From 5cb269a5fd9b2f722303a91632ca8ee18a6c1dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marius Poke Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 10:41:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Update docs/docs/adrs/adr-020-cutomizable_slashing_and_jailing.md Co-authored-by: insumity --- docs/docs/adrs/adr-020-cutomizable_slashing_and_jailing.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/docs/adrs/adr-020-cutomizable_slashing_and_jailing.md b/docs/docs/adrs/adr-020-cutomizable_slashing_and_jailing.md index b8e910d789..e83119eabf 100644 --- a/docs/docs/adrs/adr-020-cutomizable_slashing_and_jailing.md +++ b/docs/docs/adrs/adr-020-cutomizable_slashing_and_jailing.md @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ The additional economical security a consumer gets from slashing is limited: Since most of the stake is delegated, slashing punishes delegators more than validators. One benefit of slashing is that it acts as a deterrent for someone buying a large amount of staking tokens in order to attack a consumer chain. -For example, an attacker could get `$15.000.000` worth of ATOM, which would give them around `1%` voting power on the Cosmos Hub (at the time of this writing). +For example, an attacker could get `$15,000,000` worth of ATOM, which would give them around `1%` voting power on the Cosmos Hub (at the time of this writing). On a consumer chain, this voting power could be amplified depending on the other validators that opt in. However, by having the right [power shaping](https://cosmos.github.io/interchain-security/features/power-shaping) settings, the voting power of validators can be capped. This means that even if the attacker manages to double sign without getting slashed, as long as they don't have 1/3+ of the voting power, they cannot benefit from the attack.