README.md

Denial of Service

A malicious contract can permanently stall another contract by failing in a strategic way. In particular, contracts that bulk perform transactions or updates using a for loop can be DoS'd if a call to another contract or transfer fails during the loop.

Attack Scenarios

• Auction contract where frontrunner must be reimbursed when they are outbid. If the call refunding the frontrunner continuously fails, the auction is stalled and they become the de facto winner.

• Contract iterates through an array to pay back its users. If one transfer fails in the middle of a for loop all reimbursements fail.

• Attacker spams contract, causing some array to become large. Then for loops iterating through the array might run out of gas and revert.

Examples

• Both insecure and secure versions of the auction contract mentioned above

• Bulk refund functionality that is suceptible to DoS, and a secure version

Mitigations

• Favor pull over push for external calls
• If iterating over a dynamically sized data structure, be able to handle the case where the function takes multiple blocks to execute. One strategy for this is storing iterator in a private variable and using while loop that exists when gas drops below certain threshold.

References

• https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4ghzhv/governmentals_1100_eth_jackpot_payout_is_stuck/
• https://github.com/ConsenSys/smart-contract-best-practices#dos-with-unexpected-revert
• https://vessenes.com/ethereum-griefing-wallets-send-w-throw-considered-harmful/