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Hobbes's war of all against all.md

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---
bibtex: @article{kavka1983hobbes,
  title={Hobbes's war of all against all},
  author={Kavka, Gregory S},
  journal={Ethics},
  volume={93},
  number={2},
  pages={291--310},
  year={1983},
  publisher={JSTOR}
}
---

Kavka, Gregory S. 1983. Hobbes’s war of all against all. Ethics 93: 291–310.

In Leviathan, Hobbes offers a hypothetical contract argument in support of the conclusion that political sovereigns have absolute and unlimited authority over their subjects, and that-save when their survival is immediately at stake-these subjects are morally obligated to obey all of their sovereign's commands. p296

I have suggested that Hobbes's discussion of the problem of individual security contains two basic flaws: (a) it overlooks the possibility of rational present cooperation based on the expectation of future cooperation, and (b) it oversimplifies and inaccurately portrays the relationship between security and the concentration of power within a group p309

  • Gauthier thinks CH13 is obviously correct. p291

I shall argue that these attitudes are not warranted. Hobbes's argument relies only on assumptions about human beings that are much more plausible than psychological egoism, but it is invalid. p291

Hobbes argues that people living in a state of nature, without a common power over them to keep them in awe, are in a state of war of every person against every other. p292

So a war of all against all is a state in which each knows that every other is willing to fight him, not one in which each is constantly fighting

To prove the state of nature is a state of war, Hobbes begins with five assumptions. p292

  1. Natural equality
  2. Conflicting desires
  3. Forward Lookers
  4. Advantage of anticipation
  5. Limited altruism

From these five quite reasonable and realistic assumptions about human beings, Hobbes constructs an elegant and insightful argument for the state of nature being a state of war p293

There are no moral restraints from violence in the state of nature because everyone has the natural right to defend themselves however necessary.

Third, and most important, even "moderate" people, who have no desire for power or glory for its own sake and who may have no specific quarrels with one, may, for defensive purposes, engage in anticipatory violence against one.' p294

In Hobbes's words, ". . . there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation.' p294

Cognition is important...

For a universal state of war to exist, it is not enough that anticipation be the most reasonable strategy, it must also be believed so by all who do not wish to fight for other reasons, and most must be aware that others so believe it p294

McNeilly believes that Hobbes employs the method of mathematics in his political philosophy. He thus constructs an interpretation of the state of war argument as a logical deduction from formal definitions. On his view, what the argument shows is that it is a necessary truth that human beings not living under a common power (i.e., living in a state of nature) will be in a state of war that constitutes a state of despair in Hobbes's sense: a state in which they have no hope of attaining their objectives. p295

He contends, however, that the second alternative is basically illusory. Because of the constant danger of factionalism, civil war, and social disintegration in a group governed by a limited or divided power, such a form of social organization does not provide its members with sufficient security to really remove them from the state of nature p296 (see Ch17)

The argument that the state of nature is a state of war of all against all supplies the crucial remaining premise that allows Hobbes to conclude that the parties would choose the absolute sovereign as the lesser evil. p297

Argues against the Hobbes' premises

The reasonableness of anticipatory violence

Despite the fact that this crucial inference has escaped criticism in the literature, it is clear that it is fallacious. p298

The inability of emergent coalitions to form

Lying low is not, however, the most attractive alternative to anticipation. Joining with others in a defensive coalition promises to yield much greater benefit p298

But less extensive coalition arrangements still within the state of nature are imaginable, the simplest being an exchange, among a number of persons, of promises of mutual aid in case of attack. p298

Thus, Hobbes would argue that it is unreasonable for you to risk your life to save your partner (or his land), since he may well flee when you or your property is attacked. Further, your coalition partner's awareness that you may reason in this way and not keep the pact in the future, makes it even more likely that he will not come to your aid p299

Kavka now uses an iterated PD to argue the plausibility of emergent coalitions. p300