From 64b4c9e9d1e6f75bca8f3aec3a085cf6c610849f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Todd Herr Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 13:51:41 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] First check-in for rev-36 --- Makefile | 2 +- draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.xml | 0 draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md | 2 +- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.xml diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 3bf18e2..4085732 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # # built using mmark 2. -VERSION = 35 +VERSION = 36 DOCNAME = draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis #XMLFLAGS=-v diff --git a/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.xml b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69de29 diff --git a/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md index 2792fd4..f3de033 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md +++ b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ surname = "Levine (ed)" organization = "Standcore LLC" fullname = "John Levine" [author.address] - email = "standards@standore.com" + email = "standards@standcore.com" %%% From 467396efd650dac74da62176c1f199e979ddef9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Todd Herr Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2024 08:16:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Tweaks for Issues 155 and 156 --- draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.html | 5714 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.txt | 4424 ++++++++++++++++++++++ draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.xml | 3118 ++++++++++++++++ draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md | 11 +- 4 files changed, 13262 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.html create mode 100644 draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.txt diff --git a/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.html b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..74ba866 --- /dev/null +++ b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.html @@ -0,0 +1,5714 @@ + + + + + + +Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Internet-DraftDMARCbisNovember 2024
Herr (ed) & Levine (ed)Expires 24 May 2025[Page]
+
+
+
+
Workgroup:
+
DMARC
+
Internet-Draft:
+
draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36
+
Obsoletes:
+
+7489, 9091 (if approved)
+
Published:
+
+ +
+
Intended Status:
+
Standards Track
+
Expires:
+
+
Authors:
+
+
+
T. Herr (ed)
+
Valimail
+
+
+
J. Levine (ed)
+
Standcore LLC
+
+
+
+
+

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)

+
+

Abstract

+

This document describes the Domain-based Message Authentication, +Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) protocol.

+

DMARC permits the owner of an email's Author Domain to enable +validation of the domain's use, to indicate the Domain Owner's +or Public Suffix Operator's message handling +preference regarding failed validation, and to request reports about the +use of the domain name. Mail receiving organizations can use this information +when evaluating handling choices for incoming mail.

+

This document obsoletes RFCs 7489 and 9091.

+
+
+
+

+Status of This Memo +

+

+ This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the + provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

+

+ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task + Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working + documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is + at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

+

+ Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

+

+ This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 May 2025.

+
+
+ +
+
+ ▲

+Table of Contents +

+ +
+
+
+
+

+1. Introduction +

+

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING: +The source for this draft is maintained on GitHub at: +https://github.com/ietf-wg-dmarc/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis

+

Abusive email often includes unauthorized and deceptive use of a +domain name in the "From" header field defined in section 3.6.2 of [RFC5322] +and referred to as RFC5322.From. The domain typically belongs to an organization +expected to be known to - and presumably trusted by - the recipient. The Sender +Policy Framework (SPF) [RFC7208] and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [RFC6376] +protocols provide domain-level authentication but are not directly associated +with the RFC5322.From domain, also known as the Author Domain. +DMARC leverages these two protocols, providing a method for Domain Owners to publish +a DNS TXT record describing the email authentication policies for the Author Domain +and to request specific handling for messages using that domain that fail validation +checks. These DNS records are called DMARC Policy Records.

+

As with SPF and DKIM, DMARC validation results in a verdict of either "pass" or +"fail". A DMARC result of "pass" requires not only an SPF or DKIM pass verdict for +the email message, but also and more importantly that the domain associated with +the SPF or DKIM pass be "aligned" with the Author Domain in one of two +modes - "relaxed" or "strict". Domains are said to be in "relaxed alignment" +if they have the same Organizational Domain; a +domain's Organizational Domain is the domain at the top of the namespace +hierarchy for that domain while having the same administrative authority as +that domain. On the other hand, domains are in "strict alignment" if and only +if they are identical. The choice of required alignment mode is left to the +Domain Owner that publishes a DMARC Policy Record.

+

A DMARC pass for a message indicates only that the use of the Author Domain has been +validated for that message as authorized by the Domain Owner. Such authorization +does not carry an explicit or implicit value assertion about that message or about +the Domain Owner, and so a DMARC pass by itself does not guarantee that delivery to +the recipient's Inbox would be safe or desirable. For a mail-receiving organization +participating in DMARC, a message that passes DMARC validation is part of a message +stream reliably associated with the Author Domain. Therefore, reputation assessment +of that stream by the mail-receiving organization can assume the use of that Author +Domain is authorized by the Domain Owner.

+

On the other hand, a message that fails this validation is not necessarily associated +with the Author Domain and so should not affect the Author Domain's reputation. The phrase +"not necessarily associated" was purposely chosen here, as it is importatnt to understand +that some messages making authorized use of the Author Domain can still fail DMARC validation +checks. [RFC7960] and Section 7 of this document both discuss reasons +why such failures may happen. Because of this, a mail-receiving organization that performs +DMARC validation can choose to honor the Domain Owner's requested message handling for validation +failures, but it is not required to do so. DMARC is commonly used as one input to more complex +filtering decisions, and so the mail-receiving organization might choose different actions entirely.

+

DMARC, in the associated [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] +documents, also specifies a reporting framework. Using it, a mail-receiving +organization can generate regular reports about messages that use Author +Domains for which a DMARC Policy Record exists; those reports are sent to the +address(es) specified by the Domain Owner in the DMARC Policy Record. Domain Owners +can use these reports, especially the aggregate reports, not only to identify +sources of mail attempting to fraudulently use their domain, but also (and perhaps +more importantly) to flag and fix gaps in their own authentication practices. However, +as with honoring the Domain Owner's stated mail handling preference, a mail-receiving +organization supporting DMARC is under no obligation to send requested reports, although +it is recommended that they do send aggregate reports.

+

The use of DMARC creates some interoperability challenges that require due +consideration before deployment, particularly with configurations that +can cause mail to be rejected. These are discussed in Section 7.

+
+
+
+
+

+2. Requirements +

+

The following sections describe topics that guide the specification of DMARC.

+
+
+

+2.1. High-Level Goals +

+

DMARC has the following high-level goals:

+
    +
  • +

    Allow Domain Owners and Public Suffix Operators (PSOs) to validate their email authentication deployments.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Allow Domain Owners and PSOs to assert their desired message handling +for validation failures on messages purporting to have authorship +within the domain.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Minimize implementation complexity for both senders and receivers.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Reduce the amount of successfully delivered spoofed emails.

    +
    • +
  • +

    Work at Internet scale.

    +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+

+2.2. Anti-Phishing +

+

DMARC is designed to prevent the unauthorized use of the Author Domain +of an email message, a technique known as "spoofing". Such unauthorized usage can +frequently be found in messages impersonating a domain belonging to a business entity, +messages that are meant to entice the recipient to provide sensitive information, such +as usernames, passwords, and financial account information. These spoofed messages are +commonly referred to as "phishing".

+

DMARC can only be used to combat specific forms of exact-domain spoofing directly. DMARC +does not attempt to solve all problems with spoofed or otherwise fraudulent emails. In +particular, it does not address the use of visually similar domain names ("cousin domains") +or abuse of the RFC5322.From human-readable display-name, as defined in +Section 3.4 of [RFC5322].

+
+
+
+
+

+2.3. Scalability +

+

Scalability is a significant issue for systems that need to operate in +an environment as widely deployed as current SMTP email. For this reason, +DMARC seeks to avoid the need for third parties or pre-sending +agreements between senders and receivers. This preserves the +positive aspects of the current email infrastructure.

+

Although DMARC does not introduce third-party senders (namely +external agents authorized to send on behalf of an operator) to the +email-handling flow, it also does not preclude them. Such third +parties are free to provide services in conjunction with DMARC.

+
+
+
+
+

+2.4. Out of Scope +

+

Several topics and issues are specifically out of scope of this +work. These include the following:

+
    +
  • +

    Different treatment of messages that are not authenticated (e.g., +those that have no DKIM signature or those sent using an Author +Domain for which no DMARC Policy Record +exists) versus those that fail validation;

    +
    • +
  • +

    Evaluation of anything other than RFC5322.From header field;

    +
    • +
  • +

    Multiple reporting formats;

    +
    • +
  • +

    Publishing policy other than via the DNS;

    +
    • +
  • +

    Reporting or otherwise evaluating other than the last-hop IP +address;

    +
    • +
  • +

    Attacks in the display-name portions of the RFC5322.From header field, +also known as "display name" attacks;

    +
    • +
  • +

    Authentication of entities other than domains, since DMARC is +built upon SPF and DKIM, which authenticate domains; and

    +
    • +
  • +

    Content analysis.

    +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+3. Terminology and Definitions +

+

This section defines terms used in the rest of the document.

+
+
+

+3.1. Conventions Used in This Document +

+

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", +"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this +document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] +when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

+

Readers are encouraged to be familiar with the contents of +[RFC5598]. In particular, that document +defines various roles in the messaging infrastructure that can appear the same +or separate in various contexts. For example, a Domain Owner could, +via the messaging security mechanisms on which DMARC is based, delegate the +ability to send mail as the Domain Owner to a third party with +another role. This document does not address the distinctions among +such roles; the reader is encouraged to become familiar with that +material before continuing.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2. Definitions +

+

The following sections define the terms used in this document.

+
+
+

+3.2.1. Authenticated Identifiers +

+

Authenticated Identifiers are those domain-level identifiers for which authorized +use is validated using a supported authentication mechanism.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.2. Author Domain +

+

The domain name of the apparent author as extracted from the RFC5322.From header field.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.3. DKIM Signing Domain +

+

The domain name that is the value of the "d" tag in a validated DKIM-Signature header +field in an email message.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.4. SPF Domain +

+

SPF, [RFC7208], can validate the uses of both the domain found in an SMTP [RFC5321] +HELO/EHLO command (the HELO identity) and the domain found in an SMTP MAIL command (the +MAIL FROM identity). DMARC relies solely on SPF validation of the MAIL FROM identity. +Section 2.4 of [RFC7208] describes the determination of the MAIL FROM identity for +cases in which the SMTP MAIL command has a null path, i.e., the mailbox composed of +the local-part "postmaster" and the HELO identity.

+

The term "SPF Domain" when used in this document refers to an SPF validated MAIL FROM +identity.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.5. DMARC Policy Domain +

+

The domain name at which an applicable DMARC Policy Record is discovered +for the Author Domain of an email message.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.6. DMARC Policy Record +

+

A DNS TXT record published by a Domain Owner or Public Suffix +Operator (PSO) to enable validation of an Author +Domain's use, to indicate the Domain Owner's or PSO's message +handling preference regarding failed validation, and optionally to request reports +about the use of the Author Domain.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.7. Domain Owner +

+

An entity or organization that has control of a given DNS domain, +usually by holding its registration. Domain Owners range from complex, +globally distributed organizations to service providers working on +behalf of non-technical clients to individuals responsible for maintaining +personal domains. This specification uses this term as analogous to an +Administrative Management Domain as defined in [RFC5598]. It can also +refer to delegates, such as Report Consumers when those are outside of +their immediate management domain.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.8. Domain Owner Assessment Policy +

+

The message handling preference expressed in a DMARC Policy Record +by the Domain Owner regarding failed validation of the Author Domain is called the "Domain Owner Assessment Policy". Possible values are described in +Section 4.7.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.9. Enforcement +

+

Enforcement describes a state where the existing Domain Owner Assessment Policy +for an Organizational Domain and all subdomains below it +is not "p=none". This state means that the Organizational Domain and its subdomains +can only be used as Author Domains if they are properly validated +using the DMARC mechanism.

+

Historically, Domain Owner Assessment Policies of "p=quarantine" or "p=reject" +have been higher value signals to Mail Receivers. Messages with Author +Domains for which such policies exist that are not validated using the DMARC mechanism +will not reach the inbox at Mail Receivers that participate in DMARC and honor the +Domain Owner's expressed handling preference.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.10. Identifier Alignment +

+

DMARC describes the concept of alignment between the Author Domain +and an Authenticated Identifier, and requires +such Identifier Alignment between the two for a message to achieve a DMARC pass. DMARC +defines two states for alignment.

+
+
+
+3.2.10.1. Relaxed Alignment +
+

When the Author Domain has the same Organizational Domain +as an Authenticated Identifier, the two are said to be +in relaxed alignment.

+
+
+
+
+
+3.2.10.2. Strict Alignment +
+

When the Author Domain is identical to an Authenticated Identifier, the two are said to be in strict alignment.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.11. Mail Receiver +

+

The entity or organization that receives and processes email. Mail +Receivers operate one or more Internet-facing Message Transfer Agents (MTAs).

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.12. Monitoring Mode +

+

Monitoring Mode describes a state where the existing Domain Owner Assessment Policy for an +Organizational Domain and all subdomains below it +is "p=none", and the Domain Owner is receiving aggregate reports +for the Organizational Domain. While the use of the Organizational Domain and all +its subdomains as Author Domains can still be validated by a Mail Receiver deploying the DMARC mechanism, the Domain Owner expresses no handling +preference for messages that fail DMARC validation. The Domain Owner is, however, using +the content of the DMARC aggregate reports to make any needed adjustments to +the authentication practices for its mail streams.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.13. Non-existent Domains +

+

For DMARC purposes, a non-existent domain is consistent with the term's meaning +as described in [RFC8020]. That is, if the response code received for a query +for a domain name is NXDOMAIN, then the domain name and any possible subdomains +do not exist.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.14. Organizational Domain +

+

The Organizational Domain for any domain is akin to the ADMD described in +[RFC5598]. A domain's Organizational Domain is the domain at the top of +the namespace hierarchy for that domain while having the same administrative +authority as the domain. An Organizational Domain is determined by applying +the algorithm found in Section 4.10.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.15. Public Suffix Domain (PSD) +

+

Some domains allow the registration of subdomains that are +"owned" by independent organizations. Real-world examples of +these domains are ".com", ".org", ".us", and ".co.uk", to name just a few. +These domains are called "Public Suffix Domains" (PSDs). +For example, "ietf.org" is a registered domain name, and ".org" is its PSD.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.16. Public Suffix Operator (PSO) +

+

A Public Suffix Operator is an organization that manages operations +within a PSD, particularly the DNS records published for names at and +under that domain name.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.17. PSO Controlled Domain Names +

+

PSO-Controlled Domain Names are names in the DNS that are managed by +a PSO. PSO-controlled Domain Names may have one label (e.g., ".com") or more +(e.g., ".co.uk"), depending on the PSD's policy.

+
+
+
+
+

+3.2.18. Report Consumer +

+

A Report Consumer is an operator that receives reports from another operator +implementing the reporting mechanisms described in the documents +[I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]. +This term applies collectively to the system components that receive and process +these reports and the organizations that operate those components.

+

Report Consumers can receive reports concerning domains for which the Report +Consumer is also the Domain Owner or PSO, +or concerning domains that belong to another operator entirely. The DMARC mechanism +permits a Domain Owner to act as a Report Consumer for its domain(s) and/or to +designate third parties to so act. See Section 10.6 for further +discussion of such designation.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+4. Overview and Key Concepts +

+

This section provides a general overview of the design and operation +of the DMARC environment.

+
+
+

+4.1. DMARC Basics +

+

DMARC permits a Domain Owner or PSO to enable +validation of an Author Domain's use in an email message, to indicate +the Domain Owner's or PSO's message handling preference regarding failed validation, and +to request reports about use of the Author Domain. A domain's DMARC Policy Record is published in the DNS as a TXT record at the name created by prepending +the label "_dmarc" to the domain name and is retrieved through normal DNS queries.

+

DMARC's validation mechanism produces a "pass" result if a DMARC Policy Record exists for +the Author Domain of an email message and the Author Domain is aligned +with an Authenticated Identifier from that message. +When a DMARC Policy Record exists for the Author Domain and the DMARC mechanism does not +produce a "pass" result, the Mail Receiver's handling of that message +can be influenced by the Domain Owner Assessment Policy expressed +in the DMARC Policy Record.

+

It is important to note that the authentication mechanisms employed +by DMARC only validate the usage of a DNS domain in an email message. +They do not validate the local-part of any email address identifier +found in that message, nor do such validations carry an explicit or +implicit value assertion about that message or about the Domain Owner.

+

DMARC's reporting component involves the collection of information +about received messages using the Author Domain for periodic aggregate reports +to the Domain Owner or PSO. The parameters and format for such reports are +discussed in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

+

A Mail Receiver participating in DMARC might also generate per-message failure +reports that contain information related to individual messages that fail DMARC +validation checks. Per-message failure reports are a useful source of +information when debugging deployments (if messages can be determined +to be legitimate even though failing validation) or in analyzing +attacks. The capability for such services is enabled by DMARC but +defined in other referenced material such as +[RFC6591] and [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]

+
+
+
+
+

+4.2. Use of RFC5322.From +

+

One of the most obvious points of security scrutiny for DMARC is the +choice to focus on an identifier, namely the RFC5322.From address, +which is part of a body of data that has been trivially forged +throughout the history of email. This field is the one used by end +users to identify the source of the message, and so it has always +been a prime target for abuse through such forgery and other means. +That said, of all the identifiers that are part of the message itself, +this is the only one required to be present. A message without a single, +properly formed RFC5322.From header field does not comply with +[RFC5322], and handling such a message is outside of the scope of this specification.

+
+
+
+
+

+4.3. Authentication Mechanisms +

+

The following mechanisms for determining Authenticated Identifiers are supported in this version of DMARC:

+
    +
  • +

    DKIM, [RFC6376]. The DKIM Signing Domain +from a validated DKIM-Signature header field is an Authenticated Identifier.

    +
    • +
  • +

    SPF, [RFC7208]. The validated SPF Domain from the email +message is the Authenticated Identifier.

    +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+

+4.4. Identifier Alignment Explained +

+

DMARC validates the authorized use of the Author Domain by requiring +either that it have the same Organizational Domain as an +Authenticated Identifier (a condition known as "Relaxed +Alignment") or that it be identical to the Authenticated Identifier + (a condition known as "Strict Alignment"). The choice of relaxed +or strict alignment is left to the Domain Owner and is expressed in +the domain's DMARC Policy Record. In practice, nearly all Domain +Owners have found relaxed alignment sufficient to meet their needs. Domain name comparisons +in this context are case-insensitive, per [RFC4343].

+

The following table is meant to illustrate possible alignment conditions.

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+Table 1: +"Alignment Examples" +
Authenticated IdentifierAuthor DomainIdentifier Alignment
foo.example.comnews.example.comrelaxed; the two have the same Organizational Domain, example.com
news.example.comnews.example.comstrict; the two are identical
foo.example.netnews.example.comnone; the two do not share a common Organizational Domain
+

It is important to note that Identifier Alignment cannot occur with a +message that is not valid per [RFC5322], particularly one with a +malformed, absent, or repeated RFC5322.From header field, since in that case +there is no reliable way to determine a DMARC Policy Record +that applies to the message. Accordingly, DMARC operation is predicated on the input +being a valid RFC5322 message object. For non-compliant cases, handling +is outside of the scope of this specification. Further discussion of this +can be found in Section 10.5.

+
+
+

+4.4.1. DKIM-Authenticated Identifiers +

+

DKIM permits a Domain Owner to claim some responsibility for a message by +associating the domain to the message. This association is done by inserting +the domain as the value of the "d" tag in a DKIM-Signature header field, and the +assertion of responsibility is validated through a cryptographic signature in +the header field. If the cryptographic signature validates, then the DKIM Signing +Domain is the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier.

+

There is currently no generally accepted mechanism by which a Domain Owner may +assert a list of third-party DKIM Signing Domains that are authorized to sign on +behalf of a given Author Domain. Therefore, DMARC requires that Identifier +Alignment is applied to the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier because a message can +bear a valid signature from any domain, even one used by a bad actor. A DKIM-Authenticated +Identifier that does not have Identifier Alignment with the Author Domain is not enough +to validate whether the use of the Author Domain has been authorized by its Domain Owner.

+

A single email can contain multiple DKIM signatures, and it is considered to +produce a DMARC "pass" result if any DKIM-Authenticated Identifier aligns with +the Author Domain.

+
+
+
+
+

+4.4.2. SPF-Authenticated Identifiers +

+

SPF can validate the uses of both the domain found in an SMTP HELO/EHLO command +(the HELO identity) and the domain found in an SMTP MAIL command (the MAIL FROM +identity). DMARC relies solely on SPF validation of the MAIL FROM identity. If +the use of the domain in the MAIL FROM identity is validated by SPF, then that +domain is the SPF-Authenticated Identifier.

+

There is currently no generally accepted mechanism by which a Domain Owner may +assert a list of third-party domains that are authorized for use as the MAIL FROM +identity for mail using a given Author Domain. Therefore, DMARC requires that Identifier Alignment +is applied to the SPF-Authenticated Identifier because any Domain Owner, even a bad +actor, can publish an SPF record for its domain and send email that will obtain an +SPF pass result. An SPF-Authenticated Identifier that does not have Identifier +Alignment with the Author Domain is not enough to validate whether the use of the Author +Domain has been authorized by its Domain Owner.

+
+
+
+
+

+4.4.3. Alignment and Extension Technologies +

+

If in the future DMARC is extended to include the use of other authentication +mechanisms, the extensions MUST allow for the assignment of a domain +as an Authenticated Identifier so that alignment with the Author Domain +can be validated.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+4.5. DMARC Policy Record Explained +

+

A Domain Owner or PSO advertises +DMARC participation of one or more of its domains by publishing DMARC Policy Records that will apply to those domains. In doing so, Domain Owners +and PSOs indicate their handling preference regarding failed validation for email +messages using their domain in the RFC5322.From header field as well as their +desire (if any) to receive feedback about such messages in the form of aggregate and/or +failure reports.

+

DMARC Policy Records are stored as DNS TXT records with names starting with +the label "_dmarc". For example, the Domain Owner of "example.com" would publish +a DMARC Policy Record at the name "_dmarc.example.com", and a Mail Receiver +wishing to find the DMARC Policy Record for mail with an Author Domain +of "example.com" would issue a TXT query to the DNS for the name "_dmarc.example.com". +A Domain Owner or PSO may choose not to participate in DMARC validation by Mail Receivers +simply by not publishing a DMARC Policy Record for its Author Domain(s).

+

DMARC Policy Records can also apply to subdomains of the name at which they +are published in the DNS, if the record is published at an Organizational +Domain for the subdomains. The Domain Owner Assessment Policy that applies to the subdomains can be identical to the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy that applies to the Organizational Domain or different, depending +on the presence or absence of certain values in the DMARC Policy Record. See Section 4.7 +for more details.

+

DMARC's use of the Domain Name Service is driven by DMARC's use of domain +names and the nature of the query it performs. The query requirement matches +with the DNS for obtaining simple parametric information. It uses an established +method of storing the information associated with the domain name targeted by +a DNS query, specifically an isolated TXT record that is restricted to the +DMARC context. Using the DNS as the query service has the benefit of reusing +an extremely well-established operations, administration, and management +infrastructure, rather than creating a new one.

+

Per [RFC1035], a TXT record can comprise multiple "character-string" objects. +Where this is the case, the module performing DMARC evaluation MUST concatenate +these strings by joining together the objects in order and parsing the result as a single string.

+

A Domain Owner can choose not to have some underlying authentication mechanisms +apply to DMARC evaluation of its Author Domain(s). For example, if a Domain Owner +only wants to use DKIM as the underlying authentication mechanism, then the Domain +Owner does not publish an SPF record that can produce Identifier Alignment +between an SPF-Authenticated Identifier and the Author Domain. Alternatively, if +the Domain Owner wishes to rely solely on SPF, then it can send email messages that +have no DKIM-Signature header field that would produce Identifier Alignment between +a DKIM-Authenticated Identifier and the Author Domain. Neither approach is recommended, +however.

+

A Mail Receiver implementing the DMARC mechanism gets the Domain Owner's or +PSO's published Domain Owner Assessment Policy and can use it to inform its handling decisions +for messages that undergo DMARC validation checks and do not produce a result of +pass. Mail handling considerations based on Domain Owner Assessment Policy enforcement +are discussed below in Section 5.4.

+
+
+
+
+

+4.6. DMARC Reporting URIs +

+

[RFC3986] defines a syntax for identifying a resource. The DMARC +mechanism uses this as the format by which a Domain Owner +or PSO specifies the destination(s) for the two +report types that are supported. The DMARC Poilcy Record format +allows for a list of these URIs to be provided, with each URI separated by commas (ASCII 0x2c).

+

A formal definition is provided in Section 4.8.

+
+
+
+
+

+4.7. DMARC Policy Record Format +

+

DMARC Policy Records follow the extensible "tag-value" syntax for DNS-based +key records defined in DKIM [RFC6376].

+

Section 8 creates a registry for known DMARC tags and +registers the initial set defined in this document. Only tags defined +in that registry are to be processed; unknown tags MUST be ignored.

+

The following tags are valid DMARC tags:

+
+
adkim:
+
+

(plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "r".) Indicates whether +the Domain Owner or PSO requires +strict or relaxed DKIM Identifier Alignment mode. See Section 4.4.1 for details. +Valid values are as follows:

+
+
r:
+
relaxed mode +
+
+
s:
+
strict mode +
+
+
+
+
+
aspf:
+
+

(plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "r".) Indicates whether +the Domain Owner or PSO requires strict or relaxed SPF Identifier Alignment +mode. See Section 4.4.2 for details. Valid values are as follows:

+
+
r:
+
relaxed mode +
+
+
s:
+
strict mode +
+
+
+
+
+
fo:
+
+

Failure reporting options (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "0") +Provides requested options for the generation of failure reports. +Report generators may choose to adhere to the requested options. +This tag's content MUST be ignored if a "ruf" tag (below) is not +also specified. This tag can include one or more of the values shown here; +if more than one value is assigned to the tag, the list of values should be +separated by colons (e.g., fo=0:d). The valid values and their meanings are:

+
+
0:
+
Generate a DMARC failure report if all underlying authentication +mechanisms fail to produce an aligned "pass" result. +
+
+
1:
+
Generate a DMARC failure report if any underlying authentication +mechanism produced something other than an aligned "pass" result. +
+
+
d:
+
Generate a DKIM failure report if the message had a signature +that failed evaluation, regardless of its alignment. DKIM-specific +reporting is described in [RFC6651]. +
+
+
s:
+
Generate an SPF failure report if the message failed SPF +evaluation, regardless of its alignment. SPF-specific +reporting is described in [RFC6652]. +
+
+
+
+
+
np:
+
+

Domain Owner Assessment Policy for non-existent subdomains +of the given Organizational Domain (plain-text; OPTIONAL). For this tag, the definition +of "non-existent subdomain" is the same as that used for "Non-existent Domains" in Section 3.2.13. +The policy expressed by this tag indicates the message handling preference of the Domain Owner +or PSO for mail using non-existent subdomains +of the prevailing Organizational Domain and not passing DMARC validation. It applies +only to non-existent subdomains of the Organizational Domain queried and not to either +existing subdomains or the domain itself. Its syntax is identical to that of the "p" +tag defined below. If the "np" tag is absent, the policy specified by the "sp" tag (if +the "sp" tag is present) or the policy specified by the "p" tag, if the "sp" +tag is not present, MUST be applied for non-existent subdomains.

+
+
+
p:
+
+

Domain Owner Assessment Policy (plain-text; RECOMMENDED +for DMARC Policy Records). Indicates the message handling preference of the Domain Owner +or PSO for mail using its domain but not passing DMARC validation. +The policy applies to the domain queried and to subdomains, unless the +subdomain policy is explicitly described using the "sp" or "np" tags. +If this tag is not present in an otherwise syntactically valid DMARC +Policy Record, then the record is treated as if it included "p=none" (see +Section 4.10.1). This tag is not applicable for third-party +reporting records (see [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]). +Possible values are as follows:

+
+
none:
+
The Domain Owner offers no expression of preference. +
+
+
quarantine:
+
The Domain Owner considers such mail to be suspicious. It is possible +the mail is valid, although the failure creates a significant concern. +
+
+
reject:
+
The Domain Owner considers all such failures to be a clear indication +that the use of the domain name is not valid. See Section 7.2 +for some discussion of SMTP rejection methods and their implications. +
+
+
+
+
+
psd:
+
+

A flag indicating whether the domain is a PSD. (plain-text; OPTIONAL; +default is "u"). Possible values are:

+
+
y:
+
PSOs include this tag with a value of "y" to indicate that the domain +is a PSD. If a record containing this tag with a value of "y" is found during +policy discovery, this information will be used to determine the Organizational +Domain and DMARC Policy Domain applicable to the message in question. +
+
+
n:
+
The DMARC Policy Record is published for a domain that is not a PSD, but it is +the Organizational Domain for itself and its subdomains. +
+
+
u:
+
The default indicates that the DMARC Policy Record is published for a domain +that is not a PSD, and may or may not be an Organizational Domain for itself and +its subdomains. Use the mechanism described in Section 4.10 for determining +the Organizational Domain for this domain. +
+
+
+
+
+
rua:
+
+

Addresses to which aggregate feedback reports are to be sent (comma-separated plain-text +list of DMARC Reporting URIs; OPTIONAL). If present, the Domain Owner is requesting +Mail Receivers to send aggregate feedback reports as defined in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] +to the URIs listed. Any valid URI can be specified. A Mail Receiver MUST implement support +for a "mailto:" URI, i.e., the ability to send a DMARC report via electronic mail. If the +tag is not provided, Mail Receivers MUST NOT generate aggregate feedback reports for +the domain. URIs involving schemes not supported by Mail Receivers MUST be ignored. +[I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] also discusses considerations that apply when the +domain name of a URI differs from the domain publishing the DMARC Policy Record. See +Section 10.6 for additional considerations.

+
+
+
ruf:
+
+

Addresses to which message-specific failure information is to be reported +(comma-separated plain-text list of DMARC URIs; OPTIONAL). If present, the +Domain Owner is requesting Mail Receivers to send detailed failure reports about +messages that fail the DMARC evaluation in specific ways (see the "fo" tag above) to +the URIs listed. Depending on the value of the "fo" tag, the format for such reports +is described in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting], [RFC6651], or [RFC6652]. Any +valid URI can be specified. A Mail Receiver MUST implement support for a "mailto:" +URI, i.e., the ability to send message-specific failure information via electronic mail. +If the tag is not provided, Mail Receivers MUST NOT generate failure reports for the +domain. URIs involving schemes not supported by Mail Receivers MUST be ignored. +[I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] discusses considerations that apply when +the domain name of a URI differs from that of the domain advertising the policy. +See Section 10.6 for additional considerations.

+
+
+
sp:
+
+

Domain Owner Assessment Policy for all subdomains of the given Organizational Domain +(plain-text; OPTIONAL). Indicates the message handling preference of the Domain Owner +or PSO for mail using an existing subdomain of the prevailing Organizational Domain for +and not passing DMARC validation. It applies only to existing subdomains of the message's +Organizational Domain in the DNS hierarchy and not to the Organizational Domain itself. +Its syntax is identical to that of the "p" tag defined above. If both the "sp" tag is +absent, and the "np" tag is either absent or not applicable, the policy specified by +the "p" tag MUST be applied for subdomains. Note that "sp" will be ignored for +DMARC Policy Records published on subdomains of Organizational Domains and PSDs due +to the effect of the DMARC Policy Discovery.

+
+
+
t:
+
+

DMARC policy test mode (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "n"). For +the Author Domain to which the DMARC Policy Record applies, the "t" tag serves +as a signal to the actor performing DMARC validation checks as to whether or not +the Domain Owner wishes the Domain Owner Assessment Policy declared in the "p", +"sp", and/or "np" tags to actually be applied. This tag does not affect the +generation of DMARC reports, and it has no effect on any policy ("p", "sp", or "np") +that is "none". See Appendix A.6 for further discussion of the use +of this tag. Possible values are as follows:

+
+
y:
+
A request that the actor performing the DMARC validation check not +apply the policy, but instead apply any special handling rules it might have +in place, such as rewriting the RFC5322.From header field (see Appendix A.6). +The Domain Owner is currently testing its specified DMARC assessment policy, and has +an expectation that the policy applied to any failing messages will be one level below the +specified policy. That is, if the policy is "quarantine" and the value of the "t" +tag is "y", a policy of "none" will be applied to failing messages; if the policy +is "reject" and the value of the "t" tag is "y", a policy of "quarantine" will be +applied to failing messages, irrespective of any other special handling rules that +might be triggered by the "t" tag having a value of "y". +
+
+
n:
+
The default is a request to apply the Domain Owner Assessment Policy as specified +to any message that produces a DMARC "fail" result. +
+
+
+
+
+
v:
+
+

Version (plain-text; REQUIRED). Identifies the record retrieved +as a DMARC Policy Record. It MUST have the value of "DMARC1". The value +of this tag MUST match precisely; if it does not or it is absent, +the entire record MUST be ignored. It MUST be the first tag in the +list.

+
+
+
+

A DMARC Policy Record MUST comply with the formal specification found +in Section 4.8 in that the "v" tag MUST be present and MUST +appear first. Unknown tags MUST be ignored. Syntax errors +in the remainder of the record MUST be discarded in favor of +default values (if any) or ignored outright.

+

Note that given the rules of the previous paragraph, the addition of a +new tag into the registered list of tags does not itself require a +new version of DMARC to be generated (with a corresponding change to +the "v" tag's value), but a change to any existing tags does require +a new version of DMARC.

+
+
+
+
+

+4.8. Formal Definition +

+

The formal definition of the DMARC Policy Record format, using [RFC5234] +and [RFC7405], is as follows:

+
+
  dmarc-uri     = URI
+                ; "URI" is imported from [RFC3986];
+                ; commas (ASCII 0x2C) and exclamation
+                ; points (ASCII 0x21) MUST be
+                ; encoded
+
+  dmarc-sep     = *WSP ";" *WSP
+
+  equals        = *WSP "=" *WSP
+
+  dmarc-record  = dmarc-version *(dmarc-sep dmarc-tag) [dmarc-sep]
+
+  dmarc-tag     = 1*ALPHA equals 1*dmarc-value
+
+  ; any printing characters but semicolon
+  dmarc-value   = %x20-3A / %x3C-7E
+
+  dmarc-version = "v" equals %s"DMARC1" ; case sensitive
+
+  ; specialized syntax of DMARC values
+  dmarc-request = "none" / "quarantine" / "reject"
+
+  dmarc-yorn    = "y" / "n"
+
+  dmarc-psd     = "y" / "n" / "u"
+
+  dmarc-rors    = "r" / "s"
+
+  dmarc-urilist = dmarc-uri *(*WSP "," *WSP dmarc-uri)
+
+  dmarc-fo      = "0" / "1" / "d" / "s" / "d:s" / "s:d"
+
+
+
+

In each dmarc-tag, the dmarc-value has a syntax that depends on the tag name. +The ABNF rule for each dmarc-value is specified in the following table:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+Table 2: +"Tag Names and Values" +
Tag NameValue Rule
pdmarc-request
tdmarc-yorn
psddmarc-psd
npdmarc-request
spdmarc-request
adkimdmarc-rors
aspfdmarc-rors
ruadmarc-urilist
rufdmarc-urilist
fodmarc-fo
+
+
+
+
+

+4.9. Flow Diagram +

+
+
 +---------------+                             +--------------------+
+ | Author Domain |< . . . . . . . . . . . .    | Return-Path Domain |
+ +---------------+                        .    +--------------------+
+     |                                    .               ^
+     V                                    V               .
+ +-----------+     +--------+       +----------+          v
+ |   MSA     |<***>|  DKIM  |       |   DMARC  |     +----------+
+ |  Service  |     | Signer |       | Validator|<***>|    SPF   |
+ +-----------+     +--------+       +----------+  *  | Validator|
+     |                                    ^       *  +----------+
+     |                                    *       *
+     V                                    v       *
+  +------+        (~~~~~~~~~~~~)      +------+    *  +----------+
+  | sMTA |------->( other MTAs )----->| rMTA |    **>|   DKIM   |
+  +------+        (~~~~~~~~~~~~)      +------+       | Validator|
+                                         |           +----------+
+                                         |                ^
+                                         V                .
+                                  +-----------+           .
+                    +---------+   |    MDA    |           v
+                    |  User   |<--| Filtering |      +-----------+
+                    | Mailbox |   |  Engine   |      |   DKIM    |
+                    +---------+   +-----------+      |  Signing  |
+                                                     | Domain(s) |
+                                                     +-----------+
+
+  MSA = Mail Submission Agent
+  MDA = Mail Delivery Agent
+
+
+

The above diagram shows a typical flow of messages through a +DMARC-aware system. Dashed lines (e.g., -->) denote the actual message +flow, dotted lines (e.g., < . . >) represent DNS queries used to retrieve +message policy related to the supported message authentication schemes, +and starred lines (e.g., <**>) indicate data exchange between message-handling +modules and message authentication modules. "sMTA" is the sending MTA, and +"rMTA" is the receiving MTA.

+

Put simply, when a message reaches a DMARC-aware rMTA, a DNS query +will be initiated to determine if a DMARC Policy Record exists that applies +to the Author Domain. If a DMARC Policy Record is found, the rMTA will use +the results of SPF and DKIM validation checks to determine DMARC validation +status. The DMARC validation status can then factor into the message handling +decision made by the recipient's mail system.

+

More details on specific actions for the parties involved can be +found in Section 5.1 and Section 5.3.

+
+
+
+
+

+4.10. DNS Tree Walk +

+

An Organizational Domain serves two different purposes, +depending on the context:

+ +

[RFC7489] defined an Organizational Domain as "The domain that was registered with a domain +name registrar." RFC 7489 discussed using a "public suffix" list (PSL) as the authoritative +list of the parent domains for Organizational Domains, and further described a method for +determining the Organizational Domain of an Author Domain or an Authenticated Identifier. +However, RFC 7489 mandated no requirement for a specific PSL for Mail Receivers to use +(though it did suggest the one found at https://publicsuffix.org/) nor did it provide +any guidance for the frequency of regular retrieval of the PSL by Mail Receivers participating +in DMARC. RFC 7489 acknowledged the possibility of interoperability issues caused by Mail +Receivers choosing different PSLs, and even suggested that if a more reliable and secure +method for determining the Organizational Domain could be created, that method should +replace reliance on a public suffix list.

+

This update to DMARC offers more flexibility to Domain Owners, especially those with large, +complex organizations that might want to apply decentralized management to their DNS and their +DMARC Policy Records. Rather than just using a public suffix list to help identify +an Organizational Domain, this update defines a discovery technique known colloquially as +the "DNS Tree Walk". The target of any DNS Tree Walk is discovry of a valid DMARC Policy Record, +and its use in determining an Organizational Domain allows for publishing DMARC Policy Records +at multiple points in the namespace.

+

This flexibility comes at a possible cost, however. Since the DNS Tree Walk +relies on the Mail Receiver making a series of DNS queries, the potential +exists for an ill-intentioned Domain Owner to send mail with Author Domains +with tens or even hundreds of labels for the purpose of executing a Denial +of Service Attack on the Mail Receiver. To guard against such abuse of the +DNS, a shortcut is built into the process so that Author Domains with more +than eight labels do not result in more than eight DNS queries. Observed data +at the time of publication showed that Author Domains with up to seven labels +were in usage, and so eight was chosen as the query limit to allow for some +future expansion of the name space that did not require updating this document.

+

The generic steps for a DNS Tree Walk are as follows:

+
    +
  1. +

    Query the DNS for a TXT record that matches the format of a DMARC Policy Record at +the starting point for the Tree Walk. The starting point for the DNS Tree Walk will +depend on the ultimate target of the DNS Tree Walk. Section 4.10.1 and +Section 4.10.2 describe the possible starting points. A possibly +empty set of records is returned.

    +
    2. +
  2. +

    Records that do not start with a "v" tag that identifies the current +version of DMARC are discarded. If multiple DMARC Policy Records are +returned, they are all discarded. If a single record remains and it +contains either a "psd=y" tag or a "psd=n" tag, stop.

    +
    3. +
  3. +

    Break the subject DNS domain name into a set of ordered labels. Assign +the count of labels to "x", and number the labels from right to left; e.g., +for "a.mail.example.com", "x" would be assigned the value 4, "com" would be +label 1, "example" would be label 2, "mail" would be label 3, and so forth.

    +
    4. +
  4. +

    If x < 8, remove the left-most (highest-numbered) label from the subject +domain. If x >= 8, remove the left-most (highest-numbered) labels from the +subject domain until 7 labels remain. The resulting DNS domain name is the +new target for the next lookup.

    +
    5. +
  5. +

    Query the DNS for a DMARC Policy Record at the DNS domain name matching this +new target. A possibly empty set of records is returned.

    +
    6. +
  6. +

    Records that do not start with a "v" tag that identifies the current +version of DMARC are discarded. If multiple DMARC Policy Records are returned for +a single target, they are all discarded. If a single record remains and it +contains a "psd=n" or "psd=y" tag, stop.

    +
    7. +
  7. +

    Determine the target for the next query by removing the left-most label +from the target of the previous query. Repeat steps 5, 6, and 7 until the +process stops or there are no more labels remaining.

    +
    8. +
+

To illustrate, for a message with the arbitrary Author Domain of +"a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com", a full DNS Tree Walk would require the following +eight queries to potentially locate the DMARC Policy Record or Organizational Domain:

+
    +
  • _dmarc.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.h.i.j.mail.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.i.j.mail.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.j.mail.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.mail.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.com +
    • +
+
+
+

+4.10.1. DMARC Policy Discovery +

+

The DMARC Policy Record to be applied to an email message will be the record found at any +of the following locations, listed from highest preference to lowest:

+
    +
  • The Author Domain +
    • +
  • The Organizational Domain of the Author Domain +
    • +
  • The Public Suffix Domain of the Author Domain +
    • +
+

Policy discovery starts first with a query for a valid DMARC Policy Record at the +name created by prepending the label "_dmarc" to the Author Domain of the +message being evaluated. If a valid DMARC Policy Record is found there, then this is the +DMARC Policy Record to be applied to the message; however, this does not necessarily mean +that the Author Domain is the Organizational Domain to be used in Identifier +Alignment checks. Whether this is also the Organizational Domain is dependent +on the value of the "psd" tag, if present, or some conditions described in +Section 4.10.2.

+

If no valid DMARC Policy Record is found by the first query, then perform a DNS +Tree Walk to find the Author Domain's Organizational Domain or its Public +Suffix Domain. The starting point for this DNS Tree Walk is determined as +follows:

+
    +
  • If the Author Domain has eight or fewer labels, the starting point will be +the immediate parent domain of the Author Domain. +
    • +
  • Otherwise, the starting point will be the name produced by shortening the Author +Domain as described starting in step 3 of Section 4.10. +
    • +
+

If the DMARC Policy Record to be applied is that of the Author Domain, then the +Domain Owner Assessment Policy is taken from the "p" tag of the record.

+

If the DMARC Policy Record to be applied is that of either the Organizational Domain or the +Public Suffix Domain and the Author Domain is a subdomain of that domain, then the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy is taken from the "sp" tag (if any) if the Author Domain exists, +or the "np" tag (if any) if the Author Domain does not exist. In the absence of +applicable "sp" or "np" tags, the "p" tag policy is used for subdomains.

+

If a retrieved DMARC Policy Record does not contain a valid "p" tag, or contains an "sp" or +"np" tag that is not valid, then:

+
    +
  • +

    If a "rua" tag is present and contains at least one syntactically valid reporting +URI, the Mail Receiver MUST act as if a record containing "p=none" was +retrieved and continue processing;

    +
    • +
  • +

    Otherwise, the Mail Receiver applies no DMARC processing to this message.

    +
    • +
+

If the set produced by the DNS Tree Walk contains no DMARC Policy Record (i.e., +any indication that there is no such record as opposed to a transient DNS error), +Mail Receivers MUST NOT apply the DMARC mechanism to the message.

+

Handling of DNS errors when querying for the DMARC Policy Record is +left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver. For example, to ensure +minimal disruption of mail flow, transient errors could result in +delivery of the message ("fail open"), or they could result in the +message being temporarily rejected (i.e., an SMTP 4yx reply), which +invites the sending MTA to try again after the condition has possibly +cleared, allowing a definite DMARC conclusion to be reached ("fail +closed").

+

Note: PSD policy is not used for Organizational Domains that have +published a DMARC Policy Record. Specifically, this is not a mechanism to +provide feedback addresses (rua/ruf) when an Organizational Domain has +declined to do so.

+
+
+
+
+

+4.10.2. Identifier Alignment Evaluation +

+

It may be necessary to perform multiple DNS Tree Walks to determine if an +Authenticated Identifier and an Author Domain are in alignment, meaning +that they have either the same Organizational Domain (relaxed alignment) or +that they're identical (strict alignment). DNS Tree Walks done to discover an +Organizational Domain for use in Identifier Alignment Evaluation might start +at any of the following locations:

+
    +
  • The Author Domain of the message being evaluated. +
    • +
  • The SPF-Authenticated Identifier if there is an SPF pass result for the message +being evaluated. +
    • +
  • Any DKIM-Authenticated Identifier if one or more DKIM pass results exist for +the message being evaluated. +
    • +
+

Note: There is no need to perform Identifier Alignment Evaluations under any of +the following conditions:

+
    +
  • The Author Domain and the Authenticated Identifier(s) are all the +same domain, and there is a DMARC Policy Record published for that domain. +In this case, this common domain is treated as the Organizational Domain. +For example, if the common domain in question is "mail.example.com", and +there is a valid DMARC Policy Record published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com", +then "mail.example.com" is the Organizational Domain. +
    • +
  • No applicable DMARC Policy Record is discovered for the Author Domain. In +this case, the DMARC mechanism does not apply to the message in question. +
    • +
  • The DMARC Policy record for the Author Domain indicates strict alignment. In +this case, a simple string comparison of the Author Domain and the Authenticated +Identifier(s) is all that is required. +
    • +
+

To discover the Organizational Domain for a domain, perform the DNS Tree Walk +described in Section 4.10 as needed for any of the domains in question.

