Fixed CodeQL warnings

- Sign check of bitwise operation
- Comparison result is always the same

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
 # Change log
 
+## [1.5.3] - 2023-11-16
+### Added
+-
+
+### Changed
+- 
+
+### Fixed
+- Fixed CodeQL warnings about sign check of a bitwise operation
+
 ## [1.5.2] - 2023-11-15
 ### Added
 -
@@ -10,7 +20,6 @@
 - Tidied up code that sets 'Processing' screen on Nano S devices
 - Changed all Variable Length Arrays to a defined length
 
-
 ### Fixed
 - Fix freezing at 'Processing' screen on Nano S devices
 

Makefile

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ all: default
 APPNAME = "Seed Tool"
 APPVERSION_M = 1
 APPVERSION_N = 5
-APPVERSION_P = 2
+APPVERSION_P = 3
 APPVERSION   = "$(APPVERSION_M).$(APPVERSION_N).$(APPVERSION_P)"
 
 APP_LOAD_PARAMS = --appFlags 0x10 $(COMMON_LOAD_PARAMS) --curve secp256k1 --path ""

README.md

@@ -37,7 +37,10 @@ The application uses [Sharded Secret Key Reconstruction (SSKR)](https://github.c
 For more information about SSKR, see [SSKR for Users](https://github.com/BlockchainCommons/crypto-commons/blob/master/Docs/sskr-users.md).
 
 > [!NOTE]
-> Generated Shamir's Secret Shares may be cheaply and safely backed up to a steel wallet using the method described [here](https://blockmit.com/english/guides/diy/make-cold-wallet-washers/) or [here](https://jlopp.github.io/metal-bitcoin-storage-reviews/reviews/safu-ninja/). This will keep your backup safe in event of fire, flood or natural disaster.
+> SSKR is non-deterministic. There is a random factor introduced when the shares are created, which means that every time you generate shares they will be different. This is an expected and correct result.
+
+> [!TIP]
+> Generated Shamir's Secret Shares may be cheaply and safely backed up to a steel wallet using the methods described [here](https://blockmit.com/english/guides/diy/make-cold-wallet-washers/), [here](https://jlopp.github.io/metal-bitcoin-storage-reviews/reviews/safu-ninja/) or [here](https://github.com/BlockchainCommons/crypto-commons/blob/master/Docs/sskr-cold-storage.md). This will keep your backup safe in event of fire, flood or natural disaster.
 
 ## Check Shamir's secret shares
 The Ledger application also provides an option to confirm the onboarded seed against SSKR shares.

src/bc-sskr/sskr.c

@@ -376,8 +376,8 @@ static int16_t combine_shards_internal(
     // here, all of the shards are unpacked into member groups. Now we go through each
     // group and recover the group secret, and then use the result to recover the
     // master secret
-    uint8_t gx[SHAMIR_MAX_SHARE_COUNT];
-    const uint8_t *gy[SHAMIR_MAX_SHARE_COUNT];
+    uint8_t gx[SSKR_MAX_GROUP_COUNT];
+    const uint8_t *gy[SSKR_MAX_GROUP_COUNT];
 
     // allocate enough space for the group shards and the encrypted master secret
     uint8_t group_shares[SSKR_MAX_STRENGTH_BYTES * (SSKR_MAX_GROUP_COUNT + 1)];

src/ux_common/onboarding_seed_bip39.c

@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ unsigned int bolos_ux_bip39_mnemonic_encode(const uint8_t* seed,
         idx = 0;
         for (j = 0; j < 11; j++) {
             idx <<= 1;
-            idx += (bits[(i * 11 + j) / 8] & (1 << (7 - ((i * 11 + j) % 8)))) > 0;
+            idx += (bits[(i * 11 + j) / 8] & (1 << (7 - ((i * 11 + j) % 8)))) != 0;
         }
         word_len = BIP39_WORDLIST_OFFSETS[idx + 1] - BIP39_WORDLIST_OFFSETS[idx];
         if ((offset + word_len) > out_len) {

src/ux_common/onboarding_seed_sskr.c

@@ -141,8 +141,7 @@ unsigned int bolos_ux_sskr_mnemonic_encode(unsigned char *input,
 
     for (uint8_t i = 0; i < (uint8_t) input_len; i++) {
         offset = SSKR_MNEMONIC_LENGTH * input[i];
-        if ((position + SSKR_MNEMONIC_LENGTH <= output_len) &&
-            (offset <= SSKR_WORDLIST_LENGTH - SSKR_MNEMONIC_LENGTH)) {
+        if (position + SSKR_MNEMONIC_LENGTH <= output_len) {
             memcpy(output + position, SSKR_WORDLIST + offset, SSKR_MNEMONIC_LENGTH);
         } else {
             memzero(output, sizeof(output));