaders. That
+said, the Society could never have produced these effects had it pursued
+them directly. By limiting its programming, and thereby nurturing a reputation
+for intellectual seriousness and distance from short-term partisan
+politics, the Society has, perhaps paradoxically, been more effective in
+serving the political goals of its allies than a more directly partisan organization
+ever could have been.
+The orientation to debate discussed above (see “Building Chapters”)
+was not the only model available to the founders of the Society. When
+it was created, the other model, especially for campus organizing, was
+represented by the Dartmouth Review. Calabresi argues that
+
+we’ve tried to remain in dialogue with the organizations we’re trying to compete
+with on the left. One thing we very much did not want to do when we started
+going was turn into another Dartmouth Review. We thought that the Dartmouth
+Review was a forum where conservatives got together and had fun by
+acting like caricatures of themselves and taking all sorts of extreme positions
+and making themselves the objects of hatred and alienated everybody. We
+wanted to be engaged in constructive dialogue with liberal institutions. The
+underlying premise of the Federalist Society was that if we could just get liberals
+to think about and talk about our ideas enough, we might persuade them that
+we’re right. So we want to be a reasonable organization like AEI, an organization
+of thoughtful and intelligent people, an organization that’s engaged in dialogue
+with people on the left, not an organization that’s a caricature of what
+conservatives could be. That’s colored us with the ABA; it’s been the case with
+law schools, with law firms. We’ve always attempted to be in dialogue with the
+organizations that we’re competing with, in part because we hope to influence
+them to some extent.
+
+The rejected Dartmouth Review style of conservative organization was
+outrageous, attention-grabbing, and ideologically extreme. Former Review
+editor Dinesh D’Souza claims that the Review’s strategic insight was
+that “by staking out a kind of far-right position, the Review has legiti-
+164 CHAPTER 5
+
+mated a wide range of positions in the middle.”74 Reminiscent of the strategies
+of the far Left in the 1960s, by baiting liberal institutions to censor
+it, the Review sought to uncover their concealed ideological bias and inherent
+repressiveness. This repression would repel students from the Left,
+and the Review, by stretching the ideological range far to the right, would
+tend to pull the center along with it. Despite the Review’s visibility in
+the early 1980s, the Society’s founders rejected this approach. Federalist
+Society members are regularly reminded by their leaders to be cordial and
+well mannered with their ideological opponents. While this is driven in
+part by what the Society’s leaders consider appropriate, it is also informed
+by the assumption that ideology has a personal component, that people
+are initially attracted to or repelled by the character of an ideological
+movement’s representatives rather than their ideas. The Society’s strategy
+was, therefore, to generate for legal conservatism a reputation as more
+rational, open-minded, intellectual, and idealistic than its opposition, and
+as a result to attract individuals who share these temperamental characteristics,
+even if they were, like much of the Society’s leadership in an earlier
+ideological phase, vaguely liberal.
+This emphasis on intellectual debate is, again perhaps paradoxically,
+the key to the Society’s ability to fulfill its more directly political goals.
+Calabresi argues that the Society was designed to be a “conservative university
+without walls,” recognizing the critical political functions produced
+by modern higher education.
+
+We’ve tried to replicate the function that major universities serve on the left of
+
+creating a community of people with similar views on similar issues. We’ve
+tried to do that by holding debates and meetings, particularly panel discussions.
+We’ve definitively tried to keep the organization more of an intellectual organization,
+as an organization that debates ideas, puts people in touch with each
+other, and forms friendships, networks of friends, rather than crossing over the
+line of actually lobbying for a bill in Congress, or taking a position in an amicus
+brief before the Supreme Court.
+
+Gary Lawson argues something similar, noting that “the mere fact of having
+a gathering place, a place where people can, twice a year on the national
+level and however many times on the local level, gather, of course
+has that consequence. That’s not something we ever tried to stop or stifle.
+It’s always a by-product, an incidental consequence of ‘at last there is a
+conservative legal organization out there.’ ” Calabresi takes a somewhat
+less passive approach than Lawson to the indirect effects of the organization,
+emphasizing the network-building functions of the Society’s formal
+activities, and also suggesting that these were intended, and not just desirable
+unintended consequences. One important goal of the Society was
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 165
+
+letting conservatives know who’s out there in the conservative movement, so
+you build up networks of friends and associates who are all on the conservative
+side of things. The hope is that people will collaborate on projects on conservatism
+and law in the future, but that collaboration will only get started if the
+friendships are there and if people know who’s out there in the conservative
+community. Basically the situation we face is that at any given law school there
+may be ten or fifteen conservatives, and they may know each other but they
+wouldn’t know other conservatives at other schools but for the existence of
+something like the Federalist Society. Similarly conservative lawyers are scattered
+all across the country, but there may be only one or two or three in any
+given firm. By having an organization like the Federalist Society you bring all
+those people together, they form friendships, they start working together, they
+start collaborating on things, and before you know it you have a powerful network
+of people who are working on programs of social change. Basically one
+thing we concluded was that the Left had very powerful networks of Harvard
+and Yale Law School, or past Supreme Court clerks who tended to be liberal,
+and those networks on the left tended to be very effective . . . at influencing
+legal developments in a liberal direction. . . . So hopefully what we’ve done is
+create a major network on the right of people who like to talk about law, talk
+about legal issues, who will get together and act on legal issues. And it’s all very
+decentralized—they’re not acting according to a program.... They [Society
+members] tend to be libertarians or social conservatives and they will naturally
+tend to collaborate with each other on conservative legal developments.
+
+Networking versus intellectual engagement may be a false dichotomy,
+since the Society is, first and foremost, a network cemented by intellectual
+and philosophical commitment. The Society’s assumption has been that
+serious intellectual stimulation and opportunities to meet other legal conservatives
+will generate strong bonds of friendship. Once these activities
+are in place, the Society networks do not need any direction from the
+center.75 By increasing the probability that conservative lawyers will interact
+with others of similar views and interests, the Society helps members
+share ideas, provide tips on opportunities for activism, and share leads
+on employment.76 Through repeated contact with other conservatives, the
+Society’s networks reinforce ideological commitment, transform general
+attitudes into well-formed philosophical commitments, and as a consequence
+make members more willing to defend their views publicly.77
+The Society’s networks also increase the willingness of members to be
+open about their identity as conservatives.78 Many of the Federalist Society
+members I have spoken to refer to conservative lawyers as being “in
+the closet,” and the comparison to homosexuals is quite instructive.79 The
+Federalist Society tie, with its picture of James Madison, serves a similar
+function to a pink triangle bumper sticker or lapel pin, signaling to those
+166 CHAPTER 5
+
+“in the closet” that their identity is not shameful and that there are others
+out there like them. In the process, it helps transform what would otherwise
+be a stigmatized identity into a badge of pride and in the process
+creates a deep emotional attachment to the organization. This function
+was, of course, more important in the Society’s early years. Gary Lawson
+recalls,
+
+People don’t understand what the law schools were like twenty years ago. It
+was much more important to bring people out of the closet. We started with
+six people at Yale. We were the six who would self-identify as anything other
+than far left. Four traditional conservatives, one libertarian—me—and one classical
+conservative, Hayekian. In terms of speaking up in class, that was basically
+me, and the reason for that was that anyone who said anything out of the orthodoxy
+would get hissed. Not only did the professors not do anything about it,
+but some of them we strongly suspected were complicitous in that. Someone
+like me, I reveled in it because I liked being the bad guy. It would be uncomfortable
+for someone [else].
+
+This account of the situation at Yale seems hyperbolic not because Lawson
+is engaged in victim-mongering, or because Yale was a strange outlier—no
+less a figure of the Left than Duncan Kennedy confirms that a
+similar situation existed at Harvard Law School80—but because the Society
+(in conjunction with changes in the larger culture) has been so effective
+in shifting the tone in America’s elite law schools. As an early grant proposal
+describes it, the purpose of the organization was to “reduce the
+necessity of conforming. To be outside the liberal network will no longer
+mean having to sacrifice all of the benefits. In days of conservative administrations,
+our network will even be able to offer advantages that the other
+cannot.”81 Solidarity and collective action would, the Society’s founders
+hoped, encourage conservatives to show their ideological stripes.82
+One important consequence of declining preference falsification among
+conservatives has been an increasing willingness to pursue ideologically
+driven pro bono work. Calabresi observes, “I’ve just kind of casually noticed
+that significant numbers of Federalists who are out practicing . . . in
+firms try to find conservative pro bono work, and I don’t remember that
+going on to that degree twenty years ago.” Being embedded in a network
+of fellow believers provides social support for taking on controversial
+cases, helps lawyers identify sympathetic allies in their firm, and gets members’
+names into circulation among those with relevant cases. By reducing
+the stigma of legal conservatism and creating durable networks between
+its members, the Federalist Society also reduces search costs for conservative
+litigation organizations. As Chip Mellor, the president of the Institute
+for Justice argues, the Federalist Society “attracts a wonderful array of
+talent, bright and committed conservative and libertarian lawyers who
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 167
+
+are looking to apply their philosophy through their legal training in some
+fashion. All of them have a certain awareness of the kinds of issues that
+we deal with. They’re a tremendous talent pool that’s out there ready to
+be mobilized in some fashion.” One clear example of the importance of
+the Society’s role in reducing the transaction costs of identifying conservatives
+is the Institute for Justice’s recent move to create state-level chapters.
+Mellor observes that, in deciding where IJ should set up state chapters,83
+the critical factors are “a viable conservative and libertarian state think
+tank, constitutional provisions that are not gutted in terms of their potential
+for advancing liberty, a strong Federalist Society presence, a mediumsized
+state with both a nonpoliticized and a noncorrupt judiciary.” The
+Federalist Society provides public goods for organizational entrepreneurs
+like IJ, goods that are vital given that identifying conservative lawyers
+is an expensive and time-consuming task that serves the interests of all
+conservative organizations but would not be cost effective for any of them
+to produce on their own.84
+
+A Counter-ABA?
+
+From early in its history, the Federalist Society has had to decide how it
+should relate to the grandfather of all legal organizations, the American
+Bar Association. While the Society made some efforts to influence the
+ABA directly, this approach was almost wholly ineffective. The Society
+has chosen instead to harshly and repeatedly criticize the ABA, damaging
+its legitimacy as the representative of the legal profession, and added
+activities that replicate some of the professional bar’s functions, such as
+networking and professional development. Driven by the Society leadership’s
+personal anger at the defeat of the Bork nomination, this
+“counter-ABA” strategy has become an increasingly central part of the
+organization’s mission.
+It has always been an article of faith within the Federalist Society that,
+as its 1983 proposal put it, “Under the guise of nonpartisan and even
+non-controversial law reform proposals, both the state bar associations
+and the ABA have played crucial roles in developing a legal agenda which
+sometimes strangles dissent.”85 In its early “Three Year Plan,” the Society
+set out as a key goal of its newly created Lawyers Division to
+
+bring together and coordinate conservative activity within the ABA. This will
+involve using the ABA national, state and city conventions as both a recruiting
+ground and a platform. . . . [We should] determine which sections of the ABA
+our members are involved in. We will concentrate our activities in one or two of
+these sections. In the long term, making conservatives from around the country
+168 CHAPTER 5
+
+aware of each other’s existence and encouraging them to become active in a
+section of the ABA where they can help tip the balance of power will be a means
+through which we will improve the ideological balance in the ABA.86
+
+As early as 1984, the Society’s leaders recognized that this strategy of
+infiltration for ideological balancing was insufficient.
+
+In addition to activities within the ABA, we will pull together conservative lawyers
+outside the ABA and use the Federalist Society as a national conservative
+legal organization which would do on a smaller scale many of the things the
+ABA does, such as pronouncements or ratings concerning appointments to legal
+positions or comments on developments affecting the law. At present most
+Americans and even many knowledgeable observers think the ABA is conservative
+itself. This way at least some other legal organizations could be quoted to
+show that the ABA’s view that “we have to take the Meese nomination headon”
+is not the only legal viewpoint.87
+
+The “many knowledgeable observers” that the Society referred to in this
+document even included the conservative foundations that were funding
+the organization. In a 1984 letter (which may have sparked the comment
+above), Thomas Main, a program officer at the Smith Richardson Foundation,
+remarked, “In your last letter, you claim the ABA has a liberal
+bias, which I found rather surprising. I had been under the impression that
+the ABA is a relatively conservative organization. I would like evidence of
+this bias.”88 Before the Society could make the case for becoming a
+“counter-ABA,” it had to convince the conservative movement that a need
+existed in the first place.
+The Society’s relationship to the ABA combined revealing the ABA’s
+ideological character with using that revelation to inject competition into
+the market for representing the profession. The latter objective is evidenced
+in a grant proposal from 1985, which predicted that “the very
+existence of an organization with some reputation for scholarliness which
+expressed alternative views would help undermine the influence exercised
+by the organized bar on the legal and political communities. It would
+undercut the bar associations’ monopoly on respectability and provide a
+vehicle for publicizing the partisan nature of much of their work.”89 The
+Society thought that this approach would be especially influential on
+those outside of the conservative movement. Consider this passage from
+the first issue of the Society’s ABA Watch:
+
+One of the most disturbing social trends of the last two decades has the growing
+
+politicization of institutions that were once praised for being impartial and
+
+“above politics.” One by one, leading American institutions, from our courts,
+to the academy, to the media, have become vehicles for achieving political objectives.
+This trend is no doubt alarming to many members of the legal commu-
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 169
+
+nity. . . . For decades, public officials have generally believed that the organization
+is objective and apolitical. To this day, on matters involving legal policy
+and appointments to the bench, the ABA receives the utmost deference from
+most legislators.90
+
+Many issues of ABA Watch have bemoaned the “liberal bias” in ABA
+activities, from its amicus briefs in such cases as Grutter v. Bollinger to
+its ratings of federal judicial nominees. The Society’s core argument, however,
+is that having any principled position is inappropriate for a professional
+organization intended to represent a wide range of members. The
+Federalist Society has staked out a rhetorical position in favor of “neutrality,”
+no doubt knowing that any kind of rigorously applied neutrality
+would require a dramatic restriction of the ABA’s mission. The Society
+has taken advantage of a bind that the ABA, and to a degree all professional
+organizations, face. While the idea of professional neutrality has
+entered into terminal decline, the ABA’s justification for its existence presumes
+that such a neutral role can exist. This bind has provided a very
+effective opening for the Society’s attacks on the organization.
+The drive to turn the Federalist Society into a counter-ABA picked up
+momentum after the defeat of the Bork nomination in 1987. Calabresi
+believes the nomination injected a powerful emotional charge into the
+organization, rooted in the close personal connection that Bork had
+forged with the group.91
+
+It was tremendously energizing for conservatives, having a martyr, basically.
+That’s the only way of describing it.... Bork was a person who forged extremely
+deep friendships with a large number of people. He had been an active
+spokesman for thirty years before his nomination, he’d been around for a long
+time, he knew all the leading conservatives in the conservative legal movement.
+We [had] been his students or his law clerks, or worked with him in the SGs
+office, been colleagues of his when he was a judge.... People felt a tremendous
+loyalty to him; he was one of these unusual people who inspires a real loyalty,
+one that I feel today. In fact I named my oldest son Robert, I’m sure because of
+my admiration for him.... People didn’t set about to make Bork a martyr
+because it would be politically useful to the conservative cause to have a martyr.
+People genuinely felt outraged. They felt the way if their father or mother had
+not been confirmed to the Supreme Court, or some close personal friend. There
+were a lot of people who felt this way and nursed their sense of grievance, and
+it became a martyrdom situation.
+
+That sense of martyrdom translated into a powerful motivation to use the
+Society to get revenge on the liberal legal elites who were seen as responsible
+for Bork’s defeat. While the organization has continued to conduct its
+intellectual activities, Calabresi believes it has given an impetus to the
+counter-ABA functions of the Society:
+170 CHAPTER 5
+
+I think one question that we struggled with in the mid- to late eighties was what
+direction our lawyer’s division should go in, whether we should try to be a
+conservative alternative to the ABA. I think the Bork nomination failure pushed
+us [in that direction], forming practice groups in various areas where practitioners
+in communications law or administrative law could get together and
+talk about their fields, basically trying to increase our membership so that it
+was closer to the size of the ABA. I think we became much more interested in
+being a conservative alternative to the ABA after the Bork fight in part because
+one of the key things in the Bork fight was that the ABA committee split on
+giving Bork a well-qualified rating for the Supreme Court. Four or five members
+of the ABA review committee said he was not qualified or that he was only
+qualified, not well qualified, so the ABA was seen as playing a role in Bork’s
+defeat. That made us want to be more of a conservative alternative to the ABA.
+In that sense we became more political than we had been before the Bork confirmation
+fight, because before that we did not have so concretely the goal of
+being a conservative alternative to the ABA. After the Bork fight we did to a
+greater extent.
+
+Most social movements have a seminal moment of injustice that motivates
+their members to greater exertions: homosexuals remember Stonewall,
+blacks images of John Lewis being beaten in Rock Hill, feminists
+the Clarence Thomas hearings. These moments of injustice serve essential
+organizational functions. They are often ritualized and remembered,
+nursed as grievances and used as motivation for extracting extra effort
+from group members. They can also, as in the case of the Bork nomination,
+serve as catalysts for organizational change and the intensification
+of effort. Before the nomination, the organization’s budget had leveled
+off. In the four years after it, the Society’s budget doubled, in large part
+due to the “Bork effect.” A Development Planning Meeting memo from
+October 1990 notes, “A special appeal to the Federalist Society mailing
+list signed by Judge Bork has been the most successful ever. Receipts total
+$17,250 and are matchable. Another grant of $10,000 from the Foundation
+for American Studies came in after receiving this letter.”92 Other fundraising
+memos mention the importance of Bork’s support to the Society’s
+fund-raising efforts.93
+In addition to the growth of the Society’s Lawyers Division, the most
+important institutional shift in the organization since the Bork nomination
+has been the addition of the Society’s practice groups. The Society
+currently operates fifteen practice groups, examining subjects from administrative
+law to telecommunications,94 roughly the same set of topics
+that the Society began with in 1995. In contrast to the lawyer and student
+chapters, the practice groups were the result of planning rather than gradual
+evolution, driven by the Society’s reaction to, and attempt to partially
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 171
+
+substitute for, the ABA’s “Sections.” The original proposal to the E. L.
+Wiegand Foundation, which funded the practice groups’ start-up costs,
+makes the motivations for the practice groups clear, and shows that the
+Society’s criticism of the ABA is not simply a rhetorical ploy, but is sincerely
+believed by its leaders. The objectives of the practice groups were
+the following:
+
+1. To develop a mechanism by which like-minded lawyers with practices in
+particular areas can meet to exchange ideas. Existing groups that try to
+bring lawyers together on the basis of their work in specific areas of law—
+i.e., the organized bar—almost never focus on topics that are of importance
+to lawyers interested in traditional legal values. . . . It is no surprise,
+therefore, that a significant number of talented attorneys will not (and
+perhaps cannot) use meetings of the ABA and other existing bar groups
+to seek out lawyers who share their principles.
+2. To facilitate a more in-depth analysis of how traditional legal principles
+should inform judgments in particularized or specialized areas of legal
+practice. . . . The organized bar has no apparent interest in such ideas—
+even at the simple level of raising them through debate—and it is therefore
+very difficult to use existing institutions as a springboard for serious
+discussion.
+3. To create and bring together networks of lawyers in major areas of legal
+practice who, through projects of mutual interest, can counterbalance
+negative trends that are developing due to government action, judicial
+overreaching, or leftward pressures by the organized bar. The leadership
+of the organized bar is, by and large, captured by the Left. Consequently,
+there are limits to how much leadership those interested in traditional
+legal principles are able to assert through the organized bar.95
+
+The practice groups reflected the frustration of the Society’s members
+with the ABA’s perceived blending of professional status with an ideologically
+motivated agenda, and the hope that by reflecting the ABA’s structure
+on the right the Society could perform for conservatives the same
+functions that were performed for those on the left by the ABA. In replicating
+the structure of the ABA’s organized sections, the Society has also
+duplicated many of its functions. The practice groups organize panels at
+the Society’s annual meetings, operate subcommittees for the discussion
+of more specific areas of law, maintain websites that keep members upto-date
+on new cases in their area of interest, publish newsletters that
+provide a forum for the groups’ most active members to disseminate their
+ideas, direct members to new articles and books within the ideological
+umbrella of the organization, and publish transcripts of practice group
+panels. The Society also believed that by providing continuing legal education
+opportunities for practice group members, the new division would
+172 CHAPTER 5
+
+“attract attorneys who might not otherwise be exposed to our activities,”96
+since they could justify to their firms devoting their time to Federalist
+Society projects in their specific areas of interest that they could not
+with its more purely intellectual debates.
+These conferences, which are held across the country, also help to create
+a stronger national network of conservative attorneys interested in specific
+areas of law, by giving them the opportunity to create personal connections
+along functional lines. In the Society’s view, the practice groups
+are designed to link
+
+leading practitioners to one another, as well as to public policy leaders. Practice
+Groups . . . facilitate networks that enable lawyer members to become active
+in the issues that matter most to them—issues where they can have an impact....A
+number of Practice Groups are establishing pro-bono networks that
+connect lawyers with opportunities for pro-bono service in their practice areas.
+The Criminal Law group, Environmental Law and Property Rights group, and
+the Free Speech group have all initiated these valuable referral networks.97
+
+The practice groups represent the Society’s effort to organize functionally
+as well as geographically, in order to facilitate more active, policy-relevant
+interactions between members, and to allow for a more intensive form of
+involvement with the Society than is available in the Lawyers Division.
+An example of the sort of interaction that the Society was looking for is
+indicated by an instance where “on their own initiative and behalf, several
+members of the Administrative Law group responded to a request by the
+Senate Governmental Affairs Committee to review draft legislation, culminating
+in the completion of a memorandum to Committee staff.”98 In
+addition, the practice groups’ newsletters and white papers fill the middlerange
+void between the work of legal scholars and the typically nonstrategic
+activities of lawyers in private practice.
+The work of the Society’s practice groups is the closest it has gotten
+to active involvement in public policy. Even here the group maintenance
+imperative still exists, in the insistence that members are involved “on
+their own initiative and behalf,” without the imprimatur of the Society
+itself. When the practice groups were created, there was substantial concern
+that they would cross the line into position-taking, and thus break
+the organization’s boundaries. Lee Liberman Otis recalls, “I was nervous
+that practice groups would really have trouble not taking positions....I
+think what they end up doing is exchanging ideas of their areas of practice,
+and serving as organizational mechanism for people to get to know
+each other, who then if they want to go out and take positions together
+and [pursue] cases, they know each other and they can do that.” Even
+with the more ambitious set of activities associated with being a “counterABA,”
+the Federalist Society is still a professional organization designed
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 173
+
+to serve the interests of its members, albeit with an open appeal to one
+part of the ideological spectrum. This concern for avoiding conflict explains
+why, even though it has added counter-ABA functions to its original
+mission of encouraging intellectual debate, the Society has focused on
+facilitating rather than directing political, legislative, or litigation work.
+Whatever reservations the officials of the Society may have about
+its role as a counter-ABA after the Bork nomination, other members of
+the conservative movement came to see it that way. Michael Greve, a
+founder of the Center for Individual Rights, argues, “It’s actually a sort
+of serious counterinstitution to the American Bar Institution.... It’s
+nothing official. It’s just people know each other.... None of it is conspiratorial,
+that’s just how the world works. Just as liberals have their own
+institutions—they’re called universities, or the ABA—so conservatives
+have theirs.”
+The Federalist Society is still far from a true alternative to the ABA. It
+has a small percentage of the ABA’s budget, a fraction of its membership,
+and lacks the ABA’s structural role in the legal profession. That said, the
+Society is clearly doing more for its members than operating as a debating
+society. Its practice groups help conservatives develop alternative approaches
+to law and public policy, and its Lawyers Division fosters social
+networks that make conservative lawyers less dependent upon the mainstream
+bar. It is increasing its role in helping conservative lawyers fulfill
+their obligation to do pro bono work for conservative and libertarian
+causes. It is not yet a complete alternative to the ABA, but it is closer to
+fulfilling this function that it was fifteen years ago.
+
+Back to the Law Schools
+
+The Federalist Society began in the nation’s law schools, and while its
+programming has expanded dramatically, it has never lost its focus on
+legal education. At the top of the Society’s list of complaints with the legal
+establishment has been the perceived exclusion of conservative faculty in
+American law schools. For most of its quarter-century history, its response
+remained at the level of critique, but over the last few years the Society
+has sought to directly address the representation of conservatives in legal
+education. The fortunes of this project are a useful prism through which
+to evaluate the future of the Society and its effort to undermine the liberal
+legal network.
+In 1996, James Piereson of the Olin Foundation asked Eugene Meyer
+whether there was anything that the Society could do to alter the ideological
+balance of America’s law schools. Meyer spoke with Gary Lawson
+of Boston University, who told Meyer that his one-year fellowship
+174 CHAPTER 5
+
+at Yale Law School was vital to his success in obtaining a teaching
+job. The Olin Foundation had been operating its own fellowship program,
+which provided funding for a year of leave for professors in a
+wide range of disciplines (including law) prior to submitting their tenure
+file. Meyer and Lawson’s idea was even more ambitious than this, since
+it proposed using foundation support to improve the success of conservatives
+at the front end of the hiring process, and not just at the back
+end of the tenure process.
+The market for potential law professors is quite different from that in
+the arts and sciences. Whereas applicants for jobs in political science or
+English can demonstrate their scholarly potential through their dissertations,
+this is only possible for the minority of law teaching applications
+with JD’s or PhD’s. A large number of applicants to the legal academy
+take jobs in government or law firms before applying for teaching positions,
+rather than going directly into teaching. As proof of scholarly impact
+has become more important in law school hiring, the ability to get
+time off to write before entering the legal academic market has become
+increasingly important. A 1999 proposal for the Olin Fellows program
+argued that the process by which time to write is allocated is biased toward
+those on the left.99 “Fellowships do exist, but they are difficult to
+obtain and usually are closely controlled by fairly senior professors who
+share, even more than the average law school academic, the prevailing
+left-wing orthodoxy that dominates the academy. Therefore, if these opportunities
+are going to exist for students dedicated to principles of the
+rule of law and limited government, a new fellowship program is necessary.”100
+The proposal noted that the conservative movement had already
+been successful in placing students in law and economics, but that in other
+areas of law the conservative infrastructure was much more limited.
+
+The few fellowships generally available to conservative students are in law and
+economics. As a result, this has been the one area of law where conservative
+scholars have had good opportunities—largely because of the excellent John
+M. Olin Law and Economics programs that exist in many leading law schools.
+Unfortunately, generally conservative perspectives in teaching are just as desperately
+needed in most other legal subjects. In addition, there is some tendency
+for any conservative teaching law to be pushed into law and economics. Therefore,
+while there should be great pride in the build-up in that area, it is crucial
+to reach into other parts of the legal academy as well.101
+
+The Olin Fellows program represented a new stage in conservative
+movement philanthropy in legal education, and to some degree in higher
+education more broadly. Conservative organizations, like the Intercollegiate
+Studies Institute and the Institute for Humane Studies, have long
+provided grants for like-minded students in PhD programs, to encourage
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 175
+
+them to complete their studies in a timely manner. The Olin Fellows program
+is a step beyond these programs or the Olin pre—tenure review
+fellowships, in that they are designed to attract the brightest young conservatives
+into academic work and equip them with the qualifications to
+compete for the top jobs in legal academia. Where most previous conservative
+initiatives with university faculty, therefore, involved strongly supporting
+the few conservatives who managed to work their way into academic
+positions, the Olin Fellows program seeks to actively place them
+in those positions in the first place. The Society’s strategy with the Olin
+Fellows program builds on the assumption that has governed most of the
+Olin-funded efforts to influence higher education, which is that change
+filters down from the top.102 Meyer observes that the Society’s standards
+for the fellowships are very high. In response to applicants from lowerstatus
+institutions, he says, “I am going to be fairly blunt. I know the
+situation if someone says, ‘I was first in my class at Dayton Law School
+. . . and I have written some op-eds on legal issues. . . . I clerked for a
+district court.... That’s great, but honestly almost everybody who has
+gotten this has clerked for the Court of Appeals. A number have clerked
+for the Supreme Court. If their resume doesn’t look like they’d be competitive
+for the Supreme Court, chances aren’t good.” Because of the importance
+of marks of distinction in legal academic hiring, the Society almost
+always limits its Olin Fellows program to candidates from top law schools
+with impressive clerkship and restricts the schools at which fellowships
+can be used to those at the top of the law school pecking order.
+It is still too early to tell whether the Olin Fellows program has been
+effective, and in any case it is very difficult to disentangle the impact of
+the program from the influence of a changed legal culture or greater
+willingness of law schools to consider hiring conservatives. Table 5.1
+shows the fellows from 1997 to 2006, along with the schools that they
+graduated from, where they took their fellowship, who they clerked for,
+and their current teaching position, if any. Of the thirty-one Olin fellows,
+all but ten now have academic teaching jobs. Did the Olin fellowship
+program play a role in placing these conservatives in the legal academy?
+It is difficult to know. On the one hand, the best placements among the
+Olin Fellows have been those with a Supreme Court clerkship (and a
+law degree from Notre Dame, Harvard, Yale and Chicago) or a PhD in
+economics (Michigan). It would be surprising if candidates like this did
+not get an academic teaching position of some sort. Their success could
+simply be a sign of the impact of conservative Supreme Court appointments
+on the legal academy, and thus a strong argument for a direct
+connection between electoral and academic change. In addition, at least
+some law schools, especially Harvard, have made a clear push to hire
+more conservatives: at almost the same time that Harvard Law hired
+TABLE 5.4
+
+Olin Fellows, 1997–2006
+
+Primary
+Fellowship Other Academic Focus
+Name and Year JD from Degree? a Appellate Clerkship Job b L&E?
+
+Allen Ferrell Harvard 1997 Harvard 1995 “Kennedy SC/Silberman, Harvard Yes
+DC Circuit”
+
+Adrian Vermeule Georgetown 1997 Harvard 1993 Scalia SC/Sentelle, DC Circuit Harvard No
+Erica Worth Harris Virginia 1997 Texas 1996 None None Yes
+Geoff Manne Chicago 1998 Chicago 1997 Arnold, 8th Circuit Lewis&Clark Yes
+Matt Stowe Texas/Cornell 1998 Harvard 1996 O’Connor SC/Lutting, 4th Circuit None No
+Keith Sharfman Cornell 1999 Chicago 1997 Easterbrook, 7th Circuit Rutgers Yes
+Scott Angstreich Georgetown/ Harvard 1998 M.Phil. Ginsburg, DC Circuit None No
+Harvard 1999
+
+Julian Ku Virginia 1999 Yale 1998 Smith, 5th Circuit Hofstra No
+Thomas Lambert Northwestern 1999 Chicago 1998 Smith, 5th Circuit Missouri Yes
+Rachel Barkow Georgetown 2001 Harvard 1996 Scalia SC/Silberman, DC Circuit NYU No
+Nicholas Rosenkranz NYU 2001 Yale 1999 Kennedy SC/Easterbrook, Georgetown No
+7th Circuit
+
+Laurence Claus Northwestern 2001 Queensland 1991 D.Phil. Easterbrook, 7th Circuit San Diego No
+Amy Barrett GWU 2001 Notre Dame 1997 Scalia SC/Silberman, DC Circuit NotreDame No
+Adam Mossoff Northwestern 2001 Chicago 2001 MA Wiener, 5th Circuit Michigan State Yes
+David Moore Chicago 2001 BYU 1996 Alito SC/Alito 3rd Circuit Kentucky No
+Jennifer Braceras Harvard 2001 Harvard 1994 Winter, 2nd Circuit None No
+Ilya Somin Northwestern 2002 Yale 2001 PhD Smith, 5th Circuit GMU No
+James Prescott Harvard 2003 Harvard 2002 PhD Garland, DC Circuit Michigan Yes
+Charles Keckler Northwestern 2003 Michigan 1999 PhD Boggs, 6th Circuit None No
+Donald Kochan Virginia 2003 Cornell 1998 Suhrheinrich, 6th Circuit Chapman Yes
+Robert Miller Yale 2003 Yale 1997 PhD None Villanova No
+
+Jeffrey Manns Harvard 2004 Yale 2003 D.Phil. Wilkinson, 4th Circuit None Yes
+Chaim Saiman Harvard 2004 Columbia 2001 McConnell, 10th Circuit Villanova No
+John Pfaff Northwestern 2004 Chicago, 2003 PhD Stephen Williams, DC Circuit Fordham Yes
+Brian Fitzpatrick NYU 2005 Harvard 2000 Scalia SC/O’Scannlain, 9th Circuit Vanderbilt No
+Nathan Sales Georgetown 2005 Duke 2000 Sentelle, DC Circuit George Mason No
+Elizabeth Harmer- Harvard 2006 Stanford 1998 M.Phil. None None No
+
+Dionne
+
+Charles Fischette Penn 2006 Virginia 2005 MA Walker, 2nd Circuit None No
+Christopher Newman UCLA 2006 Michigan 1999 Kozinski, 9th Circuit None No
+Michael Risch Stanford 2006 Chicago 1998 None West Virginia Yes
+K.A.D. Kamara Northwestern, 2006 Harvard 2004 PhD Hartz, 10th Circuit None Yes
+
+a Completed or Near-Completed
+b Tenure or Tenure-Track
+178 CHAPTER 5
+
+former Olin Fellow Adrian Vermeule away from Chicago, they also
+hired John Manning and Jack Goldsmith. While all three had sterling
+qualifications, there are also indications that conservatives’ rhetoric of
+intellectual diversity also helped create a climate in which their hiring
+seemed institutionally prudent.103
+While the opportunity structure for conservatives in the legal academy
+may have become more permissive over the last few years, in interviews
+with a number of the Olin Fellows I was told that the fellowship had
+a substantial impact on their career trajectory. A couple of the fellows
+mentioned that they used the fellowship to support work on a second
+degree, while a large number of them thought the networks they developed
+while a fellow, the experience of faculty seminars, and the prestige
+of the fellowship made a difference in obtaining an academic job. One
+fellow’s assessment of the impact of his fellowship was “that it had a
+substantial impact. I became better acclimated to legal academia (as opposed
+to my prior graduate work).... I made contacts and developed
+friendships with academics that have proven invaluable in both professional
+and personal terms, and I made great strides in becoming a legal
+scholar. More important, I acquired the knowledge and skills that made
+it possible for me to succeed in obtaining a full-time academic position
+the year after my fellowship (and I received multiple job offers).”104 One
+very highly placed fellow observed that he thought it was unlikely that he
+would have gotten an academic job without the fellowship, because
+“there would be no time to write.”105 This fellow had not published any
+articles before his fellowship year, but he was able to finish two articles
+that year and start a third. Laurence Claus, with degrees from Australia
+and Britain, observed that the fellowship “gave me an opportunity to
+write a substantial piece of U.S. constitutional law scholarship and to
+explore the US entry-level teaching market. Without it I probably would
+have taken an academic position in Europe and would have entered the
+U.S. academy, if at all, only much later as a lateral appointment with an
+already-established reputation.” Finally, a fellow from a less highly
+ranked law school observed that the fellowship “taught me how to approach
+scholarly topics, it provided an opportunity to learn about game
+theory, it gave me the chance to make contacts with top-notch scholars
+at least one of whom has continued to serve as a mentor, it added a topnotch
+school to my resume, and it allowed me to write and place well two
+pieces.”106 It is still early in the history of the Federalist Society’s Olin
+Fellows program, but there are some signs that it has helped, at the margins,
+to alter the ideological composition of the legal academy that caused
+the Society to come into existence in the first place.
+THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 179
+
+Conclusion
+
+The Federalist Society was founded to dislodge what it saw as the “hegemony”
+of liberalism in the key institutions of the legal profession, and as
+such has been a critical component in the larger conservative mission of
+scaling back liberal successes in the courts. The aspiration of some in the
+Society’s leadership, and perhaps more outside it, that the organization
+should become a “counter-ABA” is part of the larger conservative movement’s
+objective to break what it sees as the liberal control of many of
+the institutions of modern America.107 The Federalist Society represents,
+without a doubt, the most vigorous, durable, and well-ordered organization
+to emerge from this rethinking of modern conservatism’s political
+strategy. In fact, it would be difficult to name a case of conservative mobilization
+outside of economic and foreign policy, with the exception of
+welfare reform, that has been as successful as the Federalist Society.108 If
+anything, the success of the Society has been more impressive than the
+project of welfare reform. Conservatives had a powerful political resource
+in public opposition to liberalized welfare policy, but have not been able
+to draw upon a similar popular engagement with matters of judicial philosophy,
+apart from occasional distaste for specific liberal initiatives in
+the courts. Transforming the courts, therefore, required a strategy of elite
+rather than popular mobilization. Conservatives had to create a web of
+intellectual, political, and network entrepreneurs who could generate new
+legal ideas, dedicated activists, litigation centers, and connections between
+individuals across the country that could certify individuals as ideologically
+suitable for positions as clerks and judges.
+The Federalist Society has played a critical part in building the support
+structure of the conservative legal network. The success of the Society
+was not predetermined, but has been the product of the careful strategic
+leadership of a tight network of individuals who have been with the organization
+since its founding, in tandem with the foundation executives and
+the well-placed senior members of the conservative legal community who
+assisted the Society at critical junctures. The success of the Society is in
+large part a product of its self-limitation, driven by its leaders’ strong
+commitment to intellectual debate and determination to avoid expanding
+into areas that would introduce divisive controversy between its philosophical
+wings. This success can also be traced to the effectiveness of the
+Society’s peculiar organizational structure in reconciling the goals of a
+large participatory membership and an insulated leadership cadre. This
+leadership cadre has been able to effectively impress norms of “rational
+debate” on the Society that set it apart from other conservative membership
+organizations. These norms have enhanced the Society’s effectiveness
+180 CHAPTER 5
+
+in persuading outsiders, maintaining dialogue with liberals, and, as a consequence,
+reducing the stigma attached to its ideas.
+Perhaps the greatest success of the Society is one that must be seen as
+double-edged. It has vigorously attempted to expose the “hidden” ideological
+bias behind the ABA and America’s law schools. These were once
+essential parts of the “American Establishment,” a set of interlocking institutions
+that exercised substantial influence over American society, generally
+but not always in a liberal direction.109 While the Society, along
+with other parts of the conservative movement, has helped weaken the
+power of this establishment, it has, counter to its typical members’ philosophy,
+further weakened the idea that there are any “neutral” standards,
+and in particular any institutions that can be counted upon to defend
+them. This is an outcome that should not, in the main, be laid at the feet
+of the Society’s leaders. The strategy adopted by the Society was, in large
+part, dictated by the difficulty its leaders faced in infiltrating the primary
+institutions of the law. As a result, they had little choice but to directly
+attack those institutions, expose their underlying ideological orientation,
+and present themselves as an alternative to them. The consequence, however,
+is that neither the Federalist Society nor its enemies on the left can
+count on the authority or legitimacy that the institutions of the law once
+held in American life. Partially as a result of the Society’s challenge to the
+liberal legal network, the law has become wracked by seemingly unending
+ideological conflict, making it even harder to move toward the Society’s
+understanding of the rule of law as something that transcends the ideological
+conflicts of the day. The Society’s activities have injected competition
+into the legal profession, but not, at least for now, a new establishment.
+6
+
+Law and Economics II: Institutionalization
+
+I have the strong feeling that the economic analysis
+of law has “peaked out” as the latest fad in legal
+scholarship and that it will soon be treated by the
+historians of legal thought like the writings of
+Laswell and McDougal. Future legal historians
+will need to exercise their imaginations to figure
+out why so many people could have taken most of
+this stuff so seriously.1
+—Morton Horwitz, Professor of Law, Harvard
+University, 1980
+
+FOR A GOOD DEAL of the period covered in chapter 4, the question that
+loomed over law and economics was not whether it was right or wrong,
+but whether it was worthy of being considered seriously at all. Among a
+large part of the legal academic community, law and economics was
+thought to be the province of libertarian eccentrics, a nihilistic project to
+undermine the normative foundations of American law, or simply unfamiliar
+and vaguely threatening. This atmosphere of stigma meant that
+elite law schools did not feel the need to make room for the field or its
+adherents, and its ideas could be legitimately ignored. The strategic challenge
+of law and economics, therefore, was to remove the field’s stigma
+and force a debate on the merits. The engagement of a huge swathe of
+legal academia with Richard Posner and the increasing prestige of market
+solutions to policy problems (even among liberals) played a large part in
+erasing this stigma. Henry Manne’s seminars for judges and law professors
+built on these changes in the environment by reducing the mystery
+and threat associated with law and economics, associating the idea with
+the prestige of federal judges and equipping law professors to intelligently
+engage with and contribute to the field.
+By the time this chapter opens, in the early 1980s, law and economics
+had become a legitimate if still controversial part of the legal academic
+community. Law and economics was no longer “off the wall,” but it was
+still a distinctly minority approach even in its core areas of private law.2
+Today, law and economics is dominant in private law and plays an im-
+182 CHAPTER 6
+
+portant role in much of the rest of legal education. The law schools of
+Harvard, Yale, Chicago, and Stanford boast over a dozen law and economics
+practitioners each, organized into well-funded research centers.
+In just twenty years, an economics-focused law school with a libertarian
+spirit at George Mason University went from nothing to the U.S. News
+top 40. While critical legal studies, its great combatant for the mind of
+the legal academy, has been all but vanquished, law and economics continues
+to increase in its influence.
+Some have argued that the explanatory power of the economic approach,
+the changing nature of legal problems, and the spread of scholarly
+standards to professional schools made this success inevitable. But it is
+difficult to account for the speed and thoroughness with which law and
+economics ripped through legal academia without accounting for the role
+of organizational entrepreneurship and creative patronage.
+Especially important in moving law and economics from a barely tolerated
+minority to a dominant presence in legal academia was the Olin
+Foundation’s two-decade-long investment in law and economics programs
+at the top-ranked law schools in the country. Olin believed that
+law and economics represented a rare crack in the liberal legal network,
+a beachhead for conservatives otherwise locked out of the elite legal academy.
+Beginning in a period when most of those schools had only a handful
+of law and economics scholars, Olin’s strategic patronage increased the
+visibility and prestige of law and economics, intensified the networking
+and productivity of its practitioners, and drew ambitious future law professors
+into its sphere. In a profession intensely sensitive to prestige and
+distinction, the presence of the Olin programs in elite law schools sent a
+powerful signal to institutions further down the academic pecking order
+that to “keep up with the Joneses” they needed to hire students trained
+in law and economics. Due in substantial part to Olin’s patronage, law
+and economics moved rapidly from an insurgency to a part of the legal
+academic establishment.
+Ironically enough, Olin’s remarkable support of law and economics
+came at a time when the ideological character of the field was moving
+well beyond its libertarian roots. Law and economics at the elite level
+came to resemble disciplinary economics in its overall ideological coloration.3
+This represented a substantial shift from the prevailing opinion in
+law schools but a far cry from law and economics’ former free-market
+enthusiasm. This shift raises the question of how much Olin’s support
+transformed law schools, and how much elite law schools transformed
+law and economics.
+Quite a distance from the Olin Programs’ ivy-covered confines, a very
+different model for reshaping the law was developing at an obscure commuter
+school in the suburbs of Northern Virginia. While the Olin Founda-
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 183
+
+tion judged that supporting law and economics at the nation’s elite law
+schools was the key to transforming legal culture, Henry Manne’s effort
+to build an economics-driven law school at George Mason University was
+informed by a very different strategy. Unlike the Olin programs, which
+were characterized by a focus on methodological sophistication and disciplinary
+legitimacy, GMU Law carried forward the more libertarian variant
+of law and economics that Manne first encountered at the University
+of Chicago. Manne’s law school at GMU would test whether conservatives
+could influence the legal mainstream by building a place of refuge
+for law and economics’ original libertarian spirit rather than by burrowing
+from within at existing law schools. On the one hand, GMU is an
+unquestionable organizational success—it is difficult to identify any law
+school in the last forty years that has moved so far, so fast. Where its
+broader ambitions to influence the character of legal education are concerned,
+however, the jury is still out.
+
+A Foothold among the Elite: The Olin Law and Economics Programs
+
+John M. Olin was as establishment a figure as one’s imagination could
+fabricate. Olin vacationed and socialized with America’s corporate elite
+and through the 1960s his philanthropic activities were not markedly different
+than those of other wealthy Americans. Olin was especially generous
+to his alma mater, Cornell, and was a member of its board of trustees
+from 1954 to 1966.4 It thus came as a shock to Olin when, in 1969,
+Cornell’s buildings were seized by armed black students, who squeezed
+curricular and other changes from frightened university administrators.5
+The events at Cornell led Olin to suspect that the administrators of traditional
+charitable institutions no longer shared his conservative values.
+George Gillespie, Olin’s private lawyer, recalls that his client “stopped
+giving to Cornell at about that time... [and] his philanthropy turned to
+what he called the preservation of liberty and the free market system.”
+The resignation of Henry Ford II from the Ford Foundation board in
+1976 reinforced Olin’s skepticism of traditional philanthropy, and convinced
+him that the typical, family-run, perpetual foundation model was
+a poor fit for this new kind of strategic conservative philanthropy. It was
+at this point that Olin contacted William Simon, who had been the secretary
+of the treasury in the Nixon and Ford administrations. Gillespie recalls
+that Olin “admired Simon’s way of addressing problems, which was
+very directly and almost strident.” Olin trusted that Simon shared his own
+conservative vision, and he appointed him to direct a new foundation
+designed to ensure fidelity to his intentions. James Piereson, the executive
+director of the Olin Foundation from 1985 to 2005, recalls that
+184 CHAPTER 6
+
+John Olin did not set the foundation up as a family foundation; these tend to be
+outlets for family charities, do not have a strong point of view, and are usually
+ineffective in accomplishing anything important. . . . John Olin created a foundation
+with a purpose. He appointed various business associates to the board
+who shared his philosophy, hired Simon as president, and told them to spend
+the money in a generation. These early decisions allowed the foundation to stay
+on track until it closed a generation after his death.
+
+Rather than trusting the goodwill and judgment of traditional institutions,
+Olin sought to direct his money to individuals that shared his ideological
+convictions and appeared to be doing important work, primarily
+in the world of ideas.
+By the 1970s, John M. Olin feared for the future of the capitalist system
+that had made him so wealthy. This fear led to his aggressive grant-making,
+and to Henry Manne. Olin was so impressed by the Manne programs
+in law and economics that he sought to use them as a model for additional
+foundation programming. The July 5, 1979, minutes of the Olin board
+of trustees report that “Mr. Olin introduced a discussion of whether laweconomics
+programs similar that of Henry Manne at the University of
+Miami can be established elsewhere. During the course of discussion, it
+appeared to be the view of a number of trustees that it is difficult to emulate
+or even transplant successful programs. What is needed, rather, is
+to identify institutions and individuals with leadership qualities who are
+willing to establish centers for the study of free market economics, including
+centers promoting interdisciplinary approaches.”6 Soon thereafter,
+Olin encouraged Cornell’s law school to lure Manne and the LEC to Ithaca.
+While there was not an explicit promise that Manne’s appointment
+would lead Olin to reopen his wallet to Cornell, the possibility that it
+would made this a matter of intense interest on the part of the law school
+dean and the president.7 Ultimately, the proposal was thwarted by a coalition
+of liberal and conservative faculty who opposed law and economics.
+The failure of the Cornell gambit deeply frustrated Olin and the foundation’s
+trustees. The minutes of the March 27, 1980, board of trustees
+meeting report that “after considerable discussion, in which displeasure
+in Cornell’s actions was voiced by a number of the Trustees, the Trustees
+authorized Mr. Joyce to communicate with Cornell the sense of disappointment
+the Trustees felt in Cornell’s unwillingness to appoint
+Dr. Manne.” The aborted project of bringing Manne to Cornell confirmed
+Olin’s earlier disappointment with the university’s leadership, and, when
+combined with his reading of trends in American politics, led him to believe
+that the hour for American capitalism was very late. A letter written
+by Olin in 1980 to the president of Cornell University indicates his state
+of mind at the time.
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 185
+
+I enclose with this letter a copy of an article which appeared in Business Week,
+April 23, 1980, entitled “Marxists on the campus—in the faculty.” . . . I cannot
+help but feel a situation has developed at Cornell which needs very very serious
+study and correction. The article... points out in rather sharp detail the infusion
+into the higher educational structure of our country of scholars stemming
+back to the 50s and 60s with definite left-wing attitudes and convictions. It
+matters little to me whether the economic development is classified as Marxism,
+Keynesianism or whatnot—the fundamental involved is the increased development
+since F. D. Roosevelt’s 1932 presidency and following World War II of
+socialism in our country. There is ample evidence of the growth of liberalism/
+socialism, which words I regard in our country as synonymous, and unless this
+trend is halted, I very much fear the 1980 decade will bring about very very
+serious problems in our own country. . . . I now have the privilege of reflecting
+rather in great depth upon the problems which are facing all of us and it is for
+this reason I felt I wished to write this letter to you rather emphasizing my
+concern about the situation which I feel exists at Cornell, triggered by the recent
+law college faculty left-wing rejection of Doctor Manne and his Law and Economics
+Center . . . which brings into sharp focus the divided responsibility and
+authority existing now between the Board of Trustees, your administration, and
+the faculty, which is a cause of deep study upon my part and great concern to
+me. I am definitely of the opinion the situation now existing can only worsen
+and may result in the intrusion of organized labor into our faculty with its
+concomitant problems of contract negotiation to closed shop eventually resulting
+in socialism taking over. I feel very strongly the time has come for a
+thorough analysis of the existing situation and the development of an alternative
+and remedy for correction be instituted as promptly as possible.8
+
+For Olin, the problems of America’s economy and universities were increasingly
+of a piece, and law and economics seemed to offer an opportunity
+to remedy both. Bolstering this support was Frank O’Connell, Olin’s
+former labor lawyer and the first executive director of the Olin Foundation,
+who was intimately aware of the interface between law and economics
+and as hostile as his boss to government regulation and labor unions.
+Law and economics was the Olin Foundation’s first effort at strategic
+philanthropy, and its ambitions in the area increased with the foundation’s
+ballooning assets. As enthusiasm for the Manne programs waned (as described
+in chapter 4) the board’s interest in gaining a foothold in the top
+law schools grew. In an early sign of the foundation’s acute concern for
+academic distinction, “In 1981, Olin Board member George Gillespie expressed
+his concern that many of Manne’s Olin Fellows were entering private
+law practice rather than the academy, and those who chose to become
+professors were not able to secure appointments at the nation’s best law
+schools.”9 By 1983, when the board definitively pulled support from the
+186 CHAPTER 6
+
+Simmons Building project, the foundation had decided to seek out other
+outlets for its beneficence. This shift from lower-status institutions to the
+American elite was reflected in all of the foundation’s programming. As
+early as the late 1970s, the board had concluded that funding smaller conservative
+schools had little impact on the national debate. “The work of
+these schools, however laudable in its intentions, makes little or no difference
+in the hearts and minds of Americans as regards attitudes toward free
+enterprise, nor do their faculties, alumni, and students tend to influence the
+climate of opinion . . . our hull has acquired a few barnacles and it may
+now be time to scrape down the hull.”10
+Pulling support from Manne’s programs was consistent with this process
+of “scraping down the hull,” but personal factors also played a role.
+The members of the foundation board were, like John M. Olin, men of
+America’s elite. Piereson recalls that
+
+our trustees were focused on elite institutions because by and large this is where
+they went to school. [Richard] Furlaud and [Peter] Flanigan went to Princeton;
+Gene Williams went to Yale; Gillespie to Harvard Law School; Chuck Knight
+to Cornell.... These trustees wanted us to work with elite institutions, not so
+much because they were influential but because this is the world they lived in.
+From my own point of view, I felt that we could have greater influence if we
+could penetrate these institutions, because they are emulated by other colleges
+and universities of lesser stature. Thus, the trustees and staff came to the same
+conclusion via different routes.
+
+This elite-focused strategy was also influenced by a desire to honor John
+M. Olin, with whom much of the board was personally close. The
+minutes of a 1981 Olin Foundation Steering Committee meeting report
+that in a discussion of the Olin Fellows at Emory, Gillespie suggested
+that Henry Manne “be contacted to encourage stricter criteria be used
+in selection of future participants in this program, especially if John M.
+Olin’s name is to be associated with the Center.”11 The meeting prior to
+the foundation’s decision to eliminate the Olin Fellows program at
+Emory observed that the “SC [Steering Committee] thought that a fellowship
+program bearing Mr. Olin’s name might be better pursued at
+an institution of greater influence and reputation.”12 While the Olin
+Foundation was certainly in the business of strategic philanthropy, therefore,
+it was not wholly lacking in the traditional philanthropic motivations
+of burnishing the benefactor’s memory.
+The effort to bring law and economics programs to elite institutions
+was, at least at the start, an initiative of the foundation’s board. As James
+Piereson recalls, “Mike Joyce [the Olin Foundation’s executive director
+from 1979 to 1985] was not all that sympathetic about law and economics.
+I’ve talked to Mike about this. He thought it was too abstract or
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 187
+
+theoretical. He was more interested in the intellectual combat you find
+in the magazines. However, our board members were very interested in
+working with these law schools.” George Gillespie recalls supporting law
+and economics “was really not a staff initiative. . . . The board took a
+greater interest, and understood more fully what we were doing than in
+some of the other programs.” At the same meeting where the board
+agreed to withdraw its support from the Olin Fellows at the LEC, they
+decided that
+
+efforts should be made to identify one of the top dozen or so law schools in the
+United States at a university with an outstanding economics department whose
+law and economics faculties would support institution of a law and economics
+program similar in scope to that which had been offered at the University of
+Miami Law School and Emory University Law School for law students who
+might be known as John M. Olin Fellows. The trustees emphasized in the course
+of their discussion the desirability of emphasizing both the quality of the institution—law
+school and economics department—and the quality of the students
+and faculty who might be invited to participate in a John M. Olin Law and
+Economics Program.13
+
+With that decision, the Olin Foundation’s project to inject law and economics
+into the nation’s elite law schools was launched.
+The foundation’s aggressive expansion of its programming in law and
+economics reflected its newly increasing ambitions. At the January 22,
+1981, board meeting, William Simon “stressed the importance of staff
+using its imagination in evaluating and planning the Foundation’s programs,”14
+leading to a major effort at long-term planning. A November
+1982 report to the trustees, which Piereson recalls was “heavily influential
+in shaping the subsequent direction of the foundation,” laid out this
+new approach. The report noted that grant-making had declined over
+the previous few years because of the dearth of attractive applications.
+As a consequence, the staff noted that “in the future, the Foundation
+may have to increase its efforts to seek out high quality projects.”15 In
+contrast to its previously passive approach, the report recommended
+that the foundation should operate more like a “venture capitalist, who
+seeks new and more productive investments for his funds. He initiates
+opportunities. Following this model, the Foundation’s staff could begin
+to search out new projects, discuss them with the Steering Committee
+and Board of Trustees, suggest them to qualified individuals or organizations,
+and use Foundation grants to make them realities. . . . Where the
+Foundation has attempted this, as in the creation of the Law and Economics
+movement, its efforts have been successful.”16 This entrepreneurial
+turn was facilitated by the foundation’s steadily increasing assets. As
+Piereson recalls, “After John Olin died in 1982, almost $60 million came
+188 CHAPTER 6
+
+into the Foundation from his estate. He died at precisely the point when
+the long bull market of the 1980s took off. When I came in as executive
+director at the end of 1985, those assets had increased to $100 million
+at a time when we were spending less than $5 million per year. I had the
+latitude of spending a lot of money very quickly without everyone in
+the world knowing we had it. Otherwise we would be inundated with
+proposals, but instead we were able to pick our spots, and allocate this
+money before the wide world knew we had it.”17 Law and economics
+would be the most important target of the foundation’s entrepreneurial
+ambitions and loosened purse-strings.
+The first of the new Olin programs began with a meeting between the
+foundation staff and Professor Gerhard Casper of the University of Chicago
+Law School. Piereson recalls that “Gillespie and Simon at a Steering
+Committee meeting told Mike [Joyce], go out to Chicago and get a law
+and economics program at Chicago. It was not something Mike would
+have done on [his] own; they told him to do it.” After meeting with Casper,
+he says, “We did make a grant to Chicago, and that became the prototype
+for others. There was faculty research, visiting lecturers, student fellowships,
+some other things which would provide a basis for the group
+to grow in the law school. . . . Eventually we did develop the idea that we
+could influence legal education more broadly this way, by funding these
+programs at several important places.”
+The decision to start law and economics centers at elite law schools
+represented a turn to a more directive, strategic form of patronage. With
+a professional staff and a broad portfolio of supported projects, the foundation
+could serve as a focal point for learning and feedback in the development
+of the conservative movement’s intellectual infrastructure. The
+foundation was especially alert for opportunities to influence legal education:
+just as it was supporting conservative students in elite law schools
+through the Federalist Society, law and economics offered entre´e into the
+faculty. Piereson recalls,
+
+I also had the view that it was important to get into the law schools. I felt they
+
+were very important institutions, and it was important to have some sort of
+presence there. Remember, by now the Federalist Society had started, so you
+had student groups forming. Because of that, you had a way to bring various
+speakers in and activities. The law and economics thing now seemed like a way
+to work on the faculty side and the curriculum. As time passed, the Federalist
+Society chapters did work very closely with the law and economics people on
+the faculty. They became their advisors and so on. A lot of them became speakers
+in Federalist Society activities, like Richard Epstein. So they worked on parallel
+tracks. . . . I would have preferred to do something in constitutional law,
+but you couldn’t really do that; you didn’t have enough people inside the univer-
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 189
+
+sities, inside the law schools, to do that. If you said to a dean that you wanted
+to fund conservative constitutional law, he would reject the idea out of hand.
+But if you said that you wanted to support law and economics, he would see
+that as a program with academic content and he would be much more open to
+the idea. Law and economics is neutral, but it has a philosophical thrust in the
+direction of free markets and limited government. That is, like many disciplines,
+it seems neutral but isn’t in fact.
+
+The foundation’s leaders did not have a strong sense of the subtleties of
+the field, especially the differences between libertarians trained in law like
+Epstein and the rising generation of law and economics professors—many
+of whom had PhD’s in economics—more interested in doing work that
+was respectable among professional economists. In their defense, the
+foundation’s leaders were also realistic about how much they could direct
+the evolution of the field or pick and choose whom to support. Law and
+economics seemed like the opening in the world of elite legal education
+that they were looking for, and they quickly committed serious resources
+to the project.
+After Chicago, the foundation went to Yale, where it was able to take
+advantage of the presence of George Priest, a prolific Chicago-trained
+scholar who had recently arrived at the law school. Before Olin began
+supporting law and economics at Yale, there was a small law and economics
+presence on the faculty and only the nub of an institutional structure.
+Priest recalls that while there were people at the law school with an interest
+in law and economics (Guido Calabresi, Robert Bork, Ralph Winter,
+Bruce Ackerman, and starting in 1983, Jerry Mashaw),
+
+there was no institutional feature at all. [Dean] Harry Wellington, largely as a
+fund-raising effort, created something called the Program on Civil Liability, of
+which Guido [Calabresi] was supposed to be the director, and they were going
+to raise corporate money. Well, anyone who knows Guido’s views knows he is
+pretty liberal if not radical. So they raised a little money, but not a lot. When I
+came here, the year after I came here, I headed that program. Guido had never
+written on business; he wrote on accidents, and the only connection to business
+came through insurance. Harry Wellington had some ties from the insurance
+industry, and he raised some money from there for civil liability reform. But
+Guido wasn’t business oriented, and I was, it wasn’t so much conservative as
+it was a more business practical orientation. So I raised some money, and we
+had some conferences.
+
+Thus, while law and economics was certainly not absent from Yale, “It
+still wasn’t much of an institutional presence.” The Olin Foundation
+moved law and economics at Yale from a primarily research-based project
+of a few professors to a much more wide-ranging program capable of
+190 CHAPTER 6
+
+making a substantial imprint on the culture of the school. Priest concludes,
+“What the Olin Foundation did was [provide] an infusion of new
+money, which we used for a workshop, a journal, student scholarships;
+we brought fellows in. It was not controversial in the slightest, because it
+brought in a lot of money, and schools can always use money.”
+The foundation hoped to make law and economics an institutionalized
+part of Yale Law School, and by 2000 the staff thought they had succeeded.
+An Olin grant proposal record concludes that
+
+staff considers the law and economics program at Yale to have been an excellent
+investment. George Priest is a preeminent scholar in the law and economics
+movement, and his students have achieved remarkable success. Sixty-one former
+JMO Fellows hold professorial positions at American law schools; 11 former
+JMO Fellows have clerked for the U.S. Supreme Court, one for the Supreme
+Court of Australia and two for the Supreme Court of Israel; 105 JMO Fellows
+have clerked for Judges on the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal; 66 JMO Fellows
+have clerked for Judges on U.S. District Courts; and seven JMO Fellows have
+clerked on state supreme courts. This is one of our most influential Law and
+Economics grants (along with Harvard and Chicago) and staff believes the Yale
+program is well worth sustaining after we close our doors. Moreover, Dean
+Anthony Kronman has written a very strong letter. . . . in which he commits to
+raising an endowment for a chair in Law and Economics as well as for other
+programs at the Center. Clearly, he is doing all he can to assure the permanency
+of the program.18
+
+The foundation believed that its support for law and economics at Yale
+had delivered what the Manne programs had not—a substantial impact
+on America’s legal elite (especially students, who were always a greater
+concern for the foundation than was faculty research) and an entrenched
+position for the field at the nation’s top law schools. On the other hand,
+some of this perceived success with students was simply a function of
+attaching the Olin brand to future lawyers who would have ended up
+succeeding regardless. In fact, at least some of the Yale John M. Olin
+Fellows, such as current Yale Law professor Reva Siegel, were anything
+but sympathetic to the foundation’s goals. Where Henry Manne’s prominent
+position at less prestigious institutions gave him almost complete
+control over the direction of his programming, the Olin programs in
+elite law schools like Yale were under much greater pressures to adapt
+to their surroundings.
+The success of the Olin programs in the 1980s was, in large part, a
+consequence of investments made in the previous decade. As Piereson
+recalls, “There was not much else going on in law and economics [in the
+1970s] other than Manne’s programs. At that time, we could not have
+spent much more in law and economics. In . . . the eighties [law and eco-
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 191
+
+nomics scholars] began getting jobs at very good places, and they could
+mount these programs. Priest was at Yale, Shavell went to Harvard. All
+you needed was one or two people in a law school, and they could begin
+to build.” Some of the seeds of the growth of law and economics in the
+1980s had been planted at Chicago, and others by the Manne programs.
+Both Priest and Cornell’s Jonathan Macey had been active participants in
+Manne’s Liberty Fund conferences, and a number of the alumni of
+Manne’s economics seminars for professors had moved into top teaching
+positions. The rise of “fundable faculty” in law and economics was, therefore,
+not exogenous to conservative patronage, but to a significant degree
+a consequence of its earlier work.