+

For each Tree Walk that retrieved valid DMARC Policy Records, select the Organizational +Domain from the domains for which valid DMARC Policy Records were retrieved from the longest +to the shortest:

+
    +
  1. +

    If a valid DMARC Policy Record contains the "psd" tag set to "n" ("psd=n"), this is the +Organizational Domain, and the selection process is complete.

    +
    2. +
  2. +

    If a valid DMARC Policy Record, other than the one for the domain where the tree +walk started, contains the "psd" tag set to "y" ("psd=y"), the Organizational +Domain is the domain one label below this one in the DNS hierarchy, and the +selection process is complete. For example, if in the course of a tree walk a DMARC +Policy Record is queried for at first "_dmarc.mail.example.com" and then "_dmarc.example.com", +and a valid DMARC Policy Record containing the "psd" tag set to "y" is found at +"_dmarc.example.com", then "mail.example.com" is the domain one label below "example.com" +in the DNS hierarchy and is thus the Organizational Domain.

    +
    3. +
  3. +

    Otherwise, select the DMARC Policy Record found at the name with the fewest number +of labels. This is the Organizational Domain and the selection process is complete.

    +
    4. +
+

If this process does not determine the Organizational Domain, then the initial target +domain is the Organizational Domain.

+

For example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", a search +for the Organizational Domain would require a series of DNS queries for DMARC Policy +Records starting with "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com" and finishing with "_dmarc.com". +If there are DMARC Policy Records published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" and +"_dmarc.example.com", but not at "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com" or +"_dmarc.com", then the Organizational Domain for this domain would be +"example.com".

+

As another example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", if a +search for the Organizational Domain yields a DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" +with the "psd" tag set to "n", then the Organizational Domain for this domain would +be "mail.example.com".

+

As a last example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", if a +search for the Organizational Domain only yields a DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.com" +and that record contains the tag "psd=y", then the Organizational Domain for +this domain would be "example.com".

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+5. DMARC Participation +

+

This section describes the actions for participating in DMARC for each of +three unique entities - Domain Owners, PSOs, and Mail Receivers.

+
+
+

+5.1. Domain Owner Actions +

+

A Domain Owner wishing to fully participate in DMARC will +publish a DMARC Policy Record to cover each Author Domain and corresponding Organizational Domain +to which DMARC validation should apply, send email that produces at least one, and +preferably two, Authenticated Identifiers that align +with the Author Domain, and will receive and monitor the content of DMARC aggregate +reports. The following sections describe how to achieve this.

+
+
+

+5.1.1. Publish an SPF Record for an Aligned Domain +

+

To configure SPF for DMARC, the Domain Owner MUST send mail that has +an RFC5321.MailFrom domain that will produce an SPF-Authenticated +Identifier that has Identifier Alignment +with the Author Domain.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.1.2. Configure Sending System for DKIM Signing Using an Aligned Domain +

+

To configure DKIM for DMARC, the Domain Owner MUST send mail that +has a DKIM Signing Domain that will produce a +DKIM-Authenticated Identifier that +has Identifier Alignment with the Author Domain.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.1.3. Set Up a Mailbox to Receive Aggregate Reports +

+

Proper consumption and analysis of DMARC aggregate reports are essential +to any successful DMARC deployment for a Domain Owner. DMARC aggregate +reports, which are defined in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting], +contain valuable data for the Domain Owner, showing sources of mail +using the Author Domain.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.1.4. Publish a DMARC Policy Record for the Author Domain and Organizational Domain +

+

Once SPF, DKIM, and the aggregate reports mailbox are all in place, +it's time to publish a DMARC Policy Record. For best results, Domain Owners +usually start with "p=none", (see Section 5.1.5) +with the "rua" tag containing a URI that references the mailbox created +in the previous step. This is commonly referred to as putting the Author +Domain into Monitoring Mode. If the Organizational Domain +is different from the Author Domain, a record also needs to be published for the +Organizational Domain.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.1.5. Collect and Analyze Reports +

+

The reason for starting at "p=none" is to ensure that nothing's been +missed in the initial SPF and DKIM deployments. In all but the most +trivial setups, a Domain Owner can overlook a server here or be unaware +of a third party sending agreement there. Starting at "p=none", therefore, +takes advantage of DMARC's aggregate reporting function, with the Domain +Owner using the reports to audit its own mail streams' authentication +configurations.

+

While it is possible for a human to read aggregate reports, they are +formatted in such a way that it is recommended that they be machine-parsed, +so setting up a mailbox involves more than just the physical creation +of that mailbox. Many third-party services exist that will process DMARC +aggregate reports or the Domain Owner can create its own set of tools. +No matter which method is chosen, the ability to consume these reports and +parse the data contained in them will go a long way to ensuring a +successful deployment.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.1.6. Remediate Unaligned or Unauthenticated Mail Streams +

+

DMARC aggregate reports can reveal to the Domain Owner mail streams using the +Author Domain that should be passing DMARC validation checks but are not. If +the reason for the streams not passing is due to Authenticated Identifiers being +unaligned or missing entirely, then the Domain Owner wishing to fully participate +in DMARC MUST take necessary steps to address these shortcomings.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.1.7. Decide Whether to Update Domain Owner Assessment Policy to Enforcement +

+

Once the Domain Owner is satisfied that it is properly authenticating +all of its mail, then it is time to decide if it is appropriate to +change its Domain Owner Assessment Policy to Enforcement. +Depending on its cadence for sending mail, it may take many months +of consuming DMARC aggregate reports before a Domain Owner reaches +the point where it is sure that it is properly authenticating all +of its mail, and the decision on which "p" value to use will depend +on its needs.

+

In making this decision it is important to understand the +interoperability issues involved and problems that can result for +mailing lists and for delivery of legitimate mail. Those +issues are discussed in detail in Section 7.4

+
+
+
+
+

+5.1.8. A Note on Large, Complex Organizations and Decentralized DNS Management +

+

Large, complex organizations frequently adopt a decentralized model for +DNS management, whereby management of a subtree of the name space is delegated +to a local department by the central IT organization. In such situations, the +"psd" tag makes it possible for those local departments to declare any arbitrary +node in their subtree as an Organizational Domain. This would be accomplished by +publishing a DMARC Policy Record at that node with the "psd" tag set to "n". The +reasons that departments might declare their own Organizational Domains include a +desire to have different policy settings or reporting URIs than the DMARC Policy Record +published for the apex domain.

+

Such configurations would work in theory, and they might involve domain names with +many labels, reflecting the structure of the organization, for example:

+
    +
  • Apex domain (DMARC Policy Record published here): example.com +
    • +
  • Zone cut domain (DMARC Policy Record with "psd=n" published here): b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com +
    • +
  • Author Domain: mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com +
    • +
+

However, Domain Owners should be aware that due to the anti-abuse protections +built into the DNS Tree Walk, the DMARC Policy Record published +at the zone cut domain in this example will never be discovered. A Mail Receiver +performing a Tree Walk would only perform queries for these names:

+
    +
  • _dmarc.mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.c.d.e.f.g.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.d.e.f.g.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.e.f.g.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.f.g.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.g.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.example.com +
    • +
  • _dmarc.com +
    • +
+

To avoid this circumstance, Domain Owners wishing to have a specific DMARC Policy +Record applied to a given [Author Domain]{#author-domain) longer than eight labels +MUST publish a DMARC Policy Record at that domain's location in the DNS namespace, +as such records are always queried by Mail Receivers that participate in DMARC before +the Tree Walk begins. In the above example, this would mean publishing a DMARC Policy +Record at the name "_dmarc.mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com.".

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+5.2. PSO Actions +

+

In addition to the DMARC Domain Owner actions, if a PSO +publishes a DMARC Policy Record it MUST include the "psd" tag (see Section 4.7) +with a value of "y" ("psd=y").

+
+
+
+
+

+5.3. Mail Receiver Actions +

+

Mail Receivers wishing to fully participate in DMARC +will apply the DMARC mechanism to inbound email messages when a DMARC +Policy Record exists that applies to the Author +Domain, and will send aggregate reports to Domain +Owners that request them. Mail Receivers might also send failure reports +to Domain Owners that request them.

+

The steps for applying the DMARC mechanism to an email message can take +place during the SMTP transaction, and should do so if the Mail Receiver +plans to honor Domain Owner Assessment Policies that +are at the Enforcement state.

+

Many Mail Receivers perform one or both of the underlying Authentication +Mechanisms on inbound messages even in cases +where no DMARC Policy Record exists for the Author Domain of a given message, +or where the Mail Receiver is not participating in DMARC. Nothing in this +section is intended to imply that the underlying Authentication Mechanisms +should only be performed by Mail Receivers participating in DMARC.

+

The next sections describe the steps for a Mail Receiver wishing to fully +participate in DMARC.

+
+
+

+5.3.1. Extract Author Domain +

+

Once the email message has been transmitted to the Mail Receiver, the Mail +Receiver extracts the domain in the RFC5322.From header field as the Author +Domain. If the domain is a U-label, the domain MUST be converted to an +A-label, as described in Section 2.3 of [RFC5890], for further processing.

+

If zero or more than one domain is extracted from the RFC5322.From header +field, then DMARC validation is not possible and the process terminates. +In the case where more than one domain is retrieved, the Mail Receiver +MAY choose to go forward with DMARC validation anyway. See +Section 10.5 for further discussion.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.3.2. Determine If The DMARC Mechanism Applies +

+

If precisely one Author Domain exists for the message, then perform the +step described in [DMARC Policy Discovery] to determine if the DMARC +mechanism applies. If a DMARC Policy Record is not +discovered during this step, then the DMARC mechanism does not apply and +DMARC validation terminates for the message.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.3.3. Determine If Authenticated Identifiers Exist +

+

For each Authentication Mechanism underlying DMARC, perform the required +check to determine if an Authenticated Identifier +exists for the message if such check has not already been performed. Results from +each check must be preserved for later use as follows:

+
    +
  • For SPF, the preserved results MUST include "pass" or "fail", and if "fail", SHOULD +include information about the reasons for failure if available. The results MUST further +include the domain name used to complete the SPF check. +
    • +
  • For DKIM signature validation checks, for each signature checked, the +results MUST include "pass" or "fail", and if "fail", SHOULD include +information about the reasons for failure. The results MUST further include +the value of the "d" and "s" tags from each checked DKIM signature. +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+

+5.3.4. Conduct Identifier Alignment Checks If Necessary +

+

For each Authenticated Identifier found in the message, the Mail Receiver checks +to see if the Authenticated Identifier is aligned +with the Author Domain.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.3.5. Determine DMARC "Pass" or "Fail" +

+

If one or more of the Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author Domain, the +message is considered to pass the DMARC mechanism check.

+

If no Authenticated Identifiers exist for the domain, or none of the Authenticated +Identifiers align with the Author Domain, the message is considered to fail the +DMARC mechanism check.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.3.6. Apply Policy If Appropriate +

+

Email messages that fail the DMARC mechanism check are handled in accordance with +the Mail Receiver's local policies. These local policies may take into account the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy for the Author Domain at the Mail Receiver's discretion.

+

If one or more DNS queries required to perform DMARC validation on the message +do not complete due to temporary or permanent DNS errors, the message cannot be +considered to pass or fail the DMARC mechanism check. In such cases, the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy cannot be applied to the message, and any other handling +decisions for the message are left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver.

+

See Section 7.2 for further discussion of topics regarding rejecting messages.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.3.7. Store Results of DMARC Processing +

+

If the Mail Receiver intends to fully participate in DMARC, then results obtained from +the application of the DMARC mechanism by the Mail Receiver MUST be stored for eventual +presentation back to the Domain Owner in the form of aggregate feedback reports. Section 4.7 and +[I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] discuss aggregate feedback.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.3.8. Send Aggregate Reports +

+

To ensure maximum usefulness for DMARC across the email ecosystem, Mail +Receivers SHOULD generate and send aggregate reports with a frequency +of at least once every 24 hours. Such reports provide Domain Owners with +insight into all mail streams using Author Domains under the Domain Owner's +control, and aid the Domain Owner in determining whether and when to transition +from Monitoring Mode to Enforcement.

+

The most common reasons for a Mail Receiver to opt out of sending aggregate +reports include resource constraints, local policy against sharing data, and +concerns about user privacy.

+
+
+
+
+

+5.3.9. Optionally Send Failure Reports +

+

Per-message failure reports can be a useful source of information for a Domain +Owner, either for debugging deployments or in analyzing attacks, and so Mail +Receivers MAY choose to send them. Experience has shown, however, that Mail +Receivers rightly concerned about protecting user privacy have either chosen to +heavily redact the information in such reports (which can hinder their usefulness) +or not send them at all. See [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] for further information.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+5.4. Policy Enforcement Considerations +

+

The final handling of any message is always a matter of local policy and is +left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver.

+

A DMARC pass for a message indicates only that the use of the Author Domain +has been validated for that message as authorized by the Domain Owner. +Such authorization does not carry an explicit or implicit value assertion about +that message or the Domain Owner, and Mail Receivers MAY choose to reject or +quarantine a message even if it passes the DMARC validation check. Mail Receivers +are encouraged to maintain anti-abuse technologies to combat the possibility of +DMARC-enabled criminal campaigns.

+

Mail Receivers MAY choose to accept email that fails the DMARC +validation check even if the published Domain Owner Assessment Policy +is "reject". In particular, because of the considerations discussed +in [RFC7960] and in Section 7.4 of this document, it is important that Mail +Receivers SHOULD NOT reject messages solely because of a published policy of "reject", +but that they apply other knowledge and analysis to avoid situations such as rejection +of legitimate messages sent in ways that DMARC cannot describe, harm to the operation of +mailing lists, and similar.

+

If a Mail Receiver chooses not to honor the published Domain Owner +Assessment Policy to improve interoperability among mail systems, it may +increase the likelihood of accepting abusive mail. At a minimum, Mail +Receivers SHOULD add the Authentication-Results header field (see +[RFC8601]), and it is RECOMMENDED when delivering messages that fail the DMARC validation check.

+

When Mail Receivers deviate from a published Domain Owner +Assessment Policy during message processing they SHOULD make +available the fact of and reason for the deviation to the Domain +Owner via feedback reporting, specifically using the +"PolicyOverride" feature of the aggregate report defined in +[I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

+

To enable Domain Owners to receive DMARC feedback without impacting +existing mail processing, discovered policies of "p=none" MUST NOT +modify existing mail handling processes.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+6. DMARC Feedback +

+

DMARC Feedback is described in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]

+

As an operational note for Public Suffix Operators, feedback for non-existent +domains can be desirable and useful, just as it can be for Organizational +Domains. Therefore, both such entities should consider including "rua=" tags +in any DMARC Policy Records they publish for themselves. See Section 9 +for discussion of Privacy Considerations.

+
+
+
+
+

+7. Other Topics +

+

This section discusses some topics regarding choices made in the +development of DMARC, largely to commit the history to record.

+
+
+

+7.1. Issues Specific to SPF +

+

Though DMARC does not inherently change the semantics of an SPF +policy record, historically lax enforcement of such policies has led +many to publish extremely broad records containing many extensive network +ranges. Domain Owners are strongly encouraged to carefully review +their SPF records to understand which networks are authorized to send +on behalf of the Domain Owner before publishing a DMARC Policy Record. Furthermore, +Domain Owners should periodically review their SPF records to ensure that +the authorization conveyed by the records matches the domain's current needs.

+

SPF was intended to be implemented early in the SMTP transaction, meaning it's +possible for a message to fail SPF validation prior to any message content being +transmitted, and so some Mail Receiver architectures might implement SPF in +advance of any DMARC operations. This means that an SPF hard fail ("-") prefix +on a sender's SPF mechanism, such as "-all", could cause a message to be rejected early in +the SMTP transaction, before any DMARC processing takes place, if the message +fails SPF authentication checks. Domain Owners choosing to use "-all" to terminate +SPF records should be aware of this, and should understand that messages that +might otherwise pass DMARC due to an aligned DKIM-Authenticated Identifier could be rejected solely due to an SPF fail. +Moreover, messages rejected early in the SMTP transaction will never appear in +aggregate DMARC reports, as the transaction will never proceed to the DATA phase +and so the RFC5322.From domain will never be revealed and its DMARC policy will +never be discovered. Domain Owners and Mail Receivers can consult +[M3SPF] and [M3AUTH] for more discussion of the topic and best practices +regarding publishing SPF records and when to reject based solely on SPF failure:

+
+
+
+
+

+7.2. Rejecting Messages +

+

The DMARC mechanism calls for rejection of a message during the SMTP +session under certain circumstances. This is preferable to +generation of a Delivery Status Notification +[RFC3464], since fraudulent messages caught and rejected using the DMARC +mechanism would then result in the annoying generation of such failure reports +that go back to the RFC5321.MailFrom address.

+

This synchronous rejection is typically done in one of two ways:

+
    +
  • +

    Full rejection, wherein the SMTP server issues a 5xy reply code to the +DATA command as an indication to the SMTP client that the transaction failed; +the SMTP client is then responsible for generating a notification that +delivery failed (see Section 4.2.5 of [RFC5321]).

    +
    • +
  • +

    A "silent discard", wherein the SMTP server returns a 2xy reply +code implying to the client that delivery (or, at least, relay) +was successfully completed, but then simply discards the message +with no further action.

    +
    • +
+

Each of these has a cost. For instance, a silent discard can help to +prevent backscatter, but it also effectively means that the SMTP +server has to be programmed to give a false result, which can +confound external debugging efforts.

+

Similarly, the text portion of the SMTP reply may be important to +consider. For example, when rejecting a message, revealing the +reason for the rejection might give an attacker enough information to +bypass those efforts on a later attempt, though it might also assist +a legitimate client to determine the source of some local issue that +caused the rejection.

+

In the latter case, when doing an SMTP rejection, providing a clear +hint can be useful in resolving issues. A Mail Receiver +might indicate in plain text the reason for the rejection by using the +word "DMARC" somewhere in the reply text. For example:

+
+
550 5.7.1 Email rejected per DMARC policy for example.com
+
+
+

Many systems are able to scan the SMTP reply text to determine the nature +of the rejection. Thus, providing a machine-detectable reason for rejection +allows the problems causing rejections to be properly addressed by automated systems.

+

If a Mail Receiver elects to defer delivery due to the inability to +retrieve or apply DMARC policy, this is best done with a 4xy SMTP +reply code.

+
+
+
+
+

+7.3. Interoperability Issues +

+

DMARC limits which end-to-end scenarios can achieve a "pass" result.

+

Because DMARC relies on SPF [RFC7208] and/or DKIM [RFC6376] to achieve +a "pass", their limitations also apply.

+

Issues specific to the use of policy mechanisms alongside DKIM are +further discussed in [RFC6377], particularly Section 5.2.

+

Mail that is sent by authorized, independent third parties might not be +sent with Identifier Alignment, also preventing a "pass" result. A Domain +Owner can use DMARC aggregate reports to identify this mail and take steps +to address authentication shortcomings.

+
+
+
+
+

+7.4. Interoperability Considerations +

+

As discussed in "Interoperability Issues between DMARC and Indirect +Email Flows" [RFC7960], use of "p=reject" can be incompatible with and +cause interoperability problems to indirect message flows such as +"alumni forwarders", role-based email aliases, and mailing lists +across the Internet.

+

As an example of this, a bank might send only targeted messages to +account holders. Those account holders might have given their bank +addresses such as "jones@alumni.example.edu" (an address that relays +the messages to another address with a real mailbox) or +"finance@association.example" (a role-based address that does similar +relaying for the current head of finance at the association). When +such mail is delivered to the actual recipient mailbox, it will +most likely fail SPF checks unless the RFC5321.MailFrom address is +rewritten by the relaying MTA, as the incoming IP address will be that +of "example.edu" or "association.example", and not an IP address authorized +by the originating RFC5321.MailFrom domain. DKIM signatures will generally +remain valid in these relay situations.

+
+

It is therefore critical that domains that publish "p=reject" +MUST NOT rely solely on SPF to secure a DMARC pass, and +MUST apply valid DKIM signatures to their messages.

+
+

In the case of domains that have general users who send routine email, +those that publish a Domain Owner Assessment Policy +of "p=reject" are likely to create significant interoperability +issues. In particular, if users in such domains post messages to mailing +lists on the Internet, those messages can cause significant operational problems +for the mailing lists and for the subscribers to those lists, as explained below and +in [RFC7960].

+
+

It is therefore critical that domains that host users who might +post messages to mailing lists SHOULD NOT publish Domain Owner Assessment Policies +of "p=reject". Any such domains wishing to publish "p=reject" SHOULD first +take advantage of DMARC aggregate report data for their domain to +determine the possible impact to their users, first by publishing +"p=none" for at least a month, followed by publishing "p=quarantine" for +an equally long period of time, and comparing the message disposition +results. Domains that choose to publish "p=reject" SHOULD either +implement policies that their users not post to Internet mailing lists +and/or inform their users that their participation in mailing lists may +be hindered.

+
+

As noted in Section 5.4, Mail Receivers +need to apply more analysis than just DMARC validation in their +disposition of incoming messages. An example of the consequences of +honoring a Domain Owner Assessment Policy of "p=reject" without further analysis +is that rejecting messages that have been relayed by a mailing list can cause +the Mail Receiver's users to have their subscriptions to that mailing list canceled +by the list software's automated handling of such rejections - it looks +to the list manager as though the recipient's email address is no +longer working, so the address is automatically unsubscribed. An example of this +scenario, albeit with DKIM Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP) rather than DMARC, +can be found in Section 5.2 of [RFC6377].

+
+

It is therefore critical that Mail Receivers MUST NOT reject +incoming messages solely on the basis of a "p=reject" policy by +the sending domain. Mail Receivers must use the DMARC +policy as part of their disposition decision, along with other +knowledge and analysis. "Other knowledge and analysis" here might +refer to observed sending patterns for properly-authenticated mail +using the sending domain, content filtering, etc. In the absence of +other knowledge and analysis, Mail Receivers MUST treat such failing +mail as if the policy were "p=quarantine" rather than "p=reject".

+
+

Failure to understand and abide by these considerations can cause +legitimate, sometimes important email to be rejected, can cause +operational damage to mailing lists throughout the Internet, and +can result in trouble-desk calls and complaints from the Mail Receiver's +employees, customers, and clients.

+

In practice, despite this advice, few Mail Receivers apply any mitigation +techniques when receiving indirect mail flows, few organizations consider +the effect of DMARC policies on their users' indirect mail, and it is unlikely +that any advice in this document will change that. As a result, mail forwarded +through mailing lists with unmodified From: header lines is frequently rejected +due to a p=reject policy.

+

In the ten years since large consumer mail systems started publishing p=reject +policies, mailing list software has all adopted workarounds to make the From: +header line DMARC aligned. Some simply use the list's address, while others do +per-address modifications intended to be reversible or to allow mail to be +forwarded back to the original author, e.g., bob@example.com turned into +bob=example.com@user.somelist.example. While these workarounds are far from +ideal, they are firmly established and list operators treat them as a fact of life.

+

Mail developers have been trying for a decade to invent technical methods +to allow mailing lists to continue to work without modifying the From: header +line, with a prominent example being the Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) +protocol described in [RFC8617]. While work continues, as of this document's +publication, none of the methods have become widely used. Should such a technical +method achieve widespread adoption in the future, this document can be updated to +reflect that.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+8. IANA Considerations +

+

This section describes actions completed by IANA.

+
+
+

+8.1. Authentication-Results Method Registry Update +

+

IANA has added the following to the "Email Authentication Methods" +registry:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+Table 3: +"Authentication-Results Method Registry Update" +
MethodDefinedptypePropertyValueStatusVersion
dmarc[this document]headerfromthe domain portion of the RFC5322.From header fieldactive1
dmarc[this document]policydmarcEvaluated DMARC policy applied/to be applied after policy options including pct: and sp: have been processed. Must be none, quarantine, or reject.active1
+
+
+
+
+

+8.2. Authentication-Results Result Registry Update +

+

IANA has added the following in the "Email Authentication Result +Names" registry:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+Table 4: +"Authentication-Results Result Registry Update" +
Auth Method(s)CodeSpecificationStatus
dmarcfail[this document]active
dmarcnone[this document]active
dmarcpass[this document]active
dmarcpermerror[this document]active
dmarctemperror[this document]active
+
+
+
+
+

+8.3. Feedback Report Header Fields Registry Update +

+

The following has been added to the "Feedback Report Header Fields" +registry:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+Table 5: +"Feedback Report Header Fields" +
Field NameDescriptionMultiple ApperancesRelated "Feedback-Type"ReferenceStatus
Identity-Alignmentindicates whether the message about which a report is being generated had any identifiers in alignmentNoauth-failure[this document]current
+
+
+
+
+

+8.4. DMARC Tag Registry +

+

A registry tree called "Domain-based Message Authentication, +Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Parameters" exists, and it +and any sub-registries thereunder should be updated to reference +this document. Within it, a new sub-registry called the "DMARC +Tag Registry" exists.

+

Names of DMARC tags are registered with IANA in this sub-registry. Entries +are assigned only for values that have been documented in a manner that +satisfies the terms of Specification Required, per [RFC8126]. Each +registration includes the tag name; the specification that defines it; +a brief description; and its status, which is one of "current", "experimental", +or "historic". The Designated Expert needs to confirm that the provided +specification adequately describes the new tag and clearly presents +how it would be used within the DMARC context by Domain Owners and +Mail Receivers.

+

To avoid version compatibility issues, tags added to the DMARC +specification are to avoid changing the semantics of existing records +when processed by implementations conforming to prior specifications.

+

The set of entries to be defined in this registry is as follows:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+Table 6: +"DMARC Tag Registry" +
Tag NameReferenceStatusDescription
adkim[this document]currentDKIM alignment mode
aspf[this document]currentSPF alignment mode
fo[this document]currentFailure reporting options
np[this document]currentRequested handling policy for non-existent subdomains
p[this document]currentRequested handling policy
pct[this document]historicSampling rate
psd[this document]currentIndicates whether policy record is published by a Public Suffix Domain
rf[this document]historicFailure reporting format(s)
ri[this document]historicAggregate Reporting interval
rua[this document]currentReporting URI(s) for aggregate data
ruf[this document]currentReporting URI(s) for failure data
sp[this document]currentRequested handling policy for subdomains
t[this document]currentTest mode for the specified policy
v[this document]currentSpecification version
+
+
+
+
+

+8.5. DMARC Report Format Registry +

+

Also, within "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and +Conformance (DMARC) Parameters", a new sub-registry called "DMARC +Report Format Registry" exists and should be updated to reference +this document.

+

Names of DMARC failure reporting formats are registered with IANA +in this registry. New entries are assigned only for values that +satisfy the definition of Specification Required, per +[RFC8126]. In addition to a reference to a permanent +specification, each registration includes the format name, a +brief description, and its status, which must be one of "current", +"experimental", or "historic". The Designated Expert needs to +confirm that the provided specification adequately describes the +report format and clearly presents how it would be used within the +DMARC context by Domain Owners and Mail Receivers.

+

The entry in this registry is as follows:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+Table 7: +"DMARC Report Format Registry" +
Format NameReferenceStatusDescription
afrf[this document]currentAuthentication Failure Reporting Format (see [RFC6591])
+
+
+
+
+

+8.6. Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names Registry +

+

Per [RFC8552], please update the following entry to the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+Table 8: +"Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry +
RR Type_NODE NAMEReference
TXT_dmarc[this document]
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+9. Privacy Considerations +

+

This section discusses issues specific to private data that may be +included if DMARC reports are requested. Issues associated with +sending aggregate reports and failure reports are addressed in +[I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and +[I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] respectively.

+
+
+

+9.1. Aggregate Report Considerations +

+

Aggregate reports may, particularly for small organizations, provide some +limited insight into email sending patterns. As an example, in a small +organization, an aggregate report from a particular domain may be sufficient +to make the report receiver aware of sensitive personal or business +information. If setting an "rua" tag in a DMARC Policy Record, the reporting +address needs controls appropriate to the organizational requirements to +mitigate any risk associated with receiving and handling reports.

+

In the case of "rua" requests for multi-organizational PSDs, additional +information leakage considerations exist. Multi-organizational PSDs that +do not mandate DMARC use by registrants risk exposure of private data of +registrant domains if they include the "rua" tag in their DMARC Policy Record.

+
+
+
+
+

+9.2. Failure Report Considerations +

+

Failure reports do provide insight into email sending patterns, including +specific users. If requesting failure reports, data management controls +are needed to support appropriate management of this information. The +additional detail available through failure reports (relative to aggregate +reports) can drive a need for additional controls. As an example, a +company may be legally restricted from receiving data related to a specific +subsidiary. Before requesting failure reports, any such data spillage risks +have to be addressed through data management controls or publishing DMARC +Policy Records for relevant subdomains to prevent reporting on data related to +their emails.

+

Due to the nature of the email contents which may be shared through Failure +Reports, most Mail Receivers refuse to send them out of privacy concerns. Out +of band agreements between Report Consumers and Mail Receivers may be required +to address these concerns.

+

DMARC Policy Records for multi-organizational PSDs MUST NOT include the "ruf" tag.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+10. Security Considerations +

+

This section discusses security issues and possible remediations +(where available) for DMARC.

+
+
+

+10.1. Authentication Methods +

+

Security considerations from the authentication methods used by DMARC +are incorporated here by reference.

+

Both of the email authentication methods that underlie DMARC provide some +assurance that an email was transmitted by an MTA which is authorized to +do so. SPF policies map domain names to sets of authorized MTAs (see Section 11.4 of [RFC7208]). +Validated DKIM signatures indicate that an email was transmitted by an MTA with +access to a private key that matches the published DKIM key record.

+

Whenever mail is sent, there is a risk that an overly permissive source +may send mail that will receive a DMARC pass result that was not, in fact, +intended by the Domain Owner. These results may lead to issues when +systems interpret DMARC pass results to indicate a message is in some way +authentic. They also allow such unauthorized senders to evade the Domain +Owner's intended message handling for DMARC validation failures.

+

To avoid this risk one must ensure that no unauthorized source can add +DKIM signatures to the domain's mail or transmit mail which will evaluate +as SPF pass. If, nonetheless, a Domain Owner wishes to include a +permissive source in a domain's SPF record, the source can be excluded +from DMARC consideration by using the "?" qualifier on the SPF record +mechanism associated with that source.

+
+
+
+
+

+10.2. Attacks on Reporting URIs +

+

URIs published in DNS TXT records are well-understood possible +targets for attack. Specifications such as [RFC1035] and +[RFC2142] either expose or cause the exposure of email addresses that +could be flooded by an attacker, for example. Records found in the DNS such as MX, NS, +and others advertise potential attack destinations. Common DNS names such +as "www" plainly identify the locations at which particular services can +be found, providing destinations for targeted denial-of-service or +penetration attacks. This all means that Domain Owners will need to harden +these addresses against various attacks, including but not limited to:

+
    +
  • +

    high-volume denial-of-service attacks;

    +
    • +
  • +

    deliberate construction of malformed reports intended to identify +or exploit parsing or processing vulnerabilities;

    +
    • +
  • +

    deliberate construction of reports containing false claims for the +Submitter or Reported-Domain fields, including the possibility of +false data from compromised but known Mail Receivers.

    +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+

+10.3. DNS Security +

+

The DMARC mechanism and its underlying Authentication Mechanisms (SPF and DKIM) +depend on the security of the DNS. Examples of how hostile parties can +have an adverse impact on DNS traffic include:

+
    +
  • +

    If they can snoop on DNS traffic, they can get an idea of who is +receiving mail using the domain(s) in question.

    +
    • +
  • +

    If they can block outgoing or reply DNS messages, they can prevent +systems from discovering senders' DMARC policies.

    +
    • +
  • +

    If they can send forged response packets, they can make aligned mail +appear unaligned or vice-versa.

    +
    • +
+

None of these threats are unique to DMARC, and they can be addressed using +a variety of techniques, including, but not limited to:

+
    +
  • +

    Signing DNS records with Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], +which enables recipients to validate the integrity of DNS data and detect and discard +forged responses.

    +
    • +
  • +

    DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DNS over HTTPS [RFC8484] can mitigate snooping +and forged responses.

    +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+

+10.4. Display Name Attacks +

+

An increasingly common attack in messaging abuse is the presentation of false +information in the display-name portion of the RFC5322.From header field. +For example, it is possible for the email address in that field to be +an arbitrary address or domain name while containing a well-known +name (a person, brand, role, etc.) in the display name, intending to +fool the end user into believing that the name is used legitimately.

+

Such attacks, known as display name attacks, are out of scope for DMARC.

+
+
+
+
+

+10.5. Denial of DMARC Processing Attacks +

+

The declaration in Section 5.3.1 and elsewhere in this document +that messages that do not contain precisely one RFC5322.From domain are +outside the scope of this document exposes an attack vector that must be +taken into consideration.

+

Because such messages are outside the scope of this document, an attacker +can craft messages with multiple RFC5322.From domains, including the spoofed +domain, in an effort to bypass DMARC validation and get the fraudulent message +to be displayed by the victim's MUA with the spoofed domain successfully shown +to the victim. In those cases where such messages are not rejected due to other +reasons (for example, many such messages would violate RFC5322's requirement that +there be precisely one From: header field), care must be taken by the Mail Receiver +to recognize such messages as the threats they might be and handle them +appropriately.

+

The case of a syntactically valid multi-valued RFC5322.From field presents a +particular challenge. Experience has shown that most such messages are abusive +and/or unwanted by their recipients, and given this fact, a Mail Receiver may make a +negative disposition decision for the message prior to and instead of its being +subjected to DMARC processing. However, in a case where a Mail Receiver requires +that the message be subject to DMARC validation, a recommended approach as per +[RFC7489] is to apply the DMARC mechanism to each domain found in the RFC5322.From +field as the Author Domain and apply the most strict policy selected among the +checks that fail. Such an approach might prove useful for a small number of +Author Domains, but it is possible that applying such logic to messages with +a large number of domains (where "large" is defined by each Mail Receiver) will +expose the Mail Receiver to a form of denial of service attack. Limiting the number of +Author Domains processed will avoid this risk. If not all Author Domains are +processed, then the DMARC evaluation is incomplete.

+
+
+
+
+

+10.6. External Reporting Addresses +

+

To avoid abuse by bad actors, reporting addresses generally have to +be inside the domains about which reports are requested. To +accommodate special cases such as a need to get reports about domains +that cannot actually receive mail, Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] describes +a DNS-based mechanism for validating approved external reporting.

+

The obvious consideration here is an increased DNS load against +domains that are claimed as external recipients. Negative caching +will mitigate this problem, but only to a limited extent, mostly +dependent on the default TTL in the domain's SOA record.

+

Where possible, external reporting is best achieved by having the +report be directed to domains that can receive mail and simply having +it automatically forwarded to the desired external destination.

+

Note that the addresses shown in the "ruf" tag receive more +information that might be considered private data since it is +possible for actual email content to appear in the failure reports. +The URIs identified there are thus more attractive targets for +intrusion attempts than those found in the "rua" tag. Moreover, +attacking the DNS of the subject domain to cause failure data to be +routed fraudulently to an attacker's systems may be an attractive +prospect. Deployment of DNSSEC [RFC4033] is advisable if this is a concern.

+
+
+
+
+

+10.7. Secure Protocols +

+

This document encourages the use of secure transport mechanisms to +prevent the loss of private data to third parties that may be able to +monitor such transmissions. Unencrypted mechanisms should be +avoided.

+

In particular, a message that was originally encrypted or otherwise +secured might appear in a report that is not sent securely, which +could reveal private information.

+
+
+
+
+

+10.8. Relaxed Alignment Considerations +

+

The DMARC mechanism allows both DKIM- and SPF-Authenticated Identifiers +to validate authorized use of an Author Domain on behalf of a Domain Owner. If malicious or unaware users can gain control of the SPF record or DKIM selector +records for a subdomain of the Organizational Domain, the subdomain can be used to generate email +that achieves a DMARC pass on behalf of the Organizational Domain.

+

A scenario such as this could occur under the following conditions:

+
    +
  • A DMARC record exists for the domain "example.com", such that "example.com" is an Organizational Domain +
    • +
  • An attacker controls DNS for the domain "evil.example.com" and publishes an SPF record for that domain +
    • +
  • The attacker sends email with RFC5322.From header field containing "foo@example.com" and an SPF-Authenticated Identifier of "evil.example.com" +
    • +
+

Although this email was not authorized by the Domain Owner, it can produce a DMARC pass because the SPF-Authenticated Identifier +("evil.example.com") has Identifier Alignment with the Author Domain ("example.com").

+

The Organizational Domain Owner should be careful not to delegate control of subdomains if this is an +issue, and consider using the Strict Alignment option if appropriate.

+

DMARC evaluation for relaxed alignment is also highly sensitive to errors in +determining the Organizational Domain if the Author Domain does not have a published +DMARC Policy Record. If an incorrectly selected Organizational +Domain is a parent of the correct Organizational Domain, then relaxed alignment could +potentially allow a malicious sender to send mail that achieves a DMARC pass verdict. +This potential exists for both the legacy [RFC7489] and current methods for determining +the organizational domain, the latter described in Section 4.10.2.

+

The following example illustrates this possibility:

+
    +
  • Mail is sent with an Author Domain of "a.mail.example.com" and Authenticated Identifiers of "mail.example.com" +
    • +
  • There is no DMARC Policy Record published at "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com" +
    • +
  • There is one published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" and this is intended to be the Organizataional Domain for this message +
    • +
  • There is also a DMARC Policy Record published at "_dmarc.example.com", with default alignment (relaxed) +
    • +
  • An is able to send mail with the Author Domain of "evil.example.com" and an Authenticated Identifier of "mail.example.com" +
    • +
+

In this scenario, if a Mail Receiver incorrectly determines the Organizational Domain to be "example.com", +then the attacker's mail will pass DMARC validation checks.

+

This issue is entirely avoided by the use of Strict Alignment and publishing explicit +DMARC Policy Records for all Author Domains used in an organization's email.

+

For cases where Strict Alignment is not appropriate, this issue can be mitigated by the Domain +Owner periodically (perhaps weekly, or whatever frequency might be appropriate for a given organization's +perational needs) checking the DMARC Policy Records, if any, of PSDs +above the Organizational Domain in the DNS tree and (for legacy [RFC7489] checking that +appropriate PSL entries remain present). If a PSD publishes a DMARC Policy Record without +the appropriate "psd=y" tag, Organizational Domain owners can add "psd=n" to their Organizational +Domain's DMARC Policy Record so that the PSD's DMARC Policy Record will not be incorrectly +interpreted to indicate that the PSD is the Organizational Domain.

+
+
+
+
+
+

+11. References +

+
+

+11.1. Normative References +

+
+
[I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]
+
+Brotman, A., "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Aggregate Reporting", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting-21, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting-21>.
+
+
[I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]
+
+Jones, S. M. and A. Vesely, "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Failure Reporting", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting-11, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting-11>.
+
+
[RFC1035]
+
+Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
+
+
[RFC2119]
+
+Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
+
+
[RFC3986]
+
+Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
+
+
[RFC4343]
+
+Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity Clarification", RFC 4343, DOI 10.17487/RFC4343, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4343>.
+
+
[RFC5234]
+
+Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
+
+
[RFC5321]
+
+Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.
+
+
[RFC5322]
+
+Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322, DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.
+
+
[RFC5890]
+
+Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework", RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.
+
+
[RFC6376]
+
+Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed., "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76, RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6376>.
+
+
[RFC6377]
+
+Kucherawy, M., "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) and Mailing Lists", BCP 167, RFC 6377, DOI 10.17487/RFC6377, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6377>.
+
+
[RFC6591]
+
+Fontana, H., "Authentication Failure Reporting Using the Abuse Reporting Format", RFC 6591, DOI 10.17487/RFC6591, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6591>.
+
+
[RFC6651]
+
+Kucherawy, M., "Extensions to DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) for Failure Reporting", RFC 6651, DOI 10.17487/RFC6651, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6651>.
+
+
[RFC6652]
+
+Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) Authentication Failure Reporting Using the Abuse Reporting Format", RFC 6652, DOI 10.17487/RFC6652, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6652>.
+
+
[RFC7208]
+
+Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1", RFC 7208, DOI 10.17487/RFC7208, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7208>.
+
+
[RFC7405]
+
+Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF", RFC 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7405>.
+
+
[RFC7489]
+
+Kucherawy, M., Ed. and E. Zwicky, Ed., "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)", RFC 7489, DOI 10.17487/RFC7489, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7489>.
+
+
[RFC7960]
+
+Martin, F., Ed., Lear, E., Ed., Draegen, T., Ed., Zwicky, E., Ed., and K. Andersen, Ed., "Interoperability Issues between Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) and Indirect Email Flows", RFC 7960, DOI 10.17487/RFC7960, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7960>.
+
+
[RFC8552]
+
+Crocker, D., "Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves", BCP 222, RFC 8552, DOI 10.17487/RFC8552, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8552>.
+
+
[RFC8601]
+
+Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for Indicating Message Authentication Status", RFC 8601, DOI 10.17487/RFC8601, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8601>.
+
+
+
+
+

+11.2. Informative References +

+
+
[M3AUTH]
+
+"M3AAWG Email Authentication Recommended Best Practices", <https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf>.
+
+
[M3SPF]
+
+"M3AAWG Best Practices for Managing SPF Records", <https://www.m3aawg.org/Managing-SPF-Records>.
+
+
[RFC2142]
+
+Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>.
+
+
[RFC2308]
+
+Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
+
+
[RFC3464]
+
+Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message Format for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464, DOI 10.17487/RFC3464, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3464>.
+
+
[RFC4033]
+
+Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
+
+
[RFC4870]
+
+Delany, M., "Domain-Based Email Authentication Using Public Keys Advertised in the DNS (DomainKeys)", RFC 4870, DOI 10.17487/RFC4870, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4870>.
+
+
[RFC5598]
+
+Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598, DOI 10.17487/RFC5598, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5598>.
+
+
[RFC7858]
+
+Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D., and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
+
+
[RFC8020]
+
+Bortzmeyer, S. and S. Huque, "NXDOMAIN: There Really Is Nothing Underneath", RFC 8020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8020, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8020>.
+
+
[RFC8126]
+
+Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
+
+
[RFC8174]
+
+Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
+
+
[RFC8484]
+
+Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
+
+
[RFC8551]
+
+Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0 Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.
+
+
[RFC8617]
+
+Andersen, K., Long, B., Ed., Blank, S., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed., "The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) Protocol", RFC 8617, DOI 10.17487/RFC8617, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8617>.
+
+
[RFC9091]
+
+Kitterman, S. and T. Wicinski, Ed., "Experimental Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Extension for Public Suffix Domains", RFC 9091, DOI 10.17487/RFC9091, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9091>.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+Appendix A. Technology Considerations +

+

This section documents some design decisions made in the +development of DMARC. Specifically addressed here are some +suggestions that were considered but not included in the design, +with explanatory text regarding the decision.

+
+
+

+A.1. S/MIME +

+

S/MIME, or Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions [RFC8551], +is a standard for encrypting and signing MIME data in a message. This +was suggested and considered as a third security protocol for +authenticating the source of a message.

+

DMARC is focused on authentication at the domain level (i.e., the +Domain Owner taking responsibility for the message), while S/MIME is +really intended for user-to-user authentication and encryption. This +alone appears to make it a bad fit for DMARC's goals.

+

S/MIME also suffers from the heavyweight problem of Public Key +Infrastructure, which means that distribution of keys used to validate +signatures needs to be incorporated. In many instances, this alone +is a showstopper. There have been consistent promises that PKI +usability and deployment will improve, but these have yet to +materialize. DMARC can revisit this choice after those barriers are +addressed.

+

S/MIME has extensive deployment in specific market segments +(government, for example) but does not enjoy similar widespread +deployment over the general Internet, and this shows no signs of +changing. DKIM and SPF are both deployed widely over the general +Internet, and their adoption rates continue to be positive.

+

Finally, experiments have shown that including S/MIME support in the +initial version of DMARC would neither cause nor enable a substantial +increase in the accuracy of the overall mechanism.

+
+
+
+
+

+A.2. Method Exclusion +

+

It was suggested that DMARC include a mechanism by which a Domain +Owner could instruct Mail Receivers not to attempt validation by one +of the supported methods (e.g., "check DKIM, but not SPF").

+

Specifically, consider a Domain Owner that has deployed one of the +technologies and that technology fails for some messages, but such +failures don't cause enforcement action. Deploying DMARC would cause +enforcement action for policies other than "none", which would appear +to exclude participation by that Domain Owner.

+

The DMARC development team evaluated the idea of policy exception +mechanisms on several occasions and invariably concluded that there +was not a strong enough use case to include them. The target audience +for DMARC does not appear to have concerns about the failure modes of +one or the other being a barrier to DMARC's adoption.

+

In the scenario described above, the Domain Owner has a few options:

+
    +
  1. +

    Tighten up its infrastructure to minimize the failure modes of +the single deployed technology.

    +
    2. +
  2. +

    Deploy the other supported authentication mechanism, to offset +the failure modes of the first.

    +
    3. +
  3. +

    Deploy DMARC in a reporting-only mode.

    +
    4. +
+
+
+
+
+

+A.3. Sender Header Field +

+

It has been suggested in several message authentication efforts that +the Sender header field be checked for an identifier of interest, as +the standards indicate this as the proper way to indicate a +re-mailing of content such as through a mailing list. Most recently, +it was a protocol-level option for DomainKeys [RFC4870], but on evolution to +DKIM, this property was removed.

+

The DMARC development team considered this and decided not to include +support for doing so for the following reasons:

+
    +
  1. +

    The main user protection approach is to be concerned with what +the user sees when a message is rendered. There is no consistent +behavior among MUAs regarding what to do with the content of the +Sender field, if present. Accordingly, supporting the checking of +the Sender identifier would mean applying policy to an identifier +the end user might never actually see, which can create a vector +for attack against end users by simply forging a Sender field +containing some identifier that DMARC will like.

    +
    2. +
  2. +

    Although it is certainly true that this is what the Sender field +is for, its use in this way is also unreliable, making it a poor +candidate for inclusion in the DMARC evaluation algorithm.

    +
    3. +
  3. +

    Allowing multiple ways to discover policy introduces unacceptable +ambiguity into the DMARC validation algorithm in terms of which +policy is to be applied and when.

