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When discussing EDHOC during and after the Paris Hackathon on Lightweight IoT Security I noticed the following to things in RFC 9528 that does not seem optimal:
Storing the information here for discussion. If people agree, this could be filed as errata, be included in implementation guidance, be included in a future document updating EDHOC, or be included in a RFC9528bis, etc, ....
OLD:
The Initiator SHOULD NOT persistently
store PRK_out or application keys until the Initiator has verified
message_4 or a message protected with a derived application key, such
as an OSCORE message, from the Responder and the application has
authenticated the Responder.
NEW:
The Initiator SHOULD NOT persistently
store C_I, C_R, PRK_out, or application keys until the Initiator has verified
message_4 or a message protected with a derived application key, such
as an OSCORE message, from the Responder and the application has
authenticated the Responder.
Motivation: This applies to C_I and C_R equally much as the keys.
OLD:
In deployments where no protected application message is sent from the
Responder to the Initiator, message_4 MUST be supported and MUST be used.
NEW:
?
Motivation: I don't think there is reason to mandate use a forth message if EHDOC is only used for authentication and receipt of messase_3 is signaled by the Responder opening a door/bridge..., i.e., message_4 can be replaced by an action in the real-world.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Interpreting real-world actions sounds like an invitation for mismatches. (Like, if the gate opens after I sent "please open for 6 minutes", how do I known it's not just because someone else asked for 3 minutes open time?)
But maybe the criterion is not having received feedback through some band, but rather the lack of intention to keep communicating, which would make:
NEW:
In deployments where no protected application message is sent from the
Responder to the Initiator *and the initiator uses the key material
after message 3*, message_4 MUST be supported and MUST be used.
Hi,
When discussing EDHOC during and after the Paris Hackathon on Lightweight IoT Security I noticed the following to things in RFC 9528 that does not seem optimal:
Storing the information here for discussion. If people agree, this could be filed as errata, be included in implementation guidance, be included in a future document updating EDHOC, or be included in a RFC9528bis, etc, ....
Motivation: This applies to C_I and C_R equally much as the keys.
Motivation: I don't think there is reason to mandate use a forth message if EHDOC is only used for authentication and receipt of messase_3 is signaled by the Responder opening a door/bridge..., i.e., message_4 can be replaced by an action in the real-world.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: