From 2992783be529d2483e73bd5dac282b8f025401ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Surya Seetharaman Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 08:17:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Fix site-src docs Signed-off-by: Surya Seetharaman --- .../npeps/npep-133-fqdn-egress-selector.md | 440 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 440 insertions(+) create mode 100644 site-src/npeps/npep-133-fqdn-egress-selector.md diff --git a/site-src/npeps/npep-133-fqdn-egress-selector.md b/site-src/npeps/npep-133-fqdn-egress-selector.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..62e7df7d --- /dev/null +++ b/site-src/npeps/npep-133-fqdn-egress-selector.md @@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ +# NPEP-133: FQDN Selector for Egress Traffic + +* Issue: + [#133](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/network-policy-api/issues/133) +* Status: Implementable + +## TLDR + +This enhancement proposes adding a new optional selector to specify egress peers +using [Fully Qualified Domain +Names](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fully_qualified_domain_name) (FQDNs). + +## Goals + +* Provide a selector to specify egress peers using a Fully Qualified Domain Name + (for example `kubernetes.io`). +* Support basic wildcard matching capabilities when specifying FQDNs (for + example `*.cloud-provider.io`) +* Currently only `ALLOW` type rules are proposed. + * Safely enforcing `DENY` rules based on FQDN selectors is difficult as there + is no guarantee a Network Policy plugin is aware of all IPs backing a FQDN + policy. If a Network Policy plugin has incomplete information, it may + accidentally allow traffic to an IP belonging to a denied domain. This would + constitute a security breach. + + By contrast, `ALLOW` rules, which may also have an incomplete list of IPs, + would not create a security breach. In case of incomplete information, valid + traffic would be dropped as the plugin believes the destination IP does not + belong to the domain. While this is definitely undesirable, it is at least + not an unsafe failure. + +* Currently only AdminNetworkPolicy is the intended scope for this proposal. + * Since Kubernetes NetworkPolicy does not have a FQDN selector, adding this + capability to BaselineAdminNetworkPolicy could result in writing baseline + rules that can't be replicated by an overriding NetworkPolicy. For example, + if BANP allows traffic to `example.io`, but the namespace admin installs a + Kubernetes Network Policy, the namespace admin has no way to replicate the + `example.io` selector using just Kubernetes Network Policies. + +## Non-Goals + +* This enhancement does not include a FQDN selector for allowing ingress + traffic. +* This enhancement only describes enhancements to the existing L4 filtering as + provided by AdminNetworkPolicy. It does not propose any new L7 matching or + filtering capabilities, like matching HTTP traffic or URL paths. + * This selector should not control what DNS records are resolvable from a + particular workload. + * This selector provides no capability to detect traffic destined for + different domains backed by the same IP (e.g. CDN or load balancers). +* This enhancement does not add any new mechanisms for specifying how traffic is + routed to a destination (egress gateways, alternative SNAT IPs, etc). It just + adds a new way of specifying packets to be allowed or dropped on the normal + egress data path. +* This enhancement does not require any mechanism for securing DNS resolution + (e.g. DNSSEC or DNS-over-TLS). Unsecured DNS requests are expected to be + sufficient for looking up FQDNs. + +## Introduction + +FQDN-based egress controls are a common enterprise security practice. +Administrators often prefer to write security policies using DNS names such as +“www.kubernetes.io” instead of capturing all the IP addresses the DNS name might +resolve to. Keeping up with changing IP addresses is a maintenance burden, and +hampers the readability of the network policies. + +## User Stories + +* As a cluster admin, I want to allow all Pods in the cluster to send traffic to + an external service specified by a well-known domain name. For example, all + Pods must be able to talk to `my-service.com`. + +* As a cluster admin, I want to allow Pods in the "monitoring" namespace to be + able to send traffic to a logs-sink, hosted at `logs-storage.com` + +* As a cluster admin, I want to allow all Pods in the cluster to send traffic to + any of the managed services provided by my Cloud Provider. Since the cloud + provider has a well known parent domain, I want to allow Pods to send traffic + to all sub-domains using a wild-card selector -- `*.my-cloud-provider.com` + +* As a cluster admin, I want to allow Pods in the cluster to send traffic to a + entire tree of domains. For example, our CDN has domains of the format + `...my-app.cdn.com`. I want to be able to use a + wild-card selector toallow the full tree of subdomains below + `**.my-app.cdn.com`. + +### Future User Stories + +These are some user stories we want to keep in mind, but due to limitations of +the existing Network Policy API, cannot be implemented currently. The design +goal in this case is to ensure we do not make these unimplementable down the +line. + +* As a cluster admin, I want to switch the default disposition of the cluster to + be default deny. This is enforced using a `BaselineAdminNetworkPolicy`. I also + want individual namespace owners to be able to specify their egress peers. + Namespace admins would then use a FQDN selector in the Kubernetes + `NetworkPolicy` objects to allow `my-service.com`. + +## API + +This NPEP proposes adding a new type of `AdminNetworkPolicyEgressPeer` called +`FQDNPeerSelector` which allows specifying domain names. + +```golang + +// DomainName describes one or more domain names to be used as a peer. +// +// DomainName can be an exact match, or use the wildcard specifier '*' to match +// one or more labels. +// +// '*', the wildcard specifier, matches one or more entire labels. It does not +// support partial matches. '*' may only be specified as a prefix. +// +// Examples: +// - `kubernetes.io` matches only `kubernetes.io`. +// It does not match "www.kubernetes.io", "blog.kubernetes.io", +// "my-kubernetes.io", or "wikipedia.org". +// - `blog.kubernetes.io` matches only "blog.kubernetes.io". +// It does not match "www.kubernetes.io" or "kubernetes.io". +// - `*.kubernetes.io` matches subdomains of kubernetes.io. +// "www.kubernetes.io", "blog.kubernetes.io", and +// "latest.blog.kubernetes.io" match, however "kubernetes.io", and +// "wikipedia.org" do not. +// +// +kubebuilder:validation:Pattern=`^(\*\.)?([a-zA-z0-9]([-a-zA-Z0-9_]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?\.)+[a-zA-z0-9]([-a-zA-Z0-9_]*[a-zA-Z0-9])?\.?$` +type DomainName string + +type AdminNetworkPolicyEgressPeer struct { + + // DomainNames provides a way to specify domain names as peers. + // + // DomainNames is only supported for ALLOW rules. In order to control + // access, DomainNames ALLOW rules should be used with a lower priority + // egress deny -- this allows the admin to maintain an explicit "allowlist" + // of reachable domains. + // + // Support: Extended + // + // + // +optional + // +listType=set + // +kubebuilder:validation:MinItems=1 + DomainNames []Domain `json:"domainNames,omitempty"` +} +``` + +### Examples + +#### Pods in `monitoring` namespace can talk to `my-service.com` and `*.cloud-provider.io` + +```yaml +apiVersion: policy.networking.k8s.io/v1alpha1 +kind: AdminNetworkPolicy +metadata: + name: allow-my-service-egress +spec: + priority: 55 + subject: + namespaces: + matchLabels: + kubernetes.io/metadata.name: "monitoring" + egress: + - name: "allow-to-my-service" + action: "Allow" + to: + - domainNames: + - "my-service.com" + - "*.cloud-provider.io" + ports: + - portNumber: + protocol: TCP + port: 443 +``` + +#### Maintaining an allowlist of domains + +There are a couple ways to maintain an allowlist: + +This example, includes the DENY rule in the same ANP object. It's also possible +to use another ANP object with a lower priority (e.g. `100` in this example): +```yaml +apiVersion: policy.networking.k8s.io/v1alpha1 +kind: AdminNetworkPolicy +metadata: + name: allow-my-service-egress +spec: + priority: 55 + subject: + namespaces: + matchLabels: + kubernetes.io/metadata.name: "monitoring" + egress: + - name: "allow-to-my-service" + action: "Allow" + to: + - domainNames: + - "my-service.com" + - "*.cloud-provider.io" + ports: + - portNumber: + protocol: TCP + port: 443 + - name: "default-deny" + action: "Deny" + to: + - networks: + - "0.0.0.0/0" +``` + +This example uses a default-deny BaselineAdminNetworkPolicy to create the +allowlist: +```yaml +apiVersion: policy.networking.k8s.io/v1alpha1 +kind: AdminNetworkPolicy +metadata: + name: allow-my-service-egress +spec: + priority: 55 + subject: + namespaces: + matchLabels: + kubernetes.io/metadata.name: "monitoring" + egress: + - name: "allow-to-my-service" + action: "Allow" + to: + - domainNames: + - "my-service.com" + - "*.cloud-provider.io" + ports: + - portNumber: + protocol: TCP + port: 443 +--- +apiVersion: policy.networking.k8s.io/v1alpha1 +kind: BaselineAdminNetworkPolicy +metadata: + name: default +spec: + subject: + namespaces: {} + ingress: + - action: Deny + to: + - networks: + - "0.0.0.0/0" +``` + +### Expected Behavior + +1. A FQDN egress policy does not grant the workload permission to communicate + with any in-cluster DNS services (like `kube-dns`). A separate rule needs to + be configured to allow traffic to any DNS servers. +1. FQDN policies should not affect the ability of workloads to resolve domains, + only their ability to communicate with the IP backing them. Put another way, + FQDN policies should not result in any form of DNS filtering. + * For example, if a policy allows traffic to `kubernetes.io`, any selected + Pods can still resolve `wikipedia.org` or + `my-services.default.svc.cluster.local`, but can not send traffic to them + unless allowed by a different rule. +1. Each implementation will provide guidance on which DNS name-server is + considered authoritative for resolving domain names. This could be the + `kube-dns` Service or potentially some other DNS provider specified in the + implementation's configuration. +1. DNS record querying and lifetimes: + * Pods are expected to make a DNS query for a domain before sending traffic + to it. If the Pod fails to send a DNS request and instead just sends + traffic to the IP (either because of caching or a static config), traffic + is not guaranteed to flow. + * Pods should respect the TTL of DNS records they receive. Trying to + establish new connection using DNS records that are expired is not + guaranteed to work. + * When the TTL for a DNS record expires, the implementor should stop + allowing new connections to that IP. Existing connection will still be + allowed (that's consistent with NetworkPolicy behavior on long-running + connections). +1. Implementations must support at least 100 unique IPs (either IPv4 or IPv6) + for each domain. This is true for both explicitly specified domains, as well + as for each domain selected by a wild-card rule. For example, the rule + `*.kubernetes.io` supports 100 IPs each for both `docs.kubernetes.io` and + `blog.kubernetes.io`. +1. PTR records are not required to properly configure a FQDN selector. For + example, as long as an A record exists mapping `my-hostname` to `1.2.3.4`, + the Network Policy implementation should allow traffic to `1.2.3.4`. There is + no requirement that a PTR record for `1.2.3.4.in-addr.arpa` exist or that it + points to `my-hostname` (it is allowed to point to `other-host`). +1. Targeting in-cluster endpoints with FQDN selector is not recommended. There + are other selectors which can more precisely capture intent. However, if + in-cluster endpoints are selected: + * ✅︎ Supported: + * Selecting Pods using their [generated DNS + record](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/dns-pod-service/#pods) + (for example `pod-ip-address.my-namespace.pod.cluster.local`). This is + analogous to selecting the Pod by its IP address using the Network + selector. + * Headless Services can be selected using their [generated DNS + record](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/dns-pod-service/#services) + because the generated DNS records contain a list of all the Pod IPs that + back the service. + * ❌ Not Supported: + * ClusterIP Services can not be selected using their [generated DNS + record](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/dns-pod-service/#services) + (for example `my-svc.my-namespace.svc.cluster.local`). This is + consistent with the behavior when selecting the Service VIP using the + Network selector. + * ExternalName Services return a `CNAME` record. See the entry below + about CNAME support. + * Any record which points to the IPs used for `LoadBalancer` type + services. This includes the `externalIPs` and the + `.status.loadBalancer.ingress` fields +1. If the specified domain in a FQDN selector resolves to a [CNAME + record](#cname-records) the behavior of the implementor depends on the + returned response. + + If the upstream resolver used [CNAME chasing](#cname-chasing) to fully + resolve the domain to a A/AAAA record and returns the resulting chain, the + implementor can use this information to allow traffic to the specified IPs. + However the implementor does not need to perform their own CNAME chasing or + to understand resolutions across multiple DNS requests. + + For example, if the FQDN selector is allowing traffic to `www.kubernetes.io`: + * If a DNS query to the upstream resolver returns *a single response* with + the following records: + ``` + www.kubernetes.io -- CNAME to kubernetes.io + kubernetes.io -- A to 1.2.3.4 + ``` + The implementor can use this response to allow traffic to `1.2.3.4` + * If DNS query only responds with a CNAME record, the resolver is not + required to allow traffic even if subsequent requests resolve the full + chain: + ``` + # REQUEST 1 + + www.kubernetes.io -- CNAME to kubernetes.io + + # REQUEST 2 + + kubernetes.io -- A to 1.2.3.4 + ``` + The implementer can still deny traffic to `1.2.3.4` because no single + response contained the full chain required to resolve the domain. + +## Alternatives + +### IP Block Selector + +IP blocks are an important tool for specifying Network Policies. However, they +do not address all user needs and have a few short-comings when compared to FQDN +selectors: + +* IP-based selectors can become verbose if a single logical service has numerous + IPs backing it. +* IP-based selectors pose an ongoing maintenance burden for administrators, who + need to be aware of changing IPs. +* IP-based selectors can result in policies that are difficult to read and + audit. + +### L4 Proxy + +Users can also configure a L4 Proxy (e.g. using SOCKS) to inspect their traffic +and implement egress firewalls. They present a few trade-ofs when compared to a +FQDN selector: + +* Additional configuration and maintenance burden of the proxy application + itself +* Configuring new routes to direct traffic leaving the application to the L4 + proxy. + +### L7 Policy + +Another alternative is to provide a L7 selector, similar to the policies +provided by Service Mesh providers. While L7 selectors can offer more +expressivity, they often come trade-offs that are not suitable for all users: + +* L7 selectors necessarily support a select set of protocols. Users may be + using a custom protocol for application-level communication, but still want + the ability to specify endpoints using DNS. +* L7 selectors often require proxies to perform deep packet inspection and + enforce the policies. These proxies can introduce un-desireable latencies in + the datapath of applications. + +## References + +* [NPEP #126](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/network-policy-api/issues/126): + Egress Control in ANP + +### Implementations + +* [Antrea](https://antrea.io/docs/main/docs/antrea-network-policy/#fqdn-based-filtering) +* [Calico](https://docs.tigera.io/calico-enterprise/latest/network-policy/domain-based-policy) +* [Cilium](https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/security/policy/language/#dns-based) +* [OpenShift](https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/latest/networking/openshift_sdn/configuring-egress-firewall.html) + +The following is a best-effort breakdown of capabilities of different +NetworkPolicy providers, as of 2023-09-25. This information may be out-of-date, +or inaccurate. + +| | Antrea | Calico | Cilium | OpenShift
(current) | OpenShift
(future) | +| -------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------ | ------------ | ------------------------- | ------------------------ | +| Implementation | DNS Snooping
+ Async DNS | DNS Snooping | DNS Snooping | Async DNS | DNS Snooping | +| Wildcards | ✅︎ | ️✅︎ | ✅︎ | ❌ | ✅︎ | +| Egress Rules | ✅︎ | ️✅︎ | ✅︎ | ✅︎ | ✅︎ | +| Ingress Rules | ❌ | ️❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | +| Allow Rules | ✅︎ | ️✅︎ | ✅︎ | ✅︎ | ✅︎ | +| Deny Rules | ✅︎ | ️❌(?) | ❌ | ✅︎ | ❌(?) | + +## Appendix + +### CNAME Records + +CNAME records are a type of DNS record (like a `A` or `AAAA`) that direct the +resolver to query another name to retrieve actual A/AAAA records. + +For example: +``` +$ dig www.kubernetes.io + +... Omitted output ... + +;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: +; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096 +;; QUESTION SECTION: +;www.kubernetes.io. IN A + +;; ANSWER SECTION: +www.kubernetes.io. 3600 IN CNAME kubernetes.io. +kubernetes.io. 3600 IN A 147.75.40.148 + +... Omitted Output ... +``` +### CNAME Chasing + +CNAME chasing refers to an optional behavior for DNS resolvers whereby they +perform subsequent lookups to resolve CNAMEs returned for a particular query. In +the above example, querying for `www.kubernetes.io.` returned a CNAME record for +`kubernetes.io.`. When CNAME chasing is enabled, the DNS server will +automatically resolve `kubernetes.io.` and return both records as the DNS +response. \ No newline at end of file