    +
    4. +
+
+
+
+
+

+A.4. Domain Existence Test +

+

The presence of the "np" tag in this specification seemingly implies that +there would be an agreed-upon standard for determining a domain's existence.

+

Since the DMARC mechanism is focused on email, one might think that the +definition of "resolvable" in [RFC5321] applies. Using that definition, only +names that resolve to MX Resource Records (RRs), A RRs, or AAAA RRs are deemed +to be resolvable and to exist in the DNS. This is a common practice among Mail +Receivers to determine whether or not to accept a mail message before performing +other more expensive processing.

+

The DMARC mechanism makes no such requirement for the existence of specific DNS +RRs in order for a domain to exist; instead, if any RR exists for a domain, then +the domain exists. To use the terminology from [RFC2308], an "NXDOMAIN" response +(rcode "Name Error") to a DNS query means that the domain name does not exist, +while a "NODATA" response (rcode "NOERROR") means that the given resource record +type queried for does not exist, but the domain name does.

+

Furthermore, in keeping with [RFC8020], if a query for a name returns NXDOMAIN, +then not only does the name not exist, every name below it in the DNS hierarchy +also does not exist.

+
+
+
+
+

+A.5. Organizational Domain Discovery Issues +

+

An earlier informational version of the DMARC mechanism [RFC7489] +noted that the DNS does not provide a method by which the "domain of record", +or the domain that was actually registered with a domain registrar, can +be determined given an arbitrary domain name. That version further mentioned +suggestions that have been made that attempt to glean such information from +SOA or NS resource records, but these too are not fully reliable, as the +partitioning of the DNS is not always done at administrative boundaries.

+

That previous version posited that one could "climb the tree" to find the +Organizational Domain, but expressed concern that an attacker could exploit +this for a denial-of-service attack through sending a high number of messages +each with a relatively large number of nonsense labels, causing a Mail Receiver +to perform a large number of DNS queries in search of a DMARC Policy Record. This +version defines a method for performing a DNS Tree Walk, +and further mitigates the risk of the denial-of-service attack by expressly limiting +the number of DNS queries to execute regardless of the number of labels in the domain +name.

+

Readers curious about the previous method for Organizational Domain Discovery are +directed to Section 3.2 of [RFC7489].

+
+
+
+
+

+A.6. Removal of the "pct" Tag +

+

An earlier informational version of the DMARC mechanism [RFC7489] +included a "pct" tag and specified all integers from 0 to 100 inclusive +as valid values for the tag. The intent of the tag was to provide domain +owners with a method to gradually change their preferred Domain Owner Assessment +Policy (the "p" tag) from "none" to "quarantine" or from "quarantine" to "reject" +by requesting the stricter treatment for just a percentage of messages +that produced DMARC results of "fail".

+

Operational experience showed that the pct tag was usually not accurately +applied, unless the value specified was either 0 or 100 (the default), +and the inaccuracies with other values varied widely from one implementation to +another. The default value was easily implemented, as it required no +special processing on the part of the Mail Receiver, while the value +of 0 took on unintended significance as a value used by some intermediaries +and mailbox providers as an indicator to deviate from standard handling of +the message, usually by rewriting the RFC5322.From header field in an effort to +avoid DMARC failures downstream.

+

These custom actions when the "pct" tag was set to 0 proved valuable to the +email community. In particular, header field rewriting by an intermediary meant +that a Domain Owner's aggregate reports could reveal to the Domain Owner +how much of its traffic was routing through intermediaries that don't rewrite +the RFC5322.From header field. Such information wasn't explicit in the aggregate +reports received; rather, sussing it out required work on the part of the Domain +Owner to compare aggregate reports from before and after the "p" value was changed +and "pct=0" was included in the DMARC Policy Record, but the data was there. +Consequently, knowing how much mail was subject to possible DMARC failure due to +a lack of RFC5322.From header field rewriting by intermediaries could assist the +Domain Owner in choosing whether to move from Monitoring Mode +to Enforcement. Armed with this knowledge, the Domain Owner could +make an informed decision regarding subjecting its mail traffic to possible DMARC +failures based on the Domain Owner's tolerance for such things.

+

Because of the value provided by "pct=0" to Domain Owners, it was logical +to keep this functionality in the protocol; at the same time, it didn't make +sense to support a tag named "pct" that had only two valid values. This version +of the DMARC mechanism, therefore, introduces the "t" tag as shorthand for "testing", +with the valid values of "y" and "n", which are meant to be analogous in their +application by mailbox providers and intermediaries to the "pct" tag values +"0" and "100", respectively.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+Appendix B. Examples +

+

This section illustrates both the Domain Owner side and the Mail +Receiver side of a DMARC exchange.

+
+
+

+B.1. Identifier Alignment Examples +

+

The following examples illustrate the DMARC mechanism's use of +Identifier Alignment. For brevity's sake, only message header fields and +relevant SMTP commands are shown, as message bodies are not considered +when conducting DMARC checks.

+
+
+

+B.1.1. SPF +

+

The following SPF examples assume that SPF produces a passing result. +Alignment cannot exist if SPF does not produce a passing result.

+

Example 1: SPF in Strict Alignment:

+
+
     MAIL FROM: <sender@example.com>
+
+     From: sender@example.com
+     Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
+     To: receiver@example.org
+     Subject: here's a sample
+
+
+

In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom domain and the Author Domain are identical. +Thus, the identifiers are in Strict Alignment.

+

Example 2: SPF in Relaxed Alignment:

+
+
     MAIL FROM: <sender@child.example.com>
+
+     From: sender@example.com
+     Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
+     To: receiver@example.org
+     Subject: here's a sample
+
+
+

In this case, the Author Domain (example.com) is a parent of the +RFC5321.MailFrom domain. Thus, the identifiers are in relaxed alignment +because they both have the same Organizational Domain (example.com).

+

Example 3: No SPF Identifier Alignment:

+
+
     MAIL FROM: <sender@example.net>
+
+     From: sender@child.example.com
+     Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
+     To: receiver@example.org
+     Subject: here's a sample
+
+
+

In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom domain that is neither the same as, +a parent of, nor a child of the Author Domain. Thus, the identifiers +are not in alignment.

+
+
+
+
+

+B.1.2. DKIM +

+

The examples below assume that the DKIM signatures pass validation. +Alignment cannot exist with a DKIM signature that does not validate.

+

Example 1: DKIM in Strict Alignment:

+
+
     DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.com; ...
+     From: sender@example.com
+     Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
+     To: receiver@example.org
+     Subject: here's a sample
+
+
+

In this case, the DKIM "d" tag and the Author Domain have +identical DNS domains. Thus, the identifiers are in Strict Alignment.

+

Example 2: DKIM in Relaxed Alignment:

+
+
     DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.com; ...
+     From: sender@child.example.com
+     Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
+     To: receiver@example.org
+     Subject: here's a sample
+
+
+

In this case, the DKIM signature's "d" tag includes a DNS +domain that is a parent of the Author Domain. Thus, the +identifiers are in relaxed alignment, as they have the same +Organizational Domain (example.com).

+

Example 3: No DKIM Identifier Alignment:

+
+
     DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.net; ...
+     From: sender@child.example.com
+     Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800
+     To: receiver@example.org
+     Subject: here's a sample
+
+
+

In this case, the DKIM signature's "d" tag includes a DNS +domain that is neither the same as, a parent of, nor a child of the +Author Domain. Thus, the identifiers are not in alignment.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+B.2. Domain Owner Example +

+

A Domain Owner that wants to use DMARC should have already deployed +and tested SPF and DKIM. The next step is to publish a DMARC Policy +Record for the Domain Owner's Organizational Domain.

+
+
+

+B.2.1. Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode +

+

The Domain Owner for "example.com" has deployed SPF and DKIM on +its messaging infrastructure. The Domain Owner wishes to begin using DMARC +with a policy that will solicit aggregate feedback from Mail Receivers +without affecting how the messages are processed in order to:

+
    +
  • +

    Confirm that its legitimate messages are authenticating correctly

    +
    • +
  • +

    Validate that all authorized message sources have implemented +authentication measures

    +
    • +
  • +

    Determine how many messages from other sources would be affected +by publishing a Domain Owner Assessment Policy at Enforcement

    +
    • +
+

The Domain Owner accomplishes this by constructing a DMARC Policy Record +indicating that:

+
    +
  • +

    The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1;")

    +
    • +
  • +

    Mail Receivers should not alter how they treat these messages because +of this DMARC Policy Record ("p=none")

    +
    • +
  • +

    Aggregate feedback reports are sent via email to the address +"dmarc-feedback@example.com" +("rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com")

    +
    • +
  • +

    All messages from this Organizational Domain are subject to this +policy (no "t" tag present, so the default of "n" applies).

    +
    • +
+

To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +creates an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format):

+
+
  ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain example.com
+  _dmarc  IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
+                   "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com" )
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+B.2.2. Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode, Per-Message Failure Reports +

+

The Domain Owner from the previous example has used the aggregate +reporting to discover some messaging systems that had not yet +implemented DKIM correctly, but they are still seeing periodic +authentication failures. To diagnose these intermittent +problems, they wish to request per-message failure reports when +authentication failures occur.

+

Not all Mail Receivers will honor such a request, but the Domain Owner +feels that any reports it does receive will be helpful enough to +justify publishing this record. The default per-message failure report +format ([RFC6591]) meets the Domain Owner's needs in this scenario.

+

The Domain Owner accomplishes this by adding the following to its +DMARC Policy Record from Appendix B.2.1:

+
    +
  • Per-message failure reports are sent via email to the +address "auth-reports@example.com" +("ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com") +
    • +
+

To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format):

+
+
  ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain example.com
+  _dmarc  IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
+                   "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
+                   "ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com" )
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+B.2.3. Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third Party +

+

The Domain Owner from the previous example is maintaining the same +policy but now wishes to have a third party serve as a Report Consumer. +Again, not all Mail Receivers will honor this request, but those that +do MUST implement additional checks to validate that the third party +authorizes reception of failure reports on behalf of this domain.

+

The Domain Owner needs to alter its DMARC Policy Record from Appendix B.2.2 +as follows:

+
    +
  • Per-message failure reports are sent via email to the +address "auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" +("ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net") +
    • +
+

To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format):

+
+
  ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain example.com
+  _dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
+                  "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
+                  "ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" )
+
+
+

Because the address used in the "ruf" tag is outside the Organizational Domain +in which this record is published, conforming Mail Receivers MUST implement +additional checks as described in Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. +To pass these additional checks, the Report Consumer's Domain Owner will need to +publish an additional DMARC Policy Record as follows:

+
    +
  • Given the DMARC Policy Record published by the Domain Owner at +"_dmarc.example.com", the DNS administrator for the Report Consumer +will need to publish a TXT resource record at +"example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net" with the value +"v=DMARC1;" to authorize receipt of the reports. +
    • +
+

To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might +create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format):

+
+
  ; zone file for thirdparty.example.net
+  ; Accept DMARC reports on behalf of example.com
+  example.com._report._dmarc   IN   TXT    "v=DMARC1;"
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+B.2.4. Overriding destination addresses +

+

The third party Report Consumer can also publish "rua" and "ruf" tags in order +to override the specific address published by example.com with a different +address in the same third party domain. This may be necessary if the third +party Report Consumer has changed its email address, or want to guard against +typos in the DMARC Policy Record of the Author Domain. Intermediaries and other +third parties should refer to Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] +for the full details of this mechanism.

+

The third party Report Consumer accomplishes this by adding the following to its +DMARC Policy Record from Appendix B.2.3:

+
    +
  • The override address for aggregate reports is +"aggregate-reports@thirdparty.example.net" +("rua=mailto:aggregate-reports@thirdparty.example.net") +
    • +
  • The override address for failure reports is +"failure-reports@thirdparty.example.net" +("ruf=mailto:failure-reports@thirdparty.example.net") +
    • +
+

To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might +create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format):

+
+
  ; zone file for thirdparty.example.net
+  ; Accept DMARC reports on behalf of example.com
+  ; Override destination mailboxes
+  example.com._report._dmarc   IN   TXT    (
+          "v=DMARC1; "
+          "rua=mailto:aggregate-reports@thirdparty.example.net; "
+          "ruf=mailto:failure-reports@thirdparty.example.net" )
+
+
+

In this case only the "ruf" tag is actually overridden, because, in the +previous example, failure reporting is the only reporting type that was +directed to the third party Report Consumer.

+
+
+
+
+

+B.2.5. Subdomain, Testing, and Multiple Aggregate Report URIs +

+

The Domain Owner has implemented SPF and DKIM in a subdomain used for +pre-production testing of messaging services. It now wishes to express +a handling preference for messages from this subdomain that fail DMARC validation +to indicate to participating Mail Receivers that use of this domain is not valid.

+

As a first step, it will express that it considers messages using this +subdomain that fail DMARC validation to be suspicious. The goal here +will be to enable examination of messages sent to mailboxes hosted by +participating Mail Receivers as a method for troubleshooting any existing +authentication issues. Aggregate feedback reports will be sent to +a mailbox within the Organizational Domain, and to a mailbox at a Report +Consumer selected and authorized to receive them by the Domain Owner.

+

The Domain Owner will accomplish this by constructing a DMARC Policy Record +indicating that:

+
    +
  • +

    The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1;")

    +
    • +
  • +

    It is applied only to this subdomain (the DMARC Policy Record is published at +"_dmarc.test.example.com" and not "_dmarc.example.com")

    +
    • +
  • +

    Mail Receivers are advised that the Domain Owner considers messages +that fail to authenticate to be suspicious ("p=quarantine")

    +
    • +
  • +

    Aggregate feedback reports are sent via email to the +addresses "dmarc-feedback@example.com" and +"example-tld-test@thirdparty.example.net" +("rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com, + mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net")

    +
    • +
  • +

    The Domain Owner desires only that an actor performing a DMARC +validation check apply any special handling rules it might have +in place, such as rewriting the RFC53322.From header field; the Domain +Owner is testing its setup at this point and so does not want +the handling policy to be applied. ("t=y")

    +
    • +
+

To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone +file (following the conventional zone file format):

+
+
  ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain test.example.com
+  _dmarc IN  TXT  ( "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; "
+                    "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,"
+                    "mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net; "
+                    "t=y" )
+
+
+

Once enough time has passed to allow for collecting enough reports to +give the Domain Owner confidence that all authorized email sent using +the subdomain is properly authenticating and passing DMARC validation checks, +then the Domain Owner can update the DMARC Policy Record to indicate that it considers +validation failures to be a clear indication that use of the subdomain +is not valid. It would do this by altering the record to advise Mail Receivers +of its position on such messages ("p=reject") and removing the testing flag ("t=y").

+

To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone +file (following the conventional zone file format):

+
+
  ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain test.example.com
+  _dmarc IN  TXT  ( "v=DMARC1; p=reject; "
+                    "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com,"
+                    "mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net" )
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+B.3. Mail Receiver Example +

+

A Mail Receiver that wants to participate in DMARC should already be checking +SPF and DKIM, and possess the ability to collect relevant information +from various email-processing stages to provide feedback to Domain +Owners (possibly via Report Consumers).

+
+
+

+B.3.1. SMTP Session Example +

+

An optimal DMARC-enabled Mail Receiver performs validation and +Identifier Alignment checking during the SMTP [RFC5321] conversation.

+

Before returning a final reply to the DATA command, the Mail +Receiver's MTA has performed:

+
    +
  1. +

    An SPF check to determine an SPF-Authenticated Identifier.

    +
    2. +
  2. +

    DKIM checks that yield one or more DKIM-Authenticated +Identifiers.

    +
    3. +
  3. +

    A DMARC Policy Record lookup.

    +
    4. +
+

The presence of an Author Domain DMARC Policy Record indicates that the Mail +Receiver should continue with DMARC-specific processing before returning a +reply to the DATA command.

+

Given a DMARC Policy Record and the set of Authenticated Identifiers, the +Mail Receiver checks to see if the Authenticated Identifiers align +with the Author Domain (taking into consideration any strict versus +relaxed options found in the DMARC Policy Record).

+

For example, the following sample data is considered to be from a +piece of email originating from the Domain Owner of "example.com":

+
+
  Author Domain: example.com
+  SPF-authenticated Identifier: mail.example.com
+  DKIM-authenticated Identifier: example.com
+  DMARC Policy Record:
+    "v=DMARC1; p=reject; aspf=r;
+     rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com"
+
+
+

In the above sample, the SPF-Authenticated Identifier and the +DKIM-Authenticated Identifier both align with the Author Domain. The +Mail Receiver considers the above email to pass the DMARC check, avoiding +the "reject" policy that is requested to be applied to email that fails +the DMARC validation check.

+

If no Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author Domain, then +the Mail Receiver applies the Domain Owner Assessment Policy. However, +before this action is taken, the Mail Receiver can consult external +information to override the Domain Owner Assessment Policy. For example, +if the Mail Receiver knows that this particular email came +from a known and trusted forwarder (that happens to break both SPF +and DKIM), then the Mail Receiver may choose to ignore the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy.

+

The Mail Receiver is now ready to reply to the DATA command. If the +DMARC check yields that the message is to be rejected, then the Mail +Receiver replies with a 5xy code to inform the sender of failure. If +the DMARC check cannot be resolved due to transient network errors, +then the Mail Receiver replies with a 4xy code to inform the sender +as to the need to reattempt delivery later. If the DMARC check +yields a passing message, then the Mail Receiver continues with +email processing, perhaps using the result of the DMARC check as an +input to additional processing modules such as a domain reputation +query.

+

Before exiting DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver checks to +see if the Author Domain DMARC Policy Record requests AFRF-based reporting. +If so, then the Mail Receiver can emit an AFRF to the reporting +address supplied in the DMARC Policy Record.

+

At the exit of DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver captures +(through logging or direct insertion into a data store) the result of +DMARC processing. Captured information is used to build feedback for +Domain Owner consumption. This is unnecessary if the Domain Owner +has not requested aggregate reports, i.e., no "rua" tag was found in +the policy record.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+B.4. Organizational and Policy Domain Tree Walk Examples +

+

If an Author Domain has no DMARC Policy Record, a Mail Receiver uses a tree walk +to find the DMARC Policy.

+

If the DMARC Policy Record allows relaxed alignment and the SPF- or DKIM-Authenticated +Identifiers are different from the Author Domain, a Mail Receiver uses a tree walk to +discover the respective Organizational Domains to determine Identifier Alignment.

+
+
+

+B.4.1. Simple Organizational and Policy Example +

+

A Mail Receiver receives an email with:

+
    +
  • Author Domain: example.com +
    • +
  • RFC5321.MailFrom Domain: example.com +
    • +
  • DKIM-Authenticated Identifier: signing.example.com +
    • +
+

In this example, "_dmarc.example.com" and "_dmarc.signing.example.com" both +have DMARC Policy Records while "_dmarc.com" does not. If SPF or DKIM yield pass +results, they still have to be aligned to support a DMARC pass. Since +not all domains are the same, if the alignment is relaxed then the tree +walk is performed to determine the Organizational Domain for each.

+

To determine the Organizational Domain for the Author Domain, +query "_dmarc.example.com" and "_dmarc.com"; "example.com" is the last +element of the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy Record, so it is the Organizational +Domain for "example.com".

+

For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain, the Organizational Domain already found for +"example.com" is "example.com", so SPF is aligned.

+

To determine the Organizational Domain for the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier, +query "_dmarc.signing.example.com", "_dmarc.example.com", and "_dmarc.com". +Both "signing.example.com" and "example.com" have DMARC Policy Records, +but "example.com" is the highest element in the tree with a DMARC Policy Record +(it has the fewest labels), so "example.com" is the Organizational Domain. Since +this is also the Organizational Domain for the Author Domain, DKIM is aligned +for relaxed alignment.

+

Since both SPF and DKIM are aligned, they can be used to determine if the +message has a DMARC pass result. If the result is not pass, then the policy +domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the appropriate policy. In this +case, since the RFC5322.From domain has a DMARC Policy Record, that is the policy +domain.

+
+
+
+
+

+B.4.2. Deep Tree Walk Example +

+

A Mail Receiver receives an email with:

+
    +
  • Author Domain: a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com +
    • +
  • RFC5321.MailFrom Domain: example.com +
    • +
  • DKIM-Authenticated Identifier: signing.example.com +
    • +
+

Both "_dmarc.example.com" and "_dmarc.signing.example.com" have DMARC Policy Records, +while "_dmarc.com" does not. If SPF or DKIM yield pass results, they still have +to be aligned to support a DMARC pass. Since not all domains are the same, if +the alignment is relaxed then the tree walk is performed to determine the Organizational +Domain for each.

+

To determine the Organizational Domain For the Author Domain, query +"_dmarc.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com", then query "_dmarc.g.h.i.j.k.example.com" (skipping +the intermediate names), then query "_dmarc.h.i.j.k.example.com", +"_dmarc.i.j.k.example.com", "_dmarc.j.k.example.com", "_dmarc.k.example.com", +"_dmarc.example.com", and "_dmarc.com". None of +"a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com", "g.h.i.j.k.example.com", "h.i.j.k.example.com", +"i.j.k.example.com", "j.k.example.com", or "k.example.com" have a DMARC Policy Record.

+

Since "example.com" is the last element of the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy Record, +it is the Organizational Domain for "a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com".

+

For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain, the Organizational domain already found +for "example.com" is "example.com". SPF is aligned.

+

For the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier, query "_dmarc.signing.example.com", "_dmarc.example.com", +and "_dmarc.com". Both "signing.example.com" and "example.com" have DMARC Policy Records, +but "example.com" is the highest element in the tree with a DMARC Policy Record, so +"example.com" is the Organizational Domain. Since this is also the Organizational Domain +for the Author Domain, DKIM is aligned for relaxed alignment.

+

Since both SPF and DKIM are aligned, they can be used to determine if the +message has a DMARC pass result. If the results for both are not pass, then +the policy domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the appropriate policy. +In this case, the Author Domain does not have a DMARC Policy Record, so the +policy domain is the highest element in the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy Record, +example.com.

+
+
+
+
+

+B.4.3. Example with a PSD DMARC Policy Record +

+

In rare cases, a PSD publishes a DMARC Policy Record with a psd tag, which the tree +walk must take into account.

+

A Mail Receiver receives an email with:

+
    +
  • Author Domain: giant.bank.example +
    • +
  • RFC5321.MailFrom Domain: mail.giant.bank.example +
    • +
  • DKIM-Authenticated Identifier: mail.mega.bank.example +
    • +
+

In this case, "_dmarc.bank.example" has a DMARC Policy Record which includes the +"psd=y" tag, and "_dmarc.example" does not have a DMARC Policy Record. +While "_dmarc.giant.bank.example" has a DMARC Policy Record without a "psd" tag, +"_dmarc.mega.bank.example" and "_dmarc.mail.mega.bank.example" have no DMARC Policy Records.

+

Since the three domains are all different, tree walks find their Organizational Domains +to see which are aligned.

+

For the Author Domain "giant.bank.example", the tree walk finds the DMARC Policy Record +at "_dmarc.giant.bank.example", then the DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.bank.example", and +stops because of the "psd=y" flag. The Organizational Domain is "giant.bank.example" because +it is the domain directly below the one with "psd=y". Since the Organizational Domain has a +DMARC Policy Record, it is also the policy domain.

+

For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain "mail.giant.bank.example", the tree walk finds no DMARC Policy +Record at "_dmarc.mail.giant.bank.example", but does find both the DMARC Policy Record at +"_dmarc.giant.bank.example" and then the DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.bank.example", and +stops because of the "psd=y" flag. Again the Organizational Domain is "giant.bank.example" because +it is the domain directly below the one with "psd=y". Since this is the same Organizational Domain +as the Author Domain, SPF is aligned.

+

For the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier "mail.mega.bank.example", the tree walk finds no DMARC Policy +Records at "_dmarc.mail.mega.bank.example" or "_dmarc.mega.bank.example", then finds the DMARC +Policy Record at "_dmarc.bank.example" and stops because of the "psd=y" flag. +The Organizational Domain is "mega.bank.example", so DKIM is not aligned.

+

Since SPF is aligned, it can be used to determine if the message has a DMARC pass result. If the +result is not pass, then the policy domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the appropriate +policy.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+B.5. Utilization of Aggregate Feedback: Example +

+

Aggregate feedback is consumed by Domain Owners to enable their +understanding of how a given domain is being processed by the Mail +Receiver. Aggregate reporting data on emails that pass all underlying +authentication checks is used by Domain Owners to validate that their +authentication practices remain accurate. For example, if a third party +is sending on behalf of a Domain Owner, the Domain Owner can use aggregate +report data to validate ongoing authentication practices of the third party.

+

Data on email that only partially passes underlying authentication +checks provides visibility into problems that need to be addressed by +the Domain Owner. For example, if either SPF or DKIM fails to produce +an Authenticated Identifier, the Domain Owner is provided with enough +information to either directly correct the problem or understand where +authentication-breaking changes are being introduced in the email +transmission path. If authentication-breaking changes due to email +transmission path cannot be directly corrected, then the Domain Owner at least +maintains an understanding of the effect of DMARC-based policies upon +the Domain Owner's email.

+

Data on email that fails all underlying authentication checks +provides baseline visibility on how the Domain Owner's domain is +being received at the Mail Receiver. Based on this visibility, the +Domain Owner can begin deployment of authentication technologies +across uncovered email sources, if the mail that is failing the checks +was generated by or on behalf of the Domain Owner. Data regarding +failing authentication checks can also allow the Domain Owner to +come to an understanding of how its domain is being misused.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+Appendix C. Changes from RFC 7489 +

+

This document is intended to render [RFC7489] obsolete. As one might guess, +that means there are significant differences between RFC 7489 and this +document. This section will summarize those changes.

+
+
+

+C.1. Informational vs. Standards Track +

+

RFC 7489 was not the product of any IETF work stream, but was instead published into +the RFC series by the Independent Submissions Editor and is classified as an Informational +RFC.

+

This document, by contrast, is intended to be Internet Standards Track.

+
+
+
+
+

+C.2. Changes to Terminology and Definitions +

+

The following changes were made to the Terminology and Definitions section.

+
+
+

+C.2.1. Terms Added +

+

These terms were added:

+
    +
  • Domain Owner Assessment Policy +
    • +
  • Enforcement +
    • +
  • Monitoring Mode +
    • +
  • Non-existent Domains +
    • +
  • Public Suffix Domain (PSD) +
    • +
  • Public Suffix Operator (PSO) +
    • +
  • PSO Controlled Domain Names +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+

+C.2.2. Definitions Updated +

+

These definitions were updated:

+
    +
  • Organizational Domain +
    • +
  • Report Receiver (renamed to Report Consumer) +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+C.3. Policy Discovery and Organizational Domain Determination +

+

The algorithms for DMARC policy discovery and for determining the Organizational Domain +have been changed. Specifically, reliance on a Public Suffix List (PSL) has been replaced +by a technique called a "DNS Tree Walk", and the methodology for the DNS Tree Walk is explained +in detail in this document.

+

The DNS Tree Walk also incorporates PSD policy discovery, which was introduced in +[RFC9091]. That RFC was an Experimental RFC, and the results of that experiment were +that the RFC was not implemented as written. Instead, this document redefines the +algorithm for PSD policy discovery, and thus obsoletes [RFC9091].

+

These algorithm changes introduce the possibility of interoperability issues where a +Domain Owner expects a DMARC Policy or an Organizational Domain to be identified by +the Tree Walk process, but a Mail Receiver using an RFC 7489-based implementation of +DMARC and relying on a PSL might arrive at a different answer.

+

This issue is entirely avoided by the use of Strict Alignment and publishing explicit +DMARC Policy Records for all Author Domains used in an organization's email.

+
+
+
+
+

+C.4. Reporting +

+

Discussion of both aggregate and failure reporting have been moved to separate documents +dedicated to the topics.

+

In addition, the ability to specify a maximum report size in the DMARC URI has been removed.

+
+
+
+
+

+C.5. Tags +

+

Several tags have been added to the "DMARC Policy Record Format" section of this document since +RFC 7489 was published, and at the same time, several others were removed.

+
+
+

+C.5.1. Tags Added +

+
    +
  • np - Policy for non-existent domains (Imported from [RFC9091]) +
    • +
  • psd - Flag indicating whether a domain is a Public Suffix Domain +
    • +
  • t - Replacement for some pct tag functionality. See Appendix A.6 for further discussion +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+

+C.5.2. Tags Removed +

+
    +
  • pct - Tag requesting application of DMARC policy to only a percentage of messages. See Appendix A.6 for discussion +
    • +
  • rf - Tag specifying requested format of failure reports +
    • +
  • ri - Tag specifying requested interval between aggregate reports +
    • +
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+C.6. Expansion of Domain Owner Actions Section +

+

RFC 7489 had just two paragraphs in its Domain Owner Actions section, and while +the content of those paragraphs was correct, it was minimalist in its approach to +providing guidance to domain owners on just how to implement DMARC.

+

This document provides much more detail and explanatory text to a Domain Owner, +focusing not just on what to do to implement DMARC, but also on the reasons for +each step and the repercussions of each decision.

+

In particular, this document makes explicit that domains for general-purpose +email SHOULD NOT deploy a DMARC policy of p=reject. See Section 7.4 +for further discussion of this topic.

+
+
+
+
+

+C.7. Report Generator Recommendations +

+

In the cases where a DMARC Policy Record specifies multiple destinations for either aggregate +reports or failure reports, RFC 7489 stated:

+
+
  Receivers **MAY** impose a limit on the number of URIs to which they
+  will send reports but **MUST** support the ability to send to at least
+  two.
+
+
+

This document in Section 4.6 says:

+
+
  A report **SHOULD** be sent to each listed URI provided in the DMARC
+  Policy Record.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+C.8. Removal of RFC 7489 Appendix A.5 +

+

One of the appendices in RFC 7489, specifically Appendix A.5, +has been removed from the text with this update. The appendix was titled +"Issues with ADSP in Operation" and it contained a list of issues associated +with ADSP that influenced the direction of DMARC. The ADSP protocol was moved +to "Historic" status in 2013 and working group consensus was that such a +discussion of ADSP's influence on DMARC was no longer relevant.

+
+
+
+
+

+C.9. RFC 7489 Errata Summary +

+

Remove this before final submission: + (https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#ref_errata says errata in the Reported + state should not be referenced; they are not considered stable.)

+

This document and its companion documents ([I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] +and [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]) address the following errata +filed against [RFC7489] since that document's publication in March, +2015. More details on each of these can be found at +https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=7489

+
+
[Err5365] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5365, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5365:
+
+

To be addressed in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

+
+
+
[Err5371] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5371, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5371:
+
+

To be addressed in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

+
+
+
[Err5440] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5440, RFC 7489, Section 7.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440:
+
+

To be addressed in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

+
+
+
[Err5440] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5440, RFC 7489, Sections B.2.1, B.2.3, and B.2.4 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440:
+
+

Addressed both in this document and in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

+
+
+
[Err6439] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 6439, RFC 7489, Section 7.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6439:
+
+

To be addressed in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

+
+
+
[Err6485] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 6485, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6485:
+
+

To be addressed in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].

+
+
+
[Err7835] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 7835, RFC 7489, Section 6.6.3 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7835:
+
+

This erratum is in reference to the description of the process documented +in RFC 7489 for the applicable DMARC policy for an email message. The process +for doing this has drastically changed in DMARCbis, and so the text identified in +this erratum no longer exists.

+
+
+
[Err5151] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5151, RFC 7489, Section 1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5151:
+
+

This erratum is in reference to the Introduction section of RFC 7489. +That section has been substantially rewritten in DMARCbis, and the text +at issue for this erratum no longer exists.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+C.10. General Editing and Formatting +

+

A great deal of the content from RFC 7489 was preserved in this document, but much +of it was subject to either minor editing, re-ordering of sections, and/or both.

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+Acknowledgements +

+

This reworking of the DMARC mechanism specified in [RFC7489] is the +result of contributions from many participants in the IETF Working Group +dedicated to this effort. Although the contributors are too numerous to +mention, significant contributions were made by Kurt Andersen, Laura Atkins, +Seth Blank, Alex Brotman, Dave Crocker, Douglas E. Foster, Ned Freed, +Mike Hammer, Steven M. Jones, Scott Kitterman, Murray S. Kucherawy, +Barry Leiba, Alessandro Vesely, and Tim Wicinski.

+

The authors and contributors also recognize that this document would not +have been possible without the work done by those who had a hand in producing +[RFC7489]. The Acknowledgements section from that document is preserved +in full below.

+
+
+
+
+

+Acknowledgements - RFC 7489 +

+

DMARC and the draft version of this document submitted to the +Independent Submission Editor were the result of lengthy efforts by +an informal industry consortium: DMARC.org (see https://dmarc.org). +Participating companies included Agari, American Greetings, AOL, Bank +of America, Cloudmark, Comcast, Facebook, Fidelity Investments, +Google, JPMorgan Chase & Company, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Netease, +PayPal, ReturnPath, The Trusted Domain Project, and Yahoo!. Although +the contributors and supporters are too numerous to mention, notable +individual contributions were made by J. Trent Adams, Michael Adkins, +Monica Chew, Dave Crocker, Tim Draegen, Steve Jones, Franck Martin, +Brett McDowell, and Paul Midgen. The contributors would also like to +recognize the invaluable input and guidance that was provided early +on by J.D. Falk.

+

Additional contributions within the IETF context were made by Kurt +Andersen, Michael Jack Assels, Les Barstow, Anne Bennett, Jim Fenton, +J. Gomez, Mike Jones, Scott Kitterman, Eliot Lear, John Levine, +S. Moonesamy, Rolf Sonneveld, Henry Timmes, and Stephen J. Turnbull.