+Equally important in explaining the foundation’s decision to set up law
+and economics programs at the top law schools were the advantages of
+law and economics’ ideological ambiguity. Imagining the difficulties in
+starting similar centers at the nation’s top law schools in “originalist jurisprudence”
+is sufficient to make this point clear. Piereson observes that
+“you couldn’t get into the law schools with programs targeted at constitutional
+law. . . . When you went in with law and economics, you didn’t
+need to specify anything about the content; the content took care of itself,
+because economics is what it is. If you went in with constitutional law,
+you wouldn’t want Larry Tribe constitutional law, you’d want Bob Bork
+constitutional law. But you couldn’t go in and say that.” Also helping law
+and economics programming avoid direct opposition was its concentration
+in the early 1980s in areas that were not on the cutting edge of the
+nation’s cultural wars—such as antitrust, torts, and economic regulation—and
+that were widely acknowledged to be intellectually weak and
+thus a relatively soft target.
+Law and economics was also interesting to the foundation’s board in
+a way that constitutional and other hot-button areas of the law were not.
+Gillespie recalls that “law and economics, even though I’m not an economist,
+I can understand the analysis that goes into it, and it seems right to
+me. . . . I don’t read Supreme Court decisions on the progeny of Roe v.
+Wade. It doesn’t interest me. . . . It had to do with the kind of board we
+had. . . . John Olin was first and foremost a businessman, and this is a
+business approach to the law.” While the staff were, if anything, more
+motivated by constitutional questions, the board made the final decisions,
+and their heart was clearly in law and economics. The board’s interest,
+combined with the presence of law and economics professors at the top
+law schools, made it an attractive candidate for the foundation’s growing
+funds. This set the stage for the foundation’s ambitious effort to change
+what was then the nation’s most influential law school—Harvard.
+192 CHAPTER 6
+
+Law and Economics and the Battle for Harvard Law School
+
+Where the Olin Foundation’s main goal at Chicago and Yale was to accelerate
+trends that were already in motion, its ambition at Harvard Law
+School was much more audacious. At Harvard, the Olin Foundation
+sought nothing less than the ideological redirection of the law school, and
+the defeat of its most dynamic faction, critical legal studies (CLS). The
+foundation’s leaders believed that Harvard played a pivotal role in the
+nation’s legal profession, and that its control by CLS would give the Left
+a powerful platform for shaping the development of the law. In these
+conservatives’ minds, law and economics was the only movement capable
+of providing an intellectually respectable alternative, and the foundation
+committed millions of dollars to its support. While other factors played
+an important part in the defeat of CLS over the next two decades, the
+Olin Foundation’s patronage of law and economics at Harvard certainly
+played a critical part.
+Because of its size and prestige, Harvard Law School has an outsized
+impact on American legal culture and the character of the legal professoriate.19
+The foundation also became interested in developments at Harvard
+for reasons that had little to do with the intrinsic merits of law and economics,
+but a great deal to do with concerns that board members (especially
+Gillespie) had with trends among the school’s faculty—especially
+the growth of CLS. While CLS was a sweeping movement, a few of the
+beliefs of its adherents deserve our attention. First and perhaps most
+crudely, CLS was an effort to create a community of left-leaning law professors
+seeking intellectual sustenance, community, and power in numbers.20
+Second, CLS supporters saw themselves as the true inheritors of
+legal realism, arguing that law was essentially indeterminate and consequently
+its interpretation was “politics all the way down.”21 Third, the
+belief that law was reducible to politics drove CLS scholars like Morton
+Horwitz to demonstrate the ways that the law, far from being neutral,
+had supported the interests of the powerful, especially business.22 Fourth,
+CLS supporters believed that the ideology of legalism and rights had deradicalized
+social movements of the left, directing their protest into safe,
+“liberal” channels incapable of achieving their transformative goals. Finally,
+CLS trumpeted the belief that not only was the “personal” political,
+but so was the “professional.” Genuine radicalism required that the law
+schools’ role in perpetuating “hierarchy” be exposed and that they be
+transformed into sites for political resistance.23 The challenge these tenets
+represented for both legal liberalism and modern conservatism proved,
+for a time, powerfully stimulating to scholarship as well as activism.
+The growth of CLS was an unintended effect of the effort in the 1970s
+to inject greater intellectual energy into Harvard by attracting young, in-
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 193
+
+tellectually exciting professors. Derek Bok, the president of Harvard when
+CLS faculty were hired, recalls,
+
+I think we did recognize that they had different views, which was regarded as
+a strength, because the law school, like many other law schools throughout the
+fifties and sixties had been, while full of very bright people, was characterized
+by a uniformity of approach that a number of people thought was intellectually
+unfortunate. One of them was Erwin Griswold, so this wasn’t any effort to
+get more liberal voices per se. Erwin of course was a very staunch Republican
+conservative of the old school, liberal on civil liberties, conservative on economic
+matters, but he felt there ought to be more diversity in the faculty, and
+that was a common view. People saw the appointment of people like [Roberto]
+Unger and Morty Horwitz, who had historical training and Duncan Kennedy
+as a step in that direction.24 They tended to have different intellectual approaches.
+. . . It wasn’t thought of in left-right terms at all.
+
+By the late 1970s, however, Bok and others sensed that while hiring
+Unger, Horwitz, Kennedy, and others had increased the intellectual dynamism
+of Harvard, it also created a deep conflict over the direction and
+control of the school. By the time that CLS became a topic for discussion
+within the Olin Foundation in 1984, many observers wondered if the
+movement was on its way toward control of Harvard. Particularly
+alarming to graduates of the old Harvard Law was Duncan Kennedy, who
+proposed using first-year classes, such as his class on torts, to “teach our
+students that bourgeois or liberal legal thought is a form of mystification.”25
+Even more disturbing, he encouraged young lawyers (in the Harvard
+Law School Bulletin, a publication read by alumni), to “reconceive
+the internal issues of firm hierarchy as an important part of one’s political
+life, fighting the oligarchy of senior partners, opposing the oppression of
+secretaries by arrogant-young men who turn around and grovel before
+their mentors.”26 Such statements were to be expected from the students,
+perhaps, but from professors at a school that was famous for the rigor—
+some would say the sadism—of the faculty? Lawyers like Gillespie were
+not especially concerned that Kennedy would succeed in injecting his acolytes
+into firms like Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Gillespie recalls, “I didn’t
+care about that—it wasn’t going to happen, or at least I didn’t regard it
+as a risk.” Kennedy’s real threat was to what men like Gillespie saw as
+the traditional, civilized place of Harvard within the legal profession. To
+them, Kennedy represented a kind of professional barbarism.
+The publication of an article in the New Yorker by Calvin Trillin, claiming
+that supporters of CLS had enough support to block appointments,
+convinced the Olin Foundation board that the situation at Harvard had
+become critical.27 The May 22, 1984, minutes of the foundation report
+that George Gillespie “asked that staff consider what could be done in
+194 CHAPTER 6
+
+the area of critical legal issue studies at Harvard University and suggested
+that they confer with the most reputable scholars known to them in this
+field to prepare a presentation to the Trustees for discussion at May 31
+meeting.”28 At that meeting, the board of trustees agreed that it should
+seek “to support scholars at leading universities who are able to advance
+the intellectual case against the CLS movement through public lectures
+and debates, publication and research” as well as “emphasize support of
+assistant law professors in the John M. Olin program of support for the
+untenured faculty.”29 Harvard Law professor Philip Areeda was invited
+to the next board meeting to help the foundation develop its strategy.30
+Areeda was not a law and economics scholar, in the contemporary meaning
+of the term, but a “traditionalist” deeply committed to Harvard’s
+inherited understanding of the purposes and means of legal education.31
+Areeda’s close friend Derek Bok confirms that he was deeply shaken by
+the conflict at Harvard Law.
+
+There were even times when he was thinking of leaving the law school because
+he found it personally unpleasant. It focused particularly on the appointments
+process, where critical legal studies were always pushing their people, and of
+course that created great resistance on the other side, and by the end a lot of
+people lost their objectivity because they were consumed in this kind of battle
+between those people who thought . . . they could take over the law school.
+Probably not the most realistic view, but some of them entertained it, and were
+pushing for more and more faculty members who were part of their group, and
+this infuriated people on the other side. There was never a complete breakdown,
+but there was a lot of bitterness and unpleasant debates, unsatisfactory outcomes,
+in the sense that it became hard to get anyone through, which caused
+Phil a lot of anxiety and upset.
+
+Areeda had the good fortune to have Bok and Gillespie, his old law school
+friends, as allies in the project of countering CLS. Gillespie recalls,
+
+I was a friend of Phillip Areeda. . . . We were together on the Harvard Law
+Review. He was a year ahead of me; he was a classmate of Sam Butler’s [Gillespie’s
+partner at Cravath, Swaine]. Sam was very active in Harvard affairs over
+time. Derek Bok, the president of Harvard, was also on the Harvard Law Review
+with me, also a class ahead of me, a classmate of Butler. . . . Sam talked
+quite a bit with Derek . . . and I invited Phil Areeda to sit and talk with us at
+the foundation about the critical legal studies problem, and how that could be
+turned around.
+
+While Areeda was increasingly losing control of the situation within Harvard’s
+walls, his alliance with the Olin Foundation allowed him to, in
+effect, expand the zone of conflict. Without this alliance, he might have
+simply given up the fight.
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 195
+
+The Olin Foundation board’s meeting with Areeda cemented its determination
+to use law and economics as a counter to CLS. In December
+1984, members of the board met with the dean of the Law School, James
+Vorenberg, and Professor Steven Shavell “to discuss the possible establishment
+of a law and economics program at Harvard Law School . . .
+those present at the meeting (Samuel C. Butler and Messrs Gillespie and
+Joyce) had focused on the possible law and economics program as a
+counter to the Critical Legal Studies Group within the Harvard Law
+School faculty. Mr. Gillespie also reported that he and Mr. Joyce had
+strongly suggested that any such program at Harvard Law School should
+include a significant emphasis on student programs.”32 Gillespie was especially
+interested in the example of the newly created Olin program at
+Yale, asking in January 1985 “if this program could be suggested as a
+model to Harvard in planning a like program.”33 By March 1985 the
+foundation approved a grant of $917,000 over three years to support
+law and economics at Harvard Law, the money to be spent on student
+fellowships, visiting speakers, workshops, research funds, and conferences.
+The law and economics program went from original expressions
+of concern (May 1984) to funding (March 1985) to implementation (fall
+1985) remarkably rapidly, which was a necessity in a context as volatile
+as Harvard Law School in the mid-1980s.
+When the foundation first became engaged with the situation at Harvard,
+the group of law and economics scholars at the school was limited
+to Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow. Shavell recalls that the foundation
+board members “did not tie their support to particular pet projects. They
+really gave us freedom to develop our programs as we saw fit, the only
+real constraint being that, usually, they wanted a certain [percentage of
+their funds] to be spent on students as opposed to faculty research.” From
+the start, the Olin Foundation was not particularly engaged with the particular
+ideological or methodological coloration of law and economics at
+Harvard, assuming that it was generally sympathetic to markets and that
+it was futile to seek control over its substance in any case. As Shavell
+notes, the foundation’s more pressing concern was that its programming
+reach students, which is a sign that its focus was on the character of the
+law school, not the substance of scholarship. On this dimension, the Olin
+funding was a success, giving a small group of lawyer-economists a much
+larger footprint on the culture of Harvard than they would have had without
+it. As Duncan Kennedy recalls, the Olin program provided
+
+something to affiliate with. If they’re going to create a law and economics counterinsurgency,
+it means that they’re going to have unbelievable resources available
+to do it. And they had a genuine organizational talent. . . . They created,
+using the Olin money, a genuine community. The money wouldn’t have done
+196 CHAPTER 6
+
+them any good if they didn’t have the capacity to organize through the law and
+economics workshops. . . . Everybody who did law and economics in the country
+came to the workshop. Students could come to the workshops. . . . They
+[produced] . . . the impression that there’s a national thing even though there’s
+only two people there.
+
+The Olin funding came at a time when CLS—despite its extreme
+claims—seemed to be the only source of genuine intellectual ferment in
+Harvard Law School. The “traditionalists” were in no position to provide
+an alternative to CLS, wedded as they were to older, less intellectual traditions
+in legal scholarship. Law and economics scholars like Shavell and
+Kaplow, on the other hand, could compete with CLS on its own intellectual
+terms, and with funding from the Olin Foundation they could provide
+an alternative community for students who recognized the exhaustion
+of the traditionalists.
+At the same time that Olin initiated its support of law and economics
+at Harvard, the Federalist Society launched a very public effort to convince
+the legal profession that Harvard Law was out of control.34 Much
+of the Society’s 1984 conference at Harvard was devoted to attacks on
+CLS, and this came hot on the heels of the publication of Trillin’s article
+and the exit of traditionalist Paul Bator for Chicago, who pointed to battles
+with CLS as the reason for his move. This effort to heighten the perception
+of crisis reached a crescendo in May 1985, in a debate at the New
+York City Harvard Club sponsored by the Federalist Society that pitted
+Kennedy and Abram Chayes on the left against Paul Bator and Robert
+Clark on the right. The Society’s advertising for the event was, itself, an
+important part of its strategy to publicize the “crisis” at Harvard. It trumpeted
+CLS’s supposedly outrageous views and told Harvard alumni that
+the Society believed that it was “important to bring to the attention of
+alumni the pervasive effects this movement is having at Harvard Law
+School.”35 At the panel, both Bator and Clark pressed the point that, in
+addition to its rejection of “science, business and the legal profession,”
+CLS had a damaging effect on Harvard, making it difficult for the faculty
+to make offers and encouraging candidates to reject them.36 Extending
+the offensive after the symposium, the Society had transcripts of the event
+sent to all New York—area Harvard alumni. George Hicks concludes that
+the Federalist Society event “initiated a strong wave of alumni support
+for getting things back under control, and it identified Clark as someone
+who would fight back.”37
+The perception of crisis helped CLS’s foes to further expand the zone
+of conflict, linking the beleaguered anti-CLS faculty members with allies
+outside the University. CLS’s opponents combined this outside support
+with a well-positioned internal ally, Harvard president Derek Bok. Bok
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 197
+
+denies that his concern with CLS was due to alumni pressure, arguing
+that his involvement with the Law School was due to
+
+the situation itself. What I really feared was not alumni reaction, what I feared
+was that people like Phil would just get upset and leave, which I am sure would
+have upset the Law School, but what I really feared was that the Law School
+would be greatly diminished. . . . I got more involved in the appointments process
+because I had lost a certain degree of confidence in the objectivity of the
+process because people on both sides were so engaged in the battle with the
+other side that... people’s judgment[s] were being influenced by political and
+tactical considerations rather than a dispassionate view of the quality of the
+candidate. So I did something that hadn’t been done before, which was on a
+few occasions insisted on having an ad hoc proceeding where we brought in
+people from outside the Law School faculty, which is a common procedure but
+not used in the memory of man in the Law School. But we imposed it anyways,
+in the case of a few appointments that . . . circumstances suggested needed a
+dispassionate review.38
+
+While alumni played a role in Bok’s decision, insofar as they were part of
+an unwelcome public relations problem for the university, it seems more
+likely that Bok became involved for a simpler reason: no Harvard president
+would wish to preside over the implosion of one of the university’s
+most important assets. This public relations problem reinforced Bok’s
+instinct toward institutional conservation. Bok was a Cold War, “vital
+center” liberal, and as such was closely attuned to the threat to liberal
+institutions that could come from the left.39 Kennedy believes that the
+memory of the conflict-ridden 1960s played a role as well. “In this period,
+there’s still the smell of gunpowder, there’s still a dim haze in the skies
+over Cambridge.” It is not difficult to imagine that someone like Bok
+would be alarmed that a faction with as little interest in institutional preservation
+as CLS could attain veto power at Harvard Law School.
+With the resignation of Dean Vorenberg in 1989, Bok had an opportunity
+to appoint someone who would do what the previous dean had not
+done—get the situation at Harvard under control. Clark’s scholarly work
+had drawn on law and economics (even though he lacked the technical
+skills of Shavell and Kaplow), and the Olin program represented a major
+institutional commitment opposed to CLS’s vision of law. It thus made
+sense for Clark to build up law and economics, both because of its inherent
+merit and because it could act as a counterweight to CLS. Before Clark
+became dean in 1989, there were five law and economics faculty at the
+law school (three of which were appointed after the creation of the Olin
+program): Steve Shavell, Lewis Kaplow, Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman,
+and Howell Jackson. During Clark’s term of office, hiring in the
+area accelerated, as Kaplow was placed on the appointments committee
+198 CHAPTER 6
+
+and law and economics hires were made in 1992 (Bruce Hay), 1994
+(Christine Jolls, Einer Elhauge), 1995 (W. Kip Viscusi), 1997 (John
+Coates), 1998 (J. Mark Ramseyer), 1999 (Mark Roe and Allen Ferrell)
+and 2002 (Guhan Subramanian). Law and economics became a major
+faction in the law school, and the alliance of many of its members with
+the traditionalists made it difficult for CLS to get appointments of its own.
+Dean Clark and his allies in law and economics succeeded in reducing
+CLS to a small minority, no longer a significant power in the school’s
+decision-making. Just a few years after its initial investment, the foundation’s
+staff concluded that their investment had been a success, both in
+fostering a movement sympathetic to free markets and in shifting the balance
+of power in the nation’s most visible law school. The staff wrote to
+the foundation’s board in 1993 that
+
+when we began supporting Law and Economics some years ago, our goal was
+to create programs in the leading universities in the hope that this investment
+would establish the field as a legitimate area of study in schools all over the
+country. Our initial hopes have been fulfilled: Law and Economics has become
+a major field of specialty in the law schools, and has had a pervasive effect on
+legal thinking not only in the law schools but also in the courts, in business and
+in government generally. In addition, Law and Economics gives us an important
+foothold in law schools that we would not have otherwise. Conservative students
+tend to gravitate to professors in law and economics, and the discipline provides
+an intellectual framework within which to criticize the doctrines that are taught
+by liberal and left-wing faculty (by far the majority in most law schools). Our
+program at Harvard has been very successful in the years since it began in 1985.
+Initially, there were only two or three faculty with any interest in the field and
+the Dean at the time was unsympathetic. Since then, however, the number of
+students in the field has increased dramatically and the presence of Law and
+Economics in the curriculum has expanded as well. The number of faculty with
+expertise in Law and Economics has also grown; currently the school has eight
+faculty members whose main specialty is Law and Economics, and another five
+who have substantial involvement with the field. This makes Law and Economics
+one of the largest specialty areas within the School. . . . Thus, there is good reason
+to believe our investment has paid off well at Harvard.40
+
+Dean Clark, who shared an interest in thwarting CLS, agreed with the
+staff’s assessment, telling William Simon in 1994 that “the Foundation’s
+support has played a crucial role in restoring the academic soundness of
+Harvard Law School, an institution whose influence on law and legal
+education is indisputably enormous.”41
+The Olin Foundation’s money was certainly not the only cause of law
+and economics’ success at Harvard. Once the field came to be seen as a
+major movement in legal education, having established a significant posi-
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 199
+
+tion at Yale and Chicago, Harvard’s traditional desire for preeminence
+put pressure on the school to make additional hires in law and economics.
+This pressure would have been present whether the Olin program had
+been established or not. One suggestive indication that the Olin program
+was far from irrelevant, however, is the number of Harvard law and economics
+faculty who were trained at Harvard, and thus were able to take
+advantage of the resources of the Olin program. For example, Elhauge
+received his JD from Harvard in 1986, Ferrell in 1995, Hay in 1988,
+Jolls in 1993, and Subramanian in 1998. The Olin program played an
+important role in attracting Harvard students into law and economics
+and training them sufficiently that they could be hired as professors at
+Harvard (and elsewhere). Interestingly, none of the law and economics
+faculty hired in this period came from Chicago. This may have been due
+to the ideological stigma that attached to Chicago-style law and economics,
+but a more likely hypothesis is that Harvard simply has a very high
+propensity to hire its own graduates. By building up law and economics
+at Harvard, the Olin Foundation deepened the pool of law and economics
+practitioners from which Harvard law professors are traditionally drawn.
+Had the law and economics faculty members at Harvard depended on
+recruiting faculty from other institutions, it is unlikely that they could
+have built up the field at Harvard so rapidly. The consequence of that
+would have been a smaller law and economics bloc, and with it a smaller
+anti-CLS contingent.
+The internecine conflict between CLS and law and economics at Harvard
+was an important part of the larger battle over the last twentyfive
+years for control over American legal culture. The Olin Foundation
+entered this battle less because of its commitment to—or even understanding
+of—law and economics, and more because it saw the fortunes
+of law and economics as tied up with the direction that the legal profession
+would take over the next few decades. As I argued in chapter 1,
+elite law schools help to generate the legal ideas that shape the long-term
+development of doctrine, provide students with the intellectual capital,
+professional distinction, and networks that they draw on in their subsequent
+careers, and produce the next generation of law professors. A
+movement without a significant presence at Harvard and Yale law
+schools will, therefore, be hampered in building a support structure for
+legal change. The Olin Foundation’s support of law and economics at
+Harvard was driven by its fear that the Left might use the Law School
+to produce these critical resources for itself and deny them to conservatives.
+The foundation’s staff would have preferred to throw their support
+behind other forms of legal scholarship that were closer to their conservative
+principles, but in the battle to repel the CLS offensive, law and
+economics was the only weapon available.
+200 CHAPTER 6
+
+The Olin Programs and the Diffusion of Law and Economics
+
+From Harvard, Yale, and Chicago, the foundation quickly moved to
+spread Olin programs in law and economics to other elite law schools.
+The fact that these leading schools had developed strong, well-funded
+programs in law and economics sent a signal to the rest of elite legal
+education that this was now a respectable, mainstream field of legal scholarship,
+since no field that had a presence at these schools could be considered
+“off the wall.” In fact, the presence of law and economics at Harvard
+and Yale suggested that the field was now a part of any respectable law
+school’s portfolio. The foundation was now pushing against an open
+door. Nevertheless, openness to law and economics did not necessarily
+translate into the kind of major investment in an area that can transform
+the character of an institution. For that to happen in elite institutions,
+substantial outside subsidy was required, which was precisely what the
+Olin Foundation provided.
+In the wake of the foundation’s support of Harvard, Yale, and Chicago,
+the Olin programs in law and economics spread very rapidly: Penn in
+1986, Stanford, Berkeley, and Virginia in 1987, Columbia, Duke, Georgetown,
+and Toronto in 1989, Cornell in 1992, and Michigan in 2000.42
+Despite the increasing popularity of the field, these programs would not
+have developed as quickly, or had as much impact in elite law schools,
+were it not for the support of the Olin Foundation. From January 1985
+to January 1989, approximately $4.45 million was donated by the major
+conservative foundations to law and economics (including the Manne
+programs), of which only $736,000 came from sources other than Olin.
+While support for law and economics would broaden somewhat in subsequent
+years (see figure 6.1), Olin was the dominant decision-maker in the
+area, with other foundations piggybacking on its leadership.43 It is highly
+unlikely that any of the other conservative patrons had the will or means
+to get these programs off the ground, and no major law school showed
+much interest in funding such programs themselves.
+After Harvard, Yale, and Chicago, Stanford was the law and economics
+program that had the strongest internal support and that received the
+most generous funding from the Olin Foundation. By 1987, when Stanford
+Law submitted its first proposal for a law and economics center, the
+faculty already included eleven professors of law and economics, a number
+of whom also held appointments at the Hoover Institution.44 A letter
+from the Law School’s dean, Paul Brest, accompanied Stanford’s initial
+application and frankly stated, “One of my priorities as Dean is, to put
+it immodestly, to develop the preeminent integrated curriculum in law,
+economics and business.”45 Stanford received an initial grant of $870,733
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 201
+
+$5,000,000
+
+$4,500,000
+
+$4,000,000
+
+$3,500,000
+
+$3,000,000
+
+$2,500,000
+
+$2,000,000
+
+$1,500,000
+
+$1,000,000
+
+$500,000
+
+$0
+1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
+
+John M. Olin Foundation, Inc
+Sarah Scaife Foundation
+Bradley/McKenna/Earhart
+
+Figure 6.1. Foundation Funding for Law and Economics (in 2004 dollars),
+1995–2004
+
+for its first three years, and continued to be among the most richly funded
+of the Olin programs in law and economics. As was the case at Harvard
+and Yale, the place of law and economics in the context of the larger
+ideological environment at the University was never far from the Olin
+Foundation’s mind, as a grant proposal record from 1996 shows. “Stanford
+is, overall, a less conservative institution than the University of Chicago.
+But first-rate people who understand and respect markets are a significant
+presence—at the law school, the economics department, the
+business school and the Hoover institution. The law school, for example,
+has thirty-eight faculty members, twelve of whom make the insights of
+the law and economics movement an important part of their teaching
+and scholarship.”46 The foundation saw supporting law and economics at
+Stanford as a way of putting its support behind the relatively conservative
+portion of the university’s faculty.
+The other reason for the foundation’s strong support of law and economics
+at Stanford was its perceived impact on other institutions, through
+the production of teaching faculty. The foundation’s staff reported in
+1986 that “one mark of his [Mitch Polinsky’s] success is that the number
+of students choosing to pursue both a JD and a PhD in economics has
+doubled since the early years of the program. Moreover, many of the students
+concentrating in law and economics are the most intellectually able
+and conscientious in their class, according to Prof. Polinsky. Graduates
+of the Olin program have gone on to teaching positions at Berkeley, Har-
+202 CHAPTER 6
+
+vard, Yale and Michigan.”47 The foundation shifted its law and economics
+programming in the direction of elite institutions precisely because it
+thought that these institutions dictated the agendas and produced the faculty
+for all the other schools lower on the academic food chain. The foundation’s
+2002 retrospective analysis of its grant-making in law and economics
+recalled that “trustees saw support for Law and Economics as an
+opportunity both to advance cutting edge scholarly research as well as to
+gain a foothold for market economics and limited government in the law
+schools, whose faculties tended to be very much on the left. . . . The Foundation
+made these grants on the ‘trickle down’ theory, expecting that if
+all the best schools mounted programs in the field, others would feel the
+need to follow.”48 The foundation clearly believed that its Stanford grants,
+along with those at Chicago, Yale, and Harvard, had succeeded in influencing
+the rest of legal academia, and also in further entrenching law and
+economics in the law schools’ curricula. In one of its last grant reports,
+the foundation staff reported that
+
+Stanford Law School is a place that takes law and economics very seriously,
+and our program has had the full support of the Dean, Kathleen Sullivan. Although
+she will be stepping aside shortly as Dean, she assures us in the attached
+letter (as well as in two visits to our offices) that Law and Economics is such a
+critical part of the Law School that any new dean is bound to be equally supportive.
+. . . [Polinsky and] Sullivan are determined to raise the funds required
+to continue the program indefinitely. They have pledged to match any grant we
+might now make, and to do so on a 2:1 basis for a gift in excess of $2.5 million.
+Assuming a new dean is appointed who is sympathetic to Law and Economics
+(and Stanford’s president assures us this will be the case), staff would enthusiastically
+recommend continued support for this program.49
+
+Law and economics, which had never been particularly controversial at
+Stanford, was now effectively institutionalized.
+At Stanford, the Olin Foundation saw supporting law and economics
+as a way of enhancing the resources of an already distinguished group of
+law professors sympathetic to market economics. Berkeley, as a 1987 staff
+report noted, was another story.
+
+The law and economics program is not at this point very well developed. It
+consists primarily in the activities of two professors, [Robert] Cooter and
+[Daniel] Rubinfeld. Staff met with Rubinfeld, and was not overly impressed,
+but thought that he might be able to give some impetus to the law and economics
+movement at Berkeley. . . . From our contacts in the field, staff has discerned
+that Rubinfeld and Cooter are well regarded, but not considered
+among the top scholars. . . . Given these considerations, staff thinks a small
+grant would be warranted if strategically placed to encourage the growth of
+law and economics.50
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 203
+
+Given that the foundation was not overly impressed with the personnel
+at Berkeley (a judgment that, in retrospect, was obviously unwarranted
+and, as with some of the foundation’s other judgments in law and economics,
+not particularly well-informed), why did they choose to put one
+of their few Olin centers at Boalt Hall? The staff’s evaluation of Berkeley’s
+1994 application makes its motivation clear.
+
+Boalt Hall is one of the two best law schools on the West Coast (Stanford is
+the other), and is also one of the very few academic schools/departments at
+Berkeley with a conservative presence. Staff believes it is important to maintain
+an intellectual beachhead at Berkeley in the form of our Law and Economics
+Program. At Berkeley, as at other eminent law schools, most of the faculty
+lean to the left; our Law and Economics program is a strong counterweight,
+providing intellectual support for rational inquiry, free markets, and skepticism
+about what government can achieve. [Name redacted] notes that Berkeley
+faces a great deal of funding pressure because of the shortfall in local funds,
+so that the infusion of Olin money could make a big difference in keeping Law
+and Economics alive here.51
+
+The foundation’s motivation for supporting law and economics at
+Berkeley was not idiosyncratic, as staff evaluations of law and economics
+programs at Georgetown and Columbia at roughly the same time
+demonstrate.
+
+Our grant to Georgetown represented an opportunity to strengthen and expand
+a small but sound program in Law and Economics at a law school which is in
+a unique position (on Capitol Hill) to draw upon the law and policy resources
+of Washington. . . . The last time this proposal came up for funding two years
+ago, staff had mixed feelings about it because the quality of one conference was
+questionable and the law school had recently disciplined a student for revealing
+that admissions office data showed minorities were admitted based on less stringent
+criteria than white students.52 Since then, however, staff has gained confidence
+in the program, in part because of the praise with which [name redacted]
+speak of it. . . . Moreover, Georgetown is an important school, and it undoubtedly
+behooves us to “keep a candle lit in the darkness,” by continuing to fund
+law and economics inside the school.53
+Prof. [name redacted] . . . agrees that Columbia is very strong on corporate
+law, and has a great deal of respect for some of the Law and Economics professors
+like John Coffee and Mark Roe. But his impression was that the program
+may be suffering some directional drift and he advised keeping a close watch
+on it. He thought it was worth continued support, however, because it is important
+to have a foothold for free-market thinking at Columbia Law School.54
+
+The foundation supported law and economics at Berkeley, Georgetown,
+and Columbia for the same reason that it plowed money into Harvard:
+204 CHAPTER 6
+
+because it saw the program as an opportunity to shift the ideological balance
+in the university at large, as well as in the law school. At Berkeley,
+for example, the foundation judged that Cooter and Rubinfeld were well
+positioned to influence the future of the law school, noting that they had
+both served on major appointments committees, while Oliver Williamson
+was head of the Faculty Senate.55 Four years later, the foundation was
+impressed with the inroads that law and economics had made at Berkeley,
+noting that the program “has assumed an increasingly prominent position
+at Boalt Hall, and there are currently ten economists on the law school
+faculty.”56 An outside evaluation of the program from one of the leaders
+of law and economics concluded that “the program there is quite strong
+and has in many ways . . . a Chicago flavor. . . . There is not a huge
+amount of top flight brilliance, but there is a lot of very solid competence
+with real intellectual energy. . . . The faculty has really turned itself
+around for the better in the last couple of years. Overall I think the program
+is behind the industry leaders, but certainly within the top ten.”57
+Did the increasing presence of law and economics at Berkeley, to take
+one example, have the influence on the ideological character of the law
+school that the Olin Foundation hoped it would? While Cooter was
+clearly on the libertarian-conservative side of the ideological fence, Rubinfeld
+was a Democrat and served as assistant attorney general for antitrust
+in the Clinton administration. Cooter believes that, despite the fact
+that many law and economics professors like Rubinfeld considered
+themselves Democrats or liberals in national politics, what really matters
+is their placement within the distribution of law school and university
+opinion.
+
+The faculty perceives Dan [Rubinfeld] as being conservative while knowing that
+he’s a liberal Democrat, and it’s because he’s an economist. In the debates
+among the faculty, you may be in favor of affirmative action, you may be as in
+favor of affirmative action as the law allows, like Ian Ayres, but you’re still an
+economist. You just can’t accept the bull about regulation and control, the nirvana
+theory that social programs are going to work because they’re well-intended.
+This stuff just doesn’t fly. . . . If you have any judgment about how you
+evaluate data, whatever your prior beliefs, you’re going to come out pro-market
+in a way that a lot of people in a society are not. I think law and economics is
+inherently pro-market, and less inherently conservative. Certainly the distribution
+of sentiment in the ALEA [American Law and Economics Association] is
+shifted to the right, relative to American law schools, probably relative to the
+American public.
+
+Law professors with economics training also differ from other law professors
+where decision-making on internal university matters is concerned.
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 205
+
+On our faculty, and on many faculties, the strongest leftists are also the strongest
+proponents of what I call “other values.” By other values I mean not the
+traditional values by which the quantity and quality of scholarship is to be
+evaluated. . . . For example, if you apply those standards, it’s going to be hard
+to achieve your affirmative action goals. So as a consequence, the economists
+are all committed to those traditional research values. . . . We have a common
+framework, and that framework is antagonistic to the other values approach
+to choosing faculty members. That’s one of the reasons that a person who is a
+liberal Democrat but an economist will be perceived as a conservative by the
+rest of the faculty.58
+
+While relatively few of the hires that Berkeley has made in law and economics
+would be considered conservatives, what really matters in a university
+are faculty preferences on issues internal to the university.59 So
+while law and economics has lost the ideological fervor that it once had,
+at places like Berkeley the law and economics liberals are to the right of
+the rest of the faculty. While that may not be exactly what the Olin
+Foundation thought it was getting, their support for law and economics
+probably has had the effect of shifting the ideological dynamics in elite
+law schools.
+The kind of law and economics that was dominant at Harvard, and
+that increasingly characterized the Olin programs at other universities,
+differed significantly from what was being taught at Chicago and George
+Mason. While it is perhaps too simple a formulation, Chicago-style law
+and economics was not just more libertarian than what evolved at Harvard,
+it was more of a “lawyer’s” version of the field, as opposed to the
+more economist-dominated Harvard variant.60 A 1990 report to the Olin
+Foundation from a major figure in the field made it clear that law and
+economics had changed dramatically since the foundation first committed
+to it.
+
+When the field started getting underway in the late 1960s and early 1970s, its
+leading practitioners painted with broad and bold strokes. . . . The more recent
+developments in the area have been somewhat different. There are fewer manifestos
+in support of the discipline, and fewer wholesale attacks on its soundness
+and operation. It is no longer fighting for a place within the curriculum, but
+has secured powerful beachheads in multiple areas: all the common law subjects
+(property, contracts and torts), procedure litigation and settlement, corporate
+law, bankruptcy and secured transactions, criminal law. Similarly, the techniques
+of analysis have changed. . . . While the overall level of economic sophistication
+on faculties has grown, there is probably a greater gap between the
+cutting edge of research on the one hand and the knowledge of the ordinary
+law professor on the other. The faculty then [sic] tends to go into the area is
+206 CHAPTER 6
+
+often armed with both a law degree and a PhD in economics. In consequence
+of the level of formality and abstraction, there are conspicuous barriers between
+what is done and understood by law and economics types of the one hand, and
+the rest of the legal academic world on the other hand.61
+
+Fifteen years later, these trends have only increased, to the point where
+most newly minted law and economics practitioners now have dual degrees.
+While the field is still certainly to the right of the rest of legal academia
+on economic matters, this is because its ideological distribution increasingly
+resembles that of the discipline of economics, where even
+liberal Democrats are substantially more sympathetic to market arrangements
+than most of their academic colleagues. In short, the number of
+true believers has declined as the field has become more professionalized.
+Given that law and economics’ impact has occurred as the field has become
+more ideologically mainstream, did patrons like the Olin Foundation
+really get what they were looking for?
+To answer this question, we need a relatively compact understanding
+of what the patrons of law and economics programs wanted, as compared
+to the preferences of the academics who were actually running them. At
+least in the case of the Olin Foundation, the motivations were fairly clear.
+First and foremost, the foundation believed that the state of legal education
+was in grave danger, which was far from a trivial concern for an
+organization whose board included partners in the whitest of white-shoe
+law firms. By supporting law and economics, the foundation hoped to
+establish a “foothold” in the law schools for conservatives, and to provide
+a “counterbalance” against liberals. Second, law and economics was just
+one part of conservative foundation efforts on university campuses. Law
+and economics was a way to get conservative-leaning faculty inside the
+university, where they could affect campus debate and governance, at a
+time when the barriers to other forms of legal conservatism were much
+more considerable. Third, the foundation hoped that, through its grants
+to students and its programming in the law schools, the Olin programs
+would alter the socialization of the next generation of lawyers, making
+them less sympathetic to government management of the economy and
+more able to press the case for the free market. Fourth, the foundation
+believed that law and economics could have a salutary influence on law
+itself, raising doubts about the efficacy of regulation and providing intellectual
+support for a legal system more supportive of free markets.
+The interests of law and economics professors, by contrast, have only
+a partial overlap with those of their patrons. While a number of the law
+and economics professors hired in the 1980s and 1990s were avid supporters
+of free markets, many were not, and this trend only accelerated
+as the field became more mainstream. For the professors who staffed
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 207
+
+them—even those who were more conservative—the most prominent motivation
+for building the Olin Centers was purely academic. Professors
+doing work in law and economics found the subject stimulating and important
+for future lawyers to understand, wanted to build a research infrastructure
+for themselves, and hoped to produce high-quality research.
+Only a few university administrators, such as Harvard’s Dean Clark, seem
+to have shared the Olin Foundation’s ambition to use law and economics
+to reshape the politics of their institutions, but by the 1990s most recognized
+that supporting law and economics was necessary in order to keep
+up with the market leaders. In short, the Olin Foundation was more concerned
+with the indirect effects of law and economics—on the law school,
+the university, and society and government—while the professors were
+interested in their direct outputs, such as facilitating scholarly production
+and debate, and increasing the prestige of their field. The relationship
+between the Olin Foundation and its law and economics programs was,
+in short, a marriage of convenience, albeit one that brought substantial
+benefits to both sides.
+
+A Home at Last: The George Mason University School of Law
+
+Over the last thirty years, conservative patrons interested in reshaping
+higher education have focused on gaining a presence in elite institutions
+by supporting student organizations, such as the Federalist Society and
+undergraduate conservative newspapers, and by building research
+programs around conservative professors. This focus on elite schools was
+driven by the belief—especially strong at the Olin Foundation—that intellectual
+credibility and distinction are produced by only a handful of institutions.
+This explains the foundation’s repeated concern that it create a
+“foothold” or “beachhead” and “keep a candle lit in the darkness” at
+top-ranked schools. Henry Manne’s project of building George Mason
+University School of Law (GMUSL) represented a very different approach
+to influencing the legal academy—building an alternative institution
+from the bottom up rather than influencing the legal academy from the
+top down. While the Olin programs represented a “Fabian” strategy of
+slowly burrowing into mainstream institutions, GMUSL followed a
+“Gramscian” approach of creating a parallel institution where more libertarian
+professors could hone their ideas without the compromises associated
+with elite institutions. The consequence of the Fabian strategy of the
+Olin Foundation was that, as the previous two sections showed, law and
+economics came to adapt to the norms of elite institutions, becoming
+more technically sophisticated, closer to mainstream economics, less accessible
+to lawyers, and more ideologically heterogeneous. Starting from
+208 CHAPTER 6
+
+scratch at GMUSL, Manne was able to build an institution infused with
+a “Chicago” flavor—less methodologically formal, more oriented to
+shaping doctrine and public policy, and more openly libertarian. A close
+examination of Manne’s experiment in Northern Virginia, therefore, provides
+a useful study of the challenges and opportunities associated with
+one important approach to legal and educational change.
+By the mid-1980s, Manne’s opportunity for institution-building at
+Emory was finished. As Manne puts it, “I was sort of coasting.” It was
+then that Manne received a phone call from the economist Gordon Tullock,
+who had, along with James Buchanan, built a public-choice-oriented
+economics department at George Mason University, the new state university
+in Northern Virginia. The University, led by its president, George
+Johnson, had acquired a low-status law school based in Washington,
+D.C., and was considering what to do with it. Steve Eagle, an associate
+dean under Manne, recalls that “the University president at the time was
+interested in putting the University on the map. I’m not sure he was interested
+in putting it on any particular continent. He wanted the law school
+to make a splash. If he could have gotten someone in a totally different
+field than law and economics, he would have done that. As it was, George
+Johnson spoke with Jim Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, and both of them
+told [him] that Henry was a hot property.” The perception that Manne
+was a successful organizational entrepreneur and had an ambitious plan
+already developed for legal education made him immensely attractive to
+Johnson. Initially, Manne was uninterested.
+
+I said, “Gordon, . . . one thing I would never do was go into an existing law
+school, because I couldn’t stand it. They’d run me out on a rail in a year anyways.”
+Gordon said, “Well, come up to talk to George and tell him about your
+ideas on legal education anyways.” This was 1985. As a favor to Buchanan and
+Tullock I agreed to go up and talk to Johnson. They were already there and they
+were trying to help Johnson. They had a hidden agenda; they were going to find
+conservatives for him. He didn’t mind it, because he had heavy financial support
+from Republican interests in Northern Virginia. At any rate, he was very persuasive,
+and, given my condition, I was susceptible too. I gave him the program that I
+would do. It was basically the Rochester program limited to Law and Economics,
+which at this point really looks good. It’s the big hot field in law, but no one had
+ever thought about building a law school around it. That’s what I told him I
+wanted to do, but that I couldn’t do it with the faculty he had there.
+
+Manne quickly recognized that the weakness of the existing law school,
+and Johnson’s desire for an immediate jolt to the University’s reputation
+gave him an opportunity that most academic entrepreneurs can only
+dream of: liquidating the law school’s existing commitments and starting
+anew. The previous dean of the school
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 209
+
+told the faculty, “I want you to get out and practice law. You get no extra money
+from me for writing law review articles.” Just the opposite of what any school
+would be doing. That played beautifully into my hands, because what George
+was telling me, that he’d make some money available to me to buy out faculty,
+really was beginning to make sense. . . . I didn’t tell anyone, but I planned to
+get rid of every nontenured professor. . . . George convinced me that I could
+create a new kind of law school there, even though there was an existing faculty.
+. . . I started thinking about it. . . . It became attractive as soon as I saw that
+there was a chance of doing what I wanted to do at Rochester.
+
+In building a new law school, Manne had some important advantages.
+First and foremost was the LEC. “No one had ever heard of George
+Mason Law School, but lots of people had heard of Henry Manne’s Law
+and Economics Center.”62 The LEC ensured that the re-formed school
+would begin with a widely recognized research program, along with the
+still vibrant program for federal judges. Second, the weakness of the inherited
+law school allowed Manne to act quickly, before opposition to his
+plans could organize. Eschewing the usual advice given new deans to
+slowly build the faculty’s trust, Manne decided to conduct a bloodbath.
+He immediately fired every nontenured faculty member, offered buyouts
+to others, and gave a few of the survivors the opportunity to receive advanced
+degrees in economics. Manne recalls that George Johnson instructed
+him to “ ‘act fast, do anything you want to do now, because by
+next April they’ll be organized.’ I took his advice . . . and within two
+weeks I had announced these departures, and, exactly as he said, by April
+the cabal had started, but it was too late, because there weren’t enough
+of them left.” Acting quickly also had the advantage of freeing up resources
+to aggressively add new professors, many of whom he knew
+through the Economics Institute for Law Professors.
+
+Because of my familiarity with law professors who had been through the law
+institute, I knew a bunch of guys who stayed in touch with me, because they
+had really glommed on to the field. And they were at places where they weren’t
+happy. . . . So I got Larry Ribstein, who was at Mercer, doing great corporate
+work which they didn’t appreciate. [Michael] Krauss was at McGill doing tort
+law and economics, and being very underappreciated. I got Frank Buckley, who
+was out in western Canada, who had already spent some time at Chicago, and
+an economist who had been through our program, Bill Bishop. . . . Then I hired
+our former Olin Fellows: Henry Butler, Steve Crafton, and later Lloyd Cohen
+and . . . Bruce Johnsen. Then I hired a couple of economists, got a name from
+Harold Demsetz, Bruce Kobyashi. He came that year. At that point we had
+more PhD’s in economics on the George Mason law school than any other law
+school in the country.
+210 CHAPTER 6
+
+On top of selecting faculty who accepted his vision, Manne also made
+clear that GMUSL would not be a democracy. “I had an important and
+identical discussion with all of them. . . . We’re going to be a law and
+economics law school. We’re going to have specialized tracks. . . . I’m
+going to run it. We’re going to have faculty meetings when and if necessary,
+but this is not going to be a faculty-run operation. In blood every
+one of them signed on. It’s what they wanted, what any good academic
+wants, for an administrator to run the thing and let them do what they’re
+interested in.” The availability of underplaced law and economics faculty,
+Manne’s networks, and the reputation of the LEC allowed him to
+rapidly build a sympathetic faculty and avoid effective internal challenges
+to his plans.
+Manne’s plan for the law school closely followed his earlier design at
+Rochester: specialization, a pervasive role for law and economics, and the
+introduction of required classes in quantitative methods.63 The law school
+at GMU, in short, would not look like any other law school in America.
+These innovations, however, led to problems with the school’s application
+for admission to the Association of American Law Schools.64
+The visiting committee of the AALS that began to scrutinize the school
+in 1989 was impressed with the school’s rapid progress in its first two
+years, but had two concerns: whether the school had the resources to
+support its track system and the racial and gender balance of the faculty.
+The committee was especially concerned that “the dearth of minority
+and women candidates interested in pursuing law and economics might
+preclude an effective hiring process geared towards diversifying the faculty
+at George Mason.”65 When interviewed by the committee, Manne
+argued that he had aggressively sought out women and racial minorities,
+but that his insistence on a law and economics faculty limited the pool
+he could draw from. At this point a member of the AALS committee
+asked whether, if that was the case, there was something flawed about
+the overall conception of the school. “Is having a racially and gender
+diverse faculty as great a priority at George Mason as hiring a tax professor?
+Dean Manne responded that there are trade-offs implicit in any
+decision. While the school would continue to work hard to diversify the
+faculty, that issue was simply different from the need to teach a given
+subject matter.”66 Other members of the committee questioned whether
+the school’s effort to increase the academic credentials of its students
+was consistent with substantial minority representation on the student
+body. In the end, this line of questioning fizzled out when supporters of
+GMU School of Law questioned where an affirmative action standard
+could be found in AALS rules.
+The most daunting obstacle in building a first-rate law school at GMU
+was attracting resources for ambitious institution-building in a new uni-
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 211
+
+versity without a significant endowment, a deep pool of alumni, or an
+impressive university “brand name.” This challenge hampered the law
+school’s growth, damaged its early esprit de corps, and contributed to
+Manne’s departure from the school’s deanship. Despite George Johnson’s
+commitments to the law school, these financial concerns emerged early
+on, as can be seen in a 1987 letter from Manne to the president of the
+Earhart Foundation.
+
+As I began to tell you at the AEI dinner, being dean at the George Mason University
+School of Law has been an exciting challenge. The pace has been quite
+hectic, but we have accomplished minor miracles. Quite frankly, however, the
+University, for all its support, has not been able to keep up with us. . . . In
+spite of their encouragement, the University administrators did not expect us
+to accomplish so much in so short a time. Consequently next year’s budget does
+not provide the support services necessary for our new faculty to work to their
+full potential. . . . I am especially concerned that we not disappoint the new
+faculty, since their first reaction to the School will effectively determine our
+academic reputation with new recruits for years to come.67
+
+Manne also faced challenges in obtaining corporate support for GMUSL.
+In a letter to one of his supporters, Manne complained, “As you undoubtedly
+know, many corporations, perhaps because of obsessive concern with
+‘competitiveness,’ are substantially reducing or omitting contributions to
+educational institutions. . . . This is all particularly frustrating because I
+have finally reached the point where I can greatly leverage the influence
+of my programs.”68
+While financing was always a problem at GMUSL, Manne had some
+very important compensating assets. GMUSL was able to draw upon the
+local, Washington-based network of conservative-libertarian lawyers and
+jurists, in particular Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg, who quickly
+joined GMUSL’s faculty. Jeffrey Parker, one of the earliest members of
+the faculty, recalls that Ginsburg “was extremely important, and it was
+all due to his long acquaintanceship with Henry. . . . There was a core of
+these really high-powered people who held the place in the zone of legitimacy
+while it was building itself out. . . . Doug had taught at Harvard,
+Bork had taught at Yale, these were people who could teach any place. But
+because of their relationship with Henry, and because of their intellectual
+interest in law and economics, they were here.” Ginsburg, now the chief
+judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has, in fact, taught at least
+one seminar a year since 1988. Manne recalls of Ginsburg that “while
+still at Harvard he attended the Economics Institute for Law Professors
+and became totally convinced (if he was not already) of the importance
+of law and economics. I knew him to be extremely bright, and I wanted
+him associated with the school as much as anything in order to help me
+212 CHAPTER 6
+
+out. Also I knew he would be a superb teacher. I don’t think that any
+really important steps were taken without being vetted with Doug.”
+Other connections to the conservative movement have helped GMUSL,
+especially its support from the University’s increasingly conservative
+board of trustees. Starting with the administration of Governor George
+Allen in 1994 and continuing into that of Governor James Gilmore, such
+conservative movement fixtures as William Kristol, Ed Feulner, and James
+Miller were chosen for the board, and Ed Meese was appointed the University’s
+rector. These men were very familiar with law and economics
+and sensitive to the asset that a libertarian-tinged law school in the D.C.-
+area would represent for the conservative movement. The importance that
+the conservative movement attributed to GMUSL can also be seen in a
+1993 grant report from the Olin Foundation, which had sharply reevaluated
+its judgment of Manne.
+
+Henry Manne has accomplished a great deal for the discipline of law and economics.
+Over forty percent of sitting federal judges have now attended one of
+his institutes, and the reliance on economic criteria to help make sense of legal
+problems is steadily winning acceptance in the courts after establishing a foothold
+in the law schools. George Mason is a law school with a growing reputation,
+and its serious commitment to law and economics gives it something
+unique to offer students. Staff believes that continued support for the Law and
+Economics Center at George Mason is warranted by these accomplishments.
+Furthermore, it is important to remember that Bill Clinton’s election means that
+conservatives can no longer count on the changing composition of the federal
+judiciary to make judges concerned with the economic implications of their
+decisions. For twelve years the Reagan and Bush appointments to the federal
+bench created a judiciary that was steadily more inclined to consider market
+processes and economic effects in the decision-making. With Bill Clinton having
+the next three years to appoint liberals to the court, it is especially important
+that every sitting judge who is even slightly receptive to the law and economics
+approach be given every chance to become familiar with it.69
+
+For a brief period in the late 1990s, the law school had fallen out of the
+U.S. News top 50 law schools, a list that is highly sensitive to faculty
+resources. William Kristol recalls that, recognizing the importance of the
+law school to the conservative movement, “under Meese’s leadership, and
+I supported him, . . . we insisted on a reallocation of resources toward
+the law school. At the margin we wanted greater effort to go to the law
+school. It did happen, and subsequently the dean of the law school told
+me that it was useful. . . . This got them back onto the Top 50.” While
+modest budget reallocations such as this may seem like a small matter,
+they are the sort of support at the margin that can make the difference
+between successful and unsuccessful organizational entrepreneurship. To
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 213
+
+the conservatives on the GMU Board of Visitors and the staff of the Olin
+Foundation, support for GMUSL was a way to shape the development of
+the law, even in periods like the late 1990s when their power over the
+courts was waning.
+Henry Manne’s original strategy for GMUSL was to take advantage of
+the path dependence of American legal education, which he thought was
+wasteful and ill suited to the character of contemporary legal practice.
+With a new curriculum made possible by of the lack of built-in constituencies
+for the status quo, Manne believed that GMUSL could attract highquality
+students and place them with top firms. While GMU has been able
+to attract increasingly strong students over time, it does not appear that
+the school’s pedagogy has given it the overwhelming competitive advantage
+Manne anticipated.
+Instead, the market failure that GMU has exploited most successfully
+has been on the research side of legal education. Theorists since Becker
+have modeled discrimination as a “taste,” believing that in a competitive
+market discriminators have to pay a price for satisfying this taste in the
+form of higher labor costs and consequently lower profits.70 Conversely,
+firms that do not discriminate can take advantage of their rivals’ taste for
+discrimination, by hiring the better quality (and cheaper) labor that they
+have spurned. Conservatives, including those at GMUSL, have long believed
+that conservatives are discriminated against in the academy. To the
+degree that this is true and entrance to the market is not artificially suppressed,
+institutions that do not discriminate on the basis of ideology
+should have a substantial competitive advantage.
+What was bad for conservatives as a general matter, therefore, was
+good for GMUSL, allowing it to move up the ranking by exploiting a
+considerable market failure. Steve Eagle argues that
+
+people who were interested in law and economics and people who might have
+had a libertarian perspective on the world that was congenial to the rest of the
+faculty were typically not wanted elsewhere. So Mason was able to hire very
+high caliber people in its niche while its reputation was still comparatively tentative.
+We would never have been able to hire people of comparable quality who
+were seen as more mainstream by some, because they would have gravitated to
+law schools that were more established. So from a quality point of view we
+were able to get the cream of the crop in law and economics, whereas we would
+have been seen as an outlier and a new unproven school among the senior people
+we would have liked to have gotten in more established places.
+
+The Becker theory of discrimination suggests that discrimination is not a
+stable competitive equilibrium, because the nondiscriminator will be able
+to take away market share from the discriminator. In the GMUSL case,
+this means that the law school’s competitive advantage depends upon the
+214 CHAPTER 6
+
+continuing presence of ideological discrimination. As Daniel Polsby, the
+current dean of GMUSL, puts it, “Labor markets are sticky, and there are
+good reasons for that. We worry every day that what we do is going to
+get competed away. It’s all public. There are no secrets, this is a public
+institution, everything we do is public unless it’s in the bathroom. They
+know as much about it as we do. The problem is not a knowledge problem,
+it’s an action problem. It is, ‘Can you get your faculty to do what we
+can get our faculty to do in crucial personnel decisions?’ The answer is
+usually no.” It is not quite accurate to say that GMUSL is parasitic on
+discrimination against fellow legal conservatives. Most of the leaders of
+the school believe that the greatest intensity of discrimination in the market
+occurs at the initial hiring stage, when the objective merit of candidates
+is difficult to determine. GMUSL seeks to push a number of libertarian
+conservatives past this initial hiring stage, keeping these young
+lawyers in the academic pool until they are able to prove their objective
+merit. Polsby claims that
+
+what we want to do is to prepare people to overwhelm the prejudices and foolishness
+of the food chain. In the last analysis, it will be hard for schools further
+up in the food chain to prefer a plainly worse-qualified over a plainly betterqualified
+person. Somebody is out there with thirteen articles and one hundred
+citations, you know he or she is dominating somebody with three articles and
+twenty-nine citations. We are proponents of moneyball here, and we have a
+pretty simple predictive model of productivity here, and it very rarely fails us,
+and anybody can use it. Candidly, we’re just smarter about these sorts of things.
+. . . We’re not burdened by intolerance for people who have libertarian and
+conservative leanings, and we’re not going to discriminate against them. It may
+be the case that we would discriminate against people on the left, with socialist
+inclination, but of equal talent, but that becomes very theoretical because our
+dear friends in the food chain snap those people up.
+
+Given that GMUSL looks for scholars who have been undervalued in
+the academic marketplace, faculty attrition is built into the GMU model.
+Rather than focusing on retaining faculty, which is financially beyond
+GMU’s means, the school supports the mobility aspirations of its faculty,
+operating as the minor league for conservative and libertarian law professors.
+According to Polsby, “We don’t work on retention, we work on the
+opposite. Any time we can move somebody up the food chain, it adds
+credibility to the story we’re telling the market about why you should
+come here rather than to our competitor to start your career. We’ve got
+now to a point where there’s enough evidence for the proposition that
+skeptical people are entitled to believe it. . . . I don’t want to hire anyone
+here who doesn’t want to become the next Sterling Professor of Law at
+Yale.” Another GMUSL professor makes a similar point, observing,
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 215
+
+“What we really specialize in, in recent years, is people who aren’t totally
+ripe for the market generally, and they come here two, three, four, five
+years and get seasoned and get a research agenda. We get a lot of those
+people here, and then they move on.”71 GMUSL seeks, quite openly, to
+perform a critical service to the larger conservative movement by increasing
+the market value of ideologically sympathetic young law professors.
+GMUSL’s leaders believe that providing this public good to the conservative
+movement is wholly consistent with their institutional self-interest.
+From the point of view of the larger conservative movement, how successful
+has GMUSL been? Unlike the Olin programs at elite law schools,
+GMU has not lost its ideological distinctiveness as it has grown in prestige.
+In addition, while retaining its libertarian character GMU has, by a
+number of different measures, improved more than any other law school
+in the last quarter-century. As Daniel Polsby suggests, “As a rule, the rank
+of schools as measured by the market test doesn’t change. They are really
+stable. Our rank has changed; we are able to attract stronger faculty, and
+in comparison tests for student’s picking law schools, there’s movement.
+Interestingly, there’s very little movement in the reputation numbers that
+U.S. News is using since the early 1990s. Those numbers we’ve moved a
+little bit in a favorable direction, but very little.” GMUSL ranks considerably
+higher on objective measures of research output and student quality
+than in reputational surveys, reflecting the stickiness of academic distinction.
+For instance, three recent surveys of faculty quality, citations and
+scholarly productivity ranked it at number 22, number 23, and number
+27 in the country,72 while subjective surveys of faculty quality ranked
+GMU slightly lower, but not considerably.73 Of particular interest, no
+school in the country showed as great a disparity between objective measures
+of faculty quality and U.S. News rankings as GMU.74 This suggests
+that either GMUSL’s connection to its parent university, or its libertarian
+reputation, has had a significant drag on its reputation in the legal academy.
+There is also insufficient evidence to conclude that GMU has been
+able to operate as a successful minor league for elite law schools. While
+GMU faculty have been hired by Vanderbilt, George Washington, Illinois,
+and William and Mary, the school has not yet made a dent in the law
+schools that bestow academic distinction. GMUSL’s Todd Zywicki has
+visited at Georgetown, David Bernstein at Michigan, and Eugene Kontorovich
+at Chicago and Northwestern, but only Kontorovich has yet moved
+on to one of these elite law schools.75
+This points to the limitations of GMUSL’s original gamble. Because of
+the university’s nonexistent national reputation, its administrators were
+willing to give Manne substantial leeway to create a law and economics
+law school with a clearly libertarian bent. The institutional weakness that
+facilitated innovation also limited the school’s ability to compete in law
+216 CHAPTER 6
+
+school rankings. That said, there is evidence that the school has considerably
+improved the quality of its students. The most recent rankings of
+student quality put it at number 31, one spot above the older and betterendowed
+law school at Emory that Manne left twenty years ago.76 This
+is an impressive achievement, but GMUSL still does not attract students
+who can compete for positions in top law firms, clerkships, or the legal
+academy.77 GMUSL may influence America’s legal culture in the next decade
+through the professional mobility of its young conservative law professors,
+but there are few indications that it will do so any time soon
+through its students.
+
+Conclusion
+
+Simply measured in terms of the penetration of its adherents in the legal
+academy, law and economics is the most successful intellectual movement
+in the law of the past thirty years, having rapidly moved from insurgency
+to hegemony. The commanding place of law and economics in the modern
+legal academy makes it tempting to conclude that this outcome was inevitable.
+While there were certainly structural forces that put the wind at the
+movement’s back, there can be little question that organizational entrepreneurship
+and patronage played a critical role in allowing the law and
+economics movement to take advantage of the opportunity provided by
+these larger forces.
+The law and economics movement went through a series of reasonably
+distinct stages on the way to its current status in the American legal academy,
+and at each stage patronage and entrepreneurial activity played important
+roles. In the beginning, law and economics (with the partial exception
+of its application to antitrust) was so far out of the legal academic
+mainstream as to be reasonably characterized as “off the wall.” Limited
+almost exclusively to law professors who saw in the idea a powerful device
+for criticizing government intervention in the economy, the idea
+needed an institutional home to protect it until conditions changed. Without
+the nurturance of law and economics at Chicago Law School, therefore,
+the ground would not have been prepared for its rapid diffusion
+when environmental conditions changed.
+Moving law and economics’ status from “off the wall” to “controversial
+but respectable” required a combination of celebrity and organizational
+entrepreneurship. On the one hand, Richard Posner’s sterling establishment
+credentials and powerful intellectual gifts meant that he could
+not be ignored. No matter how hard Posner’s critics insisted that his arguments
+were off the wall, the fact that prestigious liberal legal academics
+were arguing with him suggested the opposite. In that sense, Posner
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 217
+
+played the classic role of the intellectual entrepreneur, demonstrating that
+the status quo is open to challenge and that an alternative is available.
+Manne’s organizational entrepreneurship worked hand in hand with
+Posner’s intellectual entrepreneurship and celebrity in moving law and
+economics out of the legal academic periphery. A good deal of the resistance
+to law and economics came from two sources: unfamiliarity and
+ideological stigma. Manne’s programs for law professors overcame unfamiliarity
+by equipping academics with the basic concepts of economics,
+eliminating the mystery associated with unfamiliar concepts. Those
+programs eroded the field’s ideological stigma by creating personal
+bonds between the legal academy’s mainstream and law and economics,
+and by convincing participants that economics was an ideologically neutral
+set of tools. Manne’s programs for federal judges also helped erase
+law and economics’ stigma, since if judges—the symbol of legal professional
+respectability—took the ideas seriously, they could not be crazy
+and irresponsible.
+This account suggests the limitations of thinking about intellectual
+change through the metaphor of the “marketplace of ideas.” In any market
+there are some things that participants simply will not buy and sell
+because they are considered immoral or inappropriate for exchange.
+Through most of the 1960s, for example, it could barely be said that law
+and economics was in the marketplace at all because the market’s normsetters
+refused to take it seriously. This points has two implications. First,
+the substance of an idea matters in the early development of an intellectual
+movement, but mainly through its ability to generate intense commitment
+from a small cadre of people willing to bear the disapprobation of the
+majority. Second, the early breakthrough of an idea into widespread discussion
+is more a function of its respectability than its truth content. Only
+after an idea has been treated as appropriate for discussion are its claims
+welcomed into the marketplace of ideas and its ideas discussed on the
+merits. This is a political and sociological process, rather than the playing
+out of the scientific method.
+By the time this chapter opened in the early 1980s, law and economics
+had entered the marketplace of ideas but was still a distinctly niche player.
