---
bibtex: @article{ingham2013disagreement,
title={Disagreement and epistemic arguments for democracy},
author={Ingham, Sean},
journal={Politics, Philosophy \& Economics},
pages={1470594X12460642},
year={2013},
publisher={SAGE Publications}
}
---
"According to this view, decisions reached through deliberative forms of democratic decision-making will be not merely fair, but also reasonable, according to some procedure-independent standard. For ‘epistemic democrats’, this alleged tendency is part of what justifies deliberative democratic procedures, part of what underwrites their legitimacy or explains their value relative to alternative procedures. What there is to be said for deliberative democratic procedures derives in part from what there is to be said for the quality of their decisions, according to this view." p137
"If an account of democracy implies that, with the right democratic procedure in place, the political judgments of rational observers would converge to a consensus merely upon observing the procedure’s decisions, then the account is, if not ipso facto implausible, at least deserving of special scrutiny." p137 - call this the non-convergence constraint.
"There are other strategies for justifying deliberative democratic procedures that can be deployed alongside or instead of epistemic justifications." p138
Epsitemic accounts: Anderson (2006), Estlund (2008), Fuerstein (2008), Goodin (2003), Goodin and List (2001), Landemore (2012), Mart ́ı (2006), Misak (2008), Nelson (2008), Nino (1996), Ober (2008), Pettit and List (2011), Talisse (2009), and Vermeule (2009), among others. See also Landemore and Elster (2012).