+
+
+
+
+

+Authors' Addresses +

+
+
Todd M. Herr
+
Valimail
+ +
+
+
John Levine
+
Standcore LLC
+ +
+
+
+ + + diff --git a/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.txt b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90a6bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4424 @@ + + + + +DMARC T. Herr (ed) +Internet-Draft Valimail +Obsoletes: 7489, 9091 (if approved) J. Levine (ed) +Intended status: Standards Track Standcore LLC +Expires: 24 May 2025 20 November 2024 + + +Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) + draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36 + +Abstract + + This document describes the Domain-based Message Authentication, + Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) protocol. + + DMARC permits the owner of an email's Author Domain (#author-domain) + to enable validation of the domain's use, to indicate the Domain + Owner's (#domain-owner) or Public Suffix Operator's (#public-suffix- + operator) message handling preference regarding failed validation, + and to request reports about the use of the domain name. Mail + receiving organizations can use this information when evaluating + handling choices for incoming mail. + + This document obsoletes RFCs 7489 and 9091. + +Status of This Memo + + This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the + provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- + Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 May 2025. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 1] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ + license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. + Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights + and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components + extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as + described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are + provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.1. High-Level Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.2. Anti-Phishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.3. Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.4. Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3. Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.2.1. Authenticated Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.2.2. Author Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.2.3. DKIM Signing Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.2.4. SPF Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.2.5. DMARC Policy Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.2.6. DMARC Policy Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 3.2.7. Domain Owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 3.2.8. Domain Owner Assessment Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 3.2.9. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 3.2.10. Identifier Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 3.2.11. Mail Receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 3.2.12. Monitoring Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 3.2.13. Non-existent Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 3.2.14. Organizational Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.2.15. Public Suffix Domain (PSD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.2.16. Public Suffix Operator (PSO) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.2.17. PSO Controlled Domain Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.2.18. Report Consumer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 4. Overview and Key Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.1. DMARC Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.2. Use of RFC5322.From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.3. Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.4. Identifier Alignment Explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 4.4.1. DKIM-Authenticated Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 4.4.2. SPF-Authenticated Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 4.4.3. Alignment and Extension Technologies . . . . . . . . 16 + 4.5. DMARC Policy Record Explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 4.6. DMARC Reporting URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 2] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + 4.7. DMARC Policy Record Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 4.8. Formal Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 4.9. Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 4.10. DNS Tree Walk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 4.10.1. DMARC Policy Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + 4.10.2. Identifier Alignment Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 5. DMARC Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 5.1. Domain Owner Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 5.1.1. Publish an SPF Record for an Aligned Domain . . . . . 32 + 5.1.2. Configure Sending System for DKIM Signing Using an + Aligned Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 5.1.3. Set Up a Mailbox to Receive Aggregate Reports . . . . 32 + 5.1.4. Publish a DMARC Policy Record for the Author Domain and + Organizational Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 5.1.5. Collect and Analyze Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 5.1.6. Remediate Unaligned or Unauthenticated Mail + Streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + 5.1.7. Decide Whether to Update Domain Owner Assessment Policy + to Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + 5.1.8. A Note on Large, Complex Organizations and + Decentralized DNS Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + 5.2. PSO Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 5.3. Mail Receiver Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 5.3.1. Extract Author Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 5.3.2. Determine If The DMARC Mechanism Applies . . . . . . 35 + 5.3.3. Determine If Authenticated Identifiers Exist . . . . 35 + 5.3.4. Conduct Identifier Alignment Checks If Necessary . . 36 + 5.3.5. Determine DMARC "Pass" or "Fail" . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 5.3.6. Apply Policy If Appropriate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 5.3.7. Store Results of DMARC Processing . . . . . . . . . . 37 + 5.3.8. Send Aggregate Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + 5.3.9. Optionally Send Failure Reports . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + 5.4. Policy Enforcement Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + 6. DMARC Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 + 7. Other Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 + 7.1. Issues Specific to SPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 + 7.2. Rejecting Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 + 7.3. Interoperability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 + 7.4. Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 + 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 + 8.1. Authentication-Results Method Registry Update . . . . . . 43 + 8.2. Authentication-Results Result Registry Update . . . . . . 44 + 8.3. Feedback Report Header Fields Registry Update . . . . . . 45 + 8.4. DMARC Tag Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 + 8.5. DMARC Report Format Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 + 8.6. Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names + Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 + 9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 3] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + 9.1. Aggregate Report Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + 9.2. Failure Report Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 10.1. Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 10.2. Attacks on Reporting URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 10.3. DNS Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + 10.4. Display Name Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + 10.5. Denial of DMARC Processing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + 10.6. External Reporting Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + 10.7. Secure Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 10.8. Relaxed Alignment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 + 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 + Appendix A. Technology Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 + A.1. S/MIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 + A.2. Method Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 + A.3. Sender Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 + A.4. Domain Existence Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 + A.5. Organizational Domain Discovery Issues . . . . . . . . . 60 + A.6. Removal of the "pct" Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 + Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + B.1. Identifier Alignment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + B.1.1. SPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + B.1.2. DKIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 + B.2. Domain Owner Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 + B.2.1. Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode . . . . . . . . . . . 64 + B.2.2. Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode, Per-Message Failure + Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 + B.2.3. Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third + Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 + B.2.4. Overriding destination addresses . . . . . . . . . . 66 + B.2.5. Subdomain, Testing, and Multiple Aggregate Report + URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 + B.3. Mail Receiver Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 + B.3.1. SMTP Session Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 + B.4. Organizational and Policy Domain Tree Walk Examples . . . 70 + B.4.1. Simple Organizational and Policy Example . . . . . . 70 + B.4.2. Deep Tree Walk Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 + B.4.3. Example with a PSD DMARC Policy Record . . . . . . . 72 + B.5. Utilization of Aggregate Feedback: Example . . . . . . . 73 + Appendix C. Changes from RFC 7489 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 + C.1. Informational vs. Standards Track . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 + C.2. Changes to Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . 74 + C.2.1. Terms Added . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 + C.2.2. Definitions Updated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 + C.3. Policy Discovery and Organizational Domain + Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + C.4. Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 + C.5. Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 + C.5.1. Tags Added . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 + C.5.2. Tags Removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 + C.6. Expansion of Domain Owner Actions Section . . . . . . . . 76 + C.7. Report Generator Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 + C.8. Removal of RFC 7489 Appendix A.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 + C.9. RFC 7489 Errata Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 + C.10. General Editing and Formatting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 + Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 + Acknowledgements - RFC 7489 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 + +1. Introduction + + RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING: + The source for this draft is maintained on GitHub at: + https://github.com/ietf-wg-dmarc/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis + (https://github.com/ietf-wg-dmarc/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) + + Abusive email often includes unauthorized and deceptive use of a + domain name in the "From" header field defined in section 3.6.2 of + [RFC5322] and referred to as RFC5322.From. The domain typically + belongs to an organization expected to be known to - and presumably + trusted by - the recipient. The Sender Policy Framework (SPF) + [RFC7208] and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [RFC6376] protocols + provide domain-level authentication but are not directly associated + with the RFC5322.From domain, also known as the Author Domain + (#author-domain). DMARC leverages these two protocols, providing a + method for Domain Owners to publish a DNS TXT record describing the + email authentication policies for the Author Domain and to request + specific handling for messages using that domain that fail validation + checks. These DNS records are called DMARC Policy Records (#dmarc- + policy-record). + + As with SPF and DKIM, DMARC validation results in a verdict of either + "pass" or "fail". A DMARC result of "pass" requires not only an SPF + or DKIM pass verdict for the email message, but also and more + importantly that the domain associated with the SPF or DKIM pass be + "aligned" with the Author Domain in one of two modes - "relaxed" or + "strict". Domains are said to be in "relaxed alignment" if they have + the same Organizational Domain (#organizational-domain); a domain's + Organizational Domain is the domain at the top of the namespace + hierarchy for that domain while having the same administrative + authority as that domain. On the other hand, domains are in "strict + alignment" if and only if they are identical. The choice of required + alignment mode is left to the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) that + publishes a DMARC Policy Record. + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 5] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + A DMARC pass for a message indicates only that the use of the Author + Domain has been validated for that message as authorized by the + Domain Owner. Such authorization does not carry an explicit or + implicit value assertion about that message or about the Domain + Owner, and so a DMARC pass by itself does not guarantee that delivery + to the recipient's Inbox would be safe or desirable. For a mail- + receiving organization participating in DMARC, a message that passes + DMARC validation is part of a message stream reliably associated with + the Author Domain. Therefore, reputation assessment of that stream + by the mail-receiving organization can assume the use of that Author + Domain is authorized by the Domain Owner. + + On the other hand, a message that fails this validation is not + necessarily associated with the Author Domain and so should not + affect the Author Domain's reputation. The phrase "not necessarily + associated" was purposely chosen here, as it is importatnt to + understand that some messages making authorized use of the Author + Domain can still fail DMARC validation checks. [RFC7960] and + Section 7 of this document both discuss reasons why such failures may + happen. Because of this, a mail-receiving organization that performs + DMARC validation can choose to honor the Domain Owner's requested + message handling for validation failures, but it is not required to + do so. DMARC is commonly used as one input to more complex filtering + decisions, and so the mail-receiving organization might choose + different actions entirely. + + DMARC, in the associated [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] documents, also specifies a + reporting framework. Using it, a mail-receiving organization can + generate regular reports about messages that use Author Domains for + which a DMARC Policy Record exists; those reports are sent to the + address(es) specified by the Domain Owner in the DMARC Policy Record. + Domain Owners can use these reports, especially the aggregate + reports, not only to identify sources of mail attempting to + fraudulently use their domain, but also (and perhaps more + importantly) to flag and fix gaps in their own authentication + practices. However, as with honoring the Domain Owner's stated mail + handling preference, a mail-receiving organization supporting DMARC + is under no obligation to send requested reports, although it is + recommended that they do send aggregate reports. + + The use of DMARC creates some interoperability challenges that + require due consideration before deployment, particularly with + configurations that can cause mail to be rejected. These are + discussed in Section 7. + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +2. Requirements + + The following sections describe topics that guide the specification + of DMARC. + +2.1. High-Level Goals + + DMARC has the following high-level goals: + + * Allow Domain Owners (#domain-owner) and Public Suffix Operators + (PSOs) (#public-suffix-operator) to validate their email + authentication deployments. + + * Allow Domain Owners and PSOs to assert their desired message + handling for validation failures on messages purporting to have + authorship within the domain. + + * Minimize implementation complexity for both senders and receivers. + + * Reduce the amount of successfully delivered spoofed emails. + + * Work at Internet scale. + +2.2. Anti-Phishing + + DMARC is designed to prevent the unauthorized use of the Author + Domain (#author-domain) of an email message, a technique known as + "spoofing". Such unauthorized usage can frequently be found in + messages impersonating a domain belonging to a business entity, + messages that are meant to entice the recipient to provide sensitive + information, such as usernames, passwords, and financial account + information. These spoofed messages are commonly referred to as + "phishing". + + DMARC can only be used to combat specific forms of exact-domain + spoofing directly. DMARC does not attempt to solve all problems with + spoofed or otherwise fraudulent emails. In particular, it does not + address the use of visually similar domain names ("cousin domains") + or abuse of the RFC5322.From human-readable display-name, as defined + in Section 3.4 of [RFC5322]. + +2.3. Scalability + + Scalability is a significant issue for systems that need to operate + in an environment as widely deployed as current SMTP email. For this + reason, DMARC seeks to avoid the need for third parties or pre- + sending agreements between senders and receivers. This preserves the + positive aspects of the current email infrastructure. + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 7] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + Although DMARC does not introduce third-party senders (namely + external agents authorized to send on behalf of an operator) to the + email-handling flow, it also does not preclude them. Such third + parties are free to provide services in conjunction with DMARC. + +2.4. Out of Scope + + Several topics and issues are specifically out of scope of this work. + These include the following: + + * Different treatment of messages that are not authenticated (e.g., + those that have no DKIM signature or those sent using an Author + Domain (#author-domain) for which no DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc- + policy-record) exists) versus those that fail validation; + + * Evaluation of anything other than RFC5322.From header field; + + * Multiple reporting formats; + + * Publishing policy other than via the DNS; + + * Reporting or otherwise evaluating other than the last-hop IP + address; + + * Attacks in the display-name portions of the RFC5322.From header + field, also known as "display name" attacks; + + * Authentication of entities other than domains, since DMARC is + built upon SPF and DKIM, which authenticate domains; and + + * Content analysis. + +3. Terminology and Definitions + + This section defines terms used in the rest of the document. + +3.1. Conventions Used in This Document + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP + 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + + Readers are encouraged to be familiar with the contents of [RFC5598]. + In particular, that document defines various roles in the messaging + infrastructure that can appear the same or separate in various + contexts. For example, a Domain Owner (#domain-owner) could, via the + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 8] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + messaging security mechanisms on which DMARC is based, delegate the + ability to send mail as the Domain Owner to a third party with + another role. This document does not address the distinctions among + such roles; the reader is encouraged to become familiar with that + material before continuing. + +3.2. Definitions + + The following sections define the terms used in this document. + +3.2.1. Authenticated Identifiers + + Authenticated Identifiers are those domain-level identifiers for + which authorized use is validated using a supported authentication + mechanism (#authentication-mechanisms). + +3.2.2. Author Domain + + The domain name of the apparent author as extracted from the + RFC5322.From header field. + +3.2.3. DKIM Signing Domain + + The domain name that is the value of the "d" tag in a validated DKIM- + Signature header field in an email message. + +3.2.4. SPF Domain + + SPF, [RFC7208], can validate the uses of both the domain found in an + SMTP [RFC5321] HELO/EHLO command (the HELO identity) and the domain + found in an SMTP MAIL command (the MAIL FROM identity). DMARC relies + solely on SPF validation of the MAIL FROM identity. Section 2.4 of + [RFC7208] describes the determination of the MAIL FROM identity for + cases in which the SMTP MAIL command has a null path, i.e., the + mailbox composed of the local-part "postmaster" and the HELO + identity. + + The term "SPF Domain" when used in this document refers to an SPF + validated MAIL FROM identity. + +3.2.5. DMARC Policy Domain + + The domain name at which an applicable DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc- + policy-record) is discovered for the Author Domain (#author-domain) + of an email message. + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 9] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +3.2.6. DMARC Policy Record + + A DNS TXT record published by a Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or + Public Suffix Operator (PSO) (#public-suffix-operator) to enable + validation of an Author Domain's (#author-domain) use, to indicate + the Domain Owner's or PSO's message handling preference regarding + failed validation, and optionally to request reports about the use of + the Author Domain. + +3.2.7. Domain Owner + + An entity or organization that has control of a given DNS domain, + usually by holding its registration. Domain Owners range from + complex, globally distributed organizations to service providers + working on behalf of non-technical clients to individuals responsible + for maintaining personal domains. This specification uses this term + as analogous to an Administrative Management Domain as defined in + [RFC5598]. It can also refer to delegates, such as Report Consumers + when those are outside of their immediate management domain. + +3.2.8. Domain Owner Assessment Policy + + The message handling preference expressed in a DMARC Policy Record + (#dmarc-policy-record) by the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) regarding + failed validation of the Author Domain (#author-domain) is called the + "Domain Owner Assessment Policy". Possible values are described in + Section 4.7. + +3.2.9. Enforcement + + Enforcement describes a state where the existing Domain Owner + Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) for an Organizational Domain + (#organizational-domain) and all subdomains below it is not "p=none". + This state means that the Organizational Domain and its subdomains + can only be used as Author Domains (#author-domain) if they are + properly validated using the DMARC mechanism. + + Historically, Domain Owner Assessment Policies of "p=quarantine" or + "p=reject" have been higher value signals to Mail Receivers (#mail- + receiver). Messages with Author Domains for which such policies + exist that are not validated using the DMARC mechanism will not reach + the inbox at Mail Receivers that participate in DMARC and honor the + Domain Owner's expressed handling preference. + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 10] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +3.2.10. Identifier Alignment + + DMARC describes the concept of alignment between the Author Domain + (#author-domain) and an Authenticated Identifier (#authenticated- + identifiers), and requires such Identifier Alignment between the two + for a message to achieve a DMARC pass. DMARC defines two states for + alignment. + +3.2.10.1. Relaxed Alignment + + When the Author Domain (#author-domain) has the same Organizational + Domain (#organizational-domain) as an Authenticated Identifier + (#authenticated-identifier), the two are said to be in relaxed + alignment. + +3.2.10.2. Strict Alignment + + When the Author Domain (#author-domain) is identical to an + Authenticated Identifier (#authenticated-identifier), the two are + said to be in strict alignment. + +3.2.11. Mail Receiver + + The entity or organization that receives and processes email. Mail + Receivers operate one or more Internet-facing Message Transfer Agents + (MTAs). + +3.2.12. Monitoring Mode + + Monitoring Mode describes a state where the existing Domain Owner + Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) for an Organizational Domain + (#organizational-domain) and all subdomains below it is "p=none", and + the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) is receiving aggregate reports for + the Organizational Domain. While the use of the Organizational + Domain and all its subdomains as Author Domains (#author-domain) can + still be validated by a Mail Receiver (#mail-receiver) deploying the + DMARC mechanism, the Domain Owner expresses no handling preference + for messages that fail DMARC validation. The Domain Owner is, + however, using the content of the DMARC aggregate reports to make any + needed adjustments to the authentication practices for its mail + streams. + +3.2.13. Non-existent Domains + + For DMARC purposes, a non-existent domain is consistent with the + term's meaning as described in [RFC8020]. That is, if the response + code received for a query for a domain name is NXDOMAIN, then the + domain name and any possible subdomains do not exist. + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 11] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +3.2.14. Organizational Domain + + The Organizational Domain for any domain is akin to the ADMD + described in [RFC5598]. A domain's Organizational Domain is the + domain at the top of the namespace hierarchy for that domain while + having the same administrative authority as the domain. An + Organizational Domain is determined by applying the algorithm found + in Section 4.10. + +3.2.15. Public Suffix Domain (PSD) + + Some domains allow the registration of subdomains that are "owned" by + independent organizations. Real-world examples of these domains are + ".com", ".org", ".us", and ".co.uk", to name just a few. These + domains are called "Public Suffix Domains" (PSDs). For example, + "ietf.org" is a registered domain name, and ".org" is its PSD. + +3.2.16. Public Suffix Operator (PSO) + + A Public Suffix Operator is an organization that manages operations + within a PSD, particularly the DNS records published for names at and + under that domain name. + +3.2.17. PSO Controlled Domain Names + + PSO-Controlled Domain Names are names in the DNS that are managed by + a PSO. PSO-controlled Domain Names may have one label (e.g., ".com") + or more (e.g., ".co.uk"), depending on the PSD's policy. + +3.2.18. Report Consumer + + A Report Consumer is an operator that receives reports from another + operator implementing the reporting mechanisms described in the + documents [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]. This term applies collectively + to the system components that receive and process these reports and + the organizations that operate those components. + + Report Consumers can receive reports concerning domains for which the + Report Consumer is also the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or PSO + (#public-suffix-operator), or concerning domains that belong to + another operator entirely. The DMARC mechanism permits a Domain + Owner to act as a Report Consumer for its domain(s) and/or to + designate third parties to so act. See Section 10.6 for further + discussion of such designation. + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 12] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +4. Overview and Key Concepts + + This section provides a general overview of the design and operation + of the DMARC environment. + +4.1. DMARC Basics + + DMARC permits a Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or PSO (#public-suffix- + operator) to enable validation of an Author Domain's (#author-domain) + use in an email message, to indicate the Domain Owner's or PSO's + message handling preference regarding failed validation, and to + request reports about use of the Author Domain. A domain's DMARC + Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record) is published in the DNS as a TXT + record at the name created by prepending the label "_dmarc" to the + domain name and is retrieved through normal DNS queries. + + DMARC's validation mechanism produces a "pass" result if a DMARC + Policy Record exists for the Author Domain of an email message and + the Author Domain is aligned (#identifier-alignment) with an + Authenticated Identifier (#authenticated-identifiers) from that + message. When a DMARC Policy Record exists for the Author Domain and + the DMARC mechanism does not produce a "pass" result, the Mail + Receiver's (#mail-receiver) handling of that message can be + influenced by the Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain-owner- + policy) expressed in the DMARC Policy Record. + + It is important to note that the authentication mechanisms employed + by DMARC only validate the usage of a DNS domain in an email message. + They do not validate the local-part of any email address identifier + found in that message, nor do such validations carry an explicit or + implicit value assertion about that message or about the Domain + Owner. + + DMARC's reporting component involves the collection of information + about received messages using the Author Domain for periodic + aggregate reports to the Domain Owner or PSO. The parameters and + format for such reports are discussed in + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. + + A Mail Receiver participating in DMARC might also generate per- + message failure reports that contain information related to + individual messages that fail DMARC validation checks. Per-message + failure reports are a useful source of information when debugging + deployments (if messages can be determined to be legitimate even + though failing validation) or in analyzing attacks. The capability + for such services is enabled by DMARC but defined in other referenced + material such as [RFC6591] and [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 13] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +4.2. Use of RFC5322.From + + One of the most obvious points of security scrutiny for DMARC is the + choice to focus on an identifier, namely the RFC5322.From address, + which is part of a body of data that has been trivially forged + throughout the history of email. This field is the one used by end + users to identify the source of the message, and so it has always + been a prime target for abuse through such forgery and other means. + That said, of all the identifiers that are part of the message + itself, this is the only one required to be present. A message + without a single, properly formed RFC5322.From header field does not + comply with [RFC5322], and handling such a message is outside of the + scope of this specification. + +4.3. Authentication Mechanisms + + The following mechanisms for determining Authenticated Identifiers + (#authenticated-identifiers) are supported in this version of DMARC: + + * DKIM, [RFC6376]. The DKIM Signing Domain (#dkim-signing-domain) + from a validated DKIM-Signature header field is an Authenticated + Identifier. + + * SPF, [RFC7208]. The validated SPF Domain (#spf-domain) from the + email message is the Authenticated Identifier. + +4.4. Identifier Alignment Explained + + DMARC validates the authorized use of the Author Domain (#author- + domain) by requiring either that it have the same Organizational + Domain (#organizational-domain) as an Authenticated Identifier + (#authenticated-identifier) (a condition known as "Relaxed Alignment + (#relaxed-alignment)") or that it be identical to the Authenticated + Identifier (a condition known as "Strict Alignment (#strict- + alignment)"). The choice of relaxed or strict alignment is left to + the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) and is expressed in the domain's + DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record). In practice, nearly all + Domain Owners have found relaxed alignment sufficient to meet their + needs. Domain name comparisons in this context are case-insensitive, + per [RFC4343]. + + The following table is meant to illustrate possible alignment + conditions. + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 14] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + +==================+==================+=========================+ + | Authenticated | Author Domain | Identifier Alignment | + | Identifier | | | + +==================+==================+=========================+ + | foo.example.com | news.example.com | relaxed; the two have | + | | | the same Organizational | + | | | Domain, example.com | + +------------------+------------------+-------------------------+ + | news.example.com | news.example.com | strict; the two are | + | | | identical | + +------------------+------------------+-------------------------+ + | foo.example.net | news.example.com | none; the two do not | + | | | share a common | + | | | Organizational Domain | + +------------------+------------------+-------------------------+ + + Table 1: "Alignment Examples" + + It is important to note that Identifier Alignment cannot occur with a + message that is not valid per [RFC5322], particularly one with a + malformed, absent, or repeated RFC5322.From header field, since in + that case there is no reliable way to determine a DMARC Policy Record + (#dmarc-policy-record) that applies to the message. Accordingly, + DMARC operation is predicated on the input being a valid RFC5322 + message object. For non-compliant cases, handling is outside of the + scope of this specification. Further discussion of this can be found + in Section 10.5. + +4.4.1. DKIM-Authenticated Identifiers + + DKIM permits a Domain Owner to claim some responsibility for a + message by associating the domain to the message. This association + is done by inserting the domain as the value of the "d" tag in a + DKIM-Signature header field, and the assertion of responsibility is + validated through a cryptographic signature in the header field. If + the cryptographic signature validates, then the DKIM Signing Domain + is the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier. + + There is currently no generally accepted mechanism by which a Domain + Owner may assert a list of third-party DKIM Signing Domains that are + authorized to sign on behalf of a given Author Domain. Therefore, + DMARC requires that Identifier Alignment is applied to the DKIM- + Authenticated Identifier because a message can bear a valid signature + from any domain, even one used by a bad actor. A DKIM-Authenticated + Identifier that does not have Identifier Alignment with the Author + Domain is not enough to validate whether the use of the Author Domain + has been authorized by its Domain Owner. + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 15] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + A single email can contain multiple DKIM signatures, and it is + considered to produce a DMARC "pass" result if any DKIM-Authenticated + Identifier aligns with the Author Domain. + +4.4.2. SPF-Authenticated Identifiers + + SPF can validate the uses of both the domain found in an SMTP HELO/ + EHLO command (the HELO identity) and the domain found in an SMTP MAIL + command (the MAIL FROM identity). DMARC relies solely on SPF + validation of the MAIL FROM identity. If the use of the domain in + the MAIL FROM identity is validated by SPF, then that domain is the + SPF-Authenticated Identifier. + + There is currently no generally accepted mechanism by which a Domain + Owner may assert a list of third-party domains that are authorized + for use as the MAIL FROM identity for mail using a given Author + Domain. Therefore, DMARC requires that Identifier Alignment is + applied to the SPF-Authenticated Identifier because any Domain Owner, + even a bad actor, can publish an SPF record for its domain and send + email that will obtain an SPF pass result. An SPF-Authenticated + Identifier that does not have Identifier Alignment with the Author + Domain is not enough to validate whether the use of the Author Domain + has been authorized by its Domain Owner. + +4.4.3. Alignment and Extension Technologies + + If in the future DMARC is extended to include the use of other + authentication mechanisms, the extensions MUST allow for the + assignment of a domain as an Authenticated Identifier so that + alignment with the Author Domain can be validated. + +4.5. DMARC Policy Record Explained + + A Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or PSO (#public-suffix-operator) + advertises DMARC participation of one or more of its domains by + publishing DMARC Policy Records (#dmarc-policy-record) that will + apply to those domains. In doing so, Domain Owners and PSOs indicate + their handling preference regarding failed validation for email + messages using their domain in the RFC5322.From header field as well + as their desire (if any) to receive feedback about such messages in + the form of aggregate and/or failure reports. + + DMARC Policy Records are stored as DNS TXT records with names + starting with the label "_dmarc". For example, the Domain Owner of + "example.com" would publish a DMARC Policy Record at the name + "_dmarc.example.com", and a Mail Receiver (#mail-receiver) wishing to + find the DMARC Policy Record for mail with an Author Domain (#author- + domain) of "example.com" would issue a TXT query to the DNS for the + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 16] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + name "_dmarc.example.com". A Domain Owner or PSO may choose not to + participate in DMARC validation by Mail Receivers simply by not + publishing a DMARC Policy Record for its Author Domain(s). + + DMARC Policy Records can also apply to subdomains of the name at + which they are published in the DNS, if the record is published at an + Organizational Domain (#organizational-domain) for the subdomains. + The Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) that + applies to the subdomains can be identical to the Domain Owner + Assessment Policy that applies to the Organizational Domain or + different, depending on the presence or absence of certain values in + the DMARC Policy Record. See Section 4.7 for more details. + + DMARC's use of the Domain Name Service is driven by DMARC's use of + domain names and the nature of the query it performs. The query + requirement matches with the DNS for obtaining simple parametric + information. It uses an established method of storing the + information associated with the domain name targeted by a DNS query, + specifically an isolated TXT record that is restricted to the DMARC + context. Using the DNS as the query service has the benefit of + reusing an extremely well-established operations, administration, and + management infrastructure, rather than creating a new one. + + Per [RFC1035], a TXT record can comprise multiple "character-string" + objects. Where this is the case, the module performing DMARC + evaluation MUST concatenate these strings by joining together the + objects in order and parsing the result as a single string. + + A Domain Owner can choose not to have some underlying authentication + mechanisms apply to DMARC evaluation of its Author Domain(s). For + example, if a Domain Owner only wants to use DKIM as the underlying + authentication mechanism, then the Domain Owner does not publish an + SPF record that can produce Identifier Alignment between an SPF- + Authenticated Identifier and the Author Domain. Alternatively, if + the Domain Owner wishes to rely solely on SPF, then it can send email + messages that have no DKIM-Signature header field that would produce + Identifier Alignment between a DKIM-Authenticated Identifier and the + Author Domain. Neither approach is recommended, however. + + A Mail Receiver implementing the DMARC mechanism gets the Domain + Owner's or PSO's published Domain Owner Assessment Policy and can use + it to inform its handling decisions for messages that undergo DMARC + validation checks and do not produce a result of pass. Mail handling + considerations based on Domain Owner Assessment Policy enforcement + are discussed below in Section 5.4. + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 17] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +4.6. DMARC Reporting URIs + + [RFC3986] defines a syntax for identifying a resource. The DMARC + mechanism uses this as the format by which a Domain Owner (#domain- + owner) or PSO (#public-suffix-organization) specifies the + destination(s) for the two report types that are supported. The + DMARC Poilcy Record format (#policy-record-format) allows for a list + of these URIs to be provided, with each URI separated by commas + (ASCII 0x2c). + + A formal definition is provided in Section 4.8. + +4.7. DMARC Policy Record Format + + DMARC Policy Records follow the extensible "tag-value" syntax for + DNS-based key records defined in DKIM [RFC6376]. + + Section 8 creates a registry for known DMARC tags and registers the + initial set defined in this document. Only tags defined in that + registry are to be processed; unknown tags MUST be ignored. + + The following tags are valid DMARC tags: + + adkim: (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "r".) Indicates whether + the Domain Owner (#domain-owner) or PSO (#public-suffix- + organization) requires strict or relaxed DKIM Identifier Alignment + mode. See Section 4.4.1 for details. Valid values are as + follows: + + r: relaxed mode + s: strict mode + + aspf: (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "r".) Indicates whether the + Domain Owner or PSO requires strict or relaxed SPF Identifier + Alignment mode. See Section 4.4.2 for details. Valid values are + as follows: + + r: relaxed mode + s: strict mode + + fo: Failure reporting options (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "0") + Provides requested options for the generation of failure reports. + Report generators may choose to adhere to the requested options. + This tag's content MUST be ignored if a "ruf" tag (below) is not + also specified. This tag can include one or more of the values + shown here; if more than one value is assigned to the tag, the + list of values should be separated by colons (e.g., fo=0:d). The + valid values and their meanings are: + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 18] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + 0: Generate a DMARC failure report if all underlying + authentication mechanisms fail to produce an aligned "pass" + result. + 1: Generate a DMARC failure report if any underlying + authentication mechanism produced something other than an + aligned "pass" result. + d: Generate a DKIM failure report if the message had a signature + that failed evaluation, regardless of its alignment. DKIM- + specific reporting is described in [RFC6651]. + s: Generate an SPF failure report if the message failed SPF + evaluation, regardless of its alignment. SPF-specific + reporting is described in [RFC6652]. + + np: Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) for non- + existent subdomains of the given Organizational Domain (plain- + text; OPTIONAL). For this tag, the definition of "non-existent + subdomain" is the same as that used for "Non-existent Domains" in + Section 3.2.13. The policy expressed by this tag indicates the + message handling preference of the Domain Owner or PSO for mail + using non-existent subdomains of the prevailing Organizational + Domain and not passing DMARC validation. It applies only to non- + existent subdomains of the Organizational Domain queried and not + to either existing subdomains or the domain itself. Its syntax is + identical to that of the "p" tag defined below. If the "np" tag + is absent, the policy specified by the "sp" tag (if the "sp" tag + is present) or the policy specified by the "p" tag, if the "sp" + tag is not present, MUST be applied for non-existent subdomains. + + p: Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain-owner-policy) (plain- + text; RECOMMENDED for DMARC Policy Records). Indicates the + message handling preference of the Domain Owner or PSO for mail + using its domain but not passing DMARC validation. The policy + applies to the domain queried and to subdomains, unless the + subdomain policy is explicitly described using the "sp" or "np" + tags. If this tag is not present in an otherwise syntactically + valid DMARC Policy Record, then the record is treated as if it + included "p=none" (see Section 4.10.1). This tag is not + applicable for third-party reporting records (see + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]). Possible values are as + follows: + + none: The Domain Owner offers no expression of preference. + quarantine: The Domain Owner considers such mail to be + suspicious. It is possible the mail is valid, although the + failure creates a significant concern. + reject: The Domain Owner considers all such failures to be a + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 19] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + clear indication that the use of the domain name is not valid. + See Section 7.2 for some discussion of SMTP rejection methods + and their implications. + + psd: A flag indicating whether the domain is a PSD. (plain-text; + OPTIONAL; default is "u"). Possible values are: + + y: PSOs include this tag with a value of "y" to indicate that the + domain is a PSD. If a record containing this tag with a value + of "y" is found during policy discovery, this information will + be used to determine the Organizational Domain and DMARC Policy + Domain applicable to the message in question. + n: The DMARC Policy Record is published for a domain that is not + a PSD, but it is the Organizational Domain for itself and its + subdomains. + u: The default indicates that the DMARC Policy Record is + published for a domain that is not a PSD, and may or may not be + an Organizational Domain for itself and its subdomains. Use + the mechanism described in Section 4.10 for determining the + Organizational Domain for this domain. + + rua: Addresses to which aggregate feedback reports are to be sent + (comma-separated plain-text list of DMARC Reporting URIs; + OPTIONAL). If present, the Domain Owner is requesting Mail + Receivers to send aggregate feedback reports as defined in + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] to the URIs listed. Any + valid URI can be specified. A Mail Receiver MUST implement + support for a "mailto:" URI, i.e., the ability to send a DMARC + report via electronic mail. If the tag is not provided, Mail + Receivers MUST NOT generate aggregate feedback reports for the + domain. URIs involving schemes not supported by Mail Receivers + MUST be ignored. [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] also + discusses considerations that apply when the domain name of a URI + differs from the domain publishing the DMARC Policy Record. See + Section 10.6 for additional considerations. + + ruf: Addresses to which message-specific failure information is to + be reported (comma-separated plain-text list of DMARC URIs; + OPTIONAL). If present, the Domain Owner is requesting Mail + Receivers to send detailed failure reports about messages that + fail the DMARC evaluation in specific ways (see the "fo" tag + above) to the URIs listed. Depending on the value of the "fo" + tag, the format for such reports is described in + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting], [RFC6651], or [RFC6652]. Any + valid URI can be specified. A Mail Receiver MUST implement + support for a "mailto:" URI, i.e., the ability to send message- + specific failure information via electronic mail. If the tag is + not provided, Mail Receivers MUST NOT generate failure reports for + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 20] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + the domain. URIs involving schemes not supported by Mail + Receivers MUST be ignored. [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] + discusses considerations that apply when the domain name of a URI + differs from that of the domain advertising the policy. See + Section 10.6 for additional considerations. + + sp: Domain Owner Assessment Policy for all subdomains of the given + Organizational Domain (plain-text; OPTIONAL). Indicates the + message handling preference of the Domain Owner or PSO for mail + using an existing subdomain of the prevailing Organizational + Domain for and not passing DMARC validation. It applies only to + existing subdomains of the message's Organizational Domain in the + DNS hierarchy and not to the Organizational Domain itself. Its + syntax is identical to that of the "p" tag defined above. If both + the "sp" tag is absent, and the "np" tag is either absent or not + applicable, the policy specified by the "p" tag MUST be applied + for subdomains. Note that "sp" will be ignored for DMARC Policy + Records published on subdomains of Organizational Domains and PSDs + due to the effect of the DMARC Policy Discovery (#dmarc-policy- + discovery). + + t: DMARC policy test mode (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "n"). + For the Author Domain to which the DMARC Policy Record applies, + the "t" tag serves as a signal to the actor performing DMARC + validation checks as to whether or not the Domain Owner wishes the + Domain Owner Assessment Policy declared in the "p", "sp", and/or + "np" tags to actually be applied. This tag does not affect the + generation of DMARC reports, and it has no effect on any policy + ("p", "sp", or "np") that is "none". See Appendix A.6 for further + discussion of the use of this tag. Possible values are as + follows: + + y: A request that the actor performing the DMARC validation check + not apply the policy, but instead apply any special handling + rules it might have in place, such as rewriting the + RFC5322.From header field (see Appendix A.6). The Domain Owner + is currently testing its specified DMARC assessment policy, and + has an expectation that the policy applied to any failing + messages will be one level below the specified policy. That + is, if the policy is "quarantine" and the value of the "t" tag + is "y", a policy of "none" will be applied to failing messages; + if the policy is "reject" and the value of the "t" tag is "y", + a policy of "quarantine" will be applied to failing messages, + irrespective of any other special handling rules that might be + triggered by the "t" tag having a value of "y". + n: The default is a request to apply the Domain Owner Assessment + Policy as specified to any message that produces a DMARC "fail" + result. + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 21] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + v: Version (plain-text; REQUIRED). Identifies the record retrieved + as a DMARC Policy Record. It MUST have the value of "DMARC1". + The value of this tag MUST match precisely; if it does not or it + is absent, the entire record MUST be ignored. It MUST be the + first tag in the list. + + A DMARC Policy Record MUST comply with the formal specification found + in Section 4.8 in that the "v" tag MUST be present and MUST appear + first. Unknown tags MUST be ignored. Syntax errors in the remainder + of the record MUST be discarded in favor of default values (if any) + or ignored outright. + + Note that given the rules of the previous paragraph, the addition of + a new tag into the registered list of tags does not itself require a + new version of DMARC to be generated (with a corresponding change to + the "v" tag's value), but a change to any existing tags does require + a new version of DMARC. + +4.8. Formal Definition + + The formal definition of the DMARC Policy Record format, using + [RFC5234] and [RFC7405], is as follows: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 22] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + dmarc-uri = URI + ; "URI" is imported from [RFC3986]; + ; commas (ASCII 0x2C) and exclamation + ; points (ASCII 0x21) MUST be + ; encoded + + dmarc-sep = *WSP ";" *WSP + + equals = *WSP "=" *WSP + + dmarc-record = dmarc-version *(dmarc-sep dmarc-tag) [dmarc-sep] + + dmarc-tag = 1*ALPHA equals 1*dmarc-value + + ; any printing characters but semicolon + dmarc-value = %x20-3A / %x3C-7E + + dmarc-version = "v" equals %s"DMARC1" ; case sensitive + + ; specialized syntax of DMARC values + dmarc-request = "none" / "quarantine" / "reject" + + dmarc-yorn = "y" / "n" + + dmarc-psd = "y" / "n" / "u" + + dmarc-rors = "r" / "s" + + dmarc-urilist = dmarc-uri *(*WSP "," *WSP dmarc-uri) + + dmarc-fo = "0" / "1" / "d" / "s" / "d:s" / "s:d" + + In each dmarc-tag, the dmarc-value has a syntax that depends on the + tag name. The ABNF rule for each dmarc-value is specified in the + following table: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 23] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + +==========+===============+ + | Tag Name | Value Rule | + +==========+===============+ + | p | dmarc-request | + +----------+---------------+ + | t | dmarc-yorn | + +----------+---------------+ + | psd | dmarc-psd | + +----------+---------------+ + | np | dmarc-request | + +----------+---------------+ + | sp | dmarc-request | + +----------+---------------+ + | adkim | dmarc-rors | + +----------+---------------+ + | aspf | dmarc-rors | + +----------+---------------+ + | rua | dmarc-urilist | + +----------+---------------+ + | ruf | dmarc-urilist | + +----------+---------------+ + | fo | dmarc-fo | + +----------+---------------+ + + Table 2: "Tag Names and + Values" + +4.9. Flow Diagram + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 24] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + +---------------+ +--------------------+ + | Author Domain |< . . . . . . . . . . . . | Return-Path Domain | + +---------------+ . +--------------------+ + | . ^ + V V . + +-----------+ +--------+ +----------+ v + | MSA |<***>| DKIM | | DMARC | +----------+ + | Service | | Signer | | Validator|<***>| SPF | + +-----------+ +--------+ +----------+ * | Validator| + | ^ * +----------+ + | * * + V v * + +------+ (~~~~~~~~~~~~) +------+ * +----------+ + | sMTA |------->( other MTAs )----->| rMTA | **>| DKIM | + +------+ (~~~~~~~~~~~~) +------+ | Validator| + | +----------+ + | ^ + V . + +-----------+ . + +---------+ | MDA | v + | User |<--| Filtering | +-----------+ + | Mailbox | | Engine | | DKIM | + +---------+ +-----------+ | Signing | + | Domain(s) | + +-----------+ + + MSA = Mail Submission Agent + MDA = Mail Delivery Agent + + The above diagram shows a typical flow of messages through a DMARC- + aware system. Dashed lines (e.g., -->) denote the actual message + flow, dotted lines (e.g., < . . >) represent DNS queries used to + retrieve message policy related to the supported message + authentication schemes, and starred lines (e.g., <**>) indicate data + exchange between message-handling modules and message authentication + modules. "sMTA" is the sending MTA, and "rMTA" is the receiving MTA. + + Put simply, when a message reaches a DMARC-aware rMTA, a DNS query + will be initiated to determine if a DMARC Policy Record exists that + applies to the Author Domain. If a DMARC Policy Record is found, the + rMTA will use the results of SPF and DKIM validation checks to + determine DMARC validation status. The DMARC validation status can + then factor into the message handling decision made by the + recipient's mail system. + + More details on specific actions for the parties involved can be + found in Section 5.1 and Section 5.3. + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 25] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +4.10. DNS Tree Walk + + An Organizational Domain (#organizational-domain) serves two + different purposes, depending on the context: + + * The Organizational Domain of the Author Domain (#author-domain) + establishes the DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record) for + that domain when no DMARC Policy Record is published specifically + for the Author Domain. (see Section 4.10.1) + + * The Organizational Domains of an Authenticated Identifier + (#authenticated-identifiers) and the Author Domain are used in + determining Identifier Alignment between the two. (see + Section 4.10.2). + + [RFC7489] defined an Organizational Domain as "The domain that was + registered with a domain name registrar." RFC 7489 discussed using a + "public suffix" list (PSL) as the authoritative list of the parent + domains for Organizational Domains, and further described a method + for determining the Organizational Domain of an Author Domain or an + Authenticated Identifier. However, RFC 7489 mandated no requirement + for a specific PSL for Mail Receivers to use (though it did suggest + the one found at https://publicsuffix.org/ + (https://publicsuffix.org/)) nor did it provide any guidance for the + frequency of regular retrieval of the PSL by Mail Receivers + participating in DMARC. RFC 7489 acknowledged the possibility of + interoperability issues caused by Mail Receivers choosing different + PSLs, and even suggested that if a more reliable and secure method + for determining the Organizational Domain could be created, that + method should replace reliance on a public suffix list. + + This update to DMARC offers more flexibility to Domain Owners, + especially those with large, complex organizations that might want to + apply decentralized management to their DNS and their DMARC Policy + Records. Rather than just using a public suffix list to help + identify an Organizational Domain, this update defines a discovery + technique known colloquially as the "DNS Tree Walk". The target of + any DNS Tree Walk is discovry of a valid DMARC Policy Record, and its + use in determining an Organizational Domain allows for publishing + DMARC Policy Records at multiple points in the namespace. + + This flexibility comes at a possible cost, however. Since the DNS + Tree Walk relies on the Mail Receiver making a series of DNS queries, + the potential exists for an ill-intentioned Domain Owner to send mail + with Author Domains with tens or even hundreds of labels for the + purpose of executing a Denial of Service Attack on the Mail Receiver. + To guard against such abuse of the DNS, a shortcut is built into the + process so that Author Domains with more than eight labels do not + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 26] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + result in more than eight DNS queries. Observed data at the time of + publication showed that Author Domains with up to seven labels were + in usage, and so eight was chosen as the query limit to allow for + some future expansion of the name space that did not require updating + this document. + + The generic steps for a DNS Tree Walk are as follows: + + 1. Query the DNS for a TXT record that matches the format of a DMARC + Policy Record at the starting point for the Tree Walk. The + starting point for the DNS Tree Walk will depend on the ultimate + target of the DNS Tree Walk. Section 4.10.1 and Section 4.10.2 + describe the possible starting points. A possibly empty set of + records is returned. + + 2. Records that do not start with a "v" tag that identifies the + current version of DMARC are discarded. If multiple DMARC Policy + Records are returned, they are all discarded. If a single record + remains and it contains either a "psd=y" tag or a "psd=n" tag, + stop. + + 3. Break the subject DNS domain name into a set of ordered labels. + Assign the count of labels to "x", and number the labels from + right to left; e.g., for "a.mail.example.com", "x" would be + assigned the value 4, "com" would be label 1, "example" would be + label 2, "mail" would be label 3, and so forth. + + 4. If x < 8, remove the left-most (highest-numbered) label from the + subject domain. If x >= 8, remove the left-most (highest- + numbered) labels from the subject domain until 7 labels remain. + The resulting DNS domain name is the new target for the next + lookup. + + 5. Query the DNS for a DMARC Policy Record at the DNS domain name + matching this new target. A possibly empty set of records is + returned. + + 6. Records that do not start with a "v" tag that identifies the + current version of DMARC are discarded. If multiple DMARC Policy + Records are returned for a single target, they are all discarded. + If a single record remains and it contains a "psd=n" or "psd=y" + tag, stop. + + 7. Determine the target for the next query by removing the left-most + label from the target of the previous query. Repeat steps 5, 6, + and 7 until the process stops or there are no more labels + remaining. + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 27] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + To illustrate, for a message with the arbitrary Author Domain of + "a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com", a full DNS Tree Walk would + require the following eight queries to potentially locate the DMARC + Policy Record or Organizational Domain: + + * _dmarc.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com + * _dmarc.