+The field’s move out of this niche depended on a combination of environmental
+and entrepreneurial forces. Changes in the politics of the federal
+courts and regulatory agencies, the increasing prestige of market solutions,
+and the transformation of corporate law all increased the demand
+for law and economics. By the mid-1980s a “tipping point” was reached
+in which the prestige and relative position of elite law schools—the arbiters
+of distinction for legal education as a whole—became associated with
+the presence of a substantial law and economics program. Having become
+218 CHAPTER 6
+
+so associated, the law and economics trend filtered down to those lower
+in the legal education pecking order.
+While these factors were certainly important in the rise of law and economics,
+the speed and depth of its absorption into legal education required
+agents capable of turning these opportunities into outcomes. Law
+and economics was given substantial financial support from corporations
+and foundations, in a way that no other conservative legal movement
+was. This was not because movement patrons, particularly foundations,
+were especially enthusiastic about law and economics, but because it
+seemed to have substantial momentum as well as the potential to be useful
+to the broader movement. Especially in elite legal education, these patrons
+provided strategic coordination and leadership as well as funding. Law
+and economics also attracted a handful of extremely able and enthusiastic
+organizational entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs chose to invest their
+time in producing human capital in the form of their students, social capital
+in the networks that were a by-product of their intellectual activity,
+and cultural capital through their success in building a legitimate, respected
+place for conservatives in elite institutions. These entrepreneurs
+and their conservative patrons worked hand in hand, despite the fact that
+their goals were, in important ways, quite different.
+In the process of moving law and economics from the periphery to the
+core of legal academia, however, the movement changed in important
+ways. The stigma attached to the idea in its early days ensured that its
+attraction was limited to legal scholars whose ideological commitments
+made them willing to bear a high degree of alienation. It was this very
+ideological commitment that attracted patrons like the Olin Foundation
+to the movement in the first place. As the stigma on law and economics
+disappeared and it moved to a position of considerable distinction in legal
+academia, its ideological base expanded accordingly. The movement took
+on the ideological and methodological coloration of its parent discipline
+of economics, as well as absorbing many of the qualities required for
+respectability in elite institutions. The law and economics that has attained
+such an impressive status in top law schools is not, in short, the
+aggressively free-market faith of the movement’s early days. It might even
+be appropriate to say that law and economics is no longer a movement
+at all, but a discipline. Given the ideological distribution of the overall
+legal professorate, injecting that discipline into the law schools was a significant
+victory for conservative patrons like the Olin Foundation, but it
+is a victory that has come at a cost in ideological purity.
+The GMU law school represents an illuminating alternative to the strategy
+of working through existing distinguished law schools. By avoiding
+the compromises—both methodological and ideological—that came with
+established institutions, Henry Manne was able to build a law school with
+L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S II 219
+
+a durable libertarian character. The ideological coloration of the school
+allowed it to actively seek to advance the interests of the larger conservative-libertarian
+movement, by providing an institutional space in which
+scholars out of the legal academic mainstream can develop a scholarly
+reputation and move on to higher-status institutions. The question going
+forward is whether GMUSL’s place in the intensely status-conscious
+structure of legal academia will permit it to effectively serve its ambitious
+goals. In short, while the Olin programs’ place in the legal academic establishment
+may have limited its ideological coherence, GMUSL’s ideological
+coherence may limit its impact on the legal academic establishment.
+7
+
+Conservative Public Interest Law II:
+Lessons Learned
+
+THE FIRST GENERATION of conservative public interest lawyers was hobbled
+by its failure to adapt to a transformed legal and political system,
+one in which the locus of political power had become firmly nationalized,
+and where agenda control, policy-specific knowledge, media savvy, appeals
+to idealism, and elite networks rivaled grassroots organization and
+business power. These early conservative lawyers also failed to learn from
+their liberal legal adversaries, instead replicating strategies that had been
+effective in other areas but were poorly adapted to the very different terrain
+of the law. As a consequence, the conservative public interest law
+movement failed in these years, with a few exceptions, to attract skilled,
+idealistic, creative young lawyers. Its reactive strategy made it difficult to
+set the political and legal agenda.
+In contrast, it is impossible to deny the success of the second generation
+of conservative public interest law firms. Since their founding in 1991
+and 1989, respectively, both the Institute for Justice and the Center for
+Individual Rights have established impressive track records of placing significant
+cases before the Supreme Court. IJ has successfully defended
+Ohio’s school voucher plan before the Supreme Court (in Simmons-Harris
+v. Zelman) and challenged New York’s ban on interstate shipment of
+wine (in Swedenburg v. Kelly). In spite of losing the argument before the
+Supreme Court in Kelo v. New London, IJ has effectively used the case to
+raise the salience of the issue and put eminent domain restrictions on
+the legislative agenda in statehouses across the country. CIR reached the
+Supreme Court with major, precedent-setting cases even earlier. CIR’s
+challenges to the constitutionality of affirmative action in university admissions
+in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger succeeded in limiting
+the use of preferences in undergraduate admissions, and came within
+one vote of eliminating them in law schools. Just as important were CIR’s
+challenges to restrictions on academic speech and its victories in Rosenberger
+v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, a landmark
+religious liberty case, Reno v. Bossier Parish School District, which restricted
+the use of race in local redistricting, and United States v. Morrison,
+where CIR successfully argued that provisions of the Violence
+Against Women Act exceeded Congress’s power under the commerce
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 221
+
+clause. Despite the millions of dollars that conservative patrons invested
+in first-generation firms, none of them came close to this record of winning
+important, precedent-setting cases.
+While changes in the composition of the federal courts were certainly
+important in explaining this record of success, just as critical were the
+lessons that conservative organizational entrepreneurs drew from the failure
+of first-generation firms, and from the success of their liberal counterparts.
+The second-generation firms had clearer, more forthrightly libertarian
+principles than their first-generation predecessors. These principles
+gave CIR and IJ distance from traditional conservative interests like business
+and a willingness to draw on the rhetoric, strategies, legal precedents,
+and belief in an affirmative role for the courts created by legal liberals. In
+addition, CIR and IJ were led by authentic members of a conservative
+“new class”: products of a new constellation of conservative institutions
+committed to a set of ideological principles rather than corporate interests.
+The changing profile of conservative public interest law’s leaders
+went hand in hand with the growth of the Federalist Society and the rising
+number of conservatives in the legal academy. Conservatives were increasingly
+led not by representatives of the movement’s core constituencies,
+but by those with the cultural, social, and human capital essential to the
+peculiarities of legal politics. This shift became possible as a result of the
+increasing prominence and sophistication of conservative foundations.
+The movement’s patrons had been burned by the failure of the first-generation
+firms but were primed for alternatives by the Horowitz Report and
+by Chip Mellor’s Center for Applied Jurisprudence project. When firms
+like IJ and CIR emerged that reflected what the movement had learned
+from its first, dispiriting fifteen years, foundation patrons were ready and
+willing to give them long-term support.
+The second-generation firms were guided by a shared set of lessons
+about the conditions for effective legal change, in particular the importance
+of agenda control. Where the previous generation of conservatives
+had insisted on “judicial restraint,” CIR and IJ had learned that conservative
+interests could only be protected by actively using courts to establish
+new or reinvigorate old rights, rather than simply standing in the way of
+the activism of the Left. Having established distance from business and
+shifted their strategy to initiating action in the courts, CIR and IJ had the
+freedom to choose an eclectic group of clients: small businessmen, local
+property-owners, consumers, students, professors, and racial minorities.
+This new, more strategic approach to client selection allowed CIR and IJ
+to pick cases with the potential to alter the nation’s constitutional debate,
+transform the reputation of the conservative movement, and place significant
+opportunities for legal change before the courts.
+222 CHAPTER 7
+
+Despite their substantial strategic similarity, CIR and IJ have widely
+divergent approaches to personnel, case selection, ground-level legal tactics,
+organizational ethos and presentation, and finances. Considered one
+by one, these differences may seem minor. Yet together, they constitute
+deep differences in organizational culture, which explain CIR and IJ’s
+case selection, their relationship with the larger conservative movement,
+their willingness to invest in recruitment and training, and their capacity
+to sustain themselves over the long term.
+Despite their impressive success, conservative public interest law firms
+face substantial constraints in their ability to reshape the law and American
+legal culture. Some of these constraints are rooted in the structure
+of American politics and society, while others are internal to the conservative
+movement itself. In particular, conservative public interest law
+continues to be dependent on the progress of the larger conservative
+program to transform the legal profession. Until conservatives, operating
+through organizations like the Federalist Society, have succeeded
+in fully integrating themselves into the legal profession—especially the
+nation’s law schools—and integrated public interest practice more fully
+into their professional lives, the success of conservative public interest
+law firms will be limited.
+
+Creating the Center for Individual Rights
+
+Opening its doors in 1989, the Center for Individual Rights was the first
+conservative public interest law firm to emerge from the reevaluation of
+the field that began with Michael Horowitz’s report a decade earlier.
+CIR’s founders, Michael Greve and Michael McDonald, had worked in
+first-generation conservative law firms, and this experience, along with
+their close study of the liberals’ legal strategies, shaped the design of CIR.
+The founding of CIR was not driven by a sudden change in the opportunity
+structure. Rather, a window of opportunity had been open for more
+than a decade, as the judiciary became more conservative, conservative
+lawyers populated the Justice Department, and the movement’s organizational
+density increased. The creation of CIR is best understood as an
+“inside story,” driven primarily by learning within the movement rather
+than stimuli in the political environment.
+CIR’s founders had been important players in the evolution of the
+conservative legal movement. Before coming to Washington, Greve received
+a PhD in political science at Cornell University, where he studied
+under Professor Jeremy Rabkin, an aggressive, take-no-prisoners conservative
+and a critic of the judiciary’s role in the political process. Rabkin
+argued that special interest groups and the judiciary had cooperated to
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 223
+
+expand the meaning and force of statutes, achieving political outcomes
+that they no longer had the electoral power to legislate. Legal liberalism,
+Rabkin argued, had corrupted constitutional norms while claiming high
+constitutional principle.1 Greve and Rabkin (who was a founding member
+of CIR’s board of directors) believed that the high moral tone taken
+by special interests on the left was simply a cover for undemocratic,
+illiberal transfers of resources conducted through constitutionally illegitimate
+means. This overriding sense of liberal hypocrisy became powerfully
+stamped on CIR’s organizational culture and communications
+style, and it gave the firm an edgy quality altogether lacking in most firstgeneration
+firms.
+While much of CIR’s edgy organizational style drew on Greve’s and
+Rabkin’s critiques of legal liberalism, its legal strategy drew primarily on
+McDonald’s experience at the Washington Legal Foundation and its spinoff,
+the American Legal Foundation. For McDonald, WLF was a model
+for CIR’s founders of how such a firm should not be run. McDonald
+recalls that, in his experience there,
+
+one day you’d be working on death penalty briefs, the next you’d be working
+on environmental law, the day after you’d be working on some qui tam action,
+the day after that you’d be working on separation of powers. There was no
+rhyme or reason. A lot of it was amicus work; a lot of it was driven by the
+perpetual need for fund-raising. . . . A lot of these organizations felt they had
+to develop large in-house staff, which is what elevated the fund-raising to such
+a key element. . . . They’d have three or four attorneys and four people doing
+fund-raising, so you’d have to have a million or two million just to run the
+place. You didn’t have a lot of money left over to do actual litigation.
+
+The lost opportunities were not more than theoretical, as the case of CIR’s
+first client demonstrated.
+
+When I was at ALF . . . Tom Lamprecht came knocking on my door. He had
+been denied a radio license because—I kid you not—he was a man, and spent
+his life savings hiring a D.C. regulatory firm to litigate in front of the FCC. The
+case was great from every conceivable point of view—and it was a winner. But
+I was told we didn’t have money to litigate it in court. I told Tom that if I ever
+started a law firm he should see us. He did, and we eventually won.2 . . . [When
+CIR began] it was the only case we had, and it could have been WLF’s. But,
+again, the thinking there was: it’s just another affirmative action case and we’re
+already “doing” those types of cases (i.e., filing amicus briefs in other people’s
+cases) and getting as much bang for the buck from our donors as we can. . . .
+From the viewpoint of WLF, its overhead and expenses—it did vast amounts of
+direct mail in those days—it made no economic sense. You wouldn’t reap any
+extra financial good from taking on Lamprecht, and it would have prevented
+224 CHAPTER 7
+
+the attorney who took it from writing, I don’t know, six amicus briefs for the
+same amount of time that could posture WLF as being in six other important
+areas of the law.3
+
+Similar to Chip Mellor’s experience at the Mountain States Legal Foundation,
+WLF frustrated McDonald’s desire to engage in serious, strategically
+sophisticated public interest lawyering. This professional frustration,
+along with a desire to achieve conservative goals, spurred the search for
+a new kind of conservative public interest law firm.
+Studies of movement investments in public interest law by Horowitz
+and CAJ had primed conservative patrons for the new approach that
+Greve and McDonald were proposing. Greve recalls that foundations
+were especially open to new forms of legal activism. “Foundations at the
+time were predisposed toward this. [We said,] ‘Here’s a better model...
+that reflects the insights of the Horowitz Report and the current thinking
+about this. There is significant start-up time on these things, so give us
+two or three years to try this out, this different model, and if it succeeds
+it’s cool. If it doesn’t, we’ll be the first to tell you . . . and then we’ll just
+shut our doors.” In a conscious echo of the Horowitz Report, CIR’s
+founders told their patrons, “Over the past fifteen years, foundations,
+corporations, and individuals have invested substantial sums of money in
+the conservative, free-market public interest law movement. On the
+whole, the return on that investment has not been great. Despite some
+notable success stories . . . the public interest law movement has, with
+few exceptions, failed to bring about meaningful and lasting legal
+change.”4 The cause of this failure was that “original litigation is the only
+effective way to change the direction of the law. With some exceptions,
+however, conservative, free-market law firms have initiated and litigated
+far fewer cases than liberal law firms of comparable size.”5 Drawing on
+the political science that Greve had cut his teeth on in graduate school and
+the experience of McDonald at WLF, CIR’s founders traced conservative
+firms’ reluctance to bring original litigation to the political economy of
+organizational maintenance.6 CIR claimed that
+
+public interest law firms can successfully change the law, but only if they are of
+a certain size; they must be large enough to employ many attorneys, and they
+must maintain large enough administrative and support staffs to allow their
+attorneys to perform trial-level litigation. However, if a law firm reaches that
+size, Horowitz observed that it will also need to develop a budget in excess of
+one million dollars in order to cover its overhead costs. But since money is
+scarce, that firm will find itself in a constant struggle to avoid running a deficit.
+Many public interest groups are therefore driven into making either one of two
+choices: (1) to cut staff, avoid original litigation, and file cost-saving, but largely
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 225
+
+ineffectual, amicus briefs; or (2) to maintain a large legal staff and reluctantly
+channel a sizeable portion of their budgets away from litigation and into nonstop
+fund-raising activities. Hence the increasing ineffectiveness of many litigation
+groups to effectuate meaningful legal reform.7
+
+Part of the solution to this problem was specialization. This conclusion
+was based on the failures of the first-generation firms and a reevaluation
+of the strategies of their foes on the left. Greve recalls that the crucial flaw
+of first-generation firms was
+
+that they were general-purpose firms. It was based on the misperception that
+Ralph Nader had succeeded because he was a loud-mouth and had an opinion
+on everything. But that was actually not how he operated. It was actually a
+bunch of firms that are very highly specialized. Non-Nader funds on the left
+operated on the exact same principle—a very high degree of specialization and
+a lot of competition. . . . So our notion was that you have to have real live
+original litigation and you have to be specialized in certain areas . . . You don’t
+win by funding amicus briefs and having an opinion on everything.
+
+The founders of CIR recognized what political scientists have subsequently
+demonstrated, which is that, by becoming “repeat players” in
+specific areas of law, public interest law firms can spread their investment
+in developing expertise over a large number of cases. The returns on these
+specialized investments are a reputation for expertise, an appreciation for
+the strategies of opposing lawyers, a network of outside lawyers and supporting
+groups, and credibility with judges.8
+The other advantage of small, focused firms is that they can rely on a
+handful of individuals and foundations, avoiding the loss of organizational
+focus that can come through from maintaining a base of large, lowdollar
+donors. In CIR’s case, this strategy also made a virtue of necessity.
+“Our only source of money was foundations . . . and we knew that our
+natural source of money—the Olins, Scaifes, etc.—wouldn’t give us that
+much, so we had to think small.”9 CIR’s financial strategy was also driven
+by what Greve and McDonald (like the Capital Legal Foundation before
+them) had learned about the dangers of business patronage. The “constant
+quest for money has often resulted in a ‘pro-business’ strategy: case
+selection and litigation strategy have been driven by fund-raising needs.
+On occasion, conservative firms have also defended corporate positions
+in violations of free-market principles.”10 CIR’s founders recognized that
+the power of public interest law comes from the perception that it is untainted
+by “private interests.” Close financial connections to corporations
+preclude such a principled public face, creating “a reputation of conservative
+public interest law firms as a ‘business front.’ Ralph Nader’s organizations
+or environmental groups are widely regarded as ‘the public’s’ au-
+226 CHAPTER 7
+
+thentic representatives; conservative public interest law firms have been
+denounced as corporate America’s hired guns.”11 Following Horowitz,
+CIR’s founders also argued that conservative public interest law firms
+needed to demonstrate their public interest credentials by finding liberal
+“entrenched interests” to accuse of hypocrisy, secrecy, and conspiring
+against the public.
+While they were critical of existing conservative firms, both Greve and
+McDonald were open to, and, because of their professional and academic
+background, fully capable of, learning from legal liberals. As McDonald
+remembers, “The ideas [behind CIR] came from rejecting what we’d seen
+on the right and imitating what we thought the Left was doing—whether
+it was [is] a different matter. I guess we thought that Alan Morrison of
+Public Citizen was a good model. You’d never hear from him for a while,
+and then he’d pop up with an INS v. Chadha or something at the Supreme
+Court. He didn’t seem to have much of a staff either.” Conservatives
+needed to go beyond standing in the way of lawyers like Morrison and
+instead mimic them by seizing control of the legal agenda to establish
+rights of their own that could be used against institutions controlled by
+liberals.12 By initiating cases and thereby controlling the legal agenda, CIR
+could shape the facts and venue of cases, influence public perceptions, and
+force liberals onto the defensive by making them look like the defenders of
+an unaccountable status quo.
+CIR believed that they could have a large impact despite their small size
+by leveraging the services of lawyers in private practice. The experience of
+liberal public interest firms had shown that “many small groups have been
+very effective in litigation because they make extensive use of existing
+‘free’ resources—most prominently, the pro bono service of for-profit law
+firms. The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, Trial Lawyers for Public
+Justice, and the—of course much larger—ACLU fit this description.”13
+CIR would mimic these organizations by identifying cases and shaping
+strategy while farming out the heavy lifting (and costs) to pro bono litigators
+in wealthy private firms. This strategy depended on networks and
+resources that had not existed a decade before. McDonald recalls, “We
+thought that what with the influx of talented Reagan-era attorneys back
+into private practice, and through the Federalist Society, we had a great
+pool of talent to draw on to fit case to attorney.” Federalist Society meetings
+would create opportunities to “solicit information and advice about
+cases and issues that fit the Center’s agenda.”14 For an organization that,
+at least initially, would only have two full-time staff members, the ability
+to draw upon a large, geographically dispersed network to help find cases
+was essential. What is more, the Federalist Society network made it easier
+to identify lawyers ideologically attuned to CIR’s mission and skilled in
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 227
+
+particular areas of law. The Federalist Society, in effect, reduced the transaction
+costs of conservative public interest law. Just as important as the
+Federalist Society network was the existence of a pool of conservative
+lawyers with experience in government and a taste for doing policy-relevant
+legal work. CIR’s hope was that once these lawyers went back into
+private practice, they would seize the opportunity to continue working on
+cases as interesting as those they had been responsible for in government.
+Inducing Reagan administration veterans to partner with CIR would
+allow the conservative movement to leverage the substantial resources of
+private firms for conservative legal activism. Over the years, CIR has in
+fact been able to draw very successfully on these Reagan alumni, including
+Theodore Olson and Douglas Cox of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, Michael
+Carvin of Cooper, Carvin and Rosenthal, and Michael McConnell.15
+This points to the important, and generally overlooked, mechanism of
+electoral success feeding back into the development of a legal support
+structure, through creating an “alumni” pool of former public servants
+whose work in government provides the skills, networks, and temperament
+for legal activity outside government. But the creation of a cadre of
+experienced lawyers as a consequence of electoral success is only onethird
+of the equation. For this revolving door to spin effectively, the conservative
+movement needed organizations like the Federalist Society to
+connect alumni to causes and groups like CIR to activate this “latent
+resource” for political action. These factors allowed CIR to maintain a
+lean, low-cost firm dependent primarily on foundation support and a
+small group of individual supporters, rather than mass mailings and corporate
+largesse.
+The emergence of a new generation of wealthy libertarians in the technology
+and finance sectors also helped CIR reconcile its funding needs
+with its strategic ambitions. Changes in the economy also helped CIR
+solve its organizational maintenance problems. First-generation firms
+depended heavily on funding from corporations (and their owners or
+senior management) in areas (such as ranching, extractive industries,
+and manufacturing) that were severely impacted by the new regulatory
+state and the Naderite firms who knew how to exploit it. By the late
+1980s, entirely new sources of wealth had emerged, especially in high
+technology, and the result was a sizable number of very wealthy, relatively
+young, temperamentally libertarian donors.16 As Greve argues,
+“The first generation played in the old economy, second generation in
+the new, with lots of rich, individual donors. I don’t mean millionaires,
+I mean people who can write a six-figure check the way you or I buy
+bagels.” These newly wealthy individuals were looking for opportunities
+to invest their money in organizations that shared the libertarian im-
+228 CHAPTER 7
+
+pulses that (at least in the late 1980s and early 1990s) characterized
+entrepreneurs in areas like software and the Internet. “The biggest contributors
+found us, sometimes based on news articles they’d seen, because
+they wanted to invest in this ‘sector’ and had asked around for
+worthwhile outfits. I did virtually no donor prospecting.”17 When combined
+with supportive foundations, a handful of very large individual
+donations from new economy millionaires were sufficient to fund CIR’s
+lean organizational model. These new economy libertarians were unlikely
+to compromise CIR’s legal strategy, since they were attracted to
+the firm primarily by its sharply defined ideological principles.
+Finally, CIR aimed to mimic the Left in its relationship with the academy.
+An early planning document argued that
+
+liberal public interest law firms cooperate closely and in various ways with leading
+academic scholars. As a result, they have been able to gain access to legal
+and scientific expertise, to develop feasible litigation strategies; to secure a large
+amount of credibility in public policy forums and in court; and to draw upon
+a steady stream of talented law school graduates who will work for the firms.
+The conservative, free-market public interest law movement’s connections to
+academic scholars have, on the whole, been rather tenuous. We are convinced
+that this is a serious weakness. Accordingly, the Center for Individual Rights
+maintains close contacts with legal scholars in the academic community. . . .
+Academic advisors are asked to identify potential litigation issues and to formulate
+a corresponding litigation strategy for the Center to pursue in court. They
+also give advice to the attorneys who litigate the Center’s cases.18
+
+CIR’s intentions to disconnect conservative public interest law from business
+interests and to tie it to conservatives in the academy and the think
+tank community were two sides of the same coin. CIR’s founders shared
+the growing sense of many libertarian conservatives that, with a few exceptions,
+businessmen could not be counted on to pursue the interests of
+a free market. Indeed, they were all too ready to cut deals with the activist
+state in the interest of their short-term bottom line.19 Business was neither
+interested in the broader constitutional norms that protect free markets
+nor concerned about the social institutions that safeguard those markets.
+Conservative intellectuals, Federalist Society members, and conservative
+foundations—all based in or connected to the academy—shared the second-generation
+legal entrepreneurs’ concern for the larger constitutional
+order, and could thus constitute the new “base” for conservative public
+interest law. This shift reflected the increasing autonomy of the conservative
+movement, a shift Horowitz had pointed to a decade earlier. This new
+cadre of Reagan-era conservative activists sought organizational forms in
+which they, not business, would hold the movement’s strategic reins.
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 229
+
+CIR’s Strategic Opportunism
+
+CIR’s core commitments were to a method of organizing public interest
+law activism, a broad critique of the administrative state, and a set of
+roughly libertarian principles rather than to any particular area of law
+or public policy. While the Institute for Justice established very detailed
+litigation strategies even before the organization was founded (through
+the Center for Applied Jurisprudence), CIR adopted a market model of
+issue selection. Like the early NAACP, CIR’s case selection was characterized
+by strategic opportunism: pursuing a range of theoretically attractive
+options and then throwing itself behind those that demonstrated traction
+in the courts and within their organizational network.20 This opportunistic
+approach was itself opportunistic, in the sense that it was not the result
+of careful, advance planning, but was a response to feedback from the
+legal environment.
+CIR attracted attention and developed a network early on, causing a
+stream of potential litigants to present themselves to the organization.
+The founders developed an ability to recognize cases with substantial legal
+potential (drawn from the cases they had induced to come through the
+door) that fit within the organization’s general interests. That is, rather
+than planning, CIR emphasized case attraction and strategic sorting. As
+McDonald recalls,
+
+All—let me repeat—all of the CIR cases that made it to the Supreme Court
+had an element of pure fortuitousness to them. . . . Ron Rosenberger went to a
+number of other PILFs before he came to us. They turned him down. Maybe
+because of, let’s call it, the WLF-Lamprecht problem.21 We were clever enough
+to see the case’s potential and wanted to litigate in that area, but it wasn’t as
+though we designed the case through theory first and then “created” or found
+Ron Rosenberger. . . . We got into the VAWA [Violence Against Women Act]
+Morrison case because John Jeffries—the UVA law prof who argued Rosenberger—thought
+we were decent guys and when some local practitioner in Virginia
+called him for help in Morrison, because he didn’t know about VAWA he
+said call CIR. Again, we didn’t create Morrison. . . . And we got into the Bossier
+redistricting case because the attorney from Louisiana who had been handling
+it had heart problems. He consulted a federal judge who thought well of CIR
+and said why not call them. . . . [Our approach was to] be opportunistic—if a
+Lamprecht or a Rosenberger walks through the door and you see that their
+cases fit within one of your mission areas. Bossier fit within our mission area
+of race neutrality but was a bit more of a stretch perhaps, but you don’t pass
+up an opportunity to argue before the Supreme Court. Doing that helps generate
+more potential cases. In the meantime, sure, we thought about what the
+next “logical” case would be to achieve x, y, or z in one area of another,
+230 CHAPTER 7
+
+but . . . the only area where we could really design a strategy was in the area of
+race preferences. There we had our pick because no one else would litigate them
+for all sorts of reasons.
+
+CIR embraced opportunism because, having tried both opportunism and
+planning as a mode of organizational agenda-setting, opportunism
+worked. McDonald recalls that “we thought of litigating against federal
+regulatory agencies . . . but it was next to impossible to find clients. We
+thought of doing environmental cases, but, again, [it was] difficult to find
+clients not already swept up in mega-Superfund litigation or some other
+kind of litigation. . . . Greve wrote a book on environmental law and
+could think up all sorts of cases, but none of them worked in practice.”
+This pattern of issue opportunism helps to explain the areas of legal
+activism CIR pursued as well as those it dropped. The fortunes of four
+issues illuminate CIR’s evolving strategic focus. Despite strong initial interest,
+CIR dropped two of those issues—legal reform in institutions serving
+the disadvantaged and libel law—from its organizational agenda
+while aggressively pursuing two others, academic free speech and affirmative
+action (both of which are discussed in the next section).
+While it was not part of its original grant proposals, CIR began designing
+a “Social Responsibility Project” shortly after it was created. This
+initiative was designed to use strategic litigation to “improve the functioning
+of schools and public housing agencies that serve the poor” and “support
+policies and institutions conducive to individual responsibility, self
+reliance, and a sense of social obligation”22 The initiative dovetailed with
+then-Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp’s emphasis
+on “empowerment” of the poor and the first Bush administration’s
+interest in education reform.23 The project focused on school discipline
+and safety in public housing, with CIR taking the side of local “empowerment-oriented”
+organizations who wanted the government to have
+more authority and discretion. As McDonald recalls, “We had a law clerk
+working on this full time to contact these types of groups—trolling for
+potential clients with legal problems to see if we could help with so-called
+empowerment.” This was a far cry from the cases that would later make
+CIR’s name, all of which attacked government discretion in the name of
+individual rights.
+While the Olin Foundation funded the project for one year and CIR
+was able to enlist the help of organizations such as the National Association
+of Secondary School Principals and the National School Safety Center,24
+the firm ultimately abandoned the project. Greve recalls that the
+Social Responsibility Project “was in fact connected to Kemp’s ownership
+initiatives, which also bombed, and for the same reason: lack of
+client competence. Plus, the distinction conservatives want to draw be-
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 231
+
+tween ‘law-abiding’ public housing residents and ‘lawbreakers’ is illusory,
+since every law-abiding resident has a half-dozen lawbreaking relatives
+and doesn’t want the book thrown at them. We spent a long time
+advising folks in HUD’s flagship projects (e.g. Trenton) with little to
+show for it.”25 The Social Responsibility Project was a bad fit for CIR’s
+organizational form, because of “the complexity and sheer mess of those
+types of situations. There really is no one target, but fifty different moving
+legal targets—nothing for you to get your arms around.”26 Practical
+experience and the firm’s design impelled CIR to seek out relatively simple,
+potentially precedent-setting cases with a clear path to the Supreme
+Court rather than fighting rearguard efforts with geographically limited
+impact. The temperament of CIR’s founders was also a poor fit with the
+slow, time-consuming demands of building credibility with representatives
+of the poor and racial minorities. While such cases might have made
+sense for an organization with a large staff, budget, and PR apparatus—
+as IJ would soon demonstrate—they made little sense for a firm with
+CIR’s organizational commitments.
+Despite McDonald’s strong interest in libel law, rooted in his previous
+work at WLF and ALF, the issue was also dropped when it failed to bear
+fruit. CIR did develop a case in the area early on, Krauser v. Consumer
+Reports, which offered “an opportunity to test a ‘no-fault’ theory of libel,
+which would permit libel plaintiffs seeking solely a retraction (and no
+damages) to escape the overly demanding ‘actual malice’ standard of New
+York Times v. Sullivan.”27 CIR took on other libel cases over its first few
+years, representing conservative movement figures like S. Fred Singer and
+Dinesh D’Souza, but this line of work quickly fizzled out. The most important
+constraint, according to McDonald, was that, “unlike the area
+of racial discrimination, the playing field was woefully tilted toward the
+defense bar, and the Supreme Court wasn’t going to budge.” Even more
+important, by taking on the issue of “academic freedom” CIR found a
+new outlet for its interest in the First Amendment, but on the side of
+expanding the reach of constitutionally protected speech, rather than constricting
+it
+The failure of the Social Responsibility Project and libel law reform
+helped to point CIR, both tactically and ideologically, toward a marked
+libertarianism in its caseload. Both libel law reform and the Project had
+more in common with traditional conservatism than they did with libertarianism,
+in that they sought to limit liberty in the name of a higher
+principle, such as individual reputation or school and neighborhood
+order. Current CIR president Terry Pell believes that traditional conservatives
+face systemic constraints in pursuing these objectives through public
+interest law, in a way that libertarians do not. “The courts [have] limited
+the ability of institutions to act in a deliberate and effective manner. . . .
+232 CHAPTER 7
+
+Courts are most naturally used as a way to limit the executive branch, or
+institutions in general. And the laws are all set up as limits on the government.
+So if you’re a public interest law firm using the courts, you’re likely
+using laws that were designed to limit institutional authority in some way.
+That would all push you against any systematic effort to strengthen the
+prerogatives of institutions.” The failure of the Social Responsibility Project
+and libel law reform provides an intriguing explanation for the greater
+success of CIR and IJ, which identified with opposition to, rather than
+defense of, government authority. Libertarians were able to work with
+the trend in American law initiated by liberals to strip executive institutions
+of discretion and force them to operate in accordance with clear,
+national rules or professional standards.28 It is important to remember,
+however, that CIR’s libertarian focus was an emergent, not a founding,
+commitment. Though McDonald and Greve were less committed libertarians
+than IJ’s founders were, their interaction with the legal environment—combined
+with their temperamental instinct for going where the
+action was—gradually pushed CIR in a libertarian direction.29 This is another
+example of how the conservative legal movement was shaped by
+the liberal legal system that it simultaneously sought to dislodge.
+
+Issue Opportunism at CIR: Free Speech and Affirmative Action
+
+Recognizing the futility of using conservative public interest law to support
+governmental authority, however, pointed to the solution—attacking
+institutions controlled by the Left on the basis of fundamental constitutional
+principles, such as the First Amendment’s rights of free speech and
+religion and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection
+of the laws. “What we learned,” Greve recalls, “is that public interest
+law works when you can wield a big constitutional club. On any other
+issue, the regulatory state will eat you alive.” Universities provided a
+happy hunting ground for such cases, and also allowed CIR to adopt a
+posture of defending individuals against large, oppressive organizations,
+and to do so by using constitutional claims that liberals had pioneered.
+The opportunity for this new avenue for conservative litigation was the
+“political correctness” scare of the early 1990s, which provided a powerful
+cultural hook for CIR’s litigation and alerted potential conservative
+donors to the importance of countering the campus Left.
+CIR’s founders knew from the start that specialization was vital, but
+lacked a clear sense of what their organization’s specialty should be. The
+arrival of the “PC craze” solved its problem. McDonald recalls, “Initially,
+we only asked for two years of funding from foundations, on the assumption
+that we’d either find our ‘niche’ or not, in which case we’d close up
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 233
+
+shop. But then the PC craze hit and we’d found a niche. It hadn’t been on
+our radar screen when we started CIR but it did fit within our core mission
+of protecting free speech and civil rights. We modified and adapted.” CIR
+had no long-term litigation strategy in the area, but developed one in
+response to the cases that came in the door. “We had no idea that PC was
+going to be as big as it was. No idea whatsoever. When Tim McGuire
+walked into our office with the flap about admission records at Georgetown
+Law Center, we were floored when it ended up on the front pages
+of the Washington Post and the New York Times, and that was just the
+start of all sorts of other similar cases.”30 CIR had found a niche that
+matched the substantive interests and temperament of the organization’s
+leaders, as well as their strong links with academia.
+Sensing that attacking censorship on campus was both substantively
+important and appealing to donors and the larger conservative movement,
+CIR quickly formalized its work in the area into an Academic
+Freedom Defense Fund. An early planning paper for the AFDF makes
+clear that CIR had a clear sense that there was a need and a political
+opportunity in the area, as well as an issue likely to generate excitement
+from donors.
+
+Uniformly, our “advisors” argued that the establishment of an Academic Freedom
+Defense Fund (AFDF) is an idea whose time has come. We share this assessment
+for both substantive and, as it were, tactical reasons. As to substance, the
+“PC” movement is a genuine menace, and the protection afforded to conservative
+and middle-of-the-roadish students and academics by organizations such
+as the ACLU and the AAUP is insufficient and, shall we say, unreliable. As to
+tactics, Aaron Wildavsky has remarked that the “PC” movement is really the
+first issue that has split the Left on campus. This opportunity should be exploited:
+the more of a wedge we can drive between heretofore closely aligned
+leftist constituencies, the better.31
+
+While the AFDF was clearly motivated by a genuine desire to defend
+the rights of (predominantly conservative) academics, Greve’s comment
+shows that it was also seen as part of the “war of position” in the modern
+university between liberals and conservatives. The founders of CIR sincerely
+believed that efforts to limit the speech of those on the right were
+real and designed to shut off challenges to academic liberalism. For conservatives,
+campus politics was simply politics by other means in a different
+venue. Defending themselves required coalition-building strategies designed
+to split moderate liberals from those to their left, strategies that
+conservatives were deploying with increasing regularity in areas like
+school choice and welfare reform.32 Attacking political correctness also
+had the advantage of attracting conservatives willing to donate their labor
+to the cause—a substantial advantage given CIR’s dependence on outside
+234 CHAPTER 7
+
+counsel. The proposal for the AFDF noted that “CIR has received far
+more requests for cases in this than in any other area of activities.”33 Finally,
+the issue attracted substantial interest and consequently free public
+relations from the larger conservative movement. Conservative magazines
+loved stories about political correctness on campus, and publishers were
+recognizing that books on “liberal bias” in academia had a market.34 Ever
+on the lookout for areas in which they could leverage free resources, academic
+free speech emerged as a clear winner.
+Racial and gender preferences in education were not a focus of CIR’s
+early strategy documents, and the firm shied away from the issue in its
+early years. In its original proposal for the AFDF, CIR made clear that
+affirmative action was freighted with danger, because of the intrinsic difficulty
+of winning cases in the area and because of the tensions it might
+produce with its potential allies.
+
+In our opinion, the AFDF should limit itself strictly to cases and controversies
+that have a bearing upon academic freedom and First Amendment rights. In
+particular, the AFDF should not get sidetracked into issues of related, but ultimately,
+quite different concern—most notably, race, including racial quotas in
+student admission and faculty hiring and promotion. When we discussed this
+with several of our “consultants,” we received mixed reactions. Some advisors
+viewed race- and gender-based hiring, promotion, and admissions as the problem
+for conservative academics, and they urged that the envisioned AFDF provide
+legal assistance to victims of racial discrimination. Of course, racial and
+gender preferences do abound in higher education. Discriminatory policies are
+the source of many of the complaints and inquiries we receive (and would receive
+in larger numbers if the AFDF were established). Nonetheless, we believe
+that the AFDF should refrain from devoting its resources to reverse discrimination
+cases, at least as a general rule. First, “Title VI” and “Title VII” civil rights
+cases are exceedingly difficult and expensive. The proof problems are almost
+always daunting, and litigation costs run into hundreds of thousands of dollars
+for most cases. Second . . . the vigorous advocacy of First Amendment rights
+and academic freedom has the potential of driving a wedge between heretofore
+united political constituencies. This potential might be lost if the AFDF were
+perceived, not as a “civil libertarian” organization but, rightly or wrongly, as
+simply yet another conservative hobby horse.35
+
+Appealing to nonconservatives was central to CIR’s political strategy of
+splitting the Left, and explains why it went out of its way to explain to
+foundations its hesitation in pursuing affirmative action cases. “In order
+to attain their broader political and philosophical objectives, conservatives
+and moderates must seek to cooperate with non-radicalized liberals
+on issues on which both sides, for all their disagreements, happen to agree;
+and the defense of academic freedom is first and foremost among these
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 235
+
+issues. In this way, an Academic Freedom Defense Fund might contribute
+to a productive political ‘realignment’ on college campuses.”36
+Just a few years later CIR reversed itself and began filing the cases that
+led up to its Supreme Court challenges to affirmative action in Gratz and
+Grutter. What explains this rapid strategic shift? First, CIR had already
+nosed its way into the question of affirmative action in the Lamprecht
+challenge to FCC radio license policies and its free speech cases challenging
+university interpretations of their antidiscrimination duties. But the
+jump to a direct attack on affirmative action in university admissions
+threatened the support CIR sought to attract from centrists and liberals,
+might give the firm an unsavory racial stigma, and unquestionably required
+a large increase in funding. In its 1993 request for funding from
+the Olin Foundation, CIR addressed its previous concerns directly.
+
+When the AFDF was established two years ago, we decided to stay away from
+affirmative action and reverse discrimination cases. We believed that AFDF’s
+success would depend on its reputation—and practice—as a (civil) libertarian
+organization dedicated to free speech and inquiry, and that a preoccupation
+with questions of race and gender might interfere with this strategy. In hindsight,
+this was the right approach. However, the time has come to revisit the
+original decision to stay away from quota cases. First, the AFDF (and CIR in
+general) now has developed a reputation as a principled civil libertarian organization.
+It can easily afford to take a few high-profile discrimination cases without
+blurring its central message. Second, the quotaization of the academy has
+continued apace. Unless and until hiring and admissions by numbers are arrested,
+all the other items on the agenda for higher education will, in the long
+run, be losing causes.37
+
+McDonald believes that CIR’s shift to enthusiasm for affirmative action
+litigation had a simpler motivation. The justification in 1993, in McDonald’s
+telling, was “a retroactive highfalutin’ attempt to justify the fact
+that a really good case involving racial preferences had come our way—
+namely Hopwood. . . . Here again, CIR didn’t initiate the case, a local
+attorney by the name of Steve Smith did—but we got in touch with him
+and looked over the admissions policy and thought, ‘[There’s] no way
+we cannot not do this.’ ” In 1991, when the firm was still quite young,
+a case like Hopwood would have stretched CIR’s organizational capacity
+to its breaking point. “Take away our low (by comparison with what
+we could have been making at WLF, say) salaries and overhead and that
+doesn’t leave you with much to do more than a few original cases each
+year, and, if you do, they’d better not be factually messy—fifty depositions
+and the like. We had to wait for the law to change, for the universities
+to become more brazen about their use of race . . . and for CIR to
+develop a good track record so that we could attract more and more
+236 CHAPTER 7
+
+good firms to our cause.”38 By 1993, CIR was convinced that it could
+handle one case like Hopwood without outstripping its fund-raising and
+organizational capacity.
+Another factor that allowed CIR to consider a challenge to affirmative
+action was the increasing density of conservative organizations on campus,
+the most important of which was the National Association of Scholars.
+From the vantage point of its professorial constituency, NAS saw
+affirmative action as intimately connected to CIR’s existing agenda of
+academic freedom. As Steve Balch, the president of NAS, told Greve
+in 1993,
+
+I realize the difficulty of attempting reverse discrimination cases. Nonetheless,
+
+they comprise the largest category of complaints we receive, and are, alas, likely
+
+to remain a growth industry. It’s imperative that we deal with them for two
+reasons. First, they drive a lot of our people out of the business (not because
+they’re all white males—we’re not; but because reverse discrimination is most
+likely to be inflicted on white males who are also “politically incorrect”). Second,
+these policies comprise the linchpin of a whole regime of campus governance
+inimical to the ideals of liberal education. If, through some legal breakthrough,
+reverse discrimination was no longer permitted, university administrators would
+be compelled to configure an entirely new set of alliances to support themselves,
+drastically transforming the political equation on campus.39
+
+Attacking affirmative action went hand in hand with defending the free
+speech rights of conservative professors. Attacking affirmative action
+would enhance the probability that conservatives would be hired, while
+CIR’s existing free speech litigation would protect them once they made
+their way through the university’s gates. As McDonald recalls, “Every
+time we’d do an academic case, the client or his colleagues would inevitably
+ask us to do race cases. . . . Dr. X would say, you should sue my school,
+too, because it has quotas.” In affirmative action, conservatives had an
+issue with potentially large popular appeal, a newly vibrant infrastructure
+of conservative academics, support from conservative foundations, and a
+sense that, due to the hesitancy of Republican lawmakers, the courts were
+likely to be the only venue for policy change.40
+The reason for the relative absence of effective challenges to affirmative
+action was not the dearth of attractive plaintiffs, but the absence of public
+interest lawyers interested in representing them. As McDonald recalls,
+this gave CIR the space to select clients and venues strategically.
+
+You had legitimately aggrieved plaintiffs a-plenty . . . it was a target-rich environment.
+You can’t open any statute book, federal or state, without coming
+across some set-aside that has no sound predicate in law. But none of these
+groups were willing to touch them because it was very cost intensive and the
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 237
+
+law was evolving. Once we got into this area of law and people found we were
+the only game in town, we had our choice of plaintiffs. There are economic
+reasons [for the absence of litigation]. For example, it might cost a couple of
+thousand dollars to file an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in the Adarand
+case, but then you can send out a fund-raising letter that says we filed a brief
+with the Supreme Court . . . and we’re working on behalf of Mr. Adarand, even
+though they’re not technically representing him.41
+
+The success of CIR was as much a victory of organization as it was legal
+strategy or political opportunity. CIR’s predecessors, with a few exceptions,
+had been caught in an organizational maintenance trap driven by
+dependence on business and unsophisticated direct mail donors. CIR, by
+contrast, had chosen an organizational design that limited its financial
+needs and allowed it to raise money primarily from a handful of sophisticated
+donors who understood its basic approach. This gave CIR the freedom
+to focus immediately on litigation and to spread their litigation bets
+until they hit on an issue—academic freedom—that worked.
+The success of CIR’s academic freedom cases won the firm a high public
+profile and enhanced its reputation within the conservative movement.
+Having developed a reputation as the scourge of political correctness, CIR
+attracted clients who believed their issues were akin to those the firm had
+already handled. This specialized reputation allowed CIR to sift through
+the “target-rich environment” of clients that came through its door,
+choose those with the greatest promise, rapidly test the litigation waters,
+and follow up on cases that bore fruit. This is the approach that allowed
+CIR to identify and successfully litigate such important, precedent-setting
+cases as Morrison and Rosenberger, and eventually led to its challenge to
+affirmative action in university admissions.
+
+The Evolution of the Institute for Justice
+
+Unlike CIR, the Institute for Justice’s legal strategy and issue focus were
+designed through Mellor’s Center for Applied Jurisprudence (described
+in chapter 3) before the organization was up and running. The books
+published by CAJ42 provided IJ with an operational design, an approach
+to legal activism, and a set of thoroughly vetted legal strategies on specific
+issues. IJ’s early planning documents identified economic liberty, educational
+choice, property rights, and the First Amendment as its key issues,
+and fifteen years later these remain its central commitments. IJ’s history
+has been marked by the implementation of a well-established vision, in
+sharp contrast to CIR’s opportunistic search for issues capable of providing
+legal and political traction.
+238 CHAPTER 7
+
+From the moment it opened its doors, IJ was committed to pursuing
+libertarian goals by targeting groups typically associated with liberalism.
+For example, IJ’s earliest proposals highlighted its pursuit of “economic
+liberty” through defending “low-capital entrepreneurs” like a “black
+Muslim entrepreneur whose African hairstyling salon is threatened with
+closure because Mr. Uqdah does not have a cosmetology license,” as well
+as targeting licensing requirements in the taxicab business.43 The same
+proposal identified its strategy of representing “low-income parents” in
+cases that “will place urban public schools on trial and clearly identify
+choice as a low-income empowerment solution.”44 These cases drew on
+the work that Bolick had done at the Landmark Legal Foundation,
+which built on the arguments of Stuart Butler, Walter Williams, Clarence
+Thomas (Bolick’s mentor at the EEOC), and Robert Woodson that economic
+growth in the inner cities was being held back by government
+regulation, rather than insufficient spending.45 These supporters of “empowerment”
+believed that “deregulating the inner city” would give conservatives
+political traction among traditional supporters of liberalism,
+African-Americans in particular.
+The legal theory that accompanied empowerment was that attacking
+the impact of state regulation on the poor and racial minorities would
+help reinvigorate the property rights provisions of the Constitution. The
+line of cases that stood in IJ’s way was, by its own admission, quite long.
+
+We believe it is timely and essential to begin a direct assault on the SlaughterHouse
+Cases, which read the privileges or immunities clause out of the 14th
+Amendment. Such an assault must unfold as part of a carefully planned, longterm
+program to restore constitutional protection for economic liberty. It will
+be essential to identify licensing and permitting laws and other governmentcreated
+barriers to entry that frame the economic liberty issue most compellingly.
+We have high confidence in our ability to do this since we have been very
+successful in all of our cases in identifying the best possible factual settings and
+the most sympathetic clients.46
+
+These cases had ambitious long-term objectives but quite modest shortterm
+aims, which made it difficult to persuade some of IJ’s patrons that
+there was a high payoff to its activities, in comparison to those of CIR.
+The staff of the Olin Foundation responded to IJ’s initial grant proposal
+by observing that “some of the litigation the Institute has started looks
+promising, while lawsuits to allow ghetto residents to start shoe shine
+or barber businesses are more quixotic.”47 Even today, Olin Foundation
+president James Piereson recalls, “I’ve had some mixed views on the other
+cases they’ve done, like the street vendors and the licensing stuff. It seems
+like small-bore sort of stuff; it’s hard to find what the range and preceden-
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 239
+
+tial value of it is. You get the beauticians freed up in Washington, D.C.,
+but its not clear how far you can take it.”
+The founders of IJ did not share the Olin Foundation’s skepticism.
+From the start, IJ judged that placing poor, black clients against large
+government institutions would improve their odds of success in the
+courts, magnify their public profile, and help change the reputation of
+conservatives and libertarians. By representing clients who were sympathetic
+by prevailing liberal standards, IJ could get around the usual assumptions
+of the media and courts that conservative lawyers were just
+fronts for big business. Representing traditionally liberal clients had the
+potential to transform the identification of civil rights with liberalism, and
+to remove the stigma of racism from conservatives. Once this identification
+had been broken, IJ’s leaders calculated, it would be possible for
+conservatives to gain a hearing on a wide range of issues. “Once we make
+common cause on an issue like school choice, other pieces of the puzzle,
+such as economic liberty and private property rights, seem to follow logically.
+. . . Given that our goal is to give people greater control over their
+destinies, we should never cede either the moral high ground or the opportunity
+to put a human, compassionate face on our philosophy.”48
+The most daunting early challenge for IJ was financial, not strategic.
+Despite the substantial spadework that Mellor had done to show conservative
+patrons the need for an organization like IJ, fund-raising for the
+firm was more complex than Mellor anticipated. Mellor was hired by the
+Pacific Research Institute to resuscitate the think tank and was uncomfortable
+raising start-up funds for IJ from supporters. This meant that IJ had
+to solicit support from a single, large contributor to get the organization
+off the ground and develop its own funding base.
+
+I needed a seed funder, who was Charles Koch.49 I’d known Charles for a long
+time and I thought, “This is just the sort of thing he should like.” I never got to
+make a pitch directly to him; I went through some functionaries. [They said no.]
+I thought, what are we going to do, who else would give us enough money to be
+serious? And I had a really hard time thinking of somebody, when the call came
+and said, “We’ve been thinking about it again, and we’d like to listen to what
+you have to say.” . . . He said, “Here’s what I’m going to do. I’ll give you up to
+$500,000 a year for three years, each year, but you have to come back each
+year and demonstrate that you’ve met these milestones that you’ve set out to
+accomplish and I will evaluate it on a yearly basis, and there’s no guarantees.”50
+
+The universe of conservative patrons at the time was quite limited, and
+the number of those willing and able to make very large contributions was
+even smaller. On the other hand, the intimate nature of the conservative
+patronage network and their relatively flat organizational structure meant
+that Mellor could gain personal access to a deep-pocketed potential
+240 CHAPTER 7
+
+contributor based on his own reputation, produced through the network
+of conservative and libertarian organizations.
+IJ’s earliest grant proposals were of a piece with the strategies developed
+at the Center for Applied Jurisprudence. Given the “perilous state” of the
+rule of law in America, IJ argued, “It is not enough to depend on academic
+discourse or private lawyers to remedy this tragic situation.” Instead,
+
+The inertia in the legal system and its dominance by special interests can be overcome
+only through skilled advocacy by individuals armed with philosophically
+and tactically consistent strategies based on natural rights and the Constitution.
+These advocates must pursue carefully selected cases having significant potential
+to set favorable precedent and to provide a compelling platform to argue the
+issue in the court of public opinion. Every case should be a building block in a
+progression of cases that relentlessly reshapes American jurisprudence.51
+
+This emphasis on strategic litigation was familiar to the conservative patrons
+who had supported Mellor’s work at the Pacific Research Institute.
+IJ’s early grant applications made sure to recall foundations’ previous
+support of CAJ: “Ultimate success depends upon our executing the program
+and talent you played such a key role in developing.”52 What was
+new was the recognition that conservative public interest law’s problems
+went well beyond legal strategy to the underdeveloped state of conservative
+legal activism more broadly.
+
+While principled advocacy is essential, it is beyond the province of any one
+organization or group of individuals to accomplish all that needs to be done.
+Quite simply, there are not enough trained advocates who know how to make
+use of the unique tools that our type of public interest law has to offer. Consequently,
+a substantial effort must be made to train law students, lawyers, and
+policy activists how to apply their talent and idealism in the real world of litigation,
+media relations, and public debate. With such training, the talent pool of
+effective advocates will be increased dramatically and the chances of ultimate
+success will rise immeasurably.53
+
+The solution was to conduct a series of seminars led by IJ staff and major
+conservative legal scholars (the grant proposal named Charles Fried of
+Harvard, Jonathan Macey of Cornell, and Michael Krauss of George
+Mason). The purpose was to overcome the problem that “lawyers, driven
+by the demands of private practice, rarely recognize opportunities to advance
+principles within the context of their practices.”54 The seminars
+would introduce conservative lawyers to the possibilities for pro bono
+legal activism and facilitate the “spontaneous, decentralized action” that
+libertarians have philosophical reasons to prefer to conscious, centralized
+planning. As we shall see later in this chapter, IJ’s high hopes in this area
+have not, fifteen years later, been met.
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 241
+
+In spite of its interest in looking beyond the courtroom, the primary
+activity of IJ has always been litigation, and unlike CIR it has been remarkably
+consistent in the kinds of cases it handles. For instance, IJ has
+litigated school choice cases since its founding. In 1992, it sued the Chicago
+and Los Angeles schools systems, arguing that their low quality of
+instruction violated state constitutional guarantees.55 In these cases IJ accepted
+the idea that state constitutions established judiciable standards of
+government performance—a position usually associated with legal liberalism—but
+claimed that the failure of government argued for allowing
+parents to take their percentage of school funding to private schools. This
+case convinced the Olin Foundation to fund IJ, because “even if the courts
+do not issue injunctions mandating the equivalent of a voucher system,
+the publicity of putting urban public education ‘on trial’ would be very
+bad news for the defenders of the public education monopoly and its
+constant demands for still more money.”56 IJ lost both of these cases,
+however, and while it has occasionally used the courts to claim that school
+choice was an affirmative state duty, not simply a constitutional option,57
+this has ceased to be a major part of IJ’s legal strategy.58 The main purpose
+of these cases was to use the law to reinforce IJ’s argument that the public
+school system is a source of unaccountable power, and that the interests
+of school providers should not be conflated with those of schoolchildren.
+Like their liberal predecessors, IJ sought to use the law to change the
+framing and salience of political issues.59
+IJ’s work in the area of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence is an
+even clearer instance of how it has used the law as a mobilizing tactic, to
+set the political agenda, and to transform public opinion. Mellor recalls
+that takings could easily have been seen as a libertarian issue of minor
+importance: “All the way along in Kelo [and in other litigation in the
+area], we had the challenge to take an issue that we thought was vitally
+important, but by its very nature conducted in such a way that it was not
+on the radar screen of most Americans. . . . We had to figure out ways to
+mobilize people and public outrage around the issue.” For its first step in
+framing the issue, IJ could hardly have found a better enemy than Donald
+Trump, who had convinced the state of New Jersey to use its power of
+eminent domain to condemn a private home to make way for a casino
+parking lot.60 IJ won and followed with a series of similar cases, including
+a challenge to Pittsburgh’s plan to use eminent domain to make way for
+a downtown mall. In that case, IJ never filed a suit, helping instead to
+organize local community groups, staging protests, and launching a highprofile
+public relations campaign, the centerpiece of which were ten threehundred-square-foot
+billboards. The city eventually promised not to use
+eminent domain. IJ followed up with a similar mix of legal and nonlegal
+tactics in other states, as well as an ambitious program to train local
+242 CHAPTER 7
+
+activists. Mellor recalls that IJ “wanted to equip community activists with
+the tools to head off eminent domain even before it got to court. That is
+in fact what we did through on-line materials, but also through annual
+conferences, where we’d bring activists together for the weekend and
+teach them everything from organizing techniques, to media relations, to
+the legal procedures they could expect.”
+IJ finally reached the Supreme Court with a takings case in Kelo v. New
+London, where it took on the effort by the Pfizer Corporation and local
+government to use eminent domain to make room for the drug company’s
+research facility. Kelo is a good example of the strange bedfellows coalitions
+that IJ hoped, from its founding, to put together: it was supported
+with an amicus brief signed by the NAACP, American Association of Retired
+Persons, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference. IJ lost the
+case in the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, but was able to
+quickly transform legal failure into mobilization success.
+
+When we got the result, I came in the next day and announced that we were
+going to launch our “Hands Off Our Home” campaign, which was an evolution
+of the Castle Coalition, to take the Kelo decision to the state level, and fight it
+there. I said next week we’re going to hold a news conference at the National
+Press Club to announce this new campaign, dedicate three million dollars to it.
+Fight the battle at the state level, whether it’s through litigation, legislation,
+initiative, and try to create greater property rights against eminent domain.61
+
+In addition to attracting large donations from existing donors, the failure
+in Kelo led to “several thousand new small dollar donations, and new
+activists to the Castle Coalition [IJ’s property rights network].” While
+“winning the Kelo case with a resounding victory in the Supreme Court
+was the desired outcome” for IJ,62 a narrow, divided or technical victory
+might have been worse than failure. As Mellor concludes, “A defeat with
+the kind of dissent that we got, is as good as it could possibly be. Not
+only has this ignited outrage across the country that will transform the
+debate for a long time to come, it will demonstrate the power of citizen
+activism on this issue. That’s good for property rights and the democratic
+process, and it will leave IJ a much stronger organization as a result of
+the skills we’ve acquired doing this.”63 Polls taken after the decision show
+that it was resoundingly unpopular (although few respondents were likely
+to have substantial information on the issue). Politicians in over half of
+the states (as of June 2006) have passed legislation narrowing the use of
+eminent domain.64 Legislation on the subject has even been debated in
+Congress. Using its newfound fund-raising power on the issue, IJ has
+hired staff to “mobilize across the nation in the states where eminent
+domain reform is being considered, and to be a catalyst to make sure that
+the best possible reform happens.”65
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 243
+
+IJ also used Kelo to expand the range of its organizational capacities.
+Kelo produced an outpouring of articles from libertarian law professors,
+demonstrating the impact that litigation can have on the scholarly
+agenda.66 IJ has used the aftermath of Kelo to build its own research capacities,
+creating a Strategic Research Program designed to expand on
+the substantial research that it has already produced on eminent domain
+“abuse.” IJ told its donors that
+
+the release of Public Power, Private Gain67 gave the Institute for Justice great
+momentum moving forward, particularly with our case Kelo v. City of New
+London. Groups such as the NAACP have used strategic research for years, but
+there is no other group on our side of the ideological spectrum that has come
+close to conducting and using research as part of a focused litigation agenda,
+especially combined so potently with media relations and outreach components.
+Supplementing the work of traditional think tanks, we will produce and
+publish studies within our specific areas of concentration and move promptly
+to apply such research to our litigation agenda.68
+
+IJ has given the program a $400,000 budget, hired an experienced PhD
+policy analyst as director of strategic research, and plans to run conferences,
+fund in-house research, and solicit academic articles and shorter
+papers that address specific issues that the firm has identified as critical
+in making its case before courts, with the public, and among experts. As
+far back as the Center for Applied Jurisprudence project, IJ’s leaders
+have recognized the importance of coordinating litigation and research,
+but the experience of the very fact-intensive takings cases taught the
+firm that they needed to be much more deeply integrated. By attracting
+attention to these issues, Kelo had the further effect of increasing patrons’
+willingness to invest in IJ’s organizational capacities, which will
+have an impact on all of its litigation in the coming years.
+IJ’s response to the Kelo decision shows that what Michael McCann
+has argued about the comparable worth movement also appears true of
+conservative litigation: it is possible to win, in the sense of encouraging
+popular mobilization and inducing action in venues other than the
+courts, by losing.69 IJ’s approach to the outcome in Kelo also casts doubt
+on the claim that legal activism is necessarily demobilizing.70 In fact, IJ
+has typically used litigation to attract public attention by framing issues
+in stark, moralistic ways, helping reshape perceptions of the conservative
+movement’s racial goodwill, build coalitions with traditionally liberal
+groups, and create emotionally charged events that help build more
+permanent forms of political mobilization. None of these are intrinsic
+to litigation as a political strategy, and it is certainly possible for lawheavy
+political strategies to sap energy from other approaches to politi-
+244 CHAPTER 7
+
+cal change. Law has the capacity to mobilize as well as demobilize, depending
+on the target of political change and the strategic approach of
+legal-organizational entrepreneurs.
+
+Organizational Style and Legitimation in Conservative
+Public Interest Law
+
+IJ and CIR came out of the same rethinking of conservative legal strategy,
+and extracted many of the same lessons from that experience: specialize;
+emphasize original, long-term litigation; appeal to idealism; and
+establish distance from business. Despite this common starting point, IJ
+and CIR have developed quite distinct organizational cultures, driven
+by the attitudes and preferences of their founders, the demands of organizational
+maintenance, and the mobilization of staff and patrons. These
+different organizational cultures have also influenced the firms’ longterm
+prospects.
+IJ’s self-presentation is remarkably consistent, both physically and
+philosophically. Its Washington, D.C., office is laid out in an open plan
+with glass doors, an image that IJ consciously considered in its design.71
+The staff’s attitude is strikingly upbeat, optimistic, and allergic to cynicism.
+In all my interviews with IJ staff, they combined an attitude of openness
+while staying on message, and seemed so motivated by their clients
+that the larger legal issues sometimes drifted into the background. This
+reflects the infusion of public relations throughout the entire organization:
+while IJ has two full-time public relations specialists to shape the
+firm’s media strategy, all of its lawyers are expected to consider how its
+cases will play in the “court of public opinion.”
+IJ’s cases are designed for maximum dramatic impact, typically through
+representing a racial minority or low-income person challenging a large
+institution, with a great deal of emphasis on the personal dimension of
+the case. John Kramer, IJ’s vice president for communications, observes
+that its ideal case must have “compelling clients, very simple facts, and
+outrageous acts.” IJ’s press strategy reflects its case selection and its emphasis
+on the compelling personal stories of its clients. “We make it clear
+to reporters that our cases aren’t just about increasing the number of cabs
+on the streets in a given city, or about improving the quality of education,
+or about sometimes obscure words on parchment that guarantee a right.
+Our cases demonstrate real-life human dramas. They are about real people
+and their dreams of a better life for themselves and their families.”72
+Designing cases in this way allows them to work with the grain of modern
+television journalism, which is attracted to legal cases with a sympathetic
+individual plaintiff, a deliberate violation of individual rights, and a sim-
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 245
+
+ple causal story.73 One indication of IJ’s success in this regard is that its
+school choice and eminent domain cases have been featured on 60
+Minutes. IJ’s strategic judgment, in sharp contrast to CIR, is that judges
+need to sympathize with their clients and fear a public outcry if they fail
+to rule in their favor.74 So, for example, in its school choice litigation IJ
+repeatedly brought large numbers of inner-city parents to the courthouse
+for important trials, a strategy that may have helped sway at least one
+judge in an early, critical trial in Wisconsin.75 Bolick admits that IJ’s emphasis
+on “helping the judge want to rule in our favor” through storytelling
+and social science evidence “is counterintuitive to many lawyers—
+indeed, offensive to some, especially government lawyers, who hate to
+hear about the equities—but it is an important part of the American legal
+tradition.”76 This approach reflects the lessons that IJ drew from its liberal
+predecessors in public interest law.
