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Add support to validate against multiple keys #1033

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9 changes: 9 additions & 0 deletions .readthedocs.yaml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
version: 2
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build:
os: ubuntu-22.04
tools:
python: "3"

mkdocs:
configuration: mkdocs.yml
216 changes: 216 additions & 0 deletions docs/rotating-keys.md
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# Rotating Keys

Key rotation consists in retiring and replacing cryptographic keys with new ones.
Performing that operation on a regular basis is an industry standard.

## Why should I rotate my keys?

Rotating keys allows us to:

1. Limit the number of tokens signed with the same key, helping the prevention of attacks enabled by cryptanalysis
2. Adopt other algorithms or stronger keys
3. Limit the impact of eventual compromised keys

## The challenges

After rotating keys, apps will likely receive requests with tokens issues with the previous key.
If the key rotation of an app is done with a "hard cut", requests with non-expired tokens issued with the old key **will fail**!

Imagine if you were the user who logged in just before a key rotation on that kind of app, you'd probably have to log in again!

That's rather frustrating, right!?

## Preventing issues

It's possible to handle key rotation in a smoother way by leveraging the `SignedWithOneInSet` validation constraint!

Say your application uses the symmetric algorithm `HS256` with a not so secure key to issue tokens:

```php
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);

namespace MyApp;

require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use DateTimeImmutable;
use Lcobucci\Clock\FrozenClock;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Builder;
use Lcobucci\JWT\JwtFacade;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Signer;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Signer\Key\InMemory;

// `FrozenClock` is used here to fix to a point in time that allows our validation to pass
$clock = new FrozenClock(new DateTimeImmutable('2023-11-04 21:06:01+00:00'));
$token = (new JwtFacade(clock: $clock))->issue(
new Signer\Hmac\Sha256(),
InMemory::plainText(
'a-very-long-and-secure-key-that-should-actually-be-something-else'
),
static fn (Builder $builder): Builder => $builder
->issuedBy('https://api.my-awesome-app.io')
->permittedFor('https://client-app.io')
);
```

!!! Sample
Here's a token issued with the code above, if you want to test the script locally:

<details>
<summary>Sample token</summary>

// line breaks added for readability
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.eyJpYXQiOjE2OTkxMzE5NjEsIm5iZiI6MTY5OTEzMTk2MSwiZXhwIjoxNjk5MTMyMjYxLCJpc3MiOiJ
odHRwczovL2FwaS5teS1hd2Vzb21lLWFwcC5pbyIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vY2xpZW50LWFwcC5pbyJ9
.IA9S0n8Q2O97lyR8KczVE8g-hxbbH6_TfJS-JWTQR4c
</details>

Your parsing logic (with validations) look like:

```php
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);

namespace MyApp;

require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use DateTimeImmutable;
use Lcobucci\Clock\FrozenClock;
use Lcobucci\JWT\JwtFacade;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Signer;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Signer\Key\InMemory;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint;

// `FrozenClock` is used here to fix to a point in time that allows our
// validation to pass
$clock = new FrozenClock(new DateTimeImmutable('2023-11-04 21:06:35+00:00'))

$validationConstraints = [
new Constraint\SignedWith(
new Signer\Hmac\Sha256(),
InMemory::plainText(
'a-very-long-and-secure-key-that-should-actually-be-something-else'
),
),
new Constraint\StrictValidAt($clock),
];

$jwt = ''; // Fetched from, for example, a request header

$token = (new JwtFacade())->parse($jwt, ...$validationConstraints);
```

### Performing a backwards compatible rotation

Now Imagine that you want to adopt the new `BLAKE2B` symmetric algorithm.

These are the changes to your issuing logic:

```diff
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);

namespace MyApp;

require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use DateTimeImmutable;
use Lcobucci\Clock\FrozenClock;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Builder;
use Lcobucci\JWT\JwtFacade;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Signer;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Signer\Key\InMemory;

// `FrozenClock` is used here to fix to a point in time that allows our validation to pass
$clock = new FrozenClock(new DateTimeImmutable('2023-11-04 21:06:01+00:00'));
$token = (new JwtFacade(clock: $clock))->issue(
- new Signer\Hmac\Sha256(),
+ new Signer\Blake2b(),
- InMemory::plainText(
- 'a-very-long-and-secure-key-that-should-actually-be-something-else'
+ InMemory::base64Encoded(
+ 'GOu4rLyVCBxmxP+sbniU68ojAja5PkRdvv7vNvBCqDQ='
),
static fn (Builder $builder): Builder => $builder
->issuedBy('https://api.my-awesome-app.io')
->permittedFor('https://client-app.io')
);
```

!!! Sample
Here's a token issued with the code above, if you want to test the script locally:

<details>
<summary>Sample token</summary>

// line breaks added for readability
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJCTEFLRTJCIn0
.eyJpYXQiOjE2OTkxMzE5NjEsIm5iZiI6MTY5OTEzMTk2MSwiZXhwIjoxNjk5MTMyMjYxLCJpc3Mi
OiJodHRwczovL2FwaS5teS1hd2Vzb21lLWFwcC5pbyIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vY2xpZW50LWFwc
C5pbyJ9.bD67s8IXpAJiBTIZn1et_M5WSS7kfmuNiacNRz5lArQ
</details>

So far, nothing different that a normal rotation.