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com + * _dmarc.h.i.j.mail.example.com + * _dmarc.i.j.mail.example.com + * _dmarc.j.mail.example.com + * _dmarc.mail.example.com + * _dmarc.example.com + * _dmarc.com + +4.10.1. DMARC Policy Discovery + + The DMARC Policy Record to be applied to an email message will be the + record found at any of the following locations, listed from highest + preference to lowest: + + * The Author Domain + * The Organizational Domain of the Author Domain + * The Public Suffix Domain of the Author Domain + + Policy discovery starts first with a query for a valid DMARC Policy + Record at the name created by prepending the label "_dmarc" to the + Author Domain of the message being evaluated. If a valid DMARC + Policy Record is found there, then this is the DMARC Policy Record to + be applied to the message; however, this does not necessarily mean + that the Author Domain is the Organizational Domain to be used in + Identifier Alignment checks. Whether this is also the Organizational + Domain is dependent on the value of the "psd" tag, if present, or + some conditions described in Section 4.10.2. + + If no valid DMARC Policy Record is found by the first query, then + perform a DNS Tree Walk to find the Author Domain's Organizational + Domain or its Public Suffix Domain. The starting point for this DNS + Tree Walk is determined as follows: + + * If the Author Domain has eight or fewer labels, the starting point + will be the immediate parent domain of the Author Domain. + * Otherwise, the starting point will be the name produced by + shortening the Author Domain as described starting in step 3 of + Section 4.10. + + If the DMARC Policy Record to be applied is that of the Author + Domain, then the Domain Owner Assessment Policy is taken from the "p" + tag of the record. + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 28] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + If the DMARC Policy Record to be applied is that of either the + Organizational Domain or the Public Suffix Domain and the Author + Domain is a subdomain of that domain, then the Domain Owner + Assessment Policy is taken from the "sp" tag (if any) if the Author + Domain exists, or the "np" tag (if any) if the Author Domain does not + exist. In the absence of applicable "sp" or "np" tags, the "p" tag + policy is used for subdomains. + + If a retrieved DMARC Policy Record does not contain a valid "p" tag, + or contains an "sp" or "np" tag that is not valid, then: + + * If a "rua" tag is present and contains at least one syntactically + valid reporting URI, the Mail Receiver MUST act as if a record + containing "p=none" was retrieved and continue processing; + + * Otherwise, the Mail Receiver applies no DMARC processing to this + message. + + If the set produced by the DNS Tree Walk contains no DMARC Policy + Record (i.e., any indication that there is no such record as opposed + to a transient DNS error), Mail Receivers MUST NOT apply the DMARC + mechanism to the message. + + Handling of DNS errors when querying for the DMARC Policy Record is + left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver. For example, to ensure + minimal disruption of mail flow, transient errors could result in + delivery of the message ("fail open"), or they could result in the + message being temporarily rejected (i.e., an SMTP 4yx reply), which + invites the sending MTA to try again after the condition has possibly + cleared, allowing a definite DMARC conclusion to be reached ("fail + closed"). + + Note: PSD policy is not used for Organizational Domains that have + published a DMARC Policy Record. Specifically, this is not a + mechanism to provide feedback addresses (rua/ruf) when an + Organizational Domain has declined to do so. + +4.10.2. Identifier Alignment Evaluation + + It may be necessary to perform multiple DNS Tree Walks to determine + if an Authenticated Identifier and an Author Domain are in alignment, + meaning that they have either the same Organizational Domain (relaxed + alignment) or that they're identical (strict alignment). DNS Tree + Walks done to discover an Organizational Domain for use in Identifier + Alignment Evaluation might start at any of the following locations: + + * The Author Domain of the message being evaluated. + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 29] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + * The SPF-Authenticated Identifier if there is an SPF pass result + for the message being evaluated. + * Any DKIM-Authenticated Identifier if one or more DKIM pass results + exist for the message being evaluated. + + Note: There is no need to perform Identifier Alignment Evaluations + under any of the following conditions: + + * The Author Domain and the Authenticated Identifier(s) are all the + same domain, and there is a DMARC Policy Record published for that + domain. In this case, this common domain is treated as the + Organizational Domain. For example, if the common domain in + question is "mail.example.com", and there is a valid DMARC Policy + Record published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com", then + "mail.example.com" is the Organizational Domain. + * No applicable DMARC Policy Record is discovered for the Author + Domain. In this case, the DMARC mechanism does not apply to the + message in question. + * The DMARC Policy record for the Author Domain indicates strict + alignment. In this case, a simple string comparison of the Author + Domain and the Authenticated Identifier(s) is all that is + required. + + To discover the Organizational Domain for a domain, perform the DNS + Tree Walk described in Section 4.10 as needed for any of the domains + in question. + + For each Tree Walk that retrieved valid DMARC Policy Records, select + the Organizational Domain from the domains for which valid DMARC + Policy Records were retrieved from the longest to the shortest: + + 1. If a valid DMARC Policy Record contains the "psd" tag set to "n" + ("psd=n"), this is the Organizational Domain, and the selection + process is complete. + + 2. If a valid DMARC Policy Record, other than the one for the domain + where the tree walk started, contains the "psd" tag set to "y" + ("psd=y"), the Organizational Domain is the domain one label + below this one in the DNS hierarchy, and the selection process is + complete. For example, if in the course of a tree walk a DMARC + Policy Record is queried for at first "_dmarc.mail.example.com" + and then "_dmarc.example.com", and a valid DMARC Policy Record + containing the "psd" tag set to "y" is found at + "_dmarc.example.com", then "mail.example.com" is the domain one + label below "example.com" in the DNS hierarchy and is thus the + Organizational Domain. + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 30] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + 3. Otherwise, select the DMARC Policy Record found at the name with + the fewest number of labels. This is the Organizational Domain + and the selection process is complete. + + If this process does not determine the Organizational Domain, then + the initial target domain is the Organizational Domain. + + For example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", a search + for the Organizational Domain would require a series of DNS queries + for DMARC Policy Records starting with "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com" + and finishing with "_dmarc.com". If there are DMARC Policy Records + published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" and "_dmarc.example.com", but + not at "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com" or "_dmarc.com", then the + Organizational Domain for this domain would be "example.com". + + As another example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", + if a search for the Organizational Domain yields a DMARC Policy + Record at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" with the "psd" tag set to "n", + then the Organizational Domain for this domain would be + "mail.example.com". + + As a last example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", if + a search for the Organizational Domain only yields a DMARC Policy + Record at "_dmarc.com" and that record contains the tag "psd=y", then + the Organizational Domain for this domain would be "example.com". + +5. DMARC Participation + + This section describes the actions for participating in DMARC for + each of three unique entities - Domain Owners, PSOs, and Mail + Receivers. + +5.1. Domain Owner Actions + + A Domain Owner (#domain-owner) wishing to fully participate in DMARC + will publish a DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record) to cover + each Author Domain (#author-domain) and corresponding Organizational + Domain (#organizational-domain) to which DMARC validation should + apply, send email that produces at least one, and preferably two, + Authenticated Identifiers (#authenticated-identifiers) that align + with the Author Domain, and will receive and monitor the content of + DMARC aggregate reports. The following sections describe how to + achieve this. + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 31] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +5.1.1. Publish an SPF Record for an Aligned Domain + + To configure SPF for DMARC, the Domain Owner MUST send mail that has + an RFC5321.MailFrom domain that will produce an SPF-Authenticated + Identifier (#spf-identifiers) that has Identifier Alignment + (#identifier-alignment-explained) with the Author Domain. + +5.1.2. Configure Sending System for DKIM Signing Using an Aligned + Domain + + To configure DKIM for DMARC, the Domain Owner MUST send mail that has + a DKIM Signing Domain (#dkim-signing-domain) that will produce a + DKIM-Authenticated Identifier (#dkim-identifiers) that has Identifier + Alignment (#identifier-alignment-explained) with the Author Domain. + +5.1.3. Set Up a Mailbox to Receive Aggregate Reports + + Proper consumption and analysis of DMARC aggregate reports are + essential to any successful DMARC deployment for a Domain Owner. + DMARC aggregate reports, which are defined in + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting], contain valuable data for the + Domain Owner, showing sources of mail using the Author Domain. + +5.1.4. Publish a DMARC Policy Record for the Author Domain and + Organizational Domain + + Once SPF, DKIM, and the aggregate reports mailbox are all in place, + it's time to publish a DMARC Policy Record. For best results, Domain + Owners usually start with "p=none", (see Section 5.1.5) with the + "rua" tag containing a URI that references the mailbox created in the + previous step. This is commonly referred to as putting the Author + Domain into Monitoring Mode (#monitoring-mode). If the + Organizational Domain is different from the Author Domain, a record + also needs to be published for the Organizational Domain. + +5.1.5. Collect and Analyze Reports + + The reason for starting at "p=none" is to ensure that nothing's been + missed in the initial SPF and DKIM deployments. In all but the most + trivial setups, a Domain Owner can overlook a server here or be + unaware of a third party sending agreement there. Starting at + "p=none", therefore, takes advantage of DMARC's aggregate reporting + function, with the Domain Owner using the reports to audit its own + mail streams' authentication configurations. + + While it is possible for a human to read aggregate reports, they are + formatted in such a way that it is recommended that they be machine- + parsed, so setting up a mailbox involves more than just the physical + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 32] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + creation of that mailbox. Many third-party services exist that will + process DMARC aggregate reports or the Domain Owner can create its + own set of tools. No matter which method is chosen, the ability to + consume these reports and parse the data contained in them will go a + long way to ensuring a successful deployment. + +5.1.6. Remediate Unaligned or Unauthenticated Mail Streams + + DMARC aggregate reports can reveal to the Domain Owner mail streams + using the Author Domain that should be passing DMARC validation + checks but are not. If the reason for the streams not passing is due + to Authenticated Identifiers being unaligned or missing entirely, + then the Domain Owner wishing to fully participate in DMARC MUST take + necessary steps to address these shortcomings. + +5.1.7. Decide Whether to Update Domain Owner Assessment Policy to + Enforcement + + Once the Domain Owner is satisfied that it is properly authenticating + all of its mail, then it is time to decide if it is appropriate to + change its Domain Owner Assessment Policy to Enforcement + (#enforcement). Depending on its cadence for sending mail, it may + take many months of consuming DMARC aggregate reports before a Domain + Owner reaches the point where it is sure that it is properly + authenticating all of its mail, and the decision on which "p" value + to use will depend on its needs. + + In making this decision it is important to understand the + interoperability issues involved and problems that can result for + mailing lists and for delivery of legitimate mail. Those issues are + discussed in detail in Section 7.4 + +5.1.8. A Note on Large, Complex Organizations and Decentralized DNS + Management + + Large, complex organizations frequently adopt a decentralized model + for DNS management, whereby management of a subtree of the name space + is delegated to a local department by the central IT organization. + In such situations, the "psd" tag makes it possible for those local + departments to declare any arbitrary node in their subtree as an + Organizational Domain. This would be accomplished by publishing a + DMARC Policy Record at that node with the "psd" tag set to "n". The + reasons that departments might declare their own Organizational + Domains include a desire to have different policy settings or + reporting URIs than the DMARC Policy Record published for the apex + domain. + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 33] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + Such configurations would work in theory, and they might involve + domain names with many labels, reflecting the structure of the + organization, for example: + + * Apex domain (DMARC Policy Record published here): example.com + * Zone cut domain (DMARC Policy Record with "psd=n" published here): + b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com + * Author Domain: mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com + + However, Domain Owners should be aware that due to the anti-abuse + protections built into the DNS Tree Walk (#dns-tree-walk), the DMARC + Policy Record published at the zone cut domain in this example will + never be discovered. A Mail Receiver performing a Tree Walk would + only perform queries for these names: + + * _dmarc.mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com + * _dmarc.c.d.e.f.g.example.com + * _dmarc.d.e.f.g.example.com + * _dmarc.e.f.g.example.com + * _dmarc.f.g.example.com + * _dmarc.g.example.com + * _dmarc.example.com + * _dmarc.com + + To avoid this circumstance, Domain Owners wishing to have a specific + DMARC Policy Record applied to a given [Author Domain]{#author- + domain) longer than eight labels MUST publish a DMARC Policy Record + at that domain's location in the DNS namespace, as such records are + always queried by Mail Receivers that participate in DMARC before the + Tree Walk begins. In the above example, this would mean publishing a + DMARC Policy Record at the name + "_dmarc.mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com.". + +5.2. PSO Actions + + In addition to the DMARC Domain Owner actions, if a PSO (#public- + suffix-operator) publishes a DMARC Policy Record it MUST include the + "psd" tag (see Section 4.7) with a value of "y" ("psd=y"). + +5.3. Mail Receiver Actions + + Mail Receivers (#mail-receiver) wishing to fully participate in DMARC + will apply the DMARC mechanism to inbound email messages when a DMARC + Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record) exists that applies to the + Author Domain (#author-domain), and will send aggregate reports to + Domain Owners that request them. Mail Receivers might also send + failure reports to Domain Owners that request them. + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 34] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + The steps for applying the DMARC mechanism to an email message can + take place during the SMTP transaction, and should do so if the Mail + Receiver plans to honor Domain Owner Assessment Policies (#domain- + owner-policy) that are at the Enforcement (#enforcement) state. + + Many Mail Receivers perform one or both of the underlying + Authentication Mechanisms (#authentication-mechanisms) on inbound + messages even in cases where no DMARC Policy Record exists for the + Author Domain of a given message, or where the Mail Receiver is not + participating in DMARC. Nothing in this section is intended to imply + that the underlying Authentication Mechanisms should only be + performed by Mail Receivers participating in DMARC. + + The next sections describe the steps for a Mail Receiver wishing to + fully participate in DMARC. + +5.3.1. Extract Author Domain + + Once the email message has been transmitted to the Mail Receiver, the + Mail Receiver extracts the domain in the RFC5322.From header field as + the Author Domain. If the domain is a U-label, the domain MUST be + converted to an A-label, as described in Section 2.3 of [RFC5890], + for further processing. + + If zero or more than one domain is extracted from the RFC5322.From + header field, then DMARC validation is not possible and the process + terminates. In the case where more than one domain is retrieved, the + Mail Receiver MAY choose to go forward with DMARC validation anyway. + See Section 10.5 for further discussion. + +5.3.2. Determine If The DMARC Mechanism Applies + + If precisely one Author Domain exists for the message, then perform + the step described in [DMARC Policy Discovery] to determine if the + DMARC mechanism applies. If a DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy- + record) is not discovered during this step, then the DMARC mechanism + does not apply and DMARC validation terminates for the message. + +5.3.3. Determine If Authenticated Identifiers Exist + + For each Authentication Mechanism underlying DMARC, perform the + required check to determine if an Authenticated Identifier + (#authenticated-identifier) exists for the message if such check has + not already been performed. Results from each check must be + preserved for later use as follows: + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 35] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + * For SPF, the preserved results MUST include "pass" or "fail", and + if "fail", SHOULD include information about the reasons for + failure if available. The results MUST further include the domain + name used to complete the SPF check. + * For DKIM signature validation checks, for each signature checked, + the results MUST include "pass" or "fail", and if "fail", SHOULD + include information about the reasons for failure. The results + MUST further include the value of the "d" and "s" tags from each + checked DKIM signature. + +5.3.4. Conduct Identifier Alignment Checks If Necessary + + For each Authenticated Identifier found in the message, the Mail + Receiver checks to see if the Authenticated Identifier is aligned + (#identifier-alignment-evaluation) with the Author Domain. + +5.3.5. Determine DMARC "Pass" or "Fail" + + If one or more of the Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author + Domain, the message is considered to pass the DMARC mechanism check. + + If no Authenticated Identifiers exist for the domain, or none of the + Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author Domain, the message + is considered to fail the DMARC mechanism check. + +5.3.6. Apply Policy If Appropriate + + Email messages that fail the DMARC mechanism check are handled in + accordance with the Mail Receiver's local policies. These local + policies may take into account the Domain Owner Assessment Policy for + the Author Domain at the Mail Receiver's discretion. + + If one or more DNS queries required to perform DMARC validation on + the message do not complete due to temporary or permanent DNS errors, + the message cannot be considered to pass or fail the DMARC mechanism + check. In such cases, the Domain Owner Assessment Policy cannot be + applied to the message, and any other handling decisions for the + message are left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver. + + See Section 7.2 for further discussion of topics regarding rejecting + messages. + + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 36] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +5.3.7. Store Results of DMARC Processing + + If the Mail Receiver intends to fully participate in DMARC, then + results obtained from the application of the DMARC mechanism by the + Mail Receiver MUST be stored for eventual presentation back to the + Domain Owner in the form of aggregate feedback reports. Section 4.7 + and [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] discuss aggregate feedback. + +5.3.8. Send Aggregate Reports + + To ensure maximum usefulness for DMARC across the email ecosystem, + Mail Receivers SHOULD generate and send aggregate reports with a + frequency of at least once every 24 hours. Such reports provide + Domain Owners with insight into all mail streams using Author Domains + under the Domain Owner's control, and aid the Domain Owner in + determining whether and when to transition from Monitoring Mode + (#monitoring-mode) to Enforcement (#enforcement). + + The most common reasons for a Mail Receiver to opt out of sending + aggregate reports include resource constraints, local policy against + sharing data, and concerns about user privacy. + +5.3.9. Optionally Send Failure Reports + + Per-message failure reports can be a useful source of information for + a Domain Owner, either for debugging deployments or in analyzing + attacks, and so Mail Receivers MAY choose to send them. Experience + has shown, however, that Mail Receivers rightly concerned about + protecting user privacy have either chosen to heavily redact the + information in such reports (which can hinder their usefulness) or + not send them at all. See [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] for + further information. + +5.4. Policy Enforcement Considerations + + The final handling of any message is always a matter of local policy + and is left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver. + + A DMARC pass for a message indicates only that the use of the Author + Domain (#author-domain) has been validated for that message as + authorized by the Domain Owner (#domain-owner). Such authorization + does not carry an explicit or implicit value assertion about that + message or the Domain Owner, and Mail Receivers MAY choose to reject + or quarantine a message even if it passes the DMARC validation check. + Mail Receivers are encouraged to maintain anti-abuse technologies to + combat the possibility of DMARC-enabled criminal campaigns. + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 37] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + Mail Receivers MAY choose to accept email that fails the DMARC + validation check even if the published Domain Owner Assessment Policy + is "reject". In particular, because of the considerations discussed + in [RFC7960] and in Section 7.4 of this document, it is important + that Mail Receivers SHOULD NOT reject messages solely because of a + published policy of "reject", but that they apply other knowledge and + analysis to avoid situations such as rejection of legitimate messages + sent in ways that DMARC cannot describe, harm to the operation of + mailing lists, and similar. + + If a Mail Receiver chooses not to honor the published Domain Owner + Assessment Policy to improve interoperability among mail systems, it + may increase the likelihood of accepting abusive mail. At a minimum, + Mail Receivers SHOULD add the Authentication-Results header field + (see [RFC8601]), and it is RECOMMENDED when delivering messages that + fail the DMARC validation check. + + When Mail Receivers deviate from a published Domain Owner Assessment + Policy during message processing they SHOULD make available the fact + of and reason for the deviation to the Domain Owner via feedback + reporting, specifically using the "PolicyOverride" feature of the + aggregate report defined in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. + + To enable Domain Owners to receive DMARC feedback without impacting + existing mail processing, discovered policies of "p=none" MUST NOT + modify existing mail handling processes. + +6. DMARC Feedback + + DMARC Feedback is described in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] + + As an operational note for Public Suffix Operators, feedback for non- + existent domains can be desirable and useful, just as it can be for + Organizational Domains. Therefore, both such entities should + consider including "rua=" tags in any DMARC Policy Records they + publish for themselves. See Section 9 for discussion of Privacy + Considerations. + +7. Other Topics + + This section discusses some topics regarding choices made in the + development of DMARC, largely to commit the history to record. + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 38] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +7.1. Issues Specific to SPF + + Though DMARC does not inherently change the semantics of an SPF + policy record, historically lax enforcement of such policies has led + many to publish extremely broad records containing many extensive + network ranges. Domain Owners (#domain-owner) are strongly + encouraged to carefully review their SPF records to understand which + networks are authorized to send on behalf of the Domain Owner before + publishing a DMARC Policy Record. Furthermore, Domain Owners should + periodically review their SPF records to ensure that the + authorization conveyed by the records matches the domain's current + needs. + + SPF was intended to be implemented early in the SMTP transaction, + meaning it's possible for a message to fail SPF validation prior to + any message content being transmitted, and so some Mail Receiver + architectures might implement SPF in advance of any DMARC operations. + This means that an SPF hard fail ("-") prefix on a sender's SPF + mechanism, such as "-all", could cause a message to be rejected early + in the SMTP transaction, before any DMARC processing takes place, if + the message fails SPF authentication checks. Domain Owners choosing + to use "-all" to terminate SPF records should be aware of this, and + should understand that messages that might otherwise pass DMARC due + to an aligned DKIM-Authenticated Identifier (#dkim-identifiers) could + be rejected solely due to an SPF fail. Moreover, messages rejected + early in the SMTP transaction will never appear in aggregate DMARC + reports, as the transaction will never proceed to the DATA phase and + so the RFC5322.From domain will never be revealed and its DMARC + policy will never be discovered. Domain Owners and Mail Receivers + (#mail-receiver) can consult [M3SPF] and [M3AUTH] for more discussion + of the topic and best practices regarding publishing SPF records and + when to reject based solely on SPF failure: + +7.2. Rejecting Messages + + The DMARC mechanism calls for rejection of a message during the SMTP + session under certain circumstances. This is preferable to + generation of a Delivery Status Notification [RFC3464], since + fraudulent messages caught and rejected using the DMARC mechanism + would then result in the annoying generation of such failure reports + that go back to the RFC5321.MailFrom address. + + This synchronous rejection is typically done in one of two ways: + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 39] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + * Full rejection, wherein the SMTP server issues a 5xy reply code to + the DATA command as an indication to the SMTP client that the + transaction failed; the SMTP client is then responsible for + generating a notification that delivery failed (see Section 4.2.5 + of [RFC5321]). + + * A "silent discard", wherein the SMTP server returns a 2xy reply + code implying to the client that delivery (or, at least, relay) + was successfully completed, but then simply discards the message + with no further action. + + Each of these has a cost. For instance, a silent discard can help to + prevent backscatter, but it also effectively means that the SMTP + server has to be programmed to give a false result, which can + confound external debugging efforts. + + Similarly, the text portion of the SMTP reply may be important to + consider. For example, when rejecting a message, revealing the + reason for the rejection might give an attacker enough information to + bypass those efforts on a later attempt, though it might also assist + a legitimate client to determine the source of some local issue that + caused the rejection. + + In the latter case, when doing an SMTP rejection, providing a clear + hint can be useful in resolving issues. A Mail Receiver (#mail- + receiver) might indicate in plain text the reason for the rejection + by using the word "DMARC" somewhere in the reply text. For example: + + 550 5.7.1 Email rejected per DMARC policy for example.com + + Many systems are able to scan the SMTP reply text to determine the + nature of the rejection. Thus, providing a machine-detectable reason + for rejection allows the problems causing rejections to be properly + addressed by automated systems. + + If a Mail Receiver elects to defer delivery due to the inability to + retrieve or apply DMARC policy, this is best done with a 4xy SMTP + reply code. + +7.3. Interoperability Issues + + DMARC limits which end-to-end scenarios can achieve a "pass" result. + + Because DMARC relies on SPF [RFC7208] and/or DKIM [RFC6376] to + achieve a "pass", their limitations also apply. + + Issues specific to the use of policy mechanisms alongside DKIM are + further discussed in [RFC6377], particularly Section 5.2. + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 40] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + Mail that is sent by authorized, independent third parties might not + be sent with Identifier Alignment, also preventing a "pass" result. + A Domain Owner can use DMARC aggregate reports to identify this mail + and take steps to address authentication shortcomings. + +7.4. Interoperability Considerations + + As discussed in "Interoperability Issues between DMARC and Indirect + Email Flows" [RFC7960], use of "p=reject" can be incompatible with + and cause interoperability problems to indirect message flows such as + "alumni forwarders", role-based email aliases, and mailing lists + across the Internet. + + As an example of this, a bank might send only targeted messages to + account holders. Those account holders might have given their bank + addresses such as "jones@alumni.example.edu" (an address that relays + the messages to another address with a real mailbox) or + "finance@association.example" (a role-based address that does similar + relaying for the current head of finance at the association). When + such mail is delivered to the actual recipient mailbox, it will most + likely fail SPF checks unless the RFC5321.MailFrom address is + rewritten by the relaying MTA, as the incoming IP address will be + that of "example.edu" or "association.example", and not an IP address + authorized by the originating RFC5321.MailFrom domain. DKIM + signatures will generally remain valid in these relay situations. + + | It is therefore critical that domains that publish "p=reject" MUST + | NOT rely solely on SPF to secure a DMARC pass, and MUST apply + | valid DKIM signatures to their messages. + + In the case of domains that have general users who send routine + email, those that publish a Domain Owner Assessment Policy (#domain- + owner-policy) of "p=reject" are likely to create significant + interoperability issues. In particular, if users in such domains + post messages to mailing lists on the Internet, those messages can + cause significant operational problems for the mailing lists and for + the subscribers to those lists, as explained below and in [RFC7960]. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 41] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + | It is therefore critical that domains that host users who might + | post messages to mailing lists SHOULD NOT publish Domain Owner + | Assessment Policies of "p=reject". Any such domains wishing to + | publish "p=reject" SHOULD first take advantage of DMARC aggregate + | report data for their domain to determine the possible impact to + | their users, first by publishing "p=none" for at least a month, + | followed by publishing "p=quarantine" for an equally long period + | of time, and comparing the message disposition results. Domains + | that choose to publish "p=reject" SHOULD either implement policies + | that their users not post to Internet mailing lists and/or inform + | their users that their participation in mailing lists may be + | hindered. + + As noted in Section 5.4, Mail Receivers (#mail-receivers) need to + apply more analysis than just DMARC validation in their disposition + of incoming messages. An example of the consequences of honoring a + Domain Owner Assessment Policy of "p=reject" without further analysis + is that rejecting messages that have been relayed by a mailing list + can cause the Mail Receiver's users to have their subscriptions to + that mailing list canceled by the list software's automated handling + of such rejections - it looks to the list manager as though the + recipient's email address is no longer working, so the address is + automatically unsubscribed. An example of this scenario, albeit with + DKIM Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP) rather than DMARC, can be + found in Section 5.2 of [RFC6377]. + + | It is therefore critical that Mail Receivers MUST NOT reject + | incoming messages solely on the basis of a "p=reject" policy by + | the sending domain. Mail Receivers must use the DMARC policy as + | part of their disposition decision, along with other knowledge and + | analysis. "Other knowledge and analysis" here might refer to + | observed sending patterns for properly-authenticated mail using + | the sending domain, content filtering, etc. In the absence of + | other knowledge and analysis, Mail Receivers MUST treat such + | failing mail as if the policy were "p=quarantine" rather than + | "p=reject". + + Failure to understand and abide by these considerations can cause + legitimate, sometimes important email to be rejected, can cause + operational damage to mailing lists throughout the Internet, and can + result in trouble-desk calls and complaints from the Mail Receiver's + employees, customers, and clients. + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 42] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + In practice, despite this advice, few Mail Receivers apply any + mitigation techniques when receiving indirect mail flows, few + organizations consider the effect of DMARC policies on their users' + indirect mail, and it is unlikely that any advice in this document + will change that. As a result, mail forwarded through mailing lists + with unmodified From: header lines is frequently rejected due to a + p=reject policy. + + In the ten years since large consumer mail systems started publishing + p=reject policies, mailing list software has all adopted workarounds + to make the From: header line DMARC aligned. Some simply use the + list's address, while others do per-address modifications intended to + be reversible or to allow mail to be forwarded back to the original + author, e.g., bob@example.com turned into + bob=example.com@user.somelist.example. While these workarounds are + far from ideal, they are firmly established and list operators treat + them as a fact of life. + + Mail developers have been trying for a decade to invent technical + methods to allow mailing lists to continue to work without modifying + the From: header line, with a prominent example being the + Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) protocol described in [RFC8617]. + While work continues, as of this document's publication, none of the + methods have become widely used. Should such a technical method + achieve widespread adoption in the future, this document can be + updated to reflect that. + +8. IANA Considerations + + This section describes actions completed by IANA. + +8.1. Authentication-Results Method Registry Update + + IANA has added the following to the "Email Authentication Methods" + registry: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 43] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + +======+===========+======+==========+===============+======+=======+ + |Method| Defined |ptype | Property | Value |Status|Version| + +======+===========+======+==========+===============+======+=======+ + |dmarc | [this |header| from | the domain |active|1 | + | | document] | | | portion of | | | + | | | | | the | | | + | | | | | RFC5322.From | | | + | | | | | header field | | | + +------+-----------+------+----------+---------------+------+-------+ + |dmarc | [this |policy| dmarc | Evaluated |active|1 | + | | document] | | | DMARC policy | | | + | | | | | applied/to | | | + | | | | | be applied | | | + | | | | | after policy | | | + | | | | | options | | | + | | | | | including | | | + | | | | | pct: and sp: | | | + | | | | | have been | | | + | | | | | processed. | | | + | | | | | Must be | | | + | | | | | none, | | | + | | | | | quarantine, | | | + | | | | | or reject. | | | + +------+-----------+------+----------+---------------+------+-------+ + + Table 3: "Authentication-Results Method Registry Update" + +8.2. Authentication-Results Result Registry Update + + IANA has added the following in the "Email Authentication Result + Names" registry: + + +================+===========+=================+========+ + | Auth Method(s) | Code | Specification | Status | + +================+===========+=================+========+ + | dmarc | fail | [this document] | active | + +----------------+-----------+-----------------+--------+ + | dmarc | none | [this document] | active | + +----------------+-----------+-----------------+--------+ + | dmarc | pass | [this document] | active | + +----------------+-----------+-----------------+--------+ + | dmarc | permerror | [this document] | active | + +----------------+-----------+-----------------+--------+ + | dmarc | temperror | [this document] | active | + +----------------+-----------+-----------------+--------+ + + Table 4: "Authentication-Results Result Registry Update" + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 44] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +8.3. Feedback Report Header Fields Registry Update + + The following has been added to the "Feedback Report Header Fields" + registry: + + +=========+==============+==========+============+=========+=======+ + |Field | Description |Multiple | Related |Reference|Status | + |Name | |Apperances| "Feedback- | | | + | | | | Type" | | | + +=========+==============+==========+============+=========+=======+ + |Identity-| indicates |No | auth- |[this |current| + |Alignment| whether the | | failure |document]| | + | | message | | | | | + | | about which | | | | | + | | a report is | | | | | + | | being | | | | | + | | generated | | | | | + | | had any | | | | | + | | identifiers | | | | | + | | in alignment | | | | | + +---------+--------------+----------+------------+---------+-------+ + + Table 5: "Feedback Report Header Fields" + +8.4. DMARC Tag Registry + + A registry tree called "Domain-based Message Authentication, + Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Parameters" exists, and it and any + sub-registries thereunder should be updated to reference this + document. Within it, a new sub-registry called the "DMARC Tag + Registry" exists. + + Names of DMARC tags are registered with IANA in this sub-registry. + Entries are assigned only for values that have been documented in a + manner that satisfies the terms of Specification Required, per + [RFC8126]. Each registration includes the tag name; the + specification that defines it; a brief description; and its status, + which is one of "current", "experimental", or "historic". The + Designated Expert needs to confirm that the provided specification + adequately describes the new tag and clearly presents how it would be + used within the DMARC context by Domain Owners and Mail Receivers. + + To avoid version compatibility issues, tags added to the DMARC + specification are to avoid changing the semantics of existing records + when processed by implementations conforming to prior specifications. + + The set of entries to be defined in this registry is as follows: + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 45] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + +=======+===========+==========+=============================+ + | Tag | Reference | Status | Description | + | Name | | | | + +=======+===========+==========+=============================+ + | adkim | [this | current | DKIM alignment mode | + | | document] | | | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | aspf | [this | current | SPF alignment mode | + | | document] | | | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | fo | [this | current | Failure reporting options | + | | document] | | | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | np | [this | current | Requested handling policy | + | | document] | | for non-existent subdomains | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | p | [this | current | Requested handling policy | + | | document] | | | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | pct | [this | historic | Sampling rate | + | | document] | | | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | psd | [this | current | Indicates whether policy | + | | document] | | record is published by a | + | | | | Public Suffix Domain | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | rf | [this | historic | Failure reporting format(s) | + | | document] | | | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | ri | [this | historic | Aggregate Reporting | + | | document] | | interval | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | rua | [this | current | Reporting URI(s) for | + | | document] | | aggregate data | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | ruf | [this | current | Reporting URI(s) for | + | | document] | | failure data | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | sp | [this | current | Requested handling policy | + | | document] | | for subdomains | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | t | [this | current | Test mode for the specified | + | | document] | | policy | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + | v | [this | current | Specification version | + | | document] | | | + +-------+-----------+----------+-----------------------------+ + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 46] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + Table 6: "DMARC Tag Registry" + +8.5. DMARC Report Format Registry + + Also, within "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and + Conformance (DMARC) Parameters", a new sub-registry called "DMARC + Report Format Registry" exists and should be updated to reference + this document. + + Names of DMARC failure reporting formats are registered with IANA in + this registry. New entries are assigned only for values that satisfy + the definition of Specification Required, per [RFC8126]. In addition + to a reference to a permanent specification, each registration + includes the format name, a brief description, and its status, which + must be one of "current", "experimental", or "historic". The + Designated Expert needs to confirm that the provided specification + adequately describes the report format and clearly presents how it + would be used within the DMARC context by Domain Owners and Mail + Receivers. + + The entry in this registry is as follows: + + +========+===========+=========+==================================+ + | Format | Reference | Status | Description | + | Name | | | | + +========+===========+=========+==================================+ + | afrf | [this | current | Authentication Failure Reporting | + | | document] | | Format (see [RFC6591]) | + +--------+-----------+---------+----------------------------------+ + + Table 7: "DMARC Report Format Registry" + +8.6. Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names Registry + + Per [RFC8552], please update the following entry to the "Underscored + and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry: + + +=========+============+=================+ + | RR Type | _NODE NAME | Reference | + +=========+============+=================+ + | TXT | _dmarc | [this document] | + +---------+------------+-----------------+ + + Table 8: "Underscored and Globally + Scoped DNS Node Names" registry + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 47] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +9. Privacy Considerations + + This section discusses issues specific to private data that may be + included if DMARC reports are requested. Issues associated with + sending aggregate reports and failure reports are addressed in + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] respectively. + +9.1. Aggregate Report Considerations + + Aggregate reports may, particularly for small organizations, provide + some limited insight into email sending patterns. As an example, in + a small organization, an aggregate report from a particular domain + may be sufficient to make the report receiver aware of sensitive + personal or business information. If setting an "rua" tag in a DMARC + Policy Record, the reporting address needs controls appropriate to + the organizational requirements to mitigate any risk associated with + receiving and handling reports. + + In the case of "rua" requests for multi-organizational PSDs, + additional information leakage considerations exist. Multi- + organizational PSDs that do not mandate DMARC use by registrants risk + exposure of private data of registrant domains if they include the + "rua" tag in their DMARC Policy Record. + +9.2. Failure Report Considerations + + Failure reports do provide insight into email sending patterns, + including specific users. If requesting failure reports, data + management controls are needed to support appropriate management of + this information. The additional detail available through failure + reports (relative to aggregate reports) can drive a need for + additional controls. As an example, a company may be legally + restricted from receiving data related to a specific subsidiary. + Before requesting failure reports, any such data spillage risks have + to be addressed through data management controls or publishing DMARC + Policy Records for relevant subdomains to prevent reporting on data + related to their emails. + + Due to the nature of the email contents which may be shared through + Failure Reports, most Mail Receivers refuse to send them out of + privacy concerns. Out of band agreements between Report Consumers + and Mail Receivers may be required to address these concerns. + + DMARC Policy Records for multi-organizational PSDs MUST NOT include + the "ruf" tag. + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 48] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +10. Security Considerations + + This section discusses security issues and possible remediations + (where available) for DMARC. + +10.1. Authentication Methods + + Security considerations from the authentication methods used by DMARC + are incorporated here by reference. + + Both of the email authentication methods that underlie DMARC provide + some assurance that an email was transmitted by an MTA which is + authorized to do so. SPF policies map domain names to sets of + authorized MTAs (see Section 11.4 of [RFC7208]). Validated DKIM + signatures indicate that an email was transmitted by an MTA with + access to a private key that matches the published DKIM key record. + + Whenever mail is sent, there is a risk that an overly permissive + source may send mail that will receive a DMARC pass result that was + not, in fact, intended by the Domain Owner. These results may lead + to issues when systems interpret DMARC pass results to indicate a + message is in some way authentic. They also allow such unauthorized + senders to evade the Domain Owner's intended message handling for + DMARC validation failures. + + To avoid this risk one must ensure that no unauthorized source can + add DKIM signatures to the domain's mail or transmit mail which will + evaluate as SPF pass. If, nonetheless, a Domain Owner wishes to + include a permissive source in a domain's SPF record, the source can + be excluded from DMARC consideration by using the "?" qualifier on + the SPF record mechanism associated with that source. + +10.2. Attacks on Reporting URIs + + URIs published in DNS TXT records are well-understood possible + targets for attack. Specifications such as [RFC1035] and [RFC2142] + either expose or cause the exposure of email addresses that could be + flooded by an attacker, for example. Records found in the DNS such + as MX, NS, and others advertise potential attack destinations. + Common DNS names such as "www" plainly identify the locations at + which particular services can be found, providing destinations for + targeted denial-of-service or penetration attacks. This all means + that Domain Owners will need to harden these addresses against + various attacks, including but not limited to: + + * high-volume denial-of-service attacks; + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 49] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + * deliberate construction of malformed reports intended to identify + or exploit parsing or processing vulnerabilities; + + * deliberate construction of reports containing false claims for the + Submitter or Reported-Domain fields, including the possibility of + false data from compromised but known Mail Receivers. + +10.3. DNS Security + + The DMARC mechanism and its underlying Authentication Mechanisms (SPF + and DKIM) depend on the security of the DNS. Examples of how hostile + parties can have an adverse impact on DNS traffic include: + + * If they can snoop on DNS traffic, they can get an idea of who is + receiving mail using the domain(s) in question. + + * If they can block outgoing or reply DNS messages, they can prevent + systems from discovering senders' DMARC policies. + + * If they can send forged response packets, they can make aligned + mail appear unaligned or vice-versa. + + None of these threats are unique to DMARC, and they can be addressed + using a variety of techniques, including, but not limited to: + + * Signing DNS records with Domain Name System Security Extensions + (DNSSEC) [RFC4033], which enables recipients to validate the + integrity of DNS data and detect and discard forged responses. + + * DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DNS over HTTPS [RFC8484] can mitigate + snooping and forged responses. + +10.4. Display Name Attacks + + An increasingly common attack in messaging abuse is the presentation + of false information in the display-name portion of the RFC5322.From + header field. For example, it is possible for the email address in + that field to be an arbitrary address or domain name while containing + a well-known name (a person, brand, role, etc.) in the display name, + intending to fool the end user into believing that the name is used + legitimately. + + Such attacks, known as display name attacks, are out of scope for + DMARC. + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 50] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +10.5. Denial of DMARC Processing Attacks + + The declaration in Section 5.3.1 and elsewhere in this document that + messages that do not contain precisely one RFC5322.From domain are + outside the scope of this document exposes an attack vector that must + be taken into consideration. + + Because such messages are outside the scope of this document, an + attacker can craft messages with multiple RFC5322.From domains, + including the spoofed domain, in an effort to bypass DMARC validation + and get the fraudulent message to be displayed by the victim's MUA + with the spoofed domain successfully shown to the victim. In those + cases where such messages are not rejected due to other reasons (for + example, many such messages would violate RFC5322's requirement that + there be precisely one From: header field), care must be taken by the + Mail Receiver to recognize such messages as the threats they might be + and handle them appropriately. + + The case of a syntactically valid multi-valued RFC5322.From field + presents a particular challenge. Experience has shown that most such + messages are abusive and/or unwanted by their recipients, and given + this fact, a Mail Receiver may make a negative disposition decision + for the message prior to and instead of its being subjected to DMARC + processing. However, in a case where a Mail Receiver requires that + the message be subject to DMARC validation, a recommended approach as + per [RFC7489] is to apply the DMARC mechanism to each domain found in + the RFC5322.From field as the Author Domain and apply the most strict + policy selected among the checks that fail. Such an approach might + prove useful for a small number of Author Domains, but it is possible + that applying such logic to messages with a large number of domains + (where "large" is defined by each Mail Receiver) will expose the Mail + Receiver to a form of denial of service attack. Limiting the number + of Author Domains processed will avoid this risk. If not all Author + Domains are processed, then the DMARC evaluation is incomplete. + +10.6. External Reporting Addresses + + To avoid abuse by bad actors, reporting addresses generally have to + be inside the domains about which reports are requested. To + accommodate special cases such as a need to get reports about domains + that cannot actually receive mail, Section 3 of + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] describes a DNS-based mechanism + for validating approved external reporting. + + The obvious consideration here is an increased DNS load against + domains that are claimed as external recipients. Negative caching + will mitigate this problem, but only to a limited extent, mostly + dependent on the default TTL in the domain's SOA record. + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 51] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + Where possible, external reporting is best achieved by having the + report be directed to domains that can receive mail and simply having + it automatically forwarded to the desired external destination. + + Note that the addresses shown in the "ruf" tag receive more + information that might be considered private data since it is + possible for actual email content to appear in the failure reports. + The URIs identified there are thus more attractive targets for + intrusion attempts than those found in the "rua" tag. Moreover, + attacking the DNS of the subject domain to cause failure data to be + routed fraudulently to an attacker's systems may be an attractive + prospect. Deployment of DNSSEC [RFC4033] is advisable if this is a + concern. + +10.7. Secure Protocols + + This document encourages the use of secure transport mechanisms to + prevent the loss of private data to third parties that may be able to + monitor such transmissions. Unencrypted mechanisms should be + avoided. + + In particular, a message that was originally encrypted or otherwise + secured might appear in a report that is not sent securely, which + could reveal private information. + +10.8. Relaxed Alignment Considerations + + The DMARC mechanism allows both DKIM- and SPF-Authenticated + Identifiers (#identifier-alignment-explained) to validate authorized + use of an Author Domain (#author-domain) on behalf of a Domain Owner + (#domain-owner). If malicious or unaware users can gain control of + the SPF record or DKIM selector records for a subdomain of the + Organizational Domain, the subdomain can be used to generate email + that achieves a DMARC pass on behalf of the Organizational Domain. + + A scenario such as this could occur under the following conditions: + + * A DMARC record exists for the domain "example.com", such that + "example.com" is an Organizational Domain + * An attacker controls DNS for the domain "evil.example.com" and + publishes an SPF record for that domain + * The attacker sends email with RFC5322.From header field containing + "foo@example.com" and an SPF-Authenticated Identifier of + "evil.example.com" + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 52] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + Although this email was not authorized by the Domain Owner, it can + produce a DMARC pass because the SPF-Authenticated Identifier + ("evil.example.com") has Identifier Alignment with the Author Domain + ("example.com"). + + The Organizational Domain Owner should be careful not to delegate + control of subdomains if this is an issue, and consider using the + Strict Alignment (#strict-alignment) option if appropriate. + + DMARC evaluation for relaxed alignment is also highly sensitive to + errors in determining the Organizational Domain if the Author Domain + does not have a published DMARC Policy Record (#dmarc-policy-record). + If an incorrectly selected Organizational Domain is a parent of the + correct Organizational Domain, then relaxed alignment could + potentially allow a malicious sender to send mail that achieves a + DMARC pass verdict. This potential exists for both the legacy + [RFC7489] and current methods for determining the organizational + domain, the latter described in Section 4.10.2. + + The following example illustrates this possibility: + + * Mail is sent with an Author Domain of "a.mail.example.com" and + Authenticated Identifiers of "mail.example.com" + * There is no DMARC Policy Record published at + "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com" + * There is one published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" and this is + intended to be the Organizataional Domain for this message + * There is also a DMARC Policy Record published at + "_dmarc.example.com", with default alignment (relaxed) + * An is able to send mail with the Author Domain of + "evil.example.com" and an Authenticated Identifier of + "mail.example.com" + + In this scenario, if a Mail Receiver incorrectly determines the + Organizational Domain to be "example.com", then the attacker's mail + will pass DMARC validation checks. + + This issue is entirely avoided by the use of Strict Alignment and + publishing explicit DMARC Policy Records for all Author Domains used + in an organization's email. + + For cases where Strict Alignment is not appropriate, this issue can + be mitigated by the Domain Owner periodically (perhaps weekly, or + whatever frequency might be appropriate for a given organization's + perational needs) checking the DMARC Policy Records, if any, of PSDs + (#public-suffix-domain) above the Organizational Domain in the DNS + tree and (for legacy [RFC7489] checking that appropriate PSL entries + remain present). If a PSD publishes a DMARC Policy Record without + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 53] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + the appropriate "psd=y" tag, Organizational Domain owners can add + "psd=n" to their Organizational Domain's DMARC Policy Record so that + the PSD's DMARC Policy Record will not be incorrectly interpreted to + indicate that the PSD is the Organizational Domain. + +11. References + +11.1. Normative References + + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] + Brotman, A., "Domain-based Message Authentication, + Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Aggregate Reporting", + Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dmarc- + aggregate-reporting-21, 4 November 2024, + . + + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting] + Jones, S. M. and A. Vesely, "Domain-based Message + Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Failure + Reporting", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- + dmarc-failure-reporting-11, 10 September 2024, + . + + [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and + specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, + November 1987, . + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + . + + [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform + Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, + RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, + . + + [RFC4343] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) Case + Insensitivity Clarification", RFC 4343, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4343, January 2006, + . + + [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax + Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008, + . + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 54] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + [RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008, + . + + [RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008, + . + + [RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for + Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework", + RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010, + . + + [RFC6376] Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed., + "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76, + RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011, + . + + [RFC6377] Kucherawy, M., "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) and + Mailing Lists", BCP 167, RFC 6377, DOI 10.17487/RFC6377, + September 2011, . + + [RFC6591] Fontana, H., "Authentication Failure Reporting Using the + Abuse Reporting Format", RFC 6591, DOI 10.17487/RFC6591, + April 2012, . + + [RFC6651] Kucherawy, M., "Extensions to DomainKeys Identified Mail + (DKIM) for Failure Reporting", RFC 6651, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6651, June 2012, + . + + [RFC6652] Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) + Authentication Failure Reporting Using the Abuse Reporting + Format", RFC 6652, DOI 10.17487/RFC6652, June 2012, + . + + [RFC7208] Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for + Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1", RFC 7208, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7208, April 2014, + . + + [RFC7405] Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF", + RFC 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, December 2014, + . + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 55] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + [RFC7489] Kucherawy, M., Ed. and E. Zwicky, Ed., "Domain-based + Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance + (DMARC)", RFC 7489, DOI 10.17487/RFC7489, March 2015, + . + + [RFC7960] Martin, F., Ed., Lear, E., Ed., Draegen, T., Ed., Zwicky, + E., Ed., and K. Andersen, Ed., "Interoperability Issues + between Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, + and Conformance (DMARC) and Indirect Email Flows", + RFC 7960, DOI 10.17487/RFC7960, September 2016, + . + + [RFC8552] Crocker, D., "Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource + Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves", + BCP 222, RFC 8552, DOI 10.17487/RFC8552, March 2019, + . + + [RFC8601] Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for Indicating + Message Authentication Status", RFC 8601, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8601, May 2019, + . + +11.2. Informative References + + [M3AUTH] "M3AAWG Email Authentication Recommended Best Practices", + . + + [M3SPF] "M3AAWG Best Practices for Managing SPF Records", + . + + [RFC2142] Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and + Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997, + . + + [RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS + NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998, + . + + [RFC3464] Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message Format + for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464, + DOI 10.17487/RFC3464, January 2003, + . + + [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. + Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", + RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, + . + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 56] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + [RFC4870] Delany, M., "Domain-Based Email Authentication Using + Public Keys Advertised in the DNS (DomainKeys)", RFC 4870, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4870, May 2007, + . + + [RFC5598] Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5598, July 2009, + . + + [RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D., + and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport + Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May + 2016, . + + [RFC8020] Bortzmeyer, S. and S. Huque, "NXDOMAIN: There Really Is + Nothing Underneath", RFC 8020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8020, + November 2016, . + + [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for + Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, + RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, + . + + [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC + 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, + May 2017, . + + [RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS + (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018, + . + + [RFC8551] Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/ + Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0 + Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551, + April 2019, . + + [RFC8617] Andersen, K., Long, B., Ed., Blank, S., Ed., and M. + Kucherawy, Ed., "The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) + Protocol", RFC 8617, DOI 10.17487/RFC8617, July 2019, + . + + [RFC9091] Kitterman, S. and T. Wicinski, Ed., "Experimental Domain- + Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance + (DMARC) Extension for Public Suffix Domains", RFC 9091, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9091, July 2021, + . + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 57] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +Appendix A. Technology Considerations + + This section documents some design decisions made in the development + of DMARC. Specifically addressed here are some suggestions that were + considered but not included in the design, with explanatory text + regarding the decision. + +A.1. S/MIME + + S/MIME, or Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions [RFC8551], is + a standard for encrypting and signing MIME data in a message. This + was suggested and considered as a third security protocol for + authenticating the source of a message. + + DMARC is focused on authentication at the domain level (i.e., the + Domain Owner taking responsibility for the message), while S/MIME is + really intended for user-to-user authentication and encryption. This + alone appears to make it a bad fit for DMARC's goals. + + S/MIME also suffers from the heavyweight problem of Public Key + Infrastructure, which means that distribution of keys used to + validate signatures needs to be incorporated. In many instances, + this alone is a showstopper. There have been consistent promises + that PKI usability and deployment will improve, but these have yet to + materialize. DMARC can revisit this choice after those barriers are + addressed. + + S/MIME has extensive deployment in specific market segments + (government, for example) but does not enjoy similar widespread + deployment over the general Internet, and this shows no signs of + changing. DKIM and SPF are both deployed widely over the general + Internet, and their adoption rates continue to be positive. + + Finally, experiments have shown that including S/MIME support in the + initial version of DMARC would neither cause nor enable a substantial + increase in the accuracy of the overall mechanism. + +A.2. Method Exclusion + + It was suggested that DMARC include a mechanism by which a Domain + Owner could instruct Mail Receivers not to attempt validation by one + of the supported methods (e.g., "check DKIM, but not SPF"). + + Specifically, consider a Domain Owner that has deployed one of the + technologies and that technology fails for some messages, but such + failures don't cause enforcement action. Deploying DMARC would cause + enforcement action for policies other than "none", which would appear + to exclude participation by that Domain Owner. + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 58] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + The DMARC development team evaluated the idea of policy exception + mechanisms on several occasions and invariably concluded that there + was not a strong enough use case to include them. The target + audience for DMARC does not appear to have concerns about the failure + modes of one or the other being a barrier to DMARC's adoption. + + In the scenario described above, the Domain Owner has a few options: + + 1. Tighten up its infrastructure to minimize the failure modes of + the single deployed technology. + + 2. Deploy the other supported authentication mechanism, to offset + the failure modes of the first. + + 3. Deploy DMARC in a reporting-only mode. + +A.3. Sender Header Field + + It has been suggested in several message authentication efforts that + the Sender header field be checked for an identifier of interest, as + the standards indicate this as the proper way to indicate a re- + mailing of content such as through a mailing list. Most recently, it + was a protocol-level option for DomainKeys [RFC4870], but on + evolution to DKIM, this property was removed. + + The DMARC development team considered this and decided not to include + support for doing so for the following reasons: + + 1. The main user protection approach is to be concerned with what + the user sees when a message is rendered. There is no consistent + behavior among MUAs regarding what to do with the content of the + Sender field, if present. Accordingly, supporting the checking + of the Sender identifier would mean applying policy to an + identifier the end user might never actually see, which can + create a vector for attack against end users by simply forging a + Sender field containing some identifier that DMARC will like. + + 2. Although it is certainly true that this is what the Sender field + is for, its use in this way is also unreliable, making it a poor + candidate for inclusion in the DMARC evaluation algorithm. + + 3. Allowing multiple ways to discover policy introduces unacceptable + ambiguity into the DMARC validation algorithm in terms of which + policy is to be applied and when. + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 59] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +A.4. Domain Existence Test + + The presence of the "np" tag in this specification seemingly implies + that there would be an agreed-upon standard for determining a + domain's existence. + + Since the DMARC mechanism is focused on email, one might think that + the definition of "resolvable" in [RFC5321] applies. Using that + definition, only names that resolve to MX Resource Records (RRs), A + RRs, or AAAA RRs are deemed to be resolvable and to exist in the DNS. + This is a common practice among Mail Receivers to determine whether + or not to accept a mail message before performing other more + expensive processing. + + The DMARC mechanism makes no such requirement for the existence of + specific DNS RRs in order for a domain to exist; instead, if any RR + exists for a domain, then the domain exists. To use the terminology + from [RFC2308], an "NXDOMAIN" response (rcode "Name Error") to a DNS + query means that the domain name does not exist, while a "NODATA" + response (rcode "NOERROR") means that the given resource record type + queried for does not exist, but the domain name does. + + Furthermore, in keeping with [RFC8020], if a query for a name returns + NXDOMAIN, then not only does the name not exist, every name below it + in the DNS hierarchy also does not exist. + +A.5. Organizational Domain Discovery Issues + + An earlier informational version of the DMARC mechanism [RFC7489] + noted that the DNS does not provide a method by which the "domain of + record", or the domain that was actually registered with a domain + registrar, can be determined given an arbitrary domain name. That + version further mentioned suggestions that have been made that + attempt to glean such information from SOA or NS resource records, + but these too are not fully reliable, as the partitioning of the DNS + is not always done at administrative boundaries. + + That previous version posited that one could "climb the tree" to find + the Organizational Domain, but expressed concern that an attacker + could exploit this for a denial-of-service attack through sending a + high number of messages each with a relatively large number of + nonsense labels, causing a Mail Receiver to perform a large number of + DNS queries in search of a DMARC Policy Record. This version defines + a method for performing a DNS Tree Walk (#dns-tree-walk), and further + mitigates the risk of the denial-of-service attack by expressly + limiting the number of DNS queries to execute regardless of the + number of labels in the domain name. + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 60] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + Readers curious about the previous method for Organizational Domain + Discovery are directed to Section 3.2 of [RFC7489]. + +A.6. Removal of the "pct" Tag + + An earlier informational version of the DMARC mechanism [RFC7489] + included a "pct" tag and specified all integers from 0 to 100 + inclusive as valid values for the tag. The intent of the tag was to + provide domain owners with a method to gradually change their + preferred Domain Owner Assessment Policy (the "p" tag) from "none" to + "quarantine" or from "quarantine" to "reject" by requesting the + stricter treatment for just a percentage of messages that produced + DMARC results of "fail". + + Operational experience showed that the pct tag was usually not + accurately applied, unless the value specified was either 0 or 100 + (the default), and the inaccuracies with other values varied widely + from one implementation to another. The default value was easily + implemented, as it required no special processing on the part of the + Mail Receiver, while the value of 0 took on unintended significance + as a value used by some intermediaries and mailbox providers as an + indicator to deviate from standard handling of the message, usually + by rewriting the RFC5322.From header field in an effort to avoid + DMARC failures downstream. + + These custom actions when the "pct" tag was set to 0 proved valuable + to the email community. In particular, header field rewriting by an + intermediary meant that a Domain Owner's aggregate reports could + reveal to the Domain Owner how much of its traffic was routing + through intermediaries that don't rewrite the RFC5322.From header + field. Such information wasn't explicit in the aggregate reports + received; rather, sussing it out required work on the part of the + Domain Owner to compare aggregate reports from before and after the + "p" value was changed and "pct=0" was included in the DMARC Policy + Record, but the data was there. Consequently, knowing how much mail + was subject to possible DMARC failure due to a lack of RFC5322.From + header field rewriting by intermediaries could assist the Domain + Owner in choosing whether to move from Monitoring Mode (#monitoring- + mode) to Enforcement (#enforcement). Armed with this knowledge, the + Domain Owner could make an informed decision regarding subjecting its + mail traffic to possible DMARC failures based on the Domain Owner's + tolerance for such things. + + Because of the value provided by "pct=0" to Domain Owners, it was + logical to keep this functionality in the protocol; at the same time, + it didn't make sense to support a tag named "pct" that had only two + valid values. This version of the DMARC mechanism, therefore, + introduces the "t" tag as shorthand for "testing", with the valid + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 61] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + values of "y" and "n", which are meant to be analogous in their + application by mailbox providers and intermediaries to the "pct" tag + values "0" and "100", respectively. + +Appendix B. Examples + + This section illustrates both the Domain Owner side and the Mail + Receiver side of a DMARC exchange. + +B.1. Identifier Alignment Examples + + The following examples illustrate the DMARC mechanism's use of + Identifier Alignment. For brevity's sake, only message header fields + and relevant SMTP commands are shown, as message bodies are not + considered when conducting DMARC checks. + +B.1.1. SPF + + The following SPF examples assume that SPF produces a passing result. + Alignment cannot exist if SPF does not produce a passing result. + + Example 1: SPF in Strict Alignment: + + MAIL FROM: + + From: sender@example.com + Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800 + To: receiver@example.org + Subject: here's a sample + + In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom domain and the Author Domain are + identical. Thus, the identifiers are in Strict Alignment. + + Example 2: SPF in Relaxed Alignment: + + MAIL FROM: + + From: sender@example.com + Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800 + To: receiver@example.org + Subject: here's a sample + + In this case, the Author Domain (example.com) is a parent of the + RFC5321.MailFrom domain. Thus, the identifiers are in relaxed + alignment because they both have the same Organizational Domain + (example.com). + + Example 3: No SPF Identifier Alignment: + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 62] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + MAIL FROM: + + From: sender@child.example.com + Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800 + To: receiver@example.org + Subject: here's a sample + + In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom domain that is neither the same + as, a parent of, nor a child of the Author Domain. Thus, the + identifiers are not in alignment. + +B.1.2. DKIM + + The examples below assume that the DKIM signatures pass validation. + Alignment cannot exist with a DKIM signature that does not validate. + + Example 1: DKIM in Strict Alignment: + + DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.com; ... + From: sender@example.com + Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800 + To: receiver@example.org + Subject: here's a sample + + In this case, the DKIM "d" tag and the Author Domain have identical + DNS domains. Thus, the identifiers are in Strict Alignment. + + Example 2: DKIM in Relaxed Alignment: + + DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.com; ... + From: sender@child.example.com + Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800 + To: receiver@example.org + Subject: here's a sample + + In this case, the DKIM signature's "d" tag includes a DNS domain that + is a parent of the Author Domain. Thus, the identifiers are in + relaxed alignment, as they have the same Organizational Domain + (example.com). + + Example 3: No DKIM Identifier Alignment: + + DKIM-Signature: v=1; ...; d=example.net; ... + From: sender@child.example.com + Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800 + To: receiver@example.org + Subject: here's a sample + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 63] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + In this case, the DKIM signature's "d" tag includes a DNS domain that + is neither the same as, a parent of, nor a child of the Author + Domain. Thus, the identifiers are not in alignment. + +B.2. Domain Owner Example + + A Domain Owner that wants to use DMARC should have already deployed + and tested SPF and DKIM. The next step is to publish a DMARC Policy + Record for the Domain Owner's Organizational Domain. + +B.2.1. Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode + + The Domain Owner for "example.com" has deployed SPF and DKIM on its + messaging infrastructure. The Domain Owner wishes to begin using + DMARC with a policy that will solicit aggregate feedback from Mail + Receivers without affecting how the messages are processed in order + to: + + * Confirm that its legitimate messages are authenticating correctly + + * Validate that all authorized message sources have implemented + authentication measures + + * Determine how many messages from other sources would be affected + by publishing a Domain Owner Assessment Policy at Enforcement + + The Domain Owner accomplishes this by constructing a DMARC Policy + Record indicating that: + + * The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1;") + + * Mail Receivers should not alter how they treat these messages + because of this DMARC Policy Record ("p=none") + + * Aggregate feedback reports are sent via email to the address + "dmarc-feedback@example.com" ("rua=mailto:dmarc- + feedback@example.com") + + * All messages from this Organizational Domain are subject to this + policy (no "t" tag present, so the default of "n" applies). + + To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner + creates an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file + (following the conventional zone file format): + + ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain example.com + _dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; " + "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com" ) + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 64] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +B.2.2. Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode, Per-Message Failure Reports + + The Domain Owner from the previous example has used the aggregate + reporting to discover some messaging systems that had not yet + implemented DKIM correctly, but they are still seeing periodic + authentication failures. To diagnose these intermittent problems, + they wish to request per-message failure reports when authentication + failures occur. + + Not all Mail Receivers will honor such a request, but the Domain + Owner feels that any reports it does receive will be helpful enough + to justify publishing this record. The default per-message failure + report format ([RFC6591]) meets the Domain Owner's needs in this + scenario. + + The Domain Owner accomplishes this by adding the following to its + DMARC Policy Record from Appendix B.2.1: + + * Per-message failure reports are sent via email to the address + "auth-reports@example.com" ("ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com") + + To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner + might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file + (following the conventional zone file format): + + ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain example.com + _dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; " + "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; " + "ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com" ) + +B.2.3. Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third Party + + The Domain Owner from the previous example is maintaining the same + policy but now wishes to have a third party serve as a Report + Consumer. Again, not all Mail Receivers will honor this request, but + those that do MUST implement additional checks to validate that the + third party authorizes reception of failure reports on behalf of this + domain. + + The Domain Owner needs to alter its DMARC Policy Record from + Appendix B.2.2 as follows: + + * Per-message failure reports are sent via email to the address + "auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" ("ruf=mailto:auth- + reports@thirdparty.example.net") + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 65] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner + might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file + (following the conventional zone file format): + + ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain example.com + _dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; " + "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; " + "ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" ) + + Because the address used in the "ruf" tag is outside the + Organizational Domain in which this record is published, conforming + Mail Receivers MUST implement additional checks as described in + Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. To pass these + additional checks, the Report Consumer's Domain Owner will need to + publish an additional DMARC Policy Record as follows: + + * Given the DMARC Policy Record published by the Domain Owner at + "_dmarc.example.com", the DNS administrator for the Report + Consumer will need to publish a TXT resource record at + "example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net" with the value + "v=DMARC1;" to authorize receipt of the reports. + + To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might + create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file + (following the conventional zone file format): + + ; zone file for thirdparty.example.net + ; Accept DMARC reports on behalf of example.com + example.com._report._dmarc IN TXT "v=DMARC1;" + +B.2.4. Overriding destination addresses + + The third party Report Consumer can also publish "rua" and "ruf" tags + in order to override the specific address published by example.com + with a different address in the same third party domain. This may be + necessary if the third party Report Consumer has changed its email + address, or want to guard against typos in the DMARC Policy Record of + the Author Domain. Intermediaries and other third parties should + refer to Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] for the + full details of this mechanism. + + The third party Report Consumer accomplishes this by adding the + following to its DMARC Policy Record from Appendix B.2.3: + + * The override address for aggregate reports is "aggregate- + reports@thirdparty.example.net" ("rua=mailto:aggregate- + reports@thirdparty.example.net") + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 66] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + * The override address for failure reports is "failure- + reports@thirdparty.example.net" ("ruf=mailto:failure- + reports@thirdparty.example.net") + + To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might + create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file + (following the conventional zone file format): + + ; zone file for thirdparty.example.net + ; Accept DMARC reports on behalf of example.com + ; Override destination mailboxes + example.com._report._dmarc IN TXT ( + "v=DMARC1; " + "rua=mailto:aggregate-reports@thirdparty.example.net; " + "ruf=mailto:failure-reports@thirdparty.example.net" ) + + In this case only the "ruf" tag is actually overridden, because, in + the previous example, failure reporting is the only reporting type + that was directed to the third party Report Consumer. + +B.2.5. Subdomain, Testing, and Multiple Aggregate Report URIs + + The Domain Owner has implemented SPF and DKIM in a subdomain used for + pre-production testing of messaging services. It now wishes to + express a handling preference for messages from this subdomain that + fail DMARC validation to indicate to participating Mail Receivers + that use of this domain is not valid. + + As a first step, it will express that it considers messages using + this subdomain that fail DMARC validation to be suspicious. The goal + here will be to enable examination of messages sent to mailboxes + hosted by participating Mail Receivers as a method for + troubleshooting any existing authentication issues. Aggregate + feedback reports will be sent to a mailbox within the Organizational + Domain, and to a mailbox at a Report Consumer selected and authorized + to receive them by the Domain Owner. + + The Domain Owner will accomplish this by constructing a DMARC Policy + Record indicating that: + + * The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1;") + + * It is applied only to this subdomain (the DMARC Policy Record is + published at "_dmarc.test.example.com" and not + "_dmarc.example.com") + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 67] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + * Mail Receivers are advised that the Domain Owner considers + messages that fail to authenticate to be suspicious + ("p=quarantine") + + * Aggregate feedback reports are sent via email to the addresses + "dmarc-feedback@example.com" and "example-tld- + test@thirdparty.example.net" ("rua=mailto:dmarc- + feedback@example.com, mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net") + + * The Domain Owner desires only that an actor performing a DMARC + validation check apply any special handling rules it might have in + place, such as rewriting the RFC53322.From header field; the + Domain Owner is testing its setup at this point and so does not + want the handling policy to be applied. ("t=y") + + To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner + might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file + (following the conventional zone file format): + + ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain test.example.com + _dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; " + "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com," + "mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net; " + "t=y" ) + + Once enough time has passed to allow for collecting enough reports to + give the Domain Owner confidence that all authorized email sent using + the subdomain is properly authenticating and passing DMARC validation + checks, then the Domain Owner can update the DMARC Policy Record to + indicate that it considers validation failures to be a clear + indication that use of the subdomain is not valid. It would do this + by altering the record to advise Mail Receivers of its position on + such messages ("p=reject") and removing the testing flag ("t=y"). + + To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner + might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file + (following the conventional zone file format): + + ; DMARC Policy Record for the domain test.example.com + _dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=reject; " + "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com," + "mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net" ) + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 68] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +B.3. Mail Receiver Example + + A Mail Receiver that wants to participate in DMARC should already be + checking SPF and DKIM, and possess the ability to collect relevant + information from various email-processing stages to provide feedback + to Domain Owners (possibly via Report Consumers). + +B.3.1. SMTP Session Example + + An optimal DMARC-enabled Mail Receiver performs validation and + Identifier Alignment checking during the SMTP [RFC5321] conversation. + + Before returning a final reply to the DATA command, the Mail + Receiver's MTA has performed: + + 1. An SPF check to determine an SPF-Authenticated Identifier. + + 2. DKIM checks that yield one or more DKIM-Authenticated + Identifiers. + + 3. A DMARC Policy Record lookup. + + The presence of an Author Domain DMARC Policy Record indicates that + the Mail Receiver should continue with DMARC-specific processing + before returning a reply to the DATA command. + + Given a DMARC Policy Record and the set of Authenticated Identifiers, + the Mail Receiver checks to see if the Authenticated Identifiers + align with the Author Domain (taking into consideration any strict + versus relaxed options found in the DMARC Policy Record). + + For example, the following sample data is considered to be from a + piece of email originating from the Domain Owner of "example.com": + + Author Domain: example.com + SPF-authenticated Identifier: mail.example.com + DKIM-authenticated Identifier: example.com + DMARC Policy Record: + "v=DMARC1; p=reject; aspf=r; + rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com" + + In the above sample, the SPF-Authenticated Identifier and the DKIM- + Authenticated Identifier both align with the Author Domain. The Mail + Receiver considers the above email to pass the DMARC check, avoiding + the "reject" policy that is requested to be applied to email that + fails the DMARC validation check. + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 69] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + If no Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author Domain, then + the Mail Receiver applies the Domain Owner Assessment Policy. + However, before this action is taken, the Mail Receiver can consult + external information to override the Domain Owner Assessment Policy. + For example, if the Mail Receiver knows that this particular email + came from a known and trusted forwarder (that happens to break both + SPF and DKIM), then the Mail Receiver may choose to ignore the Domain + Owner Assessment Policy. + + The Mail Receiver is now ready to reply to the DATA command. If the + DMARC check yields that the message is to be rejected, then the Mail + Receiver replies with a 5xy code to inform the sender of failure. If + the DMARC check cannot be resolved due to transient network errors, + then the Mail Receiver replies with a 4xy code to inform the sender + as to the need to reattempt delivery later. If the DMARC check + yields a passing message, then the Mail Receiver continues with email + processing, perhaps using the result of the DMARC check as an input + to additional processing modules such as a domain reputation query. + + Before exiting DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver checks to + see if the Author Domain DMARC Policy Record requests AFRF-based + reporting. If so, then the Mail Receiver can emit an AFRF to the + reporting address supplied in the DMARC Policy Record. + + At the exit of DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver captures + (through logging or direct insertion into a data store) the result of + DMARC processing. Captured information is used to build feedback for + Domain Owner consumption. This is unnecessary if the Domain Owner + has not requested aggregate reports, i.e., no "rua" tag was found in + the policy record. + +B.4. Organizational and Policy Domain Tree Walk Examples + + If an Author Domain has no DMARC Policy Record, a Mail Receiver uses + a tree walk to find the DMARC Policy. + + If the DMARC Policy Record allows relaxed alignment and the SPF- or + DKIM-Authenticated Identifiers are different from the Author Domain, + a Mail Receiver uses a tree walk to discover the respective + Organizational Domains to determine Identifier Alignment. + +B.4.1. Simple Organizational and Policy Example + + A Mail Receiver receives an email with: + + * Author Domain: example.com + * RFC5321.MailFrom Domain: example.com + * DKIM-Authenticated Identifier: signing.example.com + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 70] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + In this example, "_dmarc.example.com" and + "_dmarc.signing.example.com" both have DMARC Policy Records while + "_dmarc.com" does not. If SPF or DKIM yield pass results, they still + have to be aligned to support a DMARC pass. Since not all domains + are the same, if the alignment is relaxed then the tree walk is + performed to determine the Organizational Domain for each. + + To determine the Organizational Domain for the Author Domain, query + "_dmarc.example.com" and "_dmarc.com"; "example.com" is the last + element of the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy Record, so it is the + Organizational Domain for "example.com". + + For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain, the Organizational Domain already + found for "example.com" is "example.com", so SPF is aligned. + + To determine the Organizational Domain for the DKIM-Authenticated + Identifier, query "_dmarc.signing.example.com", "_dmarc.example.com", + and "_dmarc.com". Both "signing.example.com" and "example.com" have + DMARC Policy Records, but "example.com" is the highest element in the + tree with a DMARC Policy Record (it has the fewest labels), so + "example.com" is the Organizational Domain. Since this is also the + Organizational Domain for the Author Domain, DKIM is aligned for + relaxed alignment. + + Since both SPF and DKIM are aligned, they can be used to determine if + the message has a DMARC pass result. If the result is not pass, then + the policy domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the + appropriate policy. In this case, since the RFC5322.From domain has + a DMARC Policy Record, that is the policy domain. + +B.4.2. Deep Tree Walk Example + + A Mail Receiver receives an email with: + + * Author Domain: a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com + * RFC5321.MailFrom Domain: example.com + * DKIM-Authenticated Identifier: signing.example.com + + Both "_dmarc.example.com" and "_dmarc.signing.example.com" have DMARC + Policy Records, while "_dmarc.com" does not. If SPF or DKIM yield + pass results, they still have to be aligned to support a DMARC pass. + Since not all domains are the same, if the alignment is relaxed then + the tree walk is performed to determine the Organizational Domain for + each. + + To determine the Organizational Domain For the Author Domain, query + "_dmarc.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com", then query + "_dmarc.g.h.i.j.k.example.com" (skipping the intermediate names), + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 71] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + then query "_dmarc.h.i.j.k.example.com", "_dmarc.i.j.k.example.com", + "_dmarc.j.k.example.com", "_dmarc.k.example.com", + "_dmarc.example.com", and "_dmarc.com". None of + "a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com", "g.h.i.j.k.example.com", + "h.i.j.k.example.com", "i.j.k.example.com", "j.k.example.com", or + "k.example.com" have a DMARC Policy Record. + + Since "example.com" is the last element of the DNS tree with a DMARC + Policy Record, it is the Organizational Domain for + "a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com". + + For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain, the Organizational domain already + found for "example.com" is "example.com". SPF is aligned. + + For the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier, query + "_dmarc.signing.example.com", "_dmarc.example.com", and "_dmarc.com". + Both "signing.example.com" and "example.com" have DMARC Policy + Records, but "example.com" is the highest element in the tree with a + DMARC Policy Record, so "example.com" is the Organizational Domain. + Since this is also the Organizational Domain for the Author Domain, + DKIM is aligned for relaxed alignment. + + Since both SPF and DKIM are aligned, they can be used to determine if + the message has a DMARC pass result. If the results for both are not + pass, then the policy domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to + determine the appropriate policy. In this case, the Author Domain + does not have a DMARC Policy Record, so the policy domain is the + highest element in the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy Record, + example.com. + +B.4.3. Example with a PSD DMARC Policy Record + + In rare cases, a PSD publishes a DMARC Policy Record with a psd tag, + which the tree walk must take into account. + + A Mail Receiver receives an email with: + + * Author Domain: giant.bank.example + * RFC5321.MailFrom Domain: mail.giant.bank.example + * DKIM-Authenticated Identifier: mail.mega.bank.example + + In this case, "_dmarc.bank.example" has a DMARC Policy Record which + includes the "psd=y" tag, and "_dmarc.example" does not have a DMARC + Policy Record. While "_dmarc.giant.bank.example" has a DMARC Policy + Record without a "psd" tag, "_dmarc.mega.bank.example" and + "_dmarc.mail.mega.bank.example" have no DMARC Policy Records. + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 72] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + Since the three domains are all different, tree walks find their + Organizational Domains to see which are aligned. + + For the Author Domain "giant.bank.example", the tree walk finds the + DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.giant.bank.example", then the DMARC + Policy Record at "_dmarc.bank.example", and stops because of the + "psd=y" flag. The Organizational Domain is "giant.bank.example" + because it is the domain directly below the one with "psd=y". Since + the Organizational Domain has a DMARC Policy Record, it is also the + policy domain. + + For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain "mail.giant.bank.example", the tree + walk finds no DMARC Policy Record at + "_dmarc.mail.giant.bank.example", but does find both the DMARC Policy + Record at "_dmarc.giant.bank.example" and then the DMARC Policy + Record at "_dmarc.bank.example", and stops because of the "psd=y" + flag. Again the Organizational Domain is "giant.bank.example" + because it is the domain directly below the one with "psd=y". Since + this is the same Organizational Domain as the Author Domain, SPF is + aligned. + + For the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier "mail.mega.bank.example", the + tree walk finds no DMARC Policy Records at + "_dmarc.mail.mega.bank.example" or "_dmarc.mega.bank.example", then + finds the DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.bank.example" and stops + because of the "psd=y" flag. The Organizational Domain is + "mega.bank.example", so DKIM is not aligned. + + Since SPF is aligned, it can be used to determine if the message has + a DMARC pass result. If the result is not pass, then the policy + domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the appropriate + policy. + +B.5. Utilization of Aggregate Feedback: Example + + Aggregate feedback is consumed by Domain Owners to enable their + understanding of how a given domain is being processed by the Mail + Receiver. Aggregate reporting data on emails that pass all + underlying authentication checks is used by Domain Owners to validate + that their authentication practices remain accurate. For example, if + a third party is sending on behalf of a Domain Owner, the Domain + Owner can use aggregate report data to validate ongoing + authentication practices of the third party. + + Data on email that only partially passes underlying authentication + checks provides visibility into problems that need to be addressed by + the Domain Owner. For example, if either SPF or DKIM fails to + produce an Authenticated Identifier, the Domain Owner is provided + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 73] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + with enough information to either directly correct the problem or + understand where authentication-breaking changes are being introduced + in the email transmission path. If authentication-breaking changes + due to email transmission path cannot be directly corrected, then the + Domain Owner at least maintains an understanding of the effect of + DMARC-based policies upon the Domain Owner's email. + + Data on email that fails all underlying authentication checks + provides baseline visibility on how the Domain Owner's domain is + being received at the Mail Receiver. Based on this visibility, the + Domain Owner can begin deployment of authentication technologies + across uncovered email sources, if the mail that is failing the + checks was generated by or on behalf of the Domain Owner. Data + regarding failing authentication checks can also allow the Domain + Owner to come to an understanding of how its domain is being misused. + +Appendix C. Changes from RFC 7489 + + This document is intended to render [RFC7489] obsolete. As one might + guess, that means there are significant differences between RFC 7489 + and this document. This section will summarize those changes. + +C.1. Informational vs. Standards Track + + RFC 7489 was not the product of any IETF work stream, but was instead + published into the RFC series by the Independent Submissions Editor + and is classified as an Informational RFC. + + This document, by contrast, is intended to be Internet Standards + Track. + +C.2. Changes to Terminology and Definitions + + The following changes were made to the Terminology and Definitions + section. + +C.2.1. Terms Added + + These terms were added: + + * Domain Owner Assessment Policy + * Enforcement + * Monitoring Mode + * Non-existent Domains + * Public Suffix Domain (PSD) + * Public Suffix Operator (PSO) + * PSO Controlled Domain Names + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 74] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +C.2.2. Definitions Updated + + These definitions were updated: + + * Organizational Domain + * Report Receiver (renamed to Report Consumer) + +C.3. Policy Discovery and Organizational Domain Determination + + The algorithms for DMARC policy discovery and for determining the + Organizational Domain have been changed. Specifically, reliance on a + Public Suffix List (PSL) has been replaced by a technique called a + "DNS Tree Walk", and the methodology for the DNS Tree Walk is + explained in detail in this document. + + The DNS Tree Walk also incorporates PSD policy discovery, which was + introduced in [RFC9091]. That RFC was an Experimental RFC, and the + results of that experiment were that the RFC was not implemented as + written. Instead, this document redefines the algorithm for PSD + policy discovery, and thus obsoletes [RFC9091]. + + These algorithm changes introduce the possibility of interoperability + issues where a Domain Owner expects a DMARC Policy or an + Organizational Domain to be identified by the Tree Walk process, but + a Mail Receiver using an RFC 7489-based implementation of DMARC and + relying on a PSL might arrive at a different answer. + + This issue is entirely avoided by the use of Strict Alignment and + publishing explicit DMARC Policy Records for all Author Domains used + in an organization's email. + +C.4. Reporting + + Discussion of both aggregate and failure reporting have been moved to + separate documents dedicated to the topics. + + In addition, the ability to specify a maximum report size in the + DMARC URI has been removed. + +C.5. Tags + + Several tags have been added to the "DMARC Policy Record Format" + section of this document since RFC 7489 was published, and at the + same time, several others were removed. + +C.5.1. Tags Added + + * np - Policy for non-existent domains (Imported from [RFC9091]) + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 75] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + * psd - Flag indicating whether a domain is a Public Suffix Domain + * t - Replacement for some pct tag functionality. See Appendix A.6 + for further discussion + +C.5.2. Tags Removed + + * pct - Tag requesting application of DMARC policy to only a + percentage of messages. See Appendix A.6 for discussion + * rf - Tag specifying requested format of failure reports + * ri - Tag specifying requested interval between aggregate reports + +C.6. Expansion of Domain Owner Actions Section + + RFC 7489 had just two paragraphs in its Domain Owner Actions section, + and while the content of those paragraphs was correct, it was + minimalist in its approach to providing guidance to domain owners on + just how to implement DMARC. + + This document provides much more detail and explanatory text to a + Domain Owner, focusing not just on what to do to implement DMARC, but + also on the reasons for each step and the repercussions of each + decision. + + In particular, this document makes explicit that domains for general- + purpose email SHOULD NOT deploy a DMARC policy of p=reject. See + Section 7.4 for further discussion of this topic. + +C.7. Report Generator Recommendations + + In the cases where a DMARC Policy Record specifies multiple + destinations for either aggregate reports or failure reports, RFC + 7489 stated: + + Receivers **MAY** impose a limit on the number of URIs to which they + will send reports but **MUST** support the ability to send to at least + two. + + This document in Section 4.6 says: + + A report **SHOULD** be sent to each listed URI provided in the DMARC + Policy Record. + + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 76] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +C.8. Removal of RFC 7489 Appendix A.5 + + One of the appendices in RFC 7489, specifically Appendix A.5, has + been removed from the text with this update. The appendix was titled + "Issues with ADSP in Operation" and it contained a list of issues + associated with ADSP that influenced the direction of DMARC. The + ADSP protocol was moved to "Historic" status in 2013 and working + group consensus was that such a discussion of ADSP's influence on + DMARC was no longer relevant. + +C.9. RFC 7489 Errata Summary + + Remove this before final submission: (https://www.rfc- + editor.org/styleguide/part2/#ref_errata (https://www.rfc- + editor.org/styleguide/part2/#ref_errata) says errata in the Reported + state should not be referenced; they are not considered stable.) + + This document and its companion documents + ([I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] and + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting]) address the following errata + filed against [RFC7489] since that document's publication in March, + 2015. More details on each of these can be found at https://www.rfc- + editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=7489 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/ + errata_search.php?rfc=7489) + + [Err5365] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5365, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1 + https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5365 (https://www.rfc- + editor.org/errata/eid5365): To be addressed in + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. + + [Err5371] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5371, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1 + https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5371 (https://www.rfc- + editor.org/errata/eid5371): To be addressed in + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. + + [Err5440] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5440, RFC 7489, Section 7.1 + https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440 (https://www.rfc- + editor.org/errata/eid5440): To be addressed in + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. + + [Err5440] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5440, RFC 7489, Sections B.2.1, + B.2.3, and B.2.4 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440 + (https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440): Addressed both in this + document and in [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. + + [Err6439] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 6439, RFC 7489, Section 7.1 + https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6439 (https://www.rfc- + editor.org/errata/eid6439): To be addressed in + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 77] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. + + [Err6485] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 6485, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1 + https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6485 (https://www.rfc- + editor.org/errata/eid6485): To be addressed in + [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]. + + [Err7835] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 7835, RFC 7489, Section 6.6.3 + https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7835 (https://www.rfc- + editor.org/errata/eid7835): This erratum is in reference to the + description of the process documented in RFC 7489 for the + applicable DMARC policy for an email message. The process for + doing this has drastically changed in DMARCbis, and so the text + identified in this erratum no longer exists. + + [Err5151] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5151, RFC 7489, Section 1 + https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5151 (https://www.rfc- + editor.org/errata/eid5151): This erratum is in reference to the + Introduction section of RFC 7489. That section has been + substantially rewritten in DMARCbis, and the text at issue for + this erratum no longer exists. + +C.10. General Editing and Formatting + + A great deal of the content from RFC 7489 was preserved in this + document, but much of it was subject to either minor editing, re- + ordering of sections, and/or both. + +Acknowledgements + + This reworking of the DMARC mechanism specified in [RFC7489] is the + result of contributions from many participants in the IETF Working + Group dedicated to this effort. Although the contributors are too + numerous to mention, significant contributions were made by Kurt + Andersen, Laura Atkins, Seth Blank, Alex Brotman, Dave Crocker, + Douglas E. Foster, Ned Freed, Mike Hammer, Steven M. Jones, Scott + Kitterman, Murray S. Kucherawy, Barry Leiba, Alessandro Vesely, and + Tim Wicinski. + + The authors and contributors also recognize that this document would + not have been possible without the work done by those who had a hand + in producing [RFC7489]. The Acknowledgements section from that + document is preserved in full below. + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 78] + +Internet-Draft DMARCbis November 2024 + + +Acknowledgements - RFC 7489 + + DMARC and the draft version of this document submitted to the + Independent Submission Editor were the result of lengthy efforts by + an informal industry consortium: DMARC.org (see https://dmarc.org + (https://dmarc.org)). Participating companies included Agari, + American Greetings, AOL, Bank of America, Cloudmark, Comcast, + Facebook, Fidelity Investments, Google, JPMorgan Chase & Company, + LinkedIn, Microsoft, Netease, PayPal, ReturnPath, The Trusted Domain + Project, and Yahoo!. Although the contributors and supporters are + too numerous to mention, notable individual contributions were made + by J. Trent Adams, Michael Adkins, Monica Chew, Dave Crocker, Tim + Draegen, Steve Jones, Franck Martin, Brett McDowell, and Paul Midgen. + The contributors would also like to recognize the invaluable input + and guidance that was provided early on by J.D. Falk. + + Additional contributions within the IETF context were made by Kurt + Andersen, Michael Jack Assels, Les Barstow, Anne Bennett, Jim Fenton, + J. Gomez, Mike Jones, Scott Kitterman, Eliot Lear, John Levine, S. + Moonesamy, Rolf Sonneveld, Henry Timmes, and Stephen J. Turnbull. + +Authors' Addresses + + Todd M. Herr + Valimail + Email: todd@someguyinva.com + + + John Levine + Standcore LLC + Email: standards@standcore.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Herr (ed) & Levine (ed) Expires 24 May 2025 [Page 79] diff --git a/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.xml b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.xml index e69de29..066c6cd 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.xml +++ b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-36.xml @@ -0,0 +1,3118 @@ + + + + + +Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) +Valimail
+todd@someguyinva.com +
Standcore LLC
+standards@standcore.com +
 +Application +DMARC + + +This document describes the Domain-based Message Authentication, +Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) protocol. +DMARC permits the owner of an email's Author Domain to enable +validation of the domain's use, to indicate the Domain Owner's +or Public Suffix Operator's message handling +preference regarding failed validation, and to request reports about the +use of the domain name. Mail receiving organizations can use this information +when evaluating handling choices for incoming mail. +This document obsoletes RFCs 7489 and 9091. + + + + + + +
Introduction +RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING: +The source for this draft is maintained on GitHub at: +https://github.com/ietf-wg-dmarc/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis +Abusive email often includes unauthorized and deceptive use of a +domain name in the "From" header field defined in section 3.6.2 of +and referred to as RFC5322.From. The domain typically belongs to an organization +expected to be known to - and presumably trusted by - the recipient. The Sender +Policy Framework (SPF) and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) +protocols provide domain-level authentication but are not directly associated +with the RFC5322.From domain, also known as the Author Domain. +DMARC leverages these two protocols, providing a method for Domain Owners to publish +a DNS TXT record describing the email authentication policies for the Author Domain +and to request specific handling for messages using that domain that fail validation +checks. These DNS records are called DMARC Policy Records. +As with SPF and DKIM, DMARC validation results in a verdict of either "pass" or +"fail". A DMARC result of "pass" requires not only an SPF or DKIM pass verdict for +the email message, but also and more importantly that the domain associated with +the SPF or DKIM pass be "aligned" with the Author Domain in one of two +modes - "relaxed" or "strict". Domains are said to be in "relaxed alignment" +if they have the same Organizational Domain; a +domain's Organizational Domain is the domain at the top of the namespace +hierarchy for that domain while having the same administrative authority as +that domain. On the other hand, domains are in "strict alignment" if and only +if they are identical. The choice of required alignment mode is left to the +Domain Owner that publishes a DMARC Policy Record. +A DMARC pass for a message indicates only that the use of the Author Domain has been +validated for that message as authorized by the Domain Owner. Such authorization +does not carry an explicit or implicit value assertion about that message or about +the Domain Owner, and so a DMARC pass by itself does not guarantee that delivery to +the recipient's Inbox would be safe or desirable. For a mail-receiving organization +participating in DMARC, a message that passes DMARC validation is part of a message +stream reliably associated with the Author Domain. Therefore, reputation assessment +of that stream by the mail-receiving organization can assume the use of that Author +Domain is authorized by the Domain Owner. +On the other hand, a message that fails this validation is not necessarily associated +with the Author Domain and so should not affect the Author Domain's reputation. The phrase +"not necessarily associated" was purposely chosen here, as it is importatnt to understand +that some messages making authorized use of the Author Domain can still fail DMARC validation +checks. and of this document both discuss reasons +why such failures may happen. Because of this, a mail-receiving organization that performs +DMARC validation can choose to honor the Domain Owner's requested message handling for validation +failures, but it is not required to do so. DMARC is commonly used as one input to more complex +filtering decisions, and so the mail-receiving organization might choose different actions entirely. +DMARC, in the associated and +documents, also specifies a reporting framework. Using it, a mail-receiving +organization can generate regular reports about messages that use Author +Domains for which a DMARC Policy Record exists; those reports are sent to the +address(es) specified by the Domain Owner in the DMARC Policy Record. Domain Owners +can use these reports, especially the aggregate reports, not only to identify +sources of mail attempting to fraudulently use their domain, but also (and perhaps +more importantly) to flag and fix gaps in their own authentication practices. However, +as with honoring the Domain Owner's stated mail handling preference, a mail-receiving +organization supporting DMARC is under no obligation to send requested reports, although +it is recommended that they do send aggregate reports. +The use of DMARC creates some interoperability challenges that require due +consideration before deployment, particularly with configurations that +can cause mail to be rejected. These are discussed in . +
+ +
Requirements +The following sections describe topics that guide the specification of DMARC. + +
High-Level Goals +DMARC has the following high-level goals: + +
    +
  • Allow Domain Owners and Public Suffix Operators (PSOs) to validate their email authentication deployments. +
    • +
  • Allow Domain Owners and PSOs to assert their desired message handling +for validation failures on messages purporting to have authorship +within the domain. +
    • +
  • Minimize implementation complexity for both senders and receivers. +
    • +
  • Reduce the amount of successfully delivered spoofed emails. +
    • +
  • Work at Internet scale. +
    • +
+
+ +
Anti-Phishing +DMARC is designed to prevent the unauthorized use of the Author Domain +of an email message, a technique known as "spoofing". Such unauthorized usage can +frequently be found in messages impersonating a domain belonging to a business entity, +messages that are meant to entice the recipient to provide sensitive information, such +as usernames, passwords, and financial account information. These spoofed messages are +commonly referred to as "phishing". +DMARC can only be used to combat specific forms of exact-domain spoofing directly. DMARC +does not attempt to solve all problems with spoofed or otherwise fraudulent emails. In +particular, it does not address the use of visually similar domain names ("cousin domains") +or abuse of the RFC5322.From human-readable display-name, as defined in +. +
+ +
Scalability +Scalability is a significant issue for systems that need to operate in +an environment as widely deployed as current SMTP email. For this reason, +DMARC seeks to avoid the need for third parties or pre-sending +agreements between senders and receivers. This preserves the +positive aspects of the current email infrastructure. +Although DMARC does not introduce third-party senders (namely +external agents authorized to send on behalf of an operator) to the +email-handling flow, it also does not preclude them. Such third +parties are free to provide services in conjunction with DMARC. +
+ +
Out of Scope +Several topics and issues are specifically out of scope of this +work. These include the following: + +
    +
  • Different treatment of messages that are not authenticated (e.g., +those that have no DKIM signature or those sent using an Author +Domain for which no DMARC Policy Record +exists) versus those that fail validation; +
    • +
  • Evaluation of anything other than RFC5322.From header field; +
    • +
  • Multiple reporting formats; +
    • +
  • Publishing policy other than via the DNS; +
    • +
  • Reporting or otherwise evaluating other than the last-hop IP +address; +
    • +
  • Attacks in the display-name portions of the RFC5322.From header field, +also known as "display name" attacks; +
    • +
  • Authentication of entities other than domains, since DMARC is +built upon SPF and DKIM, which authenticate domains; and +
    • +
  • Content analysis. +
    • +
+
+
+ +
Terminology and Definitions +This section defines terms used in the rest of the document. + +
Conventions Used in This Document +The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", +"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this +document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 +when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. +Readers are encouraged to be familiar with the contents of +. In particular, that document +defines various roles in the messaging infrastructure that can appear the same +or separate in various contexts. For example, a Domain Owner could, +via the messaging security mechanisms on which DMARC is based, delegate the +ability to send mail as the Domain Owner to a third party with +another role. This document does not address the distinctions among +such roles; the reader is encouraged to become familiar with that +material before continuing. +
+ +
Definitions +The following sections define the terms used in this document. + +
Authenticated Identifiers +Authenticated Identifiers are those domain-level identifiers for which authorized +use is validated using a supported authentication mechanism. +
+ +
Author Domain +The domain name of the apparent author as extracted from the RFC5322.From header field. +
+ +
DKIM Signing Domain +The domain name that is the value of the "d" tag in a validated DKIM-Signature header +field in an email message. +
+ +
SPF Domain +SPF, , can validate the uses of both the domain found in an SMTP +HELO/EHLO command (the HELO identity) and the domain found in an SMTP MAIL command (the +MAIL FROM identity). DMARC relies solely on SPF validation of the MAIL FROM identity. +Section 2.4 of describes the determination of the MAIL FROM identity for +cases in which the SMTP MAIL command has a null path, i.e., the mailbox composed of +the local-part "postmaster" and the HELO identity. +The term "SPF Domain" when used in this document refers to an SPF validated MAIL FROM +identity. +
+ +
DMARC Policy Domain +The domain name at which an applicable DMARC Policy Record is discovered +for the Author Domain of an email message. +
+ +
DMARC Policy Record +A DNS TXT record published by a Domain Owner or Public Suffix +Operator (PSO) to enable validation of an Author +Domain's use, to indicate the Domain Owner's or PSO's message +handling preference regarding failed validation, and optionally to request reports +about the use of the Author Domain. +
+ +
Domain Owner +An entity or organization that has control of a given DNS domain, +usually by holding its registration. Domain Owners range from complex, +globally distributed organizations to service providers working on +behalf of non-technical clients to individuals responsible for maintaining +personal domains. This specification uses this term as analogous to an +Administrative Management Domain as defined in . It can also +refer to delegates, such as Report Consumers when those are outside of +their immediate management domain. +
+ +
Domain Owner Assessment Policy +The message handling preference expressed in a DMARC Policy Record +by the Domain Owner regarding failed validation of the Author Domain is called the "Domain Owner Assessment Policy". Possible values are described in +. +
+ +
Enforcement +Enforcement describes a state where the existing Domain Owner Assessment Policy +for an Organizational Domain and all subdomains below it +is not "p=none". This state means that the Organizational Domain and its subdomains +can only be used as Author Domains if they are properly validated +using the DMARC mechanism. +Historically, Domain Owner Assessment Policies of "p=quarantine" or "p=reject" +have been higher value signals to Mail Receivers. Messages with Author +Domains for which such policies exist that are not validated using the DMARC mechanism +will not reach the inbox at Mail Receivers that participate in DMARC and honor the +Domain Owner's expressed handling preference. +