+
+We borrow heavily and consciously from the Left for our litigation strategies,
+mainly from the [NAACP] LDF in its campaign to overturn Plessy. A strategic,
+case-by-case, goal-oriented litigation strategy; sympathetic cases . . . and arguing
+in the court of public opinion. . . . In the 1980s, I devoured everything I
+could find on Thurgood Marshall, MLK, and the civil rights movement. From
+Marshall and MLK I derived the insights of setting the terms of the debate,
+pursuing a principled incremental, long-term agenda; expressing the cause in
+the most universal possible terms, and forging nontraditional alliances.77
+
+In order to break through the public’s instinctive suspicion of conservative
+and libertarian claims to speak for the public interest, IJ’s founders
+thought it essential to generate sympathy for the organization’s clients,
+typically with a simple, direct narrative whose fundamental injustice does
+not require a commitment to IJ’s underlying principles.
+Perhaps nothing reveals the stylistic differences between the CIR and
+IJ so well as the debate on affirmative action. Clint Bolick argues that
+“CIR would not think twice about representing a white male who had
+said something politically incorrect, in violation of a speech code. . . . We
+would. They are more aggressive about taking on political correctness.
+We’re more focused on building a case in the court of public opinion.”78
+CIR’s current president accepts this distinction:
+
+[IJ] won’t touch a case unless it will promote a certain kind of public debate.
+For example, my impression is they will never bring a reverse discrimination
+case on behalf of a white plaintiff. . . . It’s an article of faith. . . . The reason for
+this is they don’t want to be portrayed in the press as representing disgruntled
+white people. They want always to be representing racial minorities in these
+kinds of cases. That’s a press strategy that drives their legal strategy, whereas
+we’re just the reverse. We find the legal cases we want to bring, and then we
+246 CHAPTER 7
+
+figure out how to promote them. We feel that it’s very important in these very
+charged issues to speak from a consistent and principled point of view. . . . The
+reason they only want to bring these sorts of cases on behalf of African-Americans
+is . . . they want to blunt the argument that the other side makes that we’re
+racially insensitive. . . . To our way of thinking, that’s just playing racial politics
+that we’re opposed to. We will not posture in these cases that way. We will
+bring a strong case that we believe represents the legal principle that we think
+ought to be strengthened. We’ll go to great lengths to describe that principle in
+ways that we think will connect with people. We’re not blind to racial politics.
+But we’d never construct a case around our desire to posture against the other
+side’s mischaracterization of us, the way IJ would.79
+
+While Pell’s characterization of IJ may be harsh, it does reflect the very
+different self-images of the two organizations, and their relationship to
+the legacy of Brown. While both reject affirmative action, for instance,
+CIR has firmly associated itself with the more minimal “anticlassification”
+understanding of Brown, while IJ clearly identifies with the “antisubordination”
+tradition that interprets Brown as a call for undoing the
+legacy of slavery and segregation.80 CIR legitimates its litigation by reference
+to the plain text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
+Act of 1964, while IJ seeks to embody the broader aspirations of the
+civil rights movement. IJ is not simply playing “racial politics,” as Pell
+suggests, although they certainly are trying to reshape the public reputation
+of conservatism. The leaders of IJ have actually internalized the
+loftier aspirations of the civil rights era, aspirations that the leaders of
+CIR claim have become a smokescreen to hide the old-fashioned politics
+of transfer-seeking.
+Until its affirmative action litigation heated up, CIR did not employ any
+public relations staff, and, when it did, it hired a lawyer and government
+veteran, Terry Pell, rather than the public relations professionals employed
+by IJ.81 CIR’s public relations strategy is significantly constrained
+by its strategic choice to represent unpopular clients. As Greve argues,
+“It’s a challenge if you have innocent but highly suspicious or suspect
+clients. It’s a very different skill to handle those sorts of situations properly.
+You can’t say, ‘Here’s the client. Isn’t he an admirable person?’ and
+we’ll play the equities.” Unable to draw on the attractiveness of their
+clients, as IJ has done so skillfully, CIR modeled itself instead on the
+ACLU. Jeremy Rabkin, a member of CIR’s board since its founding, argues,
+“We liked harrumphing about individual rights, rather abstract
+claims where we could say, in the manner of the ACLU, ‘The law is the
+law, no exceptions, you must live with it, you who wield authority.’ ”
+This was partially a matter of temperament—CIR’s founders would have
+found drawing attention to the client’s “story” insufferably sentimental.
+It was also a matter of principle, since they believed that policymaking
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 247
+
+through emotional appeals had led to the decline of constitutional formalities
+in the first place. As Terry Pell puts it, “We wanted to be what the
+ACLU should have been, and was at one point: an uncompromising defender
+of civil liberties and individual rights. We wanted to get rid of all
+the political litmus tests that the ACLU was beginning to apply to all their
+cases, [where there were] clear violations of individual rights that they
+wouldn’t litigate because it didn’t serve one of their favored constituencies
+or political causes.” CIR’s approach to public relations, according to Pell,
+is to develop a reputation for taking cases regardless of the client if an
+important principle is at stake, as it did in defending the free speech rights
+of Michael Levin, a professor of philosophy at CUNY with odious views
+on racial matters.82 CIR gambled that observers of the organization would
+recognize that if the organization was willing to defend clients without
+IJ’s marquee value, then the principle must really be important.
+CIR has taken a more narrowly legalistic approach to strategic litigation
+than IJ, believing that the judges would be willing to accept uncomfortable
+outcomes when faced with a powerful claim rooted in constitutional principle.
+Emphasizing law, rather than the attractiveness of its client, draws on
+CIR’s intellectual, academic organizational culture, as well as its darker,
+more sardonic mood. The highly intellectual background of the CIR’s
+staff—both Greve and Pell have PhD’s, and at least one of the organization’s
+staff lawyers had hoped to go into teaching law before coming to
+CIR—led them to become frustrated in organizations where they were pressured
+to say things they knew were untrue and do things they thought were
+a waste of time. While McDonald and Greve were repelled by conservative
+public interest law, Pell found his way into conservative lawyering through
+his negative experience with corporate law.
+
+These firms defend big companies, and your job as an attorney is to think
+through every possible ambiguity or possibility that might cost the company
+money and get rid of it. Intellectually, it’s quite stifling. Anything you might
+find interesting there’s a good chance the client wouldn’t find interesting. In fact
+your job is to keep interesting things from happening to your client. You just
+have to anticipate all the interest in these issues and wring it out. . . . So what
+they paid us a lot of money to do was essentially to figure the next and the next
+and the next logical step of these regulations so they could comply with those
+interpretations of the regulations. I found it to be a waste of time. I thought
+corporations were not particularly thoughtful about what they were doing; I’m
+not sure it made economic sense. I didn’t find it reprehensible in a conventional
+moral sense, I just didn’t want to be the one doing it. If they wanted someone
+to do it, fine, just not me.
+
+CIR’s organizational culture was attractive to lawyers like Pell, McDonald,
+and Michael Rosman, CIR’s general counsel, because it allowed for
+248 CHAPTER 7
+
+a high standard of workmanship and professionalism, the kind of intellectually
+satisfying lawyering they found so lacking in their previous experiences.
+These men, in short, were looking for a way to be serious professionals,
+as well as effective ideological activists. In CIR they found it.
+The founders’ worldview was equally important in helping to structure
+the organizational culture of CIR. Greve recalls that, in contrast to the
+sunny optimism of IJ, “Mike [McDonald] and I always agreed that the
+world was going to pot.” CIR’s founders did not believe that history was
+on their side. McDonald and Greve believed that the hour was very late
+indeed, that liberalism had already corrupted the fundamental forms of
+law, politics, and society. The best that could be done was to use the law
+to point out the hypocrisy of the Left and to win enough battles to make
+liberals in government and universities hesitant in their use of power. CIR
+believed that, if a case was structured carefully enough, judges would
+conclude that they had to rule for their clients in order to preserve broader
+rules, often those created by legal liberals. Rabkin recalls that CIR
+thought that “we could do some good by showing that if courts were
+going to be activist policymakers, we could remind everyone that liberal
+constituencies wouldn’t be the only beneficiaries.”
+This dark, sardonic mood of CIR comes out clearest in CIR’s newsletter,
+the Docket Report, which summarizes the organization’s cases while
+(especially before Greve left in 2000) simultaneously savaging its opponents
+in a casual, wisecracking, intensely personal way.83 While the staff
+of CIR clearly believed in the merits of their cases, the newsletter shows
+that their mental energy was clearly directed at what they believed were
+hypocritical and intellectually mediocre opponents. Especially venomous
+was the opening essay in each issue, “The Last Line of Defense,” which
+took its title from an Arnold Schwarzenegger movie, True Lies. For example,
+in reference to Title IX, the Docket Report mocked the feminist position.
+“For every female athletic slot that’s been created over the past five
+years, five positions have been terminated. But that doesn’t matter because
+we need equity and because without Title IX, women will again
+have their feet bound and because then what would that do to the
+WNBA.”84 Regarding the law firm of Harry Reasoner, the opposing counsel
+in Hopwood, CIR noted that “the [National Journal] ratings [of law
+firm minority participation] show, inter alia, the number of black partners
+at Mr. Reasoner’s 539-lawyer firm, and wouldn’t you know, the answer
+is one. Do let’s hope Mr. Reasoner takes him to the country club.”85 Assessing
+the Violence Against Women Act, the Report cautioned that “in
+all the excitement over the discovery that there are constitutional limits
+to congressional power, it’s easily overlooked that VAWA is not—repeat,
+not—a sensible law that, unfortunately, must give way to more important
+constitutional constraints. VAWA is a piece of feminist demagoguery—a
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 249
+
+‘conceptual breakthrough,’ NOW calls it—that thoroughly deserves a
+short life and a brutal, violent death.”86 The common denominator in all
+of these comments is an unwillingness to accept, as IJ has, the purported
+goals of liberalism, which CIR consistently argued were a smokescreen
+for power and attempts to circumvent constitutional rights.
+
+Limitations on the Conservative Public Interest Law Network
+
+Though both organizations have succeeded in reorienting conservative
+public interest law, both CIR and IJ have faced important limits on their
+effectiveness. The most significant constraint is the limited number of conservative
+lawyers willing and able to provide their skills to pro bono work,
+especially in areas less glamorous than IJ and CIR’s headline-grabbing
+cases. Attracting attorneys to participate in the conservative legal cause
+was a central part of the legal strategies mapped out by the second generation
+of conservative public interest law. This was especially true for the
+Center for Individual Rights, which sought to keep its staff and budget
+small by depending on outside pro bono counsel drawn from veterans of
+the Reagan administration and lawyers identified through the Federalist
+Society’s recently developed lawyers chapters.
+Inherent in the enterprise of public interest law—of any ideological coloration—is
+the challenge of attracting ambitious lawyers with enormous
+earning potential into poorly compensated, controversial, and time-consuming
+public interest work. As chapter 2 showed, this was one of the
+liberal legal networks’ most vexing problems, but it has turned out to be
+even more difficult for conservatives than for their liberal predecessors.
+First, liberals have been able to draw upon the powerful cultural resonance
+between the pursuit of justice (defined in legal liberal terms) and a
+career in law, while there are relatively few such normative resources for
+conservative lawyers to draw upon.87 Second, the suspicion among legal
+liberals that private, unregulated markets are a haven for injustice creates
+a target for activism in the millions of everyday transactions of a capitalist
+economy. Public interest lawyers doing even fairly mundane activities
+(such as bringing suits against landlords or poring through environmental
+impact statements) can easily imagine that they are part of a more sweeping
+attempt to civilize capitalism. Libertarian conservatives by contrast,
+want a less regulated society, and thus the environment for legal activism
+writ small is more circumscribed. Third, as chapter 2 documented, much
+of the infrastructure of modern public interest law, from law school clinics
+to pro bono activism in private law firms and service as government lawyers,
+has been organized by legal liberals and is encoded with the ideology
+of their designers. It should not be a surprise that these channels are not
+250 CHAPTER 7
+
+particularly open, or at the least attractive, to conservatives and libertarians.
+Fourth, and probably most important, conservatives rarely believe,
+as many liberals do, that large, corporate law firms are inherently morally
+polluting, and are consequently less willing to make the large financial
+sacrifices inherent in public interest law.
+Conservative firms face the same competitive pressures as public interest
+law firms on the left. McDonald observes that
+
+the pay scale for good attorneys has gone off the [charts]. I think, in this respect,
+
+left or right, it’s mostly the same. You’re left with people whose heart is in the
+right (or left) place, and they may be competent, but what you really need are
+Supreme Court law clerk types who are really sharp. Otherwise you have attorneys
+of the type who run walk-in legal clinics and process cases. They learn
+their job, but it’s just a job. They don’t care. There are boutique constitutional
+firms in D.C. that pay really large salaries to get the people we wanted. We had
+a young woman who was excellent but since a firm like that offered her five
+times as much to work for them she couldn’t “afford” the luxury of PI law.
+
+CIR’s original organizational design was, in part, a response to this competitive
+situation. “We couldn’t afford to hire a Scalia or a Rehnquist
+clerk, but Jones Day or whomever could. Fine, let them hire the clerk,
+and then let CIR ‘pitch’ a good constitutional law case to them, and let
+them lobby their firm to take it.”88 While this model pushes much of the
+costs of litigation off CIR’s books, it also puts extraordinary demands on
+its handful of in-house lawyers, who must be exceptionally skilled and
+creative, while also sufficiently malleable to fit the organization’s peculiar
+structure. Given the still-limited resources of the larger conservative network,
+the constraints of public interest work, the temperament of conservative
+lawyers, and patrons’ lack of interest in nurturing future staff members,
+CIR has faced a continuing problem of finding lawyers with the right
+temperament and skills. Pell recalls that
+
+we had this guy working for us for three years, the intake lawyer, a good guy,
+really smart. Compared to private sector salaries we were paying him a pittance.
+Well, it finally became clear when he left that he was independently wealthy.
+. . . [By contrast] Rosman and I, who are the permanent types around here now,
+just feel like we fell into this fantastic opportunity where we can do something
+that we really want to do. Both of us have decided that it’s just worth paying
+the price, without any security. I don’t know where you’d find people like us.
+
+In addition to the problem of competing financially with private sector
+firms, the controversial nature of the firm’s docket, the lack of job security,
+and the still imperfectly institutionalized nature of the organization create
+further challenges.
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 251
+
+CIR is still a very ad hoc organization, and somebody who comes to work for
+CIR feels like they’ve walked off a cliff. It’s partially the impermanence of the
+organization—who knows, it could be out of existence in a couple of years. It’s
+partially the race question; it does not make it easy to go from CIR to academia
+or another law firm. IJ spends a lot of time cultivating all that institutional
+mystique and ethos, boot camps and weekends, clinic; they have all that junk.
+They’re cultivating human assets. We don’t spend ten seconds doing that and
+everybody knows it. Someone who comes to work for us basically knows
+they’re on their own.89
+
+CIR was able to do without a significant investment in recruitment and
+training for its first fifteen years because of the commitment of its founders
+and the draw that its caseload had on smart, ideologically committed
+young lawyers. Greve and McDonald have now moved on to other things,
+and the legal environment is no longer the “target-rich” environment that
+it once was. These changes may make CIR difficult to sustain as a major
+player in conservative public interest law in the coming years.
+The Institute for Justice has gone much further than CIR in attempting
+to solve the supply problem, and it needs to, since its litigation strategy
+depends upon in-house lawyers and following up its high-profile cases
+with a large number of “copycat cases.” From its earliest days, IJ put a
+substantial amount of time, energy, and money into training conservative
+legal activists. An early grant solicitation, which placed support for educating
+lawyers before IJ’s litigation program,90 noted that
+
+while principled advocacy is essential, it is beyond the province of any one
+organization or group of individuals to accomplish all that needs to be done.
+Quite simply, there are not enough trained advocates who know how to make
+use of the unique tools that our type of public interest law has to offer. Consequently,
+a substantial effort must be made to train law students, lawyers, and
+policy activists how to apply their talent and idealism in the real world of litigation,
+media relations, and public debate. With such training, the talent pool of
+effective advocates will be increased dramatically and the chances of ultimate
+success will rise immeasurably. . . . Law schools teach students how to be technicians
+manipulating an increasingly prescriptive system of laws and regulation,
+too often without regard for principle or philosophy. Lawyers, driven by the
+demands of private practice, rarely recognize opportunities to advance principles
+within the context of their practices. . . . Our seminars would thus fill an
+important niche and provide critically important training that would enhance
+the long term effectiveness of all who attend.91
+
+IJ, unlike CIR, was deeply concerned in its early years that there were not
+enough skilled, experienced litigators to go around. While the Federalist
+Society would help identify interested lawyers, it could do little to increase
+252 CHAPTER 7
+
+the numbers of conservatives willing to devote themselves to full-time
+public interest litigation. IJ has tried to remedy the supply problem by
+encouraging young lawyers and law students to filter through conservative
+public interest law organizations, in the hopes that close contact with
+public interest law would lessen the draw of private law practice. IJ runs
+a three-day annual summer seminar at Georgetown University, and has
+substantial and well-developed clerkship and internship programs, including
+opportunities in its recently developed state chapters. According
+to John Kramer, these programs have played an important role in persuading
+young law students to consider a career in public interest law, and
+have identified a large number of IJ’s hires over the last few years. “Historically,
+that is a real proving ground for us. The students come in through
+that, they’ve excelled before . . . and they’ve seen, from an inside perspective,
+how we operate and have an appreciation for that style of communication
+and litigation.”
+CIR, on the other hand, has always had a less fleshed-out educational
+and developmental program. Terry Pell attributes the difference between
+the two organizations in this area to the pressures of fund-raising.
+
+We have this summer clerk program, and it used to be this disorganized thing,
+and whoever showed up showed up and that was that. Well, one of the first
+things I did was to highlight this thing with a big article in the newsletter and
+a special letter to all of our donors introducing it. I even had these kids write
+letters. Then we sent out a questionnaire asking people to rank all the things
+CIR does and one of them was training young lawyers through the summer
+clerk program. Well, that was universally the lowest-ranked thing we did. Donors
+didn’t care whether we did that at all. . . . Donors’ basic message was,
+whatever you do, go win cases. Anything that’s a distraction from winning cases
+we don’t care about. So if we had a clinic, they would just say, you guys should
+be out winning cases, not running clinics. Somebody else should do that. IJ has
+different donors.
+
+The training and development of lawyers has, at best, a second-order
+relationship to the issues that motivate CIR’s patrons, who in most cases
+were attracted by the firm’s reputation for high-profile litigation and naturally
+continue to be concerned with winning battles in the here and now.
+Identifying and nurturing talent is a reasonable fit with IJ’s personal,
+human-scale organizational culture, its broader ambitions, and the image
+of itself that it projects to donors. CIR’s abstract, intellectual, legalistic
+organizational culture and narrower focus on particular cases, by contrast,
+attracts different kinds of donors with, at least in Pell’s view, different
+time horizons and willingness to accept diffuse outcomes that will be
+reaped by the conservative movement as a whole. While it would be very
+difficult to verify the qualitative difference in IJ and CIR’s donor base, the
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 253
+
+following figures show significance convergence in CIR and IJ’s foundation
+patrons, but considerable divergence in their individual donor base.92
+
+A. Percentage of IJ $10,000-and-up donors who give anything to CIR:
+i. Foundations 16.7 percent
+ii. Individuals 8.1 percent
+B. Percentage of IJ $10,000-and-up donors who gave at least $10,000 to CIR:
+i. Foundations 16.7 percent
+ii. Individuals 3.5 percent
+C. Total number of $10,000-and-up donors to CIR vs. IJ:
+i. Foundations 8 vs. 37
+ii. Individuals 11 vs. 86
+D. Percentage of all $10,000-and-up donors to CIR who also gave to IJ:
+i. Foundations 75 percent
+ii. Individuals 30 percent
+
+Given IJ’s substantially larger budget (three times larger than CIR),93 it is
+not surprising that only a small percentage of its donors contribute to
+CIR. What is more surprising is that, despite its smaller budget, only 30
+percent of CIR’s larger donors gave to IJ. So it may be that the differences
+in the two organizations’ ability to invest in human capital is, as Pell
+argues, driven by what can be sold to their patrons.
+The leaders of CIR and IJ both agree that recruiting conservative lawyers
+into public interest law—either as a career or through pro bono
+work—has been the second generation’s greatest organizational failure.
+Chip Mellor notes, “It’s been one of our goals all along with our training
+program for lawyers, and I’ll tell you, it hasn’t been as successful as I’d
+like. It’s had some success, but, boy, I would have hoped for much more.
+. . . I think every one we get is a plus, but I’m no longer thinking that
+there is this unmobilized army out there waiting to charge the ramparts.”
+Rosman believes that much of the supply problem can be attributed to
+ideological bias. “It is very hard for conservative people in private practices
+in large firms to do pro bono work as easily as it is for those with
+liberal political views.” In his experience, large private law firms are more
+likely to see public relations problems with conservative rather than liberal
+pro bono activities, even if they don’t have a direct ideological bias
+against such activity. As chapter 5 shows, the Federalist Society has invested
+substantial resources in using publicity to change the behavior of
+large firms’ pro bono committees and networking lawyers in private practice
+with public interest work, but it is too early to determine whether it
+will be successful.
+The more fundamental source of the conservative legal movement’s
+failure to match their liberal legal counterparts’ commitment to public
+interest law work may be internal to the movement itself. Pell believes
+254 CHAPTER 7
+
+that the problem is traceable to the unwillingness of many conservative
+lawyers to play a supporting role in legal change:
+
+Conservatives have been trained with the idea that you can bring one blockbuster
+case that changes legal precedent forever, and you can do it without
+discovery by filing a few clever motions. . . . They are less likely to take cases
+where it’s murky, complicated, involves lots of procedural hoops along the way
+and where you’re playing the angles along the way through a lot of discovery.
+That is not the kind of case that appeals to conservative lawyers. The other
+kind of case that doesn’t appeal to them is the run-of-the-mill “So-and-so didn’t
+get tenure and it’s a race preference. It’s like every other one of these cases but
+it would be a good idea if someone took it, wouldn’t you like to take it.” The
+answer is invariably, “No, I would not.” Let me litigate the Michigan case but
+I don’t want to bother with some small employment discrimination case.
+There’s no conservative who thinks they belong in the minor leagues, as a general
+matter. With liberals, if you go to any law firm pro bono committee, they
+just have dozens of moronic little cases where they’re representing some tenant
+in a landlord-tenant dispute and it’s the individual rather than the larger legal
+principle that attracts lawyers to those cases. . . . So somebody gets a sense
+that they are helping the cause when they bring one of these little cases. The
+conservative mission is not built around a lot of little cases, so people feel sidelined
+when you give them one.
+
+Any legal movement needs to have an informal division of labor, with a
+substantial pool of lawyers willing to engage in fairly routine but often
+labor-intensive trial work that applies existing precedents. The conservative
+public interest law field, by contrast, is top-heavy, with a reasonable
+number of lawyers willing to volunteer for “A Team” work but few willing
+to participate at the lower ranks. This vice may be inseparable from
+the virtues of the more libertarian (as opposed to religious) side of conservatism:
+a belief system that does not celebrate an ethos of service, humility,
+or collective endeavor is likely to be hampered when movement activities
+call for just those attributes. Christian conservatives, by contrast, have
+been able to draw upon religious supports for these qualities, and seem
+to have been more successful in drawing a wide base of lawyers to bring
+non-precedent-setting cases.94
+The lack of a “B Team” to support the CIR and IJ “A Team” has also
+meant that conservatives have been less able to avail themselves of the
+spontaneous, unplanned action that their Hayekian principles point to.
+The dearth of conservative and libertarian lawyers willing to engage in
+pro bono activity means that most conservative legal activism flows
+through firms like CIR and IJ, rather than bubbling up from below. As
+Mellor observes, “The biggest lack right now is dedicated pro bono work
+by a cadre of conservative and libertarian lawyers around the country.
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 255
+
+I’m not even talking about finding them, because we don’t use them. I’m
+talking about people who go out there and do it on their own voluntarily,
+and I just don’t see it happening.” This lack of unplanned, entrepreneurial
+litigation reduces the opportunity for unorthodox legal strategies or trial
+and error, and so conservatives are betting a great deal on the effectiveness
+of legal strategies developed at the top of the legal food chain.
+Two of IJ’s more recent projects, its entrepreneurship clinic at the University
+of Chicago and its state chapters, may have some effect on increasing
+supply in the long term. Started in 1997, IJ’s Clinic on Entrepreneurship
+can be directly linked to its annual training program. University of
+Chicago law professor Richard Epstein recalls,
+
+We had two students, Mark Chenoweth, who is now at the Koch Foundation,
+
+and Tim Koh, who keeps bouncing around from one Senate committee to another
+and I think is now clerking for Justice Thomas. [They] went to an IJ
+conference where they talked about freedom of contract [and] limited government.
+. . . They came into my office and said, “You know Chip Mellor?” I said,
+“Yeah, I’ve been involved with Chip from the beginning.” . . . They said, “We’d
+like to start a clinic here that would do some transactional work,” and their
+attitude was that too many people who think about civil rights think about
+beating people over the head to hire them, and their attitude is rather than beat
+other people over the head, we want to beat the government over the head. . . .
+It will be a transactional clinic which will help people get through the regulatory
+maze. So they came to me and I was strongly in favor of it. The clinic people
+were originally very dubious about this. . . . IJ was known to be ideological,
+and what they didn’t know is that . . . they have most stellar reputation of
+anyone I’ve every dealt with. . . . They have a terribly conciliatory style of doing
+business. There were hearings and objections. . . . He [Mellor] came here, and
+he never rose to the bait, which is more than you can say for me. The dean was
+Douglas Baird, and he was uneasy about doing this himself, so he set up a
+committee. In the end the committee realized it would be a great deal. In the
+first year there was some suspicion, but in the six or seven years it has been in
+place there has not been a peep of dissent or controversy on the part of anybody.
+
+Given IJ’s ideological reputation, opposition was almost inevitable. In the
+end, IJ’s reputation for competence, its ability to fund the program itself,
+and the opportunity provided by the existing structure of clinical education
+at the Law School helped sweep away opposition. Epstein recalls that
+the clinic was
+
+in a sense . . . ideological, but in a way that appealed to both left and right. All
+
+of these clinics have an ideology. The mental health clinic trying to protect people
+who were thrown out in the street by the city, they would be appalled if
+they thought they were some sort of neutral [project]. . . . The program was
+256 CHAPTER 7
+
+fully funded from the outside, which was a huge advantage when we needed to
+expand our capabilities. It was a transactional program when we had none
+before.... There was a long debate on whether they would have to take cases
+from needy clients that didn’t fit their mission statement, like supporting quotas
+or affirmative action. After a while, people realized, hey, we don’t tell any of
+our clinics what cases to take or how to run them. The questions were such
+things as who gets to control the appointments, and we decided that they [IJ]
+get to propose the appointments and we have to ratify.
+
+The Law School was already supporting clinics with controversial cases,
+such as the MacArthur Justice Center, which specializes in challenges to
+the death penalty, prison conditions, and conditions at Guanta´namo Bay.
+Consequently, it was difficult to challenge IJ’s program on the basis of its
+ideology without raising problems for the existing programs. So far, the
+clinic has not produced any significant legal cases, and few if any of its
+alumni have gone into public interest law, which is not surprising given
+that most of its participants are specialists in business law, and its caseload
+is focused on transactions, not litigation. IJ hopes to replicate its clinic at
+other law schools when the right opportunity presents itself.95
+IJ’s other effort to extend its reach and attract new lawyers into libertarian
+public interest law work are its state chapters in Arizona, Minnesota,
+and Washington. Clint Bolick recalls the original impetus for the chapters:
+
+We began noticing several years ago that in some areas, especially school choice
+and eminent domain, we were litigating mostly state constitutional issues. The
+Left discovered the utility of state constitutions decades ago. For all our talk
+about federalism, most conservative litigating groups have focused on federal
+constitutional issues. We began a two-year study of the potential for state chapters
+focusing on state constitutional issues. We also studied liberal groups, especially
+the ACLU, to examine their models.
+
+So far, IJ’s experience in state-level public interest law has been mixed. In
+Arizona, IJ had a number of advantages, not the least of which was
+Bolick’s willingness to move to Phoenix when the chapter was created in
+2001. In addition,
+
+We chose Arizona because we had good contacts there, we had litigated there
+with success, it has an honest judiciary, there is a strong free-market policy
+organization (Goldwater Institute), and it has a libertarian tradition. Subsequently
+we opened chapters in North Carolina and Washington. North Carolina
+did not work out because we could not find the right director—we now
+recognize that human capital is the first prerequisite to success—and could not
+find sufficient core-mission cases. It is in transition to a North Carolina—based
+public interest law firm. Arizona and Washington are going great. We just won
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 257
+
+a wonderful eminent domain precedent in Arizona that will aid our efforts in
+other states. We are currently investigating potential in other states.96
+
+Setting up state chapters is a natural outgrowth of IJ’s emphasis on “grassroots
+tyranny.” Eminent domain, for example, has certain similarities to
+such popular liberal areas of litigation as housing and criminal law, in
+that there are thousands of opportunities to challenge administrative decisions,
+which allows individual lawyers to feel a part of something much
+more significant than their individual case. These cases, combined with
+IJ’s increasing state-level organizational presence and additional libertarian-oriented
+clinics, may help to overcome the movement’s continuing
+absence of a B Team. The effects of all of these activities are still unclear,
+and will be for some time to come.
+
+Organizational Adaptation and Evolution
+
+As we saw in the discussion of “boundary maintenance” in chapter 5,
+successful organizational entrepreneurs must avoid absorbing new functions
+that distract from or contradict their original mission while, at
+the same time, developing new areas of opportunity consistent with the
+organization’s core functions. Failing at the first of these can lead to
+resource constraints, a loss of organizational focus, and a confused public
+image. Failing at the second can lead to a loss of organizational dynamism
+as rival organizations exploit new opportunities and staff become
+bored and move on to other opportunities. IJ began life with a clear
+and consistent legal strategy and issue focus, so the greatest threat to its
+organizational flourishing has been losing focus and being drawn into
+areas in tension with its original mission. Given that CIR was designed
+to be flexible and opportunistic, its greatest challenge has been to avoid
+being trapped in cases that limit its ability to discover and take advantage
+of unexploited prospects for legal change. While CIR maintained
+extraordinary dynamism in its early years, the demands of its affirmative
+action litigation have made it less effective than IJ in overcoming its
+fundamental challenge.
+The issue of affirmative action has presented the most serious challenge
+to IJ’s organizational focus. While IJ as an organization has never litigated
+the issues of affirmative action or race-based congressional districting, the
+topic was a priority for Clint Bolick, whose interest in it dated back to
+his service on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Bolick’s
+involvement with these issues reached its hottest point when President
+Clinton nominated Lani Guinier to be assistant attorney general for civil
+rights. Bolick famously penned an op-ed accusing both Guinier and Edu-
+258 CHAPTER 7
+
+cation Department nominee Norma Cantu of being “Clinton’s Quota
+Queens,”97 helping set off a controversial confirmation battle that ended
+with the withdrawal of Guinier’s nomination. Bolick went on less than
+two years later to attack Deval Patrick, and then four years later Bill Lann
+Lee, for the same position as Guinier, and for the same reason.98 Bolick
+capped off this involvement by publishing The Affirmative Action Fraud
+in 1996.99
+This activity brought Bolick and IJ enormous public attention and a
+high profile in the conservative movement. Mellor recalls that “Clint was
+very good at being a media personality on [affirmative action]. He was
+the go-to guy whenever there was a contentious issue, and then he takes
+on Lani Guinier. To everyone’s surprise, we win. And so he became a
+prominent national spokesperson on that issue, and with that came opportunities
+for more—litigation, money, publicity.” Despite the enormous
+attention it attracted, affirmative action was an issue where opportunistically
+responding to attention ran counter to IJ’s core mission. Mellor explains
+that
+
+there just came a point on it, after a couple of years, where it became clear that
+this was a distraction. We were really getting out into an issue that was not
+central to our mission, and furthermore it was [creating] conflict in the very
+[same] communities that were most directly active in our litigation and encumbering
+the organization and the other individuals in the organization with issues
+that were counterproductive. . . . So we said, let’s not do that anymore. . . .
+Despite the fact that a lot of points were wonderfully well made and completely
+valid it just didn’t complement our issues, and we had just gotten into it because
+of Clint’s personal interest and the surprise success of the Lani Guinier issue
+and allowed that to be a target of opportunity that just pulled us further and
+further down this one path. . . . One of the keys to our success has been staying
+focused—seizing occasional targets of opportunity but staying focused and not
+getting distracted, and when we were distracted, getting rapidly out.
+
+Affirmative action has always been a difficult issue for IJ. Despite Mellor
+and especially Bolick’s intense disagreement with the policy, the issue runs
+counter to IJ’s organizational culture, which is optimistic and oriented to
+pushing conservative “empowerment” approaches to the problems of the
+poor and racial minorities. Criticizing liberal policies like affirmative action
+was, by contrast, “more of a CIR thing.”100
+All of CIR’s successes, by contrast, have come from being nimble and
+opportunistic, but the organization’s responses to those opportunities
+have created commitments that now make it difficult to reorient it
+around new areas of litigation. This threatens to produce the kind of
+institutionalization its founders feared. Terry Pell recalls that “the Greve
+model was to blow up the institution, essentially. He never wanted the
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 259
+
+institution to get to the point where it couldn’t be easily blown up.”
+Greve’s study of the environmental movements of the United States and
+Germany101 had sensitized him to the risk that organizational maintenance
+imperatives could encourage public interest movements to stay
+committed to a particular line of cases or issues once the opportunity
+for a major impact had passed. This commitment to organizational nimbleness
+also reflected a strategic assessment of conservatives’ position in
+modern American institutions.
+
+They [liberals] are much more concerned about permanently owning territory,
+so however the law changes, they just adapt them to the territory that they’ve
+already acquired. The Right does not own much institutional territory at all, so
+the only tool we’ve got is some big ideological or legal precedent that you can
+quickly get without having to run a lot of institutions. Whereas the Left owns
+every big university in the country because they control the personnel, the way
+we influence those institutions is to get their race preference policy struck down
+by the Supreme Court. Because we don’t control those institutions, we have to
+do this from the outside.102
+
+CIR believed that the most conservatives could achieve through the courts
+were formal legal victories that established a legal principle, rather than
+wholesale reform.
+Staying nimble and remaining open to new areas of opportunity was,
+in part, a recognition of the limited potential of the law to transform
+institutions controlled by liberals. Avoiding excessive commitment to a
+particular issue was also connected to CIR’s preference for a lean organizational
+form. Staying small required that CIR pursue reasonably clear
+precedents that would avoid the need for substantial, resource-intensive,
+follow-on litigation. This contrasted with what they viewed as the legal
+strategy of the Left, which was to obtain relatively diffuse, “balancing”-
+type rulings that could be used as a resource in subsequent waves of litigation
+and bureaucratic politics. Both CIR’s size and the temperament and
+normative commitments of its staff made long-term commitment to an
+issue unappealing.
+
+Wanting to have clear laws drives the size of our organization and our desire
+to be nimble. People here do not find it interesting to file the same case over
+and over again . . . or to organize legions of lawyers to bring the same case over
+and over again. . . . Lawyers on the right, they always want to be involved in
+the biggest, baddest, most precedent-setting case around. They don’t want to
+bring the follow-on cases. On the other hand, the Left has organized itself to
+bring hundred and thousands of follow-on cases. So if they get some little slight
+advantage in a legal precedent anywhere, they’re organized to take advantage
+of it in all kinds of different contexts. That’s one institutional advantage they
+have over us. We’re just organized to do a different thing.103
+260 CHAPTER 7
+
+The emphasis on “wholesale litigation” can be seen in the diminishing
+role of religious liberty and academic free speech in CIR’s caseload. This
+was partially driven by the demands of CIR’s affirmative action cases,
+which required a long-term commitment and attention to fund-raising
+that severely tested CIR’s organizational design. The decline of the issue
+was also a matter of conscious design. As McDonald argues, “We did
+want to be first to make a big point and clear the way for other groups
+to do things wholesale.” With its precedent in Rosenberger, for example,
+CIR created a powerful precedent that a wide range of other organizations,
+especially Christian conservatives like the American Center for Law
+and Justice, could use in their own litigation. By demonstrating that restrictions
+on campus free speech were vulnerable and would rarely be
+defended by the courts, CIR made it easy for groups like the Foundation
+for Individual Rights in Education and the Individual Rights Foundation
+to create an industry out of suing universities for violating the free speech
+rights of professors and students.
+Paradoxically, CIR committed itself to both nimbleness and a willingness
+to stick with cases for as long as necessary. In its previous litigation,
+this latter commitment had not created any serious problems for CIR as
+the cases were not fact-intensive and were susceptible to relatively quick
+resolution. Terry Pell notes that the affirmative action cases, beginning
+with Hopwood, exposed this previously unimportant tension in CIR’s
+strategy.
+
+The problem we ran into was the race preference cases. . . . If we say we’re
+trying to change the law and set new precedent, we can’t walk away from this.
+One of the things we tell our donors is that we pick the tough fights and stay
+in them for the long haul. . . . We’re not dissuaded by this, that, or the other
+adverse opinion along the way. Well, that means that you can’t just walk away
+from this stuff or your donors wonder what you’re doing. In this case one of
+the big challenges we’ve had is that the race preference cases have swallowed
+up the ability of CIR to be flexible and take risks and move onto new areas.
+Our time is spent just keeping that thing alive and moving.
+
+The difficulty that the affirmative action cases have presented is threefold.
+First, they absorbed an enormous amount of time and effort, which limited
+CIR’s ability to develop new cases and areas of expertise. Second, the
+cases necessarily put a damper on CIR’s freewheeling intellectual organizational
+culture. With a commitment as large and challenging as affirmative
+action, the scrutiny on CIR’s utterances increased exponentially, and
+as a consequence there was pressure for staff to stay “on message.” This
+meant, for example, avoiding saying in public what at least one staff member
+believed, which is that all of the civil rights laws reaching private
+conduct were unconstitutional. This created enormous stresses for an or-
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 261
+
+ganization that prided itself on fearless truth-telling and an unwillingness
+to bend to political correctness. It also took some of the fun out of what,
+for its first few years, had been an incredibly exciting environment to
+operate in.
+Finally, the fund-raising required by the affirmative action cases also
+had a profound effect on CIR’s previously dynamic organizational structure.
+Affirmative action certainly fit CIR’s strategy of attacking the discretion
+of liberal institutions and had the benefit of attracting a large
+number of new donors, many of whom were frustrated by the Republican
+Party’s hesitancy in attacking the issue. After receiving a surprise
+gift of $1.5 million from a previously low-dollar donor, CIR hired a
+number of staff attorneys, moving the organization away from its original,
+lean structure, toward something that looked more like IJ. Michael
+McDonald recalls that
+
+the official rationale for hiring more attorneys was: we now know this stuff,
+affirmative action. So we don’t need to continually look for cooperating counsel.
+We have the money to do the cases in-house, but we didn’t really want to
+do run-of-the-mill AA cases. So we had one foot in the old model and one foot
+in the newer model. I saw it wasn’t working and advocated returning to the
+older model, but we had the ACLU-envy problem. Certain people close to us or
+on our board would say, “Why can’t you be like the ACLU and have a chapter in
+every state or do more wholesale litigation.” I suppose that was one of the many
+things we never fully sorted out.
+
+This influx of new money into the organization thus created two problems.
+First, it loosened the external constraints that made CIR’s original
+organizational structure a necessity. Second, the presence of a substantial
+pool of new donors attracted by affirmative action and unfamiliar with
+CIR’s organizational culture has made it difficult to reorient the firm
+around new issues. This has fed back into problems in attracting significant
+legal talent to the firm, since CIR can only compensate for its relatively
+low salaries and the stigma that attaches to its affirmative action
+cases by maintaining a reputation for intellectual excitement and challenge.
+It has become clear to CIR’s leaders that what is necessary in order
+to attract entrepreneurial people—a constant stream of new cases—may
+run counter to what is necessary to hold onto a mature funding base.
+
+Donors are like students. They sign up for your class because they have an idea
+of what they’re going to get, and you have to have an idea of what they think
+they’re getting, so you can make them feel like they got that. We have a subset
+of our donors who are only interested in affirmative action, but I think that is
+only a subset. The larger group of donors is interested in affirmative action or
+other things like affirmative action. . . . So when you pick a new area you have
+262 CHAPTER 7
+
+to take your donors as they are and kind of move them and explain to them
+why, given what they’ve already found interesting, they might also find this
+other thing interesting. So it’s a game. . . . There is [also] an institutional fatigue
+factor. The people who started these things were very entrepreneurial; Mike
+Greve and Mike McDonald are examples of that. Well, you just get tired after
+a while. This institution has been around for ten years and it’s just harder to get
+people excited about doing a new thing. So that pushes people in the direction of
+doing something that’s predictable.104
+
+Despite all the attention that Hopwood, Gratz, and Grutter brought to
+CIR, the issue also created a powerful, self-reinforcing dynamic rooted in
+its new donor base that has eaten away at the organization’s opportunistic
+ethos. The choice to attack affirmative action was fateful, as once CIR
+took on affirmative action, its reputation within the conservative movement
+rested upon its ability to push these cases to a conclusion, no matter
+how long it took or the impact the cases had on its organizational culture.
+IJ has effectively managed the challenges to its organizational focus,
+but CIR has found it difficult to move on from the affirmative action
+cases that have absorbed so much of its time and attention. IJ effectively
+extricated itself from the issue of affirmative action, thereby regaining its
+concentration on its core issues and eliminating a substantial obstacle to
+“strange bedfellows” coalitions with local minority groups. CIR has, in
+the last few years, begun to open up new litigation areas, such as its challenge
+to the authority of Child Protective Services agencies to order medical
+procedures opposed by parents or legal guardians.105 While this issue
+may be genuinely important, it lacks the gut-level appeal to the conservative
+movement or the potential for establishing wide-ranging precedent
+of CIR’s earlier cases. CIR, having thrived on opportunism in the past,
+may find it hard to regain the energy it once had as its involvement with
+affirmative action continues and the number of attractive targets for its
+style of litigation diminishes.
+
+Conclusion
+
+As the example of the first generation of conservative public interest law
+showed, opportunities, threats, and the availability of resources do not
+necessarily translate into effective social movement organizations. As a
+consequence, it is possible for social movements to miss opportunities
+when their organizations are not up to the task of exploiting changes in
+the political environment. The development of effective political organizations
+is a highly contingent process that unfolds over time, and to
+understand it requires probing deeply into social movements’ internal
+C O N S E R V A T I V E P U B L I C I N T E R E S T L A W II 263
+
+reevaluation of past investments and innovations in political strategy
+and tactics. It is this internal rhythm of puzzling and problem solving,
+rather than changes in the political environment, that seems most important
+in explaining the emergence of conservative public interest law’s
+second generation.
+The second-generation conservative firms were the product of intramovement
+learning: when combined with their continued interest in promoting
+legal change, patrons’ post—Horowitz Report recognition that
+previous approaches to conservative public interest law had been failures
+provided an opening for new organizational entrepreneurs to approach
+patrons for support. Because first-generation firms faced strong incentives
+to maintain their approach, this learning process occurred through generational
+replacement rather than organizational evolution. It took ten
+years of missed litigation opportunities before this process of learning and
+generational replacement produced CIR and IJ. This points to a factor
+largely missing from studies of legal “backlash”:106 organizational entrepreneurs,
+and the patrons who support them, are the essential link between
+political opportunities and political outcomes. Explaining when
+and how backlash occurs thus requires that we recognize the considerable
+intellectual, organizational, and resource mobilization obstacles that
+countermobilizing agents face.
+Overcoming the obstacles to effective countermobilization in public
+interest law depended upon the maturing of the broader conservative
+legal movement. Movement patrons had to wait for a new generation
+of leaders to emerge and for them to develop sufficient experience and
+strategic sophistication to be a reasonable outlet for sizable, long-term
+investment. In addition, second-generation strategies depended upon the
+growth of a broad network of conservative lawyers and the ripening
+of the movement’s ideas. The Federalist Society was the conservative
+movement’s core investment in the development of both of these resources,
+and so it is not an accident that the second-generation firms
+emerged after the Society had become a major, institutionalized presence
+in American legal culture.
+The success of IJ and CIR also depended upon a shift in the character
+of conservative patrons, from business leaders to foundation directors.
+Leaders of the conservative legal movement had been repeatedly frustrated
+by the lack of imagination and principle of American businessmen
+and their willingness to cooperate with government despite their rhetorical
+attachment to antistatism. The emergence of forthrightly libertarian
+firms like IJ and CIR, therefore, had to await the decline of business’s
+leadership of the conservative movement and its replacement with an alliance
+between intellectuals and charitable foundations. The leaders of
+these foundations shared with those they funded a primary locus of social-
+264 CHAPTER 7
+
+ization and network in the world of ideas rather than the world of enterprise.
+Thus the public interest law firms capable of defending the free
+market depended strongly on the emergence of a “new class” of conservative
+activists motivated by ideological and cultural goals rather than economic
+interests. This new class of conservative activists—both patrons
+and organizational entrepreneurs—have found their inspiration in the empowerment
+of the inner-city poor, affirmative action, and academic freedom,
+rather than the interests of business.
+The shift of conservative public interest law’s “principals” from business
+to the new class of conservative patrons and entrepreneurs accompanied
+a transformation in the movement’s ideological orientation. Whereas
+most of the first-generation firms were traditionally conservative in orientation,
+Capital Legal Foundation, CIR, and IJ all flew the flag of libertarianism,
+and the most successful litigation by first-generation firms (such
+as Pacific Legal Foundation’s work in Nollan) had a libertarian spirit as
+well. These firms were able to take advantage of a structural bias in the
+American legal system orienting public interest law to challenging governmental
+discretion and power rather than (as many traditional conservatives
+preferred) defending it. When legal conservatives have sought to
+limit the power of government, either through the use of the commerce
+clause, the First Amendment, or the takings clause, their success has been
+impressive. However, when they have attempted to use public interest law
+to support the authority of government, they have found little success.107
+This bias in the American legal system led CIR, for example, to converge
+with the libertarianism of IJ, and has given the firm some unexpected
+affinities with its liberal counterparts. Terry Pell observes that
+
+the norms [of most large institutions] are driven by the general principle of
+efficiency. That’s what these managerial institutions are supposed to do, achieve
+a certain objective in the most efficient way possible without questioning
+whether that objective is a legitimate objective to pursue at all. . . . We, all of
+us, on the left and the right, are the ones saying, “No, we ought to be having a
+debate about whether efficiency in this area is such a good idea, and whether
+the ends being served here are appropriate in a free society.”
+
+The enterprise of public interest law gives firms like IJ and CIR other
+interests in common with their liberal counterparts, especially where the
+political economy of public interest lawyering is concerned. For instance,
+any measure that would reduce the financial lure of high-paying
+corporate law work, or that increased the prestige of public interest law,
+would solve both liberal and conservative firms’ problems in attracting
+high-quality legal talent. Firms like IJ and CIR are certainly a part of
+the larger conservative-libertarian movement, but they are also public
+interest lawyers, and this gives them a different view of the world than
+their ideological allies.
+Conclusion
+
+THESE FINAL PAGES move beyond the case of the law, identifying directions
+for future research on large-scale political change and the lessons
+of the conservative experience for political entrepreneurs and patrons.
+Drawing on the cases in the preceding chapters, I present an approach to
+understanding the rhythms and mechanisms of large-scale political
+change, one that puts agency, contingency, and policy and institutional
+variability at its core. Second, I identify what the example of the law can
+teach us about the transformation of the conservative movement over the
+past forty years. In doing so, I place special emphasis on conservatism’s
+shift from a movement dominated by business, grassroots organizations,
+and Republican elected officials to one increasingly directed by a conservative
+“new class” of ideologically motivated actors. Third, I conclude by
+asking what lessons the experience of conservatives in the law over the
+past forty years hold for political entrepreneurs and patrons, both in the
+law and beyond.
+
+The Rhythms and Sources of Political Change
+
+Social scientists have a long-standing fascination with modeling politics
+as a market with a natural tendency toward equilibrium. In the famous
+“Hotelling” model of political competition, losing political parties were
+modeled as adjusting their bids to the electorate by moving closer to the
+median voter.1 The force of political competition, this model claimed,
+ruled out long-term political or policy advantage. American political history,
+however, has been marked by long periods in which one ideological
+“team” outcompetes the other, producing institutional and policy change
+in its preferred direction for decades. If politics is truly competitive, the
+losing side in political competition should rapidly compete away any advantages
+possessed by the winners.
+The Hotelling model assumes that political markets are like markets
+for commodities, in that the demand is fixed, products are homogenous,
+technology of production is simple and transparent, start-up costs are
+low, and barriers to entry are nonexistent. These are very poor assumptions
+for modern politics, in which the agenda is up for grabs (demand is
+variable and products are differentiated), the technology of production is
+complex and nontransparent (expertise and political strategy are im-
+266 CONCLUSION
+
+portant), start-up costs are high (complex organizations are required that
+demand substantial trial and error to produce), and barriers to entry are
+significant (those created by policies and institutional design, and through
+the transfer of politically significant activity into civil society). The complexity
+of political competition means that actors do not limit themselves
+to the marginal advantages of median voter models, but seek to construct
+a “regime” that will generate supernormal profits over a span of decades.
+In that sense, politics is more like markets for technology than markets
+for potatoes.2
+The foregoing chapters identified four sources of durable competitive
+advantage in politics: ideas and arguments, political strategies and institutional
+design, the reputations of political movements, and entrenchment
+in civil society. Of these, ideas are especially important. Political movements
+can attain a durable advantage by identifying their own ideas with
+common sense, intellectual seriousness, responsibility, professionalism,
+and ordinary decency, while claiming that their opponents’ ideas are “off
+the wall”—eccentric, irresponsible, morally dubious, and outside the professional
+mainstream. A movement whose ideas have been effectively
+branded as off the wall will find it impossible to attract supporters who
+are, like most professionals, acutely concerned with being seen as responsible,
+serious, and mainstream.
+Ideational entrenchment was an especially acute challenge for conservatives,
+and overcoming it was the object of some of the movement’s
+longest-term projects. In its early years the organizational entrepreneurs
+of the law and economics movement devoted enormous effort to overcoming
+the widespread belief that the approach was nothing more than
+thinly veiled ideology, properly dismissed rather than argued with. The
+Federalist Society was founded by conservative students in elite law
+schools to force the legal establishment to seriously consider ideas that
+were typically dismissed as strange or reactionary. Public interest law
+firms faced the challenge of ideational entrenchment as well, and were
+forced to devote significant resources to convincing courts that resurrecting
+the commerce and takings clauses of the Constitution was something
+more than a far-out attempt to take the nation back to the era of Lochnerism.
+It was only after they broke through the powerful ideological insulation
+of legal liberalism that conservatives were able to compete on a reasonably
+even playing field.
+Political strategies and institutional design are a second source of durable
+competitive advantage in politics. For example, chapter 2 described
+how liberals developed a network of public interest groups, tied to congressional
+subcommittees, the regulatory bureaucracy, and the legal profession
+that were able to maximize the potential of regulatory statutes
+despite the significant costs this imposed on business and local govern-
+CONCLUSION 267
+
+ments. While conservatives tried to overcome this organizational-institutional
+alignment through efforts to “defund the Left” and by creating a
+network of conservative firms to provide the “other side,” chapter 3
+showed that, well into the 1980s, neither strategy was effective in eroding
+this source of legal liberals’ competitive advantage. It took more than two
+decades before conservatives were able to effectively use legislation to
+erode many of the accomplishments of public interest law, and a decade
+and a half before they had public interest law firms of their own vying for
+the agenda of the federal courts.3
+A third source of competitive political advantage can be found in the
+reputations of political movements. A common device that ordinary citizens
+and potential recruits use to decide whether to support movements is
+reliance on the moral reputation of advocates on particular issues. These
+reputations are sticky because people readily attend to information that
+reinforces their preexisting evaluations, and so once a movement has developed
+a reputation, it can be hard to shake. By the 1960s, legal liberalism
+had come to be associated, especially among the young, with idealism,
+the individual, civil rights, and a concern with justice, while conservatism
+was tarred with the brush of self-interest, unseemly ties to business and
+other large concentrations of power, and a lack of concern for racial justice.
+These reputations were so powerful that for almost twenty years
+conservative public interest law was treated as an oxymoron, and with it
+the belief that the highest ideals of the legal profession could be reconciled
+with ideological conservatism. The programming of the conservative
+movement over the last twenty-five years was, to a considerable degree,
+aimed at transforming this reputation. The Federalist Society organized
+its conferences and campus speakers to convince young lawyers that conservatism
+was the movement of serious intellectual thought and legal liberals
+the defenders of a stale status quo. Following the argument that
+Michael Horowitz made in 1980, the Institute for Justice’s caseload was
+designed to use high-profile litigation to make liberals look like the defenders
+of irresponsible, self-interested, concentrated power, while conservatives
+were the protectors of the public interest, the little guy, and the
+cause of racial equality. These nonlegal goals meant that IJ could win, in
+the sense of helping to alter the reputation of conservatism, even when it
+lost in court.
+The final source of durable competitive advantage is political entrenchment
+in civil society, in our case the legal profession and the nation’s
+law schools. Law schools are especially important to the construction of
+durable advantage because they are one of the main arbiters of distinction
+in the legal profession. Competition over control of law schools was,
+therefore, a battle for who would determine standards of professional
+honor and prestige and control the boundaries on the kinds of ideas that
+268 CONCLUSION
+
+are held by respectable lawyers. By the early 1970s, the ideological assumptions
+of law professors, their construction of the profession of legal
+education, and the movements and interest groups that were institutionally
+connected to law schools had developed a significant bias toward
+legal liberalism. Given the self-reproducing character of the professoriate,
+the perception (if not the reality) that legal education was hostile to conservatives,
+and the greater attractions of private practice for those on the
+right, conservatives faced a strategic problem without an obvious solution.
+While law and economics was a reasonably rapid response to liberal
+dominance in legal education, in other areas (especially constitutional
+law), change has been slow. One response, the Olin Fellows program administered
+by the Federalist Society, appears to have had some success in
+encouraging the hiring of non–law and economics faculty in elite law
+schools, but this is still work at the margins.
+In all four of these areas, conservatives invested significant time and
+engaged in widespread experimentation before they figured out how to
+erode the competitive advantage of legal liberalism. The lag between the
+emergence of liberals’ initial advantage and the development of an effective
+conservative response was a matter of decades. What can explain this
+persistence of durable advantage? How can we make sense of when these
+advantages erode or disappear? To develop an answer, we must begin by
+reframing the concept of “regime.” As I use it, a regime can be said to
+exist when there are multiple, reinforcing sources of durable advantage
+present in any particular policy or institutional domain (or, more broadly,
+when such advantages exist across an entire polity). So, for example, we
+can say that there was a “liberal legal regime” because of the interacting
+sources of durable advantage in the realm of ideas, institutions and political
+strategy, movement reputations, and civil society. The deeper the durable
+advantage, the more we can say that a particular regime is “entrenched.”
+Put in economic terms, an entrenched regime can be said to
+allow its supporters to extract monopoly rents or “supernormal” profits.
+Thinking of regimes in terms of competition helps us to endogenize the
+process of political change, because few if any of the sources of durable
+change are so entrenched as to be immune from challenge. Rather than
+being noncompetitive, it is better to think about entrenched regimes as
+being “contestable markets.”4 If regimes really were pure monopolies,
+then the losers in politics would have no option but to sit back and wait
+for some exogenous shock to bring them salvation.5 Like incumbents in
+contestable markets, however, political regimes almost always have vulnerabilities.
+Resistance is almost never futile. In most cases, the regime’s
+advantage comes because it has created a “technology” that the other side
+finds hard to replicate. This is one way to think about the explosion of
+public interest law in the late 1960s and early 1970s: liberals had created
+CONCLUSION 269
+
+a tool that took conservatives a very long time to make sense of and master,
+and it was embedded in a social network that conservatives could not
+match. There was nothing in the liberal advantage in the area that could
+not be competed away, but it required intellectual, strategic, and organizational
+creativity that emerged only with a very significant lag.
+When these durable competitive advantages are eroded depends upon
+the character of entrenchment and the quality of agent response. To understand
+entrenchment and how agents maneuver around it, let us start
+with two examples from technology. Microsoft was able to derive supernormal
+profits for a sustained period of time because of barriers to entry
+created by its intellectual property and the network effects that attracted
+users and software producers to its dominant standard in operating systems.
+Dell Computer quickly developed a commanding position in the
+market for personal computers by combining a just-in-time production
+process with direct sales to consumers. In the first instance, Microsoft’s
+powerful position on the desktop made it almost impossible to mount a
+“symmetrical” challenge in the form of an alternative operating system.
+Instead, Microsoft’s competitive position has been threatened by an
+“asymmetric” challenge from competitors such as Google seeking to
+move software off the desktop entirely, through web-based applications.
+In Dell’s case, there was never any mystery as to what it was doing, but
+competitors had substantial investments in preexisting ways of organizing
+production and sales or failed to reengineer their organizations to execute
+with Dell’s efficiency. Eventually competitors eroded this competitive advantage
+by a symmetric strategy of mimicry: they simply got better, over
+time, in doing the things that Dell had done for years. For a decade, however,
+Dell was able to sustain very high profits and sales, despite its completely
+transparent strategy. In the first case, change happened when competitors
+hit upon a rival strategy that exposed a previously unseen or
+unexploited angle of attack. In the second case, change happened when
+rivals developed organizational forms that rivaled those of their competitors.
+In both cases, change came from the skill of rival agents at discovering
+weaknesses in the dominant actor and developing strategies or
+organizational forms capable of exploiting it.
+The metaphor of technological change can help us understand the endogenous
+sources of large-scale policy and institutional change, and the
+cases of IJ and the Center for Individual Rights are a useful place to start.
+The first source of endogenous change is learning. Previous generations
+of conservative public interest lawyers simply did not understand the
+sources of liberal public interest lawyers’ success and missed out on significant
+opportunities to learn from them. It took a new generation of
+firms, with lawyers who had studied their liberal predecessors closely, to
+draw appropriate lessons. The second source of endogenous change is
+270 CONCLUSION
+
+organizational structure. The first generation of public interest lawyers
+was organized along geographic lines in an increasingly centralized polity
+that rewarded D.C.-based networks and the opportunistic selection of
+venue. This organizational form was exceptionally sticky, but when conservatives
+developed new, D.C.-based firms with weak or nonexistent ties
+to business, they were able to rapidly produce significant victories in the
+courts and in public opinion. A final source of endogenous change can be
+found in relationships with patrons. The first generation of public interest
+lawyers failed to recognize the strategic importance of idealism, and as a
+consequence their close ties to business hurt their reputation for “public
+interestedness” and their ability to attract high-quality lawyers. Largescale
+change happened when competitors to legal liberalism developed
+ties to new patrons, leading to a shift in their reputation and ability to
+attract young lawyers comparable to those of their competitors.
+In none of these cases were opportunities for effective political competition
+unavailable in the decades before they were effectively exploited.
+That is, the regime of public interest law had always been vulnerable.
+Thinking of entrenchment in terms of unexploited vulnerability moves
+our attention away from the incumbent to the challenger. If there are
+almost always vulnerabilities in the incumbent’s position, why then are
+they not taken advantage of? The answer is that entrenchment is the joint
+product of the structure of the incumbent regime and the failures of rival
+agents. The rhythm of political change is produced by the interaction
+of the problems and puzzles generated by the dominant regime with the
+problem-solving and adaptation of their opponents.
+Theorists of path dependence made a significant breakthrough in understanding
+large-scale political change when they observed that macrostructural
+stimuli like changing world economic conditions or electoral
+shocks did not influence countries, or policy areas within countries,
+equally.6 The structure of inherited policy commitments or national institutional
+forms, they argued, substantially mediated the impact of these
+structural forces. While this was a major step forward in political analysis,
+it only added one deterministic variable on top of another: instead of
+electoral power or macroeconomic conditions determining policy outcomes,
+the structure of inherited commitments did. The losers in this
+model simply disappear from view, but as the examples in this book show,
+losers have substantial room for effective action, even when faced with
+seemingly imposing constraints on change. Strategically sophisticated losers
+in one period can invest resources in such a way that they are able to
+erode the disadvantages they will face in the future.7
+In Paul Pierson’s work, special attention is put on the phenomenon of
+myopia: much of the cause of entrenchment is the focus actors place on
+the short term, since in the short term it almost always makes sense to
+CONCLUSION 271
+
+pursue marginal gains within an existing regime rather than challenging
+it. Myopia, however, is a variable rather than a constant, as the examples
+of long-range behavior in this book make clear. For example, intellectual
+entrepreneurs at Chicago like Simons and Director made the University
+into a safe space—an “abeyance structure”—for free market thought at
+a time when most academic institutions were either hostile or uninterested.
+In other words, they invested their time and sought out resources
+for activities designed in the hope that the opportunity structure in the
+future would be more open than it was in the present. The patrons of
+the first generation of conservative public interest law, by contrast, invested
+in activities closely tied to their own firms’ short-term bottom
+line. The returns on their myopic political investments were correspondingly
+meager.
+The patrons of the second generation, by contrast, were willing to wait
+much longer for their returns. They invested in law and economics in the
+hopes that it would provide ammunition to defend free markets at some
+indefinite time in the future and that it would help—in a way that was
+not entirely clear to them—to shift the balance in law schools. They invested
+in the Federalist Society, despite the fact that the organization’s
+main outputs, such as networks and idea development, were difficult to
+measure or trace back to their source and would only bear fruit decades
+later, when generations of law students matured into senior, practicing
+lawyers and law professors. They invested in Chip Mellor’s Center for
+Applied Jurisprudence, despite the fact that it was a planning exercise for
+a firm that did not yet exist and that did not open up shop for another
+six years. There was nothing dramatically new about the opportunity
+structure in the 1980s and 1990s where any of these activities were concerned.
+Instead, change happened because, by that point, a new network
+of entrepreneurial agents recognized previously ignored strategic opportunities,
+had plausible plans for how to take advantage of them, and identified
+long-term oriented patrons willing to bankroll their ideas.
+In short, there are always more opportunities floating around a political
+system than there are actors with the acuity to recognize them or the
+capacity to effectively exploit them. It is this surplus of opportunities that
+provides a tempting playing field for organizational entrepreneurs. Skill
+matters in exploiting these opportunities, but skillful agents are a very
+scarce commodity, which means there will often be very significant “big
+bills left on the sidewalk” of political competition.8 The first generation
+of public interest law shows what can happen when abundant resources
+chase too few effective agents, or when those agents are embedded in
+organizational structures in which creative activity is impossible.
