diff --git a/openpgp.d.ts b/openpgp.d.ts
index 5b4e567ce..3baca2221 100644
--- a/openpgp.d.ts
+++ b/openpgp.d.ts
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ interface Config {
   rejectPublicKeyAlgorithms: Set<enums.publicKey>;
   rejectCurves: Set<enums.curve>;
 }
-export var config: Config;
+export var config: Config & { checkEdDSAFaultySignatures: boolean }; // option only supported if set at the global openpgp.config level
 
 // PartialConfig has the same properties as Config, but declared as optional.
 // This interface is relevant for top-level functions, which accept a subset of configuration options
diff --git a/src/config/config.js b/src/config/config.js
index a5b60896f..dcf68d728 100644
--- a/src/config/config.js
+++ b/src/config/config.js
@@ -286,5 +286,12 @@ export default {
    * @memberof module:config
    * @property {Set<String>} rejectCurves {@link module:enums.curve}
    */
-  rejectCurves: new Set([enums.curve.secp256k1])
+  rejectCurves: new Set([enums.curve.secp256k1]),
+  /**
+   * Whether to validate generated EdDSA signatures before returning them, to ensure they are not faulty signatures.
+   * This check will make signing 2-3 times slower.
+   * Faulty signatures may be generated (in principle) if random bitflips occur at specific points in the signature
+   * computation, and could be used to recover the signer's secret key given a second signature over the same data.
+   */
+  checkEdDSAFaultySignatures: true
 };
diff --git a/src/crypto/public_key/elliptic/eddsa.js b/src/crypto/public_key/elliptic/eddsa.js
index e38cbb96f..c7acf0d6b 100644
--- a/src/crypto/public_key/elliptic/eddsa.js
+++ b/src/crypto/public_key/elliptic/eddsa.js
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import util from '../../../util';
 import enums from '../../../enums';
 import hash from '../../hash';
 import { getRandomBytes } from '../../random';
+import defaultConfig from '../../../config';
 
 nacl.hash = bytes => new Uint8Array(sha512().update(bytes).digest());
 
@@ -68,6 +69,20 @@ export async function sign(algo, hashAlgo, message, publicKey, privateKey, hashe
     case enums.publicKey.ed25519: {
       const secretKey = util.concatUint8Array([privateKey, publicKey]);
       const signature = nacl.sign.detached(hashed, secretKey);
+      if (defaultConfig.checkEdDSAFaultySignatures && !nacl.sign.detached.verify(hashed, signature, publicKey)) {
+        /**
+         * Detect faulty signatures caused by random bitflips during `crypto_sign` which could lead to private key extraction
+         * if two signatures over the same message are obtained.
+         * See https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/issues/170.
+         * If the input data is not deterministic, e.g. thanks to the random salt in v6 OpenPGP signatures (not yet implemented),
+         * then the generated signature is always safe, and the verification step is skipped.
+         * Otherwise, we need to verify the generated to ensure that no bitflip occured:
+         * - in M between the computation of `r` and `h`.
+         * - in the public key before computing `h`
+         * The verification step is almost 2-3 times as slow as signing, but it's faster than re-signing + re-deriving the public key for separate checks.
+         */
+        throw new Error('Transient signing failure');
+      }
       return { RS: signature };
     }
     case enums.publicKey.ed448:
diff --git a/src/crypto/public_key/elliptic/eddsa_legacy.js b/src/crypto/public_key/elliptic/eddsa_legacy.js
index 63929ea7c..65b5f7fce 100644
--- a/src/crypto/public_key/elliptic/eddsa_legacy.js
+++ b/src/crypto/public_key/elliptic/eddsa_legacy.js
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import nacl from '@openpgp/tweetnacl/nacl-fast-light';
 import util from '../../../util';
 import enums from '../../../enums';
 import hash from '../../hash';
+import defaultConfig from '../../../config';
 
 nacl.hash = bytes => new Uint8Array(sha512().update(bytes).digest());
 
@@ -51,6 +52,20 @@ export async function sign(oid, hashAlgo, message, publicKey, privateKey, hashed
   }
   const secretKey = util.concatUint8Array([privateKey, publicKey.subarray(1)]);
   const signature = nacl.sign.detached(hashed, secretKey);
+  if (defaultConfig.checkEdDSAFaultySignatures && !nacl.sign.detached.verify(hashed, signature, publicKey.subarray(1))) {
+    /**
+     * Detect faulty signatures caused by random bitflips during `crypto_sign` which could lead to private key extraction
+     * if two signatures over the same message are obtained.
+     * See https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/issues/170.
+     * If the input data is not deterministic, e.g. thanks to the random salt in v6 OpenPGP signatures (not yet implemented),
+     * then the generated signature is always safe, and the verification step is skipped.
+     * Otherwise, we need to verify the generated to ensure that no bitflip occured:
+     * - in M between the computation of `r` and `h`.
+     * - in the public key before computing `h`
+     * The verification step is almost 2-3 times as slow as signing, but it's faster than re-signing + re-deriving the public key for separate checks.
+     */
+    throw new Error('Transient signing failure');
+  }
   // EdDSA signature params are returned in little-endian format
   return {
     r: signature.subarray(0, 32),