+ +
Identifier Alignment +DMARC describes the concept of alignment between the Author Domain +and an Authenticated Identifier, and requires +such Identifier Alignment between the two for a message to achieve a DMARC pass. DMARC +defines two states for alignment. + +
Relaxed Alignment +When the Author Domain has the same Organizational Domain +as an Authenticated Identifier, the two are said to be +in relaxed alignment. +
+ +
Strict Alignment +When the Author Domain is identical to an Authenticated Identifier, the two are said to be in strict alignment. +
+
+ +
Mail Receiver +The entity or organization that receives and processes email. Mail +Receivers operate one or more Internet-facing Message Transfer Agents (MTAs). +
+ +
Monitoring Mode +Monitoring Mode describes a state where the existing Domain Owner Assessment Policy for an +Organizational Domain and all subdomains below it +is "p=none", and the Domain Owner is receiving aggregate reports +for the Organizational Domain. While the use of the Organizational Domain and all +its subdomains as Author Domains can still be validated by a Mail Receiver deploying the DMARC mechanism, the Domain Owner expresses no handling +preference for messages that fail DMARC validation. The Domain Owner is, however, using +the content of the DMARC aggregate reports to make any needed adjustments to +the authentication practices for its mail streams. +
+ +
Non-existent Domains +For DMARC purposes, a non-existent domain is consistent with the term's meaning +as described in . That is, if the response code received for a query +for a domain name is NXDOMAIN, then the domain name and any possible subdomains +do not exist. +
+ +
Organizational Domain +The Organizational Domain for any domain is akin to the ADMD described in +. A domain's Organizational Domain is the domain at the top of +the namespace hierarchy for that domain while having the same administrative +authority as the domain. An Organizational Domain is determined by applying +the algorithm found in . +
+ +
Public Suffix Domain (PSD) +Some domains allow the registration of subdomains that are +"owned" by independent organizations. Real-world examples of +these domains are ".com", ".org", ".us", and ".co.uk", to name just a few. +These domains are called "Public Suffix Domains" (PSDs). +For example, "ietf.org" is a registered domain name, and ".org" is its PSD. +
+ +
Public Suffix Operator (PSO) +A Public Suffix Operator is an organization that manages operations +within a PSD, particularly the DNS records published for names at and +under that domain name. +
+ +
PSO Controlled Domain Names +PSO-Controlled Domain Names are names in the DNS that are managed by +a PSO. PSO-controlled Domain Names may have one label (e.g., ".com") or more +(e.g., ".co.uk"), depending on the PSD's policy. +
+ +
Report Consumer +A Report Consumer is an operator that receives reports from another operator +implementing the reporting mechanisms described in the documents + and . +This term applies collectively to the system components that receive and process +these reports and the organizations that operate those components. +Report Consumers can receive reports concerning domains for which the Report +Consumer is also the Domain Owner or PSO, +or concerning domains that belong to another operator entirely. The DMARC mechanism +permits a Domain Owner to act as a Report Consumer for its domain(s) and/or to +designate third parties to so act. See for further +discussion of such designation. +
+
+
+ +
Overview and Key Concepts +This section provides a general overview of the design and operation +of the DMARC environment. + +
DMARC Basics +DMARC permits a Domain Owner or PSO to enable +validation of an Author Domain's use in an email message, to indicate +the Domain Owner's or PSO's message handling preference regarding failed validation, and +to request reports about use of the Author Domain. A domain's DMARC Policy Record is published in the DNS as a TXT record at the name created by prepending +the label "_dmarc" to the domain name and is retrieved through normal DNS queries. +DMARC's validation mechanism produces a "pass" result if a DMARC Policy Record exists for +the Author Domain of an email message and the Author Domain is aligned +with an Authenticated Identifier from that message. +When a DMARC Policy Record exists for the Author Domain and the DMARC mechanism does not +produce a "pass" result, the Mail Receiver's handling of that message +can be influenced by the Domain Owner Assessment Policy expressed +in the DMARC Policy Record. +It is important to note that the authentication mechanisms employed +by DMARC only validate the usage of a DNS domain in an email message. +They do not validate the local-part of any email address identifier +found in that message, nor do such validations carry an explicit or +implicit value assertion about that message or about the Domain Owner. +DMARC's reporting component involves the collection of information +about received messages using the Author Domain for periodic aggregate reports +to the Domain Owner or PSO. The parameters and format for such reports are +discussed in . +A Mail Receiver participating in DMARC might also generate per-message failure +reports that contain information related to individual messages that fail DMARC +validation checks. Per-message failure reports are a useful source of +information when debugging deployments (if messages can be determined +to be legitimate even though failing validation) or in analyzing +attacks. The capability for such services is enabled by DMARC but +defined in other referenced material such as + and +
+ +
Use of RFC5322.From +One of the most obvious points of security scrutiny for DMARC is the +choice to focus on an identifier, namely the RFC5322.From address, +which is part of a body of data that has been trivially forged +throughout the history of email. This field is the one used by end +users to identify the source of the message, and so it has always +been a prime target for abuse through such forgery and other means. +That said, of all the identifiers that are part of the message itself, +this is the only one required to be present. A message without a single, +properly formed RFC5322.From header field does not comply with +, and handling such a message is outside of the scope of this specification. +
+ +
Authentication Mechanisms +The following mechanisms for determining Authenticated Identifiers are supported in this version of DMARC: + +
    +
  • DKIM, . The DKIM Signing Domain +from a validated DKIM-Signature header field is an Authenticated Identifier. +
    • +
  • SPF, . The validated SPF Domain from the email +message is the Authenticated Identifier. +
    • +
+
+ +
Identifier Alignment Explained +DMARC validates the authorized use of the Author Domain by requiring +either that it have the same Organizational Domain as an +Authenticated Identifier (a condition known as "Relaxed +Alignment") or that it be identical to the Authenticated Identifier + (a condition known as "Strict Alignment"). The choice of relaxed +or strict alignment is left to the Domain Owner and is expressed in +the domain's DMARC Policy Record. In practice, nearly all Domain +Owners have found relaxed alignment sufficient to meet their needs. Domain name comparisons +in this context are case-insensitive, per . +The following table is meant to illustrate possible alignment conditions. +"Alignment Examples" + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Authenticated IdentifierAuthor DomainIdentifier Alignment
foo.example.comnews.example.comrelaxed; the two have the same Organizational Domain, example.com
news.example.comnews.example.comstrict; the two are identical
foo.example.netnews.example.comnone; the two do not share a common Organizational Domain
It is important to note that Identifier Alignment cannot occur with a +message that is not valid per , particularly one with a +malformed, absent, or repeated RFC5322.From header field, since in that case +there is no reliable way to determine a DMARC Policy Record +that applies to the message. Accordingly, DMARC operation is predicated on the input +being a valid RFC5322 message object. For non-compliant cases, handling +is outside of the scope of this specification. Further discussion of this +can be found in . + +
DKIM-Authenticated Identifiers +DKIM permits a Domain Owner to claim some responsibility for a message by +associating the domain to the message. This association is done by inserting +the domain as the value of the "d" tag in a DKIM-Signature header field, and the +assertion of responsibility is validated through a cryptographic signature in +the header field. If the cryptographic signature validates, then the DKIM Signing +Domain is the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier. +There is currently no generally accepted mechanism by which a Domain Owner may +assert a list of third-party DKIM Signing Domains that are authorized to sign on +behalf of a given Author Domain. Therefore, DMARC requires that Identifier +Alignment is applied to the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier because a message can +bear a valid signature from any domain, even one used by a bad actor. A DKIM-Authenticated +Identifier that does not have Identifier Alignment with the Author Domain is not enough +to validate whether the use of the Author Domain has been authorized by its Domain Owner. +A single email can contain multiple DKIM signatures, and it is considered to +produce a DMARC "pass" result if any DKIM-Authenticated Identifier aligns with +the Author Domain. +
+ +
SPF-Authenticated Identifiers +SPF can validate the uses of both the domain found in an SMTP HELO/EHLO command +(the HELO identity) and the domain found in an SMTP MAIL command (the MAIL FROM +identity). DMARC relies solely on SPF validation of the MAIL FROM identity. If +the use of the domain in the MAIL FROM identity is validated by SPF, then that +domain is the SPF-Authenticated Identifier. +There is currently no generally accepted mechanism by which a Domain Owner may +assert a list of third-party domains that are authorized for use as the MAIL FROM +identity for mail using a given Author Domain. Therefore, DMARC requires that Identifier Alignment +is applied to the SPF-Authenticated Identifier because any Domain Owner, even a bad +actor, can publish an SPF record for its domain and send email that will obtain an +SPF pass result. An SPF-Authenticated Identifier that does not have Identifier +Alignment with the Author Domain is not enough to validate whether the use of the Author +Domain has been authorized by its Domain Owner. +
+ +
Alignment and Extension Technologies +If in the future DMARC is extended to include the use of other authentication +mechanisms, the extensions MUST allow for the assignment of a domain +as an Authenticated Identifier so that alignment with the Author Domain +can be validated. +
+
+ +
DMARC Policy Record Explained +A Domain Owner or PSO advertises +DMARC participation of one or more of its domains by publishing DMARC Policy Records that will apply to those domains. In doing so, Domain Owners +and PSOs indicate their handling preference regarding failed validation for email +messages using their domain in the RFC5322.From header field as well as their +desire (if any) to receive feedback about such messages in the form of aggregate and/or +failure reports. +DMARC Policy Records are stored as DNS TXT records with names starting with +the label "_dmarc". For example, the Domain Owner of "example.com" would publish +a DMARC Policy Record at the name "_dmarc.example.com", and a Mail Receiver +wishing to find the DMARC Policy Record for mail with an Author Domain +of "example.com" would issue a TXT query to the DNS for the name "_dmarc.example.com". +A Domain Owner or PSO may choose not to participate in DMARC validation by Mail Receivers +simply by not publishing a DMARC Policy Record for its Author Domain(s). +DMARC Policy Records can also apply to subdomains of the name at which they +are published in the DNS, if the record is published at an Organizational +Domain for the subdomains. The Domain Owner Assessment Policy that applies to the subdomains can be identical to the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy that applies to the Organizational Domain or different, depending +on the presence or absence of certain values in the DMARC Policy Record. See +for more details. +DMARC's use of the Domain Name Service is driven by DMARC's use of domain +names and the nature of the query it performs. The query requirement matches +with the DNS for obtaining simple parametric information. It uses an established +method of storing the information associated with the domain name targeted by +a DNS query, specifically an isolated TXT record that is restricted to the +DMARC context. Using the DNS as the query service has the benefit of reusing +an extremely well-established operations, administration, and management +infrastructure, rather than creating a new one. +Per , a TXT record can comprise multiple "character-string" objects. +Where this is the case, the module performing DMARC evaluation MUST concatenate +these strings by joining together the objects in order and parsing the result as a single string. +A Domain Owner can choose not to have some underlying authentication mechanisms +apply to DMARC evaluation of its Author Domain(s). For example, if a Domain Owner +only wants to use DKIM as the underlying authentication mechanism, then the Domain +Owner does not publish an SPF record that can produce Identifier Alignment +between an SPF-Authenticated Identifier and the Author Domain. Alternatively, if +the Domain Owner wishes to rely solely on SPF, then it can send email messages that +have no DKIM-Signature header field that would produce Identifier Alignment between +a DKIM-Authenticated Identifier and the Author Domain. Neither approach is recommended, +however. +A Mail Receiver implementing the DMARC mechanism gets the Domain Owner's or +PSO's published Domain Owner Assessment Policy and can use it to inform its handling decisions +for messages that undergo DMARC validation checks and do not produce a result of +pass. Mail handling considerations based on Domain Owner Assessment Policy enforcement +are discussed below in . +
+ +
DMARC Reporting URIs + defines a syntax for identifying a resource. The DMARC +mechanism uses this as the format by which a Domain Owner +or PSO specifies the destination(s) for the two +report types that are supported. The DMARC Poilcy Record format +allows for a list of these URIs to be provided, with each URI separated by commas (ASCII 0x2c). +A formal definition is provided in . +
+ +
DMARC Policy Record Format +DMARC Policy Records follow the extensible "tag-value" syntax for DNS-based +key records defined in DKIM . + creates a registry for known DMARC tags and +registers the initial set defined in this document. Only tags defined +in that registry are to be processed; unknown tags MUST be ignored. +The following tags are valid DMARC tags: + +
+
adkim:
+
(plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "r".) Indicates whether +the Domain Owner or PSO requires +strict or relaxed DKIM Identifier Alignment mode. See for details. +Valid values are as follows: + +
+
r:
+
relaxed mode
+
s:
+
strict mode
+
+
aspf:
+
(plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "r".) Indicates whether +the Domain Owner or PSO requires strict or relaxed SPF Identifier Alignment +mode. See for details. Valid values are as follows: + +
+
r:
+
relaxed mode
+
s:
+
strict mode
+
+
fo:
+
Failure reporting options (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "0") +Provides requested options for the generation of failure reports. +Report generators may choose to adhere to the requested options. +This tag's content MUST be ignored if a "ruf" tag (below) is not +also specified. This tag can include one or more of the values shown here; +if more than one value is assigned to the tag, the list of values should be +separated by colons (e.g., fo=0:d). The valid values and their meanings are: + +
+
0:
+
Generate a DMARC failure report if all underlying authentication +mechanisms fail to produce an aligned "pass" result.
+
1:
+
Generate a DMARC failure report if any underlying authentication +mechanism produced something other than an aligned "pass" result.
+
d:
+
Generate a DKIM failure report if the message had a signature +that failed evaluation, regardless of its alignment. DKIM-specific +reporting is described in .
+
s:
+
Generate an SPF failure report if the message failed SPF +evaluation, regardless of its alignment. SPF-specific +reporting is described in .
+
+
np:
+
Domain Owner Assessment Policy for non-existent subdomains +of the given Organizational Domain (plain-text; OPTIONAL). For this tag, the definition +of "non-existent subdomain" is the same as that used for "Non-existent Domains" in . +The policy expressed by this tag indicates the message handling preference of the Domain Owner +or PSO for mail using non-existent subdomains +of the prevailing Organizational Domain and not passing DMARC validation. It applies +only to non-existent subdomains of the Organizational Domain queried and not to either +existing subdomains or the domain itself. Its syntax is identical to that of the "p" +tag defined below. If the "np" tag is absent, the policy specified by the "sp" tag (if +the "sp" tag is present) or the policy specified by the "p" tag, if the "sp" +tag is not present, MUST be applied for non-existent subdomains. +
+
p:
+
Domain Owner Assessment Policy (plain-text; RECOMMENDED +for DMARC Policy Records). Indicates the message handling preference of the Domain Owner +or PSO for mail using its domain but not passing DMARC validation. +The policy applies to the domain queried and to subdomains, unless the +subdomain policy is explicitly described using the "sp" or "np" tags. +If this tag is not present in an otherwise syntactically valid DMARC +Policy Record, then the record is treated as if it included "p=none" (see +). This tag is not applicable for third-party +reporting records (see and ). +Possible values are as follows: + +
+
none:
+
The Domain Owner offers no expression of preference.
+
quarantine:
+
The Domain Owner considers such mail to be suspicious. It is possible +the mail is valid, although the failure creates a significant concern.
+
reject:
+
The Domain Owner considers all such failures to be a clear indication +that the use of the domain name is not valid. See +for some discussion of SMTP rejection methods and their implications.
+
+
psd:
+
A flag indicating whether the domain is a PSD. (plain-text; OPTIONAL; +default is "u"). Possible values are: + +
+
y:
+
PSOs include this tag with a value of "y" to indicate that the domain +is a PSD. If a record containing this tag with a value of "y" is found during +policy discovery, this information will be used to determine the Organizational +Domain and DMARC Policy Domain applicable to the message in question.
+
n:
+
The DMARC Policy Record is published for a domain that is not a PSD, but it is +the Organizational Domain for itself and its subdomains.
+
u:
+
The default indicates that the DMARC Policy Record is published for a domain +that is not a PSD, and may or may not be an Organizational Domain for itself and +its subdomains. Use the mechanism described in for determining +the Organizational Domain for this domain.
+
+
rua:
+
Addresses to which aggregate feedback reports are to be sent (comma-separated plain-text +list of DMARC Reporting URIs; OPTIONAL). If present, the Domain Owner is requesting +Mail Receivers to send aggregate feedback reports as defined in +to the URIs listed. Any valid URI can be specified. A Mail Receiver MUST implement support +for a "mailto:" URI, i.e., the ability to send a DMARC report via electronic mail. If the +tag is not provided, Mail Receivers MUST NOT generate aggregate feedback reports for +the domain. URIs involving schemes not supported by Mail Receivers MUST be ignored. + also discusses considerations that apply when the +domain name of a URI differs from the domain publishing the DMARC Policy Record. See + for additional considerations. +
+
ruf:
+
Addresses to which message-specific failure information is to be reported +(comma-separated plain-text list of DMARC URIs; OPTIONAL). If present, the +Domain Owner is requesting Mail Receivers to send detailed failure reports about +messages that fail the DMARC evaluation in specific ways (see the "fo" tag above) to +the URIs listed. Depending on the value of the "fo" tag, the format for such reports +is described in , , or . Any +valid URI can be specified. A Mail Receiver MUST implement support for a "mailto:" +URI, i.e., the ability to send message-specific failure information via electronic mail. +If the tag is not provided, Mail Receivers MUST NOT generate failure reports for the +domain. URIs involving schemes not supported by Mail Receivers MUST be ignored. + discusses considerations that apply when +the domain name of a URI differs from that of the domain advertising the policy. +See for additional considerations. +
+
sp:
+
Domain Owner Assessment Policy for all subdomains of the given Organizational Domain +(plain-text; OPTIONAL). Indicates the message handling preference of the Domain Owner +or PSO for mail using an existing subdomain of the prevailing Organizational Domain for +and not passing DMARC validation. It applies only to existing subdomains of the message's +Organizational Domain in the DNS hierarchy and not to the Organizational Domain itself. +Its syntax is identical to that of the "p" tag defined above. If both the "sp" tag is +absent, and the "np" tag is either absent or not applicable, the policy specified by +the "p" tag MUST be applied for subdomains. Note that "sp" will be ignored for +DMARC Policy Records published on subdomains of Organizational Domains and PSDs due +to the effect of the DMARC Policy Discovery. +
+
t:
+
DMARC policy test mode (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "n"). For +the Author Domain to which the DMARC Policy Record applies, the "t" tag serves +as a signal to the actor performing DMARC validation checks as to whether or not +the Domain Owner wishes the Domain Owner Assessment Policy declared in the "p", +"sp", and/or "np" tags to actually be applied. This tag does not affect the +generation of DMARC reports, and it has no effect on any policy ("p", "sp", or "np") +that is "none". See for further discussion of the use +of this tag. Possible values are as follows: + +
+
y:
+
A request that the actor performing the DMARC validation check not +apply the policy, but instead apply any special handling rules it might have +in place, such as rewriting the RFC5322.From header field (see ). +The Domain Owner is currently testing its specified DMARC assessment policy, and has +an expectation that the policy applied to any failing messages will be one level below the +specified policy. That is, if the policy is "quarantine" and the value of the "t" +tag is "y", a policy of "none" will be applied to failing messages; if the policy +is "reject" and the value of the "t" tag is "y", a policy of "quarantine" will be +applied to failing messages, irrespective of any other special handling rules that +might be triggered by the "t" tag having a value of "y".
+
n:
+
The default is a request to apply the Domain Owner Assessment Policy as specified +to any message that produces a DMARC "fail" result.
+
+
v:
+
Version (plain-text; REQUIRED). Identifies the record retrieved +as a DMARC Policy Record. It MUST have the value of "DMARC1". The value +of this tag MUST match precisely; if it does not or it is absent, +the entire record MUST be ignored. It MUST be the first tag in the +list. +
+
+A DMARC Policy Record MUST comply with the formal specification found +in in that the "v" tag MUST be present and MUST +appear first. Unknown tags MUST be ignored. Syntax errors +in the remainder of the record MUST be discarded in favor of +default values (if any) or ignored outright. +Note that given the rules of the previous paragraph, the addition of a +new tag into the registered list of tags does not itself require a +new version of DMARC to be generated (with a corresponding change to +the "v" tag's value), but a change to any existing tags does require +a new version of DMARC. +
+ +
Formal Definition +The formal definition of the DMARC Policy Record format, using +and , is as follows: + + +In each dmarc-tag, the dmarc-value has a syntax that depends on the tag name. +The ABNF rule for each dmarc-value is specified in the following table: +"Tag Names and Values" + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Tag NameValue Rule
pdmarc-request
tdmarc-yorn
psddmarc-psd
npdmarc-request
spdmarc-request
adkimdmarc-rors
aspfdmarc-rors
ruadmarc-urilist
rufdmarc-urilist
fodmarc-fo
+ +
Flow Diagram + +| DKIM | | DMARC | +----------+ + | Service | | Signer | | Validator|<***>| SPF | + +-----------+ +--------+ +----------+ * | Validator| + | ^ * +----------+ + | * * + V v * + +------+ (~~~~~~~~~~~~) +------+ * +----------+ + | sMTA |------->( other MTAs )----->| rMTA | **>| DKIM | + +------+ (~~~~~~~~~~~~) +------+ | Validator| + | +----------+ + | ^ + V . + +-----------+ . + +---------+ | MDA | v + | User |<--| Filtering | +-----------+ + | Mailbox | | Engine | | DKIM | + +---------+ +-----------+ | Signing | + | Domain(s) | + +-----------+ + + MSA = Mail Submission Agent + MDA = Mail Delivery Agent +]]> +The above diagram shows a typical flow of messages through a +DMARC-aware system. Dashed lines (e.g., -->) denote the actual message +flow, dotted lines (e.g., < . . >) represent DNS queries used to retrieve +message policy related to the supported message authentication schemes, +and starred lines (e.g., <**>) indicate data exchange between message-handling +modules and message authentication modules. "sMTA" is the sending MTA, and +"rMTA" is the receiving MTA. +Put simply, when a message reaches a DMARC-aware rMTA, a DNS query +will be initiated to determine if a DMARC Policy Record exists that applies +to the Author Domain. If a DMARC Policy Record is found, the rMTA will use +the results of SPF and DKIM validation checks to determine DMARC validation +status. The DMARC validation status can then factor into the message handling +decision made by the recipient's mail system. +More details on specific actions for the parties involved can be +found in and . +
+ +
DNS Tree Walk +An Organizational Domain serves two different purposes, +depending on the context: + +
    +
  • The Organizational Domain of the Author Domain establishes +the DMARC Policy Record for that domain when no DMARC Policy +Record is published specifically for the Author Domain. (see ) +
    • +
  • The Organizational Domains of an Authenticated Identifier +and the Author Domain are used in determining Identifier Alignment between the two. (see +). +
    • +
+ defined an Organizational Domain as "The domain that was registered with a domain +name registrar." RFC 7489 discussed using a "public suffix" list (PSL) as the authoritative +list of the parent domains for Organizational Domains, and further described a method for +determining the Organizational Domain of an Author Domain or an Authenticated Identifier. +However, RFC 7489 mandated no requirement for a specific PSL for Mail Receivers to use +(though it did suggest the one found at https://publicsuffix.org/) nor did it provide +any guidance for the frequency of regular retrieval of the PSL by Mail Receivers participating +in DMARC. RFC 7489 acknowledged the possibility of interoperability issues caused by Mail +Receivers choosing different PSLs, and even suggested that if a more reliable and secure +method for determining the Organizational Domain could be created, that method should +replace reliance on a public suffix list. +This update to DMARC offers more flexibility to Domain Owners, especially those with large, +complex organizations that might want to apply decentralized management to their DNS and their +DMARC Policy Records. Rather than just using a public suffix list to help identify +an Organizational Domain, this update defines a discovery technique known colloquially as +the "DNS Tree Walk". The target of any DNS Tree Walk is discovry of a valid DMARC Policy Record, +and its use in determining an Organizational Domain allows for publishing DMARC Policy Records +at multiple points in the namespace. +This flexibility comes at a possible cost, however. Since the DNS Tree Walk +relies on the Mail Receiver making a series of DNS queries, the potential +exists for an ill-intentioned Domain Owner to send mail with Author Domains +with tens or even hundreds of labels for the purpose of executing a Denial +of Service Attack on the Mail Receiver. To guard against such abuse of the +DNS, a shortcut is built into the process so that Author Domains with more +than eight labels do not result in more than eight DNS queries. Observed data +at the time of publication showed that Author Domains with up to seven labels +were in usage, and so eight was chosen as the query limit to allow for some +future expansion of the name space that did not require updating this document. +The generic steps for a DNS Tree Walk are as follows: + +
    +
  1. Query the DNS for a TXT record that matches the format of a DMARC Policy Record at +the starting point for the Tree Walk. The starting point for the DNS Tree Walk will +depend on the ultimate target of the DNS Tree Walk. and + describe the possible starting points. A possibly +empty set of records is returned. +
    2. +
  2. Records that do not start with a "v" tag that identifies the current +version of DMARC are discarded. If multiple DMARC Policy Records are +returned, they are all discarded. If a single record remains and it +contains either a "psd=y" tag or a "psd=n" tag, stop. +
    3. +
  3. Break the subject DNS domain name into a set of ordered labels. Assign +the count of labels to "x", and number the labels from right to left; e.g., +for "a.mail.example.com", "x" would be assigned the value 4, "com" would be +label 1, "example" would be label 2, "mail" would be label 3, and so forth. +
    4. +
  4. If x < 8, remove the left-most (highest-numbered) label from the subject +domain. If x >= 8, remove the left-most (highest-numbered) labels from the +subject domain until 7 labels remain. The resulting DNS domain name is the +new target for the next lookup. +
    5. +
  5. Query the DNS for a DMARC Policy Record at the DNS domain name matching this +new target. A possibly empty set of records is returned. +
    6. +
  6. Records that do not start with a "v" tag that identifies the current +version of DMARC are discarded. If multiple DMARC Policy Records are returned for +a single target, they are all discarded. If a single record remains and it +contains a "psd=n" or "psd=y" tag, stop. +
    7. +
  7. Determine the target for the next query by removing the left-most label +from the target of the previous query. Repeat steps 5, 6, and 7 until the +process stops or there are no more labels remaining. +
    8. +
+To illustrate, for a message with the arbitrary Author Domain of +"a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com", a full DNS Tree Walk would require the following +eight queries to potentially locate the DMARC Policy Record or Organizational Domain: + +
    +
  • _dmarc.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.g.h.i.j.mail.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.h.i.j.mail.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.i.j.mail.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.j.mail.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.mail.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.com
    • +
+ +
DMARC Policy Discovery +The DMARC Policy Record to be applied to an email message will be the record found at any +of the following locations, listed from highest preference to lowest: + +
    +
  • The Author Domain
    • +
  • The Organizational Domain of the Author Domain
    • +
  • The Public Suffix Domain of the Author Domain
    • +
+Policy discovery starts first with a query for a valid DMARC Policy Record at the +name created by prepending the label "_dmarc" to the Author Domain of the +message being evaluated. If a valid DMARC Policy Record is found there, then this is the +DMARC Policy Record to be applied to the message; however, this does not necessarily mean +that the Author Domain is the Organizational Domain to be used in Identifier +Alignment checks. Whether this is also the Organizational Domain is dependent +on the value of the "psd" tag, if present, or some conditions described in +. +If no valid DMARC Policy Record is found by the first query, then perform a DNS +Tree Walk to find the Author Domain's Organizational Domain or its Public +Suffix Domain. The starting point for this DNS Tree Walk is determined as +follows: + +
    +
  • If the Author Domain has eight or fewer labels, the starting point will be +the immediate parent domain of the Author Domain.
    • +
  • Otherwise, the starting point will be the name produced by shortening the Author +Domain as described starting in step 3 of .
    • +
+If the DMARC Policy Record to be applied is that of the Author Domain, then the +Domain Owner Assessment Policy is taken from the "p" tag of the record. +If the DMARC Policy Record to be applied is that of either the Organizational Domain or the +Public Suffix Domain and the Author Domain is a subdomain of that domain, then the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy is taken from the "sp" tag (if any) if the Author Domain exists, +or the "np" tag (if any) if the Author Domain does not exist. In the absence of +applicable "sp" or "np" tags, the "p" tag policy is used for subdomains. +If a retrieved DMARC Policy Record does not contain a valid "p" tag, or contains an "sp" or +"np" tag that is not valid, then: + +
    +
  • If a "rua" tag is present and contains at least one syntactically valid reporting +URI, the Mail Receiver MUST act as if a record containing "p=none" was +retrieved and continue processing; +
    • +
  • Otherwise, the Mail Receiver applies no DMARC processing to this message. +
    • +
+If the set produced by the DNS Tree Walk contains no DMARC Policy Record (i.e., +any indication that there is no such record as opposed to a transient DNS error), +Mail Receivers MUST NOT apply the DMARC mechanism to the message. +Handling of DNS errors when querying for the DMARC Policy Record is +left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver. For example, to ensure +minimal disruption of mail flow, transient errors could result in +delivery of the message ("fail open"), or they could result in the +message being temporarily rejected (i.e., an SMTP 4yx reply), which +invites the sending MTA to try again after the condition has possibly +cleared, allowing a definite DMARC conclusion to be reached ("fail +closed"). +Note: PSD policy is not used for Organizational Domains that have +published a DMARC Policy Record. Specifically, this is not a mechanism to +provide feedback addresses (rua/ruf) when an Organizational Domain has +declined to do so. +
+ +
Identifier Alignment Evaluation +It may be necessary to perform multiple DNS Tree Walks to determine if an +Authenticated Identifier and an Author Domain are in alignment, meaning +that they have either the same Organizational Domain (relaxed alignment) or +that they're identical (strict alignment). DNS Tree Walks done to discover an +Organizational Domain for use in Identifier Alignment Evaluation might start +at any of the following locations: + +
    +
  • The Author Domain of the message being evaluated.
    • +
  • The SPF-Authenticated Identifier if there is an SPF pass result for the message +being evaluated.
    • +
  • Any DKIM-Authenticated Identifier if one or more DKIM pass results exist for +the message being evaluated.
    • +
+Note: There is no need to perform Identifier Alignment Evaluations under any of +the following conditions: + +
    +
  • The Author Domain and the Authenticated Identifier(s) are all the +same domain, and there is a DMARC Policy Record published for that domain. +In this case, this common domain is treated as the Organizational Domain. +For example, if the common domain in question is "mail.example.com", and +there is a valid DMARC Policy Record published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com", +then "mail.example.com" is the Organizational Domain.
    • +
  • No applicable DMARC Policy Record is discovered for the Author Domain. In +this case, the DMARC mechanism does not apply to the message in question.
    • +
  • The DMARC Policy record for the Author Domain indicates strict alignment. In +this case, a simple string comparison of the Author Domain and the Authenticated +Identifier(s) is all that is required.
    • +
+To discover the Organizational Domain for a domain, perform the DNS Tree Walk +described in as needed for any of the domains in question. +For each Tree Walk that retrieved valid DMARC Policy Records, select the Organizational +Domain from the domains for which valid DMARC Policy Records were retrieved from the longest +to the shortest: + +
    +
  1. If a valid DMARC Policy Record contains the "psd" tag set to "n" ("psd=n"), this is the +Organizational Domain, and the selection process is complete. +
    2. +
  2. If a valid DMARC Policy Record, other than the one for the domain where the tree +walk started, contains the "psd" tag set to "y" ("psd=y"), the Organizational +Domain is the domain one label below this one in the DNS hierarchy, and the +selection process is complete. For example, if in the course of a tree walk a DMARC +Policy Record is queried for at first "_dmarc.mail.example.com" and then "_dmarc.example.com", +and a valid DMARC Policy Record containing the "psd" tag set to "y" is found at +"_dmarc.example.com", then "mail.example.com" is the domain one label below "example.com" +in the DNS hierarchy and is thus the Organizational Domain. +
    3. +
  3. Otherwise, select the DMARC Policy Record found at the name with the fewest number +of labels. This is the Organizational Domain and the selection process is complete. +
    4. +
+If this process does not determine the Organizational Domain, then the initial target +domain is the Organizational Domain. +For example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", a search +for the Organizational Domain would require a series of DNS queries for DMARC Policy +Records starting with "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com" and finishing with "_dmarc.com". +If there are DMARC Policy Records published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" and +"_dmarc.example.com", but not at "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com" or +"_dmarc.com", then the Organizational Domain for this domain would be +"example.com". +As another example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", if a +search for the Organizational Domain yields a DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" +with the "psd" tag set to "n", then the Organizational Domain for this domain would +be "mail.example.com". +As a last example, given the starting domain "a.mail.example.com", if a +search for the Organizational Domain only yields a DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.com" +and that record contains the tag "psd=y", then the Organizational Domain for +this domain would be "example.com". +
+
+
+ +
DMARC Participation +This section describes the actions for participating in DMARC for each of +three unique entities - Domain Owners, PSOs, and Mail Receivers. + +
Domain Owner Actions +A Domain Owner wishing to fully participate in DMARC will +publish a DMARC Policy Record to cover each Author Domain and corresponding Organizational Domain +to which DMARC validation should apply, send email that produces at least one, and +preferably two, Authenticated Identifiers that align +with the Author Domain, and will receive and monitor the content of DMARC aggregate +reports. The following sections describe how to achieve this. + +
Publish an SPF Record for an Aligned Domain +To configure SPF for DMARC, the Domain Owner MUST send mail that has +an RFC5321.MailFrom domain that will produce an SPF-Authenticated +Identifier that has Identifier Alignment +with the Author Domain. +
+ +
Configure Sending System for DKIM Signing Using an Aligned Domain +To configure DKIM for DMARC, the Domain Owner MUST send mail that +has a DKIM Signing Domain that will produce a +DKIM-Authenticated Identifier that +has Identifier Alignment with the Author Domain. +
+ +
Set Up a Mailbox to Receive Aggregate Reports +Proper consumption and analysis of DMARC aggregate reports are essential +to any successful DMARC deployment for a Domain Owner. DMARC aggregate +reports, which are defined in , +contain valuable data for the Domain Owner, showing sources of mail +using the Author Domain. +
+ +
Publish a DMARC Policy Record for the Author Domain and Organizational Domain +Once SPF, DKIM, and the aggregate reports mailbox are all in place, +it's time to publish a DMARC Policy Record. For best results, Domain Owners +usually start with "p=none", (see ) +with the "rua" tag containing a URI that references the mailbox created +in the previous step. This is commonly referred to as putting the Author +Domain into Monitoring Mode. If the Organizational Domain +is different from the Author Domain, a record also needs to be published for the +Organizational Domain. +
+ +
Collect and Analyze Reports +The reason for starting at "p=none" is to ensure that nothing's been +missed in the initial SPF and DKIM deployments. In all but the most +trivial setups, a Domain Owner can overlook a server here or be unaware +of a third party sending agreement there. Starting at "p=none", therefore, +takes advantage of DMARC's aggregate reporting function, with the Domain +Owner using the reports to audit its own mail streams' authentication +configurations. +While it is possible for a human to read aggregate reports, they are +formatted in such a way that it is recommended that they be machine-parsed, +so setting up a mailbox involves more than just the physical creation +of that mailbox. Many third-party services exist that will process DMARC +aggregate reports or the Domain Owner can create its own set of tools. +No matter which method is chosen, the ability to consume these reports and +parse the data contained in them will go a long way to ensuring a +successful deployment. +
+ +
Remediate Unaligned or Unauthenticated Mail Streams +DMARC aggregate reports can reveal to the Domain Owner mail streams using the +Author Domain that should be passing DMARC validation checks but are not. If +the reason for the streams not passing is due to Authenticated Identifiers being +unaligned or missing entirely, then the Domain Owner wishing to fully participate +in DMARC MUST take necessary steps to address these shortcomings. +
+ +
Decide Whether to Update Domain Owner Assessment Policy to Enforcement +Once the Domain Owner is satisfied that it is properly authenticating +all of its mail, then it is time to decide if it is appropriate to +change its Domain Owner Assessment Policy to Enforcement. +Depending on its cadence for sending mail, it may take many months +of consuming DMARC aggregate reports before a Domain Owner reaches +the point where it is sure that it is properly authenticating all +of its mail, and the decision on which "p" value to use will depend +on its needs. +In making this decision it is important to understand the +interoperability issues involved and problems that can result for +mailing lists and for delivery of legitimate mail. Those +issues are discussed in detail in +
+ +
A Note on Large, Complex Organizations and Decentralized DNS Management +Large, complex organizations frequently adopt a decentralized model for +DNS management, whereby management of a subtree of the name space is delegated +to a local department by the central IT organization. In such situations, the +"psd" tag makes it possible for those local departments to declare any arbitrary +node in their subtree as an Organizational Domain. This would be accomplished by +publishing a DMARC Policy Record at that node with the "psd" tag set to "n". The +reasons that departments might declare their own Organizational Domains include a +desire to have different policy settings or reporting URIs than the DMARC Policy Record +published for the apex domain. +Such configurations would work in theory, and they might involve domain names with +many labels, reflecting the structure of the organization, for example: + +
    +
  • Apex domain (DMARC Policy Record published here): example.com
    • +
  • Zone cut domain (DMARC Policy Record with "psd=n" published here): b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com
    • +
  • Author Domain: mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com
    • +
+However, Domain Owners should be aware that due to the anti-abuse protections +built into the DNS Tree Walk, the DMARC Policy Record published +at the zone cut domain in this example will never be discovered. A Mail Receiver +performing a Tree Walk would only perform queries for these names: + +
    +
  • _dmarc.mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.c.d.e.f.g.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.d.e.f.g.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.e.f.g.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.f.g.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.g.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.example.com
    • +
  • _dmarc.com
    • +
+To avoid this circumstance, Domain Owners wishing to have a specific DMARC Policy +Record applied to a given [Author Domain]{#author-domain) longer than eight labels +MUST publish a DMARC Policy Record at that domain's location in the DNS namespace, +as such records are always queried by Mail Receivers that participate in DMARC before +the Tree Walk begins. In the above example, this would mean publishing a DMARC Policy +Record at the name "_dmarc.mail.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.example.com.". +
+
+ +
PSO Actions +In addition to the DMARC Domain Owner actions, if a PSO +publishes a DMARC Policy Record it MUST include the "psd" tag (see ) +with a value of "y" ("psd=y"). +
+ +
Mail Receiver Actions +Mail Receivers wishing to fully participate in DMARC +will apply the DMARC mechanism to inbound email messages when a DMARC +Policy Record exists that applies to the Author +Domain, and will send aggregate reports to Domain +Owners that request them. Mail Receivers might also send failure reports +to Domain Owners that request them. +The steps for applying the DMARC mechanism to an email message can take +place during the SMTP transaction, and should do so if the Mail Receiver +plans to honor Domain Owner Assessment Policies that +are at the Enforcement state. +Many Mail Receivers perform one or both of the underlying Authentication +Mechanisms on inbound messages even in cases +where no DMARC Policy Record exists for the Author Domain of a given message, +or where the Mail Receiver is not participating in DMARC. Nothing in this +section is intended to imply that the underlying Authentication Mechanisms +should only be performed by Mail Receivers participating in DMARC. +The next sections describe the steps for a Mail Receiver wishing to fully +participate in DMARC. + +
Extract Author Domain +Once the email message has been transmitted to the Mail Receiver, the Mail +Receiver extracts the domain in the RFC5322.From header field as the Author +Domain. If the domain is a U-label, the domain MUST be converted to an +A-label, as described in Section 2.3 of , for further processing. +If zero or more than one domain is extracted from the RFC5322.From header +field, then DMARC validation is not possible and the process terminates. +In the case where more than one domain is retrieved, the Mail Receiver +MAY choose to go forward with DMARC validation anyway. See + for further discussion. +
+ +
Determine If The DMARC Mechanism Applies +If precisely one Author Domain exists for the message, then perform the +step described in [DMARC Policy Discovery] to determine if the DMARC +mechanism applies. If a DMARC Policy Record is not +discovered during this step, then the DMARC mechanism does not apply and +DMARC validation terminates for the message. +
+ +
Determine If Authenticated Identifiers Exist +For each Authentication Mechanism underlying DMARC, perform the required +check to determine if an Authenticated Identifier +exists for the message if such check has not already been performed. Results from +each check must be preserved for later use as follows: + +
    +
  • For SPF, the preserved results MUST include "pass" or "fail", and if "fail", SHOULD +include information about the reasons for failure if available. The results MUST further +include the domain name used to complete the SPF check.
    • +
  • For DKIM signature validation checks, for each signature checked, the +results MUST include "pass" or "fail", and if "fail", SHOULD include +information about the reasons for failure. The results MUST further include +the value of the "d" and "s" tags from each checked DKIM signature.
    • +
+
+ +
Conduct Identifier Alignment Checks If Necessary +For each Authenticated Identifier found in the message, the Mail Receiver checks +to see if the Authenticated Identifier is aligned +with the Author Domain. +
+ +
Determine DMARC "Pass" or "Fail" +If one or more of the Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author Domain, the +message is considered to pass the DMARC mechanism check. +If no Authenticated Identifiers exist for the domain, or none of the Authenticated +Identifiers align with the Author Domain, the message is considered to fail the +DMARC mechanism check. +
+ +
Apply Policy If Appropriate +Email messages that fail the DMARC mechanism check are handled in accordance with +the Mail Receiver's local policies. These local policies may take into account the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy for the Author Domain at the Mail Receiver's discretion. +If one or more DNS queries required to perform DMARC validation on the message +do not complete due to temporary or permanent DNS errors, the message cannot be +considered to pass or fail the DMARC mechanism check. In such cases, the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy cannot be applied to the message, and any other handling +decisions for the message are left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver. +See for further discussion of topics regarding rejecting messages. +
+ +
Store Results of DMARC Processing +If the Mail Receiver intends to fully participate in DMARC, then results obtained from +the application of the DMARC mechanism by the Mail Receiver MUST be stored for eventual +presentation back to the Domain Owner in the form of aggregate feedback reports. and + discuss aggregate feedback. +
+ +
Send Aggregate Reports +To ensure maximum usefulness for DMARC across the email ecosystem, Mail +Receivers SHOULD generate and send aggregate reports with a frequency +of at least once every 24 hours. Such reports provide Domain Owners with +insight into all mail streams using Author Domains under the Domain Owner's +control, and aid the Domain Owner in determining whether and when to transition +from Monitoring Mode to Enforcement. +The most common reasons for a Mail Receiver to opt out of sending aggregate +reports include resource constraints, local policy against sharing data, and +concerns about user privacy. +
+ +
Optionally Send Failure Reports +Per-message failure reports can be a useful source of information for a Domain +Owner, either for debugging deployments or in analyzing attacks, and so Mail +Receivers MAY choose to send them. Experience has shown, however, that Mail +Receivers rightly concerned about protecting user privacy have either chosen to +heavily redact the information in such reports (which can hinder their usefulness) +or not send them at all. See for further information. +
+
+ +
Policy Enforcement Considerations +The final handling of any message is always a matter of local policy and is +left to the discretion of the Mail Receiver. +A DMARC pass for a message indicates only that the use of the Author Domain +has been validated for that message as authorized by the Domain Owner. +Such authorization does not carry an explicit or implicit value assertion about +that message or the Domain Owner, and Mail Receivers MAY choose to reject or +quarantine a message even if it passes the DMARC validation check. Mail Receivers +are encouraged to maintain anti-abuse technologies to combat the possibility of +DMARC-enabled criminal campaigns. +Mail Receivers MAY choose to accept email that fails the DMARC +validation check even if the published Domain Owner Assessment Policy +is "reject". In particular, because of the considerations discussed +in and in of this document, it is important that Mail +Receivers SHOULD NOT reject messages solely because of a published policy of "reject", +but that they apply other knowledge and analysis to avoid situations such as rejection +of legitimate messages sent in ways that DMARC cannot describe, harm to the operation of +mailing lists, and similar. +If a Mail Receiver chooses not to honor the published Domain Owner +Assessment Policy to improve interoperability among mail systems, it may +increase the likelihood of accepting abusive mail. At a minimum, Mail +Receivers SHOULD add the Authentication-Results header field (see +), and it is RECOMMENDED when delivering messages that fail the DMARC validation check. +When Mail Receivers deviate from a published Domain Owner +Assessment Policy during message processing they SHOULD make +available the fact of and reason for the deviation to the Domain +Owner via feedback reporting, specifically using the +"PolicyOverride" feature of the aggregate report defined in +. +To enable Domain Owners to receive DMARC feedback without impacting +existing mail processing, discovered policies of "p=none" MUST NOT +modify existing mail handling processes. +
+
+ +
DMARC Feedback +DMARC Feedback is described in +As an operational note for Public Suffix Operators, feedback for non-existent +domains can be desirable and useful, just as it can be for Organizational +Domains. Therefore, both such entities should consider including "rua=" tags +in any DMARC Policy Records they publish for themselves. See +for discussion of Privacy Considerations. +
+ +
Other Topics +This section discusses some topics regarding choices made in the +development of DMARC, largely to commit the history to record. + +
Issues Specific to SPF +Though DMARC does not inherently change the semantics of an SPF +policy record, historically lax enforcement of such policies has led +many to publish extremely broad records containing many extensive network +ranges. Domain Owners are strongly encouraged to carefully review +their SPF records to understand which networks are authorized to send +on behalf of the Domain Owner before publishing a DMARC Policy Record. Furthermore, +Domain Owners should periodically review their SPF records to ensure that +the authorization conveyed by the records matches the domain's current needs. +SPF was intended to be implemented early in the SMTP transaction, meaning it's +possible for a message to fail SPF validation prior to any message content being +transmitted, and so some Mail Receiver architectures might implement SPF in +advance of any DMARC operations. This means that an SPF hard fail ("-") prefix +on a sender's SPF mechanism, such as "-all", could cause a message to be rejected early in +the SMTP transaction, before any DMARC processing takes place, if the message +fails SPF authentication checks. Domain Owners choosing to use "-all" to terminate +SPF records should be aware of this, and should understand that messages that +might otherwise pass DMARC due to an aligned DKIM-Authenticated Identifier could be rejected solely due to an SPF fail. +Moreover, messages rejected early in the SMTP transaction will never appear in +aggregate DMARC reports, as the transaction will never proceed to the DATA phase +and so the RFC5322.From domain will never be revealed and its DMARC policy will +never be discovered. Domain Owners and Mail Receivers can consult + and for more discussion of the topic and best practices +regarding publishing SPF records and when to reject based solely on SPF failure: +
+ +
Rejecting Messages +The DMARC mechanism calls for rejection of a message during the SMTP +session under certain circumstances. This is preferable to +generation of a Delivery Status Notification +, since fraudulent messages caught and rejected using the DMARC +mechanism would then result in the annoying generation of such failure reports +that go back to the RFC5321.MailFrom address. +This synchronous rejection is typically done in one of two ways: + +
    +
  • Full rejection, wherein the SMTP server issues a 5xy reply code to the +DATA command as an indication to the SMTP client that the transaction failed; +the SMTP client is then responsible for generating a notification that +delivery failed (see ). +
    • +
  • A "silent discard", wherein the SMTP server returns a 2xy reply +code implying to the client that delivery (or, at least, relay) +was successfully completed, but then simply discards the message +with no further action. +
    • +
+Each of these has a cost. For instance, a silent discard can help to +prevent backscatter, but it also effectively means that the SMTP +server has to be programmed to give a false result, which can +confound external debugging efforts. +Similarly, the text portion of the SMTP reply may be important to +consider. For example, when rejecting a message, revealing the +reason for the rejection might give an attacker enough information to +bypass those efforts on a later attempt, though it might also assist +a legitimate client to determine the source of some local issue that +caused the rejection. +In the latter case, when doing an SMTP rejection, providing a clear +hint can be useful in resolving issues. A Mail Receiver +might indicate in plain text the reason for the rejection by using the +word "DMARC" somewhere in the reply text. For example: + + +Many systems are able to scan the SMTP reply text to determine the nature +of the rejection. Thus, providing a machine-detectable reason for rejection +allows the problems causing rejections to be properly addressed by automated systems. +If a Mail Receiver elects to defer delivery due to the inability to +retrieve or apply DMARC policy, this is best done with a 4xy SMTP +reply code. +
+ +
Interoperability Issues +DMARC limits which end-to-end scenarios can achieve a "pass" result. +Because DMARC relies on SPF and/or DKIM to achieve +a "pass", their limitations also apply. +Issues specific to the use of policy mechanisms alongside DKIM are +further discussed in , particularly Section 5.2. +Mail that is sent by authorized, independent third parties might not be +sent with Identifier Alignment, also preventing a "pass" result. A Domain +Owner can use DMARC aggregate reports to identify this mail and take steps +to address authentication shortcomings. +
+ +
Interoperability Considerations +As discussed in "Interoperability Issues between DMARC and Indirect +Email Flows" , use of "p=reject" can be incompatible with and +cause interoperability problems to indirect message flows such as +"alumni forwarders", role-based email aliases, and mailing lists +across the Internet. +As an example of this, a bank might send only targeted messages to +account holders. Those account holders might have given their bank +addresses such as "jones@alumni.example.edu" (an address that relays +the messages to another address with a real mailbox) or +"finance@association.example" (a role-based address that does similar +relaying for the current head of finance at the association). When +such mail is delivered to the actual recipient mailbox, it will +most likely fail SPF checks unless the RFC5321.MailFrom address is +rewritten by the relaying MTA, as the incoming IP address will be that +of "example.edu" or "association.example", and not an IP address authorized +by the originating RFC5321.MailFrom domain. DKIM signatures will generally +remain valid in these relay situations. +
It is therefore critical that domains that publish "p=reject" +MUST NOT rely solely on SPF to secure a DMARC pass, and +MUST apply valid DKIM signatures to their messages. +
In the case of domains that have general users who send routine email, +those that publish a Domain Owner Assessment Policy +of "p=reject" are likely to create significant interoperability +issues. In particular, if users in such domains post messages to mailing +lists on the Internet, those messages can cause significant operational problems +for the mailing lists and for the subscribers to those lists, as explained below and +in . +
It is therefore critical that domains that host users who might +post messages to mailing lists SHOULD NOT publish Domain Owner Assessment Policies +of "p=reject". Any such domains wishing to publish "p=reject" SHOULD first +take advantage of DMARC aggregate report data for their domain to +determine the possible impact to their users, first by publishing +"p=none" for at least a month, followed by publishing "p=quarantine" for +an equally long period of time, and comparing the message disposition +results. Domains that choose to publish "p=reject" SHOULD either +implement policies that their users not post to Internet mailing lists +and/or inform their users that their participation in mailing lists may +be hindered. +
As noted in , Mail Receivers +need to apply more analysis than just DMARC validation in their +disposition of incoming messages. An example of the consequences of +honoring a Domain Owner Assessment Policy of "p=reject" without further analysis +is that rejecting messages that have been relayed by a mailing list can cause +the Mail Receiver's users to have their subscriptions to that mailing list canceled +by the list software's automated handling of such rejections - it looks +to the list manager as though the recipient's email address is no +longer working, so the address is automatically unsubscribed. An example of this +scenario, albeit with DKIM Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP) rather than DMARC, +can be found in . +
It is therefore critical that Mail Receivers MUST NOT reject +incoming messages solely on the basis of a "p=reject" policy by +the sending domain. Mail Receivers must use the DMARC +policy as part of their disposition decision, along with other +knowledge and analysis. "Other knowledge and analysis" here might +refer to observed sending patterns for properly-authenticated mail +using the sending domain, content filtering, etc. In the absence of +other knowledge and analysis, Mail Receivers MUST treat such failing +mail as if the policy were "p=quarantine" rather than "p=reject". +