+One final point about the sources of long-term change emerges from
+the examples of the previous chapters: the importance of networks and
+272 CONCLUSION
+
+information. An effective process of learning is vital for political movements
+seeking to erode entrenched regimes, but learning happens most
+productively through carefully nurtured networks that facilitate multiple,
+ongoing interactions by movement actors. Understanding learning, therefore,
+means understanding the structures in which it occurs. Learning depends
+on the free flow of information, since the consequences of past
+experiences need to be quickly conveyed to other agents, compared, and
+lessons drawn and disseminated. For this to occur, agents need abundant,
+credible, and reliable information. Where information flow is slow, unreliable,
+or poorly structured, lesson-drawing will be hampered and experiences
+will not flow back into subsequent decision-making.
+The key to the diffusion of information and the drawing of effective
+lessons is the development of networks and structured processes for feedback.
+Networks are often described as emerging through a spontaneous,
+evolutionary process, but some of the most important networks are the
+result of conscious design and construction by network entrepreneurs.
+For example, chapter 5 showed how the debates, meetings, and conventions
+of the Federalist Society produce powerful networks of conservative
+lawyers because they create the opportunity for repeated interactions over
+time and because the ethos of the organization encourages trust. A number
+of the professors I interviewed for chapter 4 insisted that, in the 1970s,
+Henry Manne’s seminars for law professors and Liberty Fund conferences
+helped produce networks among the otherwise thinly scattered group of
+scholars in the field. These meetings allowed for the development, among
+other things, of personal reputations. For example, the Liberty Fund conferences
+helped George Priest, then at the obscure University of Puget
+Sound Law School, to get on the elite legal academy’s radar screen, eventually
+helping him land at Yale Law School.
+Information and lesson-drawing also occur through formal processes of
+feedback, processes that are of special interest to foundation patrons because
+of their keen interest in evaluating their political investments. The
+Horowitz Report was solicited by the Scaife Foundation to provide an unvarnished
+look at conservative public interest law, and the report’s lessons
+deeply impressed themselves on the major conservative patrons. Building
+on Horowitz’s arguments, Mellor’s Center for Applied Jurisprudence
+(funded by the Koch, Bradley, Olin, and Smith Richardson foundations)
+brought together a wide range of figures in law and other disciplines to
+consciously think through the experience of conservative public interest
+law and to identify opportunities and organizational forms that might
+make it more successful in the future. IJ’s emphasis on black empowerment
+instead of race neutrality, for example, can be traced to these sessions.
+Conservative foundations were well suited to acquiring information
+and feeding it back into movement programming. The conservative pa-
+CONCLUSION 273
+
+tronage strategy of “spread betting”—supporting a wide range of projects
+and then reinvesting in those that worked—required leaders with the experience
+to effectively evaluate the success of movement ventures. The
+continuity of foundation leadership—Michael Joyce, James Piereson, and
+Richard Larry each served for a quarter-century—meant that there were
+people in critical positions with long, personal experience with the movement’s
+political entrepreneurs. The networks they built increased their
+access to reliable information, and their position far up on the learning
+curve meant that they were in a strong position to draw lessons and,
+through their disbursement of money, to make those lessons stick.
+The key claim of this section is that the durability of a policy or institutional
+regime is determined in large part by the ability of its rivals to
+discover or implement an effective response. Through the 1970s and
+well into the 1980s, the liberal legal regime thrived, despite its weakening
+electoral support, because conservatives found it difficult to develop
+organizational capacity in the academy, the legal profession, and public
+interest law. Since that time, conservatives have dramatically improved
+their effectiveness in elite organizational mobilization. As a consequence,
+they have rendered competitive areas of the law that were once
+effectively monopolistic.
+What conservatives have not been able to do is move beyond competition
+to actually displace the liberal legal network and construct a dominant
+regime of their own. Movement investments like the Olin programs
+in law and economics helped increase the number of conservatives on
+elite law school faculties, but they still remain a relatively small minority.
+Conservatives’ one significant effort to create a noteworthy law school of
+their own, at George Mason University, has been remarkably successful
+given its modest founding but is nowhere close to challenging the legal
+academic elite. Conservatives have a deeper bench of public interest law
+firms than twenty years ago, but few of their rivals—the NAACP LDF,
+ACLU, Environmental Defense Fund, Mexican American Legal Defense
+and Educational Fund, and Natural Resources Defense Council—have
+disappeared or even been markedly weakened. The Federalist Society has
+taken on many of the functions of the organized bar, but conservatives
+have not attained significant power within the ABA or AALS, and both
+organizations continue to draw conservatives’ ire. This same pattern of
+competition rather than hegemony can be seen in a variety of other areas
+outside the law, such as Social Security, education, and the environment.9
+At the same time, legal liberals have captured little, if any, new institutional
+or ideational turf since the early 1970s. Largely as a consequence
+of the increasing effectiveness of conservative organizational mobilization,
+their energies have been devoted increasingly to holding on to what
+they already have.
+274 CONCLUSION
+
+What this pattern of effective conservative mobilization without significant
+displacement of liberalism may point to are the diminishing possibilities
+for regime construction in modern American politics. Partisans of
+realignment theory once believed that American politics always featured
+a dominant “sun” party and a reactive “moon” party.10 This metaphor
+no longer accurately describes American politics, which is increasingly
+characterized by two equally competitive parties, each capable of deploying
+resources in civil society as well as in Washington, D.C. This heightened
+level of organizational mobilization means that any competitive advantage
+possessed by one party—whether it be electoral, social, or even
+religious—will lead to the rapid development of organizational infrastructure
+to challenge it.11 While political agents continue to try to create durable
+regimes in institutions and policy domains, competitive pressures have
+become sufficiently robust that the returns on investing in regime status
+are lower than in the past. The failed attempt by Karl Rove to create a
+durable Republican Party regime of the kind built by Mark Hanna and
+William McKinley in the late nineteenth century is just the most visible
+example of the difficulty faced by regime builders in an organizationally
+competitive political system. Increasingly, therefore, our politics is characterized
+by the absence of a dominant party, an era without a regime, in
+which political time has dramatically sped up: what, in another context,
+Stephen Skowronek called a “politics of permanent preemption.”12 If anything,
+this condition is even more profound than Skowronek’s argument
+would lead us to believe, because the tight competition that produces the
+reactive, preemptive modern style of politics now characterizes civil society
+and organizational mobilization as well as elections.
+
+Understanding Modern Conservatism
+
+In the late 1960s, conservatism was still a movement tightly linked to, and
+governed by, the interests of business, grassroots activists, and Republican
+elected officials. These interests are still vital parts of modern conservatism,
+but they have been increasingly joined by, and in some cases rendered
+subordinate to, a network of conservative organizations whose
+members are primarily motivated by ideological principle rather than coalitional
+affiliations. In the process of adding this ideologically motivated
+stratum to the conservative movement, and in responding to the challenge
+of liberal entrenchment, conservatism was transformed philosophically
+and strategically as well as organizationally. This section briefly sums up
+the book’s findings on this transformation and lays the groundwork for
+the discussion of the larger lessons of the conservative experience with
+elite mobilization, the subject of the third and final section.
+CONCLUSION 275
+
+In the early 1970s, conservative ideas and political strategy were animated
+by the belief that the genie of legal liberalism could be put back in
+the bottle. This hope led to conservative support for “judicial restraint”
+or “strict constructionism,” concepts borrowed from an earlier generation
+of liberal thought. These ideas argued for a strictly limited role for
+federal courts in public policy, claiming that the activist judiciary of the
+Warren Court was inconsistent with democratic rule. Decades earlier, conservatives
+had been attracted to quite a different judicial philosophy,
+which saw the courts as a bulwark against a democratic mob that, if given
+free rein, would destroy private property and centralize power in a strong
+national state. Judicial restraint was a fundamentally negative idea, a theory
+about what courts should not do, rather than what they ought to do.
+This philosophy became increasingly unattractive to conservatives as the
+federal courts and the legal profession became increasingly influenced by
+liberalism, and as conservatism became a more populist movement. The
+political strategy that accompanied judicial restraint was placing believers
+in “strict construction” on the federal bench and creating conservative
+public interest groups to present the “other side” when liberals sought to
+use the courts to advance their policy goals. Together, the idea of judicial
+restraint, a reconfigured federal judiciary, and public interest lawyers capable
+of balancing out the information available to judges, would resurrect
+the constitutional status quo ante, before the disruptions of Brown,
+Griswold, Goldberg, and the like.
+The professional and ideational entrenchment of legal liberalism made
+it impossible to turn the clock back, and so conservatives were forced to
+adapt to the structure of the regime they sought to displace. First, conservatives
+learned that they needed to adapt many of their rivals’ organizational
+forms. Whereas conservatives’ strength was in grassroots and business
+mobilization at the state and local level, they were forced to build
+up their elite infrastructure in Washington, D.C. Ironically, to counter
+centralization, conservatives had to centralize their own organizational
+apparatus. Second, conservatives learned that they could not simply create
+alternatives to institutions controlled by liberals, but would have to
+organize within them. The reputations of academic institutions, for example,
+are highly sticky, and their role in conveying distinction very difficult,
+if not impossible, to replicate. As a result, conservatives sought out ways
+to operate inside of institutions where they were unwelcome. In the process,
+however, they had to play by the rules created by their rivals. Third,
+while most conservatives were suspicious of the central place of civil rights
+and an activist judiciary in American legal culture, these had become so
+deeply entrenched that conservatives had to find ways to adapt them for
+their own purposes. The symbolic stature of Brown meant that conservatives
+needed to adjust to its standard of justification, by arguing that their
+276 CONCLUSION
+
+goals—like school choice—were truer to Brown’s egalitarian aspirations
+than those of their liberal counterparts. This strategic necessity provided
+an opening for conservatives who genuinely believed in a vigorous role
+for the courts and the moral idea of civil rights—like the founders of IJ—
+to drag the conservative legal movement in their direction. This philosophical
+shift went hand in hand with the discovery that the tools of public
+interest law were more suited to challenging government authority
+than defending it. The shift of conservative public interest law to libertarianism,
+therefore, can be understood as an endogenous adaptation to legal
+liberalism’s transformation of American law.
+These adaptations were accompanied by a shift of power within the
+conservative legal movement, from grassroots activists, Republican politicians,
+and business to a “new class” of legal professionals and academics.
+Where the first generation of conservative public interest law was dominated
+by business, second-generation firms were led by lawyers and intellectuals
+whose primary commitment was to ideological principle and a
+standard of legal professionalism. The Federalist Society was rooted in
+law schools, not party politics, fired by a mission of creating a conservative
+legal establishment with distinguished credentials, and armed with
+ideas that the legal academy could not ignore.
+The coming to power of the conservative new class was a necessary—
+albeit not uncontested—adaptation to the character of the American legal
+profession and the competitive demands of responding to legal liberalism.
+The technical and intellectual character of modern law and the importance
+of prestige and distinction in the legal profession meant that, in
+order to be taken seriously by the profession, conservatives had to develop
+a network of experts with command over a wide range of issues and processes,
+the respect of mainstream lawyers and academics, and markers of
+professional distinction. In addition, countering the liberal legal network
+required a deep familiarity with its strategy, organizations, and ideas that
+could only come from a cadre of leaders drawn from the same professional
+background as their adversaries. Finally, the development of a conservative
+new class was necessary to convince potential elite recruits to the
+cause that legal professionalism was consistent with conservative ideas.
+However functional we might think these changes in conservatism
+were, none were obvious or automatic, and most emerged only very gradually
+and after a great deal of trial and error. Too often, the story of
+modern conservatism has been told through the “myth of diabolical competence.”
+Oddly enough, this myth has characterized accounts of conservatism
+written on the left and the right. Focusing primarily on conservatives’
+successes, this myth tells a tale of conservative movement actors
+who carefully and strategically planned out an assault on liberalism, an
+assault that was almost always successful. This approach, by focusing on
+CONCLUSION 277
+
+the programs that succeeded while ignoring those that failed, is guilty of
+survivor bias. It is true that conservatives have, in many cases, showed
+significant strategic acumen. But the lessons of the first generation of conservative
+public interest law show that the movement went through a
+very long period of almost complete organizational failure. Conservative
+philanthropists invested very substantial sums in Henry Manne’s entrepreneurial
+activities on behalf of law and economics, only to pull back
+sharply just as he was at the cusp of creating a major new piece of the
+conservative organizational infrastructure. CIR’s strategy of attacking affirmative
+action and defending free speech on college campuses may seem
+far-sighted and strategic now, but it was nowhere to be found in its original
+plans. While the conservative movement has had its very considerable
+strengths, it was never a monolith, often made serious errors, and succeeded
+by shrewd adaptation rather than by the far-sighted pursuit of a
+grand plan.
+
+Lessons from Conservatives
+
+What lessons, if any, does the history of conservative legal mobilization
+hold for political entrepreneurs and patrons in the future? This question
+has, of late, been a matter of some urgency for liberals in particular. Liberal
+donors have pored over studies of how conservatives built their policy
+infrastructure in the hopes of replicating their accomplishments.13 Most
+of these analyses, unfortunately, have been based on publicly available
+information and thus lacked a nuanced sense of the challenges actually
+faced by conservative patrons and entrepreneurs or the way that they
+responded to them. Serious political learning, by contrast, requires a view
+from the inside, and with it an effort to empathize with the challenges
+faced by the actors from whom one wishes to learn. This final section
+sums up the lessons for political activists that I have drawn from the development
+of the conservative legal movement, as well as suggesting some
+limits on lesson-drawing.
+The most serious mistake those seeking to learn from legal conservatives
+could make would be to create carbon copies of conservatives’ organizational
+apparatus, mimicking rather than learning. The most successful
+conservative projects, such as the Federalist Society, were adaptations
+to specific weaknesses of the conservative movement and responses to the
+character of liberal entrenchment. By the late 1970s and early 1980s,
+conservatives were strong at the grass roots, but lacked dense networks
+in Washington and representation in the elite strata of the legal profession.
+Their ideas were taken very seriously in the everyday world of electoral
+politics, but lacked legitimacy in the highest ranks of the legal academy.
+278 CONCLUSION
+
+While they were increasingly integrated into American culture and politics,
+conservatives felt like strangers in the elite ranks of the legal academy
+and organized bar. The structure of the Federalist Society made unquestionably
+good sense as a response to these specific problems and as a way
+to maneuver through institutions that were controlled by their rivals. The
+success of the Federalist Society, however, does not mean that it can be
+cloned, for actors today face a very different set of challenges than conservatives
+did. So, for example, legal liberals remain very strong in the elite
+circles of the legal profession and continue to be well networked in Washington,
+but they are weak in grassroots mobilization, and their elite organizations
+have few thick connections to mass organizations.14 Their ideas
+continue to possess unquestioned legitimacy in elite circles, even as they
+have lost their grip on the public imagination and become in some cases
+the object of ridicule. Legal liberals can still call law schools their home,
+even as they have become more and more isolated in American culture.
+To the degree that liberals invest resources replicating conservative organizations
+designed for problems different from the ones they face today,
+they will waste money, time, and human capital.
+That does not mean that there are no lessons of general applicability
+from the conservative organizational mobilization in the law. The first is
+the need for honesty. Conservatives were willing to face, at times brutally,
+the ideational and organizational weaknesses of the movement. The Horowitz
+Report, for example, was a major turning point for conservatives
+because it laid bare the manifest inadequacies of the movement, criticizing
+almost the entirety of the conservative infrastructure in the law, and did
+so directly to the holders of the movement’s purse strings. As painful as
+they were, these sharp criticisms primed conservative patrons for new
+kinds of organizations, led by new kinds of leaders. Those seeking to learn
+from conservatives would be well served, therefore, by being open to the
+possibility of failure.
+The conservative experience also suggests that little significant change
+is likely to come from existing organizations or leaders. Mellor and
+Bolick at IJ and Greve and McDonald at CIR had been miserable at
+MSLF and the Washington Legal Foundation because cases that represented
+real opportunities for legal conservatism, such as the Denver
+cable case and the cause of Thomas Lamprecht, could not be effectively
+pursued within their organizational confines. Change came instead from
+new organizations, and their predecessors only changed much later, if at
+all.15 This suggests that political movements need to anticipate, and, in
+fact, encourage, a significant degree of creative destruction in their own
+organizational apparatus if they are to quickly and effectively develop
+more effective responses.
+CONCLUSION 279
+
+The history of the conservative legal movement suggests that successful
+political patrons engage in spread betting combined with feedback
+and learning, rather than expecting too much from grand planning.16
+Conservatives’ learning and feedback did not, however, involve using
+narrow, technical forms of evaluation. Conservative patrons were willing
+to accept fairly diffuse, hard-to-measure goals with long-term payoffs
+when they had faith in the individuals behind the projects. This
+goes against the grain of much of contemporary philanthropy, which
+emphasizes rigorous, usually quantitative, evaluative measurement.
+Conservative patrons were typically quite close to the entrepreneurs they
+funded and depended on their own subjective evaluation of both a given
+entrepreneur’s effectiveness and the information that flowed through
+trusted movement networks—rather than on “objective” measures of
+outcomes. Where goals such as transforming the climate of opinion are
+concerned, this form of subjective evaluation may be more effective than
+seemingly precise measures that often leave out the most important, albeit
+difficult-to-measure, outcomes.
+Legal conservatives did not achieve as much as they have simply by
+more effectively packaging or marketing their ideas. Instead, conservatives
+became more effective by challenging, and ultimately changing, their
+ideas. Decades of debate in Federalist Society conferences and within the
+network of conservative scholars led to jettisoning the concepts of judicial
+restraint and strict constructionism, and then original intent, before finally
+settling (at least provisionally) on “original meaning.” Where legal
+conservatives in the early 1970s were focused on limiting the implications
+of Brown, the new generation of legal conservatives such as Clint Bolick
+of IJ openly embraced the more radical “antisubordination” interpretation
+of Brown, while disagreeing vigorously with liberals about its implications.17
+The conservative legal movement took ideas very seriously, and
+its patrons invested significant resources in serious, first-order discussion
+of fundamental commitments with little if any short-term payoffs. While
+many contemporary liberals seem obsessed with creating their own think
+tanks to allow for “instant response,” conservatives recognized the need
+to go back to “first things.” This was reflected, for instance, in the Federalist
+Society’s convention norms that panels should include debates among
+conservatives, as well as with liberals.
+Conservatives, therefore, were willing to carve out enough space from
+the movement’s old categories, commitments, and constituencies to allow
+serious intellectual discussion and argumentation, leading to a reconsideration
+of ideas, strategies, and alliances. This suggests that political movements
+need organizations and norms of deliberation that allow members
+to argue fervently among one another on matters of fundamental principle.
+Going back to first things also meant that conservatives were willing
+280 CONCLUSION
+
+to distance themselves from their existing constituencies, even when this
+meant challenging their allies’ short-term interests. Conservatives went
+out of their way to find cases that put them on the other side of business
+or that appealed to constituencies, such as inner-city blacks, who were
+outside of the conservative coalition. The willingness of intellectuals to
+reconsider fundamental principles went hand in hand with using litigation
+to reach out to new groups as part of a strategy of reshaping the movement’s
+reputation. Conservatives used strategic litigation to reshape perceptions
+that they were greedy, callous, captured by big business, and
+uninterested in the cause of racial justice. In the process, they reached out
+to new constituents by organizing around new issues. The willingness
+to experiment with new organizational approaches that is essential to
+organizational entrepreneurship, therefore, is most likely to come out of
+an environment of intellectual openness.
+Perhaps one of the most common mistakes that have been made by
+those who have attempted to learn from the conservative legal movement
+has been the tendency to confuse direct organizational goals and the desired
+by-products of activities with other ends. The Manne programs in
+the 1970s and 1980s and the lectures and conventions of the Federalist
+Society, for example, contributed mightily to the development of academic
+and professional networks. These networks spurred intellectual
+productivity, improved the information that conservatives could access in
+government, and assisted in identifying ideological sympathizers when
+staffing the federal judiciary and administrative agencies. As important as
+these outputs were, however, they were by-products, or external benefits,
+of activities and organizations that worked because they were not aimed
+directly at these goals. Professors and judges attended Manne’s seminars
+because they were deeply intellectually stimulating, and, despite the unquestioned
+presence of opportunists within its ranks, such stimulation
+remains the main force drawing lawyers and law students to Federalist
+Society meetings. Strong networks of the kind that came from these programs
+developed because of the emotional and intellectual intensity that
+comes from an activity that knits people together and not because the
+organizations serve instrumental goals for their members. Even when the
+objective of organizational mobilization is narrowly political, therefore,
+it may be more effectively pursued through means that are broader and
+more indirect.
+The final lesson to be drawn from the conservative legal experience
+concerns the relationship between structure and agency and is relevant to
+both social scientists and political activists. At any one time, the constraints
+of an existing regime can seem crushing and inescapable, frustrating
+the ability of individuals to create change of any consequence in the
+CONCLUSION 281
+
+world. The constraints and structures of any particular period are, however,
+often the creation of a previous generation’s political agents. In the
+short term, politics is, in fact, a world of constraints, but to agents willing
+to wait for effects that may not emerge for decades, the world is rich with
+opportunity. Activists would do well to learn from, and act upon, these
+examples of long-term effects. So, too, political scientists would serve
+their discipline well by taking the time to study them.
+This page intentionally left blank
+Appendix
+
+Interviews
+
+Douglas Baird. Dean (1994–99), University of Chicago Law School;
+currently Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law.
+October 2005.
+
+Derek Bok. President Emeritus and current Interim President, Harvard
+University; Dean (1968–71), Harvard Law School. October 2005.
+
+Clint Bolick. Cofounder and Counsel for Strategic Litigation, Institute
+for Justice; currently President and General Counsel, Alliance for School
+Choice. October 2003.
+
+Steven Calabresi. George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern
+University School of Law; Cofounder, Federalist Society.
+October 2001.
+
+Laurence Claus. Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law;
+former John. M. Olin Fellow at Northwestern University School of Law.
+December 2005.
+
+Robert Cooter. Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law and Director of the
+Program in Law and Economics, University of California, Berkeley Boalt
+Hall. May 2006.
+
+Roger Crampton. Dean (1973–80), Cornell University Law School.
+November 2005.
+
+Kenneth Cribb. Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, Reagan
+administration. April 2004.
+
+Steven Eagle. Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
+July 2005.
+
+Richard Epstein. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of
+Law, University of Chicago Law School. October 2005.
+
+George Gillespie. Director of the Washington Post Company and partner
+at Cravath, Swaine; at the Olin Foundation’s closing in 2005, President
+and Treasurer of its Board; formerly John M. Olin’s personal lawyer.
+October 2005.
+284 APPENDIX
+
+Michael Graetz. Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
+April 2006.
+
+Michael Greve. Cofounder, Center for Individual Rights; currently Director
+of the Federalism Project, American Enterprise Institute. July 2001;
+May 2004; August 2004.
+
+Ernest Hueter. President, National Legal Center for the Public Interest.
+June 2004.
+
+Sanford Jaffe. Program Officer (1968–83), Government and Law Program,
+Ford Foundation. October 2006.
+
+David Kennedy. President of the Earhart Foundation and Chairman of
+the Board of the Institute for Justice. March 2004.
+
+Duncan Kennedy. Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard
+Law School. October 2005.
+
+John Kramer. Vice President of Communications, Institute for Justice.
+October 2004.
+
+William Kristol. Editor, Weekly Standard; Chief of Staff (1989–93) for
+vice president of the United States; Board of Visitors (1997–2001), George
+Mason University. September 2005.
+
+Gary Lawson. Abraham & Lillian Benton Scholar, Boston University
+School of Law. July 2005.
+
+Leslie Lenkowsky. CEO (2001–3), Corporation for National; and Community
+Service; President (1990–97), Hudson Institute. May 2004.
+
+Henry Manne. Dean Emeritus, George Mason University School of Law;
+former Director of the Law and Economics Center (University of Miami,
+1974–80; Emory, 1980–86). November 2004; July 2005; August 2005.
+
+Jerry Mashaw. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. May 2006.
+
+Fred McChesney. Class of 1967 James B. Haddad Professor of Law,
+Northwestern University School of Law; formerly Associate Director for
+Policy and Evaluation, Federal Trade Commission; 1986–87 John M.
+Olin Fellow in Law & Economics at the University of Chicago Law
+School. October 2005.
+
+Michael McDonald. Acting Assistant Chairman for Programs, National
+Endowment for the Humanities; Cofounder, Center for Individual Rights.
+July 2001; August 2004.
+APPENDIX 285
+
+David McIntosh. Partner, Meyer Brown and Platt; member of Congress
+(1995–2001), Indiana 2nd; head of George H. W. Bush’s Council on Competitiveness.
+July 2005.
+
+William H. (Chip) Mellor. President and General Counsel, Institute for
+Justice, which he founded in 1991; President (1986–91), Pacific Research
+Institute for Public Policy. July 2001; October 2003; July 2004; October
+2004; May 2006.
+
+Eugene Meyer. President, Federalist Society. June 2004; October 2005;
+July 2006; November 2006.
+
+Jim Moody. Capital Legal Foundation. June 2004.
+
+Lee Liberman Otis. Office of Legal Counsel, George H. W. Bush administration;
+General Counsel (2001–5), Department of Energy. July 2005.
+
+Jeffrey Parker. Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
+July 2005.
+
+Terry Pell. President, Center for Individual Rights. November 2003;
+June 2004.
+
+James Piereson. Executive Director, Olin Foundation, 1985–2005. April
+2004; August 2005; July 2006.
+
+Daniel Polsby. Dean and Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason
+University School of Law; formerly Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law,
+Northwestern University School of Law. July 2005.
+
+Richard Posner. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
+Circuit; Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School.
+October 2005.
+
+George Priest. John M. Olin Professor of Law & Economics and Codirector
+of the John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public
+Policy, Yale Law School. May 2005; July 2005.
+
+Jeremy Rabkin. Professor of Government, Cornell University;
+founding member of Board of Directors, Center for Individual Rights.
+August 2004.
+
+Richard Rosett. Dean (1990–95), Rochester Institute of Technology College
+of Business; Dean (1974 to 1983), University of Chicago Business
+School. September 2005.
+
+Michael Rosman. General Counsel, Center for Individual Rights, 1993–
+present. November 2003.
+286 APPENDIX
+
+Warren Schwartz. Professor of Law and Director of the John M. Olin
+Program in Law and Economics, Georgetown Law School. July 2006.
+
+Robert Scott. Professor (1974–2006) and Dean (1991–2001), University
+of Virginia School of Law. Currently Alfred McCormack Professor of
+Law, Columbia University. May 2006.
+
+Steven Shavell. Samuel R. Rosenthal Professor of Law and Economics and
+Director of the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business,
+Harvard Law School. October 2006.
+
+Todd Zywicki. Professor of Law, George Mason University School of
+Law. July 2005; July 2006.
+Notes
+
+Introduction
+
+1. Patrick J. Buchanan to Richard Nixon, Washington, November 10, 1972,
+in From the President: Richard Nixon’s Secret Files, ed. Bruce Oudes (New York:
+Harper and Row, 1989), 558–68. David Yalof observes that Nixon made changing
+the behavior of the courts a central plank of his 1968 campaign, and explicitly
+directed his attorney general that he was looking for “young conservative nominees.”
+David Yalof, Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of
+Supreme Court Nominees (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 100.
+2. Vincent Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn’t
+(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
+3. William Kristol, “Disappointed, Depressed and Demoralized,” Weekly Standard,
+October 3, 2005.
+4. Todd Zywicki, “A Great Mind?” Legal Times, October 10, 2005, http://
+mason.gmu.edu/~tzywick2/Legal%20Times%20Mier%20Op%20Ed.pdf.
+5. Donald Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s
+Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Jane Mansbridge,
+Why We Lost the ERA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
+6. Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management
+in American Civic Life (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003).
+7. Steven Teles, Whose Welfare? AFDC and Elite Politics (Lawrence: University
+Press of Kansas, 1996); Steven Teles, “Conservative Mobilization Against the
+Activist State,” in The Transformation of American Politics, ed. Paul Pierson and
+Theda Skocpol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Jeffrey Henig,
+“Conservatives and Education, 1980–2005” and Judith Layzer, “Conservatives
+and the Environment, 1980–2005,” in Conservatism and American Political Development,
+ed. Brian Glenn and Steven Teles (forthcoming).
+8. There is one significant segment of the conservative countermobilization in
+the law that I do not examine directly in this book, and that is religious conservatives.
+The reasons for this are more practical than theoretical. First, there is already
+an excellent study of the subject, Steven Brown’s Trumping Religion: The Christian
+Right, the Free Speech Clause, and the Courts (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
+Press, 2003). Second, I do not believe that I could have obtained access to
+the kind of “inside” materials on religious conservatives that I have obtained on
+the rest of the conservative movement. Third, I lack the intellectual background,
+especially on the substance of American religious thought and organization, to do
+the subject justice. That said, I do believe that substantial work remains to be
+done on the subject, and that my emphasis on strategic choice and organizational
+development would add considerably to the foundation laid by Brown.
+288 N O T E S T O P A G E S 6–9
+
+Chapter 1
+Political Competition, Legal Change, and the New American State
+
+1. Robert Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge:
+Harvard University Press, 2001).
+2. Martha Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants (Cambridge: Harvard
+University Press, 1970).
+3. Skocpol, Diminished Democracy; Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg,
+Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized
+Its Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
+4. An analysis of the connection between a diffuse policy process and the rise
+of networked forms of coordination can be found in Chris Ansell, “The Networked
+Polity: Regional Development in Western Europe,” Governance, July
+2000, 303–33.
+5. Jack Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions,
+and Social Movements (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
+6. See, for example, Shep Melnick’s Regulation and the Courts: The Case of
+the Clean Air Act (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1983) and Between the Lines:
+Welfare Rights in Court (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994).
+7. Skocpol, Diminished Democracy; Crenson and Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy;
+Sidney Milkis, The President and the Parties (Oxford: Oxford University
+Press, 1993).
+8. See in particular Mark Landy and Martin Levin, eds., The New Politics of
+Public Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
+9. John Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University
+Press, 2002); Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, Politics by Other
+Means (New York: Norton, 2002); Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social
+Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1979).
+10. Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention: How Government
+Prioritizes Problems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
+11. Jeffrey Berry, The New Liberalism (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999).
+12. Jo Freeman, “The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican
+Party,” Political Science Quarterly 101 (1986): 327–56.
+13. Alvin Ward Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New
+Class: A Frame of Reference, Theses, Conjectures, Arguments, and an Historical
+Perspective on the Role of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia in the International
+Class Contest of the Modern Era (London: Macmillan, 1979). Neoconservatives
+also became attracted to the concept of the new class: one expression of their
+understanding of this phenomenon can be found in B. Bruce-Briggs, ed., The New
+Class? (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1979).
+14. Geoffrey Kabaservice, The Guardians: Kingman Brewster, His Circle, and
+the Rise of the Liberal Establishment (New York: Henry Holt, 2004).
+15. Jacob Hacker has persuasively argued that this strategy of “drift” has reduced
+the risk reduction functions of the American welfare state. Jacob Hacker,
+“Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of
+Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,” American Political Science Review
+98, no. 2 (2004): 243–60.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 9–10 289
+
+16. John Skrentny observes, for example, that when the Bilingual American
+Education Act was passed in 1967, “No one spoke out against bilingual education,
+either as a violation of American assimilationist ideals or as a pedagogy that
+would not or may not work.” Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution, 204.
+17. This broader understanding of party actors has similarities to the concept
+of the “political block” used by David Plotke in Building a Democratic Political
+Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s (Cambridge:
+Cambridge University Press, 1996). An account that makes activists a central component
+of the modern political party, and that attributes a significant degree of
+contemporary party polarization to them, is John Aldrich, in Why Parties?: The
+Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University
+of Chicago Press, 1995), chapter 6.
+18. The most concrete example of this incorporation of interest groups into
+the party system in contemporary politics is the Republican Party’s “K Street project,”
+and Grover Norquist’s “Wednesday Meeting” of conservative activists, but
+this coordination of interest group and party activity has now become an institutionalized
+feature of American politics across the political spectrum. See Nicholas
+Confessore, “Welcome to the Machine,” Washington Monthly, July–August
+2003.
+19. David Horowitz, The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in
+America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery 2006); Dinesh D’Souza, Illiberal Education:
+The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (New York: Free Press, 1991); Charles
+Sykes, Profscam: Professors and the Demise of Higher Education (Washington,
+D.C.: Regnery, 1988); Eric Alterman, What Liberal Media? The Truth About Bias
+and News (New York: Basic Books, 2004); Bernard Goldberg, Bias: A CBS Insider
+Exposes How the Media Distort the News (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2001);
+Robert Lichter, The Media Elite: America’s New Power Brokers (Bethesda, Md.:
+Adler and Adler, 1990); Sally Satel, PC, M.D.: How Political Correctness is Corrupting
+Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
+20. Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
+National Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law 6, no. 2 (1957): 279.
+21. Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (Chicago: University of Chicago
+Press, 1991), 15.
+22. Keith Whittington, “ ‘Interpose Your Friendly Hand’: Political Supports
+for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court,” American
+Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (2005): 583–96; J. Mitchell Pickerill and
+Cornell Clayton, “The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism,”
+Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 2 (2004): 233–48; Howard Gillman, “How
+Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts
+in the United States, 1875–1891,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 3
+(2002): 511–24.
+23. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University
+Press, 1993).
+24. Roy B. Flemming and B. Dan Wood, “The Public and the Supreme Court:
+Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods,” American Journal
+of Political Science 41, no. 2 (1997): 468–98; William Mishler and Reginald S.
+Sheehan, “The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact
+290 N O T E S T O P A G E S 10–13
+
+of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions,” American Political Science Review
+87, no. 1 (1993): 87–101; James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert
+S. Erikson, “Dynamic Representation,” American Political Science Review 89,
+no. 3 (1995): 543–65.
+25. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson, “Understanding the Constitutional
+Revolution,” Virginia Law Review 87, no. 6 (2001): 1045–1104. A similar argument
+is made by David Adamany, who emphasizes that the Supreme Court is most
+likely to come into conflict with rising partisan coalitions at precisely the moment
+when their legitimacy is most in doubt—in their early years. Thus, far from serving
+the legitimating function that Dahl pointed to, the Supreme Court tends to erode
+the legitimacy of rising political orders. David Adamany, “Legitimacy, Realigning
+Elections, and the Supreme Court,” Wisconsin Law Review 73:790–846.
+26. Pickerill and Clayton, “Rehnquist Court,” 236.
+27. Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make (Cambridge: Harvard
+University Press, 1997).
+28. Balkin and Levinson, “Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,”
+1088.
+29. Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
+1998), 3.
+30. Epp’s concept of the support structure is quite similar to Skowronek’s “alternative
+governing coalition,” described in Building a New American State (New
+York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Because I believe the concepts to be
+roughly similar, I will use the terms interchangeably.
+31. Marc Galantner, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
+Limits of Legal Change,” Law and Society Review 9, no. 1 (1974): 95–160; Kevin
+T. McGuire, “Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced
+Lawyers in Litigation Success,” Journal of Politics 57, no. 1 (1995): 187–96; Lee
+Epstein and Joseph Kobylka, The Supreme Court and Legal Change (Chapel Hill:
+University of North Carolina Press, 1992).
+32. H. W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
+1991).
+33. Jack Balkin, “Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics,”
+Yale Law Journal 110, no. 8 (2001): 1444–45.
+34. Owen Fiss, “Objectivity and Interpretation,” Stanford Law Review 34, no.
+4 (1982): 739–63.
+35. Epstein and Kobylka, Supreme Court.
+36. Michael Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights(Oxford: Oxford University
+Press, 2004). Recent evidence of this can be found in the Supreme Court’s
+decision in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) at 18–20.
+37. Artemus Ward and David Weiden, Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of
+Law Clerks At the United States Supreme Court (New York: NYU Press, 2006),
+73. Under Burger, Warren and Vinson, the percentage drawn from these seven
+schools was only slightly lower, 69 percent.
+38. David Yalof provides persuasive evidence that President Nixon found it
+very difficult to identify potential Supreme Court nominees, because of the shallow
+pool of viable conservative nominees and the weakness of the network that
+his attorney general could draw upon in identifying them. David Yalof, Pursuit
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 13–16 291
+
+of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees
+(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 97–132. The nomination of Sandra
+Day O’Connor, at the height of Ronald Reagan’s political power, can also be
+seen as an example of the consequences of a president being forced to make an
+ideologically uncertain nomination because of the thin pool of judicial candidates
+from which to draw. A strong network will also enhance the ability of the president
+to make “stealth” nominations to the bench when his own coalition has
+“private” information not accessible to opponents.
+39. This reproductive process will be limited by competitive pressures from
+rival law schools (which are, for the top law schools, somewhat muted because
+of the force of reputation and financial endowment) and the desire to hire former
+Supreme Court clerks as professors (which will be influenced by the partisan
+makeup of the Court). The latter pressure may have declined with the increasing
+importance of publications and joint degrees in initial legal academic hiring.
+40. Peter Eisinger, The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities
+(Madison, Wisc.: Institute for Poverty Research, 1973); Hanspeter Kriesi, “Political
+Context and Opportunity,” in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements,
+ed. David Snow, Sarah Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell,
+2004), 67–90; H. P. Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest:
+Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,” British Journal of Political
+Science 16, no. 1 (1986): 57–86.
+41. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social
+Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977):
+1212–41.
+42. Marshall Ganz, Five Smooth Stones: Strategy, Leadership, and the California
+Agriculture Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
+43. While Paul Pierson has urged us to think of structures as the consequence
+of actions earlier in a temporal sequence, he has, to my mind, underplayed the
+importance that conscious agent action can play in producing structures in future
+periods. The difference here is one of emphasis—Pierson sees structures as largely
+the result of accidents, while my approach emphasizes those that are the product
+of conscious political investment, defined as the expenditure of resources in one
+period designed to produce returns in future periods. Put another way, path dependence
+can be the product of agents oriented to the long term. Paul Pierson, Thinking
+in Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
+44. Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security; Marc Landy, Marc Roberts,
+and Steven Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong
+Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Richard Harris and Sidney
+Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies (Oxford: Oxford
+University Press, 1996), Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution.
+45. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly; Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins
+of the New Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
+46. Thomas Burke has made a similar argument in “On the Resilience of
+Rights,” in Seeking the Center: Politics and Policymaking at the New Century, ed.
+Martin Levin, Marc Landy, and Martin Shapiro (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
+University Press, 2001).
+292 N O T E S T O P A G E S 16–18
+
+47. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. Quentin
+Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 182.
+David Plotke refers to this as the “common sense” produced by a dominant political
+party. Plotke, Democratic Political Order.
+48. For examples of Bourdieu’s application of the “field” concept see his Homo
+Academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) and
+The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, trans. Susan Emanuel
+(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). Bourdieu’s concept of “fields”
+has similarities with the concept of “realms” in Daniel Bell’s Cultural Contradictions
+of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1976).
+49. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political
+Science Review 56, no. 4 (1962): 947–52. Similar arguments are made in
+Deborah Stone, “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas,” Political
+Science Quarterly 104, no. 2 (1989): 281–300; Roger Cobb and Marc Howard
+Ross, Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
+1997); Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, Agendas and Instability in American
+Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Steven Lukes, Power: A
+Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974).
+50. The following argument draws heavily on Mark Blyth, Great Transformations
+(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), as well as Frank Knight’s
+classic Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
+51. A similar point was made by Lee Ann Banaszak in her comparison of American
+and Swiss suffrage movements, Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity,
+Culture and the Struggle of Women’s Suffrage (Princeton: Princeton University
+Press, 1996).
+52. Traci Sawyers and David Meyer emphasize that existing opportunities may
+simply be “missed” due to lack of sufficient mobilization. “Missed Opportunities:
+Social Movement Abeyance and Public Policy,” Social Problems 46, no. 2 (1999):
+187–206.
+53. Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in Handbook for Theory and
+Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. J. G. Richardson (Westport, Conn.:
+Greenwood Press, 1986), 241–58; Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite
+Schools in the Field of Power, trans. Lauretta C. Clough (Stanford: Stanford University
+Press, 1996).
+54. Insurgent intellectuals constantly struggle to legitimate their academic endeavors.
+See Scott Frickel and Neil Gross, “A General Theory of Scientific/Intellectual
+Movements,” American Sociological Review 70, no. 22 (2005): 204–32.
+55. Mark A. Smith, The Right Talk: How Conservatives Transformed the
+Great Society into the Economic Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
+2007).
+56. Erik Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France (Cambridge: Cambridge
+University Press, 2003), 26–27. For a classic article on framing and social movements,
+see David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert
+D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
+Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81.
+57. Jane Mansbridge, “The Making of Oppositional Consciousness,” in Oppositional
+Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest, ed. Jane Mans-
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 18–19 293
+
+bridge and Aldon Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 7. The
+concept of oppositional consciousness is connected to what Doug McAdam has
+called “cognitive liberation.” See Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development
+of the Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago
+Press, 1982), 48–51.
+58. Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability.
+59. An example of how shared ideas can provide coordination in the absence of
+hierarchical oversight can be found in Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger: A
+Study in Administrative Behavior (Washington, D.C.: RFF Press, 1967), chapter 6.
+60. Chris Ansell, “Symbolic Networks: The Realignment of the French Working
+Class, 1887–1894,” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 2 (1997):
+359–90.
+61. Kevin Smart, Principles and Heresies: Frank S. Meyer and the Shaping of
+the American Conservative Movement (Wilmington, Del.: ISI, 2002). See also
+George Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945
+(New York: Basic Books, 1976); and Jeffrey Hart, The Making of the American
+Conservative Mind: National Review and Its Times (Wilmington, Del.: ISI
+Press, 2005).
+62. James Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American
+Journal of Sociology 94, Supplement (1988): 118.
+63. Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, The Critical Mass in Collective Action:
+A Micro-Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
+64. Marc Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology
+78, no. 6 (1973): 1360–80.
+65. Marc Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
+of Embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985): 481–510.
+66. Joel Podolny and Karen Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” Annual
+Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 62–64.
+67. Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual
+Change (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
+68. Teles, “Conservative Mobilization.”
+69. This may explain why so many of the early leaders of the conservative
+organizational network were neoconservatives (that is, former leftists or liberals).
+See in particular Irving Kristol, Reflections of a Neo-Conservative (New York:
+Basic Books, 1983).
+70. For a description of this long-term strategy of change, see Martha Derthick
+and Steven Teles, “From Third Rail to Presidential Commitment—And Back? The
+Conservative Campaign for Social Security Privatization and the Limits of LongTerm
+Political Strategy,” in Glenn and Teles, Conservatism and American Political
+Development; Teles, “Conservative Mobilization.”
+71. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University
+Press, 1995); Charles Perrow, “The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations,”
+American Sociological Review 26, no. 6 (1961): 854–66.
+72. The classic discussion of the role of patrons in solving the collective action
+problem is Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups. Walker was responding in this
+work primarily to Mancur Olson, whose The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge:
+Harvard University Press, 1971) predicted that while concentrated inter-
+294 N O T E S T O P A G E S 19–27
+
+ests would form groups with relative ease, it would be almost impossible for more
+diffuse interests to do so (with the exception of groups capable of providing selective
+incentives for membership).
+73. Edwards and McCarthy, for example, found that MADD chapters that
+received support from patrons were more than two and a half times as likely to
+survive as those that did not. Bob Edwards and John McCarthy, “Strategy Matters:
+The Contingent Value of Social Capital in the Survival of Local Social Movement
+Organizations,” Social Forces 83, no. 2 (2004): 621–51.
+74. This was a significant challenge for the NAACP LDF in its early years,
+when conflicts between the organization’s vision of civil rights led to conflict—
+and ultimately the withdrawal of support—with its major donor, the Garland
+Fund. Mark Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education
+(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
+75. Alan Jacobs, “The Politics of Investment: Theorizing Governments’ Policy
+Choices for the Long Term,” paper delivered to the American Political Science
+Association Meeting, September 2006; Teles, “Conservative Mobilization.”
+
+Chapter 2
+The Rise of the Liberal Legal Network
+
+1. Epp, The Rights Revolution.
+2. Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution.
+3. Spencer Weber Waller, Thurman Arnold (New York: NYU Press, 2005),
+126–27, 151–52. The most important of these was Coca-Cola. Thurman Arnold
+had built a close relationship with Coke’s president, Robert Woodruff, when he
+was assistant attorney general in the Antitrust Division, and leveraged this contact
+to sign up the company as Arnold, Fortas and Porter’s first major client.
+4. Peter Irons, The New Deal Lawyers (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
+1982), 298.
+5. Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A Biography (New Haven: Yale University Press,
+1992), 133.
+6. Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s
+to the 1980s (Union, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange, 2001), 207.
+7. Ibid., 213.
+8. Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Legal Education at Michigan, 1859–1959 (Ann
+Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1959), 85–87.
+9. Sandra Epstein, Law at Berkeley: The History of Boalt Hall (Berkeley, Calif.:
+IGS Press, 1997), 203, 224, 225.
+10. Robert Gordon, “Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty
+in the New Deal and After,” in History of the Yale Law School: The Triennial
+Lectures, ed. Anthony Kronman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004),
+84–91.
+11. Stevens, Law School, 157.
+12. Student Association of the School of Law, Yale University, The Yale Reporter:
+1948 Supplement.
+13. Arthur Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men,
+1817–1967 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 311.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 27–30 295
+
+14. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers, 299.
+15. Quoted in Jenna Rae McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston
+and the Struggle for Civil Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
+1983), 71.
+16. Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal Strategy, 30.
+17. Risa Golubuff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge: Harvard
+University Press, 2007); Kenneth Mack, “Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering
+and Politics in the Era Before Brown,” Yale Law Journal 115, no. 2 (2005):
+256.
+18. Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal Strategy, 145.
+19. Ibid., 157.
+20. The NAACP LDF was not, even after the formalization of its national staff,
+a wholly hierarchical organization. Its network of lawyers often initiated litigation
+at cross-purposes to its larger strategic objectives, a point noted in Tushnet and
+explored in greater detail in Risa Golubuff, “ ‘Let Economic Equality Take Care
+of Itself’: The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the
+1940s,” UCLA Law Review 52, no. 5 (2005): 1393.
+21. Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU
+(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 86.
+22. Ibid., 168.
+23. Ibid., 206.
+24. Ibid., 267.
+25. Jerold Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern
+America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 192.
+26. Ibid., 193.
+27. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago: Headquarters
+Office, 1950), 339.
+28. President’s Annual Address, “The Lawyer’s Responsibility to America,” in
+Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago: Headquarters Office,
+1951), 443.
+29. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly, 79–80.
+30. Auerbach, Unequal Justice, 199.
+31. Ibid., 236; Percival Roberts Bailey, “Progressive Lawyers: A History of the
+National Lawyers Guild, 1936–1958,” PhD diss., Rutgers University, 1979.
+32. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (1950), 222.
+33. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (1951), 218.
+34. Richard Abel, American Lawyers (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
+1991), 132.
+35. Ford Foundation Annual Report 1953 (New York: Ford Foundation,
+1953), 43; Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago: Headquarters
+Office, 1953), 119.
+36. These grants included $300,000 to the NLAA to work with the ABA in
+developing permanent legal aid offices in large cities, and to expand the availability
+of legal aid in underserved areas. Ford Foundation Annual Report 1957 (New
+York: Ford Foundation, 1957), 31.
+37. Ibid., 68.
+296 N O T E S T O P A G E S 30–34
+
+38. Ford Foundation Annual Report 1958 (New York: Ford Foundation,
+1958), 40.
+39. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 344 (1963).
+40. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago: Headquarters
+Office, 1963), 440–41.
+41. Earl Johnson, Justice and Reform: The Formative Years of the OEO Legal
+Services Program (New York: Russell Sage, 1974), 23.
+42. Martha Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement,
+1960–1973 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), chapter 3; Dorothy J. Samuels,
+“Expanding Justice: A Review of the Ford Foundation’s Legal Services Program,”
+Ford Foundation Archives, January 1984, 18.
+43. Robert Gordon, “The Legal Profession,” in Looking Back at Law’s Century,
+ed. Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth, and Robert Kagan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
+University Press, 2002), 32.
+44. Susan Lawrence, The Poor in Court (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
+1990), appendix C.
+45. Teles, Whose Welfare?, chapter 6.
+46. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago: Headquarters
+Office, 1961), 527.
+47. Johnson, Justice and Reform, 54.
+48. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago: Headquarters
+Office, 1965), 392–93.
+49. Ibid., 395. An internal Ford Foundation report from 1984 attributes the
+ABA’s shift to the “education spadework” done by the ABA’s committee on legal
+aid headed by Whitney North Seymour, and funded by the Ford Foundation. Samuels,
+“Expanding Justice,” 14.
+50. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago: Headquarters
+Office, 1966), 426.
+51. Ibid., 429.
+52. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago: Headquarters
+Office, 1967), 470.
+53. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago: Headquarters
+Office, 1970), 709.
+54. Ibid., 659, 661. Similar statements suggesting legal reform and activism as
+an alternative to violence in the streets can be found in the presidential addresses
+of Orison Marsden—Annual Report of the American Bar Association (1967),
+402–and William Gossett—Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago:
+Headquarters Office, 1969), 435, 437.
+55. Annual Report of the American Bar Association (1969), 439; Annual Report
+of the American Bar Association (1970), 664–65.
+56. Stephen Botein, “ ‘What We Shall Meet Afterwards in Heaven’: Judgeship
+as a Symbol for Modern American Lawyers,” in Professions and Professional
+Ideologies in America, ed. Charles Geison (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
+Press, 1983), 49–69.
+57. This shift in the American elite’s attitudes toward liberalism is captured
+wonderfully in Kabaservice, The Guardians.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 34–38 297
+
+58. Edward Kuhn, “The ABA’s Number One Issue,” Time, August 20, 1965,
+http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,841981,00.html.
+59. Johnson, Justice and Reform, 22.
+60. Ford Foundation Annual Report 1963 (New York: Ford Foundation,
+1963), 25.
+61. Ford Foundation Annual Report 1964 (New York: Ford Foundation,
+1964), 23.
+62. Ford Foundation Annual Report 1966 (New York: Ford Foundation,
+1966), 6.
+63. Charles Epp makes this point convincingly in The Rights Revolution by
+pointing to the failure of the Ford Foundation’s substantial investment in Indian
+legal reform.
+64. McGeorge Bundy, Action for Equal Opportunity (New York: Ford Foundation,
+1966), 3, http://www.fordfound.org/elibrary/documents/0325/toc.cfm.
+The text was delivered as a speech to the Urban League, August 2, 1966.
+65. Ibid., 5.
+66. Ibid., 7.
+67. Ibid., 9.
+68. Among the members of the board were the senior leadership of Bechtel,
+Polaroid, Royal Dutch Petrol, Cummins Engine, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune,
+and, of course, Henry Ford II.
+69. For example, grants for “minority rights” increased from 2.5 percent to 40
+percent of Ford Foundation giving between 1960 and 1970. Samuels, “Expanding
+Justice,” 22.
+70. Washington Legal Foundation, In Whose Interest? Public Law Activism in
+the Law Schools (Washington, D.C.: WLF, 1990).
+71. Heather MacDonald, “This Is the Legal Mainstream?” City Journal, Winter
+2006, http://www.city-journal.org/html/16_1_law_schools.html.
+72. Ibid.
+73. “Enhancing Theory with Practice: Evaluation of Four Years of Work by
+the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR)—a
+Foundation-supported Institution to Promote the Use of Clinical Education in
+Law Schools,” Project Evaluation, Division of National Affairs, Ford Foundation
+Archives (#002165), November 1972, 1.
+74. Samuels, “Expanding Justice,” 3.
+75. Ford Foundation, “Enhancing Theory with Practice,” 90.
+76. Ibid., 89.
+77. Ibid., 90.
+78. Ibid., 96–97.
+79. Quoted in Laura Kalman, “Professing Law: Elite Law School Professors in
+the Twentieth Century,” in Sarat, Garth, and Kagan, Looking Back, 351.
+80. John Randall, Presidential Address, ABA National Meeting, Washington,
+D.C., August 1960, Annual Report of the American Bar Association (Chicago:
+Headquarters Office, 1960), 480.
+81. See, for example, Orison Marsden’s ABA presidential address in 1969,
+when he advocated federal government support for clinical education to train
+298 N O T E S T O P A G E S 38–41
+
+lawyers to conduct criminal cases. Annual Report of the American Bar Association
+(1969), 662.
+82. Ralph Brown, David Cavers, Harry Kalvern, and Murray Schwartz, “Evaluation
+of the Professional Responsibility Program of the National Council of
+Legal Clinics,” Ford Foundation Archives (#000417), May 1965.
+83. Ibid.
+84. “Docket Excerpt—Board of Trustees Meeting, 3/28–29/68. National Affairs
+(Government and Law) 68-894. Establishment of a Council on Legal Education
+in Professional Responsibility,” Ford Foundation Archives, March 1968, 2.
+85. Robert Stevens, “Law Schools and Law Students,” Virginia Law Review
+59, no. 4 (1973): 579–80.
+86. “Between 1957 and 1970, entering students at each school we studied became
+increasingly liberal or radical. Combining percentages of ‘far left’ and ‘liberal’
+students the Yale aggregate rose from 56 percent in the class of 1960 to 80
+percent in the Class of 1972. By 1972, no less than 32 percent of the Yale entering
+class described themselves as ‘far left,’ a percentage at least twice as large as that
+at any other school. By 1972 ‘moderates’ and ‘conservatives’ could muster only
+13 percent of the entering Yale class; in the Class of 1960, 40 percent of the Yale
+respondents had put themselves in those categories. At the remaining schools, the
+percentage of ‘far left’ and ‘liberal’ students had risen dramatically, but about
+half of the 1970 and 1972 classes still thought of themselves as ‘moderate’ or
+‘conservative.’. . . Legal education and liberal or radical political views appear to
+be related. While the great majority of students tended to retain the same political
+outlook they had on entering law school, among those whose political philosophies
+shifted, 65 percent moved leftward. The liberalizing tendency was most perceptible
+in two instances. First, over a fifth of those who entered law school with
+a moderate political outlook characterized themselves as ‘liberals’ on graduation.
+Second, almost as large a percentage with a conservative political perspective on
+entering law school emerged viewing themselves as ‘moderates.’ ” Stevens, “Law
+Schools and Law Students,” 583–84.
+87. George Hicks, “The Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the
+Harvard Law School Student Body,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
+29, no. 2 (2006): 634.
+88. Ford Foundation Annual Report 1972 (New York: Ford Foundation,
+1972), 6.
+89. Between 1974–75 and 1984–85, the number of electives in “discrimination
+in the law” in American law schools increased by 92.9 percent, while electives in
+natural resources and the environment increased by 20 percent, on top of what
+appears to have been very substantial growth in the years just before. That said,
+electives in patent, copyright, and trademark leaped 115.6 percent. William Powers,
+A Study of Contemporary Law School Curricula (Indianapolis: Office of the
+consultant on Legal Education to the American Bar Association, 1987), 36. The
+new classes that reflected more liberal priorities were, in effect, layered onto the
+old law school curricula, rather than fundamentally altering it.
+90. Laura Holland, “Invading the Ivory Tower: The History of Clinical Education
+at Yale Law School,” Journal of Legal Education 49, no. 4 (1999): 504–34.
+91. Ibid., 520.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 41–45 299
+
+92. See, for example, J. Peter Byrne, “Academic Freedom and Political Neutrality
+in Law Schools: An Essay on Structure and Ideology in Professional Education,”
+Journal of Legal Education 43 (1993): 315.
+93. Auerbach, Unequal Justice, 278–79.
+94. Donna Fossum, “Law Professors: A Profile of the Teaching Branch
+of the Legal Profession,” American Bar Foundation Research Journal 5, no. 3
+(1980): 505.
+95. Ibid., 505.
+96. Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (New Haven: Yale
+University Press, 1996), 60.
+97. Everett Carl Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset, The Divided American
+Academy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1975).
+98. Ibid., 60.
+99. John McGinnis, Matthew Schwartz, and Benjamin Tisdell, “The Patterns
+and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty,” Georgetown
+Law Journal 93, no. 4 (2005): 1175, 1184.
+100. Charles Reich, “Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act,”
+Yale Law Journal 72, no. 7 (1963): 1347–60; “The New Property,” Yale Law
+Journal 73, no. 5 (1964): 733–87; “The Law of the Planned Society,” Yale Law
+Journal 75, no. 8 (1966): 1227–70; “Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution,”
+Harvard Law Review 76, no. 4 (1963): 673–754.
+101. Davis, Brutal Need, 82.
+102. Reich, “Mr. Justice Black,” 745.
+103. Davis, Brutal Need, 84.
+104. Reich, “The New Property,” 782–83.
+105. Ibid., 779.
+106. Ibid., 783–85.
+107. Elizabeth Bussiere, “The New Property Theory of Welfare Rights: Promises
+and Pitfalls,” Good Society 13, no. 2 (2004): 6.
+108. Lawrence, The Poor in Court, 32–33.
+109. One example of the impact of these law professors–activists is Richard
+Daynard’s Tobacco Control Research Center at Northeastern University Law
+School, which nurtured the antismoking movement’s legal network in its early
+days. Start-up funding for the Center was provided by the Rockefeller Foundation,
+and it “received a grant of more than $1 million from the National Cancer
+Institute to do ‘the legal research and analysis needed to support states, municipalities,
+health insurers and public interest groups as they pursue innovative legal
+interventions to reduce tobacco use.” Martha Derthick, Up in Smoke (Washington,
+D.C.: CQ Press, 2004), 100–101.
+110. Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
+the Bar of Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 16ff.
+111. Kalman, The Strange Career, 50.
+112. Ibid., 51.
+113. Fiss, “Objectivity and Interpretation,” 741.
+114. For instance, Frank Michelman’s foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s
+issue on the 1968 term began, “In the end, no doubt, a victorious War on Poverty
+will have somehow attacked and conquered relative deprivation.” Frank Michel-
+300 N O T E S T O P A G E S 45–51
+
+man, “The Supreme Court, 1968 Term,” Harvard Law Review 83, no. 1 (1969):
+7–282.
+115. See also Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard
+University Press, 1977); Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola,
+N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1978); Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State
+(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Owen Fiss, “Groups and the Equal
+Protection Clause,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no 2 (1976): 107–77.
+116. Martin Shapiro, “Interest Groups and Supreme Court Appointments,”
+Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1990): 955. There is still not, as of
+2006, a significant constitutional law casebook written by a conservative or libertarian,
+although a few are being prepared.
+117. Kalman, The Strange Career, 52.
+118. Mark Tushnet, “Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation
+of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies,” Texas Law Review 57 (1979): 1319.
+119. A good example of this skepticism can be seen in Duncan Kennedy,
+“American Constitutionalism as Civil Religion: Notes of an Atheist,” Nova Law
+Review 19 (1995): 909. Among the most prominent of the attacks on CLS were
+Duke Law School dean Paul Carrington, “Of Law and the River,” Journal of
+Legal Education 34 (1984): 222 and Owen Fiss, “The Death of the Law,” Cornell
+Law Review 72 (1986): 245.
+120. Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups.
+121. Works whose arguments were in the air at the time included Theodore
+Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969); Grant McConnell, Private
+Power and American Democracy (New York: Vintage 1966); Olson, Logic
+of Collective Action.
+122. Interview with McGeorge Bundy, Ford Foundation Archives, 25–26.
+123. “Advocacy, Law and the Public Interest” (Confidential Information
+Paper), Ford Foundation Archives, March 1970, 3.
+124. Interview with Sanford Jaffe, conducted by Thomas Hilbink, University
+of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ford Foundation Archives, October–November
+2001, 19, 20, 23, 24.
+125. Ibid., 20.
+126. Ford Foundation, “Advocacy, Law and the Public Interest,” 14. Donald
+Rumsfeld’s defense of legal services, and of OEO more generally, are discussed in
+James Mann, “Up Close: Young Rumsfeld,” Atlantic, November 2003.
+127. Jaffe, interview by Hilbink, 24.
+128. Ibid., 18.
+129. Jaffe interview.
+130. Ford Foundation, “Advocacy, Law and the Public Interest,” 9.
+131. Ibid., 10.
+132. Ibid., 13.
+133. Jeffrey Berry, Lobbying for the People (Princeton: Princeton University
+Press, 1977), 51.
+134. Jaffe, interview by Hilbink, 25.
+135. Berry, Lobbying for the People, 52. Interestingly, Ruckleshaus would later
+go on to be a significant figure in supporting public interest law, serving as cochair-
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 51–54 301
+
+man of the Council for Public Interest Law, which was directed by none other
+than Charles Halpern, the cofounder of the Center for Law and Social Policy. See
+for example the major report, Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the
+Scales of Justice: Financing Public Interest Law in America (Washington, D.C.:
+Council for Public Interest Law, 1976).
+136. Jaffe, interview by Hilbink, 25–26.
+137. Robert Rabin, “Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
+Law,” Stanford Law Review 28 (January 1976): 236.
+138. Jaffe interview.
+139. Jaffe, interview by Hilbink, 35.
+140. Anthony King, ed., The New American Political System, 2nd ed. (Washington,
+D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1990); Marc Landy and Martin
+Levin, The New Politics of Public Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
+Press, 1995).
+141. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “The Professionalization of Reform,” Public
+Interest, Fall 1965.
+142. Julian Zelizer, On Capitol Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
+143. Richard Stewart, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law,”
+Harvard Law Review 88, no. 8 (1975): 1667–1813.
+144. Joseph Smith, “Judicial Procedures as Instruments of Political Control:
+Congress’ Strategic Use of Citizen Suits,” Legislative Studies Quarterly: forthcoming;
+Joseph Smith, “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors: Statutory Changes
+to Judicial Review Under the Clean Air Act,” Political Research Quarterly 58
+(March 2005): 139–49; Michael McCann, Taking Reform Seriously (Ithaca, N.Y.:
+Cornell University Press, 1986), 61–67; Thomas Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits and
+Legal Rights: The Battle over Litigation in American Society (Berkeley and Los
+Angeles: University of California Press, 2002).
+145. On the concept of legislative “high demanders” and its implications for
+congressional organization, see Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, “The
+Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not
+Organized as Markets,” Journal of Political Economy 96, no. 1 (1988): 132–63.
+On traceability, see Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (New
+Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
+146. William Lunch, The Nationalization of American Politics (Berkeley and
+Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).
+147. Skocpol, Diminished Democracy.
+148. McCann, Taking Reform Seriously, 33.
+149. Teles, Whose Welfare?; Melnick, Between the Lines.
+150. Epstein and Kobylka, Supreme Court.
+151. On the role of judges as instigators of this movement, see Malcolm Feeley
+and Edward Rubin, Judicial Policymaking and the Modern State (Cambridge:
+Cambridge University Press, 1998). On the role of public interest litigants in
+prison reform, see Margo Schlanger, “Beyond the Hero Judge: Institution Reform
+Litigation as Litigation,” Michigan Law Review 97 (1999): 1994–2036.
+152. Epstein and Kobylka, Supreme Court.
+302 N O T E S T O P A G E S 54–60
+
+153. Jane Sherron de Hart, Litigating Equality: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminist
+Lawyers and the Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming);
+Reva Siegel, “Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
+Change: The Case of the de facto ERA,” California Law Review 94
+(2006): 1323.
