diff --git a/docs/algorithms/ntru.rst b/docs/algorithms/ntru.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53d1c9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/algorithms/ntru.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+.. _NTRU Primal Attacks:
+
+NTRU Primal Attacks
+=====================
+
+We construct an (easy) example NTRU instance::
+
+    from estimator import *
+    params = NTRU.Parameters(n=200, q=7981, Xs=ND.UniformMod(3), Xe=ND.UniformMod(3))
+    params
+
+The simplest (and quickest to estimate) model is solving via uSVP and assuming the Geometric Series
+Assumption (GSA) [Schnorr03]_. The success condition was formulated in [USENIX:ADPS16]_ and
+studied/verified in [AC:AGVW17]_, [C:DDGR20]_, [PKC:PosVir21]_. The treatment of small secrets is
+from [ACISP:BaiGal14]_. Here, the NTRU instance is treated as a homoegeneous LWE instance::
+
+    NTRU.primal_usvp(params, red_shape_model="gsa")
+
+We get a similar result if we use the ``GSA`` simulator. We do not get the identical result because
+we optimize β and d separately::
+
+    NTRU.primal_usvp(params, red_shape_model=Simulator.GSA)
+
+To get a more precise answer we may use the CN11 simulator by Chen and Nguyen [AC:CheNgu11]_ (as
+`implemented in FPyLLL
+<https://github.com/fplll/fpylll/blob/master/src/fpylll/tools/bkz_simulator.py>_`)::
+
+    NTRU.primal_usvp(params, red_shape_model=Simulator.CN11)
+
+We can then improve on this result by first preprocessing the basis with block size β followed by a
+single SVP call in dimension η [RSA:LiuNgu13]_. We call this the BDD approach since this is
+essentially the same strategy as preprocessing a basis and then running a CVP solver::
+
+    NTRU.primal_bdd(params, red_shape_model=Simulator.CN11)
+
+We can improve these results further by exploiting the sparse secret in the hybrid attack
+[C:HowgraveGraham07]_ guessing ζ positions of the secret::
+
+    NTRU.primal_hybrid(params, red_shape_model=Simulator.CN11)
+
+In addition to the primal secret key recovery attack, this module supports the dense sublattice
+attack as formulated in [EC:KirFou17]_, and refined/verified in [AC:DucWoe21]_. The baseline
+dense sublattice attack uses a 'z-shape' variant of the Geometric Series Assumption, called the
+ZGSA::
+
+    params.possibly_overstretched
+    NTRU.primal_dsd(params, red_shape_model=Simulator.ZGSA)
+
+Of course we can also use the CN11 simulator for this attack as well::
+
+    NTRU.primal_dsd(params, red_dhape_model=Simulator.CN11)
+
+**Note:** Currently, dense sublattice attack estimation is only supported if the distributions of
+``f`` and ``g`` are equal. ``NTRU.primal_dsd()`` will return a ``NotImplementedError`` if this is
+not the case. 
+                        
diff --git a/docs/index.rst b/docs/index.rst
index 7d20907..8e5e53a 100644
--- a/docs/index.rst
+++ b/docs/index.rst
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Lattice Estimator
    algorithms/lwe-dual
    algorithms/lwe-bkw
    algorithms/gb
+   algorithms/ntru
 
    contributing
 
diff --git a/estimator/ntru_primal.py b/estimator/ntru_primal.py
index 4b32aa2..8d9296a 100644
--- a/estimator/ntru_primal.py
+++ b/estimator/ntru_primal.py
@@ -200,6 +200,10 @@ def __call__(
         .. note :: Non-overstretched parameters (where the probability of Dense sublattice
            discovery is 0) will return β = d.
         """
+        if params.Xs.stddev != params.Xe.stddev:
+            raise NotImplementedError("""Dense sublattice attack estimation currently unsupported for f and g with
+                                      different variances""")
+
         params = NTRUParameters.normalize(params)
         # allow for a larger embedding lattice dimension: Bai and Galbraith
         m = params.m + params.n if params.Xs <= params.Xe else params.m