Failure to understand and abide by these considerations can cause +legitimate, sometimes important email to be rejected, can cause +operational damage to mailing lists throughout the Internet, and +can result in trouble-desk calls and complaints from the Mail Receiver's +employees, customers, and clients. +In practice, despite this advice, few Mail Receivers apply any mitigation +techniques when receiving indirect mail flows, few organizations consider +the effect of DMARC policies on their users' indirect mail, and it is unlikely +that any advice in this document will change that. As a result, mail forwarded +through mailing lists with unmodified From: header lines is frequently rejected +due to a p=reject policy. +In the ten years since large consumer mail systems started publishing p=reject +policies, mailing list software has all adopted workarounds to make the From: +header line DMARC aligned. Some simply use the list's address, while others do +per-address modifications intended to be reversible or to allow mail to be +forwarded back to the original author, e.g., bob@example.com turned into +bob=example.com@user.somelist.example. While these workarounds are far from +ideal, they are firmly established and list operators treat them as a fact of life. +Mail developers have been trying for a decade to invent technical methods +to allow mailing lists to continue to work without modifying the From: header +line, with a prominent example being the Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) +protocol described in . While work continues, as of this document's +publication, none of the methods have become widely used. Should such a technical +method achieve widespread adoption in the future, this document can be updated to +reflect that. +
+
+ +
IANA Considerations +This section describes actions completed by IANA. + +
Authentication-Results Method Registry Update +IANA has added the following to the "Email Authentication Methods" +registry: +"Authentication-Results Method Registry Update" + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
MethodDefinedptypePropertyValueStatusVersion
dmarc[this document]headerfromthe domain portion of the RFC5322.From header fieldactive1
dmarc[this document]policydmarcEvaluated DMARC policy applied/to be applied after policy options including pct: and sp: have been processed. Must be none, quarantine, or reject.active1
+ +
Authentication-Results Result Registry Update +IANA has added the following in the "Email Authentication Result +Names" registry: +"Authentication-Results Result Registry Update" + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Auth Method(s)CodeSpecificationStatus
dmarcfail[this document]active
dmarcnone[this document]active
dmarcpass[this document]active
dmarcpermerror[this document]active
dmarctemperror[this document]active
+ +
Feedback Report Header Fields Registry Update +The following has been added to the "Feedback Report Header Fields" +registry: +"Feedback Report Header Fields" + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Field NameDescriptionMultiple ApperancesRelated "Feedback-Type"ReferenceStatus
Identity-Alignmentindicates whether the message about which a report is being generated had any identifiers in alignmentNoauth-failure[this document]current
+ +
DMARC Tag Registry +A registry tree called "Domain-based Message Authentication, +Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Parameters" exists, and it +and any sub-registries thereunder should be updated to reference +this document. Within it, a new sub-registry called the "DMARC +Tag Registry" exists. +Names of DMARC tags are registered with IANA in this sub-registry. Entries +are assigned only for values that have been documented in a manner that +satisfies the terms of Specification Required, per . Each +registration includes the tag name; the specification that defines it; +a brief description; and its status, which is one of "current", "experimental", +or "historic". The Designated Expert needs to confirm that the provided +specification adequately describes the new tag and clearly presents +how it would be used within the DMARC context by Domain Owners and +Mail Receivers. +To avoid version compatibility issues, tags added to the DMARC +specification are to avoid changing the semantics of existing records +when processed by implementations conforming to prior specifications. +The set of entries to be defined in this registry is as follows: +"DMARC Tag Registry" + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Tag NameReferenceStatusDescription
adkim[this document]currentDKIM alignment mode
aspf[this document]currentSPF alignment mode
fo[this document]currentFailure reporting options
np[this document]currentRequested handling policy for non-existent subdomains
p[this document]currentRequested handling policy
pct[this document]historicSampling rate
psd[this document]currentIndicates whether policy record is published by a Public Suffix Domain
rf[this document]historicFailure reporting format(s)
ri[this document]historicAggregate Reporting interval
rua[this document]currentReporting URI(s) for aggregate data
ruf[this document]currentReporting URI(s) for failure data
sp[this document]currentRequested handling policy for subdomains
t[this document]currentTest mode for the specified policy
v[this document]currentSpecification version
+ +
DMARC Report Format Registry +Also, within "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and +Conformance (DMARC) Parameters", a new sub-registry called "DMARC +Report Format Registry" exists and should be updated to reference +this document. +Names of DMARC failure reporting formats are registered with IANA +in this registry. New entries are assigned only for values that +satisfy the definition of Specification Required, per +. In addition to a reference to a permanent +specification, each registration includes the format name, a +brief description, and its status, which must be one of "current", +"experimental", or "historic". The Designated Expert needs to +confirm that the provided specification adequately describes the +report format and clearly presents how it would be used within the +DMARC context by Domain Owners and Mail Receivers. +The entry in this registry is as follows: +"DMARC Report Format Registry" + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Format NameReferenceStatusDescription
afrf[this document]currentAuthentication Failure Reporting Format (see )
+ +
Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names Registry +Per , please update the following entry to the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry: +"Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
RR Type_NODE NAMEReference
TXT_dmarc[this document]
+
+ +
Privacy Considerations +This section discusses issues specific to private data that may be +included if DMARC reports are requested. Issues associated with +sending aggregate reports and failure reports are addressed in + and + respectively. + +
Aggregate Report Considerations +Aggregate reports may, particularly for small organizations, provide some +limited insight into email sending patterns. As an example, in a small +organization, an aggregate report from a particular domain may be sufficient +to make the report receiver aware of sensitive personal or business +information. If setting an "rua" tag in a DMARC Policy Record, the reporting +address needs controls appropriate to the organizational requirements to +mitigate any risk associated with receiving and handling reports. +In the case of "rua" requests for multi-organizational PSDs, additional +information leakage considerations exist. Multi-organizational PSDs that +do not mandate DMARC use by registrants risk exposure of private data of +registrant domains if they include the "rua" tag in their DMARC Policy Record. +
+ +
Failure Report Considerations +Failure reports do provide insight into email sending patterns, including +specific users. If requesting failure reports, data management controls +are needed to support appropriate management of this information. The +additional detail available through failure reports (relative to aggregate +reports) can drive a need for additional controls. As an example, a +company may be legally restricted from receiving data related to a specific +subsidiary. Before requesting failure reports, any such data spillage risks +have to be addressed through data management controls or publishing DMARC +Policy Records for relevant subdomains to prevent reporting on data related to +their emails. +Due to the nature of the email contents which may be shared through Failure +Reports, most Mail Receivers refuse to send them out of privacy concerns. Out +of band agreements between Report Consumers and Mail Receivers may be required +to address these concerns. +DMARC Policy Records for multi-organizational PSDs MUST NOT include the "ruf" tag. +
+
+ +
Security Considerations +This section discusses security issues and possible remediations +(where available) for DMARC. + +
Authentication Methods +Security considerations from the authentication methods used by DMARC +are incorporated here by reference. +Both of the email authentication methods that underlie DMARC provide some +assurance that an email was transmitted by an MTA which is authorized to +do so. SPF policies map domain names to sets of authorized MTAs (see ). +Validated DKIM signatures indicate that an email was transmitted by an MTA with +access to a private key that matches the published DKIM key record. +Whenever mail is sent, there is a risk that an overly permissive source +may send mail that will receive a DMARC pass result that was not, in fact, +intended by the Domain Owner. These results may lead to issues when +systems interpret DMARC pass results to indicate a message is in some way +authentic. They also allow such unauthorized senders to evade the Domain +Owner's intended message handling for DMARC validation failures. +To avoid this risk one must ensure that no unauthorized source can add +DKIM signatures to the domain's mail or transmit mail which will evaluate +as SPF pass. If, nonetheless, a Domain Owner wishes to include a +permissive source in a domain's SPF record, the source can be excluded +from DMARC consideration by using the "?" qualifier on the SPF record +mechanism associated with that source. +
+ +
Attacks on Reporting URIs +URIs published in DNS TXT records are well-understood possible +targets for attack. Specifications such as and + either expose or cause the exposure of email addresses that +could be flooded by an attacker, for example. Records found in the DNS such as MX, NS, +and others advertise potential attack destinations. Common DNS names such +as "www" plainly identify the locations at which particular services can +be found, providing destinations for targeted denial-of-service or +penetration attacks. This all means that Domain Owners will need to harden +these addresses against various attacks, including but not limited to: + +
    +
  • high-volume denial-of-service attacks; +
    • +
  • deliberate construction of malformed reports intended to identify +or exploit parsing or processing vulnerabilities; +
    • +
  • deliberate construction of reports containing false claims for the +Submitter or Reported-Domain fields, including the possibility of +false data from compromised but known Mail Receivers. +
    • +
+
+ +
DNS Security +The DMARC mechanism and its underlying Authentication Mechanisms (SPF and DKIM) +depend on the security of the DNS. Examples of how hostile parties can +have an adverse impact on DNS traffic include: + +
    +
  • If they can snoop on DNS traffic, they can get an idea of who is +receiving mail using the domain(s) in question. +
    • +
  • If they can block outgoing or reply DNS messages, they can prevent +systems from discovering senders' DMARC policies. +
    • +
  • If they can send forged response packets, they can make aligned mail +appear unaligned or vice-versa. +
    • +
+None of these threats are unique to DMARC, and they can be addressed using +a variety of techniques, including, but not limited to: + +
    +
  • Signing DNS records with Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) , +which enables recipients to validate the integrity of DNS data and detect and discard +forged responses. +
    • +
  • DNS over TLS or DNS over HTTPS can mitigate snooping +and forged responses. +
    • +
+
+ +
Display Name Attacks +An increasingly common attack in messaging abuse is the presentation of false +information in the display-name portion of the RFC5322.From header field. +For example, it is possible for the email address in that field to be +an arbitrary address or domain name while containing a well-known +name (a person, brand, role, etc.) in the display name, intending to +fool the end user into believing that the name is used legitimately. +Such attacks, known as display name attacks, are out of scope for DMARC. +
+ +
Denial of DMARC Processing Attacks +The declaration in and elsewhere in this document +that messages that do not contain precisely one RFC5322.From domain are +outside the scope of this document exposes an attack vector that must be +taken into consideration. +Because such messages are outside the scope of this document, an attacker +can craft messages with multiple RFC5322.From domains, including the spoofed +domain, in an effort to bypass DMARC validation and get the fraudulent message +to be displayed by the victim's MUA with the spoofed domain successfully shown +to the victim. In those cases where such messages are not rejected due to other +reasons (for example, many such messages would violate RFC5322's requirement that +there be precisely one From: header field), care must be taken by the Mail Receiver +to recognize such messages as the threats they might be and handle them +appropriately. +The case of a syntactically valid multi-valued RFC5322.From field presents a +particular challenge. Experience has shown that most such messages are abusive +and/or unwanted by their recipients, and given this fact, a Mail Receiver may make a +negative disposition decision for the message prior to and instead of its being +subjected to DMARC processing. However, in a case where a Mail Receiver requires +that the message be subject to DMARC validation, a recommended approach as per + is to apply the DMARC mechanism to each domain found in the RFC5322.From +field as the Author Domain and apply the most strict policy selected among the +checks that fail. Such an approach might prove useful for a small number of +Author Domains, but it is possible that applying such logic to messages with +a large number of domains (where "large" is defined by each Mail Receiver) will +expose the Mail Receiver to a form of denial of service attack. Limiting the number of +Author Domains processed will avoid this risk. If not all Author Domains are +processed, then the DMARC evaluation is incomplete. +
+ +
External Reporting Addresses +To avoid abuse by bad actors, reporting addresses generally have to +be inside the domains about which reports are requested. To +accommodate special cases such as a need to get reports about domains +that cannot actually receive mail, describes +a DNS-based mechanism for validating approved external reporting. +The obvious consideration here is an increased DNS load against +domains that are claimed as external recipients. Negative caching +will mitigate this problem, but only to a limited extent, mostly +dependent on the default TTL in the domain's SOA record. +Where possible, external reporting is best achieved by having the +report be directed to domains that can receive mail and simply having +it automatically forwarded to the desired external destination. +Note that the addresses shown in the "ruf" tag receive more +information that might be considered private data since it is +possible for actual email content to appear in the failure reports. +The URIs identified there are thus more attractive targets for +intrusion attempts than those found in the "rua" tag. Moreover, +attacking the DNS of the subject domain to cause failure data to be +routed fraudulently to an attacker's systems may be an attractive +prospect. Deployment of DNSSEC is advisable if this is a concern. +
+ +
Secure Protocols +This document encourages the use of secure transport mechanisms to +prevent the loss of private data to third parties that may be able to +monitor such transmissions. Unencrypted mechanisms should be +avoided. +In particular, a message that was originally encrypted or otherwise +secured might appear in a report that is not sent securely, which +could reveal private information. +
+ +
Relaxed Alignment Considerations +The DMARC mechanism allows both DKIM- and SPF-Authenticated Identifiers +to validate authorized use of an Author Domain on behalf of a Domain Owner. If malicious or unaware users can gain control of the SPF record or DKIM selector +records for a subdomain of the Organizational Domain, the subdomain can be used to generate email +that achieves a DMARC pass on behalf of the Organizational Domain. +A scenario such as this could occur under the following conditions: + +
    +
  • A DMARC record exists for the domain "example.com", such that "example.com" is an Organizational Domain
    • +
  • An attacker controls DNS for the domain "evil.example.com" and publishes an SPF record for that domain
    • +
  • The attacker sends email with RFC5322.From header field containing "foo@example.com" and an SPF-Authenticated Identifier of "evil.example.com"
    • +
+Although this email was not authorized by the Domain Owner, it can produce a DMARC pass because the SPF-Authenticated Identifier +("evil.example.com") has Identifier Alignment with the Author Domain ("example.com"). +The Organizational Domain Owner should be careful not to delegate control of subdomains if this is an +issue, and consider using the Strict Alignment option if appropriate. +DMARC evaluation for relaxed alignment is also highly sensitive to errors in +determining the Organizational Domain if the Author Domain does not have a published +DMARC Policy Record. If an incorrectly selected Organizational +Domain is a parent of the correct Organizational Domain, then relaxed alignment could +potentially allow a malicious sender to send mail that achieves a DMARC pass verdict. +This potential exists for both the legacy and current methods for determining +the organizational domain, the latter described in . +The following example illustrates this possibility: + +
    +
  • Mail is sent with an Author Domain of "a.mail.example.com" and Authenticated Identifiers of "mail.example.com"
    • +
  • There is no DMARC Policy Record published at "_dmarc.a.mail.example.com"
    • +
  • There is one published at "_dmarc.mail.example.com" and this is intended to be the Organizataional Domain for this message
    • +
  • There is also a DMARC Policy Record published at "_dmarc.example.com", with default alignment (relaxed)
    • +
  • An is able to send mail with the Author Domain of "evil.example.com" and an Authenticated Identifier of "mail.example.com"
    • +
+In this scenario, if a Mail Receiver incorrectly determines the Organizational Domain to be "example.com", +then the attacker's mail will pass DMARC validation checks. +This issue is entirely avoided by the use of Strict Alignment and publishing explicit +DMARC Policy Records for all Author Domains used in an organization's email. +For cases where Strict Alignment is not appropriate, this issue can be mitigated by the Domain +Owner periodically (perhaps weekly, or whatever frequency might be appropriate for a given organization's +perational needs) checking the DMARC Policy Records, if any, of PSDs +above the Organizational Domain in the DNS tree and (for legacy checking that +appropriate PSL entries remain present). If a PSD publishes a DMARC Policy Record without +the appropriate "psd=y" tag, Organizational Domain owners can add "psd=n" to their Organizational +Domain's DMARC Policy Record so that the PSD's DMARC Policy Record will not be incorrectly +interpreted to indicate that the PSD is the Organizational Domain. +
+
+ + + + +References +Normative References + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Informative References + + + M3AAWG Email Authentication Recommended Best Practices + + + + + + M3AAWG Best Practices for Managing SPF Records + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Technology Considerations +This section documents some design decisions made in the +development of DMARC. Specifically addressed here are some +suggestions that were considered but not included in the design, +with explanatory text regarding the decision. + +
S/MIME +S/MIME, or Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions , +is a standard for encrypting and signing MIME data in a message. This +was suggested and considered as a third security protocol for +authenticating the source of a message. +DMARC is focused on authentication at the domain level (i.e., the +Domain Owner taking responsibility for the message), while S/MIME is +really intended for user-to-user authentication and encryption. This +alone appears to make it a bad fit for DMARC's goals. +S/MIME also suffers from the heavyweight problem of Public Key +Infrastructure, which means that distribution of keys used to validate +signatures needs to be incorporated. In many instances, this alone +is a showstopper. There have been consistent promises that PKI +usability and deployment will improve, but these have yet to +materialize. DMARC can revisit this choice after those barriers are +addressed. +S/MIME has extensive deployment in specific market segments +(government, for example) but does not enjoy similar widespread +deployment over the general Internet, and this shows no signs of +changing. DKIM and SPF are both deployed widely over the general +Internet, and their adoption rates continue to be positive. +Finally, experiments have shown that including S/MIME support in the +initial version of DMARC would neither cause nor enable a substantial +increase in the accuracy of the overall mechanism. +
+ +
Method Exclusion +It was suggested that DMARC include a mechanism by which a Domain +Owner could instruct Mail Receivers not to attempt validation by one +of the supported methods (e.g., "check DKIM, but not SPF"). +Specifically, consider a Domain Owner that has deployed one of the +technologies and that technology fails for some messages, but such +failures don't cause enforcement action. Deploying DMARC would cause +enforcement action for policies other than "none", which would appear +to exclude participation by that Domain Owner. +The DMARC development team evaluated the idea of policy exception +mechanisms on several occasions and invariably concluded that there +was not a strong enough use case to include them. The target audience +for DMARC does not appear to have concerns about the failure modes of +one or the other being a barrier to DMARC's adoption. +In the scenario described above, the Domain Owner has a few options: + +
    +
  1. Tighten up its infrastructure to minimize the failure modes of +the single deployed technology. +
    2. +
  2. Deploy the other supported authentication mechanism, to offset +the failure modes of the first. +
    3. +
  3. Deploy DMARC in a reporting-only mode. +
    4. +
+
+ +
Sender Header Field +It has been suggested in several message authentication efforts that +the Sender header field be checked for an identifier of interest, as +the standards indicate this as the proper way to indicate a +re-mailing of content such as through a mailing list. Most recently, +it was a protocol-level option for DomainKeys , but on evolution to +DKIM, this property was removed. +The DMARC development team considered this and decided not to include +support for doing so for the following reasons: + +
    +
  1. The main user protection approach is to be concerned with what +the user sees when a message is rendered. There is no consistent +behavior among MUAs regarding what to do with the content of the +Sender field, if present. Accordingly, supporting the checking of +the Sender identifier would mean applying policy to an identifier +the end user might never actually see, which can create a vector +for attack against end users by simply forging a Sender field +containing some identifier that DMARC will like. +
    2. +
  2. Although it is certainly true that this is what the Sender field +is for, its use in this way is also unreliable, making it a poor +candidate for inclusion in the DMARC evaluation algorithm. +
    3. +
  3. Allowing multiple ways to discover policy introduces unacceptable +ambiguity into the DMARC validation algorithm in terms of which +policy is to be applied and when. +
    4. +
+
+ +
Domain Existence Test +The presence of the "np" tag in this specification seemingly implies that +there would be an agreed-upon standard for determining a domain's existence. +Since the DMARC mechanism is focused on email, one might think that the +definition of "resolvable" in applies. Using that definition, only +names that resolve to MX Resource Records (RRs), A RRs, or AAAA RRs are deemed +to be resolvable and to exist in the DNS. This is a common practice among Mail +Receivers to determine whether or not to accept a mail message before performing +other more expensive processing. +The DMARC mechanism makes no such requirement for the existence of specific DNS +RRs in order for a domain to exist; instead, if any RR exists for a domain, then +the domain exists. To use the terminology from , an "NXDOMAIN" response +(rcode "Name Error") to a DNS query means that the domain name does not exist, +while a "NODATA" response (rcode "NOERROR") means that the given resource record +type queried for does not exist, but the domain name does. +Furthermore, in keeping with , if a query for a name returns NXDOMAIN, +then not only does the name not exist, every name below it in the DNS hierarchy +also does not exist. +
+ +
Organizational Domain Discovery Issues +An earlier informational version of the DMARC mechanism +noted that the DNS does not provide a method by which the "domain of record", +or the domain that was actually registered with a domain registrar, can +be determined given an arbitrary domain name. That version further mentioned +suggestions that have been made that attempt to glean such information from +SOA or NS resource records, but these too are not fully reliable, as the +partitioning of the DNS is not always done at administrative boundaries. +That previous version posited that one could "climb the tree" to find the +Organizational Domain, but expressed concern that an attacker could exploit +this for a denial-of-service attack through sending a high number of messages +each with a relatively large number of nonsense labels, causing a Mail Receiver +to perform a large number of DNS queries in search of a DMARC Policy Record. This +version defines a method for performing a DNS Tree Walk, +and further mitigates the risk of the denial-of-service attack by expressly limiting +the number of DNS queries to execute regardless of the number of labels in the domain +name. +Readers curious about the previous method for Organizational Domain Discovery are +directed to . +
+ +
Removal of the "pct" Tag +An earlier informational version of the DMARC mechanism +included a "pct" tag and specified all integers from 0 to 100 inclusive +as valid values for the tag. The intent of the tag was to provide domain +owners with a method to gradually change their preferred Domain Owner Assessment +Policy (the "p" tag) from "none" to "quarantine" or from "quarantine" to "reject" +by requesting the stricter treatment for just a percentage of messages +that produced DMARC results of "fail". +Operational experience showed that the pct tag was usually not accurately +applied, unless the value specified was either 0 or 100 (the default), +and the inaccuracies with other values varied widely from one implementation to +another. The default value was easily implemented, as it required no +special processing on the part of the Mail Receiver, while the value +of 0 took on unintended significance as a value used by some intermediaries +and mailbox providers as an indicator to deviate from standard handling of +the message, usually by rewriting the RFC5322.From header field in an effort to +avoid DMARC failures downstream. +These custom actions when the "pct" tag was set to 0 proved valuable to the +email community. In particular, header field rewriting by an intermediary meant +that a Domain Owner's aggregate reports could reveal to the Domain Owner +how much of its traffic was routing through intermediaries that don't rewrite +the RFC5322.From header field. Such information wasn't explicit in the aggregate +reports received; rather, sussing it out required work on the part of the Domain +Owner to compare aggregate reports from before and after the "p" value was changed +and "pct=0" was included in the DMARC Policy Record, but the data was there. +Consequently, knowing how much mail was subject to possible DMARC failure due to +a lack of RFC5322.From header field rewriting by intermediaries could assist the +Domain Owner in choosing whether to move from Monitoring Mode +to Enforcement. Armed with this knowledge, the Domain Owner could +make an informed decision regarding subjecting its mail traffic to possible DMARC +failures based on the Domain Owner's tolerance for such things. +Because of the value provided by "pct=0" to Domain Owners, it was logical +to keep this functionality in the protocol; at the same time, it didn't make +sense to support a tag named "pct" that had only two valid values. This version +of the DMARC mechanism, therefore, introduces the "t" tag as shorthand for "testing", +with the valid values of "y" and "n", which are meant to be analogous in their +application by mailbox providers and intermediaries to the "pct" tag values +"0" and "100", respectively. +
+
+ +
Examples +This section illustrates both the Domain Owner side and the Mail +Receiver side of a DMARC exchange. + +
Identifier Alignment Examples +The following examples illustrate the DMARC mechanism's use of +Identifier Alignment. For brevity's sake, only message header fields and +relevant SMTP commands are shown, as message bodies are not considered +when conducting DMARC checks. + +
SPF +The following SPF examples assume that SPF produces a passing result. +Alignment cannot exist if SPF does not produce a passing result. +Example 1: SPF in Strict Alignment: + + + + From: sender@example.com + Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800 + To: receiver@example.org + Subject: here's a sample +]]> +In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom domain and the Author Domain are identical. +Thus, the identifiers are in Strict Alignment. +Example 2: SPF in Relaxed Alignment: + + + + From: sender@example.com + Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800 + To: receiver@example.org + Subject: here's a sample +]]> +In this case, the Author Domain (example.com) is a parent of the +RFC5321.MailFrom domain. Thus, the identifiers are in relaxed alignment +because they both have the same Organizational Domain (example.com). +Example 3: No SPF Identifier Alignment: + + + + From: sender@child.example.com + Date: Fri, Feb 15 2002 16:54:30 -0800 + To: receiver@example.org + Subject: here's a sample +]]> +In this case, the RFC5321.MailFrom domain that is neither the same as, +a parent of, nor a child of the Author Domain. Thus, the identifiers +are not in alignment. +
+ +
DKIM +The examples below assume that the DKIM signatures pass validation. +Alignment cannot exist with a DKIM signature that does not validate. +Example 1: DKIM in Strict Alignment: + + +In this case, the DKIM "d" tag and the Author Domain have +identical DNS domains. Thus, the identifiers are in Strict Alignment. +Example 2: DKIM in Relaxed Alignment: + + +In this case, the DKIM signature's "d" tag includes a DNS +domain that is a parent of the Author Domain. Thus, the +identifiers are in relaxed alignment, as they have the same +Organizational Domain (example.com). +Example 3: No DKIM Identifier Alignment: + + +In this case, the DKIM signature's "d" tag includes a DNS +domain that is neither the same as, a parent of, nor a child of the +Author Domain. Thus, the identifiers are not in alignment. +
+
+ +
Domain Owner Example +A Domain Owner that wants to use DMARC should have already deployed +and tested SPF and DKIM. The next step is to publish a DMARC Policy +Record for the Domain Owner's Organizational Domain. + +
Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode +The Domain Owner for "example.com" has deployed SPF and DKIM on +its messaging infrastructure. The Domain Owner wishes to begin using DMARC +with a policy that will solicit aggregate feedback from Mail Receivers +without affecting how the messages are processed in order to: + +
    +
  • Confirm that its legitimate messages are authenticating correctly +
    • +
  • Validate that all authorized message sources have implemented +authentication measures +
    • +
  • Determine how many messages from other sources would be affected +by publishing a Domain Owner Assessment Policy at Enforcement +
    • +
+The Domain Owner accomplishes this by constructing a DMARC Policy Record +indicating that: + +
    +
  • The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1;") +
    • +
  • Mail Receivers should not alter how they treat these messages because +of this DMARC Policy Record ("p=none") +
    • +
  • Aggregate feedback reports are sent via email to the address +"dmarc-feedback@example.com" +("rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com") +
    • +
  • All messages from this Organizational Domain are subject to this +policy (no "t" tag present, so the default of "n" applies). +
    • +
+To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +creates an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format): + + +
+ +
Entire Domain, Monitoring Mode, Per-Message Failure Reports +The Domain Owner from the previous example has used the aggregate +reporting to discover some messaging systems that had not yet +implemented DKIM correctly, but they are still seeing periodic +authentication failures. To diagnose these intermittent +problems, they wish to request per-message failure reports when +authentication failures occur. +Not all Mail Receivers will honor such a request, but the Domain Owner +feels that any reports it does receive will be helpful enough to +justify publishing this record. The default per-message failure report +format () meets the Domain Owner's needs in this scenario. +The Domain Owner accomplishes this by adding the following to its +DMARC Policy Record from : + +
    +
  • Per-message failure reports are sent via email to the +address "auth-reports@example.com" +("ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com")
    • +
+To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format): + + +
+ +
Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third Party +The Domain Owner from the previous example is maintaining the same +policy but now wishes to have a third party serve as a Report Consumer. +Again, not all Mail Receivers will honor this request, but those that +do MUST implement additional checks to validate that the third party +authorizes reception of failure reports on behalf of this domain. +The Domain Owner needs to alter its DMARC Policy Record from +as follows: + +
    +
  • Per-message failure reports are sent via email to the +address "auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" +("ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net")
    • +
+To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format): + + +Because the address used in the "ruf" tag is outside the Organizational Domain +in which this record is published, conforming Mail Receivers MUST implement +additional checks as described in . +To pass these additional checks, the Report Consumer's Domain Owner will need to +publish an additional DMARC Policy Record as follows: + +
    +
  • Given the DMARC Policy Record published by the Domain Owner at +"_dmarc.example.com", the DNS administrator for the Report Consumer +will need to publish a TXT resource record at +"example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net" with the value +"v=DMARC1;" to authorize receipt of the reports.
    • +
+To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might +create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format): + + +
+ +
Overriding destination addresses +The third party Report Consumer can also publish "rua" and "ruf" tags in order +to override the specific address published by example.com with a different +address in the same third party domain. This may be necessary if the third +party Report Consumer has changed its email address, or want to guard against +typos in the DMARC Policy Record of the Author Domain. Intermediaries and other +third parties should refer to +for the full details of this mechanism. +The third party Report Consumer accomplishes this by adding the following to its +DMARC Policy Record from : + +
    +
  • The override address for aggregate reports is +"aggregate-reports@thirdparty.example.net" +("rua=mailto:aggregate-reports@thirdparty.example.net")
    • +
  • The override address for failure reports is +"failure-reports@thirdparty.example.net" +("ruf=mailto:failure-reports@thirdparty.example.net")
    • +
+To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might +create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file +(following the conventional zone file format): + + +In this case only the "ruf" tag is actually overridden, because, in the +previous example, failure reporting is the only reporting type that was +directed to the third party Report Consumer. +
+ +
Subdomain, Testing, and Multiple Aggregate Report URIs +The Domain Owner has implemented SPF and DKIM in a subdomain used for +pre-production testing of messaging services. It now wishes to express +a handling preference for messages from this subdomain that fail DMARC validation +to indicate to participating Mail Receivers that use of this domain is not valid. +As a first step, it will express that it considers messages using this +subdomain that fail DMARC validation to be suspicious. The goal here +will be to enable examination of messages sent to mailboxes hosted by +participating Mail Receivers as a method for troubleshooting any existing +authentication issues. Aggregate feedback reports will be sent to +a mailbox within the Organizational Domain, and to a mailbox at a Report +Consumer selected and authorized to receive them by the Domain Owner. +The Domain Owner will accomplish this by constructing a DMARC Policy Record +indicating that: + +
    +
  • The version of DMARC being used is "DMARC1" ("v=DMARC1;") +
    • +
  • It is applied only to this subdomain (the DMARC Policy Record is published at +"_dmarc.test.example.com" and not "_dmarc.example.com") +
    • +
  • Mail Receivers are advised that the Domain Owner considers messages +that fail to authenticate to be suspicious ("p=quarantine") +
    • +
  • Aggregate feedback reports are sent via email to the +addresses "dmarc-feedback@example.com" and +"example-tld-test@thirdparty.example.net" +("rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com, + mailto:tld-test@thirdparty.example.net") +
    • +
  • The Domain Owner desires only that an actor performing a DMARC +validation check apply any special handling rules it might have +in place, such as rewriting the RFC53322.From header field; the Domain +Owner is testing its setup at this point and so does not want +the handling policy to be applied. ("t=y") +
    • +
+To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone +file (following the conventional zone file format): + + +Once enough time has passed to allow for collecting enough reports to +give the Domain Owner confidence that all authorized email sent using +the subdomain is properly authenticating and passing DMARC validation checks, +then the Domain Owner can update the DMARC Policy Record to indicate that it considers +validation failures to be a clear indication that use of the subdomain +is not valid. It would do this by altering the record to advise Mail Receivers +of its position on such messages ("p=reject") and removing the testing flag ("t=y"). +To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner +might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone +file (following the conventional zone file format): + + +
+
+ +
Mail Receiver Example +A Mail Receiver that wants to participate in DMARC should already be checking +SPF and DKIM, and possess the ability to collect relevant information +from various email-processing stages to provide feedback to Domain +Owners (possibly via Report Consumers). + +
SMTP Session Example +An optimal DMARC-enabled Mail Receiver performs validation and +Identifier Alignment checking during the SMTP conversation. +Before returning a final reply to the DATA command, the Mail +Receiver's MTA has performed: + +
    +
  1. An SPF check to determine an SPF-Authenticated Identifier. +
    2. +
  2. DKIM checks that yield one or more DKIM-Authenticated +Identifiers. +
    3. +
  3. A DMARC Policy Record lookup. +
    4. +
+The presence of an Author Domain DMARC Policy Record indicates that the Mail +Receiver should continue with DMARC-specific processing before returning a +reply to the DATA command. +Given a DMARC Policy Record and the set of Authenticated Identifiers, the +Mail Receiver checks to see if the Authenticated Identifiers align +with the Author Domain (taking into consideration any strict versus +relaxed options found in the DMARC Policy Record). +For example, the following sample data is considered to be from a +piece of email originating from the Domain Owner of "example.com": + + +In the above sample, the SPF-Authenticated Identifier and the +DKIM-Authenticated Identifier both align with the Author Domain. The +Mail Receiver considers the above email to pass the DMARC check, avoiding +the "reject" policy that is requested to be applied to email that fails +the DMARC validation check. +If no Authenticated Identifiers align with the Author Domain, then +the Mail Receiver applies the Domain Owner Assessment Policy. However, +before this action is taken, the Mail Receiver can consult external +information to override the Domain Owner Assessment Policy. For example, +if the Mail Receiver knows that this particular email came +from a known and trusted forwarder (that happens to break both SPF +and DKIM), then the Mail Receiver may choose to ignore the Domain +Owner Assessment Policy. +The Mail Receiver is now ready to reply to the DATA command. If the +DMARC check yields that the message is to be rejected, then the Mail +Receiver replies with a 5xy code to inform the sender of failure. If +the DMARC check cannot be resolved due to transient network errors, +then the Mail Receiver replies with a 4xy code to inform the sender +as to the need to reattempt delivery later. If the DMARC check +yields a passing message, then the Mail Receiver continues with +email processing, perhaps using the result of the DMARC check as an +input to additional processing modules such as a domain reputation +query. +Before exiting DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver checks to +see if the Author Domain DMARC Policy Record requests AFRF-based reporting. +If so, then the Mail Receiver can emit an AFRF to the reporting +address supplied in the DMARC Policy Record. +At the exit of DMARC-specific processing, the Mail Receiver captures +(through logging or direct insertion into a data store) the result of +DMARC processing. Captured information is used to build feedback for +Domain Owner consumption. This is unnecessary if the Domain Owner +has not requested aggregate reports, i.e., no "rua" tag was found in +the policy record. +
+
+ +
Organizational and Policy Domain Tree Walk Examples +If an Author Domain has no DMARC Policy Record, a Mail Receiver uses a tree walk +to find the DMARC Policy. +If the DMARC Policy Record allows relaxed alignment and the SPF- or DKIM-Authenticated +Identifiers are different from the Author Domain, a Mail Receiver uses a tree walk to +discover the respective Organizational Domains to determine Identifier Alignment. + +
Simple Organizational and Policy Example +A Mail Receiver receives an email with: + +
    +
  • Author Domain: example.com
    • +
  • RFC5321.MailFrom Domain: example.com
    • +
  • DKIM-Authenticated Identifier: signing.example.com
    • +
+In this example, "_dmarc.example.com" and "_dmarc.signing.example.com" both +have DMARC Policy Records while "_dmarc.com" does not. If SPF or DKIM yield pass +results, they still have to be aligned to support a DMARC pass. Since +not all domains are the same, if the alignment is relaxed then the tree +walk is performed to determine the Organizational Domain for each. +To determine the Organizational Domain for the Author Domain, +query "_dmarc.example.com" and "_dmarc.com"; "example.com" is the last +element of the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy Record, so it is the Organizational +Domain for "example.com". +For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain, the Organizational Domain already found for +"example.com" is "example.com", so SPF is aligned. +To determine the Organizational Domain for the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier, +query "_dmarc.signing.example.com", "_dmarc.example.com", and "_dmarc.com". +Both "signing.example.com" and "example.com" have DMARC Policy Records, +but "example.com" is the highest element in the tree with a DMARC Policy Record +(it has the fewest labels), so "example.com" is the Organizational Domain. Since +this is also the Organizational Domain for the Author Domain, DKIM is aligned +for relaxed alignment. +Since both SPF and DKIM are aligned, they can be used to determine if the +message has a DMARC pass result. If the result is not pass, then the policy +domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the appropriate policy. In this +case, since the RFC5322.From domain has a DMARC Policy Record, that is the policy +domain. +
+ +
Deep Tree Walk Example +A Mail Receiver receives an email with: + +
    +
  • Author Domain: a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com
    • +
  • RFC5321.MailFrom Domain: example.com
    • +
  • DKIM-Authenticated Identifier: signing.example.com
    • +
+Both "_dmarc.example.com" and "_dmarc.signing.example.com" have DMARC Policy Records, +while "_dmarc.com" does not. If SPF or DKIM yield pass results, they still have +to be aligned to support a DMARC pass. Since not all domains are the same, if +the alignment is relaxed then the tree walk is performed to determine the Organizational +Domain for each. +To determine the Organizational Domain For the Author Domain, query +"_dmarc.a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com", then query "_dmarc.g.h.i.j.k.example.com" (skipping +the intermediate names), then query "_dmarc.h.i.j.k.example.com", +"_dmarc.i.j.k.example.com", "_dmarc.j.k.example.com", "_dmarc.k.example.com", +"_dmarc.example.com", and "_dmarc.com". None of +"a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com", "g.h.i.j.k.example.com", "h.i.j.k.example.com", +"i.j.k.example.com", "j.k.example.com", or "k.example.com" have a DMARC Policy Record. +Since "example.com" is the last element of the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy Record, +it is the Organizational Domain for "a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.example.com". +For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain, the Organizational domain already found +for "example.com" is "example.com". SPF is aligned. +For the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier, query "_dmarc.signing.example.com", "_dmarc.example.com", +and "_dmarc.com". Both "signing.example.com" and "example.com" have DMARC Policy Records, +but "example.com" is the highest element in the tree with a DMARC Policy Record, so +"example.com" is the Organizational Domain. Since this is also the Organizational Domain +for the Author Domain, DKIM is aligned for relaxed alignment. +Since both SPF and DKIM are aligned, they can be used to determine if the +message has a DMARC pass result. If the results for both are not pass, then +the policy domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the appropriate policy. +In this case, the Author Domain does not have a DMARC Policy Record, so the +policy domain is the highest element in the DNS tree with a DMARC Policy Record, +example.com. +
+ +
Example with a PSD DMARC Policy Record +In rare cases, a PSD publishes a DMARC Policy Record with a psd tag, which the tree +walk must take into account. +A Mail Receiver receives an email with: + +
    +
  • Author Domain: giant.bank.example
    • +
  • RFC5321.MailFrom Domain: mail.giant.bank.example
    • +
  • DKIM-Authenticated Identifier: mail.mega.bank.example
    • +
+In this case, "_dmarc.bank.example" has a DMARC Policy Record which includes the +"psd=y" tag, and "_dmarc.example" does not have a DMARC Policy Record. +While "_dmarc.giant.bank.example" has a DMARC Policy Record without a "psd" tag, +"_dmarc.mega.bank.example" and "_dmarc.mail.mega.bank.example" have no DMARC Policy Records. +Since the three domains are all different, tree walks find their Organizational Domains +to see which are aligned. +For the Author Domain "giant.bank.example", the tree walk finds the DMARC Policy Record +at "_dmarc.giant.bank.example", then the DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.bank.example", and +stops because of the "psd=y" flag. The Organizational Domain is "giant.bank.example" because +it is the domain directly below the one with "psd=y". Since the Organizational Domain has a +DMARC Policy Record, it is also the policy domain. +For the RFC5321.MailFrom domain "mail.giant.bank.example", the tree walk finds no DMARC Policy +Record at "_dmarc.mail.giant.bank.example", but does find both the DMARC Policy Record at +"_dmarc.giant.bank.example" and then the DMARC Policy Record at "_dmarc.bank.example", and +stops because of the "psd=y" flag. Again the Organizational Domain is "giant.bank.example" because +it is the domain directly below the one with "psd=y". Since this is the same Organizational Domain +as the Author Domain, SPF is aligned. +For the DKIM-Authenticated Identifier "mail.mega.bank.example", the tree walk finds no DMARC Policy +Records at "_dmarc.mail.mega.bank.example" or "_dmarc.mega.bank.example", then finds the DMARC +Policy Record at "_dmarc.bank.example" and stops because of the "psd=y" flag. +The Organizational Domain is "mega.bank.example", so DKIM is not aligned. +Since SPF is aligned, it can be used to determine if the message has a DMARC pass result. If the +result is not pass, then the policy domain's DMARC Policy Record is used to determine the appropriate +policy. +
+
+ +
Utilization of Aggregate Feedback: Example +Aggregate feedback is consumed by Domain Owners to enable their +understanding of how a given domain is being processed by the Mail +Receiver. Aggregate reporting data on emails that pass all underlying +authentication checks is used by Domain Owners to validate that their +authentication practices remain accurate. For example, if a third party +is sending on behalf of a Domain Owner, the Domain Owner can use aggregate +report data to validate ongoing authentication practices of the third party. +Data on email that only partially passes underlying authentication +checks provides visibility into problems that need to be addressed by +the Domain Owner. For example, if either SPF or DKIM fails to produce +an Authenticated Identifier, the Domain Owner is provided with enough +information to either directly correct the problem or understand where +authentication-breaking changes are being introduced in the email +transmission path. If authentication-breaking changes due to email +transmission path cannot be directly corrected, then the Domain Owner at least +maintains an understanding of the effect of DMARC-based policies upon +the Domain Owner's email. +Data on email that fails all underlying authentication checks +provides baseline visibility on how the Domain Owner's domain is +being received at the Mail Receiver. Based on this visibility, the +Domain Owner can begin deployment of authentication technologies +across uncovered email sources, if the mail that is failing the checks +was generated by or on behalf of the Domain Owner. Data regarding +failing authentication checks can also allow the Domain Owner to +come to an understanding of how its domain is being misused. +
+
+ +
Changes from RFC 7489 +This document is intended to render obsolete. As one might guess, +that means there are significant differences between RFC 7489 and this +document. This section will summarize those changes. + +
Informational vs. Standards Track +RFC 7489 was not the product of any IETF work stream, but was instead published into +the RFC series by the Independent Submissions Editor and is classified as an Informational +RFC. +This document, by contrast, is intended to be Internet Standards Track. +
+ +
Changes to Terminology and Definitions +The following changes were made to the Terminology and Definitions section. + +
Terms Added +These terms were added: + +
    +
  • Domain Owner Assessment Policy
    • +
  • Enforcement
    • +
  • Monitoring Mode
    • +
  • Non-existent Domains
    • +
  • Public Suffix Domain (PSD)
    • +
  • Public Suffix Operator (PSO)
    • +
  • PSO Controlled Domain Names
    • +
+
+ +
Definitions Updated +These definitions were updated: + +
    +
  • Organizational Domain
    • +
  • Report Receiver (renamed to Report Consumer)
    • +
+
+
+ +
Policy Discovery and Organizational Domain Determination +The algorithms for DMARC policy discovery and for determining the Organizational Domain +have been changed. Specifically, reliance on a Public Suffix List (PSL) has been replaced +by a technique called a "DNS Tree Walk", and the methodology for the DNS Tree Walk is explained +in detail in this document. +The DNS Tree Walk also incorporates PSD policy discovery, which was introduced in +. That RFC was an Experimental RFC, and the results of that experiment were +that the RFC was not implemented as written. Instead, this document redefines the +algorithm for PSD policy discovery, and thus obsoletes . +These algorithm changes introduce the possibility of interoperability issues where a +Domain Owner expects a DMARC Policy or an Organizational Domain to be identified by +the Tree Walk process, but a Mail Receiver using an RFC 7489-based implementation of +DMARC and relying on a PSL might arrive at a different answer. +This issue is entirely avoided by the use of Strict Alignment and publishing explicit +DMARC Policy Records for all Author Domains used in an organization's email. +
+ +
Reporting +Discussion of both aggregate and failure reporting have been moved to separate documents +dedicated to the topics. +In addition, the ability to specify a maximum report size in the DMARC URI has been removed. +
+ +
Tags +Several tags have been added to the "DMARC Policy Record Format" section of this document since +RFC 7489 was published, and at the same time, several others were removed. + +
Tags Added + +
    +
  • np - Policy for non-existent domains (Imported from )
    • +
  • psd - Flag indicating whether a domain is a Public Suffix Domain
    • +
  • t - Replacement for some pct tag functionality. See for further discussion
    • +
+
+ +
Tags Removed + +
    +
  • pct - Tag requesting application of DMARC policy to only a percentage of messages. See for discussion
    • +
  • rf - Tag specifying requested format of failure reports
    • +
  • ri - Tag specifying requested interval between aggregate reports
    • +
+
+
+ +
Expansion of Domain Owner Actions Section +RFC 7489 had just two paragraphs in its Domain Owner Actions section, and while +the content of those paragraphs was correct, it was minimalist in its approach to +providing guidance to domain owners on just how to implement DMARC. +This document provides much more detail and explanatory text to a Domain Owner, +focusing not just on what to do to implement DMARC, but also on the reasons for +each step and the repercussions of each decision. +In particular, this document makes explicit that domains for general-purpose +email SHOULD NOT deploy a DMARC policy of p=reject. See +for further discussion of this topic. +
+ +
Report Generator Recommendations +In the cases where a DMARC Policy Record specifies multiple destinations for either aggregate +reports or failure reports, RFC 7489 stated: + + +This document in says: + + +
+ +
Removal of RFC 7489 Appendix A.5 +One of the appendices in RFC 7489, specifically , +has been removed from the text with this update. The appendix was titled +"Issues with ADSP in Operation" and it contained a list of issues associated +with ADSP that influenced the direction of DMARC. The ADSP protocol was moved +to "Historic" status in 2013 and working group consensus was that such a +discussion of ADSP's influence on DMARC was no longer relevant. +
+ +
RFC 7489 Errata Summary +Remove this before final submission: + (https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#ref_errata says errata in the Reported + state should not be referenced; they are not considered stable.) +This document and its companion documents ( +and ) address the following errata +filed against since that document's publication in March, +2015. More details on each of these can be found at +https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=7489 + +
+
[Err5365] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5365, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5365:
+
To be addressed in . +
+
[Err5371] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5371, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5371:
+
To be addressed in . +
+
[Err5440] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5440, RFC 7489, Section 7.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440:
+
To be addressed in . +
+
[Err5440] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5440, RFC 7489, Sections B.2.1, B.2.3, and B.2.4 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5440:
+
Addressed both in this document and in . +
+
[Err6439] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 6439, RFC 7489, Section 7.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6439:
+
To be addressed in . +
+
[Err6485] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 6485, RFC 7489, Section 7.2.1.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6485:
+
To be addressed in . +
+
[Err7835] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 7835, RFC 7489, Section 6.6.3 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7835:
+
This erratum is in reference to the description of the process documented +in RFC 7489 for the applicable DMARC policy for an email message. The process +for doing this has drastically changed in DMARCbis, and so the text identified in +this erratum no longer exists. +
+
[Err5151] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5151, RFC 7489, Section 1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5151:
+
This erratum is in reference to the Introduction section of RFC 7489. +That section has been substantially rewritten in DMARCbis, and the text +at issue for this erratum no longer exists. +
+
+
+ +
General Editing and Formatting +A great deal of the content from RFC 7489 was preserved in this document, but much +of it was subject to either minor editing, re-ordering of sections, and/or both. +
+
+ +
Acknowledgements +This reworking of the DMARC mechanism specified in is the +result of contributions from many participants in the IETF Working Group +dedicated to this effort. Although the contributors are too numerous to +mention, significant contributions were made by Kurt Andersen, Laura Atkins, +Seth Blank, Alex Brotman, Dave Crocker, Douglas E. Foster, Ned Freed, +Mike Hammer, Steven M. Jones, Scott Kitterman, Murray S. Kucherawy, +Barry Leiba, Alessandro Vesely, and Tim Wicinski. +The authors and contributors also recognize that this document would not +have been possible without the work done by those who had a hand in producing +. The Acknowledgements section from that document is preserved +in full below. +
+ +
Acknowledgements - RFC 7489 +DMARC and the draft version of this document submitted to the +Independent Submission Editor were the result of lengthy efforts by +an informal industry consortium: DMARC.org (see https://dmarc.org). +Participating companies included Agari, American Greetings, AOL, Bank +of America, Cloudmark, Comcast, Facebook, Fidelity Investments, +Google, JPMorgan Chase & Company, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Netease, +PayPal, ReturnPath, The Trusted Domain Project, and Yahoo!. Although +the contributors and supporters are too numerous to mention, notable +individual contributions were made by J. Trent Adams, Michael Adkins, +Monica Chew, Dave Crocker, Tim Draegen, Steve Jones, Franck Martin, +Brett McDowell, and Paul Midgen. The contributors would also like to +recognize the invaluable input and guidance that was provided early +on by J.D. Falk. +Additional contributions within the IETF context were made by Kurt +Andersen, Michael Jack Assels, Les Barstow, Anne Bennett, Jim Fenton, +J. Gomez, Mike Jones, Scott Kitterman, Eliot Lear, John Levine, +S. Moonesamy, Rolf Sonneveld, Henry Timmes, and Stephen J. Turnbull. +
+ + + + diff --git a/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md index f3de033..d00f478 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md +++ b/draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.md @@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ The generic steps for a DNS Tree Walk are as follows: 2. Records that do not start with a "v" tag that identifies the current version of DMARC are discarded. If multiple DMARC Policy Records are returned, they are all discarded. If a single record remains and it - contains a "psd=n" tag, stop. + contains either a "psd=y" tag or a "psd=n" tag, stop. 3. Break the subject DNS domain name into a set of ordered labels. Assign the count of labels to "x", and number the labels from right to left; e.g., @@ -1610,10 +1610,11 @@ ideal, they are firmly established and list operators treat them as a fact of li Mail developers have been trying for a decade to invent technical methods to allow mailing lists to continue to work without modifying the From: header -line, such as the Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) protocol described -in [@RFC8617]. While work continues, none of the methods have become widely -used and there is little reason to believe that any future methods will be more -successful. +line, with a prominent example being the Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) +protocol described in [@RFC8617]. While work continues, as of this document's +publication, none of the methods have become widely used. Should such a technical +method achieve widespread adoption in the future, this document can be updated to +reflect that. # IANA Considerations {#iana-considerations}