+154. Sid Milkis and Richard Harris, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale
+of Two Agencies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
+155. Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution.
+156. David Kirp and Donald Jensen, eds., School Days, Rule Days (Philadelphia:
+Falmer Press, 1986).
+157. Ronald Formisano, Boston Against Busing (Chapel Hill: University of
+North Carolina Press, 2003); Jennifer Hochschild, The New American Dilemma:
+Liberal Democracy and School Desegregation (New Haven: Yale University Press,
+1984). Hochschild is quite clear that school desegregation could not be accomplished
+through normal, participatory political processes.
+158. Epstein and Kobylka, The Supreme Court.
+159. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts.
+160. Melnick, Between the Lines, 236.
+161. This suggests that the “non-median policy outcomes” that Jacob Hacker
+and Paul Pierson have identified with the contemporary Republican regime may
+not be an anomaly of the last decade, but a persistent feature of our constitutional
+system. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off Center: The Republic Revolution and
+the Erosion of American Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
+162. This is discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.
+163. Carlyle Hall, “CLIPI’s 30 Most Important Cases,” August 1997, http://
+www.clipi.org/pdf/importantmatters.pdf; see also New York Times, February 8,
+1975.
+164. Michael Greve, “Why Defunding the Left Failed,” Public Interest, Fall
+1987, 91–106.
+
+Chapter 3
+Conservative Public Interest Law I: Mistakes Made
+
+1. Chapters 3 through 7 are based to a considerable degree on materials obtained
+from privately available files. Unless otherwise noted, all sources were acquired
+under a condition of nontransferability and are on file with the author.
+2. Peter Swenson, Capitalists Against Markets (Oxford: Oxford University
+Press, 2002).
+3. David Vogel, “Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciousness
+of American Corporate Executives,” British Journal of Political Science
+8, no. 1 (1978): 45–78.
+4. The classic study of asymmetric information is George Akerlof, “The Market
+for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly
+Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (1970): 488–500.
+5. For a detailed discussion of these changes, see Lucas Powe, The Warren
+Court and American Politics (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
+Press, 2001).
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 60–66 303
+
+6. David Yalof, Pursuit of Justices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
+2001), 97–132.
+7. George Bisharat, “Right Lawyers for the Right Time: The Rise of the Pacific
+Legal Foundation,” unpublished manuscript.
+8. Hueter interview. Also see James Singer, “Liberal Public Interest Law Firms
+Face Budgetary, Ideological Challenges,” National Journal, December 8, 1979,
+2055.
+9. Jefferson Decker, “The Conservative Non-Profit Movement and the Rights
+Revolution,” paper delivered to the American Society of Legal Historians, Baltimore,
+November 18, 2006, 2–3.
+10. As Jefferson Decker notes, the election of Jerry Brown as governor of California
+in 1975 made it obvious to PLF that assistance from the state was unlikely
+to be forthcoming. As a consequence of this, PLF moved away from the welfare
+and social services cases that Zumbrun had brought with him from government
+service to the environmental issues that agitated his business supporters. Ibid., 4.
+11. Lee Epstein, Conservatives in Court (Knoxville: University of Tennessee
+Press, 1985), 133.
+12. Lewis Powell, “Attack on the American Free Enterprise System,” confidential
+memorandum to the United States Chamber of Commerce, August 23, 1971,
+2, www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources_document13.html.
+13. Ibid., 6.
+14. Hueter interview.
+15. For example, Theberge was the founding director of the Media Institute,
+one of the conservative movement’s first responses to “liberal media bias.” John
+Salmoa, Ominous Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), 112.
+16. Ibid., 125.
+17. Hueter interview.
+18. Unless otherwise documented, quotations derive from the interviews listed
+in the appendix.
+19. Hueter interview.
+20. R. McGreggor Cawley, Federal Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion
+and Environmental Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996).
+21. Kennedy would ultimately become the chairman of the board of the Institute
+for Justice, as well as the president of the Earhart Foundation.
+22. As discussed later in this chapter, Mellor would go on to be the president
+of the Pacific Research Institute and then the president of the Institute for Justice.
+23. Mellor interview.
+24. Decker, “Conservative Non-Profit Movement,” 3.
+25. William E. Schmidt, “Denver Suit Looming as Threat to Way Cities Award
+Cable TV Franchises,” New York Times, December 2, 1982. See also Mountain
+States Legal Foundation v. City of Denver, 567 F.Supp. 476 (D.Colo 1983), appeal
+dismissed 751 F.2d 1151 (1983).
+26. Vogel, “Why Businessmen Distrust Their State.”
+27. Kennedy interview.
+28. Chip Mellor, “Free Market Comes Full Circle,” Carry The Torch, May
+1995, http://www.ij.org/publications/torch/ctt_5_95.html.
+304 N O T E S T O P A G E S 67–72
+
+29. Horowitz was appointed chief counsel of the Office of Management and
+Budget in the first term of the Reagan administration, and is now a senior fellow
+at the Hudson Institute.
+30. I am indebted to Oliver Houck of Tulane Law School, who generously
+provided me with a copy of the Horowitz Report after I had done months of futile
+searching.
+31. Michael Horowitz, “In Defense of Public Interest Law,” in Institute for
+Educational Affairs, Perspectives on Public Interest Law, Foundation Officers
+Forum Occasional Papers, no. 2 (1981): 7–8.
+32. Michael Horowitz, “The Public Interest Law Movement: An Analysis with
+Special Reference to the Role and Practices of Conservative Public Interest Law
+Firms,” unpublished manuscript prepared for the Scaife Foundation, 1980, 24.
+33. Ibid., 3.
+34. Ibid., 73.
+35. Ibid.
+36. Ibid., 58.
+37. This same point was made, from a standpoint hostile to the conservative
+movement, in Oliver Houck, “With Charity For All,” Yale Law Journal 93, no.
+8 (1984): 1415–1563.
+38. Horowitz, “Public Interest Law Movement,” 26.
+39. Ibid., 28.
+40. Ibid., 30.
+41. Ibid.
+42. Ibid., 63.
+43. Ibid., 72.
+44. Ibid., 54.
+45. Ibid.
+46. Ibid.
+47. Amicus curiae participation can have an impact on judicial outcomes, but
+only when it is strategically focused and combined with actual control over litigation,
+in particular the choice of client and venue. Furthermore, Paul Collins has
+convincingly shown that it is not the sheer fact of participation, but the information
+that amici provide to the court, that leads to their (fairly small) impact. Paul
+Collins, “Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation
+in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation,” Law and Society Review 38, no. 4
+(2004): 807–32.
+48. Horowitz, “Public Interest Law Movement,” 83.
+49. McCann, Taking Reform Seriously. John Patrick Diggins makes the point
+in Up From Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) that
+many of the former communists among the early leaders of the conservative movement
+shared the temperament—if not the ideology—of their former comrades. It
+was specifically this nonconservative temperament that Horowitz sought to deploy
+for conservative ends.
+50. Cases that pitted conservatives against business interests would be, not
+problematic, but especially attractive, as they would help the movement “divest
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 72–76 305
+
+itself of the label and reality of being ‘business oriented’ ” and help it “establish
+the moral high ground.” Horowitz, “Public Interest Law Movement,” 87.
+51. Ibid., 85–86.
+52. Among the works that Horowitz may have had in mind were Thomas Sowell,
+Black Education: Myths and Tragedies (New York: McKay, 1972); Nathan
+Glazer, “The Limits of Social Policy,” Commentary 52, no. 3 (1971); Martin Anderson,
+Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States
+(Palo Alto: Hoover Institution, 1978); James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime
+(New York: Basic Books, 1975).
+53. The best examples of this were two books by Stuart Butler: Enterprise
+Zones: Greenlining the Inner Cities (New York: Universe Books, 1981) and, with
+Anna Kondratas, Out of the Poverty Trap (New York: Free Press, 1987).
+54. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Southeastern Law Foundation), December
+12, 1980. All dates on Olin Foundation reports are the date that the grantee
+was notified, which is consistent across the foundation’s history.
+55. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Southeastern Law Foundation), January
+25, 1982.
+56. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for New England Legal Foundation), September
+29, 1982.
+57. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Washington Legal Foundation), February
+9, 1982.
+58. Olin Grant Proposal Report (for Institute for Justice), June 16, 1992. Despite
+this skepticism, Olin provided the first foundation support to IJ beyond its
+original seed funders.
+59. Ibid.
+60. Dan Burt, Abuse of Trust: A Report on Ralph Nader’s Network (Chicago:
+Regnery Gateway, 1982).
+61. Ibid.
+62. Olin Grant Proposal Record, September 25, 1980.
+63. Olin Grant Proposal Record, June 23, 1982.
+64. Among the lawyers who rejected Westmoreland’s case were Clark Clifford
+of Clifford and Warnke, Edward Bennett Williams of Williams and Connolly, and
+Stanley Resor of Debevoise and Plimpton. Connie Bruck, “How Dan Burt Deserted
+the General,” American Lawyer, April 1985, 118.
+65. Sally Bedell and Dan Kower, “Anatomy of a Smear: How CBS News Broke
+the Rules and ‘Got’ Gen. Westmoreland,” TV Guide, May 24, 1982.
+66. Lenkowsky interview.
+67. Karen Donovan, V. Goliath: The Trials of David Boies (New York: Knopf,
+2005), 46.
+68. Although he was assisted by David Dorsen, an experienced libel lawyer,
+Burt actually tried the case.
+69. Donovan, V. Goliath, 48.
+70. Bruck, “Burt Deserted the General,” 118.
+71. Nancy Blodgett, “Ralph Naders of the Right,” American Bar Association
+Journal 70 (May 1984): 71. Here Burt is listed in the profiles of major conservative
+players.
+306 N O T E S T O P A G E S 77–89
+
+72. For instance, the Federalist Society’s journalists’ guide to legal experts lists
+seven experts in libel law, mainly professors of law, http://fedsoc.eresources.ws/
+doclib/20070326_JournalistGuide.pdf.
+73. Dan Burt to Michael Joyce, October 25, 1985.
+74. Described in detail in chapter 7.
+75. Capital Legal Foundation, Proposal for Funding, “Barriers to Entry Project,”
+appended to a letter from Dan Burt to James Piereson, August 8, 1986, 5–6.
+76. Ibid., 6.
+77. Ibid., 7–8.
+78. “The Center for Constitutional Litigation,” 1985, 1 (no author on document,
+but authored jointly by Chip Mellor and Clint Bolick).
+79. Ibid.
+80. Ibid., 4.
+81. Ibid., 3.
+82. Mellor interview.
+83. Pacific Research Institute, “Proposal for The Center for Applied Jurisprudence,”
+1987, 2.
+84. Ibid.
+85. Among the “possible task force participants or leaders” mentioned were
+Richard Epstein (professor of law, University of Chicago), Bernard Siegan (professor
+of law, University of San Diego), Fred McChesney (then professor at Emory
+University, now at Northwestern University School of Law), Randy Barnett (then
+professor of law at Chicago-Kent School of Law, now Georgetown University
+Law Center), Henry Manne, Rex Lee (former solicitor general of the United
+States), Clint Bolick, and Michael Horowitz. Ibid., 2–3.
+86. Pacific Research Institute, “Proposal for Center,” 3–4.
+87. Center for Individual Rights, “A Brief Description of Program Activities,”
+1989, 11.
+88. Clint Bolick, Unfinished Business (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute
+for Public Policy, 1991).
+89. Ibid., 4.
+90. Ibid.
+91. Ibid., 137.
+92. Clint Bolick, “Clinton’s Quota Queen,” Wall Street Journal, April 30,
+1993.
+93. Bolick, Unfinished Business, 141.
+94. Ibid., 136.
+95. Ibid., 140.
+96. Ibid., 141.
+97. On the idea of “counterrights,” see Thomas Burke, “On The Resilience of
+Rights,” in Levin, Landy, and Shapiro, Seeking the Center.
+98. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
+99. Bolick, Unfinished Business, 142–43.
+100. This is a lesson that recent scholars have framed as the “constitution beyond
+the courts.” See Reva Siegel and Robert Post, “Legislative Constitutionalism
+and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical
+Leave Act,” Yale Law Journal 112 (2003): 1943–2059.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 90–93 307
+
+Chapter 4
+Law and Economics I: Out of the Wilderness
+
+1. In the terms of the social movement literature, the University of Chicago
+served as an “abeyance structure” for the movement. Taylor defines the term abeyance
+as a “holding process by which movements sustain themselves in nonreceptive
+political environments and provide continuity from one state of mobilization
+to another.” For classical economics, that “nonreceptive” period lasted from
+the 1930s to the 1960s, and the existence of the University allowed classical economic
+ideas to develop despite their unpopularity, so that they were available
+when the political tides changed. Verta Taylor, “Social Movement Continuity:
+The Women’s Movement in Abeyance,” American Sociological Review 54, no. 5
+(1989): 761–75.
+2. Ronald Coase, “Law and Economics at Chicago,” Journal of Law and Economics
+36, no. 1 (1993): 243.
+3. Aaron Director, in “The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics
+at Chicago, 1932–1970,” ed. Edmund Kitch, Journal of Law and Economics
+26, no. 1 (1983): 176.
+4. Barbara Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez-Faire: Robert Hale
+and the First Law and Economics Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University
+Press, 1998).
+5. Director, in “The Fire of Truth,” 179.
+6. Henry Simons, “Some Comments on University Policy,” Henry Simons Papers,
+University of Chicago Special Collections, Box 8, Folder 8, pp. 23, 25.
+7. Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a
+Problem of Fiscal Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
+8. Henry Simons, A Positive Plan for Laissez-Faire: Some Proposals for a Liberal
+Economic Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936).
+9. George Stigler, in “The Fire Of Truth,” 178.
+10. Juan Gabriel Valdes, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile
+(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
+11. Henry Simons, “Memorandum I On a Proposed Institute of Political Economy,”
+Henry Simons Papers, University of Chicago Special Collections, Box 8,
+Folders 8–9.
+12. R. M. Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pelerin Society (Indianapolis: Liberty
+Fund, 1995), 90.
+13. A detailed examination of the history of this project can be found in Steven
+Teles and Daniel Kenney, “Spreading the Word,” in Growing Apart?: America
+and Europe in the 21st Century, ed. Jeffrey Kopstein and Sven Steinmo (Cambridge:
+Cambridge University Press, 2007).
+14. The idea of “remnantism” is most typically associated with Albert Jay
+Nock, Memoirs of a Superfluous Man (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943),
+but it can also be seen in the conclusion of Alisdair McIntyre’s After Virtue: A
+Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,
+1984).
+15. Coase, “Law and Economics at Chicago,” 246.
+16. Simons, “Memorandum I,” 1.
+308 N O T E S T O P A G E S 93–101
+
+17. Ibid., 2–3.
+18. Ibid., 8–9.
+19. Ibid., 12.
+20. Henry Simons to Friedrich Hayek, May 18, 1945, Henry Simons Papers,
+University of Chicago Special Collections, Box 8, Folder 9.
+21. Director, in “The Fire of Truth,” 181.
+22. Wesley Liebeler, in “The Fire of Truth,” 183.
+23. Robert Bork, in “The Fire of Truth,” 183.
+24. While it is possible to overstate this point, consider also Ronald Coase’s
+comment, quoted later in this section, that he was Saint Paul to Director’s Christ.
+25. A similar account appears in Kitch, “The Fire of Truth,” 184.
+26. Among the important figures who were a part of the Anti-Trust Project
+were John McGee, John Jewkes, William Letwin, David Sawers, Richard Stillerman,
+Robert Bork, and Ward Bowman.
+27. Coase, “Law and Economics at Chicago,” 247–48.
+28. Harold Demsetz, in “The Fire of Truth,” 189.
+29. Kitch, “The Fire of Truth,” 290.
+30. Coase, in “The Fire of Truth,” 192.
+31. This was largely due to student editing, a cause of persistent annoyance
+among law and economics scholars. See in particular Richard Posner, “The Future
+of the Student-Edited Law Review,” Stanford Law Review 47 (Summer 1995):
+1131.
+32. An intellectual history of law and economics, or one less focused on its
+place within the conservative movement, might emphasize the work of Guido
+Calabresi and the “Yale School” as much as I emphasize Posner and Chicago.
+33. See for example Guido Calabresi, “The Decision for Accidents: An Approach
+to Nonfault Allocation of Costs,” Harvard Law Review 78, no. 4 (1965):
+713–45.
+34. Gary Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal
+of Political Economy 76, no. 2 (1968): 169–217.
+35. A shrewd analysis of the Chicago “style” can be found in Jedediah Purdy,
+“The Chicago Acid Bath,” American Prospect 9, no. 36 (1998), www.prospect
+.org/print/V9/36/purdy-j.html.
+36. George Priest, “Henry Manne and the Market Measure of Intellectual Influence,”
+Case Western Reserve University Law Review 50 (Winter 1999): 325. It
+is generally accepted today that while Economic Analysis of Law was a powerful
+intellectual statement, Posner’s grasp on economic concepts was, at times, uneven.
+37. Interview with Henry Manne, conducted by Fred McChesney, Liberty
+Fund, 2006.
+38. Roberta Romano, “After The Revolution in Corporate Law,” Journal of
+Legal Education 55 (September 2005): 342.
+39. Baird interview.
+40. Dennis Carlton from the business school joined Lexecon’s leadership
+in 1978.
+41. Romano, “After the Revolution.”
+42. Michael Mandel, “Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses,”
+Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, no. 2 (1999): 115–16.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 101–106 309
+
+43. Ibid., 115.
+44. Amy Bach and Matt Siegel, “Midas Touch in the Ivory Tower: Selling Law
+and Economics,” American Lawyer, April 1994, 61.
+45. The original writing of this chapter and chapter 6 was completed before
+the publication of Henry Manne, “How Law and Economics Was Marketed in a
+Hostile World: A Very Personal History,” in The Origins of Law and Economics:
+Essays by the Founding Fathers, ed. Francesco Parisi and Charles Rowley (Cheltenham:
+Edward Elgar, 2005). Some of the quotations from my interviews with
+Manne closely track his discussion of similar matters in this essay.
+46. Henry Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal
+of Political Economy 73, no. 2 (April 1965). Manne’s direct target was Adolph
+Berle and Gardiner Means’s classic of old-style, liberal law and economics, The
+Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: McMillan, 1936).
+47. Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (New York: Free
+Press, 1966).
+48. S. M. Amadae and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The Rochester School: The
+Origins of Positive Political Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1
+(1999): 269–95; the term mother ship is Kenneth Shepsle’s, quoted in Jonathan
+Cohn, “When Did Political Science Forget about Politics?” New Republic, October
+25, 1999, http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/Kayser/TNR%20Cohn.pdf.
+49. Henry Manne to President W. Allen Wallis, “Report on Law Schools,”
+January 1968, 3–4.
+50. Ibid., 5.
+51. Ibid., 18.
+52. Ibid., 31–32.
+53. Ibid., 24–25.
+54. Ibid., 30.
+55. Ibid., 7.
+56. Letter from Henry Manne to Pierre Goodrich, October 5, 1970.
+57. Ibid.
+58. Letter from Henry Manne to Pierre Goodrich, December 15, 1972.
+59. Ibid.
+60. Ibid.
+61. Rosett interview.
+62. Henry Manne, “An Intellectual History of the George Mason University
+School of Law,” 1993, http://www.law.gmu.edu/econ/history.html. The Rochester
+bar seemed to believe that a new law school at Rochester would lead to a glut of
+lawyers in the area. The school’s heavy dependence on the stock price of Xerox
+and Eastman Kodak may have played a role after Manne left, but during the time
+he was there the price of both companies increased considerably.
+63. Ibid.
+64. See, for example, Ralph Winter, “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and
+the Theory of the Corporation,” Journal of Legal Studies 6, no. 2 (1997): 251–
+92 and Douglas Ginsburg, “Making Automobile Regulation Work: Policy Options
+and a Proposal,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 2 (1979): 74–
+102. Ginsburg also taught, in 1979, in an LEC advanced course for law professors,
+and became a close friend and advisor to Manne.
+310 N O T E S T O P A G E S 108–118
+
+65. Henry Manne to George Pearson, Fred C. Koch Foundation, December
+20, 1973.
+66. Ibid.
+67. Confidential Memorandum from Henry G. Manne on The Center for Studies
+in Law and Economics at the University of Miami Law School, April 16, 1974.
+68. Henry Manne to Richard A. Ware, President, Earhart Foundation, February
+21, 1975.
+69. Ultimately published as Kitch, “The Fire of Truth.”
+70. Priest, “Henry Manne.”
+71. Priest was never made an offer at Virginia because, as Goetz recalls, “he was
+dinged by his classmate Ron Cass, who said, ”George didn’t even make law review!”
+72. Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies (Cambridge: Harvard University
+Press, 1998).
+73. Henry Butler, “The Manne Programs in Economics for Federal Judges,”
+Case Western Reserve Law Review 50, no. 2 (1999): 355.
+74. Ibid., 357.
+75. Ibid., 359; Manne, “How Law and Economics Was Marketed,” 320.
+76. Butler, “The Manne Programs,” 370.
+77. Ibid., 376.
+78. Ibid., 366.
+79. Alliance for Justice, Justice for Sale: Shortchanging the Public Interest for
+Private Gain (Washington, D.C.: Alliance for Justice, 1993); Community Rights
+Counsel, Nothing for Free: How Judicial Seminars Are Undermining Environmental
+Protections and Breaking the Public’s Trust (Washington, D.C.: Community
+Rights Counsel, 2000).
+80. Legislation has been proposed that would, in effect, ban privately funded
+programs for judges, and transfer all such programming to the Federal Judicial
+Center. Federal Judiciary Ethics Reform Act of 2006, S2202, 109th Cong., 2nd
+sess. FREE notes that its seminars, like those of the LEC, are funded solely by
+charitable foundations, not corporations, and that legal challenges to its conferences
+in the federal courts have been firmly rejected. See FREE, “Info for Journalists,”
+http://www.free-eco.org/funding.php. .
+81. Manne, “How Law and Economics Was Marketed,” 319. The propriety
+of the LEC seminars has been defended by a frequent participant, James Q. Wilson,
+in “Junket Science?” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2006.
+82. This strategy was later followed by other conservative organizations inside
+the university, including Robert George’s James Madison Program at Princeton
+University. Timothy Webster, “A New Birth of Civic Education on Campus,” Philanthropy
+16, no. 2 (2002): 17–23.
+83. Manne, memorandum.
+84. Manne interview.
+85. Ibid.
+86. Ibid.
+87. Manne to Ware.
+88. Henry Manne to Henry King Stanford, March 18, 1980.
+89. Memorandum from Dennis Lynch, Associate Dean, University of Miami
+Law School, “Subject: Report of the Dean Search Committee to the Faculty,”
+October 30, 1979. This memo reported that “Henry Manne informed the Com-
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 118–121 311
+
+mittee that he regularly is contacted about his interest in being a Dean at other
+law schools. He has told all the schools that he has no interest unless they wish
+to bid for the Law and Economics Center. His asking price is $1,000,000 and two
+schools are interested, but he expects they will not make a firm offer. In any case,
+if a Dean who is committed to building a law and economics program is appointed
+at Miami, it would take a good deal more to attract him to another school.” It
+should be noted that this memo was written at a time when Manne was in substantial
+conflict with the administrators writing the minutes, so at the very least the
+tone may have been overstated. Manne in fact specifically challenged most of its
+claims, including that the LEC had an “asking price” of $1 million in a letter to
+the dean on November 9, 1979. Among the schools that had shown some interest
+in Manne was Cornell, an incident that is discussed in detail in chapter 6.
+90. “Chronology of Events with Supporting Documents, Re: Law and Economics
+Center Shift to Emory University,” November 22, 1980, 5.
+91. The impact of UVA and USC on the penetration of law and economics into
+elite institutions can be seen, for example, at Yale, NYU, and Chicago. Six of their
+most prestigious professors—Robert Ellickson (USC, 1970–81), Michael Graetz
+(UVA, 1972–79, USC, 1979–83); Jerry Mashaw (UVA, 1968–76), Allen Schwartz
+(USC, 1976–87), Richard Epstein (USC, 1968–73), and Michael Levine (USC,
+1968–87)—spent a significant part of their early careers at UVA or USC. UVA has
+done better at retaining its top figures in law and economics from this period,
+such as Lillian BeVier, Michael Dooley, and Charles Goetz. This list could also
+include Warren Schwartz of Georgetown and Robert Scott of Columbia, both of
+whom were at UVA in the 1970s (Scott left for Columbia in 2006). Early adoption
+of law and economics appears to have had a bottom-line effect on the status of
+the respective law schools. In the most recent US News rankings, UVA ranked 10
+and USC 16, considerably above the level of their undergraduate counterparts (24
+and 27, respectively).
+92. Sanford Kadish and Monrad Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes:
+Cases and Materials (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).
+93. Michael Graetz and Charles Whitebreak, “Monrad Paulsen and the Idea
+of a University Law School,” Virginia Law Review 67, no. 3 (1981): 445.
+94. Scott interview.
+95. Michael Levine, “ ‘Law and . . .’ in Theory and Practice: The USC Style
+and Its Influence,” USC Law Review 74 (November 2000): 225.
+96. In the words of Michael Levine, “[Robert] Ellickson, like me, had had difficulty
+interesting other law faculties in his style of analysis.” Levine, “Law and
+. . .” The term moneyball was popularized by Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art
+of Winning an Unfair Game (New York: Norton, 2003).
+97. Scott interview.
+98. While there are innumerable examples of these traditions, a few early
+works that focused on explaining political failure were: James Buchanan and
+Richard Wagner, Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes
+(New York: Academic Press, 1977); William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative
+Government (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, 1971); Roger Noll, “The Nature
+and Causes of Regulatory Failure,” Administrative Law Review 23, no. 4
+(1971): 424–37; Olson, Logic of Collective Action.
+312 N O T E S T O P A G E S 121–126
+
+99. Among the most important Caltech public choice scholars were John Ferejohn,
+Morris Fiorina, Charles Plott, Lance Davis, and Roger Noll; its faculty also
+included important non-public-choice scholars Morgan Kousser and Bruce Cain.
+100. Levine, “Law and . . .” A good example of the outcome of this relationship
+with Caltech is Michael Levine and Charles Plott, “Agenda Influence and Its
+Implications,” Virginia Law Review 63, no. 4 (1977): 561–604. At UVA, an early
+example of economist-lawyer collaboration using public choice is Jerry Mashaw,
+Charles Goetz, F. Goodman, Warren Schwartz, et. al., Social Security Hearings
+and Appeals: A study of the Social Security Administration Hearing System (Lexington,
+Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978).
+101. Mashaw begins his book Greed, Chaos and Governance: Using Public
+Choice to Improve Public Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) by recalling
+that “our monthly meetings in the early 1970s alternated between Charlottesville
+and Blacksburg. Papers were read. Wine was drunk. Argument lasted
+deep into the night” (vii).
+102. Ehrlich became famous in the mid-1970s for his work on the economics
+of crime, especially “The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment—A Question of
+Life and Death,” American Economic Review 65, no. 3 (1975): 397–417.
+103. Liquidated damages are a mechanism to encourage contractual compliance,
+whereby the damages to be paid if one or the other party violates contractual
+conditions are specified in the contract. The article was Charles Goetz and Robert
+Scott, “Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: A
+Theory of Efficient Breach,” Columbia Law Review 77 (1977): 554.
+104. This connection between clustering and increasing returns has been observed
+in economic geography, as in Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, and Anthony
+Venables, The Spatial Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), and in the sociology
+of ideas, as in Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies (Cambridge:
+Harvard University Press, 1998).
+105. While admitting that the Manne programs had an important impact on
+others, Scott recalls that “Graetz, Jeffries and I, looking back on it, behaved a
+little badly. We didn’t take it quite as seriously as Henry wanted us to. . . . It was
+the collection of very smart, productive scholars at Virginia at that time, the young
+Turk, ambitious part of the faculty, that had the greatest influence on me, especially
+in private law.” Scott interview.
+106. Olin Grant Proposal Record, Olin Foundation Archives, September
+19, 2001.
+107. Thomas D. Morgan, “Status Report on the School of Law, Emory University,”
+July 15, 1981, 30–31.
+108. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Olin Fellowship Program), Olin Foundation
+Archives, September 25, 1980.
+109. Olin Foundation, “A Report on the Law and Economics Program at
+Emory University,” Olin Foundation Archives, 1983, 1.
+110. Manne interview.
+111. Olin Foundation, “Report on the Law and Economics Program,” 1.
+112. Manne interview.
+113. James T. Laney to Henry Manne, May 3, 1982.
+114. Henry Manne to John M. Olin, May 17, 1982.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 127–138 313
+
+115. Ibid.
+116. F. Stuart Gulley, The Academic President as Moral Leader: James T.
+Laney at Emory University, 1977–1993 (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press,
+2001), 174.
+117. Ibid., 42.
+118. Lewis Rockwell to Henry Manne, March 31, 1982.
+119. Memo from Roger Miller, “Re: Location of LEC Building,” no date,
+attached to March 31, 1982 letter from Lewis Rockwell.
+120. Henry Manne to Michael Joyce, May 5, 1982.
+121. Olin Foundation, “Report on the Law and Economics Program,” 2.
+122. Ibid., 2.
+123. Ibid., 2–3.
+124. Piereson interview.
+125. Olin Foundation, “Report on the Law and Economics Program,” 3.
+126. Michael Joyce to Henry Manne, December 1, 1982.
+127. James Laney to Henry Manne, December 10, 1982.
+128. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the John M. Olin
+Foundation, Olin Foundation Archives, March 31, 1983.
+129. “Statement of Purpose: Chattahoochee Institute,” attached to letter from
+Manne to Jim Cowart, May 17, 1983.
+130. Expanded activities come from document titled “New Institute,”
+attached to letter of April 25, 1983.
+131. William Rosett to Henry Manne, May 24, 1983.
+132. John Miller, A Gift of Freedom: How the John M. Olin Foundation
+Changed America (New York: Encounter, 2005), chapter 3.
+133. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Economics Institute for Federal Judges),
+Olin Foundation Archives, November 1, 1985.
+134. Manne interview.
+
+Chapter 5
+The Federalist Society: Counter-Networking
+
+1. See, for example, People for the American Way, The Federalist Society: From
+Obscurity to Power, http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/file_4.pdf, August 2001; Institute
+for Democracy Studies, The Federalist Society and the Challenge to a Democratic
+Jurisprudence, January 2001.
+2. The Society typically presents itself as an organization of “conservatives and
+libertarians,” which describes their programs and membership accurately. For the
+sake of felicity of expression, I will simply use the term conservative to describe
+the Society’s ideas, except where the distinction is relevant.
+3. David Brock, Blinded by the Right: The Conscience of an Ex-Conservative
+(New York: Crown, 2002).
+4. “Proposal for a Symposium on the Legal Ramifications of the New Federalism,”
+Federalist Society Archives, 1982, 1.
+5. Ibid., 5
+6. Ibid., 2.
+314 N O T E S T O P A G E S 139–144
+
+7. Lee S. Liberman to Richard Larry, August 29, 1982.
+8. “Proposal To Form a National Conservative Legal Organization,” Federalist
+Society Archives, October 15, 1982.
+9. Ibid.
+10. Ibid.
+11. Eugene Meyer to Richard Larry (Scaife Family Charitable Trusts), October
+25, 1983. It would be a mistake to assume that the prominence of these placement
+activities reflects their importance to the Society’s leaders. Rather, they were emphasized
+because the impact of the majority of the Society’s activities were, as the
+letter notes, “difficult to measure accurately.”
+12. Eugene Meyer is the son of Frank Meyer, who, as an editor at National
+Review, took the lead in meshing tradition and liberty into conservative
+“fusionism.”
+13. Hicks, “Conservative Influence,” 650; Otis interview.
+14. Otis interview. The Institute for Educational Affairs was started by Irving
+Kristol to funnel corporate money into conservative organizations. While IEA was
+not an overwhelming success, its support for the Federalist Society was a notable
+exception.
+15. Michael Horowitz was general counsel to the Office of Management
+and Budget between 1981 and 1985. Today, he is a senior fellow at the Hudson
+Institute.
+16. McIntosh had founded the Chicago chapter of the Society along with Lee
+Liberman Otis.
+17. Cribb interview.
+18. An excellent study of the Reagan administration’s view of the permanent
+bureaucracy, especially in the Department of Justice, is Marissa Martino Golden,
+What Motivates Bureaucrats? Politics and Administration During the Reagan Administration
+(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
+19. I am indebted to Todd Zywicki for this insight.
+20. Sidney Blumenthal, “Quest for Lasting Power: A New Generation is Being
+Nurtured To Carry the Banner for the Right,” Washington Post, September 25,
+1985.
+21. “How To Form a Conservative Law Student Group,” Chicago Federalist
+Society, Harvard Society for Law and Public Policy, Stanford Foundation for
+Law and Economic Policy, Yale Federalist Society, and the Leadership Institute,
+1982, 3.
+22. Ibid., 4.
+23. Ibid., 7.
+24. As we shall see later, the Society created institutional mechanisms, such as
+the absence of elections for national leadership, that also helped to dampen factional
+conflict.
+25. “How to Form a Conservative Law Student Group,” 4.
+26. McIntosh interview.
+27. The debate between original intent and original meaning focuses on
+whether fidelity to the Constitution requires judges to deduce the intention of the
+framers of a particular provision, or whether attention should be focused solely
+on the meaning of the terms at the time that it was passed.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 146–152 315
+
+28. Recall that Nollan was the breakthrough takings case of the Pacific Legal
+Foundation, discussed in chapter 3.
+29. Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington
+(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977).
+30. Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Form 990,
+1983–2000.
+31. The source for the Student and Lawyer Chapters, 1996–2001 is the “Federalist
+Society Annual Reports, 1995–2001.” The 1993 data is taken from “December
+7, 1993 Trustee Meeting Briefing Materials,” Federalist Society. Data for
+1988, 1991, 1994, and 1995 are rough estimates taken from the same document.
+32. Meyer interview.
+33. Figures taken from “Campaign for the Federalist Society,” Federalist Society
+Archives, 1997, 14.
+34. The decline in the Society’s membership in 2002 was driven by a sharp
+drop in its programming in law schools (which are its primary mechanism of
+campus recruitment) due to speakers’ reluctance to fly in the wake of the 9/11
+attacks.
+35. A number of one-half travel stipends are available for travel to the annual
+student conference of the Society, chapter heads have their expenses covered for an
+annual training meeting in Washington, and fairly small honoraria are provided to
+speakers.
+36. Otis interview.
+37. Eugene Meyer to Michael Joyce, August 20, 1984.
+38. Meyer interview.
+39. Eugene Meyer to James Capua, Institute for Educational Affairs, October
+21, 1983. The specific figures were $30,000 from IEA, $36,000 from the Olin
+Foundation, $2,500 from the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, $15,000 from the
+JM Foundation, and $15,000 from the Sarah Scaife Foundation.
+40. Miller, A Gift of Freedom.
+41. Lee Liberman Otis to E. Spencer Abraham, March 6, 1985.
+42. “Development Board for Federalist Society,” Federalist Society Archives,
+February 1988. Hatch’s name comes up repeatedly in fund-raising memos, as well
+as in fund-raising letters sent out by the Society under his name. Along with Robert
+Bork, he appears to be the figure with the strongest and most consistent support
+for the Society’s fund-raising activities. For example, the five-year plan indicates
+that Bork and Hatch were the cochairmen of the development push that
+helped bring the Society’s budget to over a million dollars per annum. Federalist
+Society Board of Directors, “Five Year Plan and Development Activities, Revised
+and Annotated” (submitted to the Development Board), Federalist Society Archives,
+1989, 7.
+43. Federalist Society Board of Directors, “Five Year Plan,” 5.
+44. Ibid.
+45. A powerful critique of the public choice approach to interest groups and
+social movements is Wilson, Political Organizations.
+46. “Confirmation Hearing on the Nominations of Michael Chertoff and
+Viet D. Dinh to be Assistant Attorneys General,” Hearing before the committee
+316 N O T E S T O P A G E S 152–163
+
+on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 9, 2001, Senate
+Hearing 107–298.
+47. Ibid., written questions submitted by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.).
+48. Senator Orrin Hatch, “In Defense of the Federalist Society,” 108th Cong.,
+1st sess., Congressional Record (January 9, 2003). S120-3.
+49. For the distinction between civil and enterprise association, see Michael
+Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). For
+the need to find a balance between these poles, see Michael Oakeshott, The Politics
+of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism (New Haven: Yale University Press,
+1996).
+50. “Proposal to Form a National Conservative Legal Organization.”
+51. Irving Kristol to Eugene Meyer, October 3, 1985. Just a few months earlier
+the idea was referred to in a letter from Eugene Meyer to Mr. Tom Bell, Simpson,
+Thatcher and Bartlett, July 19, 1985.
+52. “The Federalist Society Litigation Center,” Federalist Society Archives,
+summer 1985.
+53. “Federalist Society Litigation Center: Status Report,” Federalist Society
+Archives, May 5, 1986.
+54. “Federalist Society Litigation Task Force,” Federalist Society Archives,
+date uncertain, 1985–86.
+55. Confidential letter to Eugene Meyer, name and date redacted.
+56. Meyer interview.
+57. Federalist Society, Grant Proposal to the Brady Foundation, Pro Bono Populi
+Center, Executive Summary, 3.
+58. Federalist Society, “Pro-Bono Activity at the AmLaw100,” 2003, http://
+www.fed-soc.org/resources/id.45/default.asp.
+59. Federalist Society, Pro Bono Populi Center proposal.
+60. Ibid., 2.
+61. Eugene Meyer estimates that it was from 1983 or 1984.
+62. “Federalist Society Recommendation and Evaluation of Judges,” Federalist
+Society Archives, 1983–84.
+63. Confidential interview.
+64. Sekulow is chief counsel at the American Center for Law and Justice.
+65. David D. Kirkpatrick, “In Alito, GOP Reaps Harvest Planted in 1982,”
+New York Times, January 30, 2006.
+66. Meyer interview.
+67. Jeanne Cummings, “Point Man For Miers Juggles Allegiances,” Wall Street
+Journal, October 26, 2005, A4.
+68. Minutes, Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Organizational
+Meeting, July 31, 1982, Westpark Hotel, Rosslyn, Va., Item 3.
+69. Theda Skocpol, “Associations Without Members,” American Prospect 10,
+no. 45 (1999), www.prospect.org/print/V10//45/skocpol-t.html.
+70. Francesca Polletta, Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American
+Social Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
+71. Jo Freeman, “Crises and Conflicts in Social Movement Organizations,”
+Chrysalis 5 (1978): 43–51.
+72. Meyer interview.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 164–168 317
+
+73. The remarkable density of the Federalist Society’s networks is demonstrated
+in Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth, and John Heinz, “Lawyers of the
+Right: Networks and Organization,” Case Western Reserve University School of
+Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-10, May 2006, http://papers.ssrn.com/
+sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=903326.
+74. Dinesh D’Souza, Letters to a Young Conservative (New York: Basic Books,
+2002), 33–34.
+75. On this point, consider a very early (August 20, 1984) letter from Eugene
+Meyer to Michael Joyce of the Bradley Foundation, where he notes that, despite
+the critical need to engage practicing lawyers for financial purposes, “we are convinced
+that it is best to direct our efforts to involve the legal community as a whole
+more toward the educational rather than the networking aspects.”
+76. Society networks also increase the probability that conservatives can identify
+other conservatives in the employment process, through the increasing the
+number of “weak ties” within the movement. On the importance of weak ties in
+employment, see Granovetter, “Strength of Weak Ties.”
+77. Behavioral research has shown that discussions in groups organized on
+ideological lines tends to produce greater polarization. See, for example, Cass R.
+Sunstein, “Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go to Extremes,” Yale Law Journal
+110, no. 1 (2000): 92–94. This suggests that the Society and its liberal sister, the
+American Constitution Society, do not simply reflect ideological polarization, but
+may help to accelerate it by increasing the frequency of personal interactions in
+ideologically homogeneous settings.
+78. One way of thinking about stigma is that it is the opposite of what Bourdieu
+has called “distinction.” Reducing stigma is, consequently, a critical contribution
+to building up the cultural capital of the movement. This concept is discussed
+in greater detail in chapter 1.
+79. This was true in the Society’s early years, one example of which is Russell
+Van Patten, then-head of the Yale Federalist Society, who noted back in 1986 that
+“there are a lot of closet Federalists.” Jill Abramson, “Right Place at the Right
+Time,” American Lawyer, June 1986, 99.
+80. See chapter 6.
+81. “Three Year Expansion Plan for the Development of the Federalist Society
+Into An Effective National Conservative Legal Organization,” Federalist Society
+Archives, 1984.
+82. On the idea of preference falsification, see Timur Kuran, Private Truths,
+Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge:
+Harvard University Press, 1995).
+83. IJ’s state chapters are discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.
+84. Where the Society has been less effective has been in convincing conservative
+lawyers that ideologically informed pro bono activity is a professional obligation.
+The consequences of this are discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.
+85. “Federalist Society General Proposal, 1983–1984,” Federalist Society Archives,
+6.
+86. “Three Year Expansion Plan,” 2.
+87. Ibid., 4.
+318 N O T E S T O P A G E S 168–178
+
+88. Thomas P. Main to Eugene Meyer, January 3, 1984. Meyer responded to
+this letter by noting that “it is very likely that a majority of the ABA’s membership
+is to the right of the leadership and staff which are primarily responsible for the
+organization’s public opinions. This also explains why the ABA’s political bias is
+not as well known as it should be. I think this subject is worth a small monograph
+. . .” Eugene Meyer to Thomas Main, January 23, 1984. After the defeat of the
+Bork nomination, the Society would begin to increase its watchdog role vis-a`-vis
+the ABA well beyond a “small monograph.”
+89. “Federalist Society General Proposal, 1984–1985,” Federalist Society Archives,
+6.
+90. “From the Editors,” ABA Watch 1, no. 1 (August 1996): 2. http://
+www.fed-soc.org/Publications/ABAwatch/August1996/editors.htm.
+91. Calabresi clerked for Bork on the D.C. Circuit and helped him write The
+Tempting of America (New York: Free Press, 1997).
+92. “Development Planning Meeting, October 4, 1990,” attached document
+entitled, “Trustee Action Status (as of 10/03/90),” Federalist Society Archives.
+93. For example, “1991 Development Projects Discussion and Timetable” in
+the Federalist Society Archives mentions the effectiveness of Judge Bork in the
+area of direct mail, signifying Bork’s usefulness in rallying support for the Society
+among the broader conservative movement.
+94. The full list of practice groups includes administrative law, civil rights, corporations,
+criminal law and procedure, environmental law and property rights,
+federalism and separation of powers, financial services and e-commerce, free
+speech and election law, intellectual property, international and national security
+law, labor and employment law, litigation, professional responsibility, religious
+liberties, and telecommunications.
+95. Eugene Meyer to Kristen Avansino, E. L. Wiegand Foundation, July 28,
+1995, 1–2.
+96. Ibid.
+97. Federalist Society, “Interim Report on the E.L. Wiegand Practice Groups,”
+Federalist Society Archives. This report was submitted to Kristen Avansino by
+Eugene Meyer.
+98. Ibid.
+99. There is also a program of Olin Fellows in Law and Economics, which is
+administered directly by the Olin programs in law and economics at individual
+law schools.
+100. “Proposal to the John M. Olin Foundation Inc. for the John M. Olin
+Fellows in Law for the 2000–2001 Academic Year,” Federalist Society Archives,
+March 15, 1999, 3.
+101. Ibid.
+102. This is discussed in greater detail, in the case of law and economics, in
+chapter 6.
+103. Anne Schneider-Mayerson, “Harvard Law on a Heterodox Spree, Listing
+to the Right,” New York Observer, December 5, 2005, http://www.observer.com/
+printpage.asp?iid=11980&ic=News+Story+3, accessed December 17, 2005.
+104. Confidential interview.
+105. Confidential interview.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 179–184 319
+
+106. Moore interview.
+107. See Steven Teles, “Conservative Counter-Mobilization and the Modern
+Administrative State,” in Transformations of American Politics, ed. Paul Pierson
+and Theda Skocpol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
+108. For a concise study of this success, see Steven Teles and Timothy Prinz,
+“The Politics of Rights Retraction: Welfare Reform From Entitlement to Block
+Grants,” in Levin, Landy, and Shapiro, Seeking the Center.
+109. An insightful argument for the benign influence of this movement is John
+Judis, The Paradox of American Democracy: Elites, Special Interests and the Betrayal
+of the Public Trust (New York: Pantheon, 2000), while a useful history of
+this establishment is Kabaservice, The Guardians.
+
+Chapter 6
+Law and Economics II: Institutionalization
+
+1. Morton Horwitz, “Law and Economics: Science or Politics?” Hofstra Law
+Review 8, no. 4 (1980): 905.
+2. As noted in chapter 1, the concept of an idea being “on” or “off the wall”
+comes from Jack Balkin, “Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics,”
+Yale Law Journal 110, no. 8 (2001): 1407–58.
+3. Survey evidence shows that economists are not, in any simple way, more
+“conservative” than the general public—there are about as many questions where
+economists are more liberal than the public than where they are more conservative.
+The distinctions come in the composition of economists’ attitudes. Caplan
+finds that, compared to the general public, economists “are even less worried
+about high profits, executive pay, and downsizing, and are more likely to see both
+downsizing and current economic disturbances as good on the whole. Economists
+are also much more likely to accept a supply-and-demand explanation for the gas
+price rise, and have more optimistic views of the quality of new jobs, and the
+growth of real incomes and wages over the past 20 years. . . . [On the other hand,
+they] worry even less about foreign aid, immigration, welfare, affirmative action,
+and the work ethic.... Economists also have left-leaning perspectives on high
+taxes, tax cuts, and female labor force participation, and right-leaning perspectives
+on tax breaks, business investment in the workforce, and families’ need for
+two incomes.” Bryan Caplan, “What Makes People Think Like Economists? Evidence
+on Economic Cognition from the ‘Survey of Americans and Economists on
+the Economy,’ ” Journal of Law and Economics 44, no. 2 (2001): 414. To the
+degree that “lawyer-economists” share the preferences of disciplinary economics,
+they will tend to share the social—and even redistributive—liberalism of their
+colleagues in the legal academy, but will differ from the markedly in their preference
+for market arrangement in the economy.
+4. Miller, A Gift of Freedom, 21.
+5. Donald Downs, Cornell ’69: Liberalism and the Crisis of the American University
+(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).
+6. Minutes, Board of Trustees Meeting, Olin Foundation Archives, July 5,
+1979, 4.
+320 N O T E S T O P A G E S 184–193
+
+7. Crampton interview.
+8. John M. Olin to Thomas Rhodes, 1980.
+9. Miller, A Gift of Freedom, 67.
+10. Ibid.
+11. Minutes of the John M. Olin Foundation Steering Committee Meeting,
+Olin Foundation Archives, November 25, 1981.
+12. Minutes of the John M. Olin Foundation Steering Committee Meeting,
+Olin Foundation Archives, March 15, 1983.
+13. Minutes, John M. Olin Foundation Board of Trustees Meeting, Olin Foundation
+Archives, March 31, 1983, 2.
+14. Minutes, John M. Olin Foundation Board of Trustees Meeting, Olin Foundation
+Archives, January 22, 1981, 1.
+15. “Report to the Trustees on the Future Direction of the Grants Program”
+(prepared by the Foundation Staff and reviewed by the Steering Committee), Olin
+Foundation Archives, November 23, 1982, 6.
+16. Ibid., 24.
+17. It should also be noted that in the twenty years after this report was written,
+the S&P 500 would increase tenfold (and this ignores the impact of dividends).
+In combination with the additional funds that were put into the foundation at
+Olin’s death, his direction that all of the funds be spent in a relatively short period
+of time, and the relatively few existing commitments of the foundation, the resources
+for aggressive grant-making were substantial.
+18. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Yale Law School), Olin Foundation Archives,
+May 16, 2000.
+19. Harvard and Yale law schools have placed more graduates in top teaching
+positions than all other law schools combined. Leiter Reports, “The Best Law
+Schools for the ‘Best’ Jobs in Law Teaching,” http://www.leiterrankings.com/jobs/
+2006job_teaching.shtml.
+20. Mark Tushnet, “Critical Legal Studies: A Political History,” Yale Law Journal
+100, no. 5 (1991): 1515–44.
+21. David Kairys, “Law and Politics,” George Washington Law Review 52
+(1984): 243–62; Clare Dalton, “An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine,”
+Yale Law Journal 95, no 5 (1985): 997–1114.
+22. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860
+(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
+23. Duncan Kennedy, “Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy,” in The
+Politics of Law, ed. David Kairys (New York: Basic Books, 1982; 2nd ed., 1990;
+3d ed., 1998).
+24. Horwitz’s PhD from Harvard was, in fact, in government.
+25. Duncan Kennedy, “First Year Law Teaching as Political Action,” Law and
+Social Problems 1 (1980): 47.
+26. Duncan Kennedy, “Rebels from Principle: Changing the Corporate Law
+Firm From Within,” Harvard Law School Bulletin, Fall 1981, 39.
+27. Calvin Trillin, “A Reporter at Large: Harvard Law,” New Yorker, March
+26, 1984, 53. George Gillespie confirms that the Trillin article was very important
+in spurring the interest of both himself and fellow board member Richard
+Furlaud.
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 194–202 321
+
+28. Minutes, John M. Olin Board of Trustees Meeting, Olin Foundation Archives,
+May 22, 1984.
+29. Minutes, John M. Olin Board of Trustees Meeting, Olin Foundation Archives,
+May 31, 1984.
+30. Piereson interview.
+31. See, for example, his defense of the Socratic method of law teaching in
+Philip Areeda, “The Socratic Method,” Harvard Law Review 109, no. 5 (1996):
+911–22.
+32. Minutes, John M. Olin Board of Trustees Meeting, Olin Foundation Archives,
+December 13, 1984.
+33. Minutes, John M. Olin Board of Trustees Meeting, Olin Foundation Archives,
+January 17, 1985.
+34. My account draws heavily on Hicks, “Conservative Influence.”
+35. Ibid., 674. The letter was so inflammatory that Morton Horwitz, who was
+originally on the CLS side of the panel with Kennedy, withdrew.
+36. Ibid., 676.
+37. Ibid., 684.
+38. Bok is alluding in this passage to the tenure denials of Clare Dalton and
+David Trubek, which are considered by many to be the turning point in the fortunes
+of CLS at Harvard.
+39. Arthur Schlesinger, The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (Boston:
+Houghton, Mifflin, 1949). A more recent version of the same argument can be
+found in Peter Beinart, The Good Fight: Why Liberals—And Only Liberals—Can
+Win the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).
+40. Olin Grant Proposal Record, Olin Foundation Archives, October
+10, 1973.
+41. Robert C. Clark to William E. Simon, November 28, 1994; emphasis
+added.
+42. Robert Cooter, “What is Law and Economics? Why Did it Succeed,” lecture,
+Vanderbilt University, Nashville, April 28, 2006.
+43. Figure 6.1 is based on data on grants to law and economics compiled by
+Media Transparency, and accessed at http://www.mediatransparency.org. It understates
+some of these sources, such as the Earhart Foundation, for which data
+was only available from 1995 onward. It also fails to include donations from
+individuals to law and economics programs.
+44. They were William Baxter, Kenneth Scott, John Barton, Marc Franklin,
+Paul Goldstein, Mitch Polinsky, Tom Campbell, Robert Ellickson, Ronald Gilson,
+and Robert Mnookin, as well as the future Nobel Prize–winning economist
+Myron Scholes, who held a joint appointment in the school.
+45. Paul Brest to James Piereson, May 26, 1987.
+46. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Stanford Law School), Olin Foundation
+Archives, May 23, 1996.
+47. Ibid.
+48. Overview of John M. Olin Grants in Law (Academic), Olin Foundation
+Archives, spring 2002.
+322 N O T E S T O P A G E S 202–213
+
+49. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Stanford Law School), Olin Foundation
+Archives, April 12, 2004. The Olin Foundation’s terminal grant to Stanford’s Law
+and Economics Program was $3 million.
+50. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Boalt Hall School of Law), Olin Foundation
+Archives, June 18, 1987.
+51. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Boalt Hall School of Law), Olin Foundation
+Archives, March 29, 1994.
+52. See discussion of this incident in chapter 7.
+53. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Georgetown University), Olin Foundation
+Archives, December 21, 1993.
+54. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Columbia University School of Law),
+Olin Foundation Archives, March 29, 1994.
+55. Williamson, who also held positions in the business school and economics
+department, moved to Berkeley from Penn in 1988.
+56. Olin Grant Proposal Record (for Boalt Hall School of Law), Olin Foundation
+Archives, September 15, 1998.
+57. Ibid.
+58. Cooter interview.
+59. One study showed that there were six Republicans as compared to thirtysix
+Democrats on the Boalt Hall faculty. See Daniel Klein and Andrew Western,
+“How Many Democrats per Republican at UC-Berkeley and Stanford? Voter Registration
+Data Across 23 Academic Departments,” Academic Questions, 2004,
+http://www.ratio.se/pdf/wp/dk_aw_voter.pdf.
+60. This point is made in greater detail in Richard Posner, “A Review of Steven
+Shavell’s Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law,” Journal of Economic Literature
+44, no. 2 (2006): 405–14.
+61. Letter from [name redacted] to James Piereson, October 31, 1990.
+62. Manne interview.
+63. Henry Manne, “An Intellectual History of the George Mason University
+School of Law,” Law and Economics Center, GMU School of Law, 1993,
+www.law.gmu.edu/econ/history.html.
+64. Admission to AALS is effectively mandatory for law schools that aspire to a
+national reputation. Affirmative action continues to be a major bone of contention
+between the GMU law school and its credentialing authorities. David Bernstein,
+“Affirmative Blackmail,” Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2006.
+65. Thomas Morgan, “Admission of George Mason to Membership in the Association
+of American Law Schools,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 50, no.
+2 (1999): 447–48.
+66. Morgan, “Admission of George Mason,” 450.
+67. Manne to David Kennedy, Earhart Foundation, May 13, 1987.
+68. Manne to Robert J. Hurley, VP and General Counsel, NL Industries, June
+18, 1987.
+69. Olin Grant Proposal Record (request for LEC, federal judges workshop,
+faculty workshops, research projects and Supreme Court Economic Review), Olin
+Foundation Archives, December 21, 1993.
+70. Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University
+of Chicago Press, 1971).
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 215–227 323
+
+71. Zwycki interview.
+72. Leiter’s Law School Rankings, http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter
+/rankings02/faculty_quality.html; http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/
+rankings02/citations.html; http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings02/
+books.html.
+73. Ibid., http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/rankings03.html.
+74. Ibid., http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/differences_from_
+USNews.html.
+75. As of fall 2006.
+76. Ibid., http://www.leiterrankings.com/students/2006student_quality.shtml.
+77. GMU is unranked in placing law teachers, is not in the top 25 in placing
+students in top law firms, and did not place any clerks on the Supreme Court until
+the 2008 term. http://www.leiterrankings.com/jobs/2006job_teaching.shtml;
+http://www.calvin.edu/admin/csr/students/sullivan/law/; http://www.leiterrankings
+.com/jobs/1991scotus_clerks.shtml.
+
+Chapter 7
+Conservative Public Interest Law II: Lessons Learned
+
+1. Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
+2. Lamprecht v. Federal Communications Commission, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C.
+Cir. 1992).
+3. McDonald interview.
+4. Center for Individual Rights, “A Brief Description of Program Activities,”
+1.
+5. Ibid., 2.
+6. As noted earlier, Greve had studied at Cornell with Jeremy Rabkin, a student
+of James Q. Wilson at Havard, whose Political Organizations put the question of
+organizational maintenance at the forefront in explaining the behavior of interest
+groups and social movements. This same focus on organizational maintenance is
+present in Michael Greve, “Environmentalism and the Rule of Law: Administrative
+Law and Movement Politics in West Germany and the United States,” PhD
+diss., Cornell University Department of Government, 1987.
+7. CIR, “A Brief Description.”
+8. For a systematic study of the benefits of repeat play, see Kevin McGuire,
+“Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation
+Success,” Journal of Politics 57, no. 1 (1995): 187–96.
+9. McDonald interview.
+10. CIR, “A Brief Description,” 3.
+11. Ibid., 2.
+12. This strategy of “counterrights” is described in Burke, “On the Resilience
+of Rights.”
+13. CIR, “A Brief Description,” 4.
+14. Ibid., 5–6.
+15. The Reagan administration did not just produce conservative lawyers, but
+also helped in the creation of conservative law firms. Both Cooper, Carvin and
+324 N O T E S T O P A G E S 227–233
+
+Rosenthal and Wiley, Rein and Fielding were founded in the 1980s by veterans of
+the Reagan administration, and along with the older Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher
+provided a welcoming environment for lawyers interested in conservative public
+interest law.
+16. A highly critical assessment of the libertarianism of Internet millionaires
+can be found in Paulina Borsook, Cyberselfish: A Critical Romp Through the
+Terribly Libertarian Culture of High Tech (New York: Public Affairs, 2000).
+17. Greve interview.
+18. CIR, “A Brief Description,” 10–11.
+19. Paul Weaver’s The Suicidal Corporation (New York: Simon and Schuster,
+1988) is a powerful statement of how some thinkers of libertarian sympathies
+were recognizing this insight.
+20. Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal Strategy.
+21. By the “WLF–Lamprecht problem,” McDonald is referring to the first generation’s
+unfavorable organizational economics of taking on major, original
+litigation.
+22. Center for Individual Rights, “Social Responsibility Project,” n.d., probably
+late 1989.
+23. Robert Kuttner, “Bleeding Heart Conservative: Jack Kemp, Caring Republican,”
+New Republic, June 11, 1990.
+24. “A partnership of Pepperdine University and the United States Departments
+of Justice and Education,” Ronald Stephens, Executive Director, to
+Michael S. Greve, October 20, 1989.
+25. While this point may seem harsh, it is not without scholarly support, such
+as Tracey Meares and Jeffrey Fagan, “Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control:
+The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities,” March 2000, Columbia
+Law School, Public Working Paper No. 010. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
+sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=223148.
+26. McDonald interview.
+27. Center for Individual Rights, “A Proposal and Request for Funding” (submitted
+to the John M. Olin Foundation), February 1990, 3.
+28. See, for example, Malcolm Feely and Edward Rubin, Judicial Policymaking
+and the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
+29. Further evidence that the move toward libertarianism was driven by the
+imperatives of American law, rather than the preferences of conservative activists,
+can be seen in the shifting emphasis of religious conservative public interest lawyers.
+Where they once focused on reviving older understandings of the establishment
+clause, religious conservative PILFs have shifted their energies to the free
+speech provisions of the First Amendment. In practice, this has led those firms to
+move from defending to circumscribing the authority of local governments. In
+the process, religious conservatives have increasingly drawn lessons from—and in
+many cases drawn on the precedents created by—civil libertarians. This shift is
+shrewdly described in Stephen Brown, Trumping Religion: The New Christian
+Right, The First Amendment, and the Courts (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
+Press, 2004).
+30. McDonald interview. McGuire had been employed by the Georgetown
+Law Center admissions department in an administrative capacity. While working
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 233–239 325
+
+there, he examined the files of admitted applicants, and found a substantial gap
+between the GPAs and LSAT scores of black and white students. He subsequently
+published an article in the law school paper reporting his findings, which touched
+off a ferocious debate, including demands for his expulsion. Ultimately, McGuire
+and the law school settled on a reprimand for violating a duty of nondisclosure.
+McGuire’s account of the issue can be found in Timothy McGuire, “My Bout
+with Affirmative Action,” Commentary 93 (April 1992): 50–52.
+31. Michael Greve to James Piereson, April 5, 1991, 1.
+32. See, for example, Jeffrey Henig, “Education Policy and the Politics of Privatization
+Since 1980,” in Glenn and Teles, Conservatism and American Political
+Development.
+33. Greve to Piereson, 2.
+34. Dinesh D’Souza’s bestselling Illiberal Education came out at the same time
+that CIR threw itself into the area of campus free speech.
+35. Greve to Piereson, 3–4.
+36. Center for Individual Rights, “A Proposal and Request For Funding” (submitted
+to the John M. Olin Foundation), May 6, 1991, 3.
+37. Center for Individual Rights Academic Freedom Defense Fund, “Report
+on Activities, 1992–1993 and Request for Continued Funding,” (submitted to the
+John M. Olin Foundation), May 18, 1993, 2–3.
+38. McDonald interview.
+39. Steven Balch, President, NAS, to Michael Greve, May 12, 1993, 2.
+40. This legislative hesitancy is documented in John Skrentny, “Republican Efforts
+to End Affirmative Action: Walking a Fine Line,” in Seeking the Center, 132–
+71, as well as Gary McDowell, “Affirmative Inaction: The Brock-Meese Standoff
+on Federal Racial Quotas,” Policy Review 48 (Spring 1989): 32–37.
+41. The case he refers to is Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 200 U.S. 321, 337.
+42. Bolick, Unfinished Business; Mark Pollot, Grand Theft and Petit Larceny:
+Property Rights in America (San Francisco: PRI, 1993); Jonathan Emord, Freedom,
+Technology and the First Amendment (San Francisco: PRI, 1991). Mark
+Pollot’s book was originally designed to be written by Gail Norton, then at the
+Mountain States Legal Foundation. Her participation was cut short when she was
+elected attorney general of Colorado, a position that served as a stepping-stone
+to her recent position as U.S. secretary of the interior.
+43. Institute for Justice, Grant Application Letter (recipient redacted) February
+10, 1992, 4.
+44. Ibid.
+45. Stuart Butler, Enterprise Zones: Greenlining the Inner Cities (New York:
+University Books, 1981); Walter Williams, The State Against Blacks (New York:
+McGraw Hill, 1982); Nina Easton, Gang of Five: Leader at the Center of the
+Conservative Crusade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 196.
+46. Chip Mellor to James Piereson, September 2, 1994, 4.
+47. Olin Grant Report on the Institute for Justice, June 16, 1992.
+48. Clint Bolick, Voucher Wars (Washington, D.C.: Cato, 2003), 218, 219.
+49. Charles Koch is the CEO and owner of Koch Industries, the largest privately
+held corporation in the United States. He was also a founder of the Cato
+326 N O T E S T O P A G E S 239–243
+
+Institute in 1977, and has been the largest supporter of libertarian causes over the
+last thirty years.
+50. Mellor interview.
+51. Institute for Justice, Grant Application Letter, 1–2.
+52. Ibid., 6.
+53. Ibid., 2.
+54. Ibid., 3.
+55 Jenkins v. Leininger (filed in the Cook County, Ill., Circuit Court, County
+Department, Chancery Division, on June 10, 1992) and Arviso v. Honig (filed in
+the Los Angeles County Superior Court on June 11, 1992). IJ’s detailed description
+of the cases can be found at http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/chicago/
+backgrounder.html.
+56. Olin Grant Report, June 16, 1992.