Now check the changes on the parsing and validation logic:

```diff
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);

namespace MyApp;

require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use DateTimeImmutable;
use Lcobucci\Clock\FrozenClock;
use Lcobucci\JWT\JwtFacade;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Signer;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Signer\Key\InMemory;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint;

// `FrozenClock` is used here to fix to a point in time that allows our
// validation to pass
$clock = new FrozenClock(new DateTimeImmutable('2023-11-04 21:06:35+00:00'));

$validationConstraints = [
- new Constraint\SignedWith(
- new Signer\Hmac\Sha256(),
- InMemory::plainText(
- 'a-very-long-and-secure-key-that-should-actually-be-something-else'
- ),
- ),
+ new Constraint\SignedWithOneInSet(
+ new Constraint\SignedWithUntilDate(
+ new Signer\Blake2b(),
+ InMemory::base64Encoded(
+ 'GOu4rLyVCBxmxP+sbniU68ojAja5PkRdvv7vNvBCqDQ='
+ ),
+ new DateTimeImmutable('2025-12-31 23:59:59+00:00'),
+ $clock,
+ ),
+ new Constraint\SignedWithUntilDate(
+ new Signer\Hmac\Sha256(),
+ InMemory::plainText(
+ 'a-very-long-and-secure-key-that-should-actually-be-something-else'
+ ),
+ new DateTimeImmutable('2023-12-31 23:59:59+00:00'),
+ $clock,
+ ),
+ ),
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new Constraint\StrictValidAt($clock),
];

$jwt = ''; // Fetched from, for example, a request header

$token = (new JwtFacade())->parse($jwt, ...$validationConstraints);
```

Now the application is able to accept non-expired tokens issued with either old and new keys!
In this case, the old key would automatically only be accepted until `2023-12-31 23:59:59+00:00`, even if engineers forget to remove it from the list.

!!! Important`
The order of `SignedWithUntilDate` constraints given to `SignedWithOneInSet` does matter, and it's recommended to leave older keys at the end of the list.
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions docs/validating-tokens.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ This library provides the following constraints:
* `Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint\PermittedFor`: verifies if the claim `aud` contains the expected value
* `Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint\RelatedTo`: verifies if the claim `sub` matches the expected value
* `Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint\SignedWith`: verifies if the token was signed with the expected signer and key
* `Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint\SignedWithOneInSet`: verifies the token signature against multiple `SignedWithUntilDate` constraints
* `Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint\SignedWithUntilDate`: verifies if the token was signed with the expected signer and key (until a certain date)
* `Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint\StrictValidAt`: verifies presence and validity of the claims `iat`, `nbf`, and `exp` (supports leeway configuration)
* `Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint\LooseValidAt`: verifies the claims `iat`, `nbf`, and `exp`, when present (supports leeway configuration)
* `Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint\HasClaimWithValue`: verifies that a **custom claim** has the expected value (not recommended when comparing cryptographic hashes)
Expand Down
1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions mkdocs.yml
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Expand Up @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ nav:
- 'configuration.md'
- Guides:
- 'extending-the-library.md'
- 'rotating-keys.md'
- 'upgrading.md'

markdown_extensions:
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion phpcs.xml.dist
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Expand Up @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
<rule ref="Lcobucci" />

<rule ref="SlevomatCodingStandard.Functions.UnusedParameter">
<exclude-pattern>tests/UnsupportedParser.php</exclude-pattern>
<exclude-pattern>tests</exclude-pattern>
</rule>
</ruleset>

38 changes: 38 additions & 0 deletions src/Validation/Constraint/SignedWithOneInSet.php
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<?php
declare(strict_types=1);

namespace Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint;

use Lcobucci\JWT\Token;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\ConstraintViolation;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\SignedWith as SignedWithInterface;

use const PHP_EOL;

final class SignedWithOneInSet implements SignedWithInterface
{
/** @var array<SignedWithUntilDate> */
private readonly array $constraints;

public function __construct(SignedWithUntilDate ...$constraints)
{
$this->constraints = $constraints;
}

public function assert(Token $token): void
{
$errorMessage = 'It was not possible to verify the signature of the token, reasons:';

foreach ($this->constraints as $constraint) {
try {
$constraint->assert($token);

return;
} catch (ConstraintViolation $violation) {
$errorMessage .= PHP_EOL . '- ' . $violation->getMessage();
}
}

throw ConstraintViolation::error($errorMessage, $this);
}
}
47 changes: 47 additions & 0 deletions src/Validation/Constraint/SignedWithUntilDate.php
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<?php
declare(strict_types=1);

namespace Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\Constraint;

use DateTimeImmutable;
use DateTimeInterface;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Signer;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Token;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\ConstraintViolation;
use Lcobucci\JWT\Validation\SignedWith as SignedWithInterface;
use Psr\Clock\ClockInterface;

final class SignedWithUntilDate implements SignedWithInterface
{
private readonly SignedWith $verifySignature;
private readonly ClockInterface $clock;

public function __construct(
Signer $signer,
Signer\Key $key,
private readonly DateTimeImmutable $validUntil,
?ClockInterface $clock = null,
) {
$this->verifySignature = new SignedWith($signer, $key);

$this->clock = $clock ?? new class () implements ClockInterface {
public function now(): DateTimeImmutable
{
return new DateTimeImmutable();
}
};
}

public function assert(Token $token): void
{
if ($this->validUntil < $this->clock->now()) {
throw ConstraintViolation::error(
'This constraint was only usable until '
. $this->validUntil->format(DateTimeInterface::RFC3339),
$this,
);
}

$this->verifySignature->assert($token);
}
}
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