---
bibtex: @book{rawls1999theory,
title={A theory of justice},
author={Rawls, John},
year={1999},
publisher={Belknap Press}
}
---
** John Rawls, 1999, Revised Edition ***
--- §1 ---
The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society. p3
"Justice is the first virtue of social institutions." Laws must be abolished if they are unjust. Justice denies the lost of freedom by some can be made up for by benefits to others. p3
The only justification for injustice is the avoidance of a greater one. "Being the first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising". The only justification for injustice is the avoidance of a greater one. p4
Assuming society to be more or less self sufficient and purposed for mutual advantage. There is an identity of interests and conflict in this association. There will be inevitable conflict about how to distribute the benefits of cooperation. The principles that determine this distribution are the principles of social justice. p4
- Rawls makes an assumption that social cooperation is for mutual advantage. But this in tern presupposed society as a voluntary association, something which doesn't seem to be the case.
A 'well ordered' society is one designed to advance the good of its members and effectively regulated by a public (agreed) conception of justice. p5
The conception of justice is the fundamental charter of well ordered association, where by everyone accepts and knows others accept the principles of justice, and basic social institutions satisfy these principles. p4-5
The concept of justice is different from conceptions of justice. People may disagree over their conceptions of justice and its principles, but can still agree on the concept of justice. The concept of justice identifies the role of the principles of social justice. p5
The pursuit of ends requires that "the scheme of social cooperation be stable". Whilst justice is primary, "one conception of justice is preferable to another when its broader consequences are more desirable." p6
We cannot assess a conception of justice by its distributive impact along, as a conception of justice also affects the stability, coordination, and efficiency of society. p6
--- §2 ---
"The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society ... the major institutions that distribute fundamental rights and duties, and determine the division of advantages that stem from social cooperation" p6
Deep inequalities arise because institutions of society favour certain starting positions. The principles of social justice must first apply to the inequalities of birth. p7
A Theory of Justice is limited to justice amongst a society. It is not necessarily applicable to justice between societies, nor within voluntary associations. This is an ideal theory concerned with strict compliance of its members p7-8
So a conception of social justice should be regarded firstly as the standard whereby the distributive aspects of society are assessed. It forms just a part of a complete conception, a social idea. p8-9
Concept of justice: the role of its principles in assigning rights & duties & distribution of benefits of social cooperations; a proper balance between competing claims.
Conception of justice: set of principles for identifying and determining this balance; an interpretation of this role. p10
Every ethical theory must address the issue of justice.
--- §3 ---
The idea behind the conception of justice is to abstract earlier social contract theory. The original position of parties then, refers not to a contract to enter society, but of those principles free and reasonable people would accept in an initial position of equality. These principles will then regulate all further agreements, and is what I call justice as fairness p10
The original position parallels the state of nature in traditional contract theory. Here it is a purely hypothetical situation designed to lead to a certain conception of justice. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance where no one knows their future place in society. These principles would then be the result of a fair bargain. p11
"Our social situation is just if is such that b this sequence f hypothetical agreements we would have contracted into the general system of rules which define it." p12
When institutions satisfy these principles, those engaged in them can say they are fair. The general recognition of this would provide the basis for the public acceptance of these principles. As no society is really voluntary, adherence to these principles would be as close to voluntary association as possible. p12
The idealised people in the original position are assumed to be rational and mutually disinterested. Because of this, they wouldn't accept poorer life prospects simply because this could advance society as a whole. Justice based on teleological conceptions is therefore ruled out. "The principle of utility is incompatible with the conception of social cooperation amongst equals for mutual advantage" p12-13
Since everyone's well being depends on social cooperation, without which no one would have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such to encourage everyone's cooperation. p13
- can the original position be viewed as a search for consensus. it's what parties freely agree to, with no mention of imposition of justice
"The principles of justice as fairness come as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme" p13
The social contract is not and agreement to enter a cooperative endeavour. It is an agreement to accept certain moral principles. As a social 'contract', it must be to all parties advantage, and public in nature. p14-15
People in the original position would choose 2 principles - equality & difference. The original position entails this. p14
Argues for the necessity of society: everyone's well being relies on cooperation without which, no-one could have a satisfactory life. p15
--- §4 ---
The principles accepted by rational people in the original position would yield the most reasonable conception of justice. This is what links justice to rational choice. p15-16
The idea of the original position is to make vivid the reasonable restrictions to arguments concerning justice. And one intuitively reasonable principle is that no one should be disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstance, nor be able to tailor principles to our current circumstance. p16
Our moral principles need to match our intuitions about instantiations of them. When there is conflict between the two, we can revise either principle or intuition. By going back and forth and adjusting either so they match, we can reach alignment. This is reflective equilibrium and we have reached the original position. p18
--- §5 ---
If it is rational for an individual to maximise their own net welfare, then why isn't it rational for a society as a whole to do the same. Furthermore, if the good is independent for the right, and the right derived from the good, then the moral action that whichever maximises the good. p21-22
The striking fact of Utilitarianism is that is isn't concerned with the distribution of the good. p23 It doesn't take seriously the distinction between persons. p24
--- §6 ---
Liberty and equality are concepts that are distinction and must be weighed against each other. One must be given priority. p24
"Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others." p25
In justice as fairness, the right takes priority over the good. Interests that violate justice have no value and can't override its claim. p28
The conception of society as a well ordered cooperative endeavour for mutual benefit rules out the principles of utilitarianism. p29
--- §7 ---
Intuitionalism claims that there is a irreducible family of first order principles which must be balanced by our considered judgement. No single standard exists. p30
Intuitionalism cannot, therefore offer any priority of justice over equality, the right over the good. p32 It can however, identify principles of moral importance. p34 It denies there is a solution to the priority problem. p36
--- §8 ---
The problem with intuitionism is that it cannot offer a constructive answer to the question of priority between principles. p36
The assignment of weights to the priority problem is a significant part of the conception of justice. If we don't have a criteria to do solve this, then our rational discussion has come to an end. p37
Principles of justice are not self evident, therefore Rawls rejects intuitionism because it could ground no agreement in the original position. p37
Reliance on intuition can be further reduced by employing lexical or serial ordering of principles (p38), or substitution of prudential for moral principles. p39
--- §9 ---
Moral theory can be thought of as an attempt to describe our moral capacity; an ability to formulate principles and conjoin them with circumstance in order to lead to consistent moral judgements. p41
Justice as fairness then, is the hypothesis that the principles that would be chosen in the original position are identical to our considered moral position in reflective equilibrium; and would be chosen in preference to traditional conceptions of justice. p42-43