+57. For example, in 2002 IJ filed suit in Arizona along the lines of its earlier
+suits in Chicago and Los Angeles. http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/
+az_voucher_remedy/3_7_02pr.html. In this case, IJ attempted to intervene in an
+existing school funding case, arguing that the remedy for state constitutional violations
+should be vouchers rather than additional funding for the public school
+system.
+58. Mellor interview.
+59. Michael McCann, Rights at Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
+1994).
+60. Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Coking (filed in Atlantic
+County, NJ Superior Court on December 10, 1996).
+61. Mellor interview.
+62. Ibid.
+63. O’Connor’s dissent claimed starkly, “Any property may now be taken for
+the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be
+random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate
+influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development
+firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer
+property from those with fewer resources to those with more.” 454 U.S. 469
+(2005).
+64. This figure is taken from Institute for Justice, “Legislative Action Since
+Kelo,” http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/State-Summary-Publication.pdf.
+Excellent studies of the post-Kelo backlash, and its effects on the planning
+process, can be found in David Cole, “Why Kelo is Not Good News for
+Local Planners and Developers,” Georgia State University Law Review 22, no. 4
+(2006): 803–56; Timothy Sandefur, “The ‘Backlash’ So Far: Will Americans Get
+Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform,” Michigan State Law Review 2006, http://
+ssrn.com/abstract=868539; Ilya Somin, “Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic
+Development Takings After Kelo,” Supreme Court Economic Review 15
+(2007), http://ssrn.com/abtract=874865.
+65. Mellor interview.
+66. McCann, Rights at Work, 51. See, for example, Somin, “Controlling the
+Grasping Hand,” Sandefur, “The ‘Backlash’ So Far,” Ilya Somin and Jonathan
+Adler, “The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings and Environ-
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 243–251 327
+
+mental Protection,” Washington University Law Review (forthcoming); and the
+symposium “The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and Urban
+Development: After County of Wayne v. Hathcock,” Michigan State Law Review
+2004, no. 4.
+67. Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: A Five-Year, State-by-State Report
+Examining the Abuse of Eminent Domain (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
+Justice, 2003).
+68. Institute for Justice, “Proposal: Strategic Research Program,” October
+2006.
+69. McCann, Rights at Work.
+70. This is one of the most important claims of Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow
+Hope (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
+71. Chip Mellor, “The IJ Way,” Carry the Torch, August 2000, http://
+www.ij.org/publications/torch/. IJ has since moved to new offices in Arlington,
+Virginia.
+72. John Kramer, “A Vision to Communicate,” Liberty and Law 5, no. 4
+(1996), http://www.ij.org/publications/liberty/.
+73. William Haltom and Michael McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics,
+Media and the Litigation Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
+74. Bolick, Voucher Wars , 110–11.
+75. Ibid., 90.
+76. Bolick, quoted in ibid., 110–11.
+77. Bolick interview.
+78. Diana Schemo, “Group Vows to Monitor Academia’s Responses,” New
+York Times, June 25, 2003, A2.
+79. Pell interview.
+80. The distinction comes from Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel, “The American
+Civil Rights Tradition: Anti-Classification or Anti-Subordination?” Miami Law
+Review 58 (2003): 9–33.
+81. Pell was deputy assistant secretary of education from 1985 to 1988, then
+general counsel and chief of staff in the Office of Drug Control Policy in the
+George H. W. Bush administration.
+82. Levin was infamous for his views on the relationship between race, IQ, and
+criminality, and defended the use of “statistical discrimination.” For a discussion
+of the case, see Nathan Glazer, “Levin, Jeffries and the Fate of Academic Autonomy,”
+Public Interest, Summer 1995, 14–40.
+83. Ann Coulter, for example, was on the staff of CIR before carving out a
+career attacking liberalism.
+84. Center for Individual Rights, Docket Report, October 1998, 8.
+85. Center for Individual Rights, Docket Report, August 1996, 3.
+86. Ibid., 7.
+87. Among the many movies that place liberal lawyering at their center are To
+Kill a Mockingbird, And Justice for All, A Civil Action, North Country, and Erin
+Brockovich. It would be difficult to come up with a single film that places a lawyer
+for a conservative issue in the same light.
+88. McDonald interview.
+89. Pell interview.
+328 N O T E S T O P A G E S 251–265
+
+90. This ordering may have been due to IJ’s expectation of donor interest,
+rather its own sense of priorities.
+91. Chip Mellor, Foundation Funding Request (specific foundation redacted),
+February 3, 1992, 2–3.
+92. While IJ’s list of those who have given $10,000 or more to the organization
+is publicly available, CIR’s is not. In order to get a rough sense of the overlap
+between the two organizations’ funding base while keeping CIR’s donors anonymous,
+I presented Terry Pell of CIR with IJ’s $10,000-plus list and asked him to
+calculate these figures.
+93. http://www.ij.org/pdf_folder/financials/financial_snapshot.pdf; http://www
+.cir-usa.org/articles/cir_ar_2004_new.pdf.
+94. Brown, Trumping Religion. Brown also observes that the Alliance Defense
+Fund has invested considerable resources in training Christian conservative lawyers,
+and has demanded that those who attend its programs donate a specific number
+of hours to public interest litigation.
+95. Bolick interview.
+96. Ibid.
+97. Clint Bolick, “Clinton’s Quota Queens,” Wall Street Journal, April 30,
+1993, A12.
+98. Clint Bolick, “Civil Rights Nominee, Quota Clone,” Wall Street Journal,
+February 2, 1994; Clint Bolick, “A Vote for Lee is a Vote For Preferences,” Wall
+Street Journal, October 27, 1997. See also Bolick’s follow-up on Patrick, Clint Bolick,
+“Coronation of a Quota King at Justice,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 1994.
+99. Clint Bolick, The Affirmative Action Fraud (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute,
+1996).
+100. Mellor interview.
+101. Greve, “Environmentalism and the Rule of Law.”
+102. Pell interview.
+103. Ibid.
+104. Ibid.
+105. Mueller v. City of Boise, St. Luke’s Medical Center, et al. was a class-action
+suit filed against alleged violations of parents’ right to direct the medical treatment
+of their children.
+106. The classic backlash argument is Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope. A more
+recent version of the argument can be found in Michael Klarman, “Brown, Lawrence
+(and Goodridge),” Michigan Law Review 104, no. 3 (2005): 431.
+107. The exception, of course, is IJ’s school choice litigation, but even that defended
+the government authority to enact a libertarian policy.
+
+Conclusion
+
+1. Harold Hotelling, “Stability in Competition,” Economic Journal 39, no.
+153 (1929): 41–57; Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New
+York: Harper and Row, 1957). There are other mechanisms for the production
+of equilibrium. For example, Reva Siegel has argued, “If the constitutional law
+that officials pronounce diverges too far from understandings to which American
+N O T E S T O P A G E S 265–274 329
+
+citizens subscribed, a mobilized citizenry knows how to hold judges and the
+elected officials who appoint them to account.” Reva Siegel, “Constitutional Culture,
+Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de
+facto ERA,” California Law Review 94, no. 5 (2006): 1419. In Siegel’s model,
+mobilization and countermobilization ultimately move constitutional law back to
+something like the equilibrium position of public values. This assumes, however,
+that the challenges for the first movers and the countermobilizers are symmetric:
+the key point of my argument is that they are not, and it is this asymmetry that
+produces constitutional regimes.
+2. Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis
+(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
+3. Three examples of legislative erosion are the Personal Responsibility and
+Work Opportunity Act of 1995, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
+Act of 1996, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
+4. Mine is an imprecise adaptation of the concept described at greatest detail
+in William Baumol, John Panzar, and Robert Willig, Contestable Markets and the
+Theory of Industry Structure, rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, 1988). Baumol’s
+account builds on, among others, Harold Demsetz, “Why Regulate Utilities?”
+Journal of Law and Economics 11, no. 1 (1968): 55–65. The most important
+part of these works, for my purposes, is that monopoly status is consistent with
+vulnerability to competition.
+5. Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual
+Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 369–404.
+6. Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
+Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
+2001); Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? (Cambridge: Cambridge University
+Press, 1994).
+7. Teles, “Conservative Mobilization”; Teles and Prinz, “Politics of Rights Retraction”;
+Teles, Whose Welfare?, chapter 7.
+8. The phrase, and the concept behind it, come from Mancur Olson, “Distinguished
+Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk:
+Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor,” Journal of Economic Perspectives
+10, no. 2 (1996): 3–24. On the importance of skill in political entrepreneurship,
+see Adam Sheingate, “The Terrain of the Political Entrepreneur,” in Formative
+Acts: Reckoning with Agency in American Politics, ed. Stephen Skowronek and
+Matthew Glassman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).
+9. The achievements, and limitations, of conservatives in these areas are
+discussed in detail in Glenn and Teles, Conservatism and American Political
+Development.
+10. Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper and
+Row, 1952).
+11. The Democratic Party’s attempt to reverse Republican’s competitive advantage
+among the religious can be seen in the enormous efforts that have been
+devoted to creating a recognizable “religious Left.” See, for example, Cayle Murphy
+and Alan Cooperman, “Religious Liberals Gain New Visibility,” Washington
+Post, May 20, 2006, A1.
+12. Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, chapter 8.
+330 N O T E S T O P A G E S 277–279
+
+13. Matt Bai, “Wiring the Giant Left-Wing Conspiracy,” New York Times
+Magazine, July 25, 2004. Some of the mistakes that have come from this effort
+to learn from conservatives are described in Ari Berman, “Big $$ for Progressive
+Politics,” The Nation, October 16, 2006.
+14. Skocpol, Diminished Democracy.
+15. Clayton Christensen shows a similar pattern in the introduction of new
+technologies, in which “disruptive innovations” are almost always adopted by
+new firms, rather than by existing market leaders. Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s
+Dilemma (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).
+16. The importance of learning from failure in philanthropy is discussed in
+depth in Peter Frumkin, Strategic Philanthropy: The Art and Science of Philanthropy
+(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
+17. The distinction between “anticlassification” and “antisubordination” is
+laid out in Balkin and Siegel, “American Civil Rights Tradition.”
+Index
+
+abeyance structures, 271, 307n1 Association of American Law Schools
+abortion, 2, 54, 56–57 (AALS), 25, 36–37, 108, 210, 273,
+Abraham, E. Spencer, 151 322n64
+academic freedom, 55, 231–37, 247, 260, Ayres, Ian, 204
+264, 277, 325n34
+Ackerman, Bruce, 44, 189 Bachrach, Peter, 16
+Adamany, David, 290n25 Baird, Douglas, 99, 121, 255
+Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 237 Baker v. Carr, 44–45
+affirmative action (racial neutrality, quo- Balch, Steve, 236
+tas), 41, 55–56, 71, 84, 86, 204–5, 210, Balkin, Jack, 11–12
+220, 223, 229, 234–37, 245–46, 256, Baratz, Morton, 16
+257–62, 264, 272, 322n64 Barkow, Robert, 176
+Alchian, Armen, 110, 112 Barnett, Randy, 160, 306n85
+Aldrich, John, 289n17 Barrett, Amy, 176
+Alito, Samuel, nomination of, 1, 160 Barton, John, 321n44
+Bator, Paul, 196 Allen, George, 212 Baumol, William, 97 Alliance Defense Fund, 328n94 Baxter, William, 97, 321n44 alternative governing coalition, 17–21, Bebchuk, Lucian, 197 290n30 Becker, Gary, 97–98, 110, 213 American Association of University Profes- Bell, Daniel, 292n48 sors (AAUP), 233 Benjamin Report, 76 American Bar Association (ABA), 11–12, Berle, Adolph, 26 25, 28–35, 38, 49, 51, 57, 156–58, 167– Bernstein, David, 215 73, 171, 273, 295n36, 296n49, 318n88 BeVier, Lillian, 84, 311n91 American Center for Law and Justice, 260, Bickel, Alexander, 44 316n64 Bishop, William, 209 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Bittker, Boris, 26 25, 28, 54, 73, 233, 246–47, 256, 261 Bleich, Erik, 17 American Constitution Society, 317n77 Boalt Hall. See University of California at American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 141, Berkeley 163, 211 Boies, David, 76 American Law and Economics Association Bok, Derek, 193–94, 196–97
+(ALEA), 204 Bolick, Clint, 65, 78, 79–81, 84–87, 238,
+American Legal Foundation (ALF), 223, 245, 256, 257–58, 278–79, 306n85; Un231
+finished Business by, 85, 87
+American Liberty League, 28 Bork, Robert, 1, 94, 111, 139, 141, 146,
+Anderson, Reuben, 74 151, 158–61, 169–70, 189, 191, 211,
+Angstreich, Scott, 176 308n26, 315n42, 318nn91 and 93; nomiantitrust,
+94–98, 108, 116, 125, 191, 216 nation of, 148, 167–70, 173, 318n88
+Anti-Trust Project, 95, 308n26 boundary maintenance, 135, 137, 152–62,
+Aranson, Peter, 118 257
+Areeda, Philip, 194–95, 197 Bourdieu, Pierre, 16, 317n78
+Arnold, Fortas and Porter, 25, 294n3 Bowman, Ward, 308n26
+Arnold, Thurman, 26, 94, 294n3 Braceras, Jennifer, 177
+332 INDEX
+
+Bradley Foundation, 151, 201f Center for Constitutional Litigation, proBrady
+Foundation, 155 posed (CCL), 80–81, 85
+Brennan, William, 97–98 Center for Individual Rights (CIR): foundBrest,
+Paul, 200 ing of, 80, 84–85, 222–28, 278; free
+Bright, William, 121–22 speech and affirmative action activism
+Brown, Jerry, 303n10 by, 220–21, 232–37, 325n34; generally,
+Brown, Ralph, 38 4, 220–22; 262–64, 269–70, 277,
+Brown, Steven P., 328n94 327n83; limitations on, 249–54, 257–
+Brown v. Barry (Ego Brown case), 78 62; organizational culture of, 244–49,
+Brown v. Board of Education, 44–45, 246, 257–62; strategic opportunism of, 229–
+275–76, 279 37, 257–62, 270
+Buchanan, James, 110, 121–22, 208 Center for Law in the Public Interest
+Buchanan, Pat, 1–2 (CLIPI), 57
+Buckley, Frank, 209 Center for Law and Social Policy, 50, 113,
+Bundy, McGeorge, 35, 46–47, 49–51, 57 301n135
+Burger Court, 1, 38 Center for the Study of Public Choice, 122
+Burt, Dan, 74–79, 88, 305n71 Center for the Study of Responsive Law,
+Bush, George H. W., 141, 212, 230 50
+Bush, George W., 1, 152, 157–58, 160 Chattahoochee Institute, 90, 124, 130–32
+Butler, Henry, 113, 209 Chayes, Abram, 196
+Butler, Samuel C., 194–95, 238 Chenoweth, Mark, 255
+Butler, Stuart, 85 Child Protective Services agencies, 262
+Choper, Jesse, 44
+Cahn, Jean and Edgar, 31–32, 34 civil rights, 13, 23, 27–28, 35, 39, 41, 45–
+Cain, Bruce, 312n99 46, 49, 53–54, 56, 69, 81, 83, 85–86,
+Calabresi, Guido, 97, 99, 110, 189, 233–34, 239, 245–46, 255, 260, 267,
+308n32 275–76, 294n74
+Calabresi, Steven, 139, 141, 143–45, 161, Clark, Robert, 196–98, 207
+163–64, 166, 169, 318n91 Claus, Laurence, 176, 178
+California Chamber of Commerce, 61 Clayton, Cornell, 10
+California Department of Social Welfare, Clement, Edith Brown, 152
+60 clinical legal education, 23, 36–41, 54,
+California Institute of Technology (Cal- 156, 249–50, 252, 255–57, 297n81
+tech), 121, 312n99 Clinton, William J., 135, 148, 212, 257–58
+Campbell, Tom, 321n44 Coase, Ronald, 96, 97, 110, 118, 121–23,
+Cantu, Norma, 258 133
+Capital Legal Foundation (CLF), 73–79, Coates, John, 198
+225, 264 Coca-Cola Company, 124, 294n3
+Caplan, Bryan, 319n3 Coffee, John, 203
+Carlton, Dennis, 308n40 Cohen, Lloyd, 209
+Carnegie Corporation, 42, 51 Coleman, James, 18
+Carter, Jimmy, 124, 127, 157 Columbia University, 26–27, 31, 43, 119,
+Carter Center, 127 203
+Carvin, Michael, 227 commerce clause, 220–21, 264, 266
+Casper, Gerhard, 188 Congress, 43, 52–55, 60, 220, 242
+Cass, Ronald, 310n71 Cooper, Carvin and Rosenthal, 227,
+Cato Institute, 160, 325n49 323n15
+CBS, 75–77 Coors, Joseph, 63–66
+Center for Applied Jurisprudence (CAJ), Cooter, Robert, 202–4
+82–85, 87, 221, 224, 228–29, 237, 240, Cornell University, 183–85, 222
+243, 271, 272 Coulter, Ann, 327n83
+INDEX 333
+
+Council on Competitiveness, White House, Elhauge, Einer, 198–99
+147 Ellickson, Robert, 311nn91 and 96,
+Council for Environmental Quality, 51 321n44
+Council on Legal Education for Profes- Ely, John Hart, 44
+sional Responsibility (CLEPR), 36–40 Emerson, Thomas, 26
+Council for Public Interest Law, 301n135 eminent domain, 220, 241–43, 257
+counter-ABA, 167–73, 179 Emory University, Henry Manne and, 90,
+counterrights, 87, 89 110, 118, 124–32, 134, 186, 208, 216
+Cox, Douglas, 227 empowerment, 72, 77, 85, 230, 238, 258,
+Crafton, Steven, 209 264, 272
+Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 76, 193–94 entrepreneurs: intellectual, 17–18, 58, 95–
+Cribb, Kenneth, 141–42, 161 96, 101, 133, 135, 179, 217, 271; netcritical
+legal studies (CLS), 24, 45, 182, work, 18–19, 106, 133, 135, 160, 179,
+192–99, 321n38 272; organizational, 85, 91, 101, 115,
+136–39, 161, 167, 182, 212, 216–18,
+Dahl, Robert, 10–12, 290n25 221, 244, 257, 263–64, 271, 280; politiDalton,
+Clare, 321n38 cal, 4, 17, 19, 24, 179, 265, 273, 277
+Dam, Kenneth, 95, 97 environmental law, 23, 33, 44, 47, 50, 54–
+Daniels, William, 65–66 57, 60–61, 64, 172, 225–26, 230, 259,
+Dartmouth Review, 163–64 273, 303n10
+Daynard, Richard, 299n109 Epp, Charles, 11–12, 17, 22, 78, 290n30,
+Decker, Jefferson, 65, 303n10 297n63
+Democratic Party, 2, 7–9, 42, 45–47, 57, Epstein, Richard, 90, 146, 188–89, 255,
+148, 204–5, 322n59, 329n11 306n85, 311n91
+Demsetz, Harold, 98, 110, 112, 209 Equal Employment Opportunity CommisDenver
+cable case, 65–66, 278 sion, 85, 257
+Dewey, Thomas, 28
+Diggins, John Patrick, 304n49 Fabian strategy, 207
+Dinh, Viet, 152 Federal Communications Commission
+Director, Aaron, 91, 93–98, 104–5, 133, (FCC), 75, 223, 235
+271 Federalist Society: ABA Watch of, 168–69;
+Dooley, Michael, 311n91 Bork nomination’s effect on, 169–70;
+Dorsen, David, 305n68 boundary maintenance by, 152–62; as a
+Douglas, William O., 26 counter-ABA, 167–73, 273; D.C. chapD’Souza,
+Dinesh, 163, 231, 325n34 ter of, 145–47; development of chapters
+Durbin, Richard, 152 by, 142–47, 149–50, 166–67; elite supDworkin,
+Ronald, 44–45 porters of, 141–42, 151; founding of,
+137–42, 266; funding structure of, 73,
+Eagle, Steve, 107, 208, 213 147–51, 271; generally, 58, 68, 135–37,
+Earhart Foundation, 111, 114, 117, 201f, 161–62, 179–80, 277–80; Harvard Club
+211, 303n21, 321n43 debate of, 196; indirect approach to
+Easterbrook, Frank, 100, 158 legal change of, 136–37, 144–45, 163–
+economic consulting, 97, 100–101, 131 67, 172–73, 279; judicial nominees and,
+economic expert witnesses, 101, 131 152, 157–61, 168–69; lack of formal polEconomics
+Institute for Federal Judges, icy positions of, 144–45, 152–57, 159–
+109, 111–14, 131–33, 181, 217, 280, 62, 172–73; law school culture and,
+310n81 173–78, 188, 196, 222, 267–68, 276;
+Economics Institute for Law Professors, Lawyers Division of, 149, 160, 167,
+105–7, 113–14, 118, 123–24, 132–33, 170, 172–73, 249; membership in as an
+181, 191, 209, 211, 217, 272, 280, ideological signal, 142, 158–59, 249; net309n64,
+312n105 working among conservatives through,
+Ehrlich, Isaac, 122, 312n102 77, 89, 135–36, 140, 158–59, 162–67,
+334 INDEX
+
+Federalist Society (cont’d) Gillespie, George, 131, 183, 185–88, 191–
+222, 226–28, 263, 272; Olin Fellows 95, 320n27
+program of, 173–78, 268; practice Gilmore, James, 212
+groups within, 148–49, 170–73, Ginsburg, Douglas, 106, 211–12, 309n64
+318n94; pro bono law and, 155–57, Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, 113
+166, 249, 253; proposed litigation center Glazer, Nathan, 84
+of, 152, 154–55; Yale Symposium of, Goetz, Charles, 111–12, 121–23, 310n71,
+138–40, 142 311n91
+Feldstein, Martin, 112 Goldberg, Arthur, 49
+Ferejohn, John, 312n99 Goldberg v. Kelly, 32, 275
+Ferrell, Allen, 176, 198–99 Goldsmith, Jack, 178
+Feulner, Ed, 212 Goldstein, Paul, 321n44
+Field Foundation, 43 Goldwater Institute, 256
+Fifth Amendment, 146, 241 Goodrich, Pierre, 104–5
+Fiorina, Morris, 312n99 Gossett, William, 48, 296n54
+Fire of Truth Liberty Fund Conference, Graetz, Michael, 99, 107, 119–20, 121,
+111 123–24, 311n91, 312n105
+First Amendment, 231–32, 234, 237, Gramsci, Antonio, 16, 207
+324n29 Gratz v. Bollinger, 220, 235, 254, 262,
+Fischette, Charles, 177 290n36
+Fisher, Anthony, 82 Gray, C. Boyden, 141–42
+Fiss, Owen, 12, 44–45, 300n119 Great Society, 31, 72
+Fitzpatrick, Brian, 177 Greve, Michael, 67, 77, 84–85, 173, 222–
+Flanigan, Peter, 186 27, 230, 232–33, 236, 246–48, 251,
+Fluor, J. Simon, 61 258–59, 262, 278, 323n6
+Ford, Henry, II, 48, 183 Griswold, Erwin, 27, 193
+Ford Foundation, 23, 30–31, 34–41, 46– Griswold v. Connecticut, 54, 275
+52, 56, 183, 297nn63 and 69 Grutter v. Bollinger, 169, 220, 235, 254,
+Fortas, Abe, 31 262
+Foundation for American Studies, 170 Guinier, Lani, 86, 257–58
+Foundation for Research on Economics
+and the Environment, 113 Hacker, Jacob, 288n15, 302n161
+Fowler, Cody, 29 Halpern, Charles, 113, 301n135
+Frank, Jerome, 26, 29 Hamilton, Walter Hale, 26
+Frankfurter, Felix, 26–27 Hammer, Armand, 57
+Franklin, Marc, 321n44 Handler, Milton, 27
+Freund, Paul, 27 Hanna, Mark, 274
+Fried, Charles, 240 Harmer-Dionne, Elizabeth, 177
+Friedman, Milton, 92, 98, 108, 112 Harris, Erica Worth, 176
+Furlaud, Richard, 186, 320n27 Hart, Henry, 27
+Harvard University, 26–27, 39–40, 44, 97,
+Ganz, Marshall, 15 166, 175, 190–99, 203–5, 320n19,
+Garland Fund, 294n74 321n38; CLS at, 190–99, 321n38
+Garrity, Arthur, 2 Hatch, Brent, 151, 161
+George, Robert, 310n82 Hatch, Orrin, 151, 152, 154, 161, 315n42
+George Mason University (GMU), 182–83, Hay, Bruce, 198–99
+205, 207–16, 218–19, 273, 323n77 Hayek, Friedrich, 91, 92–94, 166, 254
+Georgetown University, 203, 233, 252, Heritage Foundation, 128, 145
+324n30 Hicks, George, 196
+Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, 227, 324n15 Holland, Laura, 40
+Gideon v. Wainwright, 22, 30–34, 36, 44, Hoover East, 90, 124, 130–32
+56 Hoover Institution, 126–28, 200–201
+INDEX 335
+
+Hopwood v. Texas, 235–36, 248, 260, 262 judicial selection, 1, 10–14, 82, 135, 142,
+Horowitz, Michael, 67–69, 141, 142, 145, 147–48, 153, 157–61, 163, 168–69,
+304nn29 and 49, 306n85, 314n15 175, 212, 280, 290n38, 291n39. See
+Horowitz Report, 67–75, 78, 80–82, 84– also individual candidates
+85, 139, 151, 154, 221–22, 224, 226, Justice Department, 141, 222, 314n18
+228, 263, 267, 272, 278
+Horwitz, Morton, 181, 192, 193, 321n35 Kabaservice, Geoffrey, 296n57
+Hotelling model of political competition, Kalman, Laura, 45
+265 Kamara, K.A.D., 177
+Houck, Oliver, 304nn30 and 37 Kaplow, Louis, 195–96, 197
+Housing and Urban Development, Depart- Katz, Milton, 27
+ment of (HUD), 230–31 Katz, Wilber, 91, 94
+Houston, Charles Hamilton, 27 Keckler, Charles, 177
+Howard University, 27 Kelo v. New London, 220, 241–43
+Hueter, Ernest, 63 Kemp, Jack, 230
+Humphrey, Hubert, 98 Kennedy, David, 64–65, 67, 82, 88,
+303nn21 and 22
+INS v. Chadha, 226 Kennedy, Duncan, 166, 193, 195–97
+Institute for Educational Affairs, 314n14 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 245
+Institute for Humane Studies, 84, 174 Kitch, Edmund, 95, 111, 139
+Institute for Justice (IJ): development of, Knight, Charles, 186
+255–57, 262; founding and evolution of, Knight, Frank, 91
+80, 82–85, 167, 237–44, 255–57, 262, Kobyashi, Bruce, 209
+272, 278, 305n58; generally, 4, 66, 74, Koch, Charles, 239, 325n49
+77–78, 220–22, 232, 262–64, 269–70, Kochan, Donald, 177
+303n21, 326n57; limitations on, 249, Koch Foundation, 255
+251–58; organizational culture of, 244– Koh, Tim, 255
+49, 267, 272, 279, 327n90; takings Kontorovich, Eugene, 215
+clause activism by, 200, 241–43 Kousser, Morgan, 312n99
+Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 174 Kraakman, Reinier, 197
+interdisciplinary scholarship, 45, 102, Kramer, John, 244, 252
+118–19, 121, 184 Krauser v. Consumer Reports, 231
+Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 50–51 Krauss, Michael, 209, 240
+Irons, Peter, 25, 27 Kristol, Irving, 154, 314n14
+Kristol, William, 1, 212
+Jackson, Howell, 197 Kronman, Anthony, 190
+Jaffe, Louis, 27 Ku, Julian, 176
+Jaffe, Sanford, 48–51, 52 Kuhn, Edward, 33, 34
+James, Fleming, 26 Kurland, Philip, 44
+James Madison Program at Princeton Uni- Kyl, John, 65
+versity, 310n82
+Jeffries, John, 123–24, 229, 312n105 Lambert, Thomas, 176
+Jewkes, John, 308n26 Lamprecht, Thomas, 223, 229, 278
+Johnsen, Bruce, 209 Lamprecht v. Federal Communications
+Johnson, George, 208–9, 211 Commission, 229, 235
+Johnson, Leland, 97 Landes, Richard, 100
+Jolls, Christine, 198–99 Landis, James, 26–27
+Jones Bridge. See Simmons Building Landmark Legal Foundation (LLF), 63, 78,
+Jones Day, 250 85, 238
+Journal of Law and Economics, 95–96 Laney, James T., 125–29
+Joyce, Michael, 128, 131, 149, 151, 184, Larry, Richard, 75, 78, 114–15, 139, 151,
+186, 188, 195, 273 273
+336 INDEX
+
+Law and Economics Center (LEC), 4, 101, McGinnis, John, 42
+108–18, 124–32, 184–85, 209–10, 212, McGovern, George, 1, 7
+311n89 McGuire, Timothy, 233, 324n30
+Lawson, Gary, 138, 144, 155, 161–62, McIntosh, David, 139, 141–44, 146–47,
+164, 166, 173–74 151, 155, 161, 314n16
+Lee, Bill Lann, 258 McIntyre, Alisdair, 307n14
+Lee, Rex, 306n85 McKenna Foundation, 201f
+legal realism, 24–25, 41, 44, 102, 192 McKinley, William, 274
+Lenkowsky, Leslie, 75 Media Institute, 303n15
+Leo, Leonard, 160, 161 Media Transparency, 321n43
+Letwin, William, 308n26 Meese, Edwin, 141, 145, 160, 168, 212
+Levi, Edward, 37, 94 Mellon Foundation, 51
+Levin, Michael, 247, 327n82 Mellor, Chip, 64–67, 71, 79–85, 87–88,
+Levine, Michael, 121, 311n91 and 96 166–67, 224, 239–42, 253–55, 258, 278
+Levinson, Sanford, 11 Melnick, Shep, 55
+Lexecon, 97, 100–101, 131 Mentschikoff, Soia, 108–9, 117
+Liberty Fund, 104; law and economics con- Meyer, Eugene, 141, 144, 149–50, 152,
+ferences of, 90, 109, 111–12, 114, 197, 154, 157, 159–61, 173–75, 314n12,
+272 316n61, 317n75, 318n88
+Llewellyn, Karl, 26, 29, 95 Meyer, Frank, 18, 314n12
+Lochner v. New York, 146, 266 Michelman, Frank, 44, 299n114
+Luhnow, Harold, 93 Miers nomination, 1, 160–61
+Miller, James, 212 MacArthur Justice Center at the University Miller, Robert, 177 of Chicago Law School, 256 Miller, Roger, 128 Macey, Jonathan, 191, 240 Mnookin, Robert, 321n44 Main, Thomas, 168, 318n88 Mobilization for Youth (MFY), 31, 43 Mandel, Michael, 101 Mont Pelerin Society, 92–93, 131 Manne, Geoff, 176 Moody, Jim, 74–76 Manne, Henry, 90, 93–94, 99, 101–18, Moore, David, 177 123–34, 183–86, 190, 207–13, 216– Morgan, Tom, 124–25, 132 218, 277, 280, 306n85, 309nn45, 46, Morrison, Alan, 226 and 64, 310n89. See also Law and Eco- Mossoff, Adam, 176 nomics Center (LEC) Mountain States Legal Foundation Manning, John, 178 (MSLF), 63–66, 79–80, 88, 224, 278 Manns, Jeffrey, 177 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 52 Markman, Stephen, 145, 147, 158 Mueller v. City of Boise, 328n105 Marsden, Orison, 33, 36, 296n54, 297n81 Murphy amendment, 49, 51 Marshall, Thurgood, 27, 245
+Mashaw, Jerry, 121, 123–24, 189, 311n91,
+312n101 NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), 25,
+McAdam, Doug, 293n57 27–28, 46, 50, 54, 229, 243, 245,
+McAvoy, Paul, 112 294n74, 295n20
+McCann, Michael, 243 Nader network, 53, 58, 71, 74–75, 128,
+McCarthy, John, 294n73 225, 227
+McChesney, Fred, 110, 306n85 National Association of Scholars, 236
+McClellan, James, 140 National Association of Secondary School
+McConnell, Michael, 84, 227 Principals, 230
+McDonald, Heather, 36 National Cancer Institute, 299n109
+McDonald, Michael, 222–26, 229–32, National Lawyers Guild, 29, 32
+235–36, 247–48, 250–51, 260–62, 278 National Legal Aid Association (NLAA),
+McGee, John, 308n26 30, 295n36
+INDEX 337
+
+National Legal Aid and Defender Associa- Otis, Lee Liberman, 138–39, 141–42, 144,
+tion (NLADA), 34, 36 149, 151, 155, 158, 172, 314n16
+National Legal Center for the Public Interest
+(NLCPI), 62–63, 68 Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), 61–63, 68, National Organization for Women 87, 303n10 (NOW), 249 Pacific Research Institute (PRI), 82, 84, National Review, 18, 139, 314n12 239–40 National School Safety Center, 230 Parker, Jeffrey, 211 Natural Resources Defense Council Patrick, Deval, 258 (NRDC), 50–51 Paulsen, Monrad, 119–20, 123 Nelson, Dorothy, 120 Pegasus reading group, 121 neoconservatives, 288n13, 293n69 Pell, Terry, 231, 246–47, 250, 252–53, New Deal lawyers, 22–29, 41, 43 258, 260, 264, 327n81 New England Legal Foundation (NELF), Pew Foundation, 105 73
+Pfaff, John, 177 Newman, Christopher, 177
+New York Times v. Sullivan Pfizer Corporation, 242 , 44, 75–76, Philadelphia Society, 131 231
+Niebuhr, Reinhold, 127 Pickerill, J. Mitchell, 10
+Nixon, Richard M., 1, 23, 40, 42, 47, 50, Piereson, James, 151, 173, 183, 186–91,
+57, 60, 97–98, 145, 287n1, 290n38 238, 273
+Noll, Roger, 312n99 Pierson, Paul, 270–71, 291n43, 302n161
+Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Pilon, Roger, 160
+87, 146, 264 Pincus, William, 37
+Norquist, Grover, 289n18 Plessy v. Ferguson, 245
+Norton, Gail, 325n42 Plotke, David, 289n17, 292n47
+Plott, Charles, 312n99
+Oakeshott, Michael, 153 Polinsky, Mitch, 201–2, 321n44
+Occidental Petroleum, 57 political correctness, 232–37, 245, 261
+O’Connell, Frank, 185 Pollot, Mark, 325n42
+O’Connor, Sandra Day, nomination of, Polsby, Daniel, 214–15
+291n38 Posner, Richard, 1, 90, 95–101, 105, 118–
+Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), 19, 132–33, 181, 216–17, 308n32; Eco22,
+41, 49; Legal Services Program nomic Analysis of Law by, 96, 98–100,
+(LSP), 31–35, 43, 54 105, 123, 308n36
+Olin, John M., 126–27, 131, 183–87, 191, Powell, Lewis, 32, 57, 61–62
+320n17 Prescott, James, 177 Olin Fellows program, 109–11, 130, 132, Priest, George, 98, 111–12, 189–90, 191, 174–78, 186–88, 190, 268, 318n99 272, 310n71 Olin Foundation, 72–73, 75, 111, 124–32, pro bono law, 41, 54, 76, 154–57, 159, 134, 151, 173–74, 182–207, 212–13, 166, 172–73, 226, 240, 249, 253–54, 230, 235, 238–39, 241, 305n58, 317n84 320n17, 322n49 public choice, 118, 121–22, 208, 312nn99 Olin Law and Economics Programs, 124, and 100 174, 182–207, 219, 273, 318n99, Public Citizen, 226 322n49 public goods, 44, 89, 136, 167, 215 Olson, Theodore, 159, 227
+opportunity structure, 15, 51–52, 81, 178,
+222, 271 Rabkin, Jeremy, 84, 222–23, 246, 248,
+organizational maintenance, 19, 27, 59, 323n6
+70–71, 81, 87, 135–36, 153, 224, 227, Ramseyer, J. Mark, 198
+237, 244, 259, 323n6 Ransom, William, 28
+338 INDEX
+
+Reagan, Ronald, 57, 60, 78–79, 82, 141– school choice, 220, 233, 239, 241, 245,
+43, 157–58, 212, 226–28, 249, 291n38, 256, 276, 326n57, 328n107
+323n15 Schwartz, Allen, 311n91
+Reasoner, Harry, 248 Schwartz, Warren, 106, 121–24, 311n91
+Rehnquist Court, 13 Scott, Kenneth, 321n44
+Reich, Charles, 43 Scott, Robert, 119, 122–24, 311n91,
+religious conservatives, 2, 56, 60, 254, 312n105
+260, 287n8, 324n29, 328n94 Segal, Bernard, 33
+remnantism, 93, 307n14 Sekulow, Jay, 160, 316n64
+Reno v. Bossier Parish School District, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee,
+220, 229 172
+Republican Party, 2, 7–9, 25, 40, 51, 56– Senate Judiciary Committee, 145
+57, 65, 86, 140, 149, 157, 159–61, 236, Seymour, Whitney North, 31, 296n49
+261, 274–77, 289n18, 302n161, Shapiro v. Thompson, 32
+322n59, 329n11 Sharfman, Keith, 176
+Reynolds v. Sims, 44 Sharp, Malcolm, 91
+Ribstein, Lawrence, 209 Shavell, Steven, 191, 195–97
+Riker, William, 102 Siegan, Bernard, 306n85
+Risch, Michael, 177 Siegel, Reva, 190, 328n1
+Roberts, John, nomination of, 159–60 Sierra Club, 65, 73
+Rockefeller Foundation, 51, 299n109 Simmons Building, 125, 186
+Rockwell, Lewis, 128 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 220
+Roe, Mark, 198, 203 Simon, William, 129–31, 183–84, 187–88,
+Roe v. Wade, 45, 54, 191 198
+Romano, Roberta, 99, 101 Simons, Henry, 91–94, 104, 271
+Roosevelt, Franklin D., 25 Singer, S. Fred, 231
+Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the 60 Minutes, 75–77, 245
+University of Virginia, 220, 229, 237, Skowronek, Stephen, 6, 17, 274, 290n30
+260 Skrentny, John, 24, 289n16
+Rosenfield, Andrew, 100 Slaughter-House Cases, 238
+Rosenkranz, Nicholas, 176 Smith, Steve, 235
+Rosett, Richard, 130–31 Smith, William French, 61, 141
+Rosman, Michael, 247, 250, 253 Smith Richardson Foundation (SRF), 75,
+Rostow, Eugene, 27 84, 168
+Rove, Karl, 274 Somin, Ilya, 177
+Rubinfeld, Daniel, 202–4 Southeastern Legal Foundation, 72
+Ruckleshaus, William, 50–51, 300n135 Southern Christian Leadership Conference,
+Rumsfeld, Donald, 49 242
+Sparer, Edward, 31–32, 34, 43
+Sacks, Howard, 37 standing, 52–53
+Saiman, Chaim, 177 Stanford University, 97, 99, 126–27, 141,
+Sales, Nathan, 177 200–202, 322n49
+Samuelson, Paul, 112 Stevens, Robert, 39
+Sawers, David, 308n26 Stigler, George, 92, 97–98
+Scaife Foundation, 67, 75, 78, 114, 139, Stillerman, Richard, 308n26
+151, 154, 201f, 272 Stowe, Matt, 176
+Scalia, Antonin, 1, 139, 141–42, 146, 158 Subramanian, Guhan, 198–99
+Schlafly, Fred and Phyllis, 29 Sullivan, Kathleen, 202
+Schmidt, John, 141 Sunkist, 79
+Scholes, Myron, 321n44 Superfund, 230
+INDEX 339
+
+Supreme Court, 1–2, 10–13, 29–32, 44, Urban League, 35
+159, 169–70, 175, 191, 220, 231, 242, U.S. News & World Report law school
+290nn25 and 38; clerks of, 120, 165, rankings, 182, 212, 215
+175, 190, 250, 290n37, 291n39,
+323n77 Van Patten, Russell, 317n79
+Surrey, Stanley, 27 Vermeule, Adrian, 176, 178
+Swedenburg v. Kelly, 220 Viner, Jacob, 91
+Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
+takings clause, 87, 146, 155, 241, 243, 220, 229, 248–49
+264, 266 Virginia Tech, 121–22
+Taylor, Telford, 27 Viscusi, W. Kip, 198
+Taylor, Verta, 307n1 Volker Fund, 93, 95
+Theberge, Leonard, 62, 303n15 Vorenberg, James, 195, 197
+think tanks, 81–82, 114, 154, 160, 167,
+228, 239, 243, 279 Wallis, W. Allen, 102, 105
+Thomas, Clarence, 1, 80, 85, 113, 238; Ware, Richard, 114, 117
+nomination of, 170 War on Poverty, 30, 38, 299n114
+Train, Russell, 51 Warren Court, 41, 44–45, 60, 275
+Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 61 Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), 36,
+Trebilcock, Michael, 106 73, 223–24, 229, 231, 235, 278
+Tribe, Lawrence, 44–45, 191 Washington, D.C., centralization of poliTrillin,
+Calvin, 193, 196, 320n27 cymaking in, 16, 54, 68, 74, 203, 270,
+Trubek, David, 321n38 275, 277
+Trump, Donald, 241 Watt, James, 63–64
+Tullock, Gordon, 121–122, 208 Weaver, Paul, 324n19
+Tushnet, Mark, 45 Wellington, Harry, 189
+Westmoreland v. CBS, 75–77, 305n64
+Uhlmann, Michael, 62–63 Weston, Bill, 115–17
+Unger, Roberto, 193 Wiegand Foundation, 148, 171
+United States Chamber of Commerce, Wildavsky, Aaron, 233
+Lewis Powell’s memo to, 57, 61 Wiley, Rein and Fielding, 323n15
+United States v. Morrison, 220, 229, 237 Williams, Gene, 186
+University of California at Berkeley, 26, Williams, Walter, 238
+202–5, 322n59 Williamson, Oliver, 204, 322n55
+University of Chicago, 4, 90–99, 103–4, Wilson, James Q., 310n81, 323n6
+108–9, 112, 120–21, 133, 138–39, 141, Winter, Ralph, 99, 106, 109, 139, 189
+188–89, 191, 199, 201, 205, 216, 255– Woodruff, Robert, 124, 126, 294n3
+56, 271, 307n1, 308n32 Woodson, Robert, 238
+University of Miami, Henry Manne and,
+108–18, 124–25, 134, 310n89 Yale University, 26–27, 39, 40, 99, 104,
+University of Michigan, 26 109, 138–39, 141–42, 166, 189–91,
+University of Rochester, Henry Manne 199–202, 298n86, 308n32, 320n19
+and, 101–8, 210 Yalof, David, 287n1, 290n38
+University of Southern California (USC), Yeager, Leland, 122
+39, 118–21, 124, 133, 311n91 Yoo, John, 160
+University of Toronto, 106 Young Americans for Freedom, 143
+University of Virginia (UVA), 118–24, 133,
+220, 311n91, 312n105 Zumbrun, Ronald, 60–6, 303n10
+Uqdah, Taalib-Din Abdul, 238 Zywicki, Todd, 1, 215
+This page intentionally left blank
+PRINCETON STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS
+
+HISTORICAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
+
+Ira Katznelson, Martin Shefter, and Theda Skocpol, Series Editors
+
+The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law
+by Steven M. Teles
+Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States? by Robin Archer
+The Transformation of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of
+Conservatism edited by Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol
+Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court,
+and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History by Keith E. Whittington
+Governing the American State: Congress and the New Federalism by Kimberley
+S. Johnson
+What a Mighty Power We Can Be: African-American Fraternal Groups and the
+Struggle for Racial Equality by Theda Skocpol, Ariane Liazos, and Marshall Ganz
+Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate by Gregory Wawro
+and Eric Schickler
+When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan and the Rise of Social Security by
+Edwin Amenta
+Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America by Kristin A.
+Goss
+Race, State, and Policy: American Race Politics in Comparative Perspective by
+Robert C. Lieberman
+How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare
+State by Andrea Louise Campbell
+Managing the President’s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy
+Formulation by Andrew Rudalevige
+Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development
+edited by Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter
+Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America by Daniel J.
+Tichenor
+Dry Bones Rattling: Community Building to Revitalize American Democracy
+by Mark R. Warren
+The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation
+in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 by Daniel P. Carpenter
+Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S.
+Congress by Eric Schickler
+The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State: Institutions and Interest Group Power
+in the United States, France, and Japan by Adam D. Sheingate
+In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War
+Grand Strategy by Aaron L. Friedberg
+Stuck in Neutral: Business and the Politics of Human Capital Investment Policy
+by Cathie Jo Martin
+Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America by Paul Frymer
+Faithful and Fearless: Moving Feminist Protest inside the Church and Military by
+Mary Fainsod Katzenstein
+Forged Consensus: Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the United
+States, 1921–1953 by David M. Hart
+Parting at the Crossroads: The Emergence of Health Insurance in the United States
+and Canada by Antonia Maioni
+Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy
+by Edwin Amenta
+The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States
+by Christopher Howard
+Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest by Amy Bridges
+Imperiled Innocents: Anthony Comstock and Family Reproduction in Victorian
+America by Nicola Beisel
+The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton’s Plan for Health Security
+by Jacob Hacker
+The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit by
+Thomas J. Sugrue
+Party Decline in America: Policy, Politics, and the Fiscal State by John J. Coleman
+The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative
+Veto by Jessica Korn
+Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Culture, and the Struggle for
+Woman Suffrage by Lee Ann Banaszak
+Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Politics and Business in
+America by David Vogel
+From the Outside In: World War II and the American State by Bartholomew H.
+Sparrow
+Classifying by Race edited by Paul E. Peterson
+Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation by
+Jennifer L. Hochschild
+Political Organizations by James Q. Wilson
+Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective by
+Theda Skocpol
+Experts and Politicians: Reform Challenges to Machine Politics in New York,
+Cleveland, and Chicago by Kenneth Finegold
+Bound by Our Constitution: Women, Workers, and the Minimum Wage by Vivien
+Hart
+Prisoners of Myth: The Leadership of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1933–1990
+by Erwin C. Hargrove
+Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience by Martin
+Shefter
+Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia by
+Colleen A. Dunlavy
+The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism by J. David Greenstone
+Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United
+States by Victoria C. Hattam
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ZABALA--Filipe-J.--SILVEIRA--Fabiano-F.-Decades-of-Jurimetrics.-PUCRS--2019..md b/ZABALA--Filipe-J.--SILVEIRA--Fabiano-F.-Decades-of-Jurimetrics.-PUCRS--2019..md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e669b46
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+++ b/ZABALA--Filipe-J.--SILVEIRA--Fabiano-F.-Decades-of-Jurimetrics.-PUCRS--2019..md
@@ -0,0 +1,1943 @@
+D E C A D E S
+O F
+J U R I M E T R I C S
+
+Filipe J. Zabala∗1 and Fabiano F. Silveira†2
+
+1School of Technology, PUCRS
+
+2019-12-31
+
+Jurimetria é harmonia
+entre o exato e o direito
+calibra o que é meu com os fatos
+previsível, enfim, quem diria?
+
+Contents
+
+1 Old Wine in New Bottles 2
+1.1 Recognizing the bottles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+1.2 Drinking the wine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+1.3 Gueule de bois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+
+2 Three Prisms of Jurimetrics 16
+2.1 The Judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
+2.2 The Lawmaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
+2.3 The Lawyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+
+3 Applications 19
+3.1 Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+3.3 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+
+4 The Posterior Step 25
+4.1 Ignorance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
+4.2 Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
+4.3 Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
+
+∗filipe.zabala@pucrs.br
+†
+fabiano.feijo.silveira@gmail.com
+
+1
+
+arXiv:2001.00476v1 [cs.CY] 30 Dec 2019
+Abstract
+
+Jurimetrics: decades of history, decades to-be auspicious. A Brazilian point of view on the
+trajectory of this forgotten concept in the quantitative approach of the law, with code and examples
+in free software.
+Keywords: Jurimetrics, Law, Statistics, Thomas Bayes, Lee Loevinger, Artificial Intelligence,
+Empirical Legal Studies.
+
+1 Old Wine in New Bottles
+
+T
+
+he year 2019 is interesting in a ‘jurimetrical’ point of view. Several historical decades have been
+completed, which makes an appropriate moment for reflections on possible deviations that may be
+distorting the current understanding of the matter.
+The conceptual framework of jurimetrics was first presented (2019 − 1949)/10 = 7 decades ago by
+[Loevinger(1949)]
+1
+. His manifesto begins considering that ‘one of the greatest anomalies of modern times
+that the law, which exists as a public guide to conduct, has become such a recondite mystery that it is
+incomprehensible to the public and scarcely intelligible to its own votaries’. Even nowadays the scenario
+is not much different, but the tools available at this time allow to address this issue, rather than simply
+‘make the people obey the laws they do not understand’.
+In Loevinger’s writings from 1949 to 1992 it is possible to observe the influence of a wide variety of
+philosophers, like Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Thomas Bayes, Francis Bacon, Aristotle, among others.
+He was ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’, as the saying attributed (2019 − 1675)/10 ≈ 34 decades
+ago to Isaac Newton. This idea, however, was documented (2019 − 1159)/10 = 86 decades ago in
+John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon [John of Salisbury and Lejeune(2009)], which accredits to the French
+philosopher Bernard of Chartres. On the foreword of [Merton(1993)], Humberto Eco suggests that this
+concept is found in the texts of Priscian in the 5th century, around 160 decades ago.
+
+As Merton himself says, Bernard’s Aphorism is known through its quotation by John of
+Salisbury in the Metalogicon (I can confirm his answer to a question raised by Merton: it
+is, indeed, in III, 4), and Bernard is not the original inventor, for the concept (if not the
+metaphor of the dwarfs) appears in Priscian six centuries earlier. (Humberto Eco on the
+foreword of [Merton(1993)], p. xiv.)
+
+Even in modern science is not straightforward to measure the contribution of each collaborator
+on a complex theory, although there are proposals in the literature [Winston(1985)]. [Donoho(2015)]
+discusses [t]he 50 years of data science, when more than 5 decades ago John Tukey wrote The Future
+of Data Analysis, pointing an ‘unrecognized science whose subject of interest was learning from data, or
+‘data analysis”. ‘No scientific discovery is named after its original discoverer’, states the Stigler’s Law of
+Eponymy [Stigler(1980)] – which ironically is an eponym2 – in the sense that
+
+Laplace employed Fourier transforms in print before Fourier published on the topic, that
+Lagrange presented Laplace transforms before Laplace began his scientific career, that Poisson
+published the Cauchy distribution in 1824, 29 years before Cauchy touched on it in an incidental
+manner, and that Bienaymé stated and proved the Chebychev inequality a decade before
+and in greater generality than Chebychev’s first work on the topic. [Stigler(1980), p. 148]
+
+In the text that assigned the term Googol 3
+to the number 10100, [Kasner and Newman(1940)] points
+out in the Chapter 1 – New Names for Old – that
+
+[e]very once in a while there is house cleaning in mathematics. Some old names are discarded,
+some dusted off and refurbished; new theories, new additions to the household are assigned a
+place and name. [Kasner and Newman(1940), p. 3]
+
+Thus, we are only guardians of the old wine, passed from bottle to bottle throughout history.
+
+1 https://mncourts.libguides.com/lee_loevinger
+2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eponym
+3 The term was coined by Edward Kasner’s nephew, Milton Sirotta (1911–1981). According to [Koller(2004)] the name
+‘Google’ is a corruption of ‘Googol’, misspelled by Sean Anderson in September of 1997 when the domain google.com was
+registered.
+
+Page 2
+1.1 Recognizing the bottles
+
+During research the authors were led to [Leibniz(1666)], that for the given purposes will be considered
+the milestone on the formal association of quantitative thought and law, although [Friendly(2008)] refers
+to early 1660s texts concerning a ‘political arithmetic’. Leibniz sheds light on the subject focusing on
+symbolic representation of languages using basic components units. With more than thirty five decades
+old, his writings suggests ‘the primitive terms comprise things and, as well, modes or relations’, in a
+translation from Latin [Amunategui(2014)]. This kind of structure involving small blocks associated by
+a set of rules is merged on the foundations of the legal reasoning and all kinds of quantitative approach
+like statistics, mathematics, computer science, data science, machine learning, artificial intelligence and
+many other labels.
+
+Figure 1: [Leibniz(1666)] excerpt, p. 27.
+
+Exactly (2019 − 1709)/10 = 31 decades ago, Nicolaus (Nicolas/Nikolas/Niklaus) I Bernoulli (1687-
+1759) published his thesis De Usu Artis Canjectandi in Jure, or ‘On the Use of the Art of Conjecturing in
+Law’ [Bernoulli(1709)]. It is a well-documented reference of the quantitative approach in the law, which
+deals with everyday issues such as lottery and insurance pricings, inheritance, confidence in witnesses,
+probabilities of innocence and survival of people. [Kohli(1975)] and [Hald(2003)] points out he had
+great influence from the work of his uncle and master James (Jacques/Jakob/Jacob/Jacobi) I Bernoulli
+(1654-1705), Art of Conjecture4
+, published posthumously in 1713 [Bernoulli(1713)].
+
+An edition of the works of Jakob Bernoulli would be incomplete if one did not attach to it the
+thesis of his nephew Niklaus from the year 1709 ‘On the Use of the Art of Conjecturing in
+Law’. The spiritual father of this work is clearly Jacob. Whole sections from both the diary
+and the ‘Ars Conjectandi’ Niklaus has taken literally. At other points, questions and mere
+hints of Jacob were taken up and further processed. [Kohli(1975), p. 541]5
+
+Also inspired on James I Bernoulli’s work, [Condorcet(1785)] presents the currently known Condorcet’s
+jury theorem, a milestone in problems concerning voting systems. It can be applied in a wide variety of
+fields, such as social sciences and machine learning. The theorem can be stated in terms of a dichotomous
+variable assuming the values 1 and 0, and it is considered reasonable to assign a ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’
+classification. If a decision maker – e.g. a judge or classifier – assigns correctly the 1’s with probability
+θ greater than 1/2, the theorem asserts that more decision makers increases the overall probability of
+correct assignments. With θ less than 1/2, more decision makers decreases the overall probability of
+correct assignments, and for θ = 1/2 the number of decisiors is indifferent. Adapted from [Berg(1996)],
+the theorem is formally described as follows.
+
+4 Part IV, Chapter II.
+5
+“Eine Ausgabe der Werke von Jakob Bernoulli wäre unvollständig, würde man ihr nicht die Dissertation seines Neffen
+Niklaus aus dem Jahre 1709 ‘Über den Gebrauch der Mutmaßungskunst in Fragen des Rechts’ beifügen. Der geistige Vater
+dieses Werkes ist eindeutig Jakob. Ganze Abschnitte sowohl aus dem Tagebuch als auch aus der ‘Ars Conjectandi’ hat
+Niklaus wörtlich übernommen. An andern Stellen wurden Fragestellungen und bloße Andeutungen Jakobs aufgegriffen und
+weiterverarbeitet.”
+
+Page 3
+Theorem 1. (Condorcet’s theorem) Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be n independent binary distributed random
+variables such that P r(Xi = 1) = θ > 1/2 and Pn = P r(
+PXi > n/2). Then (a) Pn > θ and (b) Pn
+is monotonously increasing in n and Pn −→ 1 as n −→ ∞. If θ < 1/2, then Pn < θ and Pn −→ 0 as
+n −→ ∞. Finally, when θ = 1/2, then Pn = 1/2 for all n.
+Example 1. If n = 3 and θ = 0.6 then P3 – the probability of at least two of three decision makers agree
+in the correctly assignment of 1’s – is given by
+
+P3 = 0.6 × 0.6 × 0.6 + 0.6 × 0.6 × 0.4 + 0.6 × 0.4 × 0.6 + 0.4 × 0.6 × 0.6 = 0.648 > 0.6.
+
+,
+Example 2. If n = 3 and θ = 0.3, then
+
+P3 = 0.3
+3 + 3 × 0.3
+2 × 0.7 = 0.216 < 0.3.
+
+,
+Example 3. If n = 3 and θ = 0.5, then
+
+P3 = 0.5
+3 + 3 × 0.5
+3 = 0.5.
+
+,
+[Condorcet(1785)] also points James I Bernoulli and Abraham de Moivre as precursors of the idea
+of seeking the probability of future events according to the law of past events, even they have given
+no method in their works to achieve this6
+. Considering the method, Condorcet points out the work
+of Thomas Bayes and Richard Price [Bayes(1763)], as well as Pierre-Simon Laplace for treating the
+question analytically [Laplace(1774)]. The Condorcet’s theorem and its consequences has been discussed
+and extended in literature7 until recently.
+Still in France, the 19th century brought the works of Adolphe Quetelet, André-Michel Guerry and
+Simeón Poisson. They were interested in Laplace’s work, as well in the analysis of conviction rates.
+During the development of l’homme moyen8
+concept, from 1827 to 1835 Quetelet looked for potentially
+meaningful relationships in social data. According to [Stigler(1986)],
+
+[h]e examined birth and death rates by month and city, by temperature, and by time of day.
+He calculated the month of conception from the birth month and tried to relate it to marriage
+statistics. He investigated mortality by age, by profession, by locality, by season, in prisons,
+and in hospitals. He considered other human attributes: height, weight, growth rate, and
+strength. Quetelet’s interests also extended to moral qualities: statistics on drunkenness,
+insanity, suicides, and crime. [Stigler(1986), p. 186]
+
+Based on Compte Général de L’administration de la Justice Criminelle en France data [France(1829)],
+Quetelet worked in the analysis of conviction rates, also handled by [Guerry(1833)] and [Poisson(1837)].
+According to [Stigler(1986)],
+
+Quetelet had given the numbers of accused and convicted as 7,234 and 4,594; Poisson gave
+them as 6,652 and 4,037, respectively. Thus for Quetelet the 1825 conviction rate was 0.635,
+for Poisson it was 0.607. The explanation for this discrepancy is that in preparing the report
+for 1827 the minister of justice (Count Portalis) had discovered that in the report for 1825
+the figures given had been augmented by those for accused condemned in absentia, and he
+had provided the needed correction. Apparently Quetelet missed this change (announced in a
+footnote on p. v of the Compte général for 1827), but Poisson did not. [Stigler(1986), p. 188]
+
+The seminal works of [Holmes Jr.(1881)] and [Holmes Jr.(1897)] lead to new perspectives in the Law,
+considering the precedent (the decided, or the stare decisis) in similar cases. Discussing early forms of
+liability, Holmes declares ‘other tools are needed besides logic’.
+6
+“L’idée de chercher la probabilité des évènements futurs d’après la loi des évènements passés, parroît s’être présentée
+à Jacques Bernoulli & à Moivre, mais ils n’ont donné dans leurs ouvrages aucune méthode pour y parvenir. M.rs Bayes
+& Price en ont donné une dans les Transactions philosophiques, années 1764 & 1765, & M. de la Place est le premier qui
+ait traité cette question d’une maniére analytique.”
+7
+[Grofman et al.(1983)], [Boland(1989)], [Ladha(1992)], [Berg(1993)], [Berg(1996)], [Austen-Smith and Banks(1996)],
+[List and Goodin(2001)], [Williams(2004)], [Gehrlein(2006)], [Gehrlein and Lepelley(2011)],
+[Kaniovski and Zaigraev(2011)], [Zaigraev and Kaniovski(2012)] and [Gottlieb and Hussain(2015)].
+8 Average man.
+
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+●
+
+Source: Poisson (1837)
+
+0.5
+
+0.6
+
+0.7
+
+1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830
+year
+
+rate
+
+group
+
+●
+
+●
+
+●
+
+●
+
+France
+
+People
+
+Property
+
+Seine
+
+France conviction rates (1825−1830)
+
+Figure 2: France conviction rates (1825-1830)
+
+The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. [Holmes Jr.(1881), p. 5]
+
+The Bayesian approach provides a formal mechanism to incorporate information to decision maker’s
+experience. Such approach – discussed briefly in Sections 1.2, 3.2 and 4 – also provides tools to prediction,
+suggested by Holmes Jr. in stating that
+[t]he object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force
+through the instrumentality of the courts. [Holmes Jr.(1897), p. 1]
+[Llewellyn(1930b)] discusses the problem of defining law and defends the Roscoe Pound’s ‘precepts’,
+in opposition to ‘rules’ for being a ‘term sufficiently ambiguous’. At page 460 Llewellyn considers ‘making
+the study of law a study in first instance of particularized situations’, where ‘generalization must come
+from a resynthesis of such particularized studies’.
+Inspired by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s writings and considering the advances in quantitative methods,
+[Loevinger(1949)] is a manifesto in defense of rationality in the law. Labeled jurimetrics, this house cleaning
+occured seven decades ago and still provokes high-level discussions. Forward Llewellyn’s next step,
+Loevinger identifies Roscoe Pound – dean of Harvard Law School – as ‘the most prominent spokesman’ of
+Legal Realists, considered by Loevinger a ‘school of Sociological Jurisprudence’ that ‘has developed more
+from the stimulus of (Rudolph von) Jhering than of Holmes’. Loevinger defends the ‘legal principle as
+the most significant aspect of law’, opposed to the ‘emphasis on the particular case’, ‘although agreeing
+with the Realists that law must adapt itself to social needs’.
+‘The scholars whose writings have emphasized the particular case, rather than the general
+rule, as the basis for a study of the law, have been called Legal Realists’. [Loevinger(1949), p.
+10]
+
+The next step forward in the long path of man’s progress must be from jurisprudence (which
+is mere speculation about law) to jurimetrics – which is the scientific investigation of legal
+problems. [Loevinger(1949), p. 31]
+
+Page 5
+After the 1949 seminal article, Lee Loevinger was proliferous writing about science and law in the
+1950s and 1960s. [Loevinger(1950)] makes a book review of Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in
+American Justice, published by Jerome Frank in 1949. He points out the shift of Frank’s ideas between
+1930 and 1949, criticizing the ‘individualized cases’ concept and the lack of a formal definition for ‘justice’.
+[Loevinger(1952)] discusses some Holmes Jr.’s ideas, like ‘the life of the law has not been logic: it
+has been experience’. He considers this a slogan ‘at least superficially misleading’, but points out that
+Holmes Jr. wish ‘a more conscious and rational recognition of the grounds of judicial decision’. Also
+makes a defense of the use of logic in law, referring indirectly to the concept of coherence [Leonard(1980)],
+[Loschi and Wechsler(2002)]. Loevinger retakes Jerome Frank’s work, citing Mortimer Adler, Walter
+Wheeler Cook, Dennis Lloyd, Julius Cohen, William James, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey among
+others, making considerations about the foundations of probability theory.
+While there appears to be a real difference between a ‘fair preponderance of the evidence’ and
+‘clear and convincing proof ’, there is no obvious indication that there is a similar differentiation
+between the latter phrase and ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’. At least some of this
+confusion might be avoided if courts were to adopt a terminology of probability logic. The
+conventional mode of representation calls for the use of 0 to indicate that a proposition is
+untrue or impossible, the use of 1.0 to indicate that a proposition is true or certain, and the
+use of intervening values to indicate the relative probability (or frequency) of its being true.
+[Loevinger(1952), p. 495]
+Loevinger finishes An Introduction to Legal Logic stating
+[t]he future of the law, and perhaps of society itself, will depend upon the ability of the legal
+professionals to develop and utilize patterns and forms of thinking in the law adequate to deal
+with the complex problems of modern life. [Loevinger(1952), p. 522]
+[Loevinger(1958)] refers again to ‘legal realists’ and takes up the issue of ‘individualized cases’, making
+a deep discussion in the distinction between ‘evidence’, ‘facts’/‘opinions’, ‘subjective’/‘objective’ and
+‘perceptions’/‘conclusions’ concepts. He discusses admissibility and coherence, suggesting the social
+policy ‘be accomplished by establishing an appropriate rule relating to the degree of proof required,
+rather than by artificial rules excluding classes of evidence’. He ends the article declaring
+in order to function effectively at any level, every mind must take account of the learning and
+thinking that has preceded and must approach contemporary problems in terms of contemporary
+concepts. [Loevinger(1958), p. 175]
+
+[Loevinger(1961)] discusses the advances of science, considering that ‘science and law have been linked
+in man’s speech and thinking for centuries’. He points out Karl Pearson’s idea that ‘the classification
+of facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative significance is the function of science’. From
+Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. writings, Loevinger remembers that ‘an ideal system of law should draw
+its postulates and its legislative justification from science’ and ‘for the rational study of the law the
+black-letter, man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and
+the master of economics’. The scientific advances cited by Loevinger are related largely to electronics in
+the field of data retrieval. He defines in a very mature way the concepts of hardware and software:
+‘Hardware’ means simply the mechanical devices – the physical machines – that science has
+produced. ‘Software’ means the intellectual systems of designs and concepts that have been
+produced. [Loevinger(1961), p. 258]
+He alerts ‘that legal prediction is an activity in which lawyers, and for that matter citizens in all
+occupations, are commonly engaged’, and that the legal profession has no choice unless adapt to new
+technologies ‘to retain its position of intellectual leadership’. To apply in a practical way he points out
+[t]he branch of mathematics that appears to be of the most immediate practical utility in the
+fields of law and the behavioral sciences is statistics. There is much in statistics that is of
+present practical application in day-to-day legal problems and it has good claim to be included
+in every law school curriculum. [Loevinger(1961), p. 262]
+[Loevinger(1962)] discusses the principle of parsimony in scientific thinking, known as Occam’s Razor
+and summarized in the maxim ‘entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity’ 9
+. [Loevinger(1963)]
+9
+‘Essentia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitate’, William of Occam, 14th century.
+
+Page 6
+retakes some ideas of Oliver Holmes Jr. and brings jurimetrics as a new science, considering jurisprudence
+as ‘the philosophy of law’. Examining the methodology of legal inquiry, Leovinger considers the electronic
+data retrieval as an interesting and seminal area of work. He details some principles of text manipulation
+and points out an association factor purposed by [Stiles(1961)]. Such factor assigns a relevance to related
+terms, ‘where A is the number of documents indexed by one term; B is the number of documents indexed
+by a second term; f is the number of documents indexed by the combination of both terms; and N is
+the total number of documents in the collection. If AB is greater than fN the association is negative’.
+
+Figure 3: Association Factor by [Stiles(1961)].
+
+Loevinger also discusses a probabilistic indexing suggested by [Maron and Kuhns(1960)], as well a
+system named ‘LEX’ designed as a LEgal indeX by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
+Justice10. In the following excerpt he describes the modern approach to data manipulation:
+Conceivably, it may become possible to record all the decisions in a field of law, or perhaps in
+the entire law, in such fashion that their full text can be searched electronically in microseconds.
+[Loevinger(1963), p. 26]
+
+The discussion purposed by Loevinger is very opportune, considering that substantial textual structures
+are easily handled today with tools written in R, Python and REGEX (REGular EXpressions)11
+,
+for instance. The TF-IDF (Term Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency) [Spärck Jones(1972)] and its
+derived metrics [Lopes et al.(2016)] can be considered a new generation of relevance metrics discussed by
+Loevinger. Also driven by the modernization of the legal processes, [Allen and Caldwell(1963)] considers
+schemes and diagrams as shown in Figure 4, while [Allen(1963)] sets his thesis:
+If
+1. the written materials used in the tax field are more systematically drafted,
+Then
+2. human beings will be able to ‘read’ and ‘work with’ those materials ‘better’, and
+3. automatic devices will be able to ‘read’ and ‘work with’ those materials ‘better’.
+
+[Allen(1963), p. 714]
+
+[Loevinger(1966)] discusses science and law as rival systems, claiming at page 535 that ‘up to the
+present time law has made little use of science, or the empiric method, and (...) the lawyers generally
+have little understanding of science or its concepts and methods’, pointing out a symposium issue in Law
+and Contemporary Problems12 as one of the few significant efforts to scientific work in the law. Loevinger
+also discusses the empirical approach given by [Kalven et al.(1966)] about jury behavior and makes a
+defense of the complementarity of methods and the difficulty in recognizing the limitations of each field.
+The point that needs to be made, however, is that the empiric and the dialectic methods
+are not rivals or alternatives but complementary methods adapted to different problems and
+applicable in different situations. (...) Much of the difficulty in the relationship between law
+and science has arisen from the failure of both lawyers and behavioral scientists to recognize the
+limitations of their respective methods and the kinds of problems to which they are appropriate.
+[Loevinger(1966), pp. 541-543]
+Giving preference to data production over more theories, Loevinger considers ‘the records of judgements
+in the hundreds of trial courts’ as ‘an obvious rich mine of data’ and indicates ‘an ineluctable
+relationship between science and semantics’. He was concerned about the different understandings of
+vague terms as ‘justice’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘public interest’, purposing ‘experimental and quantitative
+investigation of such semantic questions’.
+10 https://www.justice.gov/atr
+11 https://regex101.com/
+12https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol28/iss1/
+
+Page 7
+Figure 4: Scheme by [Allen and Caldwell(1963), p. 227].
+
+The profession of law and those it serves can hope and demand that the law schools begin
+to study both of the great systems of gathering data, the dialectic and the empiric, and bring
+both to bear in seeking solutions of the proliferating and increasingly complex problems of
+government in a scientific age, and in training those who will become our future governors.
+[Loevinger(1966), p. 551]
+
+[Loevinger(1985)] makes a review of the main ideas of jurimetrics, in a lecture pointing out ‘the
+greatest developments of technology now appear to be tending toward a dispersion of power’, in the
+sense that
+
+the world today is divided between societies which value democracy and individual freedom
+and those which subjugate the individual to the state and are ruled by authoritarian regimes.
+Probably the most critical issue confronting us today is the distribution of power – political
+power – within our own society and in the community of nations. (...) In the critical area of
+communications new modes of transmitting and receiving information are proliferating and
+are segmenting audiences for all of the mass media. At the same time the new technologies
+provide increasing means for small groups and even individuals to disseminate views and
+make divergent voices heard. [Loevinger(1985), p. 19]
+
+[Loevinger(1992b)] asserts both science and law ‘rest upon subjective judgments or assumptions’, and
+‘proof of facts in all disciplines rests upon subjective judgments of probability’. This is a Bayesian point
+of view, deeply supported in literature since [Bayes(1763)].
+
+Page 8
+Figure 5: Bayes’ Theorem by [Loevinger(1992b), p. 327]
+
+An important reference concerning the subjectivist point of view of probability is the work of Bruno
+de Finetti. He purposed the representation theorem [de Finetti(1937)], where exchangeable variables13
+are conditionally independent given a non-observed parameter θ. This quantity is treated as a nuisance
+parameter, giving a predictive characterization to de Finetti’s theorem. Throughout his work a strong
+subjectivist point of view becomes clear, as can be noticed, e.g., in the motto ‘PROBABILITY DOES
+NOT EXIST’ [de Finetti(1974), p. x] and in the following excerpt.
+
+There is no way, however, in which the individual can avoid the burden of responsibility for
+his own evaluations. The key cannot be found that will unlock the enchanted garden wherein,
+among the fairy-rings and the shrubs of magic wands, beneath the trees laden with monads and
+noumena, blossom forth the flowers of ‘Probabilitas realis’. With these fabulous blooms safely
+in our button-holes we would be spared the necessity of forming opinions, and the heavy loads
+we bear upon our necks would be rendered superfluous once and for all. [de Finetti(1975), p.
+42]
+
+Under this point of view, it is possible to formally assign the decision maker’s opinion about θ to a
+probability distribution called prior, which in turn is calibrated with data obtained from the likelihood
+function. This procedure provides a posterior distribution, or the decision maker’s opinion about θ after
+the data. This approach can be naturally applied in the law, as pointed out by Loevinger.
+
+Lawyers gather data, which they call ‘evidence’; scientists gather evidence, which they call
+‘data’. Both terms mean the same thing, which is intellectual support for some conclusion or
+proposition. [Loevinger(1992b), p. 323]
+
+Loevinger retakes the Ockham’s Razor concept from the Bayesian point of view [Jefferys and Berger(1992)],
+
+and points out legal rules of evidence and ‘burden of proof’ conditioned on the admissibility of such
+proofs and evidences. He indicates some cases in which probability calculations was used by courts,
+discussing objective and subjective approaches to probability interpretation. Finally, [Loevinger(1992a)]
+discusses philosophically some aspects of logic and Sociology, re-examinating ‘albeit somewhat reluctantly’
+[Kaye(1992)], [Loevinger(1992b)] and [Jasanoff(1992)].
+[Kowalski(1995)] points out the similarities between computing and the law, that ‘seem to cover all
+areas of computing software (...) as programming, program specification, database description and query,
+integrity constraints, and knowledge representation in artificial intelligence’. Besides that, he indicates
+the similarities between computing and law are ‘extend also to the problems that the two fields share of
+developing, maintaining and reusing large and complex bodies of linguistic texts’.
+
+The linguistic style in which legislation is normally written has many similarities with the
+language of logic programming. (...) These extensions include the introduction of types, relative
+clauses, both ordinary negation and negation by failure, integrity constraints, metalevel
+reasoning and procedural notation. [Kowalski(1995), p. 325]
+13An exchangeable variable is characterized when the order of the observations does not alter its probability law.
+
+Page 9
+At this point in the timeline it is possible to observe the non-intersection of Jurimetrics with Empirical
+Legal Research and Legal Realism. Several textbooks emerged indicating some point of views on the
+history of the quantitative empiricism in the law, to the best of our knowledge not quoting Loevinger and
+jurimetrics. [Schlegel(1995), P = 432, L = 0, J = 0]
+14 conceives American Legal Realism and Empirical
+Social Science in the sense that ‘the point of this book is the stories’. The author declares to ‘love stories’
+and be ‘better at narrative than analytic history’, offering to his readers ‘a capsule summary of the story
+of Realism as it is usually told’.
+
+Thus it was not until the 1920s that more than an isolated soul would claim that legal science
+was unscientific and so elicit clues as to why that was, and still is, the case. The group of
+scholars that made this claim and so brought the notion of science as an empirical inquiry if
+not into, then at least up against, law was the American Legal Realists. [Schlegel(1995), p. 1]
+
+[Kritzer(2009), P = 50, L = 0, J = 0] makes a bibliographic essay of the Empirical Legal Studies
+Before 1940, stating that ‘Empirical Legal Studies is a term that began to come into vogue around 2000’,
+pointing out several studies conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s. He considers the legal realism as
+an essentially American movement ‘in significant part’ because ‘almost all of the empirical legal research
+of the period was done by Americans focusing on the United States’. While the author do not discusses
+every study found, he claims to have ‘provided as complete a bibliography of that research as possible’.
+[Cane and Kritzer(2010), P = 1112, L = 0, J = 1]
+15 indicates in The Oxford Handbook of Empirical
+Legal Research that ‘in the American legal Academy, empirical research gained contemporary prominence
+in the late 1990s’. The authors points out ‘the genesis of empirically based studies of judicial behavior
+is commonly traced to the pioneering work of C. Hermann Pritchett in the late 1940s’.
+In An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research, [Epstein and Martin(2014), P = 324, L = 0, J = 0]
+retakes some Holmes Jr.’s ideas, as ‘the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
+economics’, pointing out that the ‘future is here’. The authors present code and databases treated in
+R and Stata softwares. They use a classic statistical approach, considering methods that violates the
+likelihood principle16 – such as confidence intervals and p-value calculation from classical hypothesis tests
+– as ‘close approximations to Bayesian methods’, which can be noticed in the following excerpt.
+
+Technically, to use population data to extrapolate to a different context or a future context,
+Bayesian statistics are the appropriate method. Bayesian statistics treat data as given and
+parameters as the things about which we have uncertainty. All the inferential tools described
+in this book are close approximations to Bayesian methods as long as we have sufficiently
+large samples, which provides justification for their use. In other words, it is appropriate to
+use hypothesis tests or confidence intervals as part of a process of extrapolation to different
+contexts or different time periods as an approximate Bayesian solution to the inferential
+problem. [Epstein and Martin(2014), p. 154]
+
+At last, the Empirical Legal Research by [Leeuw and Schmeets(2016), P = 328, L = 0, J = 0] ‘covers
+all major fields of law, as the Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Cane and Kritzer, 2010)
+shows’. On the other hand, Loevinger exposes in his articles ‘considerable diversity among the references
+cited’, discussing the ideas of a wide range of authors.
+
+Some service has, indeed, been rendered by the modern thinkers, Bentham, Jhering, Holmes,
+Pound, the Realists, and others of similar views, in bringing law out of the sky and down to
+earth. [Loevinger(1949), p. 15]
+
+[Bench-Capon(2015)] refers to [Loevinger(1949)] and [Mehl(1959)] as who anticipated many of the
+computational systems that have been implemented and proposed. For some reason, however, the
+Empirical Legal Research and Legal Realism literature does not gave the appropriate credit to Lee
+Loevinger. Clues about this issue are found (again) in [Loevinger(1949)]. At the end of the second
+paragraph of page 4, he asserts that ‘the trouble with law is not the public but the lawyers, that what
+is needed is not publicity but progress’. At pages 39-40 claims that ‘advertising is no substitute for
+research’, and complements on the footnote #85:
+14P: number of (#) pages. L: # times loevinger term was found. J: # times jurimetric* radical was found.
+15The reference found was the citation of Robertson, D. (1982). “Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords: A Jurimetric
+Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science 12: 1–25. Robertson does not cite Loevinger, considering the ‘celebrated
+paradigm is Schubert’s The Judicial Mind, a classic of what has been called ‘jurimetrics”.
+16For more details see [Birnbaum(1962)], [Wechsler et al.(2008)] and [Mayo(2014)].
+
+Page 10
+Needless to say, the term ‘research’ is here used in its scientific sense, and what is carelessly
+called ‘legal research’ by the average lawyer has no more relation to it than numerology has
+to statistics. [Loevinger(1949), p. 40]
+
+Cultivating a collaborative thinking and inspired by known and unknown giants, the authors support
+a unified approach to the topic and celebrate the dedication of so many people for so many decades in
+building such a vast and detailed work. Cheers!
+
+1.2 Drinking the wine
+
+Of course it is not important what term is used to indicate the scientific discipline suggested.
+It is important that it have a distinctive name, as well as a general program. The name
+suggested here seems, to the author, as good as any, since it seems to indicate the nature of the
+subject matter, and corresponds to other similar terms, such as biometrics and econometrics.
+[Loevinger(1949), p. 31]
+
+Jurimetrics is the application of quantitative methods in the law.17 So, anyone who considers quantitative
+approaches to legal problems is making jurimetrics. The term is concise and intuitive like
+biometrics, chemometrics, econometrics and so on. It combines the flexibility of the Human Science with
+the precision of the Natural Science.
+An example of this scientific association is the case United States v. Carroll Towing Co., concerning
+the sinking of the barge Anna C on January 4, 1944. Judge Learned Hand uses for the first
+time a cost-benefit analysis for assigning liability and determining negligence [Hand(1947)]. Although
+[Feldman and Kim(2005)] discusses other approaches and indicates the called Hand rule might produce
+games with inefficient equilibria, the case is a milestone in a modern use of quantitative methods in the
+law. In the judge’s words, the Hand rule is described as follows.
+
+Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she
+does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations,
+to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that
+she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of
+adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic
+terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
+whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < LP. [Hand(1947), online]
+
+To the best of our knowledge, the first works in brazilian jurimetrics were produced in IME-USP18
+.
+[Montoya-Delgado(1998)] and [Montoya-Delgado et al.(2001)] presents a methodologic proposal for calculating
+the probability of paternity when DNA information available comes only from the accused’s
+relatives. The proposed method allows to evaluate the probability of paternity considering the HardyWeinberg
+equilibrium law using the Bayesian approach.
+[Nakano(2006)] builds ‘a mathematical model for calculating the probability of paternity and implement
+it in software’.19 The author also considers the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium law, applying methods
+such Bayesian Networks and Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST). Purposed by [Pereira and Stern(1999)],
+the FBST is a Bayesian measure of evidence for precise (sharp) hypotheses, as well as a Bayesian alternative
+to significance tests or, equivalently, to p-values.
+[Wechsler et al.(2006)] describes a technical report concerning a civil law issue of leasing contracts
+dollar-indexed for vehicle purchase. The authors studies aspects related to the validity – from the
+vehicle buyers’ financial point of view – of a legal action against leasing companies. Making use of
+the Bayesian approach, they build a calculator based on a 2001 jurisprudency20, 27 variables and the
+opinion about the judgements. They presents the applications Check Balance21 and Decision Supporter 22
+in order to provide reference values to the decision maker. The opinion about how favorable are the legal
+17Albeit [Loevinger(1963), p. 8] asserts ‘(i)t is unnecessary, and perhaps impossible, to give a precise definition to the
+field of jurimetrics’.
+18Instituto de Matemática e Estatística, Universidade de São Paulo (Institute of Mathematics and Statistics, University
+of São Paulo).
+19Construir um modelo matemático para cálculo da probabilidade de paternidade e implementá-lo em software.
+[Nakano(2006), p. 5]
+20Recurso Especial do STJ n◦. 473141.
+21Verifica Saldo.
+22Apoiador de Decisão.
+
+Page 11
+decisions to the vehicle buyer or the leasing companies is given in a ordinal scale from 1 (highly favorable
+to vehicle buyer) to 5 (highly favorable to leasing companies), where 0 indicates ignorance about the
+decisions. To the levels of the ordinal scale are assigned parameters of a beta probability distribution
+[Johnson et al.(1995), pp. 210-275].
+
+Figure 6: Decision Supporter window by [Wechsler et al.(2006), p. 49]
+
+[Kadane(2012)] refers to a lecture given in the XI Brazilian Meeting on Bayesian Statistics, concerning
+the case of Kansas cellphone users23 in which ‘Sprint-Nextel was sued for conspiring with other cell phone
+providers to impose high prices for text-messaging’. Kadane discusses the probability sampling concept
+and its application, pointing out that in the present case ‘classical statistics did not address the court’s
+question, but Bayesian analysis did’.
+Half decade ago [Zabala and Silveira(2014)] present a brief history of what was known so far about
+jurimetrics. Some considerations and suggestions on practical and theoretical applications of the subject
+are made. A division of jurimetrics into three prisms is proposed, formalizing a connection between law
+and quantitative thinking. Some theoretical and applied examples are presented, demonstrating part
+of the application in different contexts and raising fundamental questions for use in Brazilian law. In
+26 April 2016 the same authors purposed a jurimetrics symbol24 called Juri-yang. Presented in Figure
+7, it represents the harmony between ‘juri’ – indicated by three dots forming a stylized balance – and
+‘metrics’, indicated by three aligned dots suggesting a stylized scatter plot.
+[Trecenti(2015)] presents the method of influence diagram applied to civil justice litigation. The data
+were obtained from the web, through web scraping and text mining techniques. The R packages tjsp
+and bnr were developed, used respectively to facilitate access to the TJSP25 database and adjust the
+parameters of Bayesian networks based on a Gibbs sampler. The author discusses the importance of data
+extraction and manipulation, as well as the use of open-source packages that allow the reproducibility of
+jurimetric works.
+[Nunes(2016)] discusses how statistics can reinvent the law. The author cites a series of lectures
+taught in Brazil in 1973 by the philosophy professor at the Universities of Milan and Turin, Mario
+Losano. According the author, Losano ‘did not agree with the idea of the quantification of law and
+rejected statistics because he considered it to be incompatible with law in all its scope, including the
+study of general norms, principles and social values’26, considering that ‘predicting the content of a
+23Quin Jackson et al. v. Sprint Nextel Corporation, Case No. 09-cv-2192 (N.D. Ill.).
+24 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Juri-yang.png
+25Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo.
+26(...) não compactuava com a ideia da quantificação do Direito e rejeitava a Estatística por considerá-la incompatível
+com o Direito em toda sua abrangência, incluindo o estudo das normas gerais, princípios e valores sociais. [Nunes(2016),
+
+Page 12
+Figure 7: Juri-yang.
+
+sentence would be impracticable’27. Considering the expression ‘jurimetrics’, Nunes points out Lee
+Loevinger had a ‘deterministic view of knowledge’28 and ‘stuck to the concept of deterministic causality,
+Loevinger understood that uncertainty would deprive the scientist of the means of identifying the causes
+of a phenomenon, preventing him from making predictions about his future behavior.’29
+[Marcondes et al.(2019)] discusses the necessity of ‘transparency and complete auditability’ in judicial
+systems, considering random procedures to select jury, court or judge. The authors emphasizes ‘these
+principles are neglected by random procedures in some judicial systems, which are performed in secrecy
+and are not auditable by the involved parties’. As an example of such a procedure is discussed the
+assignment of cases in the Brazilian Supreme Court, presenting ‘a review of how sortition has been
+historically employed by societies and discusses how Mathematical Statistics may be applied to random
+procedures of the judicial system’. The authors finalize the article purposing a ‘statistical model for
+assessing randomness in case assignment’, applied to the Brazilian Supreme Court.
+[Aires et al.(2017)], [Aires(2019)] and [Aires et al.(2019)] develop an approach to identify potential
+conflicts between norms based on deontic logic. The authors evaluate the effectiveness of the presented
+techniques ‘using a manually annotated contract conflict corpus with results close to the current state-ofthe-art
+for conflict identification, while introducing a more complex classification task of such conflicts’ for
+which their method ‘surpasses the state-of-the art method’. [Zabala and Silveira(2019)] present general
+purpose tools for jurimetrics, with code and databases available in free software. Examples are given in
+Section 3.3 and in the Figure 2.
+
+1.3 Gueule de bois
+
+In 23 March 2019 was enacted in France the Law No. 2019-222, a regulation know as Article 33. It
+provides a penalty up to 5 years of imprisonment, a fine up to 300,000 euros and possible loss of civil
+rights for anyone who discloses analysis of French judiciary data [France(2019)]
+30. According to Article
+33,
+p. 104]
+27(...) a previsão do conteúdo de uma sentença seria inviável. [Nunes(2016), p. 105]
+28(...) uma visão determinista do conhecimento. [Nunes(2016), p. 100]
+29Preso ao conceito de causalidade determinística, Loevinger entendia que a incerteza privaria o cientista dos meios
+de identificação das causas de um fenômeno, impedindo-o de formular previsões a respeito do seu comportamento futuro.
+[Nunes(2016), p. 100]
+30
+“Les données d’identité des magistrats et des membres du greffe ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une réutilisation ayant pour
+objet ou pour effet d’évaluer, d’analyser, de comparer ou de prédire leurs pratiques professionnelles réelles ou supposées.
+La violation de cette interdiction est punie des peines prévues aux articles 226-18,226-24 et 226-31 du code pénal, sans
+préjudice des mesures et sanctions prévues par la loi n◦. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et
+aux libertés.”
+
+Page 13
+[t]he identity data of magistrates and members of court can not be reuse with the aim of
+object or effect of evaluating, to analyze, compare or predict their practices real or assumed.
+Violation of this prohibition is punished by the penalties provided for in Articles 226-18,226-
+24 and 226-31 of the Penal Code, without prejudice to the measures and sanctions provided
+for by Law n◦
+. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 relating to data processing, files and freedoms.
+The penalties provided in Article 226-18 [France(2004)]
+31 points out
+[t]he collection of personal data by fraudulent, disloyal or unlawful means is punishable by five
+years’ imprisonment and a fine of 300,000 euros.
+The Article 226-31 [France(1994)]
+32 governs
+[n]atural persons guilty of one of the offenses provided for in this chapter also incur the
+following additional penalties: (...) [t]he ban on civil and family rights, (...) the professional
+or social activity in the exercise or on the occasion of the exercise of which the offense was
+committed, (...) [and] the confiscation of the thing that served or was intended to commit the
+offense or the thing that is the product of it.
+On the other hand, Brazil is much more advanced in this sense when compared to France, at least
+in theory. The brazilian legislation brings the Act 12.527/11, popularly known Access to Information
+Act, promulgated in 18 November 2011 [Brasil(2011)] and regulated in 16 May 2012 [Brasil(2012)]. It
+systematizes the data access in all public spheres in Brazil, and guarantees to Brazilian citizens the right
+to request access to public data. In the legal text33 can be found the following:
+It is the duty of public bodies and entities to promote, regardless of requirements, the disclosure
+in a place that is easily accessible, within the scope of their competences, of information
+of collective or general interest produced or guarded by them. (...) In order to comply with
+the caput, public bodies and entities shall use all legitimate means and instruments at their
+disposal, and disclosure on official websites of the World Wide Web (Internet) is mandatory.
+(...) Sites (...) shall (...) meet (...) the following requirements: I - contain content search
+tools that allow access to information in an objective, transparent, clear and in easy to understand
+language; II - enable the recording of reports in various electronic formats, including
+open and non-proprietary, such as spreadsheets and text, in order to facilitate the analysis
+of information; III - enable automated access by external systems in open, structured and
+machine readable formats; IV - disclose in detail the formats used for structuring the information;
+V - guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the information available for access;
+VI - keep updated the information available for access. [Brasil(2011), Article 8]
+The authors, however, were unsuccessful in most data requests through official brazilian channels. In
+4 December 2014 at 09:46:34, the Administrative Proceeding No. 22.031/2014 has been opened regarding
+the Manifestation No. 211234/2014. The manifestation mentions the Act 12.527/11 to request access to
+a sample database for conducting academic work. The solicitation34 requested the following:
+31
+“Le fait de collecter des données à caractère personnel par un moyen frauduleux, déloyal ou illicite est puni de cinq
+ans d’emprisonnement et de 300 000 euros d’amende.”
+32
+“Les personnes physiques coupables de l’une des infractions prévues par le présent chapitre encourent également les
+peines complémentaires suivantes (...) [l]’interdiction des droits civiques, civils et de famille, (...) l’activité professionnelle
+ou sociale dans l’exercice ou à l’occasion de l’exercice de laquelle l’infraction a été commise, (...) [et] la confiscation de la
+chose qui a servi ou était destinée à commettre l’infraction ou de la chose qui en est le produit.”
+33
+“É dever dos órgãos e entidades públicas promover, independentemente de requerimentos, a divulgação em local de fácil
+acesso, no âmbito de suas competências, de informações de interesse coletivo ou geral por eles produzidas ou custodiadas.
+(...) Para cumprimento do disposto no caput, os órgãos e entidades públicas deverão utilizar todos os meios e instrumentos
+legítimos de que dispuserem, sendo obrigatória a divulgação em sítios oficiais da rede mundial de computadores (internet).
+(...) Os sítios (...) deverão (...) atender (...) aos seguintes requisitos: I - conter ferramenta de pesquisa de conteúdo
+que permita o acesso à informação de forma objetiva, transparente, clara e em linguagem de fácil compreensão; II -
+possibilitar a gravação de relatórios em diversos formatos eletrônicos, inclusive abertos e não proprietários, tais como
+planilhas e texto, de modo a facilitar a análise das informações; III - possibilitar o acesso automatizado por sistemas
+externos em formatos abertos, estruturados e legíveis por máquina; IV - divulgar em detalhes os formatos utilizados para
+estruturação da informação; V - garantir a autenticidade e a integridade das informações disponíveis para acesso; VI -
+manter atualizadas as informações disponíveis para acesso.”
+34 a) a base de metadados relativa à base processual e b) a extração de dados públicos (brutos) processuais, com o maior
+histórico possível. Segue abaixo lista de informações que necessito para o estudo: nome do advogado, comarca, situação,
+número Themis, número CNJ, parte, classe/natureza, órgão julgador, última movimentação, acórdão, processo principal,
+processo de 1o grau, relator, data de distribuição, volumes, quantidades de folhas, notas de expediente, último julgamento,
+dados do 1o grau, depósitos judiciais e última atualização.
+
+Page 14
+(a) the metadata database of the court lawsuits and (b) the extraction of court lawsuits (raw)
+public data with the longest possible record. Below is a list of the information I need for the
+study: name of lawyer, county, situation, Themis number, CNJ number, part, class/nature,
+judging body, latest move, judgment, main proceedings, 1st degree case, rapporteur, date of
+distribution, volumes, sheet quantities, file notes, last judgment, 1st degree data, court deposits
+and last update.
+
+Five days later a feedback was given by TJDFT-COSIST, the First Instance Systems and Statistics
+Coordination35 of the Court of Justice of the Federal District and Territories36. The document No.
+22.031/2014, sent in 9 December 2014, informed about the impossibility to fulfill the request for public
+databases. The allegations37 was the following:
+
+In this case, the request does not limit the desired data, and only indicates the extraction
+of public databases, which is not feasible in view of the number of records of that, and the
+lack of access of this Coordination to such records for extraction. In addition, there is no
+integration between the first and second instance computer systems, so verification of some
+related information here will require manual verification of the processes. Given the above,
+this Coordination informs the impossibility of fulfilling the request.
+
+Figure 8: Administrative Proceeding No. 22.031/2014.
+
+35 COSIST – Coordenadoria de Sistemas e Estatísticas da Primeira Instância.
+36 TJDFT – Tribunal de Justiça do Distrito Federal e dos Territórios.
+37 No caso em questão o pedido não limita os dados desejados, e indica apenas a extração de bases de dados públicos, o
+que não é viável tendo em vista a quantidade de registros daquela, e a ausência de acesso desta Coordenação a tais registros
+para extração. Além disso, não há integração entre os sistemas informatizados da primeira e da segunda instância, de
+modo que a verificação de algumas informações relacionadas no presente exigirá a verificação manual dos processos.
+Diante do exposto, esta Coordenação informa a impossibilidade de atendimento da solicitação.
+
+Page 15
+After some attempts to gain access to public databases, the only useful feedback came from TJMGSEPLAG-CEINFO,
+the Institutional Management Information Center38 and the Executive Secretariat of
+Planning and Quality in Institutional Management39 of the Minas Gerais Court40. They made available
+in 5 December 2014 a sample of 11 variables for 5,080,270 TJMG court lawsuits from 2000 to 2013,
+analyzed by [Oliveira(2014)]. In Section 3.2 it is presented tjmg_year, a clean and ready-to-use version
+of TJMG dataset, concerning the counting of 4,236,229 lawsuits grouped by year.
+
+2 Three Prisms of Jurimetrics
+
+Much of the activity of government, including that of lawmakers, judges, administrators and
+other lawyers consists of investigating and ascertaining facts. [Loevinger(1966), p. 535]
+
+The Three Prisms of Jurimetrics is an approach proposed half decade ago by [Zabala and Silveira(2014)].
+The authors intended to unify the subject, in order to give a formal connection between the three main
+players of the judiciary: judge, lawmaker and lawyer. As the universe of study is wide, the analysis
+permeates all forms of legal action and needs a didactic way to understanding the role of quantitative
+methods in the legal framework. The prisms are, therefore, the looks or points of view of the main agents
+of the judiciary. [Schlag(2009)] considers the ‘dedifferentiation problem’, in the sense that ‘more sophisticated
+theories of law lead us to a point where we are no longer able to distinguish law from culture, or
+society, or the market, or politics or anything of the sort’. Anyway, considering the separation of powers
+model – consecrated on the Articles 2nd and 60th of the Brazilian Federal Constitution4142 [Brasil(1988)]
+– and the Occam’s Razor principle, we are still interested in delimiting the study of jurimetrics to the
+judiciary, although there may be associations of the latter with other entities.
+
+2.1 The Judge
+
+The first prism refers to the judge’s view. A judge’s main activity is to decide in situations under
+uncertainty. Considering the intersections between computing, quantitative methods and the law, it
+is possible to build modern calculators in order to support the magistrate’s decision. [DeGroot(2004)]
+presents methods for optimal statistical decisions considering the subjective probabilities as numerical
+representations of the decision maker’s beliefs and utility as numerical representations of his/her tastes
+and preferences. The approach given by Morris DeGroot maximizes the expected utility taking the
+primitives ‘is more likely than’ for probability and ‘is preferred to’ for utility, in order to disentangle
+these two components. The opinion about a latent parameter θ is updated under the Bayesian paradigm.
+Judicial expertise can be brought to the judicial process, in order to resolve doubts raised by the judge.
+Guidelines on the reality of precedents can also be considered, demonstrating the available information
+on parameters of interest. [Zabala(2019)] ‘presents a new tool to support the decision concerning moral
+damage indemnity values of the judiciary of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. A Bayesian approach is given,
+in order to allow the assignment of the magistrate’s opinion about such indemnity amounts, based on
+historical values. The solution is delivered in free software using public data, in order to permit future
+audits’.
+In addition to the reasons already presented, there is a possibility to consider the contribution of
+the expert witness. The ‘expert testimony has become increasingly essential in a wide variety of litigated
+cases’ [Berger(2011)], albeit ‘has many virtues, and just as many negative aspects’ [Cohen(2015)].
+‘The probability of winning increases with the skillful presentation of evidence’, argues [Matson(2012)].
+[Aitken and Stoney(1991)] states ‘the court is concerned with the probabilities (or odds) of guilt, and
+the expert witness is concerned with the probabilities of the evidence’. Once the opinion of an expert
+witness is widely accepted, it helps to resolve questions regarding the legal process involving the lack
+of immediate evidence or even in cases of difficult measurement such as, for instance, cases involving
+discrimination or prejudice.
+38 CEINFO – Centro de Informações para Gestão Institucional.
+39 SEPLAG – Secretaria Executiva de Planejamento e Qualidade na Gestão Institucional.
+40 TJMG – Tribunal de Justiça de Minas Gerais, http://www.tjmg.jus.br/.
+41
+“Art. 2◦ São Poderes da União, independentes e harmônicos entre si, o Legislativo, o Executivo e o Judiciário.”
+42
+“Art. 60◦, § 4◦ Não será objeto de deliberação a proposta de emenda tendente a abolir: III - a separação dos Poderes.”
+
+Page 16
+2.2 The Lawmaker
+
+The second prism refers to the lawmaker’s/legislator’s view. It is foreseen as one of the main activities
+of the legislator to purpose data-based bills, considering technical procedures and a legislative impact
+study. Fortunately, the Brazilian legislation is already taking this path. Know as Economic Freedom
+Act [Brasil(2019)], it determines that proposals for editing and amending normative acts should be
+accompanied by a regulatory impact analysis.43
+
+Proposals for editing and amending normative acts in the general interest of economic agents
+or users of the services rendered, issued by a federal government agency or entity, including
+municipalities and public foundations, will be preceded by a regulatory impact analysis, which
+will contain information and data on the possible effects of the normative act to verify the
+reasonableness of its economic impact. [Brasil(2019), Art. 5]
+
+In addition to supporting new bills and amendments to normative acts, it is required more technical
+forms and scientific studies to protect the population from irresponsible arbitrariness. Empirical and
+technical analysis helps to control the pure rhetoric and demagogy in the production of laws. This kind
+of approach helps to understand the areas we should prioritize efforts, focus investments and so on.
+In order to helping the public administration to understand the judiciary behavior, it is possible to
+present realized and forecasted values from the available datasets. In Example 3.3.2 there are presented
+the realized values from January 2000 to December 2017, as well as the forecasting from January 2018
+to July 2021. The algorithm uses only the realized values to train and test different models. Available
+in function fits from the jurimetrics package, it is a way to easily forecast the court proceedings
+volume and other univariate time series. Such analysis can be used to anticipate and improve resources
+allocation, such as provision of funds, agency expenses and all sort of elements related to how provisions
+should be made. Regarding the management of the judiciary and other public institutions, there are
+several examples of how the public data analysis can help in the decision making for the coming months
+and years.
+In Brazil, there is an explicit need for data analysis in the discussion about the Civil Procedure Code
+(CPC ) amendment proposals concerning court appeals suppression. The debate revolves around the
+following question: Does court appeals suppression significantly alter the timing of the process? To the
+best of our knowledge, there were no proposals considering technical analysis or somehow evaluating
+financial and social impacts of such suppression over time.
+On the other hand, in 2015 the Brazilian Jurimetrics Association44 identified, in partnership with the
+National Council of Justice45, critical points in the child adoption process. The findings motivated the
+Amendment Project no. 5850/2016 [Brasil(2016)], approved by the Brazilian congress in 22 November
+2017 as the Act 13.509/2017 [Brasil(2017)]. This Act impacts the Statute of the Child and Adolescent
+(ECA) and the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT), streamlining judicial procedures related to the
+dismissal of family power and the adoption of children and adolescents.
+The Brazilian Jurimetrics Association also made a study called ‘Biggest Litigants’, an endeavor to
+identify the most frequent litigants and pointing out alternative ways to solve this class of legal problems.
+The study considered data from the website consumidor.gov.br and of some Brazilian courts. The
+authors were honored to contribute to this study by helping to clean up the TJRS databases. The main
+problem was the lack of a unique identification key for each litigant. In the case, it was necessary to
+use REGular EXpressions (REGEX) to find patterns and group the litigants by name. According the
+technical report46, ‘only 20 companies concentrate more than 50% of disputes’, and ‘in the state of São
+Paulo 30 companies concentrate more than 70% of the judicial processes’. The findings also indicates
+‘the telephone companies and financial institutions consistently grouping more than 40% of processes
+across all surveyed federation units. In addition, it is possible to identify that consumption ratios vary
+according to the location under study. Most litigation in all economic areas discuss damages for moral
+damages, which are often associated with improper registration in delinquent databases’.
+43
+“Art. 5◦ As propostas de edição e de alteração de atos normativos de interesse geral de agentes econômicos ou de
+usuários dos serviços prestados, editadas por órgão ou entidade da administração pública federal, incluídas as autarquias
+e as fundações públicas, serão precedidas da realização de análise de impacto regulatório, que conterá informações e dados
+sobre os possíveis efeitos do ato normativo para verificar a razoabilidade do seu impacto econômico.”
+44Associação Brasileira de Jurimetria - ABJ.
+45Conselho Nacional de Justiça - CNJ.
+46https://abj.org.br/cases/maiores-litigantes-2/
+
+Page 17
+2.3 The Lawyer
+
+The third prism refers to the lawyer’s view. The lawyer can use technical studies to support requirements,
+evaluate probabilities or even forecast values. This professional can use the quantitative analysis to
+measure and improve his/her performance. It is currently feasible to demonstrate on court, for instance,
+the risks that involve a claim if a right anticipation is not granted. Note we are not talking about the
+end of the legal argument, but its enrichment.
+
+It is difficult to imagine what difference it makes to a juror, lawyer, or scientist to be told that
+a defendant is 218 times more likely than some man chosen at random to be the father of a
+child or that there is a 99.54% probability that the defendant is the father. [Loevinger(1992b),
+p. 343]
+
+The Brazilian Civil Procedure Code observes the use of probability in decisions concerning urgency
+guardianship. Article 300 considers the danger of damage and risk to the useful result. Such concepts
+refer to the use of statistics and quantitative methods in general. The law is translated into probabilistic
+terms, indicating the legislator’s intention to treat the legal issue in a technical and scientific manner.
+
+Art. 300. The urgency guardianship will be granted when there are elements that evidence
+the probability of the right and the danger of damage or the risk to the useful result of the
+process.47 [Brasil(2015)]
+
+Another utility of quantitative approach for the benefit of law is – as Holmes Jr., Loevinger and
+other researchers suggest – the predictability of legal decision. Judgments, systematically analyzed, can
+provide answers about the probability of success of a claim. Once many lawsuits are filed considering
+these probabilities, it is important to consider this technical perspective in order to maximize the chances
+to bring a financial return to the lawyer or office. It happens that in the vast majority of cases the analysis
+of financial viability of the demand judgment is not properly analyzed, measuring risks inappropriately
+and often misguiding customers. Considering the analysis of the ‘obvious rich’ court decisions, there are
+also several possibilities this kind of databases can bring, such as the analysis of judges profile, projection
+of indemnity values, estimated time of the process, among others.
+In business law offices there is a need to estimate the provision of lawsuit funds. Estimated amount
+to be disbursed in lawsuits permits proper allocation of money for corporate judicial liabilities. Still
+considering law offices, one can mention the benefits that quantitative methods can bring to compliance.
+Jurimetrics can help in risk assessment, strategy development and internal controls, allowing for more
+objective and verifiable evaluations. This approach supports decisions to be taken, directing efforts
+towards legal security.
+Another major point in legal action through the prism of advocacy – as well other prisms – is the
+possibility of alternative means for problem solving. Using state of the art technology, new platforms of
+agreements and arbitration tend to simplify and massify dispute resolutions. Examples of this technology
+are Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) and smart contracts.
+According to [Wang(2009), p. 23], ‘ODR is usually known as any of online ADR, e-ADR, iADR, virtual
+ADR and cyber ADR. It was technologically developed in the US and Canada, and it is still used mainly
+in the US’. The concept of smart contracts was coined by [Szabo(1996)], and refers to a computer protocol
+used to intermediate trackable and irreversible transactions, and was consecrated by [Nakamoto(2008)].
+Finally, the modern lawyer must be able to use tools that allow the practitioner to describe a set
+of instructions to be performed. Spreadsheets and programming languages are examples of this kind of
+tools. A good way to start is by understanding how spreadsheets work, and what they can do to simplify
+daily workflows. The most spreadsheets allow programming, usually called ‘macros’. The operator can
+record a set of instructions by using point-and-click, that is automatically converted in written language.
+The most widely used language in spreadsheets is BASIC and its dialects [Kemeny and Kurtz(1964)].
+Besides BASIC, there are dozens of languages able to solve complex problems. A trained operator is
+capable to build solutions in a fast and scalable way.
+47Art. 300. A tutela de urgência será concedida quando houver elementos que evidenciem a probabilidade do direito e
+o perigo de dano ou o risco ao resultado útil do processo.
+
+Page 18
+3 Applications
+
+3.1 Tools
+
+The collection of tools used by a data analyst can be extensive. It will depends of the objective, scope and
+resources available. Usually this professional must be able to build their own tools, constantly adapting
+it to the dynamics of gather, analyze and presenting data. To allow a critical assessment to be carried
+out, however, it is necessary the considered data-related elements be available for any person.
+The verification and reproducibility principles are pillars of science, and was recently discussed by
+[Pashler and Wagenmakers(2012)], [Baker(2016)], [Munafò et al.(2017)] and [Wasserstein et al.(2019)].
+They points out there is as crises of confidence and reproducibility, much due to a misuse of statistics,
+frequently the p-value misinterpretation. In order to guarantee good practices in science, projects like
+The Dryad Digital Repository48 defends open, easy-to-use, not-for-profit and community-governed data
+infrastructure for scholarly literature. On the same line is The Science Code Manifesto49, in which the
+signatories adopt five principles:
+
+1. Code All source code written specifically to process data for a published paper must be available
+to the reviewers and readers of the paper.
+
+2. Copyright The copyright ownership and license of any released source code must be clearly stated.
+
+3. Citation Researchers who use or adapt science source code in their research must credit the code’s
+creators in resulting publications
+
+4. Credit Software contributions must be included in systems of scientific assessment, credit, and
+recognition.
+
+5. Curation Source code must remain available, linked to related materials, for the useful lifetime of
+the publication.
+
+There is a plethora of projects based on free and open source software for those who wish to do
+science. Considering the data analysis and presentation, some examples are given on Table 1. Each
+software described can be extended with libraries, packages and user defined functions. For instance,
+recently [Gerum(2019)] presents Pylustrator, an open source library tool for Python to generate the
+code necessary to compose publication figures from single plots. In R language [R Core Team(2019)] is
+built ggplot2 [Wickham(2016)], a system for ‘declaratively’ creating graphics based on The Grammar
+of Graphics [Wilkinson(2005)]. A general purpose tools for jurimetrics can be found at the jurimetrics
+package [Zabala and Silveira(2019)].
+R is a free software environment for statistical computing and graphics. It compiles and runs on
+a wide variety of Unix-like platforms and Windows. It is a GNU50 project which is similar to the S
+language and environment, developed at Bell Laboratories (formerly AT&T, now Lucent Technologies)
+by John Chambers and colleagues. It follows a minimalist object-oriented concept, which specifies a
+small standard core accompanied by language extension packages. To install R the reader may access
+the official website project51. It is recommended to always keep R at its latest version as well the using of
+RStudio editor52, an R-integrated development environment. Among many tools it enables the creation
+of automatic presentations and reports in various formats such as pdf, html and docx, merging languages
+such as R, LATEX, markdown, C++, Python, SQL and D3. It is available in Desktop and Server editions
+along with their respective previews, gathering R functionalities harmonically.
+The packages used in this article can be installed and updated with the following R code. For Unixlike
+operating systems, it is recommended to run the following instructions on a terminal after executing
+the sudo R command followed by the admin password.
+48 https://datadryad.org
+49 http://sciencecodemanifesto.org/
+50 The GNU General Public License is a type of license used for free software that grants end users (individuals,
+organizations or companies) the freedom to use, study, share and modify the software.
+51 https://cloud.r-project.org/
+52 https://rstudio.com/
+
+Page 19
+Application URL
+
+Cytoscape.js http://js.cytoscape.org/
+C++ http://www.cplusplus.com/
+D3.js https://d3js.org/
+GNU Octave https://www.gnu.org/software/octave/
+GNU PSPP https://www.gnu.org/software/pspp/
+JASP https://jasp-stats.org/
+Julia https://julialang.org/
+LATEX https://www.latex-project.org/
+LibreOffice https://www.libreoffice.org/
+Markdown https://www.markdownguide.org/
+MySQL https://www.mysql.com/
+Orange http://orange.biolab.si/
+Python https://www.python.org/
+R https://www.r-project.org/
+Scilab https://www.scilab.org/
+Stan https://mc-stan.org/
+Tabula https://tabula.technology
+TensorFlow https://www.tensorflow.org/
+
+Table 1: A sample of free software to handle and present data
+
+> packs <- c("tidyverse","devtools")
+> install.packages(packs, dep = T)
+> devtools::install_github("filipezabala/jurimetrics", force = T)
+> update.packages(ask = F)
+
+3.2 Data
+
+Data is a collection of tables, documents and files, usually transformed in binary format. [Breiman(2001)]
+asserts ‘Statistics starts with data’, that are used ‘to predict and to get information about the underlying
+data mechanism’. The data gathering is usually laborious, taking much of the total analysis time.
+Tools like MySQL, Python or R – referenced on Table 1 – may help in data handling. At this point it is
+considered that the reader has already understood the relevance in mastering high-level languages for the
+solution of applied problems. In this way it is considered that the reader performs simple operations using
+command line53, the reading of technical documentation and executes other eventual tasks, although it
+can be time-consuming.
+Even not all applications needs substantial amount of data, it is commonplace to use a considerable
+structure of databases and processing. In a personal computer it is possible to create useful tools and
+deliver solutions for relevant problems. Some databases used by the authors are available in jurimetrics
+package.
+53 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line_interface
+
+Page 20
+> data("tjmg_year")
+> y <- ts(data = tjmg_year$count, start = c(2000), frequency = 1)
+> head(y, 10)
+Time Series:
+Start = 2000
+End = 2009
+Frequency = 1
+[1] 38403 49560 66653 81005 92012 107442 164101 213774 280847 343614
+> sum(y)
+[1] 4236229
+
+In opposition of data collecting, some practical situations brings the necessity to decide with sample
+size near to (if not) zero, considering only the previous decision maker’s experience and expected utility.
+The Bayesian approach presents tools to address solutions involving small to big data structures, using
+available data to update the opinion using the likelihood principle. Such principle asserts the information54
+about some unknown parameter θ, related to an observed variable X, is obtained only through
+the likelihood function. The Bayesian operation calibrates the previous opinion, contained in a prior
+distribution π(θ), with the likelihood function L(X|θ). The Bayesian then assigns his/her opinion about
+θ after the data to the posterior distribution π(θ|X). The mathematical representation is given by
+
+π(θ|X) = π(θ)L(X|θ)
+R
+θ
+π(θ)L(X|θ)dθ ∝ π(θ)L(X|θ).
+
+3.3 Examples
+
+This section brings two examples in which the authors currently work. Code and documentation can be
+found at github.com/filipezabala/jurimetrics.
+
+3.3.1 Preliminary injunction
+
+Preliminary injunction55 is a legal instrument used in Brazil to provide the complainant an anticipated
+right, based on periculum in mora (danger in delay) and fumus boni iuris (likelihood of success on the
+merit of the case) principles [Grubbs et al.(2003)]. To base the arguments it is common for lawyers to
+use rhetoric, but it is possible to consider a quantitative approach for this purpose.
+
+Example 4. (Protest restraint) Suppose a company has been incorrectly listed on a negative credit bureau.
+Consider also the customers make the purchase only if the company is not listed in negative bureaus. If
+a company has (i) an average of 1000 monthly credit bureau consultations, (ii) 10% of the consultations
+converted in customers and (iii) an average ticket of $3450.00 per client, the expected value of X: ‘loss
+amount per business day of negative credit bureau attribution’ can be calculated by
+
+E(X) = 1000 × 0.1 × 3450
+22
+= 15681.82.
+
+The jurimetrics package brings the exp_loss function, that performs the purposed calculations
+given the parameters average.consult, prob.hire and average.ticket. The function returns a list
+of two positions: expected.value and text. Note that text brings a rudiment of an automatic report,
+generated using the input parameters only. The reader can build their own custom functions combining
+pre-existing functions.
+54 According to [Gosh(1988)], in Basu’s sense ‘information is what information does. It changes opinion. Only a Bayesian
+knows how to characterize his/her prior opinion on θ as a prior distribution q(θ). This prior opinion is changed, by the
+data x, to the posterior opinion q
+∗(θ) = q(θ)L(θ)/
+Pq(θ)L(θ)’.
+55 Antecipação de tutela, in Portuguese.
+
+Page 21
+> library(jurimetrics)
+> (ev <- exp_loss(average.consult = 1000, prob.hire = 0.1, average.ticket = 3450))
+$expected.loss
+[1] 15682
+$text
+[1] "The estimated loss amount per business day is $15681.82."
+> paste0("The half of the expected loss is ", ev$expected.loss/2, ".")
+[1] "The half of the expected loss is 7840.91."
+
+,
+
+3.3.2 Court proceedings volume forecast
+
+In the experience of the authors, a frequently asked question is about the court proceedings volume
+forecast. Any law operator should consider the amount of proceedings volume in the next months and
+years, as it impacts the entire chain of the judiciary. There is substancial purposes in literature to address
+the problem of forecasting values observed over time. The theme is usually referenced as time series, and
+will be considered the treatment given by [Hyndman and Athanasopoulos(2018)] and [Hyndman(2018)].
+Available in the jurimetrics package, the database tjrs_year_month contains a sample of the
+monthly processual volume of 5,625,666 court lawsuits in a south brazilian court56 between January
+2000 and December 2017. Based on the Access to Information Act [Brasil(2011)] and its regulation
+[Brasil(2012)], the data were obtained from the court website57 via web scraper written in Python
+language. The following code attaches the data in a tibble data frame format58 with 216 rows and 2
+columns, yearMonth and count.
+
+> library(jurimetrics)
+> data(tjrs_year_month) # attaching data
+
+In order to print the first 10 lines, just enter the name of the attached data. Note the information
+about the class of the object (tibble) is a 216 × 2 × 1 dimension tensor. The tibble object also brings
+information about the columns classes, respectively <date> and <int(eger)>. In the last line is displayed
+the number of rows and columns not shown on the screen, in this case 206 rows. The option print(n =
+Inf) prints all the lines, but this procedure is not encouraged.
+
+> tjrs_year_month
+
+# A tibble: 216 x 2
+yearMonth count
+<date> <int>
+1 2000-01-01 12
+2 2000-02-01 222
+3 2000-03-01 576
+4 2000-04-01 647
+5 2000-05-01 1098
+6 2000-06-01 2307
+7 2000-07-01 107
+8 2000-08-01 4743
+9 2000-09-01 3301
+10 2000-10-01 4255
+# ... with 206 more rows
+> # tjrs_year_month %>% print(n = Inf) # print all the 216 lines
+
+As the data is time series-like, it is recommended to convert it in a time-series object through the
+function ts. The function transforms the data from a start date, in this case January 2000 indicated
+by c(2000,1). The frequency of observations must be supplied, in which 12 refers to monthly, 6 to
+biannual, 3 to quarterly and 1 to yearly observations.
+56 TJRS – Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul.
+57 http://www.tjrs.jus.br/site/
+58 https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tibble/vignettes/tibble.html
+
+Page 22
+At a glance it is possible to observe peaks of lawsuits judged in the months of March, April, August
+and September, while valleys occur in January. In this sense, we are looking for a model that capture
+this – and maybe other not so obvious – behaviors to make useful predictions. It is noteworthy, however,
+that all models are simplifications and idealizations of reality. The idea that complex physical, biological
+or social systems can be precisely described by a model is unlikely. Building idealized representations
+that capture important stable aspects of such systems is, however, a vital part of scientific, political and
+market analysis, driving decisions in situations of uncertainty. The use of modelling usually leads to
+helpful insights in the achievement of theoretical and practical results. [Box(1979)] points out that ‘all
+models are wrong but some are useful’, suggesting
+
+[f]or such a model there is no need to ask the question ‘Is the model true?’. If ‘truth’ is to
+be the ‘whole truth’ the answer must be ‘No’. The only question of interest is ‘Is the model
+illuminating and useful?’ ([Box(1979), pp. 202-203]
+
+> (y <- ts(data = tjrs_year_month$count, start = c(2000,1), frequency = 12))
+
+Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
+2000 12 222 576 647 1098 2307 107 4743 3301 4255 5017 4819
+2001 220 3153 4823 4054 5868 5084 199 6271 3958 4816 5344 5366
+2002 218 3185 4793 4812 5962 6059 296 5914 5057 8068 9574 13298
+2003 1293 8726 12639 14259 14241 16940 953 18850 17196 20102 18526 20440
+2004 754 11137 24722 20646 20489 25490 3686 23938 23300 21315 21965 25790
+2005 760 11998 26251 22408 21814 29089 18033 26014 23623 22118 25293 25723
+2006 15794 12219 27052 25350 28483 28662 23002 34301 27000 28537 32323 31973
+2007 7171 21820 34138 29551 34852 30634 26801 36776 30171 34086 32273 29654
+2008 12780 20196 32816 34032 33247 35545 34177 45412 38270 45866 39761 33548
+2009 18204 17460 43022 43083 35652 41244 38571 42821 43666 40700 39835 32906
+2010 22982 20864 43883 38889 44821 37571 39317 40314 38927 38610 39392 34991
+2011 20010 27162 37795 36449 38173 42342 35974 44597 40687 37855 37043 34255
+2012 17173 24373 42825 37704 45831 40870 32243 45656 34618 43379 37585 32612
+2013 16343 21962 38792 39893 38117 39811 31737 41841 36519 43293 38288 31896
+2014 16136 22415 33838 36927 36900 26766 35550 40608 38130 42740 37506 37183
+2015 17096 29100 41133 39881 33891 36962 36145 38498 38599 21560 44918 31096
+2016 13455 23148 35486 29451 32326 43092 37561 42904 38194 38019 37958 31796
+2017 8626 27212 44352 32129 36362 33478 33534 41154 32806 37405 36977 28945
+> sum(y)
+[1] 5625666
+
+The tidy data can then be applied in the function fits in order to adjust the best model from classes
+ARIMA, ETS, TBATS and NNETAR. The strategy is to fit/train models with a percentage corresponding
+to the first points of the time series and comparing the remaining last points with the prediction made
+by each considered model. The comparison is made using the mean squared error (MSE) of prediction,
+given by
+
+MSE =
+1
+n
+Xn
+i=1
+(yi − yˆi)
+2
+
+where n is the number of remaining/test points of the time series, yi
+is the i
+th tested value and yˆi the
+i
+th predicted value by a given model.
+The parameter train is set by default to 0.8 = 80%, remaining around 20% of the points to test. The
+model that leads to prediction with the smallest MSE is declared the best model. The function returns
+a list with four positions: $fcast, $mse.pred, $best.model and $runtime. The $fcast contains the
+predicted time series using the model that minimizes the MSE. $mse.pred shows the MSE for each
+considered model, and $best.model specifies the best model, in this case from the class neural network
+autoregressive. As suggested in Example 4, it is possible to arrange the functions to compose automatic
+reports.
+
+Page 23
+> (fit <- fits(y, show.main.graph = F))
+
+$fcast
+Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
+2018 14148 28343 39777 34743 37086 35660 35452 38980 35254 37454 37383 32396
+2019 17767 29523 38800 36150 37260 36734 36541 38143 36520 37473 37510 34842
+2020 21250 30964 38464 36825 37340 37215 37088 37798 37105 37498 37545 36256
+2021 25157 33409 38250 37172 37397 37418 37344
+$mse.pred
+mse.pred.aa mse.pred.ets mse.pred.tb mse.pred.nn
+1 1.13e+08 68219968 68947440 31652653
+$best.model
+[1] "nnetar"
+$runtime
+Time difference of 3.019 secs
+
+The parameter steps is set by default to NULL, in this case projecting the number of points corresponding
+to the complementary percentage defined in train. The user may set steps to a value greater
+or equal than train*length(x), never smaller. The max.points limits the maximum number of points
+to be used, set to 500 by default. If the parameter show.main.graph is set to TRUE, the main plot
+is presented, and show.sec.graph = TRUE prints the intermediate plots. If show.value = TRUE, the
+system prints the textual results of the function. The PI = TRUE prints the prediction intervals used in
+nnar models, but may take long time processing. Finally, theme_doj = TRUE will use the Decades Of
+Jurimetrics theme, based on ggplot2::theme.
+As shown in Figure 9, the black line indicates the observed points, meanwhile the blue line indicates
+the predicted values. The NNAR(3, 1, 2) [12] model has inputs yt−1, yt−2, yt−3 and yt−12, and two
+neurons in the hidden layer59. This means to make the predictions the model looks 1, 2, 3 and 12
+months in the historical series, capturing monthly, bimonthly, quarterly and yearly behaviors.
+
+0
+
+10000
+
+20000
+
+30000
+
+40000
+
+2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
+Time
+
+x
+
+Forecasts from NNAR(3,1,2)[12]
+
+Figure 9: Monthly proceedings volume forecast in TJRS Court.
+
+59 According to [Hyndman and Athanasopoulos(2018)], a NNAR(p, P, k) [m] model has inputs yt−1, yt−2, . . ., yt−p,
+yt−m, yt−2m, . . ., yt−Pm and k = (p + P + 1)/2 neurons in the hidden layer. A NNAR(p, P, 0) [m] model is equivalent to
+an ARIMA(p, 0, 0)(P, 0, 0) [m] model but without the restrictions on the parameters that ensure stationarity.
+
+Page 24
+4 The Posterior Step
+
+There was a man in our town
+and he was wondrous wise:
+he jumped into a BRAMBLE BUSH
+and scratched out both his eyes—
+and when he saw that he was blind,
+with all his might and main
+he jumped into another one
+and scratched them in again.
+
+4.1 Ignorance
+
+In the morning a children ask: is the man wondrous wise?
+
+Two states may be considered:
+
+W : the man is wondrous wise
+W : the man is not wondrous wise
+As Dennis Lindley conveniently points out on the foreword of [de Finetti(1974), p. ix], ‘we shall all
+be Bayesian by 2020’. In advance, [Ferrie(2019)] purposes a ‘babyesian’ approach. So, trying to answer
+the children’s question under this point of view, initially equal weights are assigned to the two states,
+let’s say ‘fifty-fifty’. This is called Bayes-Laplace prior and can be represented by
+
+P(W) = 50
+100
+P(W) = 50
+100
+Under this perspective it is possible to answer ‘I’m 50% sure that the man is wondrous wise’.
+
+4.2 Learning
+
+In the afternoon, a children ask: is the man wondrous wise?
+
+Even belonging to a privileged environment, it is hard to believe that 50% of people are wondrous wise.
+Considering such an environment, the guess may turn around, let’s say... 20-80. It can be represented
+by
+P(W) = 20
+100
+P(W) = 80
+100
+Under this perspective it is possible to answer ‘I’m 20% sure that the man is wondrous wise’.
+Reading the poem again, it can be noted the man deliberately jumped into a bramble bush and
+scratched out both his eyes, going blind. Considering this information, the guess is updated to 10-90. It
+can be represented by
+P(W) = 10
+100
+P(W) = 90
+100
+Under this perspective it is possible to answer ‘I’m 10% sure that the man is wondrous wise’.
+Continuing to read the poem, it can be noted the man jumped deliberately into a bramble bush
+again. Under this perspective, the guess is updated to 5-95. It can be represented by
+
+P(W) = 5
+100
+P(W) = 95
+100
+Under this perspective it is possible to answer ‘I’m 5% sure that the man is wondrous wise’.
+Googling it is found a Wikipedia article60 called ‘There Was a Man in Our Town’, indicating the
+poem is originally an English nursery rhyme61. The article reports ‘(i)t is believed to be based on the
+Greek myth of Bellerophon’62. Assuming this, the guess is updated to 40-60. It can be represented by
+
+P(W) = 40
+100
+P(W) = 60
+100
+60https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_Was_a_Man_in_Our_Town
+61https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nursery_rhyme
+62https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bellerophon
+
+Page 25
+Under this perspective it is possible to answer ‘I’m 40% sure that the man is wondrous wise’.
+Continuing the reading, it is found Bellerophon bravely captured Pegasus and slaved Chimera. The
+guess is updated to 70-30. It can be represented by
+
+P(W) = 70
+100
+P(W) = 30
+100
+Under this perspective it is possible to answer ‘I’m 70% sure that the man is wondrous wise’.
+Continuing to read the article, it is informed Bellerophon was arrogant, angered Zeus, lived out his
+life in misery and... had fallen into a thorn bush causing him to become blind. The guess is then updated
+to 1-99. It can be represented by
+
+P(W) = 1
+100
+P(W) = 99
+100
+Under this perspective it is possible to answer ‘I’m 1% sure that the man is wondrous wise’.
+
+4.3 Knowledge
+
+At night, a children ask: is the man wondrous wise?
+
+Before you answer, you unintentionally bump into in a book called The Bramble Bush. The subtitle
+is Some Lectures on Our Law and Its Study. The author is Karl N. Llewellyn, referenced as
+[Llewellyn(1930a)]. What is your posterior step?
+
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